Chapter 1. Provisions Common to Courts

General Provisions

§§ 9-1-1 and 9-1-3. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§9-1-1. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 53, art. 8 (1); 1857, ch. 61, art. 4; 1871, § 878; 1880, § 2263; 1892, § 912; 1906, § 988; Hemingway’s 1917, § 708; 1930, § 731; 1942, § 1646; Laws, 1914, ch. 239]

§9-1-3. [Codes, 1880, §§ 2263, 2292; 1892, §§ 912, 933; 1906, §§ 988, 1009; Hemingway’s 1917, §§ 708, 729; 1930, § 732; 1942, § 1647; Laws, 1914, ch. 239]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-1-1 authorized the holding of special terms of courts.

Former §9-1-3 specified conditions under which the term of court could be extended without a special order, or by order entered on the minutes of the court.

§ 9-1-5. Extension into term in other county of same district.

In order to utilize the services of a judge temporarily assigned to chancery or circuit court in a county, the chancery or circuit court judge is authorized to extend a term of his court in one (1) county in a district, even if it overlaps into a term of that court in another county in the same district, so long as the term of court in the county into which the extension runs shall not be pretermitted. The Nineteenth Chancery Court District and the Eighteenth Circuit Court District are hereby excepted from the provisions of this section.

The word “county” wherever used herein shall be construed to mean “judicial district” in counties having two (2) judicial districts.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1647.5; Laws, 1970, ch. 327, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 3, 1970).

§ 9-1-7. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 53, art. 10 (4); 1857, ch. 61, art. 3; 1871, § 877; 1880, § 2266; 1892, § 915; 1906, § 991; Hemingway’s 1917, § 711; 1930, § 735; 1942, § 1650]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-1-7 provided that a change in the time or place of holding any court would not affect writs, process, bonds, recognizances, etc. issued or pending before the change.

§ 9-1-9. Adjourning if the judge be absent.

If the circuit judge or chancellor fail to attend at any term of the court, it shall stand adjourned from day to day until the third day, when, if the judge or chancellor shall not appear and open court, it shall stand adjourned without day; but, by virtue of a written order by the judge or chancellor, it may be adjourned by the clerk or sheriff to any day of the term, as the order may direct, and parties, witnesses and jurors must attend accordingly.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 54, art 2 (6); 1857, ch. 61, art. 6, ch. 62, art. 10; 1871, §§ 881, 984; 1880, § 2264; 1892, § 913; 1906, § 989; Hemingway’s 1917, § 709; 1930, § 733; 1942, § 1648.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts § 22.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 157-159.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Circuit court.

3. Chancery court.

1. In general.

Where the presiding judge of the court died during the term at which the defendant was indicted for murder and arraigned, and failed to sign any of the minutes of the term prior to his death, and during the interim before the appearance of the successor, the clerk of the court noted on the minutes thereof the judge’s absence and adjournment of court from day to day, and thereafter the duly appointed and qualified successor approved and signed the minutes of what transpired prior to the day on which he assumed the duties of the office, as reported by the clerk, overruling by such successor of a motion to quash the indictment, predicated on the lack of authority in such successor to sign the minutes of transactions taking place prior to his assumption of office, was proper. Grant v. State, 189 Miss. 341, 197 So. 826, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1940).

Appeal taken within six months after rendition of order overruling new trial held not barred, though motion made at November term was not acted on until following July term. Mayflower Mills v. Breeland, 168 Miss. 207, 149 So. 787, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 162 (Miss. 1933), overruled, Haralson v. State, 308 So. 2d 222, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1852 (Miss. 1975).

Court convened on a day other than that set by law, except as provided by this section. [Code 1942 § 1648], is not a legal court. Steverson v. McLeod Lumber Co., 120 Miss. 65, 81 So. 788, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1919).

This section [Code 1942 § 1648] provides for an adjourned session only if the judge be absent. Beard v. McLain, 117 Miss. 316, 78 So. 184, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1918).

2. Circuit court.

Order in effect adjourning regular term of circuit court to later day, pursuant to which sheriff and clerk adjourned court, held valid. Mississippi & S. V. R. Co. v. Brown, 160 Miss. 123, 132 So. 556, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1931).

Where circuit judge is unable to attend term of court on opening day or subsequent day, he may have order entered on minutes recessing court to future day during term. Perry v. State, 154 Miss. 459, 122 So. 744, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 164 (Miss. 1929).

Circuit judges have no authority to pretermit court terms, but they may be adjourned under statute. Ivey v. State, 154 Miss. 60, 119 So. 507, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 198 (Miss. 1928).

3. Chancery court.

Power of chancellor to authorize clerk or sheriff to adjourn court to later date exhausted when once exercised. Williams v. Simon, 135 Miss. 562, 99 So. 433, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1924).

Where the chancery court directed the clerk to adjourn the regular term on a designated day, a decree in a suit pending on the first day of the regular term, rendered on the adjourned day, was not rendered at a special term, but at an adjourned term. First Nat'l Bank v. Abe Block & Co., 82 Miss. 197, 33 So. 849, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 115 (Miss. 1903).

§ 9-1-11. Judge not to sit when interested or related.

The judge of a court shall not preside on the trial of any cause where the parties, or either of them, shall be connected with him by affinity or consanguinity, or where he may be interested in the same, or wherein he may have been of counsel, except by the consent of the judge and of the parties.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 53, art. 2 (186), ch. 54, art. 2 (7); 1857, ch. 61, art. 12, ch. 62, art. 7; 1871; § 986; 1880, § 2270; 1892, § 919; 1906, § 995; Hemingway’s 1917, § 715; 1930, § 736; 1942, § 1651.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A practicing attorney selected as a special judge for service on the Supreme Court may remain of counsel in all cases presently pending in the state and federal courts. However, pursuant to §9-1-25 which applies to any judge of the Supreme Court, a special judge may not be engaged in the practice of law and, therefore, may not practice in any of the state courts during his tenure as a special judge. A special judge may, pursuant to the same statute, practice in the federal courts in any case in which he or she was engaged when appointed. Hurst, May, 21, 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 04-0180.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Interest of judge in an official or representative capacity, or relationship of judge to one who is a party in an official or representative capacity, as disqualification. 10 A.L.R.2d 1307.

Relationship to attorney as disqualifying judge. 50 A.L.R.2d 143.

Disqualification of judge in contempt proceedings involving himself or court of which he is member. 64 A.L.R.2d 600.

Prior representation or activity as attorney or counsel as disqualifying judge. 72 A.L.R.2d 443.

Time for asserting disqualification of judge, and waiver of disqualification. 73 A.L.R.2d 1238.

Intervenor’s right to disqualify judge. 92 A.L.R.2d 1110.

Disqualification of judge because of his or another’s holding or owning stock in corporation involved in litigation. 25 A.L.R.3d 1331.

Disqualification of judge, justice of the peace, or similar judicial officer for pecuniary interest in fines, forfeitures, or fees payable by litigants. 72 A.L.R.3d 375.

Membership in fraternal or socil club or order affected by a case as ground for disqualification of judge. 75 A.L.R.3d 1021.

Prior representation or activity as prosecuting attorney as disqualifying judge from sitting or acting in criminal case. 16 A.L.R.4th 550.

Disqualification of judge in state proceedings to punish contempt against or involving himself in open court and in his actual presence. 37 A.L.R.4th 1004.

Disqualification of judge because of political association or relation to attorney in case. 65 A.L.R.4th 73.

Disqualification from criminal proceeding of trial judge who earlier presided over disposition of case of coparticipant. 72 A.L.R.4th 651.

Judge’s previous legal association with attorney connected to current case as warranting disqualification. 85 A.L.R.4th 700.

Substitution of judge in state criminal trial. 45 A.L.R.5th 591.

Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting Attorney as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case. 85 A.L.R.5th 471.

Disqualification of Judge for Having Decided Different Case Against Litigant – State Cases. 85 A.L.R.5th 547.

Laws governing judicial recusal or disqualification in state proceeding as violating federal or state constitution. 91 A.L.R.5th 437.

Construction of provision in Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 42(b) that if contempt charges involve disrespect to or criticism of judge, he is disqualified from presiding at trial or hearing except with defendant’s consent. 3 A.L.R. Fed. 420.

Disqualification of judge under 28 USCS § 455(b)(5)(iii), where judge or his or her spouse, or certain of their relatives, is known to have an interest that could be affected by the proceeding. 54 A.L.R. Fed. 855.

Disqualification of judge under 28 USCS § 455(b)(4), providing for disqualification where judge has financial or other interest in proceeding. 55 A.L.R. Fed. 650; 163 A.L.R. Fed. 575.

Am. Jur.

46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judges §§ 784 et seq.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Judges, Form 31.1 (Affidavit – In support of petition to disqualify judge – partiality of judge).

CJS.

48A C.J.S., Judges §§ 137, 138, 264-266, 290.

Practice References.

Young, Trial Handbook for Mississippi Lawyers § 2:5.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Relationship to parties.

3. Relationship to counsel for parties.

4. Relationship to victim of crime.

5. Interest in cause.

6. Prior interest in cause as counsel.

7. Consent.

8. Proceedings for disqualification.

1. In general.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mother’s motion for recusal as the appellate record did not identify any evidence under Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 165 or Miss. Code. Ann. §9-1-11 that would disqualify the trial judge. J.N.W.E. v. W.D.W., 922 So. 2d 12, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 489 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 926 So. 2d 922, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 2006).

Presumption is that judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased; to overcome presumption, evidence must produce reasonable doubt about validity of presumption. Hunter v. State, 684 So. 2d 625, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1996).

Judge is required to disqualify himself or herself if reasonable person, knowing all circumstances, would harbor doubts about his or her impartiality. Hunter v. State, 684 So. 2d 625, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1996); Dowbak v. State, 666 So. 2d 1377, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1996).

When judge is not disqualified by Constitution or statute, propriety of decision not to recuse himself or herself is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dowbak v. State, 666 So. 2d 1377, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1996).

In a proceeding for enforcement against the plaintiff of an oral settlement agreement allegedly reached regarding an automobile accident personal injury claim, the judge should have recused himself where he was present in the room during the critical settlement conference and was a witness to factual matters pertaining to the central issue of the credibility of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s witnesses. Collins v. Dixie Transport, Inc., 543 So. 2d 160, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 196 (Miss. 1989).

A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubt about his impartiality. Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So. 2d 952, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2594 (Miss. 1986).

The chancellor did not err in refusing to recuse himself in an action by county taxpayers protesting the issuance of tax anticipation notes by the county board of supervisors where he was not related to any of the parties, and was not otherwise interested in the cause of action. West v. Greene County Board of Supervisors, 368 So. 2d 1260, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2253 (Miss. 1979).

2. Relationship to parties.

Municipal court judge was publicly reprimanded because she committed judicial misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; the judge’s failure to recuse herself from a case involving a family member violated constitutional and statutory law. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Clinkscales, 192 So.3d 997, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 241 (Miss. 2016).

In a case alleging tortious interference with business relations, there was no error based on a trial judge’s failure to recuse himself under Miss. Unif. Cir. & Cty. R. 1.15 because the owners failed to raise the issue of alleged impartiality at the trial court level; the owners’ website showed that they knew of a grounds for recusal at the time of trial, and even if the owners had not been able to raise this issue before the trial judge, a reversal would still not have been granted because the judge was not connected to the objectors by affinity or consanguinity, and he had no interest in the outcome of the case based on vague allegations that the judge had eaten at the owners’ lodge. Bateman v. Gray, 963 So. 2d 1284, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 595 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

Trial judge was not required to disqualify himself under Miss. Const. Art. VI, § 165, Miss. Code Ann. §9-1-11, or Miss. Unif. Cir. & County Ct. Prac. R. 1.15 where there was no evidence that the trial judge was connected with the parties through marriage or blood and there was no evidence that the judge may have had an interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or that he was otherwise precluded by the statute; it was only in causes wherein the judge may have been of counsel that provided for disqualification. Hathcock v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 912 So. 2d 844, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 213 (Miss. 2005).

In an action against a school for injuries sustained by a five-year-old child, the trial judge did not err in failing to recuse himself based on the fact that he, as lead attorney, had cross-examined the child’s father as a medical expert witness in prior cases. Summers v. St. Andrew's Episcopal Sch., 759 So. 2d 1203, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 2000).

Defendant in capital murder trial was not prejudiced by trial judge’s denial of his motion for recusal, though trial judge’s former law firm had represented victim in divorce action, trial judge’s nephew who was member of same law firm represented victim’s estate and victim’s daughter, and victim’s daughter was witness against defendant at trial; there was nothing in manner trial judge presided over trial which indicated prejudice to defendant, and there was no evidence of any financial arrangements between trial judge and his former law firm. Hunter v. State, 684 So. 2d 625, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1996).

Where the prosecuting witness in a case brought under the “bad check” statute was his first cousin, the trial judge should have recused himself. Black v. State, 187 So. 2d 815, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1355 (Miss. 1966).

A trial judge should avoid sitting in a case where the sole prosecuting witness is a near relative who is interested in the outcome of the prosecution. Black v. State, 187 So. 2d 815, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1355 (Miss. 1966).

Judge is not disqualified to sit in a case unless connected with party by affinity or consanguinity, or pecuniarily interested. Cashin v. Murphy, 138 Miss. 853, 103 So. 787, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. 1925).

Chancellor whose wife had deposit in bank, and who had other relatives connected with it, disqualified in proceedings for receivership. Dodd v. Kelley, 107 Miss. 471, 65 So. 561, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Miss. 1914).

Justice of peace disqualified where first cousin was president of corporation, one of the parties. Nimocks v. McGehee, 97 Miss. 321, 52 So. 626, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 251 (Miss. 1910).

3. Relationship to counsel for parties.

Recusal was not required by fact that judge was brother-in-law of attorney retained to help defense with jury selection, where all parties agreed to judge’s continued service, judge did not act in bad faith or dishonestly, and jury was not informed of the relationship. Dowbak v. State, 666 So. 2d 1377, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1996).

A trial judge who was the brother of a senior partner in a law firm representing a principal defendant should have recused himself from the case because of the appearance of impropriety. Trial judges in such a situation, particularly where the judge has filed a notice of relationship and a motion has been made for recusal because of the close kinship, should grant the motion and decline to participate in the case. In re Moffett, 556 So. 2d 723, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1990).

A special chancellor in a divorce proceeding should have recused himself where both the chancellor and the husband had law offices in the same town, they had played golf together on several occasions and had had lunch together on one occasion, although, standing alone, the chancellor’s failure to recuse himself was not reversible error. Robinson v. Irwin, 546 So. 2d 683, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 321 (Miss. 1989).

A judge in a medical malpractice action should have recused himself in light of the fact that the judge’s brother was a senior partner in the law firm representing the defendant hospital, obviously a part of the medical community, coupled with allegations and testimony that the medical community in the county had assisted in electing the judge, since this would lead a reasonable person, with knowledge of the circumstances, to harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality. Jenkins v. Forrest County General Hosp., 542 So. 2d 1180, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 642 (Miss. 1988).

Judge is not disqualified from hearing homicide case on basis of fact that homicide defendant’s former attorney, against whom defendant has filed bar complaint, has at one time been law partner of judge. Ruffin v. State, 481 So. 2d 312, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2432 (Miss. 1985); Jenkins v. Forrest County General Hosp., 542 So. 2d 1180, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 642 (Miss. 1988).

Relationship to attorney not disqualification; suggestion of disqualification must be made before trial unless knowledge acquired subsequently. Shireman v. Wildberger, 125 Miss. 499, 87 So. 657, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 123 (Miss. 1921).

Relationship to attorney does not disqualify; “party” defined. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Standard Drug Co., 121 Miss. 510, 83 So. 676, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 1920).

However, a judge is disqualified where son and brother-in-law have taken case on contingent basis. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Kirk, 102 Miss. 41, 58 So. 710, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss.), modified, 102 Miss. 56, 58 So. 834 (Miss. 1912), limited, Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Standard Drug Co., 121 Miss. 510, 83 So. 676, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 1920).

4. Relationship to victim of crime.

In a prosecution for capital murder, the trial judge did not err in refusing to recuse himself under this section, on the grounds that he was a near relative of the victim, where the judge was at most a third or fourth cousin of the deceased and could not be considered a close relative and where the record reflected no bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. Coleman v. State, 378 So. 2d 640, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2542 (Miss. 1979); Jenkins v. Forrest County General Hosp., 542 So. 2d 1180, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 642 (Miss. 1988).

5. Interest in cause.

Postconviction relief was properly denied in a burglary case because the trial judge did nothing more than accept appellant’s plea and give the appropriate sentence; therefore, he did not get involved and there was no reason for him to recuse himself. Christie v. State, 915 So. 2d 1073, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 852 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and arson were proper where merely presenting a document which, testimony revealed, was inaccurate and written at the behest of defendant, was insufficient to establish that the judge had an interest in the outcome; defendant did not explain what benefit, other than to disqualify the judge, the testimony would have been to his case or how he was prejudiced by its absence. Payton v. State, 897 So. 2d 921, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 602 (Miss. 2003).

Judge is not disqualified to issue fiat for injunction restraining writ of execution against garnishee by mere fact that he rendered the judgment on which the garnishment was predicated. Campbell v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 199 Miss. 309, 24 So. 2d 531, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 199 (Miss. 1946).

Judge not disqualified to sit in case, unless connected with party by affinity or consanguinity, or pecuniarily interested. Cashin v. Murphy, 138 Miss. 853, 103 So. 787, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. 1925).

6. Prior interest in cause as counsel.

Trial judge abused his discretion in declining to recuse himself in a prosecution for aggravated assault and forcible rape of child, since he had served as county prosecuting attorney in an earlier youth-court shelter hearing regarding the child’s custody as a result of the events giving rise to the criminal charges, and 1) the threshold issue in that hearing was whether the complainant was an “abused child” under Miss. Code Ann. §43-21-105(m), which went to the heart of the issue of defendant’s guilt; 2) the judge might have personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the criminal case due to his participation in the youth-court shelter hearing. Miller v. State, 94 So.3d 1120, 2012 Miss. LEXIS 384 (Miss. 2012).

Because the judge appeared on behalf of the state as an assistant district attorney at the inmate’s plea colloquy he abused his discretion when he failed to recuse himself and ruled on the inmate’s post-conviction relief motion. Both due process and Miss. Code Ann. §9-1-11 required reversal of the dismissal of the inmate’s motion post conviction relief. Overstreet v. State, 17 So.3d 621, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 609 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

Because the judge appeared on behalf of the state as an assistant district attorney at the inmate’s plea colloquy he abused his discretion when he failed to recuse himself and ruled on the inmate’s post-conviction relief motion. Both due process and Miss. Code Ann. §9-1-11 required reversal of the dismissal of the inmate’s motion post conviction relief. Overstreet v. State, 17 So.3d 621, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 609 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

Defendant in capital murder trial was not prejudiced by trial judge’s denial of his motion for recusal, though trial judge’s former law firm had represented victim in divorce action, trial judge’s nephew who was member of same law firm represented victim’s estate and victim’s daughter, and victim’s daughter was witness against defendant at trial; there was nothing in manner trial judge presided over trial which indicated prejudice to defendant, and there was no evidence of any financial arrangements between trial judge and his former law firm. Hunter v. State, 684 So. 2d 625, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1996).

A circuit court judge should have recused himself in a medical malpractice action against a physician and a hospital where the judge had previously acted as counsel for the hospital, and the physician had been hired by the hospital during the time of the judge’s representation. Collins v. Joshi, 611 So. 2d 898, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 795 (Miss. 1992).

A judge would be disqualified from ruling on a defendant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (§§99-39-1 et seg.) where the judge was also the district attorney who signed the indictment. Moore v. State, 573 So. 2d 688, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 782 (Miss. 1990).

Evidence that a Supreme Court justice had served as Attorney General at the time the defendant was extradited from another state was insufficient to overcome the presumption that the justice was qualified and unbiased, where the justice had no personal involvement in or actual knowledge of the defendant’s case while he was Attorney General, the Office of Attorney General exercised no responsibility in the defendant’s trial, the involvement of the Office of Attorney General in the actual extradition of the defendant was minimal, and the Attorney General’s entrance into the case arose after being noticed by the filing of the defendant’s appeal which occurred only one week prior to the justice’s departure from the Office of Attorney General. Turner v. State, 573 So. 2d 657, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 792 (Miss. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910, 111 S. Ct. 1695, 114 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2522 (U.S. 1991).

A judge who had served as the prosecutor at the time of the defendant’s indictment should have disqualified himself; the very functions involved in the performance of the positions of judge and prosecutor are contradictory and no person can be considered to be impartial while that person is also acting as a partisan. Since the judge failed to disqualify himself, the defendant was deprived of due process, which includes a fair and impartial trial. Jenkins v. State, 570 So. 2d 1191, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 701 (Miss. 1990).

Chancellor, who had represented one of the parties in 2 separate uniform reciprocal enforcement support act complaints in his official capacity as county attorney, was not required to disqualify himself in a child custody case. Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So. 2d 952, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2594 (Miss. 1986).

The statute does not disqualify a judge who had been the district attorney and had drawn the statutory indictment for murder upon which defendant was tried. Kirby v. State, 78 Miss. 175, 28 So. 846, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 104 (Miss. 1900).

Where the prisoner was tried and convicted, but his sentence was postponed, and the judge who tried the case went out of office, and one who had been consulted and retained as counsel for the state by the prosecuting attorney succeeded to the bench, the latter can pass sentence. Thomas v. State, 6 Miss. 20, 1840 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1840).

7. Consent.

Circuit judge, who as an assistant district attorney had participated in a suspect’s prosecution, was disqualified from ruling on the suspect’s motion for postconviction relief and should have recused himself because, even assuming that the suspect had effectively waived the judge’s disqualification to preside over his guilty plea hearing, that waiver did not extend to the postconviction proceeding, which was separate and distinct from the underlying criminal proceeding. Holmes v. State, 966 So. 2d 858, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 668 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

Denial of the mother’s motion to recuse the judge was proper where the mother brought up the issue of recusal of the judge after the case was decided against her; therefore, she effectively acquiesced to the judge hearing her case. Watts v. Watts, 854 So. 2d 11, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 143 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 859 So. 2d 392, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 378 (Miss. 2003).

Consent of parties presumed if qualifications of judge not questioned before final judgment, but objection may be made on motion for new trial if attorneys did not know of disqualification. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Kirk, 102 Miss. 41, 58 So. 710, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss.), modified, 102 Miss. 56, 58 So. 834 (Miss. 1912), limited, Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Standard Drug Co., 121 Miss. 510, 83 So. 676, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 1920).

8. Proceedings for disqualification.

While attorney may rightfully, in cases where he or she thinks judge’s relations would result to injury of defendant, move for recusation of judge, Supreme Court, in such case, will look to whole trial and pass upon questions on appeal in light of completed trial; every act and movement had during entire trial will be considered, and if Supreme Court is unable to find that rulings have been prejudicial to defendant, it will not reverse. Hunter v. State, 684 So. 2d 625, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1996).

When judge is not disqualified under constitutional or statutory provisions, propriety of his or her sitting is question to be decided by judge and is subject to review only in case of manifest abuse of discretion. Hunter v. State, 684 So. 2d 625, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1996).

Motion for new trial charging presiding judge with being unfair and partial, and charging him with political bias and race prejudice, and asking judge to recuse himself in order that movant might have a fair and competent judge, in absence of explanations, held contemptuous. Ex parte Redmond, 156 Miss. 582, 126 So. 485, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1930).

Ex parte affidavits inadmissible as evidence on recusation motion. Cashin v. Murphy, 138 Miss. 853, 103 So. 787, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. 1925).

Judge, attacked by recusation motion, may hear and determine it instead of surrendering bench to another to pass thereon. Cashin v. Murphy, 138 Miss. 853, 103 So. 787, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. 1925).

Suggestion of disqualification must be made before trial unless knowledge is acquired subsequently. Shireman v. Wildberger, 125 Miss. 499, 87 So. 657, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 123 (Miss. 1921).

§§ 9-1-13 through 9-1-15. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1989, ch. 587, § 7, eff from and after April 25, 1989 (became law without the Governor’s signature).

§9-1-13. [Codes, 1892, § 921; 1906, § 997; Hemingway’s 1917, § 717; 1930, § 738; 1942, § 1653; Laws, 1928, Ex. ch. 86; Laws, 1952, ch. 235; Laws, 1966, ch. 352, § 2; Laws, 1988, ch. 429, § 2]

§9-1-14. [En Laws 1983, ch. 518; Laws, 1986, ch. 504]

§9-1-15. [Codes, 1942, § 1653.5; Laws, 1968, ch. 313, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-1-13 permitted the commission of special judges to fill in for sick or disabled circuit judges, county judges, or chancellors.

Former §9-1-14 permitted the reactivation of retired chancery, circuit, or county judges in emergency situations.

Former §9-1-15 permitted the governor to appoint full-time replacement chancery and circuit judges for periods of extended disability of sitting judges.

For present similar provisions, see §9-1-105.

§ 9-1-17. Supreme Court, circuit, chancery and county courts and Court of Appeals may punish for contempt and refer certain persons for placement in restitution, house arrest or restorative justice center or program.

The Supreme, circuit, chancery and county courts and the Court of Appeals shall have power to fine and imprison any person guilty of contempt of the court while sitting, but the fine shall not exceed One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) for each offense, nor shall the imprisonment continue longer than thirty (30) days. If any witness refuse to be sworn or to give evidence, or if any officer or person refuse to obey or perform any rules, order, or judgment of the court, such court shall have power to fine and imprison such officer or person until he shall give evidence, or until the rule, order, or judgment shall be complied with.

At the discretion of the court, any person found in contempt for failure to pay child support and imprisoned therefor may be referred for placement in a state, county or municipal restitution, house arrest or restorative justice center or program, provided such person meets the qualifications prescribed in Section 99-37-19.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 53, art. 2 (177), ch. 54, art. 2 (48); 1857, ch. 61, art. 37, ch. 62, art. 4; 1871, §§ 538, 980; 1880, § 2273; 1892, § 923; 1906, § 999; Hemingway’s 1917, § 719; 1930, § 741; 1942, § 1656; Laws, 1928, ch. 42; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 10; Laws, 2009, ch. 367, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment added the last paragraph.

Cross References —

Authority of impaneling judge of state grand jury to punish for contempt as provided in this section, see §13-7-21.

Contempt for refusal to present books, records, or invoices reflecting transactions involving the purchase, gift, or sale of tobacco by persons subject to tax, see §27-69-35.

Disobedience of final order in consumer protection proceeding constituting contempt, see §75-24-17.

Court’s authority in proper cases to adjudge party in contempt, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 70.

Circuit Court may punish non-compliance with Uniform Circuit Court Rules as contempt, see Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 1.03.

Inapplicability of Mississippi Rules of Evidence in contempt proceedings, see Miss. R. Evid. 1101.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right to punish for contempt for failure to obey court order or decree either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous. 12 A.L.R.2d 1059.

Punishment of civil contempt in other than divorce cases by striking pleading or entering default judgment or dismissal against contemner. 14 A.L.R.2d 580.

Bail jumping after conviction, failure to surrender or to appear for sentencing, and the like, as contempt. 34 A.L.R.2d 1100.

Limitation statute applicable to criminal contempt proceedings. 38 A.L.R.2d 1131.

Necessity of affidavit or sworn statement as foundation for constructive contempt. 41 A.L.R.2d 1263.

Assaulting, threatening, or intimidating witness as contempt of court. 52 A.L.R.2d 1297.

Sufficiency of notice to, or service upon, contemnor’s attorney in civil contempt proceedings. 60 A.L.R.2d 1244.

Who may institute civil contempt proceedings. 61 A.L.R.2d 1083.

Published article or broadcast as direct contempt of court. 69 A.L.R.2d 676.

Court’s power to punish for contempt a child within the age group subject to jurisdiction of juvenile court. 77 A.L.R.2d 1004.

Use of affidavit to establish contempt. 79 A.L.R.2d 657.

Power to base separate contempt prosecutions or punishments on successive refusals to respond to same or similar questions. 94 A.L.R.2d 1246.

False or inaccurate report of judicial proceedings as contempt. 99 A.L.R.2d 440.

Circumstances under which one court can punish a contempt against another court. 99 A.L.R.2d 1100.

Delay in adjudication of contempt committed in the actual presence of court as affecting court’s power to punish contemnor. 100 A.L.R.2d 439.

Interference with enforcement of judgment in criminal or juvenile delinquent case as contempt. 8 A.L.R.3d 657.

Release of information concerning forthcoming or pending trial as ground for contempt proceeding or other disciplinary measures against member of the bar. 11 A.L.R.3d 1104.

Attack on judiciary as a whole as indirect contempt. 40 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Defense of entrapment in contempt proceedings. 41 A.L.R.3d 418.

Allowance of attorneys’ fees in civil contempt proceedings. 43 A.L.R.3d 793.

Failure of party or his attorney to appear at pretrial conference. 55 A.L.R.3d 303.

Attorney’s addressing allegedly insulting remarks to court during course of trial as contempt. 68 A.L.R.3d 273.

Conduct of attorney in connection with making objections or taking exceptions as contempt of court. 68 A.L.R.3d 314.

Refusal to answer questions before state grand jury as direct contempt of court. 69 A.L.R.3d 501.

Power of court to impose standard of personal appearance or attire. 73 A.L.R.3d 353.

Right of injured party to award of compensatory damages or fine in contempt proceedings. 85 A.L.R.3d 895.

Oral court order implementing prior written order or decree as independent basis of charge of contempt within contempt proceedings based on violation of written order. 100 A.L.R.3d 889.

Attorney’s failure to attend court, or tardiness, as contempt. 13 A.L.R.4th 122.

Judgment in favor of plaintiff in state court action for defendant’s failure to obey request or order to answer interrogatories or other discovery questions. 30 A.L.R.4th 9.

Attorney’s use of objectionable questions in examination of witness in state judicial proceeding as contempt of court. 31 A.L.R.4th 1279.

Failure to rise in state courtroom as constituting criminal contempt. 38 A.L.R.4th 563.

Intoxication of witness or attorney as contempt of court. 46 A.L.R.4th 238.

Divorce: propriety of using contempt proceeding to enforce property settlement award or order. 72 A.L.R.4th 298.

Abuse or misuse of contempt power as ground for removal or discipline of judge. 76 A.L.R.4th 982.

Contempt: state court’s power to order indefinite coercive fine or imprisonment to exact promise of future compliance with court’s order-anticipatory contempt. 81 A.L.R.4th 1008.

Attorney’s argument as to evidence previously ruled inadmissible as contempt. 82 A.L.R.4th 886.

Holding jurors in contempt under state law. 93 A.L.R.5th 493.

Violation of automatic stay provisions of 1978 Bankruptcy Code (11 USCS § 362) as contempt of court. 57 A.L.R. Fed. 927.

Attorney’s conduct as justifying summary contempt order under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.58 A.L.R. Fed. 22.

Participation of private counsel for beneficiary of court order allegedly violated by defendant, in prosecution of federal criminal contempt proceeding. 96 A.L.R. Fed. 519.

Am. Jur.

17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contempt §§ 203 et seq.

CJS.

17 C.J.S., Contempt §§ 69 et seq.

Practice References.

Young, Trial Handbook for Mississippi Lawyers §§ 5:1, 5:4-5:6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Contempt, what constitutes.

3. —Constructive contempt.

4. Rights of defendant.

5. Proceedings for contempt.

6. —Information.

7. —Evidence.

8. —Judgment.

9. —Review.

1. In general.

Chancery court could hold a mother in contempt pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §9-1-17 because her failure to pay her portion of a car lease constituted a direct violation of the chancery court’s order. Mercier v. Mercier, 11 So.3d 1283, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 365 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

Where a decedent’s daughter was held in contempt for failing to inventory and turn over to decedent’s wife all assets in her possession that belonged to the decedent’s estate, the contempt was civil and not criminal because: (1) the contempt order’s primary purpose was to enforce the wife’s rights to possess the decedent’s property, and (2) the daughter had been ordered not to pay a fine to the court, but only to pay the wife’s attorney’s fees. Fisher v. Patton (In re Estate of Patton), 971 So. 2d 1281, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 10 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

The limits of the statute apply only where the sanction is imposed for direct contempt; the limits do not apply to constructive contempt. Wyssbrod v. Wittjen, 798 So. 2d 352, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 2001).

It was proper for a chancellor to find a father not in contempt for failure to pay the full amount of child support required where the father filed for a modification of child support before the children’s mother filed the motion for contempt concerning the arrearage in child support payments. Thurman v. Thurman, 559 So. 2d 1014, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 185 (Miss. 1990).

A petition to hold a county board of supervisors in contempt for failure to comply with a consent decree was a petition for criminal contempt rather than civil contempt, where the alleged contempt did not consist of the defendants refusing to do any affirmative act required but rather doing that which had been prohibited, and the petition recited that prior acts of the defendants justified an increase in previously imposed criminal sanctions “in order to deter such defendants from further violations.” Common Cause of Mississippi v. Smith, 548 So. 2d 412, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 362 (Miss. 1989).

The indemnitor of surety company, which had furnished payment and performance bonds in connection with construction contracts, held in civil contempt for refusal to comply with decree of state chancery court requiring him to provide financial statements and disclose the whereabouts of his assets, and whose refusal was based on the ground that compliance with the decree would result in self-incrimination under the fourth and fifth amendments to the federal constitution, was directed to furnish the required information if granted immunity from prosecution under state criminal statutes. Morgan v. Thomas, 448 F.2d 1356, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 8009 (5th Cir. Miss. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920, 92 S. Ct. 948, 30 L. Ed. 2d 790, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 3636 (U.S. 1972).

This section [Code 1942 § 1656] does not apply to the scope of punishment for contempt occurring while the court is not sitting, the applicable section under these circumstances is Code 1942, § 2562, applying to offenses for which a penalty is not provided elsewhere by statute. Melvin v. State, 210 Miss. 132, 48 So. 2d 856, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 329 (Miss. 1950).

This section [Code 1942 § 1656] defines the extent of punishment only while the court is sitting, but it does not exclude the power to punish for contempt while the court is not sitting. Melvin v. State, 210 Miss. 132, 48 So. 2d 856, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 329 (Miss. 1950).

Contrition and apology serve only to ameliorate the offense of contempt and to mitigate the punishment. Brannon v. State, 202 Miss. 571, 29 So. 2d 916, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 319 (Miss. 1947).

Provision empowering the court to punish any person for breach of any decree or order of the court, by fine or imprisonment, or both, provides for criminal contempt, while a provision providing that, if any person refuses to obey or perform any order or judgment of the court, the court shall have power to fine and imprison him until the order or judgment is complied with, provides for civil or quasi criminal contempt; the order for imprisonment in the former case is for a past and completed act or omission, is punitory and must be suffered, and its purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the court; in the latter case the punishment is coercive and the contemnor may discharge himself by compliance with the terms of the decree violated, and its purpose is to compel obedience to its decrees. Evans v. Evans, 193 Miss. 468, 9 So. 2d 641, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1942).

2. Contempt, what constitutes.

Husband was not in contempt for failure to comply with a modified child support order; the order made it virtually impossible for the husband to be held in contempt by allowing him to estimate and subtract college expenses from the monthly support obligation during the summer months. Weeks v. Weeks, 29 So.3d 80, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 860 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

Husband was not in contempt for failing to provide a wife with evidence that he had complied with a previous order to maintain the wife as an irrevocable beneficiary on a life insurance policy, because the order only required him to maintain the coverage, not to provide her with proof of coverage. Weeks v. Weeks, 29 So.3d 80, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 860 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

Chancery court’s refusal to hold the husband in contempt was not error where the wife failed to show that he had not maintained a life insurance policy with her as an irrevocable beneficiary. Weeks v. Weeks, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 187 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2008), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 29 So.3d 80, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 860 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

Contemnor failed to comply with divorce decree, and a chancellor did not commit manifest error or abuse the chancery court’s discretion by incarcerating the contemnor, as the chancellor’s decision was supported by the record, which included the chancellor’s findings that the contemnor was not credible; further, the divorce decree was not ambiguous, so the contemnor’s argument that the contemnor could not obey because of the decree’s alleged vagueness was rejected. Stribling v. Stribling, 960 So. 2d 556, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 1 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

Through the court reporter’s repeated failure to complete trial transcripts in a timely manner, the court reporter had a serious negative effect on the efficiency of the court; pursuant to Miss. R. Governing Certified Ct. Reporters IX(A)(2), the court reporter was in willful constructive criminal contempt of the Mississippi Supreme Court for his repeated failure to comply with its orders and the Supreme Court revoked his court reporter certification and ordered him to pay all costs of the the contempt proceedings, including attorney’s fees and court reporter’s fees. In re Hoppock, 849 So. 2d 1275, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 342 (Miss. 2003).

A chancellor was “manifestly in error” when he found a mother in contempt of court for effectively curtailing the father’s court-ordered visitation rights with the parties’ daughter by moving to Alaska. The mother never ignored an order of the court since there was nothing in the court order that restricted her from moving to another state. Stevison v. Woods, 560 So. 2d 176, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 205 (Miss. 1990).

A former husband was properly held in contempt of court for failure to pay his former wife monies due for insurance premiums under the parties’ original divorce decree, which provided that the former wife was to purchase insurance on behalf of the parties’ children and that the former husband was to reimburse the former wife for the premium allocated to the parties’ son, in spite of the former husband’s arguments that he had obtained health insurance on the children’s behalf and should be absolved of any responsibility to reimburse the former wife for any insurance she obtained; the divorce judgment required the former husband to reimburse the former wife for the son’s premiums, which the former husband failed to do. Stevison v. Woods, 560 So. 2d 176, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 205 (Miss. 1990).

A father was not in contempt for failure to pay child support under an automatic adjustment clause of a property settlement agreement where the agreement was uncertain in that a genuine dispute existed over the amount owed, over the commencement year of the escalation clause, and over which consumer price index was to be utilized. Wing v. Wing, 549 So. 2d 944, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 443 (Miss. 1989).

Direct criminal contempt is one which takes place in very presence of judge, making all elements of offense personal knowledge, and such may be summarily punished without affidavit, pleading, or formal charges, and no evidence or proof other than court’s own knowledge is required to punish such contempt. Varvaris v. State, 512 So. 2d 886, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2783 (Miss. 1987).

Appellant, who contended that certain household goods and an automobile which had been in the possession of the deceased actually belonged to his wife and his principal, respectively, was not guilty of contempt by filing replevin action against the administratrix, in her individual capacity, to recover possession of the property while the estate was in process of administration. Ballew v. Case, 232 Miss. 183, 98 So. 2d 451, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 458 (Miss. 1957).

Contempt is complete when there is a deliberate purpose or calculation to corrupt administration of justice and that purpose or calculation is accompanied by definite overt act or declaration on part of contemnor, designed to carry that purpose or calculation into effect; and failure of design becomes immaterial, except as it may have some place in considering punishment to be inflicted. Jones v. State, 208 Miss. 762, 45 So. 2d 576, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1950).

One who attempts to bribe or influence decision of juror is guilty of contempt of court, regardless of whether act which constitutes contempt is committed in or out of presence of court, or whether juror is actually sworn on particular case or is only member of panel from which trial jury is to be selected. Jones v. State, 208 Miss. 762, 45 So. 2d 576, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1950).

Person is guilty of contempt of court when he approaches prospective juror, who has been summoned for trial of murder case, at juror’s home and advises juror that there are some things in favor of defendant that court will not permit to go to jury, that deceased had been running over defendant, but that fact would be kept from jury and if it wasn’t brought out juror should give defendant a break. Jones v. State, 208 Miss. 762, 45 So. 2d 576, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1950).

Where defendant, as a witness in a criminal prosecution, had the appearance of being intoxicated on the witness stand, was chewing gum and smoking a cigarette, and upon retiring from the witness stand faced the district attorney, and in close proximity to the judge’s bench, gritted his teeth at the district attorney and scowled at him in a hostile and threatening manner and said “I’ll see you when you come down,” conduct constituted contempt. Estes v. State, 192 Miss. 400, 6 So. 2d 132, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1942).

Any words or conduct which impedes, embarrasses, obstructs, defeats or corrupts the administration of courts of justice or which to a substantial degree is calculated, or would tend so to do, is a contempt and within the protection of the rule are included all those who are actually a part of the official personnel of the court and when the prohibited language or conduct has a real relation to the discharge by them of official functions appertaining to the court as a court, and so long as the protected person is acting in a lawfully authorized manner; and it is immaterial that the prohibited language or conduct had no successful eventuation. Estes v. State, 192 Miss. 400, 6 So. 2d 132, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1942).

The right of the court to enforce respect for itself begins where the right of the citizen to speak ends, and the line of demarcation is fixed at that point where that which is spoken or published is calculated to obstruct the functioning processes of the court or to impede or impair the efficiency of its machinery then in motion, it being immaterial whether the obstruction is by force, insult, persuasion or disobedience, whether committed by act or word, or whether it affects the judge, the grand or petit jury, or any person made part of its personnel by its process. Sullens v. State, 191 Miss. 856, 4 So. 2d 356, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 195 (Miss. 1941).

The citizens may reasonably criticize even the court or the judges thereof; and the exercise of this right may embarrass the particular functionary; it may depreciate the effectiveness of our legal procedure, yet so long as it pulls up short of the obstruction or impediment of the machinery of the court then in motion, it is free from interference by the court. Sullens v. State, 191 Miss. 856, 4 So. 2d 356, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 195 (Miss. 1941).

A newspaper article, stating that a good show was then being staged in the Hinds County Circuit Court room, that on the stage or screen it would be well worth the price of admission, and that statutes ought to provide an admission fee for court rooms when big human dramas were being staged to help in defraying court expenses, when viewed through the lens of the constitutional provision protecting freedom of speech, did not constitute contempt nor indicate any reasonable tendency to obstruct, embarrass or hinder the court in the proper exercise of its functions. Sullens v. State, 191 Miss. 856, 4 So. 2d 356, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 195 (Miss. 1941).

Filing motion for new trial is not contempt. Ex parte Redmond, 156 Miss. 582, 126 So. 485, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1930).

“Direct contempt” is language or conduct which interferes with orderly administration of justice, and may be an open insult in the presence of the court, or defiance or resistance of the court’s authority. Neely v. State, 98 Miss. 816, 54 So. 315, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 128 (Miss. 1910).

Being in the courtroom while drunk does not constitute contempt where judge knows nothing about it and there is no interference with the court. Neely v. State, 98 Miss. 816, 54 So. 315, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 128 (Miss. 1910).

3. —Constructive contempt.

Through the court reporter’s repeated failure to complete trial transcripts in a timely manner, the court reporter had a serious negative effect on the efficiency of the court; pursuant to Miss. R. Governing Certified Ct. Reporters IX(A)(2), the court reporter was in willful constructive criminal contempt of the Mississippi Supreme Court for his repeated failure to comply with its orders and the Supreme Court revoked his court reporter certification and ordered him to pay all costs of the the contempt proceedings, including attorney’s fees and court reporter’s fees. In re Hoppock, 849 So. 2d 1275, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 342 (Miss. 2003).

The limits of this section upon the punishment that may be imposed for direct contempt of court are inapplicable to a constructive contempt. Wood v. State, 227 So. 2d 288, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1343 (Miss. 1969).

Misrepresentations and disrespectful language contained in a bill of exceptions constitute only a constructive, and not a direct, contempt of court. Wood v. State, 227 So. 2d 288, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1343 (Miss. 1969).

Where a defendant, found to have committed constructive contempt, was sentenced to six months confinement, and to pay a $500 fine, the offense of which he was convicted was petty, and the court did not commit error in refusing to grant the defendant a trial by jury. Hinton v. State, 222 So. 2d 690, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1551 (Miss. 1969).

This section [Code 1942 § 1656], in referring to direct contempt, does not exclude the power to punish for constructive contempt. Evers v. State, 241 Miss. 560, 131 So. 2d 653, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 374 (Miss. 1961).

To warrant a conviction for constructive contempt the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the alleged contemnor would have a reasonably real and substantial tendency to impede the administration of justice. Evers v. State, 241 Miss. 560, 131 So. 2d 653, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 374 (Miss. 1961).

Constructive contempts of court are confined to cases pending at the time of the publication, and a case decided cannot be considered pending because it is subject to be reopened by the court before the end of the term. Evers v. State, 241 Miss. 560, 131 So. 2d 653, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 374 (Miss. 1961).

A statement to the press, after a conviction and sentence of another, characterizing the conviction as “a mockery of justice”, “in a courtroom of segregationists apparently resolved to put [defendant, a Negro] legally away”, held not to constitute constructive contempt. Evers v. State, 241 Miss. 560, 131 So. 2d 653, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 374 (Miss. 1961).

Evidence that the accused, who had not on any prior occasion been before a court, was in the witness room when another witness came in and announced that the case “was off,” whereupon the accused went home and failed to appear at trial time the next morning, but, upon being brought into the court room within 45 minutes, after an attachment was issued, stated that he did not act intentionally, was not sufficient to prove that the accused was guilty of constructive criminal contempt. Ridgeway v. State, 232 Miss. 588, 100 So. 2d 99, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 307 (Miss. 1958).

This section [Code 1942 § 1656] defines the extent of the punishment only while the court is sitting, but it does not exclude the power to punish for contempt while the court is not sitting, and the power to deal with constructive contempts is derived from the inherent power of the court. Young v. State, 230 Miss. 525, 93 So. 2d 452, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 393 (Miss. 1957).

Conduct of defendant which is calculated to influence juror interfering with proper function of jury as part of court, and shows intention to obstruct justice is constructive contempt of court. Yarber v. State, 208 Miss. 806, 45 So. 2d 596, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1950).

Defendant is guilty of constructive contempt of court, when, knowing that juror was on special venire to try criminal case, defendant went to juror’s home at night and told juror that he was friend of man to be tried, that his friend had made mistake and if juror would be as light on him as he possibly could without doing anything he thought he should not do, friend would try to repay juror some way or other. Yarber v. State, 208 Miss. 806, 45 So. 2d 596, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1950).

Constructive contempt is any act done which tends to impede, degrade, obstruct, embarrass, interrupt, defeat or corrupt the administration of justice when the act is done beyond the presence of the court. Brannon v. State, 202 Miss. 571, 29 So. 2d 916, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 319 (Miss. 1947); Jones v. State, 208 Miss. 762, 45 So. 2d 576, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1950).

Defendant may be punished for constructive contempt although liable to criminal prosecution for his acts. Durham v. State, 97 Miss. 549, 52 So. 627, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1910).

4. Rights of defendant.

Defendant’s due process rights were not violated by a contempt conviction because a trial court, even though not required for direct contempt, gave defendant notice and conducted a hearing where she was allowed to present evidence. In re Hampton, 919 So. 2d 949, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss.), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1131, 126 S. Ct. 2042, 164 L. Ed. 2d 784, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 3868 (U.S. 2006).

Inability to pay to avoid incarceration is a continuing defense to civil contempt since imprisonment does not accomplish the purpose of the civil contempt decree, but merely punishes. A litigant may be incarcerated for civil contempt for failure to pay a judgment but that litigant is always entitled to offer evidence of inability to pay as a defense, not to the contempt, but to the incarceration. Thus, when a chancellor suspended a contemnor’s incarceration and granted her an additional month to pay the judgment, the suspension carried with it the right of the contemnor prior to the hearing to determine whether or not she should be incarcerated and an opportunity to again offer proof on the defense to the incarceration of inability to pay, and it was reversible error for the chancellor to refuse to hear such proof. Stewart v. Wilkinson, 566 So. 2d 210, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 482 (Miss. 1990).

Individual held in prison for civil contempt was improperly held without being afforded opportunity to prove present inability to pay. defendant may avoid judgment of contempt by establishing that he is without present ability to discharge obligation, he has burden of proving his inability to pay, and such showing must be made with particularity and not in general terms. Where contemnor is unable to pay, even if that present inability is due to his misconduct, imprisonment cannot accomplish purpose of civil contempt decree, which is to compel obedience. Jones v. Hargrove, 516 So. 2d 1354, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2950 (Miss. 1987).

As a matter of due process, a defendant who, during the course of representing himself in a state prosecution, repeatedly engaged in disruptive conduct and denounced, insulted and slandered the trial judge, was entitled to a public trial before another judge on criminal contempt charges entered at the conclusion of the trial, and the trial judge erred in pronouncing the defendant guilty of 11 criminal contempts and sentencing him to 11 to 22 years thereon, after a jury verdict of guilty in the criminal trial, since marked personal feelings were evident on both sides. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S. Ct. 499, 27 L. Ed. 2d 532, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 89 (U.S. 1971).

Where defendant was arrested in October 1948, and he was arraigned at the following November term of county court, at which time he waived a trial by jury but there was a six-month delay between his arraignment and trial in May, 1949, the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion erred in not granting the defendant a trial by jury. Newton v. State, 211 Miss. 644, 52 So. 2d 488, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 394 (Miss. 1951).

Defendant in contempt is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, cannot be compelled to testify against himself, and is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Ramsay v. Ramsay, 125 Miss. 715, 88 So. 280, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 157 (Miss. 1921).

Punitive sentence may be imposed only after opportunity to defend. Ramsay v. Ramsay, 125 Miss. 715, 88 So. 280, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 157 (Miss. 1921).

Defendant not entitled to jury in contempt proceeding. O'Flynn v. State, 89 Miss. 850, 43 So. 82, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 1906).

5. Proceedings for contempt.

The determination of punishment for contempt-fine, imprisonment, both, or neither-is within the discretion of the chancellor; while §9-1-17 provides that all state courts have the power to imprison any person guilty of contempt, a court is not required to incarcerate any person found in contempt of court. Gebetsberger v. East, 627 So. 2d 823, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 532 (Miss. 1993).

Even where there has been established a prima facie case of contempt, the contemnor may avoid judgment of contempt by establishing that he or she is without present ability to discharge the obligation; if the contemnor raises this as a defense, he or she has the burden of proving his or her inability to pay, and this showing must be made with particularity. Gebetsberger v. East, 627 So. 2d 823, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 532 (Miss. 1993).

Only court contemned has jurisdiction to punish contemnor. Contempt was against Chancery Court of Lowndes County, and not Washington County, where Lowndes Chancery Judges recused themselves from cause, and Chancery Judge from Washington County was designated special judge to hear cause; contempt is affront to court, and not to judge as individual. Culpepper v. State, 516 So. 2d 485, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2957 (Miss. 1987).

A state trial judge in whose courtroom a contemptuous act was allegedly committed by a civil rights worker, should recuse himself from hearing any later proceedings in the matter of the contempt charge, where it was said in affidavits submitted that the judge had previously made intemperate remarks concerning civil rights litigation generally, and where the judge had been a losing defendant in a civil rights suit filed by the alleged contemnor. Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 91 S. Ct. 1778, 29 L. Ed. 2d 423, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 35 (U.S. 1971).

A trial judge can only adjudge a witness in contempt and punish him for false swearing where he finds the witness guilty as a result of his own personal or judicial knowledge of the facts in regard to which the testimony has been given and knows beyond a reasonable doubt that the witness has wilfully and corruptly sworn falsely; otherwise, the procedure prescribed by Code 1942 § 2479, should be followed. McInnis v. State, 202 Miss. 715, 32 So. 2d 444, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 334 (Miss. 1947).

Contempt of court, based on attempt to intimidate witness, is offense against state, and prosecution must be in name of and on behalf of public. Prine v. State, 143 Miss. 231, 108 So. 716, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1926).

Statutes regulating venue of criminal trials generally not applicable to contempt proceedings. Prine v. State, 143 Miss. 231, 108 So. 716, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1926).

Proper procedure, where accused was charged by information with attempted bribery of witness, was taken by citing him, having him answer the charge, and then taking testimony offered in the matter. Durham v. State, 97 Miss. 549, 52 So. 627, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1910).

6. —Information.

Information for contempt need not conclude against peace and dignity of state. Prine v. State, 143 Miss. 231, 108 So. 716, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1926).

Information for contempt held not void because of failure to state venue. Prine v. State, 143 Miss. 231, 108 So. 716, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1926).

Information for contempt held sufficient. Prine v. State, 143 Miss. 231, 108 So. 716, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1926).

7. —Evidence.

In wife’s contempt action against former husband, the wife presented no evidence that the husband issued 23 checks for child support, which the wife did not present to the bank for months, with fraudulent intent; rather, the record showed the wife rebuffed the husband’s efforts to make good on the checks, and wanted to file another complaint causing the husband yet more financial problems and emotional distress, and the wife was properly held in contempt. Broome v. Broome, 832 So. 2d 1247, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 858 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

Lower court judge’s ruling finding defendant in direct criminal contempt was proper, although judge admitted that he did not hear exactly what was said prior to defendant’s outburst of profanity, but did state that statements of defendant were directed assistant district attorney; court rejected defendant’s contention that all evidence presented at hearing indicated that defendant was merely repeating words which policeman said to his son upon his arrest, placing much emphasis on fact that state put no one on stand to refute testimony except assistant district attorney who simply stated that words spoken were directed to another assistant district attorney. Varvaris v. State, 512 So. 2d 886, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2783 (Miss. 1987).

Trial court did not have sufficient facts before it to properly issue contempt order where Supreme Court’s review of record revealed no clear and explicit evidence that order placing defendants in contempt of court was well taken, and judgment of conviction did not contain material facts known to court constituting contempt. Mississippi Asso. of Educators v. Trustees of Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 510 So. 2d 123, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2439 (Miss. 1987).

In civil contempt cases the weight and sufficiency of the evidence must be clear and convincing, and not beyond a reasonable doubt, as required in criminal cases. Masonite Corp. v. International Woodworkers of America, 206 So. 2d 171, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1242 (Miss. 1967).

Sworn answer in constructive contempt proceedings does not preclude court from receiving evidence therein. O'Flynn v. State, 89 Miss. 850, 43 So. 82, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 1906).

8. —Judgment.

It was no error to imprison a father for not paying attorney’s fees ordered in contempt proceedings because (1) Miss. Code Ann. §9-1-17 gave a chancellor such authority, and (2) the father could have avoided a contempt finding by showing inability to pay with particularity. Vincent v. Rickman, 167 So.3d 245, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 125 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).

Attorney fees, witness fees, and court reporter fees were properly imposed against an attorney who failed to attend a court-ordered hearing; she was properly fined and ordered to serve jail time under Miss. Code Ann. §9-1-17 for direct contempt, and the fees were awarded in a bifurcated proceeding. In re Hampton, 919 So. 2d 949, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss.), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1131, 126 S. Ct. 2042, 164 L. Ed. 2d 784, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 3868 (U.S. 2006).

In direct contempt, judgment of conviction should contain material facts known to court constituting contempt. Ex parte Redmond, 156 Miss. 582, 126 So. 485, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1930).

Judgment, in effect reciting court found respondent guilty of contempt, but leaving time and manner to conjecture, could not be maintained. Ex parte Redmond, 156 Miss. 582, 126 So. 485, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1930).

9. —Review.

A chancellor was without authority to give defendants fixed jail sentences and fines, having found the defendants guilty of civil contempt but not criminal contempt and, therefore, the sentences and fines had to be reversed, even though the chancellor was manifestly wrong in finding the defendants not guilty of criminal contempt, since the Supreme Court was powerless to reverse on the chancellor’s finding of not guilty of criminal contempt. Hinds County Bd. of Supervisors v. Common Cause of Mississippi, 551 So. 2d 107, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 719 (Miss. 1989).

Where the employer’s petition for citation of contempt for violation of a temporary injunction charged that the labor union and its officials had failed and refused to direct the union members to cease participating in a work stoppage and to return to work, the charge was one of civil contempt and the employer was entitled to appeal from a decree of the chancery court which found the defendants were not guilty. Masonite Corp. v. International Woodworkers of America, 206 So. 2d 171, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1242 (Miss. 1967).

On appeals from a judgment for contempt of court, the Supreme Court will decide for itself the question of contempt. Evers v. State, 241 Miss. 560, 131 So. 2d 653, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 374 (Miss. 1961).

In an appeal from a contempt conviction, the Supreme Court is not held to the rule that it will not reverse unless the chancellor is manifestly wrong, but is empowered to review the case and decide whether there has been an actual contempt of court. Ballew v. Case, 232 Miss. 183, 98 So. 2d 451, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 458 (Miss. 1957).

Court’s knowledge in contempt case should be reflected in judgment for purposes of review. Ex parte Redmond, 156 Miss. 582, 126 So. 485, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1930).

Judgment for contempt should be clear and explicit to constitute res judicata, and warrant appellate court in affirming, reversing, annulling, or modifying it. Ex parte Redmond, 156 Miss. 582, 126 So. 485, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1930).

In proceeding for direct contempt, contemnor should be permitted to make statement and apology, and courteously state views to have them incorporated in bill of exceptions. Ex parte Redmond, 156 Miss. 582, 126 So. 485, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1930).

If witness, after testifying in murder case, committed for contempt in presence of jury, reversal will be proper. Walker v. State, 143 Miss. 421, 108 So. 899, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1926).

Request of district attorney to hold witness for contempt, declined by court, not reversible error. Walker v. State, 143 Miss. 421, 108 So. 899, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1926).

Conviction for contempt of court based on attempted intimidation of witness not reversed because attempt failed. Prine v. State, 143 Miss. 231, 108 So. 716, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1926).

§ 9-1-19. Authority of judges of supreme, circuit courts and chancellors and judges of Court of Appeals to grant remedial writs.

The judges of the Supreme and circuit courts and chancellors and judges of the Court of Appeals, in termtime and in vacation, may severally order the issuance of writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, supersedeas and attachments, and grant injunctions and all other remedial writs, in all cases where the same may properly be granted according to right and justice, returnable to any court, whether the suit or proceedings be pending in the district of the judge or chancellor granting the same or not. The fiat of such judge or chancellor shall authorize the issuance of the process for a writ returnable to the proper court or before the proper officer; and all such process or writs may be granted, issued and executed on Sunday.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 53, art. 6(5); 1857, ch. 61, art. 9, ch. 62, art. 3; 1871, §§ 533, 979; 1880, §§ 1904, 2267; 1892, § 916; 1906, § 992; Hemingway’s 1917, § 712; 1930, § 742; 1942, § 1657; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 11, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Cross References —

Relief under Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, see §§99-39-1 et seq.

Procedure for petitioning for remedial writs in supreme court, see Miss. R. App. P. 21.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Contempt: state court’s power to order indefinite coercive fine or imprisonment to exact promise of future compliance with court’s order-anticipatory contempt. 81 A.L.R.4th 1008.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Supersedeas.

3. Certiorari.

4. Coram nobis.

5. Prohibition.

6. Injunction.

7. Other writs and remedies.

1. In general.

The procedural availability of remedial writ is proper to promote judicial efficiency and economy with respect to determination of whether the defendant’s constitutional right to have trial conducted in the “county where the offense was committed,” which was waived at his first trial, may be reinstated after appellate reversal. State v. Caldwell, 492 So. 2d 575, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2531 (Miss. 1986).

No appeal may be taken from the court’s refusal to set aside a transfer made under this section [Code 1942 § 1657]. McMahan v. Adult Membership Boards of Phi Kappa, etc., 244 Miss. 692, 145 So. 2d 692, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 497 (Miss. 1962).

Appeal from transfer in vacation from a circuit to a chancery court held to have been improvidently granted. McMahan v. Adult Membership Boards of Phi Kappa, etc., 244 Miss. 692, 145 So. 2d 692, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 497 (Miss. 1962).

This section [Code 1942 § 1657], providing for remedial writs grantable by supreme and circuit judges, deals solely with original jurisdiction. Alexander v. Johnson, 165 Miss. 721, 138 So. 329, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 321 (Miss. 1931).

2. Supersedeas.

Where attempted appeal from order granting temporary injunction was abortive, Supreme Court judge could not grant writ of supersedeas under this section [Code 1942 § 1657]. Alexander v. Johnson, 165 Miss. 721, 138 So. 329, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 321 (Miss. 1931).

Supreme Court, on motion for supersedeas, will not pass on matters further than necessary to determine motion. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Jackson & E. R. Co., 129 Miss. 437, 91 So. 902, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 1922).

The terms of granting a supersedeas may be fixed by the judge who grants it. Kramer v. Holster, 55 Miss. 243, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1877).

3. Certiorari.

Writ of certiorari to review order of supervisors improperly issued because of failure to show good cause, held not void where judge had jurisdiction to issue it. Hamilton v. Long, 181 Miss. 627, 180 So. 615, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 103 (Miss. 1938).

4. Coram nobis.

Although the refusal by the circuit judge to issue a writ of coram nobis is not an appealable action the Supreme Court will consider the petition in banc in a regular term on its merits as being addressed to the inherent constitutional powers of the court in its revisory capacity with reference to a case pending before it. Wetzel v. State, 225 Miss. 450, 76 So. 2d 188, 76 So. 2d 194, 76 So. 2d 846, 78 So. 2d 774, 84 So. 2d 429, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 607, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 608, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 601, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 602, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 396, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 583 (Miss.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 870, 76 S. Ct. 121, 100 L. Ed. 770, 1955 U.S. LEXIS 244 (U.S. 1955).

Refusal of Supreme Court to grant an appeal from trial court’s refusal to grant writ of error coram nobis did not leave petitioner without further remedy, since petitioner could apply to judge of Supreme Court for such writ. Buckler v. State, 173 Miss. 350, 161 So. 683, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 224 (Miss. 1935).

Writ of error coram nobis may be granted by judges of Supreme Court, although trial judge refused to grant writ and although writ is not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, since writ is remedial. Buckler v. State, 173 Miss. 350, 161 So. 683, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 224 (Miss. 1935).

5. Prohibition.

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition. State v. Maples, 402 So. 2d 350, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2151 (Miss. 1981).

Writ of prohibition issued in vacation without notice by clerk of circuit court, on order of circuit judge of another district, forbidding supervisors to conduct election, held void and not to affect election. Hamilton v. Long, 181 Miss. 627, 180 So. 615, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 103 (Miss. 1938).

Writ of prohibition cannot be used to prevent prosecution for violation of valid ordinance. Hurley v. Corinth, 97 Miss. 396, 52 So. 695, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 264 (Miss. 1910).

One whose business has been closed under prosecution for violation of void ordinance has no other adequate remedy and is entitled to writ of prohibition. Crittenden v. Booneville, 92 Miss. 277, 45 So. 723, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 177 (Miss. 1908).

6. Injunction.

After the circuit court signed an order directing a chancery clerk to issue the injunction, the filing of the petition and order and the docketing of the case in the circuit court confers no jurisdiction on the circuit court. McMahan v. Adult Membership Boards of Phi Kappa, etc., 244 Miss. 692, 145 So. 2d 692, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 497 (Miss. 1962).

Chancery court has jurisdiction to hear in vacation application for a mandatory injunction. Stigall v. Sharkey County, 197 Miss. 307, 20 So. 2d 664, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 291 (Miss. 1945).

If chancellor of district having jurisdiction of receivership improperly refuses injunction writ, judge of Supreme Court on proper showing will issue writ to preserve status quo of case until chancellor passes on merits. Sullivan v. Hughes, 172 Miss. 744, 161 So. 316, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 184 (Miss. 1935).

7. Other writs and remedies.

This section (Code 1871 § 2267) does not confer upon the circuit court power to appoint a receiver in chancery. Alexander v. Manning, 58 Miss. 634, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 13 (Miss. 1881).

§ 9-1-21. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1974, ch. 328, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1974; and by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 1 (175); 1857, ch. 61, art. 14; 1871, § 537; 1880, § 2269; 1892, § 918; 1906, § 994; Hemingway’s 1917, § 714; 1930, § 743; 1942, § 1658]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-1-21 permitted judges of the circuit and county courts, as well as chancellors, to order writs of subpoena duces tecum in vacation.

§ 9-1-23. Judges conservators of peace; must reside in district.

The judges of the Supreme, circuit and county courts and chancellors and judges of the Court of Appeals shall be conservators of the peace for the state, each with full power to do all acts which conservators of the peace may lawfully do; and the circuit judges and chancellors shall reside within their respective districts and the county judges shall reside in their respective counties.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 15; 1871, § 532; 1880, § 2268; 1892, § 917; 1906, § 993; Hemingway’s 1917, § 713; 1930, § 740; 1942, § 1655; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 12, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

§ 9-1-25. Judges not to practice law.

It shall not be lawful for any judge of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or a judge of the circuit court, or a chancellor to exercise the profession or employment of an attorney or counsellor at law, or to be engaged in the practice of law; and any person offending against this prohibition shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor and be removed from office; but this shall not prohibit a chancellor or circuit judge or a judge of the Court of Appeals from practicing in any of the courts for a period of six (6) months from the time such judges or chancellors assume office so far as to enable them to bring to a conclusion cases actually pending when they were appointed or elected in which such chancellor or judge was then employed, nor shall a judge of the Supreme Court be hindered from appearing in the courts of the United States in any case in which he was engaged when he was appointed or elected judge.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 26, art. 3 (14); 1857, ch. 9, art. 4; 1871, § 2247; 1880, § 2401; 1892, § 213; 1906, § 219; Hemingway’s 1917, § 193; 1930, § 3696; 1942, § 8668; Laws, 1914, ch. 235; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 13, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Cross References —

Election and terms of chancellor, see §9-5-1.

Election and terms of judge of the circuit court, see §9-7-1.

County judges being prohibited from practicing law, see §9-9-9.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A judge has six months to bring to a conclusion any cases from their prior private practice pending at the time of their election or appointment as Chancellor. After that six month period has expired further representation of a client would result in violation of this Section. 1995 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 438.

The statute prohibits an attorney from representing new social security cases and new bankruptcy cases while serving as a Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court and also prevents the attorney from representing new federal cases in federal court. Easley, Jr., 2001 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 44.

The statute prohibits a Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court from practicing law before an administrative agency after assuming office; however, the Justice may appear in a federal court in a case in which he was engaged when elected or appointed to the Supreme Court. Easley, Jr., 2001 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 44.

A Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court may represent himself in a lawsuit in state courts as long as such representation does not constitute representation of any other party, individual, or entity, e.g., partnerships or professional corporations. Easley, Jr., 2001 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 44.

A Mississippi Supreme Court Justice is prohibited from practicing law after taking office with the exception of continuing any representation of clients whose cases are in a federal court; however, a Supreme Court Justice may represent himself in a matter by presenting a motion to a court for payment of services rendered prior to becoming a Supreme Court Justice. Easley, Jr., 2001 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 216.

Once an attorney has concluded his or her service as a special judge, the prohibition of this section would no longer apply. Therefore, the attorney may return to the practice of law in all cases in which the attorney was designated as counsel of record before his selection as special judge. The length of the appointment’s term does not change this conclusion. Hurst, May, 21, 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 04-0180.

A practicing attorney selected as a special judge for service on the Supreme Court may remain of counsel in all cases presently pending in the state and federal courts. However, pursuant to this section which applies to any judge of the Supreme Court, a special judge may not be engaged in the practice of law and, therefore, may not practice in any of the state courts during his tenure as a special judge. A special judge may, pursuant to the same statute, practice in the federal courts in any case in which he or she was engaged when appointed. Hurst, May, 21, 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 04-0180.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity and application of state statute prohibiting judge from practicing law. 17 A.L.R.4th 829.

Judge’s previous legal association with attorney connected to current case as warranting disqualification. 85 A.L.R.4th 700.

Removal or discipline of state judge for neglect of, or failure to perform, judicial duties. 87 A.L.R.4th 727.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Evidence.

3. Discipline.

1. In general.

Where a county judge had not willfully abused the privilege of filing new complaints while in office, the court adopted the commission’s recommendation that the judge be publicly reprimanded and that he be reinstated after his temporary suspension. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 876 So. 2d 324, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 780 (Miss. 2004).

Since, pursuant to Miss Const of 1890, § 175, the only action a grand jury can take after investigating the conduct of a public officer is to return a presentment or indictment, it was necessary to expunge from a grand jury report all references to the nonjudicial conduct of a judge whose indictment was barred by the statute of limitations. Petition of Moore, 336 So. 2d 736, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1520 (Miss. 1976).

2. Evidence.

Where a judge became involved in lease negotiations pertaining to a barge landing site for a county landfill, and advised one party to the lease on the benefits of dealing with the landfill and drafting the lease agreement himself, he violated Canons 1, 2 A, 2.B, 3 A(1), 3 C, 5 C(1) and 5 F, as well as §§9-1-25 and23-15-975. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Jenkins, 725 So. 2d 162, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 436 (Miss. 1998).

3. Discipline.

Where a judge breached the peace during the repossession of an automobile jointly owned by the judge’s wife and mother-in-law, his conduct violated Miss. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 1; the Supreme Court of Mississippi suspended him for 180 days without compensation. The judge had a pattern of misconduct, as he had been disciplined in the past for practicing law as a judge in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §§9-1-25, §9-9-9. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 977 So. 2d 314, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 2008).

§ 9-1-27. Officers pro tempore to be appointed in certain cases.

Whenever a vacancy shall exist in the office of clerk of any court, sheriff, or coroner and the vacancy shall not have been filled on or before the commencement of the term of any court which the clerk, sheriff, or coroner is required to attend, or if the clerk, sheriff, or coroner shall be absent, deceased, become unable, or refuse to discharge his duties, or be on trial therein, the court, or the judge or judges thereof, shall have power to appoint a suitable person to discharge the duties of clerk, sheriff, or coroner pro tempore, who shall take the oath required by law, and perform the duties and receive the emoluments of the office to which he is appointed, until the proper incumbent shall be duly qualified or return to his duties.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 27, class 2, art. 4, class 3, art. 1 (11); 1857, ch. 62, art. 14; 1871, § 983; 1880, § 2279; 1892, § 928; 1906, § 1004; Hemingway’s 1917, § 724; 1930, § 748; 1942, § 1663.

Cross References —

Appointment of a temporary coroner, see §9-1-27.

Appointment of a coroner pro tempore, see §41-61-57.

Business hours of the clerk’s office, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 77.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

When a sheriff is so ill as to be unable to perform his official duties, the circuit court may appoint a suitable person to discharge the sheriff’s duties until such time as the incumbent is able to return, and the county board may make a recommendation to the court in regard to such appointment. 2001 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 80.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

An appointment under the provisions of the act for the appointment of a clerk pro tempore in case the clerk should be at any time unable from sickness or any unavoidable cause to attend the court, is not limited to the term of the court. Cocke v. Halsey, 41 U.S. 71, 10 L. Ed. 891, 1842 U.S. LEXIS 348 (U.S. 1842).

The court has no authority to remove a clerk or suspend him (unless under the section [Code 1942 § 1663] as now amended he be on trial) from office except upon conviction for an offense which subjects him to removal. Ex parte Lehman, 60 Miss. 967, 1883 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1883).

§ 9-1-29. Court to control clerk’s office.

Each court shall have control over all proceedings in the clerk’s office, and such control shall be exercised in a manner consistent with the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 54, art. 2 (22); 1857, ch. 61, art. 26, ch. 62, art. 9; 1871, §§ 542, 982; 1880, § 2274; 1892, § 924; 1906, § 1000; Hemingway’s 1917, § 720; 1930, § 749; 1942, § 1664; Laws, 1978, ch. 425, § 2; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Clerks of Supreme Court, see §§9-3-13 et seq.

Clerks of chancery court, see §§9-5-131 et seq.

Clerks of circuit court, see §§9-7-121 et seq.

Administrative Office of Courts to assist court clerks, see §9-21-3.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Chancery Judge is not authorized to order employees to be provided to Office of Chancery Clerk. O’1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 605.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court §§ 22 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Clerks of Courts §§ 327, 328.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The circuit court has ample power to promulgate rules pertaining to appeals to it from the county court, and when its rules are not complied with the order dismissing the appeal will be affirmed, in the absence of evidence that this act constituted an abuse of the court’s discretion. Mississippi State Highway Com. v. McGrew, 206 So. 2d 334, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1572 (Miss. 1968).

Whether dismissal of bill on plaintiff’s request during last 1917 vacation was erroneous, properly presented by exceptions at January term 1918. Northern v. Scruggs, 118 Miss. 353, 79 So. 227, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1918).

§ 9-1-31. Records of office of clerk delivered to successor.

When the office of clerk of any court shall become vacant, the records, papers, books, stationery, and everything belonging thereto, shall be delivered to the successor in office by any person having the same, on demand; and if any person having such records, papers, books, stationery, or other things shall refuse to deliver the same on demand to the person entitled thereto, he shall be liable for all damages sustained by any person aggrieved thereby; and in case of a refusal or a detention of the same, or of any part thereof, after demand made, the court may compel the delivery thereof, by fine and imprisonment at discretion, for contempt of court; and the court, or judge in vacation, may order process to be issued for the seizure of such records, papers, books, stationery, and other things, and for the delivery thereof to the successor in office.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 27, class 2, art. 1 (14), class 3, art. 1 (12); 1857, ch. 61, art. 18, ch. 62, art. 18; 1871, §§ 555, 994; 1880, § 2280; 1892, § 929; 1906, § 1005; Hemingway’s 1917, § 725; 1930, § 754; 1942, § 1669.

§ 9-1-33. Minutes of Supreme Court, circuit, chancery and county courts and Court of Appeals.

The minutes of the proceedings of the Supreme, circuit, chancery and county courts and the Court of Appeals shall be entered by the clerk of each, respectively, in the minute book of the court, against the next sitting of the court, if practicable, when the same shall be read in open court; and when corrected shall be signed – the minutes of the Supreme Court by the Chief Justice or presiding judge, of the Court of Appeals by the Chief Judge or presiding judge, of the circuit court by the circuit judge, of the chancery court by the chancellor, and of the county court by the county judge; and on the last day of the term, or within ten (10) days thereafter, the minutes shall be drawn up, read and signed.

Whenever by inadvertence said minutes and proceedings may remain unsigned or the judge of said court dies before signing the minutes, the succeeding judge or judges of said court may, in their discretion, examine into said unsigned minutes and ascertain as to the correctness thereof, and after same shall have been read in open court, and if the court is of the opinion that same are true and correct, then the said minutes may be signed and adopted by said judge or judges.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1847, ch. 53, art. 2 (159), ch. 54, art. 2 (54); 1857, ch. 61, art. 23, ch. 62, art. 15; 1871, §§ 543, 991; 1880, § 2282; 1892, § 931; 1906, § 1007; Hemingway’s 1917, § 727; 1930, § 750; 1942, § 1665; Laws, 1962, ch. 307; Laws, 1980, ch. 393; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 14, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Cross References —

Maintenance of the minute book, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 79.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 24 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 246 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Signing minutes.

3. —Who may sign.

4. —Time for signing.

5. —Signing after term, effect of.

6. Impeachment of minutes.

7. —Evidence.

1. In general.

The day after rendition of a judgment at law is the date of the pronouncement of the judgment by the court at the conclusion of the trial and this day is determined by the entry of the judgment and the minutes of the court. Duncan v. Brock, 216 Miss. 406, 62 So. 2d 562, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 650 (Miss. 1953).

The date when a judgment is rendered is determined by the entry of the judgment on the minutes of the court. Johnson v. Mississippi Power Co., 189 Miss. 67, 196 So. 642, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 1940).

Order extending court term must be entered on minutes signed by judge before expiration of extended term. Watson v. State, 166 Miss. 194, 146 So. 122, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 335 (Miss. 1933).

Judgment is void where entered by the clerk 30 days after adjournment. Hammond-Gregg Co. v. Bradley, 119 Miss. 72, 80 So. 489, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 12 (Miss. 1918).

2. Signing minutes.

The proper interpretation of this section as now written is that the judgments or decrees rendered and entered on the unsigned minutes are either voidable or valid, as the case may be, depending on the determination of the judge or chancellor as to whether the minutes are correct and should be signed. Eubanks v. W. H. Hodges & Co., 207 So. 2d 640, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1626, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1627 (Miss. 1968).

Where the trial judge before the expiration of a term extended the same for an additional term during which the judgment of conviction in question was entered, and thereafter ordered a second extension, but he did not sign the minutes either during or on the last day of the regular term or at the beginning or ending of the first extended term, or for the second extended term, the judgment of conviction was invalid, under the decision in Jackson v. Gordon (1943) 194 Miss 268, 11 So. 2d 901; Patton v. State (1943) 194 Miss 757, 12 So. 2d 383; Tucker v. State (Miss. Ward v. State, 12 So. 2d 526 (Miss. 1943); Patton v. State, 12 So. 2d 537 (Miss. 1943); Bell v. State, 12 So. 2d 784 (Miss. 1943).

Order extending the regular term of court of a circuit court was invalid where the presiding judge did not sign the minutes day by day throughout the term, nor did he sign the minutes on the last day of the term, and a signing of the minutes thereafter was a signing thereof in vacation. Jackson v. Gordon, 194 Miss. 268, 11 So. 2d 901, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1943), but see, De La Beckwith v. State, 615 So. 2d 1134, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 807 (Miss. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 884, 114 S. Ct. 232, 126 L. Ed. 2d 187, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 5961 (U.S. 1993).

The duty of trial judge to sign minutes within term time is function which appertains to general administration of his office, and is not one which litigant is required to stand by and watch as to whether duty has been performed. Williams v. State, 179 Miss. 419, 174 So. 581, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1937).

Writing or entry on court’s minute book does not become part of minutes until they are read and signed by presiding judge. Watson v. State, 166 Miss. 194, 146 So. 122, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 335 (Miss. 1933).

3. —Who may sign.

Where a presiding judge, who died during the term, would have had the right to sign all the minutes of the term of the last day thereof, or at any time before the adjournment of the term, it necessarily followed that his successor in office was vested with the same power and authority where he was appointed and qualified before the adjournment of the term commenced by his predecessor. Grant v. State, 189 Miss. 341, 197 So. 826, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1940).

4. —Time for signing.

Signing by the presiding judge of the minutes at the end of an invalid extended term could not be considered as a correction of the minutes nunc pro tunc, since there is no right or authority in a presiding judge to sign the minutes of his court after the term has expired by operation of law and is in vacation. Jackson v. Gordon, 194 Miss. 268, 11 So. 2d 901, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1943), but see, De La Beckwith v. State, 615 So. 2d 1134, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 807 (Miss. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 884, 114 S. Ct. 232, 126 L. Ed. 2d 187, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 5961 (U.S. 1993).

While the entry of the minutes each day by the clerk of court against the next sitting of the court is contemplated, and is to be commended as good practice, it is not made mandatory that they shall be signed until the last day of the term, but it is mandatory that the same shall be signed before the adjournment of the court. Grant v. State, 189 Miss. 341, 197 So. 826, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1940).

Statutory provision that court’s minutes shall be drawn up, read, and signed on last day of term before adjournment is mandatory, and requires signature thereof before expiration of term fixed by law or order calling special term. Watson v. State, 166 Miss. 194, 146 So. 122, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 335 (Miss. 1933).

Presiding judge has no right to sign court minutes after term expires by operation of law. Watson v. State, 166 Miss. 194, 146 So. 122, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 335 (Miss. 1933).

5. —Signing after term, effect of.

Where the trial judge prior to the expiration of the term signed an order to extend the term, and thereafter signed another order for a second extension, but failed to sign the minutes either from day to day or at the end of the regular term, or at the beginning or ending of the first extended term, or for the second extended term, and his signature did not appear on the minutes when the validity of the proceedings were challenged during the second extended term, judgment of conviction entered during the first extended term was invalid. Patton v. State, 194 Miss. 757, 12 So. 2d 383, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1943); Tucker v. State, 12 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1943); Ward v. State, 12 So. 2d 526 (Miss. 1943); Patton v. State, 12 So. 2d 537 (Miss. 1943); Bell v. State, 12 So. 2d 784 (Miss. 1943).

Where circuit judge failed to sign any of minutes until after expiration of term, and therefore record did not legally show that any term of court had been held, defect could be raised for first time on appeal. Williams v. State, 179 Miss. 419, 174 So. 581, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1937).

Attempted extension of court term, at which defendant was indicted, by order entered on minutes not signed by presiding judge before expiration of term, was ineffective, and trial of defendant thereafter was nullity. Watson v. State, 166 Miss. 194, 146 So. 122, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 335 (Miss. 1933).

6. Impeachment of minutes.

Judicial record complete on its face not subject to impeachment; judgment rendered day court adjourned entered several days later on blank page in front of place where judge signed minutes finally adjourning the court, in absence of showing of irregularity or fraud such fact cannot be shown in chancery suit to declare the judgment void. Childress v. Carley, 92 Miss. 571, 46 So. 164, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 1908).

7. —Evidence.

Exclusion of circuit clerk’s testimony that court’s minutes, on which order was entered extending special term at which defendant was indicted, had not been signed when defendant’s objections to trial after expiration of such term were heard, held prejudicial error. Watson v. State, 166 Miss. 194, 146 So. 122, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 335 (Miss. 1933).

Circuit court minutes cannot be contradicted by parol. Williams v. State, 125 Miss. 347, 87 So. 672, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 1921).

Parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict the minutes as to date of adjournment. Jones v. Williams, 62 Miss. 183, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 46 (Miss. 1884).

The question of priority between two judgments in the same court is to be determined by the minutes and evidence aliunde is inadmissible to show that the one last entered was the first rendered. Johnson v. Edde, 58 Miss. 664, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 1881).

§ 9-1-35. Seal of court.

The clerk of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals, at the expense of the state, and the clerk of every circuit and chancery court, at the expense of the county, shall keep a seal, with the style of the court around the margin and the image of an eagle in the center.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 53, art. 2 (188), ch. 54, art. 2 (64); 1857, ch. 61, art. 19, ch. 62, art. 19; 1871, §§ 556, 1273; 1880, §§ 1410, 2275; 1892, § 925; 1906, § 1001; Hemingway’s 1917, § 721; 1930, § 752; 1942, § 1667; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 15, eff from and after date said ch. 518, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

§ 9-1-36. Office allowance for circuit judges, chancellors and certain staff; procedure to employ certain staff members; title to tangible property; reports; adoption of rules and regulations.

  1. Each circuit judge and chancellor shall receive an office operating allowance for the expenses of operating the office of the judge, including retaining a law clerk, legal research, stenographic help, stationery, stamps, furniture, office equipment, telephone, office rent and other items and expenditures necessary and incident to maintaining the office of judge. The allowance shall be paid only to the extent of actual expenses incurred by the judge as itemized and certified by the judge to the Supreme Court in the amounts set forth in this subsection; however, the judge may expend sums in excess thereof from the compensation otherwise provided for his office. No part of this expense or allowance shall be used to pay an official court reporter for services rendered to said court.
    1. Until July 1, 2008, the office operating allowance under this subsection shall be not less than Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) nor more than Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00) per annum.
    2. From and after July 1, 2008, the office operating allowance under this subsection shall be Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00) per annum.
  2. In addition to the amounts provided for in subsection (1), there is hereby created a separate office allowance fund for the purpose of providing support staff to judges. This fund shall be managed by the Administrative Office of Courts.
  3. Each judge who desires to employ support staff after July 1, 1994, shall make application to the Administrative Office of Courts by submitting to the Administrative Office of Courts a proposed personnel plan setting forth what support staff is deemed necessary. The plan may be submitted by a single judge or by any combination of judges desiring to share support staff. In the process of the preparation of the plan, the judges, at their request, may receive advice, suggestions, recommendations and other assistance from the Administrative Office of Courts. The Administrative Office of Courts must approve the positions, job descriptions and salaries before the positions may be filled. The Administrative Office of Courts shall not approve any plan which does not first require the expenditure of the funds in the support staff fund for compensation of any of the support staff before expenditure is authorized of county funds for that purpose. Upon approval by the Administrative Office of Courts, the judge or judges may appoint the employees to the position or positions, and each employee so appointed will work at the will and pleasure of the judge or judges who appointed him but will be employees of the Administrative Office of Courts. Upon approval by the Administrative Office of Courts, the appointment of any support staff shall be evidenced by the entry of an order on the minutes of the court. When support staff is appointed jointly by two (2) or more judges, the order setting forth any appointment shall be entered on the minutes of each participating court.
  4. The Administrative Office of Courts shall develop and promulgate minimum qualifications for the certification of court administrators. Any court administrator appointed on or after October 1, 1996, shall be required to be certified by the Administrative Office of Courts.
  5. Support staff shall receive compensation pursuant to personnel policies established by the Administrative Office of Courts; however:
    1. From and after July 1, 1994, the Administrative Office of Courts shall allocate from the support staff fund an amount of Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00) per fiscal year per judge for whom support staff is approved for the funding of support staff assigned to a judge or judges; and
    2. From and after July 1, 2008, the Administrative Office of Courts shall allocate from the support staff fund an amount of Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00), in addition to the amount provided in paragraph (a). Of the amount provided in this paragraph (b), each judge shall utilize an amount sufficient to ensure that judge has access to the services of a law clerk, whether hired by the judge separately or in concert with another judge. Any excess funds remaining upon satisfaction of this requirement may be used for any other support staff as defined in this section. Any employment pursuant to this subsection shall be subject to the provisions of Section 25-1-53.

      The Administrative Office of Courts may approve expenditure from the fund for additional equipment for support staff appointed pursuant to this section in any year in which the allocation per judge is sufficient to meet the equipment expense after provision for the compensation of the support staff.

  6. For the purposes of this section, the following terms shall have the meaning ascribed herein unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
    1. “Judges” means circuit judges and chancellors, or any combination thereof;
    2. “Support staff” means court administrators, law clerks, legal research assistants or secretaries, or any combination thereof, but shall not mean school attendance officers;
    3. “Compensation” means the gross salary plus all amounts paid for benefits or otherwise as a result of employment or as required by employment; provided, however, that only salary earned for services rendered shall be reported and credited for Public Employees’ Retirement System purposes. Amounts paid for benefits or otherwise, including reimbursement for travel expenses, shall not be reported or credited for retirement purposes;
    4. “Law clerk” means a clerk hired to assist a judge or judges who has a law degree or who is a full-time law student who is making satisfactory progress at an accredited law school.
  7. Title to all tangible property, excepting stamps, stationery and minor expendable office supplies, procured with funds authorized by this section, shall be and forever remain in the State of Mississippi to be used by the circuit judge or chancellor during the term of his office and thereafter by his successors.
  8. Any circuit judge or chancellor who did not have a primary office provided by the county on March 1, 1988, shall be allowed an additional Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) per annum to defray the actual expenses incurred by the judge or chancellor in maintaining an office; however, any circuit judge or chancellor who had a primary office provided by the county on March 1, 1988, and who vacated the office space after that date for a legitimate reason, as determined by the Department of Finance and Administration, shall be allowed the additional office expense allowance provided under this subsection. The county in which a circuit judge or chancellor sits is authorized to provide funds from any available source to assist in defraying the actual expenses to maintain an office.
  9. The Supreme Court, through the Administrative Office of Courts, shall submit to the Department of Finance and Administration the itemized and certified expenses for office operating allowances that are directed to the court pursuant to this section.
  10. The Supreme Court, through the Administrative Office of Courts, shall have the power to adopt rules and regulations regarding the administration of the office operating allowance authorized pursuant to this section.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4175.6; Laws, 1972, ch. 398, §§ 1, 2, 3; Laws, 1978, ch. 531, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 528, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 485, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 373, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 42; Laws, 1994, ch. 506, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 414, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 524, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 534, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 557, § 3; brought forward without change, Laws, 2010, ch. 561, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2010.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1993, ch. 518.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment added the second sentence in (8).

The 2007 amendment, in (1), substituted “Supreme Court in the amounts set forth in this subsection; however” for “Supreme Court and then in an amount of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) per annum; however” in the introductory paragraph and added (a) and (b); in (5), added (b), and divided the former first paragraph into the present introductory paragraph and (a) and (b) by inserting “(a)” preceding “From and after” and adding “(b)” and the first three sentences in (b); added (6)(d); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2010 amendment brought the section forward without change.

Cross References —

Court reporters and court reporting generally, see §§9-13-1 et seq.

Allowing judges and chancellors to apply their expense allowances to court administration special fund, see §9-17-5.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Section 9-1-36(4) is the only provision for reimbursement of expenses to a legal research assistant employed by a circuit judge or chancellor, and the board of supervisors may not pay such travel expenses. 1995 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 765.

Section 9-1-36(8) does not contemplate payments by a county for expenses in maintaining a private office by a circuit judge or chancellor. 2003 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 49.

There is no authority for counties within a circuit court district to supplement by pro rata share the salaries of court support staff. 2003 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 472.

County approval is required before a position is submitted for approval by the Administrative Office of Courts at a salary which would increase the county’s supplemental payment obligations. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 106.

This section allows a county to provide funds for expenses in maintaining a private office by a circuit judge or chancellor if no office is provided by the county. The term “actual expenses” means expenses actually incurred by the circuit judge or chancellor in maintaining an office. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 433.

Counties within a judicial district do not have a responsibility to pay for the office expenses of a circuit judge or chancellor. However, each county within the judicial district may provide funds to assist in defraying the actual expenses to maintain an office. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 433.

Shands, Aug, 27, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0433 withdrawn. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 596.

§ 9-1-37. Allowance for stationery.

The circuit, chancery and county courts shall make allowance to the clerks thereof of all needful sums for supplying the offices and courtrooms with necessary stationery, furniture, books, presses, seals, and other things necessary for the same, and for the safe-keeping of the books, records, and papers belonging thereto; and such allowance shall be certified to the board of supervisors. Provided, however, that in no event shall said circuit, chancery or county courts be allowed to purchase furniture in excess of five hundred dollars for any one year without first securing the approval of the board of supervisors of the county.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 27, class 2, art. 1 (157), class 3, art. 1 (52); 1857, ch. 61, art. 27, ch. 62, art. 19; 1871, §§ 541, 985; 1880, § 2276; 1892, § 926; 1906, § 1002; Hemingway’s 1917, § 722; 1930, § 753; 1942, § 1668; Laws, 1936, ch. 252.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

All requests made by the chancery or circuit courts for equipment or supplies must be presented first to the board of supervisors; only if and when the board of supervisors fails to procure necessary items may the court order the court clerk to procure those items, and such court order has the legal effect of binding the board to follow that order. 1997 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 405.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The circuit and chancery courts are respectively empowered under this section [Code 1942 § 1668], in case the board of supervisors have failed to do so, to procure the necessary record books, stationery, furniture, etc., belonging to the court exercising the power, but have no authority to procure other such articles for the county. Board of Sup'rs v. Hughes, 83 Miss. 195, 35 So. 424 (Miss. 1903).

The clerk should first ask the court to make the allowance, and if the application is approved in whole or in part, the court should direct the court what to purchase, limiting the sum to be expended. Board of Sup'rs v. Hughes, 83 Miss. 195, 35 So. 424 (Miss. 1903).

The court should allow or disallow the bill for supplies presented by the clerk rather than certify the same to the board of supervisors to be passed on. State v. Lovell, 70 Miss. 309, 12 So. 341, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1892).

§ 9-1-38. Certain judicial records exempt from public access requirements.

Records in the possession of a public body, as defined by paragraph (a) of Section 25-61-3, which are developed among judges and among judges and their aides, shall be exempt from the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983.

HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 424, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

Editor’s Notes —

“The Mississippi Public Records Act”, referred to in this section, is Laws, 1983, ch. 424, §§ 1-9, which appears as §§25-61-1 et seq.

Cross References —

Exemption from Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983 of those records judicially determined to be exempt, see §25-61-11.

§ 9-1-39. Clerks of circuit, chancery and county courts in separate judicial districts in Harrison County.

In Harrison County, a county having two judicial districts, the clerks of the circuit and chancery courts of said county shall be the clerks of the respective circuit and chancery courts in each of the districts aforesaid and the circuit clerk shall additionally be the clerk of the county court as provided by law, in each of said districts and they shall keep offices both at Gulfport and Biloxi, in which all books, records, dockets, papers and documents belonging to each of the courts of said district shall be kept respectively; and all dockets, records, papers and books required to be kept by law by clerks of the circuit, chancery and county courts in this state shall be kept by each of said clerks respectively at Gulfport and Biloxi, for each of said districts; and the enrollment of a judgment or decree in the district where the same may be rendered or obtained, shall be a lien on all property of the person against whom the same may be rendered within the district where so enrolled.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 2910-05; Laws, 1962, ch. 257, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved June 1, 1962).

Cross References —

Duties of clerk of chancery court, see §§9-5-135,9-5-137.

Oath and bond of clerk of circuit court, see §9-7-121.

§ 9-1-41. Reasonableness of attorneys’ fees; evidence.

In any action in which a court is authorized to award reasonable attorneys’ fees, the court shall not require the party seeking such fees to put on proof as to the reasonableness of the amount sought, but shall make the award based on the information already before it and the court’s own opinion based on experience and observation; provided however, a party may, in its discretion, place before the court other evidence as to the reasonableness of the amount of the award, and the court may consider such evidence in making the award.

HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 393, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 13, 1990).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Application.

1. In general.

In a case where there are many billable hours that the trial court is unable to observe or lacks knowledge of, it is incumbent upon the party requesting attorney fees to place before the trial court evidence as to the reasonableness of the amount of the award, so that the record as a whole can support the award of attorney’s fees. Speights v. Speights, 126 So.3d 76, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 743 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

Standard of review for award of attorneys’ fees is abuse of discretion, and such awards must be supported by credible evidence. Regency Nissan v. Jenkins, 678 So. 2d 95, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 435 (Miss. 1996).

Award of $7,500 in attorney fees to successful plaintiff in action against used car dealer for violation of Odometer Disclosure Act was not abuse of discretion; plaintiff supported his claim with sixteen pages of itemized expenses, plaintiff’s attorney billed 82.50 hours at $140 per hour plus expenses of $164.91 for total of $11,714.91, and amount was adjusted downward by trial court. Regency Nissan v. Jenkins, 678 So. 2d 95, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 435 (Miss. 1996).

2. Application.

Chancery court did not abuse its discretion in connection with the issue of attorney’s fees because a father was not entitled to fees that he would have incurred anyway litigating issues of custody, which was the primary issue in the case, or child support; with no specific evidence as to the amount of fees that the father incurred because of the mother’s contempt, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion by awarding the father attorney’s fees. Heisinger v. Riley, 243 So.3d 248, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 154 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).

Chancery court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees to a mother because it determined that the award was a reasonable amount based on its experience, observation, and the information before it, i.e., the pleadings that requested the attorney’s fees and a three-day hearing that required the presence of the mother’s attorney Taylor v. Timmons (In re C.T.), 228 So.3d 311, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 332 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

Where the court found that debt owed by debtor was nondischargeable in the amount of $2,903.89, and the creditor’s attorney requested $11,988.75 in fees and costs, considering the Miss. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5 factors and the lodestar amount, the court reduced the amount requested by 50% because it found no basis to justify a fee award so much greater than the amount recovered. Hometown Credit, LLC v. Peters (In re Peters), — B.R. —, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 861 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Mar. 28, 2017).

Where debtor agreed to nondischargeable judgment in amount of $1,347.90 on underlying debt and creditor requested $5,080 in attorney fees, court, applying factors in Miss. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5, reduced amount to $1,270 because there was no basis to justify award of fees so much greater than amount recovered, the customary fee for actions of this type was one-third of the amount of the indebtedness and the questions presented were not novel or difficult. Pikco Finance, Inc. v. Staten (In re Staten), 559 B.R. 666, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3997 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2016).

Chancellor did not abuse the chancellor’s discretion in ordering a former spouse to pay damages to the ex-spouse in a contempt judgment because, while there was no itemized bill of the legal services or travel expenses of the ex-spouse, the record showed the amount of legal work performed and the ex-spouse’s residence in another state. Moreover, the award was reasonable. Moseley v. Smith, 180 So.3d 667, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 689 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014), cert. dismissed, — So.3d —, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 605 (Miss. 2015), cert. dismissed, — So.3d —, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 625 (Miss. 2015).

In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiff was awarded attorney’s fees and expenses because the time billed by plaintiff in pursuit of the declaratory judgment, including the time billed pursuing summary judgment, was neither excessive nor unreasonable where plaintiff’s briefs were thoroughly researched and well written — a fact that greatly contributed to its success in this proceeding. MGM Resorts Miss., Inc. v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp., — F. Supp. 3d —, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118483 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 4, 2015).

Trial court did not err in awarding a wife attorney’s fees because it awarded a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to the wife pursuant to the statute based on its experience, observation, and the information before it, i.e., the pleadings and a one-day hearing. Riley v. Riley, 196 So.3d 1159, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 505 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

In a divorce action, the trial court’s award of attorneys fees to the wife was not supported by the evidence; although she testified about her lack of income, she did not submit a financial statement to substantiate her inability to pay, and there was no evidence as to the amount or reasonableness of the fees. Speights v. Speights, 126 So.3d 76, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 743 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

Award of attorney’s fees was not an abuse of discretion because there was evidence of the actual attorney’s fees homeowners incurred; since there was a basis for the award of punitive damages, an award of attorney’s fees was proper. Woodkrest Custom Homes Inc. v. Cooper, 108 So.3d 460, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 24 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

In a products liability action alleging three welding rod manufacturers’ failure to warn, the court granted the married couple’s request for an attorney’s fee award; exercising its discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and recognizing the factors for determining a reasonable fee, set forth in Miss. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5, as well as the legislative dictated regarding reasonable fees in Miss. Code Ann. §9-1-41, the court allowed the manufacturers to either stipulate to the fee amount requested by the couple, $2,173,185.73, or to provide the court with a challenge to the couple’s fee request within 28 days from the date of the court’s order. Jowers v. BOC Group, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 724, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28806 (S.D. Miss. 2009), vacated, in part, 617 F.3d 346, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17862 (5th Cir. Miss. 2010).

Where an insurance salesman breached an employment agreement by selling policies to former clients, the award of attorney’s fees was proper because the former employer was not require to provide any additional offer of proof on the necessity or reasonableness of attorneys’ fees. Raines v. Bottrell Ins. Agency, Inc., 992 So. 2d 642, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 274 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 997 So. 2d 924, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 541 (Miss. 2008).

In a collection suit, an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of one-third of the judgment was presumptively reasonable based on the application of several factors, such as the difficulty in collecting the judgment due to a bankruptcy filing and a fee agreement. Gulf City Seafoods, Inc. v. Oriental Foods, Inc., 986 So. 2d 974, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 771 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 987 So. 2d 451, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 341 (Miss. 2008).

In a dispute involving the sale of real estate, a chancellor used the reasonableness factors under Miss. Code Ann. §9-1-41 in awarding the sellers their attorney fees under the terms of a contract since they prevailed. Culbreath Revocable Trust v. Sanders, 979 So. 2d 704, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 591 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 979 So. 2d 691, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 162 (Miss. 2008).

In a complex contract case regarding damages to equipment owned by a utilities commission, a trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding fees to two attorneys in the case, as it was clear from the language of the trial judge’s order that the judge did in fact apply the reasonableness factors under McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764 (Miss 1982), even though he did not detail his reasoning; moreover, it was unnecessary to determine whether McKee predated Miss. Code Ann. §9-1-41. Upchurch Plumbing, Inc. v. Greenwood Utils. Comm'n, 964 So. 2d 1100, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 495 (Miss. 2007).

Chancery court erred in finding that there was nothing before it to show that the creditor’s accountant’s fees were reasonable; but for the fraud of the debtor, the creditor would not have incurred this expense. Allred v. Fairchild, 916 So. 2d 529, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 809 (Miss. 2005).

An award of one-third of the amount collected was appropriate where the defendant had to defend against the plaintiff’s claim in order to collect the amount owed and where the defendant presented testimony from an experienced trial attorney in Mississippi who stated that 25 percent of the amount collected is a reasonable attorneys’ fee in Mississippi for collection of an open account if suit is not filed and that 33 1/3 percent is appropriate if suit is filed. Par Indus. v. Target Container Co., 708 So. 2d 44, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1998).

Attorneys’ fees awarded in a case involving an employer’s bad faith failure to pay a worker’s compensation claim were improperly granted because the trial court abused its discretion by making inaccurate findings regarding the factors outlined in determining the reasonableness of such an award. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Cook, 832 So. 2d 474, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 399 (Miss. 2002).

§ 9-1-43. Limit on compensation of chancery clerks and circuit clerks and their related employees; liability on bonds; chancery court clerk clearing accounts; circuit court clerk clearing accounts; journals and receipts; punishment for failure to deposit funds.

  1. After making deductions for employer contributions paid by the chancery or circuit clerk to the Public Employees’ Retirement System under Sections 25-11-106.1 and 25-11-123(f)(4), employee salaries and related salary expenses, and expenses allowed as deductions by Schedule C of the Internal Revenue Code, no office of the chancery clerk or circuit clerk of any county in the state shall receive fees as compensation for the chancery clerk’s or circuit clerk’s services in excess of Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00). All such fees received by the office of chancery or circuit clerks that are in excess of the salary limitation shall be deposited by such clerk into the county general fund on or before April 15 for the preceding calendar year. If the chancery clerk or circuit clerk serves less than one (1) year, then he shall not receive as compensation any fees in excess of that portion of the salary limitation that can be attributed to his time in office on a pro rata basis. Upon leaving office, income earned by any clerk in his last full year of office but not received until after his last full year of office shall not be included in determining the salary limitation of the successor clerk. There shall be exempted from the provisions of this subsection any monies or commissions from private or governmental sources which: (a) are to be held by the chancery or circuit clerk in a trust or custodial capacity as prescribed in subsections (4) and (5); or (b) are received as compensation for services performed upon order of a court or board of supervisors which are not required of the chancery clerk or circuit clerk by statute.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any chancery clerk or circuit clerk to use fees in excess of Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00), to pay the salaries or actual or necessary expenses of employees who are related to such clerk by blood or marriage within the first degree of kinship according to the civil law method of computing kinship as provided in Sections 1-3-71 and 1-3-73. However, the prohibition of this subsection shall not apply to any individual who was an employee of the clerk’s office prior to the date his or her relative was elected as chancery or circuit clerk. The spouse and/or any children of the chancery clerk or circuit clerk employed in the office of the chancery clerk may be paid a salary; however, the combined annual salaries of the clerk, spouse and any child of the clerk may not exceed an amount equal to the salary limitation.
  3. The chancery clerk and the circuit clerk shall be liable on their official bond for the proper deposit and accounting of all monies received by his office. The State Auditor shall promulgate uniform accounting methods for the accounting of all sources of income by the offices of the chancery and circuit clerk.
  4. There is created in the county depository of each county a clearing account to be designated as the “chancery court clerk clearing account,” into which shall be deposited: (a) all such monies as the clerk of the chancery court shall receive from any person complying with any writ of garnishment, attachment, execution or other like process authorized by law for the enforcement of child support, spousal support or any other judgment; (b) any portion of any fees required by law to be collected in civil cases which are to pay for the service of process or writs in another county; and (c) any other money as shall be deposited with the court which by its nature is not, at the time of its deposit, public monies, but which is to be held by the court in a trust or custodial capacity in a case or proceeding before the court. The clerk of the chancery court shall account for all monies deposited in and disbursed from such account and shall be authorized and empowered to draw and issue checks on such account at such times, in such amounts and to such persons as shall be proper and in accordance with law.

    The following monies paid to the chancery clerk shall be subject to the salary limitation prescribed under subsection (1): (a) all fees required by law to be collected for the filing, recording or abstracting of any bill, petition, pleading or decree in any civil case in chancery; (b) all fees collected for land recordings, charters, notary bonds, certification of decrees and copies of any documents; (c) all land redemption and mineral documentary stamp commissions; and (d) any other monies or commissions from private or governmental sources for statutory functions which are not to be held by the court in a trust capacity. Such fees as shall exceed the salary limitations shall be maintained in a bank account in the county depository and accounted for separately from those monies paid into the chancery court clerk clearing account.

  5. There is created in the county depository in each county a clearing account to be designated as the “circuit court clerk civil clearing account,” into which shall be deposited: (a) all such monies and fees as the clerk of the circuit court shall receive from any person complying with any writ of garnishment, attachment, execution or any other like process authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment; (b) any portion of any fees required by law or court order to be collected in civil cases; (c) all fees collected for the issuance of marriage licenses; and (d) any other money as shall be deposited with the court which by its nature is not, at the time of its deposit, public monies but which is to be held by the court in a trust or custodial capacity in a case or proceeding before the court.

    There is created in the county depository in each county a clearing account to be designated as the “circuit court clerk criminal clearing account,” into which shall be deposited: (a) all such monies as are received in criminal cases in the circuit court pursuant to any order requiring payment as restitution to the victims of criminal offenses; (b) any portion of any fees and fines required by law or court order to be collected in criminal cases; and (c) all cash bonds as shall be deposited with the court. The clerk of the circuit court shall account for all monies deposited in and disbursed from such account and shall be authorized and empowered to draw and issue checks on such account, at such times, in such amounts and to such persons as shall be proper and in accordance with law; however, such monies as are forfeited in criminal cases shall be paid by the clerk of the circuit court to the clerk of the board of supervisors for deposit in the general fund of the county.

    The following monies paid to the circuit clerk shall be subject to the salary limitation prescribed under subsection (1): (a) all fees required by law to be collected for the filing, recording or abstracting of any bill, petition, pleading or decree in any civil action in circuit court; (b) copies of any documents; and (c) any other monies or commissions from private or governmental sources for statutory functions which are not to be held by the court in a trust capacity.

  6. The chancery clerk and the circuit clerk shall establish and maintain a cash journal for recording cash receipts from private or government sources for furnishing copies of any papers of record or on file, or for rendering services as a notary public, or other fees wherein the total fee for the transaction is Ten Dollars ($10.00) or less. The cash journal entry shall include the date, amount and type of transaction, and the clerk shall not be required to issue a receipt to the person receiving such services. The State Auditor shall not take exception to the furnishing of copies or the rendering of services as a notary by any clerk free of charge.

    In any county having two (2) judicial districts, whenever the chancery clerk serves as deputy to the circuit clerk in one (1) judicial district and the circuit clerk serves as deputy to the chancery clerk in the other judicial district, the chancery clerk may maintain a cash journal, separate from the cash journal maintained for chancery clerk receipts, for recording the cash receipts paid to him as deputy circuit clerk, and the circuit clerk may maintain a cash journal, separate from the cash journal maintained for circuit clerk receipts, for recording the cash receipts paid to him as deputy chancery clerk. The cash receipts collected by the chancery clerk in his capacity as deputy circuit clerk and the cash receipts collected by the circuit clerk in his capacity as deputy chancery clerk shall be subject to the salary limitation prescribed under subsection (1).

  7. Any clerk who knowingly shall fail to deposit funds or otherwise violate the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor in office and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in an amount not to exceed double the amount that he failed to deposit, or imprisoned for not to exceed six (6) months in the county jail, or be punished by both such fine and imprisonment.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 481, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 570, § 9; Laws, 1998, ch. 369, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 422, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 505, § 11; Laws, 2011, ch. 402, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 14, 2011.).

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the second sentence of subsection (2). The words “However, that the prohibition” were changed to “However, the prohibition”. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 20, 1998 meeting.

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in subsection (2). The words “and/r” were changed to “and/or”. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its April 26, 2001 meeting.

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated May 14, 1993, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the addition of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 481, § 1.

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 5, 1997, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1997, ch. 570, § 9.

On August 2, 1999, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1999, ch. 422, § 1.

By letter dated August 19, 2004, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the amendment of this section by Laws, 2004, ch. 505, § 16.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment substituted “Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00)” for “Seventy-five Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($75,600.00) annually, and from and after January 1, 2000, in excess of Eighty-three Thousand One Hundred Sixty Dollars ($83,160.00) annually” in (1); and substituted “Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00)” for “Seventy-five Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($75,600.00) annually, and from and after January 1, 2000, in excess of Eighty-three Thousand One Hundred Sixty Dollars ($83,160.00) annually” in (2).

The 2011 amendment inserted “employer contributions paid by the chancery or circuit clerk to the Public Employees’ Retirement System under Sections 25-11-106.1 and 25-11-123 (f)(4)” in (1).

Cross References —

Additional allowance for chancery court clerks in certain counties, see §25-7-10.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Under Section 9-1-43, the only time that a relative of a chancery or circuit clerk may be paid a salary, which combined with the clerk’s fees would exceed the cap, would be when that relative was employed by the clerk’s office prior to the time the clerk was first elected to office. To allow otherwise would defeat the intent of the statute. 1995 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 477.

Any compensation received by circuit clerks for services rendered that are not statutorily required would be exempt from the salary limitations as set forth in Section 9-1-43. 1996 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 3.

Under Section 9-1-43(1) chancery and circuit clerks will be allowed to deduct employee salaries and related expenses, and any expenses allowed as deductions by Schedule C of the Internal Revenue Code for purposes of determining fees to be received by them as compensation. 1996 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 716.

A chancery or circuit clerk may employ anyone related to them outside the first degree, pay that employee’s salary and related expenses out of fees earned by that office and deduct that employee’s salary and related expenses as a deductible expense of the office in reaching the salary cap. 1997 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 757.

A new chancery clerk’s salary for the remainder of that year is limited by the unfulfilled salary cap of the old clerk, and the new clerk is entitled to earn fees limited by that portion of the salary cap that can be attributed to his time in office on a pro rata basis. 1998 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 744.

The county identification number should be used in setting up a clearing account in the county depository for funds held by the chancery court in a case before the court. 2003 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 35.

Nothing in subsection (2) of this section would authorize a circuit clerk to employ a relative within the third degree of kinship who is to be paid out of public funds by the board of supervisors pursuant to §9-7-126. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 413.

The salary of a family member would not count as part of the twenty-five percent compensation of a retired circuit or chancery clerk. 2005 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 56.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In a case in which defendant, a former county circuit clerk, was convicted of embezzlement, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 666(a)(1), his reliance on the Phillips decision, a Louisiana case, was misplaced. In the Phillips case, defendant, a former tax assessor of a parish, was not an agent of the parish under 18 U.S.C.S. § § 666(d)(1), because Louisiana law completely separated the tax assessor’s office from the parish government; however, in Mississippi, circuit clerks were not completely separated from county governments in Mississippi, and the Phillips decision was not applicable in the present case. United States v. Harris, 296 Fed. Appx. 402, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22020 (5th Cir. Miss. 2008).

§ 9-1-45. Filing of annual reports by chancery and circuit clerks; failure to provide report; notice of noncompliance; hearing to determine level of compliance; penalties for noncompliance.

  1. Each chancery and circuit clerk shall file, not later than April 15 of each year, with the State Auditor of Public Accounts a true and accurate annual report on a form to be designed and supplied to each clerk by the State Auditor of Public Accounts immediately after January 1 of each year. The form shall include the following information: (a) revenues subject to the salary cap, including fees; (b) revenues not subject to the salary cap; and (c) expenses of office, including any salary paid to a clerk’s spouse or children. Each chancery and circuit clerk shall provide any additional information requested by the Public Employees’ Retirement System for the purpose of retirement calculations.
  2. In any county having two (2) judicial districts, a separate report may be filed by the chancery clerk and circuit clerk for each judicial district. Whenever the chancery clerk serves as deputy to the circuit clerk in one (1) judicial district and the circuit clerk serves as deputy to the chancery clerk in the other judicial district, each clerk may file, for the judicial district in which he serves, one (1) report for the revenues and expenses of his office in his capacity as chancery or circuit clerk and a separate report for reporting the revenues collected and expenses incurred in his capacity as deputy circuit or deputy chancery clerk.
  3. If the chancery or circuit clerk fails to provide the reports required in this section, then the State Auditor shall give by United States certified mail, return receipt requested, written notification to the chancery or circuit clerk of noncompliance. If within thirty (30) days after receipt of the notice, the chancery or circuit clerk, in the opinion of the State Auditor, remains in noncompliance, the State Auditor may institute civil proceedings in a court of the county in which the clerk serves. The court, upon a hearing, shall decide the issue and if it determines that the clerk is not in substantial compliance, shall order the clerk to immediately and thereafter comply. Violations of any order of the court shall be punishable as for contempt. In addition, the court in its discretion may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) upon the clerk, for which he shall be liable in his individual capacity, for any such noncompliance that the court determines as intentional or willful.

HISTORY: Laws, 1996, ch. 535, § 4; Laws, 1998, ch. 369, § 2; Laws, 2004, ch. 318, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 12, 2004.).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 7-7-2 provides that the words “State Auditor of Public Accounts,” “State Auditor” and “Auditor” appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor’s functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.

Section §27-104-6, provides that wherever the term “State Fiscal Officer” appears in any law it shall mean “Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment designated the two formerly undesignated paragraphs as (1) and (2); and added (3).

Cross References —

Chancery court clerk fees, see §25-7-9.

As to fees charged by clerks of the chancery court, see §25-7-9.

Circuit court clerk fees, see §25-7-13.

As to fees charged by clerks of the circuit court, see §25-7-13.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The content of the clerk’s annual report to the State Auditor is set forth by Section 9-1-45. The report includes revenues, including fees both subject to and not subject to the cap, expenses and additional information which may be requested by the Public Employees’ Retirement System for purposes of retirement calculations. 1996 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 716.

§ 9-1-46. Semiannual reports by clerks of county, municipal and justice courts to Administrative Office of Courts; information to be included.

  1. Semiannually, the circuit clerks of each county, the municipal court clerks of each municipality, and the justice court clerks of each county shall report to the Administrative Office of Courts the following information:
    1. Individual misdemeanor and felony case records by offense, from the circuit clerk for all circuit and county court criminal proceedings, and from the municipal and justice court clerks for all misdemeanors, electronically when available, containing the date on which the criminal charges were filed, charge code and name of indicted offenses, count number of indicted offenses, whether counsel was appointed, the disposition of the charges, date disposed, date sentenced, charge code and name of sentenced offenses, and sentence length.
    2. Data should be kept individually by case number and misdemeanor charges or indicted felony offense, and include, for criminal docket purposes, demographic information necessary for tracking individuals across multiple databases should be collected, including date of birth, city and state of residence, race, and gender.
  2. The Administrative Office of Courts shall be empowered to establish a uniform reporting format for all court clerks described in subsection (1) of this section. Such reporting format shall emphasize the need for reporting information in a sortable, electronic format. All clerks who submit required information in other formats shall report to the Administrative Office of Courts a schedule for conversion to technology to enable the reporting of all required data in a sortable, electronic format.
  3. Semiannual reports shall be made to the Administrative Office of Courts by December 31, 2014, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and every year thereafter, and on June 30, 2015, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and every year thereafter. On August 1, 2015, and each year thereafter, the Administrative Office of Courts shall provide to PEER and the Office of State Public Defender sortable, electronic copies of all reports required by this section.
  4. The Administrative Office of Courts shall share the information required under this section with the Oversight Task Force.

HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 65; Laws, 2016, ch. 487, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2016.

Amendment Notes —

The 2016 amendment inserted “whether counsel was appointed” in (1)(a); and inserted “and the Office of State Public Defender” in (3).

Cross References —

Oversight Task Force, see §47-5-6.

§ 9-1-47. Municipal and justice courts authorized to purge judgment rolls of fines and fees owed by deceased person.

The municipal and justice courts are authorized to purge judgment rolls of all fines and fees owed by any deceased person upon presentation of proof that the person liable for such fines or fees is deceased.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 499, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 6, 2009.).

§ 9-1-49. Report concerning certain persons’ access to firearms.

  1. The clerk of the court shall prepare and forward to the Department of Public Safety the information described by subsection (2) of this section not later than the thirtieth day after the date the court:
    1. Judicially determines that a person is a person with mental illness or person with an intellectual disability under Title 41, Chapter 21, Mississippi Code of 1972, whether ordered for inpatient treatment, outpatient treatment, day treatment, night treatment or home health services treatment;
    2. Acquits a person in a criminal case by reason of insanity or on a ground of intellectual disability, without regard to whether the person is ordered by a court to receive inpatient treatment or residential care under Section 99-13-7;
    3. Appoints a guardian or conservator under Title 93, Chapter 13, based on the determination that the person is incapable of managing his own estate due to mental weakness;
    4. Determines that a person is incompetent to stand trial pursuant to Rule 9.06 of the Mississippi Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice;
    5. Finds under Section 93-13-151 that a person has been restored to reason; or
    6. Enters an order of relief from a firearms disability under Section 97-37-5(4).
  2. The clerk of the court shall prepare and forward the following information:
    1. The complete name, race, and sex of the person;
    2. Any known identifying number of the person, including social security number, driver’s license number, or state identification card number;
    3. The person’s date of birth; and
    4. The federal prohibited-person information that is the basis of the report required by this section.
  3. If practicable, the clerk of the court shall forward to the Department of Public Safety the information described by subsection (2) of this section in an electronic format prescribed by the department.
  4. If an order previously reported to the department under subsection (1) of this section is reversed by order of any court, the clerk shall notify the department of the reversal not later than thirty (30) days after the clerk receives the court order or the mandate from the appellate court.
  5. The duty of a clerk to prepare and forward information under this section is not affected by:
    1. Any subsequent appeal of the court order;
    2. Any subsequent modification of the court order; or
    3. The expiration of the court order.

HISTORY: Laws, 2013, ch. 384, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2013.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected an error in subsection (1)(a) by substituting “person is a person with mental illness or person with an intellectual disability” for “person is a mentally ill or mentally retarded person.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its August 1, 2013, meeting.

Cross References —

Clerk of court to provide to Department of Public Safety certain information about individuals who have been determined to have been restored to reason under this section, see §9-1-49.

Electronic Filing and Storage of Court Documents

§ 9-1-51. Definitions.

For purposes of Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57, the following terms shall have the meanings ascribed herein unless the context shall otherwise require:

“Court” shall mean the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, circuit courts, chancery courts, county courts, youth courts, family courts, justice courts and the municipal courts of this state.

“Clerk” shall mean the clerks of any court.

“Judge” shall mean the senior judge of any court.

“County office” shall mean the office of the circuit clerk, chancery clerk, tax assessor and tax collector of every county of this state.

“Documents,” “court records,” or “court-related records” shall mean and include, but not be limited to, all contents in the file or record of any case or matter docketed by the court, administrative orders, court minutes, court dockets and ledgers, and other documents, instruments or papers required by law to be filed with the court.

“Electronic filing of documents” shall mean the transmission of data to a clerk of any court or state agency by the communication of information which is originally displayed in written form and thereafter converted to digital electronic signals, transformed by computer and stored by the clerk or state agency either on microfilm, magnetic tape, optical discs or any other medium.

“Electronic storage of documents” shall mean the storage, retention and reproduction of documents using microfilm, microfiche, data processing, computers or other electronic process which correctly and legibly stores and reproduces or which forms a medium for storage, copying or reproducing documents.

“Filing system” or “storage system” shall mean the system used by a court or county office for the electronic filing or storage of documents.

HISTORY: Laws, 1987, ch. 490, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 5; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 506, § 3; Laws, 1997, ch. 507, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 8, 1997).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1999, ch. 432, § 1, provides:

“SECTION 1. From and after the date Laws, 1999, ch. 432, is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, all family courts are abolished. All matters pending in any family court abolished shall be transferred to the county court of the county wherein the family court was located without the necessity for any motion or order of court for such transfer.”

Cross References —

Chancery court clerk authorized to keep minute books by means of electronic filing or storage or both, as provided in this section in lieu of or in addition to any paper records, see §§9-5-135 et seq.

Electronic storage of certain files, records and other documents of circuit or county courts, see §9-7-128.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

41 Am. Jur. Trials 683, Computer Research for the Trial Lawyer.

§ 9-1-53. Authority to electronically file and store court documents.

Courts and county offices are hereby authorized but not required to institute procedures for the electronic filing and electronic storage of court documents to further the efficient administration and operation of the courts. Electronically filed or stored documents may be kept in lieu of any paper documents. Courts governed by rules promulgated by the Mississippi Supreme Court that institute electronic filing and electronic storage of court documents and offices of circuit and chancery clerks that institute electronic filing and electronic storage of court documents shall do so in conformity with such rules and regulations prescribed by the Administrative Office of Courts and adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court concerning court records or court-related records. The provisions of Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57 shall not be construed to amend or repeal any other provision of existing state law which requires or provides for the maintenance of official written documents, records, dockets, books, ledgers or proceedings by a court or clerk of court in those courts which do not elect to exercise the discretion granted by this section. It is hereby declared to be the intent of the Legislature that official written documents, records, dockets, books, ledgers or proceedings may be filed, stored, maintained, reproduced and recorded in the manner authorized by Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57 or as otherwise provided by law, in the discretion of the clerk.

HISTORY: Laws, 1987, ch. 490, § 2; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 6; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 2; Laws, 1997, ch. 507, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 8, 1997).

Cross References —

Chancery Court clerk authorized to keep minute books by means of electronic filing or storage or both, as provided in this section in lieu of or in addition to any paper records, see §§9-5-135 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

41 Am. Jur. Trials 683, Computer Research for the Trial Lawyer.

§ 9-1-55. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[En Laws, 1987, ch. 490, § 3]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-1-55 directed the Mississippi Supreme Court to promulgate rules and regulations to implement the provisions of §§9-1-51 through9-1-57.

§ 9-1-57. Plan for electronic storage system.

A plan for the storage system shall require, but not be limited to, the following:

All original documents shall be recorded and released into the system within a specified minimum time period after presentation to the clerk;

Original paper records may be used during the pendency of any legal proceeding;

The plan shall include setting standards for organizing, identifying, coding and indexing so that the image produced during the duplicating process can be certified as a true and correct copy of the original and may be retrieved rapidly;

All materials used in the duplicating process which correctly and legibly reproduces or which forms a medium of copying or reproducing all public records, as herein authorized, and all processes of development, fixation and washing of said photographic duplicates shall be of a quality approved for permanent photographic records by the United States Bureau of Standards;

The plan shall provide for retention of the court records consistent with other law and in conformity with rules and regulations prescribed by the Administrative Office of Courts and adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court and shall provide security provisions to guard against physical loss, alterations and deterioration; and

All transcripts, exemplifications, copies or reproductions on paper or on film of an image or images of any microfilmed or otherwise duplicated record shall be deemed to be certified copies of the original for all purposes.

HISTORY: Laws, 1987, ch. 490, § 4; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 3; Laws, 1997, ch. 507, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved April 8, 1997).

Cross References —

Chancery Court clerk authorized to keep minute books by means of electronic filing or storage or both, as provided in this section in lieu of or in addition to any paper records, see §§9-5-135 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

41 Am. Jur. Trials 683, Computer Research for the Trial Lawyer.

Appointment to Judicial Office

§ 9-1-101. Definitions.

As used in Sections 9-1-101 through 9-1-107, 25-3-53 and 25-3-55 the following terms shall have the meaning ascribed to them herein:

“Judicial office” means the position of judge of the Court of Appeals, chancery, circuit or county court judge, or Supreme Court Justice.

“Judicial officer” means a judge of the Court of Appeals, chancery, circuit or county court, or a Supreme Court Justice.

HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 587, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 16, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

§ 9-1-103. Vacancy in office.

Whenever a vacancy shall occur in any judicial office by reason of death of an incumbent, resignation or retirement of an incumbent, removal of an incumbent from office, or creation of a new judicial office in which there has not heretofore been an incumbent, the Governor shall have the authority to appoint a qualified person to fill such vacancy to serve for the unexpired term or until such vacancy is filled by election as provided in Section 23-15-849, Mississippi Code of 1972. When a vacancy shall occur for any of the reasons enumerated in this section, the clerk of the court shall notify the Governor of such vacancy immediately.

HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 587, § 2, eff from and after April 25, 1989 (became law without the Governor’s signature).

Cross References —

Appointment of special judge to fill vacancy until Governor makes his appointment, see §9-1-105.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews.

Judicial Selection – What is Right for Mississippi?, 21 Miss. C. L. Rev. 199, Spring, 2002.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Write-in election.

Write-in election for a circuit court judge was proper under Miss. Code Ann. §23-15-365 because the circuit judge passed away after qualifying for the November 2, 2010 election, and Miss. Code Ann. §9-1-103 permitted the appointee judge to serve for the unexpired term with no requirement of a special election since the circuit judge died fewer than nine months before the expiration of his term; the use of the word “or” in Miss. Code Ann. §9-1-103 means that an election under Miss. Code Ann. §23-15-849(1) need not occur if there is so little time in the unexpired term that the appointee may legally serve for the unexpired term. Rayner v. Barbour, 47 So.3d 128, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 572 (Miss. 2010).

§ 9-1-105. Physical disability or sickness; absence of judicial officer from state, etc.; appointment of special judge to serve on emergency basis.

  1. Whenever any judicial officer is unwilling or unable to hear a case or unable to hold or attend any of the courts at the time and place required by law by reason of the physical disability or sickness of such judicial officer, by reason of the absence of such judicial officer from the state, by reason of the disqualification of such judicial officer pursuant to the provision of Section 165, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, or any provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct, or for any other reason, the Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court, with the advice and consent of a majority of the justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court, may appoint a person as a special judge to hear the case or attend and hold a court.
  2. Upon the request of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the senior judge of a chancery or circuit court district, the senior judge of a county court, or upon his own motion, the Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court, with the advice and consent of a majority of the justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court, shall have the authority to appoint a special judge to serve on a temporary basis in a circuit, chancery or county court in the event of an emergency or overcrowded docket. It shall be the duty of any special judge so appointed to assist the court to which he is assigned in the disposition of causes so pending in such court for whatever period of time is designated by the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice, in his discretion, may appoint the special judge to hear particular cases, a particular type of case, or a particular portion of the court’s docket.
  3. When a vacancy exists for any of the reasons enumerated in Section 9-1-103, the vacancy has not been filled within seven (7) days by an appointment by the Governor, and there is a pending cause or are pending causes in the court where the vacancy exists that in the interests of justice and in the orderly dispatch of the court’s business require the appointment of a special judge, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, with the advice and consent of a majority of the justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court, may appoint a qualified person as a special judge to fill the vacancy until the Governor makes his appointment and such appointee has taken the oath of office.
  4. If the Chief Justice pursuant to this section shall make an appointment within the authority vested in the Governor by reason of Section 165, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, the Governor may at his election appoint a person to so serve. In the event that the Governor makes such an appointment, any appointment made by the Chief Justice pursuant to this section shall be void and of no further force or effect from the date of the Governor’s appointment.
  5. When a judicial officer is unwilling or unable to hear a case or unable or unwilling to hold court for a period of time not to exceed two (2) weeks, the trial judge or judges of the affected district or county and other trial judges may agree among themselves regarding the appointment of a person for such case or such limited period of time. The trial judges shall submit a notice to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court informing him of their appointment. If the Chief Justice does not appoint another person to serve as special judge within seven (7) days after receipt of such notice, the person designated in such order shall be deemed appointed.
  6. A person appointed to serve as a special judge may be any currently sitting or retired chancery, circuit or county court judge, Court of Appeals judge or Supreme Court Justice, or any other person possessing the qualifications of the judicial office for which the appointment is made; however, a judge or justice who was retired from service at the polls shall not be eligible for appointment as a special judge in the district in which he served prior to his defeat.
  7. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, the need for an appointment pursuant to this section may be certified to the Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court by any attorney in good standing or other officer of the court.
  8. The order appointing a person as a special judge pursuant to this section shall describe as specifically as possible the duration of the appointment.
  9. A special judge appointed pursuant to this section shall take the oath of office, if necessary, and shall, for the duration of his appointment, enjoy the full power and authority of the office to which he is appointed.
  10. Any currently sitting justice or judge appointed as a special judge under this section shall receive no additional compensation for his or her service as special judge. Any other person appointed as a special judge hereunder shall, for the period of his service, receive compensation from the state for each day’s service a sum equal to 1/260ths of the current salary in effect for the judicial office; however, no retired chancery, circuit or county court judge, retired Court of Appeals judge or any retired Supreme Court Justice appointed as a special judge pursuant to this section may, during any fiscal year, receive compensation in excess of fifty percent (50%) of the current salary in effect for a chancery or circuit court judge. Any person appointed as a special judge shall be reimbursed for travel expenses incurred in the performance of the official duties to which he may be appointed hereunder in the same manner as other public officials and employees as provided by Section 25-3-41, Mississippi Code of 1972.
  11. If any person appointed as such special judge is receiving retirement benefits by virtue of the provisions of the Public Employees’ Retirement Law of 1952, appearing as Sections 25-11-1 through 25-11-139, Mississippi Code of 1972, such benefits shall not be reduced in any sum whatsoever because of such service, nor shall any sum be deducted as contributions toward retirement under said law.
  12. The Supreme Court shall have authority to prescribe rules and regulations reasonably necessary to implement and give effect to the provisions of this section.
  13. Nothing in this section shall abrogate the right of attorneys engaged in a case to agree upon a member of the bar to preside in a case pursuant to Section 165 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890.
  14. The Supreme Court shall prepare the necessary payroll for special judges appointed pursuant to this section and shall submit such payroll to the Department of Finance and Administration.
  15. Special judges appointed pursuant to this section shall direct requests for reimbursement for travel expenses authorized pursuant to this section to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court shall submit such requests to the Department of Finance and Administration. The Supreme Court shall have the power to adopt rules and regulations regarding the administration of travel expenses authorized pursuant to this section.

HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 587, § 3; Laws, 1991, ch. 373, § 2; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 17; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 18, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2014, ch. 407, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2014; Laws, 2018, ch. 391, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 2018).

Editor's Notes —

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1993, ch. 518.

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 18.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment , in (2), in the first sentence, inserted “or upon his own motion,” and “in the event of an emergency or overcrowded docket,” and substituted “serve on a temporary basis” for “serve on an emergency basis,” and in the last sentence, added “for whatever period of time is designated by the Chief Justice” at the end; and substituted “currently” for “presently” in the first sentences of (6) and (10).

The 2014 amendment, in (10), substituted “fifty percent (50%)” for ”twenty-five percent (25%).”

The 2018 amendment, effective March 19, 2018, in (2), inserted “the senior judge of a county court” and “or county” in the first sentence and made related changes, and added the last sentence; in the second sentence of (10), substituted “equal to 1/260ths” for “equal to 1/260”; and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

Cross References —

Designation of certain retired judges as Senior Judges, see §9-1-107.

Recall of retired Supreme Court justices, see §9-3-6.

Services of retired Supreme Court Judges, see §9-3-12.

Compensation of special judge, see §§25-3-53 and25-3-55.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Unless the Supreme Court order appointing a county court judge as special judge specifies otherwise, such county judge would continue to serve in the capacity of a special judge even when his/her elected term ends. 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 595.

Pursuant to subsection (14) of this section, special judges receive compensation from the Department of Finance and Administration. 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 595.

A special judge is entitled to the same power and authority as a regularly elected judge and would be able to carry a firearm under the provisions of §97-37-7. 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 595.

A special judge would be able to conduct marriage ceremonies under the same authority and limitations as a judge in the office to which he has been appointed. 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 595.

A practicing attorney selected as a special judge for service on the Supreme Court may remain of counsel in all cases presently pending in the state and federal courts. However, pursuant to §9-1-25 which applies to any judge of the Supreme Court, a special judge may not be engaged in the practice of law and, therefore, may not practice in any of the state courts during his tenure as a special judge. A special judge may, pursuant to the same statute, practice in the federal courts in any case in which he or she was engaged when appointed. Hurst, May, 21, 2004, A.G. Op. #04-0180.

Assignment of causes or matters to a county judge pursuant to §9-9-35 is by consent of the county judge. Therefore, the latter has discretion is accepting assignments while the former does not appear to have the same authority. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 312.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Substitution of judge in state criminal trial. 45 A.L.R.5th 591.

Construction and validity of state provisions governing designation of substitute, pro tempore, or special judge. 97 A.L.R.5th 537.

Law Reviews.

Recent Trends in Mississippi Judicial Rule Making: Court Power, Judicial Recusals, and Expert Testimony, 23 Miss. C. L. Rev. 1, Fall, 2003.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

I. In general.

1. In general.

2.-5. [Reserved for future use.]

II. Under former §9-1-13.

6. In general.

7. Powers and functions of special judge.

8. Termination of authority.

I. In general.

1. In general.

Trial court properly dismissed individuals’ complaint against the Supreme Court chief justice for appointing a special chancellor to hear outstanding matters regarding two underlying cases as the chief justice enjoyed judicial immunity and the appointment was a judicial act. Vinson v. Prather, 879 So. 2d 1053, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 555 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

An order denying a defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief would not be vacated on the ground that the appointment of the judge who issued the order did not comply with §9-1-105(5) because notice of the appointment was not sent to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, since one who acts pursuant to the color of authority, though without legal authority, nevertheless performs valid acts. Lack v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 626 So. 2d 121, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 484 (Miss. 1993).

2.-5. [Reserved for future use.]

II. Under former § 9-1-13.

6. In general.

Whether a chancellor will call in another chancellor under [Code 1942 § 1652], because of his disqualification, or certify his disqualification to the governor for the appointment of a special chancellor under this section, is a matter pertaining to the administrative functions of his office, and is not subject to review. Anderson v. Anderson, 190 Miss. 508, 200 So. 726, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 72 (Miss. 1941).

Case argued before special judge, sitting for chief justice, and two regular judges, where chief justice resumed seat and read the opinion, it was binding on the parties, the two regular judges hearing the argument concurring therein. Bowles v. Wood, 90 Miss. 742, 44 So. 169, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1907).

7. Powers and functions of special judge.

Constitution § 165, authorizing the Governor to commission a lawyer to preside at a term of the court or in a case necessarily encompasses the right of the commissioned special judge to sign orders and decrees in a case or cases over which he has been designated to preside. De Moe v. McLeod, 228 Miss. 481, 89 So. 2d 730, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 537 (Miss. 1956).

A special chancellor, appointed and commissioned by the Governor under Constitution § 165 to try a suit to confirm title to real estate, has authority to sign a final decree in vacation. De Moe v. McLeod, 228 Miss. 481, 89 So. 2d 730, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 537 (Miss. 1956).

Fact that a special judge presided at the murder trial and regular judge heard and denied a motion for new trial did not constitute reversible error where the motion was properly denied on its merits and there was no showing that a special judge would have sustained the motion. Sims v. State, 209 Miss. 545, 47 So. 2d 849, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 412 (Miss. 1950).

The appointment of a special judge becomes effective upon the signing of his commission by the governor and its attestation by the secretary of state, even though the commission is not received until later by the appointee; and acts done by the appointee after acceptance of the appointment and qualification by taking the prescribed oath are valid. Smith v. State, 200 Miss. 184, 26 So. 2d 543, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 280 (Miss. 1946).

A special judge commissioned under this section is a de facto officer and his acts are valid although he failed to take the required official oath before assuming the duties of office. Powers v. State, 83 Miss. 691, 36 So. 6, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 90 (Miss. 1904), overruled, Jones v. State, 144 Miss. 52, 109 So. 265, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 341 (Miss. 1926).

A special judge, appointed under this section, is empowered to approve the stenographer’s report of the evidence and to sign the bill of exceptions. Lopez v. Jackson, 79 Miss. 460, 31 So. 206, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1901).

A bill of exceptions must be signed by the special judge, where he is appointed under this section [Code 1942 § 1653], and not by the regular judge. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Bowles, 71 Miss. 994, 16 So. 235, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1894).

8. Termination of authority.

Authority of special judge appointed to act for chief justice of the Supreme Court during his illness terminates when chief justice resumes his duties. John E. Hall Com. Co. v. R. L. Crook & Co., 87 Miss. 445, 40 So. 20, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 99 (Miss. 1906).

§ 9-1-107. Senior judges.

  1. Retired Court of Appeals, chancery, circuit or county court judges or retired Supreme Court Justices, who have served as a judge or justice for at least six (6) years and who are either at least sixty-two (62) years of age or are receiving state retirement benefits and who desire to be designated as senior judges of the State of Mississippi shall file a certificate for such designation with the Supreme Court. The certificate shall be in such form as prescribed by the Supreme Court. The filing of such certificate shall place such judge on senior status.
  2. If judges who are placed on senior status are receiving retirement benefits by virtue of the provisions of the Public Employees’ Retirement Law of 1952, appearing as Sections 25-11-1 through 25-11-139, Mississippi Code of 1972, such benefits shall not be reduced in any sum whatsoever because of being placed on senior status or because of service as a special judge, pursuant to Section 9-1-105, nor shall any sum be deducted as contributions toward retirement under such law.
  3. The Supreme Court shall have the authority to promulgate rules and regulations governing the service and tenure of senior judges on senior status, and may remove from senior status any judge who does not comply with the dictates of this statute or who, without good cause, refuses appointment under Section 9-1-105.
  4. Any person appointed as senior judge on senior status hereunder shall, for the period of his service as a special judge pursuant to Section 9-1-105, receive compensation from the state for each day’s service a sum equal to 1/260ths of the current salary in effect for the judicial offices. Any person appointed as a senior judge on senior status shall be reimbursed for travel expenses incurred in the performance of the official duties to which he may be appointed hereunder in the same manner as other public officials and employees as provided by Section 25-3-41, Mississippi Code of 1972. Each judge so serving shall make out an itemized account of the number of days he in good faith served, and make affidavit to same and file it with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The said clerk shall issue a certificate showing the length of time such senior judge or judges on senior status served, and the Department of Finance and Administration shall issue its warrant therefor.
  5. During tenure as a senior judge, senior judges shall be deemed active members of the Mississippi Conference of Judges and shall be required to satisfy the requirements of continuing judicial education.

HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 587, § 4; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 18; Laws, 2001, ch. 348, § 1; Laws, 2016, ch. 377, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 6, 2016).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 27-104-1 provides that the term “Fiscal Management Board” shall mean the “Department of Finance and Administration”.

Laws of 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1993, ch. 518.

On March 1, 2002, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2002, ch. 348, § 1.

Amendment Notes —

The 2001 amendment, in the first sentence of (1), deleted “who are at least sixty-two (62) years of age” following “Justices” and inserted “and who are either at least sixty-two (62) years of age or are receiving retirement benefits” following “eight (8) years.”

The 2016 amendment substituted “six (6) years” for “eight (8) years” in the first sentence of (1); and substituted “sum equal to 1/260ths” for “sum equal to 1/260” in the first sentence of (4).

Cross References —

Appointment of special judges to serve on emergency basis, see §9-1-105.

Recall of retired supreme court justices, see §9-3-6.

Services of retired Supreme Court Judges, see §9-3-12.

Chapter 3. Supreme Court

General Provisions

§ 9-3-1. Districts.

The state shall be divided into three (3) Supreme Court districts, as follows, to wit:

The counties of Bolivar, Claiborne, Copiah, Hinds, Holmes, Humphreys, Issaquena, Jefferson, Kemper, Lauderdale, Leake, Madison, Neshoba, Newton, Noxubee, Rankin, Scott, Sharkey, Sunflower, Warren, Washington and Yazoo shall constitute the First District.

The counties of Adams, Amite, Clarke, Covington, Forrest, Franklin, George, Greene, Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson Davis, Jones, Lamar, Lawrence, Lincoln, Marion, Pearl River, Perry, Pike, Simpson, Smith, Stone, Walthall, Wayne, and Wilkinson shall constitute the Second District.

The counties of Alcorn, Attala, Benton, Calhoun, Carroll, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Clay, Coahoma, DeSoto, Grenada, Itawamba, Lafayette, Lee, Leflore, Lowndes, Marshall, Monroe, Montgomery, Oktibbeha, Panola, Pontotoc, Prentiss, Quitman, Tallahatchie, Tate, Tippah, Tishomingo, Tunica, Union, Webster, Winston and Yalobusha, shall constitute the Third District.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 55, art. 11 (1); 1857, ch. 63, art. 1; 1871, § 402; 1880, § 1397; 1892, § 4337; 1906, § 4900; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3179; 1930, § 3357; 1942, § 1941; Laws, 1987, ch. 491, § 1, eff from and after December 14, 1987 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment).

Cross References —

Civil practice and procedure provisions common to courts, see §§11-1-1 et seq.

Provisions for filling vacancies in the office of judge of the Supreme Court, see §23-15-849.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power of court to impose standard of personal appearance or attire. 73 A.L.R.3d 353.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

State system of electing judges to Supreme Court, including at-large, multi-member features, and east-to-west district lines dividing state into three districts did not dilute black voting strength, and did not violate § 2 of Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965. Magnolia Bar Ass'n v. Lee, 793 F. Supp. 1386, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10889 (S.D. Miss. 1992), aff'd, 994 F.2d 1143, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17043 (5th Cir. Miss. 1993).

§ 9-3-3. Terms of court.

A term of the supreme court shall be held twice in each year in the city of Jackson, to be styled the Supreme Court; and the terms shall commence the second Monday of September and the first Monday of March, and the court shall be kept open for the discharge of business for at least nine months of every year if the business therein should require.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 55, arts. 11 (1), 12; 1857, ch. 63, art. 4; 1871, § 405; 1880, § 1398; 1892, § 4338; 1906, § 4901; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3180; 1930, § 3358; 1942, § 1942; Laws, 1922, ch. 140.

Editor’s Notes —

This section is modified or supplanted by Rule 26(d), Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, as indicated in Appendix II, Statutes Modified or Supplanted, to those Rules.

Cross References —

Exemption of the judiciary from provisions of open meetings law, see §25-41-3.

Period of time for filing unaffected by expiration of term of court, see Miss. R. App. P. 26.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts § 40.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 148, 149.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Appeal would not be reinstated, where motion to reinstate was made after term at which appeal was dismissed and no special circumstances were shown excusing delay. Lampton v. Stevens, 173 Miss. 316, 160 So. 274, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 199 (Miss. 1935).

Appellant should apply for certiorari directing clerk to send up record, on clerk’s failure to certify record within time prescribed by law. Lovett v. Harrison, 162 Miss. 814, 137 So. 471, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1931).

§ 9-3-5. Adjournment, if judges absent; special terms; discontinuances.

If, at the commencement of any regular term, a quorum of the judges shall not be present, it shall be the duty of the clerk to adjourn the court from day to day, by an entry of the fact on the minute-book, for twelve juridical days; and if a quorum of the judges shall not appear by the thirteenth day, and if there should not be a clerk, or he shall not be in attendance, any of the judges of the court in attendance may adjourn it from day to day for twelve juridical days, but if two of the judges shall so order, the court shall stand adjourned to a later day, and notice of the order shall be published, as for a special term. And if there be a failure of the term, it shall be the duty of the judges, or any two of them, to order a special term, at such time as they may appoint, notice of which shall be published in a newspaper published in the city of Jackson, if there be one, and, if not, in some newspaper published at some other place in the state, for three weeks. And after a term has regularly commenced, the court, or any of the judges, may adjourn the court from day to day or from time to time, as may be necessary and proper; and there shall not be a discontinuance of any suit, process, matter, or thing, returned or pending in the court, because a sufficient number of judges shall not attend at the commencement of the term, or at any other day to which the court may have been adjourned; and in case a quorum of judges should not be present at any day to which the court may have been adjourned during a term, a further adjournment may be ordered.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 55, art. 2 (26); 1857, ch. 63, art. 6; 1871, § 407; 1880, § 1400; 1892, § 4340; 1906, § 4904; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3183; 1930, § 3359; 1942, § 1943.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Application of requirement that newspaper be locally published for official notice publication. 85 A.L.R.4th 581.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 22 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 157-159, 161-163.

§ 9-3-6. Recall of retired Supreme Court justices; compensation.

  1. The Supreme Court shall have the authority to request any supreme court justice who has retired from the court, except by defeat at the polls, to return to active service on an emergency basis.
  2. It shall be the duty of such recalled judge, who consents to serve, to assist the court in the disposition of causes pending in the court and in the determination of causes presented to the court, under such rules and regulations as the supreme court may adopt. However, such judge shall not be entitled to vote in the decision of any case heard by the Supreme Court.
  3. No such recalled judge may, during any fiscal year, receive compensation in excess of twenty-five percent (25%) of the current salary in effect for an associate justice of the Supreme Court. While serving under this section, such judge shall be compensated at the monthly rate of a regular supreme court justice.
  4. If such recalled judge is receiving retirement benefits by virtue of the provisions of the Public Employees’ Retirement Law of 1952, appearing as Sections 25-11-1 through 25-11-139, Mississippi Code of 1972, such benefits shall not be reduced in any sum whatsoever because of such service, nor shall any sum be deducted as contributions toward retirement under said act.
  5. The Supreme Court may, by order spread upon its minutes, give a name or title to the judicial positions created by the provisions of this section.

HISTORY: Laws, 1981, ch. 360, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 449, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Cross References —

Appointment of special judges to serve on emergency basis, see §9-1-105.

Designation of certain retired judges as Senior Judges, see §9-1-107.

Services of retired Supreme Court Judges, see §9-3-12.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judges §§ 16, 237.

§ 9-3-7. How cost of notices paid.

The cost of publishing the notices by order of the judges shall be paid out of the appropriation for the judicial department, and the auditor shall issue a warrant therefor on the order of the supreme court allowing the account for making the publication.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1401; 1892, § 4341; 1906, § 4905; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3184; 1930, § 3360; 1942, § 1944.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 7-7-2 provides that the words “State Auditor of Public Accounts,” “State Auditor” and “Auditor” appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor’s functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.

Section §27-104-6, provides that wherever the term “State Fiscal Officer” appears in any law it shall mean “Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration.”

§ 9-3-9. Jurisdiction of the court.

The Supreme Court shall have such jurisdiction as properly belongs to a court of appeals, and shall hear and determine all manner of pleas, complaints, motions, causes, and controversies, civil and criminal, which are now pending therein, or which may be brought before it, and which shall be cognizable in said court; but a cause shall not be removed into said court until after final judgment in the court below, except as provided by Section 9-4-3, or in cases particularly provided for by law; and the Supreme Court may grant new trials and correct errors of the circuit court in granting or refusing the same.

Provided, however, the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be otherwise provided by law in cases and proceedings for modification of any rates charged or sought to be charged to the public by any public utility.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 55, art. 2 (5), ch. 61, art. 7 (1); 1857 ch. 61, art. 166, ch. 63, art. 8; 1871, §§ 409, 648; 1880, §§ 1405, 1720; 1892, § 4345; 1906, § 4909; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3187; 1930, § 3361; 1942, § 1945; Laws, 1983, ch. 467, § 2; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 19, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Cross References —

Jurisdiction of chancery courts in general, see §9-5-81.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts generally, see §§9-7-81 et seq.

Jurisdiction of county court, see §9-9-21.

Civil practice and procedure provisions applicable to courts, see §§11-1-1 et seq.

Appeals from denial of applications to register as an elector, see §§23-15-61 through23-15-79.

Appeal to the Supreme Court of a determination of a contest of a primary election, see §23-15-933.

Judicial review of final decisions of employee appeals board, see §25-9-132.

Appeals to Supreme Court in school board cases, see §37-65-129.

Appeals from chancery courts from decisions as to disciplining of nurses, see §73-15-31.

Appeals from chancery courts in proceedings involving licenses or permits issued by state board of pharmacy, see §73-21-101.

Appeals to Supreme Court in criminal cases, see §§99-35-101 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Questions or legal theories affecting trust estates as subject to consideration on appeal though not raised below. 11 A.L.R.2d 317.

Sufficiency of random sampling of drug or contraband to establish jurisdictional amount required for conviction. 45 A.L.R.5th 1.

Civil actions removable from state court to federal court under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1443. 159 A.L.R. Fed. 377.

Who is “person acting under” officer of United States or any agency thereof for purposes of availability of right to remove state action to federal court under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1). 166 A.L.R. Fed. 297.

Am. Jur.

4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review §§ 75 et seq.

5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review §§ 552, 618.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction in general.

2. —Original jurisdiction.

3. —Cases commenced in justice of the peace court.

4. —Advisory opinions.

5. —Title to property.

6. —Other particular matters.

7. Right of review.

8. Standing.

9. Filing of appeal.

10. Filing of cross-appeal.

11. Effect of appeal.

12. Matters reviewable in general.

13. —Moot issues.

14. —Jurisdiction.

15. —Process.

16. —Rulings on particular motions.

17. —Instructions.

18. —Other particular matters.

19. Presentation and objection in lower court, necessity of.

20. —Issues considered on appeal.

21. —Issues not considered on appeal.

22. Motion for new trial in lower court, necessity of.

23. Requirement of final judgment or order.

24. —Rulings on demurrers.

25. —Rulings on requests for new trials.

26. —Interlocutory decrees or orders.

27. —Other particular rulings or orders.

28. Record on appeal.

29. Review in general.

30. —Abuse of discretion.

31. —Federal questions.

32. —Presumptions.

33. —Comments or argument of counsel.

34. —Comments on failure of defendant to testify.

35. —Comments on failure of defendant to present evidence.

36. —Comments on evidence presented.

37. —Comments to jurors relating to rendition of verdict.

38. —Comments relating to sentencing.

39. —Miscellaneous Comments.

40. —Instructions.

41. —Weight and sufficiency of evidence.

42. —Validity and construction of statutes.

43. Disposition of appeal.

44. —Affirmance.

45. —Reversal; remand.

46. —Granting of new trial.

47. —Dismissal of appeal.

48. —Restitution.

49. Procedure and practice.

50. —Pleading.

51. —Parties.

52. —Evidence.

53. —Judgment.

54. —Attorney fees.

1. Jurisdiction in general.

Jury did not return proper verdict as it was instructed to find for either the husband and wife or the driver, but by its verdict, the jury did neither; only then was the circuit judge authorized to enter a judgment upon that verdict, and since there was no proper verdict, it was improper for the circuit judge to enter a final judgment, and the appellate court did not have jurisdiction under Miss. Code Ann. §9-3-9. Baham v. Sullivan, 924 So. 2d 580, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 1032 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

The Supreme Court’s authority to impose sanctions on a judge is not dependant upon the recommendations of the Commission on Judicial Performance. The Supreme Court has full jurisdiction to increase or diminish sanctions based on its review of the record made before the commission. In re Collins, 524 So. 2d 553, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2932 (Miss. 1987).

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction where there had ceased to be a controversy. Insured Sav. & Loan Asso. v. State, 242 Miss. 547, 135 So. 2d 703, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 592 (Miss. 1961).

Supreme Court cannot temporarily suspend its jurisdiction, confer the same on a circuit court to pass upon a matter, and, after it has done so, to report back to, and reinvest the Supreme Court with jurisdiction. Copeland v. Robertson, 236 Miss. 95, 108 So. 2d 419, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 299 (Miss. 1959).

On appeal to Supreme Court, it is primary duty of court to determine ex mero motu its jurisdiction of cause. Roach v. Black Creek Drainage Dist., 206 Miss. 794, 41 So. 2d 5, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 301 (Miss. 1949).

What properly belongs to a court of appeals depends on consideration of public policy, and is mainly to be determined by the legislature. The legislature has the power to make a decision of a lower court final. Dismukes v. Stokes, 41 Miss. 430, 1867 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 1867), but see De La Beckwith v. State, 615 So. 2d 1134, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 807 (Miss. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 884, 114 S. Ct. 232, 126 L. Ed. 2d 187, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 5961 (U.S. 1993).

2. —Original jurisdiction.

Supreme Court would not act as trial court and would not invoke its discretionary jurisdiction to hear Governor’s petition, brought in his capacity as Governor and Administrator of Medicaid Division, for mandamus or prohibition to prevent Attorney General from proceeding with suit against tobacco companies for reimbursement of medicaid expenditures on ground that he lacked authority to do so. In re Fordice, 691 So. 2d 429, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 104 (Miss. 1997).

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition. State v. Maples, 402 So. 2d 350, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2151 (Miss. 1981).

3. —Cases commenced in justice of the peace court.

Supreme Court has no jurisdiction where circuit court acquired no jurisdiction on appeal from police justice of city, and may dismiss on its own motion. Rodgers v. Hattiesburg, 99 Miss. 639, 55 So. 481, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 234 (Miss. 1911).

Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on appeal where no judgment of justice of peace is filed in circuit court. Rayborn v. Cothern, 43 So. 70 (Miss. 1907), overruled, Jones v. State, 155 Miss. 364, 123 So. 882, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1929); Jones v. State, 47 So. 479 (Miss. 1908); Murphy v. Hutchinson, 47 So. 666 (Miss. 1908), overruled, Jones v. State, 155 Miss. 364, 123 So. 882, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1929); Donald Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Marsh, 48 So. 230 (Miss. 1909).

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction of a suit begun in the court of a justice of the peace where the record does not show the proceedings in that court nor a bond for appeal to the circuit court, and the case will be dismissed by the Supreme Court of its own motion. Ruff v. Montgomery, 83 Miss. 184, 35 So. 465, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1903), overruled, Jones v. State, 155 Miss. 364, 123 So. 882, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1929).

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction of a case begun in the court of a justice of the peace, unless the circuit court had jurisdiction. Ball, Brown & Co. v. Sledge, 82 Miss. 747, 35 So. 214, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 199 (Miss. 1903), overruled, Jones v. State, 155 Miss. 364, 123 So. 882, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1929).

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of an appeal by a claimant from the circuit court in cases originating in a justice’s court where the property claimed exceeds fifty dollars in value and has been by the circuit court subjected to execution for more than that sum, although the amount in controversy in the original suit was less than fifty dollars. Andrews v. Partee, 79 Miss. 80, 29 So. 788, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1901).

4. —Advisory opinions.

The Supreme Court does not give advisory opinions. Gangloff v. State, 232 Miss. 395, 99 So. 2d 461, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 285 (Miss. 1958).

Motion filed, as a suggestion of error, for advisory opinion which may be of advantage to the administration of justice by clarification of certain matters must be overruled when no action by Supreme Court is sought by way of changing the judgment rendered or otherwise than an advisory opinion. Gipson v. State, 203 Miss. 434, 35 So. 2d 327, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 289 (Miss. 1948).

The importance of questions submitted does not give to Supreme Court power to render advisory opinions which it does not have under the Constitution and law. Gipson v. State, 203 Miss. 434, 35 So. 2d 327, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 289 (Miss. 1948).

The Supreme Court has no power or duty to render advisory opinions. Van Norman v. Barney, 199 Miss. 581, 25 So. 2d 324, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 228 (Miss. 1946); Sheldon v. Ladner, 205 Miss. 264, 38 So. 2d 718, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 428 (Miss. 1949).

5. —Title to property.

Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to make conclusive adjudication of title to property on appeal of proceeding under Code 1942, § 948, begun in justice of peace court, where neither justice of peace court nor circuit court on appeal had jurisdiction to make final and conclusive adjudication of title to property as between parties to litigation. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Supreme Court, circuit courts, chancery courts and county courts, when acting on appeal from a special possessory court of a justice or justices of peace, have only such jurisdiction to adjudicate regarding title to land as is vested in special court from which appeal was taken. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

6. —Other particular matters.

The Supreme Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal by the State from a dismissal with prejudice for violation of §99-17-1’s 270-day rule under §99-35-103(a). State v. Harrison, 648 So. 2d 66, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 633 (Miss. 1994).

Although the Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi Bar provide for reinstatement through petition, an order of automatic reinstatement is within the scope of the Supreme Court’s exclusive and inherent jurisdiction of attorney discipline matters. Broome v. Mississippi Bar, 603 So. 2d 349, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 385 (Miss. 1992).

Unless some property rights are involved, civil courts have no jurisdiction over ecclesiastical controversy and are without jurisdiction to decide who is, or who ought to be, presiding bishop of the diocese. Conic v. Cobbins, 208 Miss. 203, 44 So. 2d 52, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1950).

Provision in church manual permitting bishops to retain 10% of all monies raised by them in their respective dioceses does not give an ousted bishop such property rights in monies raised by his successor in the diocese as to entitle him to invoke jurisdiction of civil courts as to the 10% claimed by him. Conic v. Cobbins, 208 Miss. 203, 44 So. 2d 52, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1950).

An application to file a bill of review based on newly discovered evidence, even after affirmance by the Supreme Court of the decree sought to be avoided, should be made to the chancery court which rendered the decree and not to the Supreme Court. Hall v. Waddill, 78 Miss. 16, 27 So. 936, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1900).

7. Right of review.

Where defendant did not cite any authority to support his claim that he was entitled to jury instruction on lesser included offense of simple assault, claim was barred. Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court is not under obligation to review all capital murder sentences to determine whether death sentence is appropriate in particular case, but Court must determine whether sentence is excessive or disproportionate to penalty imposed in similar cases. Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030, 117 S. Ct. 588, 136 L. Ed. 2d 517, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7523 (U.S. 1996).

Supreme Court has judicial review of any action by the Mississippi Gaming Commission that exceeds its statutory authority. Casino Magic Corp. v. Ladner, 666 So. 2d 452, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 651 (Miss. 1995).

The State did not have the authority to appeal from an order granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict rendered by the trial court to the defendant in a criminal case. State v. Insley, 606 So. 2d 600, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 532 (Miss. 1992).

An order revoking a suspension of sentence is not appealable. Kittrell v. State, 201 Miss. 514, 29 So. 2d 313, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 412 (Miss. 1947).

Appeal by plaintiff from judgment of circuit court is barred by acceptance of payment of judgment. Adams v. Carter, 92 Miss. 579, 47 So. 409, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1908) but see Davis v. Noblitt & Capers Electric Co., 594 So. 2d 610, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 1992).

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction of an appeal prosecuted by a municipality from a judgment of the circuit court discharging one arrested for violating an ordinance of the municipality. City of Water Valley v. Davis, 73 Miss. 521, 19 So. 235, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 156 (Miss. 1895).

8. Standing.

Owners of residential property located near property that was rezoned by the city had standing to appeal from a decision of the circuit court regarding the rezoning classification since the value of their property might be affected by the zoning of the subject property. Luter v. Oakhurst Associates, Ltd., 529 So. 2d 889, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 332 (Miss. 1988).

A municipal taxpayer and owner of property rezoned by the city had standing to prosecute an appeal from the circuit court’s reversal of the city’s decision to rezone, and was a proper party appellant. Luter v. Hammon, 529 So. 2d 625, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 336 (Miss. 1988).

Objection of multifariousness in enjoining makers and assignees of notes not considered on appeal where only makers can be prejudiced and they make no complaint. Coast Realty & Colony Co. v. Security Trust Co., 118 Miss. 690, 79 So. 848, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1918).

9. Filing of appeal.

Where the judgment of the court complained of in a personal injury action was entered on the minutes of the court on September 8th, 1939, the court adjourned on September 22nd, 1939, an appeal bond filed and approved on March 21, 1930, more than six months after the entry of judgment but less than six months after the adjournment of the court, was not filed within time, the six months’ limitation on the time within which to appeal from the judgment beginning on the day after it was rendered. Johnson v. Mississippi Power Co., 189 Miss. 67, 196 So. 642, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 1940).

Statutes limiting time for appeals are mandatory and jurisdictional. Turner v. Simmons, 99 Miss. 28, 54 So. 658, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 7 (Miss. 1910).

Where appeal, in case involving rights of the parties to an office, is not filed in time for court to decide question while their rights are existent, and when the case is reached neither is entitled to it, the case will be dismissed. Pafhausen v. State, 94 Miss. 103, 47 So. 897, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 29 (Miss. 1908).

Where appeal bond filed within two years but citation not served on appellee nor transcript filed in Supreme Court within that time, the appeal will be dismissed. Beasley v. Cottrell, 94 Miss. 253, 47 So. 662, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 22 (Miss. 1908).

10. Filing of cross-appeal.

Where defendant did not prosecute a cross-appeal from a judgment assessing him with costs of the appeal to circuit court and the cost of the trial de novo therein, such judgment is final, even if the cause should be affirmed. Douglas v. Warren, 44 So. 2d 853 (Miss. 1950).

Supreme court refused to review chancellor’s refusal to grant complainant damages in action to quiet title on defendant’s appeal where no cross-appeal was filed by complainant. Duncan v. Mars, 44 So. 2d 529 (Miss. 1950).

In absence of cross-appeal and appellee’s declaration failing to demand full amount sheriff could have successfully sued for as fees for serving overseers’ commissions, supreme court cannot increase judgment, but will affirm judgment recovered. Forrest County v. Thompson, 204 Miss. 628, 37 So. 2d 787, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 395 (Miss. 1948).

No cross-appeal lies from judgment by which appellee obtains in trial court amount demanded by his declaration. Forrest County v. Thompson, 204 Miss. 628, 37 So. 2d 787, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 395 (Miss. 1948).

No cross-appeal is necessary to obtain judgment in supreme court for fees fixed by statute when amount approved by supreme court is less than amount awarded appellee in trial court. Forrest County v. Thompson, 204 Miss. 628, 37 So. 2d 787, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 395 (Miss. 1948).

Appellee may file cross assignment of error. Webb Sumner Oil Mill v. Southern Coal Co., 129 Miss. 127, 91 So. 698, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 1922).

Cross appeal and cross assignment of errors not considered where filed after submission of case. Reid v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 94 Miss. 639, 47 So. 670, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 323 (Miss. 1909).

11. Effect of appeal.

Lower court without power to proceed further with trial until appeal disposed of. Jennings v. Shapira, 131 Miss. 596, 95 So. 305, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 198 (Miss. 1923).

12. Matters reviewable in general.

Defendant’s double jeopardy claim was properly before the appellate court because it was considered a final judgment pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §11-51-3. Roberson v. State, 856 So. 2d 532, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 404 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 859 So. 2d 1017, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 569 (Miss. 2003).

Supreme Court can only review matters on appeal as were considered by lower court. Ditto v. Hinds County, 665 So. 2d 878, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 585 (Miss. 1995).

Supreme Court may not act upon or consider matters which do not appear in record and must confine itself to what actually does appear in record. Ditto v. Hinds County, 665 So. 2d 878, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 585 (Miss. 1995).

The issue of whether the interrogation of a juvenile without the presence of his mother was violative of statutory law was not moot and would be addressed on appeal, even though the juvenile’s sentence of 6 months’ probation had been completed, since appellate review of the issue was necessary in order to avoid future repetition by law enforcement officers. M.A.C. v. Harrison County Family Court, 566 So. 2d 472, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 449 (Miss. 1990).

Assignment of error not considered where decision will not affect right of appellant. Ramsay v. Ramsay, 125 Miss. 185, 87 So. 491, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 113 (Miss. 1921).

Supreme Court on determining bill without equity will not retain case because of great public importance in order to settle principles. Lampton v. Edwards, 54 So. 245 (Miss. 1911).

Question settled by Supreme Court not open for review unless resulting evil is manifest and mischievous. Moss Point Lumber Co. v. Board of Sup'rs, 89 Miss. 448, 42 So. 290, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 103 (Miss. 1906).

13. —Moot issues.

Although judicial discipline proceeding was moot insofar as it required that judge leave office since he had already left office and was not a candidate for reelection, Supreme Court would hear case given that judicial conduct is a matter of great public interest and Supreme Court decisions on same serve as guide for entire judiciary. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Dodds, 680 So. 2d 180, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 425 (Miss. 1996).

An appeal from a judgment affirming a decision of the board of trustees of a school district to expel a student was not rendered moot by the student’s completion of the semester while the appeal was pending. The expulsion, if upheld, should have as its legal consequence the nullification of the student’s credit for the semester in question, thus the case is not moot. Furthermore, school expulsions or suspensions are, in most instances, capable of repetition yet evade review. Jones v. Board of Trustees, 524 So. 2d 968, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 1988).

Supreme Court will not adjudicate moot questions and will not render judgment which is unenforceable and useless. Sheldon v. Ladner, 205 Miss. 264, 38 So. 2d 718, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 428 (Miss. 1949).

Appeal in suit to enjoin election not entertained after election is held. McDaniel v. Hurt, 92 Miss. 197, 41 So. 381, 190 Miss. LEXIS 3 (Miss. 1907).

14. —Jurisdiction.

If chancellor sustains demurrer to bill in equity on ground of no equity jurisdiction and declines jurisdiction when in fact case is good one in equity, his action is reviewable by Supreme Court. McClendon v. Mississippi State Highway Com., 205 Miss. 71, 38 So. 2d 325, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 413 (Miss. 1949).

Question of whether chancery court has full or general jurisdiction of proceedings to remove disabilities of minority under § 159(f), Constitution of 1890, because chancery court was invested with jurisdiction for removal of disabilities of minority when Constitution became effective will not be passed on by Supreme Court when another decisive question will dispose of case. Dyer v. Russell, 204 Miss. 719, 38 So. 2d 104, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 400 (Miss. 1948).

The question of sufficiency of process may be raised in the Supreme Court for the first time. Khoury v. Saik, 203 Miss. 155, 33 So. 2d 616, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1948).

Whether cross bill presents matter of common law or equity jurisdiction will not be first considered on appeal. Schaff v. Kahn & Bernstein, 121 Miss. 412, 83 So. 622, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1919).

Order of chancellor sustaining demurrers to bill and ordering transfer to the circuit court is appealable. Robertson v. F. Goodman Dry Goods Co., 115 Miss. 210, 76 So. 149, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1917).

Defendant not objecting to jurisdiction of chancery court and filing cross bill held estopped on appeal from questioning jurisdiction. Indianola Compress & Storage Co. v. Southern R. Co., 110 Miss. 602, 70 So. 703, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 88 (Miss. 1915).

Question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Gardner v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co., 78 Miss. 640, 29 So. 469, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 160 (Miss. 1900), overruled, Jones v. State, 155 Miss. 364, 123 So. 882, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1929); Ruff v. Montgomery, 83 Miss. 184, 35 So. 465, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1903), overruled, Jones v. State, 155 Miss. 364, 123 So. 882, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1929); McPhail v. Blann, 47 So. 666 (Miss. 1908), overruled, Jones v. State, 155 Miss. 364, 123 So. 882, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1929); Greenwood v. Weaver, 96 Miss. 604, 50 So. 981, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 154 (Miss. 1910); Rodgers v. Hattiesburg, 99 Miss. 639, 55 So. 481, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 234 (Miss. 1911); Xydias v. Pellman, 121 Miss. 400, 83 So. 620, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 174 (Miss. 1919); Brasham v. State, 140 Miss. 712, 106 So. 280, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 306 (Miss. 1925).

15. —Process.

Writ of seizure returnable in middle of term of circuit court is triable at next succeeding term, and judgment entered at term at which return is erroneous, and though not subject to collateral attack may be corrected by appeal. Willsford v. Meyer-Kiser Corp., 139 Miss. 387, 104 So. 293, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 165 (Miss. 1925).

Lower court may after appeal correct sheriff’s return so as to show valid service and such amendment will be considered by appellate court. H. Lupkin & Sons v. Russell, 108 Miss. 742, 67 So. 185, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 267 (Miss. 1915).

16. —Rulings on particular motions.

Where a trial court has granted an additur or, in the alternative, a new trial on the issue of damages only, the defendant only may elect (1) to reject the additur and have the case retried on the issue of damages only, (2) to appeal to the Supreme Court on grounds that the trial court should not have granted the additur at all or, alternatively, that the additur granted was legally excessive, or (3) to accept the additur and pay the judgment; the plaintiff can only appeal to the Supreme Court arguing that the trial court abused its discretion and that the additur is legally inadequate. Odom v. Roberts, 606 So. 2d 114, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1992).

Where a trial court has granted a remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial on the issue of damages only, the plaintiff only may elect (1) to reject the remittitur and have the case retried on the issue of damages only, (2) to appeal to the Supreme Court on grounds that the circuit court should not have granted the remittitur at all or, alternatively, that the remittitur granted was legally excessive, or (3) to accept the remittitur; in such a case, the defendant’s only procedural avenue is to appeal to the Supreme Court arguing that the trial court abused its discretion and that the remittitur was legally inadequate. Odom v. Roberts, 606 So. 2d 114, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1992).

Where a trial court has denied a remittitur, the defendant may appeal to the Supreme Court on grounds that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order the remittitur and, if the defendant can convince the Supreme Court on that score, the defendant may argue that the damage award be reduced to such an amount as would no longer be contrary to the overwhelming weight of the credible evidence; if the defendant should be successful, the plaintiff would then have the option of accepting the remittitur or going to trial again on the issue of damages only. Odom v. Roberts, 606 So. 2d 114, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1992).

Where a trial court has denied a plaintiff’s motion for an additur, the plaintiff may appeal on grounds that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order an additur, whereupon it becomes incumbent upon the Supreme Court, if it finds that the trial court did abuse its discretion, to order an additur up to the point where the verdict is no longer so low that it is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the credible evidence; the right to accept the additur (and pay the judgment) on pain of a new trial on damages only lies exclusively with the defendant. Odom v. Roberts, 606 So. 2d 114, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1992).

Where demurrer improperly sustained as to one of two counts of declaration, appellate court will not pass on question presented by other. Hudson v. Mississippi C. R. Co., 95 Miss. 41, 48 So. 289, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 204 (Miss. 1909).

Overruling accused’s objection to bill of particulars not reviewed on appeal unless gross abuse of discretion shown. Richberger v. State, 90 Miss. 806, 44 So. 772, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1907).

17. —Instructions.

In employee’s suit against employer for damages for wrongful discharge, where no appeal is taken by employee from judgment entered pursuant to peremptory instruction to return verdict for unpaid salary to date of judgment, correctness of the instruction, which resulted in disallowance of incidental damages claimed by employee, is not before the Supreme Court. Masonite Corp. v. Handshoe, 208 Miss. 166, 44 So. 2d 41, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 1950).

Peremptory instruction granted, marked and filed became part of record and reviewable on appeal. McCorkle v. Illinois C. R. Co., 101 Miss. 124, 57 So. 419, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1912).

18. —Other particular matters.

Once a judge has exercised his or her discretion and determined that a juror probably could not be impartial, that determination may not be assigned on appeal as error. Coverson v. State, 617 So. 2d 642, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 168 (Miss. 1993).

Decision of judge as to legality of place designated for holding court other than the regular court house not open to collateral attack. Brookhaven Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 132 Miss. 689, 97 So. 484, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1923).

Judgment dismissing action for untruthfulness of allegation of poverty in affidavit in lieu of security for costs is reviewable by Supreme Court. Feazell v. Soltzfus, 98 Miss. 886, 54 So. 444 (Miss. 1910).

19. Presentation and objection in lower court, necessity of.

Where party against whom motion for summary judgment is made wishes to attack one or more of affidavits upon which motion is based, he must file in trial court motion to strike affidavit, and failure to file motion to strike constitutes waiver of any objection to affidavit. Travis v. Stewart, 680 So. 2d 214, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 530 (Miss. 1996).

Objection to use of affidavit in connection with summary judgment motion may not be raised for first time on appeal. Travis v. Stewart, 680 So. 2d 214, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 530 (Miss. 1996).

Failure to raise a specific objection to testimony at trial will result in a waiver of this point on appeal. Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 707, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 411 (Miss. 1996).

Although the justice of the peace or the mayor or the police justice, in appeals from their courts, are required to transmit to the proper clerk a certified copy of the record of the proceedings, if no objection is made to the transcript before or during the trial of the case on its merits, it will be conclusively presumed that the transcript was before the court and complied in every respect with the law, and no error can be predicated on that ground on appeal to the supreme court. Whittington v. State, 218 Miss. 631, 67 So. 2d 515, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 581 (Miss. 1953).

Errors committed in county court, not complained of in circuit court on appeal thereto, are waived, and will not be considered in the Supreme Court. Eaton v. Hattiesburg Auto Sales Co., 151 Miss. 211, 117 So. 534, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 298 (Miss. 1928).

Question of trial errors not raised below may not be raised on appeal. De Laval Separator Co. v. Cutts, 142 Miss. 379, 107 So. 522, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1926).

Consideration of points first made on suggestion of error optional with court. Mars v. Germany, 135 Miss. 387, 100 So. 23, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 1924).

New points raised by suggestion of error not considered. Lusk v. Seal, 129 Miss. 228, 91 So. 386, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1922).

20. —Issues considered on appeal.

A search and seizure question was preserved for review by the Supreme Court, even though the defendant did not use the term “Fourth Amendment” or “Section 23” at the initial suppression hearing, where there was no doubt that the defendant was seeking protection of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 3, § 23 of the Mississippi Constitution. Longstreet v. State, 592 So. 2d 16, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 840 (Miss. 1991).

Errors affecting fundamental rights are exceptions to rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Brooks v. State, 209 Miss. 150, 46 So. 2d 94, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 373 (Miss. 1950).

Where defendant failed to object to search warrant when offered in evidence but did request peremptory instruction and, after trial, made motion in arrest of judgment, the Supreme Court will treat the question as though defendant made timely objection. Jenkins v. State, 207 Miss. 281, 42 So. 2d 198, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 338 (Miss. 1949).

Insufficiency of bigamy indictment may be raised for first time on appeal when indictment is fatally defective for failure to set forth time, place and circumstance of former marriage, or name of person with whom former marriage is alleged to have been contracted. Wash v. State, 206 Miss. 858, 41 So. 2d 29, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 307 (Miss. 1949).

21. —Issues not considered on appeal.

Party was procedurally barred from raising issue of alleged error in use of jury instruction where no contemporaneous objection was made. Lewis v. Hiatt, 683 So. 2d 937, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 632 (Miss. 1996).

Defendant’s argument as to portion of jury instruction to which no objection was made at trial was procedurally barred. Tran v. State, 681 So. 2d 514, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 432 (Miss. 1996).

Defendant waived appellate review of his claim that trial court erred in allowing evidence of marijuana and syringes at his trial for possession of methamphetamine; in his objection at trial, defendant complained of relevancy of marijuana to methamphetamine charge, but on appeal, his claim was bottomed on prejudicial effect of introduction of evidence on jury’s decision. (Per Smith, J., with the Chief Justice, a Presiding Justice, and one Justice concurring, two Justices concurring in result only, and a Presiding Justice concurring and joining in separate concurrence.) Townsend v. State, 681 So. 2d 497, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 414 (Miss. 1996).

Defendant convicted of possessing methamphetamine waived appellate review of his claim that trial court erred by refusing his instruction which correctly spoke to jury’s need to find that defendant was “beyond a reasonable doubt,” “aware of the presence and character of the particular substance . . . and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it”; defense counsel refused to delete portions of that proposed instruction that trial court found offending and superfluous, and defendant, without objection, refused to submit amended version upon trial court’s request. Townsend v. State, 681 So. 2d 497, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 414 (Miss. 1996).

Contention by plaintiff in medical malpractice action that defendants had improperly supported motion for summary judgment with affidavit of expert witness whose identity had not previously been disclosed despite request by plaintiff for disclosure of identity and opinions of experts who would be used at trial was waived and could not be considered on appeal where plaintiff did not file motion to strike affidavit or file rebuttal affidavit. Travis v. Stewart, 680 So. 2d 214, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 530 (Miss. 1996).

Justice court judge obstructed justice where, after being served with formal complaint by Commission on Judicial Performance, he circulated order to Constables and members of staff demanding that they deliver to him official and unofficial notes and evidence relating to cases and allegations against him and that failure to abide by his orders would constitute grounds for contempt, even though judge never executed order as it was an attempt to knowingly and intentionally intimidate staff in performance of their duties and as potential witnesses against judge. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Dodds, 680 So. 2d 180, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 425 (Miss. 1996).

Defendants, by failing to object at trial, waived any error in admission of police officer’s testimony that he had asked one defendant, whose child died from cocaine overdose, whether cocaine was used as a tool to quiet the child. Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 707, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 411 (Miss. 1996).

Trial issue raised for first time in defendant’s rebuttal brief on appeal would not be considered. Sanders v. State, 678 So. 2d 663, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 300 (Miss. 1996).

Court will not consider issues raised for first time in rebuttal brief on appeal; appellants cannot be allowed to ambush appellees in their rebuttal briefs, thereby denying appellees opportunity to respond to appellants’ arguments. Sanders v. State, 678 So. 2d 663, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 300 (Miss. 1996).

Mother was procedurally barred from raising on appeal claim that Chancellor erred in ordering mother and her current husband to take a drug test, the failure of which would result in change of custody, where she failed to make a contemporaneous objection. Riley v. Doerner, 677 So. 2d 740, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1996).

Passenger’s objection “for the record” to jury instruction requiring verdict for driver if jury found that one vehicle accident was “unavoidable” was not put to court in specific meaningful manner and resulted in waiver of issue on appeal. Shields v. Easterling, 676 So. 2d 293, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 307 (Miss. 1996).

The rule that questions not raised in the lower court will not be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court applies to the Supreme Court’s review of appeals involving collateral attacks originating in the lower court as well as its review of convictions flowing in the wake of direct appeal, and is particularly true where constitutional questions are involved; thus, a post-conviction relief petitioner, by failing to attack the constitutionality of the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (§§99-39-1 et seq.) in the lower court, waived any error in this regard and could not seek reversal of the trial court’s ruling in the Supreme Court. Patterson v. State, 594 So. 2d 606, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 42 (Miss. 1992).

A defendant failed to preserve for appeal the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing the defendant’s request for a preliminary determination as to whether his prior convictions could be used for impeachment, where the defendant did not make a proffer of the testimony that he would have offered. Settles v. State, 584 So. 2d 1260, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 456 (Miss. 1991).

Fact that judgment of conviction in prosecution for assault and battery with intent to kill and murder erroneously recites that case was tried by jury of twelve consisting of named juror and eleven others, named juror being member of regular jury panel for term but not in fact on this jury, will not be considered by supreme court on appeal when affidavits setting forth facts were filed long after motion for new trial had been overruled and after court term had adjourned, and matter was not presented to trial court for correction. Craig v. State, 208 Miss. 528, 44 So. 2d 860, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 270 (Miss. 1950).

Where suit was brought against vendor of realty for breach of warranty based on prior owner’s reservation of one half of minerals and was tried on assumption that reservation was valid, Supreme Court refused to consider validity of reservation for first time on appeal. Meredith v. Pratt, 208 Miss. 412, 44 So. 2d 521, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 257 (Miss. 1950).

Where assignment of error related to improper remarks of district attorney which did not appear in the record and no special bill of exceptions was actually taken, Supreme Court refused to notice the alleged error. Page v. State, 208 Miss. 347, 44 So. 2d 459, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1950).

Purchaser of real property who refuses to carry out contract to purchase on other grounds cannot, on appeal from judgment in favor of vendor, raise the objection to form of deed tendered that it required vendee to pay taxes, since grantor did not have opportunity to meet this objection, which he might have corrected had any request been made that he do so. Vanlandingham v. Jenkins, 207 Miss. 882, 43 So. 2d 578, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 399 (Miss. 1949).

Exclusion of evidence by trial court will not be considered on appeal when evidence offered was large box of vouchers and invoices, offered en masse, without individual consideration of their materiality, and appellant failed to offer any individual exhibit although court offered to permit any or all papers to be identified, their materiality shown and introduction then made. Shaw v. Bula Cannon Shops, Inc., 205 Miss. 458, 38 So. 2d 916, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 443 (Miss. 1949).

Objection to admission of evidence must be specific; general objection to admission of evidence overruled not considered on appeal, unless evidence was inadmissible for any purpose. Bessler Movable Stairway Co. v. Bank of Leakesville, 140 Miss. 537, 106 So. 445, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1925).

In absence of record objection, no complaint of admission of statement will be heard. Bowman v. State, 141 Miss. 115, 106 So. 264, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 218 (Miss. 1925).

Point as to validity of Sunday contract, not raised directly or inferentially in the court below, will not be considered on appeal. Gilliam v. McLemore, 141 Miss. 253, 106 So. 99, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 213 (Miss. 1925).

Objection to revivor in administrator’s name cannot be made for first time on appeal. Weaver v. Turner, 125 Miss. 250, 87 So. 641, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 114 (Miss. 1921).

Failure to object below to misnaming of complainant precluded raising point on appeal. National Surety Co. v. Board of Sup'rs, 120 Miss. 706, 83 So. 8, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 125 (Miss. 1919).

On appeal from order discharging receiver and awarding damages subsequent order of court is not reviewable. Huston v. King, 119 Miss. 347, 80 So. 779, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 7 (Miss. 1919).

Objection to want of arraignment of accused, not made in court below, not considered on appeal. Washington v. State, 93 Miss. 270, 46 So. 539, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 95 (Miss. 1908).

Rulings on admission and exclusion of evidence will not be considered on appeal where motion for new trial did not direct court’s attention to particular rulings. Carpenter v. Savage, 93 Miss. 233, 46 So. 537, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1908).

22. Motion for new trial in lower court, necessity of.

Contention that verdict in suit for property damage growing out of collision of automobiles was contrary to overwhelming weight of evidence is not properly presented for review on appeal, where no motion for new trial was filed in the lower court raising point. Gilmer v. Gunter, 46 So. 2d 447 (Miss. 1950).

The attorney general may waive motion for a new trial as a prerequisite for appeal in a criminal prosecution. Holmes v. State, 201 Miss. 509, 29 So. 2d 312, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 411 (Miss. 1947).

While motion for new trial is unnecessary to obtain review in Supreme Court, unless made on grounds which would set aside or modify judgment and could not otherwise be considered by trial judge, complaining party has right to make it, and judgment is not final until disposed of, if seasonably made. Moore v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 Miss. 420, 156 So. 875, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 204 (Miss.), aff'd, Moore v. Montgomery-Ward & Co., 158 So. 148 (Miss. 1934).

Failure to move for new trial defeats review as to inadequacy of damages. Tendall v. Davis, 129 Miss. 30, 91 So. 701, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 17 (Miss. 1922).

The purpose of rule 6 of the rules of the Supreme Court is to dispense with the necessity for a motion for new trial when the error assigned is based upon any ruling made in the trial, but in the absence of error in any of the rulings of the trial court, the rule in question does not dispense with the necessity for a motion for a new trial when the assignment of error is based solely upon objection to the amount of the verdict. Coccora v. Vicksburg Light & Traction Co., 126 Miss. 713, 89 So. 257, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1921).

23. Requirement of final judgment or order.

Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal because a chancellor’s interim judgment was interlocutory in nature and not a final, appealable judgment where the language in the interim judgment that it was a final judgment had been scratched out and initialed by the chancellor, the chancellor had apparently not ruled on a pending issue regarding attorneys’ fees, and there was no final judgment certification. Lewis v. Harvey (In re Estate of Lewis), 135 So.3d 202, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 141 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).

An appeal cannot be taken in a criminal case from a verdict of the jury without the judgment and sentence of the court having been rendered. Lang v. State, 238 Miss. 677, 119 So. 2d 608, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 456 (Miss. 1960).

Without decree, no appeal will lie from chancery court to Supreme Court, and when there is no decree of any kind signed, or filed in proper office, and no application for appeal, motion to dismiss appeal must be sustained although record discloses admission by parties that interlocutory decree had been entered by chancery court. In re Graham's Estate, 208 Miss. 857, 45 So. 2d 726, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 305 (Miss. 1950).

Final judgment of circuit court is judgment adjudicating merits of controversy. Roach v. Black Creek Drainage Dist., 206 Miss. 794, 41 So. 2d 5, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 301 (Miss. 1949).

While a judgment which adjudicates everything material to the determination of the cause, and which, when executed according to its terms, will give all the relief which could be afforded is final, a necessary qualification of this rule is, that, if a motion for the setting aside of a judgment is filed before the end of the term of the court at which it was rendered, the finality of the judgment is thereby suspended and the limitation on the time for an appeal begins when, but not until, the motion is disposed of. Johnson v. Mississippi Power Co., 189 Miss. 67, 196 So. 642, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 1940).

No appeal is allowable from circuit court judgment unless in all respects final. State ex rel. Rice v. Large, 171 Miss. 330, 157 So. 694, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 253 (Miss. 1934).

Judgment, putting statute of limitations respecting appeals into operation, lacks finality until final disposition of seasonable motion for new trial or other proper motion challenging it. Moore v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 Miss. 420, 156 So. 875, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 204 (Miss.), aff'd, Moore v. Montgomery-Ward & Co., 158 So. 148 (Miss. 1934).

The Supreme Court is without jurisdiction of an appeal in a criminal case which is prosecuted before judgment from a verdict convicting the appellant and will of its own motion dismiss it. Hayden v. State, 81 Miss. 55, 32 So. 922, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1902).

The court has no jurisdiction of an appeal by the state in criminal cases except from final judgments. State v. McDowell, 72 Miss. 138, 17 So. 213, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1894).

24. —Rulings on demurrers.

Order of circuit court from which appeal was taken to effect that demurrer to petition was heard and considered and it is ordered that demurrer be sustained and petitioners praying appeal to supreme court it is ordered that same be granted is not final judgment and not appealable. Roach v. Black Creek Drainage Dist., 206 Miss. 794, 41 So. 2d 5, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 301 (Miss. 1949).

No appeal is allowable from circuit court judgment unless judgment is in all respects final, and order ruling on demurrer, which goes no further than to rule on demurrer, is no final judgment. Roach v. Black Creek Drainage Dist., 206 Miss. 794, 41 So. 2d 5, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 301 (Miss. 1949).

Supreme Court is without jurisdiction of case by appeal from order of circuit court sustaining demurrer to petition and granting appeal and case so appealed must be dismissed. Roach v. Black Creek Drainage Dist., 206 Miss. 794, 41 So. 2d 5, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 301 (Miss. 1949).

In quo warranto proceeding order merely ruling on demurrer was not appealable. State ex rel. Rice v. Large, 171 Miss. 330, 157 So. 694, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 253 (Miss. 1934).

Judgment sustaining demurrer to declaration not a final judgment. Bank of Courtland v. Long Creek Drainage Dist., 133 Miss. 531, 97 So. 881, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 161 (Miss. 1923).

Where demurrer sustained to bill and 60 days granted in which to amend, appeal then taken from order sustaining demurrer should be dismissed. Armstrong v. Moore, 112 Miss. 511, 73 So. 566, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1917).

Sustaining demurrer and allowing thirty days to file amended bill without dismissing bill was not a final decree. Moore v. Evans, 98 Miss. 855, 54 So. 438, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1910).

Ruling on demurrer in action at law not reviewed where no final judgment rendered by trial court. Tate County v. Bourland, 42 So. 379 (Miss. 1906).

25. —Rulings on requests for new trials.

After motion for new trial is filed, judgment finally disposing of case, prior to which no appeal to Supreme Court will lie, is judgment overruling motion for new trial. Shaw v. Bula Cannon Shops, Inc., 205 Miss. 458, 38 So. 2d 916, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 443 (Miss. 1949).

Motion for new trial suspends final judgment as a final judgment until motion is overruled, but it does not operate to revoke notice to court reporter to transcribe notes of evidence which was given according to law and at proper time, and motion to strike stenographer’s transcript on ground notice was revoked should be overruled. Shaw v. Bula Cannon Shops, Inc., 205 Miss. 458, 38 So. 2d 916, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 443 (Miss. 1949).

Under the Code of 1892 the court had no jurisdiction of an appeal from an order granting a new trial until the case had been finally decided. Wood v. American Life Ins. & Trust Co., 8 Miss. 609, 1843 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1843); Bank of Lexington v. Taylor, 10 Miss. 27, 1843 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1843); Terry v. Robins, 13 Miss. 291, 1845 Miss. LEXIS 72 (Miss. 1845); S. & F. Dorr & Co. v. Watson & Woodhouse, 28 Miss. 383, 1854 Miss. LEXIS 185 (Miss. 1854); Brown v. Carraway, 47 Miss. 668, 1873 Miss. LEXIS 19 (Miss. 1873).

26. —Interlocutory decrees or orders.

Where disputes of fact must be settled before the law may be applied to them, an interlocutory appeal should rarely be granted. Where the question presented is one of law application, certification for appeal is not per se precluded since in some sense every question of law will likely involve some application of law to fact. Nevertheless, an interlocutory appeal ought ordinarily to be granted only where at its core the question concerns a dispute regarding the content of the applicable law, a dispute with respect to which there is a substantial basis for a difference of opinion, or where the difficulty of application makes the case the substantial equivalent of one wherein the legal principles are not well settled. American Electric, Div. of FL Industries v. Singarayar, 530 So. 2d 1319, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 418 (Miss. 1988).

The fact that a case is certified for interlocutory appeal by a lower court pursuant to Rule 5(a), Miss. Sup. Ct. R,. does not preclude a de novo review by the Supreme Court as to whether the rule’s criteria have been met and whether the application for interlocutory appeal should be granted. The Supreme Court retains absolute authority to decide whether an interlocutory appeal should be granted, notwithstanding the rule’s provision that the lower courts may assist in the exercise of that authority. American Electric, Div. of FL Industries v. Singarayar, 530 So. 2d 1319, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 418 (Miss. 1988).

A Rule 5(a), Miss. Sup. Ct. R., certificate for interlocutory appeal should include a statement of the question of law being certified and the prong or prongs of the rule deemed applicable. American Electric, Div. of FL Industries v. Singarayar, 530 So. 2d 1319, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 418 (Miss. 1988).

An order of a Circuit Court holding in abeyance a motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction was not appropriate for interlocutory appeal since the motion was not denied or granted, and thus there was no final order. State v. Europa Cruise Line, Ltd., 528 So. 2d 839, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 328 (Miss. 1988).

In exceptional circumstances appeals from circuit court interlocutory orders are warranted; thus, such appeals may be granted where the appeal may settle an important principle of law in the case and may advance the ultimate determination of the action, and where justice may be served without delay and expense to the litigant and the court. Sonford Products Corp. v. Freels, 495 So. 2d 468, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2658 (Miss. 1986), overruled, Bickham v. Department of Mental Health, 592 So. 2d 96, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 978 (Miss. 1991).

Where an interlocutory appeal was taken by defendants in a suit for contract construction and specific performance, and the chancellor failed to make special findings of fact and law as requested by the complainants, and undisposed issues of law and fact existed at the time the appeal was taken, it was improvidently granted and was dismissed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to act as a trial court in the decisions of propositions which should have been settled by the court below. Management, Inc. v. Crosby, 186 So. 2d 466, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1313 (Miss. 1966).

Appeals to Supreme Court from interlocutory orders or decrees apply only to cases in chancery courts. Roach v. Black Creek Drainage Dist., 206 Miss. 794, 41 So. 2d 5, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 301 (Miss. 1949).

Appeal from interlocutory decree without allowance by the chancellor pursuant to Code 1906, § 35, (see Code 1942 § 1148), dismissed and case remanded. Greve v. McGee, 92 Miss. 190, 45 So. 706, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1907).

27. —Other particular rulings or orders.

Chancellor’s order that found father in contempt for failing to pay child support but did not determine the amount of the arrearage or the amount of future child support the father would be obligated to pay was not a final order and could not be considered on appeal. Maurer v. Boyd, 111 So.3d 690, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 171 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

The Supreme Court was authorized to treat a circuit court’s denial of a criminal defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment against him on double jeopardy grounds as a “final judgment” in a civil action under §11-51-3, which authorizes an appeal from a final judgment, and §9-3-9, which gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction of an appeal from any final judgment in the circuit court, since the double jeopardy claim went beyond the defendant’s right not to be convicted in that it involved his constitutional right not to be prosecuted for the offense, and therefore denial of the claim was final and justified immediate determination. De La Beckwith v. State, 615 So. 2d 1134, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 807 (Miss. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 884, 114 S. Ct. 232, 126 L. Ed. 2d 187, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 5961 (U.S. 1993).

An order for psychiatric examination of an accused to ascertain his mental capacity to stand trial is not a final judgment so as to be appealable. Jaquith v. Beckwith, 248 Miss. 491, 157 So. 2d 403, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1963).

28. Record on appeal.

Error could not be predicated on a trial court’s refusal of defense instructions where the reviewing court was not provided with a trial transcript of what transpired when the instructions were presented to the trial court; it is the duty of the appellant to see that the record of trial proceedings wherein error is claimed is brought before the reviewing court. Smith v. State, 572 So. 2d 847, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 664 (Miss. 1990).

Supreme Court will not consider matters which are not properly a part of the record before it, hence papers obtained after adjournment of trial court not presented to that court for correction will not be considered on appeal. Craig v. State, 208 Miss. 528, 44 So. 2d 860, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 270 (Miss. 1950).

The Supreme Court is without authority to consider, on motion for certiorari, a prayer that a motion for a new trial made after adjournment of the term be sent up and incorporated into the appeal record. Dobbs v. State, 200 Miss. 595, 27 So. 2d 551, 29 So. 2d 84, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 330, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 354 (Miss. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 787, 67 S. Ct. 1318, 91 L. Ed. 1817, 1947 U.S. LEXIS 2295 (U.S. 1947), overruled in part, Flowers v. State, 473 So. 2d 164, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2140 (Miss. 1985).

Duty of appellant to perfect record to show omitted objection, and in the absence of such showing, no complaint will be heard. Bowman v. State, 141 Miss. 115, 106 So. 264, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 218 (Miss. 1925).

In the absence of a sufficient showing in the record of an abuse of advocacy, assignment of error for alleged improper argument of counsel will not be considered. McLeod v. State, 130 Miss. 83, 92 So. 828, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 199 (Miss. 1922).

Supreme Court will not consider statement dehors the record, made by the trial judge as reasons for his order. Gulf Coast Stevedoring Co. v. Gibbs, 124 Miss. 188, 86 So. 582, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 484 (Miss. 1921).

Where record shows the questions but not what the answers of a witness would have been, exclusion of such testimony cannot be reviewed. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Scarlet, 115 Miss. 285, 76 So. 265, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 210 (Miss. 1917), rev'd, 249 U.S. 528, 39 S. Ct. 369, 63 L. Ed. 752, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2071 (U.S. 1919).

Court must try case on facts shown by record and not on briefs. Atlantic Horse Ins. Co. v. Nero, 108 Miss. 321, 66 So. 780, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1914).

Where circuit court had no jurisdiction of appeal from justice court because of insufficiency of record, Supreme Court will hear appeal only where record is corrected by certiorari. Levis-Zukoski Mercantile Co. v. McIntyre, 93 Miss. 806, 47 So. 435, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1908).

Affidavit not considered to help out record on appeal. Jenkins v. Barber, 85 Miss. 666, 38 So. 36, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 113 (Miss. 1904).

The Supreme Court cannot consider papers which are not a part of the record. Whit v. State, 85 Miss. 208, 37 So. 809, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 151 (Miss. 1904).

The Supreme Court alone in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can authoritatively determine what papers constitute the record on appeal, and the clerk of the lower court cannot be enjoined from incorporating certain papers in the transcript on the ground that they are not properly a part of the record. Portwood v. Feld, 72 Miss. 542, 17 So. 373, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. 1895).

29. Review in general.

Supreme Court reviews de novo record on appeal from grant of motion for summary judgment. J. O. Hooker & Sons v. Roberts Cabinet Co., 683 So. 2d 396, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 92, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 596 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court will not disturb findings of Chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless Chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, or made finding which was clearly erroneous. Settle v. Galloway, 682 So. 2d 1032, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 573 (Miss. 1996).

Reviewing court does not consider unsupported assignments of error. Touchstone v. Touchstone, 682 So. 2d 374, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 534 (Miss. 1996).

Admission of evidence is within the discretion of the chancellor, who should not be held in error for excluding repetitive and probably irrelevant evidence. Touchstone v. Touchstone, 682 So. 2d 374, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 534 (Miss. 1996).

Court will consider only those matters that actually appear in the record and does not rely on mere assertions in briefs. Touchstone v. Touchstone, 682 So. 2d 374, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 534 (Miss. 1996).

Question of defendant’s actual guilt of conspiracy could not be litigated on appeal from denial of postconviction relief after defendant pled guilty to conspiracy. Taylor v. State, 682 So. 2d 359, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 532 (Miss. 1996).

On appeal, Supreme Court and circuit court are limited to findings of Board of Review of Employment Security Commission. Clark Printing Co. v. Mississippi Empl. Sec. Comm'n, 681 So. 2d 1328, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 528 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court is ultimate expositor of state’s law and conducts de novo review on questions of law. Clark Printing Co. v. Mississippi Empl. Sec. Comm'n, 681 So. 2d 1328, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 528 (Miss. 1996).

Test of reasonableness to be applied by Supreme Court in determining whether provision of covenant for homeowners’ association is reasonable is same as that which is to be applied by chancery court, and question of validity of clear and unambiguous covenant at issue is matter of law. Griffin v. Tall Timbers Dev., 681 So. 2d 546, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 516 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court would assume that trial court made sufficient findings to support summary determination that plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney fees based on defendants’ unsuccessful motion to compel withdrawal of plaintiffs’ counsel, where parties did not designate transcripts of hearings on appeal. Willard v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 681 So. 2d 539, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court would assume that trial courts made sufficient findings to support summary denials of plaintiffs’ requests for attorney fees after bringing successful motions to compel discovery, where transcripts of hearings were not designated on appeal. Willard v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 681 So. 2d 539, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court requires appellate counsel to not only make condensed statement of the case but to also support propositions of law with reasons and authorities. Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1996).

Defendant’s claim that youthful offender statute was unconstitutional was procedurally barred, since defendant did not cite any authority for his proposition or give any reasons as to why his position was correct reflection of the law. Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1996).

Sentencing is within complete discretion of trial court and not subject to appellate review if it is within limits prescribed by statute. Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court is under no duty to consider assignments of error when no authority is cited. Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court will always review chancellor’s findings of fact, but Court will not disturb factual findings of chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless Court can say with reasonable certainty that chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, was clearly erroneous, or applied erroneous legal standard. Cummings v. Benderman, 681 So. 2d 97, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 501 (Miss. 1996).

Even if Supreme Court disagrees with lower court on finding of fact and might have arrived at different conclusion, Supreme Court is still bound by chancellor’s findings unless manifestly wrong. Cummings v. Benderman, 681 So. 2d 97, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 501 (Miss. 1996).

In reviewing errors of law, Supreme Court proceeds de novo. Cummings v. Benderman, 681 So. 2d 97, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 501 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court will not reverse trial judge’s denial of motion for new trial unless Court is convinced that verdict is so contrary to weight of evidence that, if it is allowed to stand, it would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Morgan v. State, 681 So. 2d 82, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 429 (Miss. 1996).

Review of jurisdictional matters by Mississippi Supreme Court is on de novo basis, but in reviewing circuit court’s findings of fact in support of its jurisdictional holdings, Supreme Court recognizes that circuit judge heard testimony and was in a much better position to judge extent of party’s contacts with forum. Cappaert v. Walker, Bordelon, Hamlin, Theriot & Hardy, 680 So. 2d 831, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 497 (Miss. 1996).

State Supreme Court generally gives great deference to jury’s findings and will set aside verdict only when it is contrary to weight of evidence and credible testimony. Ducker v. Moore, 680 So. 2d 808, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 499 (Miss. 1996).

On review of whether jury verdict was against weight of evidence, when evidence is conflicting, state Supreme Court defers to jury’s determination of credibility of witnesses and weight of their testimony. Ducker v. Moore, 680 So. 2d 808, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 499 (Miss. 1996).

Reviewing court in divorce action will not set aside chancellor’s findings of fact on issue of adultery unless they are manifestly wrong. Holden v. Frasher-Holden, 680 So. 2d 795, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 485 (Miss. 1996).

Where the chancellor in a divorce action has failed to make his or her own findings of fact and conclusions of law on issue of adultery, Supreme Court will review the record de novo. Holden v. Frasher-Holden, 680 So. 2d 795, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 485 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court will not disturb chancellor’s findings when supported by substantial evidence, unless chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or erroneous legal standard was applied. United Southern Bank v. Bank of Mantee, 680 So. 2d 220, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 527 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court employs de novo standard of review in reviewing lower court’s grant of summary judgment; evidentiary matters are viewed in light most favorable to nonmoving party, and if any triable issues of fact exist, lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment will be reversed, but otherwise, decision is affirmed. Travis v. Stewart, 680 So. 2d 214, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 530 (Miss. 1996).

Although Supreme Court is not bound by the Commission on Judicial Performance’s findings in judicial disciplinary proceeding, Commission’s findings are given great deference when based on clear and convincing evidence. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Dodds, 680 So. 2d 180, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 425 (Miss. 1996).

Standard for reviewing granting or denying of summary judgment is same standard as is employed by trial court. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So. 2d 627, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1996).

Appellate court conducts de novo review of orders granting or denying summary judgment. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So. 2d 627, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1996).

Clearly erroneous standard of review was appropriate in determining whether trial court erred in holding that defendant failed to make prima facie showing of gender discrimination in exercise of peremptory challenges against female jurors. Simon v. State, 679 So. 2d 617 (Miss. 1996).

Summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Mississippi Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 678 So. 2d 983, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 1996), overruled in part, Meyers v. Am. States Ins. Co., 914 So. 2d 669, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss. 2005).

Standard of review is de novo for questions of law. Mississippi Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 678 So. 2d 983, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 1996), overruled in part, Meyers v. Am. States Ins. Co., 914 So. 2d 669, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss. 2005).

In considering bar matters, Supreme Court examines evidence de novo and renders such orders as it deems appropriate. The Mississippi Bar v. Carter, 678 So. 2d 981, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 406 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court conducts de novo review in bar disciplinary matter, which necessarily includes review of sanctions imposed. Wright v. State, 678 So. 2d 963, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 1996).

In reviewing bar disciplinary matter, deference is accorded to findings of complaint tribunal but Supreme Court has nondelegable duty of ultimately satisfying itself as to facts, and reaching such conclusions and making such judgments as it considers appropriate and just. Wright v. State, 678 So. 2d 963, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 1996).

In attorney disciplinary proceedings, beyond reasonable doubt standard does not apply, but rather Supreme Court applies clear and convincing evidence standard. Wright v. State, 678 So. 2d 963, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 1996).

Alimony award will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is found to be against overwhelming weight of the evidence or manifestly in error. Parsons v. Parsons, 678 So. 2d 701, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1996).

Defendant failed to adequately demonstrate violation of fundamental right regarding his claim of speedy trial violation in connection with delay of more than 18 months between his arrest and his indictment and trial and, thus, reviewing court would not use rule of plain error to hear speedy trial issue, which was not raised in trial court; defendant’s discussion of issue on appeal was brief and did not state how delay violated his rights. Sanders v. State, 678 So. 2d 663, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 300 (Miss. 1996).

As a rule, Supreme Court only addresses issues on plain error review when error of trial court has impacted upon fundamental right of defendant; it has been established that where fundamental rights are violated, procedural rules give way to prevent miscarriage of justice. Sanders v. State, 678 So. 2d 663, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 300 (Miss. 1996).

Chancellor’s finding of fact will not be overturned on appeal unless manifestly erroneous. Shepard v. Jones by & Through Jones (In re Estate of Stowers), 678 So. 2d 660, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 329 (Miss. 1996).

For speedy trial purposes, finding of good cause for delay is finding of ultimate fact, and should be treated on appeal as any other finding of fact; it will be left undisturbed where there is in record substantial credible evidence from which it could have been made. Walton v. State, 678 So. 2d 645, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 192 (Miss. 1996).

If trial judge applied erroneous standard in ruling on motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, Supreme Court will not affirm trial court’s finding of fact. Walton v. State, 678 So. 2d 645, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 192 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court reviews conclusions of law de novo. Ramsey v. Copiah Bank, N.A., 678 So. 2d 637, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1996).

Questions of law are subject to de novo appellate review. Bank of Mississippi v. Southern Mem. Park, 677 So. 2d 186, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 315 (Miss. 1996).

Chancellor’s ruling on findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Bank of Mississippi v. Southern Mem. Park, 677 So. 2d 186, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 315 (Miss. 1996).

Denial of requested attorney fees, incurred by perpetual trust trustee while new cemetery owner attempted to substitute trustee, resolved question of law that was subject to de novo review on appeal. Bank of Mississippi v. Southern Mem. Park, 677 So. 2d 186, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 315 (Miss. 1996).

When reviewing a jury verdict of guilty, Supreme Court is required to accept as true all evidence favorable to state, together with reasonable inferences arising therefrom, and to disregard evidence favorable to defendant; if such will support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, jury verdict shall not be disturbed. Rhodes v. State, 676 So. 2d 275, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 318 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court conducts de novo review on questions of law, including whether joint tenancy can be severed by will and whether conservator violated fiduciary duties. Herrington v. Bodman (In re Estate of Bodman), 674 So. 2d 1245, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 190 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court’s review of whether confession was voluntary is limited, and circuit court sits as fact finder when determining voluntariness of confession and its determination will not be reversed unless manifestly wrong. Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030, 117 S. Ct. 588, 136 L. Ed. 2d 517, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7523 (U.S. 1996).

Where counsel failed to proffer contemplated questions and answers from witnesses concerning defendant’s future behavior, Supreme Court cannot assume what the witness would have testified to. Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030, 117 S. Ct. 588, 136 L. Ed. 2d 517, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7523 (U.S. 1996).

When reviewing denial of motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), jury’s decision is afforded great deference because of jury’s position to evaluate and weigh evidence and truthfulness of witnesses’ testimony. Luther McGill, Inc. v. Bradley, 674 So. 2d 11, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 210 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court reviewing denial of post-conviction relief in capital murder case lacked authority under state law to reweigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in order to uphold death sentence after finding that improperly defined aggravating circumstance had been submitted to jury, and also lacked authority to engage in harmless error analysis, where case was tried and affirmed on direct appeal before passage of statute granting such authority. Cole v. State, 666 So. 2d 767, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 595 (Miss. 1995).

Supreme Court will not disturb findings of chancellor in action for title to real property unless chancellor is manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or applied erroneous legal standard. Dew v. Langford, 666 So. 2d 739, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 594 (Miss. 1995).

Supreme Court is without authority to disturb conclusions of chancellor in suit claiming title to real property when substantial evidence supports findings, even though Supreme Court may have found otherwise as an original matter. Dew v. Langford, 666 So. 2d 739, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 594 (Miss. 1995).

Supreme Court will not reverse final order of Mississippi State Department of Health unless agency’s decision was arbitrary or capricious. Cain v. Mississippi State Dep't of Health, 666 So. 2d 506, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 621 (Miss. 1995).

That Supreme Court will not reverse chancellor’s finding where it is supported by substantial credible evidence holds true for contempt matters. Varner v. Varner, 666 So. 2d 493, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 599 (Miss. 1995).

Determination of punishment for contempt falls within discretion of chancellor, and Supreme Court will not reverse on appeal absent manifest error or application of erroneous legal standard. Varner v. Varner, 666 So. 2d 493, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 599 (Miss. 1995).

Supreme Court proceeds de novo in determining claimed errors of law. Ford v. Holly Springs Sch. Dist., 665 So. 2d 840, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 452 (Miss. 1995).

Issues of whether notice of nonrenewal of principal’s employment was timely and whether superintendent of school district had authority to issue a letter of nonrenewal to principal were questions of law to which de novo standard of review applied on appeal. Ford v. Holly Springs Sch. Dist., 665 So. 2d 840, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 452 (Miss. 1995).

In reviewing a school district’s decision not to renew an employee’s contract, the Supreme Court’s inquiry concerns whether the nonrenewal decision was (1) made for a reason not specifically prohibited by law, (2) made in accordance with the applicable procedural requirements, (3) supported by substantial evidence, and (4) arbitrary or capricious. Harris v. Canton Separate Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 655 So. 2d 898, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 269 (Miss. 1995).

When a defendant raises the issue of severance, a trial court should hold a hearing on the issue. The State has the burden of making a prima facie case showing that the offenses charged fall within the language of the statute allowing multi-count indictments. If the State meets its burden, the defendant may rebut by showing that the offenses were separate and distinct acts or transactions. In making its determination regarding severance, the trial court should pay particular attention to whether the time period between the occurrences is insignificant, whether the evidence proving each count would be admissible to prove each of the other counts, and whether the crimes are interwoven. If a trial court follows this procedure, the Supreme Court will review the trial court’s decision under the abuse of discretion standard giving due deference to the trial court’s findings. On review, the Supreme Court will defer to the trial court’s findings even if the jury later acquits the defendant on one or more counts or if the Supreme Court concludes on appeal that a directed verdict, j.n.o.v. or new trial should have been granted on one or more counts. Corley v. State, 584 So. 2d 769, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 480 (Miss. 1991).

The Supreme Court will vacate or modify the Board of Bar Admissions’ bar examination grading decision only where it is found to be “arbitrary, capricious or malicious.” Mississippi Bd. of Bar Admissions v. Applicant F, 582 So. 2d 377, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 181 (Miss.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 984, 112 S. Ct. 591, 116 L. Ed. 2d 616, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 6863 (U.S. 1991).

The Supreme Court has the independent authority to reassess the punishment meted out by the Complaint Tribunal and to increase or decrease the punishment as it deems proper; there is no standard as to what punishment for particular misconduct ought to be, and cases are considered on a case by case basis. Mississippi State Bar v. Attorney D., 579 So. 2d 559, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1991).

The Supreme Court conducts a de novo review in a bar disciplinary matter which necessarily includes a review of the sanctions imposed. Deference is accorded the findings of the complaint tribunal but the Supreme Court “has the non-delegable duty of ultimately satisfying itself as to the facts, and reaching such conclusions and making such judgments as it considers appropriate and just.” Mississippi State Bar v. Smith, 577 So. 2d 1249, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 185 (Miss. 1991).

In the youth court, as elsewhere, requests for continuance are addressed to the sound discretion of the court, except that in youth court more so than almost any other there is an imperative that the Court proceed with the matter as promptly as may fairly be done. The Supreme Court will not reverse the youth court in exercising its discretion in these cases unless the youth court abused its discretion and the Supreme Court is convinced that injustice would result therefrom. In Interest of T.L.C., 566 So. 2d 691, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 431 (Miss. 1990), overruled in part, D.T. v. Hinds Cnty. Youth Court (In re J.T.), 188 So.3d 1192, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 165 (Miss. 2016).

The Supreme Court acts as the fact-finder in judicial misconduct proceedings, giving great deference to the findings, based on clear and convincing evidence, and the recommendations of the Mississippi Judicial Performance Commission. However, the Supreme Court is not bound by the recommendations of the Commission and may impose additional sanctions. Mississippi Judicial Performance Com. v. Walker, 565 So. 2d 1117, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 291 (Miss. 1990).

The review of the decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Commission is like the review of any other administrative body which sits as a trier of fact. If the decision of the Commission is based upon substantial evidence and there is no error of law, the decision will be affirmed on appeal. Thus, if there is a quantum of credible evidence which supports the decision of the Commission, no court will reverse the decision. The Supreme Court will not determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies when the evidence is conflicting, the assumption being that the Commission, as the trier of facts, has previously determined which evidence is credible and which is not. This is not to say that the reviewing court will merely “rubber stamp” the Commission’s actions; where no evidence or only a scintilla of evidence supports a Workers’ Compensation Commission decision, the Supreme Court would not hesitate to reverse. Metal Trims Industries, Inc. v. Stovall, 562 So. 2d 1293, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 277 (Miss. 1990).

There are practical and institutional limitations upon the Supreme Court’s ability to find facts; consequently, much deference is placed upon the trial judge’s full discharge of his or her responsibility to make findings of fact as to the question of whether Miranda rights have been intelligently, knowing and voluntarily waived. However, when the trial judge fails to make specific findings and only makes general findings thereby allowing admissibility of evidence, the Supreme Court’s scope of review is considerably broader particularly when the trial judge’s findings on the precise points at issue on appeal are not clearly inferable from the findings made. McCarty v. State, 554 So. 2d 909, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 499 (Miss. 1989).

The scope of appellate review under §11-7-213[Repealed] is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a motion for new trial where the plaintiff refuses to accept an additur. State Highway Com. v. Warren, 530 So. 2d 704, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 422 (Miss. 1988).

Statement by trial judge that accused waived requirement of Code 1942 § 2505, that copy of indictment be delivered to him must be given great weight by supreme court on appeal of defendant from judgment of conviction. Simmons v. State, 208 Miss. 586, 45 So. 2d 149, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1950).

On appeal, Supreme Court is limited to facts which are of record, and reasonable inference therefrom. American Life Ins. Co. v. Walker, 208 Miss. 1, 43 So. 2d 657, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 401 (Miss. 1949).

Function of Supreme Court as appellate court is to examine record of trial and determine whether any error of law was committed by trial court, and, in that connection, whether facts in evidence are sufficient to sustain jury’s verdict. Dickins v. State, 208 Miss. 69, 43 So. 2d 366, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 1949).

Supreme Court is limited on review to case as presented to jury in trial court and is not permitted to conjecture as to what result might or could have been had recovery been sought on some other ground. Picard v. Waggoner, 204 Miss. 366, 37 So. 2d 567, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 375 (Miss. 1948).

Determination must be made solely on the record of the court below. Hemphill v. Smith, 128 Miss. 586, 91 So. 337, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 141 (Miss. 1922).

A question, not raised either by assignment of error or mentioned in brief of the appellant, need not be considered on appeal. McCaleb v. McCaleb, 110 Miss. 486, 70 So. 563, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 62 (Miss. 1915), modified, 113 Miss. 337, 74 So. 275, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1917).

Supreme Court may ignore theory on which case tried in lower court. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Hawkins, 104 Miss. 55, 61 So. 161, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 8 (Miss. 1913).

Where case submitted on agreed statement of facts, Supreme Court can look only to facts set out in such statement. Grant v. Independent Order of Sons & Daughters of Jacob, 97 Miss. 182, 52 So. 698, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 266 (Miss. 1910).

Issues on appeal must be same as those made in trial court. Vicksburg Mfg. & Supply Co. v. J. H. Jaffray Constr. Co., 94 Miss. 282, 49 So. 116, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1908).

Question not directly involved and unnecessary to decision need not be considered. Adams v. Samuel R. Bullock & Co., 94 Miss. 27, 47 So. 527, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 1908).

30. —Abuse of discretion.

Appellate court applies abuse of discretion standard of review when determining whether trial court erred in refusing additur or new trial. Lewis v. Hiatt, 683 So. 2d 937, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 632 (Miss. 1996).

Admissibility of photographs rests within sound discretion of trial court which will be upheld unless there has been abuse of discretion. Brown v. State, 682 So. 2d 340, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 427 (Miss. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1127, 117 S. Ct. 1271, 137 L. Ed. 2d 348, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 1821 (U.S. 1997).

Standard of review for trial court’s decision on whether to award attorney fees to party who successfully brings motion to compel discovery is abuse of discretion standard. Willard v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 681 So. 2d 539, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court would not reach issues of school board’s statutory power to create alcohol policy for its students and set punishments for violation of such policy and whether student suspended in adherence to such policy received procedural due process, where such issues were not raised in proceedings below with respect to student’s suspension; review procedure was not available for purpose of settling abstract or academic questions, and Supreme Court had no power to issue advisory opinions. Board of Trustees v. T.H. by & Through T.H. (In the Interest of T.H.), 681 So. 2d 110, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 492 (Miss. 1996).

When defendant alleges that he cannot obtain impartial jury without change of venue, lower court’s decision to deny such motion is within trial judge’s sound discretion; decision of lower court will not be overturned if that discretion has not been abused. Morgan v. State, 681 So. 2d 82, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 429 (Miss. 1996).

Standard of review when trial court institutes sanctions for discovery abuses is whether trial court abused its discretion in its decision; Supreme Court will affirm unless there is definite and firm conviction that trial court committed clear error of judgment in conclusion it reached upon weighing of relevant factors. Kinard v. Morgan, 679 So. 2d 623, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 422 (Miss. 1996).

Standard of review for award of attorneys’ fees is abuse of discretion, and such awards must be supported by credible evidence. Regency Nissan v. Jenkins, 678 So. 2d 95, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 435 (Miss. 1996).

Chancellor’s ruling on findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Bank of Mississippi v. Southern Mem. Park, 677 So. 2d 186, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 315 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court will reverse trial judge’s denial of request for new trial only when such denial amounts to abuse of that judge’s discretion. Shields v. Easterling, 676 So. 2d 293, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 307 (Miss. 1996).

Supreme Court will not disturb trial court’s ruling on matters pertaining to redirect unless there has been clear abuse of discretion. Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030, 117 S. Ct. 588, 136 L. Ed. 2d 517, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7523 (U.S. 1996).

Abuse of discretion standard applies to Supreme Court’s review of a trial judge’s denial of a motion for additur. McBride v. Chevron U.S.A., 673 So. 2d 372, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1996), modified, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 271 (Miss. May 23, 1996).

Abuse of discretion standard applies to Supreme Court’s review of trial judge’s decision not to allow rebuttal testimony. McBride v. Chevron U.S.A., 673 So. 2d 372, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1996), modified, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 271 (Miss. May 23, 1996).

If trial court follows proper procedure in determining whether multi-count indictment warrants severance, Supreme Court will give deference to trial court’s findings on review, employing abuse of discretion standard. Hughes v. State, 665 So. 2d 852, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 564 (Miss. 1995).

No reversal for refusal of continuance unless abuse of sound discretion is clear. Continental Ins. Co. v. Brown, 142 Miss. 199, 106 So. 633, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 48 (Miss. 1926).

Conviction not reversed on appeal for refusal of change of venue except on clear showing of abuse of trial court’s discretion. Dalton v. State, 141 Miss. 841, 105 So. 784, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 199 (Miss. 1925).

31. —Federal questions.

Law of case rule is inapplicable on second appeal where question involved arises under Constitution and laws of the United States. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. State, 107 Miss. 597, 65 So. 881, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1914).

Federal Supreme Court decisions on the Constitution of the United States are binding on state courts. State v. Louisville & N.R.R., 97 Miss. 35, 51 So. 918 (1910).

The Supreme Court will consider authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on Federal question. Overton v. State, 70 Miss. 558, 13 So. 226 (Miss. 1893).

32. —Presumptions.

Judgment of circuit court as to qualification of juror is prima facie correct. Donahue v. State, 142 Miss. 20, 107 So. 15, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1926).

No presumption of verdict for certain defendant being influenced by erroneous peremptory instruction for other defendant. Gilliam v. McLemore, 141 Miss. 253, 106 So. 99, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 213 (Miss. 1925).

Where stenographer’s notes of evidence not set up or stricken, presumption is that evidence supported chancellor’s decree. Berry v. Dampier, 131 Miss. 893, 95 So. 744, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 224 (Miss. 1923).

33. —Comments or argument of counsel.

Prosecutor’s closing argument that defendant’s accomplices were not being tried because they had been exonerated in prior judicial hearing was proper response to defense counsel’s references to the fact that no action was being taken against defendant’s accomplices. Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030, 117 S. Ct. 588, 136 L. Ed. 2d 517, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7523 (U.S. 1996).

Prosecutor’s closing argument during guilt phase that “This man deserves everything that he can get for the most brutal murder” and “He’s guilty” were not personal opinion comments, as prosecutor never said that she believed that defendant was guilty or that she believed that defendant deserved the death penalty. Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030, 117 S. Ct. 588, 136 L. Ed. 2d 517, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7523 (U.S. 1996).

Prosecutors are afforded the right to argue anything in the State’s closing argument that was presented as evidence, but arguing statements of fact which are not in evidence or necessarily inferable from it and which are prejudicial to the defendant is error. Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030, 117 S. Ct. 588, 136 L. Ed. 2d 517, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7523 (U.S. 1996).

Prosecuting attorney should refrain from commenting upon appearance of defendant when he has not been introduced as a witness. Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030, 117 S. Ct. 588, 136 L. Ed. 2d 517, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7523 (U.S. 1996).

Prosecuting attorney should refrain from doing anything or saying anything that would tend to cause jury to disfavor defendant due to matters other than evidence relative to the crime. Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030, 117 S. Ct. 588, 136 L. Ed. 2d 517, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7523 (U.S. 1996).

A prosecutor’s biblical references during closing argument at the sentencing phase of a capital murder prosecution did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, as the comments were within the “broad latitude” afforded counsel in closing argument. Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077, 116 S. Ct. 783, 133 L. Ed. 2d 734, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 547 (U.S. 1996).

A trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the State’s objection to the defense counsel’s use during closing argument of a homemade chart as a visual aid to demonstrate to the jury the various standards of proof and belief which fell short of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard; while distinctions between reasonable doubt, all possible doubt, beyond a shadow of a doubt, and the like, are not properly the subject of jury instructions, they are permissible during a trial counsel’s closing argument. However, the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since there was nothing depicted on the chart that could not have been generously explored and explained via the spoken word. Heidelberg v. State, 584 So. 2d 393, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 437 (Miss. 1991).

Where an objection to a comment made during closing argument is sustained, and no request is made that the jury be instructed to disregard the comment, there is no error unless a fundamental right is clearly involved. Brock v. State, 530 So. 2d 146, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 361 (Miss. 1988).

The failure to obtain rulings from the trial court on objections to alleged improper argument of counsel waived the objections. Cole v. State, 525 So. 2d 365, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2655 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934, 109 S. Ct. 330, 102 L. Ed. 2d 348, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 4775 (U.S. 1988).

34. —Comments on failure of defendant to testify.

Prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s demeanor and appearance may have highlighted his failure to testify, which is plainly prohibited, and the remark should not have been made. Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030, 117 S. Ct. 588, 136 L. Ed. 2d 517, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7523 (U.S. 1996).

Any error in prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s demeanor, which might have been taken as a comment on failure to testify, was cured by instructions to jurors to disregard remarks of counsel which have no basis in the evidence and to not draw any unfavorable inference against defendant because of his failure to testify. Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030, 117 S. Ct. 588, 136 L. Ed. 2d 517, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7523 (U.S. 1996).

A prosecutor’s remarks during the penalty phase of a capital murder prosecution did not constitute an improper comment on the defendant’s failure to testify where the prosecutor stated that the defendant “showed no compassion, but would send a lawyer up here and ask you for compassion,” since the argument pointed out the lack of a mitigation defense presented by the defendant, and that he was reduced to sending his lawyer in to plead for his life after all else had failed. Davis v. State, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192, 116 S. Ct. 1684, 134 L. Ed. 2d 785, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3101 (U.S. 1996).

The prosecutor’s closing argument in the guilt phase of a capital murder prosecution did not constitute an improper comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent following arrest where the prosecutor, while discussing a county jail inmate’s testimony as to statements made by the defendant while he was in the jail, referred to the relationship between the defendant and the witness, and described the circumstances under which the statements were made. Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077, 116 S. Ct. 783, 133 L. Ed. 2d 734, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 547 (U.S. 1996).

A prosecutor’s closing argument in a capital murder case did not constitute a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify at trial, in spite of the defendant’s argument that the prosecutor’s comments highlighted the fact that the only people alive who could have testified as to the events surrounding the murders were the defendant and his accomplice, where the prosecutor merely stated that the defendant and his accomplice saw to it that there were no eyewitnesses, and that “people who kill their victims and kill their eyewitnesses cannot be set free.” Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077, 116 S. Ct. 783, 133 L. Ed. 2d 734, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 547 (U.S. 1996).

In the sentencing phase of a capital murder prosecution, the State’s closing argument did not constitute a comment on the defendant’s failure to take the witness stand in his own defense where the State made the following argument: “Do you think she was suffering? Do you think that’s cruel and atrocious, and what’s even more than that, what do you think was running through [defendant’s] head as he sat through watching her gag on her own blood? What do you think he was thinking?” Thorson v. State, 653 So. 2d 876, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 600 (Miss. 1994).

A prosecutor did not improperly comment during closing argument on the defendant’s right to remain silent where the prosecutor remarked that the victim could not talk because she was dead and stated that only the defendant and God knew what happened, but he did not observe the defendant’s silence during trial; the prosecutor’s comments would be a reference to the defendant’s failure to testify only if innuendo and insinuation were employed. Alexander v. State, 610 So. 2d 320, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 580 (Miss. 1992).

A prosecutor improperly commented during closing argument on a capital murder defendant’s failure to testify where the prosecutor stated that the defendant “hasn’t told you the whole truth yet,” that “you still don’t know the whole story,” and that the defendant was the only person alive who could give the whole story. Butler v. State, 608 So. 2d 314, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 588 (Miss. 1992).

A prosecutor did not improperly comment on the defendant’s failure to testify when he stated during closing argument: “That’s what you have got before you, and that’s all you have got before you. All the evidence in this case points to one thing and one thing only”; the prosecutor’s comment related to the evidence presented in the trial by both the State and defense as a whole, rather than the failure of the defendant to take the stand. Rogers v. State, 599 So. 2d 930, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 123 (Miss.), overruled in part, Mayfield v. State, 612 So. 2d 1120, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 861 (Miss. 1992).

In a capital murder prosecution, the prosecutor’s statement that there had not been any testimony that the defendant acted in self-defense did not constitute an impermissible comment upon the failure of the defendant to testify, where the prosecutor’s statement was made in connection with his argument that the State had proved the required element that the defendant’s actions were not done in necessary self-defense. Ladner v. State, 584 So. 2d 743, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1015, 112 S. Ct. 663, 116 L. Ed. 2d 754, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 7261 (U.S. 1991).

A prosecutor’s statement in closing argument that “they” hadn’t bothered to tell the jury what the defendant was doing at a certain location was not an impermissible comment on the defendant’s failure to testify since it was proper for the prosecutor to question the defense’s inability to successfully explain the defendant’s presence in the area where the crime took place, and the prosecutor’s use of the word “they” appeared to be a reference to the defendant’s 2 attorneys rather than the defendant himself. Jimpson v. State, 532 So. 2d 985, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 428 (Miss. 1988).

An assignment of error based on the prosecutor’s comment on the defendant’s failure to testify was not procedurally barred for failure to make a contemporaneous objection because the right not to take the witness stand is a fundamental constitutional right. Livingston v. State, 525 So. 2d 1300, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 1988).

35. —Comments on failure of defendant to present evidence.

A prosecutor’s comments on the defendant’s failure to testify reached a constitutional dimension so egregious that failure on the part of the defense counsel to make a proper objection either at trial or in his motion for a new trial did not waive the error where the prosecutor made 4 separate statements telling the jury that the State’s witness’ testimony was “unopposed,” “unimpeached,” “unrebutted,” and that there was “no evidence whatsoever toward their unreliability.” Whigham v. State, 611 So. 2d 988, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 821 (Miss. 1992).

It was improper for a prosecutor to comment on a burglary defendant’s failure to call a witness who was allegedly with the defendant at the time the crime was committed, where there was no suggestion that the witness was not equally available to the State, the witness was not identified as a person under the control of the defendant, and he was not a close relative who would ordinarily be expected to be put in an unacceptable compromising position should he be called to testify as to the validity of the defendant’s alibi. Burke v. State, 576 So. 2d 1239, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 54 (Miss. 1991).

A prosecutor’s comment in closing argument regarding the defense’s failure to call the defendant’s “good friend” to testify was reversible error since the failure of either party to examine a witness equally accessible to both parties is not a proper subject for comment before a jury. Holmes v. State, 537 So. 2d 882, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 628 (Miss. 1988).

A prosecutor’s comment during closing argument regarding the defendant’s failure to call witnesses on his own behalf was harmless error where there was substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt and the trial judge sustained the objection to the improper statement although he did not admonish the jury when requested to do so. Brock v. State, 530 So. 2d 146, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 361 (Miss. 1988).

36. —Comments on evidence presented.

A prosecutor’s comments during closing argument, referring to the defendant as a liar, where not improper where the defendant had admitted on the witness stand that he had lied on more than one occasion about key facts, and the prosecutor’s comments were in response to evidence and testimony presented in the case. Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 492 (Miss. 1989), rev'd, in part, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 313, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 5501 (U.S. 1990).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault and shooting into a dwelling house, comments made by the district attorney to the effect that no one knew whether the defendant contended that he was not guilty because he didn’t shoot the gun into the house or because he did shoot the gun into the house but could not appreciate the wrongfulness of that act, were comments on the defense presented, or lack thereof, rather than comments on the defendant’s failure to testify and, therefore, were not improper. Shook v. State, 552 So. 2d 841, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 449 (Miss. 1989).

Record does not properly preserve for review point that district attorney in prosecution for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor accused defendant of perjury during course of argument of case, when record shows that no objection was made at time of argument and question was not raised until after argument was concluded and jury retired. Outlaw v. State, 208 Miss. 13, 43 So. 2d 661, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 402 (Miss. 1949).

37. —Comments to jurors relating to rendition of verdict.

The prohibition against “golden rule” arguments, which ask the jurors to put themselves in the place of one of the parties, extends to criminal cases. Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 635, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 348 (Miss. 1988).

A prosecutor’s remark during closing argument, to the effect that finding the defendant guilty would make the statement that law and order exists for everyone in the county, was improper. Jurors are representatives of the community in one sense, but they are not to vote in a representative capacity. Each juror is to apply the law to the evidence and vote accordingly. The issue which each juror must resolve is not whether he or she wishes to “send a message” but whether he or she believes that the evidence showed the defendant to be guilty of the crime charged. Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 201, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 125 (Miss. 1988).

38. —Comments relating to sentencing.

In the penalty phase of a capital murder prosecution, the prosecutor’s comment that “we have never heard one single witness say he ever felt sorry for what he did” was not impermissible, as it was simply an argument that none of the defendant’s mitigation witnesses indicated that the defendant was sorry for killing the victim, and was not an argument for “lack of remorse” as an aggravating factor. Davis v. State, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192, 116 S. Ct. 1684, 134 L. Ed. 2d 785, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3101 (U.S. 1996).

A prosecutor’s comments in closing argument during the sentencing phase of a capital case suggesting that prisoners and guards might be in danger if the defendant were to receive a life sentence rather than the death penalty were not improper. Woodward v. State, 533 So. 2d 418, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 492 (Miss. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028, 109 S. Ct. 1767, 104 L. Ed. 2d 202, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2004 (U.S. 1989).

A prosecutor’s comments during closing argument which referred to the potential sentences for murder and manslaughter were improper. The question of punishment is categorically unrelated to whether the verdict should be murder or manslaughter. Marks v. State, 532 So. 2d 976, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 425 (Miss. 1988).

A prosecutor’s argument in the sentencing phase of a capital case regarding the possibility of the defendant being paroled and the fact that another murder defendant had committed murder after being paroled from a life sentence constituted reversible error. The argument regarding parole introduced an arbitrary factor into the sentencing process proscribed by §99-19-105(3)(a). Williams v. State, 544 So. 2d 782, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2843 (Miss. 1987).

39. —Miscellaneous Comments.

Comments made by a prosecutor during his closing argument in a capital murder prosecution did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, where the prosecutor stated that the victim was a human being and had a right to be protected by the law even though he may not have been wealthy or prominent or a leader in his community, in spite of the defendant’s argument that the “value” of the victim’s life should not be a factor in considering whether the defendant should live or die and that such a consideration introduces an arbitrary factor into the process, since the prosecutor’s statement was innocuous. Mackbee v. State, 575 So. 2d 16, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 831 (Miss. 1990).

A prosecutor’s references to the Bible during his closing argument were not improper. Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 492 (Miss. 1989), rev'd, in part, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 313, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 5501 (U.S. 1990).

In a murder prosecution, the prosecutor’s comment during closing argument that the defendant was “clothed in the full protection of the Constitution of the United States and he has got what [the victim] never got. And that is a jury of 12 good people to decide his fate,” did not warrant reversal of the jury’s verdict where the comment was an isolated statement and no other portion of the closing argument focused on the exercise of constitutional rights by the defendant. Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 492 (Miss. 1989), rev'd, in part, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 313, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 5501 (U.S. 1990).

A prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument referring to an expert as a “whore,” stating that the expert was paid $2,000, and that the expert resided outside the state should not have been made but did not constitute reversible error. Dunaway v. State, 551 So. 2d 162, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 371 (Miss. 1989).

In an eminent domain proceeding arising from the condemnation of land for the purpose of widening a highway, the highway department counsel’s repeated statements in closing argument that the jurors were citizens and taxpayers and the highway department was working for them were for the purpose of inflaming the minds of the jurors and constituted reversible error. Dykes v. State Highway Com., 535 So. 2d 1349, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 572 (Miss. 1988).

A prosecutor’s comments during cross-examination of the defendant pertaining to the fact that the defendant had been released from jail after the preliminary hearing because bond had been posted did not constitute error where the remarks were made in response to the defendant’s implication that his release from jail was due to the State’s inability to present evidence sufficient to retain him in custody. Dixon v. State, 519 So. 2d 1226, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 152 (Miss. 1988).

Permitting district attorney in closing argument to refer to defendant in murder prosecution as a “black gorilla,” is reversible error. Harris v. State, 209 Miss. 141, 46 So. 2d 91, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 372 (Miss. 1950).

Court’s refusal to prevent improper argument together with refusal of proper charge as to such argument held prejudicial to defendant and constituted reversible error. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Weinstein, 99 Miss. 515, 55 So. 48, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 1911).

40. —Instructions.

Supreme Court does not review jury instructions in isolation. Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1996).

On review of jury instructions, state Supreme Court does not review instructions in isolation, but rather, reads instructions as whole to determine if jury was properly instructed; accordingly, defects in specific instructions do not require reversal where all instructions taken as whole fairly, although not perfectly, announce applicable primary rules of law, however, if those instructions do not fairly or adequately instruct jury, state Supreme Court can and will reverse. Boone v. Wal-Mart Stores, 680 So. 2d 844, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1996).

On appeal, Supreme Court does not review jury instructions in isolation; rather, they are read as whole to determine if jury was properly instructed. Shields v. Easterling, 676 So. 2d 293, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 307 (Miss. 1996).

In reviewing trial judge’s denial of request for peremptory instructions that direct a verdict, Supreme Court will consider evidence in light most favorable to appellee, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from evidence, and if facts so considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of appellant that reasonable men could not have arrived at contrary verdict, Supreme Court is required to reverse and render; if there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict, however, affirmance is required. McBride v. Chevron U.S.A., 673 So. 2d 372, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1996), modified, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 271 (Miss. May 23, 1996).

Supreme Court will reverse judgment on appeal because of errors of court below in erroneously granting some, and refusing other, instructions which result in denial of fair trial to appellant because jury is not properly instructed on law of case. Wilburn v. Gordon, 209 Miss. 27, 45 So. 2d 844, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1950).

Error of court in overruling defendant’s motion to exclude state’s evidence and for instruction requiring jury to return verdict of not guilty made at conclusion of state’s evidence in trial of charge of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor is waived by defendant who proceeds to introduce evidence in his own behalf. Faust v. State, 43 So. 2d 379 (Miss. 1949).

Supreme Court must find verdict improper before reversing case on ground that inaccuracy in instruction may have misled jury in reaching improper verdict. Neely v. Charleston, 204 Miss. 360, 37 So. 2d 495, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 374 (Miss. 1948).

Supreme Court will not reverse a case because the instruction is not happily phrased, or because not technically correct, so long as instruction is not misleading, or where the inaccuracy complained of could have had no influence on jury in reaching verdict that could be said to be improper. Neely v. Charleston, 204 Miss. 360, 37 So. 2d 495, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 374 (Miss. 1948).

Fact that instruction is technically inaccurate will not alone cause a reversal of judgment; but when case on appeal is examined as a completed trial, and substantial error has not been committed and a fair and just result has been reached, judgment will be affirmed, notwithstanding error in instruction. Neely v. Charleston, 204 Miss. 360, 37 So. 2d 495, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 374 (Miss. 1948).

Only one of several reasons for reversal selected therefor. Richardson Corp. v. Standard Drug Co., 141 Miss. 92, 106 So. 95, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 211 (Miss. 1925).

Judgment for guest injured in automobile not reversed because of instruction whose error, if any, was harmless. Friis v. Gahan, 139 Miss. 375, 104 So. 170, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1925).

Judgment not reversed for erroneous instruction unless complaining party prejudiced. Hampton v. State, 132 Miss. 154, 96 So. 165, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 43 (Miss. 1923).

If there be evidence which would have supported a contrary verdict the Supreme Court will set aside a verdict rendered on erroneous instructions unless it is clear they could not have influenced the result. Solomon v. City Compress Co., 69 Miss. 319, 10 So. 446, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 1892).

41. —Weight and sufficiency of evidence.

When Supreme Court reviews sufficiency of evidence, it looks to all of the evidence before jurors to determine whether or not reasonable, hypothetical juror could find, beyond reasonable doubt, that defendant is guilty. Morgan v. State, 681 So. 2d 82, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 429 (Miss. 1996).

On review of sufficiency of evidence to support conviction, evidence which supports verdict is accepted as true, and state is given benefit of all reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence. Morgan v. State, 681 So. 2d 82, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 429 (Miss. 1996).

When reviewing denial of motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), Supreme Court is bound to consider evidence in light most favorable to appellee, giving that party benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from evidence. Luther McGill, Inc. v. Bradley, 674 So. 2d 11, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 210 (Miss. 1996).

A finding of “good cause” for a continuance under §99-17-1 is a finding of ultimate fact, and should be treated as any other finding of ultimate fact challenged on appeal, i.e., the finding will be undisturbed only where there is in the record substantial, credible evidence from which it may fairly have been made, and will ordinarily be reversed where there is a complete absence of probative evidence in the record. Folk v. State, 576 So. 2d 1243, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1991).

Findings by a trial judge that a confession was admissible are findings of fact, which are treated as any other findings of fact; as long as the trial judge applies the correct legal standards, his or her decision will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly in error or is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Berry v. State, 575 So. 2d 1, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 849 (Miss. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928, 111 S. Ct. 2042, 114 L. Ed. 2d 126, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2673 (U.S. 1991).

The factual findings of a chancery court in a civil contempt case are affirmed unless manifest error is present and apparent. However, the Supreme Court is not bound by the manifest error rule when reviewing an appeal of a conviction of criminal contempt; reviewing proceeds ab initio to determine whether on the record the contemnor is guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. Premeaux v. Smith, 569 So. 2d 681, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 628 (Miss. 1990).

If a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission is based on substantial evidence, the circuit court and the Supreme Court are bound by the finding of fact made by the Commission. International Paper Co. v. Kelley, 562 So. 2d 1298, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 274 (Miss. 1990).

A finding of fact is “clearly erroneous” when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Ponthieux v. State, 532 So. 2d 1239, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 483 (Miss. 1988).

A finding of fact is “clearly erroneous” when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Estate of Varvaris, 528 So. 2d 800, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 264 (Miss. 1988).

Chancellor’s findings, on conflicting evidence, are conclusive on appeal unless manifestly wrong. Magnolia Textiles, Inc. v. Gillis, 206 Miss. 797, 41 So. 2d 6, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1949); James v. Federal Royalty Co., 44 So. 2d 542 (Miss. 1950).

Decree of chancellor will not be reversed unless it is manifestly erroneous, and, while it is duty of Supreme Court to affirm if there is sufficient substantial evidence to support chancellor’s finding, it is equally its duty to reverse in absence of such support where overwhelming proof is barrier against affirmance of decree. Reed v. Charping, 207 Miss. 1, 41 So. 2d 11, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 312 (Miss. 1949).

Decree of chancellor substantially supported by competent evidence will not be reversed by Supreme Court on appeal. Magnolia Textiles, Inc. v. Gillis, 206 Miss. 797, 41 So. 2d 6, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1949).

Chancellor’s finding on conflicting evidence will be affirmed on appeal when his finding is not against weight of evidence and is not manifestly wrong. Williams v. Barlow, 205 Miss. 449, 38 So. 2d 914, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 442 (Miss. 1949).

Only question presented on appeal from decision of chancellor overruling motion to dismiss bill for divorce is whether chancellor was manifestly wrong in his findings and conclusions. Canerdy v. Canerdy, 37 So. 2d 490 (Miss. 1948).

On clear preponderance of evidence in favor of plaintiff, Supreme Court will reverse findings of fact by chancellor based on general and inconclusive testimony. Pannell v. Glidewell, 142 Miss. 77, 107 So. 273, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 63 (Miss. 1926).

Decree on verdict not disturbed unless manifestly wrong. Thomas v. State, 129 Miss. 332, 92 So. 225, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 46 (Miss. 1922); New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Ward, 132 Miss. 462, 96 So. 401, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1923); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jones, 134 Miss. 53, 98 So. 230, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 234 (Miss. 1923); Ayers v. Tonkel, 138 Miss. 712, 103 So. 361, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 77 (Miss. 1925); Green v. Everson, 141 Miss. 129, 106 So. 265, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 219 (Miss. 1925); Watkins v. Watkins, 142 Miss. 210, 106 So. 753, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1926); Pierce v. Garrett, 142 Miss. 641, 107 So. 885, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 1926).

Chancellor’s decree based on conflicting testimony not disturbed unless manifestly wrong. Grace v. Pierce, 127 Miss. 831, 90 So. 590, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1921); Meek v. Humphreys County, 133 Miss. 386, 97 So. 674, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 135 (Miss. 1923); Starnes v. Nation, 97 So. 881 (Miss. 1923); Planters' Gin & Milling Co. v. Greenville, 138 Miss. 876, 103 So. 796, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 96 (Miss. 1925).

Conviction on insufficient testimony reversed. Adams v. State, 47 So. 787 (Miss. 1908).

42. —Validity and construction of statutes.

Supreme Court will not pass upon constitutionality of statute unless such decision is necessary to dispose of the case. Gatlin v. State, 207 Miss. 588, 42 So. 2d 774, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 371 (Miss. 1949).

Later re-enactment of statute after construction by Supreme Court adopts construction. Burks v. Moody, 141 Miss. 370, 106 So. 528, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 429 (Miss. 1926).

One of two reasonable constructions of statute will be adhered to. Maris v. Lindsey, 124 Miss. 742, 87 So. 12, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 544 (Miss. 1921).

Prior reasonable construction placed upon statute by Supreme Court followed whether the best construction or not. Zama v. Ayers Separate School Dist., 120 Miss. 444, 82 So. 313, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 105 (Miss. 1919).

Supreme Court is bound by former construction of statute re-enacted under that construction. R. J. McLin & Co. v. Worden, 99 Miss. 547, 55 So. 358, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 229 (Miss. 1911).

While the facts of a case may be settled by agreement of the parties the Supreme Court cannot upon the mere concession or admission of counsel declare a statute valid or invalid. Jones v. Madison County, 72 Miss. 777, 18 So. 87, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1895).

43. Disposition of appeal.

Decree of confirmation of title and removal of clouds in suit brought by purchaser of land at foreclosure sale under deed of trust will be modified so as to eliminate finding of confirmation, but affirmed as to removal of clouds when defendant mortgagor remained in possession after foreclosure sale but foreclosure sale was valid. Duncan v. Mars, 44 So. 2d 529 (Miss. 1950).

On appeal to supreme court, verdict given in trial court will not be disturbed where evidence is equally balanced or nearly so, and would warrant verdict for either party. Magnolia Textiles, Inc. v. Gillis, 206 Miss. 797, 41 So. 2d 6, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1949).

44. —Affirmance.

When reviewing denial of motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), if there is substantial evidence in support of verdict, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair minded jurors in exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, affirmance is required. Luther McGill, Inc. v. Bradley, 674 So. 2d 11, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 210 (Miss. 1996).

“Substantial evidence” in support of a verdict, such as to require affirmance of trial court’s denial of appellant’s request for directed verdict, is evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of their impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions. McBride v. Chevron U.S.A., 673 So. 2d 372, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1996), modified, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 271 (Miss. May 23, 1996).

Where appellee’s counsel states in his brief that careful examination of the record shows no error which he could with confidence assert, and therefore respectfully confesses that cause should be affirmed, supreme court will affirm judgment appealed from without reading the record. Horne v. Burnett's Lumber & Supply Co., 208 Miss. 448, 44 So. 2d 536, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 263 (Miss. 1950).

Affirmance by evenly divided court is binding judicial precedent unless and until it is overruled. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Harland, 205 Miss. 380, 38 So. 2d 771, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 436 (Miss. 1949); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Higgins, 201 Miss. 467, 29 So. 2d 267, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 407 (Miss. 1947).

In suit to quiet title, decree of chancellor that covenant in deed prohibiting use of property for any type of textile industry did not prohibit use of described property as place to manufacture garments or other similar articles of wearing apparel given on conflicting evidence equally balanced, or nearly so, will be affirmed on appeal to supreme court. Magnolia Textiles, Inc. v. Gillis, 206 Miss. 797, 41 So. 2d 6, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1949).

In absence of cross-appeal and appellee’s declaration failing to demand full amount sheriff could have successfully sued for as fees for serving overseers’ commissions, supreme court cannot increase judgment, but will affirm judgment recovered. Forrest County v. Thompson, 204 Miss. 628, 37 So. 2d 787, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 395 (Miss. 1948).

The rule in passing on a ruling of a lower court is that the Supreme Court will look to the whole record, and, if in the light thereof no harm appears to have resulted to the appellant from the ruling complained of, the judgment will be affirmed, though the ruling may have been erroneous when made. Planters' Lumber Co. v. Sibley, 130 Miss. 26, 93 So. 440, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 182 (Miss. 1922).

Judgment for plaintiff affirmed where all questions settled on former appeal adversely to defendant. Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Hines, 109 Miss. 500, 68 So. 485, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 184 (Miss. 1915).

Judgment correct on merits affirmed although minor errors committed on trial. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Jackson, 95 Miss. 79, 48 So. 614, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 225 (Miss. 1909).

Judgment affirmed where testimony essential to consideration of question presented has been stricken from record. Pafhausen v. State, 94 Miss. 103, 47 So. 897, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 29 (Miss. 1908).

Affirmance by Supreme Court of decree of chancery court does not affect the right to request chancery court for leave to file a bill of review based on newly discovered evidence. Hall v. Waddill, 78 Miss. 16, 27 So. 936, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1900).

The affirmance by the Supreme Court of a judgment of a circuit court does not render the judgment more effective in bar of another suit than it was before the appeal. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. McCerren, 75 Miss. 687, 23 So. 423, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1898).

45. —Reversal; remand.

Supreme Court will not per se reverse trial court for failing to order mistrial after witness exclusion rule violation; rather, resultant degree of prejudice to defendant must first demonstrate that trial court abused its discretion. Brown v. State, 682 So. 2d 340, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 427 (Miss. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1127, 117 S. Ct. 1271, 137 L. Ed. 2d 348, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 1821 (U.S. 1997).

Remand was required to determine reasonable amount of attorney fees to award perpetual trust trustee, incurred to ensure proper substitution of trustee by new cemetery owner. Bank of Mississippi v. Southern Mem. Park, 677 So. 2d 186, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 315 (Miss. 1996).

When reviewing denial of motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), if facts considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of appellant that reasonable men could not have arrived at contrary verdict, Supreme Court is required to reverse and render. Luther McGill, Inc. v. Bradley, 674 So. 2d 11, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 210 (Miss. 1996).

In order to remand case for an additur on damages, Supreme Court must find that the jury was biased or prejudiced or that the verdict was against overwhelming weight of the evidence. McBride v. Chevron U.S.A., 673 So. 2d 372, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1996), modified, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 271 (Miss. May 23, 1996).

Where, two years after a suit was filed for the establishment of a land line, the chancery court entered an order dismissing without prejudice the bill of complaint, a temporary injunction and a cross bill, the Supreme Court, not being an original trier of fact, would not determine the case, but would remand for reopening, to permit any party to introduce further or other evidence, and for a final decision. Everett v. Berry, 244 So. 2d 736, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1347 (Miss. 1971).

Where fine greater than that permitted by Code 1942, § 2562, providing for maximum penalties in misdemeanor cases, was imposed for violation of Code 1942 § 2613, subsection b, providing only a minimum penalty for second conviction for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors, supreme court, upon reversal, would remand cause to trial court for imposition of sentence. Jenkins v. State, 207 Miss. 281, 42 So. 2d 198, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 338 (Miss. 1949).

Where four justices of the Supreme Court vote to reverse judgment of conviction for attempted rape, but only three vote to reverse and dismiss, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded. Street v. State, 196 Miss. 818, 18 So. 2d 297, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 259 (Miss. 1944).

Where, at beginning of trial, accused’s counsel caused state’s witness to be summoned for accused and requested private interview with him, but declined court’s offer to permit conference in sheriff’s hearing, and failed to renew request after state examined witness, and examination was full and complete, case will not be reversed for such reason. Frazier v. State, 142 Miss. 456, 107 So. 674, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Miss. 1926).

To reverse, an error must have been committed in the trial favorable to appellee and prejudicial to appellant. Calicoat v. State, 131 Miss. 169, 95 So. 318, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 296 (Miss. 1923).

Judgment reversed by majority of Supreme Court, although not concurring in reasons therefor. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 131 Miss. 343, 94 So. 7, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 263 (Miss. 1922), writ of error dismissed, 263 U.S. 673, 44 S. Ct. 5, 68 L. Ed. 500, 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2833 (U.S. 1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 698, 44 S. Ct. 5, 68 L. Ed. 512, 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2968 (U.S. 1923).

Judgment of trial court not reversed except by majority of participating judges of Supreme Court holding specific supporting ruling erroneous. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 131 Miss. 343, 94 So. 7, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 263 (Miss. 1922), writ of error dismissed, 263 U.S. 673, 44 S. Ct. 5, 68 L. Ed. 500, 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2833 (U.S. 1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 698, 44 S. Ct. 5, 68 L. Ed. 512, 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2968 (U.S. 1923).

Notwithstanding that petition for setting aside default judgment failed to set forth the character of the intended defense, judgment setting aside such default judgment will not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court after a trial on the merits wherein the defendant attempted a substantial defense. Planters' Lumber Co. v. Sibley, 130 Miss. 26, 93 So. 440, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 182 (Miss. 1922).

Mere confession of error does not necessitate reversal of judgment or decree. Webb Sumner Oil Mill v. Southern Coal Co., 129 Miss. 127, 91 So. 698, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 1922).

Decree reversed where recovery of an impossible amount is decreed and course of trial is not entirely satisfactory. Quitman Lumber Co. v. Turner, 48 So. 819 (Miss. 1909).

Where only possible judgment reached, case will not be reversed because some of defendant’s pleas were traversed on immaterial issues. Evans v. Lilly & Co., 95 Miss. 58, 48 So. 612, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 1909).

Where accused is found entitled to bail on appeal from order denying it, and record does not show facts on which to determine amount, case will be remanded for bail to be fixed in lower court. Saunders v. Stephenson, 94 Miss. 676, 47 So. 783, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 328 (Miss. 1909).

No reversal of judgment unless prejudicial error shown. Rector v. Shippey, Outzen & Co., 93 Miss. 254, 46 So. 408, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 80 (Miss. 1908).

Case remanded where lower court passed on only one of two points involved. Edwards v. Kingston Lumber Co., 92 Miss. 598, 46 So. 69, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 207 (Miss. 1908).

46. —Granting of new trial.

On appeal from conviction of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor all Supreme Court can grant defendant is new trial where evidence against him was so lacking in weight that court is justified in reversing case and defendant failed to ask for directed verdict in lower court at end of all evidence for both sides but incorporated in motion for new trial ground that verdict of jury was against overwhelming weight of evidence. Faust v. State, 43 So. 2d 379 (Miss. 1949).

Supreme Court may grant new trial only where trial court has erroneously refused to do so. Hattiesburg Chero Cola Bottling Co. v. Price, 143 Miss. 14, 108 So. 291, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 239 (Miss. 1926).

When decree of chancery court, rendered on bill, answer, and proof, is reversed and remanded generally, it must be tried de novo. Pigford v. Ladner, 142 Miss. 435, 107 So. 658, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 103 (Miss. 1926).

On reversal for lack of evidence, case remanded for new trial on absence of request below for directed verdict. Berry v. Magee, Gibson & Magee, 140 Miss. 307, 105 So. 518, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 263 (Miss. 1925).

New evidence of defendant’s absence when crime committed not ground for new trial. Quick v. State, 133 Miss. 634, 98 So. 108 (Miss. 1923).

New trial not granted for newly discovered evidence, where issue non est factum and due diligence not shown. John A. Shank & Co. v. Geiger, 132 Miss. 320, 96 So. 515, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 63 (Miss. 1923).

Jury’s finding held contrary to evidence and new trial awarded. Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Bennett, 127 Miss. 413, 90 So. 113, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 239 (Miss. 1921).

Newly discovered evidence, impeaching material witness, is ground for new trial. Campbell v. State, 123 Miss. 713, 86 So. 513, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 73 (Miss. 1920).

Supreme Court can award new trial on issue of damages only. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Scott, 108 Miss. 871, 67 So. 491, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1915).

The Supreme Court will set aside a verdict and grant a new trial on consideration of the facts alone if they fail to sustain it. Monroe v. State, 71 Miss. 196, 13 So. 884, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1893); Harris v. State, 71 Miss. 462, 14 So. 266, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 98 (Miss. 1893).

If it appears that a fourth new trial is unauthorized the court will vacate the order and remand for judgment nunc pro tunc on the third verdict, and if it was authorized the court will affirm with directions to proceed to another trial. Tagert v. Baker, 57 Miss. 303, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 77 (Miss. 1879).

Code 1906 § 800, (see Code 1942 § 1536), providing that no more than two trials shall be granted to the same party in any case, applies only to the circuit court. The power of the Supreme Court to award new trials for errors of law is without limit. Shelby v. Offutt, 51 Miss. 128, 1875 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1875).

47. —Dismissal of appeal.

Because the chancellor retained jurisdiction to supervise the reunification process and to revisit the case in six months for further review, its order and opinion did not constitute a final, appealable judgment, and thus, the order was, not appropriate for consideration on direct appeal; the order left open for consideration in the chancery court the issues of custody and visitation. Wigington v. McCalop, 191 So.3d 124, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 192 (Miss. 2016).

Appeal from a decision in an election contest concerning a primary mayoral race was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Miss. Code Ann. §9-3-9 because documents required under Miss. Code Ann. §23-15-927 were not included in the appellate record. Moore v. Parker, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 127 (Miss. Mar. 8, 2007), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 962 So. 2d 558, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 476 (Miss. 2007).

Where the court declined to set aside a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of rape, but set aside the sentence imposed by the court, found the defendant insane, and committed him to a state hospital for treatment, and directed that defendant be remanded to the circuit court for imposition of sentence, when and if he regained his sanity, there was final judgment, and the supreme court was without jurisdiction and would dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the circuit court. Lang v. State, 238 Miss. 677, 119 So. 2d 608, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 456 (Miss. 1960).

Where prosecutor erroneously called defendant’s estranged wife to the witness stand causing defendant to object in presence of the jury to her competency as witness against him, defendant was not entitled to reversal since he made no motion for a mistrial at time of trial. Blackwell v. State, 44 So. 2d 409, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 457 (Miss. 1950).

Statute authorizing dismissal of “pending” causes for want of prosecution held applicable only to cases not yet decided, and hence was inapplicable where judgment below had been reversed on appeal, although under court rule no mandate had been issued because of appellee’s failure to pay costs. Dubois v. Thomas, 173 Miss. 697, 161 So. 868, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 239 (Miss. 1935).

Appellant cannot dismiss appeal, unless granted right to do so by the court. Wolf v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 130 Miss. 144, 93 So. 581, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 192 (Miss. 1922).

Appellant allowed to dismiss appeal from decree overruling demurrer to bill, where all questions cannot be decided on appeal because supplemental bill had been filed by appellee. Wolf v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 130 Miss. 144, 93 So. 581, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 192 (Miss. 1922).

Supreme Court may dismiss bill on affirming decree sustaining demurrer. Parker v. Board of Sup'rs, 125 Miss. 617, 88 So. 172, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 149 (Miss. 1921).

Appeal dismissed where real purpose is to obtain affirmance. Smith v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 125 Miss. 139, 87 So. 488, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 341 (Miss. 1921).

Where no petition for appeal and no appeal bond tendered Supreme Court cannot docket and dismiss cause. Calcote v. Stampley, 114 Miss. 887, 75 So. 689, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 1917).

Court cannot dismiss appeal and order writ of procedendo to issue without giving appellant an opportunity to defend. Wilson v. Handsboro, 96 Miss. 376, 50 So. 982, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 53 (Miss. 1910).

Appeal dismissed where no bond in record on appeal from justice to the circuit court. Johnson v. Marshall, 48 So. 182 (Miss. 1909), overruled, Jones v. State, 155 Miss. 364, 123 So. 882, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1929); Humphreys v. McFarland, 48 So. 182 (Miss. 1909), overruled, Jones v. State, 155 Miss. 364, 123 So. 882, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1929).

Where the record of a case at law does not show an appeal from a justice’s court to the circuit court and the sum demanded is less than $200, the Supreme Court of its own motion will dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, although the stenographer’s notes recite that the case was appealed to the circuit court from a justice’s court. Gardner v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co., 78 Miss. 640, 29 So. 469, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 160 (Miss. 1900), overruled, Jones v. State, 155 Miss. 364, 123 So. 882, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1929).

In default of payment of attorney fees allowed to wife on appeal by husband from a decree in a suit for divorce within the time allowed by the court therefor, the bill will be dismissed. Hall v. Hall, 77 Miss. 741, 27 So. 636, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 22 (Miss. 1900).

48. —Restitution.

The Supreme Court has inherent power on reversing a judgment, where the facts appear of record, to award a restitution to the party dispossessed under the judgment pending his appeal. Hall v. Wells, 54 Miss. 289, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1877).

49. Procedure and practice.

Although trial court initially determines in forma pauperis status, Supreme Court is in unique position of deciding which inmate, if any, abuses in forma pauperis status, and thus Supreme Court will determine when such abuse is oppressive to judiciary, and by order will apprise trial court to restrict privilege if necessary. Hyde v. State, 666 So. 2d 445, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 639 (Miss. 1995).

Trial courts should advise criminal defendants of their rights concerning appeal on the record at the time of sentencing and should solicit a decision in that regard. Should a decision be made on the record to appeal, the defendant should be advised that the decision will stand unless a written statement to the contrary, signed by the defendant and the attorney, is filed with the court. Should the decision be made to waive appeal, the defendant should nevertheless be informed of the timeliness for appeal and told that the decision to waive shall stand unless the defendant gives written notice to the court and the attorney prior to the expiration of the time. Should no decision be made, the court should inform the defendant that the failure to express the desire to appeal shall be considered a waiver of the right to appeal and that such waiver will stand unless the defendant gives written notice to the court and counsel prior to the expiration of the time in which to perfect the appeal. Wright v. State, 577 So. 2d 387, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 182 (Miss. 1991).

Neither the circuit court nor the Supreme Court had the authority to consider a county supervisor’s attempted appeal from an order of the board of supervisors finding that he had removed himself from his district and declaring his office vacant under the authority of §25-1-59, where the supervisor filed a notice of appeal to the circuit court but failed to file a bill of exceptions as required by §11-51-75. Moore v. Sanders, 569 So. 2d 1148, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 445 (Miss. 1990).

A motion to stay hearing on an appeal, filed in reply to a suggestion of error, until the trial court should have an opportunity to “perfect the record” and “furnish a supplemental transcript herein” is a procedure unknown in this state. Irwin v. Vick, 203 Miss. 44, 34 So. 2d 725, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 230 (Miss. 1948).

Case may not on appeal be transformed into a different one from that in trial court. Noxubee County v. Long, 141 Miss. 72, 106 So. 83, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 209 (Miss. 1925).

Limiting time for argument not error unless accused prejudiced; where the record showed no prejudice, the time allowed not being consumed, there was no error in limitation. McLeod v. State, 130 Miss. 83, 92 So. 828, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 199 (Miss. 1922).

50. —Pleading.

Motion to strike portions of former husband’s brief would be denied, where motion appeared to be just another in the series of actions and incidents the parties had used to harass each other at their child’s expense. Touchstone v. Touchstone, 682 So. 2d 374, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 534 (Miss. 1996).

Acceptance of payment of judgment by plaintiff must be raised in Supreme Court by special plea in bar of appeal and not motion to dismiss. Adams v. Carter, 92 Miss. 578, 46 So. 59, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1908).

51. —Parties.

One neither necessary nor proper party to equity suit cannot intervene. Crystal Springs Bank v. New Orleans Cattle Loan Co., 132 Miss. 52, 95 So. 520, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 5 (Miss.), modified, 132 Miss. 454, 96 So. 309, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 54 (Miss. 1923).

52. —Evidence.

Although the prosecutor told a sequestered witness of the testimony of another witness before the sequestered witness gave rebuttal testimony, the admission of the witness’ rebuttal testimony did not result in sufficient prejudice to require reversal of the conviction where her rebuttal testimony was consistent with her testimony in the case-in-chief. Doby v. State, 532 So. 2d 584, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1988).

Supreme Court has right to make use of knowledge of popular and general customs of people of state and public conditions therein. Moore v. Grillis, 205 Miss. 865, 39 So. 2d 505, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 472 (Miss. 1949).

53. —Judgment.

Where appeal with supersede as was pending in the court and issue remained open, Supreme Court could correct judgment awarding appellee impleaded fund which erroneously included interest on the fund, on motion, although judgment of circuit court was rendered against appellee rather than against the fund. Gayden v. Kirk, 208 Miss. 283, 44 So. 2d 410, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 1950).

Supreme Court will not enter final decree on appeal when case has features of detail which make it better that final decree be worked out and entered by chancery court in conformity to opinion of supreme court. Dyer v. Russell, 204 Miss. 719, 38 So. 2d 104, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 400 (Miss. 1948).

Seventh Amendment to United States Constitution, preserving right of trial by jury, inapplicable to state courts, and does not prevent final judgment on appeal in state court contrary to verdict, where trial court should have directed verdict. Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Hales, 140 Miss. 829, 105 So. 458, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 313 (Miss. 1925).

Common law on subject remains as if case subsequently overruled had never been decided. Gross v. State, 135 Miss. 624, 100 So. 177, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 50 (Miss. 1924).

Recitals of jurisdictional facts in judgment are controlled by record on appeal. Hattiesburg Hardware Co. v. Pittsburg Steel Co., 115 Miss. 663, 76 So. 570, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 1917).

Supreme Court has full jurisdiction over orders and judgments made during term until term expires. Fairley v. State, 114 Miss. 510, 75 So. 374, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1917).

Judgment on appeal is res judicata, but not as to new case made by new pleading and new evidence. Middleton v. Davis, 105 Miss. 152, 62 So. 164, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 190 (Miss. 1913).

The Supreme Court after deciding a case and giving judgment cannot sustain a motion to correct the judgment filed at a subsequent term because of the existence of some fact neither pleaded nor proved in the court below, on the suggestion that such course is necessary to make the judgment conform to the decision. Le Blanc v. Illinois C. R. Co., 73 Miss. 463, 19 So. 211, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 153 (Miss. 1895).

The Supreme Court is without power to correct its own judgment at a subsequent term on account of any error of law or of fact, although to prevent a failure of justice it will sometimes correct a judgment at a subsequent term where the circumstances are peculiar and exceptional, as in the case of fraud on the part of the person obtaining the judgment, the failure of the judgment as entered to accord with that intended to be entered, some misconception by the court of the case made in the record, or other circumstances of like nature. Le Blanc v. Illinois C. R. Co., 73 Miss. 463, 19 So. 211, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 153 (Miss. 1895); Cotten v. McGehee, 54 Miss. 621, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 59 (Miss. 1877).

54. —Attorney fees.

On appeal by a husband from a decree in a suit for divorce directing him to pay alimony pendente lite and counsel fees to the wife the Supreme Court has the power to award the wife a reasonable solicitor’s fee for reciting the appeal. Hall v. Hall, 77 Miss. 741, 27 So. 636, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 22 (Miss. 1900).

§ 9-3-11. The chief justice; presiding justices.

The judge of the Supreme Court who has been for the longest time continuously a member of the court shall be chief justice; and, the two (2) judges of the supreme court who have served continuously for the next longest time shall be presiding justices. In case of the absence of the chief justice, the presiding justice who has been for the longest time continuously a member shall preside. In the event that two (2) or more judges of the Supreme Court shall have served as members of the Supreme Court for equal periods of time, then seniority shall be determined according to the length of time that such judges shall have been members of the Mississippi State Bar.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 55, art. 27; 1857, ch. 63, art. 18; 1871, § 420; 1880, § 1413; 1892, § 4351; 1906, § 4917; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3193; 1930, § 3362; 1942, § 1946; Laws, 1976, ch. 305, eff from and after May 1, 1976.

Cross References —

Administrative Office of Courts to assist Chief Justice of Supreme with his administrative duties, see §9-21-3.

§ 9-3-12. Resignation and retirement of judges age 68 years and older; services and compensation of retired judge.

  1. Any judge of the Mississippi Supreme Court who has reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years, and who resigns as hereafter provided, may retire from active service as Chief, Presiding, or Associate Justice of the Supreme Court by forwarding a written resignation to the Governor, with a copy to the Supreme Court. Any vacancy on the Supreme Court shall be filled as provided by law. Such judge shall perform for the judges of the Supreme Court such service as the court may designate from time to time. There shall be no more than three (3) such judges serving at any one (1) time and each judge shall serve for a term equal to the balance of the term for which he was last elected by popular vote as a Supreme Court judge; provided, however, no such judge shall serve for a longer period than four (4) years. Such judge shall receive a salary equivalent to two-thirds (2/3) of the salary of an associate justice.
  2. During his tenure, such judge shall continue to be deemed an official elected by popular vote for the remainder of the term to which he was elected by popular vote as a judge of the Supreme Court within the meaning of subsection (f) of Section 25-11-111 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, but such judge shall not be entitled to vote as to the decision of any case heard by the Supreme Court.
  3. The provisions of this section shall not in any manner be construed to require any judge to resign, or to alter, limit or modify the privileges of a Supreme Court judge to resign from active service and to retire in the manner provided by law, or the privilege of a Supreme Court judge who so retires to receive full retirement benefits in the manner provided by law. However, no such judge who resigns under the provisions of this section shall receive retirement benefits while serving under the provisions of this section.
  4. The Supreme Court may, by order spread upon its minutes, give a name or title to the judicial positions created by the provisions of this section.

HISTORY: Laws, 1973, ch. 452, §§ 1-4; Laws, 1994, ch. 335, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 14, 1994).

Cross References —

Appointment of special judges to serve on emergency basis, see §9-1-105.

Designation of certain retired judges as Senior Judges, see §9-1-107.

Recall of retired Supreme Court justices, see §9-3-6.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judges § 16.

CJS.

48A C.J.S., Judges §§ 52, 53.

§ 9-3-13. Clerk of Supreme Court to take oath and give bond.

The clerk of the Supreme Court, before he enters on the discharge of the duties of his office, shall take the oath prescribed in the constitution, and enter into bond with at least two sufficient sureties, to be approved by the court, or in vacation by two of the judges, payable to the state in the penalty of five thousand dollars, conditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of his office. The bond shall be recorded in the minutes of the court, and, immediately thereafter deposited and filed in the office of the secretary of state.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 3226; 1930, § 3363; 1942, § 1947; Laws, 1908, ch. 143.

Cross References —

Provisions common to court clerks, see §§9-1-27 et seq.

§ 9-3-14. Appointment of clerk of Supreme Court.

The clerk of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by majority vote of the Supreme Court and shall serve at the pleasure of the court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 393, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 1979).

Cross References —

Provisions common to court clerks, see §§9-1-27 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court §§ 2-6.

§ 9-3-15. How clerk of Supreme Court may appoint deputies.

The clerk of the Supreme Court shall have power, with the approbation of the court, or of the judges in vacation, to appoint one or more deputies, who shall take the oath of office, and who thereupon shall have power to do and perform all the acts and duties which their principal may lawfully do; such approval, when given by the judges in vacation, shall be in writing, and shall be entered on the minutes of the court at the next term.

HISTORY: Codes Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 27, class 2, art. 1 (12); class 3, art. 1 (10); 1857, ch. 61, art. 17, ch. 62, art. 13; 1871, §§ 551, 990; 1880, § 2281; 1892, § 930; 1906, § 1006; Hemingway’s 1917, § 726; 1930, § 747; 1942, § 1662.

Cross References —

Provisions common to court clerks, see §§9-1-27 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 42.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Acting as guardian of the person or estate of an habitual drunkard is not one of the ex officio duties of a clerk of the chancery court, but devolves upon him when, but not unless, he is appointed as such by a decree of that court, and therefore is not within the ex officio powers vested in a deputy chancery clerk by the statute. O'Bannon v. Henrich, 191 Miss. 815, 4 So. 2d 208, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1941).

Deputy circuit clerk may appoint justice of peace to preside over eminent domain court. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 107 Miss. 626, 65 So. 650, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 1914), aff'd, 250 U.S. 363, 39 S. Ct. 513, 63 L. Ed. 1032, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 1756 (U.S. 1919).

§ 9-3-17. Duties of clerk.

The clerk shall carefully keep a minute of the proceedings of the court for each day, drawn up at large in a record book to be kept by him for that purpose; he shall seasonably record the judgments, decrees, orders, and decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court; he shall safely keep all records, files, books and papers committed to his charge, and also all presses and furniture belonging to his office, and deliver such records, files, books, papers, presses and furniture to his successor in office; and in case of refusal or failure to deliver whatever belongs to his office to his successor, his bond may be put in suit by the Attorney General; he shall prepare for any person demanding the same a certified copy of any paper, record, decree, judgment, or entry on file in his office, proper to be certified, for the fees prescribed by law. The transcript filed in the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, the process in each case, and the judgment or decree of the court thereon, shall be the final record in the cause, and certified as such by the clerk whenever an exemplification of the judgment or decree of the court may be required.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 27, class 4, art. 2 (7); 1857, ch. 63, art. 26; 1871, § 427; 1880, § 1445; 1892, § 4384; 1906, § 4949; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3225; 1930, § 3364; 1942, § 1948; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 20, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Cross References —

Provisions common to court clerks, see §§9-1-27 et seq.

Administrative Office of Courts to assist court clerks, see §9-21-3.

When the clerk must refuse to accept a record, see Miss. Sup. Ct., Rule 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 24 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 337 et seq.

§ 9-3-19. Civil docket.

The clerk of the Supreme Court shall make out and keep a docket of civil cases pending in or which may be brought to the court and place thereon all such cases in the order in which they may have been or may be filed in his office, irrespective of districts.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 3181; 1930, § 3365; 1942, § 1949; Laws, 1916, ch. 163.

Cross References —

Call and order of the docket, in cases where oral argument is and is not requested, see Miss. R. App. P. 23.

§ 9-3-21. Criminal docket.

The clerk shall keep a docket of criminal cases, on which he shall enter all criminal cases brought before the court in the order in which they may be sent up or certified; and he shall keep such other dockets as may be deemed proper by the court. Provided, however, that all cases brought before the court in which the defendant has been sentenced to suffer the death penalty shall be preference cases, and shall be set down for hearing and submission not later than sixty (60) days after the filing of the transcript of the record in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, by order upon its minutes, for good cause shown and to prevent injustice, may extend the time for hearing or submission in any case in which the defendant has been sentenced to suffer the death penalty.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 4386; 1906, § 4951; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3227; 1930, § 3366; 1942, § 1950; Laws, 1954 Ex. ch. 19; Laws, 1977, ch. 458, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1977).

§ 9-3-23. Allowance for books.

The Supreme Court shall make allowance to the clerk for all needful sums for supplying the office with necessary books, stationery, furniture, and presses for preserving the records and for the safe-keeping of the books and papers belonging to the office. The allowance, being certified to the auditor of public accounts by any of the judges, shall be paid out of the appropriation for the judicial department.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 27, class 4, art. 1 (32); 1857, ch. 63, art. 22; 1871, § 422; 1880, § 1411; 1892, § 4349; 1906, § 4915; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3191; 1930, § 3367; 1942, § 1951.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 7-7-2 provides that the words “State Auditor of Public Accounts,” “State Auditor” and “Auditor” appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor’s functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.

Section §27-104-6, provides that wherever the term “State Fiscal Officer” appears in any law it shall mean “Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration.”

§ 9-3-25. Old records; how dealt with.

The Supreme Court of the state of Mississippi is authorized to require its clerk, by order to that effect entered on its minutes, to destroy the transcript of the record, briefs of counsel, and related documents in any case appealed to it from a lower court after the expiration of five years from the rendition of the final judgment in the case by the Supreme Court. Before destroying such records the clerk of the supreme court shall advise the director of the department of archives and history of the contemplated destruction of the records, and, if the director of the department of archives and history shall so desire, the records, or such of them as he may desire, shall not be destroyed, but shall be immediately delivered to him for preservation in his office.

The transcripts of all existing records, briefs of counsel, and all other related documents, which the said clerk is not authorized to destroy, shall be collected by said clerk, under the direction of the Supreme Court, shall be cleaned, organized, and placed in shelves or files with adequate identifications of such records, and shall be maintained by the clerk in a place or places accessible to lawyers, judges and the general public, and in a manner best suited to their preservation. The capitol commission shall provide additional adequate and proper space for the storage of all such records, which in the opinion of the supreme court cannot be stored conveniently and efficiently in the clerk’s record storage room of the new capitol adjoining the courtroom.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 3368; 1942, § 1952; Laws, 1930, ch. 71; Laws, 1964, ch. 345, eff from and after passage (approved April 6, 1964).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 29-5-1, as added by Laws, 1984, Chapter 488, § 7, provided, at subsection (2) therein, that the words “capitol commission” appearing in the laws of the state shall be construed to mean the bureau of capitol facilities of the office of general services. Thereafter, Laws of 1989, Chapter 544, § 24, amended Section 7-1-451 to provide that the term “Office of General Services” appearing in any law of the state shall mean the Department of Finance and Administration.

Cross References —

Archives and Records Management Law, generally, see §§25-59-1 et seq.

Requirement that consent of director of department of archives and history be obtained prior to destruction of public records, see §§25-59-21,25-59-31.

§ 9-3-27. Supreme Court judges may employ secretaries and research assistants for the court.

The judges of the Supreme Court are authorized and empowered to employ such number of secretaries and research assistants to said court as the court may deem necessary for its efficient operation, provided, that each of said research assistants herein authorized shall be qualified members of the Mississippi State Bar, or qualified for admission thereto under the laws of this state. They shall each receive a salary to be fixed by the judges of the Supreme Court, through an order entered on the minutes of said court, within the appropriation for the payment of such salaries in the Supreme Court. Said secretaries and research assistants, upon entering into the discharge of their duties, shall take an oath to be administered by one of the judges of said court that they will faithfully discharge the duties of said office and that they will not disclose the secrets or deliberations of the court, and they shall be removed at the pleasure of the court. Said secretaries and assistants shall be paid on a certificate by the chief justice or by a justice appointed by him to so act to the auditor of public accounts, who shall issue his warrant for the amount or amounts so certified to the state treasurer.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 3151; 1930, § 3409; 1942, § 1993; Laws, 1910, ch. 232; Laws, 1924, ch. 340; Laws, 1928, ch. 187; Laws, 1948, ch. 219; Laws, 1950, ch. 337; Laws, 1952, ch. 246; Laws, 1964, ch. 346, § 2; Laws, 1966 Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 340, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 29, 1968).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 7-7-2 provides that the words “State Auditor of Public Accounts,” “State Auditor” and “Auditor” appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor’s functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.

Section §27-104-6, provides that wherever the term “State Fiscal Officer” appears in any law it shall mean “Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration.”

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A board of supervisors has no power to require a chancery clerk, circuit clerk, or person holding both offices, to personally perform official duties when the duties incumbent upon a chancery clerk, a circuit clerk or the person who holds both offices, are in fact being properly and timely performed by the deputy; regardless of whether the board hires a recording clerk for the board minutes, it must still pay the chancery clerk those fees and compensation that are mandatory; there is no authority that would permit the board to require a chancery clerk to take down the proceedings of the board in long hand rather than short hand; since the compensation of the deputy clerk is by salary, not by fees, the fees that accrue will accrue to the clerk, not the deputy. 1998 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 808.

§ 9-3-28. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1976, ch. 430, § 2, eff from and after December 31, 1978.

[En Laws, 1976, ch. 430, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-3-28 authorized the Supreme Court to request active chancery and circuit court judges to sit temporarily as supreme court commissioners, and provided for the duties, expenses and oath of commissioners.

§ 9-3-29. Officers to attend the court; marshal and deputy marshals appointed; salaries.

The Supreme Court may, by order entered on its minutes, appoint a marshal and such deputy marshals as the court may deem necessary not to exceed three (3), who shall hold their places during the pleasure of the court, and shall attend its sessions, and perform all the duties of a sheriff and deputies attending court, and shall obey all lawful orders of the court. Said marshal and deputy marshals shall each receive a salary to be fixed by the judges of the Supreme Court, through an order entered on the minutes of said court, within its appropriation. They shall be paid on a certificate by the chief justice, or by a justice appointed by him to so act, to the Auditor of Public Accounts, who shall issue his warrant for the amount or amounts so certified to the State Treasurer.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1451; 1892, § 4387; 1906, § 4952; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3228; 1930, § 3369; 1942, § 1953; Laws, 1902, ch. 112; Laws, 1910, ch. 221; Laws, 1920, ch. 115; Laws, 1922, ch. 159; Laws, 1966 Ex Sess, ch. 25, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 522, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 7-7-2 provides that the words “State Auditor of Public Accounts,” “State Auditor” and “Auditor” appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor’s functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.

Section §27-104-6, provides that wherever the term “State Fiscal Officer” appears in any law it shall mean “Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration.”

§ 9-3-31. Court may require sheriff of Hinds county to attend.

The Supreme Court may at any time require the sheriff of Hinds county, with a competent number of deputies, to attend and perform all lawful orders of the court; and, for any failure in this, after notice of the requirement by the court, the sheriff may be punished by the court for a contempt; and for attending the court he shall be allowed two dollars a day for each person so attending, to be paid as the marshal and porter are paid. And at all times, when proper, the court shall dispense with the services of a marshal and require the said sheriff to perform all its duties.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, §§ 1452, 1453; 1892, § 4388; 1906, § 4953; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3229; 1930, § 3370; 1942, § 1954.

§§ 9-3-33 and 9-3-35. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§9-3-33. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 55, art. 2 (5); 1857, ch. 63, art. 3; 1871, § 404; 1880, § 1404; 1892, § 4344; 1906, § 4908; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3186; 1930, § 3373; 1942, § 1957]

§9-3-35. [Codes, 1880, § 1406; 1892, § 4346; 1906, § 4912; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3188; 1930, § 3374; 1942, § 1958]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-3-33 granted Supreme Court judges the power to grant certain appeals.

Former §9-3-35 authorized the Supreme Court to make all orders and issue all process.

§ 9-3-37. Issues of fact may be tried.

The supreme court may try and determine all issues of fact which may arise out of any appeal before it and be necessary to the disposition thereof, and, to this end, may, by order in each case, prescribe in what way evidence may be produced before it on the issue.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1412; 1892, § 4350; 1906, § 4916; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3192; 1930, § 3376; 1942, § 1960.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Specific issues of fact.

1. In general.

A divorced wife appealing from a judgment of contempt of court for her failure to return a house to her divorced husband in good condition in violation with the provisions of the divorce decree, could enter a plea for mitigation of punishment by reason of insanity, for the first time on appeal. Adair v. Holden, 222 So. 2d 834, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1562 (Miss. 1969).

Although the Supreme Court may direct a trial judge to act as facility or agent for the Supreme Court for the purpose of developing evidence as to whether a defendant or his attorneys deliberately waived defendant’s right to object to testimony with reference to the search of his automobile, the burden is upon the Supreme Court to determine whether it is satisfied that such a waiver had or had not occurred. Mixon v. Black, 198 So. 2d 213, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1247 (Miss. 1967).

When matters are to be presented to the Supreme Court in the form of evidence, as permitted by this section, it is better practice for appellee for file a plea in bar. Insured Sav. & Loan Asso. v. State, 242 Miss. 547, 135 So. 2d 703, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 592 (Miss. 1961).

Supreme Court will receive affidavits; and determine whether title to judgment on which appealing execution creditor relies has been transferred to third person. McInnis v. Simmons, 162 Miss. 606, 139 So. 872, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 162 (Miss. 1932).

Motion to dismiss plaintiff’s appeal because he accepted payment of the judgment pending appeal must be dismissed, the proper way of raising the question being by plea in bar, supported by proper evidence. Adams v. Carter, 92 Miss. 578, 46 So. 59, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1908).

A plea in bar of an appeal based on the statute of limitations may be filed in and passed upon by the Supreme Court. Farmer v. Allen, 85 Miss. 672, 38 So. 38, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 181 (Miss. 1904).

Where the court of original jurisdiction rendered a judgment on the merits of a case on specific grounds, declining to pass on other grounds duly presented, the Supreme Court may, nevertheless, affirm on the grounds not passed on. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Adams, 81 Miss. 90, 32 So. 937, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1902).

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to try a claimant’s issue for property seized under execution from it, since the court has no power to try any issue of fact not necessary to be decided for the disposition of a pending appeal. The remedy is replevin. State v. Booker, 61 Miss. 16, 1883 Miss. LEXIS 62 (Miss. 1883).

2. Specific issues of fact.

There are practical and institutional limitations upon the Supreme Court’s ability to find facts; consequently, much deference is placed upon the trial judge’s full discharge of his or her responsibility to make findings of fact as to the question of whether Miranda rights have been intelligently, knowing and voluntarily waived. However, when the trial judge fails to make specific findings and only makes general findings thereby allowing admissibility of evidence, the Supreme Court’s scope of review is considerably broader particularly when the trial judge’s findings on the precise points at issue on appeal are not clearly inferable from the findings made. McCarty v. State, 554 So. 2d 909, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 499 (Miss. 1989).

This section [Code 1942 § 1960] does not apply to a case where no appeal has been perfected, for under its terms the issues of fact which the Supreme Court may try are limited to those arising out of the appeal. Windom v. State, 192 So. 2d 689, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1263 (Miss. 1966).

On appeal of a libel action where the lower court’s findings as to malice were not clear, the Supreme Court had authority under this section [Code 1942 § 1960] and its rules to require the trial judge who heard the case on the merits and sitting without a jury to supplement his findings of fact with specific findings on the issue of malice, and as to whether the proof of malice was made to the extent and in the manner required by decisions of the federal courts. Reaves v. Foster, 191 So. 2d 423, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1217 (Miss. 1966).

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under this section [Code 1942 § 1960] is limited to the trial of issues of fact which may arise out of any appeal before it and necessary to the disposition thereof, and consequently does not permit issuance by the clerk of the trial court of a writ of garnishment to collect costs incurred on appeal to the Supreme Court. State v. Keeton, 176 Miss. 590, 169 So. 760, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1936).

§ 9-3-39. Court may make and enforce rules.

The Supreme Court shall have power to make such rules in respect to making out records for said court and for the Court of Appeals as may be expedient, and may prescribe the form and manner in which records shall be prepared for appeal, and cause the same to be bound, but shall not require any record to be printed; and may enforce its rules by proper fines or by refusal to allow costs to be taxed to the clerks below on records not made out according to the rules, or by refusing to permit such records to be filed. And the court may prescribe the mode of pleading in causes therein, civil and criminal, and the manner of trying the same; and may also establish such rules of practice and proceedings therein as may be deemed necessary and proper for certainty and dispatch of business, and may dismiss causes for noncompliance with any of the rules; but such rules must be consistent with law.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 55, art. 4; 1857, ch. 63, art. 24; 1871, § 426; 1880, § 1408; 1892, § 4348; 1906, § 4914; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3190; 1930, § 3377; 1942, § 1961; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 21, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Cross References —

For current set of court rules made under authority of this section and Mississippi Constitution, as well as procedures related to tracking system adopted by Supreme Court for all civil and criminal cases, see Miss. R. App. P. 1 et seq.

Provision that local rules shall be filed with Supreme Court, which shall publish and disseminate them, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 83.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Dismissal of action for failure or refusal of plaintiff to obey court order. 4 A.L.R.2d 348.

Dismissal of state court action for failure or refusal of plaintiff to answer written interrogatories. 56 A.L.R.3d 1109.

Dismissal of state court action for failure or refusal of plaintiff to obey request or order for production of documents or other objects. 27 A.L.R.4th 61.

Dismissal of state court action for failure or refusal of plaintiff to appear or answer questions at deposition or oral examination. 32 A.L.R.4th 212.

Dismissal of state court action for plaintiff’s failure or refusal to obey court order relating to pleadings or parties. 3 A.L.R.5th 237.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 48-51.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 171-174.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Transcript of record in general.

2. —Form and contents.

3. —Agreed transcript.

4. —Transcript fee.

5. Assignment of errors.

6. Briefs.

7. Agreement of counsel.

8. Docketing and hearing of causes.

9. —Original papers — when considered.

10. —Harmless error — no reversal.

11. New trial.

12. Suggestion of error.

13. Motions.

14. Mandate, issuance or retention of.

15. Reinstatement of dismissed causes.

16. Divisions of court.

1. Transcript of record in general.

The authority of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure in aid of its appellate jurisdiction includes the power to issue writs of certiorari to court reporters requiring the preparation and filing of transcripts of testimony in cases appealed to the court. Supreme Court Rule 44 is adopted in order to establish a uniform procedure with reference to requests by court reporters for additional time in which to transcribe their notes. Brown v. Water Valley, 319 So. 2d 649, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1481 (Miss. 1975).

When return day has passed without clerk of trial court filing record, failure of appellant to apply for writ of certiorari is negligent. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. McGraw, 118 Miss. 850, 80 So. 331, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1918).

Recitals of jurisdictional fact in judgment are controlled by record on appeal. Hattiesburg Hardware Co. v. Pittsburg Steel Co., 115 Miss. 663, 76 So. 570, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 1917).

2. —Form and contents.

Use of loose-leaf binders was not a compliance with Supreme Court rule requiring transcript of record to be bound in “non-flexible pasteboard covers, with marbled sides.” Davis v. Rosenthal Plywood Sales Co., 207 Miss. 574, 42 So. 2d 750, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1949).

Though the trial judge may require court reporter to take all voir dire examinations, it is sufficient that reporter be required to take questions and answers to which objections are made in course of voir dire. Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 178 So. 579, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1938).

Where record shows questions but not what answers of witness would have been, exclusion of such testimony cannot be reviewed. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Scarlet, 115 Miss. 285, 76 So. 265, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 210 (Miss. 1917), rev'd, 249 U.S. 528, 39 S. Ct. 369, 63 L. Ed. 752, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2071 (U.S. 1919).

Under Supreme Court rule 2 (59 So VII) clerk making up transcript need not include copies of his endorsement of filing on papers and records deposited with him. Mississippi C. R. Co. v. Chambers, 103 Miss. 400, 60 So. 562, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 184 (Miss. 1912), overruled, Richmond v. Enochs, 109 Miss. 14, 67 So. 649, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1915).

Where record not double spaced, case will be remanded to docket for writ of certiorari to clerk of lower court to send up proper transcript. Howell v. State, 103 Miss. 520, 60 So. 135, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 155 (Miss. 1912).

3. —Agreed transcript.

Court rule held not to authorize counsel to make whole or any part of original record of trial court record on appeal. Austin v. Von Seutter, 170 Miss. 467, 151 So. 563, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1934).

4. —Transcript fee.

Motion to retax costs was dismissed where certificate alleging that costs paid were excessive was made by mother-in-law of attorney who filed motion and who was to receive as compensation one-half of amount collected, since mother-in-law was not “disinterested person” within court rule requiring certificate to be made by disinterested person (Supreme Court Rule 21A). Deer Island Fish & Oyster Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 172 Miss. 284, 159 So. 656, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 1935).

Lower court clerk having acted on agreement of counsel that original exhibits be certified to Supreme Court in lieu of transcript thereof, after he had made copies of exhibits, though not required to act on such agreement, clerk was not entitled to fees he would have earned by filing transcript. Austin v. Von Seutter, 170 Miss. 467, 151 So. 563, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1934).

Motion to retax costs in Supreme Court on account of incorrect number of words in instrument, or transcript thereof, or transcript of entire record, must be accompanied by written statement of true number of words with certificate of its correctness by competent disinterested person. Peck & Hills Furniture Co. v. Greer, 166 Miss. 249, 148 So. 387 (Miss. 1933).

Clerk failing to incorporate bill of lading in evidence without excuse not allowed fees for making transcript. Jordan v. Mississippi C. R. Co., 107 Miss. 323, 65 So. 276, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 85 (Miss. 1914).

5. Assignment of errors.

On appeal from a conviction for the sale of LSD, the wrongful refusal of the state to disclose the identity of the confidential informant, although not directly assigned as error, was apparent from the briefs and the record and therefore noticeable as plain error under Rule 6. Hemphill v. State, 313 So. 2d 25, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1665 (Miss. 1975).

The Supreme Court on its own motion will raise question of absence of necessary parties. Robbins v. Berry, 209 Miss. 422, 47 So. 2d 846, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 407 (Miss. 1950).

Assignments of error not argued in appellants’ brief are waived. Vail v. Jackson, 206 Miss. 299, 40 So. 2d 151, 41 So. 2d 357 (1949); McGee v. State, 40 So. 2d 160 (Miss.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 805, 70 S. Ct. 77, 94 L. Ed. 487, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 1886 (U.S. 1949).

Supreme Court must accept version of incident given by appellee in civil case and accepted by jury when on appeal appellants do not assign as error that verdict of jury was against weight of evidence. Milner Hotels, Inc. v. Brent, 207 Miss. 892, 43 So. 2d 654, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 400 (Miss. 1949).

Case will not be reversed for error unless such error is prejudicial to defendant and is embraced in an assignment of error. McGee v. State, 40 So. 2d 160 (Miss.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 805, 70 S. Ct. 77, 94 L. Ed. 487, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 1886 (U.S. 1949).

In suit for partition of real property, Supreme Court will not pass upon question of size of complainant’s proportionate interest in the property when lower court’s failure to adjudicate question is not assigned as error, under rule 6. Dantone v. Dantone, 205 Miss. 420, 38 So. 2d 908, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 439 (Miss. 1949).

In action against town for damages to land caused by defective sewage tank, landowners held not precluded from challenging propriety of directed verdict for defendant, although instruction was not excepted to nor motion for new trial made assigning as ground giving of the instruction, in view of statute and court rule making such action unnecessary. Hodges v. Drew, 172 Miss. 668, 159 So. 298, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1935).

Error in admitting evidence may be presented, though question was not included in motion for new trial. Deposit Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Silver Saver Stores, Inc., 166 Miss. 882, 148 So. 367, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 387 (Miss. 1933).

Error in decree not complained of on appeal therefrom cannot be considered on motion to correct reviewing court’s judgment. Nickey v. State, 167 Miss. 650, 145 So. 630, 146 So. 859, 147 So. 324, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1933), aff'd, 292 U.S. 393, 54 S. Ct. 743, 78 L. Ed. 1323, 1934 U.S. LEXIS 718 (U.S. 1934).

Alleged error in calculation and statement in court below of amount due by appellants could not be rectified on motion to correct reviewing court’s judgment where not separately and particularly assigned. Nickey v. State, 167 Miss. 650, 145 So. 630, 146 So. 859, 147 So. 324, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1933), aff'd, 292 U.S. 393, 54 S. Ct. 743, 78 L. Ed. 1323, 1934 U.S. LEXIS 718 (U.S. 1934).

Under rule 6, the test of Supreme Court’s right to review ruling of trial court is whether it could be assigned for error. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 131 Miss. 343, 94 So. 7, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 263 (Miss. 1922), writ of error dismissed, 263 U.S. 673, 44 S. Ct. 5, 68 L. Ed. 500, 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2833 (U.S. 1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 698, 44 S. Ct. 5, 68 L. Ed. 512, 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2968 (U.S. 1923).

Where controversy appears to be between appellants and a county and appellees are not interested, cause will be retained to permit appellants to file assignments of error raising point and serving copy on attorney-general, and time will be given to file briefs and replies. McCaleb v. McCaleb, 110 Miss. 486, 70 So. 563, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 62 (Miss. 1915), modified, 113 Miss. 337, 74 So. 275, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1917).

6. Briefs.

Absent a showing by the appellee that the abstract or abridgment prepared by the appellant is defective or insufficient, the appellee is not permitted to file a counter abstract or abridgment, as such duplication would defeat the purposes for which Rule 41 was adopted. Litton Systems, Inc. v. Burrows, 321 So. 2d 297, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1525 (Miss. 1975).

Abstract of record which referred to certain pages of the voir dire examination and instructions submitted to the trial court, and to three volumes of the record in their entirety, did not comply with Rule 41. Stevenson v. State, 312 So. 2d 10, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1636 (Miss. 1975).

Where the appendix to the appellant’s brief was clearly an attempt to extend the 75 page limitation placed on appellants’ briefs, the appendix was removed from the file and returned to the appellant. Stevenson v. State, 312 So. 2d 10, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1636 (Miss. 1975).

McGee v. State, 40 So. 2d 160 (Miss.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 805, 70 S. Ct. 77, 94 L. Ed. 487, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 1886 (U.S. 1949).

When counsel for appellant complies with rule 7, paragraph 2, of Supreme Court, requesting that a concise statement of the case precede the argument of counsel, and counsel for appellee neither challenges his statement of facts of the case nor sets forth in his brief a different statement of facts, appellee has no just cause of complaint if the Supreme Court accepts the appellant’s statement of facts as being true. Frederic v. Board of Sup'rs, 197 Miss. 293, 20 So. 2d 92, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 300 (Miss. 1944).

Briefs should be confined to facts and law and should not contain opinions counsel may entertain of each other. Felder v. Acme Mills, 112 Miss. 322, 73 So. 52, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 113 (Miss. 1916).

Party excepting to questions of fact in administratix’s account should set forth each exception in his brief with reasons why it sould be sustained and citation to pages of record containing evidence as to items excepted to. Davis v. Blumenberg, 107 Miss. 432, 65 So. 503, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1914).

Supreme Court Rule 7 par. 3 as to double spacing applies both to original matter and quotations, and where single spaced brief filed it will be remanded with leave to file new brief within one week. Bank of Roxie v. Lampton, 103 Miss. 398, 60 So. 561, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 183 (Miss. 1912).

Case remanded to docket with leave to file new brief where appellant’s brief is partly in black and partly in red ink in violation of rule 7 par. City of Water Valley v. State, 103 Miss. 314, 60 So. 325, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 1912).

Case remanded to docket with leave to file another brief where attorney has his name, profession, and address printed in large letters in middle of each page of brief contrary to rule 7 par. 3. Grace v. Floyd, 103 Miss. 201, 60 So. 135, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 154 (Miss. 1912).

7. Agreement of counsel.

Disputed oral agreement of counsel not regarded as excuse for delay in not filing appeal within time by law. Rule 22, 72 So. VIII. Williams v. Meredian L. & R. Co., 114 Miss. 73, 75 So. 59, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1917).

8. Docketing and hearing of causes.

Appeal from judgment of circuit court upholding reasonableness of ordinance extending city limits, where appeal bond was filed by one objector on the 22nd of March and the other on the 24th of March, is returnable on the 1st day of May. Vail v. City of Jackson, 206 Miss. 299, 40 So. 2d 151, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 263 (Miss. 1949).

Cause is on docket for trial the Monday first after expiration of 20 days from taking appeal. Rule of court fixing time of hearing criminal docket is within power of court and consistent with law, being necessary to enable court to properly handle the business before it. Bennett v. State, 99 Miss. 644, 55 So. 482, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 235 (Miss. 1911).

All criminal cases on docket ready for hearing on day of term fixed will be tried. Other criminal cases placed on docket after that time will be continued. Bennett v. State, 99 Miss. 644, 55 So. 482, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 235 (Miss. 1911).

Case of public importance to county from which it comes may be advanced on docket whether preference case or not. Weston v. Hancock County, 98 Miss. 800, 54 So. 307, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 1910).

9. —Original papers — when considered.

Where there appeared to be no reason why original exhibits sent to Supreme Court by order of trial court could not have been copied in record, such exhibits were stricken from record and returned to clerk of lower court. Spitchley v. Covington, 181 Miss. 678, 177 So. 31, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1937).

Original exhibits should be sent to Supreme Court only when an inspection of them instead of copies thereof would aid court in determining matter before it. Spitchley v. Covington, 181 Miss. 678, 177 So. 31, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1937).

The court rule relating to sending of original papers to Supreme Court does not authorize trial court generally to send up all documentary exhibits to Supreme Court. Spitchley v. Covington, 181 Miss. 678, 177 So. 31, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1937).

An original paper introduced as evidence on trial could be made part of record on appeal only pursuant to court rule providing for judge or chancellor making necessary order in proper case. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., v. Duncan, 175 Miss. 724, 165 So. 546, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1936).

An original paper introduced as evidence on trial could be made part of record on appeal only pursuant to court rule providing for judge or chancellor making necessary order in proper case, and such relief could not be granted on motion for certiorari to bring up such paper and have it made part of record on appeal. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., v. Duncan, 175 Miss. 724, 165 So. 546, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1936).

Lower court clerk having acted on agreement of counsel that original exhibits be certified to Supreme Court in lieu of transcript thereof, after he had made copies of exhibits, though not required to act on such agreement, clerk was not entitled to fees he would have earned by filing transcript. Austin v. Von Seutter, 170 Miss. 467, 151 So. 563, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1934).

Original of papers constituting part of record in trial court may be sent up to Supreme Court on appeal only when Supreme Court, trial judge, or chancellor makes order therefor. Austin v. Von Seutter, 170 Miss. 467, 151 So. 563, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1934).

The order and recitals thereof in the judge’s order sending original papers up for inspection under Supreme Court rule 28 are not considered as evidence in the record, and the court will limit its consideration to the instructions and verdict without reference to recitals in the order. Gulf Coast Stevedoring Co. v. Gibbs, 124 Miss. 188, 86 So. 582, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 484 (Miss. 1921).

10. —Harmless error — no reversal.

Under Rule 11 of Supreme Court, no judgment shall be reversed on ground of misdirection to jury, or improper admission or exclusion of evidence, or for error as to matter of pleading or procedure, unless it shall affirmatively appear from whole record that such judgment has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Summerall v. State, 206 Miss. 878, 41 So. 2d 51, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 310 (Miss. 1949).

Judgment of conviction of grand larceny will not be reversed on ground of misdirection to jury or other errors which are harmless in face of testimony in record and when judgment of court below is not miscarriage of justice. Countryman v. State, 204 Miss. 117, 37 So. 2d 21, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 349 (Miss. 1948).

Supreme Court will not reverse, unless record discloses that trial court erred in making ruling complained of, and that appellant was materially prejudiced thereby. Lewis v. State, 173 Miss. 821, 163 So. 387, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1935).

Where insured’s demurrer to special plea was erroneously sustained, question whether insurer had waived defense relied on must be determined by trial court and not by Supreme Court. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gresham, 170 Miss. 211, 154 So. 547, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 125 (Miss. 1934).

Judgment not reversed for erroneous instruction unless it affirmatively appears that complaining party is prejudiced. Smith v. Shelton, 132 Miss. 118, 95 So. 835, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 25 (Miss. 1923).

Erroneous instruction held harmless. Cecil Lumber Co. v. McLeod, 122 Miss. 767, 85 So. 78, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 475 (Miss. 1920).

Where accused voluntarily absented himself during examination of two jurors one of whom was accepted, error, if any, in proceeding with trial was harmless. Thomas v. State, 117 Miss. 532, 78 So. 147, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 170 (Miss. 1918).

11. New trial.

On appeal of a libel action where the lower court’s findings as to malice were not clear, the Supreme Court had authority under this section [Code 1942 § 1961] and its rules to require the trial judge who heard the case on the merits and sitting without a jury to supplement his findings of fact with specific findings on the issue of malice, and as to whether the proof of malice was made to the extent and in the manner required by decisions of the federal courts. Reaves v. Foster, 191 So. 2d 423, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1217 (Miss. 1966).

Although Supreme Court’s order is one of reversal and remand, its opinion is to be regarded as law of case on any similar facts or issues upon rehearing in trial court. State Highway Com. v. Coahoma County, 203 Miss. 629, 32 So. 2d 555, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 367 (Miss. 1947).

Where judgment for plaintiff was reversed in part and Supreme Court rendered judgment trial court should have rendered, defendant was “successful party” entitled to full costs on appeal. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 166 Miss. 53, 144 So. 50, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 306 (Miss. 1932).

The purpose of rule 6 of the rules of the Supreme Court is to dispense with the necessity for a motion for new trial when the error assigned is based upon any ruling made in the trial, but in the absence of error in any of the rulings of the trial court, the rule in question does not dispense with the necessity for a motion for a new trial when the assignment of error is based solely upon objection to the amount of the verdict. Coccora v. Vicksburg Light & Traction Co., 126 Miss. 713, 89 So. 257, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1921).

Where cause reversed solely on measure of damages but remanded generally, motion to correct judgment so as to remand for trial as to damages only will be sustained. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Boon, 112 Miss. 493, 73 So. 563, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 134 (Miss. 1917).

Supreme Court may award new trial on issue of damages only. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Scott, 108 Miss. 871, 67 So. 491, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1915).

12. Suggestion of error.

Where on the original submission to a quorum of the judges elaborate briefs had been submitted by both sides, and on suggestion of error reply briefs were requested and filed, and the matter was considered en banc, the Supreme Court would not grant authority to file a second suggestion of error. Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 378, 142 So. 2d 13 (Miss. 1962).

On suggestion of error in affirmance of conviction for murder, crucial test is not whether original opinion of supreme court may have contained erroneous statement or conclusion of law, but whether such error was committed in trial court. Dickins v. State, 208 Miss. 69, 43 So. 2d 366, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 1949).

Supreme Court is compelled to limit its examination to record before it on suggestion of error in affirmance of judgment of murder conviction and cannot consider assurances of innocence of defendant which derive not from record but from independent investigation of counsel. McAfee v. State, 41 So. 2d 43 (Miss. 1949).

Second suggestion of errors filed after expiration of time for filing suggestion of errors, without permission, and in violation of Rule 14 of Supreme Court, is no part of record. Ball v. State, 203 Miss. 521, 36 So. 2d 159, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 300 (Miss. 1948).

A suggestion of error under rule 14 is to all intents and purposes a request for rehearing, and may be filed without an order of the court if done within the original fifteen days allowed, or within the extended time granted by order of the court therefor; and in such event it suspends the judgment and also the effect and operation of any mandate issued thereon until the suggestion of error shall have been disposed of. White v. State, 190 Miss. 589, 195 So. 479, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1940).

The proper construction of the statute relating to certifying final judgments to the court below (Code 1942 § 1990) requires the clerk of the Supreme Court to certify a final judgment of decree within twenty days after any suggestion of error shall have been disposed of, or, if none has been filed, that he then certify the judgment and issue the mandate, within the period so prescribed, after the time allowed under the rule for filing a suggestion of error, or the extended time granted under an order of the court for that purpose, shall have expired. White v. State, 190 Miss. 589, 195 So. 479, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1940).

The Supreme Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear a manslaughter case on suggestion of error after mandate was issued to and received by the court below upon reversal of the case by a division of the Supreme Court, where within the fifteen days allowed for filing such suggestion of error, an extension of time was granted so as to allow thirty days for filing the same, as shown by an order duly entered upon the minutes of the court prior to the expiration of the original fifteen days allowed, notwithstanding that no order was entered in the Supreme Court, nor notice given to the court below, recalling such mandate at any time prior thereto. White v. State, 190 Miss. 589, 195 So. 479, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1940).

Year within which municipal bonds might be issued after favorable determination of litigation did not begin to run until issuance of mandate fifteen days after Supreme Court’s decision, which was time allowed for filing of suggestion of error. Love v. Mayor & Board of Aldermen, 166 Miss. 322, 148 So. 382, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 389 (Miss. 1933).

Suggestion of error not filed until long after time for filing thereof had expired should be dismissed. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 166 Miss. 53, 144 So. 50, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 306 (Miss. 1932).

Motion to change award of costs must be filed in time allowed for filing suggestion of error. Bacot v. Holloway, 140 Miss. 120, 104 So. 696, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1925).

Motion to correct judgment of remand filed after adjournment and more than 15 days after rendition, not predicated on mistake nor grounds contained in Code 1906 § 1016, is a suggestion of error and must be overruled as not filed within time fixed. Rule 14, 72 So. VIII. McCrory v. Donald, 118 Miss. 596, 79 So. 801, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1918).

13. Motions.

Supreme Court rule 16 is amended to require that all motions to strike the court reporter’s notes for failure to give notice to court reporter as required by the provisions of Code 1972 §9-13-33 [Repealed] shall be filed not later than 10 days after the record in the cause is filed in Supreme Court. Sossaman v. State, 308 So. 2d 222, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1851 (Miss. 1975).

Supreme Court may overrule motion to dismiss appeal when record has not been filed at time motion is made but is filed few days later and prior to order on motion without impairment of general provisions of Code 1942, § 1966, or Rules of Court, where circumstances are not ordinary and advancement of justice requires that court relax its rules. Van Norman v. Van Norman, 45 So. 2d 847 (Miss. 1950).

Motion to expunge parts of record dismissed where no brief filed or counsel appeared as required by rule 16 (59 So IX) when motions called for hearing. Goehns v. Wallace, 108 Miss. 489, 66 So. 978, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1914).

Compliance with rule 16 as to notice to opposite party may be shown by proper certificate signed; unsigned memorandum, not sufficient and motion to continue remanded to docket on failure to comply with rule. Germain v. Harwell, 103 Miss. 521, 60 So. 212, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 164 (Miss. 1912).

14. Mandate, issuance or retention of.

Statute permitting suit in forma pauperis applies only to a court of original jurisdiction and not to courts of appeal; accordingly it does not authorize setting down of a mandate on an affidavit in forma pauperis. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Walters, 190 Miss. 761, 198 So. 746, 200 So. 732, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 183 (Miss. 1940).

Failure of the Supreme Court to recall a mandate issued to and received by the court below after reversal of a manslaughter prosecution by a division of the Supreme Court, pending a hearing on a suggestion of error, prior to judgment of affirmance of the conviction or before the expiration of the term, did not deprive the Supreme Court of power to recall the same, where the court entered an order on its minutes continuing all matters undisposed of to the next succeeding term; and the issuance by the clerk of a mandate under the judgment of affirmance in lieu of the former mandate would be effective ipso facto to revoke and recall the original mandate. White v. State, 190 Miss. 589, 195 So. 479, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1940).

Where costs on appeal, though adjudged against appellee, were paid by appellant after execution against appellee was returned unsatisfied, appellant held not entitled to dismissal of cause or to order directing clerk to refuse payment of costs if tendered by appellee and to decline to issue mandate on ground of appellee’s laches in delaying to pay costs; applicability of doctrine of laches being for determination of court below on return of cause. Dubois v. Thomas, 173 Miss. 697, 161 So. 868, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 239 (Miss. 1935).

15. Reinstatement of dismissed causes.

Felony cases dismissed because appellant has escaped and remains a fugitive when the case is called for hearing on the merits may be reinstated only under the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 18. Miller v. State, 311 So. 2d 348, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1607 (Miss. 1975).

Rule 18, relating to reinstatement of a cause which has been dismissed, has been construed to require a statement, not merely that there is merit in the appeal, but the substance of the ground for which reversal is asked must be set forth, with sufficient facts to show the pertinency of such ground for reversal. Warren v. State, 165 Miss. 783, 144 So. 698, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 293 (Miss. 1932), overruled, Brown v. Water Valley, 319 So. 2d 649, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1481 (Miss. 1975).

16. Divisions of court.

Supreme Court rule authorizing the court to sit in three divisions of three judges each, with each division having full power to hear and to judge all cases assigned to it, was not unconstitutional. In Mississippi Constitution § 149A, authorizing two divisions of three judges each, “two” was surplusage as there were only six judges on the court at the time the section was adopted. Russell v. State, 312 So. 2d 422, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1641 (Miss. 1975).

Under constitutional provision authorizing Supreme Court to sit in two divisions under such rules and regulations as court might adopt, decision of division of Supreme Court becomes authoritative and binding as to cases thus determined and decided by division of court. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 178 Miss. 838, 173 So. 672, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 236 (Miss. 1937).

§§ 9-3-40 and 9-3-41. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§9-3-40. [En Laws, 1978, ch. 425, § 1]

§9-3-41. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 55, art. 3 (1); 1857, ch. 63, art. 18; 1871, § 420; 1880, § 1413; 1892, § 4352; 1906, § 4918; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3194; 1930, § 3379; 1942, § 1963; Laws, 1922, ch. 243]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-3-40 provided for the approval of local court rules by the Supreme Court.

Former §9-3-41 specified which cases required that opinions be in writing.

§ 9-3-43. Supreme Court decisions; designation of private publication as official reports.

The Supreme Court may declare the published volumes of the decisions of the supreme court, as the same are published by any person, firm or corporation, to be official reports of the decisions of the Supreme Court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 9029.5; Laws, 1966, ch. 381, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1966.

§ 9-3-45. Mississippi edition of Supreme Court decisions; purchase; distribution; pricing.

It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to contract for the purchase of and to purchase not more than four hundred (400) copies of the official Mississippi edition of the decisions of the Supreme Court and advance sheets with headnotes. The Supreme Court shall, when approved by the Chief Justice, certify the account therefor to the State Fiscal Officer, who thereupon shall issue his warrant upon the State Treasury for the amounts so specified. Of these copies, the Secretary of State shall deliver, if so requested, a copy to each circuit judge, each chancellor, each district attorney, and each county attorney, each county judge, each Supreme Court judge, the Attorney General and each assistant, and to all others heretofore or hereafter authorized by law to receive same. Before delivery of the copies, the Secretary of State shall first have stamped thereon as follows: “Property of the State of Mississippi for the use of the_______________Judicial District,” and his successors in office; and he shall place an appropriately similar stamp on each copy delivered to the other court officers mentioned in this section.

The contractor shall have exclusive sale of all reports published under this section, including the advance sheets with headnotes, but the contract shall provide that the permanent volumes of the Mississippi Reports shall not sell, within the state, for a greater price than that approved by the Chief Justice. The contractor shall mail directly to each circuit judge, each chancellor, each district attorney, and each county attorney the advance sheets at the same time they are mailed out to other subscribers within the state.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 9029.7; Laws, 1966, ch. 396, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 506, § 23; Laws, 2002, ch. 351, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 7-7-2 provides that the words “State Auditor of Public Accounts,” “State Auditor” and “Auditor” appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor’s functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.

Section §27-104-6, provides that wherever the term “State Fiscal Officer” appears in any law it shall mean “Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

§§ 9-3-47 and 9-3-49. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1990, ch. 363, § 3 eff from and after December 31, 1995.

§9-3-47. [En Laws, 1990, ch. 363, § 1]

§9-3-49. [En Laws, 1990, ch. 363, § 2]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-3-47 related to the appointment of magistrates from Supreme Court districts to assist the Supreme Court.

Former §9-3-49 related to the duty of the Supreme Court Clerk to maintain statistics concerning former §9-3-47.

Rule-Making

§ 9-3-61. General rule-making power vested in Supreme Court.

As a part of the judicial power granted in Article 6, Section 144, of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, the Supreme Court has the power to prescribe from time to time by general rules the forms of process, writs, pleadings, motions, rules of evidence and the practice and procedure for trials and appeals in the Court of Appeals and in the circuit, chancery and county courts of this state and for appeals to the Supreme Court from interlocutory or final orders of trial courts and administrative boards and agencies, and certiorari from the Court of Appeals.

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 15; Laws, 1982, ch. 321, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 22; Laws, 1996, ch. 384, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Cross References —

Power of the court to prescribe rules for the development of records control schedules for the courts of the state, see §25-59-17.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Propriety of exclusion of press or other media representatives from civil trial. 39 A.L.R.5th 103.

Law Reviews.

1981 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Civil Procedure. 52 Miss. L. J. 399, June 1982.

The Limits of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s Rule-Making Authority. 60 Miss. L. J. 359, Fall 1990.

1982 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Civil Procedure: Judicial Decisions. 53 Miss L. J. 130, March 1983.

Recent Trends in Mississippi Judicial Rule Making: Court Power, Judicial Recusals, and Expert Testimony, 23 Miss. C. L. Rev. 1, Fall, 2003.

§ 9-3-63. Limitation on rules.

Rules prescribed by the Supreme Court shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by Article 3, Section 31 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 and as declared by Amendment VII to the Constitution of the United States.

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 16; Laws, 1996, ch. 384, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews.

The Limits of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s Rule-Making Authority. 60 Miss. L. J. 359, Fall 1990.

§ 9-3-65. Advisory committee on Rules of Civil Practice and Procedure; membership; terms.

  1. There shall be an advisory committee on rules which shall consist of (a) two (2) members selected by the judges of the Court of Appeals; (b) two (2) members selected by the Conference of Circuit Court Judges; (c) two (2) members selected by the Conference of Chancery Court Judges; (d) two (2) members selected by the Conference of County Court Judges; (e) two (2) members selected by the Mississippi Bar; (f) two (2) members selected by the Magnolia Bar Association; (g) two (2) members selected by the Mississippi Trial Lawyers Association; (h) two (2) members selected by the Mississippi Defense Lawyers Association; (i) two (2) members selected by the Mississippi Prosecutors Association; (j) two (2) members selected by the Mississippi Public Defenders Association; (k) the Dean of the University of Mississippi School of Law, or his designee; and (l) the Dean of the Mississippi College School of Law, or his designee.
  2. All members of the advisory committee shall serve for terms of three (3) years provided that the committee at its discretion may divide its membership so that approximately one-third (1/3) of its members’ terms will expire each year and may modify the terms of such of its members as may be necessary to accomplish this end. Such selections and appointments shall be made by the respective appointing authorities. Vacancies on the advisory committee shall be filled by the respective selecting and appointing authorities. Members of the committee shall be eligible for reappointment.

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 17; Laws, 1996, ch. 384, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

§ 9-3-67. Advisory committee on Rules of Civil Practice and Procedure; chairman; research counsel; expenses.

The Advisory Committee on Rules shall select a chairman and a vice-chairman from among its members and shall provide for its method of operation. The committee shall have the authority to employ and compensate a competent person or persons to serve as research counsel for the advisory committee who shall serve at the pleasure of the committee either in a full-time or part-time capacity. The committee shall have the authority to employ reporters to direct such projects as it may undertake and to compensate such reporters as may be appropriate. In addition, the committee shall have the authority to employ and compensate such assistants to and staff for the research counsel and the reporters, and to employ and compensate such other persons as the committee may from time to time deem necessary or advisable to discharge the duties with which the committee is herein charged. Reasonable actual expenses of food, lodging and transportation incurred by members of the committee in the performance of their duties shall be reimbursed.

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 18; Laws, 1996, ch. 384, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

§ 9-3-69. Advisory committee on Rules of Civil Practice and Procedure; duties.

The advisory committee shall make a comprehensive and continuing study of practice and procedure in the trial and appellate courts of this state; shall draft such rules pertaining thereunto as it concludes will simplify, improve and expedite the administration of justice; shall publicize the terms and provisions of the proposed rules and shall receive and consider suggestions from the bench, the bar and the public for their improvement; and shall recommend and submit a final draft of any proposed rules to the supreme court, which may amend, revise, delete or add to the recommended rules as it concludes will best serve the administration of justice.

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 19; Laws, 1996, ch. 384, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

§ 9-3-70. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1998, ch. 342, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 16, 1998).

[Laws, 1996, ch. 384, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1996]

Editor’s Notes —

Former Section 9-3-70 related to review of proposed new rules and rule changes by the Advisory Committee on Rules.

§§ 9-3-71 and 9-3-73. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1996, ch. 384, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

§9-3-71. [Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 20; Laws, 1982, ch. 321, § 2]

§9-3-73. [Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 21]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-3-71 was entitled: Submission of proposed rules to legislature; when effective; legislative disapproval; rules not submitted of no effect.

Former §9-3-73 was entitled: Conflicts of proposed rules and Code of 1972 to be specifically noted.

Chapter 4. Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi

§ 9-4-1. Establishment of Court of Appeals.

  1. There is hereby established a court to be known as the “Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi,” which shall be a court of record.
  2. The Court of Appeals shall be comprised of ten (10) appellate judges, two (2) from each Court of Appeals District, selected in accordance with Section 9-4-5.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch 564, § 97; Laws, 2001, ch. 574, § 1, eff July 30, 2001 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the enactment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 104, provides as follows:

“SECTION 104. Section 100 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 1995, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended whichever is later and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On September 6, 1994, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 97.

On July 30, 2001, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 2001, ch. 574, § 1.

Amendment Notes —

The 2001 amendment substituted “Court of Appeals District” for “congressional district” in (2).

Cross References —

For rules governing practice and procedures in appeals to the Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi, see Miss. R. App. P. 1 et seq.

Election of judges of Court of Appeals to be as prescribed in this chapter, see §23-15-994.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 5-9.

Law Reviews.

Southwick, The Mississippi Court of Appeals: History, Procedures, and First Year’s Jurisprudence. 65 Miss. L. J. 593, Spring 1996.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Residency requirement.

1. In general.

Sections 9-4-1 through 9-4-17, which establish the Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi, are constitutional. Marshall v. State, 662 So. 2d 566, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 492 (Miss. 1995).

2. Residency requirement.

As a candidate for judge of the Mississippi Court of Appeals has to reside within the district for the office she seeks, and as appellee did not meet her burden to prove that she met the residency requirement, the trial court erred in finding that she was a qualified candidate for the position. Bryant v. Westbrooks, 99 So.3d 128, 2012 Miss. LEXIS 462 (Miss. 2012).

Candidate for the office of Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi must reside within the district for the office she seeks. Bryant v. Westbrooks, 99 So.3d 128, 2012 Miss. LEXIS 462 (Miss. 2012).

§ 9-4-3. Jurisdiction of court; issuance of decisions.

  1. The Court of Appeals shall have the power to determine or otherwise dispose of any appeal or other proceeding assigned to it by the Supreme Court.

    The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is limited to those matters which have been assigned to it by the Supreme Court.

    The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules for the assignment of matters to the Court of Appeals. These rules may provide for the selective assignment of individual cases and may provide for the assignment of cases according to subject matter or other general criteria. However, the Supreme Court shall retain appeals in cases imposing the death penalty, or cases involving utility rates, annexations, bond issues, election contests, or a statute held unconstitutional by the lower court.

  2. Decisions of the Court of Appeals are final and are not subject to review by the Supreme Court, except by writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court may grant certiorari review only by the affirmative vote of four (4) of its members. At any time before final decision by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court may, by order, transfer to the Supreme Court any case pending before the Court of Appeals.
  3. The Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition or any other process when this may be necessary in any case assigned to it by the Supreme Court.
  4. The Court of Appeals shall issue a decision in every case heard before the Court of Appeals within two hundred seventy (270) days after the final briefs have been filed with the court.
  5. The Supreme Court shall issue a decision in every case within its original jurisdiction, including all direct and post-conviction collateral relief appeals or applications in cases imposing the death penalty, within two hundred seventy (270) days after the final briefs have been filed with the court. The Supreme Court shall issue a decision in every case received on certiorari from the Court of Appeals within one hundred eighty (180) days after the final briefs have been filed with the court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 492, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 588, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the enactment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Cross References —

Power of court to punish for contempt, see §9-1-17.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts §§ 22, 23, 84.

Law Reviews.

Southwick, The Mississippi Court of Appeals: History, Procedures, and First Year’s Jurisprudence. 65 Miss. L. J. 593, Spring 1996.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

It is within the authority of the Court of Appeals, upon proper referral from the Supreme Court, to grant a motion for a discretionary interlocutory appeal. McGriggs v. Montgomery, 710 So. 2d 886, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 192 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

There is no rule, statute, or constitutional provision which would limit the state’s right to seek certiorari review of a Court of Appeals decision which reverses a criminal conviction and remands for a new trial. Cohen v. State, 732 So. 2d 867, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 623 (Miss. 1998).

While jurisdiction of Court of Appeals is limited solely to those cases assigned to it by Supreme Court, once such an assignment is made, that court considers and disposes of each case not by way of preliminary review but as fully empowered appellate court; except as to those cases which by statute must be retained by Supreme Court, no litigant has right to further review by certiorari. Harris v. State, 704 So. 2d 1286, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 47 (Miss.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 827, 118 S. Ct. 90, 139 L. Ed. 2d 47, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4857 (U.S. 1997).

§ 9-4-5. Selection of judges of court; qualifications; terms of office; Court of Appeals Districts.

  1. The term of office of judges of the Court of Appeals shall be eight (8) years. An election shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November 1994, to elect the ten (10) judges of the Court of Appeals, two (2) from each congressional district; provided, however, judges of the Court of Appeals who are elected to take office after the first Monday of January 2002, shall be elected from the Court of Appeals Districts described in subsection (5) of this section. The judges of the Court of Appeals shall begin service on the first Monday of January 1995.
    1. In order to provide that the offices of not more than a majority of the judges of said court shall become vacant at any one (1) time, the terms of office of six (6) of the judges first to be elected shall expire in less than eight (8) years. For the purpose of all elections of members of the court, each of the ten (10) judges of the Court of Appeals shall be considered a separate office. The two (2) offices in each of the five (5) districts shall be designated Position Number 1 and Position Number 2, and in qualifying for office as a candidate for any office of judge of the Court of Appeals each candidate shall state the position number of the office to which he aspires and the election ballots shall so indicate.
      1. In Congressional District Number 1, the judge of the Court of Appeals for Position Number 1 shall be that office for which the term ends January 1, 1999, and the judge of the Court of Appeals for Position Number 2 shall be that office for which the term ends January 1, 2003.
      2. In Congressional District Number 2, the judge of the Court of Appeals for Position Number 1 shall be that office for which the term ends on January 1, 2003, and the judge of the Court of Appeals for Position Number 2 shall be that office for which the term ends January 1, 2001.
      3. In Congressional District Number 3, the judge of the Court of Appeals for Position Number 1 shall be that office for which the term ends on January 1, 2001, and the judge of the Court of Appeals for Position Number 2 shall be that office for which the term ends January 1, 1999.
      4. In Congressional District Number 4, the judge of the Court of Appeals for Position Number 1 shall be that office for which the term ends on January 1, 1999, and the judge of the Court of Appeals for Position Number 2 shall be that office for which the term ends January 1, 2003.
      5. In Congressional District Number 5, the judge of the Court of Appeals for Position Number 1 shall be that office for which the term ends on January 1, 2003, and the judge of the Court of Appeals for Position Number 2 shall be that office for which the term ends January 1, 2001.
    2. The laws regulating the general elections shall apply to and govern the elections of judges of the Court of Appeals except as otherwise provided in Sections 23-15-974 through 23-15-985.
    3. In the year prior to the expiration of the term of an incumbent, and likewise each eighth year thereafter, an election shall be held in the manner provided in this section in the district from which the incumbent Court of Appeals judge was elected at which there shall be elected a successor to the incumbent, whose term of office shall thereafter begin on the first Monday of January of the year in which the term of the incumbent he succeeds expires.
  2. No person shall be eligible for the office of judge of the Court of Appeals who has not attained the age of thirty (30) years at the time of his election and who has not been a practicing attorney and citizen of the state for five (5) years immediately preceding such election.
  3. Any vacancy on the Court of Appeals shall be filled by appointment of the Governor for that portion of the unexpired term prior to the election to fill the remainder of said term according to provisions of Section 23-15-849, Mississippi Code of 1972.
    1. The State of Mississippi is hereby divided into five (5) Court of Appeals Districts as follows:

      FIRST DISTRICT.— The First Court of Appeals District shall be composed of the following counties and portions of counties: Alcorn, Benton, Calhoun, Chickasaw, Choctaw, DeSoto, Itawamba, Lafayette, Lee, Marshall, Monroe, Pontotoc, Prentiss, Tate, Tippah, Tishomingo, Union, Webster and Yalobusha; in Grenada County the precincts of Providence, Mt. Nebo, Hardy and Pea Ridge; in Montgomery County the precincts of North Winona, Lodi, Stewart, Nations and Poplar Creek; in Panola County the precincts of East Sardis, South Curtis, Tocowa, Pope, Courtland, Cole’s Point, North Springport, South Springport, Eureka, Williamson, East Batesville 4, West Batesville 4, Fern Hill, North Batesville A, East Batesville 5 and West Batesville 5; and in Tallahatchie County the precincts of Teasdale, Enid, Springhill, Charleston Beat 1, Charleston Beat 2, Charleston Beat 3, Paynes, Leverette, Cascilla, Murphreesboro and Rosebloom.

      SECOND DISTRICT.— The Second Court of Appeals District shall be composed of the following counties and portions of counties: Bolivar, Carroll, Claiborne, Coahoma, Holmes, Humphreys, Issaquena, Jefferson, Leflore, Quitman, Sharkey, Sunflower, Tunica, Warren, Washington and Yazoo; in Attala County the precincts of Northeast, Hesterville, Possomneck, North Central, McAdams, Newport, Sallis and Southwest; that portion of Grenada County not included in the First Court of Appeals District; in Hinds County Precincts 11, 12, 13, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 40, 41, 83, 84 and 85, and the precincts of Bolton, Brownsville, Cayuga, Chapel Hill, Cynthia, Edwards, Learned, Pine Haven, Pocahontas, St. Thomas, Tinnin, Utica 1 and Utica 2; in Leake County the precincts of Conway, West Carthage, Wiggins, Thomastown and Ofahoma; in Madison County the precincts of Farmhaven, Canton Precinct 2, Canton Precinct 3, Cameron Street, Canton Precinct 6, Bear Creek, Gluckstadt, Smith School, Magnolia Heights, Flora, Virlilia, Canton Precinct 5, Cameron, Couparle, Camden, Sharon, Canton Precinct 1 and Canton Precinct 4; that portion of Montgomery County not included in the First Court of Appeals District; that portion of Panola County not included in the First Court of Appeals District; and that portion of Tallahatchie County not included in the First Court of Appeals District.

      THIRD DISTRICT.— The Third Court of Appeals District shall be composed of the following counties and portions of counties: Clarke, Clay, Jasper, Kemper, Lauderdale, Lowndes, Neshoba, Newton, Noxubee, Oktibbeha, Rankin, Scott, Smith and Winston; that portion of Attala County not included in the Second Court of Appeals District; in Jones County the precincts of Northwest High School, Shady Grove, Sharon, Erata, Glade, Myrick School, Northeast High School, Rustin, Sandersville Civic Center, Tuckers, Antioch and Landrum; that portion of Leake County not included in the Second Court of Appeals District; that portion of Madison County not included in the Second Court of Appeals District; and in Wayne County the precincts of Big Rock, Yellow Creek, Hiwannee, Diamond, Chaparral, Matherville, Coit and Eucutta.

      FOURTH DISTRICT.— The Fourth Court of Appeals District shall be composed of the following counties and portions of counties: Adams, Amite, Copiah, Covington, Franklin, Jefferson Davis, Lawrence, Lincoln, Marion, Pike, Simpson, Walthall and Wilkinson; that portion of Hinds County not included in the Second Court of Appeals District; and that portion of Jones county not included in the Third Court of Appeals District.

      FIFTH DISTRICT.— The Fifth Court of Appeals District shall be composed of the following counties and portions of counties: Forrest, George, Greene, Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Lamar, Pearl River, Perry and Stone; and that portion of Wayne County not included in the Third Court of Appeals District.

    2. The boundaries of the Court of Appeals Districts described in paragraph (a) of this subsection shall be the boundaries of the counties and precincts listed in paragraph (a) of this subsection as such boundaries existed on October 1, 1990.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 3; Laws, 1994, ch. 340, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch 564, § 98; Laws, 2001, ch. 574, § 2, eff July 30, 2001 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the enactment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Laws, 1994, ch. 340, § 5, directs the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi to submit Section 4 of ch. 340 for approval under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Attorney General has determined that section 1 of ch. 340, which amends §9-4-5, should also be submitted for approval under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and has so submitted it.

Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 104, provides as follows:

“SECTION 104. Section 100 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 1995, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended whichever is later and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On September 6, 1994, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 98.

On July 30, 2001, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 2001, ch. 574, § 2.

Amendment Notes —

The 2001 amendment added the proviso in the second sentence of (1); deleted “congressional” following “five (5)” in (2)(a); deleted “congressional” following “section in the” in (2)(c); and added (5).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power of successor judge taking office during term time to vacate, set aside, or annul judgment entered by his or her predecessor. 51 A.L.R.5th 747.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Residency requirement.

As a candidate for judge of the Mississippi Court of Appeals has to reside within the district for the office she seeks, and as appellee did not meet her burden to prove that she met the residency requirement, the trial court erred in finding that she was a qualified candidate for the position. Bryant v. Westbrooks, 99 So.3d 128, 2012 Miss. LEXIS 462 (Miss. 2012).

Candidate for the office of Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi must reside within the district for the office she seeks. Bryant v. Westbrooks, 99 So.3d 128, 2012 Miss. LEXIS 462 (Miss. 2012).

§ 9-4-7. Structure and personnel of court.

  1. The Court of Appeals shall be subject to the administrative policies and procedures as may be established by the Supreme Court, including docket control of the Court of Appeals cases. Whenever feasible, and subject to approval of the Supreme Court, the administrative structure of the Supreme Court shall also support the Court of Appeals.
  2. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and appointment of employees by the Court of Appeals shall be governed by personnel policies adopted and approved by the Administrative Office of the Courts. Whenever feasible and approved by the Supreme Court, employees of the Supreme Court shall also serve the Court of Appeals. The records of the Court of Appeals shall be kept by the Supreme Court Clerk or a deputy of the clerk.
  3. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall appoint a Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for a term of four (4) years, and the person so named shall be eligible for reappointment, subject to the discretion of the Chief Justice.
  4. The Chief Justice may assign one or more Court of Appeals Judges to serve as lower court trial judges to provide docket relief as he deems necessary.
  5. The Court of Appeals shall be authorized to employ an Opinion Editor of the Court of Appeals.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 4; Laws, 2007, ch. 551, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2007.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the enactment of this section by Laws of 1993, ch. 518.

Amendment Notes —

The 2007 amendment added (5).

§ 9-4-9. Quorum of court; assignment of judges to panels; presiding judge of panel.

The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules for the submission of cases to panels of the court and to the court en banc, as well as all other rules of procedure for the Court of Appeals. The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, insofar as practicable, shall assign judges to panels in such a manner that each judge shall sit a substantially equal number of times with each other judge. The Chief Judge shall preside over any panel on which he or she shall sit, and the Chief Judge shall appoint one or more judges to preside, at the will and pleasure of the Chief Judge, over any panel on which the Chief Judge is not a member of a panel.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 5; Laws, 1995, ch. 357, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 14, 1995).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the enactment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

§ 9-4-11. Location of court.

The Court of Appeals shall be located in the City of Jackson and shall have offices as convenient to the State Law Library and the Supreme Court as can be arranged; but the court en banc, or any panel thereof, may sit at such other locations within the state as the Supreme Court may determine by rule.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 6, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the enactment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the enactment of this section by Laws of 1993, ch. 518.

§ 9-4-13. Salaries of court and its personnel.

  1. The judges of the Court of Appeals shall receive salaries as provided for in Section 25-3-35, shall be reimbursed for mileage expenses incurred in performing their duties at the rate authorized by law for public officials and employees as provided for in Section 25-3-41, and shall receive an expense allowance as provided for in Section 25-3-43.
  2. Staff attorneys, law clerks, the opinion editor and all other employees of the Court of Appeals shall be of the same grade classification as Supreme Court employees performing the same or similar duties.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 7; Laws, 1999, ch. 532, § 2; Laws, 2007, ch. 551, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2007.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the enactment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Laws of 1999, ch. 532, § 4 provides:

“SECTION 4. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1999, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever date is later.”

On July 6, 1999, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1999, ch. 532, § 2.

Amendment Notes —

The 2007 amendment, in (2), inserted “the opinion editor,” and made a minor stylistic change.

§ 9-4-15. Time for holding elections for office of judge of Court of Appeals.

General elections for the office of judge of the Court of Appeals shall be held at the same times as general elections for congressional offices.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 31; Laws, 1994, ch 564, § 99, eff from and after September 6, 1994 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the enactment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 104, provides as follows:

“SECTION 104. Section 100 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 1995, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended whichever is later and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On September 6, 1994, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 99.

§ 9-4-17. Severability clause.

If any section, paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase or any part of this act [Laws, 1993, ch. 518] is declared to be unconstitutional or void, or if for any reason is declared to be invalid or of no effect, the remaining sections, paragraphs, sentences, clauses, phrases or parts thereof shall be in no manner affected thereby but shall remain in full force and effect.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 43, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the enactment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the enactment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Chapter 5. Chancery Courts

Chancellors, Districts and Terms

§ 9-5-1. Chancellors; election, holding of court terms, terms of office, and residency.

A chancellor shall be elected for and from each of the chancery court districts as provided in this chapter and the listing of individual precincts shall be those precincts as they existed on October 1, 1990. He shall hold court in any other district with the consent of the chancellor thereof when in their opinion the public interest may be thereby promoted. The terms of all chancellors elected at the regular election for the year 1930 shall begin on the first day of January, 1931, and their terms of office shall continue for four (4) years. A chancellor shall be a resident of the district in which he serves but shall not be required to be a resident of a subdistrict if the district is divided into subdistricts.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 1; 1871, § 978; 1880, §§ 1803, 1804; 1892, §§ 456, 458; 1906, § 505; Hemingways’s 1917, § 261; 1930, § 319; 1942 § 1227; Laws, 1930, ch. 113; Laws, 1994, ch 564, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 356, § 1. (See Editor’s note).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 1.

Laws 2002, ch. 713 (Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 543), provides in pertinent part:

“BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, That the following amendment to the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 is proposed to the qualified electors of the state:

“Amend Section 153, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, to read as follows:

“‘Section 153. The judges of the circuit and chancery courts shall be elected by the people in a manner and at a time to be provided by the Legislature. The judges elected for a term of office beginning from and after January 1, 2003, shall hold their office for a term of six (6) years.’

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That this proposed amendment shall be submitted by the Secretary of State to the qualified electors at an election to be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November 2002, as provided by Section 273 of the Constitution and by general law.

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the explanation of this proposed amendment for the ballot shall read as follows: ‘This proposed constitutional amendment increases the terms of office of circuit and chancery court judges from four to six years beginning January 1, 2003.’

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi shall submit this resolution, immediately upon adoption by the Legislature, to the Attorney General of the United States or to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in accordance with the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

This section was set out to correct an error in the 2014 Replacement Volume. The version of the section that was to become effective upon effectuation under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, provided a proposed amendment to Section 153 of the Mississippi Constitution (by Chapter 713, Laws of 2002) was ratified by the electorate, was erroneously set out in the bound volume. The United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment of this section by Chapter 356, Laws of 2002, but the constitutional amendment was defeated by the electorate, and the amendment by Chapter 356, Laws of 2002, never became law. The section as set out above is the section as it appeared prior to the 2002 amendment.

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 63, provides in part:

“SECTION 63. (1) The Standing Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment is directed to provide the counties census block equivalency files and maps necessary to assist the counties in identifying the boundaries of any subdistricts within a chancery or circuit court district.

“(2)(a) The Split Precinct Block List developed in conjunction with House Bill No. 703, 2015 Regular Session [Chapter 476, Laws of 2015], that details the portions of the partial or split precincts that are contained within a judicial subdistrict by census block number as that list is utilized to detail partial or split precincts for judicial subdistricts in this act is hereby incorporated into and shall be construed to be an integral part of this act. A partial or split precinct contained in this act is identified by an asterisk (*) following its designation within any judicial subdistrict. The Standing Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment shall file the Split Precinct Block List with the Secretary of State.

“(3)(a) This act shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes hereof and to redistrict the trial courts of this state in compliance with constitutional requirements.

“(b) It is intended that this act and the districts and subdistricts described herein completely encompass all the area within the state and all the voters in this state. It is also intended that no district shall include any of the area included within the description of any other district, and that no subdistrict shall include any of the area included within the description of any other subdistrict.

“(c)(i) If the districts or subdistricts described in this act do not carry out the purposes hereof because of: omissions; duplication; overlapping areas; erroneous nomenclature; lack of adequate maps or descriptions of political subdivisions, wards or other divisions thereof, or of their boundary lines; then the Secretary of State, at the joint request of the Lieutenant Governor and the Speaker of the House, by order, shall correct any omissions, overlaps, erroneous nomenclature or other defects in the description of the districts and subdistricts so as to accomplish the purposes and objectives of this act.

“(ii) In promulgating any order under this subsection (3), the Secretary of State, in addition to insuring that all areas of the state are completely and accurately encompassed in the districts and subdistricts, shall be guided by the following standards:

“1. Gaps in the description of any district or subdistrict shall be completed in a manner that results in a total description of the district or subdistrict that is consonant with the description of adjacent districts or subdistricts and results in complete contiguity of districts and subdistricts;

“2. In any allocation of area or correction of descriptions made pursuant to this subsection, the Secretary of State shall, consistent with the foregoing standards, preserve the contiguity and compactness of districts and subdistricts and avoid the unnecessary division of political subdivisions.

“(d) A copy of any order issued under this subsection shall be filed by the Secretary of State in his own office and in the offices of the affected commissioners of election and registrars. The Secretary of State may adopt reasonable rules regulating the procedure for applications for orders under this act and the manner of serving and filing any notice or copy of orders. Upon the filing of an order, the description of any affected district or subdistrict shall be deemed to have been corrected to the full extent as if the correction had been contained in the original description set forth in this act.

“(e) The redistricting contained in this act supersedes any prior redistricting.”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 63, was enacted with a subdivision (2)(a) but no (2)(b).

Chapter 476, Laws of 2015 amended a number of sections in Chapters 5 and 7 of Title 9. For a complete list of Code sections affected by Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, see Table B, Allocation of Acts, in the Statutory Tables Volume.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment added “provided, however, that the terms of all chancellors elected at the regular election in November 2002 shall begin on the first day of January 2003, and their terms of office shall continue for six (6) years” at the end of the third sentence.

Cross References —

Judge not to sit when interested or related, see §9-1-9.

General provisions common to courts, see §§11-1-1 et seq.

Civil practice and procedure provisions common to courts, see §§11-1-1 et seq.

Civil practice and procedure generally in chancery courts, see §§11-5-1 et seq.

Provisions for filling vacancies in the office of chancellor, see §23-15-849.

For rules governing practice and procedure in chancery courts, see Miss. Uniform Chancery Court Rules 1.01 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power of successor judge taking office during termtime to vacate, etc., judgment entered by his predecessor. 11 A.L.R.2d 1117.

Power of court to impose standard of personal appearance or attire. 73 A.L.R.3d 353.

Law Reviews.

Case, In search of an independent judiciary: alternatives to judicial elections in Mississippi. 13 Miss. C. L. Rev. 1, Fall, 1992.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2. Construction and application.

1. Validity.

This section is constitutional, although the Const. 1890 § 158, while authorizing the legislature to provide for the interchange of circuit judges, contains no similar provision respecting chancellors. First Nat'l Bank v. Abe Block & Co., 82 Miss. 197, 33 So. 849, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 115 (Miss. 1903).

2. Construction and application.

State judicial elections come within coverage of “results test” provisions of § 2 of Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 USCS § 1973), as amended in 1982; if term “representatives” limited coverage with respect to judicial elections, limitation would exclude all claims involving judicial elections; better reading of term describes winners of representative, popular elections. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 115 L. Ed. 2d 348, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3627 (U.S. 1991).

Chancellor is not disqualified when not related to parties or financially interested. Walker v. Walker, 140 Miss. 340, 105 So. 753, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 267 (Miss. 1925), overruled, Davis v. Davis, 194 Miss. 343, 12 So. 2d 435, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 75 (Miss. 1943).

Chancellor has no authority in habeas corpus proceedings to admit person convicted of felony to bail pending appeal. Leggett v. Vannison, 133 Miss. 22, 96 So. 518, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1923).

§ 9-5-3. Chancery court districts; terms of court; determination of appropriate number of chancellorships for each district.

  1. The state shall be divided into an appropriate number of chancery court districts, severally numbered and composed of the counties as set forth in the sections which follow. A court to be styled “The Chancery Court of the County of_______________” shall be held in each county, and within each judicial district of a county having two (2) judicial districts, at least twice a year. Court shall be held in chancery court districts consisting of a single county on the same dates state agencies and political subdivisions are open for business excluding legal holidays. The dates upon which terms shall commence and the number of days for which terms shall continue in chancery court districts consisting of more than one (1) county shall be set by order of the chancellor in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section. A matter in court may extend past a term if the interest of justice so requires.
  2. An order establishing the commencement and continuation of terms of court for each of the counties within a chancery court district consisting of more than one (1) county shall be entered annually and not later than October 1 of the year immediately preceding the calendar year for which the terms of court are to become effective. Notice of the dates upon which terms of court shall commence and the number of days for which the terms shall continue in each of the counties within a chancery court district shall be posted in the office of the chancery clerk of each county within the district and mailed to the office of the Secretary of State for publication and distribution to all Mississippi Bar members. If an order is not timely entered, the terms of court for each of the counties within the chancery court district shall remain unchanged for the next calendar year.
  3. The number of chancellorships for each chancery court district shall be determined by the Legislature based upon the following criteria:
    1. The population of the district;
    2. The number of cases filed in the district;
    3. The caseload of each chancellor in the district;
    4. The geographic area of the district;
    5. An analysis of the needs of the district by the court personnel of the district; and
    6. Any other appropriate criteria.
  4. The Judicial College of the University of Mississippi Law Center and the Administrative Office of Courts shall determine the appropriate:
    1. Specific data to be collected as a basis for applying the above criteria;
    2. Method of collecting and maintaining the specified data; and
    3. Method of assimilating the specified data.
  5. In a district having more than one (1) office of chancellor, there shall be no distinction whatsoever in the powers, duties and emoluments of those offices except that the chancellor who has been for the longest time continuously a chancellor of that court or, should no chancellor have served longer in office than the others, the chancellor who has been for the longest time a member of The Mississippi Bar shall be the senior chancellor. The senior chancellor shall have the right to assign causes and dockets and to set terms in districts consisting of more than one (1) county.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, §§ 1455, 1790; 1892, §§ 440, 448; 1906, §§ 487, 496; Hemingway’s 1917, §§ 238, 249; 1930, § 318; 1942, § 1215; Laws, 1930, ch. 113; Laws, 1936, ch. 230; Laws, 1947, 1st Ex. ch. 10; Laws, 1948, ch. 239, § 1; Laws, 1950, ch. 315, § 1; Laws, 1952, ch. 232, § 1; Laws, 1954 Ex. ch. 18; Laws, 1958, ch. 269, § 1; Laws, 1966, ch. 326, § 1; Laws, 1977, ch. 451, § 3; Laws, 1982, ch. 355, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 443, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch 564, § 2; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 2.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment, in (1), substituted “composed of the counties” for “comprised of the counties” in the first sentence, and deleted “From and after January 1, 1995, the dates upon which” from the beginning of the second sentence; substituted “all Mississippi Bar members” for “all members of the Mississippi Bar” in the next-to-last sentence of (2); and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

Cross References —

Division of state into chancery court districts, see Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 152.

Constitutional authority for electing chancellor, see Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 153.

Prohibition of chancellor practicing law, see §9-1-25.

Circuit court districts and terms, see §§9-7-3 et seq.

Terms of county court, see §9-9-19.

Exemption of the judiciary from provisions of open meetings law, see §25-41-3.

Chancellor violating gambling law, see §97-33-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 1-6, 22, 23.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 121-135, 148-170.

§ 9-5-5. First district; composition.

The First Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:

Alcorn County;

Itawamba County;

Lee County;

Monroe County;

Pontotoc County;

Prentiss County;

Tishomingo County; and

Union County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 318; 1942, § 1216; Laws, 1932, chs. 141, 151; Laws, 1936, ch. 230; Laws, 1950, ch. 322; Laws, 1968, ch. 314, § 5; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 3; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 3.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed of the following” for “shall be comprised of the following” in the introductory paragraph.

§ 9-5-7. First district; number of chancellors.

  1. There shall be four (4) chancellors for the First Chancery Court District.
  2. The four (4) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” “Place Two,” “Place Three” and “Place Four.” The chancellor to fill Place One must be a resident of Alcorn, Prentiss or Tishomingo County. The chancellors to fill Place Two and Place Three must reside in Itawamba, Lee, Monroe, Pontotoc or Union County. The chancellor to fill Place Four may be a resident of any county in the district. Election of the four (4) offices of chancellor shall be by election to be held in every county within the First Chancery Court District.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1216.1; Laws, 1968, ch. 314, §§ 1-4; Laws, 1974, ch. 373, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 4; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 1, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 4.

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 1.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment substituted “four (4) chancellors” for “three (3) chancellors” in (1); and added (2).

The 2015 amendment, in (2), deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of the first sentence, substituted “must be a resident” for “shall be a resident” in the second sentence, “must reside in Itawamba” for “shall be a resident of Itawamba” in the third sentence, and “may be a resident” for “shall be a resident” in the fourth sentence, and deleted “of Mississippi” from the end of the last sentence.

§ 9-5-9. Second district; composition.

The Second Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:

Jasper County;

Newton County; and

Scott County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 318; 1942, § 1217; Laws, 1932, chs. 141, 142; Laws, 1936, ch. 231; Laws, 1938, ch. 278; Laws, 1940, ch. 223; Laws, 1947, 1st Ex. ch. 10, § 2; Laws, 1948, chs. 240, 241; Laws, 1966, ch. 326, § 6; Laws, 1968, ch. 315, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 496; Laws, 1977, ch. 451, § 4; Laws, 1982, ch. 355, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 3; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 5; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 5.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the first sentence.

Cross References —

Terms of chancery court in Rankin County as twentieth chancery court district, see §9-5-57.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Summons by publication addressed to a nonresident minor made returnable on a day which is neither a rules day nor the first day of a regular term of court is void on direct attack. Khoury v. Saik, 203 Miss. 155, 33 So. 2d 616, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1948).

§ 9-5-11. Third district; composition.

  1. The Third Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. DeSoto County;
    2. Grenada County;
    3. Montgomery County;
    4. Panola County;
    5. Tate County; and
    6. Yalobusha County.
  2. The Third Chancery Court District shall be divided into two (2) subdistricts as follows:
    1. Subdistrict 3-1 shall consist of DeSoto County.
    2. Subdistrict 3-2 shall consist of Grenada County, Montgomery County, Panola County, Tate County and Yalobusha County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 318; 1942, § 1218; Laws, 1932, ch. 141; Laws, 1946, ch. 398; Laws, 1948, ch. 242; Laws, 1958, ch. 269, § 5; Laws, 1964, ch. 302; Laws, 1966, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1982, ch. 457, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 4; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 6; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 6.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the first sentence.

§ 9-5-13. Third district; number of chancellors; number and election of chancellors of subdistricts.

  1. There shall be three (3) chancellors for the Third Chancery Court District.
    1. The chancellor of Subdistrict 3-1 shall be elected from DeSoto County. The two (2) chancellors of Subdistrict 3-2 shall be elected from Grenada County, Montgomery County, Panola County, Tate County and Yalobusha County.
    2. For purposes of appointment and election, the three (3) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct. The chancellorship in Subdistrict 3-1 shall be denominated only as “Place One,” and the chancellorships in Subdistrict 3-2 shall be denominated only as “Place Two” and “Place Three.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1218.1; Laws, 1970, ch. 325, §§ 1-4, eff from; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 7; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 2, eff Jan. 1, 2007.

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 7.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 2.

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment added (2)(b).

§ 9-5-15. Fourth district; composition.

  1. The Fourth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Amite County;
    2. Franklin County;
    3. Pike County; and
    4. Walthall County.
  2. There shall be two (2) chancellors for the Fourth Chancery Court District. The two (2) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One” and “Place Two.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 318; 1942, § 1219; Laws, 1932, ch. 141; Laws, 1942, ch. 309; Laws, 1944, ch. 313; Laws, 1948, ch. 243; Laws, 1954 Ex. Sess. ch. 18, § 5; Laws, 1966, ch. 329, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 5; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 8; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 8.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 64, provides:

“SECTION 64. Candidates for new chancellorships and circuit judgeships created by this act shall run for those offices in a special election to be conducted in conjunction with the general election of November 2015. Candidates shall file the intent to be a candidate not later than 5:00 p.m. on June 1, 2015, and otherwise shall qualify as provided by Section 23-15-977, and shall run for office and be elected as provided in Sections 23-15-974 through 23-15-985 (Nonpartisan Judicial Election Act). The judges elected shall serve a three-year term to begin January 1, 2016, and the terms of those offices shall thereafter be as is provided for chancellors and circuit judges generally.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment, effective until January 1, 2016, substituted “is composed of” for “is comprised of” in the introductory paragraph; and effective from and after January 1, 2016, substituted “is composed of” for “is comprised of” in (1), and added (2).

§ 9-5-17. Fifth district; composition.

  1. The Fifth Chancery Court District is composed of Hinds County.
  2. The Fifth Chancery Court District shall be divided into the following four (4) subdistricts:
    1. Subdistrict 5-1 shall consist of the following precincts in Hinds County: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 44, 45, 46, 47, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 92, 93, 96 and 97.
    2. Subdistrict 5-2 shall consist of the following precincts in Hinds County: 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, Brownsville, Cynthia, Pocahontas and Tinnin.
    3. Subdistrict 5-3 shall consist of the following precincts in Hinds County: 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 31, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 86, 89 and Jackson State.
    4. Subdistrict 5-4 shall consist of the following precincts in Hinds County: 87, 88, 90, 91, 94, 95, Bolton, Byram 1, Byram 2, Cayuga, Chapel Hill, Clinton 1, Clinton 2, Clinton 3, Clinton 4, Clinton 5, Clinton 6, Dry Grove, Edwards, Learned, Old Byram, Pinehaven, Raymond 1, Raymond 2, Spring Ridge, St. Thomas, Terry, Utica 1 and Utica 2.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 318; 1942, § 1220; Laws, 1932, chs. 141, 150; Laws, 1934, ch. 175; Laws, 1938, ch. 279; Laws, 1948, ch. 244; Laws, 1950, ch. 315, § 2; Laws, 1955, Ex. ch. 35, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 217; Laws, 1975, ch. 416; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 6; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 9; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 9.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 62 provides:

“SECTION 62. The boundaries of the precincts described in Sections 9-5-17 (Fifth Chancery Court District), 9-5-31, (Ninth Chancery Court District), 95-5-37 (Eleventh Chancery District), 9-5-43 (Fourteenth Chancery Court District), 9-5-51 (Seventeenth Chancery Court District), 9-7-21 (Sixth Circuit Court District), 9-7-23 (Seventh Circuit Court District), 9-7-29 (Ninth Circuit Court District) and 9-7-33 (Eleventh Circuit Court District), Mississippi Code of 1972, shall be the boundaries of the precincts as those boundaries are contained in the Census Bureau’s 2010 TIGER/Line Shapefiles released in November 2010. Partial or split precincts are identified by an asterisk (*).”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed of” for “is comprised of” in (1); and in (2), added “and Jackson State” at the end of (c), inserted “1, Byram 2” in (d), and deleted “Precincts” following Hinds County, rearranged the list of precincts to put them in numerical order, and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

§ 9-5-19. Fifth district; number and election of chancellors; divisions of court.

  1. There shall be four (4) chancellors for the Fifth Chancery Court District. One chancellor shall be elected from each subdistrict.
  2. While there shall be no limitation whatsoever upon the powers and duties of the said chancellors other than as cast upon them by the Constitution and laws of this state, the court in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, in the discretion of the senior chancellor, may be divided into four (4) divisions as a matter of convenience by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1220.1; Laws, 1955 Ex. ch. §§ 1-5; Laws, 1956, ch. 217; Laws, 1960, ch. 226; Laws, 1971, ch. 381, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 10, eff from and after September 6, 1994 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 10.

§ 9-5-21. Sixth district; composition.

The Sixth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:

Attala County;

Carroll County;

Choctaw County;

Kemper County;

Neshoba County; and

Winston County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 318; 1942, § 1221; Laws, 1932, ch. 141; Laws, 1934, chs. 176, 177; Laws, 1938, ch. 280; Laws, 1942, ch. 316; Laws, 1948, chs. 245, 239, § 3; Laws, 1950, ch. 339; Laws, 1956, ch. 218; Laws, 1966, ch. 330, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 306; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 7; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 11; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 11.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the first sentence.

§ 9-5-22. Sixth district; number of chancellors.

  1. There shall be two (2) chancellors for the Sixth Chancery Court District.
  2. The two (2) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One” and “Place Two.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 371; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 12; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 3, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 12.

The preamble to Laws of 2005 of ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 3.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment added (2).

The 2015 amendment deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of (2).

§ 9-5-23. Seventh district; composition.

  1. The Seventh Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Bolivar County;
    2. Coahoma County;
    3. Leflore County;
    4. Quitman County;
    5. Tallahatchie County; and
    6. Tunica County.
  2. The Seventh Chancery Court District shall be divided into two (2) subdistricts as follows:
    1. Subdistrict 7-1 shall consist of Bolivar County and Coahoma County;
    2. Subdistrict 7-2 shall consist of Leflore County, Quitman County, Tallahatchie County and Tunica County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 318; 1942, § 1222; Laws, 1932, chs. 141, 148; Laws, 1934, ch. 178; Laws, 1938, ch. 281; Laws, 1950, ch. 359; Laws, 1956, ch. 219; Laws, 1964, ch. 303; Laws, 1968, ch. 317, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 343; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 8; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 13; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 13.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the first sentence of (1).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

Separate maintenance was related to the transaction forming the basis of a former husband’s complaint for divorce as he conceded that he sought a divorce in Florida in order to avoid or cease his separate maintenance obligation in Mississippi; in his Florida complaint, the husband asserted that no alimony was sought. To the contrary, the Mississippi separate maintenance orders showed a basis for a possible award of alimony, and the former wife’s motion to enforce the Mississippi orders did not waive personal jurisdiction for alimony purposes. Because the Florida court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over the former wife, and its judgment was not res judicata over her claim for alimony, the issue of alimony was properly before a chancery court in Mississippi. Lofton v. Lofton, 924 So. 2d 596, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 168 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

§ 9-5-25. Seventh district; number and election of chancellors.

[Until January 1, 2011, this section shall read as follows:]

There shall be two (2) chancellors for the Seventh Chancery Court District. One (1) chancellor shall be elected from each subdistrict.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1222.1; Laws, 1968, ch. 317, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 14; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 4; Laws, 2010, ch. 438, § 2, eff (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section. See Editor’s note.).

Editor’s Notes —

The version of this section that is currently in effect is not certain. The amendments in the second tier of this section are to take effect from and after the date the bill containing the amendments is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Right Act of 1965, as amended and extended. The bill was submitted to the United States Attorney General under Section 5, but the Attorney General has not yet responded to the submission. The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Shelby County v. Holder (June 25, 2013), struck down the coverage formula that determined what jurisdictions are subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, so the coverage formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance under Section 5.

Because of the Shelby County decision, the United States Attorney General is not making any determinations under Section 5 on voting or election changes made by states. The Supreme Court did not strike down Section 5, so it is still in effect. It has not yet been determined if bills that were submitted to the United States Attorney General under Section 5 and were pending at the time of the Shelby County decision are now in effect as a result of that decision. After such a determination has been made, that information will be included in the Advance Code Service.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 14.

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 4.

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment provided for two versions of the section effective until January 1, 2011, and effective from and after January 1, 2011; in the version effective from and after January 1, 2011, rewrote the section.

The 2010 amendment, in the second version, effective January 1, 2011, rewrote the section.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Senate Bill 2339 of 2005 [Chapter 501, Laws of 2005] does not, by its express terms, amend, modify or repeal Sections 9-5-255 and 41-21-61 (a). 2005 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 206.

§ 9-5-25. Seventh district; number and election of chancellors.

[From and after January 1, 2011, this section shall read as follows:]

There shall be three (3) chancellors for the Seventh Chancery Court District. The three (3) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct. One (1) chancellor shall be elected from Subdistrict 7-1 and shall be denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” and two (2) chancellors shall be elected from Subdistrict 7-2 and shall be denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place Two” and “Place Three.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1222.1; Laws, 1968, ch. 317, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 14; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 4; Laws, 2010, ch. 438, § 2, eff (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section. See Editor’s note.).

§ 9-5-27. Eighth district; composition.

The Eighth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:

Hancock County;

Harrison County; and

Stone County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 318; 1942, § 1223; Laws, 1932, ch. 141; Laws, 1938, ch. 282; Laws, 1947, 1st Ex. ch. 10, § 4; Laws, 1948, ch. 246; Laws, 1952, ch. 232, § 2; Laws, 1954, ch. 226; Laws, 1958, ch. 275; Laws, 1960, ch. 227; Laws, 1964, ch. 304, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 318, §§ 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 9; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 15; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 15.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the first sentence.

§ 9-5-29. Eighth district; number and election of chancellors; divisions of court.

  1. There shall be four (4) chancellors for the Eighth Chancery Court District.
  2. The four (4) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” “Place Two,” “Place Three” and “Place Four.”
  3. While there shall be no limitation whatsoever upon the powers and duties of the chancellors other than as cast upon them by the Constitution and laws of this state, the court in the Eighth Chancery Court District, in the discretion of the senior chancellor, may be divided into four (4) divisions as a matter of convenience by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1223.1; Laws, 1964, ch. 305, §§ 1-4; Laws, 1972, ch. 310, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 43; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 16; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 12, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 16.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of (2); and made a minor stylistic change in (3).

§ 9-5-31. Ninth district; composition.

  1. The Ninth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Humphreys County;
    2. Issaquena County;
    3. Sharkey County;
    4. Sunflower County;
    5. Warren County; and
    6. Washington County.
  2. The Ninth Chancery Court District shall be divided into three (3) subdistricts as follows:
    1. Subdistrict 9-1 shall consist of the following precincts in the following counties:
      1. Sunflower County: Boyer-Linn, Drew, Fairview-Hale, Indianola 2 East*, Indianola 3 North*, Indianola 3 Northeast*, Indianola 3 South*, Rome, Ruleville, Ruleville North and Sunflower Plantation; and
      2. Washington County: American Legion, Brent Center, Buster Brown Community Center, Darlove Baptist Church*, Elks Club, Extension Building, Grace Methodist Church*, Greenville Industrial College, Leland Health Department Clinic, Leland Rotary Club, Metcalf City Hall and Potter House Church.
    2. Subdistrict 9-2 shall consist of Humphreys County and the following precincts in the following counties:
      1. Sunflower County: Doddsville, Indianola 2 East*, Indianola 2 West, Indianola 3 North*, Indianola 3 Northeast*, Indianola 3 South*, Indianola Southeast, Inverness, Moorhead, Sunflower 3 and Sunflower 4; and
      2. Washington County: Arcola City Hall, Christ Wesleyan Methodist Church, Darlove Baptist Church*, Glen Allan Health Clinic, Grace Methodist Church*, Hollandale City Hall, St. James Episcopal Church, Swiftwater Baptist Church, Tampa Drive and Ward’s Recreation Center.
    3. Subdistrict 9-3 shall consist of Issaquena County, Sharkey County and Warren County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 318; 1942, § 1224; Laws, 1932, ch. 141; Laws, 1936, ch. 232; Laws, 1942, ch. 312; Laws, 1948, ch. 247; Laws, 1950, ch. 320; Laws, 1956, ch. 220; Laws, 1966, ch. 331, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 404; Laws, 1980, ch. 325; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 10; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 17; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 13, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 17.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 62 provides:

“SECTION 62. The boundaries of the precincts described in Sections 9-5-17 (Fifth Chancery Court District), 9-5-31, (Ninth Chancery Court District), 95-5-37 (Eleventh Chancery District), 9-5-43 (Fourteenth Chancery Court District), 9-5-51 (Seventeenth Chancery Court District), 9-7-21 (Sixth Circuit Court District), 9-7-23 (Seventh Circuit Court District), 9-7-29 (Ninth Circuit Court District) and 9-7-33 (Eleventh Circuit Court District), Mississippi Code of 1972, shall be the boundaries of the precincts as those boundaries are contained in the Census Bureau’s 2010 TIGER/Line Shapefiles released in November 2010. Partial or split precincts are identified by an asterisk (*).”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in (1); substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in (1); and in (2), rewrote ((a)(i) and (ii), which read: “(i) Sunflower County: Indianola 3 North, Indianola 3 South, Ruleville, Boyer-Linn, Fairview-Hale, Rome, Sunflower Plantation, Drew and Ruleville North Precincts; and (ii) Washington County: Buster Brown Community Center, Extension Building, Faith Lutheran Church, Brent Center, William Percy Library, American Legion, Metcalf City Hall, Elks Club, Leland Health Department Clinic, Leland Light and Water Plant and Greenville Industrial College Precincts”; and rewrote (b)(i) and (ii), which read: “(i) Sunflower County: Inverness, Indianola 1, Moorhead, Indianola 2 West, Indianola 2 East, Sunflower, Indianola 3 Northeast and Doddsville Precincts; and (ii) Washington County: St. James Episcopal Church, Swiftwater Baptist Church, Glen Allan Health Clinic, Italian Club, Ward’s Recreation Center, Avon Health Center, Arcola City Hall, Kapco Co., Hollandale City Hall, Darlove Baptist Church, Mangelardi Bourbon Store and Grace Methodist Church Precincts.”

§ 9-5-33. Ninth district; number and election of chancellors.

There shall be three (3) chancellors for the Ninth Chancery Court District. One (1) chancellor shall be elected from each subdistrict.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1224.1; Laws, 1966, ch. 331, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 18, eff from and after September 6, 1994 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 18.

§ 9-5-35. Tenth district; composition.

The Tenth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:

Forrest County;

Lamar County;

Marion County;

Pearl River County; and

Perry County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 318; 1942, § 1225; Laws, 1932, ch. 141; Laws, 1934, ch. 179; Laws, 1936, ch. 233; Laws, 1947, 1st Ex. ch. 10, § 5; Laws, 1956, ch. 221; Laws, 1958, ch. 274; Laws, 1971, ch. 319, § 1; Laws, 1973, ch. 341, § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 325, § 2(1), 1981, ch. 492, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 11; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 19; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 14, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 19.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the first sentence.

§ 9-5-36. Tenth district; number and election of chancellors; residence.

  1. There shall be four (4) chancellors for the Tenth Chancery Court District.
  2. The four (4) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” “Place Two,” “Place Three” and “Place Four.” The chancellor to fill Place One and Place Four may be a resident of any county in the district. The chancellor to fill Place Two must be a resident of Lamar, Marion, Pearl River or Perry County. The chancellor to fill Place Three must be a resident of Forrest County. Election of the four (4) offices of chancellor shall be by election to be held in every county within the Tenth Chancery Court District.

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 325, § 1(1, 3); Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 44; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 20; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 5, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 15, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 20.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 5.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment substituted “four (4) chancellors” for “three (3) chancellors” in (1); and rewrote (2).

The 2015 amendment, in (2), deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of the first sentence, substituted “may be a resident” for “shall be a resident” in the second sentence and “must be a resident” for “shall be a resident” in the third and fourth sentences, and deleted “of Mississippi” from the end of the last sentence.

§ 9-5-37. Eleventh district; composition.

  1. The Eleventh Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Holmes County;
    2. Leake County;
    3. Madison County; and
    4. Yazoo County.
  2. The Eleventh Chancery Court District shall be divided into two (2) subdistricts as follows:
    1. Subdistrict 11-1 shall consist of Holmes County, Yazoo County and the following precincts in Madison County: Bible Church, Canton 4, Canton 5, Flora, Madison County Baptist Family Life Center, Magnolia Heights and Smith School;
    2. Subdistrict 11-2 shall consist of Leake County and the following precincts in Madison County: Bear Creek, Camden, Cameron, Canton 1, Canton 2, Canton 3, Canton 7, Cedar Grove, Cobblestone, Couparle, Gluckstadt, Highland Colony Baptist Church, Liberty, Lorman/Cavalier, Luther Branson School, Madison 1, Madison 2, Madison 3, Main Harbor, New Industrial Park, North Bay, Ratliff Ferry, Ridgeland 1, Ridgeland 3, Ridgeland 4, Ridgeland First Methodist Church, Ridgeland Tennis Center, Sharon, Sunnybrook, Tougaloo, Trace Harbor, Victory Baptist Church, Virlilia, Whisper Lake and Yandell Road.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 318; 1942, § 1226; Laws, 1932, ch. 141; Laws, 1940, ch. 224; Laws, 1966, ch. 332, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 321, § 1; Laws, 1978, ch. 446, § 1 1980, ch. 314; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 12; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 21; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 16, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 21.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 62 provides:

“SECTION 62. The boundaries of the precincts described in Sections 9-5-17 (Fifth Chancery Court District), 9-5-31, (Ninth Chancery Court District), 95-5-37 (Eleventh Chancery District), 9-5-43 (Fourteenth Chancery Court District), 9-5-51 (Seventeenth Chancery Court District), 9-7-21 (Sixth Circuit Court District), 9-7-23 (Seventh Circuit Court District), 9-7-29 (Ninth Circuit Court District) and 9-7-33 (Eleventh Circuit Court District), Mississippi Code of 1972, shall be the boundaries of the precincts as those boundaries are contained in the Census Bureau’s 2010 TIGER/Line Shapefiles released in November 2010. Partial or split precincts are identified by an asterisk (*).”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the first sentence of (1); and in (2), rewrote (a) and (b), which read: “(a) Subdistrict 11-1 shall consist of Holmes County, Yazoo County and Canton Precinct 4, Canton Precinct 5, Smith School, Magnolia Heights and Flora Precincts of Madison County; (b) Subdistrict 11-2 shall consist of Leake County and Farmhaven, Madisonville, Trace Harbor, Canton Precinct 1, Canton Precinct 2, Canton Precinct 3, Canton Precinct 6, Cameron Street, Bear Creek, Madison, Ridgeland, Gluckstadt, Lorman/Cavalier, Virlilia, Cameron, Couparle, Camden and Sharon Precincts of Madison County.”

Cross References —

Administrative Office of Courts to assist court clerks, see §9-21-3.

§ 9-5-38. Eleventh district; number and election of chancellors.

There shall be three (3) chancellors for the Eleventh Chancery Court District. The three (3) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct. One (1) chancellor shall be elected from Subdistrict 11-1 and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” one (1) chancellor shall be elected from Subdistrict 11-2 and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place Two,” and one (1) chancellor shall be elected at large from the entire Eleventh Chancery Court District and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place Three.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 446, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 45; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 22; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 17, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 22.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 64, provides:

“SECTION 64. Candidates for new chancellorships and circuit judgeships created by this act shall run for those offices in a special election to be conducted in conjunction with the general election of November 2015. Candidates shall file the intent to be a candidate not later than 5:00 p.m. on June 1, 2015, and otherwise shall qualify as provided by Section 23-15-977, and shall run for office and be elected as provided in Sections 23-15-974 through 23-15-985 (Nonpartisan Judicial Election Act). The judges elected shall serve a three-year term to begin January 1, 2016, and the terms of those offices shall thereafter be as is provided for chancellors and circuit judges generally.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment, effective January 1, 2016, rewrote the section, which read: “There shall be two (2) chancellors for the Eleventh Chancery Court District. One (1) chancellor shall be elected from each subdistrict.”

§ 9-5-39. Twelfth district; composition.

The Twelfth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:

Clarke County; and

Lauderdale County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1226.2; Laws, 1947, 1st Ex. ch. 10, § 7; Laws, 1948, ch. 248; Laws, 1958, ch. 263; Laws, 1966, ch. 326, § 7; Laws, 1972, ch. 345, § 1; Laws, 1983, ch. 479; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 13; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 23; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 18, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 23.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for ”shall be comprised” in the introductory language.

§ 9-5-40. Twelfth district; number of chancellors.

  1. There shall be two (2) judges for the Twelfth Chancery Court District.
  2. The two (2) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One” and “Place Two.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 312; Laws, 1994, ch 564, § 24; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 6, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 19, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 24.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 6.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment added (2).

The 2015 amendment deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of (2).

§ 9-5-41. Thirteenth district; composition.

  1. The Thirteenth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Covington County;
    2. Jefferson Davis County;
    3. Lawrence County;
    4. Simpson County; and
    5. Smith County.
  2. There shall be two (2) chancellors for the Thirteenth Chancery Court District. The two (2) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One” and “Place Two.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1226.3; Laws, 1947, 1st Ex. ch. 10, § 8; Laws, 1964, ch. 306, § 1; Laws, 1972, ch. 384, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 14; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 25; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 7, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 20, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 25.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 7.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment added (2).

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in (1); and deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of the last sentence in (2).

§ 9-5-43. Fourteenth district; composition.

  1. The Fourteenth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Chickasaw County;
    2. Clay County;
    3. Lowndes County;
    4. Noxubee County;
    5. Oktibbeha County; and
    6. Webster County.
  2. The Fourteenth Chancery Court District shall be divided into three (3) subdistricts as follows:
    1. Subdistrict 14-1 shall consist of Chickasaw County, Webster County and the following precincts in Oktibbeha County: Bell Schoolhouse*, Bradley, Center Grove, Central Starkville*, Craig Springs, Double Springs, East Starkville*, Gillespie Street Center*, Maben, North Adaton, North Longview, North Starkville 2*, North Starkville 3, Northeast Starkville, Self Creek, South Adaton, South Longview, South Starkville*, Sturgis and West Starkville*.
    2. Subdistrict 14-2 shall consist of the following precincts in the following counties:
      1. Clay County: Cedar Bluff, Central West Point, East West Point, Siloam, South West Point and Vinton; and
      2. Lowndes County: Air Base A, Air Base B, Air Base C, Air Base D, Air Base E, Brandon A, Brandon B, Brandon C, Brandon D, Caledonia, Columbus High School A, Columbus High School B, Columbus High School C, Columbus High School D, Dowdle Gas Training Center B, Fairgrounds C, Fairgrounds E, Fairgrounds F, Hunt C, Lee Middle School, Mitchell A, New Hope A, New Hope B, New Hope C, New Hope D, New Hope E, Rural Hill A, Rural Hill B, Rural Hill C, Sale A, Sale B, Sale C, Steens A, Steens B, Steens C, Trinity B, Union Academy B, Union Academy C and University A.
    3. Subdistrict 14-3 shall consist of Noxubee County and the following precincts in the following counties:
      1. Clay County: Cairo, Caradine, North West Point, Pheba, Pine Bluff, Tibbee, Union Star and West West Point;
      2. Lowndes County: Artesia, Coleman A, Coleman B, Crawford A, Fairgrounds A, Fairgrounds B, Fairgrounds D, Fairgrounds G, Hunt A, Hunt B, Mitchell B, New Hope F, Plum Grove A, Plum Grove B, Plum Grove C, Propst Park Community Hut, Trinity A, Union Academy A, University B, West Lowndes A and West Lowndes B; and
      3. Oktibbeha County: Bell Schoolhouse*, Central Starkville*, East Starkville*, Gillespie Street Center*, Hickory Grove, North Starkville 2*, Oktoc, Osborn, Sessums, South Starkville*, Southeast Oktibbeha and West Starkville*.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1226.7; Laws, 1948, ch. 239, § 4; Laws, 1950, ch. 353, § 1; Laws, 1952, ch. 230; Laws, 1956, ch. 222; Laws, 1968, ch. 309, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 15; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 26; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 21, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 26.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 62 provides:

“SECTION 62. The boundaries of the precincts described in Sections 9-5-17 (Fifth Chancery Court District), 9-5-31, (Ninth Chancery Court District), 95-5-37 (Eleventh Chancery District), 9-5-43 (Fourteenth Chancery Court District), 9-5-51 (Seventeenth Chancery Court District), 9-7-21 (Sixth Circuit Court District), 9-7-23 (Seventh Circuit Court District), 9-7-29 (Ninth Circuit Court District) and 9-7-33 (Eleventh Circuit Court District), Mississippi Code of 1972, shall be the boundaries of the precincts as those boundaries are contained in the Census Bureau’s 2010 TIGER/Line Shapefiles released in November 2010. Partial or split precincts are identified by an asterisk (*).”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised of” in (1); rewrote (2)(a), which read: “Subdistrict 14-1 shall consist of Chickasaw County, Webster County and the following precincts in Oktibbeha County: West Starkville, Adaton, North Longview, Self Creek, Double Springs, Northeast Starkville, East Starkville, North Starkville, Maben, South Starkville, South Longview, Craig Springs, Bradley, Center Grove and Sturgis Precincts”; in (2)(b), alphabetized the precincts in (i), and rewrote (ii), which read: “Lowndes County: Caledonia, Steens A, Steens B, Caldwell, Stokes Beard B, Fairview, Sale, Rural Hill B, Lee High, Brandon, Franklin, Air Base A, Air Base B, Air Base C, Steens C, Rural Hill A, New Hope A, Mitchell, New Hope B, Union Academy A and University A Precincts”; in (2)(c), in (i), alphabetized the precincts, and deleted “Una” from the list, rewrote (ii), which read: “Lowndes County: Stokes Beard A, Fair Grounds, Coleman, Plum Grove A, Crawford A, Hunt B, Hunt A, Union Academy B, University B, West Lowndes, Artesia, Mayhew, Crawford B, Crawford C, New Hope C and Plum Grove B Precincts; and,” rewrote (iii), which read: “Oktibbeha County: Osborn, Hickory Grove, Bell Schoolhouse, Central Starkville, Gillespie Street Center, Sessums and Oktoc Precincts”; and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

§ 9-5-45. Fourteenth district; number and election of chancellors.

There shall be three (3) chancellors for the Fourteenth Chancery Court District. One (1) chancellor shall be elected from each subdistrict.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1226.7-01; Laws, 1970, ch. 326, §§ 1-4; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 27, eff from and after September 6, 1994 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 27.

§ 9-5-47. Fifteenth district; composition.

The Fifteenth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:

Copiah County; and

Lincoln County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1226.8; Laws, 1950, ch. 315, §§ 3-7; Laws, 1952, ch. 231, §§ 1-3 (paragraphs 2, 3, 5); Laws, 1962, ch. 280, §§ 1-6; Laws, 1971, ch. 305, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 302; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 16; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 28; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 22, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 28.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory paragraph.

§ 9-5-49. Sixteenth district; composition.

The Sixteenth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:

George County;

Greene County; and

Jackson County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1226.9; Laws, 1952, ch. 232, §§ 3-8; Laws, 1954, ch. 246, § 1; Laws, 1966, ch. 334, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 306 § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 311, § 1; Laws, 1977, ch. 432, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 17; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 29; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 23, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 29.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory paragraph.

§ 9-5-50. Sixteenth district; number and election of chancellors.

  1. There shall be three (3) chancellors for the Sixteenth Chancery Court District.
  2. The three (3) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” “Place Two” and “Place Three.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1973, ch. 421, § 1; Laws, 1977, ch. 431; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 46; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 30; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 24, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 30.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment deleted “For the purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of (2).

§ 9-5-51. Seventeenth district; composition; division; number and election of chancellors.

  1. The Seventeenth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Adams County;
    2. Claiborne County;
    3. Jefferson County; and
    4. Wilkinson County.
  2. The Seventeenth Chancery Court District shall be divided into two (2) subdistricts as follows:
    1. Subdistrict 17-1 shall consist of Claiborne County, Jefferson County, and the following precincts in Adams County: Airport Carpenter*, Convention Center*, Foster Mound, Maryland*, Northside School, Palestine, Pine Ridge, Thompson and Washington*.
    2. Subdistrict 17-2 shall consist of Wilkinson County and the following precincts in Adams County: Beau Pre, Bellemont, By-Pass Fire Station, Carpenter*, Concord, Convention Center*, Courthouse, Duncan Park, Kingston, Liberty Park, Maryland*, Morgantown, Oakland and Washington.
  3. There shall be two (2) chancellors for the Seventeenth Chancery Court District. One (1) chancellor shall be elected from each subdistrict.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1226.95; Laws, 1954, Ex. ch. 18, §§ 2-4, 6, 7; Laws, 1971, ch. 418, § 1; Laws, 1972, ch. 381, § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 478; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 18; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 31; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 25, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 31.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 62 provides:

“SECTION 62. The boundaries of the precincts described in Sections 9-5-17 (Fifth Chancery Court District), 9-5-31, (Ninth Chancery Court District), 95-5-37 (Eleventh Chancery District), 9-5-43 (Fourteenth Chancery Court District), 9-5-51 (Seventeenth Chancery Court District), 9-7-21 (Sixth Circuit Court District), 9-7-23 (Seventh Circuit Court District), 9-7-29 (Ninth Circuit Court District) and 9-7-33 (Eleventh Circuit Court District), Mississippi Code of 1972, shall be the boundaries of the precincts as those boundaries are contained in the Census Bureau’s 2010 TIGER/Line Shapefiles released in November 2010. Partial or split precincts are identified by an asterisk (*).”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in (1); and in (2), rewrote (a), which read: “Subdistrict 17-1 shall consist of Claiborne County, Jefferson County, and the following precincts in Adams County: Maryland Heights, Palestine, Northside School, Thompson, Pine Ridge, Airport, Anchorage and Washington Precincts,” and rewrote (b), which read: “Subdistrict 17-2 shall consist of Wilkinson County and the following precincts in Adams County: Courthouse, By-Pass Fire Station, Cloverdale, Bellemont, Carpenter No. 1, Duncan Park, Beau Pre, Kingston, Concord, Liberty Park, Morgantown and Oakland Precincts.”

§ 9-5-53. Eighteenth district; composition.

The Eighteenth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:

Benton County;

Calhoun County;

Lafayette County;

Marshall County; and

Tippah County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1226.96; Laws, 1958, ch. 269, §§ 2-4, 6, 7 (paragraphs 1-5); Laws, 1960, ch. 229 (paragraph 2); Laws, 1964, ch. 307 (paragraph 2); Laws, 1966, ch. 335, § 2; Laws, 1971, ch. 427, § 1; Laws, 1973, ch. 347, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 19; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 32; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 26, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 32.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory language.

§ 9-5-54. Eighteenth district; number of chancellors.

  1. There shall be two (2) chancellors for the Eighteenth Chancery Court District.
  2. The two (2) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One” and “Place Two.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 387; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 33; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 8, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 27, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 33.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 8.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment added (2).

The 2015 amendment deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of (2).

§ 9-5-55. Nineteenth district; composition.

The Nineteenth Chancery Court District is composed of the following counties:

Jones County; and

Wayne County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1226.97; Laws, 1966, ch. 326, §§ 2-5; Laws, 1968, ch. 322, § 1; Laws, 1980, ch. 359; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 20; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 34; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 28, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 34.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory language.

§ 9-5-57. Twentieth district; composition.

The Twentieth Chancery Court District shall be Rankin County.

HISTORY: Laws, 1977, ch. 451, §§ 1, 2; reenacted, Laws, 1982, ch. 355, § 3; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 21; Laws, 1994, ch 564, § 35; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 29, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 35.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment deleted “comprised of” preceding “Rankin County.”

§ 9-5-58. Twentieth district; number and election of chancellors.

There shall be three (3) chancellors for the Twentieth Chancery Court District. For purposes of appointment and election the three (3) chancellorships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” “Place Two” and “Place Three.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 36; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 30, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the addition of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 36.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 64, provides:

“SECTION 64. Candidates for new chancellorships and circuit judgeships created by this act shall run for those offices in a special election to be conducted in conjunction with the general election of November 2015. Candidates shall file the intent to be a candidate not later than 5:00 p.m. on June 1, 2015, and otherwise shall qualify as provided by Section 23-15-977, and shall run for office and be elected as provided in Sections 23-15-974 through 23-15-985 (Nonpartisan Judicial Election Act). The judges elected shall serve a three-year term to begin January 1, 2016, and the terms of those offices shall thereafter be as is provided for chancellors and circuit judges generally.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment, effective January 1, 2016, substituted “three (3)” for “two (2)” both times it appears, and added “and ‘Place Three’ ” at the end, and made related stylistic changes.

Jurisdiction, Powers and Authority, Vacation Matters

§ 9-5-81. Jurisdiction of the chancery court, in general.

The chancery court in addition to the full jurisdiction in all the matters and cases expressly conferred upon it by the constitution shall have jurisdiction of all cases transferred to it by the circuit court or remanded to it by the supreme court; and such further jurisdiction, as is, in this chapter or elsewhere, provided by law.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 54, arts. 2 (1), 10 (4); 1857, ch. 62, art. 2; 1871, § 974; 1880, § 1829; 1892, § 482; 1906, § 532; Hemingway’s 1917, § 289; 1930, § 351; 1942, § 1262.

Cross References —

Constitutional jurisdiction of the chancery court, see Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 159.

Jurisdiction of Supreme Court, see §9-3-9.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts generally, see §§9-7-81 et seq.

Jurisdiction of county courts, see §9-9-21.

Civil practice and procedure provisions common to courts, see §§11-1-1 et seq.

Prohibition against reversal of judgment or decree in civil case for want of jurisdiction to render, see §11-3-9.

Civil practice and procedure in chancery courts generally, see §§11-5-1 et seq.

Venue of civil actions generally, see §§11-11-1 et seq.

Provisions pertaining to injunctions, see §§11-13-1 et seq.

Suits to confirm title or interest, and to remove clouds on title, see §§11-17-1 et seq.

Jurisdiction over real property interests, see §11-17-37.

Partition of land by chancery court, see §11-21-3.

Sequestration of property, see §§11-29-1 et seq.

Attachment in chancery against nonresident, absent or absconding debtors, see §§11-31-1 et seq.

Garnishment proceedings, see §§11-35-1 et seq.

Habeas corpus proceedings, see §§11-43-1 et seq.

Suits by and against state or its political subdivisions, see §§11-45-1 et seq.

Provision that a person aggrieved by the refusal or neglect of a registrar or election commissioner to perform any duty relative to registration of electors may petition the chancery court for injunctive relief, see §23-15-95.

Determination of primary election contests by a circuit judge or chancellor, see §§23-15-929 through23-15-941.

Proceedings to compel public access to public records, see §25-61-13.

Jurisdiction of appeals from school closing order of board of trustees, see §37-65-129.

Jurisdiction of and procedures in chancery court for involuntary commitment proceedings, see §41-21-63.

Appeal from denial, suspension or revocation of license to operate ambulatory surgical facility, see §41-73-23.

Jurisdiction of chancery court to issue injunction and appoint receiver under Medicaid Fraud Control Act, see §43-13-227.

Jurisdiction of organization of master water management district, see §§51-7-1 et seq.

Jurisdiction over creation of urban flood and drainage control district, see §51-35-307.

Appeals from adverse actions by the state board of pharmacy on licenses or permits, see §73-21-101.

Enforcement by chancery court of monetary penalty assessed by state board of pharmacy, see §73-21-103.

Proceedings to restrain or prevent violations of consumer protection law, see §75-24-9.

Jurisdiction of appeals under the meat, meat-food and poultry regulation and inspection law, see §75-33-23.

Proceedings for removal of directors of nonprofit corporations, see §79-11-249.

Chancery court’s power to order inspection and copying of records of nonprofit corporation, see §79-11-289.

Jurisdiction of chancery court with respect to foreign nonprofit corporation’s appeal of revocation of its certificate of authority, see §79-11-389.

Jurisdiction of chancery court where person fails or refuses to properly execute certificate relative to limited partnership, see §79-14-205.

Jurisdiction of chancery court with respect to application for dissolution of limited partnership, see §79-14-802.

Jurisdiction of chancery court with respect to winding up limited partnership’s affairs, see §79-14-803.

Jurisdiction to establish escheats, see §89-11-11.

Jurisdiction of proceedings brought by trustee or beneficiary concerning administration of a trust, see §91-8-203.

Jurisdiction in suits for divorce, see §93-5-5.

Jurisdiction of suits for annulment of marriage, see §§93-7-11,93-7-13.

Jurisdiction of proceedings under the uniform law on paternity, see §93-9-15.

Jurisdiction to enjoin a nuisance, see §95-3-7.

Jurisdiction to entertain suits against violators of intoxicating liquor laws, see §§99-27-41.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The County Attorney has no obligation to represent a petitioner in a commitment proceeding in chancery court. 1997 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 758.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Availability of equitable remedy of accounting between principal and agent. 3 A.L.R.2d 1310.

Injunction by state court against action in court of another state. 6 A.L.R.2d 896.

Remedies during promisor’s lifetime on contract to convey or will property at death in consideration of support or services. 7 A.L.R.2d 1166.

Capacity of cotenant to maintain suit to set aside conveyance of interest of another cotenant because of fraud, undue influence, or incompetency. 7 A.L.R.2d 1317.

Specific performance or injunctive relief against breach of contract, other than lease or agreement therefor, or contract for services, terminable by one party but not the other. 8 A.L.R.2d 1208.

Change of conditions after execution of contract or option for sale of real property as affecting right to specific performance. 11 A.L.R.2d 390.

Punitive damages: power of equity court to award. 58 A.L.R.4th 844.

Am. Jur.

27A Am. Jur. 2d, Equity §§ 4 et seq.

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Equity §§ 9 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

I. Matters in Equity.

1. In general.

2. Legal remedy as affecting relief in equity.

3. Jurisdiction in general.

4. —Foreign persons, controversies and decrees.

5. Equitable causes.

6. —Fraud or false representations.

7. —Mistake.

8. —Multiplicity of actions.

9. Penalties and forfeitures.

10. Subjects of jurisdiction.

11. —Property rights.

12. —Preservation of property.

13. —Contracts.

14. —Conveyances, mortgages and liens.

15. —Trusts.

16. —Adoptions.

17. —Miscellaneous.

18. Equitable suits and remedies.

19. —Accounting.

20. —Discovery.

21. —Injunction.

22. —Condemnation proceedings.

23. —Exercise of trust powers.

24. Filing of criminal charges.

25. —Foreign judicial proceedings.

26. —Labor disputes.

27. —Nuisances and unlawful obstructions.

28. —Trespass.

29. —Violations of ordinances.

30. —Cancellation and rescission.

31. —Recoupment.

32. —Reformation.

33. Specific performance.

34. —Interpleader.

35. —Bill of revivor.

36. Relief from judgments.

37. Appeal; bill of review.

II. Divorce and Alimony.

38. Jurisdiction in general.

39. Annulment.

40. Separate maintenance.

III. Matters Testamentary and of Administration.

41. Jurisdiction in general.

42. Powers and authority of court.

43. Jurisdiction in particular matters.

IV. Minor’s Business.

44. Jurisdiction in general.

45. Jurisdiction in particular matters.

V. Idiocy, Lunacy, and Persons of Unsound Mind.

46. Jurisdiction in general.

47. Jurisdiction in particular matters.

VI. Cases Transferred from Circuit Court, or Remanded by Supreme Court.

48. In general.

VII. Other Cases Provided by Law.

49. Jurisdiction in general.

50. Accounting.

51. Assignment.

52. Attachment.

53. Creditors’ bills to set aside fraudulent conveyances.

54. Land titles.

55. Liens.

56. Mutual accounts.

57. Official and fiduciary bonds.

58. Personal decrees.

59. Receivers.

60. Penalties.

61. Miscellaneous.

I. Matters in Equity.

1. In general.

While subject matter jurisdiction lay within either the circuit or the chancery court, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction of heavy equipment vendor’s action against a county board of supervisors where the amended complaint, although it sought some relief equitable in nature, in substantial part partook of an action at law, in that it charged the board of supervisors with breach of duties not unlike those generally contractual, and the complaint sought the assessment of civil penalties. Canton Farm Equipment, Inc. v. Richardson, 501 So. 2d 1098, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2273 (Miss. 1987).

Where under a divorce decree, entered pursuant to an agreement of the parties thereto relative to the support and maintenance of the parties’ two children, the father assumed obligation to transfer to the children two insurance policies, but failed to do so before his death, equity would treat the children as clothed with the same interests as if the duty had been actually performed. Mahaffey v. First Nat'l Bank, 231 Miss. 798, 97 So. 2d 756, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 567 (Miss. 1957).

Chancery court of this state derives its equity jurisprudence from English Court of Chancery. Poole v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 208 Miss. 364, 44 So. 2d 467, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1950).

Equity will order that done which ought to have been done. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Marathon Lumber Co., 119 Miss. 802, 81 So. 492, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1919).

Court of equity is court of conscience, and exercising broad discretion should see that wrong and oppression are not inflicted under guise of legal procedure, but that justice is done as the right of each case demands. Herring v. Sutton, 86 Miss. 283, 38 So. 235, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 19 (Miss. 1905).

Equity is defined to be that system of justice which was administered by the high court of chancery in England. Smith v. Everett, 50 Miss. 575, 1874 Miss. LEXIS 95 (Miss. 1874), overruled, Bank of Mississippi v. Duncan, 52 Miss. 740, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1876).

2. Legal remedy as affecting relief in equity.

A personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident was outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the chancery court although it was alleged that full, adequate and expeditious relief could not be granted by a circuit court and the expenses for discovery required in circuit court would be exorbitant, time consuming and inadequate. Blackledge v. Scott, 530 So. 2d 1363, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1988).

Mortgagee will not be enjoined from foreclosing until accounting can be had between parties concerning a difference in attorney’s fees where there was a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. Hub Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Warren, 207 Miss. 297, 42 So. 2d 203, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 340 (Miss. 1949).

Chancery court having taken jurisdiction on any ground of equity will administer full relief, although ground of equity fails under proof and remaining issues present legal subjects only and decree will cover only legal rights and grant legal remedies. McClendon v. Mississippi State Highway Com., 205 Miss. 71, 38 So. 2d 325, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 413 (Miss. 1949).

Resort to equity is improper if there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. Pollard v. Phalen, 98 Miss. 155, 53 So. 453, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 47 (Miss. 1910).

The court cannot grant relief against a judgment at law where the remedy at law is plain and adequate. McKinney v. Willis, 64 Miss. 82, 1 So. 3, 1886 Miss. LEXIS 19 (Miss. 1886).

3. Jurisdiction in general.

The chancery court is a court of record and of general jurisdiction. Hollingsworth v. Central Oil Co., 236 Miss. 779, 112 So. 2d 518, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 376 (Miss. 1959).

Section 147 of Constitution, prohibiting reversal of decree in chancery for want of jurisdiction by reason of error as to whether cause was one of equity or common-law jurisdiction, covers only cases in which trial judge assumes jurisdiction, but where judge declines jurisdiction when in fact case is one good in equity, his action is reviewable. McClendon v. Mississippi State Highway Com., 205 Miss. 71, 38 So. 2d 325, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 413 (Miss. 1949).

Chancery court taking jurisdiction will retain the cause and adjust all equities. Barber v. Barber, 106 Miss. 128, 63 So. 343, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 114 (Miss. 1913).

The court having taken jurisdiction of a bill because of an equitable feature charged, does not lose it because such feature is not maintained by the evidence, and may adjudicate the legal rights of the parties. Atkinson v. Felder, 78 Miss. 83, 29 So. 767, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 1900).

The inhibition of § 147 of the Constitution against the reversal of a decree because the case was one of common law jurisdiction, does not confer jurisdiction of such a case upon the chancery court. Carbolineum Wood-Preserving & Mfg. Co. v. Meyer, 76 Miss. 586, 25 So. 297, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1898).

The court will not take jurisdiction where the matters in controversy are actually pending in the circuit court, since to do so might lead to different results in the two courts. Ricks v. Richardson, 70 Miss. 424, 11 So. 935, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1892).

“Full jurisdiction” indicates that where a court takes hold of a subject it ought to dispose of it fully and finally. Bank of Mississippi v. Duncan, 52 Miss. 740, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1876); Georgia P. R. Co. v. Brooks, 66 Miss. 583, 6 So. 467, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 150 (Miss. 1889); Eyrich v. Capital State Bank, 67 Miss. 60, 6 So. 615, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1889).

The legislature may confer on the chancery court jurisdiction of legal matters in aid of its authority over the principal matter of equitable nature. Bank of Mississippi v. Duncan, 52 Miss. 740, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1876); Buie v. Pollock, 55 Miss. 309, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1877).

4. —Foreign persons, controversies and decrees.

Chancery court has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate controversy involving validity and effect of power of attorney, which has not been acknowledged and recorded in manner of conveyance of land, with respect to conveyance of real property situated in Republic of Greece where all parties reside in Mississippi and have been effectively subjected to in personam jurisdiction of chancery court; court may enter personal judgment, even though controlling substantive law is that of Greece; final adjudication would effectively bind parties in Mississippi and presumably in all other states even though adjudication may not be enforceable in Greece as matter of right and maybe not even as matter of comity. Kountouris v. Varvaris, 476 So. 2d 599, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2245 (Miss. 1985).

The chancery court of Mississippi has no power to set aside a decree of the chancery court of Arkansas. Cliburn v. Cliburn, 209 Miss. 631, 48 So. 2d 126, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 424 (Miss. 1950).

The court has jurisdiction of a bill for relief filed against a non-resident having property in this state to redress a wrong even if the damages are unliquidated. Gordon v. Warfield, 74 Miss. 553, 21 So. 151, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1897).

Independently of statute, by virtue of its general equity powers, the court may, without a judgment at law and nulla bona return, subject to the demands of creditors the effects in this state of a nonresident. Dollman v. Moore, 70 Miss. 267, 12 So. 23, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1892).

5. Equitable causes.

In an action relating to waste disposal, a transfer to a chancery court was improper because equitable claims were not added until after the transfer, and the action had been pending in the circuit court for five years before the transfer was requested. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Mooney, 909 So. 2d 1081, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 73 (Miss. 2005).

The court has jurisdiction, where one corporation transfers all its property to another, to enforce its liabilities against the property in the hands of the purchasing corporation, if the transfer is not in good faith, and its jurisdiction is not affected because incidentally the ascertainment of unliquidated damages is involved. Vicksburg & Y. C. Tel. Co. v. Citizens' Tel. Co., 79 Miss. 341, 30 So. 725, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1901).

6. —Fraud or false representations.

Jurisdiction of court of equity to relieve against fraud and its legal equivalent with respect to judgments and decrees is as ample as that respecting contracts, dominant requirements being that facts constituting fraud, accident, mistake or surprise must have been controlling factors in effectuation of original decree, without which original decree would not have been made as it was made; facts justifying relief must be clearly and positively alleged as facts and must be clearly and convincingly proved; facts must not have been known to injured party at time of original decree, and his ignorance at time must not have been result of want of reasonable care and diligence. Van Norman v. Van Norman, 205 Miss. 114, 38 So. 2d 452, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 416 (Miss. 1949).

Chancery court has general jurisdiction of fraud. Foote-Patrick Co. v. Caladonia Ins. Co., 113 Miss. 419, 74 So. 292, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1917).

Where an illiterate colored man was induced to exchange his land for other land worth not more than half his land by one in whom he had confidence representing other parties, deed was properly set aside for fraud. Carter v. Eastman Gardner & Co., 95 Miss. 651, 48 So. 615, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1909).

7. —Mistake.

Equity will not give any relief from mistake if party could by reasonable diligence have ascertained real facts; nor where means of information are open to both parties and no confidence is reposed, but relief may be proper if enforcement of contract would be unconscionable and party making mistake was in exercise of ordinary diligence. Hunt v. Davis, 208 Miss. 710, 45 So. 2d 350, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 290 (Miss. 1950).

Equity will never give any relief from a mistake, if the party could by reasonable diligence, have ascertained the real facts, or where the means of information are open to both parties and no confidence is reposed. Terre Haute Cooperage v. Branscome, 203 Miss. 493, 35 So. 2d 537, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 297 (Miss. 1948).

Equity will grant appropriate relief to a party to a contract for a unilateral mistake under proper circumstances. Terre Haute Cooperage v. Branscome, 203 Miss. 493, 35 So. 2d 537, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 297 (Miss. 1948).

Equity will interfere to prevent unfair advantage of judgment rendered by mutual mistake of facts. Robertson v. Aetna Ins. Co., 134 Miss. 398, 98 So. 833, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 263 (Miss. 1924).

Equity jurisdiction of mistake is as broad and extensive as in case of fraud. Brown v. Wesson, 114 Miss. 216, 74 So. 831, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1917).

Equity will correct mistake in description of land conveyed in a deed. McAllister v. Richardson, 103 Miss. 418, 60 So. 570, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 188 (Miss. 1912).

If one or both of the parties to an instrument are mistaken as to the subject matter, if the mistake is material equity will grant relief. Allen v. Luckett, 94 Miss. 868, 48 So. 186, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 339 (Miss. 1909).

Generally a mistake of law pure and simple is not ground for relief but there are some exceptions. Powell v. Plant, 23 So. 399 (Miss. 1898).

The court has jurisdiction to afford relief where there has been a mistake and such consequent confusion of goods that there is no adequate remedy at law. Selleck v. Macon Compress & Warehouse Co., 72 Miss. 1019, 17 So. 603, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1895).

8. —Multiplicity of actions.

Where the rights and remedies of the complainants are entirely separate, independent and distinct, they cannot maintain a joint action either at common law or equity. Newton Oil & Mfg. Co. v. Sessums, 102 Miss. 181, 59 So. 9 (Miss. 1912).

To warrant joinder of all in one suit there must be some recognized ground of equitable interference or some community of interest in the subject-matter or a common right or title involved or a common purpose in pursuit of a common adversary where each may resort to equity. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Williamson, 101 Miss. 1, 57 So. 559, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1912).

Where injury is continuous in its nature equity will interfere to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Williamson, 101 Miss. 1, 57 So. 559, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1912).

Actions at law by different parties for different forms of negligence will not be enjoined. Gulf Compress Co. v. Wooten Cotton Co., 98 Miss. 651, 54 So. 86, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1910).

There is a marked difference between “multiplicity of suits” and “multitude of suits.” Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Barnes, 94 Miss. 484, 48 So. 823, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1909); Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Williamson, 101 Miss. 1, 57 So. 559, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1912).

Suits must be governed by same principles of law and practically the same facts before equity jurisdiction attaches. Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Barnes, 94 Miss. 484, 48 So. 823, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1909); Gulf Compress Co. v. Wooten Cotton Co., 98 Miss. 651, 54 So. 86, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1910).

Bill to avoid multiplicity of suits will not lie where the same law and facts do not apply to all the claims. Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Barnes, 94 Miss. 484, 48 So. 823, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1909).

To avoid a multiplicity of suits complainant was entitled to maintain bill to restrain ejectment at law. Butler v. Scottish-American Mortg. Co., 93 Miss. 215, 46 So. 829, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Miss. 1908).

Equity has jurisdiction to restrain prosecution of a number of actions at law based upon the same state of facts. Whitlock v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 91 Miss. 779, 45 So. 861, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 199 (Miss. 1907).

The court will not take jurisdiction on the ground of multiplicity to enjoin three separate actions at law, though the defense to all of them is the same. Johnston v. Stone, 71 Miss. 593, 14 So. 81, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1893).

The court has no jurisdiction, in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits, to enjoin separate actions to recover damages against the complainant where the plaintiffs have no common interest except in the questions of law and fact involved and where they could not be proceeded against by the complainant separately. Tribbette v. Illinois C. R. Co., 70 Miss. 182, 12 So. 32, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1892).

9. Penalties and forfeitures.

Where optional right of forfeiture is solely in the hands of one of the parties equity will enforce forfeiture of contract only where he acts with promptness and at the earliest reasonable time after default. Gannaway v. Toler, 122 Miss. 111, 84 So. 129, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 423 (Miss. 1920).

Equity will not enforce forfeiture, but will relieve against it. Eckert v. Searcy, 114 Miss. 150, 74 So. 818, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 1917).

Courts of equity cannot refuse to enforce statutory penalties. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Marshall, 100 Miss. 626, 56 So. 792, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 64 (Miss. 1911).

The rule that equity will not enforce a penalty applies only to penalties imposed by private contract, and not to statutory penalties. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Marshall, 100 Miss. 626, 56 So. 792, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 64 (Miss. 1911).

Where chancery court takes jurisdiction of suit to recover penalties under Code 1906 § 5004 Supreme Court will not reverse case solely on ground of want of jurisdiction. Grenada Lumber Co. v. State, 98 Miss. 536, 54 So. 8, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1910).

The chancery court in proper cases will enforce statutory penalties as, where having jurisdiction for one purpose, the enforcement of such penalty is necessary to full relief. State v. Hall, 70 Miss. 678, 13 So. 39, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1893).

10. Subjects of jurisdiction.

The ascertainment of boundaries alone does not confer jurisdiction as a separate ground of equity. Wroten v. Fenn, 203 Miss. 361, 35 So. 2d 534, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1948).

11. —Property rights.

Section65-7-201’s procedure for establishing a private right-of-way is not a complete and adequate alternative remedy to the recognition and enforcement of an easement of way by necessity; thus, §65-7-201 was not a bar to the chancery court’s granting of equitable relief in establishing an easement by necessity. Broadhead v. Terpening, 611 So. 2d 949, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 824 (Miss. 1992).

Where a bill sought to cancel a cloud on the title to real estate and an injunction to prevent acts of alleged trespass, and discovery, the chancery court did not err in refusing to transfer the case to Circuit Court. Evans v. Broadhead, 233 So. 2d 771, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1667 (Miss. 1970).

Unless some property rights are involved, civil courts have no jurisdiction over ecclesiastical controversy and are without jurisdiction to decide who is, or who ought to be, presiding bishop of diocese. Conic v. Cobbins, 208 Miss. 203, 44 So. 2d 52, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1950).

Provision in church manual permitting bishops to retain 10% of all monies raised by them in their respective dioceses does not give an ousted bishop such property rights in monies raised by his successor in dioceses as to entitle him to invoke jurisdiction of civil courts as to the 10% claimed by him. Conic v. Cobbins, 208 Miss. 203, 44 So. 2d 52, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1950).

Equity has jurisdiction to apportion between owners of property burden of common lien thereon. Swalm v. Sauls, 141 Miss. 515, 106 So. 775, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 454 (Miss. 1926).

Circumstances calling for equity to assume jurisdiction of boundary dispute between parties claiming through common grantor stated. Middleton v. Howell, 127 Miss. 880, 90 So. 725, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 292 (Miss. 1921).

The court has jurisdiction to enforce and is the proper forum in which to assert the rights of one who owns a house situated on the land of another. Decell v. McRee, 83 Miss. 423, 35 So. 940, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 60 (Miss. 1904).

A number of plaintiffs separately suing the same defendant in actions of trespass, the defendant’s liability depending upon the same facts, and the act complained of being a constantly recurring one, may be enjoined and their cases consolidated to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Garrison, 81 Miss. 257, 32 So. 996, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 136 (Miss. 1902).

The court has jurisdiction under § 500 Code 1892 (§ 550 Code 1906), of suits to remove clouds upon the title to real estate, if the complainant has a perfect legal or equitable title. Gentry v. Gamblin, 79 Miss. 437, 28 So. 809, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1901).

The court has jurisdiction under § 2576 Code 1880 (Code 1906 § 3525), in a partition suit to adjudicate all conflicting claims of those properly joined as parties. This is true even where a defendant denies he is a co-tenant and asserts adverse title. Claughton v. Claughton, 70 Miss. 384, 12 So. 340, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1892).

The chancery court, upon petition of a purchaser at a sale, under a decree made by it, may issue a writ of assistance to put the grantee of the purchaser in possession of the land bought, if the grantee, though not a party to the record, be entitled to possession as against him who has the possession. Gibson v. Marshall, 64 Miss. 72, 8 So. 205, 1886 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1886).

To prevent a multiplicity of suits the court has jurisdiction of a bill by the purchaser of personal property which has been attached in his hands by creditors of the seller against the sheriff and attaching creditors to recover from the proceeds of a sale under the attachments a sum equal to the debt satisfied by his purchase. Lowenstein v. Abramsohn, 76 Miss. 890, 25 So. 498, 1899 Miss. LEXIS 10 (Miss. 1899); J. Pollock & Co. v. Okolona Sav. Institution, 61 Miss. 293, 1883 Miss. LEXIS 123 (Miss. 1883).

12. —Preservation of property.

Independently of statute the court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of sequestration for the seizure and preservation of personal property, so that it may be subject to any final decree that may be rendered. Dean v. Boyd, 86 Miss. 204, 38 So. 297, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 22 (Miss. 1905).

Notwithstanding an appeal from the final decree with supersedeas the chancery court has jurisdiction to make orders for the preservation of property in the hands of its receiver. Lamb v. Rowan, 81 Miss. 369, 33 So. 4, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1902).

13. —Contracts.

A claim for specific performance of contract of employment plus attendant injunctive relief is within the jurisdiction of the county court on its equity side, and is also within the jurisdiction of the chancery court. Lee v. Coahoma Opportunities, Inc., 485 So. 2d 293, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2423 (Miss. 1986).

Equity cannot give relief to party on the ground he has made an improvident contract. Butterfield Lumber Co. v. Guy, 92 Miss. 361, 46 So. 78, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 174 (Miss. 1908).

The court will not entertain jurisdiction of a bill for relief against a usurious contract except upon the condition that complainant submits to due equity. American Freehold Land & Mortg. Co. v. Jefferson, 69 Miss. 770, 12 So. 464, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. 1892).

Where a suit is brought in equity on a note stipulating for an attorney’s fee, if suit should be necessary to collect it, the chancery court has full jurisdiction to fix the quantum of the fee and include it in the decree. Eyrich v. Capital State Bank, 67 Miss. 60, 6 So. 615, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1889).

14. —Conveyances, mortgages and liens.

A tort claimant may maintain an action in chancery court to set aside a conveyance made to hinder, delay or defraud such creditor without first obtaining a judgment at law ascertaining damages. Allred v. Nesmith, 245 Miss. 376, 149 So. 2d 29, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 525 (Miss. 1963).

Equity may foreclose mortgage or deed of trust independently of powers conferred on trustee by contract, and may order sale of property where trustee is precluded by stipulation to act. Smith v. Cleveland Steam Laundry, Inc., 131 Miss. 254, 95 So. 433, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1923).

Equity foreclosing deed of trust may determine all questions in controversy. Robertson v. F. Krauss & Sons, 129 Miss. 310, 92 So. 74, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 42 (Miss. 1922).

Assignee of debt may appoint substitute trustee under provision of deed of trust allowing beneficiary, his executor, administrator, or assigns, under his hand and seal to appoint a substitute trustee. Scruggs v. Northern, 123 Miss. 169, 85 So. 89, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 1920).

The chancery court has jurisdiction of a bill by the assignee of a landlord’s claim for rent against non-resident beneficiaries of a trust deed given by the tenant on agricultural products, the trustee in which had sued out a writ of replevin against the tenant, who had given a replevin-bond, sold the cotton, and paid the proceeds to his sureties to abide the result of the suit, and against such sureties as trustees in invitum, to have the priority of his lien established and the proceeds subjected to it. Dreyfus v. Gage, 79 Miss. 403, 30 So. 691, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 59 (Miss. 1901).

The jurisdiction of the court over property exceeding one thousand dollars in value, embraced in an assignment from creditors, does not attach until the petition and bond required by §§ 117, 118, and 119 Code 1892 (Code 1906 §§ 120, 121, 122), are filed and approved. Weimer v. Scales, 74 Miss. 1, 19 So. 588, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 1896).

When jurisdiction has attached, the court will determine all controversies in which liens are asserted, including attachments. Weimer v. Scales, 74 Miss. 1, 19 So. 588, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 1896).

The court has jurisdiction to enforce, in favor of the assignee of a note for the purchase price of personal property, and of a separate written contract reserving the legal title to the property sold as security therefor, the lien thereby created. Ross-Meehan Brake-Shoe Foundry Co. v. Pascagoula Ice Co., 72 Miss. 608, 18 So. 364, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 37 (Miss. 1895).

The court has jurisdiction of a bill to have sold for the payment of the purchase money an undivided interest in a partnership conveyed by conditional sale. Journey v. Priestly, 70 Miss. 584, 12 So. 799, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 25 (Miss. 1893).

15. —Trusts.

The chancery court properly authorized a sale of a portion of land conveyed for public burial purposes, even if the trustee of the land had no express power to sell, where the business owned by the trustee was in extreme financial difficulties and the land in question was threatened with foreclosure, and with the sale accomplished, all liens would be released and a substantial fund would be created for continued operation of the cemetery; courts of equity have an inherent power to protect trusts and may order a sale of part of the trust property if necessary for the execution of trust purposes. Hengen v. Perpetual Care Cemeteries, Inc., 230 So. 2d 795, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1563 (Miss. 1970).

A chancery court may authorize an endowment trustee to sell sufficient of the corpus to enable it to fulfill the purpose of the endowment. Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Garrett, 203 Miss. 182, 33 So. 2d 603, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1948).

Chancery court having jurisdiction of testamentary trust funds, bank acting as trustee and executor, and of the plaintiff has full jurisdiction to determine issues in respect to alleged improper handling of the trust funds. Garrett v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 153 F.2d 289, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 1914 (5th Cir. Miss. 1946).

Chancery court has general superintendence of all fiduciary relations, and the removal of a trustee appointed by it is within its power. Yeates v. Box, 198 Miss. 602, 22 So. 2d 411, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 232 (Miss. 1945).

The court has jurisdiction at the suit of the beneficiary to enforce a trust which has been abandoned by the trustee. Carey v. Fulmer, 74 Miss. 729, 21 So. 752, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 54 (Miss. 1897).

The court has jurisdiction to follow a trust fund through all changes, whether its identity is preserved or it is merged in a mass. To fix a charge upon a mass, however, complainant must show that his specific fund or thing has gone into and remains part of the mass. Shields v. Thomas, 71 Miss. 260, 14 So. 84, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 154 (Miss. 1893); Ryan v. Paine, 66 Miss. 678, 6 So. 320, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 164 (Miss. 1889); Kinney v. Paine, 68 Miss. 258, 8 So. 747, 1890 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1891); Billingsley v. Pollock, 69 Miss. 759, 13 So. 828, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 38 (Miss. 1892).

16. —Adoptions.

The chancery court had jurisdiction to hear an adoption action even though the Youth Court had previously assumed jurisdiction of the minors involved as neglected children; although the Youth Court’s jurisdiction continued for the offense and for the purpose of the “neglected or abused” subject matter, the jurisdiction did not act to exclude the adoption proceeding in the Chancery Court, since it constituted a different subject matter. In re Petition of Beggiani, 519 So. 2d 1208, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1988).

17. —Miscellaneous.

Courts will not decide dispute as to which party was elected deacon of church. Edwards v. De Vance, 138 Miss. 580, 103 So. 194, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1925).

Equity has jurisdiction of suit by depositors of insolvent bank against directors for deceit in inducing them to make deposits when the bank was insolvent, to prevent multiplicity of suits. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Hand, 90 Miss. 893, 44 So. 161, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1907).

The court has jurisdiction of a bill by a citizen and taxpayer in his own name and behalf to prevent a violation of the Constitution by an unauthorized and unlawful action of the boards of supervisors, although the attorney general and the district attorney decline to sue and refuse to authorize the use of their names in so doing. Board of Sup'rs v. Buckley, 81 Miss. 474, 33 So. 650 (Miss. 1902).

The court has no jurisdiction to determine when highways shall be improved. In the matter of local improvements and special assessments it can only interfere in cases of fraud or oppression, or some wrong constituting a plain abuse of discretion by the local authorities. Nugent v. Mayor, etc., of Jackson, 72 Miss. 1040, 18 So. 493, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 70 (Miss. 1895).

The remedy at law being inadequate, the court has jurisdiction without previous recovery at law of a bill by the owner of a residence fronting on a street to abate as a nuisance permanent obstructions in the street. Canton Cotton Warehouse Co. v. Potts, 69 Miss. 31, 10 So. 448, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 66 (Miss. 1891).

18. Equitable suits and remedies.

Case held to be one for an accounting in equity. Evans v. Hoye, 101 Miss. 244, 57 So. 805, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 131 (Miss. 1912).

19. —Accounting.

Chancery court had concurrent jurisdiction over a suit by the client of a real estate agency seeking damages and other relief at law based on an alleged failure to properly supervise an employee because the client also made a proper request for an equitable accounting; transfer of the action to a circuit court so that the realtors could try the case to a jury trial was not required because the relators did not have an absolute right to a jury trial in a civil action. RE/Max Real Estate Partners., Inc. v. Lindsley, 840 So. 2d 709, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 118 (Miss. 2003).

Where a nursing professor established a fiduciary relationship with a former employer, and the former employer had control of all the financial information involved in the relationship, a chancery court could properly order an accounting. Univ. Nursing Assocs., PLLC v. Phillips, 842 So. 2d 1270, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 59 (Miss. 2003).

A bill for redemption of corporate stock, pledged as collateral for indebtedness, and an accounting brought by the owner against the corporation will lie where the stock has been retired. Hudson v. Belzoni Equipment Co., 203 Miss. 212, 33 So. 2d 796, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1948).

An action involving numerous dealings over a period of 16 years was properly transferred to the chancery court for accounting. Dunagin v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Miss. 809, 80 So. 276, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 135 (Miss. 1918).

One who lends money at extortionate rates of interest under a contract void as against public policy and who establishes an agency for carrying on his nefarious business cannot maintain a suit in equity against one placed by him in charge of such business for an accounting where he must call in the aid directly or indirectly of the illegal contracts to make out his case. Woodson v. Hopkins, 85 Miss. 171, 37 So. 1000, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 167 (Miss. 1905).

20. —Discovery.

When a bill is sufficient as a bill of discovery, it is not competent to challenge it by motion for a bill of particulars or by special demurrers on grounds that, as to matters about which discovery is sought and is due, the bill does not allege in that detail and precision of averment required when the complainant is in possession of the facts which will enable him so to allege. Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Keller, 197 Miss. 1, 17 So. 2d 797, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 265 (Miss. 1944).

Having jurisdiction to discover amount of timber wasted chancery court could award damages therefor although plaintiff could have sued at law. Bomer Bros. v. Warren County, 103 Miss. 343, 60 So. 328, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 178 (Miss. 1912).

Having taken jurisdiction for discovery chancery court may grant full relief in the case. Keystone Lumber Yard v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 96 Miss. 116, 50 So. 445, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. 1909).

Discovery is proper where a subsequent written agreement affecting liability of the parties on a note was entered into by them before its assignment, possession of which is withheld from complainant who acquired the note, leaving him uncertain of his rights. Enochs v. Mississippi Bank & Trust Co., 87 Miss. 325, 39 So. 529, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 127 (Miss. 1905).

Where a compress company and a railroad company, for their own convenience, make an agreement whereby the latter instead of delivering cotton to the consignee, delivers it to the former and turns over to the consignee compress tickets calling not for specific bales, but for an equal number of bales of average weight and quality, the court has jurisdiction of a bill by the consignee to secure equitable relief for the loss of cotton shipped and for a shortage in shipment, against either or both, when the facts, when discovered, may justify. Mississippi Cotton Compress & Warehouse Co. v. M. Levy & Co., 83 Miss. 774, 36 So. 281, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 96 (Miss. 1904).

The court has jurisdiction of a bill to cancel an acquittance, for a discovery, and an accounting, notwithstanding the defendant is a foreign corporation having its office, books and assets out of the state, and though the court may find itself powerless to grant administrative relief if the defendant declines to make the discovery. Clark v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 76 Miss. 22, 23 So. 453, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 60 (Miss. 1898).

21. —Injunction.

Injunction is a proper remedy to declare void a state statute. Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d 692, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1390 (Miss. 1970).

A bill of complaint alleging that state statutes prohibiting the teaching in public schools that man ascended or descended from a lower form of animal violated the First Amendment prohibition of the United States Constitution stated a cause of action for injunctive relief in Chancery against the State Board of Education. Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d 692, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1390 (Miss. 1970).

The court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the clerk of a lower court from incorporating certain papers in the transcript on the ground that they are not properly part of the record. Portwood v. Feld, 72 Miss. 542, 17 So. 373, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. 1895).

22. —Condemnation proceedings.

The court has jurisdiction, notwithstanding an injunction against the action of the Mississippi levee commissioners is prohibited by statute, to enjoin the condemnation of land for levee purposes on the ground that one of the three persons claiming to be commissioners to assess damages is without right to the office. Hurley v. Board of Mississippi Levee Comm'rs, 76 Miss. 141, 23 So. 580, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 62 (Miss. 1898).

23. —Exercise of trust powers.

In order to enjoin a sale under a deed of trust given to secure a usurious debt it is unnecessary for the complainant to have paid or tendered more than the principal of the debt, since under the statute he could recover back all interest paid. Southern Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Tony, 78 Miss. 916, 29 So. 825, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1901); Purvis v. Woodward, 78 Miss. 922, 29 So. 917, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 148 (Miss. 1901).

The court may enjoin an effort to sell under the trust deed for largely more than the sum due. Carey v. Fulmer, 74 Miss. 729, 21 So. 752, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 54 (Miss. 1897).

24. Filing of criminal charges.

Equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin one from making an affidavit charging a criminal offense. Crighton v. Dahmer, 70 Miss. 602, 13 So. 237, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1893).

25. —Foreign judicial proceedings.

Ordinarily chancery will enjoin an action in another state where it appears that it is fraudulent or brought for purpose of vexing, harassing or oppressing an opponent, or that it is an evasion of laws of the domicil. Poole v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 208 Miss. 364, 44 So. 2d 467, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1950).

State courts cannot interfere with federal courts as general rule, but when defendant is resident citizen of this state he can be required by injunction to bring his proposed action of libel within this state, it not having been previously filed, since it is strictly proceeding in personam, where Congress has not fixed venue. Poole v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 208 Miss. 364, 44 So. 2d 467, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1950).

Chancery court in determining right of injunction against foreign suit will consider hardship and inconvenience that may arise when party is called upon to defend at a distance. Poole v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 208 Miss. 364, 44 So. 2d 467, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1950).

Citizen of state will be restrained by its courts from instituting suit in another state against another citizen, both parties at all times residing within state, upon cause of action which has been adjudicated by such courts, and arose within its jurisdiction necessary witnesses being all there, and foreign suit being instituted for purpose of harassing and annoying other party, and plaintiff being insolvent. Poole v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 208 Miss. 364, 44 So. 2d 467, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1950).

26. —Labor disputes.

Norris-LaGuardia Act curtails only equity jurisdiction of federal courts in field of labor disputes and has no application to equity courts of state. Southern Bus Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, etc., 205 Miss. 354, 38 So. 2d 765, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 435 (Miss. 1949).

State chancery court has jurisdiction to issue injunction on behalf of bus company engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce against labor union and its members to enjoin use of violence, force, intimidation, and coercion during labor dispute. Southern Bus Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, etc., 205 Miss. 354, 38 So. 2d 765, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 435 (Miss. 1949).

Jurisdiction of court of equity may be invoked by one being picketed for injunctive relief against mass picketing. Southern Bus Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, etc., 205 Miss. 354, 38 So. 2d 765, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 435 (Miss. 1949).

27. —Nuisances and unlawful obstructions.

Where suit, brought in the chancery court for an injunction to abate a nuisance, failed on an injunction issue, the chancellor erred in not deciding the issue of damages. Shaw v. Owen, 229 Miss. 126, 90 So. 2d 179, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 593 (Miss. 1956).

Municipality creates public nuisance, which equity court has power to enjoin, when it gathers surface waters from thirteen acre area, much of it diverted from its natural flow, concentrates it into thirty inch culvert and discharges it upon lot adjoining important thoroughfare, with outtake therefrom of only fifteen inches, resulting in unsightly and unsanitary mosquito-breeding pond constituting menace to public health. City of Jackson v. Robertson, 208 Miss. 422, 44 So. 2d 523, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 258 (Miss. 1950).

Equity has jurisdiction, on grounds of injunctive relief and to prevent multiplicity of suits, of suit filed by a number of landowners against State Highway Commission for injunction to restrain continuation by defendant of common nuisance caused by obstruction of water course through respective lands of plaintiffs and for damages done to their crops and lands. McClendon v. Mississippi State Highway Com., 205 Miss. 71, 38 So. 2d 325, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 413 (Miss. 1949).

The court has jurisdiction at the suit of private parties having a special interest to award a mandatory injunction requiring the removal from navigable waters of an unlawful obstruction. Pascagoula Boom Co. v. Dickson, 77 Miss. 587, 28 So. 724, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 53 (Miss. 1900).

28. —Trespass.

Right to injunctive relief is basic ground of jurisdiction of court of equity, particularly when it comes to enjoining repeated and continuing trespass to property, where actions at law would entail multiplicity of suits and where damages would be irreparable. Southern Bus Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, etc., 205 Miss. 354, 38 So. 2d 765, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 435 (Miss. 1949).

29. —Violations of ordinances.

The chancery court has the power and authority to enjoin parties for violations of zoning ordinances and subdivision ordinances. Johnson v. Hinds County, 524 So. 2d 947, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 194 (Miss. 1988).

30. —Cancellation and rescission.

In a suit by an executrix for cancellation of a deed as a forgery, where there was a sharply drawn factual issue as to whether the purported conveyance was or was not a forgery, and the evidence adduced by the parties on the issue was in irreconcilable conflict, it was the province of the chancellor as trier of fact to resolve the conflict, and in so doing the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence were matters exclusively for the determination of the chancellor, and he having resolved the issue and found as a matter of fact that the instrument was a forgery and void, and there being ample evidentiary support for such finding, his decree must be affirmed on appeal. Blakeney v. Blakeney, 244 So. 2d 3, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1309 (Miss. 1971).

Unilateral mistakes due to negligence of complainant in grossly overestimating number of feet of timber on land, did not entitle it to rescission of timber deed, where the real facts could have been ascertained by reasonable diligence and means of information were open to both parties and contract was not unconscionable. Terre Haute Cooperage v. Branscome, 203 Miss. 493, 35 So. 2d 537, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 297 (Miss. 1948).

Failure to support in accordance with a promise in a deed is not sufficient ground for cancellation of the deed. Wilson v. Combs, 203 Miss. 286, 33 So. 2d 830, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 266 (Miss. 1948).

Deed will not be set aside because grantor did not understand it, in absence of timely application. Wynn v. Kendall, 122 Miss. 809, 85 So. 85, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 477 (Miss. 1920).

The court has jurisdiction of a joint suit by a large number of persons who were fraudulently induced to execute separate promissory notes to the same payee, the facts in respect to each of them being the same, to enjoin the assignment of the notes, and have them surrendered and cancelled. Hightower & Crawford v. Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co., 83 Miss. 708, 36 So. 82, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1904).

31. —Recoupment.

Recoupment is of common law origin. It is a purely defensive claim and cannot be used by defendant offensively. Jurisdiction of courts of equity to make complete adjustment necessary to ends of justice is not affected by statute allowing set-off and recoupment nor repeal thereof; where complainant is a nonresident recoupment may be used both defensively and offensively. Sterling Products Co. v. Watkins-Gray Lumber Co., 131 Miss. 145, 95 So. 313, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 282 (Miss. 1923).

32. —Reformation.

The chancery court has jurisdiction of a suit to reform a contract for mutual mistake of the parties. Poole v. McCarty, 233 Miss. 724, 103 So. 2d 922, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1958).

Court will reform mineral deed to include an eight acre tract where evidence discloses the eight-acres were omitted therefrom by mutual mistake of the parties. Adams v. Hill, 208 Miss. 341, 44 So. 2d 457, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 253 (Miss. 1950).

Chancery court has jurisdiction to reform deed and adjust equities between parties. Eichelberger v. Cooper, 101 Miss. 253, 57 So. 808, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1912).

The court will not reform a contract where the parties did what they intended at the time, informed as they were. Wise v. Brooks, 69 Miss. 891, 13 So. 836, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 1892).

Where, through ignorance, a county treasurer is not required to give an additional bond as security for school funds, but gives only a general bond, the same being intended, however, by all parties, including the sureties, as security for all moneys to be received by the officer, the chancery court has jurisdiction of a bill to have the bond reformed so as to hold the securities liable for the proper disbursement of the school funds. Hall v. State, 69 Miss. 529, 13 So. 38, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1891).

33. Specific performance.

Defendants’ unconditional offer to sell, by warranty deed, their rights to certain land for $30,000 cash was an offer of a cash sale as distinguished from sale on credit, and plaintiff’s statement, contained in his acceptance, that he would deliver a cashier’s check upon execution of the deed was not a counteroffer, and the chancellor erred in refusing specific performance. Hutton v. Hutton, 239 Miss. 217, 119 So. 2d 369, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 280 (Miss.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834, 81 S. Ct. 67, 5 L. Ed. 2d 60, 1960 U.S. LEXIS 583 (U.S. 1960).

As a general rule, to be subject to specific performance a contract must be specific and distinct in its terms, plain and definite in its meaning, and must show with certainty that the minds of the parties have met and mutually agreed as to all its details upon the offer made on one hand and accepted on the other, but if any of these requisites are lacking, specific performance will not be decreed by a court of equity. Hutton v. Hutton, 239 Miss. 217, 119 So. 2d 369, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 280 (Miss.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834, 81 S. Ct. 67, 5 L. Ed. 2d 60, 1960 U.S. LEXIS 583 (U.S. 1960).

Specific performance of contracts in equity is not a matter of right, but of sound legal discretion, and it will never be decreed unless the contract is just and fair in all its parts. Everett v. Hubbard, 199 Miss. 857, 25 So. 2d 768, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1946).

Bill for specific performance of contract made by undisclosed agent must aver the facts of agency, authority of the agent to make the contract, and that it was made for the principal or ratified by him. Young v. Clark, 135 Miss. 683, 100 So. 180, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 52 (Miss. 1924).

Specific performance of contract for sale of land will not be decreed unless the contract is specific in its terms and shows with certainty that the parties mutually agreed upon all the details. Fowler v. Nunnery, 126 Miss. 510, 89 So. 156, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 60 (Miss. 1921).

Equity will not specifically enforce contract obligating railroad to perfectly drain a farm through which its line extends and provide crossings as there is an adequate remedy at law. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Payne, 93 Miss. 50, 46 So. 405, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 79 (Miss. 1908).

The court has jurisdiction of a bill for the specific performance of a contract for the lease of trees on a homestead acquired under the United States Homestead laws, such leases not being prohibited either expressly or by fair implication by any statute, decision of the federal courts, or rules of any department or officer of the government. Orrell v. Bay Mfg. Co., 83 Miss. 800, 36 So. 561, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 98 (Miss. 1904), writ of error dismissed, 198 U.S. 581, 25 S. Ct. 804, 49 L. Ed. 1172, 1905 U.S. LEXIS 946 (U.S. 1905).

34. —Interpleader.

Sheriff can maintain interpleader to settle conflicting claims of parties to money realized under execution. Kelly v. Howard, 98 Miss. 543, 54 So. 10, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. 1910).

35. —Bill of revivor.

Bill of revivor must be against personal representatives of deceased defendant. Carter v. Kimbrough, 122 Miss. 543, 84 So. 251, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 453 (Miss. 1920).

36. Relief from judgments.

The court has jurisdiction to grant new trials at law after the adjournment of the law court on newly discovered evidence. Tatum v. Tate, 77 Miss. 684, 27 So. 647, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1900).

The court has jurisdiction of relief against a judgment obtained without notice, but instead of granting a new trial at law will take full cognizance of the case and do justice between the parties. Newman v. Taylor, 69 Miss. 670, 13 So. 831, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1892).

37. Appeal; bill of review.

After term court of equity cannot set aside decree when matter completely disposed of. Correction can be made only on appeal or in proper case by bill of review. Carter v. Kimbrough, 122 Miss. 543, 84 So. 251, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 453 (Miss. 1920); Shirley v. Conway, 44 Miss. 434, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1870); Lane & Standley v. W. J. Wheless & Co., 46 Miss. 666, 1872 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1872).

Where the court has taken jurisdiction of a proceeding to compel an agent to account for misappropriated funds, its decree will not be disturbed on appeal on the ground that the complainant had a complete remedy at law. Const. 1890 § 147. Decell v. Hazlehurst Oil Mill & Fertilizer Co., 83 Miss. 346, 35 So. 761, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 50 (Miss. 1904).

The court has jurisdiction of a bill of review based on newly discovered evidence, though the decree has been appealed from and affirmed. Hall v. Waddill, 78 Miss. 16, 27 So. 936, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1900).

The court or the chancellor in vacation has jurisdiction to grant an appeal from an interlocutory order discharging a receiver. Pearson v. Kendrick, 74 Miss. 235, 21 So. 37, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 147 (Miss. 1896).

If the court errs in holding that a cause is of equity jurisdiction, its decree because of the mandate of § 147 of the Constitution cannot be reversed on that ground. Barrett v. Carter, 69 Miss. 593, 13 So. 625, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1891).

II. Divorce and Alimony.

38. Jurisdiction in general.

Separate maintenance was related to the transaction forming the basis of a former husband’s complaint for divorce as he conceded that he sought a divorce in Florida in order to avoid or cease his separate maintenance obligation in Mississippi; in his Florida complaint, the husband asserted that no alimony was sought. To the contrary, the Mississippi separate maintenance orders showed a basis for a possible award of alimony, and the former wife’s motion to enforce the Mississippi orders did not waive personal jurisdiction for alimony purposes. Because the Florida court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over the former wife, and its judgment was not res judicata over her claim for alimony, the issue of alimony was properly before a chancery court in Mississippi. Lofton v. Lofton, 924 So. 2d 596, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 168 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

Bill to set aside decree of divorce granted in another state on the ground of fraud and praying for decree that complainant and defendant are husband and wife under the law of Mississippi, is beyond the power of the chancery court to grant, since the decree, if granted, would be merely advisory, there being no affirmative or executory relief prayed for. Cliburn v. Cliburn, 209 Miss. 631, 48 So. 2d 126, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 424 (Miss. 1950).

Party who appears after judgment and moves to discharge judgment on ground of insufficient process or notice submits himself to jurisdiction of court, and court, in discharging judgment previously taken, should render proper judgment against him. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 208 Miss. 686, 45 So. 2d 271, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1950).

When husband has submitted himself to general jurisdiction of chancery court by filing bill of review praying for review of decree in favor of wife on ground that court was without jurisdiction to award custody of child, alimony, attorney’s fees and lien upon process by publication, wife’s motion for rehearing on whole case should be sustained to extent of granting her rehearing upon such portions of her original bill as court has under its jurisdiction in view of husband’s entry of appearance. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 208 Miss. 686, 45 So. 2d 271, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1950).

Decree in separate maintenance suit is conclusive as res judicata in subsequent divorce suit, so far as concerns any issue which was litigated between parties in separate maintenance suit, and if issue was decided in favor of wife in that suit, it bars husband in any subsequent divorce suit brought by him predicated on facts which were in existence at time of maintenance decree and which were put in issue and decided in favor of wife therein. Van Norman v. Van Norman, 205 Miss. 114, 38 So. 2d 452, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 416 (Miss. 1949).

A court of equity has inherent power to declare a decree for alimony a specific lien upon the real estate of the husband to enforce the payment of alimony to the wife. Felder v. Felder's Estate, 195 Miss. 326, 13 So. 2d 823, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 127 (Miss. 1943).

The chancery court has inherent power where, in its judgment, it is deemed necessary for the enforcement of its orders to remand a defendant to the custody of the sheriff until he has executed the bond for the payment of alimony required of him by decree of the court. Felder v. Felder's Estate, 195 Miss. 326, 13 So. 2d 823, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 127 (Miss. 1943).

While the general rule is that in order for a decree or judgment awarding the custody of children to be valid, the child or children must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, their removal from the jurisdiction prior to decree after the court has once acquired jurisdiction of such children does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to fix their custody. Cole v. Cole, 194 Miss. 292, 12 So. 2d 425, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1943).

The chancery court has jurisdiction of a bill by a wife driven from her home to vacate a conveyance by her husband of the homestead and subject it to alimony. Scott v. Scott, 73 Miss. 575, 19 So. 589, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 172 (Miss. 1895).

39. Annulment.

At common law, equity court had jurisdiction to annual marriage where party thereto did not have sufficient capacity to comprehend meaning of marriage and duties of such relation; and statute providing for insanity at the time of marriage as a cause for absolute divorce did not abrogate the power of the chancery court to annul a marriage on the ground of insanity brought for that purpose on behalf of the insane spouse. Parkinson v. Mills, 172 Miss. 784, 159 So. 651, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 128 (Miss. 1935).

40. Separate maintenance.

Grant of a wife’s petition for separate maintenance was upheld because the chancery court did not manifestly err in finding that the wife, although admittedly partly to blame for the couple’s separation, did not substantially contribute to the separation; considering each party’s financial state and additional factors, the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $1,200 per month to the wife, even though this award was in excess of the husband’s income after expenses. Tackett v. Tackett, 967 So. 2d 1264, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 746 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

The jurisdiction of the chancery court to make an allowance to a wife living apart from her husband for her separate maintenance is to be exercised according to equitable principles, and the amount to be allowed in any case must be determined according to the facts disclosed by the record in the particular case, and is largely within the discretion of the trial judge. Gardiner v. Gardiner, 230 Miss. 778, 90 So. 2d 668, 93 So. 2d 638, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 421, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 422 (Miss. 1957).

Separate maintenance of $250 per month for wife and her two children did not compel correction where husband was worth between $15,000 and $18,000 with a net annual income of from $5,000 to $6,000, especially since it remained subject to the court’s revision. Hall v. Hall, 199 Miss. 478, 24 So. 2d 347, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 218 (Miss. 1946).

Suits for separate maintenance, wherein there is no prayer by bill or cross-bill for divorce, are not based upon statute (Code 1942, § 2743) providing for allowances under divorce decrees, or any other statute, but are lodged in the equity jurisdiction of the chancery courts and are regulated by equitable principles independently of, and apart from, statutes of divorce. Wilson v. Wilson, 198 Miss. 334, 22 So. 2d 161, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 202 (Miss.), modified, 198 Miss. 334, 23 So. 2d 303, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1945).

Wife will be denied decree of separate maintenance where she has left or abandoned her husband and remains away without just cause. Wilson v. Wilson, 198 Miss. 334, 22 So. 2d 161, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 202 (Miss.), modified, 198 Miss. 334, 23 So. 2d 303, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1945).

III. Matters Testamentary and of Administration.

41. Jurisdiction in general.

Equity will not exercise jurisdiction merely to interpret will, without request for further relief. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 135 Miss. 428, 100 So. 181, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 86 (Miss. 1924).

Chancery court has jurisdiction to determine all matters relating to administration of estates, and is always open for hearing petitions by interested parties for the construction of last wills of decedents. Owens v. Waddell, 87 Miss. 310, 39 So. 459, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 1905).

42. Powers and authority of court.

Duties and powers of administrator are fixed by law and cannot be enlarged by the chancery court. Alexander v. Herring, 99 Miss. 427, 55 So. 360, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 1910).

Chancery court cannot authorize administrator to engage in business with estate funds. Alexander v. Herring, 99 Miss. 427, 55 So. 360, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 1910).

43. Jurisdiction in particular matters.

Title vests in ward where guardian, though owner of land, under mistake holds it for ward for the statutory period; equity does not relieve where party mistakes law as to his private legal rights. Smith v. Muse, 138 Miss. 518, 103 So. 356, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 75 (Miss. 1925).

Suit on bond of executor appointed in Tennessee, in the name of the state of Tennessee, to compel payment of money to persons in this state to be administered in accordance with the laws of Tennessee was maintainable in Mississippi. Cutrer v. Tennessee, 98 Miss. 841, 54 So. 434, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1910).

Distributee of an estate can recover personal estate of decedent in chancery but not at law if there are no valid debts outstanding and no administration or final settlement of administration. Jones v. R. L. Clemmer & Son, 98 Miss. 508, 54 So. 4, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 90 (Miss. 1910).

Courts of Mississippi have jurisdiction of a suit by creditors on an executrix bond for concealing assets, where executrix resided here at decedent’s death, administration was undertaken in this state, the assets had their situs here, and her surety resides here. Myers v. Martinez, 95 Miss. 104, 48 So. 291, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 206 (Miss. 1909).

The court has jurisdiction of a suit by legatees upon a cause of action specifically bequeathed to them if there be no executor of the will and the estate of the testator owe no debts. Patton v. Pinkston, 86 Miss. 651, 38 So. 500, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 53 (Miss. 1905).

IV. Minor’s Business.

44. Jurisdiction in general.

Decree in proceeding to remove disabilities of minority is valid though failing to recite jurisdictional facts when allegations of petition show basis of jurisdiction of court to act, as petition is part of record of the proceeding. Dyer v. Russell, 204 Miss. 719, 38 So. 2d 104, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 400 (Miss. 1948).

Question of whether chancery court has full or general jurisdiction of proceedings to remove disabilities of minority under § 159(f), Constitution of 1890, because chancery court was invested with jurisdiction for removal of disabilities of minority when Constitution became effective will not be passed on by Supreme Court when another decisive question will dispose of case. Dyer v. Russell, 204 Miss. 719, 38 So. 2d 104, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 400 (Miss. 1948).

The court exercises a general jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution in minor’s business, just as in matters of general equity, and its records need not show the facts authorizing the exercise of such jurisdiction in a particular case. Ames v. Williams, 72 Miss. 760, 17 So. 762, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1895).

45. Jurisdiction in particular matters.

Chancery court, in proceeding to remove disabilities of minority, acts as court of special and limited jurisdiction, and all jurisdictional facts must appeal of record. Dyer v. Russell, 204 Miss. 719, 38 So. 2d 104, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 400 (Miss. 1948).

The court has jurisdiction of a bill filed by one within two years after the removal of his disability of infancy to review the proceedings and decree in a partition suit under which land had been sold and the purchase money paid in good faith more than two years prior to filing such bill, notwithstanding the limitation of two years fixed by § 2693 Code 1880 (Code 1906 § 3122). Martin v. Gilleyler, 70 Miss. 324, 12 So. 254 (Miss. 1892).

The jurisdiction of the chancery court extends to the allowance of an attorney’s fees out of an infant’s estate for services rendered in the recovery of the estate. Epperson v. Nugent, 57 Miss. 45, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. 1879).

A court of chancery has jurisdiction to decree an account for profits of land against a disseizor, where some of the complainants are infants. Carmichael v. Hunter, 5 Miss. 308, 1840 Miss. LEXIS 14 (Miss. 1840); Wathen v. Glass, 54 Miss. 382, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1877).

V. Idiocy, Lunacy, and Persons of Unsound Mind.

46. Jurisdiction in general.

Chancery court has full jurisdiction over persons of unsound mind. Mabry v. Hoye, 124 Miss. 144, 87 So. 4, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 536 (Miss. 1921).

47. Jurisdiction in particular matters.

Chancery court has jurisdiction of suit to cancel settlement between two persons, both of whom claim all of a decedent’s estate, on ground that one party was incompetent mentally to agree to it and that it was improvident and fraudulent, and it is unimportant that plaintiff described himself as co-administrator rather than next friend of incompetent, since the court looks to substance and not to the form of pleading. McCullum v. Gavin, 206 Miss. 151, 39 So. 2d 859, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 249 (Miss. 1949).

Court cannot reject and exercise jurisdiction at same time, and it is improper for court to dismiss suit to cancel settlement on ground it is without jurisdiction to hear petition in which plaintiff describes himself as co-administrator when in fact plaintiff was suing as next friend and at same time uphold agreement sought to be cancelled. McCullum v. Gavin, 206 Miss. 151, 39 So. 2d 859, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 249 (Miss. 1949).

Chancery court held to have jurisdiction to annul marriage of person where, at time of marriage, he was permanently insane. Parkinson v. Mills, 172 Miss. 784, 159 So. 651, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 128 (Miss. 1935).

Chancery court may not inquire into sanity of one under an indictment for murder. Hawie v. Hawie, 128 Miss. 473, 91 So. 131, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1922).

Guardian of an insane widow may renounce will for her and exercise right of redemption given by Code 1906 § 5086. Hardy v. Richards, 98 Miss. 625, 54 So. 76, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1910).

Renunciation of will by guardian of insane widow may be by ex parte proceedings and need not be by a bill in chancery. Hardy v. Richards, 98 Miss. 625, 54 So. 76, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1910).

Where a conveyance of the homestead was executed by the husband when he was non compos as to all duties to his wife, and in fraud of her rights, a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in ejectment by the grantee against her and to cancel the deed as a fraud on her rights in the homestead. Moseley v. Larson, 86 Miss. 288, 38 So. 234, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1905).

Chancery court can decree an account for profits of land against a disseizor where complainants are non compos mentis. Robinson v. Burritt, 66 Miss. 356, 6 So. 206, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 105 (Miss. 1889).

VI. Cases Transferred from Circuit Court, or Remanded by Supreme Court.

48. In general.

The Supreme Court’s remand of a child support case to the chancery court “for such further proceedings and judgments as may be required and as may be consistent with this opinion” did not restrict the chancery court to consideration of the issues litigated in the original proceeding. Harrell v. Duncan, 593 So. 2d 1, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 979 (Miss. 1991).

Where a suit was brought in the circuit court, but prior to the conclusion of the trial, the plaintiff made a motion to transfer the case to chancery court, and where the circuit court granted such motion, the chancery court was vested with jurisdiction and the circuit court could not dispose of the case. Ainsworth v. Blakeney, 227 Miss. 544, 86 So. 2d 501, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 723 (Miss. 1956).

Circuit court and chancery court to which suit was transferred were courts of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate litigation against Federal Housing Authority under Contract Settlement Act of 1944, 41 USCA, §§ 101 et seq., and Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 31 USCA, § 846; and Federal Public Housing Authority is suable in Mississippi courts. Walsh Const. Co. v. Davis, 204 Miss. 509, 37 So. 2d 757, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 385 (Miss. 1948).

Where an appeal from county court in equity case was erroneously taken to the circuit court instead of the chancery court as required by Code 1942, § 1616, and it was too late to appeal anew, circuit court should have transferred case to chancery court under § 157 of the Constitution, and that court erred in overruling a motion therefor and dismissing the appeal. W. Horace Williams Co. v. Federal Credit Co., 198 Miss. 111, 21 So. 2d 582, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1945).

Section 157 of the Constitution, providing that causes brought in circuit court of which chancery court has exclusive jurisdiction shall be transferred to the chancery court, is mandatory and applies to appeals from county court. W. Horace Williams Co. v. Federal Credit Co., 198 Miss. 111, 21 So. 2d 582, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1945).

Decree of chancery court not reversed solely for reason that cause in which it was rendered is properly cognizable in law court only. Yazoo Delta Mortg. Co. v. Hutson, 140 Miss. 461, 106 So. 5, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 280 (Miss. 1925).

It is error to sustain demurrer after cause transferred to chancery court solely because plaintiff’s right is at law or because equitable action is not strictly presented. Stark v. Fulton, 136 Miss. 637, 101 So. 857, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 188 (Miss. 1924).

Court will not take jurisdiction where the matters in controversy are actually pending in the circuit court. Ricks v. Richardson, 70 Miss. 424, 11 So. 935, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1892).

VII. Other Cases Provided by Law.

49. Jurisdiction in general.

County youth court did not err in transferring what was a child custody case to the county chancery court, as the mother’s allegation that her 10-month-old child was in need of supervision was insufficient to show the child was in need of supervision under the relevant statute, Miss. Code Ann. §43-21-105(k), which required a child in need of supervision to have at least reached his seventh birthday; since there were also no allegations of abuse or neglect of the child, the case was a child custody case that fell under the jurisdiction of the county chancery court. In re L.D.M, 910 So. 2d 522, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 2005).

While partnership assets may be tangible property, the partnership interest being litigated upon dissolution of the partnership constitutes intangible personal property and, therefore, an action to dissolve a partnership is an action over personal property; thus, a chancery court may properly hear a case for the dissolution and accounting of a partnership. Crowe v. Smith, 603 So. 2d 301, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 327 (Miss. 1992).

If any aspect of a case is within its subject matter jurisdiction, the chancery court has authority to hear and adjudge any non-chancery pure law claims via pendent jurisdiction. Johnson v. Hinds County, 524 So. 2d 947, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 194 (Miss. 1988).

Landowners, joining in equity suit to abate common nuisance and for damages, have right to have their controversy adjudicated in court of competent jurisdiction, and chancery court in which suit was brought has jurisdiction to proceed, after settlement of suit on abatement of nuisance issue, to full and complete determination of all remaining issues, even though they may cover only legal rights and require granting of none but legal remedies. McClendon v. Mississippi State Highway Com., 205 Miss. 71, 38 So. 2d 325, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 413 (Miss. 1949).

Const. of 1890 § 162, providing that all causes that may be brought in chancery court whereof the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction shall be transferred to the circuit court, is mandatory. Murphy v. Meridian, 103 Miss. 110, 60 So. 48, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1912).

Const. of 1890 § 147 does not apply where court below declines jurisdiction. It applies only where trial court erroneously assumes jurisdiction. Mitchell v. Bank of Indianola, 98 Miss. 658, 54 So. 87, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 107 (Miss. 1910).

By virtue of § 160 of the Constitution, the chancery court has jurisdiction as to cases within paragraph “f” of § 159 of the Constitution to try legal as well as equitable titles. Woods v. Riley, 72 Miss. 73, 18 So. 384, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1894).

Equity may afford auxiliary aid where a law court first acquires jurisdiction; it may afford complete relief where it first acquires jurisdiction, though the titles and rights involved are of a legal, as distinguished from an equitable, character. Woods v. Riley, 72 Miss. 73, 18 So. 384, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1894).

Section 160 of the Constitution reversed the former relations of the courts in which the circuit court possessed general jurisdiction and was the repository of the power to administer legal remedies, and the chancery court had jurisdiction of certain designated matters and where there was not a full, adquate and complete remedy at law. Now by § 156 of the Constitution the circuit court has original jurisdiction “in all matters, civil and criminal, in this state not vested by this Constitution in some other court.” Whitney v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 71 Miss. 1009, 15 So. 33, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1894).

The legislature may confer on the chancery court jurisdiction of legal matters in aid of its authority over the principal matter of equitable negligence. Buie v. Pollock, 55 Miss. 309, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1877).

As a matter of necessity, in order to ascertain the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the courts, reference must be had to the system of jurisprudence prevalent at the time the Constitution was adopted, and to the legislation of the state with a view to which the framers of the Constitution must be understood to have acted. Servis v. Beatty, 32 Miss. 52, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1856).

50. Accounting.

Equity may compel accounting of the perquisites and emoluments of the sheriff’s office in suit of a rightful claimant, although incidentally determination of the title to the office may be necessary. Baker v. Nichols, 111 Miss. 673, 72 So. 1, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 366 (Miss. 1916).

51. Assignment.

Court has no jurisdiction under Code 1892 § 117 (Code 1906 § 120), except where assignment for creditors is general. Lowenstein v. Hooker, 71 Miss. 102, 14 So. 531, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 192 (Miss. 1893).

52. Attachment.

Code of 1906 § 536 giving chancery court jurisdiction of attachments does not violate Const. 1890 § 159 ¶f. Dinwiddie v. Glass, 111 Miss. 449, 71 So. 745, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 319 (Miss. 1916).

53. Creditors’ bills to set aside fraudulent conveyances.

The court can exercise jurisdiction, as provided by § 503 Code 1892 (Code 1906 § 553), to set aside conveyances of other devices made to defraud creditors only in behalf of creditors whose debts are due when the bill is filed. Browne v. Hernsheim, 71 Miss. 574, 14 So. 36, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 120 (Miss. 1893).

Jurisdiction of bills by creditors without judgment whose debts are due to set aside fraudulent conveyances and devices to hinder and delay creditors is expressly conferred by § 159 Const. 1890. McBride v. Adams, 70 Miss. 716, 12 So. 699 (Miss. 1893).

Such jurisdiction is not affected by § 31 of the Constitution declaring that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. McBride v. Adams, 70 Miss. 716, 12 So. 699 (Miss. 1893).

54. Land titles.

Original jurisdiction to make conclusive and final adjudication of title to land rests alone with circuit and chancery courts, and to a limited extent with the county courts. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Supreme Court, circuit courts, chancery courts and county courts, when acting on appeal from a special possessory court of a justice or justices of peace, have only such jurisdiction to adjudicate regarding title to land as is vested in special court from which appeal was taken. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Const. 1890 § 159 par. f and § 160 confer on chancery court jurisdiction to try legal as well as equitable titles. Keystone Lumber Yard v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 96 Miss. 116, 50 So. 445, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. 1909).

The court has no jurisdiction to reform a tax collector’s deed. Boone v. Dulion, 80 Miss. 584, 32 So. 1, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 283 (Miss. 1902).

55. Liens.

Where debt to bank was assumed by grantees in deed to husband and wife, court held it was only equitable and just that the one-half interest of husband in property be charged with an equitable lien to secure one-half of the amount assumed. Prater v. Prater, 208 Miss. 59, 44 So. 2d 538, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 229 (Miss. 1950).

Assignee of note and deed of trust covering machinery and equipment in manufacturing plant who files suit in chancery court for foreclosure of deed of trust, for appointment of receivor, for adjudication of priorities of liens and moves to abate prior action filed by mechanic to enforce his lien, must abide by equities of case resulting from fact that mechanic’s lien had been created in favor of mechanic without notice of existence of prior executed note containing agreement to subsequently give deed of trust on same property to which mechanic’s lien attached. Buckwalter v. McElroy, 205 Miss. 54, 38 So. 2d 317, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 411 (Miss. 1949).

But the equity of an accounting is sufficient as basis for the jurisdiction of a chancery court in cases of mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens. W. M. Carter Lumber Co. v. Deopp, 110 Miss. 591, 70 So. 701, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1915).

56. Mutual accounts.

The court has no jurisdiction under § 161 of the Constitution of 1890 conferring upon it concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court of “suits involving inquiry into matters of mutual accounts” of an account containing items of debit and credit and items in favor of defendant, being mere payments, where it did not appear that he had an independent account against the complainant. George D. Barnard & Co. v. Sykes, 72 Miss. 297, 18 So. 450, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 147 (Miss. 1894).

57. Official and fiduciary bonds.

Chancery court had jurisdiction under § 161 of the Constitution of suit by district attorney on behalf of county or district thereof against member of board of supervisors of the district and his surety to recover loss resulting from unauthorized use of construction equipment for benefit of private individuals. Moreover, additional basis for chancery jurisdiction, even apart from this constitutional section, existed in prayer for discovery as to the loss, expenses and outlays incurred by rendition of the unauthorized services to the some fourteen named citizens of the county. Shumpert v. Lee County, 197 Miss. 513, 20 So. 2d 82, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 316 (Miss. 1944).

Chancery court has jurisdiction of suit on bond of secretary and treasurer of board of levee commissioners. Adams v. Williams, 97 Miss. 113, 52 So. 865, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 283 (Miss. 1910).

Section 161 of the Const. of 1890, conferring jurisdiction upon the chancery court of suits on “bonds of fiduciaries” embraces only technical trusts, where bond is required by law. George D. Barnard & Co. v. Sykes, 72 Miss. 297, 18 So. 450, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 147 (Miss. 1894).

Section 161 Const. 1890, giving concurrent jurisdiction “of suits on bonds of public officers for failure to account for money, or property received or wasted, or lost by neglect” does not give the chancery court jurisdiction of a suit on the bond of a sheriff for damages because of an excessive attachment of personal property, a part of which is destroyed in his custody. Cazeneuve v. Curell, 70 Miss. 521, 13 So. 32, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 47 (Miss. 1893).

58. Personal decrees.

The court has no jurisdiction in a foreign attachment under §§ 486-487 Code 1892 (§§ 536, 537 Code 1906), to render a personal decree against the non-resident defendant. Rothrock Const. Co. v. Port Gibson Mfg. Co., 80 Miss. 517, 32 So. 116, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 298 (Miss. 1902).

Section 592 Code 1892 (Code 1906 § 643), authorizing personal decrees for balance, after sale of mortgaged property, and § 147 Const. 1890, prohibiting reversals from certain errors of jurisdiction by analogy support such right to adjudicate. Atkinson v. Felder, 78 Miss. 83, 29 So. 767, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 1900).

59. Receivers.

Neither the court nor chancellor in vacation has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver until the bill is filed and the cause is pending. Barber v. Manier, 71 Miss. 725, 15 So. 890, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 27 (Miss. 1894); Smith v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., 79 Miss. 266, 30 So. 653, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 54 (Miss. 1901).

All distinction between equity and common law jurisdiction, after it has been entertained, being swept away by § 147 of the Constitution, where an independent creditor’s bill for the preservation of the assets taken control of by the chancery court under such void appointment has been filed, a decree in such suit appointing a new receiver, even if erroneous, is not assailable collaterally as being void for want of jurisdiction. Section 160 of the Constitution dispensing with the necessity for first exhausting legal remedies, is also invoked by the court in this case. Whitney v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 71 Miss. 1009, 15 So. 33, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1894).

Such proceeding is not protected by § 147 of the Const., not being a “cause” within its meaning. Whitney v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 71 Miss. 1009, 15 So. 33, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1894).

The court has no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for a bank on its ex parte application, though it is insolvent. Whitney v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 71 Miss. 1009, 15 So. 33, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1894).

60. Penalties.

Laws 1910 ch. 134 giving chancery court concurrent jurisdiction of suits for penalties for violation thereof does not violate Const. 1890 § 159. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Marshall, 100 Miss. 626, 56 So. 792, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 64 (Miss. 1911).

The court is without jurisdiction ordinarily to enforce penalties. Mississippi R. Com. v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co., 78 Miss. 750, 29 So. 789, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 141 (Miss. 1901).

Under our Constitution the legislature cannot confer jurisdiction upon chancery courts of bills for the mere purpose of recovering penalties. Mississippi R. Com. v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co., 78 Miss. 750, 29 So. 789, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 141 (Miss. 1901).

61. Miscellaneous.

Where suit, brought in the chancery court for an injunction to abate a nuisance, failed on an injunction issue, the chancellor erred in not deciding the issue of damages. Shaw v. Owen, 229 Miss. 126, 90 So. 2d 179, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 593 (Miss. 1956).

Suit for damages over laying of sidewalk due to change of grading is not within Const. 1890 § 161. Murphy v. Meridian, 103 Miss. 110, 60 So. 48, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1912).

Sec. 4286 Code 1892 (Code 1906 § 4838), authorizing the railroad commission to apply to the circuit or chancery court for aid in enforcing obedience to their process, orders, decisions, and determinations, does not affect their jurisdiction, but merely directs resort to them according to their established jurisdiction. Mississippi R. Com. v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co., 78 Miss. 750, 29 So. 789, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 141 (Miss. 1901).

A chancery court has no jurisdiction to assess and collect the taxes authorized under the act of March 17, 1871, creating levee board No. 1, but it may enforce the trust created by it in favor of the bond-holders-creditors of the board. Woodruff v. State, 77 Miss. 68, 25 So. 483, 1899 Miss. LEXIS 48 (Miss. 1899).

The court has jurisdiction, pending an appeal from a decree against one seeking a cancellation of his adversary’s title, of a bill filed by him for an injunction against cutting and removing trees, the defendant being insolvent and the timber constituting its chief value. The jurisdiction is auxiliary or ancillary within § 160 of the Constitution to that conferred by § 1833 Code 1880 (§ 500 Code 1892; § 550 Code 1906), in conjunction with paragraph “f” of § 159 of the Constitution. Woods v. Riley, 72 Miss. 73, 18 So. 384, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1894).

In appointing guardians the court exercises general, and not limited and inferior, jurisdiction, and its decree appointing a clerk cannot be collaterally attacked. Ames v. Williams, 72 Miss. 760, 17 So. 762, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1895).

§ 9-5-83. Court may determine all matters in estates administered.

The court in which a will may have been admitted to probate, letters of administration granted, or a guardian may have been appointed, shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions in relation to the execution of the trust of the executor, administrator, guardian, or other officer appointed for the administration and management of the estate, and all demands against it by heirs at law, distributees, devisees, legatees, wards, creditors, or others; and shall have jurisdiction of all cases in which bonds or other obligations shall have been executed in any proceeding in relation to the estate, or other proceedings, had in said chancery court, to hear and determine upon proper proceedings and evidence, the liability of the obligors in such bond or obligation, whether as principal or surety, and by decree and process to enforce such liability.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, § 976; 1880, § 1834; 1892, § 504; 1906, § 554; Hemingway’s 1917, § 314; 1930, § 352; 1942, § 1263.

Cross References —

Registering claims against estates, see §9-5-173.

Docketing estate matters, see §9-5-203.

Limitation of express trusts in equity matters, see §15-1-39.

Proceedings in escheat matters, see §89-11-11.

Administration of estates of decedents, generally, see §§91-7-1 et seq.

Guardianships, generally, see §§93-13-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Revocation or withdrawal of election to take under or against will. 71 A.L.R.2d 942.

Appealability of probate orders allowing or disallowing claims against estate. 84 A.L.R.4th 269.

Am. Jur.

27A Am. Jur. 2d, Equity §§ 4, 37, 52.

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Equity §§ 33-71.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2. Construction and application generally.

3. Jurisdiction in particular matters.

4. Suits by or against estate.

5. Suits on bond.

6. Parties.

7. Venue.

1. Validity.

The statute is constitutional. Bank of Mississippi v. Duncan, 52 Miss. 740, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1876); Brunini v. Pera, 54 Miss. 649, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1877).

2. Construction and application generally.

This section [Code 1942 § 1263] is full, specific and definite, and authorizes the court at which letters of administration or of guardianship have been granted, to hear and determine all questions in relation to the execution of the trust of the executor, administrator, guardian or other officer appointed for the administration and management of all the estate, and all demands against it by heirs at law, distributees, devisees, legatees, wards, creditors or others. Newsom v. Federal Land Bank, 184 Miss. 318, 185 So. 595, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 38 (Miss. 1939).

The statute contemplates that the chancery court in which the guardianship is being administered shall draw to itself the decision and control of all litigations affecting the guardianship, between the wards and the guardian, or between third persons and the guardian, or against the ward though the guardian. Newsom v. Federal Land Bank, 184 Miss. 318, 185 So. 595, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 38 (Miss. 1939).

The chancellor, in the administration of estates and guardianships, may supervise and inquire into the management; he need not personally conduct the inquiry or consult witnesses and prepare the papers necessary to such supervision, but may appoint such assistants as may be required for the proper development and conduct of such cases, under his supervision; and the chancery court has full jurisdiction of proceedings against administrators, executors or guardians and sureties on their bonds to enforce claims or other liabilities against them, in his own court. Newsom v. Federal Land Bank, 184 Miss. 318, 185 So. 595, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 38 (Miss. 1939).

Chancery court has full jurisdiction of proceedings against administrators and surety, to enforce claim allowed against estate. Lawson v. Dean, 144 Miss. 309, 109 So. 801, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 361 (Miss. 1926).

The statute applies in favor of distributees, even after a formal settlement by the administrator. Brunini v. Pera, 54 Miss. 649, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1877).

3. Jurisdiction in particular matters.

Beneficiaries’ complaint focused on the administration of the trust, and they had labeled their claims as negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and gross negligence; however, the bank’s actions or inactions that were at issue arose solely from its capacity as trustee and any duty it might have had arose from its appointment as trustee, such that because the action sought to interpret the trustee’s obligations under the terms of the trust, the trust was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Warren County Chancery Court and had been since its inception. Trustmark Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 865 So. 2d 1148, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 185 (Miss. 2004).

The chancery court had jurisdiction of an executor’s action for construction of a will, a determination of the identity of the legatees, and a direction as to the distribution of the residual estate. Cain v. Dunn, 241 So. 2d 650, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1351 (Miss. 1970).

Where a will was admitted to probate in the county where the testatrix had had her residence and citizenship, and where the executor of the will was appointed and qualified, the chancery court thereof had jurisdiction and venue of an action to construe the will even though it involved title to real property located in another county. Hutton v. Hutton, 233 Miss. 458, 102 So. 2d 424, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1958).

Jurisdiction of all demands by creditors or others against an estate of a decedent is vested in chancery court of county in which letters of administration are granted. Trippe v. O'Cavanagh, 203 Miss. 537, 36 So. 2d 166, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss. 1948).

No court other than chancery court in which letters of administration has been granted has jurisdiction over petition for sale of decedent’s nonexempt lands for payment of decedent’s debts. Trippe v. O'Cavanagh, 203 Miss. 537, 36 So. 2d 166, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss. 1948).

Chancery court having jurisdiction of testamentary trust funds, bank acting as trustee and executor, and of the plaintiff has full jurisdiction to determine issues in respect to alleged improper handling of the trust funds. Garrett v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 153 F.2d 289, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 1914 (5th Cir. Miss. 1946).

Court of chancery has inherent power to remove a trustee for good cause, such power being incidental to the court’s paramount duty to see that trusts are properly executed. Yeates v. Box, 198 Miss. 602, 22 So. 2d 411, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 232 (Miss. 1945).

Will vesting right in trustees to determine when the trust is to be closed does not put arbitrary power in their hands, but, at most, only the authority for exercise of sound discretion, and bill in equity seeking review of such discretion may be maintained. Yeates v. Box, 198 Miss. 602, 22 So. 2d 411, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 232 (Miss. 1945).

While chancery court will not substitute its judgment for that of a trustee, it will, whenever the circumstances require, review the exercise of discretion given to a trustee to decide whether it is reasonable or unreasonable. Yeates v. Box, 198 Miss. 602, 22 So. 2d 411, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 232 (Miss. 1945).

Chancery courts may remove trustee irrespective of his domicile. Nutt v. State, 96 Miss. 473, 51 So. 401, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 171 (Miss. 1910).

Supreme Court will not interfere with removal of trustee by the chancery court for misconduct unless it be palpably unjust. Nutt v. State, 96 Miss. 473, 51 So. 401, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 171 (Miss. 1910).

The chancery court in which a will is probated has jurisdiction to decree the sale of lands, at the suit of the legatee, though the land lie and all defendants reside out of the county. Turner v. Turner, 57 Miss. 775, 1880 Miss. LEXIS 58 (Miss. 1880).

The chancery court in which a guardian is subsequently appointed has jurisdiction to ascertain proper compensation to those entitled thereto from the ward’s estate. Epperson v. Nugent, 57 Miss. 45, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. 1879).

4. Suits by or against estate.

No suit can be maintained under this statute without application having been presented to the court in which the guardianship is pending, setting up some reasonable necessity for the bringing of such suit. Newsom v. Federal Land Bank, 184 Miss. 318, 185 So. 595, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 38 (Miss. 1939).

The statute does not authorize a suit by an administrator against a person who bid off the same for the price of goods sold by the administrator under decree directing the sale to be for cash. Pate v. Taylor, 66 Miss. 97, 5 So. 515, 1888 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1888).

Ex contractu creditors may sue in chancery without judgments. Hunt v. Potter, 58 Miss. 96, 1880 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1880); Brasfield v. French, 59 Miss. 632, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1882).

The statute enables a judgment-creditor of an estate to sue in equity. Whitfield & Billups v. Evans, 56 Miss. 488, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 150 (Miss. 1879); Clopton v. Haughton, 57 Miss. 787, 1880 Miss. LEXIS 61 (Miss. 1880).

5. Suits on bond.

Executors de son tort of a deceased surety on the bond of an administrator may be sued in equity with the principal thereon. Buie v. Pollock, 55 Miss. 309, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1877).

6. Parties.

A chancellor is justified in dismissing a petition filed by life tenants under a testamentary trust for its modification where process has not been served on the remaindermen. Reedy v. Johnson's Estate, 200 Miss. 205, 26 So. 2d 685, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 284 (Miss. 1946).

Judgment creditors of the heirs of an intestate were proper parties to a proceeding involving the final account of the administrator. Stone v. Townsend, 190 Miss. 547, 1 So. 2d 237, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1941).

7. Venue.

Where a will was admitted to probate in the county where the testatrix had had her residence and citizenship, and where the executor of the will was appointed and qualified, the chancery court thereof had jurisdiction and venue of an action to construe the will even though it involved title to real property located in another county. Hutton v. Hutton, 233 Miss. 458, 102 So. 2d 424, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1958).

Chancery Court of county in which nonexempt land of decedent is located does not have jurisdicition of bill by creditor seeking lien against land for payment of his claims, when decedent’s estate is in process of administration in another county. Trippe v. O'Cavanagh, 203 Miss. 537, 36 So. 2d 166, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss. 1948).

Where testator bequeathed $1,000 to his brother and directed that if any part thereof remained unused by him at his death, it should become the property of testator’s nephew, and testator’s brother died within a month of the testator, the chancery court administering the estate of the testator and not the chancery court administering the estate of testator’s brother was the proper court to decide to whom the legacy belonged. Rose v. Bennett, 193 Miss. 878, 11 So. 2d 307, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 10 (Miss. 1943).

Under this section [Code 1942 § 1263] jurisdiction of all demands by creditors or others against an estate of a decedent is vested in the chancery court of the county in which letters of administration were granted, even though there are other defendants to the suit, some of whom may reside or be found in county other than that in which the letters of administration were granted. State ex rel. Gully v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 187 Miss. 66, 191 So. 285, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 79 (Miss. 1939).

An action to recover on a public official’s bond against the principal’s executrix and surety was properly dismissed for want of jurisdiction in the chancery court, where the action was brought in the county in which the surety could be served with process instead of the county in which letters of administration had been granted. State ex rel. Gully v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 187 Miss. 66, 191 So. 285, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 79 (Miss. 1939).

§ 9-5-85. Court may summon all persons and punish for contempt.

The chancery court shall have power to issue a summons for any person, or subpoena for any witness, whose appearance in court may be deemed necessary for any purpose, whether such party or witness reside in the same or any other county. It shall be the duty of the party summoned or subpoenaed, to attend the court according to the command of the process; and if it be necessary or proper to enforce the appearance of the party, the court, on the return of the process executed and failure to appear, may issue an attachment, and may fine the party when brought in for a contempt. If a witness before the court shall refuse to testify, the court may commit such witness for contempt of the court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, § 980; 1880, § 1835; 1892, § 506; 1906, § 557; Hemingway’s 1917, § 317; 1930, § 366; 1942, § 1277.

Cross References —

Power of courts to punish contempt, see §9-1-17.

Process, notice and publication generally, see §§13-3-1 et seq.

Disobedience of final order entered in consumer protection proceeding constituting contempt, see §75-24-17.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Intoxication of witness or attorney as contempt of court. 46 A.L.R.4th 238.

Right to punish for contempt for failure to obey court order or decree either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous. 12 A.L.R.2d 1059.

Am. Jur.

17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contempt §§ 29 et seq.

CJS.

17 C.J.S., Contempt §§ 65, 70, 76, 77 et seq.

§ 9-5-87. Power to punish for violation of injunction.

The chancery court, or the chancellor in vacation, or judge granting the writ, shall have power to punish any person for breach of injunction, or any other order, decree, or process of the court, by fine or imprisonment, or both, or the chancellor or judge granting the writ may require bail for the appearance of the party at the next term of the court to answer for the contempt; but such person shall be first cited to appear and answer. And any person so punished by order of the chancellor in vacation, may on five (5) days’ notice to the opposite party, apply to a judge of the Supreme Court, who, for good cause shown, may supersede the punishment until the meeting of the said chancery court.

At the discretion of the court, any person found in contempt for failure to pay child support and imprisoned therefor may be referred for placement in a state, county or municipal restitution, house arrest or restorative justice center or program, provided such person meets the qualifications prescribed in Section 99-37-19.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1846; 1892, § 509; 1906, § 560; Hemingway’s 1917, § 320; 1930, § 367; 1942, § 1278; Laws, 2009, ch. 367, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment added the second paragraph.

Cross References —

Punishment for violation of injunction against nuisances, see §95-3-19.

Court’s authority in proper cases to adjudge party in contempt, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 70.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right to punish for contempt for failure to obey court order or decree either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous. 12 A.L.R.2d 1059.

Divorce: propriety of using contempt proceeding to enforce property settlement award or order. 72 A.L.R.4th 298.

Am. Jur.

42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions §§ 235, 314-318.

CJS.

43A C.J.S., Injunctions §§ 393-440.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Matters within power to punish for contempt.

3. Contempt proceedings.

4. —Evidence.

5. —Judgment or decree.

6. Appeal.

1. In general.

Contempt findings were reversed, based on lack of jurisdiction over various named defendants, where there was failure to properly issue service of process, which is required before named person becomes party to motion; knowledge by way of media is not sufficient to bring person before court. Mississippi Asso. of Educators v. Trustees of Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 510 So. 2d 123, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2439 (Miss. 1987).

Criminal contempt is punishment for a past offense, is quasi criminal, and a defendant is presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the essence of the offense is that a defendant wilfully, maliciously, and contumaciously has refused to comply with the decree of court. Langford v. Langford, 253 Miss. 483, 176 So. 2d 266, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1006 (Miss. 1965).

A statute empowering the court to punish any person for breach of any decree or order of the court, by fine or imprisonment, or both, provides for criminal contempt, while a statute providing that if any person refused to obey or perform any order or judgment of the court, the court shall have power to fine and imprison him until the order or judgment is complied with, provides for civil or quasi criminal contempt; the order for imprisonment in the former case is for a past and completed act or omission, is punitory and must be suffered, and its purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the court; in the latter case the punishment is coercive and the contemnor may discharge himself by compliance with the terms of the decree violated, and its purpose is to compel obedience to its decrees. Evans v. Evans, 193 Miss. 468, 9 So. 2d 641, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1942).

2. Matters within power to punish for contempt.

Contemnor failed to comply with divorce decree, and a chancellor did not commit manifest error or abuse the chancery court’s discretion by incarcerating the contemnor, as the chancellor’s decision was supported by the record, which included the chancellor’s findings that the contemnor was not credible; further, the divorce decree was not ambiguous, so the contemnor’s argument that the contemnor could not obey because of the decree’s alleged vagueness was rejected. Stribling v. Stribling, 960 So. 2d 556, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 1 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

Individual held in prison for civil contempt was improperly held without being afforded opportunity to prove present inability to pay. While defendant may avoid judgment of contempt by establishing that he is without present ability to discharge obligation, he has burden of proving his inability to pay, and such showing must be made with particularity and not in general terms. Where contemnor is unable to pay, even if that present inability is due to his misconduct, imprisonment cannot accomplish purpose of civil contempt decree, which is to compel obedience. Jones v. Hargrove, 516 So. 2d 1354, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2950 (Miss. 1987).

The chancery court does not have the power to punish for an injunction prohibiting gambling operations under Code 1942 § 2562, which covers penalty where none fixed elsewhere by statute, but under this section. Alexander v. State, 210 Miss. 517, 49 So. 2d 890, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 290 (Miss. 1951).

Statute (Code 1942 § 2646), providing that any place where liquors are found, kept or possessed shall be deemed to be a common nuisance and may be abated by writ of injunction issued out of a court of equity upon a bill filed in the name of the state, may appropriately be taken in connection with this section, [Code 1942 § 1278] which is declaratory of the power of the chancery court or chancellor in vacation to punish any person for violation of an injunction as for a contempt. Murphy v. State, 202 Miss. 890, 32 So. 2d 875, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 352 (Miss. 1947).

The power to punish for contempt in vacation hereunder is not confined to injunction cases but expressly includes “any other order, decree or process of the court,” and, therefore, includes the enforcement of an alimony decree in vacation. Johnson v. Johnson, 189 Miss. 561, 198 So. 308, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 145 (Miss. 1940).

Husband wilfully and deliberately ignoring orders of the court to pay alimony was properly sentenced to confinement until alimony was paid. Millis v. State, 106 Miss. 131, 63 So. 344, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 115 (Miss. 1913).

A restraining order is foreign to the practice in this state and such an order without bond is a nullity; Wherefore defendant charged with violating a restraining order issued upon an amended bill can only be adjudged guilty of violating such void order, and their guilt cannot be predicated on a violation of an injunction issued upon the original bill. Castleman v. State, 94 Miss. 609, 47 So. 647, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 317 (Miss. 1908).

3. Contempt proceedings.

Trial court did not have sufficient facts before it to properly issue contempt order where Supreme Court’s review of record revealed no clear and explicit evidence that order placing defendants in contempt of court was well taken, and judgment of conviction did not contain material facts known to court constituting contempt. Mississippi Asso. of Educators v. Trustees of Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 510 So. 2d 123, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2439 (Miss. 1987).

In determining whether a person cited for contempt has the right to a jury trial, which determination must be based on whether the contempt is to be treated as a serious or a petty offense, the court must look to the maximum sentence which could be imposed under the statute if a maximum penalty has been set, and if no maximum penalty has been set, the court should look to the penalty actually imposed as the best evidence of the seriousness of the offense. McGowan v. State, 258 So. 2d 801, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1516 (Miss.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006, 93 S. Ct. 430, 34 L. Ed. 2d 298, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 632 (U.S. 1972).

A defendant who, in a trial without a jury was found guilty of contempt for violating an injunction prohibiting him from conducting the unlawful business of keeping and selling intoxicating liquor on certain premises, and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and a fine of $750, was not entitled to a jury trial, but was entitled to have his fine reduced to $500. McGowan v. State, 258 So. 2d 801, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1516 (Miss.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006, 93 S. Ct. 430, 34 L. Ed. 2d 298, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 632 (U.S. 1972).

Since the chancellor had power both in vacation and term time to hear and determine a petition alleging that the appellant was in contempt of the court’s injunction, the chancellor did not divest himself of the power to hear the matter in vacation by a citation requiring appellant to execute a bond, where neither the citation nor the bond required appellant to appear at the next term of court, but required his appearance on the vacation date named in the order for citation, and it further appeared that the appellant never executed the bond in question. Livaudais v. Mississippi E. R. Co., 228 Miss. 576, 89 So. 2d 588, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 548 (Miss. 1956).

Chancery court has authority to hear and determine petitions for contempt in vacation. Gordon v. Gordon, 196 Miss. 476, 17 So. 2d 191, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 217 (Miss. 1944).

For a conviction for criminal contempt, not only the procedure, but the proof, must conform to practice in criminal cases. Evans v. Evans, 193 Miss. 468, 9 So. 2d 641, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1942).

Contempt proceedings against executor for failure to pay widow year’s support theretofore allowed her by court were properly held by chancellor in vacation in another county. Prentiss v. Turner, 170 Miss. 496, 155 So. 214, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1934).

4. —Evidence.

In civil contempt cases the weight and sufficiency of the evidence must be clear and convincing, and not beyond a reasonable doubt, as required in criminal cases. Masonite Corp. v. International Woodworkers of America, 206 So. 2d 171, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1242 (Miss. 1967).

Where evidence is insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant deliberately and contumaciously intended to defy the power and dignity of the court in failing to comply with the alimony and child support provisions of a divorce decree, his imprisonment for criminal contempt is not justified. Langford v. Langford, 253 Miss. 483, 176 So. 2d 266, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1006 (Miss. 1965).

Regardless of the rule as to the essentials of a prima facie case in civil contempt, mere proof of failure to pay alimony without more is not sufficient to make a case of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intent deliberately and contumaciously to defy the power and dignity of the court justifying imprisonment as for criminal contempt. Evans v. Evans, 193 Miss. 468, 9 So. 2d 641, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1942).

In a proceeding for criminal contempt for failure of a husband, defendant in a divorce suit, to obey a decree ordering the payment of alimony and solicitor’s fees, a prima facie case of “wilful, deliberate and contumacious refusal” was not established, where the only evidence was the testimony of the wife as to the mere fact that the alimony had not been paid. Evans v. Evans, 193 Miss. 468, 9 So. 2d 641, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1942).

Absence of violated writ of injunction, with sheriff’s return, from record in contempt proceeding, held immaterial, where counsel’s agreement disclosed that writ was served on contemner. Hanna v. State, 169 Miss. 314, 153 So. 371, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1934).

Evidence held not sufficient to show contempt for interference with decree awarding custody of minor child. Magee v. State, 99 Miss. 83, 54 So. 802, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1910).

5. —Judgment or decree.

Only judgment or decree chancellor was authorized to render in proceeding for contempt in violating injunction against sale of gasoline without permit and payment of excise tax was one of fine, imprisonment, or both, for contemner’s past conduct. Hanna v. State, 169 Miss. 314, 153 So. 371, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1934).

6. Appeal.

Where the employer’s petition for citation of contempt for violation of a temporary injunction charged that the labor union and its officials had failed and refused to direct the union members to cease participating in a work stoppage and to return to work, the charge was one of civil contempt and the employer was entitled to appeal from a decree of the chancery court which found the defendants were not guilty. Masonite Corp. v. International Woodworkers of America, 206 So. 2d 171, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1242 (Miss. 1967).

Decree holding one guilty of contempt and providing punishment if he does not comply with the order of the court within a certain time is interlocutory and cannot be appealed from. Nutt v. State, 95 Miss. 422, 49 So. 145, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 259 (Miss. 1909).

§ 9-5-89. Guardian ad litem; appointment and compensation; effect of failure to appoint.

The court may appoint a guardian ad litem to any infant or defendant of unsound mind, and allow him suitable compensation payable out of the estate of such party, but the appointment shall not be made except when the court shall consider it necessary for the protection of the interest of such defendant; and a decree or judgment of any court shall not be void or erroneous because of the failure to have a guardian ad litem.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 54, art. 2(45); 1857, ch. 62, art. 52; 1871, § 1031; 1880, § 1894; 1892, § 553; 1906, § 604; Hemingway’s 1917, § 364; 1930, § 398; 1942, § 1309.

Cross References —

Infant, defined, see §1-3-21.

Appointment of receivers of estates of minors and persons of unsound mind, see §11-5-163.

Divorce proceedings for married minor, see §93-5-9.

Appointment of guardian ad litem in divorce proceedings, see §93-5-13.

Court appointment of guardian for minor, see §93-13-13.

Proceedings to remove minority disability, see §93-19-3.

Court appointment of an attorney to serve as guardian, and its costs, see Miss. Rule Civ. Proc., Rule 17.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right of child to action against mother for infliction of prenatal injuries. 78 A.L.R.4th 1082.

Prosecution of mother for prenatal substance abuse based on endangerment of or delivery of controlled substance to child. 70 A.L.R.5th 461.

Am. Jur.

27A Am. Jur. 2d, Equity § 63.

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Equity § 53.

Law Reviews.

1978 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts. 50 Miss. L. J. 137, March 1979.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Minors.

3. Incompetents.

1. In general.

A guardian ad litem should object to incompetent testimony, and if he fails to do so, the court of its own motion should reject it. Neblett v. Neblett, 70 Miss. 572, 12 So. 598, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 17 (Miss. 1893).

2. Minors.

Because the child’s best interest was the court’s “polestar” consideration in determining child custody, the importance of guardian ad litem appointments in child custody proceedings could not be overemphasized; in a case where a mother sought modification of child custody, and there was an allegation of abuse, it was mandatory that a guardian ad litem be appointed, under Miss. Code Ann. §93-5-23 (Supp. 2002). Robison v. Lanford, 841 So. 2d 1119, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 151 (Miss. 2003).

In an action to construe a will wherein the question was whether the intended devisee was the testatrix’ minor granddaughter, or testatrix’ daughter, the decree of the chancery court was not void as against the minor because no guardian ad litem had been appointed, where the minor and her father, with whom she resided, were made parties to the petition, and were both served with process, and the natural father and mother of the minor were both very active and diligent in behalf of the minor on the trial of the case. Hutton v. Hutton, 233 Miss. 458, 102 So. 2d 424, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1958).

Guardian’s ad litem duty to represent infant throughout litigation; guardian ad litem not qualified to act as commissioner to foreclose vendor’s lien. Belt v. Adams, 124 Miss. 194, 86 So. 584, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 485 (Miss. 1920).

Service of process in another state on minor defendants to a suit in this state, it not being made to appear that there is no father, mother, or guardian in this state upon whom process may be served, does not give jurisdiction as to such minors, or authorize the appointment of a guardian ad litem for them. Erwin v. Carson, 54 Miss. 282, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 31 (Miss. 1876); Frank v. Webb, 67 Miss. 462, 6 So. 620, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1889).

3. Incompetents.

Where a grantee and optionee sued the grantor and trustee in a deed of trust, seeking a declaration as to the mental competency of the grantor and confirmation of title in the grantee, and the grantor had never disclaimed the grantee’s title until this was done by the guardian ad litem, the grantee and the optionee rather than the grantor should be charged with compensation of the guardian ad litem. Austin v. Branch, 221 So. 2d 727, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1507 (Miss. 1969).

Where a testatrix left all of her property to the use of her incompetent brother during his life, with the remainder to his guardian, and a guardian ad litem, who was appointed by the court to represent the incompetent during the probate proceedings, filed an answer on behalf of his ward, the incompetent was adequately represented at the probate. Darby v. Arrington, 194 Miss. 123, 11 So. 2d 220, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 170 (Miss. 1942).

Where the alleged incompetent owner of realty and his guardian were both made parties to a proceeding to foreclose a trust deed given by the guardian, and the owner appeared in the proceeding to contest confirmation of the sale on the ground of invalidity of the adjudication of insanity and appointment of a guardian because the owner was not served with process, questions as to the regularity and efficacy of the foreclosure proceedings were res judicata, in a subsequent proceeding to remove the cloud from the title (the sale having been confirmed), if the owner was sane, since he was not only properly summoned but appeared and resisted the entry of the final decree on the identical grounds urged in the proceeding to clear the title, and they were also res judicata, even if the owner was insane and the appointment of the guardian was invalid because no process had been served on the owner in the incompetency proceedings, since he was properly sued through the guardian, who was at least invested with the capacities of a guardian ad litem or next friend. Dana v. Zerkowsky, 192 Miss. 302, 5 So. 2d 423, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1942).

§ 9-5-91. Information to be provided to Administrative Office of Courts by chancery clerk in chancery cases in which guardian ad litem is appointed.

  1. In a chancery case in which a guardian ad litem is appointed by the court, it is the duty of the chancery clerk to prepare and forward to the Administrative Office of Courts the information described by subsection (2) of this section not later than the last day of the month following the entry of an order approving any payment to the guardian ad litem.
  2. The clerk shall prepare and forward the following information when filed in a contested case where the guardian ad litem fees exceed One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00):
    1. A copy of any invoice for guardian ad litem fees;
    2. A copy of any order directing payment of guardian ad litem fees; and
    3. A copy of any petition seeking recovery of guardian ad litem fees, as well as any orders concerning payment of guardian ad litem fees, including, but not limited to, orders of contempt.
  3. If an order previously reported under subsection (1) of this section is amended by order of the court, the clerk shall forward the subsequent court order not later than the last day of the month following the entry of the amended order.
  4. The duty of a clerk to prepare and forward information under this section is not affected by:
    1. Any subsequent appeal of the court order;
    2. Any subsequent modification of the court order; or
    3. The expiration of the court order.
  5. This section does not apply to youth court matters.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 418, § 2, effective upon passage (April 1, 2017).

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-5-91 authorized a chancellor to exercise the same jurisdiction and perform the same duties in vacation as exercised and performed in term time.

A former §9-5-91 [Codes, 1880, § 1952; 1892, §§ 457, 593; 1906, § 506; Hemingway’s 1917, § 262; 1930, § 320; 1942, § 1228; Laws, 1886, p. 145; Laws, 1940, ch. 244; Laws, 1946, ch. 274; Laws, 1966, ch. 336, § 1; Laws, 1972, ch. 446, § 1; Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, effective from and after July 1, 1991] authorized a chancellor to exercise the same jurisdiction and perform the same duties in vacation as exercised and performed in term time.

§ 9-5-93. Trial of causes in vacation; power to enter decree prior to adjournment of next succeeding term.

Whenever the chancery court or chancellor has lawfully set any matter in vacation for confirmation or decree, and no contest has been timely filed, if an order or decree determining the same or setting another date therefor be not entered upon such date, the chancellor shall have the power to enter an order or decree on any day prior to the adjournment of the next succeeding term, without further process. Provided, that if the matter be one in which contest might have been entered prior to the date set and such contest be filed before the entry of such order or decree, the same shall be disposed of as if such contest had been timely filed.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1228.5; Laws, 1956, ch. 213, eff July 1, 1956.

Cross References —

Rules concerning vacation matters, see Miss. Uniform Chancery Court Rules 7.00 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts § 23.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts § 156.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A will contest may not be tried in vacation where there was no precedent order therefor at term or written consent by the parties. Winters v. Carver, 248 Miss. 792, 161 So. 2d 202, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 305 (Miss. 1964).

§ 9-5-95. Court or chancellor may extend time in vacation.

The court or chancellor in vacation shall have power in proper cases for good cause shown to grant a reasonable enlargement of the time for the filing of an answer or answers, or of a demurrer or demurrers, and shall have power in like cases and for like cause shown to set aside decrees pro confesso and thereupon to permit the filing of answer or answers. But no such enlargement of time should be granted where the request therefor is solely for delay or is the result of inexcusable neglect on the part of the defendant or his solicitor.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 321; 1942, § 1229; Laws, 1924, ch. 151.

Cross References —

Constitutional prohibition of delay in justice, see Miss Const. Art. 3, § 24.

Enlargement of time in which to comply with provisions of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 6.

Overruled demurrers not delaying trials, see Miss. Uniform Chancery Court Rule 2.10.

Rules concerning vacation matters, see Miss. Uniform Chancery Court Rules 7.00 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

27A Am. Jur. 2d, Equity §§ 107-173.

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Equity §§ 139-166.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Decree pro confesso.

1. In general.

Where a vendor brought an action to obtain purchasers’ execution of a new note and a deed of trust for a lost one and to obtain a lien for balance of indebtedness then due on land conveyed, this action could have properly been tried by chancellor in term time and the chancellor was without authority to try the case and enter final decree for the vendor in vacation in view of the fact that since the deed of trust had not been recorded, there was no constructive notice to be restored, and restoration of constructive notice was the object of the statute. Hood v. Lamar, 219 Miss. 349, 68 So. 2d 456, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 395 (Miss. 1953).

2. Decree pro confesso.

A decree pro confesso will not be set aside where delay in filing an answer is inexcusable. Davis v. Polk Financial Service, 242 Miss. 419, 135 So. 2d 175, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 578 (Miss. 1961).

As a general rule the motion to set aside a pro confesso decree must set out a meritorius defense and be supported by affidavit. Bates v. McClellan, 212 Miss. 860, 56 So. 2d 52, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 319 (Miss. 1952).

A person who has recovered a pro confesso decree may waive the requirement of a formal motion, affidavit and answer on an application to set aside the decree. Bates v. McClellan, 212 Miss. 860, 56 So. 2d 52, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 319 (Miss. 1952).

Where an application to set aside a pro confesso decree is presented by a short motion spread on the motion docket and by a statement to the court ore tenus by the solicitor for the defendant and the matter proceeds to the final hearing without objection, no question can be successfully raised as to form. Bates v. McClellan, 212 Miss. 860, 56 So. 2d 52, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 319 (Miss. 1952).

On motion to set aside decree pro confesso, affidavit and motion must set out not only that defendant has meritorious defense, but also sufficient details thereof so as to enable judge to determine its meritoriousness vel non. Alexander v. Hyland, 208 Miss. 890, 45 So. 2d 739, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 312 (Miss. 1950).

Motion to set aside decree pro confesso in suit involving title to land to permit defendant to answer and to continue case until next term of court for trial on merits should be sustained when it is shown that defendant has meritorious defense, that failure to file answer was caused by misunderstandings as to time of trial and that valuable witness for defendant, a surveyor, was absent because he had been injured, and there is no showing that any harm will ensue to plaintiff if defendant is granted trial on merits. Alexander v. Hyland, 208 Miss. 890, 45 So. 2d 739, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 312 (Miss. 1950).

§ 9-5-97. Additional powers of chancellor in vacation.

In the matter of ordering, decreeing and confirming sales of real and personal property of decedents, or of minors, or of persons of unsound mind, and in all other matters testamentary or of administration, in minors’ business, matters affecting persons of unsound mind, and in the matter of the removal of disabilities of minority, the chancellors of the several districts of this state are hereby authorized and empowered to do in vacation all things, and to exercise all the powers in such matters that could be done by them in term time; and all laws governing the action of the chancery court in such matters, and the process and procedure therein, shall apply when the chancellor shall act therein in vacation; but before any sale of real estate shall be confirmed by the chancellor in vacation, the parties in interest shall have notice thereof as provided by law in the matter of confirming sales by chancellors in vacation.

HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 507; Hemingway’s 1917, § 263; 1930, § 322; 1942, § 1230; Laws, 1900, ch. 92.

Cross References —

Powers of circuit judge in vacation, see §11-7-131.

Authority of chancellor in vacation to order executor or administrator to continue business of decedent, see §91-7-173.

Procedure in vacation for executor or administrator to borrow money to pay claims, see §91-7-219.

Rules concerning vacation matters, see Miss. Uniform Chancery Court Rules 7.00 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts § 23.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts § 242.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Specific decrees.

1. In general.

Petition for sale of decedent’s lands in W. county to pay debts may be heard by chancellor in S. county within same chancery district. Whitley v. Towle, 163 Miss. 418, 141 So. 571, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1932).

Judicial sale cannot be confirmed in vacation when a bona fide protest is filed. Culley v. Rhodes, 124 Miss. 640, 87 So. 136, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 482 (Miss. 1921).

Chancery court or chancellor in vacation may exact an accounting from guardians or remove them. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Jackson, 111 Miss. 752, 72 So. 150, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 384 (Miss. 1916).

Chancellor may approve executor’s final account in vacation. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. State, 110 Miss. 16, 69 So. 1007, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. 1915).

2. Specific decrees.

Chancellor had jurisdiction to render decree removing disabilities of minority in vacation, where only living parent appeared and answered petition. Wilkerson v. Swayze, 147 Miss. 141, 113 So. 327, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 347 (Miss. 1927).

Final decrees made in vacation cannot be vacated after adjournment. Ex parte Stanfield, 98 Miss. 214, 53 So. 538, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 54 (Miss. 1910).

Ex parte petition by attorney for decree requiring payment of his fee for services in estate matter cannot be granted in vacation. Murphy v. Harris, 93 Miss. 286, 48 So. 232, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1908).

§§ 9-5-99 and 9-5-101. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§9-5-99. [Codes, 1942, § 1231; Laws, 1932, ch. 143]

§9-5-101. [Codes, 1942, § 1231; Laws, 1932, ch. 143]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-5-99 specified rules governing service of process in matters heard and decided in vacation.

Former §9-5-101 provided for appearances and continuances invacation.

§ 9-5-103. Bonds of receivers, assignees, executors may be reduced or cancelled, if excessive or for sufficient cause.

Whenever it shall appear by petition to the chancery court, or chancellor in vacation, that any bond given by an assignee, receiver, executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee is in excess of the value of the estate being administered, and as such is an unnecessary expense to the estate, or that other sufficient cause appears for so doing, the chancery court or chancellor in vacation may, after five days’ service of copy of said petition on the surety, cancel the bond or reduce the same to an amount sufficient to protect the estate, or accept a new bond in substitution of an existing one. However, the decree rendered shall not affect the liability upon a bond which accrued prior to its cancellation, reduction or substitution.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 264; 1930, § 323; 1942, § 1233; Laws, 1914, ch. 155; Laws, 1940, ch. 234; Laws, 1958, ch. 232.

Cross References —

Chancellor’s authority to require additional security in vacation, see §11-1-23.

Appointing or removing receivers in vacation, see §11-5-151.

Discharge of surety from liability on bond, see §91-7-317.

Applicability of Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure to proceedings brought under this section, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 81.

Rules concerning vacation matters, see Miss. Uniform Chancery Court Rules 7.00 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees §§ 130 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts § 156.

§ 9-5-105. Expense of chancellor in hearing vacation matter paid equally by parties.

When any chancellor in this state shall, by agreement of the parties, hear any cause or matter in vacation, at any place, other than the place of his residence, all expenses incurred by him in attendance upon said hearing, shall be paid equally by the parties thereto, upon the chancellor’s filing an itemized statement thereof, with the clerk of the chancery court of the county in which such matter shall be pending; and when at any such hearing the attendance of the court reporter shall be required his actual expenses shall be likewise paid.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 324; 1942, § 1234; Laws, 1924, ch. 153.

Cross References —

Payment of chancellor’s expenses for drainage district hearings, see §51-29-109.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

46 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Judges §§ 50-58.

CJS.

48A C.J.S., Judges §§ 224 et seq.

Chancery Clerks

§ 9-5-131. Bond of clerk.

The clerk of the chancery court, before he enters upon the duties of the office, shall take the oath of office and give bond, with sufficient surety, to be payable, conditioned and approved as provided by law, in a penalty equal to five percent (5%) of the sum of all the state and county taxes shown by the assessment rolls and the levies to have been collectible in the county for the year immediately preceding the commencement of the term of office for such clerk; however, such bond shall not exceed the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). Such clerk may be required by the court, or the chancellor in vacation, to give additional bond in any particular case, which shall be a cumulative security, and shall not in any manner affect the liability on his official bond for any matter covered by it. His official bond shall be held to cover all his official acts, and all moneys which may come into his hands according to law or by order of the court or chancellor.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 27, art. 4 (1); 1857, ch. 62, art. 12; 1871, § 990; 1880, § 1807; 1892, § 460; 1906, § 509; Hemingway’s 1917, § 266; 1930, § 325; 1942, § 1235; Laws, 1984, ch. 474; Laws, 1986, ch. 458, § 10; Laws, 1991, ch. 604, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 48, Chapter 458, Laws, 1986, provided that §9-5-131 would stand repealed from and after October 1, 1989. Subsequently, three 1989 chapters (341, 342, and 343) amended Section 48, Chapter 458, Laws, 1986, by deleting the date for repeal.

Cross References —

Constitutional authority for office of clerk of the chancery court, see Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 168.

Provisions common to court clerks, see §§9-1-27 et seq.

Provision that chancery clerks shall be elected in 1987 and every four years thereafter, see §23-15-193.

Nominations for state, district, county, and county district offices which are elective, see §§23-15-291 et seq.

Officer before whom oath shall be taken, see §25-1-9.

Place of filing oath, see §25-1-11.

Office hours and site of office of chancery court clerk, see §25-1-99.

Same person holding offices of circuit and chancery court clerk, see §25-1-103.

Fees of chancery court clerks, see §§25-7-9,25-7-13.

Duties of chancery clerk with respect to county depositories, see §27-105-315.

Rules concerning chancery clerks, see Miss. Uniform Chancery Court Rules 9.00 et seq.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

As the position of county administrator and its attendant responsibilities not within the statutory responsibilities of the chancery clerk, such position represents an additional position of responsibility the clerk may, in the mutual discretion of the board of supervisors and the clerk, assume in consideration for additional compensation, and, as such, both the bond required by a chancery clerk and the bond required by a county administrator must be given. 1992 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 455.

The provisions of §§9-5-131,9-7-121,19-3-5,19-4-9,21-1-7,21-17-5(1), and27-1-13, only mandate the use of tax assessment rolls and the avails to be collected from levies thereon in calculating the amount of the bonds therein required. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 11.

The calculation of a bond pursuant to §§9-5-131,9-7-121,19-3-5,19-4-9,21-1-7,21-17-5(1), and27-1-13, includes all assessment rolls upon which a board of supervisors may levy ad valorem taxes. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 11.

The calculation pursuant to §§9-5-131,9-7-121,19-3-5,19-4-9,21-1-7,21-17-5(1), and27-1-13, includes all ad valorem tax levies listed on the certified levy sheet, including school district levies. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 11.

The calculation pursuant to §§9-5-131,9-7-121,19-3-5,19-4-9,21-1-7,21-17-5(1), and27-1-13, includes all classes of property upon which ad valorem taxes are levied and collected. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 11.

In calculating the amount of a bond pursuant to §§9-5-131,9-7-121,19-3-5,19-4-9,21-1-7,21-17-5(1), and27-1-13, the total amount of ad valorem taxes to be collected, rather than the actual amount collected, must be used. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 11.

There is no requirement in Section 9-5-131 et seq., which would require a chancery clerk to post foreclosure notices and execute an affidavit stating that the same was posted, nor is there such requirement or authority in Sections 25-7-9, 25-7-11, and 89-1-53 et. seq., however, pursuant to Sections 25-7-33 and 25-7-45, if a clerk chooses to post such notices, he may assess a fee of $ .25 for executing an affidavit stating that the same was posted. 2003 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 112.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees §§ 130 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327, 328.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The sureties on the official bond are liable to the heirs for the proceeds of land of a decedent sold by the clerk as commissioner, although a special statutory bond to account therefor had been given before the sale. Johnson v. Bobbitt, 81 Miss. 339, 33 So. 73, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 152 (Miss. 1902).

§ 9-5-132. Training and continuing education course requirements for chancery clerks; filing of certificate of compliance; penalty for failure to file; courses; expenses; continuing education credit for attendance at chancery court proceedings.

  1. Except as otherwise provided herein, no chancery clerk elected for a full term of office commencing on or after January 1, 1996, shall exercise any functions of office or be eligible to take the oath of office unless and until the chancery clerk has filed in the office of the circuit clerk a certificate of completion of a course of training and education conducted by the Mississippi Judicial College of the University of Mississippi Law Center within six (6) months of the beginning of the term for which such chancery clerk is elected. A chancery clerk who has completed the course of training and education and has satisfied his annual continuing education course requirements, and who is then elected for a succeeding term of office subsequent to the initial term for which he completed the training course, shall not be required to repeat the training and education course upon reelection. Any chancery clerk who has served a full or partial term before January 1, 1996, shall be exempt from the requirements of this subsection.
  2. In addition to meeting the requirements of subsection (1) of this section, after taking office by election or otherwise, each chancery clerk shall be required to file annually in the office of the circuit clerk a certificate of completion of a course of continuing education conducted by the Mississippi Judicial College. No chancery clerk shall have to comply with this subsection unless he will have been in office for five (5) months or more during a calendar year.
  3. Each chancery clerk elected for a term commencing on or after January 1, 1992, shall be required to file annually the certificate required in subsection (2) of this section commencing January 1, 1994.
  4. The requirements for obtaining the certificates in this section shall be as provided in subsection (6) of this section.
  5. Upon the failure of any chancery clerk to file with the circuit clerk the certificates of completion as provided in this section, such chancery clerk shall, in addition to any other fine or punishment provided by law for such conduct, not be entitled to any fee, compensation or salary, from any source, for services rendered as chancery clerk, for the period of time during which such certificate remains unfiled.
  6. The Mississippi Judicial College of the University of Mississippi Law Center shall prepare and conduct courses of training for basic and continuing education for chancery clerks of this state. The basic course of training shall be known as the “Chancery Clerks Training Course” and shall consist of at least thirty-two (32) hours of training. The continuing education course shall be known as the “Continuing Education Course for Chancery Clerks,” and shall consist of at least eighteen (18) hours of training. The content of the basic and continuing education courses and when and where such courses are to be conducted shall be determined by the judicial college. The judicial college shall issue certificates of completion to those chancery clerks who complete such courses.
  7. The expenses of the training, including training of those elected as chancery clerk who have not yet begun their term of office, shall be borne as an expense of the office of the chancery clerk.
  8. Chancery clerks shall be allowed credit toward their continuing education course requirements for attendance at chancery court proceedings if the presiding chancery court judge certifies that the chancery clerk was in actual attendance at a term or terms of court; provided, however, that at least twelve (12) hours per year of the continuing education course requirements must be completed at a regularly established program or programs conducted by the Mississippi Judicial College.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 595, § 2; Laws, 1995, ch. 337, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 10, 1995).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court §§ 2-4.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts § 253 et seq.

§ 9-5-133. How clerk of chancery court may appoint deputies.

The clerk of the chancery court shall have power, with the approbation of the court, or of the judge in vacation, to appoint one or more deputies, who shall take the oath of office, and who thereupon shall have power to do and perform all the acts and duties which their principal may lawfully do; such approval, when given by the judge in vacation, shall be in writing, and shall be entered on the minutes of the court at the next term.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 27, class 2, art. 1 (12); class 3 art. 1 (10); 1857, ch. 61, art. 17, ch. 62, art. 13; 1871, §§ 551, 990; 1880, § 2281; 1892, § 930; 1906, § 1006; Hemingway’s 1917, § 726; 1930, § 747; 1942, § 1662.

Cross References —

Provisions common to court clerks, see §§9-1-27 et seq.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Chancery Judge is not authorized to order employees to be provided to Office of Chancery Clerk. O’1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 605.

A board of supervisors is vested with the power to purchase real estate on which to construct public health buildings and clinics sponsored by the public health units of any county, or a public health building to house the county health department, out of the general fund and, provided that ultimate control and management of the facilities remains in the hands of local government, the operation of the building may be done pursuant to contract. 1998 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 801.

There is no statutory authority for a chancery clerk to hire a public information officer. 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 304.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 43.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Acting as guardian of the person or estate of an habitual drunkard is not one of the ex officio duties of a clerk of the chancery court, but devolves upon him when, but not unless, he is appointed as such by a decree of that court, and therefore is not within the ex officio powers vested in a deputy chancery clerk by the statute. O'Bannon v. Henrich, 191 Miss. 815, 4 So. 2d 208, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1941).

Deputy circuit clerk may appoint justice of peace to preside over eminent domain court. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 107 Miss. 626, 65 So. 650, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 1914), aff'd, 250 U.S. 363, 39 S. Ct. 513, 63 L. Ed. 1032, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 1756 (U.S. 1919).

§ 9-5-135. Clerk to attend court and keep minutes.

  1. The clerk shall, in person or by deputy, attend all the sessions of the court, and shall keep minute books, in which he shall record, under the directions of the chancellor, all the proceedings of the court; and the minutes of the preceding day shall be read by him each morning of the session in open court, and the last day’s proceedings shall be read by him in open court before adjournment, and the minutes must be signed by the chancellor.
  2. The clerk, at his option, may elect to keep the minute books by means of electronic filing or storage or both, as provided in Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57 in lieu of or in addition to any paper records.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 15; 1871, § 991; 1880, § 1808; 1892, § 461; 1906, § 510; Hemingway’s 1917, § 267; 1930, § 326; 1942, § 1236; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1994).

Cross References —

Provisions common to clerks, see §§9-1-27 et seq.

Minutes of all courts of record, see §9-1-33.

Clerk’s custody of exhibits, see §9-13-27.

Duty of clerk to keep minutes for board of supervisors, see §19-3-27.

Crime of alteration of records, see §97-11-1.

Clerk’s duty to keep minute book, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 79.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Chancery Judge is not authorized to order employees to be provided to Office of Chancery Clerk. O’1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 605.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court §§ 1, 29.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Under Article 6, § 170 of the Mississippi Constitution and §19-17-1, the duties of the clerk of the board of supervisors and the county auditor are just as much a part of the duties of the chancery clerk as attending and keeping the minutes of all chancery court proceedings as is required by §§9-5-135 and9-5-137. Barlow v. Weathersby, 597 So. 2d 1288, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 196 (Miss. 1992).

§ 9-5-137. Other duties of the clerk.

It shall be the duty of the clerk to preserve and keep all records, files, papers and proceedings belonging to his office, and to record all last wills and testaments which may be probated; all letters testamentary, of administration, and guardianship; all accounts allowed; all inventories, appraisements, and reports duly returned; all instruments which are duly proved, and which by law are required to be recorded in his office, in well-bound books to be kept for that purpose, each class in a separate book or books, or by means of electronic filing or storage or both in addition to or in lieu of any such physical records as provided in Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57, as the clerk may elect; all records shall be properly indexed. He shall issue all process which may be required of him by law or by order of the court, or the chancellor in vacation; and shall discharge all other duties which may be required of him by law, or which properly appertain to the duties of his office. The clerk shall be under the direction of the court in termtime, and of the chancellor in vacation.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, § 996; 1880, § 1822; 1892, § 477; 1906, § 526; Hemingway’s 1917, § 283; 1930, § 327; 1942, § 1237; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1994).

Cross References —

Provisions common to clerks, see §§9-1-27 et seq.

Lis pendens record, see §§11-47-1 et seq.

Duty of chancery clerks following creation of municipal corporation, see §21-1-23.

Duty of clerk following enlargement or contraction of corporate limits of municipality, see §§21-1-39,21-1-41.

Duty of court and clerks following abolition of municipal corporation, see §§21-1-53,21-1-55,21-1-57.

Records of motor vehicle ad valorem tax collections, see §27-51-25.

Duty of clerk with respect to land classification report, see §29-3-37.

Duty of clerk with respect to records of veterans, see §35-3-11.

Duty of clerk with regard to commitment proceedings of persons in need of mental treatment, see §§41-21-61 et seq.

Filing to perfect security interest, see §75-2-401.

Recording declaration of trust under investment trust law, see §79-15-19.

Filing certificate of dissolution of credit union, see §81-13-59.

Recording construction liens, see §85-7-133.

Filing instrument concerning the sale of lands, see §89-3-1.

Duty of clerk in recording instruments concerning land, see §89-5-25.

Duty of clerk in filing vouchers for annual accounts by executors and administrators, see §91-7-279.

Appointment of clerk as guardian of minor, see §93-13-21.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court §§ 20-31.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Former husband was unable to show a violation of U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 1 or Miss. Code Ann. §9-5-137 in a divorce action because the evidence demonstrated that he was served personally, and no hearing was commenced without adequate and timely process. Richardson v. Richardson, 856 So. 2d 426, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 259 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 638 (Miss. Nov. 6, 2003).

Under Article 6, § 170 of the Mississippi Constitution and §19-17-1, the duties of the clerk of the board of supervisors and the county auditor are just as much a part of the duties of the chancery clerk as attending and keeping the minutes of all chancery court proceedings as is required by §§9-5-135 and9-5-137. Barlow v. Weathersby, 597 So. 2d 1288, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 196 (Miss. 1992).

§ 9-5-139. Chancery clerk’s office at Biloxi.

In Harrison County, a county with two judicial districts, it shall be the duty of the chancery clerk to keep in his office at Biloxi, suitable record books or electronic equipment for the purpose of recording deeds, deeds of trust and other conveyances, instruments and contracts required by law to be recorded, and all deeds, deeds of trust, mortgages, contracts, wills and other conveyances and contracts, and all muniments of title, documents and other papers required by law to be filed, enrolled or recorded relating to property situated in said second judicial district, shall be properly filed, enrolled or recorded in the office of said clerk at Biloxi, in books or by means of electronic filing or storage or both as provided in Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57, as he may elect, and to be kept for that purpose in his said office at Biloxi. All official bonds shall be recorded by said clerk as required by law in the offices of the said clerk at Gulfport and at Biloxi.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 2910-06; Laws, 1962, ch. 257, § 6; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1994).

Cross References —

Duties of clerk of chancery court, see §§9-5-135,9-5-137.

§ 9-5-141. Acts clerk may perform at any time.

The clerk or his deputy may at any time receive and file all bills, petitions, motions, accounts, inventories, reports, or other papers offered for that purpose, and may issue all process authorized by law and proper in any matter or proceeding. He may also at any time, in termtime or vacation, perform the following functions; issue warrants of appraisement to appraise the personal estate of decedents; allow and register claims against estates being administered in the court of which he is clerk; make all orders and issue all process necessary for the collection and preservation of estates of decedents, minors, and persons of unsound mind; appoint some person to collect and preserve the estate of any decedent in the state in any case provided for; grant letters of administration to the husband or wife, or other person entitled thereto; take the proof of wills, admit wills to probate, in common form, grant letters testamentary, letters of administration with the will annexed, and de bonis non; appoint guardians for minors, persons of unsound mind, and convicts of felony; grant letters of administration; institute suits in cases provided for, and, whenever an appeal shall be taken from the grant of letters testamentary, of administration, or guardianship, appoint some fit person to discharge the duties pending the appeal. He may do all such other acts as are provided by law and by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, § 995; 1880, § 1814; 1892, § 468; 1906, § 517; Hemingway’s 1917, § 274; 1930, § 337; 1942, § 1248; Laws, 1914, ch. 212; Laws, 1974, ch. 449, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Power of court to determine all matters in estates administered, see §9-5-83.

Appointment of temporary administrator, see §91-7-53.

Grant of administration in decedents’ estates, see §91-7-63.

Grant of administration de bonis non, see §91-7-69.

Grant of letters to county administrator, see §91-7-79.

Appointment of sheriff as administrator, see §91-7-83.

Method for probating claims, see §91-7-149.

Proceedings in insolvent estates, see §91-7-261.

Appointment of guardian, see §§93-13-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Probate where two or more testamentary documents, bearing the same date or undated, are proffered. 17 A.L.R.3d 603.

What circumstances excuse failure to submit will for probate within time limit set by statute. 17 A.L.R.3d 1361.

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court §§ 20-23.

10 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executors and Administrators, Forms 191 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Validity of wills.

1. In general.

Where instrument purporting to be a will was admitted to probate by the clerk in vacation, without notice to the objectors, and will contest was filed thereafter but before approval and confirmation of clerk’s acts in question, and admission to probate was thereafter approved and confirmed over objection of contestants, and on subsequent trial of will contest probate of the instrument was offered in evidence but contestant offered no evidence, peremptory instruction in favor of proponent was correct. Bigleben v. Henry, 196 Miss. 586, 17 So. 2d 602, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 1944).

2. Validity of wills.

Attempt to contest will was unseasonable where, while chancery court was in vacation, chancery clerk on January 24, 1983, admitted will and codicils to probate, thereafter issuing Letters Testamentary; on June 13, 1983, chancellor entered order ratifying actions by chancery clerk conducted while court was in vacation; and, action to set aside will alleging mental incompetency when making will was commenced on May 6, 1985. Sims v. Stennis, 510 So. 2d 798 (Miss. 1987).

Probate of will in common form before chancery clerk in vacation is prima facie evidence of validity of will until will is declared invalid and set aside by proper and lawful proceeding in proper court, having jurisdiction of subject matter and of parties in interest. Rice v. McMullen, 207 Miss. 706, 43 So. 2d 195, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 382 (Miss. 1949).

In proceeding by residuary legatee to recover his share of estate, introduction in evidence of proceedings before chancery clerk in vacation admitting will to probate in common form makes out prima facie case of validity of will. Rice v. McMullen, 207 Miss. 706, 43 So. 2d 195, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 382 (Miss. 1949).

Probate of a will in common form before the clerk in vacation should be deemed prima facie evidence of the validity of the will unless and until its invalidity shall have been determined by the court. Bigleben v. Henry, 196 Miss. 586, 17 So. 2d 602, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 1944).

Where contest of a will was filed after admission of the will to probate by the clerk in vacation without notice to the objectors but before such admission was approved and confirmed by the court, such contest was not filed “before probate” within the meaning of Code 1942 § 504, so as to preclude introduction in evidence of the probate of the will as prima facie evidence of its validity, in the trial of the will contest. Bigleben v. Henry, 196 Miss. 586, 17 So. 2d 602, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 1944).

Entry by the clerk of his order in vacation admitting a will to probate is an adjudication by him that the instrument has been duly proven by the presentation thereof with the affidavits of the subscribing witnesses thereto attached. Bigleben v. Henry, 196 Miss. 586, 17 So. 2d 602, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 1944).

§ 9-5-143. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 38; 1871, § 1020; 1880, § 1815; 1892, § 469; 1906, § 518; Hemingway’s 1917, § 275; 1930, § 338; 1942, § 1249]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-5-143 directed that rules be held in the clerk’s office, specified the purposes for such rules, and when they should be held.

§ 9-5-145. How proceedings before clerk to be conducted.

In all applications and proceedings before the clerk in vacation or in term time, the same pleadings and evidence and forms shall be observed, and the same process and service and return shall be necessary, as though the proceedings were before the court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, § 995; 1880, § 1821; 1892, § 476; 1906, § 525; Hemingway’s 1917, § 282; 1930, § 339; 1942, § 1250; Laws, 1974, ch. 449, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 26, 1974).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Courts §§ 24, 25.

CJS.

14 C.J.S., Clerks of Courts §§ 236-265.

§ 9-5-147. All acts of clerk subject to approval or disapproval.

All acts, judgments, orders, or decrees made by the clerk in term time or vacation or at rules, shall be subject to the approval or disapproval of the court of which he is clerk, and shall not be final until approved by the court. All such orders and proceedings of the clerk may, by order of the chancellor in vacation, be suspended until a hearing before him in court, and shall be subject to such orders and decrees as the court may make.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 38; 1871, §§ 995, 1020; 1880, §§ 1815, 1819; 1892, §§ 470, 474; 1906, §§ 519, 523; Hemingway’s 1917, §§ 276, 280; 1930, § 340; 1942, § 1251; Laws, 1974, ch. 449, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 26, 1974).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court §§ 20-28.

CJS.

14 C.J.S., Clerks of Courts §§ 236-265.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Probate of wills.

1. In general.

Whether dismissal of bill on plaintiff’s request during the last 1917 vacation was erroneous was properly presented by exceptions at the January term 1918. Northern v. Scruggs, 118 Miss. 353, 79 So. 227, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1918).

2. Probate of wills.

Where contest of a will was filed after admission of the will to probate by the clerk in vacation without notice to the objectors but before such admission was approved and confirmed by the court, such contest was not filed “before probate” within the meaning of Code 1942, § 504, so as to preclude introduction in evidence of the probate of the will as prima facie evidence of its validity, in the trial of the will contest. Bigleben v. Henry, 196 Miss. 586, 17 So. 2d 602, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 1944).

Entry by the clerk of his order in vacation admitting a will to probate is an adjudication by him that the instrument has been duly proven by the presentation thereof with the affidavits of the subscribing witnesses thereto attached. Bigleben v. Henry, 196 Miss. 586, 17 So. 2d 602, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 1944).

Probate of a will in common form before the clerk in vacation should be deemed prima facie evidence of the validity of the will unless and until its invalidity shall have been determined by the court. Bigleben v. Henry, 196 Miss. 586, 17 So. 2d 602, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 1944).

Where instrument purporting to be a will was admitted to probate by the clerk in vacation, without notice to the objectors, and will contest was filed thereafter but before approval and confirmation of clerk’s acts in question, and admission to probate was thereafter approved and confirmed over objection of contestants, and on subsequent trial of will contest probate of the instrument was offered in evidence but contestant offered no evidence, peremptory instruction in favor of proponent was correct. Bigleben v. Henry, 196 Miss. 586, 17 So. 2d 602, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 1944).

As respects liability of chancery clerk for failure to attach to claim against estate certificate that claim was probated, allowed, and registered, probating, allowing, and registering of claims against estate are not “judicial acts.” Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 158 So. 922, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 25 (Miss. 1935).

Whenever claim against estate of decedent, to which affidavit in compliance with statute is attached, is presented to clerk for probate, clerk has mandatory duty to admit claim to probate by attaching his certificate thereto. Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 158 So. 922, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 25 (Miss. 1935).

Bill against chancery clerk and his surety for failure to attach to claim against estate clerk’s certificate setting forth that claim was probated, allowed, and registered, because of which failure claim was disallowed, held not demurrable because not alleging that administrator possessed assets with which to pay claim if it had been properly probated, since claimant would at least be entitled to nominal damages. Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 158 So. 922, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 25 (Miss. 1935).

§ 9-5-149. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1880, § 1816; 1892, § 471; 1906, § 520; Hemingway’s 1917, § 277; 1930, § 341; 1942, § 1252; Laws, 1974, ch. 449, § 4]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-5-149 directed that the clerk keep minutes of proceedings before the clerk and specified the manner of taking and recording the minutes.

§ 9-5-151. How minutes of proceedings before clerk preserved and approved.

The minutes so kept of proceedings in vacation or in term time shall constitute a record of the office and shall be carefully preserved as such, free from erasure or alteration; and, at the first term thereafter of the court, in the case of minutes in vacation, or in the case of minutes in term time before the clerk at that term or the first term thereafter, shall be examined by the court and if approved, shall thereby become the minutes of the court, as if entered at a term thereof; and all the orders and decrees entered in said minutes in vacation, shall, by such approval of the court, become final and be as valid and effectual as if done by the court when they were done by the clerk.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1817; 1892, § 472; 1906, § 521; Hemingway’s 1917, § 278; 1930, § 342; 1942 § 1253; Laws, 1974, ch. 449, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved March 26, 1974).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 29.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Attempt to contest will was unseasonable where, while chancery court was in vacation, chancery clerk on January 24, 1983, admitted will and codicils to probate, thereafter issuing Letters Testamentary; on June 13, 1983, chancellor entered order ratifying actions by chancery clerk conducted while court was in vacation; and action to set aside will alleging mental incompetency when making will was commenced on May 6, 1985. Sims v. Stennis, 510 So. 2d 798 (Miss. 1987).

§ 9-5-153. How approval of clerk’s minutes and orders shown.

The approval by the court of minutes entered in vacation or in term time, and adoption of the orders and decrees made by the clerk, may be evidenced by an order of the court approving such orders and decrees, excepting such as may be specified as not approved. It shall not be necessary to enter on the minutes of the court, in term time, any of said orders or decrees made in vacation or in term time, but the same, as entered in vacation or in term time, shall, by the approval of the court, become the acts of the court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1818; 1892, § 473; 1906, § 522; Hemingway’s 1917, § 279; 1930, § 343; 1942, § 1254; Laws, 1974, ch. 449, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved March 26, 1974).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court §§ 20-29.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

§ 9-5-155. Bonds examined by chancellor.

The chancellor shall, at each term of the court, carefully examine all bonds taken by the clerk in vacation, in pursuance of any order of the court, or the requirement of law, in any proceeding in such court, and make such orders in reference thereto as he shall deem necessary for the security of the parties interested therein.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, § 995; 1880, § 1820; 1892, § 475; 1906, § 524; Hemingway’s 1917, § 281; 1930, § 344; 1942, § 1255.

Cross References —

Rules concerning vacation matters, see Miss. Uniform Chancery Court Rules 7.00 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bonds §§ 4-22.

CJS.

11 C.J.S., Bonds §§ 7-30.

§ 9-5-157. Register of sureties on bonds to be kept.

The clerk of the chancery court shall either procure a well-bound book, arranged alphabetically and properly ruled, lined and headed to show the name of the principal and surety, name of principal obligor, name of obligee, date of bond, penalty of bond, kind of bond, where recorded if recorded, number of suit in which filed and date of discharge or provide for the electronic filing or storage or both as provided in Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57 of this information. In one of these manners he shall abstract each bond, when filed in his office, by entering in such record the name of each principal and surety, under the proper letter, the name of principal obligor, name of obligee, date, penalty, kind of bond, where recorded if recorded, and number of suit in which filed. And when such bond has been discharged, the date thereof shall be entered in said record under the proper heading. The clerk of the chancery court shall also, as soon as said record has been obtained, thus abstract all executor’s, administrator’s and guardian’s bonds in matters at that time pending in the chancery court of his county.

HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 527; Hemingway’s 1917, § 284; 1930, § 345; 1942, § 1256; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1994).

Cross References —

Register of sureties on bonds to be kept by circuit clerks, see §9-7-137.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bonds §§ 1 et seq.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 29.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

§ 9-5-159. Abstract of certain decrees furnished circuit clerk.

The clerk of the chancery court shall, within ten days after the expiration of the term at which any decree for money shall be made, which is enforceable by execution against the defendant, furnish an abstract of such decree to the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which such decree is made; and it shall be the duty of the circuit clerk forthwith to enroll the same on the “Judgment Roll” in his office as judgments of the circuit court are required to be enrolled.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1823; 1892, § 478; 1906, § 528; Hemingway’s 1917, § 285; 1930, § 346; 1942, § 1257.

Cross References —

Final judgment rendered in Supreme Court, see §11-3-41.

Form of judgment roll, see §11-7-189.

Effect of enrollment of judgment, see §11-7-197.

Decree rendered in estate of intestate, see §91-1-31.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

27A Am. Jur. 2d, Equity §§ 155 et seq.

§ 9-5-161. Clerk to make final record of causes.

  1. The clerk shall, within three (3) months after the final termination of each suit involving real estate, record all the pleadings, proofs, exhibits and proceedings therein, or such part thereof as may be required by order of the chancellor, in a book to be kept for that purpose, and to be styled “The Book of Final Records in Chancery.” He shall likewise make a final record of all other proceedings or suits, if required by the decree or by order of the chancellor, omitting such portions from the record books as the chancellor may direct. The clerk shall also make final record of all or such portions of a former terminated proceeding or suit as may be requested by any person, upon payment by such person of the cost thereof.
  2. It shall be the duty of the chancery clerk of any county in which there is a county court established, to record in the final record the proceedings of all or any part thereof of proceedings in said court, affecting the title of lands in said county, when requested so to do by any person interested in said lands, and upon the payment of the fee therefor by the person requesting same, and the clerk shall index same in the deed records of the county, and the filing of said proceedings or parts thereof shall be constructive notice from the date of said filing to all persons of said proceedings the same as if they had been decided by the chancery court.
  3. The records required by subsections (1) and (2) of this section may be kept by means of electronic filing or storage or both as provided in Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57, as the clerk may elect.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 15; 1871 § 991; 1880, § 1808; 1892, § 462; 1906, § 511; Hemingway’s 1917, § 268; 1930, § 347; 1942, § 1258; Laws, 1946, ch. 469, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1994).

Cross References —

Final record in suit affecting real estate in circuit court, see §9-7-127.

Filing of papers relating to any cause, see §11-1-5.

Final judgment rendered in Supreme Court, see §11-3-41.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 29.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

§ 9-5-163. Custodian of certain records and papers.

The clerk of the chancery court shall be the custodian of all documents, records, books and papers belonging, or in any way appertaining, to the probate court, and of the board of police, formerly existing, except as to such as may be required by law to be kept by the clerk of the circuit court; and, as such custodian, he shall do and perform all acts in relation to such records, books and papers which were heretofore required of, or might lawfully have been done by, the clerk of the said probate court or board of police. All such documents, records, books and papers may be kept by means of electronic filing or storage or both as provided in Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57, as the clerk may elect.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, § 997; 1880, § 1824; 1892, § 479; 1906, § 529; Hemingway’s 1917, § 286; 1930, § 348; 1942, § 1259; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1994).

Cross References —

Authority to purchase photorecording equipment for chancery clerks, see §19-15-5.

Larceny of court records, see §97-9-3.

Rule requiring that all papers be kept in proper files, see Miss. Uniform Chancery Court Rule 9.02.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 29.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

§ 9-5-165. Removal and return of court files and documents in clerk’s office.

The clerk shall not suffer any paper filed to be withdrawn but by leave of the chancellor, and then only by retaining a copy to be made at the cost of the party obtaining the leave. Provided, however, that any duly licensed and practicing attorney in good standing in the court may remove court files and related legal papers other than youth court and adoption court files and related papers from the clerk’s office by signing therefor himself, or by a designated representative of his law office, on a record to be provided for that purpose. Such files or documents so removed shall be attested to by the clerk or his deputy at the time of removal, and said attorney shall be personally responsible for their safekeeping and return within ten (10) days, or before the first day of the next term of chancery court, whichever comes first and such files or documents shall not be removed from the county where the same are filed except that said files or documents may be taken by said attorney for use in a vacation hearing to such county where the hearing may be held. Failure to return any such court files or related legal papers as provided herein shall constitute contempt of court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 16; 1871, § 992; 1880, § 1809; 1892, § 463; 1906, § 512; Hemingway’s 1917, § 269; 1930, § 328; 1942, § 1238; Laws, 1964, ch. 308, eff from and after passage (approved March 23, 1964).

Cross References —

Duties of board of supervisors as to indexing and filing of chancery causes finally disposed of, see §19-15-7.

Removal of case files from the clerk’s office, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 79.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 29.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The approval of sufficiency of an appeal bond is not the equivalent of the filing of the bond, when the provisions of this section [Code 1942 § 1238] have not been complied with. Wood v. Warren, 193 So. 2d 123, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1274 (Miss. 1966).

Suit in chancery begun when bill filed with clerk. Williams v. New York Life Ins. Co., 132 Miss. 345, 96 So. 97, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 32 (Miss. 1923).

A paper is not filed in the legal sense, notwithstanding it may be marked “filed,” until it has been delivered to the proper official with the purpose that the usual steps be taken in reference thereto. Where a bill is handed to the clerk and marked “filed” by him, but immediately carried away by the solicitor who stated that he did not wish process issued, there has been no such filing as will give priority of lien over another creditor who, before the return of the bill and issuance of process, has filed a like bill and had process issued thereon. Meridian Nat'l Bank v. Hoyt & Bros. Co., 74 Miss. 221, 21 So. 12, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 142 (Miss. 1896).

§ 9-5-167. Newspaper subscribed for and preserved.

The clerk of the chancery court shall subscribe to at least one (1) and not more than two (2) of the newspapers published in his county as the court or chancellor may direct; and in the event no newspaper is published in the county, the clerk shall subscribe to the newspaper in which the publications ordered by the court are usually made. To preserve such newspapers, the clerk shall carefully file the original or microfilm copies thereof in his office, or may keep the same by means of electronic filing or storage or both as provided in Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57, as the clerk may elect. Before the clerk may utilize microfilm copies of newspapers presently on file and of those newspapers to be received in the future, the written approval of the court and the board of supervisors must be obtained. The expense of the subscriptions and the expense of the binding of filed newspapers or of the microfilming process shall be paid out of the county treasury. Two (2) or more counties may join together and agree to accomplish the purposes of this section and to share the costs of necessary equipment, subscriptions and labor involved.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1827; 1892, § 481; 1906, § 531; Hemingway’s 1917, § 288; 1930, § 349; 1942, § 1260; Laws, 1972, ch. 382, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1994).

Cross References —

Summons by publication, see §§13-3-27,13-3-31, and13-3-32.

Publication of notice to creditors of estates of decedent, see §§91-7-49,91-7-145,91-7-147.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 29.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

That notice was given taxpayers that rolls were open to objections could not be shown by copies of newspaper filed in chancery clerk’s office. Henderson Molpus Co. v. Gammill, 149 Miss. 576, 115 So. 716, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 61 (Miss. 1928).

§ 9-5-169. All records and papers subject to inspection.

All the records and papers of the office of the chancery clerk shall, at all reasonable hours on business days, be subject to the inspection and examination of all citizens; and the clerk shall show to any person enquiring for it where any record or paper in his office can be found, and shall allow him access to it, and to examine it and make any copy, note, or memorandum he desires to make of it.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1826; 1892, § 480; 1906, § 530; Hemingway’s 1917, § 287; 1930, § 350; 1942, § 1261.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abstracts of Title §§ 4, 5, 6.

CJS.

1 C.J.S., Abstracts of Title § 5.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In view of public policy to encourage small holdings in fee, equality among heirs, activity of sales, and freedom of transfers, and the fact that the statutes provide for recording of instruments affecting title to land, and charge the public with notice of such instruments and their contents, the law should be liberalized as to the right of inspection of records and making copies thereof. Logan v. Mississippi Abstract Co., 190 Miss. 479, 200 So. 716, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1941).

The right to make copies of public records is restricted as to time to “all reasonable hours on business days,” and as to methods, so as not to interfere unduly with the use of the records by the public, or with the clerk in the discharge of his duties, or materially to lessen the compensation of the clerk. Logan v. Mississippi Abstract Co., 190 Miss. 479, 200 So. 716, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1941).

The word “copy” in the statute includes photographic copies. Logan v. Mississippi Abstract Co., 190 Miss. 479, 200 So. 716, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1941).

A Mississippi corporation, chartered to own, use, make and keep a full set of abstract books and records, by which to make and compile abstracts of title and ownership maps covering the real estate in the state, and in connection therewith, to make copies of public records by all means and devices, had the right to examine and make photostatic copies of the records of Coahoma County, although such corporation had no special existing or prospective interest in any lands in such county nor present employment to examine and copy the records. Logan v. Mississippi Abstract Co., 190 Miss. 479, 200 So. 716, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1941).

§ 9-5-171. Destruction of records.

  1. The chancery clerk of each of the counties of the State of Mississippi, with the approval of the board of supervisors of such county, after an inventory has been made and checked by the board and an order spread on its minutes listing the reference, is authorized to dispose of records pursuant to a records control schedule approved by the Local Government Records Committee as provided in Section 25-60-1.
  2. No records which are in the process of being audited by the State Department of Audit or which are the basis of litigation shall be destroyed until at least twelve (12) months after final completion of the audits and litigation.
  3. Records may be filed and retained by electronic means as provided in Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57, whether the record is to be destroyed or not; provided, however, that destruction of records shall be carried out in accordance with Sections 25-59-21 and 25-59-27.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1261.5; Laws, 1952, ch. 208, §§ 1-3; Laws, 1966, ch. 337, §§ 1-3; Laws, 1987, ch. 420; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 11; Laws, 1996, ch. 537, § 7; Laws, 1998, ch. 439, § 1; Laws, 2006, ch. 495, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2006.

Amendment Notes —

The 2006 amendment rewrote the section to provide that records retention and destruction standards apply to all counties regardless of election.

Cross References —

Authority of Supreme Court clerk to destroy old records on appeal, see §9-3-25.

Provision for formulation of records control schedules for courts and requirement that director of department of archives and history be consulted prior to destruction of records, see §25-59-17.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Jackson County Adult Detention Center inmate requests for sick call are not on list of enumerated records in this section and may be legally destroyed when they are no longer of benefit to the agency. 1997 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 100.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 29.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

§ 9-5-173. Register of claims against estates.

The clerk shall keep in his office a well-bound book, or by means of electronic filing or storage or both as provided in Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57, as the clerk may elect, to be called the “Register of Claims,” each page of which shall be divided into five (5) columns, the first to contain the creditor’s name, the second the description of the claim, the third the time when due, the fourth the amount of the claim, and the fifth the day of the registry. He shall register in said book all claims proved and allowed against any estate administered in his court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, § 996; 1880, § 1822; 1892, § 477; 1906, § 526; Hemingway’s 1917, § 283; 1930, § 335; 1942, § 1246; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 12, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1994).

Cross References —

Jurisdiction of court to determine all matters in estates administered, see §9-5-83.

Duty of clerk to docket matters testamentary, see §9-5-203.

Limitation of time for filing claims against estate of deceased person, see §§91-7-151,91-7-153.

Method of probating claims, see §91-7-149.

Examination and adjudication of claims, see §91-7-269.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

31 Am. Jur. 2d, Executors and Administrators §§ 535 et seq.

10 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executors and Administrators, Forms 611-628.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators §§ 540-556, 558-563, 565-587.

Dockets

§ 9-5-201. Dockets to be kept; general docket, and other entries therein.

  1. The clerk shall keep a general docket in which he shall enter the names of the parties in each suit, the time of filing the complaint, petition or answer, and all other papers in the cause, the issuance and return of process, and a note of reference to all orders made therein by the book and page. He shall mark on the papers in every cause the style and number of the suit, and the time when and the party by whom filed. All the papers and pleadings filed in a cause shall be kept in the same file, and all the files kept in numerical order. The general docket shall be duly indexed, both direct and indirect, in the alphabetical order of the names of the parties, and each of them, so that the page of the docket containing the entries in each cause may be readily found.
  2. The general docket required to be kept by this section and all other dockets or records required by law to be kept by the chancery clerk may be kept on computer in lieu of any other physical docket, record or well-bound book if all such dockets and records are kept by computer in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Administrative Office of Courts.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 16; 1871, § 992; 1880, § 1809; 1892, § 463; 1906, § 512; Hemingway’s 1917, § 269; 1930, § 328; 1942, § 1238; Laws, 1964, ch. 308; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 8; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 13; Laws, 1994, ch. 458, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Cross References —

Alternate manner of keeping docket, see §9-5-215.

Form of lis pendens docket, see §11-47-15.

Chancery clerk maintaining a general docket for the Chancery Court, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 79.

Setting of causes for trial, see Miss. Uniform Chancery Court Rule 3.01.

Clerk’s duty to maintain the general docket, see Miss. Uniform Chancery Court Rule 9.01.

Clerk’s duty to securely maintain all disputed documents, see Miss. Uniform Chancery Court Rule 9.04.

§ 9-5-203. Matters testamentary, etc., to be docketed.

The clerk shall place on the general docket all applications made and proceedings had in said court in matters testamentary, of administration, in minors’ business, and in cases of persons of unsound mind, by entering the name of the person whose estate is the subject of the application or proceedings, the time of filing the application or other paper, the nature of it in brief terms, the issuance and return of process, if any, or publication and proof of it, and a note of reference to all orders made by the clerk or court, by the book and page, so that by reference to such docket the history of the administration of such estate may be traced.

Such docket may be kept on computer as provided in Section 9-5-201.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1810; 1892, § 464; 1906, § 513; Hemingway’s 1917, § 270; 1930, § 329; 1942, § 1239; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 14; Laws, 1994, ch. 458, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Cross References —

Jurisdiction of chancery court to determine all matters in estates administered, see §9-5-83.

Index and filing of all estate matters finally disposed of, see §19-15-7.

Duty of clerk to list defaulting executors, administrators, and guardians, see §91-7-283.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 29.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

§ 9-5-205. Issue docket.

The chancery clerk shall keep an issue docket in which he shall set down (1) all causes triable according to due course at the instant term and (2) such other causes for final hearings as may be ordered (a) by the court or (b) by consent of all the parties. And he shall also place on said docket all petitions for the sale of the estates of decedents, minors and persons of unsound mind; all proceedings representing estates to be insolvent; final accounts of executors, administrators and guardians and petitions for distribution of an estate or payment of a legacy and all other similar matters in which an order or decree of the court is sought in matters testamentary, of administration, or guardianship, and wherein the issuance of process or notice is necessary to the final hearing on the matter so set down.

Such docket may be kept on computer as provided in Section 9-5-201.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1240; Laws, 1938, Ex. ch. 53; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 15; Laws, 1994, ch. 458, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Cross References —

Alternate manner of keeping docket, see §9-5-215.

Precedence on docket of suits to compel public access to public records, see §25-61-13.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 29.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

§§ 9-5-207 through 9-5-211. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§9-5-207. [Codes, 1942, § 1241; Laws, 1938, Ex. ch. 53]

§9-5-209. [Codes, 1942, § 1242; Laws, 1938, Ex. ch. 53]

§9-5-211. [Codes, 1942, § 1243; Laws, 1938, Ex. ch. 53]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-5-207 directed the clerk to enter causes on the issue docket in the order in which they are numbered, without the need of a request of any party.

Former §9-5-209 authorized the court to cause to be entered in the issue docket any cause which the clerk omitted to enter.

Former §9-5-211 directed that the issue docket be called for trial as in the circuit court.

§ 9-5-213. Motion docket and entries.

The clerk shall also keep a motion docket in which he shall, in the order in which they are filed, docket as of course and without request, all demurrers, motions, ex parte petitions, exceptions to evidence or reports, and all matters pertaining to administration or guardianship not directed to be placed on the issue docket. He shall also place on the motion docket all matters brought before him in vacation when presented, and, at the next term of the court, all such matters on said docket shall be examined and disposed of by the court by approving or disapproving the same.

Such docket may be kept on computer as provided in Section 9-5-201.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1244; Laws, 1938, Ex. ch. 53; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 16; Laws, 1994, ch. 458, § 13, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Cross References —

Rules relative to motion day and to books and records kept by clerk, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 78 and Miss. R. Civ. P. 79, respectively.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 29.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

§ 9-5-215. Loose leaf docket.

Any chancellor in this state may, by an order made and entered on the minute book of the chancery court in each of said counties in his district, require the docket of said court to be provided and kept as follows:

The clerk shall provide and keep, for the use of the chancellor, a loose leaf judge’s docket, in which he shall enter, on a separate sheet, each matter or cause now pending in the court, or hereafter instituted therein, together with a chronological list of all pleadings, orders and decrees in each such matter or cause.

The sheets on which the various matters or causes are entered shall be arranged in such docket as the chancellor may direct, and shall remain therein until each matter or cause is finally disposed of, when the sheet containing the entries concerning the same shall be removed, and placed in numerical order in a transfer binder.

All litigated or contested matters or causes appearing on the judge’s docket, which are triable by law, or by consent, at any term, shall be set for trial by the chancellor at such time during the term as he may direct. Provided, however, when any chancellor has entered an order on the minute book of the chancery court of the counties in his district requiring the docket of said court to be kept, as provided in this section, Sections 9-5-205 through 9-5-213 shall not apply to the chancery court of said district.

Such docket may be kept on computer as provided in Section 9-5-201.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1245; Laws, 1938, ch. 266; Laws, 1938, Ex. ch. 53; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 17; Laws, 1994, ch. 458, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts § 26.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts § 248.

§ 9-5-217. Execution docket and entries therein.

The clerk shall keep an execution docket in the manner required of the clerk of the circuit court, in which he shall enter all final process issued by him, and record at large the returns that may be made thereon.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1813; 1892, § 467; 1906, § 516; Hemingway’s 1917, § 273; 1930, § 336; 1942, § 1247.

Cross References —

Execution docket of circuit court, see §9-7-181.

Execution docket kept by sheriff, see §19-25-61.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts, § 26.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts, § 248.

Family Masters

§§ 9-5-241 through 9-5-253. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§9-5-241. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 54, art. 2 (25); 1857, ch. 62, art. 79; 1871, § 1057; 1880, § 1927; 1892, § 584; 1906, § 635; Hemingway’s 1917, § 395; 1930, § 445; 1942, § 1365]

§9-5-243. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 54 art. 2(27); 1857, ch. 62, art. 81; 1871, § 1059; 1880, § 1929; 1892, § 586; 1906, § 637; Hemingway’s 1917, § 399; 1930, § 446; 1942, § 1366; Laws, 1962, ch. 286, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 324; Laws, 1971, ch. 306, § 1]

§9-5-245. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 54, art. 2(28); 1857, ch. 62, art. 82; 1871, § 1060; 1880, § 1930; 1892, § 587; 1906, § 638; Hemingway’s 1917, § 400; 1930, § 447; 1942, § 1367]

§9-5-247. [Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 85; 1871, § 1063; 1880, § 1933; 1892, § 590; 1906, § 641; Hemingway’s 1917, § 403; 1930, § 448; 1942, § 1368]

§9-5-249. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 54, art. 2 (29); 1857, ch. 62, art. 84; 1871, § 1062; 1880, § 1931; 1892, § 588; 1906, § 639; Hemingway’s 1917, § 401; 1930, § 449; 1942, § 1369]

§9-5-251. [Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 80; 1871, § 1058; 1880, § 1928; 1892, § 585; 1906, § 636; Hemingway’s 1917, § 396; 1930, § 451; 1942, § 1371]

§9-5-253. [Codes, 1880, § 1932; 1892, § 589; 1906, § 640; Hemingway’s 1917, § 402; 1930, § 452; 1942, § 1372]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-5-241 authorized the appointment of masters of the chancery court.

Former §9-5-243 specified the powers of the masters.

Former §9-5-245 granted masters the power to subpoena witness.

Former §9-5-247 authorized the chancellor to direct an accounting in any cause, and specified the manner in which a master could express doubts concerning the accounting.

Former §9-5-249 authorized masters to charge a fee for providing copies of reports or other papers.

Former §9-5-251 authorized the appointment of special commissioners.

Former §9-5-253 authorized the court to require bonds of masters or special commissioners.

§ 9-5-255. Family masters; appointment, qualifications, powers, and duties.

  1. Except as provided by subsection (9) of this section, the senior chancellor of each chancery court district in the state may apply to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for the appointment of one or more persons to serve as family masters in chancery in each of the counties or for all of the counties within the respective chancery court district if the senior chancellor states in writing that the chancery court district’s docket is crowded enough to warrant an appointment of a family master. The Chief Justice shall determine from the information provided by the senior chancellor if the need exists for the appointment of a family master. If the Chief Justice determines that the need exists, a family master shall be appointed. If the Chief Justice determines that the need does not exist, no family master shall be appointed.
  2. Family masters in chancery shall have the power to hear cases and recommend orders establishing, modifying and enforcing orders for support in matters referred to them by chancellors and judges of the circuit, county or family courts of such county. The family master in chancery shall have jurisdiction over paternity matters brought pursuant to the Mississippi Uniform Law on Paternity and referred to them by chancellors and judges of the circuit, county or family courts of such county. As used in this section, “order for support” shall have the same meaning as such term is defined in Section 93-11-101.
  3. In all cases in which an order for support has been established and the person to whom the support obligation is owed is a nonrelated Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) family on whose behalf the Department of Human Services is providing services, the family master in chancery or any other judge or court of competent jurisdiction shall, upon proper pleading by the department and upon appropriate proceedings conducted thereon, order that the department may recover and that the obligor shall be liable for reasonable attorney’s fees at a minimum of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) or an amount set by the court and court costs which the department incurs in enforcing and collecting amounts of support obligation which exceed administrative fees collected and current support owed by the obligor.
  4. Persons appointed as family masters in chancery pursuant to this section shall meet and possess all of the qualifications required of chancery and circuit court judges of this state, shall remain in office at the pleasure of the appointing chancellor, and shall receive reasonable compensation for services rendered by them, as fixed by law, or allowed by the court. Family masters in chancery shall be paid out of any available funds budgeted by the board of supervisors of the county in which they serve; provided, however, in the event that a family master in chancery is appointed to serve in more than one county within a chancery court district, then the compensation and expenses of such master shall be equally apportioned among and paid by each of the counties in which such master serves. The chancery clerk shall issue to such persons a certificate of appointment.
  5. Family masters in chancery shall have power to administer oaths, to take the examination of witnesses in cases referred to them, to examine and report upon all matters referred to them, and they shall have all the powers in cases referred to them properly belonging to masters or commissioners in chancery according to the practice of equity courts as heretofore exercised.
  6. Family masters in chancery shall have power to issue subpoenas for witnesses to attend before them to testify in any matter referred to them or generally in the cause, and the subpoenas shall be executed in like manner as subpoenas issued by the clerk of the court. If any witness shall fail to appear, the master shall proceed by process of attachment to compel the witness to attend and give evidence.
  7. Family masters in chancery are authorized and empowered to conduct original hearings on matters in such county referred to such masters by any chancellor or judge of such county.
  8. In all cases heard by masters pursuant to this section, such masters shall make a written report to the chancellor or judge who refers the case to him. Such chancellor or judge may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made and reported by the master, and may recommit the matter to the master with instructions. In all cases referred to such master, initialing for approval by the master of a proposed decree shall be sufficient to constitute the master’s report.
  9. Any chancellor required by this section to appoint a person or persons to serve as family masters in chancery may forego the requirement to appoint such masters or if family masters have been appointed, such chancellor may terminate such appointments and leave such positions vacant, only if an exemption from the United States Department of Health and Human Services is obtained for the county or counties involved. Such positions may remain vacant for as long as such exemption remains in effect.

HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 518, § 11; Laws, 1986, ch. 474, § 1; Laws, 1989, ch. 440, § 3; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 75; Laws, 1997, ch. 316, § 14; Laws, 2003, ch. 514, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 19, 2003.).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Chapter 564, Laws of 1994.

Section 43-1-1 provides that the term “State Department of Public Welfare” or “State Board of Public Welfare” shall mean the State Board of Human Services.

Laws of 1999, ch. 432, § 1, provides:

“SECTION 1. From and after the date Laws, 1999, ch. 432, is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, all family courts are abolished. All matters pending in any family court abolished shall be transferred to the county court of the county wherein the family court was located without the necessity for any motion or order of court for such transfer.”

By letter dated May 28, 1999, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the changes made by Chapter 432, Laws of 1999. For a complete list of sections affected by Chapter 432, Laws of 1999, see the Statutory Tables Volume, Table B, Allocation of Acts.

Amendment Notes —

The 2003 amendment inserted “at a minimum of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) or an amount set by the court” following “reasonable attorney’s fees” in (3).

Cross References —

Qualifications of chancery and circuit court judges, see Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 154 and Code §9-1-23.

Department of Human Services generally, see §§43-1-1 et seq.

Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, see §§43-17-1 et seq.

Mississippi Uniform Law on Paternity, see §§93-9-1 et seq.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A county court judge may be appointed as a family master and receive additional compensation from the county beyond the compensation that is received for being a county court judge. 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 689.

The Chief Justice can execute a Memorandum of Understanding on behalf of all appointed family masters allowing the Child Support Maximization Project to use the monies paid to the family masters by the counties as a source for federal matching funds. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 554.

Senate Bill 2339 of 2005 [Chapter 501, Laws of 2005] does not, by its express terms, amend, modify or repeal Sections 9-5-255 and 41-21-61 (a). 2005 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 206.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Attorneys’ fees: cost of services provided by paralegals or the like as compensable element of award in state court. 73 A.L.R.4th 938.

Chapter 7. Circuit Courts

Judges, Districts, and Terms of Court

§ 9-7-1. Judges; election; holding of terms of court; term of office; residence.

A circuit judge shall be elected for and from each circuit court district and the listing of individual precincts shall be those precincts as they existed on October 1, 1990. He may hold court in any other district with the consent of the judge thereof, when in their opinion the public interest may require. The terms of all circuit judges hereafter elected shall begin on the first day of January 1931 and their terms of office shall continue for four (4) years. A circuit judge shall be a resident of the district in which he or she serves but shall not be required to be a resident of a subdistrict if the district is divided into subdistricts.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 53, art. 6 (3, 12); 1857, ch. 61, arts. 7, 8; 1871, §§ 526, 531; 1880, § 1483; 1892, § 631; 1906, § 689; Hemingway’s 1917, § 467; 1930, § 476; 1942, § 1414; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 37; Laws, 2002, ch. 356, § 2. (See Editor’s note).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 37.

Laws 2002, ch. 713 (Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 543), provides in pertinent part:

“BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, That the following amendment to the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 is proposed to the qualified electors of the state:

“Amend Section 153, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, to read as follows:

“‘Section 153. The judges of the circuit and chancery courts shall be elected by the people in a manner and at a time to be provided by the Legislature. The judges elected for a term of office beginning from and after January 1, 2003, shall hold their office for a term of six (6) years.’

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That this proposed amendment shall be submitted by the Secretary of State to the qualified electors at an election to be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November 2002, as provided by Section 273 of the Constitution and by general law.

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the explanation of this proposed amendment for the ballot shall read as follows: ‘This proposed constitutional amendment increases the terms of office of circuit and chancery court judges from four to six years beginning January 1, 2003.’

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi shall submit this resolution, immediately upon adoption by the Legislature, to the Attorney General of the United States or to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in accordance with the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

This section is being set out to correct an error in the 2014 Replacement Volume. The version of the section that was to become effective upon effectuation under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, provided a proposed amendment to Section 153 of the Mississippi Constitution (by Chapter 713, Laws of 2002) was ratified by the electorate, was erroneously set out in the bound volume. The United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment of this section by Chapter 356, Laws of 2002, but the constitutional amendment was defeated by the electorate, and the amendment by Chapter 356, Laws of 2002, never became law. The section as set out above is the section as it appeared prior to the 2002 amendment.

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 63, provides in part:

“SECTION 63. (1) The Standing Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment is directed to provide the counties census block equivalency files and maps necessary to assist the counties in identifying the boundaries of any subdistricts within a chancery or circuit court district.

“(2)(a) The Split Precinct Block List developed in conjunction with House Bill No. 703, 2015 Regular Session [Chapter 476, Laws of 2015], that details the portions of the partial or split precincts that are contained within a judicial subdistrict by census block number as that list is utilized to detail partial or split precincts for judicial subdistricts in this act is hereby incorporated into and shall be construed to be an integral part of this act. A partial or split precinct contained in this act is identified by an asterisk (*) following its designation within any judicial subdistrict. The Standing Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment shall file the Split Precinct Block List with the Secretary of State.

“(3)(a) This act shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes hereof and to redistrict the trial courts of this state in compliance with constitutional requirements.

“(b) It is intended that this act and the districts and subdistricts described herein completely encompass all the area within the state and all the voters in this state. It is also intended that no district shall include any of the area included within the description of any other district, and that no subdistrict shall include any of the area included within the description of any other subdistrict.

“(c)(i) If the districts or subdistricts described in this act do not carry out the purposes hereof because of: omissions; duplication; overlapping areas; erroneous nomenclature; lack of adequate maps or descriptions of political subdivisions, wards or other divisions thereof, or of their boundary lines; then the Secretary of State, at the joint request of the Lieutenant Governor and the Speaker of the House, by order, shall correct any omissions, overlaps, erroneous nomenclature or other defects in the description of the districts and subdistricts so as to accomplish the purposes and objectives of this act.

“(ii) In promulgating any order under this subsection (3), the Secretary of State, in addition to insuring that all areas of the state are completely and accurately encompassed in the districts and subdistricts, shall be guided by the following standards:

“1. Gaps in the description of any district or subdistrict shall be completed in a manner that results in a total description of the district or subdistrict that is consonant with the description of adjacent districts or subdistricts and results in complete contiguity of districts and subdistricts;

“2. In any allocation of area or correction of descriptions made pursuant to this subsection, the Secretary of State shall, consistent with the foregoing standards, preserve the contiguity and compactness of districts and subdistricts and avoid the unnecessary division of political subdivisions.

“(d) A copy of any order issued under this subsection shall be filed by the Secretary of State in his own office and in the offices of the affected commissioners of election and registrars. The Secretary of State may adopt reasonable rules regulating the procedure for applications for orders under this act and the manner of serving and filing any notice or copy of orders. Upon the filing of an order, the description of any affected district or subdistrict shall be deemed to have been corrected to the full extent as if the correction had been contained in the original description set forth in this act.

“(e) The redistricting contained in this act supersedes any prior redistricting.”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 63, was enacted with a subdivision (2)(a) but no (2)(b).

Chapter 476, Laws of 2015 amended a number of sections in Chapters 5 and 7 of Title 9. For a complete list of Code sections affected by Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, see Table B, Allocation of Acts, in the Statutory Tables Volume.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment added “provided, however, that the terms of all circuit judges elected at the regular election in November 2002 shall begin on the first day of January 2003, and their terms of office shall continue for six (6) years” at the end of the third sentence.

Cross References —

Constitutional authority for the election and term of office of circuit judges, see Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 153.

Prohibition against judge having interest in cause or being related to parties sitting in cases, see §9-1-11.

Proceedings when judge is disabled or disqualified, see §§9-1-11.

Required residence within the district, see §9-1-23.

Prohibition against practice of law, see §9-1-25.

Civil practice and procedure provisions common to courts, see §§11-1-1 et seq.

Civil practice and procedure in circuit courts generally, see §§11-7-1 et seq.

Provisions for filling vacancies in the office of circuit judge, see §23-15-849.

Violation of gambling laws by judge, see §97-33-3.

Criminal procedure generally, see §§99-1-1 et seq.

Relief under Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, see §§99-39-1 et seq.

Rules governing practice and procedure in circuit courts, see Miss. Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice 1.01 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power of successor judge taking office during termtime to vacate, etc., judgment entered by his predecessor. 11 A.L.R.2d 1117.

Power of court to impose standard of personal appearance or attire. 73 A.L.R.3d 353.

Am. Jur.

46 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Judges §§ 6-20.

CJS.

48A C.J.S., Judges §§ 20-79, 81-122, 124-135.

Law Reviews.

Case, In search of an independent judiciary: alternatives to judicial elections in Mississippi. 13 Miss. C. L. Rev. 1, Fall, 1992.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

State judicial elections come within coverage of “results test” provisions of § 2 of Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 USCS § 1973), as amended in 1982; if term “representatives” limited coverage with respect to judicial elections, limitation would exclude all claims involving judicial elections; better reading of term describes winners of representative, popular elections. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 115 L. Ed. 2d 348, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3627 (U.S. 1991).

The record need not show that the “public interest” required the interchange. Fletcher v. State, 60 Miss. 675, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1882).

§ 9-7-3. Circuit court districts and terms of court; number of judges; powers and duties of judges.

  1. The state is divided into an appropriate number of circuit court districts severally numbered and composed of the counties as set forth in the sections which follow. A court to be styled “The Circuit Court of the County of_______________ ” shall be held in each county, and within each judicial district of a county having two (2) judicial districts, at least twice a year. Court shall be held in circuit court districts consisting of a single county on the same dates state agencies and political subdivisions are open for business excluding legal holidays. The dates upon which terms shall commence and the number of days for which the terms shall continue in circuit court districts consisting of more than one (1) county shall be set by order of the circuit court judge in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section. A matter in court may extend past a term if the interest of justice so requires.
  2. An order establishing the commencement and continuation of terms of court for each of the counties within a circuit court district consisting of more than one (1) county shall be entered annually and not later than October 1 of the year immediately preceding the calendar year for which the terms of court are to become effective. Notice of the dates upon which the terms of court shall commence and the number of days for which the terms shall continue in each of the counties within a circuit court district shall be posted in the office of the circuit clerk of each county within the district and mailed to the office of the Secretary of State for publication and distribution to all Mississippi Bar members. If an order is not timely entered, the terms of court for each of the counties within any circuit court district shall remain unchanged for the next calendar year.A certified copy of any order entered under the provisions of this subsection shall, immediately upon the entry thereof, be delivered to the clerk of the board of supervisors in each of the counties within the circuit court district.
  3. The number of judges in each circuit court district shall be determined by the Legislature based upon the following criteria:
    1. The population of the district;
    2. The number of cases filed in the district;
    3. The case load of each judge in the district;
    4. The geographic area of the district;
    5. An analysis of the needs of the district by the court personnel of the district; and
    6. Any other appropriate criteria.
  4. The Judicial College of the University of Mississippi Law Center and the Administrative Office of Courts shall determine the appropriate:
    1. Specific data to be collected as a basis for applying the above criteria;
    2. Method of collecting and maintaining the specified data; and
    3. Method of assimilating the specified data.
  5. In a district having more than one (1) office of circuit judge, there shall be no distinction whatsoever in the powers, duties and emoluments of those offices except that the judge who has been for the longest time continuously a judge of that court or, should no judge have served longer in office than the others, the judge who has been for the longest time a member of The Mississippi Bar, shall be the senior judge. The senior judge shall have the right to assign causes and dockets and to set terms in districts consisting of more than one (1) county. A circuit court judge shall have the right to assign criminal matters to county court as provided in Section 9-9-21.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1394; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1934, ch. 180; Laws, 1936, ch. 227; Laws, 1936, 1st Ex. ch. 13; Laws, 1954, ch. 254, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 344, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 443, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 22; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 38; Laws, 2013, ch. 361, § 2; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 31, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 38.

The effective date of Chapter 361, Laws of 2013, which amended this section, is “from and after the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.” However, after the bill was approved, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Shelby County v. Holder (June 25, 2013), struck down the coverage formula that determined what jurisdictions are subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, so the coverage formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance under Section 5.

Because of the Shelby County decision, the United States Attorney General is not making any determinations under Section 5 on voting or election changes made by states. The Supreme Court did not strike down Section 5, so it is still in effect. For that reason, the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office submitted Chapter 361, Laws of 2013, to the United States Attorney General, in order to technically meet the requirements of Section 5 and fulfill the condition in the effective date of the bill, which will allow the bill to take effect.

By letter dated October 22, 2013, the United States Attorney General responded that he is not making determinations on the merits of any bill that is submitted under Section 5. The submission of Chapter 361 and the response from the United States Attorney General technically met the requirements of Section 5 and fulfilled the condition in the effective date of Chapter 361, so Chapter 361 became effective from and after October 22, 2013, the date of the United States Attorney General’s response letter.

This section is being set out to correct an error in the 2014 Replacement Volume. The version of the section that was to become effective upon effectuation under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, provided a proposed amendment to Section 153 of the Mississippi Constitution (by Chapter 713, Laws of 2002) was ratified by the electorate, was erroneously set out in the bound volume. The United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment of this section by Chapter 356, Laws of 2002, but the constitutional amendment was defeated by the electorate, and the amendment by Chapter 356, Laws of 2002, never became law. The section as set out above is the section as it appeared prior to the 2002 amendment.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2013 amendment added the last sentence in (5).

The 2015 amendment, in (1), substituted “and composed of” for “and comprised of” in the first sentence and deleted “From and after January 1, 1995, the dates upon which” from the beginning of the third sentence; in (2), substituted “all Mississippi Bar members” for “all members of the Mississippi Bar” in the second sentence; and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

Cross References —

Constitutional authority for dividing the state into circuit court districts, see Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 152.

Provisions for furniture, equipment, and supplies, see §§9-1-35 to9-1-37.

Chancery court districts, see §§9-5-3 et seq.

Authority of circuit court judge to assign criminal matters to county judge, see §9-9-21.

Exemption of the judiciary from provisions of open meetings law, see §25-41-3.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Circuit court must be held within the boundaries of the county. See Sections 9-7-3 and 19-3-43. 1996 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 531.

Since §9-9-35 specifically governs the assignment of cases to a county judge when justified by an overcrowded docket, controls over the more general provision of this section stating that the senior judge has the authority to assign causes and dockets. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 312.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 18 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 148, 149.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Although a judge’s conduct in entering orders regarding a defendant at the same time the senior judge was also entering orders regarding that defendant in some of the same cases did not evidence the level of civility and professionalism expected of judges, the judge’s conduct did not constitute a violation of the statute. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Byers, 757 So. 2d 961, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 27 (Miss. 2000).

There has been a vast expansion by statutory enactment of the times within which circuit judges are lawfully empowered to conduct court affairs. Although the Mississippi Constitution contemplates circuit courts being held at fixed, stated terms provided by statute, and the circuit courts of this State have had fixed terms, the legislature by various enactments-§§11-1-7 [repealed],11-7-131 to 133,11-7-121 [repealed],11-1-16, and9-7-3-has granted circuit courts wide latitude in taking official actions in vacation. Griffin v. State, 565 So. 2d 545, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 285 (Miss. 1990), limited, Presley v. State, 792 So. 2d 950, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 153 (Miss. 2001).

Where the business of a circuit court does not require that it sit for the entire length of the term as fixed by statute, the trial of a defendant’s appeal was properly dismissed for want of prosecution during the three days which the court sat, and his motion for a new trial was properly overruled. McDowell v. State, 251 Miss. 156, 168 So. 2d 658, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 336 (Miss. 1964).

§ 9-7-5. First district; composition.

The First Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:

Alcorn County;

Itawamba County;

Lee County;

Monroe County;

Pontotoc County;

Prentiss County; and

Tishomingo County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1395; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1934, ch. 180; Laws, 1936, ch. 227; Laws, 1936, 1st Ex. ch. 13; Laws, 1946, ch. 350; Laws, 1950, ch. 329; Laws, 1958, ch. 247; Laws, 1960, ch. 230; Laws, 1968, ch. 325, § 5; Laws, 1972, ch. 410, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 487, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 23; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 39; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 32, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 39.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory paragraph.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Defendant’s offense was charged to have been committed in Lee County, which was in the First Circuit Court District, Miss. Code Ann. §9-7-5, and any other circuit court in the First Circuit Court District could have accepted defendant’s guilty plea, Miss. Code Ann. §99-15-24; the Monroe County Circuit Court was in the First Circuit Court District, Miss. Code Ann. §9-7-5, and therefore the Monroe County Circuit Court was an appropriate venue for defendant’s guilty plea to the Lee County charge, and thus all of defendant’s arguments dependent on the impropriety of the venue for the plea were without merit. Garner v. State, 944 So. 2d 934, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 921 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. dismissed, 951 So. 2d 563, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 534 (Miss. 2007).

§ 9-7-7. First district; number of judges.

  1. There shall be four (4) judges for the First Circuit Court District.
  2. The four (4) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” “Place Two,” “Place Three” and “Place Four.” The judge to fill Place One must reside in Alcorn, Prentiss or Tishomingo County. The judges to fill Place Two and Place Three must reside in Itawamba, Lee, Monroe or Pontotoc County. The judge to fill Place Four may be a resident of any county in the district. Election of the four (4) offices of judge shall be by election to be held in every county within the First Circuit Court District.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1395.1; Laws, 1968, ch. 325, §§ 1-4; Laws, 1974, ch. 373, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 40; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 9; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 33, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 40.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 9.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment substituted “four (4) judges” for “three (3) judges” in (1); and added (2).

The 2015 amendment in (2), deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” at the beginning, substituted “must reside in” for “shall be a resident of” in the second and third sentences, and substituted “may be a resident” for “shall be a resident” in the next-to-last sentence.

Cross References —

Judicial review of final decisions of employee appeals board, see §25-9-132.

§ 9-7-9. Second district; composition.

The Second Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:

Hancock County;

Harrison County; and

Stone County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1396; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1932, ch. 144; Laws, 1934, ch 181; Laws, 1938, ch. 274; Laws, 1940, ch. 228; Laws, 1948, ch. 249; Laws, 1954, chs. 225, 242; Laws, 1958, ch. 265; Laws, 1962, ch. 288; Laws, 1968, ch. 326, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 352; Laws, 1976, ch. 313; Laws, 1979, ch. 332; Laws, 1983, ch. 367, ch. 499, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 24; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 41; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 34, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 41.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory paragraph.

§ 9-7-11. Second district; number and election of judges.

  1. There shall be four (4) judges for the Second Circuit Court District.
  2. The four (4) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” “Place Two,” “Place Three” and “Place Four.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1396.1; Laws, 1968, ch. 326, §§ 2-4; Laws, 1971, ch. 328, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 42; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 35, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 42.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment deleted “circuit” preceding “judges for the Second Circuit Court District” in (1); and deleted “For the purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of (2).

§ 9-7-13. Third district; composition.

The Third Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:

Benton County;

Calhoun County;

Chickasaw County;

Lafayette County;

Marshall County;

Tippah County; and

Union County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1397; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1944, ch. 311; Laws, 1964, ch. 310; Laws, 1964, ch. 311; Laws, 1971, ch. 368, § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 475, § 1; Laws, 1980, ch 432, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 25; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 43; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 36, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1975, ch. 475, § 2, effective from and after September 1, 1975, provides as follows:

“SECTION 2. All summonses, subpoenas, citations, writs, process and processes of every nature and kind whatsoever which have been heretofore lawfully issued and made returnable to a term of court the date of which is changed by this act shall be legal and valid precisely as if they were made returnable to the terms and dates herein fixed; provided, however, that in all instances where the time for appearance or pleading is shortened by the changes of court terms herein made, such appearance or pleading shall be due on the first day of the next succeeding term of court.”

Laws of 1980, ch. 432, § 2 effective from and after July 1, 1980, provides as follows:

“SECTION 2. All summonses, subpoenas, citations, writs, process and processes of every nature and kind whatsoever which have been heretofore lawfully issued and made returnable to a term of court the date of which is changed by this act shall be legal and valid precisely as if they were made returnable to the terms and dates herein fixed; provided, however, that in all instances where the time for appearance or pleading is shortened by the changes of court terms herein made, such appearance or pleading shall be due on the first day of the next succeeding term of court.”

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 43.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory paragraph.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Order in effect adjourning regular term of circuit court of Calhoun County to later day, pursuant to which sheriff and clerk adjourned court, held valid. Mississippi & S. V. R. Co. v. Brown, 160 Miss. 123, 132 So. 556, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1931).

Where circuit court of Lafayette County undertook to hold special term of court for criminal business during the time provided by this section to be devoted exclusively to civil business and in which no grand jury is to be impaneled, the impaneling and proceedings of the grand jury thereat were a nullity and indictment of defendant for murder was a nullity. Williams v. State, 156 Miss. 346, 126 So. 40, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 181 (Miss. 1930).

§ 9-7-14. Third district; number of judges.

  1. There shall be three (3) judges for the Third Circuit Court District.
  2. The three (3) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” “Place Two” and “Place Three.” The judge to fill “Place One” must be a resident of Calhoun, Chickasaw, Lafayette or Union County. The judge to fill “Place Two” must be a resident of Benton, Marshall or Tippah County. The judge to fill “Place Three” may be a resident of any county in the district.

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 474, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 44; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 10; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 37, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 44.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 10.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment substituted “three (3) judges” for “two (2) judges” in (1); and added (2).

The 2015 amendment deleted “circuit” preceding “judges for the Third Circuit Court District” in (1); and in (2), deleted “For the purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning, substituted “must be a resident” for “shall be a resident” in the second and third sentences, substituted “County” for “Counties” at the end of the second sentence, and substituted “may be a resident” for “shall be a resident” in the last sentence.

§ 9-7-15. Fourth district; composition; divisions; local contributions for support of court.

  1. The Fourth Circuit Court District shall be composed of the following counties:
    1. Leflore County;
    2. Sunflower County; and
    3. Washington County.
  2. The Fourth Circuit Court District shall be divided into four (4) subdistricts as follows:
    1. Subdistrict 4-1 shall consist of the following precincts in the following counties:
      1. Leflore County: Minter City, North Greenwood, Money, Northeast Greenwood, Schlater, West Greenwood, Mississippi Valley State University and Southeast Greenwood Precincts; and
      2. Sunflower County: Ruleville, Rome, Sunflower Plantation, Drew, Doddsville, Boyer-Linn, Fairview-Hale and Ruleville North Precincts.
    2. Subdistrict 4-2 shall consist of the following precincts in the following counties:
      1. Sunflower County: Indianola 1, Sunflower, Indianola 3 North, Indianola 3 South and Indianola 3 Northeast Precincts; and
      2. Washington County: Extension Building, Faith Lutheran Church, American Legion, Metcalfe City Hall, Elks Club, Leland Health Department Clinic, Leland Light and Water Plant and Greenville Industrial College Precincts.
    3. Subdistrict 4-3 shall consist of the following precincts in the following counties:
      1. Leflore County: East Greenwood Sub-A, East Greenwood Sub-B, Central Greenwood, North Itta Bena, South Itta Bena, Southwest Greenwood, Rising Sun, Sidon, Morgan City, Swiftown and South Greenwood Precincts;
      2. Sunflower County: Moorhead, Inverness, Indianola 2 West and Indianola 2 East Precincts; and
      3. Washington County: Arcola City Hall, Hollandale City Hall, Darlove Baptist Church and Mangelardi Bourbon Store Precincts.
    4. Subdistrict 4-4 shall consist of the following precincts in Washington County: St. James Episcopal Church, Swiftwater Baptist Church, Glen Allan Health Clinic, Italian Club, Ward’s Recreation Center, Buster Brown Community Center, Avon Health Center, Kapco Company, Brent Center, William Percy Library and Grace Methodist Church Precincts.
  3. The local contributions required for the maintenance of the Fourth Circuit Court District shall be paid on a pro rata basis each by Leflore, Sunflower and Washington Counties.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1398; Laws, 1931, Ex. ch. 37; Laws, 1932, ch. 214; Laws, 1934, ch. 182; Laws, 1942, ch. 314; Laws, 1944, ch. 312; Laws, 1959, Ex. ch. 25; Laws, 1964, ch. 312; Laws, 1968, ch. 327, § 2; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 3; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 26; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 45, eff from and after September 6, 1994 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 45.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Validity of term of court.

1. In general.

The assumption is that the legislature was aware of the rule declared by the supreme court that where there is but one judge of a judicial district, a term held in one county or part of the district during the time fixed by law for holding a term in another county or part of the district is illegal and the proceedings thereat will not be sustained, and that the legislature did not intent to so arrange the terms in the fourth district that the time of a term in any county in the district would overlap upon the term in any other county therein. Candate v. State, 196 Miss. 711, 18 So. 2d 441, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1944).

By this section the legislature intended to fix, and did fix, for Holmes county a term of four successive weeks beginning each on the first Monday in April and in October. Candate v. State, 196 Miss. 711, 18 So. 2d 441, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1944).

Inasmuch as order made on Tuesday, October 5, 1943, for adjournment or recess to October 18 was to a day within the term, the recess order was expressly authorized by Code 1942 § 1649, and inasmuch as the day to which adjournment or recess had been taken was within the term, the judge was authorized to sign the minutes of October 5th on or during the day next in session, which was on October 18, or on any remaining day in session during the four weeks of the term. Candate v. State, 196 Miss. 711, 18 So. 2d 441, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1944).

Adjournment of the circuit court of Sunflower County, convened in accordance with this section, without trial on felony charge pursuant to indictment returned during term, was not a violation of constitutional right of speedy trial, in that statute (§ 1494, Code 1906), requiring trial of indictments at first term unless good cause shown for continuance, did not prevent subsequent trial within reasonable limits without showing good cause. Heard v. Clark, 156 Miss. 355, 126 So. 43, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 182 (Miss. 1930).

2. Validity of term of court.

The division of time between civil and criminal business as to the circuit court in Leflore County is for convenience in the administration of the business of the court, and does not deprive court of jurisdiction to enter default judgment in civil case during that portion of term allotted for criminal business. Strain v. Gayden, 197 Miss. 353, 20 So. 2d 697, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 295 (Miss. 1945).

Where court in Holmes county convened on first Monday in October and order adjourning until following day was entered and signed by the presiding judge, and at the close of the following day order was made adjourning court until October 18, a day within the term, but the judge did not sign the minutes containing such order on that day, validity of the term and court’s right to proceed on later date to conviction in criminal case could not be questioned, since it would be presumed that the judge signed the minutes on the day to which adjournment was taken, and on each succeeding day throughout the term, so long as in session, including those on the last day. Candate v. State, 196 Miss. 711, 18 So. 2d 441, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1944).

§ 9-7-17. Fourth district; number and election of judges.

There shall be four (4) circuit judges for the Fourth Circuit Court District. One (1) circuit judge shall be elected from each subdistrict.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1398.1; Laws, 1968, ch. 327, § 1; Laws, 1978, ch. 355, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 48; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 46, eff from and after September 6, 1994 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 46.

§ 9-7-18. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1994, ch 564, § 101, eff from and after January 1, 1995.

[Laws, 1989, ch. 378, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1989.].

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the repeal of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564.

Former §9-7-18 was entitled: Creation of office of magistrate of the circuit court of the fourth circuit court district.

§ 9-7-19. Fifth district; composition.

The Fifth Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:

Attala County;

Carroll County;

Choctaw County;

Grenada County;

Montgomery County;

Webster County; and

Winston County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1399; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1934, ch. 394; Laws, 1938, ch. 275; Laws, 1940, ch. 226; Laws, 1962, chs. 289, 290; Laws, 1966, ch. 338, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1973, ch. 364, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 397, § 2; Laws, 1978, ch. 324, § 2; Laws, 1979, ch. 385; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 4; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 27; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 47; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 38, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 47.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory paragraph.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In a prosecution for murder defendant was properly arraigned in vacation, where the arraignment was publicly conducted in the place designated for holding court. Crossley v. State, 420 So. 2d 1376, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2253 (Miss. 1982).

§ 9-7-20. Fifth district; number of judges.

  1. There shall be two (2) judges for the Fifth Circuit Court District.
  2. The two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One” and “Place Two.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 324, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 49; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 48; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 11, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 39, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 48.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 11.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment added (2).

The 2015 amendment deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” at the beginning of (2).

§ 9-7-21. Sixth district; composition; divisions; number and election of judges.

  1. The Sixth Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Adams County;
    2. Amite County;
    3. Franklin County; and
    4. Wilkinson County.
  2. The Sixth Circuit Court District shall be divided into two (2) subdistricts as follows:
    1. Subdistrict 6-1 shall consist of Wilkinson County and the following precincts in the following counties:
      1. Adams County: Airport, By-Pass Fire Station, Carpenter, Concord*, Courthouse*, Duncan Park*, Foster Mound, Maryland*, Northside School, Pine Ridge, Thompson and Washington*; and
      2. Amite County: Ariel, Berwick, Crosby, East Centreville, East Gloster*, Gloster*, Homochitto, South Liberty* and Street.
    2. Subdistrict 6-2 shall consist of Franklin County and the following precincts in the following counties:
      1. Adams County: Beau Pre, Bellemont, Concord*, Convention Center, Courthouse*, Duncan Park*, Kingston, Liberty Park, Maryland*, Morgantown, Oakland, Palestine and Washington*; and
      2. Amite County: Amite River, East Fork, East Gloster*, East Liberty, Gloster*, Liberty, New Zion, Oneil, Riceville, Smithdale, South Liberty*, Tangipahoa, Tickfaw, Walls and Zion Hills.
  3. There shall be two (2) judges for the Sixth Circuit Court District. The two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct. One (1) judge shall be elected from each subdistrict.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1400; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1942, ch. 310; Laws, 1958, ch. 253; Laws, 1979, ch. 424; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 5; Laws, 1984, ch. 413; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 28; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 49; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 40, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 49.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 62 provides:

“SECTION 62. The boundaries of the precincts described in Sections 9-5-17 (Fifth Chancery Court District), 9-5-31, (Ninth Chancery Court District), 95-5-37 (Eleventh Chancery District), 9-5-43 (Fourteenth Chancery Court District), 9-5-51 (Seventeenth Chancery Court District), 9-7-21 (Sixth Circuit Court District), 9-7-23 (Seventh Circuit Court District), 9-7-29 (Ninth Circuit Court District) and 9-7-33 (Eleventh Circuit Court District), Mississippi Code of 1972, shall be the boundaries of the precincts as those boundaries are contained in the Census Bureau’s 2010 TIGER/Line Shapefiles released in November 2010. Partial or split precincts are identified by an asterisk (*).”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in (1); in (2), rewrote (a)(i), which read: “Adams County: Courthouse, By-Pass Fire Station, Cloverdale, Carpenter No. 1, Concord, Maryland Heights, Northside School, Thompson, Pine Ridge, Airport and Anchorage Precincts; and,” rewrote (a)(ii), which read: “Amite County: Gloster, Ariel, Homochitto, Crosby, East Centreville, Street and Berwick Precincts,” rewrote (b), which read: “Subdistrict 6-2 shall consist of Franklin County, all of Amite County except Gloster, Ariel, Homochitto, Crosby, East Centreville, Street and Berwick Precincts and the following precincts in Adams County: Bellemont, Duncan Park, Beau Pre, Kingston, Liberty Park, Palestine, Morgantown, Oakland and Washington Precincts”; and in (3), deleted “circuit” preceding “judges” in the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

Cross References —

Administrative Office of Courts to assist court clerks, see §9-21-3.

§ 9-7-23. Seventh district; composition; divisions.

  1. The Seventh Circuit Court District shall be Hinds County.
  2. The Seventh Circuit Court District shall be divided into four (4) subdistricts in Hinds County as follows:
    1. Subdistrict 7-1 shall consist of the following precincts in Hinds County: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 44, 45, 46, 47, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 92, 93, 96 and 97.
    2. Subdistrict 7-2 shall consist of the following precincts in Hinds County: 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30 , 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, Brownsville, Cynthia, Pocahontas and Tinnin.
    3. Subdistrict 7-3 shall consist of the following precincts in Hinds County: 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 31, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 , 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 86, 89, and Jackson State.
    4. Subdistrict 7-4 shall consist of the following precincts in Hinds County: 87, 88, 90 , 91, 94, 95, Bolton, Byram 1, Byram 2, Cayuga, Chapel Hill, Clinton 1, Clinton 2, Clinton 3, Clinton 4, Clinton 5, Clinton 6, Dry Grove, Edwards, Learned, Old Byram, Pinehaven, Raymond 1, Raymond 2, Spring Ridge, St. Thomas, Terry, Utica 1 and Utica 2.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1401; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1932, ch. 146; Laws, 1954, Ex. Sess. ch. 17, § 1; Laws, 1966, ch. 339, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 344, § 8; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 29; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 50; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 41, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 50.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 62 provides:

“SECTION 62. The boundaries of the precincts described in Sections 9-5-17 (Fifth Chancery Court District), 9-5-31, (Ninth Chancery Court District), 95-5-37 (Eleventh Chancery District), 9-5-43 (Fourteenth Chancery Court District), 9-5-51 (Seventeenth Chancery Court District), 9-7-21 (Sixth Circuit Court District), 9-7-23 (Seventh Circuit Court District), 9-7-29 (Ninth Circuit Court District) and 9-7-33 (Eleventh Circuit Court District), Mississippi Code of 1972, shall be the boundaries of the precincts as those boundaries are contained in the Census Bureau’s 2010 TIGER/Line Shapefiles released in November 2010. Partial or split precincts are identified by an asterisk (*).”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment deleted “comprised of” preceding ”Hinds County“ in (1); in (2), in (a), placed the precincts in numerical order, in (b), placed the precincts in numerical order and deleted “Precincts” from the end, in (c), placed the precincts in numerical order and added “and Jackson State” at the end, and in (d), placed the precincts in numerical and alphabetical order, and inserted “1, Byram 2” following “Byram”; and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

Cross References —

Jurisdiction of circuit court of first judicial district of Hinds County over violations of Medicaid Fraud Control Act, see §43-13-223.

§ 9-7-25. Seventh district; number and election of judges; powers and duties of judges.

  1. There shall be four (4) circuit judges for the Seventh Circuit Court District. One (1) judge shall be elected from each subdistrict.
  2. While there shall be no limitation whatsoever upon the powers and duties of the said judges other than as cast upon them by the Constitution and laws of this state, the court in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, in the discretion of the senior circuit judge, may be divided into civil and criminal divisions as a matter of convenience, by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1414.3; Laws, 1954 Ex. ch. 17, §§ 2-5 (¶¶ 1-4); Laws, 1964, ch. 319, §§ 1-4 (¶¶ 1-4); Laws, 1982, ch. 421; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 50; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 51, eff from and after September 6, 1994 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 51.

Cross References —

Jurisdiction of first judicial district of Hinds County to grant injunctive relief and appoint receivers in matters relating to legal expense insurance plans, see §83-49-31.

§ 9-7-27. Eighth district; composition.

  1. The Eighth Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Leake County;
    2. Neshoba County;
    3. Newton County; and
    4. Scott County.
  2. There shall be two (2) judges for the Eighth Circuit Court District.
  3. The two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One” and “Place Two.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1402; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1934, ch. 183; Laws, 1936, ch. 228; Laws, 1938, ch. 276; Laws, 1942, ch. 311; Laws, 1954, ch. 244; Laws, 1962, ch. 291; Laws, 1966, ch. 340, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 344, § 9; Laws, 1973, ch. 356, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 319; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 6; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 30; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 52; Laws, 1997, ch. 378, § 1; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 42, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Section 52 of Chapter 564, Laws of 1994.

On October 21, 1997, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the amendment of this section by Section 1 of Chapter 378, Laws of 1997.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in (1); deleted the former last sentence in (2), which read: “The initial term for the second judgeship created under this section shall begin on the effective date of Laws, 1997, Ch. 378, and shall end at the same time as for circuit judges generally”; and deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of (3).

§ 9-7-29. Ninth district; composition; divisions.

  1. The Ninth Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Issaquena County;
    2. Sharkey County; and
    3. Warren County.
  2. The Ninth Circuit Court District shall be divided into two (2) subdistricts as follows:
    1. Subdistrict 9-1 shall consist of Issaquena County, Sharkey County and the following precincts in Warren County: 3-61 Store*, American Legion Hall, Auditorium, Brunswick, Cedar Grove*, Kings*, Number 7 Fire Station*, St. Aloysius and Vicksburg Junior High School*.
    2. Subdistrict 9-2 shall consist of the following precincts in Warren County: 3-61 Store*, Beechwood, Bovina, Cedar Grove*, Culkin, Elks Lodge, Goodrum, Jett, Kings*, Moose Lodge, Number 7 Fire Station*, Oak Ridge, Plumbers Hall, Redwood, Tingleville, Vicksburg Junior High School*, YMCA and Yokena.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1403; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1938, ch. 277; Laws, 1966, ch. 341, § 1; Laws, 1978, ch. 365, § 2; Laws, 1979, ch. 418; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 7; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 31; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 53; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 43, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 53.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 62 provides:

“SECTION 62. The boundaries of the precincts described in Sections 9-5-17 (Fifth Chancery Court District), 9-5-31, (Ninth Chancery Court District), 95-5-37 (Eleventh Chancery District), 9-5-43 (Fourteenth Chancery Court District), 9-5-51 (Seventeenth Chancery Court District), 9-7-21 (Sixth Circuit Court District), 9-7-23 (Seventh Circuit Court District), 9-7-29 (Ninth Circuit Court District) and 9-7-33 (Eleventh Circuit Court District), Mississippi Code of 1972, shall be the boundaries of the precincts as those boundaries are contained in the Census Bureau’s 2010 TIGER/Line Shapefiles released in November 2010. Partial or split precincts are identified by an asterisk (*).”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for ”shall be comprised” in (1); and in (2), rewrote (a), which read: “Subdistrict 9-1 shall consist of Issaquena County, Sharkey County and the following precincts in Warren County: St. Aloysius, Kings, Cedar Grove, Waltersville, Auditorium, Brunswick, Vicksburg Junior High School and American Legion Precincts,” and rewrote (b), which read: “Subdistrict 9-2 shall consist of the following precincts in Warren County: Oak Ridge, Bovina, Culkin, Redwood, Number 7 Firestation, Jett, Elks Lodge, Goodrum, Yokena, Plumbers Hall, Y.M.C.A., Moose Lodge and Tingleville Precincts.”

§ 9-7-30. Ninth district; number and election of judges.

There shall be two (2) judges for the Ninth Circuit Court District. One (1) judge shall be elected from each subdistrict.

HISTORY: Codes, 1978, ch. 365, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 51; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 54, eff from and after September 6, 1994 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 54.

§ 9-7-31. Tenth district; composition.

The Tenth Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:

Clarke County;

Kemper County;

Lauderdale County; and

Wayne County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1404; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1934, ch. 184; Laws, 1950, ch. 354; Laws, 1962, ch. 292; Laws, 1964, ch. 313; Laws, 1972, ch. 344, § 1; Laws, 1978, ch. 360, § 3; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 8; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 32; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 55; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 44, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 55.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory language.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where circuit court of Wayne County, by reason of the prevalence of an epidemic, adjourned the court from the first Monday until the third Monday of January, and thereafter while the court was in session extended the regular term, trial and conviction of defendant for possessing still during week of extended term was legal. Perry v. State, 154 Miss. 459, 122 So. 744, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 164 (Miss. 1929).

Chapter 130, Laws 1926, entitled an act to make the terms of the several circuit courts for the transaction of criminal business perpetual, is amended by this section as far as Lauderdale County is concerned (Chapter 140, Laws 1926), and one term of court fixed by law will terminate at the beginning of another term fixed by law. Walton v. State, 147 Miss. 851, 112 So. 790, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 311 (Miss. 1927).

An indictment found by a grand jury impaneled at a former term of court, where another term of court has intervened, is without authority to act, and an indictment found by such grand jury thereat is void; the grand jury ceases to be a legal body when a subsequent term of court begins. Walton v. State, 147 Miss. 851, 112 So. 790, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 311 (Miss. 1927).

§ 9-7-32. Tenth district; number of judges.

  1. There shall be two (2) judges for the Tenth Circuit Court District.
  2. The two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One” and “Place Two.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 360, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 52; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 56; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 12, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 45, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 56.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 12.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment added (2).

The 2015 amendment deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of (2).

§ 9-7-33. Eleventh district; composition; divisions.

  1. The Eleventh Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Bolivar County;
    2. Coahoma County;
    3. Quitman County; and
    4. Tunica County.
  2. The Eleventh Circuit Court District shall be divided into three (3) subdistricts as follows:
    1. Subdistrict 11-1 shall consist of the following precincts from the following counties:
      1. Bolivar County: Benoit, Beulah, Boyle, Choctaw, Cleveland Courthouse, East Central Cleveland*, East Cleveland*, East Rosedale, Gunnison, Longshot, North Cleveland, Northwest Cleveland*, Pace, Scott, Shaw, Skene, South Cleveland*, Stringtown, West Central Cleveland, West Cleveland and West Rosedale; and
      2. Coahoma County: Bobo, Clarksdale 2-4*, Clarksdale 5-4*, Farrell*, Rena Lara and Sherard*.
    2. Subdistrict 11-2 shall consist of the following precincts from the following counties:
      1. Bolivar County: Cleveland Eastgate, Duncan/Alligator, East Central Cleveland*, East Cleveland*, Merigold, Mound Bayou, Northwest Cleveland*, Renova, Shelby, South Cleveland* and Winstonville;
      2. Coahoma County: Cagle Crossing, Clarksdale 1-4*, Clarksdale 3-3, Clarksdale 3-4, Clarksdale 4-2, Clarksdale 4-3, Dublin and Roundaway; and
      3. Quitman County: Belen*, District 3 South*, Lambert, Northwest Marks, Southwest Marks and West Lambert.
    3. Subdistricts 11-3 shall consist of Tunica County and the following precincts in the following counties:
      1. Coahoma County: Clarksdale 1-4*, Clarksdale 2-4*, Clarksdale 5-4*, Coahoma, Farrell*, Friar’s Point, Jonestown, Lula, Lyon and Sherard*; and
      2. Quitman County: Belen*, Crenshaw, Crowder, Darling, District 3 North, District 3 South* and Sledge.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1405; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1940, ch. 227; Laws, 1942, ch. 315; Laws, 1950, ch. 334; Laws, 1952, ch. 233; Laws, 1956, ch. 225; Laws, 1964, ch. 748; Laws, 1968, ch. 310, § 1; Laws, 1973, ch. 392, § 1; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 9; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 33; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 57; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 46, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 57.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 62 provides:

“SECTION 62. The boundaries of the precincts described in Sections 9-5-17 (Fifth Chancery Court District), 9-5-31, (Ninth Chancery Court District), 95-5-37 (Eleventh Chancery District), 9-5-43 (Fourteenth Chancery Court District), 9-5-51 (Seventeenth Chancery Court District), 9-7-21 (Sixth Circuit Court District), 9-7-23 (Seventh Circuit Court District), 9-7-29 (Ninth Circuit Court District) and 9-7-33 (Eleventh Circuit Court District), Mississippi Code of 1972, shall be the boundaries of the precincts as those boundaries are contained in the Census Bureau’s 2010 TIGER/Line Shapefiles released in November 2010. Partial or split precincts are identified by an asterisk (*).”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in (1); and in (2), rewrote (a)(i) and (ii), which read: “(i) Bolivar County: Gunnison, Rosedale, Pace, Benoit, Scott, East-Central Cleveland, Cleveland Courthouse, Central Cleveland, West Cleveland, Longshot, North Cleveland, Skene, Shaw, Boyle and Stringtown Precincts; and (ii) Coahoma County: Sherard, Clarksdale 2-4, Rena Lara, and Bobo Precincts”; rewrote (b)(i) through (iii), which read: “(i) Bolivar County: Alligator-Duncan, Shelby, Mound Bayou, Winstonville, Merigold, and East Cleveland Precincts; (ii) Coahoma County: Clarksdale 4-2, Mattson, Clarksdale 3-3, Cagle Crossing and Roundway Precincts; and (iii) Quitman County: North Marks, West Marks, Sabino, West Lambert, Lambert, and Mattie Precincts”; and rewrote (c)(i) and (ii), which read: “(i) Coahoma County: Lula, Farrell, Friars Point, Lyon, Clarksdale 1-4, Clarksdale 1-4A, Clarksdale 1-4B, Clarksdale 1-4C, Clarksdale 1-4D, Clarksdale 1-4E, Clarksdale 1-4F, Clarksdale 2-4A, Clarksdale 2-4B, Clarksdale 2-4C, Clarksdale 3-3A, Clarksdale 3-3B, Clarksdale 3-3C, Clarksdale 3-3D, Clarksdale 3-3E, Clarksdale 3-3F, Clarksdale 4-2A, Clarksdale 5-4, Clarksdale 5-4A, Clarksdale 5-4B, Coahoma and Jonestown Precincts; and (ii) Quitman County: Crenshaw, Sledge, Birdie Darling, Belen, Marks, and Crowder Precincts.”

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where the judge of the circuit court of Bolivar County, Second District, on April 29, signed an order extending the term from May 2nd to May 9th, and on May 9th signed another order for a second extension to May 23rd but the minutes were not signed by the judge until the latter part of the second extended term, a judgment of conviction entered during the first extended term was invalid. Patton v. State, 194 Miss. 757, 12 So. 2d 383, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1943).

Where circuit judge of Quitman County failed to sign any of minutes until after expiration of term, record did not legally show that any term of circuit court had been held requiring reversal of conviction which was had during such term. Williams v. State, 179 Miss. 419, 174 So. 581, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1937).

§ 9-7-34. Eleventh district; number and election of judges.

There shall be three (3) judges for the Eleventh Circuit Court District. One (1) judge shall be elected from each subdistrict.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 420; Laws, 1983, ch. 442, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 53; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 58, eff from and after September 6, 1994 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 58.

§ 9-7-35. Twelfth district; composition.

  1. The Twelfth Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Forrest County; and
    2. Perry County.
  2. There shall be two (2) judges for the Twelfth Circuit Court District. The two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One” and “Place Two.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1406; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1954, ch. 254, § 5; Laws, 1956, chs. 226, 227; Laws, 1958, ch. 243; Laws, 1964, chs. 315, 316; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 10; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 34; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 59; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 47, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 59.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 64, provides:

“SECTION 64. Candidates for new chancellorships and circuit judgeships created by this act shall run for those offices in a special election to be conducted in conjunction with the general election of November 2015. Candidates shall file the intent to be a candidate not later than 5:00 p.m. on June 1, 2015, and otherwise shall qualify as provided by Section 23-15-977, and shall run for office and be elected as provided in Sections 23-15-974 through 23-15-985 (Nonpartisan Judicial Election Act). The judges elected shall serve a three-year term to begin January 1, 2016, and the terms of those offices shall thereafter be as is provided for chancellors and circuit judges generally.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment provided for two versions of the section, in the first version effective until January 1, 2016, substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised,” and in the introductory language, in the second version, effective from and after January 1, 2016, substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in (1), and added (2).

§ 9-7-37. Thirteenth district; composition.

  1. The Thirteenth Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Covington County;
    2. Jasper County;
    3. Simpson County; and
    4. Smith County.
  2. There shall be two (2) judges for the Thirteenth Circuit Court District. The two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One” and “Place Two.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1407; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1934, ch. 185; Laws, 1962, ch. 293; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 11; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 35; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 60; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 48, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 60.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 64, provides:

“SECTION 64. Candidates for new chancellorships and circuit judgeships created by this act shall run for those offices in a special election to be conducted in conjunction with the general election of November 2015. Candidates shall file the intent to be a candidate not later than 5:00 p.m. on June 1, 2015, and otherwise shall qualify as provided by Section 23-15-977, and shall run for office and be elected as provided in Sections 23-15-974 through 23-15-985 (Nonpartisan Judicial Election Act). The judges elected shall serve a three-year term to begin January 1, 2016, and the terms of those offices shall thereafter be as is provided for chancellors and circuit judges generally.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment provided for two versions of the section, in the first version effective until January 1, 2016, substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised”, in the introductory language, in the second version, effective from and after January 1, 2016, substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised,” in (1); and added (2).

§ 9-7-39. Fourteenth district; composition; number of judges.

  1. The Fourteenth Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. Lincoln County;
    2. Pike County; and
    3. Walthall County.
    1. There shall be two (2) judges for the Fourteenth Circuit Court District.
    2. The two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One” and “Place Two.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1408; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1940, ch. 225; Laws, 1971, ch. 459; Laws, 1973, ch. 360, § 1; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 12; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 36; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 61; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 13, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 49, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 61.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 13.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment added (2)(b).

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised,” in (1); and deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of (2)(b).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Statute (Chapter 225 Laws of 1940) amending sections dealing with terms of court in Lincoln County by setting out the sections thereof intended to be amended, was not invalid for failure to bring forward the whole of the chapter in which such section was contained. Fugler v. State, 192 Miss. 775, 7 So. 2d 873, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 72 (Miss. 1942).

§ 9-7-41. Fifteenth district; composition.

The Fifteenth Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:

Jefferson Davis County;

Lamar County;

Lawrence County;

Marion County; and

Pearl River County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1409; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1932, ch. 149; Laws, 1950, ch. 335; Laws, 1952, ch. 234; Laws, 1958, ch. 286; Laws, 1960, ch. 231; Laws, 1964, ch. 317; Laws, 1970, ch. 330, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 322; Laws, 1975, ch. 479; Laws, 1976, ch. 336; Laws, 1977, ch. 319; Laws, 1979, ch. 308; Laws, 1981, ch. 493, § 1; Laws, 1982, chs. 417, § 1; 461; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 13; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 37; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 62; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 50, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 62.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory language.

§ 9-7-42. Fifteenth district; number of judges.

  1. There shall be three (3) judges for the Fifteenth Circuit Court District.
  2. The three (3) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” “Place Two,” and “Place Three.” The judge to fill Place One must be a resident of Jefferson Davis, Lamar, Lawrence or Marion County. The judge to fill Place Two may be a resident of any county in the district. The judge to fill Place Three must be a resident of Pearl River County.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 417, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 54; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 63; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 14, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 51, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 63.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 14.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 64, provides:

“SECTION 64. Candidates for new chancellorships and circuit judgeships created by this act shall run for those offices in a special election to be conducted in conjunction with the general election of November 2015. Candidates shall file the intent to be a candidate not later than 5:00 p.m. on June 1, 2015, and otherwise shall qualify as provided by Section 23-15-977, and shall run for office and be elected as provided in Sections 23-15-974 through 23-15-985 (Nonpartisan Judicial Election Act). The judges elected shall serve a three-year term to begin January 1, 2016, and the terms of those offices shall thereafter be as is provided for chancellors and circuit judges generally.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment added (2).

The 2015 amendment provided for two versions of the section, and in the second version, effective from and after January 1, 2016, substituted “three (3)” for “two (2)” in (1); in (2), deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” at the beginning, substituted “three (3)” for “two (2)” and added “and Place Three” at the end of the first sentence, and added the last three sentences.

Cross References —

Court terms for fifteenth district, see §9-7-41.

§ 9-7-43. Sixteenth district; composition.

The Sixteenth Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:

Clay County;

Lowndes County;

Noxubee County; and

Oktibbeha County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1410; Laws, 1931, ch. 37; Laws, 1934, ch. 186; Laws, 1936, ch. 229; Laws, 1942, ch. 308; Laws, 1950, ch. 361; Laws, 1955, Ex. ch. 37; Laws, 1958, chs. 270, 278; Laws, 1960, ch. 232; Laws, 1962, ch. 294, §§ 1-5; Laws, 1966, ch. 343, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 303, § 1; Laws, 1978, ch. 360, § 4; Laws, 1978, ch. 482, § 1; Laws, 1980, ch. 351; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 14; Laws, 1983, 1st Ex Sess ch. 5; Laws, 1984, ch. 360, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 38; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 64; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 52, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 64.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory paragraph.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Circuit Court of Kemper County had jurisdiction of murder prosecution, where, before expiration of term, order was entered extending term for two weeks, grand jury was recalled after beginning of extended portion of term, returned indictment, and case was tried during extended portion of term, since extension order did not limit court’s power during extended portion of term to dealing with such matters only as were before court when order was entered. Brown v. State, 173 Miss. 563, 161 So. 465 (Miss. 1935), rev'd, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682, 1936 U.S. LEXIS 527 (U.S. 1936).

§ 9-7-44. Sixteenth district; number of judges.

  1. There shall be three (3) judges for the Sixteenth Circuit Court District.
  2. The three (3) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” “Place Two” and “Place Three.” The judge to fill Place One must be a resident of Lowndes County. The judge to fill Place Two must be a resident of Oktibbeha County. The judge to fill Place Three must be a resident of either Clay or Noxubee County. Election of the three (3) offices of judge shall be by election to be held in every county within the Sixteenth Circuit Court District.

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 344; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 65; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 15, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 53, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the introductory language of the second tier of the section. The word “Effective ” was changed to “From.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its July 13, 2009, meeting.

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 65.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 15.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment provided for versions of the section effective from January 1, 2007 until January 1, 2011, and effective from and after January 1, 2011; in the version effective until January 1, 2011, added (2); and in the version effective from and after January 1, 2011, substituted “three (3) judges” for “two (2) judges” in (1); and added (2).

The 2015 amendment, in (2), deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning, and substituted “must be a resident” for “shall be a resident” everywhere it appears.

§ 9-7-45. Seventeenth district; composition; divisions.

The Seventeenth Circuit Court District shall be divided into two (2) subdistricts as follows:

Subdistrict 17-1 shall be composed of DeSoto County; and

Subdistrict 17-2 shall be composed of Panola County, Tallahatchie County, Tate County and Yalobusha County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 473; 1942, § 1411; Laws, 1932, ch. 147; Laws, 1968, ch. 329, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 331, § 1; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 15; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 39; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 66; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 54, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 66.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “shall be composed” for “shall consist of” in (a) and (b).

§ 9-7-46. Seventeenth district; number and election of judges.

  1. There shall be four (4) circuit judges for the Seventeenth Circuit Court District.
  2. For the purpose of appointment and election, the four (4)judge ships shall be separate and distinct, and one (1) judge shall be elected from Subdistrict 17-1, two (2) judges shall be elected from Subdistrict 17-2, and one (1) judge shall be elected from every county in the district. The two (2) judgeships in Subdistrict 17-2 shall be denominated as “Place One” and “Place Two,” the judgeship in Subdistrict 17-1 shall be denominated as “Place Three,” and the at-large judgeship shall be denominated as “Place Four.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 413; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 55; Laws, 1994, ch 564, § 67; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 16, eff Jan. 1, 2007.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the introductory language of the second tier of the section. The word “Effective” was changed to “From..” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its July 13, 2009, meeting.

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 67.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 16.

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment provided for versions of the section effective from January 1, 2007 until January 1, 2011, and effective from and after January 1, 2011; in the version effective until January 1, 2011, added the second and third sentences in (2); and in the version effective from and after January 1, 2011, substituted “four (4) judges” for “three (3) judges” in (1); and rewrote (2).

§ 9-7-47. Eighteenth district; composition.

The Eighteenth Circuit Court District shall be Jones County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1411.5; Laws, 1954, ch. 254, §§ 2-4, 7; Laws, 1962, ch. 295; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 16; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 40; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 68, eff from and after September 6, 1994 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment of this section).

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the source line of this section. The words “ch. 254” were substituted for “ch. 250” following “Laws, 1954.”

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 68.

Cross References —

Extension into term of court in other county of same district, see §9-1-5.

§ 9-7-49. Nineteenth district; composition; local contributions for support of court.

  1. The Nineteenth Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:
    1. George County;
    2. Greene County; and
    3. Jackson County.
  2. The local contribution required for the maintenance of the Nineteenth Circuit Court District shall not exceed, as to George and Greene Counties, the amount of their present local contribution in their present respective circuit court districts, and any excess shall be paid by Jackson County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1411.7; Laws, 1962, ch. 296, §§ 1-8; Laws, 1964, ch. 318, §§ 1, 2, 4 (¶¶ 2, 4, 7); Laws, 1970, ch. 332, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 329, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 305; Laws, 1979, ch. 377; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 17; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 41; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 69; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 55, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 69.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in (1).

Cross References —

Extension into term of court in other county of same district, see §9-1-5.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The authority for an order taking a matter under consideration for a decision in vacation ended with the commencement of an intervening term of the circuit court and a final judgment which was entered, in vacation, subsequent to that date was null and void. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Jarrell, 360 So. 2d 682, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2297 (Miss. 1978).

Since this section [Code 1972, §9-7-49] gives the court the authority to try criminal cases during the same week that civil cases are set for trial, it was not reversible error for the court to set civil cases during the week criminal cases were to be tried; if there are not enough civil cases to keep the court busy, criminal cases may be set for trial, so long as the civil cases are given precedence over the criminal cases. Bright v. State, 293 So. 2d 818, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1814 (Miss. 1974).

§ 9-7-51. Nineteenth district; number and election of judges; divisions.

  1. There shall be three (3) judges for the Nineteenth Circuit Court District. The three (3) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” “Place Two” and “Place Three.”
  2. The senior judge of the Nineteenth Circuit Court District may divide the court of any county within the district into civil, criminal and appellate court divisions as a matter of convenience by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1411.8; Laws, 1970, ch. 333, §§ 1-5; Laws, 1978, ch. 379, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 56; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 70; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 56, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected an error in this section. The paragraph designation “(a)” was deleted from the first line, and the subsection designation “(2)” was substituted for the paragraph designation “(b)” on the fifth line. (The section had contained a (1)(a) and (b), but no (2).) The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its April 28, 1999 meeting.

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 70.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment, in (1), deleted “circuit” preceding “judges” in the first sentence, and deleted “For the purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning of the second sentence.

§ 9-7-53. Twentieth district; composition.

The Twentieth Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:

Madison County; and

Rankin County.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1411.9; Laws, 1971, ch. 344; Laws, 1976, ch. 397, § 1; Laws, 1978, ch. 344, § 1; Laws, 1982, ch. 481, § 1; Laws, 1983, ch. 305, ch. 499, § 18; Laws, 1984, ch. 360, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 42; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 71; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 57, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 71.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory paragraph.

§ 9-7-54. Twentieth district; number of judges.

  1. There shall be three (3) judges for the Twentieth Circuit Court District.
  2. The three (3) judgeships shall be separate and distinct and denominated for purposes of appointment and election only as “Place One,” “Place Two” and “Place Three.” The judge to fill Place One must reside in Rankin County, the judge to fill Place Two must reside in Madison County, and the judge to fill Place Three may reside in either Madison or Rankin County.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 481, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 57; Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 72; Laws, 2005, ch. 501, § 17, eff Jan. 1, 2007; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 58, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 72.

The preamble to Laws of 2005, ch. 501, reads as follows:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit court districts and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has thoroughly investigated the state of the trial courts and trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2005, ch. 501, §§ 19 and 22 provide:

“SECTION 19. The candidates for any new judgeships or chancellorships created under Laws 2005, Chapter 501, shall be entitled to run for those offices in the judicial election prior to the commencement of the initial term of the new judgeship or chancellorship.

“SECTION 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007, provided it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On July 15, 2005, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2005, ch. 501, § 17.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Laws of 2015, ch. 476, § 64, provides:

“SECTION 64. Candidates for new chancellorships and circuit judgeships created by this act shall run for those offices in a special election to be conducted in conjunction with the general election of November 2015. Candidates shall file the intent to be a candidate not later than 5:00 p.m. on June 1, 2015, and otherwise shall qualify as provided by Section 23-15-977, and shall run for office and be elected as provided in Sections 23-15-974 through 23-15-985 (Nonpartisan Judicial Election Act). The judges elected shall serve a three-year term to begin January 1, 2016, and the terms of those offices shall thereafter be as is provided for chancellors and circuit judges generally.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment added (2).

The 2015 amendment provided for two versions of the section, and in the second version, effective January 1, 2016, in (1), substituted “three (3)” for “two (2),” and in (2), in the first sentence, deleted “For purposes of appointment and election” from the beginning, added “and Place Three” at the end and made a related stylistic change, and added the last sentence.

Federal Aspects—

Provisions of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see 42 USCS § 1973c.

§ 9-7-55. Twenty-first district; composition.

The Twenty-first Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:

Holmes County;

Humphreys County; and

Yazoo County.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch 564, § 73; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 59, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the addition of this section by Laws, 1994, ch. 564, § 73.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory paragraph.

§ 9-7-57. Twenty-second district; composition.

The Twenty-second Circuit Court District is composed of the following counties:

Claiborne County;

Copiah County; and

Jefferson County.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch 564, § 74; Laws, 2015, ch. 476, § 60, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 22, 2015).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the addition of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 74.

The preamble to Chapter 476, Laws of 2015, effective from and after April 22, 2015, provides:

“WHEREAS, it is the responsibility of the Legislature under Section 152 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 to divide the state into an appropriate number of circuit and chancery court districts; and

“WHEREAS, the Legislature has investigated the state of the trial courts and the trial court districts and has considered the needs of the state according to all the criteria imposed by the Constitution and by general law; NOW, THEREFORE,”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “is composed” for “shall be comprised” in the introductory paragraph.

Jurisdiction, Powers and Authority

§ 9-7-81. Jurisdiction; general enumeration of subjects.

The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all actions when the principal of the amount in controversy exceeds two hundred dollars, and of all other actions and causes, matters and things arising under the constitution and laws of this state which are not exclusively cognizable in some other court, and such appellate jurisdiction as prescribed by law. Such court shall have power to hear and determine all prosecutions in the name of the state for treason, felonies, crimes, and misdemeanors, except such as may be exclusively cognizable before some other court; and said court shall have all the powers belonging to a court of oyer and terminer and general jail delivery, and may do and perform all other acts properly pertaining to a circuit court of law.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 6 (5); 1857, ch. 61, art. 29; 1871, § 519; 1880, § 1493; 1892, § 645; 1906, § 702; Hemingway’s 1917, § 481; 1930, § 490; 1942, § 1428.

Cross References —

Jurisdiction of Supreme Court, see §9-3-9.

Jurisdiction of chancery court in general, see §9-5-81.

Jurisdiction of county court, see §9-9-21.

Civil practice and procedure provisions common to courts, see §§11-1-1 et seq.

Prohibition against reversal of judgment or decree in civil case for want of jurisdiction to render, see §11-3-9.

Civil practice and procedure in circuit courts, see §§11-7-1 et seq.

Venue of civil actions generally, see §§11-11-1 et seq.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts over arbitration proceedings based on controversies arising out of construction contracts and related agreements, see §11-15-129.

Trial of right of property, see §§11-23-1 et seq.

Jurisdiction and powers of circuit court in eminent domain proceedings, see §11-27-3.

Attachment at law against debtors, see §§11-33-1 et seq.

Garnishment proceedings, see §§11-35-1 et seq.

Action of replevin, see §§11-37-1 et seq.

Quo warranto proceedings, see §§11-39-1 et seq.

Mandamus and writs of prohibition, see §§11-41-1 et seq.

Habeas corpus proceedings, see §§11-43-1 et seq.

Suits by and against state or its political subdivisions, see §§11-45-1 et seq.

Appeals from denial of applications to register as an elector, see §§23-15-61 through23-15-79.

Determination of primary election contests by a circuit judge or chancellor, see §§23-15-929 through23-15-941.

Determination of election contests in circuit court, see §§23-15-951 and23-15-953.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts over appeals from determinations relative to provisions requiring disclosure of campaign finances, see §23-15-813.

Judicial review of final decisions of employee appeals board, see §25-9-132.

Appeals from decisions under animal by-products disposal law of 1964, see §41-51-29.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts over violations of Medicaid Fraud Control Act, see §43-13-223.

Provision that a person aggrieved by an order issued pursuant to the Mississippi Catfish Processor Fair Practices Act may seek judicial review in the Hinds County Circuit Court, First Judicial District, see §69-7-667.

Provisions relative to jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Hinds County to hear employers’ appeals regarding rates of contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Fund, see §71-5-355.

For circuit court’s jurisdiction in paternity cases, see §93-9-15.

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, see §§97-43-1 et seq.

Criminal procedure generally, see §§99-1-1 et seq.

County in which motions may be made or a guilty plea entered with respect to criminal cases in circuit courts, see §99-15-24.

Appeals to circuit court in criminal cases, see §§99-35-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Constitutional rights of owner as against destruction of building by public authorities. 14 A.L.R.2d 82.

Re-employment of discharged servicemen. 29 A.L.R.2d 1279.

Power of state court to decline jurisdiction of action under Federal Employers’ Liability Act. 43 A.L.R.2d 774.

Municipal immunity from liability for torts. 60 A.L.R.2d 1198.

Disqualification of arbitrator by court or stay of arbitration proceedings prior to award, on ground of interest, bias, prejudice, collusion, or fraud of arbitrators. 65 A.L.R.2d 755.

State court jurisdiction over contest involving primary election for member of Congress. 68 A.L.R.2d 1320.

Action for death caused by maritime tort within a state’s territorial waters. 71 A.L.R.2d 1296.

State’s power to subject nonresident individual other than a motorist to jurisdiction of its courts in action for tort committed within state. 78 A.L.R.2d 397.

Constitutionality of arbitration statutes. 55 A.L.R.2d 432.

Authority of District Court to order telephone company to assist law enforcement agents in tracing telephone calls. 58 A.L.R. Fed. 719.

Minimum amount in controversy requirement for actions brought against carrier on bill of lading or receipt under 49 USCS § 11707 (“Carmack Amendment”). 66 A.L.R. Fed. 737.

Civil actions removable from state court to federal court under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1443. 159 A.L.R. Fed. 377.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 56 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 9, 10.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction in general.

2. Original jurisdiction.

3. Amount in controversy.

4. Criminal jurisdiction.

5. Appellate jurisdiction.

1. Jurisdiction in general.

Mississippi justice courts and the circuit courts shared concurrent jurisdiction in matters in which the amount in controversy exceeded $200 but not $2,500. Arant v. Hubbard, 824 So. 2d 611, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 257 (Miss. 2002).

Mississippi Constitution Article 4 § 38 vests competence of a candidate’s qualifications for office-including whether the candidate meets residency qualifications-in the Senate. Thus, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction of an election contest wherein it was alleged that candidates did not meet the residency requirements for service in the Senate as prescribed in Article 4 § 42 of the Mississippi Constitution. Foster v. Harden, 536 So. 2d 905, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 639 (Miss. 1988), overruled in part, Dillon v. Myers, 227 So.3d 923, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 134 (Miss. 2017).

Circuit court had jurisdiction to decide suit challenging powers being exercised by Lieutenant Governor where there was no exclusive vesting in another court of jurisdiction to hear and decide such claim, and due to nature of relief sought, i.e., that Lieutenant Governor’s exercise of certain powers in Senate be declared unconstitutional and he be debarred from exercising such authority, such case was akin to those historically within circuit court jurisdiction, to-wit: quo warranto proceedings. Dye v. State, 507 So. 2d 332, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2507 (Miss. 1987).

While subject matter jurisdiction lay within either the circuit or the chancery court, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction of heavy equipment vendor’s action against a county board of supervisors where the amended complaint, although it sought some relief equitable in nature, in substantial part partook of an action at law, in that it charged the board of supervisors with breach of duties not unlike those generally contractual, and the complaint sought the assessment of civil penalties. Canton Farm Equipment, Inc. v. Richardson, 501 So. 2d 1098, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2273 (Miss. 1987).

Provision in church manual permitting bishops to retain ten per cent of all monies raised by them in their respective dioceses does not give to ousted bishop such property rights in monies raised by his successor in office as to entitle him to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil courts to recover the ten per cent claimed by him. Conic v. Cobbins, 208 Miss. 203, 44 So. 2d 52, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1950).

Unless some property rights are involved, civil courts have no jurisdiction over ecclesiastical controversies and are without jurisdiction to decide who is, or who ought to be, presiding bishop of the diocese. Conic v. Cobbins, 208 Miss. 203, 44 So. 2d 52, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1950).

Under Code 1942, § 3778, providing for the recall of municipal officers and providing that on refusal of the board to call an election a petition may be presented to the governor who shall at once order an election according to the terms thereof, the power to call an election rests exclusively with the governor, hence the circuit court was held to be without power to call such an election. Coleman v. Lucas, 206 Miss. 274, 39 So. 2d 879, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1949).

Circuit court and chancery court to which suit was transferred were courts of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate litigation against Federal Housing Authority under Contract Settlement Act of 1944, 41 USCA, §§ 101 et seq., and Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 31 USCA, § 846; and Federal Public Housing Authority is suable in Mississippi courts. Walsh Const. Co. v. Davis, 204 Miss. 509, 37 So. 2d 757, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 385 (Miss. 1948).

As the necessary effect of Const. 1890 § 147, we have practically a complete blending of law and equity and only maintain courts to administer them. Goyer Cold-Storage Co. v. Wildberger, 71 Miss. 438, 15 So. 235, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1893).

Where jurisdiction is given to a court by the constitution, it cannot be conferred exclusively on any other court by the legislature. Montross v. State, 61 Miss. 429, 1883 Miss. LEXIS 154 (Miss. 1883).

The circuit court has jurisdiction where there is no other legal remedy. Madison County Court v. Alexander, 1 Miss. 523, 1832 Miss. LEXIS 13 (Miss. 1832); Planters' Ins. Co. v. Cramer, 47 Miss. 200, 1872 Miss. LEXIS 62 (Miss. 1872), overruled, State v. Maples, 402 So. 2d 350, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2151 (Miss. 1981), but see De La Beckwith v. State, 615 So. 2d 1134, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 807 (Miss. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 884, 114 S. Ct. 232, 126 L. Ed. 2d 187, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 5961 (U.S. 1993).

2. Original jurisdiction.

Dismissal of the insured’s action against her insurer in Mississippi for bad faith was improper where there was no personal or subject matter jurisdiction over the insurer, Miss. Const. art. 6, § 156, Miss Code Ann. §9-7-81; none of the parties were Mississippi residents, none of the actions creating the dispute occurred in Mississippi, and Mississippi law would not have governed the litigation. Hogrobrooks v. Progressive Direct, 858 So. 2d 913, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1029 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Where the non-movant’s complaint alleged seven counts at law and one equitable count seeking an accounting, the chancery court erred in refusing to transfer the case to the circuit court; the non-movant failed to allege a true claim for an accounting, as the non-movant sought an accounting of the non-movant rather than an accounting of the movants, and, therefore, the circuit court had jurisdiction pursuant to Miss. Const. art. VI, § 156 and Miss. Code Ann. §9-7-81. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Smith, 854 So. 2d 1045, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 471 (Miss. 2003).

The circuit court, rather than the chancery court, had jurisdiction over a tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Little v. Collier, 759 So. 2d 454, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 103 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

A chancery clerk was entitled to bring an original action in the circuit court, in the nature of quo warranto, under §§11-39-1 and11-39-5 as supplanted by the rules of civil procedure, for reinstatement by the county board of supervisors to the posts of clerk of the board of supervisors and county auditor. Barlow v. Weathersby, 597 So. 2d 1288, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 196 (Miss. 1992).

An action by an insured to recover medical expenses incurred by his wife, even though predicated on the theory of specific performance, was nothing more than a suit for a breach of contract and, pursuant to this section, should have been brought in the circuit court rather than the chancery court. Dixie Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Allison, 372 So. 2d 1081, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2151 (Miss. 1979).

The circuit courts of this state have original jurisdiction of suits filed therein for damages based upon actions ex contractu and ex delicto, and the inherent power to correct judgments obtained in the circuit court through fraud, accident or mistake. City of Starkville v. Thompson, 243 So. 2d 54, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1500 (Miss. 1971).

Original jurisdiction to make conclusive and final adjudication of title to land rests alone with circuit and chancery courts, and to a limited extent with the county courts. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

The framers of the constitution evidently intended by all “matters civil” in § 156, Const. 1890, vesting in the circuit court original jurisdiction, to mean matters of common law cognizance. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Le Blanc, 74 Miss. 650, 21 So. 760, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1897).

The court has jurisdiction generally of an action of ejectment and is not deprived thereof by Const. 1890 § 160. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Le Blanc, 74 Miss. 650, 21 So. 760, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1897).

Constitution § 160 reversed the former relation of the courts, in which the circuit court possessed general jurisdiction and was the repository of the power to administer legal remedies, and the chancery court had jurisdiction of certain designated matters and where there was not a full, adequate and complete remedy at law. Now, by Const. § 156, the circuit court has original jurisdiction “in all matters, civil and criminal, in this state not vested by this constitution in some other court.” Whitney v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 71 Miss. 1009, 15 So. 33, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1894).

A claimant’s issue is not an original suit. Bernheimer v. Martin, 66 Miss. 486, 6 So. 326, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1889).

The original jurisdiction of the circuit court can be made, by statute, to embrace contested election cases. Hall v. Lyon, 59 Miss. 218, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 107 (Miss. 1881).

Garnishment is not an original suit, and the circuit court may issue and render judgment thereon for amounts within the justices’ jurisdiction. Martin v. Harvey, 54 Miss. 685, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1877).

3. Amount in controversy.

Actual damage for $190.00 and $25.00 statutory damage may be combined in a suit giving the circuit court jurisdiction. Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Greenwald & Champenois, 104 Miss. 417, 61 So. 426, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 43 (Miss. 1913).

The circuit court may lose jurisdiction where after suit is brought against two joint defendants a compromise with one reduces the amount sued for below $200.00. Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Hitt & Rutherford, 99 Miss. 679, 55 So. 484, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 237 (Miss. 1911).

The value of the property replevied determines jurisdiction as to amount. Brumfield v. Hoover, 90 Miss. 502, 43 So. 951, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 1907).

If the amount of a judgment of a justice of the peace in another state, together with the costs of suit paid by the plaintiffs, exceed $200.00, the circuit court has jurisdiction of the suit for the aggregate amount. McDougle v. Fulmer, 82 Miss. 200, 34 So. 152, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 144 (Miss. 1903).

Jurisdiction as to the amount in controversy is to be determined by the whole amount claimed by the plaintiff, and not by what is left to be contended for after the exclusion by the court of special damages. Jacobs v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 76 Miss. 278, 24 So. 535, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 91 (Miss. 1898).

If the record shows less than the jurisdictional amount and does not show that case originated in a justice’s court, judgment will be reversed and proceedings dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Andrews v. Wallace, 72 Miss. 291, 16 So. 204, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 64 (Miss. 1894).

The pleadings, where honest, fix and determine the amount in controversy. Fenn v. Harrington, 54 Miss. 733, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 91 (Miss. 1877).

The principal of the amount in controversy at the time the suit is brought, after deducting credits, if any, is the test of jurisdiction. Martin v. Harden, 52 Miss. 694, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1876).

4. Criminal jurisdiction.

A proper reading of Article III § 27 of the Mississippi Constitution initially requires an indictment that charges the essential elements of the criminal offense. Once the indictment has been served on the defendant, a court having subject matter jurisdiction is empowered to proceed. A subsequent event such as a guilty plea to a lesser related offense in no way ousts the court of personal jurisdiction. This reading is consistent with the purposes which an indictment serves-the reasons it has been accorded the status of a constitutional right-(1) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him or her as will enable the accused to make his or her defense and avail himself or herself of a conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause, (2) to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be obtained, and (3) to guard against malicious, groundless prosecution. Jefferson v. State, 556 So. 2d 1016, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 485 (Miss. 1989).

When a juvenile is charged with an offense carrying a potential life sentence, such as rape or murder, jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the circuit court and the Youth Court Act is inapplicable. Smith v. State, 534 So. 2d 194, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 545 (Miss. 1988).

Murder is a crime excepted from the jurisdiction of the youth court. Thus, the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over a juvenile charged with murder. Boyd v. State, 523 So. 2d 1037, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 1988).

Circuit courts have all the common-law power of English criminal courts to examine, try and deliver every prisoner who is in jail or under charge within the jurisdiction of the court. State v. Thornhill, 251 Miss. 718, 171 So. 2d 308, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 896 (Miss. 1965).

One of two courts of concurrent jurisdiction may, by valid order of dismissal, relinquish its exclusive jurisdiction acquired by criminal prosecution being first instituted therein, so that the other court may proceed then with prosecution of same offense. Hegwood v. State, 206 Miss. 160, 39 So. 2d 865, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 250 (Miss. 1949).

Dismissal without prejudice to the state of proceeding against defendant in justice of the peace court for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor on motion of state did not prevent the defendant from being indicted for the same offense in the circuit court having concurrent jurisdiction. Hegwood v. State, 206 Miss. 160, 39 So. 2d 865, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 250 (Miss. 1949).

A justice of the peace is not authorized to bind over a defendant charged with a misdemeanor unless proof shows he is guilty of a felony. The circuit court cannot take original jurisdiction to try a misdemeanor on the affidavit before the justice of the peace. Young v. State, 140 Miss. 165, 105 So. 461, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 245 (Miss. 1925).

The circuit court has original jurisdiction to try only cases on indictment presented by the grand jury. Young v. State, 140 Miss. 165, 105 So. 461, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 245 (Miss. 1925).

5. Appellate jurisdiction.

Circuit court lost jurisdiction over an employee’s action where judicial review was sought of a decision by the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission that denied her claim for workers’ compensation benefits when the employee failed to file a timely appeal from the same court’s order affirming the Commission’s decision; the circuit court erred in vacating its own order and replacing it with a new and contrary order. Univ. of S. Miss. v. Gillis, 872 So. 2d 60, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1193 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 873 So. 2d 1032, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 479 (Miss. 2004).

Nothing in §9-7-81 places temporal limits upon the Circuit Court’s exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and, thus, the expiration of the term of the Circuit Court had no effect on its power as an appellate court to grant a motion to reconsider the decision of a city civil service commission to uphold a police lieutenant’s discharge. City of Gulfport v. Saxton, 437 So. 2d 1215, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2925 (Miss. 1983).

While it is still mandatory that the justice of the peace or the mayor or police justice, in appeals from their courts, transmit to the proper clerk a certified copy of the record of the proceedings with the original papers, process and appeal bond, if no objection is made to the transcript before or during the trial of the case, on its merits, it will be conclusively presumed that the transcript was before the court and complied in every respect with the law. Whittington v. State, 218 Miss. 631, 67 So. 2d 515, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 581 (Miss. 1953).

Supreme Court, circuit courts, chancery courts and county courts, when acting on appeal from a special possessory court of a justice or justices of peace, have only such jurisdiction to adjudicate regarding title to land as is vested in special court from which appeal was taken. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Neither justice of the peace, nor circuit court on appeal, in proceeding under Code 1942, § 948, have any jurisdiction to make final and conclusive adjudication of title to property involved. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Circuit court has jurisdiction of both subject-matter and parties on appeal with supersedeas from default judgment by justice of peace in summary proceeding under § 948, Code of 1942, to obtain possession of real property rendered on invalid service of process, although justice had jurisdiction only of subject-matter when default judgment was rendered. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Where plaintiff brought an action for $105 in justice court to which defendant interposed plea of setoff for the first time on appeal in the circuit court for a sum less than $200, the circuit court nevertheless had jurisdiction to pass on the question of whether such plea could be filed for the first time in the circuit court, since the court had jurisdiction of the case as appealed from the justice of peace court wherein the plaintiff’s demand of $105 was within the jurisdiction of such court. Wright v. Thornton, 196 Miss. 395, 17 So. 2d 437, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 205 (Miss. 1944).

Law for validating bonds held not to divest circuit court of jurisdiction of appeals after order of issuance. Pearce v. Mantachie Consol. School Dist., 134 Miss. 497, 99 So. 134, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1924).

Decisions of the secretary of the state may be reviewed by the circuit court on certiorari. Power v. Robertson, 130 Miss. 188, 93 So. 769, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 196 (Miss. 1922).

Where a plaintiff dismisses his appeal from a judgment against him in a justice’s court in an attachment suit the court may notwithstanding allow a claimant’s issue to be made up and tried. Dreyfus v. Mayer, 69 Miss. 282, 12 So. 267, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 107 (Miss. 1891).

The court, by the common law and without a statute, has jurisdiction upon certiorari to examine and reverse judicial proceedings before the mayor of a municipality. Holberg v. Macon, 55 Miss. 112, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 115 (Miss. 1877).

This rule does not apply in unlawful entry and detainer cases. Poston v. MHOON, 49 Miss. 620, 1873 Miss. LEXIS 154 (Miss. 1873).

Circuit court by consolidating several cases on appeal from a justice of the peace court did not lose jurisdiction because the aggregate amount was in excess of the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. Ammons v. Whitehead, 31 Miss. 99, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 40 (Miss. 1856); McLendon v. Pass, 66 Miss. 110, 5 So. 234, 1888 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1888).

The circuit court, on an appeal or certiorari from a justice of the peace, has such jurisdiction only as the justice had. Glass v. Moss, 2 Miss. 519, 1837 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1837); Crapoo v. Grand Gulf, 17 Miss. 205, 1848 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1848); Stier v. Surget, 18 Miss. 154, 1848 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1848); Scofield v. Pensons, 26 Miss. 402, 1853 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1853), overruled, Pittman v. Chrisman, 59 Miss. 124, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1881); Askew v. Askew, 49 Miss. 301, 1873 Miss. LEXIS 115 (Miss. 1873); Bell v. West Point, 51 Miss. 262, 1875 Miss. LEXIS 43 (Miss. 1875).

§ 9-7-83. Jurisdiction of cases transferred or remanded to it.

The circuit court shall have jurisdiction of all cases transferred to it by the chancery court or remanded to it by the supreme court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 646; 1906, § 703; Hemingway’s 1917, § 482; 1930, § 491; 1942, § 1429.

Cross References —

Constitutional provision for transfer to circuit court of causes erroneously brought in chancery court, see Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 162.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In an action by the members of a Confederate Veterans society against a university for violating Miss. Code Ann. §55-15-81, the circuit court properly ruled that, despite their argument to the contrary and the nomenclature used, the case was a mandamus action and not one for injunctive relief, denied the members’ motion to retransfer to the chancery court, and granted a university’s motion to dismiss the action for lack of standing because the members failed to challenge the judgment from the chancery court transferring the case, the circuit court had jurisdiction under two statutes, and the members had no private right that entitled them to require that the university refrain from implementing its diversity plan. Miss. Div. of Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Univ. of Miss., — So.3d —, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 425 (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2018).

Section 162 of the Constitution, providing that causes brought in chancery court of which circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction shall be transferred to the circuit court, is mandatory and applies to appeals from county court. W. Horace Williams Co. v. Federal Credit Co., 198 Miss. 111, 21 So. 2d 582, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1945).

In the case of an erroneous transfer of an action by the state tax collector to recover the penalty for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors and for the abatement of a nuisance from the chancery to the circuit court, the circuit court should and must proceed with the case, since there is no appeal from such erroneous transfer and no provision made for its correction. Craig v. Woods, 190 Miss. 258, 199 So. 772, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 45 (Miss. 1941).

Where an action by the state tax collector for the recovery of penalties for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors and for general equitable relief was erroneously transferred from the chancery court to the circuit court, and it did not appear that any substantial right of the complainant was affected by the erroneous transfer, the only course open to the circuit court was to dismiss the action upon complainant’s refusal to proceed. Craig v. Woods, 190 Miss. 258, 199 So. 772, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 45 (Miss. 1941).

Where cause was transferred from chancery court to circuit court, latter acquired jurisdiction whether it was of law cognizance or not. Warner v. Hogin, 148 Miss. 562, 114 So. 347, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1927); Dunn v. Dent, 176 Miss. 786, 170 So. 299, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 174 (Miss. 1936).

§ 9-7-85. Jurisdiction; suit for sum below.

If a suit shall be brought in the circuit court for a sum of less than the court can take cognizance of, or if a greater sum than is due shall be demanded, on purpose to confer jurisdiction, the complaint shall be involuntarily dismissed pursuant to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure; and if the plaintiff, in any case, shall not recover more than the minimal jurisdictional amount, he shall not recover any costs of the defendant unless the judge shall be of the opinion, and so enter on the record, that the plaintiff had reasonable ground to expect to recover more than the minimal jurisdictional amount, or unless the court shall have jurisdiction of the cause, without respect to the amount in controversy.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 58, art. 1 (11); 1857, ch. 61, art. 33; 1871, § 666; 1880, § 1497; 1892, § 649; 1906, § 706; Hemingway’s 1917, § 485; 1930, § 494; 1942, § 1432; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Venue of actions or proceedings against public officers. 48 A.L.R.2d 423.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 56 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 22 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Evasion of jurisdictional amount.

3. Recovery of costs.

1. In general.

The statute only relates to actions ex contractu. Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Mabry, 67 Miss. 131, 7 So. 224, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 50 (Miss. 1889).

The entry of the opinion of the judge that the plaintiff had ground to expect to recover over two hundred dollars must be made at the term at which the judgment is rendered. Shackelford v. M. P. Levy & Co., 63 Miss. 125, 1885 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1885).

2. Evasion of jurisdictional amount.

The jurisdiction of the court, where the affidavit in replevin shows the proper amount, can only be defeated by showing that a false valuation of the property was made on “purpose to confer jurisdiction.” On this point this section [Code 1942, § 1432] applies to the courts of justices of the peace as well as circuit courts. Ball, Brown & Co. v. Sledge, 82 Miss. 749, 35 So. 447, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1903).

The test of jurisdiction is the amount demanded in the pleadings, subject to be defeated, if shown to be an attempt to evade the statute. Fenn v. Harrington, 54 Miss. 733, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 91 (Miss. 1877).

It must appear that a greater sum than $200.00 was demanded on purpose to evade the law requiring suits for sums of and under that amount to be brought before a justice of the peace, or the plaintiff cannot be nonsuited. Griffin v. Lower, 37 Miss. 458, 1859 Miss. LEXIS 38 (Miss. 1859).

3. Recovery of costs.

In action against Federal Housing Authority under Contract Settlement Act of 1944, court should include in final judgment an allowance of attorney fees equal to minimum fee for collections fixed by local bar association, which fee should include fee for partial payments collected before suit through efforts of attorney. Walsh Const. Co. v. Davis, 204 Miss. 509, 37 So. 2d 757, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 385 (Miss. 1948).

Where the plaintiff brought an action for wrongful removal of timber to the plaintiff’s damage in the sum of $525, and he recovered only $40, he was not entitled to costs against the defendant in the absence of a finding and entry in the record by the trial judge that plaintiff had reason to expect to recover more than the jurisdictional amount of $200. Gulf Refining Co. v. Miller, 153 Miss. 741, 121 So. 482, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 75 (Miss. 1929).

A plaintiff recovering less than $200.00 where the record does not show that the judge trying the case held that the plaintiff reasonably expected to recover more than $200.00 cannot tax the defendant with the cost. Gulfport Turpentine Co. v. Strickland, 115 Miss. 1, 75 So. 689, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 1917).

§ 9-7-87. Special terms; jurisdiction; juries for.

At a special term the circuit court may impanel grand and petit juries, and shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil and criminal business, in the same manner as at a regular term.

Parties and witnesses shall be bound to attend; and witnesses duly subpoenaed or bound by recognizance, shall be subject to the same penalties for failure to attend as if such failure had occurred at a regular term. On receiving the order for a special term, if it be held because of a failure of a regular term, the proper officers shall open the envelopes containing the names of the jurors for such regular term, if it has not been done, and the venire facias shall issue and the jurors be summoned as required by law; but if there be no such envelopes, the jurors shall be drawn as provided in case of a failure of the judge to draw them. The judge may direct whether jurors shall be summoned and how they shall be drawn.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 53, art. 8 (2); 1857, ch. 61, art. 4; 1871, § 878; 1880, § 1482; 1892, § 630; 1906, § 688; Hemingway’s 1917, § 466; 1930, § 475; 1942, § 1413.

Cross References —

Special term of Supreme Court, see §9-3-5.

Empaneling juries generally, see §§13-5-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts § 22.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 97, 108, 126, 130-166.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 161-163.

50A C.J.S., Juries §§ 143-189.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Special term for criminal business at time statute provided for civil term devoted exclusively to civil business, was unauthorized, and indictment was nullity. Williams v. State, 156 Miss. 346, 126 So. 40, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 181 (Miss. 1930).

Proceedings at a term unauthorized are void. Arbour v. Yazoo & Miss. V. Ry. Co., 96 Miss. 340, 98 Miss. 714, 54 So. 158 (1911).

§ 9-7-89. Motions against officers for money collected.

The circuit court shall hear and determine all motions against attorneys at law, sheriffs, coroners, and other officers, for money collected or received as such, and not paid over on demand to the party entitled to the same, and may give judgment and award execution thereon.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 53, art. 2 (164); 1857, ch. 61, art. 30; 1871, § 523; 1880, § 1494; 1892, § 647; 1906, § 704; Hemingway’s 1917, § 483; 1930, § 492; 1942, § 1430.

Cross References —

Eminent domain proceedings, see §11-27-3.

§ 9-7-91. Judgments and executions.

The circuit court may render judgments according to the principles and usages of law, in all cases cognizable before it, and award executions, directed to the sheriff or other proper officer of any county. The court, upon legal conviction of a person of a crime or misdemeanor, shall proceed to judgment and award execution thereon as the law directs.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 1 (147); 1857, ch. 61, art. 31; 1871, § 521; 1880, § 1495; 1892, § 648; 1906, § 705; Hemingway’s 1917, § 484; 1930, § 493; 1942, § 1431.

Cross References —

Transfer of cases from county courts to circuit court in nineteenth circuit court district, see §9-7-95.

Uniform enforcement of foreign judgments, see §§11-7-301 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Modern views of state courts as to whether consent judgment is entitled to res judicata or collateral estoppel effect. 91 A.L.R.3d 1170.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Judgment in general.

2. Validity of judgment.

3. Operation and effect.

4. Lien of judgment.

5. Vacation of judgment.

6. Reversal of judgment.

7. Res judicata.

8. Action on judgment.

1. Judgment in general.

A judgment is not a contract. Berkson v. Cox, 73 Miss. 339, 18 So. 934, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 120 (Miss. 1895).

2. Validity of judgment.

No lapse of time will help the validity of a void judgment. Lester v. Miller, 76 Miss. 309, 24 So. 193, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1898).

A judgment in replevin against principal and surety if rendered after the death of the surety is void as to both. Weis v. Aaron, 75 Miss. 138, 21 So. 763, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 98 (Miss. 1897), overruled, Bank of Philadelphia v. Posey, 130 Miss. 530, 92 So. 840, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1922).

A suit on a judgment on a note for a gambling contract can be defeated by showing the illegality of the original transaction. Campbell v. New Orleans Nat'l Bank, 74 Miss. 526, 21 So. 400, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 177 (Miss. 1896).

A judgment based upon a summons issued in term-time, returnable instanter, though not taken until the next term, is void. Joiner v. Delta Bank, 71 Miss. 382, 14 So. 464, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 187 (Miss. 1893).

The entry of a void judgment does not operate as a discontinuance of the cause. Moore v. Hoskins, 66 Miss. 496, 6 So. 500, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 136 (Miss. 1889).

In attacking a judgment for want of notice the most convincing proof must be made. Duncan v. Gerdine, 59 Miss. 550, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1882); Quarles v. Hiern, 70 Miss. 891, 14 So. 23, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1893).

3. Operation and effect.

A judgment by default in a suit to enforce a mechanic’s lien must be limited to matters of right averred in the petition and cannot be extended by its prayer. Reid v. Gregory, 78 Miss. 247, 28 So. 835, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1900).

Creditors may obtain personal judgments against a defendant in attachments, notwithstanding he has enjoined them from proceeding in their suit against the property in his personal possession claimed to be in custodia legis, and defendant, failing to defend on the merits, is bound by such judgments. Hart v. Livermore Foundry & Mach. Co., 72 Miss. 809, 17 So. 769, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1895).

In a controversy between the judgment creditor and a third person, the judgment is prima facie evidence of indebtedness. Aron v. Chaffe, 72 Miss. 159, 17 So. 11, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 127 (Miss. 1894).

4. Lien of judgment.

Where several judgments against the same person are rendered on the same day the priority of lien exists in the order of rendition and the entries on the minutes are conclusive as to this. Herron v. Walker, 69 Miss. 707, 12 So. 259, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1892).

5. Vacation of judgment.

Where there is no levy or garnishment in the county where rendered, the judgment for the debt in attachment should be set aside for want of jurisdiction. Campbell v. Triplett, 74 Miss. 365, 20 So. 844, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1896).

Unless a judgment is void, it cannot, at a subsequent term, be vacated or reversed by the court rendering it. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Bolding, 69 Miss. 255, 13 So. 844, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 170 (Miss. 1891).

A judgment without service of process may be set aside upon motion. Meyer Bros. v. Whitehead, 62 Miss. 387, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 90 (Miss. 1884); Newman v. Taylor, 69 Miss. 670, 13 So. 831, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1892).

Upon motion, a judgment made upon return of personal service may be vacated at a subsequent term upon proof that the return is false. Meyer Bros. v. Whitehead, 62 Miss. 387, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 90 (Miss. 1884).

6. Reversal of judgment.

A judgment by default predicated of a declaration which wholly fails to statea cause of action will be reversed on appeal. Bradstreet Co. v. Jackson, 81 Miss. 233, 32 So. 999, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1902).

Where the scire facias is not supported in a material particular by the judgment nisi, a judgment final inconsistent with the judgment nisi is erroneous, and, if to a party’s prejudice, must be reversed. Smith v. State, 76 Miss. 728, 25 So. 491, 1899 Miss. LEXIS 8 (Miss. 1899).

In view of Const. 1890 § 147, a judgment on a claimant’s issue will not be reversed because it appears the successful claimant had only an equitable title. Goyer Cold-Storage Co. v. Wildberger, 71 Miss. 438, 15 So. 235, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1893).

7. Res judicata.

A dismissal without prejudice does not bar a new suit on the same cause of action. Cole v. Fagan, 108 Miss. 100, 66 So. 400, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1914); Germain v. Harwell, 108 Miss. 396, 66 So. 396, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 1914).

A suit for damage from flooding lands where there has been a recovery does not bar a second action for a subsequent like injury. Rosamond v. Carroll County, 101 Miss. 701, 57 So. 979, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 144 (Miss. 1911).

A judgment against a garnishee is not a bar to a suit against him by his creditor, but execution on the judgment in such suit should be stayed as to an amount equal to the judgment against the garnishee. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Fulton, 71 Miss. 385, 14 So. 271, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1893).

8. Action on judgment.

In a suit on a domestic judgment its nature cannot be changed. The new judgment must be the same in kind. McInnis v. Graves, 80 Miss. 632, 31 So. 902, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 269 (Miss. 1902).

§ 9-7-93. Time may be allotted by court for civil and criminal business separately.

In the county where it may be necessary, in the discretion of the court or judge, the court may designate a certain portion of the time allotted for the holding of court exclusively to the civil business and a certain portion of the time exclusively to the hearing of criminal business, and in cases where the court or judge does this, the court or judge shall so allot the time as to meet the necessities of the criminal and civil business, and, in all cases where it is practical to do so, the court or judge shall separate the civil and criminal business, so that certain time shall be devoted to each.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 468; 1930, § 477; 1942, § 1415; Laws, 1906, ch. 106.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts § 22.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 151, 152.

§ 9-7-95. Transfer for trial of cases filed in county courts in nineteenth district.

Cases filed in the county courts of any county in the nineteenth circuit court district, with the exception of equity and youth court cases, at the discretion of the county court judge, and with the consent of the circuit judge, may be transferred for trial to the circuit courts of such district, and the judgment rendered thereon on any such transferred case in the circuit court shall be a final judgment and shall be appealable in the same manner as now provided by law for appeals from final judgments rendered by circuit courts.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1411.7; Laws, 1962, ch. 296, §§ 1-8; Laws, 1964, ch. 318, §§ 1, 2, 4 (¶¶ 2, 4, 7); Laws, 1970, ch. 332, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 3, 1970).

Circuit Clerks

§ 9-7-121. Clerk; oath of office and bond.

The clerk of the circuit court, before he enters upon the duties of the office, shall take the oath of office, and give bond, with sufficient surety, to be payable, conditioned and approved as provided by law, in a penalty equal to three percent (3%) of the sum of all the state and county taxes shown by the assessment rolls and the levies to have been collectible in the county for the year immediately preceding the commencement of the term of office for such clerk. However, such bond shall not exceed the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). And he may be required to give additional bond from time to time, for the faithful application of all moneys coming into his hands by law or order of the court; but such additional bonds shall be cumulative security, and the original bond shall likewise cover all moneys coming into the hands of the clerk by law or order of the court.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 27, art. 2 (9); 1857, ch. 61, art. 16; 1871, § 550; 1880, § 1484; 1892, § 633; 1906, § 690; Hemingway’s 1917, § 469; 1930, § 478; 1942, § 1416; Laws, 1986, ch. 458, § 11; reenacted, Laws, 1989, ch. 343, § 1; Laws, 1992, ch. 386, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 48, Chapter 458, Laws, 1986, provided that §9-7-121 would stand repealed from and after October 1, 1989. Subsequently, three 1989 chapters (341, 342, and 343) amended Section 48, Chapter 458, Laws, 1986, by deleting the date for repeal.

Cross References —

Constitutional authority for the office of clerk of the circuit court, see Miss. Const. Art. 6, Art. § 168.

Provisions common to clerks, see §§9-1-27 et seq.

Clerks serving in separate judicial districts, see §9-1-39.

Circuit clerk maintaining a permanent record of pardons, see §9-7-139.

Circuit clerk’s duties in connection with record of pardons, see §9-7-139.

Circuit clerk’s duties as clerk of the county court, see §9-9-29.

Circuit clerk’s duties as custodian of depositions, exhibits, maps, etc., see §9-13-27.

Requirement of additional bonds for chancery clerk, see §11-5-165.

Responsibilities of circuit clerks relative to provisions requiring disclosure of campaign finances, see §§23-15-805 and23-15-815.

Responsibilities of circuit clerks relative to election contests, see §§23-15-911,23-15-927,23-15-931, and23-15-951.

Maintenance by the circuit clerk of a list of persons convicted of felonies other than manslaughter or of violating the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, for the purpose of purging voter registration records, see §23-15-151.

Provision that circuit clerks shall be elected in 1987 and every four years thereafter, see §23-15-193.

Nominations for state, district, county, and county district offices which are elective, see §§23-15-291 et seq.

Provision that the circuit clerk shall be the custodian of optical mark reading equipment acquired by a county as part of a voting system, see §23-15-515.

Approval and filing of oaths and bonds of public officials, see §§25-1-9 et seq.

Location and hours of office of circuit clerk, see §25-1-99.

Same person holding the offices of circuit and chancery clerk, see §25-1-103.

Fees of clerk, see §25-7-13.

Prohibition against the practice of law, see §73-3-43.

Crime of altering records, see §97-11-1.

Clerk’s duty to keep papers, see Miss. Uniform Circuit & County Court Rule 1.12.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The provisions of §§9-5-131,9-7-121,19-3-5,19-4-9,21-1-7,21-17-5(1), and27-1-13, only mandate the use of tax assessment rolls and the avails to be collected from levies thereon in calculating the amount of the bonds therein required. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 11.

The calculation of a bond pursuant to §§9-5-131,9-7-121,19-3-5,19-4-9,21-1-7,21-17-5(1), and27-1-13, includes all assessment rolls upon which a board of supervisors may levy ad valorem taxes. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 11.

The calculation pursuant to §§9-5-131,9-7-121,19-3-5,19-4-9,21-1-7,21-17-5(1), and27-1-13, includes all ad valorem tax levies listed on the certified levy sheet, including school district levies. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 11.

The calculation pursuant to §§9-5-131,9-7-121,19-3-5,19-4-9,21-1-7,21-17-5(1), and27-1-13, includes all classes of property upon which ad valorem taxes are levied and collected. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 11.

In calculating the amount of a bond pursuant to §§9-5-131,9-7-121,19-3-5,19-4-9,21-1-7,21-17-5(1), and27-1-13, the total amount of ad valorem taxes to be collected, rather than the actual amount collected, must be used. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 11.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court §§ 1 et seq.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 1-4.

3B Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Bonds § 43:18.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Court §§ 327-351.

21 C.J.S., Courts § 136.

§ 9-7-122. Training and continuing education requirements for circuit clerks; filing of certificate of compliance; penalty for failure to file; courses; expenses; continuing education credit for attendance at circuit court proceedings; compliance with Section 9-1-46.

  1. Except as otherwise provided herein, no circuit clerk elected for a full term of office commencing on or after January 1, 1996, shall exercise any functions of office or be eligible to take the oath of office unless and until the circuit clerk has filed in the office of the chancery clerk a certificate of completion of a course of training and education conducted by the Mississippi Judicial College of the University of Mississippi Law Center within six (6) months of the beginning of the term for which such circuit clerk is elected. A circuit clerk who has completed the course of training and education and has satisfied his annual continuing education course requirements, and who is then elected for a succeeding term of office subsequent to the initial term for which he completed the training course, shall not be required to repeat the training and education course upon reelection. A circuit clerk that has served either a full term of office or part of a term of office before January 1, 1996, shall be exempt from the requirements of this subsection.
  2. In addition to meeting the requirements of subsection (1) of this section, after taking office by election or otherwise, each circuit clerk shall be required to file annually in the office of the chancery clerk a certificate of completion of a course of continuing education conducted by the Mississippi Judicial College. No circuit clerk shall have to comply with this subsection unless he will have been in office for five (5) months or more during a calendar year.
  3. Each circuit clerk elected for a term commencing on or after January 1, 1992, shall be required to file annually the certificate required in subsection (2) of this section commencing January l, 1993.
  4. The requirements for obtaining the certificates in this section shall be as provided in subsection (6) of this section.
  5. Upon the failure of any circuit clerk to file with the chancery clerk the certificates of completion as provided in this section, such circuit clerk shall, in addition to any other fine or punishment provided by law for such conduct, not be entitled to any fee, compensation or salary, from any source, for services rendered as circuit clerk, for the period of time during which such certificate remains unfiled.
  6. The Mississippi Judicial College of the University of Mississippi Law Center shall prepare and conduct courses of training for basic and continuing education for circuit clerks of this state. The basic course of training shall be known as the “Circuit Clerks Training Course” and shall consist of at least thirty-two (32) hours of training. The continuing education course shall be known as the “Continuing Education Course for Circuit Clerks” and shall consist of at least eighteen (18) hours of training. The content of the basic and continuing education courses and when and where such courses are to be conducted shall be determined by the judicial college. The judicial college shall issue certificates of completion to those circuit clerks who complete such courses.
  7. The expenses of the training, including training of those elected as circuit clerk who have not yet begun their term of office, shall be borne as an expense of the office of the circuit clerk.
  8. Circuit clerks shall be allowed credit toward their continuing education course requirements for attendance at circuit court proceedings if the presiding circuit court judge certifies that the circuit clerk was in actual attendance at a term or terms of court; provided, however, that at least twelve (12) hours per year of the continuing education course requirements must be completed at a regularly established program or programs conducted by the Mississippi Judicial College.
  9. By August 1, 2015, and each year thereafter, the Administrative Office of Courts shall certify to the Mississippi Judicial College the names of all circuit clerks who have failed to provide the information required by Section 9-1-46. The judicial college shall not issue a certificate of continuing education required by subsection (2) of this section to any such clerk, and shall report to the State Auditor, and the board of supervisors of the county the clerk is elected from that the clerk shall not be entitled to receive the compensation set out in subsection (5) of this section. A clerk may be certified after coming into compliance with the requirements of Section 9-1-46.

HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 416, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 595, § 3; Laws, 1995, ch. 375, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 69, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in subsection (3) by substituting “subsection (2) of this section” for “subsection (2) of this action.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its August 17, 2015, meeting.

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment added (9).

§ 9-7-123. Appointment of deputy clerks; oath; bond.

  1. The clerk of the circuit court shall have power, with the approbation of the court, or of the judge in vacation, to appoint one or more deputies, who shall take the oath of office and may give bond, and who thereupon shall have power to do and perform all the acts and duties which their principal may lawfully do; such approval, when given by the judge in vacation, shall be in writing, and shall be entered on the minutes of the court at the next term.
  2. Each deputy clerk of the circuit court, before he enters upon the duties of the appointment, shall take the oath of office, and shall give bond, with sufficient surety, to be payable, conditioned and approved as provided by law, in a penalty equal to three percent (3%) of the sum of all the state and county taxes shown by the assessment rolls and the levies to have been collectible in the county for the year immediately preceding the commencement of the term of office for the circuit clerk. However, the amount of such bond shall not be less than Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) nor more than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). The bond shall cover all monies coming into the hands of the deputy clerk by law or order of the court. The board of supervisors, in its discretion, may pay the bond on behalf of the deputy clerk.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 27, class 2, art. 1 (12), class 3, art. 1 (10); 1857, ch. 61, art. 17, ch. 62, art. 13; 1871, §§ 551, 990; 1880, § 2281; 1892, § 930; 1906, § 1006; Hemingway’s 1917, § 726; 1930, § 747; 1942, § 1662; Laws, 1999, ch. 380, § 1; Laws, 2009, ch. 467, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment, in (2), substituted “shall give bond” for “may give bond” in the first sentence, and rewrote the second sentence.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A board of supervisors is vested with the power to purchase real estate on which to construct public health buildings and clinics sponsored by the public health units of any county, or a public health building to house the county health department, out of the general fund and, provided that ultimate control and management of the facilities remains in the hands of local government, the operation of the building may be done pursuant to contract. 1998 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 801.

Only the clerk and his or her sworn deputy clerk have the authority to keep or make entries to the general docket, whether that docket be bound book or on computer. 2003 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 755.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 43.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Since circuit clerks were authorized by Miss. Code Ann. §9-7-123 to hire deputy clerks, Miss. Code Ann. §9-7-126 authorized circuit clerks to supervise the public duties of the deputy clerks who were deemed to be employees of the county, and Miss. Code Ann. §9-7-126 required that county boards of supervisors defray the salaries of deputy clerks with funds from the county treasury, the fact that circuit clerks received county funds to pay deputies and that clerks controlled those county employees strongly weighed in favor of finding that clerks were county agents for purposes of 18 U.S.C.S. § 666(d)(1). United States v. Harris, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50575 (S.D. Miss. July 11, 2007), aff'd, 296 Fed. Appx. 402, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22020 (5th Cir. Miss. 2008).

Acting as guardian of the person or estate of an habitual drunkard is not one of the ex officio duties of a clerk of the chancery court, but devolves upon him when, but not unless, he is appointed as such by a decree of that court, and therefore is not within the ex officio powers vested in a deputy chancery clerk by the statute. O'Bannon v. Henrich, 191 Miss. 815, 4 So. 2d 208, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1941).

Deputy circuit clerk may appoint justice of peace to preside over eminent domain court. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 107 Miss. 626, 65 So. 650, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 1914), aff'd, 250 U.S. 363, 39 S. Ct. 513, 63 L. Ed. 1032, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 1756 (U.S. 1919).

§ 9-7-124. Appointment of temporary deputies to assist circuit clerk of county.

  1. The board of supervisors of any county, in its discretion, may authorize the circuit clerk of the county to appoint one or more temporary full-time or temporary part-time deputies for the purpose of assisting the circuit clerk in the performance of duties relating to certification of signatures on initiative petitions as provided by Section 23-17-21.
  2. The salary of any temporary deputy clerk appointed under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall be established by the board of supervisors and paid out of any available funds in the county general fund.

HISTORY: Laws, 1997, ch. 323, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1997.

§ 9-7-125. Deputy circuit clerks; appointment and payment in certain counties.

  1. The circuit clerk of every county wherein is partially located a national forest and wherein U. S. Highway 49 and Mississippi Highway 26 intersect may appoint a full-time or part-time deputy to insure the efficient operation of the office of circuit clerk of said county.
  2. The boards of supervisors in said counties are authorized to pay to said circuit clerk a sum not to exceed three hundred dollars ($300.00) per month for employment of such deputy.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1662.5; Laws, 1964, ch. 278, § 1; Laws, 1972, ch. 387, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 26, 1972).

§ 9-7-126. Additional remuneration to circuit court clerks for salaries of deputy circuit clerks.

  1. There shall be allowed out of the county treasury from the general county funds, or any other available funds payable monthly by the board of supervisors of the county, not less than the following amounts for the purposes of defraying the salaries of deputy circuit clerks:

    Class 1 and 2 counties not less than Four Hundred Fifty Dollars ($450.00) per month;

    Class 3 and 4 counties not less than Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month;

    Class 5, 6, 7 and 8 counties not less than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month.

    The above and foregoing allowances shall be for the purposes of defraying the salaries of deputy circuit clerks provided such allowance, and upon written request of the circuit clerk, shall be paid directly to the deputy circuit clerk designated by him, in the absence of which request, the allowance shall be paid monthly to the circuit clerk. Deputy circuit clerks employed under authority of this section shall be deemed employees of the county. The clerk shall select and supervise their public duties.

  2. This section shall not apply to any county having a county court except that in any county in which U.S. Highway 49 and Mississippi Highway 6 intersect, any county in which U.S. Highway 61 and Mississippi Highway 4 intersect, any county having a population in excess of fifty-seven thousand (57,000) and which is traversed by the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway or whose county seat is within twenty (20) miles of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, any county bordering the State of Tennessee and the Mississippi River, any county in which U.S. Highway 61 and U.S. Highway 82 intersect, any county in which U.S. Highway 61 and Mississippi Highway 8 intersect, any county in which U.S. Highway 82 and U.S. Highway 49E intersect, any county in which U.S. Highway 49 and Mississippi Highway 16 intersect and which is traversed by Interstate Highway 55, and any county in which Highway 589 and Highway 98 intersect, the provisions of this section shall be discretionary with the respective board of supervisors.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 3934.9; Laws, 1972, ch. 467, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1975, ch. 424; Laws, 1986, ch. 402; Laws, 1994, ch. 499, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 496, § 1; Laws, 2009, ch. 422, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment added “and any county in which Highway 589 and Highway 98 intersect” preceding “the provisions of this section” near the end of (2); and made a minor stylistic change.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Board of supervisors is not required to contribute county funds in excess of statutory amounts; issue of compensating deputy circuit clerks whether for working overtime or otherwise is matter that must be resolved between clerk and his deputies, and is not issue that rests with board of supervisors. 1990 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 175.

For purposes of the nepotism statute, the circuit clerk is the is the appointing authority of a deputy who is being paid by the board of supervisors. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 413.

If the Board of Supervisors chooses to pay only the $450.00 required in Miss. Code Ann. §9-7-126 for a deputy clerk’s salary, the employer’s part of the social security withholding and Public Employee Retirement Systems contributions on the $450.00 must be paid by the county, and not by the circuit clerk. 2007 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 83, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 98.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

In a case in which defendant, a former county circuit clerk, was convicted of embezzlement, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 666(a)(1), he argued unsuccessfully that the district court erred by refusing to dismiss the embezzlement counts because he was not an agent of a county under 18 U.S.C.S. § 666(d)(1). Since (1) defendant directed and controlled deputy clerks, who were county employees; (2) as an officer of the county, he collected money belonging to the county; and (3) he was authorized to act on behalf of the county in directing county employees, defendant was an agent of the county. United States v. Harris, 296 Fed. Appx. 402, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22020 (5th Cir. Miss. 2008).

Since circuit clerks were authorized by Miss. Code Ann. §9-7-123 to hire deputy clerks, Miss. Code Ann. §9-7-126 authorized circuit clerks to supervise the public duties of the deputy clerks who were deemed to be employees of the county, and Miss. Code Ann. §9-7-126 required that county boards of supervisors defray the salaries of deputy clerks with funds from the county treasury, the fact that circuit clerks received county funds to pay deputies and that clerks controlled those county employees strongly weighed in favor of finding that clerks were county agents for purposes of 18 U.S.C.S. § 666(d)(1). United States v. Harris, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50575 (S.D. Miss. July 11, 2007), aff'd, 296 Fed. Appx. 402, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22020 (5th Cir. Miss. 2008).

2. Miscellaneous.

In a case in which defendant, a former county circuit clerk, was convicted of embezzlement, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 666(a)(1), his reliance on the Phillips decision, a Louisiana case, was misplaced. In the Phillips case, defendant, a former tax assessor of a parish, was not an agent of the parish under 18 U.S.C.S. § § 666(d)(1), because Louisiana law completely separated the tax assessor’s office from the parish government; however, in Mississippi, circuit clerks were not completely separated from county governments in Mississippi, and the Phillips decision was not applicable in the present case. United States v. Harris, 296 Fed. Appx. 402, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22020 (5th Cir. Miss. 2008).

§ 9-7-127. Final record to be made.

Within three (3) months after the final determination of any suit, or if an appeal shall have been taken, then within three (3) months after receiving a certificate of the affirmance of the judgment, the clerk shall enter in a well-bound book, to be kept for the purpose, a full and complete record of all the proceedings in the suit, if the title to the real estate be involved or affected, and if not, only on the order of the court. On failure to make a final record required by law or the order of the court, the clerk may be fined, as for a contempt, Twenty Dollars ($20.00) for each failure; and he shall also be liable in damages to any party injured. A final record shall not be made of any suit without a judgment on the merits. Such record may be kept on computer as provided in Section 9-7-171.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 640; 1906, § 697; Hemingway’s 1917, § 476; 1930, § 485; 1942, § 1423; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 18; Laws, 1994, ch. 458, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court §§ 20-22 et seq.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 24 et seq.

2 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Appeal and Error, Form 542.1 (Notice to clerk to prepare record – Transcript of complete record – Another form).

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

§ 9-7-128. Disposal and destruction of certain case files and loose records; electronic storage of certain files, records and documents.

  1. Where there is no requirement for a permanent record to be made, the clerk, upon order of the court, may dispose of and destroy all case files of the circuit or county court which have been in existence for ten (10) years or which have been reduced to judgment and that judgment satisfied and cancelled. The clerk may also dispose of and destroy any loose records not required by law to be kept as permanent records after a period of ten (10) years. No records, however, may be destroyed without the approval of the Director of the Department of Archives and History.
  2. The files, records and other documents described herein may, upon order of the court in accordance with the provisions of this section, be electronically stored for convenience and efficiency in storage. The electronic storage of documents, for purposes of this section, shall have the same meaning as set forth in Section 9-1-51. In those counties electing to store files, records and documents by means of electronic storage, the following described case files shall be electronically stored after the time periods described below have elapsed:
    1. Cases in county criminal or civil court which have been dismissed or in which a judgment has been entered at least three (3) years prior to the date upon which they are electronically stored; and
    2. Cases in circuit, criminal or civil court which have been dismissed or in which a judgment has been entered at least five (5) years prior to the date upon which they are electronically stored.
  3. Nothing in this section shall serve as authority to destroy any docket book, minute book, issue docket, subpoena docket, witness docket book, execution docket book, voter registration book, marriage record book, trial order, abstract of judgment, judgment roll, criminal file where an indictment was returned and the defendant convicted if the file is not at least twenty (20) years old, habeas corpus docket, preliminary hearing docket or Court of Appeals or Supreme Court appeals docket.

HISTORY: Codes 1942, § 1423; Laws, 1972, ch. 461, § 1; Laws, 1981 ch. 501, § 19; Laws, 1987, ch. 470; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 23, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Cross References —

Archives and Records Management Law, generally, see §§25-59-21 et seq.

Requirement that consent of director of department of archives and history be obtained prior to destruction of public records, see §§25-59-21,25-59-31.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Miss. Code Section 9-7-128, while by its terms applicable to circuit court, gives guidance as to legislative intent regarding destruction of justice court docket books; subsection (3) evinces intent that no docket book be destroyed; this has historically been position of Attorney General’s office in regard to justice court docket books. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 77.

Municipal judge, under authority of Section 21-23-7(10) may adopt municipal analog of 9-7-128. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 339.

§ 9-7-129. List of allowances against county treasury.

Within ten days after each term of circuit court, it shall be the duty of the clerk to deliver to the clerk of the board of supervisors a certified list of allowances made by the court at such term, payable out of the county treasury, specifying the amount, to whom allowed, and on what account. For any failure to deliver such list, the clerk of the circuit court may be punished by the court as for a contempt.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1491; 1892, § 641; 1906, § 698; Hemingway’s 1917, § 477; 1930, § 486; 1942, § 1424.

§ 9-7-131. Jury fee book.

The clerk of the circuit court shall keep a book to be called the “jury book,” in which he shall enter the time of issuing all certificates to jurors, the amount thereof, and to whom issued. Such book may be kept by means of electronic filing or storage or both as provided in Sections 9-1-51 through 9-1-57, or otherwise, as the clerk may elect. Within ten (10) days after each term of the court, he shall file in the office of the clerk of the board of supervisors of his county a certified copy of such entries, for the information of the board. For any failure in this respect, the clerk of the circuit court may be fined and imprisoned by the court as for a contempt.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 145; 1871, § 746; 1880, § 1699; 1892, § 642; 1906, § 699; Hemingway’s 1917, § 478; 1930, § 487; 1942, § 1425; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 19, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1994).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court §§ 20 et seq.

§ 9-7-133. Jury tax imposed and how collected.

A jury tax of three dollars is imposed on each original suit in the circuit court in which a plea is filed, and on every issue therein tried separately by a jury, and a tax of two dollars on each case transferred or appealed thereto, to constitute a fund for the payment of jurors, and to be collected by the clerk or sheriff as costs. The clerk shall be liable on his official bond for any failure to charge, receive, or issue execution for the jury tax; and the sheriff shall likewise be liable for a failure to collect or to pay the same to the county treasurer; and they may be fined as for a contempt therefor not more than one hundred dollars.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 4 (1); 1857, ch. 61, art. 147; 1871, § 525; 1880, § 1700; 1892, § 643; 1906, § 700; Hemingway’s 1917, § 479; 1930, § 488; 1942, § 1426.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity of law or rule requiring state court party who requests jury trial in civil case to pay costs associated with jury. 68 A.L.R.4th 343.

§ 9-7-135. Clerk to report list of cases subject to jury tax.

Within ten days after the end of any term of the court, the clerk shall furnish to the clerk of the board of supervisors a list of all judgments rendered and suits disposed of at such term, or in the preceding vacation, on which a jury tax is imposed, and shall pay over all sums received by him for jury tax during the term and since the last term, and for any failure shall be liable as provided by Section 9-7-133. And if any clerk shall fail to furnish the said list he shall be fined by the court in the sum of one hundred dollars, on motion of the clerk of the board of supervisors or the district attorney.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 4 (3); 1857, ch. 61, art. 148; 1871, § 749; 1880, § 1701; 1892, § 644; 1906, § 701; Hemingway’s 1917, § 480; 1930, § 489; 1942, § 1427.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury § 63.

§ 9-7-137. Register of sureties on bonds to be kept.

The clerk of the circuit court shall procure a well-bound book, arranged alphabetically and properly ruled, lined and headed to show the name of the principal and surety, name of principal obligor, name of obligee, date of bond, penalty of bond, kind of bond, where recorded if recorded, number of suit in which filed and date of discharge. In this he shall abstract each bond, when filed in his office, by entering in such record the name of each principal and surety, under the proper letter, the name of principal obligor, name of obligee, date, penalty, kind of bond, where recorded if recorded, and number of suit in which filed. And when such bond has been discharged, the date thereof shall be entered in said record under the proper heading. Such information may be kept on computer as provided in Section 9-7-171.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1375; 1892, § 2695; 1906, §§ 527, 3055; Hemingway’s 1917, §§ 284, 2413; 1930, §§ 345, 2247; 1942, §§ 345, 1256; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 20; Laws, 1994, ch. 458, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Cross References —

Register of sureties on bonds to be kept by chancery clerks, see §9-5-157.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bonds §§ 1 et seq.

§ 9-7-139. Recordation of pardons in county of conviction.

When a pardon may be granted by the governor to anyone convicted of a crime, two copies thereof shall be filed with the secretary of state in accordance with the provisions of Section 7-3-5, Mississippi Code of 1972. One such copy shall be retained by the secretary of state in a permanent register and the other copy shall be immediately forwarded by the secretary of state to the circuit clerk of the county in which such person was convicted. The county shall furnish and the circuit clerk shall maintain a permanent record of pardons and the circuit clerk may certify the fact of any recorded pardon for use in any court or agency, state or federal.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1427.5; Laws, 1964, ch. 368, eff from and after passage (approved June 11, 1964).

§ 9-7-141. Circuit court clerk’s office at Biloxi.

  1. In Harrison County, a county having two (2) judicial districts, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the circuit court to keep in his office at Biloxi, all records, record books, electronic equipment, records and documents and other documents of every character which he is now required by law to keep in his office at Gulfport, and said records, record books and documents of whatever character or duly certified copies thereof shall have the same force and effect in law as they would have if said books, records and documents had been kept or preserved by him in his office at Gulfport. And likewise, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the circuit court of Harrison County, as clerk of county court to keep in his office at Biloxi, all of the records, record books and documents of every character which he is now required by law to keep in his office at Gulfport, and said records, books and documents, or duly certified copies thereof, shall likewise have the same force and effect in law as they would have if said books, records and documents had been kept or preserved by him in his office at Gulfport.
  2. The Secretary of State shall furnish to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Harrison County, for the use of said court at Biloxi, a full set of the reports of the Supreme Court or court of last resort of this state, and all other books and laws which he shall at any time be required to deliver to the sheriff or the clerk of said county, in the several counties of this state; and also all other laws, maps and public documents required by law to be furnished, or usually furnished, to the sheriff or clerk of the circuit and chancery courts of this state under laws now or heretofore in force or that may hereafter be enacted.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, §§ 2910-07, 2910-20; Laws, 1962, ch. 257, §§ 7, 20; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 21, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1994).

Dockets

§ 9-7-171. General docket.

  1. The clerk shall keep a general docket, in which he shall enter the names of the parties in each case, the time of filing the declaration, indictment, record from inferior courts on appeal or certiorari, petition, plea, or demurrer, and all other papers in the cause, the issuance and return of process, and a note of all judgments rendered therein, by reference to the minute book and page. He shall mark on the papers in every cause the style and number of the suit, and the time when, and the party by whom filed; and he shall not suffer any paper so filed to be withdrawn but by leave of the court, and then only by retaining a copy, to be made at the cost of the party obtaining the leave. All the papers and pleadings filed in a cause shall be kept in the same file, and all the files kept in numerical order. Entries in criminal cases shall not be made on the docket so as to disclose the names of the defendants until their arrest. And the docket shall be duly indexed, both directly and indirectly, in the alphabetical order of the names of each of the parties.
  2. The general docket required to be kept by this section and all other dockets or records required by law to be kept by the circuit clerk may be kept on computer in lieu of any other physical docket, record or well-bound book if all such dockets and records are kept by computer in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Administrative Office of Courts.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 634; 1906, § 691; Hemingway’s 1917, § 470; 1930, § 479; 1942, § 1417; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 22; Laws, 1994, ch. 458, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Cross References —

Minutes of circuit court, see §9-1-33.

Assignment of cases and duties to county judges when dockets are overcrowded, see §9-9-35.

Docketing circuit court judgments or decrees in arbitration proceedings arising out of controversies based on construction contracts and related agreements, see §11-15-139.

For rule prescribing general docket entry requirements, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 79.

For rule pertaining to trail docket, see Miss. Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 9.02.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Only the clerk and his or her sworn deputy clerk have the authority to keep or make entries to the general docket, whether that docket be bound book or on computer. 2003 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 755.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 29.

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts §§ 52-56.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 246 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Compliance.

Circuit clerk adequately complied with Miss. Code Ann. §9-7-171 and Miss. R. Civ. P. 79 because no evidence was adduced that a docket entry was backdated. In re Dunn, 166 So.3d 488, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 232 (Miss. 2013).

§ 9-7-173. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 53, art. 3; 1857, ch. 61, art. 20; 1871, § 557; 1880, § 1485; 1892, § 635; 1906, § 692; Hemingway’s 1917, § 471; 1930, § 480; 1942, § 1418]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-7-173 directed the clerk to prepare, before the start of the term, a docket of cases triable at the approaching term of the court, and directed the court to call cases in the order they appeared on the docket.

§ 9-7-175. Criminal docket.

The clerk shall make out for each term a separate docket of cases begun by indictment, presentment, information, or other proceedings of a criminal nature, in the name or on behalf of the state or any municipal corporation. Such docket may be kept on computer as provided in Section 9-7-171.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 53, art. 5; 1857, ch. 61, art. 21; 1871, § 559; 1880, § 1486; 1892, § 636; 1906, § 693; Hemingway’s 1917, § 472; 1930, § 481; 1942, § 1419; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 23; Laws, 1994, ch. 458, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Cross References —

Assignment of cases and duties to county judges when dockets are overcrowded, see §9-9-35.

Proceedings in criminal cases generally, see §§99-1-1 et seq.

For rule pertaining to trial docket, see Miss. Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 9.02.

§ 9-7-177. Appearance docket.

The clerk shall keep an appearance docket, in which he shall enter all civil cases not triable at the first term after they are begun, in the order in which they are commenced, with the date of such commencement. Such docket may be kept on computer as provided in Section 9-7-171.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 22; 1871, § 558; 1880, § 1487; 1892, § 637; 1906, § 694; Hemingway’s 1917, § 473; 1930, § 482; 1942, § 1420; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 24; Laws, 1994, ch. 458, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 24 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 246 et seq.

§ 9-7-179. Subpoena docket.

The clerk shall keep a subpoena docket, in which he shall enter the style and number of each case in which a subpoena for a witness is issued, the name of the party for whom the witness is subpoenaed, to whom the subpoena is directed, the date of its issuance, when returnable, whether or not executed. He shall therein keep an account of all witnesses who may be absent when the case in which they have been subpoenaed is called for trial, or who may disqualify themselves from giving testimony by being intoxicated when such case is tried; and he shall not issue any certificate to such witnesses. The docket shall be kept duly indexed. Such docket may be kept on computer as provided in Section 9-7-171.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 22; 1871, § 561; 1880, § 1488; 1892, § 638; 1906, § 695; Hemingway’s 1917, § 474; 1930, § 483; 1942, § 1421; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 25; Laws, 1994, ch. 458, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Since inclusion of second sentence of Rule 45(a), clerk is relieved of burden of including any information on “hip-pocket” subpoenas, except signature and seal. 1992 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 422.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Impeachment of witness with respect to intoxication. 8 A.L.R.3d 749.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts § 24 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 246 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Prevailing party held not entitled to recover witness fees where certificate of allowance was not issued by clerk or demanded by witness during term of court or within five days thereafter notwithstanding witness made proper affidavit before clerk. Woodruff v. Bright, 175 Miss. 109, 166 So. 390, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1936).

§ 9-7-181. Execution docket.

The clerk shall keep a docket, in which he shall enter every capias pro finem and all executions issued by him, specifying the names of the parties, the date, the amount of the judgment or decree and of costs, the name of the officer to whom it is delivered, to what county directed, the date when issued, and the return-day thereof; and, when the same is returned, shall, without delay, record the return at large on the same page of the docket. And the execution docket shall be kept duly indexed, both directly and indirectly, in the alphabetical order of the names of each of the parties. Such docket may be kept on computer as provided in Section 9-7-171.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 268; 1871, § 565; 1880, § 1489; 1892, § 639; 1906, § 696; Hemingway’s 1917, § 475; 1930, § 484; 1942, § 1422; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 26; Laws, 1994, ch. 458, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 24 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 246 et seq.

Circuit Court Community Corrections Act of 2010

§ 9-7-201. Repealed.

Repealed by its own term, effective July 1, 2013.

§9-7-201. [Laws, 2010, ch. 544, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 28, 2010.)]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-7-201 authorized the Circuit Court Community Corrections Program pilot program.

Chapter 9. County Courts

§ 9-9-1. Continuation and establishment in certain counties.

  1. There shall be an inferior court to be known as the county court in and for each of the following counties:
    1. Each county of the state wherein a county court is in existence on July 1, 1985;
    2. From and after January 1, 1987, each county that has a population exceeding fifty thousand (50,000) inhabitants as shown by the latest federal decennial census; and
    3. The board of supervisors of any county having a population exceeding thirty-nine thousand (39,000) inhabitants as shown by the latest federal decennial census in which Highways 589 and 98 intersect shall have the option to establish a county court under the provisions of this section.
    1. A county judge for a county that is required to establish a county court under subsection (1)(b) of this section shall be elected by the qualified electors of the county in the same manner as provided for the election of circuit court judges at an election held at the same time as the next regular election of circuit court judges first occurring after the date upon which it can be determined that a county court is required under the provisions of subsection (1)(b) of this section to be established in such county.
    2. A county judge for a county electing to establish a county court under subsection (1)(c) of this section shall be elected by the qualified electors of the county in the same manner as provided for the election of circuit court judges at an election held at the November general election first occurring after the date when the board of supervisors spreads upon its minutes a resolution creating the county court. The term of the county court judge so elected shall begin on the first day of January following the November election, and shall end at the same time as for county court judges generally. Thereafter, the county court judge shall be elected and serve for a term as provided for county court judges generally.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not be construed so as to require that a county court be established in any county in which the board of supervisors has agreed and contracted with the board of supervisors of any other county or counties to support and maintain one (1) county court for such counties as provided in Section 9-9-3.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 693; 1942 § 1604; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1934, ch. 236; Laws, 1936, ch. 247; Laws, 1948, ch. 236; Laws, 1950, ch. 321; Laws, 1962, ch. 300; Laws, 1964, ch. 322; Laws, 1966, ch. 344, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 311, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 335, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 477, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 457, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 60; Laws, 2002, ch. 356, § 3; Laws, 2007, ch. 318, § 1; brought forward without change, Laws, 2010, ch. 442, § 2, eff June 21, 2010 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the bringing forward without change of this section).

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation deleted the words “for the same term and” preceding “in the same manner” in (2)(a). The words were added by a 2002 bill that was contingent upon ratification of a constitutional amendment which failed. The words were mistakenly left in the code and included in Laws of 2017, ch. 318, § 1. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its August 15, 2017, meeting.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2002, ch. 713 (Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 543), provides in pertinent part:

“BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, That the following amendment to the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 is proposed to the qualified electors of the state:

“Amend Section 153, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, to read as follows:

“‘Section 153. The judges of the circuit and chancery courts shall be elected by the people in a manner and at a time to be provided by the Legislature. The judges elected for a term of office beginning from and after January 1, 2003, shall hold their office for a term of six (6) years.’

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That this proposed amendment shall be submitted by the Secretary of State to the qualified electors at an election to be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November 2002, as provided by Section 273 of the Constitution and by general law.

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the explanation of this proposed amendment for the ballot shall read as follows: ‘This proposed constitutional amendment increases the terms of office of circuit and chancery court judges from four to six years beginning January 1, 2003.’

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi shall submit this resolution, immediately upon adoption by the Legislature, to the Attorney General of the United States or to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in accordance with the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.”

On June 25, 2007, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the amendments to this section by Laws of 2007, ch. 318, § 1.

By letter dated June 21, 2010, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the bringing forward without change of this section by Laws of 2010, ch. 442.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment inserted “for the same term and” in (2).

The 2007 amendment added (1)(c); added (2)(b) and designated former (2) as present (2)(a); substituted “subsection (1)(b)” for “paragraph (1)(b)” both times it appears in (2)(a); and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

The 2010 amendment brought this section forward without change.

Cross References —

Civil practice and procedure provisions common to courts, see §§11-1-1 et seq.

Civil practice and procedure generally in county courts, see §§11-9-1 et seq.

Jurisdiction of county courts in paternity cases, see §93-9-15.

Rules governing practice and procedure in county courts, see Miss. Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice 1.01 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Place of holding sessions of trial court as affecting validity of its proceedings. 18 A.L.R.3d 572.

Power of court to impose standard of personal appearance or attire. 73 A.L.R.3d 353.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 5 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 121 et seq.

Law Reviews.

1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Civil Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 719, December 1979.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jurisdiction in general.

3. Jurisdictional amount.

4. Jurisdiction in vacation.

5. Exclusive jurisdiction.

6. Criminal jurisdiction.

1. In general.

Chapter 17 of the Code of 1930, pertaining to county courts, is not a repeal but a re-enactment of the applicable provisions of the Act of 1926. Quitman County v. Turner, 196 Miss. 746, 18 So. 2d 122, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1944).

One of the purposes in the establishment of county courts was to provide a judicial officer possessing all the qualifications of a circuit judge or chancellor, who would be available at all times for service in habeas corpus cases and to furnish a speedy remedy in habeas corpus. Cole v. Cole, 194 Miss. 292, 12 So. 2d 425, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1943).

County Court Act did not repeal entire eminent domain chapter, but both must be construed together, and all provisions of each not repugnant to provisions of other must stand and in case of repugnancy county court chapter controls. Mississippi State Highway Dep't v. Haines, 162 Miss. 216, 139 So. 168, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1932).

Statute creating county courts in certain counties held not local or special law, when interpreted as authorizing governor to determine population of counties automatically coming under act. State ex rel. Knox v. Speakes, 144 Miss. 125, 109 So. 129, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 339 (Miss. 1926).

2. Jurisdiction in general.

Where timely objection was not made, as specifically required by Code 1942 § 1433, venue was waived. Wofford v. Cities Service Oil Co., 236 So. 2d 743, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1499 (Miss. 1970).

Supreme Court, circuit courts, chancery courts and county courts, when acting on appeal from a special possessory court of a justice of the peace, have only such jurisdiction to adjudicate regarding title to land as is vested in special court from which appeal was taken. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Original jurisdiction to make conclusive and final adjudication of title to land rests alone with circuit and chancery courts, and to a limited extent with the county courts. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

County court has jurisdiction under this section of ejectment action to recover possession of land whose value does not exceed $1,000. Allen v. Gibson, 198 Miss. 23, 20 So. 2d 479, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 164 (Miss. 1945).

Jurisdiction of county court is not confined to particular justice district, but is concurrent with jurisdiction of all justices of county. Webb v. State, 158 Miss. 715, 131 So. 262, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1930).

County court had no jurisdiction of suit by school patron to restrain further employment of alleged incompetent driver of school truck, county court having no jurisdiction in equity for maintenance of civil rights. Welch v. Bryant, 157 Miss. 559, 128 So. 734, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 331 (Miss. 1930).

Chancellor ordering issuance of writ of injunction could not transfer case to county court for hearing on whether injunction should be made perpetual. Welch v. Bryant, 157 Miss. 559, 128 So. 734, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 331 (Miss. 1930).

3. Jurisdictional amount.

County court had jurisdiction of proceeding for partition of land held by tenants in common in which original bill alleged that value of lots sought to be partitioned at time of filing of bill would not exceed $1000 and final decree of county court adjudicated truth of this fact and found that value of land had increased since time of filing of bill because of discovery of oil nearby and lots brought $1,200 at sale, since jurisdiction having been acquired by original bill it was not defeated by subsequent events. Barnes v. Rogers, 206 Miss. 887, 41 So. 2d 58, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 311 (Miss. 1949).

Jurisdiction of a court is determined by amount in controversy at time when court is first called on to exercise jurisdiction, which, in trial court, is amount claimed at time when suit is filed, and jurisdiction once acquired is not defeated by subsequent events, even though they are of such character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in first instance. Barnes v. Rogers, 206 Miss. 887, 41 So. 2d 58, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 311 (Miss. 1949).

County court is court of general jurisdiction although limited in amount of its jurisdiction. Barnes v. Rogers, 206 Miss. 887, 41 So. 2d 58, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 311 (Miss. 1949).

A county court had no jurisdiction of a replevin action involving life insurance policies, the value of which was given in the affidavit as totaling $100 but which actually had a cash surrender value in excess of $1000. Van Norman v. Van Norman, 203 Miss. 310, 34 So. 2d 733, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 270 (Miss. 1948).

A judgment of the trial court sustaining a demurrer to an action to enforce a money reserve title contract, based on the claim that the amount sued for exceeded the jurisdictional amount and that the plaintiff failed to demand possession of the chattel before bringing suit, was not on the merits, and so the defense of res judicata was not available in a second action, in which the sum sued for was within the jurisdictional amount. Grant v. Dotson, 193 Miss. 577, 10 So. 2d 680, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 155 (Miss. 1942).

4. Jurisdiction in vacation.

However, as to eminent domain cases, statute (Laws 1936, ch. 247) now confers on county judge in vacation jurisdiction county court had in term time. State Highway Com. v. Day, 181 Miss. 708, 180 So. 794, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 1938).

County court is unauthorized to try causes in vacation; hence trial and judgment during vacation were void. Mississippi State Highway Dep't v. Haines, 162 Miss. 216, 139 So. 168, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1932).

Failure to object to trial of eminent domain proceeding before county court in vacation did not confer jurisdiction on county court by consent. Mississippi State Highway Dep't v. Haines, 162 Miss. 216, 139 So. 168, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1932).

5. Exclusive jurisdiction.

Exclusive jurisdiction of an unlawful entry detainer case is now vested in the county court by reason of this section. Gardner v. Cook, 173 Miss. 244, 158 So. 150, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 389 (Miss. 1935).

The effect of this section is to abolish special eminent domain courts (see Code 1942, § 2750) in counties having county courts, and to vest the jurisdiction thereof in the county court. City of Hattiesburg v. Pritchett, 160 Miss. 342, 134 So. 140, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 181 (Miss. 1931).

6. Criminal jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction of county court in misdemeanor case is co-extensive with boundary of county wherein offense was committed, and venue of crime is in that county. Webb v. State, 158 Miss. 715, 131 So. 262, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1930).

To confer jurisdiction on county court in misdemeanor case, State need only allege and prove crime was committed in county. Webb v. State, 158 Miss. 715, 131 So. 262, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1930).

§ 9-9-3. Establishment by agreement between two or more counties; expenses of operating court to be prorated.

Any two (2) or more counties in the discretion of their respective boards of supervisors may contract and agree between themselves to support and maintain one (1) county court for such counties. If such agreement be made then the expenses of the operation of said court shall be prorated among such two (2) or more counties and the pro rata part of each county shall be paid from the general funds of each county, from any special tax which may be levied for the support of such court, or any funds made available to the county from the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for this purpose.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 693; 1942, § 1604; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1934, ch. 236; Laws, 1936, ch. 247; Laws, 1948, ch. 236; Laws, 1950, ch. 321; Laws, 1962, ch. 300; Laws, 1964, ch. 322; Laws, 1966, ch. 344, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 311, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 335, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 338, eff from and after passage (approved March 11, 1974).

Cross References —

Relationship between this section and general requirements with respect to the establishment of county courts, see §9-9-1.

County courts in counties not brought within the provisions of this chapter by the terms of this section or §9-9-1, see §9-9-37.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Place of holding sessions of trial court as affecting validity of its proceedings. 18 A.L.R.3d 572.

Law Reviews.

1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Civil Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 719, December 1979.

§ 9-9-5. County judge; qualifications, election, term of office, and filling of vacancies.

  1. The county judge shall possess all of the qualifications of a circuit judge as prescribed by the Mississippi Constitution. In the event of the establishment of a county court by agreement between two (2) or more counties as provided in Section 9-9-3, the judge of said court may be a qualified elector of any one (1) of said counties, and shall have such other qualifications as provided for by law. The county judge shall be elected by the qualified electors of his county at the time and in the manner as circuit judges are elected and he shall hold office for the same term. Vacancies in the office of county judge shall be filled in the same manner as vacancies in the office of circuit judge.
  2. Provided, however, that in any county having a total population in excess of eleven thousand (11,000) according to the 1970 federal decennial census and a total assessed valuation of real and personal property of not less than sixteen million dollars ($16,000,000.00) and not more than seventeen million dollars ($17,000,000.00) and in which Mississippi Highway 4 and United States Highway 61 intersect, in which there is a vacancy in the post of county judge resulting from the failure of a candidate to qualify for that post, the board of supervisors of such county may, upon certification of such vacancy to the board, appoint a county judge to serve out the term so vacated who shall be a licensed attorney from such county or an adjoining county. The compensation of such attorney shall be the same he would have otherwise received if elected.
  3. In the event that any county wherein is located a state hospital and wherein U.S. Highway 80 and Mississippi Highway 43 intersect shall establish a county court, the county judge of such county shall be elected at the general election to be held on Tuesday after the first Monday of November, 1982, after qualifying therefor as provided by law. Provided, however, that the board of supervisors of such county may appoint a county judge who shall be a licensed attorney from such county until the office of county judge shall be filled pursuant to said election.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, §§ 693, 697; 1942, §§ 1604, 1608; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1934, ch. 236; Laws, 1936, chs. 247, 254; Laws, 1946, ch. 370; Laws, 1948, ch. 236; Laws, 1950, chs. 251, 321; Laws, 1952, ch. 238; Laws, 1954, ch. 230; Laws, 1954 Ex Sess ch. 15; Laws, 1955 Ex. ch. 39, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 231, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1960, ch. 234; Laws, 1962, ch. 300; Laws, 1964, ch. 322; Laws, 1966, chs. 344, § 1, 345, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 311, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1970, chs. 335, § 1, 402, § 4; Laws, 1971, ch. 495, § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 399; Laws, 1982, ch. 476, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 22, 1982).

Cross References —

Qualifications of circuit judge, see Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 154.

Prohibition against judge having interest in cause or being related to parties sitting in cases, see §9-1-11.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Place of holding sessions of trial court as affecting validity of its proceedings. 18 A.L.R.3d 572.

Am. Jur.

46 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Judges §§ 8, 10, 11, 12, 68, 69.

CJS.

48A C.J.S., Judges §§ 20, 21.

Law Reviews.

Case, In search of an independent judiciary: alternatives to judicial elections in Mississippi. 13 Miss. C. L. Rev. 1, Fall, 1992.

1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Civil Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 719, December 1979.

§ 9-9-7. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1994, ch 564, § 102, eff from and after September 6, 1994 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the repeal of this section).

[Codes, 1930, § 708; 1942, § 1623; Laws, 1926, ch. 131]

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 6, 1994, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the repeal of this section by Laws of 1994, ch. 564, § 66.

Former §9-9-7 was entitled: Primary elections, county judges nominated.

§ 9-9-9. County judge; general restriction on practice of law.

The county judge shall not practice law in any of the courts of the county wherein he holds court, but this prohibition shall not prohibit the judges of the county courts from practicing in any of the courts so far as to enable them to bring to a conclusion cases actually pending when they were appointed or elected, in which such county judges were then employed as provided in Section 9-1-25, Mississippi Code of 1972, for judges of the circuit court and chancellors.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 697; 1942, § 1608; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1936, ch. 254; Laws, 1946, ch. 370; Laws, 1950, ch. 251; Laws, 1952, ch. 238; Laws, 1954, ch. 230; Laws, 1954 Ex Sess ch. 15; Laws, 1955 Ex. ch. 39, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 231, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1960, ch. 234; Laws, 1966, ch. 345, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 311, § 2; Laws, 1970, ch. 402, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved April 3, 1970).

Cross References —

Prohibition against practice of law by Supreme Court judges, circuit judges and chancellors, see §9-1-25.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Serving as a family master does not amount to the practice of law as contemplated by this section and Section 9-9-11. 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 689.

A county court judge may be appointed as a family master and receive additional compensation from the county under Section 9-5-255(4) beyond the compensation that is received for being a county court judge. 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 689.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews.

1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Civil Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 719, December 1979.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Discipline.

Where a judge breached the peace during the repossession of an automobile jointly owned by the judge’s wife and mother-in-law, his conduct violated Miss. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 1; the Supreme Court of Mississippi suspended him for 180 days without compensation. The judge had a pattern of misconduct, as he had been disciplined in the past for practicing law as a judge in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §§9-1-25,9-9-9. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 977 So. 2d 314, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 2008).

Where a county judge had not willfully abused the privilege of filing new complaints while in office, the court adopted the commission’s recommendation that the judge be publicly reprimanded and that he be reinstated after his temporary suspension. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 876 So. 2d 324, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 780 (Miss. 2004).

§ 9-9-11. County judge; compensation and further restrictions.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (2), (3) and (4), the county court judge shall receive an annual salary payable monthly out of the county treasury in an amount not to exceed One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) less than the salary which is now or shall hereafter be provided for circuit and chancery judges of this state, in the discretion of the board of supervisors of said county; provided, however, that the salary of such judge shall not be reduced during his term of office. Provided further, that the office of county court judge in any county receiving an annual salary of Thirty-six Thousand Dollars ($36,000.00) or more shall be a full-time position, and the holder thereof shall not otherwise engage in the practice of law.
  2. If a county court is established by agreement between two (2) or more counties as provided in Section 9-9-3, the county judge of the court so established shall be paid a salary equal to one and one-half (1-1/2) times that salary that he would be paid if he were the judge of the smallest of such two (2) or more counties, such salary to be paid in monthly installments as provided by law; provided that such salary shall not exceed One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) less than the salary of the circuit and chancery judges of this state.
  3. The county court judge shall receive an annual salary payable monthly out of the county treasury as follows:
    1. In any county having a population of seventy thousand (70,000) or more according to the 1980 federal census, the county judge shall receive an annual salary of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) less than that paid to a circuit court judge. The office of county judge shall be a full-time position, and the holder thereof shall not otherwise engage in the practice of law.
    2. In any county having a population of sixty thousand (60,000) or more but less than seventy thousand (70,000) according to the 1980 federal census, the county judge shall receive an annual salary of Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00). The office of county judge shall be a full-time position, and the holder thereof shall not otherwise engage in the practice of law. The county judge shall not be eligible for any additional salary except as may be authorized in subsection (4).
    3. In any county having a population of twenty-seven thousand (27,000) or more but less than sixty thousand (60,000) according to the 1980 federal census, the county judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) but not more than Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00), in the discretion of the board of supervisors of said county. The county judge shall not be eligible for any additional salary except as may be authorized in subsection (4). In the event that the board of supervisors of said county elects to pay such county judge an annual salary of Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) or more, the office of county judge shall be a full-time position, and the holder thereof shall not otherwise engage in the practice of law.
    4. In any county having a population of less than twenty-seven thousand (27,000) according to the 1980 federal census, the county judge shall receive an annual salary of not less than Four Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($4,200.00) and not more than Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($8,500.00), in the discretion of the board of supervisors of said county. The county judge shall not be eligible for any additional salary except as may be authorized in subsection (4).
  4. The county judge of any county described in this subsection shall be paid the compensation, and he shall be subject to any restrictions set forth in the following paragraphs:
    1. The county judge of any such Class 1 county with a population according to the latest federal decennial census of forty-five thousand (45,000) or more and lying wholly within a levee district and having two (2) judicial districts shall, in the discretion of the board of supervisors of such county, receive an annual salary not exceeding Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00), or a sum which is One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) less than the salary which is now or shall hereafter be provided for circuit and chancery judges of the state, whichever is greater.
    2. The county judge of any Class 1 county having an area in excess of nine hundred twenty-five (925) square miles shall receive an annual salary of not less than Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) but, in the discretion of the board of supervisors of such county, such salary may be not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) less than the annual salary of a circuit judge, payable monthly out of the county treasury, and the county judge shall not practice law.
    3. The office of county judge in any such Class 1 county with a population according to the 1970 federal decennial census of greater than thirty-nine thousand (39,000), and where U.S. Highway 61 and Mississippi Highway 6 intersect, shall receive an annual salary to be paid in monthly installments of not less than an amount equal to ninety percent (90%) of the annual salary which is now or shall hereafter be provided for circuit and chancery judges of the state, as follows: The salary of the county judge shall be increased by ten percent (10%) annually above the base salary of the preceding year until such time as the judge’s salary is equal to the amount that is provided by this subsection. The office of county judge shall be a full-time position and the holder thereof shall not otherwise engage in the practice of law.
    4. In any Class 1 county bordering on the Mississippi River and which has situated therein a national military park and national military cemetery, the office of county judge shall be a full-time position and the holder thereof shall not otherwise engage in the practice of law. The salary for the county judge in said county shall be fixed at a sum which is One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) less than the salary which is now or shall hereafter be provided for circuit and chancery judges of this state.
    5. The county judge in any county having a population of at least forty-two thousand one hundred eleven (42,111), according to the 1970 census, and where U.S. Highway 49E and U.S. Highway 82 intersect, shall receive an annual salary to be paid in monthly installments of not less than Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) but not more than Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) less than the annual salary of the circuit judge, in the discretion of the board of supervisors of said county.
    6. The county judge in any Class 1 county bordering on the Mississippi River and having an area of less than four hundred fifty (450) square miles wherein U.S. Highways 84 and 61 intersect shall receive an annual salary of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) less than the annual salary of a circuit judge, and such county judge shall not practice law in any manner. The county judge in such county shall not be eligible to receive any additional salary authorized by this section or from any other source other than that set out and authorized by this paragraph.
    7. The county judge of any Class 1 county bordering on the Mississippi River on the west and the State of Tennessee on the north, and traversed north to south by Interstate Highway 55, shall receive an annual salary of ninety percent (90%) of the salary which is now or shall hereafter be provided for chancery and circuit judges of this state, but in any event not less than Sixty Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($60,200.00).
    8. The county judge of any Class 1 county with a population of greater than sixty-nine thousand (69,000) according to the 1980 federal decennial census, and wherein U.S. Highway 80 and Mississippi Highway 43 intersect, shall receive an annual salary in an amount not greater than the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) less than the salary which is now or shall hereafter be provided for circuit and chancery judges of this state, in the discretion of the board of supervisors of said county.
    9. The county judge of any county having a population in excess of sixty-six thousand (66,000) according to the 1980 federal decennial census, wherein is located a state-supported university and in which U.S. Highways 49 and 11 intersect, shall receive an annual salary of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) less than that paid to a circuit court judge. The office of such county judge shall be a full-time position, and the holder thereof shall not otherwise engage in the practice of law.
    10. The county judge of any county having two (2) judicial districts, having a population in excess of sixty-one thousand nine hundred (61,900) according to the 1980 federal decennial census, in which U.S. Interstate Highway 59 intersects with U.S. Highway 84, shall receive an annual salary of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) less than the salary which is now or hereafter authorized to be paid circuit and chancery court judges of this state. The office of such county judge shall be a full-time position, and the holder thereof shall not otherwise engage in the practice of law.
    11. The office of county judge of any Class I county wherein U.S. Highway 51 and U.S. Highway 98 intersect shall be a full-time position and the holder thereof shall not otherwise engage in the practice of law. The annual salary for the office of county judge in said county may be fixed, in the discretion of the board of supervisors of said county, at a sum not to exceed Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) less than the salary which is now or shall hereafter be provided for circuit and chancery judges of this state.
    12. The county judge of any county having a population of more than forty-one thousand six hundred (41,600) but less than forty-one thousand six hundred fifty (41,650) according to the 1980 federal census, and wherein U.S. Highway 49 intersects with Mississippi Highway 22, shall receive an annual salary payable monthly out of the county treasury of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) less than the salary provided now or hereafter for circuit and chancery judges of this state.
    13. The county judge of any county having a population of more than fifty-seven thousand (57,000) but less than fifty-seven thousand one hundred (57,100) according to the 1980 federal census, wherein U.S. Highway 45 intersects with Mississippi Highway 6, shall receive an annual salary in an amount established by the board of supervisors, but in no event to exceed the salary provided now or hereafter for circuit and chancery judges of this state.
    14. The county judge of any county having a population of more than fifty-seven thousand three hundred (57,300) according to the 1980 federal decennial census, wherein is located a state-supported university and wherein U.S. Highways 82 and 45 intersect, shall receive an annual salary in an amount established by the board of supervisors, but in no event to exceed the salary provided now or hereafter for circuit and chancery judges of this state.
  5. The salary of a county court judge or justice court judge shall not be reduced during his term of office as a result of a population decrease based upon the 1990 federal decennial census.
  6. The salary of a sheriff shall not be reduced during his term of office as a result of a population decrease based upon the 1990 federal decennial census.
  7. Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, the board of supervisors of any county, in its discretion, may pay its county court judge an annual salary of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) less than that paid to a circuit court judge. The office of county judge shall be a full-time position, and the holder thereof shall not otherwise engage in the practice of law.
    1. There shall be transferred to the county for each county court judge, payment to be made in monthly installments from the Judicial System Operation Fund created under Section 9-21-45, an annual salary supplement of:
      1. From and after January 1, 2013, through December 31, 2013, the sum of Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-seven Dollars and Fifty Cents ($7,957.50), plus any applicable fringe benefits resulting from this amount;
      2. From and after January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2014, the sum of Fifteen Thousand Nine Hundred Fifteen Dollars ($15,915.00), plus any applicable fringe benefits resulting from this amount;
      3. From and after January 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015, the sum of Twenty-three Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-two Dollars and Fifty Cents ($23,872.50), plus any applicable fringe benefits resulting from this amount; and
      4. From and after January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2019, the sum of Thirty-one Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Dollars ($31,830.00), plus any applicable fringe benefits resulting from this amount.
    2. From and after January 1, 2019, and every four (4) years thereafter, the annual salary in this subsection (8) shall be adjusted according to the level of compensation recommended by the State Personnel Board for county court judges in the board’s most recent report on judicial salaries, as required under Section 25-9-115, to the extent that sufficient funds are available.
    3. The total annual salary paid to the county court judge out of the county treasury and out of the Judicial System Operation Fund created under Section 9-21-45 shall not exceed the salary limitation set forth in subsection (7) of this section.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, §§ 693, 697; 1942, §§ 1604, 1608; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1934, ch. 236; Laws, 1936, chs. 247, 254; Laws, 1946, ch. 370; Laws, 1948, ch. 236; Laws, 1950, chs. 251, 321; Laws, 1952, ch. 238; Laws, 1954, ch. 230; Laws, 1954 Ex Sess ch. 15; Laws, 1955 Ex. ch. 39, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 231, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1960, ch. 234; Laws, 1962, ch. 300; Laws, 1964, ch. 322; Laws, 1966, chs. 344, § 1, 345, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 311, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1970, chs. 335, § 1, 402, § 4; Laws, 1971, ch. 495, § 1; Laws, 1973, ch. 486, § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 461; Laws, 1978, ch. 504, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 457, § 2; Laws, 1980, ch. 558; Laws, 1982, ch. 476, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 526; Laws, 1986, ch. 463; Laws, 1988, ch. 508; Laws, 1989, ch. 323, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 559 § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 550, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 334, § 1; Laws, 2006, ch. 376, § 1; Laws, 2012, ch. 329, § 8, eff January 1, 2013 (the later of the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, or January 1, 2013).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 559, § 2, effective from and after passage (approved April 12, 1991), provides as follows:

“SECTION 2. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage; however, the amendment under Section 1 of this act to Section 9-9-11(4)(g) and new paragraph (4)(n) of Section 9-9-11 shall take effect and be in force from and after October 1, 1991.”

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated May 27, 1993, interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 550, § 1.

By letter dated August 19, 2004, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 2004, ch. 334, § 1.

On June 28, 2006, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2006, ch. 376, § 1.

Laws of 2012, ch. 329, § 11 provides:

“SECTION 11. Sections 1 and 8 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, or January 1, 2013, whichever occurs later; and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 2012.”

By letter dated August 24, 2012, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the amendment of this section by Chapter 329, Laws of 2012.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment rewrote (7).

The 2006 amendment substituted “subsections (2), (3) and (4)” for “subsections (2) and (3)” in (1); substituted “payable monthly out of the county treasury of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) less than” for “in an amount established by the board of supervisors but in no event to exceed” preceding “the salary provided” near the end of (4)( l ); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2012 amendment substituted “If a county court is established by agreement” for “In the event of the establishment of a county court by agreement” in (2); and added (8).

Cross References —

Salary of judge of county court established by agreement between two or more counties as provided in this section, see §9-9-11.

Applicability of this section to county judges in counties which have come under the provisions of this chapter by an election, see §9-9-37.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Serving as a family master does not amount to the practice of law as contemplated by Section 9-9-9 and this section. 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 689.

A county court judge may be appointed as a family master and receive additional compensation from the county under Section 9-5-255(4) beyond the compensation that is received for being a county court judge. 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 689.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Judge’s previous legal association with attorney connected to current case as warranting disqualification. 85 A.L.R.4th 700.

Am. Jur.

46 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Judges §§ 61 et seq.

CJS.

48A C.J.S., Judges §§ 181 et seq.

Law Reviews.

1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Civil Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 719, December 1979.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The salary provision in this section [Code 1942 § 1608] for county judge applies only to the larger counties automatically established by the Act of 1926, and the sliding-scale provision of Code 1942 § 1618 applies to the smaller counties which elected to establish county courts under the enabling provisions of the Act of 1926, so that the annual salary for judge of Quitman County Court, established by the people under the enabling provisions of the Act of 1926 at a salary of $2,000, continued to remain at $2,000 after the adoption of the 1930 Code since that county fell in that category under Code 1942 § 1618, in view of the fact that § 697 of 1930 Code merely carried over the automatic provision of the Act of 1926, whereas § 706, Code 1930 (Code 1942 § 1618) carried over the enabling provisions of the Act of 1926. Quitman County v. Turner, 196 Miss. 746, 18 So. 2d 122, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1944).

§ 9-9-13. Municipalities may supplement salaries of county judicial officers surrendering right to practice law.

The governing body of any municipality with a population in excess of one hundred thousand (100,000) persons, upon determination that municipal security or efficiency is involved in the judicial process in the handling of appeals from municipal court and of related matters, may contract to supplement the salary of county judicial officers in the county in which such municipality is located in exchange for the surrender by such judicial officers of the right to engage in the practice of law. The salary of such judicial officer so supplemented shall not exceed the salary of circuit or chancery judges in such county or of municipal councilmen, whichever is less.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1608.5; Laws, 1964, ch. 503, eff from and after passage (approved June 11, 1964).

§ 9-9-14. Additional judge for Harrison County.

  1. In order to relieve the crowded condition of the docket in the county court of Harrison County and particularly to facilitate and make possible the trial and disposition of the large number of causes on said docket, there shall be three (3) county judges for Harrison County provided for and elected as herein set out.
  2. For the purposes of nomination and election, the three (3) judgeships shall be separate and distinct, to be denominated for purposes of appointment, nomination and election only as “place one,” “place two” and “place three.” There shall be no distinction whatsoever in the powers, duties and emoluments of the three (3) offices of county judge, except that the county judge of Harrison County who has been for the longest time continuously a county judge of said county shall have the power to assign causes, terms and dockets.
  3. While there shall be no limitation whatsoever upon the powers and duties of the said county judges other than as cast upon them by the constitution and laws of this state, the county court of Harrison County may, in the discretion of the county judge who has been for the longest time continuously a judge of said court, be divided into civil, equity and criminal divisions as a matter of convenience, by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.
  4. The Governor shall appoint some qualified person from Harrison County to fill the office of county judge hereby created, who shall hold office until his successor is elected and qualified in the manner and form as provided in Section 9-9-5, Mississippi Code of 1972, and said appointment and election shall in all respects be of the same import as if the office had heretofore been in existence and a vacancy had as of October 1, 1972, occurred therein.
  5. Each county judge shall appoint his own court reporter in accordance with Section 9-13-61, Mississippi Code of 1972, for the purpose of doing the necessary stenographic work of the court.
  6. The family court judge in Harrison County shall be the county judge for “place three” from and after March 19, 1999, to serve for the term expiring December 31, 2002.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1604.9; Laws, 1972, ch. 348, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 432, § 3, eff from and after May 28, 1999 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

By letter dated May 28, 1999, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 1999, ch. 432, § 3.

§ 9-9-15. Additional judges for Hinds County.

  1. In order to relieve the crowded condition of the docket in the county court and in the youth court of the first judicial district of Hinds County and particularly to facilitate and make possible the trial and disposition of the large number of causes on said docket and in the youth court, there shall be three (3) county judges for Hinds County, Mississippi, provided for and elected as herein set out.
  2. For purposes of appointment, nomination and election, the three (3) judgeships shall be separate and distinct, the presently existing judgeship and its succession to be denominated for purposes of appointment, nomination and election only as Place One, Place Two and Place Three. There shall be no distinction whatsoever in the powers, duties and emoluments of the three (3) offices of county judge, except that the county judge of Hinds County who has been for the longest time continuously a county judge of said county, shall have the right to assign causes, terms and dockets.
  3. While there shall be no limitation whatsoever upon the powers and duties of the said county judges other than as cast upon them by the constitution and laws of this state, the county court in Hinds County may, in the discretion of the county judge who has been for the longest time continuously a judge of said court, be divided into civil, criminal and youth court divisions as a matter of convenience, by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1604.5; Laws, 1958, ch. 231, §§ 1-4; Laws, 1971, ch. 364, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 15, 1971).

§ 9-9-16. Additional judge for Washington County.

  1. In order to relieve the crowded condition of the docket in the county court of Washington County and particularly to facilitate and make possible the trial and disposition of the large number of causes on said docket, it is enacted that from and after January 1, 1976, in the manner provided herein, there shall be two (2) county judges for Washington County, Mississippi, provided for and elected as herein set out.
  2. For the purposes of nomination and election, the two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct, the presently existing judgeship and its succession to be denominated for purposes of appointment, nomination and election only as “place one” and the judgeship hereby created and its succession for said selfsame purposes and none other to be designated as “place two.” There shall be no distinction whatsoever in the powers, duties and emoluments of the two (2) offices of county judge, except that the county judge of Washington County who has been for the longest time continuously a county judge of said county shall have the power to assign causes, terms and dockets. Should neither judge of said county court have served longer in said office than the other, then that judge of this county court who has been for the longest time a member of the Mississippi State Bar shall have the right to assign causes, terms and dockets.
  3. While there shall be no limitation whatsoever upon the powers and duties of the said county judges other than as cast upon them by the constitution and laws of this state, the county court of Washington County may, in the discretion of the county judge who has been for the longest time continuously a judge of said court, be divided into civil, equity, youth and criminal divisions as a matter of convenience, by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.
  4. Each county judge shall appoint his own court reporter in accordance with Section 9-13-61, Mississippi Code of 1972, for the purpose of doing the necessary stenographic work of the court.
  5. The additional judgeship created by this section shall remain vacant unless prior to May 10, 1975, the board of supervisors of Washington County, Mississippi, shall adopt an order duly entered upon the minutes of said board stating that sufficient county funds are available for the compensation and related expenses of the additional judgeship created herein.
  6. If the order of the board of supervisors as required under subsection (5) of this section shall have been duly adopted and entered upon the minutes of said board prior to May 10, 1975, then the additional judgeship herein created shall be filled by a person elected in the regular primary and general elections to be held in 1975, and the person so elected shall hold office from January 1, 1976, for the remainder of the regular term for county judges. All candidates for such office shall possess all of the qualifications of a circuit judge as prescribed by the state constitution and shall qualify for election in the same manner and be governed by the same statutes as other candidates for county office. After the first election to fill the judgeship created herein, the provisions of Section 9-9-5, Mississippi Code of 1972, shall apply to the judgeship created herein.

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 464, § eff from and after passage (approved April 3, 1975).

§ 9-9-17. Additional judge for Jackson County.

  1. In order to relieve the crowded condition of the docket in the county court and in the youth court of Jackson County and particularly to facilitate and make possible the trial and disposition of the large number of causes on said docket and in the youth court, there shall be two (2) county judges for Jackson County, Mississippi, provided for and elected as herein set out.
  2. For the purposes of nomination and election, the two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct, the presently existing judgeship and its succession to be denominated for purposes of appointment, nomination and election only as Place One and the judgeship hereby created and its succession for said selfsame purposes and none other to be designated as Place Two. There shall be no distinction whatsoever in the powers, duties and emoluments of the two (2) offices of county judge, except that the county judge of Jackson County who has been for the longest time continuously a county judge of said county shall have the right to assign causes, terms and dockets.
  3. While there shall be no limitation whatsoever upon the powers and duties of the said county judges other than as cast upon them by the Constitution and laws of this state, the county court of Jackson County may, in the discretion of the county judge who has been for the longest time continuously a judge of said court, be divided into civil, equity, criminal and youth court divisions as a matter of convenience by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.
  4. The two (2) county judges shall be elected at the same time and in the same manner now prescribed by law for the existing judgeship of Jackson County.
  5. The Board of Supervisors of Jackson County may, in its discretion, set aside, appropriate and expend moneys from the general fund to be used in the payment of salaries of judges, clerks, reporters, officers and employees of the youth court division of the county court, including the related facilities of the youth court division of the county court, and such funds shall be expended for no other purposes.

    The county shall not be reimbursed for the amount of any such levy provided for by this section under the terms of the Homestead Exemption Law.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1604.7; Laws, 1970, ch. 337, §§ 1-4; Laws, 1975, ch. 491; Laws, 1985, ch. 536, § 3; Laws, 1986, ch. 400, § 1, eff from and after October 1, 1986.

Cross References —

Provisions of the Homestead Exemption Law, see §§27-33-1 et seq.

§ 9-9-18. Additional county court judge for Rankin County.

  1. In order to relieve the crowded condition of the docket in the county court and in the youth court of Rankin County and particularly to facilitate and make possible the trial and disposition of the large number of causes on the docket and in the youth court, there shall be two (2) county judges for Rankin County, provided for and elected as herein set out.
  2. For the purposes of nomination and election, the two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct, the presently existing judgeship and its succession to be denominated for purposes of appointment, nomination and election only as “Place One” and the judgeship hereby created and its succession for said selfsame purposes and none other to be designated as “Place Two.” There shall be no distinction whatsoever in the powers, duties and emoluments of the two (2) offices of county judge, except that the county judge of Rankin County who has been for the longest time continuously a county judge of the county shall have the right to assign causes, terms and dockets. Should neither judge of the county court have served longer in office than the other, then that judge of this county court who has been for the longest time a member of The Mississippi Bar shall have the right to assign causes, terms and dockets.
  3. While there shall be no limitation whatsoever upon the powers and duties of the county judges other than as cast upon them by the Constitution and laws of this state, the county court of Rankin County may, in the discretion of the county judge who has been for the longest time continuously a judge of the court, be divided into civil, equity, criminal and youth court divisions as a matter of convenience by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.
  4. The initial holder of the additional judgeship created by this section, or “Place Two,” shall be elected in the regular election of November 2002; candidates therefor shall qualify to run not later than forty-five (45) days before that election. The person elected shall begin the term of office in January of 2003 at the same time as county judges generally, and there shall be no vacancy of the office before that time. The two (2) judges shall otherwise be elected, and any vacancy in office filled, as provided for county judges generally.
  5. The Board of Supervisors of Rankin County may, in its discretion, set aside, appropriate and expend monies from the general fund to be used in the payment of salaries of judges, clerks, reporters, officers and employees of the youth court division of the county court, including the related facilities of the youth court division of the county court, and such funds shall be expended for no other purposes. The county shall not be reimbursed for the amount of any such levy provided for by this section under the terms of the Homestead Exemption Law.

HISTORY: Laws, 2002, ch. 495, § 1, eff July 22, 2002 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the addition of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated July 22, 2002, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 2002, ch. 495, § 1.

§ 9-9-18.1. Additional county court judge for Madison County.

  1. In order to relieve the crowded condition of the docket in the county court and in the youth court of Madison County and particularly to facilitate and make possible the trial and disposition of the large number of causes on the docket and in the youth court, there shall be two (2) county judges for Madison County, provided for and elected as herein set out.
  2. For the purposes of nomination and election, the two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct, the presently existing judgeship and its succession to be denominated for purposes of appointment, nomination and election only as Place One and the judgeship hereby created and its succession for said selfsame purposes and none other to be designated as Place Two. There shall be no distinction whatsoever in the powers, duties and emoluments of the two (2) offices of county judge, except that the county judge of Madison County who has been for the longest time continuously a county judge of the county shall have the right to assign causes, terms and dockets. Should neither judge of the county court have served longer in office than the other, then that judge of this county court who has been for the longest time a member of The Mississippi Bar shall have the right to assign causes, terms and dockets.
  3. While there shall be no limitation whatsoever upon the powers and duties of the county judges other than as cast upon them by the Constitution and laws of this state, the county court of Madison County may, in the discretion of the county judge who has been for the longest time continuously a judge of the court, be divided into civil, equity, criminal and youth court divisions as a matter of convenience by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.
  4. The initial holder of the additional judgeship created by this section, or “Place Two,” shall be elected in the regular election of November 2002; candidates therefor shall qualify to run not later than forty-five (45) days before that election. The person elected shall begin the term of office in January of 2003 at the same time as county judges generally, and there shall be no vacancy of the office before that time. The two (2) judges shall otherwise be elected, and any vacancy in office filled, as provided for county judges generally.
  5. The Board of Supervisors of Madison County may, in its discretion, set aside, appropriate and expend monies from the general fund to be used in the payment of salaries of judges, clerks, reporters, officers and employees of the youth court division of the county court, including the related facilities of the youth court division of the county court, and such funds shall be expended for no other purposes. The county shall not be reimbursed for the amount of any such levy provided for by this section under the terms of the Homestead Exemption Law.

HISTORY: Laws, 2002, ch. 495, § 2, eff July 22, 2002 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the addition of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated July 22, 2002, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 2002, ch. 495, § 2.

§ 9-9-18.2. County court judge for Pearl River County.

  1. In order to relieve the crowded condition of the docket in the courts and in the youth court of Pearl River County and particularly to facilitate and make possible the trial and disposition of the large number of causes on the docket and in the youth court, there shall be a county court with one (1) county judge for Pearl River County, provided for and elected as herein set out.
  2. The county court of Pearl River County may, in the discretion of the county judge, be divided into civil, equity, criminal and youth court divisions as a matter of convenience by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.
  3. The initial holder of the judgeship created by this section shall be elected in the regular election of November 2010; candidates therefor shall qualify to run not later than sixty (60) days before that election.The person elected shall begin the term of office in January of 2011 at the same time as county judges generally, and there shall be no vacancy of the office before that time.Thereafter, the judge shall otherwise be elected, and any vacancy in office filled, as provided for county judges generally.
  4. The Board of Supervisors of Pearl River County may, in its discretion, set aside, appropriate and expend monies from the general fund to be used in the payment of salaries of the judge, clerks, reporters, officers and employees of the youth court division of the county court, including the related facilities of the youth court division of the county court, and such funds shall be expended for no other purposes.The county shall not be reimbursed for the amount of any such levy provided for by this section under the terms of the Homestead Exemption Law.

HISTORY: Laws, 2010, ch. 442, § 1, eff June 21, 2010 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the addition of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

By letter dated June 21, 2010, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Acts of 1965, as amended and extended, to the addition of this section by Laws of 2010, ch. 442.

Cross References —

Provisions of the Homestead Exemption Law, see §§27-33-1 et seq.

§ 9-9-18.3. Additional county court judges for Lauderdale County.

  1. In order to relieve the crowded condition of the docket in the county court and in the youth court of Lauderdale County and particularly to facilitate and make possible the trial and disposition of the large number of causes on the docket and in the youth court, there shall be two (2) county judges for Lauderdale County, provided for and elected as herein set out.
  2. For the purposes of nomination and election, the two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct, the presently existing judgeship and its succession to be denominated for purposes of appointment, nomination and election only as “Place One” and the judgeship hereby created and its succession for said selfsame purposes and none other to be designated as “Place Two.” There shall be no distinction whatsoever in the powers, duties and emoluments of the two (2) offices of county judge, except that the county judge of Lauderdale County who has been for the longest time continuously a county judge of the county shall have the right to assign causes, terms and dockets. Should neither judge of the county court have served longer in office than the other, then that judge of the county court who has been for the longest time a member of The Mississippi Bar shall have the right to assign causes, terms and dockets.
  3. While there shall be no limitation whatsoever upon the powers and duties of the said county judges other than as cast upon them by the Constitution and laws of this state, the county court of Lauderdale County may, in the discretion of the county judge who has been for the longest time continuously a judge of said court, be divided into civil, equity, criminal and youth court divisions as a matter of convenience by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.
  4. The initial holder of the additional judgeship created by this section, or “Place Two,” shall be elected in the regular election of November 2006; candidates therefor shall qualify to run not later than forty-five (45) days before that election. The person elected shall begin the term of office in January of 2007 at the same time as county judges generally, and there shall be no vacancy of the office before that time. Thereafter the two (2) judges shall otherwise be elected, and any vacancy in office filled, as provided for county judges generally.
  5. The Board of Supervisors of Lauderdale County may, in its discretion, set aside, appropriate and expend monies from the general fund to be used in the payment of salaries of judges, clerks, reporters, officers and employees of the youth court division of the county court, including the related facilities of the youth court division of the county court, and such funds shall be expended for no other purposes. The county shall not be reimbursed for the amount of any such levy provided for by this section under the terms of the Homestead Exemption Law.

HISTORY: Laws, 2006, ch. 507, § 1, eff June 30, 2006 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the addition of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

On June 30, 2006, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws of 2006, ch. 507, § 1.

§ 9-9-18.5. Additional county court judge for DeSoto County.

  1. In order to relieve the crowded condition of the docket in the county court and in the youth court of DeSoto County and particularly to facilitate and make possible the trial and disposition of the large number of causes on the docket and in the youth court, there shall be two (2) county judges for DeSoto County, provided for and elected as herein set out.
  2. For the purposes of nomination and election, the two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct, the first existing judgeship and its succession to be denominated for purposes of appointment, nomination and election only as “Place One” and the judgeship hereby created and its succession for said selfsame purposes and none other to be designated as “Place Two.” There shall be no distinction whatsoever in the powers, duties and emoluments of the two (2) offices of county judge, except that the county judge of DeSoto County who has been for the longest time continuously a county judge of the county shall have the right to assign causes, terms and dockets. Should neither judge of the county court have served longer in office than the other, then that judge who has been for the longest time a member of The Mississippi Bar shall have the right to assign causes, terms and dockets.
  3. While there shall be no limitation whatsoever upon the powers and duties of the county judges other than as cast upon them by the Constitution and laws of this state, the county court of DeSoto County may, in the discretion of the county judge who has been for the longest time continuously a judge of the court, be divided into civil, equity, criminal and youth court divisions as a matter of convenience by the entry of an order upon the minutes of the court.
  4. The initial holder of the additional judgeship created by this section, or “Place Two,” shall be elected in the regular election of November 2008; candidates therefor shall qualify to run not later than forty-five (45) days before that election. The term of office of the person elected shall begin on the first day of January following the November election and shall end at the same time as for county judges generally. The two (2) judges shall otherwise be elected, and any vacancy in office filled, as provided for county judges generally.
  5. The Board of Supervisors of DeSoto County may, in its discretion, set aside, appropriate and expend monies from the general fund to be used in the payment of salaries of judges, clerks, reporters, officers and employees of the youth court division of the county court, including the related facilities of the youth court division of the county court, and such funds shall be expended for no other purposes. The county shall not be reimbursed for the amount of any such levy provided for by this section under the terms of the Homestead Exemption Law.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 395, § 1, eff July 16, 2008 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the addition of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

On July 16, 2008, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the enactment of this section by Chapter 395, Laws of 2008.

Cross References —

Provisions of the Homestead Exemption Law, see §§27-33-1 et seq.

§ 9-9-18.6. Additional county court judge for Lee County.

  1. In order to relieve thecrowded condition of the docket in the county court and in the youthcourt of Lee County and particularly to facilitate and make possiblethe trial and disposition of the large number of causes in the youthcourt, there shall be two (2) county judges for Lee County, providedfor and elected as herein set out.
  2. For the purposes of nominationand election, the two (2) judgeships shall be separate and distinct,with the county judgeship that existed on January 1, 2018, to be denominatedfor purposes of appointment, nomination and election only as “PlaceOne” and the additional judgeship hereby created to be designatedas “Place Two.” There shall be no distinction whatsoeverin the powers, duties and emoluments of the two (2) offices of countyjudge, except that the county judge of Lee County who has been forthe longest time continuously a county judge of the county shall havethe right to assign causes, terms and dockets. Should neither judgeof the county court have served longer in office than the other, thenthat judge of the county court who has been for the longest time amember of The Mississippi Bar shall have the right to assign causes,terms and dockets.
  3. While there shall beno limitation whatsoever upon the powers and duties of the countyjudges other than as cast upon them by the Constitution and laws ofthis state, the county court of Lee County may, in the discretionof the county judge who has been for the longest time continuouslya judge of the court, be divided into civil, equity, criminal andyouth court divisions as a matter of convenience by the entry of anorder upon the minutes of the court.
  4. The initial holder ofthe additional judgeship created by this section, or “PlaceTwo,” shall be elected in the regular election of November2018. The person elected shall begin the term of office in January2019 at the same time as county judges generally, and there shallbe no vacancy of the office before that time. The two (2) judges shallotherwise be elected, and any vacancy in office filled, as providedfor county judges generally.
  5. Each county judge shallappoint a court reporter in accordance with Section 9-13-61 for thepurpose of doing the necessary stenographic work of the court.
  6. The Board of Supervisorsof Lee County may, in its discretion, set aside, appropriate and expendmonies from the general fund to be used in the payment of salariesof judges, clerks, reporters, officers and employees of the youthcourt division of the county court, including the related facilitiesof the youth court division of the county court, and such funds shallbe expended for no other purposes. The county shall not be reimbursedfor the amount of any such levy provided for by this section underthe terms of the Homestead Exemption Law.

HISTORY: Laws, 2018, ch. 418, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 26, 2018).

Cross References —

Provisions of the Homestead Exemption Law, see §27-33-1 et seq.

§ 9-9-19. Term of court fixed.

  1. A term of court shall be held in the county courthouse of the county, beginning on the second Monday of each month and continuing so long as may be necessary; but in counties where there are two (2) circuit court districts the county court shall meet alternately in the two (2) districts in the county courthouse in the same month and in the same district as the board of supervisors of said county holds its meetings. Provided that in the County of Jones, a county having two (2) judicial districts, that a term shall be held in the second judicial district of said county on the second Monday of each month; and provided that in the first judicial district a term shall be held on the fourth Monday of January, the fourth Monday of March, the fourth Monday of April, the fourth Monday of June and the fourth Monday of October. Provided that in the County of Hinds, a county having two (2) judicial districts, a term shall be held in the first judicial district on the second Monday of each month and in the second judicial district on the second Monday of March, June, September and December, and provided further that, when such terms are held concurrently, either of the county judges of Hinds County may be assigned to hold all or any part of such terms in either of the two (2) judicial districts. Provided, further, that in the County of Bolivar, a county having two (2) judicial districts, a term shall be held in the first judicial district on the second Monday of April, August and December, and in the second judicial district on the second Monday of January, February, March, May, June, July, September, October and November. Provided, however, that in the County of Harrison, a county having two (2) county judges and two (2) judicial districts, that a term shall be held in each judicial district concurrently each month. Provided, however, that the judge of the county court for good cause shown may, by order spread on the minutes of the county court, designate some place other than the county courthouse for the holding of such term of the county court as may be designated in said order. The county judge may call a special term of the county court upon giving ten (10) days’ notice, and such notice shall be given by posting the same at the front door of the courthouse in said county and by the publication of said notice for one insertion in some newspaper of general circulation in the county.
  2. If a county court is established pursuant to an agreement between two or more counties as provided in Section 9-9-3, the terms thereof shall remain continuously open and shall not be closed and the judge of such court shall sit in rotation in the county seat of each county, beginning on Monday of each week for at least a week in each county in each month.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, §§ 693, 702; 1942, §§ 1604, 1613; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1934, ch. 236; Laws, 1936, chs. 234, 247; Laws, 1948, ch. 236; Laws, 1950, chs. 319, 321; Laws, 1958, ch. 231, § 5; Laws, 1962, chs. 300, 301, 302; Laws, 1964, ch. 322; Laws, 1966, ch. 344, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 311, § 1; Laws, 1970, chs. 335, § 1, 336, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 397, § 1; Laws, 1972, ch. 348, § 2, eff from and after October 1, 1972.

Cross References —

Exemption of the judiciary from provisions of open meetings law, see §25-41-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Place of holding sessions of trial court as affecting validity of its proceedings. 18 A.L.R.3d 572.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 22 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 148, 149.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The statute should receive a reasonably liberal interpretation in furtherance of its object. Marsalis v. State, 191 Miss. 49, 2 So. 2d 792, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 145 (Miss. 1941).

While an order, under which a term of county court was to open at the county court house but would thereafter convene in another city for the trial of cases originating in certain supervisors’ districts of the county, was valid, it did not circumscribe the jurisdiction of the county court as to venue in any particular portion of the county, or deprive the court of jurisdiction, while sitting at the county court house, to dismiss a prosecution which had been instituted and tried in such other city, and, therefore, a subsequent prosecution of the same charge in the circuit court was not subject to the defense that the prosecution was still pending in county court. Marsalis v. State, 191 Miss. 49, 2 So. 2d 792, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 145 (Miss. 1941).

It is not within the allowance of the statute that an order by the county judge should be so framed as to confine the territorial jurisdiction of the court when sitting at a place, fixed in the order, to cases originating within the area of, and adjacent to, that place and to the effect that thereby the court would have no territorial jurisdiction of that area while sitting elsewhere in the county. Marsalis v. State, 191 Miss. 49, 2 So. 2d 792, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 145 (Miss. 1941).

County court is unauthorized to try causes in vacation; hence trial and judgment during vacation were void. Mississippi State Highway Dep't v. Haines, 162 Miss. 216, 139 So. 168, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1932).

Failure to object to trial of eminent domain proceeding before county court in vacation did not confer jurisdiction on county court by consent. Mississippi State Highway Dep't v. Haines, 162 Miss. 216, 139 So. 168, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1932).

§ 9-9-21. Jurisdiction.

  1. The jurisdiction of the county court shall be as follows: It shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the justice court in all matters, civil and criminal of which the justice court has jurisdiction; and it shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the circuit and chancery courts in all matters of law and equity wherein the amount of value of the thing in controversy shall not exceed, exclusive of costs and interest, the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00), and the jurisdiction of the county court shall not be affected by any setoff, counterclaim or cross-bill in such actions where the amount sought to be recovered in such setoff, counterclaim or cross-bill exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00). Provided, however, the party filing such setoff, counterclaim or cross-bill which exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) shall give notice to the opposite party or parties as provided in Section 13-3-83, and on motion of all parties filed within twenty (20) days after the filing of such setoff, counterclaim or cross-bill, the county court shall transfer the case to the circuit or chancery court wherein the county court is situated and which would otherwise have jurisdiction. It shall have exclusively the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the justice court in the following matters and causes: namely, eminent domain, the partition of personal property, and actions of unlawful entry and detainer, provided that the actions of eminent domain and unlawful entry and detainer may be returnable and triable before the judge of said court in vacation. The county court shall have jurisdiction over criminal matters in the county assigned by a judge of the circuit court district in which the county is included.
  2. In the event of the establishment of a county court by an agreement between two (2) or more counties as provided in Section 9-9-3, it shall be lawful for such court sitting in one (1) county to act upon any and all matters of which it has jurisdiction as provided by law arising in the other county under the jurisdiction of said court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 693; 1942, § 1604; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1934, ch. 236; Laws, 1936, ch. 247; Laws, 1948, ch. 236; Laws, 1950, ch. 321; Laws, 1962, ch. 300; Laws, 1964, ch. 322; Laws, 1966, ch. 344, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 311, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 335, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 477, § 2; Laws, 1984, ch. 348; Laws, 1991, ch. 311, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 427, § 1; Laws, 2003, ch. 429, § 1; Laws, 2013, ch. 361, § 1, eff October 22, 2013 (the date of the United States Attorney General’s response to the submission of this section under Section 5 of the Voting Right Act of 1965).

Editor’s Notes —

The effective date of Chapter 361, Laws of 2013, which amended this section, is “from and after the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.” However, after the bill was approved, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Shelby County v. Holder (June 25, 2013), struck down the coverage formula that determined what jurisdictions are subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, so the coverage formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance under Section 5.

Because of the Shelby County decision, the United States Attorney General is not making any determinations under Section 5 on voting or election changes made by states. The Supreme Court did not strike down Section 5, so it is still in effect. For that reason, the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office submitted Chapter 361, Laws of 2013, to the United States Attorney General, in order to technically meet the requirements of Section 5 and fulfill the condition in the effective date of the bill, which will allow the bill to take effect.

By letter dated October 22, 2013, the United States Attorney General responded that he is not making determinations on the merits of any bill that is submitted under Section 5. The submission of Chapter 361 and the response from the United States Attorney General technically met the requirements of Section 5 and fulfilled the condition in the effective date of Chapter 361, so Chapter 361 became effective from and after October 22, 2013, the date of the United States Attorney General’s response letter.

Amendment Notes —

The 2003 amendment substituted “Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00)” for “Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00)” throughout (1).

The 2013 amendment added the last sentence in (1).

Cross References —

Jurisdiction of Supreme Court, see §9-3-9.

Jurisdiction of chancery court in general, see §9-5-81.

Jurisdiction of circuit courts generally, see §§9-7-81 et seq.

Authority of circuit court judge to assign criminal matters to county judge, see §9-9-21.

Civil practice and procedure provisions common to courts, see §§11-1-1 et seq.

Civil practice and procedure in county courts, see §§11-9-1 et seq.

Partition of personalty by county court or justice of the peace, see §11-21-73.

Unlawful entry and detainer proceedings in county court, see §§11-25-101 et seq.

Jurisdiction and powers of county courts in eminent domain proceedings, see §11-27-3.

Suits by and against state or its political subdivisions, see §§11-45-1 et seq.

Provisions for bringing forfeiture proceedings in county court pursuant to the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see §41-29-177.

Procedure for forfeiture of property seized for violation of fish and game laws, see §§49-7-251 et seq.

Jurisdiction of county courts in paternity cases, see §93-9-15.

Jurisdictional limits of county court, as set forth in this section, as affecting where proceedings may be brought for forfeiture of vehicle used in drive-by shooting, see §97-3-111.

Appeals to circuit courts in criminal cases, see §§99-35-1 et seq.

Counterclaims and cross-claims which exceed county court’s jurisdiction, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 13.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Place of holding sessions of trial court as affecting validity of its proceedings. 18 A.L.R.3d 572.

Civil actions removable from state court to federal court under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1443. 159 A.L.R. Fed. 377.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 56 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 9, 10.

Law Reviews.

1978 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts. 50 Miss. L. J. 137, March 1979.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jurisdiction in general.

3. Jurisdictional amount.

4. Jurisdiction in vacation.

5. Exclusive jurisdiction.

6. Criminal jurisdiction.

1. In general.

Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §9-9-21, the buyers were required to give notice to the dealership, and both parties were required to make a motion, within 20 days after the filing of the counterclaim, to transfer the case to the circuit or chancery court of the county in which the county court was located; no such notice was given, and the parties failed to make a motion within 20 days, such that their failure to notify the court could not confer jurisdiction on the county court; since the parties did not follow these mandated procedures and the counterclaim failed to comply with the then jurisdictional prerequisites, the counterclaim could not be adjudicated in the county court. Hobbs Auto., Inc. v. Dorsey, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 90 (Miss. Feb. 10, 2005).

Chapter 17 of the Code of 1930, pertaining to county courts, is not a repeal but a re-enactment of the applicable provisions of the Act of 1926. Quitman County v. Turner, 196 Miss. 746, 18 So. 2d 122, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1944).

One of the purposes in the establishment of county courts was to provide a judicial officer possessing all the qualifications of a circuit judge or chancellor, who would be available at all times for service in habeas corpus cases and to furnish a speedy remedy in habeas corpus. Cole v. Cole, 194 Miss. 292, 12 So. 2d 425, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1943).

County Court Act did not repeal entire eminent domain chapter, but both must be construed together, and all provisions of each not repugnant to provisions of other must stand and in case of repugnancy county court chapter controls. Mississippi State Highway Dep't v. Haines, 162 Miss. 216, 139 So. 168, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1932).

Statute creating county courts in certain counties held not local or special law, when interpreted as authorizing governor to determine population of counties automatically coming under act. State ex rel. Knox v. Speakes, 144 Miss. 125, 109 So. 129, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 339 (Miss. 1926).

2. Jurisdiction in general.

Creditor properly brought its claim before a justice court because the county lacked a county court and then appealed to the circuit court, even though a debtor’s estate was still open because creditor’s action was purely a possessory action. Gandy v. Citicorp, 985 So. 2d 371, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 360 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

Injunctive order granted by the county court judge was within the meaning of Miss. Code Ann. §9-9-21(1) as that statute had been interpreted by case law; where property or property interests were involved, the county court had appropriate jurisdiction. Swan v. Hill, 855 So. 2d 459, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 628 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

A claim for specific performance of contract of employment plus attendant injunctive relief is within the jurisdiction of the county court on its equity side, and is also within the jurisdiction of the chancery court. Lee v. Coahoma Opportunities, Inc., 485 So. 2d 293, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2423 (Miss. 1986).

Where timely objection was not made, as specifically required by § 1433, venue was waived. Wofford v. Cities Service Oil Co., 236 So. 2d 743, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1499 (Miss. 1970).

Supreme court, circuit courts, chancery courts and county courts, when acting on appeal from a special possessory court of a justice of the peace, have only such jurisdiction to adjudicate regarding title to land as is vested in special court from which appeal was taken. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Original jurisdiction to make conclusive and final adjudication of title to land rests alone with circuit and chancery courts, and to a limited extent with the county courts. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

County court has jurisdiction under this section of ejectment action to recover possession of land whose value does not exceed $1,000. Allen v. Gibson, 198 Miss. 23, 20 So. 2d 479, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 164 (Miss. 1945).

Jurisdiction of county court is not confined to particular justice district, but is concurrent with jurisdiction of all justices of county. Webb v. State, 158 Miss. 715, 131 So. 262, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1930).

County court had no jurisdiction of suit by school patron to restrain further employment of alleged incompetent driver of school truck, county court having no jurisdiction in equity for maintenance of civil rights. Welch v. Bryant, 157 Miss. 559, 128 So. 734, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 331 (Miss. 1930).

Chancellor ordering issuance of writ of injunction could not transfer case to county court for hearing on whether injunction should be made perpetual. Welch v. Bryant, 157 Miss. 559, 128 So. 734, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 331 (Miss. 1930).

3. Jurisdictional amount.

Jurisdiction attached when the company elected to file its complaint in county court for an amount within the jurisdictional limit of $200,000, as the company sought damages for time and material in the amount of $171,073.63; jurisdiction cannot be divested by upwardly fluctuating attorney’s fees, and the county court was not divested of jurisdiction and erred in transferring the case to circuit court. Ram-Kabir of Am., LLC v. S.C. Anderson Grp. Int'l, 199 So.3d 1240, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 380 (Miss. 2016).

County court has the authority to grant an amendment to the ad damnum clause even though by doing so it will divest itself of jurisdiction and require the matter to be transferred to either the chancery or circuit courts. Wal-Mart Super Ctr. v. Long, 852 So. 2d 568, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 312 (Miss. 2003).

County court had jurisdiction of proceeding for partition of land held by tenants in common in which original bill alleged that value of lots sought to be partitioned at time of filing of bill would not exceed $1000 and final decree of county court adjudicated truth of this fact and found that value of land had increased since time of filing of bill because of discovery of oil nearby and lots brought $1,200 at sale, since jurisdiction having been acquired by original bill it was not defeated by subsequent events. Barnes v. Rogers, 206 Miss. 887, 41 So. 2d 58, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 311 (Miss. 1949).

Jurisdiction of a court is determined by amount in controversy at time when court is first called on to exercise jurisdiction, which, in trial court, is amount claimed at time when suit is filed, and jurisdiction once acquired is not defeated by subsequent events, even though they are of such character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in first instance. Barnes v. Rogers, 206 Miss. 887, 41 So. 2d 58, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 311 (Miss. 1949).

County court is court of general jurisdiction although limited in amount of its jurisdiction. Barnes v. Rogers, 206 Miss. 887, 41 So. 2d 58, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 311 (Miss. 1949).

A county court had no jurisdiction of a replevin action involving life insurance policies, the value of which was given in the affidavit as totaling $100 but which actually had a cash surrender value in excess of $1000. Van Norman v. Van Norman, 203 Miss. 310, 34 So. 2d 733, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 270 (Miss. 1948).

A judgment of the trial court sustaining a demurrer to an action to enforce a money reserve title contract, based on the claim that the amount sued for exceeded the jurisdictional amount and that the plaintiff failed to demand possession for the chattel before bringing suit, was not on the merits, and so the defense of res judicata was not available in a second action, in which the sum sued for was within the jurisdictional amount. Grant v. Dotson, 193 Miss. 577, 10 So. 2d 680, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 155 (Miss. 1942).

4. Jurisdiction in vacation.

However, as to eminent domain cases, statute (Laws 1936, ch. 247) now confers on county judge in vacation jurisdiction county court had in term time. State Highway Com. v. Day, 181 Miss. 708, 180 So. 794, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 1938).

County court is unauthorized to try causes in vacation; hence trial and judgment during vacation were void. Mississippi State Highway Dep't v. Haines, 162 Miss. 216, 139 So. 168, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1932).

Failure to object to trial of eminent domain proceeding before county court in vacation did not confer jurisdiction on county court by consent. Mississippi State Highway Dep't v. Haines, 162 Miss. 216, 139 So. 168, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1932).

5. Exclusive jurisdiction.

Exclusive jurisdiction of an unlawful entry detainer case is now vested in the county court by reason of this section. Gardner v. Cook, 173 Miss. 244, 158 So. 150, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 389 (Miss. 1935).

The effect of this section is to abolish special eminent domain courts (see Code 1942 § 2750) in counties having county courts, and to vest the jurisdiction thereof in the county court. City of Hattiesburg v. Pritchett, 160 Miss. 342, 134 So. 140, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 181 (Miss. 1931).

6. Criminal jurisdiction.

A county court properly exercised jurisdiction in a criminal proceeding for hunting during a closed season and hunting without wearing fluorescent orange where the county court judge reviewed the tickets issued to the defendant and noted that they were not supported by affidavits, and held that the justice court never attained jurisdiction over the case. Hodnett v. State, 787 So. 2d 670, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 211 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

A county court, though having concurrent jurisdiction with a justice of the peace court over the crime of assault and battery, did not have jurisdiction to proceed with defendant’s prosecution for that crime where the justice of the peace court had first acquired full and exclusive jurisdiction of the case and the case was still pending there when an affidavit charging defendant with the same crime was filed with the county court. Franklin v. Franklin, 335 So. 2d 907, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1954 (Miss. 1976).

Jurisdiction of county court in misdemeanor case is co-extensive with boundary of county wherein offense was committed, and venue of crime is in that county. Webb v. State, 158 Miss. 715, 131 So. 262, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1930).

To confer jurisdiction on county court in misdemeanor case, State need only allege and prove crime was committed in county. Webb v. State, 158 Miss. 715, 131 So. 262, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1930).

§ 9-9-23. Powers of county judge.

The county judge shall have power to issue writs, and to try matters, of habeas corpus on application to him therefor, or when made returnable before him by a superior judge. He shall also have the power to order the issuance of writs of certiorari, supersedeas, attachments, and other remedial writs in all cases pending in, or within the jurisdiction of, his court. He shall have the authority to issue search warrants in his county returnable to his own court or to any court of a justice of the peace within his county in the same manner as is provided by law for the issuance of search warrants by justices of the peace. In all cases pending in, or within the jurisdiction of, his court, he shall have, in term time, and in vacation, the power to order, do or determine to the same extent and in the same manner as a justice of the peace or a circuit judge or a chancellor could do in term time or in vacation in such cases. But he shall not have original power to issue writs of injunction, or other remedial writs in equity or in law except in those cases hereinabove specified as being within his jurisdiction: Provided, however, that when any judge or chancellor authorized to issue such writs of injunction, or any other equitable or legal remedial writs hereinabove reserved, shall so direct in writing the hearing of application therefor may be by him referred to the county judge, in which event the said direction of the superior judge shall vest in the said county judge all authority to take such action on said application as the said superior judge could have taken under the right and the law, had the said application been at all times before the said superior judge. The jurisdiction authorized under the foregoing proviso shall cease upon the denying or granting of the application.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 698; 1942, § 1609; Laws, 1926, ch. 131.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171, all reference in the Mississippi Code to justice of the peace shall mean justice court judge.

Cross References —

Rule relative to injunctive relief, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 65.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power of successor judge taking office during termtime to vacate, etc., judgment entered by his predecessor. 11 A.L.R.2d 1117.

Propriety and legality of issuing only one search warrant to search more than one place or premises occupied by same person. 31 A.L.R.2d 864.

Authority to consent for another to search or seizure. 31 A.L.R.2d 1078.

Premises temporarily unoccupied as dwelling within provision forbidding unreasonable search of dwellings. 33 A.L.R.2d 1430.

Seizure of books, documents, or other papers under search warrant not describing such items. 54 A.L.R.4th 391.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jurisdiction of county judge.

3. Habeas corpus proceedings.

1. In general.

Assuming that the circuit court in which an indictment was returned would have the authority to permit the amendment to the indictment, the county court to which the cause was transferred had an equal right to do so. Grimsley v. State, 215 Miss. 43, 60 So. 2d 509, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 535 (Miss. 1952).

Chancellor ordering issuance of writ of injunction could not transfer case to county court for hearing on whether injunction should be made perpetual. Welch v. Bryant, 157 Miss. 559, 128 So. 734, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 331 (Miss. 1930).

2. Jurisdiction of county judge.

County court had no jurisdiction of suit by school patron to restrain further employment of alleged incompetent driver of school truck, county court having no jurisdiction in equity for maintenance of civil rights. Welch v. Bryant, 157 Miss. 559, 128 So. 734, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 331 (Miss. 1930).

3. Habeas corpus proceedings.

County judge presented with petition for writ of habeas corpus by noncustodial parent followed by proof that custodial parent has become frequent drug user and is substantially emotionally unstable may refuse to enforce prior chancery court decree, and may enter judgment dismissing petition and temporarily vesting custody of child with noncustodial parent pending further action by chancery court on any petition for modification that may be pending or may be brought by either or both parties. Wade v. Lee, 471 So. 2d 1213, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2130 (Miss. 1985).

The chancery court in granting a divorce is authorized to make such orders touching the care, custody and maintenance of the children of the marriage as may seem equitable and just and where the chancery court makes no order of custody, the county court has jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus and to determine the rightful custody of the minor. Payne v. Payne, 58 So. 2d 377 (Miss. 1952).

One of the purposes in the establishment of county courts was to provide a judicial officer possessing all the qualifications of a circuit judge or chancellor, who would be available at all times for service in habeas corpus cases and to furnish a speedy remedy in habeas corpus. Cole v. Cole, 194 Miss. 292, 12 So. 2d 425, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1943).

A county judge, passing upon an application in habeas corpus, acts not as a county court, but with all the power and authority of a circuit judge or chancellor, and an appeal may be taken direct to the supreme court under § 1149 (Code 1942). Cole v. Cole, 194 Miss. 292, 12 So. 2d 425, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1943).

§ 9-9-25. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1942, § 1614; Laws, 1934, ch. 237]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-9-25 authorized county court judges to deliver opinions, make and sign judgments and decrees, and try cases during vacation of the court.

§ 9-9-27. Transfer of cases; prosecution by affidavit.

In any civil case instituted in the circuit court, wherein all parties file a motion to transfer said case to the county court for trial, or wherein all parties file an instrument of writing consenting to such a transfer, the circuit court may, in its discretion, transfer the case to the county court for trial; and the said county court shall have full jurisdiction of and shall proceed to try any case so transferred, provided, however, that such order of transfer be rendered prior to the empaneling of the jury in such cases.

In misdemeanor cases and in felony cases not capital, wherein indictments have been returned by the grand jury, the circuit court may transfer with full jurisdiction all or any of the same, in its discretion, to the county court for trial; and the said county court shall have jurisdiction of and shall proceed to try all charges of misdemeanor which may be preferred by the district attorney or by the county prosecuting attorney or by the sheriff on affidavit sworn to before the circuit clerk of the county; and prosecutions by affidavit are hereby authorized in misdemeanor cases under the same procedure as if indictments had been returned in the circuit court and same had been transferred to the county court.

And, provided further, any reputable citizen may make an affidavit charging crime before the judge of the county court, and such affidavit shall be filed with the clerk of the county court, and if the crime charged is a misdemeanor, the county court shall have jurisdiction to try and dispose of said charge and, if the crime charged be a felony, the county judge shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine said cause, the same as now provided by law to be done by justices of the peace, and to commit the person so charged, with or without bail as the evidence may warrant, or to discharge the defendant.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 694; 1942, § 1605; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1944, ch. 191; Laws, 1952, ch. 255.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171, all reference in the Mississippi Code to justice of the peace shall mean justice court judge.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Criminal cases.

1. In general.

Words “for trial,” in statute respecting transfer of cases from circuit court to county court, include everything circuit court could have done had case not been transferred. Ex parte Tucker, 164 Miss. 20, 143 So. 700, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 219 (Miss. 1932).

2. Criminal cases.

A deputy clerk, who was neither a judge nor a conservator of the peace, as defined by §§99-15-3 and99-15-5, was without authority under §9-9-27 to issue an arrest warrant; accordingly, the warrant issued by him was invalid. Lanier v. State, 450 So. 2d 69, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1695 (Miss. 1984).

Assuming that the Circuit Court in which an indictment was returned would have the authority to permit the amendment to the indictment, the county court to which the cause was transferred had an equal right to do so. Grimsley v. State, 215 Miss. 43, 60 So. 2d 509, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 535 (Miss. 1952).

Where indictment was returned charging defendant with possession of intoxicating liquor, capias was issued, and defendant arrested and released on bond to a later day of the term, circuit court had authority to transfer the cause to county court. Baylis v. State, 209 Miss. 335, 46 So. 2d 796, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 395 (Miss. 1950).

In prosecution for felonious assault by cutting with knife, trial court’s refusal to transfer case to county court pursuant to motion made to that effect on trial day, when all of witnesses who were shown to be material in any respect were present at court, including character witnesses for accused from distant county, was not abuse of trial court’s discretion. Ferrell v. State, 208 Miss. 539, 45 So. 2d 127, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 272 (Miss. 1950).

County court to which circuit court has transferred criminal case for trial has right to proceed with prosecution of father for desertion and failure to support child although chancery court had acquired jurisdiction in matter prior to commencement of prosecution through divorce action brought by mother against father. Williams v. State, 207 Miss. 816, 43 So. 2d 389, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 391 (Miss. 1949), overruled, Lenoir v. State, 237 Miss. 620, 115 So. 2d 731, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 512 (Miss. 1959).

The fact that a capias for arrest on a misdemeanor charge was issued on the affidavit of the county prosecuting attorney, by the clerk of the county court, without any order therefor from the county judge, did not render it invalid or avoid jurisdiction by the court over the person of the defendant, since, inasmuch as the affidavit of the county prosecuting attorney took the place of an indictment in the circuit court, the process on the charge of misdemeanor so made was a capias to be issued by the clerk of the county court. Cooper v. State, 193 Miss. 672, 10 So. 2d 764, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 156 (Miss. 1942).

Legislature may create inferior court having jurisdiction of felonies and have indictments originating in circuit court transferable to inferior court. Ex parte Tucker, 164 Miss. 20, 143 So. 700, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 219 (Miss. 1932).

Defendant being in court, no notice of order transferring indictment from circuit court to county court other than entry of order on minutes was necessary. Ex parte Tucker, 164 Miss. 20, 143 So. 700, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 219 (Miss. 1932).

§ 9-9-29. Court of record; duties of circuit clerk and sheriff; fees.

The county court shall be a court of record and the clerk of the circuit court shall be the clerk of the county court, and he or his deputy shall attend all the sessions of the county court, and have present at all sessions, all books, records, files, and papers pertaining to the term then in session. The dockets, minutes, and records of the county court shall be kept, so far as is practicable, in the same manner as are those of the circuit court as provided by statute and the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The sheriff shall be the executive officer of the county court; he shall by himself, or deputy, attend all its sessions, and he shall serve all process and execute all writs issued therefrom in the manner as such process and writs would be served and executed when issued by the justice courts, or by the circuit or chancery courts according as appertains to the value of the cause or matter in hand. The clerk and sheriff shall receive the same fees for attendance, and for other services as are allowed by law to the clerk and to the sheriffs for like duties in the circuit and chancery courts; provided however, that in all cases where the justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the county court, the clerk shall be allowed to receive only such fees as are allowed to justice courts, and the sheriff shall be allowed only such fees as the constable in said justice court would be entitled to under the law for similar services.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 699; 1942, § 1610; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1928, Ex. ch. 66; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Clerk’s duty to maintain general docket, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 79.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A clerk is required to attend the sessions of county court, and is entitled to the fee set forth by law for attendance upon the court, however, the clerk does not have to be physically present the entire time the court is in session, unless required by the court. 1991 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 765.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 24 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Sheriff who has received $250 per year in payment of “public services not otherwise provided for,” under Code 1942 § 3952(f), is not entitled to additional $250 per year under this section [Code 1942 § 1610] for services in county court, as county court has only certain transferred jurisdiction originally exercised by justice, chancery and circuit courts, and sheriff in county court performs duties that otherwise he generally would have performed in other courts. Forrest County v. Thompson, 204 Miss. 628, 37 So. 2d 787, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 395 (Miss. 1948).

County court clerk, who by law is the same person as the circuit court clerk, and who, as circuit clerk, received an allowance for public service not particularly provided for under Code 1942 § 3934, subsection (c), was not entitled to an additional allowance, as county clerk, for public service not particularly provided for, since by statute the compensation of the county clerk is expressly confined to the fees allowed by law for like duties in the circuit and chancery courts, which means that the county clerk must look to the fixed schedule of the fees specifically allowed by law for services in the circuit and chancery courts, and there is no authority to make allowance to the county clerk as such for public service not particularly provided for. Covington v. Quitman County, 196 Miss. 416, 17 So. 2d 597, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1944).

The word “fees,” as used in the statute providing that the clerk and the sheriff shall receive the same fees for attendance, and for other services as are allowed by law, etc., is to be interpreted, according to its common usage, as a charge fixed by law for the services of a public officer. Covington v. Quitman County, 196 Miss. 416, 17 So. 2d 597, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1944).

Filing motion for new trial in county court over ten days after entry of final judgment, during same term, does not suspend judgment, nor resuscitate right of appeal, notwithstanding power of the county court, as a court of record, with respect to control over its minutes, judgments, decrees and orders. Mutual Health & Ben. Ass'n v. Cranford, 173 Miss. 152, 156 So. 876, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 387 (Miss. 1934).

§ 9-9-31. Duties of prosecuting attorney.

The county prosecuting attorney shall be the prosecuting attorney of the county court, and he shall prosecute all cases therein which he is now required by law to prosecute, and all cases appealed from the county court to the circuit court, in which it is the duty of the county attorney, under the law, to appear and prosecute.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 701; 1942, § 1612; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1978, ch. 509, § 1, eff from and after January 1, 1980.

§ 9-9-33. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1930, § 703; 1942, § 1615; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1966, ch. 347, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-9-33 specified how a list of jurors was to be procured and what the compensation of jurors and witnesses would be.

§ 9-9-35. Circuit judges authorized to assign cases and other court duties to county judges where dockets overcrowded.

In any county in cases where an overcrowded docket justifies the same, any circuit judge may assign to a county judge in said county only, for hearing and final disposition, any case, cause, hearing or motion, or any proceedings involved in the trial and final disposition thereof.

All orders in said cause, trial or hearing may be signed as follows: “ _______________County Judge and Acting Circuit Judge by assignment.” No special order evidencing said assignment shall be entered on the minutes, except in cases where a county judge is assigned the duty of opening and organizing a court where a grand jury is to be impaneled, in which case an order so assigning the said county judge to act shall be signed and entered on the minutes of the court on the opening day thereof.

No compensation for said services shall be allowed said county judge, neither shall said county judge be compelled to accept any assignment except at his will.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1605.5; Laws, 1962, ch. 303; Laws, 1982, ch. 476, § 3; Laws, 1989, ch. 378, § 4; Laws, 1989, ch. 486, § 2; Laws, 2013, ch. 361, § 3, October 22, 2013 (the date of the United States Attorney General’s response to the submission of this section under Section 5 of the Voting Right Act of 1965).

Editor’s Notes —

The effective date of Chapter 361, Laws of 2013, which amended this section, is “from and after the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended.” However, after the bill was approved, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Shelby County v. Holder (June 25, 2013), struck down the coverage formula that determined what jurisdictions are subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, so the coverage formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance under Section 5.

Because of the Shelby County decision, the United States Attorney General is not making any determinations under Section 5 on voting or election changes made by states. The Supreme Court did not strike down Section 5, so it is still in effect. For that reason, the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office submitted Chapter 361, Laws of 2013, to the United States Attorney General, in order to technically meet the requirements of Section 5 and fulfill the condition in the effective date of the bill, which will allow the bill to take effect.

By letter dated October 22, 2013, the United States Attorney General responded that he is not making determinations on the merits of any bill that is submitted under Section 5. The submission of Chapter 361 and the response from the United States Attorney General technically met the requirements of Section 5 and fulfilled the condition in the effective date of Chapter 361, so Chapter 361 became effective from and after October 22, 2013, the date of the United States Attorney General’s response letter.

Amendment Notes —

The 2013 amendment deleted the last sentence in the third paragraph which read: “Furthermore, no assignment of any cause or hearing shall be made where counsel on both sides object thereto.”

Cross References —

For constitutional provision permitting legislature to authorize prosecutions before inferior courts, see Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 27.

Transfer of cases from circuit court to county court, see §9-9-27.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Since this section specifically governs the assignment of cases to a county judge when justified by an overcrowded docket, it controls over the more general statute, §9-7-3, which provides that the senior judge has the authority to assign causes and dockets. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 312.

At any of the circuit judges may assign criminal causes or matters involving the handling of guilty please, through criminal information, to the county judge. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 312.

A circuit judge may not assign an entire category of criminal cases or matters involving the handling of guilty pleas through criminal information to a county judge; rather, assignments should be done on a case-by-case basis. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 312.

Assignment of causes or matters to a county judge pursuant to this section is by consent of the county judge. Therefore, the latter has discretion is accepting assignments while the former does not appear to have the same authority. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 312.

§ 9-9-36. Chancellors authorized to assign cases and other court duties to county judges where dockets overcrowded.

In any county in cases where an overcrowded docket justifies the same, any chancellor may assign to a county judge in that county only, for hearing and final disposition, any case, cause, hearing or motion, or any proceedings involved in the trial and final disposition thereof.

All orders in the cause, trial or hearing may be signed as follows: “ _______________County Judge and Acting Chancellor by assignment.” No special order evidencing the assignment shall be entered on the minutes.

No compensation for those services shall be allowed the county judge, neither shall the county judge be compelled to accept any assignment except at his will. Furthermore, no assignment of any cause or hearing shall be made where counsel on both sides object to the assignment.

HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 378, § 3; Laws, 1989, ch. 486, § 1; brought forward without change, Laws, 2010, ch. 442, § 3, eff June 21, 2010 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the bringing forward without change of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

By letter dated June 21, 2010, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Acts of 1965, as amended and extended, to the bringing forward without change of this section by Laws of 2010, ch. 442.

Amendment Notes —

The 2010 amendment brought the section forward without change.

§ 9-9-37. Certain counties may establish or abolish court.

  1. From and after July 1, 2013, or the date this section is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later, in any county not brought within the provisions of this chapter by the terms of Sections 9-9-1 and 9-9-3, the board of supervisors is authorized to determine whether a county court shall be established in the county. If a majority of the board are in favor of a county court, then the board shall so certify to the Secretary of State and the Governor shall then issue a proclamation establishing the county court in the county; and thereafter at the next succeeding meeting of the board of supervisors the board shall call an election for the election of a county judge, and the election shall be conducted in the way and manner now provided by law for holding a special election.
    1. Any county not brought within the provisions of this chapter by the terms of Sections 9-9-1 and 9-9-3 that has a county court established under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section may thereafter come from under this chapter in the manner hereinafter provided. On petition of twenty percent (20%) of the qualified electors of the county, addressed to the board of supervisors of the county, an election shall be called by the board of supervisors and conducted in the way and manner now provided by law for a special election for the purpose of determining whether the county court shall be abolished; and, if the majority vote at the election is in favor of abolishing the county court, then the election commission shall so certify to the Secretary of State. The Governor shall then issue a proclamation declaring that the county court in said county be abolished on the first day of the month next succeeding the election.
    2. If a county court is abolished under the provisions of this subsection (2), the board of supervisors is not authorized to establish a county court within less than two (2) years thereafter.
  2. The salary of the county judge shall be as provided in Section 9-9-11.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, §§ 697, 706; 1942, §§ 1608, 1618; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1932, ch. 200; Laws, 1934, ch. 233; Laws, 1936, ch. 254; Laws, 1946, ch. 370; Laws, 1950, ch. 251; Laws, 1952, ch. 238; Laws, 1954, ch. 230; Laws, 1954, Ex Sess ch. 15; Laws, 1955 Ex. ch. 39, § 1; Laws, 1956, chs. 231, §§ 1, 2, 233; Laws, 1960, ch. 234; Laws, 1966, ch. 345, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 311, § 2; Laws, 1970, ch. 402, § 4; Laws, 1971, ch. 495, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 502, § 61; Laws, 2013, ch. 383, § 1, eff October 22, 2013 (the date of the United States Attorney General’s response to the submission of this section under Section 5 of the Voting Right Act of 1965).

Editor’s Notes —

The effective date of Chapter 383, Laws of 2013, which amended this section, is “from and after the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Right Act of 1965, as amended and extended.” However, after the bill was approved, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Shelby County v. Holder (June 25, 2013), struck down the coverage formula that determined what jurisdictions are subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, so the coverage formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance under Section 5.

Because of the Shelby County decision, the United States Attorney General is not making any determinations under Section 5 on voting or election changes made by states. The Supreme Court did not strike down Section 5, so it is still in effect. For that reason, the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office submitted Chapter 383, Laws of 2013, to the United States Attorney General, in order to technically meet the requirements of Section 5 and fulfill the condition in the effective date of the bill, which will allow the bill to take effect.

By letter dated October 22, 2013, the United States Attorney General responded that he is not making determinations on the merits of any bill that is submitted under Section 5. The submission of Chapter 383 and the response from the United States Attorney General technically met the requirements of Section 5 and fulfilled the condition in the effective date of Chapter 383, so Chapter 383 became effective from and after October 22, 2013, the date of the United States Attorney General’s response letter.

Amendment Notes —

The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 7 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

This section is to be construed as referring to population of county as a whole and therefore applicable to a county, the rural population of which as a whole exceeded the urban population, although in one or two of judicial districts found in county, the urban population exceeded the rural population. Wilby v. Board of Supervisors, 226 Miss. 744, 85 So. 2d 195, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 458 (Miss. 1956).

Chapter 17 of the Code of 1930, pertaining to county courts, is not a repeal but a re-enactment of the applicable provisions of the Act of 1926. Quitman County v. Turner, 196 Miss. 746, 18 So. 2d 122, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1944).

The salary provision in Code 1942 § 1608 of $3,600 per year for county judge applies only to the larger counties automatically established by the Act of 1926, and the sliding-scale provision of this section applies to the smaller counties which elected to establish county courts under the enabling provisions of the Act of 1926, so that the annual salary for judge of Quitman County Court, established by the people under the enabling provisions of the Act of 1926 at a salary of $2,000 continued to remain at $2,000 after the adoption of 1930 Code since that county fell in that category under this section and did not increase to $3,600, in view of fact that § 697 of 1930 Code (now Code 1942 § 1608) merely carried over the automatic provision of the Act of 1926, whereas § 706 Code 1930 (now this section [Code 1942 § 1618] ) carried over the enabling provisions of the Act of 1926. Quitman County v. Turner, 196 Miss. 746, 18 So. 2d 122, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1944).

§ 9-9-39. Effect of abolition of county court; pending matters transferred.

All pending matters in any county court that may be abolished shall be transferred to the court of proper jurisdiction without the necessity for any motion or order of court for such transfer or for reformation of pleadings, and final judgments or decrees in causes transferred shall include costs incurred in the county court. After abolishment of a county court, executions and all process on final judgments or decrees theretofore entered therein shall be issued by the clerk of the circuit court of the county and made returnable to any court in the county where rendered then having jurisdiction of the subject-matter involved or of any of the parties, and the court to which such executions or process is returned shall have jurisdiction thereof and try all issues pertaining thereto.

After the abolishment of a county court, the circuit clerk of the county shall be the official custodian of all its records and may certify to copies thereof under his seal. When the result of an appeal to the supreme court shall be a reversal of the circuit court and in material particulars in effect an affirmance of the judgment of a county court which has been abolished, the supreme court shall enter judgment in the cause or remand it to the circuit court which shall have full jurisdiction thereof and shall enter final judgment in accordance with the opinion and fiat of the supreme court or proceed as the supreme court may otherwise direct.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1619; Laws, 1932, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts § 9.

§ 9-9-41. Court may be abolished in certain counties.

In any county in which there is a city of more than thirteen thousand six hundred inhabitants and less than fourteen thousand inhabitants, as shown by the next preceding regular federal census, and having a county court established by Section 9-9-1, the board of supervisors shall, on petition of not less than twenty per cent (20%) of the qualified electors of said county, call an election for the purpose of ascertaining whether said court shall be abolished. Said election shall be held in the manner provided by law for holding general elections and at least three weeks’ notice thereof shall be given by publication in some newspaper having a general circulation within the county.

The tickets used at said election shall have on their face the following:

For abolishing the county court of_______________county ( )

Against abolishing the county court of_______________county ( )

and the voters shall vote by placing a cross mark after one of said

propositions.

In the event a majority of the qualified electors of said county voting in said election vote in favor of the abolition of said court then the same shall immediately cease to exist and the clerk of the circuit court shall transfer all cases pending on the docket of said court. Those cases involving misdemeanors or amounts under two hundred dollars shall be transferred to the proper justice of the peace and those involving over two hundred dollars shall be transferred to the circuit court of the county.

In the event said county court is abolished as hereinabove provided, all executions or garnishments issued on judgment rendered by said court shall be returnable before the circuit court of the county and shall be disposed of just as if the judgment had been rendered by said circuit court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1620; Laws, 1938, ch. 284; Laws, 1950, ch. 352.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171, all reference in the Mississippi Code to justice of the peace shall mean justice court judge.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts § 9.

§ 9-9-43. Legislative action or election required to abolish courts in certain counties.

In any county now having a county court established by Chapter 131 of the laws of 1926 and having only one judicial district therein and in which the assessed valuation of real and personal property has fallen below seventeen million dollars but exceeds fifteen million dollars according to the assessment of 1932, and in which the urban population exceeds the rural population, and having therein a municipality in excess of 15,000 population, according to the last federal census, said county court shall remain in existence until abolished by a direct act of the legislature or by an election as now provided by law.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1621; Laws, 1934, ch. 235.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts § 9.

§ 9-9-45. When other counties become eligible for establishment or abolition of court.

When hereafter any county of the state shall become eligible by reason of the growth in population, in assessed valuation and the existence therein of a municipality of the number of inhabitants all as specified in Section 9-9-1 of this chapter, it shall be the duty of the Governor, upon the determination by him of the facts aforesaid, to issue his public proclamation establishing a county court in the said county, and calling an election on a date to be fixed in said proclamation for the election of a county judge. The term of office of a county judge elected under this section and Section 9-9-39 shall expire thereafter at the same time at which there expires the regular terms of circuit judges and chancellors. When in the last year of any four-year judicial period any county has fallen below the requirements of eligibility as stated in Section 9-9-1 of this chapter, it shall be the duty of the Governor so to ascertain and proclaim, thereupon after the expiration of the then four-year term, the county court shall cease to exist in such county, unless by an election held under the provisions of Section 9-9-39 the said court be retained or reestablished.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 707; 1942, § 1622; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; brought forward without change, Laws, 2010, ch. 442, § 4, eff June 21, 2010 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the bringing forward without change of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

By letter dated June 21, 2010, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Acts of 1965, as amended and extended, to the bringing forward without change of this section by Laws of 2010, ch. 442.

Amendment Notes —

The 2010 amendment brought this section forward without change.

Chapter 11. Justice Courts

§ 9-11-1. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 6, eff from and after January 1, 1984.

[Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch 50, art. 14 (1, 2); 1857, ch. 58, arts. 1, 2; 1871, § 1297; 1880, § 2185; 1892, § 2392; 1906, § 2721; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2220; 1930, § 2069; 1942, § 1803; Laws, 1926, ch. 209; Laws, 1932, ch. 174; Laws, 1960, ch. 188; Laws, 1964, ch. 329, § 1; Laws, 1966, ch. 289, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 339, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 497, § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 340; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 7; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 6]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-11-1 specified the number of justices of the peace districts in counties, and provided for elections and designation of positions.

§ 9-11-2. Determination of number of justice court judges in each county.

  1. From and after January 1, 1984, there shall be a competent number of justice court judges in each county of the state. The number of justice court judges for each county shall be determined as follows:
    1. In counties with a population, according to the latest federal decennial census, of thirty-five thousand (35,000) and less, there shall be two (2) justice court judges unless the board of supervisors, by resolution duly spread upon its minutes, finds that one (1) justice court judge is a competent number to adequately handle the needs of the citizens of the county.
    2. In counties with a population, according to the latest federal decennial census, of more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) and less than seventy thousand (70,000), there shall be three (3) justice court judges, unless the board of supervisors, by resolution duly spread upon its minutes, finds that two (2) is a competent number of justice court judges to adequately handle the needs of the citizens of the county.
    3. In counties with a population, according to the latest federal decennial census, of seventy thousand (70,000) and less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000), there shall be four (4) justice court judges, unless the board of supervisors, by resolution duly spread upon its minutes, finds that three (3) is a competent number of justice court judges to adequately handle the needs of the citizens of the county.
    4. In counties with a population, according to the latest federal decennial census, of one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) and more, there shall be five (5) justice court judges, unless the board of supervisors, by resolution duly spread upon its minutes, finds that four (4) is a competent number of justice court judges to adequately handle the needs of the citizens of the county.
  2. The board of supervisors shall establish single member election districts in the county for the election of each of the justice court judges authorized and required to be elected for the county under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, and one (1) justice court judge shall be elected for each district by the electors thereof. In any county authorized and required under the provisions of subsection (1)(a) of this section to provide for the election of two (2) justice court judges for the county in which there are two (2) judicial districts, the smaller of such judicial districts, according to population based upon the latest federal decennial census, shall comprise or shall be wholly encompassed within one (1) of such election districts.
    1. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize or require more than five (5) justice court judges in any one (1) county from and after January 1, 1984, nor to authorize or require an increase in the number of justice court judges for any county during the term of office of any justice court judge.
    2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize or require a county to decrease the number of justice court judge positions in the county as of June 30, 2014.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 497, § 2; Laws, 1975, ch. 423; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 8; Laws, 1983 2nd Ex Sess, ch. 7, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 515, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2007, ch. 588, § 1 provides as follows:

“SECTION 1. (1) There is created a task force to study and assess the duties and services provided by the justice court judges, the training and compensation of justice court judges, the jurisdictional limits of justice courts, uniform rules of procedure for justice courts, whether jury trials should occur in justice courts, when justice court judges are elected, the manner in which justice court judges are elected and the feasibility of nonpartisan elections for justice court judges.

“(2) The task force shall be composed of the following members:

“(a) One (1) appellate judge appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall chair the committee.

“(b) Three (3) justice court judges appointed by the Conference of Justice Court Judges.

“(c) Two (2) circuit court clerks appointed by the Circuit Clerks Association.

“(d) One (1) circuit judge appointed by the Conference of Circuit Judges.

“(e) One (1) county court judge appointed by the Conference of County Court Judges.

“(f) One (1) supervisor appointed by the Mississippi Association of Supervisors.

“(g) The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Division A, the Chairman of the House of Representatives Judiciary A Committee, the Chairman of the Senate Elections Committee and the Chairman of the House Apportionment and Elections Committee, or their designees, shall serve as legislative liaisons and nonvoting members.

“(3) The member of the task force who is appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall serve as chairman of the task force. The task force shall meet at the call of the chairman and at its first meeting shall select a vice chairman from among its membership. The vice chairman shall also serve as secretary of the task force and shall be responsible for keeping all records of the task force. A majority of the members of the task force shall constitute a quorum.

“(4) The task force shall file a report with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate containing its findings and recommendations regarding the justice court system by not later than December 1, 2007.

“(5) Legislative members of the committee shall receive per diem, travel or other expenses, if authorized by the Management Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate, from the contingent expense funds of their respective houses in the same amounts as provided for committee meetings when the Legislature is not in session; provided that no per diem or expense for attending meetings of the committee shall be paid while the Legislature is in session.

“(6) Nonlegislative members of the task force shall receive no compensation for their service on the task force but may be reimbursed for expenses related to their service on the task force as authorized by law.

“(7) The task force shall be dissolved on December 1, 2007.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment added the language beginning “unless the board of supervisors, by resolution…” at the end of (1)(a), (b), (c) and (d); substituted “subsection” for “paragraph” near the beginning of the last sentence in (2); added (3)(b); deleted “or decrease” following “or require an increase” in (3)(a); and deleted (4), which provided that justice court judges serving on November 8, 1983, in a county in which justice court districts drawn pursuant to subsection (2) are being contested in a court action or reviewed under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, shall continue to hold office until a final adjudication of the court action or approval of the districts under the Voting Rights Act or the election and qualification of successors of the justice court judges.

Cross References —

Provisions relative to compensation of justice court judges of a county where their number exceeds that authorized by §9-11-2(1), see §25-3-36.

Appointment of judge to serve for justice court judge who is unable to serve for thirty consecutive days, see §9-11-31.

Provision that single member election districts for the election of constables shall be of the same number and shall have the same boundaries as districts established for justice court judges pursuant to this section, see §19-19-2.

Provision that justice court judges shall be elected in 1987 and every four years thereafter, see §23-15-193.

Nominations for state, district, county, and county district offices which are elective, see §§23-15-291 et seq.

Rules governing practice and procedure in justice courts, see Uniform Rules of Procedure for Justice Court 1.00 et seq.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

There is apparently no law that would prohibit justice court judge from serving as municipal judge of more than one city in county; there in no statutory authority or guidelines for setting compensation of such judge, other than general rule that such compensation must be reasonable in relation to duties performed. 1992 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 481.

Section 9-11-15 authorizes justice court judge to hold court on Saturdays if business of court requires and clerk or deputy clerk must be present if it is necessary to issue process from bench. 1994 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 997.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Justices of the Peace § 5.

CJS.

51 C.J.S., Justices of the Peace § 3.

Law Reviews.

Case, In search of an independent judiciary: alternatives to judicial elections in Mississippi. 13 Miss. C. L. Rev. 1, Fall, 1992.

§ 9-11-3. Certification of successful completion of courses of training and continuing education and minimum competency examination conducted and administered by Mississippi Judicial College; exemption from competency examination.

  1. Except as otherwise provided herein, no justice court judge elected for a full term of office commencing on or after January 1, 2012, shall exercise the judicial functions of his office or be eligible to take the oath of office until he has filed in the office of the chancery clerk the following two (2) certifications: (a) a certificate of completion of a course of training and education conducted by the Mississippi Judicial College of the University of Mississippi Law Center; and (b) a certificate of successful completion of a minimum competency examination administered by the Mississippi Judicial College of the University of Mississippi Law Center within six (6) months of the beginning of the term for which such justice is elected. A justice court judge who has completed the course of training and education, passed the minimum competency examination, and has satisfied his annual continuing education course requirements, and who is then elected for a succeeding term of office subsequent to the initial term for which he completed the training course, shall not be required to repeat the basic training and education course upon reelection but shall be subject to the continuing education requirements.
  2. In addition to meeting the requirements of subsection (1) of this section, after taking office, each justice court judge shall be required to file annually in the office of the chancery clerk a certificate of completion of a course of continuing education conducted by the Mississippi Judicial College.
  3. The requirements for obtaining each of the certificates in subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall be as provided in Section 9-11-4.
  4. Upon the failure of any justice court judge to file with the chancery clerk the certificates of completion as provided in subsections (1) and (2) of this section, such justice court judge shall, in addition to any other fine or punishment provided by law for such conduct, not be entitled to compensation for the period of time during which such certificates remain unfiled. If a justice court judge has not filed the required certifications within eight (8) months of the inception of the term, that justice court judge shall forfeit his office, his position shall be declared vacant, and the resulting vacancy shall be filled as provided by Section 23-15-839.
  5. The competency examination requirements in Sections 9-11-3 and 9-11-4 shall not apply to any sitting justice court judges as of July 24, 2008.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1803.2; Laws, 1964, ch. 330; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 15; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 28; Laws, 1989, ch. 448, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 321, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 319, § 2; Laws, 2011, ch. 367, § 1, eff July 5, 2011 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2008, ch. 319, § 1, provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known as the “Justice Court Reform Act of 2008.”

On July 24, 2008, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the amendment of this section by Chapter 319, Laws of 2008.

By letter dated July 5, 2011, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Chapter 367, Laws of 2011.

Amendment Notes —

The 2008 amendment, in the first sentence of (1), substituted “January 1, 2012” for “January 1, 1992,” “oath of office until” for “oath of office unless,” inserted “the following two (2) certification: (a) a” and “and (b) a certificate of successful completion of a minimum competency examination administered by the Mississippi Judicial College of the University of Mississippi Law Center,” and made minor stylistic changes”; in the last sentence of (1), inserted “passed the minimum competency examination,” inserted “basic” following “required to repeat the,” added “but shall be subject to the continuing education requirements” at the end, and made minor stylistic changes; and in (4), added the last sentence.

The 2011 amendment added (5).

§ 9-11-4. Basic and continuing education courses for justice court judges; minimum competency examination; exemption from competency examination; remedial courses; costs and expenses.

    1. The Mississippi Judicial College of the University of Mississippi Law Center shall prepare and conduct courses of training for basic and continuing education for justice court judges of this state. The basic course of training shall be known as the “Justice Court Judge Training Course” and shall consist of eighty (80) hours of training. The continuing education course shall be known as the “Continuing Education Course for Justice Court Judges,” and shall consist of twenty-four (24) hours of training. The content of the basic and continuing education courses and when and where such courses are to be conducted shall be determined by the Judicial College. The Judicial College shall issue certificates of completion to those justice court judges who complete such courses.
    2. The Mississippi Judicial College of the University of Mississippi Law Center shall prepare and administer a minimum competency examination, as approved by the Mississippi Supreme Court, upon completion of the required basic course of training for justice court judges. If an elected justice court judge fails to complete the examination or fails the examination, there shall be a remedial twenty-four-hour course to be followed by a second opportunity for the justice court judge to achieve a passing score on the minimum competency examination.
  1. All costs and expenses for preparing and conducting the basic and continuing education courses, the remedial basic course, and the minimum competency examination provided for in subsection (1) of this section shall be paid out of any funds which are made available to the Judicial College upon authorization and appropriation by the Legislature.
  2. The competency examination requirements in Sections 9-11-3 and 9-11-4 shall not apply to any sitting justice court judge as of July 24, 2008.

HISTORY: Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 16; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 28; Laws, 2008, ch. 319, § 3; Laws, 2011, ch. 367, § 2, eff July 5, 2011 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2008, ch. 319, § 1, provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known as the “Justice Court Reform Act of 2008.”

On July 24, 2008, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the amendment of this section by Chapter 319, Laws of 2008.

By letter dated July 5, 2011, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Chapter 367, Laws of 2011.

Amendment Notes —

The 2008 amendment, in (1), added (b), and redesignated former (1) as present (1)(a); in (1)(a), substituted “consist of eighty (80) hours” for “consist of at least thirty-two (32) hours” and “consist of twenty-four (24) hours” for “consist of at least eighteen (18) hours”; and in (2), inserted “the remedial basic course, and the minimum competency examination,” and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2011 amendment added (3).

Cross References —

Provisions of this section governing issuance of certificates of completion of justice court judges training and education courses, required to be filed by justice court judges, see §9-11-3.

§ 9-11-5. Courtrooms; offices; insurance.

  1. The justice court judges shall be provided courtrooms by the county and all trials shall be held therein. Such courtrooms shall be in the county courthouse, county office building or any other building within the county deemed appropriate by the board of supervisors.
  2. The county shall provide office space and furnish each justice court office and provide necessary office supplies.
  3. The board of supervisors of each county may secure insurance coverage to protect the office of the justice court clerk against losses due to theft or robbery.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1803.3; Laws, 1964, ch. 332; Laws, 1979, ch. 476, § 2; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 9; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 28; Laws, 1986, ch. 367; Laws, 2008, ch. 319, § 4; Laws, 2008, ch. 553, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 4 of ch. 319, Laws of 2008, effective from and after July 24, 2008 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Chapter 319, Laws of 2008), amended this section. Section 2 of ch. 553, Laws of 2008, effective July 1, 2008 (approved May 10, 2008), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 2 of ch. 553, Laws of 2008, which contains language that specifically provides that it supersedes §9-11-5 as amended by Chapter 319, Laws of 2008.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2008, ch. 319, § 1, provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known as the “Justice Court Reform Act of 2008.”

Amendment Notes —

The first 2008 amendment (ch. 319), added (2)(b).

The second 2008 amendment (ch. 553) deleted former (2)(b), which read: “The sheriff shall provide courtroom security when justice court is in session in accordance with the provisions of Section 19-25-69.”

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Preliminary hearing does not fall under trial court and therefore Justice Court Judge may conduct preliminary hearing where location of hearing is reasonable, i.e. jail or courthouse; Justice Court Clerk is not mandated by statute to notify defendant or witnesses of upcoming preliminary hearing. 1990 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 76.

Board of supervisors has clear statutory duty to provide adequate court facilities for each county. 1994 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 959.

The board of supervisors is responsible for providing a courtroom and office space for the county justice court; if the board fails to do so, a writ of mandamus, requiring the board to fulfill their statutory duties, may be sought in circuit court. 1997 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 462.

The county board of supervisors has discretion in setting the office hours during which the justice court clerk’s office will be open with a clerk present and in providing for the location of the justice court offices. 2000 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 641.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Justices of the Peace § 22.

CJS.

51 C.J.S., Justices of the Peace § 60.

§ 9-11-7. Oath of office and bond.

Every person elected a justice court judge shall, before he enters on the duties of the office, take the oath of office prescribed by Section 155 of the Constitution, and give bond, with sufficient surety, to be payable, conditioned and approved as provided by law and in the same manner as other county officers, in a penalty not less than Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00); and any party interested may proceed on such bond in a summary way, by motion in any court having jurisdiction of the same, against the principal and surety, upon giving five (5) days’ previous notice.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 50, art 7 (1); 1857, ch. 58, art. 3; 1871, § 1298; 1880, § 2186; 1892, § 2393; 1906, § 2722; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2221; 1930, § 2070; 1942, § 1804; Laws, 1986, ch. 458, § 12; Reenacted, Laws, 1989, ch. 342, § 1; Laws, 2009, ch. 467, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 48, Chapter 458, Laws, 1986, provided that §9-11-7 would stand repealed from and after October 1, 1989. Subsequently, three 1989 chapters (341, 342, and 343) amended Section 48, Chapter 458, Laws, 1986, by deleting the date for repeal.

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment substituted “not less than Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00)” for “equal to Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00)” preceding “and any party interested may proceed on such bond.”

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Justices of the Peace §§ 6, 60.

3B Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Bonds § 43:18.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A justice of the peace and his official bond are liable for damages from his false certificate of acknowledgment. Hodges v. Mills, 139 Miss. 347, 104 So. 165, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 155 (Miss. 1925).

§ 9-11-9. Civil jurisdiction; pecuniary interest in outcome of action.

Justice court judges shall have jurisdiction of all actions for the recovery of debts or damages or personal property, where the principal of the debt, the amount of the demand, or the value of the property sought to be recovered shall not exceed Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($3,500.00).

The justice court judges shall have no pecuniary interest in the outcome of any action once suit has been filed.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 50, art 2 (9); 1857, ch 58, art. 7; 1871, § 1302; 1880, § 2190; 1892, § 2394; 1906, § 2723; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2222; 1930, § 2071; 1942, § 1805; Laws, 1964, ch. 333; Laws, 1977, ch. 308; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 4; Laws, 1985, ch. 478, § 1; Laws, 1986, ch. 365; Laws, 1995, ch. 573, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 319, § 5, eff July 24, 2008 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section.).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2008, ch. 319, § 1, provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known as the “Justice Court Reform Act of 2008.”

On July 24, 2008, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the amendment of this section by Chapter 319, Laws of 2008.

Amendment Notes —

The 2008 amendment substituted “Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($3,500.00)” for “Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00).”

Cross References —

Civil practice and procedure before justice court, see §§11-9-101 et seq.

Transfer of case where court has subject matter jurisdiction but not venue, see §11-11-17.

Partition of personalty by county court or justice court, see §11-21-73.

Trial of right of property in justice court, see §§11-23-25 et seq.

Unlawful entry and detainer proceedings before justice court judge, see §§11-25-1 et seq.

Attachment at law against debtors, see §§11-33-1 et seq.

Garnishment proceedings, see §§11-35-1 et seq.

As to action of replevin, see §§11-37-101 et seq.

Jurisdiction of justice court in proceeding to secure a confiscation of property seized under the tobacco tax law, see §27-69-55.

Jurisdiction of justice court in Mississippi marine conservation commission cases, see §49-15-65.

Proceeding under justice courts, see §85-7-265.

Jurisdiction of justice court of claims for salvage services, see §89-17-21.

Jurisdiction of justice court over criminal cases, see §99-33-1.

Imposition and amount of restitution authorized by justice court, see §99-37-3.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Justice court may not order restitution of more than $1,000, court’s current jurisdictional limit, for medical bills and similar expenses arising from assault. 1992 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 611.

If defendant is charged with misdemeanor involving fraud, found guilty and wishes to make restitution, Justice Court is limited to $1,000.00 restitution, even though amount of fraud is above $1,000.00. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 565.

Attorney fees are included in the amount of the demand and therefore are included in the jurisdictional limit in justice court. 1998 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 712.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Disqualification of judge, justice of the peace, or similar judicial officer for pecuniary interest in fines, forfeitures, or fees payable by litigants. 72 A.L.R.3d 375.

Judge’s previous legal association with attorney connected to current case as warranting disqualification. 85 A.L.R.4th 700.

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Justices of the Peace §§ 24 et seq.

CJS.

51 C.J.S., Justices of the Peace §§ 26, 42 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction in general.

2. Amount in controversy.

3. —Interest, costs and damages.

4. —Attorney fees.

5. Consolidation of suits.

6. Joinder of causes of action.

7. Splitting or dividing cause of action.

8. Claimant’s issue.

9. Replevin.

10. Appeal.

1. Jurisdiction in general.

Mississippi justice courts and the circuit courts shared concurrent jurisdiction in matters in which the amount in controversy exceeded $200 but not $2,500. Arant v. Hubbard, 824 So. 2d 611, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 257 (Miss. 2002).

The appearance of the defendant before a justice of the peace cures a defective service of summons. Helmer Bros. v. Hastings, 142 Miss. 403, 107 So. 551, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 95 (Miss. 1926).

A justice of the peace may suspend business to try a criminal case and render a valid judgment by default at the same term by resuming the business of his court. Welch v. Hannie, 112 Miss. 79, 72 So. 861, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1916).

Under a municipal charter which provides for an additional justice of the peace for the town, the civil jurisdiction of such justice under the general law is not limited by a provision of the charter that the mayor and councilmen may fix penalties for violations of the charter or ordinances, the offense to be ascertained by trial before the mayor or justice of the peace for the town. Matthews v. Cotton, 83 Miss. 472, 35 So. 937, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 66 (Miss. 1904).

The civil jurisdiction of justices of the peace was conferred by constitutional grant and not by legislation. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Brookhaven Mach. Co., 71 Miss. 663, 16 So. 252, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1893).

The jurisdiction embraces suits “founded on any penal statute,” although these words, which appear in the corresponding section of Code 1857 p. 405, were not brought forward in the Codes of 1871, 1880 and 1892. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Sullivan, 70 Miss. 447, 12 So. 460, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 127 (Miss. 1892).

The justice’s jurisdiction is not limited by the Constitution to actions on contracts. Bell v. West Point, 51 Miss. 262, 1875 Miss. LEXIS 43 (Miss. 1875); Higgins v. Deloach, 54 Miss. 498, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 1877).

2. Amount in controversy.

Jurisdiction of justice of peace is determined by amount demanded in good faith in pleadings. Simpson County v. Furlow, 160 Miss. 232, 134 So. 146, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 184 (Miss. 1931).

Where plaintiff filed statement charging defendant with $200 for killing horse and $10 for killing yearling, and judgment was entered for $110, justice of the peace had no jurisdiction. Simpson County v. Furlow, 160 Miss. 232, 134 So. 146, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 184 (Miss. 1931).

Test as to jurisdictional amount in controversy is determined at time of filing suit. Catchot v. Russell, 160 Miss. 330, 134 So. 140, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1931).

The amount honestly claimed by plaintiff determines jurisdiction. Betts v. Falgo, 126 Miss. 252, 88 So. 636, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 31 (Miss. 1921).

The amount that a tenant may owe for the rent of a place does not determine the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace to dispossess said tenant on the ground he is in default of rent. Simpson v. Boykin, 118 Miss. 701, 79 So. 852, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 123 (Miss. 1918), overruled, Jackson v. Schwartz, 240 So. 2d 60, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1267 (Miss. 1970).

A tenant remanding the case of his landlord to the justice court because of want of jurisdiction cannot afterwards in the same case be heard to contend that the amount sued for is over $200.00. Weatherall v. Brown, 113 Miss. 887, 74 So. 765, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 161 (Miss. 1917).

Items denied by the defendant and eliminated from the account which reduces amount originally claimed below $200.00 gives the justice of the peace jurisdiction of the case. Kantrovitz v. McNeill, 110 Miss. 873, 71 So. 13, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 1916).

The value of the property honestly claimed in the affidavit determines the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace regardless of the findings of the jury as to its value. Johnson v. Tabor, 101 Miss. 78, 57 So. 365, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1912).

A compromise with one carrier as co-defendant, which reduces the amount sued for below the jurisdiction of the circuit court, deprives that court of jurisdiction. Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Hitt & Rutherford, 99 Miss. 679, 55 So. 484, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 237 (Miss. 1911).

The demand, where honestly made, fixes and determines the amount in controversy. Fenn v. Harrington, 54 Miss. 733, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 91 (Miss. 1877); Ross v. Natchez, J. & C. R. Co., 61 Miss. 12, 1883 Miss. LEXIS 61 (Miss. 1883); Griffin v. McDaniel, 63 Miss. 121, 1885 Miss. LEXIS 29 (Miss. 1885).

The principal of the debt at the time suit is brought, after deducting credits if any, is the test of jurisdiction. Martin v. Harden, 52 Miss. 694, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1876).

3. —Interest, costs and damages.

Interest is not to be included in determining “principal amount in controversy” on question whether circuit court has jurisdiction. Catchot v. Russell, 160 Miss. 330, 134 So. 140, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1931).

The principal amount in controversy, exclusive of the interest, determines jurisdiction. Wainwright v. Atkins, 104 Miss. 438, 61 So. 454, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1913).

In suits on penal bonds, jurisdiction is determined by the amount of damages honestly claimed. Shattuck v. Miller, 50 Miss. 386, 1874 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1874); State v. Luckey, 51 Miss. 528, 1875 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1875).

In computing the amount in controversy, costs, damages and interest are excluded. N. O., J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Evans, 49 Miss. 785, 1874 Miss. LEXIS 13 (Miss. 1874); Jackson v. Whitfield, 51 Miss. 202, 1875 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1875).

4. —Attorney fees.

Where agreed percentage of principal and interest added as attorney’s fee to face of note, excluding interest, exceeded $200, circuit court had jurisdiction, attorney’s fee being part of “principal amount in controversy.” Catchot v. Russell, 160 Miss. 330, 134 So. 140, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1931).

The stipulation in a promissory note for 10% added for attorney’s fees makes the attorney part of the cause of action in determining the amount sued for. Parks v. Granger, 96 Miss. 503, 51 So. 716, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 1910).

5. Consolidation of suits.

A justice of the peace cannot consolidate separate and distinct suits, if, when united, the demand exceeds two hundred dollars. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. McCollister, 66 Miss. 106, 5 So. 695, 1888 Miss. LEXIS 70 (Miss. 1888).

6. Joinder of causes of action.

Plaintiff need not embrace in the same suit independent causes of action, though all may be due. Ash v. W. A. Lee & Co., 51 Miss. 101, 1875 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. 1875); Pittman v. Chrisman, 59 Miss. 124, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1881); Drysdale v. Biloxi Canning Factory, 67 Miss. 534, 7 So. 541, 1890 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1890); McLendon v. Pass, 66 Miss. 110, 5 So. 234, 1888 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1888); Morris v. Shryock & Rowland, 50 Miss. 590, 1874 Miss. LEXIS 98 (Miss. 1874).

7. Splitting or dividing cause of action.

A single demand cannot be split in order to confer jurisdiction. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Ford, 97 Miss. 198, 52 So. 208, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 219 (Miss. 1910).

A suit for damages for two separate mules killed at the same time cannot be split so as to give the justice of the peace jurisdiction. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Payne, 92 Miss. 126, 45 So. 705, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 1907).

But where one ships freight, part belonging to him and part to others, although under a single contract, he may sue in tort in a justice’s court for injury to his own property by the negligence of the carrier if the sum does not exceed two hundred dollars. Waters v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 74 Miss. 534, 21 So. 240, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 163 (Miss. 1897).

An account, though embracing various items, cannot be divided so as to give jurisdiction. Grayson v. Williams, 1 Miss. 298, 1827 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1827); Pittman v. Chrisman, 59 Miss. 124, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1881).

8. Claimant’s issue.

The justices of the peace have jurisdiction to try a claimant’s issue although the value of the property exceeds two hundred dollars. Bernheimer v. Martin, 66 Miss. 486, 6 So. 326, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1889).

Pittman v. Chrisman, 59 Miss. 124, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1881).

9. Replevin.

The affidavit in replevin determines the jurisdiction of the court so far as it concerns the value of the property sued for, unless the plaintiff knowingly undervalued or overvalued it for jurisdictional purposes; Code 1892 § 649 (Code 1906 § 706, Code 1942 § 485), providing a penalty for suing for more than is due for jurisdictional purposes, applies to justice’s courts. Ball, Brown & Co. v. Sledge, 82 Miss. 749, 35 So. 447, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1903).

10. Appeal.

In declining to follow Melikian v. Avent (N.D. Miss. 1969) 300 F Supp 516, the reviewing court held that the civil side of the Mississippi fee system did not comport with due process, in light of the record which supported the inference that creditors would file more frequently in the courts of the judges who tended to favor the plaintiffs, and where there was testimony to this effect, and further testimony to the effect that judges knew and understood this to be the case, and where the undisputed evidence showed that cases were unevenly distributed throughout the judges in the various counties. Brown v. Vance, 637 F.2d 272, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 20552 (5th Cir. Miss. 1981).

On appeal to the circuit court if the justice court had jurisdiction the circuit court will have. Hobbs Auto Co. v. Jones, 140 Miss. 610, 105 So. 764, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 296 (Miss. 1925).

Items accruing after suit are improperly added to account before justice of the peace, but such conduct will not cause dismissal of the appeal. Hobbs Auto Co. v. Jones, 140 Miss. 610, 105 So. 764, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 296 (Miss. 1925).

A void judgment by default before a justice of the peace may be appealed from and on appeal the judgment set aside where there was no appearance of defendant in the justice court. Mississippi C. R. Co. v. Calhoun, 140 Miss. 289, 105 So. 519, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1925).

And on appeal to the circuit court the latter may render a judgment for rent in excess of $200.00. Stollenwerck v. Eure, 119 Miss. 854, 81 So. 594, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1919).

The execution of an appeal bond does not preclude the appellant on appeal from attacking the judgment appealed from for want of jurisdiction of the justice. Adams v. Fidelity Mut. L. Ins. Co., 94 Miss. 433, 49 So. 119, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1909).

Where defendant in replevin action retained the several articles of property involved under bond, and, by consent, only part of the property was adjudged restored to plaintiff, defendant’s appeal from justice court concerns only the rights of the parties to the property adjudged to be restored. Mellini v. Duly, 88 Miss. 219, 40 So. 546, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1906).

§ 9-11-10. Civil jurisdiction; prepayment of costs as prerequisite; penalties.

No justice of the peace court shall have jurisdiction over any civil suit attempted to be filed therein unless and until all legally required court costs, as set out, but not restricted to, Sections 25-7-25 and 25-7-27, Mississippi Code of 1972, are deposited with the court. The justice of the peace shall not file, docket, issue process, or otherwise assume jurisdiction until such costs shall have been paid.

Any violation shall constitute a misdemeanor wherein the county court, or in the absence of a county court, the circuit court shall have jurisdiction. Upon conviction the justice of the peace shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00).

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, 1974, ch. 329, eff from and after July 1, 1974.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6 § 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to justice of the peace shall mean justice court judge.

Cross References —

Money paid into the justice court clerk clearing account, see §9-11-18.

Payment of costs and fees in advance to clerk of justice court, see §25-7-25.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Justices of the Peace §§ 24 et seq.

CJS.

51 C.J.S., Justices of the Peace §§ 26, 42 et seq.

§ 9-11-11. Uniform case record; certified copies of papers furnished to parties; destruction of closed files.

It shall be the duty of the justice court to keep a uniform case record developed by the Attorney General on each case, civil and criminal, brought before it. Upon disposition, each record shall be signed by the justice court judge. It shall be the duty of a justice court, when required, to furnish to either party a certified copy of all proceedings, and of all papers and process relating thereto, in any action before it. Closed civil and criminal files may be destroyed after seven and one-half (71/2) years with written approval from the Director of the Department of Archives and History.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch 50, art. 2 (12); 1857, ch. 58, art. 14; 1871, § 1308; 1880, § 2193; 1892, § 2397; 1906, § 2726; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2225; 1930, § 2074; 1942, § 1808; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 17; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 28; Laws, 1985, ch. 440, § 2; Laws, 1998, ch. 439, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1998.

Cross References —

Entry to identify docket, see §9-11-13.

Entry on justice court docket of clerks appointed by justice court judge, see §9-11-27.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A signed, written, case record is required only upon disposition of the case, i.e., when a judgment or order is entered; however, the docket must be available and open to inspection by the public at all times whether in printed form or by computer. 1991 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 910.

Justice court statutes do not mention “judgment form” other than case record that justice court judge is required, under Miss. Code Section 9-11-11, to sign upon disposition of each case. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 331.

Clerk and deputy clerk are duty-bound to record all actions but it is ultimate responsibility of justice court judge to ensure correctness of disposition before signing off on it. 1994 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 997.

Based on Sections 9-11-11 and 63-9-29 [Repealed], a justice court clerk has the authority to collect a fine on a traffic ticket in advance and in lieu of the defendant attending court. The judge should sign the docket book if he makes a determination that the fine was properly paid. 1996 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 493.

Although a uniform case record developed by the Attorney General must be maintained and signed by the justice court judge upon the disposition of each case, the justice court docket need not be maintained in paper form, but may instead be maintained on computer so long as the public has access to the docket by way of printed copies or access to the computer itself. 1997 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 534.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Justices of the Peace §§ 22 et seq.

CJS.

51 C.J.S., Justices of the Peace § 128.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Effect of requiring docket entries.

3. Evidence.

1. In general.

Judgment entered at regular term of justice court, based on return of process at special day with continuance to regular term, was not void. McCormick Motor Car Co. v. McDonald, 153 Miss. 409, 121 So. 121, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 40 (Miss. 1929).

Court of justice of the peace is court of record. Strickland v. Webb, 152 Miss. 421, 120 So. 168, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 269 (Miss. 1928).

Justice of the peace had no authority to enter judgment after his term of office expired. Strickland v. Webb, 152 Miss. 421, 120 So. 168, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 269 (Miss. 1928).

It is a copy of the entries on this docket which the justice is to transmit, certified, to the circuit court on appeal. Hughston v. Cornish, 59 Miss. 372, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 119 (Miss. 1882).

2. Effect of requiring docket entries.

A judgment written on a slip of paper that is no part of the docket of the justice of the peace is void. A justice of the peace must write his judgments in his docket. Board of Sup'rs v. Steele, 124 Miss. 340, 86 So. 810, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 514 (Miss. 1921).

An execution on a judgment which does not show service of process on defendant and is by default should be quashed and garnishment on the judgment discharged on appeal. Carrollton Hardware & Implement Co. v. Marshall, 117 Miss. 224, 78 So. 7, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1918), overruled, Bank of Philadelphia v. Posey, 130 Miss. 530, 92 So. 840, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1922).

But if a justice enters his judgment on a loose piece of paper and after his court adjourns transfers the entry to his docket, the judgment is not invalid. Holley v. State, 74 Miss. 878, 21 So. 923, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1897).

3. Evidence.

A judge violated §9-11-11 and Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), 3A(4), 3A(5), and 3B(1) where he failed to promptly dispose of the court’s business and allowed his relationship with the court clerk to affect his duties, and where he engaged in ex parte communications which required his recusal in 44 cases within a short period of time. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Spencer, 725 So. 2d 171, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 448 (Miss. 1998).

§ 9-11-13. Entry to identify docket.

Each justice of the peace shall, at the beginning and in front of all his entries in his docket, make and subscribe substantially the following entry, to-wit:

“A docket of proceedings in matters civil and criminal before , a justice of the peace of the county of , in the State of Mississippi, in District No. of said county, for the election of justices of the peace. Witness my signature. Justice of the Peace.”

Click to view

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 2239; 1892, § 2398; 1906, § 2727; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2226; 1930, § 2075; 1942, § 1809.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to justice of the peace shall mean justice court judge.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Justices of the Peace §§ 22 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Failure of judgment of justice of peace, on appeal to circuit court, to set forth judicial district, did not invalidate it. Dotson v. State, 156 Miss. 365, 126 So. 38, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1930).

§ 9-11-15. Regular terms of court; nonresident defendant; trial at reasonable time; court of record; power to punish for contempt; designation of at least one-half day per month as traffic court day; expunction of misdemeanor convictions.

  1. Justice court judges shall hold regular terms of their courts, at such times as they may appoint, not exceeding two (2) and not less than one (1) in every month, at the appropriate justice court courtroom established by the board of supervisors; and they may continue to hold their courts from day to day so long as business may require; and all process shall be returnable, and all trials shall take place at such regular terms, except where it is otherwise provided; but where the defendant is a nonresident or transient person, and it shall be shown by the oath of either party that a delay of the trial until the regular term will be of material injury to him, it shall be lawful for the judge to have the parties brought before him at any reasonable time and hear the evidence and give judgment or where the defendant is a nonresident or transient person and the judge and all parties agree, it shall be lawful for the judge to have the parties brought before him on the day a citation is made and hear the evidence and give judgment. Such court shall be a court of record, with all the power incident to a court of record, including power to fine in the amount of fine and length of imprisonment as is authorized for a municipal court in Section 21-23-7(11) for contempt of court.
    1. In counties with a population of less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000), each justice court shall designate at least one-half (1/2) day each month as a traffic court day, sufficient to handle the traffic violations docket of that court, and shall notify all appropriate law enforcement agencies of the date or dates. On the day or days so designated, the justice court shall give priority to all cases involving traffic violations.
    2. In counties with a population of one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) or more, each justice court shall designate at least one (1) day each month as a traffic court day, sufficient to handle the traffic violations of that court, and shall notify all appropriate law enforcement agencies of the date or dates. On the day or days so designated, the justice court shall give priority to all cases involving traffic violations. The one (1) day may be one (1) whole day or it may be divided into half days as long as one-half (1/2) day is held in the morning and one-half (1/2) day is held in the afternoon, in the discretion of the court.
  2. The justice court may, in its discretion, upon prior notice to the county prosecutor and upon a showing in open court of rehabilitation, good conduct for a period of two (2) years since the last conviction in any court and that the best interest of society would be served, order the record of conviction of a person of any or all misdemeanors in that court expunged, and upon so doing, such person thereafter legally stands as though he or she had never been convicted of the misdemeanor(s) and may lawfully so respond to any query of prior convictions. This order of expunction does not apply to the confidential records of law enforcement agencies and has no effect on the driving record of a person maintained under Title 63, Mississippi Code of 1972, or any other provision of said Title 63.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, a person who was convicted in justice court of a misdemeanor before reaching his twenty-third birthday, excluding conviction for a traffic violation, and who is a first offender, may utilize the provisions of Section 99-19-71, to expunge such misdemeanor conviction.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 50, art. 10 (5); 1857, ch. 58, art. 9; 1871, § 1309; 1880, § 2194; 1892, § 2399; 1906, § 2728; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2227; 1930, § 2076; 1942, § 1810; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 10; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 28; Laws, 1990, ch. 349, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 344, § 1; Laws, 2010, ch. 500, § 1; Laws, 2016, ch. 406, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2016.

Amendment Notes —

The 2010 amendment added the (1) designation; and added (2).

The 2016 amendment added (3) and (4).

Cross References —

Location of courtrooms of justice court judges, see §9-11-5.

Trial without delay for nonresident or transient defendants, see §11-9-105.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Miss. Code Section 9-11-15 requires justice court judges to “hold regular terms of their courts, at such times as they may appoint, not exceeding two and not less than one (1) in every month”; this section also provides justice court is court of record “with all power incident to a court of record, including power to fine in amount of fine and length of imprisonment that is authorized for municipal court in Miss. Code Section 21-23-7(11) for contempt of court.” 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 331.

Section 9-11-15 authorizes justice court judge to hold court on Saturdays if business of court requires and clerk or deputy clerk must be present if it is necessary to issue process from bench. 1994 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 997.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Intoxication of witness or attorney as contempt of court. 46 A.L.R.4th 238.

Am. Jur.

17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contempt § 137.

CJS.

17 C.J.S., Contempt §§ 69 et seq.

51 C.J.S., Justices of the Peace § 60.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Place of holding trial.

3. Time for holding trials; regular terms.

4. —Consent of parties.

5. —Nonresident or transient persons.

6. Notice of trial; service of process.

1. In general.

A justice court is a “court of record” as contemplated by §99-15-17; thus, appointed counsel who was representing indigent defendants at preliminary hearings in justice court was not limited to a fee of $200 per case plus out-of-pocket expenses. Gibson v. Board of Supervisors, 656 So. 2d 312, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 275 (Miss. 1995).

A justice of the peace court is a court of record and has inherent power to correct clerical errors at any time and to make the judgment entry correspond with the judgment rendered, and this power exists in criminal prosecutions as well as in civil cases. Kitchens v. State, 253 Miss. 734, 179 So. 2d 13, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1040 (Miss. 1965).

Circuit court has jurisdiction of both subject-matter and parties, on appeal with supersedeas, from default judgment by justice of the peace, in summary proceeding under Code 1942 § 948, to obtain possession of real property rendered on invalid service of process, although justice of the peace had jurisdiction only of subject-matter when default judgment was rendered. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Neither justice of the peace, nor circuit court on appeal, in proceeding under Code 1942 § 948, have any jurisdiction to make final and conclusive adjudication of title to property involved. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

The rule that continuances rest in the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to review upon appeal only for abuse of discretion, cannot apply to courts of justices of the peace for the reason that upon appeal to the circuit court such cases are tried there de novo. Gardner v. Price, 199 Miss. 809, 25 So. 2d 459, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 249 (Miss. 1946).

Court of justice of peace is court of record and of general jurisdiction. Simpson v. Phillips, 164 Miss. 256, 141 So. 897, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1932).

The presumption of law is that justice of peace court, as a court of record, had sufficient proof before it before rendering judgment. Simpson v. Phillips, 164 Miss. 256, 141 So. 897, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1932).

2. Place of holding trial.

A justice of the peace whose district is partly in two circuit court districts of the county may hold his court in either or both districts and will have entire jurisdiction of persons within his district, but appeals from his court to the circuit court must be to the circuit court of the district in which the suit is tried. Woods v. Speer, 127 Miss. 593, 90 So. 322, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 262 (Miss. 1921).

Where a justice of the peace has two regular places in his district and alternates in holding his terms of court on certain days at specific places, a writ of garnishment on judgment rendered at one place may be returnable to the next regular term of his court at said place, although a regular intervening term of court may be held at the other place. Edwards v. Kingston Lumber Co., 92 Miss. 598, 46 So. 69, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 207 (Miss. 1908).

A justice must hold his court within the district for which he was elected and is without jurisdiction to hold it elsewhere. State v. Tate, 77 Miss. 469, 27 So. 619, 1899 Miss. LEXIS 88 (Miss. 1899).

Perjury cannot be predicated on false swearing before a justice assuming to hold court without his district. State v. Tate, 77 Miss. 469, 27 So. 619, 1899 Miss. LEXIS 88 (Miss. 1899).

3. Time for holding trials; regular terms.

Party summoned to appear in justice court on named date is subject to default at regular term after continuance of case thereto. McCormick Motor Car Co. v. McDonald, 153 Miss. 409, 121 So. 121, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 40 (Miss. 1929).

Although a justice may continue to hold court from day to day following his regular court day, so long as business may require, he must hold regular terms, and an adjournment of his court from a regular court day to a day other than his next regular court day on the mistaken idea that the day of adjournment is a legal holiday is unauthorized and a judgment by default rendered on the day to which he so adjourned is void. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Dalton, 86 Miss. 299, 38 So. 285, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 1905).

Where the plaintiff’s attorney caused the defendant’s attorney to act upon the belief that a case would be continued at the next term of the justice’s court, a judgment taken by plaintiff himself at said term in the absence of the defendant and his attorney is fraudulent and after the defendant without fault has lost the right to appeal it will be enjoined and a new trial granted in equity, although the plaintiff’s attorney had no intent to deceive. Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Flowers, 85 Miss. 633, 38 So. 37, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1904).

4. —Consent of parties.

Justices of the peace may, by consent of the parties, postpone the trial of a cause to a particular day between the regular terms and then try it and give judgment. Rice v. Locke, 59 Miss. 189, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 99 (Miss. 1881).

5. —Nonresident or transient persons.

When the plaintiff or defendant is a nonresident or transient person, upon affidavit that a delay in the trial until the regular term would be of material injury, the justice may have the parties summoned to appear at any reasonable time and what is a reasonable time is a question for him to decide. Goodbar v. Owen, 70 Miss. 840, 12 So. 556, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1893).

6. Notice of trial; service of process.

Parties litigant are not charged with notice of time and place of holding courts of justice of peace. Swift & Co. v. Fox, 163 Miss. 783, 141 So. 277, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 86 (Miss. 1932); McCormick Motor Car Co. v. McDonald, 153 Miss. 409, 121 So. 121, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 40 (Miss. 1929).

Default judgment against garnishee, entered by justice of peace after service of garnishee summons, not specifying time and place for hearing, held void and ineffective. Swift & Co. v. Fox, 163 Miss. 783, 141 So. 277, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 86 (Miss. 1932).

Summons issued and returnable, not to regular term of justice court, but to special day, is not void, but merely irregular. McCormick Motor Car Co. v. McDonald, 153 Miss. 409, 121 So. 121, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 40 (Miss. 1929).

Where summons was returnable to a past day which was an impossible date, and the law did not fix the time or place of the next term, such matters being left to the discretion and convenience of the justice of the peace, the judgment rendered pursuant thereto was void. Howell v. Kersh, 152 Miss. 266, 119 So. 186, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1928).

A judgment of a justice, unless against a non-resident or transient person as authorized by this section, upon less than five days’ service of process, is void. Comenitz v. Bank of Commerce, 85 Miss. 662, 38 So. 35, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 178 (Miss. 1904), overruled, Bank of Philadelphia v. Posey, 130 Miss. 530, 92 So. 840, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1922).

A judgment of a justice in a civil case against two or more defendants is an entirety and being void as to one is void as to all. Comenitz v. Bank of Commerce, 85 Miss. 662, 38 So. 35, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 178 (Miss. 1904), overruled, Bank of Philadelphia v. Posey, 130 Miss. 530, 92 So. 840, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1922).

On appeal of a case involving a non-resident wherein the trial at a “reasonable time” is left to the decision of the justice, the circuit court cannot dismiss the case on the ground that reasonable notice was not given, but will try it anew on its merits. Goodbar v. Owen, 70 Miss. 840, 12 So. 556, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1893).

§ 9-11-17. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 325 § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 50, art. 11 (6); 1857, ch. 58, art. 12; 1871, § 1312; 1880, § 2195; 1892, § 2400; 1906, § 2729; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2228; 1930, § 2077; 1942, § 1811; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 20; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 28]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-11-17 permitted justice court judges to sit and act together or individually.

§ 9-11-18. Justice court clerk clearing account.

  1. There is hereby created in the county depository of each county a clearing account to be designated as the “Justice Court Clerk Clearing Account,” in which shall be deposited (a) all such monies as the clerk of the justice court shall receive from any person complying with any writ of garnishment, attachment, execution or other like process authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment; (b) all such monies as are received in criminal cases in the justice court pursuant to any order requiring payment as restitution to the victims of criminal offenses; (c) all cash bonds as shall be deposited with the court; (d) any portion of any fees required by law to be collected in civil cases which are to pay for the service of process or writs in another county as provided by Section 9-11-20; and (e) any other money as shall be deposited with the court, except fees paid for the services of a constable, which by its nature is not at the time of its deposit public monies, but which is to be held by the court in a trust or custodial capacity in a case or proceeding before the court. The clerk of the justice court shall account for all monies deposited in and disbursed from such account and shall be authorized and empowered to draw and issue checks on such account at such times, in such amounts and to such persons as shall be proper and in accordance with law; provided, however, such monies as are forfeited in criminal cases shall be paid by the clerk of the justice court to the clerk of the board of supervisors for deposit in the general fund of the county in the same manner as provided in Section 9-11-19 for fees, costs, fines and penalties charged and collected in the justice court.
  2. Any monies deposited with the court in civil cases, which are fees paid for the services of a constable, shall be reported by the clerk of the court in the same manner as provided by Section 9-11-19 and shall be considered as being fees within the meaning of such section. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the board of supervisors to disburse such fees monthly, upon approval of the board of supervisors, to the constables entitled thereto.
  3. The justice court clearing account may bear interest and the clerk of the justice court shall account for all interest earned on such account and pay such interest to the clerk of the board of supervisors for deposit in the general fund of the county in the same manner as provided in Section 9-11-19 for fees, costs, fines and penalties charged and collected in the justice court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1984, ch. 502, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 414, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Appointment and duties of clerk of justice court, see §§9-11-27 and9-11-29.

Exemption from report of and payment into county general fund of monies deposited in justice court clerk clearing account, see §9-11-19.

Provision that requirement that sums paid to justice court clerk be deposited in general fund of county is inapplicable to monies required to be deposited in the justice court clerk clearing account, see §25-3-36.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Constable fees, except mileage fee and fail case allowance, are to be deposited in justice court clerk clearing account; justice court clerk is not required to deposit constable fees from clearing account to county general fund; board of supervisors is empowered to pay employer’s contribution only as to $1,000ear fail case allowance. 1990 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 48.

A constable is not entitled to receive a fee for service of process unless that process is actually served; if the constable returns the process “unable to serve” or “not found,” then he has not actually served the process and he is not entitled to a fee. 1998 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 599.

A constable is responsible for requesting payment from the county for the services he provides. 1998 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 746.

§ 9-11-19. Collection and report of fines and penalties.

  1. It shall be the duty of every clerk of the justice court to receive and account for all fees, costs, fines and penalties charged and collected in the justice court, and, monthly to report in writing under oath, to the clerk of the board of supervisors who shall upon receipt submit such report to the board of supervisors of all such fees, costs, fines and penalties received, including cash bonds and other monies which have been forfeited in criminal cases and at least semiannually any delinquent fines and penalties, giving the date, amount, and names of persons from whom such monies were received, and to pay so much thereof as shall have been received to the clerk of the board of supervisors for deposit into the general fund of the county. Any clerk of the justice court who shall fail to make such report or to pay the money so received shall, in addition to any other fine or punishment provided by law for such conduct, not be entitled to compensation for the period of time during which such report or money is outstanding.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not, except as to cash bonds and other monies which have been forfeited in criminal cases, apply to monies required to be deposited in the justice court clerk clearing account as provided in Section 9-11-18, Mississippi Code of 1972.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 50, art. 2 (27); 1857, ch. 58, art. 33; 1871, § 1342; 1880, § 2230; 1892, § 2430; 1906, § 2759; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2258; 1930, § 2107; 1942, § 1841; Laws, 1932, ch. 195; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 21; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 14; Laws, 1984, ch. 502, § 3; Laws, 1993, ch. 406, § 1, eff from and after October 1, 1993.

Cross References —

Money paid into the justice court clerk clearing account, see §9-11-18.

Payment to clerk of board of supervisors of amounts forfeited in criminal cases, see §9-11-18.

Deposits into county general fund of interest earned on justice court clerk clearing accounts, see §9-11-18.

Payment to county chancery clerk of fees collected for serving process or writ issued in different county, see §9-11-20.

Justice court fees, costs, fines and penalties after January 1, 1984 being paid to clerk for deposit into county general fund, see §25-3-36.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

Minimum fine which may be imposed, see §99-33-3.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Miss. Code Section 9-11-19 makes it duty of every clerk of justice court to receive and account for all fees, costs, fines and penalties that are charged and collected in justice court, and to report monthly to board of supervisors as to such accounts. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 331.

Justice court clerk is, under Miss. Code Section 9-11-19, required to keep records on delinquent fines. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 331.

Section 9-11-19 sets forth the duty of the justice court clerk to collect and account for all fees, costs, fines and penalties charged in justice court. The justice court clerk is to report such collections to the clerk of the board of supervisors monthly. There is no requirement that the justice court judge verify these collections. 1996 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 493.

Constable fees are considered a “claim” for purposes of payment from the claims docket. Farmer and 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 612.

The chancery clerk is not authorized to pay constable fees from the certificate sent by the justice court clerk without the approval of the county board of supervisors. Farmer and 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 612.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court § 31.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Justice court judge’s receiving a criminal defendant’s bond and loaning bond money to other defendants was willful, or at least negligent, misconduct which he knew or should have known was beyond legitimate exercise of his legal authority and constituted judicial misconduct, even though judge’s handling of money was limited to a few occasions, and there was no evidence that he materially benefited from collection of fine money. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Dodds, 680 So. 2d 180, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 425 (Miss. 1996).

It is improper for a justice court judge to handle money in lieu of court clerk handling money. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Dodds, 680 So. 2d 180, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 425 (Miss. 1996).

A justice court judge should undertake the responsibility of personally receiving fine money only in isolated and clearly necessitous circumstances. If such an extreme occasions arises, the judge must give a written receipt, keep the money segregated and apart from his or her own, and at the very first opportunity deliver it to the justice court clerk with an explanation of why the judge received it personally. Mississippi Judicial Performance Com. v. Justice Court Judge, 580 So. 2d 1259, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 303 (Miss. 1991).

Recommendation of Commission on Judicial Performance, pursuant to Commission’s rules, was accepted by the Supreme Court and removal ordered for a justice court judge who had knowingly accepted money from fine violations, falsely entered a judgment “dismissed” on court dockets and records, and retained fine money for his own use. In re Stewart, 490 So. 2d 882, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2496 (Miss. 1986).

Justice court judge whose ignorance and incompetence results in skimming of traffic ticket funds or other funds is to be removed from office. In re Inquiry Concerning Garner, 466 So. 2d 884, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1960 (Miss. 1985).

A particular statute, §9-11-19, concerning the duties of a justice to account for fines and making its violation a misdemeanor, does not control the general statute, §97-11-25, concerning unlawful conversion of public funds by a state officer and making its violation a felony, since there are substantive differences between the two, violation of the method of performing a duty on the one hand as opposed to unlawful conversion of public funds on the other. Hannah v. State, 336 So. 2d 1317, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1565 (Miss. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101, 97 S. Ct. 1125, 51 L. Ed. 2d 551, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 765 (U.S. 1977).

A convict can properly turn his fine over to the justice before whom he was convicted. Odom v. State, 58 So. 145 (Miss. 1912).

§ 9-11-20. Service of process or writ outside of issuing county; sharing fees.

In any civil case in the justice court in which any process or writ is to be served outside of the county where issued, the clerk of the justice court is hereby authorized and directed to forward, by United States mail, to the clerk of the justice court of the county where such writ or process is to be served, that portion of any fees required by law to be collected for the service of such process or writ along with the process or writ to be served. The clerk of the justice court of the county where the process or writ is to be served shall, upon receipt thereof, deliver such process or writ to a constable of the county for the service thereof and shall report and pay over such fees to the chancery clerk of the county at the time and in the manner provided in subsection (1) of Section 9-11-19 for the report and payment of fees, costs, fines and penalties charged and collected in the justice court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1984, ch. 502, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1984).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A constable has no jurisdiction to serve process outside the county in which he was elected and therefore may not collect a fee for serving such process. 2002 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 505.

A constable may not serve a summons for a Justice Court in a county other than the one in which he was elected. 2005 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 46.

§ 9-11-21. Receipt itemizing costs, fees and other payments made to clerk of justice court.

The clerk of the justice court is required in all cases to give to any person paying him any fees, costs or other money a uniform receipt, the form of which is to be prepared by the attorney general. Such receipt shall contain the particulars of such fees, costs or other money, the amount of such fees, costs or other money and such other information as the attorney general shall deem necessary. The county shall have printed such receipts at county expense and distribute them to the clerk of the justice court of the county. Provided, however, that where the party filing the complaint is an entity of government, the clerk shall not be required to receive a prepayment of costs nor issue a receipt, but the clerk shall enter a notation on the docket wherein said complaint is recorded indicating that the party is exempt from payment of costs.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1841.5; Laws, 1964, ch. 334; Laws, 1984, ch. 502, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1984).

Cross References —

Money paid into the justice court clerk clearing account, see §9-11-18.

Making and filing of bill of costs, see §11-53-65.

Fees of justice court, see §25-7-25.

§ 9-11-23. Remedy for money collected.

When any clerk of the justice court shall have collected in his official capacity any money, fines or penalties, and shall fail to pay or account for the same to the person or official entitled to receive the same, he shall be liable to be proceeded against on his official bond in a summary way by motion in any court having jurisdiction of the amount collected and withheld, of which motion five (5) days’ notice shall be served on the clerk of the justice court and the sureties on his bond, or such of them as may be found; and judgment for the amount illegally withheld by the clerk of the justice court and ten percent (10%) thereon, and all costs, shall be rendered against the clerk of the justice court and his sureties, or such of them as have been served with notice.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 50, art. 2 (26); 1857, ch. 58, art. 32; 1871, § 1339; 1880, § 2229; 1892, § 2431; 1906, § 2760; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2259; 1930, § 2108; 1942, § 1842; Laws, 1985, ch. 440, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 27, 1985).

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to justice of the peace shall mean justice court judge.

Cross References —

Money paid into the justice court clerk clearing account, see §9-11-18.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Justice of the peace who received from garnishee amount of judgment against defendant and costs and paid it over to judgment creditor after defendant had filed his plea of having been adjudicated a bankrupt and notwithstanding money was exempt as wages held liable with his bondsmen to bankrupt as against contention that justice of the peace was not authorized to receive or disburse the money, and, therefore, could not be proceeded against upon his bond and be made to pay over the money again under statute. Korndorffer v. Fail, 179 Miss. 244, 174 So. 565, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 19 (Miss. 1937).

Demand need not necessarily be made upon the administratrix of a deceased justice of the peace before bringing action on his official bond. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Adams County, 105 Miss. 675, 63 So. 192, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 1913).

§ 9-11-25. Delivery of books, records and papers of justice court judge leaving office or dying to justice court clerk.

Every justice court judge whose term of office expires, or who resigns, removes from the county, or otherwise goes out of office, and the legal representative and next of kin of every justice court judge who dies, shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, deliver his case record, with all process and papers and books of statutes relating to his office, to the clerk of the justice court of the county.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 50, art. 10 (3); 1857, ch. 58, art. 15; 1871, § 1341; 1880, §§ 2232-2236; 1892, § 2432; 1906, § 2761; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2260; 1930, § 2109; 1942, § 1843; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 22; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 28; Laws, 1991, ch. 594, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 15, 1991).

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Justices of the Peace § 8.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where the prosecuting witness in a robbery prosecution had denied that she had ever been convicted of any offenses other than driving without a driver’s license and permitting gambling on premises occupied by her, the accused was entitled to show other convictions of the prosecuting witness by a deputy circuit clerk, whose office was a custodian of the docket of a man who was formerly a justice of the peace. Hardin v. State, 232 Miss. 470, 99 So. 2d 600, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1958).

Where a justice of the peace died after an appeal had been taken from his judgment, but before the record had been sent to the circuit court, and his administrator had complied with Code 1892, § 2432, providing that on the death of a justice of the peace his representative shall deliver his docket and papers to the clerk of the circuit court, who shall deliver them to the successor in the office of the decedent, the appeal will not be dismissed although a term of court has intervened between the death of the justice and the return of the record to the circuit court. Brennan v. Straas, 85 Miss. 341, 37 So. 956, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 163 (Miss. 1904).

§ 9-11-27. Appointment of clerk; designation of powers; compliance with Section 9-1-46.

  1. The board of supervisors of each county shall, at its own expense, appoint one (1) person to serve as clerk of the justice court system of the county, and may appoint such other employees for the justice court of the county as it deems necessary, including a person or persons to serve as deputy clerk or deputy clerks. The board of supervisors of each county with two (2) judicial districts may, at its own expense, appoint two (2) persons to serve as clerks of the justice court system of the county, one (1) for each judicial district, and may appoint such other employees for the justice court system of the county as it deems necessary including persons to serve as deputy clerks. The clerk and deputy clerks shall be empowered to file and record actions and pleadings, to receive and receipt for monies, to acknowledge affidavits, to issue warrants in criminal cases upon direction by a justice court judge in the county, to approve the sufficiency of bonds in civil and criminal cases, to certify and issue copies of all records, documents and pleadings filed in the justice court and to issue all process necessary for the operation of the justice court. The clerk or deputy clerks may refuse to accept a personal check in payment of any fine or cost or to satisfy any other payment required to be made to the justice court. All orders from the justice court judge to the clerk of the justice court shall be written. All cases, civil and criminal, shall be assigned by the clerk to the justice court judges of the county in the manner provided in Section 11-9-105 and Section 99-33-2. A deputy clerk who works in an office separate from the clerk and who is the head deputy clerk of the separate office may be designated to be trained as a clerk as provided in Section 9-11-29.
  2. By August 1, 2015, and each year thereafter, the Administrative Office of Courts shall report the names of all justice court clerks who have failed to comply with the reporting requirements of Section 9-1-46 to the boards of supervisors that selected them. Each clerk shall be given three (3) months from the date on which the board was given notice to come into compliance with the requirements of Section 9-1-46. The Administrative Office of Courts shall notify the board of supervisors of any justice court clerk who fails to come into compliance after the three-month notice required in this subsection. Any noncompliant clerks shall be terminated for failure to comply with Section 9-1-46 reporting requirement.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 409; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 11; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 7; Laws, 1985, ch. 440, § 4; Laws, 1990, ch. 380, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 480, § 2; Laws, 1991, ch. 551, § 3; Laws, 1994, ch. 341, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 462, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 70, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Amendment Notes —

The 2001 amendment added the last sentence.

The 2014 amendment added (2).

Cross References —

Justice court docket, see §9-11-11.

Money paid into the justice court clerk clearing account, see §9-11-18.

Duty of justice court judge to collect and report fines and penalties, see §9-11-19.

Continuing education and bond required of justice court clerk, see §9-11-29.

Venue of civil actions upon appointment of clerk for justice court prior to January 1, 1984, see §11-9-101.

Procedure for commencing civil suits in justice courts, see §11-9-105.

Transfer of action to proper venue where court has subject matter jurisdiction but lacks venue jurisdiction, see §11-11-17.

Costs and fees in justice courts, see §25-7-25.

Venue of criminal actions upon appointment of clerk for justice court prior to January 1, 1984, see §99-33-1.

Filing affidavit in criminal matters before judge or clerk of justice court from and after January 1, 1984, see §99-33-2.

Rule governing clerk’s duty to keep papers, see Uniform Rule of Procedure for Justice Court 1.06.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The responsibility to oversee the everyday administrative duties of the justice court clerk lies with the board of supervisors and may not be delegated to the justice court judge; the justice court judge has the authority to oversee the duties of the justice court clerk and deputy clerks with respect to the conducting of trials and hearings, but such authority does not extend to the administrative level; the board of supervisors may seek advice from the justice court judge on matters concerning the operation of the justice court, but any policy making decisions with regards to the operation of the justice court clerk’s office should be made by the board of supervisors. Trapp, Jr., 2001 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 708.

Miss. Code Section 9-11-27 specifically allows justice court clerk or deputy clerk to take guilty plea for traffic offenses. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 997.

Duties of justice court clerk are set forth at Miss. Code Section 9-11-27. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 331.

Miss. Code Section 9-11-27 gives justice court clerk power to acknowledge affidavits. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 331.

Justice court clerk has both power and duty to issue witness subpoenas in criminal and civil cases pursuant to Miss. Code Section 9-11-27. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 331.

There is nothing in statutes specifically requiring justice court clerk to attend court and to record all proceedings; however, it is duty of justice court clerk under Miss. Code Section 9-11-27 to do all acts necessary for operation of justice court. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 331.

In justice court, after felony case has been bound over by the judge, it is duty of justice court clerk under Miss. Code Section 9-11-27 to certify case over to Grand Jury and make all copies of file and send that to Circuit Court. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 331.

Under Miss. Code Section 9-11-27, justice court clerk has duty to “issue all process necessary for the operation of the justice court.”; this includes subpoenas, garnishments, and writs of replevin. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 331.

Clerk and deputy clerk are duty-bound to record all actions but it is ultimate responsibility of justice court judge to ensure correctness of disposition before signing off on it. 1994 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 997.

Legislative intent of Section 9-11-27 is to allow Justice Court Clerk to operate independently or without judicial direction as to execution of her specific statutory duties; thus, while board of supervisors has administrative supervision over Justice Court Clerk, Justice Court Judge may direct clerk in carrying out of such duties and tasks as are necessary to actual conduct of trials. 1994 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 997.

Only board of supervisors can pass on claim of vendor and order it paid; if claim is denied and later determined to have been properly allowable by court of competent jurisdiction, then any interest determined to be owing should be paid by board of supervisors. 1994 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 135.

A deputy court clerk has the authority to acknowledge affidavits anywhere in the county at any time, to include after 5:00 p.m. and on weekends. 2003 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 582.

Any county law enforcement officials may serve as deputy clerks as long as they have been officially appointed by the board of supervisors. 2005 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 111.

An entity of government is not required to prepay court costs prior to commencing a civil action. 2005 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 118.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of court §§ 2 et seq.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Justice court judge did not interfere with rotation of cases so as to create forum shopping or violate judicial canons, where it was practice of judges to handle cases for each other when the other was unavailable and statutes did not prohibit judges from handling each other’s cases when a judge is unavailable. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Dodds, 680 So. 2d 180, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 425 (Miss. 1996).

§ 9-11-29. Clerk’s certificate of completion of Justice Court Clerks Training Course; bond entered by clerk.

  1. Within ninety (90) days after appointment, every person appointed as clerk of the justice court under the provisions of Section 9-11-27, or a deputy clerk designated to receive training under Section 9-11-27, shall file annually in the office of the circuit clerk a certificate of completion of a course of training and education conducted by the Mississippi Judicial College of the University of Mississippi Law Center. The training course shall be known as the “Justice Court Clerks Training Course” and shall consist of at least twelve (12) hours of instruction. The contents of the courses and when and where the courses are to be conducted shall be determined by the judicial college. The judicial college shall issue a certificate of completion to the clerks and deputy clerks who complete a course.
  2. Every person appointed as clerk and deputy clerk of the justice court shall, before entering into the duties of the position, give bond, with sufficient surety, to be payable, conditioned and approved as provided by law and in the same manner as other county officers, in a penalty equal to Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00); and any party interested may proceed on such bond in a summary way, by motion in any court having jurisdiction of the same, against the principal and sureties, upon giving five (5) days’ previous notice. The cost of the bond shall be paid by the county.
  3. Upon the failure of any person appointed as clerk of the justice court to file the certificates of completion as provided in subsection (1) of this section, that person shall not be allowed to carry out any of the duties of the office of clerk of the justice court, and shall not be entitled to compensation for the period of time during which the required certificates remain unfiled.

HISTORY: Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 12; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 8; Laws, 1986, ch. 352; Laws, 1986, ch. 458, § 13; reenacted, Laws, 1989, ch. 341, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 462, § 2; Laws, 2013, ch. 550, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2013.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 48, Chapter 458, Laws, 1986, provided that §9-11-29 would stand repealed from and after October 1, 1989. Subsequently, three 1989 chapters (341, 342, and 343) amended Section 48, Chapter 458, Laws, 1986, by deleting the date for repeal.

Amendment Notes —

The 2001 amendment substituted “Section 9-11-27, or a deputy clerk designated to receive training under Section 9-11-27,” for “subsection (2) of Section 9-11-27,” in (1).

The 2013 amendment added the last three sentences of (1); substituted “the required certificates” for “such certificates” in (3); and made minor stylistic changes.

Cross References —

For similar requirements of continuing education courses by justice court judges, see §9-11-3.

Money paid into the justice court clerk clearing account, see §9-11-18.

Bonding of public officers, see §25-1-13 et seq.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Section 9-1-29 does not apply to justice courts because Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable to justice courts. 1994 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 997.

The justice court clerk and all justice court deputy clerks must give bond prior to assuming the duties of the clerk, and there is no distinction between deputy clerks that handle money and those that do not handle money. 2001 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 654.

Each justice court deputy clerk must comply with the bond requirements of subsection (2). 2001 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 654.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of court § 3.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 327-351.

§ 9-11-31. Board of supervisors to appoint justice court or municipal court judge to serve for justice court judge who is unable to serve for thirty consecutive days.

  1. When any justice court judge is unable, by reason of being under any suspension by the Commission on Judicial Performance or the Mississippi Supreme Court, or by reason of sickness or other disability, to attend and hold court at the time and place required by law to do so for a period of time in excess of thirty (30) consecutive days, and due to such inability to attend and hold court there is no judge to hold court in such county, the board of supervisors of the county in which such judge serves shall appoint another justice court judge of the county or an adjoining county or a municipal court judge to attend and hold said court and perform all the duties of such judge during such suspension or disability.
  2. Any presently sitting justice court judge appointed pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall receive no additional compensation for his or her service. Any other person so appointed shall, for the period of his service, receive compensation from the county for each day’s service a sum equal to 1/260ths of the current salary in effect for justice court judges.

HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 426, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

Cross References —

Justice court judge who is unable to serve by reason of being under suspension not to receive salary, see §25-3-36.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

When justice is unable to attend and hold court, Miss. Code Section 9-11-31 provides that board of supervisors may appoint qualified person “to attend and hold said court and perform all the duties of such judge during such suspension or disability.” 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 331.

When a justice court judge resigns, the vacancy should be filled in accordance with §23-15-839; §9-11-31 is to be used only when the justice court judge’s office is temporarily vacant due to suspension or disability. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 128.

§ 9-11-33. Correction of errors or mistakes in proceedings or records; setting aside proceedings or judgments for good cause.

A justice court judge may correct any errors or mistakes in any proceedings that are conducted before such judge or in the records of proceedings conducted before such judge. A justice court judge may set aside any proceeding or judgment in a case conducted before such judge upon a written order as may be just and proper after a proceeding in which the judge determines that good cause has been shown to support such order.

HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 437, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Section 9-11-33 does not give a justice court judge the authority to set aside a not guilty verdict from a criminal charge. Furthermore, any attempt to retry a defendant for a crime in which he has already been found not guilty would constitute double jeopardy. Nash, April 26, 1996, A.G. Op. # 96-0278.

A justice court judge may correct errors or set aside judgments in cases conducted before such judge but does not have authority to set aside or modify a judgment in a case heard before another judge. 1997 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 378.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

28 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 439, Proof of Circumstances Justifying the Setting Aside of Tax Sales of Real Property.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Judicial Misconduct.

Recommendation for a public reprimand was not adopted since it was too lenient for a judge who committed willful misconduct under Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 177A by violating Miss. Code Jud. Conduct Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(7), 3B(8), and 3C(1) when he engaged in improper ex parte communications; moreover, he ignored Miss. Code Ann. §9-11-33 and Miss. Unif. R. P. J. Ct. 2.06 when he set aside a final judgment and interfered with orders handed down by another judge. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Britton, 936 So. 2d 898, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 463 (Miss. 2006).

While acting in an official capacity, judge violated Miss. Const. art. VI, § 177A, Miss. Code Ann. §9-11-33, and Miss. Code Jud. Conduct Canons 1, 2(A), 2(B), 3(A), 3(B)(2), 3(B)(7), 3(B)(8), 3(C)(1), 3(C)(2), 4(A), and 4(D)(1), by conducting ex parte communications with parties, by habitually taking civil cases under advisement and failing to render timely decisions or correct orders when necessary; a public reprimand, suspension for 30 days without pay, and payment of the costs of the proceeding was held to be appropriate discipline. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. McPhail, 874 So. 2d 441, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 593 (Miss. 2004).

§ 9-11-35. Justice Court Collections Payment Program; purpose; funding of program.

  1. The Department of Revenue shall administer the Justice Court Collections Payment Program. The purpose of the program shall be to provide support for salaries of justice court personnel, for the purchase, operation and maintenance of software and equipment, for facility planning and improvement, and for other expenses incurred for the purpose of collecting fines and assessments within the justice court system. Monies appropriated by the Legislature to the Department of Revenue for the purposes of funding the Justice Court Collections Payment Program shall be expended by the department to each participating county based upon that county’s deposits in the Treasury of the monies received under the provisions of Section 99-19-73.
  2. The Department of Revenue shall promulgate rules and procedures relating to the disbursement of monies to participating counties. The department shall promulgate rules and procedures to ensure that the justice court system of a participating county practices proper and effective collection procedures for the collection of fines and other assessments. The county may use monies received from the program to defray the costs associated with collection actions under Section 19-3-41(4) for collection of delinquent fines and other assessments. The county shall participate in collection actions under Section 19-3-41(2) for collection of delinquent fines and other assessments in order to qualify.

HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 512, § 1; Laws, 2017, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 7, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved June 23, 2017).

Amendment Notes —

The 2017 amendment, effective June 23, 2017, rewrote the section by deleting all references to “Justice Court Collections Fund” and “fund,” the source of monies in the fund, and the maximum amount counties could receive from the fund, and by adding all references to the “Justice Court Collections Payment Program” and “program,” and providing that monies “appropriated by the Legislature to the Department of Revenue for the purposes of funding the Justice Court Collections payment Program shall be expended by the department to each participating county based upon that county’s deposits in the Treasury of the monies received under the provisions of Section 99-19-73.”

Chapter 13. Court Reporters and Court Reporting

In General

§ 9-13-1. Appointment of court reporter in circuit and chancery courts.

Each circuit judge and chancellor shall appoint a competent person as shorthand reporter in his district by an entry upon the minutes of the court of an order to that effect, dated and signed by him. The said shorthand reporter shall be known as the official court reporter of said district.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 4235; 1906, § 4785; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3138; 1930, § 709; 1942, § 1624.

Cross References —

Taking of oaths before court reporter, see §11-1-1.

Fee for transcript of testimony and exhibits to testimony, or copy of such transcript and exhibits, see §25-7-89.

Costs for recording hearings before employee appeals board and contracting with court reporters, see §25-9-132.

Stenographic transcription of involuntary commitment hearing, see §41-21-73.

Rules governing court reporters, see Rules and Regulations Governing Certified Court Reporters.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 1-4.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 136 et seq.

Practice References.

Young, Trial Handbook for Mississippi Lawyers § 2:22.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

It is common knowledge that most court reporters use tape recorders as they are taking the testimony, and if, on account of disability or other cause, the reporter is unable to do the transcriptions, others may run the recorders, and, in most cases, complete the transcriptions. Motor Supply Co. v. Hunter, 251 Miss. 837, 164 So. 2d 410, 171 So. 2d 870, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 539, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 909 (Miss. 1964).

Each judge of the district is under a duty to have available a person who is ready, willing and able to perform the duties of court reporter. Motor Supply Co. v. Hunter, 251 Miss. 837, 164 So. 2d 410, 171 So. 2d 870, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 539, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 909 (Miss. 1964).

§ 9-13-3. Oath.

Before entering into his office, the court reporter shall take, in open court, an oath that he will faithfully discharge the duties thereof; and the oath so taken shall be entered in the minutes of the court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 4236; 1906, § 4786; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3139; 1930, § 710; 1942, § 1625.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

By virtue of this section the appointee must take an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of the office of court reporter. Motor Supply Co. v. Hunter, 251 Miss. 837, 164 So. 2d 410, 171 So. 2d 870, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 539, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 909 (Miss. 1964).

§ 9-13-5. Nature and term of office.

The court reporter when appointed and qualified by taking the oath required, and by filing the bond hereinafter mentioned, thereby becomes an officer of the court, and shall hold his office as court reporter for the term of four years from the date of his appointment unless sooner removed.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 4237; 1906, § 4787; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3140; 1930, § 711; 1942, § 1626.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Intent of statute, providing that term of office for court reporter is four years, is that court reporter’s term is concurrent with term of office of judge. 1991 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 182.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

On compliance with the provisions of the appropriate sections, the person appointed as court reporter becomes an officer of the court. Motor Supply Co. v. Hunter, 251 Miss. 837, 164 So. 2d 410, 171 So. 2d 870, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 539, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 909 (Miss. 1964).

§ 9-13-7. Appointment and qualifications certified to other counties.

Copy of the writing by which the court reporter was appointed, and of the minutes relative to court reporter’s oath shall, at the cost of the court reporter, be certified by the clerk of the court in which the entries thereof are made, to the clerk of the court in each of the several counties of the district for which the court reporter was appointed, to be entered on the minutes of the court in each county.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 4238; 1906, § 4788; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3141; 1930, § 712; 1942, § 1627.

§ 9-13-9. Bond.

The judge or chancellor shall require the court reporter to give bond in a penalty of not less than two thousand dollars to be approved by the court, conditioned for the faithful discharge of his duties, and such bond shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the court of any county in the district, who shall, at the cost of the court reporter, certify a copy thereof to the clerk of said court in each of the other counties of the district, to be filed and preserved in his office, and said copies shall be competent evidence in any proceedings. And such bond shall be recorded at length in the bond record book of the county where the original is filed.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 4239; 1906, § 4789; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3142; 1930, § 713; 1942, § 1628.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees §§ 130 et seq.

3B Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Bonds § 43:18.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts § 136.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A court reporter who has not complied with §9-13-9 should not be allowed to continue serving as a court reporter until the bond requirement has been fulfilled. In re Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center, 593 So. 2d 44, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1992).

Under this section, the court reporter must give a bond in the sum of not less than $2,000, conditioned for the faithful discharge of duties. Motor Supply Co. v. Hunter, 251 Miss. 837, 164 So. 2d 410, 171 So. 2d 870, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 539, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 909 (Miss. 1964).

§ 9-13-11. Removal from office.

The judge or chancellor may in his discretion at any time remove the court reporter from office for incompetency or neglect of duty, and may appoint a court reporter to fill the vacancy as often as such removals occur. The appointment of a successor to the court reporter shall be made, and he shall qualify in the same manner, and he shall comply with all the other requirements, as is provided in the foregoing sections of this chapter.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 4246; 1906, § 4796; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3149; 1930, § 714; 1942, § 1629.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

By virtue of this section the judge, in his discretion, may remove a court reporter for neglect of duty. Motor Supply Co. v. Hunter, 251 Miss. 837, 164 So. 2d 410, 171 So. 2d 870, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 539, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 909 (Miss. 1964).

§ 9-13-13. Resignation or vacation of office.

It shall not be lawful for the court reporter to resign or vacate his office so long as any business connected therewith, upon the discharge of which he has entered, is unfinished; but after such business has been completed as required by law, he may at any time resign or vacate his office; and his resignation shall take effect from the time he notifies the judge or chancellor of the same.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 4245; 1906, § 4795; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3148; 1930, § 715; 1942, § 1630.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Court stenographer did not relieve himself of duty of filing transcript of evidence by resignation. Robertson v. Southern Bitulithic Co., 129 Miss. 453, 92 So. 580, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 61 (Miss. 1922), overruled, Brown v. Water Valley, 319 So. 2d 649, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1481 (Miss. 1975).

Stenographer’s transcript not stricken from the record on ground he resigned office before filing thereof and his certificate was not official. Ward v. Ward, 123 Miss. 217, 85 So. 181, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. 1920).

§ 9-13-15. Court reporter pro tempore; effect of appointment upon compensation of regular reporter.

If the court reporter is absent during the session of the court, the judge or chancellor may, by an order entered upon the minutes of the court, appoint a court reporter pro tempore, who shall be sworn to faithfully discharge his duties as such, and who shall perform all the duties and be liable to all the penalties and punishments described for or incident to the office of court reporter. The court reporter pro tempore shall be paid for his services by the Administrative Office of Courts, out of the salary of the regular court reporter and at the same rate as the regular court reporter for the time that the court reporter pro tempore shall act. The court which is being served by the court reporter pro tempore shall authorize his compensation by auditing and reporting the time served by the court reporter pro tempore to the Administrative Office of Courts. However, if the appointment of a court reporter pro tempore is made because of illness of the regular court reporter, the court may authorize compensation of said court reporter pro tempore from the Administrative Office of Courts without diminution of the salary of the regular court reporter, for a period not to exceed forty-five (45) days in any one (1) calendar year. The salary of the court reporter pro tempore shall be paid as provided in Section 9-13-19.

All acts of the court reporter pro tempore shall be as valid and effectual as if done by the regular court reporter; and such acts as are required to be certified and signed by the court reporter shall be certified and signed by him as court reporter pro tempore.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 4244; 1906, § 4794; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3147; 1930, § 716; 1942, § 1631; Laws, 1966, ch. 349, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 38, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Neither court reporters for the chancery, circuit, or county courts accrue leave, whether personal or sick, which may be used as creditable service for the purpose of calculating retirement benefits. 1998 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 154.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 1-4.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Courts §§ 136 et seq.

§ 9-13-17. Additional court reporters; compensation of regular reporter when assistant reporter alone is serving.

The circuit judge, chancellor, family court judge or county judge may, by an order spread upon the minutes and made a part of the records of the court, appoint an additional court reporter for a term or part of a term whose duties, qualifications and compensation shall be the same as is now provided by law for official court reporters. The additional court reporter shall be subject to the control of the judge or chancellor, as is now provided by law for official court reporters, and the judge or chancellor shall have the additional power to terminate the appointment of such additional court reporter, whenever in his opinion the necessity for such an additional court reporter ceases to exist, by placing upon the minutes of the court an order to that effect. The regular court reporter shall not draw any compensation while the assistant court reporter alone is serving; however, in the event the assistant court reporter is serving because of the illness of the regular court reporter, the court may authorize payment of said assistant court reporter from the Administrative Office of Courts without diminution of the salary of the regular court reporter, for a period not to exceed forty-five (45) days in any one (1) calendar year. However, in any circuit, chancery, county or family court district within the State of Mississippi, if the judge or chancellor shall determine that in order to relieve the continuously crowded docket in such district, or for other good cause shown, the appointment of an additional court reporter is necessary for the proper administration of justice, he may, with the advice and consent of the board of supervisors if the court district is composed of a single county and with the advice and consent of at least one-half (1/2) of the boards of supervisors if the court district is composed of more than one (1) county, by an order spread upon the minutes and made a part of the records of the court, appoint an additional court reporter. The additional court reporter shall serve at the will and pleasure of the judge or chancellor, may be a resident of any county of the state, and shall be paid a salary designated by the judge or chancellor not to exceed the salary authorized by Section 9-13-19. The salary of the additional court reporter shall be paid by the Administrative Office of Courts, as provided in Section 9-13-19; and mileage shall be paid to the additional court reporter by the county as provided in the same section. The office of such additional court reporter appointed under this section shall not be abolished or compensation reduced during the term of office of the appointing judge or chancellor without the consent and approval of the appointing judge or chancellor.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 3154; 1930, § 717; 1942, § 1632; Laws, 1916, ch. 236; Laws, 1955 Ex. ch. 36; Laws, 1966, ch. 350, § 1; Laws, 1969 Ex Sess, ch. 22, § 1; Laws, 1972, ch. 498, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 315; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 39, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Laws, 1999, ch. 432, § 1, provides:

“SECTION 1. From and after the date Laws, 1999, ch. 432, is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, all family courts are abolished. All matters pending in any family court abolished shall be transferred to the county court of the county wherein the family court was located without the necessity for any motion or order of court for such transfer.”

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Neither court reporters for the chancery, circuit, or county courts accrue leave, whether personal or sick, which may be used as creditable service for the purpose of calculating retirement benefits. 1998 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 154.

County approval is required before a position such as an additional court reporter is submitted to the Administrative Office of Courts at a salary which would exceed the county’s allocation of state funds and increase the county’s supplemental payment obligation. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 394.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

4 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Clerks of Court §§ 58:13 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Evidently for the purpose of preventing delay, this section authorizes a judge to appoint an additional court reporter and to terminate the appointment when the necessity ceases to exist. Motor Supply Co. v. Hunter, 251 Miss. 837, 164 So. 2d 410, 171 So. 2d 870, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 539, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 909 (Miss. 1964).

§ 9-13-19. Salary; annual report.

  1. Court reporters for circuit and chancery courts may be paid an annual salary payable by the Administrative Office of Courts not to exceed Forty-nine Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($49,500.00) for court reporters with five (5) years’ experience or less; not to exceed Fifty-eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($58,500.00) for court reporters who have more than five (5) years’experience but less than ten (10) years; and not to exceed Sixty-four Thousand Dollars ($64,000,00) for court reporters who have ten (10) years or more experience. No amount of the increase in the maximum salary authorized by this section shall be paid from the State General Fund. The board of supervisors of any county is authorized to pay its court reporters the applicable amount of the maximum salary authorized by this section. In addition, any court reporter performing the duties of a court administrator in the same judicial district in which the person is employed as a court reporter may be paid additional compensation for performing the court administrator duties. The annual amount of the additional compensation shall be set by vote of the judges and chancellors for whom the court administrator duties are performed, with consideration given to the number of hours per month devoted by the court reporter to performing the duties of a court administrator. The additional compensation shall be submitted to the Administrative Office of Courts for approval.
  2. The several counties in each respective court district shall transfer from the general funds of those county treasuries to the Administrative Office of Courts a proportionate amount to be paid toward the annual compensation of the court reporter, including any additional compensation paid for the performance of court administrator duties. The amount to be paid by each county shall be determined by the number of weeks in which court is held in each county in proportion to the total number of weeks court is held in the district. For purposes of this section, the term “compensation” means the gross salary plus all amounts paid for benefits, or otherwise, as a result of employment or as required by employment, but does not include transcript fees otherwise authorized to be paid by or through the counties. However, only salary earned for services rendered shall be reported and credited for retirement purposes. Amounts paid for transcript fees, benefits or otherwise, including reimbursement for travel expenses, shall not be reported or credited for retirement purposes.

    For example, if there are thirty-eight (38) scheduled court weeks in a particular district, a county in which court is scheduled five (5) weeks out of the year would have to pay five-thirty-eighths (5/38) of the total annual compensation.

  3. The salary and any additional compensation for the performance of court administrator duties shall be paid in twelve (12) installments on the last working day of each month after it has been duly authorized by the appointing judge or chancellor and an order duly placed on the minutes of the court. Each county shall transfer to the Administrative Office of Courts one-twelfth (1/12) of the amount required to be paid pursuant to subsection (2) of this section by the twentieth day of each month for the salary that is to be paid on the last working day of the month. The Administrative Office of Courts shall pay to the court reporter the total amount of salary due for that month. Any county may pay, in the discretion of the board of supervisors, by the twentieth day of January of any year, the amount due for a full twelve (12) months.
  4. From and after October 1, 1996, all circuit and chancery court reporters will be employees of the Administrative Office of Courts.
  5. No circuit or chancery court reporter shall be entitled to any compensation for any special or extended term of court after passage of this section.
  6. No chancery or circuit court reporter shall practice law in the court within which he or she is the court reporter.
  7. For all travel required in the performance of official duties, the circuit or chancery court reporter shall be paid mileage by the county in which the duties were performed at the same rate as provided for state employees in Section 25-3-41. The court reporter shall file in the office of the clerk of the court which he serves a certificate of mileage expense incurred during that term and payment of such expense to the court reporter shall be paid on allowance by the judge of such court.

HISTORY: Codes 1892, § 4242; 1906, § 4792; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3145; 1930, § 718; 1942, § 1633; Laws, 1916, ch. 232; Laws, 1928, ch. 228; Laws, 1942, ch. 303; Laws, 1944, ch. 187; Laws, 1946, ch. 348, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1948, ch. 265, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1950, ch. 327, §§ 1-3; Laws, 1952, ch. 237; Laws, 1958, ch. 339; Laws, 1960, ch. 325; Laws, 1966, ch. 351, § 1; Laws, 1966, ch. 435, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 395, § 1; Laws, 1973, ch. 484, § 1; Laws, 1977, ch. 449; Laws, 1980, ch. 478; Laws, 1985, ch. 510, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 538; Laws, 1989, ch. 350, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 433, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 550, § 2; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 37; Laws, 1996, ch. 414, § 2; Laws, 1997, ch. 570, § 8; Laws, 2004, ch. 505, § 6; Laws, 2015, ch. 451, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

Editor’s Notes —

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated July 13, 1993, interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 37.

Laws, 1997, ch. 570, § 14, provides as follows:

“SECTION 14. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, or October 1, 1997, whichever occurs later.”

The United States Attorney General, by letter dated September 5, 1997, interposed no objection, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1997, ch. 570, § 8.

By letter dated August 19, 2004, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the amendment of this section by Laws, 2004, ch. 505, § 6.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment, in the first sentence of (1), deleted “of Thirty-eight Thousand Dollars ($38,000.00)” following “annual salary,” and added the language following “Office of Courts.”

The 2015 amendment provided for four versions of the section, in the version effective through September 30, 2015, made minor stylistic changes; in the version effective from and after October 1, 2015, through September 30, 2016, in (1), substituted “Forty-three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($43,500.00)” for “Forty Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($40,500.00),” “Forty-eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($48,500.00)” for “Forty-three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($43,500.00)” and “Fifty-two Thousand Dollars ($52,000.00)” for “Forty-six Thousand Dollars ($46,000.00)” in the first sentence, and added the second and third sentences; in the version effective from and after October 1, 2016, through September 30, 2017, in (1), substituted “Forty-six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($46,500.00)” for “Forty Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($40,500.00),” “Fifty-three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($53,500.00)” for “Forty-three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($43,500.00),” “Fifty-eight Thousand Dollars ($58,000.00)” for “Forty-six Thousand Dollars ($46,000.00)” in the first sentence, and added the second and third sentences; in the version of the section effective from and after October 1, 2017, in (1), substituted “Forty-nine Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($49,500.00)” for “Forty Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($40,500.00),” “Fifty-eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($58,500.00)” for “Forty-three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($43,500.00),” “Sixty-four Thousand Dollars ($64,000,00)” for “Forty-six Thousand Dollars ($46,000.00)” in the first sentence, and added the second and third sentences; and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Neither court reporters for the chancery, circuit, or county courts accrue leave, whether personal or sick, which may be used as creditable service for the purpose of calculating retirement benefits. 1998 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 154.

A court reporter is required, unless waived, for child support cases filed by the Department of Human Services, and such court reporters are to paid an annual salary provided by the several counties of each respective court district. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 799.

Association dues could be included in the definition of “compensation” as “amounts paid for benefits, or otherwise, as a result of employment or as required by employment”, and therefore, the board of supervisors may not pay amounts for dues over and above its proportionate share that is paid to the Administrative Office of Courts. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 53.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Under this section stenographer is to receive $65 for each week of court scheduled to be held in his district and he cannot recover an additional amount for services during a special term. Robinson v. Madison County, 120 Miss. 406, 82 So. 307, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 100 (Miss. 1919).

§ 9-13-21. Court reporter’s tax fee.

In each suit, cause or matter where (1) a plea or answer is filed, and (2) in probate or any other cause or matter wherein the court reporter actually serves, a court reporter’s tax fee of ten dollars ($10.00) shall be collected as costs, and paid into the treasury of the county in which the case is tried, as the jury tax is collected by law and paid in the circuit court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 719; 1942, § 1634; Laws, 1926, ch. 144; Laws, 1978, ch. 427, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 23, 1978).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Attorney’s personal liability for expenses incurred in relation to services for client. 66 A.L.R.4th 256.

§ 9-13-23. Stationery furnished.

The board of supervisors of each county shall provide the court reporter with all necessary stationery used by him in the performance of his official duties in the county.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 736; 1906, § 797; Hemingway’s 1917, § 582; 1930, § 720; 1942, § 1635; Laws, 1896, ch. 83; Laws, 1910, ch. 111; Laws, 1926, ch. 156.

§ 9-13-25. Duties.

The court reporter shall attend each session of the court of the district for which he was appointed, from day to day, and unless the same be waived, shall take, under the control of the judge or chancellor full and complete notes, stenographically (and may use recording machines in aid thereof) of all the oral evidence and other oral proceedings, except arguments of counsel, in each case, civil and criminal, tried therein upon an issue of facts and, in any other matter or in any other case that the judge or chancellor may especially direct. He shall carefully note the order in which the evidence, both oral and written, is introduced, and by whom it is introduced, giving the name of each witness, and identifying each deposition, exhibit made, or other item of evidence or matter of proceedings by words or figures of description, and he shall carefully note oral motions and all objections of counsel and rulings of the court made during the trial, in the order in which the same shall occur. And, upon request of any party, he shall, within the time required by the Mississippi Supreme Court Rules, or from the time of the demand, if made after the trial, neatly write out in typewriting a complete copy of his stenographic notes as taken therein or he shall neatly write out in typewriting a complete copy of all matters recorded on the recording machine with a caption showing the style of the case, its number, the court in which it was tried, and when tried, and shall affix thereto a suitable index, and shall certify, sign, and file the same in the office of the clerk of the court in which the case was tried; and he shall preserve his stenographic notes or his tape or record made by said recording machine in each case in which an appeal is taken, as a record of his office. If a party demand the writing out of the court reporter’s notes for any other than the bona fide purpose of perfecting an appeal, he shall pay the court reporter in advance Twenty-five Cents (25¢) per hundred words for the same, but such work shall not delay the preparation of records for appeals. The court reporter shall serve in all habeas corpus and other matters which are heard in vacation, by agreement or otherwise, in the county of residence of the judge or chancellor. The court is authorized to purchase recording machines for the use of the court reporter, the cost of which shall be allocated to each county in the district according to the weeks of court held in each county. Any recording machine purchased for this purpose shall be of such quality as to accurately take and preserve all notes and records herein required to be made and preserved.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 4240; 1906, § 4790; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3143; 1930, § 721; 1942, § 1636; Laws, 1926, ch. 144; Laws, 1958, ch. 280, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 423, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch, 573, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Destruction of court reporter’s shorthand notes, see §9-5-171.

Extension of time for court reporters to prepare and file transcript. Miss. Sup. Ct., Rule 11.

Court reporter obtaining an extension of time to transcribe notes, see Miss. Sup. Ct., Rule 44.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Circuit and Chancery court reporters may not be reimbursed for meals when they are traveling within district of employment to perform routine duties of office. 1992 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 701.

A court reporter is required, unless waived, for child support cases filed by the Department of Human Services, and such court reporters are to paid an annual salary provided by the several counties of each respective court district. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 799.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 249 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Striking of transcript from record.

3. Filing of transcript.

4. Exhibits.

1. In general.

In a case alleging exposure to mold and other substances, an issue relating to the failure to have a court reporter present at a hearing for summary judgment was not preserved for review since no objection was made; even if the error had been preserved, such presence was not required under Miss. R. Civ. P. 78 and Miss. Code Ann. §9-13-25, and the appellate court had no authority to promulgate such a rule. Hosey v. Mediamolle, 963 So. 2d 1267, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 585 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

Where defendant’s counsel in argument referred to insurance, it was not error to refuse the request of plaintiff that court reporter take down the argument of defendant’s counsel inasmuch as the reporter is not required to take stenographic notes of the arguments of counsel. Ward v. Mitchell, 216 Miss. 379, 62 So. 2d 388, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 648 (Miss. 1953).

A court reporter is not required to take stenographic notes of the arguments of counsel. Ward v. Mitchell, 216 Miss. 379, 62 So. 2d 388, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 648 (Miss. 1953).

Official report of the testimony delivered at a former trial is sufficiently authenticated by a stenographer’s certificate that it is a true transcript of such testimony. McMasters v. State, 83 Miss. 1, 35 So. 302, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 3 (Miss. 1903).

2. Striking of transcript from record.

Official stenographer’s notes will be stricken on motion, where evidence but partially reported and omission not supplied. Benjamin v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 126 Miss. 57, 87 So. 895, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1921).

Where two stenographers acted at different times during the trial either was the official stenographer, and the transcript furnished will not be stricken unless shown to be incorrect in some material particular. Lumber Mineral Co. v. King, 96 Miss. 344, 54 So. 250, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1911).

3. Filing of transcript.

To exercise its appellate jurisdiction effectively, the Supreme Court must have before it all records necessary for the proper consideration of cases on appeal, and the court can hear and determine all motions and issues necessary for the exercise of its appeal powers and for the enforcement of its orders; since a proper decision of most cases on appeal requires a detailed consideration of the testimony in the trial court, it is futile to require a clerk to file a record that does not include a transcript of the testimony; although Mississippi Code Annotated section 9-13-41 [Repealed] permits a bill of exceptions in the absence of a transcript of the testimony, where the court reporter’s notes are available, a transcription of such notes is preferable and a bill of exceptions is a poor substitute. Brown v. Water Valley, 319 So. 2d 649, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1481 (Miss. 1975).

The Supreme Court’s inherent authority to promulgate rules in aid of its appellate jurisdiction includes power to require a court reporter to prepare and file a transcript of the evidence taken on the trial of a case, and cases holding to the contrary are overruled. Brown v. Water Valley, 319 So. 2d 649, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1481 (Miss. 1975).

Court stenographer required to file transcript when notified to do so. Robertson v. Southern Bitulithic Co., 132 Miss. 892, 95 So. 638, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 10 (Miss. 1923).

4. Exhibits.

Failure of stenographer to mark deposition, documents and other evidence will not cause them to be stricken from record on appeal. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. M. Levy & Sons, 141 Miss. 196, 106 So. 524, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 230 (Miss. 1925).

Ordinance held not properly made part of record on appeal where not identified or marked as exhibit by stenographer, nor certified to by clerk. Puyper v. Picayune, 134 Miss. 492, 99 So. 16, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 282 (Miss. 1924).

Where newspaper containing libelous matter was introduced in evidence but not marked as an exhibit and referred to in stenographer’s notes, motion to strike bill of exceptions from record sustained, although newspaper was made an exhibit to the pleadings and so part of record, since no cross references were made thereto by the stenographer required by Rule 2 of the court. Richmond v. Enochs, 109 Miss. 14, 67 So. 649, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1915).

§ 9-13-27. Custody of exhibits.

It shall be the duty of the court reporter to deliver to the clerk of the court in which any suit may be tried, at the conclusion of the trial, all depositions, exhibits, maps or other item of evidence, or matter of proceeding, introduced in evidence during the progress of the trial, and such clerk is hereby designated the custodian of such depositions, exhibits, maps or other item of evidence, or matter of proceeding, and he shall file and identify the same and, in the event an appeal to the supreme court shall be perfected in the suit, it shall be the duty of the clerk to correctly transcribe such depositions, exhibits, or other item of evidence, or matter or proceeding, and to cause a correct copy of any map to be made and to incorporate said copies of depositions, exhibits, maps, or other item of evidence, or matter of proceeding in the record of such suit to be filed with the supreme court. Provided, however, that upon order of the trial court any original exhibit shall be forwarded to the supreme court as a part of the record.

It shall be the duty of the clerk to safely keep in his custody all of such original depositions, exhibits, maps or other item of evidence, or matter of proceeding, until the final determination of the suit, or until the time has expired in which an appeal to the supreme court may be perfected.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 722; 1942, § 1637; Laws, 1930, ch. 16.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The chancery clerk is under no duty to retain exhibits in a particular matter where appeal time is long past or where he has received a court mandate affirming the lower court; owners of exhibits may petition the court and recover their property after the conclusion of the court cases; it is recommended, however, that the chancery clerk obtain a court order before destroying the exhibits. 1998 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 791.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 249 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Theft of real evidence from office of circuit court during appeal of murder conviction does not impermissibly deprive convicted defendant of right to appeal where defendant suffers no prejudice from loss of physical exhibits in that there is no contested issue of fact upon which light could be shed by viewing exhibits. Holmes v. State, 475 So. 2d 434, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2194 (Miss. 1985).

In a proceeding against a city where maps were introduced by city and were withdrawn with the permission to substitute copies and the copies were never supplied, the city was in no position to invoke the rule that the appellant take such steps as are available for having an incomplete record made complete on appeal. Gaw v. Holly Springs, 228 Miss. 506, 87 So. 2d 252, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 540 (Miss. 1956).

§ 9-13-29. Withdrawal of exhibits.

At any time prior to the expiration of the period allowed by law to perfect an appeal to the supreme court, or before the determination of the suit, any party to said suit, or any witness who may have testified therein, may, upon petition duly filed and presented to the court or presented to the trial judge thereof in vacation, and upon ten days notice to the opposite party or parties, or to one of his attorneys of record, in which notice the time and place of the presentation of the petition shall be given, obtain an order from the court or judge authorizing the clerk of the court to permit said petitioning party to withdraw from the clerk’s custody, any exhibit, map or other item of evidence, which may be the property of said party or witness, if in the opinion of the court or judge such withdrawal shall be proper. Provided, however, the party or witness requesting the withdrawal shall cause a true copy of such exhibit, map, or other item of evidence, or matter of proceeding to be made by the clerk, and such clerk shall duly certify to the correctness of the copy, and such party or witness shall pay all fees authorized by law for making such copy and for such certificate; the clerk shall be required to make the copy and certificate upon the payment of such fees. Thereafter such certified copy of said exhibit, map or other item of evidence, or matter of proceedings shall remain in custody of the clerk, and during any hearing or trial of the cause and for all other purposes the duly certified copy of such exhibit, map or item of evidence, or matter of proceeding shall be deemed and considered as the true exhibit, map, item of evidence or matter of proceeding exhibited and introduced in such suit.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 723; 1942, § 1638; Laws, 1930, ch. 16.

§ 9-13-31. Trial; reporting the trial.

In all criminal cases, and (a) in all civil cases, and (b) matters in probate, and (c) in matters of special proceedings, wherein property or demands of as much as Fifty Dollars ($50.00) may be in issue, no party shall be required without his consent to go to trial in a circuit or chancery court unless the case is attended by a court reporter; provided, however, that the judge of any chancery court may dispense with the requirement of a court reporter in hearings on temporary support and maintenance and/or temporary child custody in domestic cases unless one (1) or both of the parties request a court reporter. And in and by means of the court reporter’s shorthand notes, it shall be competent and effectual, for the purposes of appeal and all otherwise, to make of the record every part of the proceedings arising and done during the trial, from the opening until the conclusion thereof, including motions so arising to amend the pleadings, except amendments to indictments, and the ruling of the court thereon and all other motions and steps that may occur in the trial, in addition to the oral testimony. And in such a trial, provided objections are duly made and noted, no exceptions need be taken, either for the purposes of appeal or otherwise, or if taken shall not be noted, to any ruling or decision of the court, and this provision shall include the rulings of a court on objections to testimony. If any ruling or decision of the court as to any matter arising during the trial appear in the copy of the court reporter’s notes, it shall not be necessary to take any exceptions or bill of exceptions thereto. Exceptions and bills of exception shall be necessary only when it is desired to reserve exceptions to some ruling or decision of the court which would not otherwise appear of record. No bill of exceptions need be taken to the action of the court in overruling a motion for a new trial. In all cases tried either in the circuit or chancery court in which the evidence is taken down by an official court reporter, all pleadings and all papers filed or introduced in the case, all orders of the court entered on the minutes, all instructions and a copy of the court reporter’s notes shall constitute the record and no bill of exceptions shall be necessary in order to make any of the above matters part of the record.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 736; 1906, § 797; Hemingway’s 1917, § 581; 1930, § 724; 1942, § 1639; Laws, 1896, ch. 83; Laws, 1910, ch. 111; Laws, 1989, ch. 446, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 407, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 15, 1990).

Cross References —

Necessity of objections versus exceptions, for purposes of appeal, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 46.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right to have reporter’s notes read to jury. 50 A.L.R.2d 176.

Am. Jur.

4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 237 et seq.

2 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Appeal and Error, Form 64.1 (Notice-To clerk to prepare reporter’s transcript-Another form).

Practice References.

Young, Trial Handbook for Mississippi Lawyers §§ 2:22, 29:7.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Objections and exceptions.

3. Sufficiency and correctness of transcript.

4. Authentication of bill of exceptions.

5. Amendment or correction; perfecting record.

6. Amendments to indictments.

7. Matters of record.

1. In general.

It is not necessary to make a motion for a new trial grounded upon errors shown in the official transcript of the record, including the pleadings, transcribed evidence, verdict and judgment of the court. Colson v. Sims, 220 So. 2d 345, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1459 (Miss. 1969).

Bill of exceptions embodying substance of evidence proper method of supplying omissions. Benjamin v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 126 Miss. 57, 87 So. 895, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1921).

Bills of exceptions are statutory and must be prepared as provided by statute; unknown to common law. Richmond v. Enochs, 109 Miss. 14, 67 So. 649, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1915).

The time limited for the preparation of a bill of exceptions does not begin to run until the decree is rendered. Speed v. McKnight, 76 Miss. 723, 25 So. 872, 1899 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1899).

Only trial judge can make bill of exceptions; neither stenographer nor clerk can do so. McBride v. Adams, 70 Miss. 716, 12 So. 699 (Miss. 1893).

2. Objections and exceptions.

Supreme Court refused on appeal to consider alleged improper remarks of plaintiff’s counsel in argument to jury where parties disagreed as to what they were and where there was no bill of exception disclosing them. New Orleans & N. R. Co. v. Bryant, 209 Miss. 193, 46 So. 2d 433, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 1950).

Where defendant failed to object to search warrant when offered in evidence but did request peremptory instruction, and, after trial, made motion in arrest of judgment, the supreme court will treat the question as though defendant made timely objection. Jenkins v. State, 207 Miss. 281, 42 So. 2d 198, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 338 (Miss. 1949).

Objection to argument in form of motion for mistrial made after jury retires is not timely made. Stevenson v. Robinson, 37 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1948).

Argument of counsel will not be considered by supreme court on appeal in absence of bill of exceptions disclosing fact of such argument or ruling thereon by trial judge, and no motion for mistrial. Magnolia Miss Dress Co. v. Zorn, 204 Miss. 1, 36 So. 2d 795, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 337 (Miss. 1948).

Exceptions need not be taken to trial court’s ruling and should not be noted in transcripts so as to add unlawfully to costs. Nicholson v. Bankers' & Shippers' Ins. Co., 164 Miss. 523, 145 So. 349, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 243 (Miss. 1933).

3. Sufficiency and correctness of transcript.

Under this section, in a case required to be attended by a court reporter, the entire trial proceedings, including a view of the premises in an eminent domain case, must be conducted with the court reporter present. Gunn v. Mississippi State Highway Com., 229 So. 2d 828, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1258 (Miss. 1969).

Stenographer’s transcript stricken, when not a transcript of evidence on which case tried. Roberts v. Lyon Co., 124 Miss. 345, 86 So. 851, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 516 (Miss. 1921).

4. Authentication of bill of exceptions.

Presumption is, in absence of contrary showing, that bill of exceptions was seasonably presented for approval and signature of judge. Cato v. Crystal Ice Co., 108 Miss. 667, 67 So. 155, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 258 (Miss. 1915).

A special judge commissioned under § 165, Constitution 1890, should approve the stenographer’s notes and sign the bill of exceptions. Lopez v. Jackson, 79 Miss. 460, 31 So. 206, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1901).

Under the Act of 1896 (Laws p. 91), where the evidence, and proceedings were noted by the official court reporter and such notes were written out, and the parties or their attorneys agreed in writing to their correctness, it was not necessary that the trial judge approve and sign them to make them part of the record. State v. Spengler, 74 Miss. 129, 20 So. 879, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 1896).

A special judge commissioned under § 165, Constitution 1890, before whom a case is tried, must sign the bill of exceptions, though presented after the term, as provided in the statute. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Bowles, 71 Miss. 994, 16 So. 235, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1894); Lopez v. Jackson, 79 Miss. 460, 31 So. 206, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1901).

5. Amendment or correction; perfecting record.

Perfecting record and making bill of exceptions is trial court’s duty; if exhibits in record are illegible, making it difficult or impossible to copy them, circuit judge or chancellor may hear and determine matters involved and perfect bill of exceptions. Planters' Oil Mill v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 150 Miss. 813, 117 So. 242, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 167 (Miss. 1928), overruled, Brown v. Water Valley, 319 So. 2d 649, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1481 (Miss. 1975).

Correction of errors in bill of exceptions, where testimony is taken down by court’s stenographer, must take place in trial court except as provided by statute. Williams v. W. M. Hardee & Son, 140 Miss. 151, 106 So. 16, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 243 (Miss. 1925).

Bill of exceptions can be amended only with consent of trial judge. Ladnier v. Ingram Day Lumber Co., 122 Miss. 577, 84 So. 385, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 455 (Miss. 1920).

6. Amendments to indictments.

Amendment to indictment must be by order of court which must precisely specify amendment, and order must be spread on minutes. Thomas v. State, 167 Miss. 504, 142 So. 507, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 205 (Miss. 1932).

When order permitting amendment of indictment is made it is unnecessary that trial be suspended until clerk records order on minutes. Thomas v. State, 167 Miss. 504, 142 So. 507, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 205 (Miss. 1932).

7. Matters of record.

Where there was a variance between the indictment and proof in prosecution for receiving stolen property, and the trial judge sustained a motion for amendment of the indictment, but there was no written order for the amendment entered on the minutes, the variance was not eliminated by the action of the court in sustaining the motion. Hitt v. State, 217 Miss. 61, 63 So. 2d 665, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 411 (Miss. 1953).

While remarks in argument to jury by district attorney in criminal prosecution can be shown either by special bill or exceptions or the reporter’s notes, in either case they must be shown before the Supreme Court can know whether they were harmful. Strong v. State, 199 Miss. 17, 23 So. 2d 750, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 266 (Miss. 1945).

Defendant in tort action could not complain of court’s action in sustaining demurrer to defendant’s plea of nil debit and counterclaim, where trial court thereupon dictated into the record, as permitted by this section, his ruling to the effect that the case should proceed to trial as if the plea interposed was one of proper general issue, under which ruling the case so proceeded. Moore v. Abdalla, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1944).

Where master did not sign amendment to his report purporting to incorporate stenographer’s transcript of evidence taken before him, transcript did not become a part of record, and, in absence of compliance with statute relating to making transcript a part of record, transcript could not be considered by reviewing court on appeal. Spitchley v. Covington, 181 Miss. 678, 177 So. 31, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1937).

Where trial of accused for possession of intoxicating liquor was noted by official reporter and no transcript was made because no notice was given until expiration of statutory time, bill of exceptions setting out evidence sworn to by counsel for accused, presented to but not approved by trial judge, and as to correctness of which Attorney General did not agree, was not properly before court on appeal and no notice could be taken thereof under statute. Stewart v. State, 179 Miss. 31, 174 So. 579, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 22 (Miss. 1937).

In view of this section, statute requiring chancery courts, upon request of party, to find facts specifically and separately state their conclusions of law therefrom, and providing that such findings and conclusions shall be entered of record, is easily complied with without any sort of necessity for delay. General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cooper, 176 Miss. 491, 165 So. 420, 167 So. 801, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 1936).

Supreme Court cannot look to briefs to supply that which is not of record on appeal. Alexander v. Hancock, 174 Miss. 482, 164 So. 772, 165 So. 126, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 91 (Miss. 1935).

The purpose and effect of the statute requiring the chancellor to make a finding of facts upon request of a party is to include the opinion of the chancellor as a material part of the record. Bullard v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 173 Miss. 450, 160 So. 280, 162 So. 169, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 200 (Miss. 1935).

Where plaintiff’s demurrer to defendant’s special plea in bar was dictated into record, it became part of reporter’s record of trial. Peck & Hills Furniture Co. v. Greer, 166 Miss. 249, 148 So. 387 (Miss. 1933).

Motion for new trial, specifying exclusion of statement signed by plaintiff as ground therefor, held unnecessary to present such error on appeal, since a motion for new trial is only necessary to bring to trial court’s attention matters not embraced in the rulings during the trial, as taken down by the stenographer. Weyen v. Weyen, 165 Miss. 257, 139 So. 856 (Miss. 1932).

Pleadings and replication already in Supreme Court on first appeal should be omitted from record on subsequent appeal. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. M. Levy & Sons, 147 Miss. 211, 113 So. 325, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 345 (Miss. 1927).

Special “bill of exceptions” not signed by chancellor did not belong in record. Kline v. Sims, 113 So. 190 (Miss. 1927).

Chancellor’s opinion was properly made part of record on appeal. Kline v. Sims, 113 So. 190 (Miss. 1927).

Failure of stenographer to mark deposition, documents and other evidence will not cause them to be stricken from record on appeal. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. M. Levy & Sons, 141 Miss. 196, 106 So. 524, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 230 (Miss. 1925).

Proceedings on petition to amend exceptions should not be included in record. Ladnier v. Ingram Day Lumber Co., 122 Miss. 577, 84 So. 385, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 455 (Miss. 1920).

Peremptory instruction granted, marked filed by clerk, excepted to, became part of record reviewable on appeal without motion for new trial. McCorkle v. Illinois C. R. Co., 101 Miss. 124, 57 So. 419, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1912).

§ 9-13-32. Trial; attorney of record or interested entity may have proceeding recorded where official court reporter is not provided.

Any attorney of record or interested entity in any cause pending in a court, including justice court, which does not provide an official court reporter, may, in the discretion of the attorney or interested entity, record or have recorded any court proceeding in the cause by mechanical means or stenographically. Any expenses incident thereto shall be borne by the party or parties represented by the entity or attorney of record. The record of the court proceeding shall be used for impeachment purposes only. An interested entity includes, but is not limited to, the victim of a crime or a property owner on whose property a crime has been committed.

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 317; Laws, 2017, ch. 356, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2017.

Amendment Notes —

The 2017 amendment rewrote the section, which read: “Any attorney of record in any cause pending in a court which does not provide an official court reporter, may, in the discretion of such attorney, record or have recorded any court proceeding in such cause by mechanical means or stenographically. Any expenses incident thereto shall be borne by the party or parties represented by such attorney of record. The record of the court proceeding shall be used for impeachment purposes only.”

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

For actions pending in a court which does not provide an official court reporter, an attorney of record may choose to use a tape recorder or other means of recording the proceedings. 1997 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 442.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Trial judge did not abuse the judge’s discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ request for their own, separately retained court reporter to transcribe a summary judgment hearing because the plaintiffs’ did not have a statutory right, under Miss. Code. Ann. §9-13-32, to transcribe the summary judgment hearing. Furthermore, there was no applicable rule justifying the adoption of such a mandatory transcription rule for dispositive motion hearings. Palermo v. LifeLink Found., Inc., 152 So.3d 1177, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 14 (Miss. Ct. App.), aff'd, 152 So.3d 1099, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 578 (Miss. 2014).

§§ 9-13-33 through 9-13-41. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§9-13-33. [Codes, 1892, § 736; 1906, § 797; Hemingway’s 1917, § 582; 1930, § 725; 1942, § 1640; Laws 1896, ch. 83; Laws, 1910, ch. 111; Laws, 1926, ch. 156; Laws, 1936, ch. 236; Laws, 1958, ch. 273; Laws, 1962, ch. 305, §§ 1-4; Laws, 1964, ch. 325, §§ 1-4; Laws, 1971, ch. 442, § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 354, § 1; Laws, 1982, ch. 361]

§9-13-35. [Codes, 1930, § 726; Laws, 1942, § 1641; Laws, 1926, ch. 156]

§9-13-37. [Codes, 1892, § 736; 1906, § 797; Hemingway’s 1917, § 583; 1930, § 727; 1942, § 1642; Laws, 1896, ch. 83; Laws, 1910, ch. 111; Laws, 1920, ch. 145]

§9-13-39. [Codes 1892, § 736; 1906, § 797; Hemingway’s 1917, § 585; 1930, § 728; 1942, § 1643; Laws, 1896, ch. 83; Laws, 1910, ch. 111; Laws, 1920, ch. 145]

§9-13-41. [Codes, 1892, § 736; 1906, § 797; Hemingway’s 1917, § 585; 1930, § 729; 1942, § 1644; Laws, 1896, ch. 83; Laws, 1910, ch. 111; Laws, 1920, ch. 145; Laws, 1950, ch. 350]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-13-33 provided for transcripts of trials, requests for transcripts or parts thereof, and costs of transcripts.

Former §9-13-35 provided for the filing of transcripts with the court clerk, and the making of corrections to transcripts.

Former §9-13-37 allowed a court reporter to request additional time to transcribe the transcript of a trial.

Former §9-13-39 prohibited the striking of a transcript unless the transcript was shown to be incorrect.

Former §9-13-41 specified the contents of a record on appeal.

§ 9-13-43. Transcript as prima facie correct; use as evidence.

When a transcript has been made by the official reporter and certified to as being a correct transcript of notes, tapes or audio records of the testimony and other proceedings of the trial, the same shall be prima facie a correct statement thereof and may thereafter be introduced and read in evidence in the trial of any case in any state court of the state of Mississippi, without the necessity of further identification, provided such matter is otherwise admissible.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1636.1; Laws, 1958, ch. 280, § 2.

§ 9-13-45. Penalty for wilful neglect of duty.

If the court reporter willfully neglects to perform any duty required of him by law, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, may be fined not exceeding Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or imprisoned not more than six (6) months. Moreover, he shall be liable to a deduction from his salary at the rate of Ten Dollars ($10.00) a day for each day that he shall be in such default, which deduction shall be made by the court when it authorizes his salary to the Administrative Office of the Courts, and in addition thereto he shall be liable on his bond to the party injured for all damages which may be sustained by reason of his neglect of duty. If any court reporter shall neglect or refuse to transcribe his official notes and to file such transcript within the time and in the manner required by law, or by order of the court or judge, he shall be liable upon his bond for a penalty in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00), to be recovered by the party aggrieved thereby, whether the person aggrieved has suffered any actual damage or not.

HISTORY: Codes 1892, § 4243; 1906, § 4793; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3146; 1930, § 730; 1942, § 1645; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 40, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Since a bill of exceptions may be prepared and filed, the failure of the court reporter to transcribe the notes of the trial is not an excuse for delays in completing the record for appeal, and the continuance would be granted in a case, which was first returnable in the Supreme Court almost one year earlier, on condition that the record would be filed in the court within approximately two months. Motor Supply Co. v. Hunter, 251 Miss. 837, 164 So. 2d 410, 171 So. 2d 870, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 539, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 909 (Miss. 1964).

Neglect of the court reporter does not relieve the appellant or counsel from a duty to comply with the statutory directions. Warren v. State, 165 Miss. 783, 144 So. 698, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 293 (Miss. 1932), overruled, Brown v. Water Valley, 319 So. 2d 649, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1481 (Miss. 1975).

Where appointed stenographer who took part of testimony during illness of regular stenographer refused to transcribe and deliver that part taken by him, regular stenographer was not liable to penalty for failure to transcribe and file all or that part of record taken by him. Johnson v. Ward, 102 Miss. 464, 59 So. 806, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 75 (Miss. 1912).

§ 9-13-61. Official county and family court reporter.

There shall be an official court reporter for each county and family court judge in the State of Mississippi, to be appointed by such judge, for the purpose of performing the necessary and required stenographic work of the court or division thereof over which the appointing judge is presiding, said work to be performed under the direction of such judge and in the same manner and to the same effect as is provided in the chapter on court reporting.

Except as hereinafter provided, the reporters of said courts shall receive an annual salary of not less than Twenty-four Thousand Dollars ($24,000.00) and may, at the discretion of the board of supervisors, receive a monthly salary equal to that of the reporter of the circuit court district wherein the county lies, the same to be paid monthly by the county out of its general fund.

Provided, however, that in any Class 1 county having a population in excess of fifty-six thousand (56,000) persons according to the 1970 federal decennial census, the reporter shall receive a monthly salary equal to that of the reporter of the circuit court district wherein the county or family court lies, the same to be paid monthly by the county out of its general fund.

Provided further, that in any Class 1 county bordering on the Mississippi River and which has situated therein a national military park and national military cemetery, and having a population in excess of forty-four thousand (44,000) according to the 1970 federal decennial census, the reporter shall receive a monthly salary equal to that of the reporter of the circuit court district wherein the county lies, the same to be paid monthly by the county out of its general fund.

Provided further, that in any Class 1 county bordering on the Mississippi River wherein U.S. Highways 61 and 84 intersect, and having a population in excess of thirty-seven thousand (37,000) in the 1960 federal decennial census, the reporter shall receive a monthly salary equal to that of the reporter of the circuit court district wherein the county lies, the same to be paid monthly by the county out of its general fund.

Provided further, that in addition to the foregoing compensation, all county and family court reporters shall be paid the same fees for transcript of the record on appeals as are now or hereafter paid circuit court reporters for like or similar work.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 700; 1942, § 1611; Laws, 1926, ch. 131; Laws, 1928, ch. 219; Laws, 1948, ch. 224; Laws, 1950, ch. 355; Laws, 1952, ch. 240; Laws, 1956, ch. 232; Laws, 1960, ch. 235; Laws, 1966, ch. 346, § 1; Laws, 1966 Ex sess, ch. 24 § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 333, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 311, § 3; Laws, 1970, ch. 395, § 2; Laws, 1975, ch. 385; Laws, 1977, ch. 447, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 510, § 2; Laws, 1997, ch. 432, § 1, eff from and after October 1, 1997.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1999, ch. 432, § 1, provides that:

“SECTION 1. From and after the date Laws, 1999, ch. 432, is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, all family courts are abolished. All matters pending in any family court abolished shall be transferred to the county court of the county wherein the family court was located without the necessity for any motion or order of court for such transfer.”

Cross References —

Appointment of additional county court reporters and their compensation, see §9-13-17.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Counties may not pay the premium on the required bond for official court reporters of the chancery and circuit court, but may pay the premium for the bonds of county court reporters and may pay the dues for the membership of the county court reporter in the court reporter’s association upon making a determination that such dues are reasonable and necessary to the performance of the court reporter’s duties. 1999 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 53.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Attorney’s personal liability for expenses incurred in relation to services for client. 15 A.L.R.3d 531.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts §§ 1-4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

On appeal from county court to circuit court in eminent domain proceeding, appellants must give notice to stenographer to transcribe notes, as prescribed by statutes relating to court reporters. Mississippi State Highway Dep't v. Haines, 162 Miss. 216, 139 So. 168, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1932).

§ 9-13-62. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1977, ch. 447, § 2, eff from and after October 1, 1977.

[Code, 1942, § 1633; en Laws, 1973, ch. 484, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-13-62 set the salaries of court reporters in certain counties.

§ 9-13-63. County court reporter fees as items of costs.

In all cases filed in the county court, a court reporter’s fee shall be charged as an item of cost as follows: A fee of one dollar ($1.00) shall be charged in all cases which, if there were no county court, would have been filed in the justice of the peace court; a fee of two dollars ($2.00) shall be charged in all cases appealed to the county court and a fee of three dollars ($3.00) shall be charged in all cases which, if there were no county court, would be filed in the circuit or chancery courts. All of said reporter’s fees above mentioned are to be paid into the general fund of the county; provided, however, that no jury tax shall be charged in any case unless there is an issue joined and no court reporter’s fee shall be charged unless issue has been joined in such case and testimony taken.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1611.5; Laws, 1970, ch. 395, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1970.

Cross References —

Tax fees of circuit and chancery court reporters, see §9-13-21.

Fee for transcript of testimony and exhibits to testimony, or copy of such transcript and exhibits, see §25-7-89.

Board of Certified Court Reporters

§ 9-13-101. Board of Certified Court Reporters; membership; terms of office.

  1. The Board of Certified Court Reporters, hereinafter referred to as “the board,” shall be composed of nine (9) members. Two (2) of the members shall be judges, one (1) from the Supreme Court and one (1) from a trial court, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi with the approval of the full court. Two (2) of the board members shall be practicing attorneys and shall be appointed by the Chief Justice, with the approval of the full court, on nomination by the Mississippi Bar. Two (2) of the members shall be official court reporters in, and citizens of, Mississippi for at least five (5) years prior to their appointments and shall be appointed by the Chief Justice with approval of the full court on nomination by the Board of Directors of the Mississippi Court Reporters Association. Two (2) of the members shall be free-lance court reporters in, and citizens of, Mississippi for at least five (5) years prior to their appointments and shall be appointed by the Chief Justice with approval of the full court on nomination by the Board of Directors of the Mississippi Court Reporters Association. Initially, for judges, lawyers and reporters, one (1) of the two (2) shall be appointed for a term of one (1) year and one (1) for a term of two (2) years. For court reporters, one (1) official shall be appointed for a term of one (1) year and one (1) for a term of two (2) years and one (1) free-lance court reporter shall be appointed for a term of one (1) year and one (1) for a term of two (2) years. The ninth board member shall be the Supreme Court Clerk, who shall serve as a permanent member of the board.
  2. After each member’s term expires, his successor shall be appointed for a term of two (2) years. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall fill any vacancy for the duration of an unexpired term by appointing a person having the appropriate qualifications and the Supreme Court may remove any member for cause. Members may be appointed to successive terms.
  3. Each member shall take an oath that he will fairly, impartially and to the best of his ability administer the provisions of Sections 9-13-101 through 9-13-121.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 599, § 10, eff from and after July 2, 1994.

Cross References —

Rule governing creation, appointment, duties, powers, etc. of the Board of Certified Court Reporters, see Rules and Regulations Governing Certified Court Reports, Rule II.

§ 9-13-103. Meetings of board; officers; mailing address.

The Supreme Court shall specify a date for the first meeting of the board, at which the board will organize itself by electing one (1) of its members chairman and electing such other officers as deemed appropriate. The office of the Supreme Court shall be the permanent mailing address for all applications or correspondence of the board. The board shall hold its meetings not less than once a year at such times and places as the board shall designate.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 599, § 11, eff from and after July 2, 1994.

§ 9-13-105. Duties and powers of board.

The board is charged with the duty and vested with the power and authority:

To determine the content of and administer examinations to be given to applicants for certification as a court reporter.

To determine an applicant’s ability to make a verbatim record of proceedings which may be used in any court in this state by any recognized system designated by the board and to pass upon the eligibility of applicants for certification.

To issue certificates to those found qualified as court reporters who are in compliance with Section 9-13-109.

To promulgate, amend and revise regulations relevant to its duties as necessary to implement this chapter. Such regulations shall be consistent with the provisions of Sections 9-13-101 through 9-13-121 and shall not be effective until approved by the Supreme Court.

To make studies and, from time to time, recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning matters pertaining to court reporters.

To account to the Supreme Court in all fiscal matters following recognized accounting procedures of the State Auditor.

To exercise jurisdiction over disciplinary matters with regard to certified court reporters, those reporters granted temporary permission as noncertified or nonresident court reporters, those holding themselves out in the State of Mississippi to be court reporters and anyone engaged in the unauthorized practice of court reporting within the State of Mississippi in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the board.

To enter into contracts, hire staff and do such other things as may be necessary to implement the provisions of Sections 9-13-101 through 9-13-121.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 599, § 12; Laws, 2011, ch. 311, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment substituted “a court reporter” for “Certified Shorthand Reporters” in (a); substituted “court reporters” for “Certified Shorthand Reporters” in (c) and (e); and rewrote (g).

§ 9-13-107. Certification of reporters required; application for certification examination.

No person shall be qualified or authorized to report testimony or proceedings relevant to matters under the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Mississippi, all state agencies or the Legislature or any committee or subcommittee thereof, or where appeal to any court of the State of Mississippi is allowable by law, unless such person satisfies the provisions of Sections 9-13-101 through 9-13-121 with respect to certification. Sections 9-13-101 through 9-13-121 shall not be construed to apply to any proceedings that take place outside the borders of the State of Mississippi.

Every applicant for examination for certification as a Certified Shorthand Reporter shall file with the person designated by the board a written application in the form prescribed by the board. At the time the application is filed, the applicant shall pay to the board an application fee established by regulation, which fee shall not be subject to withdrawal by the applicant in the event he should decide not to take the examination or is denied the right to take the examination. Upon request, the board shall forward to any interested person application forms together with the text of this chapter and copies of regulations promulgated by the board under the provisions of this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 599, § 13, eff from and after July 2, 1994.

§ 9-13-109. Requirements for certification.

Every applicant for certification shall have reached the age of majority, be of good moral character and be a resident citizen of the State of Mississippi. Further, every applicant shall meet the criteria established by the board for certification or shall meet the requirements of Section 9-13-109.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 599, § 14, eff from and after July 2, 1994.

§ 9-13-111. Issuance of certification without examination; requirements.

Upon application and payment of the application fee within six (6) months of the effective date of this chapter [July 2, 1994] and upon a showing of residence within the State of Mississippi, certification without examination shall issue to:

Any official court reporter serving on January 3, 1996, in a Mississippi court on a full-time basis, if such reporter is actually engaged in verbatim reporting through shorthand symbols or the stenomask method.

Any free-lance reporter actually engaged in verbatim reporting through shorthand symbols or the stenomask method and who had been so engaged as of July 2, 1994.

Any person enrolled in any public or private institution in the State of Mississippi on July 2, 1994, who is majoring in a course of study in court reporting and who receives a degree in such course of study.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 599, § 15; Laws, 1996, ch. 484, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 11, 1996).

§ 9-13-113. Official court reporters must be certified shorthand reporters; exception for temporary reporters.

After July 2, 1994, no judge of any court of this state shall appoint an official court reporter who is not a certified shorthand reporter. In the event of a vacancy, a judge may appoint a temporary reporter; but such temporary reporter shall, within thirty (30) days of such appointment, make application for temporary certification and shall not serve for more than six (6) months without having obtained a permanent certification under Sections 9-13-101 through 9-13-121, except as provided by Section 9-13-121(3).

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 599, § 16, eff from and after July 2, 1994.

§ 9-13-115. Free-lance and nonresident reporters.

  1. Free-lance reporters shall make application for certification in the manner prescribed in Section 9-13-105. Without satisfying the requirements of this chapter, no free-lance reporter shall make a verbatim record of any testimony of a proceeding, jurisdiction of which is within the courts of Mississippi or where appeal to any court of the State of Mississippi is allowable by law.
  2. Any court reporter not a resident of Mississippi wishing to make a verbatim record or transcript of testimony to be used in a legal proceeding within the State of Mississippi may do so upon obtaining temporary permission from the board or the judge of any court of record, such permission not to be valid for more than thirty (30) days unless special conditions are established therein by the board or judge from whom the temporary permission was obtained.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 599, § 17, eff from and after July 2, 1994.

§ 9-13-117. Revocation or suspension of certificate; disqualification.

The board, for good cause shown and in keeping with its regulations and after a hearing conducted in a manner consistent with due process, may revoke or suspend any certificate issued or may disqualify any applicant from certification.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 599, § 18, eff from and after July 2, 1994.

§ 9-13-118. Practicing court reporting without certification; filing false information to obtain certification; penalties.

  1. Any person who: (a) undertakes or attempts to undertake the practice of court reporting for remuneration without having first procured a certificate or temporary permission under Sections 9-13-101 through 9-13-123; or (b) knowingly files false information with the board for the purpose of obtaining certification or temporary permission under Sections 9-13-101 through 9-13-123, shall be subject to a civil fine to be imposed by the board of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00).
  2. Each day’s violation shall be considered a separate infraction.
  3. A person who is not authorized to practice court reporting under Sections 9-13-101 through 9-13-123 shall not bring or maintain an action to recover fees for court reporting services that the person performed in violation of this section.

HISTORY: Laws, 2011, ch. 311, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

§ 9-13-119. Annual certification fee; renewal of certification; disposition of funds.

  1. All Certified Shorthand Reporters and Certified Stenomask Reporters shall pay to the board an annual certification fee established by the board. All certificates issued under the provisions of this chapter shall expire one (1) year from the date of issue. Applications for renewal of certification shall be accompanied by the required annual certification fee.
  2. All funds collected under the provisions of this chapter shall be deposited into a special fund, hereby created in the State Treasury. All expenses incurred by the board in implementing the provisions of this chapter shall be paid out of such special fund pursuant to legislative appropriation.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 599, § 19, eff from and after July 2, 1994.

§ 9-13-121. Giving of examinations for certification; notice; effect of not passing examination; temporary certificates; photo identification.

    1. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1), any person graduating from a court reporting school approved by the State of Mississippi or some other state shall be given a temporary certification but shall make application for and pass a Certified Shorthand Reporter’s (CSR) examination as is provided in this section.
    2. Any person who is enrolled in a court reporting program or court reporting school, whether in Mississippi or out of state, that is accredited by the National Court Reporting Association, and who graduates prior to November 1, 2008, shall be granted certification without examination.
    1. The Board of Court Reporters shall implement a true CSR examination wherein all examinees are given the option to take any part or parts of the examination independent of the other parts; however, each part, once passed, need not be retaken by that examinee. Any applicant granted a temporary certification or permit shall be allowed not less than thirty-six (36) months after being granted the temporary certification or permit to pass the examination.
      1. Examinations for certification shall be given not less than every six (6) months at a time and place designated by the board. Notification of such examinations shall be given each applicant in writing not less than thirty (30) days before each examination date. Proof of notice of an examination having been sent less than thirty (30) days before an examination date shall automatically extend a temporary certificate for an additional six (6) months beyond what is otherwise provided in this section.
      2. If an applicant holding temporary certification has not qualified for certification within the required time, the applicant shall be permitted a hearing before the board. If said applicant has passed at least two (2) parts of the examination, the applicant will be given an additional extension of not more than one (1) year.
      3. If a court reporter is unavailable, the use of audio or video equipment shall be authorized.
  1. Those reporters holding temporary certificates must submit their applications, together with the fee, to the board and take the next scheduled examination. If the applicant holding temporary certification has not qualified for certification within the required time, the applicant shall be deemed unqualified to serve as a reporter until the applicant passes the examination and receives permanent certification or has been granted an extension according to subsection (2).
  2. Photo identification may be required of any applicant prior to the taking of an examination for security reasons only but shall not be used for discrimination against applicants on the basis of race, gender, age, creed or national origin.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 599, § 20; Laws, 2000, ch. 402, § 1; Laws, 2003, ch. 479, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 10, 2003.).

Amendment Notes —

The 2000 amendment rewrote (1) and (2); added “or has been granted an extension according to subsection (2)” in (3); and added (4).

The 2003 amendment rewrote the section.

§ 9-13-123. Definitions; effect of chapter on courts and individual’s rights.

As used in Sections 9-13-101 through 9-13-121:

“Courts” includes all courts. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as a limitation upon the power of the Supreme Court or of the trial courts to govern the conduct of, and to discipline, official court reporters, nor shall this chapter be construed as any limitation upon the rights of any individual to seek any remedy afforded by law, nor as any exclusive mode of regulating court reporters.

“Court reporter” means a Certified Shorthand Reporter or a Certified Stenomask Reporter.

“The practice of court reporting” means the making of a verbatim record by means of written symbols or abbreviations in pen shorthand, machine shorthand, or oral stenography, also known as steno mask, of testimony or proceedings relevant to matters under the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Mississippi, all state agencies or the Legislature or any committee or subcommittee thereof, or where appeal to any court of the State of Mississippi is allowable by law.

“The making of a verbatim record” includes the taking of a deposition.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 599, § 21; Laws, 2011, ch. 311, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment rewrote the section.

Chapter 15. Judicial Council [Repealed]

§§ 9-15-1 through 9-15-9. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1977, ch. 429, § 6, eff from and after June 30, 1980.

[En Laws, 1977, ch. 429, §§ 1-5]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §9-15-1 established the judicial council and provided for its membership, terms, filling vacancies, organizational meeting, and officers.

Former §9-15-3 provided for meetings of the judicial council.

Former §9-15-5 fixed the duties of the judicial council.

Former §9-15-7 provided for the reimbursement of expenses of judicial council members.

Former §9-15-9 directed state and local officers and agencies and political subdivisions of the state to provide assistance and information to the judicial council upon request, but restricted the council from obtaining statutorily protected information or information not relevant to judicial functions.

Chapter 17. Court Administrators

§ 9-17-1. Establishment of office; appointment and compensation of court administrator.

  1. The judges and chancellors of judicial districts, including chancery, circuit and county courts, may, in their discretion, jointly or independently, establish the office of court administrator in any county by an order entered on the minutes of each participating court in the county.

    The establishment of the office of court administrator shall be accomplished by vote of a majority of the participating judges and chancellors in the county, and such court administrator shall be appointed by vote of a majority of the judges or chancellors and may be removed by a majority vote of the judges or chancellors. In case of a tie vote, the senior judge or senior chancellor shall cast two (2) votes.

  2. The court administrator shall be provided office space in the same manner as such is afforded the judges and chancellors.
  3. The annual salary of each court administrator appointed pursuant to this section shall be set by vote of the judges and chancellors of each participating county and shall be submitted to the Administrative Office of Courts for approval pursuant to Section 9-1-36. The salary shall be paid in twelve (12) installments on the last working day of the month by the Administrative Office of Courts after it has been authorized by the participating judges and chancellors and an order has been duly placed on the minutes of each participating court.

    Any county within a judicial district having a court administrator shall transfer to the Administrative Office of Courts one-twelfth (1/12) of its pro rata cost of authorized compensation as defined in Section 9-1-36 for the court administrator by the twentieth day of each month for the compensation that is to be paid on the last day of that month. The board of supervisors may transfer the pro rata cost of the county from the funds of that county pursuant to Section 9-17-5(2)(b).

  4. For all travel required in the performance of official duties, the court administrator shall be paid mileage by the county in which the duties were performed at the same rate as provided for state employees in Section 25-3-41, Mississippi Code of 1972. The court administrator shall file a certificate of mileage expense incurred during that term with the board of supervisors of each participating county and payment of such expense shall be paid proportionately out of the court administration fund established pursuant to Section 9-17-5.

HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 531, § 2; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 41; Laws, 1994, ch. 506, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 23, 1994).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

Cross References —

Rules governing certification and continuing education for court administrators, see Rules and Regulations for Certification and Continuing Education for Mississippi Court Administrators 1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Section9-17-1, combined with the approval of the Youth Court budget, as mandated by §§43-21-123 and19-9-96, authorized a youth court judge’s hiring of a youth court administrator who performed non-judicial, administrative functions of the youth court. Nelson v. State, 656 So. 2d 318, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 303 (Miss. 1995).

§ 9-17-3. Duties of court administrator.

It shall be the duty of the court administrator to:

Perform all nonjudicial tasks of the court;

Maintain all statistical reports;

Serve as liaison with the general public and members of the bar;

Coordinate and assist in the duties of the clerks of the courts of the district related to the judicial duties of the clerks;

Provide general administrative support for all judges and chancellors of the district; and

Perform other duties assigned by the judges.

HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 531, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1978.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Miss. Code Section 9-17-3 provides for court administrator’s duties. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 954.

Based on Sections 9-21-1, 9-17-3 and 9-21-19, all statistical reports of a court should be prepared and maintained by the court administrator. However, any request for statistical data made by the AOC should be complied with by the receiver of such request. If the court administrator maintains all statistical data, then such a request should be made to the court administrator. 1996 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 324.

The Youth Court Judge has the legal responsibility for administering the youth court detention facility, although the Youth Court Judge may delegate this function to his designee and may appoint a court administrator pursuant to the statute. 1998 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 615.

§ 9-17-5. Court administration special fund.

  1. In each county where a court administrator has been appointed pursuant to this chapter, a special fund in the county treasury is hereby established to be known as the “court administration fund.”
    1. The judges and chancellors may apply their expense allowance in Section 9-1-36, Mississippi Code of 1972, to the court administration fund.
    2. The board of supervisors of any county within a judicial district having a court administrator is authorized to pay its pro rata cost of the salary and furnish an equipped office for the court administrator and his staff from county funds. The board of supervisors is further authorized to accept grants, gifts, donations or federal funds for the benefit of the office of the court administrator.
    3. The board of supervisors of any county within a judicial district having a court administrator is authorized, in its discretion, to charge, in addition to all other costs required by law, an amount not to exceed two dollars ($2.00) for each complaint filed in the chancery, circuit and county courts of such county. Any money collected pursuant to this subsection shall be paid into the court administrator fund.
    4. Money paid into the court administration fund under this chapter shall be applied to the office of the court administrator for the purpose of funding that office.
  2. All expenditures made from the court administration fund shall be upon written requisition of the court administrator approved by a judge or chancellor to the county or counties of the district designated by him, in proportion to the business of his office in the county.

HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 531, § 4 1983, ch. 398, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Language of statute which authorizes county to pay its pro rata share of costs and to receive grants, gifts, donations or federal funds for benefit of court administrator’s office, is to empower county to lawfully expend funds for court administrator’s office, and was not intended to give county option of withdrawing from its obligation of paying its pro rata share of costs of court administrator’s office. 1990 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 346.

Two dollar ($2.00) fee must be established by board of supervisors and therefore must be reflected on board’s minutes; likewise, statute specifically limits levying of two dollar ($2.00) fee to complaints filed in chancery, circuit and county courts, and thus could not be extended to justice court. 1990 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 646.

Miss. Code Section 9-17-5 provides for payment of court administrator from a special fund in county treasury. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 954.

Court administration fee applied only to chancery filings since only chancery administrator had been created. 1993 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 428.

Chapter 19. Commission on Judicial Performance

§ 9-19-1. Membership.

The Commission on Judicial Performance shall consist of the following members:

One (1) circuit court judge to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi upon the recommendation of the Governor;

One (1) chancellor to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi upon the recommendation of the Lieutenant Governor;

One (1) county court judge to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi upon the recommendation of the Speaker of the House;

One (1) justice court judge to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi;

One (1) practicing attorney to be appointed by the Chief Justice upon the recommendation of the Governing Board of The Mississippi Bar; and

Two (2) lay persons who shall not be residents of the same Supreme Court District to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi.

An alternate for each member shall be selected at the time and in the manner prescribed for initial appointments in each representative class to replace those members who might be disqualified or absent.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 1; Laws, 1980, ch. 385, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 483, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 515; Laws, 2001, ch. 527, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Amendment Notes —

The 2001 amendment rewrote the section.

Cross References —

Rules governing conduct of judges, see Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 1 et seq.

Rules governing the jurisdiction, organization, procedures, etc. of the Commission on Judicial Performance, see Rules of the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance 1 et seq.

§ 9-19-3. Terms of office; prohibited activities of members; chairman.

The terms of office of the commission members shall be for six (6) years, except that the initial terms of office shall be as follows: the circuit court judge member for six (6) years, the chancellor member for five (5) years, the county court judge member for five (5) years, the justice court judge member for four (4) years, one (1) of the lay members for three (3) years, the other lay member for two (2) years, and the attorney member for one (1) year. Members shall not be allowed to succeed themselves after serving a full term. Commission membership terminates if a member ceases to hold the position that qualified the member for appointment. A vacancy shall be filled by the appointing power for the remainder of the term.

No member of the commission, except a justice or judge, shall be eligible for state judicial office so long as he is a member of the commission and for a period of two (2) years thereafter. No member of the commission shall hold office in a political party or participate in any campaign for judicial office and hold public office; provided that a judge may participate in his own campaign for judicial office and hold that office. The commission shall elect one (1) of its members as its chairman.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 2, eff from and after January 1, 1980.

§ 9-19-5. Compensation.

The members of the commission on judicial performance shall be reimbursed for all reasonable and necessary travel expenses and subsistence as may be incurred in the performance of their duties. Members of the commission who are judges shall serve without compensation. Other members of the commission shall receive a per diem in the amount authorized in Section 25-3-69, Mississippi Code of 1972, for each day or part thereof spent in performing their duties under this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 8; Laws, 1997, ch. 404, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1997.

§ 9-19-7. Executive director; administrative staff.

The commission may appoint and remove an executive director and such administrative staff as may be required. This staff shall report each charge filed to the commission.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511 § 9, eff from and after January 1, 1980.

§ 9-19-9. Disqualification of commission member from acting on complaint.

If a complaint is filed against a member of the commission, he shall be disqualified as to that complaint.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 3, eff from and after January 1, 1980.

§ 9-19-11. Private admonishments.

The commission on judicial performance may privately admonish a justice or judge found to have been engaged in improper action or a dereliction of duty affecting the administration of justice; subject to review in the supreme court; provided, however, that all appeals from private admonishments shall remain confidential.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 4, eff from and after January 1, 1980.

§ 9-19-13. Disqualification of judge during pendency of proceedings.

Except as otherwise provided in Section 25-3-36(7), on recommendation of the commission on judicial performance, the Supreme Court may disqualify a judge from exercising any judicial function, without loss of salary, during pendency of proceedings before the commission or in the supreme court. If so disqualified, a special judge shall be appointed to perform his duties, as provided by law.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 5; Laws, 1990, ch. 426, § 3, eff from and after June 18, 1990 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the amendment).

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected an error in an internal reference in the first sentence by substituting “Section 25-3-36(7)” for “Section 25-3-36(6).” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its August 17, 2015, meeting.

Cross References —

Authority of board of supervisors to appoint judge to serve for justice court judge who is unable to serve for thirty consecutive days, see §9-11-31.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Substitution of judge in state criminal trial. 45 A.L.R.5th 591.

§ 9-19-15. Retirement or disability of judge.

A justice or judge retired by the supreme court or the seven-member tribunal shall be considered to have retired voluntarily. The supreme court’s finding of disability shall satisfy any certification of disability required by applicable retirement and disability law.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 6, eff from and after January 1, 1980.

§ 9-19-17. Removed judge as ineligible for judicial office; suspension from practice of law.

A justice or judge removed by the supreme court or the seven-member tribunal is ineligible for judicial office, and pending further order of the court, may be suspended from practicing law in this state.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 7, eff from and after January 1, 1980.

§ 9-19-19. Secrecy of proceedings before commission.

All commission members, staff, witnesses or any other person privy to any hearing before the commission shall take an oath of secrecy concerning all proceedings before the commission, violation of which shall be punishable as contempt.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 10, eff from and after January 1, 1980.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Confidentiality of proceedings or reports of judicial inquiry board or commission. 5 A.L.R.4th 730.

§ 9-19-21. Subpoena of witnesses; inspection of documents and records; information for use in impeachment or recall election; retention of records of complaints outside commission’s jurisdiction.

  1. The commission shall be entitled to compel by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses, including the judge as witness, and to provide for the inspection of documents, books, accounts and other records.
  2. If the commission, after investigation of a complaint, determines that there is sufficient evidence to warrant a hearing to determine whether or not there has been a violation under Section 177A, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, the commission may employ counsel to prepare and present the complaint to the commission, a committee of the commission, its master or its factfinder, and to represent the commission before the supreme court.
  3. The commission shall make transcripts of all hearings that are conducted under subsection (2) of this section. Such transcripts shall serve as a record in proceedings before the supreme court.
  4. On request of the speaker of the house of representatives, the president of the senate or the governor, the commission shall make available information for use in consideration of impeachment or recall election, respectively.
  5. No records pertaining to complaints determined by the commission to be outside its jurisdiction shall be retained over twelve (12) months after such determination by the commission.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 13; Laws, 1980, ch. 385, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

Cross References —

Violations of prohibition against use of court personnel in judicial campaigns to be referred to Commission on Judicial Performance, see §23-15-874.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Justice court judge obstructed justice where, after being served with formal complaint by Commission on Judicial Performance, he circulated order to Constables and members of staff demanding that they deliver to him official and unofficial notes and evidence relating to cases and allegations against him and that failure to abide by his orders would constitute grounds for contempt, even though judge never executed order as it was an attempt to knowingly and intentionally intimidate staff in performance of their duties and as potential witnesses against judge. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Dodds, 680 So. 2d 180, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 425 (Miss. 1996).

§ 9-19-23. Rules and regulations.

The commission on judicial performance shall make rules implementing this chapter, including rules of practice and procedure concerning receiving, processing and handling of complaints or inquiries and for hearings of the commission, a committee of the commission, its master or its factfinder, and the supreme court, to be approved by the supreme court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 11; Laws, 1980, ch. 385, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Recommendation of Commission on Judicial Performance, pursuant to Commission’s rules, was accepted by the Supreme Court and removal ordered for a justice court judge who had knowingly accepted money from fine violations, falsely entered a judgment “dismissed” on court dockets and records, and retained fine money for his own use. In re Stewart, 490 So. 2d 882, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2496 (Miss. 1986).

§ 9-19-25. Receipt and expenditure of funds.

The commission is authorized and empowered to receive and expend funds appropriated or granted for the purposes of this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 12; Laws, 1980, ch. 385, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

§ 9-19-27. Annual report.

The commission shall publish an annual statistical report which shall contain the number of complaints filed and the number of dispositions by type, specifying the number of complaints and dispositions for the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, circuit courts, chancery courts, county courts, justice courts, municipal courts and all other courts in existence in Mississippi. The annual report shall also contain all other data the commission deems appropriate; however, no judicial district, county, region or individual judge shall be referred to in the foregoing report. All references shall be only to general court types and shall comply with the applicable confidentiality requirements.

HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 511, § 14; Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 24, eff July 13, 1993 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the amendment of this section).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 518, § 45, provides as follows:

“SECTION 45. Section 32 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 2, 1993, or the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, whichever is later.”

On July 13, 1993, the United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended to the amendment of this section by Laws, 1993, ch. 518.

§ 9-19-29. Privileged character of complaints; immunity from civil suit.

All complaints filed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be absolutely privileged. The Commission on Judicial Performance, its members, executive director, commission counsel, master or fact finder, their assistants, staff and employees, and the members of any committee created under the authority of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct shall be immune from civil suit for any conduct arising out of the performance of their official duties.

HISTORY: Laws, 1981, ch. 483, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 15, 1981); Laws, 2018, ch. 429, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 11, 2018).

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment, effective April 11, 2018, inserted "and the members of any committee created under the authority of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct" and made a related change.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

Following dismissal of federal claims, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction was not warranted over state law claims against the estate of a United States Attorney who disclosed tax returns to a state ethics commission; the claims raised novel and complex issues of Mississippi immunity law under this section, which had never been applied in any reported decision by Mississippi state courts. Diaz v. Estate of Lampton, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89770 (S.D. Miss. June 26, 2013).

§ 9-19-31. Judicial Performance Fund created; purpose; distribution of monies from fund; fund to be a continuing fund; components of fund.

There is created in the State Treasury a special interest-bearing fund to be known as the Judicial Performance Fund. The purpose of the fund shall be to provide supplemental funding to the Commission on Judicial Performance. Monies from the funds derived from assessments under Section 99-19-73 shall be distributed by the State Treasurer upon warrants issued by the Commission on Judicial Performance. The fund shall be a continuing fund, not subject to fiscal-year limitations, and shall consist of: (a) monies appropriated by the Legislature for the purpose of funding the Commission on Judicial Performance; (b) the interest accruing to the fund; (c) monies received under the provisions of Section 99-19-73; (d) monies received from the federal government; and (e) monies received from such other sources as may be provided by law.

HISTORY: Laws, 2004, ch. 543, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Chapter 21. Administrative Office of Courts

Creation and Duties of Administrative Office of Courts

§ 9-21-1. Administrative Office of Courts established; purpose; “court” defined.

The Administrative Office of Courts is hereby created. The purpose of the Administrative Office of Courts shall be to assist in the efficient administration of the nonjudicial business of the courts of the state and in improving the administration of justice in Mississippi by performing the duties and exercising the powers as provided in this chapter.

As used in this chapter, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term “court” means any tribunal recognized as a part of the judicial branch of government, but not including county boards of supervisors.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 15, 1993).

Cross References —

Administrative Office of Courts to certify and monitor drug courts, see §9-23-7.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Based on Sections 9-21-1, 9-17-3 and 9-21-19, all statistical reports of a court should be prepared and maintained by the court administrator. However, any request for statistical data made by the AOC should be complied with by the receiver of such request. If the court administrator maintains all statistical data, then such a request should be made to the court administrator. 1996 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 324.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Relation to other laws.

Although the Mississippi Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) receives federal funding for certain programs, its purpose under Miss. Code Ann. §9-21-1 is to assist in administration of the nonjudicial business of the state courts. Therefore, bribes which were allegedly paid by an attorney to two circuit judges to influence the outcome of cases filed in their courts were not connected with the transactions or business of the AOC, and thus their convictions of federal program bribery under 18 U.S.C.S. § 666 were erroneous. United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 27003 (5th Cir. Miss. 2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 833, 131 S. Ct. 136, 178 L. Ed. 2d 83, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 6417 (U.S. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 833, 131 S. Ct. 134, 178 L. Ed. 2d 81, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 6353 (U.S. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 833, 131 S. Ct. 124, 178 L. Ed. 2d 33, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 6208 (U.S. 2010).

§ 9-21-3. Duties of Administrative Office of Courts.

  1. The Administrative Office of Courts shall be specifically charged with the duty of assisting the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi with his duties as the chief administrative officer of all courts of this state, including without limitation the task of insuring that the business of the courts of the state is attended with proper dispatch, that the dockets of such courts are not permitted to become congested and that trials and appeals of cases, civil and criminal, are not delayed unreasonably.
  2. The office shall also perform the following duties:
    1. To work with the clerks of all youth courts and civil and criminal trial courts in the state to collect, obtain, compile, digest and publish information and statistics concerning the administration of justice in the state.
    2. To serve as an agency to apply for and receive any grants or other assistance and to coordinate and conduct studies and projects to improve the administration of justice by the courts of the state, and it may conduct such studies with or without the assistance of consultants.
    3. To supply such support to the Judicial Advisory Study Committee necessary to accomplish the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation, research and clerical assistance.
    4. To promulgate standards, rules and regulations for computer and/or electronic filing and storage of all court records and court-related records maintained throughout the state in courts and in offices of circuit and chancery clerks.
    5. It shall perform such other duties relating to the improvement of the administration of justice as may be assigned by the Supreme Court of Mississippi.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 2; Laws, 1995, ch. 547, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 507, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved April 8, 1997).

Cross References —

Supreme Court, see §§9-3-1 et seq.

§ 9-21-5. Administrative Director.

The Administrative Director shall be appointed by and shall serve at the pleasure of the Supreme Court of Mississippi as the Director of the Administrative Office of Courts. The Administrative Director shall devote full time to the duties of the office to the exclusion of engagement in any other business or profession for profit.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 3; Laws, 1996, ch. 492, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 11, 1996).

§ 9-21-7. Director authorized to hire assistants and employees.

The Administrative Director, with the approval of the Supreme Court, is authorized to employ and set the compensation of such assistants and other employees as are necessary to enable him to perform his duties, subject to approval of the State Personnel Board.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved April 15, 1993).

§ 9-21-9. Duties and authority of Director.

The Administrative Director of Courts shall have the following duties and authority with respect to all courts in addition to any other duties and responsibilities as may be properly assigned by the Supreme Court:

To require the filing of reports, the collection and compilation of statistical data and other information on the judicial and financial operation of the courts and on the operation of other offices directly related to and serving the courts;

To determine the state of the dockets and evaluate the practices and procedures of the courts and make recommendations concerning the number of judges and other personnel required for the efficient administration of justice;

To prescribe uniform administrative and business methods, systems, forms and records to be used in the offices of the clerks of courts;

To devise, promulgate and require the use of a uniform youth court case tracking system, including a youth court case filing form for filing with each individual youth court matter, to be utilized by the Administrative Office of Courts and the youth courts in order that the number of youthful offenders, abused, neglected, truant and dependent children, as well as children in need of special care and children in need of supervision, may be tracked with specificity through the youth court and adult justice systems; in support of the uniform case docketing system, the director shall require that all youth courts utilize the Mississippi Youth Court Information Delivery System (MYCIDS);

To develop, promulgate and require the use of a statewide docket numbering system to be utilized by the youth courts, which youth court docket numbers shall standardize and unify the numbering system by which youth court docket numbers are assigned, such that each docket number would, among other things, identify the county and year in which a particular youth court action was commenced;

To develop, promulgate and require the use of uniform youth court orders and forms in all youth courts and youth court proceedings;

To prepare and submit budget recommendations for state appropriations necessary for the maintenance and operation of the judicial system and to authorize expenditures from funds appropriated for these purposes as permitted or authorized by law;

To develop and implement personnel policies for nonjudicial personnel employed by the courts;

To investigate, make recommendations concerning and assist in the securing of adequate physical accommodations for the judicial system;

To procure, distribute, exchange, transfer and assign such equipment, books, forms and supplies as are acquired with state funds or grant funds or otherwise for the judicial system;

To make recommendations for the improvement of the operations of the judicial system;

To prepare and submit an annual report on the work of the judicial system to the Supreme Court;

To take necessary steps in the collection of unpaid court costs, fines and forfeitures;

To perform such additional administrative duties relating to the improvement of the administration of justice as may be assigned by the Supreme Court; and

To promulgate standards, rules and regulations for computer and/or electronic filing and storage of all court records and court-related records maintained throughout the state in courts and in offices of circuit and chancery clerks.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 5; Laws, 1995, ch. 547, § 2; Laws, 1997, ch. 440, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 507, § 6; Laws, 2015, ch. 418, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 1 of ch. 440, Laws, 1997, effective July 1, 1997, amended this section. Section 6 of ch. 507, Laws, 1997, effective from and after passage (approved April 8, 1997) also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of both amendments pursuant to Section 1-1-109 which gives the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision, and Publication authority to integrate amendments so that all versions of the same code section enacted within the same legislative session may become effective. The Joint Committee on Compilation, Revision, and Publication ratified the integration of these amendments as consistent with the legislative intent at the May 8, 1997 meeting of the Committee.

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment added “in support of the uniform case docketing system, the director shall require that all youth courts utilize the Mississippi youth Court Information Delivery System (MYCIDS)” to the end of (d).

Cross References —

Organization, administration, and operation of Youth Court, see §§43-21-101 et seq.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

County approval is required before a position is submitted for approval by the Administrative Office of Courts at a salary which would increase the county’s supplemental payment obligations. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 106.

§ 9-21-11. Director authorized to apply for, receive, and distribute, funds and grants.

  1. The Administrative Director of Courts is authorized and empowered to: study and apply for any and all applications for funds and grants directed to the office from any federal governmental agency or entity; disburse such aid, assistance, funds, monies, grants or subgrants; and coordinate the same with the overall administration of justice in Mississippi to assist or aid in the administration of justice, criminal or civil, or the improvement of courts and the judicial system.
  2. The courts of the state, regardless of the name they bear, shall be proper local units or entities of government to apply for and receive such assistance, aid, funds, monies, grants and subgrants.
  3. Grants to youth courts shall be made in accordance with Section 43-21-801.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 6; Laws, 2015, ch. 418, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment added (3).

§ 9-21-13. Director to coordinate functions and duties of administrative personnel; expenditure of state monies.

  1. The Administrative Director of Courts shall coordinate the functions and duties of administrative personnel, including court administrators and court administrative aides to judges, to facilitate cooperation and so that the overall administration of justice may be accomplished with efficiency in all courts of the state.
  2. The Administrative Director of Courts is authorized to direct the expenditure of state monies appropriated to the Administrative Office of Courts or any courts of the state for any and all functions or projects directly or indirectly affecting the operation of any court and may transfer monies appropriated for the office or any account to any one or more other accounts or office.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved April 15, 1993).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

If in any year in which funds are sufficient to pay the salaries of support staff and purchase additional equipment, such remaining funds may be reallocated for the purpose of acquiring equipment for the trial judges themselves, pursuant to Section 9-21-13(2). 1996 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 406.

County approval is required before a position is submitted for approval by the Administrative Office of Courts at a salary which would increase the county’s supplemental payment obligations. 2004 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 106.

§ 9-21-14. Comprehensive Electronic Court Systems Fund created; purpose; distribution of monies from fund; continuing fund; pilot program.

  1. There is created in the State Treasury a special fund to be known as the Comprehensive Electronic Court Systems Fund. The purpose of the fund shall be to provide funding for the development, implementation and maintenance of a comprehensive case management and electronic filing system, one of the purposes of which will be to provide duplicate dockets and case files at remote sites. The system will be designed to:
    1. Provide a framework for the seamless, transparent exchange of data among courts and with appropriate law enforcement, children’s services and public welfare agencies.
    2. Allow judges and prosecutors to determine whether there are holds or warrants from other jurisdictions for defendants prior to release on bail or otherwise.
    3. Assist related agencies in tracking the court activity of individuals in all participating jurisdictions.
    4. Assist child protection and human services agencies to determine the status of children and caregivers in the participating jurisdictions.
    5. Duplicate and preserve court documents at remote sites so that they may be protected against catastrophic loss.
    6. Improve the ability of the Administrative Office of Courts and the state courts to handle efficiently monies flowing through the courts and to collect delinquent fees, fines and costs.
    7. Enable the state courts and clerks to generate management reports and analysis tools, allowing them to constantly track individual cases and the overall caseload.
    8. Provide a uniform system for docketing and tracking cases and to automatically generate status reports.
    9. Enable the Administrative Office of Courts to acquire statistical data promptly and efficiently.
    10. Make trial court and individual case dockets available to the public online through use of the Internet.
  2. Monies from the fund shall be distributed by the State Treasurer upon warrants issued by the Administrative Office of Courts.
  3. The fund shall be a continuing fund, not subject to fiscal-year limitations, and shall consist of:
    1. Monies appropriated by the Legislature for the purposes of funding the comprehensive case management and electronic filing system;
    2. The interest accruing to the fund;
    3. Monies received from the federal government;
    4. Donations; and
    5. Monies received from such other sources as may be provided by law.
  4. The Supreme Court may utilize and fund as a pilot program any case management and electronic filing system of the Three Rivers Planning and Development District or that of any county or vendor that complies with the data and case management and electronic filing policy standards adopted by the Supreme Court. No statewide comprehensive case management and electronic system shall be implemented by the Mississippi Supreme Court unless such system is approved by the Legislature.

HISTORY: Laws, 2006, ch. 573, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 385, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2007.

Amendment Notes —

The 2007 amendment substituted “may utilize and fund as a pilot” for “shall utilize as a pilot” in (4).

§ 9-21-15. Director authorized to employ consultants and consultant firms.

The Administrative Director of Courts is authorized and empowered to employ consultants and consultant firms and to contract with the same for their services for reasonable compensation and as necessary to improve the administration of justice and the courts of the state. The contracts with such consultants or consultant firms shall be considered as contracts for professional services.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved April 15, 1993).

§ 9-21-17. Director, and Supreme Court, authorized to use services of any member of court and court-supportive personnel.

The Administrative Director of Courts and the Supreme Court are authorized to use the services of any member of the judiciary of any court and any court-supportive personnel, including, without limitation, court reporters, clerks, bailiffs, law clerks, court administrators, secretaries and employees in clerks’ offices to carry out studies, projects and functions designed to improve or effect the efficient administration of justice and the operation of courts.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved April 15, 1993).

§ 9-21-19. Judges, clerks and other employees of court to comply with Director’s requests for information.

All judges, clerks of court, and other officers or employees of the courts and of offices related to and serving the courts shall comply with all requests made by the Administrative Director for information and statistical data relative to the work of the courts and of such offices and relative to the expenditure of public monies for their maintenance and operation.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved April 15, 1993).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Based on Sections 9-21-1, 9-17-3 and 9-21-19, all statistical reports of a court should be prepared and maintained by the court administrator. However, any request for statistical data made by the AOC should be complied with by the receiver of such request. If the court administrator maintains all statistical data, then such a request should be made to the court administrator. 1996 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 324.

§ 9-21-21 through 9-21-41. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2018, ch. 396, §§ 1 through 11, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 2018).

§9-21-21. [Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 11; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1996, ch. 315, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1998, ch. 503, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 427, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2001).]

Editor's Note —

Laws of 2018, ch. 396, § 12, effective March 19, 2018, provides:

“SECTION 12. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is authorized to order the continuance of the work of the Criminal Code Consulting Group of the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Study Committee and any other group or subcommittee of the Judicial Advisory Committee as he sees fit.”

Former § 9-21-21 created the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Study Committee.

Former § 9-21-23 related to the purpose of the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Study Committee.

Former § 9-21-25 provided for the election of a chairperson to preside over, and the conduct of, the meetings of the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Study Committee.

Former § 9-21-27 related to the frequency and quorum of the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Study Committee meetings.

Former § 9-21-29 required the Administrative Office of the Courts to provide necessary support to the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Study Committee.

Former § 9-21-31 provided additional duties and powers of the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Study Committee and required annual reports.

Former § 9-21-33 required state and local government agencies to assist the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Study Committee upon request of the study committee.

Former § 9-21-35 authorized the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Study Committee to enlist the services of public or private agencies, associations and organizations as needed to carry out the purposes and objections of this chapter.

Former § 9-21-37 authorized the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Study Committee to employ support personnel.

Former § 9-21-39 related authorized members of the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Study Committee to receive a per diem payment and travel expenses.

Former § 9-21-41 authorized the Mississippi Judicial Advisory Study Committee to receive and expend funds appropriated to it by the Legislature.

§ 9-21-23. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2018, ch. 396, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 2018).

§9-21-23. [Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 12; reenacted, Laws, 1996, ch. 315, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 503, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 427, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2001).]

§ 9-21-25. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2018, ch. 396, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 2018).

§9-21-25. [Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 13; reenacted, Laws, 1996, ch. 315, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 503, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 427, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2001).]

§ 9-21-27. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2018, ch. 396, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 2018).

§9-21-27. [Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 14; reenacted, Laws, 1996, ch. 315, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 503, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 427, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2001).]

§ 9-21-29. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2018, ch. 396, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 2018).

§9-21-29. [Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 15; reenacted, Laws, 1996, ch. 315, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 503, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 427, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2001).]

§ 9-21-31. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2018, ch. 396, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 2018).

§9-21-31. [Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 16; reenacted, Laws, 1996, ch. 315, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 503, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 427, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2001).]

§ 9-21-33. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2018, ch. 396, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 2018).

§9-21-33. [Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 17; reenacted, Laws, 1996, ch. 315, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 503, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 427, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2001).]

§ 9-21-35. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2018, ch. 396, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 2018).

§9-21-35. [Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 18; reenacted, Laws, 1996, ch. 315, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 503, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 427, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2001).]

§ 9-21-37. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2018, ch. 396, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 2018).

§9-21-37. [Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 19; reenacted, Laws, 1996, ch. 315, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 503, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 427, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2001).]

§ 9-21-39. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2018, ch. 396, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 2018).

§9-21-39. [Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 20; reenacted, Laws, 1996, ch. 315, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 503, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 427, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2001).]

§ 9-21-41. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2018, ch. 396, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved March 19, 2018).

§9-21-41. [Laws, 1993, ch. 610, § 21; reenacted, Laws, 1996, ch. 315, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 503, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 427, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2001).]

§ 9-21-43. Mississippi Civil Legal Assistance Fund created; organizations eligible to receive funds.

  1. There is hereby created in the State Treasury a special fund designated as the Civil Legal Assistance Fund. The funds shall be administered by the Supreme Court through the Administrative Office of Courts. The Administrative Office of Courts may also accept monies from any public or private source for deposit into the fund. Money remaining in the fund at the end of a fiscal year shall not lapse into the State General Fund, and any interest earned from the investment of monies in the fund shall be deposited to the credit of the funds.
  2. All monies shall be allocated to only those organizations providing legal services to low income Mississippians. Furthermore, no monies from this fund shall be expended to provide legal services in matters currently prohibited by the Legal Services Corporation, Washington, D.C., and no funds shall be expended on persons who are not financially eligible to receive legal services as directed by the Legal Services Corporation, Washington, D.C.
  3. The monies appropriated shall be distributed to eligible legal services programs based on the percentage of poverty population within the program service area, consistent with the formula used by the Legal Services Corporation.
  4. Monies appropriated to the fund may be used to promote increased participation by the private bar in the delivery of legal services to the indigent through the Mississippi Volunteer Lawyers Project.
  5. Recipients of funds shall have the following duties:
    1. To develop, operate and administer programs within their respective service areas that provide free legal services to indigent clients involved in civil matters;
    2. To report annually to the Supreme Court, through the Administrative Office of Courts, on its activities, including providing a copy of its annual audit that accounts for the use of the funds; and
    3. To refund annually all unused or uncommitted funds.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 474, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

§ 9-21-45. Judicial System Operation Fund created; source of money; use of funds.

  1. There is created in the State Treasury a special fund designated as the Judicial System Operation Fund. The funds shall be administered by the Supreme Court through the Administrative Office of Courts. The fund shall consist of monies deposited therein as provided in Section 99-19-72 and monies from any other source designated for deposit into the fund. The Administrative Office of Courts may also accept monies from any public or private source for deposit into the fund. Money remaining in the fund at the end of a fiscal year shall not lapse into the State General Fund, and any interest earned from the investment of monies in the fund shall be deposited to the credit of the fund.
  2. Monies in the fund shall be subject to appropriation by the Legislature and may only be used for the purpose of the operation of the judicial system in the state as determined necessary by the Supreme Court and to provide additional funds for the judicial salaries set forth in Section 25-3-35 and Section 9-9-11(8). Monies in the fund used for the purposes described in this section shall be in addition to other funds available from any other source for such purposes.

HISTORY: Laws, 2010, ch. 561, § 2; Laws, 2012, ch. 329, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2012.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected an error in a statutory reference in subsection (2) by substituting “ Section 25-3-35” for “ Section 25-3-25.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its August 1, 2013, meeting.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2012, ch. 329, § 11 provides:

“SECTION 11. Sections 1 and 8 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after the date it is effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, or January 1, 2013, whichever occurs later; and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 2012.”

Section 25-3-25, referred to in (2), should be a reference to Section 25-3-35. The section is set out above as amended by Section 2 of Chapter 329, Laws of 2012.

Amendment Notes —

The 2012 amendment added “and to provide additional funds for the judicial salaries set forth in Section 25-3-25 and Section 9-9-11(8)” to the end of the first sentence in (2).

Cross References —

Annual salary supplement for county court judges to be transferred from Judicial System Operation Fund established in this section in monthly installments, see §9-9-11.

Portion of fees collected by clerk of the supreme court to be deposited in Judicial System Operation Fund established in this section, see §25-7-3.

Portion of fees collected by clerks of chancery courts to be deposited in Judicial System Operation Fund established in this section, see §25-7-9.

Portion of fees collected by clerks of the circuit court to be deposited in Judicial System Operation Fund established in this section, see §25-7-13.

Studies of Administrative Office of Courts

§ 9-21-51. Study of storage of court and court-related records; promulgation of rules and regulations for electronic filing and storage of court records.

  1. The Supreme Court through the Administrative Office of Courts shall conduct a study to determine the progress of the implementation of Chapter 458, Laws of 1994 and Chapter 521, Laws of 1994. In conducting such study, the Administrative Office of Courts shall examine the various court systems and county offices in the state as defined in Section 9-1-51 to determine the types of computer software and hardware being used by courts and county offices which have elected to store records electronically. The Administrative Office of Courts, after consultation with designees of the Mississippi Association of Supervisors, the Mississippi Circuit Clerks’ Association, the Mississippi Association of Chancery Clerks, the Mississippi Municipal Association, The Mississippi Bar, the Department of Archives and History and such other interested entities as the Administrative Office of Courts may identify, shall promulgate standards, rules and regulations for computer and/or electronic filing and storage of all court records and court-related records maintained throughout the state in courts and in county offices. The standards, rules and regulations required by this subsection shall be completed by the Administrative Office of Courts and adopted by the Supreme Court on or before July 1, 1998.
  2. Concurrently with the study mandated in subsection (1) of this section, the Administrative Office of Courts shall consult with designees of the Mississippi Association of Supervisors, the Mississippi Circuit Clerks’ Association, the Mississippi Association of Chancery Clerks, the Assessors/Collectors Association, the Mississippi Municipal Association, the Mississippi State Tax Commission, The Mississippi Bar, the Department of Archives and History and such other interested entities as the Administrative Office of Courts may identify for the purpose of jointly considering and jointly proposing to the Legislature recommendations relating to the electronic filing and storage of all noncourt records maintained throughout the state in county offices as defined in Section 9-1-51. The Administrative Office of Courts shall report to the Legislature not later than January 1, 1998, a summary report of the types of computer software and hardware being used by courts and county offices which have elected to store records electronically, the rules promulgated pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, as well as the recommendations of the group as to the standards, rules and regulations for computer and/or electronic filing and storage of all noncourt records maintained throughout the state in county offices.
  3. All courts and county offices electing to store court records and court-related records electronically shall comply with the standards, rules and regulations promulgated by the Administrative Office of Courts and adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court. Any courts or county offices which currently store court records and court-related records electronically or which elect to store such records electronically before January 1, 1998, must bring such systems into compliance with the standards, rules and regulations no later than January 1, 1999.

    The Administrative Office of Courts shall assist any court or county office currently storing court records or court-related records electronically or electing to store such records before July 1, 1999, in order to assure compliance with the standards, rules and regulations to be promulgated.

HISTORY: Laws, 1997, ch. 507, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 8, 1997).

Editor’s Notes —

The code sections affected by Laws, 1994, ch. 458, referenced in subsection (1), are §§9-7-171, 9-7-175 through 9-7-181, 9-7-127, 9-7-137, 11-7-189, 43-21-251, 9-5-201 through 9-5-205, 9-5-213 and 9-5-215.

The code sections affected by Laws, 1994, ch. 521, referenced in subsection (1), are §§9-1-51 through 9-1-57, 9-5-135 through 9-5-139, 9-5-157, 9-5-161 through 9-5-167, 9-5-171, 9-5-173, 9-5-201 through 9-5-205, 9-5-213, 9-5-215, 9-7-127, 9-7-131, 9-7-137, 9-7-141, 9-7-171, 9-7-175 through 9-7-181, 11-7-189, 27-1-9, 19-3-41, 19-5-1 through 19-5-7, 19-25-59 through 19-25-63, 35-3-13, 85-7-133, 89-5-25 through 89-5-29 and 89-5-33.

Section 27-3-4 provides that the terms “‘Mississippi State Tax Commission,’ ‘State Tax Commission,’ ‘Tax Commission’ and ‘commission’ appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of the duties and functions by the Mississippi State Tax Commission, the State Tax Commission or Tax Commission shall mean the Department of Revenue.”

Administrative Office of the Courts to Establish Program for Use of Interpreters in All Courts

§ 9-21-71. Definitions.

The following words and phrases shall have the meanings ascribed to them unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

“Non-English speaker” means any party or witness who cannot readily understand or communicate in spoken English and who consequently cannot equally participate in or benefit from the proceedings unless an interpreter is available to assist the individual. The fact that a person for whom English is a second language knows some English does not prohibit that individual from being allowed to have an interpreter.

“Interpreter” means any person authorized by a court and competent to translate or interpret oral or written communication in a foreign language during court proceedings.

“Court proceedings” means a proceeding before any court of this state or a grand jury hearing.

HISTORY: Laws, 2006, ch. 569, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2006.

§ 9-21-73. Program established.

  1. The Director of the Administrative Office of Courts shall establish a program to facilitate the use of interpreters in all courts of the State of Mississippi.
    1. The Administrative Office of Courts shall prescribe the qualifications of and certify persons who may serve as certified interpreters in all courts of the State of Mississippi in bilingual proceedings. The Director of the Administrative Office of Courts may set and charge a reasonable fee for certification.
    2. The director shall maintain a current master list of all certified interpreters and shall report annually to the Supreme Court on the frequency of requests for and the use and effectiveness of the interpreters.
  2. In all state court bilingual proceedings, the presiding judicial officer, with the assistance of the director, shall utilize the services of a certified interpreter to communicate verbatim all spoken or written words when the necessity therefor has been determined pursuant to Section 9-21-79.
  3. All state courts shall maintain on file in the office of the clerk of the court a list of all persons who have been certified as interpreters in accordance with the certification program established pursuant to this section.

HISTORY: Laws, 2006, ch. 569, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2006.

§ 9-21-75. Compensation.

The court may appoint either an interpreter who is paid or a volunteer interpreter.

HISTORY: Laws, 2006, ch. 569, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2006.

§ 9-21-77. Oath, confidentiality and public comment.

  1. Prior to providing any service to a non-English speaking person, the interpreter shall subscribe to an oath that he or she shall interpret all communications in an accurate manner to the best of his or her skill and knowledge.
  2. The oath shall conform substantially to the following form:

    INTERPRETER’S OATH

    “Doyou solemnly swear or affirm that you will faithfully interpret from(state the language) into English and from English into (state thelanguage) the proceedings before this court in an accurate mannerto the best of your skill and knowledge?”

  3. Interpreters shall not voluntarily disclose any admission or communication that is declared to be confidential or privileged under state law. Out-of-court disclosures made by a non-English speaker communicating through an interpreter shall be treated by the interpreter as confidential or privileged or both unless the court orders the interpreter to disclose such communications or the non-English speaker waives such confidentiality or privilege.
  4. Interpreters shall not publicly discuss, report or offer an opinion concerning a matter in which they are engaged, even when that information is not privileged or required by law to be confidential.
  5. The presence of an interpreter shall not affect the privileged nature of any discussion.

HISTORY: Laws, 2006, ch. 569, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2006.

§ 9-21-79. Determination of need for an interpreter.

  1. An interpreter is needed and a court interpreter shall be appointed when the judge determines, after an examination of a party or witness, that: (a) the party cannot understand and speak English well enough to participate fully in the proceedings and to assist counsel; or (b) the witness cannot speak English so as to be understood directly by counsel, court and jury.
  2. The court should examine a party or witness on the record to determine whether an interpreter is needed if:
    1. A party or counsel requests such an examination;
    2. It appears to the court that the party or witness may not understand and speak English well enough to participate fully in the proceedings; or
    3. If the party or witness requests an interpreter.

      The fact that a person for whom English is a second language knows some English should not prohibit that individual from being allowed to have an interpreter.

  3. After the examination, the court should state its conclusion on the record, and the file in the case shall be clearly marked and data entered electronically when appropriate by court personnel to ensure that an interpreter will be present when needed in any subsequent proceeding.
  4. Upon a request by the non-English speaking person, by counsel, or by any other officer of the court, the court shall determine whether the interpreter provided is able to communicate accurately with and translate information to and from the non-English speaking person. If it is determined that the interpreter cannot perform these functions, the court shall provide the non-English speaking person with another interpreter.

HISTORY: Laws, 2006, ch. 569, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2006.

§ 9-21-81. Interpreter’s fees and expenses.

  1. Any volunteer interpreter providing services under this act shall be paid reasonable expenses by the court.
  2. The expenses of providing an interpreter in any court proceeding may be assessed by the court as costs in the proceeding, or in the case of an indigent criminal defendant to be paid by the county.

HISTORY: Laws, 2006, ch. 569, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2006.

Guardian Ad Litem Transparency and Oversight Panel

§ 9-21-101. Guardian Ad Litem Transparency and Oversight Panel created; composition; duties [Repealed effective December 31, 2020].

  1. The Guardian Ad Litem Transparency and Oversight Panel is created to address and investigate the appointment of guardians ad litem as required by statute or ordered by a court, determine the frequency of such appointments, and compile an analysis of the costs to the various counties and to parties. The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subdivision A, shall chair the panel. The other members shall be the following fourteen (14) persons:
    1. The Chair of the Conference of Chancery Court Judges, or a designee;
    2. The Chair of the Conference of County Court Judges, or a designee;
    3. The Chair of the Council of Youth Court Judges, or a designee;
    4. A youth court referee appointed by the Chair of the Council of Youth Court Judges;
    5. The Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Division B, or a designee;
    6. The Senate Chair of the Investigate State Offices Joint Committee;
    7. The Chair of the House of Representatives Judiciary “A” Committee, or a designee;
    8. The Chair of the House of Representatives Judiciary “B” Committee, or a designee;
    9. The Chair of the House of Representatives Youth and Family Affairs Committee, or a designee;
    10. The Director of the Administrative Office of Courts, or a designee;
    11. The Director of the Mississippi Judicial College, or a designee;
    12. Two (2) attorneys who are regularly appointed as guardians ad litem, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and
    13. A youth court prosecutor appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
  2. All appointed members of the panel shall be appointed within thirty (30) days of April 1, 2017. Members of the panel shall serve without compensation.
  3. A vacancy in the panel shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled as prescribed in subsection (1) of this section. The task force shall hold its first meeting within sixty (60) days of April 1, 2017, on the call of the chairperson of the task force. A majority of the membership of the panel shall constitute a quorum, and the panel shall meet at the call of the chairperson, or upon an affirmative vote of a majority of the panel. All members must be notified in writing of all meetings at least five (5) days before the date on which a meeting of the panel is scheduled.
  4. The duties of the panel shall be to:
      1. Compile and analyze the information required to be submitted in Section 9-5-91, and ultimately to recommend legislation to improve the guardian ad litem system.
      2. Assess the feasibility and potential benefit or detriment of counties employing a full-time guardian ad litem and make a finding and recommendation.
    1. Report its findings and recommendations to the Legislature by December 1 of each year of its existence.
  5. The Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review Joint Committee of the Legislature shall assist the panel in carrying out its duties required by this section. The Director of the Joint Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review shall designate an appropriate employee to act as a point of contact for staff support to the panel. In addition, the panel may consult with employees of any state agency or department necessary to accomplish the panel’s responsibilities under this section.
  6. This section shall stand repealed on December 31, 2020.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 418, § 1, eff from and after Apr. 1, 2017.

Chapter 23. Drug Courts

§ 9-23-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the Alyce Griffin Clarke Drug Court Act.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 515, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

Cross References —

Courts, generally, see §§9-1-1 et seq.

Administrative Office of Courts, see §§9-21-1 et seq.

Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see §§41-29-101 et seq.

General narcotic drug regulations, see §§41-29-301 et seq.

Alcoholism and alcohol abuse prevention control and treatment, see §§41-30-1 et seq.

Commitment of alcoholics and drug addicts for treatment see §§41-31-1 et seq. and41-32-1 et seq.

Youth Court, generally, see §§43-21-101 et seq.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The drug court judge could establish rules as to who is responsible and required to collect drug court revenues. 2006 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 55.

§ 9-23-3. Legislative intent.

  1. The Legislature of Mississippi recognizes the critical need for judicial intervention to reduce the incidence of alcohol and drug use, alcohol and drug addiction, and crimes committed as a result of alcohol and drug use and alcohol and drug addiction. It is the intent of the Legislature to facilitate local drug court alternative orders adaptable to chancery, circuit, county, youth, municipal and justice courts.
  2. The goals of the drug courts under this chapter include the following:
    1. To reduce alcoholism and other drug dependencies among adult and juvenile offenders and defendants and among respondents in juvenile petitions for abuse, neglect or both;
    2. To reduce criminal and delinquent recidivism and the incidence of child abuse and neglect;
    3. To reduce the alcohol-related and other drug-related court workload;
    4. To increase personal, familial and societal accountability of adult and juvenile offenders and defendants and respondents in juvenile petitions for abuse, neglect or both;
    5. To promote effective interaction and use of resources among criminal and juvenile justice personnel, child protective services personnel and community agencies; and
    6. To use corrections resources more effectively by redirecting prison-bound offenders whose criminal conduct is driven in part by drug and alcohol dependence to intensive supervision and clinical treatment available in the drug court.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 515, § 2; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment added (2)(f) and made related stylistic changes.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Transfer to Drug Court.

Where police found drugs in the vehicle of a minor, he was charged with possession of more than thirty grams of marijuana. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s untimely motion to transfer the case to drug court; defendant had no right to have his case transferred. Jim v. State, 911 So. 2d 658, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 665 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

§ 9-23-5. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings ascribed unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

“Chemical” tests means the analysis of an individual’s: (i) blood, (ii) breath, (iii) hair, (iv) sweat, (v) saliva, (vi) urine, or (vii) other bodily substance to determine the presence of alcohol or a controlled substance.

“Crime of violence” means an offense listed in Section 97-3-2.

“Drug court” means an immediate and highly structured intervention process for substance abuse treatment of eligible defendants or juveniles that:

Brings together substance abuse professionals, local social programs and intensive judicial monitoring; and

Follows the key components of drug courts published by the Drug Court Program Office of the United States Department of Justice.

“Evidence-based practices” means supervision policies, procedures and practices that scientific research demonstrates reduce recidivism.

“Risk and needs assessment” means the use of an actuarial assessment tool validated on a Mississippi corrections population to determine a person’s risk to reoffend and the characteristics that, if addressed, reduce the risk to reoffend.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 515, § 3; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment added (a), (b), (d), and (e), redesignated former (a) as (c), and deleted former (b), which read: “‘Chemical tests’ means the analysis of an individual’s: (i) blood, (ii) breath, (iii) hair, (iv) sweat, (v) saliva, (vi) urine; or (vii) other bodily substance to determine the presence of alcohol or a controlled substance.”

§ 9-23-7. Administrative Office of Courts to certify and monitor drug courts.

The Administrative Office of Courts shall be responsible for certification and monitoring of local drug courts according to standards promulgated by the State Drug Courts Advisory Committee.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 515, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

Cross References —

Administrative Office of Courts, see §§9-21-1 et seq.

§ 9-23-9. State Drug Courts Advisory Committee created; recommendations; rules and regulations.

  1. The State Drug Courts Advisory Committee is established to develop and periodically update proposed statewide evaluation plans and models for monitoring all critical aspects of drug courts. The committee must provide the proposed evaluation plans to the Chief Justice and the Administrative Office of Courts. The committee shall be chaired by the Director of the Administrative Office of Courts and shall consist of not less than seven (7) members nor more than eleven (11) members appointed by the Supreme Court and broadly representative of the courts, law enforcement, corrections, juvenile justice, child protective services and substance abuse treatment communities.
  2. The State Drug Courts Advisory Committee may also make recommendations to the Chief Justice, the Director of the Administrative Office of Courts and state officials concerning improvements to drug court policies and procedures including the drug court certification process. The committee may make suggestions as to the criteria for eligibility, and other procedural and substantive guidelines for drug court operation.
  3. The State Drug Courts Advisory Committee shall act as arbiter of disputes arising out of the operation of drug courts established under this chapter and make recommendations to improve the drug courts; it shall also make recommendations to the Supreme Court necessary and incident to compliance with established rules.
  4. The State Drug Courts Advisory Committee shall establish through rules and regulations a viable and fiscally responsible plan to expand the number of adult and juvenile drug court programs operating in Mississippi. These rules and regulations shall include plans to increase participation in existing and future programs while maintaining their voluntary nature.
  5. The State Drug Courts Advisory Committee shall receive and review the monthly reports submitted to the Administrative Office of Courts by each certified drug court and provide comments and make recommendations, as necessary, to the Chief Justice and the Director of the Administrative Office of Courts.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 515, § 5; Laws, 2008, ch. 390, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Amendment Notes —

The 2008 amendment added (4).

The 2014 amendment added “including the drug court certification process” at the end of the first sentence in (2); added (5); and made a minor stylistic change.

Cross References —

State Drug Court Advisory Committee responsible for developing statewide rules and policies as they relate to Veterans Treatment Court programs, see §9-25-1.

§ 9-23-11. Uniform certification process for drug and certain other courts; minimum standards for drug court operation; collection and reporting of certain data.

  1. The Administrative Office of Courts shall establish, implement and operate a uniform certification process for all drug courts and other problem-solving courts including juvenile courts, veterans courts or any other court designed to adjudicate criminal actions involving an identified classification of criminal defendant to ensure funding for drug courts supports effective and proven practices that reduce recidivism and substance dependency among their participants.
  2. The Administrative Office of Courts shall establish a certification process that ensures any new or existing drug court meets minimum standards for drug court operation.
    1. These standards shall include, but are not limited to:
      1. The use of evidence-based practices including, but not limited to, the use of a valid and reliable risk and needs assessment tool to identify participants and deliver appropriate interventions;
      2. Targeting medium to high risk offenders for participation;
      3. The use of current, evidence-based interventions proven to reduce dependency on drugs or alcohol, or both;
      4. Frequent testing for alcohol or drugs;
      5. Coordinated strategy between all drug court program personnel involving the use of graduated clinical interventions;
      6. Ongoing judicial interaction with each participant; and
      7. Monitoring and evaluation of drug court program implementation and outcomes through data collection and reporting.
    2. Drug court certification applications shall include:
      1. A description of the need for the drug court;
      2. The targeted population for the drug court;
      3. The eligibility criteria for drug court participants;
      4. A description of the process for identifying appropriate participants including the use of a risk and needs assessment and a clinical assessment;
      5. A description of the drug court intervention components including anticipated budget and implementation plan;
      6. The data collection plan which shall include collecting the following data:

      1. Total number of participants;

      2. Total number of successful participants;

      3. Total number of unsuccessful participants and the reason why each participant did not complete the program;

      4. Total number of participants who were arrested for a new criminal offense while in the drug court program;

      5. Total number of participants who were convicted of a new felony or misdemeanor offense while in the drug court program;

      6. Total number of participants who committed at least one (1) violation while in the drug court program and the resulting sanction(s);

      7. Results of the initial risk and needs assessment or other clinical assessment conducted on each participant; and

      8. Any other data or information as required by the Administrative Office of Courts.

    3. Every drug court shall be certified under the following schedule:
      1. A drug court application submitted after July 1, 2014, shall require certification of the drug court based on the proposed drug court plan;
      2. A drug court established after July 1, 2014, shall be recertified after its second year of funded operation;
      3. A drug court in existence on July 1, 2014, must submit a certification petition within one (1) year of July 1, 2014, and be certified pursuant to the requirements of this section prior to expending drug court resources budgeted for fiscal year 2016; and
      4. All drug courts shall submit a re-certification petition every two (2) years to the Administrative Office of Courts after the initial certification.
  3. All certified drug courts shall measure successful completion of the drug court based on those participants who complete the program without a new criminal conviction.
    1. All certified drug courts must collect and submit to the Administrative Office of Courts each month, the following data:
      1. Total number of participants at the beginning of the month;
      2. Total number of participants at the end of the month;
      3. Total number of participants who began the program in the month;
      4. Total number of participants who successfully completed the drug court in the month;
      5. Total number of participants who left the program in the month;
      6. Total number of participants who were arrested for a new criminal offense while in the drug court program in the month;
      7. Total number of participants who were convicted for a new criminal arrest while in the drug court program in the month; and
      8. Total number of participants who committed at least one (1) violation while in the drug court program and any resulting sanction(s).
    2. By August 1, 2015, and each year thereafter, the Administrative Office of Courts shall report to the PEER Committee the information in subsection (4)(a) of this section in a sortable, electronic format.
  4. All certified drug courts may individually establish rules and may make special orders and rules as necessary that do not conflict with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court or the Administrative Office of Courts.
  5. A certified drug court may appoint the full- or part-time employees it deems necessary for the work of the drug court and shall fix the compensation of those employees.Such employees shall serve at the will and pleasure of the judge or the judge’s designee.
  6. The Administrative Office of Courts shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the certification and re-certification process and make any other policies not inconsistent with this section to carry out this process.
  7. A certified drug court established under this chapter is subject to the regulatory powers of the Administrative Office of Courts as set forth in Section 9-23-17.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 515, § 6; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in subsection (5). The word “this article” was changed to “this chapter.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its July 13, 2009, meeting.

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment rewrote the section to provide a uniform certification process for drug and certain other courts, to revise the minimum standards for drug court operation and to require the collection and reporting of certain data.

§ 9-23-13. Intervention services; certification of inpatient treatment programs.

  1. A drug court’s alcohol and drug intervention component shall provide for eligible individuals, either directly or through referrals, a range of necessary court intervention services, including, but not limited to, the following:
    1. Screening using a valid and reliable assessment tool effective for identifying alcohol and drug dependent persons for eligibility and appropriate services;
    2. Clinical assessment;
    3. Education;
    4. Referral;
    5. Service coordination and case management; and
    6. Counseling and rehabilitative care.
  2. Any inpatient treatment or inpatient detoxification program ordered by the court shall be certified by the Department of Mental Health, other appropriate state agency or the equivalent agency of another state.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 515, § 7; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment, in (1), substituted “shall” for “may” and inserted “either directly or through referrals,” following “for eligible individuals”; in (1)(a), inserted “using a valid and reliable assessment tool effective for identifying alcohol and drug dependent persons,” and deleted “other” following “for eligibility and” near the end.

Cross References —

Commitment of alcoholics and drug addicts for treatment, see §§41-31-1 et seq. and41-32-1 et seq.

§ 9-23-15. Requirements for participation in drug courts.

  1. In order to be eligible for alternative sentencing through a local drug court, the participant must satisfy each of the following criteria:
    1. The participant cannot have any felony convictions for any offenses that are crimes of violence as defined in Section 97-3-2 within the previous ten (10) years.
    2. The crime before the court cannot be a crime of violence as defined in Section 97-3-2.
    3. Other criminal proceedings alleging commission of a crime of violence cannot be pending against the participant.
    4. The participant cannot be currently charged with burglary of a dwelling under Section 97-17-23(2) or 97-17-37.
    5. The crime before the court cannot be a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol or any other drug or drugs that resulted in the death of a person.
    6. The crime charged cannot be one of trafficking in controlled substances under Section 41-29-139(f), nor can the participant have a prior conviction for same.
  2. Participation in the services of an alcohol and drug intervention component shall be open only to the individuals over whom the court has jurisdiction, except that the court may agree to provide the services for individuals referred from another drug court. In cases transferred from another jurisdiction, the receiving judge shall act as a special master and make recommendations to the sentencing judge.
    1. As a condition of participation in a drug court, a participant may be required to undergo a chemical test or a series of chemical tests as specified by the drug court. A participant is liable for the costs of all chemical tests required under this section, regardless of whether the costs are paid to the drug court or the laboratory; however, if testing is available from other sources or the program itself, the judge may waive any fees for testing.
    2. A laboratory that performs a chemical test under this section shall report the results of the test to the drug court.
  3. A person does not have a right to participate in drug court under this chapter. The court having jurisdiction over a person for a matter before the court shall have the final determination about whether the person may participate in drug court under this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 515, § 8; Laws, 2011, ch. 366, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment added the last sentence in (4); and made some minor stylistic changes.

The 2014 amendment, in (1)(a), added “as defined in Section 97-3-2 within the previous ten (10) years”; in (1)(b), added “as defined in Section 97-3-2”; rewrote (1)(d), which read: “The participant cannot have been currently charged with burglary of an occupied dwelling”; in (1)(f), substituted “trafficking in” for “distribution, sale, possession with intent to distribute, production, manufacture or cultivation of” and inserted “under Section 41-29-139(f).”

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A person may be eligible for sentencing through drug court if they have been charged under Section 41-29-313, commonly known as the “precursor” statute. 2006 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 547.

A person may be eligible for sentencing through drug court if they have been charged under Section 97-1-1, where the “conspiracy” is to commit a violation of Sections 41-29-139 (b)(1) or 41-29-139(c)(2)(D) or 41-29-313. 2006 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 547.

The definition of “occupied dwelling” in subsection (1)(d) of this section requires that a person actually be present in the dwelling at the time of the burglary. 2006 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 547.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. No right to transfer.

2. Judicial misconduct.

1. No right to transfer.

Circuit court did not err in dismissing an inmate’s motion for post-conviction collateral relief because pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §9-23-15, the inmate had no right to attend drug court. the inmate had no right to have his case transferred to the drug court. Phillips v. State, 25 So.3d 404, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 23 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).

Post-conviction relief was denied in case where inmate argued his case should have been transferred to drug court under Miss. Code Ann. §9-23-15; pursuant to that section, an inmate has no right to have his case transferred to the drug court. Phillips v. State, 25 So.3d 404, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 23 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).

Where police found drugs in the vehicle of a minor, he was charged with possession of more than thirty grams of marijuana. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying his untimely motion to transfer the case to drug court; defendant did not have an equal protection claim since no one has the right to attend the drug court. Jim v. State, 911 So. 2d 658, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 665 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

2. Judicial misconduct.

Judge violated Miss. Code Ann. §9-23-15(2) and Miss. Code Jud. Conduct Canons 1, 2(A), and 3(B)(2) by accepting participants from other courts. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Thompson, 169 So.3d 857, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 242 (Miss. 2015).

§ 9-23-17. Authority of Administrative Office of Courts.

With regard to any drug court established under this chapter, the Administrative Office of Courts shall do the following:

Certify and re-certify drug court applications that meet standards established by the Administrative Office of Courts in accordance with this chapter.

Ensure that the structure of the intervention component complies with rules adopted under this section and applicable federal regulations.

Revoke the authorization of a program upon a determination that the program does not comply with rules adopted under this section and applicable federal regulations.

Make agreements and contracts to effectuate the purposes of this chapter with:

Another department, authority or agency of the state;

Another state;

The federal government;

A state-supported or private university; or

A public or private agency, foundation, corporation or individual.

Directly, or by contract, approve and certify any intervention component established under this chapter.

Require, as a condition of operation, that each drug court created or funded under this chapter be certified by the Administrative Office of Courts.

Collect monthly data reports submitted by all certified drug courts, provide those reports to the State Drug Courts Advisory Committee, compile an annual report summarizing the data collected and the outcomes achieved by all certified drug courts and submit the annual report to the Oversight Task Force.

Every three (3) years contract with an external evaluator to conduct an evaluation of the effectiveness of the drug court program, both statewide and individual drug court programs, in complying with the key components of the drug courts adopted by the National Association of Drug Court Professionals.

Adopt rules to implement this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 515, § 9; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in this section by inserting the word “the” preceding “Administrative Office of Courts” in (a). The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its July 24, 2014, meeting.

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment substituted “shall” for “may” in the introductory paragraph; added (a), (g), and (h) and redesignated former (a) through (e) as (b) through (f) and former (f) as (i); in (e), substituted “chapter” for ”act” at the end.

Cross References —

Oversight Task Force, see §47-5-6.

§ 9-23-19. Funding for drug courts.

  1. All monies received from any source by the drug court shall be accumulated in a fund to be used only for drug court purposes. Any funds remaining in this fund at the end of a fiscal year shall not lapse into any general fund, but shall be retained in the drug court fund for the funding of further activities by the drug court.
  2. A drug court may apply for and receive the following:
    1. Gifts, bequests and donations from private sources.
    2. Grant and contract money from governmental sources.
    3. Other forms of financial assistance approved by the court to supplement the budget of the drug court.
  3. The costs of participation in an alcohol and drug intervention program required by the certified drug court may be paid by the participant or out of user fees or such other state, federal or private funds that may, from time to time, be made available.
  4. The court may assess such reasonable and appropriate fees to be paid to the local drug court fund for participation in an alcohol or drug intervention program.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 515, § 10; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment added (3) and (4).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Section 9-13-19 permits an agreement between a county and other governmental entities to whom drug testing equipment has been loaned to specify that the fees charged for use of the machine and related costs be paid directly to the county juvenile drug court. 2005 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 598.

§ 9-23-21. Immunity for drug court staff.

The director and members of the professional and administrative staff of the drug court who perform duties in good faith under this chapter are immune from civil liability for:

Acts or omissions in providing services under this chapter; and

The reasonable exercise of discretion in determining eligibility to participate in the drug court.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 515, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

§ 9-23-23. Successful completion of drug court may result in expunction of criminal record.

If the participant completes all requirements imposed upon him by the drug court, including the payment of fines and fees assessed, the charge and prosecution shall be dismissed. If the defendant or participant was sentenced at the time of entry of plea of guilty, the successful completion of the drug court order and other requirements of probation or suspension of sentence will result in the record of the criminal conviction or adjudication being expunged. However, no expunction of any implied consent violation shall be allowed.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 515, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

DRUG COURT FUND

§ 9-23-51. Drug Court Fund created; purpose; distribution of monies from fund; fund to be a continuing fund; components of fund.

There is created in the State Treasury a special interest-bearing fund to be known as the Drug Court Fund. The purpose of the fund shall be to provide supplemental funding to all drug courts in the state. Monies from the funds derived from assessments under Section 99-19-73 shall be distributed by the State Treasurer upon warrants issued by the Administrative Office of Courts, pursuant to procedures set by the State Drug Courts Advisory Committee to assist both juvenile drug courts and adult drug courts. Funds from other sources shall be distributed to the drug courts in the state based on a formula set by the State Drug Courts Advisory Committee. The fund shall be a continuing fund, not subject to fiscal-year limitations, and shall consist of: (a) monies appropriated by the Legislature for the purposes of funding drug courts; (b) the interest accruing to the fund; (c) monies received under the provisions of Section 99-19-73; (d) monies received from the federal government; and (e) monies received from such other sources as may be provided by law.

HISTORY: Laws, 2004, ch. 543, § 1; Laws, 2005, 2nd Ex Sess, ch. 1, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2005.

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment, 2nd Ex Sess, ch. 1, deleted “to the drug courts where the respective violations occur in the state” at the end of the third sentence.

Chapter 25. Veterans Treatment Courts

§ 9-25-1. Veterans Treatment Courts; legislative intent; authorization; eligibility for participation; Administrative Office of Courts to oversee; development of statewide rules and policies by State Drug Court Advisory Committee; funding; immunity.

  1. The Legislature recognizes that our military veterans have provided an invaluable service to our country. In doing so, many may have suffered the effects of, including, but not limited to, post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury and depression, and may also suffer drug and alcohol dependency or addiction and co-occurring mental illness and substance abuse problems. As a result of this, some veterans come into contact with the criminal justice system and are charged with felony offenses. There is a critical need for the justice system to recognize these veterans, provide accountability for their wrongdoing, provide for the safety of the public, and provide for the treatment of our veterans. It is the intent of the Legislature to create a framework for which specialized veterans treatment courts may be established at the circuit court level and at the discretion of the circuit court judge.
  2. Authorization.— A circuit court judge may establish a Veterans Treatment Court program. The Veterans Treatment Court may, at the discretion of the circuit court judge, be a separate court program or as a component of an existing drug court program. At the discretion of the circuit court judge, the Veterans Treatment Court may be operated in one (1) county within the circuit court district, and allow veteran participants from all counties within the circuit court district to participate.
  3. Eligibility.— (a)In order to be eligible to participate in a Veterans Treatment Court program established under this section, the attorney representing the state must consent to the defendant’s participation in the program. Further, the court in which the criminal case is pending must have found that the defendant is a veteran of the United States Armed Forces as defined in Title 38 USCS.
  4. Administrative Office of Courts.— With regard to any Veterans Treatment Court established under this chapter, the Administrative Office of Courts may do the following:
    1. Ensure that the structure of the intervention component complies with rules adopted under this chapter and applicable federal regulations.
    2. Revoke the authorization of a program upon a determination that the program does not comply with rules adopted under this chapter and applicable federal regulations.
    3. Enter into agreements and contracts to effectuate the purposes of this chapter with:
      1. Another department, authority, or agency of the state;
      2. Another state;
      3. The federal government;
      4. A state-supported or private university; or
      5. A public or private agency, foundation, corporation, or individual.
    4. Directly, or by contract, approve and certify any intervention component established under this chapter.
    5. Require, as a condition of operation, that each veterans court created or funded under this chapter be certified by the Administrative Office of Courts.
    6. Adopt rules to implement this chapter.
  5. State Drug Court Advisory Committee.— (a) The State Drug Court Advisory Committee shall be responsible for developing statewide rules and policies as they relate to Veterans Treatment Court programs.
  6. Funding for Veterans Treatment Courts.— (a) All monies received from any source by the Veterans Treatment Court program shall be accumulated in a fund to be used only for Veterans Treatment Court purposes. Any funds remaining in this fund at the end of the fiscal year shall not lapse into the General Fund, but shall be retained in the Veterans Treatment Court fund for the funding of further activities by the Veterans Treatment Court program.
  7. Immunity.— The coordinator and members of the professional and administrative staff of the Veterans Treatment Court program who perform duties in good faith under this chapter are immune from civil liability for:
    1. Acts or omissions in providing services under this chapter; and
    2. The reasonable exercise of discretion in determining eligibility to participate in the Veterans Treatment Court program.
  8. This section shall be codified as a separate chapter in Title 9, Mississippi Code of 1972.

Participation in the services of an alcohol and drug intervention component shall only be open to the individuals over whom the court has jurisdiction, except that the court may agree to provide the services for individuals referred from another Veterans Treatment Court. In cases transferred from another jurisdiction, the receiving judge shall act as a special master and make recommendations to the sentencing judge.

(i) As a condition of participation in a Veterans Treatment Court, a participant may be required to undergo a chemical test or a series of chemical tests as specified by the Veterans Treatment Court program. A participant may be held liable for costs associated with all chemical tests required under this section. However, a judge may waive any fees for testing.

A laboratory that performs chemical tests under this section shall report the results of the tests to the Veterans Treatment Courts.

A person does not have the right to participate in a Veterans Treatment Court program under this chapter. The court having jurisdiction over a person for a matter before the court shall have the final determination about whether the person may participate in the Veterans Treatment Court program.

A defendant shall be excluded from participating in a Veterans Treatment Court program if any one (1) of the following applies:

The crime before the court is a crime of violence as set forth in paragraph (c) of this subsection.

The defendant does not demonstrate a willingness to participate in a treatment program.

The defendant has been previously convicted of a felony crime of violence including, but not limited to: murder, rape, sexual battery, statutory rape of a child under the age of sixteen (16), armed robbery, arson, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, stalking, or any offense involving the discharge of a firearm or where serious bodily injury or death resulted to any person.

The court in which the criminal case is pending shall allow an eligible defendant to choose whether to proceed through the Veterans Treatment Court program or otherwise through the justice system.

Proof of matters under this section may be submitted to the court in which the criminal case is pending in any form the court determines to be appropriate, including military service and medical records, previous determinations of a disability by a veteran’s organization or by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, testimony or affidavits of other veterans or service members, and prior determinations of eligibility for benefits by any state or county veterans office.

The State Drug Court Advisory Committee may also make recommendations to the Chief Justice, the Director of the Administrative Office of Courts and state officials concerning improvements to Veterans Treatment Court policies and procedures.

The State Drug Court Advisory Committee shall act as an arbiter of disputes arising out of the operation of Veterans Treatment Court programs established under this chapter and make recommendations to improve the Veterans Treatment Court programs.

A Veterans Treatment Court program may apply for and receive the following:

Gifts, bequests and donations from private sources.

Grant and contract money from governmental sources.

Other forms of financial assistance approved by the court to supplement the budget of the Veterans Treatment Court program.

HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 82, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Chapter 27. Rivers McGraw Mental Health Diversion Pilot Program Act

§ 9-27-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the Rivers McGraw Mental Health Diversion Pilot Program Act.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 416, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 11, 2017).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 416, § 13, effective April 11, 2017, provides:

“SECTION 13. Sections 1 through 11 of this act shall be codified as a new chapter in Title 9, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 9-27-3. Legislative intent.

  1. The Legislature recognizes the critical need for judicial intervention to establish court processes and procedures that are more responsive to the needs of defendants with mental illnesses, while maintaining public safety and the integrity of the court process. It is the intent of the Legislature to facilitate pilot programs for local mental health diversion program alternatives in several pilot circuit court districts that will be adaptable to chancery, circuit, county, youth, municipal and justice courts.
  2. The goals of the mental health diversion pilot programs under this chapter include the following:
    1. Reduce the number of future criminal justice contacts among offenders with mental illnesses;
    2. Reduce the inappropriate institutionalization of people with mental illnesses;
    3. Improve the mental health and well-being of defendants who come in contact with the criminal justice system;
    4. Improve linkages between the criminal justice system and the mental health system;
    5. Expedite case processing;
    6. Protect public safety;
    7. Establish linkages with other state and local agencies and programs that target people with mental illnesses in order to maximize the delivery of services; and
    8. To use corrections resources more effectively by redirecting prison-bound offenders whose criminal conduct is driven in part by mental illnesses to intensive supervision and clinical treatment available in the mental health diversion pilot program.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 416, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 11, 2017).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 416, § 13, effective April 11, 2017, provides:

“SECTION 13. Sections 1 through 11 of this act shall be codified as a new chapter in Title 9, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 9-27-5. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings ascribed unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

“Chemical tests” means the analysis of an individual’s: (i) blood, (ii) breath, (iii) hair, (iv) sweat, (v) saliva, (vi) urine, or (vii) other bodily substance to determine the presence of alcohol or a controlled substance.

“Mental health diversion program” means an immediate and highly structured intervention process for mental health treatment of eligible defendants or juveniles that:

Brings together mental health professionals, local social programs and intensive judicial monitoring; and

Follows the key components of the mental health court curriculum published by the Bureau of Justice of the United States Department of Justice.

“Evidence-based practices” means supervision policies, procedures and practices that scientific research demonstrates reduce recidivism.

“Risk and needs assessment” means the use of an actuarial assessment tool validated on a Mississippi corrections population to determine a person’s risk to reoffend and the characteristics that, if addressed, reduce the risk to reoffend.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 416, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 11, 2017).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 416, § 13, effective April 11, 2017, provides:

“SECTION 13. Sections 1 through 11 of this act shall be codified as a new chapter in Title 9, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 9-27-7. Administrative Office of Courts to be repository of pilot program reports; pilot program standards; collection and reporting of certain data.

  1. The Administrative Office of Courts is the repository for reports filed by pilot programs established under this chapter. The goal of the pilot programs is to support effective and proven practices that reduce recidivism and provide treatment for participants.
  2. Pilot programs must adhere to the standards established in this chapter.
    1. These standards shall include, but are not limited to:
      1. The use of evidence-based practices including, but not limited to, the use of a valid and reliable risk and needs assessment tool to identify participants and deliver appropriate treatments;
      2. Targeting medium- to high-risk offenders for participation;
      3. The use of current, evidence-based interventions proven to provide mental health treatment;
      4. Coordinated strategy between all mental health diversion pilot program personnel;
      5. Ongoing judicial interaction with each participant; and
      6. Monitoring and evaluation of mental health diversion pilot program implementation and outcomes through data collection and reporting.
    2. Pilot programs must implement a data collection plan, which shall include collecting the following data:
      1. Total number of participants;
      2. Total number of successful participants;
      3. Total number of unsuccessful participants and the reason why each participant did not complete the program;
      4. Total number of participants who were arrested for a new criminal offense while in the program;
      5. Total number of participants who were convicted of a new felony or misdemeanor offense while in the program;
      6. Total number of participants who committed at least one (1) violation while in the program and the resulting sanction(s);
      7. Results of the initial risk and needs assessment or other clinical assessment conducted on each participant; and
      8. Any other data or information as required by the Administrative Office of Courts.
  3. All mental health diversion pilot programs must measure successful completion of the program based on those participants who complete the program without a new criminal conviction.
    1. Pilot programs must collect and submit to the Administrative Office of Courts each month, the following data:
      1. Total number of participants at the beginning of the month;
      2. Total number of participants at the end of the month;
      3. Total number of participants who began the program in the month;
      4. Total number of participants who successfully completed the program in the month;
      5. Total number of participants who left the program in the month;
      6. Total number of participants who were arrested for a new criminal offense while in the program in the month;
      7. Total number of participants who were convicted for a new criminal arrest while in the program in the month; and
      8. Total number of participants who committed at least one (1) violation while in the program and any resulting sanction(s).
    2. By August 1, 2018, and each year thereafter, the Administrative Office of Courts shall report to the PEER Committee the information in subsection (4)(a) of this section in a sortable, electronic format.
  4. Mental health diversion pilot programs may individually establish rules and may make special orders and rules as necessary that do not conflict with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court or the Administrative Office of Courts.
  5. A mental health diversion pilot program may appoint the full or part-time employees it deems necessary for the work of the mental health diversion pilot program and shall fix the compensation of those employees, who shall serve at the will and pleasure of the senior circuit court judge.
  6. A mental health diversion pilot program established under this chapter is subject to the regulatory powers of the Administrative Office of Courts as set forth in Section 9-27-13.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 416, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 11, 2017).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 416, § 13, effective April 11, 2017, provides:

“SECTION 13. Sections 1 through 11 of this act shall be codified as a new chapter in Title 9, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 9-27-9. Mental health intervention services; certification of inpatient treatment.

  1. A mental health diversion pilot program’s mental health intervention component shall provide for eligible individuals, either directly or through referrals, a range of necessary court treatment services, including, but not limited to, the following:
    1. Screening using a valid and reliable assessment tool effective for identifying persons affected by mental health issues for eligibility and appropriate services;
    2. Clinical assessment;
    3. Education;
    4. Referral;
    5. Service coordination and case management; and
    6. Counseling and rehabilitative care.
  2. Any inpatient treatment ordered by the court shall be certified by the Department of Mental Health, other appropriate state agency or the equivalent agency of another state.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 416, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 11, 2017).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 416, § 13, effective April 11, 2017, provides:

“SECTION 13. Sections 1 through 11 of this act shall be codified as a new chapter in Title 9, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 9-27-11. Requirements for participation in mental health diversion pilot program.

  1. In order to be eligible for alternative sentencing through a local mental health diversion pilot program, the participant must satisfy each of the following criteria:
    1. The participant cannot have any felony convictions for any offenses that are crimes of violence as defined in Section 97-3-2, other than burglary under Section 97-17-23(1), within the previous ten (10) years.
    2. The crime before the court cannot be a crime of violence as defined in Section 97-3-2, other than burglary under Section 97-17-23(1).
    3. Other criminal proceedings alleging commission of a crime of violence other than burglary under Section 97-17-23(1) cannot be pending against the participant.
    4. The crime before the court cannot be a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol or any other substance that resulted in the death of a person. In addition, persons who are ineligible for nonadjudication under Section 63-11-30 shall be ineligible to participate in a mental health diversion program.
    5. The crime charged cannot be one of trafficking in controlled substances under Section 41-29-139(f), nor can the participant have a prior conviction for same.
  2. Participation in the services of a mental health treatment component shall be open only to the individuals over whom the court has jurisdiction, except that the court may agree to provide the services for individuals referred from another mental health diversion program. In cases transferred from another jurisdiction, the receiving judge shall act as a special master and make recommendations to the sentencing judge.
    1. As a condition of participation in a mental health diversion program, a participant may be required to undergo a chemical test or a series of chemical tests as specified by the program. A participant is liable for the costs of all chemical tests required under this section, regardless of whether the costs are paid to the mental health diversion program or the laboratory; however, if testing is available from other sources or the program itself, the judge may waive any fees for testing.
    2. A laboratory that performs a chemical test under this section shall report the results of the test to the mental health diversion program.
  3. A person does not have a right to participate in a mental health diversion program under this chapter. The court having jurisdiction over a person for a matter before the court shall have the final determination about whether the person may participate in the mental health diversion program under this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 416, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 11, 2017).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 416, § 13, effective April 11, 2017, provides:

“SECTION 13. Sections 1 through 11 of this act shall be codified as a new chapter in Title 9, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 9-27-13. Authority of Administrative Office of Courts.

With regard to any mental health diversion pilot program established under this chapter, the Administrative Office of Courts shall do the following:

Collect monthly data reports submitted by all mental health diversion pilot programs, compile an annual report summarizing the data collected and the outcomes achieved by all mental health diversion pilot programs and submit the annual report to the PEER Committee.

After three (3) years, contract with an external evaluator to conduct an evaluation of the effectiveness of the mental health diversion pilot programs in complying with the key components of the mental health diversion pilot programs.

Adopt rules to implement this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 416, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 11, 2017).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 416, § 13, effective April 11, 2017, provides:

“SECTION 13. Sections 1 through 11 of this act shall be codified as a new chapter in Title 9, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 9-27-15. Funding for mental health diversion pilot programs.

  1. All monies received from any source by a mental health diversion pilot program shall be accumulated in a local fund to be used only for mental health diversion pilot program purposes. Any funds remaining in a local fund at the end of a fiscal year shall not lapse into any general fund, but shall be retained in the mental health diversion pilot program fund for the funding of further activities by the mental health diversion pilot program. Any funds remaining in a local fund at the time of repeal of this chapter shall lapse into the appropriate county’s general fund.
  2. A mental health diversion pilot program may apply for and receive the following:
    1. Gifts, bequests and donations from private sources.
    2. Grant and contract monies from governmental sources.
    3. Other forms of financial assistance approved by the court to supplement the budget of the mental health diversion pilot program.
  3. The costs of participation in a mental health treatment program required by the mental health diversion pilot program may be paid by the participant or out of user fees or such other state, federal or private funds that may, from time to time, be made available.
  4. The court may assess reasonable and appropriate fees to be paid to the local mental health diversion pilot program fund for participation in a mental health treatment program.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 416, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 11, 2017).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 416, § 13, effective April 11, 2017, provides:

“SECTION 13. Sections 1 through 11 of this act shall be codified as a new chapter in Title 9, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 9-27-17. Immunity for mental health diversion pilot program staff.

The director and members of the professional and administrative staff of the mental health diversion pilot program who perform duties in good faith under this chapter are immune from civil liability for:

Acts or omissions in providing services under this chapter; and

The reasonable exercise of discretion in determining eligibility to participate in the mental health diversion pilot program.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 416, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 11, 2017).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 416, § 13, effective April 11, 2017, provides:

“SECTION 13. Sections 1 through 11 of this act shall be codified as a new chapter in Title 9, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 9-27-19. Successful completion of mental health diversion pilot program may result in dismissal of charge and prosecution or expunction of criminal record.

If the participant completes all requirements imposed upon him by the mental health diversion pilot program, including the payment of fines and fees assessed, the charge and prosecution shall be dismissed. If the defendant or participant was sentenced at the time of entry of a plea of guilty, the successful completion of the mental health diversion pilot program order and other requirements of probation or suspension of sentence will result in the record of the criminal conviction or adjudication being expunged.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 416, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 11, 2017).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 416, § 13, effective April 11, 2017, provides:

“SECTION 13. Sections 1 through 11 of this act shall be codified as a new chapter in Title 9, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 9-27-21. Certain circuit court districts eligible to establish mental health diversion pilot program; assistance of certain drug courts.

The following circuit court districts may establish a mental health diversion pilot program: Second, Third, Eighth, Twelfth, Seventeenth and Twentieth Circuit Court Districts. The purpose of a pilot program is to implement procedures to meet the goals listed in Section 9-27-3 on a trial basis and is conditioned upon the availability of funds obtained for that purpose from public or private sources other than funds appropriated by the Legislature. Any drug court in the Second, Third, Eighth or Twentieth Circuit Court Districts shall render such assistance as is authorized by the senior circuit judge.

HISTORY: Laws, 2017, ch. 416, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 11, 2017).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 416, § 13, effective April 11, 2017, provides:

“SECTION 13. Sections 1 through 11 of this act shall be codified as a new chapter in Title 9, Mississippi Code of 1972.”