MSCODE

Chapter 1. Libel and Slander

§ 95-1-1. Certain words actionable.

All words which, from their usual construction and common acceptation, are considered as insults, and calculated to lead to a breach of the peace, shall be actionable; and a plea, exception or demurrer shall not be sustained to preclude a jury from passing thereon, who are the sole judges of the damages sustained; but this shall not deprive the courts of the power to grant new trials, as in other cases.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 3; 1857, ch. 54, art. 1; 1871, § 1973; 1880, § 1004; 1892, § 10; 1906, § 10; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1; 1930, § 11; 1942, § 1059.

Cross References —

Right of defendant in criminal prosecution to show truth of matter written or published, see Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 13 and Code §97-3-57.

Right of remedy for injury to reputation, see Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 24.

Limitation on right of plaintiff to recover costs in libel and slander action, see §11-53-33.

Time for bringing action for libel, see §15-1-35.

Provisions relative to statements, editorials, and news stories which reflect upon the honesty, integrity, or moral character of a candidate for elective office, see §§23-15-875 and 23-15-877

Liability of radio and television stations or networks, see §95-1-3.

Right of newspapers and radio or television stations to have opportunity to make corrections prior to suit, see §95-1-5.

Punishment upon conviction for libel, see §97-3-55.

Indictments for libel, see §99-7-33.

Right to show use of insulting words on part of victim in trials for assault and battery, see §99-17-19.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Truth as defense.

3. Words uttered or written by agent.

4. When publication complete.

5. Actionable words, in general.

6. —Words actionable per se.

7. Privileged communication.

8. Qualified privilege.

9. Damages.

10. —Mitigation.

11. Judicial proceedings.

12. —Pleadings.

13. —Evidence.

14. —Jury questions.

15. —Instructions.

1. In general.

To maintain claim of defamation, plaintiff must establish false and defamatory statement concerning plaintiff, unprivileged publication to third party, fault amounting at least to negligence on part of publisher, and, either actionability of statement irrespective of special harm, or existence of special harm caused by publication. Boone v. Wal-Mart Stores, 680 So. 2d 844, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1996).

Fault in defamation cases involving private persons, regardless of their social standing, or ranks and privileges, may be predicated on negligence of publisher; plaintiff is not required to prove malice. Boone v. Wal-Mart Stores, 680 So. 2d 844, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1996).

In order for merchant to be immune from liability on defamation claim arising from questioning of customer by merchant for purpose of ascertaining whether or not customer is guilty of shoplifting, pursuant to state merchant immunity statute, merchant must prove that it conducted questioning of suspected shoplifter in reasonable manner. Boone v. Wal-Mart Stores, 680 So. 2d 844, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1996).

“Libel” is method of defamation expressed in writing. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So. 2d 627, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1996).

Claim of defamation requires that plaintiff establish false and defamatory statement which concerns plaintiff, unprivileged publication of statement to third party, fault amounting to at least negligence on part of publisher, and either actionability of statement irrespective of special harm or existence of special harm caused by publication. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So. 2d 627, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1996).

Threshold question in any defamation action is whether published statements are false. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So. 2d 627, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1996).

Action of sheriff in giving license tag number of vehicle which was seized in drug arrest, which had formerly belonged to county chancery clerk and which still had license tag numbers issued in clerk’s name despite sale to individual involved in drug arrest, to reporter without indicating conflict as to ownership was false statement and was actionable as result of material omissions on part of sheriff, even though statement that vehicle was registered to clerk was absolutely true; sheriff knew, and failed to state to reporter, that license tags had been expired for 16 months, or that clerk had sold vehicle but that new license tags had not been issued. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So. 2d 627, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1996).

Material omissions from reports of true facts are capable of creating defamatory impression. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So. 2d 627, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1996).

Public figure who brings libel action can only prevail by proving through clear and convincing evidence that publisher acted with actual malice. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So. 2d 627, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1996).

“Actual malice,” showing of which on part of publisher must be made in order to allow recovery by public figure in libel action, is defined as ill will or reckless disregard of falsity of statements made. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So. 2d 627, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1996).

Where an author, after tape recording interviews with psychoanalyst, wrote magazine article which was later published as book and which contained lengthy passages in quotation marks attributed to psychoanalyst, some of which had no identical statement appearing in author’s taped interviews, author was not entitled to summary judgment in suit by psychoanalyst for libel, because deliberate alteration of words uttered by public figure does not equate with knowledge of falsity for purpose of New York Times standard, unless alteration results in material change in meaning conveyed by statement; and with respect to some of the quotations, evidence presented question for jury whether author acted with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard as to truth or falsity. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 111 S. Ct. 2419, 115 L. Ed. 2d 447, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3630 (U.S. 1991).

Fact issue as to whether misleading actions by sheriff in giving license tag number of vehicle seized in drug arrest, which was licensed to county chancery clerk, to reporter without making clear that there was conflict in ownership of vehicle were taken with actual malice precluding summary judgment in libel action brought by clerk after news story was published stating that vehicle belonging to clerk was seized. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So. 2d 627, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1996).

The discovery rule applies to defamation actions in that limited class of libel cases in which, because of the secretive or inherently undiscoverable nature of the publication the plaintiff did not know, or with reasonable diligence could not have discovered, that he or she had been defamed. Staheli v. Smith, 548 So. 2d 1299, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1989), limited, Raddin v. Manchester Educ. Found., 175 So.3d 1243, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 507 (Miss. 2015).

There are 2 questions which must be answered in determining whether the actual malice standard should be applied in a given defamation case. The first is “Is the plaintiff a public official/public figure or a private figure?” The second is, “Regardless of the plaintiff’s status, is the alleged defamation a matter of public concern or interest?” Staheli v. Smith, 548 So. 2d 1299, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1989), limited, Raddin v. Manchester Educ. Found., 175 So.3d 1243, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 507 (Miss. 2015).

A public employee who was employed as a public university professor involved in geology research and grants was not in that class of higher level, decision-making employees such that he became a public official for purposes of determining whether the actual malice standard applied in a defamation action. Additionally, the professor was not a vortex public figure because the issues involved were not matters of general public concern or interest where the professor alleged that the dean at the university had defamed him in written recommendations against tenure and a pay raise. Staheli v. Smith, 548 So. 2d 1299, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1989), limited, Raddin v. Manchester Educ. Found., 175 So.3d 1243, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 507 (Miss. 2015).

The purpose of §95-1-1 is to allow a cause of action where there is usually a face-to-face encounter or where words are uttered to another in an insulting manner and which would precipitate an immediate, forceful and violent reaction by a reasonable person. The statute is designed to punish words spoken (not written) face-to-face with no cooling-off time before a physical altercation occurred. Thus, the statute did not apply where the statement was typewritten and placed on the windshields of cars and in mailboxes. Isaacks v. Reed, 537 So. 2d 409, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 585 (Miss. 1988).

This section [Code 1942, § 1059] indicates no legislative intent that it shall operate beyond the borders of this state, but is designed to maintain peace within the state. Tattis v. Karthans, 215 So. 2d 685, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1367 (Miss. 1968).

In the absence of a showing of a North Carolina statute similar to this section [Code 1942, § 1059], no cause of action was created by words spoken in that state and not republished in Mississippi. Tattis v. Karthans, 215 So. 2d 685, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1367 (Miss. 1968).

In actions brought under this section [Code 1942, § 1059], the court has the power to pass on a demurrer where the demurrer is not based upon a construction of the words, but on some other ground evidenced by the declaration. Tattis v. Karthans, 215 So. 2d 685, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1367 (Miss. 1968).

Where the declaration brought under this section [Code 1942, § 1059] specifically charged that the original statements complained of were made in state of North Carolina but failed to state that there had been a republication of the statements within the state of Mississippi, the plaintiff could not maintain a cause of action in the latter state. Tattis v. Karthans, 215 So. 2d 685, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1367 (Miss. 1968).

While store and its assistant manager had a legal right to discharge one of its sales clerks for no reason at all and without recommendation if they saw fit to do so, they had no right to slander such sales clerk or other sales clerks without any proof of wrongdoing on their part. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

It has not been deemed requisite to introduce the customers in a store, or bystanders in a place of business, to testify as to their understanding of the meaning of alleged slanderous words, and it is necessary only to prove that such persons or some of them, heard the charges, or that the facts and circumstances would entitle the jury to believe that they heard and understood the same. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

Notwithstanding that slanderous remarks are directed to several persons, recovery may be had by one of them where the charge is made in the alternative to a smaller group, as distinguished from a general class, and especially if the plaintiff is able to satisfy the jury from all the facts and circumstances testified to that injury was intended to be done the plaintiff by the implications from the language used, and especially when the plaintiff is spoken to both separately and collectively with others, depending upon what the hearers might reasonably understand therefrom. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

A literal construction of the statute will not be applied by the court. Huckabee v. Nash, 182 Miss. 754, 183 So. 500, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1938).

The gravamen of the statute is the speaking of the words, whether true or false, in an insulting manner. Huckabee v. Nash, 182 Miss. 754, 183 So. 500, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1938).

Mutual exchange of opprobrious insulting epithets in violation of the statute and occurring in the same altercation is not actionable where the complaining party provoked such exchange. Huckabee v. Nash, 182 Miss. 754, 183 So. 500, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1938).

In action on note, defendant held not entitled to recoup amount of damages arising from use of actionable words by plaintiff because of defendant’s failure to pay note, since plea of recoupment was an independent tort. Calhoun v. McNair, 175 Miss. 44, 166 So. 330, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1936).

Railroad company liable where superintendent wrote libelous letter to plaintiff’s attorney in reply to claim for damages, where malice or lack of honest belief in truth of statements is shown. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Brooks, 69 Miss. 168, 13 So. 847, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 172 (Miss. 1891).

Where occasion privileged, plaintiff must establish malice. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Brooks, 69 Miss. 168, 13 So. 847, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 172 (Miss. 1891).

The immunity of a witness, in a judicial proceeding, from liability for slander is not affected by the statute. Verner v. Verner, 64 Miss. 321, 1 So. 479, 1886 Miss. LEXIS 66 (Miss. 1886).

It is not necessary that the words be spoken to, or in the presence of, the plaintiff. Scott v. Peebles, 10 Miss. 546, 1844 Miss. LEXIS 177 (Miss. 1844); Warren v. Norman, 1 Miss. 387, 1831 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1831).

2. Truth as defense.

Truth is complete defense to action for libel. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So. 2d 627, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1996).

The truth of the slanderous words spoken constitutes no defense, and can only go to the jury in mitigation of damages. McLean v. Warring, 13 So. 236 (Miss. 1893).

The truth of the words spoken is no defense; but their truth or falsity is an important consideration for a jury in estimating the damages. Crawford v. Mellton, 20 Miss. 328, 1849 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1849); Jefferson v. Bates, 152 Miss. 128, 118 So. 717, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 225 (Miss. 1928).

3. Words uttered or written by agent.

A plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against a corporate employer for violation of Mississippi’s actionable words statute (§95-1-1) stemming from an incident in which he was cursed by a managerial employee in the presence of a supervisor, since a corporate employer cannot be held liable under the statute for the words of its employee, and there was no indication that the offending employee’s words were spoken at the command of the employer. Lawson v. Heidelberg E., 872 F. Supp. 335, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd, 70 F.3d 1269, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34896 (5th Cir. Miss. 1995).

But corporation in common-law action was held liable for slanderous words of agent in scope of employment without ratification. Doherty v. L. B. Price Mercantile Co., 132 Miss. 39, 95 So. 790, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. 1923).

Corporation not liable under this statute [Code 1942, § 1059]. Neely v. Payne, 126 Miss. 854, 89 So. 669, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 85 (Miss. 1921).

Principal not liable under this statute [Code 1942, § 1059] for words of agent. Dixie Fire Ins. Co. v. Betty, 101 Miss. 880, 58 So. 705, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 1912).

Express company not liable for libelous letter written by acting agent upon whom there was no duty to answer correspondence and who acted as a mere volunteer. Southern Express Co. v. Fitzner, 59 Miss. 581, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1882).

4. When publication complete.

If words are spoken only to the complaining party or to his agents, representing him in the matter discussed and invited by him, it is not such a publication as will support an action for slander and this includes one who is interceding for the employee as his authorized agent or representative. Kirk Jewelers, Inc. v. Bynum, 222 Miss. 134, 75 So. 2d 463, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 630 (Miss. 1954).

Right of action for libel against newspaper accrued as soon as paper containing alleged libelous matter was exhibited to third persons. Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1943).

A cause of action for libel against a newspaper accrues where the paper is first published. Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1943).

In libel action against newspaper, having its place of business in Hinds county, cause of action accrued in Hinds county where alleged libelous matter was first published and circulated, and the fact that the alleged libel was also circulated in Sunflower county through a local distributor, did not establish a new and separate cause of action in Sunflower county. Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1943).

The mere dictation of a libelous letter to a stenographer in an office of a corporation is not a publication thereof where the stenographer does not repeat it. Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel & Kaufman, 113 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 109 (Miss. 1917).

Libelous matter contained in a letter written and mailed in this state to an addressee in another state is not published until the letter is received and read. McCarlie v. Atkinson, 77 Miss. 594, 27 So. 641, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 27 (Miss. 1900).

Publication is complete where defamatory letter exceeding privilege of occasion is received and read by attorneys. McCarlie v. Atkinson, 77 Miss. 594, 27 So. 641, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 27 (Miss. 1900).

5. Actionable words, in general.

Even if subject statements were false, plaintiff in order to prevail in defamation action must establish that words employed were clearly directed toward plaintiff, and defamation must be clear and unmistakable from words themselves and not product of innuendo, speculation, or conjecture. McCullough v. Cook, 679 So. 2d 627, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1996).

A statement made by an attorney, who was prosecuting a libel action, regarding the defendants in that action was not actionable where the attorney stated, “Whatever defense they are using, a defense they are not using is that the statements they made were true”; sharp commentary is not actionable libel. Lawrence v. Evans, 573 So. 2d 695, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 819 (Miss. 1990).

A former college employee’s allegations regarding the college president’s charges of incompetence, if made with malice as the employee alleged, could serve as a basis for a defamation action. Holland v. Kennedy, 548 So. 2d 982, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 411 (Miss. 1989).

Name calling and verbal abuse are to be taken as statements of opinion, not fact, and therefore will not give rise to an action for libel. Johnson v. Delta-Democrat Pub. Co., 531 So. 2d 811, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 486 (Miss. 1988).

Even assuming that words uttered were actionable by reason of context in which they were uttered, person claiming damage as result of slander must allege and prove special damages, and such special damages must be charged with particularity; person alleging slander had no case where he did not in any manner suggest any damages of pecuniary character caused by alleged slander, and had wholly failed to make any substantial showing of injury to reputation. Baugh v. Baugh, 512 So. 2d 1283, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2813 (Miss. 1987), limited, Speed v. Scott, 787 So. 2d 626, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 2001).

Words not within the contemplation of the statute do not become actionable because prompted by anger. Salvo v. Edens, 237 Miss. 734, 116 So. 2d 220, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 526 (Miss. 1959).

The following words in a dentist’s letter to a woman who had not paid his bill and who had rejected a denture made by him: “Had I also known that you and your husband had no aversion to your running around toothless and thereby losing permanently your, until now, somewhat pleasant facial contours, I should never have suggested immediate denture service”, were held not actionable under this statute [Code 1942, § 1059], in Salvo v. Edens, 237 Miss. 734, 116 So. 2d 220, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 526 (Miss. 1959).

A letter from a general agent of an insurance company advising the local agent that in view of the credit report on a named insured it would be necessary to cancel the insurance policy issued upon insured’s business was not libelous, and, even if it was, it would have been qualifiedly privileged. Miley v. Foster, 229 Miss. 106, 90 So. 2d 172, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 591 (Miss. 1956).

While the imputation of a crime needs no innuendo to sustain its status as presumably libelous, its publication in the former category is not absolutely and of necessity defamatory but the particular statements must be adjudged in the light of the particular business. Sheffield v. Journal Pub. Co., 211 Miss. 294, 51 So. 2d 479, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 355 (Miss. 1951).

In slander action by sales clerk against store and its assistant manager, predicated upon the accusation by the assistant manager that plaintiff and two other sales clerks trifled with the store’s money with ill intentions, the fact that the accuser may not have carried out his threat to inform any prospective employer concerning such sales clerks was immaterial, the question being how the hearers who were present at the time the accusations were made could have reasonably understood them as reflecting in a defamatory manner upon all of them. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

Notice to the public made by mortgagee in good faith correcting advertised foreclosure of trust deed by pointing out that certain land not owned by the mortgagor should not have been included in the deed of trust or notice of sale, stating that further publication of the notice of sale had been stopped in order to eliminate such land, was not libelous. Barcroft v. Armstrong, 198 Miss. 565, 21 So. 2d 817, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 230 (Miss. 1945).

Declaration against hotel corporation and its manager to recover damages for conduct of manager in cursing, and abusing plaintiff and threatening him with violence and ejection from hotel, held to state cause of action for breach of duty arising from the relationship of innkeeper and guest rather than cause of action under actionable words statute, which would have precluded recovery against corporate defendants, notwithstanding that the words set forth in the declaration were manifestly both insulting and calculated to lead to a breach of the peace. Milner Hotels, Inc. v. Dougherty, 195 Miss. 718, 15 So. 2d 358, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1943).

The prohibition contained in this section [Code 1942, § 1059] against sustaining a plea, exception or demurrer in a case stated thereunder, so as to preclude a jury from passing on the facts complained of, has no application to a corporate defendant. Milner Hotels, Inc. v. Dougherty, 195 Miss. 718, 15 So. 2d 358, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1943).

A liberal construction of the statute requires that the words spoken of another must be insulting from their usual construction and acceptation and must be calculated to lead to a breach of the peace. Huckabee v. Nash, 182 Miss. 754, 183 So. 500, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1938).

A defendant calling the plaintiff a son-of-a-bitch is not liable under the statute where such words were provoked by plaintiff using the same words with reference to defendant, and an instruction to that effect is not erroneous. Huckabee v. Nash, 182 Miss. 754, 183 So. 500, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1938).

Where defendant had rented house to plaintiff and plaintiff took possession of another house, defendant’s words that plaintiff used skeleton key to enter house, held not actionable where evidence disclosed mutual mistake as to which house was rented. Cooper v. Davidson, 172 Miss. 74, 157 So. 418, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1935).

Charge in writing by railroad company that station agent overcollected from patrons and took liberties with company’s funds, if false, was actionable. Tribble v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 103 Miss. 1, 60 So. 2, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 134 (Miss. 1912).

Not slander where defendant, an election officer, told plaintiff he was a convict and could not vote. Dedeaux v. King, 92 Miss. 38, 45 So. 466, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1907).

However, it was not libelous for insurance company to publish statement that rival company may have settled certain losses before it, but did not pay them first, and that latest accounts were that money for payment of rival company’s losses had not shown up, adding: “moral: Insure in this company. Losses paid promptly, not settled.” P. L. Hennessey & Co. v. Traders' Ins. Co., 87 Miss. 259, 39 So. 692, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1905).

Where defendant on denial by plaintiff that stolen cotton had been traced to his barn, stated that “people could lie” an action for slander is maintainable. Wiseman v. Parker, 73 Miss. 378, 19 So. 102, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1895).

When, in action for slander, the slanderous words alleged are not in foreign or technical language, and not ambiguous nor uttered in fable, question or enigma or the like, but are such plain, ordinary words as are in common use, an instruction to the jury that unless the words used were understood by the hearers to have been uttered in a malicious or slanderous sense they must find for the defendant, is erroneous. In such case, it is the judgment of the jury, and not the opinion of the hearers of the words, that must determine whether they were slanderous or not. Jarnigan v. Fleming, 43 Miss. 710, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 77 (Miss. 1870).

Words “Plaintiff swore to a lie” spoken of his testimony before a justice of peace, are actionable. Lewis v. Black, 27 Miss. 425, 1854 Miss. LEXIS 73 (Miss. 1854).

The gravamen of the statute is the speaking of the words, whether true or false, in an insulting manner. Crawford v. Mellton, 20 Miss. 328, 1849 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1849).

The words, “Crawford swore a lie, and I can prove it,” are actionable words under the statute. Crawford v. Mellton, 20 Miss. 328, 1849 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1849).

Only two things are necessary to bring words spoken of another within the statute, viz.: First, they must be insulting; and, second, they must be calculated to lead to a breach of the peace. Crawford v. Mellton, 20 Miss. 328, 1849 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1849); Scott v. Peebles, 10 Miss. 546, 1844 Miss. LEXIS 177 (Miss. 1844).

Abusive and insulting words not actionable at common law unless special damages alleged in declaration and proven; such words actionable under statute. Cock v. Weatherby, 13 Miss. 333, 1845 Miss. LEXIS 77 (Miss. 1845); Davis v. Farrington, 1 Miss. 304, 1827 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. 1827).

Everything written of another subjecting him to scorn and ridicule and calculated to cause breach of peace is libel. Torrance v. Hurst, 1 Miss. 403, 1831 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1831).

6. —Words actionable per se.

Veteran’s claim of slander per se was properly dismissed by the trial court, as labeling him as a thief and a dishonest person was an insult that might have lead to a breach of the peace under Miss. Code Ann. §95-1-1, but it did not relieve the veteran of his obligation to prove special damages. Cook v. Wallot, 172 So.3d 788, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 245 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

Mere statements by former daughter-in-law that she had never known former father-in-law to wear neck brace and that she did not know he was disabled did not constitute words that would be slanderous per se, because words in question did not generate clear and unmistakable accusation that former father-in-law had been guilty of fraud in obtaining Social Security disability benefits, nor did words impute crime. Baugh v. Baugh, 512 So. 2d 1283, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2813 (Miss. 1987), limited, Speed v. Scott, 787 So. 2d 626, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 2001).

Generally to orally call a white person a Negro is not actionable per se, but it may be actionable in certain sections of the country under the social habits and customs prevailing in those sections. Natchez Times Pub. Co. v. Dunigan, 221 Miss. 320, 72 So. 2d 681, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 541 (Miss. 1954).

Words which accuse a person of being a thief are actionable per se. Lemonis v. Hogue, 213 Miss. 775, 57 So. 2d 865, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 424 (Miss. 1952).

Where a newspaper story stated that the plaintiff was a two-gun man who is alleged to have threatened to shoot himself, members of family and the whole neighborhood, that story did not charge the plaintiff with a crime; therefore actual damages must be shown. Sheffield v. Journal Pub. Co., 211 Miss. 294, 51 So. 2d 479, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 355 (Miss. 1951).

Language of printed statement by trustees of public school regarding lumber dealer, and descending from defense into abuse, held actionable per se, at common law. Hodges v. Cunningham, 160 Miss. 576, 135 So. 215, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1931).

Defendant’s good faith statement he had mortgage on automobile plaintiff traded held not actionable per se though plaintiff, grantor, had trust deed. Winton v. Patterson, 152 Miss. 158, 119 So. 161, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 239 (Miss. 1928).

Words to effect that plaintiff set fire to and burned his house are actionable per se. Jefferson v. Bates, 152 Miss. 128, 118 So. 717, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 225 (Miss. 1928).

Law imputes intention to damage the other party by speaking of words that are slanderous per se. Jefferson v. Bates, 152 Miss. 128, 118 So. 717, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 225 (Miss. 1928).

Language clearly imputing embezzlement, actionable per se; damage implied from spoken words slanderous per se. Doherty v. L. B. Price Mercantile Co., 132 Miss. 39, 95 So. 790, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. 1923).

But statement in letter not injuring reputation, exposing to public hatred, degrading or imputing that person is unworthy of credit not libelous per se. Heralds of Liberty v. Rankin, 130 Miss. 698, 94 So. 849, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 242 (Miss. 1922).

Words falsely charging one with commission of crime are actionable per se only where such charge if true would subject him to punishment for a crime involving moral turpitude, or one infamous in character, or one which if not necessarily infamous would bring disgrace upon him. Woodville v. Pizatti, 119 Miss. 85, 80 So. 491, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 14 (Miss. 1918).

Slanderous per se to say that member of legislature received money for voting an appropriation. Nabors v. Mathis, 115 Miss. 564, 76 So. 549, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 234 (Miss. 1917).

Where insurance company issued circular letter to its agents, not referring to plaintiff by name, but referring to him as a hard drinker, a habitual carrier of firearms, reputed to have killed two men, and stating that he had lost a foot when insured and had recently shot off the other for which he was making claim, such language did not constitute libel per se, in view of plaintiff’s substantial admission of such facts, and the statement as to his claim for a lost foot was consistent with accidental shooting. Holliday v. Maryland Casualty Co., 115 Miss. 56, 75 So. 764, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 184 (Miss. 1917).

Accusing one of being thief, actionable per se. Valley Dry Goods Co. v. Buford, 114 Miss. 414, 75 So. 252, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1917).

An instance where a statement concerning plaintiff’s use of money advanced under contract to deliver staves, was not libelous per se. Lucas E. Moore Stave Co. v. Wells, 111 Miss. 796, 72 So. 228, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1916).

Letter stating that another was in fact dishonest, without brains, undiplomatic, and not optimistic, and comparing his actions with those of a hog which muddies the stream was defamatory and libelous per se. Hines v. Shumaker, 97 Miss. 669, 52 So. 705, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 269 (Miss. 1910).

A clearance paper given a discharged employee, reciting: “Cause for leaving service, unsatisfactory service, conduct good,” is not libelous per se. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Ely, 83 Miss. 519, 35 So. 873, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 73 (Miss. 1903).

To charge the defendant with having poisoned the plaintiff is actionable per se. Furr v. Speed, 74 Miss. 423, 21 So. 562, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 181 (Miss. 1896).

Both intention to injure and to damage are implied by law from the speaking of words that are slanderous per se. Furr v. Speed, 74 Miss. 423, 21 So. 562, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 181 (Miss. 1896).

7. Privileged communication.

An absolutely privileged communication is one made in the interest of the public service or the due administration of justice, and in practical effect is limited to legislative, judicial or military proceedings. Krebs v. McNeal, 222 Miss. 560, 76 So. 2d 693, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 639 (Miss. 1955).

An officer of the law has no absolute privilege for any and all comments which he makes. Krebs v. McNeal, 222 Miss. 560, 76 So. 2d 693, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 639 (Miss. 1955).

Statement by assisting manager of store that plaintiff and two others trifled with store’s money with ill intent was not privileged under State Unemployment Compensation Act providing that communications in connection with requirements and administration of act shall be privileged as alleged accusations were not made in connection with requirements or administration of that act. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Harland, 205 Miss. 380, 38 So. 2d 771, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 436 (Miss. 1949).

Matter published in a judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged. Gunter v. Reeves, 198 Miss. 31, 21 So. 2d 468, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1945).

Allegations made in affidavit for search warrant, in absence of showing taking allegation out of general rule, is absolutely privileged as matter published in a judicial proceeding. Gunter v. Reeves, 198 Miss. 31, 21 So. 2d 468, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1945).

Absolutely privileged communication is one made in interest of public service or administration of justice and is practically limited to legislative and judicial proceedings and other actions of state. Grantham v. Wilkes, 135 Miss. 777, 100 So. 673, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1924).

Defendant’s statement that plaintiff admitted theft not privileged because made to brother of other alleged thief. Valley Dry Goods Co. v. Buford, 114 Miss. 414, 75 So. 252, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1917).

Letter from defendant corporation sent under seal and for plaintiff’s inspection alone, relating to business transaction between them and urging payment for machinery, was privileged and not actionable libel. Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel & Kaufman, 113 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 109 (Miss. 1917).

Statement of defendant to fraternal organization attempting to settle difference between himself and plaintiff, that plaintiff had been guilty of perjury, not made in rebuttal of charges against defendant, is not privileged. Pate v. Trollinger, 113 Miss. 255, 74 So. 131, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1916).

The scope of the defamatory matter, in order to be excusable on the ground of privileged communication, must not exceed exigency of privileged occasion. Hines v. Shumaker, 97 Miss. 669, 52 So. 705, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 269 (Miss. 1910).

Statements casually made to officers, not for the public good, which were also made to other persons, are not privileged communications. Bigner v. Hodges, 82 Miss. 215, 33 So. 980, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1903).

Where occasion privileged, plaintiff must establish malice. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Brooks, 69 Miss. 168, 13 So. 847, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 172 (Miss. 1891).

8. Qualified privilege.

In a suit to recover for the alleged libel of the plaintiff in a credit report, where there was nothing before the court to dispute the defendant’s contention that this report was made in good faith in the ordinary and everyday course of its business in answer to a request from a client for a credit report on the plaintiff, and nothing in the report suggested malice or anything more than the reporting of what was found from informants to be the facts about which a questionnaire related, the report enjoyed a qualified privilege and it was immaterial whether its contents were libelous per se or libelous per quod. Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 438 F.2d 1043, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 11984 (5th Cir. Miss. 1971).

A credit report furnished in good faith, and without malice, by a reporting agency to one entitled to receive the same is entitled to qualified privilege, even though it contains erroneous information. Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 325 F. Supp. 460, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14248 (S.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1406, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10066 (5th Cir. Miss. 1972).

Where government employees gave allegedly defamatory oral and written statements to an Air Force officer in the course of his investigation of the manager of the Exchange Services Store at an air base, they were afforded the protection of the doctrine of governmental immunity. Houtenville v. Dunahoo, 286 F. Supp. 5, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9083 (N.D. Miss. 1968).

Statements made by a university dean when recommending against a professor’s tenure were protected by a qualified governmental immunity where there was no publication outside the circle of persons having an intimate and direct interest in the tenure proceedings and there was no showing that the dean acted with malice. Staheli v. Smith, 548 So. 2d 1299, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1989), limited, Raddin v. Manchester Educ. Found., 175 So.3d 1243, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 507 (Miss. 2015).

Evidence in a slander suit by a highway patrolman against a person whom he had arrested for public drunkenness, and who had thereafter telephoned law enforcement agencies, including the patrolman’s superiors, repeatedly calling the patrolman a “heathen son of a bitch” and charging that the patrolman had taken $2,100 out of such person’s pocket, supported a finding that, if the occasion when the statements were made was conditionally privileged as a communication with the proper law enforcement officials to inquire of property lost or stolen, such conditional privilege was abused in that such statements charging the patrolman with being a thief were false and made out of ill will and spite and in bad faith. Ralston Purina Co. v. Colton, 262 So. 2d 414, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1313 (Miss. 1972).

In a libel action, the evidence was insufficient to establish malice on the part of the defendant newspaper publisher in publishing a photograph of articles taken from the automobile of a person arrested on a charge of bank robbery, which articles included explosives and weapons along with a campaign poster of the plaintiff who had run for public office and been actively engaged in politics in Mississippi, and was admittedly known throughout the state. Perkins v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 241 So. 2d 139, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1320 (Miss. 1970).

A plaintiff who had been prominently engaged in state politics for a good many years and had been a candidate and had conducted political campaigns for several public offices over a twenty-year period, was, at the time of the publication of an allegedly libelous photograph, a “public figure” notwithstanding the fact that his latest political campaign ended several weeks before publication of the libel. Perkins v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 241 So. 2d 139, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1320 (Miss. 1970).

Where the declaration showed that plaintiff occupied a prominent quasi-public position and that the editorial in question was a criticism of the assertions of plaintiff in regard to matters of public interest, and it was not alleged that there was any falsity in the statements of fact on which the writer therein based his criticisms, only that the editorial contained false and libelous words concerning plaintiff, the state of the pleadings on its face showed that the occasion was conditionally privileged, and the editorial was not actionable since the privilege had not been abused. Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 230 Miss. 583, 93 So. 2d 171, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 401 (Miss. 1957).

In a libel action by a sheriff against a newspaper on the ground that the article stated that the sheriff had shot a person without justification whereas a deputy had fired the shot, the article was not libelous because the sheriff and deputy were acting in concert and had committed an illegal assault on a person just before the shooting so that the article was substantially correct. Smith v. Byrd, 225 Miss. 331, 83 So. 2d 172, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 588 (Miss. 1955).

The law guards jealously the right to the enjoyment of a good reputation, but public policy, good morals, the interests of society, and sound business demand that an employer, or his representative, be permitted to discuss freely with an employee, or his chosen representative, charges made against the employee affecting the latter’s employment and on such occasion there is a qualified privilege and statements made within the scope of the privilege, in good faith and without malice, are not actionable. Killebrew v. Jackson City Lines, Inc., 225 Miss. 84, 82 So. 2d 648, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 562 (Miss. 1955).

One is privileged to publish the actual facts as to the commission of a crime and the facts as to the arrest and charges made against a person suspected of the crime provided the statement does not go further than a mere report of the news by making charges, directly or by inference, insinuation, or assumption that the person arrested is guilty of the crime and if the account does not go beyond a mere narration of the transaction recounted and makes injurious reflections on the private or business character of a party to the transaction it is actionable if untrue. Krebs v. McNeal, 222 Miss. 560, 76 So. 2d 693, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 639 (Miss. 1955).

It is a fundamental requisite that one claiming the benefit of qualified privilege must believe in good faith that the defamatory matter is true. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

The existence of the privilege does not license the speaker to introduce irrelevant defamatory matter beyond the exigencies of the occasion. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

While the fact that alleged slanderous words may have been uttered in the presence and hearing of other persons who were accidentally present and to whom the remarks were not addressed will not overthrow the qualifiedly privileged nature of the communication, the fact that slanderous charges are made in the presence and hearing of others not interested in the investigation, is not an immaterial circumstance where the privilege is exceeded and the one claiming the benefit of the privilege is acting in bad faith, without probable cause, and from anger and displayed malice, in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of the person to whom the slanderous charges are addressed. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

In action by sales clerk against store and its assistant manager to recover damages for slanderous remarks, the entire context of what the assistant manager said to the plaintiff and two other sales clerks must be considered in determining whether the defendants acted in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

In slander action by sales clerk against store and its assistant manager, the fact that a friendly relation had previously existed between the parties who were interested in the investigation with regard to misplacement of store’s money is a circumstance to disprove malice, but such fact is not controlling. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

In suit by sales clerk against store and its assistant manager to recover damages for slander, privilege in the conduct of an investigation to determine who was responsible for negligent or careless misplacement of store’s money was exceeded by accusation of hiding store’s money with ill intent and warranted jury finding that the accusation in its slanderous aspects was not made in good faith and on probable cause for suspecting anyone of having trifled with the store’s money with ill intentions. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

Qualifiedly privileged communication is one made in good faith to person having interest in subject matter or about which he has a duty to a person having a corresponding interest or duty. Grantham v. Wilkes, 135 Miss. 777, 100 So. 673, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1924).

Under § 124 of the Const. an applicant for pardon does not have to sign his petition, and a person signing such petition is exercising a qualfied privilege. Grantham v. Wilkes, 135 Miss. 777, 100 So. 673, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1924).

A circular letter by an insurance company to its agents concerning reputation of insured and matters pertaining to the risk, not libelous per se, constituted a qualified privileged communication. Holliday v. Maryland Casualty Co., 115 Miss. 56, 75 So. 764, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 184 (Miss. 1917).

Examination by Masonic Lodge Committee investigating charges against member is an occasion of qualified privilege. Jones v. Edwards, 57 Miss. 28, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1879); Fritz v. Williams, 16 So. 359 (Miss. 1894).

9. Damages.

Punitive damages are not recoverable in an action for libel or slander per quad where no actual damages are shown. Barton v. Barnett, 226 F. Supp. 375, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6419 (N.D. Miss. 1964).

In a suit based upon actionable word statute where defendant called plaintiff a crook, an instruction advising the jury that they were not authorized to award damages for injury to plaintiff’s reputation in the community, was proper since plaintiff sought only exemplary damages. Wells v. Branscome, 222 Miss. 1, 74 So. 2d 743, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 609 (Miss. 1954).

In slander action by sales clerk against store and assistant manager, testimony showing personal reactions of plaintiff to accusations, loss incident to discharge, and humiliation incident to her own republication of charges, could influence jury only in arriving at amount of damages, and if introduction is erroneously permitted, remittitur reducing judgment from $15,000 to $7,500 will cure any harm done by testimony in regard to measure of damages. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Harland, 205 Miss. 380, 38 So. 2d 771, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 436 (Miss. 1949).

While instruction in suit by sales clerk against store and assistant manager to recover damages for slanderous remarks, that the jury could not award her any damages whatever on account of her discharge was proper in view of the fact that she was not employed for a fixed term, plaintiff was entitled to show that she was in fact damaged in her reputation by what had transpired, as represented by evidence that she was unable to obtain or retain employment thereafter by reason thereof. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

$500 damages to man under 21 years of age, denounced as thief and liar, held not excessive. Landrum v. Ellington, 152 Miss. 569, 120 So. 444, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 1929).

Jury, within reasonable bounds, sole judge of damage sustained. Landrum v. Ellington, 152 Miss. 569, 120 So. 444, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 1929).

Where words were actionable per se plaintiff was entitled to exemplary damages and it was unnecessary to show special damages. Jefferson v. Bates, 152 Miss. 128, 118 So. 717, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 225 (Miss. 1928).

Plaintiff in malicious libel, entitled to punitive damages as the jury might assess, without showing actual damages. Hubbard v. Rutledge, 52 Miss. 581, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 259 (Miss. 1876).

10. —Mitigation.

In an action for slander against an insurance company after plaintiff had recovered on policy, evidence that recovery had been contested on the ground of fraudulent representations, admissible in mitigation of damages. National Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v. De Vance, 110 Miss. 196, 70 So. 83, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1915).

Apology admissible in mitigation of damages but not as bar. Dixie Fire Ins. Co. v. Betty, 101 Miss. 880, 58 So. 705, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 1912).

The truth of the slanderous words spoken constitutes no defense, and can only go to the jury in mitigation of damages. McLean v. Warring, 13 So. 236 (Miss. 1893).

Sudden heat of passion is circumstance mitigating damages. Powers v. Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227, 1859 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Miss. 1859).

The truth or falsity of words is an important consideration for a jury in estimating the damages. Crawford v. Mellton, 20 Miss. 328, 1849 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1849); Jefferson v. Bates, 152 Miss. 128, 118 So. 717, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 225 (Miss. 1928).

11. Judicial proceedings.

Statement by attorney for plaintiff in argument to jury that plaintiff had read to jury testimony given on former trial by absent witness in response to plaintiff’s questions but that defendant did not read testimony of witness given in response to questions asked on behalf of defendant, to which objection was overruled, was not reversible error. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Harland, 205 Miss. 380, 38 So. 2d 771, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 436 (Miss. 1949).

Whether alleged libelous words are calculated to lead to breach of peace is question for jury. Hodges v. Cunningham, 160 Miss. 576, 135 So. 215, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1931).

Jury passes on both amount of damages and on whether or not words were actionable. Davis v. Woods, 95 Miss. 432, 48 So. 961, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 249 (Miss. 1909).

12. —Pleadings.

Where plaintiff’s declaration seeking damages for libel is based primarily on common law rights and the Mississippi actionable words statute, the fact that it also alleges as an element of damages that he was deprived of his rights under the United States Constitution is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts and a motion to remand was sustained. Walker v. Savell, 243 F. Supp. 478, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7387 (N.D. Miss. 1965).

Sufficient in slander to allege words or synonymous words constituting same. Valley Dry Goods Co. v. Buford, 114 Miss. 414, 75 So. 252, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1917).

Declaration setting out words used and alleging that from their usual construction and common acceptance they are considered insulting and calculated to lead to violence and breach of peace, and were spoken contrary to statute, held good on demurrer. Davis v. Woods, 95 Miss. 432, 48 So. 961, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 249 (Miss. 1909).

A bill of particulars in an action for slander which gives the actionable words, the time, place, and the names of the persons to whom they were spoken, is sufficient. McLean v. Warring, 13 So. 236 (Miss. 1893).

A declaration which avers that defendant spoke the works “contrary to the statute, with a view to insult the plaintiff, and to lead him to commit violence and breach of the peace,” brings the case within the statute. Scott v. Peebles, 10 Miss. 546, 1844 Miss. LEXIS 177 (Miss. 1844).

A declaration in an action under the statute is insufficient if it does not show that the action is based on the statute and is within its purview. Scott v. Peebles, 10 Miss. 546, 1844 Miss. LEXIS 177 (Miss. 1844); Warren v. Norman, 1 Miss. 387, 1831 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1831); Davis v. Farrington, 1 Miss. 304, 1827 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. 1827).

13. —Evidence.

Youth court records of a juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency arising from a shoplifting incident were admissible into evidence in the juvenile’s slander suit against a store employee arising from the same incident, since the truth is a total defense to a slander suit; the juvenile’s action of initiating the slander suit “lifted the veil of confidentiality” of the youth court proceedings, thereby exposing him to the “harsh realities of litigation.” Daniels by Glass v. Wal-Mart Stores, 634 So. 2d 88, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 564 (Miss. 1993), limited, Sample v. State, 643 So. 2d 524, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 466 (Miss. 1994), limited, Mask v. Elrod (In re Estate of Mask), 703 So. 2d 852, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 752 (Miss. 1997).

Where it was contended that a letter from a general agent of an insurance company advising the local agent that in view of a credit report it would be necessary to cancel insurance policies covering plaintiff’s business was libelous, it was not error to admit in evidence a credit report which formed the basis of the letter, since, if for no other reason, the report was admissible on the question of good faith and freedom from malice on the part of the writer of the letter. Miley v. Foster, 229 Miss. 106, 90 So. 2d 172, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 591 (Miss. 1956).

In a suit based upon the actionable words statute, to recover for statements made by the defendant that the plaintiff was a crook, testimony relative to the plaintiff’s general reputation for honesty and fair dealing was admissible in mitigation of damages. Wells v. Branscome, 222 Miss. 1, 74 So. 2d 743, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 609 (Miss. 1954).

In slander action by sales clerk against store and assistant manager, testimony by clerk that customers stopped, looked and listened, is sufficient proof that customers heard remarks complained of. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Harland, 205 Miss. 380, 38 So. 2d 771, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 436 (Miss. 1949).

In slander suit by sales clerk against store and its assistant manager resulting from accusations by assistant manager that plaintiff and two others trifled with store’s money with ill intent, defendants are entitled to prove, on question of good faith, the information on which assistant manager acted in making accusations. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Harland, 205 Miss. 380, 38 So. 2d 771, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 436 (Miss. 1949).

In an action against an employer and its assistant store manager for slander in charging plaintiff and two other employees with trifling with the employer’s money with ill intentions, the trial court erred in excluding testimony that the assistant store manager was acting in the premises in the light of information that the hidden check had been given to one of the three plaintiffs and not to one of the two remaining employees, since such testimony was pertinent to the issue of malice. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Higgins, 201 Miss. 467, 29 So. 2d 267, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 407 (Miss. 1947).

While the plaintiff is limited in his right of recovery to the charge made in the declaration and which is admitted to have been proved in so far as testimony on behalf of plaintiff is concerned, it is competent for plaintiff to prove such additional facts and circumstances as will throw light on the question as to whether third persons present would reasonably understand that the speaker intended to reflect upon plaintiff. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

In slander action by sales clerk against store and its assistant manager, evidence that investigation with regard to misplacement of store’s money was considered by assistant manager as involving an act of carelessness warranted jury in believing that his statements accusing plaintiff and two other sales clerks with trifling with store’s money with ill intentions were made in wilful and wanton disregard of their rights, and in excess of any right that he had in investigating an act of mere carelessness. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

In slander suit by sales clerk against store and its assistant manager, wherein assistant manager, investigating misplacement of store’s money, accused plaintiff and others of trifling with the store’s money with ill intentions, there being no evidence that any of them were responsible for such misplacements, evidence warranted jury in imposing both actual and punitive damages. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

In assessing punitive damages in slander suit by sales clerk against store and its assistant manager for accusations exceeding defendant’s privilege in investigating misplacement of store’s money, jury could properly take into consideration evidence that defendant’s store had current assets worth more than $261,000,000 and that its earned surplus was nearly $110,000,000. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

Where the communication is upon a privileged occasion and is a privileged communication, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show actual malice in order to recover. But if the privilege of the communication is not conceded, and does not appear from the plaintiff’s testimony, the burden is then upon the defendant, who relies upon the privilege, to establish it. Hines v. Shumaker, 97 Miss. 669, 52 So. 705, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 269 (Miss. 1910).

An allegation in a declaration for slander that defendant “had butchered and sold his patrons a steer affected with a loathsome disease, and which at the time had a running sore or cancer on its leg,” is supported by testimony that “He had butchered and sold a steer which was unfit for use because it had a running sore on its leg.” Bigner v. Hodges, 82 Miss. 215, 33 So. 980, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1903).

The exact words alleged to have been spoken, or synonymous words, must be proved. It is not sufficient to prove words conveying a similar idea. Jones v. Edwards, 57 Miss. 28, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1879).

In libel suit, where defense was honest motive, held defendant might be questioned as to effect of plaintiff’s business in competition with his own. Hubbard v. Rutledge, 57 Miss. 7, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1879).

Where manifest that word was used in its ordinary and popular meaning, court should so decide and exclude evidence of technical meaning. Rodgers v. Kline, 56 Miss. 808, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 219 (Miss. 1879).

First Amendment restrictions mandate that the plaintiff in a defamation action bear the burden of proving falsity. Burk v. Illinois C. G. R. Co., 529 So. 2d 515, 1988 La. App. LEXIS 1569 (La.App. 1 Cir.), cert. denied, 532 So. 2d 179, 1988 La. LEXIS 2528 (La. 1988).

14. —Jury questions.

When evidence on the question as to whether the defendant made the defamatory statements ascribed to him was in conflict, a question for the jury was clearly presented. Miley v. Foster, 229 Miss. 106, 90 So. 2d 172, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 591 (Miss. 1956).

Under the actionable words statute the jury are the sole judges of damages sustained, but the discretion vested in the jury must be reasonably exercised. Wells v. Branscome, 222 Miss. 1, 74 So. 2d 743, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 609 (Miss. 1954).

Where alleged slanderous language is unambiguous, it is to be construed in its ordinary sense, and without reference to how those to whom it was published understood it or what was intended by the publisher, the jury being the judges as to whether the words would reasonably be understood in a defamatory meaning. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

Where the evidence showed that defendant store’s assistant manager in a loud and angry voice and in the presence of store customers accused the plaintiff and two other sales clerks of hiding store money with ill intent and stated that they were all fired without a recommendation, question whether the plaintiff was individually slandered was for the jury to decide. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

In suit by sales clerk against store and its assistant manager to recover damages for slanderous remarks, the jury was entitled to consider defendants’ attitude in failing to tell one who is considering employing plaintiff that in so far as was known the plaintiff was all right and had a good record, as a circumstance to show whether they had acted wilfully and wantonly in discharging her for the reasons set forth in the slanderous utterances complained of, in view of the fact that there was no evidence to show that plaintiff was guilty of the accusations made with regard to trifling with or hiding the store’s money with ill intent. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. 2d 572, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1946).

15. —Instructions.

In an action brought under the common-law slander, instructions which failed to state that the words spoken were “calculated to lead to a breach of peace,” were not erroneous as the words calculated to lead to a breach of the peace is required under the actionable word statute but not under common-law slander suit. Travis v. Hunt, 224 Miss. 193, 79 So. 2d 734, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 476 (Miss. 1955).

In a suit based upon actionable words statute to recover damages for plaintiff from defendant for calling the plaintiff a crook, peremptory instruction for the buyer on liability was proper. Wells v. Branscome, 222 Miss. 1, 74 So. 2d 743, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 609 (Miss. 1954).

An instruction to the jury that if they believe from the evidence that such damages as the plaintiff has suffered, were caused by his own actions and conduct or from any other source and not by the publication made by defendant, they must find for defendant, was proper. Sheffield v. Journal Pub. Co., 211 Miss. 294, 51 So. 2d 479, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 355 (Miss. 1951).

An instruction in a suit for slander which erroneously uses the word “uttered” instead of the word “published” is not reversible error. Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel & Kaufman, 113 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 109 (Miss. 1917).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Libel and slander: words reflecting upon one in his character as employee as actionable per se. 6 A.L.R.2d 1008.

Admissibility on question of damages in action for libel or slander of testimony as to the impression or effect of the matter upon the minds of individuals. 12 A.L.R.2d 1005.

Civil liability for insulting or abusive language not amounting to defamation. 15 A.L.R.2d 108.

Libel and slander: statements regarding labor relations or disputes. 19 A.L.R.2d 694.

Libel and slander: defamation of one relative to another by person not related to either, as subject of qualified privilege. 25 A.L.R.2d 1388.

Liability for permitting walls or other portions of place of public resort to be occupied with matter defamatory of plaintiff. 28 A.L.R.2d 1454.

Libel and slander: report of mercantile agency as privileged. 30 A.L.R.2d 776.

Libel and slander: statements and briefs as privileged. 32 A.L.R.2d 423.

Imputation of perjury or false swearing as actionable per se. 38 A.L.R.2d 161.

Liability for statement or publication representing plaintiff as cruel to or killer of animals. 39 A.L.R.2d 1388.

Libel and slander: statements respecting race, color, or nationality as actionable. 46 A.L.R.2d 1287.

Libel and slander: statement or publication that plaintiff has been indicted or is under indictment. 52 A.L.R.2d 1178.

Libel and slander: criticism of literary or artistic works. 64 A.L.R.2d 245.

Libel and slander: privilege in connection with proceedings to disbar or otherwise discipline attorney. 77 A.L.R.2d 493.

Defamatory nature of statements reflecting on plaintiff’s religious beliefs, standing, or activities. 87 A.L.R.2d 453.

Libel and slander: publication by accidental communication, or communication only to plaintiff. 92 A.L.R.2d 219.

Comment Note. – Constitutional aspects of libel or slander of public officials. 95 A.L.R.2d 1450.

Libel: Imputing credit unworthiness to nontrader. 99 A.L.R.2d 700.

Libel and slander: sufficiency of identification of plaintiff by matter complained of as defamatory. 100 A.L.R.2d 227.

Venue of civil libel action against newspaper or periodical. 15 A.L.R.3d 1249.

Libel and slander: what constitutes actual malice, within federal constitutional rule requiring public officials and public figures to show actual malice. 20 A.L.R.3d 988.

Libel by will. 21 A.L.R.3d 754.

Defamation: Actionability of accusation or imputation of tax evasion. 32 A.L.R.3d 1427.

Relevancy of matter contained in pleading as affecting privilege within law of libel. 38 A.L.R.3d 272.

Libel and slander: actionability of statements imputing inefficiency or lack or qualification to public school teacher. 40 A.L.R.3d 490.

Libel and slander: qualified privilege of reply to defamatory publication. 41 A.L.R.3d 1083.

What constitutes “publication” of libel in order to start running of period of limitations. 42 A.L.R.3d 807.

Libel and slander: privilege of reporting judicial proceedings as extending to proceeding held in secret or as to which record is sealed by court. 43 A.L.R.3d 634.

Right of governmental entity to maintain action for defamation. 45 A.L.R.3d 1315.

Libel and slander: actionability of defamatory statements as to business conduct, relating to a single transaction or occurrence. 51 A.L.R.3d 1300.

Libel and slander: privileged nature of communications made in course of grievance or arbitration procedure provided for by collective bargaining agreement. 60 A.L.R.3d 1041.

Libel and slander: privileged nature of communication to other employees or employees’ union of reason for plaintiff’s discharge. 60 A.L.R.3d 1080.

Libel and slander: Dictation to defendant’s secretary, typist, or stenographer as publication. 62 A.L.R.3d 1207.

Disparagement of the quality of intangible property. 74 A.L.R.3d 298.

Libel and slander: Who is “public figure” in the light of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 94 S. Ct. 2997.75 A.L.R.3d 616.

Libel and slander: Privileged nature of statements or utterances by member of school board in course of official proceedings. 85 A.L.R.3d 1137.

Libel and slander: Privileged nature of communications between insurer and insured. 85 A.L.R.3d 1161.

Libel by newspaper headlines. 95 A.L.R.3d 660.

Defamation: publication of “letter to editor” in newspaper as actionable. 99 A.L.R.3d 573.

Allowance of punitive damages in action for slander of title or disparagement of property. 7 A.L.R.4th 1219.

Liability of commercial printer for defamatory statement contained in matter printed for another. 16 A.L.R.4th 1372.

Refusal of defendant in “public figure” libel case to identify claimed sources as raising presumption against existence of source. 19 A.L.R.4th 919.

Libel and slander: attorneys’ statements, to parties other than alleged defamed party or its agents, in course of extrajudicial investigation or preparation relating to pending or anticipated civil litigation as privileged. 23 A.L.R.4th 932.

State constitutional protection of allegedly defamatory statements regarding private individual. 33 A.L.R.4th 212.

Libel and slander: privileged nature of statements or utterances by members of governing body of public institution of higher learning in course of official proceedings. 33 A.L.R.4th 632.

Criticism or disparagement of physician’s or dentist’s character, competence, or conduct as defamation. 38 A.L.R.4th 836.

Criticism or disparagement of dentist’s character, competence, or conduct as defamation. 120 A.L.R.5th 483.

Defamation of psychiatrist, psychologist, or counselor. 38 A.L.R.4th 874.

Defamation: application of New York Times and related standards to nonmedia defendants. 38 A.L.R.4th 1114.

Defamation: privilege accorded state or local governmental administrative records relating to private individual member of public. 40 A.L.R.4th 318.

What constitutes “single publication” within meaning of single publication rule affecting action for libel and slander, violation of privacy, or similar torts. 41 A.L.R.4th 541.

Defamation: nature and extent of privilege accorded public statements, relating to subject of legislative business or concern, made by member of state or local legislature or council outside of formal proceedings. 41 A.L.R.4th 1116.

Actionable nature of advertising impugning quality or worth of merchandise or products. 42 A.L.R.4th 318.

Criticism or disparagement of attorney’s character, competence, or conduct as defamation. 46 A.L.R.4th 326.

Libel or slander: defamation by gestures or acts. 46 A.L.R.4th 403.

Defamation: publication by intracorporate communication of employee’s evaluation. 47 A.L.R.4th 674.

Defamation: privilege attaching to news report of criminal activities based on information supplied by public safety officers-modern status. 47 A.L.R.4th 718.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of compensatory damages for defamation. 49 A.L.R.4th 1158.

Defamation: who is “libel-proof.” 50 A.L.R.4th 1257.

Libel and slander: defamation by cartoon. 52 A.L.R.4th 424.

Libel and slander: defamation by photograph. 52 A.L.R.4th 488.

Defamation of class or group as actionable by individual member. 52 A.L.R.4th 618.

Libel and slander: defamation by question. 53 A.L.R.4th 450.

Libel and slander: sufficiency of identification of allegedly defamed party. 54 A.L.R.4th 746.

Defamation of professional athlete or sports figure. 54 A.L.R.4th 869.

Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as defamation – post-New York Times cases. 57 A.L.R.4th 404.

Libel or slander: defamation by statement made in jest. 57 A.L.R.4th 520.

Imputation of allegedly objectionable political or social benefits or principles as defamation. 62 A.L.R.4th 314.

Publication of allegedly defamatory matter by plaintiff (“self-publication”) as sufficient to support defamation action. 62 A.L.R.4th 616.

Defamation: designation as scab. 65 A.L.R.4th 1000.

In personam jurisdiction, in libel and slander action, over nonresident who mailed allegedly defamatory letter from outside state. 83 A.L.R.4th 1006.

Who is “public figure” for purposes of defamation action. 19 A.L.R.5th 1.

Who is “public official” for purposes of defamation action. 44 A.L.R.5th 193.

Libel and slander: Charging one with breach or nonperformance of contract. 45 A.L.R.5th 739.

Defamation: Publication of letter to editor in newspaper as actionable. 54 A.L.R.5th 443.

Liability for statement or publication charging plaintiff with killing of, cruelty to, or inhumane treatment of animals. 69 A.L.R.5th 645.

Libel and slander: statements regarding labor relations or disputes. 94 A.L.R.5th 149.

Immunity of police or other law enforcement officer from liability in defamation action. 100 A.L.R.5th 341.

Defamation of manufacturer, regarding product, other than through statement charging breach or nonperformance of contract. 104 A.L.R.5th 523.

Defamation of building contractor or subcontractor other than through statement charging breach or nonperformance of contract. 106 A.L.R.5th 475.

Defamation of member of clergy. 108 A.L.R.5th 495.

Defamation of church member by church or church official. 109 A.L.R.5th 541.

Criticism or disparagement of physician’s character, competence, or conduct as defamation. 16 A.L.R.6th 1.

Liability of Newspaper for Libel and Slander - 21st Century Cases. 22 A.L.R. 6th 553.

Defamation of Psychiatrist, Psychologist, or Counselor. 67 A.L.R.6th 437.

Validity, construction, and application of federal criminal statute (18 USCS § 1464) punishing utterance of obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication. 17 A.L.R. Fed. 900.

Am. Jur.

50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander §§ 1 et seq.

12A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance, Form 45 (complaint, petition, or declaration – for damages resulting from intentional infliction of emotional distress-counts for slander and defamation-by employee).

16A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Libel and Slander, Forms 21 et seq. (complaints, petitions, or declaration – libel.

16A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Libel and Slander, Form 70.1 (Allegation – Innuendo – False charge – Plaintiff’s character).

19 Am. Jur. Trials, Defamation, §§ 1 et seq.

1 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Identification of Individual Allegedly Defamed, §§ 13 et seq. (proof of identification of unnamed person where referred to in defamatory statement as an individual); §§ 21 et seq. (proof of identification of unnamed person where referred to in defamatory statement as a member of a group or class).

40 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 649, Sufficiency of Retraction of Defamatory Statement.

5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Defamation by Employer, §§ 1 et seq.

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Invasion of Privacy by False Light Publicity, §§ 1 et seq.

CJS.

53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander

Injurious Falsehood §§ 1-15, 22, 23, 31–34, 38–41, 43, 77, 83.

Lawyers’ Edition.

“Actual malice” determinations in defamation suits held subject to de novo review. 80 L. Ed. 2d 502.

Law Reviews.

Comment, Ferguson v. Watkins: The Vortex Within Mississippi Defamation Law. 55 Miss. L. J. 619, September 1985.

Practice References.

Damages in Tort Actions (Matthew Bender).

Douthwaite, Ronald W. Eades, Jury Instructions for Personal Injury and Tort Cases (Michie).

Munger, What’s It Worth? A Guide to Current Personal Injury Awards and Settlements, 2003 Edition (Michie).

§ 95-1-3. Liability of radio and television stations or networks.

The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, by any person other than the owner, licensee or operator, or some agent or employee thereof.
In no event, however, shall any owner, licensee or operator, or the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or operator of such a station or network of stations, be held liable for any damages for any defamatory statement uttered over the facilities of such station or network by or on behalf of any candidate for public office, unless such statement is made by an agent or employee of the station in the course of his employment.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1059.5; Laws, 1954, ch. 250, §§ 1, 2.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A person is not a “public figure” who does not occupy a role of special prominence in the affairs of society or who has not been thrust to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved; and the New York Times rule does not automatically extend to all reports of judicial proceedings regardless of whether the party plaintiff in such proceedings is a public figure who might be assumed to have voluntarily exposed him – or herself to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood; there is no substantial reason why one involved in litigation should forfeit that degree of protection afforded by the law of defamation simply by virtue of being drawn into a courtroom. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S. Ct. 958, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 26 (U.S. 1976).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Defamation by radio or television. 50 A.L.R.3d 1311.

Defamation: privilege attaching to news report of criminal activities based on information supplied by public safety officers-modern status. 47 A.L.R.4th 718.

Defamation: who is “libel-proof.” 50 A.L.R.4th 1257.

Libel and slander: defamation by cartoon. 52 A.L.R.4th 424.

Defamation of class or group as actionable by individual member. 52 A.L.R.4th 618.

Libel and slander: defamation by question. 53 A.L.R.4th 450.

Libel and slander: sufficiency of identification of allegedly defamed party. 54 A.L.R.4th 746.

Defamation of professional athlete or sports figure. 54 A.L.R.4th 869.

Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as defamation – post-New York Times cases. 57 A.L.R.4th 404.

Libel or slander: defamation by statement made in jest. 57 A.L.R.4th 520.

Who is “public figure” for purposes of defamation action. 19 A.L.R.5th 1.

Liability of Internet Service Provider For Internet or E-mail Defamation. 84 A.L.R.5th 169.

Am. Jur.

50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander § 353.

19 Am. Jur. Trials, Defamation, §§ 1 et seq.

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Invasion of Privacy by False Light Publicity, §§ 1 et seq.

CJS.

53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander

Injurious Falsehood §§ 173-180.

§ 95-1-5. Newspapers and radio or television stations to have opportunity to make corrections prior to suit.

Before any civil action is brought for publication, in a newspaper domiciled and published in this state or authorized to do business in Mississippi so as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, of a libel, or against any radio or television station domiciled in this state, the plaintiff shall, at least ten (10) days before instituting any such action, serve notice in writing on the defendant at its regular place of business, specifying the article, broadcast or telecast, and the statements therein, which he alleges to be false and defamatory.
If it appears upon the trial that said article was published, broadcast or telecast in good faith, that its falsity was due to an honest mistake of the facts, and there were reasonable grounds for believing that the statements in said article, broadcast or telecast were true, and that within ten (10) days after the service of said notice a full and fair correction, apology and retraction was published in the same edition or corresponding issues of the newspaper in which said article appeared, and in as conspicuous place and type as was said original article, or was broadcast or telecast under like conditions correcting an honest mistake, and if the jury shall so find, the plaintiff in such case shall recover only actual damages. The burden of proof of the foregoing facts shall be affirmative defenses of the defendant and pled as such.
This section shall not apply to any publication concerning a candidate for public office made within ten (10) days of any primary, general or special election in which such candidate’s candidacy for or election to public office is to be determined, and this section shall not apply to any editorial or to any regularly published column in which matters of opinions are expressed.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1059.7; Laws, 1962, ch. 318, §§ 1-4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Newspaper’s refusal to print a retraction of an article publishing a sheriff’s department report concerning a contractor’s arrest for home repair fraud did not amount to gross negligence, as Miss. Code Ann. §95-1-5(2) did not impose upon the newspaper a duty to retract. Hegwood v. Cmty. First Holdings, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 363, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37901 (S.D. Miss. 2008).

Failure of plaintiff to serve demand for retraction upon newspaper and wire service before filing civil action for libel requires dismissal of libel action; dismissal is without prejudice, where newspaper and wire service had suffered no substantial prejudice from failure to receive demand for retraction, in that filing of claim placed newspaper and wire service on notice of nature and identity of plaintiff’s claims. Pannell v. Associated Press, 690 F. Supp. 546, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8512 (N.D. Miss. 1988).

Miss Code Anno §95-1-5(1) applies to Associated Press Wire Service and other forms of news reporting services such as news magazine and cable or satellite news transmissions. Pannell v. Associated Press, 690 F. Supp. 546, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8512 (N.D. Miss. 1988).

Retraction demand is absolute prerequisite to cause of action for libel. Pannell v. Associated Press, 690 F. Supp. 546, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8512 (N.D. Miss. 1988).