Chapter 1. Land and Conveyances

In General

§ 89-1-1. Land conveyed to vest immediately or in future.

Any interest in or claim to land may be conveyed to vest immediately or in the future, by writing signed and delivered; and such writing shall have the effect to transfer, according to its terms, the title of the person signing and delivering it, with all its incidents, as fully and perfectly as if it were transferred by feoffment with livery of seizin, notwithstanding there may be an adverse possession thereof.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 36, art. 1; 1871, § 2284; 1880, § 1187; 1892, § 2433; 1906, § 2762; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2266; 1930, § 2110; 1942, § 831.

Cross References —

Definition of term “land” see §1-3-25.

Definition of term “written,” see §1-3-61.

Lis pendens, see §§11-47-1 et seq.

Limitations of actions concerning land, see §§15-1-1 et seq.

Deeds in tax sales, see §§27-45-23,89-1-27.

Condominiums, see §§89-9-1 et seq.

Deeds by executors and administrators, see §91-7-223.

Release of powers of appointment, see §91-15-1 et seq.

Abolishment of disability of coverture, see §93-3-1.

Necessary elements of valid conveyance between husband and wife, see §93-3-9.

Sale of land by guardian, see §93-13-51.

Removal of disability of minority in relation to real estate, see §93-19-1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Character of instrument as deed or will.

3. Deed in consideration of support.

4. Conveyance of future interest.

5. Conveyance to take effect in future.

6. Restrictive covenants.

7. Reservations and exceptions.

8. Vesting of title in grantee—generally.

9. —Extent of rights acquired.

10. —Priority of other interests.

11. — —Notice.

12. Effect of grantor's mental state.

13. Delivery and acceptance of deed.

14. Construction of particular terms.

15. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

In suit to cancel recorded deed, where nondelivery of deed is alleged, the burden of proving nondelivery is on one claiming nondelivery. Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, 204 Miss. 206, 37 So. 2d 256, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 356 (Miss. 1948).

This section [Code 1942, § 831] is applicable to devises by will, as well as to conveyances by deed, since a will is a writing signed under an authorization for delivery upon the happening of the event which is to vest title in the devisee. Ricks v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 191 Miss. 323, 2 So. 2d 344, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 128 (Miss. 1941).

Statute held to remove all restraints on transfer of real estate. Hamilton v. Jackson, 157 Miss. 284, 127 So. 302, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1930).

This section practically abolishes the doctrine of champerty in reference to lands. Cassedy v. Jackson, 45 Miss. 397, 1871 Miss. LEXIS 89 (Miss. 1871), limited, Wallace v. Okolona Sav. Institute, 49 Miss. 616, 1873 Miss. LEXIS 153 (Miss. 1873).

2. Character of instrument as deed or will.

A purported conveyance of “all my right, title, interest and claim in and to” described lands, stating that it is understood that the grantor “shall have and hold all her right and title to above described property so long as she shall live, but at her death [grantee] shall claim and hold all right and title”, operates as a present conveyance with reservation of a life estate, and is not invalid as an attempted testamentary disposition. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 236 Miss. 751, 112 So. 2d 224, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 372 (Miss. 1959).

An instrument, which was executed and acknowledged in form of a deed and duly delivered and the consideration therefor paid, and which by its plain terms immediately vested the title to the land in the grantee, subject only to the reservation of the right of possession of the grantor as long as he lived, must be given effect as a valid deed. Tanner v. Foreman, 212 Miss. 355, 54 So. 2d 483, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 456 (Miss. 1951).

An instrument in the words and form of, and describing itself as, a deed, acknowledged and recorded as a deed, is a deed and not a will notwithstanding a provision reserving a life estate to grantor and that title should vest in grantee at grantor’s death. Watts v. Watts, 198 Miss. 246, 22 So. 2d 625, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 190 (Miss. 1945).

Instrument purporting to convey land to grantee for consideration of $10 and other valuable consideration, providing that grantee was to cultivate the land free of rent, pay the taxes, and support grantor during the remainder of her life, title not to pass until grantor’s death, was a “deed” rather than a “will,” whereby grantee acquired, during grantor’s lifetime, title charged with obligation to support grantor for balance of her life. Hald v. Pearson, 197 Miss. 410, 20 So. 2d 71, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 308 (Miss. 1944).

In determining whether an instrument is a deed or a will, the court must ascertain and give effect to intention of the parties as gathered from entire instrument, in light of circumstances surrounding its execution. Carter v. Dabbs, 196 Miss. 692, 18 So. 2d 747, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 250 (Miss. 1944).

The difference between a deed and a will is that by means of the former a present interest passes, while the latter takes effect only at the death of the testator. Hald v. Pearson, 197 Miss. 410, 20 So. 2d 71, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 308 (Miss. 1944); Watts v. Watts, 198 Miss. 246, 22 So. 2d 625, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 190 (Miss. 1945).

Instruments labeled warranty deeds, containing operative words of conveyance usual to warranty deeds, whereby grantors, who intended to execute deeds, purported to convey land in fee simple reserving to themselves a house and the use of pasture and ten acres, were deeds and not wills, notwithstanding provision, following grantee’s promise to pay specified annual amounts to grantors until their deaths, that at that time the property is to be the grantee’s, where instruments also provided that if grantee failed to make full annual payments the “deeds” are null and void. Carter v. Dabbs, 196 Miss. 692, 18 So. 2d 747, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 250 (Miss. 1944).

Instrument conveying land, postponing possession and use of land by grantee until grantor’s death, was valid deed and not a will. Graham v. Triplett, 148 Miss. 299, 114 So. 621, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 63 (Miss. 1927).

Instrument granting all property that grantor might die seized and possessed of, with provision that grantee pay certain sums to relatives held a will and not a deed. Martin v. Graham, 114 Miss. 653, 75 So. 447, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1917).

Estimate in form of deed held to be deed and not will, though using words “I will this property.” Brinson v. Sandifer, 90 Miss. 41, 42 So. 89, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1907).

3. Deed in consideration of support.

Deed for support of grantor not cancelled for breach of agreement where it provides no lien, nor forfeiture on condition broken; such deed not set aside on ground grantor did not understand terms, in absence of timely application. Wynn v. Kendall, 122 Miss. 809, 85 So. 85, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 477 (Miss. 1920).

Deed in consideration of support of grantor not cancelled for failure to perform agreement where it contained no provision for forfeiture and reserved no liens to secure performance. Lowrey v. Lowrey, 111 Miss. 153, 71 So. 309, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 258 (Miss. 1916).

4. Conveyance of future interest.

This statute removes all restraints on the inter vivos transfer of interests in real estate whether present or future. Hemphill v. Mississippi State Highway Com., 245 Miss. 33, 145 So. 2d 455, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 529 (Miss. 1962).

This statute makes good as a deed a conveyance of a future interest. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 236 Miss. 751, 112 So. 2d 224, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 372 (Miss. 1959).

Where a testatrix devised to her two daughters a life interest in certain real estate with the remainder over to their descendants, bequeathed one dollar each to her other children, and devised to the same two daughters the rest of her estate both real and personal, the two daughters having no children, took a fee to the realty. Oliphant v. Skelton, 230 Miss. 518, 93 So. 2d 181, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 392 (Miss. 1957).

A conveyance of a life estate by the holder thereof to the remaindermen named in the deed to the grantor is valid. Ricks v. Riddell, 200 Miss. 122, 26 So. 2d 782, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 273 (Miss. 1946).

Conveyance of remainder reserving life estate in grantors held valid. Stubblefield v. Haywood, 123 Miss. 480, 86 So. 295, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 46 (Miss. 1920).

5. Conveyance to take effect in future.

Instrument executed by owner and wife purporting to convey land to son, containing provision that “this deed of conveyance is not to be delivered, or so considered delivered during” the lives of the grantors, but death of both shall constitute a full and complete delivery, and the land shall immediately vest in fee simple in him, was testamentary in character and ineffective as a deed; and the surviving grantor and widow of the owner could not effectively make a delivery upon her deathbed, as she was without power to amend the intention and purpose of her deceased husband. Palmer v. Riggs, 197 Miss. 256, 19 So. 2d 807, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 293 (Miss. 1944).

Conveyances by instruments to take effect at maker’s death are not within rule that conveyances may be made to vest in future, since instruments conveying interests to vest in future must take effect in praesenti, and maker must part with all right to thereafter dispose of land otherwise. Tapley v. McManus, 175 Miss. 849, 168 So. 51, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 72 (Miss. 1936).

Instrument in form of deed, not to become effective until death of maker, is testamentary and cannot operate as a deed. Tapley v. McManus, 175 Miss. 849, 168 So. 51, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 72 (Miss. 1936).

In instrument conveying land to take effect after maker’s death, habendum clause that grantee should have and hold premises to her, her heirs and assigns forever, did not modify express testamentary provisions so as to convey present interest, but only limited and defined estate granted. Tapley v. McManus, 175 Miss. 849, 168 So. 51, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 72 (Miss. 1936).

Instrument in form of deed, not to become effective until death of maker, cannot operate as a deed, so that maker of such instrument could have it canceled on ground that grantee was attempting to interfere with maker’s use and occupation of land. Tapley v. McManus, 175 Miss. 849, 168 So. 51, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 72 (Miss. 1936).

Instrument providing that, in consideration of donee caring for her during life, donor did “bargain, sell, convey and warrant” to him land, but providing transfer not to take effect until death of donor, is not a valid deed. Kelly v. Covington, 119 Miss. 658, 81 So. 485, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 1919).

6. Restrictive covenants.

In suit to quiet title to land in which decree involves meaning of restriction in deed against operation on property of textile industry, decree for neither side can rest on testimony of experts in textile trade as to meaning of term “textile industry” when their own disagreement and divergence of understanding of its significance make manifest that phrase is ambiguous and not solvable by uniform trade understanding. Magnolia Textiles, Inc. v. Gillis, 206 Miss. 797, 41 So. 2d 6, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1949).

In suit to quiet title, when phrase in restrictive covenant is shown by expert witnesses to be ambiguous, situation justifies resort to further aid of construction, that of negotiations and conversations leading up to adoption of restrictive covenant. Magnolia Textiles, Inc. v. Gillis, 206 Miss. 797, 41 So. 2d 6, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1949).

Provision in deed to school trustees that in case land ceased to be used as school property land was to revert back to grantor became effective when trustees abandoned building on land, transferred pupils to another consolidated school, enlarged its facilities through successive bond issues and serviced pupils of old school district by busses from new school, and heirs of grantor took possession of property, destroyed buildings without objection by trustees, placed land upon tax rolls and asserted dominion over land. James v. Gulf Refining Co., 206 Miss. 781, 41 So. 2d 2, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 300 (Miss. 1949).

Restrictions intended to limit the use of property to a particular purpose should be clearly defined and understood by the parties. Frederic v. Merchants & Marine Bank, 200 Miss. 755, 28 So. 2d 843, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1947).

A resolution in the minutes of the board of directors of a grantor bank which recited that the proposed grantee explained that land would be used for a specified purpose, even if such recitals had been contained in the deed of conveyance, did not impose an enforceable restriction on the use of the property. Frederic v. Merchants & Marine Bank, 200 Miss. 755, 28 So. 2d 843, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1947).

Where grantors conveyed property to be held by grantee as long as it should be used for waterworks purposes, and later delivered deed to another, city claiming under both deeds owned fee simple title. Hamilton v. Jackson, 157 Miss. 284, 127 So. 302, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1930).

Intent to subject estates to restrictions on alienation or encumbrance or liability for life tenant’s debts must be clearly expressed. Montroy v. Phillips, 134 Miss. 345, 98 So. 775, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1924).

7. Reservations and exceptions.

A reservation in a deed whereby the grantors purported to retain a reversionary interest in minerals was ambiguous and would be construed against the grantors where the grantors did not own a reversionary interest, but owned only a remainder in the mineral interest. Deason v. Cox, 527 So. 2d 624, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 209 (Miss. 1988).

Grantee who accepts deed containing reservation or exception of all minerals in lands conveyed with full knowledge of language and import of deed cannot obtain reformation of deed to eliminate reservation, despite his dissatisfaction and protestations at time of its execution. Holland v. Bass, 45 So. 2d 743 (Miss. 1950).

Reservation in deed of all minerals made part of consideration is not inconsistent with status of deed as being cast in warranty form. Holland v. Bass, 45 So. 2d 743 (Miss. 1950).

Provision in deed reserving life estate to grantor and providing that title should vest in grantee at grantor’s death does not postpone vesting of title until death of grantor but passes an immediate interest or right, with full enjoyment thereof, postponed until grantor’s death. Watts v. Watts, 198 Miss. 246, 22 So. 2d 625, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 190 (Miss. 1945).

Reservation of an undivided one-fourth interest in all minerals, oil and gas “that might hereafter be discovered on the lands herein described,” reserved to grantor and its assignees a present, undivided one-fourth interest in the minerals that might be found in the land, as tenants in common of the grantee, with the right, by necessary implication from the reservation itself, to enter upon the land to ascertain the presence of and remove minerals that might lie therein. McNeese v. Renner, 197 Miss. 203, 21 So. 2d 7, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1945).

In order for a reservation in a deed to be operative it must withhold from the grant something which would have passed by the deed but for the reservation. Barataria Canning Co. v. Ott, 84 Miss. 737, 37 So. 121, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 90 (Miss. 1904).

If there is a patent ambiguity in the description of land excepted from a conveyance, the exception, not the deed, is void for uncertainty. McAllister v. Honea, 71 Miss. 256, 14 So. 264, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 163 (Miss. 1893).

8. Vesting of title in grantee—generally.

Quitclaim deed to 80 acres of farmland in Mississippi which an Alabama corporation claimed it received from a real estate investment company (‘‘debtor’’) before the debtor declared bankruptcy was invalidunder Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-1 because it was not signed by an individual who had the power to represent the debtor, and even if the deed was somehow valid, a trustee who was appointed to administer the debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy case had the power under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544 to avoid the deed because the deed was not recorded before the debtor declared bankruptcy. Smith v. Dynasty Grp., Inc. (In re Heritage Real Estate Inv., Inc), — B.R. —, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3618 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Oct. 17, 2017), aff'd, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229036 (S.D. Miss. 2018).

Earlier instrument sufficed to transfer the father’s partnership interest in the subject property to the son where the instrument had been signed, sealed, and delivered, it evinced the father’s intent to transfer title to all partnership property to the son, and the property had been purchased and treated as partnership property. White v. White (In re White), 234 So.3d 1210, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 351 (Miss. 2017).

Decedent’s transfer of land to herself as trustee for the benefit of her four children and the heirs at law of any of such children who should die during the continuance of the trust, with provision for distribution of the trust to the beneficiaries upon the death of the trustee or her termination of the trust, vested the property in the trustee and beneficiaries so that trust property was not part of decedent’s gross estate so as to be subject to federal estate taxes. Hays' Estate v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 169, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 4012 (5th Cir. 1950).

Execution by husband and wife of deed to homestead property to son, delivery of deed to clerk and its recordation, son being overseas in war, vested record and legal title to property in son, which could not be destroyed by destruction of recorded deed by mother. Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, 204 Miss. 206, 37 So. 2d 256, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 356 (Miss. 1948).

One who by his tenant is in actual possession under a deed to a part of a tract of land conveyed to him thereby, there being no adverse possession, is deemed in legal possession of the whole tract conveyed. Houston v. National Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 80 Miss. 31, 31 So. 540, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 314 (Miss. 1902); Seals v. Williams, 80 Miss. 234, 31 So. 707, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 236 (Miss. 1902).

9. —Extent of rights acquired.

Deed to property executed by wife conveys only interest in property owned by her, which is an undivided one-half interest when wife owns interest by reason of deed naming husband and wife as grantees, and deletion of husband’s name from deed after its delivery to grantees does not increase interest of wife in property. Prater v. Prater, 208 Miss. 59, 43 So. 2d 582, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 408 (Miss. 1949).

Conveyance by cotenant of all his right, title and interest, conveys to grantee merely such right as grantor has in land, usual covenants are restricted to such interest, and grantee becomes substituted for grantor as tenant in common with other tenants. Howard v. Wactor, 41 So. 2d 259 (Miss. 1949).

Deed to railroad of a right-of-way for 200 feet through land of grantor, identifying no particular strip with that certainty which a conveyance of the fee would require, and reserving to grantor rights as to timber and of cultivation, conveyed only a floating easement or right of usage. New Orleans & N. R. R. v. Morrison, 203 Miss. 791, 35 So. 2d 68, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 323 (Miss. 1948).

Where an easement will satisfy the purpose of the grant, a fee will not be included in the grant unless expressly provided. New Orleans & N. R. R. v. Morrison, 203 Miss. 791, 35 So. 2d 68, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 323 (Miss. 1948).

Where a life estate is created by a deed which provides that the holder shall have a fee-simple title should the remaindermen predecease the life tenant, without issue the life tenant, by virtue of such provision, has an executory interest in the land which is not conveyed in a deed of the life estate from the holder thereof to the remaindermen, and the grantees of the life estate cannot convey a fee-simple title on the strength of such conveyance to them of the life estate. Ricks v. Riddell, 200 Miss. 122, 26 So. 2d 782, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 273 (Miss. 1946).

A deed to a strip of land limiting the grantee’s interest to “a private easement or for street purposes only” does not authorize the grantee to take exclusive possession of the land. Lott v. Payne, 82 Miss. 218, 33 So. 948, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1903).

The grantee in a deed conveying only title to land cannot maintain trespass as assignee of the grantor. Blodgett v. Seals, 78 Miss. 522, 29 So. 852, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1900).

A grantee’s covenant to pay a stipulated rent, contained in and constituting the consideration of the deed to him, is binding between the assignee of the covenant and the assignee of the land in fee. Wright v. Hardy, 76 Miss. 524, 24 So. 697, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 96 (Miss. 1898).

A conveyance of land vests in the grantee by way of assignment all rights of action and defense that his grantor had in respect thereto. Fink v. Henderson, 74 Miss. 8, 19 So. 892, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 1896).

10. —Priority of other interests.

A grantee in a voluntary conveyance takes subject to all existing equities against his grantor, and cannot afterward acquire the lands at or through a tax sale freed from such equities if the grantor could not have done so. North American Trust Co. v. Lanier, 78 Miss. 418, 28 So. 804, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1900).

A grantee of land takes subject to a prior unrecorded deed from his grantor of which he has actual notice. Henderson v. Cameron, 73 Miss. 843, 20 So. 2, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 213 (Miss. 1896).

11. — —Notice.

A purchaser of land from a life tenant is not entitled to recover from the remainderman, or have a lien on the remainder interest, for the cost of improvements made on the property by him, and equity will not, on the mere ground of the remainderman’s silence, relieve one who is perfectly acquainted with his rights, or has the means of becoming so, by examining the land records or otherwise, and the purchaser from the life tenant may not claim the benefit of an estoppel when he does not examine the land records, even if the true owner remains silent at a time when he knows another is about to purchase the land or make improvements thereon. Collier v. King, 251 Miss. 607, 170 So. 2d 632, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 888 (Miss. 1965).

Purchaser of land with notice from public records that owner is dead at the time is charged with constructive notice of whether or not owner left will, if not, who were heirs at law, and whether debts of deceased had been paid. Howard v. Wactor, 41 So. 2d 259 (Miss. 1949).

Mortgagee for value and without notice, not chargeable with unrecorded assignment of lease. Corinth Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 111 Miss. 62, 71 So. 266, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 241 (Miss. 1916).

Deed to land with “party wall agreement and party ownership agreement thereunto appertaining, and easements and tenements,” sufficient to put grantee on notice of any such encumbrances. Binder v. Weinberg, 94 Miss. 817, 48 So. 1013, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 363 (Miss. 1909).

12. Effect of grantor's mental state.

The grantees of a deed, who had a fiduciary relationship with the grantor, overcame the presumption of undue influence in the execution of the deed, where the grantor, along with her 3 children, initiated seeking preparation of the deed, the grantor expressed her intent to convey the property to the grantees several weeks prior to the execution of the deed, the attorney who prepared the deed testified that the grantor knew what she was doing when the deed was executed, and the grantor remained in complete control of her finances at all times. Vega v. Estate of Mullen, 583 So. 2d 1259, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 119 (Miss. 1991).

Marriage ties alone do not constitute a “confidential relationship” sufficient to raise a presumption of undue influence. Smith v. Smith, 574 So. 2d 644, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 787 (Miss. 1990), aff'd, 672 So. 2d 1194, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1996).

The date of execution of the deed should be the critical time when considering the standard of “weakness of intellect” or “great weakness of mind” with respect to the mental capacity to execute a deed. Furthermore, the “before and after” rule, applied in cases of permanent insanity, should not apply in cases involving a “weakness of intellect. Smith v. Smith, 574 So. 2d 644, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 787 (Miss. 1990), aff'd, 672 So. 2d 1194, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1996).

There was sufficient evidence to rebut a presumption of undue influence with respect to the conveyance of a farm by a father to his sons where the father was “very sharp” mentally, aware of his family and finances, strong-willed, and, although he lived with one of the grantees at the time of the conveyance, also lived at various times with others and, therefore, was not solely dependant on the grantees. Miner v. Bertasi, 530 So. 2d 168, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1988).

The burden of proving lack of mental capacity rests on the party seeking to have the deed of conveyance set aside. Clear and convincing evidence is required to establish lack of mental capacity and the crucial time in such incapacity is when the document is executed. In re Conservatorship of Stevens, 523 So. 2d 319, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 95 (Miss. 1988).

In order to be capable of executing deed, grantor must have mentality sufficient to enable him to understand and appreciate the nature and effect of the transaction. Puryear v. Austin, 205 Miss. 590, 39 So. 2d 257, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 449 (Miss. 1949).

Deed of well-educated man signed by mark, shortly before death, at time when blood transfusion was being administered and when grantor was of advanced age, ravaged by disease, weak and irrational, conveying all grantor’s property to his brother, without consideration, and including in description in deed land and lease not owned by grantor and about which he made no comment, is entirely void because of grantor’s mental incapacity. Puryear v. Austin, 205 Miss. 590, 39 So. 2d 257, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 449 (Miss. 1949).

Deed from mother to two daughters is not presumptively void because of confidential relationship between parties, or because of undue influence, when parties lived in residence together, mother could not speak English and daughters acted as her agents in all her business transactions and acted as her interpreters. Dantone v. Dantone, 205 Miss. 420, 38 So. 2d 908, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 439 (Miss. 1949).

13. Delivery and acceptance of deed.

Where a widow assigned and acknowledged a warranty deed conveying her farm to her niece, reserving a life estate to herself, which deed was handed to her brother with the instructions to keep and deliver it to the niece upon the widow’s death, which instructions were followed, there was a valid delivery from the widow to the niece in view of the undisputed testimony that the grantor reserved no right to recall the deed, and that the delivery to the brother was unequivocally to hold for the niece. Myers v. Laird, 230 Miss. 675, 93 So. 2d 828, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 1957).

Grantee manifests acceptance of deed when, upon discovery of recorded deed, he claims property conveyed and takes possession. Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, 204 Miss. 206, 37 So. 2d 256, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 356 (Miss. 1948).

Delivery of deed, after proper execution, to chancery clerk for recording is constructive delivery to grantee when it is apparent either from words or acts of grantor that it is his intention to treat deed as being delivered. Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, 204 Miss. 206, 37 So. 2d 256, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 356 (Miss. 1948).

A valid conveyance presupposes a complete delivery, which does not mean a mere manual possession of the document of conveyance, but a transfer, as by livery of seizin, which constitutes a deliberate present investiture of title. Palmer v. Riggs, 197 Miss. 256, 19 So. 2d 807, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 293 (Miss. 1944).

A deed made to two grantees may be delivered to and accepted by one of them so as to invest him with an undivided interest in the land and yet be ineffectual as to the other for want of a delivery to and acceptance on his part. Chapman v. White Sewing-Mach Co., 76 Miss. 821, 25 So. 868, 1899 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1899), modified, Chapman v. White Sewing-Mach. Co., 77 Miss. 890, 28 So. 749, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1900).

14. Construction of particular terms.

The wording of a deed which provided that “we hereby bargain, sell, convey and warrant to the Trustees of Oakgrove Consolidated High School and their successors the following described land. . . ” could only connote a conveyance absolute and the grantors’ children would not be heard some 50 years later to say that the grantors’ intent was something entirely different from what was expressed in the plain and simple legalese in the recorded instrument of conveyance. Garraway v. Yonce, 549 So. 2d 1341, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 453 (Miss. 1989).

While the trend of the law in the construction of deeds has been extremely strict, and the words of the deed have been paramount in determining the type of conveyance executed rather than the true intent of the grantor, the new trend and interpretation of this rule of law is toward ascertaining the true intent of the grantor when dealing with conveyances by deed, as has been done in construing conveyances by will in this state for almost a hundred years. Avant v. Wells, 244 So. 2d 398, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1329 (Miss. 1971).

A deed which recited that the grantor did “hereby warrant, sell and convey” certain land to his wife for a named consideration, but further provided that after the death of the wife, by fee simple, the property be equally divided between two named persons, sufficiently showed that it was the intention of the grantor to convey to his wife a life estate only, and upon her death a remainder to be divided equally between the two named persons. Avant v. Wells, 244 So. 2d 398, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1329 (Miss. 1971).

Where the recitals of a deed announce a purpose to invest a life estate in the grantee, with remainder to his children, but the granting party conveys the land in fee simple to the grantee and his heirs, the grant controls. Dunbar v. Aldrich, 79 Miss. 698, 31 So. 341, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 114 (Miss. 1901).

15. Miscellaneous.

In order to have merger of title, it is necessary that first and second deeds of trust be owned entirely by the same party. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Stewart, 608 So. 2d 1120, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1992).

Separate deeds may be used to sever estate in the entirety under narrow range of circumstances whereby both spouses act in concert pursuant to common purpose and without derogation of other’s right of survivorship. Thus, separate deeds could be used by husband and wife to sever estate in the entirety where both deeds were executed, acknowledged and recorded at same time and place, and ownership arrangement regarding the property was clearly division of marital property in anticipation of spouses’ impending divorce. Newton v. Long, 588 So. 2d 192 (1991).

An otherwise valid warranty deed would not be set aside for failure of consideration; if there were any failure of consideration, the result would be addressed by awarding damages, rather than a cancellation of the deed. Vega v. Estate of Mullen, 583 So. 2d 1259, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 119 (Miss. 1991).

Where land is described in a deed by township, range and section, so that it may be located with absolute certainty, it is of no importance to the validity of the conveyance that the lands or a portion thereof are recited as lying in an incorrect county. Holliman v. Charles L. Cherry & Assoc., Inc., 569 So. 2d 1139, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 204 (Miss. 1990).

One who relies upon a conveyance by deed is not precluded from claiming adversely possessed land even though the land description in the deed does not include contiguous land adversely possessed by the predecessor in title. Stallings v. Bailey, 558 So. 2d 858, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 157 (Miss. 1990).

A deed which conveyed a “2 and one-half/32 and one-half (2.5/32.5)” mineral interest in one land parcel comprising 25 acres and another land parcel comprising 7.5 acres, “containing in the aggregate of 32.5 acres” conveyed a full and undivided 2.5 mineral acres out of the aggregate of 32.5 acres, rather than an undivided 2.5/32.5 fractional interest from each acre in the 25-acre track and also from each acre in the 7.5-acre track. Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 63 (Miss. 1990).

If a party who contemplates purchasing a piece of property wishes to protect himself or herself against the possibility that he or she may be unable to secure financing adequate to make the purchase, it is incumbent upon that party to so provide by clear language in the contract. Otherwise, this is a risk the buyer assumes when he or she executes the contract. Osborne v. Bullins, 549 So. 2d 1337, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 448 (Miss. 1989).

Although, ordinarily, previous negotiations or contracts are merged into a deed of conveyance, certain preliminary stipulations, such as are independent and collateral, and not such preliminary agreements as would be merged in the conveyance, survive the deed and confer independent causes of action. Knight v. McCain, 531 So. 2d 590, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 435 (Miss. 1988).

Where a remainderman affirmatively misled a purchaser from the life tenant into believing that if he purchased the property he would get a good title, and the remainderman thereafter observed the day to day progress of the construction by the purchaser of a home upon the property without any mention of his remainder interest, the purchaser was entitled to a lien for the value of the improvements he had so constructed. Collier v. King, 251 Miss. 607, 170 So. 2d 632, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 888 (Miss. 1965).

Under this section, a residuary devise or bequest carries everything the testator has attempted but failed to dispose of, unless a contrary intention appears from the will. Oliphant v. Skelton, 230 Miss. 518, 93 So. 2d 181, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 392 (Miss. 1957).

One who purchases real property on faith of public records from wife does not occupy position of innocent purchaser for value as to interest of husband when deed conveying property to husband and wife has been altered before recording by deletion of husband’s name from deed as one of the grantees. Prater v. Prater, 208 Miss. 59, 43 So. 2d 582, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 408 (Miss. 1949).

Purchaser of property under forgery is not exalted by law into preferred position of innocent purchaser for value and thief can give no title. Prater v. Prater, 208 Miss. 59, 43 So. 2d 582, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 408 (Miss. 1949).

Purchaser of real property who refuses to carry out contract to purchase on other grounds cannot, on appeal from judgment in favor of vendor, raise the objection to form of deed tendered that it required vendee to pay taxes, since grantor did not have opportunity to meet this objection, which he might have corrected had any request been made that he do so. Vanlandingham v. Jenkins, 207 Miss. 882, 43 So. 2d 578, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 399 (Miss. 1949).

Lessor not obligated to put lessee in possession without express provision therefor, as tenant has statutory power to evict an intruder. West v. Kitchell, 109 Miss. 328, 68 So. 469, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 159 (Miss. 1915).

A deed that describes land by section, township and range is not void for uncertainty because it does not describe the state and county in which the land is situated. Ladnier v. Ladnier, 75 Miss. 777, 23 So. 430, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 22 (Miss. 1898).

Unless specially authorized by the terms of the instrument, a trustee in a deed of trust is unauthorized to appoint another to act in his place. Carey v. Fulmer, 74 Miss. 729, 21 So. 752, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 54 (Miss. 1897).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A tax lien is extinguished once the State acquires property, not necessarily when the deed was recorded. Miller, February 23, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0039.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Conveyance or reservation of minerals as including minerals recoverable only by open pit mining. 1 A.L.R.2d 787.

Restrictive covenants, conditions, or agreements in respect of real property discriminating against persons on account of race, color, or religion. 3 A.L.R.2d 466.

Rights as between vendor and vendee under land contract in respect of interest. 25 A.L.R.2d 951.

Deeds: meaning of terms “dwelling” or “dwelling house” or “house” as used in the conveyance or exception or reservation clauses. 38 A.L.R.3d 1419.

Validity and construction or restrictive covenant requiring consent to construction on lot. 40 A.L.R.3d 864.

Pre-emptive rights to realty as violation of rule against perpetuities or rule concerning restraints on alienation. 40 A.L.R.3d 920.

Covenant in deed restricting material to be used in building construction. 41 A.L.R.3d 1290.

Applicability of statute of frauds to agreement to rescind contract for sale of land. 42 A.L.R.3d 242.

Specific performance of land contract notwithstanding failure of vendee to make required payments on time. 55 A.L.R.3d 10.

Construction and operation of “optional agreement-flat payment” land contract under which optionee has right to take title when periodic payments (otherwise to be treated as rent) equal agreed price. 55 A.L.R.3d 159.

Independent option to purchase real estate as violating rule against perpetuities or restraints on alienation. 66 A.L.R.3d 1294.

Specificity of description of premises as affecting enforceability of contract to convey real property-modern cases. 73 A.L.R.4th 135.

Effect of Federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (12 USCS §§ 2801-2809) on enforcement of state disclosure and antiredlining statutes against federal financial institutions. 57 A.L.R. Fed. 322.

Am. Jur.

14 Am. Jur. 2d, Champerty and Maintenance §§ 11 et seq.

5A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Champerty and Maintenance, Forms 31, 32 (answer alleging that conveyance was champertous).

8 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev) Deeds, Forms 14-18 (jury instructions as to what constitutes delivery of deed).

7 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Deeds §§ 87:231 et seq. (reservations and exceptions).

13 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 483, Delivery of Deeds.

17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 283, Voluntary Grantor’s Mistake in Conveying more than was Intended.

38 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 633, Dedication of Land to Public Use.

CJS.

14 C.J.S., Champerty and Maintenance

Barratry and Related Matters § 16.

14 C.J.S., Champerty and Maintenance; Barratry and Related Matters § 16.

26A C.J.S., Deeds §§ 164 et seq.

§ 89-1-3. Land to be conveyed only by writing.

An estate of inheritance or freehold, or for a term of more than one (1) year, in lands shall not be conveyed from one to another unless the conveyance be declared by writing signed and delivered.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (1); 1857, ch. 36, art. 19; 1871, § 2302; 1880, § 1188; 1892, § 2434; 1906, § 2763; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2267; 1930, § 2111; 1942, § 832.

Cross References —

Definition of term “written,” see §1-3-61.

Operation of decree of chancery court as conveyance, see §11-5-85.

Land office certificates vesting title in land, see §13-1-131.

Statutes of frauds, see §§15-3-1 et seq.,89-1-47.

Conveyances by attorney in fact, see §87-3-3.

Requirement that spouse join in conveying homestead, see §89-1-29.

Requirements for valid conveyance between husband and wife, see §93-3-9.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Instrument executed by agent acting under parol authority.

3. Delivery.

4. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

A severance from a joint tenancy to a tenancy in common is not a conveyance when it arises from the course of dealing, but is simply a change from one form of ownership to that of another form and arises by the operation of law. Bird v. Stein, 102 F. Supp. 399, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4742 (D. Miss. 1952), rev'd, 204 F.2d 122, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3982 (5th Cir. Miss. 1953).

No estate in land passed under this section by verbal gift. Smith v. Taylor, 183 Miss. 542, 184 So. 423, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 267 (Miss. 1938).

To establish title by estoppel, evidence must show all necessary elements of estoppel. Roberts v. Bookout, 162 Miss. 676, 139 So. 175, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1932).

Mortgagee for value without notice is not chargeable with unrecorded assignment of lease. Corinth Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 111 Miss. 62, 71 So. 266, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 241 (Miss. 1916).

License to go on land and take turpentine from trees, is not an interest in land requiring writing. Newton v. Long, 107 Miss. 349, 65 So. 460, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 91 (Miss. 1914).

At common law “land,” embraced both soil and natural products such as trees growing upon and affixed to it. L. N. Dantzler Lumber Co. v. State, 97 Miss. 355, 53 So. 1, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1910), limited, Merrill Engineering Co. v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 192 Miss. 378, 5 So. 2d 666, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 5 (Miss. 1942).

When reasonably possible, conveyances should be so construed as to render them operative. Swan v. New England Mortg. & Sec. Co., 75 Miss. 907, 23 So. 627, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 40 (Miss. 1898).

This section forbids a verbal agreement between two adjoining proprietors that a division wall, built in part upon the land of each, shall be the sole property of one of them. Weems v. Mayfield, 75 Miss. 286, 22 So. 892, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1897).

A parol agreement authorizing the cutting of standing trees is within this section. Walton v. Lowrey, 74 Miss. 484, 21 So. 243, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 165 (Miss. 1896).

A license to use land is good only to those in whose favor or for whose use it is given. Agnew v. Jones, 74 Miss. 347, 23 So. 25, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1896).

A verbal lease of land to begin at a future fixed time, and to continue not more than one year, is valid. McCroy v. Toney, 66 Miss. 233, 5 So. 392, 1888 Miss. LEXIS 95 (Miss. 1888).

Real estate cannot be passed or incumbered for a longer period than one year by a mere deposit of the title deeds. Gothard v. Flynn, 25 Miss. 58, 1852 Miss. LEXIS 142 (Miss. 1852).

2. Instrument executed by agent acting under parol authority.

Agent under parol authority may execute written contract binding principal to exchange of lands. Hopper v. McAllum, 87 Miss. 441, 40 So. 2, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 159 (Miss. 1905).

Inasmuch as a lease of land for more than one year must be by deed the appointment of an agent to make it must be by deed. Lobdell v. Mason, 71 Miss. 937, 15 So. 44, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1894).

An instrument executed by an agent who is only verbally authorized purporting to rent land for more than one year is invalid as a lease for the time over one year, but in equity it is good as a contract binding the principal to execute a lease. Lobdell v. Mason, 71 Miss. 937, 15 So. 44, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1894).

3. Delivery.

Where a widow assigned and acknowledged a warranty deed conveying her farm to her niece, reserving a life estate to herself, which deed was handed to her brother with the instructions to keep and deliver it to her niece upon the widow’s death, which instructions were followed, there was a valid delivery from the widow to the niece in view of the undisputed testimony that the grantor reserved no right to recall the deed, and that the delivery to the brother was unequivocally to hold for the niece. Myers v. Laird, 230 Miss. 675, 93 So. 2d 828, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 1957).

Delivery may be constructive as well as actual, it being sufficient if the words or acts of the grantor manifest his intention to treat the deed as having been delivered. Frederic v. Merchants & Marine Bank, 200 Miss. 755, 28 So. 2d 843, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1947).

Where owner put purchaser in possession of house under oral agreement to sell, and executed but did not deliver deed, there was no change of interest or title. Osler v. Atlas Assurance Co., 127 Miss. 511, 90 So. 185, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 253 (Miss. 1921).

Deposit of deed to be delivered by depository to grantee after grantor’s death, if without reservation, is sufficient delivery to vest title. Wilson v. Bridgforth, 108 Miss. 199, 66 So. 524, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 1914).

Act of grantor placing deed in tin box among his private papers in wardrobe used by him and wife, did not constitute delivery to wife. Ligon v. Barton, 88 Miss. 135, 40 So. 555, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1906).

If a deed be once effectually delivered, no subsequent acts of the grantor can disparage the title conveyed. Hall v. Waddill, 78 Miss. 16, 27 So. 936, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1900).

To effect a valid delivery of a deed the grantor must part with it so absolutely and irrevocably as never thereafter to have the right to recall it. Hall v. Waddill, 78 Miss. 16, 27 So. 936, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1900).

4. Miscellaneous.

The statutory signing requirements of §§15-3-1,89-1-3,89-1-29 and91-9-1 [repealed] were satisfied with respect to a deed of trust relating to homestead property, even though the wife neglected to sign the deed of trust document, where her signature appeared on the 2 attachments to the deed of trust-the property description and the adjustable rate mortgage rider-which constituted an integral part of the deed of trust. United Miss. Bank v. GMAC Mortgage Co., 615 So. 2d 1174, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 1993).

The wording of a deed which provided that “we hereby bargain, sell, convey and warrant to the Trustees of Oakgrove Consolidated High School and their successors the following described land. . . ” could only connote a conveyance absolute and the grantors’ children would not be heard some 50 years later to say that the grantors’ intent was something entirely different from what was expressed in the plain and simple legalese in the recorded instrument of conveyance. Garraway v. Yonce, 549 So. 2d 1341, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 453 (Miss. 1989).

A conveyance of land executed to a corporation in violation of the Mississippi Blue Sky Law (Laws, 1916, ch. 97) was utterly void and imparted no notice to subsequent purchasers, nor did it set in motion the running of the 10-year statute of limitations. Mississippi State Highway Com. v. Smith, 197 So. 2d 212, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1503 (Miss. 1967).

Alteration of deed by deletion of name of one of two grantees named in deed when it was delivered does not operate to pass title to grantee whose name remains in deed as title to one-half interest in property which has vested in grantee whose name was deleted can pass only by instrument of writing. Prater v. Prater, 208 Miss. 59, 43 So. 2d 582, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 408 (Miss. 1949).

One who purchases real property on faith of public records from wife does not occupy position of innocent purchaser for value as to interest of husband when deed conveying property to husband and wife has been altered before recording by deletion of husband’s name from deed as one of the grantees. Prater v. Prater, 208 Miss. 59, 43 So. 2d 582, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 408 (Miss. 1949).

Deed to property executed by wife conveys only interest in property owned by her, which is an undivided one-half interest when wife owns interest by reason of deed naming husband and wife as grantees, and deletion of husband’s name from deed after its delivery to grantees does not increase interest of wife in property. Prater v. Prater, 208 Miss. 59, 43 So. 2d 582, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 408 (Miss. 1949).

Instrument purporting to be a deed, which has no grantee, either corporation or person, in being is void; deed for school and church purposes to Collins Graveyard and Collins School House was ineffectual, where no corporations so named were known in the community. Morgan v. Collins School House, 160 Miss. 321, 133 So. 675, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 172 (Miss. 1931).

Deed for support of grantor not cancelled for breach of agreement where it provides no lien nor forfeiture on condition broken; such deed not set aside on grounds grantor did not understand terms in absence of timely application. Wynn v. Kendall, 122 Miss. 809, 85 So. 85, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 477 (Miss. 1920).

A deed conveying lands in a legal subdivision described as a corner or fractional corner of the same containing a certain area is not void for uncertainty. Swan v. New England Mortg. & Sec. Co., 75 Miss. 907, 23 So. 627, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 40 (Miss. 1898).

A deed conveying “lot 36 in the town of Webb” is not void for uncertainty, since the courts will take judicial notice of the municipal subdivisions of the state and that they are in the counties to which they belong. Wilkerson v. Webb, 75 Miss. 403, 23 So. 180 (Miss. 1897).

A verbal agreement by the owner to convey land to a county for school purposes, by which third parties are induced to erect a schoolhouse thereon, is an irrevocable license for the purpose for which it was made as long as the house is used for the purpose specified. Agnew v. Jones, 74 Miss. 347, 23 So. 25, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1896).

The section does not prevent the vesting of the title to lands by virtue of an adverse possession for the statutory period, though the holding were begun under a parol gift or purchase. Davis v. Davis, 68 Miss. 478, 10 So. 70, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 52 (Miss. 1891).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Rights as between vendor and vendee under land contract in respect of interest. 25 A.L.R.2d 951.

Applicability of statute of frauds to agreement to rescind contract for sale of land. 42 A.L.R.3d 242.

Statute of frauds: validity of lease or sublease subscribed by one of the parties only. 46 A.L.R.3d 619.

Specificity of description of premises as affecting enforceablilty of contract to convey real property-modern cases. 73 A.L.R.4th 135.

Specificity of description of premises as affecting enforceability of lease. 73 A.L.R.4th 236.

Am. Jur.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds §§ 105 et seq.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 60-64.

38 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 633, Dedication of Land to Public Use.

CJS.

26A C.J.S., Deeds § 39.

51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 21 et seq.

§ 89-1-5. Words of inheritance not necessary.

Every estate in lands granted, conveyed, or devised, although the words deemed necessary by the common law to transfer an estate of inheritance be not added, shall be deemed a fee-simple if a less estate be not limited by express words, or unless it clearly appear from the conveyance or will that a less estate was intended to be passed thereby.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (23); 1857, ch. 36, art. 2; 1871, § 2285; 1880, § 1189; 1892, § 2435; 1906, § 2764; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2268; 1930, § 2112; 1942, § 833.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Deeds to railroads.

1. In general.

Section 89-1-5, which provides, in part, that “the words deemed necessary by the common law to transfer an estate of inheritance” are no longer necessary to create a fee simple, does not alter the principle that reservations or exceptions expressed in doubtful or ambiguous language are, as a general rule, construed most strongly against the grantor and in favor of the grantee. Deason v. Cox, 527 So. 2d 624, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 209 (Miss. 1988).

Under a land sale contract providing for reconveyance to the vendor in the event that industrial facilities were not developed on the property within five years, a condition which was not satisfied, the purchaser was required to convey fee simple title (including timber rights) where, although timber rights had been reserved to the vendor in the original deed and were later conveyed to the purchaser for separate consideration, the rights under the timber deed expired while the property was possessed by the purchaser and thus, merged into the ownership under the original deed. Forbes v. Columbia Pulp & Paper Co., 340 So. 2d 734, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1732 (Miss. 1976).

Language in a will that all of the testator’s property was to pass to his wife and daughter and their descendents created a fee simple in the wife and daughter and not a life estate. Bradford v. Federal Land Bank, 338 So. 2d 388, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1620 (Miss. 1976).

A devise of all testator’s property, except a certain parcel, to his wife, was construed to give her the fee notwithstanding an expressed desire that testator’s daughter should receive all property that her mother should have at her death. Wheeler v. Williams, 235 Miss. 142, 108 So. 2d 578, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 412 (Miss. 1959).

Under this section decedent’s transfer of land to herself as trustee for the benefit of her four children and the heirs at law of any of such children who should die during the continuance of the trust, with provision for distribution of the trust to the beneficiaries upon death of the trustee or her termination of the trust, vested the property in the trustee and the beneficiaries, so that the trust property was not part of decedent’s gross estate so as to be subject to federal estate taxes. Hays' Estate v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 169, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 4012 (5th Cir. 1950).

Devise of land without words of inheritance vests fee-simple title. Strickland v. Delta Inv. Co., 163 Miss. 772, 137 So. 734, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1931).

Devise to two daughters providing that in case of daughters’ predeceasing testatrix, their children were to inherit each mother’s share, or if one died without children whole estate was to go to other, or if both died without children estate was to go over, was a contingency providing against death of daughters before testatrix, and upon their survival of testatrix they took a fee simple. Nations v. Colonial & United States Mortg. Co., 115 Miss. 741, 76 So. 642, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1917).

2. Deeds to railroads.

While Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-5 contained a presumption that a fee simple title passes unless expressly limited, there also existed a presumption of an easement when a deed failed to specifically identify a tract of land to be used for a railway, and where the railroad’s deed gave it a right to enter upon and hold the property, but did not convey the land itself, and the language that the conveyance was against the grantors and their heirs and assigns forever was not in the granting clause, the railroad only had a right of way, and thus, the interest that plaintiff potential purchasers of an industrial plant acquired from the railroad, through a quit claim deed for the property that adjoined the industrial plant, was only a right of way, and the potential purchasers’ claim of trespass against defendants, the industrial plant seller and the ultimate buyer, failed on defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Fibre Corp. v. GSO Am., Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37906 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 8, 2005).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds § 23.

CJS.

26A C.J.S., Deeds § 42.

§ 89-1-7. Estate in two or more persons.

All conveyances or devises of land made to two (2) or more persons, including conveyances or devises to husband and wife, shall be construed to create estates in common and not in joint tenancy or entirety, unless it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was intended to create an estate in joint tenancy or entirety with the right of survivorship. But an estate in joint tenancy or entirety with right of survivorship may be created by such conveyance from the owner or owners to himself, themselves or others, or to himself, themselves and others.

An estate in joint tenancy or entirety with right of survivorship between spouses may be terminated by deed of one spouse to the other without necessity of joinder of the grantee spouse and without regard to whether the property constitutes any part of the homestead of the spouses.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 36, art. 18; 1871, § 2301; 1880, § 1197; 1892, § 2441; 1906, § 2770; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2274; 1930, § 2113; 1942, § 834; Laws, 1958, ch. 237; Laws, 1993, ch. 395, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

Cross References —

Partition of property, see §§11-21-1 et seq.

Larceny by cotenant, see §97-17-63.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Tenancy in common.

3. Joint tenancy.

4. Tenancy by entirety.

5. Conveyances to trustees.

6. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

This section does not apply to mortgages or choses in action. Vaughn v. Vaughn, 238 Miss. 342, 118 So. 2d 620, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 411 (Miss. 1960).

The law does not favor joint estates with the right of survivorship. Cross v. O'Cavanagh, 198 Miss. 137, 21 So. 2d 473, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1945).

The statute does not apply to conveyances made before its passage. Gresham v. King, 65 Miss. 387, 4 So. 120, 1888 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1888).

2. Tenancy in common.

A reservation or conveyance of a fractional interest in minerals creates a tenancy-in-common between the parties as to the minerals. Thornhill v. System Fuels, Inc., 523 So. 2d 983, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 172 (Miss. 1988).

The rule which prevents one tenant in common from purchasing an outstanding title to the common property and setting it up against his cotenant is founded upon a confidential relation which is presumed to exist between them, and has no application where the circumstances surrounding them negative any such relation, and show that they, though in law tenants in common, are not such in fact, and are asserting hostile claims against each other with reference to the common property. Bayless v. Alexander, 245 So. 2d 17, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1349 (Miss. 1971).

Where a will provided that two legatees were to take the dividends from certain bank stock for life with the power to sell stock upon agreement among themselves, the remainder to go to two named remaindermen, the relationship created was that of tenancy in common between the legatees, so that upon the death of one legatee his interest would pass to the remaindermen. Birmingham v. Conger, 222 So. 2d 388, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1530 (Miss. 1969).

A conveyance to two or more individuals is presumed to create a tenancy in common in the named individuals, absent evidence rebutting such a presumption. Chevron Oil Co. v. Clark, 291 F. Supp. 552, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12565 (S.D. Miss. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 432 F.2d 280, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7176 (5th Cir. Miss. 1970).

Where a trustee, who was the owner of a one-half interest in land, and a woman, who was the record owner of a one-half interest of the surface and three-tenths of the minerals in the land, were tenants in common, upon the conveyance by the trustee to a third person of his one-half interest, the third person became a tenant in common with the woman. Anderson v. Boyd, 229 Miss. 596, 91 So. 2d 537, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 642 (Miss. 1956).

Under will devising brother one-sixth, two sisters each one-third, and former wife one-sixth of remainder, their interest was estate in common, and admissions against interest by less than all of them were not admissible in will contest. Nebhan v. Mansour, 162 Miss. 418, 139 So. 166, 139 So. 878, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 120 (Miss. 1932).

Residuary legacy of real estate to two nephews for their lives made nephews tenants in common. Henry v. Henderson, 103 Miss. 48, 60 So. 33, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1912).

Conveyance to “Pink Boutwell and wife” created tenancy in common, and husband and wife each owned an undivided one-half interest. Conn v. Boutwell, 101 Miss. 353, 58 So. 105, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 155 (Miss. 1911).

Upon renunciation of will by widow, executors who were residuary legatees became tenants in common with widow and were entitled to partition of the estate. Laughlin v. O'Reily, 92 Miss. 121, 45 So. 193, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. 1907).

Unity of possession only necessary to constitute tenancy in common, regardless of commencement, quantum of interest, or source of title. Laughlin v. O'Reily, 92 Miss. 121, 45 So. 193, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. 1907).

A child in esse at the date of a conveyance to his mother and children, takes as tenant in common with the mother, under this section. Brabham v. Day, 75 Miss. 923, 23 So. 578, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 36 (Miss. 1898).

Conveyance to three nieces for their lives, and at their death to the descendants of their bodies in fee, if any there be, and if they have none to survive them, then to the heirs of their brothers and sisters in fee, created a tenancy in common for the life of the last survivor of the nieces, the heirs of predeceasing tenants in common holding in common with the surviving tenants. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 72 Miss. 749, 18 So. 479, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 63 (Miss. 1895).

A devise to two persons, without other words, makes them tenants in common. Nichols v. Denny, 37 Miss. 59, 1859 Miss. LEXIS 3 (Miss. 1859).

3. Joint tenancy.

Award of the entire purchase price of a home to one of the unmarried joint tenants (JT1) was appropriate. Joint tenants were allowed to seek partition of a property under Miss. Code Ann. §11-21-3 partition, the chancellor could adjust the equities and determine the claims of the joint tenants under Miss. Code Ann. §11-21-9, and JT1 had paid the entire purchase price for the home along with the cost of all utilities, insurance, club dues, and taxes while JT2 had paid nothing. Jones v. Graphia, 95 So.3d 751, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 493 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).

A deed conveying property to a husband and wife specifically created a joint tenancy, where it was conveyed to them “as joint tenants, not as tenants in common, but with the rights of survivorship in each upon death of either.” Ayers v. Petro, 417 So. 2d 912, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2087 (Miss. 1982).

Although joint tenancies are not favored in Mississippi, they may be created by the use of specific language in the deed or other instrument. O'Connor v. Dickerson, 188 So. 2d 241, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1374 (Miss. 1966).

Deeds to husband and wife “and the survivor of them” manifested an intention to create an estate in joint tenancy and not an estate in common, entitling the wife to take as survivor as against the heirs at law of her deceased husband. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 207 Miss. 480, 42 So. 2d 438, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 356 (Miss. 1949).

Deed of an undivided four-fifths interest in certain land to two persons “jointly” did not create joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Doran v. Beale, 106 Miss. 305, 63 So. 647, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 135 (Miss. 1913).

4. Tenancy by entirety.

Because the debtors owned their homestead as tenants by the entirety, any non-exempt equity in the debtors’ homestead could be administered only to the extent of the joint claims against the debtors. In re Pace, 521 B.R. 124, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4341 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014).

Plaintiffs contended and defendant agreed that because defendant failed to have both plaintiffs, as tenants by the entirety, execute the construction contract, the lien did not attach to the property as a means of securing the debt owed only by one plaintiff to defendant, but the other plaintiff’s alleged knowledge and consent to work being done on property she owned might amount to authorization, regardless of whether or not she was a signatory to the contract, and summary judgment was inappropriate at this stage. Ward v. McCammon (In re Ward), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1200 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Mar. 28, 2014).

Property was held by plaintiffs as tenants by the entirety, and by virtue of each spouse possessing an undivided interest in the entire estate, the property was not subject to unilateral action of less than all the owners. Ward v. McCammon (In re Ward), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1200 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Mar. 28, 2014).

Chapter 13 debtor who owned real property with her husband as a tenant by the entireties, which she claimed as her homestead, was allowed under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(b)(3)(B) to exempt the full value of the property from unsecured creditors’ claims for debts she incurred separately, when her husband did not join her in filing bankruptcy. Mississippi was a common law state, the common law of Mississippi constituted “applicable nonbankruptcy law” under § 522(b)(3)(B), and her homestead was exempt under Mississippi law from any process which could arise from the claims at issue. In re Dixon, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5680 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2011).

Separate deeds may be used to sever estate in the entirety under narrow range of circumstances whereby both spouses act in concert pursuant to common purpose and without derogation of other’s right of survivorship. Thus, separate deeds could be used by husband and wife to sever estate in the entirety where both deeds were executed, acknowledged and recorded at same time and place, and ownership arrangement regarding property was clearly division of marital property in anticipation of spouses’ impending divorce. Newton v. Long, 588 So. 2d 192 (1991).

A tenancy by the entirety with right of survivorship was not converted to a tenancy in common by divorce of the parties; since a tenancy by the entirety is a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship plus the marital relation, even if the divorce terminated the tenancy by the entirety, the parties remained joint tenants with the right of survivorship and, upon the wife’s death, the property became the husband’s property. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 336 So. 2d 497, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1510 (Miss. 1976).

A tenancy by the entireties in real property cannot be severed or destroyed by the act of one of the tenants. Cuevas v. Cuevas, 191 So. 2d 843, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1227 (Miss. 1966).

5. Conveyances to trustees.

This section does not preclude the creation of a joint estate in trustees, which on the death of one will vest title in the survivors. King v. O'Tuckolofa Gun & Rod Club, 178 Miss. 606, 174 So. 83, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1937).

The right of survivorship exists where the estate is conveyed to trustees jointly. McAllister v. Plant, 54 Miss. 106, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1876).

6. Miscellaneous.

A deed in which a widower deeded land to himself and to the niece of his deceased wife as an “estate in the entirety with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common” was, under other Mississippi decisions and under the law generally, sufficient to vest the entire title to the property in the niece after the widower’s death. Welborn v. Henry, 252 So. 2d 779, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1198 (Miss. 1971).

Where a cotenant’s widow in possession claimed property to the exclusion of the other cotenants for more than 10 years after the death of her husband, who had claimed the entirety of the property, and during such period the widow had received all benefits flowing from the land and had made all expenditures without accounting to anyone, there was the equivalent of an ouster of the other cotenants and she had clear full title by adverse possession, the fiduciary relationship usually presumed to exist between cotenants having no application here; since the circumstances surrounding the widow’s acquisition of title completely negated any such relation to the extent that it was the equivalent of an ouster of the other cotenants. Bayless v. Alexander, 245 So. 2d 17, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1349 (Miss. 1971).

In an action brought by cotenants to confirm and establish their title to an undivided interest as cotenants in certain land as against claims of another cotenant, who had purchased a tax title to the property, the purchasing cotenant could not claim adverse possession as against her cotenants where there was no ouster of the cotenants such as would give them notice that her claim was adverse to their interest. Gavin v. Hosey, 230 So. 2d 570, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1556 (Miss. 1970).

The purchase of an outstanding tax title to the common property by one cotenant inures to the benefit of all cotenants, the reason being the confidential relationship or position of trust presumed to exist between cotenants. Gavin v. Hosey, 230 So. 2d 570, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1556 (Miss. 1970).

Where a grant or devise is made to one and his children, or issue, or the children of issue of his body, or equivalent words, and the named person has no child at the effective date of the instrument, the named person takes a fee simple title to the property conveyed or devised, unless the instrument, by express words or necessary implication, shows a clear intent to create a life estate in the named person, remainder to afterborn children or issue. Ewing v. Ewing, 198 Miss. 304, 22 So. 2d 225, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 198 (Miss. 1945).

A conveyance of realty, effective immediately, to the grantors’ daughter, “and the children of her body,” reserving a life estate to one of the grantors, does not, where there are no children in being on the effective date of the grant, give the daughter’s children an interest as tenants in common or joint tenants with their mother. Ewing v. Ewing, 198 Miss. 304, 22 So. 2d 225, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 198 (Miss. 1945).

Under will bequeathing estate to three living sisters and the heirs of deceased sister, and providing that at the death of the living sisters what was left of the estate was to go to the heirs of the deceased sister, the heirs are entitled to possession of each sister’s share upon her death, rather than upon the death of the last survivor of them. Cross v. O'Cavanagh, 198 Miss. 137, 21 So. 2d 473, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1945).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Creation of right of survivorship by instrument ineffective to create estate by entireties or joint tenancy. 1 A.L.R.2d 247.

Use of debtor’s individual funds or property for acquisition, improvement of, or discharge of liens on, property held in estate by entireties as a fraud upon creditors. 7 A.L.R.2d 1104.

Capacity of cotenant to maintain suit to set aside conveyance of interest of another cotenant because of fraud, undue influence, or incompetency. 7 A.L.R.2d 1317.

Validity and effect of conveyance by one spouse to other of grantor’s interest in property held as estate by entireties. 8 A.L.R.2d 634.

Rights and remedies as between cotenants of cemetery lots respecting burials therein. 10 A.L.R.2d 219.

Retrospective operation of legislation affecting estates by the entireties. 27 A.L.R.2d 868.

Character of tenancy created by owner’s conveyance to himself and another, or to another alone, of an undivided interest. 44 A.L.R.2d 595.

Estate by entireties as affected by statute declaring nature of tenancy under grant or devise to two or more persons. 32 A.L.R.3d 570.

Felonious killing of one cotenant or tenant by the entireties by the other as affecting latter’s rights in the property. 42 A.L.R.3d 1116.

Validity and effect of provision in deed attempting to make reservation or exception in favor of grantor’s spouse. 52 A.L.R.3d 753.

Estate created by deed to persons described as husband and wife but not legally married. 9 A.L.R.4th 1189.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership §§ 11-15, 28-31.

7 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership §§ 75:51 et seq. (tenancy in common).

12 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Life Tenants and Remaindermen §§ 166:9 et seq. (creation of life estates and future interests).

20 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 321, Status of Property as Separate.

Young, Trial Handbook for Mississippi Lawyers § 19:15.

CJS.

86 C.J.S., Tenancy in Common §§ 7 et seq.

§ 89-1-9. The rule in Shelley’s Case abolished.

A conveyance or devise of land or other property to any person for life, with remainder to his heirs or heirs of his body, shall be held to create an estate for life in such person, with remainder to his heirs or heirs of his body, who shall take as purchasers, by virtue of the remainder so limited to them.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1201; 1892, § 2446; 1906, § 2776; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2280; 1930, 2114; 1942, § 835.

Cross References —

Descent of land generally, see §91-1-3.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where a will devised one-half of a parcel of land to the testator’s son for life, and then to the heirs of the body of the son in fee simple, the testator intended to devise a life estate to the son, with remainder after his death to the heirs of his body in fee simple, should he have such heirs, and, upon the son dying without heirs, the devise lapsed and reverted to the heirs of the testator. Boxley v. Jackson, 191 Miss. 134, 2 So. 2d 160, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 125 (Miss. 1941).

The rule in Shelley’s Case was abolished by this section. Boxley v. Jackson, 191 Miss. 134, 2 So. 2d 160, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 125 (Miss. 1941).

The grantor may impose restrictions on alienation of land during the period of life of up to two persons. Russell v. Federal Land Bank, 180 Miss. 55, 176 So. 737, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 99 (Miss. 1937).

Where deed conveyed land to grantee for life and provided that on grantee’s death land should become property of grantee’s legal heirs and prohibited grantee from selling, mortgaging, or otherwise incumbering land, the restrictions on the alienation were valid. Russell v. Federal Land Bank, 180 Miss. 55, 176 So. 737, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 99 (Miss. 1937).

Will devising land to testator’s son for life and then to son’s bodily heirs held effective to make life tenant’s children remaindermen in fee, notwithstanding statute limiting suspension of alienation where subsequent provisions in will were dependent on contingencies which did not in fact occur. Federal Land Bank v. Newsom, 175 Miss. 114, 161 So. 864, 166 So. 345, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 27 (Miss. 1935).

Devise for life with remainder to heirs or heirs of body creates estate for life with remainder in fee. Stigler v. Shurlds, 131 Miss. 648, 95 So. 635, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1923).

This section and Shelley’s Case held not to apply to conveyance to woman and heirs of her body, such not being grant to her for life with remainder to heirs of her body. Liberty Bank v. Wilson, 116 Miss. 377, 77 So. 145, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 310 (Miss. 1917).

Whether provision in deed was a gift over of the land in case of death of grantor without heirs, held not to be determined until event happens and person taking thereunder is before court. Liberty Bank v. Wilson, 116 Miss. 377, 77 So. 145, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 310 (Miss. 1917).

Devise to two daughters providing that in case of daughters’ deaths their children were to inherit their shares, or if one died without children whole estate was to go to other, or if both died without children estate was to go over, was a contingency providing against death of daughters before testatrix and upon their survival of testatrix they took a fee simple. Nations v. Colonial & United States Mortg. Co., 115 Miss. 741, 76 So. 642, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1917).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Grant to one for life, and afterwards, either absolutely or contingently, to grantor’s heirs or next of kin, as leaving reversion or creating remainder. 16 A.L.R.2d 691.

Nontrust life estate expressly given for support and maintenance, as limited thereto. 26 A.L.R.2d 1207.

Timber rights of life tenant. 51 A.L.R.2d 1374.

Modern status of the rule in Shelley’s Case. 99 A.L.R.2d 1161.

Duty as between life tenant and remainderman with respect to cost of improvements or repairs made under compulsion of governmental authority. 43 A.L.R.4th 1012.

Am. Jur.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds § 186.

28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estates §§ 102 et seq.

CJS.

26A C.J.S., Deeds §§ 248 et seq.

§ 89-1-11. Remainder good without particular estate.

When an estate is, by any conveyance, limited in remainder to the son or daughter of any person, to be begotten such son or daughter born after the decease of the father, shall take the estate in the same manner as if he or she had been born in the lifetime of the father, although no estate shall have been conveyed to support the contingent remainder after his death.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (27); 1857, ch. 36, art. 9; 1871, § 2292; 1880, § 1202; 1892, § 2447; 1906, § 2777; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2281; 1930, § 2115; 1942, § 836.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estates § 211.

CJS.

31 C.J.S., Estates §§ 94 et seq.

§ 89-1-13. Limitation on failure of issue.

Every contingent limitation in any conveyance or will made to depend upon the dying of any person without heirs or heirs of the body, or without issue or issue of the body, or without children, or offspring, or descendant, or other relative, shall be held and interpreted as a limitation, to take effect when such person shall die not having such heir, or issue, or child, or offspring, or descendant, or other relative, as the case may be, living at the time of his death, or born to him within ten (10) months thereafter, unless the intention of such limitation be otherwise expressly and plainly declared on the face of the instrument creating it.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (26); 1857, ch. 36, art. 8; 1871, § 2291; 1880, § 1203; 1892, § 2448; 1906, § 2778; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2282; 1930, § 2116; 1942, § 837.

Cross References —

Wills generally, see §§91-5-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Construction and application.

1. In general.

The purpose of this section is to make the test whether the person in question left issue surviving him at the time of his death or had issue born to him within ten months thereafter, instead of whether or not he may have at any time subsequent to the execution of a will in his favor have had issue which predeceased such a beneficiary. Hays v. Cole, 221 Miss. 459, 73 So. 2d 258, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 551 (Miss. 1954).

This section applies to the situation at common law where there would be construed to exist an indefinite failure of issue and thus a void fee tail estate. White v. Inman, 212 Miss. 237, 54 So. 2d 375, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 447 (Miss. 1951).

The statute fixes the period at which the contingent limitation is to take effect. Sims v. Conger, 39 Miss. 231, 1860 Miss. LEXIS 46 (Miss. 1860).

The statute was designed to give to certain words a meaning different from that before attached to them by the courts. Hampton v. Rather, 30 Miss. 193, 1855 Miss. LEXIS 86 (Miss. 1855); Jordan v. Roach, 32 Miss. 481, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 228 (Miss. 1856); Busby v. Rhodes, 58 Miss. 237, 1880 Miss. LEXIS 114 (Miss. 1880).

2. Construction and application.

Quitclaim deed executed to each other by four devisees of tract of land, each devisee having defeasible fee simple title, by which tract was divided into four parcels and each devisee took possession of his or her allotted parcel, served to separate use and income of divided parcels but could not confer upon respective grantees fee simple title to parcels as division was made subject to, and could not change, terms of will under which devisees took defeasible fee simple title. Crump v. Phelps, 207 Miss. 682, 43 So. 2d 105, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 1949).

Defeasible fee simple title is vested in named devisees under will providing trust for benefit of four named devisees and survivor or survivors of them and issue of deceased devisees subject to restriction that in event of death of devisee having no issue, devisee’s share is to be equally divided between surviving devisees and issue of those who may have died, issue to take by representation interest of deceased parent, and this interpretation of will is supported by this section against contention that executory limitation over could not become effective unless death of one of children of testatrix occurred prior to her death. Crump v. Phelps, 207 Miss. 682, 43 So. 2d 105, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 1949).

Statute providing that contingent limitation in will depending on the dying of any person without issue, or issue of the body, or without children, shall be interpreted as limitation to take effect when such person shall die not having such heir, or issue, or child, has reference to death of devisee or legatee, and in absence of contrary intention expressly declared on face of will, requires that the limitation over be interpreted as taking effect on death of one of devisees without issue at any time. Hanie v. Grissom, 178 Miss. 108, 172 So. 500, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 1937).

Limitation over contained in provision in will that if any of children to whom testatrix left certain realty should die without children, his or her share in realty should go equally to testatrix’ children that were living, was intended to take effect on death of child without issue at any time, whether before or after death of testatrix, and hence children took fee defeasible on their deaths without issue, leaving one or more of the other children surviving them. Hanie v. Grissom, 178 Miss. 108, 172 So. 500, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 1937).

Will executed in 1929 by testatrix dying in 1929, and providing that if any of children to whom testatrix left certain realty should die without children, his or her share in such realty should go equally to testatrix’ children that were living, held not violative of rule against perpetuities or the two-donee statute, as respects interest passing on death of one child in 1933 without issue. Hanie v. Grissom, 178 Miss. 108, 172 So. 500, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 1937).

As to share given directly to testator’s daughter, two-donee statute as it read in 1871 did not affect right of testator’s sisters and brothers nor their descendants from taking as purchasers under will. Darrow v. Moore, 163 Miss. 705, 142 So. 447, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 85 (Miss. 1932).

Devise to two daughters providing that in case of daughters predeceasing testatrix their children to inherit each daughter’s share, or if one died without children whole estate to go to other, or if both died without children estate to go over, contingency provided against was death of daughters before testatrix and upon their survival of testatrix they took a fee simple. Nations v. Colonial & United States Mortg. Co., 115 Miss. 741, 76 So. 642, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1917).

The statute will not be construed to add the words “then living” to a limitation to the descendants of the donee of a life interest. Caldwell v. Willis, 57 Miss. 555, 1880 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1880), disapproved, Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 356, 140 So. 2d 843 (Miss.).

In a devise to the son for life, and, after his death, to his lineal descendants, to the remotest posterity, and, in case of failure of lineal descendants, to the heirs of the devisor, the limitation over is void. Powell v. Brandon, 24 Miss. 343, 1852 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1852).

In a devise to the daughter and the heirs of her body, but, if she die without issue, then to the children of the devisor alive at her death, the limitation over is valid. Kirby v. Calhoun, 16 Miss. 462, 1847 Miss. LEXIS 43 (Miss. 1847).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Nontrust life estate expressly given for support and maintenance, as limited thereto. 26 A.L.R.2d 1207.

Timber rights of life tenant. 51 A.L.R.2d 1374.

Modern status of the rule in Shelley’s Case. 99 A.L.R.2d 1161.

Am. Jur.

28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estates §§ 363 et seq.

CJS.

31 C.J.S., Estates § 144.

§ 89-1-15. Estates in fee tail prohibited.

Estates in fee tail are prohibited; and every estate which, but for this statute, would be an estate in fee tail, shall be an estate in fee simple; but any person may make a conveyance or a devise of lands to a succession of donees then living, and upon the death of the last of said successors to any person or any heir.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (24); 1857, ch. 36, art. 3; 1871, § 2286; 1880, § 1190; 1892, § 2436; 1906, § 2765; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2269; 1930, § 2117; 1942, § 838.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Construction of terms.

3. Restraints on alienation.

4. Validity of devise—generally.

5. —Partial validity.

6. —Under rule against perpetuities.

7. Resulting estates—generally.

8. —Fee simple.

9. —Life estate.

10. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

The underlying purposes accomplished by the rule against perpetuities and the rule against restraints on alienation are the same. Patterson v. Patterson, 193 So. 2d 575 (Miss. 1967).

This section; prohibiting estates in fee tail does not by its terms abrogate the common law rule that disabling restraints upon the alienation of a legal life estate or fee are void. Patterson v. Patterson, 193 So. 2d 575 (Miss. 1967).

This statute deals only with conveyances or devises of lands, and is not applicable to personal property. Magee v. Estate of Magee, 236 Miss. 572, 111 So. 2d 394, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 352 (Miss. 1959).

This section not applicable to personalty. Thomas v. Thomas, 97 Miss. 697, 53 So. 630, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 313 (Miss. 1910).

2. Construction of terms.

A will devising testatrix’s real estate equally to a son and two daughters in common, and providing that if one of the devisees should die without leaving bodily heirs his or her share should go to the survivors, or if two of them should die without bodily heirs the land should go to the survivor, and that if either of the three devisees should die leaving bodily heirs, the heirs were to take the deceased parent’s share, violated the former “two donees” provision of this section (Code 1892, § 2436) permitting a devise of lands to a succession of donees then living not exceeding two and to the heirs of the body of the remainderman, and, in default thereof, to the right heirs of the donor, in fee simple, so that under the will the three devisees named as first takers took a determinable fee simple, subject to be defeated as to each share by the death of the devisee without bodily heirs, and upon the death of the two devisees named as first takers the entire estate finally vested in fee simple in the remaining devisee. Carter v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 231 Miss. 8, 94 So. 2d 624, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 488 (Miss. 1957).

Under a conveyance to the grantors’ daughter “and the children of her body,” reserving a life estate to one of the grantors, the daughter, having no children at the time of the conveyance, takes a fee tail, which by this section [Code 1942, § 838] is converted into a fee simple. Ewing v. Ewing, 198 Miss. 304, 22 So. 2d 225, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 198 (Miss. 1945).

Where a grant or devise is made to one and his children, or issue, or the children or issue of his body, or equivalent words, and the named person has no child at the effective date of the instrument, the named person takes a fee simple title to the property conveyed or devised, unless the instrument, by express words or necessary implication, shows a clear intent to create a life estate in the named person, remainder to after-born children or issue. Ewing v. Ewing, 198 Miss. 304, 22 So. 2d 225, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 198 (Miss. 1945).

An intent on the part of the grantors of realty to an only daughter “and the children of her body,” to convey a life estate to the daughter with remainder to her children may not be inferred where, at the time of the conveyance, which was in consideration of love and affection, the daughter was only 16 years of age and unmarried, so that it was problematical whether she would ever have children. Ewing v. Ewing, 198 Miss. 304, 22 So. 2d 225, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 198 (Miss. 1945).

Where a will devised one-half of a parcel of land to the testator’s son for life, and then to the heirs of the body of the son in fee simple, the testator intended to devise a life estate to the son, with remainder after his death to the heirs of his body in fee simple, should he have such heirs, and, upon the son dying without heirs, the devise lapsed and reverted to the heirs of the testator. Boxley v. Jackson, 191 Miss. 134, 2 So. 2d 160, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 125 (Miss. 1941).

A former enactment of this statute; while permitting contingent ultimate limitations to the right heirs of the donor either generally or specifically, was construed as not changing the common law rule that a conveyance to one’s own right heirs, like a deed without a grantee is void, and that when right heirs are designated as a class as such limitees, they take by descent and not by purchase, but when they are named specifically as individuals, they take by purchase and not by descent. West Tennessee Co. v. Townes, 52 F.2d 764, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1696 (D. Miss. 1931).

Gift to son in trust for donor’s children to farm lands during trust period and divide property, was donation to class, not violation of two-donee statute. Shannon v. Riley, 153 Miss. 815, 121 So. 808, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 80 (Miss. 1929).

Deed of property to one for life with remainder to children in fee, not an attempt to create estate in violation of this section. Reddoch v. Williams, 129 Miss. 706, 92 So. 831, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1922).

Where death of persons is dealt with as uncertain event it is presumed that death at a particular time or under particular circumstances is meant, and where circumstances do not appear it is presumed death is to occur prior to death of devisee before vesting in him of the property in possession; holding otherwise would render devise void for uncertainty. Bibby v. Broome, 116 Miss. 70, 76 So. 835, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 299 (Miss. 1917).

Bequest for use of sons for life, then each father’s part to his children, to be theirs when they reach 21 years, providing if any died before age or condition fulfilled without brothers or sisters his share should go to surviving grandchildren of testatrix of proper age on condition fulfilled, created an executory devise and not an “estate tail.” Thomas v. Thomas, 97 Miss. 697, 53 So. 630, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 313 (Miss. 1910).

Where there was a devise to wife and children for their natural lives, and to children and heirs of their bodies if there should be any at the time of their death, and if not, to revert to the estate in gross and be again divided between testator’s wife and children and to their heirs, “they” to take a life estate only, and the grandchildren were to take only such share as their deceased parent would have taken, the word “they” should be construed to refer to children of the testator and not to any surviving grandchild, in view of the dominant purpose of the will to vest a life estate in the testator’s wife and children and remainder in fee to his grandchildren. Davenport v. Collins, 96 Miss. 716, 51 So. 449, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1910).

3. Restraints on alienation.

Restraints on alienation during the lifetime of a life tenant are valid. Patterson v. Patterson, 193 So. 2d 575 (Miss. 1967).

Where will established a life estate in certain real property for one life tenant and prohibited sale of property until grandchildren remaindermen were 45 years of age, there resulted a restraint on alienation in excess of that permitted by this section. Patterson v. Patterson, 193 So. 2d 575 (Miss. 1967).

Clause in will prohibiting partition during life of widow, first life tenant, and of children, second life tenant, precludes partition during such period. Ford v. Smith, 162 Miss. 138, 137 So. 482, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 104 (Miss. 1931).

Testator may prevent alienation of property during period restrictions may be made under two-donee statute. Ford v. Smith, 162 Miss. 138, 137 So. 482, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 104 (Miss. 1931).

Devise in fee prohibiting alienation until 1975, with absolute devise over on death of first taker before such date, conveyed life estate subject to be converted into fee. Bratton v. Graham, 146 Miss. 246, 111 So. 353, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 179 (Miss. 1927).

Prohibition against alienation during life of first devisee is legal. Bratton v. Graham, 146 Miss. 246, 111 So. 353, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 179 (Miss. 1927).

Testator may prohibit alienation of life estate devised. Crawford v. Solomon, 131 Miss. 792, 95 So. 686, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 217 (Miss. 1923).

Where alienation not prohibited in will or deed, chancery court may sell land of minor for reinvestment, where interest is remainder. Crawford v. Solomon, 131 Miss. 792, 95 So. 686, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 217 (Miss. 1923).

4. Validity of devise—generally.

Provision limiting devise to 3 sisters and 2 brothers in case of death without descendants held invalid. Norfleet v. Norfleet, 151 Miss. 790, 119 So. 306, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 1928).

Devise of land to succession of donees, three in number, is void. Scott v. Turner, 137 Miss. 636, 102 So. 467, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1925).

This section not violated where possible for remainder in fee to vest upon death of first life tenant. Stigler v. Shurlds, 131 Miss. 648, 95 So. 635, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1923).

Principle that will may be sustained by dropping void ulterior limitation, not applicable where provision cannot be separated without interfering with manifest purpose of testator. Gully v. Neville, 55 So. 289 (Miss. 1911).

5. —Partial validity.

Although restraint upon alienation of a life estate until remaindermen thereof became 45 years of age was in excess of that permitted by this section, court applied doctrine of approximation and adjudicated the restraint valid during the life of the life tenant, and invalid thereafter. Patterson v. Patterson, 193 So. 2d 575 (Miss. 1967).

Portions of will which violate statute limiting suspension of alienation are rejected and valid portions are enforced, if enforcement is practicably possible and will not defeat dominant purpose of will. Federal Land Bank v. Newsom, 175 Miss. 114, 161 So. 864, 166 So. 345, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 27 (Miss. 1935).

Void ulterior limitations on estate will not void whole provision if first can be lawfully separated; will, if possible, will be sustained in so far as it does not offend against two-donee statute. Bratton v. Graham, 146 Miss. 246, 111 So. 353, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 179 (Miss. 1927).

Deed containing ulterior limitees held valid up to point where statute violated. Reddoch v. Williams, 129 Miss. 706, 92 So. 831, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1922).

6. —Under rule against perpetuities.

Mississippi follows the “wait and see” doctrine with respect to the rule against perpetuities under which the future interest in question is held valid if the required contingency actually happens during the perpetuities period, even though the interest was not good at its creation because it was possible for the required contingency to happen outside the perpetuities period. C & D Inv. Co. v. Gulf Transport Co., 526 So. 2d 526, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1988).

This section was inapplicable to a case where the court was called upon to determine whether the rule against perpetuities was violated by the provisions of a will leaving the bulk of testator’s estate in trust which was to terminate when testator’s youngest grandchild (whether living at the time of the execution of the will or thereafter born) became 25 years of age, but further providing that in no event should the trust continue for a longer period than 35 years from the date of the will. 243 Miss. 356, 140 So. 2d 843.

Court will construe ambiguous will, if reasonably possible, to render it valid under rule against perpetuities or two-donee statute. Bratton v. Graham, 146 Miss. 246, 111 So. 353, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 179 (Miss. 1927).

Where gift is invalid in part because of rule against perpetuities, separable parts violating rule may be rejected and rest upheld. Reddoch v. Williams, 129 Miss. 706, 92 So. 831, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1922).

7. Resulting estates—generally.

Joint will operates as separate will of each; joint will of wife and second husband providing survivor to have property while unmarried, otherwise to go to all heirs, but if neither should marry at their death property to be divided between their heirs, wife intended to give husband life estate if he did not remarry with equal division among all her children by both husbands and their descendants, at his death. Hill v. Godwin, 120 Miss. 83, 81 So. 790, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1919).

Devise for life with remainder to testator’s heirs, vested remainder in living heirs at testator’s death. Schlater v. Lee, 117 Miss. 701, 78 So. 700, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 214 (Miss. 1918).

Sons of donor held to take at his death a possibility coupled with an interest which they could convey. Alexander v. Richardson, 106 Miss. 517, 64 So. 217, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 165 (Miss. 1913).

8. —Fee simple.

Devise to A and heirs of his body is devise in fee simple. Bolton v. Barnett, 131 Miss. 802, 95 So. 721, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 1923).

Devise to son and daughter and heirs to be held, used, occupied and enjoyed in common until “my youngest grandchild now living or that may come into existence hereafter shall have reached the years of 21,” gave son fee simple subject only to limitation, if any as to joint use, possession, etc. Fairchild v. Hardinson, 120 Miss. 236, 82 So. 73, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1919).

Conveyance to woman and heirs of her body was conveyance in fee simple. Liberty Bank v. Wilson, 116 Miss. 377, 77 So. 145, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 310 (Miss. 1917).

Devise to two daughters providing that in case of their deaths, their children were to inherit each mother’s share, or if one died without children whole estate was to go to other daughter, or if both died without children estate was to go over, contingency provided against was death of daughters before testatrix and upon their survival of testatrix they took a fee simple. Nations v. Colonial & United States Mortg. Co., 115 Miss. 741, 76 So. 642, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1917).

Devise of land to nephew “and to the heirs of his body,” gave nephew fee simple title. Wallace v. Wallace, 114 Miss. 591, 75 So. 449, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 77 (Miss. 1917).

Devise of lands to four daughters providing part of any dying without issue to go to survivors, gave each of daughters a fee simple defeasible upon death without issue leaving one or more devisees surviving, and was a valid executory devise. Armstrong v. Thomas, 112 Miss. 272, 72 So. 1006, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 104 (Miss. 1916).

Will devising land to nephews equally with provision that each should transfer his share to his children, and if any died without children his share to go to survivor or survivors, but if all died without children the entire property should go to grandsons for life or their heirs, or, on failure of heirs in both lines then to next of kin always preferring those bearing testator’s name in equal degree of kinship, violated this statute and nephews took in fee. Nicholson v. Fields, 111 Miss. 638, 71 So. 900, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 354 (Miss. 1916).

Will of all testator’s property to his “sister, at her death the heirs to have it,” gave sister fee simple title. Harring v. Flowers, 91 Miss. 242, 45 So. 571, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 187 (Miss. 1907).

Conveyance or devise in trust to one and the heirs of his body creates a trust estate in fee simple. Powell v. Brandon, 24 Miss. 343, 1852 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1852); Jordan v. Roach, 32 Miss. 481, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 228 (Miss. 1856); Dibrell v. Carlisle, 48 Miss. 691, 1873 Miss. LEXIS 91 (Miss. 1873).

9. —Life estate.

Where decedent died intestate, and the surviving children entered into an agreement effectively creating a life estate for one sibling who remained on the farm, the trial court properly applied contract interpretation rules, properly found that the intent of the agreement was not to limit restraint on alienation only to time of execution of contract, and properly held the agreement was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation; thus, plaintiff’s partition action was dismissed. In re Estate of Harris v. Harris, 840 So. 2d 742, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 188 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Devise of land to person for life with remainder to heirs creates life estate with remainder in fee. Stigler v. Shurlds, 131 Miss. 648, 95 So. 635, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1923).

Devise of all estate to wife during widowhood, providing that if she remarried she should have one-half thereof during life with remainder to her children or if no children to testator’s relatives, other half to go immediately to testator’s relatives, gave wife at most indefeasible, nondevisable, and nondescendable life estate, and on her death without children her relatives took nothing. Hale v. Neilson, 112 Miss. 291, 72 So. 1011, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 107 (Miss. 1916).

Residuary devise of estate in equal shares to 7 children for life, providing on death of any his share should be equally divided among remainder, and on death of last child property to be equally divided among all testator’s living grandchildren, was single gift of life estate continuing in life tenants as a class until all dead with remainder to grandchildren in fee, and did not violate statute. Redmond v. Redmond, 104 Miss. 512, 61 So. 552, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 58 (Miss. 1913).

Residuary devise to two nephews for their lives, and at their death to the heirs of their body, with gift over in case of their death without issue was in effect devised to each for life of survivor, so that only life of survivor could be counted in the succession of donees, and so construed did not violate statute. Henry v. Henderson, 103 Miss. 48, 60 So. 33, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1912).

10. Miscellaneous.

A residuary bequest to the testator’s son and grandchildren in equal shares, naming the five grandchildren who were alive at the time of execution, constituted a class bequest to all of the grandchildren rather than an individual bequest to each of the named grandchildren, where the evidence revealed that the testator was not aware that a sixth grandchild had been conceived, and that he was no less fond of the sixth grandchild than of the other five. Cain v. Dunn, 241 So. 2d 650, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1351 (Miss. 1970).

This section had no application to the validity of a gas and oil lease, under which any interest acquired by the lessee was conveyed to him to take effect in praesenti, and by which provision was made for renewal as long as gas and oil should be produced in paying quantities, it was stipulated that if no well should be commenced before a specified date the lease would terminate, unless the lessee by such date should tender the lessor the sum of $100, which payment should operate as a renewal for twelve months, and that further deferments for like periods might be procured by similar payments, but which lease contained no limitation to postpone the vesting of the interest acquired until a future date, or that could be said to result in a restraint against alienation either to the mineral rights or to the fee itself. Lloyd's Estate v. Mullen Tractor & Equipment Co., 192 Miss. 62, 4 So. 2d 282, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1941).

Testator’s brothers and sisters of half blood, not being right heirs, gift over to them jointly with brothers and sisters of whole blood made them third donees under statute, and they could not take under will. Darrow v. Moore, 163 Miss. 705, 142 So. 447, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 85 (Miss. 1932).

In the absence of descriptive words to point out the individuals who were to take as contingent ultimate limitees, under a former enactment of this provision, right heirs took by descent and not by purchase. West Tennessee Co. v. Townes, 52 F.2d 764, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1696 (D. Miss. 1931).

Under deed conveying standing timber with ten-year limitation to remove, right to perpetual extension of time for removal does not violate this section. Nichols v. Day, 128 Miss. 756, 91 So. 451, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 164 (Miss. 1922).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Mortgage foreclosure forbearance statutes-modern status. 83 A.L.R.4th 243.

Am. Jur.

28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estates §§ 44 et seq.

CJS.

31 C.J.S., Estates §§ 24-26 et seq.

§ 89-1-17. Alienation good for grantor’s interest; remainder not affected.

All alienations and warranties of lands purporting to convey or pass a greater estate than the grantor may lawfully convey or pass, shall operate as alienation or warranties of so much of the right and estate in such lands as the grantor could lawfully convey, but shall not pass or bar the right to the residue of the estate purported to be conveyed; nor shall the alienation of any particular estate on which a remainder may depend, whether such alienation be by will or other writing, nor the union of such particular estate with the inheritance, by purchase or by descent, so operate, by merger or otherwise as to defeat, impair, or in any way affect such remainder.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (25); 1857, ch. 36, art. 7; 1871, § 2290; 1880, § 1199; 1892, § 2444; 1906, § 2774; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2278; 1930, § 2118; 1942, § 839.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Conveyance as passing grantor’s interest only.

2. Merger.

1. Conveyance as passing grantor’s interest only.

A will devising real property to the testator’s wife “to be hers during her lifetime, and to use the same for her personal comfort and benefit, as she may see fit and proper, without hindrance or trouble from anyone,” creates only a life estate in the widow and does not, at her discretion, vest her with power to sell the fee. Old Ladies Home Asso. v. Platt, 252 Miss. 260, 172 So. 2d 770, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1098 (Miss. 1965).

The objection that statutory provision permitting lease of sixteenth section lands for oil, gas and mineral exploration and development, and for entry upon such lands for such purposes, was unconstitutional because the lease might under its terms remain in force so long as oil and gas should be produced from the land and therefore longer than the 25 years prescribed by a constitutional provision, is obviated by the statute providing that conveyances purporting to convey or pass a greater estate than the grantor might lawfully convey or pass, shall operate and pass such a right or estate as the grantor might lawfully convey. Pace v. State, 191 Miss. 780, 4 So. 2d 270, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 184 (Miss. 1941).

Deed conveying partnership property passes interests of only those partners actually executing it. Tinnin v. Brown, 98 Miss. 378, 53 So. 780, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1910).

Supervisors’ deed to timber on school land passes only such interest as they could convey. L. N. Dantzler Lumber Co. v. State, 97 Miss. 355, 53 So. 1, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1910), limited, Merrill Engineering Co. v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 192 Miss. 378, 5 So. 2d 666, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 5 (Miss. 1942).

Grantee in deed from widow with only dower interest does not hold adversely to remaindermen until widow’s death. Anglin v. Broadnax, 97 Miss. 514, 52 So. 865, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 282 (Miss. 1910).

Deed from widow with only dower interest conveys only a life estate. Barrier v. Young, 96 Miss. 160, 50 So. 559, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 32 (Miss. 1909).

Vendor’s right to subject land to payment of purchase money is affected by this statute. Howell v. Hill, 94 Miss. 566, 48 So. 177, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 337 (Miss. 1909).

2. Merger.

This section prevents merger of contingent remainder and life estate in holder of fee. City Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cortright, 122 Miss. 75, 84 So. 136, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 420 (Miss. 1920).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Termination of trust where life interest and remainder or reversion are acquired by same person. 50 A.L.R.2d 1161.

Conveyance of land as including mature but unharvested crops. 51 A.L.R.4th 1263.

Mortgage foreclosure forbearance statutes-modern status. 83 A.L.R.4th 243.

Am. Jur.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds § 289.

28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estates §§ 162, 163.

51 Am. Jur. 2d, Life Tenants and Remaindermen § 84.

CJS.

26A C.J.S., Deeds §§ 231-246 et seq.

§ 89-1-19. Right of entry not tolled by death of disseizor.

If any disseizor of lands who has no right or title therein, die seized thereof, his dying seized shall not be such descent in law to the heir of the disseizor as to take away the entry of the person who, at the time of such descent, had lawful right of entry.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 3 (3); 1857, ch. 36, art. 10; 1871, § 2293; 1880, § 1200; 1892, § 2445; 1906, § 2775; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2279; 1930, § 2119; 1942, § 840.

Cross References —

Unlawful entry and detainer generally, see §§11-25-1 et seq.

Descent of land, see §91-1-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Mortgage foreclosure forbearance statutes-modern status. 83 A.L.R.4th 243.

§ 89-1-21. How body politic, public or private corporation may convey land.

All bodies politic and public corporations may convey their lands by and under the corporate seal and the signature of an officer; and such officer signing the same may acknowledge the execution of the deed, or proof thereof may be made as in other cases.

Any private corporation may convey lands by a conveyance signed in its name by an officer or by an authorized agent or attorney in fact; and such officer, agent or attorney in fact signing the same may acknowledge the execution of the conveyance, or proof thereof may be made as in other cases. The absence of the corporate seal shall not affect the validity of a conveyance by a private corporation so executed.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 36, art. 33; 1871, § 2316; 1880, § 1194; 1892, § 2437; 1906, § 2766; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2270; 1930, § 2120; 1942, § 841; Laws, 1956, ch. 175.

Cross References —

Constitutional provision in regard to landholding by corporations, see MS Const Art. 4, § 84.

Limitation of actions to recover realty because of defective conveyance by corporation, see §15-1-11.

Prohibition against corporation purchasing public lands, see §29-1-75.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A bank was not obligated to go behind this section authorizing a private corporation to convey lands by conveyance signed in its name by an officer or authorized agent, or behind a certified copy of a corporate resolution delivered to it by the corporation’s secretary, providing that the president and any vice-president could execute deeds of trust, to determine whether the two officers who did execute a deed of trust were in fact authorized to do so by the corporate resolution which appeared on the corporate minutes. Rivervalley Co. v. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank, 331 F. Supp. 698, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12606 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

Corporate deed executed by secretary to himself as grantee not void, where president also joined. Mexican Gulf Land Co. v. Globe Trust Co., 125 Miss. 862, 88 So. 512, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 174 (Miss. 1921).

Unsealed deed by corporation will not support plaintiff’s title in ejectment. Littelle v. Creek Lumber Co., 99 Miss. 241, 54 So. 841, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 199 (Miss. 1911).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations § 1791.

CJS.

19 C.J.S., Corporations §§ 644 et seq.

§ 89-1-23. Aliens holding land.

Resident aliens may acquire and hold land, and may dispose of it and transmit it by descent, as citizens of the state may. Except as otherwise provided in this section, nonresident aliens shall not hereafter acquire or hold land, but a nonresident alien may have or take a lien on land to secure a debt, and at any sale thereof to enforce payment of the debt may purchase the same, and thereafter hold it, not longer than twenty (20) years, with full power during said time to sell the land, in fee, to a citizen; or he may retain it by becoming a citizen within that time. All land held or acquired contrary to this section shall escheat to the state; but a title to real estate in the name of a citizen of the United States, or a person who has declared his intention of becoming a citizen, whether resident or nonresident, if he be a purchaser or holder, shall not be forfeited or escheated by reason of the alienage of any former owner or other person.

Any person who was or is a citizen of the United States and became or becomes an alien by reason of marriage to a citizen of a foreign country, may hereafter inherit, or if he or she heretofore inherited or acquired or hereafter inherits, may hold, own, transmit by descent or transfer land free from any escheat to the State of Mississippi, if said land has not heretofore escheated by final valid order or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.

Nonresident aliens who are citizens of Syria or the Lebanese Republic may inherit property from citizens or residents of the State of Mississippi.

Nonresident aliens may acquire and hold not to exceed three hundred twenty (320) acres of land in this state for the purpose of industrial development thereon. In addition, any nonresident alien may acquire and hold not to exceed five (5) acres of land for residential purposes. The nonresident alien may dispose of any such land, but if any land acquired for industrial development ceases to be used for industrial development while owned by a nonresident alien, it shall escheat to the state. The limitation set forth in this paragraph shall not apply to corporations in which the stock thereof is partially or wholly owned by nonresident aliens.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2439; 1906, § 2768; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2272; 1930, § 2121; 1942, § 842; Laws, 1924, ch. 165; Laws, 1938, ch. 354; Laws, 1940, ch. 237; Laws, 1988, ch. 439, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1988).

Cross References —

Institution of quo warranto proceedings against alien acquiring or holding land contrary to law, see §11-39-3.

Prohibition against nonresident alien purchasing public lands, see §29-1-75.

Escheats generally, see §§89-11-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Circumstances negated prolongation of three year period in which Honduran widow of United States citizen owning land in Mississippi could sell the land and keep the proceeds, as provided by 1928 treaty with Honduras, where widow, although represented by counsel during closing of husband’s affairs in Honduras, made no inquiry nor took any action to sell land during twelve year period between her husband’s death and her own. De Tenorio v. McGowan, 510 F.2d 92, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15570 (5th Cir. Miss. 1975).

This section yields to any applicable provision of any valid treaty of the United States with a foreign country, constituting a part of the supreme law of the land under article 6, clause 2, of the United States Constitution. De Tenorio v. McGowan, 510 F.2d 92, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15570 (5th Cir. Miss. 1975).

This section [Code 1942, § 842] is void, in so far as it conflicts with any existing treaty between the United States and the Republic of Italy. Guiseppe v. Cozzani, 238 Miss. 273, 118 So. 2d 189, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 401 (Miss. 1960).

Foreign corporation may do business in other state or country and sue in its courts, unless forbidden by statute or contrary to public policy. State ex rel. Brown v. Scottish American Mortg. Co., 111 Miss. 98, 71 So. 291, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 1916).

Foreign corporation, purchaser of land under trust deed, did not, by agreeing to rescind contract of sale to residents because of defect in title and repaying purchase price, become purchaser at sale for payment of debt as it merely reacquired its original title; statute contemplates involuntary sale where alien buys only as last resort to protect lien. State ex rel. Brown v. Scottish American Mortg. Co., 111 Miss. 98, 71 So. 291, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 1916).

Common law excluded alien from inheriting from citizen. Scottish American Mortg. Co. v. Butler, 99 Miss. 56, 54 So. 666, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 14 (Miss. 1910).

Nonresident alien mortgagee obtaining possession through tenants under void sale and receiving rents for more than 10 years under claim of title secured a perfect title against mortgagor. Scottish American Mortg. Co. v. Butler, 99 Miss. 56, 54 So. 666, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 14 (Miss. 1910).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Mortgage foreclosure forbearance statutes-modern status. 83 A.L.R.4th 243.

Am. Jur.

3B Am. Jur. 2d, Aliens and Citizens §§ 1731, 1732.

CJS.

3 C.J.S., Aliens §§ 5 et seq.

§ 89-1-25. Quitclaim deeds and disclaimers of title by school district boards of trustees, municipalities and boards of supervisors.

In all cases where a board of trustees of any school district, governing authorities of any municipality or board of supervisors of any county in the State of Mississippi has heretofore attempted to convey or to obtain title to real property or any interest therein and thereafter any question of title arises with reference to the procedure of conveyance, description of the property attempted to be conveyed or obtained or other matters connected therewith, and the governing authority of said school district, municipality or county determines by order entered on its minutes that the said political subdivision is asserting no further claim of title, that at the time of said attempted conveyance or disposition of said property, if property was conveyed or disposed of by the political subdivision, the said political subdivision did then receive the fair and reasonable market value of said property, and that a period of at least five (5) years has elapsed from the date of the said original attempted conveyance or disposition or obtaining of title of said property; the said board of trustees of said school district, governing authorities of said municipality or board of supervisors of said county, as the case may be, is thereupon hereby authorized, in its discretion, to execute quitclaim deeds and disclaimers of title on behalf of said political subdivision, after which any right or claim of said political subdivision in and to said realty shall be cut off and not thereafter brought into issue. Any such quitclaim deed or disclaimer of title heretofore executed by or on behalf of said political subdivision in accordance with the foregoing shall likewise be valid if executed in accordance with the provisions hereof.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 846.5; Laws, 1960, ch. 321; Laws, 1974, ch. 359, eff from and after passage (approved March 14, 1974).

Cross References —

Authority of board of supervisors to sell real estate belonging to county, see §19-7-3.

Power of municipality to sell real estate, see §21-17-1.

Sale of school property not used for school purposes, see §§37-7-451,37-27-43.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Any interest of the municipality in property owned by the county may be extinguished pursuant to this section by (a) a conveyance of such interest by the city to the county, or (b) the execution by the city of a quitclaim deed or disclaimer of title to a purchaser from the county. Creekmore, March 26, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0129.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Mortgage foreclosure forbearance statutes-modern status. 83 A.L.R.4th 243.

§ 89-1-27. Conveyances by masters, commissioners, sheriffs or other officers.

Conveyances by masters, commissioners, sheriffs, and constables for lands sold by virtue of any decree or judgment of any court in this state, shall be good and effectual for passing all the interest the defendant had in the lands to the purchaser thereof, but shall not prejudice the rights of other claimants. In case any master, commissioner, sheriff, or other officer should, for any cause whatever, fail or omit to make such conveyance, without good cause for the omission or failure, during his continuance in office, the court which rendered the judgment or decree may, on petition for that purpose, order the successor of such master, commissioner, sheriff, or other officer, to make a proper conveyance to the purchaser; and all conveyances made by masters, commissioners, sheriffs, or other officers, shall be acknowledged or proved and recorded as other conveyances. In case any tax collector should fail to make a conveyance for land sold by him for taxes of any kind during his continuance in office, the board of supervisors of the proper county, on petition for that purpose and proof of the purchase and payment of the money, may order the successor of such tax collector to make a conveyance to the purchaser.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (35); 1857, ch. 36, art. 26; 1871, § 2309; 1880, § 1198; 1892, § 2442; 1906, § 2771; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2275; 1930, § 2127; 1942, § 848.

Cross References —

Operation of chancery court decree as conveyance, see §11-5-85.

Conveyance of land sold under execution, see §§13-3-187,13-3-189.

Sales under execution, see §13-3-161.

Form of conveyance by sheriff, see §89-1-65.

Form of conveyance by administrator, executor, guardian, master, or commissioner, see §89-1-67.

Indexing of conveyances by sheriffs, constables, marshals, masters, commissioners, executors, administrators, guardians, or trustees, see §89-5-35.

Power of executors and administrators to make deeds of conveyance, see §91-7-223.

Sale of land by guardian in the interest of ward, see §93-13-51.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Tax deed erroneously reciting sale made March 4, 1906, instead of correct date March 4, 1907, cannot be reformed or validated in ex parte proceeding before supervisors. Clark v. Hibbler, 109 Miss. 432, 69 So. 220, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 1915).

Purchaser at sheriff’s or commissioner’s sale is purchaser in invitum, and caveat emptor applies. Wells v. Gay & Ellarbee, 93 Miss. 268, 46 So. 497 (Miss. 1908).

Sale under trust deed of 400 acres in bulk instead of 160 acre tracts is void. McClusky v. Trussel, 90 Miss. 544, 44 So. 69, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Miss. 1907).

§ 89-1-29. Spouse’s role in conveying homestead; incompetent spouse; limited power of attorney in conveyance of homestead.

A conveyance, mortgage, deed of trust or other incumbrance upon a homestead exempted from execution shall not be valid or binding unless signed by the spouse of the owner if the owner is married and living with the spouse or by an attorney in fact for the spouse. But where the spouse of the owner of the homestead exempted from execution has been adjudicated incompetent, then the owner of the homestead may file a petition in the chancery court and allege in the petition the incompetence of the spouse and the adjudication of incompetency of the spouse and the facts of the case. The summons for the spouse who has been adjudicated incompetent shall be issued and be served in the same manner as process is served in other cases on persons who are incompetent. The court shall hear the case in vacation or in termtime as in other cases, and if the court finds the spouse to be incompetent and the owner entitled to relief, the court by decree shall authorize and empower the owner to execute a conveyance, mortgage, deed of trust or other incumbrance upon the homestead without the signature of the spouse. However, no mortgage or deed of trust executed in favor of the Farmers Home Administration at the time of the purchase of real estate to secure the payment of the money used to purchase the real estate shall be invalid because it is not signed by the spouse of the owner. All powers of attorney authorizing any conveyance, mortgage, deed of trust or other incumbrance upon a homestead shall designate an attorney in fact other than the spouse and shall comply with the provisions of Chapter 3 of Title 87.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1258; 1892, § 1983; 1906, § 2159; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1834; 1930, § 1778; 1942, § 330; Laws, 1924, ch. 169; 1980, ch. 514, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 419, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 442, § 23, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

Amendment Notes —

The 2007 amendment added “or by an attorney in fact for the spouse” to the end of the first sentence; and added the last sentence.

The 2008 amendment rewrote the second and third sentences; in the fourth sentence, substituted “finds the spouse to be incompetent” for “finds the spouse to be insane”; and made a minor stylistic change.

Cross References —

Conveyances by attorney in fact generally, see §87-3-3.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Construction with other laws.

3. What constitutes homestead.

4. Validity of conveyances in general.

5. —Conveyance pursuant to premarital contract.

6. —Conveyance to spouse.

7. —Miscellaneous.

8. Validity of incumbrances in general.

9. —Instrument securing payment of purchase money.

10. —Miscellaneous.

11. Effect of abandonment of homestead.

12. Effect of change of residence.

13. Effect of separation or divorce of parties to marriage.

14. Rights and remedies of spouses.

15. Rights of grantees under deeds.

16. Rights of agents under real estate listing contracts.

17. Pleading.

18. Limitation of actions.

19. Application of doctrine of estoppel.

1. In general.

Court is unwilling to read the statute to require that both spouses sign a homestead application in order for it to be effective. Dixon v. Jones (In re Will of Jones), 138 So.3d 205, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 230 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).

There was no merit in bank customers’ argument that the 1997 renewal and extension of the previous deeds of trust deprived them of their homestead exemption; the customers admitted that the bank had a lien on their house at all times prior to the 1997 renewal. Whitefoot v. BancorpSouth Bank, 856 So. 2d 639, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 591 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 866 So. 2d 473, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 206 (Miss. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 833, 125 S. Ct. 148, 160 L. Ed. 2d 52, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 5851 (U.S. 2004).

Statutes granting homestead exemption are entitled to be liberally construed. Daily v. Gulfport, 212 Miss. 361, 54 So. 2d 485, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 457 (Miss. 1951).

Conditions existing at time of execution of the instrument conveying homestead determine its validity or invalidity, which cannot be affected by subsequent events. Hughes v. Hahn, 209 Miss. 293, 46 So. 2d 587, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 388 (Miss. 1950).

If a husband owns no assignable interest in the land which might otherwise be claimed as a homestead, statute has no application. Davis v. Davidor, 200 Miss. 657, 27 So. 2d 371, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 335 (Miss. 1946).

A conveyance of the homestead by the husband in which the wife does not join is not valid or binding if he is living with his wife or, even if he is not living with her, if at the time of the execution thereof the husband was non compos mentis touching all matters connected with and all duties and obligations owing to her. Moseley v. Larson, 86 Miss. 288, 38 So. 234, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1905).

A person who is both a citizen and resident of this state, as well as a householder having a family, is entitled to homestead exemption. Vignaud v. Dean, 77 Miss. 860, 27 So. 881, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 37 (Miss. 1900).

The owner of a homestead has no vested right in the statute prescribing the mode of the alienation; and the law requiring the wife to join in the conveyance by the husband of his homestead applies to all conveyances hereafter made by him, although he owned the land in fee in his own right prior to the passage of the statute. Massey v. Womble, 69 Miss. 347, 11 So. 188, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 1891).

The section [Code 1942, § 332] does not prevent the wife from devising her homestead. Kelly v. Alred, 65 Miss. 495, 4 So. 551, 1888 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1888).

The conditions existing at the time of the execution of the instrument determine its validity. Cummings v. Busby, 62 Miss. 195, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1884).

2. Construction with other laws.

In view of the provisions of §§11-21-3,93-3-1 and93-3-3, §89-1-29 did not preclude a wife, who held real property as joint tenant with husband from whom she was separated but not divorced, from maintaining an action to partition the property, notwithstanding that husband continued to reside on the property and claimed it as his homestead. Trigg v. Trigg, 498 So. 2d 334, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2779 (Miss. 1986).

Conveyance of homestead by husband alone in settlement of claim for labor is governed by this section [Code 1942, § 330] and not Code 1906, § 2156 [Code 1942, § 327]. Chatman v. Poindexter, 101 Miss. 496, 58 So. 361, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 163 (Miss. 1911).

3. What constitutes homestead.

In a suit by an heir of deceased grantor to enjoin removal of timber from grantor’s homestead under a timber deed which was void as to homestead because the wife of grantor did not sign, where it appeared that the grantor did not specifically designate the 160 acres which constituted the homestead tract out of 300 acre tract covered by deed, and the court should have appointed commissioners under the statute to make the allotment. Thompson v. Dyess, 218 Miss. 770, 67 So. 2d 721, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 602 (Miss. 1953).

The statute does not require the actual utilization of every acre of land in a tract before it can be claimed as a homestead. Daily v. Gulfport, 212 Miss. 361, 54 So. 2d 485, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 457 (Miss. 1951).

Where lands are not contiguous because a road separated them, such a separation does not necessarily defeat a homestead claim. Daily v. Gulfport, 212 Miss. 361, 54 So. 2d 485, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 457 (Miss. 1951).

4. Validity of conveyances in general.

Statutory signature requirement cannot be waived; by statute, the quitclaim deed attempting to convey the home without the wife’s signature was invalid. Dixon v. Jones (In re Will of Jones), 138 So.3d 205, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 230 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).

Wife’s homestead was to be determined as of the date of execution of the deed. Since the husband and wife still lived on the Tate County farm when the deed was executed, the wife was entitled to a homestead exemption; it was only after the land swap that the wife filed a homestead application in DeSoto County, and the chancellor properly declared the exchange deed (between the father and a son), void as to the wife’s homestead interest. Davis v. Smith, 922 So. 2d 814, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 554 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 927 So. 2d 750, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 2006).

Conveyance of homestead to third parties by husband during lifetime of wife without her joining in conveyance is void. Ward v. Ward, 517 So. 2d 571, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2968 (Miss. 1987).

In order to be valid, wife must sign her husband’s conveyance of homestead property pursuant to the requirements of Code 1972, §89-1-29, and where deed to homestead property was signed only by the husband without his wife’s knowledge or approval, and there was nothing to indicate that the wife had any intent to abandon a conjugal relationship with her husband or to abandon the occupancy of the property, the deed was void. Hendry v. Hendry, 300 So. 2d 147, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1614 (Miss. 1974).

A conveyance of homestead which is not signed by the wife of the owner is void. Travis v. Dantzler, 244 Miss. 360, 141 So. 2d 556, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 455 (Miss. 1962).

A deed is void as to the owner of the homestead who has executed a deed to the same until the other spouse joins therein with the contemporaneous consent of both; consequently, there can be no joinder by the wife in the execution of a conveyance of the homestead by the husband unless she executes the conveyance during his lifetime and with his consent. Hughes v. Hahn, 209 Miss. 293, 46 So. 2d 587, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 388 (Miss. 1950).

A deed to the husband’s homestead is not invalid where the husband and wife each executed it, with the knowledge and consent of the other, although they did not execute it at the same time. Hughes v. Hahn, 209 Miss. 293, 46 So. 2d 587, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 388 (Miss. 1950).

A deed by the husband which attempts to convey away the homestead without the joinder of the wife in the execution of the conveyance is null and void as to both the husband and wife. Hughes v. Hahn, 209 Miss. 293, 46 So. 2d 587, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 388 (Miss. 1950).

Deed to homestead by husband alone is void. Yazoo Lumber Co. v. Clark, 95 Miss. 244, 48 So. 516, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 215 (Miss. 1909).

Common and contemporaneous consent existing, fact that wife signed deed to homestead 8 months after husband did not make it void. Howell v. Hill, 94 Miss. 566, 48 So. 177, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 337 (Miss. 1909).

Conveyance of homestead by wife without joinder of husband is a nullity. Levis-Zukoski Mercantile Co. v. McIntyre, 93 Miss. 806, 47 So. 435, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1908).

5. —Conveyance pursuant to premarital contract.

Husband’s deed to homestead without wife’s joinder not void, where made pursuant to contract entered into prior to marriage. Minor v. Interstate Gravel Co., 130 Miss. 553, 94 So. 3, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1922).

6. —Conveyance to spouse.

While one spouse may convey to another spouse his or her interest in homestead property, statutory mandate that any conveyance of that homestead without joinder of both spouses is invalid still applies to any conveyance to third party. There can be no operative conveyance or effectual release of exemption unless statutory method is pursued with strictness, and no requirement of statute may be waived by husband and wife or by either of them. Ward v. Ward, 517 So. 2d 571, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2968 (Miss. 1987).

Deed signed by husband only, conveying part of homestead to wife and stepdaughter, held ineffective to convey interest to stepdaughter, though valid as between husband and wife. Smith v. Stanley, 159 Miss. 720, 132 So. 452, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1931).

Husband may make valid deed conveying homestead to wife, but this does not defeat his right to occupy. Williams v. Green, 128 Miss. 446, 91 So. 39, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 128 (Miss. 1922).

Deed to homestead by husband alone invalid, though wife one of grantees. Chatman v. Poindexter, 101 Miss. 496, 58 So. 361, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 163 (Miss. 1911).

7. —Miscellaneous.

While it may have been the testator’s intent to quitclaim the home to himself and his daughter, and to her alone after his death, he did not legally do so, as the quitclaim deed was signed solely by the testator, who was married, and this was not sufficient under the law. Dixon v. Jones (In re Will of Jones), 138 So.3d 205, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 230 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).

Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-29 was a clear, unambiguous statute and its plain meaning had to be applied. Because the requirements of the statute were not met, i.e., a husband had not signed the deed of trust as required by the statute, the deed of trust was neither valid nor binding, and a trial court’s judgment so declaring was affirmed. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Parker, 975 So. 2d 233, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 104 (Miss. 2008).

Forfeited tax patent obtained from the State of Mississippi was set aside because a husband conveyed homestead property without permission from his wife; therefore, the conveyance was void under Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-29, and taxes should not have accumulated on the land since a total homestead exemption applied. Alexander v. Daniel, 904 So. 2d 172, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 370 (Miss. 2005).

In a proceeding to determine heirship, the chancellor did not err in holding that a deed was not signed by, or with the authority of, a wife, as required by §89-1-29. Goodwin v. McMurphy, 435 So. 2d 639, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2617 (Miss. 1983).

Warranty deed from mother to daughter, conveying homestead property on which mother and father were living as their home, was void where father’s interest, granted to daughter by quitclaim deed, was not conveyed until some four years later. Gilmer v. Freeman, 336 So. 2d 717, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1512 (Miss. 1976).

A married woman who executes an oil and gas lease of homestead property without joinder of her husband ratifies it where, after obtaining a divorce, she conveys the subject property and quitclaims her rights to oil and gas. Bounds v. Ohio Oil Co., 234 Miss. 277, 106 So. 2d 66, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 487 (Miss. 1958).

This section [Code 1942, § 332] requiring husband to join in conveyance of wife’s homestead is not applicable where a husband and wife were separated for nine years when wife executed a mineral lease. Schmidt v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 219 F.2d 551, 1955 U.S. App. LEXIS 4856 (5th Cir. Miss. 1955).

Where a wife did not join with husband in execution of a mineral deed, and the husband owned a legal title to the property, the mineral deed was valid as to the minerals which were under the land not within the homestead interest of the wife, but was invalid as to minerals under the homestead property. Lee v. Duncan, 220 Miss. 234, 70 So. 2d 615, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 431 (Miss. 1954).

Where husband executed deed to daughter of tract of land including homestead in 1942, but wife did not join in the conveyance until 1948 after the husband’s death and after suit by his heirs for partition, deed by husband was null and void as to homestead and title thereof descended to his heirs at law as tenants in common. Hughes v. Hahn, 209 Miss. 293, 46 So. 2d 587, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 388 (Miss. 1950).

Execution by husband and wife of deed to homestead property to son, delivery of deed to clerk and its recordation, son being overseas in war, vested record and legal title to property in son, which could not be destroyed by destruction of recorded deed by mother. Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, 204 Miss. 206, 37 So. 2d 256, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 356 (Miss. 1948).

The conveyance of a part of a homestead by a woman alone while living with a man as his common-law wife after their earlier divorce and her subsequent marriage to another, who died shortly after assumption of the matrimonial common-law status, was invalid because not signed by the common-law husband. Oatis v. Mingo, 199 Miss. 896, 26 So. 2d 453, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 259 (Miss. 1946).

8. Validity of incumbrances in general.

In light of its dicta finding much force in the argument that the statute does not require a joint deed of husband and wife, the Mississippi Supreme Court would likely hold that a valid deed of trust was created when spouses contemporaneously signed separate but identical deeds of trust to their homestead because the parties clearly intended to create a valid deed of trust as part of one global transaction. Avakian v. Citibank, N.A., 773 F.3d 647, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 23159 (5th Cir. Miss. 2014).

Construing spouses’ separately signed deeds of trust to their homestead together comports with the basic purpose of protecting the spouses because the deeds of trust provide a clear written record of the couples’ contemporaneous consent to the creation of a deed of trust. Avakian v. Citibank, N.A., 773 F.3d 647, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 23159 (5th Cir. Miss. 2014).

Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-29, where the wife debtor did not sign the deed of trust signed by her husband in favor of the creditor, the deed of trust was null and void. The fact that the wife conveyed the property to the husband on the same date that he signed the deed of trust did not affect this result. Rhymes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Rhymes), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 779 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Mar. 14, 2008).

Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-29, where the wife debtor did not sign the deed of trust signed by her husband in favor of the creditor, the deed of trust was null and void. However, because the creditor paid off two existing deeds of trust on the property, the creditor was entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the two creditors whose debts were secured by the property. Rhymes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Rhymes), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 779 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Mar. 14, 2008).

Under Mississippi statute providing that deed of trust on homestead is invalid and not binding unless signed by spouse of owner if owner be married and living with spouse, validity of deed of trust is judged by circumstances existing at time of its execution, and subsequent actions by spouse who fails to join in execution cannot cure invalidity of instrument. Craddock v. Brinkley, 671 So. 2d 662, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 1996).

An encumbrance of homestead property signed by only one of the spouses is void and therefore may not be reformed on the ground of oversight. Strong v. Powell, 247 Miss. 55, 150 So. 2d 516, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1963).

Husband and wife may execute valid mortgage on after-acquired property used as homestead. Adkinson & Bacot Co. v. Varnado, 91 Miss. 825, 47 So. 113, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 215 (Miss. 1907).

Husband and wife may execute valid mortgage on after-acquired property used as a homestead. Adkinson & Bacot Co. v. Varnado, 91 Miss. 825, 47 So. 113, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 215 (Miss. 1907).

A deed of trust by a husband alone being void, his widow and children take as tenants in common at his death. Hubbard v. Sage Land & Improv. Co., 81 Miss. 616, 33 So. 413, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 179 (Miss. 1902).

No conveyance of the homestead shall be valid unless signed by the wife of the owner. Duggan v. Champlin, 75 Miss. 441, 23 So. 179, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1897).

A conveyance or encumbrance by the husband of the homestead without the wife joining in the deed is not valid. Rights to a homestead are not dependent upon mistaken or false statements made by the husband, but upon the fact of his being the head of a family and residing upon the premises as a home. Hinds v. Morgan, 75 Miss. 509, 23 So. 35, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1897).

Contemporaneous assent of husband and wife, if living together, is essential to an incumbrance of the exempt homestead. Duncan v. Moore, 67 Miss. 136, 7 So. 221, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 45 (Miss. 1889).

9. —Instrument securing payment of purchase money.

Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-29, where the wife debtor did not sign the deed of trust signed by her husband in favor of the creditor, the deed of trust was null and void. Creditor’s argument that Miss. Code §85-3-23 did not apply to debtors because a deed of trust was issued to secure a purchase money lien on the property and the homestead rights had not yet attached was without merit where the debtors had owned the property and had been occupying the property for some time prior to the time that the husband signed the deed of trust. Rhymes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Rhymes), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 779 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Mar. 14, 2008).

Where a wife joined with her husband in executing a deed of trust to the homestead, belonging to the husband, and thereafter upon the destruction of the building by fire the insurance proceeds were paid to the husband who deposited them in his wife’s name, but by agreement with the mortgagee most of such proceeds were paid to the mortgagee by the husband and used in rebuilding the destroyed home, the wife had no cause of action to set aside a foreclosure of the deed of trust since she was not prejudiced in her rights by the disposition made by her husband of the insurance money which belonged to him, not to her. McFarlane v. Plant, 185 Miss. 616, 188 So. 530, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 169 (Miss. 1939).

Deed of trust securing purchase money of homestead, valid without wife’s signature. Jarvis v. Armstrong, 94 Miss. 145, 48 So. 1, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1908).

Deed of trust securing money advanced for construction of house converted into homestead, valid without wife’s signature. Jarvis v. Armstrong, 94 Miss. 145, 48 So. 1, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1908).

Although the husband forges his wife’s name to the mortgage on land including the homestead, to secure borrowed money (the mortgagee being innocent), and a part of the money is used to pay off the purchase-money debt secured by a vendor’s lien on the whole land, the mortgagee, who takes up the note for the purchase-money debt will be subrogated to the rights of the holder of the purchase-money lien as against the homestead. North American Trust Co. v. Lanier, 78 Miss. 418, 28 So. 804, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1900).

A similar statute (Laws 1873, p 78) held not to be applicable where the incumbrance was to secure the purchase-money of the homestead. Billingsley v. Niblett, 56 Miss. 537, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 159 (Miss. 1879).

10. —Miscellaneous.

Facts were undisputed that the proceeds of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) subordinate loan were applied to cure the delinquent arrearage that had accrued on the primary loan; the court, however, found that the payment of the proceeds to cure the primary note arrearage did not permit the subordinate deed of trust to become a purchase money security interest. Since the deed of trust securing HUD’s arrearage payment was not a purchase money security interest and since it was not signed by the debtor’s spouse, the deed of trust was invalid. In re Burks, 421 B.R. 762, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4120 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2009).

Deed of trust being serviced was a valid lien encumbering debtor’s homestead property even though it was not executed by his spouse. In re Burks, 421 B.R. 762, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4120 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2009).

Where the court made a finding, under Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(3), that the debtor’s signature on a deed of trust was forged, the deed of trust was void and unenforceable, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-29 (1980). Ramsey v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Ramsey), 424 B.R. 217, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3541 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2009).

Arbitration clause in a contract between clients, a husband and a wife, and a termite company was enforceable against the wife, even though she did not sign the contract, because it did not encompass an incumbrance under Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-29. Terminix Int'l, Inc., Ltd. P'ship v. Rice, 904 So. 2d 1051, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1459 (Miss. 2004).

Invalidity of deed of trust arising from spouse’s failure to sign deed of trust on homestead property was not cured by spouse’s act of signing promissory note one year later evidencing indebtedness to deed of trust holder; note was not attachment to nor integral part of deed of trust. Craddock v. Brinkley, 671 So. 2d 662, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 1996).

Spouse’s failure to sign deed of trust on homestead property given by husband as security for loan rendered deed of trust null and void as matter of law, and thus, foreclosure sale pursuant to deed of trust had to be set aside and title to property vested in owner’s son who received has interest in property via laws of descent and distribution. Craddock v. Brinkley, 671 So. 2d 662, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 1996).

The statutory signing requirements of §§15-3-1,89-1-3,89-1-29 and91-9-1 [repealed] were satisfied with respect to a deed of trust relating to homestead property, even though the wife neglected to sign the deed of trust document, where her signature appeared on the 2 attachments to the deed of trust-the property description and the adjustable rate mortgage rider-which constituted an integral part of the deed of trust. United Miss. Bank v. GMAC Mortgage Co., 615 So. 2d 1174, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 1993).

Bank was entitled to foreclose a deed of trust against homestead property for advances made to the husband, acting alone and without wife’s knowledge, which were additional to the original indebtedness secured by the deed of trust contract where the contract contained a “dragnet clause” which clearly and unambiguously provided that its purpose was to “secure all loans and advances which Beneficiary has made or may hereafter make to the Grantor, or any of them”; nor did the fact that the husband pledged certain cattle as additional security for the advances, which were missing when the bank sought to replevy them, amount to a waiver on the part of the bank of the security granted it by the deed of trust. Newton County Bank, Louin Branch Office v. Jones, 299 So. 2d 215, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1592 (Miss. 1974).

“Dragnet” clause contained in a deed of trust executed by a husband and wife on their homestead property, purporting to cover “any other or further indebtedness in the way of future advances hereunder, or otherwise, that the grantor, or either of them, may now or hereafter owe the beneficiary”, was not broad enough to cover an indebtedness incurred by the husband on a conditional sales contract prior to the divorce, and without the wife’s concurrence or knowledge, and discounted to a bank, beneficiary of the deed of trust, or on renewal notes signed by the husband after the divorce. Hudson v. Bank of Leakesville, 249 So. 2d 371, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1157 (Miss. 1971).

Where the wife of the grantor failed to sign a deed granting right to remove timber from land owned by the grantor and occupied by him and his wife, this rendered deed void insofar as it affected the grantor’s homestead. Thompson v. Dyess, 218 Miss. 770, 67 So. 2d 721, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 602 (Miss. 1953).

In an action to cancel a trust deed and a foreclosure deed on the ground that it was executed at the time the husband was married to a prior wife, husband alone executed the trust deed and realty involved was the homestead of husband and wife, the note and trust deed were valid although not signed by prior wife because at time of execution of note and deed husband and wife were separated and not living together. McGehee v. Middleton, 58 So. 2d 16 (Miss. 1952).

Doctrine “he who seeks equity must do equity” not applicable in suits by husband and wife to enjoin cutting of timber under contract signed by husband alone. Young v. Ashley, 123 Miss. 693, 86 So. 458, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 70 (Miss. 1920).

Deed to cut timber on homestead, not signed by wife was void, or at most only a license. Blair v. Frank B. Russell & Co., 120 Miss. 108, 81 So. 785, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 64 (Miss. 1919).

A deed of trust executed by a husband who is living with his wife is void as to the homestead exemption of one hundred and sixty acres included therein without the joinder of the wife, and his widow and children take as tenants in common at his death, and a release of all exemption rights which the beneficiary in the trust deed, without further consideration, procures from the widow in eighty acres adjoining the eighty acres on which the dwelling is situated, is void for all purposes except to fix the character of such eighty acres as a part of the homestead. Hubbard v. Sage Land & Improv. Co., 81 Miss. 616, 33 So. 413, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 179 (Miss. 1902).

A deed of trust drawn up and handed to the husband for his and his wife’s signatures on a secular day, and after signature delivered on a secular day to the beneficiary without the latter’s knowledge that it was signed on Sunday, is valid. Duggan v. Champlin, 75 Miss. 441, 23 So. 179, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1897).

A conveyance by the husband of all the merchantable timber on his homestead, with an indefinite time for its removal, is an encumbrance of such homestead and void if the wife does not join. McKenzie v. Shows, 70 Miss. 388, 12 So. 336, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 119 (Miss. 1892).

Where a husband having jointly with his wife executed a mortgage intended to include their homestead, and afterwards without authority from her, but in an honest effort to correct the mistake, inserted the homestead which had been omitted from the description, the mortgage is inoperative as to the homestead. Foote v. Hambrick, 70 Miss. 157, 11 So. 567, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1892).

11. Effect of abandonment of homestead.

Husband could not claim exemption in his former homestead after abandonment, and wife could not assert exemption which husband had abandoned, because effect of this would be to claim 2 exemptions for wife in same property. Joe T. Dehmer Distributors, Inc. v. Temple, 826 F.2d 1463, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12486 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987).

In order for encumbered property to constitute homestead, owner must be living with spouse; when husband removes himself from homestead property without intent to return and wife consents, homestead is abandoned notwithstanding wife’s continued residence on land; question whether owner of property is living with spouse is factual. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Southeastern Fire Ins. Co., 751 F.2d 771, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 27780 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Husband may convey abandoned homestead by separate deed. Lindsey v. Holly, 105 Miss. 740, 63 So. 222, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 257 (Miss. 1913).

A temporary removal because of necessity by husband and wife, they retaining an intention to return to the premises, is not an abandonment of the homestead. Collins v. Bounds, 82 Miss. 447, 34 So. 355, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1903).

An incumbrance on the land of the husband, which was once his homestead, given by him alone when not residing on the land, is not rendered invalid because of an intention to re-occupy it in the future. Majors v. Majors, 58 Miss. 806, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1881).

12. Effect of change of residence.

A deed of trust on property formerly occupied as a homestead executed by the husband alone, after moving from the homestead, is not invalid as to the wife. Grantham v. Ralle, 248 Miss. 364, 158 So. 2d 719, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 402 (Miss. 1963).

Husband who in good faith has selected another homestead may convey good title to his former homestead without the joining of his wife in the deed. Livelar v. Kepner, 244 Miss. 723, 146 So. 2d 346, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 502 (Miss. 1962).

An exemptionist who sells his homestead in order to make a change of residence, and which he afterwards effects, can, before removal, execute a valid conveyance of the property without his wife joining him therein. Wilson v. Gray, 59 Miss. 525, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 150 (Miss. 1882).

13. Effect of separation or divorce of parties to marriage.

A deed of trust on a marital homestead was invalid where (1) only the husband, and not the wife, signed the deed of trust, and (2) the deed of trust was executed prior to the separation and divorce of the husband and wife. Thurman v. Thurman, 770 So. 2d 1015, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 483 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

A conveyance of the homestead property by the husband without the signature of the wife is invalid, even though the wife be not living on the homestead property at the time of execution of the deed of conveyance, if her absence is occasioned by the act of the husband in driving her away from the home. Robbins v. Berry, 213 Miss. 744, 57 So. 2d 576, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 421 (Miss. 1952).

Even though a wife was guilty of collusion in a divorce proceeding, she was entitled to have a deed to the homestead canceled where she was living away from the husband and her absence was occasioned by an act of the husband in driving her away, and where the purchasers who bought the homestead were not innocent purchasers. Crosby v. Hatten, 213 Miss. 240, 56 So. 2d 705, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 356 (Miss. 1952).

The test whether the husband abandoned any homestead rights under statutes invalidating conveyance of the homestead is whether the husband had abandoned the conjugal relation with his wife and the occupancy of the property, but the wrongful ouster of the spouse does not constitute a wilful abandonment; and if a spouse voluntarily separates from the other and abandons the intention of living with him or her through no fault of the latter, he or she has abandoned any homestead rights. Etheridge v. Webb, 210 Miss. 729, 50 So. 2d 603, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 310 (Miss. 1951).

An abandonment of a homestead may be obtained by a free and voluntary separation of the parties and the test is whether the husband was away from the homestead with the mature intention not to return to it. Etheridge v. Webb, 210 Miss. 729, 50 So. 2d 603, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 310 (Miss. 1951).

A husband may not drive his wife away or otherwise by his own wrong cause her to leave, and thereupon exercise the assumed right to convey the homestead without her joinder in the conveyance, if nevertheless it remained her right and actual intention to return. Philan v. Turner, 195 Miss. 172, 13 So. 2d 819, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 1943).

The sole fact that the wife, for the time being, is living apart from her husband does not neutralize her right of veto upon a conveyance of the homestead by the husband. Philan v. Turner, 195 Miss. 172, 13 So. 2d 819, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 1943).

Where a wife leaves her husband with the intention not to return to the homestead, she loses her right to veto a conveyance of the homestead by her husband. Philan v. Turner, 195 Miss. 172, 13 So. 2d 819, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 1943).

The fact that a wife, leaving her husband, left some of her personal belongings at the home, while a fact to be considered in determining whether she left the homestead with the intention of returning, is not controlling. Philan v. Turner, 195 Miss. 172, 13 So. 2d 819, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 1943).

Where the wife’s leaving her invalid husband in need of personal attention because of his bringing his widowed sister and her child to live with him and care for him while the wife was working, was without legal justification under the circumstances, the wife lost her right to veto his conveyance of the homestead, notwithstanding she may have intended to return to the homestead if and when her sister-in-law moved therefrom. Philan v. Turner, 195 Miss. 172, 13 So. 2d 819, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 1943).

A husband’s conveyance of homestead property was not void because his wife did not join in the execution thereof, where the evidence showed that she was at the time voluntarily living away from him and refused to return to live with him. Sylvester v. Stevens, 186 Miss. 503, 191 So. 483, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 257 (Miss. 1939).

Permission given by husband after legal separation from wife to lumber company to enter land and cut and remove logs therefrom held binding, under statute, against wife claiming homestead rights in such land. Lewis v. Ladner, 177 Miss. 473, 168 So. 281, 172 So. 312, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 230 (Miss. 1936).

Proof of husband’s abandonment of homestead in unlawful entry and detainer action against wife by purchaser of land at sale on foreclosure of trust deed executed by wife alone must be clear and decisive of such intention, accompanied by husband’s removal from premises. Gardner v. Cook, 173 Miss. 244, 158 So. 150, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 389 (Miss. 1934).

Evidence in unlawful entry and detainer action held to show that defendant’s husband had not abandoned defendant or their homestead when she executed trust deed, on foreclosure of which plaintiff purchased land, so that deed, in which husband did not join, was void. Gardner v. Cook, 173 Miss. 244, 158 So. 150, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 389 (Miss. 1934).

Where wife signed separation agreement without coercion and separation followed, husband’s deed to homestead without wife’s signature was not void. Board of Mayor & Aldermen of Booneville v. Clayton, 155 Miss. 428, 124 So. 490, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 310 (Miss. 1929).

Divorced wife of owner receiving part of wild land by decree in divorce cannot assert homestead right against purchaser under prior trust deed made by husband. Mounger v. Gandy, 110 Miss. 133, 69 So. 817, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 13 (Miss. 1915).

In legal contemplation, the husband is living with his wife, though driven by stress of pecuniary difficulties to absent himself from his wife and home in the effort to provide for himself and family, and a deed of conveyance to the homestead by the wife during such absence of the husband is invalid. Walton v. Walton, 76 Miss. 662, 25 So. 166, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1898).

A husband who had driven his wife from his home and refused to permit her to return, cannot lawfully convey the premises to a third person, for the law will not suffer a husband to acquire by his wrong what the statute has denied him. Scott v. Scott, 73 Miss. 575, 19 So. 589, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 172 (Miss. 1895).

14. Rights and remedies of spouses.

Section89-1-29 applies when spouses are married and living together on homestead; however, spouse forced off homestead retains §89-1-29 veto power. Joe T. Dehmer Distributors, Inc. v. Temple, 826 F.2d 1463, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12486 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987).

While §89-1-29 does not give wife any property right or ownership, it does give her veto power. Ward v. Ward, 517 So. 2d 571, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2968 (Miss. 1987).

A wife, who with her husband conveyed a homestead, had such an interest in the homestead that a life estate could be reserved to her as well as to her husband; since the homestead could not have been conveyed to the grantees without the consent of the wife, she would have the right to refuse to convey it unless the life estate was reserved to her. Moore v. Moore, 254 So. 2d 879 (Miss. 1971).

Where a husband and wife executed a deed of trust on their homestead property, and the deed contained a “dragnet” clause stating that it was intended to cover any other or further indebtedness that the grantors or either of them might thereafter owe the beneficiary, the clause was not sufficiently broad in its terms to secure an indebtedness of the husband on a conditional sales contract executed by the husband alone prior to the divorce of the parties and then discounted to the bank which was the beneficiary of the deed of trust, in the absence of the wife’s knowledge of the transaction, and a foreclosure of the deed of trust, upon the husband’s default under the conditional sales contract, would be enjoined. Hudson v. Bank of Leakesville, 249 So. 2d 371, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1157 (Miss. 1971).

In suit by husband to cancel deed of conveyance executed by wife in which husband did not join, on ground that property conveyed was homestead property, husband is entitled to prove, if he can, that property, although belonging to wife, constitutes homestead, and that he was living with wife at time conveyance thereof was executed. Etheridge v. Webb, 204 Miss. 159, 37 So. 2d 168, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 351 (Miss. 1948).

In suit by husband to cancel deed of conveyance executed by wife in which husband did not join, on ground that property described in deed was homestead, burden of proof is on husband to prove that he was living with wife, either actually or in a legal sense, within the meaning of this section [Code 1942, § 332], at time she conveyed the property. Etheridge v. Webb, 204 Miss. 159, 37 So. 2d 168, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 351 (Miss. 1948).

A wife living separate and apart from her husband at the time of his death was entitled to cancellation of a conveyance, executed without her knowledge, consent, or signature, to property admittedly their homestead both at the time of the separation and of the husband’s death. Stringer v. Arrington, 202 Miss. 798, 32 So. 2d 879, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 342 (Miss. 1947).

So long as the wife has the right and the will to remain at home, she is to be considered as living there within the meaning of the statute; the will to remain includes a situation where, being away without her own fault, the wife has the will to return, although, when she abandons the intention to return, she no longer has the right to veto a homestead conveyance even though she had the right theretofore to remain. Philan v. Turner, 195 Miss. 172, 13 So. 2d 819, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 1943).

This section [Code 1942, § 330] gives the wife the veto power against encumbrances or conveyances by her husband of the exempt homestead, but imposes no limitation of his common law rights to deal with the indebtedness secured by the homestead. McFarlane v. Plant, 185 Miss. 616, 188 So. 530, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 169 (Miss. 1939).

Wife’s veto power against conveyance of homestead by husband is not a property right. Kimbrough v. Powell, 143 Miss. 498, 108 So. 498, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1926).

Equity will protect right of wife in homestead; wife proper party in suit to protect homestead against those claiming under instrument signed by husband alone. Young v. Ashley, 123 Miss. 693, 86 So. 458, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 70 (Miss. 1920).

In that the wife has a mere veto power on the sale of a homestead and not a property right subject to bargain and sale, a promise made by the husband to the wife to secure her signature is void. New Orleans R. & M. S. Co. v. Gatti, 77 Miss. 754, 27 So. 601 (Miss. 1900).

Since a wife has only a veto power in respect to conveyance of a homestead, she cannot maintain a bill, the sole object of which is the cancellation of the husband’s deed in which she did not join. Scott v. Scott, 73 Miss. 575, 19 So. 589, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 172 (Miss. 1895).

Although the wife must join in the conveyance of her husband’s homestead, she has no estate therein, and is not the proper party to a bill by him to cancel the trust deed thereon given by him alone, and he cannot, by joining her as a complainant, avoid the requirement in a court of chancery to do equity by offering to pay the assured debt. Pounds v. Clarke, 70 Miss. 263, 14 So. 22, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 142 (Miss. 1892), overruled, McDonald v. Sanford, 88 Miss. 633, 41 So. 369, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1906).

The wife has a mere veto power. Billingsley v. Niblett, 56 Miss. 537, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 159 (Miss. 1879); Smith v. Scherck, 60 Miss. 491, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 88 (Miss. 1882); Duncan v. Moore, 67 Miss. 136, 7 So. 221, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 45 (Miss. 1889); Scott v. Scott, 73 Miss. 575, 19 So. 589, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 172 (Miss. 1895); New Orleans R. & M. S. Co. v. Gatti, 77 Miss. 754, 27 So. 601 (Miss. 1900).

15. Rights of grantees under deeds.

A deed from a husband to his homestead, although void from the want of his wife’s joinder therein, is good against a third party as color of title to sustain a claim by adverse possession. Johnson v. Hunt, 79 Miss. 639, 31 So. 205, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 100 (Miss. 1901); Avera v. Williams, 81 Miss. 714, 33 So. 501, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 195 (Miss. 1902).

A deed executed by a husband living with his wife purporting to convey his homestead is not good to convey any interest whatever therein unless it be signed by the wife. Hence, the vendee in a deed from a husband living with his wife which she did not sign, purporting to convey his homestead, cannot maintain ejectment for the lands after the death of the husband against those who claim under his heirs. Johnson v. Hunt, 79 Miss. 639, 31 So. 205, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 100 (Miss. 1901).

16. Rights of agents under real estate listing contracts.

An exclusive real estate listing contract served to make the real estate agent the special agent of the owner, with limited power to find a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy the property on terms and conditions fixed by the appellee; but the execution of such a contract did not serve to permit the agent to acquire any legal interest in the property placed in his hands for sale, nor did the contract create any incumbrance upon the property involved. C. Buck Bush Realty Co. v. Whetstone, 266 So. 2d 135, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1387 (Miss. 1972).

It is a general rule that a person who has employed a broker to sell property cannot avoid liability for the commission on the ground that he is unable to complete the transaction because his wife refused to join in the contract for sale or deed, where the broker has found a purchaser ready, willing and able to purchase the property. C. Buck Bush Realty Co. v. Whetstone, 266 So. 2d 135, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1387 (Miss. 1972).

17. Pleading.

Plea of res judicata setting up fact that in divorce proceeding property was adjudged to belong to wife should not be sustained in subsequent suit by husband to cancel deed of conveyance to property executed by wife alone on ground that property described in deed was homestead as the deed required the signature of husband if property did in fact constitute homestead at time of execution of deed and if husband was then living with wife. Etheridge v. Webb, 204 Miss. 159, 37 So. 2d 168, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 351 (Miss. 1948).

Benefits of statute invalidating trust deed of wife’s homestead, unless signed and acknowledged by husband living with wife, need not be affirmatively asserted by husband in unlawful entry and detainer action by purchaser at sale on foreclosure of such deed. Gardner v. Cook, 173 Miss. 244, 158 So. 150, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 389 (Miss. 1934).

18. Limitation of actions.

A mineral deed to homestead which was not signed by the wife of the owner, being void, did not carry with it constructive possession, and therefore the ten years statute of limitations was inapplicable to an action by the husband and wife to cancel the deed brought some 21 years after the conveyance. Travis v. Dantzler, 244 Miss. 360, 141 So. 2d 556, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 455 (Miss. 1962).

Laches is not a defense to a suit to cancel a deed of the husband conveying a tract of land which constituted the spouses’ family homestead, provided that the proceedings are instituted within the statutory period. Robbins v. Berry, 213 Miss. 744, 57 So. 2d 576, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 421 (Miss. 1952).

19. Application of doctrine of estoppel.

Conveyance of homestead without spouse’s joining in execution of deed is absolutely void, no subsequent action by non-joining spouse cures its invalidity, and where spouse is required or forced to leave homestead on account of other spouse’s misconduct, and is absent at time of deed’s execution, instrument is likewise invalid; divorce decree based on irreconcilable differences is not proper judgment for purposes of collaterally estopping claim by non-joining spouse. Welborn v. Lowe, 504 So. 2d 205, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2437 (Miss. 1987).

Under §89-1-29, a married woman who, in 1940, joined her husband in executing a deed of his separate property, which was their homestead, was not estopped to assert an after-acquired title against the grantee in the deed, where the deed, though reciting that the grantors were husband and wife, did not recite that the property was homestead or the separate property of the husband and did not indicate that her joinder was pro forma or limited to a release of her homestead interest. Hinton on behalf of Hinton v. Hydraulic Pumps, Inc., 437 So. 2d 1007, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2884 (Miss. 1983).

A husband who attempts to convey part of the homestead without his wife’s signature is not estopped by his warranty to assert the invalidity of the deed, even after the wife’s death. Thompson v. Dyess, 218 Miss. 770, 67 So. 2d 721, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 602 (Miss. 1953).

As to the contention that a deed of trust and foreclosure thereunder were void because the land involved was homestead property, and the mortgagor’s wife had not joined in the execution of the deed of trust, stipulations in the deed of trust that the land covered thereby was not part of the mortgagor’s homestead was not binding on him, although it was a declaration against interest to be considered by the chancellor in determining whether such land was in fact part of his homestead. Kyle v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 186 Miss. 287, 187 So. 534, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 202 (Miss. 1939).

Wife, securing credit and advances on faith of her trust deed, held not estopped to assert invalidity thereof because not signed by husband, living with her on homestead conveyed, as defense to unlawful entry and detainer action by purchaser of land at foreclosure sale. Gardner v. Cook, 173 Miss. 244, 158 So. 150, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 389 (Miss. 1934).

The conveyance of a homestead, or any part of it, by the husband alone being void, a warranty clause does not create an estoppel against him even after the death of his wife. Bollen v. R. G. Lilly & Son, 85 Miss. 344, 37 So. 811, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1904).

A deed by a husband alone purporting to convey to a railroad the right of way over his homestead, being void, is no defense to an action of trespass quare clausum fregit by the husband and wife against the railroad for entering and taking the right of way. Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Singleterry, 78 Miss. 772, 29 So. 754, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 171 (Miss. 1900).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Homestead Right of Cotenant as Affecting Partition. 83 A.L.R.6th 605.

Am. Jur.

40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homestead §§ 112 et seq.

13A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Homestead, Forms 41 et seq. (conveyance or encumbrance of homestead where spouse incompetent).

9A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d Homestead, §§ 135:41 et seq. (conveyance or encumbrance of homestead).

§ 89-1-31. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1980, ch. 514, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1980.

[Codes, 1880, § 1260; 1892, § 1985; 1906, § 2161; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1836; 1930, § 1780; 1942, § 332; Laws, 1924, ch. 169]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §89-1-31 required a husband to join in the conveyance of his wife’s homestead.

§ 89-1-33. Effect of word “warrant” in conveyance.

The word “warrant” without restrictive words in a conveyance shall have the effect of embracing all of the five (5) covenants known to common law, to wit: seizin, power to sell, freedom from incumbrance, quiet enjoyment and warranty of title.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1233; 1892, § 2480; 1906, § 2817; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2318; 1930, § 2122; 1942, § 843.

Cross References —

Effect of the words “warrant specially,” see §89-1-35.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Rights and remedies upon breach.

1. In general.

In a case in which the father conveyed land by warranty deed to his daughter, reserving unto himself a life estate, but he attempted to reconvey one acre of the same tract to another person later, the chancellor correctly found that the father had reserved a life estate and that he could have conveyed his reserved life estate, but that reading the conveyance as retaining the right to reconvey title in fee simple was repugnant to the granting clause in the conveyance to his daughter as the father conveyed and warranted the property to his daughter; pursuant to the deed, the daughter acquired ownership of the property upon delivery of the deed; and the father could not subsequently convey to another person property he no longer owned. T&W Homes Etc, LLC v. Crotwell, 235 So.3d 66, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 338 (Miss. 2017).

Trial court erred in refusing to require the sellers to correct defects in title and convey the property to the buyer because the real estate contract required the sellers to convey by warranty deed and to cure defects, but they ignored their obligations under contract and pursued a better deal with a third party, which constituted a material breach of the contract and of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Under Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-33, the warranty deed, absent other restrictive language, would have the effect of embracing all five covenants known to the common law, which were seizin, power to sell, freedom from encumbrances, quiet enjoyment and warranty of title. Ferrara v. Walters, 919 So. 2d 876, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 609 (Miss. 2005).

The wording of a deed which provided that “we hereby bargain, sell, convey and warrant to the Trustees of Oakgrove Consolidated High School and their successors the following described land. . . ” could only connote a conveyance absolute and the grantors’ children would not be heard some 50 years later to say that the grantors’ intent was something entirely different from what was expressed in the plain and simple legalese in the recorded instrument of conveyance. Garraway v. Yonce, 549 So. 2d 1341, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 453 (Miss. 1989).

Under Mississippi law, a grantor is liable for breach of warranty even though the grantee has notice of an outstanding encumbrance. Mills v. Damson Oil Corp., 686 F.2d 1096, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 25678 (5th Cir. Miss. 1982).

Grantors conveying land under warranty deed could reserve timber, though they had only possibility of reverter. Finkbine Lumber Co. v. Saucier, 150 Miss. 446, 116 So. 736, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1928).

Purchaser with warranty deed knowing of outstanding incumbrance could not require vendor to secure release before paying balance of purchase price. Stokely v. Cooper, 150 Miss. 143, 116 So. 538, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 123 (Miss. 1928).

Grantor liable for breach of warranty, though grantee has notice of incumbrance. Sutton v. Cannon, 135 Miss. 368, 100 So. 24, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 45 (Miss. 1924).

“Warrant” in deed, followed by restrictive words, embraces only warranties expressed therein. Staton v. Henry, 130 Miss. 372, 94 So. 237, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 221 (Miss. 1922).

Warranty against incumbrance includes taxes; parol evidence inadmissible to show grantee assumed payment of taxes. Martin v. Partee, 121 Miss. 482, 83 So. 673, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 1920).

Deed held to contain warranty against incumbrances. Garner v. Garner, 117 Miss. 694, 78 So. 623, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 213 (Miss. 1918).

The word “warrant” warrants the possession or seisin as well as the title. Allen v. Caffee, 85 Miss. 766, 38 So. 186, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 191 (Miss. 1904).

2. Rights and remedies upon breach.

Chancery court committed reversible error when it denied attorney fees to the purchaser of a warranty timber deed after the chancery court found in favor of the purchaser in a breach of contract action in which it was determined that the seller of the deed did not have legal title to the land. Gordon v. Gordon, 929 So. 2d 981, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 395 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

A purchaser under a timber warranty deed could recover reasonable attorney fees and other expenses of adjudicating title, not to exceed the price paid for the timber, when the seller breached covenants embraced by the warranty deed and the purchaser was not divested of the timber while adjudicating title. Greenlee v. Mitchell, 607 So. 2d 97, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 483 (Miss. 1992).

If vendor conveys real property by warranty deed and it is subsequently determined that there is defect in chain of title, vendor has breached covenants of seizin and power to sell; in case in which covenantee is not divested of land while adjudicating title, covenantee may be awarded reasonable attorney fees and other expenses of adjudicating title, not to exceed price paid by covenantee when purchasing land. Howard v. Clanton, 481 So. 2d 272, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2426 (Miss. 1985).

Where defendant grantors warranted that they had title and the title failed, the grantees were not required to hold possession of the property conveyed until adverse possession gave them title. Guerra v. State, 209 So. 2d 627, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1462 (Miss. 1968).

A contract to convey a merchantable title to land by a general warranty deed implies an obligation to convey a perfect, fee-simple title, and where the seller does not own and cannot convey most of the minerals underlying the land the purchaser’s rescission of the contract is justified. Brent v. Corbin, 252 Miss. 464, 173 So. 2d 430, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1121 (Miss. 1965).

The measure of damages for a partial failure under a covenant of warranty of title to real property is the difference between the value of the tract without the lost portion. Holcomb v. McClure, 211 Miss. 849, 52 So. 2d 922, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 417 (Miss. 1951).

Purchaser’s suit against vendor of realty for breach of warranty of title based on reservation of one-half interest in mineral rights by prior owner was not barred by purchaser’s resale of realty where he did not convey and warrant to his vendee reserved mineral rights. Meredith v. Pratt, 208 Miss. 412, 44 So. 2d 521, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 257 (Miss. 1950).

Eviction or surrender not essential to suit on warranty by grantee, buying paramount title; such action may be brought in assumpsit or in chancery. Coopwood v. McCandless, 99 Miss. 364, 54 So. 1007, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 214 (Miss. 1911).

Warrantor’s liability for breach of warranty is purchase price with interest. Allen v. Miller, 99 Miss. 75, 54 So. 731, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1910).

In order to recover on warranty for amount paid in purchasing paramount title or incumbrance, covenantee must show that such was paramount to title conveyed to him. Allen v. Miller, 99 Miss. 75, 54 So. 731, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1910).

A grantee in a general warranty deed who purchases land after the taxes of the current year have become a charge thereon may, after the 15th of December, pay the taxes thereon not previously paid by the grantor and at once sue for and recover the sum paid to protect the title. Swinney v. Cockrell, 86 Miss. 318, 38 So. 353, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 43 (Miss. 1905).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Breach of covenant for quiet enjoyment in lease. 41 A.L.R.2d 1414.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions §§ 45 et seq.

7A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, Forms 1 et seq. (covenants of title).

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Covenants §§ 45 et seq.

§ 89-1-35. Effect of words “warrant specially.”

The words “warrant specially,” in a conveyance, shall constitute a covenant that the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives, will forever warrant and defend the title of the property unto the grantee and his heirs, representatives, and assigns, against the claims of all persons claiming by, through, or under the grantor.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1234; 1892, § 2481; 1906, § 2818; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2319; 1930, § 2123; 1942, § 844.

Cross References —

Effect of the word “warrant,” see §89-1-33.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Conveyance with special warranty may be grant of fee simple title. Jones v. Metzger, 132 Miss. 247, 96 So. 161, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1923).

Words “warrant specially” is warranty only against those claiming through grantor. Jones v. Metzger, 132 Miss. 247, 96 So. 161, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1923).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 63, 64, 71.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Covenants §§ 62, 63.

§ 89-1-37. Effect of a conveyance without warranty.

A conveyance without any warranty shall operate to transfer the title and possession of the grantor as a quitclaim and release.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1235; 1892, § 2482; 1906, § 2819; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2320; 1930, § 2124; 1942, § 845.

Cross References —

Effect of quitclaim and release, see §89-1-39.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The heirs of an intestate who had conveyed to his wife by quitclaim deed and without any warranty, property then encumbered, and joined with her in obtaining a loan secured upon property standing in her name, are entitled to be subrogated to such encumbrances upon payment out of the intestate’s estate of the debts secured. Kellner v. Kellner, 241 Miss. 53, 129 So. 2d 391, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 318 (Miss. 1961).

§ 89-1-39. Effect of quitclaim and release.

A conveyance of quitclaim and release shall be sufficient to pass all the estate or interest the grantor has in the land conveyed, and shall estop the grantor and his heirs from asserting a subsequently acquired adverse title to the lands conveyed.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 36, art. 17; 1871, § 2300; 1880, § 1195; 1892, § 2438; 1906, § 2767; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2271; 1930, § 2125; 1942, § 846.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Estoppel.

2. Miscellaneous.

1. Estoppel.

Estoppel by deed bars a party from asserting a subsequently acquired title in derogation of his grant. Chevron Oil Co. v. Clark, 291 F. Supp. 552, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12565 (S.D. Miss. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 432 F.2d 280, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7176 (5th Cir. Miss. 1970).

Where at the time of executing a deed quitclaiming all his right, title and interest in and to all minerals in certain described lands, the grantor had no interest therein, and nothing in the quitclaim deed indicated any intention on the grantor’s part to convey any interest that he might subsequently acquire, the grantor was not estopped to assert his after-acquired title, and such after-acquired title did not enure to the benefit of the grantee in the quitclaim deed and his successive grantees. McLaurin v. Royalties, Inc., 231 Miss. 240, 95 So. 2d 105, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 510 (Miss. 1957).

The estoppel created by this section [Code 1942, § 846] is coextensive only with the estate, right or interest which the conveyance purports to convey. McLaurin v. Royalties, Inc., 231 Miss. 240, 95 So. 2d 105, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 510 (Miss. 1957).

Grantee in quitclaim deed acquires such title, if any, as may be then vested in grantors, but when grantors have no title when they execute deed and do not afterwards acquire any title, grantee acquires nothing by virtue of this deed and is not estopped to reply upon perfect title acquired by him elsewhere. Perkins v. White, 208 Miss. 157, 43 So. 2d 897, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 237 (Miss. 1950).

The rule that a grantor and all persons in privity with him are estopped from ever afterwards denying that, at the time his deed of conveyance was executed, he was seized of the property which his deed purported to convey, and that mortgages and deeds of trust are within this rule, has been extended by this statute to quitclaim deeds. Meyers v. American Oil Co., 192 Miss. 180, 5 So. 2d 218, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 29 (Miss. 1941), limited, Pettis v. Brown, 203 Miss. 292, 33 So. 2d 809, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 267 (Miss. 1948).

The estoppel is coextensive with the estate, right, or interest which the conveyance purports to pass. McInnis v. Pickett, 65 Miss. 354, 3 So. 660, 1887 Miss. LEXIS 70 (Miss. 1887); Bramlett v. Roberts, 68 Miss. 325, 10 So. 56, 1890 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1890); Houston v. National Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 80 Miss. 31, 31 So. 540, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 314 (Miss. 1902).

2. Miscellaneous.

Judgment on the pleadings in favor of an assignee was proper because there was no set of facts that a mortgagor could prove that would entitle him to the surplus that resulted from a foreclosure sale since his conveyances divested him of any interests or rights referenced in the deed of trust; the quitclaim deed and prior conveyances divested the mortgagee of his rights and interests in the property because he manifested his intent to transfer all his right, title, and interest in the property. Hinton v. Rolison, 175 So.3d 1281, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 519 (Miss. 2015).

A quitclaim deed which conveyed a 40-acre tract of land to the grantee but retained one half of all mineral rights for the grantor transferred to the grantee only the surface land where the grantor had previously conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the minerals to a third party. However, where the devisees of the grantor admitted that it had been intended by the grantor that the grantee should have a one-quarter interest in the minerals, the quitclaim deed would be interpreted to have conveyed to the grantee such interest. Rosenbaum v. McCaskey, 386 So. 2d 387, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2036 (Miss. 1980).

The doctrine of mutual mistake of fact was applicable and quitclaim deeds previously executed were cancelled and set aside where the deeds had been executed under the mistaken belief, shared by all parties, that the prior owner of the property had died intestate, whereas he had in fact died testate. Greer v. Higgins, 338 So. 2d 1233, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1655 (Miss. 1976).

Where the plaintiff conveyed by quitclaim deed to the defendant an undivided one-half interest in the property which the plaintiff would inherit from the deceased, and at the same time the defendant conveyed to the plaintiff by quitclaim deed an undivided one-half interest of the defendant, and thereafter it was revealed that the decedent had devised and bequeathed all of his property to the plaintiff, the plaintiff became the owner of an undivided three-fourths interest in the estate, including realty and personalty, and the defendant became vested with an undivided one-fourth interest in such estate. Jackson v. Rutledge, 231 So. 2d 803, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1613 (Miss. 1970).

The heirs of an intestate who had conveyed to his wife by quitclaim deed and without any warranty, property then encumbered, and joined with her in obtaining a loan secured upon property standing in her name, are entitled to be subrogated to such encumbrances upon payment out of the intestate’s estate of the debts secured. Kellner v. Kellner, 241 Miss. 53, 129 So. 2d 391, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 318 (Miss. 1961).

Where the mortgagor purchases from the state the land which was sold to the state for the nonpayment of the taxes and not redeemed, his action amounts merely to redemption from the tax sale and inures to the benefit of the mortgagee. Dampier v. Polk, 214 Miss. 65, 58 So. 2d 44, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 445 (Miss. 1952).

Where grantee was fully aware of outstanding interest in the land in question at time of grantor’s conveyance of her interest therein by quitclaim deed, grantor’s subsequent acquisition of such outstanding interest on behalf of, and as mere conduit of title for, third person did not place at any disadvantage either the grantee or the beneficiaries under his will and such after-acquired title did not inure to their benefit. Crooker v. Hollingsworth, 210 Miss. 636, 46 So. 2d 541, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 355 (Miss. 1950).

When a person attempts to convey title to something that he does not in fact own, and afterwards obtains good title to the property or interest thus conveyed, such subsequent acquisition will automatically inure to benefit of his prior vendees. Perkins v. White, 208 Miss. 157, 43 So. 2d 897, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 237 (Miss. 1950).

Quitclaim deed executed to each other by four devisees of tract of land, each devisee having defeasible fee simple title, by which tract was divided into four parcels and each devisee took possession of his or her allotted parcel, served to separate use and income of divided parcels but could not confer upon respective grantees fee simple title to parcels as division was made subject to, and could not change, terms of will under which devisees took defeasible fee simple title. Crump v. Phelps, 207 Miss. 682, 43 So. 2d 105, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 1949).

Release of land from trust deed by beneficiary in favor of purchaser thereof did not amount to a quitclaim deed from such beneficiary, and conveyed no title to the purchaser. A. W. Stevens Lumber Co. v. Hughes, 38 So. 769 (Miss. 1905).

A quitclaim deed is as effectual to convey title as one with general warranty. Chapman v. Sims, 53 Miss. 154, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 50 (Miss. 1876).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds §§ 245, 246.

7 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Deeds §§ 87:125 et seq. (Mississippi-statutory warranty deed, statutory special warranty deed, quitclaim deed).

CJS.

26A C.J.S., Deeds § 17.

§ 89-1-41. Effect of words “grant, bargain, sell.”

The words “grant, bargain, sell,” shall operate as an express covenant to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, that the grantor was seized of an estate, free from incumbrance made or suffered by the grantor, except the rents and services that may be reserved, and also for quiet enjoyment against the grantor, his heirs and assigns, unless limited by express word contained in the conveyance; and the grantee, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, may, in any action, assign breaches as if the covenants above mentioned were expressly inserted.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (32); 1857, ch. 36, art. 16; 1871, § 2299; 1880, § 1196; 1892, § 2440; 1906, § 2769; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2273; 1930, § 2126; 1942, § 847.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The wording of a deed which provided that “we hereby bargain, sell, convey and warrant to the Trustees of Oakgrove Consolidated High School and their successors the following described land. . . ” could only connote a conveyance absolute and the grantors’ children would not be heard some 50 years later to say that the grantors’ intent was something entirely different from what was expressed in the plain and simple legalese in the recorded instrument of conveyance. Garraway v. Yonce, 549 So. 2d 1341, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 453 (Miss. 1989).

Deed purporting to “grant, bargain, sell and convey” to a railroad company, held to convey fee and not a mere easement. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Mashburn, 235 Miss. 346, 109 So. 2d 533, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 435 (Miss. 1959).

The use of the words, “grant, bargain and sell” in a conveyance does not imply a warranty that the grantor was seized of a fee simple estate, but only of some estate of freehold; That the grantor had only a life estate is not a breach of such implied covenant. Cunningham v. Dillard, 71 Miss. 61, 13 So. 882, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 144 (Miss. 1893).

Such implied covenant cannot be extended by implication because the habendum clause of the deed is “to have and to hold the above described property to the grantee, his heirs and assigns thereafter in fee simple against the claims of any and all persons whatsoever.” Cunningham v. Dillard, 71 Miss. 61, 13 So. 882, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 144 (Miss. 1893).

The words “grant, bargain, sell,” have no effect as a warranty when the deed contains an express covenant of warranty. Weems v. McCaughan, 15 Miss. 422, 1846 Miss. LEXIS 168 (Miss. 1846).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Breach of covenant for quiet enjoyment in lease. 41 A.L.R.2d 1414.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, §§ 86 et seq.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds § 166.

CJS.

21 C.J.S., Covenants §§ 47, 52.

§ 89-1-43. Mortgages and trust estates; trust estates subject to execution.

Estates of any kind holden or possessed in trust for another, shall be subject to the like debts and charges of the person to whose use or for whose benefit they are holden or possessed as they would have been subject to them if the person had owned the like interest in the thing holden or possessed as he may own in the uses or trusts thereof, whether the trusts be fully executed or not. Said estates may be sold under execution at law, so as to pass whatever interest the cestui que trust may have; and, before a sale under a mortgage or deed of trust, the mortgagor or grantor shall be deemed the owner of the legal title of the property conveyed in such mortgage or deed of trust, except as against the mortgagee and his assigns, or the trustee after breach of the condition of such mortgage or deed of trust.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 36, art. 12; 1871, § 2295; 1880, § 1204; 1892, § 2449; 1906, § 2779; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2283; 1930, § 2128; 1942, § 849.

Cross References —

Conveyance of land sold under execution, see §§13-3-187,13-3-189.

Notice to creditors of estate, see §§91-7-145,91-7-147.

Criminal offense of removing property subject to lien either from the premises, or out of the county, or out of the state, see §§97-17-73 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Assignment.

3. Interests subject to execution.

4. Rights of purchaser at execution sale.

1. In general.

Bankruptcy court found that under Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-43, debtor lost all legal title to debtor’s real property once the underlying loan went into default, and debtor had no interest in the real property when debtor later filed for a bankruptcy petition; 11 U.S.C.S. 1322 did not help debtor as the foreclosure sale was conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law before the petition was filed. Martin v. USDA Rural Housing Serv (In re Martin), 276 B.R. 552, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1902 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2001).

Legal title remains with a debtor until default, but the mortgagee has title and the right to possession once a default has occurred. Anderson v. Kimbrough, 741 So. 2d 1041, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 454 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

If a secured creditor is authorized to foreclose by power of sale, after the debtor’s default and upon compliance with the deed of trust or other instrument, the secured creditor may sell any or all of the real estate that is subject to the security interest in its then condition or after any reasonable rehabilitation or preparation for sale. Every aspect of the sale, including the method, advertising, time, place and terms, must be commercially reasonable; this is an objective standard. Wansley v. First Nat'l Bank, 566 So. 2d 1218, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 452 (Miss. 1990).

The failure to appoint an independent trustee for a deed of trust would not invalidate the foreclosure sale of the real property. Wansley v. First Nat'l Bank, 566 So. 2d 1218, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 452 (Miss. 1990).

Where a grantee retains title to land and holds it for the benefit of another in order to secure a loan made by the grantee, the conveyance is a mortgage. The mortgage is evidenced by a deed absolute and the grantee is entitled to retain title until payment of the claim for which it is held for security. La Barre v. Gold, 520 So. 2d 1327, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2792 (Miss. 1987).

Upon default by a debtor in performance of the conditions of a deed of trust, the trustee is empowered to foreclose pursuant to §§89-1-55 and89-1-43, and, if the statutory requirements are observed, a sale under the power is a perfect foreclosure; the trustee’s deed is a conveyance as absolute as if the trustee held title in fee simple, and it cuts off the equity of redemption and any other rights in and to the property, all of which are transferred to the foreclosure sale proceeds, with the sole exception of rights perfected prior to the filing of the deed of trust under which the foreclosure sale is held. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. etc. v. L & T Developers, Inc., 434 So. 2d 699, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2687 (Miss. 1983).

A mortgagee in possession of property as the result of a foreclosure of a deed of trust could not be dispossessed until the indebtedness owing it had been paid or until a different party had acquired the land under a valid foreclosure sale. James v. Jackson Production Credit Asso., 389 So. 2d 494, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2095 (Miss. 1980).

Possession of land by owner and mortgagor, or his grantees, during life of deed of trust, cannot form basis of claim to adverse possession by him, since mortgagor has right to retain possession of property until foreclosure sale under deed of trust. Duncan v. Mars, 44 So. 2d 529 (Miss. 1950).

Deed conveying described land to named trustees and their successors so long as land is used for school purposes does not declare or create trust in lands, but conveys estate in fee simple defeasible. Kelly v. Wilson, 204 Miss. 56, 36 So. 2d 817, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 342 (Miss. 1948).

A garageman surrendering possession of a repaired truck to its owner did not thereby lose his lien as against the holder of a deed of trust embracing the truck where there had been no breach of condition or foreclosure of the deed of trust. Watson v. Broadhead, 203 Miss. 142, 33 So. 2d 302, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 241 (Miss. 1948).

After condition broken, the heirs of the grantor in a deed of trust did not have right of possession, with title passed on default to the trustee, as against either the trustee or the purchaser who succeeded to the rights of the mortgagee in possession at a void foreclosure sale, until the indebtedness was tendered or paid; and without such right of possession, essential to tenancy in common, a partition suit could not be maintained by such heirs. Wirtz v. Gordon, 187 Miss. 866, 184 So. 798, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 321 (Miss. 1938).

As against the mortgagor and the devisees under the will of the grantor in a deed of trust, the legal title of the land secured by such deed of trust passed to the trustee under this section [Code 1942, § 849] at the time of default. Wirtz v. Gordon, 187 Miss. 866, 184 So. 798, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 321 (Miss. 1938).

Mortgagee as owner of debt and incidental security may maintain action for injuries to, or conversion of, mortgaged property and apply proceeds of any recovery therefor to discharge of mortgage debt. Love v. Mississippi Cottonseed Products Co., 174 Miss. 697, 159 So. 96, 165 So. 446, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1935).

Title remained in grantor after executing deed of trust, and, on his death, property descended to his heirs. Wright v. Wright, 160 Miss. 235, 134 So. 197, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 202 (Miss. 1931).

Declaration of trust giving trustees control of land previously held by corporations as trustees and earnings therefrom for purpose of disposition of property for benefit of certificate holders held not to violate public policy or anti-trust statutes, where not inimical to public welfare. State ex rel. Knox v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 150 Miss. 1, 115 So. 598, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1928).

The record of a trust deed conveying land to secure a promissory note, not showing on its face that it is for the purchase money, is not constructive notice of an unrecorded deed, by which the grantor in the trust deed acquired title. Hart v. Gardner, 81 Miss. 650, 33 So. 442, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 183 (Miss. 1902).

A stranger cannot interpose the mortgage as an obstacle against the mortgagor seeking to recover the property or damages for its injury. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Hawkins, 65 Miss. 200, 3 So. 410, 1887 Miss. LEXIS 37 (Miss. 1887).

The statute applies to personal and real estate, and the mortgagor is capable of transmitting the legal estate by descent, devise, or deed, and the legal title in the mortgagee can only be asserted for the purpose of making the security available. Buck v. Payne & Raines, 52 Miss. 271, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 210 (Miss. 1876).

2. Assignment.

Judgment on the pleadings in favor of an assignee was proper because there was no set of facts that a mortgagor could prove that would entitle him to the surplus that resulted from a foreclosure sale since his conveyances divested him of any interests or rights referenced in the deed of trust; the quitclaim deed and prior conveyances divested the mortgagee of his rights and interests in the property because he manifested his intent to transfer all his right, title, and interest in the property. Hinton v. Rolison, 175 So.3d 1281, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 519 (Miss. 2015).

A bondholder under a deed of trust became an equitable assignee, at least pro tanto of the lien and indebtedness to the extent of his holdings, when he purchased the land in question after foreclosure of the deed of trust, notwithstanding that such sale was void because minor devisees of such land were not served with process in the foreclosure proceedings in the manner required by statute; and he succeeded to the rank of a mortgagee in possession from the date of confirmation of the sale, and with the right to have such indebtedness paid or tendered as a condition precedent to the right of the minor devisees, to enter possession of their claimed interests in such land under partition. Wirtz v. Gordon, 187 Miss. 866, 184 So. 798, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 321 (Miss. 1938).

Mortgagee who assigned mortgage debt and security and did not transfer to assignee previously accrued cause of action for conversion of mortgaged property waived such cause of action, since mortgagee’s interest in mortgaged property converted was based upon the mortgage and limited by debt secured and was lost by assignment. Love v. Mississippi Cottonseed Products Co., 174 Miss. 697, 159 So. 96, 165 So. 446, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1935).

Where debt assigned, upon default, title to mortgaged property vests in assignee with right to seize and sell conferred by mortgage. Elder v. Jones, 106 Miss. 489, 64 So. 212, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 159 (Miss. 1913).

Equitable assignment of debt secured by mortgage, not assignment of real estate or interest therein, but carries security as incident thereto. Nestor v. Davis, 100 Miss. 199, 56 So. 347, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 27 (Miss. 1911).

3. Interests subject to execution.

Statute providing that trust estates are subject to claims of beneficiaries’ creditors and may be sold under execution at law provides no aid to creditor who proceeds in court of equity, nor can it subject trustee’s estate to debts of beneficiary unless beneficiary has equitable estate in property of which trustee has legal title. Sligh v. First Nat'l Bank, 704 So. 2d 1020, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 505 (Miss. 1997).

Holder of deed of trust securing indebtedness may upon default foreclose, notwithstanding prior renewal of secured indebtedness by one other than grantor in deed of trust, absent agreement to contrary. Cochran v. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank, 509 So. 2d 1045, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2607 (Miss. 1987).

This section [Code 1942, § 849] does not apply to active trust. Stansel v. Hahn, 96 Miss. 616, 50 So. 696, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 148 (Miss. 1910).

The effect of this section [Code 1942, § 849] is to subject to sale under execution at law equitable estates which in the absence of such statute could always be subject in equity. Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923, 11 So. 604, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. 1892).

If creditors proceed in equity the statute does not aid them. Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923, 11 So. 604, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. 1892).

This section [Code 1942, § 849] applies only where there is an equitable estate in the property itself. Where there is an active trust as a mere duty or power in the trustee having the legal title to collect and pay over rents and income to the cestui que trust the statute of uses does not apply. Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923, 11 So. 604, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. 1892).

Personal property cannot be held under execution against the right of the mortgagee after condition broken. Butler v. Lee, 54 Miss. 476, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 29 (Miss. 1877).

The interest of the mortgagee, after condition broken, is not vendible under execution. Buckley v. Daley, 45 Miss. 338, 1871 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1871).

The equity of redemption is vendible under execution before sale under the mortgage. Carpenter v. Bowen, 42 Miss. 28, 1868 Miss. LEXIS 32 (Miss. 1868); Byrd v. Clarke, 52 Miss. 623, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 266 (Miss. 1876); Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. McCutchen, 52 Miss. 645, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 270 (Miss. 1876).

4. Rights of purchaser at execution sale.

One who buys at execution sale land standing in the name of the judgment debtor on the record of deeds acquires title against a prior unrecorded conveyance of which the judgment creditor has no notice. Hart v. Gardner, 81 Miss. 650, 33 So. 442, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 183 (Miss. 1902).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right of trustee to withhold trust payments from beneficiary to obtain payment of personal debt of latter to him, or to set off such debt against payment to beneficiary. 8 A.L.R.2d 209.

Trustee’s power to compromise and settle claims and actions by or against trust estate. 35 A.L.R.2d 967.

Am. Jur.

55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages §§ 8 et seq.

13 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Mortgages § 179:126 (Mississippi-deed of trust).

CJS.

59 C.J.S., Mortgages §§ 41 et seq.

Law Reviews.

The effect of bankruptcy and encumbrances on mineral interests in Mississippi. 53 Miss. L. J. 551, December, 1983.

§ 89-1-45. Mortgage for purchase money of land.

Every mortgage given at the time of the purchase of real estate to secure the payment of the purchase money, whether such mortgage be given to the seller or to a third-party lender, shall be entitled to a preference over all judgments and other debts of the mortgagor, which preference shall extend only to the land purchased.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 36, art. 13; 1871, § 2296; 1880, § 1205; 1892, § 2450; 1906, § 2780; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2284; 1930, § 2129; 1942, § 850; Laws, 2000, ch. 341, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

Amendment Notes —

The 2000 amendment inserted “whether such mortgage be given to the seller or to a third-party lender.”

Cross References —

Lien on land sold on credit, see §11-5-97.

Judgment liens, see §§11-7-191 et seq.

Recording of notice of suit affecting real estate, see §11-47-3.

Redemption by mortgagee of land sold for taxes, see §27-45-7.

Rights of purchaser at tax sale, see §27-45-27.

Lien barred on the face of the record, see §89-5-19.

Sale of personal property to pay purchase money for land, see §91-7-189.

Purchase-money leases upon decedent’s property, see §91-7-209.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Reformation of deed.

Chancery court properly granted a bank summary judgment in its action for a declaratory judgment and reformation of its deed of trust to correspond with the corrected description contained in a grantee’s deed and thus, allow it to proceed with foreclosure, because due to a scrivener’s error, the deed and deed of trust listed the wrong section and county. Williams v. US Bank Trust, N.A., 239 So.3d 540, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 657 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

§ 89-1-47. Deed not shown to be mortgage by parol evidence.

A conveyance or other writing absolute on its face, where the maker parts with the possession of the property conveyed by it, shall not be proved, at the instance of any of the parties, by parol evidence, to be a mortgage only, unless fraud in this procurement be the issue to be tried.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1299; 1892, § 4233; 1906, § 4783; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3127; 1930, § 3351; 1942, § 272.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Pleadings.

3. Evidence; burden of proof.

4. Effect of contemporaneously executed writings.

1. In general.

The wording of a deed which provided that “we hereby bargain, sell, convey and warrant to the Trustees of Oakgrove Consolidated High School and their successors the following described land. . . ” could only connote a conveyance absolute and the grantors’ children would not be heard some 50 years later to say that the grantors’ intent was something entirely different from what was expressed in the plain and simple legalese in the recorded instrument of conveyance. Garraway v. Yonce, 549 So. 2d 1341, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 453 (Miss. 1989).

A conveyance by warranty deed of property for $400 which was capable of providing an annual income of $260, without any improvements having been added, and was valued at from $1650 to $2000, was grossly inadequate and was rescinded as constituting a mortgage rather than a sale. Lampley v. Pertuit, 199 So. 2d 452, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1302 (Miss. 1967).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 272] it may be proved by parol evidence that a deed absolute on its face was procured by fraud and that possession was never parted with so that the instrument was a mortgage. Bethea v. Mullins, 226 Miss. 795, 85 So. 2d 452, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 465 (Miss. 1956).

Where it was shown that the grantor never parted with the possession of land conveyed, parol evidence is competent to show the conveyance to be a mortgage without showing fraud in its procurement. Emmons v. Emmons, 217 Miss. 594, 64 So. 2d 753, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 467 (Miss. 1953).

Before the maker of an absolute deed can offer parol evidence to have it declared to be a mortgage only, he must show either that he had not parted with possession with the land conveyed or that there was fraud in its procurement. Nix v. Nix, 210 Miss. 821, 50 So. 2d 396, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 317 (Miss. 1951).

A quitclaim deed executed by the former owner of tax-forfeited land of a quit-claim deed to the patents issued to him from the state, executed under an alleged agreement of the grantee to reconvey on payment by such former owner of the money expended for the patents, could not be considered a mortgage or security for the money, where the grantee thereunder went into possession by the mandate of the unlawful entry and detainer course, and the grantor was therefore not in a position of a mortgagor in possession. Lewis v. Williams, 186 Miss. 701, 191 So. 479, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 256 (Miss. 1939).

This section [Code 1942, § 272] does not apply to a deed made by the vendors of land to one who paid the purchase price thereof on behalf of another, holding such title as security for the repayment thereof, under a parol agreement to convey it to such other person upon payment of the purchase price, where the real purchaser remained in possession. Tanous v. White, 186 Miss. 556, 191 So. 278, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 243 (Miss. 1939).

Relief to the complainants by way of a conveyance of the land involved was not precluded by this section [Code 1942, § 272] where a money lender paid the purchase price of land on behalf of the complainants who were then lessees in possession thereof, and took title thereof in his own name as security for the purchase price under an oral agreement to convey it to the complainants upon payment of the purchase price. Tanous v. White, 186 Miss. 556, 191 So. 278, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 243 (Miss. 1939).

Where bill seeking to have deed, in connection with contemporaneous written agreement giving option to repurchase, declared to be a mortgage, contained no allegation of fraud, statute barring parol evidence to show that instrument constituted mortgage held applicable. Dixon v. Wright, 175 Miss. 191, 166 So. 374, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 1936).

This section [Code 1942, § 272] applies only to tangible property; It does not embrace the transfer of a life insurance policy made during the life of the assured, which may be shown by parol evidence to be a mere security for a debt. Armstrong v. Owens, 83 Miss. 10, 35 So. 320, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1903).

An absolute conveyance cannot be declared a mortgage on the parol evidence of the grantor, who has parted with the possession. Schwartz v. Lieber, 32 So. 954 (Miss. 1902).

Parol evidence to show that a deed absolute in form is not in fact a mortgage is admissible where the grantor has not parted with the possession of the property, or where the issue is one of fraud in the procurement of the deed, although the grantor may have parted with the possession of the property. Culp v. Wooten, 79 Miss. 503, 31 So. 1, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 83 (Miss. 1901).

Where a husband and wife temporarily remove from their homestead and cultivate other lands for a year or two, leaving their children in the occupancy of the homestead, intending themselves all the time to return to it, they have not parted with its possession. Culp v. Wooten, 79 Miss. 503, 31 So. 1, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 83 (Miss. 1901).

This section [Code 1942, § 272] has no application where the debtor was in possession of the grantor’s property when the deed was executed and remained in possession. Fultz v. Peterson, 78 Miss. 128, 28 So. 829, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 98 (Miss. 1900).

2. Pleadings.

A bill in equity to have a deed, absolute on its face, adjudged a mortgage, which charges that it was intended by the parties to be a mortgage, is not demurrable for failing to charge that the maker of the deed retained possession, or for failing to show that the agreement evidencing the intent was not in writing. Schwartz v. Lieber, 79 Miss. 257, 30 So. 649, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1901).

3. Evidence; burden of proof.

Deed acted only as debt-securing mortgage and parol evidence concerning deed was admissible to show that it had been intended for security, and not as conveyance, where grantee in deed stated on numerous occasions that deed was debt-securing mortgage, and that grantor owed him, not bank; additionally, deed at issue was one of several transactions where individuals secured loans after executing deeds to same individual who was grantee in instant case, and in those cases upon repayment, individual would reconvey property; there was also testimony that grantor had continued to express ownership interest in property until time of his death, speaking to his children about land and timber. Sweet v. Luster, 513 So. 2d 1240, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2842 (Miss. 1987).

Notwithstanding the provisions of §89-1-47, parole evidence could be introduced to prove that a deed, absolute on its face, was intended as a mortgage, where the grantor retained possession of the property. Harris v. Kemp, 451 So. 2d 1362, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1774 (Miss. 1984).

Chancellor’s finding that a deed was in fact a deed of trust given to secure the payment of funds advanced for the purchase price of the land rather than a conveyance was supported by the evidence. Fondren v. State, 199 So. 2d 625, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1306 (Miss. 1967).

After execution of a deed by a grantor to grantee, the grantee was presumed to be in possession of the undivided one-fourth interest in land which he had purchased by virtue of the deed, and the burden of proof was on those who sought to introduce parol proof to show that the grantor in the deed remained in possession after execution thereof. Conner v. Conner, 238 Miss. 471, 119 So. 2d 240, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 430 (Miss. 1960).

Even if evidence concerning possession of property had shown that a grantor remained in possession of part of land after execution of the deed to grantee, appellants would not have been entitled to have the deed adjudged to be a mortgage where the evidence was insufficient to prove that the deed was intended as a mortgage. Conner v. Conner, 238 Miss. 471, 119 So. 2d 240, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 430 (Miss. 1960).

In a suit to have an absolute deed declared a mortgage, where grantor retained control over the land and the grantee never assumed possession nor exercised any control over the land and in fact did not know the boundaries of the land, there was sufficient proof under this section [Code 1942, § 272] that the instrument was intended as a mortgage. Bethea v. Mullins, 226 Miss. 795, 85 So. 2d 452, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 465 (Miss. 1956).

There is a presumption of possession in a grantee in a warranty deed and that the burden of proof is upon one who seeks to introduce parol proof under this section [Code 1942, § 272] to show that the grantor remained in possession. Bethea v. Mullins, 226 Miss. 795, 85 So. 2d 452, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 465 (Miss. 1956).

Presumption of grantee’s possession must be overcome, before deed absolute in form can be declared mortgage. Jordan v. Jordan, 145 Miss. 779, 111 So. 102, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1927).

Evidence held not to overcome presumption of grantee’s possession required before declaring deed a mortgage. Jordan v. Jordan, 145 Miss. 779, 111 So. 102, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1927).

Statute held not to prohibit proof that assignment of life policy, absolute in form, is intended as collateral security. Garner v. Townes, 134 Miss. 791, 100 So. 20, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 328 (Miss. 1924).

4. Effect of contemporaneously executed writings.

An unrecorded contemporaneous writing showing a recorded deed absolute in form to be a mortgage is not void; The conveyance being of record, the failure to record the writing showing its real character will not affect the validity of the mortgage. Barkwell v. Swan, 69 Miss. 907, 13 So. 809, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 31 (Miss. 1892).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

The parol evidence rule and admissibility of extrinsic evidence to establish or clarify ambiguity in written contract. 40 A.L.R.3d 1384.

Am. Jur.

72 Am. Jur. 2d, Statute of Frauds § 81.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Warrant Deed Intended as Mortgage, §§ 6 et seq. (proof that deed was intended as mortgage).

CJS.

37 C.J.S., Frauds, Statute of § 148.

§ 89-1-49. Extinguishment of mortgage; applicability; line of credit.

  1. Except as provided in subsections (2) and (4) of this section, payment of the money secured by any mortgage or deed of trust shall extinguish it, and revest the title in the mortgagor as effectually as if reconveyed.
  2. This section shall have no application to security agreements executed under the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code nor to security interests created by such security agreements.
  3. As used in this section, the term “line of credit” means any loan, extension of credit or financing arrangement where the lender has agreed to make additional or future advances.
  4. This section shall have no application to a mortgage or deed of trust which states on its face that it secures a line of credit; nor to one which secures a line of credit and, under prior law, was not required to state on its face that it secures a line of credit. Mortgages or deeds of trust not covered by this section shall be extinguished as provided in subsection (5) of Section 89-5-21.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1207; 1892, § 2452; 1906, § 2782; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2286; 1930, § 2152; 1942, § 873; Laws, 1968, ch. 495, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 497, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 570, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 580, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 20, 2000.).

Amendment Notes —

The 1999 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2000 amendment rewrote (4).

Cross References —

Remedy on mortgage barred when debt is barred, see §15-1-21.

Limitation of actions on installments notes after foreclosure of mortgage, see §15-1-23.

Security interests created under the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code, see §§75-9-101 et seq.

Application of partial payments, see §75-17-9.

Joint and several obligations, see §§85-5-1,85-5-3.

Liens apparently barred on the face of the record, see §89-5-19.

Entry of satisfaction upon record of mortgage or deed of trust, see §89-5-21.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Bank’s mortgage lien against residential property did not have priority over a prior recorded deed of trust against the same property securing a line of credit, since the bank’s payment of the outstanding balance on the line of credit did not cancel the line of credit or the deed of trust, and the deed of trust remained in effect when the term of the line of credit was renewed by agreement. U.S. Bank N.A. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 45 F. Supp. 3d 582, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95934 (S.D. Miss. 2014).

Although the assignment was absolute on its face, it gave the bank only a qualified interest in the homeowner’s property. Since the assignment was given as collateral security for the homeseller’s loan, the interest conveyed was commensurate with the debt; hence, when the homeseller paid off his loan to the bank, the bank’s interest in the secured property ceased as of that moment, and the bank’s interest was reinvested in the homeseller to the same extent as it would have been if an actual reassignment from the bank to the homeseller had been executed. McKinley v. Lamar Bank, 918 So. 2d 689, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 709 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 611 (Miss. Sept. 22, 2005).

Debtor claiming usury before foreclosure sale put purchaser on notice of his claim and was entitled to have sale set aside and title declared vested in him. Hardin v. Grenada Bank, 182 Miss. 689, 180 So. 805, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 157 (Miss. 1938).

In action for death of cattle, where evidence established debt secured by mortgage on cattel was paid, exclusion of mortgage from evidence was not error. Jackson County v. Meaut, 181 Miss. 282, 179 So. 343, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1938).

Mortgage which was retained by mortgagees and not canceled on record after payment of mortgage debt, and letter of mortgagors stating that they wished mortgage to continue in force as collateral security for sum subsequently advanced by mortgagees, constituted “equitable mortgage” enforceable in chancery. Turner v. Givens, 176 Miss. 214, 166 So. 367, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 100 (Miss. 1936).

Payment of debt for which deed of trust had been assigned as collateral security extinguished debt, so that assignee could not foreclose deed of trust. Blacketor v. Cartee, 172 Miss. 889, 161 So. 696, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 188 (Miss. 1935).

Redelivery of deed of trust on homestead, by one of grantors, after payment held not to create enforceable lien for future debt. Jones v. Hyman Mercantile Co., 134 Miss. 275, 98 So. 845, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1924).

Deed of trust or mortgage extinguished by payment. Munn v. Potter, 111 Miss. 180, 71 So. 315, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 264 (Miss. 1916).

Warranty deed given to secure loan, with ticket by grantee evidencing purpose, should be cancelled or reconveyance directed upon payment of loan. Lee v. Wilkinson, 105 Miss. 358, 62 So. 275, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 206 (Miss. 1913).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Construction of provision in real-estate mortgage, land contract, or other security instrument for release of separate parcels of land as payments are made. 41 A.L.R.3d 7.

Am. Jur.

55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages §§ 345 et seq.

CJS.

59 C.J.S., Mortgages §§ 551, 552 et seq.

Law Reviews.

The effect of bankruptcy and encumbrances on mineral interests in Mississippi. 53 Miss. L. J. 551, December, 1983.

§ 89-1-51. Trustee may acknowledge satisfaction.

The trustee in a deed of trust may acknowledge satisfaction of the deed of trust in like manner as the cestui que trust may, and with like effect, but in such case the trustee shall be liable to the cestui que trust for the amount secured by the deed of trust.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1208; 1892, § 2453; 1906, § 2783; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2287; 1930, § 2153; 1942, § 874.

Cross References —

Entry of satisfaction upon record, see §89-5-21.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Company acquiring through mesne conveyances realty sold by insane person’s guardian after releases thereof by court orders from recorded trust deed, substituted for trust deeds, released of record by trustees, as security for loans of ward’s funds to guardian, held without constructive notice of such instruments and hence not liable for balance due ward from guardian, where substituted deed erroneously described property. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Crymes, 169 Miss. 701, 153 So. 803, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1934).

Where trustee in trust deed satisfied trust deed on records and took second trust deed, payable to himself, and assigned latter to secure his individual indebtedness, assignees were charged constructively with notice that second trust deed omitted name of real beneficiary. Eagle Lumber & Supply Co. v. De Weese, 163 Miss. 602, 135 So. 490, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1931).

Title of assignees of second trust deed held dependent upon validity of fraudulent cancellation of first trust deed by trustee. Eagle Lumber & Supply Co. v. De Weese, 163 Miss. 602, 135 So. 490, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1931).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Conflict of laws as to application of statute proscribing or limiting availability of action for deficiency after sale of collateral real estate. 44 A.L.R.3d 922.

§ 89-1-53. Mortgages and deeds of trust on land; to be referred to in deed of conveyance under foreclosure proceedings.

If there shall be a foreclosure and sale under any such mortgage or deed of trust on land, the deed of conveyance made to a purchaser pursuant to a sale thereunder shall recite the names of all parties to and the date of such mortgage or deed of trust, and also the book and page of the record thereof, and if made by a substituted trustee shall also recite the book and page of the record of his substitution and appointment; but the omission of such recitations shall not invalidate the deed of conveyance.

HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 2811; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2312; 1930, § 2162; 1942, § 883.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

There is no requirement in Section 9-5-131 et seq., which would require a chancery clerk to post foreclosure notices and execute an affidavit stating that the same was posted, nor is there such requirement or authority in Sections 25-7-9, 25-7-11, and 89-1-53 et. seq., however, pursuant to Sections 25-7-33 and 25-7-45, if a clerk chooses to post such notices, he may assess a fee of $ .25 for executing an affidavit stating that the same was posted. Gex, Mar. 14, 2003, A.G. Op. #03-0112.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Necessity of Production of Original Note Involved in Mortgage Foreclosure – Twenty-First Century Cases. 86 A.L.R.6th 411.

Am. Jur.

18 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev) Mortgages, Form 153.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration-to foreclose mortgage-another form).

§ 89-1-55. How lands sold under mortgages and deeds in trust.

All lands comprising a single tract, and wholly described by the subdivisions of the governmental surveys, sold under mortgages and deeds of trust, shall be sold in the manner provided by Section 111 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 for the sale of lands in pursuance of a decree of court, or under execution. All lands sold at public outcry under deeds of trust or other contracts shall be sold in the county in which the land is located, or in the county of the residence of the grantor, or one of the grantors in the trust deed, provided that where the land is situated in two (2) or more counties, the parties may contract for a sale of the whole in any of the counties in which any part of the land lies. Sale of said lands shall be advertised for three (3) consecutive weeks preceding such sale, in a newspaper published in the county, or, if none is so published, in some paper having a general circulation therein, and by posting one notice at the courthouse of the county where the land is situated, for said time, and such notice and advertisement shall disclose the name of the original mortgagor or mortgagors in said deed of trust or other contract. No sale of lands under a deed of trust or mortgage, shall be valid unless such sale shall have been advertised as herein provided for, regardless of any contract to the contrary. An error in the mode of sale such as makes the sale void will not be cured by any statute of limitations, except as to the ten-year statute of adverse possession.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2443; 1906, § 2772; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2276; 1930, § 2167; 1942, § 888; Laws, 1896, ch. 103; Laws, 1908, ch. 180; Laws, 1934, ch. 248.

Cross References —

Sale of land in subdivisions, see Miss. Const., Art. 4, § 111.

Injunctions to restrain sale of personal property seized under a deed of trust or mortgage with power of sale, see §11-13-21.

Limitation of actions concerning land, see §15-1-7.

Limitation on suits to redeem mortgages, see §15-1-19.

Reinstatement of loan by savings association prior to foreclosure sale, see §81-12-169.

For additional notice requirements in mortgage foreclosure procedures that apply to mortgage broker licensees under Section81-18-1 et seq., see §81-18-55.

Reference in deed of conveyance under foreclosure proceedings to mortgages and deeds of trust on land, see §89-1-53.

Method of sale where terms of deed of trust or mortgage are silent, see §89-1-57.

Suspension of mortgage foreclosure after declared disaster or emergency, see §§89-1-303 et seq.

Criminal offense of selling property on which there is lien without informing vendee, see §97-19-51.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Validity.

3. Construction with other laws.

4. Sale in parcels.

5. Inadequacy of price.

6. Notice of sale, in general.

7. —Time of advertising.

8. —Duration of advertising.

9. —Description of land.

10. —Disclosure of name of mortgagor or his successor in title.

11. —Place of posting notice.

12. —Effect of failure to post notice.

13. Time and place of sale.

14. Cure of error by lapse of time.

15. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

If a secured creditor is authorized to foreclose by power of sale, after the debtor’s default and upon compliance with the deed of trust or other instrument, the secured creditor may sell any or all of the real estate that is subject to the security interest in its then condition or after any reasonable rehabilitation or preparation for sale. Every aspect of the sale, including the method, advertising, time, place and terms, must be commercially reasonable; this is an objective standard. Wansley v. First Nat'l Bank, 566 So. 2d 1218, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 452 (Miss. 1990).

Once deed of trust has matured by its own terms, notice of default in monetary payment is not necessary to maker who is charged with knowledge of terms of obligation. Lake Hillsdale Estates, Inc. v. Galloway, 473 So. 2d 461, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2177 (Miss. 1985).

Upon default by a debtor in performance of the conditions of a deed of trust, the trustee is empowered to foreclose pursuant to §§89-1-55 and89-1-43, and, if the statutory requirements are observed, a sale under the power is a perfect foreclosure; the trustee’s deed is a conveyance as absolute as if the trustee held title in fee simple, and it cuts off the equity of redemption and any other rights in and to the property, all of which are transferred to the foreclosure sale proceeds, with the sole exception of rights perfected prior to the filing of the deed of trust under which the foreclosure sale is held. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. etc. v. L & T Developers, Inc., 434 So. 2d 699, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2687 (Miss. 1983).

This section [Code 1942, § 888] has no application to sales under a decree of foreclosure. Worthy v. Graham, 246 Miss. 358, 149 So. 2d 469, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 449 (Miss. 1963).

Recitals in foreclosure deed raised a presumption of compliance with this section [Code 1942, § 888]. Gardner v. State, 235 Miss. 119, 108 So. 2d 592, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1959).

No equity of redemption exists after a mortgage sale. Dean v. Simpson, 235 Miss. 162, 108 So. 2d 546, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 414 (Miss. 1959).

Trustee has no authority to proceed with foreclosure of deed of trust when mortgagor, pursuant to agreement for reduction in payment, has paid on indebtedness at reduced rate up to time of foreclosure and mortgagor is not in default or arrears at time of foreclosure. Triplett v. Bridgforth, 205 Miss. 328, 38 So. 2d 756, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1949).

A condition in a trust deed that the trustee foreclose the trust deed pursuant to the request of the holders of the defaulted notes secured does not require that the directors of a bank holding such notes enter a resolution on their minutes requesting foreclosure, and an executive officer of the bank may make such request. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Mulvihill, 200 Miss. 497, 27 So. 2d 719, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 315 (Miss. 1946).

This section [Code 1942, § 888], being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed. Cook v. Taylor, 200 Miss. 381, 27 So. 2d 404, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 301 (Miss. 1946).

Requirements of this section [Code 1942, § 888] may be waived by parties to a deed of trust. Baker v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 196 Miss. 701, 18 So. 2d 438, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 251 (Miss. 1944).

Beneficiary in deed of trust has no estate in the land, but only an interest therein to the extent that he can cause the trustee to sell the land and apply its proceeds to the payment of the secured debt. Baker v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 196 Miss. 701, 18 So. 2d 438, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 251 (Miss. 1944).

Persons foreclosing mortgages by sales should carefully follow conditions in trust deed and pertinent statutes. Wilkinson v. Federal Land Bank, 168 Miss. 645, 150 So. 218, 151 So. 761, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 168 (Miss. 1933).

This section [Code 1942, § 888] is inapplicable to deeds of trust executed before its passage. Davis v. O'Connell, 92 Miss. 348, 47 So. 672, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 258 (Miss. 1908).

2. Validity.

Because a second mortgagee lawfully foreclosed the mortgagor’s property under Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-55 and paid off a primary loan and there was no legal prohibition under Miss. Code Ann. §§11-5-101 and89-1-63 for the mortgagee’s affiliate to purchase the property at foreclosure, any rights of the mortgagor in the property were extinguished by the foreclosure sale. Pepper v. Homesales, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16692 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 3, 2009).

Nonjudicial foreclosure of deed of trust constitutes private action authorized by contract and does not come within scope of due process clause of Federal Constitution. Leininger v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 481 So. 2d 1086, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2362 (Miss. 1986).

Nonjudicial foreclosure procedure authorized by this section is not per se unconstitutional. United States v. White, 429 F. Supp. 1245, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16950 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

3. Construction with other laws.

Debtor was divested of all legal and equitable title in foreclosed property at conclusion of foreclosure sale, and therefore could not avoid sale on ground that Chapter 13 petition was filed before foreclosure deed was delivered to successful bidder at sale or recorded. In re Applewhite, 106 B.R. 468, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 1908 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989).

Although the district court’s application of the Uniform Commercial Code was correct with respect to issues pertaining to the Small Business Administration’s auction of chattel pursuant to the guaranty agreement between the SBA and appellants, which provided that the SBA may sell the secured property on default subject only that “such powers to be exercised only to the extent permitted by law”, Mississippi real property law, §89-1-55, governed the propriety of the sale of borrower’s leasehold, rather than §75-9-104(j), which specifically excludes from coverage transfers of real property, including leaseholds. United States v. Irby, 618 F.2d 352, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 16919 (5th Cir. Miss. 1980).

As a defense to an action by a successor in title to redeem encumbered land from the holder of a trust deed who had purportedly purchased the encumbered land at an invalid trustee’s foreclosure sale, and had taken possession of the land and paid the taxes thereon for 24 years, the holder of the trust deed could rely on either Code 1942, § 711, 10-year statute of adverse possession, or Code 1942, § 718, as a mortgagee in possession after a condition broken, notwithstanding the provision in this section [Code 1942, § 888], that an error in the mode of sale such as makes a sale void would not be cured by any statute of limitations, except after the 10-year statute of adverse possession. Gulfport Farm & Pasture Co. v. Hancock Bank, 232 Miss. 289, 98 So. 2d 862, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 474 (Miss. 1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 67, 79 S. Ct. 122, 3 L. Ed. 2d 106, 1958 U.S. LEXIS 178 (U.S. 1958).

A sale under a valid power to foreclose a mortgage lien superior to federal tax liens, which was begun before the institution of a Code 1942, § 7403 proceeding by the government to foreclose its tax lien but completed during the pendency thereof, effectually extinguished the government’s tax liens. United States v. Boyd, 246 F.2d 477, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 5033 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 889, 78 S. Ct. 261, 2 L. Ed. 2d 188, 1957 U.S. LEXIS 67 (U.S. 1957).

Where deed of trust provides trustee may sell after giving legal notice of time, place and terms of sale, Code 1906, § 2821 does not apply and it is sufficient if he complies with this section [Code 1942, § 888]. Lynchburg Shoe Co. v. Castleman, 116 Miss. 188, 76 So. 878, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 306 (Miss. 1917).

4. Sale in parcels.

When trustee first offers property for sale as whole and bid of mortgagee is received and subsequently, upon objection of mortgagor, trustee offers property by individual lots with less favorable results, trustee has not acted in bad faith or unfairly. Lake Hillsdale Estates, Inc. v. Galloway, 473 So. 2d 461, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2177 (Miss. 1985).

Where parties in a deed of trust of lands in two different counties specifically contracted that each parcel be sold in a county where each was situated, statute was complied with where notices and advertisements of sale on same day for each parcel were duly posted and published in county where each was situated, without any reference to sale upon a parcel. Lee v. Magnolia Bank, 209 Miss. 804, 48 So. 2d 515, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 446 (Miss. 1950).

Foreclosure sale of three 80-acre tracts of land under deed of trust is not void, although not combining with two contiguous 80-acre tracts the separated 80-acre tract so as to sell the 240 acres as whole, where homestead stood on the 160 acres, which owners used for farming purposes and separated 80-acre tract was detached about quarter or half mile, there was no road connecting them, there was no house on this 80-acre tract and it had been abandoned for farming purpose for many years. Clark v. Sayle, 208 Miss. 559, 45 So. 2d 138, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 274 (Miss. 1950).

This section [Code 1942, § 888] is not violated by offering the land, after foreclosure of trust deed, for sale by forties and then as a whole. Gulf Refining Co. v. Harrison, 201 Miss. 294, 30 So. 2d 44, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1947).

In the sale of three 80-acre tracts, two of the tracts which were contiguous should have been offered together as well as separately; and failure so to do vitiated the sale as to all three tracts. Clark v. Carpenter, 201 Miss. 436, 29 So. 2d 215, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1947).

Lands described in a trust deed other than by subdivisions of governmental surveys do not come within the language of this section [Code 1942, § 888] requiring sale in parcels. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Mulvihill, 200 Miss. 497, 27 So. 2d 719, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 315 (Miss. 1946).

Grantor of trust deed waived requirements of this section [Code 1942, § 888] by inserting provision in deed authorizing trustee to sell the land “in parcel or as a whole, as he may deem best,” and by fact that grantor was present at the sale and made no objection to the land not being offered for sale in accordance with such requirements. Baker v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 196 Miss. 701, 18 So. 2d 438, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 251 (Miss. 1944).

Parties may direct foreclosure sales in parcels or in bulk and may waive statutory requirement. Rawlings v. Anderson, 149 Miss. 632, 115 So. 714, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 60 (Miss. 1928).

Trustee under trust deed offering land in 160 acre lots “undescribed” did not comply with statute and sale was void. Rawlings v. Anderson, 149 Miss. 632, 115 So. 714, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 60 (Miss. 1928).

Trust deed directing trustee to sell lands or “sufficiency thereof” to satisfy debt required sale in parcel. Rawlings v. Anderson, 149 Miss. 632, 115 So. 714, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 60 (Miss. 1928).

Plantation held to comprise one single tract although 80 acres was separated from balance about half a mile but connected by public road, and should have been sold as if it lay contiguously. Provine v. Thornton, 92 Miss. 395, 46 So. 950, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 253 (Miss. 1908).

Provision requiring sale of land under trust deed in 160 acre tracts may be waived by parties. Brown v. British American Mortg. Co., 86 Miss. 388, 38 So. 312, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1905).

5. Inadequacy of price.

Sale price of property will not be found to be inadequate upon mortgagor’s assertion that market value is release value established for release of single lot upon sale by subdivision developer where release value is not necessarily fair market value of lot and record does not disclose proof of fair market value otherwise. Lake Hillsdale Estates, Inc. v. Galloway, 473 So. 2d 461, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2177 (Miss. 1985).

A mortgagee, who purchased the mortgaged property at a foreclosure sale, was required to account to the mortgagor for the surplus arising from a sale of the property by the mortgagee within two weeks for two and one-half times the amount bid by the mortgagee at the foreclosure sale. Central Financial Services, Inc. v. Spears, 425 So. 2d 403, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2348 (Miss. 1983).

Sale of land made by trustee in foreclosing deed of trust for total bid of a little more than 50% of its value will not be set aside for inadequacy of price, if sale is otherwise valid, but inadequacy of price may be taken into consideration along with other inequities in determining whether such sale should be set aside. Triplett v. Bridgforth, 205 Miss. 328, 38 So. 2d 756, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1949).

In determining adequacy of the price paid by a mortgagee at foreclosure sale, the amount of the indebtedness unpaid and barred by the statute of limitations at the time of an action to set the sale aside was taken into consideration. Harris v. Bailey Ave. Park, Inc., 202 Miss. 776, 32 So. 2d 689, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 340 (Miss. 1947).

Sale of land by trustee not set aside merely because price inadequate unless such as to shock conscience. Weyburn v. Watkins, 90 Miss. 728, 44 So. 145, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 1907).

6. Notice of sale, in general.

Circuit court properly granted summary judgment to a purchaser at a foreclosure sale and dismissed from the borrower’s suit pursuant to the bona fide purchaser defense because the trustee properly followed the statutory posting and publishing requirements, the borrower failed raise a genuine issue for trial where she did not show that notice was not given, that the foreclosure and subsequent sale were wrongful, or to context the purchaser’s sworn affidavit stating that he purchased the property for valuable consideration without notice of her alleged claims. Blanchard v. Mize, 186 So.3d 403, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 77 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

Because Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-55 only required the posting and publication of the notice of a foreclosure sale, a bank did not have an obligation to determine who the heirs of a deceased mortgagor were; the decedent’s heirs did not open an estate until four months after the foreclosure sale. In re Estate of May v. First Fed. Bank, 32 So.3d 1227, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 110 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).

To suggest that debtor could avoid a foreclosure sale because notice was addressed to him rather than his conservator was illogical. The conservator’s duties required him to open debtor’s mail and deal with the contents in an appropriate manner, and, therefore, in this situation, notice to debtor was notice to the conservator; furthermore, the evidence showed that the conservator was living at the property and received correspondence and notices from the creditor and the creditor’s attorney. In re Beasley, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2353 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Aug. 20, 2009).

Under §§89-1-55,89-1-57, and89-1-59, a bank did all that it was required to do when it sent two letters to the debtor stating that it would be forced to foreclose unless it could get a subordination from the holder of a note and deed of trust; no further notice was required in the absence of any such requirement in the agreement between the bank and the debtor. EB, Inc. v. Allen, 722 So. 2d 555, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 506 (Miss. 1998).

Notice of foreclosure sale was not defective under §89-1-55 for failing to clearly identify debtor-wife as signatory to deed where any doubts as to whether debtor-wife joined with husband in executing deed could be clarified by examining county land records. Morton v. Resolution Trust Corp., 918 F. Supp. 985, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20453 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

Where a deed of trust stated the manner in which a sale was to be conducted and notice to be given therefor, and the trustee gave the required notice of the sale of the land under a deed of trust by public notice and by advertisement, the mortgagor of the land, who in addition was given notice by mail of the bank’s intent to foreclose, received proper notice, and the sale was valid. Rivervalley Co. v. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank, 331 F. Supp. 698, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12606 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

The holder of a secondary deed of trust has no right to notice of foreclosure, or statutory right of redemption, but may only assert an interest prior to foreclosure by paying the amounts due and subsequently engaging in foreclosure for nonpayment of his secondary deed of trust. Crystal v. Duffy, 493 So. 2d 942, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2574 (Miss. 1986).

The mortgagor of the property or a grantee thereof who has assumed the mortgage indebtedness is entitled to notice of the sale, as owner of property. Morgan v. Linham, 227 Miss. 584, 86 So. 2d 473, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 730 (Miss. 1956).

Notice of trustee’s sale published in a newspaper during the first of the three weeks’ period of the advertisement, was not insufficient as a matter of law merely because the words “secure the payment of a certain in-” (the “in-” being the first two letters of the word “indebtedness”) were printed upside down, where error was discovered and corrected in the remaining notices, and the error did not appear at all in the typewritten notice published at the courthouse. Sly v. Gilliland, 207 Miss. 356, 42 So. 2d 393, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 348 (Miss. 1949).

Notice of trustee’s sale containing recital that trustee had been requested to foreclose said property, without mentioning who had made the request, did not render the sale void. Sly v. Gilliland, 207 Miss. 356, 42 So. 2d 393, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 348 (Miss. 1949).

Trustee’s signed notation of time and place of posting notice of sale placed at bottom of notice of trustee’s sale contained in proof of publication is incompetent evidence, when objected to, to show posting of notice of sale, when proof of publication was not made part of trustee’s deed by its terms and recitals. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Recitals in trustee’s conveyance to purchaser at foreclosure sale as to the manner in which he advertised property for sale overcame prima facie presumption that notice was properly posted and that trustee performed all acts in pais required of him. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Where the parties have agreed in the deed of trust as to the notice of sale required and such notice complies with this statute, no other notice is necessary. Harris v. Bailey Ave. Park, Inc., 202 Miss. 776, 32 So. 2d 689, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 340 (Miss. 1947).

Words, “according to law,” inserted with pen and ink or by typewriter in printed provision in trust deed providing for sale of the land in event of default “after giving notice of the time, place, and terms of sale, by advertisement posted at least _______________ days before the day of sale in three public places in county, immediately after the words ”posted at least _______________ days“ and ”in three public places,“ entirely displaced the printed provision in respect to requirement as to manner of advertising foreclosure sale, so that only such requirements as then provided by law under this section [Code 1942, § 888] were necessary. Pruitt v. Dean, 198 Miss. 71, 21 So. 2d 300, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 169 (Miss. 1945); Pruitt v. Dean, 200 Miss. 167, 26 So. 2d 342, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 278 (Miss. 1946).

Deed made by trustee under trust deed will be prima facie presumed to have been made in compliance with requirements of notice of time, place and terms of sale, unless recitals in the deed show otherwise. Chandler v. Bank of Brooksville, 181 Miss. 529, 178 So. 797, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 1938).

Trustee’s deed reciting that notice was published “for the length of time required by law” held sufficient in absence of evidence publication was not made weekly. Chandler v. Bank of Brooksville, 181 Miss. 529, 178 So. 797, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 1938).

Recitals in trustee’s deed; burden on purchaser at foreclosure to show in ejectment posting of notice of sale. Jones v. Frank, 123 Miss. 280, 85 So. 310, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1920).

7. —Time of advertising.

Publication must be made for three weeks next before and immediately preceding day of sale, and where more than one week elapsed between last advertisement and day of sale, sale was void. Planters' Mercantile Co. v. Braxton, 120 Miss. 470, 82 So. 323, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Miss. 1919).

Notices published October 8, 15, 22 and 29 with sale November 2, and publication July 7, 14, 21 and 28 with sale July 31, were sufficient, less than week elapsing between last notice and day of sale. Lake v. Castleman, 116 Miss. 175, 76 So. 877, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss. 1917).

8. —Duration of advertising.

Attorney testified that he published notice of the foreclosure sale and posted notice at the Leflore County Courthouse in Greenwood, Mississippi, for the prescribed three week period. Through the testimony of its attorney, the creditor demonstrated that it complied with the notice requirements of Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-55. In re Beasley, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2353 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Aug. 20, 2009).

Where the trustee provided for notice of sale to be published and posted for twenty-one days prior to the sale, and a publication of notice of sale was made on May 19, May 26, June 2, and June 9, 1950 and the notice of sale was posted continuously at the courthouse door May 19th to date of sale both giving notice that the sale would be held on June 12, 1950, this was a compliance with the trust deed and with this section [Code 1942, § 888]. McAllister v. Byrd, 212 Miss. 742, 55 So. 2d 435, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 504 (Miss. 1951).

Any portion of statute, except the part which requires advertisement for three consecutive weeks preceding sale, may be waived by the parties or may be changed by contract of the parties. Lee v. Magnolia Bank, 209 Miss. 804, 48 So. 2d 515, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 446 (Miss. 1950).

Advertisement for three consecutive weeks and sale 7 days after last publication complied with law. Donald v. Commercial Bank of Magee, 132 Miss. 578, 97 So. 12, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1923).

Advertising longer than statute requires does not render sale void. Jones v. Salmon, 128 Miss. 508, 91 So. 199, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 139 (Miss. 1922).

9. —Description of land.

There was no valid sale of a property because the published legal description for the notice of sale did not include the property in question. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in awarding a deficiency judgment in that, because the property had not yet been sold at foreclosure, there was no deficiency. Dorman v. Trustmark Nat'l Bank, 281 So.3d 1016, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 198 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

Notice of trustee’s sale published in a newspaper and posted at courthouse correctly describing the land to be sold was sufficient notice, notwithstanding reference to deed of trust recorded in county records in which the description was defective because of improper punctuation. Sly v. Gilliland, 207 Miss. 356, 42 So. 2d 393, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 348 (Miss. 1949).

Fact that trustee’s deed made pursuant to foreclosure sale purported to convey land not described in deed of trust did not entitle mortgagors to cancelation of trustee’s deed, where notice of foreclosure sale correctly described the land in the deed of trust. Pruitt v. Dean, 198 Miss. 71, 21 So. 2d 300, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 169 (Miss. 1945); Pruitt v. Dean, 200 Miss. 167, 26 So. 2d 342, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 278 (Miss. 1946).

Where land is correctly described in notice of foreclosure sale but incorrectly described in trustee’s deed made pursuant thereto, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale is entitled to receive at any time a corrected deed from the trustee describing the land conveyed by the deed of trust, offered for sale under the notice, and struck off to the purchaser. Pruitt v. Dean, 198 Miss. 71, 21 So. 2d 300, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 169 (Miss. 1945); Pruitt v. Dean, 200 Miss. 167, 26 So. 2d 342, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 278 (Miss. 1946).

A bill to set aside foreclosures of deeds of trust, in which bill it was alleged that “The said trustee omitted and failed to advertise, sell or convey said West Half of Northwest Quarter of said Section 29, which was part of the security conveyed by said trust deed,” was secure against demurrer when supported by an exhibit disclosing that the description of the land in the trust deed and in the posted notice, which description was erroneous, differed from the correct description in the newspaper notice. Pruitt v. Dean, 198 Miss. 71, 21 So. 2d 300, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 169 (Miss. 1945); Pruitt v. Dean, 200 Miss. 167, 26 So. 2d 342, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 278 (Miss. 1946).

10. —Disclosure of name of mortgagor or his successor in title.

Published notice of sale was improper where name of one mortgagor of property did not appear in published notice; requirement that names of all mortgagors be published is strictly construed and omission of name of co-mortgagor invalidates sale. Haygood v. First Nat'l Bank, 517 So. 2d 553, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2923 (Miss. 1987).

Defect in description of mortgagor guardian of minors in notice of sale under this section [Code 1942, § 888] could not be relied upon to invalidate sale of mortgaged premises, in view of statute (Laws, 1934, ch. 250) providing that all mortgagors of real estate located within the state, who might have the right to set aside any title to such real estate by reason of the neglect of any trustee to insert in any notice of sale of such real estate, the name of the mortgagor, should commence suit within 12 months from the passage of such act, and upon the failure of such mortgagor or other person to commence suit within such time, the right to bring suit and the remedy to enforce such right of action should be deemed thereafter to be completely extinguished. Barbour v. Williams, 196 Miss. 409, 17 So. 2d 604, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 207 (Miss. 1944).

The sale of mortgaged property under a notice setting out the mortgagor’s name as B. B. Blakeney, instead of B. Blakeney as the mortgagor signed it in the deed of trust, was void as not being a sufficient compliance with the statute, which requires the identity of the mortgagor to be disclosed by setting out his correct name, notwithstanding that a notice recited the name of the mortgagor’s wife who executed the mortgage with him, the date of the mortgage and the fact and place of recording, and a description of the land as set forth in the deed of trust. Blakeney v. Smith, 183 Miss. 151, 183 So. 920, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 227 (Miss. 1938).

Trustee’s deed held not void as to subsequent grantee because of failure to name such grantee in notice and advertisement of sale, where grantee did not assume mortgage debt and deed expressly excepted debt from warranty of the instrument. Melchor v. Casey, 173 Miss. 67, 161 So. 692, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 227 (Miss. 1935).

Statute requiring advertisement of foreclosure sale to name mortgagor whose property is advertised is in derogation of common law and must be strictly pursued. Wilkinson v. Federal Land Bank, 168 Miss. 645, 150 So. 218, 151 So. 761, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 168 (Miss. 1933).

“Mortgagor” within statute requiring advertisement of foreclosure sale to name mortgagor includes remote grantee who assumed mortgage debt with mortgagee’s consent. Wilkinson v. Federal Land Bank, 168 Miss. 645, 150 So. 218, 151 So. 761, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 168 (Miss. 1933).

Advertisement of foreclosure sale, which failed to name mortgagor in possession who was the last vendee through original mortgagor, rendered sale void, notwithstanding advertisement named original mortgagor. Wilkinson v. Federal Land Bank, 168 Miss. 645, 150 So. 218, 151 So. 761, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 168 (Miss. 1933).

11. —Place of posting notice.

State supreme court held that Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-31 applied to Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-55, and reversed the denial of a summary judgment motion filed by bank and trustee as the city where the newspaper was published encompassed two different counties and thus, the newspaper was deemed to be published in both counties under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-31(4) for purposes of the publication of foreclosure sale notices. Warren v. Johnston, 908 So. 2d 744, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 488 (Miss. 2005).

That proof of publication of notice of sale on foreclosure of a deed of trust was attached to the trustee’s deed does not necessarily imply that notice was not posted at the courthouse door, where the trustee’s deed, without reciting details, states that the notice required by law was given. Craft v. Everett, 237 Miss. 360, 115 So. 2d 133, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 479 (Miss. 1959).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 888), notice of sale under deed of trust must be posted at the courthouse door of the county where the land is situated. Clark v. Sayle, 208 Miss. 559, 45 So. 2d 138, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 274 (Miss. 1950).

Requirement of this section [Code 1942, § 888] that notice of sale be posted at the courthouse door is met by the posting of notice on face of stack of pasteboard cartons containing books, about half way down entrance hall of courthouse, in conspicuous place in corridor, not far from door space, where courthouse was being repaired, its doors were down for replacement, and bulletin board, which ordinarily stood nearby, was misplaced, and sheriff and others were using face of stack of cartons for posting of notices. Clark v. Sayle, 208 Miss. 559, 45 So. 2d 138, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 274 (Miss. 1950).

So long as the required notice is posted, there can be no objection to the trustee’s posting notices of sale in as many places in the county as he desires. Gulf Refining Co. v. Harrison, 201 Miss. 294, 30 So. 2d 44, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1947).

Although the power of sale in a trust deed covering lands located in two counties provided that notice of foreclosure sale be given in one of the counties, such provision was prohibited by this section [Code 1942, § 888] which requires that the prescribed notice be given in every county wherein the land is located. Cook v. Taylor, 200 Miss. 381, 27 So. 2d 404, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 301 (Miss. 1946).

Notice must be posted at courthouse door of county where land situated both when sale is advertised in newspaper published in county and where advertised in newspaper having general circulation therein. Fauntleroy v. Mardis, 123 Miss. 353, 85 So. 96, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 32 (Miss. 1920).

12. —Effect of failure to post notice.

Where notice of foreclosure sale under a trust deed covering land in different counties was published and posted in only one county and all of the land was sold as an entire tract after offering it for sale in separate lots and parcels, the sale was void, not only as to the land located in the county wherein no notice was given, but in the entirety. Cook v. Taylor, 200 Miss. 381, 27 So. 2d 404, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 301 (Miss. 1946).

Foreclosure sale not advertised by posting at courthouse door is invalid. Fauntleroy v. Mardis, 123 Miss. 353, 85 So. 96, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 32 (Miss. 1920).

13. Time and place of sale.

Notice specifying that the sale would be made at the south door of the courthouse was sufficient in the absence of a south door where there was only a front door and a back door, one of these being a southeast door. Gulf Refining Co. v. Harrison, 201 Miss. 294, 30 So. 2d 44, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1947).

Trustee’s sale under deed of trust and trustee’s deed given pursuant to sale held void, where notice of sale posted at courthouse door, as shown by affidavit of posting made part of deed, by mistake named a past date instead of future date as time of sale. Booker v. Federal Land Bank, 175 Miss. 281, 164 So. 877, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1936).

Lapse of twenty-four days between last publication of trustee’s sale and date of sale held to render trustee’s deed void on its face. Smith v. Deas, 158 Miss. 111, 130 So. 105, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 25 (Miss. 1930).

Sale under deed of trust is void, more than a week elapsing between last publication and day of sale. Crump v. Tucker, 149 Miss. 711, 115 So. 397, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 29 (Miss. 1928).

Sale on day following last day of three weeks’ publication authorized; notice may be published a fourth time and sale made within one week thereafter. Maris v. Lindsey, 124 Miss. 742, 87 So. 12, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 544 (Miss. 1920).

Trustee may fix time and place of sale, provided sufficient notice is given and sale is held within hours designated by statute. Davis v. O'Connell, 92 Miss. 348, 47 So. 672, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 258 (Miss. 1908).

Erroneous date at bottom of trustee’s notice of sale which properly gives time, terms and place of sale and otherwise complies with trust deed and the law, does not invalidate sale. Weyburn v. Watkins, 90 Miss. 728, 44 So. 145, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 1907).

14. Cure of error by lapse of time.

Clause herein providing that an error in the mode of sale such as makes the sale void will not be cured by any statute of limitations, except as to the ten-year statute of adverse possession, does not create a limitation and the legislature is competent to insert it, modify it or repeal it. Barbour v. Williams, 196 Miss. 409, 17 So. 2d 604, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 207 (Miss. 1944).

Statute (Laws, 1934, ch. 250) providing that all mortgagors of real estate located within the state who might have the right to set aside any title to such real estate by reason of the neglect of any trustee to insert it in a notice of sale of such real estate, the name of said mortgagor, should commence suit within 12 months from the passage of such act, and upon the failure of such mortgagor or other person to commence suit within such time, the right to bring such suit, and the remedy to enforce such right of action should be deemed thereafter to be completely extinguished, if applied so as to restrict the application of the general ten-year statute of adverse possession, was not invalid as being an impairment of contract or as class or private legislation, since the right to sue is distinct from the right sought to be enforced and is remedial in character. Barbour v. Williams, 196 Miss. 409, 17 So. 2d 604, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 207 (Miss. 1944).

The statute of limitations will cure an error in the mode of sale. Bradley v. Villere, 66 Miss. 399, 6 So. 208, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 114 (Miss. 1889).

15. Miscellaneous.

The failure to appoint an independent trustee for a deed of trust would not invalidate the foreclosure sale of the real property. Wansley v. First Nat'l Bank, 566 So. 2d 1218, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 452 (Miss. 1990).

Debtor was divested of all legal and equitable title in foreclosed property at conclusion of foreclosure sale, and therefore could not avoid sale on ground that Chapter 13 petition was filed before foreclosure deed was delivered to successful bidder at sale or recorded. In re Applewhite, 106 B.R. 468, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 1908 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989).

Mortgagee seeking deficiency judgment has burden of proving entitlement under principles of equity; it must first be determined if mortgagee has endeavored to collect indebtedness out of land; then, it must be determined whether value of property satisfies debt of mortgagor or creates surplus. Lake Hillsdale Estates, Inc. v. Galloway, 473 So. 2d 461, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2177 (Miss. 1985).

The abandonment of property by a corporate mortgagor, its failure to contest occupancy of the property by the purchaser at a trustee’s foreclosure sale, and its permitting the purchaser to make improvements on the land without making known its claim, estopped the mortgagor from asserting its claim to the property as against the purchaser and the mortgagee of the purchaser. Rivervalley Co. v. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank, 331 F. Supp. 698, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12606 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

A sale under a deed of trust which describes the property as being in township 1, where the county contains a township 1 south and a township 1 north, but no township 1 (the notice of sale similarly describing it) is void. Seal v. Anderson, 235 Miss. 249, 108 So. 2d 864, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 422 (Miss. 1959).

In suit attacking validity of foreclosure sale under deed of trust, burden of proof is on complainant to show invalidity. Clark v. Sayle, 208 Miss. 559, 45 So. 2d 138, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 274 (Miss. 1950).

Undated note secured by deed of trust is not so ambiguous as to require its reformation or foreclosure by proceeding in chancery when note provides that principal is payable in ten equal successive annual installments, the last of which shall fall due on November 1, 1947, as it is plainly apparent from this language that first installment of principal was due November 1, 1938. Triplett v. Bridgforth, 205 Miss. 328, 38 So. 2d 756, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1949).

The fact that a mortgagee may be a director or officer of the corporate mortgagor does not void purchase of the property by him at a foreclosure sale not brought about by his procurement, particularly when he purchases to protect a valid interest previously acquired. Harris v. Bailey Ave. Park, Inc., 202 Miss. 776, 32 So. 2d 689, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 340 (Miss. 1947).

Eleven acres described in a deed of trust as being located on the east side of the SW 1/4 of NW 1/4 was indefinite when offered for sale as “11 acres in the SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 ,” but, since the entire SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 was later offered for sale, title vested in the purchaser to eleven of the forty acres, the precise eleven acres to be determined between the purchaser and the owner of the remainder of the forty acres, an attorney who conducted the sale. Gulf Refining Co. v. Harrison, 201 Miss. 294, 30 So. 2d 44, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1947).

Interim payments of reasonable income or rental value of property are essential condition to injunction under moratorium statutes to stay foreclosure sale. Commodore Corp. v. Davis, 178 Miss. 376, 172 So. 867, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1937).

Upon tendering amount due and all expenses of attempted foreclosure which was refused, and again tendered with their bill for injunction, and again refused, mortgagors were entitled to injunction against foreclosure sale. Hembree v. Johnson, 119 Miss. 204, 80 So. 554, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1918).

Under bill by purchaser at void sale, for resale of land, in which husband of deceased mortgagor joined, all heirs acquired right and it was error to permit dismissal in vacation. Northern v. Scruggs, 118 Miss. 353, 79 So. 227, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1918).

Provision in trust deed making default in payment of one note causing whole debt to become due and collectible at option of creditor, is valid and not a penalty. Caldwell v. Kimbrough, 91 Miss. 877, 45 So. 7, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 167 (Miss. 1907).

Such provision not waived by mortgagee failing to act at once on request of debtor. Caldwell v. Kimbrough, 91 Miss. 877, 45 So. 7, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 167 (Miss. 1907).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Necessity and sufficiency of notice of sale to mortgagor where a chattel mortgage is sought to be foreclosed without judicial proceedings by sale under power. 30 A.L.R.2d 539.

Validity, construction, and application of provisions entitling mortgagee to increase interest rate on transfer of mortgaged property. 92 A.L.R.3d 822.

Necessity of Production of Original Note Involved in Mortgage Foreclosure – Twenty-First Century Cases. 86 A.L.R.6th 411.

Am. Jur.

55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages §§ 578 et seq.

18 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev) Mortgages, Form 153.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration-to foreclose mortgage-another form).

CJS.

59 C.J.S., Mortgages §§ 932 et seq.

Law Reviews.

Abbott, Some basic priority problems in a land development project in Mississippi with emphasis upon power of sale foreclosure procedures. 50 Miss. L. J. 665, September 1979.

§ 89-1-57. Deed of trust or mortgage; how sale made when terms not specified.

If a deed of trust or mortgage, with a power of sale, be silent as to the place and terms of sale and mode of advertising, a sale may be made after condition broken, for cash, upon such notice, and at such time and place as is required for sheriff’s sale of like property. But all such sales shall be made in the county where the land is located, or in the county of the residence of the grantor or one (1) of the grantors, provided that where the land is situated in two (2) or more counties, the parties may contract for a sale of the whole, or any part thereof, in either county in which a part of the land lies.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1237; 1892, § 2484; 1906, § 2821; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2322; 1930, § 2169; 1942, § 891; Laws, 1896, ch. 109.

Cross References —

Suspension of mortgage foreclosure after declared disaster or emergency, see §§89-1-303 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Notice.

1. In general.

A deed of trust which provides that in case of default the trustee shall take possession without notice, and, after duly advertising, sell for cash, at public auction at the courthouse door, a sufficiency of the property to make payment, is not silent as to the place and terms of sale and mode of advertising within the meaning of Code 1942, § 891. Gardner v. State, 235 Miss. 119, 108 So. 2d 592, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1959).

This section [Code 1942, § 891] applies only where trust deed does not specify manner of sale. Lynchburg Shoe Co. v. Castleman, 116 Miss. 188, 76 So. 878, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 306 (Miss. 1917).

Under trust deed designating place of sale outside of county, sale was properly made at place designated by this section [Code 1942, § 891]. Polk v. S. S. Dale & Sons, 93 Miss. 664, 47 So. 386, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1908).

Deed of trust held to adopt this section [Code 1942, § 891] as to notice and manner of sale. Melsheimer v. McKnight, 92 Miss. 386, 46 So. 827, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 250 (Miss. 1908).

A trust deed providing for sale for cash at public auction at Jackson, or any suitable place, is not silent within the meaning of this section [Code 1942, § 891]. Williams v. Dreyfus, 79 Miss. 245, 30 So. 633, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1901).

This section [Code 1942, § 891] does not apply where the trustee is vested with discretion to fix the place. Goodman v. Durant Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 71 Miss. 310, 14 So. 146, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1893).

2. Notice.

Notice of a foreclosure sale was not invalid for incorrectly describing the door of the courthouse where the sale would take place since a potential bidder would have been able to find the sale from the advertised description. Palmer v. Hope Enters. (In re Palmer), — B.R. —, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1481 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. May 30, 2017).

Under §§89-1-55,89-1-57, and89-1-59, a bank did all that it was required to do when it sent two letters to the debtor stating that it would be forced to foreclose unless it could get a subordination from the holder of a note and deed of trust; no further notice was required in the absence of any such requirement in the agreement between the bank and the debtor. EB, Inc. v. Allen, 722 So. 2d 555, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 506 (Miss. 1998).

Trustee may fix time and place of sale provided sufficient notice is given and sale held between hours designated by statute. Davis v. O'Connell, 92 Miss. 348, 47 So. 672, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 258 (Miss. 1908).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Necessity and sufficiency of notice of sale to mortgagor where chattel mortgage is sought to be foreclosed without judicial proceedings by sale under power. 30 A.L.R.2d 539.

Validity, construction, and application of provisions entitling mortgagee to increase interest rate on transfer of mortgaged property. 92 A.L.R.3d 822.

Am. Jur.

46 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 695, Intent of Parties to Ambiguous Deed.

Law Reviews.

Abbott, Some basic priority problems in a land development project in Mississippi with emphasis upon power of sale foreclosure procedures. 50 Miss. L. J. 665, September 1979.

§ 89-1-59. Accelerated debt may be reinstated by payment of all default before sale.

Where there is a series of notes or installment payments secured by a deed of trust, mortgage or other lien, and a provision is inserted in such instrument to secure them to the effect that upon a failure to pay any one (1) note or installment, or the interest thereon, or any part thereof, or for failure to pay taxes or insurance premiums on the property described in such instrument and the subject of such lien, that all the debt secured thereby should become due and collectible, and for any such reason the entire indebtedness shall have been put in default or declared due, the debtor, or any interested party, may at any time before a sale be made under the terms and provisions of such instrument, or by virtue of such lien, stop a threatened sale under the powers contained in such instrument or stop any proceeding in any court to enforce such lien by paying the amount of the note or installment then due or past due by its terms, with all accrued costs, attorneys’ fees and trustees’ fees on the amount actually past due by the terms of such instrument or lien, rather than the amount accelerated, and such taxes or insurance premiums due and not paid, with proper interest thereon, if such should have been paid by any interested party to such instrument. Any such payment or payments shall reinstate, according to the terms of such instrument, the amount so accelerated, the same as if such amount not due by its terms had not been accelerated or put in default.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 2170; 1942, § 892; Laws, 1924, ch. 157; Laws, 1975, ch. 414, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1975).

Cross References —

Limitations on actions on instalment notes after foreclosure of mortgage, see §15-1-23.

Construction of term providing option to accelerate at will, see §75-1-309.

Reinstatement of foreclosures by savings associations, see §81-12-169.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Notice.

3. Standing.

4. Evidence.

5. Caveat emptor.

1. In general.

Bankruptcy courts have recognized that there are essential differences between a contractual mortgage reinstatement and the statutory cure right afforded by 11 U.S.C.S. § 1322(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code; regardless, it was undisputed that debtor never cured the default that precipitated acceleration of the Note and, therefore, never had the statutory right to reinstate the Note. Seaberry v. Cenlar FSB (In re Seaberry), — B.R. —, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1189 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Apr. 12, 2019).

Mortgagee’s refusal to accept payment after time provided for in work-out agreement, but before foreclosure proceedings were instituted, constituted misconduct such as warranted denial of mortgagee’s request for attorney fees. In re McIntyre, 96 B.R. 65, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 2313 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1988).

The holder of a secondary deed of trust has no right to notice of foreclosure, or statutory right of redemption, but may only assert an interest prior to foreclosure by paying the amounts due and subsequently engaging in foreclosure for nonpayment of his secondary deed of trust. Crystal v. Duffy, 493 So. 2d 942, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2574 (Miss. 1986).

Debtor’s right to redemption of personal property subject to security interest is governed by Uniform Commercial Code (§75-9-506), not by §89-1-59, which applies only to secured installment transactions which are not covered by Code. Dungan v. Dick Moore, Inc., 463 So. 2d 1094, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1898 (Miss. 1985).

A contract for the purchase and sale of certain real estate was properly cancelled pursuant to findings that defendant purchasers were in arrears in the monthly installments as well as in taxes and insurance premiums, where purchasers did not take advantage of the statutory procedure for reinstatement of accelerated debts. Stabiler v. Webb, 375 So. 2d 980, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2376 (Miss. 1979).

This section [Code 1942, § 892] gave the purchaser of an automobile under a conditional sales contract the right to reinstate the instalments under the sales contract as written upon payment of the past-due instalments, even if the entire indebtedness had been accelerated or attempted to be accelerated by the then holder of the contract, at any time before a sale of the automobile which had been repossessed when the purchaser defaulted in making payment of instalments. Dearman v. Williams, 235 Miss. 360, 109 So. 2d 316, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 436 (Miss. 1959).

2. Notice.

Under §§89-1-55,89-1-57, and89-1-59, a bank did all that it was required to do when it sent two letters to the debtor stating that it would be forced to foreclose unless it could get a subordination from the holder of a note and deed of trust; no further notice was required in the absence of any such requirement in the agreement between the bank and the debtor. EB, Inc. v. Allen, 722 So. 2d 555, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 506 (Miss. 1998).

3. Standing.

In a case in which plaintiff alleged that defendants failed and refused to tender to plaintiff a trustee’s deed to the subject property and further failed and refused to deliver possession of the subject property to plaintiff, plaintiff had standing to challenge the debtor’s alleged failure to cure the default under Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-59. Hobson v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 179 So.3d 1026, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 584 (Miss. 2015).

4. Evidence.

In a case in which plaintiff alleged that defendants failed and refused to tender to plaintiff a trustee’s deed to the subject property and further failed and refused to deliver possession of the subject property to plaintiff, summary judgment was rightly granted in favor of defendants because sufficient evidence was presented to the circuit court that defendants had complied with the statutory requirements under Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-59 in reinstating the delinquent debtor’s loan. Hobson v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 179 So.3d 1026, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 584 (Miss. 2015).

5. Caveat emptor.

In a case in which plaintiff alleged that defendants failed and refused to tender to plaintiff a trustee’s deed to the subject property and further failed and refused to deliver possession of the subject property to plaintiff, the doctrine of caveat emptor barred plaintiff’s claims. Hobson v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 179 So.3d 1026, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 584 (Miss. 2015).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Failure to keep up insurance as justifying foreclosure under acceleration provision in mortgage or deed of trust. 69 A.L.R.3d 774.

What transfers justify acceleration under “due-on-sale” clause of real estate mortgage. 22 A.L.R.4th 1266.

Sufficiency of tender of payment to effect defaulting vendee’s redemption of rights in land purchased. 37 A.L.R.4th 286.

Right of debtor to “de-acceleration” of residential mortgage indebtedness under Chapter 13 of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USCS § 1322(b)). 67 A.L.R. Fed. 217.

§ 89-1-61. Forms for conveyances.

A conveyance of land may be in the following form, and shall be as effectual to transfer all the right, title, claim, and possession of the person making it as can be done by any sort of conveyance, viz.:

“In consideration of [here state it], I convey and warrant to_______________the land described as [describe it].

“Witness my signature, the_______________day of_______________ , A. D._______________ .”

If only a special warranty is intended, add the word “specially” to the word “warrant” in the conveyance.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, §§ 1231, 1232; 1892, § 2479; 1906, § 2816; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2317; 1930, § 2131; 1942, § 852.

Cross References —

Form of conveyance at tax sale, see §27-45-23.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Reservation of rights.

1. In general.

A deed which is defectively acknowledged by reason of the fact that word “delivered” was omitted from acknowledgment is good as between the parties. Kelly v. Wilson, 204 Miss. 56, 36 So. 2d 817, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 342 (Miss. 1948).

An instrument in the form of a deed which provided that the grantors were to retain possession, control and occupancy of the lands during their lifetime and then vest in the purported grantee, “but not until the death of both grantors herein, does the title pass,” was testamentary in character and did not meet the requirement of a deed that it must convey some estate effective upon delivery. Coulter v. Carter, 200 Miss. 135, 26 So. 2d 344, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 274 (Miss. 1946).

Instrument conveying in praesenti a remainder held a deed and not a will. Johnson v. Seely, 139 Miss. 60, 103 So. 499, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 1925).

If conveyance is sufficiently certain, additional description failing as to accuracy should be rejected as surplusage; on contradiction in description of premises conveyed, mistaken part should be rejected and other allowed to stand. Ladnier v. Cuevas, 138 Miss. 502, 103 So. 217, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 63 (Miss. 1925).

Debtor’s suit to reform deed to third party by creditor, to whom debtor had conveyed land by deed intended as mortgage, held not barred by limitation, right of action not accruing until execution of deed to third party. Allison v. Burnham, 136 Miss. 13, 100 So. 518, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1924).

That absolute deed was intended as mortgage may be shown by parol. Allison v. Burnham, 136 Miss. 13, 100 So. 518, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1924).

Covenant held to be for grantor’s benefit, so that grantee would not be permitted to make default and to tender back the land and receive payment. Kent v. Stevenson, 127 Miss. 529, 90 So. 241, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1921).

Condition subsequent strictly construed. Kent v. Stevenson, 127 Miss. 529, 90 So. 241, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1921).

Deed accompanied by written agreement on part of grantee to convey to third party on payment of sum of money, third party then being in and remaining in possession, may be shown to be a mortgage. Williams v. Butts, 124 Miss. 661, 87 So. 145, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 553 (Miss. 1920).

Deed conveying 175 acres more or less, by metes and bounds, does not convey 300 acres of accretions attached to original tract before conveyance. Houston Bros. v. Grant, 112 Miss. 465, 73 So. 284, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1916).

Instrument in form of deed “to take effect only after death of the grantor” was testamentary in character and not a deed. Simpson v. McGee, 112 Miss. 344, 73 So. 55, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1916).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 852] the word “warrant” constitutes a warranty of the possession as well as of the title. Allen v. Caffee, 85 Miss. 766, 38 So. 186, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 191 (Miss. 1904).

The words “convey and warrant” are effective “to transfer all the right, title, claim and possession” of the grantor only when an intention to convey a less estate is not expressed in the deed. Hart v. Gardner, 74 Miss. 153, 20 So. 877, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 128 (Miss. 1896).

2. Reservation of rights.

Where a conveyance of land contains a reservation to the grantor of “all minerals,” both liquid and solid, that phrase will not be deemed to include sand and gravel in the absence of a specific designation of sand and gravel as being intended to be reserved. Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 373 (Miss. 1954).

Owner of mineral may remove it from land, though other person owns surface but must allow sufficient land to remain to support surface. Moss v. Jourdan, 129 Miss. 598, 92 So. 689, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1922), overruled, Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 373 (Miss. 1954).

Owner of minerals not enjoined from removing it at instance of owner of surface unless injury to surface is irreparable. Moss v. Jourdan, 129 Miss. 598, 92 So. 689, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1922), overruled, Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 373 (Miss. 1954).

Under deed reserving timber with right-of-way for removing it, and providing for removal within 12 months, grantor conveyed land with timber absolutely subject to his right to remove timber within 12 months or same would pass to grantee. Hand v. Fillingame, 92 Miss. 185, 45 So. 569, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1907).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Written matter as controlling printed matter in construction of deed. 37 A.L.R.2d 820.

Specificity of description of premises as affecting enforceability of contract to convey real property-modern cases. 73 A.L.R.4th 135.

Am. Jur.

7 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Deeds §§ 87:125 et seq. (Mississippi-statutory warranty deed, statutory special warranty deed, quitclaim deed).

38 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 633, Dedication of Land to Public Use.

§ 89-1-63. Deed of trust or mortgage; power of sale; relationship of trustee to other party to deed of trust; beneficiary may purchase at sale made under power of sale; appointment or substitution of trustee by beneficiary.

  1. A deed of trust or mortgage may be in the form of a conveyance, to the end, before the words “witness my signature,” and then as follows, viz.:

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  2. Notwithstanding the form of conveyance, any deed of trust or mortgage which has been made or shall hereafter be made may confer on the trustee or mortgagee and their successors, assignees and agents the power of sale. Furthermore, any person may be appointed and may perform the duties of the trustee in a deed of trust, and such person shall not be disqualified nor shall the acts of such person be invalid because of the relationship of such person to any other party to the deed of trust. The beneficiary of a deed of trust or the mortgagee of a mortgage may purchase at any sale which has been made or shall hereafter be made under a power of sale, and any such sale shall not be invalid because of the relationship of such person to any other party to the deed of trust.
  3. The beneficiary or holder of any deed of trust, including his agents, employees, successors, assigns, attorneys-in-fact or other legal representatives, may appoint a trustee or substitute a trustee, with or without the permission of the mortgagor or mortgagors. The trustee or substitute trustee so appointed may be a natural person, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, professional association or any other legal entity.

“In trust to secure (here state what is secured, and all the necessary provisions). Witness my signature, the day of , A.D. . ”

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2483; 1906, § 2820; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2321; 1930, § 2132; 1942, § 853; Laws, 1990, ch. 489, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 383, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 15, 2007.).

Amendment Notes —

The 2007 amendment added (3).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Because a second mortgagee lawfully foreclosed the mortgagor’s property under Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-55 and paid off a primary loan and there was no legal prohibition under Miss. Code Ann. §§11-5-101 and89-1-63 for the mortgagee’s affiliate to purchase the property at foreclosure, any rights of the mortgagor in the property were extinguished by the foreclosure sale. Pepper v. Homesales, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16692 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 3, 2009).

Miss. Code Ann. §89-1-63 contains no requirement that the person named as trustee give consent or otherwise have any knowledge of being appointed; the fact that the person did not know that he was the designated trustee was not a sufficient reason to invalidate the deed of trust. Chism v. Southern Mortg. Co. (In re Chism), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1365 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Apr. 24, 2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages §§ 66 et seq.

13 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Mortgages and Trust Deeds § 179:453 (foreclosure by action-mortgagee’s purchase of property on foreclosure); §§ 179:454 et seq. (power of sale).

CJS.

59 C.J.S., Mortgages §§ 146 et seq.

§ 89-1-65. Sheriff’s conveyance.

A conveyance of land sold by a sheriff under execution may be in the following form, and shall be sufficient to convey all of the title of the defendant in the execution, which any conveyance such officer might make would in such case convey; and a conveyance by a constable in like form, the proper changes being made, shall have the like effect in case of sale made by him, viz.:

“By virtue of an execution issued by the clerk of the circuit court of county, on the day of , A.D. , returnable before said court on the Monday of , A.D. , to enforce the judgment of said court, rendered on the day of , A.D. , in favor of against , for dollars, and costs, I, as sheriff of county, have this day, according to law, sold the following lands, to wit: [here describe the land]; when became the best bidder therefor at the sum of dollars, and he having paid said sum of money, I now convey said land to him. “Witness my hand, the , A. D. Sheriff.”

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HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1241; 1892, § 2485; 1906, § 2822; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2323; 1930, § 2133; 1942, § 854.

Cross References —

Operation of chancery court decree as conveyance, see §§11-5-85 et seq.

Conveyance of land sold under execution, see §§13-3-187,13-3-189.

Sheriff’s conveyances generally, see §89-1-27.

Indexing of sheriff’s conveyance, see §89-5-35.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judicial Sales §§ 1 et seq.

§ 89-1-67. Conveyance by administrator, executor, guardian, master, or commissioner.

A conveyance by an administrator, executor, guardian, master, or commissioner, who may sell land under a decree of court may be in the following form, and shall be effective to convey all that could or would be conveyed in such case by any form of conveyance, viz.:

“By virtue of the authority conferred on me, administrator of the estate of , deceased, by the decree of the chancery court of county, rendered on the day of confirming a sale made on the day of , in pursuance of a decree of said court rendered on the day of , I, as administrator of said estate, in consideration of dollars, convey to , the purchaser thereof, the following land, to wit: [here describe the land]. “Witness my signature, the day of , A. D. ”

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The description of the character of the maker of the conveyance will vary the form according to the fact. And if a conveyance be made in pursuance of a power conferred by a will, and not by virtue of a decree, the will should be referred to as a source of power, instead of a decree.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1242; 1892, § 2486; 1906, § 2823; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2324; 1930, § 2134; 1942, § 855.

Cross References —

Indexing of conveyances by persons acting in an official or representative character, see §89-5-35.

Sale of land and deeds of conveyance by executors and administrators, see §§91-7-221,91-7-223.

Sale or compromise of claims by executors or administrators, see §91-7-229.

Sale of real estate by guardian for maintenance and education of ward, see §93-13-35.

Improvements by guardian of ward’s land, or conversion by ward of land into money, see §93-13-45.

Extension or renewal of encumbrances on estate by guardian, see §93-13-47.

Sale of land by guardian for interest of ward, see §93-13-51.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

As a general rule, in this state a power in a will to sell real estate will not be construed as a power to mortgage. Stokes v. Payne, Kennedy & Co., 58 Miss. 614, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1881).

It is always a question of intention whether or not an instrument be an execution of a power. Yates v. Clark, 56 Miss. 212, 1878 Miss. LEXIS 61 (Miss. 1878).

§ 89-1-69. Prohibition against covenants requiring payment of a fee upon the transfer of real property; exception.

  1. In this section, “property owners’ association” means an incorporated or unincorporated association that:
    1. Is designated as the representative of the owners of property in a subdivision;
    2. Has a membership primarily consisting of the owners of the property covered by the dedicatory instrument for the subdivision; and
    3. Manages or regulates the subdivision for the benefit of the owners of property in the subdivision.
  2. A deed restriction or other covenant running with the land applicable to the conveyance of real property that requires a transferee of real property or the transferee’s heirs, successors, or assigns to pay a declarant or other person imposing the deed restriction or covenant on the property or a third party designated by a transferor of the property a fee in connection with a future transfer of the property is prohibited. A deed restriction or other covenant running with the land that violates this section or a lien purporting to encumber the land to secure a right under a deed restriction or other covenant running with the land that violates this section is void and unenforceable. For purposes of this section, a conveyance of real property includes a conveyance or other transfer of an interest or estate in real property.
  3. This section does not apply to a deed restriction or other covenant running with the land that requires a fee associated with the conveyance of property in a subdivision that is payable to:
    1. A property owners’ association that manages or regulates the subdivision or the association’s managing agent if the subdivision contains more than one (1) platted lot and the right to collect a fee in connection with a future transfer of the property is evidenced by a deed restriction or covenant running with the land filed in the public land records;
    2. An entity organized under Section 501(c)(3), Internal Revenue Code of 1986 if the entity has a right to collect a fee in connection with a future transfer of the property evidenced by a deed restriction or covenant running with the land filed in the public land records; or
    3. A governmental entity.

HISTORY: Laws, 2010, ch. 348, § 1; Laws, 2011, ch. 344, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2011; Laws, 2019, ch. 330, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2019.

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment deleted “residential” preceding “subdivision” in (1)(a) and (b); and deleted “residential” preceding “real property” three times in (2).

The 2019 amendment, in (3), added “and the right to collect a fee...land filed in the public land records” at the end of (a), and inserted “if the entity has a right...land filed in the public land records” in (b).

Federal Aspects—

Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code is codified as 26 USCS § 501(c)(3).

Relief From Inequitable Mortgage Foreclosures, Execution Sales and the Like After Declared Emergency or Disaster

§ 89-1-301. Preliminary injunction against foreclosure proceedings; application to dissolve.

The provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 shall apply only in the event that the President of the United States has declared that an emergency or major disaster exists in this state and shall apply only to persons or property directly damaged in an enemy attack, or a man-made, technological or natural disaster declared by the governor in which Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 was specifically included as a relief measure for those counties covered by such disaster declaration. The provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 shall apply to any mortgage or deed of trust on real property executed prior to the date of the disaster declaration by the governor, and to any such instruments executed after the date of the disaster declaration by the governor which renewed or extended any mortgage or deed of trust executed prior to the date of the disaster declaration by the governor. When the mortgagee, or owner, or holder, or trustee, or other person having like power shall hereafter determine to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate covered by the provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, he may proceed by bill in chancery, and in the same manner as in proceedings to foreclose under existing statutes in cases where the mortgage or deed of trust contains no provisions for sale by a trustee or otherwise. Any stipulations in the mortgage or deed of trust as to the manner of foreclosure thereunder shall not preclude proceedings to foreclose any mortgage or deed of trust under the provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329. If any mortgagee, holder, owner, trustee, or other person shall attempt to foreclose otherwise than as herein provided, such proceedings may be enjoined by the mortgagor or owner in possessing of the mortgaged premises, or anyone claiming under the mortgagor, or anyone liable for the mortgage debt. Upon the filing of a sworn petition which affirmatively sets forth that neither the petitioner nor any other person owning an interest in the legal title to the mortgaged premises is able to pay the sums in arrears on the mortgaged debt, that no such person or persons have been able to secure a refinancing of the mortgaged debt up to the date of the filing of the petition, after diligent effort, and that because of the destruction of or damage to improvements on the mortgaged premises or because of economic conditions brought about by the effects of such an enemy attack or man-made, technological or natural disaster declared by the governor, the mortgaged property has depreciated in value as a proximate result of said disaster in an amount in excess of fifteen percent (15%) of its fair market value prior to said disaster, the chancellor of any chancery court of competent jurisdiction shall issue a preliminary injunction enjoining any foreclosure proceedings which have been commenced. The chancellor shall likewise issue a preliminary injunction enjoining any foreclosure proceedings which have been commenced if a sworn petition shall be filed which affirmatively sets forth that as a direct and proximate result of said disaster the petitioner or any other person owning an interest in the legal title to the mortgaged premises is unable to pay the sums in arrears on the mortgage debt, that the petitioner or such other person or persons have not been able to secure the refinancing of the mortgage debt up to the date of the filing of the petition after diligent effort, and that the petitioner has actually sustained a loss in income derived from the mortgaged property, or is presently threatened with such loss as a proximate result of such disaster, in an amount in excess of fifteen percent (15%) of the average annual income from the mortgaged property for the three (3) years immediately prior to said disaster; provided, however, for mortgages or deeds of trust on real property leased or rented for residential purposes from the mortgagor to a third party or parties, the provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 shall apply only if the mortgagor or landlord has made or is making a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the property to a reasonable standard of habitability.

Upon the issuance of any such preliminary injunction, the mortgagee may file a motion to dissolve said injunction, which motion shall be heard in termtime or in vacation, at a time to be fixed by the court not less than thirty (30) days from the date of the filing thereof. The mortgagor may implead any and all persons owning or claiming an interest in the legal title to said property and all persons who may be primarily or secondarily liable on the mortgaged indebtedness. Process shall be issued for all parties so impleaded in the manner now provided by law in suits to confirm titles and the cause shall be triable five (5) days after completion of service of process on all parties. The court may grant such continuances as may be necessary for the completion of service of process on all parties.

Upon the hearing of the motion to dissolve, unless the petitioner shall prove all of the material allegations of his petition by a preponderance of the evidence, the preliminary injunction shall be dissolved. No injunction bond shall be required for the issuance of the preliminary injunction. If the court shall find the petition was filed solely for the purpose of hindering and delaying collection of the mortgaged debt and without reasonable grounds therefor, reasonable attorney’s fees shall be allowed as in other cases upon dissolution of preliminary injunctions, but not otherwise.

If, upon hearing of the motion to dissolve, it shall be determined that said motion should not be granted, then the hearing shall continue in the same manner as provided for in Section 89-1-303, and the court shall enter its order granting the relief provided for by Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 in the case of bills to foreclose. All the terms and provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 relating to the proceedings had on, or to relief granted under, bills to foreclose shall be applicable.

Provided, however, if a deed of trust be foreclosed according to the provisions therein contained, and the sale be actually consummated without the mortgagor or his heirs or assigns availing themselves of the right to enjoin said sale as provided in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, the foreclosure and the title resting thereon, if otherwise regular, shall not be controverted on account of any of the provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, and this limitation shall also apply to minors and all others under legal disability. The provisions of this section shall apply to advertisements for sales already published at the time of the disaster declaration by the governor in which he specifically included the relief provided for in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, but in which the sale has not been made; provided that in such case the costs of the advertisement be tendered in cash with the bill for injunction.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

Cross References —

Emergency management law, see §§33-15-1 et seq.

Sale of land under mortgage or deed of trust, see §§89-1-55,89-1-57.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

3. Chancery court.

Creditor was not obligated to bring a foreclosure proceeding in the chancery court because the foreclosure took place four months before Hurricane Katrina and six months before the protections of the Relief from Inequitable Mortgage Foreclosures, Execution Sales, and the Like after Declared Emergency or Disaster Act, Miss. Code Ann. §§89-1-301 through89-1-329 were invoked. Gandy v. Citicorp, 985 So. 2d 371, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 360 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Recognition of Action for Damages for Wrongful Foreclosure — Types of Actions. 82 A.L.R.6th 43.

Mortgage foreclosure forbearance statutes-modern status. 83 A.L.R.4th 243.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Debt Adjusting Statutes. 90 A.L.R.6th 1.

Am. Jur.

13 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Mortgages § 179:457.1.

§ 89-1-303. Hearing; determination of carrying charge payments.

Suits for the foreclosure of mortgages and deeds of trust shall be deemed ready for final hearing at any time after the expiration of thirty (30) days from the completion of the service of legal process on all parties. On the hearing, the court or chancellor in vacation shall receive evidence tending to establish the reasonable, normal, actual value of the mortgaged property, may fix a minimum price or reasonable and equitable price thereon, and shall determine the reasonable value of the income on said property, if any. If it has no income, then the court or chancellor in vacation shall determine the reasonable rental value, and in lieu of a present order of sale shall direct and require the mortgagor or those interested therein to pay all or a reasonable part of said income or rental value to be used for the payment of taxes, insurance and interest on the mortgage indebtedness, together with a reasonable sum for the upkeep of said property. Said payments shall be made at such times and in such manner as shall be fixed and determined and ordered by the court or chancellor in vacation which, according to the circumstances, may appear just and equitable for a term not to extend beyond two (2) years from the date of the disaster declaration by the governor in which he specifically included the relief provided for in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329. After the expiration of two (2) years from the date of the disaster declaration by the governor in which he specifically included the relief provided for in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, if any past due principal, interest, taxes and the like have not been paid, a final order for sale may be made.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Mortgage foreclosure forbearance statutes-modern status. 83 A.L.R.4th 243.

Am. Jur.

13 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Mortgages and Trust Deeds § 179:282 (waiver of valuation and appraisement of borrower under trust deed).

§ 89-1-305. Effect of default; explanation and remedy; revocation of extension on final order of sale due to changed circumstances.

If the mortgagor or owner of the mortgaged premises, or other interested person for whose relief Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 are enacted, shall make default in the carrying charge payments, or any of them, required in the order mentioned in the foregoing section, or shall commit any waste, his or her right to a further postponement of a final sale shall terminate thirty (30) days after such default, and the mortgagee or trustee or other persons having the right to foreclose shall thereupon be entitled to apply to the court in termtime or vacation for a final decree of sale upon a satisfactory showing to the court that the default aforesaid has occurred; provided that if the default be explained on the grounds of casualty, inevitable accident, or other good reason wholly beyond the control of the defaulter, and be one which in the judgment of the court can be remedied and made good by the defaulter within a reasonably short period to be fixed by the court, then the court or chancellor in vacation shall have power to excuse the default and to make such order in reference thereto as may be just and equitable. The chancellor shall have power in vacation, at any time after the period mentioned in Section 89-1-303, to hear and determine and to order or decree in respect to any matter that shall arise under Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, to the same extent and as fully as the court could do in termtime, legal notice having been given to all parties of the said hearing in vacation. The court or chancellor in vacation shall have power to revoke the period of extension theretofore granted for the making of the final order of sale in case it may be made to appear to the chancellor in vacation, or to the court in termtime, that the occasion for said postponement no longer exists or is no longer just and reasonable; and, in general, the court, or chancellor in vacation, shall have power to alter and revise its orders theretofore made in any respect insofar as the changed circumstances and conditions may require. Provided further, that prior to two (2) years from the date of the disaster declaration by the governor in which he specifically included the relief provided for in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, no action shall be maintained in this state for a deficiency judgment until the period of time extension allowed in any proceeding begun under the provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 shall have expired.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

Cross References —

Sale of land under mortgage or deed of trust, see §§89-1-55,89-1-57.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Mortgage foreclosure forbearance statutes-modern status. 83 A.L.R.4th 243.

Am. Jur.

13 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Mortgages and Trust Deeds §§ 179:262, 179:263 (default provisions; remedies on default); §§ 179:400, 179:400.1 (covenant against waste).

28 Am. Jur. Trials 229, Slander of Title by Improper Recording of Notice of Default.

§ 89-1-307. Reference to master, farm debt adjustment committee or similar agency.

At any hearing, whether in termtime or in vacation, the chancellor shall have power to refer any issue or issues arising under the proceedings authorized by Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 to a master in chancery or to the local farm debt adjustment committee, or any similar federal or state agency, and may prescribe the time within which the master or agency aforesaid shall report. The chancellor shall give consideration to such report with or without exceptions as in his judgment and discretion the same may be entitled.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

§ 89-1-309. Suspension of statute of limitations.

The statutes of limitation which would otherwise apply to any mortgage or mortgage debt, or to any other cause of action under Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, shall cease to run upon the filing of any legal pleadings in the aforesaid court; and the period during which the same be pending in court under Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 shall be added to the period of statutory limitations which would apply to said debt or mortgage or other obligation in which the cause of action arose.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Mortgage foreclosure forbearance statutes-modern status. 83 A.L.R.4th 243.

§ 89-1-311. Application to levies and advertisements for sale.

The provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 shall apply to levies and advertisements for sales under executions, including those under deficiency judgments or decrees where the judgment, decree or account sued on existed prior to the date of the disaster declaration by the governor in which he specifically included the relief provided for in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329; and when an advertisement has been made for a sale under any execution, the judgment debtor or any person interested in the real property levied upon may enjoin the sale under execution, whereupon the plaintiff in execution shall proceed to enforce the same by a cross-bill or by original bill in the same manner as if the plaintiff in execution were the holder of a mortgage. When an original bill has been filed in response to a bill of injunction under Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, the causes may be consolidated for the hearing and for all subsequent proceedings, save as to the pleadings and process.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

Cross References —

Sale of land under mortgage or deed of trust, see §§89-1-55,89-1-57.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Mortgage foreclosure forbearance statutes-modern status. 83 A.L.R.4th 243.

§ 89-1-313. Auxiliary jurisdiction of court.

The court shall have jurisdiction to postpone the enforcement of judgment by execution sale or to order resale or give relief where such judgment is rendered in an action to collect a debt or obligation secured by a real estate mortgage, the foreclosure of which might be affected under the terms of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Mortgage foreclosure forbearance statutes-modern status. 83 A.L.R.4th 243.

§ 89-1-315. Approval of compromise settlements or compositions of mortgage indebtedness.

In case the parties to any such foreclosure action shall agree in writing upon terms of compromise settlement thereof, or of composition of the mortgage indebtedness, or both, the court shall have jurisdiction and may by its order confirm and approve such settlement or composition, or both, as the case may be.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

§ 89-1-317. Agreements as to interest or finance charges; right to prepay without penalty.

In any modification or refinancing of a debt secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on real property subject to Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, the borrower and lender may contract and agree that all or any part of the accrued interest or interest to accrue or earned finance charge which has not been paid on the existing debt may be added to the unpaid principal balance thereof, and the borrower may contract for and agree to pay interest on the principal balance as modified as otherwise provided by law; provided, any such borrower shall have the right to prepay the original balance or the modified balance of the debt without penalty.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity and construction of provision of mortgage or other real-estate financing contract prohibiting prepayment for a fixed period of time. 81 A.L.R.4th 423.

§ 89-1-319. Suspension of inconsistent laws; application to renewed or extended mortgages.

Every law and all the provisions thereof now in force insofar as inconsistent with the provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 are hereby suspended for two (2) years from the date of the disaster declaration by the governor in which he specifically included the relief provided for in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329. No postponement of sale shall be ordered or allowed under Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 which would have the effect of extending the period for redemption beyond two (2) years from the date of the disaster declaration by the governor in which he specifically included the relief provided for in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329.

Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, as to mortgage foreclosure, shall apply only to mortgages made prior to the date of the disaster declaration by the governor in which he specifically included the relief provided for in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, but shall not apply to mortgages made prior to the date of the disaster declaration by the governor in which he specifically included the relief provided for in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, which shall hereafter be renewed or extended for: (a) a period ending more than one (1) year after the date of the disaster declaration by the governor in which he specifically included the relief provided for in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, or (b) which shall be extended by agreement so as to be payable in monthly installments extending over a period of more than three (3) years. During the period of time of postponement granted under the terms of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 the several statutes of limitation be and they are hereby suspended insofar as any right or obligation may be affected by Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

Cross References —

Constitutional direction for sale of lands under decree of court, see MS Const Art. 4, § 111.

Sale of realty by court decree, see §11-5-93.

Procedure for making sales under execution, see §§13-3-161 et seq.

Limitation of actions for property sold by order of court, see §15-1-37.

Conveyances for lands sold under decree of court, see §89-1-27.

Procedure for selling lands under mortgages and deeds of trust, see §89-1-55.

§ 89-1-321. Construction of terms.

The words “mortgagor,” “mortgagee,” “judgment creditor,” “judgment debtor” and “purchaser,” whenever used in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, shall be construed to include the plural as well as the singular and also to include their personal representatives, successors and assigns, and the word “mortgage” shall be construed to include deeds of trust and vendors’ liens; and for purposes of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, deeds of trust and any instrument executed as security for an indebtedness shall be treated as a mortgage.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

§ 89-1-323. Exclusion of mortgages held by United States and mortgages securing payment of public debts or funds.

The provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 shall not apply to any mortgage while such mortgage is held by the United States or agency thereof as security or pledge of the maker, its successors or assigns, nor shall the provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 apply to any mortgage held as security or pledge to secure payment of a public debt or to secure payment of the deposit of public funds.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 12, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

§ 89-1-325. Postponement or extension shall not substantially diminish value of contract or obligation.

No postponement or extension shall be ordered under conditions which, under the temporary emergency, would substantially diminish or impair the value of the contract or obligation of the person against whom the relief is sought without reasonable allowance to justify the exercise of the police power hereby authorized.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 13, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

§ 89-1-327. Provisions are severable.

The provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 are severable, and if any of its provisions shall be held unconstitutional by any court of competent jurisdiction, the decision of such court shall not affect, impair or abrogate any of the remaining provisions, but the remaining provisions thereof shall be and remain in full force and effect without regard to that phrase, clause or portion invalidated.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 14, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

§ 89-1-329. Expiration of relief.

Except for the cases pending in court, the relief provided for in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 shall expire two (2) years from the date of any disaster declaration by the governor in which Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 were specifically included as a relief measure for those counties covered by such disaster declaration.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 371, § 15, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1980).

Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Requirements

§ 89-1-501. Applicability of real estate transfer disclosure requirement provisions.

  1. The provisions of Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 apply only with respect to transfers by sale, exchange, installment land sale contract, lease with an option to purchase, any other option to purchase or ground lease coupled with improvements, of real property on which a dwelling unit is located, or residential stock cooperative improved with or consisting of not less than one (1) nor more than four (4) dwelling units, when the execution of such transfers is by, or with the aid of, a duly licensed real estate broker or salesperson.
  2. There are specifically excluded from the provisions of Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523:
    1. Transfers pursuant to court order, including, but not limited to, transfers ordered by a probate court in administration of an estate, transfers pursuant to a writ of execution, transfers by any foreclosure sale, transfers by a trustee in bankruptcy, transfers by eminent domain, and transfers resulting from a decree for specific performance.
    2. Transfers to a mortgagee by a mortgagor or successor in interest who is in default, transfers to a beneficiary of a deed of trust by a trustor or successor in interest who is in default, transfers by any foreclosure sale after default, in an obligation secured by a mortgage, transfers by a sale under a power of sale or any foreclosure sale under a decree of foreclosure after default in an obligation secured by a deed of trust or secured by any other instrument containing a power of sale, or transfers by a mortgagee or a beneficiary under a deed of trust who has acquired the real property at a sale conducted pursuant to a power of sale under a mortgage or deed of trust or a sale pursuant to a decree of foreclosure or has acquired the real property by a deed in lieu of foreclosure.
    3. Transfers by a fiduciary in the course of the administration of a decedent’s estate, guardianship, conservatorship or trust.
    4. Transfers from one co-owner to one or more other co-owners.
    5. Transfers made to a spouse, or to a person or persons in the lineal line of consanguinity of one or more of the transferors.
    6. Transfers between spouses resulting from a decree of dissolution of marriage or a decree of legal separation or from a property settlement agreement incidental to such a decree.
    7. Transfers or exchanges to or from any governmental entity.
    8. Transfers of real property on which no dwelling is located.
    9. The provisions of Section 89-1-527.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 407, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 456, § 1; Laws, 2005, ch. 329, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2005.

Amendment Notes —

The 1997 amendment added “on which a dwelling unit is located” in subsection (1) and added paragraph (h) under subsection (2).

The 2005 amendment added (2)(i).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Illustrative cases.

While Mississippi requires a disclosure statement to accompany the sale of a domicile or house, transfers of real property on which no dwelling is located do not require disclosure statements to be provided to the buyer. Stribling Invs., LLC v. Mike Rozier Constr. Co., 189 So.3d 1216, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 19 (Miss. 2016).

Where the home seller had submitted two disclosure statements before his death, the first one with a listing agency in which the seller admitted that his home had been treated for termite damages, and the second one with the realtor in which the seller denied that his home had been treated for prior termite damage, summary judgment in favor of a realtor was proper as the home buyers failed to show that the realty possessed any prior knowledge of any problems with the seller’s memory or his home which would have triggered a duty to investigate the credibility of the seller’s denial of prior termite damage in his disclosure statement. Varnado v. Alfonso Realty, Inc., 16 So.3d 746, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 492 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

Summary judgment was appropriate against an action brought by the buyers of a home for failure to make the statutory disclosures required under Miss. Code Ann. §§89-1-501 to 523, fraud and related claims where the home was 30 years old, had obvious structural problems, the buyers were made aware of the existence of subterranean termite damage, and a contract addendum indicated that the home was being sold “as is”. Laird v. ERA Bayshore Realty, 841 So. 2d 178, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 231 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Real-estate broker’s power to bind principal by representations as to character, condition, location, quantity, or title of property. 58 A.L.R.2d 10.

Broker’s liability for damages or losses sustained by vendor of real property to vendee because of broker’s misrepresentations. 61 A.L.R.2d 1237.

Liability of vendor of structure for failure to disclose that it was built on filled ground. 80 A.L.R.2d 1453.

Duty of vendor of real estate to give purchaser information as to termite infestation. 22 A.L.R.3d 972.

Vendor and purchaser: mutual mistake as to physical condition of realty as ground for rescission. 50 A.L.R.3d 1188.

Real estate broker’s liability for misrepresentation as to income from or productivity of property. 81 A.L.R.3d 717.

Fraud predicated on vendor’s misrepresentation or concealment of danger or possibility of flooding or other unfavorable water conditions. 90 A.L.R.3d 568.

Statutes of limitation: actions by purchasers or contractees against vendors or contractors involving defects in houses or other buildings caused by soil instability. 12 A.L.R.4th 866.

Liability of vendor of existing structure for property damage sustained by purchaser after transfer. 18 A.L.R.4th 1168.

Recovery of punitive damages in action by purchasers of real property charging fraud or misrepresentation. 19 A.L.R.4th 801.

Remedies for fraud or misrepresentation as to heating or cooling cost of realty purchased. 32 A.L.R.4th 828.

Real-estate broker’s liability to purchaser for misrepresentation or nondisclosure of physical defects in property sold. 46 A.L.R.4th 546.

Broker’s liability for fraud or misrepresentation concerning development or nondevelopment of nearby property. 71 A.L.R.4th 511.

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers §§ 88, 89, 92.

37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit §§ 169, 218.

77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser §§ 278 et seq.

24 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Vendor and Purchaser, Forms 59, 113 et seq. (complaint, petition or declaration-for rescission or for damages for fraud-nondisclosure or particular misrepresentations as to condition of realty).

15C Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Real Estate Sales , Forms 1 et seq.

12 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 103, Vendor’s Failure to Warn Purchaser of Dangerous Location of Property.

16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 719, Real Estate Broker’s Misrepresentation of Condition or Value of Realty.

38 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 91, Fraudulent Misrepresentation as to Use to Which Real Property Could Be Put.

CJS.

12 C.J.S., Brokers §§ 165, 166.

92 C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser §§ 106-110.

§ 89-1-503. Delivery of written statement required; indication of compliance; right of transferee to terminate for late delivery.

The transferor of any real property subject to Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 shall deliver to the prospective transferee the written property condition disclosure statement required by Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523, as follows:

In the case of a sale, as soon as practicable before transfer of title.

In the case of transfer by a real property sales contract, or by a lease together with an option to purchase, or a ground lease coupled with improvements, as soon as practicable before execution of the contract. For the purpose of this paragraph, execution means the making or acceptance of an offer.

With respect to any transfer subject to paragraph (a) or (b), the transferor shall indicate compliance with Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 either on the receipt for deposit, the real property sales contract, the lease, or any addendum attached thereto or on a separate document.

If any disclosure, or any material amendment of any disclosure, required to be made by Section 89-1-501 through 89-1-523, is delivered after the execution of an offer to purchase, the transferee shall have three (3) days after delivery in person or five (5) days after delivery by deposit in the mail, to terminate his or her offer by delivery of a written notice of termination to the transferor or the transferor’s agent.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 407, § 2; Laws, 2002, ch. 512, § 17, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in this section as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 512, § 17. The words “this act” in the next to last paragraph were changed to “Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 16, 2002, meeting.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment inserted “property condition disclosure” preceding “statement required by” in the introductory language.

Cross References —

Amendment of any disclosure made pursuant to §§89-1-501 through89-1-523 must follow provisions of this section, see §89-1-515.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Broker’s liability for damages or losses sustained by vendor of real property to vendee because of broker’s misrepresentations. 61 A.L.R.2d 1237.

Liability of vendor of structure for failure to disclose that it was built on filled ground. 80 A.L.R.2d 1453.

Duty of vendor of real estate to give purchaser information as to termite infestation. 22 A.L.R.3d 972.

Fraud predicated on vendor’s misrepresentation or concealment of danger or possibility of flooding or other unfavorable water conditions. 90 A.L.R.3d 568.

Real-estate broker’s liability to purchaser for misrepresentation or nondisclosure of physical defects in property sold. 46 A.L.R.4th 546.

Broker’s liability for fraud or misrepresentation concerning development or nondevelopment of nearby property. 71 A.L.R.4th 511.

Real-estate broker’s power to bind principal by representations as to character, condition, location, quantity, or title of property. 58 A.L.R.2d 10.

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers §§ 88, 89, 92.

77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser §§ 278 et seq.

24 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Vendor and Purchaser, Forms 59, 113 et seq. (complaint, petition or declaration-for rescission or for damages for fraud-nondisclosure or particular misrepresentations as to condition of realty).

16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 719, Real Estate Broker’s Misrepresentation of Condition or Value of Realty.

CJS.

12 C.J.S., Brokers §§ 165, 166.

92 C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser §§ 106-110.

§ 89-1-505. Limit on duties and liabilities with respect to information required or delivered.

  1. Neither the transferor nor any listing or selling agent shall be liable for any error, inaccuracy or omission of any information delivered pursuant to Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 if the error, inaccuracy or omission was not within the personal knowledge of the transferor or that listing or selling agent, was based on information timely provided by public agencies or by other persons providing information as specified in subsection (2) that is required to be disclosed pursuant to Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523, and ordinary care was exercised in obtaining and transmitting it.
  2. The delivery of any information required to be disclosed by Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 to a prospective transferee by a public agency or other person providing information required to be disclosed pursuant to Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 shall be deemed to comply with the requirements of Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 and shall relieve the transferor or any listing or selling agent of any further duty under Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 with respect to that item of information.
  3. The delivery of a report or opinion prepared by a licensed engineer, land surveyor, geologist, structural pest control operator, contractor or other expert, dealing with matters within the scope of the professional’s license or expertise, shall be sufficient compliance for application of the exemption provided by subsection (1) if the information is provided to the prospective transferee pursuant to a request therefor, whether written or oral. In responding to such a request, an expert may indicate, in writing, an understanding that the information provided will be used in fulfilling the requirements of Section 89-1-509 and, if so, shall indicate the required disclosures, or parts thereof, to which the information being furnished is applicable. Where such a statement is furnished, the expert shall not be responsible for any items of information, or parts thereof, other than those expressly set forth in the statement.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 407, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1.-2. [Reserved for future use.]

3. Dismissal proper.

1.-2. [Reserved for future use.]

3. Dismissal proper.

Summary judgment and dismissal of the home buyers’ suit against the home sellers (in which they contended the sellers intentionally misrepresented the condition of the property) was proper as the buyers offered no evidence that the sellers intentionally misrepresented the condition of their property, or that the sellers had any personal knowledge of the conditions discovered by the buyers subsequent to their purchase. Additionally, the buyers hired their own licensed inspector prior to the closing of sale, and pursuant to his recommendations, the buyers were apparently satisfied enough with the conditions of the property to follow through with the contract and purchase the property. Williams v. Estate of Morrison, 969 So. 2d 132, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 734 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers §§ 88, 89, 92.

77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser §§ 278 et seq.

CJS.

12 C.J.S., Brokers §§ 165, 166.

92 C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser §§ 106-110.

§ 89-1-507. Approximation of certain information required to be disclosed; information subsequently rendered inaccurate.

If information disclosed in accordance with Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 is subsequently rendered inaccurate as a result of any act, occurrence or agreement subsequent to the delivery of the required disclosures, the inaccuracy resulting therefrom does not constitute a violation of Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523. If at the time the disclosures are required to be made, an item of information required to be disclosed is unknown or not available to the transferor, and the transferor or his agent has made a reasonable effort to ascertain it, the transferor may use an approximation of the information, provided the approximation is clearly identified as such, is reasonable, is based on the best information available to the transferor or his agent, and is not used for the purpose of circumventing or evading Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 407, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Real-estate broker’s liability to purchaser for misrepresentation or nondisclosure of physical defects in property sold. 46 A.L.R.4th 546.

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers §§ 88, 89, 92.

77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser §§ 278 et seq.

CJS.

12 C.J.S., Brokers § 165, 166.

92 C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser §§ 106-110.

§ 89-1-509. Form of seller’s disclosure statement.

The disclosures required by Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 pertaining to the property proposed to be transferred shall be set forth in, and shall be made on a copy of a disclosure form, the structure and composition of which shall be determined by the Mississippi Real Estate Commission.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 407, § 5; Laws, 1997, ch. 456, § 2; Laws, 1999, ch. 588, § 4, eff from and after Jan. 1, 2000.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1999, ch. 588, § 7 effective from and after January 1, 2000, contained a repealer for §§73-35-18,73-35-19 and89-1-509, effective July 1, 2003. The repealer was deleted from Laws 1999, ch. 588, § 7 by the amendments of Laws 2002, ch. 512, § 19.

Amendment Notes —

The 1997 amendment added clarifying language to the table in this section.

The 1999 amendment, effective January 1, 2000, rewrote the section.

Cross References —

Mississippi Real Estate Commission, see §73-35-5.

Information provided avowedly in fulfillment of this section as relieving expert of responsibility with respect to any information other than that set forth, see §89-1-505.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Vendor’s obligation to disclose to purchaser of land presence of contamination from hazardous substances or wastes. 12 A.L.R.5th 630.

Real-estate broker’s liability to purchaser for misrepresentation or nondisclosure of physical defects in property sold. 46 A.L.R.4th 546.

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers §§ 88, 89, 92.

77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser §§ 278 et seq.

CJS.

12 C.J.S., Brokers §§ 165, 166.

92 C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser §§ 106-110.

§ 89-1-511. Disclosures to be made in good faith.

Each disclosure required by Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 and each act which may be performed in making the disclosure, shall be made in good faith. For purposes of Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523, “good faith” means honesty in fact in the conduct of the transaction.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 407, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Real-estate broker’s liability to purchaser for misrepresentation or nondisclosure of physical defects in property sold. 46 A.L.R.4th 546.

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers §§ 88, 89, 92.

77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser §§ 278 et seq.

CJS.

12 C.J.S., Brokers §§ 165, 166.

92 C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser §§ 106-110.

§ 89-1-513. Provisions not exhaustive of items to be disclosed.

The specification of items for disclosure in Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 does not limit or abridge any obligation for disclosure created by any other provision of law or which may exist in order to avoid fraud, misrepresentation or deceit in the transfer transaction.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 407, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Real-estate broker’s liability to purchaser for misrepresentation or nondisclosure of physical defects in property sold. 46 A.L.R.4th 546.

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers §§ 88, 89, 92.

77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser §§ 278 et seq.

CJS.

12 C.J.S., Brokers §§ 165, 166.

92 C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser §§ 106-110.

§ 89-1-515. Amendment of disclosure.

Any disclosure made pursuant to Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 may be amended in writing by the transferor or his agent, but the amendment shall be subject to the provisions of Section 89-1-503.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 407, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Real-estate broker’s liability to purchaser for misrepresentation or nondisclosure of physical defects in property sold. 46 A.L.R.4th 546.

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers §§ 88, 89, 92.

77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser §§ 278 et seq.

CJS.

12 C.J.S., Brokers §§ 165, 166.

92 C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser §§ 106-110.

§ 89-1-517. Delivery of disclosure.

Delivery of disclosure required by Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 shall be by personal delivery to the transferee or by mail to the prospective transferee. For the purposes of Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523, delivery to the spouse of a transferee shall be deemed delivery to the transferee, unless provided otherwise by contract.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 407, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

§ 89-1-519. Agent; extent of agency.

Any person or entity, other than a duly licensed real estate broker or salesperson acting in the capacity of an escrow agent for the transfer of real property subject to Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 shall not be deemed the agent of the transferor or transferee for purposes of the disclosure requirements of Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523, unless the person or entity is empowered to so act by an express written agreement to that effect. The extent of such an agency shall be governed by the written agreement.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 407, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Real-estate broker’s power to bind principal by representations as to character, condition, location, quantity, or title of property. 58 A.L.R.2d 10.

Broker’s liability for damages or losses sustained by vendor of real property to vendee because of broker’s misrepresentations. 61 A.L.R.2d 1237.

Real estate broker’s liability for misrepresentation as to income from or productivity of property. 81 A.L.R.3d 717.

Real-estate broker’s liability to purchaser for misrepresentation or nondisclosure of physical defects in property sold. 46 A.L.R.4th 546.

Broker’s liability for fraud or misrepresentation concerning development or nondevelopment of nearby property. 71 A.L.R.4th 511.

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers §§ 88, 89, 92.

16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 719, Real Estate Broker’s Misrepresentation of Condition or Value of Realty.

CJS.

12 C.J.S., Brokers §§ 165, 166.

§ 89-1-521. Delivery of disclosure where more than one agent; inability of delivering broker to obtain disclosure document; notification to transferee of right to disclosure.

  1. If more than one (1) licensed real estate broker is acting as an agent in a transaction subject to Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523, the broker who has obtained the offer made by the transferee shall, except as otherwise provided in Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523, deliver the disclosure required by Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 to the transferee, unless the transferor has given other written instructions for delivery.
  2. If a licensed real estate broker responsible for delivering the disclosures under this section cannot obtain the disclosure document required and does not have written assurance from the transferee that the disclosure has been received, the broker shall advise the transferee in writing of his rights to the disclosure. A licensed real estate broker responsible for delivering disclosures under this section shall maintain a record of the action taken to effect compliance.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 407, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Failure to deliver.

Finding against three real estate agents in the buyer’s complaint alleging improper conduct was appropriate because the agents were unable to explain why their files had not been maintained as required by the Mississippi Real Estate Commission’s regulations. Further, there was no evidence that the statement was delivered to the buyer as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 89-1-521(l). Palmer v. Miss. Real Estate Comm'n, 14 So.3d 67, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 785 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Real-estate broker’s power to bind principal by representations as to character, condition, location, quantity, or title of property. 58 A.L.R.2d 10.

Real-estate broker’s liability to purchaser for misrepresentation or nondisclosure of physical defects in property sold. 46 A.L.R.4th 546.

Broker’s liability for damages or losses sustained by vendor of real property to vendee because of broker’s misrepresentations. 61 A.L.R.2d 1237.

Broker’s liability for fraud or misrepresentation concerning development or nondevelopment of nearby property. 71 A.L.R.4th 511.

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers §§ 88, 89, 92.

16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 719, Real Estate Broker’s Misrepresentation of Condition or Value of Realty.

CJS.

12 C.J.S., Brokers §§ 165, 166.

§ 89-1-523. Noncompliance with disclosure requirements not to invalidate transfer; liability for actual damages.

No transfer subject to Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 shall be invalidated solely because of the failure of any person to comply with any provision of Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523. However, any person who willfully or negligently violates or fails to perform any duty prescribed by any provision of Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 shall be liable in the amount of actual damages suffered by a transferee.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 407, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

This section does not change the construction of an “as is” clause to mean “as disclosed.” Crase v. Hahn, 754 So. 2d 471, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 465 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Broker’s liability for damages or losses sustained by vendor of real property to vendee because of broker’s misrepresentations. 61 A.L.R.2d 1237.

Liability of vendor of structure for failure to disclose that it was built on filled ground. 80 A.L.R.2d 1453.

Fraud predicated on vendor’s misrepresentation or concealment of danger or possibility of flooding or other unfavorable water conditions. 90 A.L.R.3d 568.

Statutes of limitation: actions by purchasers or contractees against vendors or contractors involving defects in houses or other buildings caused by soil instability. 12 A.L.R.4th 866.

Liability of vendor of existing structure for property damage sustained by purchaser after transfer. 18 A.L.R.4th 1168.

Recovery of punitive damages in action by purchasers of real property charging fraud or misrepresentation. 19 A.L.R.4th 801.

Remedies for fraud or misrepresentation as to heating or cooling cost of realty purchased. 32 A.L.R.4th 828.

Broker’s liability for fraud or misrepresentation concerning development or nondevelopment of nearby property. 71 A.L.R.4th 511.

Real estate broker’s liability for misrepresentation as to income from or productivity of property. 81 A.L.R.3d 717.

Real-estate broker’s liability to purchaser for misrepresentation or nondisclosure of physical defects in property sold. 46 A.L.R.4th 546.

Am. Jur.

77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser §§ 278 et seq.

CJS.

92 C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser §§ 106-110.

§ 89-1-525. Enforcement by Mississippi Real Estate Commission.

The Mississippi Real Estate Commission is authorized to enforce the provisions of Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523. Any violation of the provisions of Sections 89-1-501 through 89-1-523 shall be treated in the same manner as a violation of the Real Estate Broker License Law of 1954, Section 73-35-1 et seq., and shall be subject to same penalties as provided in that chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 1997, ch. 456, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1997.

Cross References —

Real Estate Broker License Law of 1954, see §§73-35-1 et seq.

Creation of Mississippi Real Estate Commission, see §73-35-5.

§ 89-1-527. Failure to disclose nonmaterial fact regarding property as site of death or felony crime, as site of act or occurrence having no effect on physical condition of property, or as being owned or occupied by persons affected or exposed to certain diseases; failure to disclose information provided or maintained on registration of sex offenders.

  1. The fact or suspicion that real property is or was:
    1. The site of a natural death, suicide, homicide or felony crime (except for illegal drug activity that affects the physical condition of the property, its physical environment or the improvements located thereon);
    2. The site of an act or occurrence that had no effect on the physical condition of the property, its physical environment or the improvements located thereon;
    3. Owned or occupied by a person affected or exposed to any disease not known to be transmitted through common occupancy of real estate including, but not limited to, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS);

      does not constitute a material fact that must be disclosed in a real estate transaction. A failure to disclose such nonmaterial facts or suspicions shall not give rise to a criminal, civil or administrative action against the owner of such real property, a licensed real estate broker or any affiliated licensee of the broker.

  2. A failure to disclose in any real estate transaction any information that is provided or maintained, or is required to be provided or maintained, in accordance with Section 45-33-21 through Section 45-33-57, shall not give rise to a cause of action against an owner of real property, a licensed real estate broker or any affiliated licensee of the broker. Likewise, no cause of action shall arise against any licensed real estate broker or affiliated licensee of the broker for revealing information to a seller or buyer of real estate in accordance with Section 45-33-21 through Section 45-33-57. Any factors related to this paragraph, if known to a property owner or licensee shall be disclosed if requested by a consumer.
  3. Failure to disclose any of the facts or suspicions of facts described in subsections (1) and (2) shall not be grounds for the termination or rescission of any transaction in which real property has been or will be transferred or leased. This provision does not preclude an action against an owner of real estate who makes intentional or fraudulent misrepresentations in response to a direct inquiry from a purchaser or prospective purchaser regarding facts or suspicions that are not material to the physical condition of the property including, but not limited to, those factors listed in subsections (1) and (2).

HISTORY: Laws, 2005, ch. 329, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2005.

Cross References —

Exclusion of this section from provisions of §§89-1-501 through89-1-523, see §89-1-501.

Chapter 2. Liability of Recreational Landowners

Article 1. Outdoor Recreational Land.

§ 89-2-1. Declaration of purpose; effect of opening property for outdoor recreational purposes.

The purpose of this article is to encourage persons to make available to the public land and water areas for outdoor recreational purposes. A lessee or owner who opens a land or water area to the public for outdoor recreational purposes shall not, by opening such land or water for such use:

Be presumed to extend any assurance that such land or water area is safe for any purpose;

Incur any duty of care toward a person who goes on the land or water area; or

Become liable or responsible for any injury to persons or property caused by the act or omission of a person who goes on the land or water area.

The foregoing applies, whether the person going on the land or water area is an invitee, licensee, trespasser or otherwise.

HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 488, § 1(1), eff from and after July 1, 1978.

Editor’s Notes —

At the direction of the co-counsel for the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation, the reference to “this chapter” in the first sentence of the section has been corrected to read “this article.”

Cross References —

Effect of landowner’s permission to use land, see §89-5-25.

Exceptions to limitations of landowner’s liability, see §89-2-27.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Modern status of rules conditioning landowner’s liability upon status of injured party as invitee, licensee, or trespasser. 22 A.L.R.4th 294.

Effect of statute limiting landowner’s liability for personal injury to recreational user. 47 A.L.R.4th 262.

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Premises Liability §§ 68 et seq.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Premises Liability, Form 179.2 (answer, defense, plaintiff injured during recreational use of defendant’s property, statutory defense).

§ 89-2-3. Definitions.

The term “outdoor recreational purposes” as used in this article shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing and visiting historical, archaeological, scenic or scientific sites.

HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 488, § 1(3), eff from and after July 1, 1978.

Editor’s Notes —

At the direction of the co-counsel for the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation, the reference to “this chapter” near the beginning of the section has been corrected to read “this article.”

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Effect of statute limiting landowner’s liability for personal injury to recreational user. 47 A.L.R.4th 262.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Premises Liability, Form 179.2 (answer, defense, plaintiff injured during recreational use of defendant’s property, statutory defense).

§ 89-2-5. Certain liability not limited.

This article does not relieve any person of liability which would otherwise exist for deliberate, willful or malicious injury to persons or property. The provisions hereof shall not be deemed to create or increase the liability of any person.

HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 488, § 1(2), eff from and after July 1, 1978.

Editor’s Notes —

At the direction of the co-counsel for the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation, the reference to “This chapter” at the beginning of the section has been corrected to read “This article.”

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Modern status of rules conditioning landowner’s liability upon status of injured party as invitee, licensee, or trespasser. 22 A.L.R.4th 294.

Effect of statute limiting landowner’s liability for personal injury to recreational user. 47 A.L.R.4th 262.

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Premises Liability §§ 68 et seq.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Premises Liability, Form 179.2 (answer, defense, plaintiff injured during recreational use of defendant’s property, statutory defense).

§ 89-2-7. Application of article.

The provisions of this article shall not apply if any fee is charged for entering or using any part of such land or water outdoor recreational area, or if any concession is operated on said area offering to sell or selling any item or product to persons entering thereon for recreational purposes. Said article shall not apply unless public notice of the availability of such lands for such public use shall have been published once annually in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where such lands are situated.

HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 488, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1978.

Editor’s Notes —

At the direction of the co-counsel for the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation, the reference to “this chapter” near the beginning of the first sentence has been corrected to read “this article” and the reference to “Said chapter” at the beginning of the second sentence has been corrected to read “Said article.”

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Protection of §89-2-1 is not available to landowner who made no attempt to comply with statutory notice provision contained in last sentence of §89-2-7. Dumas v. Pike County, 642 F. Supp. 131, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25794 (S.D. Miss. 1986).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Modern status of rules conditioning landowner’s liability upon status of injured party as invitee, licensee, or trespasser. 32 A.L.R.3d 508.

Effect of statute limiting landowner’s liability for personal injury to recreational user. 47 A.L.R.4th 262.

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Premises Liability §§ 68 et seq.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Premises Liability, Form 179.2 (answer, defense, plaintiff injured during recreational use of defendant’s property, statutory defense).

Article 3. Limitation of Liability.

§ 89-2-21. Definitions.

For the purposes of this article, the following words shall have the meanings ascribed herein, unless the context otherwise requires:

“Land” or “premises” means all real property, waters and private ways, and all trees, buildings and structures which are located on such real property, waters and private ways.

“Landowner” means the legal titleholder or owner of land or premises, and includes any lessee, occupant or any other person in control of such land or premises.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 360, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Effect of statute limiting landowner’s liability for personal injury to recreational user. 47 A.L.R.4th 262.

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Premises Liability §§ 30, 31, 68 et seq., 72-76, 226.

CJS.

65 C.J.S., Negligence §§ 67 et seq., 76, 77et seq., 86 et seq.

§ 89-2-23. Landowner’s duty of care with respect to recreational users of land.

Except as provided for in Section 89-2-27, a landowner: (a) shall owe no duty of care to keep land or premises safe for entry or use by others for hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, water sports, hiking or sightseeing; and (b) shall not be required to give any warning to any person entering on land or premises for hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, water sports, hiking or sightseeing as to any hazardous conditions or uses of, or hazardous structures or activities on such land or premises.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 360, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Cross References —

Exceptions to limitations of liability, see §89-2-27.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Common-law strict liability in tort of prior landowner or lessee to subsequent owner for contamination of land with hazardous waste resulting from prior owner’s or lessee’s abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activity. 13 A.L.R.5th 600.

Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question. 11 A.L.R.3d 918.

Comment note.-Premises liability: Proceeding in the dark as contributory negligence. 22 A.L.R.3d 286.

Premises liability: Proceeding in the dark along outside path or walkway as contributory negligence. 22 A.L.R.3d 599.

Premises liability: Proceeding in the dark across exterior premises as contributory negligence. 23 A.L.R.3d 441.

Comment note.-Duty of possessor of land to warn child licensees of danger. 26 A.L.R.3d 317.

Modern status of the rule absolving a possessor of land of liability to those coming thereon for harm caused by dangerous physical conditions of which the injured party knew and realized the risk. 35 A.L.R.3d 230.

Liability of owner or operator of trailer camp or park for injury or death from condition of premises. 41 A.L.R.3d 546.

Liability in connection with injury allegedly caused by defective condition of private road or driveway. 44 A.L.R.3d 355.

Liability of vendor or grantor of real estate for personal injury to purchaser or third person due to defective condition of premises. 48 A.L.R.3d 1027.

Attractive nuisance doctrine as applied to trees, shrubs, and the like. 59 A.L.R.3d 848.

Comment note.-Duty to take affirmative action to avoid injury to trespasser in position of peril through no fault of landowner. 70 A.L.R.3d 1125.

Liability for injuries in connection with ice or snow on nonresidential premises. 95 A.L.R.3d 15.

Modern status of rules as to admissibility of evidence of prior accidents or injuries at same place. 21 A.L.R.4th 472.

Modern status of rules conditioning landowner’s liability upon status of injured party as invitee, licensee, or trespasser. 22 A.L.R.4th 294.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises to police officer coming thereon in discharge of officer’s duty. 30 A.L.R.4th 81.

Effect of statute limiting landowner’s liability for personal injury to recreational user. 47 A.L.R.4th 262.

Violation of governmental regulations as to conditions and facilities of swimming pools as affecting liability in negligence. 79 A.L.R.4th 461.

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Premises Liability §§ 30, 31, 68 et seq., 72-76, 226.

18A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Negligence, Form 149.2 (Complaint, petition, or declaration-By family of decedent-Against owner of building where fatal shooting occurred).

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Premises Liability, Form 115.1 (complaint by social guest injured by dive into shallow lake against lake owner and lakefront property owner).

48 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 275, Premises Liability: Willful or Wanton Conduct causing Injury to Entrant.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1, Swimming Pool Diving Injuries-Failure to Warn of Dangerous Condition.

CJS.

65 C.J.S., Negligence §§ 67 et seq., 76, 77et seq., 86 et seq.

§ 89-2-25. Effect of landowner’s permission to use land.

Any landowner who gives permission to another person to hunt, fish, trap, camp, hike or sightsee upon land or premises shall not, by the sole act of giving such permission, be considered or construed to have:

Extended any assurance that the premises are safe for such purposes;

Caused the person to whom permission has been granted to be constituted the legal status of an invitee to whom a duty of care is owed; or

Assumed responsibility or liability for any injury to such person or his property caused by any act of such person to whom permission has been granted, except as provided in Section 89-2-27.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 360, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Cross References —

Exceptions to limitations of liability, see §89-2-27.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question. 11 A.L.R.3d 918.

Proceeding in the dark as contributory negligence. 22 A.L.R.3d 286.

Proceeding in the dark along outside path or walkway as contributory negligence. 22 A.L.R.3d 599.

Proceeding in the dark across exterior premises as contributory negligence. 23 A.L.R.3d 441.

Duty of possessor of land to warn child licensees of danger. 26 A.L.R.3d 317.

Modern status of the rule absolving a possessor of land of liability to those coming thereon for harm caused by dangerous physical conditions of which the injured party knew and realized the risk. 35 A.L.R.3d 230.

Liability of owner or operator of trailer camp or park for injury or death from condition of premises. 41 A.L.R.3d 546.

Liability in connection with injury allegedly caused by defective condition of private road or driveway. 44 A.L.R.3d 355.

Liability of vendor or grantor of real estate for personal injury to purchaser or third person due to defective condition of premises. 48 A.L.R.3d 1027.

Attractive nuisance doctrine as applied to trees, shrubs, and the like. 59 A.L.R.3d 848.

Duty to take affirmative action to avoid injury to trespasser in position of peril through no fault of landowner. 70 A.L.R.3d 1125.

Liability for injuries in connection with ice or snow on nonresidential premises. 95 A.L.R.3d 15.

Modern status of rules as to admissibility of evidence of prior accidents or injuries at same place. 21 A.L.R.4th 472.

Modern status of rules conditioning landowner’s liability upon status of injured party as invitee, licensee, or trespasser. 22 A.L.R.4th 294.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises to police officer coming thereon in discharge of officer’s duty. 30 A.L.R.4th 81.

Effect of statute limiting landowner’s liability for personal injury to recreational user. 47 A.L.R.4th 262.

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Premises Liability §§ 30, 31, 68 et seq., 72-76, 226.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Premises Liability, Form 115.1 (complaint by social guest injured by dive into shallow lake against lake owner and lakefront property owner).

CJS.

65 C.J.S., Negligence §§ 67 et seq., 76, 77et seq., 86 et seq.

§ 89-2-27. Exceptions to limitation of liability.

This article shall not limit any liability which otherwise exists for:

Willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a hazardous condition, use, structure or activity;

Injuries suffered in any case where permission to hunt, fish, trap, camp, hike, sightsee or engage in any other lawful activity was granted for a consideration other than the consideration, if any, paid to the landowner by the State of Mississippi, the federal government, or any other governmental agency; or

Injuries to third persons or to persons to whom the landowner owed a duty to keep the land or premises safe or to warn of danger, which injuries were caused by acts of persons to whom permission to hunt, fish, camp, hike, sightsee or engage in any other lawful activity was granted.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 360, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Cross References —

Limitation of a landowner’s liability to recreational users of land, to which limitation this section provides exceptions, see §§89-2-23 and89-2-25.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Common-law strict liability in tort of prior landowner or lessee to subsequent owner for contamination of land with hazardous waste resulting from prior owner’s or lessee’s abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activity. 13 A.L.R.5th 600.

Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question. 11 A.L.R.3d 918.

Proceeding in the dark as contributory negligence. 22 A.L.R.3d 286.

Proceeding in the dark along outside path or walkway as contributory negligence. 22 A.L.R.3d 599.

Proceeding in the dark across exterior premises as contributory negligence. 23 A.L.R.3d 441.

Duty of possessor of land to warn child licensees of danger. 26 A.L.R.3d 317.

Modern status of the rule absolving a possessor of land of liability to those coming thereon for harm caused by dangerous physical conditions of which the injured party knew and realized the risk. 35 A.L.R.3d 230.

Liability of owner or operator of trailer camp or park for injury or death from condition of premises. 41 A.L.R.3d 546.

Liability in connection with injury allegedly caused by defective condition of private road or driveway. 44 A.L.R.3d 355.

Liability of vendor or grantor of real estate for personal injury to purchaser or third person due to defective condition of premises. 48 A.L.R.3d 1027.

Attractive nuisance doctrine as applied to trees, shrubs, and the like. 59 A.L.R.3d 848.

Duty to take affirmative action to avoid injury to trespasser in position of peril through no fault of landowner. 70 A.L.R.3d 1125.

Liability for injuries in connection with ice or snow on nonresidential premises. 95 A.L.R.3d 15.

Modern status of rules as to admissibility of evidence of prior accidents or injuries at same place. 21 A.L.R.4th 472.

Modern status of rules conditioning landowner’s liability upon status of injured party as invitee, licensee, or trespasser. 22 A.L.R.4th 294.

Liability of owner or occupant of premises to police officer coming thereon in discharge of officer’s duty. 30 A.L.R.4th 81.

Effect of statute limiting landowner’s liability for personal injury to recreational user. 47 A.L.R.4th 262.

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Premises Liability §§ 30, 31, 68 et seq., 72-76, 226.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1, Swimming Pool Diving Injuries-Failure to Warn of Dangerous Condition.

CJS.

65 C.J.S., Negligence §§ 67 et seq., 76, 77et seq., 86 et seq.

Chapter 3. Acknowledgments

§ 89-3-1. Acknowledgment or proof necessary to recording.

  1. Except in cases governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, the provisions of Sections 89-5-101 through 89-5-113, or otherwise specially provided for by law, the execution of a written instrument of or concerning the sale of lands, whether the same be made for passing an estate of freehold or inheritance, or for a term of years, or for any other purpose, or any writing conveying personal estate, shall be acknowledged or proved, and the acknowledgment or proof duly certified by an officer competent to take the same in the manner directed by this chapter.
  2. Unless an instrument is acknowledged or proved as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the clerk’s office may refuse to admit the instrument to record. However, if an instrument is not so acknowledged or proved but is otherwise admitted to record, then all persons shall be on constructive notice of the contents of the instrument.
  3. The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall apply to all instruments of record on or after July 1, 2011. However, if the relative priorities of conflicting claims to real property were established before July 1, 2011, then the law applicable to those claims at the time those claims were established shall determine their priority.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (7); 1857, ch. 36, art. 25; 1871, § 2308; 1880, § 1215; 1892, § 2460; 1906, § 2793; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2294; 1930, § 2135; 1942, § 856; Laws, 1966, ch. 316, § 10-105; Laws, 2011, ch. 364, § 8; Laws, 2011, ch. 538, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 8 of ch. 364, Laws of 2011, effective from and after July 1, 2011 (approved March 11, 2011), amended this section. Section 2 of ch. 538, Laws of 2011, effective July 1, 2011 (approved April 26, 2011), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 2 of ch. 538, Laws of 2011, which contains language that specifically provides that it supersedes §89-3-1 as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 364.

Amendment Notes —

The first 2011 amendment (ch. 364), inserted “the provisions of Sections 89-5-101 through 89-5-113” following “Except in cases governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.”

The second 2011 amendment (ch. 538), rewrote (1); and added (2) and (3).

Cross References —

Duty of chancery clerk to record instruments, see §9-5-137.

Priority of security interests and fixtures, see §75-9-313.

Place of filing in order to perfect security interest under Uniform Commercial Code, see §75-9-501.

Recording of instruments generally, see §89-5-1.

Recording of patents, whether acknowledged or not, see §89-5-11.

Validity of deeds recorded for a 20 year period, see §89-5-13.

Recording of wills, see §§91-7-31,91-7-33.

Criminal offense of false certificate of acknowledgment or proof of deeds and other recordable instruments, see §97-21-7.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Record of defectively acknowledged deed.

1. In general.

Chancery court properly granted a decedent’s former wife summary judgment in an executrix’s action seeking to void deeds because the property-settlement agreement between the decedent and wife contemplated that the property would pass by survivorship; the conveyances of the wife’s undivided one-half interest were void, and thus, the original joint tenancy with rights of survivorship was still intact at the decedent’s death, and the wife was entitled to the entire property. O'Brien v. Westedt, 243 So.3d 792, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 165 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).

Recordation statute (§89-3-1) applies to any instrument affecting title to real property, including substitution of trustee. White v. Delta Foundation, Inc., 481 So. 2d 329, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2339 (Miss. 1985).

A deed with a defective acknowledgment was not eligible for recordation, and was not effective as to third parties, under §89-3-1, but it was wholly effective between the parties to it. Cotton v. McConnell, 435 So. 2d 683, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2737 (Miss. 1983).

Certificate of acknowledgment of a deed is presumed to state the truth. Arnold v. Byrd, 222 So. 2d 410, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1535 (Miss. 1969).

Delivery necessary to pass title. Lynch v. Lynch, 121 Miss. 752, 83 So. 807, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 119 (Miss. 1920).

Presumption of delivery from record disappears upon showing of no delivery. Lynch v. Lynch, 121 Miss. 752, 83 So. 807, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 119 (Miss. 1920).

Assignment of debt, though in form of deed of trust may be noted on deed of trust record. West v. Union Naval Stores Co., 116 Miss. 743, 77 So. 609, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 347 (Miss. 1917).

Clerk not incompetent to take acknowledgment of bank’s general assignment for creditors because indebted to bank. Dodwell v. Rieves, 114 Miss. 4, 74 So. 770, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1917).

A conveyance of personalty absolute on its face, and free from any trust, condition, or reservation, need not be recorded. Thomas v. Grand Gulf Bank, 17 Miss. 201, 1848 Miss. LEXIS 3 (Miss. 1848).

2. Record of defectively acknowledged deed.

Where a deed was first conveyed to a grandson by the decedent, then conveyed back to the estate, then conveyed to the grandson again by the executrix, but the executrix later sought to set aside the deed when the grandson died, notwithstanding the failure to have strictly followed form, the acknowledgment contained all the necessary information and, therefore, was not fatal to the deed’s validity; furthermore, it was clear from the deed that the executrix was acting on behalf of the decedent, the grantor, and, thus, there was no ambiguity Estate of Dykes v. Estate of Williams, 864 So. 2d 926, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 759 (Miss. 2003).

In action arising from defendants’ alleged negligence and misconduct in conducting substituted trustee’s foreclosure sale, acknowledgment verifying that person who executed appointment of substituted trustee had, in fact, appeared before notary public and signed document was not fatally defective under §89-3-1 due to notary’s failure to fill in blank space provided for name of person who appeared before him and executed instrument, as such person’s identity was readily ascertainable from appointment form itself. Morton v. Resolution Trust Corp., 918 F. Supp. 985, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20453 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

Where a warranty deed appeared to have been acknowledged and signed by the mark of a named grantor and the acknowledgment was notarized, but the notary public described the person who signed the deed as a person of altogether different description from that of the named grantor, the deed was properly canceled as a forgery. Arnold v. Byrd, 222 So. 2d 410, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1535 (Miss. 1969).

A deed which is defectively acknowledged by reason of the fact that word “delivered” was omitted from acknowledgment is good as between the parties. Kelly v. Wilson, 204 Miss. 56, 36 So. 2d 817, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 342 (Miss. 1948).

United States commissioner was not “judge of United States court” within statute authorizing judges of United States courts to acknowledge instruments to be recorded, and hence deed acknowledged by such commissioner was not entitled to be admitted to record in clerk’s office. Smith v. McIntosh, 176 Miss. 725, 170 So. 303, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 1936).

State, and not federal, statutes determine what officers are competent to take and certify acknowledgments which will entitle instruments to be admitted to record. Smith v. McIntosh, 176 Miss. 725, 170 So. 303, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 1936).

Deed admitted to record without proper acknowledgment did not constitute constructive notice to subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration. Smith v. McIntosh, 176 Miss. 725, 170 So. 303, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 1936).

Deed not notice to subsequent purchaser where acknowledgment defective so as not to entitle it to be recorded. Tinnin v. Brown, 98 Miss. 378, 53 So. 780, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1910).

Deed not recordable if acknowledgment fail to show its delivery, and if recorded will not impart constructive notice of its existence. Ligon v. Barton, 88 Miss. 135, 40 So. 555, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1906).

An acknowledgment to a trust deed taken before an officer who is himself trustee therein, with power to sell to pay debts, is void and does not entitle the deed to be recorded. Holden v. Brimage, 72 Miss. 228, 18 So. 383, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 142 (Miss. 1894).

Notwithstanding this section [Code 1942, § 856], if one takes a trust deed on land after having read on the record a prior trust deed on the property, though not properly acknowledged, he is not an innocent purchaser. Woods v. Garnett, 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 89 (Miss. 1894).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Instruments concerning real property should be properly executed and acknowledged before being recorded. Robinson, Jan. 18, 2005, A.G. Op. 04-0612.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Record of instrument without sufficient acknowledgment as notice. 59 A.L.R.2d 1299.

Am. Jur.

66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws § 68.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Acknowledgments, Forms 1 et seq.

§ 89-3-3. Acknowledgment and proof.

Every conveyance, contract or agreement proper to be recorded, may be acknowledged or proved before any judge of a United States court, any judge of the supreme court, any judge of the circuit court, or any chancellor, or any judge of the county court, or before any clerk of a court of record or notary public, who shall certify such acknowledgment or proof under the seal of his office, or before any justice of the peace, or police justice, or mayor of any city, town, or village, or clerk of a municipality, or member of the board of supervisors, whether the property conveyed be within his county or not.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, arts. 1 (1), 5 (3), 6 (1); 1857, ch. 36, art. 28; 1871, § 2310; 1880, § 1217; 1892, § 2464; 1906, § 2798; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2299; 1930, § 2136; 1942, § 857; Laws, 1988, ch. 347, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const., Art. 6, § 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to justice of the peace shall mean justice court judge.

Cross References —

Persons before whom oaths may be taken, see §11-1-1.

Powers of notaries public and ex officio notaries public to receive proof or acknowledgment of instruments, see §§25-33-11,25-33-17.

Acknowledgment of execution of corporate deed, see §89-1-21.

Certificate of acknowledgment and proof, see §89-5-1.

Necessity for acknowledgment or proof for validity of conveyances or mortgages, see §89-5-3.

Criminal offense of falsely personating another and thereby acknowledging deed, see §97-19-33.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

United States commissioner was not “judge of United States court” within statute authorizing judges of United States courts to acknowledge instruments to be recorded, and hence deed acknowledged by such commissioner was not entitled to be admitted to record in clerk’s office. Smith v. McIntosh, 176 Miss. 725, 170 So. 303, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 1936).

State, and not federal, statutes determine what officers are competent to take and certify acknowledgments which will entitle instruments to be admitted to record. Smith v. McIntosh, 176 Miss. 725, 170 So. 303, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 1936).

Deed admitted to record without proper acknowledgment did not constitute constructive notice to subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration. Smith v. McIntosh, 176 Miss. 725, 170 So. 303, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 1936).

Justice of the peace liable on official bond for false certificate of acknowledgment. Hodges v. Mills, 139 Miss. 347, 104 So. 165, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 155 (Miss. 1925).

An acknowledgment taken to a deed of trust by an officer who is the beneficiary therein is void. Wasson v. Connor, 54 Miss. 351, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1877).

The deputy of a clerk, where the statute authorizes him to perform all the duties enjoined upon his principal, may take an acknowledgment. McRaven v. McGuire, 17 Miss. 34, 1847 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1847).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of certificate of acknowledgment. 25 A.L.R.2d 1124.

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Acknowledgments §§ 8 et seq.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Acknowledgments, Forms 1 et seq.

CJS.

1A C.J.S., Acknowledgments §§ 24 et seq.

§ 89-3-5. Acknowledgments before commissioned officers of United States armed forces.

In all cases where a conveyance, contract, agreement or other instrument of writing has heretofore been acknowledged or proved before any commissioned officer in the services of the United States armed forces, such acknowledgment or affidavit is hereby declared to be good, valid and binding to the same extent and with like effect as though such conveyance, contract, agreement, or other instrument of writing had been acknowledged or proved before any officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments in the State of Mississippi.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 857-01; Laws, 1946, ch. 285, § 1.

Cross References —

Notarial acts of commissioned officers of the United States armed forces, see §25-33-23.

§ 89-3-7. Forms of acknowledgment.

The following forms of acknowledgment may be used in the case of conveyances or other written instruments affecting real estate or personal property; and any acknowledgment so taken and certified shall be sufficient to satisfy all requirements of law:

(a) In the case of natural persons acting in their own right: “STATE OF COUNTY OF Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority in and for the said county and state, on this day of , 20 , within my jurisdiction, the within named , who acknowledged that (he) (she) (they) executed the above and foregoing instrument. (NOTARY PUBLIC) My commission expires: ” (Affix official seal, if applicable) (b) In the case of corporations: “STATE OF COUNTY OF Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority in and for the said county and state, on this day of , 20 , within my jurisdiction, the within named , who acknowledged that (he) (she) is of , a corporation, and that for and on behalf of the said corporation, and as its act and deed (he) (she) executed the above and foregoing instrument, after first having been duly authorized by said corporation so to do. (NOTARY PUBLIC) My commission expires: ” (Affix official seal, if applicable) (c) In the case of a corporate general partner of a limited partnership: “STATE OF COUNTY OF Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority in and for the said county and state, on this day of, 20, within my jurisdiction, the within named, who acknowledged to me that (he) (she) is of, a corporation and general partner of, a limited partnership, and that for and on behalf of said corporation as general partner of said limited partnership, and as the act and deed of said corporation as general partner of said limited partnership, and as the act and deed of said limited partnership, (he) (she) executed the above and foregoing instrument, after first having been duly authorized by said corporation and said limited partnership so to do. (NOTARY PUBLIC) My commission expires: ” (Affix official seal, if applicable) (d) In the case of a corporate member of a member-managed limited liability company: “STATE OF COUNTY OF Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority in and for the said county and state, on this day of , 20, within my jurisdiction, the within named , who acknowledged to me that (he) (she) is of , a corporation and member of , a member-managed limited liability company, and that for and on behalf of said corporation as member of said limited liability company, and as the act and deed of said corporation as member of said limited liability company, and as the act and deed of said limited liability company, (he) (she) executed the above and foregoing instrument, after first having been duly authorized by said corporation and said limited liability company so to do. (NOTARY PUBLIC) My commission expires: ” (Affix official seal, if applicable) (e) In the case of a corporate manager of a manager-managed limited liability company: “STATE OF COUNTY OF Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority in and for the said county and state, on this day of, 20, within my jurisdiction, the within named, who acknowledged to me that (he) (she) is of, a corporation and manager of, a manager-managed limited liability company, and that for and on behalf of said corporation as manager of said limited liability company, and as the act and deed of said corporation as manager of said limited liability company, and as the act and deed of said limited liability company, (he) (she) executed the above and foregoing instrument, after first having been duly authorized by said corporation and said limited liability company so to do. (NOTARY PUBLIC) My commission expires: ” (Affix official seal, if applicable) (f) In the case of persons acting in representative capacities: “STATE OF COUNTY OF Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority in and for the said county and state, on this day of , 20, within my jurisdiction, the within named , who acknowledged that (he) (she) is of and that in said representative capacity (he) (she) executed the above and foregoing instrument, after first having been duly authorized so to do. (NOTARY PUBLIC) My commission expires: ” (Affix official seal, if applicable) (g) In the case of proof of execution of the instrument made by a subscribing witness: “STATE OF COUNTY OF Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority in and for the said county and state, on this day of , 20, within my jurisdiction, CD, one of the subscribing witnesses to the above and foregoing instrument, who, being first duly sworn, states that (he) (she) saw the within (or above) named AB, whose name is subscribed thereto, sign and deliver the same to EF (or that (he) (she) heard AB acknowledge that (he) (she) signed and delivered the same to EF); and that the affiant subscribed (his) (her) name as witness thereto in the presence of AB. (CD) (NOTARY PUBLIC) My commission expires: ” (Affix official seal, if applicable) (h) In the case of any business organization, foreign or domestic: “STATE OF COUNTY OF Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority in and for the said county and state, on this day of , 20 , within my jurisdiction, the within named , who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed in the above and foregoing instrument and acknowledged that he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their representative capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument, and as the act and deed of the person(s) or entity(ies) upon behalf of which he/she/they acted, executed the above and foregoing instrument, after first having been duly authorized so to do. (NOTARY PUBLIC) My commission expires: ” (Affix official seal, if applicable)

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HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2465; 1906, § 2799; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2300; 1930, § 2137; 1942, § 858; Laws, 1988, ch. 475, § 1; Laws, 1992, ch. 354 § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 446, § 1; Laws, 2011, ch. 538, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 2, ch. 475, Laws of 1988, effective from and after July 1, 1988, provides as follows:

“SECTION 2. Acknowledgments in the forms permitted under prior law shall continue to be sufficient to satisfy all requirements of law.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2000 amendment substituted “20 _______________ ” for “19 _______________ ” throughout; added present (c) through (e) and redesignated former (c) and (d) as present (f) and (g).

The 2011 amendment added (h).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Conveyance of corporate or partnership property.

3. Impeachment of acknowledgment.

4. Defective acknowledgment.

5. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

Where a deed was first conveyed to a grandson by the decedent, then conveyed back to the estate, then conveyed to the grandson again by the executrix, but the executrix later sought to set aside the deed when the grandson died, notwithstanding the failure to have strictly followed form, the acknowledgment contained all the necessary information and, therefore, was not fatal to the deed’s validity; furthermore, it was clear from the deed that the executrix was acting on behalf of the decedent, the grantor, and, thus, there was no ambiguity Estate of Dykes v. Estate of Williams, 864 So. 2d 926, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 759 (Miss. 2003).

There was no ambiguity or disabling defect in an acknowledgment which recited that the grantors “acknowledged that they signed and delivered to the foregoing deed,” so as to divest its recordation of its efficacy as constructive notice. Davis v. Gulf Refining Co., 202 Miss. 808, 32 So. 2d 133, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 344 (Miss. 1947).

Attestation by a single witness is sufficient, and a substantial compliance with the statutory form is all that is required. White v. Union Producing Co., 140 F.2d 176, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3896 (5th Cir. 1944).

Where proof of the execution of a colessor’s agreement was made in the manner required by law before an officer competent to take the same, and was duly certified to by him, the certificate, showing full compliance with the statute, is conclusive of the facts, except in cases of fraud; and if there was no fraud in procuring the execution of the instrument, there is none in making proof of its execution and having it filed for record. White v. Union Producing Co., 140 F.2d 176, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3896 (5th Cir. 1944).

The officer who has properly exercised the judicial function of taking an acknowledgment, may perform the clerical act of making the certificate at any time while he remains in office, if rights of third persons do not intervene. Harmon v. Magee, 57 Miss. 410, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 1879).

The certificate of acknowledgment cannot be enlarged by averment. Willis v. Gattman, 53 Miss. 721, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 141 (Miss. 1876).

A certificate showing a full compliance with the statute, except in cases of fraud, is conclusive of the facts. Johnston v. Wallace, 53 Miss. 331, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 72 (Miss. 1876).

The term “executed,” when used in the acknowledgment of an instrument, imports “signing, sealing, and delivery.” Smith v. Williams, 38 Miss. 48, 1859 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1859); Perkins, Livingston & Post v. Swank, 43 Miss. 349, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 46 (Miss. 1870).

The description of an officer need not be fully stated-abbreviations may be used; And it seems that evidence aliunde may be heard to show the official character of the officer. Russ v. Wingate, 30 Miss. 440, 1855 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1855).

Substantial compliance with the form, even in cases of witnesses, is sufficient. Morse v. Clayton, 21 Miss. 373, 1850 Miss. LEXIS 31 (Miss. 1850).

A deed attested by a single witness is rightfully admitted to record on proof made by him. Wilkins v. Wells, 17 Miss. 325, 1848 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1848); Morris v. Rucks, 62 Miss. 76, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1884).

2. Conveyance of corporate or partnership property.

Official acknowledgment for public record of corporate document should in some manner make it clear that it is corporation executing instrument by and through authorized officer, officers, or agent. White v. Delta Foundation, Inc., 481 So. 2d 329, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2339 (Miss. 1985).

The fact that defendant’s agent in procuring colessor’s agreement was employed at a fixed salary did not disqualify him to act as a nonofficial subscribing witness or to make proof of the execution of such agreement, where he had no pecuniary interest in the matter. White v. Union Producing Co., 140 F.2d 176, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3896 (5th Cir. 1944).

Deed signed and acknowledged by corporation’s president and attested by secretary under seal held sufficient. Griffis v. Martin Oil Co., 127 Miss. 606, 90 So. 324, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 263 (Miss. 1921).

One partner cannot acknowledge deed to partnership property unless his authority affirmatively appears. Tinnin v. Brown, 98 Miss. 378, 53 So. 780, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1910).

3. Impeachment of acknowledgment.

A certificate of acknowledgment may be shown to be a fraud and a forgery. T. H. & J. M. Allen & Co. v. Lenoir, 53 Miss. 321, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1876).

The officer who makes the certificate is incompetent as a witness to impeach it. Stone v. Montgomery, 35 Miss. 83, 1858 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1858).

4. Defective acknowledgment.

Instrument will not necessarily be deemed fatally deficient on basis of omission from acknowledgment where omission can be remedied by reference to body of instrument itself. White v. Delta Foundation, Inc., 481 So. 2d 329, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2339 (Miss. 1985).

A deed which is defectively acknowledged by reason of the fact that word “delivered” was omitted from acknowledgment is good as between the parties. Kelly v. Wilson, 204 Miss. 56, 36 So. 2d 817, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 342 (Miss. 1948).

Acknowledgment of power of attorney which failed to show acknowledgment of delivery of power, held void. Lucas v. New Hebron Bank, Inc., 181 Miss. 762, 180 So. 611, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1938).

Trust created by deed not acknowledged according to law was void; trustees thereunder not entitled to maintain suit to remove cloud on theory that upon failure of trust conveyance to them was absolute. Board of Trustees v. Odom, 100 Miss. 64, 56 So. 314, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 1911).

Deed not constructive notice to subsequent purchasers where acknowledgment fatally defective. Tinnin v. Brown, 98 Miss. 378, 53 So. 780, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1910).

Record of deed not notice when acknowledgment omits word “delivered.” Ligon v. Barton, 88 Miss. 135, 40 So. 555, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1906).

Acknowledgment which does not state that grantor executed or delivered deed is fatally bad; such deed not entitled to record and not constructive notice. Elmslie v. Thurman, 87 Miss. 537, 40 So. 67, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 179 (Miss. 1905).

Lease not entitled to record because of improper acknowledgment, not ineffective against subsequent grantees with actual notice. Ladnier v. Stewart, 38 So. 748 (Miss. 1905).

The omission of the words “on the day and year therein mentioned,” was not, under former statute, a material defect in an acknowledgment. Caruthers v. McLaran, 56 Miss. 371, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1879).

An acknowledgment that one simply “signed” a deed is not sufficient. Robinson v. Noel, 49 Miss. 253, 1873 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1873).

5. Miscellaneous.

Intention to deliver deed does not dispense with manual delivery. Lynch v. Lynch, 121 Miss. 752, 83 So. 807, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 119 (Miss. 1920).

Parol evidence admissible to show grantee of land had notice of prior lease. Ladnier v. Stewart, 38 So. 748 (Miss. 1905).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Written matter as controlling printed matter in construction of deed. 37 A.L.R.2d 820.

Am. Jur.

1A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Acknowledgments § 7:348 (subscribing witnesses).

7 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Deeds §§ 87:261 et seq. (formalities of execution).

Law Reviews.

Marcase, The absence of a signature requirement in Mississippi notary law: fraud waiting to happen. 13 Miss. C. L. Rev. 371 (Spring, 1993).

§ 89-3-9. Acknowledgment or proof in another state.

If the party who shall execute any conveyance of lands or personal property situated in this state, or if the witnesses thereto reside or be in some other state, territory in the Union, the District of Columbia, or in any possession of the United States, or land over which the United States has sovereign power, then the acknowledgment or proof may be made before and certified by the chief justice of the United States, or an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, or a circuit or district judge of the United States, or any other United States judge, or any judge or justice of the supreme or superior court of any such state, territory, District of Columbia, or possession of the United States, or land over which the United States has sovereign power, or any justice of the peace of such state, territory, District of Columbia, possession, or land over which the United States has sovereign power, whose official character shall be certified under the seal of some court of record in his country, parish or other named official jurisdiction, or before any commissioner residing in such state, territory, District of Columbia, possession, or land over which the United States has sovereign power, who may be appointed by the governor of this state to take acknowledgments and proof of conveyances, or any notary public or a clerk of a court of record having a seal of office in said state, territory, District of Columbia, possession, or land over which the United States has sovereign power, and shall be as good and effectual as if the certificate of acknowledgment or proof had been made by a competent officer in this state.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, arts. 1 (13), 6 (1); 1857, ch. 36, art. 29; 1871, § 2312; 1880, § 1219; 1892, § 2466; 1906, § 2800; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2301; 1930, § 2138; 1942, § 859; Laws, 1948, ch. 227, § 1.

Cross References —

Appointment of commissioners for other states by governor, see §7-1-17.

Persons before whom oaths may be taken, see §11-1-1.

Ex officio notaries public, see §25-33-17.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of certificate of acknowledgment. 25 A.L.R.2d 1124.

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Acknowledgments §§ 40-42.

CJS.

1A C.J.S., Acknowledgments §§ 31, 38.

§ 89-3-11. Acknowledgment or proof in another state; construction and application as to prior acknowledgments.

In the construction of this section and Section 89-3-9, the adoption of such sections shall not be construed as meaning that the word “territory” as used in Section 89-3-9 did not include prior to the adoption of these sections the possessions of the United States, or land over which the United States has sovereign power. And any acknowledgment heretofore taken in any possession of the United States, or any land over which the United States has sovereign power, by any of the officials thereof named above in Section 89-3-9 shall be as good and effectual as if made after the adoption of these sections.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 859.5; Laws, 1948, ch. 227, § 2.

§ 89-3-13. Acknowledgment or proof in foreign country.

If the party who shall execute any conveyance of lands or personal property situated in this state, or if the witnesses thereto, reside or be in a foreign country, the acknowledgment or proof of the execution of such conveyance may be made before any court of record, or the mayor or chief magistrate of any city, borough, or corporation of such foreign country in which the party or witness resides or may be; or before any commissioner residing in such country who may be appointed by the Governor, or before any ambassador, foreign minister, secretary of legation, or consul of the United States to the foreign country in which the party or witness may reside or be; or before any notary public commissioned by the government of the foreign country or any other person authorized by said government to take oaths or acknowledgments; but the certificate shall show that the party, or the party and witness, were identified before the officer, and that the party acknowledged the execution of the instrument, or that the execution was duly proved by the witness, and it shall be as good and effectual as if made and certified by a competent officer of this state.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (14); 1857, ch. 36, art. 30; 1871, § 2313; 1880, § 1220; 1892, § 2467; 1906, § 2801; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2302; 1930, § 2139; 1942, § 860; Laws, 1988, ch. 399, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

Cross References —

Appointment of commissioners by governor, see §7-1-17.

Ex officio notaries public, see §25-33-17.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of certificate of acknowledgment. 25 A.L.R.2d 1124.

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Acknowledgments § 22.

CJS.

1A C.J.S., Acknowledgments §§ 32, 38.

§ 89-3-15. Grantor and witness dead or absent, how proved.

If the grantor and witness or witnesses of any instrument of writing be dead or absent, so that the personal attendance of neither can be had, it may be established by the oath of any person who, on examination before an officer competent to take acknowledgments, can prove the handwriting of the deceased or absent witness or witnesses; or when such proof cannot be had, then the handwriting of the grantor may be proved, and the officer before whom such proof is made shall certify accordingly, and such certificate shall be deemed equivalent to an acknowledgment by the grantor or proof by a subscribing witness, and entitle the instrument to be recorded.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (16); 1857, ch. 36, art. 31; 1871, § 2314; 1880, § 1221; 1892, § 2468; 1906, § 2802; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2303; 1930, § 2140; 1942, § 861.

Cross References —

When proof of signature is unnecessary, see §13-1-139.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A single witness to a deed is sufficient. Wilkins v. Wells, 17 Miss. 325, 1848 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1848); Morris v. Rucks, 62 Miss. 76, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1884).

Chapter 5. Recording of Instruments

Article 1. General Provisions.

§ 89-5-1. Recording instruments; conveyances, acknowledgment, priority.

Except as provided by Sections 89-5-101 through 89-5-113, a conveyance of land shall not be good against a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, or any creditor, unless it be lodged with the clerk of the chancery court of the county in which the lands are situated to be recorded; but after filing with the clerk, the priority of time of filing shall determine the priority of all conveyances of the same land as between the several holders of such conveyances.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (1); 1857, ch. 36, art. 19; 1871, § 2304; 1880, § 1209; 1892, § 2454; 1906, § 2784; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2288; 1930, § 2146; 1942, § 867; Laws, 1924, ch. 239; Laws, 2011, ch. 364, § 9; Laws, 2011, ch. 538, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 9 of ch. 364, Laws of 2011, effective from and after July 1, 2011 (approved March 11, 2011), amended this section. Section 3 of ch. 538, Laws of 2011, effective July 1, 2011 (approved April 26, 2011), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 3 of ch. 538, Laws of 2011, which contains language that specifically provides that it supersedes §89-5-1 as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 364.

Amendment Notes —

The first 2011 amendment (ch. 364) added “Except as provided by Sections 89-5-101 through 89-5-113” at the beginning of the paragraph.

The second 2011 amendment (ch. 538) rewrote the section.

Cross References —

Filing and recording of secured transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code, see §§75-9-401 et seq.

Payment of insurance to mortgagees in order of priority, see §83-13-7.

Recording of federal tax liens and other federal lien notices, see §85-8-1 et seq.

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, see §§97-43-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Applicability to wills.

3. Actual possession as notice.

4. Deeds of trust.

5. Lis pendens.

6. Intervening judgments.

7. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

Title need not be recorded to bind bona fide purchaser from original owner; purchaser from record owner must ascertain existence of adverse possession hostile thereto. Lowi v. David, 134 Miss. 296, 98 So. 684, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1924).

Deed takes effect as to subsequent purchasers and creditors without notice only from time delivered to be recorded; whether subsequent deed or lien be filed or recorded or not is immaterial. Craig v. Osborn, 134 Miss. 323, 98 So. 598, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1923).

Purchasers for value without notice from grantor’s heirs entitled to same protection as if purchasing directly from grantor. Reddoch v. Williams, 129 Miss. 706, 92 So. 831, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1922).

Constructive notice begins moment deed is lodged with proper officer for record, and failure of clerk to mark filed when received is immaterial. Sowell v. Rankin, 120 Miss. 458, 82 So. 317, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1919).

Deed not constructive notice to subsequent purchasers where acknowledgment so defective as not to entitle it to record. Tinnin v. Brown, 98 Miss. 378, 53 So. 780, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1910).

The mere acknowledgment that a party signed a deed, which was not in fact signed by her, is invalid as a transfer. Jones v. Gurlie, 61 Miss. 423, 1883 Miss. LEXIS 153 (Miss. 1883).

2. Applicability to wills.

Statute making “conveyances” void as to purchasers for value without notice of lands in any county wherein conveyance is not recorded held inapplicable to “wills.” Federal Land Bank v. Newsom, 175 Miss. 114, 161 So. 864, 166 So. 345, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 27 (Miss. 1935).

Probate and record of domestic will in county where testator resided constituted notice throughout state to subsequent mortgagee of land, without necessity of recording will in county where land situated. Federal Land Bank v. Newsom, 175 Miss. 114, 161 So. 864, 166 So. 345, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 27 (Miss. 1935).

3. Actual possession as notice.

An owner in possession by himself or by his tenants is not affected by this statute, his actual possession being all of the notice necessary to any prospective purchaser. Gulf Refining Co. v. Travis, 201 Miss. 336, 29 So. 2d 100, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 399 (Miss. 1947).

Purchaser charged with notice of rights of tenant in possession. Frye v. Rose, 120 Miss. 778, 83 So. 179, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 131 (Miss. 1919).

4. Deeds of trust.

Defectively acknowledged deed of trust was ineligible for recordation under §89-5-1, however, fact that it was recorded constituted actual notice to subsequent purchasers of the interest claimed under defective deed of trust such that federal tax lien which attached subsequent to erroneous recordation of defective deed of trust was subordinate thereto. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 946, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7664 (S.D. Miss. 1989), rev'd, 901 F.2d 1297, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8550 (5th Cir. Miss. 1990).

A recorded deed of trust, containing an erroneous description of the land conveyed by the grantor, which recited that the land in question contained 60 acres more or less, whereas the grantor only owned 40 acres, was not sufficient to put the grantor’s judgment creditors on notice that an entirely different tract of land was intended to be included, and did not give notice of a description which a diligent search of the records might have disclosed as to other lands belonging to the grantor, so that while the grantee was entitled to a reformation of a trust deed as against the grantor, he was not so entitled as against the judgment creditors, who had executed on the land actually owned by the grantor. Mississippi Industries for Blind v. Jackson, 231 Miss. 135, 95 So. 2d 109, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1957).

5. Lis pendens.

The filing of a notice of lis pendens in an action before the recordation of a prior deed is effective to make a judgment recovered against the grantor after such recordation a lien on the property conveyed. Jones v. Jones, 249 Miss. 322, 161 So. 2d 640, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 393 (Miss. 1964).

6. Intervening judgments.

A judgment enrolled on January 3, 1961, within 20 days after its rendition, did not relate back to the date of its rendition, December 13, 1960, to give the judgment creditor a specific lien on property which the judgment debtor had conveyed to third parties on November 29, 1960, the deed being filed for record on December 14, 1960. Herrington v. Heidelberg, 244 Miss. 364, 141 So. 2d 717, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 456 (Miss. 1962).

In view of the provisions of the statute (Howard & H. Stat. 1840, ch. 34, p. 344, § 5) requiring the recording of an instrument to make it effective as against third persons, a judgment rendered in the interval between the execution and the recording of a deed is a lien upon the land of the debtor. Taylor v. Doe, 54 U.S. 287, 14 L. Ed. 149, 1851 U.S. LEXIS 860 (U.S. 1852).

7. Miscellaneous.

The recording of an instrument does not put any subsequent purchaser on inquiry notice. C & D Inv. Co. v. Gulf Transport Co., 526 So. 2d 526, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1988).

Certificate of acknowledgment of a deed is presumed to state the truth. Arnold v. Byrd, 222 So. 2d 410, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1535 (Miss. 1969).

Mortgagee loaning money for the purchase of lots and construction of houses thereon should advance proceeds with reasonable diligence in order that holders of statutory liens may not be unjustly defeated in their claims. First Nat'l Bank v. Virden, 208 Miss. 679, 45 So. 2d 268, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 285 (Miss. 1950).

Mortgagee who makes loan to mortgagor to enable him to purchase land and materials and lumber for the construction of houses thereon and turns money over to mortgagor as he asks for it, knowing that houses are being constructed, but doing nothing to see that such construction is being paid for, has preference over materialmen only to extent that its funds actually go into the construction, when mortgagor fails to use all money advanced by mortgagee for payment of those furnishing materials. First Nat'l Bank v. Virden, 208 Miss. 679, 45 So. 2d 268, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 285 (Miss. 1950).

This section [Code 1942, § 867] and Code 1942, §§ 868 and 869 are inapplicable where a grantee accepts a conveyance of certain mineral interests, which conveyance is expressly made subject to any valid and subsisting leases and further obligates the grantor to permit the grantee to receive half of the benefits accruing or to accrue under such leases. Gulf Refining Co. v. Harrison, 201 Miss. 294, 30 So. 2d 44, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1947).

Purchaser held entitled under statute to value of house built during his possession of land in good faith belief that he had full title, as against heirs of wife of his remote grantor who owned a half interest, irrespective of his constructive notice of their rights by recorded deed in the chain of title. Brunt v. McLaurin, 178 Miss. 86, 172 So. 309, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 181 (Miss. 1937).

Deed of trust covering land and ginning machinery and “equipment” did not include seed house constructed on leased railroad right of way. Y. D. Lumber Co. v. Refuge Cotton Oil Co., 153 Miss. 302, 120 So. 447, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. 1929).

Conveyance is not good against purchaser for value without notice, unless acknowledged or proven and lodged with clerk to be recorded; deed not lodged with clerk to be recorded is void as to subsequent purchaser without notice, even though holder has it filed after subsequent conveyance is executed. Owen v. Potts, 149 Miss. 205, 115 So. 336, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1928).

U.S. revenue laws making invalid unstamped written instruments do not make such instruments unrecordable. Sowell v. Rankin, 120 Miss. 458, 82 So. 317, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1919).

Notice not given where particular trust deed under which sale is made is referred to, which as recorded has on its face no pertinency to the actual sale, even if referred to by proper deed book and page. Provine v. Thornton, 92 Miss. 395, 46 So. 950, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 253 (Miss. 1908).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Title by adverse possession as affected by recording statutes. 9 A.L.R.2d 850.

Discharge of mortgage and taking back of new mortgage as affecting lien intervening between old and new mortgages. 43 A.L.R.5th 519.

Am. Jur.

21 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Records and Recording Laws, Forms 1 et seq.

Law Reviews.

The effect of bankruptcy and encumbrances on mineral interests in Mississippi. 53 Miss. L. J. 551, December, 1983.

§ 89-5-3. Conveyances, mortgages; void if not lodged for record.

Except as provided by Sections 89-5-101 through 89-5-113, all bargains and sales, and all other conveyances whatsoever of lands, whether made for passing an estate of freehold or inheritance, or for a term of years; and all instruments of settlement upon marriage wherein land, money, or other personalty should be settled or covenanted to be left or paid at the death of the party, or otherwise; and all deeds of trust and mortgages whatsoever, shall be void as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, unless they be acknowledged or proved and lodged with the clerk of the chancery court of the proper county, to be recorded in the same manner that other conveyances are required to be acknowledged or proved and recorded. Failure to file such instrument with the clerk for record shall prevent any claim of priority by the holder of such instrument over any similar recorded instrument affecting the same property, to the end that with reference to all instruments which may be filed for record under this section, the priority thereof shall be governed by the priority in time of the filing of the several instruments, in the absence of actual notice. But as between the parties and their heirs, and as to all subsequent purchasers with notice or without valuable consideration, said instruments shall nevertheless be valid and binding.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (2), (3); 1857, ch. 36, arts. 20, 21; 1871, §§ 2303, 2306; 1880, §§ 1211, 1212; 1892, §§ 2456, 2457; 1906, §§ 2786, 2787; Hemingway’s 1917, §§ 2290, 2291; 1930, §§ 2143, 2147; 1942, §§ 864, 868; Laws, 1924, ch. 239; Laws, 2011, ch. 364, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected an error in the first sentence by substituting “wherein land, money, or other personalty should be settled…” for “wherein land, money, or other personality should be settled…”. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its August 1, 2013, meeting.

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment added “Except as provided by Sections 89-5-101 through 89-5-113” at the beginning of the paragraph.

Cross References —

Recording of partition decrees, see §11-21-37.

Effect of failure to enter notice of lis pendens, see §11-47-9.

Constructive notice provided by lost or destroyed records, see §25-55-31.

Recording of satisfaction by surety of judgment, see §87-5-11.

Acknowledgment and proof generally, see §§89-3-3 et seq.

Recording of decree establishing title to property by descent, see §91-1-31.

Recording notice of power of appointment, see §91-15-15.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Who may claim benefit of provision.

3. Record of void instrument.

4. Effect of failure to record or delay in recording.

5. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

The purpose of the registry statute is that the record shall contain complete information about titles to land located in the county, and to effectuate this purpose, the courts should require and authorize the recording of equitable as well as legal interests. Burkett v. Peoples Bank of Biloxi, 225 Miss. 291, 83 So. 2d 185, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 688 (Miss. 1955).

This section [Code 1942, § 868] and Code 1942, §§ 867 and 869, are inapplicable where a grantee accepts a conveyance of certain mineral interests, which conveyance is expressly made subject to any valid and subsisting leases and further obligates the grantor to permit the grantee to receive half of the benefits accruing or to accrue under such leases. Gulf Refining Co. v. Harrison, 201 Miss. 294, 30 So. 2d 44, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1947).

Statute making conveyances void if not recorded is inapplicable to wills. Federal Land Bank v. Newsom, 175 Miss. 114, 161 So. 864, 166 So. 345, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 27 (Miss. 1935).

This section [Code 1942, § 868] held not superseded by Uniform Warehouse Receipts Law. Marine Bank & Trust Co. v. Greeville Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 133 Miss. 91, 97 So. 526, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 120 (Miss. 1923).

This statute applies with as much force with proper officer for record, and failure of clerk to mark filed is immaterial. Sowell v. Rankin, 120 Miss. 458, 82 So. 317, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1919).

This section [Code 1942, § 868] applied in bankruptcy. Laurel Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Horne, 101 Miss. 629, 57 So. 624, 58 So. 652, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1911).

2. Who may claim benefit of provision.

This statute applies with as much force to a creditor obtaining a lien by judgment as it does to a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer, and creditors without notice and subsequent purchasers for value without notice are in the same footing and are protected to the same extent. Burkett v. Peoples Bank of Biloxi, 225 Miss. 291, 83 So. 2d 185, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 688 (Miss. 1955).

“Creditor” or “subsequent purchaser” within statute providing that recorded lien should have no effect as to “creditors” and “subsequent purchasers” where remedy thereon was barred by limitations unless renewal or extension is entered on record is person who has parted with something of value on appearance of record, so that apparent bar cannot be availed of by one who became junior lienor before bar attached, and while notice imparted by recorded instrument was in full force. Richter Phillips Co. v. Phillips, 175 Miss. 242, 166 So. 393, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1936).

Person who became judgment creditor of mortgagor, before bar of limitations against enforcement of lien by mortgagee appeared of record, held not “creditor” or “subsequent purchaser” within statute. Richter Phillips Co. v. Phillips, 175 Miss. 242, 166 So. 393, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1936).

Purchasers for value without notice from grantor’s heirs are entitled to same protection as if purchasing directly from grantor. Reddoch v. Williams, 129 Miss. 706, 92 So. 831, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1922).

A purchaser from a vendee of lands may rely on the recitals in the deeds as to payments. Hiller v. Jones, 66 Miss. 636, 6 So. 465, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1889).

The creditors embraced are those who have obtained a lien. Loughridge & Bogan v. Bowland, 52 Miss. 546, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1876).

A purchaser at execution sale is not affected by notice of an unrecorded deed if the judgment-creditor had no notice thereof when his lien attached. Harper v. Tapley, 35 Miss. 506, 1858 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1858); Taylor v. Lowenstein, 50 Miss. 278, 1874 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1874); Humphreys v. Merrill, 52 Miss. 92, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 171 (Miss. 1876); Perry Nugent & Co. v. Priebatsch, 61 Miss. 402, 1883 Miss. LEXIS 147 (Miss. 1883).

“Purchasers for a valuable consideration” designate that class of persons who have been declared to be such by the courts. Wailes v. Cooper, 24 Miss. 208, 1852 Miss. LEXIS 42 (Miss. 1852); Claiborne v. Holmes, 51 Miss. 146, 1875 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1875).

Subsequent purchasers mean purchasers from the grantors directly. Sessions v. Doe, 15 Miss. 130, 1846 Miss. LEXIS 131 (Miss. 1846); Henderson v. Downing, 24 Miss. 106, 1852 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1852); Mississippi Valley Co. v. Chicago, S. L. & N. O. R. Co., 58 Miss. 846, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 53 (Miss. 1881); Chaffe v. Halpin & Bonham, 62 Miss. 1, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1884).

Under this statute creditors, as well as subsequent purchasers, are affected by notice of a prior, unrecorded deed. Dixon & Starkey v. Doe, 9 Miss. 70, 1843 Miss. LEXIS 145 (Miss. 1843).

3. Record of void instrument.

Warranty deed which was filed in the wrong judicial district was void as to a utility because the utility acquired its interest to the subject real property in a quick-take condemnation action without notice of the misfiled deed. Harrison County Util. Auth. v. Walker, 143 So.3d 608, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 19 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 141 So.3d 947, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 386 (Miss. 2014).

Recordation of a deed or mortgage containing a void description does not meet the requirements of the statute. In re Tucker, 1 F. Supp. 18, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1649 (D. Miss. 1932); Sack v. Gilmer Dry Goods Co., 149 Miss. 296, 115 So. 339, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1928).

Unsigned recorded deed not notice. Rainey v. Lamb Hardwood Lumber Co., 91 Miss. 690, 45 So. 367, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 178 (Miss. 1907).

Where a mortgage is void on its face the beneficiaries thereof cannot occupy the relation of bona fide purchasers. Acme Lumber Co. v. Hoyt & Bros. Co., 71 Miss. 106, 14 So. 464, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1893).

4. Effect of failure to record or delay in recording.

Decedent’s ex-wife was not entitled to execute a judgment against real estate formerly jointly owned by the decedent and his widow but conveyed by four deeds to the widow’s sister, although the late-recorded deeds were void as to the ex-wife under Miss. Code Ann. §89-5-3, because under Miss. Code Ann. §15-3-101(b)(iii) (Supp. 2010) the property was not subject to a claim against only one joint tenant, and any right the ex-wife had to execute her judgment on the jointly held property ceased to exist upon the decdent’s death. Kelly v. Roby (In re Estate of Roby), 84 So.3d 786, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 405 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

Unrecorded deed to shopping center voids title of bankruptcy debtor who is to take under deed and shopping center property is therefore not subject to automatic stay in bankruptcy proceeding. In re Pinetree, Ltd., 876 F.2d 34, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 9648 (5th Cir. Miss. 1989).

Failure to record an instrument does not affect its efficacy as between the parties thereto, nor does it prevent such an instrument from binding all subsequent purchasers who take either with notice of the instrument or who have not paid valuable consideration. Chevron Oil Co. v. Clark, 291 F. Supp. 552, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12565 (S.D. Miss. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 432 F.2d 280, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 7176 (5th Cir. Miss. 1970).

New promise to avoid bar of statute of limitations is not required to be recorded except as to creditors and subsequent purchasers for value without notice. Richter Phillips Co. v. Phillips, 175 Miss. 242, 166 So. 393, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1936).

Deed or mortgage, unless recorded, is void as to creditor obtaining lien by judgment. Sack v. Gilmer Dry Goods Co., 149 Miss. 296, 115 So. 339, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1928).

Mortgagee for value without notice, not chargeable with unrecorded assignment of lease. Corinth Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 111 Miss. 62, 71 So. 266, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 241 (Miss. 1916).

Enrolled judgment good against subsequently recorded deed from husband to wife. Austin Clothing Co. v. Posey, 105 Miss. 720, 63 So. 224, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 275 (Miss. 1913).

Execution sale of land good against prior unrecorded deed. Levis-Zukoski Mercantile Co. v. McIntyre, 93 Miss. 806, 47 So. 435, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1908).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 868], taken in connection with Code 1942, § 869, where a trust deed is made to one who fails to record it until after another has received and recorded a trust deed on the same land, the latter having knowledge of the first deed, the purchaser under the last, though having no actual knowledge of the facts, is not protected as against the prior deed, if at the time of his purchase it had been recorded. Woods v. Garnett, 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 89 (Miss. 1894).

5. Miscellaneous.

Beneficiary deed of trust was not void because it identified the note, date of the note, and payment schedule, and thus, the beneficiary could, with simple review, have been reasonably certain. Borries v. Goshen Mortgage, 219 So.3d 593, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 276 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

If a landowner’s spouse and adult child claimed an interest in a property which a utility sought to acquire in a quick-take condemnation action, their claim was against the landowner only because a warranty deed purporting to convey an interest in the subject property was misfiled in the wrong judicial district. Harrison County Util. Auth. v. Walker, 143 So.3d 608, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 19 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 141 So.3d 947, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 386 (Miss. 2014).

Cross-defendant refinancing bank was not entitled to equitable subrogation to step into the original lender’s shoes for priority over four cross-defendant judgment creditors because the property was in the debtor/borrower’s infant daughter’s name until the day of closing and if the bank had inquired of liens under the debtor’s name, the judgment creditors’ liens would have been found, thus, because the judgment creditors’ liens were filed before the refinancing mortgage was filed, and they attached upon the property being reconveyed from the minor back to the debtor, under Miss. Code Ann. §§89-5-3,89-5-25, the bank was last in priority. Shavers v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Shavers), 418 B.R. 589, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3411 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2009).

Defectively acknowledged deed of trust was ineligible for recordation under §89-5-1, however, fact that it was recorded constituted actual notice to subsequent purchasers of the interest claimed under defective deed of trust such that federal tax lien which attached subsequent to erroneous recordation of defective deed of trust was subordinate thereto. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 946, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7664 (S.D. Miss. 1989), rev'd, 901 F.2d 1297, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8550 (5th Cir. Miss. 1990).

Certificate of acknowledgment of a deed is presumed to state the truth. Arnold v. Byrd, 222 So. 2d 410, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1535 (Miss. 1969).

In a suit against a notary and his surety for affixing a false notarial certificate of acknowledgment to a deed of trust, proof of the value of the land described in the deed, the amount of prior liens, the fact that security was ample to enable the plaintiff to collect the balance on the note if the deed had been a valid instrument, and that he was otherwise unable to collect, supported a finding that the false notarial certificate was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages when default occurred on the note. King v. State, 222 So. 2d 393, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1531 (Miss. 1969).

A judgment enrolled on January 3, 1961, within 20 days after its rendition, did not relate back to the date of its rendition, December 13, 1960, to give the judgment creditor a specific lien on property which the judgment debtor had conveyed to third parties on November 29, 1960, the deed being filed for record on December 14, 1960. Herrington v. Heidelberg, 244 Miss. 364, 141 So. 2d 717, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 456 (Miss. 1962).

A recorded deed of trust, containing an erroneous description of the land conveyed by the grantor, which recited that the land in question contained 60 acres more or less, whereas the grantor only owned 40 acres, was not sufficient to put the grantor’s judgment creditors on notice that an entirely different tract of land was intended to be included, and did not give notice of a description which a diligent search of the records might have disclosed as to other lands belonging to the grantor, so that while the grantee was entitled to a reformation of a trust deed as against the grantor, he was not so entitled as against the judgment creditors, who had executed on the lands actually owned by the grantor. Mississippi Industries for Blind v. Jackson, 231 Miss. 135, 95 So. 2d 109, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1957).

The record of a deed of trust is sufficient to charge creditors and subsequent purchasers with constructive notice of its existence, notwithstanding an error in the description, whenever it is apparent what the error is and the description is such as reasonably to enable creditors and subsequent purchasers to find the land. Burkett v. Peoples Bank of Biloxi, 225 Miss. 291, 83 So. 2d 185, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 688 (Miss. 1955).

Purchaser of land for value from owner of record, who goes into possession of land without actual notice of any claims against land, does not have constructive notice of existing recorded trust deed upon land executed by grantee in unrecorded deed from purchaser’s grantor, and purchaser is entitled to have trust deed cancelled as cloud on his title. Morgan v. Mars, 207 Miss. 848, 43 So. 2d 563, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 395 (Miss. 1949).

Abstractor is not required to search all of records in order to see whether or not some outsider, unknown to records, has conveyed property to some other person; he may safely assume title to be in party shown by records to have title. Morgan v. Mars, 207 Miss. 848, 43 So. 2d 563, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 395 (Miss. 1949).

Actual possession by the owner of land or his tenants, not actual knowledge of such possession, is all of the notice necessary to overcome priority of filing for record. Gulf Refining Co. v. Travis, 201 Miss. 336, 29 So. 2d 100, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 399 (Miss. 1947).

Deed of trust on personal property immediately taken to county of buyer’s residence not constructive notice to subsequent purchaser for value unless recorded in such county. McLarty v. Ashmore, 128 Miss. 735, 91 So. 421, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 161 (Miss. 1922).

Purchase of property in the name of one person while another pays purchase price results in trust in favor of party paying, and such property cannot be sold under execution. Cannon v. Holburg Mercantile Co., 108 Miss. 102, 66 So. 400, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 177 (Miss. 1914).

Purchaser of property covered by deed of trust which refers to notes secured thereby, chargeable with notice that notes provided for attorney’s fee. Turberville v. Simpson, 94 Miss. 154, 47 So. 784 (Miss. 1908).

The purchaser of land where the record shows a good title is not bound to look beyond the record to a former occupancy. Hiller v. Jones, 66 Miss. 636, 6 So. 465, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1889).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The filing of a deed in the wrong judicial district within a county that has two judicial districts is void as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, but valid between the parties and their heirs. Garner, Oct. 5, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0628.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Record of instrument which comprises or includes an interest or right that is not a proper subject of record. 3 A.L.R.2d 577.

Agreement between real-estate owners restricting use of property as within contemplation of recording laws. 4 A.L.R.2d 1419.

Coverage of “nonrecording” or “nonfiling” insurance against loss from failure to record chattel mortgage, conditional sale, or other security instrument. 51 A.L.R.2d 325.

Priority, as between holder of unfiled or unrecorded chattel mortgage who secures possession of goods or chattels, and subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer. 53 A.L.R.2d 936.

Discharge of mortgage and taking back of new mortgage as affecting lien intervening between old and new mortgages. 43 A.L.R.5th 519.

Priority between mechanics’ liens and advances made under previous executed mortgage. 80 A.L.R.2d 179.

Am. Jur.

55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages §§ 138-141.

21 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Records and Recording Laws, Forms 1 et seq.

CJS.

59 C.J.S., Mortgages §§ 257 et seq.

76 C.J.S., Records, §§ 37-40.

Law Reviews.

The effect of bankruptcy and encumbrances on mineral interests in Mississippi. 53 Miss. L. J. 551, December, 1983.

§ 89-5-5. Priority of all instruments, and notice thereof controlled by date of filing for record; take effect, when.

Every conveyance, covenant, agreement, bond, mortgage, and deed of trust shall take effect, as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, only from the time when delivered to the clerk to be recorded; and no conveyance, covenant, agreement, bond, mortgage, or deed of trust which is unrecorded or has not been filed for record, shall take precedence over any similar instrument affecting the same property which may be of record, to the end that with reference to all instruments which may be filed for record under this section, the priority thereof shall be governed by the priority in time of the filing of the several instruments, in the absence of actual notice.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (5); 1857, ch. 36, art. 23; 1880, § 1213; 1892, § 2458; 1906, § 2788; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2292; 1930, § 2148; 1942, § 869; Laws, 1924, ch. 239.

Cross References —

Protection of paramount rights in partition proceedings, see §11-21-41.

Protection of mortgagees by fire insurance policy in order of priority, see §83-13-7.

Recording of powers of appointment, see §91-15-15.

Crime of selling encumbered property without notice of encumbrance to vendee, see §97-19-51.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Clerical errors; incomplete or incorrect instruments.

3. Priority of recording.

4. Vesting of title.

5. What constitutes actual knowledge.

6. Mechanic’s and materialman’s liens.

7. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

Recordation under this statute gives constructive notice binding upon those subsequently dealing with the land. Smith County Oil Co. v. Jefcoat, 203 Miss. 404, 33 So. 2d 629, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1948).

A nominal consideration, although a good consideration, is not a valuable consideration within the meaning of this statute so as to give a recorded deed for a nominal consideration precedent over an unrecorded prior deed for a valuable consideration. Smith County Oil Co. v. Jefcoat, 203 Miss. 404, 33 So. 2d 629, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1948).

This statute is not displaced by the law of merger. Smith County Oil Co. v. Jefcoat, 203 Miss. 404, 33 So. 2d 629, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1948).

Notice begins moment deed is lodged with proper officer for record, and failure of clerk to mark filed is immaterial. Sowell v. Rankin, 120 Miss. 458, 82 So. 317, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1919).

This section [Code 1942, § 869] applies only to legal and not equitable title. Dedeaux v. Cuevas, 107 Miss. 7, 64 So. 844, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 38 (Miss. 1914).

2. Clerical errors; incomplete or incorrect instruments.

Unsigned recorded deed not notice. Rainey v. Lamb Hardwood Lumber Co., 91 Miss. 690, 45 So. 367, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 178 (Miss. 1907).

Record of deed not notice where acknowledgement omitted word “delivered.” Ligon v. Barton, 88 Miss. 135, 40 So. 555, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1906).

The grantee has done all the law requires of him when he has filed his deed for record, and it will prevail, although the clerk make a mistake in recording it. Mangold v. Barlow, 61 Miss. 593, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 136 (Miss. 1884); Woods v. Garnett, 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 89 (Miss. 1894).

3. Priority of recording.

Bank’s mortgage lien against residential property did not have priority over a prior recorded deed of trust against the same property securing a line of credit, since the bank’s payment of the outstanding balance on the line of credit did not cancel the line of credit or the deed of trust, and the deed of trust remained in effect when the term of the line of credit was renewed by agreement. U.S. Bank N.A. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 45 F. Supp. 3d 582, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95934 (S.D. Miss. 2014).

Natural justice inexorably weighed against subrogation in favor of appellee because appellant was materially prejudiced by being placed secondary to a lien of a value and between two parties that it never agreed to be behind; when appellant recorded its deed of trust on the property appellee and all other interested parties were put on constructive notice of the existence of that deed of trust, and the failure to discover the deed of trust clearly constituted negligence. Cmty. Trust Bank of Miss. v. First Nat'l Bank of Clarksdale, 150 So.3d 683, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 445 (Miss. 2014).

The fact that the first party waited until well after the second party recorded his deed to the property in question to place on record his own claim barred him, under §89-5-5, from claiming priority of title over property deed. Kelly v. Shoemake, 460 So. 2d 811, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 2019 (Miss. 1984).

The filing of a notice of lis pendens in an action before the recordation of a prior deed is effective to make a judgment recovered against the grantor after such recordation a lien on the property conveyed. Jones v. Jones, 249 Miss. 322, 161 So. 2d 640, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 393 (Miss. 1964).

The deed first filed is presumed, in absence of contrary evidence, to be that first executed. Biglane v. Rawls, 247 Miss. 226, 153 So. 2d 665, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 295 (Miss. 1963).

Execution sale good against prior unrecorded deed. Levis-Zukoski Mercantile Co. v. McIntyre, 93 Miss. 806, 47 So. 435, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1908).

Purchasers of land without notice of unrecorded bond for title to way over the land, whose deed is first recorded, acquire an absolute unencumbered title. Wills v. Reid, 86 Miss. 446, 38 So. 793, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 91 (Miss. 1905).

4. Vesting of title.

Title to property vests upon delivery of deed and not when signed and acknowledged. Cannon v. Holburg Mercantile Co., 108 Miss. 102, 66 So. 400, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 177 (Miss. 1914).

5. What constitutes actual knowledge.

Defectively acknowledged deed of trust was ineligible for recordation under §89-5-1, however, fact that it was recorded constituted actual notice to subsequent purchasers of the interest claimed under defective deed of trust such that federal tax lien which attached subsequent to erroneous recordation of defective deed of trust was subordinate thereto. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 946, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7664 (S.D. Miss. 1989), rev'd, 901 F.2d 1297, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8550 (5th Cir. Miss. 1990).

Actual possession by the owner of land or his tenants, not actual knowledge of such possession, constitutes actual notice under the registration statutes. Gulf Refining Co. v. Travis, 201 Miss. 336, 29 So. 2d 100, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 399 (Miss. 1947).

Under Code 1942, § 868, taken in connection with this section [Code 1942, § 869], where a trust deed is made to one who fails to record it until after another has received and recorded a trust deed on the same land, the latter having knowledge of the first deed, the purchaser under the last, though having no actual knowledge of the facts, is not protected as against the prior deed, if at the time of his purchase it had been recorded. Woods v. Garnett, 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 89 (Miss. 1894).

6. Mechanic’s and materialman’s liens.

When it is shown that the petitioner has a laborer’s lien or materialman’s lien upon property constructed or repaired, those who claim to have superior liens as purchasers or encumbrances for a valuable consideration without notice must specifically and affirmatively plead their lien; for the burden of proof is upon one who claims to be an encumbrancer for value without notice, and he must show facts which will bring such claim within the exceptions set out in Code 1942, § 356. Enterprise Plumbing Co. v. Bailey Mortg. Co., 209 So. 2d 825, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1474 (Miss. 1968).

Mechanic’s and materialman’s liens for labor performed and materials furnished in connection with installation of fixed machinery and equipment to prepare manufacturing plant for operation has priority over lien of deed of trust executed after mechanic acquired his lien in compliance with prior agreement to secure note by deed of trust on after acquired property in nature of machinery and equipment to be acquired and used in manufacturing business. Buckwalter v. McElroy, 205 Miss. 54, 38 So. 2d 317, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 411 (Miss. 1949).

7. Miscellaneous.

Chancery court properly granted a lender’s successor summary judgment in its action seeking a declaratory judgment that it held a first-priority deed of trust on real property because there was no genuine issue of material fact that the successor had actual knowledge of the defective deed of trust or a beneficiary’s lien; the managing member of the settlement agent for the lender swore that the lender had no knowledge of any other deed of trust. Borries v. Goshen Mortgage, 219 So.3d 593, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 276 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

To the extent one of a bank’s deeds of trust was secondary to a lienholder’s deed of trust by virtue of the filing date, equitable subrogation applied because the bank’s loan was secured by a corresponding deed of trust for the same property, which was allowed to be pledged by the same person for the debt of a family member’s company and the bank never cancelled its other deeds of trust. Pennington Group, LLC v. PriorityOne Bank, 228 So.3d 880, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 59 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 229 So.3d 119, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 370 (Miss. 2017).

Chancery court properly found that the foreclosure a lienholder conducted was subject to the first priority lien position of a bank because the bank had a priority lien by virtue of its prior deeds of trust; it would be inequitable to hold that the bank lost its priority lien position to the lienholder, the wife and mother of the debtors to whom the bank showed favor by stopping its foreclosure proceedings and issuing another loan, a loan whose purpose was to refinance a business debt. Pennington Group, LLC v. PriorityOne Bank, 228 So.3d 880, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 59 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 229 So.3d 119, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 370 (Miss. 2017).

Under Mississippi Recording Act, earlier recorded deed of trust (DOT) would have priority over subsequently recorded DOT unless a subordination provision in the first DOT altered this result or unless equitable subrogation applied, but this could not be determined on motion for summary judgment, as there were disputed issues of material fact. Good Hope Constr., Inc. v. RJB Financing, LLC (In re Grand Soleil-Natchez, LLC), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5645 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Aug. 13, 2013).

Where the trustee in bankruptcy abandoned property owned by the debtor which had brought less than the amount of either of the liens of a chattel mortgagee or judgment creditor when sold, the proceedings in bankruptcy did not affect the rights of the lienholders, and the holder of the judgment lien retained priority to the funds. Brookhaven Bank & Trust Co. v. Gwin, 253 F.2d 17, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 4895 (5th Cir. Miss. 1958).

A recorded deed of trust, containing an erroneous description of the land conveyed by the grantor, which recited that the land in question contained 60 acres more or less, whereas the grantor only owned 40 acres, was not sufficient to put the grantor’s judgment creditors on notice that an entirely different tract of land was intended to be included, and did not give notice of a description which a diligent search of the records might have disclosed as to other lands belonging to the grantor, so that while the grantee was entitled to a reformation of a trust deed as against the grantor, he was not so entitled as against the judgment creditors, who had executed on the land actually owned by the grantor. Mississippi Industries for Blind v. Jackson, 231 Miss. 135, 95 So. 2d 109, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1957).

Mortgagee was entitled to priority against a second mortgagee for advancements subsequent to second mortgagee for advancements subsequent to second mortgage only if he did not have actual notice of second mortgage where trust deed provided that all further advances to mortgagee were to be secured as principal of obligation. North v. J. W. McClintock, Inc., 208 Miss. 289, 44 So. 2d 412, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1950).

After notice of attaching a junior lien, the senior mortgagee ordinarily will not be protected in making further advances under his mortgage given to secure such advances, where he was under no binding engagement to make such advances. North v. J. W. McClintock, Inc., 208 Miss. 289, 44 So. 2d 412, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1950).

Where at the time subsequent purchaser acquired title to land he had actual as well as constructive knowledge that the minerals had been reserved in the deed by the original grantor to his vendor, he could not invoke the aid of this section [Code 1942, § 869] on the theory of after acquired title by reason of a quitclaim deed to his vendor from the original grantor for a nominal consideration as against a prior unrecorded conveyance of minerals by the original grantor to a third person for valuable consideration. Smith County Oil Co. v. Jefcoat, 203 Miss. 404, 33 So. 2d 629, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1948).

A subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration after quitclaim deed to his vendor as to whom the original grantor had reserved the mineral rights, without notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance of the minerals from the original grantor to a third person for valuable consideration, acquired fees simple title to the property, notwithstanding that his vendor, having paid only a nominal consideration for the quitclaim deed, could not have invoked the benefits of this statute. Smith County Oil Co. v. Jefcoat, 203 Miss. 404, 33 So. 2d 629, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1948).

This section [Code 1942, § 869] and Code 1942, §§ 867 and 868 are inapplicable where a grantee accepts a conveyance of certain mineral interests, which conveyance is expressly made subject to any valid and subsisting leases and further obligates the grantor to permit the grantee to receive half of the benefits accruing or to accrue under such leases. Gulf Refining Co. v. Harrison, 201 Miss. 294, 30 So. 2d 44, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1947).

Failure to record security for debt because of inattention or agreement without purpose to give grantor fictitious credit, is not fraudulent as to grantor’s creditors. Robertson & Co. v. Columbus Ins. & Banking Co., 85 Miss. 234, 38 So. 100 (Miss. 1904).

A municipal tax deed, not filed as per §§ 3028 and 3823 of the Code of 1982 (§§ 3433 and 4338 Code 1906), must be excluded under this section [Code 1942, § 869]. Sintes v. Barber, 78 Miss. 585, 29 So. 403, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 156 (Miss. 1900).

Section89-5-19, which reverses the usual “race/notice” priority rule set out in §89-5-5 in the situation when a creditor takes a position secured by a lien on real property at a time when an earlier creditor’s lien on the same property appears on the face of the public record to be time-barred, establishes an exception to the “race/notice” scheme, not a statute of limitations. Barhorst v. Armstrong, 42 F. 2, 1890 U.S. App. LEXIS 2098 (C.C.D. Ohio 1890).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Attachment, garnishment, execution, or similar process in action on note or bond, not resulting in sale of mortgaged property, as precluding foreclosure of real-estate mortgage. 37 A.L.R.2d 959.

Am. Jur.

66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws §§ 133 et seq.

13 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Delivery of Deeds, § 21 (recordation of deed as evidence of delivery).

CJS.

76 C.J.S., Records § 20.

Law Reviews.

The effect of bankruptcy and encumbrances on mineral interests in Mississippi. 53 Miss. L. J. 551, December, 1983.

§ 89-5-7. Written contracts in relation to land recordable.

Every title-bond or other written contract in relation to land may be acknowledged or proved, and certified and recorded, in the same manner as conveyances of land; and such acknowledgment or proof, and the proper certificate thereof and delivery to the clerk of the chancery court of the proper county to be recorded, shall be notice to all subsequent purchasers of the existence of such bond or contract.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (6); 1857, ch. 36, art. 24; 1871, § 2307; 1880, § 1214; 1892, § 2459; 1906, § 2789; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2293; 1930, § 2141; 1942, § 862.

Cross References —

When a lost record shall cease to provide constructive notice, see §25-55-31.

Necessity of acknowledgment or proof for recording of instrument, see §89-3-1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Natural justice inexorably weighed against subrogation in favor of appellee because appellant was materially prejudiced by being placed secondary to a lien of a value and between two parties that it never agreed to be behind; when appellant recorded its deed of trust on the property appellee and all other interested parties were put on constructive notice of the existence of that deed of trust, and the failure to discover the deed of trust clearly constituted negligence. Cmty. Trust Bank of Miss. v. First Nat'l Bank of Clarksdale, 150 So.3d 683, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 445 (Miss. 2014).

Court construed Miss. Code §89-5-7 to mean that contract relating to land is not automatically binding on subsequent purchasers, but one can bind subsequent purchasers by recording contract, without which, contract will not be binding. Buras v. Shell Oil Co., 666 F. Supp. 919, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7636 (S.D. Miss. 1987).

U.S. revenue laws making invalid unstamped written instrument do not render unstamped deed unrecordable. Sowell v. Rankin, 120 Miss. 458, 82 So. 317, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1919).

A recital in a deed of trust to secure a part of the purchase money of land that the vendor’s lien for the remaining portion of the purchase money is to remain unimpaired, is not a contract within the meaning of the section [Code 1942, § 862]. Mairs v. Bank of Oxford, 58 Miss. 919, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 1877).

A power of attorney to sell and convey land is a contract within this section [Code 1942, § 862]. Hughes v. Wilkinson's Lessee, 37 Miss. 482, 1859 Miss. LEXIS 42 (Miss. 1859).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Agreement between real-estate owners restricting use of property as within contemplation of recording laws. 4 A.L.R.2d 1419.

Am. Jur.

66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws § 47.

§ 89-5-8. Affidavits relating to identification, marital status, heirship, etc. of party to instrument affecting real estate titles recordable; affidavit of scrivener’s error recordable; admissibility.

  1. Any affidavit relating to the identification, the marital status, the heirship, the relation, the death, or the time of death, of any person who is a party to any instrument affecting the title to real estate, or any affidavit relating to the identification of any corporation or other legal entity which is a party to any instrument affecting the title to real estate, duly sworn to and acknowledged before any officer or person authorized to administer an oath under the laws of this state, shall be recordable in the land records in the office of the chancery clerk in the county where the real estate is situated.
    1. Notice of a typographical or other minor error in an instrument affecting the title to real estate may be given by recording an affidavit of scrivener’s error. If an affidavit is conspicuously identified as an affidavit of scrivener’s error, the chancery clerk shall index the affidavit in the general index under the names of the original parties to the instrument if they are identified in the affidavit, and in the sectional index as provided in the indexing instructions of the affidavit. Notice of the corrective information provided by the affiant is effective upon recordation. An affidavit under this paragraph (a) may be prepared only by an attorney licensed to practice law in this state who prepared any instrument in the chain of title to the subject real estate.
    2. The affidavit of scrivener’s error shall be sworn to and acknowledged before any officer or person authorized to administer an oath under the laws of this state, and shall be recordable in the land records in the office of the chancery clerk in the county where the real estate is situated.
    3. If requested, the chancery clerk shall make a marginal notation on the instrument to which the affidavit refers.
  2. Any affidavit so recorded, or a certified copy thereof, shall be admissible as evidence in any action involving the instrument to which it relates or the title to the real estate affected by the instrument and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and the marketability of the title to real estate.

HISTORY: Laws, 2007, ch. 444, § 1; Laws, 2013, ch. 461, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 25, 2013).

Amendment Notes —

The 2013 amendment added (2) and redesignated former (2) as (3).

§ 89-5-9. Copies of certain records may be recorded.

A copy of the record of any instrument of writing affecting property in this state, and which has been legally recorded in any other state of the United States, or in a foreign country, when certified by the clerk or other officer in whose custody the record is, under his seal of office, if he have one, may be recorded in this state in the same way and with like effect as if it had been executed and acknowledged in this state.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1222; 1892, § 2469; 1906, § 2803; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2304; 1930, § 2144; 1942, § 865.

Cross References —

Forgery of records, see §97-21-45.

§ 89-5-11. Patents issued by United States or this state recordable.

All patents issued in the name of the United States or of this state for lands, may, whether acknowledged or not, be recorded in the office of the clerk of the chancery court of the county in which the land embraced in the patent may lie.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 231; 1880, § 1625; 1892, § 2470; 1906, § 2804; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2305; 1930, § 2145; 1942, § 866.

Cross References —

Records of land office, see §§7-11-13 et seq.

Land office certificates as evidence, see §13-1-131.

Conveyances of land by state by means of patents, see §29-1-81.

§ 89-5-13. Instruments of conveyance recorded for seven and ten years; acknowledgment valid.

  1. Concerning an interest in land, whenever an instrument of conveyance (including but not limited to a deed of trust or assignment), release, termination or cancellation which contains a defective acknowledgement has been of record seven (7) years or more in the land records of the county in which the said land is located, the acknowledgment shall be good without regard to the form of the certificate of acknowledgment.
  2. Any such instrument which has been of record for ten (10) years and which bears no acknowledgement shall likewise be treated as if properly acknowledged.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 867.5; Laws, 1954, ch. 224, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1999, ch. 412, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

Amendment Notes —

The 1999 amendment rewrote the section.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Fraud.

1. In general.

Chancery court erred in relying on Miss. Code Ann. §89-5-13 to find that two deeds were effective on the dates reflected in the acknowledgments, without addressing uncontradicted testimony regarding the intent of the parties or considering when the deeds were delivered and accepted. Morrow v. Morrow, 129 So.3d 142, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 546 (Miss. 2013).

Section 89-5-13 is a curative statute for deeds with defective acknowledgements, and therefore did not cure a deed’s total lack of acknowledgement. Greenlee v. Mitchell, 607 So. 2d 97, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 483 (Miss. 1992).

Section 89-5-13, a purely curative statute for a deed which has been of record for 20 years with a defect in the acknowledgment, had no bearing or relevance to the issue of whether the signature on a deed was authorized, and did not create a presumption that it was. Goodwin v. McMurphy, 435 So. 2d 639, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2617 (Miss. 1983).

2. Fraud.

The statute does not operate to sanction fraud, but rather is a curative statute for deeds with defective acknowledgments, and, therefore, does not apply to a forged deed. King v. King, 760 So. 2d 830, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 237 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

§ 89-5-15. Transfer of record; debt to be noted on record.

Except as provided in Section 89-5-37, Mississippi Code of 1972, when the indebtedness, or any part thereof, secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien of record shall be assigned by the person appearing by the record to be the creditor, he shall be required by the assignee to enter the fact of the assignment on the margin of the record of the lien; and in default of making such entry, any satisfaction or cancellation of the lien or instrument evidencing it entered by the original creditor shall release the same as to subsequent creditors and purchasers for value without notice, unless the assignment be by writing duly acknowledged and filed for record; and every assignment by an assignee of any such lien shall be entered in like manner and with like effect in case of failure.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2461; 1906, § 2794; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2295; 1930, § 2150; 1942, § 871; Laws, 1988, ch. 428, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 23, 1988).

Cross References —

Recording assignment of secured transaction under Uniform Commercial Code, see §75-9-405.

Assignment of notes or other writings, see §75-13-1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The fact of the assignment is all that is required under this section [Code 1942, § 871] to be entered on the margin of the record of the lien, and it is not required that in case of a partnership a name or the names of the partners shall be stated. Frierson Bldg. Supply Co. v. Pritchard, 253 Miss. 541, 176 So. 2d 301, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1011 (Miss. 1965).

Assignment by Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation of note and deed of trust in favor of land bank commissioner is effective transfer, as note and deed of trust became property of Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation under Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation Act, 12 USCS § 1020b. Triplett v. Bridgforth, 205 Miss. 328, 38 So. 2d 756, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1949).

Tax sale of land which was void as to city, holding a lien on the land by virtue of having made a loan and having accepted assignment of a deed of trust to the land as security therefor, as authorized by law, for the reason that the chancery clerk’s notation on record did not show that notice of the tax sale was sent by registered mail to the city as required by statute, did not impair or destroy the city’s right subsequently to convey the land, or affect the rights of its grantees. Pace v. Wedgeworth, 198 Miss. 1, 20 So. 2d 842, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 162 (Miss. 1945).

Assignment of note and trust deed, entered on the bottom of the trust deed on the record together with a certificate or attestation signed by the clerk stating that the assignment had been filed and recorded was valid under this section [Code 1942, § 871]. Pace v. Wedgeworth, 198 Miss. 1, 20 So. 2d 842, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 162 (Miss. 1945).

Appointment of substitute trustee by assignee of debt valid, though assignment not noted on record. Scruggs v. Northern, 123 Miss. 169, 85 So. 89, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 1920).

Assignment of debt, though in form of deed of trust, may be noted on deed of trust record. West v. Union Naval Stores Co., 116 Miss. 743, 77 So. 609, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 347 (Miss. 1917).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Conflict of laws as to application of statute proscribing or limiting availability of action for deficiency after sale of collateral real estate. 44 A.L.R.3d 922.

§ 89-5-17. Assignments of indebtedness to be marked on record.

Except as provided in Section 89-5-37, all assignments in whole or in part of any indebtedness secured by mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien of record, shall be entered on the margin of the record of the lien or said assignment shall be acknowledged and filed for record, and if the assignor or assignee of said indebtedness fail to comply with the provisions of this section the debtor shall be fully protected in transactions with the holder of record in the absence of actual notice of the assignment.

HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 2795; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2296; 1930, § 2151; 1942, § 872; Laws, 1988, ch. 428, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 23, 1988).

Cross References —

Assignments of notes or other instruments of indebtedness, see §75-13-1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

This section [Code 1942, § 872] does not apply to negotiable instruments. Hughes v. Kaw Inv. Co., 133 Miss. 48, 97 So. 465, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 1923); Schwartz v. Smith, 134 Miss. 594, 99 So. 436, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 308 (Miss. 1924).

Appointment of substitute trustee by assignee of debt valid, though assignment not noted on record. Scruggs v. Northern, 123 Miss. 169, 85 So. 89, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 1920).

§ 89-5-19. When a lien appears by the record to be barred, it ceases.

Where the remedy to enforce any mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien on real or personal property which is recorded, appears on the face of the record to be barred by the statute of limitations (which, as to a series of notes or a note payable in installments, shall begin to run from and after the maturity date of the last note or last installment), the lien shall cease and have no effect as to creditors and subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, unless within six (6) months after such remedy is so barred the fact that such mortgage, deed of trust, or lien has been renewed or extended be entered on the margin of the record thereof, by the creditor, debtor, or trustee, attested by the clerk, or a new mortgage, deed of trust, or lien, noting the fact of renewal or extension, be duly filed for record within such time. If the date of final maturity of such indebtedness so secured cannot be ascertained from the face of the record the same shall be deemed to be due one (1) year from the date of the instrument securing the same for the purpose of this section. And where a suit shall have been brought to keep a judgment alive within seven (7) years from the rendition of such judgment, the general lien of such judgment shall expire as to creditors and subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration, without notice, at the end of seven (7) years from the rendition of such judgment, notwithstanding such suit to keep alive the judgment unless a notation to keep alive such judgment shall be made on the judgment roll within six (6) months after the expiration of seven (7) years from the time of the rendition of such judgment.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2462; 1906, § 2796; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2297; 1930, § 2154; 1942, § 875; Laws, 1896, ch. 98; Laws, 1956, ch. 215; Laws, 1958, ch. 271, § 1; Laws, 1960, ch. 223.

Cross References —

Limitation of actions upon mortgages and deeds of trust generally, see §§15-1-1 et seq.

Payment extinguishing mortgage, see §89-1-49.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Persons and interests protected.

3. Renewal of mortgage.

4. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

This section [Code 1942, § 875] has no application to judgment liens. Street v. Smith, 85 Miss. 359, 37 So. 837, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 159 (Miss. 1904).

Where the debtor in a trust deed dies before the debt is barred, this section [Code 1942, § 875] does not prevent extension for one year of time to sue, provided for by another statutory provision. Klaus v. Moore, 77 Miss. 701, 27 So. 612, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1900).

This section [Code 1942, § 875] has no application to renewals or extensions made before it went into effect. Drane v. Newsom, 73 Miss. 422, 19 So. 200, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 144 (Miss. 1895).

2. Persons and interests protected.

Where note secured by deed of trust was extended from time to time, but fact of extensions was not noted on margin of record of deed of trust before remedy to enforce it appeared on face of record to be barred, or within six months thereafter, such extensions did not affect rights of subsequent creditors without notice of extensions. Lampton-Reid Co. v. Allen, 177 Miss. 698, 171 So. 780, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 152 (Miss. 1937).

That junior lien attached before bar of limitations attached to prior deed of trust did not affect right of junior lienor’s transferees who purchased for valuable consideration the note and security and had no notice that lien had not been extinguished, and parted with something of value, and hence became “creditors” or “subsequent purchasers” within statute providing that recorded lien should have no effect as to creditors and subsequent purchasers where remedy thereof was barred by limitation. Lampton-Reid Co. v. Allen, 177 Miss. 698, 171 So. 780, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 152 (Miss. 1937).

“Creditor” or “subsequent purchaser” within statute is person who has parted with something of value on appearance of record, so that apparent bar cannot be availed of by one who became junior lienor before bar attached, and while notice imparted by recorded instrument was in full force. Richter Phillips Co. v. Phillips, 175 Miss. 242, 166 So. 393, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1936).

Person who became judgment creditor of mortgagor before bar of limitations against enforcement of lien by mortgagee appeared of record held not “creditor” or “subsequent purchaser” within statute. Richter Phillips Co. v. Phillips, 175 Miss. 242, 166 So. 393, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1936).

This section [Code 1942, § 875] protects only creditors and purchasers who parted with something of value on faith of the appearance of the record. Klaus v. Moore, 77 Miss. 701, 27 So. 612, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1900).

3. Renewal of mortgage.

Where mortgaged property conveyed by mortgagor, subsequent renewal of mortgage does not relieve property of prior lien. Smith v. Childress, 119 Miss. 20, 80 So. 345, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1918).

Renewal of first mortgage does not render lien of same subordinate to that of a second mortgage. Bank of Lexington v. Cooper, 115 Miss. 782, 76 So. 659, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 264 (Miss. 1917).

4. Miscellaneous.

Where senior mortgage and notes secured thereby were barred, neither junior mortgagee nor one claiming under him was bound to know any facts not of record, nor estopped to claim priority, nor to assert that attempted revival of senior mortgage was void. Musser v. First Nat'l Bank, 165 Miss. 873, 147 So. 783, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 311 (Miss. 1933).

Where no effort was made to renew or extend notes or mortgage securing them until after notes were barred, right and remedy as to notes and mortgage were barred, and could not be revived. Musser v. First Nat'l Bank, 165 Miss. 873, 147 So. 783, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 311 (Miss. 1933).

Statute held not available to one giving deed of trust or note. Mason v. Stroud, 155 Miss. 829, 125 So. 408, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1930).

Writ of garnishment could not be issued on old judgment after seven years, though suit on judgment was commenced before seven years expired. Buckley v. F. L. Riley Mercantile Co., 155 Miss. 150, 124 So. 267, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 268 (Miss. 1929).

Trustee’s deed to purchaser showing on its face that sale was made after it was barred by statute of limitation held valid, where marginal reference was made within 6 months showing renewal of original indebtedness. McBride v. Burgin, 142 Miss. 859, 108 So. 148, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1926).

In a mortgagee’s declaratory judgment action, seeking subordination or extinguishment of 2 Small Business Administration liens against the mortgaged property, Mississippi law (§89-5-19) would be applied as the federal rule for establishing the relative priority of competing federal and private liens. Barhorst v. Armstrong, 42 F. 2, 1890 U.S. App. LEXIS 2098 (C.C.D. Ohio 1890).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In searching the records to determine the names and address of mortgagees pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Section 27-43-5, a clerk may rely upon the provisions of Section 89-5-19; he may consider as barred any lien which as of the date of the search appears to have been barred pursuant to the applicable statute of limitation at least six months prior to the date of the search for the debt secured thereby; and he need not give notice of the maturity of a tax sale to any mortgagee whose lien appears to be barred. McAdams, Feb. 18, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0055.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Reinstatement and restoration of mortgages released or discharged without authorization, as against subsequent purchasers, lienholders, judgment creditors, and the like, without notice. 35 A.L.R.2d 948.

Am. Jur.

51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions § 29.

CJS.

54 C.J.S., Limitation of Actions §§ 17, 52, 71 et seq.

§ 89-5-21. Entry of satisfaction upon record of mortgage or deed of trust.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (3), (4) and (5), any mortgagee or cestui que trust, or assignee of any mortgagee or cestui que trust, of real or personal estate, having received full payment of the money due by the mortgage or deed of trust, shall enter satisfaction upon the margin of the record of the mortgage or deed of trust, which entry shall be attested by the clerk of the chancery court and discharge and release the same, and shall bar all actions or suits brought thereon, and the title shall thereby revest in the grantor.
  2. Any such mortgagee or cestui que trust, or such assignee, by himself or his attorney, who does not, after payment of all sums owed, within one (1) month after written request, cancel on the record the mortgage or deed of trust shall forfeit the sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00), which can be recovered by suit on part of the party aggrieved, and if after request, he fails or refuses to make such acknowledgment of satisfaction, the person so neglecting or refusing shall forfeit and pay to the party aggrieved any sum not exceeding the mortgage money, to be recovered by action; but such entry of satisfaction may be made by anyone authorized to do it by the written authorization of the mortgagee or beneficiary, duly acknowledged and recorded, and shall have the same effect as if done by the mortgagee or beneficiary.
  3. With respect to a mortgage or deed of trust which states on its face that it secures a line of credit, satisfaction of record shall be accomplished and extinguishment shall occur as provided in subsection (5).
  4. As used in this section, the term “line of credit” means any loan, extension of credit or financing arrangement where the lender has agreed to make additional or future advances.
  5. Any mortgagee or cestui que trust, or the assignee of a mortgagee or cestui que trust, under a mortgage or deed of trust securing a line of credit shall, upon (a) the termination or maturity of the line of credit and the payment of all sums owing in connection with the line of credit, or (b) the payment of all sums owing in connection with the line of credit and a written request by the debtor to cancel the line of credit and the mortgage or deed of trust securing the line of credit, enter satisfaction upon the margin of the record of the mortgage or deed of trust, which entry shall be attested by the clerk of the chancery court and discharge and release the same, and shall bar all actions or suits brought thereon, and the title shall thereby revest in the grantor. For the purpose of this subsection (5), the requirement of a written request by the debtor may be satisfied by a prospective creditor’s delivery of a document, signed by the debtor, requesting cancellation of the line of credit and the mortgage or deed of trust securing the line of credit.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (33, 34); 1857, ch. 36, art. 14; 1871, § 2297; 1880, § 1206; 1892, § 2451; 1906, § 2781; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2285; 1930, § 2155; 1942, § 876; Laws, 1948, ch. 233, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 497, § 2; Laws, 1999, ch. 570, § 2; Laws, 2000, ch. 580, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved May 20, 2000).

Amendment Notes —

The 1999 amendment deleted former (2) through (5), and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; and added (4).

The 2000 amendment substituted “subsections (3), (4) and (5)” for “section” in (1); and inserted (3) and redesignated former (3) and (4) as present (4) and (5).

Cross References —

Extinguishment of mortgage or deed of trust, see §89-1-49.

Acknowledgment of satisfaction by trustee, see §89-1-51.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Recovery of penalty.

3. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

Statute providing penalty for failure to cancel mortgage after payment is penal and strictly construed against party aggrieved. Brown v. Yarbrough, 130 Miss. 715, 94 So. 887, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1922).

Section [Code 1942, § 876] applies to deeds of trust on personalty. Coon v. Robinson Mercantile Co., 110 Miss. 700, 70 So. 884, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 192 (Miss. 1916).

Action may be brought under this section [Code 1942, § 876] although mortgage in describing property gave lot number and addition but omitted block number. Pierce v. Kingston Lumber Co., 90 Miss. 216, 43 So. 81, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 40 (Miss. 1907).

The case must fall literally within the act. British & American Mortg. Co. v. Burke, 80 Miss. 643, 32 So. 51, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 291 (Miss. 1902).

The right to the penalty prescribed by this section [Code 1942, § 876] depends upon strict compliance with the statute. Requests which are not literally correct will not support an action for failure to acknowledge satisfaction of the mortgage. British & American Mortg. Co. v. Burke, 80 Miss. 643, 32 So. 51, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 291 (Miss. 1902); Lutz v. Hartman Mercantile Co., 41 So. 1039 (Miss. 1906).

2. Recovery of penalty.

Under statute mortgagor could recover actual damages for delay, and additional penalty where failure to cancel was due to mortgagee’s gross negligence. Dawkins v. Federal Land Bank, 170 Miss. 701, 155 So. 166, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 142 (Miss. 1934).

Whether delay in cancellation was due to request of plaintiff held for jury. Dawkins v. Federal Land Bank, 170 Miss. 701, 155 So. 166, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 142 (Miss. 1934).

Cestui que trust not cancelled in trust deed on request believing clerk would cancel it, on presenting cancelled note, held not subject to penalty. Johns v. Ferguson, 153 Miss. 807, 121 So. 485, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1929).

Statement held not sufficient request for cancellation to authorize recovery of penalty. Freeman v. McCormick Motorcar Co., 153 Miss. 474, 121 So. 138, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1929).

Where crops grown on rented land were delivered to mortgagor with landlord’s consent, in payment of debt, mortgagor was liable for failure to enter satisfaction on margin of record. Coon v. Robinson Mercantile Co., 110 Miss. 700, 70 So. 884, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 192 (Miss. 1916).

3. Miscellaneous.

To the extent one of a bank’s deeds of trust was secondary to a lienholder’s deed of trust by virtue of the filing date, equitable subrogation applied because the bank’s loan was secured by a corresponding deed of trust for the same property, which was allowed to be pledged by the same person for the debt of a family member’s company and the bank never cancelled its other deeds of trust. Pennington Group, LLC v. PriorityOne Bank, 228 So.3d 880, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 59 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 229 So.3d 119, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 370 (Miss. 2017).

Chancery court properly found that the foreclosure a lienholder conducted was subject to the first priority lien position of a bank because the bank had a priority lien by virtue of its prior deeds of trust; it would be inequitable to hold that the bank lost its priority lien position to the lienholder, the wife and mother of the debtors to whom the bank showed favor by stopping its foreclosure proceedings and issuing another loan, a loan whose purpose was to refinance a business debt. Pennington Group, LLC v. PriorityOne Bank, 228 So.3d 880, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 59 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 229 So.3d 119, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 370 (Miss. 2017).

Company acquiring through mesne conveyances realty sold by insane person’s guardian after releases thereof by court orders from recorded trust deed substituted for trust deeds, released on record by trustees, as security for loan of ward’s funds to guardian, held without constructive notice of such instruments and hence not liable for balance due ward from guardian, where substituted deed erroneously described property. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Crymes, 169 Miss. 701, 153 So. 803, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1934).

Where appellee objected below to introduction of trust deed releases because not made exhibits to answer on cross-bill, objection that no entry was made on margin of record held unavailable in supreme court. Hardin v. West, 163 Miss. 839, 143 So. 697, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 1932).

Title of assignees of second trust deed held dependent upon validity of fraudulent cancellation of first trust deed by trustee. Eagle Lumber & Supply Co. v. De Weese, 163 Miss. 602, 135 So. 490, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1931).

Where trustee in trust deed satisfied trust deed on record and took second trust deed, payable to himself and assigned latter to secure his individual indebtedness, assignees were charged constructively with notice that second trust deed omitted name of real beneficiary. Eagle Lumber & Supply Co. v. De Weese, 163 Miss. 602, 135 So. 490, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 4 (Miss. 1931).

Cancellation of mortgage without attestation by clerk held not constructive notice. Felt v. Covington, 134 Miss. 466, 99 So. 1, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 272 (Miss. 1924).

Statement at beginning of tax deed that “I, Lent I. Rice, the tax collector of the county of Tallahatchie, did” sell the land, not a signature of deed. Rainey v. Lamb Hardwood Lumber Co., 91 Miss. 690, 45 So. 367, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 178 (Miss. 1907).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Requiring security as condition of canceling of record mortgage or lien, or of recording payment. 2 A.L.R.2d 1064.

Damages recoverable for real-estate mortgagee’s refusal to discharge mortgage or give partial release therefrom. 8 A.L.R.4th 853.

Am. Jur.

55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages §§ 404, 420 et seq.

13 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Mortgages § 179:579.1.

CJS.

59 C.J.S., Mortgages §§ 593 et seq.

Law Reviews.

The effect of bankruptcy and encumbrances on mineral interests in Mississippi. 53 Miss. L. J. 551, December, 1983.

§ 89-5-23. Oil, gas, and mineral leases; cancellation of record upon expiration.

  1. Whenever any oil, gas and mineral lease which is now or may hereafter be recorded in any county of this state shall expire or terminate, the holder of such oil, gas and mineral lease, or the last assignee of record thereof, as the case may be, shall be required to cancel of record such oil, gas and mineral lease by entering upon the margin of the record of such lease, a notation that said oil, gas and mineral lease has terminated and expired, which entry shall be attested by the clerk of the chancery court and shall discharge and release the lands therein described from said oil, gas and mineral lease; or the holder or last assignee of record, as the case may be, of an oil, gas and mineral lease may execute an instrument, duly recordable under the laws of this state, stating that the said oil, gas and mineral lease has expired and terminated and that no further rights or claims will be asserted thereunder.

    The chancery clerk shall be allowed a fee of One Dollar ($1.00) for making such cancellation, and shall not be required to index same on sectional index but shall be required to note the cancellation on the margin of the record where said lease is recorded and if said cancellation is by separate instrument he shall note the cancellation on the margin where lease is recorded showing book and page of said instrument of cancellation.

  2. If the holder of an oil, gas and mineral lease or the last assignee of record, as the case may be, shall not, within one (1) month after written request made by the lessor or his assigns, cancel on the record said oil, gas and mineral lease, or furnish proof, as above provided, that the same has expired and terminated, the lessee or the last assignee of record, as the case may be, of such oil, gas and mineral lease, shall forfeit the sum of One Hundred Dollars ($100), which may be recovered by suit on the part of the party aggrieved.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 876-01; Laws, 1944, ch. 195, §§ 1, 2.

§ 89-5-24. Form of certain documents or instruments presented for recording; contents; exempt documents or instruments; additional recording fee for nonconforming documents or instruments.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (3) and (4), any document or instrument presented to the clerk of the chancery court for recording shall meet the following requirements:
    1. Each document or instrument shall consist of one or more individual pages printed only on one (1) side. The document or instrument shall not consist of pages that are permanently bound or in a continuous form and shall not have any attachment stapled or otherwise affixed to any page except as necessary to comply with statutory requirements. However, the individual pages of a document or instrument may be stapled together for presentation for recording. A label that is firmly attached with a bar code or return address may be accepted for recording.
    2. All documents must be printed or typed in a font no smaller than ten-point in size. If a document or instrument, other than a plat or survey or a drawing related to a plat or survey, presented for recording contains type smaller than ten-point type, the document or instrument shall be accompanied by an exact typewritten or printed copy that meets the requirements of this section.
    3. Each document shall be of sufficient legibility to produce a clear reproduction. If a document or instrument, other than a plat or survey or a drawing related to a plat or survey, is not sufficiently legible to produce a clear reproduction, the document or instrument shall be accompanied by an exact typewritten or printed copy that meets the type size requirements of paragraph (b) and shall be recorded contemporaneously as additional pages of the document or instrument.
    4. Each document or instrument, other than a plat or survey or a drawing related to a plat or survey, shall be on white paper of not less than twenty-pound weight. All text within the document or instrument shall be of sufficient color and clarity to ensure that the text is readable when reproduced from the record.
    5. All signatures on a document or instrument shall be in black or blue ink and of sufficient color and clarity to ensure that the signatures are of sufficient legibility to produce a clear reproduction when the document or instrument is reproduced from the record. The corresponding name shall be typed, printed or stamped beneath the original signature. The typing or printing of a name or the application of an embossed or inked stamp shall not cover or otherwise materially interfere with any part of the document or instrument except where provided by law. Failure to print or type signatures as required in this paragraph does not invalidate the document or instrument.
    6. The first page of each document or instrument, other than a plat or survey or a drawing related to a plat or survey, shall have a top margin of at least three (3) inches of vertical space from left to right which shall be reserved for the recorder’s use. All other margins on the document or instrument shall be a minimum of three-fourths (3/4) of one (1) inch. Nonessential information including, but not limited to, form numbers or customer notations may be placed in a margin other than the top margin. A document may be recorded if a minor portion of a seal or incidental writing extends into a margin. The recorder shall not incur any liability for failure to show a seal or information that extends beyond the margin of the permanent archival record.
  2. Each document or instrument, other than a plat or survey or a drawing related to a plat or survey, that is presented for recording and that contains any of the following information shall have that information on the first page below the three-inch margin:
    1. The name, physical business mailing address and business or employment telephone number of the individual who prepared the document; and the name, mailing address and telephone number of every grantor, grantee, borrower, beneficiary, trustee or other party to the instrument.
    2. A return address.
    3. The title of the document or instrument.
    4. Any address and telephone number required by Section 27-3-51, Mississippi Code of 1972.
    5. The legal description of the property or indexing instruction per Section 89-5-33(3). If there is insufficient space on the first page for the entire legal description or the entire indexing instruction, immediately succeeding pages shall be used.
  3. The following documents or instruments are exempt from the format requirements of this section:
    1. A document or instrument that was executed before July 1, 2009.
    2. A military separation document or instrument.
    3. A document or instrument executed outside the United States.
    4. A certified copy of a document or instrument issued by a court or governmental agency, including a vital record.
    5. A document or instrument where one (1) of the original parties is deceased or otherwise incapacitated.
    6. A document or instrument formatted to meet court requirements.
    7. A federal tax lien.
    8. A filing under the Uniform Commercial Code.
  4. The recorder shall record a document or instrument that does not substantially conform to the format standards specified in subsections (1) and (2) of this section upon payment of an additional recording fee of Ten Dollars ($10.00) per document or instrument. The fee shall be charged only for documents or instruments dated on or after July 1, 2009; this fee may not be charged for those documents or instruments specifically exempted in subsection (3).
  5. Failure to conform to the format standards specified in this section does not affect the validity or enforceability of the document or instrument.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 508, § 1; Laws, 2011, ch. 416, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 309, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2008, ch. 508, § 3, provides:

“SECTION 3. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 2009.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment effective from and after July 1, 2012, substituted “ten (10) point” for “eight (8) point” in (1)(b); rewrote (2)(a); and deleted former (2)(d) and (e), which read: “All grantors’ names” and “All grantees’ names; and redesignated former (2)(f) and (g) as present (2)(d) and (e).”

The 2014 amendment added “the name, mailing address and telephone number” following “prepared the document” in (2)(a).

§ 89-5-25. How instrument recorded and indexed; records public; copies.

  1. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the chancery court to whom any written instrument is delivered to be recorded, and which is properly recordable in his county, to record the same without delay, together with the acknowledgments of proofs and the certificates thereof, and also the plats of surveys, schedules, and other papers thereto annexed, by entering them word for word in a fair handwriting, or typewriting, or by filling up printed forms, or by recording by photostat machine or other equally permanent photographic or electronic process, and entering the hour and minute, the day of the month, and the year when the instrument was delivered to him for record, and when recorded. Records filed or stored electronically may be in addition to, or in lieu of, the physical record on paper. He shall also carefully preserve all instruments of writing, which are properly acknowledged and delivered to him to be recorded, and after recording deliver them to the party entitled thereto on demand. He shall also put a complete alphabetical index, both direct and reverse, to each book, except as provided in subsection (2), herein; and every person shall have access, at proper times, to such books, and be entitled to transcripts from the same on paying the lawful fees. He shall record the deeds and other instruments in the order of time in which they are filed for record as far as practicable.
  2. In counties having a population in excess of one hundred nineteen thousand (119,000) with an assessed valuation of all taxable property therein in excess of Sixty-three Million Dollars ($63,000,000.00), and having two (2) cities wholly located therein, each with a population in excess of thirty thousand (30,000) persons according to the preceding Federal Census, wherein the clerk of the chancery court has a well kept general index, both direct and reverse, for each kind or class of record books as required by Section 89-5-33, the board of supervisors may, by order spread upon its minutes, authorize the clerk of the chancery court to omit putting such index in each separate book of the records to which such general index is kept.
  3. This section shall not be construed to authorize and empower the boards of supervisors to purchase any photostat machines or other equally permanent photographic or electronic processes.
  4. From and after July 1, 2009, instruments to be recorded shall comply with the provisions of Section 89-5-24.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (8); 1857, ch. 36, art. 35; 1871, § 2318; 1880, § 1225; 1892, § 2474; 1906, § 2808; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2309; 1930, § 2157; 1942, § 878; Laws, 1944, ch. 196, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1962, ch. 239; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 40; Laws, 2008, ch. 508, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2008, ch. 508, § 3, provides:

“SECTION 3. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 2009.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2008 amendment added (4).

Cross References —

Duties of chancery clerk generally, see §§9-5-135,9-5-137.

Lost records, see §§25-55-1 et seq.

Recording of releases of powers of appointment, see §91-15-17.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Priority.

1. In general.

Looseleaf book held “well-bound book” within statute. Richardson v. Woolard, 133 Miss. 417, 97 So. 808, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 156 (Miss. 1923).

2. Priority.

Cross-defendant refinancing bank was not entitled to equitable subrogation to step into the original lender’s shoes for priority over four cross-defendant judgment creditors because the property was in the debtor/borrower’s infant daughter’s name until the day of closing and if the bank had inquired of liens under the debtor’s name, the judgment creditors’ liens would have been found, thus, because the judgment creditors’ liens were filed before the refinancing mortgage was filed, and they attached upon the property being reconveyed from the minor back to the debtor, under Miss. Code Ann. §§89-5-3,89-5-25, the bank was last in priority. Shavers v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Shavers), 418 B.R. 589, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3411 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2009).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Negligence in preparing abstract of title as ground of liability to one other than person ordering abstract. 50 A.L.R.4th 314.

§ 89-5-27. Receipt for instruments delivered to chancery clerk for recording.

The clerk of the chancery court, or his deputy, shall give a receipt for every written instrument delivered to him to be recorded, if demanded, in which he shall state the name of the parties, the date of delivery and quantity of land or other property therein specified, and shall also certify on or under such instrument the hour and minute, the day and month, and the year when he received it; and when the same is recorded, he shall make an appropriate reference where it is recorded, and an itemized statement of his fees therefor, and he shall deliver it to the party entitled to receive it when called for.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (10); 1857, ch. 36, art. 36; 1871, § 2319; 1880, § 1223; 1892, § 2471; 1906, § 2805; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2306; 1930, § 2156; 1942, § 877; Laws, 1924, ch. 228; Laws, 1928, ch. 199; Laws, 1952, ch. 342; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 41, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1994).

§ 89-5-29. Mortgages and deeds of trust on land; how recorded.

Except as hereinafter provided, all mortgages and deeds of trust upon land given to secure the payment of money, and all instruments of writing whereby a trustee is substituted under any such deed of trust, and all instruments of writing canceling or satisfying, or authorizing the cancellation or satisfaction of any such mortgage or deed of trust, shall be recorded separately from other instruments relating to land or records, and such records shall be called “records of mortgages and deeds of trust on land.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 2809; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2310; 1930, § 2158; 1942, § 879; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 42, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1994).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Recordation of real estate mortgages and deed of trust of land in the chattel deed records is ineffectual. Seal v. Anderson, 235 Miss. 249, 108 So. 2d 864, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 422 (Miss. 1959).

Recording appointment of substituted trustee in deed book instead of mortgage records held a compliance with statute. Camp v. Celtic Land & Improv. Co., 129 Miss. 417, 91 So. 897, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1922).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Negligence in preparing abstract of title as ground of liability to one other than person ordering abstract. 50 A.L.R.4th 314.

Am. Jur.

55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages §§ 404, 420 et seq.

CJS.

59 C.J.S., Mortgages §§ 257 et seq.

§ 89-5-31. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1993, ch. 546, § 2, eff from and after January 1, 1994.

[Codes, 1906, § 2810; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2311; 1930, § 2159; 1942, § 880; Laws, 1946, ch. 172, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former section 89-5-31 provided for the indexing of mortgages and deeds of trust on land. Similar provisions may now be found in section 89-5-33.

§ 89-5-33. General index; direct and reverse.

  1. The clerk of the chancery court shall provide a general index, direct and reverse, on which shall be entered, in regular alphabetical order under the appropriate letter, the name of each maker of the instrument and the name of each person to whom made; and in like alphabetical order under its appropriate title shall be entered the name of each person to whom the instrument is made and the name of each person by whom made. A general index, both direct and reverse, of mortgages and deeds of trust on land shall be kept separate from the general index to other records which the chancery clerk is required to keep, and he shall make the proper entries in it as he is required to make in the other general index. Immediately on receipt of any instrument to be recorded, the clerk shall make these entries in the appropriate general index and, after recording the instrument, the book and page in which the record is made shall be noted opposite each name thus placed in such general index, both direct and reverse.
  2. The clerk of the chancery court shall maintain a sectional index to instruments describing land which are also entered in the general index. Each entry shall state the name of each maker of the instrument, the name of each person to whom made, and the date, type of instrument and the appropriate reference where recorded. Opposite each such entry, the sectional index shall indicate the location of the land described in the instrument (a) by quarter section or governmental lot or other applicable subdivision of each section, township and range established by governmental survey, or (b) by lot number for platted subdivisions, official surveys, and unofficial subdivisions and surveys commonly in use. The clerk may elect to keep the sectional index by quarter-quarter section rather than by the quarter section, but shall not require a preparer’s indexing instruction to describe the quarter-quarter section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, every instrument describing land and required to be entered in the general index shall also be entered in the sectional index. In the event of conflict between the general and the sectional indices, the notice imparted by the general index shall prevail except to the extent the land is described by lot number for platted subdivisions, official surveys, and unofficial subdivisions and surveys commonly in use, the sectional index shall prevail.
  3. Every surveyor or other person who prepares a legal description of land or who prepares an instrument utilizing an existing description and every person who prepares a deed of trust shall (except as herein provided) include an indexing instruction which shall state the section, township and range and one or more quarter sections or governmental lots or other applicable subdivisions of each section in which the land is located. The preparer, at his option, may elect to note the quarter-quarter section in which the land is located, but shall not be required to do so. However, if the section or quarter sections or governmental lots or other applicable subdivisions of the section cannot feasibly be determined by such surveyor or other person, the indexing instruction shall contain a statement to that effect and shall then state all of the sections and quarter sections or governmental lots or other applicable subdivisions of the section in which the described land could possibly be located. The indexing instruction shall be distinctly set apart in the instrument so as to be readily apparent to the chancery clerk. A chancery clerk shall refuse to accept delivery of an instrument which does not contain the indexing instruction required in this section unless the instrument otherwise discloses the information required to be included in an indexing instruction. To be accepted for recording, an instrument shall state the name, address and telephone number of the person, entity or firm preparing it. If prepared by an attorney, the instrument shall also include the attorney’s Mississippi bar number. The fact that the indexing instruction or preparer information may be omitted, incorrect, incomplete or false shall not invalidate the instrument or the filing thereof for record. The chancery clerk shall enter the instrument in the sectional index according to the indexing instruction, or equivalent information if accepted for filing without an indexing instruction, and shall make no entries under any other quarter sections or governmental lots or subdivisions of the section. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the following kinds of instruments shall be indexed as stated:
    1. Instruments describing land by reference to officially platted subdivisions or to official surveys or to unofficial subdivisions and surveys commonly in use will not require an indexing instruction and shall be indexed in the general index and the sectional index for such subdivision or survey without further requirement.
    2. Instruments describing land or interests in land solely by reference to previously recorded instruments or affecting previously recorded instruments shall not require an indexing instruction and need not be entered in the sectional index but shall be entered in the general index and noted on the margin of the previously recorded instrument. Instruments describing land or interests in land by specific description of certain parcels and, for other parcels, by reference to previously recorded instruments, shall be entered in the sectional index according to the indexing instruction for the specific description and also noted on the margin of the previously recorded instrument, in addition to the general index.
    3. Instruments containing blanket descriptions of all land within a stated geographic area without specific description shall be entered in a separate part of the sectional index or in an index of indefinite records or an index of blanket conveyances in addition to the general index.
    4. Instruments describing land in irregular sections (all or any part of a section not capable of being divided into quarter sections for indexing purposes) shall be entered in the general index and in an appropriate sectional index maintained by the chancery clerk. The indexing instruction, however, shall be proper and complete if it states no more than the number of the irregular section or sections in which the land is located or, as above provided, in which the land could possibly be located. When an instrument describes land within an irregular section according to officially platted subdivisions or to official surveys or to unofficial subdivisions or surveys commonly in use, it shall be indexed in the sectional index for such subdivisions or surveys.
  4. When an instrument has been restored to service from microfilm or other archived record, the chancery clerk shall enter a notation on the margin stating that it is a substituted record and stating the date on which it was restored to service. Such marginal notation shall then constitute notice that the general index must be examined for instruments filed prior to such date which may have been noted on the margin of the original record but do not appear on the margin of the restored record.
  5. The clerk of the chancery court shall enter instruments in the sectional index by the end of the twentieth day the office is open following the day on which the instrument is filed, except for records of tax sales.
  6. If the chancery clerk elects to abbreviate the names of parties to an instrument in the indices, the clerk shall maintain a list of standard abbreviations used for that purpose and shall adhere to such list.
  7. The clerk of the chancery court shall not correct or alter an entry made in any index, whether kept manually or by computer, unless the date and time of the change is clearly disclosed on the revised record.
  8. If insufficient space is available for making entries on the margin of a recorded instrument, the chancery clerk may enter on the margin a reference where a continuation sheet is located.
  9. Except as expressly provided herein, nothing contained in this section shall be construed to modify the requirements of other statutes regarding the duties of the clerk of the chancery court to index and record instruments affecting the title to land.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, § 2320; 1880, § 1224; 1892, § 2472; 1906, § 2806; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2307; 1930, § 2160; 1942, § 881; Laws, 1993, ch. 546, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 521, § 43; Laws, 2008, ch. 356, § 1; Laws, 2009, ch. 442, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in subsection (3). In the third sentence of (3), an apparent typographical error was corrected by substituting “determined by such survey or other person” for “determined by such survey or other person.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its April 26, 2001, meeting.

Subsequently a publishing error was corrected by substituting the word “surveyor” for “survey” so that the phrase read “determined by such surveyor or other person.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 546, § 3, effective January 1, 1994, provides as follows:

“SECTION 3. Nothing in this act shall be construed to require chancery clerks to alter records filed prior to January 1, 1994, nor shall this act be construed to affect land titles prior to January 1, 1994.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2008 amendment inserted “and every person who prepares a deed of trust” near the beginning of (3).

The 2009 amendment added the seventh sentence in (3).

Cross References —

Filing of brownfield agreements, see §49-35-17.

Persons who for compensation write deeds of conveyance, deeds of trust, mortgages or contracts, or make or certify abstracts of title to certain real estate, held to be engaged in the practice of law, see §73-3-55.

Recording of release of power of appointment, see §91-15-17.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Conflict between indices.

2. Validity.

1. Conflict between indices.

Summary judgment was properly awarded to a bank in a company’s suit alleging that it was a bona fide purchaser of property for value without notice of the bank’s deed of trust because under Miss. Code Ann. §89-5-33(2), the company had a duty to search the general index, as it prevailed over an incorrect entry in the sectional index. Alamac LLC v. Travelers Bank & Trust, 941 So. 2d 219, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 711 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

2. Validity.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the neighbors in their action against other neighbors to have fences removed was appropriate under Miss. Code Ann. §89-5-33(3) because the misnomer in the original deed transfer did not invalidate the restrictive covenants, and even if it had, the developer followed the necessary steps to correct the defect; accordingly, the other neighbors’ argument that the deed transfers were invalid was without merit. Journeay v. Berry, 953 So. 2d 1145, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 228 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Statute does not require cancellations or assignments of deed of trust to bear legal description but it does require that any person who prepares an instrument “utilizing an existing description” to include an indexing instruction for sectional index. Amos, March 2, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0070.

Chancery Clerk of county could use proposed parcel numbers system as official sectional index of county without being in violation of Section 89-5-33. O’Beirne, March 9, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-0971.

Chancery Clerk should not refuse to accept for recording instrument that does not have information required under 89-5-33(3) and no penalty should be imposed for accepting it. Thomas, March 9, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0016.

Indexing information does not have to be part of legal description and can be stated in separate part of instrument or as exhibit. Thomas, March 9, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0016.

If the records of the Chancery Clerk’s Office are stored electronically and there is therefore no book and page, they may be assigned a properly indexed unique identifier which will make them readily accessible to the general public; such records must be cross-referenced as required by Section 89-5-33 and, also, any electronically maintained records must be accessible to the public in accordance with the Public Records Act. McAdams, Jan. 10, 2003, A.G. Op. #02-0760.

§ 89-5-35. How certain conveyances indexed.

Every conveyance by a sheriff, constable, marshal, master, commissioner, executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or other person, in an official or representative character, shall be indexed by the clerk in proper alphabetical order as the conveyance of each person who executed it, and, in like manner, as the conveyance of each person whose property is sold and conveyed; and, for failure herein, he shall be liable in damages and for a penalty of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) to any person sustaining damage by such failure.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1226; 1892, § 2473; 1906, § 2807; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2308; 1930, § 2161; 1942, § 882.

Cross References —

Conveyances by masters, commissioners, sheriffs and constables, see §89-1-27.

Forms of conveyances by sheriffs, constables, or persons acting in representative or official character, see §§89-1-65,89-1-67.

§ 89-5-37. Name of beneficiary must be disclosed in mortgage or deed of trust to be recorded; exception.

The clerk of the chancery court, or his deputy, shall not record any mortgage or deed of trust in which the name of the beneficiary is not disclosed therein, and if such instrument is recorded it shall not impart notice to anyone. But the preceding sentence shall not apply if the mortgage or deed of trust discloses as beneficiary the name of an agent or other representative designated as such of one or more holders of the secured indebtedness in which event there shall be no requirement to disclose the holders of promissory notes, bonds, certificates of participation, trustee’s certificates or the like secured by the mortgage or deed of trust. The assignment or transfer of a secured indebtedness need not be filed for record nor entered on the margin of the record if the holder thereof is represented by an agent, trustee or the like disclosed as beneficiary in the mortgage or deed of trust.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (10); 1857, ch. 36, art. 36; 1871, § 2319; 1880, § 1223; 1892, § 2471; 1906, § 2805; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2306; 1930, § 2156; 1942, § 877; Laws, 1924, ch. 228; Laws, 1928, ch. 199; Laws, 1952, ch. 342; Laws, 1988, ch. 428, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 23, 1988).

Cross References —

Application of the exceptions provided in this section to the requirement that transfers of record-debts be noted on the record, see §89-5-15.

Application of the exceptions provided in this section to the requirement that assignments of indebtedness be marked on the record, see §89-5-17.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Prohibition against notice by an improperly recorded deed of trust applies to constructive notice only and would not prevent actual notice. Borries v. Goshen Mortgage, 219 So.3d 593, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 276 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

Beneficiary deed of trust was not void because it identified the note, date of the note, and payment schedule, and thus, the beneficiary could, with simple review, have been reasonably certain. Borries v. Goshen Mortgage, 219 So.3d 593, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 276 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

Chancery court properly granted a lender’s successor summary judgment in its action seeking a declaratory judgment that it held a first-priority deed of trust on real property because there was no genuine issue of material fact that the successor had actual knowledge of the defective deed of trust or a beneficiary’s lien; the managing member of the settlement agent for the lender swore that the lender had no knowledge of any other deed of trust. Borries v. Goshen Mortgage, 219 So.3d 593, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 276 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

District court did not err in finding that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), validly assigned the deed of trust on the homeowners’ home to the lender, which in turned assigned the home to another lender, the company that ultimately sold the homeowners’ home via foreclosure sale; under governing state law, the appellate court therefore must enforce the clear terms of the deed of trust that empowered MERS to make subsequent assignments. Burton v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 642 Fed. Appx. 422, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5890 (5th Cir. Miss. 2016).

Tenant’s goods and chattels, which he conveyed by recorded trust deed to trustee as security for indebtedness to decedent’s estate, held subject to payment of rent, where landlord had no actual notice of such deed, which did not sufficiently disclose beneficiary to constitute constructive notice of its contents, and tenant represented throughout that goods were free from any lien. Life Ins. Co. v. Page, 178 Miss. 287, 172 So. 873, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 206 (Miss. 1937).

Recorded trust deed, conveying chattels to trustee as security for indebtedness to estate of named decedent, did not sufficiently disclose beneficiary to constitute constructive notice of its contents. Life Ins. Co. v. Page, 178 Miss. 287, 172 So. 873, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 206 (Miss. 1937).

Evidence held not to sustain finding that named mortgagee was not beneficiary as required for record to constitute notice defeating lien of mortgagor’s trustee. National Stockyards Nat'l Bank v. Isaacs, 146 Miss. 369, 112 So. 1, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 235 (Miss. 1927).

§ 89-5-39. Books of record not to be removed.

A book of record of conveyances shall not be removed by writ or subpoena duces tecum, or otherwise, before any court, out of the courthouse in which such record is kept, when a certified copy or transcript may be given in evidence.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (22); 1857, ch. 36, art. 34; 1871, § 2317; 1880, § 1228; 1892, § 2476; 1906, § 2813; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2314; 1930, § 2164; 1942, § 885.

Cross References —

Admissibility in evidence of certified copies of records, see §§13-1-77 et seq.

§ 89-5-41. Records in counties divided into two districts.

Where it is not now so provided by law, in any county divided into two (2) districts for circuit and chancery courts, the board of supervisors may, by an order entered on its minutes, to go into effect six (6) weeks thereafter, require the clerk of the chancery court to transcribe into new record books the record of all conveyances theretofore made, and record all conveyances thereafter made affecting property situated wholly or partly in the district not before having the records; and all conveyances shall thereafter be recorded only in the proper district. And the records of conveyances in such district shall be kept and have the same effect as if they were several counties.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2477; 1906, § 2814; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2315; 1930, § 2165; 1942, § 886.

§ 89-5-43. Penalty on clerk for failure of duty.

Any clerk who shall refuse or fail to perform any of the duties herein required shall, for every such refusal or neglect, be liable on his official bond to any party injured for all damages which such party may have sustained by reason of the nonperformance of such duty.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (11); 1857, ch. 36, art. 37; 1871, § 2321; 1880, § 1229; 1892, § 2478; 1906, § 2815; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2316; 1930, § 2166; 1942, § 887.

Cross References —

Criminal penalty for failure to perform duty, see §97-11-37.

§ 89-5-45. Substitution of trustee must appear of record; general substitution allowed for certain beneficiaries.

Sales of land made under deeds of trust by substituted trustees shall not convey the interest of the grantor or grantors therein, but shall be absolutely null and void, both at law and in equity, unless the substitution shall appear of record in the office of the chancery clerk of the county where the land is situated, and unless it shall so appear by being actually spread at large upon the record before the first advertisement or notice of sale shall have been posted or published; the filing for record or lodging with the clerk not being sufficient. Such substitution, however, may so appear by a separate instrument recorded as above set out in all respects, or a copy of such substitution may be recorded as above set out. Provided, however, that where the beneficiary named in the deed of trust is an agency of the United States or the State of Mississippi, a national or state chartered bank or savings and loan association, a federal land bank, a production credit association, or an insurance company, the beneficiary may substitute the trustee named therein and the trustee named in all deeds of trust held by such beneficiary in the county, by recording in the office of the chancery clerk in the county where the land encumbered is situated one (1) instrument designated as a general substitution. It shall not be necessary for the general substitution to identify individually deeds of trust affected, or the grantors therein, it being sufficient if the instrument recites the name and address of the beneficiary and declares that its purpose is to name a substitute trustee for all mortgages or deeds of trust held by the named beneficiary which are recorded in the county. All general substitutions shall be indexed by the chancery clerk in a separate book especially designated for such purpose.

HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 2773; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2277; 1930, § 2168; 1942, § 890; Laws, 1896, ch. 96; Laws, 1983, ch. 328, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

Cross References —

Place of sale under execution, see §13-3-161.

Sales under deeds of trust or mortgages generally, see §89-1-55.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Right to appoint substituted trustee.

3. Recording of appointment of substituted trustee.

4. Effect of void sale.

5. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

Recording means copying instrument into public records in book kept for purpose by or under superintendence of officer therefor. White v. Stennis, 151 Miss. 765, 118 So. 902, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 377 (Miss. 1928).

Sale under trust deed by substituted trustee is void unless appointment recorded in chancery clerk’s office in county of land’s situs. Camp v. Celtic Land & Improv. Co., 129 Miss. 417, 91 So. 897, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1922).

Substitution must precede sale. Provine v. Thornton, 92 Miss. 395, 46 So. 950, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 253 (Miss. 1908).

Instrument substituting trustee is of record from time delivered to clerk. Brown v. British American Mortg. Co., 86 Miss. 388, 38 So. 312, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1905).

Recording of instrument of substitution contemporaneous with sale complies with law. Brown v. British American Mortg. Co., 86 Miss. 388, 38 So. 312, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1905).

Failure to record substitution before sale renders sale void, though duly recorded thereafter. Hyde v. Hoffman, 31 So. 415 (Miss. 1902).

A sale of land under a deed of trust made by a duly appointed substituted trustee before his appointment was filed for record, is void, though the appointment was duly filed thereafter. Hyde v. Hoffman, 31 So. 415 (Miss. 1902).

Sale by substituted trustee void unless substitution placed of record before sale. Shipp v. New South Bldg. & Loan Asso., 81 Miss. 17, 32 So. 904, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1902); Polk v. S. S. Dale & Sons, 93 Miss. 664, 47 So. 386, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1908).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 890], the writing appointing a substituted trustee must be of record before a valid sale under a trust deed can be made by him. White v. Jenkins, 79 Miss. 57, 28 So. 570, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1901); Shipp v. New South Bldg. & Loan Asso., 81 Miss. 17, 32 So. 904, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1902).

2. Right to appoint substituted trustee.

The executor of the estate of the mortgagee in a deed of trust is empowered to appoint a substitute trustee where such power was specifically given in the deed trust to the mortgagee or his assignes. White v. Hesdorffer, 202 Miss. 711, 32 So. 2d 442, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1947).

Liquidating agent of insolvent bank held its legal representative within provision of deed of trust giving bank authority to substitute trustee. Stringer v. Price, 143 Miss. 189, 108 So. 431, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1926).

Provision that beneficiary, executor, administrator, or assigns, under his hand and seal, could appoint substitute trustee, did not require substitution under hand and seal of original beneficiary but could be done by assignee. Scruggs v. Northern, 123 Miss. 169, 85 So. 89, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 1920).

Provision of deed of trust that beneficiary, assignee, or legal representative might appoint another trustee, where trustee refused to act, gave corporation assignee right to appoint substituted trustee. West v. Union Naval Stores Co., 117 Miss. 153, 77 So. 961, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 160 (Miss. 1918).

The attorney in fact of the beneficiary of a deed of trust cannot appoint a substituted trustee where the deed provides for the appointment “by the beneficiary or any holder of the notes secured or their legal representatives.” Allen v. Alliance Trust Co., 84 Miss. 319, 36 So. 285, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 40 (Miss. 1904).

3. Recording of appointment of substituted trustee.

Substitution of the trustee under a deed of trust of land should be recorded in the records of mortgages and deeds of trust on land, rather than in the chattel mortgages and deeds of trust records. Seal v. Anderson, 235 Miss. 249, 108 So. 2d 864, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 422 (Miss. 1959).

Placement of the name of the county in the space provided for that of the substituted trustee and the name of the substituted trustee in the space provided for the county in a substitution of trustee in a deed of trust referred to by book and page, there being two pages in the book numbered the same as that specified in the substitution, violated strict compliance with this section [Code 1942, § 890] and probably so deterred the average layman from bidding at a subsequent foreclosure sale as to render the sale voidable. Federal Land Bank v. Collom, 201 Miss. 266, 28 So. 2d 126, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 357 (Miss. 1946).

Where substitution of trustee under trust mortgage was pasted or written on margin of record of mortgage before first notice of foreclosure sale was posted or published, foreclosure by substituted trustee was valid. Federal Land Bank v. McCraney, 171 Miss. 191, 157 So. 248, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 218 (Miss. 1934).

Attorney’s copying substitution of trustees in deed of trust book, neither beneficiary nor clerk being present, was unauthorized and sale by substituted trustee was void. White v. Stennis, 151 Miss. 765, 118 So. 902, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 377 (Miss. 1928).

Appointment of substituted trustee by writing addressed to chancery clerk of county, specifying substitution, held sufficient to vest substituted trustee with power to maintain suit in replevin for property covered by deed of trust. Stringer v. Price, 143 Miss. 189, 108 So. 431, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1926).

Recording appointment of substituted trustee in deed book instead of mortgage record held a compliance with statute. Camp v. Celtic Land & Improv. Co., 129 Miss. 417, 91 So. 897, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1922).

Substitution of trustee appears of record and is spread thereon when written on margin by clerk and signed by beneficiary. King v. Jones, 121 Miss. 319, 83 So. 531, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1919).

Substitution of trustee may be by separate writing attached to original. Watkins v. McDonald, 41 So. 376 (Miss. 1906).

4. Effect of void sale.

Where a county, which had become the purchaser of land upon foreclosure of a deed of trust held by it, and had received a deed thereto from a subsequent trustee, but had obtained no title because the substitution of the trustee was not made a matter of record as required by statute, sold the land under an order of the board of supervisors, which was void in that the order had been made at a special meeting, the call for which failed to make provision, either expressly or impliedly, for taking up the matter of the sale and conveyance of the land, a later valid foreclosure of the trust deed and the purchase by the county did not inure to the benefit of the would-be purchaser under the void sale by the board, so as to render her title good, since such would-be purchaser had been affected with notice of the illegality of the first foreclosure and the conveyance following it made to her, and persons dealing with members of the board of supervisors, who are trustees for the public and bound by the limitations fixed by law on their powers, must take notice of their powers and cannot acquire rights where they are acting beyond their authority. Simpson County v. Floyd, 192 Miss. 501, 6 So. 2d 580, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1942).

5. Miscellaneous.

Trustee did not lack authority to conduct a foreclosure sale because the initial deed of trust named him as trustee the record was devoid of any substitution of a trustee. Hall v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 210 So.3d 1002, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 157 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).

Substituted trustee could resell where first sale void because substitution not recorded. Polk v. S. S. Dale & Sons, 93 Miss. 664, 47 So. 386, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1908).

Trustee appointed by mortgagee under provision providing for such appointment in default of payment to foreclose same, is not a substituted trustee. Searles v. Kelley, Simmons & Co., 88 Miss. 228, 40 So. 484, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 1906).

Instrument by corporation substituting trustee not void because not under seal. Brown v. British American Mortg. Co., 86 Miss. 388, 38 So. 312, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1905).

§§ 89-5-47 through 89-5-53. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1989, ch. 515, § 9, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

§89-5-47. [Codes, 1930, § 2171; 1942, § 893; Laws, 1924, ch. 226]

§89-5-49. [Codes, 1930, § 2172; 1942, § 894; Laws, 1924, ch. 226]

§89-5-51. [Codes, 1930, § 2173; 1942, § 895; Laws, 1924, ch. 226]

§89-5-53. [Codes, 1930, § 2174; 1942, § 896; Laws, 1924, ch. 226; Laws, 1978, ch. 529 § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §89-5-47 specified the place for filing notice of a federal tax lien. For provisions governing filing of federal tax liens from and after January 1, 1990, see Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act, §§85-8-1 et seq.

Former §89-5-49 required notice of a federal tax lien to be entered in a federal tax lien index. For provisions governing filing of federal tax liens from and after January 1, 1990, see Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act, §§85-8-1 et seq.

Former §89-5-51 related to entering notice of discharge of a lien. For provisions governing filing of federal tax liens from and after January 1, 1990, see Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act, §§85-8-1 et seq.

Former §89-5-53 provided for compensation of the chancery clerk for filing and indexing notice of lien, and each certificate of discharge. For provisions governing filing of federal tax liens from and after January 1, 1990, see Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act, §§85-8-1 et seq.

Article 3. Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act.

§ 89-5-101. Short title.

This article may be cited as the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act.

HISTORY: Laws, 2011, ch. 364, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Comparable Laws from other States —

Alabama: Code of Ala. §§35-4-120 et seq.

Arizona: A.R.S. §§ 11-487 et seq.

Arkansas: A.C.A. §§14-15-301 et seq.

Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 7-35aa et seq.

Florida: Fla. Stat. § 695.27

Idaho: Idaho Code § 31-2901 et seq.

Hawaii: HRS § 502-121 et seq.

Illinois: 765 ILCS 33/1 et seq.

Kansas: K.S.A. § 58-4401 et seq.

Michigan: MCLS § 565.841 et seq.

Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 111.366 et seq.

New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §14-9A-1 et seq.

North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47-16.1 et seq.

Oklahoma: 16 Okl. St. § 86.1 et seq.

South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. §30-6-10 et seq.

Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §§66-24-201 et seq.

Texas: Tex. Prop. Code § 15.001 et seq.

Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-142.10 et seq.

Washington: Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 65.24.010 et seq.

§ 89-5-103. Definitions.

In this article:

  1. “Document” means information that is:
    1. Inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form; and
    2. Eligible to be recorded in the land records maintained by the chancery clerk.
  2. “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
  3. “Electronic document” means a document that is received by the chancery clerk in an electronic form.
  4. “Electronic signature” means an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a document and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the document.
  5. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public corporation, government, or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity.
  6. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

HISTORY: Laws, 2011, ch. 364, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

§ 89-5-105. Validity of electronic documents.

If a law requires, as a condition for recording, that a document be an original, be on paper or another tangible medium, or be in writing, the requirement is satisfied by an electronic document satisfying this article.

If a law requires, as a condition for recording, that a document be signed, the requirement is satisfied by an electronic signature.

A requirement that a document or a signature associated with a document be notarized, acknowledged, verified, witnessed, or made under oath is satisfied if the electronic signature of the person authorized to perform that act, and all other information required to be included, is attached to or logically associated with the document or signature. A physical or electronic image of a stamp, impression, or seal need not accompany an electronic signature.

HISTORY: Laws, 2011, ch. 364, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

§ 89-5-107. Recording of documents.

In this section, “paper document” means a document that is received by the chancery clerk in a form that is not electronic.

A chancery clerk:

  1. Who implements any of the functions listed in this section shall do so in compliance with standards established by the commission.
  2. May receive, index, store, archive, and transmit electronic documents.
  3. May provide for access to, and for search and retrieval of, documents and information by electronic means.
  4. Who accepts electronic documents for recording shall continue to accept paper documents as authorized by state law and shall place entries for both types of documents in the same index.
  5. May convert paper documents accepted for recording into electronic form.
  6. May convert into electronic form information recorded before the chancery clerk began to record electronic documents.
  7. May accept electronically any fee or tax that the chancery clerk is authorized to collect.
  8. May agree with other officials of a state or a political subdivision thereof, or of the United States, on procedures or processes to facilitate the electronic satisfaction of prior approvals and conditions precedent to recording and the electronic payment of fees and taxes.

HISTORY: Laws, 2011, ch. 364, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Cross References —

Mississippi Electronic Recording Commission, see §89-5-109.

§ 89-5-109. Administration and standards.

The Mississippi Electronic Recording Commission consisting of eleven (11) members is created to adopt standards to implement this article. The membership of the commission shall comprise the following:

  1. A person appointed by the Governor;
  2. A person appointed by the Lieutenant Governor;
  3. A person appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives;
  4. Three (3) members of the Chancery Clerks’ Association;
  5. A person appointed by the Mississippi Association of Supervisors;
  6. The director of the Mississippi Information Technology Services or his designee; and
  7. Three (3) persons appointed by the Secretary of State.

    Appointed members of the commission shall serve a term of two (2) years from the date of appointment as evidenced by letters to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, with the appointment letter last received being the effective date of appointment. Any member serving by virtue of appointment shall serve until a successor is duly appointed. Appointed members shall be eligible for reappointment at the end of their terms.

Appointments are to be made no later than October 1, 2011, and the initial meeting of the commission is to be held no later than November 1, 2011. The initial meeting is to be called at a time and place designated by the Secretary of State who shall preside until a permanent chair is elected. The election of a permanent chair shall be held at the initial meeting. The chair shall serve during the chair’s tenure but shall not serve consecutive terms as chair. The commission shall establish rules to govern the conduct of its meetings and shall elect such officers as provided in the rules. A quorum shall consist of no fewer than six (6) members.

To keep the standards and practices of chancery clerks in this state in harmony with the standards and practices of recording offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this article and to keep the technology used by chancery clerks in this state compatible with technology used by recording offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this article, the commission, so far as is consistent with the purposes, policies, and provisions of this article, in adopting, amending, and repealing standards shall consider:

Standards and practices of other jurisdictions;

The most recent standards promulgated by national standard-setting bodies, such as the Property Records Industry Association;

The views of interested persons and governmental officials and entities;

The needs of counties of varying size, population, and resources; and

Standards requiring adequate information security protection to ensure that electronic documents are accurate, authentic, adequately preserved, and resistant to tampering.

HISTORY: Laws, 2011, ch. 364, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

§ 89-5-111. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

HISTORY: Laws, 2011, ch. 364, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

§ 89-5-113. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

This article modifies, limits, and supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 USCS Section 7001, et seq.) but does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act (15 USCS Section 7001(c)) or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103(b) of that act (15 USCS Section 7003(b)).

HISTORY: Laws, 2011, ch. 364, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Chapter 6. Mississippi Plane Coordinate System

§ 89-6-1. Description of systems of plane coordinates.

  1. The systems of plane coordinates established and maintained by the National Ocean Service/National Geodetic Survey (formerly the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey), or its successors, for defining and stating the geographic position or location of points on the surface of the earth within the State of Mississippi are hereafter to be known and designated as the Mississippi Coordinate System of 1927 (MCS’27) and the Mississippi Coordinate System of 1983 (MCS’83). These systems divide the area within the state into an “East Zone” and a “West Zone.”
    1. The area now included in the following eastern counties shall constitute the East Zone: Alcorn, Attala, Benton, Calhoun, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Clarke, Clay, Covington, Forrest, George, Greene, Hancock, Harrison, Itawamba, Jackson, Jasper, Jones, Kemper, Lafayette, Lamar, Lauderdale, Leake, Lee, Lowndes, Marshall, Monroe, Neshoba, Newton, Noxubee, Oktibbeha, Pearl River, Perry, Pontotoc, Prentiss, Scott, Smith, Stone, Tippah, Tishomingo, Union, Wayne, Webster and Winston.
    2. The area now included in the following western counties shall constitute the West Zone: Adams, Amite, Bolivar, Carroll, Claiborne, Coahoma, Copiah, DeSoto, Franklin, Grenada, Hinds, Holmes, Humphreys, Issaquena, Jefferson, Jefferson Davis, Lawrence, Leflore, Lincoln, Madison, Marion, Montgomery, Panola, Pike, Quitman, Rankin, Sharkey, Simpson, Sunflower, Tallahatchie, Tate, Tunica, Walthall, Warren, Washington, Wilkinson, Yalobusha and Yazoo.
  2. When any survey extends from one (1) into the other of the above coordinate zones, the position of all points involved may be referred to either of the two (2) zones.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 462, § 1, eff from and after January 1, 1992.

§ 89-6-3. Plane coordinate values.

The plane coordinate values for a point on the earth’s surface, used to express the geographic position or location of such point in the appropriate zone of the systems described in Section 89-6-1, shall consist of two (2) distances expressed in U.S. Survey Feet and decimals of a foot when using the Mississippi Coordinate System of 1927 and expressed in meters and decimals of a meter or U.S. Survey Feet and decimals of a foot when using the Mississippi Coordinate System of 1983. One (1) of these distances, to be known as the “Y” or “N-coordinate,” shall give the position in a north and south direction; the other, to be known as the “X” or “E-coordinate,” shall give the position in an east and west direction. These coordinates shall be made to depend upon and conform to the plane rectangular coordinate values for the monumented points of the National Geodetic Reference System as published by the National Ocean Service/National Geodetic Survey (formerly the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey), or its successors, and whose plane coordinates have been computed on the system defined in this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 462, § 2; Laws, 2006, ch. 380, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2006.).

Amendment Notes —

The 2006 amendment inserted “or U.S. Survey Feet and decimals of a foot” following “and decimals of a meter” near the end of the first sentence.

§ 89-6-5. Definitions applicable to Mississippi Coordinate System of 1927.

For purposes of more precisely defining the Mississippi Coordinate System of 1927, the following definition by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey (now the National Ocean Service/National Geodetic Survey) is adopted:

The “Mississippi Coordinate System of 1927 East Zone” is a transverse Mercator projection of the Clarke spheroid of 1866, having a central meridian eighty-eight (88) degrees fifty (50) minutes west of Greenwich, on which meridian the scale is set at one (1) part in twenty-five thousand (25,000) too small. The origin of coordinates is at the intersection of the meridian eighty-eight (88) degrees fifty (50) minutes west of Greenwich and the parallel twenty-nine (29) degrees forty (40) minutes north latitude. This origin is given the coordinates: X 500,000 feet and Y 0 feet.

The “Mississippi Coordinate System of 1927 West Zone” is a transverse Mercator projection of the Clarke spheroid of 1866, having a central meridian ninety (90) degrees twenty (20) minutes west of Greenwich, on which meridian the scale is set at one (1) part in seventeen thousand (17,000) too small. The origin of coordinates is at the intersection of the meridian ninety (90) degrees twenty (20) minutes west of Greenwich and the parallel thirty (30) degrees thirty (30) minutes north latitude. This origin is given the coordinates: X 500,000 feet and Y 0 feet.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 462, § 3, eff from and after January 1, 1992.

§ 89-6-7. Definitions applicable to Mississippi Coordinate System of 1983.

For purposes of more precisely defining the Mississippi Coordinate System of 1983, the following definition by the National Ocean Service/National Geodetic Survey is adopted:

The “Mississippi Coordinate System of 1983 East Zone” is a transverse Mercator projection of the North American Datum of 1983, having a central meridian of eighty-eight (88) degrees fifty (50) minutes west of Greenwich, on which meridian the scale is set at one (1) part in twenty thousand (20,000) too small. The origin of coordinates is at the intersection of the meridian eighty-eight (88) degrees fifty (50) minutes west of Greenwich and the parallel twenty-nine (29) degrees thirty (30) minutes north latitude. This origin is given the coordinates: N 0 meters and E 300,000 meters.

The “Mississippi Coordinate System of 1983 West Zone” is a transverse Mercator projection of the North American Datum of 1983, having a central meridian ninety (90) degrees twenty (20) minutes west of Greenwich, on which meridian the scale is set at one (1) part in twenty thousand (20,000) too small. The origin of coordinates is at the intersection of the meridian ninety (90) degrees twenty (20) minutes west of Greenwich and the parallel twenty-nine (29) degrees thirty (30) minutes north latitude. This origin is given the coordinates: N 0 meters and E 700,000 meters.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 462, § 4, eff from and after January 1, 1992.

§ 89-6-9. Explanation of terms.

The use of the term “Mississippi Coordinate System of 1927” (MCS’27) or “Mississippi Coordinate System of 1983” (MCS’83) on any map, report of survey, or other document shall be limited to coordinates based on the Mississippi coordinate systems as defined in this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 462, § 5, eff from and after January 1, 1992.

§ 89-6-11. Recording coordinates; requirements for recognition.

No coordinates based on either Mississippi coordinate system, purporting to define the position of a point, shall be recorded on any plat or in any public record unless the coordinates are derived from an accurate connection to an identified existing or newly established permanently-monumented third order Class I(1:10,000) or higher order station of the National Geodetic Reference System. Standards and specifications of the Federal Geodetic Control Committee (FGCC) or its successor in force on the date of survey shall apply. Published existing control stations or the acceptance with intent to publish the newly established station by the National Ocean Service/National Geodetic Survey will constitute evidence of adherence to the FGCC specifications.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 462, § 6, eff from and after January 1, 1992.

§ 89-6-13. Use of system of plane coordinates to describe location of point within state.

For purposes of describing the location of any point in the State of Mississippi, it shall be considered a complete, legal and satisfactory description of such location to give the position of such point on the system of plane coordinates defined in this chapter, provided the connection to the Mississippi Coordinate System is made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and the standards of practice for surveying as adopted by the Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers and Surveyors. Whenever coordinates are affixed to any point which has previously been described by another system, the coordinates shall be construed as additional evidence of the location of the same point. In the event of any conflict as to the point or its location, the common rules of evidence shall be used to resolve the conflict. When used to reference the position of a point to be cited in recorded description of real property, the description must be written in a form that is tied to the existing land system.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 462, § 7; Laws, 2006, ch. 380, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2006.).

Amendment Notes —

The 2006 amendment, in the first sentence, substituted “standards of practice for surveying as adopted by the Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers and Surveyors” for “minimum standards of the Mississippi State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors.”

§ 89-6-15. Effective date for usage of systems.

The Mississippi Coordinate System of 1927 shall not be used after December 31, 1999; the Mississippi Coordinate System of 1983 shall be the sole system after such date.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 462, § 8, eff from and after January 1, 1992.

§ 89-6-17. Conversion of distances or coordinates between English and metric unit.

Any conversion of distances or coordinates between the English and metric unit shall be made using the following conversion factor: one (1) meter equals 3.280833333 1/3 U.S. Survey feet. A minimum of ten (10) significant figures shall be used when converting coordinates.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 462, § 9, eff from and after January 1, 1992.

§ 89-6-19. Use of metes and bounds descriptions or lot and block descriptions.

No provision of this chapter shall prohibit or preclude the use of metes and bounds descriptions or lot and block descriptions.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 462, § 10, eff from and after January 1, 1992.

Chapter 7. Landlord and Tenant

§ 89-7-1. Goods not to be removed until rent paid.

No goods or chattels, lying or being in or upon any messuage, lands or tenements, leased or rented for life, years, at will, or otherwise, shall at any time be liable to be taken by virtue of any writ of execution, or other process whatever, unless the party so taking the same shall, before the removal of the goods or chattels from such premises, pay or tender to the landlord or lessor thereof, all the unpaid rent for the said premises, whether the day of payment shall have come or not, provided it shall not amount to more than one (1) year’s rent; and the party suing out such execution or other process, paying or tendering to such landlord or lessor the rent unpaid, not to exceed one (1) year’s rent, may proceed to execute his judgment or process; and the officer levying the same shall be empowered and required to levy and pay to the plaintiff as well the money so paid for rent, as the money due under the process, and when the rent contracted for is payable, not in money, but in other things, the creditor shall pay the landlord the money value of such things.

HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 2851; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2349; 1930, § 2175; 1942, § 897; Laws, 1894, ch. 52.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

Liens generally, see §§85-7-1 through85-7-9.

Rights, obligations and remedies available under Sections89-7-1 through89-7-125 not altered or abridged by rights, obligations and remedies available under Chapter 8 of Title 89, see §89-8-3.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Landlord Lien Statute affords unpaid landlord no rights in property of third persons on landlord’s premises. By analogy, landlord should not acquire lien under §89-7-51(2) on property not belonging to lessee. Hicks v. Thomas, 516 So. 2d 1344, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2949 (Miss. 1987).

The lien for the enforcement of which the statute provides is that inherent in the relation of landlord and tenant and therefore is not one created by legal proceedings within the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act that liens obtained through legal proceedings against an insolvent within four months prior to the filing of the petition of bankruptcy shall be deemed void. Irby v. Corey, 95 F.2d 963, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 4262 (5th Cir. Miss. 1938).

Seizure and removal of automobile trailers from leased premises under attachment writ by landlord for nonpayment of rent did not affect purchase money liens on trailers, since neither vendor nor purchaser thereof did anything in furtherance of the removal. Dorsey v. Latham, 194 Miss. 253, 11 So. 2d 897, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 46 (Miss. 1943).

The provision that goods shall not be taken from rented premises under process until rent is paid does not give landlord lien on property on leased premises for rent. White v. Miazza-Woods Const. Co., 122 Miss. 213, 84 So. 181, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 428 (Miss. 1920); Walker v. First Nat'l Bank, 168 Miss. 487, 151 So. 740, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 350 (Miss. 1934).

Where estate was insolvent, rent due landlord for store occupied by decedent before death, while claim superior to that of general creditors, was not preferred over claims for expenses of last illness, funeral, and administration, where administrator sold goods in store building under court order. Walker v. First Nat'l Bank, 168 Miss. 487, 151 So. 740, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 350 (Miss. 1934).

If clause in lease prohibiting removal of property while rent was unpaid created equitable lien, it was not enforceable by statutory remedy of distress for rent. Lake v. Morson, 164 Miss. 401, 145 So. 337, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 237 (Miss. 1933).

Rent accrued prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy is, however, properly allowable as a secured claim against the proceeds of the trustee’s sale of the tenant’s goods found on the premises at the time of the bankruptcy. In re Wall, 60 F.2d 573, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1360 (D. Miss. 1932).

Under this provision a landlord has no lien for rent upon his tenant’s goods until a distress warrant is levied thereon, but has a right only to exact payment of rent before they can be taken off the premises by legal process. American Stores Co. v. Gerlach, 55 F.2d 658, 1932 U.S. App. LEXIS 3786 (3d Cir. Pa. 1932).

This provision does not make rent to accrue subsequent to bankruptcy a fixed liability absolutely owing at the time of the adjudication and as such provable against a bankrupt’s estate. In re S. & H. Katz, 6 F.2d 581, 1925 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1156 (D. Miss. 1925).

In absence of seizure of tenant’s goods by legal process, landlord has only inchoate right which may develop into a preference. Engleburg v. Tonkel, 140 Miss. 513, 106 So. 447, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1925).

Landlord has no lien for rent except on agricultural products. Engleburg v. Tonkel, 140 Miss. 513, 106 So. 447, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 286 (Miss. 1925).

Claim of lessor of storehouse is preference claim against insolvent tenant, and lessor had right to payment out of proceeds of sale though she did not assert her claim within thirty days after removal of the goods pursuant to sale. Epstein v. Farr, 112 Miss. 530, 73 So. 572, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1916).

This section [Code 1942, § 897] does not subject property of third persons on leased premises to liability for rent. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Murphy, 89 Miss. 264, 42 So. 288, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1906).

§ 89-7-3. Tenant not bound to pay rent for, or to restore, buildings destroyed; exception.

A tenant shall not be bound to pay rent for buildings after their destruction by fire or otherwise, nor shall a covenant or promise by a lessee to leave or restore the premises in good repair have the effect to bind him to erect or pay for such buildings as may be so destroyed, unless in respect to the matters aforesaid there was negligence or fault on his part, or unless he has expressly stipulated to be so bound.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, §§ 1239, 1240; 1892, §§ 2497, 2498; 1906, §§ 2834, 2835; Hemingway’s 1917, §§ 2332, 2333; 1930, § 2176; 1942, § 898.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where a building was destroyed by fire and the fire was not caused by negligence or fault of the lessee and the lessee did not expressly stipulate to pay for rent after destruction by the fire, the lessee was entitled to a reduction in the monthly rental to be paid for the leased premises and the lessee did not lose his right when he rebuilt the building at his own expense. Miller v. Miller, 222 Miss. 588, 76 So. 2d 705, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 641 (Miss. 1955).

A tenant is not liable for accidental damages or destruction by fire, unless he has contracted to assume liability for such damages. Miller v. Miller, 217 Miss. 650, 64 So. 2d 739, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 475 (Miss. 1953).

In an action brought by lessee against lessor of a gasoline station seeking reduction of monthly rental to be paid on account of destruction of the main service station building by fire, or, in the alternative, to require the lessors to restore the building to its former condition, wherein the lessors filed a cross bill to recover for damages to the building on the ground that the fire was the result of lessee’s negligence, evidence sustained a finding that there was insufficient proof that fire was caused by the negligence of lessee or his employees. Miller v. Miller, 217 Miss. 650, 64 So. 2d 739, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 475 (Miss. 1953).

In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the tenant is not liable for damages to or the destruction of a building by fire unless there was negligence or fault on his part. Miller v. Miller, 217 Miss. 650, 64 So. 2d 739, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 475 (Miss. 1953).

This section [Code 1942, § 898] affects contract rights of parties to a lease, but concluding clause is merely declaratory of common law right to sue tenant for negligent act, resulting in damage. Roell v. Brooks, 205 Miss. 255, 38 So. 2d 716, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 427 (Miss. 1949).

In action under this section [Code 1942, § 898] by landlord against tenant for damages to leased premises by fire alleged to have been caused by negligence of defendant’s manager in leaving gas heater burning during his absence from building, burden of proof is on plaintiff to show by preponderance of evidence that defendant did not use reasonable care in maintenance of reasonably safe gas heater and that such failure was proximate cause of fire and resulting damage. Roell v. Brooks, 205 Miss. 255, 38 So. 2d 716, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 427 (Miss. 1949).

Tenant, although bound under lease to restore building destroyed by fire, held not entitled to proceeds of insurance taken out by the lessor. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Therrell, 158 Miss. 810, 131 So. 263, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 109 (Miss. 1930).

Watertank, pump, and engine placed on leased premises by tenant after destruction by windstorm did not become fixtures. Frederick v. Smith, 147 Miss. 437, 111 So. 847, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1927).

If a lessee covenants “to take good care of the leased premises and to return the same in as good order as at the beginning of the lease, ordinary wear and tear, and damage by fire, wind and water excepted, and to make at his own expense all necessary repairs,” he is obliged to make all such repairs as are necessary to keep the premises in such condition. The exceptions cannot be construed to relieve him of such obligations. Waddell v. De Jet, 76 Miss. 104, 23 So. 437, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1898).

An insolvent tenant who violates his obligation to repair, to the extent of endangering the destruction of the leased premises, subjects himself to a suit for the cancellation of his lease. Waddell v. De Jet, 76 Miss. 104, 23 So. 437, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1898).

No damages are allowable, but the tenant is entitled under the statute to an abatement of rent in the proportion that the value of the use of the ginhouse and machinery accidentally destroyed by fire during his term, bears to the value of the use of the whole premises. Taylor v. Hart, 73 Miss. 22, 18 So. 546, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1895).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of tenant for damage to the leased property due to his acts or neglect. 10 A.L.R.2d 1012.

Statute requiring property to be kept in good repair as affecting landlord’s liability for personal injury to tenant or his privies. 17 A.L.R.2d 704.

Extent of lessee’s obligation under express covenant as to repairs. 20 A.L.R.2d 1331.

Landlord’s duty under express covenant to repair, rebuild, or restore, where property is damaged or destroyed by fire. 38 A.L.R.2d 682.

Condition of premises within contemplation of provision of lease or statute for cessation of rent or termination of lease in event of destruction of or damage to property as result of fire, calamity, the elements, act of God, or the like. 61 A.L.R.2d 1445.

Modern status of rules as to existence of implied warranty of habitability or fitness for use of leased premises. 40 A.L.R.3d 646.

Landlord’s failure to repair as aggravated negligence or similar fault. 40 A.L.R.3d 795.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance authorizing withholding or payment into escrow of rent for period during which premises are not properly maintained by landlord. 40 A.L.R.3d 821.

Tenant’s right, where landlord fails to make repairs, to have them made and set off cost against rent. 40 A.L.R.3d 1369.

Modern status of landlord’s tort liability for injury or death of tenant or third person caused by dangerous condition of premises. 64 A.L.R.3d 339.

Landlord’s liability for injury or death due to defects in areas of building (other than stairways) used in common by tenants. 65 A.L.R.3d 14.

Liability of landlord for personal injury or death due to inadequacy or lack of lighting on portion of premises used in common by tenants. 66 A.L.R.3d 202.

Landlord’s liability for personal injury or death due to defects in appliances supplied for use of different tenants. 66 A.L.R.3d 374.

Landlord’s liability for injury or death due to defects in exterior steps or stairs used in common by tenants. 67 A.L.R.3d 490.

Landlord’s liability for injury or death caused by defective condition of interior steps or stairways used in common by tenants. 67 A.L.R.3d 587.

Modern status of rule as to tenant’s rent liability after injury to or destruction of demised premises. 99 A.L.R.3d 738.

Commercial leases: application of rule that lease may be canceled only for “material” breach. 54 A.L.R.4th 595.

Implied warranty of fitness or suitability in commercial leases-modern status. 76 A.L.R.4th 928.

Measure and elements of damages for lessee’s breach of covenant as to repairs. 45 A.L.R.5th 251.

Time within which tenant’s right to remove trade fixtures must be exercised. 109 A.L.R.5th 421.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 678 et seq., 812 et seq.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Form 111 (instruction to jury on landlord’s statutory duty to maintain leased premises in habitable condition).

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Form 296 (complaint by lessee of apartment unit; failure of landlord to maintain water and septic system).

17 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Mobile Homes (complaint by lessee of lot in mobile home park for failure of landlord to maintain water and septic systems).

11A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Leases of Real Property §§ 161:266 et seq. (effect of injury to or destruction of premises on payment of rent).

11A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Leases of Real Property §§ 161:544 et seq. (rebuilding or restoration).

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 655, Material breach of Commercial Lease.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 366(1) et seq.

§ 89-7-5. Action for use and occupation where there is no contract.

Where there is no contract, or where the agreement is not in writing, a landlord may maintain an action to recover a reasonable satisfaction for the use and occupation of the lands held and enjoyed by another. If on the trial of such action there appear in evidence any demise or agreement the plaintiff shall not on that account be nonsuited, but may make use thereof as evidence of the amount to be recovered.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 19; 1871, § 1638; 1880, § 1323; 1892, § 2538; 1906, § 2876; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2374; 1930, § 2177; 1942, § 899.

Cross References —

Requirement that leases for a term of more than one year be in writing, see §15-3-1.

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

Rights, obligations and remedies available under Sections89-7-1 through89-7-125 not altered or abridged by rights, obligations and remedies available under Chapter 8 of Title 89, see §89-8-3.

Rental by husband of wife’s property, see §§93-3-1,93-3-7.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In an action by the lessor of commercial property to reject the lessee the lessor was entitled to recover $600 for the period of 30 days past the June 30, 1981 termination date of the lease, where a lease provision granting the lessee 30 days in which to remove the improvements placed on the lease premises was effective to extent the term of the lease for an additional 30 days; additionally, the lessor was entitled to recover a reasonable rental from August 1 to August 15, 1981, where August 15, 1981 was the date on which lessee vacated the premises, and where the lessor had sought reasonable rent after expiration of the lease. Terracina Motor Co. v. Sarullo, 419 So. 2d 1335, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2175 (Miss. 1982).

“Reasonable satisfaction” within the meaning of this section [Code 1942, § 879], is an issue of fact. Feltenstein v. Newell, 248 Miss. 880, 162 So. 2d 253, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 318 (Miss. 1964).

Where a tenant removing from leased premises leaves thereon, and abandons to the seller property covered by a conditional sale agreement, the landlord may recover from the seller, in absence of agreement, only the reasonable cost of removing the property to dead storage, and the cost of such storage. Feltenstein v. Newell, 248 Miss. 880, 162 So. 2d 253, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 318 (Miss. 1964).

A tenant upon shares is liable for damages as reasonable rental upon his failure to cultivate the land. Sledge v. Potts, 202 Miss. 480, 32 So. 2d 262, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1947).

Where under a written contract a tenant agreed to pay a percentage of certain crops as rent and reasonable rent for any and all other crops grown on the land, his abandonment of the land and failure to cultivate subjected him to a liability for reasonable value of the rental of the land notwithstanding uncertainty as to the amount of profits. Sledge v. Potts, 202 Miss. 480, 32 So. 2d 262, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1947).

Landowner is entitled to compensation for mooring of boats in front of his property for periods exceeding reasonable use for navigation; where boats are not moored constantly and permanently in front of property, owner is entitled to compensation only for time boats actually occupy banks beyond reasonable navigation uses; instruction authorizing landowner to recover for use and occupancy by mooring boats in front of bank for full period of limitation held error under evidence. Louisiana & M. R. T. Co. v. Long, 159 Miss. 654, 131 So. 84, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 358 (Miss. 1930).

Under lease of land for its mill by lumber company containing option to renew, where it acquired timber lands about its mill sufficient to furnish material for several years beyond expiration of first lease, no specific notice to lessor of intention to renew required. Crenshaw-Gary Lumber Co. v. Norton, 111 Miss. 720, 72 So. 140, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 377 (Miss. 1916).

Lessor’s covenant to renew lease runs with land. Crenshaw-Gary Lumber Co. v. Norton, 111 Miss. 720, 72 So. 140, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 377 (Miss. 1916).

Landlord entitled to reasonable rental after notice to vacate upon expiration of term, but not for time permitted tenant to remain in possession under circumstances indicating no rent charged. Thomas Hinds Lodge v. Presbyterian Church of Fayette, 103 Miss. 130, 60 So. 66, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1912).

Where one pending negotiations, looking to an entire contract with the owner for the yearly lease of lands for several years, and a subsequent purchase, enters into possession, and the negotiations fail, he is not liable for the rent stipulated for in the negotiations, but for the reasonable rental value of the premises. Sutton v. Graham, 80 Miss. 636, 31 So. 909, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 274 (Miss. 1902).

If a tenant from year to year, upon the death of a landlord, asserts title himself and refuses to surrender at the end of the year, or to longer pay rent, the heirs who recover in ejectment are entitled to charge him thereafter with the reasonable rental value, regardless of the former contract price. Thomas v. Thomas, 69 Miss. 564, 13 So. 666, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 139 (Miss. 1891).

This statute gives the right in all cases where the possession is held in recognition of and not adversely to the title of the party suing. Newberg & Anderson v. Cowan, 62 Miss. 570, 1885 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Miss. 1885).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 503, 504.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev) Landlord and Tenant, Forms 11, 12 (complaint, petition, or declaration to recover reasonable value of use and occupation).

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 552 et seq.

§ 89-7-7. Remedy by action for rent in arrear.

A person having rent in arrear or due upon any lease or demise of lands for life or lives, for years, at will, or otherwise, may bring an action for such arrears of rent against the person who ought to have paid the same or his legal representative.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 14; 1871, § 1633; 1880, § 1322; 1892, § 2537; 1906, § 2875; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2373; 1930, § 2178; 1942, § 900.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

Rights, obligations and remedies available under Sections89-7-1 through89-7-125 not altered or abridged by rights, obligations and remedies available under Chapter 8 of Title 89, see §89-8-3.

Right of landlord to remove tenant in manner prescribed by this Chapter for nonpayment of rent, not circumscribed by termination procedure specified in section89-8-13, see §89-8-13.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A sublessee incurs no liability to the lessor merely because of the subletting either for the payment of rent reserved in the original lease or for the performance of the other covenants on the part of the lessee, but the lessor and lessee may establish between themselves relationship of landlord and tenant by express agreement or by some affirmative action showing an election to treat a sublessee as the lessor’s tenant. Goldberg v. L. H. Realty Corp., 227 Miss. 345, 86 So. 2d 326, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 696 (Miss. 1956).

Where under a written contract a tenant agreed to pay a percentage of certain crops as rent and a reasonable rent for any and all other crops grown on the land, his abandonment of the land and failure to cultivate subjected him to liability for reasonable value of the rental of the land notwithstanding uncertainty as to the amount of profits. Sledge v. Potts, 202 Miss. 480, 32 So. 2d 262, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1947).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 502 et seq.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev) Landlord and Tenant, Form 1 (complaint, petition, or declaration to recover rent due under lease).

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 552 et seq.

§ 89-7-9. Death of tenant for life; apportionment of rent.

When a tenant for life who shall have demised lands, shall die on or after the day when any rent became payable, his executor or administrator may recover from the under-tenant the whole rent due; and if he die before the day when any rent is to become due, he may recover the proportion of the rent which accrued before the time of the death of the tenant. The tenant for the life of another, his executor or administrator, in case of the death of the person for whose life the estate is held, on or before the day when any rent shall become due shall have like remedy; and a like apportionment shall be made in the case of annuities.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5 (22); 1857, ch. 41, art. 20; 1871, § 1639; 1880, § 1328; 1892, § 2543; 1906, § 2881; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2379; 1930, § 2179; 1942, § 901.

Cross References —

Abatement of suit upon death of party, see §§91-7-237 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Amendment of statute, declaring rents arising from demise of land by life tenant apportionable, by adding words “and a like apportionment shall be made in the case of annuities” held not violative of constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of law in application to annuities arising under disability provisions of life policies as requiring apportionment notwithstanding express contract to contrary, where disability provisions contained no express stipulation that benefits should be apportionable. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Majet, 178 Miss. 440, 173 So. 412, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 218 (Miss. 1937).

Amendment of statute, declaring rents arising from demise of land by life tenant apportionable, by adding words “and a like apportionment shall be made in the case of annuities,” held to make all annuities apportionable, so as to entitle beneficiary under life insurance policy to payment of proportionate part of disability benefits provided for thereby in addition to face amount of policy on insured’s death before anniversary date on which annual payment would have become due. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Majet, 173 Miss. 870, 161 So. 156, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 211 (Miss. 1935).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Life tenant’s death as affecting rights under lease given by him. 14 A.L.R.4th 1054.

Death of lessee as terminating lease. 42 A.L.R.4th 963.

Am. Jur.

51 Am. Jur. 2d, Life Tenants and Remaindermen §§ 151 et seq.

CJS.

31 C.J.S., Estates §§ 50-52.

§ 89-7-11. Rent assets in hands of personal representative.

If a person lease his land and die, the rent to accrue for the land during the year of his death shall be payable to the personal representative of the decedent, who shall have the same remedy therefor as the decedent would have had if he had lived.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1327; 1892, § 2542; 1906, § 2880; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2378; 1930, § 2180; 1942, § 902.

Cross References —

Liability of person in possession of escheated property for rent of real estate, see §89-11-13.

Rental of land as asset of estate, see §91-7-91.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Although the personal representative of a decedent has the power to collect rents under this section [Code 1942, § 902], such rents collected are the property of the respective devisees of the real estate upon which the rents accrue. Gaines v. Klein, 203 Miss. 271, 34 So. 2d 489, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 262 (Miss. 1948).

The statute applies to cases of testacy as well as intestacy. Tucker v. Whitehead, 58 Miss. 762, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 1881).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 502 et seq.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 522 et seq.

§ 89-7-13. Executor or administrator may sue or distrain.

The executor or administrator of a person to whom rent is due and not paid at the time of his death may have an action for all such arrearages against the tenant or tenants who ought to have paid the rent so being behind in the lifetime of their testator or intestate, or against the executors or administrators of such tenants. Every executor or administrator of any person to whom such rent is due and not paid at the time of his death, may distrain for the arrearages of all such rents on the lands which were charged with the payment of such rents, and liable to the distress of the testator or intestate, so long as the same continue in the seizin or possession of the tenant who ought to have paid the rent to the testator or intestate in his lifetime, or in the seizin or possession of any person claiming the lands, only by and from the tenant, by purchase, gift, or descent, in like manner and form as the said executor’s or administrator’s testator or intestate might have done in his lifetime. The executors and administrators for the same distress may lawfully make avowry.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5 (20); 1857, ch. 41, art. 17; 1871, § 1636; 1880, § 1326; 1892, § 2541; 1906, § 2879; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2377; 1930, § 2181; 1942, § 903.

Cross References —

Powers of temporary administrator generally, see §91-7-57.

Leases of land by executor or administrator to pay debts of deceased, see §91-7-225.

Actions by executors or administrators, see §§91-7-231 et seq.

§ 89-7-15. Rights of assignees of lessor.

The grantees or assignees, and their heirs, personal representatives and assignees, of any lands let to lease, or of the reversion thereof, may have and enjoy the same advantages against the lessees, their personal representatives and assigns, by entry for the non-payment of rent, or for doing of waste or suffering any forfeiture, and may have and avail of all the covenants and agreements contained in the leases, demises or grants against the lessees, their personal representatives and assigns, which the lessors themselves or their heirs could have had or enjoyed.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5 (18); 1857, ch. 41, art. 15; 1871, § 1634; 1880, § 1324; 1892, § 2539; 1906, § 2877; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2375; 1930, § 2182; 1942, § 904.

Cross References —

Rights, obligations and remedies available under Sections89-7-1 through89-7-125 not altered or abridged by rights, obligations and remedies available under Chapter 8 of Title 89, see §89-8-3.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Lease of portion of building being assignable at common law, Code 1906, §§ 2877, 2878, 4001 do not affect question of whether lessor’s mortgagee charged with notice of assignment of unrecorded lease. Corinth Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 111 Miss. 62, 71 So. 266, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 241 (Miss. 1916).

Code 1906, §§ 2877, 2878, merely enlarge and broaden rights of assignee of lease under certain circumstances. Corinth Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 111 Miss. 62, 71 So. 266, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 241 (Miss. 1916).

Where lessee sublet premises subject to original lease, sublessee entitled to benefits of original lease, and to damages consequent upon lessee releasing water rights thereunder. Hairston v. Montgomery, 102 Miss. 364, 59 So. 793, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 1912).

Lessee cannot avoid lease because county and state in which land located not designated in body of lease, where same were designated in caption thereto and lease was acknowledged before officer and recorded in the county named. Gex v. Dill, 86 Miss. 10, 38 So. 193, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 7 (Miss. 1905).

The right of a tenant to renew a lease is assignable, and it may be exercised at any time during the original term unless it be limited by the grant or terminated by the parties; A landlord may demand of a tenant during the term the exercise of a right to renew the lease and if not exercised on demand, it will be terminated. McClintock v. Joyner, 77 Miss. 678, 27 So. 837, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 1900).

The right of re-entry for nonpayment of rent is not an estate in land, but a mere right or chose in action, and the assignee under Code 1892, § 660 (Code 1906, § 717), may sue and recover in his own name. Wright v. Hardy, 76 Miss. 524, 24 So. 697, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 96 (Miss. 1898).

The rights given to the assignee of a lessor by this section [Code 1942, § 904] apply only to estates for life or years, and not to estates in fee; lands let to lease are those conveyed only for life, years, or at will. Wright v. Hardy, 76 Miss. 524, 24 So. 697, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 96 (Miss. 1898).

Where an owner rents his lands and takes rent notes, and afterwards makes an assignment, conveying his lands, tenements, and hereditaments, the right to the rents passes to the assignee by the use of the word “hereditaments.” Allen v. Smith Bros. Co., 72 Miss. 689, 18 So. 579, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 72 (Miss. 1895).

The purchaser of land at partition sale is entitled to the rent falling due after his purchase, if not expressly reserved, and may distrain therefor, notwithstanding a rent note previously given therefor had been assigned by the landlord to another, who contests the purchaser’s right to such rent. Kessee v. Sloan, 69 Miss. 369, 11 So. 631, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 98 (Miss. 1891).

Rent is an incident to the reversion, and before maturity follows the title to the premises, except as otherwise provided by statute. Bloodworth v. Stevens, 51 Miss. 475, 1875 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1875).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Measure and elements of damages for lessee’s breach of covenant as to repairs. 45 A.L.R.5th 251.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 420 et seq.

2B Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Assignments § 25:165 (assignment-lease-acceptance and assumption of lessee’s lease obligations-with consent of lessor).

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 258, 259.

§ 89-7-17. Grants of rents, good without attornment.

Grants of rents or reversions or remainders shall be good and effectual without attornment of the tenants; but a tenant who has paid the rent to the grantor before notice of the grant shall not suffer any damage thereby.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (30); 1857, ch. 36, art. 5; 1871, § 2288; 1880, § 1191; 1892, § 2499; 1906, § 2836; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2334; 1930, § 2183; 1942, § 905.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 421.

11B Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Leases of Real Property § 161:705 (lessor’s right to assign rents).

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant § 259.

§ 89-7-19. Attornment of tenant to stranger void; exception.

The attornment of a tenant to a stranger shall be void unless it be with the consent of the landlord of such tenant, or pursuant to or in consequence of the judgment of a court of law or the decree of a court of equity.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 42, art. 1 (31); 1857, ch. 36, art. 6; 1871, § 2289; 1880, § 1192; 1892, § 2500; 1906, § 2837; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2335; 1930, § 2184; 1942, § 906.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 104.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 277-279.

§ 89-7-21. Rights of lessees against assignees of lessor.

All lessees of lands for a term of years, life or lives, their executors, administrators, or assigns, may have like action and advantage against all and every person or persons, their heirs and assigns, which have any gift or grant of the reversion of said lands, so leased, or any parcel thereof, for any condition, covenant, or agreement in their lease or leases, as the lessees, or any of them, might have had against the lessors and their heirs, only excepting the benefit and advantage of recoveries in value, by reason of any warranty in deed or law.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5 (19); 1857, ch. 41, art. 16; 1871, § 1635; 1880, § 1325; 1892, § 2540; 1906, § 2878; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2376; 1930, § 2185; 1942, § 907.

Cross References —

Rights, obligations and remedies available under Sections89-7-1 through89-7-125 not altered or abridged by rights, obligations and remedies available under Chapter 8 of Title 89, see §89-8-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Covenant of lessee to insure as running with the land. 18 A.L.R.2d 1051.

Rights and remedies of tenant upon landlord’s breach of covenant to repair. 28 A.L.R.2d 446.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 93 et seq.

§ 89-7-23. Notice to terminate tenancy.

Notice to quit shall be necessary only where the term is not to expire at a fixed time. In all cases in which a notice is required to be given by the landlord or tenant to determine a tenancy, two (2) months’ notice, in writing, shall be given where the holding is from year to year, and one (1) month’s notice shall be given where the holding is by the half-year or quarter-year; and where the letting is by the month or by the week, one (1) week’s notice, in writing, shall be given. This section shall not apply to rental agreements governed by the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 21; 1871, § 1640; 1880, § 1330; 1892, § 2544; 1906, § 2882; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2380; 1930, § 2224; 1942, § 946; Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 15, eff from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply to rental agreements entered into after such date.

Cross References —

Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, see §89-8-1, et seq.

Right of landlord to remove tenant in manner prescribed by this chapter for nonpayment of rent, not circumscribed by termination procedure specified in section89-8-13, see §89-8-13.

Amount of notice required to terminate tenancy governed by the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, see §89-8-19.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Tenant holding over.

3. Indefinite tenancies.

1. In general.

It is only where the rental term is not to expire at a fixed time that notice to quit becomes necessary. Price v. Moss, 214 Miss. 253, 58 So. 2d 661, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 465 (Miss. 1952).

In an unlawful entry and detainer action by one claiming title through a tax purchaser, preliminary notice to vacate the premises need not be given to tenants of one who was the owner prior to tax sale. McKay v. Shaffer, 202 Miss. 558, 32 So. 2d 746, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 317 (Miss. 1947).

A notice to vacate for various reasons given pursuant to permission of the area rent control office to proceed with legal eviction on the ground of nuisance did not place the eviction proceedings on the same basis as expiration of a month to month tenancy after due notice to vacate. Young v. Weaver, 202 Miss. 291, 32 So. 2d 202, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 275 (Miss. 1947).

Where tenancy, which had been held under definite, different contracts for 1933 and 1934, terminated on December 31, 1934, and proceeding was brought in January, 1935, after notice on January 9, 1935, to vacate, landlord’s failure to give such notice before expiration of lease did not amount to waiver of right to possession; statute requiring two months’ notice being inapplicable. Graham v. Cauthen, 175 Miss. 751, 168 So. 58, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 75 (Miss. 1936).

Landowner, demanding and receiving payment of annual rent from one entering on land, elected to constitute and acknowledge latter as tenant, thereby impliedly creating tenancy by year. Hamilton v. Federal Land Bank, 175 Miss. 462, 167 So. 642, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1936).

Tenancy may be terminated by agreement without statutory written notice. Stacks v. Robson, 139 Miss. 600, 104 So. 354, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 171 (Miss. 1925).

Tenant from year to year notified that rent would be increased but not assenting thereto, did not by remaining on the land become liable for increase as she had right to hold until tenancy terminated in statutory manner. Bancroft v. Seashore Camp Ground School, 120 Miss. 446, 82 So. 314, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1919).

Tenant from year to year entitled to two months’ notice in writing of termination. Scruggs v. McGehee, 110 Miss. 10, 69 So. 1003, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1915).

A mere licensee is not entitled to notice to quit. Johns v. McDaniel, 60 Miss. 486, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 86 (Miss. 1882).

2. Tenant holding over.

Where a tenancy was from month to month, beginning on the 10th of the month, the landlord, who gave the tenant written notice on April 5th to vacate on the 30th of that month, should not be denied double rent for the period the tenant held over after the 10th of May, on the ground that the notice fixed a time for vacation ten days earlier than he was entitled to fix, since the tenant could not have been misled by the notice, but knew that the landlord intended him to vacate not on the 30th of the month, but on the 10th of the next month, and that he had simply made a mistake in fixing the date. Gulley v. Mayo, 191 Miss. 143, 1 So. 2d 800, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 118 (Miss. 1941).

Tenant under implied tenancy from year to year had right to presume that such relation would continue for years into which he held over, in absence of statutory notice to contrary. Hamilton v. Federal Land Bank, 175 Miss. 462, 167 So. 642, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1936).

Lessee who failed to renew lease before expiration of existing term held not entitled to notice to vacate. Copiah Hardware Co. v. Johnson, 135 Miss. 358, 100 So. 31, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 48 (Miss. 1924).

3. Indefinite tenancies.

Chancellor is in error in awarding increased rent to purchaser of property from date of decree awarding possession of property and rent due, but is correct in awarding to purchaser of property rent at agreed rate where tenant from month to month refused to pay increase in rent but remained on land and there was no statutory notice terminating tenancy. Williams v. Barlow, 205 Miss. 449, 38 So. 2d 914, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 442 (Miss. 1949).

Tenant by month for indefinite period of time who is notified by landlord of increase in rent does not, by merely remaining on land, become liable for increase, but is liable only for rent agreed upon until tenancy is terminated by landlord in statutory manner. Williams v. Barlow, 205 Miss. 449, 38 So. 2d 914, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 442 (Miss. 1949).

Chancellor is in error in terminating tenancy by month for indefinite period of time, against will of tenant, and in awarding possession of premises to landlord, on record showing that no written notice was given to tenant to terminate his tenancy, as provided by this section [Code 1942, § 946]. Williams v. Barlow, 205 Miss. 449, 38 So. 2d 914, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 442 (Miss. 1949).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 946], letting of real property by month for indefinite period of time can only be terminated against will of tenant at end of monthly term then pending by giving one week’s notice in writing. Williams v. Barlow, 205 Miss. 449, 38 So. 2d 914, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 442 (Miss. 1949).

Where relation of landlord and tenant exists and there is holding from year to year with no definite period for termination of lease, notice to terminate tenancy is essential to maintenance of suit against tenant for possession. Hamilton v. Federal Land Bank, 175 Miss. 462, 167 So. 642, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1936).

Indefinite rental of building held tenancy from month to month, and tenant entitled to notice of termination. Lay v. Great Southern Lumber Co., 118 Miss. 636, 79 So. 822, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 113 (Miss. 1918).

A letting of real property by the month to continue for an indefinite period according to the wishes of the contracting parties, can only be terminated at the end of the monthly term then pending on giving one week’s notice in writing. Wilson v. Wood, 84 Miss. 728, 36 So. 609, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1904).

Where land is leased by the month to continue for an indefinite period the tenancy can only be terminated at the end of a monthly term upon a week’s notice in writing. Wilson v. Wood, 84 Miss. 728, 36 So. 609, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1904).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Retaliatory eviction of tenant for reporting landlord’s violation of law. 40 A.L.R.3d 753.

Lease provisions allowing termination or forfeiture for violation of law. 92 A.L.R.3d 967.

Circumstances excusing lessee’s failure to give timely notice of exercise of option to renew or extend lease. 27 A.L.R.4th 266.

Sufficiency as to method of giving oral or written notice exercising option to renew or extend lease. 29 A.L.R.4th 903.

What constitutes timely notice of exercise of option to renew or extend lease. 29 A.L.R.4th 956.

Waiver of statutory demand-for-rent due or of notice-to-quit prerequisite of summary eviction of lessee for nonpayment of rent-modern cases. 31 A.L.R.4th 1254.

Sufficiency as to parties giving or receiving notice of exercise of option to renew or extend lease. 34 A.L.R.4th 857.

Specificity of description of premises as affecting enforceability of lease. 73 A.L.R.4th 236.

What constitutes abandonment of residential or commercial lease-modern cases. 84 A.L.R.4th 183.

Am. Jur.

11B Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Leases of Real Property §§ 161:1270 et seq. (notice of termination and cancellation).

15 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 209, Landlord’s Reasonable Efforts to Minimize Damages After Tenant’s Breach of Lease.

25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 51, Abandonment of Lease of Real Property.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 519, Lessee’s Excusable Failure to give Timely Notice Exercising Option to Renew Lease.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 81(1) et seq., 142(1) et seq., 150(1) et seq., 173, 183.

§ 89-7-25. Tenant holding after notice liable for double rent.

When a tenant, being lawfully notified by his landlord, shall fail or refuse to quit the demised premises and deliver up the same as required by the notice, or when a tenant shall give notice of his intention to quit the premises at a time specified, and shall not deliver up the premises at the time appointed, he shall, in either case, thenceforward pay to the landlord double the rent which he should otherwise have paid, to be levied, sued for, and recovered as the single rent before the giving of notice could be; and double rent shall continue to be paid during all the time the tenant shall so continue in possession.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 23; 1871, § 1642; 1880, § 1331; 1892, § 2545; 1906, § 2883; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2381; 1930, § 2225; 1942, § 947.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Penal nature of statute.

3. Notice.

4. Recovery of double rent.

5. Attorney’s fees.

6. Waiver and estoppel.

1. In general.

The statute is the sole remedy for landlords against holdover tenants; the common law rule with regard to holdover tenants was abrogated by the statute. Dungan v. Presley, 765 So. 2d 592, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 379 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

Where the landlord did not covenant to put the new tenant in possession of the leased premises, the landlord’s right to bring a dispossessory action against the old tenant was transferred to the new tenant, and the new tenant was bound by the terms of this section and could recover no more than the damages allowed the landlord under this section. Southwest Drug Co. v. Howard Bros. Pharmacy, Inc., 320 So. 2d 776, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1499 (Miss. 1975).

Judgment may be entered for both single and double rent in an unlawful entry and detainer proceeding. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Fried, 202 Miss. 370, 31 So. 2d 116, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1947).

Single rent only was recovered by a landlord during the time reasonably necessary for the tenant to remove its improvements after receiving notice the day before the lease expired that the landlord was exercising his retake privilege. Hines Motor Co. v. Hederman, 201 Miss. 859, 30 So. 2d 70, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 457 (Miss. 1947).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 947], rent due by a tenant unlawfully holding over after notice to vacate the premises is double that which he had agreed to pay. Ellison v. Landry, 199 Miss. 161, 24 So. 2d 319, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 182 (Miss. 1946).

Tenant, who became trespasser by holding over beyond expiration of term, is liable for double rent thereafter, but only for that period dating from one year prior to suit. Sherrill v. Stewart, 199 Miss. 216, 23 So. 2d 915, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 282 (Miss. 1945).

When a person is rightfully in possession of a leased premises and the landlord seeks wrongfully to evict him, the case does not become moot upon the mere fact that the tenant’s term has expired before the time of trial, because, in such case, the general judgment in favor of the landlord would be to adjudge that the tenant was wrongfully in possession at the time the action was filed and before his rightful term expired, and might subject him to double rent under this section [Code 1942, § 947]. Henley v. Kilbas, 188 Miss. 604, 195 So. 582, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 61 (Miss. 1940).

Liability of tenant holding over after notice to quit, for double rent, is absolute. Weatherall v. Brown, 113 Miss. 887, 74 So. 765, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 161 (Miss. 1917).

After termination of lease tenant has reasonable time in which to remove effects, and on failure to do so landlord may remove them but does not acquire title by tenant’s failure to remove. Opperman v. Littlejohn, 98 Miss. 636, 54 So. 77, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1910).

2. Penal nature of statute.

In unlawful entry and detainer action against tenant holding over, imposition of damages at double rent cannot be awarded on testimony which is too vague to establish a rental basis, especially in view of penal nature of such award. Burr v. Johnson, 204 Miss. 479, 37 So. 2d 747, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 382 (Miss. 1948).

One who is no longer within the orbit of federal statute because no longer a tenant, the office of price administration having authorized action for eviction or removal in accordance with requirements of local law, cannot avoid penalty provided by this section [Code 1942, § 947]. Stovall v. Gardner, 203 Miss. 527, 36 So. 2d 163, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1948).

“Double rent” imposed under this section [Code 1942, § 947] is a penalty and not rent in the accepted sense of being a stipulated consideration for the use or occupancy of property. Stovall v. Gardner, 203 Miss. 527, 36 So. 2d 163, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1948).

This section [Code 1942, § 947] is penal and should be strictly construed against the claim for double rent. Sherrill v. Stewart, 197 Miss. 880, 21 So. 2d 11, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 319 (Miss. 1945).

Claim for double rent is one for a penalty and is subject to the one-year limitation period under Code 1942, § 731. Sherrill v. Stewart, 197 Miss. 880, 21 So. 2d 11, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 319 (Miss. 1945).

The statutory provision making a tenant liable for double rent in case he holds over after notice is penal and should be strictly construed against the claim for double rent, but that does not mean that the very letter of the statute must be followed. Gulley v. Mayo, 191 Miss. 143, 1 So. 2d 800, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 118 (Miss. 1941).

3. Notice.

Liability of tenant holding over after notice to quit for double rent is absolute. Stovall v. Gardner, 203 Miss. 527, 36 So. 2d 163, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. 1948).

There can be no double rent in the absence of a notice to quit; summons to the action is not equivalent to such notice. McKay v. Shaffer, 202 Miss. 558, 32 So. 2d 746, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 317 (Miss. 1947).

Where a tenancy was from month to month, beginning on the 10th of the month, the landlord, who gave the tenant written notice on April 5th to vacate on the 30th of that month, should not be denied double rent for the period the tenant held over after the 10th of May, on the ground that the notice fixed a time for vacation ten days earlier than he was entitled to fix, since the tenant could not have been misled by the notice, but knew that the landlord intended him to vacate not on the 30th of the month, but on the 10th of the next month, and that he had simply made a mistake in fixing the date. Gulley v. Mayo, 191 Miss. 143, 1 So. 2d 800, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 118 (Miss. 1941).

Subtenants, who held over under oral lease with tenant after termination of tenant’s lease, were not liable to landlord for double rent, where landlord did not give such tenants notice to quit. Graham v. Cauthen, 175 Miss. 751, 168 So. 58, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 75 (Miss. 1936).

Landlord’s notice to quit enures to purchaser’s benefit, and tenant becomes liable for double rent on remaining beyond his rights. Pinnix v. Jones, 127 Miss. 764, 90 So. 481, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1921).

Correspondence held to constitute notice to vacate, and plaintiff entitled to recover double rent. Stollenwerck v. Eure, 119 Miss. 854, 81 So. 594, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1919).

4. Recovery of double rent.

Hold-over tenant was liable for double rent for entire premises that he had leased with cotenant, even though he claimed that he occupied only half of the premises. Murphree v. Aberdeen-Monroe County Hosp., 671 So. 2d 1300, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 61 (Miss. 1996).

On affirmance of judgment for landlord for possession of property, double rent and costs, judgment will be entered in supreme court against tenants and their sureties on supersedeas bond for double rent, plus interest thereon at rate of 6% per annum from date of judgment below to date of judgment in supreme court, and all costs, and for five per centum upon value of property interest in dispute, or amount of judgment, whichever shall be found to be smaller, which fact will be found by lower court on remand to it for that purpose, facts as to value not appearing in record. Conn v. Brashears, 38 So. 2d 907 (Miss. 1949).

This section [Code 1942, § 947] allowing double rent and Code 1942, § 1054, providing that judge shall find upon evidence the arrears of rent or reasonable compensation are applicable to suits in unlawful entry and detainer. Burr v. Johnson, 204 Miss. 479, 37 So. 2d 747, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 382 (Miss. 1948).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 947], double rent may be recovered in an action of unlawful entry and detainer. Ellison v. Landry, 199 Miss. 161, 24 So. 2d 319, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 182 (Miss. 1946).

The statutory remedy of recovery of double rent for tenant’s holding over is exclusive, and hence recovery thereunder in dispossessory proceedings was res judicata of landlord’s action for damages, notwithstanding another statute permitting recovery of both penalty and actual damages in certain cases. Tepper Bros. v. Buttross, 178 Miss. 659, 174 So. 556, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1937).

Double rent is recoverable in unlawful entry and detainer proceeding. Weatherall v. Brown, 113 Miss. 887, 74 So. 765, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 161 (Miss. 1917).

5. Attorney’s fees.

Attorney’s fees are not recoverable under this statute, damages being expressly limited thereby to double rent, contractual provision to the contrary notwithstanding. Hines Motor Co. v. Hederman, 201 Miss. 859, 30 So. 2d 70, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 457 (Miss. 1947).

6. Waiver and estoppel.

A landlord’s sole action for damages as a result of a tenant’s holdover is provided in §89-7-25; accordingly, where the landlord notified the tenant of the approaching expiration of his annual lease and demanded that the premises be surrendered at the completion of the term, but never elected to pursue his statutory remedy by having the tenant evicted, the landlord’s acceptance of one month’s rent following the expiration of the lease created a month to month tenancy, and the landlord was entitled to nothing further when the tenant vacated the premises at the end of that month. Mississippi State Dep't of Public Welfare v. Howie, 449 So. 2d 772, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1663 (Miss. 1984).

Double rent was not recoverable prior to date on which tenant herself asserted that the term had expired, where landlord had waived the claim for double rent. Sherrill v. Stewart, 199 Miss. 216, 23 So. 2d 915, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 282 (Miss. 1945).

Tenant’s plea of estoppel in landlord’s action for double rent, upon ground that landlord’s position in present suit was inconsistent with prior suit between the same parties and relating to the same subject matter instituted by the landlord for dispossession wherein landlord waived claim for double rent, was not frivolous, so that the sustaining of plaintiff’s motion to strike the plea constituted reversible error. Sherrill v. Stewart, 197 Miss. 880, 21 So. 2d 11, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 319 (Miss. 1945).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes tenant’s holding over of leased premises. 13 A.L.R.5th 169.

Validity and construction of lease provision requiring lessee to pay liquidated sum for failure to vacate premises or surrender possession at expiration of lease. 23 A.L.R.2d 1318.

What constitutes willfulness or malice justifying landlord’s collection of statutory multiple damages for tenant’s wrongful retention of possession. 7 A.L.R.4th 589.

What are reports prepared or used by “agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions,” within Freedom of Information Act (5 USCS § 552(b)(8)). 48 A.L.R. Fed. 814.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 960.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 519, Lessee’s Excusable Failure to give Timely Notice Exercising Option to Renew Lease.

Young, Trial Handbook for Mississippi Lawyers § 32:19.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 73 et seq., 136(1) et seq., 148, 165, 177.

Law Reviews.

Walker, Common Law Protection of Economic Expectancies: “Business Torts” in Mississippi. 50 Miss. L. J. 335, March 1979.

1984 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Property. 55 Miss. L. J. 135, March, 1985.

§ 89-7-27. Proceedings against tenant holding over.

A tenant or lessee at will or at sufferance, or for part of a year, or for one or more years, of any houses, lands, or tenements, and the assigns, undertenants, or legal representatives of such tenant or lessee, shall be removed from the premises by the judge of the county court, any justice of the peace of the county, or by the mayor or police justice of any city, town, or village where the premises, or some part thereof, are situated, in the following cases, to wit:

First. Where such tenant shall hold over and continue in possession of the demised premises, or any part thereof, after the expiration of his term, without the permission of the landlord.

Second. After any default in the payment of the rent pursuant to the agreement under which such premises are held, and when complete satisfaction of the rent and any late fees due cannot be obtained by distress of goods, and three (3) days’ notice, in writing, requiring the payment of such rent or the possession of the premises, shall have been served by the person entitled to the rent on the person who owes the rent.

Third. If a written agreement between the landlord and tenant exists, any event calling for eviction in the agreement may trigger the eviction process under this section. Notice of default by email or text message is proper if the party has agreed in writing to be notified by that means.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 27; 1871, § 1646; 1880, § 1333; 1892, § 2547; 1906, § 2885; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2383; 1930, § 2226; 1942, § 948; Laws, 2018, ch. 446, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2018.

Editor's Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, Section 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to “justice of the peace” shall mean justice court judge.

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment, in the first paragraph, deleted “(1)” preceding “or more years” and substituted “shall be removed” for “may be removed”; in the paragraph captioned “Second,” inserted “complete” and “and any late fees due” and substituted “who owes the rent” for “owing the same”; and added the paragraph captioned “Third.”

Cross References —

Jurisdiction of county courts, see §9-9-1.

Civil jurisdiction of justices of the peace, see §9-11-9.

Unlawful entry and detainer by tenant, see §§11-25-1 et seq.

Duties of mayor generally, see §21-3-15.

Powers and duties of police justice, see §§21-23-1 et seq.

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

Right of landlord to remove tenant in manner prescribed by this Chapter for nonpayment of rent, not circumscribed by termination procedure specified in section89-8-13, see §89-8-13.

Annulment of lease for unlawful use of premises, see §95-3-23.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

2. Notice.

3. Procedure, generally.

4. Pleading.

5. Evidence.

6. Damages.

7. Appeals.

8. Estoppel and waiver.

9. Miscellaneous.

1. Jurisdiction.

Neither justice of peace, nor circuit court on appeal, in proceeding under this section [Code 1942, § 948], have any jurisdiction to make final and conclusive adjudication of title to property involved. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Circuit court has jurisdiction of both subject matter and parties on appeal with supersedeas from fault judgment by justice of peace, in summary proceeding under this section [Code 1942, § 948], to obtain possession of real property, rendered on invalid service of process, although justice of peace had jurisdiction only of subject matter when default judgment was rendered. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Supreme court has no jurisdiction to make conclusive adjudication of title to property on appeal of proceeding under this section [Code 1942, § 948] begun in justice of peace court, where neither justice of peace nor circuit court on appeal had jurisdiction to make final and conclusive adjudication of title to property as between parties to this litigation. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

County judge had jurisdiction of landlord’s action to oust tenant at end of term, under statute, as against contention that county court has no authority to try causes in vacation. McMillan v. Best, 171 Miss. 811, 158 So. 488, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 14 (Miss. 1935).

2. Notice.

A notice to tenant to vacate the premises was not in compliance with the statute since it failed to require in the alternative the payment of rent or the possession of the premises. Williams v. Shivers, 222 Miss. 626, 76 So. 2d 838, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 646 (Miss. 1955).

Where tenancy, which had been held under definite, different contracts for 1933 and 1934, terminated on December 31, 1934, and proceeding was brought in January, 1935, after notice on January 9, 1935, to vacate, landlord’s failure to give such notice before expiration of lease did not amount to waiver of right to possession; statute requiring two months’ notice being inapplicable. Graham v. Cauthen, 175 Miss. 751, 168 So. 58, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 75 (Miss. 1936).

3. Procedure, generally.

Judgment of county judge in ouster proceeding after termination of lease was not void on ground that county clerk filed all papers in proceeding and issued process, where defendants waived service of process and appeared before county judge by their answer and case was tried by agreement of all parties thereto. Graham v. Cauthen, 175 Miss. 751, 168 So. 58, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 75 (Miss. 1936).

Error to grant peremptory instruction when evidence sharply conflicting as to existence of relation. Lockett v. Lockett, 95 So. 741 (Miss. 1923).

Consolidation of proceedings by vendor and purchaser to eject tenant held error, but not to require reversal, though costs would be charged against landlord. Pinnix v. Jones, 127 Miss. 764, 90 So. 481, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1921).

4. Pleading.

In an action by a landlord to recover possession of a house and lot against her tenant, the court found it unnecessary to review the ruling upon pleas in demurrer by the parties where the case was finally submitted to the jury on evidence which would have been permissible if the pleading had been confined to the two affidavits contemplated by this section [Code 1942, § 948], and Code 1942, § 953. Tanner v. Walsh, 184 Miss. 147, 183 So. 278, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss. 1938).

5. Evidence.

In proceeding under this section [Code 1942, § 948], title to property cannot be conclusively adjudicated but landlord must make at least prima facie showing that he is entitled to possession. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

6. Damages.

Under Code 1942, § 947, double rent may be recovered in an action of unlawful entry and detainer inasmuch as Code 1942, §§ 1043 and 1054 provide for the recovery in such an action of “any amount for arrears of rent,” and recovery therefor is not limited to the summary action provided by this section [Code 1942, § 948]. Ellison v. Landry, 199 Miss. 161, 24 So. 2d 319, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 182 (Miss. 1946).

Plaintiff’s cause of action on defendant’s appeal bond stipulating that should judgment, awarding plaintiff possession of land under this section [Code 1942, § 948] as against defendant’s contention that he was in possession under contract for purchase, be affirmed, defendant would pay all costs and the value of use and occupation of the land after time of taking the appeal, as well as damages for waste or injury, is enforceable, upon affirmance of the judgment, only by an original action on the bond, and not by merely remanding the cause to the court below for the ascertainment of the amount of damages covered by the bond. Hodges v. Jones, 197 Miss. 107, 19 So. 2d 518, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 278 (Miss. 1944).

Interest of plaintiff in the land, where supreme court affirmed judgment granting plaintiff possession as against defendant’s contention that he was in possession under contract for its purchase, was not limited to the rent due but covered all its value, so as to entitle plaintiff to 5 per cent damages on such value under Code 1942, § 1971. Hodges v. Jones, 197 Miss. 107, 19 So. 2d 518, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 278 (Miss. 1944).

Where defendant’s appeal bond stipulated that if judgment awarding owner possession of land was affirmed he would pay all costs and the value of the use and occupation of the land after the time of taking the appeal, but the question as to the amount of damages covered by the bond had not been argued by either counsel, no judgment would be rendered for damages upon affirmance, although appellee could file a motion for such a judgment, to which appellant could reply and appellee could make rejoinder. Hodges v. Jones, 197 Miss. 107, 19 So. 2d 518, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 278 (Miss. 1944).

Proper elements of damages for wrongful suing out injunction to prevent tenants from removing building are attorney’s fees, costs, depreciation, expenses of trial, and reasonable rent. Waldauer v. Parks, 141 Miss. 617, 106 So. 881, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 467 (Miss. 1926).

7. Appeals.

Statutes relating to bond and judgment thereon in proceedings to stay execution of writ of possession in ejectment (Code 1942, §§ 1165 and 1166) have no application to an appeal by tenant from judgment rendered against him in proceeding under this section [Code 1972, § 948] awarding appellee recovery of land as against contention that tenant was in possession under contract for purchase, since this is not an appeal from a judgment in an action of ejectment with a stay of execution. Hodges v. Jones, 197 Miss. 107, 19 So. 2d 518, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 278 (Miss. 1944).

Appeal from judgment of justice of peace dispossessing tenant must be taken within five days after judgment. Simpson v. Boykin, 118 Miss. 701, 79 So. 852, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 123 (Miss. 1918), overruled, Jackson v. Schwartz, 240 So. 2d 60, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1267 (Miss. 1970).

On appeal to the circuit court the tenant may for the first time make and file an affidavit denying the facts averred by the landlord, upon which the summons was issued, and will be entitled to a trial on the merits of the issue so made. Harvey v. Clark, 81 Miss. 166, 32 So. 906, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 113 (Miss. 1902).

8. Estoppel and waiver.

Where a notice to vacate the premises was defective, but the tenant promised that he would move there was a waiver of written notice. Williams v. Shivers, 222 Miss. 626, 76 So. 2d 838, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 646 (Miss. 1955).

Rule that person who enters into possession of property under agreement with another, either express or implied, to occupy it as tenant is ordinarily estopped to deny title of landlord is applicable only where relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted or established and does not preclude alleged tenant from showing that relationship never existed. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Where tenancy, which had been held under definite, different contracts for 1933 and 1934, terminated on December 31, 1934, and proceeding was brought in January, 1935, after notice on January 9, 1935, to vacate, landlord’s failure to give such notice before expiration of lease did not amount to waiver of right to possession; statute requiring two months’ notice being inapplicable. Graham v. Cauthen, 175 Miss. 751, 168 So. 58, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 75 (Miss. 1936).

9. Miscellaneous.

Question of usury in note secured by deed of trust later foreclosed and effect of usury upon foreclosure sale will not be adjudicated in proceeding under this section [Code 1942, § 948] by purchaser of property at foreclosure sale to obtain possession of the property. McCoy v. McRae, 204 Miss. 309, 37 So. 2d 353, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1948).

Defendant in possession of land under a parol agreement with owner’s husband, approved by owner, to convey it to defendant upon payment of stipulated price, a portion of which had been paid, was merely a tenant at will or sufferance, thereby entitling owner, who had given notice to vacate and quit, to possession, since defendant’s possession was not under a deed but merely under a parol agreement. Hodges v. Jones, 197 Miss. 107, 19 So. 2d 518, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 278 (Miss. 1944).

Where tenancy of farm land for 1934 terminated on December 31, 1934, and proceeding was brought in January, 1935, after notice on January 9, 1935, to vacate, landlord was not entitled to apportionment of rent for hold-over period which terminated on March 9, 1935, based on 1934 rental. Graham v. Cauthen, 175 Miss. 751, 168 So. 58, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 75 (Miss. 1936).

Landlord who had leased premises to third person had no right of action against old tenant to secure possession of land at end of term, where she was under no contract to give possession to lessee, or to oust tenant holding over. McMillan v. Best, 171 Miss. 811, 158 So. 488, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 14 (Miss. 1935).

Judgment for landlord in statutory proceeding before justice to obtain possession is not conclusive upon title, though determination of title was involved. Vansant v. Dodds, 164 Miss. 787, 144 So. 688, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1932).

Validity of constable’s deed to execution creditor cannot be conclusively adjudicated in creditor’s action against debtor under statute authorizing removal of holdover tenant, or tenant defaulting in rent; such statutory action being purely possessory. Vansant v. Dodds, 164 Miss. 787, 144 So. 688, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1932).

Landlord cannot sue to eject tenant after sale of premises. Pinnix v. Jones, 127 Miss. 764, 90 So. 481, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1921).

Lessee holding over pending negotiations for renewal of lease, not entitled to renewal nor to hold under new term. Thomas Hinds Lodge v. Presbyterian Church of Fayette, 103 Miss. 130, 60 So. 66, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1912).

Landlord not entitled to recover rent from tenant remaining in possession after notice upon expiration of term, under circumstances indicating no rent charged. Thomas Hinds Lodge v. Presbyterian Church of Fayette, 103 Miss. 130, 60 So. 66, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1912).

Tenant has reasonable time to remove crop matured at termination of lease; matured crop at end of lease not a growing crop. Opperman v. Littlejohn, 98 Miss. 636, 54 So. 77, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1910).

Where the tenant continues to occupy the premises, and enters upon another term without objection from the landlord, a tenancy for another term is thus created which cannot be terminated in the middle of the term. Usher v. Moss, 50 Miss. 208, 1874 Miss. LEXIS 46 (Miss. 1874).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A landlord should sue for eviction in the county where the leased premises are located. Shirley, Aug. 19, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0406.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes tenant’s holding over of leased premises. 13 A.L.R.5th 169.

Waiver of statutory demand-for-rent due or of notice-to-quit prerequisite of summary eviction of lessee for nonpayment of rent-modern cases. 31 A.L.R.4th 1254.

Lessor’s retention of past-due rental payments as precluding termination of lease and dispossession of lessee for nonpayment of rent. 39 A.L.R.4th 1204.

Reviewability before trial of order denying qualified immunity to defendant sued in state court under 42 USCS § 1983. 49 A.L.R.5th 717.

When is eviction of tenant by private landlord conducted “under color of state law” for purposes of 42 USCS § 1983. 73 A.L.R. Fed. 78.

Am. Jur.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev) Landlord and Tenant, Forms 151 et seq. (landlord’s possessory remedies).

CJS.

52A C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 1335, 1336 et seq., 1361 et seq.

Law Reviews.

1984 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Property. 55 Miss. L. J. 135, March, 1985.

§ 89-7-29. Affidavit to remove.

The landlord or lessor, his legal representatives, agents, or assigns, in order to have the benefit of such proceedings, shall present to the court a sworn affidavit that contains the facts which, according to Section 89-7-27, require the removal of the tenant, describing in the affidavit the premises claimed and the amount of rent and any late fees due and when payable, and that the necessary notice has been given to terminate such tenancy. These facts shall be based on the rental agreement signed or agreed to by the landlord or lessor, his legal representatives, agents, or assigns, and the tenant. Upon receipt of the sworn affidavit, the court shall initiate the removal of the tenant for the nonpayment of rent or other event of default contained in any written agreement between the parties, as specified in the affidavit.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 28; 1871, § 1648; 1880, § 1334; 1892, § 2548; 1906, § 2886; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2384; 1930, § 2227; 1942, § 949; Laws, 2018, ch. 446, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2018.

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment rewrote the section, which read: “The landlord or lessor, his legal representatives, agents, or assigns, in order to have the benefit of such proceedings, shall make oath or affirmation of the facts which, according to the last preceding section, authorize the removal of the tenant, describing therein the premises claimed and the amount of rent due and when payable, and that the necessary notice has been given to terminate such tenancy.”

Cross References —

Right of landlord to remove tenant in manner prescribed by this Chapter for nonpayment of rent, not circumscribed by termination procedure specified in section89-8-13, see §89-8-13.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Proceedings to dispossess tenant for failure to pay rent must be strictly followed; error to dissolve injunction and dismiss bill where affidavit void. Downing v. Campbell, 131 Miss. 137, 95 So. 312, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1922).

Circuit court, on appeal thereto in proceeding by landlord to get possession of premises, trial therein being de novo, could render judgment for rent up to trial in circuit court though affidavit in lower court did not allege rent due. Stollenwerck v. Eure, 119 Miss. 854, 81 So. 594, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1919).

To summarily remove a tenant for nonpayment of rent the affidavit and proof must show that the rent was due and unpaid, that three days’ notice in writing requiring payment had been given and that the rent cannot be made by distress of the tenant’s goods. Wilson v. Wood, 84 Miss. 728, 36 So. 609, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1904).

An affidavit in a proceeding to remove a tenant holding over under this section [Code 1942, § 949] is defective if it fails to state facts from which the court may determine that the relation of landlord and tenant existed and that the term has expired. Bowles v. Dean, 84 Miss. 376, 36 So. 391, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 46 (Miss. 1904).

A proceeding to remove a tenant holding over should not be dismissed because of a defective affidavit unless the landlord declines to amend. Bowles v. Dean, 84 Miss. 376, 36 So. 391, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 46 (Miss. 1904).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes tenant’s holding over of leased premises. 13 A.L.R.5th 169.

Commercial leases: application of rule that lease may be canceled only for “material” breach. 54 A.L.R.4th 595.

§ 89-7-31. Issuance of summons; notice that landlord may dispose of tenant’s personal property if judge awards exclusive possession of premises.

  1. On receiving the affidavit, the county judge, justice court judge, municipal judge, or other officer shall issue a summons, directed to the sheriff or any constable of the county, or the marshal of the municipality in which the premises, or some part thereof, are situated, describing the premises, and commanding him to require the person in possession of the same or claiming the possession thereof, immediately to remove from the premises, or to show cause before the justice court judge or other officer, on a day to be named in the summons, why possession of the premises should not be delivered to the applicant.
  2. In addition to other information required for the summons, the summons shall state: “At the hearing, a judge will determine if the landlord is granted exclusive possession of the premises. If the judge grants possession of the premises to the landlord and you do not remove your personal property, including any manufactured home, from the premises before the date and time ordered by the judge, then the landlord may dispose of your personal property without any further legal action.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 29; 1871, § 1649; 1880, § 1335; 1892, § 2549; 1906, § 2887; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2385; 1930, § 2228; 1942, § 950; Laws, 2015, ch. 395, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2015; Laws, 2019, ch. 386, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 22, 2019).

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment, in (1), substituted “justice court judge, municipal judge” for “justice, mayor,” “municipality in which” for “city, town, or village wherein,” “immediately to remove from the premises” for “forthwith to remove therefrom” and “justice court judge” for “justice”; and added (2).

The 2019 amendment, effective March 22, 2019, substituted “to be named in the summons” for “to be named not less than three (3) nor more than five (5) days from the date of the summons” in (1).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Form 182 (writ of possession).

CJS.

52A C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant § 1375.

§ 89-7-33. Service of summons.

Such summons shall be served as a summons is served in other cases, if the tenant can be found; if not, then by putting up a copy in some conspicuous place on the premises where the tenant last or usually resided.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 30; 1871, § 1650; 1880, § 1336; 1892, § 2550; 1906, § 2888; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2386; 1930, § 2229; 1942, § 951.

§ 89-7-35. Issuance of warrant for removal.

  1. If, at the time appointed, it appears that the summons has been duly served, and if a judgment of eviction is granted, the magistrate shall issue a warrant to the sheriff or any constable of the county, or to a marshal of the municipality in which the premises, or some part thereof, are situated, immediately upon request, except when prohibited or otherwise provided under Section 89-7-45, commanding him to remove all persons from the premises, and to put the applicant into full possession thereof.
  2. If the summons complied with the requirements of Section 89-7-31(2) and if the tenant has failed to remove any of tenant’s personal property, including any manufactured home, from the premises, then, if the judge has not made some other finding regarding the disposition of any personal property in the vacated premises, the personal property shall be deemed abandoned and may be disposed of by the landlord without further notice or obligation to the tenant.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 31; 1871, § 1651; 1880, § 1337; 1892, § 2551; 1906, § 2889; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2387; 1930, § 2230; 1942, § 952; Laws, 2015, ch. 395, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2015; Laws, 2019, ch. 386, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 22, 2019).

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “municipality in which” for “city, town, or village where”, in (1); added (2); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendment, effective March 22, 2019, in (1), substituted “a judgment of eviction is granted” for “sufficient cause is not shown to the contrary” and inserted “immediately upon request, except when prohibited or otherwise provided under Section 89-7-45.”

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

If a justice court makes a finding in favor of the landlord in a proceeding for an eviction or removal, the court must immediately issue a warrant of removal according to §§89-7-35 or89-7-41; the constable is entitled to a $25.00 fee for the service of the warrant as allowed by §25-7-27(1)(b), but there is no provision for the justice court to charge any additional fee, other than the constable’s fee, for the warrant of removal. Carter, Apr. 5, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0157.

If a court makes a finding in favor of the landlord in a proceeding for an eviction or removal, the court shall immediately issue a warrant of removal. Once the landlord pays the constable fee for the removal warrant, the constable may immediately serve the warrant on the tenant. There is no need to wait ten days after a judgment for eviction before a removal warrant is issued. Riley, Dec. 5, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0657.

If a court makes a finding in favor of the landlord in a proceeding for an eviction or removal, the court shall immediately issue a warrant of removal according to Sections 89-7-35 or 89-7-41. Shirley, Aug. 17, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0201.

§ 89-7-37. Defense may be made.

The person in possession of such premises, or any person claiming possession thereof, may, at or before the time appointed in the summons for showing cause, file an affidavit with the magistrate who issued the same, denying the facts upon which the summons was issued; and the matters thus controverted may be tried by the magistrate.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 32; 1871, § 1652; 1880, § 1338; 1892, § 2552; 1906, § 2890; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2388; 1930, § 2231; 1942, § 953.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Upon appeal defendant may file his counteraffidavit in the circuit court. Bowles v. Dean, 84 Miss. 376, 36 So. 391, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 46 (Miss. 1904).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Specificity of description of premises as affecting enforceability of lease. 73 A.L.R.4th 236.

§ 89-7-39. Continuances, subpoenas.

The court may, at the request of either party, adjourn the hearing from time to time, a single adjournment not to exceed ten (10) days, except by consent, and may issue subpoenas and attachments to compel the attendance of witnesses. However, in hearings for eviction, no adjournment shall extend the entire hearing beyond forty-five (45) days from the date the eviction action was filed.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 35; 1871, § 1655; 1880, § 1339; 1892, § 2553; 1906, § 2891; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2389; 1930, § 2232; 1942, § 954; Laws, 2018, ch. 446, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2018.

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment substituted “court” for “magistrate” and “a single adjournment” for “one adjournment” and added the last sentence.

§ 89-7-41. Form of judgment for landlord; disposition of tenant’s abandoned personal property.

  1. If the decision is in favor of the landlord or other person claiming the possession of the premises, the magistrate shall issue a warrant to the sheriff, constable, or other officer immediately upon request, except when prohibited or otherwise provided under Section 89-7-45, commanding him immediately to put the landlord or other person into possession of the premises, and to levy the costs of the proceedings of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements, of the tenant or person in possession of the premises who shall have controverted the right of the landlord or other person.
  2. If the summons complied with the requirements of Section 89-7-31(2) and if the tenant has failed to remove any of tenant’s personal property, including any manufactured home, from the premises, then, if the judge has not made some other finding regarding the disposition of any personal property in the vacated premises, the personal property shall be deemed abandoned and may be disposed of by the landlord without further notice or obligation to the tenant.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 36; 1871, § 1656; 1880, § 1340; 1892, § 2554; 1906, § 2893; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2390; 1930, § 2233; 1942, § 955; Laws, 2015, ch. 395, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2015; Laws, 2019, ch. 386, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 22, 2019).

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment substituted “immediately” for “forthwith” in (1); added (2); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendment, effective March 22, 2019, in (1), inserted “immediately upon request, except when prohibited or otherwise provided under Section 89-7-45”; and made a gender neutral change.

Cross References —

Rent recoverable in action for unlawful entry and detainer, see §11-25-21.

Judgment for plaintiff and writ of possession in action for unlawful entry and detainer, see §§11-25-23,11-25-113.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

If a justice court makes a finding in favor of the landlord in a proceeding for an eviction or removal, the court must immediately issue a warrant of removal according to §§89-7-35 or89-7-41; the constable is entitled to a $25.00 fee for the service of the warrant as allowed by §25-7-27(1)(b), but there is no provision for the justice court to charge any additional fee, other than the constable’s fee, for the warrant of removal. Carter, Apr. 5, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0157.

If a court makes a finding in favor of the landlord in a proceeding for an eviction or removal, the court shall immediately issue a warrant of removal. Once the landlord pays the constable fee for the removal warrant, the constable may immediately serve the warrant on the tenant. There is no need to wait ten days after a judgment for eviction before a removal warrant is issued. Riley, Dec. 5, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0657.

If a court makes a finding in favor of the landlord in a proceeding for an eviction or removal, the court shall immediately issue a warrant of removal according to Sections 89-7-35 or 89-7-41. Shirley, Aug. 17, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0201.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Measure and elements of damages for lessee’s breach of covenant as to repairs. 45 A.L.R.5th 251.

§ 89-7-43. Judgment for defendant.

If the decision be in favor of the tenant, he shall recover costs of the applicant, and the magistrate shall issue execution therefor.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 37; 1871, § 1657; 1880, § 1341; 1892, § 2555; 1906, § 2892; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2391; 1930, § 2234; 1942, § 956.

Cross References —

Judgment for defendant in proceedings for unlawful entry and detainer, see §§11-25-27,11-25-117.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Damages, if any, to be awarded against a landlord who unsucessfully appeals from a judgment in unlawful entry and detainer are not to be measured on the value of the land where the tenant makes no claim that he owns the land or has any right to its ownership as land. McKeithen v. Bush, 201 Miss. 664, 29 So. 2d 310, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 436 (Miss. 1947).

§ 89-7-45. When warrant for removal may issue in cases of nonpayment of rent.

If a judgment of eviction is founded solely upon the nonpayment of rent and, at the time of the request for the warrant for removal the full and complete amount of rent due, including any late fees as provided in the rental agreement that have accrued as of the date of judgment, and the costs of the proceedings, have been paid to the person entitled to the rent, the magistrate shall not issue a warrant for removal. If the rent, late fees and costs have not been paid in full at the time of the request for the warrant for removal, the magistrate must immediately issue the warrant for removal unless the judge determines that, for good cause shown, a stay not to exceed three (3) days would best serve the interests of justice and equity. If it is shown that a stay is likely to result in material injury to the property of the person entitled to the rent, no stay shall be granted.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 38; 1871, § 1658; 1880, § 1342; 1892, § 2556; 1906, § 2894; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2392; 1930, § 2235; 1942, § 957; Laws, 2018, ch. 446, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2018; Laws, 2019, ch. 386, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved March 22, 2019).

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment substituted “warrant is actually” for “warrant be actually,” inserted “full and complete amount of” and “including any late fees…as provided in the rental agreement” and deleted “or give such security as shall be satisfactory to the magistrate” preceding “to the person entitled to the rent.”

The 2019 amendment, effective March 22, 2019, rewrote the section, which read: “If the proceedings be founded upon the nonpayment of rent, the issuance of the warrant for the removal of the tenant shall be stayed if the person owing the rent shall, before the warrant is actually issued, pay the full and complete amount of rent due, including any late fees that have accrued as a result of the nonpayment of rent as provided in the rental agreement, and the costs of the proceedings, to the person entitled to the rent, for the payment thereof and costs in ten (10) days; and if the rent and costs shall not be paid accordingly, the warrant shall then issue as if the proceedings had not been stayed.”

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The right to stay proceedings on payment of rent, etc., exists after trial, on appeal, in the circuit court. Flanneken v. Wright, 64 Miss. 217, 1 So. 157, 1886 Miss. LEXIS 47 (Miss. 1886).

§ 89-7-47. Record, appeals.

The magistrate before whom proceedings shall be had against a tenant holding over, shall keep a full record of his proceedings, and shall carefully preserve all papers in the cause, and the same costs shall be taxed and paid as are allowed for similar service in cases of unlawful entry and detainer, and the right of appeal shall exist as in such cases.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 39; 1871, § 1659; 1880, § 1343; 1892, § 2557; 1906, § 2895; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2393; 1930, § 2236; 1942, § 958.

Cross References —

Appeal from unlawful entry and detainer court, see §11-51-83.

Appeals from judgment of justice of the peace in civil cases, see §11-51-85.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where a circuit court affirmed the decision of justice of peace for landlord in a suit to remove tenant for nonpayment of rent, the circuit court properly allowed the landlord rent up to the time of the judgment. Williams v. Shivers, 222 Miss. 626, 76 So. 2d 838, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 646 (Miss. 1955).

Circuit court on appeal in proceeding by landlord to get possession of premises, trial therein being de novo, may render judgment for rent up to trial in circuit court though affidavit in lower court did not allege rent due. Stollenwerck v. Eure, 119 Miss. 854, 81 So. 594, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1919).

On appeal to the circuit court the tenant may for the first time make and file an affidavit denying the facts averred by the landlord, upon which the summons was issued, and will be entitled to a trial on the merits of the issue so made. Harvey v. Clark, 81 Miss. 166, 32 So. 906, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 113 (Miss. 1902).

On appeal to the circuit court in proceedings against the tenant, a successful plaintiff may recover rent to the time of trial. Paxton v. Oliver, 70 Miss. 570, 12 So. 799, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1893).

The appeal lies as well in a proceeding against a tenant holding over after the expiration of his term as against a tenant who is in default for the nonpayment of rent. Flanneken v. Wright, 64 Miss. 217, 1 So. 157, 1886 Miss. LEXIS 47 (Miss. 1886).

§ 89-7-49. Proceedings when tenant deserts premises.

If a tenant of lands, being in arrear for rent, shall desert the demised premises and leave the same uncultivated or unoccupied, so that a sufficient distress cannot be had to satisfy the arrears of rent, any constable of the county may, at the request of the landlord, and upon due proof by affidavit that the premises have been deserted, leaving rent in arrear, and not sufficient distress thereon, go upon and view the premises, and upon being satisfied that the premises have been so deserted, he shall affix a notice, in writing, upon a conspicuous part of the premises, stating what day he will return to take a second view thereof, not less than five (5) days nor more than fifteen (15) days thereafter, and requiring the tenant then to appear and pay the rent and any late fees due. At the time specified in the notice the constable shall again view the premises, and if, upon second view, the tenant shall not pay the rent and any late fees due, or there shall not be sufficient distress upon the premises, then the justice court shall immediately or within forty-eight (48) hours put the landlord in possession of the premises, and the lease thereof to such tenant shall become void. The tenant may appeal to the circuit court from the proceedings of the justice court at any time within thirty (30) days after possession delivered, by serving notice in writing thereof upon the landlord, and by giving bond, with sufficient sureties, to be approved by the justice court, for the payment to the landlord of the costs of appeal, which may be adjudged against the tenant; and thereupon the justice court shall return the proceedings before him to the next term of the circuit court, and the court shall, at the return term, examine the proceedings in a summary way, and may order restitution to be made to the tenant, with costs of appeal, to be paid by the landlord; or in case of affirming the proceedings, shall award costs against the tenant and sureties in his bond.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 24; 1871, § 1643; 1880, § 1332; 1892, § 2546; 1906, § 2884; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2382; 1930, § 2237; 1942, § 959; Laws, 1990, ch. 404, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1990; Laws, 2018, ch. 446, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2018.

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment inserted “and any late fees” in the first and second sentences; substituted “justice court shall immediately or within forty-eight (48) hours put the landlord” for “justice court may put the landlord”; and made a minor stylistic change.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

If clause in lease prohibiting removal of property while rent was unpaid created equitable lien, it was not enforceable by statutory remedy of distress for rent. Lake v. Morson, 164 Miss. 401, 145 So. 337, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 237 (Miss. 1933).

When tenant on shares abandons his contract, landlord may sue for damages. Weir v. Cooper, 122 Miss. 225, 84 So. 184, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 430 (Miss. 1920).

No suit lies for rent before it is due; on abandonment of performance of share contract landlord may at once sue for breach. Weir v. Cooper, 122 Miss. 225, 84 So. 184, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 430 (Miss. 1920).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Landlord and tenant: respective rights in excess rent when landlord relets at higher rent during lessee’s term. 50 A.L.R.4th 403.

Specificity of description of premises as affecting enforceability of lease. 73 A.L.R.4th 236.

What constitutes abandonment of residential or commercial lease-modern cases. 84 A.L.R.4th 183.

Landlord’s duty, on tenant’s failure to occupy, or abandonment of, premises, to mitigate damages by accepting or procuring another tenant. 75 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 870-872, 937.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Forms 381 et seq. (surrender, termination, and abandonment).

15 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 209, Landlord’s Reasonable Efforts to Minimize Damages After Tenant’s Breach of Lease.

25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 51, Abandonment of Lease of Real Property.

26 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 525, Landlord’s Acceptance of Abandonment or Surrender of Leased Premises.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 120 et seq., 143, 174.

52A C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 1323.

§ 89-7-51. Lien of landlord.

  1. Every lessor of land shall have a lien on the agricultural products of the leased premises, however and by whomsoever produced, to secure the payment of the rent and of money advanced to the tenant, and the fair market value of all advances made by him to his tenant for supplies for the tenant and others for whom he may contract, and for his business carried on upon the leased premises. This lien shall be paramount to all other liens, claims, or demands upon such products when perfected in accordance with Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 – Secured Transactions (Section 75-9-101 et seq.). The claim of the lessor for supplies furnished may be enforced in the same manner and under the same circumstances as his claim for rent may be; and all the provisions of law as to attachment for rent and proceedings under it shall be applicable to a claim for supplies furnished, and such attachment may be levied on any goods and chattels liable for rent, as well as on the agricultural products.
  2. All articles of personal property, except a stock of merchandise sold in the normal course of business, owned by the lessee of real property and situated on the leased premises shall be subject to a lien in favor of the lessor to secure the payment of rent for such premises as has been contracted to be paid, whether or not then due. This lien shall be subject to all prior liens or other security interests perfected according to law. No such articles of personal property may be removed from the leased premises until such rent is paid except with the written consent of the lessor. All of the provisions of law as to attachment for rent and proceedings thereunder shall be applicable with reference to the lessor’s lien under this subsection.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1301; 1892, § 2495; 1906, § 2832; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2330; 1930, § 2186; 1942, § 908; Laws, 1972, ch. 343, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 495, § 34; Laws, 2015, ch. 395, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

Amendment Notes —

The 2001 amendment, effective January 1, 2002, inserted “when perfected in accordance with Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 – Secured Transactions (Section 75-9-101, et seq.)” in the second sentence of (1).

The 2015 amendment substituted “This lien” for “Such lien” in (2) and made a minor stylistic change.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

Exclusion of landlord’s lien from operation of Uniform Commercial Code relating to secured transactions, see §75-9-104.

Liens generally, see §§85-7-1 through85-7-9.

Enforcement of liens generally, see §§85-7-141 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Persons entitled to lien.

3. Advances and supplies.

4. Existence of relation of landlord and tenant.

5. —Tenant under land contract.

6. Rights and liabilities of sublessees.

7. Rights and liabilities of purchasers of agricultural products.

8. Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, lien.

9. Priority of lien.

10. Enforcement of lien.

11. Liability of landlord to persons supplying tenant.

12. Miscellaneous.

12. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

The landlord lien statute (§89-7-51) does not provide for the ejectment of a tenant from the leased premises for failure to pay rent, but merely gives a landlord a subordinate lien on all articles of personal property. Bender v. North Meridian Mobile Home Park, 636 So. 2d 385, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 160 (Miss. 1994).

In determining whether a lien will be extended to include the proceeds of a crop sale, courts look to whether: (1) the crop lender was aware of the landlord/tenant relationship; (2) the crop lender was involved in the sale; (3) the crop lender obtained a subordination agreement from the landlord; or (4) whether the landlord expressly or impliedly waived its statutory lien. Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Sklar, 555 So. 2d 1024, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1990).

Landlord Lien statute affords unpaid landlord no rights in property of third persons on landlord’s premises. By analogy, landlord should not acquire lien under §89-7-51(2) on property not belonging to lessee. Hicks v. Thomas, 516 So. 2d 1344, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2949 (Miss. 1987).

In determining whether landlord is entitled to lien on crops securing rent of tenant house off leased premises, question is whether house was reasonably necessary to enable tenants to properly carry out farming operations. Dale v. Webb, 166 Miss. 309, 146 So. 875, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 364 (Miss. 1933).

Title to stolen crop when rent reserved therefrom held to be in tenant until division of the crop is made. Bethany v. State, 124 Miss. 870, 87 So. 410, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1921).

Under lease for year title to crop vests in tenant subject to landlord’s lien. Opperman v. Littlejohn, 98 Miss. 636, 54 So. 77, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1910).

Merchants receiving crop to ship out of state and credit on tenant’s account held liable to extent of landlord’s lien. Peets & Norman Co. v. Baker, 95 Miss. 576, 48 So. 898, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 1909).

The lien given a landlord under this section [Code 1942, § 908] is effectual to secure the rent of the dwelling house appurtenant to the farm, as well as the rent of arable lands. Scroggins v. Foster, 76 Miss. 318, 24 So. 194, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1898).

A landlord has no lien upon his tenant’s goods, other than agricultural products, and, before distress for rent, a bona fide purchaser of such goods, whether on or off the leased premises, will be protected. Richardson v. McLaurin, 69 Miss. 70, 12 So. 264, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 104 (Miss. 1891).

The lien is only given upon the agricultural products, and is not affected by their removal from the premises. Henry v. Davis, 60 Miss. 212, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1882); Fitzgerald v. Fowlkes, 60 Miss. 270, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1882); Tennessee Joint Stock Land Bank v. Bank of Greenwood, 179 Miss. 534, 172 So. 323, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1937).

There is no lien, except on the agricultural products, before the levy of attachment. Marye v. Dyche, Gates, Gillespie & Co., 42 Miss. 347, 1869 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1869).

2. Persons entitled to lien.

A landlord holding the tenant’s note for rent, who during the term and before the rent is due, conveys the rented land, cannot thereafter attach for the rent. The conveyance carries with it, as an incident, the note. Watkins v. Duvall, 69 Miss. 364, 13 So. 727, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 150 (Miss. 1891).

One who was landlord, after conveying the premises to a third person, has no lien for supplies thereafter advanced by him during the term to enable the tenant to make a crop on the land. Watkins v. Duvall, 69 Miss. 364, 13 So. 727, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 150 (Miss. 1891).

The assignment of the rent and lease carries with it the lien. Taylor v. Nelson, 54 Miss. 524, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 42 (Miss. 1877); Newman v. Bank of Greenville, 66 Miss. 323, 5 So. 753, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 103 (Miss. 1889).

3. Advances and supplies.

Under circumstances advances held made by landlord to tenant through third person, and so secured by landlord’s lien. Moak v. Moak, 150 Miss. 289, 116 So. 286, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 105 (Miss. 1928).

Fees for medical services rendered tenant and family are “advances for supplies” within lien statute. Moak v. Moak, 150 Miss. 289, 116 So. 286, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 105 (Miss. 1928).

Lien on crop exists for supplies furnished previous year. Sprouse v. Davis, 141 Miss. 564, 106 So. 824, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 462 (Miss. 1926).

Persons furnishing receiver money with which to gather tenant’s cotton crop does not acquire lien on other cotton grown on leased premises. Goodwin v. Mitchell, 38 So. 657 (Miss. 1905).

Abandonment by tenant not justified by failure of landlord to furnish meat and clothing, unless landlord obligated himself to do so. Petty v. Leggett, 38 So. 549 (Miss. 1905).

Mules are “supplies,” and taking a separate note for their price, reciting that a lien on them and the crop is retained until it is paid, is not a waiver of the landlord’s lien. Trimble v. Durham, 70 Miss. 295, 12 So. 207, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 104 (Miss. 1892).

The lien does not exist if the landlord merely guarantees the payment for supplies advanced by another. The relation of creditor and debtor must exist between the landlord and tenant to support the lien. Ellis v. Jones, 70 Miss. 60, 11 So. 566, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1892).

Advances of supplies for one year cannot be treated as advances for the next so as to be a lien on the products produced the latter year. Lumbley v. Gilruth, 65 Miss. 23, 3 So. 77, 1887 Miss. LEXIS 7 (Miss. 1887).

4. Existence of relation of landlord and tenant.

Where lands were rented to several tenants under their agreements to pay one-third of the cotton and seed, with the landlord paying one-third of the cost of fertilizer, poison and ginning, the relationship of landlord and tenant came into existence and title to and possession of the crop was vested in the tenant, subject to the landlord’s paramount lien to secure the payment of rent. Lewis v. Latham, 224 Miss. 107, 79 So. 2d 811, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 466 (Miss. 1955).

Where former litigation between the parties to a deed of trust and the decree therein established that the parties were claiming title to the land in question adversely to each other, the relation of landlord and tenant necessary to found a landlord’s lien for agricultural products grown on the land during such period of litigation did not exist; and the record in such litigation was an estoppel on the mortgagee to claim that relation. Riley v. Hardy, 185 Miss. 765, 189 So. 514, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 187 (Miss. 1939).

The relation of landlord and tenant must exist as a result of contract, either express or implied, in order to give the former a lien on the agricultural products produced on the land. Riley v. Hardy, 185 Miss. 765, 189 So. 514, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 187 (Miss. 1939).

Relation of landlord and tenant did not exist between mortgagors disputing right to possession of purchaser under deed of trust so as to create lien on agricultural products. Raleigh State Bank v. Williams, 150 Miss. 766, 117 So. 365, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 183 (Miss. 1928).

No particular form of expression is necessary to create a lease. Board of Sup'rs v. Imperial Naval Stores Co., 93 Miss. 822, 47 So. 177 (Miss. 1908).

Lease of land for 99 years or more is governed by principles of estates for years and gives no right to fee. Moss Point Lumber Co. v. Board of Sup'rs, 89 Miss. 448, 42 So. 290, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 103 (Miss. 1906).

A contract that one of the parties is to furnish the other a dwelling house for himself and family with adjacent lands, and with teams and utensils, and that such other is to cultivate the land and pay one-half the crop for the use of the property, creates the relation of landlord and tenant. Schlicht v. Callicott, 76 Miss. 487, 24 So. 869, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1898).

5. —Tenant under land contract.

Contract to convey may stipulate that annual notes in payment will be collected as rental value of the land. Pennington v. Richie, 102 Miss. 133, 58 So. 657 (Miss. 1911).

Purchaser in possession under parol contract did not create relation of landlord and tenant by executing rent notes promising to pay one bale of cotton to vendor if he should decide not to take the place. Pennington v. Richie, 102 Miss. 133, 58 So. 657 (Miss. 1911).

Upon vendee in possession under bond for title failing to pay installments, parties assumed relation of landlord and tenant. W. L. Robinson Co. v. Weathersby, 101 Miss. 724, 57 So. 983, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1911).

Peremptory instruction for rent held erroneous where notes given for the purchase price. Caston v. Turner, 95 Miss. 303, 48 So. 721, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 235 (Miss. 1909).

Under contract to convey, overpayment on first installment should be applied on second year’s rent. Flowers-Carruth Co. v. J. L. Moyse & Bros., 95 Miss. 174, 48 So. 523, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 218 (Miss. 1909).

Where purchase money notes are given and the deed specified that they shall be considered as rent, and that a landlord’s lien is retained, the holder has a valid equitable lien upon the agricultural products. Maynard v. Cocke, 71 Miss. 493, 15 So. 788, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 88 (Miss. 1893).

6. Rights and liabilities of sublessees.

Landlord held entitled to lien on crops, whether produced by tenant or subtenant. Dale v. Webb, 166 Miss. 309, 146 So. 875, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 364 (Miss. 1933).

Subtenant by reason of liability of his crops to landlord’s lien, held a surety for original tenant’s debt for supplies. Powell v. Tomlinson, 129 Miss. 354, 92 So. 226, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 47 (Miss. 1922).

Lessor held not entitled to retain goods of deceased lessee to pay indebtedness of sublessee. Hyatt v. Southern R. Co., 88 Miss. 546, 41 So. 3, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1906).

Lessee held not liable for advances made to sublessee without his consent. Hyatt v. Southern R. Co., 88 Miss. 546, 41 So. 3, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1906).

Where one has purchased from the tenant crops subject to lien, a subtenant may compel the landlord first to enforce the liability of such purchaser for the value of the crop purchased. Applewhite v. Nelms, 71 Miss. 482, 14 So. 443, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 104 (Miss. 1893).

A subtenant occupies the relation of surety for the rent due by the tenant, and in equity may compel the landlord to first resort to the estate of the tenant and preserve whatever securities he may have from the tenant, so that the subtenant, whose crop is taken for rent, may be subrogated thereto. Applewhite v. Nelms, 71 Miss. 482, 14 So. 443, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 104 (Miss. 1893); Dale v. Webb, 166 Miss. 309, 146 So. 875, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 364 (Miss. 1933); Hooks v. Burns, 168 Miss. 723, 152 So. 469, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 374 (Miss. 1934).

7. Rights and liabilities of purchasers of agricultural products.

Landlord’s lien on agricultural products as security for unpaid rent is paramount to rights of purchaser of warehouse receipts for product issued in tenant’s name in absence of proof that tenant has dealt honestly with his landlord. Phillips v. Box, 204 Miss. 231, 37 So. 2d 266, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 358 (Miss. 1948).

Bona fide purchaser of warehouse receipts held to acquire stored cotton free from landlord’s lien. McGee v. Carver, 141 Miss. 463, 106 So. 760, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 444 (Miss. 1926).

Purchaser of cotton from tenant held liable to landlord for rent. Walker-Durr Co. v. Mitchell, 97 Miss. 231, 52 So. 583, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1910).

A landlord has a lien to secure his rent and supplies for the current year on all agricultural products raised on the leased premises and may assert it against the products or the purchaser, with or without notice of such products. Ball, Brown & Co. v. Sledge, 82 Miss. 749, 35 So. 447, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1903); Tennessee Joint Stock Land Bank v. Bank of Greenwood, 179 Miss. 534, 172 So. 323, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1937).

The lien does not follow the agricultural products out of the state, and one who purchases them out of the state takes free of the lien, although he had notice of its existence. Millsaps v. Tate, 75 Miss. 150, 21 So. 663, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 86 (Miss. 1897); Ball, Brown & Co. v. Sledge, 82 Miss. 749, 35 So. 447, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1903).

A commission merchant in another state who has made advances to a planter and received and sold in good faith cotton shipped by him for his account, is not answerable for the proceeds thereof to one who had a landlord’s lien on the cotton when shipped. Chism v. Thomson, 73 Miss. 410, 19 So. 210, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 152 (Miss. 1895).

A purchaser of agricultural products grown on land in the adverse possession of another is not liable to account to the true owner of the land for the value of such products, even though he knew at the time he bought them of the want of title to the land of the occupant and who was the real owner of the land. Morgan v. Long, 73 Miss. 406, 19 So. 98, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1895).

Neither ignorance as to the tenancy by a purchaser, nor false statement by the tenant as to his right to sell will defeat the landlord’s claim. Warren v. Jones, 70 Miss. 202, 14 So. 25, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 145 (Miss. 1892).

The landlord’s right to recover from one to whom the agricultural products grown on the demised premises have been sold by the tenant is not affected by want of notice by the purchaser that the rent is due; the rule of caveat emptor applies. Eason v. Johnson, 69 Miss. 371, 12 So. 446, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 114 (Miss. 1891).

The lien will prevail against a bona fide purchaser for value. Newman v. Bank of Greenville, 66 Miss. 323, 5 So. 753, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 103 (Miss. 1889); W. L. Robinson Co. v. Weathersby, 101 Miss. 724, 57 So. 983, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1911).

It being a crime for a person with notice of the lien to remove the products from the leased premises without the landlord’s consent, the landlord can maintain an action for damages against the purchaser with notice of products subject to the lien for rent, etc. Cohn v. Smith, 64 Miss. 816, 2 So. 244, 1887 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Miss. 1887).

8. Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, lien.

A landlord did not waive her right to the statutory landlord’s lien merely because the lease contract did not specifically refer to the landlord’s lien statute since the landlord’s lien exists by positive law without writing or record. Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Sklar, 555 So. 2d 1024, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1990).

A landlord’s conduct did not constitute a waiver of the landlord’s lien, even though the landlord permitted the lessee to harvest, market and sell the crops as he saw fit, where, for the most part, rent was paid prior to the harvest and sale of crops, and the lender had actual notice of its debtor’s landlord/tenant relationship. Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Sklar, 555 So. 2d 1024, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1990).

A landlord’s lien under this section [Code 1942, § 908] can be waived. Martin v. Leflore Bank & Trust Co., 220 Miss. 106, 70 So. 2d 66, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 414 (Miss. 1954).

Proof of waiver of landlord’s lien on agricultural products for rent must be established by preponderant testimony which affirmatively shows an agreement by landlord, or conduct tantamount thereto, that tenant may deal with product as if free of any lien. Phillips v. Box, 204 Miss. 231, 37 So. 2d 266, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 358 (Miss. 1948).

Waiver of landlord’s lien in favor of purchaser of warehouse receipts for product, issued in tenant’s name, is not shown by evidence that landlord accepted farm equipment as part payment of rent and offered to accept tenant’s notes for balance, which offer tenant ignored and had cotton crop ginned, baled and placed in warehouse taking warehouse receipts in his own name and selling warehouse receipts, all without knowledge of landlord who attached cotton promptly after locating it in warehouse. Phillips v. Box, 204 Miss. 231, 37 So. 2d 266, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 358 (Miss. 1948).

Evidence held to establish that landlord did not, by its conduct, impliedly permit tenant to store cotton in compress, take warehouse receipts therefor in tenant’s name, and dispose of receipts, so as to waive landlord’s lien on cotton. Tennessee Joint Stock Land Bank v. Bank of Greenwood, 179 Miss. 534, 172 So. 323, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1937).

Evidence held not to warrant finding that landlord clothed tenant with indicia of ownership of cotton, or was negligent, or lacking in vigilance, so as to be estopped from asserting lien on cotton as against bona fide purchasers of negotiable warehouse receipts, issued in name of tenant, for cotton. Tennessee Joint Stock Land Bank v. Bank of Greenwood, 179 Miss. 534, 172 So. 323, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1937).

To effect waiver of landlord’s lien on agricultural products, evidence must preponderate that landlord either affirmatively agreed to permit, or by his conduct and course of pleadings permitted, tenant to deal with agricultural products as though they had been freed from landlord’s lien. Tennessee Joint Stock Land Bank v. Bank of Greenwood, 179 Miss. 534, 172 So. 323, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1937).

Waiver of lien of rent held limited, and to give no right to buy from tenant. Pitts v. Baskin, 140 Miss. 443, 106 So. 10, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 278 (Miss. 1925).

Landlord held estopped to assert lien on crops. Judd v. Delta Grocery & Cotton Co., 133 Miss. 866, 98 So. 243, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 191 (Miss. 1923).

Landlord who habitually permits sharecrop tenant to sell products cannot enforce landlord’s lien against or recover value of products from good faith purchaser. Phillips v. Thomas, 128 Miss. 729, 91 So. 420, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 160 (Miss. 1922).

Landlord permitting tenant to sell cotton and receiving rent from proceeds, held estopped to assert lien for advances where he gave no notice thereof to purchaser. A. C. Seavey & Sons v. Godbold, 99 Miss. 113, 54 So. 838, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1910).

A landlord who has waived his lien in favor of one who advances supplies to the tenant on the security of a trust deed on his cotton crop, after receiving from the tenant four bales and mingling them with his own, is estopped to deny that a bale of cotton seized by the trustee was grown by the tenant on the premises. Alexander v. Zeigler, 84 Miss. 560, 36 So. 536, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 64 (Miss. 1904).

A landlord who waives his lien for a specified sum to enable his tenant to secure advances from another by a deed of trust on his crops is bound by the waiver, although the deed of trust recites that the advances were to be used in making crops on other lands also and does not expressly require advances to the full extent of the waiver. Dreyfus v. W. A. Gage & Co., 84 Miss. 219, 36 So. 248, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 29 (Miss. 1904).

9. Priority of lien.

Two lessors did not have priority over a bank with a perfected lien on a lessee’s government payments, even though the bank had actual notice of the leases before it loaned money to the lessee as: (1) Miss. Code Ann. §75-9-109(a)(2) applied to agricultural liens; (2) perfection of agricultural liens was required under Miss. Code Ann. §§89-7-51(1) and75-9-101 et seq.; (3) the lessors did not perfect their liens; (4) there was no fact issue as to whether there was confidential relationship between the bank and the lessors for constructive trust purposes; and (5) the bank was not unjustly enriched as it was entitled to apply the government payments to the lessee’s loan. Pair A Dice Farms, Inc. v. InSouth Bank of Covington, 118 So.3d 165, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 802 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 387 (Miss. July 25, 2013), cert. denied, 117 So.3d 330, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 388 (Miss. 2013).

Unless the crop lender has taken steps to subordinate a landlord’s statutory priority, the landlord’s interest in the proceeds of a crop sale will be paramount to the crop lender who receives the proceeds. The landlord has the inside track in a priority clash over the proceeds of a crop sale. Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Sklar, 555 So. 2d 1024, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1990).

Unless a landlord has expressly or impliedly waived the statutory landlord’s lien, its rights are superior to all other interests, including those created by Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Sklar, 555 So. 2d 1024, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1990).

Where the bank advances money to a tenant who with the landlord gave the bank a trust deed and the landlord taking a subordinate trust deed to tenant’s farm machinery and equipment and later the bank without knowledge of the landlord advanced more money to the tenant for the operation of the farm, and the tenant paid the bank from proceeds of sale of crops, the bank applying the proceeds on the first loan and also on loan advanced without knowledge of landlord, the landlord had a superior lien on the crops because the bank was not authorized to apply proceeds on the loan made without knowledge of landlord. Cavins v. Planters Bank & Trust Co., 187 F.2d 906, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 2339 (5th Cir. Miss. 1951).

Plaintiff held to have waived lien for ginning charges on cotton by delivering to landlord without notice of his lien. Patterson v. Jones-Wilson Mercantile Co., 117 Miss. 355, 78 So. 294, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1918).

Landlord’s lien or that of seller under contract to convey is superior to lien of deed of trust given by tenant on crop for advances of supplies. Bedford v. Gartrell, 88 Miss. 429, 40 So. 801, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 136 (Miss. 1906).

Landlord’s lien held superior to that of person furnishing money to tenant with which to gather crop. Goodwin v. Mitchell, 38 So. 657 (Miss. 1905).

The owner of a cotton gin and press who gins and bales cotton, furnishing the bagging and ties, and who is paid therefor by the tenant, has a lien thereon superior to all other liens for his services, where its preparation for market is not otherwise provided for by the landlord or other interested parties. Duncan v. Jayne, 76 Miss. 133, 23 So. 392, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1898).

10. Enforcement of lien.

In order for a landlord to enforce the statutorily-created lien on a tenant’s personal property, he or she must follow the attachment for rent statutes (§§89-7-55 through89-7-125). Bender v. North Meridian Mobile Home Park, 636 So. 2d 385, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 160 (Miss. 1994).

The landlord is not confined to the statutory remedy; the lien is broader. Henry v. Davis, 60 Miss. 212, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1882); Fitzgerald v. Fowlkes, 60 Miss. 270, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1882); Cohn v. Smith, 64 Miss. 816, 2 So. 244, 1887 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Miss. 1887); Newman v. Bank of Greenville, 66 Miss. 323, 5 So. 753, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 103 (Miss. 1889).

The lien can be enforced after the termination of the lease. Fitzgerald v. Fowlkes, 60 Miss. 270, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1882).

11. Liability of landlord to persons supplying tenant.

Landlord waiving lien in favor of person supplying tenant, who took deed of trust on crop, liable to extent of waiver on collecting note out of crop; before landlord can be held on waiver of lien on crops raised by tenant by person holding deed of trust from tenant, other securities embraced therein must be resorted to. H. & C. Newman, Inc. v. Delta Grocery & Cotton Co., 138 Miss. 683, 103 So. 373, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 85 (Miss. 1925).

The landlord, in an action against him and the tenant, cannot be held liable for goods sold to the tenant merely upon proof that he waived in plaintiff’s favor his landlord’s lien on the crop and afterwards appropriated the same. Whether he would be liable in another form of action is not decided. Chism v. Alcorn, 71 Miss. 506, 15 So. 73, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 109 (Miss. 1893).

12. Miscellaneous.

12. Miscellaneous.

Render of judgment in favor of a tenant on the tenant’s unlawful-reentry issue was appropriate because the evidence showed that the landlord acted without authority in using self-help to reenter the leased property, as the lease did not provide for such action, and failed to provide the tenant with a notice and hearing before reentering the property. Crowell v. Butts, 153 So.3d 719, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 866 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 145 So.3d 674, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 395 (Miss. 2014), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 153 So.3d 684, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 530 (Miss. 2014).

A landlord’s actions in locking up a tenant’s possessions pursuant to §89-7-51(2) did not violate due process requirements where the landlord failed to use the attachment for rent statutes; since §89-7-51 did not authorize the landlord to use self-help to seize the tenant’s property, there was no state action. Bender v. North Meridian Mobile Home Park, 636 So. 2d 385, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 160 (Miss. 1994).

Landlord is liable for conversion of personal property belonging to tenant found on leased premises on taking possession because of nonpayment of rent. Clark v. Service Auto Co., 143 Miss. 602, 108 So. 704, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 299 (Miss. 1926).

Lease contract that landlord may re-enter without legal proceedings is binding to extent that landlord, entitled to possession unlawfully withheld, may re-enter without breaking doors or passages of ingress and without personal violence. Clark v. Service Auto Co., 143 Miss. 602, 108 So. 704, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 299 (Miss. 1926).

Landlord, undertaking to sell tenant’s property and settle with subtenants and heirs without taking out letters of administration or proceeding according to statutes, held liable as administrator de son tort. Blount v. Phillips, 142 Miss. 286, 107 So. 21, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1926).

No suit lies for rent before it is due; on abandonment of performance of share contract landlord may at once sue for breach. Weir v. Cooper, 122 Miss. 225, 84 So. 184, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 430 (Miss. 1920).

Landlord with knowledge of deed of trust, who had waived his lien except for rent in favor of such deed of trust, who sold the crop himself and after deducting amount due him paid balance to the tenant instead of the mortgagee, was guilty of conversion. Evans v. Carpenter, 115 Miss. 572, 76 So. 550, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 235 (Miss. 1917).

Creditor secured by deed of trust, not excused for failure to enter satisfaction of deed of trust on margin of record, where crop delivered in satisfaction of debt with landlord’s consent, though being liable for rent. Coon v. Robinson Mercantile Co., 110 Miss. 700, 70 So. 884, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 192 (Miss. 1916).

An assignee of notes given by a tenant to his landlord for rent cannot assert his lien against one who makes advances to the tenant on the security of the landlord’s waiver and the tenant’s trust deed on the crops when he has concealed his ownership of the notes and induced him to believe that the landlord’s waiver and the tenant’s trust deed will give him first lien. Dreyfus v. W. A. Gage & Co., 84 Miss. 219, 36 So. 248, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 29 (Miss. 1904).

A creditor receiving in this state in payment of his debt cotton taken from him under a landlord’s lien may enforce repayment from the debtor, although he had executed a receipt in full upon receiving the cotton. He cannot do this, however, if he received the cotton out of the state. Ball, Brown & Co. v. Sledge, 82 Miss. 749, 35 So. 447, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1903).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Modern views as to validity, under federal constitution, of state prejudgment attachment, garnishment, and replevin procedures, distraint procedures under landlords’ or innkeepers’ lien statutes, and like procedures authorizing summary seizure of property. 18 A.L.R. Fed. 223.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 545 et seq.

7 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Crops § 80:26 (lease-provision-lessor’s title in crops until payment of rent).

11B Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Leases of Real Property §§ 161:1134-161:1136 (waiver of lessor’s lien).

12 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Liens § 165:22 (notice of landlord’s lien and of sale).

CJS.

52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 1199 et seq.

§ 89-7-53. Lien for live stock, implements and vehicles.

A landlord shall have, for one (1) year, a lien for the reasonable value of all live stock, farming tools, implements and vehicles furnished by him to his tenant, upon the property so furnished and, as an additional security therefor, upon all the agricultural products raised upon the leased premises. The said property so furnished shall be considered as supplies and the lien therefor may be enforced accordingly. Such lien shall be a superior and first lien when perfected in accordance with Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 – Secured Transactions (Section 75-9-101 et seq.), and need not otherwise be evidenced by writing.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2496; 1906, § 2833; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2331; 1930, § 2187; 1942, § 909; Laws, 2001, ch. 495, § 35, eff from and after Jan. 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes —

The 2001 amendment, effective January 1, 2002, rewrote the last sentence.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

Materialman’s lien, see §85-7-131.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 560.

CJS.

52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 1227 et seq.

§ 89-7-55. Attachment for rent and supplies; who entitled to and for what.

An attachment or distress may be sued out by the lessor of lands, his executors, administrators, or assigns. It may be had for rent of the leased premises due and in arrear, or to become due, as the case may be, and for advances made by the landlord or his administrator or executor for supplies for the tenant and others for whom the tenant may have contracted and for his business carried on upon the leased premises.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2501; 1906, § 2838; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2336; 1930, § 2188; 1942, § 910.

Cross References —

Attachments against debtors generally, see §§11-33-1 et seq.

Fee of officer issuing attachment or distress for rent or supplies, see §25-7-77.

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

Distraint of goods removed before debt becomes due, see §89-7-77.

Tenant’s remedy against landlord for improper distress, see §89-7-115.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Claims within scope of statute.

3. Effect of transfer of title to leased property.

4. Rights of assignee of rent note.

5. Sale of tenant’s goods; assignment for creditors.

6. Liability of sublessee.

7. Procedure.

1. In general.

Render of judgment in favor of a tenant on the tenant’s unlawful-reentry issue was appropriate because the evidence showed that the landlord acted without authority in using self-help to reenter the leased property, as the lease did not provide for such action, and failed to provide the tenant with a notice and hearing before reentering the property. Crowell v. Butts, 153 So.3d 719, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 866 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 145 So.3d 674, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 395 (Miss. 2014), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 153 So.3d 684, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 530 (Miss. 2014).

In order for a landlord to enforce the statutorily-created lien on a tenant’s personal property, he or she must follow the attachment for rent statutes (§§89-7-55 through89-7-125). Bender v. North Meridian Mobile Home Park, 636 So. 2d 385, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 160 (Miss. 1994).

Attachment for rent is not of itself judicial proceeding. Barlow v. Serio, 129 Miss. 432, 91 So. 573, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1922).

Distress for rent, not being a judicial proceeding, depends for its validity upon compliance with the statute in making the required affidavit and bond. Pate v. Shannon, 69 Miss. 372, 13 So. 729, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 153 (Miss. 1891).

There must be a lease to entitle to the remedy. Tifft v. Verden, 19 Miss. 153, 1848 Miss. LEXIS 165 (Miss. 1848).

2. Claims within scope of statute.

Clause in lease prohibiting removal of property while rent unpaid, if creating equitable lien, was not enforceable by statutory remedy of distress for rent. Lake v. Morson, 164 Miss. 401, 145 So. 337, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 237 (Miss. 1933).

Stipulation for attorney’s fee in rent note not enforceable in attachment for rent. O'Keefe v. McLemore, 125 Miss. 394, 87 So. 655, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1921).

The statute only covers a demand for rent. An agreement of the tenant as part of the expressed consideration of the lease, to pay as rent a debt which is not such in fact, will not change this. Paxton v. Kennedy, 70 Miss. 865, 12 So. 546, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1893).

A promise to pay the taxes for a given year on a certain tract of land for the rent of premises is sufficiently definite as to amount to give the landlord a lien. Roberts v. Sims, 64 Miss. 597, 2 So. 72, 1887 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1887).

It will be sufficient if the amount of the rent can be ascertained by calculation. Brooks v. Cunningham, 49 Miss. 108, 1873 Miss. LEXIS 100 (Miss. 1873); Thrasher v. Gillespie, 52 Miss. 840, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss. 1876); Roberts v. Sims, 64 Miss. 597, 2 So. 72, 1887 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1887).

The rent must be definite. Briscoe v. McElween, 43 Miss. 556, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 66 (Miss. 1870).

3. Effect of transfer of title to leased property.

The maker of a rent note, payable to bearer, and transferred in good faith for value before maturity, cannot show as a failure of consideration of the note that the title of his lessor passed to another before the term began. Davis v. Blanton, 71 Miss. 821, 15 So. 132, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1894).

A landlord who takes the note of his tenant for rent, and afterwards, during the term and before the rent is due, conveys the rented land to another, cannot thereafter attach for the rent. Watkins v. Duvall, 69 Miss. 364, 13 So. 727, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 150 (Miss. 1891).

The purchaser of land at partition sale is entitled to the rent falling due after his purchase, if not expressly reserved, and may distrain therefor, notwithstanding a rent note previously given therefor had been assigned by the landlord to another, who contests the purchaser’s right to such rent. Kessee v. Sloan, 69 Miss. 369, 11 So. 631, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 98 (Miss. 1891).

4. Rights of assignee of rent note.

The assignee of a rent note may distrain for the amount thereof. Coker v. Britt, 78 Miss. 583, 29 So. 833, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 177 (Miss. 1900).

The assignee of a rent note who has advanced supplies to the tenant on a parol agreement that he should be subrogated to all the rights of the landlord in respect thereto, is not made landlord thereby and cannot distrain for the supplies. Coker v. Britt, 78 Miss. 583, 29 So. 833, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 177 (Miss. 1900).

5. Sale of tenant’s goods; assignment for creditors.

Bona fide purchaser of tenant’s goods, other than agricultural products, before distress for the rent, is protected. White v. Miazza-Woods Const. Co., 122 Miss. 213, 84 So. 181, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 428 (Miss. 1920).

Goods liable to be attached for rent, assigned to an assignee in an ordinary voluntary assignment for creditors, may still be subjected to the landlord’s demand. Paine v. Sykes, 72 Miss. 351, 16 So. 903, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 119 (Miss. 1894).

6. Liability of sublessee.

There is no privity of contract between a landlord and a subtenant, and the former cannot maintain an attachment for rent against the latter. Ashley v. Young, 79 Miss. 129, 29 So. 822, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1901).

7. Procedure.

The agent must carry on the proceedings in the landlord’s name. Parker v. Stovall, 31 Miss. 446, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 98 (Miss. 1856).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What sort of claim, obligation, or liability is within contemplation of statute providing for attachment, or giving right of action for indemnity, before a debt or liability is due. 58 A.L.R.2d 1451.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 591, 615.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Form 134 (warrant for distraint of tenant’s personalty to secure payment of rent).

CJS.

52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 1259, 1272 et seq.

Law Reviews.

Williamson and Redfern, Lender liability in Mississippi: Part II loan commitments and agreements. 59 Miss. L. J. 71, Spring, 1989.

§ 89-7-57. How obtained.

To obtain the attachment or distress, the party entitled thereto, his agent or attorney, shall make complaint on oath before a justice court judge averring the facts which entitle the party seeking it to the remedy; and, if anything is demanded on account of supplies, there shall be filed with the complaint an itemized bill of particulars thereof. The complainant shall enter into bond with sufficient sureties, payable to the tenant, his executor or administrator, in a penalty equal to double the sum claimed to be due, conditioned to pay all damages as may be sustained by the obligee by the wrongful suing out of the writ, and all costs that may be awarded against the principal obligor.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2502; 1906, § 2839; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2337; 1930, § 2189; 1942, § 911; Laws, 2015, ch. 395, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment, substituted “justice court judge” for “justice of the peace” in the first sentence and made minor stylistic changes.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Judgment for lessee against lessor for amount by which total of sums agreed to be deducted from monthly rent and paid lessor’s creditor by lessee exceeded rent for period before partial destruction of leased mill by fire will not be affirmed on remittitur of amount exceeding sums deductible for such period only, but must be reversed and cause remanded for entry of judgment in proper amount. Moore-Curry Lumber Co. v. Wogan, 170 Miss. 512, 155 So. 329, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 162 (Miss. 1934).

Attorney’s fees are recoverable in suit for damages for attachment for rent. Wigginton v. Moore, 147 Miss. 169, 113 So. 326, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 346 (Miss. 1927).

Person acting as agent in renting land may not sue out attachment for rent. Wigginton v. Moore, 147 Miss. 169, 113 So. 326, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 346 (Miss. 1927).

In replevin for rent due where the attachment writ was not signed or sworn to, but the landlord testified that he had verified his complaint, which was denied, it was error to overrule a motion to quash the attachment and to refuse to submit the question to the jury. Wolf v. Simmons, 75 Miss. 539, 23 So. 586, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 147 (Miss. 1897).

Distress for rent, not being a judicial proceeding, depends for its validity upon compliance with the statute in making the required affidavit and bond. Pate v. Shannon, 69 Miss. 372, 13 So. 729, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 153 (Miss. 1891).

A landlord cannot unite several distinct claims for different parcels of land, under different demises, in a single attachment for rent; He must resort to distinct proceedings for each. Briscoe v. McElween, 43 Miss. 556, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 66 (Miss. 1870).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Justice Court had jurisdiction over matter where landlord sought to enforce lien on personal property of tenant in amount of $7,000. Formby, March 23, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0122.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 615.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Forms 132, 133 (landlord’s bond in distress proceedings).

CJS.

52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 1287 et seq.

§ 89-7-59. Before whom complaint made.

Such complaint and bond may be made before any justice of the peace of the county in which the leased premises, or some part thereof, may be situated, or of any county in which the property, or some part thereof, sought to be distrained or seized may be found.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2503; 1906, § 2840; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2338; 1930, § 2190; 1942, § 912.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, Section 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to “justice of the peace” shall mean justice court judge.

Cross References —

Powers and duties of justice court judges generally, see §§11-9-101 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Judgment for lessee against lessor for amount by which total of sums agreed to be deducted from monthly rent and paid lessor’s creditor by lessee exceeded rent for period before partial destruction of leased mill by fire will not be affirmed on remittitur of amount exceeding sums deductible for such period only, but must be reversed and cause remanded for entry of judgment in proper amount. Moore-Curry Lumber Co. v. Wogan, 170 Miss. 512, 155 So. 329, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 162 (Miss. 1934).

The mayor of a municipality who is ex officio a justice of the peace, may issue the attachment, and his jurisdiction in such case is co-extensive with the county. Smith v. Jones, 65 Miss. 276, 3 So. 740, 1887 Miss. LEXIS 53 (Miss. 1887).

The affidavit need not be made before the same officer who issues the writ, nor before an officer in the same county in which the writ is to run, but can be made before any officer authorized to administer oaths. Cassedy v. Mayers, 64 Miss. 356, 1 So. 510 (Miss. 1886).

§ 89-7-61. Writ.

When the complaint has been made and bond given and approved by the justice court judge, it shall be his duty to issue a distress warrant or attachment-writ, commanding the seizure of the agricultural products, if any, upon which the party instituting the proceedings shall have claimed a lien, and also commanding the officer to distrain the goods and chattels other than the agricultural products of the tenant, if necessary, and deal with the same as provided by law; the entire seizure and distraint to be of value sufficient to satisfy the sum demanded with interest and costs.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2504; 1906, § 2841; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2339; 1930, § 2191; 1942, § 913; Laws, 2015, ch. 395, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment, substituted “has been made” for “shall have been made” and “justice court judge” for “justice” and made minor stylistic changes.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Judgment for lessee against lessor for amount by which total of sums agreed to be deducted from monthly rent and paid lessor’s creditor by lessee exceeded rent for period before partial destruction of leased mill by fire will not be affirmed on remittitur of amount exceeding sums deductible for such period only, but must be reversed and cause remanded for entry of judgment in proper amount. Moore-Curry Lumber Co. v. Wogan, 170 Miss. 512, 155 So. 329, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 162 (Miss. 1934).

A seizure and sale by a town marshal acting as constable without the limits of the town and the supervisor’s district in which the town is situated, under a distress warrant issued by the mayor of such town, are invalid and confer no title upon the purchaser at the sale. Riley v. James, 73 Miss. 1, 18 So. 930, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1895).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 1286 et seq.

§ 89-7-63. Form of affidavit.

The affidavit for an attachment for rent and supplies, or either, may be in the following form, viz.:

“State of Mississippi, County. “Before me, , a justice of the peace of the County of , came , who, being duly sworn, says on oath: That [the tenant] is indebted to him [or if the affidavit be made by an agent or attorney, strike out ‘him’ and insert the name of the landlord or person to whom the rent is due, and add after the landlord’s name, ‘of whom the affiant is agent’] in the sum of dollars for rent in arrears [or if the rent be not due, strike out the words ‘in arrears,’ and insert ‘to become due on the day of , A.D. ’] by virtue of a lease for the term commencing on the day of , A.D. , and ending on the day of , A.D. of land situated in County, and described as [here describe the leased premises; it is well to describe by name, if it has one, or by its occupants, and if such be the case it would be well to say ‘and occupied by said , tenant, during the year ’]. “And the said , the tenant, is further indebted to affiant [or if the oath be made by an agent or attorney, strike out ‘affiant’ and insert the name of the landlord or person to whom the debt is due] in the further sum of dollars, now due [if the debt be not due, strike out the words ‘now due,’ and insert ‘to become due on the day of , A.D.’] of which supplies a bill of particulars is attached hereto. Affiant [or if made by an agent or attorney, say ‘affiant’s said principal’] claims a lie the following agricultural products raised during the year , on the said leased premises [here describe the products, giving their location, if known, for the officer’s guidance]. “Sworn to and subscribed before me, this the day of , A.D. , J.P.”

Click to view

If the attachment be for rent only, strike out all relating to supplies; and if the claim be for supplies only, strike out all relating to the sum due for rent, and alter the form to suit the case.

If the claim be not due, add to the form the following words: “And affiant has just cause to suspect, and does verily believe that the said tenant will remove [or has removed, as the case may be] his effects from said leased premises before said claim [or claims] be or shall become due, so that a distress or seizure cannot be made therefor, or so as to impair the landlord’s lien on the agricultural products raised on the premises.”

If the rent be for part of the crop, or other thing than money, the affidavit should state it as it is, giving the money value of what is due.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2505; 1906, § 2842; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2340; 1930, § 2192; 1942, § 914.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, Section 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to “justice of the peace” shall mean justice court judge.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Evidence sustained finding that new oral contract under which tenant was to pay what he could as reasonable rent for possession of land had replaced written contract, and verdict that landlord’s attachment for rent was wrongfully sued out. Graham v. Swinney, 174 Miss. 579, 165 So. 438, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1936).

Judgment for lessee against lessor for amount by which total of sums agreed to be deducted from monthly rent and paid lessor’s creditor by lessee exceeded rent for period before partial destruction of leased mill by fire will not be affirmed on remittitur of amount exceeding sums deductible for such period only, but must be reversed and cause remanded for entry of judgment in proper amount. Moore-Curry Lumber Co. v. Wogan, 170 Miss. 512, 155 So. 329, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 162 (Miss. 1934).

In action by tenant’s wife to replevy trucks which were attached by landlord as tenant’s, whether wife was entitled to replevy, held for jury. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

Claimant of trucks which were attached was required to show that they were bought in good faith for valuable consideration before levy was made. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

Stranger claimant is entitled to reasonable damages for wrongful attachment under same circumstances as tenant is entitled under statute. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

Tenant’s wife who sought to replevy trucks wrongfully attached by landlord was entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, if prevailing. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

Landlord had no lien upon trucks which he attached and which were sold by tenant to his wife prior to attachment. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

Tenant’s wife who showed deed of sale to her reciting valid consideration for tenant’s trucks attached by landlord having made prima facie case, landlord had burden to establish fraud or other defense. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

Recital of valid consideration in deed of conveyance between husband and wife being prima facie true, burden of showing falsity of such recital rests upon party attacking deed. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

Affidavit of landlord as to lien to secure advances not conclusive; where evidence conflicting, issue should be submitted to jury. Striplin Cotton Co. v. Miller, 130 Miss. 430, 94 So. 227, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 300 (Miss. 1922).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Form 125 (attachment affidavit).

§ 89-7-65. Form of bond.

The bond for an attachment for rent or supplies may be in the following form, viz.:

“We, , principal, and and , sureties, bind ourselves to pay the sum of dollars, unless the said principal obligor herein shall pay to the said all such damages as he shall sustain by reason of the wrongful suing out of an attachment for rent and supplies [if for rent only, strike out the words ‘and supplies;’ and if for supplies only, strike out the words ‘rent and’] in favor of said principal obligor against the said obligee for dollars, for rent and supplies [if for rent only, strike out the words ‘and supplies;’ and if for supplies only, strike out the words ‘rent and’] due and in arrears [or if the attachment be for a debt to become due, strike out the words ‘due and in arrears,’ and insert ‘to become due on the day of , A.D. ’] upon certain leased premises, in County. “Witness our hands, this the day of , A.D. “, ” “The above bond is approved by me, this day of , A.D. . “, J.P.”

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HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2506; 1906, § 2843; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2341; 1930, § 2193; 1942, § 915.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Forms 132, 133 (landlord’s bond in distress proceedings).

§ 89-7-67. Form of the writ.

The writ of attachment for rent and supplies, or either, may be in the following form, viz.:

“The State of Mississippi. “To the sheriff or any constable of County, greeting: “Complaint on oath having been made before the undersigned, an acting justice of the peace in and for County, that is indebted to for rent in arrear on the following leased premises [here describe the premises as in the affidavit], in the sum of dollars, and that the said is further indebted to for supplies furnished the said , the tenant, by his landlord, in the sum of dollars additional; and the claim having been made that there is a lien to secure the said debts on the following named agricultural products [here describe the products as in the affidavit], and bond having been given as required by law: “Now, this is to command you that you forthwith seize and take the said agricultural products to an amount sufficient to satisfy the said debts, with interest and costs; and, if there be not a sufficiency of said products so to do, then that you distrain the other goods and chattels of the said , the tenant, so that your whole seizure may be sufficient to satisfy both of said sums, with interest and costs, and that you deal with the same as the law directs. “Witness my hand, the day of , A.D. , J.P.”

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The above form must be varied so as to conform to the affidavit; and if a lien be not claimed, the command will be in these words:

“This is to command you to distrain the goods and chattels of the said_______________ , the tenant, to an amount sufficient to satisfy the said demands, with interest and costs, and that you deal with the same as the law directs.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2507; 1906, § 2844; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2342; 1930, § 2194; 1942, § 916.

§ 89-7-69. Goods sold if not replevied.

The officer making a distress or seizure shall give notice thereof, with the cause of taking, to the tenant or his representative in person if found, or if not found, by leaving the notice at the dwelling house or other conspicuous place on the premises charged with the rent distrained for, and shall immediately advertise the property distrained or seized for sale as if under execution; and if the tenant or owner of the goods distrained or seized shall not, before the time appointed for the sale, replevy the same by giving bond with sufficient sureties, to be approved by such officer, payable to the plaintiff in the attachment, in double the amount claimed, conditioned for the payment of the sum demanded, with lawful interest for the same, and costs, at the end of three (3) months after making the distress, the officer shall sell the goods and chattels distrained or seized at public sale to the highest bidder for cash, and shall, out of the proceeds of the sale, pay the costs of the proceedings, and shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of his demand, with interest.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5(2); 1857, ch. 41, art. 2; 1871, § 1621; 1880, § 1303; 1892, § 2508; 1906, § 2845; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2343; 1930, § 2195; 1942, § 917; Laws, 2015, ch. 395, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment, substituted “immediately” for “forthwith” and made minor stylistic changes.

Cross References —

Replevin of agricultural products or other distrained property, see §89-7-89.

Trial of replevin suits, see §§89-7-107 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Failure to serve notice if tenant readily found, ground for quashing writ. Wright v. Craig, 92 Miss. 218, 45 So. 835, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1908).

Where party having right to quash comes in later and pleads, writ need not be quashed on remand after appeal. Wright v. Craig, 92 Miss. 218, 45 So. 835, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1908).

The attachment is in the nature of an execution for a money demand, and is not the beginning of a suit. Towns v. Boarman, 23 Miss. 186, 1851 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 1851).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 616.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Form 137 (order authorizing sale of tenant’s perishables distrained to secure payment of rent).

CJS.

52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 1297, 1298.

§ 89-7-71. Form of bond for payment of rent.

The bond to be taken by the officer for the payment of the rent and supplies, or either, in three (3) months, may be in the following form, viz.:

“The State of Mississippi, County of “We, , principal, and and , sureties, bind ourselves to pay the sum of [here insert double the sum claimed] dollars, unless, on or before the day of , A.D. , the said shall pay to the said the sum of dollars, being for rent and supplies due him from the said , the tenant on the land in said county, being [here describe the leased premises as in the writ], together with interest thereon to said date, and the costs of the attachment for the same, levied on the property of said tenant, and now restored to him by virtue of this bond. “Witness our signatures, this day of , A.D. . “, “, “.” “The foregoing bond is approved by me, this day of , A.D. . “, Sheriff.”

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If the attachment be for rent not due, the bond for the payment thereof will vary in its terms to suit the case.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2509; 1906, § 2846; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2344; 1930, § 2196; 1942, § 918.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The obligor is estopped by the bond from denying that the rent is owing. Tooley v. Culbertson, 6 Miss. 267, 1840 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1840); Robinson v. White, 15 Miss. 39, 1846 Miss. LEXIS 114 (Miss. 1846).

§ 89-7-73. Bond delivered to lessor, and proceedings thereon.

The bond taken for the payment of rent or supplies shall be forthwith delivered to the landlord for whom the distress was made; and if the money be not paid according to the condition, any court having jurisdiction of the amount thereof shall, on motion, award execution against the obligors therein, the bond being filed in the court, and five (5) days’ notice given of the motion.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5(3); 1857, ch. 41, art. 6; 1871, § 1625; 1880, § 1307; 1892, § 2510; 1906, § 2847; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2345; 1930, § 2197; 1942, § 919.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The proceeding by motion is a summary remedy, and must, therefore, conform to the statute in all material respects. Tifft v. Virden, 15 Miss. 91, 1846 Miss. LEXIS 123 (Miss. 1846).

The statute authorizing the judgment on motion is constitutional. Peck v. Critchlow, 8 Miss. 243, 1843 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1843).

A bond made payable to the sheriff, and by him indorsed to the landlord, is valid. Tooley v. Culbertson, 6 Miss. 267, 1840 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1840); Peck v. Critchlow, 8 Miss. 243, 1843 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1843); Phillips v. Chaney, 8 Miss. 250, 1843 Miss. LEXIS 85 (Miss. 1843); Robinson v. White, 15 Miss. 39, 1846 Miss. LEXIS 114 (Miss. 1846).

§ 89-7-75. Remedy when claim not due in certain cases.

When any landlord or lessor shall have just cause to suspect, and shall verily believe, that his tenant will remove his agricultural products on which there is a lien, or any part thereof, from the leased premises to any other place before the expiration of his term, or before the rent or claim for supplies will fall due, or that he will remove his other effects, so that distress cannot be made, the landlord or lessor, in either case, on making oath thereof, and of the amount the tenant is to pay, and at what time the same will fall due, and giving bond, as required were the debt due, may, in like manner, obtain an attachment against the goods and chattels of such tenant; and the officer making the distress shall give notice thereof, and advertise the property distrained or seized for sale. If the tenant shall not, before the time appointed for sale, give bond, with sufficient sureties, in double the amount of the rent or other demand, payable to the plaintiff, conditioned for the payment of the sum due at the time it shall fall due, with costs, the goods distrained or seized, or so much thereof as may be necessary, shall be sold by the officer, at public sale, to the highest bidder, for cash, and out of the proceeds of the sale he shall pay the costs, and shall pay to the plaintiff the amount owing to him, deducting interest for the time until the same shall become due.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5(7); 1857, ch. 42, art. 3; 1871, § 1622; 1880, § 1304; 1892, § 2511; 1906, § 2848; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2346; 1930, § 2198; 1942, § 920.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

Rights, obligations and remedies available under Sections89-7-1 through89-7-125 not altered or abridged by rights, obligations and remedies available under Chapter 8 of Title 89, see §89-8-3.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The landlord must do what the law exacts as the foundation for his attachment; otherwise, the tenant may successfully replevy, and that, too, though the truth would have justified the landlord in proceeding in the prescribed way. Dudley v. Harvey, 59 Miss. 34, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1881).

A mere belief that the tenant will remove effects other than agricultural products will not justify an attachment before the rent is due; The landlord must have “evidence of reasons and facts” upon which to base his belief. Briscoe v. McElween, 43 Miss. 556, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 66 (Miss. 1870).

It is not every contemplated removal of effects on which there is no lien that will warrant an attachment; It must be a removal of such effects that would defeat a distress for rent. Stamps v. Gilman & Co., 43 Miss. 456, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1870).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 599.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Form 138 (replevy bond by tenant to secure release of distrained personalty).

§ 89-7-77. Goods removed before debt due, distrained.

When any tenant shall have actually removed his effects, other than the agricultural products, upon which there is a lien, from the leased premises before the rent or demand for supplies has become due, so that there be no sufficient property liable to distress or seizure left on the premises, the landlord may in like manner obtain an attachment at any time after such removal or within thirty (30) days after such rent or other claim becomes due, and may levy the same on the effects so removed wherever they may be found and like proceedings shall be had thereon as in other cases. And if any tenant shall remove his agricultural products upon which there is a lien from the leased premises, the landlord may at any time have the same seized wherever they may be found, and like proceedings shall be had thereon as in other cases.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5(8); 1857, ch. 41, art. 4; 1871, § 1623; 1880, § 1305; 1892, § 2512; 1906, § 2849; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2347; 1930, § 2199; 1942, § 921.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The attachment under this statute may be issued by a justice of the peace of a county other than the one where the leased premises are situated. Honea v. Page, 60 Miss. 248, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1882).

A landlord has no lien upon his tenant’s goods other than agricultural products, and before distress for rent a bona fide purchaser of such goods, whether on or off the leased premises, will be protected. Honea v. Page, 60 Miss. 248, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1882).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Valuation of corporate stock for purposes of succession, inheritance, or estate tax, as affected by quantity involved. 23 A.L.R.2d 775.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 615 et seq.

§ 89-7-79. Goods removed, seized within thirty days.

If any tenant shall at any time convey or carry off from the demised premises, his goods or chattels, leaving the rent, or any part thereof, or the sum owing for supplies, unpaid, the landlord or lessor, or his assigns, may, within thirty (30) days next after such conveying away or carrying off such goods or chattels, cause the same to be taken and seized wherever found, and the same to sell in like manner as if they had been distrained in or upon the demised premises. But goods or chattels, other than the agricultural products upon which there is a lien, so carried off and sold in good faith for a valuable consideration before seizure made, shall not be afterwards liable to be taken and seized for rent or supplies.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5(12); 1857, ch. 41, art. 5; 1871, § 1624; 1880, § 1306; 1892, § 2513; 1906, § 2850; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2348; 1930, § 2200; 1942, § 922.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Claimant of trucks which were attached was required to show that they were bought in good faith for valuable consideration before levy was made. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

Landlord had no lien upon trucks which he attached and which were sold by tenant to his wife prior to attachment. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

Tenant’s wife who showed deed of sale to her reciting valid consideration for tenant’s trucks attached by landlord, having made prima facie case, landlord had burden to establish fraud or other defense. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

Property removed from leased premises remains subject to landlord’s lien for rent for thirty days after removal unless sold to bona fide purchaser before seizure. Durant Motor Co. v. Simpson, 160 Miss. 313, 133 So. 672, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 170 (Miss. 1931).

A landlord has no lien upon his tenant’s goods other than agricultural products, and before distress for rent a bona fide purchaser of such goods, whether on or off the premises, will be protected. Richardson v. McLaurin, 69 Miss. 70, 12 So. 264, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 104 (Miss. 1891).

It is not necessary, to authorize the seizure under this statute, for the affidavit to aver the removal. Henry v. Davis, 60 Miss. 212, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1882).

§ 89-7-81. Distress may be made after termination of lease.

Any person, or his executor, administrator, or assigns having rent in arrear upon any lease for life, years, or otherwise, ended and determined, or a claim for supplies, may distrain for such arrears, after the termination of the lease, in the same manner as if the same had not been determined; but the distress must be made within six (6) months after the termination of the lease, and during the continuance of the landlord’s title or interest, and during the possession of the tenant from whom the arrears are due.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5(14); 1857, ch. 41, art. 7; 1871, § 1626; 1880, § 1308; 1892, § 2514; 1906, § 2852; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2350; 1930, § 2201; 1942, § 923.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The property attached must be the property of the party against whom the writ is directed, or it must be liable for the rent due from him. Patty v. Bogle, 59 Miss. 491, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 141 (Miss. 1882).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Time for exercise of lessee’s option to terminate lease. 37 A.L.R.2d 1173.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 613.

CJS.

52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 1280, 1315.

§ 89-7-83. Sale of goods stopped without bond.

If the tenant shall make affidavit, before the officer holding his property under an attachment for rent or supplies alleged to be due or to become due, that he does not or will not owe the amount claimed, such officer shall not sell the property, unless it be liable to perish or greatly depreciate, or be expensive to keep, in which case he shall sell it and hold the proceeds to the end of the suit; and he shall return the attachment with the affidavit and a statement of his proceedings to the proper court, and shall summon the party who sued out the attachment to appear there; and further proceedings shall be had as if the tenant had replevied the goods by giving bond.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1316; 1892, § 2528; 1906, § 2866; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2364; 1930, § 2202; 1942, § 924.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 616.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Form 136 (motion by landlord for order authorizing sale of tenant’s perishables distrained as security for rent).

CJS.

52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant § 1298.

§ 89-7-85. Distress to be reasonable, and property seized not to be removed from county.

It shall not be lawful for any officer who may execute an attachment for rent or supplies to remove the property distrained or seized out of the county where the distress or seizure was made; and if any officer or other person shall so remove any property distrained or seized, he shall pay to the party aggrieved double the value of the property removed, to be recovered in an action. And, moreover, distresses and seizures shall in all cases be reasonable and not too great; and any officer who shall make an unreasonable distress or seizure, under color of law, shall be liable to the party aggrieved for double damages.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5(23); 1857, ch. 41, art. 8; 1871, § 1627; 1880, § 1309; 1892, § 2515; 1906, § 2853; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2351; 1930, § 2203; 1942, § 925.

Cross References —

Tenant’s remedy for wrongful distress, see §89-7-115.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 593, 642.

CJS.

52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant § 1317-1321.

§ 89-7-87. Irregularities not to affect distress.

When any distress or seizure shall be made for rent or supplies justly due, and any irregularity or unlawful act shall afterwards be done by the officer distraining or seizing, the distress or seizure shall not, for that reason, be unlawful, nor the officer making or seizing it, or the party at whose instance the writ was issued, become a trespasser from the beginning, but the party aggrieved by such irregularity or unlawful act, may recover the special damage he may have sustained thereby. However, an action shall not be sustained if tender of amends be made by the party distraining before suit is brought.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1310; 1892, § 2516; 1906, § 2854; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2352; 1930, § 2204; 1942, § 926.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The common-law right of a landlord to distrain is abrogated. Proceedings must be in accordance with the statute. There has been no relaxation of the strictness required in the observance of the law authorizing the procedure. The landlord must see that the affidavit, bond and writ conform to the law. Dudley v. Harvey, 59 Miss. 34, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1881).

§ 89-7-89. How goods replevied.

The tenant, his executor or administrator, may replevy the agricultural products or other property distrained, at any time before the sale thereof, by giving bond with one or more sufficient sureties, to be approved by the officer in whose custody the property may be, payable to the party in whose name or right the distress or seizure was made, in a penalty double the amount distrained for or double the value of the property seized, where the value is less than the amount distrained for, conditioned to prosecute his suit against the obligee in the bond for the property, and to perform the judgment of the court in such suit, in case he shall fail therein. Upon the delivery of such bond to the officer having control of the property, he shall deliver the same to the party giving the bond, and shall return the bond and the writ of attachment, with a statement of his proceedings, to the clerk of the circuit court if the value of the property or amount distrained for exceed Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00), and to the justice of the peace who issued the attachment if neither the amount claimed nor the value of the property exceed Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00); and he shall summon the party in whose name or right the distress or seizure was made, to appear at the next term of the court to which return of the attachment and bond shall be made, to answer the suit of the person replevying the property; and the officer shall make his return of having summoned such party on the papers by him returned to the court.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5 (15); 1857, ch. 41, art. 11; 1871, § 1630; 1880, § 1312; 1892, § 2518; 1906, § 2856; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2354; 1930, § 2205; 1942, § 927.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, Section 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to “justice of the peace” shall mean justice court judge.

Cross References —

Provision that the state shall have all the liens, rights, and remedies accorded to landlords in this chapter, see §29-1-107.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Evidence sustained finding that new oral contract under which tenant was to pay what he could as reasonable rent for possession of land had replaced written contract, and verdict that landlord’s attachment for rent was wrongfully sued out. Graham v. Swinney, 174 Miss. 579, 165 So. 438, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1936).

Defendant landlord without counter affidavit may disprove account sworn to with plaintiff tenant’s declaration for property attached by landlord. Sprouse v. Davis, 141 Miss. 564, 106 So. 824, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 462 (Miss. 1926).

Proceedings in attachment of agricultural products for rent becomes a suit for first time when tenant replevied property. Thornton v. Gardner, 134 Miss. 485, 99 So. 131, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 285 (Miss. 1924).

The circuit court to which the return should be made is the circuit court of the county of which the justice of the peace who issued the attachment is an officer. Hauser v. Robbins, 61 Miss. 551, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 128 (Miss. 1884).

This is true whether the property be found on the leased premises or not. Kendrick v. Watkins, 54 Miss. 495, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1877).

The ordinary action of replevin does not apply. Maxey v. White, 53 Miss. 80, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1876).

A separate suit cannot be maintained on the bond. It can by put in judgment in the replevin suit only. McKinney v. Green, 52 Miss. 70, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 165 (Miss. 1876).

The replevin is the beginning of the suit. Towns v. Boarman, 23 Miss. 186, 1851 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 1851).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 594.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Form 138 (replevy bond by tenant to secure release of distrained personalty).

CJS.

52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, §§ 1317-1321.

§ 89-7-91. Summons or publication for party distraining.

In case of failure to summon in the first instance the party in whose name or right the distress was made, a summons may be issued for him by the clerk of the circuit court or justice of the peace; and if he cannot be found, publication may be made as in attachment cases.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1313; 1892, § 2520; 1906, § 2858; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2356; 1930, § 2206; 1942, § 928.

Cross References —

Publication of notice of attachment, see §§11-33-37 et seq.

§ 89-7-93. Form of replevin-bond.

The tenant’s replevin-bond, or that of a claimant, may be in the following form, viz.:

“We, , principal, and and , sureties, bind ourselves to pay the sum of dollars [double the value of the goods and chattels, if that be less than the rent claimed], unless the said shall prosecute his suit against the said for certain goods and chattels, to wit: Eight bales of cotton [or whatever is distrained], distrained for rent [or supplies, or both, as the case may be] by virtue of an attachment in favor of against , issued by , a justice of the peace of County, and now here restored to the said , and shall perform the judgment of the court in such suit in case he shall fail therein. “Witness our hands, the day of , A.D. . “, “, “.” “I approve the foregoing bond, this day of , A.D. . “”

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HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1353; 1892, § 2519; 1906, § 2857; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2355; 1930, § 2207; 1942, § 929.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Form 138 (replevy bond by tenant to secure release of distrained personalty).

§ 89-7-95. Party replevying to propound claim.

By the first day of the next term of the court to which such replevy-bond and attachment shall have been returned, or afterwards, if longer time be granted by the court, the party who replevied the property shall file either a motion to quash the attachment proceedings or his declaration in replevin, if in the circuit court, or appear and prosecute his claim, if in a justice’s court, against the party in whose name or right the distress or seizure was made. Such party shall make defense, and if the attachment proceeding be quashed it may be amended. A tenant may file his declaration after a motion to quash shall have been denied, and the cause shall proceed to an issue and trial; and if upon trial it be found that the sum for rent or supplies was due, in whole or part, and that the distress was lawfully made, the landlord shall have judgment against the obligors in the replevy-bond for a return of the property replevied, or its value, to an amount sufficient to pay the sum found due, with interest and costs of suit. If the property replevied be restored, it shall be sold to satisfy the judgment, and if it be not sufficient, execution shall go against the party replevying for the residue.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1314; 1892, § 2521; 1906, § 2859; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2357; 1930, § 2208; 1942, § 930.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

That tenant bringing replevin for farm products seized under distress for rent failed to plead Sunday statute, held not reversible error, where landlord made no objection to evidence lease was executed on Sunday. Stamps v. Frost, 174 Miss. 325, 164 So. 584, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1935).

Error to disallow amendment of affidavit for attachment; writ having been quashed. McSwain v. Cephus, 109 Miss. 368, 69 So. 178, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1915).

By virtue of this section [Code 1942, § 930] the proceedings in a landlord’s attachment for rent or supplies may be amended. Schlicht v. Callicott, 76 Miss. 487, 24 So. 869, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1898).

In replevin by a tenant, where there is a controversy as to the amount of rent due, a general verdict for the landlord, without finding the sum due as required by this section, is insufficient, and the jury having dispersed, the case must be treated as if a mistrial had occurred. Gilleylen v. Stewart, 72 Miss. 262, 16 So. 495, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 99 (Miss. 1894).

§ 89-7-97. Form of declaration.

The declaration in replevin in such case may be substantially in the following form, to wit:

“State of Mississippi.

Circuit court, term, A.D. County of “Thomas East, the plaintiff in this case, complains of William West, the defendant, in an action of replevin. “For that heretofore, to wit: on the day of , A.D. , the said defendant wrongfully caused an officer of County to seize and take from the plaintiff’s possession, under an attachment for rent [or rent and supplies, or for supplies, as the case may be], certain personal property of the plaintiff’s, to wit: here describe the property and give the value of each separate item of it. “And the plaintiff avers that he is entitled to recover the same and also to recover of defendant the sum of dollars damages for the said wrongful taking; wherefore, he sues and demands judgment accordingly, and costs of suit.”

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HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2522; 1906, § 2860; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2358; 1930, § 2209; 1942, § 931.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Evidence sustained finding tenant’s oral contract had replaced written contract, and that landlord’s attachment for rent was wrongfully sued out. Graham v. Swinney, 174 Miss. 579, 165 So. 438, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1936).

That tenants bringing replevin for farm products seized under distress for rent failed to plead Sunday statute held not reversible error, where landlord made no objection to evidence that lease was executed on Sunday. Stamps v. Frost, 174 Miss. 325, 164 So. 584, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1935).

Judgment for lessee against lessor for amount by which total of sums agreed to be deducted from monthly rent and paid lessor’s creditor by lessee exceeded rent for period before partial destruction of leased mill by fire will not be affirmed on remittitur of amount exceeding sums deductible for such period only, but must be reversed and cause remanded for entry of judgment in proper amount. Moore-Curry Lumber Co. v. Wogan, 170 Miss. 512, 155 So. 329, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 162 (Miss. 1934).

Person incurring attorney’s fees in bringing suit for damages for attachment for rent is entitled to recover therefor. Wigginton v. Moore, 147 Miss. 169, 113 So. 326, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 346 (Miss. 1927).

§ 89-7-99. Pleas to the declaration.

The only pleas to a declaration in replevin shall be either, first, a denial that the goods were seized on demand or at the plaint of the defendant; or, second, an avowry that they were rightfully seized for rent or supplies, or both, due and in arrear, or to become due. The two pleas can only be pleaded together when each is to only a part of the declaration and relates to separate portions of the property. The first of said pleas shall be substantially to the following effect, to wit:

“Thomas East v. Circuit court, County. William West. “Now comes the defendant, William West, and for plea to plaintiff’s declaration, says: It is not true that he caused an officer of County to seize and take from plaintiff, Thomas East, under an attachment for rent, the possession of the property, or any part of it, described in the said declaration; and of this the defendant puts himself upon the country.”

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On the trial of this plea the burden of proof shall be on the plaintiff.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2523; 1906, § 2861; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2359; 1930, § 2210; 1942, § 932.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 617.

§ 89-7-101. The avowry.

The avowry shall be substantially to the following effect, to wit:

“Thomas East v. Circuit court, County. William West. “And now comes the defendant, William West, and for plea to plaintiff’s declaration he says: True it is that he caused the property described in the plaintiff’s declaration to be seized; but the seizure was not wrongful, because he says that before the said seizure defendant was the plaintiff’s landlord; that he, the defendant, as landlord, leased to the plaintiff, as tenant, certain premises in said county, to wit: [here describe the leased premises] for the term beginning on the day of , A.D. , and ending on the day of , A.D. ; that at the time of the said seizure the plaintiff, as tenant, was indebted to defendant, as landlord, in the sum of dollars, for rent of said premises and for supplies furnished his said tenant by this defendant [or for rent alone or supplies alone, as the case may be]. An itemized account or statement of said indebtedness is herewith filed [or the note or writing evidencing said debt, as the case may be], and the said debt became due on the day of , A.D. , and the said seizure was made to satisfy the sum so due; and this the defendant is ready to verify.” If the avowry be for a sum to become due, strike out from the form all after the last parenthesis, and insert in lieu thereof the following, viz.: “Which said indebtedness will become due on the day of , A.D. , and defendant had just cause to suspect, and verily believed, that the plaintiff would remove his effects, or some part of the agricultural products raised thereon, from the leased premises before the expiration of his term, or before the said debt would become due, so that distress could not be made, and the said seizure was made to satisfy the said sum. This the defendant is ready to verify.”

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HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2524; 1906, § 2862; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2360; 1930, § 2211; 1942, § 933.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Evidence sustained finding tenant’s oral contract had replaced written contract, and that landlord’s attachment for rent was wrongfully sued out. Graham v. Swinney, 174 Miss. 579, 165 So. 438, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 208 (Miss. 1936).

It is error to enter judgment by default in replevin without disposing of avowry filed. Barlow v. Serio, 129 Miss. 875, 93 So. 356, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 95 (Miss. 1922).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant § 617.

§ 89-7-103. The replication.

If the avowry be for rent and supplies, or either, claimed to be due and in arrears, the replication by the plaintiff shall be substantially in the following form, viz.:

“Thomas East v. Circuit court, County. William West. “And the plaintiff, for replication, says he was not indebted to the defendant as stated in his said avowry; and of this the plaintiff puts himself upon the country.”

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HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2525; 1906, § 2863; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2361; 1930, § 2212; 1942, § 934.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where claimant replevies property attached for rent, his replication to landlord’s avowry should not literally follow form given in this section [Code 1942, § 934] and deny indebtedness; but issue of ownership should be presented and evidence thereon admitted. Wright v. Craig, 92 Miss. 218, 45 So. 835, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1908).

§ 89-7-105. Replication in case rent not due.

If the avowry be a claim for rent or supplies, or both, to become due, the plaintiff shall reply either that he was not indebted, as in the form last above, or he may reply in substance as in the following form, viz.:

“Thomas East v. Circuit court, County. William West. “And the plaintiff, for replication, says that the defendant did not have just cause to suspect and verily believe that the plaintiff would remove his effects, or some part of the agricultural products raised thereon, from the leased premises before the expiration of his term or before the said debt would become due, so that distress could not be made; and of this plaintiff puts himself upon the country.”

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The plaintiff may, in proper case, unite the said replications, or he may reply any other facts constituting a legal answer.

And on the trial of an issue on an avowry, the burden of proof shall be on the avowant, the landlord, and he shall have the right to open and conclude the argument.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2526; 1906, § 2864; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2362; 1930, § 2213; 1942, § 935.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Tenant replevying goods attached by landlord for supplies furnished, failing to allege that crop for which supplies furnished was not grown on leased land, could not object that landlord’s evidence did not show where crop grown. McRae v. Browning, 119 Miss. 427, 81 So. 123, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. 1919).

If issue tendered denying allegation of avowry, burden is on landlord or avowant; if relation of landlord and tenant, amount of contract, or amount of supplies furnished is denied, landlord must prove contention, but if admitted no issue is made on avowry; if plaintiff undertake to confess and avoid by affirmative plea setting up new matter, and issue is tendered thereon, burden shifts and plaintiffs assuming it have right to open and close. McNeer & Dodd v. Norfleet, 113 Miss. 611, 74 So. 577, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1917).

§ 89-7-107. Replevin; when triable, and judgment upon default.

Suits by the tenant or a third person replevying the property, shall be triable at the first term of the court; and in either case, if the party replevying shall make default or fail to prosecute his suit, like judgment shall be entered against him and the sureties on the bond as upon an issue found against him on trial, and a new replevin or writ of second deliverance shall not be allowed.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5 (17); 1857, ch. 41, art. 13; 1871, § 1632; 1880, § 1320; 1892, § 2535; 1906, § 2873; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2371; 1930, § 2214; 1942, § 936.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The landlord, as against a claimant as well as against the tenant, must avow and prove the rent due, etc. Lavigne v. Russ, 36 Miss. 326, 1858 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1858); Maxey v. White, 53 Miss. 80, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1876).

The tenant or claimant is the plaintiff, and must prosecute the suit. Parkhurst v. Dunlap, 7 Miss. 577, 1842 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1842).

§ 89-7-109. Suit revived in case of death of party.

If either party to such replevin or other action growing out of an attachment for rent or supplies, die pending the same, the suit may be revived for or against the representatives of the deceased party as other actions that survive may be revived.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 25; 1871, § 1644; 1880, § 1321; 1892, § 2536; 1906, § 2874; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2372; 1930, § 2215; 1942, § 937.

Cross References —

Survival of actions generally, see §§91-7-233 et seq.

§ 89-7-111. Judgment if trial results against lessor.

If the trial of suit result in favor of the party replevying the property, the judgment shall be that he retain it, and recover of the party in whose name or right such distress was sued out damages for the wrongful suing out of the attachment. Thereupon scire facias may be issued to the sureties on the attachment-bond to appear at the next term of the court to show cause against a judgment being given against them for the amount of the judgment for damages against their principal, not to exceed the penalty of their bond; and if cause be not affirmatively shown, judgment shall be rendered against them.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1315; 1892, § 2527; 1906, § 2864; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2363; 1930, § 2216; 1942, § 938.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Tenant’s wife who sought to replevy trucks wrongfully attached by landlord was entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, if prevailing. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

Stranger claimant is entitled to reasonable damages for wrongful attachment under same circumstances as tenant is entitled under statute. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

The tenant is confined to the remedy provided in the section [Code 1942, § 938], except where rent is falsely claimed when nothing was due. Kyzer v. Middleton, 61 Miss. 360, 1883 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1883).

§ 89-7-113. Papers transferred, if returned to wrong court.

If the papers, in case of a replevin of property, be returned to the wrong court, they shall be transferred to the proper court, and the case be there proceeded with as if they had been returned to that court in the first instance.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1319; 1892, § 2534; 1906, § 2872; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2370; 1930, § 2217; 1942, § 939.

§ 89-7-115. Tenant’s remedy against landlord.

If any distress or seizure and sale be made under color of law for rent or supplies pretended to be due and in arrear, where, in truth, no rent or sum for supplies is due or owing to the party causing the distress or seizure to be made, then the owner of the agricultural products or other property so taken and sold, his executor or administrator, shall have remedy by action against the person in whose name or right such property was taken, his executor or administrator, and shall recover double the value of the property, with costs, or may put the bond of the plaintiff in suit to recover damages for the wrongful suing out of the writ, and shall recover therein double the value of the property, if the penalty of the bond amount to so much.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5 (5); 1857, ch. 41, art. 10; 1871, § 1629; 1880, § 1311; 1892, § 2517; 1906, § 2855; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2353; 1930, § 2218; 1942, § 940.

Cross References —

Rights, obligations and remedies available under Sections89-7-1 through89-7-125 not altered or abridged by rights, obligations and remedies available under Chapter 8 of Title 89, see §89-8-3.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Proper elements of damages for wrongful suing out injunction to prevent tenant from removing building are attorney’s fees, costs, expenses of trial, depreciation, and reasonable rental value. Waldauer v. Parks, 141 Miss. 617, 106 So. 881, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 467 (Miss. 1926).

This section [Code 1942, § 940] applies only where property sold under attachment and seizure and not where replevied by tenant. Thornton v. Gardner, 134 Miss. 485, 99 So. 131, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 285 (Miss. 1924).

Tenant replevying goods attached by landlord for supplies furnished, failing to allege that crops for which supplies furnished not grown on leased land, could not object that landlord’s evidence did not show where crop grown. McRae v. Browning, 119 Miss. 427, 81 So. 123, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. 1919).

Tenant may recover on the attachment bond for the actual damages sustained. Hawkins v. James, 69 Miss. 361, 11 So. 654, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 99 (Miss. 1891).

A tenant cannot recover double damages for an alleged wrongful distress by the landlord if the attachment proceedings, though based upon an affidavit and bond, appropriate to a distress, proceed thereafter as an ordinary attachment against the debtor, and were so treated by both parties. Hawkins v. James, 69 Miss. 361, 11 So. 654, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 99 (Miss. 1891).

It is only where the landlord falsely pretends that something is due that the tenant can recover the double damages. Kyzer v. Middleton, 61 Miss. 360, 1883 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1883).

There is no privity of contract between the lessor and the assignee of the term from the lessee; and the property of such assignee cannot be taken if the attachment be sued out against him by the lessor. Patty v. Bogle, 59 Miss. 491, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 141 (Miss. 1882).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Landlord and tenant: respective rights in excess rent when landlord relets at higher rent during lessee’s term. 50 A.L.R.4th 403.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 593, 642.

32 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 659, Landlord’s Conversion of Tenant’s Property.

42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 317, Constructive Eviction by Conduct of Other Tenant.

46 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 429, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Landlord.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 519, Lessee’s Excusable Failure to give Timely Notice Exercising Option to Renew Lease.

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 581, Sexual Harassment by Landlord.

CJS.

52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 1317-1321.

§ 89-7-117. Property of strangers not liable.

Property, except agricultural products on which there is a lien for rent, found or being on any demised premises, not belonging to the tenant or to some person bound or liable for the rent of such premises, shall not be liable to be distrained for rent; but if the tenant or other person liable for the rent have a limited interest in the property, the same may be distrained, and the interest therein of the tenant or person liable for the rent may be sold.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5 (10); 1857, ch. 41, art. 12; 1871, § 1631; 1880, § 1317; 1892, § 2529; 1906, § 2867; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2365; 1930, § 2219; 1942, § 941.

Cross References —

Trial of right to property levied upon, see §§11-23-7 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 607 et seq.

32 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 659, Landlord’s Conversion of Tenant’s Property.

§ 89-7-119. Replevin of property by strangers.

When any person other than the tenant shall claim to be the owner of any property distrained or seized for rent or supplies, he may make affidavit that said property is his, and not the property of the tenant, and not held to the use of the tenant in any manner whatever, and is not liable to such distress or seizure. If he desire immediate possession of said property, he shall give bond, with sufficient sureties, in the manner directed for the tenant, and such affidavit and bond shall be delivered to the officer who made the distress, who shall deliver the property to the claimant. Such claim may be interposed without giving bond, and the same proceedings shall be had thereon, except that the property claimed shall not be delivered to the claimant, but shall be disposed of as in the case of replevy by the tenant. Upon such claim being made, the landlord may release the property so claimed and forthwith distrain or seize other property in lieu thereof.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 56, art. 5 (10, 16); 1857, ch. 41, art. 12; 1871, § 1631; 1880, § 1317; 1892, § 2530; 1906, § 2868; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2366; 1930, § 2220; 1942, § 942.

Cross References —

Trial of right to property levied upon, see §§11-23-7 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Stranger claimant is entitled to reasonable damages for wrongful attachment under same circumstances as tenant, under statute. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

Burden of proving ownership on party filing affidavit for property attached by landlord; prima facie case made out by proof of ownership, and burden shifts to landlord to show that it is subject to lien for rent. Dunn v. Hart, 120 Miss. 132, 81 So. 795, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1919).

Third party owning property on leased premises, distrained for rent, may recover by remedy provided in this section [Code 1942, § 942] or by any other remedy known to law, as by replevin. Shuler v. L. Grunewald Co., 113 Miss. 763, 74 So. 659, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 151 (Miss. 1917).

A claimant of goods attached for rent is to be treated in the interposition of his claim as a plaintiff in replevin and must give attention to the prosecution of the suit without notification thereunto. Pierce v. Watkins, 74 Miss. 394, 21 So. 148, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 155 (Miss. 1896).

Where property levied upon under attachment for rent is claimed by a third person who files an affidavit without giving bond, the officer has no authority to sell it pending the suit unless the same consists of “live stock or chattels, which it is expensive to keep, or perishable articles.” Weis v. Basket, 71 Miss. 771, 15 So. 659, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1894).

Cotton ginned and in bales is not of the class that may be sold. Weis v. Basket, 71 Miss. 771, 15 So. 659, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1894).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

32 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 659, Landlord’s Conversion of Tenant’s Property.

§ 89-7-121. Form of affidavit by third person.

The affidavit by a third person claiming property distrained or seized for rent or supplies may be in the following form, to wit:

“State of Mississippi, County. “Before me, , a justice of the peace of the said county, makes oath that certain property to wit: eight bales of cotton [or whatever the property may be], distrained for rent by , a constable of said county, by virtue of an attachment for rent in favor of against , are the property of affiant and not the property of , nor held in trust for his use, in any manner whatsoever; and are not liable to such distress. “Sworn to and subscribed before me, the day of , A.D. “, J.P.”

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HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2532; 1906, § 2870; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2368; 1930, § 2221; 1942, § 943.

§ 89-7-123. Proceedings to be as in replevin by tenant.

The affidavit may be made before the officer having the property, and he shall make return of it and of the bond, if any, and the attachment papers, and summon the other party, as required in case of a replevin by the tenant; and the claimant replevying the property shall prosecute his suit against the party in whose name or right it was attached, in all respects as the tenant is required to do; and the pleadings and proceedings shall be conformed so as to present the proper issues.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 41, art. 12; 1871, § 1631; 1880, § 1318; 1892, § 2533; 1906, § 2871; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2360; 1930, § 2222; 1942, § 944.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Stranger claimant is entitled to reasonable damages for wrongful attachment under same circumstances as tenant, under statute. Rollings v. Rosenbaum, 166 Miss. 499, 148 So. 384, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 390 (Miss. 1933).

§ 89-7-125. Burden of proof.

On the trial of the issue between the landlord and such claimant, the burden of proof to show ownership in the property shall be on the claimant.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2531; 1906, § 2869; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2367; 1930, § 2223; 1942, § 945.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Burden of proving ownership on party filing affidavit under Code 1906, § 2868 [Code 1942, § 942]; prima facie case made out by proof of ownership, and burden shifts to landlord to prove property subject to lien. Dunn v. Hart, 120 Miss. 132, 81 So. 795, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 71 (Miss. 1919).

Chapter 8. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act

§ 89-8-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews.

Bell, The Mississippi Landlord-Tenant Act of 1991. 61 Miss. L. J. 527, Winter, 1991.

§ 89-8-3. Application of chapter.

  1. This chapter shall apply to, regulate and determine rights, obligations and remedies under any rental agreement entered into after July 1, 1991, wherever made, for a dwelling unit located within this state. The rights, obligations and remedies of this chapter shall be in addition to all other rights, obligations and remedies provided by law and shall not alter or abridge the rights, obligations and remedies available to residential landlords and tenants pursuant to Sections 89-7-1 through 89-7-125.
  2. The following arrangements are not governed by this chapter:
    1. Residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to detention or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious or similar service;
    2. Occupancy under a contract of sale of a dwelling unit or the property of which it is a part, if the occupant is the purchaser or a person who succeeds to his interest;
    3. Occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the portion of a structure operated for the benefit of the organization;
    4. Transient occupancy in a hotel, motel or lodgings;
    5. Occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit or a holder of a proprietary lease in a cooperative; or
    6. Occupancy under a rental agreement covering premises used by the occupant primarily for agricultural purposes or when the occupant is performing agricultural labor for the owner and such premises are rented for less than fair rental value.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 2; Laws, 1993, ch. 312, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 12, 1993).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

§ 89-8-5. Waiver of rights prohibited; provisions prohibited in rental agreement.

In any agreement, oral or written, for the rental of real property as a dwelling place, a landlord or tenant may not agree to waive or otherwise forego any of the rights, duties or remedies under this chapter, except as otherwise provided by this chapter. No rental agreement may provide that the tenant or the landlord:

Authorizes any person to confess judgment on a claim arising out of the rental agreement; or

Agrees to the exculpation or limitation of any liability of the landlord arising as a result of the landlord’s willful misconduct or the costs connected therewith.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

Cross References —

Right of landlord and tenant to agree that tenant perform duties of landlord, subject to the provisions of this section, see §89-8-23.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity, construction, and effect of provisions of lease exempting landlord or tenant from liability on account of fire. 15 A.L.R.3d 786.

Validity of exculpatory clause in lease exempting lessor from liability. 49 A.L.R.3d 321.

Landlord’s liability to third party for repairs authorized by tenant. 46 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 11-42.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 184-251.

§ 89-8-7. Definitions; agent of landlord.

  1. Subject to additional definitions contained in subsequent sections of this chapter which apply to specific sections or parts thereof, and unless the context otherwise requires, in this chapter:
    1. “Building and housing codes” includes any law, ordinance, or governmental regulation concerning fitness for habitation, construction, maintenance, operation, occupancy or use of any premises or dwelling unit;
    2. “Dwelling unit” means a structure or the part of a structure that is used as a home, residence or sleeping place by one (1) person who maintains a household or by two (2) or more persons who maintain a common household;
    3. “Good faith” means honesty in fact in the conduct of the transaction concerned and observation of reasonable community standards of fair dealing;
    4. “Landlord” means the owner, lessor or sublessor of the dwelling unit or the building of which it is a part, or the agent representing such owner, lessor or sublessor;
    5. “Organization” includes a corporation, government, governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, two (2) or more persons having a joint or common interest, and any other legal or commercial entity;
    6. “Owner” means one or more persons, jointly or severally, in whom is vested (i) all or part of the legal title to property or (ii) all or part of the beneficial ownership and a right to present use and enjoyment of the premises, and the term includes a mortgagee in possession;
    7. “Premises” means a dwelling unit and the structure of which it is a part, facilities and appurtenances therein, and grounds, areas and facilities held out for the use of tenants generally or whose use is promised to the tenant;
    8. “Rent” means all payments to be made to the landlord under the rental agreement, including any late fees that are required to be paid under the rental agreement by a defaulting tenant;
    9. “Rental agreement” means all agreements, written or oral, except to the extent an agreement under this chapter or Chapter 7, Title 89, Mississippi Code of 1972, must be in writing, and valid rules and regulations adopted under Section 89-8-11 embodying the terms and conditions concerning the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit and premises;
    10. “Tenant” means a person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others;
    11. “Qualified tenant management organizations” means any organization incorporated under the Mississippi Nonprofit Corporation Act, a majority of the directors of which are tenants of the housing project to be managed under a contract authorized by this section and which is able to conform to standards set by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development as capable of satisfactorily performing the operational and management functions delegated to it by the contract.
  2. For purposes of giving any notice required under this chapter, notice given to the agent of the landlord is equivalent to giving notice to the landlord. The landlord may contract with an agent to assume all the rights and duties of the landlord under this chapter; provided, however, that such a contract does not relieve the landlord of ultimate liability in regard to such rights and duties.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1991; Laws, 2018, ch. 446, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2018.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment added “including any late fees…by a defaulting tenant” in (h); and added the exception near the beginning of (i).

Cross References —

Mississippi Nonprofit Corporation Act, see §§79-11-101 et seq.

§ 89-8-9. Obligation to act in good faith.

Every duty under this chapter and every act which must be performed as a condition precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under this chapter, including the landlord’s termination of a tenancy or nonrenewal of a lease, imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

§ 89-8-11. Rules and regulations of landlord concerning tenant’s use and occupancy of premises.

  1. A landlord may, from time to time, adopt rules or regulations, however described, concerning the tenant’s use and occupancy of the premises. They are enforceable against the tenant only if:
    1. Their purpose is to promote the convenience, safety or welfare of the tenants in the premises, preserve the landlord’s property from abuse, or make a fair distribution of services and facilities provided for the tenants generally;
    2. They are reasonably related to the purpose for which they are adopted;
    3. They apply to all tenants in the premises in a fair manner;
    4. They are sufficiently explicit in their prohibition, direction or limitation of the tenant’s conduct to fairly inform him of what he must or must not do to comply;
    5. They are not for the purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord.
  2. A rule or regulation adopted or amended after the tenant enters into the rental agreement is enforceable against the tenant if reasonable notice of its adoption or amendment is given to the tenant and it does not work a substantial modification of the rental agreement.
  3. If the dwelling unit is an apartment in a horizontal property regime, the tenant shall comply with the bylaws of the association of the apartment owners; and if the dwelling unit is an apartment in a cooperative housing corporation, the tenant shall comply with the bylaws of the corporation.
  4. Unless otherwise agreed, the tenant shall occupy his dwelling unit only as a dwelling unit.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

Cross References —

Definition of “rental agreement” as including all rules and regulations adopted under this section, see §89-8-7.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity of exculpatory clause in lease exempting lessor from liability. 49 A.L.R.3d 321.

Express or implied restriction on lessee’s use of residential property for business purposes. 46 A.L.R.4th 496.

Provision in lease as to purpose for which premises are to be used as excluding other uses. 86 A.L.R.4th 259.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 11-42.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 184-251.

§ 89-8-13. Right to terminate tenancy for breach; notice of breach; return of prepaid rent and security; disposition of tenant’s abandoned personal property.

  1. If there is a material noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or the obligations imposed by Section 89-8-25, the landlord may terminate the tenancy as set out in subsection (3) of this section or resort to any other remedy at law or in equity except as prohibited by this chapter.
  2. If there is a material noncompliance by the landlord with the rental agreement or the obligations imposed by Section 89-8-23, the tenant may terminate the tenancy as set out in subsection (3) of this section or resort to any other remedy at law or in equity except as prohibited by this chapter.
  3. The nonbreaching party may deliver a notice to the party in breach in writing, or by email or text message if the breaching party has agreed in writing to be notified by email or text message, specifying the acts and omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement will terminate upon a date not less than fourteen (14) days after receipt of the notice if the breach is not remedied within a reasonable time not in excess of fourteen (14) days; and the rental agreement shall terminate and the tenant shall surrender possession as provided in the notice subject to the following:
    1. If the breach is remediable by repairs, the payment of damages, or otherwise, and the breaching party adequately remedies the breach before the date specified in the notice, the rental agreement shall not terminate;
    2. In the absence of a showing of due care by the breaching party, if substantially the same act or omission which constituted a prior noncompliance of which notice was given recurs within six (6) months, the nonbreaching party may terminate the rental agreement upon at least fourteen (14) days’ notice in writing, or by email or text message if the breaching party has agreed in writing to be notified by email or text message, specifying the breach and the date of termination of the rental agreement;
    3. Neither party may terminate for a condition caused by his own deliberate or negligent act or omission or that of a member of his family or other person on the premises with his consent.
  4. If the rental agreement is terminated, the landlord shall return all prepaid and unearned rent and security recoverable by the tenant under Section 89-8-21.
    1. If the material noncompliance by the tenant is the nonpayment of rent pursuant to the rental agreement, the landlord shall not be required to deliver fourteen (14) days’ notice as provided by subsection (3) of this section. In such event, the landlord may seek removal of the tenant from the premises in the manner and with the notice prescribed by Chapter 7, Title 89, Mississippi Code of 1972.
    2. Any justice court judge or other judge presiding over a hearing in which a landlord seeks to remove a tenant for the nonpayment of rent shall abide by the provisions of the rental agreement that was signed by the landlord and the defaulting tenant.
  5. Disposition of personal property, including any manufactured home, of a tenant remaining on the landlord’s premises after the tenant has been removed from the premises shall be governed by Section 89-7-35(2) or Section 89-7-41(2).

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 7; Laws, 1993, ch. 312, § 2; Laws, 2015, ch. 395, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2015; Laws, 2018, ch. 446, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2018.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment added (6).

The 2018 amendment rewrote the introductory paragraph of (3), which read: “The nonbreaching party may deliver a written notice to the party in breach specifying the acts and omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement will terminate upon a date not less than thirty (30) days after receipt of the notice if the breach is not remedied within a reasonable time not in excess of thirty (30) days; and the rental agreement shall terminate and the tenant shall surrender possession as provided in the notice subject to the following:”; in (3)(b), deleted “written” preceding “notice” and inserted “in writing, or by email...or text message” thereafter; in (5), deleted “Notwithstanding the provisions of this section or any other provisions of this chapter to the contrary,” from the beginning, designated the remainder of former (5) as (a) and substituted “deliver fourteen (14) days' notice” for “deliver thirty (30) days' written notice” therein, and added (b); and made a minor stylistic change.

Cross References —

Rights of landlord after expiration of rental agreement notwithstanding the provisions of this section, see §89-8-17.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Party who has been given 30 day notice of first breach has 30 days within which to remedy breach and to thereby prevent rental agreement from terminating; statute provides no such right to remedy or cure second, similar breach after 14 day notice has been given. Alexander, Nov. 12, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0857.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Failure of landlord to make, or permit tenant to make, repairs or alterations required by public authority as constructive eviction. 86 A.L.R.3d 352.

Waiver of statutory demand-for-rent due or notice-to-quit prerequisite of summary eviction of lessee for nonpayment of rent-modern cases. 31 A.L.R.4th 1254.

Express or implied restriction on lessee’s use of residential property for business purposes. 46 A.L.R.4th 496.

Provision in lease as to purpose for which premises are to be used as excluding other uses. 86 A.L.R.4th 259.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 246, 825-861.

16 Am. Jur. Pl and Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Forms 171-182.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 102-119.

§ 89-8-15. Repair of defects by tenant.

  1. If, within thirty (30) days after written notice to the landlord of a specific and material defect which constitutes a breach of the terms of the rental agreement or of the obligation of the landlord under Section 89-8-23, the landlord fails to repair such defect, the tenant:
    1. May repair such defect himself; and
    2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, shall be entitled to reimbursement of the expenses of such repairs within forty-five (45) days after submission to the landlord of receipted bills for such work, provided that:
      1. The tenant has fulfilled his affirmative obligations under Section 89-8-25;
      2. The expenses incurred in making such repairs do not exceed an amount equal to one (1) month’s rent;
      3. The tenant has not exercised the remedy provided by this section in the six (6) months immediately preceding; and
      4. The tenant is current in his rental payment.
  2. A tenant shall not be entitled to be reimbursed for repairs made pursuant to this section in an amount greater than the usual and customary charge for such repairs.
  3. Before correcting a condition affecting facilities shared by more than one (1) dwelling unit, the tenant shall notify all other tenants sharing such facilities of his plans and shall so arrange the work as to create the least practicable inconvenience to the other tenants.
  4. The cost of repairs made by a tenant pursuant to this section may be offset against future rent.
  5. No provision of this section shall be construed to grant a lien against the real property.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity, construction, and effect of provisions of lease exempting landlord or tenant from liability on account of fire. 15 A.L.R.3d 786.

Who, as between landlord and tenant, must make, or bear expense of, alterations, improvements, or repairs ordered by public authorities. 22 A.L.R.3d 521.

Tenant’s right, where landlord fails to make repairs, to have them made and set off cost against rent. 40 A.L.R.3d 1369.

Failure of landlord to make, or permit tenant to make, repairs or alterations required by public authority as constructive eviction. 86 A.L.R.3d 352.

Landlord’s liability to third party for repairs authorized by tenant. 46 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 631, 710-717, 794.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 372, 373, 387-401.

Law Reviews.

Note: Developing a housing plan for Mississippi: some program and funding alternatives. 61 Miss. L. J. 605, Winter, 1991.

§ 89-8-17. Rights of landlord after expiration of rental agreement.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 89-8-13, the landlord may, at any time after the expiration of a rental agreement, recover possession of the dwelling unit, cause the tenant to quit the dwelling unit involuntarily, demand an increase in rent or decrease the services to which the tenant has been entitled in accordance with any other provisions of this chapter, if such actions by the landlord did not have the dominant purpose of retaliation against the tenant for his actions authorized under this chapter and the landlord received written notice of each condition which was the subject of such actions of the tenant.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right of landlord legally entitled to possession to dispossess tenant without legal process. 6 A.L.R.3d 177.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 825-861.

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Forms 41-52.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 89-101.

§ 89-8-19. Length of term of tenancy; notice to terminate tenancy; exception to notice requirement.

  1. Unless the rental agreement fixes a definite term a tenancy shall be week to week in case of a tenant who pays weekly rent, and in all other cases month to month.
  2. The landlord or the tenant may terminate a week-to-week tenancy by written notice given to the other at least seven (7) days prior to the termination date.
  3. The landlord or the tenant may terminate a month-to-month tenancy by a written notice given to the other at least thirty (30) days prior to the termination date.
  4. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section or any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, notice to terminate a tenancy shall not be required to be given when the landlord or tenant has committed a substantial violation of the rental agreement or this chapter that materially affects health and safety.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

Cross References —

Amount of notice required to terminate tenancy not governed by this section, see §89-7-23.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right of landlord legally entitled to possession to dispossess tenant without legal process. 6 A.L.R.3d 177.

Retaliatory eviction of tenant for reporting landlord’s violation of law. 40 A.L.R.3d 753.

Lease provisions allowing termination or forfeiture for violation of law. 92 A.L.R.3d 967.

Circumstances excusing lessee’s failure to give timely notice of exercise of option to renew or extend lease. 27 A.L.R.4th 266.

Sufficiency as to method of giving oral or written notice exercising option to renew or extend lease. 29 A.L.R.4th 903.

What constitutes timely notice of exercise of option to renew or extend lease. 29 A.L.R.4th 956.

Waiver of statutory demand-for-rent due or of notice-to-quit prerequisite of summary eviction of lessee for nonpayment of rent-modern cases. 31 A.L.R.4th 1254.

Sufficiency as to parties giving or receiving notice of exercise of option to renew or extend lease. 34 A.L.R.4th 857.

Specificity of description of premises as affecting enforceability of lease. 73 A.L.R.4th 236.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 60-70.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 89, 130, 142, 144, 150, 173, 183.

§ 89-8-21. Tenant’s security deposit.

  1. Any payment or deposit of money, the primary function of which is to secure the performance of a rental agreement or any part of such an agreement, other than a payment or deposit, including an advance payment of rent, made to secure the execution of a rental agreement shall be governed by the provisions of this section.
  2. Any such payment or deposit of money shall be held by the landlord for the tenant who is a party to such agreement. The claim of a tenant to such payment or deposit shall be governed by the provisions of this section. The claim of a tenant to such payment or deposit shall be prior to the claim of any creditor of the landlord.
  3. The landlord, by written notice delivered to the tenant, may claim of such payment or deposit only such amounts as are reasonably necessary to remedy the tenant’s defaults in the payment of rent, to repair damages to the premises caused by the tenant, exclusive of ordinary wear and tear, to clean such premises upon termination of the tenancy, or for other reasonable and necessary expenses incurred as the result of the tenant’s default, if the payment or deposit is made for any or all of those specific purposes. The written notice by which the landlord claims all or any portion of such payment or deposit shall itemize the amounts claimed by such landlord. Any remaining portion of such payment or deposit shall be returned to the tenant no later than forty-five (45) days after the termination of his tenancy, the delivery of possession and demand by the tenant.
  4. The retention by a landlord or transferee of a payment or deposit or any portion thereof, in violation of this section and with absence of good faith, may subject the landlord or his transferee to damages not to exceed Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) in addition to any actual damages.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

Cross References —

Duty of landlord to return all prepaid and unearned rent and security recoverable by tenant under this section if rental agreement is terminated, see §89-8-13.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 522-528.

CJS.

51D C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 472-476.

§ 89-8-23. Duties of landlord.

  1. A landlord shall at all times during the tenancy:
    1. Comply with the requirements of applicable building and housing codes materially affecting health and safety;
    2. Maintain the dwelling unit, its plumbing, heating and/or cooling system, in substantially the same condition as at the inception of the lease, reasonable wear and tear excluded, unless the dwelling unit, its plumbing, heating and/or cooling system is damaged or impaired as a result of the deliberate or negligent actions of the tenant.
  2. No duty on the part of the landlord shall arise under this section in connection with a defect which is caused by the deliberate or negligent act of the tenant or persons on the premises with the tenant’s permission.
  3. Subject to the provisions of Section 89-8-5, the landlord and tenant may agree in writing that the tenant perform some or all of the landlord’s duties under this section, but only if the transaction is entered into in good faith.
  4. No duty on the part of the landlord shall arise under this section in connection with a defect which is caused by the tenant’s affirmative act or failure to comply with his obligations under Section 89-8-25.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

Cross References —

Right of tenant to terminate tenancy for landlord’s noncompliance with obligations imposed by this section, see §89-8-13.

Right of tenant to make repairs of defects constituting breach of landlord’s obligations under this section, see §89-8-15.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

This section is not a basis for holding a landlord negligent per se for all housing code violations, and such an interpretation would lead to inequitable and extreme results. Sweatt v. Murphy, 733 So. 2d 207, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 43 (Miss. 1999).

Because the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act informed the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision to hold that a warranty of habitability applied to residential leases, after concluding that such warranty would apply to mobile home lots, a court denied property management companies’ motion for summary judgment in a tenant’s suit to recover damages for personal injuries that he sustained when he tripped over a broken sidewalk in front of his rented lot; although the tenant had signed a lease stating that he was responsible for making all repairs, whether the tenant waived the warranty of habitability was a question for the jury. Moorman v. Tower Mgmt. Co., 451 F. Supp. 2d 846, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67246 (S.D. Miss. 2006).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity, construction, and effect of provisions of lease exempting landlord or tenant from liability on account of fire. 15 A.L.R.3d 786.

Who, as between landlord and tenant, must make, or bear expense of, alterations, improvements, or repairs ordered by public authorities. 22 A.L.R.3d 521.

Validity of exculpatory clause in lease exempting lessor from liability. 49 A.L.R.3d 321.

Landlord’s liability to third party for repairs authorized by tenant. 46 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 618-770.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 366-373, 402-407.

§ 89-8-25. Duties of tenant.

A tenant shall:

Keep that part of the premises that he occupies and uses as clean and as safe as the condition of the premises permits;

Dispose from his dwelling unit all ashes, rubbish, garbage and other waste in a clean and safe manner in compliance with community standards;

Keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit used by the tenant as clean as their condition permits;

Use in a reasonable manner all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air conditioning and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, in the premises;

Not deliberately or negligently destroy, deface, damage, impair or remove any part of the premises or knowingly permit any other person to do so;

Conduct himself and require other persons on the premises with his consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not disturb his neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of their premises;

Inform the landlord of any condition of which he has actual knowledge which may cause damage to the premises;

To the extent of his legal obligation, maintain the dwelling unit in substantially the same condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted, and comply with the requirements of applicable building and housing codes materially affecting health and safety;

Not engage in any illegal activity upon the leased premises as documented by a law enforcement agency.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 13; Laws, 1994, ch. 331, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

Cross References —

Right of landlord to terminate tenancy for tenant’s noncompliance with obligations imposed by this section, see §89-8-13.

Right of tenant to receive reimbursement for expense of repairs if tenant has fulfilled his affirmative obligations under this section, see §89-8-15.

No duty on part of landlord arises in connection with defect caused by tenant’s failure to comply with his obligations under this section, see §89-8-23.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity, construction, and effect of provisions of lease exempting landlord or tenant from liability on account of fire. 15 A.L.R.3d 786.

Who, as between landlord and tenant, must make, or bear expense of, alterations, improvements, or repairs ordered by public authorities. 22 A.L.R.3d 521.

Tenant’s obligation under lease as basis of tort liability to third persons. 44 A.L.R.3d 943.

Validity of exculpatory clause in lease exempting lessor from liability. 49 A.L.R.3d 321.

Express or implied restriction on lessee’s use of residential property for business purposes. 46 A.L.R.4th 496.

Landlord’s liability to third party for repairs authorized by tenant. 46 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am. Jur.

49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 771-824.

CJS.

51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant §§ 102-119, 387-401.

§ 89-8-27. Housing authorities authorized to contract with tenant management organizations; authority to sell public housing units to tenant management organizations.

Any county, municipality, regional housing authority or local housing authority in the state may make application to and contract with qualified tenant management organizations for the operation and management of housing projects of the authority as a means of reducing vacancies, reducing administrative costs and creating jobs from the establishment of maintenance teams. Such counties, municipalities, regional housing authorities or local housing authorities shall have the authority to sell public housing units to such tenant management organizations, provided that such sale is in compliance with any applicable federal laws and regulations and any applicable state laws and regulations.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 478, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1991, ch. 478, § 16, provides:

“SECTION 16. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1991, and shall apply only to rental agreements entered into after such date.”

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews.

Note: Developing a housing plan for Mississippi: some program and funding alternatives. 61 Miss. L. J. 605, Winter, 1991.

Beard and Hopkins, Building homes, building neighborhoods: family selection and family nurture for low income housing in two southern communities. 61 Miss. L. J. 631, Winter, 1991.

§ 89-8-29. Derrick Beard Act; termination of lease of residential premises by cosigner upon death of lessee; presumption of termination; cosigner’s choice not to terminate; effect of termination on certain liabilities of lessee’s estate or cosigner; applicability of section.

  1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Derrick Beard Act.”
  2. Any cosigner of a lease of a residential premises may terminate, and is presumed to have terminated, the lease before its expiration date upon the death of the lessee or, if there is more than one (1) lessee, upon the death of all lessees.The cosigner must provide notice to the lessor within thirty (30) days of the death of the lessee, or upon the death of all the lessees, if he or she chooses not to terminate the lease.
  3. The termination of a lease under this section shall not relieve the lessee’s estate or lessee’s cosigner from liability for:
    1. The payment of rent or other sums owed before the lessee’s death or the death of all lessees;
    2. The payment of rent or other sums owed for the remainder of the month or other thirty-day period during which the death occurred; or
    3. The payment of amounts necessary to restore the premises to its condition at the commencement of the tenancy, ordinary wear and tear excepted.
  4. Any attempted waiver by a lessor and lessee or lessee’s cosigner, by contract or otherwise, of the right of termination provided by this section shall be void and unenforceable.
  5. The provisions of this section shall apply to leases entered into or renewed from and after July 1, 2011.

HISTORY: Laws, 2011, ch. 392, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Chapter 9. Condominiums

§ 89-9-1. Citation of chapter.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Mississippi Condominium Law.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-01; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 1.

Cross References —

Inclusion of condominium units within exemptions from taxation of homesteads, see §27-33-19.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of condominium association or corporation for injury allegedly caused by condition of premises. 45 A.L.R.3d 1171.

Erection of condominium as violation of restrictive covenant forbidding erection of apartment houses. 65 A.L.R.3d 1212.

Proper party plaintiff in action for injury to common areas of condominium development. 69 A.L.R.3d 1148.

Validity and construction of condominium association’s regulations governing members’ use of common facilities. 72 A.L.R.3d 308.

Standing to bring action relating to title in real property of condominium. 72 A.L.R.3d 314.

Self-dealing by developers of condominium project as affecting contracts or leases with condominium association. 73 A.L.R.3d 613.

Enforceability of bylaw or other rule of condominium or co-operative association restricting occupancy by children. 100 A.L.R.3d 241.

Regulation of time-share or interval ownership interests in real estate. 6 A.L.R.4th 1288.

Condominium association’s liability to unit owner for injuries caused by third person’s criminal conduct. 59 A.L.R.4th 489.

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments §§ 1-3.

7 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments, Forms 1 et seq.

§ 89-9-3. Purpose of chapter.

The purpose of this chapter is to give statutory recognition to the condominium form of ownership of real property. It shall not be construed as repealing or amending any law now in effect except those in conflict herewith, and any such conflicting laws shall be affected only insofar as they apply to condominiums.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-02; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 2.

§ 89-9-5. Definitions.

For the purpose of this chapter, the following words and phrases as used herein, unless a different meaning is plainly required by the context, shall have the following meanings:

  1. “Condominium” means that form of ownership of property under which units of improvements are subject to ownership by different owners and there is appurtenant to each unit as part thereof an undivided share in the common areas.
  2. “Unit” means the elements of a condominium which are not owned in common with the owners of other condominiums in the project.
  3. “Project” means the entire parcel of real property divided, or to be divided into condominiums, including all structures thereon.
  4. “Common areas” means the entire project excepting all units therein granted or reserved.
  5. “To divide” real property means to divide the ownership thereof by conveying one or more condominiums therein but less than the whole thereof.
  6. “Real property” means and includes an estate in fee simple in the land or a leasehold therein or any other estate in land recognized by law together with the building or buildings, all improvements and structures thereon and all easements, rights, and appurtenances belonging thereto.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-03; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 3; Laws, 1970, ch. 306, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 2, 1970).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Parking space.

2. Re-subdividing.

1. Parking space.

Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §89-9-5(2) and (4), a unit contained only non-common elements, and since the Declaration of Condominium was never validly amended, the disputed parking space remained a common element of the condominium, and all owners in the condominium complex owned the parking space as owners of a common element of a condominium; however, the owner still had the exclusive right to use the parking space, free from interference by the neighbors, as stated in the Declaration of Condominium. Brice v. Ferrell, 918 So. 2d 887, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 26 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

2. Re-subdividing.

Construing the term “re-subdivided” most strongly against the homeowners and in favor of the developer, the prohibition that the lots were not to be re-subdivided meant that the platted lots were not to be divided into smaller tracts of land and then re-platted as a subdivision, and it would be unreasonable to find that the covenant drafters intended that a lot owner, who alienated a portion of a lot without assigning it a separate lot number, was engaged in prohibited re-subdividing, especially so in light of the covenant’s allowance of multi-family residential structures on the lots, which contemplated more than one property owner per lot; the evidence before the chancellor pertaining to the definition of multi-family residential use was that it included condominiums. COR Devs., LLC v. College Hill Heights Homeowners, LLC, 973 So. 2d 273, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 31 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments §§ 1-3.

§ 89-9-7. Condominium constitutes real property.

A condominium is an estate in real property consisting of an undivided interest in common in a portion of a parcel of real property together with a separate interest in space in a residential, industrial, or commercial building on such real property, such as an apartment, office, or store. A condominium may include in addition a separate interest in other portions of such real property.

Such estate may, with respect to the duration of its enjoyment, be in fee simple, leasehold or any other estate in real property recognized by law.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-04; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 4; Laws, 1970, ch. 306, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 2, 1970).

Cross References —

Partition of property, see §§11-21-1 et seq.

Party walls, see §§89-15-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Standing to bring action relating to real property of condominium. 74 A.L.R.4th 165.

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments §§ 1-3.

7 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Deeds § 87.23.1 (deed with covenants of title time-share condominium).

§ 89-9-9. Recordation of plan; amendment or revocation.

The provisions of this chapter shall apply to property divided or to be divided into condominiums only if there shall be recorded in the office of the chancery clerk in the county in which such property lies a plan consisting of (a) a description or survey map of the surface of the land included within the project, (b) diagrammatic floor plans of the building or buildings built or to be built thereon in sufficient detail to identify each unit, its relative location and approximate dimensions, and (c) a certificate consenting to the recordation of such plan pursuant to this chapter signed and acknowledged by the record owner of such real property and all record holders of security interests therein. Such plan may be amended or revoked by a subsequently acknowledged recorded instrument executed by the record owner of such real property and by all record holders of security interests therein. Until such recordation of a revocation, the provisions of this chapter shall continue to apply to such real property. The term “record owner” as used in this section includes all of the record owners of such real property at the time of recordation, but does not include holders of security interests, mineral or royalty interests, easements or rights of way.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-05; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 5; Laws, 1970, ch. 306, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 2, 1970).

Cross References —

Recording of instruments generally, see §89-5-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments §§ 6-9.

§ 89-9-11. Conveyance of unit or apartment, etc., which is part of unit presumed to convey entire condominium.

Unless otherwise expressly stated therein, any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store which is a part of the unit, shall be presumed to transfer or convey the entire condominium.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-06; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 6.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Self-dealing by developers of condominium project as affecting contracts or leases with condominium association. 73 A.L.R.3d 613.

Am. Jur.

7 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Deeds § 87.23.1 (deed with covenants of title time-share condominium).

§ 89-9-13. Incidents of condominium grant.

Unless otherwise expressly provided in the deeds, declaration of restrictions or plan, incidents of a condominium grant are as follows:

  1. The boundaries of the unit granted are the interior surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows and doors thereof, and the unit includes both the portions of the building so described and the airspace so encompassed. The following are not part of the unit: bearing walls, columns, floors, roofs, foundations, elevator equipment and shafts, central heating, central refrigeration and central air-conditioning equipment, reservoirs, tanks, pumps and other central services, pipes, ducts, flues, chutes, conduits, wires and other utility installations, wherever located, except the outlets thereof when located within the unit. In interpreting deeds and plans the existing physical boundaries of the unit or of a unit reconstructed in substantial accordance with the original plans thereof shall be conclusively presumed to be its boundaries rather than the metes and bounds expressed in the deed or plan, regardless of settling or lateral movement of the building and regardless of minor variance between boundaries shown on the plan or in the deed and those of the building.
  2. The common areas are owned by the owners of the units as tenants in common, in equal shares, one for each unit.
  3. A nonexclusive easement for ingress, egress and support through the common areas is appurtenant to each unit, and the common areas are subject to such easement.
  4. Each condominium owner shall have the exclusive right to paint, repaint, tile, wax, paper, or otherwise refinish and decorate the inner surfaces of the walls, ceilings, floors, windows and doors bounding his own unit.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-07; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 7.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity and enforceability of condominium owner’s covenant to pay dues or fees to sports or recreational facility. 39 A.L.R.4th 129.

Standing to bring action relating to real property of condominium. 74 A.L.R.4th 165.

Am. Jur.

29 Am. Jur. Trials 157, Condominium Construction Litigation: Representing the Community Association.

§ 89-9-15. Partition of common areas or of tenancy in common in condominium.

Except as provided in Section 89-9-35, the common areas shall remain undivided, and there shall be no judicial partition thereof. Nothing herein shall be deemed to prevent partition of a tenancy in common in a condominium.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-08; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 8.

Cross References —

Partition of property generally, see §11-21-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

29 Am. Jur. Trials 157, Condominium Construction Litigation: Representing the Community Association.

§ 89-9-17. Recording, enforcement and provisions of declaration of restrictions.

The owner of a project shall, prior to the conveyance of any condominium therein, record a declaration of restrictions relating to such project, which restrictions shall be enforceable equitable servitudes where reasonable, and shall inure to and bind all owners of condominiums in the project. Such servitudes, unless otherwise provided, may be enforced by any owner of a condominium in the project, and may provide, among other things:

  1. For the management of the project by one or more of the following management bodies: the condominium owners, a board of governors elected by the owners or a management agent elected by the owners or the board or named in the declaration; for voting majorities; quorums, notices, meeting dates and other rules governing such body or bodies; and for recordation from time to time, as provided for in the declaration, of certificates of identity of the persons then composing such management body or bodies, which certificates shall be conclusive evidence thereof in favor of any person relying thereon in good faith.
  2. As to any such management body:
    1. Be binding upon all the owners, whether they assume the obligations of the constructions or not;
    2. If so provided in the declaration, be exercisable by less than all, but not less than a majority of the management body;
    3. Be exercisable only after recording of a certificate by those who have power to exercise it, that said power is properly exercisable hereunder, which certificate shall be conclusive evidence thereof in favor of any person relying thereon in good faith.
  3. For amendments of such restrictions, which amendments, if reasonable and made upon vote or consent of not less than a majority in interest of the owners of the project given after reasonable notice, shall be binding upon every owner and every condominium subject thereto whether the burdens thereon are increased or decreased thereby, and whether the owner of each and every condominium consents thereto or not.
  4. For independent audit of the accounts of any management body.
    1. For reasonable assessments to meet authorized expenditures of any management body, and for a reasonable method for notice and levy thereof, each condominium to be assessed separately for its share of such expenses in proportion, unless otherwise provided, to its owner’s fractional interest in any common area;
      1. For the subordination of the liens securing such assessments to other liens either generally or specifically described.
  5. For the restrictions upon the severability of the component interests in real property which comprise a condominium.
  6. For such covenants and restrictions concerning the use, occupancy and transfer of the units as are permitted by law with reference to real property.

For the powers thereof, including power to enforce the provisions of the restrictions;

For maintenance by it of fire, casualty, liability, workmen’s compensation and other insurance insuring condominium owners, and for bonding of the members of any management body;

For provision by it of payment by it for maintenance, utility, gardening and other services benefiting the common areas; for employment of personnel necessary for operation of the building, and for legal and accounting services;

For purchase by it of materials, supplies and the like and for maintenance and repair of the common areas;

For payment by it of taxes and special assessments which would be lien upon the entire project or common areas, and for discharge by it of any lien or encumbrance levied against the entire project or common areas;

For payment by it for reconstruction of any portion or portions of the project damaged or destroyed;

For delegation by it of its powers;

For entry by it or its agents into any unit when necessary in connection with maintenance or construction for which such body is responsible;

For an irrevocable power of attorney to the management body to sell the entire project for the benefit of all of the owners thereof when partition of the project may be had under Section 89-9-35 which said power shall:

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-09; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 9.

Editor’s Notes —

Chapter 408 of Laws of 1984 (§71-3-1) changed the title of the Workmen’s Compensation Law to “Workers’ Compensation Law” and provided that the words “workmen’s compensation” shall mean “workers’ compensation” and “commission” shall mean “workers’ compensation commission”.

Cross References —

Recording of instruments generally, see §89-5-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Self-dealing by developers of condominium project as affecting contracts or leases with condominium association. 73 A.L.R.3d 613.

Construction of contractual or state regulatory provisions respecting formation, composition, and powers of governing body of condominium association. 13 A.L.R.4th 598.

Validity, construction, and application of statutes, or of condominium association’s bylaws or regulations, restricting sale, transfer, or lease of condominium units. 17 A.L.R.4th 1247.

Validity and construction of law regulating conversion of rental housing to condominiums. 21 A.L.R.4th 1083.

Right of condominium association’s management or governing body to inspect individual units. 41 A.L.R.4th 730.

Standing to bring action relating to real property of condominium. 74 A.L.R.4th 165.

Validity and construction of condominium bylaws or regulations placing special regulations, burdens, or restrictions on nonresident unit owners. 76 A.L.R.4th 295.

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments §§ 10-12, 24, 25, 27, 35-38, 46, 53.

7 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments, Forms 1 et seq. (rights and obligations of owners among themselves).

5A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Condominiums §§ 64:33 et seq. (management and operation).

5A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Condominiums § 64:82 (declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions and power of attorney by owner and developer).

7 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Covenants and Restrictions § 77:88 (restrictions on use of condominium unit).

31 Am. Jur. Trials 193, Litigation Between Association Members for Breach of Condominium Provisions: Noise.

5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Condominium Association’s Failure to Protect Residents and Guests from Criminal Attack, §§ 1 et seq.

§ 89-9-19. Restrictions on sales and leases of units in project; first refusal of management not mandatory.

The restrictions and covenants authorized by Section 89-9-17 may prescribe regulations concerning sales or leases of units, and any such restrictions and covenants shall be valid, but it shall not be mandatory that the management body be given the first right or refusal to purchase or lease any such unit which the owner thereof intends to sell or lease.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-10; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 10; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 10; Laws, 1971, ch. 310, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved February 4, 1971).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Self-dealing by developers of condominium project as affecting contracts or leases with condominium association. 73 A.L.R.3d 613.

Validity, construction, and application of statutes, or of condominium association’s bylaws or regulations, restricting sale, transfer, or lease of condominium units. 17 A.L.R.4th 1247.

Validity, construction, and application of statutes, or of condominium association’s bylaws or regulations, restricting number of units that may be owned by single individual or entity. 39 A.L.R.4th 88.

Validity and construction of condominium bylaws or regulations placing special regulations, burdens, or restrictions on nonresident unit owners. 76 A.L.R.4th 295.

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments § 42.

7 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments, Form 5 (complaint, petition, or declaration against co-owner alleging failure of selling unit to give right of “first refusal” as required by covenants, conditions, and restrictions).

§ 89-9-21. Liability of owner for assessment upon condominium; lien on assessed condominium; recording, priority, enforcement, etc., of lien.

A reasonable assessment upon any condominium made in accordance with a recorded declaration of restrictions permitted by Section 89-9-17 shall be a debt of the owner thereof at the time the assessment is made. The amount of any such assessment plus any other charges thereon, such as interest, costs, attorneys’ fees, and penalties, as such may be provided for in the declaration of restrictions, shall be and become a lien upon the condominium assessed when the management body causes to be recorded in the office of the chancery clerk of the county in which such condominium is located a notice of assessment, which shall state the amount of such assessment and such other charges thereon as may be authorized by the declaration of restrictions, a description of the condominium against which the same has been assessed, and the name of the record owner thereof. Such notice shall be signed and verified by an authorized representative of the management body or as otherwise provided in the declaration of restrictions. Such lien shall be recorded in a condominium lien book alphabetically by name of the condominium unit owner, and such books need not be obtained until a condominium plat shall have been first recorded in said county. Upon payment of said assessment and charges in connection with which such notice has been so recorded, or other satisfaction thereof, the management body shall cause to be recorded a further notice stating the satisfaction and the release of the lien thereof.

Such lien shall be prior to all other liens recorded subsequent to the recordation of said notice of assessment except that the declaration of restrictions may provide for the subordination thereof to any other liens and encumbrances. Unless sooner satisfied and released, or the enforcement thereof initiated as hereafter provided, such lien shall expire and be of no further force or effect one year from the date of recordation of said notice of assessment; provided, however, that said one-year period may be extended by the management body for a time not to exceed one (1) additional year by recording a written extension thereof.

Such lien against any unit may be enforced by sale of same by the management body, its attorney or other person authorized to make the sale, after failure of the owner to pay such an assessment in accordance with its terms, such sale to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 89-1-55, applicable to the exercise of powers of sale in mortgages and deeds of trust, or in any other manner permitted by law. Unless otherwise provided in the declaration of restrictions, the management body shall have power to bid in the condominium at foreclosure sale and to hold, lease, mortgage and convey the same. Suit to recover a money judgment for unpaid assessments may be maintained without waiving the lien securing the same.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-11; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 11.

Cross References —

Liens generally, see §85-7-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

By a request to amend its complaint against a debtor to seek foreclosure, a lienholder properly initiated foreclosure, even though the request was not granted until months later because, pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 15, the granting of a motion to amend related back to the original pleadings; thus, the lienholder initiated foreclosure proceedings prior to the expiration of the one-year extension of a condominium lien pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §89-9-21. Tally Arms Condo. Ass'n v. Breland, 854 So. 2d 28, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 789 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Court disagreed that the lienholder was entitled to more than its original lien amount because there was no authority that allowed a condominium assessment to include language that could encompass all later unfiled assessments. Tally Arms Condo. Ass'n v. Breland, 854 So. 2d 28, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 789 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Expenses for which condominium association may assess unit owners. 77 A.L.R.3d 1290.

Standing to bring action relating to real property of condominium. 74 A.L.R.4th 165.

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments §§ 28, 47, 56, 60.

7 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments, Forms 21 et seq. (assessments).

5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Condominium Association’s Failure to Protect Residents and Guests from Criminal Attack, §§ 1 et seq.

§ 89-9-23. Lien for labor performed or services or materials furnished.

No labor performed or services or materials furnished with the consent of or at the request of a condominium owner or his agent or his contractor or subcontractor shall be the basis for the filing of a lien against the condominium of any other condominium owner, or against any part thereof, or against any other property of any other condominium owner, unless such other owner has expressly consented to or requested the performance of such labor or furnishing of such materials or services. Such express consent shall be deemed to have been given by the owner of any condominium in the case of emergency repairs thereto. Labor performed or services or materials furnished for the common areas, if duly authorized by a management body provided for in a declaration of restrictions governing the property, shall be deemed to be performed or furnished with the express consent of each condominium owner. The owner of any condominium may remove his condominium from a lien against two (2) or more condominiums or any part thereof by payment to the holder of the lien of the fraction of the total sum secured by such lien which is attributable to his condominium.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-12; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 12.

Cross References —

Liens generally, see §85-7-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Expenses for which condominium association may assess unit owners. 77 A.L.R.3d 1290.

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments §§ 28, 47, 56, 60.

7 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments, Forms 21 et seq. (assessments).

§ 89-9-25. Acquisition, etc., of personal property by management body for benefit of condominium owners; transfer of beneficial interest.

Unless otherwise provided by a declaration of restrictions under Section 89-9-17, the management body, if any, provided for therein, may acquire and hold, for the benefit of the condominium owners, tangible and intangible personal property and may dispose of the same by sale or otherwise; and the beneficial interest in such personal property shall be owned by the condominium owners in the same proportion as their respective interests in the common areas, and shall not be transferrable except with a transfer of a condominium. A transfer of a condominium shall transfer to the transferee ownership of the transferor’s beneficial interest in such personal property.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-13; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 13.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Self-dealing by developers of condominium project as affecting contracts or leases with condominium association. 73 A.L.R.3d 613.

Construction of contractual or state regulatory provisions respecting formation, composition, and powers of governing body of condominium association. 13 A.L.R.4th 598.

§ 89-9-27. Construction of deed, declaration, or plan for condominium project.

Any deed, declaration, or plan for a condominium project shall be liberally construed to facilitate the operation of the project, and its provisions shall be presumed to be independent and severable.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-14; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 14.

§ 89-9-29. Liabilities of unit owners.

A. The liability of the owner of a unit for common expenses shall be limited to the amounts for which he is assessed from time to time in accordance with this chapter and the declaration.

B. The owners of a unit shall have no personal liability for any damages caused by the governing body on or in connection with the use of common areas. A unit owner shall be liable for injuries or damages resulting from an accident in his own unit to the same extent and degree that the owner of a house, an office, or a store would be liable for an accident occurring therein.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-15; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 15.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Expenses for which condominium association may assess unit owners. 77 A.L.R.3d 1290.

Personal liability of owner of condominium unit to one sustaining personal injuries or property damage by condition of common areas. 39 A.L.R.4th 98.

Liability of owner of unit in condominium, recreational development, time-share property, or the like, for assessment in support of common facilities levied against and unpaid by prior owner. 39 A.L.R.4th 114.

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments §§ 44, 57-60.

7 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments, Forms 51 et seq. (rights and obligations between owners and third persons).

5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Condominium Association’s Failure to Protect Residents and Guests from Criminal Attack, §§ 1 et seq.

§ 89-9-31. Taxes and special assessments; provisions of declaration enforceable after foreclosure of assessment, tax deed, etc.; exemption as homestead.

  1. Property taxes and special assessments assessed by municipalities, counties, the State of Mississippi, and other taxing authorities shall be assessed against and collected on the unit and the common areas and not upon the project as a whole. Each unit and common areas shall be separately assessed for ad valorem taxes and special assessments as a single parcel. The taxes and special assessments levied against each unit and common areas shall constitute a lien only upon such unit and common areas so assessed and upon no other portion of the project.
  2. All provisions of a declaration relating to a unit or common areas sold for taxes or special assessments shall survive and be enforceable after the issuance of a tax deed or other deed upon foreclosure of an assessment, certificate, or lien, a tax deed, tax certificate, or tax lien to the same extent that they would be enforceable against a voluntary grantee, immediate, mediate, or remote, of the owner of the title immediately prior to the delivery of the tax deed or other deed.
  3. Any unit of a condominium project shall be eligible for exemption under the Homestead Exemption Act of 1946, Sections 27-33-1 through 27-33-65, Mississippi Code of 1972, if all other criteria of said sections are met.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-16; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 16; Laws, 1971, ch. 481, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 31, 1971).

Cross References —

Exemption of homesteads from certain taxes, see §27-33-19.

Tax liens generally, see §§27-43-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Real-estate taxation of condominiums. 71 A.L.R.3d 952.

Am. Jur.

15A Am. Jur. 2d, Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments §§ 48-50.

§ 89-9-33. Construction of local zoning ordinances.

Unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed, local zoning ordinances shall be construed to treat like structures, lots, or parcels in like manner regardless of whether the ownership thereof is divided by sale of condominiums or into community apartments rather than by lease of apartments, offices, or stores.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-17; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 17.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Zoning or building regulations as applied to condominiums. 71 A.L.R.3d 866.

§ 89-9-35. Action for partition of condominium project by sale thereof.

Where several persons own condominiums, as defined in the Mississippi Condominium Law, in a condominium project, as defined in said law, an action may be brought by one or more of such persons for partition thereof by sale of the entire project, as though the owners of all of the condominiums in such project were tenants in common in the entire project in the same proportion as their interests in the common areas; provided, however, that a partition shall be made only upon the showing that: (1) three (3) years after damage or destruction to the project which renders a material part thereof unfit for its use prior thereto, the project has not been rebuilt or repaired substantially to its state prior to its damage or destruction, or (2) that three-fourths (3/4) or more of the project has been destroyed or substantially damaged, and that condominium owners holding in aggregate more than a fifty percent (50%) interest in the common areas are opposed to repair or restoration of the project, or (3) that the project has been in existence in excess of fifty (50) years, that it is obsolete and uneconomic, and that condominium owners holding in aggregate more than a fifty percent (50%) interest in the common areas are opposed to repair or restoration of the project, or (4) that conditions for such a partition by sale set forth in the declaration of restrictions entered into with respect to such project, pursuant to the provisions of the Mississippi Condominium Law, have been met.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-18; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 18.

Cross References —

Partition of property, generally, see §§11-21-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Standing to bring action relating to real property of condominium. 74 A.L.R.4th 165.

Am. Jur.

7 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments, Forms 41 et seq. (partition).

§ 89-9-37. Action for partition of condominium project by sale; venue; powers of court; sale.

Such action for partition by sale shall be brought in the chancery court of that county in which the project or some part thereof is situated, subject to the provisions for partition of lands by sale, as far as applicable, and the court shall have power to make all such orders as may be necessary to protect the rights of parties, and any sale ordered in such cases shall be made and reported as in the case of the sale of land; and decrees making partition shall vest title according to their terms. In such cases the court or chancellor may make all orders, and cause to be issued all process necessary to secure the rights of parties.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 896-19; Laws, 1964, ch. 270, § 19.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Standing to bring action relating to real property of condominium. 74 A.L.R.4th 165.

Am. Jur.

7 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments, Forms 41 et seq. (partition).

Chapter 11. Escheats

§ 89-11-1. When property shall escheat.

If any person die intestate, seized of or holding, either in possession or in right, at the time of his death, real or personal property, or money or choses in action, whether such person were a citizen of the state or not, and leave no heir capable of inheriting the same, all such property shall escheat to the state.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 17, art. 1; 1871, § 1844; 1880, § 881; 1892, § 1701; 1906, § 1878; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1521; 1930, § 1511; 1942, § 480.

Cross References —

Escheat of funds held by receiver of unknown or nonresident owner of mineral interest, see §11-17-34.

Escheat of public lands purchased in violation of statute, see §29-1-73.

Procedures for sale of severed minerals which escheat to the state, see §89-11-31.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The state, both in view of its rights under escheat to the property of intestates who die without heirs and parens patriae for the protection of the interests of any possible unknown heir who might appear, may bring suit to contest a probated will. Warren v. Sidney's Estate, 183 Miss. 669, 184 So. 806, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1938).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property §§ 2 et seq.

27A Am. Jur. 2d, Escheat §§ 1 et seq.

§ 89-11-3. County administrator or sheriff is escheator; his duty, and duty of the assessor.

The county administrator, if there be one, and, if none, the sheriff, shall be escheator for his county, and he shall ascertain by all practicable means what estate or property within his county, for defect of heirs, has escheated to the state, and he shall institute proceedings therefor as hereinafter directed; and the assessor of taxes shall annually, on the completion of his assessment, report to the escheator a list of all property that may have escheated to the state within the preceding twelve (12) months, or previously if not already reported, or to which no heir is known; and the assessor shall also furnish the land commissioner with a copy of such report.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 46, art. 3 (2); 1857, ch. 17, art. 2; 1871, § 1845; 1880, § 882; 1892, § 1702; 1906, § 1879; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1522; 1930, § 1512; 1942, § 481.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Section 7-11-4, effective January 1, 1980, the words “state land commissioner,” “land commissioner,” “state land office” and “land office” shall mean the secretary of state.

Cross References —

Granting of letters testamentary or of administration to county administrator, see §§91-7-79 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The sheriff, as public escheator, may bring suit to contest a probated will. Warren v. Sidney's Estate, 183 Miss. 669, 184 So. 806, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1938).

Land commissioner could not maintain escheat proceeding to recover gasoline tax subject to be refunded to dealer, where gasoline purchasers were unknown. Moore v. Eastman Gardiner Lumber Co., 156 Miss. 359, 126 So. 44, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 183 (Miss. 1930).

§ 89-11-5. Proceedings to establish escheats.

In all cases when property may have escheated to the state, it shall be the duty of the escheator of the county in which said property may be to file in the chancery court a bill in the name of the state to have the escheat judicially declared; the bill shall contain a statement of the name of the last owner, and that he died without heirs, the names of all persons who claim an interest in the property, if any be known, and also a description of the property and who, if any one, is in possession, and an averment that the same has escheated to the state for want of heirs.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 46, art. 3 (2); 1857, ch. 17, art. 3; 1871, § 1846; 1880, § 883; 1892, § 1703; 1906, § 1880; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1523; 1930, § 1513; 1942, § 482.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

State must enforce escheat on strength of own title and not on weakness of defendant’s. State ex rel. Nall v. Williams, 99 Miss. 293, 54 So. 951, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 211 (Miss. 1911).

Intestate is presumed to have left heirs capable of inheriting. State ex rel. Nall v. Williams, 99 Miss. 293, 54 So. 951, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 211 (Miss. 1911).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property §§ 46 et seq.

27A Am. Jur. 2d, Escheat §§ 20 et seq.

9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Escheat, Forms 1 et seq. (proceedings to enforce escheat).

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Escheat §§ 14 et seq.

§ 89-11-7. What persons summoned; publication made.

On the filing of the bill, the clerk shall issue a summons to all persons residing in this state and named in the bill as having or claiming an interest in the property, and also to the person named as being in possession, to appear and answer the same; and he shall give notice, by publication as in other cases, to all parties, known or unknown, having or claiming an interest in the property, to appear and answer the bill; which notice shall contain a description of the property, and the name, residence, and place of death of the last owner, if known.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 17, art. 4; 1871, § 1847; 1880, § 884; 1892, § 1704; 1906, § 1881; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1524; 1930, § 1514; 1942, § 483.

§ 89-11-9. A claimant not a party may answer.

Any person who claims an estate or interest in property against which proceedings have been instituted to have an escheat judicially declared, though not named in the bill or summoned, may, nevertheless, appear and answer the bill, interposing his title or claim, but shall not recover costs unless it appear that he has some estate or interest in the property, even though the state fail in establishing an escheat.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 17, art. 5; 1871, § 1848; 1880, § 885; 1892, § 1705; 1906, § 1882; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1525; 1930, § 1515; 1942, § 484.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Insured’s right of action for arbitrary nonrenewal of policy, where insurer has option not to renew. 37 A.L.R.4th 862.

§ 89-11-11. Proceedings in court.

The proceedings shall be conducted as other suits in the chancery court; and, if determined in favor of the state, the court shall decree the property escheated to the state, and thereby the state shall be seized and possessed of the property in law and in fact; but no final decree shall be rendered therein within less than twelve (12) months from the commencement of the suit. The successor of the escheator who filed the bill may appear and conduct the suit without revivor or alteration of the pleadings.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 46, art. 3 (7); 1857, ch. 17, art. 6; 1871, § 1849; 1880, § 886; 1892, § 1706; 1906, § 1883; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1526; 1930, § 1516; 1942, § 485.

§ 89-11-13. Persons in possession liable for rent or hire of escheated property.

The person in possession of escheated property shall be liable for the rent of real estate and hire of personal property, whether he claim title or not. Where the escheat is established, the court shall determine and decree rent or hire to the state, if any be due, and may make an allowance in proper cases to a party for the care of the property. In case the party in possession refuse or fail to deliver possession to the escheator who is authorized to receive the same, such party shall be liable to double the value of the rent or hire for the time he may so withhold possession, to be determined by the court on petition of the escheator. Decrees rendered in matters of escheats shall be conclusive against all parties thereto and privies, but may be reviewed by the supreme court on appeal.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 46, art. 3 (8); 1857, ch. 17, art. 7; 1871, § 1850; 1880, § 887; 1892, § 1707; 1906, § 1884; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1527; 1930, § 1517; 1942, § 486.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes tenant’s holding over of leased premises. 13 A.L.R.5th 169.

§ 89-11-15. Reports by escheator.

On the establishment of any escheat of land, the escheator shall, within thirty (30) days, report the fact to the land commissioner, giving a description of the land and its value, under the direction of the court. The land commissioner shall at once register the land in the register of escheated lands.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 1708; 1906, § 1885; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1528; 1930, § 1518; 1942, § 487.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Section 7-11-4, effective January 1, 1980, the words “state land commissioner,” “land commissioner,” “state land office” and “land office” shall mean the secretary of state.

Cross References —

Duties and powers of land commissioner generally, see §7-11-11.

Sale of escheated lands, see §29-1-65.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

27A Am. Jur. 2d, Escheat §§ 40 et seq.

9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Escheat, Form 17 (judgment or decree declaring property escheated and directing sale of property).

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Escheat § 27.

§ 89-11-17. Sale of escheated personalty; payment of debts.

The court which decrees any escheat thereof shall retain jurisdiction of personal property after decreeing the escheat, and shall require the same to be sold and the net proceeds to be paid into the state treasury; and it may provide for the payment of the debts of the deceased owner out of the proceeds of the personal property before the same be paid over; but any petition by a creditor, alleging an indebtedness due to him by the late owner of real or personal property which may escheat, must be filed in the suit for the declaration of the escheat before final hearing thereof, accompanied with the claim probated as if administration had been granted, or the claim will be barred.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 1709; 1906, § 1886; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1529; 1930, § 1519; 1942, § 488.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

27A Am. Jur. 2d, Escheat §§ 40 et seq.

9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Escheat, Form 17 (judgment or decree declaring property escheated and directing sale of property).

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Escheat § 27.

§ 89-11-19. How real estate subjected to payments of debts.

If the personal property of a deceased owner of escheated property be insufficient for the payment of his debts, or if there be no personal property, the petition of the creditor must show the fact. In such case the court will require the land commissioner to be notified of the pendency of the petition, and he may appear and contest the petition. And if the real estate be decreed subject to the payment of debts, the court will order the sale of a sufficiency thereof for that purpose, and require any balance of proceeds to be paid into the state treasury through the land office.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, 1710; 1906, § 1887; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1530; 1930, § 1520; 1942, § 489.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Section 7-11-4, effective January 1, 1980, the words “state land commissioner,” “land commissioner,” “state land office” and “land office” shall mean the secretary of state.

Cross References —

Sale of escheated land, see §29-1-65.

§ 89-11-21. Where escheated land is recovered from the purchaser.

If escheated land be recovered from the purchaser at the suit of an heir of the deceased owner, by proceeding instituted within ten (10) years after the escheat was declared, the state will refund to the purchaser the purchase-money with three percent (3%) per annum interest; the purchaser being liable to the heir for rents and profits, which he may recoup, pro tanto, by the improvements put upon the land, if any, and all taxes paid thereon. In all such suits to recover the land of the state’s purchaser, or his assigns, the land commissioner shall be made a party.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 46, art. 3 (14); 1857, ch. 17, art. 10; 1871, § 1853; 1880, § 890; 1892, § 1711; 1906, § 1888; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1531; 1930, § 1521; 1942, § 490.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Section 7-11-4, effective January 1, 1980, the words “state land commissioner,” “land commissioner,” “state land office” and “land office” shall mean the secretary of state.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

27A Am. Jur. 2d, Escheat §§ 44 et seq.

9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Escheat, Forms 31 et seq. (recovery, restoration or reimbursement).

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Escheat §§ 7, 8.

§ 89-11-23. Proceeds of personal property reclaimed.

Any person who is not concluded as a party or privy by a decree in favor of the state in proceedings to establish an escheat, may, at any time within six (6) years after the rendition of the decree, recover of the state, by suit, the net proceeds derived from the sale of personal property and paid into the state treasury, and three percent (3%) interest thereon, if the party shall establish his right to the property and that the same had not properly escheated to the state; but the title of the purchaser of such personal property shall not be thereby disturbed.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 46, art. 3 (14); 1857, ch. 17, art. 11; 1871, § 1854; 1880, § 891; 1892, § 1720; 1906, 1889; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1532; 1930, § 1522; 1942, § 491.

§ 89-11-25. Proceedings, where had.

Proceedings to recover real property or the proceeds of personalty escheated, shall be by bill to open the decree declaring the escheat, in the court in which the escheat was decreed.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 1713; 1906, § 1890; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1533; 1930, § 1523; 1942, § 492.

§ 89-11-27. Costs shall be allowed as in other cases.

In case the property be not escheated, the costs incurred in behalf of the state shall be paid out of the state treasury, and the court shall cause the same to be certified to the auditor of public accounts, who shall issue his warrant therefor. In case the property shall be adjudged to be escheated, a reasonable commission and attorneys’ fees shall be allowed by the court to the escheator, which shall be taxed as costs and, together with all other costs allowed by the court, shall be paid out of the proceeds of the personal property, if the said proceeds be sufficient to pay the same. If the personal property of a deceased owner of escheated property be insufficient for the payment of his debts and the costs so allowed by the court, or if there be no personal property, the court shall decree the real estate subject to the payment of the costs so allowed, and shall order the sale of a sufficiency thereof for that purpose, and require any balance of proceeds to be paid into the state treasury through the land office.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 46, art. 3 (18); 1857, ch. 17, art. 9; 1871, § 1852; 1880, § 889; 1892, § 1714; 1906, § 1891; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1534; 1930, § 1524; 1942, § 493.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Section 7-11-4, effective January 1, 1980, the words “state land commissioner,” “land commissioner,” “state land office” and “land office” shall mean the secretary of state.

Section7-7-2, as added by Laws of 1984, ch. 488, § 90, and amended by Laws of 1985, ch. 455, § 14, Laws of 1986, ch. 499, § 1, provided, at subsection (2) therein, that the words “state auditor of public accounts,” “state auditor”, and “auditor” appearing in the laws of the state in connection with the performance of auditor’s functions transferred to the state fiscal management board, shall be the state fiscal management board, and, more particularly, such words or terms shall mean the state fiscal management board whenever they appear. Thereafter, Laws of 1989, ch. 532, § 2, amended §7-7-2 to provide that the words “State Auditor of Public Accounts,” “State Auditor” and “Auditor” appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor’s functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer, and, more particularly, such words or terms shall mean the State Fiscal Officer whenever they appear. Subsequently, Laws of 1989, ch. 544, § 17, effective July 1, 1989, and codified as §27-104-6, provides that wherever the term “State Fiscal Officer” appears in any law it shall mean “Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration”.

§ 89-11-29. Institution of escheat proceedings.

The land commissioner shall have the power to discharge all the duties and to exercise all the powers herein imposed and conferred upon the county administrator or the sheriff, as the case may be, and he may institute and conduct to final conclusion all escheat proceedings authorized under this chapter, the same to be conducted in the manner herein prescribed.

HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 1892; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1535; 1930, § 1525; 1942, § 494.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Section 7-11-4, effective January 1, 1980, the words “state land commissioner,” “land commissioner,” “state land office” and “land office” shall mean the secretary of state.

Cross References —

Duties and powers of land commissioner generally, see §7-11-11.

Power of land commissioner to institute suits, see §29-1-7.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Land commissioner could not maintain escheat proceeding to recover gasoline tax subject to be refunded to dealer, where gasoline purchasers were unknown. Moore v. Eastman Gardiner Lumber Co., 156 Miss. 359, 126 So. 44, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 183 (Miss. 1930).

§ 89-11-31. Sale of severed minerals which escheat to the state.

Any severed minerals which escheat to the state under the provisions of Section 89-11-1 et seq. shall, within six (6) months after the rendition of a final decree declaring the property escheated to the state, be sold at the door of the courthouse in the county, or in the judicial district in counties having more than one (1) such district, wherein the mineral estate is located. Provided, however, that no mineral interest shall be sold if it is still producing income. Notice and advertisement of such sale shall be published each week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper published in the county, if any, and if no newspaper be published in a county, then in a newspaper having general circulation in the county and in a newspaper having a general circulation within the state, the first such publication to appear at least fifteen (15) days prior to the date fixed in said notice for such sale. Each severed mineral interest shall be sold to the highest and best bidder, except that the owner of the surface estate in which the subject mineral estate was severed may, at such sale, match the highest and best bid and be allowed to purchase said severed mineral estate, upon showing proper proof of ownership of all or part of the surface estate. The sale shall be continued from day to day, except Sundays, between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. until completed.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 531, eff from and after July 1, 1980.

Cross References —

Circumstances under which property shall escheat to the state, see §89-11-1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Application of requirement that newspaper be locally published for official notice publication. 85 A.L.R.4th 581.

Chapter 12. Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act

§ 89-12-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1982.

Cross References —

Authority of municipalities with respect to lost, stolen, abandoned or misplaced personal property, see §21-39-21.

Liquidated state trust company unclaimed property, see §81-27-8.005 et seq.

Comparable Laws from other States —

Alabama: Code of Ala. §§35-12-70 et seq.

Arkansas; A.C.A. §18-28-201 et seq.

Illinois: 765 ILCS 1025/1 et seq.

Minnesota: Minn. Stat. §§ 345.31 et seq

Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 447.500 et seq.

Nebraska: R.R.S. Neb. §§ 69-1301 et seq.

Oklahoma: §§ 60 Okl. St. § 651 et seq.

Oregon: ORS §§ 98.302 et seq.

Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §§66-29-101 et seq.

Virginia: §§ 55-210.1 et seq.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (Miss. Code Sections 89-12-1 et seq.) provides procedure for return of forfeited property where promptness requirement of Miss. Code Section 41-29-177 was not complied with, and for disposing of property where owners cannot be located. Magee, Jan. 8, 1993, A.G. Op. #92-0909.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. 98 A.L.R.2d 304.

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property §§ 2 et seq.

Jurisdictions adopting Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, see Am. Jur. 2d Desk Book, Item No. 124.

25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 685, Abandonment of Tangible Personal Property.

§ 89-12-3. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

“Banking organization” means any national or state bank, trust company, savings bank, land bank, private banker, or any similar organization which is engaged in business in this state.

“Business association” means any corporation, joint stock company, business trust, partnership, or any association for business purposes of two (2) or more individuals, whether organized for profit or nonprofit, including, but not limited to, a banking organization, financial organization, life insurance corporation and utility.

“Financial organization” means any federal or state savings and loan association, building and loan association, credit union, cooperative bank or investment company, or any similar organization which is engaged in business in this state.

“Holder” means any person in possession of property subject to the provisions of this chapter belonging to another, or who is trustee in case of a trust, or is indebted to another on an obligation subject to the provisions of this chapter.

“Insurance corporation” means any association or corporation transacting in this state the business of insurance involving in any manner a person or property; however, this term does not include self-insured workers’ compensation groups or associations comprised of members who have joint and several liability for the workers’ compensation obligation of the other members.

“Intangible personal property” includes, but is not limited to:

Monies, checks, drafts, deposits, interest, dividends, and income;

Credit balances, customer overpayments, gift certificates, security deposits, refunds, credit memos, unpaid wages, unused airline tickets, and unidentified remittances; except future and prior dividends made by the workers’ compensation groups or associations described in paragraph (e);

Monies deposited to redeem stocks, bonds, coupons, and other securities, or to make distributions;

Amounts due and payable under the terms of insurance policies;

Amounts distributable from a trust or custodial fund established under a plan to provide health, welfare, pension, vacation, severance, retirement, death, stock purchase, profit sharing, employee savings, supplemental unemployment insurance, or similar benefits;

Shares of corporate stock and other intangible ownership interests in business associations; and

Bonds, notes and other debt obligations.

“Owner” means a depositor in case of a deposit, a beneficiary in case of a trust, a creditor, claimant or payee in case of other choses in action, or any person having a legal or equitable interest in property subject to the provisions of this chapter, or his legal representative.

“Apparent owner” means the person who appears from the records of the holder to be entitled to property held by the holder.

“Person” means any individual, business association, government or political subdivision or agency, corporation, public authority, estate, trust, two (2) or more persons having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or commercial entity whether such person is acting in his own right or in a representative capacity.

“Treasurer” means the State Treasurer of the State of Mississippi.

“Utility” means any person who owns or operates in this state for public use, any plant, equipment, property, franchise, or license for the transmission of communications or the production, storage, transmission, sale, delivery, or furnishing of electricity, water, steam or gas.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 2; Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 1; Laws, 2006, ch. 452, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2006.

Amendment Notes —

The 2006 amendment added “however this term does not include self-insured workers’ compensation groups or associations comprised of members who have joint and several liability for the workers’ compensation obligation of the other members” to the end of (e); and added “except future and prior dividends made by the workers’ compensation groups or associations described in paragraph (e)” to the end of (f)(ii).

Cross References —

State treasurer, generally, see §§7-9-1 et seq.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Money qualifies as “intangible personal property” under Miss. Code Section 89-12-3(f)(i). Magee, Jan. 8, 1993, A.G. Op. #92-0909.

§ 89-12-5. Presumed abandonment of property held or owing by bank or other business association.

  1. Subject to the provisions of Sections 89-12-17 and 89-12-19, the following property held or owing by a banking or financial organization or by a business association shall be presumed abandoned:
    1. Any demand, savings, or matured time deposit made in this state with a banking organization or financial organization, together with any interest or dividend thereon, excluding any charges that may have accrued, unless the owner has, within five (5) years:
      1. Increased or decreased the amount of the deposit, or presented the passbook or other similar evidence of the deposit for the crediting of interest; or
      2. Corresponded in writing with the banking organization or financial organization concerning the deposit; or
      3. Otherwise indicated an interest in the deposit as evidenced by a memorandum on file with the banking organization or financial organization.
    2. Any sum payable on checks certified in this state or on written instruments issued in this state on which a banking or financial organization or business association is directly liable, including, but not limited to, certificates of deposit, drafts, money orders and traveler’s checks, that, with the exception of traveler’s checks and money orders, has been outstanding for more than five (5) years from the date it was payable, or from the date of its issuance if payable on demand, or, in the case of traveler’s checks, that has been outstanding for more than fifteen (15) years from the date of its issuance, or, in the case of money orders, that has been outstanding for more than seven (7) years from the date of its issuance, unless the owner has within five (5) years, or within fifteen (15) years in the case of traveler’s checks or within seven (7) years in the case of money orders, corresponded in writing with the banking or financial organization or business association concerning it, or otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a memorandum on file with the banking or financial organization or business association.
  2. Any certificate of deposit made in this state with a banking organization, together with an interest or dividend thereon, with a maturity date equal to or greater than ten (10) years shall be exempt from the time limit provisions of this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 3; Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Sums payable on money orders or traveler’s checks presumed abandoned under this section as exempt from notice requirement, see §89-12-27.

Payment or delivery of abandoned property to treasurer, see §89-12-29.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 15.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property, Form 1.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration-allegation-property as subject to abandonment); Form 1.2 (allegation-relinquishment of possession to property); Form 1.3 (allegation-intent to abandon property); Form 1.4 (allegation-intent to abandon property-as voluntary and unconditional).

Young, Trial Handbook for Mississippi Lawyers § 19:19.

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Escheat §§ 1, 3, 15.

§ 89-12-7. Presumed abandonment of unclaimed funds held or owing by life insurance corporation.

  1. Subject to the provisions of Section 89-12-17, funds held or owing by a life insurance corporation under any life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract which has matured or terminated shall be presumed abandoned if unclaimed and unpaid for more than five (5) years after the funds became due and payable as established from the records of the corporation.
  2. If a person other than the insured or annuitant is entitled to the funds and no address of such person is known to the corporation or if it is not definite and certain from the records of the corporation what person is entitled to the funds, it shall be presumed that the last known address of the person entitled to the funds is the same as the last known address of the insured or annuitant according to the records of the corporation. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.
  3. A life insurance policy not matured by actual proof of the death of the insured according to the records of the corporation shall be deemed to be matured and the proceeds due and payable if:
    1. The insured has attained, or would have attained if he were living, the limiting age under the mortality table on which the reserve is based;
    2. The policy was in force at the time the insured attained, or would have attained, the limiting age specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection; and
    3. Neither the insured nor any other person appearing to have an interest in the policy has, within the preceding five (5) years, according to the records of the corporation:
      1. Assigned, readjusted, or paid premiums on the policy,
      2. Subjected the policy to loan, or
      3. Corresponded in writing with the life insurance corporation concerning the policy.
  4. Any funds otherwise payable according to the records of the corporation shall be deemed due and payable although the policy or contract has not been surrendered as required.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 4; Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Regulation of the insurance industry, generally, see §§83-1-1 et seq.

Recovery by another state of property paid or delivered to treasurer under this chapter, see §89-12-21.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 17.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property, Form 1.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration-allegation-property as subject to abandonment); Form 1.2 (allegation-relinquishment of possession to property); Form 1.3 (allegation-intent to abandon property); Form 1.4 (allegation-intent to abandon property-as voluntary and unconditional).

Young, Trial Handbook for Mississippi Lawyers § 19:19.

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Escheat §§ 1, 3, 15.

§ 89-12-9. Presumed abandonment of funds held or owing by utility.

Subject to the provisions of Section 89-12-17 of this chapter, the following funds held or owing by any utility shall be presumed abandoned:

Any deposit made by a subscriber with a utility to secure payment for, or any sum paid in advance for, utility services to be furnished in this state, less any lawful deductions, that has remained unclaimed by the person appearing on the records of the utility entitled thereto for more than five (5) years after the termination of the services for which the deposit or advance payment was made.

Any sum which a utility has been ordered to refund and which was received for utility services rendered in this state, together with any interest thereon, less any lawful deduction, that has remained unclaimed by the person appearing on the records of the utility entitled thereto for more than five (5) years after the date it became payable in accordance with the final determination or order providing for the refund.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 5; Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Regulation of public utilities, generally, see §§77-1-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 18.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property, Form 1.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration-allegation-property as subject to abandonment); Form 1.2 (allegation-relinquishment of possession to property); Form 1.3 (allegation-intent to abandon property); Form 1.4 (allegation-intent to abandon property-as voluntary and unconditional).

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Escheat §§ 1, 3, 15.

§ 89-12-11. Presumed abandonment of dividend, interest and the like held or owing by business association for or to shareholder, bondholder and the like.

  1. Subject to the provisions of Section 89-12-17, and except as otherwise provided in subsections (2) and (5) of this section, stock or other intangible ownership interest in a business association which is held by the association, the existence of which is evidenced by records available to the association, is presumed abandoned if a dividend, distribution or other sum payable as a result of the interest has remained unclaimed by the owner for five (5) years and during that time the owner has not:
    1. Communicated in writing with the association regarding the interest or a dividend, distribution or other sum payable as a result of the interest; or
    2. Otherwise communicated with the association regarding the interest or a dividend, distribution or other sum payable as a result of the interest, as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file with the association prepared by an employee of the association.
  2. At the expiration of a five-year period following the failure of the owner to claim a dividend, distribution or other sum payable to the owner as a result of the interest, the interest is not presumed abandoned unless there have been at least five (5) dividends, distributions or other sums paid during the period, none of which has been claimed by the owner. If five (5) dividends, distributions or other sums are paid during the five-year period, the time period leading to a presumption of abandonment commences on the date that payment of the first unclaimed dividend, distribution or other sum became due and payable. If five (5) dividends, distributions or other sums are not paid during the presumptive period, the period continues to run until there have been five (5) dividends, distributions or other sums that have not been claimed by the owner.
  3. The running of the five-year period of abandonment ceases immediately upon the occurrence of a communication as described in subsection (1) of this section. If any future dividend, distribution or other sum payable to the owner as a result of the interest is subsequently not claimed by the owner, a new period of abandonment commences and relates back to the time a subsequent dividend, distribution or other sum became due and payable.
  4. At the time an interest is presumed abandoned under this section, any dividend, distribution or other sum then held for or owing to the owner as a result of the interest, and not previously abandoned, is presumed abandoned.
  5. This section does not apply to any stock or other intangible ownership of interest enrolled in a plan that provides for the automatic reinvestment of dividends, distributions or other sums payable as a result of the interest unless the records available to the State Treasurer show, with respect to any intangible ownership interest not enrolled in the reinvestment plan, that the owner has not within five (5) years communicated in any manner described in subsection (1) of this section.
  6. Notwithstanding anything in this section or any other section in this chapter to the contrary, the property presumed abandoned under this chapter shall not include capital credits or patronage refunds offered for payment by nonprofit cooperative electric power associations, nonprofit cooperative water and sewer associations, or nonprofit agricultural cooperative marketing associations, but rather such unclaimed funds shall be used for the benefit of the general membership of such associations.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 6; Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 5; Laws, 1997, ch. 415, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1997.

Amendment Notes —

The 1997 amendment revised subsection (6), so as to exempt certain payments by nonprofit agricultural cooperative marketing associations.

Cross References —

Regulation of corporations, associations and partnerships, generally, see §§79-1-1 et seq.

Sale of securities listed on stock exchange, see §89-12-30.

Relief from liability upon payment or delivery of abandoned property to treasurer, see §89-12-31.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 16.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property, Form 1.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration-allegation-property as subject to abandonment); Form 1.2 (allegation-relinquishment of possession to property); Form 1.3 (allegation-intent to abandon property); Form 1.4 (allegation-intent to abandon property-as voluntary and unconditional).

Young, Trial Handbook for Mississippi Lawyers § 19:19.

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Escheat §§ 1, 3, 15.

§ 89-12-13. Presumed abandonment of intangible personal property held by fiduciary.

Subject to the provisions of Section 89-12-17, any intangible personal property and any income or increment thereon, held in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of another person shall be presumed abandoned unless the owner has, within five (5) years after it became payable or distributable, increased or decreased the principal, accepted payment of principal or income, corresponded in writing concerning the property or otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file with the fiduciary.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 7; Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

Young, Trial Handbook for Mississippi Lawyers § 19:19.

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Escheat §§ 1, 3, 15.

§ 89-12-14. Presumed abandonment of intangible property held by business association, federal, state or local government or governmental subdivision, agency or entity.

  1. All intangible property, including, but not limited to, any interest, dividend, or other earnings thereon, less any lawful charges, held by a business association, federal, state or local government or governmental subdivision, agency or entity, or any other person or entity, regardless of where the holder may be found, if the owner has not claimed or corresponded in writing concerning the property within five (5) years after the date prescribed for payment or delivery, is presumed abandoned and subject to the custody of this state as unclaimed property if:
    1. The last known address of the owner is unknown; and
    2. The person or entity originating or issuing the intangible property is this state or any political subdivision of this state, or is incorporated, organized, created or otherwise located in this state.
  2. The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to property that is or may be presumed abandoned and subject to the custody of this state pursuant to any other provision of law containing a dormancy period different than that prescribed in subsection (1) of this section.
  3. The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall apply to all property held on July 1, 1991, or at any time thereafter, regardless of when such property became or becomes presumptively abandoned.
  4. Insofar and only insofar as funds reflected by the cancellation of State of Mississippi warrants are unclaimed and presumed abandoned, the State Treasurer shall transfer such funds out of the Abandoned Property Fund established by Section 89-12-37 to the original fund source after the expiration of five (5) years as required herein.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 7; Laws, 1992, ch. 408, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 501, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 27, 2000).

Amendment Notes —

The 2000 amendment added (4).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Unclaimed and unidentifiable funds in district attorney’s pre-trial intervention account are unclaimed property to be disposed of under statute, involving report to State Treasurer, publication of names of persons appearing to own property, and payment of property to State Treasurer. Pacific, Dec. 16, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0912.

Money or intangible property, which was subject of forfeiture proceedings which did not take place promptly, could be presumed “abandoned” under Miss. Code Section 89-12-14. Magee, Jan. 8, 1993, A.G. Op. #92-0909.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property, Form 1.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration-allegation-property as subject to abandonment); Form 1.2 (allegation-relinquishment of possession to property); Form 1.3 (allegation-intent to abandon property); Form 1.4 (allegation-intent to abandon property-as voluntary and unconditional).

§ 89-12-15. Presumed abandonment of intangible personal property held in ordinary course of holder’s business.

All intangible personal property not otherwise covered by the provisions of this chapter, including any income or increment thereon and deducting any charges that may have accrued, that is held in the ordinary course of the holder’s business and has remained unclaimed by the owner for more than five (5) years after it became payable or distributable shall be presumed abandoned.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 8; Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property, Form 1.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration-allegation-property as subject to abandonment); Form 1.2 (allegation-relinquishment of possession to property); Form 1.3 (allegation-intent to abandon property); Form 1.4 (allegation-intent to abandon property-as voluntary and unconditional).

Young, Trial Handbook for Mississippi Lawyers § 19:19.

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Escheat §§ 1, 3, 15.

§ 89-12-16. Presumed abandonment of tangible personal property or intangible personal property held by federal government, federal agency, or any officer or appointee thereof.

  1. All tangible personal property or intangible personal property, including choses in action in amounts certain, and all debts owed or entrusted funds or other property held by the federal government, or any federal agency, or any officer, or appointee thereof, shall be presumed abandoned in this state if the last known address of the owner of the property is in this state and the property has remained unclaimed for five (5) years.
  2. This section shall apply to all abandoned property held by the federal government, or any federal agency, or any officer, or any appointee thereof, on July 1, 1991, or at any time thereafter, regardless of when such property became presumptively abandoned.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property, Form 1.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration-allegation-property as subject to abandonment); Form 1.2 (allegation-relinquishment of possession to property); Form 1.3 (allegation-intent to abandon property); Form 1.4 (allegation-intent to abandon property-as voluntary and unconditional).

§ 89-12-17. Additional conditions for presumption of abandonment of intangible personal property.

Unless otherwise provided by statute of this state, intangible personal property shall be presumed abandoned under the provisions of this chapter if the conditions for presumption of abandonment stated in the provisions of this chapter exist, and if:

The last-known address of the apparent owner is in this state as shown on the records of the holder; or

No address of the apparent owner appears on the records of the holder, and

The last-known address of the apparent owner is in this state, or

The holder is domiciled in this state and has not previously paid the property to the state of the last-known address of the apparent owner, or

The holder is a government or governmental subdivision or agency of this state and has not previously paid the property to the state of the last-known address of the apparent owner; or

The last-known address of the apparent owner, as shown on the records of the holder, is in a state designated by regulation adopted by the treasurer as a state that does not provide by law for presumption of abandonment or escheat of such property and the holder is

Domiciled in this state, or

A government or governmental subdivision or agency of this state; or

The last-known address of the apparent owner, as shown on the records of the holder, is in a foreign nation and the holder is

Domiciled in this state, or

A government or governmental subdivision or agency of this state.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 1982.

Cross References —

Application of this section to presumed abandonment of property held or owing by bank or other business association, see §89-12-5.

Application of this section to presumed abandonment of unclaimed funds held or owing by life insurance corporation, see §89-12-7.

Application of this section to presumed abandonment of funds held or owing by utility, see §89-12-9.

Application of this section to presumed abandonment of dividend, interest and the like held or owing by business association for stockholder, bondholder and the like, see §89-12-11.

Application of this section to presumed abandonment of intangible personal property held by fiduciary, see §89-12-13.

Recovery by another state of property paid or delivered to treasurer under this chapter, see §89-12-21.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property, Form 1.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration-allegation-property as subject to abandonment); Form 1.2 (allegation-relinquishment of possession to property); Form 1.3 (allegation-intent to abandon property); Form 1.4 (allegation-intent to abandon property-as voluntary and unconditional).

§ 89-12-19. Additional conditions for presumption of abandonment of sum payable on money order, traveler’s check and the like.

Any sum payable on a money order, traveler’s check, or other similar written instrument (other than a third-party bank check) on which a business association is directly liable shall be presumed abandoned under the provisions of this chapter if the conditions for presumption of abandonment stated in Section 89-12-5 exist and if:

The books and records of such business association show that such money order, traveler’s check, or similar written instrument was purchased in this state;

The business association has its principal place of business in this state, and the books and records of the business association do not show the state in which such money order, traveler’s check, or similar written instrument was purchased; or

The business association has its principal place of business in this state, the books and records of the business association show the state in which such money order, traveler’s check, or similar written instrument was purchased, and the laws of the state of purchase do not provide for presumption of abandonment or escheat of the sum payable on such instrument.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 1982.

Cross References —

Recovery by another state of property paid or delivered to treasurer under this chapter, see §89-12-21.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property, Form 1.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration-allegation-property as subject to abandonment); Form 1.2 (allegation-relinquishment of possession to property); Form 1.3 (allegation-intent to abandon property); Form 1.4 (allegation-intent to abandon property-as voluntary and unconditional).

§ 89-12-21. Recovery by another state of property paid or delivered to treasurer under this chapter.

  1. At any time after property has been paid or delivered to the treasurer under the provisions of this chapter, another state shall be entitled to recover the property if:
    1. The property was presumed abandoned in this state under the provisions of paragraph (b) of Section 89-12-17 because no address of the apparent owner of the property appeared on the records of the holder when the property was presumed abandoned under the provisions of this chapter, the last-known address of the apparent owner was, in fact, in such other state, and, under the laws of that state, the property was presumed abandoned in or escheated to that state;
    2. The last-known address of the apparent owner of the property appearing on the records of the holder is in such other state and, under the laws of that state, the property was presumed abandoned in or escheated to that state;
    3. The property is the sum payable on a traveler’s check, money order, or other similar instrument that was presumed abandoned in this state under the provisions of Section 89-12-19, the traveler’s check, money order or other similar instrument was, in fact, purchased in such other state, and, under the laws of that state, the property was presumed abandoned in or escheated to that state; or
    4. The property is funds held or owing by a life insurance corporation that was presumed abandoned in this state by application of the presumption provided by subsection (2) of Section 89-12-7, the last-known address of the person entitled to the funds was, in fact, in such other state, and, under the laws of that state, the property was presumed abandoned in or escheated to that state.
  2. The claim of another state under this section to recover property shall be presented in writing to the treasurer, who shall consider the claim within ninety (90) days after it is presented. He may hold a hearing and receive evidence on such claim. He shall allow the claim if he determines that the other state is entitled to the property.
  3. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) shall not apply to property described in paragraph (c) or (d) of that subsection.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 1982.

§ 89-12-23. Report to treasurer by holder of property presumed abandoned.

  1. Every person holding funds or other intangible personal property presumed abandoned under the provisions of this chapter shall report to the Treasurer with respect to the property as hereinafter provided.
  2. The report shall be verified, shall be on a form prescribed or approved by the Treasurer, and shall include:
    1. Except with respect to traveler’s checks and money orders, the name, if known, and last known address, if any, of each person appearing from the records of the holder to be the owner of any property of the value of more than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) presumed abandoned under the provisions of this chapter;
    2. In case of unclaimed funds of life insurance corporations, the full name of the insured or annuitant and his last known address according to the life insurance corporation’s records;
    3. The nature and identifying number, if any, or description of the property and the amount appearing from the records to be due, except that items of value under One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) each may be reported in aggregate;
    4. Except for any property reported in the aggregate, the date when the property became payable, demandable, or returnable, and the date of the last transaction with the owner with respect to the property; and
    5. Other information which the Treasurer prescribes by regulation as necessary for the administration of this chapter.
  3. If the person holding property presumed abandoned under the provisions of this chapter is a successor to other persons who previously held the property for the owner, or if the holder has changed his name while holding the property, he shall file with his report all prior-known names and addresses of each holder of the property.
  4. The report shall be filed annually through 1984, and reports shall be filed every third year thereafter. The report shall be filed before November 1 of each year in which a report is required as of June 30 next preceding. The Treasurer may postpone the reporting date upon written request by any person required to file a report.
  5. If the holder of property presumed abandoned under the provisions of this chapter knows the whereabouts of the owner and if the owner’s claim has not been barred by the statute of limitations, the holder shall, before filing the required report, endeavor to communicate with the owner and take reasonable steps to prevent abandonment from being presumed. The mailing of notice to the last-known address of the owner by the holder shall constitute compliance with this subsection and no further act on the part of the holder shall be necessary.
  6. Verification, if made by a partnership, shall be executed by a partner; if made by an unincorporated association or private corporation, by an officer; and if made by a public corporation, by its chief fiscal officer.
  7. Every person who is requested in writing by the Treasurer shall file a report stating that such person is not holding any abandoned property which is reportable pursuant to the provisions of this section.
  8. The initial report filed under this chapter shall include all items of property that would have been presumed abandoned if this chapter had been in effect since July 1, 1969, and all such property shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 12; Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Mailed notice and published notice of names of persons appearing to own property presumed abandoned, see §89-12-27.

Payment or delivery of abandoned property to treasurer, see §89-12-29.

Discretion of treasurer to decline to receive property presumed abandoned, see §89-12-43.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Escheat §§ 1-3, 15.

§ 89-12-25. Agreements to locate property presumed abandoned; prohibitions; approval.

  1. It is unlawful for a person to seek to receive from another person or contract with a person for a fee or compensation for locating property which he knows has been reported, paid or delivered to the Treasurer pursuant to the provisions of this chapter prior to seven (7) months after the date of payment or delivery of the property by the holder to the Treasurer as required by Section 89-12-29.
  2. The Treasurer shall approve all contracts entered into between two (2) or more persons whereby one (1) party to the contract agrees to furnish the other party with information concerning property reported to the Treasurer under this chapter. The agreed upon fee in such contracts shall not exceed ten percent (10%) of the value of the recoverable property or Fifty Dollars ($50.00), whichever is greater. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent an owner from asserting at any time that an agreement to locate property is based upon an excessive or unjust consideration.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 13; Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 89-12-27. Published notice of names of persons appearing to own property presumed abandoned; mailed notice.

  1. Within one hundred twenty (120) days from the filing of the report required by Section 89-12-23, the Treasurer shall cause notice to be published in a newspaper having general circulation in the county of this state in which is located the last-known address of any person to be named in the notice. If no address is listed or if the address is outside this state, the notice shall be published in the county in which the holder of the abandoned property has his or her principal place of business in this state.
  2. The published notice shall be entitled “Notice of names of persons appearing to be owners of abandoned property,” and shall contain:
    1. The names in alphabetical order and last-known addresses, if any, of persons listed in the report and entitled to notice in the county as specified in subsection (1) of this section;
    2. A statement that information concerning the amount or description of the property and the name and address of the holder may be obtained by any persons possessing an interest in the property by addressing an inquiry to the Treasurer; and
    3. A statement that any person claiming an interest in the property must file a proof of claim with the Treasurer as set forth in Section 89-12-39.
  3. The Treasurer shall not be required to publish in the notice any item of less than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) unless he deems publication to be in the public interest.
  4. Within one hundred twenty (120) days from the receipt of the report required by Section 89-12-23, the Treasurer shall mail a notice to each person having an address listed therein who appears to be entitled to property valued at One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) or more and presumed abandoned under the provisions of this chapter.
  5. The mailed notice shall contain:
    1. A statement that property is being held to which the addressee appears entitled;
    2. A statement that any person claiming an interest in the property must file a proof of claim with the Treasurer as set forth in Section 89-12-39.
  6. This section shall not be applicable to sums payable on traveler’s checks or money orders presumed abandoned under the provisions of Section 89-12-5.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 14; Laws, 1983, ch. 478; Laws, 1993, ch. 460, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

Cross References —

Procedures for disposition of funds of medicaid patients in long-term care facilities who die intestate and without heirs, see §43-13-120.

Payment or delivery of abandoned property to treasurer, see §89-12-29.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 48.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property, Forms 11 et seq. (rights and duties of finder).

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property, Form 41 (complaint, petition, or declaration-against finder-for failure to give notice of finding).

9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Escheat, Form 4 (notice of names of apparent owners of unclaimed bank deposits).

§ 89-12-29. Payment or delivery of abandoned property to treasurer.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, a person who is required to file a report under Section 89-12-23 shall pay or deliver to the Treasurer all abandoned property together with the report.
  2. If the owner established the right to receive the abandoned property to the satisfaction of the holder before the property has been delivered, or it appears that for some other reason the presumption of abandonment is erroneous, the holder need not pay or deliver the property to the Treasurer, and the property is no longer presumed abandoned.
  3. The holder of an interest under Section 89-12-11 shall deliver a duplicate certificate or other evidence of ownership, if the holder does not issue certificates of ownership, to the Treasurer. Upon delivery of a duplicate certificate to the Treasurer, the holder and any transfer agent, registrar or other person acting for or on behalf of a holder in executing or delivering the duplicate certificate, is relieved of all liability of every kind in accordance with the provisions of Section 89-12-31 to every person, including any person acquiring the original certificate of the duplicate of the certificate issued to the Treasurer, for any losses or damages resulting to any person by the issuance and delivery to the Treasurer of the duplicate certificate.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 15; Laws, 1993, ch. 460, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

§ 89-12-30. Sale of securities listed on stock exchange.

  1. Securities listed on an established stock exchange must be sold at prices prevailing at the time of sale on the exchange. Other securities may be sold over the counter at prices prevailing at the time of sale or by any other method the Treasurer considers advisable.
  2. Unless the Treasurer considers it to be in the best interests of the state to do otherwise, all securities presumed abandoned under Section 89-12-11 and delivered to the Treasurer must be held for at least three (3) years before they may be sold. If the Treasurer sells any securities delivered pursuant to Section 89-12-11 before the expiration of the three-year period, any person making a claim pursuant to this chapter before the end of that time period is entitled to either the proceeds of the sale of the securities or the market value of the securities at the time the claim is made, whichever amount is greater. A person making a claim under this chapter after the expiration of the time period is entitled to receive either the securities delivered to the Treasurer by the holder, if they still remain in the hands of the Treasurer, or the proceeds received from sale, but no person has any claim under this chapter against the state, the holder, any transfer agent, registrar or other person acting for or on behalf of a holder for any appreciation in the value of the property occurring after delivery by the holder to the Treasurer.
  3. The purchaser of property at any sale conducted by the Treasurer pursuant to this chapter takes the property free of all claims of the owner or previous holder thereof and of all persons claiming through or under them. The Treasurer shall execute all documents necessary to complete the transfer of ownership.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 89-12-31. Holder relieved from liability upon payment or delivery of abandoned property to treasurer.

  1. Upon the payment or delivery of property to the Treasurer, the state assumes custody and responsibility for the safekeeping of the property. A person who pays or delivers property to the Treasurer in good faith is relieved of all liability for any claim then existing or which may arise or be made in respect to the property.
  2. If the holder pays or delivers property to the Treasurer in good faith and thereafter another person claims the property from the holder or another state claims the money or property under its laws relating to escheat or abandoned or unclaimed property, the Treasurer, upon written notice of claim, shall defend the holder against any liability on the claim.
  3. The holder of an interest under Section 89-12-11 shall deliver a duplicate certificate or other evidence of ownership if the holder does not issue certificate of ownership to the administrator.
  4. Any holder who has paid moneys to the Treasurer pursuant to the provisions of this chapter may make payment to any person appearing to such holder to be entitled thereto and, upon proof of such payment and proof that the payee was entitled thereto, the Treasurer shall forthwith reimburse the holder for the payment.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 16; Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property, Form 31 (petition or application-by finder-to deliver unclaimed or abandoned property to public officer and relieve finder of responsibility to owner).

§ 89-12-33. Owner entitled to further income or increments.

When property other than money is paid or delivered to the Treasurer under this chapter, the owner is entitled to receive from the Treasurer any dividends, interest or other increments realized or accruing on the property at or before liquidation or conversion into money.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 17; Laws, 1991, ch. 451, § 13, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 89-12-35. Effect of expiration of period of limitation.

The expiration of any period of time specified by statute or court order, during which an action or proceeding may be commenced or enforced to obtain payment of a claim for money or recovery of property, shall not prevent the money or property from being presumed abandoned property, nor affect any duty to file a report required by the provisions of this chapter, or to pay or deliver abandoned property to the treasurer.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 18, eff from and after July 1, 1982.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Section 89-12-35 of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act did not apply retroactively to lift the bar of the statute of limitations regarding the reporting and payment of funds held by an insurance company as “abandoned property.” Cole v. National Life Ins. Co., 549 So. 2d 1301, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 428 (Miss. 1989).

§ 89-12-37. Abandoned property fund; abandoned property claims payment fund.

  1. All funds received under the provisions of this chapter shall forthwith be deposited by the Treasurer in a special fund hereby established in the State Treasury to be designated the “Abandoned Property Fund,” except that the Treasurer shall deposit in a separate special fund hereby established in the State Treasury to be designated the “Abandoned Property Claims Payment Fund” an amount not exceeding One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) from which he shall make prompt payment of claims duly allowed by him as hereinafter provided. Before making the deposits in either special fund, he shall record the name and last known address of each person appearing from the holders’ reports to be entitled to the abandoned property and the name and last known address of each insured person or annuitant and, with respect to each policy or contract listed in the report of a life insurance corporation, its number, the name of the corporation and the amount due. The record shall be available for public inspection at all reasonable business hours.
  2. There is created within the Abandoned Property Fund in the State Treasury a trust to be known as the Historic Properties Financing Fund, which shall be used as provided in this section. On July 1, 1999, Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00) in the Abandoned Property Fund shall be set aside and placed in the Historic Properties Financing Fund created herein. The principal of the Historic Properties Financing Fund shall remain inviolate within the Abandoned Property Fund, and shall be invested in the same manner as the remainder of the Abandoned Property Fund. The interest and income earned from the investment of the principal of the Historic Properties Financing Fund shall be transferred quarterly to the Mississippi Landmark Grant Program account within the Historic Properties Trust Fund created under Section 39-5-23. The transferred money shall be utilized by the Department of Archives and History for the purposes as specified in Section 39-5-23(3).
  3. Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2) of this section, the funds reflected by the cancellation of State of Mississippi warrants that constitute part of the Abandoned Property Fund shall be transferred by the State Treasurer back to the original fund source if unclaimed by the owner within the time specified in Section 7-7-42.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 19; Laws, 1999, ch. 486, § 2; Laws, 2000, ch. 501, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 27, 2000).

Amendment Notes —

The 1999 amendment added (2).

The 2000 amendment substituted “Historic Properties” for “Historic Property” in the third sentence of (2); and added (3).

§ 89-12-39. Claim for abandoned property paid or delivered to treasurer; determination; interest.

  1. Any person claiming an interest in any property delivered to the state under the provisions of this chapter may file a claim on the form prescribed by the Treasurer.
  2. The Treasurer shall consider any claim filed under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, and may hold a hearing and receive evidence concerning it. If a hearing is held, he shall prepare a finding and a decision in writing on each claim filed, stating the substance of any evidence heard by him and the reasons for his decision. The decision shall be a public record.
  3. If the validity of a claim shall be determined in favor of the claimant, the Treasurer shall pay over to the claimant only that amount which the Treasurer actually received, without deduction for costs of notices or for service charges, together with interest at the rate of one-twelfth of one percent (1/12 of 1%) per month from the time when it was received by the Treasurer to the time when it was paid by him to the claimant. However, if the property claimed was interest bearing to the owner on the date of surrender by the holder, then the Treasurer shall instead add interest at a rate not to exceed five-twelfths of one percent (5/12 of 1%) per month or the lesser current market rate. The interest on interest-bearing property shall begin to accumulate on the date that the property is delivered to the Treasurer and shall cease on the earlier of the expiration of fifteen (15) years following delivery or the date on which payment is made to the owner. No interest on the interest-bearing property shall be payable for any period prior to July 1, 1982. Any holder who pays to the owner property which has been delivered to the state and which, if claimed from the Treasurer, would be subject to the provisions of this section as interest-bearing property, shall add interest as provided in this section. The added interest shall be repaid to the holder by the Treasurer in the same manner as the principal.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 20; Laws, 1993, ch. 460, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 36.

9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Escheat, Forms 31 et seq. (administrative proceedings for recovery of property).

CJS.

30A C.J.S., Escheat § 7, 8.

§ 89-12-41. Judicial review of action of treasurer upon claim.

Any person aggrieved by a decision of the treasurer or as to whose claim the treasurer has failed to act within ninety (90) days after the filing of the claim, may commence an action in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, to establish his claim. The proceeding shall be brought within thirty (30) days after the decision of the treasurer or within sixty (60) days from the filing of the claim if the treasurer fails to act.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 21, eff from and after July 1, 1982.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property, Form 1 (complaint, petition, or declaration for determination of claims to abandoned personal property); Form 4 (instruction to jury as to elements of abandonment).

9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Escheat, Forms 42 et seq. (judicial proceedings for recovery of property).

§ 89-12-43. Treasurer may decline to receive property presumed abandoned.

The treasurer, after receiving reports of property deemed abandoned pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, may decline to receive any property reported which he deems to have a value less than the cost of giving notice, or he may, if he deems it desirable because of the small sum involved, postpone taking possession until a sufficient sum accumulates. Unless the holder of the property is notified to the contrary within thirty (30) days after filing the report required under Section 89-12-23, the treasurer shall be deemed to have elected to receive the custody of the property.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 22, eff from and after July 1, 1982.

§ 89-12-45. Examination of records by treasurer or designated regulatory authority.

  1. The Treasurer may at reasonable times and upon reasonable notice examine the records of any person to determine if such person has complied with the provisions of this chapter. The Treasurer may designate the Commissioner of Banking and Consumer Finance or other appropriate regulatory authority to examine the records of institutions of regulated industries to determine if such institutions have complied with the provisions of this chapter.
  2. If, in connection with such examination, property which should have been reported pursuant to the provisions of this chapter is discovered, the holder shall pay a per diem rate equal to actual costs per examination as the cost of conducting the examination.
  3. If any person refuses to permit the examination provided in this section or to deliver property to the Treasurer as required under the provisions of this chapter, the Treasurer shall bring an action in a court of appropriate jurisdiction to compel such examination or to enforce such delivery.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 23; Laws, 1994, ch. 622, § 161, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

§ 89-12-47. Penalties for failure to make reports or to pay or deliver abandoned property.

  1. Any person who willfully fails to render any report or perform other duties required under the provisions of this chapter shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of Five Dollars ($5.00) for each day the report is withheld, but not more than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00).
  2. Any person who willfully refuses to pay or deliver abandoned property to the Treasurer as required under the provisions of this chapter shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less than Five Dollars ($5.00) nor more than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both, in the discretion of the court.
  3. In addition to any damages, penalties, or fines for which a person may be liable under any other provision of law, any person who fails to report, pay or deliver abandoned property within the time prescribed by the provisions of this chapter shall pay to the Treasurer interest at the rate of one percent (1%) per month on the property or the value thereof from the date the property should have been paid or delivered, but in no event prior to July 1, 1982; except that if the failure to report, pay or deliver is the result of mistake or other good cause shown, the Treasurer may reduce the rate of interest or waive the interest payable thereon.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 24; Laws, 1993, ch. 460, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1993.

§ 89-12-49. Rules and regulations.

The treasurer is hereby authorized to adopt necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 25, eff from and after July 1, 1982.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 685, Abandonment of Tangible Personal Property.

§ 89-12-51. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1992, ch. 408, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1992.

[Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 27; Laws 1985, ch. 403, § 2]

Editor’s Notes —

Former Section89-12-51 provided that the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (§§89-12-1 et seq.) did not apply to property presumed abandoned under the laws of another state before July 1, 1982.

§ 89-12-53. Chapter inapplicable to property of minor or incompetent.

The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person who is the owner of any type of property described herein where such person is either a minor or mentally incompetent, nor to any person who is the owner of any type of property described herein which is subject to the provisions of Section 43-13-120.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 27; Laws, 1985, ch. 403, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1985).

§ 89-12-55. Uniformity of interpretation.

This chapter shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact it.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 28, eff from and after July 1, 1982.

§ 89-12-57. Provisions of chapter supplemental to Section 21-39-21.

This chapter shall not be construed as repealing the provisions of Section 21-39-21, but shall be additional and supplemental to those provisions.

HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 497, § 29, eff from and after July 1, 1982.

§ 89-12-59. Certain unclaimed United States savings bonds escheat to state; procedures.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section of law, United States savings bonds which are unclaimed property and subject to the provisions of this chapter shall escheat to the State of Mississippi three (3) years after becoming unclaimed property by virtue of the provisions of this chapter, and all property rights and legal title to and ownership of such United States savings bonds or proceeds from such bonds, including all rights, powers and privileges of survivorship of any owner, co-owner or beneficiary, shall vest solely in the State of Mississippi according to the procedure set forth in subsections (2) through (5) of this section.
  2. Within one hundred eighty (180) days after the three (3) years prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, if no claim has been filed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter for such United States savings bonds, the State Treasurer shall commence a civil action in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County for a determination that such United States savings bonds shall escheat to the State of Mississippi. The State Treasurer may postpone the bringing of such action until sufficient United States savings bonds have accumulated in the State Treasurer custody to justify the expense of such proceedings.
  3. If no person shall file a claim or appear at the hearing to substantiate a claim or where the court determines that a claimant is not entitled to the property claimed by such claimant, then the court, if satisfied by evidence that the State Treasurer has substantially complied with the laws of the State of Mississippi, shall enter a judgment that the subject United States savings bonds have escheated to the State of Mississippi, and all property rights and legal title to and ownership of such United States savings bonds or proceeds from such bonds, including all rights, powers and privileges of survivorship of any owner, co-owner or beneficiary, shall vest solely in the State of Mississippi.
  4. The State Treasurer shall redeem such United States savings bonds escheated to the State of Mississippi and the proceeds from such redemption of United States savings bonds shall be deposited in the State General Fund. The State Treasurer shall not deposit the proceeds from the redemption of the United States savings bonds in the Abandoned Property Fund or the Abandoned Property Claims Payment Fund in accordance with the provisions of Section 89-12-37.
  5. Any person making a claim for the United States savings bonds escheated to the State of Mississippi under this subsection, or for the proceeds from such bonds, may file a claim in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Upon providing sufficient proof of the validity of such person’s claim, the State Treasurer may pay such claim in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 431, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected an error in an internal statutory reference by substituting “this chapter” for “Section 89-12-57 et seq.” and making related punctuation changes throughout the section. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its July 24, 2014, meeting.

Editor’s Notes —

This section was added by Section 8, Laws of 2014, ch. 431, effective from and after July 1, 2015. The effective date of Laws of 2014, ch. 431, was subsequently amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 477, § 7, which provides:

“SECTION 7. Section 9 of Senate Bill No. 2796, 2014 Regular Session [Chapter 431], is amended as follows:

“Section 9. Section 8 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 2014, and the remaining sections of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 2015.”

Chapter 13. Party Fences

§ 89-13-1. Adjoining owners to contribute.

Persons owning adjoining land or lots, or being lessees thereof for more than two (2) years, shall be bound to contribute equally to the erection of fences on the line dividing the land or lots, if the land or lots on their respective sides be used by the owner or lessee thereof for purposes of cultivation, or for horticultural purposes, or for the purpose of pasturing cattle, horses, hogs or sheep, or if a lot be used as an inclosure for any other purpose; and each party shall be bound to contribute equally toward keeping the party fences in good repair so long as the land or lot be so used. An owner shall not be bound to contribute to the erection of a party fence, either built or to be built, or to keeping the same in repair, who may prefer to build a fence and to leave a lane on his land between himself and the adjoining owner. But the failure to erect such fence for the space of sixty (60) days shall be deemed an abandonment of the intention to do so, and a determination to adopt the fence built, and the person so failing shall then be bound to pay his proportion of the value of the party fence.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 12, art. 6 (4); 1857, ch. 16, art. 2; 1871, § 1908; 1880, § 971; 1892, § 3126; 1906, § 3549; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2866; 1930, § 5676; 1942, § 989.

Cross References —

Party walls generally, see §§89-15-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

There was no evidence that a fence that was constructed between the parties’ properties was in fact a party fence within the meaning of Miss. Code Ann. §89-13-1. Therefore, the chancery court erred in requiring plaintiffs to reimburse defendants for the cost of the fence that defendants constructed. Varnell v. Rogers, 198 So.3d 1278, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 230 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

A yard fence erected along the line of a city lot by one of the adjoining landowner’s predecessors in title, without any contribution from the other adjoining landowner or his predecessor in title, was not a party fence. Hunter v. Williams, 230 Miss. 72, 92 So. 2d 367, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 346 (Miss. 1957).

Making of slight repairs on fence by adjoining landowner and giving of notice not to interfere would not constitute such fence a “party fence.” Evans v. State, 159 Miss. 870, 132 So. 455, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1931).

That adjoining landowners may have owned land by adverse possession up to fence would not of itself constitute such fence a “party fence.” Evans v. State, 159 Miss. 870, 132 So. 455, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1931).

Line fence does not become “party fence” unless provisions of statute are complied with so that each party owns interest in adjoining land and fence. Evans v. State, 159 Miss. 870, 132 So. 455, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1931).

An agreement between adjoining owners for the construction of a dividing line fence at the cost of both is not within the statute of frauds. Berry v. Jones, 106 Miss. 115, 63 So. 341, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1913).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

35A Am. Jur. 2d, Fences §§ 6 et seq.

9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Ejectment, Form 42.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration-for recovery of possession-fence built by adjoining landowner on plaintiff’s property).

8A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Fences §§ 114:10 et seq. (agreements affecting the construction and maintenance of fences).

CJS.

36A C.J.S., Fences §§ 2 et seq.

§ 89-13-3. Enforcement of contribution.

If any person, being requested to do so, will not contribute his proper share of the work and furnish the requisite materials suitable for a party fence, or pay the value of his share, the person desiring to build the fence may erect or construct the whole of it, of a proper and suitable kind, being a lawful fence, and may thereafter apply, in writing, to a justice of the peace, who shall appoint three (3) impartial freeholders of the neighborhood to view the fence and determine what amount should be paid by the person who has failed to contribute.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 12, art. 6 (4); 1857, ch. 16, art. 3; 1871, § 1909; 1880, § 972; 1892, § 3127; 1906, § 3550; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2867; 1930, § 5677; 1942, § 990.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to “justice of the peace” shall mean justice court judge.

Cross References —

Ascertainment of sum to be paid for use of party wall, see §89-15-5.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

35A Am. Jur. 2d, Fences §§ 12, 19, 20.

12 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Fences, Form 2 (demand on adjoining owner to pay share of cost of maintaining partition fence); Form 5 (complaint, petition, or declaration for cost of repairing half of partition or division fence).

CJS.

36A C.J.S., Fences §§ 29-31.

§ 89-13-5. Enforcement of contribution; notice and proceedings.

The opposite party shall have five (5) days’ notice of the time of the meeting of the freeholders, which may be served as a summons is required to be, and each party may introduce evidence of the value of the fence; and the freeholders, or a majority of them, may assess the amount to be paid by the one party to the other, and shall give to the party entitled to the compensation a certificate stating the amount they assess in his favor.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 12, art. 6 (4); 1857, ch. 16, art. 3; 1871, § 1909; 1880, § 972; 1892, § 3128; 1906, § 3551; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2868; 1930, § 5678; 1942, § 991.

Cross References —

Appointment of appraisers to assess value of party wall, see §89-15-5.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

35A Am. Jur. 2d, Fences §§ 21 et seq.

12 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Fences, Form 24 (notice to landowners of meeting of fence viewers); Forms 27, 28 (certificate or report of fence viewers).

CJS.

36A C.J.S., Fences §§ 31 et seq.

§ 89-13-7. Enforcement of contribution; action for amount assessed.

The party may maintain an action for the amount assessed by the freeholders; and the order of the justice appointing the freeholders, and the certificate of the freeholders, and proof of notice to the opposite party of the time of the meeting, shall be prima facie evidence to support the action. The amount recovered shall be a lien upon the land or lot of the defendant.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 3; 1871, § 1909; 1880, § 972; 1892, § 3129; 1906, § 3552; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2869; 1930, § 5679; 1942, § 992.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

35A Am. Jur. 2d, Fences § 20.

CJS.

36A C.J.S., Fences §§ 31.

§ 89-13-9. Enforcement of contribution; costs.

The freeholders each shall receive One Dollar and Fifty Cents ($1.50) per day whilst discharging their duty, to be paid by the party at whose instance they were appointed, who may recover the amount as costs, and the justice shall be entitled to fees as in other cases.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 3; 1871, § 1909; 1880, § 972; 1892, § 3130; 1906, § 3553; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2870; 1930, § 5680; 1942, § 993.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

35A Am. Jur. 2d, Fences § 30.

§ 89-13-11. Contribution where fence already built.

In case any party fence has been already built, and the adjoining land be used by the owner thereof for any of the purposes set forth in Section 89-17-1, the party who built the same shall in like manner be entitled to compensation, to the extent that ought to be contributed by the owner of the adjoining land, and in case of refusal to pay the same, the amount may be assessed and a recovery had in the same manner as for erecting a new fence.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 4; 1871, § 1910; 1880, § 973; 1892, § 3131; 1906, § 3554; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2871; 1930, § 5681; 1942, § 994.

§ 89-13-13. Contribution to keep fence in repair.

Each proprietor of land or lots separated by a party fence, shall be bound to contribute his due proportion of labor and materials for keeping the fence in good repair, so far as to make it a lawful fence; and contributions for that purpose may be enforced as above provided.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 5; 1871, § 1911; 1880, § 974; 1892, § 3132; 1906, § 3555; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2872; 1930, § 5682; 1942, § 995.

§ 89-13-15. Ownership of party fence; fence not to be removed.

A party fence will be owned jointly by the respective proprietors, either of whom may require the other to contribute to repairing it, but it shall not be taken away, razed, removed, or left down by either party without the consent of the other; and if either party violate this provision, he shall be liable to the action of the other, and be subject to such penalties as a stranger would be. However, a party shall not be bound to contribute towards keeping a party fence in repair, after he shall have ceased to use the land which is divided by it.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 6; 1871, § 1912; 1880, § 975; 1892, § 3133; 1906, § 3556; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2873; 1930, § 5683; 1942, § 996.

Cross References —

Prohibition against removal or impairment in value of party wall, see §89-15-11.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Fences, Forms 42 et seq. (complaint, petition, or declaration for damages for destruction of fence and for other relief); Form 51 (instruction to jury as to measure of damages for destruction of or damage to fence).

CJS.

36A C.J.S., Fences §§ 10, 11 et seq.

§ 89-13-17. Departure from line.

When, from natural obstacles, it shall be impracticable to erect the entire fence on the dividing line, and it be necessary to make a departure on either side, such departure may be made, but the fence shall, notwithstanding, be a party fence.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 7; 1871, § 1913; 1880, § 976; 1892, § 3134; 1906, § 3557; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2874; 1930, § 5684; 1942, § 997.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

36A C.J.S., Fences §§ 5-7.

§ 89-13-19. Removal and abandonment of party fence.

In case a joint-owner of a party fence shall desire to have a lane on his land, between his own and the adjoining land, he shall be at liberty to remove his part of the fence, on giving six (6) months’ notice to the other joint-owner, and not otherwise; but any proprietor who may remove from his land, and cease to use it for any of the purposes before mentioned, shall thereby abandon his right to the party fence.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 8; 1871, § 1914; 1880, § 977; 1892, § 3135; 1906, § 3558; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2875; 1930, § 5685; 1942, § 998.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

35A Am. Jur. 2d, Fences § 17.

CJS.

36A C.J.S., Fences § 27.

§ 89-13-21. Sale of land; lessee or owner to contribute.

In case of the sale of the premises to another person, the purchaser shall have the same right and incur the same liabilities as the original owner, in regard to the party fence. A lessee for a longer time than two (2) years shall stand in the attitude of a purchaser during his term; but if the lease be for two (2) years, or a shorter time, the owner shall be bound to contribute towards the erection and repair of the party fence, if either the owner or the tenant use the land; and in such case, the notice served on the tenant, if the owner be absent, will be sufficient.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 8; 1871, § 1914; 1880, § 977; 1892, § 3136; 1906, § 3559; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2876; 1930, § 5686; 1942, § 999.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

35A Am. Jur. 2d, Fences § 12.

CJS.

36A C.J.S., Fences §§ 29, 30.

§ 89-13-23. Fence removed if not paid for, and adopted by paying proportion of value.

The person who built the party fence may remove it at pleasure, if the owner of the adjoining land will not pay his proportion thereof; and although the proprietor of any land may desire to retain any fence built by him on a line which divides his land from that of another person, as a private fence, yet that other person may adopt the same as a party fence by paying his proportion of the value thereof; and if the value cannot be agreed upon by the parties, the person desiring to adopt the fence may apply to a justice of the peace to appoint freeholders to assess the proportion that should be paid, as in other cases.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 9; 1871, § 1915; 1880, § 978; 1892, § 3137; 1906, § 3560; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2877; 1930, § 5687; 1942, § 1000.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to “justice of the peace” shall mean justice court judge.

Chapter 15. Party Walls

§ 89-15-1. Parol agreement concerning, binding.

Any agreement for erecting walls which parties may make who own adjoining lots and desire to build party walls, shall be binding, whether in writing or not; and in case of the failure of either party to comply with his contract, the other may have an action for damages.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 10; 1871, § 1916; 1880, § 979; 1892, § 3138; 1906, § 3561; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2883; 1930, § 5688; 1942, § 1001.

Cross References —

Contracts required to be in writing, see §15-3-1.

Party fences, see §§89-13-1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

It is not a valid objection to the reconstruction of a party wall, weakened by fire, that one of the parties will be inconvenienced by the construction, or that the wall as it stood was sufficient for such party’s own use. Lexington Lodge v. Beal, 94 Miss. 521, 49 So. 833, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 1909).

Each purchaser of either lot on which a party wall has been placed, has the right to assume that any compensation as between their vendors has been paid. Mayer v. Martin, 83 Miss. 322, 35 So. 218, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 47 (Miss. 1903).

The verbal agreement of a lot owner to pay one-half of the cost of a wall to be built by an adjoining owner does not run with the land and is not enforceable by the vendee of such adjoining owner. Mayer v. Martin, 83 Miss. 322, 35 So. 218, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 47 (Miss. 1903).

A wall built upon a dividing line of two separate proprietors, partly on the land of each, is a party wall, which means a solid wall, and one of the proprietors has no right to cut windows in such wall above the roof of the other. Weems v. Mayfield, 75 Miss. 286, 22 So. 892, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1897).

A verbal agreement between two proprietors that a division wall, built partly upon the land of each, shall be the sole property of one of them is void under Code 1892, § 2434 [Code 1942, § 832]. Weems v. Mayfield, 75 Miss. 286, 22 So. 892, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1897).

Because of the writing a contemporaneous parol agreement by such grantor to build a wall cannot be shown. Money v. Peavy, 70 Miss. 260, 12 So. 334, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 118 (Miss. 1892).

To recite in a deed as a part of the consideration, that the vendees or any subsequent owner of the land conveyed, “shall have the right of uniting with and using the south wall which may be erected thereon” is not to stipulate that the wall shall or will be built, and the grantors are not liable in damages for failure to erect one. Money v. Peavy, 70 Miss. 260, 12 So. 334, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 118 (Miss. 1892).

This section [Code 1942, § 1001] authorizes verbal contracts between persons who own adjacent lots for erecting partition walls and does not apply to contracts whereby parties are negotiating to become such owners. Money v. Peavy, 70 Miss. 260, 12 So. 334, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 118 (Miss. 1892).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

59A Am. Jur. 2d, Party Walls § 6.

14B Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Party Walls, §§ 195:20 et seq. (creation of party wall interests in existing walls).

CJS.

69 C.J.S., Party Walls § 7.

§ 89-15-3. How wall may become a party wall.

If the owner of any lot shall build a substantial and durable brick or stone wall on the line which divides his lot from another, and the owner or lessee of that other lot should desire to erect an adjoining building and connect the same with the building already erected, so as to make the wall of the former building serve as the wall of his own, he may do so by paying to the owner of the first wall half the value thereof, or half the value of so much of the former wall as he may use as a wall to his own house; but he shall not be at liberty to use the former wall in any way which may prove dangerous or detrimental to the owner, except he may close lights therein.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 11; 1871, § 1917; 1880, § 980; 1892, § 3139; 1906, § 3562; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2884; 1930, § 5689; 1942, § 1002.

Cross References —

Contributions for upkeep of party fences, see §89-13-1.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

One party in restoring and repairing party walls may do so on condition that he gives an adjoining house the same right of support that it had. Lexington Lodge v. Beal, 94 Miss. 521, 49 So. 833, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 1909).

A joint owner of burned or injured party walls may be required to contribute his share to cost of repairing same. Howze v. Whitehead, 93 Miss. 578, 46 So. 401, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 78 (Miss. 1908).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Use of party wall for nonstructural purposes. 2 A.L.R.2d 1135.

Right to increase height of party wall. 24 A.L.R.2d 1053.

Am. Jur.

59A Am. Jur. 2d, Party Walls §§ 7-10, 11-15, 40, 64.

19 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Party Walls, Form 1 (complaint, petition, or declaration for contribution to cost of repair of party wall); Form 2 (complaint, petition, or declaration to determine rights in wall and for order enjoining defendant from damaging wall).

14BAm. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Party Walls §§ 195:20 et seq. (creation of party wall interests in existing walls).

CJS.

69 C.J.S., Party Walls § 19.

§ 89-15-5. Wall not to be used until paid for; how sum ascertained.

A person shall not be at liberty to join or use a wall as a party-wall without first paying to the owner thereof one-half (1/2) the value of so much as may be used; and if the parties cannot agree as to the value, either may apply to the mayor, police justice of the city, town or village, or to any justice of the peace of the county, in writing, for the appointment of suitable persons to assess the amount to be paid; and such mayor or police justice or justice of the peace shall thereupon appoint three (3) mechanics skilled in the description of work, who, or a majority of whom, shall examine the wall, and assess the amount to be paid to the owner thereof, and give a certificate of such examination and assessment to the party at whose instance they were appointed. The opposite party shall have five (5) days’ notice of the time of the meeting of the appraisers, and their names, which notice may be served as a summons is required by law to be served. On payment or tender of the amount assessed, the party desiring to use the wall may proceed to do so.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 12; 1871, § 1918; 1880, § 981; 1892, § 3140; 1906, § 3563; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2885; 1930, § 5690; 1942, § 1003.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to “justice of the peace” shall mean justice court judge.

Cross References —

Party fences generally, see §§89-13-1 et seq.

Enforcement of contribution for maintenance of party fence, see §89-13-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

59A Am. Jur. 2d, Party Walls §§ 31, 36.

CJS.

69 C.J.S., Party Walls § 19.

§ 89-15-7. Exceptions to appraisers.

If either party present to such mayor or police justice or justice of the peace, within ten (10) days after filing of assessment, exceptions to any of the appraisers, and the mayor or police justice or justice of the peace be of the opinion that the exception is well founded, a new appraiser or appraisers may be appointed, and either party shall be at liberty to introduce evidence before the appraisers as to the value of the wall.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 13; 1871, § 1919; 1880, § 982; 1892, § 3141; 1906, § 3564; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2886; 1930, § 5691; 1942, § 1004.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to “justice of the peace” shall mean justice court judge.

§ 89-15-9. Either party may appeal; final record.

The officer so appointing the appraisers shall make and preserve a record of all proceedings as in other cases before him, which shall contain the report of the appraisers, which shall be final, unless appealed from within ten (10) days, as in cases appealed from justice of the peace courts. But either party desiring may appeal, as in other cases before justices of the peace, to the circuit court of the county or district, where the whole matters of difference between the parties shall be heard anew, with or without written pleadings, in a summary way, before a jury and the court, as in other cases appealed from justices of the peace, and the findings of the circuit court in the case shall be final. On the proper certificate from the proper officer of the court finally disposing of the case, either party interested may have the final record recorded in the record of deeds of the county or district thereof.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 5692; 1942, § 1005.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to “justice of the peace” shall mean justice court judge.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

59A Am. Jur. 2d, Party Walls §§ 65, 69-74, 77, 80-85.

§ 89-15-11. Party wall not to be removed or impaired in value.

Any party wall which has been paid for, and is used as such, shall not be removed by either party without the consent of the other; nor shall it be so damaged or altered as to render it less valuable to either. And if either party violate this provision he shall be liable to the other as a trespasser for all damages that may be sustained.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 16, art. 14; 1871, § 1920; 1880, § 983; 1892, § 3142; 1906, § 3565; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2887; 1930, § 5693; 1942, § 1006.

Cross References —

Prohibition against removal of party fence, see §89-13-15.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

This chapter does not apply to an agreement for passageway and ventilation over a party wall. Binder v. Weinberg, 94 Miss. 817, 48 So. 1013, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 363 (Miss. 1909).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Use of party wall for nonstructural purposes. 2 A.L.R.2d 1135.

Right to increase height of party wall. 24 A.L.R.2d 1053.

Am. Jur.

59A Am. Jur. 2d, Party Walls §§ 24, 25, 27, 39-42, 48, 51.

19 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Party Walls, Form 2 (complaint, petition, or declaration to determine rights in wall and for order enjoining defendant from damaging wall); Form 6 (complaint, petition, or declaration against co-owner for damage to party wall).

CJS.

69 C.J.S., Party Walls §§ 16, 19, 23.

Chapter 17. Salvage

§ 89-17-1. Abandoned logs, boats, etc., salvaged.

Any saw logs, sawn or hewn timber, lumber, boat, building, or other floatable thing of value that may have become derelict in any of the waters or watercourses of the state or in the beds thereof and which have been relinquished, deserted or left by the owner thereof with the intention of abandoning same shall become the property of the owner of the bed of the stream, or the part thereof, where such property may be found and such owner may raise, float or salve said property or authorize the raising, floating or salving of such property.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 6523; 1942, § 1007; Laws, 1930, ch. 243.

Cross References —

Lien for work done or materials supplied for watercraft, see §85-7-7.

Contribution by owner of adjoining land where party fence already built and adjoining land used by owner for purposes set forth in this section, see §89-13-11.

This section not applicable to the waters of the Mississippi Sound or Gulf of Mexico, see §89-17-7.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property §§ 23, 30-35.

52 Am. Jur. 2d, Logs and Timber §§ 87, 85, 88.

68 Am. Jur. 2d, Salvage §§ 2-4.

CJS.

1 C.J.S., Abandonment § 12.

54 C.J.S., Logs and Logging §§ 56, 57.

77A C.J.S., Salvage §§ 30-35.

§ 89-17-3. Replevin by owner; bond; lien for salvage.

Any person claiming to be the owner of such property may institute an action in replevin for the recovery of such property. Any bond given in such suit to obtain possession of said property shall be liable for any depreciation in value of the property between the date of the giving of the bond and final termination of the suit. If no bond be given by either party within seventy-two (72) hours after the seizure of the property under the writ, the sheriff on the written demand of either party shall sell the same for cash at public outcry after posting a notice of the time and place of sale at three (3) or more public places in the county. The proceeds of sale shall be paid into the registry of the court to await the final outcome of the suit. The defendant in such suit, in the event he or any person acting for him or with his consent has raised, floated or salvaged the property whose title or possession is in issue, shall be entitled to a lien on such property for the reasonable expense of raising, floating, or salvaging such property.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 6524; 1942, § 1008; Laws, 1930, ch. 243.

Cross References —

This section not applicable to the waters of the Mississippi Sound or Gulf of Mexico, see §89-17-7.

§ 89-17-5. Prima facie abandonment.

In any suit brought by one claiming to be the owner of such property, proof that such property has been relinquished, deserted or left for a period of three (3) years thereafter without effort to salve such property shall be prima facie evidence of the intention to abandon.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 6525; 1942, § 1009; Laws, 1930, ch. 243.

Cross References —

This section not applicable to the waters of the Mississippi Sound or Gulf of Mexico, see §89-17-7.

§ 89-17-7. Jurisdiction limited.

The following sections, and not the foregoing, shall apply to the waters of the Mississippi Sound or of the Gulf of Mexico within the jurisdiction and control of the State of Mississippi; provided that if the foregoing sections should be held unconstitutional, then the following sections shall apply to the entire state.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 6526; 1942, § 1010; Laws, 1930, ch. 243.

§ 89-17-9. How claims for salvage service rendered shall be filed and prosecuted.

Whenever any person shall desire to claim compensation for any salvage service rendered by him in reclaiming and protecting from loss, damage, injury or destruction, any saw log, sawn or hewn timber, lumber, boat or other water craft, or other floatable thing of value, that may have become derelict, in any of the waters of this state or in the beds or on the shores thereof, or for compensation for the preservation thereof, such finder, salvor, or person raising or floating such property, shall file a petition for compensation in the circuit court of the county in which such property shall be found, raised or floated, or salved. In the petition he shall set forth a full and particular description of the property found, raised or floated, or salved, containing all names, letters or other marks of identification appearing thereon, and in the petition he shall also set forth the facts constituting his claim for compensation, and the amount claimed by him for such service, and shall also state the name of the owner of the property, if known to the petitioner, and his place of residence and post-office address. Said owner shall be made a party defendant thereto, and if the owner be unknown, all persons having or claiming any interest in the property shall be made parties defendant, and the petition shall be sworn to. Immediately upon the filing of such petition, the petitioner shall deliver to the sheriff of the county the property described in the petition to be dealt with as hereinafter provided in Section 89-17-17.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 7305; 1930, § 6527; 1942, § 1011; Laws, 1908, ch. 120.

Cross References —

General jurisdiction of circuit court, see §9-7-81.

Lien for work done to or materials supplied for watercraft, see §85-7-7.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Salvor has right to possession of vessel to enforce salvage claim only where such vessel is a derelict, and a vessel is not a derelict if the owner has not abandoned it but is in pursuit of it. Mengel Box Co. v. Joest, 127 Miss. 461, 90 So. 161, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 245 (Miss. 1921).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Time limits for salvage suits under 46 USCS § 730. 56 A.L.R. Fed. 542.

§ 89-17-11. Clerk to issue summons.

Upon filing such petition the clerk shall issue a summons to the defendant named as required by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. In case the owners of the property are unknown, then a notice shall be published as provided for by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 7306; 1930, § 6528; 1942, § 1012; Laws, 1908, ch. 120; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 124, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Summons, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

§ 89-17-13. How notice given where parties are nonresidents of state.

In suits against persons named in the petition, as defendants thereto, where such defendant is a nonresident of the state, or cannot be served with process, then notice shall be given to such defendant as is provided for in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 7307; 1930, § 6529; 1942, § 1013; Laws, 1908, ch. 120; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 125, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Service of process, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

§ 89-17-15. Procedure on return of writ; defendant to plead to petition in case of contest.

At the return of the process, in case the defendant shall contest the petitioner’s right to compensation or salvage, or the amount thereof, the petition shall stand for a complaint and the defendant shall plead to it as if it were an ordinary action at law and the matter shall be tried as provided for in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 7308; 1930, § 6530; 1942, § 1014; Laws, 1908, ch. 120; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 126, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§ 89-17-17. Sheriff to advertise property for sale; proceeds held for result of suit.

Immediately upon the delivery to the sheriff of the property described in the petition as provided in Section 89-17-9, the sheriff shall at once advertise the property for sale in the same manner as provided by law for the advertisement and sale of personal property under execution, and on the day fixed shall sell the property for cash to the highest bidder, and shall hold the proceeds to abide the result of the suit or proceeding. But the defendant to the petition, or any person interposing a claim thereto, in cases against unknown owners, can at any time before the day of sale, execute a bond with two (2) or more sureties in double the value of the property, such valuation to be fixed by the sheriff conditioned to satisfy such judgment as the petitioner shall recover in the case, and upon the execution of such bond, to be approved by the sheriff, the property shall be delivered to the defendant or claimant.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 7309; 1930, § 6531; 1942, § 1015; Laws, 1908, ch. 120.

§ 89-17-19. Failure of defendant to appear at return term; funds condemned to satisfy judgment.

In case the defendant shall not appear at the return term of the writ, or in cases against unknown owners, where no person or party interposes a claim, the court shall award the petitioner a judgment for the amount as appears to the court that petitioner is entitled to, and condemn the funds in the hands of the sheriff, or render judgment against the defendant or his bond as the case may be, for the satisfaction of the judgment so rendered and costs. In case there shall be a surplus remaining in the hands of the sheriff after satisfying the judgment and costs, it shall be paid to the clerk of the court, to be held by him subject to the claim of the owners of the property so sold, and shall be paid out to such owner, upon the order of the court, after satisfactory evidence is adduced, establishing in the judgment of the court such ownership. In all cases where the petitioner establishes his claim, and is awarded a judgment for the amount stated in the petition, the court shall allow the petitioner a reasonable attorney’s fee for preparing the petition, which shall be taxed as part of the costs of the case.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 7310; 1930, § 6532; 1942, § 1016; Laws, 1908, ch. 120.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Attorneys’ fees: cost of services provided by paralegals or the like as compensable element of award in state court. 73 A.L.R.4th 938.

§ 89-17-21. Jurisdiction of justice courts; time for trial; notice to parties.

Justice courts shall have jurisdiction of all cases provided for in this chapter, where the value of the property described in the petition does not exceed the amount provided in Section 9-11-9, and in all cases where the defendant is a nonresident, or is not served with process, the provisions of the section of the code in relation to attachments before justice court judges shall apply, and notice shall be given to the defendant, and the case tried as provided in that section of the code. When the case shall be one against unknown owners, the justice court judge shall fix the trial for a date not earlier than one (1) month from the beginning of the suit, and notices shall be posted for three (3) consecutive weeks in the county of the justice court judge, addressed to all persons having or claiming any interest in the property described in the petition, and describing the property in such notices, requiring them to appear before the justice court judge on the date fixed for trial to contest the claim of the petitioner, which notices shall be posted in the public places in the county likely to be seen, which shall be in lieu of a publication thereof in a newspaper.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 7311; 1930, § 6533; 1942, § 1017; Laws, 1908, ch. 120; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 52; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 28, made eff from and after January 1, 1984, or, with respect to a given county, from and after such earlier date as the county appoints a justice court clerk pursuant to §9-11-27(3).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 60, ch. 471, Laws, 1981, as amended by § 28 of ch. 423, Laws, 1982, provides as follows:

“SECTION 60. Section 8 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after the date it is finally effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended. Sections 4, 48 and 59 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after passage. Sections 17 and 22 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after March 31, 1982. Sections 15, 16 and 58 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1983. Sections 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56 and 57 of this act shall take effect from and after January 1, 1984, or with respect to a given county, from and after such earlier date as such county elects to employ a clerk for the justice court of such county in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 7 of this act. Sections 9, 10, 18, 19 and 43 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 1984.”

Cross References —

Civil jurisdiction of justice courts, see §9-11-9.

Notice, proceedings and trial in actions relating to attachments, see §§11-33-105,11-33-107.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Justices of the Peace §§ 24 et seq.

CJS.

51 C.J.S., Justices of the Peace §§ 26, 42 et seq.

§ 89-17-23. Person claiming property admitted to defend.

On the return of the summons before a justice of the peace, or on the day fixed for trial, in cases against nonresidents or parties not served with process, or in cases against unknown owners, the justice shall hear the cause. Any person making claim to the property described in the petition shall be admitted to defend as provided in Section 89-17-15 for cases in the circuit court, and the same mode of procedure shall be followed in the trial as is provided for the trial of civil actions before justices of the peace, under the general laws of the state, and judgment shall be rendered as hereinbefore provided in cases before the circuit court.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 7312; 1930, § 6534; 1942, § 1018; Laws, 1908, ch. 120.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const., Art. 6, § 171, all references in the Mississippi Code to justice of the peace shall mean justice court judge.

§ 89-17-25. Penalty for converting derelict property to own use.

If any person shall convert to his own use, sell or otherwise dispose of any saw log, sawn or hewn timber, lumber, boat, or other water craft, or other floatable thing of value not belonging to him, which may have come into his possession while floating as derelict, in any of the waters of the State of Mississippi, or which may theretofore have been sunken and raised or floated from such sunken condition by him or others, or which he or others may have found cast upon the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, or Mississippi Sound, in the State of Mississippi, or any bay, inlet, or bayou, emptying into same, or upon the shore of any other watercourse in the State of Mississippi, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than double the value of the property converted, sold or disposed of, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not exceeding six (6) months.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 7313; 1930, § 6535; 1942, § 1019; Laws, 1908, ch. 120.

Cross References —

Petty larceny, see §97-17-53.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

52 Am. Jur. 2d, Logs and Timber § 93.

§ 89-17-27. Unlawful to purchase derelict property from finder thereof.

If any person shall purchase, or otherwise acquire, except at a sale as provided in this chapter, or by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, from any person other than the owner thereof, any property of the character or description, and in the condition enumerated in the foregoing section, such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished by a fine not exceeding double the value of the property so purchased, or acquired, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not exceeding six (6) months.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 7314; 1930, § 6536; 1942, § 1020; Laws, 1908, ch. 120.

Cross References —

Crime of receiving stolen goods, see §97-17-70.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

Chapter 19. Mississippi Conservation Easements

§ 89-19-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known as the “Mississippi Conservation Easement Act of 1986.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 404, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 27, 1986).

Comparable Laws from other States —

Alabama Code, §§35-18-1 through35-18-6.

Georgia Code Annotated, §§44-10-1 through44-10-8.

North Carolina General Statutes, §§ 113A-230 et seq.

Tennessee Code Annotated, §§66-9-301 et seq.

Texas Natural Resources Code, §§ 183.001 through 183.005.

Virginia Code Annotated, §§ 10.1-1009 et seq.

§ 89-19-3. Definitions.

For purposes of this chapter, the following words shall have the meaning ascribed herein unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Conservation easement” shall mean a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations, the purposes of which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, historical or open-space values of real property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, educational or open-space use, protecting natural features and resources, maintaining or enhancing air and water quality or preserving the natural, historical, architectural, archaeological or cultural aspects of real property.
  2. “Holder” shall mean either:
    1. A governmental body empowered by the law of this state or the United States to hold an interest in real property; or
    2. A private, nonprofit, charitable or educational corporation, association or trust, the purposes or powers of which include retaining or protecting the natural, scenic, historical or open-space values of real property, assuring the availability of real property for agricultural, forest, recreational, educational or open-space use, protecting natural features and resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality or preserving the natural, historical, architectural, archaeological or cultural aspects of real property which is the recipient or grantee of a conservation easement.
  3. “Third-party right of enforcement” shall mean a right granted in a conservation easement to a governmental body or private, nonprofit charitable corporation, association or trust, which is not a holder but which is eligible to be a holder, to enforce any of the terms of the conservation easement.
  4. “Person” shall mean any natural person or legal entity.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 404, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 27, 1986).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

25 Am. Jur. 2d, Easements and licenses § 1.

§ 89-19-5. General provisions relating to conservation easement; acceptance; recordation; duration.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, a conservation easement may be created, conveyed, recorded and assigned, in the same method and manner as other easements.
  2. No right or duty in favor of or against a holder and no right of a person having a third-party right of enforcement arises under a conservation easement before its acceptance by the holder and a recordation of the acceptance.
  3. Except as provided in subsection (2) of Section 89-19-7 of this chapter, a conservation easement is unlimited in its duration unless the instrument creating it otherwise provides.
  4. An interest in real property in existence at the time a conservation easement is created is not impaired by the conservation easement unless the owner of the interest is a party to the conservation easement or consents to it.
  5. A conservation easement shall continue to be effective and shall not be extinguished if the easement holder is or becomes the owner in fee of the subject property.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 404, § 3; Laws, 1988, ch. 379, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 18, 1988).

Cross References —

Requirement that conservation easements be filed with the Attorney General and the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, see §89-19-15.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Conveyance of “right of way,” in connection with conveyance of another tract, as passing fee or easement. 89 A.L.R.3d 767.

“Compliance with state standards” as requirement to granting right-of-way over federal public lands under § 505(a)(iv) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 USCS § 1765(a)(iv)). 60 A.L.R. Fed. 386.

Am. Jur.

25 Am. Jur. 2d, Easements and licenses §§ 11-122.

22 Am. Jur. Trials, Condemnation of Easements §§ 1 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Abandonment of easement §§ 1-16.

5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Intent to create negative easement §§ 1-14.

28 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Permissive possession or use of land §§ 1-16.

33 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Extent of easement over servient estate §§ 1-31.

CJS.

28A C.J.S., Easements §§ 4-89.

§ 89-19-7. Actions affecting easements.

  1. Any action to enforce a conservation easement may be brought by:
    1. An owner of an interest in the real property burdened by the easement;
    2. A holder of the easement;
    3. A person having a third-party right of enforcement;
    4. The Attorney General of the State of Mississippi;
    5. The Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks; or
    6. A person otherwise authorized and empowered by law.
  2. This chapter does not, and shall not be construed to, affect the power of a court to modify or terminate a conservation easement in accordance with the principles of law and equity. In such proceeding, the holder of the conservation easement shall be compensated for the value of the easement.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 404, § 4; Laws, 1988, ch. 379, § 3; Laws, 2000, ch. 516, § 132, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 30, 2000).

Amendment Notes —

The 2000 amendment substituted “Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks” for “Department of Wildlife Conservation” in (1)(e); and made a minor stylistic change.

Cross References —

Transfer of functions of Department of Wildlife Conservation to Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, see §49-1-4.

Provision that, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a conservation easement is of unlimited duration unless the instrument creating it otherwise provides, see §89-19-5.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Conveyance of “right of way,” in connection with conveyance of another tract, as passing fee or easement. 89 A.L.R.3d 767.

“Compliance with state standards” as requirement to granting right-of-way over federal public lands under § 505(a)(iv) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 USCS § 1765(a)(iv)). 60 A.L.R. Fed. 386.

Am. Jur.

25 Am. Jur. 2d, Easements and licenses §§ 99-105.

22 Am. Jur. Trials, Condemnation of Easements §§ 1 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Abandonment of easement §§ 1-16.

5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Intent to create negative easement §§ 17-14.

28 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Permissive possession or use of land §§ 1-16.

33 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Extent of easement over servient estate §§ 1-31.

CJS.

28A C.J.S., Easements §§ 77, 78, 90-92, 117-137.

§ 89-19-9. Validity of easements not affected by certain conditions.

A conservation easement shall be valid despite the following:

It is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;

It may be or has been assigned to another holder;

It is not of a character that has been traditionally recognized at common law;

It imposes a negative burden;

It imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the burdened property or upon the holder;

The benefit does not touch or concern real property; or

There is no privity of estate or contract.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 404, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved March 27, 1986).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Conveyance of “right of way,” in connection with conveyance of another tract, as passing fee or easement. 89 A.L.R.3d 767.

“Compliance with state standards” as requirement to granting right-of-way over federal public lands under § 505(a)(iv) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 USCS § 1765(a)(iv)). 60 A.L.R. Fed. 386.

Am. Jur.

25 Am. Jur. 2d, Easements and licenses §§ 11 et seq.

22 Am. Jur. Trials, Condemnation of Easements §§ 1 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Abandonment of easement §§ 1-16.

5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Intent to create negative easement §§ 1-14.

28 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Permissive possession or use of land §§ 1-16.

33 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Extent of easement over servient estate §§ 1-31.

CJS.

28A C.J.S., Easements §§ 4, 11 et seq.

§ 89-19-11. Capital improvements on property upon which easements have been granted.

With the exception of “Mississippi Landmarks,” as defined by the Antiquities Law of Mississippi (Section 39-7-1 et seq., Mississippi Code of 1972) and of properties entered in the National Register of Historic Places, no public money, derived either from a special fund or the General Fund, shall be expended for capital improvements on any real property upon which a conservation easement has been granted unless the conservation easement is perpetual, a governmental body is the holder of the easement and the capital improvements are solely for the use and benefit of such holder.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 404, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved March 27, 1986).

§ 89-19-13. Interests to which chapter applies; relation to other laws.

  1. This chapter shall apply to an interest created after March 27, 1986, whether the interest is designated as a conservation easement or as a covenant, equitable servitude, restriction, easement or otherwise, as long as such interest complies with the provisions of this chapter.
  2. This chapter shall apply to any interest created prior to March 27, 1986, if the interest would have been enforceable had it been created after March 27, 1986, unless retroactive application would contravene the Constitution or laws of this state or the United States.
  3. This chapter shall not invalidate any interest, whether designated as a conservation or preservation easement or as a covenant, equitable servitude, restriction, easement or otherwise, that is enforceable under any other law of this state.
  4. The provisions of this chapter are cumulative and supplemental to any other provision of law.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 404, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved March 27, 1986).

§ 89-19-15. Recorded easements to be filed with Attorney General and Department of Wildlife, Fisheries, and Parks.

Whenever any instrument conveying a conservation easement is recorded after April 18, 1988, the clerk of the court recording it shall mail certified copies thereof, together with notice as to the date and place of recordation, to the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi and the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks. The requirement that certified copies be mailed to the Attorney General and the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks shall be stated in any instrument which conveys a conservation easement after April 18, 1988. The holder of any conservation easement created prior to the date hereof wishing to qualify such easement for the benefits provided under this chapter shall provide to the Attorney General and the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, within one (1) year after April 18, 1988, a certified copy of the instrument creating such easement, indicating the date and place of the recordation.

HISTORY: Laws, 1988, ch. 379, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 516, § 133, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 30, 2000).

Amendment Notes —

The 2000 amendment substituted “Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks” for “Department of Wildlife Conservation” throughout the section.

Chapter 21. Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act

§ 89-21-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 618, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Comparable Laws from other States —

Alabama: Code of Ala. §43-8-290 et seq.

Arizona: A.R.S. § 14-10001 et seq.

Arkansas: A.C.A. §28-2-201 et seq.

Florida: Fla. Stat. § 739.101 et seq.

Hawaii: HRS § 526-1 et seq.

Indiana: Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 32-17.5-1-1 et seq.

Iowa: Iowa Code § 633E.1 et seq.

Maryland: Md. ESTATES AND TRUSTS Code Ann. § 9-201 et seq.

New Hampshire: RSA 563-B:1 et seq.

New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-10-1 et seq.

Vermont: 14 V.S.A. § 1951 et seq.

Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-196.1 et seq.

West Virginia: W. Va. Code §42-6-1 et seq.

§ 89-21-3. Right to disclaim interest in property.

A person, or the representative of a person, to whom an interest in or with respect to property or an interest therein devolves by whatever means may disclaim it in whole or in part by delivering or filing a written disclaimer under this chapter. The right to disclaim exists notwithstanding (a) any limitation on the interest of the disclaimant in the nature of a spendthrift provision or similar restriction or (b) any restriction or limitation on the right to disclaim contained in the governing instrument. For purposes of this section, the “representative of a person” includes an executor of a decedent’s estate, an administrator of a decedent’s estate, a conservator of a disabled person, a guardian of a minor or incapacitated person, and an agent acting on behalf of the person within the authority of a power of attorney. For purposes of this section, the term “governing instrument” means a deed, will, trust, insurance or annuity policy, account with POD designation, security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan or instrument creating or exercising a power of appointment or a power of attorney, or a dispositive, appointive or nominative instrument of any similar type.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 618, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Appointee’s renunciation of appointment. 9 A.L.R.2d 1382.

Beneficiary’s right to disclaim or renounce spendthrift trust prior to acceptance. 14 A.L.R.3d 1437.

Creditor’s right to prevent debtor’s renunciation of benefit under will or debtor’s election to take under will. 39 A.L.R.4th 633.

Am. Jur.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Descent and Distribution §§ 157, 158.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Powers of Appointment and Alienation §§ 204, 205.

76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts §§ 98, 142.

80 Am. Jur. 2d, Wills §§ 1359, 1363.

§ 89-21-5. Time of disclaimer.

  1. The following rules govern the time when a disclaimer must be filed or delivered:
    1. If the property or interest has devolved to the disclaimant under a testamentary instrument or by the laws of intestacy, the disclaimer must be filed, if of a present interest, not later than nine (9) months after the death of the deceased owner or deceased donee of a power of appointment and, if of a future interest, not later than nine (9) months after the event determining that the taker of the property or interest is finally ascertained and his interest is indefeasibly vested. The disclaimer must be filed in the chancery court of the county in which proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceased owner or deceased donee of the power have been commenced. A copy of the disclaimer must be delivered in person or mailed by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the executor of the decedent’s estate, the administrator of the decedent’s estate, or any other fiduciary of the decedent or donee of the power.
    2. If a property or interest has devolved to the disclaimant under a nontestamentary instrument or contract, the disclaimer must be delivered or filed and also, if real property or an interest therein is disclaimed, a copy of the disclaimer must be recorded in the office of the chancery clerk of the county in which the property, or interest disclaimed, is located if a present interest, not later than nine (9) months after the effective date of the nontestamentary instrument or contract and, if of a future interest, not later than nine (9) months after the event determining that the taker of the property or interest is finally ascertained and his interest is indefeasibly vested. If the person entitled to disclaim does not know of the existence of the interest, the disclaimer must be delivered or filed and also, if real property or an interest therein is disclaimed, a copy of the disclaimer must be recorded in the office of the chancery clerk of the county in which the property or interest disclaimed is located, if a present interest, not later than nine (9) months after the person learns of the existence of the interest. The effective date of a revocable instrument or contract is the date on which the maker no longer has power to revoke it or to transfer to himself or another the entire legal and equitable ownership of the interest. The disclaimer or a copy thereof must be delivered in person or mailed by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the person who has legal title to or possession of the interest disclaimed.
  2. A surviving joint tenant (or tenant by the entireties) may disclaim as a separate interest any property or interest therein devolving to him by right of survivorship. A surviving joint tenant (or tenant by the entireties) may disclaim the entire interest in any property or interest therein that is the subject of a joint tenancy (or tenancy by the entireties) devolving to him, if the joint tenancy (or tenant by the entireties) was created by act of a deceased joint tenant (or tenant by the entireties), and the survivor did not join in creating the joint tenancy (or tenancy by the entireties), and has not accepted a benefit under it.
  3. If real property or an interest therein is disclaimed under subsection (1), a copy of the disclaimer may be recorded in the office of the chancery clerk of the county in which the property or interest disclaimed is located.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 618, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Descent and Distribution §§ 157, 158.

§ 89-21-7. Form of disclaimer.

The disclaimer must (a) describe the property or interest disclaimed, (b) declare the disclaimer and extent thereof, and (c) be signed by the disclaimant.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 618, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Descent and Distribution §§ 157, 158.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Powers of Appointment and Alienation §§ 207, 208.

76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts §§ 98, 142.

80 Am. Jur. 2d, Wills § 1367.

§ 89-21-9. Effect of disclaimer.

  1. The effects of a disclaimer are:
    1. If property or an interest therein devolves to a disclaimant under a testamentary instrument, under a power of appointment exercised by a testamentary instrument, or under the laws of intestacy, and the decedent has not provided for another disposition of that interest, should it be disclaimed, or of disclaimed or failed interests in general, the disclaimed interest devolves as if the disclaimant had predeceased the decedent, but if by law or under the testamentary instrument the descendants of the disclaimant would take the disclaimant’s share by representation were the disclaimant to predecease the decedent, then the disclaimed interest passes by representation to the descendants of the disclaimant who survive the decedent. A future interest that takes effect in possession or enjoyment after the termination of the estate or interest disclaimed takes effect as if the disclaimant had predeceased the decedent. A disclaimer relates back for all purposes to the date of death of the decedent.
    2. If property or an interest therein devolves to a disclaimant under a nontestamentary instrument or contract and the instrument or contract does not provide for another disposition of that interest, should it be disclaimed, or of disclaimed or failed interests in general, the disclaimed interest devolves as if the disclaimant had predeceased the effective date of the instrument or contract, but if by law or under the nontestamentary instrument or contract the descendants of the disclaimant would take the disclaimant’s share by representation were the disclaimant to predecease the effective date of the instrument, then the disclaimed interest passes by representation to the descendants of the disclaimant who survive the effective date of the instrument. A disclaimer relates back for all purposes to that date. A future interest that takes effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the termination of the disclaimed interest takes effect as if the disclaimant had died before the effective date of the instrument or contract that transferred the disclaimed interest.
  2. The disclaimer or the written waiver of the right to disclaim is binding upon the disclaimant or person waiving and all persons claiming through or under either of them.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 618, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Appointee’s renunciation of appointment. 9 A.L.R.2d 1382.

Beneficiary’s right to disclaim or renounce spendthrift trust prior to acceptance. 14 A.L.R.3d 1437.

Creditor’s right to prevent debtor’s renunciation of benefit under will or debtor’s election to take under will. 39 A.L.R.4th 633.

Am. Jur.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Descent and Distribution §§ 157, 158.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Powers of Appointment and Alienation §§ 209, 210.

76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts §§ 98, 142.

80 Am. Jur. 2d, Wills § 1368.

§ 89-21-11. Waiver and bar.

The right to disclaim property or an interest therein is barred by (a) an assignment, conveyance, encumbrance, pledge, or transfer of the property or interest, or a contract therefor, (b) a written waiver of the right to disclaim, (c) an acceptance of the property or interest or a benefit under it, or (d) a sale of the property or interest under judicial sale made before the disclaimer is made.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 618, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Descent and Distribution §§ 157, 158.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Powers of Appointment and Alienation §§ 207, 208.

76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts §§ 98, 142.

80 Am. Jur. 2d, Wills § 1367.

§ 89-21-13. Remedy not exclusive.

This chapter does not abridge the right of person to waive, release, disclaim, or renounce property or an interest therein under any other statute.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 618, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

§ 89-21-15. Application.

An interest in property that exists on July 1, 1994, as to which, if a present interest, the time for filing a disclaimer under this chapter has not expired or, if a future interest, the interest has not become indefeasibly vested or the taker finally ascertained, may be disclaimed within nine (9) months after July 1, 1994.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 618, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

§ 89-21-17. Uniformity of application and construction.

This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 618, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1994.

Chapter 23. Mississippi Uniform Environmental Covenants Act

§ 89-23-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Mississippi Uniform Environmental Covenants Act.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

Comparable Laws from other States —

Alabama: Code of Ala. §35-19-1 et seq.

Hawaii: HRS § 508C-1 et seq.

Illinois: 765 ILCS 122/1 et seq.

Iowa: Iowa Code § 455I.1 et seq.

Maine: 38 M.R.S. § 3001 et seq.

Maryland: Md. ENVIRONMENT Code Ann. § 1-801 et seq.

Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 114E.01 et seq.

Nebraska: R.R.S. Neb. § 76-2601 et seq.

Oklahoma: 60 Okl. St. § 49.11 et seq.

South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 34A-17-1 et seq.

Utah : Utah Code Ann. §57-25-101 et seq.

Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 10.1-1238 et seq.

Washington: Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 64.70.005 et seq.

West Virginia: W. Va. Code §22-22B-1 et seq.

§ 89-23-3. Definitions.

In this chapter:

  1. “Activity and use limitations” means restrictions or obligations created under this chapter with respect to real property.
  2. “Agency” means the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality or any other state or federal agency that determines or approves the environmental response project pursuant to which the environmental covenant is created.
  3. “Common interest community” means a condominium, cooperative, or other real property with respect to which a person, by virtue of the person’s ownership of a parcel of real property, is obligated to pay property taxes or insurance premiums, or for maintenance, or improvement of other real property described in a recorded covenant that creates the common interest community.
  4. “Environmental covenant” means a servitude arising under an environmental response project that imposes activity and use limitations.
  5. “Environmental response project” means a plan or work performed for environmental remediation of real property and conducted:
  6. “Holder” means the grantee of an environmental covenant as specified in Section 89-23-5(a).
  7. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public corporation, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity.
  8. “Record,” used as a noun, means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
  9. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
  10. “Servitude” means a covenant, profit, easement in gross, or easement appurtenant.

“Commission” means the Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality.

Under a federal or state program governing environmental remediation of real property, including:

Subchapter III or IX of the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 USC Sections 6921 through 6939e and 6991 through 6991i;

Section 7002 or 7003 of the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 USC Sections 6972 and 6973;

The federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 USC Sections 9601 through 9647, as amended;

The Mississippi Air and Water Pollution Control Law, Section 49-17-1 et seq.;

The Mississippi Solid Wastes Disposal Law of 1974, Section 17-17-1 et seq.;

The Mississippi Underground Storage Tank Act of 1988, Section 49-17-401 et seq.;

Such other laws or regulations as the commission shall enumerate.

Incident to closure of a solid or hazardous waste management unit, if the closure is conducted with approval of an agency; or

Under a state voluntary clean-up program authorized in the Mississippi Brownfields Voluntary Cleanup and Redevelopment Act, Section 49-35-1 et seq.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

Cross References —

Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality generally, see §§49-2-1 et seq.

Commission on Environmental Quality, generally, see §49-2-5.

§ 89-23-5. Holder defined; rights and obligations; subordination of rights.

Any person, including a person that owns an interest in the real property, a municipality or other unit of local government, may be a holder. An environmental covenant may identify more than one (1) holder. The interest of a holder is an interest in real property.

A right of an agency under this chapter or under an environmental covenant is not an interest in real property. Nothing in this chapter authorizes the commission to act as a holder.

An agency is bound by any obligation it assumes in an environmental covenant, but an agency does not assume obligations merely by signing or approving an environmental covenant. Any other person that signs an environmental covenant is bound by the obligations the person assumes in the covenant, but signing the covenant does not change obligations, rights, or protections granted or imposed under law other than this chapter except as provided in the covenant.

The following rules apply to interests in real property in existence at the time an environmental covenant is created or amended:

  1. An interest that has priority under other law is not affected by an environmental covenant unless the person that owns the interest subordinates that interest to the covenant.
  2. This chapter does not require a person that owns a prior interest to subordinate that interest to an environmental covenant or to agree to be bound by the covenant.
  3. A subordination agreement may be contained in an environmental covenant covering real property or in a separate record. If the environmental covenant covers commonly owned property in a common interest community, the record may be signed by any person authorized by the governing board of the owners’ association.
  4. An agreement by a person to subordinate a prior interest to an environmental covenant affects the priority of that person’s interest but does not by itself impose any affirmative obligation on the person with respect to the environmental covenant.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

§ 89-23-7. Contents of environmental covenant.

An environmental covenant must:

  1. State that the instrument is an environmental covenant executed pursuant to this chapter;
  2. Contain a legally sufficient description of the real property subject to the covenant;
  3. Describe the activity and use limitations on the real property;
  4. Identify every holder;
  5. Be signed by the agency, every holder, and unless waived by the agency, every owner of the fee simple of the real property subject to the covenant;
  6. Be signed by the commission, unless the commission waives participation; and
  7. Identify the name and location of any administrative record for the environmental response project reflected in the environmental covenant.

In addition to the information required by subsection (a), an environmental covenant may contain other information, restrictions, and requirements agreed to by the persons who signed it, including any:

Requirements for notice following transfer of a specified interest in, or concerning proposed changes in use of, applications for building permits for, or proposals for any site work affecting the contamination on, the property subject to the covenant;

Requirements for periodic reporting describing compliance with the covenant;

Rights of access to the property granted in connection with implementation or enforcement of the covenant;

A brief narrative description of the contamination and remedy, including the contaminants of concern, the pathways of exposure, limits on exposure, and the location and extent of the contamination;

Limitation on amendment or termination of the covenant in addition to those contained in Sections 89-23-17 and 89-23-19; and

Rights of the holder in addition to its right to enforce the covenant pursuant to Section 89-23-21.

In addition to other conditions for its approval of an environmental covenant, the agency or the commission may require those persons specified by the agency or commission who have interests in the real property to sign the covenant.

If the commission refuses to sign an environmental covenant, it shall set forth its reasons for refusing to sign in an order and such order may be appealed as provided in Section 49-17-41.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

§ 89-23-9. Validity of environmental covenant; effect on other instruments.

An environmental covenant that complies with this chapter runs with the land.

An environmental covenant that is otherwise effective is valid and enforceable even if:

  1. It is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;
  2. It can be or has been assigned to a person other than the original holder;
  3. It is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at common law;
  4. It imposes a negative burden;
  5. It imposes an affirmative obligation on a person having an interest in the real property or on the holder;
  6. The benefit or burden does not touch or concern real property;
  7. There is no privity of estate or contract;
  8. The holder dies, ceases to exist, resigns, or is replaced; or
  9. The owner of an interest subject to the environmental covenant and the holder are the same person.

An instrument that creates restrictions or obligations with respect to real property that would qualify as activity and use limitations except for the fact that the instrument was recorded before July 1, 2008, is not invalid or unenforceable because of any of the limitations on enforcement of interests described in subsection (b) or because it was identified as an easement, servitude, deed restriction, or other interest. This chapter does not apply in any other respect to such an instrument.

This chapter does not invalidate or render unenforceable any interest, whether designated as an environmental covenant or other interest, that is otherwise enforceable under the law of this state.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

§ 89-23-11. Relation of this chapter to other land-use laws.

This chapter does not authorize a use of real property that is otherwise prohibited by zoning, by law other than this chapter regulating use of real property, or by a recorded instrument that has priority over the environmental covenant.

An environmental covenant may prohibit or restrict uses of real property which are authorized by zoning or by law other than this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

§ 89-23-13. Notice requirement; penalty for failure to provide notice.

A copy of an environmental covenant shall be provided by the persons and in the manner required by the agency to:

  1. Each person that signed the covenant;
  2. Each person holding a recorded interest in the real property subject to the covenant;
  3. Each person in possession of the real property subject to the covenant;
  4. Each municipality or other unit of local government in which real property subject to the covenant is located; and
  5. Any other person the agency requires.

The validity of a covenant is not affected by failure to provide a copy of the covenant as required under this section.

Failure by any person to provide a copy of the covenant in the manner required by the agency shall be punishable by a civil penalty to be determined by the Commission on Environmental Quality consistent with the terms and provisions of Section 49-17-43.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

§ 89-23-15. Recording of environmental covenant, amendment, and termination.

An environmental covenant and any amendment or termination of the covenant must be recorded in every county in which any portion of the real property subject to the covenant is located. For purposes of indexing, a holder shall be treated as a grantee.

Except as otherwise provided in Section 89-23-17(b), an environmental covenant is subject to the laws of this state governing recording and priority of interests in real property including, but not limited to, the requirement of providing indexing instructions and preparer data, as set forth in Section 89-5-33(3); and, the requirement to provide an acknowledgment as set forth in Section 89-3-1.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

§ 89-23-17. Duration of environmental covenants.

An environmental covenant is perpetual unless it is:

  1. By its terms limited to a specific duration or terminated by the occurrence of a specific event;
  2. Terminated by consent pursuant to Section 89-23-19;
  3. Terminated by foreclosure of an interest that has priority over the environmental covenant;
  4. Terminated or modified in an eminent domain proceeding, but only if:
  5. Terminated or modified by the commission pursuant to the following:

The commission and the agency that signed the covenant are parties to the proceeding;

All persons identified in Section 89-23-19(a) and (b) are given notice of the pendency of the proceeding; and

The court determines, after hearing, that the termination or modification will not adversely affect human health or the environment; or

If the agency that signed an environmental covenant has determined that the intended benefits of the covenant can no longer be realized, the commission, by an order in which all persons identified in Section 89-23-19(a) and (b) have been given notice, may terminate the covenant or reduce its burden on the real property subject to the covenant.

The commission’s order shall be subject to review as provided in Section 49-17-41. Failure by the commission to make a determination within one hundred twenty (120) days of a request to terminate the covenant or reduce its burden on the real property subject to the covenant shall be deemed a decision that the environmental covenant should not be terminated or modified and parties listed in Section 89-23-21 may request a hearing before the commission in accordance with Section 49-17-41.

Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a), an environmental covenant may not be extinguished, limited, or impaired through issuance of a tax deed, foreclosure of a tax lien, or application of the doctrine of adverse possession, prescription, abandonment, waiver, lack of enforcement, or acquiescence, or a similar doctrine.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

Cross References —

Right of eminent domain, generally, see §§11-27-1 et seq.

Commission on Environmental Quality generally, see §49-2-5.

§ 89-23-19. Amendment or termination of environmental covenant; consent.

An environmental covenant may be amended or terminated by consent only if the amendment or termination is signed by:

  1. The agency;
  2. Unless waived by the agency, the current owner of the fee simple of the real property subject to the covenant;
  3. The commission, unless it waives its participation;
  4. Each person that originally signed the covenant, unless the person waived in a signed record the right to consent or a court finds that the person no longer exists or cannot be located or identified with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and
  5. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d)(2), the holder.

If an interest in real property is subject to an environmental covenant, the interest is not affected by an amendment of the covenant unless the current owner of the interest consents to the amendment or has waived in a signed record the right to consent to amendments.

Except for an assignment undertaken pursuant to a governmental reorganization, assignment of an environmental covenant to a new holder is an amendment.

Except as otherwise provided in an environmental covenant:

A holder may not assign its interest without consent of the other parties;

A holder may be removed and replaced by agreement of the other parties specified in subsection (a); and

A court of competent jurisdiction may fill a vacancy in the position of holder.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

Cross References —

Commission on Environmental Quality generally, see §49-2-5.

Recording of environmental covenant, amendments to covenant and termination of covenant required, see §89-23-15.

§ 89-23-21. Violation of environmental covenant; injunctive relief.

A civil action for injunctive or other equitable relief for violation of an environmental covenant may be maintained by:

  1. A party to the covenant;
  2. The agency;
  3. The commission;
  4. Any person to whom the covenant expressly grants power to enforce;
  5. A person whose interest in the real property or whose collateral or liability may be affected by the alleged violation of the covenant; or
  6. A municipality or other unit of local government in which the real property subject to the covenant is located.

This chapter does not limit the regulatory authority of the agency or the Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality under law other than this chapter with respect to an environmental response project.

A person is not responsible for or subject to liability for environmental remediation solely because it has the right to enforce an environmental covenant.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

Cross References —

Commission on Environmental Quality, generally, see §49-2-5.

§ 89-23-23. Application and construction of chapter.

In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

§ 89-23-25. Relation of chapter to federal law.

This chapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 USCS Section 7001 et seq.) but does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101 of that act (15 USCS Section 7001(a)) or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103 of that act (15 USCS Section 7003(b)).

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 13, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

§ 89-23-27. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 398, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

Chapter 25. Mississippi Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities

§ 89-25-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be referred to as the “Mississippi Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities.”

HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 414, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

§ 89-25-3. Statutory rule against perpetuities.

  1. A nonvested property interest is invalid unless:
    1. When the interest is created, it is certain to vest or terminate no later than twenty-one (21) years after the death of an individual then alive; or
    2. The interest either vests or terminates within ninety (90) years after its creation.
  2. A general power of appointment not presently exercisable because of a condition precedent is invalid unless:
    1. When the power is created, the condition precedent is certain to be satisfied or becomes impossible to satisfy no later than twenty-one (21) years after the death of an individual then alive; or
    2. The condition precedent either is satisfied or becomes impossible to satisfy within ninety (90) years after its creation.
  3. A nongeneral power of appointment or a general testamentary power of appointment is invalid unless:
    1. When the power is created, it is certain to be irrevocably exercised or otherwise to terminate no later than twenty-one (21) years after the death of an individual then alive; or
    2. The power is irrevocably exercised or otherwise terminates within ninety (90) years after its creation.
  4. In determining whether a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment is valid under subsection (1) (a), (2) (a), or (3) (a) of this section, the possibility that a child will be born to an individual after the individual’s death is disregarded.
  5. If, in measuring a period from the creation of a trust or other property arrangement, language in a governing instrument seeks to disallow the vesting or termination of any interest or trust beyond, seeks to postpone the vesting or termination of any interest or trust until, or seeks to operate in effect in any similar fashion upon, the later of:
    1. The expiration of a period of time not exceeding twenty-one (21) years after the death of the survivor of specified lives in being at the creation of the trust or other property arrangement; or
    2. The expiration of a period of time that exceeds or might exceed twenty-one (21) years after the death of the survivor of lives in being at the creation of the trust or other property arrangement;

      that language is inoperative to the extent that it produces a period of time that exceeds twenty-one (21) years after the death of the survivor of the specified lives.

HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 414, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in subsection (4) by inserting the word “is” between the words “death” and “disregarded” near the end of the subsection. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its August 17, 2015, meeting.

§ 89-25-5. When nonvested property interest or power of appointment is created.

  1. Except as provided in subsections (2), (3) and (4) of this section and in Section 89-25-11(1), the time of creation of a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment is determined under general principles of property law.
  2. For purposes of this chapter, if there is a person who alone can exercise a power created by a governing instrument to become the unqualified beneficial owner of:
    1. A nonvested property interest; or
    2. A property interest subject to a power of appointment described in Section 89-25-3(2) or (3), the nonvested property interest or power of appointment is created when the power to become the unqualified beneficial owner terminates.
  3. For purposes of this chapter, a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment arising from a transfer of property to a previously funded trust or other existing property arrangement is created when the nonvested property interest or power of appointment in the original contribution was created.
  4. For purposes of this chapter, if a nongeneral or testamentary power of appointment is exercised to create another nongeneral or testamentary power of appointment, every nonvested property interest or power of appointment created through the exercise of the other nongeneral or testamentary power of appointment is considered to have been created at the time of the creation of the first nongeneral or testamentary power of appointment.

HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 414, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

§ 89-25-7. Reformation.

Upon petition of an interested person, a court shall reform a disposition in the manner that most closely approximates the transferor’s manifested plan of distribution and is within the ninety (90) years allowed by Section 89-25-3(1)(b), (2)(b) or (3)(b) or the three hundred sixty (360) years allowed in Section 89-25-9(h), if:

A nonvested property interest or a power of appointment becomes invalid under Section 89-25-3;

A class gift is not invalid, but might become invalid under Section 89-25-3, and the time has arrived when the share of any class member is to take effect in possession or enjoyment;

A nonvested property interest that is not validated by Section 89-25-3(1)(a) can vest but not within ninety (90) years after its creation; or

In the case of a trust which otherwise meets the requirements of Section 89-25-9(h), all beneficial interests in the trust can vest or the trust can terminate but not within three hundred sixty (360) years.

HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 414, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

§ 89-25-9. Exclusions from the statutory rule against perpetuities.

Section 89-25-3 shall not apply to:

A nonvested property interest or a power of appointment arising out of a nondonative transfer, except a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment arising out of:

A premarital or postmarital agreement;

A separation or divorce settlement;

A spouse’s election;

A similar arrangement arising out of a prospective, existing, or previous marital relationship between the parties;

A contract to make or not to revoke a will or trust;

A contract to exercise or not to exercise a power of appointment;

A transfer in satisfaction of a duty of support; or

A reciprocal transfer;

A fiduciary’s power relating to the administration or management of assets, including the power of a fiduciary to sell, lease, or mortgage property, and the power of a fiduciary to determine principal and income;

A power to appoint a fiduciary;

A discretionary power of a trustee to distribute principal before termination of a trust to a beneficiary having an indefeasibly vested interest in the income and principal;

A nonvested property interest held by a charity, government, or governmental agency or subdivision, if the nonvested property interest is preceded by an interest held by another charity, government, or governmental agency or subdivision;

A nonvested property interest in or a power of appointment with respect to a trust or other property arrangement forming part of a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, health, disability, death benefit, income deferral, or other current or deferred benefit plan for one or more employees, independent contractors, or their beneficiaries or spouses, to which contributions are made for the purpose of distributing to or for the benefit of the participants or their beneficiaries or spouses the property, income, or principal in the trust or other property arrangement, except a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment that is created by an election of a participant or a beneficiary or spouse;

A property interest, power of appointment, or arrangement that was not subject to the common-law rule against perpetuities or is excluded by another statute of this state; or

A trust:

That is governed by the laws of this state;

That grants to the trustee the power to sell trust property; and

Which, pursuant to the terms of the trust instrument, does not exceed:

1. Three hundred sixty (360) years as to personal property; and

2. One hundred ten (110) years as to real property.

HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 414, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

§ 89-25-11. Prospective application.

  1. Except as provided by subsection (2) of this section, this chapter applies to a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment that is created on or after July 1, 2015. For purposes of this section, a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment created by the exercise of a power of appointment is created when the power is irrevocably exercised or when a revocable exercise becomes irrevocable.
  2. If a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment was created before July 1, 2015 and is determined in a judicial proceeding, commenced on or after July 1, 2015, to violate this state’s rule against perpetuities as that rule existed before July 1, 2015, a court upon the petition of an interested person may reform the disposition in the manner that most closely approximates the transferor’s manifested plan of distribution and is within the limits of the rule against perpetuities applicable when the nonvested property interest or power of appointment was created.

HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 414, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

§ 89-25-13. Uniformity.

This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.

HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 414, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

§ 89-25-15. Supersession.

This chapter supersedes the rule of the common law known as the rule against perpetuities.

HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 414, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 2015.