Authority of Court.

While the district court may have the authority to invoke its equitable power, the exercise of that authority may be inappropriate. Braaten for Heirs of Boomgaarden v. Deere & Co., 1997 ND 202, 569 N.W.2d 563, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 247 (N.D. 1997).

Conflict in Decisions.

Where there is a conflict in the decisions of a court the latest decision is generally regarded as controlling and will be followed in determining the same question. GOODMAN v. MEVORAH, 79 N.D. 653, 59 N.W.2d 192, 1953 N.D. LEXIS 71 (N.D. 1953).

Stare Decisis.

The doctrine of stare decisis has received constitutional and legislative recognition in this state. Young v. Salzer Lumber Co., 52 N.D. 685, 204 N.W. 8, 1925 N.D. LEXIS 120 (N.D. 1925).

Statutes As Continuation of Common Law.

The common law is adopted by statute as the basic law applicable to civil rights and remedies not defined by statute and a statute will be construed as a continuation of the common law, not as excluding the common law on that part of the subject not covered by the statute. Reeves & Co. v. Russell, 28 N.D. 265, 148 N.W. 654, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 111 (N.D. 1914).

When Common Law Applied.

Where there is no express constitutional or statutory declaration on a subject, the common law is applied. Brignall v. Hannah, 34 N.D. 174, 157 N.W. 1042, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 22 (N.D. 1916); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526, 1932 N.D. LEXIS 166 (N.D. 1932).

Collateral References.

Federal jurisdiction, rules, regulations, and executive orders as “laws”, for purposes of, 14 A.L.R.2d 1009.

Common Law Lien Declared by Statute.

The codes are a continuation of the common law; and, where the code declared a lien recognized at common law, but was silent as to priority, the lien was construed to have the priority it had at common law. Reeves & Co. v. Russell, 28 N.D. 265, 148 N.W. 654, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 111 (N.D. 1914).

When Common Law Applied.

Where there is no express constitutional or statutory declaration on a subject, the common law is applied. Brignall v. Hannah, 34 N.D. 174, 157 N.W. 1042, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 22 (N.D. 1916); Bank of Conway v. Stary, 51 N.D. 399, 200 N.W. 505, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 188 (N.D. 1924).

Capacity of Juveniles.

State was not required to present evidence that a 10 year old who stole a car was capable of committing a crime because the common law presumption of incapacity does not apply where the responsibility of children is declared by statute. Anderson v. M.C.H. (In the Interest of M.C.H.), 2001 ND 205, 637 N.W.2d 678, 2001 N.D. LEXIS 234 (N.D. 2001).

Code Prevails Over Common Law.

In a products liability case brought against the seller of a meat grinder, the Supreme Court of North Dakota declined to adopt the “apparent manufacturer” doctrine, because the products liability act curtailed liability of a “nonmanufacturing seller” under N.D.C.C. § 28-01.3-04 and controlled over any conflicting common law doctrine under N.D.C.C. § 1-01-06. Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 ND 183, 804 N.W.2d 55, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 192 (N.D. 2011).

Because statutes allow the parties to a written instrument to challenge the existence of consideration, and there is no common law where the law is declared by the code, the owner was not estopped from asserting the option was gratuitous and given without consideration. Deckert v. McCormick, 2014 ND 231, 857 N.W.2d 355, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 226 (N.D. 2014).

Common Law Application.

Where there is no express constitutional or statutory declaration on a subject, the common law is applied. Brignall v. Hannah, 34 N.D. 174, 157 N.W. 1042, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 22 (N.D. 1916); Bank of Conway v. Stary, 51 N.D. 399, 200 N.W. 505, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 188 (N.D. 1924); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526, 1932 N.D. LEXIS 166 (N.D. 1932); McLaughlin Oil Co. v. First State Bank, 79 N.D. 525, 57 N.W.2d 860, 1953 N.D. LEXIS 59 (N.D. 1953); Anderson v. Blixt, 72 N.W.2d 799, 1955 N.D. LEXIS 145 (N.D. 1955).

Common Law Supplementation of Commercial Code.

The particular language of N.D.C.C. § 41-01-03, permitting common law supplementation of the U.C.C., controls the general language of this section. Great Am. Ins. Cos. v. American State Bank, 385 N.W.2d 460, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 289 (N.D. 1986).

Common Law Supplementation of Uniform Probate Code.

District court erred in finding that the testator’s missing will was not presumed to be revoked, because while N.D.C.C. § 30.1-08-07 did not speak to admitting a lost will and neither N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-14-03 nor 30.1-15-02 provided specific presumptions for admitting a missing will, the drafter’s of the Uniform Probate Code did contemplate the probate of lost wills, and the district court erroneously failed to apply the common law amino revocandi presumption that a missing will was revoked; if a will could not be found upon the death of the testator, the presumption arose that the testator revoked the missing will, and under N.D.R.Ev. 301(a), the party seeking to probate the missing will must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the testator did not destroy or revoke the missing will animo revocandi. York v. Conley (In re Estate of Conley), 2008 ND 148, 753 N.W.2d 384, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 2008).

Dram Shop Statute.

The legislature intended to create a new, distinct cause of action unrelated to any recognized by common law when it enacted the dram shop statute, and did not thereby supersede unrelated premises liability actions against bar owners. Zueger v. Carlson, 542 N.W.2d 92, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 21 (N.D. 1996).

Equity.

As common law encompasses equity, and as there is no common law in any case where the law is declared by the code, equity does not apply where the law is declared by statute. State by Workmen's Compensation Bureau v. Clary, 389 N.W.2d 347, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 327 (N.D. 1986).

Exclusiveness of Statutory Expression.

The code having declared the law as to the recovery of usurious interest, there is no common-law right. Wood v. Cuthbertson, 21 N.W. 3, 3 Dakota 328, 1884 Dakota LEXIS 11 (Dakota 1884).

If a statute says that certain causes of action are transferable, it fixes public policy, and where the code speaks there is no common law. Grabow v. Bergeth, 59 N.D. 214, 229 N.W. 282, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 1930).

The statutory definition of a felony is the only definition which the court knows. State v. Malusky, 59 N.D. 501, 230 N.W. 735, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 169 (N.D. 1930).

If a particular statute is so designed that it covers the entire field to which it relates, it does so to the exclusion of the common law. In re White, 69 N.D. 61, 284 N.W. 357, 1939 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1939).

The statutes relating to the pronouncement of judgment upon conviction of a crime are exclusive, and the common law no longer applies. State ex rel. Perry v. Garecht, 70 N.D. 599, 297 N.W. 132, 1941 N.D. LEXIS 206 (N.D. 1941).

All rights and obligations under the Workers’ Compensation Act are wholly statutory. The legislature may change those rights and obligations and the legislature may afford remedies for violations of workers’ compensation statutes or may not. At any rate, common-law contract principles cannot be used to expand either the statutory rights of the claimant or the statutory obligations of the Bureau. Effertz v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 481 N.W.2d 223, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 27 (N.D. 1992).

There cannot be two rules of law on the same subject contradicting each other; therefore, where the code declares the law, there can be no occasion to look further, but where the code is silent the common law prevails. Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 6 S. Ct. 590, 29 L. Ed. 755 (1886).

Marriage.

North Dakota abrogated common-law marriages shortly after statehood; unless the statutory requirements are met, the fact of cohabitation alone is insufficient to create a legally recognized marriage. Cermak v. Cermak, 1997 ND 187, 569 N.W.2d 280, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 1997).

Statutes Construed As Continuation of Common Law.

A statute will be construed as a continuation of the common law, not as excluding the common law on that part of the subject not covered by the statute. Reeves & Co. v. Russell, 28 N.D. 265, 148 N.W. 654, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 111 (N.D. 1914).

Statute of Limitations.

Because this section provided that statutory enactments took precedence over and governed conflicting common law doctrines, the statute of limitations in N.D.C.C. § 34-01-20, not the six-year common law statute of limitations, applied to a retaliation claim by a whistleblowing employee against an employer. Vandall v. Trinity Hosps., 2004 ND 47, 676 N.W.2d 88, 2004 N.D. LEXIS 60 (N.D. 2004).

Waiver of Mechanic’s Lien.

A party entitled to a mechanic’s lien may waive that right by a signed writing or may be estopped to assert the mechanic’s lien by acts or conduct constituting estoppel. Peterson Mechanical v. Nereson, 466 N.W.2d 568, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 12 (N.D. 1991).

Waiver of Ownership.

Dog owner was entitled to a hearing under N.D.C.C. § 36-21.1-06 to determine whether her dogs should be returned or whether she voluntarily relinquished ownership, pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 1-01-08, because a relinquishment of ownership form, signed by the owner, was inconsistent with a notice of confiscation, which deputy sheriffs gave to the owner after confiscating her dogs. Peterson v. State (In re Peterson's Dogs), 2008 ND 225, 758 N.W.2d 749, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 207 (N.D. 2008).

Application.

A word defined by a statute always has the same meaning. Grunow v. Simonitsch, 21 N.D. 277, 130 N.W. 835, 1911 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 1911); Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Berzel, 69 N.D. 760, 291 N.W. 550, 1940 N.D. LEXIS 205 (N.D. 1940); Universal Motors v. Coman, 73 N.D. 337, 15 N.W.2d 73, 1944 N.D. LEXIS 66 (N.D. 1944).

General Statutory Definitions.

Where the guest statute used the term “gross negligence” without defining it, the general statutory definition of the term could be applied. Jacobs v. Nelson, 67 N.D. 27, 268 N.W. 873, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1936).

Reference to Related Statute.

Where there is doubt as to the sense in which a given word is used in a statute, it is proper to refer to cognate or related legislation to determine the sense in which the word was employed. Grabow v. Bergeth, 59 N.D. 214, 229 N.W. 282, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 1930).

Application.

The majority of the members of a board constitutes a legal quorum and the proceedings of a majority of the board of drain commissioners are valid. Turnquist v. Cass County Drain Comm'rs, 11 N.D. 514, 92 N.W. 852, 1902 N.D. LEXIS 245 (N.D. 1902).

Collateral References.

Municipal council: what constitutes requisite majority of members of municipal council voting on issue, 43 A.L.R.2d 698.

Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs.

Sheriffs are ministerial officers. A return of “Defendant not Found” in the sheriff’s name by the deputy sheriff was proper. Turnquist v. Kjelbak, 77 N.W.2d 854, 1956 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1956).

State Toxicologist.

Where driver’s license was suspended for failing field sobriety test, deputy state toxicologist could lawfully certify device, method, and that operator had been approved by state toxicologist, to establish the foundation for admissibility of driver’s blood-test results in suspension hearing. Tabert v. North Dakota DOT, 1997 ND 39, 560 N.W.2d 883, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 59 (N.D. 1997).

Collateral References.

Power of assistant or deputy prosecuting or district attorney to file information, or to sign or prosecute it in his own name, 80 A.L.R.2d 1067.

Automobile Guest Statute.

In the absence of a definition of terms in the automobile guest statute, this section defines gross negligence for the purposes of that statute. Jacobs v. Nelson, 67 N.D. 27, 268 N.W. 873, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1936).

Evidence of Reputation for Care.

It was not reversible error to exclude testimony as to defendant’s reputation for care in his profession, since the question of care is one to be decided from the facts in the particular case. McBride v. Wallace, 17 N.D. 495, 117 N.W. 857, 1908 N.D. LEXIS 79 (N.D. 1908).

Instructions.

It was not reversible error to inform a jury as to the different degrees of care and negligence imposed upon the defendant. McBride v. Wallace, 17 N.D. 495, 117 N.W. 857, 1908 N.D. LEXIS 79 (N.D. 1908).

Ordinary Care.

Under N.D.C.C. § 8-03-02 a carrier of property for reward must use at least ordinary care and diligence in the performance of all his duties. Saetz v. Braun, 116 N.W.2d 628, 1962 N.D. LEXIS 84 (N.D. 1962).

Ordinary care means such care as persons of ordinary prudence usually exercise about their own affairs of ordinary importance. Saetz v. Braun, 116 N.W.2d 628, 1962 N.D. LEXIS 84 (N.D. 1962).

Railroads.

The statutory presumption of negligence for an injury to stock trespassing upon a railway track refers to the negligence of the railway company after the stock is discovered in a place of danger. Reinke v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. St. M. Ry., 23 N.D. 182, 135 N.W. 779, 1912 N.D. LEXIS 74 (N.D. 1912).

Culpable Negligence.

In the statute defining second-degree manslaughter as applied to the operation of an automobile, the term “culpable negligence” implied a total lack of care which could be described as operating an automobile in a reckless and heedless manner with utter disregard for the lives and limbs of persons upon the highway. State v. Gulke, 76 N.D. 653, 38 N.W.2d 722 (1949), decided prior to the enactment of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-02.

Degree of Negligence Determined by Facts.

The distinction intimates clearly that the grade of negligence is determined by the facts in the case, and is primarily and generally a question of fact for the jury. Jacobs v. Nelson, 67 N.D. 27, 268 N.W. 873, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1936).

Intent Not Implied.

Negligence, whether slight, ordinary, or gross, consists of want of care and implies the absence of intentional wrongdoing. Hart v. Evanson, 14 N.D. 570, 105 N.W. 942 (N.D. 1895).

Automobile Guest Statute.

This definition applies to the term “gross negligence” within the meaning of the automobile guest statute, in the absence of a definition of such term in the guest statute. Jacobs v. Nelson, 67 N.D. 27, 268 N.W. 873, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1936).

Gross Negligence.

—In General.

Willful failure to exercise slight care, even though of brief duration, which results in injury to another, amounts to gross negligence. Rubbelke v. Jacobsen, 66 N.D. 720, 268 N.W. 675, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 219 (N.D. 1936).

—False Arrest.

Police officers were statutorily immune from suit for false arrest, where they advised plaintiff he was not privileged to be in university student lounge and gave him notice he was trespassing; reasonable officers could have believed there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff for trespassing, and their actions could not have constituted gross negligence. Wishnatsky v. Bergquist, 550 N.W.2d 394, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 156 (N.D.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 895, 117 S. Ct. 240, 136 L. Ed. 2d 169, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 5876 (U.S. 1996).

Instruction to Jury.

Trial court did not err in refusing to give a requested instruction on gross negligence where the court gave a sufficient instruction based on the statutory definition of “gross negligence” as found in this section. Sheets v. Pendergrast, 106 N.W.2d 1, 1960 N.D. LEXIS 92 (N.D. 1960).

Ordinary Negligence.

Airplane lessee, a partnership, was not bound by its partner’s actions in holding himself out as its president and entering a sale-lease back transaction because the leasing company had acted with ordinary negligence when it deposited the proceeds of the transaction in the partner’s bank account rather than the lessee’s account and prepared multiple bills of sale which evidenced its confusion (or knowledge) of the plane’s ownership, in addition to the circumstances surrounding the signing of the lease agreement, which resulted in an unidentified person printing “President” after the partner’s name at the end of the lease. Weinreis v. Hill, 2006 ND 170, 719 N.W.2d 354, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 173 (N.D. 2006).

Negotiable Notes As Consideration for Antecedent Debt.

One is a purchaser for value who takes a negotiable promissory note in the usual course of business from the payee who transfers it by endorsement of a guaranty of payment and the paper is in payment of an antecedent debt. Dunham v. Peterson, 5 N.D. 414, 67 N.W. 293, 1896 N.D. LEXIS 42 (N.D. 1896).

Where a note was transferred by the endorsement of a written guaranty of payment by the payee, the holders were not endorsees in due course who took the note as collateral security for an antecedent debt. Porter v. Andrus, 10 N.D. 558, 88 N.W. 567, 1901 N.D. LEXIS 75 (N.D. 1901).

Value.

Where a person furnished funds to another to purchase a house, and the funds were misappropriated and the lender later took a mortgage, he was not an encumbrancer for value as against a bank which was a good faith encumbrancer without notice and for value. Merchants' Bank v. Schatz, 59 N.D. 365, 230 N.W. 18, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 150 (N.D. 1930).

Destroyed Evidence.

Bad faith, as used in criminal cases involving evidence destroyed by the state, means that the state deliberately destroyed the evidence with the intent to deprive the defense of information; that is, that the evidence was destroyed by, or at the direction of, a state agent who intended to thwart the defense. State v. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d 608, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 94 (N.D. 1993).

Presumption of Good Faith.

Where the grantors of mineral interests in land were dealing with strangers and the grantors signed a mineral deed thinking it was a copy of a mineral lease executed at the same time, the grantors must bear the resulting loss as against bona fide purchasers for value from the grantee. The purchasers from the grantee had a right to rely on the presumption of fair and honest dealing. Hoffer v. Crawford, 65 N.W.2d 625, 1954 N.D. LEXIS 97 (N.D. 1954).

It was not error to instruct a jury that transfers by failing debtors to relatives should be scrutinized with special care, when the court further stated that the mere fact of relationship is not a badge of fraud and that the law presumes good faith and honest intentions. Shauer v. Alterton, 151 U.S. 607, 14 S. Ct. 442, 38 L. Ed. 286, 1894 U.S. LEXIS 2085 (U.S. 1894).

Purchaser of Real Estate.

Purchaser who was well acquainted with his grantor and knew that the grantor was not in actual possession of the premises and was aware of a prior recorded quitclaim deed was not a bona fide purchaser in good faith. Gajewski v. Bratcher, 221 N.W.2d 614, 1974 N.D. LEXIS 173, 1974 N.D. LEXIS 222 (N.D. 1974).

Purchaser of mineral title was a bona fide purchaser where he paid valuable consideration, had no intent to take unfair advantage, and had no notice, actual or constructive, of outstanding rights of others. Rosenquist v. Harris, 138 F. Supp. 21, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3722 (D.N.D. 1956).

Trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to plaintiff in a quiet title action against defendants because defendants did not have constructive notice of a mistake in a 1992 deed that resulted in a discrepancy in the placement of a legal boundary between the parties’ parcels of land; defendants were good faith purchasers. Farmers Union Oil Co. v. Smetana, 2009 ND 74, 764 N.W.2d 665, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 81 (N.D. 2009).

Question of Fact.

Good faith is a question of fact to be determined in a case. Thompson v. Sioux Falls Nat'l Bank, 150 U.S. 231, 14 S. Ct. 94, 37 L. Ed. 1063, 1893 U.S. LEXIS 2377 (U.S. 1893); Merchant v. Pielke, 10 N.D. 48, 84 N.W. 574, 1900 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1900).

A factual dispute existed as to whether partners in partnership had notice of facts which would provoke a prudent person to make further inquiry about rent obligation under ground lease purchased by partnership, so that district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that partnership had constructive notice of the mutual mistake in lease and, therefore, was not a good faith purchaser. Diocese of Bismarck Trust v. Ramada, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 760, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 214 (N.D. 1996).

A party’s status as a good faith purchaser is a mixed question of fact and law. Boe v. Rose, 1998 ND 29, 574 N.W.2d 834, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 39 (N.D. 1998).

In a dispute over an oil and gas lease, it was error for a trial court to grant summary judgment upon concluding, as a matter of law, that an individual was not a bona fide purchaser, due to having constructive notice of another’s claim when recording the lease, because (1) whether the individual had notice was a question of fact, (2) deciding an issue on summary judgment was not appropriate if the court had to draw inferences or make findings on disputed facts, (3) although two corporations argued the facts were not disputed, the corporations did not agree on the inferences that could be drawn from the evidence, (4) more than one inference could reasonably be drawn from the evidence and findings of fact were required, which was not appropriate in a summary judgment proceeding, (5) whether the individual acquired property rights in good faith and for value required findings of fact about the events surrounding a transaction, and (6) a factual dispute existed about whether the individual had constructive notice when the individual acquired rights under the lease. Northern Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Creighton, 2013 ND 73, 830 N.W.2d 556, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 73 (N.D. 2013).

Recording Act Requires Good Faith.

“Good faith”, within the recording act, implies the absence of information and belief of facts rendering the transaction unconscientious. Hunter v. McDevitt, 12 N.D. 505, 97 N.W. 869, 1903 N.D. LEXIS 63 (N.D. 1903); Harry E. McHugh, Inc. v. Haley, 61 N.D. 359, 237 N.W. 835, 1931 N.D. LEXIS 284 (N.D. 1931).

It was no error to quiet title to real estate in owners, despite the owners not recording title until after purchasers bought the property, because the purchasers had constructive notice of the owners' conflicting interest, as the purchasers knew someone planted trees around the property, which was next to the owners' home, and that the owners watered the trees and otherwise maintained the property, but did not ask the seller if the owners bought or rented the property or if the seller had sold the property, so the purchasers were not good faith purchasers, as the owners' possession and occupancy was open and notorious. Chornuk v. Nelson, 2014 ND 238, 857 N.W.2d 587, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 242 (N.D. 2014).

Summary Judgment.

In an action seeking to quiet title in mineral interests, summary judgment was inappropriate because there were disputed issues of material fact about whether the buyers were good-faith purchasers for value without notice of a prior unrecorded deed. A deed that was executed in 1990, but not recorded until 2012, was valid between the parties to the instrument and those with notice, a statement of claim imposed a duty of further inquiry to ascertain the state of the ownership of the disputed mineral interests, and a buyer was deemed to have constructive notice of the facts an inquiry would have revealed. Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson, 2016 ND 37, 875 N.W.2d 510, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 34 (N.D. 2016).

Law Reviews.

Is Good Faith in Insurance Contracts a Two-Way Street? 62 N.D. L. Rev. 355 (1986).

Exclusiveness of Statutory Definition.

The legislature has not left the meaning of the phrase “actual notice” open for judicial definition; it has itself declared the meaning which is to be ascribed to it. Patnode v. Deschenes, 15 N.D. 100, 106 N.W. 573, 1906 N.D. LEXIS 17 (N.D. 1906).

False Notice Is Not Valid.

Where plaintiff told defendant that plaintiff had received a mortgage from a third party, but it appeared that he did not have such a mortgage, it was not sufficient later to charge defendant with notice of an equity claimed by plaintiff. Myhra v. Rustad, 58 N.D. 258, 225 N.W. 796, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 203 (N.D. 1929).

Instruction.

The use of the term “knowledge or notice” in an instruction on the question of actual notice was held not to be so misleading as to be prejudicial. Farmers State Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 51 N.D. 225, 199 N.W. 961, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 186 (N.D. 1924).

Notice As Jury Question.

Rule that possession of building is notice of occupant’s interest therein is not unduly burdensome to one purchasing land upon which building is located; whether under all existent circumstances purchaser of real property has notice, actual or constructive, of outstanding interest in buildings on purchaser land is question for jury. Zimmer v. Bellon, 153 N.W.2d 757, 1967 N.D. LEXIS 100 (N.D. 1967).

Notice of Agreements with Respect to Property.

An agreement to give fixtures the legal character of personalty avails as against a purchaser of the land with notice thereof, actual or constructive. Newell v. McMurray, 51 N.D. 901, 201 N.W. 845, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 98 (N.D. 1924).

Written Notice.

Where the law prescribes a written notice as a method of giving information, the receipt of a letter containing the information is conclusive proof of knowledge of the purpose thereof. Brown v. Otesa, 80 N.W.2d 92, 1956 N.D. LEXIS 162 (N.D. 1956).

False Notice Is Not Valid.

Where plaintiff told defendant that plaintiff had received a mortgage from a third party, but it appeared that he did not have such a mortgage, it was not sufficient later to charge defendant with notice of an equity claimed by plaintiff. Myhra v. Rustad, 58 N.D. 258, 225 N.W. 796, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 203 (N.D. 1929).

Knowledge Imputed from Circumstances.

Even though constructive notice may not impart any knowledge whatsoever, from the circumstances the law imputes knowledge. Brown v. Otesa, 80 N.W.2d 92, 1956 N.D. LEXIS 162 (N.D. 1956).

Because the purchasers of real estate learned that the land was for sale through an advertisement in a local newspaper, which specifically stated that “no mineral interests will pass with the land,” and that the land would be sold “subject to any leases, encumbrances, covenants, reservations, restrictions, easements, conditions and rights appearing of record,” but did not conduct any inquiry into the state of the trustee’s title but rather assumed that they were receiving the gravel underlying the property, they were deemed to have constructive notice of the records in the register of deeds’ [now recorder] office and related unrecorded contracts. Vanderhoof v. Gravel Prods., 404 N.W.2d 485, 1987 N.D. LEXIS 294 (N.D. 1987).

In a dispute over an oil and gas lease, it was error for a trial court to grant summary judgment upon concluding, as a matter of law, that an individual was not a bona fide purchaser, due to having constructive notice of another’s claim when recording the lease, because (1) whether the individual had notice was a question of fact, (2) deciding an issue on summary judgment was not appropriate if the court had to draw inferences or make findings on disputed facts, (3) although two corporations argued the facts were not disputed, the corporations did not agree on the inferences that could be drawn from the evidence, (4) more than one inference could reasonably be drawn from the evidence and findings of fact were required, which was not appropriate in a summary judgment proceeding, (5) whether the individual acquired property rights in good faith and for value required findings of fact about the events surrounding a transaction, and (6) a factual dispute existed about whether the individual had constructive notice when the individual acquired rights under the lease. Northern Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Creighton, 2013 ND 73, 830 N.W.2d 556, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 73 (N.D. 2013).

Mineral Interest.

In an action seeking to quiet title in mineral interests, summary judgment was inappropriate because there were disputed issues of material fact about whether the buyers were good-faith purchasers for value without notice of a prior unrecorded deed. A deed that was executed in 1990, but not recorded until 2012, was valid between the parties to the instrument and those with notice, a statement of claim imposed a duty of further inquiry to ascertain the state of the ownership of the disputed mineral interests, and a buyer was deemed to have constructive notice of the facts an inquiry would have revealed. Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson, 2016 ND 37, 875 N.W.2d 510, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 34 (N.D. 2016).

Negotiable Instruments.

This section has no application to actions upon negotiable instruments in the hands of endorsees before maturity. American Nat'l Bank v. Lundy, 21 N.D. 167, 129 N.W. 99, 1910 N.D. LEXIS 154 (N.D. 1910).

Where a bank cashier had actual notice of the infirmity in a negotiable instrument, the knowledge is presumed to have been inputed to the president of the bank at the time he purchased the instrument from the bank. McCarty v. Kepreta, 24 N.D. 395, 139 N.W. 992, 1913 N.D. LEXIS 9 (N.D. 1913).

Purchaser of Real Estate.

Trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to plaintiff in a quiet title action against defendants because defendants did not have constructive notice of a mistake in a 1992 deed that resulted in a discrepancy in the placement of a legal boundary between the parties’ parcels of land; defendants were good faith purchasers. Farmers Union Oil Co. v. Smetana, 2009 ND 74, 764 N.W.2d 665, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 81 (N.D. 2009).

It was no error to quiet title to real estate in owners, despite the owners not recording title until after purchasers bought the property, because the purchasers had constructive notice of the owners' conflicting interest, as the purchasers knew someone planted trees around the property, which was next to the owners' home, and that the owners watered the trees and otherwise maintained the property, but did not ask the seller if the owners bought or rented the property or if the seller had sold the property, so the purchasers were not good faith purchasers, as the owners' possession and occupancy was open and notorious. Chornuk v. Nelson, 2014 ND 238, 857 N.W.2d 587, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 242 (N.D. 2014).

District court correctly concluded that a mortgagee did not have constructive notice that an assignee’s mortgages were intended to encumber the subject property because although the mortgagee had a similar mortgage that included the same errant legal description, it did not have a duty to inquire further into the assignee’s mortgages to determine the correct legal description of the mortgaged property. PLS Servs., LLC v. Valueplus Consulting, LLC, 2021 ND 99, 960 N.W.2d 780, 2021 N.D. LEXIS 94 (N.D. 2021).

Vendor and Purchaser.

Where a purchaser of land had knowledge of the existence of a contract between his vendor and a third party concerning the land, the purchaser was charged with notice of the terms of the contract. Stone v. Bartsch, 76 N.D. 721, 39 N.W.2d 1, 1949 N.D. LEXIS 93 (N.D. 1949).

Collateral References.

Landlord and tenant: continued possession of tenant as constructive notice to third person of unrecorded transfer of title of original lessor, 1 A.L.R.2d 322.

Landlord and tenant: landlord’s notice of one defect as constructive notice of another, affecting his liability under statute requiring property to be kept in good repair, 17 A.L.R.2d 704, 722.

Highways and streets: existence of actionable defect in street or highway as question for court or jury, 1 A.L.R.3d 496.

Adverse Possession.

Even though the owner of land which is lying at some distance from his residence might be deemed to have constructive notice of the claims and occupancy of a third person who has plowed or cultivated such land, this would not be true of a third party or a creditor. Buttz v. James, 33 N.D. 162, 156 N.W. 547, 1915 N.D. LEXIS 43 (N.D. 1915).

False Notice Is Not Valid.

Where plaintiff told defendant that plaintiff had received a mortgage from a third party, but it appeared that he did not have such a mortgage, it was not sufficient later to charge defendant with notice of an equity claimed by plaintiff. Myhra v. Rustad, 58 N.D. 258, 225 N.W. 796, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 203 (N.D. 1929).

Fixtures As Personalty.

An agreement to give fixtures the legal character of personalty avails as against a purchaser of the land with notice thereof, actual or constructive. Burlington N. R.R. v. Scheid, 398 N.W.2d 114, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 444 (N.D. 1986).

Lease Terms.

A factual dispute existed as to whether partners in partnership had notice of facts which would provoke a prudent person to make further inquiry about rent obligation under ground lease purchased by partnership, so that district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that partnership had constructive notice of the mutual mistake in lease and, therefore, was not a good faith purchaser. Diocese of Bismarck Trust v. Ramada, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 760, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 214 (N.D. 1996).

In a dispute over an oil and gas lease, it was error for a trial court to grant summary judgment upon concluding, as a matter of law, that an individual was not a bona fide purchaser, due to having constructive notice of another’s claim when recording the lease, because (1) whether the individual had notice was a question of fact, (2) deciding an issue on summary judgment was not appropriate if the court had to draw inferences or make findings on disputed facts, (3) although two corporations argued the facts were not disputed, the corporations did not agree on the inferences that could be drawn from the evidence, (4) more than one inference could reasonably be drawn from the evidence and findings of fact were required, which was not appropriate in a summary judgment proceeding, (5) whether the individual acquired property rights in good faith and for value required findings of fact about the events surrounding a transaction, and (6) a factual dispute existed about whether the individual had constructive notice when the individual acquired rights under the lease. Northern Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Creighton, 2013 ND 73, 830 N.W.2d 556, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 73 (N.D. 2013).

Negotiable Instruments.

An action on a negotiable instrument in the hands of an endorsee before maturity is not governed by this section. American Nat'l Bank v. Lundy, 21 N.D. 167, 129 N.W. 99, 1910 N.D. LEXIS 154 (N.D. 1910); Johanna v. Lennon, 32 N.D. 71, 155 N.W. 685, 1915 N.D. LEXIS 74 (N.D. 1915).

Where a bank cashier had actual notice of the infirmity in a negotiable instrument, the knowledge was presumed to have been imparted to the president of the bank at the time he purchased the instrument from the bank. McCarty v. Kepreta, 24 N.D. 395, 139 N.W. 992, 1913 N.D. LEXIS 9 (N.D. 1913).

Notice of Conveyance.

Actual notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance, or of any title to the premises, or knowledge and notice of any facts which should put a prudent man upon inquiry, impeach the good faith of the subsequent purchaser. Gress v. Evans, 46 N.W. 1132, 1 Dakota 387, 1877 Dakota LEXIS 14 (Dakota 1877); Hunter v. McDevitt, 12 N.D. 505, 97 N.W. 869, 1903 N.D. LEXIS 63 (N.D. 1903); Harry E. McHugh, Inc. v. Haley, 61 N.D. 359, 237 N.W. 835, 1931 N.D. LEXIS 284 (N.D. 1931); Pierce Township v. Ernie, 74 N.D. 16, 19 N.W.2d 755, 1945 N.D. LEXIS 47 (N.D. 1945); Agricultural Credit Corp. v. State, 74 N.D. 71, 20 N.W.2d 78, 1945 N.D. LEXIS 53 (N.D. 1945); City of Bismarck v. Casey, 77 N.D. 295, 43 N.W.2d 372, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 130 (N.D. 1950).

Mineral right purchasers did not have good-faith purchaser status where the deed referenced joint tenants, but named only one grantee, and that was an obvious error that should have put them and the landman who reviewed the title on inquiry under N.D.C.C. § 1-01-25. Fredericks v. Fredericks, 2016 ND 234, 888 N.W.2d 177, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 235 (N.D. 2016).

Notice of Easements.

Where purchasers of wooded lots in center of a subdivision had examined records and seen that plat maps represented the area as a park, and where such purchasers before purchasing the property knew that several owners of properties surrounding the area were using areas of the wooded lots for recreation, and where a careful inspection of the premises and inquiry among the adjacent owners would have disclosed that such owners claimed the park area was for their permanent use, the purchasers had constructive notice of the rights of the others in the land and could not claim the status of purchasers in good faith without notice. Putnam v. Dickinson, 142 N.W.2d 111, 1966 N.D. LEXIS 183 (N.D. 1966).

Because the purchasers of real estate learned that the land was for sale through an advertisement in a local newspaper, which specifically stated that “no mineral interests will pass with the land,” and that the land would be sold “subject to any leases, encumbrances, covenants, reservations, restrictions, easements, conditions and rights appearing of record,” but did not conduct any inquiry into the state of the trustee’s title but rather assumed that they were receiving the gravel underlying the property, they were deemed to have constructive notice of the records in the register of deeds’ [now recorder] office and related unrecorded contracts. Vanderhoof v. Gravel Prods., 404 N.W.2d 485, 1987 N.D. LEXIS 294 (N.D. 1987).

Notice of Statutory Requirements.

A dealer in municipal bonds which upon their face refer to the statute under which they were issued is bound to take notice of the statute. People's Bank v. School Dist., 3 N.D. 496, 57 N.W. 787, 1893 N.D. LEXIS 47 (N.D. 1893).

Notice of Unrecorded Deed.

A person who has knowledge of facts sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry with regard to the existence of an unrecorded deed, and who fails to make such inquiry, cannot claim protection as a bona fide purchaser under the recording act. Doran v. Dazey, 5 N.D. 167, 64 N.W. 1023, 57 Am. St. Rep. 550 (1895), decided prior to the 1899 amendment to former § 5042 (see now N.D.C.C. § 32-04-25), Shauer v. Alterton, 151 U.S. 607, 14 S. Ct. 442, 38 L. Ed. 286, 1894 U.S. LEXIS 2085 (U.S. 1894).

Judgment creditors who received copy of debtor ex-husband’s divorce decree and property settlement, in which ex-husband conveyed property in California to ex-wife, had constructive notice of the unrecorded deed. Erway v. Deck, 1999 ND 7, 588 N.W.2d 862, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 9 (N.D. 1999).

It was no error to quiet title to real estate in owners, despite the owners not recording title until after purchasers bought the property, because the purchasers had constructive notice of the owners' conflicting interest, as the purchasers knew someone planted trees around the property, which was next to the owners' home, and that the owners watered the trees and otherwise maintained the property, but did not ask the seller if the owners bought or rented the property or if the seller had sold the property, so the purchasers were not good faith purchasers, as the owners' possession and occupancy was open and notorious. Chornuk v. Nelson, 2014 ND 238, 857 N.W.2d 587, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 242 (N.D. 2014).

In an action seeking to quiet title in mineral interests, summary judgment was inappropriate because there were disputed issues of material fact about whether the buyers were good-faith purchasers for value without notice of a prior unrecorded deed. A deed that was executed in 1990, but not recorded until 2012, was valid between the parties to the instrument and those with notice, a statement of claim imposed a duty of further inquiry to ascertain the state of the ownership of the disputed mineral interests, and a buyer was deemed to have constructive notice of the facts an inquiry would have revealed. Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson, 2016 ND 37, 875 N.W.2d 510, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 34 (N.D. 2016).

Notice to Mortgagee.

A mortgagee of a vendee who took his mortgage with notice, actual or constructive, of facts creating an estoppel as between the vendor and vendee, was in no better position than the vendee with respect to the rights of the vendor. Northwestern Mut. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hanson, 72 N.D. 629, 10 N.W.2d 599, 1943 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1943).

District court correctly concluded that a mortgagee did not have constructive notice that an assignee’s mortgages were intended to encumber the subject property because although the mortgagee had a similar mortgage that included the same errant legal description, it did not have a duty to inquire further into the assignee’s mortgages to determine the correct legal description of the mortgaged property. PLS Servs., LLC v. Valueplus Consulting, LLC, 2021 ND 99, 960 N.W.2d 780, 2021 N.D. LEXIS 94 (N.D. 2021).

Quiet Title Action.

Trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to plaintiff in a quiet title action against defendants because defendants did not have constructive notice of a mistake in a 1992 deed that resulted in a discrepancy in the placement of a legal boundary between the parties’ parcels of land; defendants were good faith purchasers. Farmers Union Oil Co. v. Smetana, 2009 ND 74, 764 N.W.2d 665, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 81 (N.D. 2009).

Where the brother of a decedent informed the decedent’s wife and son that he held had previously held title to certain property as joint tenants with the decedent and that he became the sole owner of the property upon the decedent’s demise, where the decedent’s wife purported to convey the property to her children, and where the children filed a quiet title action against the decedent’s brother, the trial court erred in quieting title in favor of the children because the brother gave notice of his ownership interest and the children thus had a duty to conduct an inquiry with reasonable diligence; when they failed to make any inquiry into the brother’s purported ownership interest in the property, they lost the protection of a good faith purchaser status. A reasonably diligent inquiry would have required the children, at the very least, to conduct a record search. Swanson v. Swanson, 2011 ND 74, 796 N.W.2d 614, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 77 (N.D. 2011).

Railroad Tracks As Realty.

While it may be true that railroad tracks are generally held to be personal property, when railroad tracks are placed on mining property a disputable presumption arises that they are part of the realty and an agreement to make them personal property is binding on a purchaser only if the purchaser has notice, actual or constructive, thereof. Burlington N. R.R. v. Scheid, 398 N.W.2d 114, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 444 (N.D. 1986).

Tolling of Statute of Limitations.

Defendant who knew of the existence of a mortgage was bound to inquire as to its status under the statute of limitations, and so had constructive notice that the statute had been tolled by periodic payments of interest. Welsch v. Lee, 43 F. Supp. 368, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2288 (D.N.D. 1941).

Trustee’s Lack of Authority.

This section imputed to prospective purchaser constructive knowledge of trustee’s lack of authority to consummate sale of the real estate, which lack of authority reasonable diligence would have revealed, where the word “trustee” was added after the trustee’s signature on the earnest money agreement. Gerhardt Constr. Co. v. Wachter Real Estate Trust, 306 N.W.2d 223, 1981 N.D. LEXIS 285 (N.D. 1981).

The fact that the seller was a trustee should have indicated to purchasers the need to inquire about the state of the trustee’s title. Vanderhoof v. Gravel Prods., 404 N.W.2d 485, 1987 N.D. LEXIS 294 (N.D. 1987).

Vendor and Purchaser.

Where a purchaser of land had knowledge of the existence of a contract between his vendor and a third party concerning the land, the purchaser was charged with notice of the terms of the contract. Stone v. Bartsch, 76 N.D. 721, 39 N.W.2d 1, 1949 N.D. LEXIS 93 (N.D. 1949).

A reservation in a recorded deed from a realty company, relating to oil and gas reservations, showed the existence of a further reservation than the coal and iron reservation on record and was sufficient notice to put purchaser upon inquiry as to gas and oil reservations omitted in a recording of a deed from an improvement company. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Advanced Realty Co., 78 N.W.2d 705, 1956 N.D. LEXIS 146 (N.D. 1956).

Purchaser of mineral title was not charged with notice that deed from surface owner had been obtained by trickery where there was nothing to put him on inquiry as to the circumstances surrounding the deed. Rosenquist v. Harris, 138 F. Supp. 21, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3722 (D.N.D. 1956).

Rule that possession of building is notice of occupant’s interest therein is not unduly burdensome to one purchasing land upon which building is located; whether under all existent circumstances purchaser of real property has notice, actual or constructive, of outstanding interest in buildings on purchased land is question for jury. Zimmer v. Bellon, 153 N.W.2d 757, 1967 N.D. LEXIS 100 (N.D. 1967).

Vendee had constructive notice at time of purchase, and took subject to, the terms of an unrecorded contract for deed between the vendor and a third party, including provision therein reserving the mineral interests to the third party, where the records in register of deed’s office established that record title to the land was in the third party and vendor had no recorded interests; such facts were sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry concerning what right vendor had in the land, and such inquiry would have necessarily revealed the terms of the unrecorded contract for deed, which was in the vendor’s possession. Burlington N. v. Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233, 1982 N.D. LEXIS 319 (N.D. 1982).

Written Notice.

Where there was evidence that a notice of expiration of a period of redemption was mailed to a landowner by registered mail and that the return registry receipt card was signed by the landowner by his wife as agent, it was established that the landowner received the notice. Wilson v. Divide County, 76 N.W.2d 896, 1956 N.D. LEXIS 121 (N.D. 1956).

Contrary Intention.

Where a statute is purposely framed in the plural to prevent cumulative voting in the election of city commissioners, such voting is not authorized. State ex rel. Shaw v. Thompson, 21 N.D. 426, 131 N.W. 231, 1911 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1911).

Illustrative Cases.

N.D.C.C. § 42-01-07 is a list of remedies available against a public nuisance and does not limit the remedies that may be sought against the same individual for the same nuisance to only one of the listed remedies; the phrases separated by the word “or” in N.D.C.C. § 42-01-07 do not have separate and independent significance, interpreting “or” as indicating mutually exclusive alternatives is unreasonable, and the word “remedies” is plural, which indicates more than one remedy may be pursued against a public nuisance. Therefore, a trial court did not err by refusing to dismiss a criminal nuisance action based on the fact that a civil nuisance action had also been filed against defendant. State v. Martin, 2011 ND 6, 793 N.W.2d 188, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 5 (N.D. 2011).

Plural Includes Singular.

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01 did not use the term “pattern” to describe disorderly conduct and a pattern was not necessarily required because all that was required were reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent had engaged in disorderly conduct, when the statute’s use of plural words such as acts, words, and gestures did not mean that a pattern of behavior was required. Wetzel v. Schlenvogt, 2005 ND 190, 705 N.W.2d 836, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 2005).

Singular Includes Plural.

Where the grain upon which a thresher’s lien is claimed was grown on land situated in two counties, the lien statement should be executed in duplicate and filed in both counties as the words of the statute with respect to the place of filing should be read in the plural. Gorthy v. Jarvis, 15 N.D. 509, 108 N.W. 39, 1906 N.D. LEXIS 55 (N.D. 1906).

In a statute providing that “the board of county commissioners and county superintendent may organize a new school district from portions of school districts already authorized…” the legislative intent was to empower the organization of new districts from portions of one or more old districts. Tallmadge v. Walker, 34 N.D. 590, 159 N.W. 71, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 61 (N.D. 1916).

In the absence of a plain meaning of former N.D.C.C. § 9-10-07’s text, this section became operative, and the term “person” in former N.D.C.C. § 9-10-07 must have been taken to include both the singular and the plural. Beaudoin v. Texaco, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 512, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1310 (D.N.D. 1987).

Unregistered Securities Sales.

This section applied to prosecution for unlicensed sale of “note” under N.D.C.C. § 10-04-10 providing that no dealer shall sell any “securities” unless registered, except in exempt transactions. State v. Henderson, 156 N.W.2d 700, 1968 N.D. LEXIS 112 (N.D. 1968).

“Individual”.

Customer was not entitled to a disorderly conduct restraining order under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01 against a business for giving him the wrong color hot tub cover, refusing to refund his money, yelling at him, and continued unwanted contact with him, because a restraining order could be brought only against a natural person, not a business. Holkesvig v. Dakota Spas, 2014 ND 9, 841 N.W.2d 755, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 4 (N.D. 2014).

Person.

—Corporations.

A foreign corporation was not a person capable of receiving letters of administration upon the estate of a deceased person. Grunow v. Simonitsch, 21 N.D. 277, 130 N.W. 835, 1911 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 1911).

A corporation is liable in an action at law for deceit to the same extent as a natural person. Gunderson v. Havanna-Clyde Mining Co., 22 N.D. 329, 133 N.W. 554, 1911 N.D. LEXIS 49 (N.D. 1911).

Process.

A notice of appeal is not a writ or summons, and is therefore not process. GOOLER v. EIDSNESS, 18 N.D. 338, 121 N.W. 83, 1909 N.D. LEXIS 30 (N.D. 1909).

Property.

An executory land contract for the purchase of school lands from the state, although technically speaking not real property, must be levied upon and sold by a creditor of the vendee as such. Sox v. Miracle, 35 N.D. 458, 160 N.W. 716, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 174 (N.D. 1916).

When a divorce is granted the court has jurisdiction over all the property of the parties, both real and personal, may distribute the property as may seem just and proper, and has jurisdiction to include in the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the decree, the agreement between parties as to the division of property. Bailey v. Bailey, 53 N.D. 887, 207 N.W. 987, 1926 N.D. LEXIS 19 (N.D. 1926).

Growing crops are property and are subject to attachment. Kelly v. Stockgrowers Credit Corp., 66 N.D. 209, 263 N.W. 717, 1935 N.D. LEXIS 189 (N.D. 1935).

Signature or Subscription.

Where the signature to a will was by mark and the person who wrote the name of the maker to identify the mark failed to write his own name as a witness, the effect of the failure did not destroy the signature by mark but placed the burden of proving the mark was made as the maker’s signature upon the proponent of the writing. McKee v. Buck, 72 N.D. 86, 4 N.W.2d 652, 1942 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1942).

When a testator was unable to sign his name because of senile weakness and other physical handicaps and he signed by a mark which was witnessed, the signature by mark was valid. Whelan v. Burris, 72 N.W.2d 884, 1955 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1955).

A court of equity will not cancel an unpaid mortgage at the suit of the mortgagor when it is given as part of a compromise settlement of pending litigation and when to do so would vary the provisions of the executed compromise settlement on the technical claim of invalidity of the method of affixing the signature. Weigel v. Bauer, 95 N.W.2d 29, 1959 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1959).

Collateral References.

What constitutes “legal representative” or “personal representative” entitled to receive insurance proceeds on account of loss suffered by deceased, 40 A.L.R.4th 255.

Sufficiency of evidence of nonrevocation of lost will where codicil survives, 84 A.L.R.4th 531.

Cardinal Rule of Statutory Construction.

A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that supreme court is to construe provisions in the code with a view to effecting their objectives. In Interest of C.J.A., 473 N.W.2d 439, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 144 (N.D. 1991).

Common Law and Statute in Agreement.

Where there is no conflict between the common law and a statute, common law remains relevant. Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 180 (N.D. 1992).

Construction of Specific Words and Terms.

The term “cause of action” in the statute of limitations is not used in a technical but in a special sense according to which a cause of action accrues when the holder thereof first obtains the right to resort to the particular form of action for relief. Colonial & United States Mtg. Co. v. Northwest Thresher Co., 14 N.D. 147, 103 N.W. 915, 70 L.R.A. 814, 116 Am. St. Rep. 642, 8 Am. Ann. Cas. 1160 (1905), decided prior to the enactment of Chapter 5, p. 9, of the 1905 Laws.

In the construction of the statute giving a farm laborer a lien for wages, the term “farm laborer” is construed according to the common understanding as to its meaning. Lowe v. Abrahamson, 18 N.D. 182, 119 N.W. 241, 1908 N.D. LEXIS 114 (N.D. 1908).

The view that where the grounds for a new trial are specified by statute, such statutory enumeration is exclusive, and a new trial can be granted only for the causes prescribed by the statute is in harmony with the rule of construction provided by this section. Higgins v. Rued, 30 N.D. 551, 153 N.W. 389, 1915 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1915), Gohl v. Bechtold, 37 N.D. 141, 163 N.W. 725, 1917 N.D. LEXIS 83 (N.D. 1917).

A subsequent statute revising the whole subject matter of former enactments and intended as a substitute, repeals the former, but the original statutes may be resorted to in aid of construction in case of doubt. Klingensmith v. Siegal, 57 N.D. 768, 224 N.W. 680, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 324 (N.D. 1929).

Discretion in Trial Courts.

Trial courts are vested with wide discretionary powers in the matter of granting amendments to pleadings, “in the furtherance of justice”. French v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 29 N.D. 426, 151 N.W. 7, 1915 N.D. LEXIS 20 (N.D. 1915); Kurtz v. Paulson, 33 N.D. 400, 157 N.W. 305, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 99 (N.D. 1916); James River Nat'l Bank v. Haas, 73 N.D. 374, 15 N.W.2d 442, 1944 N.D. LEXIS 73 (N.D. 1944).

Dram Shop Act.

N.D.C.C. § 5-01-06.1 is remedial in character and should be liberally construed to advance its remedy. Born v. Mayers, 514 N.W.2d 687, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1994).

Exclusiveness of Statutory Expression.

The Sales Tax Act of 1935 covered the entire sales tax field and the court would not draw upon the common law to add to the statute a method of collection or supply a right of priority which the legislature did not provide. In re White, 69 N.D. 61, 284 N.W. 357, 1939 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1939).

Remedial Legislation.

The statute relating to the giving of notice of intention to redeem from a chattel mortgage sale was designed to enable persons interested in the property to protect themselves against unfair dealings; and, since its purpose was highly beneficent, like all remedial legislation, it should receive a liberal construction. Brown v. Smith, 13 N.D. 580, 102 N.W. 171, 1904 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 1904).

A remedial statute was to be liberally construed, even without this section. Scott v. District Court, 15 N.D. 259, 107 N.W. 61, 1906 N.D. LEXIS 31 (N.D. 1906).

Statutes in Derogation of Common Law.

When a statute abrogating a rule or principle of the common law is repealed, the common-law principle or rule is, ipso facto, revived, unless there is something to show a contrary intent on the part of the legislature. Burleigh County v. Rhud, 23 N.D. 362, 136 N.W. 1082, 1912 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1912); Reeves & Co. v. Russell, 28 N.D. 265, 148 N.W. 654, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 111 (N.D. 1914).

Even though the statute authorizing extension of the redemption period after foreclosure of a lien upon realty was in derogation of the common law, the court was not required to give strict construction to the statute. Lillegard v. Hutchinson, 67 N.D. 44, 269 N.W. 43, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 148 (N.D. 1936).

Unauthorized Practice of Law.

The statutory prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law is intended to protect the public from unlicensed attorneys and is to be liberally construed with a view to effecting its objects and to promoting justice. Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 371 (N.D. 1986).

Statutes in Derogation of Common Law.

If the common law necessarily conflicts with the code, the latter must govern, but there was no necessary conflict between the code and the common-law proceedings with reference to arbitration. Johnsen v. Wineman, 34 N.D. 116, 157 N.W. 679, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 2 (N.D. 1916).

Law Reviews.

Looking Back on a Century of Complete Codification of the Law, 53 N.D. L. Rev. 223 (1976).

Intoxicating Liquors — Persons Liable: North Dakota Extends Statutory Dram Shop Liability to Social Hosts, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 743 (1995).

In General.

In construing a statute, consideration must be given to the ordinary sense in which words are used, the context in which they are placed, and the background for the enactment as far as that can be ascertained from the whole act. Harding v. Dickinson, 76 N.D. 71, 33 N.W.2d 626, 1948 N.D. LEXIS 60 (N.D. 1948).

A statute should be construed so that an ordinary person reading it would get from it the usual, accepted meaning. Wills v. Schroeder Aviation, 390 N.W.2d 544, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 353 (N.D. 1986).

In interpreting a statute, words must be given their plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning, and consideration should be given to the ordinary sense of statutory words, the context in which they are used, and the purpose which prompted their enactment. Coldwell Banker-First Realty v. Meide & Son, 422 N.W.2d 375, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 78 (N.D. 1988).

Unless words in a statute are defined in the code, they are to be given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning. Kim-Go, H.K. Minerals, Inc. v. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc., 460 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1990); Reed v. Hillsboro Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 9, 477 N.W.2d 237, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 191 (N.D. 1991).

Words in a statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense. Christianson v. Bismarck, 476 N.W.2d 688, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 175 (N.D. 1991).

When the plain language of a statute is not “transparent,” our codified rules of statutory interpretation direct us to look to the code itself in determining the meaning of statutory terms. Northern X-Ray Co. v. State by & Through Hanson, 542 N.W.2d 733, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 25 (N.D. 1996).

Words in a statute are to be understood according to the meaning that an ordinary person could get from reading the section. State v. Velasquez, 1999 ND 217, 602 N.W.2d 693, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 229 (N.D. 1999).

District court clearly erred in concluding the obvious occurrence exception within N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46 applied because the alleged professional negligence was not within the knowledge of a layperson; under the rule of ejusdem generis, when the general words were construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects specifically enumerated the occurrence alleged was not like the failure to remove a foreign substance or performance of a medical procedure upon the wrong patient. Pierce v. Anderson, 2018 ND 131, 912 N.W.2d 291, 2018 N.D. LEXIS 137 (N.D. 2018).

Construction of Administrative Regulations.

Supreme court applied rules of statutory construction to interpret two administrative regulations, N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-03 and N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-05.1-08.2; after reviewing the legislative history and legislative intent, the conclusion was reached that the offset provisions of the two regulations applied to parents’ child support obligations when one parent assigned the right to receive child support to the State as reimbursement for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families benefits received. Simon v. Simon, 2006 ND 29, 709 N.W.2d 4, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 31 (N.D. 2006).

Construction of City Ordinance.

Where there was no long-established, practical construction by city commission of the phrase “uncovered porch,” and the controlling ordinance provision was unambiguous, there was no need to give deference to city’s construction of it. City of Fargo v. Ness, 551 N.W.2d 790, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 186 (N.D. 1996).

Municipal ordinances are interpreted in the same manner as are statutes. GO Comm. v. City of Minot, 2005 ND 136, 701 N.W.2d 865, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 171 (N.D. 2005).

Where a municipal ordinance provided that the revenues generated by the municipal water supply improvements surtax shall be expended exclusively to make improvements to the municipal water supply and further provided that in determining when to terminate the surtax, the Finance Director was directed to take into account the earnings likely to be derived from the tax proceeds set aside to make future cash payments during such time as it is possible to accomplish such set-aside, the city’s construction of its ordinance in such a way as to allow it to place interest accumulated from Northwest Area Water Supply (NAWS) Project revenues into the general fund, instead of the NAWS fund created by the ordinance, was unreasonable, as interest clearly constitutes revenues and earnings and the language used could not reasonably be construed to permit interest earnings on surtax receipts to be expended for purposes other than improvements to the city’s water supply. If the city intended to allow interest on surtax receipts to be expended for other things when it drafted the ordinance, it would have used less inclusive terms than revenues and earnings. GO Comm. v. City of Minot, 2005 ND 136, 701 N.W.2d 865, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 171 (N.D. 2005).

Where a municipal ordinance provided that revenues generated by the municipal water supply improvements surtax shall be expended exclusively to make improvements, defined in the ordinance as any measure that enhances the city’s water supply, including treatment facilities, to the municipal water supply through the Northwest Area Water Supply (NAWS) Project or, failing that, through any prudent and reasonable means to the same end, the city’s construction of the ordinance was reasonable as its use of revenues generated by the water supply improvements surtax to improve its water treatment plant fell within the range of reasonableness within which a municipality’s exercise of discretion will not be interfered with or upset by the judiciary. GO Comm. v. City of Minot, 2005 ND 136, 701 N.W.2d 865, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 171 (N.D. 2005).

In interpreting a township’s ordinance that prohibited the planting of trees 120 feet from the centerline of a road, the supreme court interpreted the ordinance as it would any statute, and the supreme court concluded that tree farmers’ trees were planted for agricultural purposes; therefore, the trees were excluded from the ordinance. Hentz v. Elma Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 2007 ND 19, 727 N.W.2d 276, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 19 (N.D. 2007).

Construction of Constitution.

Principles of construction applicable to statutes are generally applicable to construction of the constitution. McCarney v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 1979 N.D. LEXIS 332 (N.D. 1979).

Construction of Criminal Statutes.

Words or phrases explained, or defined by statute are to be understood as thus explained, or defined. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that criminal statutes are strictly construed in favor of the defendant and against the government. State v. Plentychief, 464 N.W.2d 373, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 252 (N.D. 1990).

Defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver was not subject to enhancement under N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-23.1(1)(a) as this statute provided an offense enhancement only for the manufacture and distribution of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school. The inclusion of manufacture and distribution in this provision implied that possession with intent to deliver was excluded. Furthermore, possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver could not have “involved” distribution of a controlled substance by the defendant, because the defendant had not yet distributed it; instead, only circumstances that indicated an intent to deliver the controlled substance existed. State v. Dennis, 2007 ND 87, 733 N.W.2d 241, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2007).

District court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, because under N.D.C.C. § 29-03-05, Burleigh County had authority to prosecute alleged offenses that the parties admitted occurred on the Burleigh County side of the center of the main channel of the Missouri River, or within five hundred yards of the boundary; the plain language of N.D.C.C. §§ 11-01-09 and 11-01-31, established the boundary between Morton County and Burleigh County to be through the center of the main channel of the Missouri River. State v. Wetzel, 2008 ND 186, 756 N.W.2d 775, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 182 (N.D. 2008).

Construction of Uniform Probate Code.

District court erred in finding that the testator’s missing will was not presumed to be revoked, because while N.D.C.C. § 30.1-08-07 did not speak to admitting a lost will and neither N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-14-03 nor 30.1-15-02 provided specific presumptions for admitting a missing will, the drafter’s of the Uniform Probate Code did contemplate the probate of lost wills, and the district court erroneously failed to apply the common law amino revocandi presumption that a missing will was revoked; if a will could not be found upon the death of the testator, the presumption arose that the testator revoked the missing will, and under N.D.R.Ev. 301(a), the party seeking to probate the missing will must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the testator did not destroy or revoke the missing will animo revocandi. York v. Conley (In re Estate of Conley), 2008 ND 148, 753 N.W.2d 384, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 2008).

Judicial Notice Taken of Meanings of Words.

Judicial notice must be taken of the meanings of words and phrases in the English language, and of such matters of common knowledge and science as may be known to all men of ordinary understanding and intelligence. State v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 68 N.D. 641, 282 N.W. 411, 1938 N.D. LEXIS 154, 1938 N.D. LEXIS 155 (N.D. 1938).

Legislative History And Purpose.

Given the statutory language of N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) construed with the other provisions for underinsured motorist coverage and the legislative history addressing the purpose of those statutes, N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) required the reduction for benefits paid or payable under any Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) law from the insured’s total compensable damages and not from the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage limit, because making insureds whole was furthered by construing the reducing language of N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) to authorize a reduction from compensatory damages rather than from the underinsured motorist coverage limit as long as the insured did not duplicate recovery for the same loss, and that purpose would be frustrated for WSI benefits since WSI had a subrogation right against a tortfeasor for fifty percent of the damages recovered up to a maximum of the total amount it has paid or would otherwise pay. Jund v. Johnnie B's Bar & Grill, Inc., 2011 ND 230, 814 N.W.2d 776, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 2011).

Limitation on Liberal Construction.

The terms of a statute cannot be extended unreasonably even under a liberal construction. City of Mayville v. Rosing, 19 N.D. 98, 123 N.W. 393, 1909 N.D. LEXIS 91 (N.D. 1909).

While the rule in this section is applied broadly in the attempt to sustain the constitutionality of a statute, yet the courts must be guided by rules of interpretation laid down by the legislature. State ex rel. Graham v. Hall, 73 N.D. 428, 15 N.W.2d 736, 1944 N.D. LEXIS 79 (N.D. 1944).

Specific Words Construed.

The term “cause of action” in the statute of limitations is not used in a technical but in a special sense according to which a cause of action accrues when the holder thereof first obtains the right to resort to the particular form of action for relief. Colonial & United States Mtg. Co. v. Northwest Thresher Co., 14 N.D. 147, 103 N.W. 915, 70 L.R.A. 814, 116 Am. St. Rep. 642, 8 Am. Ann. Cas. 1160 (1905), decided prior to the enactment of Chapter 5, p. 9, of the 1905 Laws.

The statute giving a “farm laborer” a lien will be construed in accordance with the ordinary meaning of that term to the effect that a farm laborer is one who labors upon a farm in raising crops or doing general farm work. Lowe v. Abrahamson, 18 N.D. 182, 119 N.W. 241, 1908 N.D. LEXIS 114 (N.D. 1908).

A general statutory definition applies to the terms “gross negligence” and “willful misconduct” within the meaning of the automobile guest statute, in the absence of a definition of such terms therein. Jacobs v. Nelson, 67 N.D. 27, 268 N.W. 873, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1936).

The ordinary, natural meaning of “descendant” used in the statute specifying exemptions from the estate tax, is the lineal issue, a person who proceeds from the body of another, as a child or grandchild. ESTATE OF LAMB, 72 N.D. 42, 4 N.W.2d 585, 1942 N.D. LEXIS 109 (N.D. 1942).

Whether or not the word “may” as used in a statute is to be construed as mandatory or permissive in meaning depends upon the context and the circumstances under which it is used. Novak v. Novak, 74 N.D. 572, 24 N.W.2d 20, 1946 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 1946).

The ordinary meaning of “lineal descendant” did not apply in the construction of the former non-lapse statute, former N.D.C.C. § 56-04-20, where it was being considered in connection with adopted children; the adoption law indicated that adopted children came within the meaning of the term “lineal descendants”. Heollinger v. Molzohn, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 110 (N.D. 1950).

It had to be presumed that at the time of the enactment of former N.D.C.C. § 15-53-18, the legislature was cognizant of the common, ordinary meaning attached to the word “incorporated”. Kiner v. Well, 71 N.W.2d 743, 1955 N.D. LEXIS 129 (N.D. 1955).

The word “must” as ordinarily used indicates a mandatory and not merely a directory or nonmandatory duty. Federal Land Bank v. Waltz, 423 N.W.2d 799, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 132 (N.D. 1988).

The word “any” is a general word and may have a diversity of meanings, its meaning in any particular case depending largely on the context and subject matter of the statute or instrument in which it is used. However, the word “any” in statutes is generally used in the sense of “all” or “every” and its meaning is comprehensive in scope and inclusive in range. State v. Zueger, 459 N.W.2d 235, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 168 (N.D. 1990).

N.D.C.C. § 65-02-11 is construed to require an element of reasonableness in determining the scope of the phrase “anything necessary” in order to avoid unreasonable or absurd consequences. State v. Altru Health Sys., 2007 ND 38, 729 N.W.2d 113, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 38 (N.D. 2007).

Commonly understood meaning of the word “teacher” in N.D.C.C. § 15.1-06-16, making it a crime to threaten a teacher, included a woman who was working as a teacher’s aide but who was licensed as a teacher, was the only figure in authority in the classroom, and was preparing a lesson at the time defendant threatened her. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to acquit under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29. State v. Maki, 2009 ND 123, 767 N.W.2d 852, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 2009).

In a case where the claimant sought a determination of an ownership interest in a tract of land, the trial court had to determine the “due date” for paying on the contract for deed, as that term was set forth in the relevant statute of limitations regarding contracts for deeds, N.D.C.C. § 28-01-42, in order to determine whether the claimant had filed the action on a contract for deed within the 10-year limitations period. In determining the meaning of that phrase, the trial court was obligated by N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02 to look at the statute’s language to determine the legislature’s intent and give those words their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, was obligated under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07 to construe that statute as a whole and harmonize its meaning to related provisions, could not consistent with N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05 disregard the letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit if the statute’s language was clear and unambiguous, and could look to N.D.C.C. § 1-02-39’ s list of extrinsic aids for construing ambiguous statutes. Locken v. Locken, 2011 ND 90, 797 N.W.2d 301, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2011).

Pursuant to statutory construction principles under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02, N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07, and N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05, the soybean seller was not entitled to consideration of the soybean seller’s motion to vacate an arbitration award, as that motion had not been filed within the mandatory 90-day time limit for challenging such awards set forth in N.D.C.C. § 32-29.3-23(2). That conclusion was true even though the soybean purchaser filed a motion to confirm 70 days after the award was entered, as nothing in the statute on the confirmation of awards, N.D.C.C. § 32-29.3-22, indicated that the filing of a motion to confirm was meant to toll the 90-day time period for filing a motion to vacate. James Valley Grain, LLC v. David, 2011 ND 160, 802 N.W.2d 158, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 158 (N.D. 2011).

Words or Phrases Defined by Statute.

When words or phrases are defined by statute, that definition may be relied upon in construing the meaning of those words or phrases in a similar statute. Larson v. Baer, 418 N.W.2d 282, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 8 (N.D. 1988).

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-05 precluded the City of Fargo, North Dakota, a home rule city, from imposing fees for noncriminal traffic offenses that exceeded the limits set forth for equivalent violations in N.D.C.C. § 39-06.1-06, because N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-05 clearly and unambiguously precludes a home rule city from superseding criminal or noncriminal offenses defined by State law, when a penalty that exceeds the limits delineated by equivalent State law supersedes State law; the word “offense” rather than the word “crimes” is used in the text of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-05, and an “offense” under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-05 includes noncriminal, as well as criminal offenses. Sauby v. City of Fargo, 2008 ND 60, 747 N.W.2d 65, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 60 (N.D. 2008).

Law Reviews.

Intoxicating Liquors — Persons Liable: North Dakota Extends Statutory Dram Shop Liability to Social Hosts, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 743 (1995).

In General.

Judicial notice must be taken of the meanings of words and phrases in the English language, and of such matters of common knowledge and science as may be known to all men of ordinary understanding and intelligence. State v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 68 N.D. 641, 282 N.W. 411, 1938 N.D. LEXIS 154, 1938 N.D. LEXIS 155 (N.D. 1938).

Unless words in a statute are defined in the code, they are to be given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning. Kim-Go, H.K. Minerals, Inc. v. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc., 460 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1990); Reed v. Hillsboro Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 9, 477 N.W.2d 237, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 191 (N.D. 1991).

When the plain language of a statute is not “transparent,” our codified rules of statutory interpretation direct us to look to the code itself in determining the meaning of statutory terms. Northern X-Ray Co. v. State by & Through Hanson, 542 N.W.2d 733, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 25 (N.D. 1996).

Legislative History And Purpose.

Given the statutory language of N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) construed with the other provisions for underinsured motorist coverage and the legislative history addressing the purpose of those statutes, N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) required the reduction for benefits paid or payable under any Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) law from the insured’s total compensable damages and not from the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage limit, because making insureds whole was furthered by construing the reducing language of N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) to authorize a reduction from compensatory damages rather than from the underinsured motorist coverage limit as long as the insured did not duplicate recovery for the same loss, and that purpose would be frustrated for WSI benefits since WSI had a subrogation right against a tortfeasor for fifty percent of the damages recovered up to a maximum of the total amount it has paid or would otherwise pay. Jund v. Johnnie B's Bar & Grill, Inc., 2011 ND 230, 814 N.W.2d 776, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 2011).

Specific Words Construed.

“Obligation” and “debt” are not synonymous; obligation is the broader term and it includes all debts, but the term “debt” does not include all obligations. Sonnesyn v. Akin, 12 N.D. 227, 97 N.W. 557, 1903 N.D. LEXIS 55 (N.D. 1903).

In the absence of anything from which a contrary intent may be gathered, the court must assume that when the legislature uses the term “doing business” or “business done”, it uses it in the sense in which it is used by the courts and legislatures of the country. State ex rel. Langer v. Packard, 40 N.D. 182, 168 N.W. 673, 1918 N.D. LEXIS 81 (N.D. 1918).

Wills.

Technical words used in a will should be construed according to their technical meaning by reference to their technical context, unless a contrary intention is plainly expressed in the will. American Cancer Soc'y v. Unruh (In re Estate of Brown), 1997 ND 11, 559 N.W.2d 818, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 1 (N.D. 1997).

Words or Phrases Defined by Statute.

When words or phrases are defined by statute, that definition may be relied upon in construing the meaning of those words or phrases in a similar statute. Larson v. Baer, 418 N.W.2d 282, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 8 (N.D. 1988).

In determining whether the adopted woman was a proper devisee of the estate of decedent, who was the mother of the adopted woman’s biological father who predeceased the decedent, courts pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 1-02-03 had to give terms that defined the relationship between people their peculiar and appropriate meaning as defined by statute. Since the decedent’s child under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-01-06(4) was the biological son and the adopted woman was the biological father’s “issue” under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-01-06(22), the fact of the adopted woman’s adoption by the adoptive father did not effect the relationship between the adopted woman and biological father, according to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-04-09(1), and meant that the adopted woman was a proper devisee of decedent. Kraft v. Ramos (In re Estate of Boehm), 2012 ND 104, 816 N.W.2d 793, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 93 (N.D. 2012).

In General.

The words and phrases used in a statute should be considered in their relation to each other and according to the rules of grammar. The statute should be construed as a whole and with a view to arriving at the intent of the legislature. Anderson v. Peterson, 78 N.D. 949, 54 N.W.2d 542, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 1952).

If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, that language cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the legislative intent because the intent is presumed to be clear from the face of the statute. However, if the statutory language is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, courts may look to extrinsic aids to interpret the statute. District One Republican Comm'n v. District One Democrat Comm'n, 466 N.W.2d 820, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 35 (N.D. 1991).

Construction Not to Impose Additional Requirements.

Where constitutional and statutory provisions are clear and unambiguous, it is improper for the courts to attempt to construe the provisions so as to legislate additional requirements or proscriptions which the words of the provisions do not themselves provide. Haggard v. Meier, 368 N.W.2d 539, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 322 (N.D. 1985).

Construction of Administrative Regulations.

Supreme court applied rules of statutory construction to interpret two administrative regulations, N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-03 and N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-05.1-08.2; after reviewing the legislative history and legislative intent, the conclusion was reached that the offset provisions of the two regulations applied to parents’ child support obligations when one parent assigned the right to receive child support to the State as reimbursement for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families benefits received. Simon v. Simon, 2006 ND 29, 709 N.W.2d 4, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 31 (N.D. 2006).

Construction of City Ordinance.

Where a municipal ordinance provided that the revenues generated by the municipal water supply improvements surtax shall be expended exclusively to make improvements to the municipal water supply and further provided that in determining when to terminate the surtax, the Finance Director was directed to take into account the earnings likely to be derived from the tax proceeds set aside to make future cash payments during such time as it is possible to accomplish such set-aside, the city’s construction of its ordinance in such a way as to allow it to place interest accumulated from Northwest Area Water Supply (NAWS) Project revenues into the general fund, instead of the NAWS fund created by the ordinance, was unreasonable, as interest clearly constitutes revenues and earnings and the language used could not reasonably be construed to permit interest earnings on surtax receipts to be expended for purposes other than improvements to the city’s water supply. If the city intended to allow interest on surtax receipts to be expended for other things when it drafted the ordinance, it would have used less inclusive terms than revenues and earnings. GO Comm. v. City of Minot, 2005 ND 136, 701 N.W.2d 865, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 171 (N.D. 2005).

In interpreting a township’s ordinance that prohibited the planting of trees 120 feet from the centerline of a road, the supreme court interpreted the ordinance as it would any statute, by harmonizing the zoning ordinance with another ordinance exempting agricultural purposes from zoning ordinances and a regulation including “tree farming” in the definition of “agriculture”. The township erred in interpreting its ordinances to apply to a tree farmer’s trees; the trees were agricultural, and they were excluded from the ordinance. Hentz v. Elma Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 2007 ND 19, 727 N.W.2d 276, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 19 (N.D. 2007).

Construction of Criminal Statute.

Defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver was not subject to enhancement under N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-23.1(1)(a) as this statute provided an offense enhancement only for the manufacture and distribution of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school. The inclusion of manufacture and distribution in this provision implied that possession with intent to deliver was excluded. Furthermore, possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver could not have “involved” distribution of a controlled substance by the defendant, because the defendant had not yet distributed it; instead, only circumstances that indicated an intent to deliver the controlled substance existed. State v. Dennis, 2007 ND 87, 733 N.W.2d 241, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2007).

District court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, because under N.D.C.C. § 29-03-05, Burleigh County had authority to prosecute alleged offenses that the parties admitted occurred on the Burleigh County side of the center of the main channel of the Missouri River, or within five hundred yards of the boundary; the plain language of N.D.C.C. §§ 11-01-09 and 11-01-31, established the boundary between Morton County and Burleigh County to be through the center of the main channel of the Missouri River. State v. Wetzel, 2008 ND 186, 756 N.W.2d 775, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 182 (N.D. 2008).

Construction of Uniform Probate Code.

District court erred in finding that the testator’s missing will was not presumed to be revoked, because while N.D.C.C. § 30.1-08-07 did not speak to admitting a lost will and neither N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-14-03 nor 30.1-15-02 provided specific presumptions for admitting a missing will, the drafter’s of the Uniform Probate Code did contemplate the probate of lost wills, and the district court erroneously failed to apply the common law amino revocandi presumption that a missing will was revoked; if a will could not be found upon the death of the testator, the presumption arose that the testator revoked the missing will, and under N.D.R.Ev. 301(a), the party seeking to probate the missing will must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the testator did not destroy or revoke the missing will animo revocandi. York v. Conley (In re Estate of Conley), 2008 ND 148, 753 N.W.2d 384, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 2008).

Effect Given to Each Provision of Statute.

A statute is to be read to give effect to each of its provisions, whenever fairly possible. County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc'y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 354 (N.D. 1985).

Legislative History.

A court need not explore legislative history when the North Dakota Legislature has clearly and unambiguously spoken. State v. O'Connor, 2016 ND 72, 877 N.W.2d 312, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 71 (N.D. 2016).

Legislative Intent.

When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the letter of the statute cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit because the legislative intent is presumed clear from the face of the statute. Wills v. Schroeder Aviation, 390 N.W.2d 544, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 353 (N.D. 1986).

In a case where the claimant sought a determination of an ownership interest in a tract of land, the trial court had to determine the “due date” for paying on the contract for deed, as that term was set forth in the relevant statute of limitations regarding contracts for deeds, N.D.C.C. § 28-01-42, in order to determine whether the claimant had filed the action on a contract for deed within the 10-year limitations period. In determining the meaning of that phrase, the trial court was obligated by N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02 to look at the statute’s language to determine the legislature’s intent and give those words their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, was obligated under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07 to construe that statute as a whole and harmonize its meaning to related provisions, could not consistent with N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05 disregard the letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit if the statute’s language was clear and unambiguous, and could look to N.D.C.C. § 1-02-39’ s list of extrinsic aids for construing ambiguous statutes. Locken v. Locken, 2011 ND 90, 797 N.W.2d 301, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2011).

Reviewing courts, in reviewing a trial court’s statutory interpretation, were tasked under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05 with applying the legislature’s intent and were required under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07 to give conflicting statutory provisions effect unless the conflict was irreconcilable, in which case the special statutory provision had to control as an exception to the general statutory provision except in those cases where the legislature enacted a general statutory provision later and manifestly intended that the general provision prevail. Where another chapter or title conflicted, the provisions of the chapter or title at issue had to prevail, pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07, as to all matters in question arising thereunder out of the same subject matter and, thus, the trial court could not apply the three-year limitations period of N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-10 to bar the lessees’ contract claims against the political subdivision, as the legislature intended that statute to apply only against tort claims against the state, which was separate from the political subdivision for liability purposes. Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc., 2011 ND 215, 812 N.W.2d 323, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 216 (N.D. 2011).

Pursuant to statutory construction principles under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02, N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07, and N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05, the soybean seller was not entitled to consideration of the soybean seller’s motion to vacate an arbitration award, as that motion had not been filed within the mandatory 90-day time limit for challenging such awards set forth in N.D.C.C. § 32-29.3-23(2). That conclusion was true even though the soybean purchaser filed a motion to confirm 70 days after the award was entered, as nothing in the statute on the confirmation of awards, N.D.C.C. § 32-29.3-22, indicated that the filing of a motion to confirm was meant to toll the 90-day time period for filing a motion to vacate. James Valley Grain, LLC v. David, 2011 ND 160, 802 N.W.2d 158, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 158 (N.D. 2011).

Plain language of N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-03(1)(d) did not require that the lease be executed by the owner of record, but merely provided that the recording of a lease of the mineral interest was deemed to be a use under N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1. Estate of Christeson v. Gilstad, 2013 ND 50, 829 N.W.2d 453, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 45 (N.D. 2013).

When interpreting a statute, the primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the legislature; when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, however, it cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the legislative intent as intent is presumed to be clear from the face of the statute. Adams County Record v. Greater N.D. Ass'n, 529 N.W.2d 830, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 53 (N.D. 1995).

Suspension of Driver’s License

Suspension of the driver’s operating license for two years was reversed and remanded because N.D.C.C. § 39-20-04.1(1)(d) clearly indicated a two-year suspension was authorized if the prior offense, not the current offense, involved a blood alcohol content of .18 percent or greater; the driver’s blood alcohol content for his current arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol was .19 percent, and the driver’s blood alcohol content from his prior offense was .05 percent. Larsen v. N.D. DOT, 2005 ND 51, 693 N.W.2d 39, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 49 (N.D. 2005).

Words Or Phrases Defined by Statute.

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-05 precluded the City of Fargo, North Dakota, a home rule city, from imposing fees for noncriminal traffic offenses that exceeded the limits set forth for equivalent violations in N.D.C.C. § 39-06.1-06, because N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-05 clearly and unambiguously precludes a home rule city from superseding criminal or noncriminal offenses defined by State law, when a penalty that exceeds the limits delineated by equivalent State law supersedes State law; the word “offense” rather than the word “crimes” is used in the text of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-05, and an “offense” under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-05 includes noncriminal, as well as criminal offenses. Sauby v. City of Fargo, 2008 ND 60, 747 N.W.2d 65, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 60 (N.D. 2008).

Law Reviews.

Intoxicating Liquors — Persons Liable: North Dakota Extends Statutory Dram Shop Liability to Social Hosts, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 743 (1995).

All Special Provisions.

Where, in construing a statute, there are provisions in conflict, and the provisions are all special rather than general, this section is not applicable. Northwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baumgartner, 136 N.W.2d 640, 1965 N.D. LEXIS 131 (N.D. 1965).

Irreconcilable Statutes.

Statutes passed at the same legislative session must be construed together if possible; but if there is an irreconcilable conflict, it is presumed that the legislature intended that the earlier statute should give way to the later. Kershaw v. Burleigh County, 77 N.D. 932, 47 N.W.2d 132, 1951 N.D. LEXIS 122 (N.D. 1951).

Where a general provision conflicts with a special provision in the same enactment, the two should be construed, if possible, to avoid an irreconcilable conflict and give effect to both provisions. District One Republican Comm'n v. District One Democrat Comm'n, 466 N.W.2d 820, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 35 (N.D. 1991).

Legislative History And Purpose.

Given the statutory language of N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) construed with the other provisions for underinsured motorist coverage and the legislative history addressing the purpose of those statutes, N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) required the reduction for benefits paid or payable under any Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) law from the insured’s total compensable damages and not from the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage limit, because making insureds whole was furthered by construing the reducing language of N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) to authorize a reduction from compensatory damages rather than from the underinsured motorist coverage limit as long as the insured did not duplicate recovery for the same loss, and that purpose would be frustrated for WSI benefits since WSI had a subrogation right against a tortfeasor for fifty percent of the damages recovered up to a maximum of the total amount it has paid or would otherwise pay. Jund v. Johnnie B's Bar & Grill, Inc., 2011 ND 230, 814 N.W.2d 776, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 2011).

Specific Statutes.

Appellate procedures provided in former N.D.C.C. § 26-17-01.13 were special provisions and provided an exception to N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32. Evanson v. Wigen, 221 N.W.2d 648, 1974 N.D. LEXIS 179 (N.D. 1974).

The one thousand four hundred dollar limitation on the payment of funeral expenses set forth in N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07 controls over the general probate provisions of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-05. In re Estate of Tuntland, 364 N.W.2d 513, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 275 (N.D. 1985).

Requirement imposed by N.D.C.C. § 40-18-15.1 that a municipal court defendant demand a jury trial within 28 days of arraignment supersedes N.D.C.C. § 40-18-15 to the extent that the latter section guarantees defendants the right to jury trial on appeal from municipal court if the defendant has not waived his right to jury trial. City of Bismarck v. Fettig, 1999 ND 193, 601 N.W.2d 247, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 210 (N.D. 1999).

District court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, because under N.D.C.C. § 29-03-05, Burleigh County had authority to prosecute alleged offenses that the parties admitted occurred on the Burleigh County side of the center of the main channel of the Missouri River, or within five hundred yards of the boundary; the plain language of N.D.C.C. §§ 11-01-09 and 11-01-31, established the boundary between Morton County and Burleigh County to be through the center of the main channel of the Missouri River. State v. Wetzel, 2008 ND 186, 756 N.W.2d 775, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 182 (N.D. 2008).

In a case where the claimant sought a determination of an ownership interest in a tract of land, the trial court had to determine the “due date” for paying on the contract for deed, as that term was set forth in the relevant statute of limitations regarding contracts for deeds, N.D.C.C. § 28-01-42, in order to determine whether the claimant had filed the action on a contract for deed within the 10-year limitations period. In determining the meaning of that phrase, the trial court was obligated by N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02 to look at the statute’s language to determine the legislature’s intent and give those words their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, was obligated under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07 to construe that statute as a whole and harmonize its meaning to related provisions, could not consistent with N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05 disregard the letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit if the statute’s language was clear and unambiguous, and could look to N.D.C.C. § 1-02-39’ s list of extrinsic aids for construing ambiguous statutes. Locken v. Locken, 2011 ND 90, 797 N.W.2d 301, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2011).

Applying the provisions of N.D.C.C. §§ 1-02-05, 1-02-07 and 1-02-27, the trial court could not apply the three-year limitations period of N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-10 to bar the lessees’ contract claims against the political subdivision, as the legislature intended that statute to apply only against tort claims against the state, which was separate from the political subdivision for liability purposes. Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc., 2011 ND 215, 812 N.W.2d 323, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 216 (N.D. 2011).

Pursuant to statutory construction principles under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02, N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07, and N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05, the soybean seller was not entitled to consideration of the soybean seller’s motion to vacate an arbitration award, as that motion had not been filed within the mandatory 90-day time limit for challenging such awards set forth in N.D.C.C. § 32-29.3-23(2). That conclusion was true even though the soybean purchaser filed a motion to confirm 70 days after the award was entered, as nothing in the statute on the confirmation of awards, N.D.C.C. § 32-29.3-22, indicated that the filing of a motion to confirm was meant to toll the 90-day time period for filing a motion to vacate. James Valley Grain, LLC v. David, 2011 ND 160, 802 N.W.2d 158, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 158 (N.D. 2011).

In a case where a county was seeking a formal judicial declaration of a public road under the specific language of N.D.C.C. § 24-07-01, an owner’s reliance upon N.D.C.C. § 28-01-04 was misplaced because the action was not one seeking the recovery of real property or the possession thereof. A specific statute controlled over the general one. McKenzie County v. Reichman, 2012 ND 20, 812 N.W.2d 332, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 20 (N.D. 2012).

Under N.D.R.Ev. 707, which was interpreted with N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07, the State was required to produce at trial the nurse who drew defendant’s blood sample as the signed statement contemplated by N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07(10) was a testimonial statement; thus, the individual who signed such a statement was a witness for confrontation purposes and defendant was entitled to be confronted with that individual at trial unless the individual was unavailable and defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. However, Rule 707 did not require the State to produce the person who prepared the volatiles solution used during the chemical test or the mail carriers and evidence custodians involved in this matter at trial. State v. Lutz, 2012 ND 156, 820 N.W.2d 111, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 156 (N.D. 2012).

Under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07, statutes that were not in irreconcilable conflict had to be harmonized if possible. That could be done in a case where the trial court incorrectly determined that N.D.C.C. § 50-09-08.2, regarding the state human services agency’s power to subpoena documents from the state insurance reserve fund, as the power to subpoena the documents did not mean that the state insurance reserve fund could not voluntarily disclose those documents, as it had the authority to do under N.D.C.C. § 26.1-02-28. State v. N.D. Ins. Reserve Fund, 2012 ND 216, 822 N.W.2d 38, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 2012).

In a property owner’s suit against adjoining owners for damage allegedly caused to his building by encroaching tree branches, N.D.C.C. § 47-01-17 was the more specific statute and thus governed over N.D.C.C. § 47-01-12 to the extent of any conflict, in accordance with N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07. The adjoining owners exclusively owned the tree, including the portions that encroached, and had a corresponding responsibility to maintain the entire tree. Herring v. Lisbon, 2012 ND 226, 823 N.W.2d 493, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 222 (N.D. 2012).

Under a concerted, harmonious interpretation, N.D.C.C. § 39-10-45 supplements rather than supplants N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(1); Read together, §§ 39-10-38(1) and 39-10-45 require drivers to stop at specific distances before exiting alleys in addition to, but not exclusive of, requiring drivers on roadways to signal when appropriate. State v. Hirschkorn, 2016 ND 117, 881 N.W.2d 244, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 121 (N.D. 2016).

Sentences.

This section applies to sentences as well as clauses. City of Fargo v. State, 260 N.W.2d 333, 1977 N.D. LEXIS 195 (N.D. 1977).

Specific Conflicts Construed.

Despite statutory provisions providing for the sale of real property as known lots or parcels, mortgagors may at the time of executing the mortgage waive the statutory right to have real property sold in separate lots or parcels. Production Credit Ass'n v. Henderson, 429 N.W.2d 421, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 252 (N.D. 1988).

Construction of Administrative Regulations.

Supreme court applied rules of statutory construction to interpret two administrative regulations, N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-03 and N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-05.1-08.2; after reviewing the legislative history and legislative intent, the conclusion was reached that the offset provisions of the two regulations applied to parents’ child support obligations when one parent assigned the right to receive child support to the State as reimbursement for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families benefits received. Simon v. Simon, 2006 ND 29, 709 N.W.2d 4, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 31 (N.D. 2006).

In General.

The rule is especially applicable where the statute, if given a retrospective operation, would be invalid as impairing the obligation of contracts or interfering with vested rights. E. J. Lander & Co. v. Deemy, 46 N.D. 273, 176 N.W. 922, 1920 N.D. LEXIS 6 (N.D. 1920); First Nat'l Bank v. Bovey, Shute & Jackson, 49 N.D. 450, 191 N.W. 765, 1922 N.D. LEXIS 77 (N.D. 1922); Marks v. Mandan, 70 N.D. 434, 296 N.W. 34, 1940 N.D. LEXIS 191 (N.D. 1940).

An act or statute does not have to contain the word “retroactive” to have retroactive application; an act or statute will be applied retroactively if its language shows a legislative intent that it be so applied. Ohlsen v. J.S. (In the Interest of W.M.V.), 268 N.W.2d 781, 1978 N.D. LEXIS 171 (N.D. 1978).

This section applies to all statutes enacted by the legislature regardless of whether they are substantive or procedural. Reiling v. Bhattacharyya, 276 N.W.2d 237, 1979 N.D. LEXIS 227 (N.D. 1979).

This section is but a canon of statutory construction to aid in interpreting statutes to ascertain legislative intent. It is not an end in itself. Like any rule of construction, this section is subservient to the goal of statutory interpretation: to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 311 (N.D. 1986).

Statutes generally are not retroactive unless expressly declared so by the legislature. State v. Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d 726, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 93 (N.D. 1990).

This section is not to be blindly followed if there is evidence the legislature intended retrospective application. State v. Davenport, 536 N.W.2d 686, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 151 (N.D. 1995).

There was no need to resort to this section to discern legislative intent when a court could rationally infer from a review of legislative history that the legislature intended retroactive application of a statute. Smith v. Baumgartner, 2003 ND 120, 665 N.W.2d 12, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 123 (N.D. 2003).

Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes for retroactivity purposes has not been resuscitated, and if a statute is to be retroactive, the Legislature must expressly declare it to be so, as made plain by the language of N.D.C.C. § 1-02-10. White v. Altru Health Sys., 2008 ND 48, 746 N.W.2d 173, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 56 (N.D. 2008).

Applicability.

In applying this section, the North Dakota Supreme Court has in the past distinguished, between substantive statutes and procedural or evidentiary statutes. Since State v. Unterseher, 255 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1977) was decided, however, the North Dakota Supreme Court has determined that this section applies to all statutes. City of Mandan v. Mi-Jon News, 381 N.W.2d 540, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 251 (N.D. 1986).

Ameliorating Penal Legislation.

Statutes are not retroactive unless expressly declared so by the Legislature; an exception should be made to this general rule, however, in the case of ameliorating penal legislation. State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 311 (N.D. 1986).

The Cummings exception to the general bar of retroactivity applies where an ameliorating penal amendment imposes a lesser penalty for an offense. The exception does not require the State to retroactively apply an essential element of the offense to a defendant’s case, as the Cummings exception applies only to a situation where a lesser penalty is imposed, not where the legislature creates an additional element to the offense. Defendant is properly charged with a crime when the charging document alleges each and every essential element of the offense in effect on the date the crime occurred. State v. Flatt, 2007 ND 98, 733 N.W.2d 608, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 97 (N.D. 2007).

Collection of Fees.

Collection of fees by director of department of corrections under N.D.C.C. § 54-23.3-04 from persons on probation prior to the effective date of that statute is not a retroactive application of the statute in violation of this section, where the fees do not apply to transactions prior to the statute’s effective date. Glaspie v. Little, 1997 ND 108, 564 N.W.2d 651, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 109 (N.D. 1997).

Future Amendments.

This statutory rule applies to future amendments to the code. Jenson v. Frazer, 21 N.D. 267, 130 N.W. 832, 1911 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1911); Ford Motor Co. v. State, 59 N.D. 792, 231 N.W. 883, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 197 (N.D. 1930).

The use of the phrase “shall have been sustained” in an amendment of the Workmen’s Compensation Act authorizing claims for compensation and the recovery of damages where injury or death occurred under circumstances creating liability on the part of a third person does not give the amendment retrospective effect in view of the use of the same phrase, with like context, in the original act. Gimble v. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 77 N.D. 581, 44 N.W.2d 198, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 153 (N.D. 1950).

Procedural Statutes.

No procedural statute is retroactive unless it is declared to be so, and the statute requiring service of notice before proceeding to foreclose a mortgage does not apply to mortgages executed before its passage. Patterson Land Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 55 N.D. 90, 212 N.W. 512, 1927 N.D. LEXIS 8 (N.D. 1927).

The long-arm statute, former N.D.C.C. § 28-06.1-02, was subject to this section and could not be used retroactively to gain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on a cause of action which accrued before its effective date. Scranton Grain Co. v. Lubbock Mach. & Supply Co., 186 N.W.2d 449, 1971 N.D. LEXIS 164 (N.D. 1971).

Revenue Laws.

The general rule of construction applicable to repeals and reviews of revenue laws is that they are to have a prospective operation only unless the intent of the legislative assembly to the contrary clearly appears. Blakemore v. Cooper, 15 N.D. 5, 105 N.W. 566, 106 N.W. 566, 1905 N.D. LEXIS 107 (N.D. 1905); Great N. Ry. v. Severson, 78 N.D. 610, 50 N.W.2d 889, 1951 N.D. LEXIS 113 (N.D. 1951).

Specific Statutes.

The 1983 amendment to N.D.C.C. § 38-08-09.8 was not expressly made retroactive and did not apply to land leased before 1983. Slaaten v. Amerada Hess Corp., 459 N.W.2d 765, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 166 (N.D. 1990).

Where the legislature did not direct retroactive application of 1993 amendments to N.D.C.C. § 65-05-01, and the workers compensation bureau’s findings were based on pre-1993 evidence and the bureau contended claimant’s claim arose before the 1993 amendment, the 1993 amendment was inapplicable. Anderson v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 553 N.W.2d 496, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 210 (N.D. 1996).

The legislative history of N.D.C.C. § 31-13-03 showed that it applied retroactively to inmates already incarcerated for certain crimes; thus, defendant, who was incarcerated for felony murder in 1992 and at the time of enactment of the statute, was subject to the law and the court was required to order him to submit a DNA sample pursuant to the statute. State v. Norman, 2003 ND 66, 660 N.W.2d 549, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 78 (N.D. 2003).

District court erred when it applied the 2005 version of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46 in effect on the commencement date of a patient’s action since the applicable law in malpractice actions was the law in effect when the cause of action arose. Unless the amendments to § 28-01-46 were retroactive, the district court should have used the date the cause of action accrued in its analysis rather than the commencement date of the action, and nothing in the statute suggested the amendments were intended to apply retroactively; because the injury date occurred on February 10, 2004, and the statute was not retroactive, the 1997 version of § 28-01-46 should have been applied. White v. Altru Health Sys., 2008 ND 48, 746 N.W.2d 173, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 56 (N.D. 2008).

Appellate court overruled the assertion that the 2005 version of the Uniform Parentage Act applied, because the law in effect in 1993, the year the original paternity adjudication proceeding was commenced applied to the father’s motion for a DNA test to dispute a 1994 adjudication of paternity; not only did the 2005 legislation not say it applied retroactively, it specifically provided that it did not. Gerhardt v. C.K., 2008 ND 136, 751 N.W.2d 702, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 136 (N.D. 2008).

Contrary to the husband's argument, the district court properly concluded that N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1(3) did not apply to cohabitation that occurred prior to August 1, 2015, and as a result, any cohabitation the wife may have engaged in prior to that date did not count toward the requirement for terminating spousal support based on cohabitation. Klein v. Klein, 2016 ND 153, 882 N.W.2d 296, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 153 (N.D. 2016).

Application.

Court overruled the reliance on a headnote to define a term because a headnote could not be used to determine legislative intent or the legislative history for any statute. Sauby v. City of Fargo, 2008 ND 60, 747 N.W.2d 65, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 60 (N.D. 2008).

Applicability.

In a case in which plaintiffs sought to quiet title to a mineral interest, the district court, which concluded that plaintiffs’ mailing of the notice of lapse of mineral interest was not timely, properly applied N.D.C.C. § 1-02-15 and a prior version of N.D.C.C. § 1-03-05 when it granted summary judgment to defendants. Halvorson v. Starr, 2010 ND 133, 785 N.W.2d 248, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 143 (N.D. 2010).

Regardless of whether the state supreme court applied statutory law, namely N.D.C.C. § 1-02-15, or the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, the insurance company, limited partnership, and rental company timely served their summons and complaint on the elevator company in a case where they alleged claims for negligence and strict liability for the damage allegedly caused to their apartment building by the elevator company’s elevator. Under both approaches, the first day was excluded and the last day was included, although the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure technically controlled the analysis because N.D.R.Civ.P. 1 stated that the rules governed the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the trial court and N.D.R.Civ.P. 3 more specifically governed the commencement of a civil action, which meant that the rule for computing time in the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure rather than a statute had to be used to determine whether a timely action was commenced. Am. Family Ins. & Prairie W. Apts. I, L.P. v. Waupaca Elevator Co., 2012 ND 13, 809 N.W.2d 337, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 13 (N.D. 2012).

Statute of Limitations.

Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 6(a) and N.D.C.C. § 1-02-15, the date of the event that triggered plaintiff’s claims, August 21, 2004, was excluded in computing the beginning of the six-year statute of limitations; instead, the next day, August 22, 2004, began the six-year statute of limitations countdown to Saturday, August 21, 2010. Because the expiration date of plaintiff’s claims was a Saturday, the statute of limitations period was Monday, August 23, 2010. Langowski v. Altendorf, 2012 ND 34, 812 N.W.2d 427, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 30 (N.D. 2012).

Statutes on Redemption.

If the last day of the year allowed for redemption from foreclosure sale falls on Sunday, the redemption may be made on Monday following. Styles v. Dickey, 22 N.D. 515, 134 N.W. 702, 1912 N.D. LEXIS 38 (N.D. 1912).

Universal Rule.

The rule is a universal rule for the computation of time, alike applicable to matters of mere practice and to the construction of statutes providing time limits for performance. Hogg v. Christenson, 29 N.D. 8, 149 N.W. 562, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 2 (N.D. 1914); Phillips v. Johnson, 50 N.D. 781, 197 N.W. 879, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 31 (N.D. 1924); Friesz v. Olsness, 51 N.D. 210, 199 N.W. 590, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 163 (N.D. 1924); Schmitz v. Olsness, 58 N.D. 604, 226 N.W. 629, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 253 (N.D. 1929).

Collateral References.

Age: inclusion or exclusion of day of birth in computing one’s age, 5 A.L.R.2d 1143.

Inclusion or exclusion of first and last day for purposes of statute of limitations, 20 A.L.R.2d 1249.

Insurance: computation of time with respect to fractions of days, in determining duration and termination of risk under accident, health, or hospital policy, 38 A.L.R.2d 768.

Inclusion or exclusion of first and last day in computing time for performance of an act or event which must take place a certain number of days before a known future date, 98 A.L.R.2d 1331.

Uniform Time Act: construction and application of Federal Uniform Time Act of 1966 (15 USCS §§ 260-267), 34 A.L.R.3d 1148.

Meaning of “Repeal”.

The repeal to which the statute refers is a repeal of an existing law by means of legislative enactment because it specifically recognizes that the act which repeals a repealing act may contain provisions which would obviate the rule of anti-reviver prescribed by the section. Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 24 N.W.2d 737, 1946 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1946).

Rejection of Repealer at Referendum Election.

This statute has no application to and does not affect repeal provisions in an emergency measure that is rejected at a referendum election and as a result is “thereby repealed”. Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 24 N.W.2d 737, 1946 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1946).

Repeal of Statute by Unconstitutional Act.

Where an unconstitutional act of the legislative assembly embodies an express repeal of a specific preexisting statute, the unconstitutional act, being void in toto, does not effect a repeal. State ex rel. Brontrager v. Mundy, 53 N.D. 249, 205 N.W. 684, 1925 N.D. LEXIS 78 (N.D. 1925).

Repeal of Statute in Abrogation of Common Law.

When a statute which abrogates a rule or principle of the common law is repealed, the common-law principle or rule is, ipso facto, revived, unless there is something to show a contrary intent on the part of the legislature. Burleigh County v. Rhud, 23 N.D. 362, 136 N.W. 1082, 1912 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1912).

In General.

The penalties which are prescribed by a statute are not extinguished by its repeal as to transactions had and completed prior to the enactment of the repealing statute. National Bank v. Lemke, 3 N.D. 154, 54 N.W. 919, 1893 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1893); Wells County v. McHenry, 7 N.D. 246, 74 N.W. 241, 1898 N.D. LEXIS 57 (N.D. 1898); Cloone v. Minot Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 68 N.D. 543, 282 N.W. 441, 1938 N.D. LEXIS 145 (N.D. 1938).

Application in Criminal Cases.

Where a statute in effect when a criminal act was committed is repealed, and the new statute is such that a defendant cannot be punished thereunder, the penalty of the repealed statute must be applied under this section. State ex rel. Snodgrass v. French, 32 N.D. 362, 155 N.W. 687, 1915 N.D. LEXIS 75 (N.D. 1915).

Effect of Suspension.

Although the terms “suspend” and “repeal” are not synonymous, suspension of a statute constitutes a temporary “repeal” of that statute within the meaning of this section. Lang v. Wonnenberg, 455 N.W.2d 832, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1990).

Repeal by Initiative or Referendum.

Even before the 1939 amendment the section was applicable in cases involving the repeal of statutes by initiative or referendum. State v. Houge, 67 N.D. 251, 271 N.W. 677, 1937 N.D. LEXIS 78 (N.D. 1937); Cuthbert v. Smutz, 68 N.D. 575, 282 N.W. 494, 1938 N.D. LEXIS 148 (N.D. 1938).

Saving Clause.

Statute addresses itself to situations where there has been outright repeal without replacement; where new law is substituted for old the legislature may accomplish its purpose to enact a saving clause without using the language found in this section, and so preserve authority of courts to impose prison sentences on offenders under prior law. Kittelson v. Havener, 239 N.W.2d 803, 1976 N.D. LEXIS 198 (N.D. 1976).

In General.

This section determined the effect and application of the 1943 Code upon statutes, laws, or rules that were in force at the time of its enactment by the 1943 legislature. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry., 92 N.W.2d 650, 1958 N.D. LEXIS 93 (N.D. 1958).

General Repealing Clauses.

A clause repealing all acts or parts thereof in conflict with a statute adds nothing to the statute’s repealing force. State ex rel. Gammons v. Sorlie, 56 N.D. 650, 219 N.W. 105, 1928 N.D. LEXIS 184 (N.D. 1928).

Lien of Tax Judgment.

Where a judgment for personal property taxes was obtained and became a lien upon the property in question before the Revised Code of 1895 took effect, the lien was not affected by the repeal of the statute. Hagler v. Kelly, 14 N.D. 218, 103 N.W. 629 (1905), overruling Gull River Lumber Co. v. Brock, 7 N.D. 135, 73 N.W. 430 (1897). Blakemore v. Cooper, 15 N.D. 5, 105 N.W. 566, 106 N.W. 566, 1905 N.D. LEXIS 107 (N.D. 1905).

Omission of Statutes from Code.

By omitting chapters 28-06 and 28-28 of the Revised Code of 1943 from the Century Code, the legislature in effect repealed those chapters. Higgins v. Hawks, 122 N.W.2d 129, 1963 N.D. LEXIS 86, 1963 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1963).

Under this section, omission of former sections from the code constituted a repeal of those sections. Kee v. Redlin, 203 N.W.2d 423, 1972 N.D. LEXIS 113 (N.D. 1972).

Repealed Statutes May Aid Construction.

A subsequent statute revising the whole subject matter of former enactments and intended as a substitute repeals the former, but the original statutes may be resorted to in aid of construction in case of doubt. Klingensmith v. Siegal, 57 N.D. 768, 224 N.W. 680, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 324 (N.D. 1929).

Statute Not Repealed by Unconstitutional Act.

Where an unconstitutional act of the legislative assembly embodies an express repeal of a specific preexisting statute, the unconstitutional act, being void in toto, does not effect a repeal. State ex rel. Brontrager v. Mundy, 53 N.D. 249, 205 N.W. 684, 1925 N.D. LEXIS 78 (N.D. 1925).

Validity of Title of Act.

A statute which fails to comply with a constitutional provision requiring every act to embrace one subject to be mentioned in its title becomes valid upon its incorporation in a proper code or revision duly adopted as such. Lapland v. Stearns, 79 N.D. 62, 54 N.W.2d 748, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 99 (N.D. 1952); Ferch v. Housing Auth., 79 N.D. 764, 59 N.W.2d 849, 1953 N.D. LEXIS 76 (N.D. 1953).

Incorporation into Code Revision Without Material Change.

The incorporation into and reenactment of certain statutes without material change, in the general revision of the laws in 1895, did not operate as a new enactment of them but only as a continuation thereof, and such statutes were to be construed as though such revision had not been made. Wells County v. McHenry, 7 N.D. 246, 74 N.W. 241, 1898 N.D. LEXIS 57 (N.D. 1898); Sargent County v. Cooper, 29 N.D. 281, 150 N.W. 878, 1915 N.D. LEXIS 11 (N.D. 1915).

Presumption Law Not Changed by Codifiers of 1943 Code.

A statute which was a recodification in the 1943 Code, rather than a new enactment, was to be considered as a continuation of the existing statute, and in such cases there was a presumption that the codifiers did not intend to change the law as it previously existed. Schmutzler v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 78 N.D. 377, 49 N.W.2d 649, 1951 N.D. LEXIS 96 (N.D. 1951); Hutchinson v. Charles, 75 N.W.2d 313 (1956).

Prior History of Statutes As Aid in Interpretation.

Where the legislature, in declaring what the printed volumes of the 1943 Code should contain, made provision for historical annotation, it was a clear indication that the prior history of the statutes incorporated in the codification might be consulted as an aid in their interpretation. Kershaw v. Burleigh County, 77 N.D. 932, 47 N.W.2d 132, 1951 N.D. LEXIS 122 (N.D. 1951).

Adoption and Succession Statutes.

There is no evidence in the succession statutes of a legislative intent that the word “issue” does not include an adopted child and the sections relating to adoption do not limit the right of an adopted child to inherit from his natural parents under the succession statutes. Bannerman v. Close, 81 N.W.2d 259 (N.D. 1957).

Although the estate representative contesting the finding that the adopted woman was a proper devisee of decedent, who was the mother of the adopted woman’s biological father, claimed that the trial court should have applied North Dakota’s Revised Uniform Adoption Act, N.D.C.C. § 14-15-14 (Adoption Act), on the effects of a decree of adoption, N.D.C.C. § 1-02-27 dictated that because the North Dakota Uniform Probate Code (Uniform Probate Code) conflicted with Adoption Act and governed the specific issue of identifying proper devisees, the Uniform Probate Code had to be applied. As a result, the adopted woman could be found to be a proper devisee despite the fact that result might not have occurred had the Adoption Act been applied. Kraft v. Ramos (In re Estate of Boehm), 2012 ND 104, 816 N.W.2d 793, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 93 (N.D. 2012).

Reconciling Statutes.

Applying the provisions of N.D.C.C. §§ 1-02-05, 1-02-07 and 1-02-27, the trial court could not apply the three-year limitations period of N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-10 to bar the lessees’ contract claims against the political subdivision, as the legislature intended that statute to apply only against tort claims against the state, which was separate from the political subdivision for liability purposes. Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc., 2011 ND 215, 812 N.W.2d 323, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 216 (N.D. 2011).

Discharge of Condition by Statute Cannot Be Waived.

Where a condition precedent to the vesting of title is recited in a contract for the transfer of an interest in real estate, and such condition is declared discharged by operation of N.D.C.C. § 47-09-07, no condition remains and waiver cannot apply to restore that which has been discharged. Adams v. Little Mo. Minerals Ass'n, 143 N.W.2d 659, 1966 N.D. LEXIS 179 (N.D. 1966).

Private Benefits.

Private statutory rights or benefits may be waived by a party entitled thereto unless such waiver would be against public policy or the statute declares or implies that they may not be waived. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Vangen, 116 N.W.2d 641, 1962 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 1962).

Statutory rights or benefits may generally be waived by the party entitled to such benefits unless such a waiver is against public policy or the statute declares or implies that it may not be waived. First State Bank v. Anderson, 452 N.W.2d 90, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 39 (N.D. 1990); Brunsoman v. Scarlett, 465 N.W.2d 162, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 3 (N.D. 1991).

Right to Mitigate Damages.

The right of a defendant in an action for conversion of personal property to show in mitigation of damages, pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 35-01-20, the amount due on any lien held by defendant, may be waived by the defendant. Wellens v. Beck, 103 N.W.2d 281, 1960 N.D. LEXIS 71 (N.D. 1960).

Right to Present Testimony at Hearing.

The right to present testimony at a hearing for a protection order is waivable. Steckler v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 76, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 214 (N.D. 1992).

Specific Statutes.

In essence, this state’s statutory scheme declares that, as a matter of public policy, a mortgagor of property over a certain number of acres is entitled to a one-year period of redemption upon foreclosure. The right to a one-year redemption period cannot be waived by a provision in the mortgage declaring that the Short-Term Act will govern. First State Bank v. Anderson, 452 N.W.2d 90, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 39 (N.D. 1990).

Statutory Provision to Contrary.

This section does not apply where there is specific statutory provision that a right of action cannot be waived, released, or barred before such cause of action has actually accrued. C. I. T. Corp. v. Hetland, 143 N.W.2d 94, 1966 N.D. LEXIS 177 (N.D. 1966).

Waiver of Mechanic’s Lien.

A party entitled to a mechanic’s lien may waive that right by a signed writing or may be estopped to assert the mechanic’s lien by acts or conduct constituting estoppel. Peterson Mechanical v. Nereson, 466 N.W.2d 568, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 12 (N.D. 1991).

Waiver Requirements.

There must be a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right to constitute a valid waiver under this section. Public Serv. Comm'n v. American Grain & Cattle, 281 N.W.2d 48, 1979 N.D. LEXIS 264 (N.D. 1979).

All Words Operative.

Sexually dangerous individual is defined under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) as an individual who is shown to have engaged in sexually predatory conduct and who has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that makes that individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that commitment as a sexually dangerous individual is unconstitutional unless the person is found to have serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior; therefore, consistent with N.D.C.C. § 1-02-38(1), the definition of a sexually dangerous individual is construed to require a connection between the disorder and dangerousness, including evidence showing the person has serious difficulty controlling his behavior, which distinguishes a sexually dangerous individual from other dangerous persons. Maedche v. Maedche, 2010 ND 171, 788 N.W.2d 331, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 170 (N.D. 2010).

Debt servicing company’s services were not illegal under N.D.C.C. § 13-06-02 because the company was not engaged in “debt adjusting” as defined in N.D.C.C. § 13-06-01, as it did not distribute money to the debtors’ creditors; rather, it negotiated settlements with the creditors, and its agreement with the debtors provided that the debtors would make all settlement payments directly to the creditors. The court rejected a Chapter 7 trustee’s argument that the “or” in the second sentence of the definition of debt adjusting meant that a person engaged in debt adjusting whether or not that person received money from the debtor and distributed the same to the debtor’s creditors, as the trustee’s interpretation of the statute would render a portion of the first sentence—that “debt adjusting” included as a part of its definition the distribution of money among creditors— inoperative. Kaler v. Able Debt Settlement, Inc. (In re Kendall), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 2273 (Bankr. D.N.D. July 14, 2010), aff'd, 440 B.R. 526, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4349 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010).

N.D.C.C. § 52-06-02(4) did not disqualify employees from unemployment compensation when they were locked out because, when interpreting the statutory disqualification for a “strike, sympathy strike, or a claimant’s work stoppage dispute of any kind,” if the inclusion of “work stoppage dispute of any kind” broadened “a claimant’s work stoppage dispute of any kind” to include employer initiated work stoppages, the phrase “a claimant’s” became superfluous, contrary to N.D.C.C. §§ 1-02-38(2) and 31-11-05(23). Olson v. Job Serv. N.D., 2013 ND 24, 826 N.W.2d 36, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 34 (N.D. 2013).

Legislative History And Purpose.

Given the statutory language of N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) construed with the other provisions for underinsured motorist coverage and the legislative history addressing the purpose of those statutes, N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) required the reduction for benefits paid or payable under any Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) law from the insured’s total compensable damages and not from the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage limit, because making insureds whole was furthered by construing the reducing language of N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) to authorize a reduction from compensatory damages rather than from the underinsured motorist coverage limit as long as the insured did not duplicate recovery for the same loss, and that purpose would be frustrated for WSI benefits since WSI had a subrogation right against a tortfeasor for fifty percent of the damages recovered up to a maximum of the total amount it has paid or would otherwise pay. Jund v. Johnnie B's Bar & Grill, Inc., 2011 ND 230, 814 N.W.2d 776, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 2011).

Statutes Presumed Constitutional.

Under N.D.R.Ev. 707, which was interpreted with N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07, the State was required to produce at trial the nurse who drew defendant’s blood sample as the signed statement contemplated by N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07(10) was a testimonial statement; thus, the individual who signed such a statement was a witness for confrontation purposes and defendant was entitled to be confronted with that individual at trial unless the individual was unavailable and defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. However, Rule 707 did not require the State to produce the person who prepared the volatiles solution used during the chemical test or the mail carriers and evidence custodians involved in this matter at trial. State v. Lutz, 2012 ND 156, 820 N.W.2d 111, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 156 (N.D. 2012).

Unreasonable Result.

It would be an absurd result if alcoholic beverage dealers could avoid liability for illegal sales to intoxicated customers depending upon whether the customers paid for their own drinks or took turns paying for each other’s drinks. Relieving the merchant of liability under the latter circumstance would not deter sales to intoxicated persons, which is the objective of the Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 56 (N.D. 1989).

N.D.C.C. § 65-02-11 is construed to require an element of reasonableness in determining the scope of the phrase “anything necessary” in order to avoid unreasonable or absurd consequences. State v. Altru Health Sys., 2007 ND 38, 729 N.W.2d 113, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 38 (N.D. 2007).

In General.

Among the extrinsic aids useful in construing an ambiguous statute to determine legislative intent are the object sought to be attained, legislative history, and administrative construction of the statute. Reed v. Hillsboro Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 9, 477 N.W.2d 237, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 191 (N.D. 1991).

In construing ambiguous statutes, the court considers the legislative history, the purpose and object of the statute, and the laws upon the same subject. Walker v. Schneider, 477 N.W.2d 167, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 187 (N.D. 1991).

Administrative Construction.

The administrative construction of a statute by the agency administering the law is entitled to deference if that interpretation does not contradict clear and unambiguous statutory language. Western Gas Resources v. Heitkamp, 489 N.W.2d 869, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 181 (N.D. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 920, 113 S. Ct. 1281, 122 L. Ed. 2d 675, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 1261 (U.S. 1993).

Supreme court applied rules of statutory construction to interpret two administrative regulations, N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-03 and N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-05.1-08.2; after reviewing the legislative history and legislative intent, the conclusion was reached that the offset provisions of the two regulations applied to parents’ child support obligations when one parent assigned the right to receive child support to the State as reimbursement for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families benefits received. Simon v. Simon, 2006 ND 29, 709 N.W.2d 4, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 31 (N.D. 2006).

Court Rules.

If a rule of court is ambiguous, the court may resort to extrinsic aids, including the rule’s historical development, to construe it. State v. Lamb, 541 N.W.2d 457, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 10 (N.D. 1996).

Extrinsic Aids.

If the language of a statute is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, extrinsic aids may be used to interpret the statute. Extrinsic aids which may be used to determine legislative intent include the laws upon the same or similar subjects and the consequences of a particular construction. Kim-Go, H.K. Minerals, Inc. v. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc., 460 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1990).

If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, that language cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the legislative intent because the intent is presumed to be clear from the face of the statute. However, if the statutory language is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, courts may look to extrinsic aids to interpret the statute. District One Republican Comm'n v. District One Democrat Comm'n, 466 N.W.2d 820, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 35 (N.D. 1991).

When a statute is ambiguous, it is the duty of this court to ascertain the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute. The court may resort to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, to construe an ambiguous provision. Kallhoff v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 484 N.W.2d 510, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 97 (N.D. 1992).

When interpreting ambiguous statutes, this court may consider pertinent extrinsic evidence. That evidence may include legislative history, the object of the statute, and the consequences of a particular construction. Kroh v. American Family Ins., 487 N.W.2d 306, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 112 (N.D. 1992).

In a case where the claimant sought a determination of an ownership interest in a tract of land, the trial court had to determine the “due date” for paying on the contract for deed, as that term was set forth in the relevant statute of limitations regarding contracts for deeds, N.D.C.C. § 28-01-42, in order to determine whether the claimant had filed the action on a contract for deed within the 10-year limitations period. In determining the meaning of that phrase, the trial court was obligated by N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02 to look at the statute’s language to determine the legislature’s intent and give those words their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, was obligated under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07 to construe that statute as a whole and harmonize its meaning to related provisions, could not consistent with N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05 disregard the letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit if the statute’s language was clear and unambiguous, and could look to N.D.C.C. § 1-02-39’ s list of extrinsic aids for construing ambiguous statutes. Locken v. Locken, 2011 ND 90, 797 N.W.2d 301, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2011).

Upon remand of the case to the trial court, the trial court under the authority of N.D.C.C. § 1-02-39 could consider the factors listed in that statute to determine the appropriate limitations period to be applied to the lessees’ contract claims against the political subdivision. The trial court needed to do so because it applied the wrong limitations period to determine that the contract claims were barred against the political subdivision, especially given the legislature’s intent under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-01 that claims against political subdivisions be treated separately from claims against the state, that tort claims as recognized by the factors set forth in N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-02, that state tort liability was separate from political subdivision liability as contemplated under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.2-01, and that the legislature had provided a “catch-all” limitations provision for actions against only against the state and its employees under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-22.1. Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc., 2011 ND 215, 812 N.W.2d 323, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 216 (N.D. 2011).

Legislative History.

When construing an ambiguous statute to ascertain the legislature’s intent, the court can consider extrinsic evidence, including the legislative history of the statute. City of Fargo v. Ness, 529 N.W.2d 572, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 41 (N.D. 1995).

District court’s issuance of an additional 90-day forced medication order following a hearing on the matter did not violate N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1(3), because legislative history clearly reflected the intention of the 1993 amendments to N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1(3), was not to place a limitation on the number of 90-day forced medication orders that could be issued, but was to require a court hearing before an extension could be granted rather than allowing an extension based only on the report of a psychiatrist. Pryatel v. T.E. (In re T.E.), 2007 ND 166, 740 N.W.2d 100, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 160 (N.D. 2007).

Given the statutory language of N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) construed with the other provisions for underinsured motorist coverage and the legislative history addressing the purpose of those statutes, N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) required the reduction for benefits paid or payable under any Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) law from the insured’s total compensable damages and not from the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage limit, because making insureds whole was furthered by construing the reducing language of N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) to authorize a reduction from compensatory damages rather than from the underinsured motorist coverage limit as long as the insured did not duplicate recovery for the same loss, and that purpose would be frustrated for WSI benefits since WSI had a subrogation right against a tortfeasor for fifty percent of the damages recovered up to a maximum of the total amount it has paid or would otherwise pay. Jund v. Johnnie B's Bar & Grill, Inc., 2011 ND 230, 814 N.W.2d 776, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 2011).

Similar Statutes.

Consideration of similar statutes of other states and court decisions interpreting those statutes is appropriate and relevant in determining the proper application of a North Dakota statute. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130 (N.D. 1988).

When the plain language of a statute is not “transparent,” our codified rules of statutory interpretation direct us to look to the code itself in determining the meaning of statutory terms. Northern X-Ray Co. v. State by & Through Hanson, 542 N.W.2d 733, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 25 (N.D. 1996).

Specific Ambiguous Statutes.

Consideration of annotations to the Field Code is just as appropriate as consideration of official comments to uniform or model acts. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130 (N.D. 1988).

Election Days.

A township election day is not a holiday. State v. Currie, 8 N.D. 545, 80 N.W. 475, 1899 N.D. LEXIS 46 (N.D. 1899).

Sunday.

Since the statute is construed as mandatory as to time provisions, the time within which nominations must be filed is not changed by the fact that the thirtieth day before election falls on Sunday. State ex rel. Anderson v. Falley, 9 N.D. 464, 83 N.W. 913, 1900 N.D. LEXIS 252 (N.D. 1900).

In court practice, where the last day for performance falls on Sunday, and where the time within which the act to be done is measured by days, generally, performance can be made on the Monday following. The same rule applies to a case involving the redemption period before a mortgage foreclosure sale. Styles v. Dickey, 22 N.D. 515, 134 N.W. 702, 1912 N.D. LEXIS 38 (N.D. 1912).

Collateral References.

Sports and games on Sunday, 24 A.L.R.2d 813.

Validity of administrative proceedings conducted on Sunday or holiday, 26 A.L.R.2d 996.

Insurance: time for payment of premium where last day falls on Sunday or holiday, 53 A.L.R.2d 877.

Regulation or licensing of business of selling motor vehicles, 57 A.L.R.2d 1265; 7 A.L.R.3d 1173.

Exclusion or inclusion of terminal Sunday or holiday in computing time for taking or perfecting appellate review, 61 A.L.R.2d 482.

Conflict of laws as to Sunday contracts, 67 A.L.R.2d 694.

Municipality’s liability for injury or death resulting from temporary condition or obstruction in street in connection with holiday, entertainment, parade, or other special event, 84 A.L.R.2d 508.

Judgment rendered on Sunday or holiday, 85 A.L.R.2d 595.

Self-service laundries, operation on Sunday, 87 A.L.R.2d 1007, 1011.

Validity of municipal regulation more restrictive than state regulation as to time for selling or serving intoxicating liquor, 51 A.L.R.3d 1061.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by claimant’s receipt of holiday pay, 3 A.L.R.4th 557.

Validity, construction, and effect of “Sunday Closing” or “Blue” laws — modern status, 10 A.L.R.4th 246.

Applicability.

In a case in which plaintiffs sought to quiet title to a mineral interest, the district court, which concluded that plaintiffs’ mailing of the notice of lapse of mineral interest was not timely, properly applied N.D.C.C. § 1-02-15 and a prior version of N.D.C.C. § 1-03-05 when it granted summary judgment to defendants. Halvorson v. Starr, 2010 ND 133, 785 N.W.2d 248, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 143 (N.D. 2010).

Not Applicable to Statute Mandatory As to Time.

The statute is not applicable to certificates of nomination to public office. State ex rel. Anderson v. Falley, 9 N.D. 464, 83 N.W. 913, 1900 N.D. LEXIS 252 (N.D. 1900).

Redemption from Foreclosure.

If the last day of the year allowed for redemption from foreclosure sale falls on Sunday the redemption may be made on Monday. Styles v. Dickey, 22 N.D. 515, 134 N.W. 702, 1912 N.D. LEXIS 38 (N.D. 1912).

Effect of Law.

The effect of R.C. 1905, § 5024 could only be to cure defects in form or substance without going to the extent of making a certificate an acknowledgment, which was not so in the first instance because not certified by an officer shown to be qualified to take acknowledgments. Goss v. Herman, 20 N.D. 295, 127 N.W. 78, 1910 N.D. LEXIS 84 (N.D. 1910).

Void Mortgage.

The legislature could not, by retroactive measures, cure a void mortgage purporting to encumber a homestead, where the wife had not acknowledged the instrument. Acklin v. First Nat'l Bank, 64 N.D. 577, 254 N.W. 769, 1934 N.D. LEXIS 236, 1934 N.D. LEXIS 237 (N.D. 1934).

Application.

The validation of the record of mortgages and assignments applied only to mortgages of and titles to real estate and not to mortgages of personal property. J. I. Case Co. v. Sax Motor Co., 64 N.D. 757, 256 N.W. 219, 1934 N.D. LEXIS 264 (N.D. 1934).