Article I General Provisions, Definitions, and Probate Jurisdiction of Court

CHAPTER 30.1-01 Short Title — Construction — General Provisions — Definitions

30.1-01-01. (1-101) Short title.

This title shall be known and may be cited as the Uniform Probate Code.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Law Reviews.

The New North Dakota Probate Code, W. Jeremy Davis, 49 N.D. L. Rev. 543 (1973).

The Uniform Probate Code: The Way to Probate in North Dakota, 50 N.D. L. Rev. 593 (1974).

North Dakota Estate Planning under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 54 N.D. L. Rev. 7 (1977).

Comparative Legislation.

Jurisdictions which have enacted the Uniform Probate Code include:

Alaska Stat. §§ 13.06.005 to 13.36.100.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-1101 to 14-7307.

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-10-101 to 15-17-101.

Fla. Stat. §§ 731.005 to 735.302, 737.101 to 737.512.

Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 560:1-101 to 560:8-102.

Idaho Code §§ 15-1-101 to 15-7-307.

Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 386.650 to 386.670.

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, §§ 1-101 to 8-401.

Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 700.1 to 700.993.

Minn. Stat. §§ 524.1-101 to 524.8-103.

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 72-1-101 to 72-5-502.

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-2201 to 30-2902.

N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-1-101 to 45-7-401.

S.C. Code Ann. §§ 62-1-100 to 62-7-604.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-1-101 to 75-8-101.

30.1-01-02. (1-102) Purposes — Rule of construction.

  1. This title shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.
  2. The underlying purposes and policies of this title are:
    1. To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated persons.
    2. To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of the decedent’s property.
    3. To promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to the decedent’s successors.
    4. To facilitate the use and enforcement of certain trusts.
    5. To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Liberal Construction.

In a guardianship case, a ward's statutory rights were not violated because a district court substantially complied with this statute by accepting a physician's letter as the required physician's report. Even though an appointed expert refused to evaluate the ward, this letter provided a medical evaluation to the court satisfying the statutory requirements, and there was liberal construction of this title. N.P. v. M.E. (In re M.E.), 2015 ND 267, 871 N.W.2d 435, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 289 (N.D. 2015).

30.1-01-03. (1-106) Effect of fraud and evasion.

Whenever fraud has been perpetrated in connection with any proceeding or in any statement filed under this title, or if fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes of this title, any person injured thereby may obtain appropriate relief against the perpetrator of the fraud or restitution from any person, other than a bona fide purchaser, benefiting from the fraud, whether innocent or not. Any proceeding must be commenced within two years after the discovery of the fraud, but no proceeding may be brought against one not a perpetrator of the fraud later than five years after the time of commission of the fraud. This section has no bearing on remedies relating to fraud practiced on a decedent during the decedent’s lifetime which affects the succession of the decedent’s estate.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Action Outside of Probate.

When the formal processes of admitting a will to probate, appointing a personal representative, or settling an estate are preceded by notice to all interested persons and a full adversarial hearing, the adjudication generally binds notified persons. An independent action for relief from fraud is authorized if it has not already been litigated in a formal testacy proceeding, and a party wronged by fraud may bring a timely action outside of the usual procedures and limitations. Ketterling v. Gonzalez (In re the Estate of Ketterling), 515 N.W.2d 158, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1994).

Applicability.

District court did not err in determining the ownership of the property at issue because its findings that an estate's failed to meet its burden of proving fraud or mistake were not clearly erroneous where the primary purpose of the estate's action was to reform a deed and determine ownership of property the estate alleged it owned, the statute of limitations was not applicable to the estate's quiet title and reformation claim, the estate's appellate brief did not attack the district court's findings of fact on fraud, and the evidence did not establish whether the son and the father's estate intended to change the personal representative's deed or whether the deed was fraudulently or mistakenly altered. Vaage v. State (In re Estate of Vaage), 2016 ND 32, 875 N.W.2d 527, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 22 (N.D. 2016).

Collateral References.

Codicil as validating will or prior codicil executed under undue influence or fraud, 21 A.L.R.2d 821, 829.

Destruction of will: what constitutes fraud within statute relating to proof of will “fraudulently” destroyed during testator’s lifetime, 23 A.L.R.2d 382.

Res judicata: judgment denying validity of will because of undue influence, lack of mental capacity, or the like, as res judicata as to validity of another will, deed, or other instrument, 25 A.L.R.2d 657.

Validity and enforceability of agreement to drop or compromise will contest or withdraw objections to probate, or of agreement to induce others to do so, 42 A.L.R.2d 1319, 1365.

Presumption or inference of undue influence from testamentary gift to relative, friend, or associate of person preparing will or procuring its execution, 13 A.L.R.3d 381.

Attorney: undue influence in gift to testator’s attorney, 19 A.L.R.3d 575.

Solicitation of testator to make will or specified bequest as undue influence, 48 A.L.R.3d 961.

Partial invalidity: may parts of will be upheld notwithstanding failure of other parts for lack of testamentary mental capacity or undue influence, 64 A.L.R.3d 261.

Fraud as extending statutory limitations period for contesting will or its probate, 48 A.L.R.4th 1094.

30.1-01-04. (1-107) Evidence of death or status.

In addition to the rules of evidence in courts of general jurisdiction, the following rules relating to a determination of death and status apply:

  1. Death occurs when an individual is determined to be dead under chapter 23-06.3.
  2. A certified or authenticated copy of a death certificate purporting to be issued by an official or agency of the place where the death purportedly occurred is prima facie evidence of the fact, place, date, and time of death, and the identity of the decedent.
  3. A certified or authenticated copy of any record or report of a governmental agency, domestic or foreign, that an individual is missing, detained, dead, or alive is prima facie evidence of the status and of the dates, circumstances, and places disclosed by the record or report.
  4. In the absence of prima facie evidence of death under subsection 2 or 3, the fact of death may be established by clear and convincing evidence, including circumstantial evidence.
  5. An individual whose death is not established under this section, who is absent for a continuous period of five years, during which the person has not been heard from, and whose absence is not satisfactorily explained after diligent search or inquiry, is presumed to be dead. The death is presumed to have occurred at the end of the period unless there is sufficient evidence for determining that death occurred earlier.
  6. In the absence of evidence disputing the time of death stated on a document described in subsection 2 or 3, a document described in subsection 2 or 3 that states a time of death one hundred twenty hours or more after the time of death of another individual, however the time of death of the other individual is determined, establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the individual survived the other individual by one hundred twenty hours.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 401, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 1; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Collateral References.

Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, construction, application, and effect of, 39 A.L.R.3d 1332.

Will provision: construction of provision as to which of two or more parties shall be deemed the survivor in case of death simultaneously, in a common disaster, or within a specified period of time, 40 A.L.R.3d 359.

30.1-01-05. (1-108) Acts by holder of general power.

For the purpose of granting consent or approval with regard to the acts or accounts of a personal representative or trustee, including relief from liability or penalty for failure to post bond, to register a trust, or to perform other duties, and for purposes of consenting to modification or termination of a trust or to deviation from its terms, the sole holder or all coholders of a presently exercisable general power of appointment, including one in the form of a power of amendment or revocation, are deemed to act for beneficiaries to the extent their interests (as objects, takers in default, or otherwise) are subject to the power.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-01-06. (1-201) General definitions.

Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent chapters which are applicable to specific chapters, and unless the context otherwise requires, in this title:

  1. “Agent” includes an attorney-in-fact under a durable or nondurable power of attorney, an individual authorized to make decisions concerning another’s health care, and an individual authorized to make decisions for another under a natural death act.
  2. “Application” means a written request to the court for an order of informal probate or appointment under chapter 30.1-14.
  3. “Augmented estate” means the estate described in section 30.1-05-02.
  4. “Beneficiary”, as it relates to a trust beneficiary, includes a person who has any present or future interest, vested or contingent, and also includes the owner of an interest by assignment or other transfer; as it relates to a charitable trust, includes any person entitled to enforce the trust; as it relates to a beneficiary of a beneficiary designation, refers to a beneficiary of an account with a payable on death designation, of a security registered in beneficiary form transferable on death, or other nonprobate transfer at death; and, as it relates to a “beneficiary designated in a governing instrument”, includes a grantee of a deed, a devisee, a trust beneficiary, a beneficiary of a beneficiary designation, a donee, or a person in whose favor a power of attorney or a power held in any individual, fiduciary, or representative capacity is exercised.
  5. “Beneficiary designation” refers to a governing instrument naming a beneficiary of an account with payable on death designation, of a security registered in beneficiary form transferable on death, or other nonprobate transfer at death.
  6. “Child” includes an individual entitled to take as a child under this title by intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes a person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote descendant.
  7. “Claims”, in respect to estates of decedents and protected persons, includes liabilities of the decedent or protected person whether arising in contract, in tort, or otherwise, and liabilities of the estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent or after the appointment of a conservator, including funeral expenses and expenses of administration. The term does not include estate or inheritance taxes or demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific assets alleged to be included in the estate.
  8. “Conservator” means a person who is appointed by a court to manage the estate of a protected person, and includes limited conservators as defined in this section.
  9. “Court” means the court having jurisdiction in matters relating to the affairs of decedents.
  10. “Descendant” of an individual means all descendants of all generations, with the relationship of parent and child at each generation being determined by the definition of child and parent contained in this title.
  11. “Devise”, when used as a noun, means a testamentary disposition of real or personal property, and when used as a verb, means to dispose of real or personal property by will.
  12. “Devisee” means a person designated in a will to receive a devise. In the case of a devise to an existing trust or trustee, or to a trustee or trust described by will, the trust or trustee is the devisee and the beneficiaries are not devisees.
  13. “Disability” means cause for a protective order as described in section 30.1-29-01.
  14. “Distributee” means any person who has received property of a decedent from the decedent’s personal representative other than as a creditor or purchaser. A testamentary trustee is a distributee only to the extent of distributed assets or increment thereto remaining in the trustee’s hands. A beneficiary of a testamentary trust to whom the trustee has distributed property received from a personal representative is a distributee of the personal representative. For the purposes of this provision, “testamentary trustee” includes a trustee to whom assets are transferred by will to the extent of the devised assets.
  15. “Estate” includes the property of the decedent, trust, or other person whose affairs are subject to this title as originally constituted and as it exists from time to time during administration.
  16. “Exempt property” means that property of a decedent’s estate which is described in section 30.1-07-01.
  17. “Expert examiner” means:
    1. A licensed physician;
    2. A psychiatrist;
    3. A licensed psychologist trained in a clinical program;
    4. An advanced practice registered nurse who is licensed under chapter 43-12.1 within the role of a certified nurse practitioner or certified clinical nurse specialist, who has completed the requirements for a minimum of a master’s degree from an accredited program, and who is functioning within the scope of practice in one of the population foci as approved by the state board of nursing; or
    5. A physician assistant who is licensed under chapter 43-17 and authorized by the state board of medical examiners to practice in this state.
  18. “Fiduciary” includes a personal representative, guardian, conservator, and trustee.
  19. “Foreign personal representative” means a personal representative appointed by another jurisdiction.
  20. “Formal proceedings” means proceedings conducted before a judge with notice to interested persons.
  21. “Governing instrument” means a deed, will, trust, insurance or annuity policy, account with payable on death designation, security registered in beneficiary form transferable on death, pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument creating or exercising a power of appointment or a power of attorney, or a dispositive, appointive, or nominative instrument of any similar type.
  22. “Guardian” means a person who or nonprofit corporation that has qualified as a guardian of a minor or incapacitated person pursuant to testamentary or court appointment, and includes limited guardians as defined in this section, but excludes one who is merely a guardian ad litem.
  23. “Heirs”, except as controlled by section 30.1-09.1-11, means persons, including the surviving spouse and the state, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a decedent.
  24. “Incapacitated person” means an individual described in section 30.1-26-01.
  25. “Informal proceedings” means those conducted by the court for probate of a will or appointment of a personal representative without notice to interested persons.
  26. “Interested person” includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person. The term also includes persons having priority for appointment as personal representative and other fiduciaries representing interested persons. The meaning as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and must be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding.
  27. “Issue” of a person means descendant as defined in subsection 10.
  28. “Joint tenants with the right of survivorship” and “community property with the right of survivorship” includes co-owners of property held under circumstances that entitle one or more to the whole of the property on the death of the other or others, but excludes forms of co-ownership registration in which the underlying ownership of each party is in proportion to that party’s contribution.
  29. “Lease” includes an oil, gas, or other mineral lease.
  30. “Letters” includes letters testamentary, letters of guardianship, letters of administration, and letters of conservatorship.
  31. “Limited conservator” means a person or nonprofit corporation, appointed by the court, to manage only those financial resources specifically enumerated by the court for the person with limited capacity and includes limited conservators as described by section 30.1-29-20.
  32. “Limited guardian” means a person or nonprofit corporation, appointed by the court, to supervise certain specified aspects of the care of a person with limited capacity and includes limited guardians as described by section 30.1-28-04.
  33. “Minor” means a person who is under eighteen years of age.
  34. “Mortgage” means any conveyance, agreement, or arrangement in which property is encumbered or used as security.
  35. “Nonresident decedent” means a decedent who was domiciled in another jurisdiction at the time of death.
  36. “Organization” means a corporation, limited liability company, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, joint venture, association, or any other legal or commercial entity.
  37. “Parent” includes any person entitled to take, or who would be entitled to take if the child died without a will, as a parent under this title, by intestate succession from the child whose relationship is in question and excludes any person who is only a stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent.
  38. “Payer” means a trustee, insurer, business entity, employer, government, governmental agency or subdivision, or any other person authorized or obligated by law or a governing instrument to make payments.
  39. “Person” means an individual, a corporation, a limited liability company, an organization, or other legal entity.
  40. “Person with limited capacity” is as defined in section 30.1-26-01.
  41. “Personal representative” includes executor, administrator, successor personal representative, special administrator, and persons who perform substantially the same function under the law governing their status. “General personal representative” excludes special administrator.
  42. “Petition” means a written request to the court for an order after notice.
  43. “Proceeding” includes action at law and suit in equity.
  44. “Property” includes both real and personal property or any interest therein and means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
  45. “Protected person” is as defined in section 30.1-26-01.
  46. “Protective proceeding” means a proceeding described in section 30.1-26-01.
  47. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
  48. “Security” includes any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, membership interest in a limited liability company, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in payments out of production under such a title or lease, collateral trust certificate, transferable share, voting trust certificate or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a security, or any certificate of interest or participation, any temporary or interim certificate, receipt, or certificate of deposit for, or any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
  49. “Settlement”, in reference to a decedent’s estate, includes the full process of administration, distribution, and closing.
  50. “Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record other than a will, to execute or adopt a tangible symbol or to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.
  51. “Special administrator” means a personal representative as described by sections 30.1-17-14 through 30.1-17-18.
  52. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
  53. “Successor personal representative” means a personal representative, other than a special administrator, who is appointed to succeed a previously appointed personal representative.
  54. “Successors” means persons, other than creditors, who are entitled to property of a decedent under the decedent’s will or this title.
  55. “Supervised administration” refers to the proceedings described in chapter 30.1-16.
  56. “Survive” means that an individual has neither predeceased an event, including the death of another individual, nor predeceased an event under sections 30.1-04-04 and 30.1-09.1-02. The term includes its derivatives, such as “survives”, “survived”, “survivor”, and “surviving”.
  57. “Testacy proceeding” means a proceeding to establish a will or determine intestacy.
  58. “Trust” includes an express trust, private or charitable, with additions thereto, wherever and however created. The term also includes a trust created or determined by judgment or decree under which the trust is to be administered in the manner of an express trust. The term excludes other constructive trusts and excludes resulting trusts, conservatorships, personal representatives, trust accounts as defined in custodial arrangements pursuant to chapter 11-22, chapter 12-48, sections 25-01.1-19 to 25-01.1-21, chapter 32-10, section 32-16-37, chapter 32-26, former chapter 47-24, chapter 47-24.1, business trusts providing for certificates to be issued to beneficiaries, common trust funds, voting trusts, security arrangements, liquidation trusts, and trusts for the primary purpose of paying debts, dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee benefits of any kind, and any arrangement under which a person is nominee or escrowee for another.
  59. “Trustee” includes an original, additional, or successor trustee, whether or not appointed or confirmed by court.
  60. “Visitor” means an individual, in guardianship proceedings, who is in nursing or social work and is an officer, employee, or special appointee of the court with no personal interest in the proceedings.
  61. “Ward” means an individual described in section 30.1-26-01.
  62. “Will” includes codicil and any testamentary instrument that merely appoints an executor, revokes or revises another will, nominates a guardian, or expressly excludes or limits the right of an individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1981, ch. 320, § 76; 1983, ch. 313, § 5; 1985, ch. 369, § 2; 1985, ch. 508, § 23; 1991, ch. 54, § 18; 1991, ch. 326, § 115; 1991, ch. 595, § 1; 1993, ch. 54, § 106; 1993, ch. 334, § 2; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 1, 2, 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 1; 2017, ch. 230, § 1, effective August 1, 2017.

Cross-References.

The term “will” includes “codicil”, see § 1-01-49, subs. 19.

Notes to Decisions

Claims.

Because a creditor’s claim for tort damages can be filed in a probate proceeding under this title, the death of a potential defendant before the period of the statute of limitations has run on a tort claim does not make N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16 ineffective, and N.D.C.C. § 28-01-26 does not apply. Ness v. Stirling (In re Estate of Stirling), 537 N.W.2d 554, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 177 (N.D. 1995), overruled in part, Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, 831 N.W.2d 369, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 2013).

Appellate court reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a corporation in its action for specific performance to compel the estate to sell the decedent’s stock certificates because the action was a claim against the estate under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-01-06(7) as it was a claim that sought to impose a liability on the estate based on a contract right to purchase shares, and it was barred by the limitation clause in N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-03(2)(b). Steen & Berg Co. v. Berg (In re Estate of Berg), 2006 ND 86, 713 N.W.2d 87, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 91 (N.D. 2006).

In determining whether the adopted woman was a proper devisee of the estate of decedent, who was the mother of the adopted woman’s biological father who predeceased the decedent, courts pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 1-02-03 had to give terms that defined the relationship between people their peculiar and appropriate meaning as defined by statute. Since the decedent’s child under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-01-06(4) was the biological son and the adopted woman was the biological father’s “issue” under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-01-06(22), the fact of the adopted woman’s adoption by the adoptive father did not affect the relationship between the adopted woman and biological father, according to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-04-09(1), and meant that the adopted woman was a proper devisee of decedent. Kraft v. Ramos (In re Estate of Boehm), 2012 ND 104, 816 N.W.2d 793, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 93 (N.D. 2012).

Determination of Heirs.

An order which stated only that: “All aunts and uncles on the maternal and paternal sides who left issue, shall receive equal shares and the share of each deceased aunt or uncle, who left issue, shall be left to the issue of that deceased person in equal shares by right of representation,” merely recited the statutory direction for inheritance by representation and did not determine the heirs. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Formal Testacy Proceeding.
—In General.

Where petitioner was attempting to establish ownership of property through an unprobated will as evidence of a devise, and did not claim that he, or anyone else, was an heir entitled to the minerals under the law of intestate succession, and also did not attempt to probate a will, the proceeding was not a “formal testacy proceeding” as defined by this section or N.D.C.C. 30.1-15-01, and since N.D.C.C. 30.1-15-06 applies to a “formal testacy proceeding”, it did not directly apply here. In re Estate of Papineau, 396 N.W.2d 735, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 442 (N.D. 1986).

—Will Contest.

Any will contest generally becomes a formal proceeding. Ketterling v. Gonzalez (In re the Estate of Ketterling), 515 N.W.2d 158, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1994).

Informal Proceedings.

Informal proceedings for determining testacy and appointing personal representatives generally do not have notice requirements, are basically ex parte in nature, and are handled administratively, not adversarially. Ketterling v. Gonzalez (In re the Estate of Ketterling), 515 N.W.2d 158, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1994).

Interested Person.

Decedent’s daughter, as the personal representative of her mother’s estate and as a residuary beneficiary and child of the decedent who stood to acquire the disputed property if her action was successful, qualified as an “interested person” under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-01-06(25) with standing to bring the will contest. Therefore, the daughter had standing in a will contest proceeding and was not prohibited from relying on the alleged invalidity of her mother and second husband’s marriage as evidence of fraud. Black v. Richmond (In re Estate of Richmond), 2005 ND 145, 701 N.W.2d 897, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 179 (N.D. 2005).

Decedent’s child was an interested person and was able to petition for removal of a personal representative; moreover, a district court failed to follow the statutory requirements for hearings on the petition because it entered an order denying such without providing time to schedule a hearing. The child requested a hearing following the procedural requirements for doing so. Valer v. Bartelson (In re Estate of Bartelson), 2013 ND 129, 833 N.W.2d 522, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 132 (N.D. 2013).

Son could not require a personal representative's supplementary inventory because, once another child was held entitled to an entire estate, the son had no right in or claim against the estate, so the son was no longer an “interested person,” and the son showed no statutory ground for the relief sought. Estate of Pedro v. Scheeler, 2014 ND 237, 856 N.W.2d 775, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 218 (N.D. 2014).

In a dispute over the sale of farmland, a dismissal of an appeal was not warranted based on mootness because the sale was made to an interested person involved in the probate proceedings; therefore, a conveyance after a district court issued its order did not deprive the North Dakota Supreme Court of jurisdiction over the farmland. In re Estate of Johnson, 2015 ND 110, 863 N.W.2d 215, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 109 (N.D. 2015).

Because a personal representative could be an interested person, petitioner was not precluded from filing petitions as an interested person in the formal supervised probate administration while simultaneously performing her fiduciary duty as the personal representative to distribute the property according to the decedent’s will and the best interests of the estate. Bouchard v. Biel (In re Estate of Brandt), 2019 ND 87, 924 N.W.2d 762, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 2019).

Probate court had personal jurisdiction over the parties because all of the parties necessary for determination of the title to the decedent’s property interests that were transferred to the legacy trust fell within the definition of an interested person, and they were provided with notice of the hearing on the petitions; and all parties to the civil action were served with notice of hearing of the petitions to determine title and value to the property. Bouchard v. Biel (In re Estate of Brandt), 2019 ND 87, 924 N.W.2d 762, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 2019).

Notice by Publication.

Notice is effected by publication only if the address or identity of the person is unknown and cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Notice to Interested Persons.

In all formal estate proceedings, notice must be given to every interested person prior to any formal hearing or order; interested persons not notified of formal proceedings are not bound. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Omitted Heirs.

Where the names and addresses of the omitted heirs were known prior to the hearing on the petition for order of distribution, but no notice of any kind was given to the omitted heirs, the probate court was without jurisdiction as to the omitted heirs. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Appearance Without Citation.

Where a person of lawful age personally appeared without being cited at a hearing called by a county judge on petition for a guardian’s appointment, and stated that she wished to have a person appointed as her guardian, and signed a written request for his appointment, the court acquired jurisdiction over her person to the same extent as if she had been cited. In re Guardianship of Jones, 66 N.D. 185, 263 N.W. 160, 1935 N.D. LEXIS 185 (N.D. 1935).

Interested Person.

Former definition of “person interested” did not apply to hearings had upon accounts concerning the ranking of creditors for sharing in the estate and accounting, allowing, or disallowing it. Elton v. Lamb, 33 N.D. 388, 157 N.W. 288, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 91 (N.D. 1916).

Will.

When used in Title 30, N.D.C.C. Judicial Procedure, Probate, the term “will” included “codicil”. Hoppin v. Fortin, 111 N.W.2d 122, 1961 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1961).

Collateral References.

Living wills: validity, construction, and effect, 49 A.L.R.4th 812.

CHAPTER 30.1-02 Scope, Jurisdiction, and Courts

30.1-02-01. (1-301) Territorial application.

Except as otherwise provided in this title, this title applies to:

  1. The affairs and estates of decedents, missing persons, and persons to be protected, domiciled in this state.
  2. The property of nonresidents located in this state or property coming into the control of a fiduciary which is subject to the laws of this state.
  3. Incapacitated persons and minors in this state.
  4. Survivorship and related accounts in this state.
  5. Trusts subject to administration in this state.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Disposition of Decedent’s Real Property.

The county court did not err in determining that agreement between decedent and his wife, residents of Washington, providing that all their property would be considered community property, title to which would immediately vest in the survivor on the death of either spouse, had no effect on the disposition of decedent’s North Dakota real property. In re Estate of Erickson, 368 N.W.2d 525, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 321 (N.D. 1985).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Lands Converted to Personalty.

Laws of this state determined whether lands situated within state were equitably converted into personalty. Security-First Nat'l Bank v. North Dakota Children Home Soc'y, 85 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1957).

30.1-02-02. (1-302) Subject matter jurisdiction.

The district court has jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to guardianship, probate, and testamentary matters, including:

  1. Estates of decedents, including construction of wills and determination of heirs and successors of decedents.
  2. Estates of protected persons.
  3. Protection of minors and incapacitated persons.
  4. Trusts.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1983, ch. 82, § 64; 1983, ch. 352, § 2; 1991, ch. 326, § 116.

Cross-References.

District court jurisdiction, see N.D. Const. Art. VI, § 8.

Jurisdiction over persons, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-12-06.

Subject matter jurisdiction of devolution and administration proceedings, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-12-05.

Notes to Decisions

Appeals to District Court.

Under certain circumstances, it is appropriate to seek a summary judgment in probate appeals to the district court. Knudsen v. Knudsen, 322 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 1982), decided prior to the amendment to this section by Session Laws 1973, ch. 352.

Breach of Fiduciary Duties.

County court has jurisdiction to review allegations of breach of fiduciary duty by the personal representative and excessive compensation of persons employed by a personal representative. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

The county court has jurisdiction to order a person who has received excessive compensation to make a refund to the estate and to order the personal representative to pay for losses to the estate caused by a breach of a fiduciary duty. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

Conservatorships.

Because the district court does not have jurisdiction over conservatorships, it is proper for it to stay its order pending a resolution of whether the conservator has the power to revoke the trust in county court. In re Bo, 365 N.W.2d 847, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 286 (N.D. 1985).

County court had authority to resolve the issue of whether conservator acted with a substantial conflict of interest in authorizing sale of farmland belonging to the estate to her son so as to determine if rescission of the contract was necessary. Kopperud v. Reilly, 453 N.W.2d 598, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 76 (N.D. 1990).

Equitable Jurisdiction.

The decision in In re Estate of Jones, 288 N.W.2d 758, which was rendered prior to the 1983 amendment of this section, is no longer dispositive of the issues of equitable jurisdiction of the county courts. In re Estate of Binder, 366 N.W.2d 454, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 293 (N.D. 1985).

A district court has jurisdiction over trusts, guardianships and conservatorships. Mangnall v. Adams (In re Mangnall), 1997 ND 19, 559 N.W.2d 221, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 12 (N.D. 1997).

Paternity Issues.

The county court had implied authority to resolve the issue of alleged paternity because such a resolution was reasonably necessary to enable the court to effectively adjudicate who should inherit the putative father’s estate. Baehm v. Sorensen, 411 N.W.2d 362 (N.D. 1987).

Probate Jurisdiction.

District courts in North Dakota have had probate jurisdiction since county courts were abolished in 1995. Ohnstad Twichell, P.C. v. Treitline, 1998 ND 10, 574 N.W.2d 194, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 11 (N.D. 1998).

Trusts.

County courts have jurisdiction over all trust matters, including the authority to grant an equitable remedy. In re Estate of Binder, 366 N.W.2d 454, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 293 (N.D. 1985).

30.1-02-03. (1-303) Venue — Multiple proceedings — Transfer.

  1. Where a proceeding under this title could be maintained in more than one place in this state, the court in which the proceeding is first commenced has the exclusive right to proceed.
  2. If proceedings concerning the same estate, protected person, ward, or trust are commenced in more than one court of this state, the court in which the proceeding was first commenced shall continue to hear the matter, and the other courts shall hold the matter in abeyance until the question of venue is decided, and if the ruling court determines that venue is properly in another court, it shall transfer the proceeding to the other court.
  3. If a court finds that in the interest of justice a proceeding or a file should be located in another court of this state, the court making the finding may transfer the proceeding or file to the other court.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-02-04. (1-304) Practice in court.

Unless specifically provided to the contrary in this title or unless inconsistent with its provisions, the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the rules concerning vacation of orders and appellate review, govern formal proceedings under this title.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Appeals to District Court.

The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to appeals from county courts to district courts unless the Probate Code specifically provides otherwise or the rules are inconsistent with the code. In re Estate of Bieber, 256 N.W.2d 879, 1977 N.D. LEXIS 165 (N.D. 1977).

N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a).

Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. is applicable to probate proceedings in county court. In re Estate of Raketti, 340 N.W.2d 894, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 417 (N.D. 1983); First Trust Co. v. Conway, 345 N.W.2d 838, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 255 (N.D. 1984).

N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b).

Rule 54(b), N.D.R.Civ.P. is applicable in probate proceedings. In re Estate of Erickson, 368 N.W.2d 525, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 321 (N.D. 1985); In re Estate of Starcher, 447 N.W.2d 293, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 200 (N.D. 1989).

30.1-02-05. (1-305) Records and certified copies.

The court or clerk of court shall keep a record for each decedent, ward, protected person, or trust involved in any document which may be filed with the court under this title, including petitions and applications, demands for notices or bonds, and of any orders or responses relating thereto by the court, and establish and maintain a system for indexing, filing, or recording which is sufficient to enable users of the records to obtain adequate information. Certifications of probated wills must indicate whether the decedent was domiciled in this state and whether the probate was formal or informal. Certifications of letters must show the date of appointment.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 290, § 1.

30.1-02-06. (1-307) Powers.

The acts and orders which this title specifies as performable by the district court may be performed either by a judge of the appropriate court or by a person, including the clerk, designated by the appropriate court by a written order filed and recorded in the office of the court. However, without a written order of the court, the clerk may sign all appropriate documents in uncontested informal probate matters if the requirements of sections 30.1-12-08 and 30.1-13-01 have been satisfied, at least one hundred twenty hours have elapsed since the decedent’s death, and the person seeking appointment as personal representative is named in the will or otherwise has priority under section 30.1-13-03 or others entitled to appointment have renounced the right to appointment.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1995, ch. 147, § 9.

30.1-02-06.1. (1-308) Appeals.

Appellate review, including the right to appellate review, interlocutory appeal, provisions as to time, manner, notice, appeal bond, stays, scope of review, record on appeal, briefs, arguments, and power of the appellate court, is governed by the rules applicable to the appeals to the supreme court in equity cases from the district court, except that in proceedings in which jury trial has been had as a matter of right, the rules applicable to the scope of review in jury cases apply.

Source: S.L. 1981, ch. 319, § 49.

Notes to Decisions

Guardian/Conservator.

Patient’s wife was unable to raise issues about the admissibility of evidence and cross-examination of witnesses in a proceeding where a guardian/conservator was appointed because she had not filed an appeal from that decision, as permitted by N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-02-06.1 and 28-27-02. C.V. v. Gurardian and Protective Servs. (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of G.L.), 2011 ND 10, 793 N.W.2d 192, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 6 (N.D. 2011).

Judgment as to Fewer Than All claims or Parties.

Parties in probate proceedings bear the duty of requesting an order or certification pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) if they seek an appeal from a judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims or parties. First Trust Co. v. Conway, 345 N.W.2d 838, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 255 (N.D. 1984).

N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b).

Rule 54(b), N.D.R.Civ.P. is applicable in probate proceedings. In re Estate of Erickson, 368 N.W.2d 525, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 321 (N.D. 1985); In re Estate of Starcher, 447 N.W.2d 293, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 200 (N.D. 1989).

Probate Orders.

The right to appellate review of probate orders is governed by the rules applicable to appeals to the supreme court in equity cases from the district court. In re Estate of Sorensen, 406 N.W.2d 365, 1987 N.D. LEXIS 331 (N.D. 1987).

Under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-02-06.1, the rules applicable to appeals in equity cases govern the right to appeal probate orders. Once jurisdiction is established under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02, N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b)’s separate requirements must also be met, if applicable. Those requirements applied in the personal representative’s case because the personal representative was appealing from a ruling in an informal probate case that did not distribute all of the insurance proceeds, approve a final distribution, or discharge the personal representative, and, thus, because not all of the issues had been ruled upon and no N.D. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification had been obtained, the state supreme court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth (In re Hollingsworth), 2012 ND 16, 809 N.W.2d 328, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 11 (N.D. 2012).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Waiver.

Devisee waived any objections concerning timely service of notice of appeal by failing to object to belated service and to the failure to file proof of service; personal representatives, who were also devisees and whose interests were opposed to the interests of the devisee who received the belated notice of appeal, could not assert devisee’s failure to receive timely notice of appeal to raise objection to district court’s assumption of jurisdiction over order admitting will to formal probate. In re Estate of Ewoniuk, 303 N.W.2d 553, 1981 N.D. LEXIS 216 (N.D. 1981).

Collateral References.

Appealability of probate orders allowing or disallowing claims against estate, 84 A.L.R.4th 269.

30.1-02-07. (1-310) Oath or affirmation on filed documents.

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this title or by rule, every document filed with the district court under this title, including applications, petitions, and demands for notice, is deemed to include an oath, affirmation, or statement to the effect that its representations are true as far as the person executing or filing it knows or is informed, and penalties for perjury may follow deliberate falsification therein.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1991, ch. 326, § 117.

Notes to Decisions

Documents Under Oath or Affirmation.

Because the personal representative’s petition and the accompanying documents did not fall within any of the exceptions to this statute, her petitions and accompanying documents were sufficient to place the information in those documents before the probate court as statements under oath or affirmation to the effect that their representations were true. Bouchard v. Biel (In re Estate of Brandt), 2019 ND 87, 924 N.W.2d 762, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 2019).

CHAPTER 30.1-03 Notice — Parties — Representation and Other Matters

30.1-03-01. (1-401) Notice — Method and time of giving.

  1. If notice of a hearing on any petition is required and, except for specific notice requirements as otherwise provided, the petitioner shall cause notice of the time and place of hearing of any petition to be given to any interested person or the interested person’s attorney if the interested person has appeared by attorney or requested that notice be sent to the interested person’s attorney. Notice shall be given:
    1. By mailing a copy thereof at least fourteen days before the time set for the hearing by certified or ordinary first-class mail addressed to the person being notified at the post-office address given in that person’s demand for notice, if any, or at that person’s office or place of residence, if known;
    2. By delivering a copy thereof to the person being notified personally at least fourteen days before the time set for the hearing; or
    3. If the address, or identity of any person is not known and cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence, by publishing at least once a week for three consecutive weeks, a copy thereof in a newspaper having general circulation in the county where the hearing is to be held, the last publication of which is to be at least ten days before the time set for the hearing.
  2. The court for good cause shown may provide for a different method or time of giving notice for any hearing.
  3. Proof of the giving of notice shall be made on or before the hearing and filed in the proceeding.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Cross-References.

Initiation of probate proceedings, see N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-14-01, 30.1-15-02.

Proceedings for review of employment of agents, compensation of personal representatives, and employees of estate, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-21.

Notes to Decisions

Interested Persons.

In all formal estate proceedings, notice must be given to every interested person prior to any formal hearing or order; interested persons not notified of formal proceedings are not bound. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Notice by Publication.

Notice is effected by publication only if the address or identity of the person is unknown and cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Omitted Heirs.

Where the names and addresses of the omitted heirs were known prior to the hearing on the petition for order of distribution, but no notice of any kind was given to the omitted heirs, the probate court was without jurisdiction as to the omitted heirs. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Proper Notice.

Beneficiary of will was given totally proper notice of hearing where notice was mailed to home address and to her attorney. Facts that beneficiary was, unbeknownst to estate’s personal representative, temporarily residing with her brother, was not informed by her brother or other beneficiaries of the hearing, and was left with no transportation after her brother borrowed her automobile on the day of the hearing, did not invalidate notice. In re Estates of Gustafson, 381 N.W.2d 208, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 260 (N.D. 1986).

Probate court had personal jurisdiction over the parties because all of the parties necessary for determination of the title to the decedent’s property interests that were transferred to the legacy trust fell within the definition of an interested person, and they were provided with notice of the hearing on the petitions; and all parties to the civil action were served with notice of hearing of the petitions to determine title and value to the property. Bouchard v. Biel (In re Estate of Brandt), 2019 ND 87, 924 N.W.2d 762, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 2019).

Notice to or service on E.M.’s attorney prior to E.M.’s or the attorney’s appearance in this action was inadequate service under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-03-01 since E.M. had not yet appeared by counsel in this matter. Bell bank v. Bell bank v. Tharaldson (In re Tharaldson Irrevocable Trust II), 2021 ND 203, 966 N.W.2d 564, 2021 N.D. LEXIS 206 (N.D. 2021).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Amendment of Process.

Irregularities in a probate sale could be corrected under former section authorizing amendment of process. Cathro v. McArthur, 30 N.D. 337, 152 N.W. 686, 1915 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1915).

Dismissal for Untimely Notice.

A party who moved for a dismissal of an appeal from the county court, on the grounds that the appeal was not timely nor properly perfected, had the burden of showing from the records the facts necessary to sustain the verdict. In re Estate of Ashbrook, 110 N.W.2d 184, 1961 N.D. LEXIS 79 (N.D. 1961).

Notice Insufficient.

On executor’s petition for the investment of funds of the estate, publication of notice of such hearing for one week did not comply with the provisions of S.L. 1925, ch. 120, § 4. Zlevor v. Tice, 64 N.D. 626, 255 N.W. 470, 1934 N.D. LEXIS 243 (N.D. 1934).

Service.

Service of notice of appeal from county court to district court upon an attorney of record, as authorized by former section 30-02-19, had to be made in the manner provided by that section and former sections 30-02-10, 30-02-11; N.D.R.Civ.P. 5(b), did not apply. In re Estate of Ashbrook, 110 N.W.2d 184, 1961 N.D. LEXIS 79 (N.D. 1961).

Service from County Court to District Court.

The mailing of notice of appeal from county court to district court by ordinary mail did not confer jurisdiction upon the county court to extend the time for the filing of the notice of appeal. In re Estate of Ashbrook, 110 N.W.2d 184, 1961 N.D. LEXIS 79 (N.D. 1961).

The requirements for personal service of notice of appeal from county court to district court were not met by mailing of notice of appeal to party, nor was it the equivalent thereof. In re Estate of Ashbrook, 110 N.W.2d 184, 1961 N.D. LEXIS 79 (N.D. 1961).

Where appellant failed to make valid service on any of the parties respondent of notice of appeal from the county court to the district court, appellee’s motion for dismissal of appeal directed to the district court was treated as a motion to strike the cause from the record of the court and the cause was ordered stricken from the appeal record. In re Estate of Ashbrook, 110 N.W.2d 184, 1961 N.D. LEXIS 79 (N.D. 1961).

Law Reviews.

A Study of Guardianship in North Dakota, 60 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1984).

30.1-03-02. (1-402) Notice — Waiver.

A person, including a guardian ad litem, conservator, or other fiduciary, may waive notice by a writing signed by the person or the person’s attorney and filed in the proceeding.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

A party could in advance, and prior to the filing of a petition for an administration, consent to the same and in advance waive all notice and citation. Fischer v. Dolwig, 39 N.D. 161, 166 N.W. 793, 1918 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1918).

30.1-03-03. (1-403) Pleadings — When parties bound by others — Notice.

In formal proceedings involving trusts or estates of decedents, minors, protected persons, or incapacitated persons, and in judicially supervised settlements, the following apply:

  1. Interests to be affected must be described in pleadings that give reasonable information to owners by name or class, by reference to the instrument creating the interests or in another appropriate manner.
  2. A person is bound by an order binding another in the following cases:
    1. An order binding the sole holder or all coholders of a power of revocation or a presently exercisable general power of appointment, including one in the form of a power of amendment, binds another person to the extent that person’s interests, as objects, takers in default, or otherwise, are subject to the power.
    2. To the extent there is no conflict of interest between them or among persons represented, an order binding a conservator binds the person whose estate the conservator controls; an order binding a guardian binds the ward if no conservator of the ward’s estate has been appointed; an order binding a trustee binds a beneficiary of the trust in proceedings to probate a will establishing or adding to a trust, to review the acts or accounts of a former fiduciary and in proceedings involving creditors or other third parties; an order binding a personal representative binds a person interested in the undistributed assets of a decedent’s estate in actions or proceedings by or against the estate; and an order binding a sole holder or all coholders of a general testamentary power of appointment binds other persons to the extent their interests as objects, takers in default, or otherwise are subject to the power.
    3. Unless otherwise represented, a minor or an incapacitated, unborn, or unascertained person is bound by an order to the extent the person’s interest is adequately represented by another party having a substantially identical interest in the proceeding.
  3. If no conservator or guardian has been appointed, a parent may represent a minor child.
  4. Notice is required as follows:
    1. The notice prescribed by section 30.1-03-01 must be given to every interested person or to one who can bind an interested person as described in subdivision a or b of subsection 2. Notice may be given both to a person and to another who may bind that person.
    2. Notice is given to unborn or unascertained persons who are not represented under subdivision a or b of subsection 2 by giving notice to all known persons whose interests in the proceedings are substantially identical to those of the unborn or unascertained persons.
  5. At any point in a proceeding, a court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interest of a minor, an incapacitated, unborn, or unascertained person, or a person whose identity or address is unknown, if the court determines that representation of the interest otherwise would be inadequate. If not precluded by conflict of interests, a guardian ad litem may be appointed to represent several persons or interests. The court shall state its reasons for appointing a guardian ad litem as a part of the record of the proceeding.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1999, ch. 294, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Interested Persons.

In all formal estate proceedings, notice must be given to every interested person prior to any formal hearing or order; interested persons not notified of formal proceedings are not bound. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Non-Binding Notice.

Where the omitted second cousins were neither unborn nor unascertained, the notice mailed to three second cousins of decedent did not bind all omitted second cousins. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Notice by Publication.

Notice is effected by publication only if the address or identity of the person is unknown and cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Omitted Heirs.

Where the names and addresses of the omitted heirs were known prior to the hearing on the petition for order of distribution, but no notice of any kind was given to the omitted heirs, the probate court was without jurisdiction as to the omitted heirs. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Proceedings by or Against Estate.

While proceedings to appoint a personal representative, and to determine testacy, heirship, and distribution, are matters involving the estate, they are not proceedings by or against the estate, and subdivision 2 b of this section does not apply. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Service of Citation.

Service of a citation could be made upon an attorney of record. Skachenko v. Sweetman, 77 N.D. 502, 43 N.W.2d 683, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1950).

Article II Intestate Succession and Wills

CHAPTER 30.1-04 Intestate Succession

30.1-04-01. (2-101) Intestate estate.

  1. Any part of a decedent’s estate not effectively disposed of by will passes by intestate succession to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed in this title, except as modified by the decedent’s will.
  2. A decedent, by will, may expressly exclude or limit the right of an individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession. If that individual or a member of that class survives the decedent, the share of the decedent’s intestate estate to which that individual or class would have succeeded passes as if that individual or each member of that class had disclaimed the intestate share.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 3; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Cross-References.

Descent and distribution of real property subject to homestead estate, see N.D.C.C. § 30-16-04.

Notes to Decisions

Construction.

Plain language of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-04-01(2) makes it clear that disinheritance of either an individual or a class must be expressed and cannot be implied. West v. Myrvik (In re Estate of Samuelson), 2008 ND 190, 757 N.W.2d 44, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 192 (N.D. 2008).

N.D.C.C. § 30.1-04-01(2) makes it clear that if a decedent excludes an individual’s right to inherit, and the individual survives the decedent, the individual’s heirs are not automatically excluded, because the share passes to the excluded individual’s heirs. West v. Myrvik (In re Estate of Samuelson), 2008 ND 190, 757 N.W.2d 44, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 192 (N.D. 2008).

Disposition of Real Property.

The county court did not err in determining that agreement between decedent and his wife, residents of Washington, providing that all their property would be considered community property, title to which would immediately vest in the survivor on the death of either spouse, had no effect on the disposition of decedent’s North Dakota real property. In re Estate of Erickson, 368 N.W.2d 525, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 321 (N.D. 1985).

Doctrine of Partial Invalidity.

Because the district court, which applied the doctrine of partial invalidity, gave effect to a portion of a decedent’s will to distribute the decedent’s shares in a ranch, it could not be said the will did not effectively dispose of the shares. The laws of intestacy therefore did not apply. Grenz v. Grenz (In re Estate of Grenz), 2020 ND 189, 948 N.W.2d 320, 2020 N.D. LEXIS 190 (N.D. 2020).

Exclusions.

Trial court did not err in holding that the granddaughters of a decedent’s half-sister inherited the intestate estate of the decedent because even though the decedent expressly excluded the half-sister under the will, it could not be inferred that the decedent intended to exclude the granddaughters; the decedent did not expressly exclude the half-sister’s heirs pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-04-01(2). West v. Myrvik (In re Estate of Samuelson), 2008 ND 190, 757 N.W.2d 44, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 192 (N.D. 2008).

Predeceased Beneficiary.

Where a will did not include a residuary clause or residuary devise, property devised to a predeceased beneficiary did not pass by will, rather, pursuant to this section it passed by the law of intestate succession to the issue of the decedent’s parents because decedent had no surviving issue or parents. Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 1988).

Because a devise in a will failed due to the fact that the devisee predeceased the decedent, an estate passed under the laws of intestate succession. A trial court erred by awarding a grandmother a portion of a decedent’s estate because the decedent’s wife was entitled to the entire estate through intestate succession, pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-04-02(1)(a); moreover, the decedent’s will did not expressly disinherit the wife, and the wife did not forfeit her right to receive the entire estate through the laws of intestate succession by not withdrawing her petition for exercise of an elective share since she was allowed to state more than one claim or defense. Hartvickson v. Haugen (In re Estate of Haugen), 2011 ND 28, 794 N.W.2d 448, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 26 (N.D. 2011).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Administration of Estate.

An administrator could reduce real estate to actual possession but he was not required to do so. Territory ex rel. Hall v. Bramble, 5 N.W. 945, 2 Dakota 189, 1880 Dakota LEXIS 2 (Dakota 1880).

Upon death of an intestate, his realty passed immediately to his heirs subject, for purposes of administration, to control of county court and possession of any administrator appointed by that court. Aberle v. Merkel, 70 N.D. 89, 291 N.W. 913, 1940 N.D. LEXIS 150 (N.D. 1940); STEVAHN v. MEIDINGER, 79 N.D. 323, 57 N.W.2d 1, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 126 (N.D. 1952).

Although an estate was in the progress of administration, an heir of a decedent could maintain an action to determine adverse claims and quiet title to decedent’s real estate provided heir did not interfere with administrator’s possession of property for purposes of administration. Hoffman v. Hoffman's Heirs, 73 N.D. 637, 17 N.W.2d 903, 1945 N.D. LEXIS 80 (N.D. 1945).

Ancestors.

Heirs of deceased intestate occupied place of ancestor as regarded taking of interest in ancestor’s property and received no better right to property than ancestor had. STEVAHN v. MEIDINGER, 79 N.D. 323, 57 N.W.2d 1, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 126 (N.D. 1952).

Bankruptcy Proceeding.

Law conferred the power and authority upon a county court and, through the court, upon an administrator of an estate, to permit the administrator to continue a proceeding instituted by a deceased former debtor under section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act. North Dakota v. Durupt, 138 F.2d 501, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 2555 (8th Cir. N.D. 1943).

Father Not Heir.

Where intestate insured who carried policy for two thousand dollars payable to his estate left a surviving widow but no lineal descendants, and the gross value of the estate did not exceed forty-five hundred dollars, his father was not an heir within meaning of former N.D.C.C. § 26-10-18 (now see N.D.C.C. § 26.1-33-40). Maixner v. Zumpf, 51 N.D. 140, 199 N.W. 183, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 148 (N.D. 1924).

Insurance Policy Not in Will.

Where insured in a policy payable to his estate made a will purporting to dispose of his property, but will made no reference to policy or the avails thereof, and where there was no change of beneficiary, and insured made no contract for the transfer or disposition of such policy or the avails thereof, he manifested an intention that upon his death such insurance policy should be payable to his heirs at law and the avails thereof distributed to them in accordance with the laws of succession. ANDERSON v. NORTHERN & DAKOTA TRUST CO., 67 N.D. 458, 274 N.W. 127, 1937 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1937).

Tenancy in Common.

Where intestate owner of real property was survived by more than one heir, descent of the property by operation of law to several heirs created a tenancy in common. STEVAHN v. MEIDINGER, 79 N.D. 323, 57 N.W.2d 1, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 126 (N.D. 1952).

Law Reviews.

Introduction to Probate and Estate Planning, 74 N.D. L. Rev. 177 (1998).

30.1-04-02. (2-102) Share of spouse.

The intestate share of a decedent’s surviving spouse is:

  1. The entire intestate estate if:
    1. No descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent; or
    2. All of the decedent’s surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of the surviving spouse who survives the decedent.
  2. The first three hundred thousand dollars, plus three-fourths of any balance of the intestate estate, if no descendant of the decedent survives the decedent, but a parent of the decedent survives the decedent.
  3. The first two hundred twenty-five thousand dollars, plus one-half of any balance of the intestate, if all of the decedent’s surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse and the surviving spouse has one or more surviving descendants who are not descendants of the decedent.
  4. The first one hundred fifty thousand dollars, plus one-half of any balance of the intestate estate, if one or more of the decedent’s surviving descendants are not descendants of the surviving spouse.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 4; 1995, ch. 322, § 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 2.

Notes to Decisions

Division Among Spouse and Children.

District court properly rescinded a deed (due to undue influence) and concluded that the subject minerals passed to a father and then his surviving spouse because the children did not argue to the district court that their mother's estate had a cause of action against the father relating to the conveyance of the Idaho home, assuming without deciding that the mother's intestate estate included all property wherever located, the total value of her estate was less than $50,000 and would pass to the father under the versions of the North Dakota and Idaho statutes that were in effect when she died in 1989, the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case. Fahey v. Fife, 2017 ND 200, 900 N.W.2d 250, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 202 (N.D. 2017).

Entire Estate.

Because a devise in a will failed due to the fact that the devisee predeceased the decedent, an estate passed under the laws of intestate succession. A trial court erred by awarding a grandmother a portion of a decedent’s estate because the decedent’s wife was entitled to the entire estate through intestate succession, pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-04-02(1)(a); moreover, the decedent’s will did not expressly disinherit the wife, and the wife did not forfeit her right to receive the entire estate through the laws of intestate succession by not withdrawing her petition for exercise of an elective share since she was allowed to state more than one claim or defense. Hartvickson v. Haugen (In re Estate of Haugen), 2011 ND 28, 794 N.W.2d 448, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 26 (N.D. 2011).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Adoption Contract.

Where plaintiff was unaware that she was entitled by an adoption contract to a larger share of decedent’s estate than she would receive under will that was being probated in county court and plaintiff’s right to participate in the distribution of the estate had not been finally adjudicated, she did not waive her right to claim larger share provided by the contract by accepting part of proceeds of estate from executrix without a court order. Fish v. Berzel, 101 N.W.2d 548, 1960 N.D. LEXIS 53 (N.D. 1960).

Division Among Spouse and Children.

Decedent’s surviving widow succeeded to a four-twelfths interest and estate in the land owned by him at time of his death, and each of his three daughters and five sons succeeded to a one-twelfth interest and estate in such land. Widow and decedent’s children became tenants in common. STEVAHN v. MEIDINGER, 79 N.D. 323, 57 N.W.2d 1, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 126 (N.D. 1952).

Upon death of decedent his widow succeeded to a one-third interest in the land owned by him in North Dakota and his four children succeeded to a two-thirds interest therein, or one-sixth interest therein to each. Frandson v. Casey, 73 N.W.2d 436, 1955 N.D. LEXIS 155 (N.D. 1955).

Homestead Estate.

Where surviving wife married and left state with her children, the homestead estate ceased and property descended one-third to surviving wife and two-thirds to children. In re Druhl's Estate, 61 N.D. 168, 237 N.W. 697, 1931 N.D. LEXIS 260 (N.D. 1931).

Insurance Payable to Estate.

Where insured died intestate and insurance was payable to estate, avails passed to deceased heirs at law as determined under laws of succession as applied to amount of avails without reference to value of deceased’s estate; avails of $9,124.82 went to surviving wife where insured left no issue, both his father and mother were dead, and policies were payable to estate. Hill v. Schroeder, 156 N.W.2d 695, 1968 N.D. LEXIS 119 (N.D. 1968).

Collateral References.

Separation agreement as barring rights of surviving spouse in other’s estate, 34 A.L.R.2d 1020, 1039.

Purchaser: relative rights in real property as between purchasers from or through decedent’s heirs or devisees and unknown surviving spouse, 39 A.L.R.2d 1082.

Construction, application, and effect of statute providing for descent of property of surviving spouse which had been derived from predeceased spouse, 49 A.L.R.2d 391.

Abandonment, desertion, or refusal to support on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate, 13 A.L.R.3d 446.

Adultery on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate, 13 A.L.R.3d 486.

Family settlement of intestate estate, 29 A.L.R.3d 174.

Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, construction, application, and effect of, 39 A.L.R.3d 1332.

Homicide as precluding taking under will or by intestacy, 25 A.L.R.4th 787.

30.1-04-03. (2-103) Share of heirs other than surviving spouse.

Any part of the intestate estate not passing to a decedent’s surviving spouse under section 30.1-04-02, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes in the following order to the individuals who survive the decedent:

  1. To the decedent’s descendants by representation.
  2. If there is no surviving descendant, to the decedent’s parents equally if both survive, or to the surviving parent.
  3. If there is no surviving descendant or parent, to the descendants of the decedent’s parents or either of them by representation.
  4. If there is no surviving descendant, parent, or descendant of a parent, but the decedent is survived on both the paternal and maternal sides by one or more grandparents or descendants of grandparents:
    1. Half to the decedent’s paternal grandparents equally if both survive, or to the surviving paternal grandparent, or to the descendants of the decedent’s paternal grandparents or either of them if both are deceased, the descendants taking by representation; and
    2. Half to the decedent’s maternal grandparents equally if both survive, or to the surviving maternal grandparent, or to the descendants of the decedent’s maternal grandparents or either of them if both are deceased, the descendants taking by representation.
  5. If there is no surviving descendant, parent, or descendant of a parent, but the decedent is survived by one or more grandparents or descendants of grandparents on the paternal but not the maternal side, or on the maternal but not the paternal side, to the decedent’s relatives on the side with one or more surviving members in the manner as described in subsection 4.
  6. If there is no surviving spouse, descendant, parent, descendant of a parent, grandparent, or descendant of a grandparent, but the intestate decedent has one deceased spouse who has one or more descendants who survive the decedent, to those descendants by representation or has more than one deceased spouse who has one or more descendants who survive the decedent, the estate is divided into as many equal shares as there are deceased spouses, each share passing to those descendants by representation.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 290, § 2; 1993, ch. 334, § 5; 1995, ch. 322, § 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 3.

Notes to Decisions

Application.

Because a devise in a will failed due to the fact that the devisee predeceased the decedent, an estate passed under the laws of intestate succession. A trial court erred by awarding a grandmother a portion of a decedent’s estate because the decedent’s wife was entitled to the entire estate through intestate succession, pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-04-02(1)(a); moreover, the decedent’s will did not expressly disinherit the wife, and the wife did not forfeit her right to receive the entire estate through the laws of intestate succession by not withdrawing her petition for exercise of an elective share since she was allowed to state more than one claim or defense. Hartvickson v. Haugen (In re Estate of Haugen), 2011 ND 28, 794 N.W.2d 448, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 26 (N.D. 2011).

Exclusions.

Trial court did not err in holding that the granddaughters of a decedent’s half-sister inherited the intestate estate of the decedent because even though the decedent expressly excluded the half-sister under the will, it could not be inferred that the decedent intended to exclude the granddaughters; the granddaughters were the only descendants of the decedent’s parents. West v. Myrvik (In re Estate of Samuelson), 2008 ND 190, 757 N.W.2d 44, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 192 (N.D. 2008).

Indentured Child.

Indenture agreement between prospective adoptive parents and foundling home which permitted the indentured child to enforce provisions of the indenture allowing inheritance by the child from the prospective parents did not create the same relationship created by statutory adoption; therefore, the natural children of the prospective parents had no inheritance rights under the laws of intestate succession to the estate of the indentured child upon his death without lineal descendants. Geiger v. Estate of Connelly, 271 N.W.2d 570, 1978 N.D. LEXIS 180 (N.D. 1978).

Predeceased Beneficiary.

Where a will did not include a residuary clause or residuary devise, property devised to a predeceased beneficiary did not pass by will, rather, pursuant to section 30.1-04-01, passed by the law of intestate succession to the issue of the decedent’s parents because decedent had no surviving issue or parents. Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 1988).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Children As Only Heirs.

Where a decedent left ten children as his only heirs at law, each child succeeded to an undivided one-tenth interest in the land and estate owned by decedent at time of his death and they succeeded to the title to the real property as tenants in common. Ellison v. Strandback, 62 N.W.2d 95, 1953 N.D. LEXIS 90 (N.D. 1953).

Determination of Heirs.

An order which stated only that: “All aunts and uncles on the maternal and paternal sides who left issue, shall receive equal shares and the share of each deceased aunt or uncle, who left issue, shall be left to the issue of that deceased person in equal shares by right of representation,” merely recited the statutory direction for inheritance by representation and did not determine the heirs. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Division Among Husband and Children.

Where decedent was survived by a husband and a son and daughter, each succeeded to undivided one-third interest in her real estate, and upon the son’s death, his surviving wife and his surviving son each succeeded to one-half of his interest in the property. Morrison v. Hawksett, 64 N.W.2d 786, 1954 N.D. LEXIS 79 (N.D. 1954).

Father.

Where intestate insured who carried an insurance policy for two thousand dollars payable to his estate left a surviving widow but no lineal descendants, and the gross value of the estate did not exceed forty-five hundred dollars, his father was not an heir within meaning of former section 26-10-18 (now see section 26.1-33-40). Maixner v. Zumpf, 51 N.D. 140, 199 N.W. 183, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 148 (N.D. 1924).

Insurance Payable to Estate.

In determining who are heirs at law and who take as such under life insurance policies made payable to estate or personal representatives of insured, resort must be had to laws of succession. ANDERSON v. NORTHERN & DAKOTA TRUST CO., 67 N.D. 458, 274 N.W. 127, 1937 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1937).

Insurance Payment Directed by Will.

The avails of a life insurance policy belonged to youngest sister of deceased testator where his will provided that in the event of his death prior to the death of said named youngest sister, all of his life insurance be paid to her. Jorgensen v. DeViney, 57 N.D. 63, 222 N.W. 464 (1928), explained, Anderson v. Northern & Dakota Trust Co., 65 N.D. 721, 261 N.W. 759 (1935) and ANDERSON v. NORTHERN & DAKOTA TRUST CO., 67 N.D. 458, 274 N.W. 127, 1937 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1937).

Stepfather.

Under former law, stepfather of a deceased intestate did not inherit, and, where deceased carried a policy of war risk insurance, his stepfather, not designated as a beneficiary, had no interest therein. Richmond v. United States, 6 F.2d 143, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 1975 (5th Cir. Ala. 1925).

Collateral References.

Nieces and nephews: descent and distribution to nieces and nephews as per stirpes or per capita, 19 A.L.R.2d 191.

Time of ascertainment of settlor’s heirs and distributees who take on failure of the trust, 27 A.L.R.2d 691.

Cousins, descent and distribution to and among, 54 A.L.R.2d 1009, 1017.

Uncles and aunts, descent and distribution to and among, 55 A.L.R.2d 643, 648.

Stepparents: descent and distribution from stepparents to stepchildren or vice versa, 63 A.L.R.2d 303.

Adopted child, right to inherit from intestate natural grandparent, 60 A.L.R.3d 631.

Homicide as precluding taking under will or by intestacy, 25 A.L.R.4th 787.

30.1-04-03.1. (2-113) Individuals related to decedent through two lines.

An individual who is related to the decedent through two lines of relationship is entitled to only a single share based on the relationship that would entitle the individual to the larger share.

Source: S.L. 1977, ch. 295, § 2; 1993, ch. 334, § 6; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

30.1-04-04. (2-104) Requirement that heir survive decedent for one hundred twenty hours — Individual in gestation.

  1. For purposes of intestate succession, homestead allowance, and exempt property, and except as otherwise provided in subsection 2:
    1. An individual who was born before a decedent’s death but who fails to survive the decedent by one hundred twenty hours is deemed to have predeceased the decedent. If it is not established by clear and convincing evidence that an individual who was born before the decedent’s death survived the decedent by one hundred twenty hours, it is deemed that the individual failed to survive for the required period.
    2. An individual who was in gestation at a decedent’s death is deemed to be living at the decedent’s death if the individual lives one hundred twenty hours after birth. If it is not established by clear and convincing evidence that an individual who was in gestation at the decedent’s death lived one hundred twenty hours after birth, it is deemed that the individual failed to survive for the required period.
  2. This section does not apply if it would result in a taking of the intestate estate by the state under section 30.1-04-05.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 7; 1995, ch. 322, § 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 4.

Collateral References.

Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, construction, application, and effect of, 39 A.L.R.3d 1332.

30.1-04-05. (2-105) No taker.

If there is no taker under the provisions of this title, the intestate estate passes to the state for the support of the common schools and an action for the recovery of such property and to reduce it into the possession of the state or for its sale and conveyance may be brought by the attorney general or by the state’s attorney in the district court of the county in which the property is situated.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Jurisdiction.

Under C.L. 1913, §§ 5760, 8175, 8525, 8846, 8849, the county court was without jurisdiction to determine escheats. Delaney v. State, 42 N.D. 630, 174 N.W. 290, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 187 (N.D. 1919).

Petition by United States.

Petition by United States constituted an objection to any attempt to dispose of moneys in hands of administrator as assets of the estate. In re Gonsky's Estate, 79 N.D. 123, 55 N.W.2d 60, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1952).

Property of United States.

Where property and moneys directed to be paid to the state treasurer belonged to the United States, the county court had no authority to direct payment to the state treasurer. In re Gonsky's Estate, 79 N.D. 123, 55 N.W.2d 60, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1952).

Collateral References.

Illegitimate, escheat of estate of, 48 A.L.R.2d 759, 778.

Other state, escheat of personal property of intestate domiciled or resident in, 50 A.L.R.2d 1375.

30.1-04-06. (2-106) Representation. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1995, ch. 322, § 26.

30.1-04-07. (2-107) Kindred of half blood.

Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit if they were of the whole blood.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Cousins: descent and distribution to and among cousins as affected by whole blood or half blood relationship, 54 A.L.R.2d 1009, 1017.

Uncles and aunts of the whole blood and of the half blood, descent and distribution to and among, 55 A.L.R.2d 643, 648.

Descent and distribution: rights of inheritance as between kindred of whole or half blood, 47 A.L.R.4th 561.

30.1-04-08. (2-108) Reserved.

Source: S.L. 2009, ch. 283, § 5.

30.1-04-09. (2-114) Parent barred from inheriting in certain circumstances.

  1. A parent is barred from inheriting from or through a child of the parent if the parent’s parental rights were terminated and the parent-child relationship was not judicially re-established or the child died before reaching eighteen years of age and there is clear and convincing evidence that immediately before the child’s death the parental rights of the child’s parent could have been terminated under other law of this state on the basis of nonsupport, abandonment, abuse, or neglect, or other actions or inactions of the parent toward the child.
  2. For purposes of intestate succession from or through the deceased child, a parent who is barred from inheriting under this section is treated as if the parent predeceased the child.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 10; 1995, ch. 322, § 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 6.

Notes to Decisions

Adopted Child.

Indenture agreement between prospective adoptive parents and foundling home which permitted the indentured child to enforce provisions of the indenture allowing inheritance by the child from the prospective parents did not create the same relationship created by statutory adoption; therefore, the natural children of the prospective parents had no inheritance rights under the laws of intestate succession to the estate of the indentured child upon his death without lineal descendants. Geiger v. Estate of Connelly, 271 N.W.2d 570, 1978 N.D. LEXIS 180 (N.D. 1978).

In determining whether the adopted woman was a proper devisee of the estate of decedent, who was the mother of the adopted woman’s biological father who predeceased the decedent, courts pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 1-02-03 had to give terms that defined the relationship between people their peculiar and appropriate meaning as defined by statute. Since the decedent’s child under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-01-06(4) was the biological son and the adopted woman was the biological father’s “issue” under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-01-06(22), the fact of the adopted woman’s adoption by the adoptive father did not affect the relationship between the adopted woman and biological father, according to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-04-09(1), and meant that the adopted woman was a proper devisee of decedent. Kraft v. Ramos (In re Estate of Boehm), 2012 ND 104, 816 N.W.2d 793, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 93 (N.D. 2012).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Action by Child.

Prior to its amendment in 1977, this section permitted a child born out of wedlock to bring an action after the alleged father’s death to determine rights of inheritance; the child had to show decedent’s paternity by clear and convincing proof; evidence that decedent had lived with child’s mother both before and after child’s birth, had orally acknowledged child as his and had provided support for her constituted sufficiently “clear and convincing” proof; the child’s right to bring an action was not dependent on whether the mother had taken any action to establish paternity by written acknowledgment or judicial determination. C.L.W. v. M.J., 254 N.W.2d 446, 1977 N.D. LEXIS 283 (N.D. 1977).

Adoption.

The right of an adopted child of inheriting from its natural parents under former section was not limited by former provisions dealing with adoption. Bannerman v. Close, 81 N.W.2d 259 (N.D. 1957).

Inheritance by Illegitimate Child.

An illegitimate child, if his father had acknowledged him by an instrument in writing properly executed, could inherit from father but not from lineal or collateral kindred. Eddie v. Eddie, 8 N.D. 376, 79 N.W. 856, 1899 N.D. LEXIS 22 (N.D. 1899).

Proof of Paternity.

Letters expressing decedent’s doubt regarding his paternity of a child and not signed in presence of any witness did not constitute an “acknowledgment” that deceased was father and were insufficient to entitle child as a claimant to inherit a share of estate. In re Berg's Estate, 72 N.D. 52, 4 N.W.2d 575, 1942 N.D. LEXIS 111 (N.D. 1942).

Collateral References.

Conflict of laws as to inheritance from or through adoptive parent, 18 A.L.R.2d 960.

Recognition: what amounts to recognition within statutes affecting the status or rights of illegitimate, 33 A.L.R.2d 705.

Adoption as affecting right of inheritance through or from natural parent or other natural kin, 37 A.L.R.2d 333.

Right of adopted child to inherit from kindred of adoptive parent, 43 A.L.R.2d 1183.

Inheritance by illegitimate, 48 A.L.R.2d 759, 77860 A.L.R.2d 1182.

Conflict of laws as to inheritance from or through adopted person, 52 A.L.R.2d 1228.

Mother’s legitimate children, inheritance by illegitimate from, 60 A.L.R.2d 1182.

Conflict of laws as to adoption, as affecting descent and distribution of decedent’s estate, 87 A.L.R.2d 1240.

Conflict of laws as to legitimacy or legitimation or as to rights of illegitimates, as affecting descent and distribution of decedent’s estate, 87 A.L.R.2d 1274.

Mother’s ancestors or collateral kindred, inheritance by illegitimate from or through, 97 A.L.R.2d 1101.

Mother’s other illegitimate children, inheritance by illegitimate from, 7 A.L.R.3d 677.

Family allowance: eligibility of illegitimate child to receive family allowance out of estate of his deceased father, 12 A.L.R.3d 1140.

Adopted child, right to inherit from intestate natural grandparent, 60 A.L.R.3d 631.

30.1-04-10. (2-109) Advancements.

  1. If an individual dies intestate as to all or a portion of the individual’s estate, property the decedent gave during the decedent’s lifetime to an individual who, at the decedent’s death, is an heir is treated as an advancement against the heir’s intestate share only if the decedent declared in a contemporaneous writing or the heir acknowledged in writing that the gift is an advancement or the decedent’s contemporaneous writing or the heir’s written acknowledgment otherwise indicates that the gift is to be taken into account in computing the division and distribution of the decedent’s intestate estate.
  2. For purposes of subsection 1, property advanced is valued as of the time the heir came into possession or enjoyment of the property or as of the time of the decedent’s death, whichever first occurs.
  3. If the recipient of the property fails to survive the decedent, the property is not taken into account in computing the division and distribution of the decedent’s intestate estate, unless the decedent’s contemporaneous writing provides otherwise.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 11; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Advancement Not Indebtedness.

Advancement did not involve an indebtedness at all, but both could be deducted from a distributee’s share of the estate. Stenson v. H. S. Halvorson Co., 28 N.D. 151, 147 N.W. 800, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 99 (N.D. 1914).

Collateral References.

Presumption and burden of proof with respect to advancement, 31 A.L.R.2d 1036.

Validity of inter vivos gift by ward to guardian or conservator, 70 A.L.R.4th 499.

Inter vivos gift of remainder in chattel, 83 A.L.R.4th 966.

Check as evidencing advancement, 74 A.L.R.5th 491.

30.1-04-11. (2-110) Debts to decedent.

A debt owed to a decedent is not charged against the intestate share of any individual except the debtor. If the debtor fails to survive the decedent, the debt is not taken into account in computing the intestate share of the debtor’s descendants.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 12; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Cross-References.

Claims against decedent, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-12-04.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Payment of Debts.

Heirs had no right to decedent’s property until his debts were paid. Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 144 N.W. 1082, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 1914).

30.1-04-12. (2-111) Alienage.

No individual is disqualified to take as an heir because the individual or an individual through whom that individual claims is or has been an alien.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 13; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

30.1-04-13. (2-112) Dower and curtesy abolished.

The estates of dower and curtesy are abolished.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 14; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Cross-References.

Dower and curtesy abolished, see N.D.C.C. § 14-07-09.

30.1-04-14. (2-115) Definitions.

In sections 30.1-04-14 through 30.1-04-20:

  1. “Adoptee” means an individual who is adopted.
  2. “Assisted reproduction” means a method of causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse.
  3. “Divorce” means any divorce or annulment, or any dissolution or declaration of invalidity of a marriage.
  4. “Functioned as a parent of the child” means behaving toward the child in a manner consistent with being the child’s parent and performing functions that are customarily performed by a parent, such as fulfilling parental responsibilities toward the child, recognizing or holding out the child as the individual’s child, materially participating in the child’s upbringing, and residing with the child in the same household as regular members of that household.
  5. “Genetic father” means the man whose sperm fertilized the egg of a child’s genetic mother. If the father-child relationship is established under the presumption of paternity under subdivision a, b, or c of subsection 2 of section 14-20-07, the term means only the man for whom that relationship is established.
  6. “Genetic mother” means the woman whose egg was fertilized by the sperm of the child’s genetic father.
  7. “Genetic parent” means a child’s genetic father or genetic mother.
  8. “Incapacity” means the inability of an individual to function as a parent of a child because of the individual’s physical or mental condition.
  9. “Relative” means a grandparent or a descendant of a grandparent.

Source: S.L. 2009, ch. 283, § 7.

Notes to Decisions

Functioned As A Parent.

Estate representative’s contention had to be rejected that the adopted woman was prohibited from inheriting from decedent, who was the mother of the adopted woman’s biological father, because the biological father did not act as the adopted woman’s father before the adopted woman turned 18-years-old, as required by N.D.C.C. § 30.1-09.1-05(3). Although the biological father did not act as a parent towards the adopted woman between the adopted woman’s ages of three and 15-years-old, the biological father and adopted woman reconciled when the adopted woman was 15-years-old, and the trial court’s finding that the biological father then “functioned as a parent of the child” as defined under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-04-14(4) was not clearly erroneous under N.D. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Kraft v. Ramos (In re Estate of Boehm), 2012 ND 104, 816 N.W.2d 793, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 93 (N.D. 2012).

30.1-04-15. (2-116) Parent-child relationship — Effect.

Except as otherwise provided in subsections 2 through 4 of section 30.1-04-18, if a parent-child relationship exists or is established under sections 30.1-04-14 through 30.1-04-20, the parent is a parent of the child and the child is a child of the parent for purposes of intestate succession.

Source: S.L. 2009, ch. 283, § 8.

Effective Date.

This section became effective August 1, 2009.

30.1-04-16. (2-117) Parent-child relationship — No distinction based on marital status.

Except as otherwise provided in section 30.1-04-09, 30.1-04-18, 30.1-04-19, or 30.1-04-20, a parent-child relationship exists between a child and the child’s genetic parents, regardless of their marital status.

Source: S.L. 2009, ch. 283, § 9.

Effective Date.

This section became effective August 1, 2009.

30.1-04-17. (2-118) Parent-child relationship — Adoptee and adoptee’s adoptive parent or parents.

  1. A parent-child relationship exists between an adoptee and the adoptee’s adoptive parent or parents.
  2. For purposes of subsection 1:
    1. An individual who is in the process of being adopted by a married couple when one of the spouses dies is treated as adopted by the deceased spouse if the adoption is subsequently granted to the decedent’s surviving spouse.
    2. A child of a genetic parent who is in the process of being adopted by a genetic parent’s spouse when the spouse dies is treated as adopted by the deceased spouse if the genetic parent survives the deceased spouse by one hundred twenty hours.
  3. If, after a parent-child relationship is established between a child of assisted reproduction and a parent under section 30.1-04-19 or between a gestational child and a parent under section 30.1-04-20, the child is in the process of being adopted by the parent’s spouse when that spouse dies, the child is treated as adopted by the deceased spouse for purposes of subdivision b of subsection 2.

Source: S.L. 2009, ch. 283, § 10.

Effective Date.

This section became effective August 1, 2009.

30.1-04-18. (2-119) Parent-child relationship — Adoptee and adoptee’s genetic parents.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections 2 through 4, a parent-child relationship does not exist between an adoptee and the adoptee’s genetic parents.
  2. A parent-child relationship exists between an individual who is adopted by the spouse of either genetic parent and:
    1. The genetic parent whose spouse adopted the individual; and
    2. The other genetic parent, but only for purposes of the right of the adoptee or a descendant of the adoptee to inherit from or through the other genetic parent.
  3. A parent-child relationship exists between both genetic parents and an individual who is adopted by a relative of a genetic parent, or by the spouse or surviving spouse of a relative of a genetic parent, but only for purposes of the right of the adoptee or a descendant of the adoptee to inherit from or through either genetic parent.
  4. A parent-child relationship exists between both genetic parents and an individual who is adopted after the death of both genetic parents, but only for purposes of the right of the adoptee or a descendant of the adoptee to inherit through either genetic parent.
  5. If, after a parent-child relationship is established between a child of assisted reproduction and a parent or parents under section 30.1-04-19 or between a gestational child and a parent or parents under section 30.1-04-20, the child is adopted by another or others, the child’s parent or parents under section 30.1-04-19 or 30.1-04-20 are deemed the child’s genetic parent or parents for purposes of this section.

Source: S.L. 2009, ch. 283, § 11.

Effective Date.

This section became effective August 1, 2009.

30.1-04-19. (2-120) Parent-child relationship — Child conceived by assisted reproduction other than a child born to a gestational carrier.

  1. In this section:
    1. “Birth mother” means a woman, other than a gestational carrier under section 30.1-04-20, who gives birth to a child of assisted reproduction. The term is not limited to a woman who is the child’s genetic mother.
    2. “Child of assisted reproduction” means a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction by a woman other than a gestational carrier under section 30.1-04-20.
    3. “Third-party donor” means an individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted reproduction, whether or not for consideration. The term does not include a husband who provides sperm, or a wife who provides eggs, that are used for assisted reproduction by the wife; the birth mother of a child of assisted reproduction; or an individual who is determined under subsection 5 or 6 to have a parent-child relationship with a child of assisted reproduction.
  2. A parent-child relationship does not exist between a child of assisted reproduction and a third-party donor.
  3. A parent-child relationship exists between a child of assisted reproduction and the child’s birth mother.
  4. Except as otherwise provided in subsections 9 and 10, a parent-child relationship exists between a child of assisted reproduction and the husband of the child’s birth mother if the husband provided the sperm that the birth mother used during his lifetime for assisted reproduction, and the husband is the genetic father of the child.
  5. A birth certificate identifying an individual other than the birth mother as the other parent of a child of assisted reproduction presumptively establishes a parent-child relationship between the child and that individual.
  6. Except as otherwise provided in subsections 7, 9, and 10, and unless a parent-child relationship is established under subsection 4 or 5, a parent-child relationship exists between a child of assisted reproduction and an individual other than the birth mother who consented to assisted reproduction by the birth mother with intent to be treated as the other parent of the child. Consent to assisted reproduction by the birth mother with intent to be treated as the other parent of the child is established if the individual:
    1. Before or after the child’s birth, signed a record that, considering all the facts and circumstances, evidences the individual’s consent; or
    2. In the absence of a signed record under subdivision a, functioned as a parent of the child no later than two years after the child’s birth; intended to function as a parent of the child no later than two years after the child’s birth but was prevented from carrying out that intent by death, incapacity, or other circumstances; or intended to be treated as a parent of a posthumously conceived child if that intent is established by clear and convincing evidence.
  7. For purposes of subdivision a of subsection 6, neither an individual who signed a record more than two years after the birth of the child, nor a relative of that individual who is not also a relative of the birth mother, inherits from or through the child unless the individual functioned as a parent of the child before the child reached the age of majority.
  8. For purposes of subdivision b of subsection 6, if the birth mother is married and no divorce proceedings are pending or if the birth mother is a surviving spouse and at her deceased spouse’s death no divorce proceedings were then pending then, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, her spouse or deceased spouse is deemed to have satisfied subdivision b of subsection 6.
  9. If a married couple are divorced before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, a child resulting from the assisted reproduction is not a child of the birth mother’s former spouse, unless the former spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after divorce, the child would be treated as the former spouse’s child.
  10. If, in a record, an individual withdraws consent to assisted reproduction before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, a child resulting from the assisted reproduction is not a child of that individual, unless the individual subsequently satisfies the requirements of subsection 6.
  11. If, under this section, an individual is a parent of a child of assisted reproduction who is conceived after the individual’s death, the child is treated as in gestation at the individual’s death for purposes of subdivision b of subsection 1 of section 30.1-04-04 if the child is in utero not later than thirty-six months after the individual’s death; or born not later than forty-five months after the individual’s death.

Source: S.L. 2009, ch. 283, § 12.

Effective Date.

This section became effective August 1, 2009.

30.1-04-20. (2-121) Parent-child relationship — Child born to a gestational carrier.

  1. In this section:
    1. “Gestational agreement” means an enforceable or unenforceable agreement for assisted reproduction in which a woman agrees to carry a child to birth for an intended parent, intended parents, or an individual described in subsection 5.
    2. “Gestational carrier” means a woman who is not an intended parent and who gives birth to a child under a gestational agreement. The term is not limited to a woman who is the child’s genetic mother.
    3. “Gestational child” means a child born to a gestational carrier under a gestational agreement.
    4. “Intended parent” means an individual who entered into a gestational agreement providing that the individual will be the parent of a child born to a gestational carrier by means of assisted reproduction. The term is not limited to an individual who has a genetic relationship with the child.
  2. A parent-child relationship is conclusively established by a court order designating the parent or parents of a gestational child.
  3. A parent-child relationship between a gestational child and the child’s gestational carrier does not exist unless the gestational carrier is:
    1. Designated as a parent of the child in a court order described in subsection 2; or
    2. The child’s genetic mother and a parent-child relationship does not exist with an individual other than the gestational carrier under this section.
  4. In the absence of a court order under subsection 2, a parent-child relationship exists between a gestational child and an intended parent who:
    1. Functioned as a parent of the child no later than two years after the child’s birth; or
    2. Died while the gestational carrier was pregnant if:
      1. There were two intended parents and the other intended parent survived the birth of the child and functioned as a parent of the child no later than two years after the child’s birth;
      2. There were two intended parents, the other intended parent also died while the gestational carrier was pregnant, and a relative of either deceased intended parent or the spouse or surviving spouse of a relative of either deceased intended parent functioned as a parent of the child no later than two years after the child’s birth; or
      3. There was no other intended parent and a relative of or the spouse or surviving spouse of a relative of the deceased intended parent functioned as a parent of the child no later than two years after the child’s birth.
  5. In the absence of a court order under subsection 2, a parent-child relationship exists between a gestational child and an individual whose sperm or eggs were used after the individual’s death or incapacity to conceive a child under a gestational agreement entered into after the individual’s death or incapacity if the individual intended to be treated as the parent of the child. The individual’s intent can be shown by:
    1. A record, signed by the individual that, considering all the facts and circumstances, evidences the individual’s intent; or
    2. Other facts and circumstances establishing the individual’s intent by clear and convincing evidence.
  6. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 7, and unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a contrary intent, an individual is deemed to have intended to be treated as the parent of a gestational child for purposes of subdivision b of subsection 5 if:
    1. The individual, before death or incapacity, deposited the sperm or eggs that were used to conceive the child;
    2. When the individual deposited the sperm or eggs, the individual was married and no divorce proceedings were pending; and
    3. The individual’s spouse or surviving spouse functioned as a parent of the child not later than two years after the child’s birth.
  7. The presumption under subsection 6 does not apply if there is a court order under subsection 2 or a signed record that satisfies subdivision a of subsection 5.
  8. If, under this section, an individual is a parent of a gestational child who is conceived after the individual’s death, the child is treated as in gestation at the individual’s death for purposes of subdivision b of subsection 1 of section 30.1-04-04 if the child is in utero not later than thirty-six months after the individual’s death or born not later than forty-five months after the individual’s death.
  9. This section does not affect other law of this state regarding the enforceability or validity of a gestational agreement.

Source: S.L. 2009, ch. 283, § 13.

Effective Date.

This section became effective August 1, 2009.

30.1-04-21. (2-122) Equitable adoption.

Sections 30.1-04-14 through 30.1-04-20 do not preclude, limit, or affect application of the doctrine of equitable adoption.

Source: S.L. 2009, ch. 283, § 14.

Effective Date.

This section became effective August 1, 2009.

CHAPTER 30.1-05 Elective Share of Surviving Spouse

Note.

Effective January 1, 1996, former chapter 30.1-05 was repealed by S.L. 1993, chapter 334, section 50 and a new chapter 30.1-05, enacted by S.L. 1993, chapter 334, § 16, was substituted therefor.

30.1-05-01. (2-202) Elective share.

  1. The surviving spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled in this state has a right of election, under the limitations and conditions stated in this chapter, to take an elective share amount equal to fifty percent of the augmented estate.
  2. If the sum of the amounts described in subdivision d of subsection 2 of section 30.1-05-02, subdivision a of subsection 1 of section 30.1-05-03, and that part of the elective-share amount payable from the decedent’s probate estate and nonprobate transfers to others under subsections 2 and 3 of section 30.1-05-03 is less than seventy-five thousand dollars, the surviving spouse is entitled to a supplemental elective-share amount equal to seventy-five thousand dollars minus the sum of the amounts described in those sections. The supplemental elective-share amount is payable from the decedent’s probate estate and from recipients of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others in the order of priority set forth in subsections 2 and 3 of section 30.1-05-03.
  3. If the right of election is exercised by or on behalf of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse’s homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance, if any, are not charged against, but are in addition to, the elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts.
  4. The right, if any, of the surviving spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled outside this state to take an elective share in property in this state is governed by the law of the decedent’s domicile at death.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 15; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 3, 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 15.

Cross-References.

Divorce, annulment, or separation, effect of, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-10-02.

Notes to Decisions

Amount of Share.

District court’s decision stated that the wife, as surviving spouse of the decedent, was allowed to claim her elective share in the amount of $67,000, plus one-fourth of the estate under Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 700.2202; however, the court’s findings did not include any calculation for the reduction of one-half of the value of property derived by the wife from the decedent by any means other than testate or intestate succession upon his death, or for the addition of one-half of any balance of the intestate estate, and the court’s conclusory findings were inadequate to understand the basis for the court’s decision about an elective share. In re Estate of Wicklund v. Wicklund, 2012 ND 29, 812 N.W.2d 359, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 26 (N.D. 2012).

Divorce Abated.

In a case in which the wife died during divorce proceedings after the district court had issued a judgment of divorce, but before resolving the issue of property division, the Supreme Court concluded that no reason existed for the husband to not inherit from the wife's estate. Because the divorce action was abated, the husband was not divorced. In re Estate of Albrecht v. Albrecht, 2018 ND 67, 908 N.W.2d 135, 2018 N.D. LEXIS 73 (N.D. 2018).

Omitted Spouse’s Share.

The amount of an omitted spouse’s share under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-06-01 is not limited to the same extent as the amount of the elective share provided for a surviving spouse under this section. In re Estate of Knudsen, 322 N.W.2d 454, 1982 N.D. LEXIS 316 (N.D. 1982).

Waiver.

Because a devise in a will failed due to the fact that the devisee predeceased the decedent, an estate passed under the laws of intestate succession. A trial court erred by awarding a grandmother a portion of a decedent’s estate because the decedent’s wife was entitled to the entire estate through intestate succession, pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-04-02(1)(a); moreover, the decedent’s will did not expressly disinherit the wife, and the wife did not forfeit her right to receive the entire estate through the laws of intestate succession by not withdrawing her petition for exercise of an elective share since she was allowed to state more than one claim or defense. Hartvickson v. Haugen (In re Estate of Haugen), 2011 ND 28, 794 N.W.2d 448, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 26 (N.D. 2011).

Collateral References.

Charge on realty: legacy accepted by surviving spouse in lieu of dower or other marital rights as charge upon real estate, where personalty is insufficient to pay legacy, 2 A.L.R.2d 607.

Waiver or abandonment of, or estoppel to assert, prior renunciation of, or election to take against, spouse’s will, 29 A.L.R.2d 244, 277.

Separation agreement as barring rights of surviving spouse in other’s estate, 34 A.L.R.2d 1020, 1039.

Loss occasioned by election against will, who must bear, 36 A.L.R.2d 291.

Revocation or withdrawal of election to take under or against will, 71 A.L.R.2d 942.

Agent or personal representative, election by spouse to take under or against will as exercisable by, 83 A.L.R.2d 1077.

Abandonment, desertion, or refusal to support on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate, 13 A.L.R.3d 446.

Adultery on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate, 13 A.L.R.3d 486.

Totten Trust: inclusion of funds in savings bank trust (Totten Trust) in determining surviving spouse’s interest in decedent’s estate, 64 A.L.R.3d 187.

Extent of rights of surviving spouse who elects to take against will in profits of or increase in value of estate accruing after testator’s death, 7 A.L.R.4th 989.

Construction, application, and effect of statutes which deny or qualify surviving spouse’s right to elect against deceased spouse’s will, 48 A.L.R.4th 972.

Determination of, and charges against, “augmented estate” upon which share of spouse electing to take against will is determined under Uniform Probate Code section 2-202, 63 A.L.R.4th 1173.

30.1-05-02. (2-201, 2-204 through 2-208) Augmented estate.

    1. In this section:
      1. “Decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others” means the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to persons, other than the decedent’s spouse, surviving spouse, the decedent, or the decedent’s creditors, estate, or estate creditors, that are included in the augmented estate under subdivision b of subsection 2.
      2. “Fractional interest in property held in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship”, whether the fractional interest is unilaterally severable or not, means the fraction, the numerator of which is one and the denominator of which, if the decedent was a joint tenant, is one plus the number of joint tenants who survive the decedent and which, if the decedent was not a joint tenant, is the number of joint tenants.
      3. “Marriage”, as it relates to a transfer by the decedent during marriage, means any marriage of the decedent to the decedent’s surviving spouse.
      4. “Nonadverse party” means a person who does not have a substantial beneficial interest in the trust or other property arrangement that would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power that the person possesses respecting the trust or other property arrangement. A person having a general power of appointment over property is deemed to have a beneficial interest in the property.
      5. “Power” or “power of appointment” includes a power to designate the beneficiary of a beneficiary designation.
      6. “Presently exercisable general power of appointment” means a power of appointment under which, at the time in question, the decedent, whether or not the decedent then had the capacity to exercise the power, held a power to create a present or future interest in the decedent, the decedent’s creditors, the decedent’s estate, or the creditors of the decedent’s estate, and includes a power to revoke or invade the principle of a trust or other property arrangement.
      7. “Probate estate” means property, whether movable or immovable, wherever situated, that would pass by intestate succession if the decedent died without a valid will.
      8. “Property” includes values subject to a beneficiary designation.
      9. “Right to income” includes a right to payments under a commercial or private annuity, an annuity trust, a unitrust, or a similar arrangement.
      10. “Transfer”, as it relates to a transfer by or of the decedent, includes:
        1. An exercise or release of a presently exercisable general power of appointment held by the decedent;
        2. A lapse at death of a presently exercisable general power of appointment held by the decedent; and
        3. An exercise, release, or lapse of a general power of appointment that the decedent created in the decedent and of a power described in subparagraph b of paragraph 2 of subdivision b of subsection 2 that the decedent conferred on a nonadverse party.
    2. In subparagraph a of paragraph 3 of subdivision b of subsection 2, “termination”, with respect to a right or interest in property, means that the right or interest terminated by the terms of the governing instrument or that the decedent transferred or relinquished the right or interests; and, with respect to a power over property, means that the power terminated by exercise, release, lapse, in default, or otherwise, except that, with respect to a power described in subparagraph a of paragraph 1 of subdivision b of subsection 2, “termination” means that the power terminated by exercise or release, but not by lapse nor in default or otherwise.
  1. The augmented estate consists of the sum of:
    1. The value of the decedent’s probate estate, reduced by funeral and administration expenses, homestead allowance as defined in section 47-18-01, family allowances, exempt property, and enforceable claims.
    2. The value of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others, which are composed of all property, whether movable or immovable, wherever situated, not included in the decedent’s probate estate, of any of the following types:
      1. Property of any of the following types that passed outside probate at the decedent’s death:
        1. Property over which the decedent alone, immediately before death, held a presently exercisable general power of appointment created by the decedent during the marriage; the amount included is the value of the property subject to the power, to the extent that the property passed at the decedent’s death, by exercise, release, lapse, in default, or otherwise, to or for the benefit of any person other than the decedent’s estate or surviving spouse.
        2. The decedent’s fractional interest in property, held by the decedent in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship; the amount included is the value of the decedent’s fractional interest contributed by the decedent during the marriage, to the extent that that fractional interest passed by right of survivorship at the decedent’s death to a surviving joint tenant other than the decedent’s surviving spouse.
        3. The decedent’s ownership interest in property or accounts held in POD, TOD, or co-ownership registration with the right of survivorship; the amount included is the value of the decedent’s ownership interest, to the extent that the decedent’s ownership interest passed at the decedent’s death to or for the benefit of any person other than the decedent’s estate or surviving spouse.
      2. Property transferred in any of the following forms by the decedent during marriage:
        1. Any irrevocable transfer in which the decedent retained the right to the possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the property if and to the extent that the decedent’s right terminated at or continued beyond the decedent’s death; the amount included is the value of the fraction of the property to which the decedent’s right related, to the extent that that fraction of the property passed outside probate to or for the benefit of any person other than the decedent’s estate or surviving spouse.
        2. Any transfer in which the decedent created a power over the income or principal of the transferred property, exercisable by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any other person, or exercisable by a nonadverse party, for the benefit of the decedent, the decedent’s creditors, the decedent’s estate, or the creditors of the decedent’s estate; the amount included is the value of the property subject to the power, to the extent that the power was exercisable at the decedent’s death to or for the benefit of any person other than the decedent’s surviving spouse or to the extent that the property subject to the power passed at the decedent’s death, by exercise, release, lapse, in default, or otherwise, to or for the benefit of any person other than the decedent’s estate or surviving spouse.
      3. Property that passed during marriage and during the two-year period next preceding the decedent’s death as a result of a transfer by the decedent if the transfer was of any of the following types:
        1. Any property that passed as a result of termination of a right or interest in, or power over, property that would have been included in the augmented estate under subparagraph a, b, or c of paragraph 1 of this subdivision, or under paragraph 2 of this subdivision, if the right, interest, or power had not terminated until the decedent’s death; the amount included is the value of the property that would have been included under these subsections, except that the property is valued at the time that the right, interest, or power terminated, and is included only to the extent that the property passed upon termination to or for the benefit of any person other than the decedent or the decedent’s estate, spouse, or surviving spouse.
        2. Any transfer of property, to the extent not otherwise included in the augmented estate, made to or for the benefit of a person other than the decedent’s surviving spouse, the amount included is the value of the transferred property to the extent that the aggregate transfers to any one donee in either of the two years exceeded ten thousand dollars.
    3. The value of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to the decedent’s surviving spouse, which are composed of all property that passed outside probate at the decedent’s death from the decedent to the surviving spouse by reason of the decedent’s death, including:
      1. The decedent’s fractional interest in property held as a joint tenant with the right of survivorship, to the extent that the decedent’s fractional interest passed to the surviving spouse as surviving joint tenant;
      2. The decedent’s ownership interest in property or accounts held in co-ownership registration with the right of survivorship, to the extent the decedent’s ownership interest passed to the surviving spouse as surviving co-owner;
      3. Proceeds of insurance, including accidental death benefits, on the life of the decedent, if the decedent owned the insurance policy immediately before death or if, and to the extent that, the decedent alone and immediately before death held a presently exercisable general power of appointment over the policy or its proceeds, the amount included is the value of the proceeds, to the extent that they were payable at the decedent’s death; and
      4. All other property that would have been included in the augmented estate under paragraph 1 or 2 of subdivision b of this subsection had it passed to or for the benefit of a person other than the decedent’s spouse, surviving spouse, the decedent, or the decedent’s creditors, estate, or estate creditors, but excluding property passing to the surviving spouse under the federal social security system.
    4. Except to the extent included in the augmented estate under subdivision a or c, the value of property:
      1. That was owned by the decedent’s surviving spouse at the decedent’s death, including:
        1. The surviving spouse’s fractional interest in property held in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship;
        2. The surviving spouse’s ownership interest in property or accounts held in co-ownership registration with the right of survivorship; and
        3. Property that passed to the surviving spouse by reason of the decedent’s death, but not including the spouse’s right to homestead allowance, family allowance, exempt property, or payments under the federal social security system.
      2. That would have been included in the surviving spouse’s nonprobate transfers to others, other than the spouse’s fractional and ownership interest included under subparagraphs a and b of paragraph 1, had the spouse been the decedent. Property included under this paragraph is valued at the decedent’s death, taking the fact that the decedent predeceased the spouse into account, except that, for purposes of subparagraphs a and b of paragraph 1, the values of the spouse’s fractional and ownership interests are determined immediately before the decedent’s death if the decedent was then a joint tenant or a co-owner of the property or accounts. The value of property included under this paragraph is reduced in each category by enforceable claims against the included property and is reduced by enforceable claims against the surviving spouse.
  2. The value of any property is excluded from the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others to the extent the decedent received adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth for a transfer of the property or if the property was transferred with the written joinder of, or if the transfer was consented to in writing by, the surviving spouse. Life insurance, accident insurance, pension, profit-sharing, retirement, and other benefit plans payable to persons other than the decedent’s surviving spouse or the decedent’s estate are also excluded from the decedent’s nonprobate transfers.
  3. The value of property includes the commuted value of any present or future interest and the commuted value of amounts payable under any trust, life insurance settlement option, annuity contract, public or private pension, disability compensation, death benefit or retirement plan, or any similar arrangement, exclusive of the federal social security system.
  4. In case of overlapping application to the same property of the paragraphs or subparagraphs of subsection 2, the property is included in the augmented estate under the provision yielding the highest value, but under any one, but only one, of the overlapping provisions if they all yield the same value.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, §§ 3, 4; 1993, ch. 334, § 15; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 3, 27.

Notes to Decisions

Computation of Elective Share.

Whether widow waived her right to claim an elective share was so interconnected with the unresolved issues of what she would receive under the will and the computation of the elective share, order denying her motion for an elective share was not appealable. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman (In re Estate of Zimmerman), 1997 ND 58, 561 N.W.2d 642, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 55 (N.D. 1997).

Nonprobate Transfers to Others.

Because individual retirement accounts (IRAs) are not pensions, and because IRAs are not specifically mentioned as excludable from the augmented estate under subdivision (1)(d), decedent spouse’s IRAs held in decedent’s name and payable to her children should have been included in her augmented estate. Luken v. Schulz (In re Estate of Luken), 551 N.W.2d 794, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 197 (N.D. 1996).

Presumption.

Business owner’s testimony did not provide enough evidence to rebut presumption that property owned by surviving spouse at decedent’s death was derived from decedent. Luken v. Schulz (In re Estate of Luken), 551 N.W.2d 794, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 197 (N.D. 1996).

Collateral References.

Determination of, and charges against, “augmented estate” upon which share of spouse electing to take against will is determined under Uniform Probate Code section 2-202, 63 A.L.R.4th 1173.

30.1-05-03. (2-209) Sources from which elective share payable.

  1. In a proceeding for an elective share, the following are applied first to satisfy the elective-share amount and to reduce or eliminate any contributions due from the decedent’s probate estate and recipients of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others:
    1. Amounts included in the augmented estate under subdivision a of subsection 2 of section 30.1-05-02 which pass or have passed to the surviving spouse by testate or intestate succession and amounts included in the augmented estate under subdivision c of subsection 2 of section 30.1-05-02; and
    2. Amounts included in the augmented estate under subdivision d of subsection 2 of section 30.1-05-02.
  2. If, after the application of subsection 1, the elective-share amount is not fully satisfied or if the surviving spouse is entitled to a supplemental elective-share amount, amounts included in the decedent’s probate estate and in the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others, other than amounts included under subparagraph a or b of paragraph 3 of subdivision b of subsection 2 of section 30.1-05-02, are applied first to satisfy the unsatisfied balance of the elective-share amount or the supplemental elective-share amount. The decedent’s probate estate and that portion of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others are so applied that liability for the unsatisfied balance of the elective-share amount or for the supplemental elective-share amount is equitably apportioned among the recipients of the decedent’s probate estate and of that portion of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others in proportion to the value of their interests therein.
  3. If, after the application of subsections 1 and 2, the elective-share or supplemental elective-share amount is not fully satisfied, the remaining portion of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others is so applied that liability for the unsatisfied balance of the elective-share or supplemental elective-share amount is equitably apportioned among the recipients of that remaining portion of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others in proportion to the value of their interests therein.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 15; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 3, 27.

30.1-05-04. (2-210) Personal liability of recipients.

  1. Only original recipients of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others, and the donees of the recipients of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others, to the extent the donees have the property or its proceeds, are liable to make a proportional contribution toward satisfaction of the surviving spouse’s elective-share or supplemental elective-share amount. A person liable to make contribution may choose to give up the proportional part of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to the person or to pay the value of the amount for which the person is liable.
  2. If any section or part of any section of this chapter is preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit included in the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others, a person who, not for value, receives the payment, item of property, or any other benefit, is obligated to return that payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of that payment or the value of that item of property or benefit, as provided in section 30.1-05-03, to the person who would have been entitled to it were that section or part of that section not preempted.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 15; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 3, 27.

Cross-References.

Divorce, annulment, or separation, effect of, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-10-02.

Homestead exemption and allowance, see N.D.C.C. chs. 30-16 and 47-18.

Notes to Decisions

Waiver of Right to Elective Share.
—In General.

Whether widow waived her right to claim an elective share was so interconnected with the unresolved issue of what she would receive under the will, order denying her motion for an elective share was not appealable. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman (In re Estate of Zimmerman), 1997 ND 58, 561 N.W.2d 642, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 55 (N.D. 1997).

Where prenuptial agreement contained no specific language declaring that wife waived rights she may have as a result of husband’s death, the agreement could not operate as a waiver of the wife’s elective share of the husband’s augmented estate. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman (In re Estate of Zimmerman), 1998 ND 116, 579 N.W.2d 591, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 121 (N.D. 1998).

—Physical Separation.

Physical separation of spouses, without divorce or legal separation, was insufficient to waive wife’s elective share under this subsection. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman (In re Estate of Zimmerman), 1998 ND 116, 579 N.W.2d 591, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 121 (N.D. 1998).

30.1-05-05. (2-211) Proceeding for elective share — Time limit.

  1. Except as provided in subsection 2, the election must be made by filing in the court and mailing or delivering to the personal representative, if any, a petition for the elective share within nine months after the date of the decedent’s death, or within six months after the probate of the decedent’s will, whichever limitation later expires. The surviving spouse shall serve a copy of the petition for the elective share on, and shall give written notice of the time and place set for hearing to persons interested in the estate and to the distributees and recipients of portions of the augmented estate whose interests may be adversely affected by the taking of the elective share. Except as provided in subsection 2, the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others, described in subdivision b of subsection 2 of section 30.1-05-02, is not included within the augmented estate for the purpose of computing the elective share, if the petition is filed more than nine months after the decedent’s death.
  2. Within nine months after the decedent’s death, the surviving spouse may petition the court for an extension of time for making an election. If, within nine months after the decedent’s death, the spouse gives notice of the petition to all persons interested in the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others, the court for cause shown by the surviving spouse may extend the time for election. If the court grants the spouse’s petition for an extension, the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others, described in subdivision b of subsection 2 of section 30.1-05-02, are not excluded from the augmented estate for the purpose of computing the elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts, if the spouse makes an election by filing in the court and mailing or delivering to the personal representative, if any, a petition for the elective share within the time allowed by the extension.
  3. The surviving spouse may withdraw a demand for an elective share at any time before entry of a final determination by the court.
  4. After notice and hearing, the court shall determine the elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts, and shall order its payment from the assets of the augmented estate or by contribution as appears appropriate under sections 30.1-05-03 and 30.1-05-04. If it appears that a fund or property included in the augmented estate has not come into the possession of the personal representative, or has been distributed by the personal representative, the court nevertheless shall fix the liability of any person who has any interest in the fund or property or who has possession thereof, whether as trustee or otherwise. The proceeding may be maintained against fewer than all persons against whom relief could be sought, but no person is subject to contribution in any greater amount than the person would have been under sections 30.1-05-03 and 30.1-05-04, had relief been secured against all persons subject to contribution.
  5. An order or judgment of the court may be enforced as necessary in suit for contribution or payment in other courts of this state or other jurisdictions.
  6. A copy of the order or judgment of the court shall be forwarded immediately to the tax commissioner by the court.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 290, § 3; 1977, ch. 295, § 5; 1993, ch. 334, § 15; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 3, 27.

30.1-05-06. (2-212) Right of election personal to surviving spouse — Incapacitated surviving spouse.

  1. The right of election may be exercised only by a surviving spouse who is living when the petition for the elective share is filed in the court under subsection 1 of section 30.1-05-05. If the election is not exercised by the surviving spouse personally, it may be exercised on the surviving spouse’s behalf by the surviving spouse’s conservator, guardian, or agent under the authority of a power of attorney.
  2. If the election is exercised on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person, the court shall set aside that portion of the elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts due from the decedent’s probate estate and recipients of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others under subsections 2 and 3 of section 30.1-05-03 and shall appoint a trustee to administer that property for the support of the surviving spouse. For the purposes of this subsection, an election on behalf of a surviving spouse by an agent under a durable power of attorney is presumed to be on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person. The trustee shall administer the trust in accordance with the following terms and any additional terms as the court determines appropriate:
    1. Expenditures of income and principal may be made in the manner, when, and to the extent that the trustee determines suitable and proper for the surviving spouse’s support, without court order but with regard to other support, income, and property of the surviving spouse exclusive of benefits of medical or other forms of assistance from any state or federal government or governmental agency for which the surviving spouse must qualify on the basis of need.
    2. During the surviving spouse’s incapacity, neither the surviving spouse nor anyone acting on behalf of the surviving spouse has a power to terminate the trust; but if the surviving spouse regains capacity, the surviving spouse then acquires the power to terminate the trust and acquire full ownership of the trust property free of trust, by delivering to the trustee a writing signed by the surviving spouse declaring the termination.
    3. Upon the surviving spouse’s death, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended trust property in the following order: under the residuary clause, if any, of the will of the predeceased spouse against whom the elective share was taken, as if that predeceased spouse died immediately after the surviving spouse; or to that predeceased spouse’s heirs under section 30.1-09.1-11.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, § 6; 1993, ch. 334, § 15; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 3, 27.

30.1-05-07. (2-213) Waiver of right to elect and of other rights. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2013, ch. 121, § 2.

Note.

See now, generally, N.D.C.C. ch. 14-03.2, Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act.

30.1-05-08. (2-214) Protection of payers and other third parties.

  1. Although under section 30.1-05-02 a payment, item of property, or other benefit is included in the decedent’s nonprobate transfers to others, a payer or other third party is not liable for having made a payment or transferred an item of property or other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument, or for having taken any other action in reliance on the validity of a governing instrument, upon request and satisfactory proof of the decedent’s death, before the payer or other third party received written notice from the surviving spouse or spouse’s representative of an intention to file a petition for the elective share or that a petition for the elective share has been filed. A payer or other third party is liable only for actions taken two or more business days after the payer or other third party received written notice of an intention to file a petition for the elective share or that a petition for the elective share has been filed. The written notice must indicate the name of the decedent, the date of the decedent’s death, the name of the person asserting an interest, the nature of the payment or item of property or other benefit, and a statement that the spouse intends to file a petition for the elective share or that a petition for the elective share has been filed. Any form of service of notice other than that described in subsection 2 is not sufficient to impose liability on a payer or other third party for actions taken pursuant to the governing instrument.
  2. The written notice must be mailed to the payer’s or other third party’s main office or home by registered mail or served upon the payer or third party in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. Notice to a sales representative of the payer or other third party does not constitute notice to the payer or other third party. Upon receipt of written notice of intention to file a petition for the elective share or that a petition for the elective share has been filed, a payer or other third party may pay any amount owed or transfer or deposit any item of property held by it to or with the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent’s estate, or if no proceedings have been commenced, to or with the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedents’ estates located in the county of the decedent’s residence. The availability of an action under this section does not prevent the payer or other third party from taking any other action authorized by law or the governing instrument. If no probate proceedings have been commenced, the payer or other third party shall file with the court a copy of the written notice received by the payer or other third party, with the payment of funds or transfer or deposit of property. The court may not charge a filing fee to the payer or other third party for any such payment, transfer, or deposit with the court, even if no probate proceedings have been commenced before the payment, transfer, or deposit. The court shall hold the funds or items of property and, upon its determination under subsection 4 of section 30.1-05-05, shall order disbursement in accordance with the determination. If no petition is filed in the court within the specified time under subsection 1 of section 30.1-05-05, or, if filed, the demand for an elective share is withdrawn under subsection 3 of section 30.1-05-05, the court shall order disbursement to the designated beneficiary. A filing fee, if any, may be charged upon disbursement either to the recipient or against the funds or property on deposit with the court, in the discretion of the court. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the court discharge the payer or other third party from all claims under the governing instrument or applicable law for the value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or deposited with the court.
  3. Upon petition to the court by the beneficiary designated in a governing instrument, the court may order that all or part of the property be paid to the beneficiary in an amount and subject to conditions consistent with this section.

Source: S.L. 1995, ch. 322, § 4.

CHAPTER 30.1-06 Spouse and Children Unprovided for in Wills

Note.

Effective January 1, 1996, former chapter 30.1-06 was repealed by S.L. 1993, section 50, and a new chapter 30.1-06, enacted by S.L. 1993, chapter 334, § 16, was substituted therefor.

30.1-06-01. (2-301) Entitlement of spouse — Premarital will.

  1. If the testator’s surviving spouse married the testator after the testator executed a will, the surviving spouse is entitled to receive, as an intestate share, no less than the value of the share of the estate the surviving spouse would have received if the testator had died intestate as to that portion of the testator’s estate, if any, that neither is devised to a child of the testator who was born before the testator married the surviving spouse and who is not a child of the surviving spouse nor is devised to a descendant of such a child or passes under section 30.1-09-05 or 30.1-09-06 to such a child or to a descendant of such a child, unless:
    1. It appears from the will or other evidence that the will was made in contemplation of the testator’s marriage to the surviving spouse;
    2. The will expresses the intention that it is to be effective notwithstanding any subsequent marriage; or
    3. The testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by the testator’s statements or is reasonably inferred from the amount of the transfer or other evidence.
  2. In satisfying the share provided by this section, devises made by the will to the testator’s surviving spouse, if any, are applied first, and other devises, other than a devise to a child of the testator who was born before the testator married the surviving spouse and who is not a child of the surviving spouse or a devise or substitute gift under section 30.1-09-05 or 30.1-09-06 to a descendant of such a child, abate as provided in section 30.1-20-02.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 16; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 5, 27.

Notes to Decisions

Amount of Share of Omitted Spouse.

The amount of an omitted spouse’s share under this section is not limited to the same extent as the amount of the elective share of a spouse under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-05-01; fact that omitted spouse was provided for by transfers outside the will in an amount in excess of one-third of the augmented estate did not, as a matter of law, establish that omitted spouse was not entitled to an intestate share of the estate. In re Estate of Knudsen, 322 N.W.2d 454, 1982 N.D. LEXIS 316 (N.D. 1982).

Intent that a transfer to a spouse outside of the will is in lieu of a testamentary provision may be shown from the amount of the transfer. In re Estate of Knudsen, 342 N.W.2d 387, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 1984).

Devises Made In Anticipation of Marriage.

Where decedent had a new will drawn up in which he left the bulk of his estate to his “wife,” where a footnote appearing in the document indicated that the will was prepared in anticipation of his wedding, and where the decedent died three days before his wedding, the probate court did not err in ruling that the terms “spouse” and “wife” as used and defined in the decedent’s will were descriptive of his fiancee and did not create a condition precedent to her right to receive the devises because the will’s definition of “spouse” and references to the decedent’s fiancee as his “spouse” were descriptive terms that did not create a condition precedent; rather, the footnote evidenced the decedent’s intent that the will be operative before and after the marriage. The district court properly concluded that the fiancee was an unconditional devisee entitled to take under the decedent’s will; the fiancee’s right to the devises to her vested at the decedent’s death. Estate of Paulson v. Risovi, 2012 ND 40, 812 N.W.2d 476, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 40 (N.D. 2012).

Joint Property.

N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-06, which simply provides that validity of a joint account with right of survivorship is not to be determined by requirements for wills, does not preclude consideration of joint bank accounts and certificates of deposits as transfers for purposes of omitted spouse statute. In re Estate of Frandson, 356 N.W.2d 125, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 393 (N.D. 1984).

Transfers Outside Will.

Life insurance benefits and joint tenancy arrangements constitute “transfers” outside the will. In re Estate of Knudsen, 342 N.W.2d 387, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 1984).

30.1-06-02. (2-302) Omitted children.

  1. Except as provided in subsection 2, if a testator fails to provide in the will for any of the testator’s children born or adopted after the execution of the will, the omitted afterborn or after-adopted child receives a share in the estate as follows:
    1. If the testator had no child living when the testator executed the will, an omitted afterborn or after-adopted child receives a share in the estate equal in value to that which the child would have received had the testator died intestate, unless the will devised all or substantially all the estate to the other parent of the omitted child and that other parent survives the testator and is entitled to take under the will.
    2. If the testator had one or more children living when the testator executed the will, and the will devised property or an interest in property to one or more of the then-living children, an omitted afterborn or after-adopted child is entitled to share in the testator’s estate as follows:
      1. The portion of the testator’s estate in which the omitted afterborn or after-adopted child is entitled to share is limited to devises made to the testator’s then-living children under the will.
      2. The omitted afterborn or after-adopted child is entitled to receive the share of the testator’s estate, as limited in paragraph 1, that the child would have received had the testator included all omitted afterborn and after-adopted children with the children to whom devises were made under the will and had given an equal share of the estate to each child.
      3. To the extent feasible, the interest granted an omitted afterborn or after-adopted child under this section must be of the same character, whether equitable or legal, present or future, as that devised to the testator’s then-living children under the will.
      4. In satisfying a share provided by this subdivision, devises to the testator’s children who were living when the will was executed abate ratably. In abating the devises of the then-living children, the court shall preserve to the maximum extent possible the character of the testamentary plan adopted by the testator.
  2. Neither subdivision a nor subdivision b of subsection 1 applies if:
    1. It appears from the will that the omission was intentional; or
    2. The testator provided for the omitted afterborn or after-adopted child by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by the testator’s statements or is reasonably inferred from the amount of the transfer or other evidence.
  3. If at the time of execution of the will the testator fails to provide in the will for a living child solely because the testator believes the child to be dead, the child is entitled to share in the estate as if the child were an omitted afterborn or after-adopted child.
  4. In satisfying a share provided by subdivision a of subsection 1 or subsection 3, devises made by the will abate under section 30.1-20-02.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 16; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 6, 27.

Notes to Decisions

Child Born Before Will Made.

This section, the current pretermitted children statute, did not apply to case where child was born before testator’s will was executed; mere omission of child from the 1987 will was insufficient to raise an inference that child was omitted from testator’s will solely because he believed she was dead. Cates v. Pfeifer, 460 N.W.2d 699 (N.D. 1990).

Conflict with Section 30.1-15-07.

Although N.D.C.C. § 30.1-15-07 generally recognizes mistake, along with several other grounds, as a basis for contesting the validity of a will, this section specifically controls whether the omission of a child from a will was because of mistake or was intentional. Cates v. Pfeifer, 460 N.W.2d 699 (N.D. 1990).

Presumption.

This section has reversed the presumption of unintentional omission on which former N.D.C.C. § 56-04-17 was based, and is based on a presumption that a testator’s failure to provide for a child living at the time the will was executed was intentional. Cates v. Pfeifer, 460 N.W.2d 699 (N.D. 1990).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Parol Testimony Allowed.

Parol testimony was admissible to show that a child omitted from a will was intentionally omitted. Schultz v. Schultz, 19 N.D. 688, 125 N.W. 555, 1910 N.D. LEXIS 28 (N.D. 1910).

Prima Facie Presumption.

The omission to provide for a child or the issue of deceased children in a will merely raised a prima facie presumption that such issue were not intentionally omitted and such presumption was rebuttable by extrinsic evidence. In re Estate of Blank, 219 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 1974), decided prior to the enactment of this section.

Unexplained Omission.

The unexplained omission of a child in a will did not necessarily invalidate instrument, though will could be ineffectual as to such child, and distribution as to him would be uninfluenced by provisions of will. Schultz v. Schultz, 19 N.D. 688, 125 N.W. 555, 1910 N.D. LEXIS 28 (N.D. 1910); Lowery v. Hawker, 22 N.D. 318, 133 N.W. 918, 1911 N.D. LEXIS 54 (N.D. 1911).

The unexplained omission of a child in a will did not necessarily invalidate such instrument, although it could be ineffectual as to such child. Child could appear in probate proceedings and demand distribution of estate which, as to him, would be uninfluenced by the provisions of the will. Lowery v. Hawker, 22 N.D. 318, 133 N.W. 918, 1911 N.D. LEXIS 54 (N.D. 1911).

Collateral References.

Adopted child as subject to protection of statute regarding rights of children pretermitted by will, or statute preventing disinheritance of child, 43 A.L.R.4th 947.

CHAPTER 30.1-07 Exempt Property and Allowances

30.1-07-00.1. (2-401) Applicable law.

This chapter applies to the estate of a decedent who dies domiciled in this state. The rights to homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance for a decedent who dies not domiciled in this state are governed by the law of the decedent’s domicile at death.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 17; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

30.1-07-01. (2-403) Exempt property.

In addition to the homestead defined in section 47-18-01, the decedent’s surviving spouse is entitled from the estate to a value, not exceeding fifteen thousand dollars in excess of any security interests therein, in household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects. If there is no surviving spouse, the decedent’s minor children, whom the decedent was obligated to support and children who were in fact being supported by the decedent, are entitled jointly to the same value. If encumbered chattels are selected and the value in excess of security interests, plus that of other exempt property, is less than fifteen thousand dollars, or if there is not fifteen thousand dollars worth of exempt property in the estate, the spouse or such children are entitled to other assets of the estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up the fifteen thousand dollar value. Rights to exempt property and assets needed to make up a deficiency of exempt property have priority over all claims against the estate, but the right to any assets to make up a deficiency of exempt property abates as necessary to permit earlier payment of the homestead allowance and family allowance. These rights are in addition to any benefit or share passing to the surviving spouse or children by the decedent’s will, unless otherwise provided, by intestate succession, or by way of elective share.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 18; 1995, ch. 322, § 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 16.

Cross-References.

Divorce, annulment, or separation, effect of, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-10-02.

Waiver of rights by surviving spouse, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-05-07.

Notes to Decisions

Disinherited Child.

A child who was specifically disinherited by a will was entitled to exempt property allowance under this section. Cates v. Pfeifer, 460 N.W.2d 699 (N.D. 1990).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Antenuptial Agreement.

A wife’s antenuptial agreement that she should receive out of her husband’s estate, in case of his death prior to hers, the use of the homestead for life and two thousand dollars, and no more, did not deprive her of the statutory exemptions. Herr v. Herr, 45 N.D. 492, 178 N.W. 443, 1920 N.D. LEXIS 155 (N.D. 1920).

An antenuptial agreement to accept a stated sum in lieu of the widow’s property rights or claims did not prevent the widow from claiming exemptions from the husband’s estate, since her right to exemptions was not in the nature of an interest in the property, but was a preferred claim against the estate. Bender v. Bender, 64 N.D. 740, 256 N.W. 222, 1934 N.D. LEXIS 262 (N.D. 1934).

Constitutional Exemption.

Former personal property exemption section was not an exemption statute as the term was used in the constitution. Farmers State Bank v. Smith, 36 N.D. 225, 162 N.W. 302, 1917 N.D. LEXIS 181 (N.D. 1917).

Failure to Appeal.

One who passively permitted the entry of the final decree of distribution without claiming the exemption, or without seeking to set aside the decree or to appeal therefrom, could not thereafter question the validity of the decree on a ground which could have been presented on appeal. Fischer v. Dolwig, 39 N.D. 161, 166 N.W. 793, 1918 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1918).

Inheritance.

Former section was one of exemption, and not of inheritance. Krumenacker v. Andis, 38 N.D. 500, 165 N.W. 524, 1917 N.D. LEXIS 45 (N.D. 1917).

Other Property.

Under C.L. 1913, § 8725, surviving husband or wife of the deceased person or, in case of his or her death, the minor children of a deceased person were entitled to the property absolutely exempt, and other property amounting to fifteen hundred dollars. Woods v. Teeson, 31 N.D. 610, 154 N.W. 797, 1915 N.D. LEXIS 219 (N.D. 1915); Charlson v. Charlson, 48 N.D. 851, 187 N.W. 418, 1922 N.D. LEXIS 107 (N.D. 1922).

Property for Family Use.

Property set apart by probate court for the use of the family of the decedent did not belong to the assets of the estate to be distributed to the heirs of the decedent. FORE v. FORE, 2 N.D. 260, 50 N.W. 712, 1891 N.D. LEXIS 50 (N.D. 1891); Bertsch v. Clooten, 51 N.D. 733, 200 N.W. 904, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1924).

Rent for Devised Land.

A widow was entitled to rent for land devised to her absolutely and utilized for the benefit of the estate. In re Korsmo's Estate, 56 N.D. 927, 220 N.W. 128, 1928 N.D. LEXIS 216 (N.D. 1928).

The sale of exempt property would not be set aside as fraudulent at the instance of a creditor. Dakota Trust Co. v. Headland, 57 N.D. 810, 224 N.W. 220, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 329 (N.D. 1929).

Collateral References.

Foreign state: allowance in state of decedent’s domicil for widow’s or children’s support as enforceable against decedent’s real estate, or proceeds thereof, in another state, 13 A.L.R.2d 973.

Separation agreement as barring right to statutory allowance, 34 A.L.R.2d 1020, 1039.

Extra-judicial separation as affecting surviving spouse’s right to widow’s allowance, 34 A.L.R.2d 1056.

What is included in term “family” or “household” in statutes relating to family allowance or exemption out of decedent’s estate, 88 A.L.R.2d 890.

Amount of allowance from decedent’s estate for widow and family where not fixed by statute, 90 A.L.R.2d 687.

Testamentary gift as affecting widow’s right to fixed stautory allowance or allowance for support, 97 A.L.R.2d 1319.

Previous judgment or agreement for their support, statutory family allowance to minor children as affected by, 6 A.L.R.3d 1387.

Waiver of right to widow’s allowance by post-nuptial agreement, 9 A.L.R.3d 1315, 1319.

Illegitimate child, eligibility to receive family allowance out of estate of his deceased father, 12 A.L.R.3d 1140.

30.1-07-02. (2-404) Family allowance.

  1. In addition to the right to homestead allowance and exempt property, the decedent’s surviving spouse and minor children whom the decedent was obligated to support and children who were in fact being supported by the decedent are entitled to a reasonable allowance in money out of the estate for their maintenance during the period of administration, which allowance may not continue for longer than one year if the estate is inadequate to discharge allowed claims. The allowance may be paid as a lump sum or in periodic installments. It is payable to the surviving spouse, if living, for the use of the surviving spouse and minor and dependent children; otherwise to the children, or persons having their care and custody. If a minor child or dependent child is not living with the surviving spouse, the allowance may be made partially to the child or the child’s guardian or other person having the child’s care and custody, and partially to the spouse, as their needs may appear. The family allowance is exempt from and has priority over all claims except the homestead allowance.
  2. The family allowance is not chargeable against any benefit or share passing to the surviving spouse or children by the will of the decedent, unless otherwise provided, by intestate succession or by way of elective share. The death of any person entitled to family allowance terminates the right to allowances not yet paid.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 19; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Cross-References.

Wages paid by employer to surviving spouse, see N.D.C.C. § 34-01-12.

Waiver of rights by surviving spouse, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-05-07.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Analysis

Court Discretion.

The county court, in its discretion, could make, by its order, an additional allowance for the maintenance of the family, though such order allowed a claim against the estate after the time for filing claims had expired. Tyvand v. McDonnell, 37 N.D. 251, 164 N.W. 1, 1917 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1917).

Validity of Decree.

One who passively permitted the entry of the final decree of distribution without claiming the exemption, or without seeking to set aside the decree or appeal therefrom, could not thereafter question the validity of the decree on a ground which could have been presented on appeal. Fischer v. Dolwig, 39 N.D. 161, 166 N.W. 793, 1918 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1918).

30.1-07-03. (2-405) Source, determination, and documentation.

  1. If the estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically devised may not be used to satisfy rights to exempt property. Subject to this restriction, the surviving spouse, guardians of minor children, or children who are adults may select property of the estate as exempt property. The personal representative may make those selections if the surviving spouse, the children, or the guardians of the minor children are unable or fail to do so within a reasonable time, or there is no guardian of a minor child. The personal representative may execute an instrument or deed of distribution to establish the ownership of property taken as exempt property. The personal representative may determine the family allowance in a lump sum not exceeding twenty-seven thousand dollars or periodic installments not exceeding two thousand two hundred fifty dollars per month for one year and may disburse funds of the estate in payment of the family allowance. The personal representative or any interested person aggrieved by any selection, determination, payment, proposed payment, or failure to act under this section may petition the court for appropriate relief, which may include a family allowance other than that which the personal representative determined or could have determined.
  2. If the right to an elective share is exercised on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person, the personal representative may add any unexpended portions payable under the homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance to the trust established under subsection 2 of section 30.1-05-06.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 20; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 7, 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 17.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Analysis

County Court Jurisdiction.

The county court had jurisdiction on proper petition to hear objections to inventory and appraisement and to issue its order allowing the same. In re Estate of Kaspari, 71 N.W.2d 558, 1955 N.D. LEXIS 123 (N.D. 1955).

Setting Aside Homestead.

A proceeding to have a homestead set aside was properly brought under section 30-16-05 and former section 30-16-07, and not under section 47-18-06. Farmers' State Bank v. Bartley, 53 N.D. 376, 206 N.W. 414, 1925 N.D. LEXIS 97 (N.D. 1925).

CHAPTER 30.1-08 Wills

30.1-08-01. (2-501) Who may make a will.

Any adult who is of sound mind may make a will.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Insane Delusions.

To defeat a will on the ground that the testator lacked soundness of mind due to an insane delusion, it must be established that the testator was possessed of a delusion that had no basis in fact or probability and was wholly the product of the imagination, that the will was the product of that delusion, and that the testator devised his property in a way, except for that delusion, he would not have done. In re Estate of Koch, 259 N.W.2d 655, 1977 N.D. LEXIS 200 (N.D. 1977).

Testamentary Capacity.
—Alcohol Consumption.

Frequent drinking is not proof of a lack of testamentary capacity absent evidence of alcohol consumption at the time of the signing. In re Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1991).

—Inquiry.

The critical inquiry in determining testamentary capacity is directed to the condition of mind of the testator at the very time he signed the will. In re Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1991).

—Presumption.

Testamentary capacity is presumed, and the burden of proving the lack thereof is upon the contestant to the will. In re Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1991).

—Standard of Proof.

Like undue influence, a will contest must prove testamentary incapacity by a preponderance of the evidence. Berquist v. Keller (In re Estate of Wagner), 551 N.W.2d 292, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 166 (N.D. 1996).

Undue Influence.

Elements necessary to invalidate a will on the basis of undue influence are that the testator was subject to such influence, the opportunity to exercise it existed, there was a disposition to exercise it, and that the result appears to be the effect of such influence; to be undue, the influence must operate at the time the will is made and must dominate and control the making of the will so as to make the will express the purpose and intent of the person exercising the influence and not the purpose and intent of the testator. Okken v. Okken Estate, 348 N.W.2d 447, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 297 (N.D. 1984).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Eighteen Years of Age.

There was no statutory requirement for capacity to make a will other than that testator must have been a person eighteen years of age or older. Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 1954 N.D. LEXIS 94 (N.D. 1954).

A person who had reached the age of eighteen years could make a will disposing of all or any part of his estate. Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 1954 N.D. LEXIS 94 (N.D. 1954).

Collateral References.

Admissibility, on issue of testamentary capacity, of previously executed wills, 89 A.L.R.2d 177.

Guardianship of adult as affecting testamentary capacity, 89 A.L.R.2d 1120.

Intoxicating liquor or drugs, testamentary capacity as affected by use of, 9 A.L.R.3d 15.

Laying foundation: necessity of laying foundation for opinion of attesting witness as to mental condition of testator or testatrix, 17 A.L.R.3d 503.

Ignorance: testator’s illiteracy or lack of knowledge of language in which will is written as affecting its validity, 37 A.L.R.3d 889.

Partial invalidity of will: may parts of will be upheld notwithstanding failure of other parts for lack of testamentary mental capacity or undue influence, 64 A.L.R.3d 261.

Alzheimer’s disease as affecting testamentary capacity, 47 A.L.R.5th 523.

30.1-08-02. (2-502) Execution — Witnessed wills — Holographic wills.

  1. Except as provided in subsection 2 and in sections 30.1-08-06 and 30.1-08-13, a will must be:
    1. In writing.
    2. Signed by the testator or in the testator’s name by some other individual in the testator’s conscious presence and by the testator’s direction.
    3. Either signed:
      1. By at least two individuals, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after witnessing either the signing of the will as described in subdivision b or the testator’s acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will; or
      2. Acknowledged by the testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments.
  2. A will that does not comply with subsection 1 is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator’s handwriting.
  3. Intent that a document constitute the testator’s will can be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of the document that are not in the testator’s handwriting.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 21; 1995, ch. 322, § 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 18.

Notes to Decisions

Application.

This section is not applicable to an instrument attempting to be established as a will where the execution and death of the maker of the instrument occur prior to the effective date of this section. Kuhn v. Kuhn, 281 N.W.2d 230, 1979 N.D. LEXIS 270 (N.D. 1979).

It was no error to probate a decedent’s will because the decedent signed the will in the presence of two witnesses, who signed the will in the decedent’s presence, and all three signatures were notarized. Nordahl v. Jensen (In re Estate of Blikre), 2019 ND 257, 934 N.W.2d 867, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 267 (N.D. 2019).

It was no error to deny probate of a decedent’s alleged holographic will because the decedent’s handwritten documents were not such a will, as the documents (1) lacked testamentary intent, (2) did not specify whether items were to be distributed between sisters and nieces, (3) did not explicitly devise anything to anyone, and (4) were not signed by the decedent. Nordahl v. Jensen (In re Estate of Blikre), 2019 ND 257, 934 N.W.2d 867, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 267 (N.D. 2019).

Attestation Clause.
—Presumption.

Recitals in an attestation clause of a will are presumed to be true and can be used to establish due execution, unless the presumption of truth is overcome by clear and convincing evidence. In re Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1991) (decided under former section 56-03-02).

The presumption of due execution created by the attestation clause of the will offered for probate must be overcome by clear and convincing evidence for individual challenging the will to prevail. In re Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1991) (decided under former section 56-03-02).

Evidence.

District court did not err in determining appellant will proponent presented evidence strong enough to establish a prima facie case of due execution of decedent’s will in accordance with the requirements of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-08-02, because the court relied upon the notes of the deceased attorney who drafted the will, the deposition testimony of the attorney’s secretary, and the testimony of a witness who saw the signed will. In re Estate of Clemetson v. Evanson, 2012 ND 28, 812 N.W.2d 388, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 25 (N.D. 2012).

Publication.

Publication of will is not required to make the will valid. In re Estate of Polda, 349 N.W.2d 11, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 287 (N.D. 1984).

Signed by Two Individuals.

Codicil was invalid even though two persons were present at the signing of the codicil where the second witness did not sign the codicil as required by law. Hoffart v. Voeller (In re Estate of Voeller), 534 N.W.2d 24, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 110 (N.D. 1995).

Testator’s Handwriting.

Order denying the brother’s petition for formal probate of a holographic will was proper because the district court did not clearly err in finding that the material portions of the purported holographic will were not in the testator’s handwriting. Beach v. Burris (Estate of Beach), 2022 ND 13, 969 N.W.2d 198, 2022 N.D. LEXIS 11 (N.D. 2022).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Burden of Proof.

Burden of proof was on one who offered a will for probate to establish execution of will in manner prescribed by statute. Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 1954 N.D. LEXIS 94 (N.D. 1954).

Compliance with Statutory Requirements.

Testamentary disposition of property of decedent was subject absolutely to control of governing statute, and failure to comply with statutory mandate concerning execution of a will was fatal to its validity. McKee v. Buck, 72 N.D. 86, 4 N.W.2d 652, 1942 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1942); Knudsen v. Lyons, 79 N.D. 595, 58 N.W.2d 845 (1953).

Written instrument which made a testamentary disposition of real property that was not entirely written, dated, and signed by hand of purported testator had to be executed and attested in manner prescribed by former section. Johnson v. Weldy, 79 N.D. 80, 54 N.W.2d 829, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 100 (N.D. 1952).

A testator had to comply with all the formalities required by statute in the execution and attesting of a will or the will was not valid. In re Baur's Estate, 79 N.D. 113, 54 N.W.2d 891, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 103 (N.D. 1952).

No will was valid unless executed according to the provisions of the laws of North Dakota or according to the law of the place in which it was made, or in which the testator at the time was domiciled. Knudsen v. Lyons, 79 N.D. 595, 58 N.W.2d 845 (1953).

Date.

Instrument sought to be probated as a holographic will had to be dated by testator himself. Montague v. Street, 59 N.D. 618, 231 N.W. 728, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 181 (N.D. 1930).

A holographic will was not dated as required by former statute, unless it showed the day, month, and year when executed. Montague v. Street, 59 N.D. 618, 231 N.W. 728, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 181 (N.D. 1930).

Defective Petition to Probate.

A petition to probate a will was fatally defective where it failed to show that document presented had been executed and subscribed by testator himself or some person in his presence and by his direction. Knudsen v. Lyons, 79 N.D. 595, 58 N.W.2d 845 (1953).

Jury Question.

Whether or not will was witnessed in the presence of testatrix was jury question. Ostlund v. Ecklund, 45 N.D. 76, 176 N.W. 350, 1920 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1920).

Mark As Signature.

A mark made by one intending by making it to execute a will, witnessed as provided in former statute, was sufficient to comply with requirements of statute. McKee v. Buck, 72 N.D. 86, 4 N.W.2d 652, 1942 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1942); Whelan v. Burris, 72 N.W.2d 884, 1955 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1955).

Place of Residence.

Former law requiring a witness to write his place of residence with his name was directory, and failure of witness to write his place of residence did not invalidate a will that had been otherwise validly executed and attested. Hutchinson v. Charles, 75 N.W.2d 313 (1956).

The validity of the execution of a will was not dependent upon the former requirement that each witness write with his name his place of residence when the will had already been otherwise validly executed and attested. Hutchinson v. Charles, 75 N.W.2d 313 (1956).

Proper Execution.

Where a will was subscribed in presence of attesting witnesses or acknowledged by testator to them to have been made by him or by his authority, testator at time declaring to attesting witnesses that instrument was his will and witnesses signing in his presence and at his request, it was properly executed under former section. Ouren v. Friswold, 55 N.D. 664, 215 N.W. 160, 1927 N.D. LEXIS 151 (N.D. 1927).

Subscribing Testator’s Name.

Person subscribing testator’s name to a will, who also signed as an attesting witness, was not required to state on instrument that he wrote testator’s name, since such fact could be shown on proof of the signature. In re Starke's Estate, 67 N.D. 178, 271 N.W. 131, 1937 N.D. LEXIS 72 (N.D. 1937).

Where name of testator was subscribed to will by another person as prescribed by former statute, signature to the will was sufficient. In re Starke's Estate, 67 N.D. 178, 271 N.W. 131, 1937 N.D. LEXIS 72 (N.D. 1937).

Where testator subscribed will in the presence of one attesting witness and acknowledged to other attesting witness that he signed will, attestation was sufficient. Collins v. Stroup, 71 N.D. 679, 3 N.W.2d 742, 1942 N.D. LEXIS 103 (N.D. 1942).

An attesting witness need not have been present when testator subscribed his name to a will. Collins v. Stroup, 71 N.D. 679, 3 N.W.2d 742, 1942 N.D. LEXIS 103 (N.D. 1942).

Collateral References.

Place of signature of holographic wills, 19 A.L.R.2d 926.

Codicil as validating will or codicil which was invalid or inoperative at time of its purported execution due to omission of signature, 21 A.L.R.2d 821, 829.

Validity of will written on disconnected sheets, 38 A.L.R.2d 477.

Signature on informal testamentary letter, 40 A.L.R.2d 736.

Presumption or inference of due execution of will, weight and effect of, 40 A.L.R.2d 1223.

“Attestation” or “witnessing” of will, required by statute, as including witnesses’ subscription, 45 A.L.R.2d 1365.

Sufficiency of publication of will, 60 A.L.R.2d 124.

Observation: effect of failure of attesting witness to observe testator’s capacity, 69 A.L.R.2d 662.

Fingerprints as signature, 72 A.L.R.2d 1267, 1267.

Presence of the testator in the witnessing of his will, what constitutes, 75 A.L.R.2d 318.

Signature to holographic will, sufficiency as to form of, 75 A.L.R.2d 895.

Validity of will as affected by fact that witness signed before testator, 91 A.L.R.2d 737.

Assistance: validity of will signed by testator with the assistance of another, 98 A.L.R.2d 824.

Mark, stamp, or symbol, or partial or abbreviated signature, validity of wills signed by, 98 A.L.R.2d 841.

Sufficiency of testator’s acknowledgment of signature from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances, 7 A.L.R.3d 317.

Place of signature of attesting witnesses, 17 A.L.R.3d 705.

Date: use of figures wholly or in part to express date of holographic will as reflecting its sufficiency, 22 A.L.R.3d 866.

Intention to make more formal will, further disposition of property, or the like, effect upon testamentary nature of document of expression therein of, 46 A.L.R.3d 938.

Revocation of witnessed will by holographic will or codicil where statute requires revocation by instrument of equal formality as will, 49 A.L.R.3d 1223.

Requirement that holographic will, or its material provisions, be entirely in testator’s handwriting as affected by appearance of some printed or written matter not in testator’s handwriting, 37 A.L.R.4th 528.

Electronic tape recording as will, 42 A.L.R.4th 176.

Proper execution of self-proving affidavit as validating or otherwise curing defect in execution of will itself, 1 A.L.R.5th 965.

30.1-08-03. Holographic will. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 50.

30.1-08-04. (2-504) Self-proved will.

  1. A will that is executed with attesting witnesses may be simultaneously executed, attested, and made self-proved, by acknowledgment thereof by the testator and affidavits of the witnesses, each made before an officer authorized to administer oaths under the laws of the state in which execution occurs and evidenced by the officer’s certificate, under official seal, attached or annexed to the will in substantially the following form:
  2. A will that is executed with attesting witnesses may at any time after its execution be made self-proved, by the acknowledgment thereof by the testator and the affidavits of the witnesses, each made before an officer authorized to administer oaths under the laws of the state in which the acknowledgment occurs and evidenced by the officer’s certificate, under the official seal, attached or annexed to the will in substantially the following form:
  3. A signature affixed to a self-proving affidavit attached to a will is considered a signature affixed to the will, if necessary to prove the will’s due execution.

STATE OF COUNTY OF I, , the testator, sign my name to this instrument this day of , , and being first sworn, declare to the undersigned authority that I sign and execute this instrument as my will and that I sign it willingly or willingly direct another to sign for me, that I execute it as my free and voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed, and that I am 18 years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no constraint or undue influence. Testator We, , , the witnesses, sign our names to this instrument, and being first sworn, declare to the undersigned authority that the testator signs and executes this instrument as the testator’s will and that the testator signs it willingly or willingly directs another to sign for the testator, and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the testator, signs this will as witness to the testator’s signing, and that to the best of our knowledge the testator is 18 years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no constraint or undue influence. Witness Witness Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me by , the testator, and subscribed and sworn to before me by and , witnesses, this day of . (Signed) (SEAL) (Official capacity of officer)

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STATE OF COUNTY OF We, , , and , the testator and the witnesses, respectively, whose names are signed to the attached or foregoing instrument, being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that the testator signed and executed the instrument as the testator’s will and that the testator had signed willingly or willingly directed another to sign for the testator, and that the testator executed it as the testator’s free and voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed; and that each of the witnesses, in the presence and hearing of the testator, signed the will as witness and that to the best of our knowledge the testator was at that time 18 years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no constraint or undue influence. Testator Witness Witness Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me by , the testator, and subscribed and sworn to before me by and , witnesses, this day of , . (Signed) (SEAL) (Official capacity of officer)

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Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, § 8; 1993, ch. 334, § 22; 1995, ch. 322, § 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 19.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Attestation.

Term “attest” as applied to wills meant act of witnessing performance of statutory requirements as to valid execution of will and doing things that statute required witness to do as a part of attestation. Hutchinson v. Charles, 75 N.W.2d 313 (1956).

Collateral References.

Proper execution of self-proving affidavit as validating or otherwise curing defect in execution of will itself, 1 A.L.R.5th 965.

30.1-08-05. (2-505) Who may witness.

  1. Any person generally competent to be a witness may act as a witness to a will.
  2. A will or any provision thereof is not invalid because the will is signed by an interested witness.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Gifts to Witnesses.

Former section voiding gift to witness applied only to subscribing witnesses to a will. Keller v. Reichert, 49 N.D. 74, 189 N.W. 690, 1922 N.D. LEXIS 11 (N.D. 1922).

Collateral References.

Executor: competency of named executor as subscribing witness to will, 74 A.L.R.2d 283.

Attorney: competency, as witness attesting will, of attorney named therein as executor’s attorney, 30 A.L.R.3d 1361.

30.1-08-06. (2-506) Choice of law as to execution.

A written will is valid if executed in compliance with section 30.1-08-02 or if its execution complies with the law at the time of execution of the place where the will is executed, or of the law of the place where at the time of execution or at the time of death the testator is domiciled, has a place of abode, or is a national.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 23; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Notes to Decisions

Application of Uniform Probate Code.

Before the Uniform Probate Code provisions apply to a will executed before the effective date of such code, the will must have been validly executed; such validity is determined by the law that existed at the time of the will’s execution. In re Estate of Thomas, 290 N.W.2d 223, 1980 N.D. LEXIS 196 (N.D. 1980).

What Law Controls.

The law in effect at the time of execution is controlling in regard to the formal validity of a will. In re Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1991).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Proof of Execution.

Proof of due execution was fulfilled under N.D.C.C. § 56-03-02, since repealed, by the affidavit establishing the signatures of two of the attesting witnesses which, with the attestation clause, raised a presumption of due execution. In re Estate of Papineau, 396 N.W.2d 735, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 442 (N.D. 1986).

Unless overcome by clear and convincing testimony, the recitals in the attestation clause of the will are presumed to be true and establish that the will was duly executed in accordance with the requirements of N.D.C.C. § 56-03-02 as that statute, since repealed, existed at the time the will was executed. In re Estate of Papineau, 396 N.W.2d 735, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 442 (N.D. 1986).

30.1-08-07. (2-507) Revocation by writing or by act.

  1. A will or any part thereof is revoked:
    1. By executing a subsequent will that revokes the previous will or part expressly or by inconsistency; or
    2. By performing a revocatory act on the will, if the testator performed the act with the intent and for the purpose of revoking the will or part or if another individual performed the act in the testator’s conscious presence and by the testator’s direction. For purposes of this subdivision, “revocatory act on the will” includes burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will or any part of it. A burning, tearing, or canceling is a “revocatory act on the will”, whether or not the burn, tear, or cancellation touched any of the words on the will.
  2. If a subsequent will does not expressly revoke a previous will, the execution of the subsequent will wholly revokes the previous will by inconsistency if the testator intended the subsequent will to replace rather than supplement the previous will.
  3. The testator is presumed to have intended a subsequent will to replace rather than supplement a previous will if the subsequent will makes a complete disposition of the testator’s estate. If this presumption arises and is not rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, the previous will is revoked; only the subsequent will is operative on the testator’s death.
  4. The testator is presumed to have intended a subsequent will to supplement rather than replace a previous will if the subsequent will does not make a complete disposition of the testator’s estate. If this presumption arises and is not rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, the subsequent will revokes the previous will only to the extent the subsequent will is inconsistent with the previous will; each will is fully operative on the testator’s death to the extent they are not inconsistent.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 24; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Notes to Decisions

Animo Revocandi Presumption.

District court erred in finding that the testator’s missing will was not presumed to be revoked, because while N.D.C.C. § 30.1-08-07 did not speak to admitting a lost will and neither N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-14-03 nor 30.1-15-02 provided specific presumptions for admitting a missing will, the drafter’s of the Uniform Probate Code did contemplate the probate of lost wills, and the district court erroneously failed to apply the common law animo revocandi presumption that a missing will was revoked; if a will could not be found upon the death of the testator, the presumption arose that the testator revoked the missing will, and under N.D.R.Ev. 301(a), the party seeking to probate the missing will must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the testator did not destroy or revoke the missing will animo revocandi. York v. Conley (In re Estate of Conley), 2008 ND 148, 753 N.W.2d 384, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 2008).

Destruction of Copy.

While the destruction of an executed duplicate will may operate to revoke the original will, the destruction of an unexecuted or conformed copy is ineffectual as an act of revocation regardless of the testator’s intent. In re Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1991).

Destruction of Original.

Our statute requires that the original will be destroyed to effectuate revocation and does not provide for revocation by destruction of a copy. In re Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1991).

Mutilation of Will.

Under subsection (2) (now (1)(b)) of this section, revocation can only be accomplished when a physical mutilation of the will is coupled with the intent and for the purpose of revocation. Thus, regardless of the testator’s intent, a revocation is not effectuated unless there has been a mutilation of the will. In re Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1991).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

New Disposition.

There was no “new disposition” within meaning of former section where name of one of two joint devisees had been obliterated and remaining devisee was named executrix, no new provisions being added. In re Estate of Bogner, 184 N.W.2d 718, 1971 N.D. LEXIS 160 (N.D. 1971).

Obliteration.

Obliteration, as used in former section, was an erasure or a blotting out of words with intent and for purpose of revoking those portions of will so obliterated; drawing lines through name of devisee and alternate executor constituted obliteration. In re Estate of Bogner, 184 N.W.2d 718, 1971 N.D. LEXIS 160 (N.D. 1971).

Obliteration of will was presumed to have been effected by testator where will had been in his custody, and was found after his death among his personal effects, and fell within any of the statutorily prescribed modes of revocation. In re Estate of Bogner, 184 N.W.2d 718, 1971 N.D. LEXIS 160 (N.D. 1971).

Testator’s partial revocation was valid where he evidenced intention to exclude daughter’s ex-husband by obliterating latter’s name wherever it appeared as devisee or executor, daughter already having been named joint devisee and executrix. In re Estate of Bogner, 184 N.W.2d 718, 1971 N.D. LEXIS 160 (N.D. 1971).

Proof.

Although proof of intent to revoke portion of will could be assumed from fact of obliteration, it was proper to show other facts and circumstances, including declarations of testator indicating an intent to revoke; failure to receive and consider such evidence would have been a dereliction of court’s duty. In re Estate of Bogner, 184 N.W.2d 718, 1971 N.D. LEXIS 160 (N.D. 1971).

Collateral References.

Duplicate copies: destruction or cancellation of one copy of will executed in duplicate as revocation of other copy, 17 A.L.R.2d 805.

Effect of testator’s attempted physical alteration of will after execution, 24 A.L.R.2d 514, 554.

Doctrine of dependent relative revocation in case of attempted physical alteration of will, 24 A.L.R.2d 514, 554.

Revocation as affected by invalidity of some or all of the dispositive provisions of later will, 28 A.L.R.2d 526.

Oral promise or agreement not to revoke will, validity of, 29 A.L.R.2d 1229.

Informal testamentary letter, revocation of will by, 40 A.L.R.2d 736.

Implied revocation of will by later will, 59 A.L.R.2d 11.

Revocation of will as affecting codicil and vice versa, 7 A.L.R.3d 1143.

Nontestamentary writing, revocation of will by, 22 A.L.R.3d 1346.

Declarations: admissibility of testator’s declarations on issue of revocation of will, in his possession at time of his death, by mutilation, alteration, or cancellation, 28 A.L.R.3d 994.

Holographic will: revocation of witnessed will by holographic will or codicil where statute requires revocation by instrument of equal formality as will, 49 A.L.R.3d 1223.

Loss: testator’s failure to make new will, following loss of original will by fire, theft, or similar casualty, as constituting revocation of original will, 61 A.L.R.3d 958.

Sufficiency of evidence of nonrevocation of lost will not shown to have been inaccessible to testator — modern cases, 70 A.L.R.4th 323.

Ademption or revocation of specific devise or bequest by guardian, committee, conservator, or trustee of mentally or physically incompetent testator, 84 A.L.R.4th 462.

Sufficiency of evidence of nonrevocation of lost will where codicil survives, 84 A.L.R.4th 531.

30.1-08-08. (2-508) Revocation by change of circumstances.

Except as provided in sections 30.1-10-03 and 30.1-10-04, a change of circumstances does not revoke a will or any part of it.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 25; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

30.1-08-09. (2-509) Revival of revoked will.

  1. If a subsequent will that wholly revoked a previous will is thereafter revoked by a revocatory act under subdivision b of subsection 1 of section 30.1-08-07, the previous will remains revoked unless it is revived. The previous will is revived if it is evident from the circumstances of the revocation of the subsequent will or from the testator’s contemporary or subsequent declarations that the testator intended the previous will to take effect as executed.
  2. If a subsequent will that partly revoked a previous will is thereafter revoked by a revocatory act under subdivision b of subsection 1 of section 30.1-08-07, a revoked part of the previous will is revived unless it is evident from the circumstances of the revocation of the subsequent will or from the testator’s contemporary or subsequent declarations that the testator did not intend the revoked part to take effect as executed.
  3. If a subsequent will that revoked a previous will in whole or in part is thereafter revoked by another, later, will, the previous will remains revoked in whole or in part, unless it or its revoked part is revived. The previous will or its revoked part is revived to the extent it appears from the terms of the later will that the testator intended the previous will to take effect.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 26; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Collateral References.

Codicil as reviving revoked will or codicil, 33 A.L.R.2d 922.

30.1-08-10. (2-510) Incorporation by reference.

Any writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Extrinsic document not in existence at date of will, incorporation in will of, 3 A.L.R.2d 682.

“Pour-over” provisions from will to inter vivos trust, 12 A.L.R.3d 56.

30.1-08-11. (2-511) Testamentary additions to trusts.

  1. A will may validly devise property to the trustee of a trust established or to be established during the testator’s lifetime by the testator, by the testator and some other person, or by some other person including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the trustor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance contracts, or at the testator’s death by the testator’s devise to the trustee, if the trust is identified in the testator’s will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will, executed before, or concurrently with, or after the execution of the testator’s will or in another individual’s will if that other individual has predeceased the testator, regardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust. The devise is not invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or because the trust was amended after the execution of the will or the testator’s death.
  2. Unless the testator’s will provides otherwise, property devised to a trust described in subsection 1:
    1. Is not held under a testamentary trust of the testator but becomes a part of the trust to which it is devised.
    2. Must be administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the governing instrument setting forth the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before or after the testator’s death.
  3. Unless the testator’s will provides otherwise, a revocation or termination of the trust before the testator’s death causes the devise to lapse.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 27; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Collateral References.

“Pour-over” provisions from will to inter vivos trust, 12 A.L.R.3d 56.

Comparative Legislation.

Jurisdictions which have enacted the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act include:

Alaska Stat. § 13.11.200.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-2511.

Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-27-101 to 28-27-105.

Cal. Prob. Code §§ 6300 to 6303.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-11-511.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-260.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 211.

D.C. Code Ann. § 18-306.

Fla. Stat. § 732.513.

Ga. Code §§ 53-12-70 to 53-12-74.

Guam Civ. Code tit. 15, §§ 701 to 707.

Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 560:2-511.

Idaho Code § 15-2-511.

Ill. 775 ILCS -4.

Ind. Code § 29-1-5-9.

Iowa Code §§ 633.275 to 633.277.

Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-3101 to 59-3105.

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 394.075.

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, § 2-511.

Md. Est. & Trusts Code Ann. §§ 4-411, 4-412.

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 203, § 3B.

Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 555.461 to 555.464.

Minn. Stat. § 525.223.

Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-11.

Mont. Code Ann. § 72-2-531.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2336.

Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 163.220 to 163.250.

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 563-A:1 to 563-A:4.

N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 3B:4-1 to 3B:4-6.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-511.

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 3-3.7.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-47.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2107.63.

Okla. Stat. tit. 84, §§ 301 to 304.

Or. Rev. Stat. § 112.265.

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 2515.

S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-510.

S.D. Cod. Laws §§ 29-2-18 to 29-2-23.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-3-106.

Tex. Probate Code Ann. § 58a.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-511.

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 2329.

Wash. Rev. Code § 11.12.250.

W. Va. Code §§ 41-3-8 to 41-3-11.

Wyo. Stat. § 2-6-103.

30.1-08-12. (2-512) Events of independent significance.

A will may dispose of property by reference to acts and events which have significance apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by the will, whether they occur before or after the execution of the will or before or after the testator’s death. The execution or revocation of a will of another person is such an event.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-08-13. (2-513) Separate writing identifying devise of certain types of tangible personal property.

Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing must be signed by the testator and must describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator’s death, it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will, it may be altered by the testator after its preparation, and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 28; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

CHAPTER 30.1-08.1 Ante-mortem Probate of Wills

30.1-08.1-01. Declaratory judgment.

Any person who executes a will disposing of the person’s estate in accordance with this title may institute a proceeding under chapter 32-23 for a judgment declaring the validity of the will as to the signature on the will, the required number of witnesses to the signature and their signatures, and the testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence of the person executing the will.

Source: S.L. 1977, ch. 296, § 2.

30.1-08.1-02. Parties — Process.

Any beneficiary named in the will and all the testator’s present intestate successors shall be named parties to the proceeding. For the purposes of this chapter, any beneficiary named in the will and all the testator’s present intestate successors shall be deemed possessed of inchoate property rights.

Service of process upon the parties to the proceeding shall be made in accordance with rule 4 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.

Source: S.L. 1977, ch. 296, § 3.

30.1-08.1-03. Finding of validity — Revocation.

If the court finds under chapter 32-23 that the will has been properly executed and that the plaintiff testator has the requisite testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence, it shall declare the will valid and order it placed on file with the court. For the purposes of section 30.1-12-02, a finding of validity under this chapter shall constitute an adjudication of probate. The will shall be binding in North Dakota unless and until the plaintiff-testator executes a new will and institutes a new proceeding under this chapter naming the appropriate parties to the new proceeding as well as the parties to any former proceeding brought under this chapter.

Source: S.L. 1977, ch 296, § 4.

Collateral References.

Sufficiency of provision for, or reference to, prospective spouse to avoid lapse or revocation of will by subsequent marriage, 38 A.L.R.4th 117.

30.1-08.1-04. Admissibility of facts — Effect on other actions.

The facts found in a proceeding brought under this chapter shall not be admissible in evidence in any proceeding other than one brought in North Dakota to determine the validity of a will; nor shall the determination in a proceeding under this chapter be binding, upon the parties to such proceeding, in any action not brought to determine the validity of a will.

Source: S.L. 1977, ch. 296, § 5.

CHAPTER 30.1-08.2 International Wills

30.1-08.2-01. (2-1001) Definitions.

In this chapter:

  1. “Authorized person” and “person authorized to act in connection with international wills” mean a person who by section 30.1-08.2-08, or by the laws of the United States, including members of the diplomatic and consular service of the United States designated by foreign service regulations, is empowered to supervise the execution of international wills.
  2. “International will” means a will executed in conformity with sections 30.1-08.2-02 through 30.1-08.2-05.

Source: S.L. 1979, ch. 376, § 1.

Comparative Legislation.

For jurisdictions which have enacted the Uniform Probate Code, including the Uniform International Wills Act, see the Comparative Legislation Note appearing under § 30.1-01-01, supra.

Jurisdictions enacting the Uniform International Wills Act, without adopting the Uniform Probate Code, include:

Cal. Prob. Code §§ 6380 to 6390.

Conn. §§ 50a-1 to 50a-9.

Ill. 755 ILCS 10/1 to 755 ILCS 10/10.

Or. Rev. Stat. § 112.232.

30.1-08.2-02. (2-1002) International will — Validity.

  1. A will is valid in form, irrespective of the place where it is made, of the location of the assets and of the nationality, domicile, or residence of the testator, if it is made in the form of an international will complying with the requirements of this chapter.
  2. The invalidity of the will as an international will does not affect its formal validity as a will of another kind.
  3. This chapter does not apply to the form of testamentary dispositions made by two or more persons in one instrument.

Source: S.L. 1979, ch. 376, § 2.

30.1-08.2-03. (2-1003) International will — Requirements.

  1. The will must be made in writing. It need not be written by the testator personally. It may be written in any language, by hand or by any other means.
  2. The testator shall declare in the presence of two witnesses and of a person authorized to act in connection with international wills that the document is the testator’s will and that the testator knows the contents thereof. The testator need not inform the witnesses, or the authorized person, of the contents of the will.
  3. In the presence of the witnesses, and of the authorized person, the testator shall sign the will or, if the testator has previously signed it, shall acknowledge that signature.
  4. If the testator is unable to sign, the absence of the testator’s signature does not affect the validity of the international will if the testator indicates the reason for the testator’s inability to sign and the authorized person makes note thereof on the will. In that case, it is permissible for any other person present, including the authorized person or one of the witnesses, at the direction of the testator, to sign the testator’s name if the authorized person makes note of this on the will, but it is not required that any person sign the testator’s name for the testator.
  5. The witnesses and the authorized person shall there and then attest the will by signing in the presence of the testator.

Source: S.L. 1979, ch. 376, § 3.

30.1-08.2-04. (2-1004) International wills — Other points of form.

  1. The signatures must be placed at the end of the will. If the will consists of several sheets, each sheet must be signed by the testator or, if the testator is unable to sign, by the person signing on the testator’s behalf or, if there is no such person, by the authorized person. In addition, each sheet must be numbered.
  2. The date of the will must be the date of its signature by the authorized person. That date must be noted at the end of the will by the authorized person.
  3. The authorized person shall ask whether the testator wishes to make a declaration concerning the safekeeping of the testator’s will. If so and at the express request of the testator, the place where the testator intends to have the testator’s will kept must be mentioned in the certificate provided for in section 30.1-08.2-05.
  4. A will executed in compliance with section 30.1-08.2-03 is not invalid merely because it does not comply with this section.

Source: S.L. 1979, ch. 376, § 4.

30.1-08.2-05. (2-1005) International will — Certificate.

The authorized person shall attach to the will a certificate to be signed by the authorized person establishing that the requirements of this chapter for valid execution of an international will have been fulfilled. The authorized person shall keep a copy of the certificate and deliver another to the testator. The certificate must be substantially in the following form:

CERTIFICATE I, (name, address, and capacity), a person authorized to act in connection with international wills, certify that on (date) at (place) (name, address, date and place of birth of testator) in my presence and that of the witnesses (name, address, date and place of birth of first witness) and (name, address, date and place of birth of second witness) has declared that the attached document is the testator’s will and that the testator knows the contents thereof. I further certify that in my presence and in that of the witnesses the testator has signed the will or has acknowledged the testator’s signature previously affixed or that following a declaration of the testator stating that the testator was unable to sign the will for the following reason , I have mentioned this declaration on the will, and the signature has been affixed by (name and address). I further certify that the witnesses and I have signed the will; each page of the will has been signed by and numbered [to be completed if appropriate]; I have satisfied myself as to the identity of the testator and of the witnesses as designated above; the witnesses met the conditions requisite to act as such according to the law under which I am acting; the testator has requested me to include the following statement concerning the safekeeping of the testator’s will [to be completed if appropriate]: . (Place of execution) (Date) (Signature)

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Source: S.L. 1979, ch. 376, § 5.

30.1-08.2-06. (2-1006) International will — Effect of certificate.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the certificate of the authorized person is conclusive of the formal validity of the instrument as a will under this chapter. The absence or irregularity of a certificate does not affect the formal validity of a will under this chapter.

Source: S.L. 1979, ch. 376, § 6.

30.1-08.2-07. (2-1007) International will — Revocation.

An international will is subject to the ordinary rules of revocation of wills.

Source: S.L. 1979, ch. 376, § 7.

30.1-08.2-08. (2-1009) Persons authorized to act in relation to international will — Eligibility — Recognition by authorizing agency.

Individuals who have been admitted to practice law before the courts of this state and are currently licensed so to do are authorized persons in relation to international wills.

Source: S.L. 1979, ch. 376, § 8.

30.1-08.2-09. (2-1010) International will information registration.

The secretary of state shall establish a registry system by which authorized persons may register in a central information center, information regarding the execution of international wills, keeping that information in strictest confidence until the death of the maker and then making it available to any person desiring information about any will who presents a death certificate or other satisfactory evidence of the testator’s death to the center. Information that may be received, preserved in confidence until death, and reported as indicated is limited to the name, social security or any other individual identifying number established by law, address, and date and place of birth of the testator, and the intended place of deposit or safekeeping of the instrument pending the death of the maker. The secretary of state, at the request of the authorized person, may cause the information it receives about execution of any international will to be transmitted to the registry system of another jurisdiction as identified by the testator, if that other system adheres to rules protecting the confidentiality of the information similar to those established in this state.

Source: S.L. 1979, ch. 376, § 9.

CHAPTER 30.1-09 Rules of Construction — Contractual Arrangements Relating to Death

30.1-09-01. Requirement that devisee survive testator by one hundred twenty hours. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 50.

30.1-09-02. Choice of law as to meaning and effect of wills. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 50.

30.1-09-03. (2-601) Rules of construction and intention applicable only to wills.

The intention of a testator as expressed in the testator’s will controls the legal effect of the testator’s dispositions. The rules of construction expressed in this chapter apply unless a contrary intention is indicated by the will.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 29; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Notes to Decisions

Ambiguity.

Whether or not an ambiguity exists in a will is a question of law; the supreme court will determine for itself the correct construction of an unambiguous will. Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 1988).

Whether an ambiguity exists in a will is a question of law for the court to decide; a will provision is ambiguous if it can be given more than one interpretation or understood in more than one sense. Zimbelman v. Loh (In re Estate of Zimbleman), 539 N.W.2d 67, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 193 (N.D. 1995).

Distribution of Non-Probate Property.

By ordering distribution according to payable on death (P.O.D.) designations of savings accounts, and an appropriate unequal distribution of the estate, district court properly gave effect to testator’s intent that accounts be divided equally while abiding by the law governing P.O.D. accounts. Berger v. Peterson (In re Estate of Peterson), 1997 ND 48, 561 N.W.2d 618, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 50 (N.D. 1997).

Extrinsic Evidence.

Where language of a will is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the testator must be determined from the language of the will itself; where language used in a will in unclear, indefinite and ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is permissible to show what the testator meant by what he said, but not to show what testator intended to say. Quandee v. Skene, 321 N.W.2d 91, 1982 N.D. LEXIS 288 (N.D. 1982).

A provision in a will is ambiguous when more than one interpretation may be given to the provision and it may be understood in more than one sense, and if the language of a will is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is permissible to remove the ambiguity, however, extrinsic evidence is admissible only to show what the testator meant by what he said, not to show what he intended to say. Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 1988).

Extrinsic evidence was properly considered to determine decedent’s intent, and evidence supported a trial court’s finding in interpreting ambiguous provision in decedent’s will; the trial court found that decedent intended the beneficiary to physically farm crop land (as opposed to leasing out land to be farmed on a sharecropping basis), and if he failed to do so, his sibling had an option to buy the land. Ruud v. Frandson, 2005 ND 174, 704 N.W.2d 852, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 208 (N.D. 2005).

Predeceased Devisee.

If the devisee predeceases the testator, the devise fails and becomes part of the residue. Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 1988).

Purpose in Construing Will.

The court’s purpose in construing a will is to ascertain the intention of the testator as it appears from a full and complete consideration of the will in light of the surrounding circumstances. Quandee v. Skene, 321 N.W.2d 91, 1982 N.D. LEXIS 288 (N.D. 1982).

The court’s purpose in construing a will is to ascertain the intention of the testator as it appears from a full and complete consideration of the will when read in light of the surrounding circumstances. In construing a will, each word, clause and provision should be given effect, if possible, and when the language of a will is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the testator must be determined from the language of the will itself. Schatz v. Schatz, 419 N.W.2d 903, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 54 (N.D. 1988).

When the court construes a will, its purpose is to ascertain the testator’s intent as it appears from a complete consideration of the will given the surrounding circumstances; if the language of the will is clear and unambiguous, the court determines the testator’s intent from the language of the will. Zimbelman v. Loh (In re Estate of Zimbleman), 539 N.W.2d 67, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 193 (N.D. 1995).

Testamentary Intent.

It is not essential that a testator understand the meaning of the technical clauses of a will, if the instrument is intended as a will and if it expresses the testator’s intent to distribute his property at death. In re Estate of Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1992).

Direct evidence that the decedent fully read and understood all of the provisions of his or her will is unnecessary. In re Estate of Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1992).

If a duly executed will contains the decedent’s general instructions for its contents, testamentary intent exists. In re Estate of Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1992).

Unless a duly executed will is ambiguous, the testamentary intent is derived from the will itself, not from extrinsic evidence. In re Estate of Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1992).

Where decedent had a new will drawn up in which he left the bulk of his estate to his “wife,” where a footnote appearing in the document indicated that the will was prepared in anticipation of his wedding, and where the decedent died three days before his wedding, the probate court did not err in ruling that the terms “spouse” and “wife” as used and defined in the decedent’s will were descriptive of his fiancee and did not create a condition precedent to her right to receive the devises because the will’s definition of “spouse” and references to the decedent’s fiancee as his “spouse” were descriptive terms that did not create a condition precedent; rather, the footnote evidenced the decedent’s intent that the will be operative before and after the marriage. The district court properly concluded that the fiancee was an unconditional devisee entitled to take under the decedent’s will; the fiancee’s right to the devises to her vested at the decedent’s death. Estate of Paulson v. Risovi, 2012 ND 40, 812 N.W.2d 476, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 40 (N.D. 2012).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Compliance with Law of Wills.

A declaration by decedent to his son that certain farm equipment was “yours and mine and to be left to you” was a present gift of one-half the property, but declaration as to half held by the deceased was testamentary in nature and could become effective only by compliance with the law of wills. Hruby v. Romanick, 128 N.W.2d 106, 1964 N.D. LEXIS 100 (N.D. 1964).

Condition Contrary to Public Policy.

Where provision in will required testatrix’ niece to divorce her husband and to terminate cohabitation with him as condition precedent to having funds in a trust created by will transferred to such niece, condition tended to encourage divorce, was contrary to public policy, and therefore was void. Graves v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 N.W.2d 584, 1965 N.D. LEXIS 105 (N.D. 1965).

Construction of Terms.

Term “separated” in clause of will which provided that trust should not be established in the event that testator was separated from his surviving wife was construed to mean separation in the physical sense, as opposed to a judicial separation. In re Estate of Johnson, 214 N.W.2d 112, 1973 N.D. LEXIS 99 (N.D. 1973).

Construing Intent.

Sole purpose of court in construing a will was to ascertain intention of testator as same appeared from a full and complete consideration of the will, when read in light of surrounding circumstances. If that intent could be ascertained and was not violative of some rule of law which existed for purpose of limiting power of testator to dispose of his property as he wished, such intent had to prevail. In re Glavkee's Estate, 76 N.D. 171, 34 N.W.2d 300, 1948 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1948).

Intention controlling in construction of a will was that which appeared either expressly or by necessary implication from language of will. In re Glavkee's Estate, 76 N.D. 171, 34 N.W.2d 300, 1948 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1948).

Duty of Court.

The first duty of court in construing a will was to ascertain testator’s intent from language used, considering circumstances under which will was made. Priewe v. Priewe, 43 N.D. 509, 175 N.W. 732, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1919).

Disposition of Insurance.

Intention on part of insured to dispose by will of avails of a life insurance policy made payable to his estate and hence payable to his heirs at law, must have been declared in clear and unmistakable terms; such intention would not be inferred from fact that will purported to dispose of all “property” of testator. ANDERSON v. NORTHERN & DAKOTA TRUST CO., 67 N.D. 458, 274 N.W. 127, 1937 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1937).

Effect of Intention.

In construing a will, testator’s intention had to be given effect as far as possible. In re McQueen's Estate, 64 N.D. 31, 250 N.W. 95, 1933 N.D. LEXIS 243 (N.D. 1933); Crabtree v. Kelly, 65 N.D. 501, 260 N.W. 262, 1935 N.D. LEXIS 136 (N.D. 1935); Heollinger v. Molzohn, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 110 (N.D. 1950); Hull v. Rolfsrud, 65 N.W.2d 94, 1954 N.D. LEXIS 80 (N.D. 1954).

Extrinsic Evidence.

Where under language of a will there was no doubt as to intent of testator to dispose of his property, but it was shown by collateral facts and circumstances that bequest applied equally to two or more different persons, such will presented a latent ambiguity and parol or extrinsic evidence was permissible to remove such ambiguity. Nystuen v. Nystuen, 80 N.W.2d 671 (N.D. 1957).

If there was a latent ambiguity in a will, and, after striking false words, there was left evidence sufficient to show intention of testator and to describe legatee, extrinsic evidence could be admitted to explain, but not to correct, a mere mistake. In re Kahoutek's Estate, 39 N.D. 215, 166 N.W. 816, 1918 N.D. LEXIS 12 (N.D. 1918).

Informal Language.

Intention of testator was not to be defeated because he merely failed to clothe his ideas in technical language, but, when ascertained, was to be implicitly obeyed, however informal, awkward, or defective language was in which it had been expressed. In re Glavkee's Estate, 76 N.D. 171, 34 N.W.2d 300, 1948 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1948).

Where testator’s intent was apparent, that intent would be given effect although testator failed to use apt legal words in a bequest or devise. In re Glavkee's Estate, 76 N.D. 171, 34 N.W.2d 300, 1948 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1948).

Intent Shown.

Provisions in a will giving and bequeathing to named brothers and sisters of testatrix “the remaining one-half of all property of which I die seized real, personal and mixed, wheresoever situated”, showed clearly that testatrix intended to pass all her property by phrase “give and bequeath” used in will. Heollinger v. Molzohn, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 110 (N.D. 1950).

When testator’s primary and dominant purpose was completely expressed in trust provisions of will, independent of any provisions that were void as against statute of perpetuities, such portion expressing primary intent of testator would be held valid so as to carry out testator’s intention as far as possible. Hull v. Rolfsrud, 65 N.W.2d 94, 1954 N.D. LEXIS 80 (N.D. 1954).

Rules of Construction Subordinate to Intent.

All rules and presumptions relating to construction of wills were subordinate to intention of the testator and had to yield thereto where such intention was ascertained, however crudely will may have been drawn. In re Glavkee's Estate, 76 N.D. 171, 34 N.W.2d 300, 1948 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1948).

Terms of Will.

Intention of testator had to be determined from terms of will itself, and where will was explicit courts were powerless to vary its terms. In re Kahoutek's Estate, 39 N.D. 215, 166 N.W. 816, 1918 N.D. LEXIS 12 (N.D. 1918).

Substance.

In construing a will, substance rather than form had to be regarded. Imperfection or awkwardness of expression would not defeat testator’s intention; if it could be ascertained from will, such intention would be given effect regardless of form of words used and of absence of technical terms. In re Glavkee's Estate, 76 N.D. 171, 34 N.W.2d 300, 1948 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1948).

Unconditional Absolute Devise.

Where an unconditional devise of all decedent’s property was contained in a valid will, and such bequest was followed by precatory words not used in the imperative and not certain in meaning as to what devisee would do in distributing property to other relatives of decedent, such precatory words did not in any way destroy absolute devise of property. Estate of Lubenow v. Lubenow, 146 N.W.2d 166, 1966 N.D. LEXIS 132 (N.D. 1966).

Collateral References.

“Proceeds” in will as indicating intention as to whether assets are to constitute principal or income, 1 A.L.R.2d 194.

Intent: admissibility of extrinsic evidence on issue of testamentary intent, 21 A.L.R.2d 319.

“College education”, purview of gift, charge, or the like for, 36 A.L.R.2d 1323.

Taxation, construction and effect of provisions of will relied upon as affecting the burden of, 37 A.L.R.2d 7.

Limitation of actions: construction of will with respect to right of retainer or setoff, against debtor’s distributive share of estate, of debt barred by statute of limitations, 39 A.L.R.2d 675, 685.

Option created by will to purchase real estate, 44 A.L.R.2d 1214, 1228.

Punctuation: changing, deleting, or adding punctuation in construing will, 70 A.L.R.2d 215.

Release: construction and effect of will provision releasing or forgiving debt due testator, 76 A.L.R.2d 1020.

Omission of provision for child, admissibility of extrinsic evidence to show testator’s intention as to, 88 A.L.R.2d 616.

Conclusiveness of testator’s statement as to amount of debt or advancement to be charged against legacy or devise, 98 A.L.R.2d 273.

Body: validity and effect of testamentary direction as to disposition of testator’s body, 7 A.L.R.3d 747.

Estate: validity, construction, and effect of bequest or devise to a person’s estate, or to the person or his estate, 10 A.L.R.3d 483.

Estate grant: admissibility of extrinsic evidence to determine whether fee or absolute interest, or only estate for life or years, was given, 21 A.L.R.3d 778.

Marital status: validity and construction of testamentary gift conditioned upon beneficiary’s remaining married, 28 A.L.R.3d 1325.

Common disaster: construction of provision as to which of two or more persons shall be deemed the survivor in case of death simultaneously, in a common disaster, or within a specified period of time, 40 A.L.R.3d 359.

Temporary will: effect upon testamentary nature of document of expression therein of intention to make more formal will, further disposition of property, or the like, 46 A.L.R.3d 938.

Advisors to trustee or executor, construction and operation of will or trust provision appointing, 56 A.L.R.3d 1249.

Wills: amount of attorneys’ compensation in proceedings involving wills and administration of decedents’ estates, 58 A.L.R.3d 317.

Construction of reference in will to statute where pertinent provisions of statute are subsequently changed by amendment or repeal, 63 A.L.R.3d 603.

Construction and effect of will provisions not expressly mentioning payment of death taxes but relied on as affecting the burden of estate or inheritance taxes, 70 A.L.R.3d 630.

Determination of price under testamentary option to buy real estate, 13 A.L.R.4th 947.

Proper disposition under will providing for allocation of express percentages or proportions amounting to more or less than whole of residuary estate, 35 A.L.R.4th 788.

Wills: effect of gift of specified percentage or share of estate (or residuary estate) to include specific property found to be of a greater value than share bequeathed, 63 A.L.R.4th 1186.

30.1-09-04. (2-602) Will passes all property — After-acquired property.

A will may provide for the passage of all property the testator owns at death and all property acquired by the estate after the testator’s death.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 30; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Devise of Property Not Owned.

Fact that in one paragraph of a will testator devised by specific description property that he did not own would not justify court in taking an equivalent amount from a bequest which was definitely made to another, and in saying that fact that former property was not owned by testator justified the conclusion that he intended that his valid and definite bequests should be set aside. In re Kahoutek's Estate, 39 N.D. 215, 166 N.W. 816, 1918 N.D. LEXIS 12 (N.D. 1918).

Failure to Describe Property.

The failure to describe devised property in a will did not invalidate the will. Collins v. Stroup, 71 N.D. 679, 3 N.W.2d 742, 1942 N.D. LEXIS 103 (N.D. 1942).

Rent for Devised Property.

Decedent’s widow was entitled to rent for a tract of land which he devised to her absolutely and which she occupied as a homestead. In re Korsmo's Estate, 56 N.D. 927, 220 N.W. 128, 1928 N.D. LEXIS 216 (N.D. 1928).

Terms Denoting Intent.

Former section permitted a testator to use the words “devise” or “bequeath” or “any other terms” denoting his intent to dispose of all his real or personal property. Heollinger v. Molzohn, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 110 (N.D. 1950).

Collateral References.

Enlarged interest acquired by testator after execution of will as passing by devise or bequest, 18 A.L.R.2d 519.

Devise of “home” as including property acquired by testator subsequently to execution of will, 38 A.L.R.2d 840, 852.

Effect of residuary clause to pass property acquired by testator’s estate after his death, 39 A.L.R.3d 1390.

Change in stock or corporate structure, or split or substitution of stock of corporation, as affecting bequest of stock, 46 A.L.R.3d 7.

30.1-09-05. (2-603) Antilapse — Deceased devisee — Class gifts.

If a devisee who is a grandparent or a lineal descendant of a grandparent of the testator is dead at the time of execution of the will, fails to survive the testator, or is treated as if the devisee predeceased the testator, the issue of the deceased devisee who survive the testator by one hundred twenty hours take in place of the deceased devisee and if they are all of the same degree of kinship to the devisee they take equally, but if of unequal degree, then those of more remote degree take by representation. One who would have been a devisee under a class gift if that person had survived the testator is treated as a devisee for purposes of this section where that person’s death occurred before or after the execution of the will.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 31; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 8, 27.

Notes to Decisions

Applicability.

This section deals with devisees who are grandparents or lineal descendants of grandparents of the testator and is not applicable to an action in which the beneficiary, who was the testator’s sister-in-law, was not a lineal descendant of the testator’s grandparents. Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 1988).

Predeceased Devisee.

If the devisee predeceases the testator, the devise fails and becomes part of the residue. Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 1988).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Adopted Children.

Adopted children come within meaning of term “lineal descendants” as used in former section, and as such could take a legacy given by will to one of the adopting parents and thus prevent legacy from lapsing when legatee died before testatrix. Heollinger v. Molzohn, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 110 (N.D. 1950).

Application.

The provision of former section for a lapse did not apply if testatrix made other provision in case of predecease of a devisee. Heollinger v. Molzohn, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 110 (N.D. 1950).

Collateral References.

Antilapse statute as applicable to devise or beq1791-1821uest in terms of distributive share, under law, in estate of testator, 3 A.L.R.2d 1419.

Time of ascertainment of membership with respect to devise or bequest to class which takes effect at testator’s death, 6 A.L.R.2d 1342.

Designated individual: devise or bequest to designated individual “or his estate”, “or his children”, “or his representatives”, or the like (other than “or his heirs”) as subject to lapse in event of individual’s death before that of testator, 11 A.L.R.2d 1387.

Who is “child”, “issue”, “descendant”, “relation”, “heir”, etc., within antilapse statute describing the person taking through or from the legatee or devisee, 19 A.L.R.2d 1159.

Illegitimate, right to take under testamentary gift to “heirs”, 27 A.L.R.2d 1232.

Right of devisee of precedent estate to take under limitation over to heirs or next of kin of testator, 30 A.L.R.2d 393.

Time as of which members of class described as remainderman’s or life tenant’s “heirs”, “next of kin”, “descendants”, “issue”, “family”, or the like, substituted by will to take place of deceased remainderman, are to be ascertained, 33 A.L.R.2d 242.

Illegitimates as within class of “children”, 34 A.L.R.2d 4.

Devolution of lapsed portion of residuary estate, 36 A.L.R.2d 1117, 1129.

Implications of class gift, giving to surviving residuary legatees lapsed portion of residuary estate, 36 A.L.R.2d 1117, 1129.

Time as of which members of class described as grantor’s or settlor’s “heirs”, “next of kin”, “relations”, and the like to whom a future gift is made, are to be ascertained, 38 A.L.R.2d 327.

Half blood: testamentary gift to class or group of specified relationship as including those of half blood, 49 A.L.R.2d 1362.

Class gifts, applicability of antilapse statutes to, 56 A.L.R.2d 948.

Time of ascertaining persons to take where designated as the “heirs”, “next of kin”, “descendants”, etc., of one other than testator, life tenant, or remainderman, 60 A.L.R.2d 1394.

When is a gift by will one to a class, 61 A.L.R.2d 212.

Intention of testator as defeating operation of antilapse statute, 63 A.L.R.2d 1172.

Who are within terms “relation”, “descendant”, “child”, “brother”, “sister”, etc., describing the legatee or devisee, in statute providing against lapse upon death of legatee or devisee before testator, 63 A.L.R.2d 1195.

Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, construction, application, and effect of, 39 A.L.R.3d 1332.

Construction of provision as to which of two or more parties shall be deemed the survivor in case of death simultaneously, in a common disaster, or within a specified period of time, 40 A.L.R.3d 359.

Inter vivos trust: antilapse statute as applicable to interest of beneficiary under inter vivos trust who predeceases life-tenant settlor, 47 A.L.R.3d 358.

Gift over to “survivors” of class or group of designated beneficiaries as restricted to surviving members of class or group, or as passing to heirs or representatives of deceased beneficiary, 54 A.L.R.3d 280.

Wills: gift to persons individually named but also described in terms of relationship to testator or another as class gift, 13 A.L.R.4th 978.

Action for tortious interference with bequest as precluded by will contest remedy, 18 A.L.R.5th 211.

Adopted child as within class in testamentary gift, 36 A.L.R.5th 395.

30.1-09-06. (2-604) Failure of testamentary provision.

  1. Except as provided in section 30.1-09-05, a devise, other than a residuary devise, that fails for any reason becomes a part of the residue.
  2. Except as provided in section 30.1-09-05, if the residue is devised to two or more persons, the share of a residuary devisee that fails for any reason passes to the other residuary devisee, or to other residuary devisees in proportion to the interests of each in the remaining part of the residue.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 32; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Notes to Decisions

Merged Charitable Organizations.

Where testator bequeathed and devised residue of his estate to four nonprofit charitable organizations, and he failed to provide for a gift over in event any of the residuary devisees ceased to exist at time of his death, there was no lapse of devise to one of organizations which had merged into another of charitable organizations before testator’s death, and, pursuant to former section 10-25-06 (see section 10-33-85 et seq., for similar provisions) remaining merged organization was entitled to devise made to defunct organization where such disposition of devise in no way frustrated charitable intent of testator. Mercy Hosp. v. Stillwell, 358 N.W.2d 506, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 417 (N.D. 1984).

Predeceased Devisee.

If the devisee predeceases the testator, the devise fails and becomes part of the residue. Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 1988).

Residue.

Residue, or residuum, is that portion of the testator’s property not otherwise disposed of by will. Zimbelman v. Loh (In re Estate of Zimbleman), 539 N.W.2d 67, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 193 (N.D. 1995).

Collateral References.

Effect of impossibility of performance of condition precedent to testamentary gift, 40 A.L.R.4th 193.

30.1-09-07. (2-605) Change in securities — Accessions — Nonademption.

  1. If a testator intended a specific devise of certain securities rather than the equivalent value thereof, the specific devisee is entitled only to:
    1. As much of the devised securities as is a part of the estate at the time of the testator’s death.
    2. Any additional or other securities of the same entity owned by the testator by reason of action initiated by the entity excluding any acquired by exercise of purchase options.
    3. Securities of another entity owned by the testator as a result of a merger, consolidation, reorganization, or other similar action initiated by the entity.
    4. Any additional securities of the entity owned by the testator as a result of a plan of reinvestment.
  2. Distributions before death with respect to a specifically devised security not provided for in subsection 1 are not part of the specific devise.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 401, § 2; 1993, ch. 334, § 33; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 9, 27.

Collateral References.

Ademption of specific legacy of corporate stock or other corporate securities, what amounts to, 61 A.L.R.2d 449.

Dividends or interest accruing between testator’s death and payment of legacy, bequest of bank deposits, stocks, bonds, notes, or other securities as carrying, 15 A.L.R.3d 1038.

Admissibility of extrinsic evidence to identify stock, bonds, or other securities disposed of by will, 16 A.L.R.3d 432.

Change in stock or corporate structure, or split or substitution of stock of corporation, as affecting bequest of stock, 46 A.L.R.3d 7.

Ademption or revocation of specific devise or bequest by guardian, committee, conservator, or trustee of mentally or physically incompetent testator, 84 A.L.R.4th 462.

30.1-09-08. (2-606) Nonademption of specific devises — Unpaid proceeds of sale, condemnation, or insurance — Sale by conservator.

  1. A specific devisee has the right to specifically devised property in the testator’s estate at the testator’s death and to:
    1. Any balance of the purchase price, together with any security interest, owed by a purchaser at the testator’s death by reason of sale of the property by the testator.
    2. Any amount of a condemnation award for the taking of the property unpaid at death.
    3. Any proceeds unpaid at death on fire or casualty insurance on or other recovery for injury to the property.
    4. Any property owned by the testator at death and acquired as a result of foreclosure, or obtained in lieu of foreclosure, of the security interest for a specifically devised obligation.
  2. If specifically devised property is sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered by a conservator or by an agent acting within the authority of a durable power of attorney for an incapacitated person, or a condemnation award, insurance proceeds, or recovery for injury to the property is paid to a conservator or to an agent acting within the authority of a durable power of attorney for an incapacitated person, the specific devisee has the right to a general pecuniary devise equal to the net sale price, the amount of the unpaid loan, the condemnation award, the insurance proceeds, or the recovery. This subsection does not apply if after the sale, encumbrance, condemnation, casualty, or recovery, it was adjudicated that the testator’s incapacity ceased and the testator survived the adjudication by at least one year. The right of a specific devisee under this subsection is reduced by any right the devisee has under subsection 1.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, § 9; 1989, ch. 401, § 3; 1993, ch. 334, § 34; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 10, 27; 1999, ch. 294, § 2.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Proceeds From Sale of Devised Property.

Under former section, where a testator entered into an executory contract for sale of previously devised property, devisee, upon the death of testator, succeeded to interest of testator therein, whatever legal nature of that interest might have been, and was entitled to receive all proceeds of such contract which were paid after testator’s death. Shure v. Dahl, 80 N.W.2d 825, 1957 N.D. LEXIS 97 (N.D. 1957).

Collateral References.

Testamentary direction to devisee to pay stated sum of money to third party as creating charge or condition or as imposing personal liability on devisee for nonpayment, 54 A.L.R.4th 1098.

Ademption or revocation of specific devise or bequest by guardian, committee, conservator, or trustee of mentally or physically incompetent testator, 84 A.L.R.4th 462.

30.1-09-09. (2-607) Nonexoneration.

A specific devise passes subject to any security interest existing at the date of death, without right of exoneration, regardless of a general directive in the will to pay debts.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 35; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

30.1-09-10. (2-608) Exercise of power of appointment.

A general residuary clause in a will, or a will making general disposition of all of the testator’s property, does not exercise a power of appointment held by the testator unless specific reference is made to the power or there is some other indication of intention to include the property subject to the power.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 36; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 11, 27.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Use of Term “Devise.”

Former section permitted the word “devise” to be used to pass all property of the testator, real and personal, in certain cases. Heollinger v. Molzohn, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 110 (N.D. 1950).

Collateral References.

Disposition of all or residue of testator’s property, without referring to power of appointment, as constituting sufficient manifestation of intention to exercise power, in absence of statute, 15 A.L.R.3d 346.

Effect of statute upon determination whether disposition of all or residue of testator’s property, without referring to power of appointment, sufficiently manifests intention to exercise power, 16 A.L.R.3d 911.

30.1-09-11. Construction of generic terms to accord with relationships as defined for intestate succession. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 50.

30.1-09-12. (2-609) Ademption by satisfaction.

  1. Property a testator gave in the testator’s lifetime to a person is treated as a satisfaction of a devise in whole or in part, only if the will provides for deduction of the gift, the testator declared in a contemporaneous writing that the gift is in satisfaction of the devise or that its value is to be deducted from the value of the devise, or the devisee acknowledged in writing that the gift is in satisfaction of the devise or that its value is to be deducted from the value of the devise.
  2. For the purposes of partial satisfaction, property given during lifetime is valued as of the time the devisee came into possession or enjoyment of the property or at the testator’s death, whichever occurs first.
  3. If the devisee fails to survive the testator, the gift is treated as a full or partial satisfaction of the devise, as appropriate, in applying sections 30.1-09-05 and 30.1-09-06, unless the testator’s contemporaneous writing provides otherwise.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 37; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Collateral References.

Satisfaction or ademption of general legacy by inter vivos gift, transfer, or payment to the legatee or another, 26 A.L.R.2d 9.

Presumption and burden of proof with respect to advancement, 31 A.L.R.2d 1036.

Conclusiveness of testator’s statement as to amount of debt or advancement to be charged against legacy or devise, 98 A.L.R.2d 273.

Conveyance or surrender of property as an accord and satisfaction of contract obligation, 59 A.L.R.5th 665.

30.1-09-13. (2-514) Contracts concerning succession.

A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate, if executed after July 1, 1975, can be established only by:

  1. Provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract;
  2. An express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract; or
  3. A writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract.

The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 38; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Notes to Decisions

No Contract Established.

In an action brought by a surviving spouse’s stepchildren challenging her inter vivos transfers of real estate to her natural child and her natural child’s husband on the grounds that it circumvented an alleged agreement between the father and stepmother for the disposition of their property upon their deaths, the father’s 1985 will clearly and unambiguously provided that his wife, the children’s stepmother, was to receive all of the rest, residue and remainder of his property if she survived him, which she did. The prior 1973 wills did not reflect an agreement by the father and his wife to treat all of the children equally upon the surviving spouse’s death; therefore, the wife became the sole owner of all of the assets of the father’s estate, other than a relatively small amount of money left to a stepdaughter of his and the stepmother acted within her rights and power in conveying assets to anyone she chose. Martin v. Berg, 2005 ND 108, 697 N.W.2d 723, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 125 (N.D. 2005).

Oral Contract.

Where a will did not make reference to a contract to make a will and the petitioners did not offer any writing signed by the testator to evidence such a contract, rather, the petitioners offered to present testimony of an oral contract, such testimony was prohibited. Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 1988).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Conjoint Will.

Terms “conjoint will” and “mutual will” did not mean the same, but referred to different types of wills, conjoint will implying that testators owned property in common, and mutual will referring to one where two or more persons made mutual or reciprocal provisions in favor of each other. Collins v. Stroup, 71 N.D. 679, 3 N.W.2d 742, 1942 N.D. LEXIS 103 (N.D. 1942).

Collateral References.

Promise not to make a will, validity and effect of, 32 A.L.R.2d 370, 380.

Breach of contract: statute of limitations applicable to action to enforce, or recover damages for breach of, contract to make a will, 94 A.L.R.2d 810.

Statute of frauds: will or instrument in form of will as sufficient memorandum of contract to devise or bequeath, 94 A.L.R.2d 921.

Acceptance of benefits under will as election precluding enforcement of contract right as to property bequeathed, 60 A.L.R.3d 1147.

Damages: measure of damages for breach of contract to will property, 65 A.L.R.3d 632.

CHAPTER 30.1-09.1 Rules of Construction of Governing Instrument

30.1-09.1-01. (2-701) Scope.

In the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, the rules of construction in this chapter control the construction of a governing instrument. The rules of construction in this chapter apply to a governing instrument of any type, except as the application of a particular section is limited by its terms to a specific type or types of provisions or governing instrument.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 39; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

30.1-09.1-02. (2-702) Requirement of survival by one hundred twenty hours.

  1. For the purposes of this title, except as provided in subsection 4, an individual who is not established by clear and convincing evidence to have survived an event, including the death of another individual, by one hundred twenty hours is deemed to have predeceased the event.
  2. Except as provided in subsection 4, for purposes of a provision of a governing instrument that relates to an individual surviving an event, including the death of another individual, an individual who is not established by clear and convincing evidence to have survived the event by one hundred twenty hours is deemed to have predeceased the event.
  3. Except as provided in subsection 4, if it is not established by clear and convincing evidence that one of two co-owners with right of survivorship survived the other co-owner by one hundred twenty hours, one-half of the property passes as if one had survived by one hundred twenty hours and one-half as if the other had survived by one hundred twenty hours and there are more than two co-owners and it is not established by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of them survived the others by one hundred twenty hours, the property passes in the proportion that one bears to the whole number of co-owners. For purposes of this subsection, the term “co-owners with right of survivorship” includes joint tenants, tenants by the entireties, and other co-owners of property or accounts held under circumstances that entitles one or more to the whole of the property or account on the death of the other or others.
  4. Survival by one hundred twenty hours is not required if:
    1. The governing instrument contains some language dealing explicitly with simultaneous deaths or deaths in a common disaster and that language is operable under the facts of the case;
    2. The governing instrument expressly indicates that an individual is not required to survive an event, including the death of another individual, by any specific period or expressly requires the individual to survive the event by a specific period, but survival of the event or the specified period must be established by clear and convincing evidence;
    3. Imposition of a one-hundred-twenty-hour requirement of survival would cause a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment to fail to qualify for validity under subdivision a of subsection 1, subdivision a of subsection 2, or subdivision a of subsection 3 of section 47-02-27.1, or to become invalid under subdivision b of subsection 1, subdivision b of subsection 2, or subdivision b of subsection 3 of section 47-02-27.1, but survival must be established by clear and convincing evidence; or
    4. The application of a one-hundred-twenty-hour requirement of survival to multiple governing instruments would result in an unintended failure or duplication of a disposition, but survival must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
    1. A payer or other third party is not liable for having made a payment or transferred an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument who, under this section, is not entitled to the payment or item of property, or for having taken any other action in good-faith reliance on the beneficiary’s apparent entitlement under the terms of the governing instrument, before the payer or other third party received written notice of a claimed lack of entitlement under this section. A payer or other third party is liable for a payment made or other action taken after the payer or other third party received written notice of a claimed lack of entitlement under this section.
    2. Written notice of a claimed lack of entitlement under subdivision a must be mailed to the payer’s or other third party’s main office or home by registered mail or served upon the payer or other third party in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of a claimed lack of entitlement under this section, a payer or other third party may pay any amount owed or transfer or deposit any item of property held by it to or with the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent’s estate, or if no proceedings have been commenced, to or with the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedents’ estates located in the county of the decedent’s residence. The court shall hold the funds or item of property and, upon its determination under this section, shall order disbursement in accordance with the determination. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the court discharge the payer or other third party from all claims for the value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or deposited with the court.
    1. A person who purchases property for value and without notice, or who receives a payment or other item of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation, is neither obligated under this section to return the payment, item of property, or benefit nor is liable under this section for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit. But a person who, not for value, receives a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who is entitled to it under this section.
    2. If this section or any part of this section is preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this section, a person who, not for value, receives the payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it were this section or part of this section not preempted.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 39; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 12, 27.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Predeceased Devisee.

If the devisee predeceases the testator, the devise fails and becomes part of the residue. Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 1988).

30.1-09.1-03. (2-703) Choice of law as to meaning and effect of governing instrument.

The meaning and legal effect of a governing instrument is determined by the local law of the state selected by the transferor in the governing instrument, unless the application of that law is contrary to the provisions relating to the elective share described in chapter 30.1-05, the provisions relating to exempt property and allowances described in chapter 30.1-07, or any other public policy of this state otherwise applicable to the disposition.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 39; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Cross-References.

Choice of law as to execution, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-08-06.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Designation by Decedent’s Will.

The law of a state designated by the decedent’s will should control the effect of the will. In re Estate of Burshiem, 483 N.W.2d 175, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 73 (N.D. 1992).

Choice of Law.

That the validity and interpretation of a will relating to personal property was to be governed by laws of testator’s domicile was a long-established rule. Penfield v. Tower, 1 N.D. 216, 46 N.W. 413, 1890 N.D. LEXIS 27 (N.D. 1890).

The provisions of a will relating to personal property situated in this state had to be considered according to law of domicile of testator at time of his death. Penfield v. Tower, 1 N.D. 216, 46 N.W. 413, 1890 N.D. LEXIS 27 (N.D. 1890); Crandell v. Barker, 8 N.D. 263, 78 N.W. 347, 1898 N.D. LEXIS 53 (N.D. 1898); Knox v. Barker, 8 N.D. 272, 78 N.W. 352, 1898 N.D. LEXIS 54 (N.D. 1898).

30.1-09.1-04. (2-704) Power of appointment — Meaning of specific reference requirement.

If a governing instrument creating a power of appointment expressly requires that the power be exercised by a reference, an express reference, or a specific reference, to the power or its source, it is presumed that the donor’s intention, in requiring that the donee exercise the power by making reference to the particular power or to the creating instrument, was to prevent an inadvertent exercise of the power.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 39; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

30.1-09.1-05. (2-705) Class gifts construed to accord with intestate succession — Exceptions.

  1. In this section:
    1. “Adoptee” has the meaning set forth in section 30.1-04-14.
    2. “Child of assisted reproduction” has the meaning set forth in section 30.1-04-19.
    3. “Distribution date” means the time when an immediate or a postponed class gift is to take effect in possession or enjoyment.
    4. “Functioned as a parent of the adoptee” has the meaning set forth in section 30.1-04-14, substituting “adoptee” for “child” in that definition.
    5. “Functioned as a parent of the child” has the meaning set forth in section 30.1-04-14.
    6. “Genetic parent” has the meaning set forth in section 30.1-04-14.
    7. “Gestational child” has the meaning set forth in section 30.1-04-20.
    8. “Relative” has the meaning set forth in section 30.1-04-14.
  2. A child of assisted reproduction, a gestational child, and except as otherwise provided in subsections 3 and 4, an adoptee and a child born to parents not married to each other, and their respective descendants if appropriate to the class, are included in class gifts and other terms of relationship in accordance with the rules for intestate succession. Terms of relationship in a governing instrument which do not differentiate relationships by the half blood from those by the whole blood, such as brothers, sisters, nieces, or nephews, are construed to include both types of relationships. Terms of relationship in a governing instrument that do not differentiate relationships by blood from those by marriage, such as uncles, aunts, nieces, or nephews, are construed to exclude relatives by marriage unless:
    1. When the governing instrument was executed, the class was then and foreseeably would be empty; or
    2. The language or circumstances otherwise establish that relatives by marriage were intended to be included.
  3. In construing a dispositive provision of a transferor who is not the genetic parent, a child of a genetic parent is not considered the child of that parent unless the parent, a relative of the genetic parent, or the spouse or surviving spouse of a relative of the genetic parent functioned as a parent of the child before the child reached eighteen years of age.
  4. In construing a dispositive provision of a transferor who is not the adoptive parent, an adoptee is not considered the child of the adoptive parent unless:
    1. The adoption took place before the adoptee reached eighteen years of age;
    2. The adoptive parent was the adoptee’s stepparent or foster parent; or
    3. The adoptive parent functioned as a parent of the adoptee before the adoptee reached eighteen years of age.
  5. The following rules apply for purposes of the class-closing rules:
    1. A child in utero at a particular time is treated as living at that time if the child lives one hundred twenty hours after birth.
    2. If a child of assisted reproduction or a gestational child is conceived posthumously and the distribution date is the deceased parent’s death, the child is treated as living on the distribution date if the child lives one hundred twenty hours after birth and was in utero not later than thirty-six months after the deceased parent’s death or born not later than forty-five months after the deceased parent’s death.
    3. An individual who is in the process of being adopted when the class closes is treated as adopted when the class closes if the adoption is subsequently granted.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 39; 1995, ch. 322, § 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 20.

Notes to Decisions

Functioned As A Parent.

Estate representative’s contention had to be rejected that the adopted woman was prohibited from inheriting from decedent, who was the mother of the adopted woman’s biological father, because the biological father did not act as the adopted woman’s father before the adopted woman turned 18-years-old, as required by N.D.C.C. § 30.1-09.1-05(3). Although the biological father did not act as a parent towards the adopted woman between the adopted woman’s ages of three and 15-years-old, the biological father and adopted woman reconciled when the adopted woman was 15-years-old, and the trial court’s finding that the biological father then “functioned as a parent of the child” as defined under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-04-14(4) was not clearly erroneous under N.D. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Kraft v. Ramos (In re Estate of Boehm), 2012 ND 104, 816 N.W.2d 793, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 93 (N.D. 2012).

30.1-09.1-06. (2-706) Life insurance — Retirement plan — Account with payable on death designation — Transfer-on-death registration — Deceased beneficiary.

  1. In this section:
    1. “Alternative beneficiary designation” means a beneficiary designation that is expressly created by the governing instrument and, under the terms of the governing instrument, can take effect instead of another beneficiary designation on the happening of one or more events, including survival of the decedent or failure to survive the decedent, whether an event is expressed in condition-precedent, condition-subsequent, or any other form.
    2. “Beneficiary” means the beneficiary of a beneficiary designation under which the beneficiary must survive the decedent and includes a class member if the beneficiary designation is in the form of a class gift and includes an individual or class member who was deceased at the time the beneficiary designation was executed as well as an individual or class member who was then living but who failed to survive the decedent, but excludes a joint tenant of a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship and a party to a joint and survivorship account.
    3. “Beneficiary designation” includes an alternative beneficiary designation and a beneficiary designation in the form of a class gift.
    4. “Class member” includes an individual who fails to survive the decedent but who would have taken under a beneficiary designation in the form of a class gift had the individual survived the decedent.
    5. “Descendant of a grandparent”, as used in subsection 2, means an individual who qualifies as a descendant of a grandparent of the decedent under the rules of construction applicable to a class gift created in the decedent’s beneficiary designation if the beneficiary designation is in the form of a class gift or rules for intestate succession if the beneficiary designation is not in the form of a class gift.
    6. “Descendants”, as used in the phrase “surviving descendants” of a deceased beneficiary or class member in subdivisions a and b of subsection 2, mean the descendants of a deceased beneficiary or class member who would take under a class gift created in the beneficiary designation.
    7. “Stepchild” means a child of the decedent’s surviving, deceased, or former spouse, and not of the decedent.
    8. “Surviving” in the phrase “surviving beneficiary” or “surviving descendant” means a beneficiary or a descendant who neither predeceased the decedent nor is deemed to have predeceased the decedent under section 30.1-09.1-02.
  2. If a beneficiary fails to survive the decedent and is a grandparent, a descendant of a grandparent, or a stepchild of the decedent, the following apply:
    1. Except as provided in subdivision d, if the beneficiary designation is not in the form of a class gift and the deceased beneficiary leaves surviving descendants, a substitute gift is created in the beneficiary’s surviving descendants. They take by representation the property to which the beneficiary would have been entitled had the beneficiary survived the decedent.
    2. Except as provided in subdivision d, if the beneficiary designation is in the form of a class gift, other than a beneficiary designation to “issue”, “descendants”, “heirs of the body”, “heirs”, “next of kin”, “relatives”, “family”, or a class described by language of similar import, a substitute gift is created in the surviving descendants of any deceased beneficiary. The property to which the beneficiaries would have been entitled had all of them survived the decedent passes to the surviving beneficiaries and the surviving descendants of the deceased beneficiaries. Each surviving beneficiary takes the share to which the surviving beneficiary would have been entitled had the deceased beneficiaries survived the decedent. Each deceased beneficiary’s surviving descendants who are substituted for the deceased beneficiary take by representation the share to which the deceased beneficiary would have been entitled had the deceased beneficiary survived the decedent. For the purposes of this subdivision, “deceased beneficiary” means a class member who failed to survive the decedent and left one or more surviving descendants.
    3. For purposes of section 30.1-09.1-01, words of survivorship, such as in a beneficiary designation to an individual “if the individual survives me”, or in a beneficiary designation to “my surviving children”, are not, in the absence of additional evidence, a sufficient indication of an intent contrary to the application of this section.
    4. If a governing instrument creates an alternative beneficiary designation with respect to a beneficiary designation for which a substitute gift is created by subdivision a or b, the substitute gift is superseded by the alternative beneficiary designation if:
      1. The alternative beneficiary designation is in the form of a class gift and one or more members of the class is entitled to take; or
      2. The alternative beneficiary designation is not in the form of a class gift and the expressly designated beneficiary of the alternative beneficiary designation is entitled to take.
  3. If, under subsection 2, substitute gifts are created and not superseded with respect to more than one beneficiary designation, and the beneficiary designations are alternative beneficiary designations, one to the other, the determination of which of the substitute gifts takes effect is resolved as follows:
    1. Except as provided in subdivision b, the property passes under the primary substitute gift.
    2. If there is a younger-generation beneficiary designation, the property passes under the younger-generation substitute gift and not under the primary substitute gift.
    3. In this subsection:
      1. “Primary beneficiary designation” means the beneficiary designation that would have taken effect had all the deceased beneficiaries of the alternative beneficiary designations who left surviving descendants survived the decedent.
      2. “Primary substitute gift” means the substitute gift created with respect to the primary beneficiary designation.
      3. “Younger-generation beneficiary designation” means a beneficiary designation that is to a descendant of a beneficiary of the primary beneficiary designation, is an alternative beneficiary designation with respect to the primary beneficiary designation, is a beneficiary designation for which a substitute gift is created, and would have taken effect had all the deceased beneficiaries who left surviving descendants survived the decedent except the deceased beneficiary or beneficiaries of the primary beneficiary designation.
      4. “Younger-generation substitute gift” means the substitute gift created with respect to the younger-generation beneficiary designation.
    1. A payer is protected from liability in making payments under the terms of the beneficiary designation until the payer has received written notice of a claim to a substitute gift under this section. Payment made before the receipt of written notice of a claim to a substitute gift under this section discharges the payer, but not the recipient, from all claims for the amounts paid. A payer is liable for a payment made after the payer has received written notice of the claim. A recipient is liable for a payment received, whether or not written notice of the claim is given.
    2. The written notice of the claim must be mailed to the payer’s main office or home by registered mail, return receipt requested, or served upon the payer in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of the claim, a payer may pay any amount owed by it to the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent’s estate or, if no proceedings have been commenced, to the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedents’ estates located in the county of the decedent’s residence. The court shall hold the funds and, upon its determination under this section, shall order disbursement in accordance with the determination. Payment made to the court discharges the payer from all claims for the amounts paid.
    1. A person who purchases property for value and without notice, or who receives a payment or other item of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation, is neither obligated under this section to return the payment, item of property, or benefit nor is liable under this section for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit. But a person who, not for value, receives a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item or property or benefit, to the person who is entitled to it under this section.
    2. If this section or any part of this section is preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this section, a person who, not for value, receives the payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it were this section or part of this section not preempted.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 39; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 13, 14, 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 21.

30.1-09.1-07. (2-707) Survivorship with respect to future interests under the terms of a trust — Substitute takers.

  1. In this section:
    1. “Alternative future interest” means to an expressly created future interest that can take effect in possession or enjoyment instead of another future interest on the happening of one or more events, including survival of an event or failure to survive an event, whether an event is expressed in condition-precedent, condition-subsequent, or any other form. A residuary clause in a will does not create an alternative future interest with respect to a future interest created in a nonresiduary devise in the will, whether or not the will specifically provides that lapsed or failed devises are to pass under the residuary clause.
    2. “Beneficiary” means the beneficiary of a future interest and includes a class member if the future interest is in the form of a class gift.
    3. “Class member” includes an individual who fails to survive the distribution date but who would have taken under a future interest in the form of a class gift had the individual survived the distribution date.
    4. “Descendants”, in the phrase “surviving descendants” of a deceased beneficiary or class member in subdivisions a and b of subsection 2, mean the descendants of a deceased beneficiary or class member who would take under a class gift created in the trust.
    5. “Distribution date”, with respect to a future interest, means the time when the future interest is to take effect in possession or enjoyment. The distribution date need not occur at the beginning or end of a calendar day, but can occur at a time during the course of a day.
    6. “Future interest” includes an alternative future interest and a future interest in the form of a class gift.
    7. “Future interest under the terms of a trust” means a future interest that was created by a transfer creating a trust or to an existing trust or by an exercise of a power of appointment to an existing trust, directing the continuance of an existing trust, designating a beneficiary of an existing trust, or creating a trust.
    8. “Surviving” in the phrase “surviving beneficiary” or “surviving descendant” means a beneficiary or a descendant who neither predeceased the distribution date nor is deemed to have predeceased the distribution date under section 30.1-09.1-02.
  2. A future interest under the terms of a trust is contingent on the beneficiary’s surviving the distribution date. If a beneficiary of a future interest under the terms of a trust fails to survive the distribution date, the following apply:
    1. Except as provided in subdivision d, if the future interest is not in the form of a class gift and the deceased beneficiary leaves surviving descendants, a substitute gift is created in the beneficiary’s surviving descendants. They take by representation the property to which the beneficiary would have been entitled had the beneficiary survived the distribution date.
    2. Except as provided in subdivision d, if the future interest is in the form of a class gift, other than a future interest to “issue”, “descendants”, “heirs of the body”, “heirs”, “next of kin”, “relatives”, or “family”, or a class described by language of similar import, a substitute gift is created in the surviving descendants of any deceased beneficiary. The property to which the beneficiaries would have been entitled had all of them survived the distribution date passes to the surviving beneficiaries and the surviving descendants of the deceased beneficiaries. Each surviving beneficiary takes the share to which the surviving beneficiary would have been entitled had the deceased beneficiaries survived the distribution date. Each deceased beneficiary’s surviving descendants who are substituted for the deceased beneficiary take by representation the share to which the deceased beneficiary would have been entitled had the deceased beneficiary survived the distribution date. For the purposes of this subdivision, “deceased beneficiary” means a class member who failed to survive the distribution date and left one or more surviving descendants.
    3. For purposes of section 30.1-09.1-01, words of survivorship attached to a future interest are not, in the absence of additional evidence, a sufficient indication of an intent contrary to the application of this section. Words of survivorship include words of survivorship that relate to the distribution date or to an earlier or an unspecified time, whether those words of survivorship are expressed in condition-precedent, condition-subsequent, or any other form.
    4. If a governing instrument creates an alternative future interest with respect to a future interest for which a substitute gift is created by subdivision a or b, the substitute gift is superseded by the alternative future interest if:
      1. The alternative future interest is in the form of a class gift and one or more members of the class is entitled to take in possession or enjoyment; or
      2. The alternative future interest is not in the form of a class gift and the expressly designated beneficiary of the alternative future interest is entitled to take in possession or enjoyment.
  3. If, under subsection 2, substitute gifts are created and not superseded with respect to more than one future interest and the future interests are alternative future interests, one to the other, the determination of which of the substitute gifts takes effect is resolved as follows:
    1. Except as provided in subdivision b, the property passes under the primary substitute gift.
    2. If there is a younger-generation future interest, the property passes under the younger-generation substitute gift and not under the primary substitute gift.
    3. In this subsection:
      1. “Primary future interest” means the future interest that would have taken effect had all the deceased beneficiaries of the alternative future interest who left surviving descendants survived the distribution date.
      2. “Primary substitute gift” means the substitute gift created with respect to the primary future interest.
      3. “Younger-generation future interest” means a future interest that is to a descendant of a beneficiary of the primary future interest, is an alternative future interest with respect to the primary future interest, is a future interest for which a substitute gift is created, and would have taken effect had all the deceased beneficiaries who left surviving descendants survived the distribution date except the deceased beneficiary of beneficiaries of the primary future interest.
      4. “Younger-generation substitute gift” means the substitute gift created with respect to the younger-generation future interest.
  4. Except as provided in subsection 5, if, after the application of subsections 2 and 3, there is no surviving taker, the property passes in the following order:
    1. If the trust was created in a nonresiduary devise in the transferor’s will or in a codicil to the transferor’s will, the property passes under the residuary clause in the transferor’s will. For purposes of this section, the residuary clause is treated as creating a future interest under the terms of a trust.
    2. If no taker is produced by the application of subdivision a, the property passes to the transferor’s heirs under section 30.1-09.1-11.
  5. If, after the application of subsections 2 and 3, there is no surviving taker and if the future interest was created by the exercise of a power of appointment:
    1. The property passes under the donor’s gift-in-default clause, if any, which clause is treated as creating a future interest under the terms of a trust; and
    2. If no taker is produced by the application of subdivision a, the property passes as provided in subsection 4. For purposes of subsection 4, “transferor” means the donor if the power was a nongeneral power and means the donee if the power was a general power.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 39; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 15, 27; 2009, ch. 283, § 22.

30.1-09.1-08. (2-708) Class gifts to descendants, issue, or heirs of the body — Form of distribution if none specified.

If a class gift in favor of “descendants”, “issue”, or “heirs of the body” does not specify the manner in which the property is to be distributed among the class members, the property is distributed among the class members who are living when the interest is to take effect in possession or enjoyment, in such shares as they would receive, under the applicable law of intestate succession, if the designated ancestor had then died intestate owning the subject matter of the class gift.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 39; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

30.1-09.1-09. (2-709) Per capita at each generation — Representation — Per stirpes.

  1. In this section:
    1. “Deceased child” or “deceased descendant” means a child or a descendant who either predeceased the distribution date or is deemed to have predeceased the distribution date under section 30.1-09.1-02.
    2. “Distribution date”, with respect to an interest, means the time when the interest is to take effect in possession or enjoyment. The distribution date need not occur at the beginning or end of a calendar day, but can occur at a time during the course of a day.
    3. “Surviving ancestor”, “surviving child”, or “surviving descendant” means an ancestor, a child, or a descendant who neither predeceased the distribution date nor is deemed to have predeceased the distribution date under section 30.1-09.1-02.
  2. If a governing instrument calls for property to be distributed “per capita at each generation”, the property is divided into as many equal shares as there are surviving descendants in the generation nearest to the designated ancestor which contains one or more surviving descendants and deceased descendants in the same generation who left surviving descendants, if any. Each surviving descendant in the nearest generation is allocated one share. The remaining shares, if any, are combined and then divided in the same manner among the surviving descendants of the deceased descendants as if the surviving descendants who were allocated a share and their surviving descendants had predeceased the distribution date.
  3. If an applicable statute or a governing instrument calls for property to be distributed “by representation” or “per stirpes”, the property is divided into as many equal shares as there are surviving children of the designated ancestor and deceased children who left surviving descendants. Each surviving child is allocated one share. The share of each deceased child with surviving descendants is divided in the same manner, with subdivision repeating at each succeeding generation until the property is fully allocated among surviving descendants.
  4. For the purposes of subsections 2 and 3, an individual who is deceased and left no surviving descendant is disregarded, and an individual who leaves a surviving ancestor who is a descendant of the designated ancestor is not entitled to a share.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 39; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 16, 27.

30.1-09.1-10. (2-710) Worthier-title doctrine abolished.

The doctrine of worthier title is abolished as a rule of law and as a rule of construction. Language in a governing instrument describing the beneficiaries of a disposition as the transferor’s “heirs”, “heirs at law”, “next of kin”, “distributees”, “relatives”, “family”, or language of similar import does not create or presumptively create a reversionary interest in the transferor.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 39; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

30.1-09.1-11. (2-711) Future interests in heirs and like.

If an applicable statute or a governing instrument calls for a present or future distribution to or creates a present or future interest in a designated individual’s “heirs”, “heirs at law”, “next of kin”, “relatives”, or “family”, or language of similar import, the property passes to those persons, including the state, and in such shares as would succeed to the designated individual’s intestate estate under the intestate succession law of the designated individual’s domicile if the designated individual died when the disposition is to take effect in possession or enjoyment. If the designated individual’s surviving spouse is living but is remarried at the time the disposition is to take effect in possession or enjoyment, the surviving spouse is not an heir of the designated individual.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 39; 1995, ch. 322, § 17; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

CHAPTER 30.1-10 General Provisions

Note.

Effective January 1, 1996, former chapter 30.1-10 was repealed by S.L. 1993, chapter 334, section 50, and a new chapter 30.1-10, enacted by S.L. 1993, chapter 334, § 40, was substituted therefor.

30.1-10-01. (2-801) Disclaimer of property interests. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 3.

30.1-10-02. (2-802) Effect of divorce, annulment, and decree of separation.

  1. An individual who is divorced from the decedent or whose marriage to the decedent has been annulled is not a surviving spouse unless, by virtue of a subsequent marriage, the spouse is married to the decedent at the time of death. A decree of separation that does not terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for purposes of this section.
  2. For purposes of chapters 30.1-04 through 30.1-07 and section 30.1-13-03, a surviving spouse does not include:
    1. An individual who obtains or consents to a final decree or judgment of divorce from the decedent or an annulment of their marriage, which decree or judgment is not recognized as valid in this state, unless subsequently that participate in a marriage ceremony purporting to marry each to the other or live together as husband and wife;
    2. An individual who, following an invalid decree or judgment of divorce or annulment obtained by the decedent, participates in a marriage ceremony with a third individual; or
    3. An individual who was a party to a valid proceeding concluded by an order purporting to terminate all marital property rights.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, § 12; 1993, ch. 334, § 40; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Cross Reference. See Section 2-804 [N.D.C.C. § 30.1-10-04] for similar provisions relating to the effect of divorce to revoke devises and other revocable provisions to a former spouse.

Cross-References.

Waiver of rights by surviving spouse, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-05-07.

Collateral References.

Separation agreement as barring rights of surviving spouse in other’s estate, 34 A.L.R.2d 1020, 1039.

Extrajudicial separation as affecting surviving spouse’s right to widow’s allowance, 34 A.L.R.2d 1056.

Abandonment, desertion, or refusal to support on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate, 13 A.L.R.3d 446.

Adultery on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate, 13 A.L.R.3d 486.

Divorce or annulment as affecting will previously executed by husband or wife, 71 A.L.R.3d 1297.

30.1-10-03. (2-803) Effect of homicide on intestate succession, wills, trusts, joint assets, life insurance, and beneficiary designations.

  1. In this section:
    1. “Disposition or appointment of property” includes a transfer of an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument.
    2. “Governing instrument” means a governing instrument executed by the decedent.
    3. “Revocable”, with respect to a disposition, appointment, provision, or nomination, means one under which the decedent, at the time of or immediately before death, was alone empowered, by law or under the governing instrument, to cancel the designation, in favor of the killer, whether or not the decedent was then empowered to designate the decedent in place of the decedent’s killer or the decedent then had capacity to exercise the power.
  2. An individual who intentionally and feloniously kills the decedent forfeits all benefits under this title with respect to the decedent’s estate, including an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted spouse’s or child’s share, a homestead allowance, exempt property, and a family allowance. If the decedent died intestate, the decedent’s intestate estate passes as if the killer disclaimed the killer’s intestate share.
  3. The intentional and felonious killing of the decedent:
    1. Revokes any revocable disposition or appointment of property made by the decedent to the killer in a governing instrument, provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of appointment on the killer, and nomination of the killer in a governing instrument, nominating or appointing the killer to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee, or agent.
    2. Voids the interests of the killer in property held with the decedent at the time of the killing as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.
  4. The voided interest under subdivision b of subsection 3 does not affect any third-party interest in property acquired for value and in good-faith reliance on an apparent title by survivorship in the killer unless a writing declaring the voided interest has been noted, registered, filed, or recorded in records appropriate to the kind and location of the property that are relied upon, in the ordinary course of transactions involving the property, as evidence of ownership.
  5. Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the killer disclaimed all revoked provisions revoked by this section or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the killer predeceased the decedent.
  6. A wrongful acquisition of property or interest by a killer not covered by this section must be treated in accordance with the principle that a killer cannot profit from any wrong.
  7. After all right to appeal has been exhausted, a judgment of conviction establishing criminal accountability for the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent conclusively establishes the convicted individual as the decedent’s killer for purposes of this section. In the absence of a conviction, the court, upon the petition of an interested person, must determine whether, under the preponderance of evidence standard, the individual would be found criminally accountable for the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent. If the court determines that, under that standard, the individual would be found criminally accountable for the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent, the determination conclusively establishes that individual as the decedent’s killer for purposes of this section.
    1. A payer or other third party is not liable for having made a payment or transferred an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument affected by an intentional and felonious killing, or for having taken any other action in reliance on the validity of the governing instrument, upon request and satisfactory proof of the decedent’s death, before the payer or other third party received written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this section. A payer or other third party does not have a duty or obligation to make any determination as to whether the decedent was a victim of a felonious killing or to seek any evidence with respect to a felonious killing even if the circumstances of the decedent’s death are suspicious or questionable as to the beneficiary’s participation in any such felonious killing. A payer or other third party is only liable for actions taken two or more business days after the actual receipt by the payer or other third party of written notice. The payer or other third party may be liable for actions taken pursuant to the governing instrument only if the form of service is that described in subdivision b.
    2. The written notice must indicate the name of the decedent, the name of the person asserting an interest, the nature of the payment or item of property or other benefit, and a statement that a claim of forfeiture or revocation is being made under this section. Written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this subsection must be mailed to the payer’s or third party’s main office or home by registered mail or served upon the payer or other third party in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. Notice to a sales representative of the payer or other third party does not constitute notice to the payer or other third party. Upon receipt of written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this section, a payer or other third party may pay any amount owed or transfer or deposit any item of property held by it to or with the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent’s estate, or if no proceedings have been commenced, to or with the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedents’ estates located in the county of the decedent’s residence. In addition to the actions available under this section, the payer or other third party may take any action authorized by law or the governing instrument. If no probate proceedings have been commenced, the payer or other third party shall file with the court a copy of the written notice received by the payer or other third party, with the payment of funds or transfer or deposit of property. The court may not charge a filing fee to the payer or other third party for the payment to the court of amounts owed or transferred to or deposit with the court of any item of property, even if no probate proceedings have been commenced before the payment, transfer, or deposit. The court shall hold the funds or item of property and, upon its determination under this section, shall order disbursement in accordance with the determination. A filing fee, if any, may be charged upon disbursement either to the recipient or against the funds or property on deposit with the court, in the discretion of the court. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the court discharge the payer or other third party from all claims for the value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or deposited with the court.
    1. A bona fide purchaser who purchases property, or who receives a payment or other item of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation, is neither obligated under this section to return the payment, item of property, or benefit nor liable under this section for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit. But a person who, not for value, receives a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who is entitled to it under this section.
    2. If this section or any part of this section is preempted by federal law, other than the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this section, a person who, not for value, receives the payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it were this section or part of this section not preempted.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 40; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 19, 27; 1997, ch. 51, § 25; 1999, ch. 294, § 3; 2007, ch. 283, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Conviction Not Required.

In the absence of a final judgment of criminal conviction, the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent may be proved by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil proceeding. In re Estates of Josephson, 297 N.W.2d 444, 1980 N.D. LEXIS 331 (N.D. 1980).

“Feloniously”.

As used in subsection 1 (see now subsection 2), “feloniously” is not limited to the intentional doing of an act which constitutes a felony as defined by statute, but refers to a killing that is wrongful and without legal excuse or justification. In re Estates of Josephson, 297 N.W.2d 444, 1980 N.D. LEXIS 331 (N.D. 1980).

Inheritance Denied.

In North Dakota a surviving spouse who “feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent” is not entitled to inherit from the deceased. In re Estate of Burshiem, 483 N.W.2d 175, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 73 (N.D. 1992).

Joint Tenancy.

Where son feloniously and intentionally killed his father with whom he held certain property in joint tenancy, the effect of such killing caused a severance of the joint tenancy and created a tenancy in common, with a one-half undivided interest of the jointly held property passing to the father’s estate and the other one-half undivided interest retained by the son. In re Estate of Snortland, 311 N.W.2d 36, 1981 N.D. LEXIS 384 (N.D. 1981).

Parents Killed by Minor.

Uniform Juvenile Court Act provisions insulating minor from a criminal conviction for killing of his parents and protecting against civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from conviction do not prohibit the operation of this section to exclude a minor from receiving benefits, including support payments until the age of majority, from his parents’ estates where the court with probate jurisdiction finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the killing of the parents by the minor was felonious and intentional. In re Estates of Josephson, 297 N.W.2d 444, 1980 N.D. LEXIS 331 (N.D. 1980).

Surviving Issue of Killer Sharing in Estate.

Although one who feloniously and intentionally kills another person is not entitled to share in his victim’s estate, the share he otherwise would have taken passes as though he had predeceased his victim; where man killed his father who died intestate, the man’s son was entitled to the man’s share in the father’s estate by representation. In re Estate of Snortland, 311 N.W.2d 36, 1981 N.D. LEXIS 384 (N.D. 1981).

Collateral References.

Life tenant’s murder by remainderman or reversioner as affecting latter’s rights to remainder or reversion, 24 A.L.R.2d 1120.

Insurance: right to proceeds of life insurance, as between estate of murdered insured and alternative beneficiary named in policy, where murderer was made primary beneficiary, 26 A.L.R.2d 987.

Insurance: killing of insured by beneficiary as affecting life insurance or its proceeds, 27 A.L.R.3d 794.

Cotenancy: felonious killing of one cotenant or tenant by the entireties by the other as affecting the latter’s right in the property, 42 A.L.R.3d 1116.

Homicide as precluding taking under will or by intestacy, 25 A.L.R.4th 787.

Law Reviews.

The New North Dakota Slayer Statute: Does It Cause a Criminal Forfeiture?, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 997 (2007).

30.1-10-04. (2-804) Revocation of probate and nonprobate transfers by divorce — No revocation by other changes of circumstances.

  1. In this section:
    1. “Disposition or appointment of property” includes a transfer of an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument.
    2. “Divorce or annulment” means any divorce or annulment, or any dissolution or declaration of invalidity of a marriage, that would exclude the spouse as a surviving spouse within the meaning of section 30.1-10-02. A decree of separation that does not terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for purposes of this section.
    3. “Divorced individual” includes an individual whose marriage has been annulled.
    4. “Governing instrument” means a governing instrument executed by the divorced individual before the divorce or annulment of the marriage to the former spouse.
    5. “Relative of the divorced individual’s former spouse” means an individual who is related to the divorced individual’s former spouse by blood, adoption, or affinity and who, after the divorce or annulment, is not related to the divorced individual by blood, adoption, or affinity.
    6. “Revocable”, with respect to a disposition, appointment, provision, or nomination means one under which the divorced individual, at the time of the divorce or annulment, was alone empowered, by law or under the governing instrument, to cancel the designation in favor of the former spouse or former spouse’s relative, whether or not the divorced individual was then empowered to designate the divorced individual in place of the former spouse or in place of the former spouse’s relative and whether or not the divorced individual then had the capacity to exercise the power.
  2. Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage:
    1. Revokes any revocable disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to the individual’s former spouse in a governing instrument and any disposition or appointment created by law or in a governing instrument to a relative of the divorced individual’s former spouse, provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or special power of appointment on the divorced individual’s former spouse or on a relative of the divorced individual’s former spouse, and nomination in a governing instrument, nominating a divorced individual’s former spouse or a relative of the divorced individual’s former spouse to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee, conservator, agent, or guardian.
    2. Severs the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at the time of the divorce or annulment as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, transforming the interests of former spouses into equal tenancies in common.
  3. A severance under subdivision b of subsection 2 does not affect any third-party interest in property acquired for value and in good-faith reliance on an apparent title by survivorship in the survivor of the former spouses unless a writing declaring the severance has been noted, registered, filed, or recorded in records appropriate to the kind and location of the property which are relied upon, in the ordinary course of transactions involving such property, as evidence of ownership.
  4. Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the former spouse and relatives of the former spouse disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the former spouse and relatives of the former spouse died immediately before the divorce or annulment.
  5. Provisions revoked solely by this section are revived by the divorced individual’s remarriage to the former spouse or by a nullification of the divorce or annulment.
  6. No change of circumstances other than as described in this section and in section 30.1-10-03 effects a revocation.
    1. A payer or other third party is not liable for having made a payment or transferred an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument affected by a divorce, annulment, or remarriage, or for having taken any other action in reliance on the validity of the governing instrument, before the payer or other third party received written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage. A payer or other third party does not have a duty or obligation to inquire as to the continued marital relationship between the decedent and a beneficiary or to seek any evidence with respect to a marital relationship. A payer or other third party is only liable for actions taken two or more business days after the actual receipt by the payer or other third party of written notice. The payer or other third party may be liable for actions taken pursuant to the governing instrument only if the form of service is that described in subdivision b.
    2. The written notice must indicate the name of the decedent, the name of the person asserting an interest, the nature of the payment or item of property or other benefit, and a statement that a divorce, annulment, or remarriage of the decedent and the designated beneficiary occurred. Written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage under this subdivision must be mailed to the payer’s or other third party’s main office or home by registered mail or served upon the payer or other third party in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage, a payer or other third party may pay any amount owed or transfer or deposit any item of property held by it to or with the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent’s estate or, if no proceedings have been commenced, to or with the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedents’ estates located in the county of the decedent’s residence. In addition to the actions available under this section, the payer or other third party may take any action authorized by law or the governing instrument. If no probate proceedings have been commenced, the payer or other third party shall file with the court a copy of the written notice received by the payer or other third party with the payment of funds or transfer or deposit of property. The court may not charge a filing fee to the payer or other third party for the payment to the court of amounts owed or transferred to or deposit with the court of any item of property, even if no probate proceedings have been commenced before the payment, transfer, or deposit. The court shall hold the funds or item of property and, upon its determination under this section, shall order disbursement or transfer in accordance with the determination. A filing fee, if any, may be charged upon disbursement either to the recipient or against the funds or property on deposit with the court, in the discretion of the court. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the court discharge the payer or other third party from all claims for the value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or deposited with the court.
    1. A bona fide purchaser who purchases property from a former spouse, relative of a former spouse, or any other person, or who receives from a former spouse, relative of a former spouse, or any other person a payment or other item of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation, is neither obligated under this section to return the payment, item of property, or benefit nor liable under this section for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit. But a former spouse, relative of a former spouse, or other person who, not for value, received a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which that person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who is entitled to it under this section.
    2. If this section or any part of this section is preempted by federal law, other than the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this section, a former spouse, relative of the former spouse, or any other person who, not for value, received a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which that person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return that payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it were this section or part of this section not preempted.

Source: S.L. 1993, ch. 334, § 40; 1995, ch. 322, §§ 20, 27; 1999, ch. 294, § 4.

Notes to Decisions

Effect of Divorce.

Husband died testate, and only those bequests and powers granted to the wife by the will were revoked by operation of law, where husband and wife were divorced after husband had executed a will and husband had not changed his will concerning wife’s rights thereunder. In re Estate of Knudsen, 322 N.W.2d 454, 1982 N.D. LEXIS 316 (N.D. 1982).

Collateral References.

Divorce or annulment as affecting will previously executed by husband or wife, 71 A.L.R.3d 1297.

30.1-10-05. (2-805) Reformation to correct mistakes.

The court may reform the terms of a governing instrument, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the transferor’s intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that the transferor’s intent and the terms of the governing instrument were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.

Source: S.L. 2009, ch. 283, § 23.

Effective Date.

This section became effective August 1, 2009.

30.1-10-06. (2-806) Modification to achieve transferor’s tax objectives.

To achieve the transferor’s tax objectives, the court may modify the terms of a governing instrument in a manner that is not contrary to the transferor’s probable intention. The court may provide that the modification has retroactive effect.

Source: S.L. 2009, ch. 283, § 24.

Effective Date.

This section became effective August 1, 2009.

CHAPTER 30.1-10.1 Disclaimer of Property Interests

30.1-10.1-01. (2-1102) Definitions.

In this chapter:

  1. “Beneficiary designation” means an instrument, other than an instrument creating a trust, naming the beneficiary of an insurance or annuity policy; an account with a designation for payment on death; a security registered in beneficiary form; a pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or other employment-related benefit plan; or any other nonprobate transfer at death.
  2. “Disclaimant” means the person to whom the disclaimed interest or power would have passed had the disclaimer not been made.
  3. “Disclaimed interest” means the interest or share to which the disclaimant would have been entitled had the disclaimer not been made.
  4. “Disclaimer” means a refusal to accept an interest in, or power over, property.
  5. “Distribution time” means the time when the disclaimed interest would have taken effect in possession or enjoyment.
  6. “Fiduciary” means a personal representative, trustee, an agent acting under a power of attorney, or other person authorized to act as a fiduciary with respect to the property of another person.
  7. “Future interest” means an interest that takes effect in possession or enjoyment, if at all, after the time of its creation.
  8. “Jointly held property” means property held in the name of two or more persons under an arrangement in which all holders have concurrent interests and under which the last surviving holder is entitled to the whole of the property.
  9. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
  10. “Signed” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record, to execute or adopt a tangible symbol, or attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic sound, symbol, or process.
  11. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan native village, which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
  12. “Trust” means an express trust, charitable or noncharitable, with additions, whenever and however created; and means a trust created pursuant to a statute, judgment, or decree which requires the trust to be administered in the manner of an express trust.

Source: S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 1; 2003, ch. 274, § 1.

Collateral References.

Appointee’s right to renounce appointment under power, 9 A.L.R.2d 1382.

Acceptance or renunciation of devise or bequest by beneficiary, what establishes, 93 A.L.R.2d 8.

Taxes: renunciation of inheritance, devise, or legacy as affecting state inheritance, estate, or succession tax, 27 A.L.R.3d 1354.

Creditor’s right to prevent debtor’s renunciation of benefit under will or debtor’s election to take under will, 39 A.L.R.4th 633.

Law Reviews.

North Dakota Estate Planning Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 54 N.D. L. Rev. 7 (1977).

30.1-10.1-02. (2-1105) General provisions.

  1. A person may disclaim, in whole or in part, any interest in or power over property, including a power of appointment. A person may disclaim the interest or power even if its creator imposed a spendthrift provision or similar restriction on transfer or a restriction or limitation on the right to disclaim.
  2. Except to the extent the fiduciary’s power to disclaim is expressly limited by another statute of this state or by the instrument creating the fiduciary relationship, a fiduciary may disclaim, in whole or in part, any interest in or power over property, including a power of appointment, whether acting in a personal or representative capacity. A fiduciary may disclaim the interest or power even if its creator imposed a spendthrift provision or similar restriction on transfer or a restriction or limitation on the right to disclaim, or an instrument other than the instrument that created the fiduciary relationship imposed a restriction or limitation on the right to disclaim.
  3. A partial disclaimer may be expressed as a fraction, percentage, monetary amount, term of years, limitation of a power, or as any other interest or estate in the property.
  4. A disclaimer must be in a writing or other record, declare the disclaimer, describe the interest or power disclaimed, be signed by the person making the disclaimer, and be delivered or filed in the manner provided in section 30.1-10.1-09.
  5. A disclaimer becomes irrevocable upon the later to occur of its delivery or filing as provided in section 30.1-10.1-09, or when it becomes effective as provided in sections 30.1-10.1-03 through 30.1-10.1-08.
  6. A disclaimer made under this chapter is not a transfer, assignment, or release.

Source: S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 1; 2003, ch. 274, § 2.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Analysis

Motive Underlying Renunciation.

The motive underlying the renunciation is not relevant to the right to renounce. Nielsen v. Cass County Social Servs. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 428 (N.D. 1986).

Renunciation Not Fraudulent Transfer.

Absent an express statutory provision to the contrary, a renunciation is not treated as a fraudulent transfer of assets, and the renouncer’s creditors cannot on that ground claim any rights to the renounced property. Nielsen v. Cass County Social Servs. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157 (N.D. 1986), decided prior to the 1987 amendment to N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-02(1).

There is no valid distinction upon which to allow the department of human services to benefit by treating a renunciation as a transfer where the renouncer’s creditors and the tax department cannot. Nielsen v. Cass County Social Servs. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157 (N.D. 1986), decided prior to the 1987 amendment to the section 50-24.1-02(1).

Section 50-24.1-02(1).

The legislature did not expressly make renunciation a disqualifying act under section 50-24.1-02(1), although it could have easily so provided; nor did it define the terms “assignment” or “transfer”. However, as commonly understood, those terms connoted an act of designating or conveying a thing from one person to another. One who assigned or transferred a property designated the assignee or transferee and the terms of the conveyance. In contrast, one who renounced a bequest or inheritance under this section could not designate the recipient or otherwise control the disposition of the renounced property. Nielsen v. Cass County Social Servs. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157 (N.D. 1986), decided prior to the 1987 amendment to N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-02(1).

Department of human services’ contention that benefit recipient’s interest in her deceased mother’s estate should be treated as an available resource or that her renunciation of it should be treated as a disqualifying transfer under section 50-24.1-02(1) was inconsistent with the requirement of prior version of this section that a renunciation relate back to the death of the decedent “for all purposes”. Nielsen v. Cass County Social Servs. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157 (N.D. 1986), decided prior to the 1987 amendment to N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-01(1).

30.1-10.1-03. (2-1106) Disclaimer of interest in property.

  1. Except for disclaimers governed by sections 30.1-10.1-04 and 30.1-10.1-05, subsections 2 through 5 apply to a disclaimer of an interest in property.
  2. The disclaimer takes effect as of the time the instrument creating the interest becomes irrevocable, or, if the interest arose under the law of intestate succession, as of the intestate’s death.
  3. The disclaimed interest passes according to a provision in the instrument creating the interest providing for the disposition of the interest, should it be disclaimed, or of disclaimed interests in general.
  4. If the instrument does not contain a provision described in subsection 3 and if the disclaimant is an individual, the disclaimed interest passes as if the disclaimant had died immediately before the distribution time. However, if by law or under the instrument the descendants of the disclaimant would share in the disclaimed interest by any method of representation had the disclaimant died before the distribution time, the disclaimed interest passes only to the descendants of the disclaimant who survive the time of distribution. If the disclaimant is not an individual, the disclaimed interest passes as if the disclaimant did not exist.
  5. Upon the disclaimer of a preceding interest, a future interest held by a person other than the disclaimant takes effect as if the disclaimant had died or ceased to exist immediately before the distribution time, but a future interest held by the disclaimant does not accelerate in possession or enjoyment.

Source: S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 1; 2003, ch. 274, § 3.

Notes to Decisions

Exclusions.

Trial court did not err in holding that the granddaughters of a decedent’s half-sister inherited the intestate estate of the decedent because even though the decedent expressly excluded the half-sister under the will, it could not be inferred that the decedent intended to exclude the granddaughters; the residuary of the estate was to pass as though the half-sister disclaimed the intestate share under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-10.1-03(4). West v. Myrvik (In re Estate of Samuelson), 2008 ND 190, 757 N.W.2d 44, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 192 (N.D. 2008).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Date of Decedent’s Death.

Prior version of this section provides for no exceptions to treating a renunciation as relating back to the date of the death of decedent. Nielsen v. Cass County Social Servs. Bd., 395 N.W.2d 157, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 428 (N.D. 1986).

30.1-10.1-04. (2-1107) Disclaimer of rights of survivorship in jointly held property.

  1. Upon the death of a holder of jointly held property, a surviving holder may disclaim in whole or in part the greater of a fractional share of the property determined by dividing the number one by the number of joint holders alive immediately before the death of the holder to whose death the disclaimer relates or all of the property except that part of the value of the entire interest attributable to the contribution furnished by the disclaimant.
  2. The disclaimer under subsection 1 takes effect as of the death of the holder to whose death the disclaimer relates.
  3. An interest disclaimed by a surviving holder of jointly held property passes as if the person whose interest is being disclaimed predeceased the holder to whose death the disclaimer relates.

Source: S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 1; 2003, ch. 274, § 4.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Surviving Spouse.

Where the surviving spouse disclaimed his interest in farmland, only the children had an interest in the property, and their signatures were essential for substantial compliance with federal requirements for special use valuation of the property. McDonald v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1494, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 11260 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005, 109 S. Ct. 1639, 104 L. Ed. 2d 155, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 1686 (U.S. 1989).

For the purpose of avoiding federal gift tax consequences, the time period in which a surviving spouse could disclaim a survivorship interest began to run at the death of the joint tenant and not at the creation of the joint tenancy. McDonald v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1494, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 11260 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005, 109 S. Ct. 1639, 104 L. Ed. 2d 155, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 1686 (U.S. 1989).

30.1-10.1-05. (2-1108) Disclaimer of interest by trustee.

If a trustee disclaims an interest in property that otherwise would have become trust property, the interest does not become trust property.

Source: S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 1; 2003, ch. 274, § 5.

30.1-10.1-06. (2-1109) Disclaimer of powers of appointment and other powers not held in fiduciary capacity.

  1. If a holder disclaims a power of appointment or other power not held in a fiduciary capacity and if the holder has not exercised the power, the disclaimer takes effect as of the time the instrument creating the power becomes irrevocable.
  2. If a holder disclaims a power of appointment or other power not held in a fiduciary capacity and if the holder has exercised the power and the disclaimer is of a power other than a presently exercisable general power of appointment, the disclaimer takes effect immediately after the date of the last exercise of the power.
  3. If a holder disclaims a power of appointment or other power not held in a fiduciary capacity, the instrument creating the power is construed as if the power ceased to exist when the disclaimer became effective.

Source: S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 1; 2003, ch. 274, § 6.

30.1-10.1-07. (2-1110) Disclaimer by appointee, object, or taker in default of exercise of power of appointment.

  1. The disclaimer by an appointee of a power of appointment takes effect as of the time the instrument by which the holder exercises the power becomes irrevocable.
  2. A disclaimer by the object or taker in default of an exercise of a power of appointment takes effect as of the time the instrument creating the power becomes irrevocable.

Source: S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 1; 2003, ch. 274, § 7.

30.1-10.1-08. (2-1111) Disclaimer of powers held in fiduciary capacity.

  1. If a fiduciary disclaims a power held in a fiduciary capacity which has not been exercised, the disclaimer takes effect as of the time the instrument creating the power becomes irrevocable.
  2. If a fiduciary disclaims a power held in a fiduciary capacity which has been exercised, the disclaimer takes effect immediately after the last exercise of the power.
  3. A disclaimer under this section is effective as to other fiduciaries if the disclaimer so provides and the fiduciary disclaiming has the authority to bind the estate, trust, or other person for whom the fiduciary is acting.

Source: S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 1; 2003, ch. 274, § 8.

30.1-10.1-09. (2-1112) Delivery.

  1. In subsections 2 through 11, delivery of a disclaimer may be effected by personal delivery, first-class mail, or any other method likely to result in its receipt.
  2. In the case of an interest created under the law of intestate succession or an interest created by will, other than an interest in a testamentary trust, a disclaimer must be delivered to the personal representative of the decedent’s estate, or if a personal representative is not then serving, it must be filed with the court having jurisdiction to appoint the personal representative.
  3. In the case of an interest in a testamentary trust, a disclaimer must be delivered to the trustee then serving, or if a trustee is not then serving, to the personal representative of the decedent’s estate, or if a personal representative is not then serving, it must be filed with a court having jurisdiction to enforce the trust.
  4. In the case of an interest in an inter vivos trust, a disclaimer must be delivered to the trustee then serving, or if a trustee is not then serving, it must be filed with a court having jurisdiction to enforce the trust, or if the disclaimer is made before the time the instrument creating the trust becomes irrevocable, it must be delivered to the settlor of a revocable trust or the transferor of the interest.
  5. In the case of an interest created by a beneficiary designation which is disclaimed before the designation becomes irrevocable, the disclaimer must be delivered to the person making the beneficiary designation.
  6. In the case of an interest created by a beneficiary designation which is disclaimed after the designation becomes irrevocable, a disclaimer of an interest in personal property must be delivered to the person obligated to distribute the interest and the disclaimer of an interest in real property must be recorded in the office of the county recorder of the county where the real property that is the subject of the disclaimer is located.
  7. In the case of a disclaimer by a surviving holder of jointly held property, the disclaimer must be delivered to the person to whom the disclaimed interest passes.
  8. In the case of a disclaimer by an object or taker in default of exercise of a power of appointment, the disclaimer must be delivered to the holder of the power or to the fiduciary acting under the instrument that created the power, or if a fiduciary is not then serving, it must be filed with the court having authority to appoint the fiduciary.
  9. In the case of a disclaimer by an appointee of a nonfiduciary power of appointment, to the holder, personal representative of the holder’s estate, or to the fiduciary under the instrument that created the power, or if a fiduciary is not then serving, it must be filed with the court having authority to appoint the fiduciary.
  10. In the case of a disclaimer by a fiduciary of a power over a trust or estate, the disclaimer must be delivered as provided in subsection 2, 3, or 4, as if the power disclaimed were an interest in property.
  11. In the case of a disclaimer of a power by an agent, the disclaimer must be delivered to the principal or the principal’s representative.

Source: S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 1; 2003, ch. 274, § 9; 2011, ch. 241, § 1.

30.1-10.1-10. (2-1113) When disclaimer barred or limited.

  1. A disclaimer is barred by a written waiver of the right to disclaim.
  2. A disclaimer of an interest in property is barred if before the disclaimer becomes effective the disclaimant accepts the interest sought to be disclaimed; the disclaimant voluntarily assigns, conveys, encumbers, pledges, or transfers the interest sought to be disclaimed or makes a contract to do so; or, a judicial sale of the interest sought to be disclaimed occurs.
  3. A disclaimer, in whole or part, of the future exercise of a power held in a fiduciary capacity is not barred by its previous exercise.
  4. A disclaimer, in whole or part, of the future exercise of a power not held in a fiduciary capacity is not barred by its past exercise unless the power is exercisable in favor of the disclaimant.
  5. A disclaimer is barred or limited if so provided by law other than this chapter.
  6. A disclaimer of a power over property which is barred by this section is ineffective. A disclaimer of an interest in property which is barred by this section takes effect as a transfer of the interest disclaimed to the persons who would have taken the interest under this chapter had the disclaimer not been barred.
  7. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, if as a result of a disclaimer or transfer the disclaimed or transferred interest is treated pursuant to the provisions of title 26 of the United States Code or regulations promulgated under that title, as never having been transferred to the disclaimant, then the disclaimer or transfer is effective as a disclaimer under this chapter.

Source: S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 1; 2003, ch. 274, § 10.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Analysis

Actions Barring Renunciation.

Only an encumbrance created by an act of the person attempting to disclaim bars renunciation. Speldrich v. Speldrich (In re Estate of Opatz), 554 N.W.2d 813, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 238 (N.D. 1996).

Third Party Actions.

The judgment lien and garnishment proceedings instituted by a third party against the devised property did not constitute encumbrances barring devisee’s right to renounce her interest in the property. Speldrich v. Speldrich (In re Estate of Opatz), 554 N.W.2d 813, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 238 (N.D. 1996).

30.1-10.1-11. (2-1115) Recording of disclaimer.

If an instrument transferring an interest in or power over property subject to a disclaimer is required or permitted by law to be filed, recorded, or registered, the disclaimer may be so filed, recorded, or registered. Except as required in subsection 6 of section 30.1-10.1-09, failure to file, record, or register the disclaimer does not affect its validity as between the disclaimant and persons to whom the property interest or power passes by reason of the disclaimer.

Source: S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 1; 2011, ch. 241, § 2.

30.1-10.1-12. (2-1116, 2-1117) Applicability.

  1. This chapter does not limit the right of a person to waive, release, disclaim, or renounce property or an interest in or power over property under any law other than this chapter.
  2. This chapter applies to any interest in or power over property, whenever created.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in section 30.1-10.1-10, an interest in or power over property existing on August 1, 2001, as to which the time for delivering or filing a disclaimer under law superseded by this chapter has not expired may be disclaimed after August 1, 2001.
  4. This chapter modifies, limits, and supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act [15 U.S.C. 7001 et seq.] but does not modify, limit, or supersede section 101(c) of that Act [15 U.S.C. 7001(c)] or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in section 103(b) of that Act [15 U.S.C. 7003(b)].

Source: S.L. 2001, ch. 301, § 1; 2003, ch. 274, § 11.

CHAPTER 30.1-11 Custody and Deposit of Wills

30.1-11-01. (2-515) Deposit of will in testator’s lifetime.

A will may be deposited by the testator or the testator’s agent with a recorder for safekeeping. The will must be sealed and kept confidential. During the testator’s lifetime, a deposited will must be delivered only to the testator or to a person authorized in a writing signed by the testator to receive the will. A conservator may be allowed to examine a deposited will of a protected testator under procedures designed to maintain the confidential character of the document to the extent possible, and to ensure that it will be resealed and kept on deposit after the examination. Upon being informed of the testator’s death, the recorder shall notify any person designated to receive the will and deliver it to that person on request or the recorder may deliver the will to the appropriate court.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 41; 1995, ch. 322, § 27; 1999, ch. 278, § 55; 2001, ch. 120, § 1.

30.1-11-02. (2-516) Duty of custodian of will — Liability.

After the death of a testator and on request of an interested person, a person having custody of a will of the testator shall deliver it with reasonable promptness to a person able to secure its probate, and if none is known, to an appropriate court. A person who willfully fails to deliver a will is liable to any person aggrieved for any damages that may be sustained by the failure. A person who willfully refuses or fails to deliver a will after being ordered by the court in a proceeding brought for the purpose of compelling delivery is subject to penalty for contempt of court.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 42; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Liability of Bank.

A bank had no authority within its charter, implied or incidental, to be custodian of a will, and, in the absence of consideration or benefit, no liability attached to a bank for failure after death of a testator to deliver his will if in its custody. Britton v. Elk Valley Bank, 54 N.D. 858, 211 N.W. 810, 1926 N.D. LEXIS 97 (N.D. 1926).

Collateral References.

Relative rights to real property as between purchasers from or through decedent’s heirs and devisees under will subsequently sought to be established as affected by concealment or withholding of will, 22 A.L.R.2d 1107.

Article III Probate of Wills and Administration

CHAPTER 30.1-12 General Provisions

30.1-12-01. (3-101) Devolution of estate at death — Restrictions.

The power of a person to leave property by will, and the rights of creditors, devisees, and heirs to the person’s property, are subject to the restrictions and limitations contained in this title to facilitate the prompt settlement of estates. Upon the death of a person, the decedent’s real and personal property devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by the decedent’s last will or to those indicated as substitutes for them in cases involving lapse, renunciation, or other circumstances affecting the devolution of testate estate, or in the absence of testamentary disposition, to the decedent’s heirs, or to those indicated as substitutes for them in cases involving renunciation or other circumstances affecting devolution of intestate estates, subject to homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance, to rights of creditors, elective share of the surviving spouse, and to administration.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Cross-References.

Successors’ rights if there is no administration, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-20-01.

Notes to Decisions

Estate Taxes.

Because the estate had insufficient liquid assets to pay the estate taxes without resorting to royalty payments, the district court did not err in finding an implied trust and in ordering the proceeds from life insurance policies to be applied to the estate tax obligation; the testator's children had equal ownership interests in the royalty payments upon her death, subject to administration, and they were entitled to the income from the royalty interests during the administration. Eagon v. McKeown (In re Estate of Eagon), 2017 ND 243, 902 N.W.2d 751, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 2017).

Merger Doctrine.

Issues of merger are resolved by the parties’ intent and the interests of substantial justice, and where a substantial injustice would have resulted if merger negated the deceased’s intent under the plain and unambiguous language of his will, the court declined to apply the doctrine of equitable merger. Flynn v. Flynn (In re Estate of Flynn), 2000 ND 24, 606 N.W.2d 104, 2000 N.D. LEXIS 28 (N.D. 2000).

Provisions.

This section provides that, upon death, a person’s real and personal property devolves to the devisees, subject to administration. Additionally, N.D.C.C. § 59-04.1-05(2)(a) [repealed] provides that devisees of specific property are entitled to income earned from that property during the administration of the estate. Stratton v. Rose, 484 N.W.2d 274, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 1992).

Sale or Lease of Estate Property.

Title to property passes to a decedent's heirs or devisees at death, subject to a personal representative's broad powers over the title for administration purposes; a personal representative is allowed to lease and sell estate property if acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons. Therefore, although a personal representative might have been acting reasonably when she leased farmland, an income-producing asset of the estate, there was insufficient analysis or supporting evidence presented on the issue. In re Estate of Johnson, 2015 ND 110, 863 N.W.2d 215, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 109 (N.D. 2015).

Suit on Accrued Claim.

Decedent’s heirs were not barred from bringing suit in their individual capacities because their claim accrued before decedent’s death and had not been included in the probate inventory, “preserved,” or distributed to the daughters when decedent’s estate was closed. Feickert v. Frounfelter, 468 N.W.2d 131, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1991).

When Property Passes.

Property passes upon death, not upon distribution. Feickert v. Frounfelter, 468 N.W.2d 131, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1991).

30.1-12-02. (3-102) Necessity of order of probate for will.

Except as provided in section 30.1-23-01, to be effective to prove the transfer of any property or to nominate an executor, a will must be declared to be valid by an order of informal probate or an adjudication of probate by the court.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 290, § 4; 1995, ch. 322, § 21.

Collateral References.

Sufficiency of evidence support grant of summary judgment in will probate or contest proceeding, 53 A.L.R.4th 561.

30.1-12-03. (3-103) Necessity of appointment for administration.

Except as otherwise provided in chapters 30.1-24 and 30.1-25, to acquire the powers and undertake the duties and liabilities of a personal representative of a decedent, a person must be appointed by order of the court, qualify, and be issued letters. Administration of an estate is commenced by the issuance of letters.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-12-04. (3-104) Claims against decedent — Necessity of administration.

No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or the decedent’s successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a personal representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed by the procedure prescribed by chapters 30.1-12 through 30.1-23. After distribution, a creditor whose claim has not been barred may recover from the distributees as provided in section 30.1-21-04 or from a former personal representative individually liable as provided in section 30.1-21-05. This section has no application to a proceeding by a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce the secured creditor’s right to the secured creditor’s security except as to any deficiency judgment which might be sought therein.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Creditor’s Petition for Appointment.

The exercise of the creditor’s power to petition for appointment of the personal representative is mandatory; a claimant cannot rely on the failure of other persons to seek appointment of a personal representative to suspend the running of a statute of limitations against the claimant. Ness v. Stirling (In re Estate of Stirling), 537 N.W.2d 554, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 177 (N.D. 1995), overruled in part, Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, 831 N.W.2d 369, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 2013).

Statute of Limitations.

This section does not prohibit enforcement of a tort claim and toll the running of the statute of limitations, but simply annexes the condition that a personal representative of decedent tort-feasor be appointed. Ness v. Stirling (In re Estate of Stirling), 537 N.W.2d 554, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 177 (N.D. 1995), overruled in part, Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, 831 N.W.2d 369, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 2013).

Collateral References.

Time for filing claim based on promise not to make a will, 32 A.L.R.2d 370, 380.

Limitations of actions: when statute of limitations begins to run against action on bond of personal representative, 44 A.L.R.2d 807.

Amendment of claim against decedent’s estate after expiration of time for filing claims, 56 A.L.R.2d 627.

Appealability of order, of court possessing probate jurisdiction, allowing or denying tardy presentation of claim to personal representative, 66 A.L.R.2d 659.

Relation back of appointment of administrator, running of statute of limitations as affected by doctrine of, 3 A.L.R.3d 1234.

Amount of claim filed against decedent’s estate as limiting amount recoverable in action against estate, 25 A.L.R.3d 1356.

Delay in appointment: effect of delay in appointing administrator or other representative on cause of action accruing at or after death of person in whose favor it would have accrued, 28 A.L.R.3d 1141.

Counterclaim: presentation of claim to executor or administrator as prerequisite of its availability as counterclaim or setoff, 36 A.L.R.3d 693.

Garnishment against executor or administrator by creditor of estate, 60 A.L.R.3d 1301.

30.1-12-05. (3-105) Proceedings affecting devolution and administration — Jurisdiction of subject matter.

Persons interested in decedents’ estates may apply to the court for determination in the informal proceedings provided in chapters 30.1-12 through 30.1-23 and may petition the court for orders in formal proceedings within the court’s jurisdiction, including those described in chapters 30.1-12 through 30.1-23. The court has exclusive jurisdiction of formal proceedings to determine how decedents’ estates subject to the laws of this state are to be administered, expended, and distributed, including actions to determine title to property alleged to belong to the estate and of any action or proceeding in which property distributed by a personal representative or its value is sought to be subjected to rights of creditors or successors of the decedent.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 69, § 36.

Cross-References.

Subject matter jurisdiction, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-02-02.

Notes to Decisions

Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

The county court has jurisdiction to order a person who has received excessive compensation to make a refund to the estate and to order the personal representative to pay for losses to the estate caused by a breach of a fiduciary duty. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

County court has jurisdiction to review allegations of breach of fiduciary duty by the personal representative and excessive compensation of persons employed by a personal representative. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

Jurisdiction.

In a case in which respondents established the legacy trust, and transferred the decedent’s interest in certain real property to themselves as trustees before the decedent died, the personal representative could petition the probate court, seeking a determination that the legacy trust was invalid and requesting the transfer of the decedent’s interest in the real property to the trust be set aside based on her claim that the decedent’s interest in that real property should be included in the estate for purposes of probate, because the dispute regarding the trust and the decedent’s mineral interests in the tract of land in Divide County were within the scope of determining title to property alleged to belong to the estate. Bouchard v. Biel (In re Estate of Brandt), 2019 ND 87, 924 N.W.2d 762, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 2019).

Misappropriation.

District court order concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to decide whether funds expended prior to the appointment of a guardian and conservator were misappropriated was reversed. The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-12-05 granted to the district court the exclusive jurisdiction of formal probate proceedings, including actions to determine title to property allegedly belonging to the estate. Valer v. Bartelson (In re Estate of Bartelson), 2011 ND 219, 806 N.W.2d 199, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 219 (N.D. 2011).

30.1-12-06. (3-106) Proceedings within the exclusive jurisdiction of court — Service — Jurisdiction over persons.

In proceedings within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court where notice is required by this title or by rule, and in proceedings to construe probated wills or determine heirs which concern estates that have not been and cannot now be opened for administration, interested persons may be bound by the orders of the court in respect to property in or subject to the laws of this state by notice in conformity with section 30.1-03-01. An order is binding as to all who are given notice of the proceeding though less than all interested persons are notified.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, § 13.

Cross-References.

Curative proceedings for persons interested in estate but not given notice of prior proceeding, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-21-01.

Subject matter jurisdiction, see N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-02-02, 30.1-12-05.

Notes to Decisions

Interested Persons.

In all formal estate proceedings, notice must be given to every interested person prior to any formal hearing or order; interested persons not notified of formal proceedings are not bound. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Probate court had personal jurisdiction over the parties because all of the parties necessary for determination of the title to the decedent’s property interests that were transferred to the legacy trust fell within the definition of an interested person, and they were provided with notice of the hearing on the petitions; and all parties to the civil action were served with notice of hearing of the petitions to determine title and value to the property. Bouchard v. Biel (In re Estate of Brandt), 2019 ND 87, 924 N.W.2d 762, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 2019).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Jurisdiction Obtained.

The county court could obtain jurisdiction over a party by his personal appearance if the party was of full age and had not been judicially declared incompetent to manage his affairs, even though there was pending a petition to declare the person incompetent. In re Guardianship of Jones, 66 N.D. 185, 263 N.W. 160, 1935 N.D. LEXIS 185 (N.D. 1935).

Where a person of lawful age personally appeared without being cited at a hearing called by a county judge on petition for a guardian’s appointment, and stated that she wished to have a person appointed as guardian, and signed a written request for his appointment, the court acquired jurisdiction over her person to the same extent as if she had been cited. In re Guardianship of Jones, 66 N.D. 185, 263 N.W. 160, 1935 N.D. LEXIS 185 (N.D. 1935).

Jurisdiction of the parties could be acquired by the presentation of a petition by a competent party and by either the issuance and service of a citation upon all other parties or by the voluntary appearance and waiver of service of citation by other parties. Tooz v. Tooz, 78 N.D. 432, 50 N.W.2d 61, 1951 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1951).

30.1-12-07. (3-107) Scope of proceedings — Proceedings independent — Exception.

Unless supervised administration as described in chapter 30.1-16 is involved, each proceeding before the court is independent of any other proceeding involving the same estate. Petitions for formal orders of the court may combine various requests for relief in a single proceeding if the orders sought may be finally granted without delay. Except as required for proceedings which are particularly described by other sections of chapters 30.1-12 through 30.1-23, no petition is defective because it fails to embrace all matters which might then be the subject of a final order, proceedings for probate of wills or adjudications of no will may be combined with proceedings for appointment of personal representatives, and a proceeding for appointment of personal representative is concluded by an order making or declining the appointment.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Appeal.

Orders in an unsupervised probate are appealable without certification, unless they determine some, but not all, of one creditor’s claims against an estate. Zimbelman v. Loh (In re Estate of Zimbleman), 539 N.W.2d 67, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 193 (N.D. 1995).

Order approving personal representative’s calculation of spouse’s elective share and denial of spouse’s motion to amend order were appealable, where estate was under informal probate administration, and each proceeding before the court in the unsupervised administration was independent of any other proceeding involving the same estate. Luken v. Schulz (In re Estate of Luken), 551 N.W.2d 794, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 197 (N.D. 1996).

Whether widow waived her right to claim an elective share was so interconnected with the unresolved issue of what she would receive under the will, order denying her motion for an elective share was not appealable. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman (In re Estate of Zimmerman), 1997 ND 58, 561 N.W.2d 642, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 55 (N.D. 1997).

Son’s appeal of an order denying a widow’s petition to determine an intestate’s heirs was not authorized because the order was not final and further proceedings regarding intestate succession and the determination of heirs could be necessary. Estate of Huston v. Huston, 2014 ND 29, 843 N.W.2d 3, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 21 (N.D. 2014).

Multiple Claims of One Creditor.

A workable reconciliation of this rule and the “separate proceeding” provisions of an unsupervised administration is to treat a determination of all of one creditor’s claims against an estate as a separate proceeding which does not need a N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification. However, if one creditor has more than one claim, an appeal from an order resolving some, but not all, of that creditor’s claims is premature without a N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification. In re Estate of Starcher, 447 N.W.2d 293, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 200 (N.D. 1989).

In an unsupervised administration, an order determining some, but not all, of one creditor’s claims against an estate is not appealable without a certification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). In re Estate of Starcher, 447 N.W.2d 293, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 200 (N.D. 1989).

In a supervised administration, an order entered before approval of distribution of the estate and discharge of the personal representative is not final and cannot be appealed without a certification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). In re Estate of Starcher, 447 N.W.2d 293, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 200 (N.D. 1989).

30.1-12-08. (3-108) Probate, testacy, and appointment proceedings — Ultimate time limit.

No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will previously probated at the testator’s domicile and appointment proceedings relating to an estate in which there has been a prior appointment, may be commenced more than three years after the decedent’s death, except:

  1. If a previous proceeding was dismissed because of doubt about the fact of the decedent’s death, appropriate probate, appointment, or testacy proceedings may be maintained at any time thereafter upon a finding that the decedent’s death occurred prior to the initiation of the previous proceeding and the applicant or petitioner has not delayed unduly in initiating the subsequent proceedings.
  2. Appropriate probate, appointment, or testacy proceedings may be maintained in relation to the estate of an absent, disappeared, or missing person for whose estate a conservator has been appointed, at any time within three years after the conservator becomes able to establish the death of the protected person.
  3. A proceeding to contest an informally probated will and to secure appointment of the person with legal priority for appointment in the event the contest is successful may be commenced within the later of twelve months from the informal probate or three years from the decedent’s death.
  4. An informal appointment or a formal testacy or appointment proceeding may be commenced thereafter if no proceeding concerning the succession or estate administration has occurred within the three-year period after the decedent’s death, but the personal representative has no right to possess estate assets as provided in section 30.1-18-09 beyond that necessary to confirm title to the assets in the successors to the estate and claims other than expenses of administration may not be presented against the estate.
  5. A formal testacy proceeding may be commenced at any time after three years from the decedent’s death for the purpose of establishing an instrument to direct or control the ownership of property passing or distributable after the decedent’s death from one other than the decedent when the property is to be appointed by the terms of the decedent’s will or is to pass or be distributed as a part of the decedent’s estate or its transfer is otherwise to be controlled by the terms of the decedent’s will.

These limitations do not apply to proceedings to construe probated wills or determine heirs of an intestate. In cases under subsection 1 or 2, the date on which a testacy or appointment proceeding is properly commenced shall be deemed to be the date of the decedent’s death for purposes of other limitations provisions of this title which relate to the date of death.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 401, § 4; 1991, ch. 348, § 1; 1995, ch. 322, § 22.

Notes to Decisions

Jurisdiction.

Although the district court had diversity jurisdiction over a suit brought by three former designated beneficiaries of accounts owned by a deceased great aunt, the probate exception applied to bar the court from exercising jurisdiction over the beneficiaries’ suit because the probate of the great aunt’s will was closely intertwined with the beneficiaries’ allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the representative and sole beneficiary of the great aunt’s estate and the beneficiaries’ claims for relief included imposing a constructive trust on assets in the estate of the great aunt’s husband. The beneficiaries had time to file a suit pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-12-08(3) to contest the informal probate of the great aunt’s will, and the state court was the proper forum to invalidate the wills of the great aunt and/or her husband. Brooks v. Wiesz, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69369 (D.N.D. 2008).

Collateral References.

Delay: loss of right to be appointed executor by delay in presenting will for probate or in seeking letters testamentary, 45 A.L.R.2d 916.

Statute limiting time for probate of will as applicable to will probated in another jurisdiction, 87 A.L.R.2d 721.

Relation back of appointment of administrator, running of statute of limitations as affected by doctrine of, 3 A.L.R.3d 1234.

What circumstances excuse failure to submit will for probate within time limit set by statute, 17 A.L.R.3d 1361.

Probate of copy of lost will as precluding later contest of will under doctrine of res judicata, 55 A.L.R.3d 755.

Fraud as extending statutory limitations period for contesting will or its probate, 48 A.L.R.4th 1094.

30.1-12-09. (3-109) Statutes of limitation on decedent’s claim for relief.

No statute of limitation running on a claim for relief belonging to a decedent which had not been barred as of the date of the decedent’s death applies to bar a claim for relief surviving the decedent’s death sooner than four months after death. A claim for relief which, but for this section, would have been barred less than four months after death is barred after four months unless tolled.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1985, ch. 82, § 73.

CHAPTER 30.1-13 Venue — Priority to Administer — Demand for Notice

30.1-13-01. (3-201) Venue for first and subsequent estate proceedings — Location of property.

  1. Venue for the first informal or formal testacy or appointment proceedings after a decedent’s death is:
    1. In the county where the decedent was domiciled at the time of death.
    2. If the decedent was not domiciled in this state, in any county where property of the decedent was located at the time of death.
  2. Venue for all subsequent proceedings within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court is in the place where the initial proceeding occurred, unless the initial proceeding has been transferred as provided in section 30.1-02-03 or subsection 3.
  3. If the first proceeding was informal, on application of an interested person and after notice to the proponent in the first proceeding, the court, upon finding that venue is elsewhere, may transfer the proceeding and the file to the other court.
  4. For the purpose of aiding determinations concerning location of assets which may be relevant in cases involving nondomiciliaries, a debt, other than one evidenced by investment or commercial paper or other instrument in favor of a nondomiciliary, is located where the debtor resides, or, if the debtor is a person other than an individual, at the place where it has its principal office. Commercial paper, investment paper, and other instruments are located where the instrument is. An interest in property held in trust is located where the trustee may be sued.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Place of personal representative’s appointment as venue of action against him in his official capacity, 93 A.L.R.2d 1199.

30.1-13-02. (3-202) Appointment or testacy proceedings — Conflicting claim of domicile in another state.

If conflicting claims as to the domicile of a decedent are made in a formal testacy or appointment proceeding commenced in this state, and in a testacy or appointment proceeding after notice pending at the same time in another state, the court of this state must stay, dismiss, or permit suitable amendment in the proceeding here unless it is determined that the local proceeding was commenced before the proceeding elsewhere. The determination of domicile in the proceeding first commenced must be accepted as determinative in the proceeding in this state.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-13-03. (3-203) Priority among persons seeking appointment as personal representative.

  1. Whether the proceedings are formal or informal, persons who are not disqualified have priority for appointment in the following order:
    1. The person with priority as determined by a probated will, including a person nominated by a power conferred in a will.
    2. The surviving spouse of the decedent who is a devisee of the decedent.
    3. Other devisees of the decedent.
    4. The surviving spouse of the decedent.
    5. Other heirs of the decedent.
    6. The guardian or conservator of the decedent at the time of the decedent’s death.
    7. A trust company.
    8. Forty-five days after the death of the decedent, any creditor.
  2. An objection to an appointment can be made only in formal proceedings. In case of objection the priorities stated in subsection 1 apply, except that:
    1. If the estate appears to be more than adequate to meet exemptions and costs of administration but inadequate to discharge anticipated unsecured claims, the court, on petition of creditors, may appoint any qualified person; or
    2. In case of objection to appointment of a person other than one whose priority is determined by will by an heir or devisee appearing to have a substantial interest in the estate, the court may appoint a person who is acceptable to heirs and devisees whose interests in the estate appear to be worth in total more than half of the probable distributable value, or, in default of this accord, any suitable person.
  3. A person entitled to letters under subdivisions b through e of subsection 1 may nominate a qualified person to act as personal representative. Any person may renounce the person’s right to nominate or to an appointment by appropriate writing filed with the court. When two or more persons share a priority, those who do not renounce must concur in nominating another to act for them, or in applying for appointment.
  4. Conservators of the estates of protected persons, or if there is no conservator, any guardian except a guardian ad litem of a minor or incapacitated person, may exercise the same right to nominate, to object to another’s appointment, or to participate in determining the preference of a majority in interest of the heirs and devisees that the protected person or ward would have if qualified for appointment.
  5. Appointment of one who does not have priority, including priority resulting from renunciation or nomination determined pursuant to this section, may be made only in formal proceedings. Before appointing one without priority, the court must determine that those having priority, although given notice of the proceedings, have failed to request appointment or to nominate another for appointment, and that administration is necessary.
  6. No person is qualified to serve as a personal representative who is:
    1. Under the age of eighteen; or
    2. A person whom the court finds unsuitable in formal proceedings.
  7. A personal representative appointed by a court of the decedent’s domicile has priority over all other persons except in cases in which the decedent’s will nominates different persons to be personal representative in this state and in the state of domicile. The domiciliary personal representative may nominate another, who shall have the same priority as the domiciliary personal representative.
  8. This section governs priority for appointment of a successor personal representative but does not apply to the selection of a special administrator.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1981, ch. 347, § 1; 2019, ch. 273, § 1, effective August 1, 2019.

Notes to Decisions

Conservators.

Conservator of estate of sister of intestate decedent was entitled under this section either to nominate or object regarding appointment of personal representative. In re Estate of Engeseth, 352 N.W.2d 631, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 358 (N.D. 1984).

Creditors.

The exercise of the creditor’s power to petition for appointment of the personal representative is mandatory; a claimant cannot rely on the failure of other persons to seek appointment of a personal representative to suspend the running of a statute of limitations against the claimant. Ness v. Stirling (In re Estate of Stirling), 537 N.W.2d 554, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 177 (N.D. 1995), overruled in part, Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, 831 N.W.2d 369, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 2013).

Interested Person.

Because a personal representative could be an interested person, petitioner was not precluded from filing petitions as an interested person in the formal supervised probate administration while simultaneously performing her fiduciary duty as the personal representative to distribute the property according to the decedent’s will and the best interests of the estate. Bouchard v. Biel (In re Estate of Brandt), 2019 ND 87, 924 N.W.2d 762, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 2019).

Preference for Heir.

As a general rule and in accordance with the statutory provisions, a domiciled heir, a member of the family in its enlarged sense, if available, is and should be given priority for appointment as personal representative or administrator; however, this is not an inflexible position and extenuating circumstances may, and at certain times must, be considered. In re Estate of Engeseth, 352 N.W.2d 631, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 358 (N.D. 1984).

Where conservator of estate of one sister of the intestate decedents and another sister of the intestate decedents both petitioned to have themselves appointed as administrator and personal representative over the estates, and none of the other heirs appeared or expressed any objection or preference between the conservator and the sister, the court acted properly under this section in appointing the conservator, who was the county public administrator, as administrator and personal representative of the estates where more than three years had passed since the death of one decedent without any heir taking action; sister filed her petition only after conservator first filed; sister’s residence in California would involve unneeded duplicity and difficulty; and it was determined to be in the best interests of all three estates to have one person handle them all. In re Estate of Engeseth, 352 N.W.2d 631, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 358 (N.D. 1984).

Collateral References.

Divorce: effect of divorce, separation, desertion, unfaithfulness, and the like, upon right to name appointee for administration of estate of spouse, 34 A.L.R.2d 876.

Separation agreement as affecting right of husband or wife to administer deceased spouse’s estate, 34 A.L.R.2d 1020, 1039.

Appeal: right of appeal from order on application for removal of personal representative, guardian, or trustee, 37 A.L.R.2d 751.

Delay in presenting will for probate or in seeking letters testamentary, loss of right to be appointed executor by, 45 A.L.R.2d 916.

Public administrator, power to contest appointment of administrator, 56 A.L.R.2d 1183, 1201.

Surviving spouse: right of surviving spouse, personally incompetent to serve as administrator because of being younger than age specified, to nominate administrator, 64 A.L.R.2d 1152.

Integrity: construction and effect of statutory provision that no person is competent to act as executor or administrator whom court finds incompetent by reason of want of integrity, 73 A.L.R.2d 458.

Public administrators and others, priority, as regards right to appointment, as between, 99 A.L.R.2d 1063.

Minor: capacity of infant to act as executor or administrator, and effect of improper appointment, 8 A.L.R.3d 590.

Foreign corporation, eligibility to appointment as executor, administrator, or testamentary trustee, 26 A.L.R.3d 1019.

Adverse interest or position as disqualification for appointment of administrator, executor, or other personal representative, 11 A.L.R.4th 638.

30.1-13-04. (3-204) Demand for notice of order or filing concerning decedent’s estate.

Any person desiring notice of any order or filing pertaining to a decedent’s estate in which the person has a financial or property interest may file a demand for notice with the court, at any time after the death of the decedent, stating the name of the decedent, the nature of the person’s interest in the estate, and the demandant’s address or that of the demandant’s attorney. The clerk shall mail a copy of the demand to the personal representative, if one has been appointed. After filing of a demand, no order or filing to which the demand relates shall be made or accepted without notice, as prescribed in section 30.1-03-01, to the demandant or the demandant’s attorney. The validity of an order which is issued or filing which is accepted without compliance with this requirement shall not be affected by the error, but the petitioner receiving the order or the person making the filing may be liable for any damage caused by the absence of notice. The requirement of notice arising from a demand under this provision may be waived in writing by the demandant and shall cease upon the termination of the demandant’s interest in the estate.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

No Right To Notice.

Son could not require a personal representative's supplementary inventory because, once another child was held entitled to an entire estate, the son had no right in or claim against the estate, so the son was no longer an “interested person,” and the son showed no statutory ground for the relief sought. Estate of Pedro v. Scheeler, 2014 ND 237, 856 N.W.2d 775, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 218 (N.D. 2014).

CHAPTER 30.1-14 Informal Probate and Appointment Proceedings

30.1-14-01. (3-301) Informal probate or appointment proceedings — Application — Contents.

  1. Applications for informal probate or informal appointment shall be directed to the court, and verified by the applicant to be accurate and complete to the best of the applicant’s knowledge and belief as to the following information:
    1. Every application for informal probate of a will or for informal appointment of a personal representative, other than a special or successor representative, shall contain the following:
      1. A statement of the interest of the applicant.
      2. The name and date of death of the decedent, the decedent’s age, and the county and state of domicile at the time of death, and the names and addresses of the spouse, children, heirs, and devisees, and the ages of any who are minors so far as known or ascertainable with reasonable diligence by the applicant.
      3. If the decedent was not domiciled in the state at the time of death, a statement showing venue.
      4. A statement identifying and indicating the address of any personal representative of the decedent appointed in this state or elsewhere whose appointment has not been terminated.
      5. A statement indicating whether the applicant has received a demand for notice, or is aware of any demand for notice of any probate or appointment proceeding concerning the decedent that may have been filed in this state or elsewhere.
      6. A statement that the time limit for informal probate or appointment under this chapter has not expired because three years or less have elapsed since the decedent’s death, or, if more than three years from the death have elapsed, circumstances described in section 30.1-12-08 have occurred authorizing tardy probate or appointment.
    2. An application for informal probate of a will shall state the following, in addition to the statements required by subdivision a:
      1. That the original of the decedent’s last will is in the possession of the court, or accompanies the application, or that an authenticated copy of a will probated in another jurisdiction accompanies the application.
      2. That the applicant, to the best of the applicant’s knowledge, believes the will to have been validly executed.
      3. That after the exercise of reasonable diligence, the applicant is unaware of any instrument revoking the will, and that the applicant believes that the instrument which is the subject of the application is the decedent’s last will.
    3. An application for informal appointment of a personal representative to administer an estate under a will shall describe the will by date of execution and state the time and place of probate or the pending application or petition for probate. The application for appointment shall adopt the statements in the application or petition for probate and state the name, address, and priority for appointment of the person whose appointment is sought.
    4. An application for informal appointment of an administrator in intestacy shall state, in addition to the statements required by subdivision a:
      1. That after the exercise of reasonable diligence, the applicant is unaware of any unrevoked testamentary instrument relating to property having a situs in this state under section 30.1-02-01, or, a statement why any such instrument of which the applicant may be aware is not being probated.
      2. The priority of the person whose appointment is sought and the names of any other persons having a prior or equal right to the appointment under section 30.1-13-03.
    5. An application for appointment of a personal representative to succeed a personal representative appointed under a different testacy status shall refer to the order in the most recent testacy proceeding, state the name and address of the person whose appointment is sought and of the person whose appointment will be terminated if the application is granted, and describe the priority of the applicant.
    6. An application for appointment of a personal representative to succeed a personal representative who has tendered a resignation as provided in subsection 3 of section 30.1-17-10, or whose appointment has been terminated by death or removal, shall adopt the statements in the application or petition which led to the appointment of the person being succeeded except as specifically changed or corrected, state the name and address of the person who seeks appointment as successor, and describe the priority of the applicant.
  2. By verifying an application for informal probate or informal appointment, the applicant submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding for relief from fraud relating to the application, or for perjury, that may be instituted against the applicant.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, §§ 14, 15.

Notes to Decisions

Appeal.

Order approving personal representative’s calculation of spouse’s elective share and denial of spouse’s motion to amend order were appealable, where estate was under informal probate administration, and each proceeding before the court in the unsupervised administration was independent of any other proceeding involving the same estate. Luken v. Schulz (In re Estate of Luken), 551 N.W.2d 794, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 197 (N.D. 1996).

Appointment of Claimant.

Upon learning of decedent’s death, proper procedure for claimant against estate for tort of decedent is to petition for appointment of herself as the personal representative of decedent’s estate under this section; if others with higher priority for appointment refuse, she can then present her claim against the estate before the statute of limitations runs out. Ness v. Stirling (In re Estate of Stirling), 537 N.W.2d 554, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 177 (N.D. 1995), overruled in part, Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, 831 N.W.2d 369, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 2013).

30.1-14-01.1. Duty of court to provide forms to an applicant — Assistance of attorney not required.

The court shall provide the necessary forms to an applicant who requests aid in using the informal probate or appointment procedure. The forms and explanatory materials must be prepared by the state court administrator and provided at cost. The assistance of an attorney is not required for informal probate or appointment procedure.

Source: S.L. 1977, ch. 297, § 1; 1979, ch. 378, § 1; 1987, ch. 396, § 1.

30.1-14-02. (3-302) Informal probate — Duty of court — Effect of informal probate.

Upon receipt of an application requesting informal probate of a will, the court, upon making the findings required by section 30.1-14-03, shall issue a written statement of informal probate if at least one hundred twenty hours have elapsed since the decedent’s death. Informal probate is conclusive as to all persons until superseded by an order in a formal testacy proceeding. No defect in the application or procedure relating thereto which leads to informal probate of a will renders the probate void.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Failure to File Will.

Failure to file the original will pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-14-03 did not invalidate informal probate proceedings because the argument lacked merit under this section. Harr v. Behle (In re Estate of Behle), 2021 ND 199, 966 N.W.2d 551, 2021 N.D. LEXIS 203 (N.D. 2021).

30.1-14-03. (3-303) Informal probate — Proof and findings required.

  1. In an informal proceeding for original probate of a will, the court shall determine whether:
    1. The application is complete.
    2. The applicant has made oath or affirmation that the statements contained in the application are true to the best of the applicant’s knowledge and belief.
    3. The applicant appears from the application to be an interested person as defined in subsection 25 of section 30.1-01-06.
    4. On the basis of the statements in the application, venue is proper.
    5. An original, duly executed, and apparently unrevoked will is in the court’s possession.
    6. Any notice required by section 30.1-13-04 has been given and that the application is not within section 30.1-14-04.
    7. It appears from the application that the time limit for original probate has not expired.
  2. The application must be denied if it indicates that a personal representative has been appointed in another county of this state or, except as provided in subsection 4, if it appears that this or another will of the decedent has been the subject of a previous probate order.
  3. A will that appears to have the required signatures and which contains an attestation clause showing that requirements of execution under section 30.1-08-02 or 30.1-08-06 have been met must be probated without further proof. In other cases, the court may assume execution if the will appears to have been properly executed, or the court may accept a sworn statement or affidavit of any person having knowledge of the circumstances of execution, whether or not the person was a witness to the will.
  4. Informal probate of a will that has been previously probated elsewhere may be granted at any time upon written application by any interested person, together with deposit of an authenticated copy of the will and of the statement probating it from the office or court where it was first probated.
  5. A will from a place which does not provide for probate of a will after death and which is not eligible for probate under subsection 1 may be probated in this state upon receipt by the court of a duly authenticated copy of the will and a duly authenticated certificate of its legal custodian that the copy filed is a true copy and that the will has become operative under the law of the other place.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 43; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Notes to Decisions

Amino Revocandi Presumption.

District court erred in finding that the testator’s missing will was not presumed to be revoked, because while N.D.C.C. § 30.1-08-07 did not speak to admitting a lost will and neither N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-14-03 nor 30.1-15-02 provided specific presumptions for admitting a missing will, the drafter’s of the Uniform Probate Code did contemplate the probate of lost wills, and the district court erroneously failed to apply the common law amino revocandi presumption that a missing will was revoked; if a will could not be found upon the death of the testator, the presumption arose that the testator revoked the missing will, and under N.D.R.Ev. 301(a), the party seeking to probate the missing will must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the testator did not destroy or revoke the missing will animo revocandi. York v. Conley (In re Estate of Conley), 2008 ND 148, 753 N.W.2d 384, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 2008).

Failure to File.

Failure to file the original will pursuant to this section did not invalidate informal probate proceedings because the argument lacked merit under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-14-02. Harr v. Behle (In re Estate of Behle), 2021 ND 199, 966 N.W.2d 551, 2021 N.D. LEXIS 203 (N.D. 2021).

30.1-14-04. (3-304) Informal probate — Unavailable in certain cases.

Applications for informal probate which relate to one or more of a known series of testamentary instruments, other than a will and one or more codicils to the will, the latest of which does not expressly revoke the earlier, must be declined.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 401, § 5.

30.1-14-05. (3-305) Informal probate — Court not satisfied.

If the court is not satisfied that a will is entitled to be probated in informal proceedings because of failure to meet the requirements of sections 30.1-14-03 and 30.1-14-04, or for any other reason specified by law, it may decline the application. A declination of informal probate is not an adjudication and does not preclude formal probate proceedings.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1987, ch. 396, § 2.

30.1-14-06. (3-306) Informal probate — Notice requirements.

The moving party must give notice, as described in section 30.1-03-01, of the moving party’s application for informal probate to any person demanding it pursuant to section 30.1-13-04, and to any personal representative of the decedent whose appointment has not been terminated. No other notice of informal probate is required.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-14-07. (3-307) Informal appointment proceedings — Delay in order — Duty of court — Effect of appointment.

  1. Upon receipt of an application for informal appointment of a personal representative other than a special administrator as provided in section 30.1-17-14, if at least one hundred twenty hours have elapsed since the decedent’s death, the court, after making the findings required by section 30.1-14-08, shall appoint the applicant subject to qualification and acceptance. If the decedent was a nonresident, the court shall delay the order of appointment until thirty days have elapsed since death unless the personal representative appointed at the decedent’s domicile is the applicant or unless the decedent’s will directs that the estate be subject to the laws of this state. The court must make its order of appointment and issue letters testamentary or letters of administration within ten working days after all requirements for informal proceedings have been met.
  2. The status of personal representative and the powers and duties pertaining to the office are fully established by informal appointment. An appointment, and the office of personal representative created thereby, is subject to termination as provided in sections 30.1-17-08 through 30.1-17-12, but is not subject to retroactive vacation.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 290, § 5; 1981, ch. 584, § 1; 1987, ch. 396, § 3.

30.1-14-08. (3-308) Informal appointment proceedings — Proof and findings required.

  1. In informal appointment proceedings, the court shall determine whether:
    1. The application for informal appointment of a personal representative is complete.
    2. The applicant has made oath or affirmation that the statements contained in the application are true to the best of the applicant’s knowledge and belief.
    3. The applicant appears from the application to be an interested person as defined in subsection 25 of section 30.1-01-06.
    4. On the basis of the statements in the application, venue is proper.
    5. Any will to which the requested appointment relates has been formally or informally probated, but this requirement does not apply to the appointment of a special administrator.
    6. Any notice required by section 30.1-13-04 has been given.
    7. From the statements in the application, the person whose appointment is sought has priority entitling the person to the appointment.
  2. Unless section 30.1-17-12 controls, the application must be denied if it indicates that a personal representative who has not filed a written statement of resignation as provided in subsection 3 of section 30.1-17-10 has been appointed in this or another county of this state, that, unless the applicant is the domiciliary personal representative or the representative’s nominee, the decedent was not domiciled in this state and that a personal representative whose appointment has not been terminated has been appointed by a court in the state of domicile or that other requirements of this section have not been met.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 44; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

30.1-14-09. (3-309) Informal appointment proceedings — Court not satisfied.

If the court is not satisfied that a requested informal appointment of a personal representative should be made because of failure to meet the requirements of sections 30.1-14-07 and 30.1-14-08, or for any other reason, it may decline the application. A declination of informal appointment is not an adjudication and does not preclude appointment in formal proceedings.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-14-10. (3-310) Informal appointment proceedings — Notice requirements.

The moving party must give notice as described by section 30.1-03-01 of the moving party’s intention to seek an appointment informally:

  1. To any person demanding it pursuant to section 30.1-13-04.
  2. To any person having a prior or equal right to appointment not waived in writing and filed with the court.

No other notice of an informal appointment proceeding is required.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-14-11. (3-311) Informal appointment unavailable in certain cases.

If an application for informal appointment indicates the existence of a possible unrevoked testamentary instrument which may relate to property subject to the laws of this state, and which is not filed for probate in this court, the court shall decline the application.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

CHAPTER 30.1-15 Formal Testacy and Appointment Proceedings

30.1-15-01. (3-401) Formal testacy proceedings — Nature — When commenced.

  1. A formal testacy proceeding is litigation to determine whether a decedent left a valid will. A formal testacy proceeding may be commenced by an interested person filing a petition as described in subsection 1 of section 30.1-15-02 in which the interested person requests that the court, after notice and hearing, enter an order probating a will, or a petition to set aside an informal probate of a will or to prevent informal probate of a will which is the subject of a pending application, or a petition in accordance with subsection 2 of section 30.1-15-02 for an order that the decedent died intestate.
  2. A petition may seek formal probate of a will without regard to whether the same or a conflicting will has been informally probated. A formal testacy proceeding may, but need not, involve a request for appointment of a personal representative.
  3. During the pendency of a formal testacy proceeding, the court shall not act upon any application for informal probate of any will of the decedent or any application for informal appointment of a personal representative of the decedent.
  4. Unless a petition in a formal testacy proceeding also requests confirmation of the previous informal appointment, a previously appointed personal representative, after receipt of notice of the commencement of a formal probate proceeding, must refrain from exercising the power to make any further distribution of the estate during the pendency of the formal proceeding. A petitioner who seeks the appointment of a different personal representative in a formal proceeding also may request an order restraining the acting personal representative from exercising any of the powers of that office and requesting the appointment of a special administrator. In the absence of a request, or if the request is denied, the commencement of a formal proceeding has no effect on the powers and duties of a previously appointed personal representative other than those relating to distribution.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Cross-References.

Probate of more than one instrument, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-15-10.

Notes to Decisions

Formal Testacy Proceeding.

Where petitioner was attempting to establish ownership of property through an unprobated will as evidence of a devise, and did not claim that he, or anyone else, was an heir entitled to the minerals under the law of intestate succession, and also did not attempt to probate a will, the proceeding was not a “formal testacy proceeding” as defined by sections 30.1-01-06 or 30.1-15-01, and since section 30.1-15-06 applies to a “formal testacy proceeding”, it did not directly apply here. In re Estate of Papineau, 396 N.W.2d 735, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 442 (N.D. 1986).

Will Contest.

With notice, any will contest generally becomes a formal proceeding. Ketterling v. Gonzalez (In re the Estate of Ketterling), 515 N.W.2d 158, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1994).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Hearing Required.

Former section contemplated a petition upon which the law required a hearing. Zlevor v. Tice, 64 N.D. 626, 255 N.W. 470, 1934 N.D. LEXIS 243 (N.D. 1934).

Collateral References.

Estoppel to contest will or attack its validity by acceptance of benefits thereunder, 78 A.L.R.4th 90.

30.1-15-02. (3-402) Formal testacy or appointment proceedings — Petition — Contents.

  1. Petitions for formal probate of a will, or for adjudication of intestacy with or without request for appointment of a personal representative, must be directed to the court, request a judicial order after notice and hearing, and contain further statements as indicated in this section. A petition for formal probate of a will:
    1. Requests an order as to the testacy of the decedent in relation to a particular instrument which may or may not have been informally probated and determining the heirs.
    2. Contains the statements required for informal applications as stated in paragraphs 1 through 6 of subdivision a of subsection 1 of section 30.1-14-01 and the statements required by paragraphs 2 and 3 of subdivision b of subsection 1 of section 30.1-14-01.
    3. States whether the original of the last will of the decedent is in the possession of the court or accompanies the petition.
  2. A petition for adjudication of intestacy and appointment of an administrator in intestacy must request a judicial finding and order that the decedent left no will and determining the heirs, contain the statements required by subdivisions a and d of subsection 1 of section 30.1-14-01, and indicate whether supervised administration is sought. A petition may request an order determining intestacy and heirs without requesting the appointment of an administrator, in which case the statements required by paragraph 2 of subdivision d of subsection 1 of section 30.1-14-01 may be omitted.

If the original will is neither in the possession of the court nor accompanies the petition and no authenticated copy of a will probated in another jurisdiction accompanies the petition, the petition also must state the contents of the will, and indicate that it is lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1999, ch. 50, § 49.

Notes to Decisions

Lost Or Destroyed Will.

District court erred in finding that the testator’s missing will was not presumed to be revoked, because while N.D.C.C. § 30.1-08-07 did not speak to admitting a lost will and neither N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-14-03 nor 30.1-15-02 provided specific presumptions for admitting a missing will, the drafter’s of the Uniform Probate Code did contemplate the probate of lost wills, and the district court erroneously failed to apply the common law amino revocandi presumption that a missing will was revoked; if a will could not be found upon the death of the testator, the presumption arose that the testator revoked the missing will, and under N.D.R.Ev. 301(a), the party seeking to probate the missing will must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the testator did not destroy or revoke the missing will animo revocandi. York v. Conley (In re Estate of Conley), 2008 ND 148, 753 N.W.2d 384, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 2008).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Appointment of Administrator.

An administrator could be appointed only as provided by the former laws relating to administration of estates of intestates. Knudsen v. Lyons, 79 N.D. 595, 58 N.W.2d 845 (1953).

Lost or Destroyed Will.

Proof that a will was in existence at the death of the testator, or that it was fraudulently destroyed during his lifetime, was a prerequisite to the probate of a will as a lost or destroyed will. Merrick v. Prescott, 48 N.D. 195, 183 N.W. 1011, 1921 N.D. LEXIS 23 (N.D. 1921).

Third Person Appointed.

The appointment of a disinterested third person, instead of petitioning parties, as administrator was discretionary with the county court. Ellis v. Ellis, 42 N.D. 535, 174 N.W. 76, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 183 (N.D. 1919).

Value of Estate.

The value of the estate had to be proved before administration would be granted. Maixner v. Zumpf, 51 N.D. 140, 199 N.W. 183, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 148 (N.D. 1924).

30.1-15-03. (3-403) Formal testacy proceeding — Notice of hearing on petition.

  1. Upon commencement of a formal testacy proceeding, the court shall fix a time and place of hearing. Notice shall be given in the manner prescribed by section 30.1-03-01 by the petitioner to the persons herein enumerated and to any additional person who has filed a demand for notice under section 30.1-13-04. Notice shall be given to the following persons:
    1. The surviving spouse, children, and other heirs of the decedent;
    2. The devisees and executors named in any will that is being, or has been, probated, or offered for informal or formal probate in the county, or that is known by the petitioner to have been probated, or offered for informal or formal probate elsewhere; and
    3. Any personal representative of the decedent whose appointment has not been terminated.
  2. If it appears by the petition or otherwise that the fact of the death of the alleged decedent may be in doubt, or on the written demand of any interested person, a copy of the notice of the hearing on said petition shall be sent by registered mail to the alleged decedent at the alleged decedent’s last-known address. The court shall direct the petitioner to report the results of, or make and report back concerning, a reasonably diligent search for the alleged decedent in any manner that may seem advisable, including any or all of the following methods:
    1. By inserting in one or more suitable periodicals a notice requesting information from any person having knowledge of the whereabouts of the alleged decedent.
    2. By notifying law enforcement officials and public welfare agencies in appropriate locations of the disappearance of the alleged decedent.
    3. By engaging the services of an investigator.

Notice may be given to other persons. In addition, the petitioner shall give notice by publication to all unknown persons and to all known persons whose addresses are unknown who have any interest in the matters being litigated.

The costs of any search so directed shall be paid by the petitioner if there is no administration or by the estate of the decedent in case there is administration.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 290, § 6.

Cross-References.

Waiver of notice, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-03-02.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Postponement.

An indefinite postponement operated as a postponement of a hearing in county court until further notice. Mongeon v. Burkebile, 79 N.D. 234, 55 N.W.2d 445, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 116 (N.D. 1952).

Service Waived.

An heir who filed in the county court having jurisdiction of the subject matter a petition for proof and probate of a will of a deceased testator requesting its probate and that he be appointed as executor in accordance with the provisions of the will, waived service of citation required by former section. Tooz v. Tooz, 78 N.D. 432, 50 N.W.2d 61, 1951 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1951).

30.1-15-04. (3-404) Formal testacy proceedings — Written objections to probate — Demand for jury trial.

Any party to a formal proceeding who opposes the probate of a will for any reason shall state in that party’s pleadings the objections to probate of the will. In a contested formal testacy proceeding, any party is entitled to a jury trial of all issues of fact by serving upon all appropriate parties and filing with the court a written demand for jury trial. The written demand must be affixed to the pleading of the party which raises any issues of fact and may not be served and filed later than seven days before the time set for hearing.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1985, ch. 368, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Extrinsic Evidence.

Although this section authorizes a jury trial for all issues of fact, the petitioners were not entitled to a jury trial where the contested will was clear and unambiguous, thereby precluding the use of extrinsic evidence to determine the testator’s intent. Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 1988).

Issues of Fact.

This section applies to determinations of factual issues regarding formal will disputes, rather than issues regarding the rescission of a contract. Kopperud v. Reilly, 453 N.W.2d 598, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 76 (N.D. 1990).

Jury Trial.

County court properly denied defendants’ request for a jury trial in action by decedent’s personal representative seeking rescission of a contract for sale of decedent’s farmland to defendant son, authorized by defendant mother in her capacity as decedent’s conservator. Kopperud v. Reilly, 453 N.W.2d 598, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 76 (N.D. 1990).

30.1-15-05. (3-405) Formal testacy proceedings — Uncontested cases — Hearings and proof.

If a petition in a testacy proceeding is unopposed, the court may order probate or intestacy on the strength of the pleadings if satisfied that the conditions of section 30.1-15-09 have been met, or conduct a hearing in open court and require proof of the matters necessary to support the order sought. If evidence concerning execution of the will is necessary, the affidavit or testimony of one of any attesting witnesses to the instrument is sufficient. If the affidavit or testimony of an attesting witness is not available, execution of the will may be proved by other evidence or affidavit.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Extrinsic Evidence.

Where it appeared from the face of a will that it was signed by the testator, extrinsic evidence was admissible, where the signature was attacked, to show that the signature in fact was the signature of the testator. In re Starke's Estate, 67 N.D. 178, 271 N.W. 131, 1937 N.D. LEXIS 72 (N.D. 1937).

30.1-15-06. (3-406) Formal testacy proceedings — Contested cases.

In a contested case in which the proper execution of a will is at issue, the following rules apply:

  1. If the will is self-proved pursuant to section 30.1-08-04, the will complies with the requirements for execution without the testimony of any attesting witness, upon filing the will and the acknowledgment and affidavits annexed or attached to it, unless there is evidence of fraud or forgery affecting the acknowledgment or affidavit.
  2. If the will is notarized pursuant to paragraph 2 of subdivision c of subsection 1 of section 30.1-08-02, but not self-proved, there is a rebuttable presumption that the will complies with the requirements for execution upon filing the will.
  3. If the will is witnessed pursuant to paragraph 1 of subdivision c of subsection 1 of section 30.1-08-02, but not notarized or self-proved, the testimony of at least one of the attesting witnesses is required to establish proper execution if the witness is within this state, competent, and able to testify. Proper execution may be established by other evidence, including an affidavit of an attesting witness. An attestation clause that is signed by the attesting witnesses raises a rebuttable presumption that the events recited in the clause occurred.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2009, ch. 283, § 25.

Cross-References.

Defenses and objections, see N.D.R.Civ.P. 12.

Rules incorporated into statutes, see N.D.R.Civ.P. 81(c).

Notes to Decisions

Burden of Proof of Will Contestant.

A contestant of a will must prove lack of testamentary intent, lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, or any other frailty in a duly executed will. In re Estate of Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1992).

Upon proof of due execution of a will, testamentary intent is presumed, placing the burden to disprove it upon the contestant. In re Estate of Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1992).

Formal Testacy Proceeding.

Where petitioner was attempting to establish ownership of property through an unprobated will as evidence of a devise, and did not claim that he, or anyone else, was an heir entitled to the minerals under the law of intestate succession, and also did not attempt to probate a will, the proceeding was not a “formal testacy proceeding” as defined by N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-01-06 or 30.1-15-01, and since N.D.C.C. § 30.1-15-06 applies to a “formal testacy proceeding”, it did not directly apply here. In re Estate of Papineau, 396 N.W.2d 735, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 442 (N.D. 1986).

Proof of Due Execution.

A proponent of a will must only prove its due execution to show testamentary intent. In re Estate of Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1992).

Collateral References.

Noncupative will, effectiveness where essential witness thereto is beneficiary, 28 A.L.R.2d 796.

Time of interlineations and changes appearing on face of will, testimony of attesting witnesses as to, 34 A.L.R.2d 619, 662.

Lost will, proof of due execution of, 41 A.L.R.2d 393.

Mental condition: necessity of laying foundation for opinion of attesting witness as to mental condition of testator or testatrix, 17 A.L.R.3d 503.

Attorney: competency, as witness attesting will, of attorney named therein as executor’s attorney, 30 A.L.R.3d 1361.

30.1-15-07. (3-407) Formal testacy proceedings — Burdens in contested cases.

In contested cases, petitioners who seek to establish intestacy have the burden of establishing prima facie proof of death, venue, and heirship. Proponents of a will have the burden of establishing prima facie proof of due execution in all cases, and, if they are also petitioners, prima facie proof of death and venue. Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress, mistake, revocation, or other cause affecting its validity. Parties have the ultimate burden of persuasion as to matters with respect to which they have the initial burden of proof. If a will is opposed by the petition for probate of a later will revoking the former, it shall be determined first whether the later will is entitled to probate, and if a will is opposed by a petition for a declaration of intestacy, it shall be determined first whether the will is entitled to probate.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, § 16.

Notes to Decisions

Burden of Contestants.

North Dakota law provides that contestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of intent or capacity as well as undue influence. Will contestants must prove undue influence at the time of the execution of the will. Rogers v. Mickelson, 477 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1991).

Legal Effect.

Where it was clear that testator intended to draft the instrument and that he intended to sign it, it was irrelevant whether he harbored some secret intention that his actions would have no effect on the disposition of his estate; the consequence of drafting and executing an unambiguous will is that it will have legal effect upon the testator’s death. Norback v. Duemeland (In re Estate of Duemeland), 528 N.W.2d 369, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 36 (N.D. 1995).

Omitted Child.

Although this section generally recognizes mistake, along with several other grounds, as a basis for contesting the validity of a will, N.D.C.C. § 30.1-06-02 specifically controls whether the omission of a child from a will was because of mistake or was intentional. Cates v. Pfeifer, 460 N.W.2d 699 (N.D. 1990).

Proof of Insanity.

Since the trial court instructed that plaintiff, as the person contesting the will, had the burden of proof, there was no error in declining to further instruct that one who makes a will is presumed sane as this presumption was already a function of the burden of proof on the contestant as the trial court instructed. In re Estate of Flaherty, 446 N.W.2d 760, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 189 (N.D. 1989).

Revocation.

Generally, when a will is shown to have been validly executed, the burden of proving revocation rests on one claiming revocation. In re Estate of Papineau, 396 N.W.2d 735, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 442 (N.D. 1986).

District court did not err in determining appellant will proponent presented evidence strong enough to establish met his burden under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-15-07 of proving due execution of decedent’s will, because the court relied upon the notes of the deceased attorney who drafted the will, the deposition testimony of the attorney’s secretary, and the testimony of a witness who saw the signed will. Because the will could not be found upon decedent’s death, the district court correctly applied the presumption that the missing will had been revoked. In re Estate of Clemetson v. Evanson, 2012 ND 28, 812 N.W.2d 388, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 25 (N.D. 2012).

Testamentary Capacity.

Testamentary capacity is presumed and the burden of proving lack of capacity is on contestants, who also have the burden of sustaining a challenge to the validity of a will on the ground of undue influence. In re Estate of Papineau, 396 N.W.2d 735, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 442 (N.D. 1986).

Under this section, the contestants of a will have the burden of proving lack of testamentary capacity. In re Estate of Aune, 478 N.W.2d 561, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 227 (N.D. 1991).

Direct evidence that the decedent fully read and understood all of the provisions of his or her will is unnecessary. In re Estate of Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1992).

It is not essential that a testator understand the meaning of the technical clauses of a will, if the instrument is intended as a will and if it expresses the testator’s intent to distribute his property at death. In re Estate of Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1992).

The question of whether a testator was suffering from an insane delusion which materially affected the will is a question of fact. The contestants must establish that the will was a product of the insane delusion and that the testator, if not laboring under the insane delusion, would have differently devised the property. In re Estate of Aune, 478 N.W.2d 561, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 227 (N.D. 1991).

Because appellant, who claimed that her father's will was the product of an insane delusion, did not make an appropriate offer of proof to properly preserve issues about evidence she claimed was improperly excluded, the district court did not improperly preclude appellant from presenting evidence about her father's alleged mental illness. Bell State Bank & Trust v. Oakland (In re Gassmann), 2015 ND 188, 867 N.W.2d 325, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 203 (N.D. 2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1241, 136 S. Ct. 1493, 194 L. Ed. 2d 597, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2255 (U.S. 2016).

Testamentary Intent.

If a duly executed will contains the decedent’s general instructions for its contents, testamentary intent exists. In re Estate of Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1992).

Regarding testamentary intent, in the absence of ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is not admissible except to show fraud or mistake. Norback v. Duemeland (In re Estate of Duemeland), 528 N.W.2d 369, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 36 (N.D. 1995).

Testator’s Handwriting.

Order denying the brother’s petition for formal probate of a holographic will was proper because the district court did not clearly err in finding that the material portions of the purported holographic will were not in the testator’s handwriting. Beach v. Burris (Estate of Beach), 2022 ND 13, 969 N.W.2d 198, 2022 N.D. LEXIS 11 (N.D. 2022).

Undue Influence.

There is no presumption of undue influence where the proponent of the will, while occupying a confidential relationship with the testator, participated in the preparation or procurement of the will and received a substantial bequest or benefit thereunder. In re Estate of Wagner, 265 N.W.2d 459, 1978 N.D. LEXIS 229 (N.D. 1978).

Contestant to the will carried the burden of proving that the will was the result of undue influence. In re Estate of Stenerson, 348 N.W.2d 141, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 303 (N.D. 1984).

Elements necessary to invalidate a will on the ground of undue influence are: that the testator was subject to such influence; that the opportunity to exercise it existed; that there was a disposition to exercise it; and that the result appears to be the effect of such influence. In re Estate of Stenerson, 348 N.W.2d 141, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 303 (N.D. 1984).

The determination of whether or not a testator was unduly influenced is a question of fact, and that determination, when made by the district court as finder of fact, will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous. In re Estate of Stenerson, 348 N.W.2d 141, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 303 (N.D. 1984).

To be undue, the influence must dominate and control the making of the will such as to make the will express the purpose and intent of the person exercising the influence rather than the testator’s purpose and intent. In re Estate of Stenerson, 348 N.W.2d 141, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 303 (N.D. 1984).

Elements necessary to invalidate a will on the basis of undue influence are that the testator was subject to such influence, the opportunity to exercise it existed, there was a disposition to exercise it, and that the result appears to be the effect of such influence; to be undue, the influence must operate at the time the will is made and must dominate and control the making of the will so as to make the will express the purpose and intent of the person exercising the influence and not the purpose and intent of the testator. Okken v. Okken Estate, 348 N.W.2d 447, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 297 (N.D. 1984).

Evidence which raises a mere suspicion of undue influence is insufficient to support a finding of undue influence. In re Estate of Polda, 349 N.W.2d 11, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 287 (N.D. 1984).

There is no presumption of undue influence, and the burden of proof does not shift to the proponent of the will to show lack of undue influence, where a confidential relationship exists between the proponent and the testator, coupled with the proponent participating in the preparation of the will and receiving a benefit by its terms. In re Estate of Polda, 349 N.W.2d 11, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 287 (N.D. 1984).

Collateral References.

Fraud as extending statutory limitations period for contesting will or its probate, 48 A.L.R.4th 1094.

30.1-15-08. (3-408) Formal testacy proceedings — Will construction — Effect of final order in another jurisdiction.

A final order of a court of another state determining testacy, the validity or construction of a will, made in a proceeding involving notice to and an opportunity for contest by all interested persons must be accepted as determinative by the courts of this state if it includes, or is based upon, a finding that the decedent was domiciled at the time of death in the state where the order was made.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-15-09. (3-409) Formal testacy proceedings — Order — Foreign will.

After the time required for any notice has expired, upon proof of notice, and after any hearing that may be necessary, if the court finds that the testator is dead, venue is proper, and that the proceeding was commenced within the limitation prescribed in section 30.1-12-08, it shall determine the decedent’s domicile at death, the decedent’s heirs, and the decedent’s state of testacy. Any will found to be valid and unrevoked shall be formally probated. Termination of any previous informal appointment of a personal representative, which may be appropriate in view of the relief requested and findings, is governed by section 30.1-17-12. The petition shall be dismissed or appropriate amendment allowed if the court is not satisfied that the alleged decedent is dead. A will from a place which does not provide for probate of a will after death may be proved for probate in this state by a duly authenticated certificate of its legal custodian that the copy introduced is a true copy and that the will has become effective under the law of the other place.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Cross-References.

Murderer cannot inherit from victim, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-10-03.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Analysis

Application.

Where the testator’s domicile at the time of death was within the state, former section, relating to venue for probate of a foreign will, did not apply. McEwen v. McEwen, 50 N.D. 662, 197 N.W. 862, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 20 (N.D. 1924).

Effect.

A foreign will was of no effect in North Dakota until probated in accordance with former law. Hull v. Rolfsrud, 65 N.W.2d 94, 1954 N.D. LEXIS 80 (N.D. 1954).

30.1-15-10. (3-410) Formal testacy proceedings — Probate of more than one instrument.

If two or more instruments are offered for probate before a final order is entered in a formal testacy proceeding, more than one instrument may be probated if neither expressly revokes the other or contains provisions which work a total revocation by implication. If more than one instrument is probated, the order shall indicate what provisions control in respect to the nomination of an executor, if any. The order may, but need not, indicate how any provisions of a particular instrument are affected by the other instrument. After a final order in a testacy proceeding has been entered, no petition for probate of any other instrument of the decedent may be entertained, except incident to a petition to vacate or modify a previous probate order and subject to the time limits of section 30.1-15-12.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Probate where two or more testamentary documents, bearing the same date or undated, are proffered, 17 A.L.R.3d 603.

30.1-15-11. (3-411) Formal testacy proceedings — Partial intestacy.

If it becomes evident in the course of a formal testacy proceeding that, though one or more instruments are entitled to be probated, the decedent’s estate is or may be partially intestate, the court shall enter an order to that effect.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Partial invalidity: may parts of will be upheld notwithstanding failure of other parts for lack of testamentary mental capacity or undue influence, 64 A.L.R.3d 261.

30.1-15-12. (3-412) Formal testacy proceedings — Effect of order — Vacation.

Subject to appeal and subject to vacation as provided herein and in section 30.1-15-13, a formal testacy order under sections 30.1-15-09 through 30.1-15-11, including an order that the decedent left no valid will and determining heirs, is final as to all persons with respect to all issues concerning the decedent’s estate that the court considered or might have considered incident to its rendition relevant to the question of whether the decedent left a valid will, and to the determination of heirs, except that:

  1. The court shall entertain a petition for modification or vacation of its order and probate of another will of the decedent if it is shown that the proponents of the later-offered will:
    1. Were unaware of its existence at the time of the earlier proceeding; or
    2. Were unaware of the earlier proceeding and were given no notice thereof, except by publication.
  2. If intestacy of all or part of the estate has been ordered, the determination of heirs of the decedent may be reconsidered if it is shown that one or more persons were omitted from the determination and it is also shown that the persons:
    1. Were unaware of their relationship to the decedent;
    2. Were unaware of the decedent’s death; or
    3. Were given no notice of any proceeding concerning the decedent’s estate, except by publication.
  3. A petition for vacation under either subsection 1 or 2 must be filed prior to the earlier of the following time limits:
    1. If a personal representative has been appointed for the estate, the time of entry of any order approving final distribution of the estate, or, if the estate is closed by statement, six months after the filing of the closing statement.
    2. Whether or not a personal representative has been appointed for the estate of the decedent, the time prescribed by section 30.1-12-08 when it is no longer possible to initiate an original proceeding to probate a will of the decedent.
    3. Twelve months after the entry of the order sought to be vacated.
  4. The order originally rendered in the testacy proceeding may be modified or vacated, if appropriate under the circumstances, by the order of probate of the later-offered will or the order redetermining heirs.
  5. The finding of the fact of death is conclusive as to the alleged decedent only if notice of the hearing on the petition in the formal testacy proceeding was sent by registered or certified mail addressed to the alleged decedent at the alleged decedent’s last-known address and the court finds that a search under subsection 2 of section 30.1-15-03 was made.

If the alleged decedent is not dead, even if notice was sent and search was made, the alleged decedent may recover estate assets in the hands of the personal representative. In addition to any remedies available to the alleged decedent by reason of any fraud or intentional wrongdoing, the alleged decedent may recover any of the estate or its proceeds from distributees which is in their hands, or the value of distributions received by them, to the extent that any recovery from distributees is equitable in view of all of the circumstances.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1995, ch. 322, § 23.

Notes to Decisions

Effect of Fraud.

When the formal processes of admitting a will to probate, appointing a personal representative, or settling an estate are preceded by notice to all interested persons and a full adversarial hearing, the adjudication generally binds notified persons. An independent action for relief from fraud is authorized, if it has not already been litigated in a formal testacy proceeding, and a party wronged by fraud may bring a timely action outside of the usual procedures and limitations. Ketterling v. Gonzalez (In re the Estate of Ketterling), 515 N.W.2d 158, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1994).

Reconsideration of Heirs.

An order could not have been res judicata, under subdivision 2 of this section, where the omitted heirs were given no notice other than by publication, thereby subjecting the determination of heirs to reconsideration by the successor of the judge who issued the original distribution order. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Codicil.

When used in Title 30, N.D.C.C. Judicial Procedure, Probate, the term “will” included “codicil”. Hoppin v. Fortin, 111 N.W.2d 122, 1961 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1961).

Where a will had been admitted to probate in county court in proceedings wherein a citation was directed to named respondents and all persons interested in the estate of deceased and service made pursuant to statute, the subsequent filing of a petition for probate of a codicil by devisee named therein who was not named in the will or in the proceedings for its probate, was a contest of the will after probate, where codicil altered disposition of a part of the estate. Hoppin v. Fortin, 111 N.W.2d 122, 1961 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1961).

Court’s Power.

The power of the county court to grant a rehearing was limited to the causes enumerated in the statute, and had to be exercised within the time prescribed. In re Hafey's Estate, 52 N.D. 262, 202 N.W. 138, 1925 N.D. LEXIS 20 (N.D. 1925).

A county court could not open, vacate, or modify a decree or order except for cause at the time and in the manner prescribed by statute. Bellingham State Bank v. McCormick, 55 N.D. 700, 215 N.W. 152, 1927 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1927).

Decree of Heirship.

Even if decree of heirship was found to be invalid, it operated as color of title for the heirs of real property. Chapin v. Letcher, 93 N.W.2d 415, 1958 N.D. LEXIS 101 (N.D. 1958).

Final Decree.

The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and statement of relief awarded embodied in a single document constituted a final decree of the county court. In re Lemery's Estate, 15 N.D. 312, 107 N.W. 365, 1906 N.D. LEXIS 38 (N.D. 1906).

The mere probating of a will was not final and conclusive as to the validity and construction of the instrument. Lowery v. Hawker, 22 N.D. 318, 133 N.W. 918, 1911 N.D. LEXIS 54 (N.D. 1911).

Former statute prescribed the power of the county court to open and vacate a final decree, the grounds therefor, and the limitations of time thereon. Reichert v. Reichert, 41 N.D. 253, 170 N.W. 621, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 72 (N.D. 1919).

Insufficient Order.

An order was insufficient which made no reference either to the facts or to the record upon which the order was made, other than to recite that a previous order of the court dismissing the petition had been entered. Mongeon v. Burkebile, 79 N.D. 234, 55 N.W.2d 445, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 116 (N.D. 1952).

Interpretation of Statutes.

A statute making a decree granting the probate of a will conclusive unless reversed, or vacated had to be read in conjunction with the statute providing for appeal to the district court from a decision of the county court affecting substantial rights, and the statute providing for contesting of a will after probate. In re McKee's Estate, 67 N.D. 504, 274 N.W. 601, 1937 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 1937); Tooz v. Tooz, 78 N.D. 432, 50 N.W.2d 61, 1951 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1951).

Jurisdiction.

In a statutory proceeding to contest a will after probate, the court would not consider a challenge on the ground that a jurisdictional fact was wanting in probate where the petitioners submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and asked for a determination as to the validity of the will. In re McKee's Estate, 67 N.D. 504, 274 N.W. 601, 1937 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 1937).

A decree of the county court could be attacked by motion in the proceeding in which it was rendered at any time on the ground of the nonexistence of any fact necessary to jurisdiction. In re Anderson's Estate, 76 N.D. 163, 34 N.W.2d 413, 1948 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1948); Knudsen v. Lyons, 79 N.D. 595, 58 N.W.2d 845 (1953).

Where final decree in probate sale was entered on November 21, 1941, and petition to set aside sale and have estate reopened was filed in 1948, the only matter that the petitioner could have considered on appeal was whether any fact in the proceedings of the county court necessary to jurisdiction was nonexistent. Skachenko v. Sweetman, 77 N.D. 502, 43 N.W.2d 683, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1950).

Motion for Summary Judgment.

Upon an appeal taken generally from the county to the district court in a proceeding for the contest of a will after probate, district court could grant motion for a summary judgment where petition upon which the purported contest was based failed to state the required statutory grounds. Hoppin v. Fortin, 111 N.W.2d 122, 1961 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1961).

Order Unappealable.

An order of the county court granting a rehearing for the causes and within the time specified in former sections dealing with rehearings, which did not determine legal rights or affect the subject matter of the proceeding in which it was issued, was not appealable to the district court as affecting substantial rights. In re Guardianship of Johnson, 87 N.W.2d 50, 1957 N.D. LEXIS 179 (N.D. 1957).

Requirements for Contesting Probated Will.

In order to contest a will after probate, it was required that a sworn petition in writing be filed containing allegations that evidence discovered since probate of the will, the material facts of which had to be set forth, showed at least one of the four grounds set out in the statute for contesting the will. Hoppin v. Fortin, 111 N.W.2d 122, 1961 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1961).

Time Limit.

A proceeding to contest a will after probate had to be instituted within one year after the entry in the county court of an order admitting the will to probate, when the will was contested upon any ground other than that some jurisdictional fact was wanting in the former probate. Tooz v. Tooz, 78 N.D. 432, 50 N.W.2d 61, 1951 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1951).

30.1-15-13. (3-413) Formal testacy proceedings — Vacation of order for other cause.

For good cause shown, an order in a formal testacy proceeding may be modified or vacated within the time allowed for appeal.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-15-14. (3-414) Formal proceedings concerning appointment of personal representative.

  1. A formal proceeding for adjudication regarding the priority or qualification of one who is an applicant for appointment as personal representative, or of one who previously has been appointed personal representative in informal proceedings, if an issue concerning the testacy of the decedent is or may be involved, is governed by section 30.1-15-02, as well as by this section. In other cases, the petition shall contain or adopt the statements required by subsection 1 of section 30.1-14-01 and describe the question relating to priority or qualification of the personal representative which is to be resolved. If the proceeding precedes any appointment of a personal representative, it shall stay any pending informal appointment proceedings as well as any commenced thereafter. If the proceeding is commenced after appointment, the previously appointed personal representative, after receipt of notice thereof, shall refrain from exercising any power of administration except as necessary to preserve the estate or unless the court orders otherwise.
  2. After notice to interested persons, including all persons interested in the administration of the estate as successors under the applicable assumption concerning testacy, any previously appointed personal representative, and any person having or claiming priority for appointment as personal representative, the court shall determine who is entitled to appointment under section 30.1-13-03, make a proper appointment and, if appropriate, terminate any prior appointment found to have been improper as provided in cases of removal under section 30.1-17-11.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 290, § 7; 1981, ch. 584, § 2.

CHAPTER 30.1-16 Supervised Administration

30.1-16-01. (3-501) Supervised administration — Nature of proceeding.

Supervised administration is a single in rem proceeding to secure complete administration and settlement of a decedent’s estate under the continuing authority of the court which extends until entry of an order approving distribution of the estate and discharging the personal representative, or other order terminating the proceeding. A supervised personal representative is responsible to the court, as well as to the interested parties, and is subject to directions concerning the estate made by the court on its own motion or on the motion of any interested party. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, or as otherwise ordered by the court, a supervised personal representative has the same duties and powers as a personal representative who is not supervised.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Appeal of Order in Supervised Administration.

Appellate court could hear a son's appeal of a will's interpretation because (1) orders entered in the supervised probate proceeding were not final until a final distribution was approved, and (2) the son's notice of appeal was timely filed after the final order of distribution was entered. Grengs v. Lakefield (Estate of Grengs), 2015 ND 152, 864 N.W.2d 424, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 158 (N.D. 2015).

A workable reconciliation of this rule and the “separate proceeding” provisions of an unsupervised administration is to treat a determination of all of one creditor’s claims against an estate as a separate proceeding which does not need a Rule 54(b) certification. However, if one creditor has more than one claim, an appeal from an order resolving some, but not all, of that creditor’s claims is premature without a Rule 54(b) certification. In re Estate of Starcher, 447 N.W.2d 293, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 200 (N.D. 1989).

In a supervised administration, an order entered before approval of distribution of the estate and discharge of the personal representative is not final and cannot be appealed without a certification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). In re Estate of Starcher, 447 N.W.2d 293, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 200 (N.D. 1989).

In an unsupervised administration, an order determining some, but not all, of one creditor’s claims against an estate is not appealable without a certification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). In re Estate of Starcher, 447 N.W.2d 293, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 200 (N.D. 1989).

30.1-16-02. (3-502) Supervised administration — Petition — Order.

A petition for supervised administration may be filed by any interested person or by a personal representative at any time or the request for supervised administration may be joined with a petition in a testacy or appointment proceeding. If the testacy of the decedent and the priority and qualification of any personal representative have not been adjudicated previously, the petition for supervised administration shall include the matters required of a petition in a formal testacy proceeding and the notice requirements and procedures applicable to a formal testacy proceeding apply. If not previously adjudicated, the court shall adjudicate the testacy of the decedent and questions relating to the priority and qualifications of the personal representative in any case involving a request for supervised administration, even though the request for supervised administration may be denied. After notice to interested persons, the court shall order supervised administration of a decedent’s estate:

  1. If the decedent’s will directs supervised administration, it shall be ordered unless the court finds that circumstances bearing on the need for supervised administration have changed since the execution of the will and that there is no necessity for supervised administration.
  2. If the decedent’s will directs unsupervised administration, supervised administration shall be ordered only upon a finding that it is necessary for protection of persons interested in the estate.
  3. In other cases if the court finds that supervised administration is necessary under the circumstances.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-16-03. (3-503) Supervised administration — Effect on other proceedings.

  1. The pendency of a proceeding for supervised administration of a decedent’s estate stays action on any informal application then pending or thereafter filed.
  2. If a will has been previously probated in informal proceedings, the effect of the filing of a petition for supervised administration is as provided for formal testacy proceedings by section 30.1-15-01.
  3. After receiving notice of the filing of a petition for supervised administration, a personal representative who has been appointed previously shall not exercise the power to distribute any estate. The filing of the petition does not affect the personal representative’s other powers and duties unless the court restricts the exercise of any of them pending full hearing on the petition.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-16-04. (3-504) Supervised administration — Powers of personal representative.

Unless restricted by the court, a supervised personal representative has, without interim orders approving exercise of a power, all powers of personal representatives under this title, but shall not exercise the power to make any distribution of the estate without prior order of the court. Any other restriction on the power of a personal representative which may be ordered by the court must be endorsed on the personal representative’s letters of appointment and, unless so endorsed, is ineffective as to persons dealing in good faith with the personal representative.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-16-05. (3-505) Supervised administration — Interim orders — Distribution and closing orders.

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, supervised administration is terminated by order in accordance with time restrictions, notices, and contents of orders prescribed for proceedings under section 30.1-21-01. Interim orders approving or directing partial distributions or granting other relief may be issued by the court at any time during the pendency of a supervised administration on the application of the personal representative or any interested person.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

In General.

An interim order in supervised administration, pursuant to a hearing upon notice but where notice of entry is not given, stands unless duly vacated pursuant to the rules of civil procedure. Further, it is subject to appellate review as an interlocutory order, upon appeal from a final order completing settlement of the estate. In re Estate of Kjorvestad, 375 N.W.2d 160, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 408 (N.D. 1985).

An interim order in supervised administration may be reviewed upon direct appeal when there is an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for its entry as a final judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). In re Estate of Kjorvestad, 375 N.W.2d 160, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 408 (N.D. 1985).

CHAPTER 30.1-17 Personal Representative — Appointment, Control, and Termination

30.1-17-01. (3-601) Qualification.

Prior to receiving letters, a personal representative shall qualify by filing with the appointing court any required bond and a statement of acceptance of the duties of the office.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Administration Regulated.

The right to administer the estate of a decedent was regulated by statute, and letters of administration had to be granted in the order and under the rules prescribed by statute. Borner v. Larson, 70 N.D. 313, 293 N.W. 836, 1940 N.D. LEXIS 175 (N.D. 1940).

Disinterested Third Party.

The appointment of a disinterested third person as administrator, instead of a petitioning party, was discretionary with the county court. Ellis v. Ellis, 42 N.D. 535, 174 N.W. 76, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 183 (N.D. 1919).

Foreign Corporation.

A foreign corporation was incompetent to receive letters of administration. Grunow v. Simonitsch, 21 N.D. 277, 130 N.W. 835, 1911 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 1911).

Law Reviews.

Summary of significant decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court in 1990 relating to executors and administrators, 66 N.D. L. Rev. 823 (1990).

30.1-17-02. (3-602) Acceptance of appointment — Consent to jurisdiction.

By accepting appointment, a personal representative submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding relating to the estate that may be instituted by any interested person. Notice of any proceeding shall be delivered to the personal representative, or mailed by ordinary first-class mail to the personal representative’s address as listed in the application or petition for appointment or as thereafter reported to the court and to the personal representative’s address as then known to the petitioner.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Foreign Corporation.

A foreign corporation was incompetent to receive letters of administration upon the estate of a deceased person. Grunow v. Simonitsch, 21 N.D. 277, 130 N.W. 835, 1911 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 1911).

30.1-17-03. (3-603) Bond not required without court order — Exceptions.

No bond is required of a personal representative appointed in informal proceedings, except:

  1. Upon the appointment of a special administrator;
  2. When an executor or other personal representative is appointed to administer an estate under a will containing an express requirement of bond; or
  3. When bond is required under section 30.1-17-05.

Bond may be required by court order at the time of appointment of a personal representative appointed in any formal proceeding, except that bond is not required of a personal representative appointed in formal proceedings if the will relieves the personal representative of bond, unless bond has been requested by an interested party and the court is satisfied that it is desirable. Bond required by any will may be dispensed with in formal proceedings upon determination by the court that it is not necessary. No bond is required of any personal representative who, pursuant to statute, has deposited cash or collateral with an agency of this state to secure performance of the personal representative’s duties.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-17-04. (3-604) Bond amount — Security — Procedure — Reduction.

If bond is required and the provisions of the will or order do not specify the amount, unless stated in that person’s application or petition, the person qualifying shall file a statement under oath with the court indicating that person’s best estimate of the value of the personal estate of the decedent and of the income expected from the personal and real estate during the next year, and shall execute and file a bond with the court, or give other suitable security, in an amount not less than the estimate. The court shall determine that the bond is duly executed by a corporate surety, or one or more individual sureties whose performance is secured by pledge of personal property, mortgage on real property, or other adequate security. The court may permit the amount of the bond to be reduced by the value of assets of the estate deposited with a domestic financial institution, as defined in section 30.1-31-02, in a manner that prevents their unauthorized disposition. On petition of the personal representative or another interested person, the court may excuse a requirement of bond, increase or reduce the amount of the bond, release sureties, or permit the substitution of another bond with the same or different sureties.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 2.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Bond in Lieu of Original Estate.

A guardian’s bond stood in lieu of the original estate until such estate was fully accounted for. Shepard v. Hanson, 9 N.D. 249, 83 N.W. 20, 1900 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 1900).

Sale of Real Property.

A sale of real property of an intestate in the course of administration was not invalid because order of license to sell did not require an additional bond to be given by the administrator, where the administrator had given a surety bond for one thousand dollars as required by C.L. 1913, § 8685, no personal property remained in the estate, and the real estate had been appraised at one thousand six hundred dollars. Skachenko v. Sweetman, 77 N.D. 502, 43 N.W.2d 683, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1950).

30.1-17-05. (3-605) Demand for bond by interested person.

Any person apparently having an interest in the estate worth in excess of one thousand dollars, or any creditor having a claim in excess of one thousand dollars, may make a written demand that a personal representative give bond. The demand must be filed with the court and a copy mailed to the personal representative if appointment and qualification have occurred. Thereupon, bond is required, but the requirement ceases if the person demanding bond ceases to be interested in the estate, or if bond is excused as provided in section 30.1-17-03 or 30.1-17-04. After receiving notice and until the filing of the bond or cessation of the requirement of bond, the personal representative shall refrain from exercising any powers of office except as necessary to preserve the estate. Failure of the personal representative to meet a requirement of bond by giving suitable bond within thirty days after receipt of notice is cause for removal and appointment of a successor personal representative.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-17-06. (3-606) Terms and conditions of bonds.

  1. The following requirements and provisions apply to any bond required by this chapter:
    1. Bonds shall name the state of North Dakota as obligee for the benefit of the persons interested in the estate and shall be conditioned upon the faithful discharge by the fiduciary of all duties according to law.
    2. Unless otherwise provided by the terms of the approved bond, sureties are jointly and severally liable with the personal representative and with each other. The address of sureties shall be stated in the bond.
    3. By executing an approved bond of a personal representative, the surety consents to the jurisdiction of the probate court which issued letters to the primary obligor in any proceedings pertaining to the fiduciary duties of the personal representative and naming the surety as a party. Notice of any proceeding shall be delivered to the surety or mailed to the surety by registered or certified mail at the surety’s address as listed with the court where the bond is filed and to the surety’s address as then known to the petitioner.
    4. On petition of a successor personal representative, any other personal representative of the same decedent, or any interested person, a proceeding in the court may be initiated against a surety for breach of the obligation of the bond of the personal representative.
    5. The bond of the personal representative is not void after the first recovery but may be proceeded against from time to time until the whole penalty is exhausted.
  2. No action or proceeding may be commenced against the surety on any matter as to which an action or proceeding against the primary obligor is barred by adjudication or limitation.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Judgment upon Final Accounting.

A judgment by the county court upon the final accounting of an executor had the same rank as a judgment in other courts of record, and was conclusive as to the executor and his bondsmen against collateral attack, except on jurisdictional grounds and those of collusion and fraud. Joy v. Elton, 9 N.D. 423, 83 N.W. 875, 1900 N.D. LEXIS 251 (N.D. 1900).

No Action Against Sureties Prior to Liability Finding.

No action could be maintained against the sureties prior to an adjudication by the probate court finding a liability. Groona v. Goldammer, 26 N.D. 122, 143 N.W. 394, 1913 N.D. LEXIS 45 (N.D. 1913); Christenson v. Grandy, 46 N.D. 418, 180 N.W. 18, 1920 N.D. LEXIS 54 (N.D. 1920).

Collateral References.

Court’s power, in absence of statute, to require corporate surety on fiduciary bond in probate proceeding, 82 A.L.R.2d 926.

30.1-17-07. (3-607) Order restraining personal representative.

  1. On petition of any person who appears to have an interest in the estate, the court, by temporary order, may restrain a personal representative from performing specified acts of administration, disbursement, or distribution, or exercise of any powers or discharge of any duties of the personal representative’s office, or make any other order to secure proper performance of the personal representative’s duty, if it appears to the court that the personal representative otherwise may take some action which would jeopardize unreasonably the interest of the applicant or of some other interested person. Persons with whom the personal representative may transact business may be made parties.
  2. The matter shall be set for hearing within ten days unless the parties otherwise agree. Notice, as the court directs, shall be given to the personal representative and the personal representative’s attorney of record, if any, and to any other parties named defendant in the petition.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Impasse Between Joint Personal Representatives.

This section, read in conjunction with N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-03(1), which provides that a personal representative must act to settle estate as expediously and efficiently as is consistent with best interests of estate, gave district court power to break impasse between corepresentatives by ordering nonconsenting representative to take action she opposed, but which was determined to be necessary to settlement. Conway v. Parker, 250 N.W.2d 266, 1977 N.D. LEXIS 227 (N.D. 1977).

30.1-17-08. (3-608) Termination of appointment — General.

Termination of appointment of a personal representative occurs as indicated in sections 30.1-17-09 through 30.1-17-12. Termination ends the right and power pertaining to the office of personal representative as conferred by this title or any will, except that a personal representative, at any time prior to distribution or until restrained or enjoined by court order, may perform acts necessary to protect the estate and may deliver the assets to a successor representative. Termination does not discharge a personal representative from liability for transactions or omissions occurring before termination, or relieve the personal representative of the duty to preserve assets subject to the personal representative’s control, to account therefor, and to deliver the assets. Termination does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the personal representative, but terminates the personal representative’s authority to represent the estate in any pending or future proceeding.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-17-09. (3-609) Termination of appointment — Death or disability.

The death of a personal representative or the appointment of a conservator for the estate of a personal representative terminates the personal representative’s appointment. Until appointment and qualification of a successor or special representative to replace the deceased or protected representative, the representative of the estate of the deceased or protected personal representative, if any, has the duty to protect the estate possessed and being administered by the decedent or ward at the time the decedent’s or ward’s appointment terminates, has the power to perform acts necessary for protection, and shall account for and deliver the estate assets to a successor or special personal representative upon the successor’s or special personal representative’s appointment and qualification.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-17-10. (3-610) Termination of appointment — Voluntary.

  1. An appointment of a personal representative terminates as provided in section 30.1-21-03, one year after the filing of a closing statement.
  2. An order closing an estate as provided in section 30.1-21-01 or 30.1-21-02 terminates an appointment of a personal representative.
  3. A personal representative may resign the position by filing a written statement of resignation with the court after giving at least fifteen days’ written notice to the persons known to be interested in the estate. If no one applies or petitions for appointment of a successor representative within the time indicated in the notice, the filed statement of resignation is ineffective as a termination of appointment and in any event is effective only upon the appointment and qualification of a successor representative and delivery of the assets to the successor representative.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Final Decree of Distribution.

The final decree of distribution of a decedent’s estate had the same rank as a judgment entered in a court of record. Sjoli v. Hogenson, 19 N.D. 82, 122 N.W. 1008, 1909 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 1909).

30.1-17-11. (3-611) Termination of appointment by removal — Cause — Procedure.

  1. A person interested in the estate may petition for removal of a personal representative for cause at any time. Upon filing of the petition, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing. Notice shall be given by the petitioner to the personal representative, and to other persons as the court may order. Except as otherwise ordered as provided in section 30.1-17-07, after receipt of notice of removal proceedings, the personal representative shall not act except to account, to correct maladministration or preserve the estate. If removal is ordered, the court also shall direct by order the disposition of the assets remaining in the name of, or under the control of, the personal representative being removed.
  2. Cause for removal exists when removal would be in the best interests of the estate, or if it is shown that a personal representative or the person seeking the personal representative’s appointment intentionally misrepresented material facts in the proceedings leading to the personal representative’s appointment, or that the personal representative has disregarded an order of the court, has become incapable of discharging the duties of the office, or has mismanaged the estate or failed to perform any duty pertaining to the office. Unless the decedent’s will directs otherwise, a personal representative appointed at the decedent’s domicile, incident to securing appointment of the personal representative or the personal representative’s nominee as ancillary personal representative, may obtain removal of another who was appointed personal representative in this state to administer local assets.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Appeal.

Son’s appeal from an order denying his petition to remove a widow as personal representative of the intestate’s estate was considered because the order was appealable without a certification. Estate of Huston v. Huston, 2014 ND 29, 843 N.W.2d 3, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 21 (N.D. 2014).

Discretion of Court.

The removal of a personal representative necessarily involves the use of discretion by the trial court, and an order removing a personal representative will not be set aside on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Jarmin v. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children, 450 N.W.2d 750, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 14 (N.D. 1990).

Particular Cases.

The county court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that individual should be removed as personal representative of decedent’s estate where he believed he was the joint owner with decedent of a $49,898.77 account; believed he was entitled to the interest accumulated on the account from the date of its establishment; knew that the residuary devisees and legatees claimed the account to be part of decedent’s estate; understood that there would be a conflict of interest between his fiduciary duty and obligation as personal representative and his personal claim to the proceeds; as personal representative, withdrew all of the assets of the estate from decedent’s conservator and deposited the funds in another bank; and furnished no bond as personal representative because none was required by the terms of decedent’s will. Jarmin v. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children, 450 N.W.2d 750, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 14 (N.D. 1990).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant appellant’s request to remove the personal representative where appellant’s failed to show how the personal representative mismanaged the estate or failed to perform a duty; appellants failed to object to the sale of decedant’s land or to offer to purchase it after receiving notice of a purchase offer; failed to prove ownership of personal property sold at the estate auction sale; and failed to prove the value of items sold which they claimed were undervalued. Hass v. DeKrey (In re Estate of Hass), 2002 ND 82, 643 N.W.2d 713, 2002 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 2002).

Order denying the heirs’ petition to remove the estate’s personal representative was appealable without a certification, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition because although appropriate and timely notices were not given and a timely inventory and appraisal were not provided, the heirs failed to show that there had been mismanagement or that the representative’s untimely notices were a detriment to the heirs or estate. Puhr v. Novak (In re Estate of Shubert), 2013 ND 215, 839 N.W.2d 811, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 203 (N.D. 2013).

District court did not abuse its discretion in denying a son’s petition to remove a widow as personal representative of an intestate’s estate because it did not misapply the law, and it provided a reasoned explanation for its determination; the district court found that the widow had done nothing inappropriate. Estate of Huston v. Huston, 2014 ND 29, 843 N.W.2d 3, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 21 (N.D. 2014).

It was not an abuse of discretion to decline a beneficiary's request to remove the personal representative of a decedent's estate because a cursory review of the record reflected a contentious probate dispute between the parties and their attorneys. Hogen v. Hogen (Estate of Hogen), 2015 ND 125, 863 N.W.2d 876, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 125 (N.D. 2015).

When the co-personal representatives filed cross-motions for removal of the other co-personal representative from the administration of the decedent’s unsupervised estate, the district court’s determination of which co-personal representative to remove was appropriate because the court found that the conduct of the co-personal representative who was not removed had been appropriate and that the conduct, or lack of conduct, of the co-personal representative who was removed had been inappropriate. Binstock v. Finch (In re Estate of Finch), 2021 ND 159, 963 N.W.2d 754, 2021 N.D. LEXIS 159 (N.D. 2021).

Procedure Not Followed.

Decedent’s child was an interested person and was able to petition for removal of a personal representative; moreover, a district court failed to follow the statutory requirements for hearings on the petition because it entered an order denying such without providing time to schedule a hearing. The child requested a hearing following the procedural requirements for doing so. Valer v. Bartelson (In re Estate of Bartelson), 2013 ND 129, 833 N.W.2d 522, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 132 (N.D. 2013).

Representative with Interest in Estate.

The mere fact that a personal representative has an interest in the estate he or she is administering is, generally, an insufficient conflict of interest to justify the removal of the personal representative. Jarmin v. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children, 450 N.W.2d 750, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 14 (N.D. 1990).

A personal representative should not be removed merely because he or she claims joint ownership of certain estate property with the decedent. Jarmin v. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children, 450 N.W.2d 750, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 14 (N.D. 1990).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Proper Removal.

An executor was properly removed where his acts were wrongful and conducive to waste of the estate or affording opportunity therefor. In re Giese's Estate, 64 N.D. 636, 255 N.W. 474, 1934 N.D. LEXIS 244 (N.D. 1934).

Collateral References.

Appeal: right of appeal from order on application for removal of personal representative, guardian, or trustee, 37 A.L.R.2d 751.

Requisites of notice and hearing in court proceedings for removal of personal representative, 47 A.L.R.2d 307.

Compromise of claim due estate as ground of removal of executor or administrator, 72 A.L.R.2d 191.

30.1-17-12. (3-612) Termination of appointment — Change of testacy status.

Except as otherwise ordered in formal proceedings, the probate of a will subsequent to the appointment of a personal representative in intestacy or under a will which is superseded by formal probate of another will, or the vacation of an informal probate of a will subsequent to the appointment of the personal representative thereunder, does not terminate the appointment of the personal representative although the personal representative’s powers may be reduced as provided in section 30.1-15-01. Termination occurs upon appointment in informal or formal appointment proceedings of a person entitled to appointment under the later assumption concerning testacy. If no request for new appointment is made within thirty days after expiration of time for appeal from the order in formal testacy proceedings, or from the informal probate, changing the assumption concerning testacy, the previously appointed personal representative upon request may be appointed personal representative under the subsequently probated will, or as in intestacy, as the case may be.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Statute dealing with existing intestate administration, upon discovery of will, 65 A.L.R.2d 1201, 1202.

30.1-17-13. (3-613) Successor personal representative.

Chapters 30.1-14 and 30.1-15 govern proceedings for appointment of a personal representative to succeed one whose appointment has been terminated. After appointment and qualification, a successor personal representative may be substituted in all actions and proceedings to which the former personal representative was a party, and no notice, process, or claim which was given or served upon the former personal representative need be given to or served upon the successor in order to preserve any position or right the person giving the notice or filing the claim may thereby have obtained or preserved with reference to the former personal representative. Except as otherwise ordered by the court, the successor personal representative has the powers and duties in respect to the continued administration which the former personal representative would have had if the appointment had not been terminated.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Misconduct by Prior Fiduciary.

Mere possibility of misconduct by a prior fiduciary is not alone sufficient reason to hold a successor fiduciary responsible for it. In re Estate of Kjorvestad, 375 N.W.2d 160, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 408 (N.D. 1985).

30.1-17-14. (3-614) Special administrator — Appointment.

A special administrator may be appointed:

  1. Informally by the court on the application of any interested person when necessary to protect the estate of a decedent prior to the appointment of a general personal representative or if a prior appointment has been terminated as provided in section 30.1-17-09.
  2. In a formal proceeding by order of the court on the petition of any interested person and finding, after notice and hearing, that appointment is necessary to preserve the estate or to secure its proper administration, including its administration in circumstances in which a general personal representative cannot or should not act. If it appears to the court that an emergency exists, appointment may be ordered without notice.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Cross-References.

Public administrator, see N.D.C.C. ch. 11-21.

Public administrator as ex officio public special administrator, see N.D.C.C. § 11-21-05.

Collateral References.

Advisors to trustee or executor, construction and operation of will or trust provision appointing, 56 A.L.R.3d 1249.

30.1-17-15. (3-615) Special administrator — Who may be appointed.

  1. If a special administrator is to be appointed pending the probate of a will which is the subject of a pending application or petition for probate, the person named executor in the will shall be appointed if available and qualified.
  2. In other cases, any proper person may be appointed special administrator.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-17-16. (3-616) Special administrator — Appointed informally — Powers and duties.

A special administrator appointed by the court in informal proceedings pursuant to subsection 1 of section 30.1-17-14 has the duty to collect and manage the assets of the estate, to preserve them, to account therefor, and to deliver them to the general personal representative upon the personal representative’s qualification. The special administrator has the power of a personal representative, under this title, necessary to perform the special administrator’s duties.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-17-17. (3-617) Special administrator — Formal proceedings — Power and duties.

A special administrator appointed by order of the court in any formal proceeding has the power of a general personal representative, except as limited in the appointment, and duties as prescribed in the order. The appointment may be for a specified time, to perform particular acts, or on other terms as the court may direct.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-17-18. (3-618) Termination of appointment — Special administrator.

The appointment of a special administrator terminates in accordance with the provisions of the order of appointment or on the appointment of a general personal representative. In other cases, the appointment of a special administrator is subject to termination as provided in sections 30.1-17-08 through 30.1-17-11.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Appointment of General Administrator.

The powers and duties of a special administrator ceased as soon as a general administrator was appointed and qualified. In re Randalls' Estate, 77 N.D. 69, 40 N.W.2d 446, 1949 N.D. LEXIS 56 (N.D. 1949).

CHAPTER 30.1-18 Powers and Duties of Personal Representatives

30.1-18-01. (3-701) Time of accrual of duties and powers.

The duties and powers of a personal representative commence upon appointment. The powers of a personal representative relate back in time to give acts by the person appointed which are beneficial to the estate occurring prior to appointment the same effect as those occurring thereafter. Prior to appointment, a person named executor in a will may carry out written instructions of the decedent relating to the decedent’s body, funeral, and burial arrangements. A personal representative may ratify and accept acts on behalf of the estate done by others if the acts would have been proper for a personal representative.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Amount of funeral expenses allowable against decedent’s estate, 4 A.L.R.2d 995.

Validating prior sales of decedent’s property, relation back of letters testamentary or of administration as, 2 A.L.R.3d 1105.

Running of statute of limitations as affected by doctrine of relation back of appointment of administrator, 3 A.L.R.3d 1234.

Law Reviews.

Summary of significant decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court in 1990 relating to executors and administrators, 66 N.D. L. Rev. 823 (1990).

30.1-18-02. (3-702) Priority among different letters.

A person to whom general letters are issued first has exclusive authority under the letters until the appointment is terminated or modified. If, through error, general letters are afterward issued to another, the first appointed representative may recover any property of the estate in the hands of the representative subsequently appointed, but the acts of the latter done in good faith before notice of the first letters are not void for want of validity of appointment.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Possession of Real Estate.

Heirs had no right to maintain an action for possession of real estate which was hostile to the rights of the administrator. Belakjon v. Hilstad, 76 N.D. 298, 35 N.W.2d 637, 1949 N.D. LEXIS 57 (N.D. 1949).

30.1-18-03. (3-703) General duties — Relation and liability to persons interested in estate — Standing to sue.

  1. A personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the standards of care applicable to trustees. A personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated and effective will and this title, and as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate. The personal representative shall use the authority conferred upon the personal representative by this title, the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to which the personal representative is party for the best interests of successors to the estate.
  2. A personal representative may not be surcharged for acts of administration or distribution if the conduct in question was authorized at the time. Subject to other obligations of administration, an informally probated will authorizes a personal representative to administer and distribute the estate according to its terms. An order of appointment of a personal representative, whether issued in informal or formal proceedings, authorizes the personal representative to distribute apparently intestate assets to the heirs of the decedent if, at the time of distribution, the personal representative is not aware of a pending testacy proceeding, a proceeding to vacate an order entered in an earlier testacy proceeding, a formal proceeding questioning the personal representative’s appointment or fitness to continue, or a supervised administration proceeding. This section does not affect the duty of the personal representative to administer and distribute the estate in accordance with the rights of claimants whose claims have been allowed, the surviving spouse, any minor and dependent children, and any pretermitted child of the decedent as described in this title.
  3. Except as to proceedings which do not survive the death of the decedent, a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in this state at the decedent’s death has the same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of this state and the courts of any other jurisdiction as the decedent had immediately prior to death.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1999, ch. 294, § 5; 2007, ch. 549, § 6.

Cross-References.

Representatives bringing action for decedent, time, see N.D.C.C. § 28-01-26.

Notes to Decisions

Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

Where personal representative improperly prepared and filed estate tax returns, failed to properly distribute estate assets, caused overdraft and service charges against estate accounts, and paid himself unreasonable and excessive attorney fees, fiduciary duty imposed by this section was breached. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

Defense of Will.

Generally, a personal representative has the duty, as well as the right, to defend the will by all fair means, and with his best efforts, at least where he has reasonable ground to believe the will is valid. In re Estate of Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d 515, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 96 (N.D. 1992).

Interested Person.

Because a personal representative could be an interested person, petitioner was not precluded from filing petitions as an interested person in the formal supervised probate administration while simultaneously performing her fiduciary duty as the personal representative to distribute the property according to the decedent’s will and the best interests of the estate. Bouchard v. Biel (In re Estate of Brandt), 2019 ND 87, 924 N.W.2d 762, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 2019).

Misappropriation.

District court order concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to decide whether funds expended prior to the appointment of a guardian and conservator were misappropriated was reversed. Under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-03, the personal representative had standing to sue for misappropriation of the decedent’s property occurring before the decedent’s death. Valer v. Bartelson (In re Estate of Bartelson), 2011 ND 219, 806 N.W.2d 199, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 219 (N.D. 2011).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Actions Not Surviving Death.

Actions for general damages for deceit, fraud, negligence, libel, slander, assault, seduction, and malicious prosecution did not survive death of decedent. Grabow v. Bergeth, 59 N.D. 214, 229 N.W. 282, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 1930).

Common Law.

At common law the action for tort died with death of tort-feasor, and this was the law in this state because actions for tort were not among the enumerated exceptions. Willard v. Mohn, 24 N.D. 386, 139 N.W. 981, 1913 N.D. LEXIS 8 (N.D. 1913); Willard v. Mohn, 24 N.D. 390, 139 N.W. 979, 1913 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1913).

Damage by Fraud and Deceit.

Former statute did not authorize suit to recover for damage caused to general estate of deceased on account of actual damage he sustained through the fraud and deceit of another. Grabow v. Bergeth, 59 N.D. 214, 229 N.W. 282, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 1930).

Damages for Pollution.

Action for damages for pollution of plaintiff’s ice field and waters of stream by upper riparian owner did not abate on death of plaintiff. McDonough v. Russell-Miller Milling Co., 47 N.D. 237, 182 N.W. 251, 1921 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1921).

Recovery of Money Only.

Statute concerning actions for the recovery of money only did not relate to actions by administrators nor actions to quiet titles. Magoffin v. Watros, 45 N.D. 406, 178 N.W. 134, 1920 N.D. LEXIS 138 (N.D. 1920).

Collateral References.

Power of sale conferred by will, right of administrator with will annexed to execute, 9 A.L.R.2d 1324.

Power of sale conferred on executor by testator as authorizing private sale, 11 A.L.R.2d 955.

Implied power of executor to sell real estate, 23 A.L.R.2d 1000.

Refund of legacy or distribution, time within which personal representative must commence action for, 29 A.L.R.2d 1248.

Appellate review proceedings, necessity that person acting in fiduciary or representative capacity give bond to maintain, 41 A.L.R.2d 1324.

Compromise claim against estate, power and responsibility of executor or administrator to, 72 A.L.R.2d 243.

Election by spouse to take under or against will as exercisable by agent or personal representative, 83 A.L.R.2d 1077.

Option to purchase, power of executor with power to sell or to lease real property, or to do both, to give an, 83 A.L.R.2d 1310.

Locating and noticing legatees, devisees, or heirs, duty and liability of executor with respect to, 10 A.L.R.3d 547.

Appeal from order granting or denying distribution, right of executor or administrator to, 16 A.L.R.3d 1274.

30.1-18-04. (3-704) Personal representative to proceed without court order — Exception.

A personal representative shall proceed expeditiously with the settlement and distribution of a decedent’s estate and, except as otherwise specified or ordered in regard to a supervised personal representative, do so without adjudication, order, or direction of the court, but may invoke the jurisdiction of the court, in proceedings authorized by this title, to resolve questions concerning the estate or its administration.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Action Founded on Contract.

An administrator could maintain an action founded on contract without obtaining permission of the county court, the actions requiring the direction of the county court being limited to those specified by law. McDonald v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 N.D. 49, 224 N.W. 676, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 179 (N.D. 1929).

30.1-18-05. (3-705) Duty of personal representative — Information to heirs and devisees.

Not later than thirty days after appointment, every personal representative, except any special administrator, shall give information of the appointment to the heirs and devisees, including, if there has been no formal testacy proceeding and if the personal representative was appointed on the assumption that the decedent died intestate, the devisees in any will mentioned in the application for appointment of a personal representative. The information must be delivered or sent by ordinary mail to each of the heirs and devisees whose address is reasonably available to the personal representative. The duty does not extend to require information to persons who have been adjudicated in a prior formal testacy proceeding to have no interest in the estate. The information must include the name and address of the personal representative, indicate that it is being sent to persons who have or may have some interest in the estate being administered, indicate whether bond has been filed, and describe the court where papers relating to the estate are on file. The information must state that the estate is being administered by the personal representative under this title without supervision by the court, but that recipients are entitled to information regarding the administration from the personal representative and may petition the court in any matter relating to the estate, including distribution of assets and expenses of administration. The personal representative’s failure to give this information is a breach of duty to the persons concerned but does not affect the validity of the appointment, the personal representative’s powers, or other duties. A personal representative may inform other persons of the appointment by delivery or ordinary first-class mail.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 401, § 6.

30.1-18-06. (3-706) Duty of personal representative — Inventory and appraisement.

  1. Within six months after appointment, or nine months after the death of the decedent, whichever is later, a personal representative, who is not a special administrator or a successor to another representative who has previously discharged this duty, shall prepare and file or mail an inventory of property owned by the decedent at the time of the decedent’s death, listing it with reasonable detail, and indicating as to each listed item, its fair market value as of the date of the decedent’s death, and the type and amount of any encumbrance that may exist with reference to any item.
  2. The personal representative may file the original of the inventory with the court and send a copy of the inventory only to interested persons who request it. If the personal representative elects not to file the inventory with the court, the personal representative must mail a copy of the inventory to each of the heirs in an intestate estate, or to each of the devisees if a will has been probated, and to any other interested persons who request it.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 290, § 8; 1989, ch. 402, § 1.

Cross-References.

Inventory and distribution of avails of life insurance policy or beneficiary certificate, see N.D.C.C. § 26.1-33-40.

Personal representative to value homestead, see N.D.C.C. § 30-16-05.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Official Duty Not Breached.

Where an administrator was unaware that the decedent had any interest in or title to land he did not breach his official duty in failing to include it in the inventory. Anderson v. Shelton, 92 N.W.2d 166, 1958 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 1958).

Supplemental Inventory.

An administrator should have prepared a supplemental inventory where property had been omitted. In re Gonsky's Estate, 79 N.D. 123, 55 N.W.2d 60, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1952).

Son could not require a personal representative's supplementary inventory because, once another child was held entitled to an entire estate, the son had no right in or claim against the estate, so the son was no longer an “interested person,” and the son showed no statutory ground for the relief sought. Estate of Pedro v. Scheeler, 2014 ND 237, 856 N.W.2d 775, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 218 (N.D. 2014).

30.1-18-07. (3-707) Employment of appraisers.

The personal representative may employ a qualified and disinterested appraiser to assist the personal representative in ascertaining the fair market value as of the date of the decedent’s death of any asset the value of which may be subject to reasonable doubt. Different persons may be employed to appraise different kinds of assets included in the estate. The names and addresses of any appraiser shall be indicated on the inventory with the item or items the appraiser appraised.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

Personal representative clearly breached his fiduciary duties by selling estate assets without making any inquiry into their actual value. Thomas by & Through Schmidt v. Thomas (In re Estate of Thomas), 532 N.W.2d 676, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 1995).

30.1-18-08. (3-708) Duty of personal representative — Supplementary inventory.

If any property not included in the original inventory comes to the knowledge of a personal representative or if the personal representative learns that the value or description indicated in the original inventory for any item is erroneous or misleading, the personal representative shall make a supplementary inventory or appraisement showing the market value as of the date of the decedent’s death of the new item or the revised market value or descriptions, and the appraisers or other data relied upon, if any, and file it with the court if the original inventory was filed, or furnish copies thereof or information thereof to persons interested in the new information.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Right To Require.

Son could not require a personal representative's supplementary inventory because, once another child was held entitled to an entire estate, the son had no right in or claim against the estate, so the son was no longer an “interested person,” and the son showed no statutory ground for the relief sought. Estate of Pedro v. Scheeler, 2014 ND 237, 856 N.W.2d 775, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 218 (N.D. 2014).

30.1-18-09. (3-709) Duty of personal representative — Possession of estate.

Except as otherwise provided by a decedent’s will, every personal representative has a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the decedent’s property, except that any real property or tangible personal property may be left with or surrendered to the person presumptively entitled thereto unless or until, in the judgment of the personal representative, possession of the property by the personal representative will be necessary for purposes of administration. The request by a personal representative for delivery of any property possessed by an heir or devisee is conclusive evidence, in any action against the heir or devisee for possession thereof, that the possession of the property by the personal representative is necessary for purposes of administration. The personal representative shall pay taxes on, and take all steps reasonably necessary for the management, protection, and preservation of, the estate in the personal representative’s possession. The personal representative may maintain an action to recover possession of property or to determine the title thereto.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Cross-References.

Civil action by foreign executor or administrator, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-24-06.

Estate tax, see N.D.C.C. ch. 57-37.1.

Notes to Decisions

Actions Against Heirs and Devisees.

Personal representative of decedent’s estate has authority to lease estate property for the benefit of joint devisees, and his decision to take possession of the property for administration purposes is conclusive against heirs and devisees, whom he may evict from the property. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 1997 ND 44, 560 N.W.2d 886, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 60 (N.D. 1997).

Sale or Lease of Estate Property.

Title to property passes to a decedent's heirs or devisees at death, subject to a personal representative's broad powers over the title for administration purposes; a personal representative is allowed to lease and sell estate property if acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons. Therefore, although a personal representative might have been acting reasonably when she leased farmland, an income-producing asset of the estate, there was insufficient analysis or supporting evidence presented on the issue. In re Estate of Johnson, 2015 ND 110, 863 N.W.2d 215, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 109 (N.D. 2015).

Suit on Accrued Claim.

Decedent’s heirs were not barred from bringing suit in their individual capacities because their claim accrued before decedent’s death and had not been included in the probate inventory, “preserved,” or distributed to the daughters when decedent’s estate was closed. Feickert v. Frounfelter, 468 N.W.2d 131, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1991).

When Property Passes.

Property passes upon death, not upon distribution. Feickert v. Frounfelter, 468 N.W.2d 131, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1991).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Accounting for Property.

All property belonging to the estate, of every kind, nature, and description, had to be accounted for in the county court of probate. Miller v. First Nat'l Bank, 62 N.D. 122, 242 N.W. 124, 1932 N.D. LEXIS 157 (N.D. 1932); Dolphin v. Peterson, 63 N.D. 792, 249 N.W. 784, 1933 N.D. LEXIS 240 (N.D. 1933).

Executor had to account for all rents and profits derived from lands of estate in his possession. Dolphin v. Peterson, 63 N.D. 792, 249 N.W. 784, 1933 N.D. LEXIS 240 (N.D. 1933).

Action by Heirs.

Heirs could maintain action for possession of real estate, or for purpose of quieting title to same, against anyone except executor or administrator. Cathro v. McArthur, 30 N.D. 337, 152 N.W. 686, 1915 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1915).

An heir could not maintain a suit for partition against other heirs and the administrator in district court after the county court had assumed jurisdiction to probate and administer the estate, and had appointed an administrator for that purpose, and before a final decree of distribution had been made in the county court. Honsinger v. Stewart, 34 N.D. 513, 159 N.W. 12, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 52 (N.D. 1916).

For purposes of administration where there had been a judgment in favor of estate in proceeding to determine adverse claims between executor and heirs at law, such judgment should have quieted title in heirs at law and in executor. Druey v. Baldwin, 41 N.D. 473, 172 N.W. 663, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D.), different results reached on reh'g, 41 N.D. 473, 182 N.W. 700, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1919).

An administrator could maintain an action to determine adverse claims concerning the possession, interest, or title of the estate in the property involved. Magoffin v. Watros, 45 N.D. 406, 178 N.W. 134, 1920 N.D. LEXIS 138 (N.D. 1920).

Even where estate was in the process of administration an heir could bring an action to quiet title. Hoffman v. Hoffman's Heirs, 73 N.D. 637, 17 N.W.2d 903, 1945 N.D. LEXIS 80 (N.D. 1945).

Action for Rent.

Where no probate proceedings had been instituted, the heir could maintain an action for rents or for the value of the use and occupation of such real estate accruing after the death of the ancestor. Belakjon v. Hilstad, 76 N.D. 298, 35 N.W.2d 637, 1949 N.D. LEXIS 57 (N.D. 1949).

Action Founded on Contract.

An administrator could maintain an action founded on contract in the same courts in which the action could have been maintained by the intestate. McDonald v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 N.D. 49, 224 N.W. 676, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 179 (N.D. 1929).

An administrator could maintain an action founded on contract without obtaining permission of the county court, the actions requiring the direction of the county court being limited to those specified by law. McDonald v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 N.D. 49, 224 N.W. 676, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 179 (N.D. 1929).

Action to Determine Adverse Claims.

The statute authorized an executor to maintain an action to determine adverse claims against property. Blakemore v. Roberts, 12 N.D. 394, 96 N.W. 1029, 1903 N.D. LEXIS 42 (N.D. 1903).

Ascertainment of Property.

An administrator had to ascertain and determine at least prima facie what property belonged to the estate. In re Gonsky's Estate, 79 N.D. 123, 55 N.W.2d 60, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1952).

Authority of Administrator.

An administrator had authority to maintain an action to recover real or personal property belonging to the estate. Perry v. Erdelt, 59 N.D. 741, 231 N.W. 888, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 192 (N.D. 1930).

Administrator of estate was authorized to bring action on official bond of public administrator ex officio who had been appointed general administrator of estate to enforce liability for defaults. Kelsey v. Olsness, 63 N.D. 758, 249 N.W. 919, 1933 N.D. LEXIS 232 (N.D. 1933).

Care of Livestock.

An executor or administrator was bound to care for livestock until an advantageous disposition thereof could be made, and he was not responsible for losses incurred if he exercised ordinary diligence. Hoffman v. Ness, 71 N.D. 283, 300 N.W. 428, 1941 N.D. LEXIS 168 (N.D. 1941).

Entitlement of Executor.

An executor was entitled to the possession of all real and personal property of the testator to which the decedent would have been entitled if alive. Blakemore v. Roberts, 12 N.D. 394, 96 N.W. 1029, 1903 N.D. LEXIS 42 (N.D. 1903).

Execution of Judgment Against Intestate.

Unless the judgment was for the recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien thereon, no execution would issue upon any judgment whether rendered against the intestate in his lifetime or against his successor in interest. First Nat'l Bank v. Rohlik, 66 N.D. 72, 262 N.W. 458, 1935 N.D. LEXIS 173 (N.D. 1935).

Farmer-Debtor Proceeding.

Administrator of deceased farmer had authority to continue farmer-debtor proceeding which decedent had instituted before his death. North Dakota v. Durupt, 138 F.2d 501, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 2555 (8th Cir. N.D. 1943).

Improper Appropriation of Estate.

In case of improper appropriation of estate property, penalty of double liability could not be invoked in the absence of bad faith, fraud, or improper motives on the part of the party against whom the penalty was sought. LARSON v. QUANRUD, BRINK & REIBOLD, 78 N.D. 70, 47 N.W.2d 743, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 1950).

Partnership Property.

A surviving partner succeeded to all of the partnership property in trust for the purpose of liquidation and the interest of the deceased partner in the ultimate distribution of the partnership assets passed to those who succeeded to his other personal property. Simonitsch v. Bruce, 258 F. 331, 1919 U.S. App. LEXIS 1214 (8th Cir. N.D. 1919).

Preservation of Buildings.

Since an executor or administrator was entrusted with the control of an estate, it was his duty to preserve it, and he was to keep all buildings and structures in repair, but in ordinary circumstances he was not to erect new ones. Hoffman v. Ness, 71 N.D. 283, 300 N.W. 428, 1941 N.D. LEXIS 168 (N.D. 1941).

Primary Right of Possession.

The primary right of possession was in the executor or administrator where one had been appointed and qualified. Belakjon v. Hilstad, 76 N.D. 298, 35 N.W.2d 637, 1949 N.D. LEXIS 57 (N.D. 1949).

Property Included by Mistake.

Executrix was not estopped from claiming title to land under joint tenancy deed by virtue of having listed the land in the probate inventory as property of decedent’s estate, since there was evidence that the property was included in the inventory by mistake, the record showed no exceptions or challenges to the inventory, and it was proper, anyway, to list joint tenancy property in an inventory for purpose of estate tax determination. Neuberger v. Dally, 210 N.W.2d 269, 1973 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1973).

Rent for Devised Property.

A widow was entitled to rent for land devised to her absolutely and utilized for the benefit of the estate. In re Korsmo's Estate, 56 N.D. 927, 220 N.W. 128, 1928 N.D. LEXIS 216 (N.D. 1928).

Taxes and Insurance.

An executor or administrator had the duty of keeping the estate’s property insured, and the taxes paid. Hoffman v. Ness, 71 N.D. 283, 300 N.W. 428, 1941 N.D. LEXIS 168 (N.D. 1941).

Collateral References.

Power of sale conferred on executor by testator as authorizing private sale, 11 A.L.R.2d 955.

Corporate books and records, inspection of, by personal representative of deceased stockholder, 15 A.L.R.2d 11.

Implied power of executor to sell real estate, 23 A.L.R.2d 1000.

Power of executor to create easements, 44 A.L.R.2d 573.

Option to purchase contained in lease, right of personal representative of leaseholder to enforce, 45 A.L.R.2d 1034.

Construction and effect of will authorizing or directing executor to retain investments received under will, 47 A.L.R.2d 187.

Repairs: power of personal representative to repair personal property of estate, 64 A.L.R.2d 857.

Power of executor with power to sell or to lease real property, or to do both, to give an option to purchase, 83 A.L.R.2d 1310.

Crops: rights in growing, unmatured annual crops as between personal representatives of decedent’s estate and heirs or devisees, 92 A.L.R.2d 1373.

Corporate stock: who may exercise voting power of corporate stock pending settlement of estate of deceased owner, 7 A.L.R.3d 629.

30.1-18-10. (3-710) Power to avoid transfers.

The property liable for the payment of unsecured debts of a decedent includes all property transferred by the decedent by any means which is in law void or voidable as against the decedent’s creditors, and subject to prior liens, the right to recover this property, so far as necessary for the payment of unsecured debts of the decedent, is exclusively in the personal representative.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Cross-References.

Deed, judgment, decree, mortgage, foreclosure, and other transfer made in favor of deceased person, or to estate or executor or administrator of deceased, legalized, see N.D.C.C. § 1-04-10.

Notes to Decisions

Transfers to Avoid Creditors.

Both the state human services department and the estate should have been allowed to pursue their claims that decedent, who transferred funds from a money market account created by proceeds of her late husband’s liquidation of his annuity to her two sons, fraudulently conveyed property, as the record showed that the transfer was made in contemplation of her death and after she learned that the state human services department might have a claim against her estate for reimbursement for Medicaid benefits provided to her late husband, especially since the proceeds could be traced and no dispute existed but that decedent had not received a reasonably equivalent value for the exchange. Bergman v. N.D. Dep't of Human Servs. (In re Estate of Bergman), 2004 ND 196, 688 N.W.2d 187, 2004 N.D. LEXIS 325 (N.D. 2004).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Insolvency Alleged.

In an action by an administrator to set aside conveyances by deceased allegedly fraudulent as to creditors, a petition alleging that the conveyances left deceased without sufficient property to pay his debts sufficiently alleged insolvency. Gilbertson v. Volden, 71 N.D. 192, 299 N.W. 250, 1941 N.D. LEXIS 152 (N.D. 1941).

Recovery in Action for Creditor’s Benefit.

If the administrator recovered in action for creditor’s benefit, he was entitled to select so much of personal property as would be reasonably necessary and sufficient to pay creditor’s claim, have title decreed in him for purpose of sale, pay claim, and render any surplus back to grantee from decedent. Johnson v. Rutherford, 28 N.D. 87, 147 N.W. 390, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1914).

Transfers to Avoid Creditors.

Transfers by decedent to avoid creditors were not void, and the administrator could assert their invalidity only for the purpose, and so far as necessary to pay debts, and could take the property transferred only to that extent. Johnson v. Rutherford, 28 N.D. 87, 147 N.W. 390, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1914).

30.1-18-11. (3-711) Powers of personal representatives — In general.

Until termination of the personal representative’s appointment, a personal representative has the same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate. This power may be exercised without notice, hearing, or order of court.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Partition and Lease of Real Property.

Personal representative of estate had the power to enter into a partition agreement whereby farmland held by the estate was partitioned and provisions were made with regard to the leasing of that farmland. Lindemann v. Lindemann, 336 N.W.2d 112, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 303 (N.D. 1983).

District court erred in denying a son’s motion to compel discovery of his mother’s medical records because they were relevant to mental capacity and undue influence issues, particularly where the siblings relied on the absence of medical records to attack the son’s claims; the validity of the quitclaim deed the mother executed was relevant because without it, the condominium would have been administered by her estate, and the son could not have legally occupied it without permission. Nelson v. Nelson, 2018 ND 212, 917 N.W.2d 479, 2018 N.D. LEXIS 219 (N.D. 2018).

Personal Representative As Trustee.

A personal representative is a trustee of the estate for the benefit of creditors and heirs; as a trustee the personal representative is governed by chapter 59-01, in addition to the provisions of Title 30.1. Cudworth v. Cudworth, 312 N.W.2d 331, 1981 N.D. LEXIS 408 (N.D. 1981).

Sale of Estate Property by Personal Representative to Son.

Where a personal representative had a substantial conflict of interest in a sale by him of estate property to his son, and the sale was voidable under section 30.1-18-13, the sale by the personal representative to his son was a fraud against the heirs of the estate, a breach of his fiduciary duty, and a violation of the trust imposed by this section. Cudworth v. Cudworth, 312 N.W.2d 331, 1981 N.D. LEXIS 408 (N.D. 1981).

Sale or Lease of Estate Property.

Title to property passes to a decedent's heirs or devisees at death, subject to a personal representative's broad powers over the title for administration purposes; a personal representative is allowed to lease and sell estate property if acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons. Therefore, although a personal representative might have been acting reasonably when she leased farmland, an income-producing asset of the estate, there was insufficient analysis or supporting evidence presented on the issue. In re Estate of Johnson, 2015 ND 110, 863 N.W.2d 215, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 109 (N.D. 2015).

Tax Liability of Personal Representative.

Personal representative of estate that owned business required to pay federal withholding taxes was personally vested under state law with the ultimate responsibility for the estate, and his authority over the business was equivalent to that of an absolute owner, so that he was a responsible person liable for the payment of such taxes. Keller v. United States, 46 F.3d 851, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1949 (8th Cir. N.D.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824, 116 S. Ct. 88, 133 L. Ed. 2d 45, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 5535 (U.S. 1995).

30.1-18-12. (3-712) Improper exercise of power — Breach of fiduciary duty.

If the exercise of power concerning the estate is improper, the personal representative is liable to interested persons for damage or loss resulting from breach of the personal representative’s fiduciary duty to the same extent as a trustee of an express trust. The rights of purchasers and others dealing with a personal representative shall be determined as provided in sections 30.1-18-13 and 30.1-18-14.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Accrual of Claim for Breach.

Under this section, the losses incurred because of breach of a personal representative’s fiduciary duty must be actual, rather than potential, and a claim for those losses does not accrue until an estate has incurred actual losses. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

Breach Not Found.

Personal representative’s failure to invest funds of certificate of deposit after its maturity in an interest-bearing account was not unreasonable or a dereliction of her fiduciary duty, where uncertainty existed about who was entitled to the funds. Berger v. Peterson (In re Estate of Peterson), 1997 ND 48, 561 N.W.2d 618, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 50 (N.D. 1997).

Jurisdiction over Breach.

County court has jurisdiction to review allegations of breach of fiduciary duty by the personal representative and excessive compensation of persons employed by a personal representative. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

Remedy for Breach.

The county court has jurisdiction to order a person who has received excessive compensation to make a refund to the estate and to order the personal representative to pay for losses to the estate caused by a breach of a fiduciary duty. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

When a personal representative (PR) was found to have transferred estate property to himself, judicial estoppel did not bar his sister from claiming breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty damages because (1) the contract was abandoned, and (2) the PR was liable for damages under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-12. Broten v. Broten, 2015 ND 127, 863 N.W.2d 902, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 2015).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

County Court.

The county court was authorized to conduct an inquiry and hear evidence to discover property belonging to the decedent’s estate. In re Gonsky's Estate, 79 N.D. 123, 55 N.W.2d 60, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1952).

Court of Equity.

Court of equity had jurisdiction to set aside final decree which was entered through fraud of administrator, provided the action was begun within three years after discovery of the fraud. Fischer v. Dolwig, 29 N.D. 561, 151 N.W. 431, 1915 N.D. LEXIS 31 (N.D. 1915).

Damage to Goods.

Fraud causing a pecuniary loss was not “damage to goods” of the deceased, and a cause of action therefor did not survive, and was not assignable. Grabow v. Bergeth, 59 N.D. 214, 229 N.W. 282, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 1930).

Discovery.

The word “discovery”, as used in former N.D.C.C. § 30-24-13, meant “to obtain for the first time knowledge of” and constructive notice of fraud would not be sufficient. Moore v. Palmer, 43 N.D. 99, 174 N.W. 93, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 20 (N.D. 1919).

Neglect or Misconduct Not Found.

It was not neglect or misconduct for administrator to accept difference between lien on property and purchase price in full settlement of claim and for sale of property. Skachenko v. Sweetman, 77 N.D. 502, 43 N.W.2d 683, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1950).

Sale of realty to decedent’s daughter for fifteen hundred fifty dollars when son had bid sixteen hundred dollars was not abuse of administrator’s discretion where daughter had deposited one hundred dollars with bid and son had deposited nothing, the appraised value of the realty being sixteen hundred dollars. Skachenko v. Sweetman, 77 N.D. 502, 43 N.W.2d 683, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1950).

Collateral References.

Improvements, liability of personal representative with respect to completion of, 5 A.L.R.2d 1250.

Interest on legacies or distributive shares where payment is delayed, personal liability of executor or administrator for, 18 A.L.R.2d 1384.

Use of decedent’s real estate, accountability of personal representative for his, 31 A.L.R.2d 243.

United States: construction and effect of 31 USCS § 192 imposing personal liability on fiduciary for paying debts due by person or estate for whom he acts before paying debts due 41 A.L.R.2d 446.

Replevin or similar possessory action, availability to one not claiming as heir, legatee, or creditor of decedent’s estate, against personal representative, 42 A.L.R.2d 418.

Business losses: liability of personal representative for losses incurred in carrying on, without testamentary authorization, decedent’s nonpartnership mercantile or manufacturing business, 58 A.L.R.2d 365.

Coexecutor’s or coadministrator’s liability for defaults or wrongful acts of fiduciary in handling estate, 65 A.L.R.2d 1019, 1068.

Venue: place of personal representative’s appointment as venue of action against him in his official capacity, 93 A.L.R.2d 1199.

Defense of action: liability of executor or administrator for negligence or default in defending action against estate, 14 A.L.R.3d 1036.

Agent or attorney, liability of executor or administrator, or his bond, for loss caused to estate by act or default of his, 28 A.L.R.3d 1191.

Taxes: liability of executor, administrator, trustee, or his counsel for interest, penalty, or extra taxes assessed against estate because of tax law violations, 47 A.L.R.3d 507.

Overpaying or unnecessarily paying tax, liability of executor or administrator to estate because of, 55 A.L.R.3d 785.

Garnishment against executor or administrator by creditor of estate, 60 A.L.R.3d 1301.

30.1-18-13. (3-713) Sale, encumbrance, or transaction involving conflict of interest — Voidable — Exceptions.

Any sale or encumbrance to the personal representative, the personal representative’s spouse, agent, or attorney, or any corporation, limited liability company, or trust in which the personal representative has a substantial beneficial interest, or any transaction which is affected by a substantial conflict of interest on the part of the personal representative, is voidable by any person interested in the estate except one who has consented after fair disclosure, unless:

  1. The will or a contract entered into by the decedent expressly authorized the transaction; or
  2. The transaction is approved by the court after notice to interested persons.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 54, § 106.

Notes to Decisions

Interested person.

Because a personal representative could be an interested person, petitioner was not precluded from filing petitions as an interested person in the formal supervised probate administration while simultaneously performing her fiduciary duty as the personal representative to distribute the property according to the decedent’s will and the best interests of the estate. Bouchard v. Biel (In re Estate of Brandt), 2019 ND 87, 924 N.W.2d 762, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 2019).

Sale to Personal Representative.

Where personal representative acknowledged buying car from decedent’s estate and testified he paid the estate $ 4,000 for the vehicle even though the “bluebook” value was $ 3,400 and the court recognized the vehicle was valued at $ 3,900 on an inventory and appraisal of estate property, there was no breach of fiduciary duty by the personal representative. Connole v. Anderson (In re Estate of Howser), 2002 ND 33, 639 N.W.2d 485, 2002 N.D. LEXIS 29 (N.D. 2002).

Judicial estoppel and election of remedies did not bar voiding a personal representative's transfer of estate property to himself while also awarding damages to his mother's estate because (1) alternative remedies were not decided, and a determination of a proper remedy was postponed to a later hearing, so damages were proper, and (2) the transfer was voidable under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-13 for a conflict of interest. Broten v. Broten, 2015 ND 127, 863 N.W.2d 902, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 2015).

Sale to Personal Representative’s Son.

While this section does not make a sale to a personal representative’s son voidable per se, such a sale was voidable where the personal representative had a substantial conflict of interest in the sale to his son. Cudworth v. Cudworth, 312 N.W.2d 331, 1981 N.D. LEXIS 408 (N.D. 1981).

Self-Dealing.

This section strictly prohibits a personal representative from engaging in estate transactions in which he has a conflict of interest or derives a personal benefit. This prohibition against self-dealing lies at the heart of the fiduciary relationship. Thomas by & Through Schmidt v. Thomas (In re Estate of Thomas), 532 N.W.2d 676, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 1995).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Jurisdiction.

Former section did not authorize action in district court to review errors properly reviewable on appeal from the final decree. Fischer v. Dolwig, 39 N.D. 161, 166 N.W. 793, 1918 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1918).

Former section granted no jurisdiction to the county court in regard to motions to set aside decree, and was a statute of limitation applicable to actions in courts of general jurisdiction because the county court lacked equitable jurisdiction. Reichert v. Reichert, 41 N.D. 253, 170 N.W. 621, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 72 (N.D. 1919); Bellingham State Bank v. McCormick, 55 N.D. 700, 215 N.W. 152, 1927 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1927).

No New Remedy Created.

Former section did not create a new remedy nor confer a new right of action, but merely recognized the existing rule that a judgment could be vacated by an equitable action upon certain grounds, and limited the time within which such action could be brought. Kranz v. Tavis, 49 N.D. 553, 192 N.W. 176, 1922 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 1922).

“Other Ground.”

The phrase “or other ground upon which the action is based” meant any other ground which addressed itself to equity as a court of conscience. Moore v. Palmer, 43 N.D. 99, 174 N.W. 93, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 20 (N.D. 1919).

Relief Not Granted.

Equity would not grant relief for mere errors of law committed by county court, nor would it grant relief where person seeking to set aside decree could have had the matter litigated in county court if due diligence had been exercised. Kranz v. Tavis, 49 N.D. 553, 192 N.W. 176, 1922 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 1922).

Setting Aside Sale.

To set aside sale of administrator it was necessary to bring a direct proceeding for that specific purpose. Knight v. Harrison, 43 N.D. 76, 174 N.W. 632, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 25 (N.D. 1919).

Statute of Limitations.

Defense of statute of limitations was good as against claim of creditor who failed to file note, or copy of it, and permitted estate to be closed and administrator discharged, and equity would not reopen probate of estate. People's State Bank v. Thompson, 64 N.D. 472, 253 N.W. 742, 1934 N.D. LEXIS 223 (N.D. 1934).

30.1-18-14. (3-714) Persons dealing with personal representative — Protection.

A person who in good faith either assists a personal representative or deals with the personal representative for value is protected as if the personal representative properly exercised the personal representative’s power. The fact that a person knowingly deals with a personal representative does not alone require the person to inquire into the existence of a power or the propriety of its exercise. Except for restrictions on powers of supervised personal representatives which are endorsed on letters as provided in section 30.1-16-04, no provision in any will or order of court purporting to limit the power of a personal representative is effective except as to persons with actual knowledge thereof. A person is not bound to see to the proper application of estate assets paid or delivered to a personal representative. The protection here expressed extends to instances in which some procedural irregularity or jurisdictional defect occurred in proceedings leading to the issuance of letters, including a case in which the alleged decedent is found to be alive. The protection here expressed is not in substitution for that provided by comparable provisions of the laws relating to commercial transactions and laws simplifying transfers of securities by fiduciaries.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Construction.

When read as a whole, N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-14 reveals an intent that a person dealing with a purported personal representative should obtain some documentary proof, typically letters issued by the court, that the personal representative has authority to act as a personal representative. Stuber v. Engel, 2017 ND 198, 900 N.W.2d 230, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 199 (N.D. 2017).

Good Faith.

A party is entitled to the protection of this section in dealing with the personal representative only if he acted in good faith. Boe v. Rose, 1998 ND 29, 574 N.W.2d 834, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 39 (N.D. 1998).

Question of Fact and Law.

A party’s status as a good faith purchaser is a mixed question of fact and law. Boe v. Rose, 1998 ND 29, 574 N.W.2d 834, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 39 (N.D. 1998).

30.1-18-15. (3-715) Transactions authorized for personal representatives — Exceptions.

Except as restricted or otherwise provided by the will or by an order in a formal proceeding and subject to the priorities stated in section 30.1-20-02, a personal representative, acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons, may properly:

  1. Retain assets owned by the decedent pending distribution or liquidation, including those in which the representative is personally interested or which are otherwise improper for trust investment.
  2. Receive assets from fiduciaries or other sources.
  3. Perform, compromise, or refuse performance of the decedent’s contracts that continue as obligations of the estate, as the personal representative may determine under the circumstances. In performing enforceable contracts by the decedent to convey or lease land, the personal representative, among other possible courses of action, may:
    1. Execute and deliver a deed of conveyance for cash payment of all sums remaining due or the purchaser’s note for the sum remaining due secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on the land; or
    2. Deliver a deed in escrow with directions that the proceeds, when paid in accordance with the escrow agreement, be paid to the successors of the decedent, as designated in the escrow agreement.
  4. Satisfy written charitable pledges of the decedent irrespective of whether the pledges constituted binding obligations of the decedent or were properly presented as claims, if in the judgment of the personal representative the decedent would have wanted the pledges completed under the circumstances.
  5. If funds are not needed to meet debts and expenses currently payable and are not immediately distributable, deposit or invest liquid assets of the estate, including moneys received from the sale of other assets, in federally insured interest-bearing accounts, readily marketable secured loan arrangements, or other prudent investments which would be reasonable for use by trustees generally.
  6. Acquire or dispose of an asset, including land in this or another state, for cash or on credit, at public or private sale and manage, develop, improve, exchange, partition, change the character of, or abandon an estate asset.
  7. Make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or alterations in buildings or other structures, demolish any improvements, raze existing or erect new party walls or buildings.
  8. Subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to public use, make or obtain the vacation of plats and adjust boundaries, adjust differences in valuation on exchange or partition by giving or receiving considerations, or dedicate easements to public use without consideration.
  9. Enter for any purpose into a lease as lessor or lessee, with or without option to purchase or renew, for a term within or extending beyond the period of administration.
  10. Enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration and removal of minerals or other natural resources or enter into a pooling or unitization agreement.
  11. Abandon property when, in the opinion of the personal representative, it is valueless, or is so encumbered, or is in condition that it is of no benefit to the estate.
  12. Vote stocks or other securities in person or by general or limited proxy.
  13. Pay calls, assessments, and other sums chargeable or accruing against or on account of securities, unless barred by the provisions relating to claims.
  14. Hold a security in the name of a nominee or in other form without disclosure of the interest of the estate but the personal representative is liable for any act of the nominee in connection with the security so held.
  15. Insure the assets of the estate against damage, loss, and liability and the personal representative against liability as to third persons.
  16. Borrow money with or without security to be repaid from the estate assets or otherwise and advance money for the protection of the estate.
  17. Effect a fair and reasonable compromise with any debtor or obligor, or extend, renew, or in any manner modify the terms of any obligation owing to the estate. If the personal representative holds a mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon property of another person, the personal representative may, in lieu of foreclosure, accept a conveyance or transfer of encumbered assets from the owner thereof in satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by lien.
  18. Pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the personal representative, and other expenses incident to the administration of the estate.
  19. Sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion rights and consent, directly or through a committee or other agent, to the reorganization, consolidation, merger, dissolution, or liquidation of a corporation, limited liability company, or other business enterprise.
  20. Allocate items of income or expense to either estate income or principal, as permitted or provided by law.
  21. Employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisers, or agents, even if they are associated with the personal representative, to advise or assist the personal representative in the performance of the personal representative’s administrative duties, and act, without independent investigation, upon their recommendations. Instead of acting personally, the personal representative may employ one or more agents to perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary.
  22. Prosecute or defend claims or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the protection of the estate and of the personal representative in the performance of the personal representative’s duties.
  23. Sell, mortgage, or lease any real or personal property of the estate or any interest therein for cash, credit, or for part cash and part credit, and with or without security for unpaid balances.
  24. Continue any unincorporated business or venture in which the decedent was engaged at the time of death:
    1. In the same business form for a period of not more than four months from the date of appointment of a general personal representative if continuation is a reasonable means of preserving the value of the business, including good will;
    2. In the same business form for any additional period of time that may be approved by order of the court in a formal proceeding to which the persons interested in the estate are parties; or
    3. Throughout the period of administration if the business is incorporated by the personal representative and if none of the probable distributees of the business who are competent adults object to its incorporation and retention in the estate.
  25. Incorporate any business or venture in which the decedent was engaged at the time of death.
  26. Provide for exoneration of the personal representative from personal liability in any contract entered into on behalf of the estate.
  27. Satisfy and settle claims and distribute the estate as provided in this title.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 54, § 106.

Cross-References.

Assignment of mortgage by foreign executor or administrator, see N.D.C.C. § 1-04-07.

Assignment, satisfaction, foreclosure of mortgage, judgment, or other lien by heirs, legatees, foreign administrator, executor, or guardian, see N.D.C.C. § 35-01-25.

Authority of executor and administrator to change boundary of irrigation district, see N.D.C.C. § 61-10-12.

Conveyance made by executor or administrator pursuant to decree of specific performance without entry of order confirming conveyance legalized, see N.D.C.C. § 1-04-19.

Investment in notes or bonds secured by federal housing administrator, see § 6-03-48.

Leasing for oil production, see N.D.C.C. §§ 38-10-02 and 38-10-03.

Property directed by will to be disposed of, duty of executor as to oil, gas, or other minerals, see N.D.C.C. § 38-10-11.

Validation of oil and gas leases made by executor, administrator, or guardian, see N.D.C.C. § 1-04-16.

Notes to Decisions

Attorneys’ Fees.

A personal representative is empowered to employ attorneys to assist in administration and to pay the compensation of the personal representative, and other expenses incident to the administration of the estate. This compensation includes reasonable attorneys’ fees to defend or prosecute any proceeding in good faith. In re Estate of O'Connell, 476 N.W.2d 8, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 179 (N.D. 1991).

Under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-15(21), the personal representative was entitled to reasonable compensation for his services rendered as the tasks required substantial time and effort and could not have been easily delegated to a third-party. N.D. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Fisk (In re Estate of Fisk), 2010 ND 186, 788 N.W.2d 611, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 237 (N.D. 2010).

Duty to Defend.

Generally, a personal representative has the duty, as well as the right, to defend the will by all fair means, and with his best efforts, at least where he has reasonable ground to believe the will is valid. In re Estate of Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d 515, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 96 (N.D. 1992).

Duty to Pay Taxes.

Personal representative of estate that owned business required to pay federal withholding taxes was personally vested under state law with the ultimate responsibility for the estate, his authority over the business was equivalent to that of an absolute owner, he controlled the estate’s bank account, and was authorized to engage in various transactions on behalf of the estate so that he was a responsible person liable for the payment of such taxes. Keller v. United States, 46 F.3d 851, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1949 (8th Cir. N.D.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824, 116 S. Ct. 88, 133 L. Ed. 2d 45, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 5535 (U.S. 1995).

Expenses Proper.

District court did not err in awarding a surviving spouse funeral and last illness expenses where the decedent’s will and the court had appointed her as the estate’s personal representative, and those expenses were paid under the power of attorney in effect at the time of the decedent’s death. Estate of Wicklund v. Wicklund, 2014 ND 64, 844 N.W.2d 565, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 58 (N.D. 2014).

Inquiry Into Decedent’s Financial Affairs.

A personal representative’s inquiry about the state of a decedent’s financial affairs, as required under N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-28-12 and 30.1-18-15(27) when those provisions are read together, includes contacting a known guardian about the decedent’s affairs; where such an inquiry would have uncovered the existence of a creditor who had sent a bill to a decedent’s guardian, that creditor was a reasonably ascertainable creditor for purposes of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-01. Larson v. Fraase (In re Estate of Elken), 2007 ND 107, 735 N.W.2d 842, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 2007).

Partition and Lease of Real Property.

Personal representative of estate had the power to enter into a partition agreement whereby farmland held by the estate was partitioned and provisions were made with regard to the leasing of that farmland. Lindemann v. Lindemann, 336 N.W.2d 112, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 303 (N.D. 1983).

Sale of Estate Property.

When the will directs that estate property is to be sold, without fixing specific time limits for such sale, the personal representative must sell the property within a reasonable time in the best interest of the estate. In re Estate of Rolczynski, 349 N.W.2d 394, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 311 (N.D. 1984).

Title to property passes to a decedent's heirs or devisees at death, subject to a personal representative's broad powers over the title for administration purposes; a personal representative is allowed to lease and sell estate property if acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons. Therefore, although a personal representative might have been acting reasonably when she leased farmland, an income-producing asset of the estate, there was insufficient analysis or supporting evidence presented on the issue. In re Estate of Johnson, 2015 ND 110, 863 N.W.2d 215, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 109 (N.D. 2015).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Action Dissolved upon Death.

The death of the defendant before the rendition of a judgment against him dissolved garnishment proceedings in the action against the defendant. First Nat'l Bank v. Rohlik, 66 N.D. 72, 262 N.W. 458, 1935 N.D. LEXIS 173 (N.D. 1935).

Action Founded on Contract.

An administrator could maintain an action founded on contract in the same court in which the action could have been maintained by the intestate. McDonald v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 N.D. 49, 224 N.W. 676, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 179 (N.D. 1929).

An administrator could maintain an action founded on contract without obtaining permission of the county court, the actions requiring the direction of the county court being limited to those specified by law. McDonald v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 N.D. 49, 224 N.W. 676, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 179 (N.D. 1929).

An executor or administrator could be directed to make a proper conveyance only when the deceased was bound by contract in writing to convey and died before making the conveyance. TWENGE v. STAVENS, 63 N.D. 1, 245 N.W. 464, 1932 N.D. LEXIS 132 (N.D. 1932).

Administrator As Defendant.

An administrator who was substituted as party defendant in an action on a promissory note against decedent could waive formal presentation of a claim which was not barred by the statute of nonclaim. Vance v. Hanson, 50 N.D. 446, 196 N.W. 750, 1923 N.D. LEXIS 127 (N.D. 1923).

An action on a note was not abated by defendant’s death before trial, so a personal representative was properly substituted as a party defendant. First Nat'l Bank v. Rohlik, 66 N.D. 72, 262 N.W. 458, 1935 N.D. LEXIS 173 (N.D. 1935).

Independent Proceeding In Rem.

Proceeding for sale of real property of an intestate in course of administration was an independent proceeding in rem, and if the petition conformed to the statutory requirements, the court thereby acquired jurisdiction. Skachenko v. Sweetman, 77 N.D. 502, 43 N.W.2d 683, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1950); Brand v. Brand, 65 N.W.2d 457, 1954 N.D. LEXIS 90 (N.D. 1954).

Joint Will.

Under a joint will made by husband and wife giving the survivor the use of all property for life, the executor was the proper party to apply to the county court for an order to invest the moneys for the benefit of the estate. Zlevor v. Tice, 64 N.D. 626, 255 N.W. 470, 1934 N.D. LEXIS 243 (N.D. 1934).

Motion to Substitute Personal Representative.

Where a motion to substitute a personal representative for a deceased party in a pending action was resisted on the ground that the cause of action did not survive, there was inherent in the court’s decision on the motion a question of substantial rights as to whether the cause of action survived the death, which intrinsically involved the merits of the action, and an order granting the motion and directing the substitution was appealable under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02(5). Missouri Slope Livestock Auction v. Wachter, 113 N.W.2d 222, 1962 N.D. LEXIS 57 (N.D. 1962), overruled in part, Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 2010 ND 138, 785 N.W.2d 863, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 131 (N.D. 2010).

Where the death of a party to an action that survived and the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased party were established or conceded, a motion to substitute the representative of the party could not be successfully resisted on the ground that an event occurring subsequent to death constituted a bar to the action. Missouri Slope Livestock Auction v. Wachter, 113 N.W.2d 222, 1962 N.D. LEXIS 57 (N.D. 1962), overruled in part, Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 2010 ND 138, 785 N.W.2d 863, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 131 (N.D. 2010).

Presumption of Notice.

The recitals of the court in the order of license to sell were presumptively true, and notice would be presumed to have been given until the contrary was proved. Skachenko v. Sweetman, 77 N.D. 502, 43 N.W.2d 683, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1950).

Proof of Claim Against Decedent.

A statute requiring the plaintiff in an action pending against a person at death to present the claim to the executor or administrator was mandatory, and a judgment without proof of thus presenting the claim would be reversed. Carlson v. Chase, 55 N.D. 680, 215 N.W. 151, 1927 N.D. LEXIS 146 (N.D. 1927).

A statute authorizing the county court to direct an administrator to execute a deed under the decedent’s contract for sale of real estate did not confer equity jurisdiction. FOX v. FOX, 57 N.D. 368, 221 N.W. 889, 1928 N.D. LEXIS 140 (N.D. 1928).

Public Administrator Ex Officio.

Administrator could sue on official bond of public administrator ex officio. Kelsey v. Olsness, 63 N.D. 758, 249 N.W. 919, 1933 N.D. LEXIS 232 (N.D. 1933).

Question of Right.

Whether in a particular action the cause of action survived the death of a party was a question of right and not a question of procedure. Missouri Slope Livestock Auction v. Wachter, 113 N.W.2d 222, 1962 N.D. LEXIS 57 (N.D. 1962), overruled in part, Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 2010 ND 138, 785 N.W.2d 863, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 131 (N.D. 2010).

Reservation of Mineral Rights.

Failure of administrators to disclose reservation of mineral rights in a deed to property sold by them until report of sale was made did not go to the jurisdiction of the court. Brand v. Brand, 65 N.W.2d 457, 1954 N.D. LEXIS 90 (N.D. 1954).

Where grantee of administrator’s deed entered appearance in writing and specially consented to the proceedings for sale of real property, he could not later object to jurisdiction of court nor collaterally attack deed which reserved mineral rights. Brand v. Brand, 65 N.W.2d 457, 1954 N.D. LEXIS 90 (N.D. 1954).

Sale After Notice Expired Prohibited.

Administratrix could not accept bid for sale of real estate after the period provided for making the sale under published notice had expired, unless another notice was published. Bolinski v. Harris, 89 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1958).

Sale Not Invalid.

Fact that cash was not paid at time of administrator’s sale would not invalidate sale where purchaser had good lien claim and record disclosed that administrator received cash “from sale of land”. Skachenko v. Sweetman, 77 N.D. 502, 43 N.W.2d 683, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 1950).

Sale of Real Estate.

Sale of real estate was authorized where necessary to pay debts duly proved in a foreign jurisdiction. Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 144 N.W. 1082, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 1914).

Sale of Partnership Interest.

Former section relating to sale of a partnership interest referred to an interest of the estate in the ultimate distribution of partnership assets, and not to a sale of a specific partnership interest in specific partnership, realty, or personalty. Gardner Hotel Co. v. Hagaman, 47 N.D. 434, 182 N.W. 685, 1921 N.D. LEXIS 117 (N.D. 1921).

Upon decease of one of the partners, the surviving partner succeeded to the partnership property in trust for purposes of liquidation. Gardner Hotel Co. v. Hagaman, 47 N.D. 434, 182 N.W. 685, 1921 N.D. LEXIS 117 (N.D. 1921).

Sale Proper.

Proceeding to sell real estate was available when necessary to a proper administration of an estate, where it was for the best interests of the estate or was assented to by all persons interested. Bolinski v. Harris, 89 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1958).

Substantial Rights.

Former N.D.C.C. § 30-24-15 and N.D.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1) were procedural in nature and neither conferred or withheld substantial rights. Missouri Slope Livestock Auction v. Wachter, 113 N.W.2d 222, 1962 N.D. LEXIS 57 (N.D. 1962), overruled in part, Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 2010 ND 138, 785 N.W.2d 863, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 131 (N.D. 2010).

Waiver of Widow’s Right to Appeal.

Where decedent owned an undivided interest in a farm and his widow owned the remaining undivided interest, a waiver by the widow of her right to appeal from a decision of the county court in connection with the estate related only to the interest of the deceased, and the widow’s own interest was not conveyed by the waiver, even though it recited that she had no further right, title, or interest. Sittner v. Mistelski, 140 N.W.2d 360, 1966 N.D. LEXIS 193 (N.D. 1966).

Collateral References.

Estate or succession tax: rights and remedies of executor or administrator as regards estate or succession tax paid or payable by him on property not passing under will or coming into his possession, 1 A.L.R.2d 978.

Power of sale conferred by will, right of administrator with will annexed to execute, 9 A.L.R.2d 1324.

Private sale, power of sale conferred on executor by testator as authorizing, 11 A.L.R.2d 955.

Corporate books and records, inspection of, by personal representative of deceased stockholder, 15 A.L.R.2d 11.

Sell real estate, implied power of executor to, 23 A.L.R.2d 1000.

Income or principal: construction of specific provision of will or trust instrument giving executor or trustee power to determine what is income or what is principal, 27 A.L.R.2d 1323.

Easements: power of executor to create easement, implied from power to sell, 44 A.L.R.2d 573.

Option to purchase contained in lease, right of personal representative of leaseholder to enforce, 45 A.L.R.2d 1034.

Repairs: power of personal representative to repair personal property of estate, 64 A.L.R.2d 857.

Life tenant: delivery or distribution to life tenant, or assent by executor to his possession or to the life interest, as inuring to benefit of the remaindermen and operating to take the remainder out of the estate, absent a trust or will provision retaining it, 68 A.L.R.2d 1107.

Compromise claim due estate, power and responsibility of executor or administrator to, 72 A.L.R.2d 191.

Compromise claim against estate, power and responsibility of executor or administrator to, 72 A.L.R.2d 243.

Compromise or settlement of action or cause of action for death, power and responsibility of executor or administrator as to, 72 A.L.R.2d 285.

Contract made for benefit of third party, power and standing of personal representative of deceased promisee to enforce a, 76 A.L.R.2d 231.

Election by spouse to take under or against will as exercisable by agent or personal representative, 83 A.L.R.2d 1077.

Option to purchase, power of executor with power to sell or to lease real property, or to do both, to give an, 83 A.L.R.2d 1310.

Crops: rights in growing, unmatured annual crops as between personal representatives of decedent’s estate and heirs or devisees, 92 A.L.R.2d 1373.

Corporate stock: who may exercise voting power of corporate stock pending settlement of estate of deceased owner, 7 A.L.R.3d 629.

Locating and noticing legatees, devisees, or heirs, duty and liability of executor with respect to, 10 A.L.R.3d 547.

Law Reviews.

North Dakota Supreme Court Review (Estate of Gilbert Elken, Jr., 2007 ND 107, 735 N.W.2d 843 (2007)), see 84 N.D. L. Rev. 567 (2008).

30.1-18-16. (3-716) Powers and duties of successor personal representative.

A successor personal representative has the same power and duty as the original personal representative to complete the administration and distribution of the estate as expeditiously as possible, but shall not exercise any power expressly made personal to the executor named in the will.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Misconduct by Prior Fiduciary.

Mere possibility of misconduct by a prior fiduciary is not alone sufficient reason to hold a successor fiduciary responsible for it. In re Estate of Kjorvestad, 375 N.W.2d 160, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 408 (N.D. 1985).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Maintenance of Former Administrator’s Action.

A successor administrator was entitled to maintain an action against the estate of a deceased surety on a former administrator’s bond to recover the amount owing to the estate by the former administrator. Graber v. Bontrager, 69 N.D. 300, 285 N.W. 865, 1939 N.D. LEXIS 152 (N.D. 1939).

30.1-18-17. (3-717) Corepresentatives — When joint action required.

If two or more persons are appointed corepresentatives and unless the will provides otherwise, the concurrence of all is required on all acts connected with the administration and distribution of the estate. This restriction does not apply when any corepresentative receives and receipts for property due the estate, when the concurrence of all cannot readily be obtained in the time reasonably available for emergency action necessary to preserve the estate, or when a corepresentative has been delegated to act for the others. Persons dealing with a corepresentative, if actually unaware that another has been appointed to serve with the corepresentative or if advised by the personal representative with whom they deal that the representative has authority to act alone for any of the reasons mentioned herein, are as fully protected as if the person with whom they dealt had been the sole personal representative.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Breaking of Impasse.

Where joint personal representatives could not agree to execution of power of attorney to accounting firm for preparation of tax returns, it was within the power of the district court under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-17-07 read in conjunction with N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-03(1) to order the nonconsenting personal representative to execute the power, where it appeared that such action was necessary in order to settle estate. Conway v. Parker, 250 N.W.2d 266, 1977 N.D. LEXIS 227 (N.D. 1977).

Collateral References.

Coexecutor’s or coadministrator’s liability for defaults or wrongful acts of fiduciary in handling estate, 65 A.L.R.2d 1019, 1068.

Right of coexecutor to reimbursement from estate for fees paid independent legal counsel retained by him, 66 A.L.R.2d 1169.

30.1-18-18. (3-718) Powers of surviving personal representative.

Unless the terms of the will otherwise provide, every power exercisable by personal corepresentatives may be exercised by the one or more remaining after the appointment of one or more is terminated, and if one of two or more nominated as coexecutors is not appointed, those appointed may exercise all the powers incident to the office.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Interest of Survivor.

The requirement that a surviving partner should make an inventory and file a bond did not affect the interest of the survivor, and was not a condition prerequisite to the assertion of his rights. Gardner Hotel Co. v. Hagaman, 47 N.D. 434, 182 N.W. 685, 1921 N.D. LEXIS 117 (N.D. 1921).

30.1-18-19. (3-719) Compensation of personal representative.

A personal representative is entitled to reasonable compensation for the personal representative’s services. If a will provides for compensation of the personal representative and there is no contract with the decedent regarding compensation, the personal representative may renounce the provision before qualifying and be entitled to reasonable compensation. A personal representative also may renounce the personal representative’s right to all or any part of the compensation. A written renunciation of fee may be filed with the court.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Attorneys’ Fees.

For case discussing guidelines for determining reasonable attorneys’ fees, see In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

District court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request for personal representative’s fees and attorney’s fees. The district court found the litigation costs and a substantial portion of the attorney’s fees were more in pursuit of appellant’s own personal interests than the estate’s interests. Sande v. Sande (In re Estate of Sande), 2020 ND 125, 943 N.W.2d 826, 2020 N.D. LEXIS 116 (N.D. 2020).

Compensation Reasonable.

District court did not err in finding personal representative fees reasonable where personal representative submitted statements showing she spent many hours preparing assets for sale and negotiating sales, attending to estate obligations, and working with legal counsel. Berger v. Peterson (In re Estate of Peterson), 1997 ND 48, 561 N.W.2d 618, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 50 (N.D. 1997).

Personal representative did not present any invoices, statements, cancelled checks, itemizations, or other documentation substantiating the requested fees; the children failed to meet their burden to affirmatively establish that the district court abused its discretion in determining a reasonable amount of additional personal representative’s fees and attorney’s fees. In re Estate of Cashmore v. Cashmore, 2010 ND 159, 787 N.W.2d 261, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 2010).

It was not an abuse of discretion to award a personal representative personal representative's fees because the trial court recognized (1) the extensive volume of work done by the personal representative for the estate and (2) that the actions taken by the personal representative were all done in good faith. Hogen v. Hogen (Estate of Hogen), 2015 ND 125, 863 N.W.2d 876, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 125 (N.D. 2015).

District court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the personal representative’s fees where it found the personal representative provided 392 hours of service over more than five years, based on a spreadsheet the personal representative prepared, the numbers of hours were reasonable given the nature of the matter, and it adequately explained its decision. In re Estate of Albrecht, 2020 ND 27, 938 N.W.2d 151, 2020 N.D. LEXIS 27 (N.D. 2020).

Determination of Amount.

District court stated that the wife, as personal representative of the estate, was allowed to claim her personal representative fees in a “reasonable amount;” however, the court’s decision did not otherwise provide a dollar amount of those services or explain how those personal representative’s fees were calculated, and as the court’s decision was inadequate to understand the basis for the award, a remand was necessary for a determination of the amount of personal representative fees. In re Estate of Wicklund v. Wicklund, 2012 ND 29, 812 N.W.2d 359, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 26 (N.D. 2012).

Double Compensation.

One person who served as both the personal representative and the attorney for an estate was entitled to reasonable compensation under both this section and N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-21. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

Excessive Compensation.

County court has jurisdiction to review allegations of breach of fiduciary duty by the personal representative and excessive compensation of persons employed by a personal representative. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

The county court has jurisdiction to order a person who has received excessive compensation to make a refund to the estate and to order the personal representative to pay for losses to the estate caused by a breach of a fiduciary duty. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

Standard of Review.

Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a), the supreme court on appeal is required to affirm the findings of the county court on compensation to a personal representative and to those properly employed to assist in administration of any estate, unless they are “clearly erroneous”. In re Estate of Kjorvestad, 375 N.W.2d 160, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 408 (N.D. 1985).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Compensable Duties.

An executrix was entitled to just and reasonable compensation for caring for, managing, and settling the estate of her deceased husband. Fish v. Berzel, 101 N.W.2d 557 (N.D. 1960).

Computation of Compensation.

Fact that inventory specified certain property as homestead did not exclude such property from estate of decedent for purposes of determining executor’s compensation. In re Novak's Estate, 73 N.D. 41, 11 N.W.2d 64, 1943 N.D. LEXIS 60 (N.D. 1943).

It was not erroneous for the court to compute the executor’s commission upon the total inventoried value of the estate, less the exempt personal property. In re Novak's Estate, 73 N.D. 41, 11 N.W.2d 64, 1943 N.D. LEXIS 60 (N.D. 1943).

Determination of proper fee to be paid to administrator should have been based not only upon actual money handled by him, but also on the value of the property undisposed of as originally inventoried and appraised. In re Novak's Estate, 73 N.D. 41, 11 N.W.2d 64, 1943 N.D. LEXIS 60 (N.D. 1943).

Excess Compensation.

County court properly ordered administrator to return to estate money paid to him above an amount slightly in excess of that authorized by law, since there was no proof of extraordinary services sufficient to justify extra allowances. In re Estate of Bjerke, 181 N.W.2d 126, 1970 N.D. LEXIS 144 (N.D. 1970).

Collateral References.

Costs and other expenses incurred by administrator or executor whose appointment was improper as chargeable against estate, 4 A.L.R.2d 160, 164.

Fiduciary’s compensation on estate assets distributed in kind, 32 A.L.R.2d 778.

Double compensation: right to double compensation where same person (natural or corporate) acts as executor and trustee, 85 A.L.R.2d 537.

Limiting effect of provision in contract, will, or trust instrument fixing trustee’s or executor’s fees, 19 A.L.R.3d 520.

Authority of probate court to depart from statutory schedule fixing amount of executor’s commissions and attorneys’ fees, 40 A.L.R.4th 1189.

30.1-18-20. (3-720) Expenses in estate litigation.

If any personal representative or person nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, the personal representative or nominee is entitled to receive from the estate necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney’s fees incurred.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Allowance of Reasonable Attorney Fees.

This section specifically provides that ultimate success in legal proceedings is not a prerequisite to the allowance of reasonable attorney fees. In re Estate of Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d 515, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 96 (N.D. 1992).

Award of attorney fees to a personal representative was not an abuse of discretion because, while the amount awarded was large, the court gave a reasoned explanation, including (1) consideration of the “lodestar” rate, and (2) the fact the case involved lengthy evidentiary hearings and issues related to reconstructing financial records and tracing crop-share proceeds and cash rent over several years for farmland in contentious litigation. Hogen v. Hogen (Estate of Hogen), 2015 ND 125, 863 N.W.2d 876, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 125 (N.D. 2015).

District court's decision approving the personal representative fees and attorney's fees was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable where many of the residuary devisees' arguments regarding the payment of fees relates to their allegation that the representative breached her fiduciary duties in selling the farmland to a grandson, the court had previously held that the representative had the power to sell the farmland, and the case had been ongoing for a long time. Mark v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 2017 ND 162, 897 N.W.2d 921, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 162 (N.D. 2017).

District court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the estate’s attorney’s fees where the Estate incurred significant attorney’s fees and costs in defending the petitions filed by the decedent’s son and the decedent’s estranged husband while the claims were pending for years. In re Estate of Albrecht, 2020 ND 27, 938 N.W.2d 151, 2020 N.D. LEXIS 27 (N.D. 2020).

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Denied.

Person named as personal representative in a will was not entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs for his unsuccessful attempt to probate the will where the will was not admitted to probate because of lack of testamentary capacity of the testator, the person initiated the probate proceeding in the hope of personal gain and without any intent to benefit the estate, and the person exercised undue influence over the testator in executing the will; under such circumstances, the person was not entitled to any presumption that he offered the will for probate in good faith. In re Estate of Honerud, 326 N.W.2d 95, 1982 N.D. LEXIS 375 (N.D. 1982).

Since an attorney employed by a beneficiary usually seeks to benefit only his or her client and not the entire estate, regardless of professed motives or resulting outcome, attorney fees are disallowed. In re Estate of Rohrich, 496 N.W.2d 566, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 34 (N.D. 1993).

Where the personal representative attacked the trust’s creation, acting primarily to benefit his own interests, he was not entitled to collect attorney fees. First Nat'l Bank v. City of Larimore (In re Oliver), 540 N.W.2d 630, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 226 (N.D. 1995).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing attorney’s fees by amount spent on activities that did nothing to benefit an estate or assist in an appeal. First Nat'l Bank v. City of Larimore (In re Oliver), 540 N.W.2d 630, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 226 (N.D. 1995).

District court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request for personal representative’s fees and attorney’s fees. The district court found the litigation costs and a substantial portion of the attorney’s fees were more in pursuit of appellant’s own personal interests than the estate’s interests. Sande v. Sande (In re Estate of Sande), 2020 ND 125, 943 N.W.2d 826, 2020 N.D. LEXIS 116 (N.D. 2020).

District court’s denial of a request for a recovery of attorney’s fees by a co-personal representative who was removed from the administration of the decedent’s unsupervised estate was appropriate because the co-personal representative neither offered, nor identified any direct evidence that the decedent was either unduly influenced or susceptible to such influence as the co-personal representative claimed and the co-personal representative failed to perform any duty pertaining to the office. Binstock v. Finch (In re Estate of Finch), 2021 ND 159, 963 N.W.2d 754, 2021 N.D. LEXIS 159 (N.D. 2021).

“Benefit” to the Estate.

In construing this section, it must appear that the personal representative acted in good faith, that his conduct was free from fraud, and that he benefited the estate before attorney fees and costs may be awarded by the court. A “benefit” to an estate certainly includes services that bring about an enhancement in value or an increase in the assets of the estate. In re Estate of Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d 515, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 96 (N.D. 1992).

A “benefit” to the estate is not to be measured solely in monetary terms, but can also include a personal representative’s good faith attempts to effectuate the testamentary intention set forth in a facially valid will. In re Estate of Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d 515, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 96 (N.D. 1992).

Expenses Incurred by Personal Representative.

The personal representative may be reimbursed for these expenses, or payment may be made directly to the attorney out of the estate. In re Estate of Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d 515, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 96 (N.D. 1992).

The personal representative may be reimbursed for these expenses, or payment may be made directly to the attorney out of the estate. In re Estate of Flaherty, 484 N.W.2d 515, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 96 (N.D. 1992).

District court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the surviving spouse administration costs and attorney’s fees where her pursuit of an elective share from the estate was congruent with the decedent’s testamentary intent to provide for the spouse during her lifetime. Estate of Wicklund v. Wicklund, 2014 ND 64, 844 N.W.2d 565, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 58 (N.D. 2014).

Defending Claims for Benefit of Personal Representative.

Even though district court did not find personal representative had acted in bad faith, court did not err in denying personal representative’s request that attorney fees be paid by the estate rather than from his personal funds where such fees were incurred in defending the validity of joint tenancies with right of survivorship between the personal representative and the deceased which defense, if successful, would have had the effect of making the joint tenancy property the property of the personal representative rather than property of the estate. Liebelt v. Saby, 279 N.W.2d 881, 1979 N.D. LEXIS 249 (N.D. 1979).

Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees.

District court did not err in finding personal representative acted in good faith and that attorneys’ fees were reasonable, where genuine controversy existed about testator’s intent expressed in his will, and fees were not allowed for work on personal representative’s own creditor claims. Berger v. Peterson (In re Estate of Peterson), 1997 ND 48, 561 N.W.2d 618, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 50 (N.D. 1997).

Requirements for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs.

It must appear that the personal representative acted in good faith, that his conduct was free from fraud, and that he benefited the estate before attorney fees and costs may be awarded by the court pursuant to this section. In re Estate of Honerud, 326 N.W.2d 95, 1982 N.D. LEXIS 375 (N.D. 1982).

Res Judicata.

Award of fees to attorney for work on behalf of one decedent’s estate, as authorized by this section, was not res judicata as to his claim against estate of that decedent’s sister for his alleged independent representation of the sister in will contest involving her brother’s estate. In re Estate of Starcher, 447 N.W.2d 293, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 200 (N.D. 1989).

Standard of Review.

Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a), the supreme court on appeal is required to affirm the findings of the county court on compensation to a personal representative and to those properly employed to assist in administration of any estate, unless they are “clearly erroneous”. In re Estate of Kjorvestad, 375 N.W.2d 160, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 408 (N.D. 1985).

Collateral References.

Right to allowance out of estate for attorneys’ fees incurred in attempt to establish or defeat will, 40 A.L.R.2d 1407.

Compensation of attorney for executor or administrator as affected by representation of heir or other beneficiary in controversy with other heirs or beneficiaries, 47 A.L.R.2d 1104.

Extra compensation for legal services, 65 A.L.R.2d 809.

Extra compensation for accounting services, 65 A.L.R.2d 838.

Right of coexecutor to reimbursement from estate for fees paid independent legal counsel retained by him, 66 A.L.R.2d 1169.

Amount of attorney’s compensation in proceedings involving wills and administration of decedent’s estates, 58 A.L.R.3d 317.

Authority of probate court to depart from statutory schedule fixing amount of executor’s commissions and attorneys’ fees, 40 A.L.R.4th 1189.

30.1-18-21. (3-721) Proceedings for review of employment of agents and compensation of personal representatives and employees of estate.

After notice to all interested persons, or on petition of an interested person, or on appropriate motion if administration is supervised, the propriety of employment of any person by a personal representative, including any attorney, auditor, investment adviser, or other specialized agent or assistant, the reasonableness of the compensation of any person so employed, or the reasonableness of the compensation determined by the personal representative for that person’s own services, including services rendered as attorney, may be reviewed by the court. If the amount of attorney’s fees is based upon the value of the decedent’s estate, the fee agreement must be in writing and mailed to all parties who are heirs of the estate pursuant to the last will and testament of the decedent. If the decedent died intestate, notice must be provided to all heirs of the estate in accordance with chapter 30.1-03. Any person who has received excessive compensation from an estate for services rendered may be ordered to make appropriate refunds.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 403, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Attorneys’ Fees.

Attorney seeking compensation from personal representative of an estate must have rendered some necessary or beneficial legal services, there must be some evidence that such services were rendered, and the compensation therefor must be reasonable. In re Estate of Vertin, 381 N.W.2d 199, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 256 (N.D. 1986).

Even without a challenge under this section, a personal representative may pay out of the estate only reasonable attorney fees, for which there must be some basis. In re Estate of Vertin, 381 N.W.2d 199, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 256 (N.D. 1986).

For case discussing guidelines for determining reasonable attorney fees, see In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

District court did not err in ordering an attorney to repay the fees he charged in the administration of an estate because there was sufficient evidence suggesting that the fees were unreasonable; the district court did not misinterpret or misapply the law in holding the attorney personally responsible for the unreasonable fees he charged because it considered the evidence and testimony before it and determined that the fees he collected in his service to the estate were unreasonable. Gleason v. Magers (In re Estate of Amundson), 2015 ND 253, 870 N.W.2d 208, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 260 (N.D. 2015).

Double Compensation.

One person who served as both the personal representative and the attorney for an estate was entitled to reasonable compensation under both N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-19 and this section. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

Excessive Compensation.

County court has jurisdiction to review allegations of breach of fiduciary duty by the personal representative and excessive compensation of persons employed by a personal representative. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

The county court has jurisdiction to order a person who has received excessive compensation to make a refund to the estate and to order the personal representative to pay for losses to the estate caused by a breach of a fiduciary duty. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 95 (N.D. 1990).

Standard of Review.

Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a), the supreme court on appeal is required to affirm the findings of the county court on compensation to a personal representative and to those properly employed to assist in administration of any estate, unless they are “clearly erroneous”. In re Estate of Kjorvestad, 375 N.W.2d 160, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 408 (N.D. 1985).

The supreme court of North Dakota will not overturn a decision on reasonable attorney fees absent a clear abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Vertin, 381 N.W.2d 199, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 256 (N.D. 1986).

CHAPTER 30.1-19 Creditors’ Claims

30.1-19-01. (3-801) Notice to creditors.

Unless notice has already been given under this section, a personal representative upon appointment may publish a notice to creditors whose identities are not reasonably ascertainable. The notice must be published once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county. If the personal representative elects to publish a notice to creditors then, in addition to publishing the notice to creditors, the personal representative shall mail a copy of the notice to those creditors whose identities are known to the personal representative or are reasonably ascertainable and who have not already filed a claim. The notice must announce the personal representative’s appointment and address and notify creditors of the estate to present their claims within three months after the date of the first publication or mailing of the notice or be forever barred. For the purpose of this section, a reasonably ascertainable creditor includes a creditor who regularly submits billings to the decedent or the decedent’s estate and to whose billings the personal representative has had access.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 298, § 1; 1989, ch. 404, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Reasonably Ascertainable Creditor.

Definition of “reasonably ascertainable creditor” in N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-01 did not exclude a creditor who submitted a bill to a decedent’s guardian, rather than to the decedent or the estate, because such an exclusion would be contrary to due process and to the principle that the term “includes” in a definition is a word of enlargement and not a term of limitation. Larson v. Fraase (In re Estate of Elken), 2007 ND 107, 735 N.W.2d 842, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 2007).

Wrongful death action under N.D.C.C. § 32-21-01 was barred by the probate code nonclaim provisions under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-03(1)-(3) because the representative was not a reasonably ascertainable creditor entitled to actual notice under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-01 when she told the representative of the pilot’s estate that no tort claims would be pursued, the claims were not filed within three months of the pilot’s death, and the nonclaim provisions were not subject to the tolling provisions of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-25(1) during the children’s minority. Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, 831 N.W.2d 369, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 2013).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Claim Prior to Notice.

Claim could be presented for allowance or rejection prior to the publication of notice to creditors. Singer v. Austin, 19 N.D. 546, 125 N.W. 560, 1910 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1910).

Protection.

The notice protected the executors, and the estates which they represented. Singer v. Austin, 19 N.D. 546, 125 N.W. 560, 1910 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1910).

Time Limit.

A creditor’s claim must have been presented within the time limited in the notice to creditors. In re Estate of Kaspari, 71 N.W.2d 558, 1955 N.D. LEXIS 123 (N.D. 1955).

Law Reviews.

North Dakota Supreme Court Review (Estate of Gilbert Elken, Jr., 2007 ND 107, 735 N.W.2d 843 (2007)), see 84 N.D. L. Rev. 567 (2008).

30.1-19-02. (3-802) Statutes of limitations.

Unless an estate is insolvent, the personal representative, with the consent of all successors whose interests would be affected, may waive any defense of limitations available to the estate. If the defense is not waived, no claim that was barred by any statute of limitations at the time of the decedent’s death may be allowed or paid. The running of any statute of limitations measured from some other event than death and advertisement and mailing of notice for claims against a decedent is suspended during the three months following the decedent’s death but resumes thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to the sections which follow. For purposes of any statute of limitations, the proper presentation of a claim under section 30.1-19-04 is equivalent to commencement of a proceeding on the claim.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, § 17; 1977, ch. 298, § 2; 1989, ch. 404, § 2.

Notes to Decisions

Duty of Creditor.

The exercise of the creditor’s power to petition for appointment of the personal representative is mandatory; a claimant cannot rely on the failure of other persons to seek appointment of a personal representative to suspend the running of a statute of limitations against the claimant. Ness v. Stirling (In re Estate of Stirling), 537 N.W.2d 554, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 177 (N.D. 1995), overruled in part, Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, 831 N.W.2d 369, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 2013).

Tolling.

Upon the death of a person liable to suit on a tort claim for damages, the time to sue the decedent’s estate is measured from the date of the injury; that person’s death only causes a temporary suspension that extends the limitation period by three months under this section. Ness v. Stirling (In re Estate of Stirling), 537 N.W.2d 554, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 177 (N.D. 1995), overruled in part, Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, 831 N.W.2d 369, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 2013).

Collateral References.

Relation back of appointment of administrator, running of statute of limitations as affected by doctrine of, 3 A.L.R.3d 1234.

Delay in appointing administrator or other representative, effect on cause of action accruing at or after death of person in whose favor it would have accrued, 28 A.L.R.3d 1141.

What constitutes rejection of claim against estate to commence running of statute of limitations applicable to rejected claims, 36 A.L.R.4th 684.

30.1-19-03. (3-803) Limitations on presentation of claims.

  1. All claims against a decedent’s estate which arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state or any political subdivision, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, the heirs and devisees of the decedent, and nonprobate transferees unless presented as follows:
    1. Within three months after the date of the first publication and mailing of notice to creditors if notice is given in compliance with section 30.1-19-01; provided, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent’s domicile before the first publication for claims in this state are also barred in this state.
    2. Within three years after the decedent’s death, if notice to creditors has not been published and mailed.
  2. All claims against a decedent’s estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision thereof, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
    1. A claim based on a contract with the personal representative, within four months after performance by the personal representative is due.
    2. Any other claim, within three months after it arises.
  3. Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
    1. Any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon property of the estate.
    2. To the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which the decedent or personal representative is protected by liability insurance.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 298, § 3; 1989, ch. 404, § 3; 1999, ch. 294, § 6.

Cross-References.

Actions by or against representatives, time, see N.D.C.C. § 28-01-26.

Notes to Decisions

Ancillary Probate Proceedings.

A creditor who has actual knowledge of domiciliary probate proceedings in another state may not make a claim in an ancillary probate in North Dakota after the time for filing claims in the domiciliary probate court has expired. In re Estate of Laschkewitsch, 507 N.W.2d 65, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 196 (N.D. 1993).

Applicability.

Non-claim statutes apply only to claims against the estate of a decedent which, if allowed, would reduce the corpus of the estate or the amount of property which would otherwise be subject to division or distribution among the heirs of an intestate decedent or the legatees and devisees of a testate decedent. Eddy v. Powers (In re Estate of Powers), 552 N.W.2d 785, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 202 (N.D. 1996).

Claims asserting partnership interests in estate property were claims arising in tort or contract and thus subject to the non-claim statute. Murphy v. Murphy, 1999 ND 118, 595 N.W.2d 571, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 110 (N.D. 1999).

Neither N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-19-03(2) nor 30.1-21-06 time-barred a decedent's estate's personal representative's retainer claim against an estate beneficiary for the beneficiary's debt to the estate for post-death cash rent and crop-share proceeds because the statutes did not apply to such a claim. Hogen v. Hogen (Estate of Hogen), 2015 ND 125, 863 N.W.2d 876, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 125 (N.D. 2015).

Court’s Failure to Appoint Representative.

Under the circumstances, plaintiff’s assertion that the failure of the court to formally appoint a personal representative tolls the nonclaim statute with regard to his claim is without merit. 383 N.W.2d 807.

Creditor’s Claim.

A creditor’s claim against an estate is barred if not presented within three months after the date of the first publication of notice to creditors, or within three months after the claim arises if it arises at or after the decedent’s death. 467 N.W.2d 691.

Wrongful death action under N.D.C.C. § 32-21-01 was barred by the probate code nonclaim provisions under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-03(1)-(3) because the representative was not a reasonably ascertainable creditor entitled to actual notice under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-01 when she told the representative of the pilot’s estate that no tort claims would be pursued, the claims were not filed within three months of the pilot’s death, and the nonclaim provisions were not subject to the tolling provisions of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-25(1) during the children’s minority. Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, 831 N.W.2d 369, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 2013).

N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-03 does not divest a court of jurisdiction over untimely filed claims. Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, 831 N.W.2d 369, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 2013).

Probate code nonclaim provisions of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-03 are not subject to the tolling provisions of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-25(1) during a person’s minority. Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, 831 N.W.2d 369, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 2013).

Survival action was barred by N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-03(1)(a) because the representative did not file her claim with the estate until after the three months allowed for filing claims under the statute had expired. Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, 831 N.W.2d 369, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 85 (N.D. 2013).

Defensive Recoupment.

A claim in the nature of a recoupment defense survives as long as the plaintiff’s cause of action exists, even if affirmative legal action upon the subject of recoupment is barred by a statute of limitations. Therefore this section does not bar defensive recoupment. 467 N.W.2d 691.

Nothing in the language of this section or in the drafter’s comments to UPC 3-803 rules out the application of defensive recoupment. 467 N.W.2d 691.

Equitable Estoppel.

Although equitable estoppel has been recognized as an exception to compliance with nonclaim statutes, there must, at a minimum, be some form of affirmative deception involved before the doctrine may be invoked. 383 N.W.2d 807.

General Provisions in Will.

A general direction in a will for the payment of debts which does not create an express trust does not obviate the necessity on the part of a creditor of presenting the claim within the period fixed by a nonclaim statute. However, where the direction in a will is specific as to the debt to be paid or the property from which payment is to be made, or is of such a nature as to create an express trust, there is no necessity for the creditor to present the claim within the statutory time period. 383 N.W.2d 807.

Joint Tenancy.

Summary judgment improper and the non-claim statute was not applicable where nephew presented a colorable showing that he owned van in joint tenancy with decedent, so that a hearing on the matter was required. Eddy v. Powers (In re Estate of Powers), 552 N.W.2d 785, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 202 (N.D. 1996).

No Notice to Creditors.

Because no notice to creditors was published, the Department of Human Services was required to submit its claim for repayment for medical assistance against the estate within three years of recipient’s death. Feiner v. Mowbray (In re Estate of Hooey), 521 N.W.2d 85, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 176 (N.D. 1994).

Statute of Limitations.

Nephew’s claim based on the profit-sharing trust certificates was time barred. Eddy v. Powers (In re Estate of Powers), 552 N.W.2d 785, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 202 (N.D. 1996).

Appellate court reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a corporation in its action for specific performance to compel the estate to sell the decedent’s stock certificates because the action was a claim against the estate under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-01-06(7) as it was a claim that sought to impose a liability on the estate based on a contract right to purchase shares, and it was barred by the limitation clause in N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-03(2)(b). Steen & Berg Co. v. Berg (In re Estate of Berg), 2006 ND 86, 713 N.W.2d 87, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 91 (N.D. 2006).

Creditor’s claims against an estate, brought more than three months after the personal representative’s published notice to creditors but less than three years after the decedent’s death, was not time barred because the creditor, who had not received mailed notice, was a reasonably ascertainable creditor under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-01. Larson v. Fraase (In re Estate of Elken), 2007 ND 107, 735 N.W.2d 842, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 2007).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Application.

Former section applied to claims of the state or for its benefit in the same manner as claims of private parties. Reith v. County of Mountrail, 104 N.W.2d 667, 1960 N.D. LEXIS 81 (N.D. 1960).

Claim Arising upon Contract.

A claim on behalf of a county against a decedent’s estate for the care of his son at the Grafton state school pursuant to his application was a claim arising upon contract within the meaning of former section and was required to be presented within time limited in the notice to creditors. Reith v. County of Mountrail, 104 N.W.2d 667, 1960 N.D. LEXIS 81 (N.D. 1960).

A claim which became defunct under former N.D.C.C. § 30-18-04 barring certain claims arising under contract, was not revitalized under former N.D.C.C. § 30-24-16 allowing suits by executors and administrators. Linster v. Holmen, 116 N.W.2d 616, 1962 N.D. LEXIS 80 (N.D. 1962).

Claim for Contribution.

A co-maker’s claim for contribution was a contingent claim, barred as against decedent’s estate for failure to file within the time prescribed by the statute of nonclaim. Johnson v. Larson, 56 N.D. 207, 216 N.W. 895, 1927 N.D. LEXIS 91 (N.D. 1927).

Death of Party to Action.

Where the death of a party to an action that survived and the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased party were established or conceded, a motion to substitute the representative of the party could not be successfully resisted on the ground that an event occurring subsequent to death constituted a bar to the action. Missouri Slope Livestock Auction v. Wachter, 113 N.W.2d 222, 1962 N.D. LEXIS 57 (N.D. 1962), overruled in part, Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 2010 ND 138, 785 N.W.2d 863, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 131 (N.D. 2010).

Failure to File Debt.

A debt due from an estate was not always expunged and rendered nonassertable by failure to file it as a creditor’s claim. LARSON v. QUANRUD, BRINK & REIBOLD, 78 N.D. 70, 47 N.W.2d 743, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 1950).

Right of Mitigation.

Statutory right of mitigation was not barred or lost by failure to file it as a claim against the estate. LARSON v. QUANRUD, BRINK & REIBOLD, 78 N.D. 70, 47 N.W.2d 743, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 1950).

Statute of Limitations.

The statute barring a claim against an estate arising upon contract, unless presented within the time limited, was not a statute of limitation but of nonclaim. Graber v. Bontrager, 69 N.D. 300, 285 N.W. 865, 1939 N.D. LEXIS 152 (N.D. 1939); In re Estate of Kaspari, 71 N.W.2d 558, 1955 N.D. LEXIS 123 (N.D. 1955).

The running of the statute of limitations was suspended following the death of a decedent only until a creditor was authorized to apply for letters of administration. Weber v. Weber, 77 N.D. 142, 42 N.W.2d 67, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 113 (N.D. 1950).

Former section was not a statute of limitations but one of nonclaim and the failure of a creditor to file a claim within the time limited in the notice to creditors was an absolute bar to the claim. Linster v. Holmen, 116 N.W.2d 616, 1962 N.D. LEXIS 80 (N.D. 1962).

On a simple open account the statute of limitations ran from the date of each item and physician was allowed to collect only for services which were performed within six years prior to testator’s death. Erenfeld v. Erenfeld, 196 N.W.2d 406, 1972 N.D. LEXIS 165 (N.D. 1972), overruled, Kadrmas, Lee & Jackson, P.C. v. Bolken, 508 N.W.2d 341, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 210 (N.D. 1993).

Time-Barred Claim.

A creditor’s claim against the estate of a decedent, which on its face showed that it was barred by the statute of limitations at the time of his death, should not have been allowed. In re Estate of Kaspari, 71 N.W.2d 558, 1955 N.D. LEXIS 123 (N.D. 1955).

Unfiled Claim.

In a suit by an administrator or executor, on behalf of an estate under former N.D.C.C. § 30-24-16, a defendant could, after time for filing claims against the estate had expired, plead and prove an unfiled claim in mitigation of plaintiff’s damages. In such a case defendant could not recover judgment against the plaintiff for the amount by which his claim exceeded that of the plaintiff. Linster v. Holmen, 116 N.W.2d 616, 1962 N.D. LEXIS 80 (N.D. 1962).

Collateral References.

Time for filing claim based on promise not to make a will, 32 A.L.R.2d 370, 380.

Government: claim of government or subdivision thereof as within provision of nonclaim statute, 34 A.L.R.2d 1003.

Necessity of compliance with nonclaim statute before bringing suit in replevin against personal representative, 42 A.L.R.2d 418.

Amendment of claim against decedent’s estate after expiration of time for filing claims, 56 A.L.R.2d 627.

Necessity of presenting spouse’s claim under separation agreement to personal representative of other spouse’s estate, 58 A.L.R.2d 1283.

Land contract, application of nonclaim statute to claim for unmatured payments under, 99 A.L.R.2d 275.

Relation back of appointment of administrator, running of statute of limitations as affected by doctrine of, 3 A.L.R.3d 1234.

Tort claim as within nonclaim statutes, 22 A.L.R.3d 493.

Delay in appointing administrator or other representative, effect on cause of action accruing at or after death of person in whose favor it would have accrued, 28 A.L.R.3d 1141.

Counterclaim or setoff, presentation of claim to executor or administrator as prerequisite of its availability as, 36 A.L.R.3d 693.

What constitutes rejection of claim against estate to commence running of statute of limitations applicable to rejected claims, 36 A.L.R.4th 684.

Law Reviews.

North Dakota Supreme Court Review (Estate of Gilbert Elken, Jr., 2007 ND 107, 735 N.W.2d 843 (2007)), see 84 N.D. L. Rev. 567 (2008).

30.1-19-04. (3-804) Manner of presentation of claims.

Claims against a decedent’s estate may be presented as follows:

  1. The claimant may deliver or mail to the personal representative and any attorney of record for the estate a written statement of the claim indicating its basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed, or may file a written statement of the claim, in the form prescribed by rule, with the clerk of the court. The claim is deemed presented on the first to occur, either receipt of the written statement of claim by the personal representative, or the filing of the claim with the court. If a claim is not yet due, the claimant shall state the date when it will become due. If the claim is contingent or unliquidated, the claimant shall state the nature of the uncertainty. If the claim is secured, the claimant shall describe the security. Failure to describe correctly the security, the nature of any uncertainty, and the due date of a claim not yet due does not invalidate the presentation.
  2. The claimant may commence a proceeding against the personal representative in any court where the personal representative may be subjected to jurisdiction, to obtain payment of the claimant’s claim against the estate, but the commencement of the proceeding must occur within the time limited for presenting the claim. A presentation of claim is not required in regard to matters claimed in proceedings against the decedent which were pending at the time of death.
  3. If a claim is presented under subsection 1, a proceeding on the claim may not be commenced more than sixty days after the personal representative has mailed a notice of disallowance, but, in the case of a claim which is not presently due or which is contingent or unliquidated, the personal representative may consent to an extension of the sixty-day period, or to avoid injustice, the court, on petition, may order an extension of the sixty-day period, but in no event may the extension run beyond the applicable statute of limitations.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2013, ch. 249, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Court’s Failure to Appoint Representative.

Under the circumstances, plaintiff’s assertion that the failure of the court to formally appoint a personal representative tolls the nonclaim statute with regard to his claim is without merit. 383 N.W.2d 807.

Mailed Bills.

Evidence of mailing a bill to the personal representative of an estate supports a finding of presentation under this section, unless outweighed by evidence that it was not received. Nickisch-Ressler Funeral Home v. Romanick, 450 N.W.2d 416, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 19 (N.D. 1990).

County did not abuse its discretion by allowing business record evidence of presentation of funeral bill by mail, even though the business records and testimony of the funeral home may not have been as complete and painstaking as estate would have liked. Nickisch-Ressler Funeral Home v. Romanick, 450 N.W.2d 416, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 19 (N.D. 1990).

Presentation Not Needed.

North Dakota court should not have tried to resolve the merits of a claim relating to an award of military retirement benefits to a former wife because she was not required to submit a claim against her husband’s estate for such since an action was pending at the time of his death; moreover, if a judgment was entered against a personal representative as a substituted party in the pending California action regarding the retirement benefits, this constituted an allowance of the claim against the former husband’s estate. Carlson v. Carlson (In re Estate of Carlson), 2007 ND 35, 728 N.W.2d 337, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 36 (N.D. 2007).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Burden of Proof When Pleading Nonclaim.

The burden of proving the presentation and rejection of a claim against a decedent’s estate, and of a suit begun within ninety days thereof, was upon the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant had answered, pleading the statute of nonclaim. Mann v. Redmon, 27 N.D. 346, 145 N.W. 1031, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 40 (N.D. 1914).

Claim by Corporation.

A claim of a corporation against a decedent’s estate could be verified by the treasurer. F. A. Patrick & Co. v. Austin, 20 N.D. 261, 127 N.W. 109, 1910 N.D. LEXIS 90 (N.D. 1910).

Claim by State.

Claim of state for paying old-age assistance to decedent was not objectionable for failure to attach papers on which allowance was made, since it was a claim for money. State v. Wehe, 72 N.D. 186, 5 N.W.2d 311, 1942 N.D. LEXIS 129 (N.D. 1942).

Claim for Care and Support.

A verified claim for care and support of decedent filed in the county court was evidence only of the fact that it was duly presented as a claim against the estate. Gange v. Gange, 79 N.D. 372, 56 N.W.2d 688, 1953 N.D. LEXIS 45 (N.D. 1953).

County Judge.

A county judge could set aside a previous rejection and allow a claim, provided, only, that this was done before it was barred. In re Smith's Estate, 13 N.D. 513, 101 N.W. 890, 1904 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1904).

Estate of Bank Shareholder.

An estate of a deceased shareholder in a state bank was liable, through the executor, for an assessment on account of a superadded statutory liability where the bank failed after the death of the shareholder and claim was not filed or allowed in probate court. Baird v. McMillan, 53 N.D. 257, 205 N.W. 682, 1925 N.D. LEXIS 77 (N.D. 1925).

Payment of Mortgage Debt.

An administrator was entitled to credit for payment of the mortgage debt, in good faith, though the claim was not filed by the mortgagee. DANIELSON v. PRITZ, 59 N.D. 548, 231 N.W. 550, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 172 (N.D. 1930).

Purchase of Claims.

A surety on an administrator’s bond could purchase claims against an estate. Luther v. Hunter, 7 N.D. 544, 75 N.W. 916, 1898 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1898).

Presentation Not Needed.

A claim particularly directed to be paid by will need not have been presented for allowance. Black v. Black, 58 N.D. 501, 226 N.W. 485, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 244 (N.D. 1929).

A creditor of a decedent whose claim was secured by mortgage, pledge, or any specific lien did not need to present his claim to the administrator for allowance in order to preserve his right to subject the property covered by the lien to the satisfaction of the claim. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Mosher, 60 N.D. 129, 232 N.W. 894, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 217 (N.D. 1930).

Reopening Probate Not Allowed.

A creditor failing to file a note or copy thereof in presenting his claim against an estate, and permitting the estate to be closed and the administrator discharged, could not invoke the district court’s equitable jurisdiction to reopen the probate of the estate. People's State Bank v. Thompson, 64 N.D. 472, 253 N.W. 742, 1934 N.D. LEXIS 223 (N.D. 1934).

Suit for Partition.

An heir could not maintain a suit for partition against other heirs and the administrator in district court, after the county court had assumed jurisdiction to probate and administer the estate, and had appointed an administrator for that purpose, and before a final decree of distribution had been made in the county court. Honsinger v. Stewart, 34 N.D. 513, 159 N.W. 12, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 52 (N.D. 1916).

Supporting Affidavit Required.

A claim presented to an administrator had to be supported by an affidavit, and, when it did not affirmatively appear that the claim was so supported, an action would not lie thereon. Swanson v. Wigen, 66 N.D. 350, 265 N.W. 413, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 175 (N.D. 1936).

Collateral References.

Extension of time: exclusiveness of grounds enumerated in statute providing, under specified circumstances, extension of time for filing claims against decedent’s estate, 57 A.L.R.2d 1304.

Amount of claim filed against decedent’s estate as limiting amount recoverable in action against estate, 25 A.L.R.3d 1356.

30.1-19-05. (3-805) Classification of claims.

  1. If the applicable assets of the estate are insufficient to pay all claims in full, the personal representative shall make payment in the following order:
    1. Costs and expenses of administration.
    2. Reasonable funeral expenses.
    3. Debts and taxes with preference under federal law.
    4. Reasonable and necessary medical and hospital expenses of the last illness of the decedent, including compensation of persons attending the decedent.
    5. The decedent’s child support obligations that were due and unpaid before death.
    6. Debts and taxes with preference under other laws of this state.
    7. All other claims.
  2. No preference shall be given in the payment of any claim over any other claim of the same class, and a claim due and payable shall not be entitled to a preference over claims not due.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1995, ch. 155, § 8.

Cross-References.

Recovery from estate of recipient of medical assistance for needy persons, see N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07.

Notes to Decisions

Determination of Costs And Expenses.

District court determined that the decedent’s personal representative, his wife, was entitled to reimbursement for costs and expenses of administration exceeding $30,000 without specifying an amount for those costs; the district court’s decision did not provide an adequate basis to understand or review the administration costs and expenses allowed, and a remand was necessary for an explanation and determination of the amount of costs and expenses of administration. In re Estate of Wicklund v. Wicklund, 2012 ND 29, 812 N.W.2d 359, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 26 (N.D. 2012).

Funeral Expenses.

The fourteen hundred dollar limitation (now three thousand dollar) on the payment of funeral expenses set forth in N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07 controls over the general probate provisions of this section. In re Estate of Tuntland, 364 N.W.2d 513, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 275 (N.D. 1985).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Claim by U.S.

Claim of United States based on notes executed by decedents during their lives had priority over claim of social service board of state of North Dakota. United States v. Kranich, 92 F. Supp. 366 (D.N.D. 1950).

F.H.A. Loans.

A claim of the farm home administration, a federal agency, for money advanced as agricultural loans, against insolvent estate of decedent was superior to that of the state social service board for old-age assistance advanced to decedent. Johnson v. Hillesland, 86 N.W.2d 522 (N.D. 1957).

Funeral Expenses.

Funeral and burial expenses of a decedent were a charge against his estate, and had to be made next in order of preference to administration expenses, and payment could not be disallowed, neglected, or refused because the funds of the estate had been used to pay claims subordinate thereto. Elton v. Lamb, 33 N.D. 388, 157 N.W. 288, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 91 (N.D. 1916).

Payment Out of Specified Property.

A testator could provide for the payment of debts and charges against an estate out of specified property, thus varying the terms of the statute. Black v. Black, 58 N.D. 501, 226 N.W. 485, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 244 (N.D. 1929).

Proceeds from Crops.

Where an executor took possession of land devised to a named devisee, any proceeds from crops produced thereon while in the executor’s possession were received by the executor as executor and had to be accounted for to the county court. Dolphin v. Peterson, 63 N.D. 792, 249 N.W. 784, 1933 N.D. LEXIS 240 (N.D. 1933).

Stay of Judgment.

In an action to have property owned by deceased, and by him transferred to his wife, declared subject to an alleged debt of decedent, before administrator took charge of any property in grantee’s possession, the court properly stayed execution of judgment or sale of property until final judgment in the county court determining validity of claim against the estate. Johnson v. Rutherford, 28 N.D. 87, 147 N.W. 390, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1914).

Collateral References.

Amount of funeral expenses allowable against decedent’s estate, 4 A.L.R.2d 995.

Propriety of payment of funeral expenses of life beneficiary or life tenant out of corpus of estate under instrument providing for invasion of corpus or estate for support of such person, 18 A.L.R.2d 1236.

Reimbursement, from decedent’s estate, of person other than personal representative or surviving spouse paying funeral expenses, 35 A.L.R.2d 1399.

Duties of public administrator as to payment of claims, 56 A.L.R.2d 1183, 1201.

Funeral expenses of married women, liability for, 82 A.L.R.2d 873.

Continuation of decedent’s business by personal representative, preference or priority of claims arising out of, 83 A.L.R.2d 1347.

Expense of administration of estate, rent or its equivalent accruing after lessee’s death as, 22 A.L.R.3d 814.

Wages of servants, employees, or the like, construction of statutory provisions giving priority on distribution to claims for, 52 A.L.R.3d 940.

30.1-19-06. (3-806) Allowance of claims.

  1. As to claims presented in the manner described in section 30.1-19-04 within the time limit prescribed in section 30.1-19-03, the personal representative may mail a notice to any claimant stating that the claim has been disallowed. If, after allowing or disallowing a claim, the personal representative changes the personal representative’s decision concerning the claim, the personal representative shall notify the claimant. The personal representative may not change a disallowance of a claim after the time for the claimant to file a petition for allowance or to commence a proceeding on the claim has run and the claim has been barred. Every claim which is disallowed, in whole or in part, by the personal representative is barred so far as not allowed unless the claimant files a petition for allowance in the court or commences a proceeding against the personal representative not later than sixty days after the mailing of the notice of disallowance or partial allowance if the notice warns the claimant of the impending bar. Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on the claimant’s claim for sixty days after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the effect of a notice of allowance.
  2. After allowing a claim, the personal representative may before payment change the allowance to a disallowance in whole or in part, but not after allowance by a court order or judgment or an order directing payment of the claim. The personal representative shall notify the claimant of the change to disallowance, and the disallowed claim is then subject to bar as provided under subsection 1. After disallowing a claim, the personal representative may change a disallowance to an allowance in whole or in part until it is barred under subsection 1 and after it is barred, it may be allowed and paid only if the estate is solvent and all successors whose interests would be affected consent.
  3. Upon the petition of the personal representative or of a claimant in a proceeding for the purpose, the court may allow, in whole or in part, any claim or claims presented to the personal representative or filed with the clerk of the court in due time and not barred by subsection 1. Notice in this proceeding must be given to the claimant, the personal representative, and those other persons interested in the estate as the court may direct, by order entered at the time the proceeding is commenced.
  4. A judgment in a proceeding in another court against a personal representative to enforce a claim against a decedent’s estate is an allowance of the claim.
  5. Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in another court entered against the personal representative, allowed claims bear interest at the legal rate for the period commencing sixty days after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired unless based on a contract making a provision for interest, in which case allowed claims bear interest in accordance with that provision.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 401, § 7.

Notes to Decisions

Bequest in Will to Claimant.

Where a claim is made against the estate for compensation for personal services rendered the decedent, and a bequest is made in the will to that claimant, there is no presumption that the bequest is in satisfaction of the claim unless it appears from the will that it was the intent of the testator that the bequest have that effect. In re Estate of Vertin, 352 N.W.2d 200, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 363 (N.D. 1984).

Claim Allowed.

North Dakota court should not have tried to resolve the merits of a claim relating to an award of military retirement benefits to a former wife because she was not required to submit a claim against her husband’s estate for such since an action was pending at the time of his death; moreover, if a judgment was entered against a personal representative as a substituted party in the pending California action regarding the retirement benefits, this constituted an allowance of the claim against the former husband’s estate. Carlson v. Carlson (In re Estate of Carlson), 2007 ND 35, 728 N.W.2d 337, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 36 (N.D. 2007).

Interest on Claim.

Because no notice to creditors was mailed or published, the time for original presentation of claims under this section was three years according to N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-03(1)(b), and thus, the Department of Medical Assistance’s claim would not have begun to bear interest until three years and sixty days after decedent’s death. North Dakota Dep't of Human Servs. v. Brenden (In re Estate of Kiesow), 2000 ND 155, 615 N.W.2d 538, 2000 N.D. LEXIS 164 (N.D. 2000).

Jurisdiction of County Court.

Where claim against estate is disallowed by personal representative and claimant petitions the county court for allowance of the claim, the county court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment allowing the claim. In re Estate of Raketti, 340 N.W.2d 894, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 417 (N.D. 1983).

Procedure After Claim Disallowed.

Claimant whose claim has been disallowed by personal representative has a choice between two alternate procedures: he may petition the county court for allowance of the claim or may initiate a separate action on the claim. In re Estate of Raketti, 340 N.W.2d 894, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 417 (N.D. 1983).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Allowance After Rejection.

A claim against a decedant’s estate could be allowed by a county judge after rejection or nonaction thereon. In re Smith's Estate, 13 N.D. 513, 101 N.W. 890, 1904 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1904).

Burden of Proof.

The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to affirmatively establish the jurisdictional facts of rejection of claim and commencement of suit within period allowed by law. Mann v. Redmon, 27 N.D. 346, 145 N.W. 1031, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 40 (N.D. 1914).

County Judge.

Approval of debt by county judge had the force and effect of a judgment so far as creditor’s bill was concerned. Johnson v. Rutherford, 28 N.D. 87, 147 N.W. 390, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1914).

Deficiency Judgment by Mortgagee.

A mortgagee, after foreclosure of his security, was not entitled to a deficiency judgment against the estate of a deceased mortgagor unless a claim had been presented to the administrator. Hedrick v. Stockgrowers' Credit Corp., 64 N.D. 61, 250 N.W. 334, 1933 N.D. LEXIS 247 (N.D. 1933).

Demurrer.

Answer which alleged that more than three months had expired after claim was rejected and before suit was commenced stated a complete defense and was not subject to general demurrer. Boyd v. Von Neida, 9 N.D. 337, 83 N.W. 329, 1900 N.D. LEXIS 243 (N.D. 1900).

Enforcement.

Publication of notice to creditors was not a necessary condition to the enforcement of the provisions of former section barring the enforcement of a rejected claim. Singer v. Austin, 19 N.D. 546, 125 N.W. 560, 1910 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 1910).

Jurisdiction.

Original jurisdiction to allow or reject claims rested in the executor or administrator and county judge, and it was only after rejection by one of them that right to maintain action in district court arose, it being in the nature of appellate, rather than original jurisdiction. In re Smith's Estate, 13 N.D. 513, 101 N.W. 890, 1904 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1904).

Payment in Due Course.

When a claim was allowed by the county judge, the allowance was in the nature of a judgment against the estate, to be paid by the executor or administrator in the due course of administration. In re Smith's Estate, 13 N.D. 513, 101 N.W. 890, 1904 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1904).

Payment of Mortgage Debt.

An administrator was entitled to credit for payment of a mortgage debt, in good faith, though a claim was not filed by the mortgagee. DANIELSON v. PRITZ, 59 N.D. 548, 231 N.W. 550, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 172 (N.D. 1930).

Protection of Good Faith Payment.

Former section allowing payment of claims without affidavit protected the executor or administrator when he had in good faith paid a claim without its being verified. F. A. Patrick & Co. v. Austin, 20 N.D. 261, 127 N.W. 109, 1910 N.D. LEXIS 90 (N.D. 1910).

Rejection by Administrator.

An administrator or executor could reject a claim by endorsing his disallowance on the claim or by neglect or refusal to act thereon. Boyd v. Von Neida, 9 N.D. 337, 83 N.W. 329, 1900 N.D. LEXIS 243 (N.D. 1900); Sunberg v. Sebekius, 38 N.D. 413, 165 N.W. 564 (N.D. 1917).

Res Judicata.

In allowing or rejecting a claim, the administrator acted merely as an auditor, and his act in passing upon the claim was not res judicata. Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 144 N.W. 1082, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 1914).

Right to Sue.

The rejection of a claim by the executor, administrator, or county judge was a condition precedent to the right to sue on it. In re Smith's Estate, 13 N.D. 513, 101 N.W. 890, 1904 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1904).

Statute of Limitations.

Statute providing that defense of statute of limitations could be interposed only by answer had no application to former statute of nonclaim. Mann v. Redmon, 23 N.D. 508, 137 N.W. 478, 1912 N.D. LEXIS 118 (N.D. 1912).

In order to set statute of limitations in motion, notice of rejection had to be given by registered mail, and the fact that notice reached claimant or his attorney by some means other than registered mail was not sufficient to start operation of statute. Quinn Wire & Iron Works v. Boyd, 52 N.D. 273, 202 N.W. 852, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 131 (N.D. 1924).

Statute began to run as of date of notice of rejection by registered mail. Quinn Wire & Iron Works v. Boyd, 52 N.D. 273, 202 N.W. 852, 1924 N.D. LEXIS 131 (N.D. 1924).

Time Limit.

Where period of time for bringing suit on claim rejected by administrator had expired, presentment to county court and its subsequent rejection did not operate to fix new period of time within which an action on the claim could be instituted. Farwell v. Richardson, 10 N.D. 34, 84 N.W. 558, 1900 N.D. LEXIS 1 (N.D. 1900).

Waiver of Former Section.

The provisions of former section could not be waived by administrator who demurred to a complaint because statute of nonclaim was an absolute defense. Mann v. Redmon, 23 N.D. 508, 137 N.W. 478, 1912 N.D. LEXIS 118 (N.D. 1912).

Collateral References.

Personal liability of executor or administrator for interest on legacies or distributive shares where payment is delayed, 18 A.L.R.2d 1384.

Interest on decree or judgment of probate court allowing a claim against estate or making an allowance for services, 54 A.L.R.2d 814.

Validity of nonclaim statute or rule provision for notice by publication to claimants against estate — post-1950 cases, 56 A.L.R.4th 458.

30.1-19-07. (3-807) Payment of claims.

  1. Upon the expiration of three months from the date of the first publication and mailing of the notice to creditors, the personal representative shall proceed to pay the claims allowed against the estate in the order of priority prescribed, after making provision for homestead, family, and support allowances, for claims already presented which have not yet been allowed or whose allowance has been appealed, and for unbarred claims that may yet be presented, including costs and expenses of administration. By petition to the court in a proceeding for the purpose, or by appropriate motion if the administration is supervised, a claimant whose claim has been allowed but not paid as provided herein may secure an order directing the personal representative to pay the claim to the extent that funds of the estate are available for the payment.
  2. The personal representative at any time may pay any just claim which has not been barred, with or without formal presentation, but the personal representative is personally liable to any other claimant whose claim is allowed and who is injured by such payment if:
    1. The payment was made before the expiration of the time limit stated in subsection 1 and the personal representative failed to require the payee to give adequate security for the refund of any of the payment necessary to pay other claimants; or
    2. The payment was made, due to the negligence or willful fault of the personal representative, in such manner as to deprive the injured claimant of the injured claimant’s priority.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 298, § 4; 1989, ch. 404, § 4.

Cross-References.

Exemptions, see ch. 28-22.

Power to avoid transfers and recover property for payment of unsecured debts, see § 30.1-18-10.

Rights in policies of life insurance and annuities exempt from claims of creditors, see § 26.1-33-36.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Appropriation of Specific Property.

An executor had the duty of following the testator’s direction for the appropriation of specific property to the payment of debts. Black v. Black, 58 N.D. 501, 226 N.W. 485, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 244 (N.D. 1929).

Distribution of Deficit.

A deficit, in case specifically appropriated property was insufficient to pay the debts and in the absence of a residuary estate, had to be spread over the several devises or legacies. Black v. Black, 58 N.D. 501, 226 N.W. 485, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 244 (N.D. 1929).

Non-Statutory Payment of Debts.

A testator could provide for the payment of debts and charges against an estate differently than as provided by statute. Black v. Black, 58 N.D. 501, 226 N.W. 485, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 244 (N.D. 1929).

Payment of Mortgage Debt.

An order authorizing an administrator to discharge a mortgage debt of the deceased was not a prerequisite to approval by the court of payment after the fact. DANIELSON v. PRITZ, 59 N.D. 548, 231 N.W. 550, 1930 N.D. LEXIS 172 (N.D. 1930).

Sale of Real Estate.

Real estate could be sold to pay debts duly proved in a foreign jurisdiction. Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 144 N.W. 1082, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 1914).

In selling property to pay debts of decedent, the administrator was to exhaust the personal property before resorting to realty. Johnson v. Rutherford, 28 N.D. 87, 147 N.W. 390, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1914).

30.1-19-08. (3-808) Individual liability of personal representative.

  1. Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a personal representative is not individually liable on a contract properly entered into in the personal representative’s fiduciary capacity in the course of administration of the estate unless the personal representative fails to reveal the personal representative’s representative capacity and identify the estate in the contract.
  2. A personal representative is individually liable for obligations arising from ownership or control of the estate or for torts committed in the course of administration of the estate only if the personal representative is personally at fault.
  3. Claims based on contracts entered into by a personal representative in the personal representative’s fiduciary capacity, on obligations arising from ownership or control of the estate or on torts committed in the course of estate administration, may be asserted against the estate by proceeding against the personal representative in the personal representative’s fiduciary capacity, whether or not the personal representative is individually liable therefor.
  4. Issues of liability as between the estate and the personal representative individually may be determined in a proceeding for accounting, surcharge or indemnification, or other appropriate proceeding.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Approval of Court.

In cases of doubt an executor or administrator was permitted to submit the matter to the county court and obtain its approval before incurring the expense incident to litigation. McDonald v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 N.D. 49, 224 N.W. 676, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 179 (N.D. 1929).

Payment of Taxes.

An administrator was not chargeable with a breach of duty in failing to pay taxes upon property which he did not know or have reasonable cause to believe was an asset of the estate. Anderson v. Shelton, 92 N.W.2d 166, 1958 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 1958).

Collateral References.

Improvements, liability of personal representative with respect to completion of, 5 A.L.R.2d 1250.

Interest on legacies or distributive shares where payment is delayed, personal liability of executor or administrator for, 18 A.L.R.2d 1384.

Use of decedent’s real estate, accountability of personal representative for his, 31 A.L.R.2d 243.

United States: construction and effect of 31 USCS § 192 imposing personal liability on fiduciary for paying debts due by person or estate for whom he acts before paying debts due 41 A.L.R.2d 446.

Replevin or similar possessory action, availability to one not claiming as heir, legatee, or creditor of decedent’s estate, against personal representative, 42 A.L.R.2d 418.

Business losses: liability of personal representative for losses incurred in carrying on, without testamentary authorization, decedent’s nonpartnership mercantile or manufacturing business, 58 A.L.R.2d 365.

Coexecutor’s or coadministrator’s liability for defaults or wrongful acts of fiduciary in handling estate, 65 A.L.R.2d 1019, 1068.

Venue: place of personal representative’s appointment as venue of action against him in his official capacity, 93 A.L.R.2d 1199.

Defense of action: liability of executor or administrator for negligence or default in defending action against estate, 14 A.L.R.3d 1036.

Agent or attorney, liability of executor or administrator, or his bond, for loss caused to estate by act or default of his, 28 A.L.R.3d 1191.

Taxes: liability of executor, administrator, trustee, or his counsel for interest, penalty, or extra taxes assessed against estate because of tax law violations, 47 A.L.R.3d 507.

Overpaying or unnecessarily paying tax, liability of executor or administrator to estate because of, 55 A.L.R.3d 785.

Garnishment against executor or administrator by creditor of estate, 60 A.L.R.3d 1301.

30.1-19-09. (3-809) Secured claims.

Payment of a secured claim is upon the basis of the amount allowed if the creditor surrenders the security. Otherwise, payment is upon the basis of one of the following:

  1. If the creditor exhausts the security before receiving payment, unless precluded by other law, upon the amount of the claim allowed less the fair value of the security.
  2. If the creditor does not have the right to exhaust the security or has not done so, upon the amount of the claim allowed less the value of the security determined by converting it into money according to the terms of the agreement pursuant to which the security was delivered to the creditor, or by the creditor and personal representative by agreement, arbitration, compromise, or litigation.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-19-10. (3-810) Claims not due and contingent or unliquidated claims.

  1. If a claim which will become due at a future time or a contingent or unliquidated claim becomes due or certain before the distribution of the estate, and if the claim has been allowed or established by a proceeding, it is paid in the same manner as presently due and absolute claims of the same class.
  2. In other cases the personal representative or, on petition of the personal representative or the claimant in a special proceeding for the purpose, the court may provide for payment as follows:
    1. If the claimant consents, the claimant may be paid the present or agreed value of the claim, taking any uncertainty into account; or
    2. Arrangement for future payment, or possible payment, on the happening of the contingency or on liquidation, may be made by creating a trust, giving a mortgage, obtaining a bond or security from a distributee, or otherwise.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

“Contingent” Claim.

A “contingent claim”, within former statute barring claims against an estate arising on contract, even though contingent, unless presented within the time limited in the notice, was one in which liability depended upon the occurrence of a future event which made it uncertain whether the claim would become a liability. Graber v. Bontrager, 69 N.D. 300, 285 N.W. 865, 1939 N.D. LEXIS 152 (N.D. 1939).

Time Limitation.

A contingent claim against an estate must have been filed within the statutory period or it was forever barred. Johnson v. Larson, 56 N.D. 207, 216 N.W. 895, 1927 N.D. LEXIS 91 (N.D. 1927).

Collateral References.

Tort claim as within nonclaim statutes, 22 A.L.R.3d 493.

30.1-19-11. (3-811) Counterclaims.

In allowing a claim the personal representative may deduct any counterclaim which the estate has against the claimant. In determining a claim against an estate, a court shall reduce the amount allowed by the amount of any counterclaims and, if the counterclaims exceed the claim, render a judgment against the claimant in the amount of the excess. A counterclaim, liquidated or unliquidated, may arise from a transaction other than that upon which the claim is based. A counterclaim may give rise to relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the claim.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Presentation of claim to executor or administrator as prerequisite of its availability as counterclaim or setoff, 36 A.L.R.3d 693.

30.1-19-12. (3-812) Execution and levies prohibited.

No execution may issue upon nor may any levy be made against any property of the estate under any judgment against a decedent or a personal representative, but this section shall not be construed to prevent the enforcement of mortgages, pledges, or liens upon real or personal property in an appropriate proceeding.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Family allowance from decedent’s estate as exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, and foreclosure, 27 A.L.R.3d 863.

30.1-19-13. (3-813) Compromise of claims.

When a claim against the estate has been presented in any manner, the personal representative may, if it appears for the best interest of the estate, compromise the claim, whether due or not due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Claim due estate, power and responsibility of executor or administrator to compromise, 72 A.L.R.2d 191.

Claim against estate, power and responsibility of executor or administrator to compromise, 72 A.L.R.2d 243.

Death: power and responsibility of executor or administrator as to compromise or settlement of action or cause of action for death, 72 A.L.R.2d 285.

Effect of settlement with and acceptance of release from one wrongful death beneficiary upon liability of tortfeasor to other beneficiaries or decedent’s personal representative, 21 A.L.R.4th 275.

30.1-19-14. (3-814) Encumbered assets.

If any assets of the estate are encumbered by mortgage, pledge, lien, or other security interest, the personal representative may pay the encumbrance or any part thereof, renew or extend any obligation secured by the encumbrance, or convey or transfer the assets to the creditor in satisfaction of the creditor’s lien, in whole or in part, whether or not the holder of the encumbrance has presented a claim, if it appears to be for the best interest of the estate. Payment of an encumbrance does not increase the share of the distributee entitled to the encumbered assets unless the distributee is entitled to exoneration.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, § 18.

30.1-19-15. (3-815) Administration in more than one state — Duty of personal representative.

  1. All assets of estates being administered in this state are subject to all claims, allowances, and charges existing or established against the personal representative wherever appointed.
  2. If the estate, either in this state or as a whole, is insufficient to cover all family exemptions and allowances determined by the law of the decedent’s domicile, prior charges, and claims, after satisfaction of the exemptions, allowances, and charges, each claimant whose claim has been allowed either in this state or elsewhere in administrations of which the personal representative is aware, is entitled to receive payment of an equal proportion of the claimant’s claim. If a preference or security in regard to a claim is allowed in another jurisdiction but not in this state, the creditor so benefited is to receive dividends from local assets only upon the balance of the creditor’s claim after deducting the amount of the benefit.
  3. In case the family exemptions and allowances, prior charges, and claims of the entire estate exceed the total value of the portions of the estate being administered separately, and this state is not the state of the decedent’s last domicile, the claims allowed in this state shall be paid their proportion if local assets are adequate for the purpose, and the balance of local assets shall be transferred to the domiciliary personal representative. If local assets are not sufficient to pay all claims allowed in this state the amount to which they are entitled, local assets shall be marshalled so that each claim allowed in this state is paid its proportion as far as possible, after taking into account all dividends on claims allowed in this state from assets in other jurisdictions.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

What constitutes “estate” of nonresident decedent within statute providing for local ancillary administration where decedent died leaving an estate in jurisdiction, 34 A.L.R.2d 1270.

Right of nonresident surviving spouse or minor children to allowance of property exempt from administration or to family allowance from local estate of nonresident decedent, 51 A.L.R.2d 1026.

30.1-19-16. (3-816) Final distribution to domiciliary representative.

The estate of a nonresident decedent being administered by a personal representative appointed in this state shall, if there is a personal representative of the decedent’s domicile willing to receive it, be distributed to the domiciliary personal representative for the benefit of the successors of the decedent unless:

  1. By virtue of the decedent’s will, if any, and applicable choice of law rules, the successors are identified pursuant to the local law of this state without reference to the local law of the decedent’s domicile;
  2. The personal representative of this state, after reasonable inquiry, is unaware of the existence or identity of a domiciliary personal representative; or
  3. The court orders otherwise in a proceeding for a closing order under section 30.1-21-01 or incident to the closing of a supervised administration.

In other cases, distribution of the estate of a decedent shall be made in the manner provided elsewhere in this title.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

CHAPTER 30.1-20 Special Provisions Relating to Distribution

30.1-20-01. (3-901) Successors’ rights if no administration.

In the absence of administration, the heirs and devisees are entitled to the estate in accordance with the terms of a probated will or the laws of intestate succession. Devisees may establish title to devised property by the probated will. Persons entitled to property by homestead allowance, exemption, or intestacy may establish title thereto by proof of the decedent’s ownership, the decedent’s death, and their relationship to the decedent. Successors take subject to all charges incident to administration, including the claims of creditors and allowances of surviving spouse and dependent children, and subject to the rights of others resulting from abatement, retainer, advancement, and ademption.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Suit on Accrued Claim.

Decedent’s heirs were not barred from bringing suit in their individual capacities because their claim accrued before decedent’s death and had not been included in the probate inventory, “preserved,” or distributed to the daughters when decedent’s estate was closed. Feickert v. Frounfelter, 468 N.W.2d 131, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1991).

When Property Passes.

Property passes upon death, not upon distribution. Feickert v. Frounfelter, 468 N.W.2d 131, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1991).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Rents and Profits from Land.

Executor or administrator could not deprive a devisee of a tract of land bequeathed to him or of the rents or profits to which he may have been entitled. Dolphin v. Peterson, 63 N.D. 792, 249 N.W. 784, 1933 N.D. LEXIS 240 (N.D. 1933); In re Estate of Kaspari, 71 N.W.2d 558, 1955 N.D. LEXIS 123 (N.D. 1955).

30.1-20-02. (3-902) Distribution — Order in which assets appropriated — Abatement.

  1. Except as provided in subsection 2 and except as provided in connection with the share of the surviving spouse who elects to take an elective share, shares of distributees abate, without any preference or priority as between real and personal property, in the following order:
    1. Property not disposed of by the will.
    2. Residuary devises.
    3. General devises.
    4. Specific devises.
  2. If the will expresses an order of abatement, or if the testamentary plan or the express or implied purpose of the devise would be defeated by the order of abatement stated in subsection 1, the shares of the distributees abate as may be found necessary to give effect to the intention of the testator.
  3. If the subject of a preferred devise is sold or used incident to administration, abatement shall be achieved by appropriate adjustments in, or contribution from, other interests in the remaining assets.

For purposes of abatement, a general devise charged on any specific property or fund is a specific devise to the extent of the value of the property on which it is charged, and upon the failure or insufficiency of the property on which it is charged, a general devise to the extent of the failure or insufficiency. Abatement within each classification is in proportion to the amounts of property each of the beneficiaries would have received if full distribution of the property had been made in accordance with the terms of the will.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Contribution by General Legatee.

General legatee was not required to contribute to payment of decedent’s debts and expenses of administration where contribution would enhance a residuary legacy and decrease a general legacy. The same rule applied to specific bequests and legacies. In re Murphy's Will, 48 N.D. 1267, 189 N.W. 497 (N.D. 1922); In re McQueen's Estate, 64 N.D. 31, 250 N.W. 95, 1933 N.D. LEXIS 243 (N.D. 1933).

A general or specific devise or bequest was not required to contribute to the expense of administration, where the contribution would enhance the residuary legacy or devise. In re McQueen's Estate, 64 N.D. 31, 250 N.W. 95, 1933 N.D. LEXIS 243 (N.D. 1933).

Distribution of Deficit.

A deficit in case specifically appropriated property was insufficient to pay debts, in absence of a residuary estate, had to be spread over several devises or legacies. Black v. Black, 58 N.D. 501, 226 N.W. 485, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 244 (N.D. 1929).

Distribution upon Settlement.

Upon final settlement the court had to proceed to distribute the residue of the estate in the hands of the executor or administrator among the persons who by law were entitled thereto. In re Gonsky's Estate, 79 N.D. 123, 55 N.W.2d 60, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1952).

Final Decree.

Final decree could not be entered until final account was settled. In re Anderson's Estate, 76 N.D. 163, 34 N.W.2d 413, 1948 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1948).

Non-Statutory Payment.

Testator could provide for payments of debts and charges against estate differently than they were provided for by statute. Black v. Black, 58 N.D. 501, 226 N.W. 485, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 244 (N.D. 1929).

Residuary Legacy.

A residuary legacy embraced only what remained after discharge of bequests, and general legatee was not required to contribute to expenses of administration where contribution would enhance a residuary legacy and decrease a general legacy. In re Murphy's Will, 48 N.D. 1267, 189 N.W. 497 (N.D. 1922).

Specific Legacy.

A legacy bequeathed out of residuary estate was not a specific legacy. Adair v. Adair, 11 N.D. 175, 90 N.W. 804, 1902 N.D. LEXIS 197 (N.D. 1902).

Testator’s Direction.

Executor had duty of following testator’s direction for appropriation of specific property to payment of debts. Black v. Black, 58 N.D. 501, 226 N.W. 485, 1929 N.D. LEXIS 244 (N.D. 1929).

Collateral References.

Surviving spouse who accepts provision of will in lieu of dower or other marital rights, priority over other legatees, devisees, and creditors, 2 A.L.R.2d 607.

Election against will, who must bear loss occasioned by, 36 A.L.R.2d 291.

Demonstrative legacy as affected by failure of source of payment, 64 A.L.R.2d 778, 785.

Mortgage: right of devisee of real property specifically devised but subject to mortgage to relief from specific devisee of other property, 72 A.L.R.2d 383.

Conclusiveness of testator’s statement as to amount of debt or advancement to be charged against legacy or devise, 98 A.L.R.2d 273.

Bequest of stated amount to several legatees as entitling each to full amount or proportionate share thereof, 1 A.L.R.3d 479.

Allocation, as between income and principal, of income on property used in paying legacies, debts, and expenses, 2 A.L.R.3d 1061.

Exoneration: right of heir or devisee to have realty exonerated from lien thereon at expense of personal estate, 4 A.L.R.3d 1023.

30.1-20-03. (3-903) Right of retainer.

The amount of a noncontingent indebtedness of a successor to the estate if due, or its present value if not due, shall be offset against the successor’s interest. But, the successor has the benefit of any defense which would be available to the successor in a direct proceeding for recovery of the debt.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Post-death Cash Rent and Crop Share Proceeds.

Decedent's estate's personal representative (PR) could seek a retainer for a beneficiary's debt to the estate for post-death cash rent and crop-share proceeds because (1) the debt was noncontingent, (2) the beneficiary's share of the estate did not vest on the decedent's death, as N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-09 let the PR possess the share to administer the estate, and (3) the estate lost no right to the proceeds for not possessing the land in question, as N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-09 did not require the PR to possess the land. Hogen v. Hogen (Estate of Hogen), 2015 ND 125, 863 N.W.2d 876, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 125 (N.D. 2015).

Decedent's estate's personal representative could not seek a retainer for a beneficiary allegedly purloining funds from a trust because this was not a noncontingent claim. Hogen v. Hogen (Estate of Hogen), 2015 ND 125, 863 N.W.2d 876, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 125 (N.D. 2015).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

County Court.

County court had authority to determine distributee’s indebtedness to estate and to order a deduction of such amount from his share. Stenson v. H. S. Halvorson Co., 28 N.D. 151, 147 N.W. 800, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 99 (N.D. 1914).

30.1-20-04. (3-904) Interest on general pecuniary devise.

General pecuniary devises bear interest at the legal rate beginning one year after the first appointment of a personal representative until payment, unless a contrary intent is indicated by the will.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Bequest of bank deposits, stocks, bonds, notes, or other securities as carrying dividends or interest accruing between testator’s death and payment of legacy, 15 A.L.R.3d 1038.

30.1-20-05. (2-517, 3-905) Penalty clause for contest.

A provision in a will purporting to penalize an interested person for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings relating to the estate is unenforceable if probable cause exists for instituting proceedings.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 334, § 45; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Collateral References.

Provision of will for forfeiture in case of contest as applied to contest by one not a beneficiary, 7 A.L.R.2d 1357.

What constitutes contest or attempt to defeat will within provision thereof forfeiting share of contesting beneficiary, 3 A.L.R.5th 590.

30.1-20-06. (3-906) Distribution in kind — Valuation — Method.

  1. Unless a contrary intention is indicated by the will, the distributable assets of a decedent’s estate shall be distributed in kind to the extent possible through application of the following provisions:
    1. A specific devisee is entitled to distribution of the thing devised, and a spouse or child who has selected particular assets of an estate as provided in section 30.1-07-01 shall receive the items selected.
    2. Any homestead or family allowance or devise payable in money may be satisfied by value in kind provided:
      1. The person entitled to the payment has not demanded payment in cash.
      2. The property distributed in kind is valued at fair market value as of the date of its distribution.
      3. No residuary devisee has requested that the asset in question remain a part of the residue of the estate.
    3. For the purpose of valuation under subdivision b, securities regularly traded on recognized exchanges, if distributed in kind, are valued at the price for the last sale of like securities traded on the business day prior to distribution, or if there was no sale on that day, at the median between amounts bid and offered at the close of that day. Assets consisting of sums owed the decedent or the estate by solvent debtors as to which there is no known dispute or defense are valued at the sum due with accrued interest or discounted to the date of distribution. For assets which do not have readily ascertainable values, a valuation as of a date not more than thirty days prior to the date of distribution, if otherwise reasonable, controls. For purposes of facilitating distribution, the personal representative may ascertain the value of the assets as of the time of the proposed distribution in any reasonable way, including the employment of qualified appraisers, even if the assets may have been previously appraised.
    4. The residuary estate must be distributed in any equitable manner.
  2. After the probable charges against the estate are known, the personal representative may mail or deliver a proposal for distribution to all persons who have a right to object to the proposed distribution. The right of any distributee to object to the proposed distribution on the basis of the kind or value of asset the distributee is to receive, if not waived earlier in writing, terminates if the distributee fails to object in writing received by the personal representative within thirty days after mailing or delivery of the proposal.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 401, § 8.

Notes to Decisions

Distribution Through Public Sale.

Where the county court found that in kind distribution of the land would be neither practicable nor workable, and that it was not desired by the heirs, it was not clear error of fact or law for the county court to order the personal representative to arrange a public sale of the farm land. Zimbelman v. Loh (In re Estate of Zimbleman), 539 N.W.2d 67, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 193 (N.D. 1995).

Collateral References.

Fiduciary’s compensation on estate assets distributed in kind, 32 A.L.R.2d 778.

30.1-20-07. (3-907) Distribution in kind — Evidence.

If distribution in kind is made, the personal representative shall execute an instrument or deed of distribution assigning, transferring, or releasing the assets to the distributee as evidence of the distributee’s title to the property.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-20-07.1. Deed of distribution — Error in description.

If a deed of distribution contains an error in its description of the property distributed or its ownership, the distributee may petition a court of proper jurisdiction to issue an ex parte order allowing an amendment of the deed of distribution to correct the error.

Source: S.L. 1979, ch. 379, § 1.

30.1-20-08. (3-908) Distribution — Right or title of distributee.

Proof that a distributee has received an instrument or deed of distribution of assets in kind, or payment in distribution, from a personal representative, is conclusive evidence that the distributee has succeeded to the interest of the estate in the distributed assets, as against all persons interested in the estate, except that the personal representative may recover the assets or their value if the distribution was improper.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Recovery of Assets.

A personal representative is not limited to recovering distributed assets only if the distribution was “improper.” Sections 30.1-21-04 and 30.1-21-06 also authorize claimants to obtain distributed assets from distributees under certain circumstances. Ohnstad Twichell, P.C. v. Treitline, 1998 ND 10, 574 N.W.2d 194, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 11 (N.D. 1998).

30.1-20-09. (3-909) Improper distribution — Liability of distributee.

Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be questioned because of adjudication, estoppel, or limitation, a distributee of property improperly distributed or paid, or a claimant who was improperly paid, is liable to return the property improperly received and its income since distribution if the distributee or claimant has the property. If the distributee or claimant does not have the property, then the distributee or claimant is liable to return the value as of the date of disposition of the property improperly received and its income and gain received by the distributee or claimant.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Appeal.

Heir abandoned any argument that mineral interests distributed in decrees were improperly distributed and that the district court erred in denying her motion to modify the decrees as they related to previously distributed mineral interests because she was merely seeking a correct distribution of the newly discovered oil, gas, and mineral interests. Lentz v. Bruun (In re Estate of Nohle), 2017 ND 100, 893 N.W.2d 755, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 97 (N.D. 2017).

To the extent an heir argued that the district court erred in denying her motion to modify the final decrees for mineral interests that were newly discovered and were not previously distributed, she sought an advisory opinion, which the supreme court was not authorized to issue; because there was no evidence of any mineral interests that were not previously distributed, any decision on the issues the heir raised about how new assets would be distributed would be advisory only. Lentz v. Bruun (In re Estate of Nohle), 2017 ND 100, 893 N.W.2d 755, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 97 (N.D. 2017).

Defective Notice.

Where the distribution was based upon defective notice because interested persons were not given notice of the hearing, the order did not bind them and was not res judicata. A nonbinding order is not an “adjudication,” and this section does not preclude re-examination of an order of distribution based upon defective notice. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Recovery of Assets.

A personal representative is not limited to recovering distributed assets only if the distribution was “improper.” Sections 30.1-21-04 and 30.1-21-06 also authorize claimants to obtain distributed assets from distributees under certain circumstances. Ohnstad Twichell, P.C. v. Treitline, 1998 ND 10, 574 N.W.2d 194, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 11 (N.D. 1998).

Decedent's estate's personal representative (PR) could seek a retainer for a beneficiary's debt to the estate for post-death cash rent and crop-share proceeds because (1) the debt was noncontingent, (2) the beneficiary's share of the estate did not vest on the decedent's death, as N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-09 let the PR possess the share to administer the estate, and (3) the estate lost no right to the proceeds for not possessing the land in question, as N.D.C.C. § 30.1-18-09 did not require the PR to possess the land. Hogen v. Hogen (Estate of Hogen), 2015 ND 125, 863 N.W.2d 876, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 125 (N.D. 2015).

30.1-20-10. (3-910) Purchasers from distributees protected.

If property distributed in kind or a security interest therein is acquired for value by a purchaser from or lender to a distributee who has received an instrument or deed of distribution from the personal representative, or is so acquired by a purchaser from or lender to a transferee of the distributee, the purchaser or lender takes title free of any right of an interested person in the estate and incurs no personal liability to the estate, or to any interested person, whether or not the distribution was proper or supported by court order or the authority of the personal representative was terminated before execution of the instrument or deed. This section protects a purchaser from or lender to a distributee who, as personal representative, has executed a deed of distribution to the personal representative, and a purchaser from or lender to any other distributee or the distributee’s transferee. To be protected under this provision, a purchaser or lender need not inquire whether a personal representative acted properly in making the distribution in kind, even if the personal representative and the distributee are the same person, or whether the authority of the personal representative had terminated before the distribution.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, § 19.

30.1-20-11. (3-911) Partition for purpose of distribution.

When two or more heirs or devisees are entitled to distribution of undivided interests in any real or personal property of the estate, the personal representative or one or more of the heirs or devisees may petition the district court prior to the formal or informal closing of the estate, to make partition. After notice to the interested heirs or devisees, the district court shall partition the property in the same manner as provided by chapter 32-16. The district court may direct the personal representative to sell any property which cannot be partitioned without prejudice to the owners and which cannot conveniently be allotted to any one party, except if a buyout is agreed upon pursuant to section 32-16-49.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2019, ch. 278, § 1, effective August 1, 2019.

Cross-References.

Action for partition of real property, generally, see N.D.C.C. ch. 32-16.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Suit by Heir.

An heir could not maintain a suit for partition against other heirs and the administrator in district court, after the county court had assumed jurisdiction to probate, and the administrator was appointed, and before the final decree of distribution was entered. Honsinger v. Stewart, 34 N.D. 513, 159 N.W. 12, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 52 (N.D. 1916).

Collateral References.

Homestead: rights of surviving spouse and children in proceeds of partition sale of homestead in decedent’s estate, 6 A.L.R.2d 515.

Pleading in partition action to authorize incidental relief, 11 A.L.R.2d 1449.

Timber rights as subject to partition, 21 A.L.R.2d 618.

Homestead right of cotenant as affecting partition, 83 A.L.R.6th 605.

30.1-20-12. (3-912) Private agreements among successors to decedent binding on personal representative.

Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing authorities, competent successors may agree among themselves to alter the interests, shares, or amounts to which they are entitled under the will of the decedent, or under the laws of intestacy, in any way that they provide in a written contract executed by all who are affected by its provisions. The personal representative shall abide by the terms of the agreement subject to the personal representative’s obligation to administer the estate for the benefit of creditors, to pay all taxes and costs of administration, and to carry out the responsibilities of the personal representative’s office for the benefit of any successors of the decedent who are not parties. Personal representatives of decedents’ estates are not required to see to the performance of trusts if the trustee thereof is another person who is willing to accept the trust. Accordingly, trustees of a testamentary trust are successors for the purposes of this section. Nothing herein relieves trustees of any duties owed to beneficiaries of trusts.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Binding Distribution Agreement.

Under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-20-12, the distribution agreement signed by appellants and the deceased’s other children was binding on the personal representative of the deceased’s estate; thus, whether the holographic will was valid was irrelevant as the personal representative would still be required to distribute the estate to respondent according to the distribution agreement. Dionne v. Dionne (In re Estate of Dionne), 2013 ND 40, 827 N.W.2d 555, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 40 (N.D. 2013).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

County Courts.

County courts were authorized to make distribution of the estate of a decedent or the residue thereof in accordance with agreements entered into by all of the heirs, legatees, or devisees, interested therein. Muller v. Sprenger, 105 N.W.2d 433, 1960 N.D. LEXIS 90 (N.D. 1960).

Jurisdiction.

Action to set aside family settlement agreement due to alleged fraud and undue influence was one in personam rather than in rem since agreement was contract and was properly triable in county in which one of several defendants resided; it was not necessary to bring action in county where deceased’s real estate was located, as required in actions for recovery of real property. Johnson v. Tomlinson, 160 N.W.2d 49, 1968 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 1968).

Payments to Executrix.

Payments made by an executrix without agreement with heirs and legatees, which were not made as a partial distribution and were not authorized by the county court, should not have been allowed to executrix in her account. Fish v. Berzel, 101 N.W.2d 557 (N.D. 1960).

Collateral References.

Post-mortem payment or performance, validity of agreement between beneficiaries as affected by provision for, 1 A.L.R.2d 1178, 1270.

Family settlement of testator’s estate, 29 A.L.R.3d 8.

Effect of settlement with and acceptance of release from one wrongful death beneficiary upon liability of tortfeasor to other beneficiaries or decedent’s personal representative, 21 A.L.R.4th 275.

30.1-20-13. (3-913) Distributions to trustee.

  1. Before distributing to a trustee, the personal representative may require that the trust be registered if the state in which it is to be administered provides for registration and that the trustee inform the beneficiaries.
  2. If the trust instrument does not excuse the trustee from giving bond, the personal representative may petition the appropriate court to require that the trustee post bond if the personal representative apprehends that distribution might jeopardize the interests of persons who are not able to protect themselves, and the personal representative may withhold distribution until the court has acted.
  3. No inference of negligence on the part of the personal representative shall be drawn from the personal representative’s failure to exercise the authority conferred by subsections 1 and 2.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2007, ch. 549, § 7.

30.1-20-14. (3-914) Disposition of unclaimed assets.

If an heir, devisee, or claimant cannot be found, the personal representative shall distribute the missing person’s share to the missing person’s conservator, if any, otherwise to the unclaimed property administrator under chapter 47-30.2.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2003, ch. 275, § 1; 2021, ch. 337, § 10, effective July 1, 2021.

Collateral References.

Illegitimate, escheat of estate of, 48 A.L.R.2d 759, 778.

Intestate domiciled or resident in another state, escheat of personal property of, 50 A.L.R.2d 1375.

Duty and liability of executor with respect to locating and noticing legatees, devisees, or heirs, 10 A.L.R.3d 547.

30.1-20-15. (3-915) Distribution to person under disability.

  1. A personal representative may discharge the personal representative’s obligation to distribute to any person under legal disability by distributing in a manner expressly provided in the will.
  2. Unless contrary to an express provision in the will, the personal representative may discharge the personal representative’s obligation to distribute to a minor or to a person under other disability by distributing to the distributor’s attorney in fact. If the personal representative knows that a conservator has been appointed or that a proceeding for appointment of a conservator is pending, the personal representative is authorized to distribute only to the conservator.
  3. If the heir or devisee is under disability other than minority, the personal representative is authorized to distribute to any of the following:
    1. An attorney in fact who has authority under a power of attorney to receive property for that person.
    2. The spouse, parent, or other close relative with whom the person under disability resides, if the distribution is of an amount or value not exceeding ten thousand dollars per year, unless the court authorizes a larger amount or greater value.

Persons receiving money or property for a disabled person are obligated to apply the money or property to the support of that person, but may not pay themselves except by way of reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses for goods and services necessary for the support of the disabled person. Excess sums must be preserved for future support of the disabled person. The personal representative is not responsible for the proper application of money or property distributed under this subsection.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 401, § 9.

30.1-20-16. (3-916) Apportionment of estate taxes.

  1. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Estate” means the gross estate of a decedent as determined for the purpose of federal estate tax and the estate tax payable to this state.
    2. “Fiduciary” means personal representative or trustee.
    3. “Person” means any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, corporation, limited liability company, government, political subdivision, governmental agency, or local governmental agency.
    4. “Person interested in the estate” means any person entitled to receive, or who has received, from a decedent or by reason of the death of a decedent any property or interest therein included in the decedent’s estate. It includes a personal representative, conservator, and trustee.
    5. “State” means any state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
    6. “Tax” means the federal estate tax and the additional estate tax imposed by chapter 57-37.1 and interest and penalties imposed in addition to the tax.
  2. Unless the will otherwise provides, the tax shall be apportioned among all persons interested in the estate. The apportionment is to be made in the proportion that the value of the interest of each person interested in the estate bears to the total value of the interests of all persons interested in the estate. The values used in determining the tax are to be used for that purpose. If the decedent’s will directs a method of apportionment of tax different from the method described in this title, the method described in the will controls.
    1. The court in which venue lies for the administration of the estate of a decedent on petition for the purpose may determine the apportionment of the tax.
    2. If the court finds that it is inequitable to apportion interest and penalties in the manner provided in subsection 2 because of special circumstances, it may direct apportionment thereof in the manner it finds equitable.
    3. If the court finds that the assessment of penalties and interest assessed in relation to the tax is due to delay caused by the negligence of the fiduciary, the court may charge the fiduciary with the amount of the assessed penalties and interest.
    4. In any action to recover, from any person interested in the estate, the amount of the tax apportioned to the person in accordance with this title, the determination of the court in respect thereto shall be prima facie correct.
    1. The personal representative or other person in possession of the property of the decedent required to pay the tax may withhold from any property distributable to any person interested in the estate, upon its distribution to the person, the amount of tax attributable to the person’s interest. If the property in possession of the personal representative or other person required to pay the tax and distributable to any person interested in the estate is insufficient to satisfy the proportionate amount of the tax determined to be due from the person, the personal representative or other person required to pay the tax may recover the deficiency from the person interested in the estate. If the property is not in the possession of the personal representative or the other person required to pay the tax, the personal representative or the other person required to pay the tax may recover from any person interested in the estate the amount of the tax apportioned to the person in accordance with this title.
    2. If property held by the personal representative is distributed prior to final apportionment of the tax, the distributee shall provide a bond or other security for the apportionment liability in the form and amount prescribed by the personal representative.
    1. In making an apportionment, allowances shall be made for any exemptions granted, any classification made of persons interested in the estate, and for any deductions and credits allowed by the law imposing the tax.
    2. Any exemption or deduction allowed by reason of the relationship of any person to the decedent or by reason of the purposes of the gift inures to the benefit of the person bearing such relationship or receiving the gift but, if an interest is subject to a prior present interest which is not allowable as a deduction, the tax apportionable against the present interest shall be paid from principal.
    3. Any deduction for property previously taxed and any credit for gift taxes or death taxes of a foreign country paid by the decedent or the decedent’s estate inures to the proportionate benefit of all persons liable to apportionment.
    4. Any credit for inheritance, succession, or estate taxes, or taxes in the nature thereof applicable to property or interests includable in the estate, inures to the benefit of the persons or interests chargeable with the payment thereof to the extent proportionately that the credit reduces the tax.
    5. To the extent that property passing to or in trust for a surviving spouse or any charitable, public, or similar gift or devisee is not an allowable deduction for purposes of the tax solely by reason of an inheritance tax or other death tax imposed upon and deductible from the property, the property is not included in the computation provided for in subsection 2, and to that extent no apportionment is made against the property. The sentence immediately preceding does not apply to any case if the result would be to deprive the estate of a deduction otherwise allowable under section 2053(d) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, relating to deduction for state death taxes on transfers for public, charitable, or religious uses.
  3. No interest in income and no estate for years or for life or other temporary interest in any property or fund is subject to apportionment as between the temporary interest and the remainder. The tax on the temporary interest and the tax, if any, on the remainder is chargeable against the corpus of the property or funds subject to the temporary interest and remainder.
  4. Neither the personal representative nor other person required to pay the tax is under any duty to institute any action to recover from any person interested in the estate the amount of the tax apportioned to the person until the expiration of the three months next following final determination of the tax. A personal representative or other person required to pay the tax who institutes the action within a reasonable time after the three months’ period is not subject to any liability or surcharge because any portion of the tax apportioned to any person interested in the estate was collectible at a time following the death of the decedent but thereafter became uncollectible. If the personal representative or other person required to pay the tax cannot collect from any person interested in the estate the amount of the tax apportioned to the person, the amount not recoverable shall be equitably apportioned among the other persons interested in the estate who are subject to apportionment.
  5. A personal representative acting in another state or a person required to pay the tax domiciled in another state may institute an action in the courts of this state and may recover a proportionate amount of the federal estate tax, of an estate tax payable to another state, or of a death duty due by a decedent’s estate to another state from a person interested in the estate who is either domiciled in this state or who owns property in this state subject to attachment or execution. For the purposes of the action, the determination of apportionment by the court having jurisdiction of the administration of the decedent’s estate in the other state is prima facie correct.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 54, § 106.

Cross-References.

Lien for estate taxes, beneficiaries share burden of taxes, see N.D.C.C. § 57-37.1-09.

Notes to Decisions

Apportionment of Estate Tax Proper.

District court did not err in apportioning the estate tax obligation in accordance with subsection (2) because a testator's boilerplate will provision directing payment of “federal and state taxes” from estate assets did not clearly and unambiguously direct a method of apportionment of estate taxes different from the method provided by statute. Eagon v. McKeown (In re Estate of Eagon), 2017 ND 243, 902 N.W.2d 751, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 2017).

Property Not Subject to Tax Liability.

Property received by decedent’s widow, to the extent that it qualified for the marital deduction or any other proper exemption or deduction in computing the estate tax, did not bear any part of the estate tax liability. Bushee v. Bushee, 303 N.W.2d 320, 1981 N.D. LEXIS 241 (N.D. 1981).

Will Directing Method of Apportionment.

The federal estate taxes will be paid according to the apportionment method of this section unless the decedent’s will directs in clear and unambiguous language a different method of apportionment. Bushee v. Bushee, 303 N.W.2d 320, 1981 N.D. LEXIS 241 (N.D. 1981).

Will provision directing the sale of decedent’s business properties and providing that “all of my debts, taxes, etc.; be paid in full, from revenue from such sale” did not clearly and unambiguously direct a method of apportionment of estate taxes different from the method provided by this section as the phrase “all of my … taxes” might refer to just personal or business taxes; there was no express reference in the will to estate taxes; and there was no express direction in the will against the apportionment of estate taxes. Bushee v. Bushee, 303 N.W.2d 320, 1981 N.D. LEXIS 241 (N.D. 1981).

This section did not apply where will clearly and unambiguously expressed testator’s intent that estate taxes were to be paid in a manner different from that provided by this section. McGuire v. Gaffney, 314 N.W.2d 851, 1982 N.D. LEXIS 235 (N.D. 1982).

Group gift of what testator’s probate estate could claim as exempt under the unified credit in the Internal Revenue Code, § 2010, and deductible residual gifts to charities were designed to save federal estate taxes by combining exemptions and deductions in federal estate tax law, and testator’s intent to pay necessary estate taxes was not inconsistent with an intent to minimize estate taxes. American Cancer Soc'y v. Unruh (In re Estate of Brown), 1997 ND 11, 559 N.W.2d 818, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 1 (N.D. 1997).

Collateral References.

What law governs apportionment of estate taxes among persons interested in estate, 16 A.L.R.2d 1282.

Wills: construction and effect of provisions of will relied upon as affecting the burden of taxation, 37 A.L.R.2d 7.

Statutes apportioning or prorating estate taxes, 37 A.L.R.2d 199.

Liability of executor or administrator to estate because of overpaying or unnecessarily paying tax, 55 A.L.R.3d 785.

Ultimate burden of estate tax in absence of statute, will or other provision, 68 A.L.R.3d 714.

Construction and effect of will provisions not expressly mentioning payment of death taxes but relied on as affecting the burden of estate or inheritance taxes, 70 A.L.R.3d 630.

Construction and application of “pay-all-taxes” provision in will, as including liability of nontestamentary property for inheritance and estate taxes, 56 A.L.R.5th 133.

Comparative Legislation.

Jurisdictions which have enacted the 1964 Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act include:

Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 236A-1 to 236A-9.

Idaho Code § 15-3-916.

Md. Tax-General Code, § 7-308.

N.M. § 3-916.

Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 116.303 to 116.383.

R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 44-23.1-1 to 44-23.1-12.

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §§ 7301 to 7309.

Wash. Rev. Code §§ 83.110.010 to 83.110.904.

CHAPTER 30.1-21 Closing Estates

30.1-21-01. (3-1001) Formal proceedings terminating administration — Testate or intestate — Order of general protection.

  1. A personal representative or any interested person may petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate. The personal representative may petition at any time, and any other interested person may petition after one year from the appointment of the original personal representative, except that no petition under this section may be entertained until the time for presenting claims which arose prior to the death of the decedent has expired. The petition may request the court to determine testacy, if not previously determined, to consider the final account or compel or approve an accounting and distribution, to construe any will or determine heirs and adjudicate the final settlement and distribution of the estate. After notice to all interested persons and hearing the court may enter an order or orders, on appropriate conditions, determining the persons entitled to distribution of the estate, and, as circumstances require, approving settlement and, after receiving satisfactory evidence of payment of any estate tax due, directing or approving distribution of the estate and discharging the personal representative from further claim or demand of any interested person.
  2. If one or more heirs or devisees were omitted as parties in, or were not given notice of, a previous formal testacy proceeding, the court, on proper petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate under this section, and after notice to the omitted or unnotified persons and other interested parties determined to be interested on the assumption that the previous order concerning testacy is conclusive as to those given notice of the earlier proceeding, may determine testacy as it affects the omitted persons and confirm or alter the previous order of testacy as it affects all interested persons as appropriate in the light of the new proofs. In the absence of objection by an omitted or unnotified person, evidence received in the original testacy proceeding shall constitute prima facie proof of due execution of any will previously admitted to probate, or of the fact that the decedent left no valid will if the prior proceedings determined this fact.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 290, § 9.

Cross-References.

Limitations on presentation of claims, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-03.

Notes to Decisions

Final Order.

Final judgment was entered resolving the remaining disputes between the parties and approving distribution of all estate property, and the children did not point to anything in the record demonstrating they advised the court other issues would be raised or further proceedings were anticipated; once a final judgment or order had been entered approving a final accounting and distribution under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-21-01(1), the estate proceedings were concluded, and the parties were not authorized to approve an amended final accounting under the statute. In re Estate of Cashmore v. Cashmore, 2010 ND 159, 787 N.W.2d 261, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 2010).

Son’s appeal of an order denying a widow’s petition to determine an intestate’s heirs was not authorized because the order was not final and further proceedings regarding intestate succession and the determination of heirs could be necessary. Estate of Huston v. Huston, 2014 ND 29, 843 N.W.2d 3, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 21 (N.D. 2014).

Interested Persons.

In all formal estate proceedings, notice must be given to every interested person prior to any formal hearing or order; interested persons not notified of formal proceedings are not bound. Olson v. Estate of Hoffas, 422 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1988).

Interim Order.

An interim order in supervised administration, pursuant to a hearing upon notice but where notice of entry is not given, stands unless duly vacated pursuant to the rules of civil procedure. Further, it is subject to appellate review as an interlocutory order, upon appeal from a final owner completing settlement of the estate. In re Estate of Kjorvestad, 375 N.W.2d 160, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 408 (N.D. 1985).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Application.

Former N.D.C.C. § 30-21-33, concerning disposal of the residue of a personal estate, related to intestate as well as testate decedents. Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 144 N.W. 1082, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 1914).

Attendance at Hearing.

Creditor was such an interested person as could attend a hearing upon a final accounting. Elton v. Lamb, 33 N.D. 388, 157 N.W. 288, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 91 (N.D. 1916).

Authority of Court.

County court had authority to determine distributee’s indebtedness to estate and to order a deduction of such amount from his share. Stenson v. H. S. Halvorson Co., 28 N.D. 151, 147 N.W. 800, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 99 (N.D. 1914).

County court determined by its final decree of distribution who were entitled to estate and their portions. In re Estate of Brudevig, 175 N.W.2d 574, 1970 N.D. LEXIS 110 (N.D. 1970), overruled, Liebelt v. Saby, 279 N.W.2d 881, 1979 N.D. LEXIS 249 (N.D. 1979).

Collateral Attack.

Judgment upon final accounting was of equal rank with judgment entered in other courts of record in state, and was conclusive against collateral attack except on jurisdictional grounds and those of collusion and fraud. In re Le Page's Trust, 67 N.D. 15, 269 N.W. 53, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 146 (N.D. 1936).

Decree Binding.

A valid final distribution decree was binding upon all persons interested in the estate. Dolphin v. Peterson, 63 N.D. 792, 249 N.W. 784, 1933 N.D. LEXIS 240 (N.D. 1933).

Decree of Distribution.

Decree of distribution was the final determination of the rights of the parties, and, upon its entry, their rights were to be exercised in accordance with the terms of the decree. Sjoli v. Hogenson, 19 N.D. 82, 122 N.W. 1008, 1909 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 1909).

Final decree of distribution was of equal rank with judgments entered by courts of record, and any distributee named in such decree could maintain an action against the executor, administrator, or his bondsman, or both, for the share to which he had been assigned. Sjoli v. Hogenson, 19 N.D. 82, 122 N.W. 1008, 1909 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 1909); Dolphin v. Peterson, 63 N.D. 792, 249 N.W. 784, 1933 N.D. LEXIS 240 (N.D. 1933).

“Descendant” Defined.

As employed in the law of descent the term “descendant” ordinarily connoted the lineal issue of a deceased person. ESTATE OF LAMB, 72 N.D. 42, 4 N.W.2d 585, 1942 N.D. LEXIS 109 (N.D. 1942).

Determination of Escheats.

Probate proceedings in the county court were limited to an administration that would result in payment of indebtedness and the ultimate distribution of residue, and did not extend to the determination of escheats. Delaney v. State, 42 N.D. 630, 174 N.W. 290, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 187 (N.D. 1919).

Disputing Petition.

Petition for distribution of estate could be controverted. In re Gonsky's Estate, 79 N.D. 123, 55 N.W.2d 60, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1952).

Where, upon final settlement and distribution, it clearly appeared that there was property in the hands of the administrator which did not belong to the estate, the county court could order such property restored to the person to whom it belonged. In re Gonsky's Estate, 79 N.D. 123, 55 N.W.2d 60, 1952 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1952).

Enforcement of Decree.

North Dakota had no special statute providing for the issuance of an execution to enforce a final decree of distribution; enforcement of such a decree was provided for by former N.D.C.C. § 30-21-10 dealing with the decree of distribution. 136 N.W.2d 455.

In suit by decedent’s son to enforce option to purchase interest in realty pursuant to provision in will granting such option, county court had jurisdiction to enter final decree as to who was entitled to estate, and also had duty to determine what proportion or part of estate each person was entitled to receive; accordingly, court had jurisdiction to determine validity of option. Schulz v. Saeman, 150 N.W.2d 67, 1967 N.D. LEXIS 145 (N.D. 1967).

Jurisdiction.

After a final decree of distribution was entered and there was no contest of the will under former N.D.C.C. § 30-06-08, or other jurisdictional challenge, the county court no longer had jurisdiction of the property distributed, and the distributee thenceforth had an action to recover his estate or, in the proper cases, its value. 136 N.W.2d 455.

Reopening Not Required.

Where shares had been distributed and estate closed, county court was not required to reopen estate on application of creditor who had not been party to proceedings for assignment of shares of heirs. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stonehouse, 67 N.D. 11, 269 N.W. 51, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 145 (N.D. 1936).

Sale of Real Estate.

Real estate could be sold to pay debts duly proved in a foreign jurisdiction. Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 144 N.W. 1082, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 1914).

30.1-21-02. (3-1002) Formal proceedings terminating testate administration — Order construing will without adjudicating testacy.

A personal representative administering an estate under an informally probated will or any devisee under an informally probated will may petition for an order of settlement of the estate which will not adjudicate the testacy status of the decedent. The personal representative may petition at any time, and a devisee may petition after one year, from the appointment of the original personal representative, except that no petition under this section may be entertained until the time for presenting claims which arose prior to the death of the decedent has expired. The petition may request the court to consider the final account or compel or approve an accounting and distribution, to construe the will and adjudicate final settlement and distribution of the estate. After notice to all devisees and the personal representative and hearing, the court may enter an order or orders, on appropriate conditions, determining the persons entitled to distribution of the estate under the will, and, as circumstances require, approving settlement and directing or approving distribution of the estate and discharging the personal representative from further claim or demand of any devisee who is a party to the proceeding and those the devisee represents. If it appears that a part of the estate is intestate, the proceedings shall be dismissed or amendments made to meet the provisions of section 30.1-21-01.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Collateral Attack on Final Decree.

A final decree of distribution entered by county court is not subject to collateral attack if the court had jurisdiction and no fraud or collusion is claimed or shown. Sturdevant v. SAE Warehouse, 270 N.W.2d 794, 1978 N.D. LEXIS 150 (N.D. 1978).

Nonparty to Proceeding.

Final decree of distribution was not res judicata so as to estop person from bringing an action to enforce a will provision and stock purchase agreements authorizing him to purchase stock in the family business where the person was not made a party and served notice of the probate proceedings and was not in privity with parties in such proceedings. Sturdevant v. SAE Warehouse, 270 N.W.2d 794, 1978 N.D. LEXIS 150 (N.D. 1978).

30.1-21-03. (3-1003) Closing estates — By sworn statement of personal representative.

  1. Unless prohibited by order of the court and except for estates being administered in supervised administration proceedings, a personal representative may close an estate by filing with the court a verified statement stating that the personal representative, or a prior personal representative whom the personal representative has succeeded, has:
    1. Fully administered the estate of the decedent by making payment, settlement, or other disposition of all claims that were presented, expenses of administration, and estate, inheritance, and other death taxes, except as specified in the statement, and by distributing the assets of the estate to the persons entitled. If any claims remain undischarged, the statement must state whether the personal representative has distributed the estate subject to possible liability with the agreement of the distributees or the statement must state in detail other arrangements that have been made to accommodate outstanding liabilities.
    2. Sent a copy thereof to all distributees of the estate and to all creditors or other claimants of whom the personal representative is aware whose claims are neither paid nor barred and has furnished a full account in writing of the personal representative’s administration to the distributees whose interests are affected thereby.
  2. If no proceedings involving the personal representative are pending in the court one year after the closing statement is filed, the appointment of the personal representative terminates.

If the personal representative has published and mailed notice to creditors as provided by section 30.1-19-01, the personal representative may not file the verified statement until three months after the date of the first publication and mailing.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1979, ch. 377, § 2; 1981, ch. 91, § 18; 1989, ch. 404, § 5.

Notes to Decisions

Ineffective.

Personal representative was properly held in contempt because he failed to make a court-ordered payment; the estate was not closed when the personal representative filed a verified statement to attempt to effectively amend a final accounting and distribution. An assertion that the estate was unable to make the payment was barred by the law of the case doctrine, res judicata, and collateral estoppel due to a prior decision in the case. Cashmore v. Cashmore (In re Estate of Cashmore), 2013 ND 150, 836 N.W.2d 427, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 148 (N.D. 2013).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Action by U.S.

United States, as successor to alien property custodian, could not maintain action in federal district court to reopen probate proceedings twelve years after final decree of distribution had been entered by county court and discharge of executor, no appeal having been taken from such action. Brownell v. Leutz, 136 F. Supp. 783, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3970 (D.N.D. 1956).

Ex Parte Allowance.

There was no appeal from an ex parte allowance and approval of a claim by the personal representative and the county judge. Johnson v. Rutherford, 28 N.D. 87, 147 N.W. 390, 1914 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1914).

Final Decree of Distribution.

Final decree of distribution was conclusive against both the administrator and the bondsmen and such a decree imported same degree of verity as judgments of other courts of record. Sjoli v. Hogenson, 19 N.D. 82, 122 N.W. 1008, 1909 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 1909).

Final decree could not be issued on the strength of proceedings which were had prior to the settlement of a final account. In re Anderson's Estate, 76 N.D. 163, 34 N.W.2d 413, 1948 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1948).

Interested Person.

Creditor was a person interested in the estate and entitled to participate in and litigate the account, whether it be annual or final. Elton v. Lamb, 33 N.D. 388, 157 N.W. 288, 1916 N.D. LEXIS 91 (N.D. 1916).

Accountings made by the administrator to which no objection or from which no appeal was taken were final and not subject to review. Priewe v. Priewe, 43 N.D. 509, 175 N.W. 732, 1919 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1919).

Prerequisites to Final Decree.

Final account and settlement were conditions prerequisite to the issuance of a final decree. In re Anderson's Estate, 76 N.D. 163, 34 N.W.2d 413, 1948 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1948).

Reopening Not Required.

Once the estate was closed and shares of heirs distributed, county court was not required to reopen administration of estate on application of creditor of heirs who was not party to estate proceedings. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stonehouse, 67 N.D. 11, 269 N.W. 51, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 145 (N.D. 1936).

30.1-21-03.1. Estate closing — Procedures.

  1. If the personal representative has not filed with the court a verified statement to close the estate, or as part of the supervised administration proceedings in accordance with this chapter, within three years from the date of death of the decedent, any devisee, heir, distributee, or claimant may petition the court, formally or by any informal request, or the court on its own motion may order, that the personal representative and the attorney employed by the personal representative be required to show cause to the court why the estate has not been closed. The court shall order the personal representative and the attorney employed by the personal representative to show cause to the court at a hearing scheduled within ninety days why the estate has not been closed. The court shall serve notice upon all heirs, devisees, claimants, distributees, and beneficiaries of the estate of the order to show cause, the date of the hearing, and of their right to participate in the hearing proceedings.
  2. Within twenty days of receipt of the order to show cause, the personal representative or the attorney employed by the personal representative shall provide the court with a report containing a time frame for the anticipated closure of the estate; a detailed explanation as to why the estate has not been closed; and a detailed accounting of all disbursements made by the estate, including specific information as to all fees and other disbursements made to the personal representative, and to any attorney, auditor, investment adviser, or other specialized agent or assistant employed to do work for the estate.
  3. After the order to show cause hearing, the court shall issue an order establishing a timetable for the closing of the estate based upon the information provided in the report and the evidence provided during the hearing. The court may award attorney’s fees and costs in favor of a petitioner if the court finds that the personal representative or the attorney employed by the personal representative has failed to show cause why the estate has not been closed within three years from the date of death of the decedent unless extended by the court. The court may file a complaint with the disciplinary board against the attorney.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 349, § 1; 1999, ch. 295, § 1.

30.1-21-04. (3-1004) Liability of distributees to claimants.

After assets of an estate have been distributed and subject to section 30.1-21-06, an undischarged claim, not barred, may be prosecuted in a proceeding against one or more distributees. No distributee shall be liable to claimants for amounts received as exempt property, homestead or family allowances, or for amounts in excess of the value of the distributee’s distribution as of the time of distribution. As between distributees, each shall bear the cost of satisfaction of unbarred claims as if the claim had been satisfied in the course of administration. Any distributee who has failed to notify other distributees of the demand made upon the distributee by the claimant in sufficient time to permit them to join in any proceeding in which the claim was asserted against the distributee loses the distributee’s right of contribution against other distributees.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1977, ch. 295, § 20.

Notes to Decisions

Improper Distribution Not Required.

A personal representative is not limited to recovering distributed assets only if the distribution was “improper.” N.D.C.C. § 30.1-21-04 and 30.1-21-06 also authorize claimants to obtain distributed assets from distributees under certain circumstances. Ohnstad Twichell, P.C. v. Treitline, 1998 ND 10, 574 N.W.2d 194, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 11 (N.D. 1998).

30.1-21-05. (3-1005) Limitations on proceedings against personal representative.

Unless previously barred by adjudication and except as provided in the closing statement, the rights of successors and of creditors whose claims have not otherwise been barred against the personal representative for breach of fiduciary duty are barred unless a proceeding to assert the same is commenced within six months after the filing of the closing statement. The rights thus barred do not include rights to recover from a personal representative for fraud, misrepresentation, or inadequate disclosure related to the settlement of the decedent’s estate.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Barred.

Breach of fiduciary duty claim was time-barred where there was no evidence of misrepresentation or inadequate disclosure, and the executor and the county court’s actions put the heirs on notice about potential issues with the reservation and triggered the statute of limitations. Seccombe v. Rohde, 2019 ND 13, 921 N.W.2d 413, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 25 (N.D. 2019).

Defense Allowed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendant bank to amend its answer to assert this section as a defense to plaintiff heir’s action, where the bank’s motion, made on the day of trial, was taken under advisement to allow plaintiff to brief the issue and prepare a defense, and the court did not reach a decision on the issue until almost five months after the trial on the merits. Hansen v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 452 N.W.2d 770, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 60 (N.D. 1990).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Money Borrowed by Administrator.

Where the administrator borrowed money for the use and benefit of the estate and had not repaid it, judgment was rendered against him in accordance with his contract unless he presented claim for part of expenses incurred. Hoffman v. Ness, 71 N.D. 283, 300 N.W. 428, 1941 N.D. LEXIS 168 (N.D. 1941).

Collateral References.

Bond of personal representative, when statute of limitations begins to run against action on, 44 A.L.R.2d 807.

30.1-21-06. (3-1006) Limitations on actions and proceedings against distributees.

Unless previously adjudicated in a formal testacy proceeding or in a proceeding settling the accounts of a personal representative or unless otherwise barred, the claim of any claimant to recover from a distributee who is liable to pay the claim, and the right of any heir or devisee, or of a successor personal representative acting in their behalf, to recover property improperly distributed or the value thereof from any distributee is forever barred at the later of:

  1. Three years after the decedent’s death.
  2. One year after the time of distribution thereof.

This section does not bar an action to recover property or value received as the result of fraud.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Applicability.

Neither N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-19-03(2) nor 30.1-21-06 time-barred a decedent's estate's personal representative's retainer claim against an estate beneficiary for the beneficiary's debt to the estate for post-death cash rent and crop-share proceeds because the statutes did not apply to such a claim. Hogen v. Hogen (Estate of Hogen), 2015 ND 125, 863 N.W.2d 876, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 125 (N.D. 2015).

Improper Distribution Not Required.

A personal representative is not limited to recovering distributed assets only if the distribution was “improper.” N.D.C.C. § 30.1-21-04 and 30.1-21-06 also authorize claimants to obtain distributed assets from distributees under certain circumstances. Ohnstad Twichell, P.C. v. Treitline, 1998 ND 10, 574 N.W.2d 194, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 11 (N.D. 1998).

30.1-21-07. (3-1007) Certificate discharging liens securing fiduciary performance.

After the personal representative’s appointment has terminated, the personal representative, the personal representative’s sureties, or any successor of either, upon the filing of a verified application showing, so far as is known by the applicant, that no action concerning the estate is pending in any court, is entitled to receive a certificate from the court that the personal representative appears to have fully administered the estate in question. The certificate evidences discharge of any lien on any property given to secure the obligation of the personal representative in lieu of bond or any surety, but does not preclude action against the personal representative or the surety.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-21-08. (3-1008) Subsequent administration — Fee.

If other property of the estate is discovered after an estate has been settled and the personal representative discharged or after one year after a closing statement has been filed, the court, upon petition of any interested person and upon notice as it directs, may appoint the same or a successor personal representative to administer the subsequently discovered estate. Any person filing a petition under this section shall pay to the clerk of district court a filing fee as prescribed in section 27-05.2-03. If a new appointment is made, unless the court orders otherwise, the provisions of this title apply as appropriate, but no claim previously barred may be asserted in the subsequent administration.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1999, ch. 107, § 5.

Note.

The reference to “section 27-05.2-03” was originally enacted as “section 11-17-04”. Due to the repeal of section 11-17-04 by section 82 of chapter 278, S.L. 1999, the code revisor has made this change.

CHAPTER 30.1-22 Compromise of Controversies

30.1-22-01. (3-1101) Effect of approval of agreements involving trusts, inalienable interests, or interest of third persons.

A compromise of any controversy as to admission to probate of any instrument offered for formal probate as the will of a decedent, the construction, validity, or effect of any governing instrument, the rights or interests in the estate of the decedent, of any successor, or the administration of the estate, if approved in a formal proceeding in the court for that purpose, is binding on all the parties thereto, including those unborn, unascertained, or who could not be located. An approved compromise is binding even though it may affect a trust or an inalienable interest. A compromise does not impair the rights of creditors or of taxing authorities who are not parties to it.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1995, ch. 322, § 24.

Collateral References.

Claim due estate, power and responsibility of executor or administrator to compromise, 72 A.L.R.2d 191.

Claim against estate, power and responsibility of executor or administrator to compromise, 72 A.L.R.2d 243.

Death: power and responsibility of executor or administrator as to compromise or settlement of action or cause of action for death, 72 A.L.R.2d 285.

Testator’s estate, family settlement of, 29 A.L.R.3d 8.

Intestate estate, family settlement of, 29 A.L.R.3d 174.

Notes to Decisions

Compromise permitted.

Procedures in N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-22-01 and 30.1-22-02 authorize a court to consider an agreement settling litigation challenging a settlor's capacity to create a trust. Therefore, a district court did not err by accepting a settlement agreement and dismissing a petition challenging the capacity to create a trust due to the settlor's alcoholism. Brakke v. Bell State Bank & Trust (In re Brakke), 2017 ND 34, 890 N.W.2d 549, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 34 (N.D. 2017).

Good faith.

In a trust dispute, a petition was a good faith challenge to the capacity to create a trust where the settlor was affected by alcoholism, and it was necessary to avoid further litigation and protect the interests of the beneficiaries. Moreover, a life estate holder did not have to sign the agreement because the settlement agreement pertained to distributions to residuary beneficiaries after the expiration of the life estate. Brakke v. Bell State Bank & Trust (In re Brakke), 2017 ND 34, 890 N.W.2d 549, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 34 (N.D. 2017).

30.1-22-02. (3-1102) Procedure for securing court approval of compromise.

The procedure for securing court approval of a compromise is as follows:

  1. The terms of the compromise shall be set forth in an agreement in writing which shall be executed by all competent persons and parents or guardians acting for any minor children having beneficial interests or having claims which will or may be affected by the compromise. Execution is not required by any person whose identity cannot be ascertained or whose whereabouts is unknown and cannot reasonably be ascertained.
  2. Any interested person, including the personal representative, if any, or a trustee, then may submit the agreement to the court for its approval and for execution by the personal representative, the trustee of every affected testamentary trust, and other fiduciaries and representatives.
  3. After notice to all interested persons or their representatives, including the personal representative of any estate and all affected trustees, the court, if it finds that the contest or controversy is in good faith and that the effect of the agreement upon the interests of persons represented by fiduciaries or other representatives is just and reasonable, shall make an order approving the agreement and directing all fiduciaries under its supervision to execute the agreement. Minor children represented only by their parents or guardians may be bound only if their parents or guardians join with other competent persons in execution of the compromise. Upon the making of the order and the execution of the agreement, all further disposition of the estate is in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1995, ch. 322, § 25.

Notes to Decisions

Oral Stipulations.

While compromise was not initially in the form of a written agreement, the parties appeared before the trial judge in open court and agreed on the record to the compromise. Oral stipulations of the parties made in open court on the record are binding. Jennings v. Hedstrom, 472 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 1991).

CHAPTER 30.1-23 Collection by Affidavit — Administration for Small Estates

30.1-23-01. (3-1201) Collection of personal property by affidavit.

  1. Thirty days after the death of a decedent, any person indebted to the decedent or having possession of tangible personal property or an instrument evidencing a debt, obligation, stock, or chose in action belonging to the decedent shall make payment of the indebtedness or deliver the tangible personal property or an instrument evidencing a debt, obligation, stock, or chose in action to a person claiming to be the successor of the decedent upon being presented an affidavit made by or on behalf of the successor stating that:
    1. The value of the entire estate subject to distribution or succession under chapters 30.1-01 through 30.1-23, wherever located, less liens and encumbrances, does not exceed fifty thousand dollars.
    2. Thirty days have elapsed since the death of the decedent.
    3. An application or petition for the appointment of a personal representative is not pending or has not been granted in any jurisdiction.
    4. The claiming successor is entitled to payment or delivery of the property.
  2. A transfer agent of any security shall change the registered ownership on the books of a corporation or limited liability company from the decedent to the successor upon the presentation of an affidavit as provided in subsection 1.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1979, ch. 380, § 1; 1987, ch. 397, § 1; 1993, ch. 54, § 106; 2005, ch. 290, § 1.

30.1-23-02. (3-1202) Effect of affidavit.

The person paying, delivering, transferring, or issuing personal property or the evidence thereof pursuant to affidavit is discharged and released to the same extent as if the person dealt with a personal representative of the decedent. The person is not required to see to the application of the personal property or evidence thereof or to inquire into the truth of any statement in the affidavit. If any person to whom an affidavit is delivered refuses to pay, deliver, transfer, or issue any personal property or evidence thereof, it may be recovered or its payment, delivery, transfer, or issuance compelled upon proof of their right in a proceeding brought for the purpose by or on behalf of the persons entitled thereto. Any person to whom payment, delivery, transfer, or issuance is made is answerable and accountable therefor to any personal representative of the estate or to any other person having a superior right.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-23-03. (3-1203) Small estates — Summary administrative procedure.

If it appears from the inventory and appraisal that the value of the entire estate, less liens and encumbrances, does not exceed the homestead as defined in section 47-18-01, plus exempt property pursuant to section 30.1-07-01, family allowance, costs and expenses of administration, reasonable funeral expenses, and reasonable and necessary medical and hospital expenses of the last illness of the decedent, the personal representative, without giving notice to creditors, may immediately disburse and distribute the estate to the persons entitled thereto and file a closing statement as provided in section 30.1-23-04.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Cross-References.

Estates of deceased members of veterans’ homes, see N.D.C.C. §§ 37-15-16 to 37-15-18.

Workforce Safety and Insurance may pay spouse of deceased claimant without probate proceeding, see N.D.C.C. § 65-05-27.

30.1-23-04. (3-1204) Small estate — Closing by sworn statement of personal representative.

  1. Unless prohibited by order of the court and except for estates being administered by supervised personal representatives, a personal representative may close an estate administered under the summary procedures of section 30.1-23-03 by filing with the court, at any time after disbursement and distribution of the estate, a verified statement stating that:
    1. To the best knowledge of the personal representative, the value of the entire estate, less liens and encumbrances, did not exceed the homestead as defined in section 47-18-01, plus exempt property, pursuant to section 30.1-07-01, family allowance, costs and expenses of administration, reasonable funeral expenses, and reasonable, necessary medical and hospital expenses of the last illness of the decedent.
    2. The personal representative has fully administered the estate by disbursing and distributing it to the persons entitled thereto.
    3. The personal representative has sent a copy of the closing statement to all distributees of the estate and to all creditors or other claimants of whom the personal representative is aware whose claims are neither paid nor barred and has furnished a full account in writing of the personal representative’s administration to the distributees whose interests are affected.
  2. If no actions or proceedings involving the personal representative are pending in the court one year after the closing statement is filed, the appointment of the personal representative terminates.
  3. A closing statement filed under this section has the same effect as one filed under section 30.1-21-03.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-23-05. Will searches, burial documents procurement, and inventory of contents.

  1. Upon being furnished with satisfactory proof of death of a sole lessee or the last surviving co-lessee of a safe deposit box, the safe deposit company may open the box for an individual who appears in person and furnishes an affidavit stating the following:
    1. The box may contain the will or deed to a burial lot or a document containing instructions for the burial of the lessee or that the box may contain property belonging to the estate of the lessee;
    2. The individual is an interested person and wishes to open the box:
      1. To conduct a will search;
      2. To obtain a document required to facilitate the lessee’s wishes regarding body, funeral, or burial arrangements; or
      3. To make an inventory of the contents of the box; and
    3. There has been no application for or appointment of a personal representative or administrator for the decedent’s estate.
  2. The safe deposit company may not open the box under this section if it has received a copy of letters from the representative of the deceased lessee’s estate or other applicable court order.
  3. The safe deposit company need not open the box if the lessee’s key or combination is not available.
  4. For purposes of this section, the term “interested person” means:
    1. A person named as personal representative in a purported will of the lessee;
    2. A person who immediately prior to the death of the lessee had the right of access to the box;
    3. The surviving spouse of the lessee;
    4. A devisee of the lessee;
    5. An heir of the lessee; or
    6. A person designated by the lessee in a writing acceptable to the safe deposit company which is filed with the safe deposit company before death.
  5. The safe deposit company need not ascertain the truth of any statement in the affidavit required to be furnished under this section, and when acting in reliance upon an affidavit, it is discharged as if it dealt with the personal representative of the lessee. The safe deposit company is not responsible for the adequacy of the description of any property included in an inventory of the contents of a safe deposit box, nor for conversion of the property in connection with actions performed under this section, except for conversion by intentional acts of the company or its employees, directors, officers, or agents. If the safe deposit company is not satisfied that the requirements of this section have been met, it may decline to open the box.
  6. No contents of a box other than a will and a document required to facilitate the lessee’s wishes regarding body, funeral, or burial arrangements may be removed pursuant to this section.

Source: S.L. 1999, ch. 296, § 1.

Article IV — Foreign Personal Representatives — Ancillary Administration

CHAPTER 30.1-24 Definitions — Powers of Foreign Personal Representatives

30.1-24-01. (4-101) Definitions.

In chapters 30.1-24 and 30.1-25:

  1. “Local administration” means administration by a personal representative appointed in this state pursuant to appointment proceedings described in chapters 30.1-12 through 30.1-23.
  2. “Local personal representative” includes any personal representative appointed in this state pursuant to appointment proceedings described in chapters 30.1-12 through 30.1-23 and excludes foreign personal representatives who acquire the power of a local personal representative pursuant to section 30.1-24-06.
  3. “Resident creditor” means a person domiciled in, or doing business in, this state, who is, or could be, a claimant against an estate of a nonresident decedent.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

What constitutes “estate” of nonresident decedent within statute providing for local ancillary administration where decedent died leaving an estate in jurisdiction, 34 A.L.R.2d 1270.

Stock owned by estate or ward, right of foreign personal representative or guardian to vote, 41 A.L.R.2d 1082.

Family allowance: right of nonresident surviving spouse or minor children to allowance of property exempt from administration or to family allowance from local estate of nonresident decedent, 51 A.L.R.2d 1026.

Action for death under foreign statute providing for action by personal representative, capacity of local or foreign personal representative to maintain, 52 A.L.R.2d 1016.

Action for death under statute of forum providing for action by personal representative, capacity of foreign domiciliary or of ancillary personal representative to maintain, 52 A.L.R.2d 1048.

Equity actions: applications of rule permitting courts to exercise jurisdiction over equity actions against foreign personal representatives where there are assets within forum, 53 A.L.R.2d 323.

Isolated acts: state statutes or rules of court conferring in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents on the basis of isolated acts or transactions within state as applicable to personal representative of deceased nonresident, 19 A.L.R.3d 171.

30.1-24-02. (4-201) Payment of debt and delivery of property to domiciliary foreign personal representative without local administration.

At any time after the expiration of sixty days from the death of a nonresident decedent, any person indebted to the estate of the nonresident decedent or having possession or control of personal property, or of an instrument evidencing a debt, obligation, stock, or chose in action belonging to the estate of the nonresident decedent may pay the debt, deliver the personal property, or the instrument evidencing the debt, obligation, stock, or chose in action, to the domiciliary foreign personal representative of the nonresident decedent upon being presented with proof of the personal representative’s appointment and an affidavit made by or on behalf of the personal representative stating:

  1. The date of the death of the nonresident decedent.
  2. That no local administration, or application, or petition therefor, is pending in this state.
  3. That the domiciliary foreign personal representative is entitled to payment or delivery.

Source: S.L. 1973 ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Collection by Domiciliary Foreign Personal Representative.

A domiciliary foreign personal representative may collect a debt or personal property by presenting the debtor or individual in possession of the property with proof of the domiciliary appointment and an affidavit stating the date of the decedent’s death, that no local administration is pending, and that the domiciliary foreign personal representative is entitled to the property. Stratton v. Rose, 484 N.W.2d 274, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 1992).

30.1-24-03. (4-202) Payment or delivery discharges.

Payment or delivery made in good faith on the basis of the proof of authority and affidavit releases the debtor or person having possession of the personal property to the same extent as if payment or delivery had been made to a local personal representative.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-24-04. (4-203) Resident creditor notice.

Payment or delivery under section 30.1-24-02 may not be made if a resident creditor of the nonresident decedent has notified the debtor of the nonresident decedent or the person having possession of the personal property belonging to the nonresident decedent that the debt should not be paid nor the property delivered to the domiciliary foreign personal representative.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-24-05. (4-204) Proof of authority — Bond.

If no local administration or application or petition for local administration is pending in this state, a domiciliary foreign personal representative may file with a court in this state, in a county in which property belonging to the decedent is located, authenticated or certified copies of the person’s appointment and of any official bond the person has given, and the court shall enter an order establishing the filing of the copies.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1995, ch. 323, § 1; 2009, ch. 284, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Filing by Domiciliary Foreign Personal Representative.

A domiciliary foreign personal representative also may file with a court in this state, in a county in which property belonging to the decedent is located, authenticated copies of his appointment. Stratton v. Rose, 484 N.W.2d 274, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 1992).

30.1-24-06. (4-205) Powers.

A domiciliary foreign personal representative who has complied with section 30.1-24-05 may exercise, as to assets in this state, all powers of a local personal representative and may maintain actions and proceedings in this state subject to any conditions imposed upon nonresident parties generally.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Cross-References.

Validation of foreclosure by foreign executor, administrator, or guardian, see N.D.C.C. § 1-05-04.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Foreign Corporation.

A foreign corporation was incompetent to receive letters of administration upon the estate of a deceased person. Grunow v. Simonitsch, 21 N.D. 277, 130 N.W. 835, 1911 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 1911).

30.1-24-07. (4-206) Power of representatives in transition.

The power of a domiciliary foreign personal representative under section 30.1-24-02 or 30.1-24-06 shall be exercised only if there is no administration or application therefor pending in this state. An application or petition for local administration of the estate terminates the power of the foreign personal representative to act under section 30.1-24-06, but the local court may allow the foreign personal representative to exercise limited powers to preserve the estate. No person who, before receiving actual notice of a pending local administration, has changed that person’s position in reliance upon the powers of a foreign personal representative shall be prejudiced by reason of the application or petition for, or grant of, local administration. The local personal representative is subject to all duties and obligations which have accrued by virtue of the exercise of the powers by the foreign personal representative and may be substituted for the foreign personal representative in any action or proceedings in this state.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-24-08. (4-207) Ancillary and other local administrations — Provisions governing.

In respect to a nonresident decedent, the provisions of chapters 30.1-12 through 30.1-23 of this title govern:

  1. Proceedings, if any, in a court of this state for probate of the will, appointment, removal, supervision, and discharge of the local personal representative, and any other order concerning the estate.
  2. The status, powers, duties, and liabilities of any local personal representative and the rights of claimants, purchasers, distributees, and others in regard to a local administration.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

CHAPTER 30.1-25 Foreign Representatives — Judgments and Personal Representatives

30.1-25-01. (4-301) Jurisdiction by act of foreign personal representative.

A foreign personal representative submits personally to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state in any proceeding relating to the estate by:

  1. Filing authenticated copies of the foreign personal representative’s appointment as provided in section 30.1-24-05;
  2. Receiving payment of money or taking delivery of personal property under section 30.1-24-02; or
  3. Doing any act as a personal representative in this state which would have given the state jurisdiction over the foreign personal representative as an individual.

Jurisdiction under subsection 2 is limited to the money or value of personal property collected.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Action for death under statute of forum providing for action by personal representative, capacity of foreign domiciliary or of ancillary personal representative to maintain, 52 A.L.R.2d 1048.

Equity actions: applications of rule permitting courts to exercise jurisdiction over equity actions against foreign personal representatives where there are assets within form, 53 A.L.R.2d 323.

Isolated acts: state statutes or rules of court conferring in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents on the basis of isolated acts or transactions within state as applicable to personal representative of deceased nonresident, 19 A.L.R.3d 171.

30.1-25-02. (4-302) Jurisdiction by act of decedent.

In addition to jurisdiction conferred by section 30.1-25-01, a foreign personal representative is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state to the same extent that the decedent was subject to jurisdiction immediately prior to death.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-25-03. (4-303) Service on foreign personal representative.

  1. Service of process may be made upon the foreign personal representative by certified mail, addressed to the foreign personal representative’s last reasonably ascertainable address, requesting a return receipt signed by the addressee only. Notice by ordinary first-class mail is sufficient if certified mail service to the addressee is unavailable. Service may be made upon a foreign personal representative in the manner in which service could have been made under other laws of this state on either the foreign personal representative or the decedent immediately prior to death.
  2. If service is made upon a foreign personal representative as provided in subsection 1, the foreign personal representative shall be allowed at least thirty days within which to appear or respond.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-25-04. (4-401) Effect of adjudication for or against personal representative.

An adjudication rendered in any jurisdiction in favor of or against any personal representative of the estate is as binding on the local personal representative as if the local personal representative were a party to the adjudication.

Source: S.L. 1973 ch. 257, § 1.

Article V Protection of Persons Under Disability and Their Property

CHAPTER 30.1-26 General Provisions

30.1-26-01. (5-101) Definitions and use of terms.

Unless otherwise apparent from the context, in this title:

  1. “Alternative resource plan” means a plan that provides an alternative to guardianship, using available support services and arrangements which are acceptable to the alleged incapacitated person. The plan may include the use of providers of service such as visiting nurses, homemakers, home health aides, personal care attendants, adult day care and multipurpose senior citizen centers; home and community-based care, human service zones, and developmental disability services; powers of attorney, representative and protective payees; and licensed congregate care facilities.
  2. “Incapacitated person” means any adult person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, or chemical dependency to the extent that the person lacks capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning that person’s matters of residence, education, medical treatment, legal affairs, vocation, finance, or other matters, or which incapacity endangers the person’s health or safety.
  3. “Least restrictive form of intervention” means that the guardianship imposed on the ward must compensate for only those limitations necessary to provide the needed care and services, and that the ward must enjoy the greatest amount of personal freedom and civil liberties consistent with the ward’s mental and physical limitations.
  4. A “protected person” is a minor or other person for whom a conservator or limited conservator has been appointed or other protective order has been made.
  5. A “protective proceeding” is a proceeding under the provisions of section 30.1-29-01 to determine that a person cannot effectively manage or apply the person’s estate to necessary ends, either because the person lacks the ability or is otherwise inconvenienced, or because the person is a minor, and to secure administration of the person’s estate by a conservator or other appropriate relief.
  6. A “ward” is a person for whom a guardian or limited guardian has been appointed. A “minor ward” is a minor for whom a guardian has been appointed solely because of minority.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1985, ch. 369, § 3; 1989, ch. 405, § 1; 2019, ch. 391, § 42, effective January 1, 2020.

Cross-References.

Age of majority, see N.D.C.C. §§ 14-10-01, 30.1-01-06.

Notes to Decisions

Least Restrictive Form of Intervention.

Given a trial court’s erroneous findings about the extent of a person’s incapacity and about the availability of an alternative resource plan, an unlimited general guardianship was not “the least restrictive form of intervention.” In re Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 136 (N.D. 1993).

Collateral References.

Protective orders limiting dissemination of financial information obtained by deposition or discovery in state civil actions, 43 A.L.R.4th 121.

Law Reviews.

A Study of Guardianship in North Dakota, 60 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1984).

Comparative Legislation.

Jurisdictions which have enacted the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act include:

Ala. Code §§ 26-2A-1 to 26-2A-160.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-5201 to 14-5212.

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-10-102, 15-14-201, 15-14-432.

D.C. Code Ann. §§ 21-2001 to 21-2077.

Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 560:5-101 to 560:5-432.

Idaho Code §§ 15-5-101 to 15-5-432.

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-101 to 5-432.

Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 700.401 to 700.494.

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 72-5-101 to 72-5-439.

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-2601 to 30-2661.

N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-5-101 to 45-5-433.

S.C. Code Ann. §§ 62-5-101 to 62-5-435.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5-101 to 75-5-433.

30.1-26-02. (5-102) Jurisdiction of subject matter — Consolidation of proceedings.

The court has jurisdiction over protective proceedings and guardianship proceedings.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975 ch. 290, § 10.

Cross-References.

Concurrent jurisdiction, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-27-11.

“Court” defined, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-01-06.

Collateral References.

Function, power, and discretion of court as affected by testamentary appointment of guardian of minor, 67 A.L.R.2d 803.

30.1-26-03. (5-103) Facility of payment or delivery.

Any person under a duty to pay or deliver money or personal property to a minor may perform this duty, in amounts not exceeding five thousand dollars per annum, by paying or delivering the money or property to:

  1. The minor, if the minor is married;
  2. Any person having the care and custody of the minor with whom the minor resides;
  3. A guardian of the minor; or
  4. A financial institution incident to a deposit in a federally insured savings account in the sole name of the minor and giving notice of the deposit to the minor.

This section does not apply if the person making payment or delivery has actual knowledge that a conservator has been appointed or proceedings for appointment of a conservator of the estate of the minor are pending. The persons, other than the minor or any financial institution under subsection 4, receiving money or property for a minor, are obligated to apply the money to the support and education of the minor, but may not pay themselves except by way of reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses for goods and services necessary for the minor’s support. Any excess sums shall be preserved for future support of the minor and any balance not so used and any property received for the minor must be turned over to the minor when the minor attains majority. Persons who pay or deliver in accordance with provisions of this section are not responsible for the proper application thereof.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Cross-References.

Action for partition of real property, payment of infant’s share of proceeds of sale, see N.D.C.C. § 32-16-42.

30.1-26-04. (5-104) Delegation of powers by parent or guardian.

A parent or a guardian of a minor or incapacitated person, by a properly executed power of attorney, may delegate to another person, for a period not exceeding six months, any of the parent’s or guardian’s powers regarding care, custody, or property of the minor child or ward, except the power to consent to marriage or adoption of a minor ward.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

CHAPTER 30.1-27 Guardians of Minors

30.1-27-01. (5-201) Status of guardian of minor — General.

A person becomes a guardian of a minor under this chapter by acceptance of a testamentary appointment and approval by the court. The guardianship status continues until terminated, without regard to the location of the guardian and minor ward.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2019, ch. 274, § 1, effective August 1, 2019.

Cross-References.

Duties and powers of public administrator, see N.D.C.C. § 11-21-05.

Collateral References.

De facto guardian: guardian de facto or de son tort of minor, 25 A.L.R.2d 752.

Law Reviews.

A Study of Guardianship in North Dakota, 60 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1984).

30.1-27-02. (5-202) Testamentary appointment of guardian of minor.

The parent of a minor may appoint by will a guardian of an unmarried minor. A testamentary appointment becomes effective upon filing the guardian’s acceptance in the court in which the will is probated and remains effective upon approval by the court either after or without a hearing, if, before acceptance, both parents are dead or the surviving parent’s rights have been terminated by prior court order. If both parents are dead, an effective appointment by the parent who died later has priority. This state recognizes a testamentary appointment effected by filing the guardian’s acceptance under a will probated in another state which is the testator’s domicile and upon approval by the court either after or without a hearing. Upon acceptance of appointment, written notice of acceptance must be given by the guardian to the minor and to the person having the minor’s care or to the minor’s nearest adult relative under section 27-20.3-02. Within forty-five days of the filing of acceptance, the testamentary guardian must file with the court a criminal history record check report and affidavit stating whether the proposed guardian has been investigated for offenses related to theft, fraud, or the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an adult or child and shall provide a release authorizing access to any record information maintained by an agency in this or another state or a federal agency.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1981, ch. 348, § 1; 2019, ch. 274, § 2, effective August 1, 2019; 2021, ch. 245, § 31, effective July 1, 2021.

Cross-References.

Guardian ad litem appointed by juvenile court, see N.D.C.C. § 27-20-48.

Guardians ad litem, see N.D.C.C. ch. 28-03.

Public administrator as ex officio guardian, see N.D.C.C. § 11-21-05.

Collateral References.

Domicile of infant on death of both parents; doctrine of natural guardianship, 32 A.L.R.2d 863.

30.1-27-03. (5-203) Objection by minor of fourteen or older to testamentary appointment. [Repealed]

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; repealed by 2019, ch. 274, § 9, effective August 1, 2019.

30.1-27-04. (5-204) Court appointment of guardian of minor — Conditions for appointment. [Repealed]

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; repealed by 2019, ch. 274, § 9, effective August 1, 2019.

30.1-27-05. (5-205) Jurisdiction and venue.

  1. The district court where the will is probated has exclusive jurisdiction over the following procedures that are governed by this chapter:
    1. To approve the acceptance of a testamentary appointment of a guardian; and
    2. To transfer a case to juvenile court in the event of an objection to the testamentary appointment under section 30.1-27-07.
  2. The juvenile court under chapter 27-20.1 has exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings to consider objections to the testamentary appointment under section 30.1-27-07 and over the court appointment of a guardian of a minor. Any person interested in the welfare of a minor may petition the juvenile court for the appointment of a guardian under section 27-20.1-05 in the following situations:
    1. If there is a living parent of the minor, known or unknown;
    2. If the testamentary guardian fails to accept appointment as guardian within sixty days after the death of the minor’s last living parent;
    3. If both parents are dead or the surviving parent’s rights have been terminated by prior court order, but there has been no appointment of a guardian for the minor by will; or
    4. If a guardianship of a minor is sought for any other reason.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2019, ch. 274, § 3, effective August 1, 2019.

30.1-27-06. (5-206) Court appointment of guardian ad litem — Approval of acceptance of testamentary appointment.

  1. Upon the filing of an acceptance of a testamentary appointment, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem promptly. The guardian ad litem fees must be paid from the estate of the deceased parent, if available.
  2. The duties of the guardian ad litem include:
    1. Personally interviewing the minor, the testamentary guardian, and other persons interested in the welfare of the minor;
    2. Explaining the guardianship proceeding to the minor in the language, mode of communication, and terms that the minor is most likely to understand, including the nature and consequences of the proceeding, the rights to which the minor is entitled, and the available legal options, including the right to retain an attorney to represent the minor;
    3. Advocating for the best interests of the minor consistent with section 14-09-06.2. The appointed guardian ad litem may not represent the minor in a legal capacity;
    4. Consulting juvenile court and other agency records to determine whether the testamentary guardian has a criminal history of abuse, neglect, exploitation, and review of the criminal history records. The guardian ad litem may access confidential juvenile court records and other confidential agency records in the exercise of the guardian ad litem’s official duties;
    5. Submitting a written report to the court within sixty days of the guardian ad litem’s appointment containing the guardian ad litem’s findings on whether the appointment of the testamentary guardian is in the best interests of the child;
    6. Notifying the court if the minor objects to the appointment of the testamentary guardian; and
    7. If the guardian ad litem’s report states the guardian ad litem believes the appointment of the testamentary guardian is contrary to the best interests of the minor, the case must be transferred to juvenile court.
  3. The guardian ad litem shall serve a copy of the report on the minor if the minor is fourteen years of age or older, the testamentary guardian, the person having the minor’s care or the minor’s nearest adult relative under section 27-20.3-02, and the personal representative of the deceased parent’s estate.
  4. After reviewing the guardian ad litem’s report, the court may approve the acceptance of the testamentary appointment without a hearing if no objection is raised by the minor, the guardian ad litem, or any other person within fourteen days of the filing of the report of the guardian ad litem.
  5. The appointment of the guardian ad litem terminates immediately after the approval of the acceptance or upon transfer of the case to juvenile court.
  6. Upon the court’s approval of the guardian’s acceptance of the appointment, the court shall issue letters of guardianship. The letters of guardianship must include:
    1. The name, address, and telephone number of the guardian;
    2. The full name of the minor;
    3. Any limitations on the guardian’s authority to make decisions on behalf of the minor;
    4. The expiration date of the appointment; and
    5. The date by which the guardian must file the annual report required under section 27-20.1-15.
  7. A written report prepared and submitted under this section is closed to the public and is not open to inspection except by the court, parties to the proceeding or the parties’ counsel, other persons for those purposes as the court may order for good cause, and others authorized by court rule.
  8. Medical, psychological, or other treatment information protected by federal law or regulation and any financial account numbers related to a child are confidential and may not be disclosed except to parties to the proceeding, their counsel, and others authorized by court rule. The court may permit access by other persons for good cause.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2019, ch. 274, § 4, effective August 1, 2019; 2021, ch. 245, § 32, effective July 1, 2021.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Best Interests of Child.

In awarding the custody of a minor or appointing a general guardian, the court was to be guided by the best interests of the child in respect to its temporal, moral, or mental welfare. Flath v. Nelson, 53 N.D. 603, 207 N.W. 444, 1926 N.D. LEXIS 13 (N.D. 1926).

In the awarding of the custody and the appointing of guardians of children, the determining consideration was the welfare of the child. Rufer v. Rufer, 67 N.D. 67, 269 N.W. 741, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 152 (N.D. 1936); Sjol v. Sjol, 76 N.D. 336, 35 N.W.2d 797, 1949 N.D. LEXIS 59 (N.D. 1949).

An eleven-year-old daughter was permitted to remain in the home of her maternal grandmother in which she had been cared for from early infancy since the welfare of the child outweighed the legal rights of the father. Borg v. Anderson, 73 N.D. 95, 11 N.W.2d 121, 1943 N.D. LEXIS 66 (N.D. 1943).

A parent was entitled to the custody of his child unless the evidence showed that the best interests of the child would not be served by awarding him custody. In re Custody of Wagner, 84 N.W.2d 587, 1957 N.D. LEXIS 138 (N.D. 1957).

In habeas corpus proceeding by father to obtain custody of nine-year-old daughter it was determined that the welfare of the child, who had been in the care and custody of the respondents almost since her birth, and treated as their own child, would be best served by permitting her to remain with the respondents. In re Custody of Wagner, 84 N.W.2d 587, 1957 N.D. LEXIS 138 (N.D. 1957).

The statutory right of the parent to primary consideration in the matter of custody was subject to a determination of what was best for the child, such best interests of the child being paramount. McKay v. Mitzel, 137 N.W.2d 792, 1965 N.D. LEXIS 115 (N.D. 1965).

The best interests of children were served by giving them to persons, who had had custody of children since their parents had been killed in auto accident, operated a 1,185 acre farm, made twelve thousand dollars per year, had four children with outstanding records, took the children to church and Sunday school every Sunday even though they might be more strict than other persons who had first petitioned for the children, who had four children of their own, who lived in trailer which was encumbered, made eight thousand dollars a year, were Lutherans but did not belong to or attend any church, and whose only character witness was owner and operator of a bar. In re Adoption of Godejohn, 190 N.W.2d 42, 1971 N.D. LEXIS 144 (N.D. 1971).

The statutory preference set forth in statute on rules for awarding custody was dependent upon a finding that an award of custody to either the mother or the father of a child of tender years would be in the best interests of the child. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 202 N.W.2d 760, 1972 N.D. LEXIS 98 (N.D. 1972).

Capacity of Child to Choose.

There was no exact age which gave child capacity to make choice as to custody within purview of statute on rules for awarding custody; phrase “other things being equal” gave court large measure of discretion to determine how best interests of child would be served and awarding custody of minor child to natural father was not an abuse of discretion under circumstances. Guldeman v. Heller, 151 N.W.2d 436, 1967 N.D. LEXIS 123 (N.D. 1967).

Child of Tender Years.

In custody proceedings neither parent is entitled to custody as of right, but other things being equal, if the child is of tender years, it should be given to the mother. Silseth v. Levang, 214 N.W.2d 361, 1974 N.D. LEXIS 253 (N.D. 1974).

Custody to Mother.

Upon the death of a father to whom was awarded the custody of a child in a divorce suit, the mother could be given custody in a habeas corpus proceeding, upon a showing that she was a proper person. Garrett v. Burbage, 55 N.D. 926, 215 N.W. 479, 1927 N.D. LEXIS 169 (N.D. 1927).

Custody to Third Party.

Custody could be awarded to a third party when the morals or safety or interests of the child demanded it. Sjol v. Sjol, 76 N.D. 336, 35 N.W.2d 797, 1949 N.D. LEXIS 59 (N.D. 1949).

Mother Admitting to Adultery.

Mother who admitted committing adultery on one occasion but who was otherwise a good mother was awarded custody of her three and five-year-old daughters. Ficek v. Ficek, 186 N.W.2d 437, 1971 N.D. LEXIS 173 (N.D. 1971).

Termination of Parental Rights.

Where a legal order terminating the parental rights of the mother to her illegitimate child was made, and where notice of the proceedings was given in accordance with the requirements of the statute, custody preferences provided by former section 30-10-07 were subordinated to the custody rights provided by the termination order. In re Klundt, 196 N.W.2d 76, 1972 N.D. LEXIS 171 (N.D. 1972).

Wishes of Deceased Parent.

Of two persons equally entitled to the custody of a child in other respects, preference was given to the one indicated by the wishes of a deceased parent. Flath v. Nelson, 53 N.D. 603, 207 N.W. 444, 1926 N.D. LEXIS 13 (N.D. 1926).

Collateral References.

Religious affiliations, consideration and weight in appointment or removal of guardian for minor child, 22 A.L.R.2d 696.

Right of infant to select own guardian, 85 A.L.R.2d 921.

Right of putative father to custody of illegitimate child, 45 A.L.R.3d 216.

Next of kin: who is minor’s next of kin for guardianship purposes, 63 A.L.R.3d 813.

30.1-27-07. (5-207) Objection to the appointment of the testamentary guardian of minor — Procedure.

  1. Any person interested in the welfare of a minor subject to a testamentary appointment of a guardian, including the minor, may object to the appointment of the testamentary guardian as contrary to the best interests of the minor within fourteen days of the filing of the report of the guardian ad litem.
  2. An objection must contain a statement alleging specific facts that demonstrate the appointment of the testamentary guardian is contrary to the best interests of the minor.
  3. Upon filing of the objection or on the court’s own motion, the court immediately shall transfer the case to the juvenile court in the county where the original probate matter was filed.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2019, ch. 274, § 5, effective August 1, 2019.

Notes to Decisions

In General.

Under North Dakota’s guardianship of minors’ law, a trial court must determine whether the welfare and best interest of the minor will be served by the appointment of the guardian. Likewise, the termination of a guardianship must be based on the ground that removal will be in the best interest of the minor; the guardianship of minors’ law applies to both voluntarily established and involuntarily established guardianships, and determining the best interest of the minor does not necessarily require a finding that the parent is unfit. Barros v. Smestad (In re Barros), 2005 ND 122, 701 N.W.2d 402, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 156 (N.D. 2005), overruled in part, State v. G.L. (In re G.L.), 2018 ND 176, 915 N.W.2d 685, 2018 N.D. LEXIS 185 (N.D. 2018).

Burden of Proof.

In the context of a parent’s action to terminate a voluntarily-established guardianship of a minor, a natural parent must initially prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the impediments leading to the creation of the guardianship are removed. A nonparent seeking custody then has the burden of rebutting the presumption that it is in the best interests of the child to be in the custody of the parent; the presumption can be overcome when there exist “exceptional circumstances.” Barros v. Smestad (In re Barros), 2005 ND 122, 701 N.W.2d 402, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 156 (N.D. 2005), overruled in part, State v. G.L. (In re G.L.), 2018 ND 176, 915 N.W.2d 685, 2018 N.D. LEXIS 185 (N.D. 2018).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

No Abuse of Discretion.

The changing of the custody of boys, aged 11 and 13, to live with their father was not an abuse of discretion, and the trial court was wise in giving priority to their training and education. Jordana v. Corley, 220 N.W.2d 515, 1974 N.D. LEXIS 220 (N.D. 1974).

30.1-27-08. (5-208) Acceptance of appointment.

By accepting a testamentary appointment as guardian, a guardian submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding relating to the guardianship that may be instituted by any interested person.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2019, ch. 274, § 6, effective August 1, 2019.

Collateral References.

Service of process: construction and effect of provision for service of process against minor on a parent, guardian, or other designated person, 92 A.L.R.2d 1336.

30.1-27-09. (5-209) Powers and duties of guardian of minor.

The powers and duties of a guardian of a minor under this chapter are defined under section 27-20.1-15.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2005, ch. 291, § 1; 2019, ch. 274, § 7, effective August 1, 2019.

Cross-References.

Assignment of mortgage by foreign guardian, see N.D.C.C. § 1-04-07.

Authority of guardian to change boundary of irrigation district, see N.D.C.C. § 61-10-12.

Bond of personal representative, see N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-17-03 to 30.1-17-07.

Guardian may invest in notes or bonds secured by federal housing administration, see N.D.C.C. § 6-03-48.

Mineral or oil rights in lands of estate, sale or lease, see N.D.C.C. § 38-10-02.

Notes to Decisions

Parental Obligations.

Parental obligations do not end when a guardian is appointed; the appointment of a guardian should indicate to the parent a need to better fulfill parental obligations. Hobus v. Hobus, 540 N.W.2d 158, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 220 (N.D. 1995).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Authority of General Guardian.

A general guardian of the persons and property of minor children was authorized to appear for and represent them in all legal suits and proceedings unless a special guardian had been appointed for that purpose. Hafey v. Hafey, 57 N.D. 381, 222 N.W. 256, 1928 N.D. LEXIS 141 (N.D. 1928).

Authority of Parent.

A parent had no authority over the property of his child without appointment as guardian of the child’s estate as provided by law. State v. Johnson, 88 N.W.2d 209 (N.D. 1958), overruled on other grounds, State v. Allen, 237 N.W.2d 154 (N.D. 1975), decided prior to the adoption of N.D.R.Crim.P. 29.

Jurisdiction.

The county court had exclusive original jurisdiction of the sale of land by executors, administrators, and guardians. In re Druhl's Estate, 61 N.D. 168, 237 N.W. 697, 1931 N.D. LEXIS 260 (N.D. 1931).

Legality of Proceedings.

Where general guardian and ward were represented by attorneys who defended quiet title suit brought against them and no special guardian was appointed to represent ward in legal proceedings, fact that court having jurisdiction over guardianship never gave consent that action be defended did not affect legality of proceedings. Woodland v. Woodland, 147 N.W.2d 590, 1966 N.D. LEXIS 146 (N.D. 1966).

Liability of Guardian.

A guardian, if he invested the ward’s funds pursuant to the order or direction of the county court, was relieved of personal liability. KILBY v. BURNHAM, 65 N.D. 169, 256 N.W. 522, 1934 N.D. LEXIS 183 (N.D. 1934).

Life Insurance for Heirs.

Adult heirs and the general guardian of infant heirs could not sue an administrator for life insurance expended for the direct benefit of the heirs with their knowledge. Hafey v. Hafey, 57 N.D. 381, 222 N.W. 256, 1928 N.D. LEXIS 141 (N.D. 1928).

Statute of Limitations.

For an action against the sureties on a guardian’s bond, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until a formal order of the court, discharging or removing the guardian, had been made. Groona v. Goldammer, 26 N.D. 122, 143 N.W. 394, 1913 N.D. LEXIS 45 (N.D. 1913).

Sureties on a Guardian’s Bond.

No action could be maintained against the sureties on a guardian’s bond prior to an adjudication by the probate court finding a liability. Christenson v. Grandy, 46 N.D. 418, 180 N.W. 18, 1920 N.D. LEXIS 54 (N.D. 1920).

Collateral References.

Judicial sale by guardian, estoppel of or waiver by parties or participants regarding irregularities or defects in, 2 A.L.R.2d 6, 78.

Guardian’s authority to make agreement to drop or compromise will contest or withdraw objections to probate, 42 A.L.R.2d 1319, 1365.

Power of court to confirm sale of ward’s property over objection of guardian, 43 A.L.R.2d 1445.

Interest on ward’s funds, guardian’s liability for, 72 A.L.R.2d 757.

Corporate stock, right of guardian to invest trust funds in, 78 A.L.R.2d 7.

Capacity of guardian to sue or be sued outside state where appointed, 94 A.L.R.2d 162.

Leases: guardian’s power to make lease for infant ward beyond minority or term of guardianship, 6 A.L.R.3d 570.

Propriety of surgically invading incompetent or minor for benefit of third party, 4 A.L.R.5th 1000.

30.1-27-10. (5-210) Termination of appointment of guardian — General. [Repealed]

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; repealed by 2019, ch. 274, § 9, effective August 1, 2019.

30.1-27-11. (5-211) Proceedings subsequent to approval or findings — Transfer to juvenile court.

  1. Upon approval of the guardian’s acceptance of the appointment of the guardian of a minor and issuance of the letters of guardianship, the court shall transfer the guardianship file to the juvenile court where the minor resides.
  2. The juvenile court under section 27-20.1-02 has exclusive jurisdiction for any filings or proceedings subsequent to approval and issuance of the letters of guardianship.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2019, ch. 274, § 8, effective August 1, 2019.

Collateral References.

Function, power, and discretion of court as affected by testamentary appointment of guardian of minor, 67 A.L.R.2d 803.

30.1-27-12. (5-212) Resignation or removal proceedings. [Repealed]

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; repealed by 2019, ch. 274, § 9, effective August 1, 2019.

CHAPTER 30.1-28 Guardians of Incapacitated Persons

30.1-28-01. (5-301) Testamentary appointment of guardian for incapacitated person.

  1. The guardian spouse or guardian parent of an adjudicated incapacitated person may, by will, appoint a successor guardian of the incapacitated person. A testamentary appointment by a guardian spouse or guardian parent becomes effective when, after having given seven days’ prior written notice of intention to do so to the incapacitated person and to the person caring for the incapacitated person or to the nearest adult relative of the incapacitated person, the successor guardian files acceptance of appointment in the court in which the will is informally or formally probated.
  2. This state shall recognize a testamentary appointment effected by filing acceptance under a will probated at the testator’s domicile in another state.
  3. On the filing with the court in which the will was probated of written objection to the appointment by the person for whom a testamentary appointment of guardian has been made, the appointment is terminated. An objection does not prevent appointment by the court in a proper proceeding of the testamentary nominee or any other suitable person upon an adjudication of incapacity in proceedings under the succeeding sections of this chapter.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 405, § 2.

Cross-References.

“Incapacitated person” defined, see N.D.C.C. § 30.1-26-01.

Public administrator as ex officio guardian, see N.D.C.C. § 11-21-05.

Law Reviews.

A Study of Guardianship in North Dakota, 60 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1984).

North Dakota Handbook for Guardians Ad Litem in Actions for Adjudication of Incapacity, 66 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1990).

30.1-28-02. (5-302) Venue.

The venue for guardianship proceedings for a proposed ward is in the place where the proposed ward resides or is present and expected to remain during the pendency of the proceedings. Notwithstanding section 30.1-02-03, the proposed ward may demand change of venue to either the county of residence or the county where the proposed ward is present. The court shall grant the demand if it is filed and served upon the petitioner more than three days before the hearing. If the demand is filed within three days of the hearing, the court may grant the demand upon good cause shown.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1983, ch. 82, § 65; 1989, ch. 405, § 3.

30.1-28-03. (5-303) Procedure for court appointment of a guardian of an incapacitated person.

  1. Any person interested in the welfare of an allegedly incapacitated person may petition for the appointment of a guardian. No filing fee under this or any other section may be required when a petition for guardianship of an incapacitated person is filed by a member of the individual treatment plan team for the alleged incapacitated person or by any state employee in the performance of official duties.
  2. The petition for appointment of a guardian must state:
    1. The name, address, and corporate or agency status of the petitioner, and its connection with or relationship to the proposed ward;
    2. The name, age, and address of the proposed ward;
    3. The name and address of any person or institution having care or custody over the proposed ward;
    4. The names and addresses of the spouse, parents, and adult children or, if none, any adult siblings and any adult with whom the proposed ward resides in a private residence, or, if none, the nearest adult relative;
    5. A brief description of and the approximate value of the real and personal property and income of the proposed ward, so far as they are known to the petitioner;
    6. The extent of guardianship authority sought, including full authority, limited authority, or no authority in each area of residential, educational, medical, legal, vocational, and financial decisionmaking unless the petitioner is undecided on the extent of authority in any area, in which case the petition must state the specific areas in which the authority is sought;
    7. The occupation and qualifications of the proposed guardian;
    8. The name and address of the attorney, if known, who most recently represented the proposed ward;
    9. A statement alleging specific facts establishing the necessity for the appointment of a guardian;
    10. The name and address of any current conservator appointed for the proposed ward;
    11. The name and address of any person designated as an attorney in fact or agent in a power of attorney or as an agent in a health care directive;
    12. The name and address of any representative payee for the proposed ward;
    13. That less intrusive alternatives to guardianship have been considered;
    14. In the form of an attached recent statement, the physical, mental, and emotional limitations of the proposed ward from an expert examiner, if available; and
    15. Whether the petition seeks to restrict any of the following rights:
      1. To vote;
      2. To seek to change marital status; or
      3. To obtain or retain a motor vehicle operator’s license.
  3. Upon the filing of a petition, the court promptly shall set a date for hearing on the issues of incapacity, appoint an attorney to act as guardian ad litem, appoint an expert examiner to examine the proposed ward, and appoint a visitor to interview the proposed guardian and the proposed ward. The proposed guardian shall attend the hearing on the petition unless excused by the court for good cause.
  4. The duties of the guardian ad litem include:
    1. Personally interviewing the proposed ward;
    2. Explaining the guardianship proceeding to the proposed ward in the language, mode of communication, and terms that the proposed ward is most likely to understand, including the nature and possible consequences of the proceeding, the right to which the proposed ward is entitled, and the legal options that are available, including the right to retain an attorney to represent the proposed ward;
    3. Advocating for the best interests of the proposed ward. The appointed attorney serving as legal guardian ad litem may not represent the proposed ward or ward in a legal capacity;
    4. Submitting a written report to the court containing the guardian ad litem’s response to the petition; and
    5. Reviewing the visitor’s written report submitted in accordance with subdivision h and i of subsection 6 and discussing the report with the proposed ward.
  5. The expert examiner shall examine the proposed ward and submit a written report to the court. The written report must contain:
    1. A description of the nature and degree of any current incapacity or disability, including the medical or psychological history, if reasonably available;
    2. A medical prognosis or psychological evaluation specifying the estimated severity and duration of any current incapacity or disability;
    3. A statement as to how or in what manner any underlying condition of physical or mental health affects the proposed ward’s ability to provide for personal needs; and
    4. A statement as to whether any current medication affects the demeanor of the proposed ward or the ability of the proposed ward to participate fully in any court proceeding or in any other procedure required by the court or by court rule.
  6. The visitor shall have the following duties:
    1. To meet, interview, and consult with the proposed ward regarding the guardianship proceeding, including explaining the purpose for the interview in a manner the proposed ward can reasonably be expected to understand.
    2. To ascertain the proposed ward’s views concerning the proposed guardian, the powers and duties of the proposed guardian, the proposed guardianship, and the scope and duration thereof.
    3. To interview the person seeking appointment as guardian.
    4. To interview other persons interested in the welfare of the proposed ward.
    5. To visit the proposed ward’s present place of residence.
    6. To discuss an alternative resource plan with the proposed ward, if appropriate.
    7. To obtain other relevant information as directed by the court.
    8. To submit a written report to the court.
    9. The visitor’s written report must contain:
      1. A description of the nature and degree of any current impairment of the proposed ward’s understanding or capacity to make or communicate decisions;
      2. A statement of the qualifications and appropriateness of the proposed guardian and a recommendation regarding whether the proposed guardian should be appointed;
      3. If the visitor recommends the proposed guardian should not be appointed, a recommendation regarding an alternative individual or entity that should be appointed as guardian;
      4. Recommendations, if any, on the powers to be granted to the proposed guardian, including an evaluation of the proposed ward’s capacity to perform the functions enumerated under subsections 3 and 4 of section 30.1-28-04; and
      5. An assessment of the capacity of the proposed ward to perform the activities of daily living.
  7. In determining whether appointment of a guardian is appropriate, the court shall consider the reports ordered by the court under this section from a guardian ad litem, visitor, and an expert examiner. The court, guardian ad litem, petitioner, or proposed ward may subpoena the individual who prepared and submitted the report to appear, testify, and be cross-examined.
  8. The proposed ward must be present at the hearing in person, unless good cause is shown for the absence. Good cause does not consist only of the physical difficulty of the proposed ward to attend the hearing. The proposed ward has the right to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses, including the court-appointed expert examiner and the visitor. The issue may be determined at a closed hearing if the proposed ward or the proposed ward’s counsel so requests.
  9. The court shall take all necessary steps to make the courts and court proceedings accessible and understandable to impaired persons. Accordingly, the court may convene temporarily, or for the entire proceeding, at any other location if it is in the best interest of the proposed ward.
  10. If the court approves a visitor, lawyer, expert examiner, guardian, or emergency guardian appointed in a guardianship proceeding, that person may receive reasonable compensation from the ward’s estate if the compensation will not unreasonably jeopardize the ward’s well-being.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1983, ch. 313, § 6; 1985, ch. 336, § 10; 1985, ch. 369, § 4; 1989, ch. 405, § 4; 1999, ch. 297, § 1; 2015, ch. 240, § 1, effective August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 230, § 2, effective August 1, 2017.

Cross-References.

Guardians ad litem, see N.D.C.C. ch. 28-03.

Notes to Decisions

Attorney Fees.

Because a petitioner for removal of existing guardians failed to demonstrate that additional fees were authorized by statute or by the parties’ agreement, a district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award additional attorney’s fees to her, and because there was statutory support for paying attorney’s fees of guardians and conservators under N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-28-03(9), 30.1-29-24(3)(w), (x) and the petitioner failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in awarding fees to the guardians and conservator, the district court’s fee awards were affirmed. E.O. v. M.O. (In re D.M.O.), 2008 ND 100, 749 N.W.2d 517, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 101 (N.D. 2008).

Compensation from Ward’s Estate.

Trial court erred in ordering compensation from a proposed ward’s estate under subsection (9) of this section after the petition for appointment of a guardian was dismissed; compensation may not be required of a person for whom someone sought a guardian if a guardian is not appointed. Miller v. Shatzka (In re Shatzka), 2003 ND 147, 669 N.W.2d 95, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 159 (N.D. 2003).

Construction.

Guardianship or conservatorship contemplates a legal proceeding in which the ward has had his or her authority withdrawn by a court order; no guardianship or conservatorship existed that withdrew the attorney's client's authority to act for himself. Runge v. Disciplinary Bd. of the N.D. Supreme Court (In re Runge), 2015 ND 32, 858 N.W.2d 901, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 29 (N.D. 2015).

Guardian ad Litem Duties.

In a guardianship case, a guardian ad litem fulfilled her duties under this statute when she stated that a guardianship was in the ward's best interest because she was not required to be the ward's advocate; the ward contended that the guardian should have advocated her wish to remain in her home and not have a guardian appointed. There was no indication that the guardian ad litem was retained as the ward's advocate. N.P. v. M.E. (In re M.E.), 2015 ND 267, 871 N.W.2d 435, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 289 (N.D. 2015).

Physician's Report.

In a guardianship case, a ward's statutory rights were not violated because a district court substantially complied with this statute by accepting a physician's letter as the required physician's report. Even though an appointed expert refused to evaluate the ward, this letter provided a medical evaluation to the court satisfying the statutory requirements, and there was liberal construction of this title. N.P. v. M.E. (In re M.E.), 2015 ND 267, 871 N.W.2d 435, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 289 (N.D. 2015).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

County Court.

The county court could appoint a guardian, if the jurisdictional facts existed, of the person or estate, or both, of a person residing in the state who was a person of unsound mind, or from any cause mentally or otherwise incompetent to manage his own property. Goetz v. Gunsch, 80 N.W.2d 548, 1956 N.D. LEXIS 170 (N.D. 1956).

District Court.

Where a guardian of an estate of an incompetent person had been appointed by the county court of his residence, the district court in an action against such incompetent person had no authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for such incompetent person. Goetz v. Gunsch, 80 N.W.2d 548, 1956 N.D. LEXIS 170 (N.D. 1956).

Jurisdiction.

Where a person of lawful age personally appeared without being cited at a hearing called by a county judge on petition for a guardian’s appointment, and stated that she wished to have a person appointed as guardian, and signed a written request for his appointment, the court acquired jurisdiction over her person to the same extent as if she had been cited. In re Guardianship of Jones, 66 N.D. 185, 263 N.W. 160, 1935 N.D. LEXIS 185 (N.D. 1935).

Collateral References.

Mental condition which will justify the appointment of guardian, committee, or conservator of the estate for an incompetent or spendthrift, 9 A.L.R.3d 774.

30.1-28-03.1. Confidentiality — Reports — Personal information.

  1. A written report prepared and submitted under subsection 5 or 6 of section 30.1-28-03 is closed to the public and is not open to inspection except by the court, parties to the proceeding or their counsel, other persons for those purposes as the court may order for good cause, and others authorized by court rule.
  2. Medical, psychological, or other treatment information protected by federal law or regulation and any financial account numbers related to a ward or proposed ward are confidential and may not be disclosed except to parties to the proceeding, their counsel, and others authorized by court rule. The court may permit access by other persons for good cause.

History. S.L. 2015, ch. 240, § 2, effective August 1, 2015.

30.1-28-03.2. Authorization of a single transaction to sell, encumber, or transfer ownership of real or personal property of the ward.

  1. A guardian may move the court for authorization to sell, mortgage, lease, or otherwise encumber or transfer ownership of the real or personal property of the ward, valued at over two thousand five hundred dollars, upon such terms as the court may order, for the purpose of paying the ward’s debts; providing for the care, maintenance, rehabilitation, training, or education of the ward or the ward’s dependents; or for any other purpose which is in the best interests of the ward.
  2. The motion must contain:
    1. The type of property;
    2. A description of the property;
    3. The type of transaction;
    4. The details of the transaction;
    5. The reason for the transaction;
    6. The current fair market value of the property:
      1. For real property, an appraisal must be provided unless good cause is shown;
      2. For personal property, a description of how the guardian arrived at the fair market value must be provided;
    7. An explanation of why the transaction is in the best interests of the ward; and
    8. A notice that any person interested in the ward’s property that opposes the transaction shall file an objection within ten days of the notice and demand a hearing.
  3. The motion must be served upon the ward, the ward’s spouse, and all interested persons.
  4. Any consents of the ward’s spouse or interested persons must be filed with the motion. If the motion is unopposed, the court may authorize the transaction without a hearing or may conduct a hearing and require proof of the matters necessary to support the authorization of the transaction.
  5. The court’s order must include specific findings regarding whether the transaction is in the best interests of the ward.

Source: S.L. 2021, ch. 255, § 2, effective August 1, 2021.

30.1-28-04. (5-304) Findings — Order of appointment.

  1. The court shall exercise the authority conferred in this chapter consistent with the maximum self-reliance and independence of the incapacitated person and make appointive and other orders only to the extent necessitated by the incapacitated person’s actual mental and adaptive limitations or other conditions warranting the procedure.
  2. At a hearing held under this chapter, the court shall:
    1. Hear evidence that the proposed ward is an incapacitated person. Age, eccentricity, poverty, or medical diagnosis alone is not sufficient to justify a finding of incapacity;
    2. Hear evidence and determine whether there are any existing general durable powers of attorney and durable powers of attorney for health care. If there are validly executed durable powers of attorney, the court shall consider the appointed attorneys in fact and agents appointed thereunder when assessing alternative resource plans and the need for a guardian; and
    3. Appoint a guardian and confer specific powers of guardianship only after finding in the record based on clear and convincing evidence that:
      1. The proposed ward is an incapacitated person;
      2. There is no available alternative resource plan that is suitable to safeguard the proposed ward’s health, safety, or habilitation which could be used instead of a guardianship;
      3. The guardianship is necessary as the best means of providing care, supervision, or habilitation of the ward; and
      4. The powers and duties conferred upon the guardian are appropriate as the least restrictive form of intervention consistent with the ability of the ward for self-care.
  3. Except upon specific findings of the court, a ward may not be deprived of any of the following legal rights: to vote, to seek to change marital status, or to obtain or retain a motor vehicle operator’s license.
  4. The court may find that the ward retains other specific rights.
  5. The order appointing a guardian confers upon the guardian only those powers and duties specified in the order. In addition to any other powers conferred upon the guardian, the court’s order must state whether the guardian has no authority, general authority, or limited authority to make decisions on behalf of the ward in each of the areas of residential, educational, medical, legal, vocational, and financial decisionmaking. A grant of limited authority must specify the limitations upon the authority of the guardian or the authority retained by the ward. The court’s order must require the guardian to provide within ninety days from the date of the order a beginning inventory of all assets owned by the ward or in which the ward has an interest. The guardian shall provide a copy of the beginning inventory to the ward and any interested persons designated by the court in its order. Unless terminated earlier by the court, an order appointing or reappointing a guardian under this section is effective for up to five years. At least ninety days before the expiration of the initial order of appointment or any following order of reappointment, the court shall request and consider information submitted by the guardian, ward, ward’s attorney, if any, and any interested persons regarding whether the need for a guardian continues to exist. If it is recommended that the guardianship continue, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem or visitor, or both, in accordance with section 30.1-28-03. The court shall hold a hearing on whether the guardianship should continue. Following the hearing and consideration of submitted information, the court may reappoint the guardian for up to another five years, allow the existing order to expire, or appoint a new guardian in accordance with this section. The supreme court, by rule or order, shall provide for the regular review of guardianship in existence on August 1, 2015.
  6. Unless a court of competent jurisdiction determines otherwise, a durable power of attorney for health care executed pursuant to chapter 23-06.5 takes precedence over any authority to make medical decisions granted to a guardian pursuant to chapter 30.1-28.
  7. A grant of general authority to make medical decisions includes the authority to consent to involuntary treatment with prescribed medications. Except upon specific findings of the court, a grant of limited authority does not include authority to consent to involuntary treatment with prescribed medications.
  8. The court may require a guardian to furnish a bond in the amount and with sureties as the court specifies.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1983, ch. 313, § 7; 1985, ch. 369, § 5; 1989, ch. 405, § 5; 1999, ch. 297, §§ 2, 3; 2015, ch. 240, § 3, effective August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 231, § 2, effective April 17, 2017; 2017, ch. 230, § 3, effective August 1, 2017; 2021, ch. 254, § 1, effective August 1, 2021.

Notes to Decisions

In General.

The guardianship law mandates that the trial court find incapacity, lack of an alternative resource plan, and necessity of guardianship supervision, all by clear and convincing evidence, then select the least restrictive form of intervention. In re Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 136 (N.D. 1993).

Appellate Review.

To balance the competing interests of protection and liberty in guardianship situations, trial courts are expected to use a clear and convincing evidentiary standard, while appellate review under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a) uses a more probing “clearly erroneous” standard. In re Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 136 (N.D. 1993).

Burden of Proof

Supreme Court of North Dakota concludes that the party proposing the transfer of a ward to a more restrictive living arrangement has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed placement is the least restrictive alternative available. This allocation of the burden of proof is in accord with the current trend of courts and legislatures to enhance the protections available to persons alleged to be incapable of caring for themselves or their property. Van Sickle v. Van Sickle (In re Guardianship of Van Sickle), 2005 ND 69, 694 N.W.2d 212, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 77 (N.D. 2005).

Findings.

In a guardianship case, since a ward could not remember being exploited financially and was unable to drive, it was not error to deprive her of the right to marry or obtain a driver's license. However, the court erred in depriving the ward of the right to testify in judicial or administrative proceedings without a specific finding. N.P. v. M.E. (In re M.E.), 2015 ND 267, 871 N.W.2d 435, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 289 (N.D. 2015).

Incapacity.
—Shown.

In a guardianship case, a court's findings regarding the ward's incapacity, the necessity of the guardianship, and the authority given to the co-guardians and the co-conservators were not clearly erroneous; the ward could not remember being exploited financially, she had overdosed on medication, she had fallen in her home several times, and she posed a fire danger due to smoking in her home. N.P. v. M.E. (In re M.E.), 2015 ND 267, 871 N.W.2d 435, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 289 (N.D. 2015).

—In General.

Read together, the definitions of “mental deficiency” and “incapacity” require an incapacity that endangers the person’s welfare. In re Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 136 (N.D. 1993).

—Inability to Make Medical Decisions.

Although the trial court properly found, by clear and convincing evidence, that a person was incapacitated for purposes of medical decisionmaking, its finding of complete incapacity was not supported by convincing evidence, and was clearly erroneous. In re Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 136 (N.D. 1993).

Least Restrictive Alternative for Residence

Trial court did not err in finding that a ward’s placement in a locked, dementia unit of a nursing home was the least restrictive alternative for his residence because his Alzheimer’s disease had been re-evaluated as “severe” and he had already wandered from his home, foster care would have to have been provided in a locked setting and would likely have been provided by people who did not have the training and experience of the people at the nursing home, and the ward was provided with a security net but also had an ability to be out of the facility and to have meaningful contacts. Van Sickle v. Van Sickle (In re Guardianship of Van Sickle), 2005 ND 69, 694 N.W.2d 212, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 77 (N.D. 2005).

There was no violation of this statute in the appointment of a guardian because, regardless of who was appointed, a physician testified that the ward required constant supervision, whether through home care or at an assisted living facility. J.W. v. B.K.J. (In re Guardianship of the Pers. & Conservatorship of the Estate of B.K.J.), 2015 ND 191, 867 N.W.2d 345, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 206 (N.D. 2015).

Least Restrictive Form of Intervention.

Given a trial court’s erroneous findings about the extent of a person’s incapacity and about the availability of an alternative resource plan, an unlimited general guardianship was not “the least restrictive form of intervention.” In re Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 136 (N.D. 1993).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Widow’s Right.

The right of a widow to manage and dispose of her own property was not placed in a guardian where widow took the stand and showed an understanding of the nature of her holdings and the effects and reasons for conveyances she made. In re Guardianship of Frank, 137 N.W.2d 218, 1965 N.D. LEXIS 118 (N.D. 1965).

Collateral References.

Mental condition which will justify the appointment of guardian, committee, or conservator of the estate for an incompetent or spendthrift, 9 A.L.R.3d 774.

Validity of guardianship proceeding based on brainwashing of subject by religious, political, or social organization, 44 A.L.R.4th 1207.

Law Reviews.

Clear Today, Uncertain Tomorrow: Competency and Legal Guardianship, and the Role of the Lawyer in Serving the Needs of Cognitively Impaired Clients, 74 N.D. L. Rev. 295 (1998).

30.1-28-05. (5-305) Acceptance of appointment — Consent to jurisdiction — Order — Letters of guardianship.

  1. By accepting appointment, a guardian submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding relating to the guardianship that may be instituted by any interested person. Notice of any proceeding so instituted must be served upon the guardian by the petitioner.
  2. A copy of the order appointing the guardian must be served by the petitioner to those given notice under section 30.1-28-09. The order must contain the name and address of the guardian as well as notice of the ward’s right to appeal the guardianship appointment and of the ward’s right to seek alteration or termination of the guardianship at any time.
  3. Letters of guardianship must contain:
    1. The name, address, and telephone number of the guardian;
    2. The name, address, and telephone number of the ward;
    3. Specification of the guardian’s authority to make decisions on behalf of the ward in residential, educational, medical, legal, vocational, and financial areas. If limited authority has been granted in any area, the letters must describe the nature of the limitations;
    4. Specification of any other powers or authority conferred upon the guardian; and
    5. Specification of limitations by the court upon the rights and privileges of the ward in matters not governed by powers of the guardian, such as voting, marriage, and driving.
  4. The letters must issue to the guardian. The court shall mail copies to the ward and the ward’s counsel.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 405, § 6; 2015, ch. 240, § 4, effective August 1, 2015.

30.1-28-06. (5-306) Termination of guardianship.

The authority and responsibility of a guardian for an incapacitated person terminates upon the death of the guardian or ward, except, the guardian may arrange for a deceased ward’s final disposition and refer the ward’s estate to probate, if no other person is available to perform those acts, the determination of incapacity of the guardian, or upon removal or resignation as provided in section 30.1-28-07. Testamentary appointment under an informally probated will terminates if the will is later denied probate in a formal proceeding. Termination does not affect the guardian’s liability for prior acts nor the guardian’s obligation to account for funds and assets of the ward.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 405, § 7; 2017, ch. 92, § 21, effective August 1, 2017.

30.1-28-07. (5-307) Removal or resignation of guardian — Termination of guardianship.

  1. On petition of the ward or any person interested in the ward’s welfare, the court may remove a guardian and appoint a successor if in the best interests of the ward. On petition of the guardian, the court may accept the guardian’s resignation and make any other order which may be appropriate.
  2. The ward or any person interested in the ward’s welfare may petition for an order that the ward is no longer incapacitated, and for removal of the guardian. A request for this order may be made by informal letter to the court or judge. Any person who knowingly interferes with transmission of this kind of request to the court or judge may be adjudged guilty of contempt of court.
  3. Before removing a guardian, accepting the resignation of a guardian, or on finding that the ward is no longer incapacitated and ordering the guardianship terminated, the court, following the same procedures to safeguard the rights of the ward as apply to a petition for appointment of a guardian, may send a visitor to the residence of the present guardian and to the place where the ward resides or is detained, to observe conditions and report in writing to the court.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 405, § 8.

Notes to Decisions

Alcoholic Ward.

Trial court’s finding that alcoholic ward remained incapacitated was supported by the evidence. In re Guardianship of Renz, 507 N.W.2d 76, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 188 (N.D. 1993).

Due Process.

As appellant never had a fair opportunity under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-28-11(4) to show why she should be appointed as her mother’s guardian, the trial judge erred (1) by not honoring a prior judge’s grant of appellant’s motion to reconsider the appointment of her siblings as guardians, and (2) by placing the burden on appellant to show why he should remove the guardians and appoint a successor under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-28-07(1). Onstad v. Onstad (In re Onstad), 2005 ND 158, 704 N.W.2d 554, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 192 (N.D. 2005).

Restoration to Competency.

District court did not err in denying a ward's petition to be restored to capacity because the ward failed to establish a prima facie case for restoration to capacity; a psychologist's notes and a visitor's report were not sufficient to establish a prima facie case for termination of the guardianship, and the ward failed to present any further evidence. M.E. v. M.E., 2017 ND 121, 894 N.W.2d 877, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 121 (N.D. 2017).

Ultimate burden to prove the need for a guardianship remains with the party petitioning for guardianship, or on the guardian if a guardianship has been established; the statute does not limit how often a ward may petition for termination of the guardianship, and it, therefore, is appropriate that the ward make a prima facie showing she no longer is incapacitated before the burden shifts to the guardian to prove the ward remains incapacitated and the guardianship continue. M.E. v. M.E., 2017 ND 121, 894 N.W.2d 877, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 121 (N.D. 2017).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Restoration to Competency.

Where a guardian had been appointed for an incompetent in this state, a judgment of a court in another state of which she subsequently became a resident, determining her competent, was not conclusive in a proceeding to have her adjudged restored to competency. In re Guardianship of Jones, 66 N.D. 185, 263 N.W. 160, 1935 N.D. LEXIS 185 (N.D. 1935).

The presumption of incapacity prevailed in absence of a showing of restoration to capacity. Goetz v. Gunsch, 80 N.W.2d 548, 1956 N.D. LEXIS 170 (N.D. 1956).

30.1-28-08. (5-308) Visitor in guardianship proceedings.

A visitor in guardianship proceedings is a person who is in nursing or social work and is an officer, employee, or special appointee of the court with no personal interest in the proceedings.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 405, § 9.

30.1-28-09. (5-309) Notices in guardianship proceedings.

  1. In a proceeding for the appointment or removal of a guardian or for an alteration or termination of a guardianship other than for the appointment of an emergency guardian or for the temporary suspension of a guardian, notice of hearing shall be given by the petitioning party, unless otherwise directed by the court, to each of the following:
    1. The ward or the proposed ward and the ward’s or proposed ward’s spouse, parents, and adult children;
    2. Any person, corporation, or institution who is serving as the ward’s guardian, attorney in fact, representative payee for public benefits, or conservator, or who has the ward’s care and custody;
    3. If no other person is notified under subdivision a, then the adult siblings and any adult with whom the proposed ward resides in a private residence, or if none can be found, any known adult relative; and
    4. The attorney for the proposed ward, the visitor, and the expert examiner, together with a copy of the respective order of appointment for each.
  2. The petitioning party, unless otherwise directed by the court, shall cause notice to be served personally on the ward or proposed ward, and the ward’s or proposed ward’s spouse and parents if they can be found within the state. Notice to the spouse and parents, if they cannot be found within the state, and to all other persons except the ward or proposed ward must be given as provided in section 30.1-03-01. Waiver of notice by the ward or proposed ward is not effective unless the ward or proposed ward attends the hearing or the ward’s or proposed ward’s waiver of notice is confirmed in an interview with the visitor.
  3. The notice must be printed with not less than double-spaced twelve-point type. The notice must inform the ward or proposed ward of the ward’s or proposed ward’s rights at the hearing and must include a description of the nature, purpose, and consequences of an appointment of a guardian.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 405, § 10; 2013, ch. 250, § 1; 2015, ch. 240, § 5, effective August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 230, § 4, effective August 1, 2017.

Notes to Decisions

Personal Jurisdiction.

In a guardianship case, a district court acquired personal jurisdiction over a ward because she appeared at a hearing and did not argue that service of a notice was defective, even though she was not personally served with notice of the hearing. N.P. v. M.E. (In re M.E.), 2015 ND 267, 871 N.W.2d 435, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 289 (N.D. 2015).

30.1-28-10. (5-310) Temporary guardians. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2013, ch. 250, § 3.

30.1-28-10.1. Emergency guardian.

  1. On petition by a person interested in the alleged incapacitated individual’s welfare, the court may appoint an emergency guardian if the court finds that compliance with the procedures of this chapter likely will result in substantial harm to the alleged incapacitated individual’s health, safety, or welfare, and that no other person appears to have authority and willingness to act in the circumstances. The court may appoint the guardian for a specified period of time, not to exceed ninety days. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for an emergency guardianship, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to advocate for the best interests of the alleged incapacitated individual in the proceeding and any subsequent proceeding. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, reasonable notice of the time and place of a hearing on the petition must be given to the alleged incapacitated individual, the individual’s spouse, if any, and any other person as the court directs.
  2. An emergency guardian may be appointed without notice to the alleged incapacitated individual and the alleged incapacitated individual’s guardian ad litem only if the court finds from affidavit or other sworn testimony that the alleged incapacitated individual will be substantially harmed before a hearing on the appointment can be held. If the court appoints an emergency guardian without notice to the alleged incapacitated individual, the alleged incapacitated individual and the individual’s spouse, if any, must be given notice of the appointment within forty-eight hours after the appointment. The court shall hold a hearing on the appropriateness of the appointment within ten days after the appointment.
  3. If a conservator has not been appointed for the alleged incapacitated individual and the emergency guardian has authority for financial decisionmaking, the court’s order of appointment must state that the guardian shall safeguard any assets held by the alleged incapacitated individual and, during the period of appointment and subject to any further order of the court, may expend the individual’s assets only for the necessary support and care of the individual.
  4. Appointment of an emergency guardian, with or without notice, is not a determination of the alleged incapacitated individual’s incapacity.
  5. The court may remove an emergency guardian at any time. An emergency guardian shall make any report the court requires. In all other respects, the provisions of this chapter concerning guardians apply to an emergency guardian.

Source: S.L. 2013, ch. 250, § 2; 2015, ch. 240, § 6, effective August 1, 2015.

30.1-28-11. (5-311) Who may be guardian — Priorities.

  1. Any competent person or a designated person from a suitable institution, agency, or nonprofit group home may be appointed guardian of an incapacitated person. No institution, agency, or nonprofit group home providing care and custody of the incapacitated person may be appointed guardian. However, if no one else can be found to serve as guardian, an employee of an agency, institution, or nonprofit group home providing care and custody may be appointed guardian if the employee does not provide direct care to the proposed ward and the court makes a specific finding that the appointment presents no substantial risk of a conflict of interest.
  2. Unless lack of qualification or other good cause dictates the contrary, the court shall appoint a guardian in accordance with the incapacitated person’s most recent nomination in a durable power of attorney.
  3. Except as provided in subsection 2, persons who are not disqualified have priority for appointment as guardian in the following order:
    1. A person nominated by the incapacitated person prior to being determined to be incapacitated, when nominated by means other than provided in subsection 2, if the incapacitated person is fourteen or more years of age and, in the opinion of the court, acted with or has sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice.
    2. The spouse of the incapacitated person.
    3. An adult child of the incapacitated person.
    4. A parent of the incapacitated person, including a person nominated by will or other writing signed by a deceased parent.
    5. Any relative of the incapacitated person with whom the incapacitated person has resided for more than six months prior to the filing of the petition.
    6. Any relative or friend who has maintained significant contacts with the incapacitated person or a designated person from a volunteer agency.
    7. A nonprofit corporation established to provide guardianship services; provided, that the corporation does not provide direct care to incapacitated persons. The corporation shall file with the court the name of an employee, volunteer, or other person from the corporation who is directly responsible for the guardianship of each incapacitated person, and shall notify the court in the event the person for any reason ceases to so act, or if a successor is named.
    8. Any appropriate government agency, including human service zones, except as limited by subsection 1.
    9. A person nominated by the person who is caring for or paying benefits to the incapacitated person.
  4. With respect to persons having equal priority, the court shall select the one it deems best qualified to serve. The court, acting in the best interest of the incapacitated person, may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having a lower priority.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1983, ch. 313, § 8; 1985, ch. 369, § 6; 1985, ch. 370, § 1; 1989, ch. 406, § 1; 2019, ch. 391, § 43, effective January 1, 2020.

Notes to Decisions

Appointment Affirmed.

District court did not abuse its discretion in appointing nephew as his aunt’s guardian and conservator under N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-28-11(4), 30.1-29-10(4) because it found that the nephew had no ownership or beneficiary interest in his aunt’s estate, would not accept any of her assets, and would waive his right to compensation if appointed. The aunt’s friend was willing to waive his right to compensation as guardian and conservator but was not willing to waive his right to take under the estate. Kolrud v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 2006 ND 219, 723 N.W.2d 384, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 221 (N.D. 2006).

Niece and a non-profit organization were properly appointed as co-guardians of a ward who suffered from Alzheimer's disease and dementia because this statute did not require the district court to make a specific finding that a person was of insufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice regarding appointing a guardian; there was no abuse of discretion in determining that the niece with equal priority to other relatives and the organization as the co-guardian were best qualified to serve. The district court was not of the opinion that the ward acted with or had sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice in this regard; the ward could not remember why she distrusted the niece and preferred other family members. J.W. v. B.K.J. (In re Guardianship of the Pers. & Conservatorship of the Estate of B.K.J.), 2015 ND 191, 867 N.W.2d 345, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 206 (N.D. 2015).

District court did not err in not appointing a nephew as the conservator and guardian of his uncle because, while the court's written findings did not explain its reasons, the oral findings were adequate to understand that family conflict was the reason for the court's finding of good cause not to appoint the nephew as conservator and guardian. C.G. v. K.P. (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of R.G.), 2016 ND 96, 879 N.W.2d 416, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2016).

Due Process.

As appellant never had a fair opportunity under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-28-11(4) to show why she should be appointed as her mother’s guardian, the trial judge erred (1) by not honoring a prior judge’s grant of appellant’s motion to reconsider the appointment of her siblings as guardians, and (2) by placing the burden on appellant to show why he should remove the guardians and appoint a successor under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-28-07(1). Onstad v. Onstad (In re Onstad), 2005 ND 158, 704 N.W.2d 554, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 192 (N.D. 2005).

Collateral References.

Priority and preference in appointment of conservator or guardian for an incompetent, 65 A.L.R.3d 991.

30.1-28-12. (5-312) General powers and duties of guardian.

  1. A guardian of an incapacitated person has only the powers and duties specified by the court.
  2. To the extent that it is consistent with the terms of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction, the guardian is entitled to custody of the person of the ward and may establish the ward’s place of residence within or without this state. However, no guardian may voluntarily admit a ward to a mental health facility or state institution for a period of more than forty-five days without a mental health commitment proceeding or other court order. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection, the guardian may readmit a ward to a mental health facility or a state institution within sixty days of discharge from that institution, if the original admission to the facility or institution had been authorized by the court.
  3. If entitled to custody of the ward, the guardian should make provision for the care, comfort, and maintenance of the ward and, whenever appropriate, arrange for the ward’s training, education, or habilitative services. The guardian shall take reasonable care of the ward’s clothing, furniture, vehicles, and personal effects.
  4. Notwithstanding general or limited authority to make medical decisions on behalf of the ward, no guardian may consent to psychosurgery, abortion, sterilization, or experimental treatment of any kind unless the procedure is first approved by order of the court.
  5. When exercising the authority granted by the court, the guardian shall safeguard the civil rights and personal autonomy of the ward to the fullest extent possible by:
    1. Meeting with the ward following the hearing, unless the ward is represented by an attorney, and explaining to the fullest extent possible the contents of the court’s order and the extent of the guardian’s authority;
    2. Involving the ward as fully as is practicable in making decisions with respect to the ward’s living arrangements, health care, and other aspects of the ward’s care; and
    3. Ensuring the ward’s maximum personal freedom by using the least restrictive forms of intervention and only as necessary for the safety of the ward or others.
  6. A guardian with authority to consent to involuntary treatment with prescribed medications may not provide consent without receiving a recommendation and determination from the ward’s treating physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, or advanced practice registered nurse that:
    1. The proposed prescribed medication is clinically appropriate and necessary to effectively treat the ward and that the ward requires treatment;
    2. The ward was offered that treatment and refused it or that the ward lacks the capacity to make or communicate a responsible decision about that treatment;
    3. Prescribed medication is the least restrictive form of intervention necessary to meet the treatment needs of the ward; and
    4. The benefits of the treatment outweigh the known risks to the ward.
  7. If no conservator for the estate of the ward has been appointed and if the guardian has been granted authority to make financial decisions on behalf of the ward, the guardian may:
    1. Institute proceedings to compel any person under a duty to support the ward or to pay sums for the welfare of the ward to perform that duty.
    2. Receive money and tangible property deliverable to the ward and apply the money and property for support, care, and education of the ward; but, the guardian may not use funds from the ward’s estate for room and board which the guardian or the guardian’s spouse, parent, or child have furnished the ward unless a charge for the service is approved by order of the court made upon notice to at least one of the next of kin of the ward, if notice is possible. The guardian shall exercise care to conserve any excess for the ward’s needs.
    3. Move the court under section 30.1-28-03.2 for authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber or transfer ownership or beneficiary of:
      1. The real property of the ward; or
      2. The personal property of the ward valued over two thousand five hundred dollars upon such terms as the court may order, for the purpose of paying the ward’s debts; providing for the care, maintenance, rehabilitation, training, or education of the ward or the ward’s dependents; or for any other purpose which is in the best interests of the ward. The sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance or transfer of ownership of personal property of the ward valued at two thousand five hundred dollars or less does not require a court order.
    4. Move the court under section 30.1-28-03.2 for authority to lease the real or personal property of the ward.
    5. A guardian may not purchase, lease, or obtain ownership or become the beneficiary of property of the ward unless the price and manner of the sale are approved by the court.
  8. If a conservator has been appointed, all of the ward’s estate received by the guardian in excess of those funds expended to meet current expenses for support, care, and education of the ward must be paid to the conservator for management as provided in this title, and the guardian must account to the conservator for funds expended.
  9. A guardian shall file an annual report with the court regarding the exercise of powers and duties in areas of authority specified in the court’s order of appointment. The report must describe the status or condition of the ward, including any change of residence and reasons for the change, any medical treatment received by or withheld from the ward, any expenditure and income affecting the ward, any sale or transfer of property affecting the ward, and any exercise of legal authority by the guardian affecting the ward. The report must include changes that have occurred since the previous reporting period and an accounting of the ward’s estate. The guardian also shall report whether the ward continues to require guardianship and whether any powers of the guardian should be increased or limited. The report must be filed with the clerk of district court. The filing of the report does not constitute an adjudication or a determination of the merits of the report nor does the filing of the report constitute the court’s approval of the report. The court may approve a report and allow and settle an accounting only upon notice to the ward’s guardian ad litem and other interested persons who have made an appearance or requested notice of proceedings. The office of the state court administrator shall provide printed forms that may be used to fulfill reporting requirements. Any report must be similar in substance to the state court administrator’s form. The forms must be available in the office of clerk of district court or obtainable through the supreme court’s internet website.
  10. Copies of the guardian’s annual report to the court and of any other reports required by the court must be mailed to the ward and any interested persons designated by the court in its order. The ward’s copy must be accompanied by a statement, printed with not less than double-spaced twelve-point type, of the ward’s right to seek alteration, limitation, or termination of the guardianship at any time.
  11. The guardian is entitled to receive reasonable sums for services and for room and board furnished to the ward as approved by the court or as agreed upon between the guardian and the conservator, provided the amounts agreed upon are reasonable under the circumstances. The guardian may request the conservator to expend the ward’s estate by payment to third persons or institutions for the ward’s care and maintenance.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1983, ch. 82, § 66; 1983, ch. 313, § 9; 1989, ch. 405, § 12; 1993, ch. 260, § 2; 2005, ch. 291, § 2; 2015, ch. 240, § 7, effective August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 231, § 3, § 3, effective April 17, 2017; 2021, ch. 255, § 1, effective August 1, 2021.

Cross-References.

Oil and gas leases made by guardian, see N.D.C.C. ch. 38-10.

Notes to Decisions

Compensation.

Trial court erred in denying a guardian’s request for compensation for services; the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-28-12(10) indicated the legislature intended to give a district court the discretion to consider what compensation was reasonable under the circumstances of any given guardianship, but the statutory language did not permit the district court to completely and preemptively reject a guardian’s request for compensation if such a request was reasonable. S.D.F. v. L.K. (In re V.J.V.N.), 2008 ND 106, 750 N.W.2d 462, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 109 (N.D. 2008).

Patient or his estate was properly ordered to pay expenses arising from the appointment of a guardian/conservator because the guardian/conservator was entitled to reasonable compensation for services under N.D.C.C. 30.1-28-12 and N.D.C.C. 30.1-29-14. The trial court had the discretion to determine the amount of reasonable compensation, the record did not show that the trial court misapplied the law in ordering the payment of expenses, and the trial court’s decision was not arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable. C.V. v. Gurardian and Protective Servs. (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of G.L.), 2011 ND 10, 793 N.W.2d 192, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 6 (N.D. 2011).

Inquiry Involving Deceased Ward’s Guardian.

A personal representative’s inquiry about the state of a decedent’s financial affairs, as required under N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-28-12 and 30.1-18-15(27) when those provisions are read together, includes contacting a known guardian about the decedent’s affairs; where such an inquiry would have uncovered the existence of a creditor who had sent a bill to a decedent’s guardian, that creditor was a reasonably ascertainable creditor for purposes of N.D.C.C. § 30.1-19-01. Larson v. Fraase (In re Estate of Elken), 2007 ND 107, 735 N.W.2d 842, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 2007).

Least Restrictive Alternative.

Trial court did not err in finding that a ward’s placement in a locked, dementia unit of a nursing home was the least restrictive alternative for his residence because his Alzheimer’s disease had been re-evaluated as “severe” and he had already wandered from his home, foster care would have to have been provided in a locked setting and would likely have been provided by people who did not have the training and experience of the people at the nursing home, and the ward was provided with a security net but also had an ability to be out of the facility and to have meaningful contacts. Van Sickle v. Van Sickle (In re Guardianship of Van Sickle), 2005 ND 69, 694 N.W.2d 212, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 77 (N.D. 2005).

Transfer to More Restrictive Living Environment.
—Burden of Proof.

Supreme Court of North Dakota concludes that the party proposing the transfer of a ward to a more restrictive living arrangement has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed placement is the least restrictive alternative available. This allocation of the burden of proof is in accord with the current trend of courts and legislatures to enhance the protections available to persons alleged to be incapable of caring for themselves or their property. Van Sickle v. Van Sickle (In re Guardianship of Van Sickle), 2005 ND 69, 694 N.W.2d 212, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 77 (N.D. 2005).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Additional Compensation.

Legislature intended to authorize court to allow additional compensation when services were rendered of such character and of such benefit to the ward or his estate as was in the judgment of court authorized or required. In re Gislason's Estate, 73 N.D. 731, 19 N.W.2d 447, 1945 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1945).

Limit on Expenditures.

Former section merely related to the restriction upon expenditures as compensation for guardian, and did not fix a definite limit on expenditures that could be made for other purposes. In re Gislason's Estate, 73 N.D. 731, 19 N.W.2d 447, 1945 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1945).

Ordinary Services.

Services rendered by guardian in shopping for ward and catering to his peculiar whims as to food and clothing were not ordinary services performed by guardian. In re Gislason's Estate, 73 N.D. 731, 19 N.W.2d 447, 1945 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1945).

Prior Authorization of Court.

Prior authorization by court was not necessary in order to entitle a guardian to be compensated for funds which he had expended, or for obligations assumed for benefit of ward in proper and necessary management of the estate. In re Gislason's Estate, 73 N.D. 731, 19 N.W.2d 447, 1945 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1945).

Where guardian incurred liability or expended moneys without previous court order authorizing them, he faced the hazard that court might not authorize the expenditure to be charged against assets of estate. In re Gislason's Estate, 73 N.D. 731, 19 N.W.2d 447, 1945 N.D. LEXIS 87 (N.D. 1945).

Collateral References.

Judicial sale by guardian, estoppel of or waiver by parties or participants regarding irregularities or defects in, 2 A.L.R.2d 6, 78.

Insurance: power of guardian of incompetent to change beneficiaries in ward’s life insurance policy, 21 A.L.R.2d 1191.

Torts: liability of incompetent’s estate for torts committed by guardian, committee, or trustee in managing estate, 40 A.L.R.2d 1103.

Guardian’s authority to make agreement to drop or compromise will contest or withdraw objections to probate, 42 A.L.R.2d 1319, 1365.

Power of court to confirm sale of ward’s property over objection of guardian, 43 A.L.R.2d 1445.

Debts: power of guardian, committee, or trustee of mental incompetent, after latter’s death, to pay debts and obligations, 60 A.L.R.2d 963.

Bank deposits: rights and powers of guardian with reference to joint bank deposit in name of incompetent and another, 62 A.L.R.2d 1091, 1100.

Attorney-client privilege: waiver of privilege by personal representative or heir of deceased client or by guardian of incompetent, 67 A.L.R.2d 1268.

Interest on ward’s funds, guardian’s liability for, 72 A.L.R.2d 757.

Capacity of guardian to sue or be sued outside state where appointed, 94 A.L.R.2d 162.

Charitable gifts from estate of incompetent, power to make, 99 A.L.R.2d 946.

Election for incompetent to take under or against will, factors considered in making, 3 A.L.R.3d 6.

Time within which election must be made for incompetent to take under or against will, 3 A.L.R.3d 119.

Election for incompetent to take under or against will, who may make election for, 21 A.L.R.3d 320.

Noncharitable gifts or allowances out of funds of incompetent ward, power of court or guardian to make, 24 A.L.R.3d 863.

Obligations or expenditures: right of guardian or committee of incompetent to incur obligations so as to bind incompetent or his estate, or to make expenditures, without approval by court, 63 A.L.R.3d 780.

Ademption or revocation of specific devise or bequest by guardian, committee, conservator, or trustee of mentally or physically incompetent testator, 84 A.L.R.4th 462.

Propriety of surgically invading incompetent or minor for benefit of third party, 4 A.L.R.5th 1000.

Power of incompetent spouse’s guardian or representative to sue for granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of marriage, or to make compromise or settlement in such suit, 32 A.L.R.5th 673.

Law Reviews.

A Study of Guardianship in North Dakota, 60 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1984).

North Dakota Supreme Court Review (Estate of Gilbert Elken, Jr., 2007 ND 107, 735 N.W.2d 843 (2007)), see 84 N.D. L. Rev. 567 (2008).

30.1-28-12.1. Annual reports and accounts — Failure of guardian to file.

If a guardian fails to file an annual report as required by section 30.1-28-12, fails to file a report at other times as the court may direct, or fails to provide an accounting of an estate, the court, upon its own motion or upon petition of any interested party, may issue an order compelling the guardian to show cause why the guardian should not immediately make and file the report or account, or be found in contempt for failure to comply.

Source: S.L. 1989, ch. 405, § 13; 2005, ch. 291, § 3.

30.1-28-12.2. Restrictions on visitation, communication, and interaction with the ward — Removal of restriction.

  1. If it is in the best interests of the ward, a guardian may restrict visitation, communication, and interaction with the ward.
  2. A family member, friend, the ward, clergy member, attorney, agency charged with the protection of vulnerable adults, or other interested person may move the court to remove the restriction on visitation, communication, and interaction with the ward.
  3. The motion must state:
    1. The movant’s relationship to the ward;
    2. Whether the guardian is unreasonably or arbitrarily denying or restricting visitation, communication, or interaction between the restricted party and the ward; and
    3. The facts supporting the movant’s allegation that the guardian is unreasonably or arbitrarily denying or restricting visitation, communication, or interaction between the restricted party and the ward.
  4. The movant shall serve the motion on the guardian, the ward, the ward’s spouse, and any other interested person.
  5. The court shall set a hearing on the motion and provide notice of the hearing to the movant, the guardian, the ward, the ward’s spouse, and any other interested person.
  6. The court shall take into consideration the ward’s wishes, and may conduct an in-camera interview with the ward and appoint a visitor or guardian ad litem.
  7. If the court grants the motion for visitation, communication, or interaction, the court may impose conditions on visitation, communication, and interaction between the restricted party and the ward.
  8. If the visitation, communication, or interaction is not in the best interests of the ward, the court may prohibit visitation, communication, or interaction between the restricted party and the ward.
  9. The court may award reasonable costs and attorney’s fees to the prevailing party if the court finds:
    1. The guardian unreasonably, arbitrarily, or in bad faith denied or restricted visitation, communication, or interaction between the restricted party and the ward; or
    2. The motion was frivolous.
  10. Costs and attorney’s fees awarded against the guardian may not be paid from the ward’s estate.
  11. If a movant for visitation, communication, and interaction states the ward’s health is in significant decline or the ward’s death may be imminent, the court shall conduct an emergency hearing on the motion as soon as practicable but not later than fourteen days after the date the motion is filed or at a later date upon a showing of good cause.

Source: S.L. 2021, ch. 256, § 1, effective August 1, 2021.

30.1-28-13. (5-313) Proceedings subsequent to appointment — Venue.

  1. The court where the ward resides has concurrent jurisdiction with the court which appointed the guardian, or in which acceptance of a testamentary appointment was filed, over resignation, removal, accounting, and other proceedings relating to the guardianship, including proceedings to limit the authority previously conferred on a guardian, or to remove limitations previously imposed.
  2. If the court located where the ward resides is not the court in which acceptance of appointment is filed, the court in which proceedings subsequent to appointment are commenced shall in all appropriate cases notify the other court, in this or another state, and after consultation with that court determine whether to retain jurisdiction or transfer the proceedings to the other court, whichever may be in the best interest of the ward. A copy of any order accepting a resignation, removing a guardian, or altering a guardian’s authority shall be sent to the court in which acceptance of appointment is filed.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1983, ch. 313, § 10.

Collateral References.

Service of process: construction and effect of provision for service of process against minor on a parent, guardian, or other designated person, 92 A.L.R.2d 1336.

30.1-28-14. Guardianships established before July 1, 1990.

The powers and duties of guardians and the rights and privileges of wards under guardianships established before July 1, 1990, are as provided by this chapter as it existed on June 30, 1990, and are not affected by chapter 405 of the 1989 Session Laws, except that guardians appointed before July 1, 1990, must comply with the requirements of subsections 2, 4, 5, and 8 of section 30.1-28-12.

Source: S.L. 1989, ch. 405, § 13; 1991, ch. 350, § 1.

30.1-28-15. Appointment of successor guardian.

  1. If the appointment of a successor guardian is required, the current guardian or any interested person may file a motion with the court for the appointment of a successor guardian.
  2. The motion and supporting documents must be served on the ward, the ward’s guardian ad litem, and every other interested person who has made an appearance or requested notice of proceedings.
  3. A notice of motion must accompany the motion and must include a statement that provides an opportunity for hearing if requested in regard to the appointment of a successor guardian.
  4. If the current or former guardian serves or served as a public administrator or a corporate guardian with more than ten wards, the motion and notice of motion may be served by first-class mail. The public administrator or corporate guardian shall then provide written notice of the motion to the state office of the protection and advocacy project, along with the contact information for each ward and proposed guardian.
  5. If a hearing is not requested by or on behalf of the ward listed in the notice, the court may sign an order appointing a successor guardian for that ward.

Source: S.L. 2005, ch. 292, § 1.

CHAPTER 30.1-29 Protection of Property of Persons Under Disability and Minors

30.1-29-01. (5-401) Protective proceedings — Burden of proof.

Upon petition and after notice and hearing in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, the court may appoint a conservator or make other protective order for cause as follows:

  1. Appointment of a conservator or other protective order may be made in relation to the estate and affairs of a minor if the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that a minor owns money or property that requires management or protection which cannot otherwise be provided, has or may have business affairs which may be jeopardized or prevented by the minor’s minority, or that funds are needed for the minor’s support and education and that protection is necessary or desirable to obtain or provide funds.
  2. Appointment of a conservator or other protective order may be made in relation to the estate and affairs of a person, including a minor, if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence:
    1. The person is unable to manage the person’s property and affairs effectively for reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, or chronic intoxication;
    2. The person is unable to manage the person’s property and affairs effectively for reasons of confinement, detention by a foreign power, or disappearance; or
    3. The person has property that will be wasted or dissipated unless proper management is provided, or that funds are needed for the support, care, and welfare of the person or those entitled to be supported by the person and that protection is necessary or desirable to obtain or provide funds.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 290, § 11; 2015, ch. 240, § 8, effective August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 230, § 5, effective August 1, 2017.

Notes to Decisions

Attorney Fees.

Appointment of a neutral conservator with limitations was proper for an elderly protected person with a large estate, cognitive decline, developing dementia, and two daughters in disagreement about the management of the estate; further, the daughter who initiated the conservatorship proceeding in good faith was properly awarded attorney fees from the estate. E.P. v. T.K. (In re Conservatorship of T.K.), 2009 ND 195, 775 N.W.2d 496, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 205 (N.D. 2009).

Construction.

Guardianship or conservatorship contemplates a legal proceeding in which the ward has had his or her authority withdrawn by a court order; no guardianship or conservatorship existed that withdrew the attorney's client's authority to act for himself. Runge v. Disciplinary Bd. of the N.D. Supreme Court (In re Runge), 2015 ND 32, 858 N.W.2d 901, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 29 (N.D. 2015).

Court's Findings.

The trial court did not make a mistake in finding that the 87-year-old respondent was incapacitated as a result of her advanced age and physical and medical problems, resulting in an inability to manage her property and that she had substantial property necessitating the appointment of a conservator for the preservation of the property and its proper application. The trial court’s findings were, therefore, not clearly erroneous, and the trial court did not err in appointing a conservator. In re Conservatorship of Gessler, 419 N.W.2d 541, 1988 N.D. App. LEXIS 1 (N.D. Ct. App. 1988).

District court had personal jurisdiction over a father and did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence supported the appointment of a conservator because the father properly received notice of the proceeding, rejected his children's attempts to assist him manage his affairs, his cognition and reasoning after his stroke were not what they had been before, and he made uncharacteristic gifts that showed a likelihood to dissipate assets. C.C. v. J.G.S. (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of J.G.S.), 2014 ND 239, 857 N.W.2d 847, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 243 (N.D. 2014).

Full and General Conservatorship.
—Not Warranted.

In view of evidence that an individual’s financial affairs were currently in order and partially controlled through her living arrangement with a vocational adjustment workshop, the trial court erred in imposing a full and general conservatorship. In re Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 136 (N.D. 1993).

Standard of Review.

Regardless of the standard of proof applicable to the initial determination of whether or not to appoint a conservator, a trial court’s determinations under this section, will not be reversed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Conservatorship of Gessler, 419 N.W.2d 541, 1988 N.D. App. LEXIS 1 (N.D. Ct. App. 1988).

Collateral References.

Mental condition which will justify the appointment of guardian, committee, or conservator of the estate for an incompetent or spendthrift, 9 A.L.R.3d 774.

Law Reviews.

A Study of Guardianship in North Dakota, 60 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1984).

30.1-29-02. (5-402) Protective proceedings — Jurisdiction of affairs of protected persons. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2009, ch. 278, § 2.

Cross-References.

See now “Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act”, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-35.

30.1-29-03. (5-403) Venue.

Venue for proceedings under this chapter is:

  1. In the place in this state where the person to be protected resides whether or not a guardian has been appointed in another place.
  2. If the person to be protected does not reside in this state, in any place where the person has property.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-29-04. (5-404) Original petition for appointment or protective order.

  1. The person to be protected, any person who is interested in the estate, affairs, or welfare of the person to be protected, including the protected person’s parent, guardian, or custodian, or any person who would be adversely affected by lack of effective management of property and affairs of the person to be protected may petition for the appointment of a conservator or for other appropriate protective order.
  2. The petition must state or include, to the extent known:
    1. The interest of the petitioner;
    2. The name, age, residence, and address of the person to be protected;
    3. The name and address of the guardian of the person to be protected, if any;
    4. The name and address of the nearest relative of the person to be protected known to the petitioner;
    5. A general statement of property of the person to be protected with an estimate of the value thereof, including any compensation, insurance, pension, or allowance to which the person to be protected is entitled;
    6. The extent of conservatorship authority sought;
    7. The name and address of any person designated as an attorney in fact or agent in a power of attorney;
    8. The name and address of any representative payee for the person to be protected;
    9. That less intrusive alternatives to conservatorship have been considered;
    10. If the appointment of a conservator is requested under subdivision a of subsection 2 of section 30.1-29-01, an attached recent statement, if any, from an expert examiner which describes the physical, mental, and emotional limitations of the person to be protected;
    11. The reason why appointment of a conservator or other protective order is necessary; and
    12. If the appointment of a conservator is requested, the name and address of the person whose appointment is sought and the basis of the person’s priority for appointment.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2017, ch. 230, § 6, effective August 1, 2017.

30.1-29-05. (5-405) Notice.

  1. On a petition for appointment of a conservator or other protective order, the person to be protected and the spouse of the person to be protected or, if none, the parents of the person to be protected, must be served personally by the petitioning party with notice of the proceeding at least fourteen days before the date of hearing if they can be found within the state, or, if they cannot be found within the state, they, any other guardian or conservator, and any government agency paying benefits to the person sought to be protected, if the person seeking the appointment has knowledge of the existence of these benefits, must be given notice in accordance with section 30.1-03-01. Waiver by the person to be protected is not effective unless the proceedings are limited to payment of veterans’ administration benefits, the person to be protected attends the hearing, or, unless minority is the reason for the proceeding, waiver is confirmed in an interview with the visitor.
  2. Notice of a petition for appointment of a conservator or other initial protective order, and of any subsequent hearing, must be given to any person who has filed a request for notice under section 30.1-29-06 and to interested persons and other persons as the court may direct. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 1, notice shall be given in accordance with section 30.1-03-01.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2017, ch. 230, § 7, effective August 1, 2017.

Notes to Decisions

Receipt of Notice.

District court had personal jurisdiction over a father and did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence supported the appointment of a conservator because the father properly received notice of the proceeding, rejected his children's attempts to assist him manage his affairs, his cognition and reasoning after his stroke were not what they had been before, and he made uncharacteristic gifts that showed a likelihood to dissipate assets. C.C. v. J.G.S. (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of J.G.S.), 2014 ND 239, 857 N.W.2d 847, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 243 (N.D. 2014).

30.1-29-06. (5-406) Protective proceedings — Request for notice — Interested person.

Any interested person who desires to be notified before any order is made in a protective proceeding may file with the court a request for notice subsequent to payment of any fee required by statute or court rule. The clerk shall mail a copy of the demand to the conservator if one has been appointed. A request is not effective unless it contains a statement showing the interest of the person making it and the person’s address, or that of the person’s attorney, and is effective only as to matters occurring after the filing. Any governmental agency paying or planning to pay benefits to the person to be protected is an interested person in protective proceedings.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-29-07. (5-407) Procedure concerning hearing and order on original petition.

  1. Upon receipt of a petition for appointment of a conservator or other protective order because of minority, the court shall set a date for hearing on the matters alleged in the petition. The proposed conservator, if any, shall attend the hearing unless excused by the court for good cause. If, at any time in the proceeding, the court determines that the interests of the minor are or may be inadequately represented, it may appoint an attorney to serve as guardian ad litem for the minor, giving consideration to the choice of the minor if fourteen years of age or older. The duties of a guardian ad litem include:
    1. Meeting, interviewing, and consulting with the person to be protected regarding the conservatorship proceeding, including explaining the purpose for the interview in the language, mode of communication, and terms the person is most likely to understand, the nature and possible consequences of the proceeding, the rights to which the person is entitled, and the legal options available, including the right to retain an attorney to represent the person;
    2. Advocating for the best interests of the person to be protected. The appointed attorney serving as guardian ad litem may not represent the person in a legal capacity;
    3. Ascertaining the views of the person to be protected concerning the proposed conservator, the powers and duties of the proposed conservator, the proposed conservatorship, and the scope and duration of the conservatorship;
    4. Interviewing the person seeking appointment as conservator;
    5. Obtaining any other relevant information;
    6. Submitting a written report to the court containing the guardian ad litem’s response to the petition; and
    7. Attending the hearing unless excused by the court for good cause.
  2. Upon receipt of a petition for appointment of a conservator or other protective order for reasons other than minority, the court shall set a date for hearing. The proposed conservator, if any, shall attend the hearing unless excused by the court for good cause. If, at any time in the proceeding, the court determines that the interests of the person to be protected are or may be inadequately represented, the court shall appoint an attorney to serve as guardian ad litem for the person to be protected. The duties of a guardian ad litem include:
    1. Meeting, interviewing, and consulting with the person to be protected regarding the conservatorship proceeding, including explaining the purpose for the interview in the language, mode of communication, and terms the person is most likely to understand, the nature and possible consequences of the proceeding, the rights to which the person is entitled, and the legal options available, including the right to retain an attorney to represent the person;
    2. Advocating for the best interests of the person to be protected. The appointed attorney serving as guardian ad litem may not represent the person in a legal capacity;
    3. Ascertaining the views of the person to be protected concerning the proposed conservator, the powers and duties of the proposed conservator, the proposed conservatorship, and the scope and duration of the conservatorship;
    4. Interviewing the person seeking appointment as conservator;
    5. Obtaining any other relevant information;
    6. Submitting a written report to the court containing the guardian ad litem’s response to the petition; and
    7. Attending the hearing unless excused by the court for good cause.
  3. If the petition seeks appointment of a conservator or other protective order for reasons other than minority and the alleged disability is mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, or chronic intoxication, the court shall direct the person to be protected be examined by an expert examiner designated by the court. The expert examiner preferably should be someone who is not connected with any institution in which the person is a patient or is detained.
    1. An expert examiner appointed under this subsection shall examine the person to be protected and submit a written report to the court. The report must contain:
      1. A description of the nature and degree of any current disability, including the medical or psychlogical history, if reasonably available;
      2. A medical prognosis or psychological evaluation specifying the estimated severity and duration of any current disability;
      3. A statement about how or in what manner any underlying condition of physical or mental health affects the ability of the person to be protected to provide for personal needs; and
      4. A statement about whether any current medication affects the demeanor of the person to be protected or the ability of the person to participate fully in any court proceeding or in any other procedure required by the court or by court rule.
    2. In determining whether appointment of a conservator is appropriate, the court shall consider the reports ordered by the court under this subsection from a guardian ad litem and an expert examiner. The court, guardian ad litem, petitioner, or person to be protected may subpoena the expert examiner who prepared and submitted the report to appear, testify, and be cross-examined.
  4. The person to be protected must be present at the hearing in person, unless good cause is shown for the absence. Good cause does not consist of the physical difficulty of the person to be protected to attend the hearing. The court shall take all necessary steps to make the courts and court proceedings accessible and understandable to impaired persons. The court may convene temporarily, or for the entire proceeding, at any other location if it is in the best interest of the person to be protected.
  5. In any case in which the veterans’ administration is or may be an interested party, a certificate of an authorized official of the veterans’ administration that the person to be protected has been found incapable of handling the benefits payable on examination in accordance with the laws and regulations governing the veterans’ administration is prima facie evidence of the necessity for a conservator or other protective order.
  6. After hearing, upon finding that the appointment of a conservator or other protective order is appropriate, the court shall make an appointment or other appropriate protective order.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 290, § 12; 1993, ch. 334, § 46; 1995, ch. 322, § 27; 2017, ch. 230, § 8, effective August 1, 2017.

Notes to Decisions

Findings.

District court had personal jurisdiction over a father and did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence supported the appointment of a conservator because the father properly received notice of the proceeding, rejected his children's attempts to assist him manage his affairs, his cognition and reasoning after his stroke were not what they had been before, and he made uncharacteristic gifts that showed a likelihood to dissipate assets. C.C. v. J.G.S. (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of J.G.S.), 2014 ND 239, 857 N.W.2d 847, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 243 (N.D. 2014).

30.1-29-08. (5-408) Permissible court orders.

  1. The court shall exercise the authority conferred in this chapter consistent with the maximum self-reliance and independence of the protected person and make protective orders only to the extent necessitated by the protected person’s actual mental and adaptive limitations and other conditions warranting the procedure.
  2. The court has the following powers which may be exercised directly or through a conservator in respect to the estate and affairs of protected persons:
    1. While a petition for appointment of a conservator or other protective order is pending and after preliminary hearing and without notice to others, the court has power to preserve and apply the property of the person to be protected as may be required for the benefit of the person to be protected or the benefit of the dependents of the person to be protected.
    2. After hearing and upon determining that a basis for an appointment or other protective order exists with respect to a minor without other disability, the court has all those powers over the estate and affairs of the minor which are or might be necessary for the best interests of the minor, the minor’s family, and members of the minor’s household.
    3. After hearing and upon determining that appointment of a conservator or other protective order is appropriate with respect to a person for reasons other than minority, the court has, for the benefit of the person and members of the person’s household, all the powers over the person’s estate and affairs which the person could exercise if present and not under disability, except the power to make a will. These powers include power to make gifts, to convey or release the person’s contingent and expectant interests in property, including marital property rights and any right of survivorship incident to joint tenancy, to exercise or release the person’s powers as trustee, personal representative, custodian for minors, conservator, or donee of a power of appointment, to enter into contracts, to create revocable or irrevocable trusts of property of the estate which may extend beyond the person’s disability or life, to exercise options of the disabled person to purchase securities or other property, to exercise the person’s rights to elect options and change beneficiaries under insurance and annuity policies and to surrender the policies for their cash value, to exercise the person’s right to an elective share in the estate of the person’s deceased spouse, and to renounce any interest by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transfer.
    4. The court may exercise or direct the exercise of its authority to exercise or release powers of appointment of which the protected person is donee, to renounce interests, to make gifts in trust or otherwise exceeding twenty percent of any year’s income of the estate, or to change beneficiaries under insurance and annuity policies, only if satisfied, after notice and hearing, that it is in the best interests of the protected person, and that the protected person either is incapable of consenting or has consented to the proposed exercise of power.
    5. An order made pursuant to this section determining that appointment of a conservator or other protective order is appropriate has no effect on the capacity of the protected person.
  3. Unless terminated earlier by the court, an order appointing or reappointing a conservator under this section is effective for up to five years. At least ninety days before the expiration of the initial order of appointment or any following order of reappointment, the court shall request and consider information submitted by the conservator, the protected person, the protected person’s attorney, if any, and any interested persons regarding whether the need for a conservator continues to exist. If it is recommended the conservatorship continue, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem in accordance with section 30.1-29-07. The court shall hold a hearing on whether the conservatorship should continue. Following the hearing and consideration of submitted information, the court may reappoint the conservator for up to another five years, allow the existing order to expire, or appoint a new conservator in accordance with this section. The supreme court, by rule or order, shall provide for regular review of conservatorships in existence on August 1, 2017.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1983, ch. 313, § 11; 2017, ch. 230, § 9, effective August 1, 2017.

Notes to Decisions

Charitable Trust.

Where questionable circumstances surrounded charitable organizations in estate plan, the trial court could not be faulted for approving a legal form for the charitable foundation that imposed a higher, fiduciary role upon management. Oliver v. Braaten (In re Sickles), 518 N.W.2d 673, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 130 (N.D. 1994).

Full and General Conservatorship.
—Not Warranted.

In view of evidence that an individual’s financial affairs were currently in order and partially controlled through her living arrangement with a vocational adjustment workshop, the trial court erred in imposing a full and general conservatorship. In re Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 136 (N.D. 1993).

Scope of Authority.

This section gives the supervising court and the conservator similar authority regarding a protected person’s real property. In re Conservatorship of Kinney, 495 N.W.2d 69, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1993).

Trial court’s formal order stating “(Testator) shall redraft any recently executed last will and testament” did not invalidate a subsequent will or violate subsection (2)(c) given that the will was in writing, was signed by the testator, and was signed by two witnesses. Furthermore, the attorney who prepared the will did so as the testator’s attorney in accordance with testator’s stated wishes with an independent attorney serving as an impartial observer over testator’s execution of the will, and no evidence existed that the court, testator’s attorney, or the independent attorney forced testator to sign the subsequent will. Bartusch v. Hager (In re Estate of Dion), 2001 ND 53, 623 N.W.2d 720, 2001 N.D. LEXIS 63 (N.D. 2001).

A court and conservator are not empowered to effectively defeat a protected person’s estate plan and intentions set forth in a valid will through the creation of a revocable living trust that depletes the estate that would have otherwise passed to intended beneficiaries. Oliver v. Braaten (In re Sickles), 518 N.W.2d 673, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 130 (N.D. 1994).

Appointment of a neutral conservator with limitations was proper for an elderly protected person with a large estate, cognitive decline, developing dementia, and two daughters in disagreement about the management of the estate; further, the daughter who initiated the conservatorship proceeding in good faith was properly awarded attorney fees from the estate. E.P. v. T.K. (In re Conservatorship of T.K.), 2009 ND 195, 775 N.W.2d 496, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 205 (N.D. 2009).

District court erred in authorizing a limited conservator to assign a father's potential legal claims because it was not clear whether the district court authorized the conservator to assign the legal claims or whether it authorized the conservator to delegate its power to investigate and pursue the claims; it was also not clear what the district court meant by the language stating that the claims were assigned to the children in “equal shares.” P.M. v. V.A.M. (In re Estate of V.A.M.), 2015 ND 247, 870 N.W.2d 201, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 267 (N.D. 2015).

Standard of Review.

A trial court’s findings concerning competency are questions of fact which will not be overturned on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Bo, 365 N.W.2d 847, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 286 (N.D. 1985).

Because a supervising court and a conservator have similar discretionary authority regarding a protected person’s estate, and a supervising court’s decision regarding that property is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard, a county court’s decision authorizing a conservator to sell a protected person’s homestead was reviewed under that standard. In re Conservatorship of Kinney, 495 N.W.2d 69, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1993).

Collateral References.

Confirm sale of ward’s property over objection of guardian, power of court to, 43 A.L.R.2d 1445.

Noncharitable gifts or allowances out of funds of incompetent ward, power of court or guardian to make, 24 A.L.R.3d 863.

Obligations or expenditures: right of guardian or committee of incompetent to incur obligations so as to bind incompetent or his estate, or to make expenditures, without approval by court, 63 A.L.R.3d 780.

30.1-29-09. (5-409) Protective arrangements and single transactions authorized.

  1. If it is established in a proper proceeding that a basis exists, as described in section 30.1-29-01, for affecting the property and affairs of a person, the court, without appointing a conservator, may authorize, direct, or ratify any transaction necessary or desirable to achieve any security, service, or care arrangement meeting the foreseeable needs of the protected person. Protective arrangements include payment, delivery, deposit, or retention of funds or property, sale, mortgage, lease, or other transfer of property, entry into an annuity contract, a contract for life care, a deposit contract, a contract for training and education, or addition to or establishment of a suitable trust.
  2. When it has been established in a proper proceeding that a basis exists, as described in section 30.1-29-01, for affecting the property and affairs of a person, the court, without appointing a conservator, may authorize, direct, or ratify any contract, trust, or other transaction relating to the protected person’s financial affairs or involving the protected person’s estate if the court determines that the transaction is in the best interests of the protected person.
  3. Before approving a protective arrangement or other transaction under this section, the court shall consider the interests of creditors and dependents of the protected person and, in view of the protected person’s disability, whether the protected person needs the continuing protection of a conservator. The court may appoint a special conservator to assist in the accomplishment of any protective arrangement or other transaction authorized under this section who shall have the authority conferred by the order and serve until discharged by order, after report to the court of all matters done pursuant to the order of appointment.
  4. This section does not apply to a guardian or conservator.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2021, ch. 255, § 3, effective August 1, 2021.

30.1-29-10. (5-410) Who may be appointed conservator — Priorities.

  1. The court may appoint an individual, limited liability company, association, corporation, or other entity with general power to serve as trustee, as conservator of the estate of a protected person.
  2. Unless lack of qualification or other good cause dictates the contrary, the court shall appoint a conservator in accordance with the protected person’s most recent nomination in a durable power of attorney.
  3. Except as provided in subsection 2, persons who are not disqualified have priority for appointment as conservator in the following order:
    1. A conservator, guardian of property, or other like fiduciary appointed or recognized by the appropriate court of any other jurisdiction in which the protected person resides.
    2. An individual or corporation nominated by the protected person by other means than provided for in subsection 2 if the protected person is fourteen or more years of age and, in the opinion of the court, has sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice.
    3. The spouse of the protected person.
    4. An adult child of the protected person.
    5. A parent of the protected person, or a person nominated by the will of a deceased parent.
    6. Any relative of the protected person with whom the protected person has resided for more than six months prior to the filing of the petition.
    7. A person nominated by the person who is caring for or paying benefits to the protected person.
  4. A person denominated in subdivision a, c, d, e, or f of subsection 3 may nominate, in writing, a substitute to serve instead and thereby transfer the priority to the substitute. With respect to persons having equal priority, the court is to select the one who is best qualified of those willing to serve. The court, for good cause, may pass over a person having higher priority and appoint a person having lower priority or no priority.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1985, ch. 370, § 2; 1993, ch. 54, § 83.

Cross-References.

Public administrator as ex officio conservator, see § 11-21-05.

Notes to Decisions

Appointment Affirmed.

District court did not abuse its discretion in appointing nephew as his aunt’s guardian and conservator under N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-28-11(4), 30.1-29-10(4) because it found that the nephew had no ownership or beneficiary interest in his aunt’s estate, would not accept any of her assets, and would waive his right to compensation if appointed. The aunt’s friend was willing to waive his right to compensation as guardian and conservator but was not willing to waive his right to take under the estate. Kolrud v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 2006 ND 219, 723 N.W.2d 384, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 221 (N.D. 2006).

Where an elderly protected person had a large estate, cognitive decline, developing dementia, and two daughters in disagreement about the management of the estate, there was good cause to appoint a neutral conservator with limitations rather than the caretaker daughter who was the most recent nomination in the protected person’s durable power of attorney because that daughter did not have the financial qualifications to manage the estate. E.P. v. T.K. (In re Conservatorship of T.K.), 2009 ND 195, 775 N.W.2d 496, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 205 (N.D. 2009).

District court did not err in not appointing a nephew as the conservator and guardian of his uncle because, while the court's written findings did not explain its reasons, the oral findings were adequate to understand that family conflict was the reason for the court's finding of good cause not to appoint the nephew as conservator and guardian. C.G. v. K.P. (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of R.G.), 2016 ND 96, 879 N.W.2d 416, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2016).

Undue Influence.

Although the respondent reposed great confidence in her pastor and another friend, the court had good cause to pass over both and appoint the county public administrator as her conservator, in the interest of avoiding any possible undue influence. In re Conservatorship of Gessler, 419 N.W.2d 541, 1988 N.D. App. LEXIS 1 (N.D. Ct. App. 1988).

Collateral References.

Right of infant to select own guardian, 85 A.L.R.2d 921.

Next of kin: who is minor’s next of kin for guardianship purposes, 63 A.L.R.3d 813.

Priority and preference in appointment of conservator or guardian for an incompetent, 65 A.L.R.3d 991.

30.1-29-11. (5-411) Bond.

Except as provided herein, the court shall require a conservator to furnish a bond conditioned upon faithful discharge of all duties of the trust according to law, with sureties as it shall specify. Unless reduced or waived by the court for good cause, the bond shall be in the amount of the aggregate capital value of the property of the estate in the conservator’s control plus one year’s estimated income, including veterans’ administration benefits received during that year, minus the value of securities deposited under arrangements requiring an order of the court for their removal and the value of any land which the fiduciary, by express limitation of power, lacks power to sell or convey without court authorization. In lieu of sureties on a bond the court may accept other security for the performance of the bond, including a pledge of securities or a mortgage of land.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 190, § 13.

30.1-29-12. (5-412) Terms and requirements of bonds.

  1. The following requirements and provisions apply to any bond required under section 30.1-29-11:
    1. Unless otherwise provided by the terms of the approved bond, sureties are jointly and severally liable with the conservator and with each other.
    2. By executing an approved bond of a conservator, the surety consents to the jurisdiction of the court which issued letters to the primary obligor in any proceeding pertaining to the fiduciary duties of the conservator and naming the surety as a party defendant. Notice of any proceeding shall be delivered to the surety or mailed to the surety by registered or certified mail at the surety’s address as listed with the court where the bond is filed and to the surety’s address as then known to the petitioner.
    3. On petition of a successor conservator or any interested person, a proceeding may be initiated against a surety for breach of the obligation of the bond of the conservator.
    4. The bond of the conservator is not void after the first recovery but may be proceeded against from time to time until the whole penalty is exhausted.
  2. No proceeding may be commenced against the surety on any matter as to which an action or proceeding against the primary obligor is barred by adjudication or limitation.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-29-13. (5-413) Acceptance of appointment — Consent to jurisdiction.

By accepting appointment, a conservator submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding, relating to the estate, that may be instituted by any interested person. Notice of any proceeding shall be delivered to the conservator, or mailed to the conservator by registered or certified mail at the conservator’s address as listed in the petition for appointment or as thereafter reported to the court and to the conservator’s address as then known to the petitioner.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-29-14. (5-414) Compensation and expense.

  1. When the estate is derived, in whole or in part, from money paid or being paid by the veterans’ administration to the conservator or the conservator’s predecessor for the benefit of the protected person, the compensation allowed from such money to the conservator shall be limited to five percent of the amount of money received from the agency during the period covered by the account, except that the court may allow a minimum compensation of not to exceed fifty dollars per year. No commission or compensation will be allowed for receipt of moneys or other assets received from a prior fiduciary nor upon the amount received from liquidation of loans or other investments.
  2. If not otherwise compensated for services rendered, any lawyer, expert examiner, conservator, or special conservator appointed in a protective proceeding is entitled to reasonable compensation from the estate.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1975, ch. 290, § 14; 2017, ch. 230, § 10, effective August 1, 2017.

Notes to Decisions

Additional Fees.

To the extent the funds have already been subjected to the full five percent statutory maximum fee, there may be no additional fees charged as a percentage of the corpus. In re Conservatorship of Estate of Vaksvik, 458 N.W.2d 339, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1990).

Fees Subject to Limitation.

The relevant inquiry in determining whether a particular charge violates the statute’s five percent limitation from veterans’ administration funds is whether the fee will be derived from funds paid by the veterans’ administration. In re Conservatorship of Estate of Vaksvik, 458 N.W.2d 339, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1990).

Flat Fees.

The statutory scheme does not allow flat fees which have no actual correlation to the service rendered to the particular estate. In re Conservatorship of Estate of Vaksvik, 458 N.W.2d 339, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1990).

Investment Income.

Where the fees charged against investment income do not come directly from veterans’ administration funds paid to the veteran’s estate, but rather from the investment income itself, they are not subject to the five percent limitation of subsection 1, though they do, of course, remain subject to the reasonableness requirement of subsection 2. In re Conservatorship of Estate of Vaksvik, 458 N.W.2d 339, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1990).

No Abuse of Discretion.

Patient or his estate was properly ordered to pay expenses arising from the appointment of a guardian/conservator because the guardian/conservator was entitled to reasonable compensation for services under N.D.C.C. 30.1-28-12 and N.D.C.C. 30.1-29-14. The trial court had the discretion to determine the amount of reasonable compensation, the record did not show that the trial court misapplied the law in ordering the payment of expenses, and the trial court’s decision was not arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable. C.V. v. Gurardian and Protective Servs. (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of G.L.), 2011 ND 10, 793 N.W.2d 192, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 6 (N.D. 2011).

Reasonableness.

Any conservator’s fees charged against conservatee’s funds, while limited by the five percent statutory maximum, are still subject to the reasonableness requirement of subsection 2. In re Conservatorship of Estate of Vaksvik, 458 N.W.2d 339, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1990).

Subsection 2 will be construed as a general provision, allowing conservators in all cases reasonable compensation for services rendered to the estate. In re Conservatorship of Estate of Vaksvik, 458 N.W.2d 339, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1990).

The bank is to be permitted reasonable fees to administer the estates up to a maximum of five percent of the moneys received from the veterans administration, and the bank may also be allowed a percentage of investment income as its fee for producing such income, subject to the reasonableness requirement of subsection 2. In re Conservatorship of Estate of Vaksvik, 458 N.W.2d 339, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1990).

Upfront Fee of Five Percent.

It is not a statutory violation for a bank to initially charge an upfront fee of five percent of each conservatee’s veterans’ administration benefits as they are received each month by the bank, and the statute expressly allows fees up to a maximum of five percent of veterans administration benefits paid. In re Conservatorship of Estate of Vaksvik, 458 N.W.2d 339, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 133 (N.D. 1990).

Collateral References.

Fiduciary’s compensation on estate assets distributed in kind, 32 A.L.R.2d 778.

Amount of attorney’s compensation in matters involving guardianship and trusts, 57 A.L.R.3d 550.

30.1-29-15. (5-415) Death, resignation, or removal of conservator.

The court may remove a conservator for good cause, upon notice and hearing, or accept the resignation of a conservator. After a conservator’s death, resignation, or removal, the court may appoint another conservator. A conservator so appointed succeeds to the title and powers of the predecessor.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-29-16. (5-416) Petitions for orders subsequent to appointment.

  1. Any person interested in the welfare of a person for whom a conservator has been appointed may file a petition in the appointing court for an order:
    1. Requiring bond or security or additional bond or security, or reducing bond;
    2. Requiring an accounting for the administration of the trust;
    3. Directing distribution;
    4. Removing the conservator and appointing a temporary or successor conservator; or
    5. Granting other appropriate relief.
  2. A conservator may petition the appointing court for instructions concerning the conservator’s fiduciary responsibility.
  3. Upon notice and hearing, the court may give appropriate instructions or make any appropriate order.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-29-17. (5-417) General duty of conservator.

In the exercise of conservator’s powers, a conservator is to act as a fiduciary and shall observe the standards of care applicable to trustees.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2007, ch. 549, § 8.

Notes to Decisions

Preservation of Estate Plan.

In dealing with a protected person’s estate, the preservation of a known estate plan is a permissible consideration for a conservator and a supervising court. In re Conservatorship of Kinney, 495 N.W.2d 69, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1993).

30.1-29-18. (5-418) Inventory and records.

Within ninety days after appointment, every conservator shall prepare and file with the appointing court a complete inventory of the estate of the protected person together with the conservator’s oath or affirmation that it is complete and accurate so far as the conservator is informed. The conservator shall provide a copy thereof to the protected person if the protected person can be located, has attained the age of fourteen years, and has sufficient mental capacity to understand these matters, and to any parent or guardian with whom the protected person resides. The conservator shall keep suitable records of the conservator’s administration and exhibit the same on request of any interested person.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-29-19. (5-419) Annual reports and accounts.

  1. At least once annually and at other times as the court may direct, a conservator shall file a report and account with the court regarding the exercise of powers and duties specified in the court’s order of appointment. The report must describe any expenditure and income affecting the protected person, any sale or transfer of property affecting the protected person, and any exercise of authority by the conservator affecting the protected person.
  2. On termination of the protected person’s minority or disability, a conservator shall file a final report and accounting and provide a copy of the report or accounting to the protected person. The report or accounting must be filed with the clerk of district court. The filing of the report or accounting does not constitute the court’s approval of the report or accounting. The court may approve a report and settle and allow an accounting only upon notice to the protected person and other interested persons who have made an appearance or requested notice of proceedings. Subject to appeal or vacation within the time permitted, an order, made upon notice and hearing, allowing an intermediate account of a conservator, adjudicates as to liabilities concerning the matters considered in connection therewith. An order, made upon notice and hearing, allowing a final account adjudicates as to all previously unsettled liabilities of the conservator to the protected person or the protected person’s successors relating to the conservatorship. In connection with any account, the court may require a conservator to submit to a physical check of the estate in the conservator’s control, to be made in any manner the court may specify. The office of the state court administrator shall provide printed forms that may be used to fulfill reporting requirements. Any report must be similar in substance to the state court administrator’s form. The forms must be available in the office of clerk of district court or obtainable through the supreme court’s internet website.
  3. Copies of the conservator’s annual report to the court and of any other reports required by the court must be mailed by the conservator to the protected person and any interested persons designated by the court in its order. The protected person’s copy must be accompanied by a statement, printed with not less than double-spaced twelve-point type, of the protected person’s right to seek alteration, limitation, or termination of the conservatorship at any time.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1989, ch. 401, § 10; 2005, ch. 291, § 4; 2017, ch. 230, § 11, effective August 1, 2017.

Notes to Decisions

Accurate Accounting Required.

Trial court abused its discretion in concluding there was no reason to require a more accurate accounting of the conservatorship where the court noted the final accounting was not complete and a number of deposits and withdrawals had been made without adequate explanations; as conservator of her husband’s estate, wife had an affirmative statutory duty to make a full and accurate accounting to the court, and a fiduciary duty to act in good faith to her husband and to others who may be interested in his estate. Deibler v. Stensland (In re Stensland), 526 N.W.2d 485, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 6 (N.D. 1995).

30.1-29-20. (5-420) Conservators — Title by appointment.

The appointment of a conservator vests in the conservator title as trustee to all property of the protected person, presently held or thereafter acquired, including title to any property theretofore held for the protected person by custodians or attorneys in fact, or to the part thereof specified in the order. An order specifying that only a part of the property of the protected person vests in the conservator creates a limited conservatorship. The appointment of a conservator is not a transfer or alienation within the meaning of general provisions of any federal or state statute or regulation, insurance policy, pension plan, contract, will, or trust instrument imposing restrictions upon or penalties for transfer or alienation by the protected person of the protected person’s rights or interest, but this section does not restrict the ability of persons to make specific provision by contract or dispositive instrument relating to a conservator.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1983, ch. 313, § 12.

Notes to Decisions

Capacity to Contract.

Heir had the capacity to sign the quitclaim deed and transfer his interest in the residence because the conservatorship statutes did not limit a protected person from engaging in transactions and a protected person was presumed to have capacity to contract with third persons. Giese v. Gleeson (In re Estate of Gleeson), 2002 ND 211, 655 N.W.2d 69, 2002 N.D. LEXIS 276 (N.D. 2002).

Law Reviews.

North Dakota Supreme Court Review, 78 N.D. L. Rev. 579 (2002).

30.1-29-21. (5-421) Recording of conservator’s letters.

Letters of conservatorship are evidence of transfer of all assets, or the part thereof specified in the letters, of a protected person to the conservator. An order terminating a conservatorship is evidence of transfer of all assets of the estate subjected to the conservatorship from the conservator to the protected person or the protected person’s successors. Subject to the requirements of general statutes governing the filing or recordation of documents of title to land or other property, letters of conservatorship, and orders terminating conservatorships, may be filed or recorded to give record notice of title as between the conservator and the protected person.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1983, ch. 313, § 13.

30.1-29-22. (5-422) Sale, encumbrance, or transaction involving conflict of interest — Voidable exceptions.

Any sale or encumbrance to a conservator, the conservator’s spouse, agent, or attorney, or any corporation, limited liability company, or trust in which the conservator has a substantial beneficial interest, or any transaction which is affected by a substantial conflict of interest is voidable unless the transaction is approved by the court, after notice to interested persons and others as directed by the court.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 54, § 106.

Notes to Decisions

Particular Cases.

Where conservator sold land to her son without having the land appraised, despite advice to get an appraisal before entering into a contract, for an amount which was less than 50% of the appraised value; and where son’s annual payment under the contract was substantially less than the annual rental income the conservatorship could have received if the land had been rented; and where conservator completed the sale without the approval of all of the intended beneficiaries under ward’s will, the sale was voidable under this section. Kopperud v. Reilly, 453 N.W.2d 598, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 76 (N.D. 1990).

Sale of Estate Property to Relative.

County court had authority to resolve the issue of whether conservator acted with a substantial conflict of interest in authorizing sale of farmland belonging to the estate to her son so as to determine if rescission of the contract was necessary. Kopperud v. Reilly, 453 N.W.2d 598, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 76 (N.D. 1990).

30.1-29-23. (5-423) Persons dealing with conservators — Protection.

A person who in good faith either assists a conservator or deals with the conservator for value in any transaction other than those requiring a court order as provided in section 30.1-29-08 is protected as if the conservator properly exercised the power. The fact that a person knowingly deals with a conservator does not alone require the person to inquire into the existence of a power or the propriety of its exercise, except that restrictions on powers of conservators which are endorsed on letters as provided in section 30.1-29-26 are effective as to third persons. A person is not bound to see to the proper application of estate assets paid or delivered to a conservator. The protection here expressed extends to instances in which some procedural irregularity or jurisdictional defect occurred in proceedings leading to the issuance of letters. The protection here expressed is not by substitution for that provided by comparable provisions of the laws relating to commercial transactions and laws simplifying transfers of securities by fiduciaries.

Source: S. L 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Applicability.

It was error to dismiss a lessee’s breach of contract claims against a sublessee based on the statutory protection for persons dealing with conservators, when the sublessee had a separate lease with the lessor’s conservator, because the lessee’s lease with the sublessee was not a transaction with a conservator. Swenson v. Mahlum, 2019 ND 144, 927 N.W.2d 850, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 136 (N.D. 2019).

30.1-29-24. (5-424) Powers of conservator in administration.

  1. A conservator has all of the powers conferred herein and any additional powers conferred by law on trustees in this state. In addition, a conservator of the estate of an unmarried minor, as to whom no one has parental rights, has the duties and powers of a guardian of a minor described in section 30.1-27-09 until the minor marries, but the parental rights so conferred on a conservator do not preclude appointment of a guardian as provided by chapter 30.1-27.
  2. A conservator has power, without court authorization or confirmation, to invest and reinvest funds of the estate as would a trustee.
  3. A conservator, acting reasonably in efforts to accomplish the purpose for which the conservator was appointed, may act without court authorization or confirmation, to:
    1. Collect, hold, and retain assets of the estate, including land in another state, until, in the conservator’s judgment, disposition of the assets should be made, and the assets may be retained even though they include an asset in which the conservator is personally interested.
    2. Receive additions to the estate.
    3. Continue or participate in the operation of any business or other enterprise.
    4. Acquire an undivided interest in an estate asset in which the conservator, in any fiduciary capacity, holds an undivided interest.
    5. Invest and reinvest estate assets in accordance with subsection 2.
    6. Deposit estate funds in a bank, including a bank operated by the conservator.
    7. Acquire or dispose of an estate asset, including land in another state for cash or on credit, at public or private sale, and to manage, develop, improve, exchange, partition, change the character of, or abandon an estate asset.
    8. Make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or alterations in buildings or other structures, demolish any improvements, and raze existing or erect new party walls or buildings.
    9. Subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to public use, to make or obtain the vacation of plats and adjust boundaries, to adjust differences in valuation on exchange or to partition by giving or receiving considerations, and to dedicate easements to public use without consideration.
    10. Enter for any purpose into a lease as lessor or lessee with or without option to purchase or renew for a term within or extending beyond the term of the conservatorship.
    11. Enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration and removal of minerals or other natural resources or enter into a pooling or unitization agreement.
    12. Grant an option involving disposition of an estate asset, to take an option for the acquisition of any asset.
    13. Vote a security, in person or by general or limited proxy.
    14. Pay calls, assessments, and any other sums chargeable or accruing against or on account of securities.
    15. Sell or exercise stock or membership interest, subscription or conversion rights, to consent, directly or through a committee or other agent, to the reorganization, consolidation, merger, dissolution, or liquidation of a corporation, limited liability company, or other business enterprise.
    16. Hold a security in the name of a nominee or in other form without disclosure of the conservatorship so that title to the security may pass by delivery, but the conservator is liable for any act of the nominee in connection with the stock so held.
    17. Insure the assets of the estate against damage or loss, and the conservator against liability with respect to third persons.
    18. Borrow money to be repaid from estate assets or otherwise, to advance money for the protection of the estate or the protected person, and for all expenses, losses, and liability sustained in the administration of the estate or because of the holding or ownership of any estate assets and the conservator has a lien on the estate as against the protected person for advances so made.
    19. Pay or contest any claim, to settle a claim by or against the estate or the protected person by compromise, arbitration, or otherwise, and to release, in whole or in part, any claim belonging to the estate to the extent that the claim is uncollectible.
    20. Pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the conservator, and other expenses incurred in the collection, care, administration, and protection of the estate.
    21. Allocate items of income or expense to either estate income or principal, as provided by law, including creation of reserves out of income for depreciation, obsolescence, or amortization, or for depletion in mineral or timber properties.
    22. Pay any sum distributable to a protected person or the protected person’s dependent without liability to the conservator, by paying the sum to the distributee or by paying the sum for the use of the distributee either to the distributee’s guardian or, if none, to a relative or other person with custody of the distributee’s person.
    23. Employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisers, or agents, even though they are associated with the conservator, to advise or assist the conservator in the performance of the conservator’s administrative duties, to act upon their recommendation without independent investigation, and instead of acting personally, to employ one or more agents to perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary.
    24. Prosecute or defend actions, claims, or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the protection of estate assets and of the conservator in the performance of the conservator’s duties.
    25. Execute and deliver all instruments which will accomplish or facilitate the exercise of the powers vested in the conservator.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1993, ch. 54, § 106.

Cross-References.

Powers of trustees, see N.D.C.C. ch. 59-16.

Notes to Decisions

Attorney Fees.

Because a petitioner for removal of existing guardians failed to demonstrate that additional fees were authorized by statute or by the parties’ agreement, a district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award additional attorney’s fees to her, and because there was statutory support for paying attorney’s fees of guardians and conservators under N.D.C.C. §§ 30.1-28-03(9), 30.1-29-24(3)(w), (x) and the petitioner failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in awarding fees to the guardians and conservator, the district court’s fee awards were affirmed. E.O. v. M.O. (In re D.M.O.), 2008 ND 100, 749 N.W.2d 517, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 101 (N.D. 2008).

Awareness of Power.

Decision denying a claim to an estate was reversed because, although a conservator had broad discretion to act on behalf of a decedent, the record did not show if money stolen from a certificate of deposit (COD) that was in a payable on death account was put in a guardianship account after it was returned due to necessity and insufficient alternative funds under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-12; also, several beneficiaries had no present interest in the COD as a payable on death account. Moreover, there was nothing to show whether a conservator was aware that the money had been in payable on death account as part of an estate plan or whether the conservator even knew that he had the power to return the funds to the pre-theft state. Thus, remand was necessary for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the conservator properly exercised its powers under N.D.C.C. ch. 30.1-29. Allmaras v. Manly (In re Estate of Allmaras), 2007 ND 130, 737 N.W.2d 612, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 137 (N.D. 2007).

Leases.

Contractual restriction of a conservator’s discretionary power to enter into a lease was void as against public policy, where such contract was entered by the conservator prior to its appointment and was not disclosed to the court or to some of the interested parties. Thompson v. First Nat'l Bank, 269 N.W.2d 763, 1978 N.D. LEXIS 162 (N.D. 1978).

Sale of Real Property.

Subject to the conservator’s fiduciary responsibilities and the prudent person standard of care in dealing with the protected person’s estate, a conservator has discretionary authority to sell the protected person’s real property without court approval. In re Conservatorship of Kinney, 495 N.W.2d 69, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1993).

Collateral References.

Judicial sale by guardian, estoppel of or waiver by parties or participants regarding irregularities or defects in, 2 A.L.R.2d 6, 78.

Insurance: power of guardian of incompetent to change beneficiaries in ward’s life insurance policy, 21 A.L.R.2d 1191.

Torts: liability of incompetent’s estate for torts committed by guardian, committee, or trustee in managing estate, 40 A.L.R.2d 1103.

Guardian’s authority to make agreement to drop or compromise will contest or withdraw objections to probate, 42 A.L.R.2d 1319, 1365.

Power of court to confirm sale of ward’s property over objection of guardian, 43 A.L.R.2d 1445.

Debts: power of guardian, committee, or trustee of mental incompetent, after latter’s death, to pay debts and obligations, 60 A.L.R.2d 963.

Bank deposits: rights and powers of guardian with reference to joint bank deposit in name of incompetent and another, 62 A.L.R.2d 1091, 1100.

Attorney-client privilege: waiver of privilege by personal representative or heir of deceased client or by guardian of incompetent, 67 A.L.R.2d 1268.

Interest on ward’s funds, guardian’s liability for, 72 A.L.R.2d 757.

Capacity of guardian to sue or be sued outside state where appointed, 94 A.L.R.2d 162.

Charitable gifts from estate of incompetent, power to make, 99 A.L.R.2d 946.

Election for incompetent to take under or against will, factors considered in making, 3 A.L.R.3d 6.

Time within which election must be made for incompetent to take under or against will, 3 A.L.R.3d 119.

Election for incompetent to take under or against will, who may make election for, 21 A.L.R.3d 320.

Noncharitable gifts or allowances out of funds of incompetent ward, power of court or guardian to make, 24 A.L.R.3d 863.

Obligations or expenditures: right of guardian or committee of incompetent to incur obligations so as to bind incompetent or his estate, or to make expenditures, without approval by court, 63 A.L.R.3d 780.

Ademption or revocation of specific devise or bequest by guardian, committee, conservator, or trustee of mentally or physically incompetent testator, 84 A.L.R.4th 462.

Propriety of surgically invading incompetent or minor for benefit of third party, 4 A.L.R.5th 1000.

Power of incompetent spouse’s guardian or representative to sue for granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of marriage, or to make compromise or settlement in such suit. 32 A.L.R.5th 673.

Law Reviews.

North Dakota Supreme Court Review, 78 N.D. L. Rev. 579 (2002).

30.1-29-25. (5-425) Distributive duties and powers of conservator.

  1. A conservator may expend or distribute income or principal of the estate without court authorization or confirmation for the support, education, care, or benefit of the protected person and the protected person’s dependents in accordance with the following principles:
    1. The conservator is to consider recommendations relating to the appropriate standard of support, education, and benefit for the protected person made by a parent or guardian, if any. The conservator may not be surcharged for sums paid to persons or organizations actually furnishing support, education, or care to the protected person pursuant to the recommendations of a parent or guardian of the protected person unless the conservator knows that the parent or guardian is deriving personal financial benefit therefrom, including relief from any personal duty of support, or unless the recommendations are clearly not in the best interests of the protected person.
    2. The conservator is to expend or distribute sums reasonably necessary for the support, education, care, or benefit of the protected person with due regard to:
      1. The size of the estate, the probable duration of the conservatorship, and the likelihood that the protected person, at some future time, may be fully able to manage the protected person’s affairs and the estate which has been conserved for the protected person.
      2. The accustomed standard of living of the protected person and members of the protected person’s household.
      3. Other funds or sources used for the support of the protected person.
    3. The conservator may expend funds of the estate for the support of persons legally dependent on the protected person and others who are members of the protected person’s household, who are unable to support themselves, and who are in need of support.
    4. Funds expended under this subsection may be paid by the conservator to any person, including the protected person, to reimburse for expenditures that the conservator might have made, or in advance for services to be rendered to the protected person when it is reasonable to expect that they will be performed and advance payments are customary or reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
  2. If the estate is ample to provide for the purposes implicit in the distributions authorized by the preceding subsection, a conservator for a protected person other than a minor has power to make gifts to charity and other objects as the protected person might have been expected to make, in amounts which do not exceed in total for any year twenty percent of the income from the estate.
  3. When a minor who has not been adjudged disabled under subsection 2 of section 30.1-29-01 attains majority, the minor’s conservator, after meeting all prior claims and expenses of administration, shall pay over and distribute all funds and properties to the former protected person as soon as possible.
  4. When the conservator is satisfied that a protected person’s disability other than minority has ceased, the conservator, after meeting all prior claims and expenses of administration, shall pay over and distribute all funds and properties to the former protected person as soon as possible.
  5. If a protected person dies, the conservator shall deliver to the court for safekeeping any will of the deceased protected person which may have come into the conservator’s possession, inform the executor or a beneficiary named therein that the conservator has done so, and retain the estate for delivery to a duly appointed personal representative of the decedent or other persons entitled thereto. If after forty days from the death of the protected person no other person has been appointed personal representative and no application or petition for appointment is before the court, the conservator may apply to exercise the powers and duties of a personal representative so that the conservator may proceed to administer and distribute the decedent’s estate without additional or further appointment. Upon application for an order granting the powers of a personal representative to a conservator, after notice to any person demanding notice under section 30.1-13-04 and to any person nominated executor in any will of which the applicant is aware, the court may order the conferral of the power upon determining that there is no objection, and endorse the letters of the conservator to note that the formerly protected person is deceased and that the conservator has acquired all of the powers and duties of a personal representative. The making and entry of an order under this section shall have the effect of an order of appointment of a personal representative as provided in section 30.1-14-08 and chapters 30.1-17 through 30.1-21, except that estate in the name of the conservator, after administration, may be distributed to the decedent’s successors without prior retransfer to the conservator as personal representative.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Attorney Fees.

Attorney fees may be awarded for the good-faith initiation of a conservatorship proceeding when appointment of a conservator is determined to be in the best interest of the protected person. E.P. v. T.K. (In re Conservatorship of T.K.), 2009 ND 195, 775 N.W.2d 496, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 205 (N.D. 2009).

Daughter who initiated conservatorship proceedings in good faith for the daughter’s mother was entitled to attorney fees from the protected person’s estate after it was determined that the appointment of a neutral conservator with limitations was in the best interest of the protected person. E.P. v. T.K. (In re Conservatorship of T.K.), 2009 ND 195, 775 N.W.2d 496, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 205 (N.D. 2009).

Discretion of Court.

Where a county court’s decision to allow the conservator of an estate to sell the protected person’s automobile, homestead, and household goods was the product of a rational mental process by which the facts in the record and the applicable law were considered together to achieve a reasoned and reasonable determination, the court did not abuse its discretion. In re Conservatorship of Kinney, 495 N.W.2d 69, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1993).

Gifts.

Where the court determined that a protected person’s son had the ability to support his family and that the protected person’s estate was not large enough to provide for her future needs unless non-income producing assets were sold, subsection (2) of this section was not applicable. In re Conservatorship of Kinney, 495 N.W.2d 69, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1993).

Preservation of Estate Plan.

In dealing with a protected person’s estate, the preservation of a known estate plan is a permissible consideration for a conservator and a supervising court. In re Conservatorship of Kinney, 495 N.W.2d 69, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1993).

Decision denying a claim to an estate was reversed because, although a conservator had broad discretion to act on behalf of a decedent, the record did not show if money stolen from a certificate of deposit (COD) that was in a payable upon death account was put in a guardianship account after it was returned due to necessity and insufficient alternative funds under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-12; also, several beneficiaries had no present interest in the COD as a payable on death account. Moreover, there was nothing to show whether a conservator was aware that the money had been in payable on death account as part of an estate plan or whether the conservator even knew that he had the power to return the funds to the pre-theft state. Thus, remand was necessary for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the conservator properly exercised its powers under N.D.C.C. ch. 30.1–29. Allmaras v. Manly (In re Estate of Allmaras), 2007 ND 130, 737 N.W.2d 612, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 137 (N.D. 2007).

Test for Disbursement.

The rules relating to disbursement of a minor’s personal injury judgment create a two-prong test that the lower court must apply. First, the court must determine whether it is necessary to invade the award. If so, the court may, in its discretion, expend or distribute sums reasonably necessary for the support, education, care, or benefit of the protected person. Because the allocation of funds is related solely to the benefit of the child, the award does not transform into community property. Dahner v. Daner, 374 N.W.2d 604, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 411 (N.D. 1985).

Collateral References.

Interest on ward’s funds, guardian’s liability for, 72 A.L.R.2d 757.

Charitable gifts from estate of incompetent, power to make, 99 A.L.R.2d 946.

Noncharitable gifts or allowances out of funds of incompetent ward, power of court or guardian to make, 24 A.L.R.3d 863.

Obligations or expenditures: right of guardian or committee of incompetent to incur obligations so as to bind incompetent or his estate, or to make expenditures, without approval by court, 63 A.L.R.3d 780.

Ademption or revocation of specific devise or bequest by guardian, committee, conservator, or trustee of mentally or physically incompetent testator, 84 A.L.R.4th 462.

30.1-29-26. (5-426) Enlargement or limitation of powers of conservator.

Subject to the restrictions in subdivision d of subsection 2 of section 30.1-29-08, the court may confer on a conservator at the time of appointment or later, in addition to the powers conferred on the conservator by sections 30.1-29-24 and 30.1-29-25, any power which the court itself could exercise under subdivisions b and c of subsection 2 of section 30.1-29-08. The court may, at the time of appointment or later, limit the powers of a conservator otherwise conferred by sections 30.1-29-24 and 30.1-29-25, or previously conferred by the court, and may at any time relieve the conservator of any limitation. If the court limits any power conferred on the conservator by sections 30.1-29-24 and 30.1-29-25, the limitation shall be endorsed upon the conservator’s letters of appointment.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 1999, ch. 50, § 50.

Notes to Decisions

Judicial Limitation on Powers.

Even if an additional grant of power by the court to the conservator is read to have included the power to revoke the trust, the court may at any time limit a power previously conferred. In re Bo, 365 N.W.2d 847, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 286 (N.D. 1985).

30.1-29-27. (5-427) Preservation of estate plan.

In investing the estate, and in selecting assets of the estate for distribution under subsections 1 and 2 of section 30.1-29-25, in utilizing powers of revocation or withdrawal available for the support of the protected person, and exercisable by the conservator or the court, the conservator and the court should take into account any known estate plan of the protected person, including the protected person’s will, any revocable trust of which the protected person is settlor, and any contract, transfer, or joint ownership arrangement with provisions for payment or transfer of benefits or interests at the protected person’s death to another or others which the protected person may have originated. The conservator may examine the will of the protected person.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Consideration Not Shown.

Decision denying a claim to an estate was reversed because, although a conservator had broad discretion to act on behalf of a decedent, the record did not show if money stolen from a certificate of deposit (COD) that was in a payable on death account was put in a guardianship account after it was returned due to necessity and insufficient alternative funds under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-12; also, several beneficiaries had no present interest in the COD as a payable on death account. Moreover, there was nothing to show whether a conservator was aware that the money had been in payable on death account as part of an estate plan or whether the conservator even knew that he had the power to return the funds to the pre-theft state. Thus, remand was necessary for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the conservator properly exercised its powers under N.D.C.C. ch. 30.1-29. Allmaras v. Manly (In re Estate of Allmaras), 2007 ND 130, 737 N.W.2d 612, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 137 (N.D. 2007).

Discretion of Court.

Where a county court’s decision to allow the conservator of an estate to sell the protected person’s automobile, homestead, and household goods was the product of a rational mental process by which the facts in the record and the applicable law were considered together to achieve a reasoned and reasonable determination, the court did not abuse its discretion. In re Conservatorship of Kinney, 495 N.W.2d 69, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 7 (N.D. 1993).

30.1-29-28. (5-428) Claims against protected person — Enforcement.

  1. A conservator must pay from the estate all just claims against the estate and against the protected person arising before or after the conservatorship upon their presentation and allowance. A claim may be presented by either of the following methods:
    1. The claimant may deliver or mail to the conservator a written statement of the claim indicating its basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed.
    2. The claimant may file a written statement of the claim, in the form prescribed by rule, with the clerk of the court and deliver or mail a copy of the statement to the conservator.
  2. A claimant whose claim has not been paid may petition the court for determination of the claim at any time before it is barred by the applicable statute of limitation, and, upon due proof, procure an order for its allowance and payment from the estate. If a proceeding is pending against a protected person at the time of appointment of a conservator or is initiated against the protected person thereafter, the moving party must give notice of the proceeding to the conservator if the outcome is to constitute a claim against the estate.
  3. If it appears that the estate in conservatorship is likely to be exhausted before all existing claims are paid, preference is to be given to prior claims for the care, maintenance, and education of the protected person or the protected person’s dependents and existing claims for expenses of administration.

A claim is deemed presented on the first to occur of either receipt of the written statement of claim by the conservator, or the filing of the claim with the court. A presented claim is allowed if it is not disallowed by written statement mailed by the conservator to the claimant within sixty days after its presentation. The presentation of a claim tolls any statute of limitation relating to the claim until thirty days after its disallowance.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Obligations or expenditures: right of guardian or committee of incompetent to incur obligations so as to bind incompetent or his estate, or to make expenditures, without approval of court, 63 A.L.R.3d 780.

Power of incompetent spouse’s guardian or representative to sue for granting or vacation compromise or settlement in such suit, 32 A.L.R.5th 673.

30.1-29-29. (5-429) Individual liability of conservator.

  1. Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a conservator is not individually liable on a contract properly entered into in the conservator’s fiduciary capacity in the course of administration of the estate unless the conservator fails to reveal the conservator’s representative capacity and identify the estate in the contract.
  2. The conservator is individually liable for obligations arising from ownership or control of property of the estate or for torts committed in the course of administration of the estate only if the conservator is personally at fault.
  3. Claims based on contracts entered into by a conservator in the conservator’s fiduciary capacity, on obligations arising from ownership or control of the estate, or on torts committed in the course of administration of the estate, may be asserted against the estate by proceeding against the conservator in the conservator’s fiduciary capacity, whether or not the conservator is individually liable therefor.
  4. Any question of liability between the estate and the conservator individually may be determined in a proceeding for accounting, surcharge, or indemnification, or other appropriate proceeding or action.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

Collateral References.

Torts committed by guardian, committee, or trustee in managing estate, liability of incompetent’s estate for, 40 A.L.R.2d 1103.

Interest on ward’s funds, guardian’s liability for, 72 A.L.R.2d 757.

30.1-29-30. (5-430) Termination of proceeding.

The protected person, the protected person’s personal representative, the conservator, or any other interested person may petition the court to terminate the conservatorship. A protected person seeking termination is entitled to the same rights and procedures as in an original proceeding for a protective order. The court, upon determining, after notice and hearing, that the minority or disability of the protected person has ceased, may terminate the conservatorship. Upon termination, title to assets of the estate passes to the former protected person or to the protected person’s successors subject to provision in the order for expenses of administration or to conveyances from the conservator to the former protected person or the former protected person’s successors to evidence the transfer.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-29-31. (5-431) Payment of debt and delivery of property to foreign conservator without local proceedings.

Any person indebted to a protected person, or having possession of property or of an instrument evidencing a debt, stock, or chose in action belonging to a protected person may pay or deliver to a conservator, guardian of the estate, or other like fiduciary appointed by a court of the state of residence of the protected person, upon being presented with proof of the appointment and an affidavit made by the fiduciary or on the fiduciary’s behalf stating:

  1. That no protective proceeding relating to the protected person is pending in this state.
  2. That the foreign conservator is entitled to payment or to receive delivery.

If the person to whom the affidavit is presented is not aware of any protective proceeding pending in this state, payment or delivery in response to the demand and affidavit discharges the debtor or possessor.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1.

30.1-29-32. (5-432) Delivery to foreign conservator. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2009, ch. 278, § 2.

CHAPTER 30.1-30 Powers of Attorney [Repealed]

[Repealed by S.L. 1985, ch. 370, § 4]

CHAPTER 30.1-30 Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act

30.1-30-01. (5-501) Definition.

A durable power of attorney is a power of attorney by which a principal designates another as the principal’s attorney in fact in writing and the writing contains the words “This power of attorney is not affected by subsequent disability or incapacity of the principal or by lapse of time,” or “This power of attorney becomes effective upon the disability or incapacity of the principal,” or similar words showing the intent of the principal that the authority conferred is exercisable notwithstanding the principal’s subsequent disability or incapacity, and, unless it states a time of termination, notwithstanding the lapse of time since the execution of the instrument.

Source: S.L. 1985, ch. 370, § 3; 1989, ch. 401, § 11.

Cross-References.

Termination and creation of agency, see Chapter 3-01.

Notes to Decisions

Document Was Durable Power of Attorney.

Grantor’s power of attorney was a durable power of attorney because the document’s specific language provided that the powers granted to the named agents were not affected by the grantor’s becoming disabled, incompetent, or incapacitated or the lapse of time. The power of attorney stated it was the grantor’s intent that the authority conferred would be exercisable notwithstanding physical disability or mental incompetence. Alerus Fin., N.A. v. W. State Bank, 2008 ND 104, 750 N.W.2d 412, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 113 (N.D. 2008).

Comparative Legislation.

Jurisdictions which have enacted the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, which comprises §§ 5-501 to 5-505, inclusive, of the Uniform Probate Code, include:

Ala. Code § 26-1-2.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-5501, 14-5502.

Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2400 to 2407.

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-14-501, 15-14-502.

D.C. Code Ann. §§ 21-2081 to 21-2085.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 4901 to 4905.

Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 551D-1 to 551D-7.

Idaho Code §§ 15-5-501 to 15-5-507.

Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 58-610 to 58-617.

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 386.093.

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 201B, §§ 1 to 7.

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-501, 5-502.

Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 700.495, 700.497.

Minn. Stat. §§ 523.07, 523.08.

Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 404.700 to 404.735.

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 72-5-501, 72-5-502.

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-2664 to 30-2672.

N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-5-501, 45-5-502.

Okla. St. Ann. tit. 58, §§ 1071 to 1077.

Pa. Cons. Stat. tit. 20, §§ 5604 to 5606.

S.C. Law Ann. §§ 62-5-501 to 62-5-505.

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 34-6-101 to 34-6-107.

Texas, Probate Code, §§ 481 to 506.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5-501, 75-5-502.

Wis. Stat. § 243.07.

W. Va. Code §§ 39-4-1 to 39-4-7.

30.1-30-02. (5-502) Durable power of attorney not affected by disability or lapse of time.

All acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during any period of disability or incapacity of the principal have the same effect and inure to the benefit of and bind the principal and the principal’s successors in interest as if the principal were competent and not disabled. Unless the instrument states a time of termination, the power is exercisable notwithstanding the lapse of time since the execution of the instrument.

Source: S.L. 1985, ch. 370, § 3; 1989, ch. 401, § 12.

30.1-30-03. (5-503) Relation of attorney in fact to court-appointed fiduciary.

  1. If, following execution of a durable power of attorney, a court of the principal’s domicile appoints a conservator, guardian of the estate, or other fiduciary charged with the management of all of the principal’s property or all of the principal’s property except specified exclusions, the attorney in fact is accountable to the fiduciary as well as to the principal. The fiduciary has the same power to revoke or amend the power of attorney that the principal would have had if the principal were not disabled or incapacitated.
  2. A principal may nominate, by a durable power of attorney, the conservator, guardian of the principal’s estate, or guardian of the principal’s person for consideration by the court if protective proceedings for the principal’s person or estate are thereafter commenced. The court shall make its appointment in accordance with the principal’s most recent nomination in a durable power of attorney except for good cause or disqualification.

Source: S.L. 1985, ch. 370, § 3.

30.1-30-04. (5-504) Power of attorney not revoked until notice.

  1. The death of a principal who has executed a written power of attorney, durable or otherwise, does not revoke or terminate the agency as to the attorney in fact or other person, who, without actual knowledge of the death of the principal, acts in good faith under the power. Any action so taken, unless otherwise invalid or unenforceable, binds the principal’s successors in interest.
  2. The disability or incapacity of a principal who has previously executed a written power of attorney that is not a durable power does not revoke or terminate the agency as to the attorney in fact or other person, who, without actual knowledge of the disability or incapacity of the principal, acts in good faith under the power. Any action so taken, unless otherwise invalid or unenforceable, binds the principal and the principal’s successors in interest.

Source: S.L. 1985, ch. 370, § 3.

30.1-30-05. (5-505) Proof of continuance of durable and other powers of attorney by affidavit.

As to acts undertaken in good faith reliance thereon, an affidavit executed by the attorney in fact under a power of attorney, durable or otherwise, stating that the attorney in fact did not have at the time of exercise of the power actual knowledge of the termination of the power by revocation or of the principal’s death, disability, or incapacity is conclusive proof of the nonrevocation or nontermination of the power at that time. If the exercise of the power of attorney requires execution and delivery of any instrument that is recordable, the affidavit when authenticated for record is likewise recordable. This section does not affect any provision in a power of attorney for its termination by expiration of time or occurrence of an event other than express revocation or a change in the principal’s capacity.

Source: S.L. 1985, ch. 370, § 3.

30.1-30-06. Gifts under power of attorney.

If any power of attorney, durable or otherwise, or other writing authorizes an attorney in fact or other agent to perform any act that the principal might or could do or evidences the principal’s intent to give the attorney in fact or agent full power to handle the principal’s affairs or deal with the principal’s property, the attorney in fact or agent may make gifts. The gifts may be in any amount of any of the principal’s property to any individual or to an organization described in sections 170(c) and 2522(a) of the Internal Revenue Code or corresponding future provisions of federal tax law, or both. Notwithstanding this section, a principal, by express words in the power of attorney or other writing, may authorize, or limit the authority of, any attorney in fact or other agent to make gifts of the principal’s property. This section applies to a power of attorney executed before August 1, 1995, as well as a power of attorney executed after July 31, 1995.

Source: S.L. 1995, ch. 324, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Attorney-in-fact's Authority.

Minnesota power of attorney let an attorney-in-fact convey North Dakota realty to third parties without consideration because Minn. Stat. § 523.24, subd. 14, gave the attorney-in-fact broad authority to act as the principal's alter ego, and N.D.C.C. § 30.1-30-06 let the attorney-in-fact gift a principal's property, as there was no undue influence. Estate of Vizenor v. Brown, 2014 ND 143, 851 N.W.2d 119, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 2014).

Article VI Nonprobate Transfers

CHAPTER 30.1-31 Multiple-Party Accounts — Provisions Relating to Effect of Death [Repealed]

[Repealed by S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 4]

Note.

Section 4 of chapter 351, S.L. 1991, repealed former Chapter 30.1-31, entitled “Multiple-Party Accounts — Provisions Relating to Effect of Death.” Section 3 of chapter 351, S.L. 1991 enacted a new Chapter 30.1-31, which has been substituted in place of the former chapter.

CHAPTER 30.1-31 Nonprobate Transfers on Death

30.1-31-01. (6-101) Nonprobate transfers on death.

  1. A provision for a nonprobate transfer on death in an insurance policy, contract of employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, certificated or uncertificated security, account agreement, custodial agreement, deposit agreement, compensation plan, pension plan, individual retirement plan, employee benefit plan, trust, conveyance, deed of gift, marital property agreement, or other written instrument of a similar nature is nontestamentary. This subsection includes a written provision that:
    1. Money or other benefits due to, controlled by, or owned by a decedent before death must be paid after the decedent’s death to a person whom the decedent designates either in the instrument or in a separate writing, including a will, executed either before or at the same time as the instrument, or later;
    2. Money due or to become due under the instrument ceases to be payable in the event of death of the promisee or the promisor before payment or demand; or
    3. Any property controlled by or owned by the decedent before death which is the subject of the instrument passes to a person the decedent designates either in the instrument or in a separate writing, including a will, executed either before or at the same time as the instrument, or later.
  2. Subsection 1 does not limit rights of creditors under other laws of this state.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

Notes to Decisions

Conflict with Section 47-11-07.

As N.D.C.C. § 47-11-07 is a general provision dealing with all oral gifts, while this chapter contains specific provisions governing joint accounts and disposition of funds remaining on deposit at death, any conflict between N.D.C.C. § 47-11-07 and N.D.C.C. ch. 30.1-31 would be resolved in favor of the latter. In re Conservatorship of Milbrath, 508 N.W.2d 360 (N.D. 1993).

Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide simple non-probate alternatives for disposition of assets upon the death of one party to a multiple-party account. In re Conservatorship of Milbrath, 508 N.W.2d 360 (N.D. 1993).

Rights Fixed by Divorce Decree.

Where wife contracted to give up her rights as a survivor when she entered into the stipulation for division of property that was incorporated into the divorce decree, without a subsequent contract or a renewed designation, the divorce decree fixed all of husband’s rights to the accounts distributed to her husband. Ridley v. Metropolitan Fed. Bank FSB, 544 N.W.2d 867, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 67 (N.D. 1996).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Deeds.

Former N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-14, pertaining to payment or transfer at death, was not applicable to a deed that was void for failure of actual or constructive delivery. First Nat'l Bank v. Bloom, 264 N.W.2d 208, 1978 N.D. LEXIS 241 (N.D. 1978).

Determining Ownership.

Statute authorizing a bank to make payments to one or more joint depositors, whether the others were living or not, did not determine the ownership of the deposit. Fish v. Berzel, 101 N.W.2d 557 (N.D. 1960).

Omitted Spouse Statute.

Former N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-06, pertaining to accounts and transfers nontestamentary, which simply provided that validity of a joint account with right of survivorship was not to be determined by requirements for wills, did not preclude consideration of joint bank accounts and certificates of deposits as transfers for purposes of the omitted spouse statute, former § 30.1-06-01. In re Estate of Frandson, 356 N.W.2d 125, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 393 (N.D. 1984).

Collateral References.

Liability of bank to joint depositor for removal of name from account at request of other joint depositor, 39 A.L.R.4th 1112.

30.1-31-02. (6-201) Definitions.

As used in sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20:

  1. “Account” means a contract of deposit between a depositor and a financial institution, and includes a checking account, savings account, certificate of deposit, and share account.
  2. “Agent” means a person authorized to make account transactions for a party.
  3. “Beneficiary” means a person named as one to whom sums on deposit in an account are payable on request after death of all parties or for whom a party is named as trustee.
  4. “Financial institution” means an organization authorized to do business under state or federal laws relating to financial institutions, and includes a bank, trust company, savings bank, building and loan association, savings and loan association, and credit union.
  5. “Multiple-party account” means an account payable on request to one or more of two or more parties, whether or not a right of survivorship is mentioned.
  6. “Party” means a person who, by the terms of an account, has a present right, subject to request, to payment from the account other than as a beneficiary or agent.
  7. “Payment” of sums on deposit includes withdrawal, payment to a party or third person pursuant to check or other request, and a pledge of sums on deposit by a party, or a setoff, reduction, or other disposition of all or part of an account pursuant to a pledge.
  8. “P.O.D. designation” means the designation of:
    1. A beneficiary in an account payable on request to one party during the party’s lifetime and on the party’s death to one or more beneficiaries, or to one or more parties during their lifetimes and on death of all of them to one or more beneficiaries; or
    2. A beneficiary in an account in the name of one or more parties as trustee for one or more beneficiaries if the relationship is established by the terms of the account and there is no subject of the trust other than the sums on deposit in the account, whether or not payment to the beneficiary is mentioned.
  9. “Receive”, as it relates to notice to a financial institution, means receipt in the office or branch office of the financial institution in which the account is established, but if the terms of the account require notice at a particular place, in the place required.
  10. “Request” means a request for payment complying with all terms of the account, including special requirements concerning necessary signatures and regulations of the financial institution; but, for purposes of sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20, if terms of the account condition payment on advance notice, a request for payment is treated as immediately effective and a notice of intent to withdraw is treated as a request for payment.
  11. “Sums on deposit” means the balance payable on an account, including interest and dividends earned, whether or not included in the current balance, and any deposit life insurance proceeds added to the account by reason of death of a party.
  12. “Terms of the account” includes the deposit agreement and other terms and conditions, including the form, of the contract of deposit.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

Collateral References.

Manner and sufficiency of revocation of tentative (“Totten”) trust of savings bank account, 38 A.L.R.2d 1243.

Stop-payment order: payment of check drawn by one depositor after stop-payment order by a joint depositor, 55 A.L.R.2d 975.

Incompetency of joint depositor as affecting status and ownership of bank account, 62 A.L.R.2d 1091, 1100.

Fingerprints as signature on instrument purporting to create joint tenancy, 72 A.L.R.2d 1267, 1267.

Bank’s right to apply or set off deposit against debt of depositor not due at time of his death, 7 A.L.R.3d 908.

Bank’s right to apply third person’s funds, deposited in debtor’s name, on debtor’s obligation, 8 A.L.R.3d 235.

Gift to survivor, creation of joint savings account or savings certificate as, 43 A.L.R.3d 971.

Revocation of tentative (“Totten”) trusts of savings bank account by inter vivos declaration or will, 46 A.L.R.3d 487.

Inclusion of funds in savings bank trust (“Totten trust”) in determining surviving spouse’s interest in decedent’s estate, 64 A.L.R.3d 187.

Death of beneficiary as terminating or revoking trust of savings bank account over which settlor retains rights of withdrawal or revocation, 64 A.L.R.3d 221.

Setoff: post-Sniadach status of banker’s right to set off bank’s claim against depositor’s funds, 65 A.L.R.3d 1284.

Liability of bank to joint depositor of savings account for amounts withdrawn by other joint depositor without presentation of passbook, 35 A.L.R.4th 1094.

Liability of bank to joint depositor for removal of name from account at request of other joint depositor, 39 A.L.R.4th 1112.

Deeds: effect of Uniform Probate Code § 6-201, providing that certain instruments attempting to pass property at death shall be deemed nontestamentary, 81 A.L.R.4th 1122.

30.1-31-03. (6-202) Limitation on scope of sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20.

Sections 30.1-31-03 through 30.1-31-20 do not apply to:

  1. An account established for a partnership, joint venture, limited liability company, or other organization for a business purpose;
  2. An account controlled by one or more persons as an agent or trustee for a corporation, limited liability company, unincorporated association, or charitable or civic organization; or
  3. A fiduciary or trust account in which the relationship is established other than by the terms of the account.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3; 1993, ch. 54, § 106.

30.1-31-04. (6-203) Types of account — Existing accounts.

  1. An account may be for a single party or multiple parties. A multiple-party account may be with or without a right of survivorship between the parties. Subject to subsection 3 of section 30.1-31-09, either a single-party account or a multiple-party account may have a P.O.D. designation, an agency designation, or both.
  2. An account established before, on, or after the effective date of sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20, whether in the form prescribed in section 30.1-31-05 or in any other form, is either a single-party account or a multiple-party account, with or without right of survivorship, and with or without a P.O.D. designation or an agency designation, within the meaning of sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20, and is governed by sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

Notes to Decisions

Purpose of Section.

This section is not concerned with the validity of the creation of a joint account; rather, it is concerned solely with defining the type of interest created by a joint account. Gelking v. Boyeff (In re Estate of Dinnetz), 532 N.W.2d 672, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 104 (N.D. 1995).

Rights of Survivor.

Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the parties intended otherwise at the time the various accounts were opened, the funds pass by right of survivorship to survivor upon one party’s death. Thomas by & Through Schmidt v. Thomas (In re Estate of Thomas), 532 N.W.2d 676, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 1995).

30.1-31-05. (6-204) Forms.

  1. A contract of deposit that contains provisions in substantially the following form establishes the type of account provided, and the account is governed by the provisions of sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20 applicable to an account of that type:
  2. A contract of deposit that does not contain provisions in substantially the form provided in subsection 1 is governed by sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20 applicable to the type of account that most nearly conforms to the depositor’s intent.

UNIFORM SINGLE- OR MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNT FORM PARTIES [name one or more parties]: OWNERSHIP [select one and initial]: SINGLE-PARTY ACCOUNT MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNT Parties own account in proportion to net contributions unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent. RIGHTS AT DEATH [select one and initial]: SINGLE-PARTY ACCOUNT At death of party, ownership passes as part of party’s estate. SINGLE-PARTY ACCOUNT WITH P.O.D. (PAY ON DEATH) DESIGNATION [name one or more beneficiaries]: At death of party, ownership passes to P.O.D. beneficiaries and is not part of party’s estate. MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNT WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP At death of party, ownership passes to surviving parties. MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNT WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP AND P.O.D. (PAY ON DEATH) DESIGNATION [name one or more beneficiaries]: At death of last surviving party, ownership passes to P.O.D. beneficiaries and is not part of last surviving party’s estate. MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNT WITHOUT RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP At death of party, deceased party’s ownership passes as part of deceased party’s estate. AGENCY (POWER OF ATTORNEY) DESIGNATION [optional] Agents may make account transactions for parties but have no ownership or rights at death unless named as P.O.D. beneficiaries. [to add agency designation to account, name one or more agents]: [select one and initial]: AGENCY DESIGNATION SURVIVES DISABILITY OR INCAPACITY OF PARTIES AGENCY DESIGNATION TERMINATES ON DISABILITY OR INCAPACITY OF PARTIES

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Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-06. (6-205) Designation of agent.

  1. By a writing signed by all parties, the parties may designate as agent of all parties on an account a person other than a party.
  2. Unless the terms of an agency designation provide that the authority of the agent terminates on disability or incapacity of a party, the agent’s authority survives disability and incapacity. The agent may act for a disabled or incapacitated party until the authority of the agent is terminated.
  3. Death of the sole party or last surviving party terminates the authority of an agent.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-07. (6-206) Applicability of sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20.

The provisions of sections 30.1-31-08 through 30.1-31-13 concerning beneficial ownership as between parties or as between parties and beneficiaries apply only to controversies between those persons and their creditors and other successors, and do not apply to the right of those persons to payment as determined by the terms of the account. Sections 30.1-31-14 through 30.1-31-20 govern the liability and setoff rights of financial institutions that make payments pursuant to it.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-08. (6-211) Ownership during lifetime.

  1. In this section, “net contribution” of a party means the sum of all deposits to an account made by or for the party, less all payments from the account made to or for the party which have not been paid to or applied to the use of another party and a proportionate share of any charges deducted from the account, plus a proportionate share of any interest or dividends earned, whether or not included in the current balance. The term includes deposit life insurance proceeds added to the account by reason of death of the party whose net contribution is in question.
  2. During the lifetime of all parties, an account belongs to the parties in proportion to the net contribution of each to the sums on deposit, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent. As between parties married to each other, in the absence of proof otherwise, the net contribution of each is presumed to be an equal amount.
  3. A beneficiary in an account having a P.O.D. designation has no right to sums on deposit during the lifetime of any party.
  4. An agent in an account with an agency designation has no beneficial right to sums on deposit.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

Notes to Decisions

Award Upheld.

Estate was properly awarded funds from the husband’s checking account where the amount awarded was half of the amount in the joint farm account on the date of the wife’s death, and the husband had transferred the moneys in the joint farm account to a different account while the divorce was pending. In re Estate of Albrecht, 2020 ND 27, 938 N.W.2d 151, 2020 N.D. LEXIS 27 (N.D. 2020).

Standing.

District court properly dismissed a son’s complaint against his brother—for contempt of court and unjust enrichment—with prejudice because, while the son appeared to claim an interest in their deceased mother’s investment account as a beneficiary, he lacked standing where he never had a vested interest in the investment account, the summons and interim order were not entered for his protection, and, even assuming that he suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action, he was not asserting his own legal rights and interests, but rather his claims rested on the legal rights and interests of his father in the parents’ divorce action. Albrecht v. Albrecht, 2020 ND 105, 942 N.W.2d 875, 2020 N.D. LEXIS 96 (N.D. 2020).

30.1-31-09. (6-212) Rights at death.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, on death of a party sums on deposit in a multiple-party account belong to the surviving party or parties. If two or more parties survive and one is the surviving spouse of the decedent, the amount to which the decedent, immediately before death, was beneficially entitled under section 30.1-31-08 belongs to the surviving spouse. If two or more parties survive and none is the surviving spouse of the decedent, the amount to which the decedent, immediately before death, was beneficially entitled under section 30.1-31-08 belongs to the surviving parties in equal shares, and augments the proportion to which each survivor, immediately before the decedent’s death, was beneficially entitled under section 30.1-31-08, and the right of survivorship continues between the surviving parties.
  2. In an account with a P.O.D. designation:
    1. On death of one of two or more parties, the rights in sums on deposit are governed by subsection 1.
    2. On death of the sole party or the last survivor of two or more parties, sums on deposit belong to the surviving beneficiary or beneficiaries. If two or more beneficiaries survive, sums on deposit belong to them in equal and undivided shares, and there is no right of survivorship in the event of death of a beneficiary thereafter. If no beneficiary survives, sums on deposit belong to the estate of the last surviving party.
  3. Sums on deposit in a single-party account without a P.O.D. designation, or in a multiple-party account that, by the terms of the account, is without right of survivorship, are not affected by death of a party, but the amount to which the decedent, immediately before death, was beneficially entitled under section 30.1-31-08 is transferred as part of the decedent’s estate. A P.O.D. designation in a multiple-party account without right of survivorship is ineffective. For purposes of this section, designation of an account as a tenancy in common establishes that the account is without right of survivorship.
  4. The ownership right of a surviving party or beneficiary, or of the decedent’s estate, in sums on deposit is subject to requests for payment made by a party before the party’s death, whether paid by the financial institution before or after death, or unpaid. The surviving party or beneficiary, or the decedent’s estate, is liable to the payee of an unpaid request for payment. The liability is limited to a proportionate share of the amount transferred under this section, to the extent necessary to discharge the request for payment.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3; 1993, ch. 334, § 47; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Notes to Decisions

Continuing Right to Survivorship.

Where a beneficial owner’s attempted oral gift in trust was ineffective, as violative of former section 30.1-31-05, the sums remaining in joint accounts upon his death passed by survivorship to the two remaining joint tenants; each received an equal share of the decedent’s ownership interest, and the right of survivorship continued between them. In re Conservatorship of Milbrath, 508 N.W.2d 360 (N.D. 1993).

Contrary Provisions in Will.

Accounts payable on death (P.O.D.) must be honored, and court correctly ordered distribution according to P.O.D. designations, and not as provided in testator’s will directing accounts be divided equally. Berger v. Peterson (In re Estate of Peterson), 1997 ND 48, 561 N.W.2d 618, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 50 (N.D. 1997).

By ordering distribution according to payable on death (P.O.D.) designations of savings accounts, and an appropriate unequal distribution of the estate, district court properly gave effect to testator’s intent that accounts be divided equally while abiding by the law governing P.O.D. accounts. Berger v. Peterson (In re Estate of Peterson), 1997 ND 48, 561 N.W.2d 618, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 50 (N.D. 1997).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to amend the judgment or grant a new trial where appellant’s brother did not explain his failure to produce an annuity contract at the hearing to support his claim to 50 percent of the proceeds; the brother argued the annuity was a payable on death account under subsection (2)(b) of this section, and under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-10(2), a right of survivorship arising from the express terms of that account could not be altered by will. First W. Bank & Trust v. First Lutheran Church Found., 2003 ND 21, 656 N.W.2d 726, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 17 (N.D. 2003).

Vesting of Ownership.

Ownership in a surviving joint tenant bank account vests immediately upon the other’s death. In re Disciplinary Action Against Larson, 485 N.W.2d 345, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 100 (N.D. 1992).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Determining Ownership.

Statute authorizing a bank to make payments to one or more joint depositors, whether the others were living or not, did not determine the ownership of the deposit. Fish v. Berzel, 101 N.W.2d 557 (N.D. 1960).

Invalidly Created Joint Account.

Former N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-04, pertaining to the right of survivorship, presumed a validly created joint account in the first instance and had no application where the account was invalidly created through the violation of a fiduciary duty. In re Estate of Mehus, 278 N.W.2d 625, 1979 N.D. LEXIS 182 (N.D. 1979).

Presumption of Ownership.

Daughter, as surviving party to a joint savings account with her deceased mother, was entitled to rely on presumption provided in former N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-04, pertaining to the right of survivorship, that she was surviving owner of deposit in account upon her mother’s death, and law of contracts imposed no burden on her to show consideration or entitlement to deposit. In re Estate of Bendickson, 353 N.W.2d 320, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 367 (N.D. 1984), overruled, Estate of Zins v. Zins, 420 N.W.2d 729, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 41 (N.D. 1988).

Surviving named beneficiary of a trust account was entitled to rely on presumption provided in former N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-04 that she was owner of any deposits in account upon death of sole trustee, and law of contracts imposed no burden on her to show consideration or entitlement to deposits. In re Estate of Bendickson, 353 N.W.2d 320, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 367 (N.D. 1984), overruled, Estate of Zins v. Zins, 420 N.W.2d 729, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 41 (N.D. 1988).

Type of Interest.

Former N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-04, pertaining to the right of survivorship, was not concerned with the validity of the creation of a joint account; rather, it was concerned solely with defining the type of interest created by a joint account, and the standard of proof required therein did not apply to the question whether the decedent was unduly influenced to create those accounts. 420 N.W.2d 729.

30.1-31-10. (6-213) Alteration of rights.

  1. Rights at death under section 30.1-31-09 are determined by the terms of the account at the death of a party. The terms of the account may be altered by written notice given by a party to the financial institution to change the terms of the account or to stop or vary payment under the terms of the account. The notice must be signed by a party and received by the financial institution during the party’s lifetime.
  2. A right of survivorship arising from the express terms of the account, section 30.1-31-09, or a P.O.D. designation, may not be altered by will.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3; 1997, ch. 282, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Contrary Provisions in Will.

Accounts payable on death (P.O.D.) must be honored, and court correctly ordered distribution according to P.O.D. designations, and not as provided in testator’s will directing accounts be divided equally. Berger v. Peterson (In re Estate of Peterson), 1997 ND 48, 561 N.W.2d 618, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 50 (N.D. 1997).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to amend the judgment or grant a new trial where appellant’s brother did not explain his failure to produce an annuity contract at the hearing to support his claim to 50 percent of the proceeds; the brother argued the annuity was a payable on death account under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-09(2)(b), and under subsection (2) of this section, a right of survivorship arising from the express terms of that account could not be altered by will. First W. Bank & Trust v. First Lutheran Church Found., 2003 ND 21, 656 N.W.2d 726, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 17 (N.D. 2003).

Failure to Change Beneficiary.

Deceased’s failure to change beneficiaries on individual retirement account (IRA) due to a mistaken impression that a change was not necessary was insufficient to change the beneficiary; that aspect of a right of survivorship arising from the express terms of the account may not be altered by will, but can only be altered by a written notice given by the party to the financial institution. Leier v. Leier (In re Estate of Leier), 524 N.W.2d 106, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 241 (N.D. 1994).

Requirements.
—Written Notice.

The requirement of written directions in former N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-05 was mandatory and exclusive, and an attempt to orally transfer an interest in a joint account was ineffective. In re Conservatorship of Milbrath, 508 N.W.2d 360 (N.D. 1993).

30.1-31-11. (6-214) Accounts and transfers nontestamentary.

Except as provided in chapter 30.1-05 or as a consequence of, and to the extent directed by, section 30.1-31-12, a transfer resulting from the application of section 30.1-31-09 is effective by reason of the terms of the account involved and this part and is not testamentary or subject to chapters 30.1-01 through 30.1-25.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-12. (6-215) Rights of creditors and others.

  1. If other assets of the estate are insufficient, a transfer resulting from a right of survivorship or P.O.D. designation under sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20 is not effective against the estate of a deceased party to the extent needed to pay claims against the estate and statutory allowances to the surviving spouse and children.
  2. A surviving party or beneficiary who receives payment from an account after death of a party is liable to account to the personal representative of the decedent for a proportionate share of the amount received to which the decedent, immediately before death, was beneficially entitled under section 30.1-31-08, to the extent necessary to discharge the claims and allowances described in subsection 1 remaining unpaid after application of the decedent’s estate. A proceeding to assert the liability may not be commenced unless the personal representative has received a written demand by the surviving spouse, a creditor, a child, or a person acting for a child of the decedent. The proceeding must be commenced within one year after death of the decedent.
  3. A surviving party or beneficiary against whom a proceeding to account is brought may join as a party to the proceeding a surviving party or beneficiary of any other account of the decedent.
  4. Sums recovered by the personal representative must be administered as part of the decedent’s estate. This section does not affect the protection from claims of the personal representative or estate of a deceased party provided in section 30.1-31-19 for a financial institution that makes payment in accordance with the terms of the account.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3; 1993, ch. 334, § 48; 1995, ch. 322, § 27.

Notes to Decisions

Exhaustion Not Required.

N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-12, by its plain language, does not require a conservator to exhaust all other assets of a protected person’s estate before withdrawing the funds from a nonprobate financial account with payable on death beneficiaries. Allmaras v. Manly (In re Estate of Allmaras), 2007 ND 130, 737 N.W.2d 612, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 137 (N.D. 2007).

Necessity Not Shown.

Decision denying a claim to an estate was reversed because, although a conservator had broad discretion to act on behalf of a decedent, the record did not show if money stolen from a certificate of deposit (COD) that was in a payable on death account was put in a guardianship account after it was returned due to necessity and insufficient alternative funds under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-31-12; also, several beneficiaries had no present interest in the COD as a payable on death account. Moreover, there was nothing to show whether a conservator was aware that the money had been in payable on death account as part of an estate plan or whether the conservator even knew that he had the power to return the funds to the pre-theft state. Thus, remand was necessary for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the conservator properly exercised its powers under N.D.C.C. ch. 30.1-29. Allmaras v. Manly (In re Estate of Allmaras), 2007 ND 130, 737 N.W.2d 612, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 137 (N.D. 2007).

30.1-31-13. (6-216) Community property and tenancy by the entireties.

  1. A deposit of community property in an account does not alter the community character of the property or community rights in the property, but a right of survivorship between parties married to each other arising from the express terms of the account or section 30.1-31-09 may not be altered by will.
  2. Sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20 do not affect the law governing tenancy by the entireties.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-14. (6-221) Authority of financial institution.

A financial institution may enter into a contract of deposit for a multiple-party account to the same extent it may enter into a contract of deposit for a single-party account, and may provide for a P.O.D. designation and an agency designation in either a single-party account or a multiple-party account. A financial institution need not inquire as to the source of a deposit to an account or as to the proposed application of a payment from an account.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-15. (6-222) Payment on multiple-party account.

A financial institution, on request, may pay sums on deposit in a multiple-party account to:

  1. One or more of the parties, whether or not another party is disabled, incapacitated, or deceased when payment is requested and whether or not the party making the request survives another party; or
  2. The personal representative, if any, or, if there is none, the heirs or devisees of a deceased party if proof of death is presented to the financial institution showing that the deceased party was the survivor of all other persons named on the account either as a party or beneficiary, unless the account is without right of survivorship under section 30.1-31-09.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-16. (6-223) Payment on P.O.D. designation.

A financial institution, on request, may pay sums on deposit in an account with a P.O.D. designation to:

  1. One or more of the parties, whether or not another party is disabled, incapacitated, or deceased when the payment is requested and whether or not a party survives another party;
  2. The beneficiary or beneficiaries, if proof of death is presented to the financial institution showing that the beneficiary or beneficiaries survived all persons named as parties; or
  3. The personal representative, if any, or, if there is none, the heirs or devisees of a deceased party, if proof of death is presented to the financial institution showing that the deceased party was the survivor of all other persons named on the account either as a party or beneficiary.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-17. (6-224) Payment to designated agent.

A financial institution, on request of an agent under an agency designation for an account, may pay to the agent sums on deposit in the account, whether or not a party is disabled, incapacitated, or deceased when the request is made or received, and whether or not the authority of the agent terminates on the disability or incapacity of a party.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-18. (6-225) Payment to minor.

If a financial institution is required or permitted to make payment pursuant to sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20 to a minor designated as a beneficiary, payment may be made pursuant to chapter 47-24.1.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-19. (6-226) Discharge.

  1. Payment made pursuant to sections 30.1-31-02 through 30.1-31-20 in accordance with the terms of the account discharges the financial institution from all claims for amounts so paid, whether or not the payment is consistent with the beneficial ownership of the account as between parties, beneficiaries, or their successors. Payment may be made whether or not a party, beneficiary, or agent is disabled, incapacitated, or deceased when payment is requested, received, or made.
  2. Protection under this section does not extend to payments made after a financial institution has received written notice from a party, or from the personal representative, surviving spouse, or heir or devisee of a deceased party, to the effect that payments in accordance with the terms of the account, including one having an agency designation, should not be permitted, and the financial institution has had a reasonable opportunity to act on it when the payment is made. Unless the notice is withdrawn by the person giving it, the successor of any deceased party must concur in a request for payment if the financial institution is to be protected under this section. Unless a financial institution has been served with process in an action or proceeding, no other notice or other information shown to have been available to the financial institution affects its right to protection under this section.
  3. A financial institution that receives written notice pursuant to this section or otherwise has reason to believe that a dispute exists as to the rights of the parties may refuse, without liability, to make payments in accordance with the terms of the account.
  4. Protection of a financial institution under this section does not affect the rights of parties in disputes between themselves or their successors concerning the beneficial ownership of sums on deposit in accounts or payments made from accounts.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3; 1997, ch. 282, § 2.

30.1-31-20. (6-227) Setoff.

Without qualifying any other statutory right to setoff or lien and subject to any contractual provision, if a party is indebted to a financial institution, the financial institution has a right to setoff against the account. The amount of the account subject to setoff is the proportion to which the party is, or immediately before death was, beneficially entitled under section 30.1-31-08 or, in the absence of proof of that proportion, an equal share with all parties.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

Cross-References.

Appropriation of bank deposits unlawful, exception, see N.D.C.C. § 6-03-67.

30.1-31-21. (6-301) Definitions.

As used in sections 30.1-31-21 through 30.1-31-30:

  1. “Beneficiary form” means a registration of a security which indicates the present owner of the security and the intention of the owner regarding the person who will become the owner of the security upon the death of the owner.
  2. “Register”, including its derivatives, means to issue a certificate showing the ownership of a certificated security or, in the case of an uncertificated security, to initiate or transfer an account showing ownership of securities.
  3. “Registering entity” means a person who originates or transfers a security title by registration, and includes a broker maintaining security accounts for customers and a transfer agent or other person acting for or as an issuer of securities.
  4. “Security” means a share, participation, or other interest in property, in a business, or in an obligation of an enterprise or other issuer, and includes a certificated security, an uncertificated security, and a security account.
  5. “Security account” means a reinvestment account associated with a security, a securities account with a broker, a cash balance in a brokerage account, cash, cash equivalents, interest, earnings, or dividends earned or declared on a security in an account, a reinvestment account, or a brokerage account, whether or not credited to the account before the owner’s death; an investment management or custody account with a trust company or a trust division of a bank, credit union, or any other financial institution with trust powers, including the securities in the account, a cash balance in the account, and cash, cash equivalents, interest, earnings, or dividends earned or declared on a security in the account, whether or not credited to the account before the owner’s death; or a cash balance or other property held for or due to the owner of a security as a replacement for or product of an account security, whether or not credited to the account before the owner’s death.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3; 2005, ch. 293, § 1.

30.1-31-22. (6-302) Registration in beneficiary form — Sole or joint tenancy ownership.

Only individuals whose registration of a security shows sole ownership by one individual or multiple ownership by two or more with right of survivorship, rather than as tenants in common, may obtain registration in beneficiary form. Multiple owners of a security registered in beneficiary form hold as joint tenants with right of survivorship, as tenants by the entireties, or as owners of community property held in survivorship form, and not as tenants in common.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-23. (6-303) Registration in beneficiary form — Applicable law.

A security may be registered in beneficiary form if the form is authorized by this or a similar statute of the state of organization of the issuer or registering entity, the location of the registering entity’s principal office, the office of its transfer agent or its office making the registration, or by this or a similar statute of the law of the state listed as the owner’s address at the time of registration. A registration governed by the law of a jurisdiction in which this or similar legislation is not in force or was not in force when a registration in beneficiary form was made is nevertheless presumed to be valid and authorized as a matter of contract law.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-24. (6-304) Origination of registration in beneficiary form.

A security, whether evidenced by certificate or account, is registered in beneficiary form when the registration includes a designation of a beneficiary to take the ownership at the death of the owner or the deaths of all multiple owners.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-25. (6-305) Form of registration in beneficiary form.

Registration in beneficiary form may be shown by the words “transfer on death” or the abbreviation “T.O.D.”, or by the words “pay on death” or the abbreviation “P.O.D.”, after the name of the registered owner and before the name of a beneficiary.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-26. (6-306) Effect of registration in beneficiary form.

The designation of a T.O.D. beneficiary on a registration in beneficiary form has no effect on ownership until the owner’s death. A registration of a security in beneficiary form may be canceled or changed at any time by the sole owner or all then surviving owners without the consent of the beneficiary.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-27. (6-307) Ownership on death of owner.

On death of a sole owner or the last to die of all multiple owners, ownership of securities registered in beneficiary form passes to the beneficiary or beneficiaries who survive all owners. On proof of death of all owners and compliance with any applicable requirements of the registering entity, a security registered in beneficiary form may be reregistered in the name of the beneficiary or beneficiaries who survived the death of all owners. Until division of the security after the death of all owners, multiple beneficiaries surviving the death of all owners hold their interests as tenants in common. If no beneficiary survives the death of all owners, the security belongs to the estate of the deceased sole owner or the estate of the last to die of all multiple owners.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-28. (6-308) Protection of registering entity.

  1. A registering entity is not required to offer or to accept a request for security registration in beneficiary form. If a registration in beneficiary form is offered by a registering entity, the owner requesting registration in beneficiary form assents to the protections given to the registering entity by sections 30.1-31-21 through 30.1-31-30.
  2. By accepting a request for registration of a security in beneficiary form, the registering entity agrees that the registration will be implemented on death of the deceased owner as provided in sections 30.1-31-21 through 30.1-31-30.
  3. A registering entity is discharged from all claims to a security by the estate, creditors, heirs, or devisees of a deceased owner if it registers a transfer of the security in accordance with section 30.1-31-27 and does so in good-faith reliance on the registration, on sections 30.1-31-21 through 30.1-31-30, and on information provided to it by affidavit of the personal representative of the deceased owner, or by the surviving beneficiary or by the surviving beneficiary’s representatives, or other information available to the registering entity. The protections of sections 30.1-31-21 through 30.1-31-30 do not extend to a reregistration or payment made after a registering entity has received written notice from any claimant to any interest in the security objecting to implementation of a registration in beneficiary form. No other notice or other information available to the registering entity affects its right to protection under sections 30.1-31-21 through 30.1-31-30.
  4. The protection provided by sections 30.1-31-21 through 30.1-31-30 to the registering entity of a security does not affect the rights of beneficiaries in disputes between themselves and other claimants to ownership of the security transferred or its value or proceeds.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-29. (6-309) Nontestamentary transfer on death.

  1. A transfer on death resulting from a registration in beneficiary form is effective by reason of the contract regarding the registration between the owner and the registering entity and sections 30.1-31-21 through 30.1-31-30 and is not testamentary.
  2. Sections 30.1-31-21 through 30.1-31-30 do not limit the rights of creditors of security owners against beneficiaries and other transferees under other laws of this state.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

30.1-31-30. (6-310) Terms, conditions, and forms for registration.

  1. A registering entity offering to accept registrations in beneficiary form may establish the terms and conditions under which it will receive requests for registrations in beneficiary form and for implementation of registrations in beneficiary form, including requests for cancellation of previously registered T.O.D. beneficiary designations and requests for reregistration to effect a change of beneficiary. The terms and conditions so established may provide for proving death, avoiding or resolving any problems concerning fractional shares, designating primary and contingent beneficiaries, and substituting a named beneficiary’s descendants to take in the place of the named beneficiary in the event of the beneficiary’s death. Substitution may be indicated by appending to the name of the primary beneficiary the letters L.D.P.S., standing for “lineal descendants per stirpes”. This designation substitutes a deceased beneficiary’s descendants who survive the owner for a beneficiary who fails to so survive, the descendants to be identified and to share in accordance with the law of the beneficiary’s domicile at the owner’s death governing inheritance by descendants of an intestate. Other forms of identifying beneficiaries who are to take on one or more contingencies, and rules for providing proofs and assurances needed to satisfy reasonable concerns by registering entities regarding conditions and identities relevant to accurate implementation of registrations in beneficiary form, may be contained in a registering entity’s terms and conditions.
  2. The following are illustrations of registrations in beneficiary form which a registering entity may authorize:
    1. Sole owner — sole beneficiary: John S. Brown T.O.D. (or P.O.D.) John S. Brown Jr.
    2. Multiple owners — sole beneficiary: John S. Brown Mary B. Brown JT. TEN. T.O.D. John S. Brown Jr.
    3. Multiple owners — primary and secondary (substituted) beneficiaries: John S. Brown Mary B. Brown JT. TEN. T.O.D. John S. Brown Jr. SUB. BENE. Peter Q. Brown or John S. Brown Mary B. Brown JT. TEN. T.O.D. John S. Brown Jr. L.D.P.S.

Source: S.L. 1991, ch. 351, § 3.

Note.

This chapter, enacted by section 3 of chapter 351, S.L. 1991, replaces former Chapter 30.1-31, entitled “Multiple-Party Accounts — Provisions Relating to Effect of Death,” which was repealed by section 4 of chapter 351, S.L. 1991.

Article VII Trust Administration

CHAPTER 30.1-32 Trust Registration [Repealed]

[Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27]

30.1-32-01. (7-101) Duty to register trusts. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-32-02. (7-102) Registration procedures — Fee. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-32-03. (7-103) Effect of registration. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

Note.

S.L. 2007, ch. 549, section 9 purported to amend this section but section 27 of the same act repealed chapter 30.1-32 in its entirety and the amendment to this section is therefore ineffective.

30.1-32-04. (7-104) Effect of failure to register. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-32-05. (7-105) Registration, qualification of foreign trustee. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

CHAPTER 30.1-32.1 Uniform Real Property Transfer on Death Act

30.1-32.1-01. Definitions.

In this chapter:

  1. “Beneficiary” means a person that receives property under a transfer on death deed.
  2. “Designated beneficiary” means a person designated to receive property in a transfer on death deed.
  3. “Joint owner” means an individual who owns property concurrently with one or more other individuals with a right of survivorship. The term includes a joint tenant and tenant by the entirety. The term does not include a tenant in common.
  4. “Property” means an interest in real property located in this state which is transferable on the death of the owner.
  5. “Transfer on death deed” means a deed authorized under this chapter.
  6. “Transferor” means an individual who makes a transfer on death deed.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3.

Effective Date.

This chapter became effective August 1, 2011.

30.1-32.1-02. Transfer on death deed authorized.

An individual may transfer property to one or more beneficiaries effective at the transferor’s death by a transfer on death deed.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3.

30.1-32.1-03. Transfer on death deed revocable.

A transfer on death deed is revocable even if the deed or another instrument contains a contrary provision.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3.

30.1-32.1-04. Transfer on death deed nontestamentary.

A transfer on death deed is nontestamentary.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3.

30.1-32.1-05. Capacity of transferor.

The capacity required to make or revoke a transfer on death deed is the same as the capacity required to make a will.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3.

30.1-32.1-06. Requirements.

  1. A transfer on death deed except as otherwise provided in subsection 2 must contain the essential elements and formalities of a properly recordable inter vivos deed.
  2. A transfer on death deed must state that the transfer to the designated beneficiary is to occur at the transferor’s death.
  3. A transfer on death deed must use the phrase “transfer on death deed” or the abbreviation “TOD” in the title of the deed.
  4. A transfer on death deed must be recorded before the transferor’s death in the public records in the office of the county recorder of the county where the property is located.
  5. An auditor’s certificate of transfer under section 11-18-02 and a statement of full consideration under section 11-18-02.2 are not required to record a transfer on death deed or a revocation instrument.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3; 2019, ch. 275, § 2, effective August 1, 2019.

30.1-32.1-07. Notice, delivery, acceptance, and consideration not required.

A transfer on death deed is effective without notice or delivery to or acceptance by the designated beneficiary during the transferor’s life or without consideration.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3.

30.1-32.1-08. Revocation by instrument authorized — Revocation by act not permitted.

  1. Subject to subsection 2, an instrument is effective to revoke a recorded transfer on death deed, or any part of it, only if the instrument:
    1. Is one of the following:
      1. A transfer on death deed that revokes the deed or part of the deed expressly or by inconsistency;
      2. An instrument of revocation that expressly revokes the deed or part of the deed; or
      3. An inter vivos deed that expressly revokes the transfer on death deed or part of the deed; and
    2. Is acknowledged by the transferor after the acknowledgment of the deed being revoked and recorded before the transferor’s death in the public records in the office of the county recorder of the county where the deed is recorded.
  2. If a transfer on death deed is made by more than one transferor, revocation by a transferor does not affect the deed as to the interest of another transferor and a deed of joint owners is revoked only if it is revoked by all of the living joint owners.
  3. After a transfer on death deed is recorded, it may not be revoked by a revocatory act on the deed.
  4. This section does not limit the effect of an inter vivos transfer of the property.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3.

30.1-32.1-09. Effect of transfer on death deed during transferor’s life.

During a transferor’s life, a transfer on death deed does not:

  1. Affect an interest or right of the transferor or any other owner, including the right to transfer or encumber the property;
  2. Affect an interest or right of a transferee, even if the transferee has actual or constructive notice of the deed;
  3. Affect an interest or right of a secured or unsecured creditor or future creditor of the transferor, even if the creditor has actual or constructive notice of the deed;
  4. Affect the transferor’s or designated beneficiary’s eligibility for any form of public assistance;
  5. Create a legal or equitable interest in favor of the designated beneficiary; or
  6. Subject the property to claims or process of a creditor of the designated beneficiary.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3.

30.1-32.1-10. Effect of transfer on death deed at transferor’s death.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in the transfer on death deed, in this section, or in state law on antilapse, revocation by divorce or homicide, survival and simultaneous death, and elective share, if applicable to nonprobate transfers, on the death of the transferor, the following rules apply to property that is the subject of a transfer on death deed and owned by the transferor at death:
    1. Subject to subdivision b, the interest in the property is transferred to the designated beneficiary in accordance with the deed.
    2. The interest of a designated beneficiary is contingent on the designated beneficiary surviving the transferor. The interest of a designated beneficiary that fails to survive the transferor lapses.
    3. Subject to subdivision d, concurrent interests are transferred to the beneficiaries in equal and undivided shares with no right of survivorship.
    4. If the transferor has identified two or more designated beneficiaries to receive concurrent interests in the property, the share of one which lapses or fails for any reason is transferred to the other, or to the others in proportion to the interest of each in the remaining part of the property held concurrently.
  2. Subject to chapter 47-19, a beneficiary takes the property subject to all conveyances, encumbrances, assignments, contracts, mortgages, liens, and other interests to which the property is subject at the transferor’s death. For purposes of this subsection and chapter 47-19, the recording of the transfer on death deed is deemed to have occurred at the transferor’s death.
  3. If a transferor is a joint owner and is:
    1. Survived by one or more other joint owners, the property that is the subject of a transfer on death deed belongs to the surviving joint owner or owners with right of survivorship; or
    2. The last surviving joint owner, the transfer on death deed is effective.
  4. A transfer on death deed transfers property without covenant or warranty of title even if the deed contains a contrary provision.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3.

30.1-32.1-11. Disclaimer.

A beneficiary may disclaim all or part of the beneficiary’s interest as provided by chapter 30.1-10.1.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3.

30.1-32.1-12. Liability for creditor claims and statutory allowances.

  1. To the extent the transferor’s probate estate is insufficient to satisfy an allowed claim against the estate or a statutory allowance to a surviving spouse or child, the estate may enforce the liability against property transferred at the transferor’s death by a transfer on death deed. The estate may not enforce the liability against a purchaser of the property for value or a person that acquires an encumbrance in the property for value from the person that received the property by a transfer on death deed.
  2. If more than one property is transferred by one or more transfer on death deeds, the liability under subsection 1 is apportioned among the properties in proportion to the net values of the property at the transferor’s death.
  3. A proceeding to enforce the liability under this section may not be commenced later than eighteen months after the transferor’s death. Any proceeding to enforce the liability as to property that has been purchased or encumbered for value must be brought against the person that received the property by a transfer on death deed for the net value at the time of the transferor’s death.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3; 2013, ch. 251, § 1.

30.1-32.1-13. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

This chapter modifies, limits, and supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act [15 U.S.C. 7001 et seq.] but does not modify, limit, or supersede section 101(c) of that Act [15 U.S.C. 7001(c)] or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in section 103(b) of that Act [15 U.S.C. 7003(b)].

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3.

30.1-32.1-14. Application.

This Act applies to a transfer on death deed made before, on, or after August 1, 2011, by a transferor dying on or after August 1, 2011. This chapter does not affect any method of transferring property otherwise permitted under the law of this state.

Source: S.L. 2011, ch. 241, § 3.

CHAPTER 30.1-33 Jurisdiction of Court Concerning Trusts [Repealed]

[Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27]

30.1-33-01. (7-201) District court jurisdiction of trusts. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-33-02. (7-202) Trust proceedings — Venue. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-33-03. (7-203) Trust proceedings — Dismissal of matters relating to foreign trusts. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-33-04. (7-204) District court jurisdiction of litigation involving trusts and third parties. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-33-05. (7-205) Proceedings for review of employment of agents and review of compensation of trustee and employees of trust. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-33-06. (7-206) Trust proceedings — Initiation by notice — Necessary parties. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

CHAPTER 30.1-34 Duties and Liabilities of Trustees [Repealed]

[Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27]

30.1-34-01. (7-301) General duties not limited. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-34-02. (7-302) Trustee’s standard of care and performance. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

Note.

S.L. 2007, ch. 549, section 10 purported to amend this section; however, section 27 of the same act repealed chapter 30.1-34 in its entirety and the amendment to this section is therefore ineffective.

30.1-34-03. (7-303) Duty to inform and account to beneficiaries. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-34-04. (7-304) Duty to provide bond. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-34-05. (7-305) Trustee’s duties — Appropriate place of administration — Deviation. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-34-06. (7-306) Personal liability of trustee to third parties. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

30.1-34-07. (7-307) Limitations on proceedings against trustees after final account. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2007, ch. 549, § 27.

Article VIII — Effective Date and Provisions for Transition

CHAPTER 30.1-35 Effective Date — Transition

30.1-35-01. Time of taking effect — Provisions for transition.

  1. This title takes effect on July 1, 1975.
  2. Except as provided elsewhere in this title, on the effective date of this title or any amendment to this title:
    1. The title or amendment applies to any wills of decedents dying thereafter. No provision of this title, however, shall be effective to invalidate any will executed prior to July 1, 1975, when that will would be valid under the laws of this state in effect at the time of its execution.
    2. The title or amendment applies to any proceedings in court then pending or thereafter commenced regardless of the time of the death of decedent except to the extent that in the opinion of the court the former procedure should be made applicable in a particular case in the interest of justice or because of infeasibility of application of the procedure of this title.
    3. Every personal representative, including a person administering an estate of a minor or incompetent holding an appointment on that date, continues to hold the appointment but has only the powers conferred by this title or the amendment and is subject to the duties imposed with respect to any act occurring or done thereafter.
    4. An act done before the effective date in any proceeding and any accrued right is not impaired by this title or the amendment. If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period of time which has commenced to run by the provisions of any statute before the effective date, the provisions shall remain in force with respect to that right.
    5. Any rule of construction or presumption provided in this title or the amendment applies to instruments executed and multiple-party accounts opened before the effective date unless there is a clear indication of a contrary intent.
    6. A person holding office as judge of the court on the effective date of this title may continue the office of judge of this court and may be selected for additional terms after the effective date of this title.

Source: S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 1; 2009, ch. 283, § 26.

Notes to Decisions

Execution of Instrument and Death Occurring Before Effective Date.

This section and N.D.C.C. § 30.1-08-08, concerning execution requirements for a valid will, are not applicable to an instrument attempted to be established as a will where the execution of such instrument and the death of the maker of the instrument occur before the effective date of such sections. Kuhn v. Kuhn, 281 N.W.2d 230, 1979 N.D. LEXIS 270 (N.D. 1979).

Procedural Rights.

Prior discretionary application of old probate procedures did not fix procedural rights for the eternity of the probated estates. It is axiomatic that procedural modes, as distinguished, from substantive rights, are not vested and are subject to repeal, modification or change. In re Estate of Kjorvestad, 375 N.W.2d 160, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 408 (N.D. 1985).

Wills Executed Before Effective Date.

Before the Uniform Probate Code provisions apply to a will executed before the effective date of such code, the will must have been validly executed; such validity is determined by the law that existed at the time of the will’s execution. In re Estate of Thomas, 290 N.W.2d 223, 1980 N.D. LEXIS 196 (N.D. 1980).

Law Reviews.

North Dakota Probate Code: Prior and Revised Article II, 72 N.D. L. Rev. 1 (1996).

CHAPTER 30.1-36 Supported Decision making Agreements

30.1-36-01. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Intentional misconduct” means conduct by a supporter with actual knowledge at the time of the conduct that the conduct is unnecessarily harmful to the health or well-being of a named individual.
  2. “Named individual” is the individual identified in a supported decisionmaking agreement who is to receive decisionmaking assistance.
  3. “Supported decisionmaking” means assistance from a person of a named individual’s choosing:
    1. To identify, collect, and organize documents that apply to a decision the named individual is considering;
    2. To identify, collect, and organize information that may be helpful to the named individual when making a decision;
    3. To help the named individual understand documents;
    4. To identify choices available for a responsible decision;
    5. To identify advantages and disadvantages of available choices;
    6. To communicate any decision by the named individual to others at the request of the named individual; or
    7. To explain the decisionmaking process allowed under this subsection to the court in any proceeding to create or modify a guardianship or conservatorship for the named individual.
  4. “Supported decisionmaking agreement” means a written, signed, dated, and witnessed understanding between a named individual and a trusted adult who agrees to provide assistance for decisionmaking to maximize the named individual’s ability to make informed, voluntary choices, including choices within:
    1. Health care.
    2. Residence.
    3. Finances.
    4. Education.
    5. Legal affairs.
    6. Vocation.
  5. “Supporter” is a person that has signed a supported decisionmaking agreement, agreeing to provide assistance to the named individual.

Source: S.L. 2019, ch. 276, § 1, effective August 1, 2019.

30.1-36-02. Confidential information.

  1. The named individual may sign separate authorizations when appropriate to allow others to disclose confidential documents, records, and information to a supporter identified in the authorization. An authorization may allow an individual to provide copies of the documents, records, and information to the supporter.
  2. A supporter may obtain information about the named individual only by having written authorization that complies with the applicable federal or state law.

Source: S.L. 2019, ch. 276, § 1, effective August 1, 2019.

30.1-36-03. Supporter — Liability.

A supporter is not liable to the named individual and has not engaged in professional misconduct for acts performed as a supporter in good faith unless the supporter has been recklessly or grossly negligent or has intentionally committed misconduct.

Source: S.L. 2019, ch. 276, § 1, effective August 1, 2019.

30.1-36-04. Formalities — Effects.

  1. It is presumed the named individual has capacity to enter a supported decisionmaking agreement. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.
  2. A named individual's use of uncommon methods of communication does not affect the named individual's capacity to enter a supported decisionmaking agreement.
  3. A named individual may have more than one supported decisionmaking agreement in effect at the same time. If any two of a named individual's supported decisionmaking agreements are incompatible, the more recent agreement prevails.
  4. Two supported decisionmaking agreements are not incompatible solely due to enabling the named individual to get decisionmaking assistance from more than one supporter at the same time for the same decision.
  5. A supported decisionmaking agreement does not prevent the named individual from:
    1. Getting decisionmaking assistance from someone who is not a supporter in a supported decisionmaking agreement;
    2. Making decisions independently without consulting a supporter; or
    3. Getting access to and copies of documents and records about the named individual.
  6. The existence or contents of a supported decisionmaking agreement may not be used as evidence of incapacity or incompetence.
  7. A supported decisionmaking agreement does not give a supporter the ability to act as a surrogate decisionmaker. A supported decisionmaking agreement does not give a supporter the authority to sign documents on behalf of the named individual.

Source: S.L. 2019, ch. 276, § 1, effective August 1, 2019.

30.1-36-05. Termination.

  1. A supported decisionmaking agreement may be terminated by the named individual by giving notice to the supporter orally, in writing, through an assistive technology device, or by any other act showing a specific intent to terminate the agreement.
  2. A supported decisionmaking agreement may be terminated by a supporter by providing written notice of the supporter's resignation to the named individual. If a supported decisionmaking agreement includes more than one supporter, any supporter can terminate the agreement only as to that supporter.
  3. A supported decisionmaking agreement is terminated as to a specific supporter when:
    1. A court has convicted the supporter of a crime involving abuse, neglect, or exploitation;
    2. A restraining order has been issued by a court to protect the named individual from the supporter; or
    3. A court has determined the supporter lacks capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning residential or educational matters, medical treatment, legal affairs, or vocational, financial, or other matters affecting the health or safety of the named individual.
  4. A supported decisionmaking agreement may be terminated by any additional method specified in the supported decisionmaking agreement.

Source: S.L. 2019, ch. 276, § 1, effective August 1, 2019.

30.1-36-06. Confidential documents, records, and information.

A supporter may not allow unauthorized access to, use of, or disclosure of any confidential documents, records, and other information about the named individual, unless the named individual has otherwise directed.

Source: S.L. 2019, ch. 276, § 1, effective August 1, 2019.

30.1-36-07. Witnesses.

  1. A notary public or two qualified witnesses must verify in writing the signatures to a supported decisionmaking agreement.
  2. To be a qualified witness, the witness must:
    1. Not be a party to the agreement;
    2. Be at least eighteen years of age;
    3. Be competent;
    4. Not be an employee or agent of a supporter in the agreement; and
    5. Not be a creditor of the named individual.

Source: S.L. 2019, ch. 276, § 1, effective August 1, 2019.

30.1-36-08. Reliance on agreement — Limitation of liability.

  1. Any third person who receives a copy of a supported decisionmaking agreement shall rely on the agreement, unless:
    1. The third person has cause to believe the named individual is being abused, neglected, or exploited by the supporter;
    2. The third person has actual knowledge or notice the supported decisionmaking agreement is invalid; or
    3. The third person has actual knowledge or notice the supported decisionmaking agreement has been terminated.
  2. A third person is not subject to criminal or civil liability and has not engaged in professional misconduct for an act or omission if the act or omission is done in good faith and in reliance on a supported decisionmaking agreement.
  3. An entity, custodian, or organization that discloses personal information about a named individual to a supporter who has written authorization to access, collect, or obtain, or to assist a named individual to access, collect, or obtain that information, is immune from any action alleging the entity, custodian, or organization improperly or unlawfully disclosed information to the supporter unless:
    1. The entity, custodian, or organization had actual knowledge or notice the named individual had revoked the authorization;
    2. The entity, custodian, or organization had actual knowledge or notice the supported decisionmaking agreement is invalid; or
    3. The entity, custodian, or organization knowingly or recklessly disclosed information beyond the scope of the authorization.
  4. A third person is not protected from charges of professional misconduct and is not immune from liability for:
    1. Acting inconsistently with the known expressed wishes of a named individual; or
    2. Failing to provide documents, records, or other information to either a named individual or a supporter who has written authorization for lawful access to or copies of the information.
  5. A supported decisionmaking agreement does not relieve a person of legal obligations to provide services to an individual with a disability.

Source: S.L. 2019, ch. 276, § 1, effective August 1, 2019.

CHAPTER 30.1-37 Uniform Electronic Wills Act

Source: S.L. 2021, hb1077, § 1, effective August 1, 2021.

30.1-37-01. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
  2. “Electronic will” means a will executed electronically in compliance with subsection of section 30.1-37-04.
  3. “Record” means information inscribed on a tangible medium or stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
  4. “Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record to:
    1. Execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
    2. Affix to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol or process.
  5. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes a federally recognized Indian tribe.
  6. “Will” includes a codicil and any testamentary instrument that merely appoints an executor, revokes or revises another will, nominates a guardian, or expressly excludes or limits the right of an individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession.

Source: S.L. 2021, ch. 257, § 1, effective August 1, 2021.

Note.

Section 2 of chapter 257, S.L. 2021, provides, “ APPLICATION. This Act applies to the will of a decedent who dies after July 31, 2021.”

30.1-37-02. Law applicable to electronic will — Principles of equity.

An electronic will is a will for all purposes of the law of this state. The law of this state applicable to wills and principles of equity apply to an electronic will, except as modified by this chapter.

Source: S.L. 2021, ch. 257, § 1, effective August 1, 2021.

Note.

Section 2 of chapter 257, S.L. 2021, provides, “ APPLICATION. This Act applies to the will of a decedent who dies after July 31, 2021.”

30.1-37-03. Choice of law regarding execution.

A will executed electronically but not in compliance with subsection 1 of section 30.1-37-04 is an electronic will under this chapter if executed in compliance with the law of the jurisdiction where the testator is:

  1. Physically located when the will is signed; or
  2. Domiciled or resides when the will is signed or when the testator dies.

Source: S.L. 2021, ch. 257, § 1, effective August 1, 2021.

Note.

Section 2 of chapter 257, S.L. 2021, provides, “ APPLICATION. This Act applies to the will of a decedent who dies after July 31, 2021.”

30.1-37-04. Execution of electronic will.

  1. Subject to subsection 4 of section 30.1-37-06, an electronic will must be:
    1. A record that is readable as text at the time of signing as provided under subdivision b;
    2. Signed by:
      1. The testator; or
      2. Another individual in the testator’s name, in the testator’s conscious presence, and by the testator’s direction; and
    3. Either:
      1. Signed by at least two individuals, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after witnessing:
        1. The signing of the will as provided under subdivision b; or
        2. The testator’s acknowledgment of the signature as provided under subdivision b or acknowledgment of the will; or
      2. Acknowledged by the testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments.
  2. Intent of a testator that the record under subdivision a of subsection be the testator’s electronic will may be established by extrinsic evidence.

Source: S.L. 2021, ch. 257, § 1, effective August 1, 2021.

Note.

Section 2 of chapter 257, S.L. 2021, provides, “ APPLICATION. This Act applies to the will of a decedent who dies after July 31, 2021.”

30.1-37-05. Revocation.

  1. An electronic will may revoke all or part of a previous will.
  2. All or part of an electronic will is revoked by:
    1. A subsequent will that revokes all or part of the electronic will expressly or by inconsistency; or
    2. A physical act, if it is established by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator, with the intent of revoking all or part of the will, performed the act or directed another individual who performed the act in the testator’s physical presence.

Source: S.L. 2021, ch. 257, § 1, effective August 1, 2021.

Note.

Section 2 of chapter 257, S.L. 2021, provides, “ APPLICATION. This Act applies to the will of a decedent who dies after July 31, 2021.”

30.1-37-06. Electronic will attested and made self-proving at time of execution.

  1. An electronic will may be simultaneously executed, attested, and made self-proving by acknowledgment of the testator and affidavits of the witnesses.
  2. The acknowledgment and affidavits under subsection 1 must be:
    1. Made before an officer authorized to administer oaths under law of the state in which execution occurs; and
    2. Evidenced by the officer’s certificate under official seal affixed to or logically associated with the electronic will.
  3. The acknowledgment and affidavits under subsection 1 must be in substantially the following form:
  4. A signature physically or electronically affixed to an affidavit that is affixed to or logically associated with an electronic will under this chapter is deemed a signature of the electronic will under subsection 1 of section 30.1-37-04.

STATE OF COUNTY OF I, , the testator, sign my name to this instrument this day of , , and being first sworn, declare to the undersigned authority that I sign and execute this instrument as my electronic will and that I sign it willingly or willingly direct another to sign for me, that I execute it as my free and voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed, and that I am 18 years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no constraint or undue influence. Testator We, , , the witnesses, sign our names to this instrument, and being first sworn, declare to the undersigned authority that the testator signs and executes this instrument as the testator’s electronic will and that the testator signs it willingly or willingly directs another to sign for the testator, and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the testator, signs this electronic will as witness to the testator’s signing, and that to the best of our knowledge the testator is 18 years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no constraint or undue influence. Witness Witness Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me by , the testator, and subscribed and sworn to before me by and , witnesses, this day of . (SEAL) (Signed) (Signed) (Official capacity of officer)

Click to view

Source: S.L. 2021, ch. 257, § 1, effective August 1, 2021.

Note.

Section 2 of chapter 257, S.L. 2021, provides, “ APPLICATION. This Act applies to the will of a decedent who dies after July 31, 2021.”

30.1-37-07. Certification of paper copy.

An individual may create a certified paper copy of an electronic will by affirming under penalty of perjury that a paper copy of the electronic will is a complete, true, and accurate copy of the electronic will. If the electronic will is made self-proving, the certified paper copy of the will must include the self-proving affidavits.

Source: S.L. 2021, ch. 257, § 1, effective August 1, 2021.

Note.

Section 2 of chapter 257, S.L. 2021, provides, “ APPLICATION. This Act applies to the will of a decedent who dies after July 31, 2021.”