RICODE

Chapter 1 Proceedings in Family Court

14-1-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be designated as the “Family Court Act”.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 39; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-7 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

Cross References.

Family court, § 8-10-1 et seq.

Personnel, organization and sessions of court, § 8-10-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 83 A.L.R.4th 1135.

14-1-2. Purpose of chapter.

The purpose of this chapter is:

To secure for each child under its jurisdiction the care, guidance, and control, preferably in his or her own home, that will serve the child’s welfare and the best interests of the state;
To conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties wherever possible, removing him or her from the custody of his or her parents only when his or her welfare or the safety and protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without that removal; and
When a child is removed from his or her own family, to secure for him or her custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his or her parents.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-2 .

Cross References.

Abused and neglected children, § 40-11-1 et seq.

Children’s code commission, § 42-74-1 .

Interstate compact on placement of children, § 40-15-1 et seq.

In General.

These principles are applicable to interim as well as final dispositions of children coming under the jurisdiction of the family court and they serve as adequate guidelines to govern the pre-hearing-detention determination. Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1662 (R.I. 1980).

The state through its power and obligation as parens patriae has both a rational and compelling interest in interference in family autonomy when these basic rights of children are violated or threatened. In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1709 (R.I. 1980).

The state’s role in protecting children may properly be preventive of harm as well as remedial. In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1709 (R.I. 1980).

Under R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-2 , the purpose of the family court was to strike a balance between the child’s welfare, the best interests of the State, and when possible, the conservation and strengthening of family ties; the fact that a trial justice iterated this function in a dependency and neglect proceeding was not evidence of bias in favor of the Department of Children, Youth and Families or against a father. In re Jermaine H., 9 A.3d 1227, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 114 (R.I. 2010).

Children’s Rights.

A child has a fundamental interest in the security of his person, physical well-being, and access to a minimal supply of the basic necessities of life. In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1709 (R.I. 1980).

Where no exceptional circumstances existed which would have required a natural parent to provide post-secondary education for petitioner, the family court had no authority to require the Department for Children and Their Families to do so as parens patriae. In re Debra, 445 A.2d 577, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 870 (R.I. 1982).

Family Relationship.

Rhode Island courts recognize the right of a family to undisturbed privacy in determining its internal arrangements, as suggested in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972); and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S. Ct. 791, 39 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1974). In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1709 (R.I. 1980).

Unless the state can prove by clear and convincing evidence that a child is actually suffering or is likely to suffer physical and/or emotional harm, there is no reason to disturb the basic security of a family relationship. In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1709 (R.I. 1980).

Jury Trial.

Juvenile presented to family court as an alleged delinquent is not constitutionally entitled to a trial by jury. In re McCloud, 110 R.I. 431 , 293 A.2d 512, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 933 (1972).

Parental Rights.

In child-abuse and related custody proceedings, the court has long espoused the position that the rights of parents are a most essential consideration, but further recognized that the best interests and welfare of the child outweigh all other considerations. In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1709 (R.I. 1980).

14-1-3. Definitions.

The following words and phrases when used in this chapter shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed as follows:

“Adult” means a person eighteen (18) years of age or older.
“Appropriate person,” as used in §§ 14-1-10 and 14-1-11 , except in matters relating to adoptions and child marriages, means and includes:
1. Any police official of this state, or of any city or town within this state;
2. Any duly qualified prosecuting officer of this state, or of any city or town within this state;
3. Any director of public welfare of any city or town within this state, or his or her duly authorized subordinate;
4. Any truant officer or other school official of any city or town within this state;
5. Any duly authorized representative of any public or duly licensed private agency or institution established for purposes similar to those specified in § 8-10-2 or 14-1-2 ; or
6. Any maternal or paternal grandparent, who alleges that the surviving parent, in those cases in which one parent is deceased, is an unfit and improper person to have custody of any child or children.
“Child” means a person under eighteen (18) years of age.
“The court” means the family court of the state of Rhode Island.
“Delinquent,” when applied to a child, means and includes any child who has committed any offense that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a felony, or who has on more than one occasion violated any of the other laws of the state or of the United States or any of the ordinances of cities and towns, other than ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles.
“Dependent” means any child who requires the protection and assistance of the court when his or her physical or mental health or welfare is harmed, or threatened with harm, due to the inability of the parent or guardian, through no fault of the parent or guardian, to provide the child with a minimum degree of care or proper supervision because of:
1. The death or illness of a parent; or
2. The special medical, educational, or social-service needs of the child which the parent is unable to provide.
“Justice” means a justice of the family court.
“Neglect” means a child who requires the protection and assistance of the court when his or her physical or mental health or welfare is harmed, or threatened with harm, when the parents or guardian:
1. Fails to supply the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, though financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so;
2. Fails to provide the child proper education as required by law; or
3. Abandons and/or deserts the child.
“Supervised independent living setting” means a supervised setting in which a young adult is living independently, that meets any safety and/or licensing requirements established by the department for this population, and is paired with a supervising agency or a supervising worker, including, but not limited to, single or shared apartments or houses, host homes, relatives’ and mentors’ homes, college dormitories or other postsecondary educational or vocational housing. All or part of the financial assistance that secures an independent supervised setting for a young adult may be paid directly to the young adult if there is no provider or other child-placing intermediary, or to a landlord, a college, or to a supervising agency, or to other third parties on behalf of the young adult in the discretion of the department.
“Voluntary placement agreement for extension of care” means a written agreement between the state agency and a young adult who meets the eligibility conditions specified in § 14-1-6(c) , acting as their own legal guardian that is binding on the parties to the agreement. At a minimum, the agreement recognizes the voluntary nature of the agreement, the legal status of the young adult and the rights and obligations of the young adult, as well as the services and supports the agency agrees to provide during the time that the young adult consents to giving the department legal responsibility for care and placement.
“Wayward,” when applied to a child, means and includes any child:
1. Who has deserted his or her home without good or sufficient cause;
2. Who habitually associates with dissolute, vicious, or immoral persons;
3. Who is leading an immoral or vicious life;
4. Who is habitually disobedient to the reasonable and lawful commands of his or her parent or parents, guardian, or other lawful custodian;
5. Who, being required by chapter 19 of title 16 to attend school, willfully and habitually absents himself or herself from school or habitually violates the rules and regulations of the school when he or she attends;
6. Who has, on any occasion, violated any of the laws of the state or of the United States or any of the ordinances of cities and towns, other than ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles; or
7. Any child under seventeen (17) years of age who is in possession of one ounce (1 oz.) or less of marijuana, as defined in § 21-28-1.02 , and who is not exempted from the penalties pursuant to chapter 28.6 of title 21.
“Young adult” means an individual who has attained the age of eighteen (18) years but has not reached the age of twenty-one (21) years and was in the legal custody of the department on their eighteenth birthday pursuant to an abuse, neglect or dependency petition; or was a former foster child who was adopted or placed in a guardianship after attaining age sixteen (16).
The singular shall be construed to include the plural, the plural the singular, and the masculine the feminine, when consistent with the intent of this chapter.
For the purposes of this chapter, “electronic surveillance and monitoring devices” means any “radio frequency identification device (RFID)” or “global positioning device” that is either tethered to a person or is intended to be kept with a person and is used for the purposes of tracking the whereabouts of that person within the community.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-3 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 252, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 291, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 216, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 542, § 9; P.L. 1994, ch. 178, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 260, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 17, § 3; P.L. 2016, ch. 407, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 408, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 47, art. 15, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 248, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 407, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 408, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

This section was amended by three acts (P.L. 2018, ch. 47, art. 15, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 248, § 1) as passed by the 2018 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all three acts.

P.L. 2018, ch. 153, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 248, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2016, ch. 407, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2016.

P.L. 2016, ch. 408, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2016.

Cross References.

Curfew streets, §§ 11-9-11 , 11-9-12 .

False fire alarms, § 11-44-21 .

Firearms violations by minors, § 11-47-32 et seq.

Organization and powers of family court, § 8-10-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.
Appropriate Person.
Delinquent.
Dependent or Neglected.
Determination of Age.
Wayward Child.

In General.

In situations of child neglect, dependency or abuse, the court’s approach should be three dimensional with due consideration given to the interests of the parents, the children and the state. In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1709 (R.I. 1980).

Appropriate Person.

“Appropriate person” as defined for the purposes of §§ 14-1-10 and 14-1-11 does not include an uncle or aunt who by petition are seeking visitation privileges relating to a niece. Ryan v. De Mello, 116 R.I. 264 , 354 A.2d 734, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1274 (1976).

A child advocate, as head of an agency meeting requirements set forth in subdivision (2)(v), is an “appropriate person” for purposes of §§ 14-1-10 and 14-1-11 . In re R.J.P., 445 A.2d 286 (R.I. 1982).

Delinquent.

By virtue of the holding in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970), an adjudication by the family court that two juveniles were delinquent and wayward within the meaning of this section on the basis of evidence found to be “clear and convincing” of conduct which would constitute robbery and assault, was a denial of due process where a standard of proof lying somewhere between “fair preponderance” and “beyond a reasonable doubt” was applied rather than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Turner, 107 R.I. 518 , 268 A.2d 732, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 803 (1970).

Nothing contained in § 11-37-8.1 , which states that a person is guilty of first degree child molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual penetration with a person fourteen (14) years of age or under, prevents a finding of “delinquency” as defined in subdivision (5) upon one under the age of 14, even though such a minor would be within the class of persons sought to be protected by the criminal molestation statute. In re Odell, 672 A.2d 457, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 110 (R.I. 1996).

Dependent or Neglected.

Petition under § 14-1-12 attributing neglect of child to lack of proper parental care and guardianship within definition of this section constitutes sufficient notice of the nature of the action and is not violative of procedural due process under U.S. Const., Amend. 14. In re Three Minor Children, 110 R.I. 11 , 289 A.2d 434, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 871 (1972).

Evidence that respondent-father had violent nature, was a stern disciplinarian of children, ages one and three, and was charged with the murder of children’s mother justified finding of his unfitness to exercise proper parental control and guardianship under subparagraph H. Engelhardt v. Bergeron, 113 R.I. 50 , 317 A.2d 877, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1136 (1974).

Subdivision (6) requires a finding that the allegedly offending conditions or conduct is, or is likely to become harmful to the best interest of the child before the child may be found to be dependent and/or neglected. In re Jonathan, 415 A.2d 1039 (R.I. 1980).

This section, requires a finding that the allegedly offending conditions or conduct is, or is likely to become harmful to the best interest of the child before the child may be found to be dependent and/or neglected. In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1709 (R.I. 1980).

The trial justice in a neglect and/or dependency proceeding is required at least to articulate his findings in regard to the emotional and physical welfare of the child in light of the parent’s alleged misconduct. In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1709 (R.I. 1980); In re Jonathan, 415 A.2d 1036, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1647 (R.I. 1980); In re Crystal, Joshua, & Jacqueline A., 448 A.2d 1226, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 987 (R.I. 1982), aff'd, In re Crystal, 476 A.2d 1030, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 513 (R.I. 1984) (decided prior to 1984 amendment).

To show dependency, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence only that a child is actually suffering or is likely to suffer physical and/or emotional harm. In re Crystal, Joshua, & Jacqueline A., 448 A.2d 1226, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 987 (R.I. 1982), aff'd, In re Crystal, 476 A.2d 1030, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 513 (R.I. 1984) (decided prior to 1984 amendment).

The trial court erred in making a finding of dependency absent an amendment to the petition before her, which alleged that the mother was abusing and neglecting her children. In re Adam R., 665 A.2d 882, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 239 (R.I. 1995).

Although the lack of housing and the need for parental aid services are not explicitly articulated in subdivision (6), those basic needs are implicitly encompassed within the statutory definition of the term “dependent.” In re Robert S., 762 A.2d 1199, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 212 (R.I. 2000).

There was legally sufficient clear and convincing evidence supporting a dependency finding since the father had made his children “dependent” by virtually abandoning them from the day of their births. In re Robert S., 762 A.2d 1199, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 212 (R.I. 2000).

Children of a mother who had paranoid schizophrenia and denied the children toys, books, medical and dental care, and any education other than what was “revealed” to her, were properly adjudicated as dependent on the family court for protection. In re Ephraim L., 862 A.2d 196, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 205 (R.I. 2004).

Children were neglected and dependent under R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-3(8) and (6) as to a father as there was evidence that the children were at risk of being harmed, based on lack of parental supervision, substance abuse, and domestic violence by and between the parents; although the father alleged there was no evidence of domestic violence, the trial justice did not believe the mother’s denials. In re Jermaine H., 9 A.3d 1227, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 114 (R.I. 2010).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial justice’s finding that a father’s son was dependent because the father admitted using a knife to remove an extra digit from the child’s hand. In re King J., 148 A.3d 176, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 112 (R.I. 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial justice’s finding that a father’s son was dependent because (1) the son’s sibling was properly found to be dependent, and (2) the father failed to comply with a case plan and psychological evaluation, believing he did not need the plan’s services. In re King J., 148 A.3d 176, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 112 (R.I. 2016).

Trial justice did not abuse her discretion in not allowing the father to admit the allegations of dependency. The reason for the father’s incarceration was his decision to engage in criminal activity; while prior to his incarceration, he made admirable efforts to provide for his family, he was aware of the mother’s history of alcoholism, and when her relapse occurred, only nine weeks after his initial detention, the father was not in a position to care for the child. In re Kurt H., 152 A.3d 408, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 9 (R.I. 2017).

Dependency is by definition a condition involving harm or potential harm to a child that arises without fault by the parent, and if the parent’s inability to provide the child with a minimum degree of care or proper supervision is a result of the parent’s incarceration, it can hardly be argued that the parent is without fault. In re Kurt H., 152 A.3d 408, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 9 (R.I. 2017).

Legally competent evidence supported the trial justice’s findings of neglect; when the child was placed in the temporary custody of the department, the father was unable to provide for the child because of his incarceration, and when the case was tried and a decision rendered, the father had made no arrangements for the child’s well-being and was unable himself to care for the child because of his incarceration. In re Kurt H., 152 A.3d 408, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 9 (R.I. 2017).

Determination of Age.

At common law a person reaches his or her next year in age at the first moment of the day prior to the anniversary date of his or her birth. In re Edward, 441 A.2d 543, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 807 (R.I. 1982).

Wayward Child.

Because a sister’s description of what her daughter told her satisfied the requirements of an excited utterance under R.I. R. Evid. 803 (2), and because a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived the juvenile’s Miranda rights before giving a full and detailed statement of the events, the juvenile’s motion to suppress was properly denied, the evidence was properly admitted, and the juvenile was properly adjudicated a wayward child. In re Frances G., 30 A.3d 630, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 132 (R.I. 2011).

Collateral References.

School, prosecution under laws as to truants and delinquent or neglected children where child is expelled from, for refusal to take oath of allegiance, to salute flag, or to participate in other ritual of a patriotic character. 141 A.L.R. 1034, 147 A.L.R. 698.

Truancy as indicative of delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant or juvenile. 5 A.L.R.4th 1212.

What constitutes delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant. 45 A.L.R. 1533, 85 A.L.R. 1099.

14-1-4. Idleness or frequenting of disreputable places.

Every child who has completed sixteen (16) years of life and has not completed eighteen (18) years of life and who habitually spends his or her time in idleness without just and sufficient reason or cause, or in frequenting poolrooms, places where intoxicating liquors are sold, gambling places, or houses of ill repute, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor; and upon conviction shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 76, § 9; P.L. 1926, ch. 840, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 181, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-4 .

Cross References.

Billiard, bagatelle, pool, or scippio table, use by minor, § 5-2-13 .

Unescorted minors, admission to shows and exhibitions, § 5-22-23 .

Collateral References.

Vagrancy of minors. 14 A.L.R. 1507.

14-1-5. Exclusive jurisdiction.

The court shall, as set forth in this chapter, have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:

Concerning any child residing or being within the state who is: (i) Delinquent; (ii) Wayward; (iii) Dependent; (iv) Neglected; or (v) Mentally disabled;
Concerning adoption of children;
To determine the paternity of any child alleged to have been born out of wedlock and to provide for the support and disposition of that child in case that child or the child’s mother has residence within the state; and
[Deleted by P.L. 2021, ch. 39, § 3 and P.L. 2021, ch. 40, § 3.]
Referred to the court in accordance with the provisions of § 14-1-28 .

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-5 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 178, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 260, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 18; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 18; P.L. 2018, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 248, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 39, § 3, effective June 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 40, § 3, effective June 7, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 153, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 248, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 39, § 3, and P.L. 2021, ch. 40, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Jurisdiction of offenses against children, § 11-9-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.
Adoption.
- — Jurisdiction.
Age.
Civil Actions.
Dependency.
Mentally Defective or Disordered.
Paternity.
Residence.
Termination of Parental Rights.

In General.

Superior court has jurisdiction over an indictment if the accused was over the specified age at the time the indictment was filed, even though the accused was under the age at the time of the alleged offense. Ex parte Albiniano, 62 R.I. 429 , 6 A.2d 554, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1939).

The family court has exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings involving delinquent or wayward children. United States v. DiPina, 178 F.3d 68, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 10936 (1st Cir. 1999).

Pursuant to R.I. Const. art. I, § 7 , dismissal of the separate cases brought against the defendants, in the Superior Court and in the District Court, respectively, would not be proper despite the fact that those courts did not have jurisdiction over the defendants because they were only 17-years-old at the time they committed the alleged offenses. Rather, the proper thing to do would be to transfer those cases to the court having exclusive original jurisdiction, which was the Family Court pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-5 . State v. Greenberg, 951 A.2d 481, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 88 (R.I. 2008).

Adoption.

In order to protect the best interests of the child, the decision of a placement agency to remove a child from the home of the prospective adoptive parents must be subject to judicial review, and the family court is the proper forum for such review. In re Joseph, 420 A.2d 85, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1850 (R.I. 1980).

Although the prospective adoptive parents may not have been entitled to the permanent custody of a child prior to filing an adoption petition, the removal of the child from their care, which would have effectively foreclosed the possibility of adoption for them, constituted an injury in fact and having been thus injured, they had standing to contest that action in the family court. In re Joseph, 420 A.2d 85, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1850 (R.I. 1980).

The discretion that § 14-1-35 confers on an agency as a guardian to consent to the adoption of a child placed in its custody pursuant to § 14-1-34 is not absolute; it remains subject to judicial review by the family court. In re Joseph, 420 A.2d 85, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1850 (R.I. 1980).

— Jurisdiction.

The Family Court retains jurisdiction to hear an adoption petition notwithstanding the appointment of a temporary guardian by the Probate Court. In re Jeramie N., 688 A.2d 825, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 29 (R.I. 1997).

Age.

Indictment was illegal and family court had jurisdiction when indictment was based on a complaint filed and warrant issued before the accused had reached the specified age, even though the indictment was found after the accused had reached the specified age. Ex parte Albiniano, 62 R.I. 429 , 6 A.2d 554, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1939).

Civil Actions.

The purpose of the legislative grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Family Court is to protect a delinquent juvenile from the adult criminal justice system, and not to shield such a juvenile from civil liability; the plaintiffs therefore were not precluded from filing a civil action in Superior Court against a juvenile defendant. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

Dependency.

In determining the status of a child to be that of a dependent child under subsection A of this section, it is contemplated that such determination shall be made at a hearing on a petition addressed to the court alleging such dependency. In re Palmer, 100 R.I. 170 , 212 A.2d 61, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 366 (1965).

Mentally Defective or Disordered.

This section did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on family court where parents sought to compel department of mental health, retardation and hospitals to assume costs of treating autistic child, since the child was not “mentally defective or mentally disordered” in the meaning of the statute, such phrase applying only to those juveniles who must of necessity be institutionalized. Naughton v. Goodman, 117 R.I. 113 , 363 A.2d 1345, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1606 (1976).

Paternity.

Notwithstanding its apparent exclusivity, this section conferred upon the family court no broader authority in the area of paternity than had formerly been exercised by those courts to whose jurisdiction the family court succeeded upon its creation in 1961, i.e., determination of paternity only in filiation proceedings, and it was never the practice in this state that the resolution of a paternity issue arising as an incident of litigation properly within the jurisdiction of another tribunal should be deferred by that tribunal pending a referral and a determination of that issue by the family court’s predecessor. Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Isele, 108 R.I. 144 , 273 A.2d 311, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1236 (1971).

Residence.

That portion of subdivision C of this section providing that either the mother or the child must have residence in the state was superseded by the 1949 amendment to § 15-8-1 (repealed, see §§ 15-8-7 , 15-8-9 ). Surber v. Pearce, 97 R.I. 40 , 195 A.2d 541, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1963).

Termination of Parental Rights.

Although the family court may name a placement agency as the guardian of a child after terminating the rights of the natural parents, it does not thereby surrender its jurisdiction over the child. In re Joseph, 420 A.2d 85, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1850 (R.I. 1980).

Collateral References.

Age of child at time of alleged offense or delinquency, or at time legal proceedings are commenced, as criterion of jurisdiction of juvenile court. 89 A.L.R.2d 506.

Contempt, power of juvenile courts to punish for. 8 A.L.R. 1548, 73 A.L.R. 1185.

Divorce court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over custody and maintenance of child as excluding jurisdiction of juvenile court. 146 A.L.R. 1171.

Homicide by juvenile as within jurisdiction of juvenile court. 48 A.L.R.2d 663.

Jurisdiction of another court over child as affected by assumption of jurisdiction by juvenile court. 11 A.L.R. 147, 78 A.L.R. 317, 146 A.L.R. 1153.

Marriage as affecting jurisdiction of juvenile court over delinquent or dependent. 14 A.L.R.2d 336.

State court’s authority, in marital or child custody proceeding, to allocate federal income tax dependency exemption for child to noncustodial parent under § 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 USCS § 152(e)). 77 A.L.R.4th 786.

14-1-5.1. Age in dispute.

In any proceeding under this chapter where the age of a person is in dispute, the person whose age is in dispute shall prove his or her age to the reasonable satisfaction of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 246, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 411, § 1.

14-1-6. Retention of jurisdiction.

When the court shall have obtained jurisdiction over any child prior to the child having attained the age of eighteen (18) years by the filing of a petition alleging that the child is wayward or delinquent pursuant to § 14-1-5 , the child shall, except as specifically provided in this chapter, continue under the jurisdiction of the court until he or she becomes nineteen (19) years of age, unless discharged prior to turning nineteen (19).
When the court shall have obtained jurisdiction over any child prior to the child’s eighteenth (18th) birthday by the filing of a miscellaneous petition or a petition alleging that the child is dependent, neglected, or abused pursuant to §§ 14-1-5 and 40-11-7 or 42-72-14 , the child shall, except as specifically provided in this chapter, continue under the jurisdiction of the court until he or she becomes eighteen (18) years of age; provided, that at least six (6) months prior to a child turning eighteen (18) years of age, the court shall require the department of children, youth and families to provide a description of the transition services including the child’s housing, health insurance, education and/or employment plan; available mentors and continuing support services, including workforce supports and employment services afforded the child in placement; or a detailed explanation as to the reason those services were not offered. As part of the transition planning, the child shall be informed by the department of the opportunity to voluntarily agree to extended care and placement by the department and legal supervision by the court until age twenty-one (21). The details of a child’s transition plan shall be developed in consultation with the child, wherever possible, and approved by the court prior to the dismissal of an abuse, neglect, dependency, or miscellaneous petition before the child’s twenty-first birthday.
A child, who is in foster care on their eighteenth birthday due to the filing of a miscellaneous petition or a petition alleging that the child is dependent, neglected, or abused pursuant to § 14-1-5 , § 40-11-7 , or § 42-72-14 , may voluntarily elect to continue responsibility for care and placement from DCYF and to remain under the legal supervision of the court as a young adult until age twenty-one (21), provided:
1. The young adult was in the legal custody of the department at age eighteen (18); and
2. The young adult is participating in at least one of the following:
  1. Completing the requirements to receive a high school diploma or GED;
  2. Completing a secondary education or a program leading to an equivalent credential; enrolled in an institution that provides postsecondary or vocational education;
  3. Participating in a job-training program or an activity designed to promote or remove barriers to employment;
  4. Be employed for at least eighty (80) hours per month; or
  5. Incapable of doing any of the foregoing due to a medical condition that is regularly updated and documented in the case plan.
A former foster child who was adopted or placed in guardianship with an adoption assistance agreement or a guardianship assistance agreement that was executed on or after his or her sixteenth birthday and prior to his or her eighteenth birthday may voluntarily agree to extended care and placement by the department and legal supervision by the court until age twenty-one (21) if the young adult satisfies the requirements in subsection (c)(2). Provided, however, the department retains the right to review the request and first attempt to address the issues through the adoption assistance agreement by providing post adoptive or post guardianship support services to the young adult and his or her adoptive or guardianship family.
Upon the request of the young adult, who voluntarily agreed to the extension of care and placement by the department and legal supervision by the court, pursuant to subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the court’s legal supervision and the department’s responsibility for care and placement may be terminated. Provided, however, the young adult may request reinstatement of responsibility and resumption of the court’s legal supervision at any time prior to his or her twenty-first birthday if the young adult meets the requirements set forth in subsection (c)(2). If the department wishes to terminate the court’s legal supervision and its responsibility for care and placement, it may file a motion for good cause. The court may exercise its discretion to terminate legal supervision over the young adult at any time.
With the consent of the person previously under the court’s supervision, the court may reopen, extend, or retain its jurisdiction beyond that person’s twenty-first birthday until his or her twenty-second birthday or until September 30, 2021, whichever date occurs first, under the following circumstances:
1. The person aged out of DCYF care or left foster care during the COVID-19 public health emergency, defined as beginning on January 27, 2020, and is entitled to extended benefits pursuant to the terms of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260; and
  1. The court has or had obtained jurisdiction over the person prior to his or her eighteenth birthday by the filing of a miscellaneous petition or a petition alleging that the child is dependent, abused, or neglected pursuant to § 14-1-5 , § 40-11-7 , or § 42-72-14 or after the person’s eighteenth birthday pursuant to a voluntary extension of care petition; and
  2. Court supervision is necessary for the department of children, youth and families to access IV-E funding to support such benefits, in whole or in part; and
  3. Court supervision is required to continue transition planning and to ensure the safety, permanency, and well-being of older youth who remain in or who age out of foster care and re-enter foster care.
The court may retain jurisdiction of any child who is seriously emotionally disturbed or developmentally delayed pursuant to § 42-72-5(b)(24)(v) until that child turns age twenty-one (21) when the court shall have obtained jurisdiction over any child prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday by the filing of a miscellaneous petition or a petition alleging that the child is dependent, neglected, and/or abused pursuant to §§ 14-1-5 , and 40-11-7 , or 42-72-14 .
The department of children, youth and families shall work collaboratively with the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals, and other agencies, in accordance with § 14-1-59 , to provide the family court with a transition plan for those individuals who come under the court’s jurisdiction pursuant to a petition alleging that the child is dependent, neglected, and/or abused and who are seriously emotionally disturbed or developmentally delayed pursuant to § 42-72-5(b)(24)(v) . This plan shall be a joint plan presented to the court by the department of children, youth and families and the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals. The plan shall include the behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals’ community or residential service level, health insurance option, education plan, available mentors, continuing support services, workforce supports and employment services, and the plan shall be provided to the court at least twelve (12) months prior to discharge. At least three (3) months prior to discharge, the plan shall identify the specific placement for the child, if a residential placement is needed. The court shall monitor the transition plan. In the instance where the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals has not made timely referrals to appropriate placements and services, the department of children, youth and families may initiate referrals.
The parent and/or guardian and/or guardian ad litem of a child who is seriously emotionally disturbed or developmentally delayed pursuant to § 42-72-5(b)(24)(v) , and who is before the court pursuant to §§ 14-1-5(1)(iii) through 14-1-5(1)(v), § 40-11-7 , or § 42-72-14 , shall be entitled to a transition hearing, as needed, when the child reaches the age of twenty (20) if no appropriate transition plan has been submitted to the court by the department of children, youth and families and the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals. The family court shall require that the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals shall immediately identify a liaison to work with the department of children, youth and families until the child reaches the age of twenty-one (21) and an immediate transition plan be submitted if the following facts are found:
1. No suitable transition plan has been presented to the court addressing the levels of service appropriate to meet the needs of the child as identified by the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals; or
2. No suitable housing options, health insurance, educational plan, available mentors, continuing support services, workforce supports, and employment services have been identified for the child.
In any case where the court shall not have acquired jurisdiction over any person prior to the person’s eighteenth (18th) birthday by the filing of a petition alleging that the person had committed an offense, but a petition alleging that the person had committed an offense that would be punishable as a felony if committed by an adult has been filed before that person attains the age of nineteen (19) years of age, that person shall, except as specifically provided in this chapter, be subject to the jurisdiction of the court until he or she becomes nineteen (19) years of age, unless discharged prior to turning nineteen (19).
In any case where the court shall not have acquired jurisdiction over any person prior to the person attaining the age of nineteen (19) years by the filing of a petition alleging that the person had committed an offense prior to the person attaining the age of eighteen (18) years that would be punishable as a felony if committed by an adult, that person shall be referred to the court that had jurisdiction over the offense if it had been committed by an adult. The court shall have jurisdiction to try that person for the offense committed prior to the person attaining the age of eighteen (18) years and, upon conviction, may impose a sentence not exceeding the maximum penalty provided for the conviction of that offense.
In any case where the court has certified and adjudicated a child in accordance with the provisions of §§ 14-1-7.2 and 14-1-7.3 , the jurisdiction of the court shall encompass the power and authority to sentence the child to a period in excess of the age of nineteen (19) years. However, in no case shall the sentence be in excess of the maximum penalty provided by statute for the conviction of the offense.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of other courts over offenses committed by any person after he or she reaches the age of eighteen (18) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 274, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 22, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 532, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 9, art. 16, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 475, § 3; P.L. 2015, ch. 118, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 47, art. 15, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 70, § 3; P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 13, § 5, effective July 6, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by two acts ( P.L. 2008, ch. 9, art. 16, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 475, § 3) as passed by the 2008 General Assembly. Since the changes are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by both acts.

P.L. 2015, ch. 118, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 130, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

This section was amended by two acts ( P.L. 2018, ch. 47, art. 15, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 70, § 3) as passed by the 2018 General Assembly. P.L. 2018, ch. 70, § 3, passed by the General Assembly on June 23, 2018, made a correction to the amendment by P.L. 2018, ch. 47, art. 15, § 1, passed by the General Assembly on June 20, 2018.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 14-1-6 (P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-6 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 1, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 118, art. 15, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 327, § 1), concerning the same subject matter, was repealed by both P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 1, and P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 1, effective April 11, 1990 and April 16, 1990, respectively.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Age of Majority.
Civil Actions.
Dependent or Neglected Child.
Loss of Jurisdiction.
Termination of Parental Rights.

Age of Majority.

In reducing the age of majority to 18, the legislature did not thereby implicitly lower the upper limit of the family court’s retained jurisdiction from 21 to 18. In re P., 451 A.2d 274, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1064 (R.I. 1982) (decided prior to reenactment of section by P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 2 and P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 2).

Civil Actions.

Dependent or Neglected Child.

Jurisdiction over child found dependent and neglected is retained by the family court until the child reaches 21 years of age or is earlier discharged from jurisdiction. In re Doe, 533 A.2d 523, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 556 (R.I. 1987) (decided prior to reenactment of section by P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 2 and P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 2).

Loss of Jurisdiction.

When an individual, at age fifteen, admitted to certain criminal counts, was committed by the Family Court to the Training School for Youth until his twenty-first birthday, later assaulted a guard at the school and was transferred to the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) to await trial, was convicted in Superior Court, turned twenty-one, and was sentenced to serve time at the ACI, the Family Court has no authority to require the Department of Children, Youth, and Families to exercise any responsibility or to create any plan with respect to the rehabilitation of this individual. Upon the attainment of the individual’s twenty-first birthday, and from the point of his transfer to the ACI, all such authority passed to the Department of Corrections and the Superior Court. In re Craig P., 671 A.2d 797, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 40 (R.I. 1996).

The Superior Court and District Court could not acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over defendants charged with criminal offenses committed when they were 17-years-old despite an amendment to R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-6 purporting to grant jurisdiction. Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-40(a) , juveniles could not be charged except in accord with “this chapter,” and R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-6 was completely silent with respect to how the Family Court could waive jurisdiction over a child; waiver could only occur pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-7 and § 14-1-7.1 . State v. Greenberg, 951 A.2d 481, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 88 (R.I. 2008).

Termination of Parental Rights.

Collateral References.

Continuing jurisdiction over infant delinquent or offender, power of juvenile court to exercise. 76 A.L.R. 657.

14-1-6.1. Records.

In any case where a court shall have obtained jurisdiction of a juvenile having attained the age of seventeen (17) years pursuant to 2007 P.L. 73, Article 22, section 1:
1. All police records relating to the arrest, detention, apprehension and disposition of the juvenile and all records of identification maintained pursuant to chapter 12-1 of the general laws shall be treated as family court records in accordance with §§ 14-1-64 and 38-2-2 of the general laws; provided, however, that no person and no department, agency or any other instrumentality of the state or of any subdivision thereof shall be held liable or otherwise legally accountable for having disclosed or disseminated any such records in reasonable reliance upon the law in effect between July 1, 2007, and the effective date of this act [November 8, 2007]; and provided further that nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit the use of witness statements and other police records in the course of judicial proceedings initiated prior to the effective date of this act; and
2. All court records of such proceedings shall be sealed upon final disposition of the case in the event of a no information, dismissal or not guilty finding or upon the completion of any sentence, probation and/or parole imposed therein.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 532, § 2.

14-1-6.2. Sentencing.

In any case in which the court shall have jurisdiction of a juvenile pursuant to this chapter, the court shall consider placing the juvenile in the least restrictive appropriate facility or program.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 532, § 2.

14-1-7. Waiver of jurisdiction or certification hearing.

If any child is charged with an offense which would be punishable by life imprisonment if committed by an adult, that child, upon motion of the attorney general, shall be brought before the court and the court shall conduct a waiver hearing pursuant to § 14-1-7.1 .
Any child sixteen (16) years of age or older who is charged with an offense which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult shall, upon motion of the attorney general, be brought before the court and the court shall conduct a waiver hearing pursuant to § 14-1-7.1 .
Any child who is charged with an offense which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult shall, upon motion of the attorney general, be brought before the court and the court shall conduct a certification hearing pursuant to § 14.- 1-7.2.
Any motion for waiver or certification shall be filed with the court within thirty (30) days of arraignment.
In any hearing on a motion for waiver pursuant to § 14-1-7.1 , the court may consider whether or not the child may be alternatively certified pursuant to § 14-1-7.2 .

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 2.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 14-1-7 (P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-7 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 1970, ch. 161, § 1), concerning waiver of jurisdiction over child, was repealed by both P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 1, and P.L. 1990, ch. 18 § 1 effective April 11, 1990 and April 16, 1990, respectively.

Cross References.

Filing of petitions by division of juvenile prosecution, § 42-9-2 .

Law Reviews.

For essay, “Juvenile Waiver in Rhode Island,” see 2 R.W.U.L. Rev. 257 (1997).

For essay, “A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders Is Not a Panacea,” see 2 R.W.U.L. Rev. 277 (1997).

2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Criminal Procedure: State v. Day, 911 A.2d 1042 (R.I. 2006), see 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 565 (2007).

Mackenzie McBurney, Comment: Paying the Price: Eliminating Life Without Parole Sentences for Juveniles in Rhode Island, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 553 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.
New Petition in Superior Court.

Construction.

The policy of lenity applies to the construction of criminal statutes and requires that a court adopt the less harsh of two possible meanings when faced with an ambiguous criminal statute. The waiver statutes of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1 are civil in nature and deal solely with waiver of a family court’s jurisdiction over a child, not with the criminality of the conduct in question; thus, the rule of lenity therefore does not apply to the construction of §§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1 . State v. Day, 911 A.2d 1042, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 192 (R.I. 2006).

New Petition in Superior Court.

There is nothing in the statutory scheme of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1 that restricts the Attorney General from bringing charges against a child in a superior court which are different than those that served as the basis for waiver from a family court, provided the new charges arise from the same nucleus of operative facts. Thus, when the Attorney General’s motion to waive a family court’s jurisdiction with charges of breaking and entering, second-degree robbery, kidnapping, and assault with intent to commit robbery and kidnapping based on a minor defendant’s breaking into a residential treatment facility and kidnapping an employee, a grand jury could indict defendant for burglary, first-degree robbery, felony assault, kidnapping, and larceny of goods valued at greater than $500 based on the same incident, and the indictment was not subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 12 (b)(2). State v. Day, 911 A.2d 1042, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 192 (R.I. 2006).

Collateral References.

Juvenile’s guilty or no contest plea in adult court as waiver of defects in transfer or certification proceedings. 74 A.L.R.5th 453.

14-1-7.1. Waiver of jurisdiction — Proof.

Upon a motion by the attorney general pursuant to § 14-1-7 , the court shall conduct a hearing at which it shall be the duty of the attorney general to produce evidence to enable the court to determine:
1. That probable cause exists to believe that the offense charged has been committed and that the child charged has committed it, unless the proof has been elicited at a prior hearing on detention of the juvenile and the findings have been made by the same justice of the family court who is conducting the waiver proceeding; and
2. That the child’s past history of offenses, history of treatment, or the heinous or premeditated nature of the offense is such that the court finds that the interests of society or the protection of the public necessitate the waiver of jurisdiction of the court over the child.
If the court finds that subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section have been proven by a preponderance of evidence, it may waive jurisdiction over the child and refer the child to the appropriate adult court to be tried for the offense as an adult.
A waiver of jurisdiction over a child pursuant to this section shall constitute a waiver of jurisdiction over that child for the offense upon which the motion is based as well as for all pending and subsequent offenses of whatever nature, and the child shall be referred to the court which would have had jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by an adult. In the event that the child is acquitted of the offense for which the waiver has been sought, the waiver shall be vacated.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 132, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 261, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 14-1-7.1 (P.L. 1972, ch. 282, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 246, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 181, § 1), concerning the prosecution of juveniles who have committed two offenses after the age of sixteen in an adult court, was repealed by both P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 1, and P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 1 effective April 11, 1990 and April 16, 1990, respectively.

Law Reviews.

For essay, “Juvenile Waiver in Rhode Island,” see 2 R.W.U.L. Rev. 257 (1997).

For essay, “A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders Is Not a Panacea,” see 2 R.W.U.L. Rev. 277 (1997).

2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Criminal Procedure: State v. Day, 911 A.2d 1042 (R.I. 2006), see 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 565 (2007).

Mackenzie McBurney, Comment: Paying the Price: Eliminating Life Without Parole Sentences for Juveniles in Rhode Island, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 553 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.
- — Double Jeopardy.
Construction.
Consolidated Petitions.
“For the Offense” Defined.
New Petition in Superior Court.
“Subject to an Indictment” Defined.
Waiver Upheld.

Constitutionality.

The provisions of this section are based upon a reasonable and rational classification and violate neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the U.S. Const., 14th amend. nor any provision of the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island. State v. Berard, 121 R.I. 551 , 401 A.2d 448, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1870 (1979) (decided prior to 1990 repeal and reenactment).

— Double Jeopardy.

The double-jeopardy clause did not bar the state from prosecuting a juvenile defendant in the superior court following his participation in a waiver-of-jurisdiction hearing in the family court, since the double-jeopardy clause applies only to proceedings that are “essentially criminal”, subjecting the defendant to the possibility of punitive incarceration. State v. Grabowski, 644 A.2d 1282, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 196 (R.I. 1994).

Construction.

Consolidated Petitions.

The Family Court had jurisdiction to act on a juvenile’s plea to 19 consolidated petitions, even though several of the offenses occurred after the juvenile’s 16th birthday, where prior to the plea the juvenile had not been adjudged delinquent as to any conduct committed after his 16th birthday. In re Dennis A., 501 A.2d 735, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 602 (R.I. 1985) (decided prior to reenactment of section by P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 2 and P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 2).

“For the Offense” Defined.

The words “for the offense” employed in R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-7.1(b) do not refer to a particular crime, but rather refer to the actions of the accused child. State v. Day, 911 A.2d 1042, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 192 (R.I. 2006).

New Petition in Superior Court.

“Subject to an Indictment” Defined.

The term “subject to an indictment” means an indictable offense. An indictable offense need not be limited to those offenses that are punishable by life imprisonment but include any felony that would be cognizable by a grand jury, even though the felony could at the option of the attorney general be the subject of an information. State v. Kennedy, 556 A.2d 564, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 54 (R.I. 1989) (decided prior to reenactment of section by P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 2 and P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 2).

Waiver Upheld.

Family court’s finding that the interest of society or the protection of the public necessitated the wavier of jurisdiction over defendant was well supported by the evidence adduced at the waiver hearing. State v. Husband, 162 A.3d 646, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 92 (R.I. 2017).

Collateral References.

Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 83 A.L.R.4th 1135.

14-1-7.2. Certification — Proof.

Upon a motion by the attorney general pursuant to § 14-1-7 , the court shall conduct a hearing at which it shall be the duty of the attorney general to produce evidence to enable the court to determine:
1. Probable cause exists to believe that the offense charged has been committed and that the child charged has committed it;
2. The child’s past history of offenses, history of treatment, or the heinous or premeditated nature of the offense is such that the court finds that the interests of society or the protection of the public necessitate the certification; and
3. The jurisdiction of the court but for the exercise of certification is in all likelihood an insufficient period of time in which to accomplish a rehabilitation of the child.
If the court finds that subdivisions (a)(1) — (a)(3) of this section have been proven by a preponderance of evidence, it shall certify the child pursuant to § 14-1-7.3 .
Any person sixteen (16) years of age or older who has been found delinquent for having committed two (2) offenses after the age of sixteen (16), which would render that person subject to an indictment if he or she were an adult, shall be certified pursuant to this section. Any findings for offenses which have occurred prior to April 11, 1990, shall be considered in making a determination of eligibility for certification. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a waiver of jurisdiction of any child pursuant to § 14-1-7.1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 2.

Law Reviews.

For essay, “Juvenile Waiver in Rhode Island,” see 2 R.W.U.L. Rev. 257 (1997).

For essay, “A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders Is Not a Panacea,” see 2 R.W.U.L. Rev. 277 (1997).

Mackenzie McBurney, Comment: Paying the Price: Eliminating Life Without Parole Sentences for Juveniles in Rhode Island, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 553 (2018).

14-1-7.3. Certification — Effect.

Upon a finding by the court that the child is subject to certification pursuant to § 14-1-7.2 , the court shall afford the child a right to a jury trial, and upon conviction for the offense charged, the court shall sentence the child in accordance with one of the following alternatives:
1. Impose a sentence upon the child to the training school for youth until the time that the child attains the age of nineteen (19) years;
2. Impose a sentence upon the child for a period in excess of the child’s nineteenth birthday to the adult correctional institutions, with the period of the child’s minority to be served in the training school for youth in a facility to be designated by the court. However, the sentence shall not exceed the maximum sentence provided for by statute for conviction of the offense.
Any child who is certified shall not be eligible for release from the training school for youth unless, after hearing, the certifying judge, or the chief judge in his or her absence, or his or her designee, determines by clear and convincing evidence that the child will not pose a threat to the public during the term of the release.
In the event that the court has modified the order of certification pursuant to § 14-1-42 by suspending the balance of the sentence imposed, any violation of the terms of the suspended sentence shall be referred to the appropriate adult court to be treated in accordance with the regular procedure of the court, unless the person is under the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the violation, in which case, jurisdiction over the sentence shall continue in the family court.
In the event that the court, after a hearing on modification of the order of certification pursuant to § 14-1-42 , has determined that it has not been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the person has been sufficiently rehabilitated and could be released in the community without posing a danger to the public should the order of certification be modified, the court shall deny the modification of the order of certification and direct the person to serve the balance of his or her sentence under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections in a facility under the control of the department. The sentence, including any term served in the training school for youth, shall be subject to the regulations and statutes governing the parole board.
Any person who commits an offense which would be punishable as a felony if committed by an adult, after having been certified and adjudicated by the family court pursuant to § 14-1-7.2 , may, after a hearing by a justice of the family court to determine that probable cause exists to believe that the child has committed the offense, have the jurisdiction over his or her sentence transferred to the department of corrections to be served in facilities under the control of the department.
A finding that the child is subject to certification shall constitute presumptive evidence of the non-amenability of the person to further treatment in facilities available to the family court and the court shall transfer the jurisdiction over his or her sentence to the department of corrections to be served in facilities under the control of the department, unless the presumption is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence which demonstrates that the person is amenable to treatment in family court facilities.
1. A finding that the child is subject to certification shall also constitute presumptive evidence of the non-amenability of the person to further treatment in facilities available to the family court and the court shall waive jurisdiction over that offense and all subsequent offenses and the child shall be prosecuted for the offense by the court which would have jurisdiction if committed by an adult, unless the presumption is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence which demonstrates that the person is amenable to treatment in family court facilities.
2. A waiver of jurisdiction over a child pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection shall constitute a waiver of jurisdiction over that child for that offense and for all subsequent offenses of whatever nature, and the child shall be referred to the court which would have had jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by an adult.
The name of any person waived or certified and convicted shall be available to the general public.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 22, § 1.

Law Reviews.

For essay, “Juvenile Waiver in Rhode Island,” see 2 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 257 (1997).

For essay, “A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders Is Not a Panacea,” see 2 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 277 (1997).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Placement in Community Facility.
Sentence Modification.

Placement in Community Facility.

Justice of the family court was cloaked with authority to temporarily place a certified juvenile at a facility in the community other than the training school, where the family court justice found that such a facility provided defendant with the best opportunity to rehabilitate himself. In re Harrison, 992 A.2d 990, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 53 (R.I. 2010).

Sentence Modification.

This section does not authorize a trial justice to prospectively and unilaterally suspend the part of a defendant’s sentence that extends beyond his twenty-first birthday. The legislature has enacted specific procedures within this section and § 14-1-42 for sentence modification. In re Nicholas V., 622 A.2d 447, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 85 (R.I. 1993).

14-1-7.4. Waiver or certification of juvenile drug offenders.

A child sixteen (16) years of age or older who has been found delinquent of having committed one felony offense after the age of sixteen (16) involving the unlawful sale, distribution, manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or deliver any controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II of § 21-28-2.08 , shall be either certified pursuant to § 14-1-7.2 or waived pursuant to § 14-1-7.1 for all subsequent felony offenses involving the unlawful sale, distribution, manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or deliver any controlled substance.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 275, § 3.

Law Reviews.

For essay, “Juvenile Waiver in Rhode Island,” see 2 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 257 (1997).

For essay, “A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders Is Not a Panacea,” see 2 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 277 (1997).

14-1-8. Jurisdiction over adults.

The court shall, as set forth in this chapter, have exclusive original jurisdiction to determine all cases of adults involved in matters arising out of § 14-1-5(3) and all cases of adults charged with:

Being responsible for or contributing to the delinquency, waywardness, or neglect of any child under sixteen (16) years of age;
Desertion, abandonment, or failure to provide subsistence for any child dependent upon him or her for support; or
Neglect to send any child to school as required by law.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-8 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Cross References.

Contributing to delinquency of child, § 11-9-4 .

Cruelty to or neglect of child, § 11-9-5 .

Exploitation of children for commercial purposes, § 11-9-1 .

Jurisdiction of offenses against children, § 11-9-9 .

Procedure in adult cases, § 14-1-45 et seq.

Support of delinquent, wayward, or neglected child, § 15-9-1 et seq.

14-1-9. Waiver of jurisdiction over adult.

If an adult is charged with an offense over which the family court may have jurisdiction by virtue of § 14-1-8 , 11-9-9 , or 8-10-4 , the court may waive jurisdiction over the adult and order that adult held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which would otherwise have jurisdiction of that offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-9 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 1987, ch. 568, § 1.

14-1-10. Preliminary investigation on information furnished to court.

Except in case of emergency detention, whenever any appropriate person shall give to the court information in his or her possession that a child is within the provisions of this chapter, it shall be the duty of the court to make a preliminary investigation to determine whether the interests of the public or of the child require that further action be taken, and to report its findings together with a statement of the facts to the judge. The inquiry may include a preliminary investigation of the home and environmental situation of the child, his or her previous history, and the circumstances which were the subject of the information. To avoid duplication of effort and to take full advantage of all existing facilities, the report of any public agency, or of any private social agency licensed by the department of children, youth, and families, may be accepted by the court as sufficient evidence for the filing of a petition.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-10 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; P.L. 1985, ch. 98, § 1.

Cross References.

Appropriate person defined, § 14-1-3 .

Cruelty to or neglect of child, § 11-9-5 .

Defective delinquents, commitment, § 40.1-22-31.

Exploited child, proceedings, § 11-9-3 .

Habitual truants and offenders, proceedings against, §§ 16-19-4 , 16-19-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.
“Appropriate Person.”

In General.

Although it may result in a determination to proceed with further investigation or with an adjudicative proceeding, the investigation by the intake department serves primarily to shield the child from arbitrary bureaucratic action and to forestall the family court from assuming jurisdiction when such would ill serve the interests of the juvenile and the public. In re Leon, 122 R.I. 548 , 410 A.2d 121, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1422 (1980).

“Appropriate Person.”

A report by an “appropriate person” as defined by § 14-1-3 that would require an investigation of a child does not include a report by an uncle or aunt. Ryan v. De Mello, 116 R.I. 264 , 354 A.2d 734, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1274 (1976).

A child advocate, as head of an agency meeting requirements set forth in § 14-1-3 , is an “appropriate person” for purposes of this section. In re R.J.P., 445 A.2d 286 (R.I. 1982).

14-1-11. Authorizing and filing petition.

The filing of the petition constitutes assumption of jurisdiction over the child. Filing shall take place upon authorization by the intake department upon completion of its procedures pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of Juvenile Proceedings, upon authorization by a justice of the family court pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules of Juvenile Proceedings, or immediately upon appearance of the child before the court following emergency detention, unless the court otherwise orders.
In the event that a petition is filed, any appropriate person having knowledge, information, or belief of the material facts that appear to warrant a petition may be a petitioner under this chapter and is not required to give recognizance or surety for costs. The petition shall be directed to the family court of the state of Rhode Island, setting forth, that in the opinion of the petitioner the child is a delinquent, wayward, dependent, or neglected child, or otherwise comes within the provisions of this chapter, and requires the care and protection of the state, and all petitions, with the exception of those requesting the arrest and/or detention of any person, shall be sworn to before a licensed notary public. Those exceptions, as stated above, shall be sworn to by either a justice or clerk of the family court.
No child shall be ordered detained at the training school unless there is pending against the child a petition setting forth facts that would constitute a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult or that alleges a violation of a valid court order, or unless the child is adjudged in contempt of court. Provided, the family court shall not detain a juvenile at the training school for the violation of a valid court order, until a hearing is conducted and it is determined that the child intentionally violated the order, and the violation involves the failure of the child to engage in services or activities intended to protect or promote the child’s health or safety, or the health or safety of any other person or persons.
In the event a child is ordered to be detained at the training school, the family court shall conduct a probable cause hearing within five (5) calendar days of the child’s detention (exclusive of weekends and/or holidays). At the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, the court shall order the release of the child from the training school unless the court finds that the child poses a substantial risk of harm to self or to others.

Nothing in this section prohibits the temporary commitment by the family court to the department of children, youth and families for placement of a child in a specific facility or program other than the training school for youth.
The department of children, youth and families, in consultation with law enforcement agencies, the attorney general, the office of the public defender, and the family court, shall develop and implement a detention risk assessment instrument by no later than July 1, 2009.
No child shall be placed in detention at the training school unless a determination is made by the family court that the child poses a substantial risk of harm to self or to others.
No petition alleging that a child is wayward by virtue of disobedient behavior may be filed except upon proof offered in the petition that the child has been subjected to a needs assessment conducted at a facility approved by the director of the department of children, youth and families and that a treatment plan resulting from that assessment has been unsuccessful.
The director of the department of children, youth and families is authorized and directed to promulgate any rules and regulations that it deems necessary to implement the provisions and purposes of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-11 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 1977, ch. 67, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 184, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 285, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 23, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 17, § 9; P.L. 2015, ch. 190, § 1.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2001, ch.77, art. 23, § 3 provides that this section “shall take effect upon the promulgation and adoption of regulations by the department of children, youth, and families pursuant to section 14-1-11(e) , provided, that any rule or regulation affecting the duties and responsibilities of the family court shall be made with the concurrence of the chief judge of the family court.”

P.L. 2015, ch. 190, § 2 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 30, 2015.

Cross References.

Detention of child pending action of court, § 14-1-21 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authorized Temporary Detention.
Detention of Nonoffender.
Petitioner.

Authorized Temporary Detention.

A family court justice has the authority to order the temporary detention of a 13-year-old in a secured facility while awaiting a hearing on a petition filed by the department of children and their families alleging that the child had been disobedient, where the child has been a habitual runaway who continues to exhibit suicidal tendencies. In re Marlene B., 540 A.2d 1028, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 57 (R.I. 1988).

Detention of Nonoffender.

Detention of a juvenile nonoffender at the training school based on a family court justice’s finding of civil contempt for violating prior placement orders of the court was a violation of this section. In re Dina N., 455 A.2d 318, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 794 (R.I. 1983).

Petitioner.

Neither an uncle nor an aunt are defined by § 14-1-3 as an “appropriate person” pursuant to whose report the family court would assume jurisdiction over a child. Ryan v. De Mello, 116 R.I. 264 , 354 A.2d 734, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1274 (1976).

A child advocate, as head of an agency meeting requirements set forth in § 14-1-3 , is an “appropriate person” for purposes of this section. In re R.J.P., 445 A.2d 286 (R.I. 1982).

14-1-11.1. Commitment of voluntary placements.

The department of children, youth and families shall petition the family court and request the care, custody, and control of any child who is voluntarily placed with the department for the purpose of foster care by a parent or other person previously having custody and who remains in foster care for a period of twelve (12) months. However, there shall be no requirement for the department to seek custody of any child with an emotional, behavioral or mental disorder or developmental or physical disability if the child is voluntarily placed with the department by a parent or guardian of the child for the purpose of accessing an out-of-home program for the child in a program which provides services for children with disabilities, including, but not limited to, residential treatment programs, residential counseling centers, and therapeutic foster care programs.
In a hearing on a petition alleging that a child is dependent, competent and creditable evidence that the child has remained in foster care for a period of twelve (12) months shall constitute prima facie evidence sufficient to support the finding by the court that the child is “dependent” in accordance with § 14-1-3 .
In those cases where a young adult who meets the eligibility criteria in § 14-1-6(c) wishes to continue in foster care after age eighteen (18), the young adult and an authorized representative of DCYF shall, before the youth reaches age eighteen (18), discuss the terms of a voluntary placement agreement for extension of care to be executed upon or after the young adult’s eighteenth birthday.
In those cases where a young adult who meets the eligibility criteria in § 14-1-6(c) exits foster care at or after age eighteen (18), but wishes to return to foster care before age twenty-one (21), DCYF shall file a petition for legal supervision of the young adult, with a voluntary placement agreement for extension of care, executed by the young adult and an authorized representative of DCYF attached.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 190, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 47, art. 15, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

14-1-12. Form and contents of petition.

The petition shall plainly state the facts which bring the child within the provisions of this chapter, and shall set forth the name, age, and residence of:
1. The child;
2. The child’s parents;
3. The child’s other legal guardian, if there is one;
4. The person or persons having custody or control of the child; and
5. The nearest known relative, if no parent or guardian can be found.
If any of the facts required by subsection (a) of this section are not known by the petitioner, the petition shall so state.
The proceeding shall be entitled “In the matter of a child under eighteen (18) years of age”.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-12 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.
Due Process.
Legislative Intent.

In General.

Although § 14-1-3 except violations of ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles from acts constituting juvenile delinquency, the petition need not allege the conduct on which the adjudication would of necessity rest with the precision and certainty of a criminal complaint and the supreme court cannot determine the validity of an adjudication of delinquency under a petition alleging such acts without a transcript of the testimony adduced at the hearing. State v. Cook, 99 R.I. 710 , 210 A.2d 577, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 506 (1965).

Due Process.

Petition under this section alleging neglected child is neglected due to lack of proper parental care and guardianship under the definition in § 14-1-3 comprises sufficient notice of the nature of the action and is not violative of procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment, U.S. Const.In re Three Minor Children, 110 R.I. 11 , 289 A.2d 434, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 871 (1972).

An order restraining the defendant from allowing a certain person to be with her children would be quashed in the absence of any record that would justify it. Desmond v. Brennan, 639 A.2d 1351, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 105 (R.I. 1994).

Where, in the absence of an apparent emergency and without required notice, upon a petition for a psychological evaluation of the petitioner, his two children, and their mother, the general master of the family court ordered custody changed, ordered the requested examination, and ignored serious assertions that these actions would be harmful, due-process rights were violated. Desmond v. Brennan, 639 A.2d 1351, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 105 (R.I. 1994).

Legislative Intent.

It is the legislative intent of this section to afford parents charged with child neglect a greater specification of the evidentiary facts upon which the court is exercising jurisdiction than required by the procedural due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. Const., but the requirements of this section are satisfied when a preliminary investigation has been conducted and finding of facts made under §§ 14-1-10 and 14-1-11 , and it is not necessary that the statement of facts be physically attached to the petition charging child neglect. In re Three Minor Children, 110 R.I. 11 , 289 A.2d 434, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 871 (1972).

14-1-13. Complaints pertaining to feeble-minded persons.

Any complaint brought before the family court under the provisions of title 40.1 shall be brought by the person and in the manner set forth by title 40.1.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-13 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

14-1-14. Petitions for adoption.

Any petition for the adoption of any person under the age of eighteen (18) years shall be brought before the family court in the manner set forth in chapter 7 of title 15.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-14 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

14-1-15. Warrants for offenses against children.

The family court is vested with authority to issue a warrant for any offense by any person as set forth in §§ 11-9-1 — 11-9-8 and chapter 9 of title 15.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-15 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

14-1-16. Summons of child or adult in charge of child.

Upon the filing of a petition, the justice, if satisfied that there is reasonable cause for the petition, may issue a summons requiring the child to appear before the court at a time and place named in it, and shall also cause a summons to be issued to at least one of the parents of the child if either of them is known to reside within the state, or if there is no parent, then to the guardian or other lawful custodian of the child, if there is one known to be so resident, and, if not, then to the person with whom the child resides, if known.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-16 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 1982, ch. 198, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Prior to the time the juvenile is presented to the court for placement pending the delinquency adjudication, he and his parents must be notified in writing of the nature and possible consequences of the placement proceedings. Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1662 (R.I. 1980).

Collateral References.

Construction and effect of provision for service against minor on a parent, guardian, or other designated person. 92 A.L.R.2d 1336.

14-1-17. Service of summons.

The summons shall require the person upon whom it is served to appear before the court at a time and place stated in it for a hearing on the petition, the allegations of which shall be set forth in the summons, and the summons shall be served by reading it to, and leaving a copy with, the person to be served, or by leaving an attested copy at the last and usual place of abode of the person summoned, with some person living there. However, in the event that the justice has reason to believe that the child may not appear upon summons, or in the event that a child has been summoned and does not appear, the justice may issue a warrant reciting the substance of the petition and requiring the officer to whom it is directed to immediately take the child and bring it before the court to be dealt with according to the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-17 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 1985, ch. 98, § 1.

14-1-18. Process running throughout state — Persons authorized to serve.

All summonses, warrants, orders, and other processes issued by the court shall run throughout the state and may be served by any officer authorized to serve the warrants of district courts or by any probation counselor, or by any officer of any private agency, society, or institution prescribed in this chapter, or by any person that may be designated by the justice.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-18 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

14-1-19. Failure to obey summons.

Any parent, guardian, lawful custodian, or other person having the care and control of a child, who shall willfully refuse or neglect to appear in court in accordance with any summons served upon him or her may be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) or be imprisoned not more than three (3) months.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-19 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 55, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Participation by Other Means.
Reason for Non-Appearance.
Representation by Counsel.

Participation by Other Means.

If a parent wishes to be present at a termination hearing but a personal appearance is not possible, the court should ascertain whether alternative means of participation can be afforded the parent and should then direct an attorney representing an out of state incarcerated parent to inform the client of the possibility of participating by deposition, telephone, or with the help of transcripts and communication with counsel. In re Brandon A., 769 A.2d 586, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 98 (R.I. 2001).

Reason for Non-Appearance.

When an effort has been made to ensure a parent’s presence at a termination hearing through the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the record must show at least the reason for that parent’s failure to appear. In re Brandon A., 769 A.2d 586, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 98 (R.I. 2001).

Representation by Counsel.

Notwithstanding the issuance of a summons that gave notice of an obligation to appear and the possible entry of a default, an appearance by counsel constituted a sufficient alternative to a personal appearance by a father summoned to a preliminary hearing, and consequently the court’s entry of default against a father represented by counsel was clearly erroneous. In re Brandon A., 769 A.2d 586, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 98 (R.I. 2001).

14-1-20. Release or placement of child in custody of officer.

Whenever any officer takes a child into custody, he or she shall, unless it is impracticable or has been otherwise ordered by the court, accept the written promise of the parent, guardian, or other custodian of the child to bring the child to the court at the time fixed. Upon that promise the child may be released in the custody of a parent, guardian, or other custodian. If not so released, the child shall be placed in the custody of a probation counselor or other person designated by the court, or shall immediately be taken to the court or other place of detention designated by the court, and the officer taking him or her shall immediately notify the court and shall file a petition when directed to do so by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-20 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Under this section and § 14-1-21 the state has implemented the least restrictive placement procedure of all the available alternatives. Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1662 (R.I. 1980).

14-1-21. Release or detention of child under custody of court.

In the case of any child whose custody has been assumed by the court, the child may, pending the final disposition of the case, be released in the custody of a parent, guardian, or other custodian, or of a probation counselor or other person appointed by the court, to be brought before the court at the designated time. When not released as provided in this section, the child, pending the hearing of the case, shall be detained at the training school subject to §§ 14-1-11 and 14-1-27 .

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-21 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 17, § 9.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Under § 14-1-20 and this section the state has implemented the least restrictive placement procedure of all the available alternatives. Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1662 (R.I. 1980).

14-1-22. Taking child into immediate custody.

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as forbidding any police officer or probation counselor from immediately taking into custody any child who is found violating any law or ordinance, or whose surroundings are such as to endanger his health, morals, or welfare, unless immediate action is taken. In each of these cases, the officer taking the child into custody shall immediately report the fact to the court and the case shall then be proceeded with as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-22 .

14-1-23. Place of detention of juveniles.

The board of police commissioners or other corresponding police authority of each city and town, and the city council of each city and town council of each town where no board of police commissioners or other corresponding police authority, exists, may provide and maintain, in their respective city or town, a suitable place or places not directly connected with any jail or lockup in which children temporarily detained awaiting the action of the court may be kept so long as detention may be necessary.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-23 .

14-1-24. Care of girls detained.

Whenever a girl is detained, she may be placed in the care of a police matron, and in the case of a city or town, the police matron may be one of those required to be appointed under the provisions of chapter 5 of title 13; and the board of police commissioners of any city or town where that board exists may appoint a police matron for that purpose.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-24 .

14-1-25. Arrest of juveniles without warrant.

Any officer authorized to make an arrest for any criminal offense may take into custody without a warrant any child believed to be delinquent or wayward within that officer’s jurisdiction, but in no case shall a child be detained in custody longer than twenty-four (24) hours without being referred to the family court for consideration.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-25 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

14-1-26. Separation from adult offenders.

In case a delinquent or wayward child is taken into custody or detained before or after the filing of a petition, or pending a hearing on the petition, the child shall not be confined in any prison, jail, lockup, or reformatory, or be transported with, or compelled or permitted to associate or mingle with, criminal, vicious, or dissolute persons, but shall be kept under the care of the person arresting the child, or of a police matron as provided in § 14-1-24 , until by order of the court other disposition is made of the child as provided in this chapter; and if the child is ordered to be detained or confined in any of the institutions mentioned in this chapter, the child shall not be conveyed to or from the institution with adult offenders.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-26 .

14-1-26.1. Temporary custody of status and non-offenders.

A juvenile taken into custody at a state, municipal, or college police department for an offense that would not be classified as criminal if committed by an adult, or non-offender juveniles, such as dependent or neglected children, shall be held for identification, investigation, and processing purposes only in an unlocked, multi-purpose room that is not designated for residential use or secure detention. The child shall not be handcuffed to a stationary object and must remain in continuous visual supervision of an agency representative.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 259, § 1.

14-1-27. Temporary detention in public or private institutions.

Subject to § 14-1-11 , provision may be made by the family court for the temporary detention of children at the training school for youth or in the custody of the director of the department of children, youth and families. The court may authorize the temporary placement of children in private homes licensed and approved by the department of children, youth and families and subject to the supervision of the court, or may arrange with any incorporated institution or agency licensed for child care, to receive for temporary care children ordered detained by the court. Unless good cause is shown to delay the commencement of the adjudicatory hearing, if a child is in detention, the family court shall commence the adjudicatory hearing within thirty (30) calendar days from whichever of the following events occurs latest: the date the petition is served on the child; or the date the child is placed in detention. In all such cases, the family court shall conclude the adjudicatory hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days of the commencement of the hearing unless good cause is shown to extend an adjudicatory hearing beyond fifteen (15) calendar days.
In any case wherein the attorney general files an application to waive and/or certify a youth, the juvenile may be detained at the training school for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days. In such cases, the department shall present to the family court a waiver report within forty-five (45) calendar days. At the expiration of ninety (90) days, the attorney general’s petition for waiver and/or certification shall be decided by the family court, unless good cause is shown to extend the time upon which the family court may render such a decision.
When DCYF makes application to the court to take a child into temporary custody due to allegations of abuse and/or neglect or dependency, DCYF shall have the duty to investigate the possibility of placing the child or children with a fit and willing relative not residing with the parents. DCYF shall conduct an assessment into the appropriateness of placement of the child or children with the relative within thirty (30) days of the child’s placement in the temporary custody of DCYF. If the department determines that the relative is a fit and proper person to have placement of the child, the child shall be placed with that relative, unless the particular needs of the child make the placement contrary to the child’s best interests. All placements with relatives shall be subject to criminal records checks in accordance with § 14-1-34 , foster care regulations promulgated by DCYF, and interstate compact approval, if necessary.
If DCYF proposes to place the child with a relative outside the state of Rhode Island, DCYF shall notify the parent who shall have an opportunity to file an objection to the placement with the family court within ten (10) days of receipt of the notice. A hearing shall be held before the child is placed outside the state of Rhode Island.
If the request of a relative for placement of a child or children is denied by DCYF, that relative shall have the right to petition the court for review. The court shall within five (5) days of the request conduct a hearing as to the suitability of temporary placement with the relative and shall make any orders incident to placement that it deems meet and just.
Whenever the court determines that permanent placement or adoption is in the best interest of a child, a fit and willing relative who has been awarded placement of the child shall be given priority over a non-relative, provided that the placement or adoption is in the best interest of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-27 ; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; P.L. 1986, ch. 156, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 84, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 23, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 17, § 9.

Cross References.

Detention of child at training school, § 14-1-11 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Probable Cause Hearing.
Statement of Facts.

Probable Cause Hearing.

Juveniles facing prehearing detention need not be afforded a probable-cause hearing. In light of the state’s interest as parens patriae, it is sufficient that a child can be detained pending final adjudication only pursuant to a specific order of a family court justice following the filing of a formal petition that states plainly the facts bringing the child within the jurisdiction of that court. Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1662 (R.I. 1980).

Statement of Facts.

If the court determines that detention in the custody of the court will best serve the interests of the child and the community, it must articulate in writing the facts and reasons on which it based its decision to detain the juvenile, and a record of the proceedings must be made so that appellate review of the decision might be obtained. Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1662 (R.I. 1980).

14-1-28. Transfer of cases from other courts.

If, during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal charge against any person in any other court it shall be ascertained that the person was under the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of committing the alleged offense, it shall be the duty of the court to immediately transfer the case, together with all the papers, documents, and records of testimony connected with the case, to the family court. The court making the transfer shall order the child to be taken immediately to the family court or to the place of detention designated by the family court, or release the child in the custody of some suitable person, to appear before the family court at a time designated by the family court. The family court shall upon the transfer proceed to hear and dispose of the case in the same manner as if it had been instituted in that court in the first instance.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-28 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Emancipated Minor.

Where the “child” involved in a parental assault is emancipated, not subject to parental control or guardianship, and has maintained his own home and supported himself for two years, it was not error to refuse to transfer such criminal case to the family court. State v. McMahon, 110 R.I. 658 , 296 A.2d 28, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 963 (1972).

14-1-29. Times and places of hearings.

The court shall designate suitable times and places for the hearing of all matters arising within its jurisdiction and may sit at any other times and places within the state that the court may seem best adapted to the carrying out of the purposes of this chapter. Hearings under this chapter may be adjourned from time to time and to different places within the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-29 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

This section contemplates that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (now family court) to adjudge a child to be a dependent child shall be exercised at a hearing on a petition addressed to the court alleging such dependency. In re Palmer, 100 R.I. 170 , 212 A.2d 61, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 366 (1965).

14-1-30. Conduct of hearings.

In the hearing of any case, the general public shall be excluded; only an attorney or attorneys, selected by the parents or guardian of a child to represent the child, may attend, and only those other persons shall be admitted who have a direct interest in the case, and as the justice may direct. All cases involving children shall be heard separately and apart from the trial of cases against adults.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-30 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 6.

Cross References.

Masters of the family court, § 8-10-3.1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.
Guardians.
Jury Trial.
Media.
Proof.

Constitutionality.

The fact that members of the press could be excluded under this provision does not alone render it unconstitutional. Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 834 (R.I. 1982).

This section is fully consonant with the right of a state to protect the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings recognized in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) and Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974). Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 834 (R.I. 1982).

This section is compatible with constitutional free-press guarantees because the press enjoys no greater right of access to juvenile proceedings than does the general public. Excluding the press from the category of those “with a direct interest” in these proceedings is, therefore, clearly permissible. Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 834 (R.I. 1982).

Guardians.

Where the mother of an alleged dependent child is herself a minor and, therefore, not competent to employ an attorney, a guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent her at a hearing under this section. In re Palmer, 100 R.I. 170 , 212 A.2d 61, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 366 (1965).

Jury Trial.

Juvenile delinquency adjudications without a jury are so common to universal practice that, by inference, the legislature saw no necessity to spell out that which had always been the practice, and juvenile was not entitled to trial by jury. In re McCloud, 110 R.I. 431 , 293 A.2d 512, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 933 (1972).

Media.

In situations in which the media have published, or in some other manner made public, the name of a juvenile involved in a proceeding in the family court; or when, prior to the commencement of the proceeding, the media have made known to the trial justice their intention to make such name public, the trial justice should, at the earliest possible opportunity, conduct a hearing at which representatives of the media and of the state or other local prosecuting authority shall be allowed to place on the record such evidence as the parties deem necessary concerning the source of information regarding the juvenile’s identity and the manner in which that information was obtained. Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 834 (R.I. 1982).

If a trial justice determines after a hearing that the media have learned the name of the juvenile from nonjudicial sources, as a result of their own investigations, or under similar circumstances, he shall permit the representatives of the media to report, publish, or make public the name of such juvenile and shall permit the representatives of the media to attend the hearing or proceeding in the family court. Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 834 (R.I. 1982).

If, after a hearing, the trial justice determines that the media have learned the name of a juvenile from a judicial source or sources or that the media have learned the name of a juvenile as a result of their presence at a proceeding in the family court, he shall order that the media shall not report, publish, or otherwise make public the name of that juvenile and may also order that the media not be permitted to attend any proceedings in the family court involving that juvenile or may impose the additional sanction of exclusion from other juvenile proceedings. Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 834 (R.I. 1982).

Proof.

Where the state attempted to have a juvenile declared wayward or delinquent because he violated a state criminal statute, the state had to prove each and every element of the offense charged. In re Pereira, 111 R.I. 712 , 306 A.2d 821, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1267 (1973).

Collateral References.

Evidence, applicability of rules of, to juvenile delinquency proceeding. 43 A.L.R.2d 1128.

The Family Court retains jurisdiction to hear an adoption petition notwithstanding the appointment of a temporary guardian by the Probate Court. 39 A.L.R.5th 103.

Testimony by children, power of juvenile court to require. 151 A.L.R. 1229.

14-1-30.1. Compelling evidence in hearings — Immunity.

In the hearing of any case in which a child is alleged to be delinquent or wayward, if a person refuses to answer a question or produce other evidence of any kind on the ground that he or she may be incriminated by it, or if a child refuses to answer a question or produce other evidence of any kind on the ground that it supports a finding that he or she is delinquent or wayward, and if the attorney general, in writing, requests the chief judge of the family court or his or her designee to order that person or child to answer the question or produce the evidence, the court, in its discretion, after notice to the witness, may order the person or child to answer the question or produce the evidence. In deciding those matters, the chief judge or his or her designee shall consider whether the person may be incriminated, or whether the evidence may support a finding that the child is delinquent or wayward, in some other jurisdiction. After complying, and if, but for this section, he or she would have been privileged to withhold the answer given or the evidence produced by him or her, that person or child shall not be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which, in accordance with the order, he gave answer or produced evidence. But he or she may, nevertheless, be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for any perjury, false swearing, or contempt committed in answering or failing to answer, or in producing, or failing to produce, evidence in accordance with the order.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 217, § 2.

Cross References.

Compelling evidence in adult cases, § 14-1-45.1 .

14-1-30.2. Foster parents — Notice of court proceedings.

The department of children, youth and families shall provide notice to foster parents, pre-adoptive parents or relatives providing care for a child of any review or hearing to be held with respect to a child in the care of the department. The foster parents, pre-adoptive parents or relatives providing care for a child may attend the hearing and file with the court a report, either written or oral, for the purpose of conveying to the court information relating to the best interest of the child. Nothing in this section shall be construed to give the foster parents, pre-adoptive parents or relatives providing care for a child legal standing as a party to the petition.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 193, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 87, § 1.

14-1-31. Services of public defender.

Prior to the commencement of any hearing, the justice shall advise the parent or guardian of any child, or the adult involved, as the case may be, that if he or she is financially unable to engage counsel, he or she is entitled to the services of the public defender. The public defender shall, at the request of a justice of the family court, appear in court on behalf of that person.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-31 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.
Guardians.
Right to Counsel.

In General.

Probation counselor’s advice, even when coupled with statement of trial justice to defendant juvenile’s mother that her boy had a right to an attorney, did not relieve trial justice of his obligation to tell both mother and son of the child’s right to be represented by either retained or appointed counsel. Gonsalves v. Devine, 110 R.I. 515 , 294 A.2d 206, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 947 (1972).

Guardians.

Since the mother of an alleged dependent child who is herself a minor and, therefore, not sui juris, cannot avail herself of the right to counsel granted by this section, the court should appoint a guardian ad litem for her. In re Palmer, 100 R.I. 170 , 212 A.2d 61, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 366 (1965).

Right to Counsel.

If a juvenile charged with acts of delinquency which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult is unable to afford counsel, a public defender should be made available to advise the person. In re John D., 479 A.2d 1173, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 550 (R.I. 1984).

Collateral References.

Duty to advise accused as to right to assistance of counsel. 3 A.L.R.2d 1003.

Right to and appointment of counsel. 60 A.L.R.2d 691.

What constitutes waiver of right to counsel by minor accused. 71 A.L.R.2d 1160.

14-1-32. Power of court to order disposition of child.

If the court finds that a child is delinquent, wayward, neglected, dependent, or otherwise within the provisions of this chapter, it may by order duly entered proceed as follows:

The court may place the child on probation or under supervision in his or her own home or in the custody of a relative or other suitable person, or in the custody of the director of children, youth and families, upon any terms the court determines. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the placement of a child in any facility licensed or approved by another department of state government, upon any terms that the court shall determine; provided, that if the court finds that a child is delinquent or wayward for any offense which has resulted in damage to the property of another, then the court may order that appropriate monetary restitution be made immediately to the owner of the damaged property by the child, his or her parent, parents, or guardian or other lawful custodian, upon examination and after a finding that the child, or his or her parent, parents, or guardian or other lawful custodian, has the ability to pay restitution.
The court may order the child to engage in community restitution at a state or municipal agency or department in addition to or in lieu of restitution, for a period of time to be determined by the court.
The court may order the parent or parents of the child to undertake a program of counseling, which program shall be designed to attempt to remedy those conditions which led to the child’s coming before the court.
The court may, by order duly entered, prior to a finding that a child is delinquent, wayward, neglected, dependent, or otherwise within the provisions of this chapter, place the petition on file. The court may, in its discretion, attach conditions to the petition. The conditions shall be a valid court order. If no action is taken on the petition for a period of one year or less, if so ordered, following the filing, the authorization issuing the petition shall be revoked by the clerk and the petition shall be closed.
The court may, after a hearing on either a stenographic or tape recorded record, and after also considering any need of the juvenile and/or the juvenile’s family for the juvenile to have a driver’s license, the relative benefits of the juvenile retaining or losing driving privileges, and whether any circumstances in the school environment or educational services are adversely affecting the juvenile’s school attendance deny, revoke, suspend and/or reinstate a juvenile’s driving privileges including both the learning license and/or driver’s license of any juvenile deemed wayward as a result of the family court finding the child truant pursuant to chapter 19 of title 16 and/or wayward/delinquent.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-32 ; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; P.L. 1976, ch. 292, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 251, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 199, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 23, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 105, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 167, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 105, § 1, and P.L. 2004, ch. 167, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2004, ch. 105, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect on January 15, 2005.

P.L. 2004, ch. 167, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect on January 15, 2005.

Cross References.

Commitment of juveniles on failure to give recognizance, § 12-13-9 .

Power of family court to order restitution, § 12-19-33 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.
Diversion of Juvenile Offenders.
Grounds.
Restitution.
Statement of Findings.
Visitation Rights.

In General.

In cases of children abandoned or neglected by their parents, the family court stands in loco parentis charged by the legislature with the responsibility of placing children who come within its protection in the custody of a person or agency qualified to provide them with the care and consideration they should have received from their parents. In re Loudin, 101 R.I. 35 , 219 A.2d 915, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 347 (1966).

Municipal probate courts lack the jurisdiction to decide petitions for guardianship opposed by a parent, which petitions may not be decided without the participation of the family court, as that court alone has the express statutory power to divest a parent of custody and/or parental rights, along with the expertise and resources essential to exercise such power. Carr v. Prader, 725 A.2d 291, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 54 (R.I. 1999).

Diversion of Juvenile Offenders.

The existence of specific provisions for the diversion of juvenile offenders suggests that the state does not regard an adjudication of delinquency resulting in incarceration in the state training school as diversionary. United States v. DiPina, 230 F.3d 477, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27325 (1st Cir. 2000).

Grounds.

Unless the state can prove by clear and convincing evidence that a child is actually suffering or is likely to suffer physical and/or emotional harm, there is no reason to disturb the basic security of a family relationship. In re Jonathan, 415 A.2d 1036, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1647 (R.I. 1980).

Where father had violent nature, was a stern disciplinarian of children, ages one and three, and was charged with the murder of children’s mother, children were dependent and neglected as father was unfit to exercise proper parental control and guardianship. Engelhardt v. Bergeron, 113 R.I. 50 , 317 A.2d 877, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1136 (1974).

Where contestants in custody dispute were maternal relatives and father of minors, family court had jurisdiction to award custody to relatives after finding father unfit due to allegedly killing children’s mother plus other evidence. Engelhardt v. Bergeron, 113 R.I. 50 , 317 A.2d 877, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1136 (1974).

Restitution.

“Damage to property”, as that phrase is used in this section, means any deprivation, loss, or impairment of the use of one’s property, whether by physical destruction, theft, or otherwise. In re Randy B., 486 A.2d 1071, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 426 (R.I. 1985).

Obtaining property by false pretenses falls within the restitution proviso of this section. In re Randy B., 486 A.2d 1071, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 426 (R.I. 1985).

Statement of Findings.

Visitation Rights.

Family court’s power to grant visitation rights is statutory and since visitation portion of the petition of an aunt and uncle seeking custody and right to visit niece was not an ancillary facet of either a divorce proceeding or a neglect and dependency proceeding, the court was without jurisdiction to grant visitation rights. Ryan v. De Mello, 116 R.I. 264 , 354 A.2d 734, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1274 (1976).

Collateral References.

Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 83 A.L.R.4th 1135.

Notice and hearing to parent before commitment of delinquent, dependent or neglected children. 76 A.L.R. 247.

Truancy as indicative of delinquency or incorrigibility, justifying commitment of infant or juvenile. 5 A.L.R.4th 1212.

14-1-32.1. Juvenile victim restitution program.

If a judge of the family court finds that a child is delinquent, wayward, or otherwise within the provisions of this chapter, and places the child on probation, he or she shall, where appropriate, require the child to compensate the victim for losses due to the act of the child, and the child shall make restitution in a reasonable amount within a reasonable period of time and in accordance with that payment schedule established by the judge from funds earned by the child pursuant to employment engaged in by the child. The restitution shall be made under the direction of a probation counselor in cooperation with the administrator of the juvenile victim restitution program within the family court.
If the child is not employed, the probation counselor, in cooperation with the restitution program administrator or a member of his or her staff, shall make a reasonable effort to find private or other public employment for the child. However, if the child does not have employment after a reasonable time and private or other public employment is not obtained, despite the efforts of the restitution program staff, the child shall, where appropriate, be directed by the court to perform work in some type of community restitution and with arrangements for compensation pursuant to § 14-1-32.2 . If parents make monetary restitution, the child may still be ordered to perform community restitution without compensation.
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the employer of a juvenile hired pursuant to the provisions of this section shall receive a credit of ten percent (10%) of the amount of wages paid to the juvenile annually against the state income tax owed by the employer, provided the credit shall not exceed the sum of three thousand dollars ($3,000) annually.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 244, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 220, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 345, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 167, art. XXIV, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 185, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “community restitution” for “community service” in subsection (b).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is set out to correct an error appearing in the 2000 Reenactment volume.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Probation.

This section should not be read so as to require that a juvenile must be placed on probation before he can be ordered to pay any restitution. Rather, it should be understood as a legislative directive under which a justice of the family court is authorized and exhorted to consider an order of restitution in the event that he places a juvenile on probation for delinquent conduct. In re Randy B., 486 A.2d 1071, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 426 (R.I. 1985).

14-1-32.2. Administration of program — Payment for services.

The family court shall be responsible for the administration of the restitution program, shall oversee and coordinate all local community based juvenile restitution programs, and shall process and make all payments to children who are required to perform community restitution in lieu of other public or private employment pursuant to § 14-1-32.1 . The probation counselor responsible for a child offender, or a child restitution office in the local city or town, shall maintain time sheets and other documents necessary to determine and process the payment of child offenders. Remuneration for the services provided by the child offender in a community restitution job shall be made as a wage payment by check, with the child offender listed as the payee. However, the check shall be mailed to the child’s probation counselor or a child restitution office established by the cities and towns. The child offender shall pay the victim of his or her acts seventy-five percent (75%) of each payment and twenty-five percent (25%) of the payment shall be retained by the child. This same percentage shall apply to the child offender who is otherwise employed at the time he or she is required to make restitution.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 244, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 167, art. XXIV, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “community restitution” for “community service” twice.

14-1-32.3. Appropriations.

The general assembly shall appropriate one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) for support and maintenance of the pilot juvenile restitution program; and the state controller is authorized and directed to draw his or her orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of that appropriation or so much of it as may be necessary for the purposes appropriated, upon receipt by him or her of properly authenticated vouchers.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 244, § 1.

14-1-32.4. Family counseling for drug or alcohol related offenses.

If the court finds that a child is delinquent or wayward for any violation of the Rhode Island Controlled Substances Act, chapter 28 of title 21, the court may order the child, his or her parent(s), guardian(s), and/or other lawful custodian(s) to participate in a program of counseling designed to attempt to remedy the conditions which led to the child’s coming before the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 284, § 5.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

14-1-33. Supervision of child placed on probation.

Whenever the court places a child on probation, the court may do so upon any terms and conditions, not inconsistent with law, that the court may deem best for the welfare of the child, but unless otherwise ordered by the court, a probation counselor may make any arrangements for the care of the child that he or she may deem best for its welfare, and may release the child in the care of its parent, guardian, or other lawful custodian, or in the care of any relative of the child. If a child has been placed on probation as provided in this chapter, the probation counselor may at any time before the discharge of the child take the child before the court without a warrant, or the court may issue a warrant to bring the child before the family court. When the child is before the court, the court may make any disposition of the case which it might have made before the child was placed on probation, or may continue or extend the period of probation.
At the end of the probation period of a child, the probation counselor shall make a report to the court, in writing, as to the conduct of the child during that period.
If, at any time during a child’s probationary term, the child is charged with an additional and subsequent delinquency offense, which if committed by an adult would be considered a felony, the probation counselor shall file a petition in the family court alleging that the child has violated probation.
If, at any time during a child’s probationary term the child is charged with an additional and subsequent wayward/disobedient or status offense, the probation counselor may file a petition in the family court alleging that the child has violated probation.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-33 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 2013, ch. 334, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 415, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 334, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 415, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Conditions of Probation.
Violation of Probation.

Conditions of Probation.

When imposing conditions of probation, a court is vested with broad discretion in order that the best interest of the juvenile will be served, and its exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed unless such discretion is abused. In re Susan, 122 R.I. 677 , 411 A.2d 296, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1432 (1980).

Violation of Probation.

Implicit in the provisions of this section is the requirement that the child not be brought before the court after probation unless a triggering event or condition occurs and such event or occurrence must be established to the court’s reasonable satisfaction. In re Leigh, 121 R.I. 198 , 397 A.2d 508, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1763 (1979).

The trial court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when, in the absence of any evidence, it held that a child had violated her probation. In re Leigh, 121 R.I. 198 , 397 A.2d 508, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1763 (1979).

14-1-34. Placement of dependent and neglected children — Criminal records of foster parents made available.

If, after a hearing on any petition, a child shall be found to be dependent or neglected within the meaning of this chapter, the court shall by decree assign the custody of the child to the director of children, youth and families, for any period that shall seem fit to the court; and the director of children, youth and families shall become entitled to the custody of the child to the exclusion of any other person. The court may at any time, for good cause shown, modify or revoke the decree.
The department of children, youth and families shall apply to the bureau of criminal identification of the state police or the local police department for a nationwide criminal records check of prospective foster parents or the department of children, youth and families may directly process a nationwide criminal records check of prospective foster parents and any household member age 18 and older. The check will conform to the applicable federal standards including the taking of fingerprints to identify the applicant. The department of children, youth and families shall request the attorney general, through the division of criminal identification, to make available any criminal record of present and prospective foster parents. The attorney general shall immediately comply with that request, and the department of children, youth and families shall examine these records in determining the suitability of these persons to be foster parents. The criminal record check shall be conducted without charge to the foster parents. At the conclusion of the background check required in this section, the state police, attorney general, or the local police department shall promptly destroy the fingerprint record of the applicant obtained pursuant to this chapter.
No license shall be issued by the department of children, youth and families to any individual seeking to be licensed as a foster parent until such time as the results of both the nationwide and statewide, criminal record background check, including the nature of any prior criminal record, are forwarded to the department of children, youth and families. The department may authorize the placement of a child in a prospective foster home pending licensure for a period not to exceed six (6) months only after the department has conducted a DCYF background check pursuant to § 40-13.2-3.1 and a statewide criminal record background check. In the event the department is unable to complete the licensing process within six (6) months of the child’s placement in the foster home, and if the department determines that continued placement of the child in said foster home is in the child’s best interest, the department shall file a petition with the family court to seek authorization to allow the child(ren) to remain in the foster home pending completion of the licensing process. The department shall provide notice of all such petitions to the office of the child advocate, children(s) parent/guardian, and CASA attorney.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-34 ; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; P.L. 1978, ch. 77, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 285, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 231, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 138, art. 43, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 107, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 23, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 23, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 25, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 22, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 147, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 154, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations and deleted “the department of” following “director of” in subsection (a).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 23, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 25, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

This section was amended by three acts (P.L. 2007, ch. 23, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 25, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 22, § 1) passed by the 2007 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all three Acts.

Subsection (d), as added by P.L. 2007, ch. 23, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 25, § 1, was redesignated as subsection (c) pursuant to the director of law revision of the joint committee on legislative services.

P.L. 2016, ch. 147, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 154, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Proceedings to declare child in care of orphanage dependent or neglected, § 14-3-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.
Adoption.
Changes in or Modification of Court Orders.
Member of Indian Tribe.
Visitation Rights.

In General.

Adoption.

The discretion that § 14-1-35 confers on an agency as a guardian to consent to the adoption of a child placed in its custody pursuant to this section is not absolute; it remains subject to judicial review by the family court. In re Joseph, 420 A.2d 85, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1850 (R.I. 1980).

Changes in or Modification of Court Orders.

The court should not change or modify a previous order of care, custody and control of minor children absent a showing that there has been some alteration or change in the circumstances that existed at the time of the original order. In re Denise, 122 R.I. 426 , 408 A.2d 606, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1557 (1979).

It was error for a trial justice to fail to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if circumstances had so changed as to warrant a child’s return to his or her mother. In re J., 447 A.2d 1148, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 968 (R.I. 1982).

Member of Indian Tribe.

In a dependency case, as the use of marijuana by the child’s father, a member of Indian tribe, was not “culturally neutral,” the court erred by not requiring testimony from a qualified expert witness pursuant to 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(e) of the Indian Child Welfare Act as to the seriousness and cultural relevance of the father’s marijuana use. In re Tamika R., 973 A.2d 547, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 93 (R.I. 2009).

Visitation Rights.

14-1-35. Guardianship of agency to which child entrusted — Adoption proceedings.

In the event that the court shall award a dependent or neglected child to the custody of the department of children, youth, and families, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, the child shall, unless otherwise ordered, become a ward and be subject to the guardianship of the department. That guardianship shall not include the guardianship of any estate of the child. The department shall be made party to any proceeding for the legal adoption of the child and may, by its attorney or agent, appear in the family court where those proceedings are pending and consent to the adoption. However, when adoption proceedings shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the family court, then notice of the filing of the petition in the adoption proceedings shall be filed with the clerk of the family court at least twenty (20) days before any final decree of adoption shall be entered, and the entry of any final decree of adoption shall release the department from any liability which may have been incurred by it by reason of the commitment of the child to it.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-35 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 23, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Adoption.
Prior Adjudications.
Protection.

Adoption.

The discretion that this section confers on an agency as a guardian to consent to the adoption of a child placed in its custody pursuant to § 14-1-34 is not absolute; it remains subject to judicial review by the family court. In re Joseph, 420 A.2d 85, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1850 (R.I. 1980).

Prior Adjudications.

Where two juveniles, adjudicated by the family court to be delinquent and wayward within the meaning of § 14-1-3 on the basis of conduct which, if proved, would have constituted robbery and assault, and where such juveniles were released from training school, placed on probation, and subsequently discharged while their appeal was pending; their appeal was not rendered moot by virtue of this section since it does not preclude the family court from taking these adjudications into consideration in the event appellant should again be referred to the family court for some alleged subsequent misconduct. State v. Turner, 107 R.I. 518 , 268 A.2d 732, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 803 (1970).

Protection.

Where this section is a strong legislative attempt to cloak a juvenile with full protection against all possible collateral legal consequences of an adjudication against him, supreme court was not persuaded that it provided the total protection contemplated in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1912, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968). State v. Turner, 107 R.I. 518 , 268 A.2d 732, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 803 (1970).

14-1-35.1. Child advocate as guardian of estate of child in certain circumstances — Plan for disbursement of funds.

Subject to the provisions of § 14-1-35 , the office of the child advocate shall be the guardian of the estate of any child for whose benefit a judgment for compensation or order approving a settlement for compensation is entered by the court pursuant to the provisions of § 12-25-3, to be held by that office in accordance with the requirements of § 42-73-9.1 .
Upon the termination of proceedings instituted under this chapter, the child advocate shall formulate a plan for the disbursement of compensation for the sole benefit of the child, whether before or at the age of majority, which plan shall be presented to and approved by the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 317, § 4.

14-1-36. Commitment of delinquent and wayward children.

In all proceedings under this chapter, the court may order a delinquent or wayward child to be committed to the training school for youth for a sentence no longer than the youth’s nineteenth birthday. However, nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit the placing of any child in the custody of the department of children, youth and families or any other agency, society, or institution, pursuant to § 14-1-32 . The commitment of delinquent or wayward children shall be by an order and all assignments of the custody of dependent, neglected, delinquent, or wayward children to the state training school for youth or to the custody of the department of children, youth and families or to any of the private institutions, agencies, or societies mentioned in this chapter shall be by a decree signed by the justice of the court by whom the order or decree is issued, and that order or decree shall be directed to any person that the court may designate, and shall require that person to take the child and deliver him or her to the officer in charge of the training school for youth or to the custody of the director of children, youth and families or of the public or private institution, agency, or society, and the order or decree shall constitute the person charged with it, while he or she has the order in his or her possession for service, an officer for all purposes under this chapter, in any county of the state in which it may be necessary for him or her to go. The person charged with carrying out the order or decree shall also deliver to the officer of the public or private institution, agency, or society or to the training school for youth or the director of children, youth and families a copy of the order or the decree signed by the justice of the court issuing it, and subject to the provisions of this chapter, the officer and other authorities in charge of the training school for youth or the director of children, youth and families or any public or private institution, agency, or society shall hold the child according to the terms of any other order or decree that may from time to time thereafter be issued by the court in relation to the child.
Whenever the court shall commit a child to the training school for youth or to the director of children, youth and families or any other institution or agency, it shall transmit with the order of commitment a summary of its information concerning the child.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 25; impl. am. P.L. 1946, ch. 1774, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-36 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14; P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 23, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 22, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment deleted “the department of” following “director of” throughout the section.

14-1-36.1. Release from training school.

No child sentenced to the training school for youth, after being found delinquent or wayward, shall be released prior to the end of his or her sentence unless authorized by a justice of the family court, after a hearing with due notice to the parties to the petition upon which the child was sentenced. At any such hearing, the family court shall authorize the release of the child to his or her home and/or to the care and custody of the department of children, youth and families unless the court finds that the child:
1. Poses a substantial risk of harm to self; or
2. Poses a substantial risk of harm to others; or
3. Has demonstrated that he or she may leave the jurisdiction of the court. Provided, however, any child who has been certified and adjudicated pursuant to §§ 14-1-7.2 and 14-1-7.3 , may not be released prior to the end of his or her sentence, except as authorized under § 14-1-42 of this chapter.
A child so sentenced may be allowed as part of a rehabilitation program to be placed temporarily in a community program outside of the training school only when authorized by the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 430, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 9, art. 12, § 2.

14-1-36.2. Assignment of custody to the director of the department of children, youth and families.

In the event the court assigns custody of a child to the director of the department of children, youth and families pursuant to §§ 14-1-11 , 14-1-11.1 , 14-1-27 , 14-1-32 , 14-1-34 , 14-1-36 , 14-1-36 .1, 40-11-7.1 , or 40-11-12 , the court shall authorize the provision of suitable treatment, rehabilitation and care for each child in the least restrictive and community-based setting.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 17, § 10.

14-1-36.3. Community confinement.

The family court may authorize that a sentenced youth or a youth who is subject to an order of detention to the Thomas C. Slater training school be placed in the community in an appropriate setting as specified in §§ 14-1-27 and 14-1-32 for a period of time as determined by the court. In any instance wherein the family court authorizes the release of a sentenced youth from the Thomas C. Slater training school to community confinement, the youth shall be supervised by probation pursuant to § 14-1-33 and the term of community confinement shall not exceed the term of his or her sentence to the training school.
The court order to place a detained youth or a sentenced youth on probation and/or in community confinement may include the use of electronic surveillance or monitoring devices as defined in this chapter, upon the finding by the court that:
1. The youth is charged with or adjudicated on an offense which meets the definition of “delinquent” as found in 14-1-3(5) ; and
2. The youth would otherwise be detained at or sentenced to the Thomas C. Slater Training School for Youth; and
3. The use of the surveillance or devices will allow the youth to be released to the home of a legal guardian, family member, or foster home placement.
Any use of electronic surveillance and monitoring devices authorized for non-adjudicated youth who have been detained in accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall be limited to thirty (30) days unless the court determines that an additional period not to exceed thirty (30) days is necessary for the safety or welfare of the youth and/or the community.
Any use of electronic surveillance and monitoring devices authorized for adjudicated youth who have been sentenced in accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall be limited to a period not to exceed sixty (60) days unless the court determines that an additional period not to exceed thirty (30) days is necessary for the safety or welfare of the youth and/or the community.
The department is authorized to adopt, amend, and rescind regulations in accordance with this chapter and implement its provisions, including rules and regulations for the application, surveillance and reporting of youth compliance with electronic surveillance and monitoring devices. The regulations shall be promulgated and become effective in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 35 of title 42.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 17, § 4.

14-1-37. Other disposition for best interests of child.

The court may make any further disposition that it may deem to be for the best interests of the child, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-37 .

14-1-38. Insufficient evidence of waywardness or delinquency.

If, after a hearing on any petition in the case of a wayward or delinquent child under this chapter, the court finds that there is not sufficient evidence to support it, the court shall adjudge the child to be not a delinquent or wayward child, as the case may be, and shall discharge the child.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-38 .

14-1-39. Fees for delivery of child to court or institution.

A fee of one dollar ($1.00), and an allowance of ten cents ($0.10) per mile traveled with any child may be paid to the person designated to deliver any child to a public or private institution, agency, or society, or to bring any child from a public or private institution, agency, or society to a session of the court, the allowance to be paid out of a sum appropriated for this purpose, when certified to by a justice of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-39 .

14-1-40. Adjudication not having effect of conviction.

No adjudication upon the status of any child in the jurisdiction of the court shall operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from a conviction, nor shall any child be deemed a criminal by reason of that adjudication, nor shall that adjudication be deemed a conviction, nor shall any child be charged with or convicted of a crime in any court, except as provided in this chapter. The disposition of a child or any evidence given in the court shall not be admissible as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in any other court, nor shall that disposition or evidence operate to disqualify a child in any future civil service application, examination, or appointment.
Any finding of delinquency based upon acts which would constitute a felony, if committed by an adult, shall be available to the attorney general for use in its recommendations to any court in sentencing and that record may be taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-20 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 349, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Criminal Procedure: State v. Day, 911 A.2d 1042 (R.I. 2006), see 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 565 (2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Criminal Record.
Evidence.
Impeachment.
Proceeding.

Criminal Record.

Minors committed to training school and later transferred to adult correctional institution while being held in custody in adult institution were not held as persons convicted of breaking the city or state criminal laws and when released will have no criminal records. Long v. Langlois, 93 R.I. 23 , 170 A.2d 618, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1961).

Evidence.

In a suit to recover damages for injuries sustained at the hands of the police after being stopped for a traffic violation, the trial judge acts within the permissible bounds of his discretion in excluding the evidence of a juvenile adjudication arising out of the same incident. Diaz v. Cianci, 737 F.2d 138, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 21117 (1st Cir. 1984).

The fact that the prosecutor directed the attention of the court to the fact that petitioner had a juvenile record at the time of his sentencing and that the record was not offered as evidence to determine a factual issue presented at the trial did not violate the provisions of this section. Taylor v. Howard, 111 R.I. 527 , 304 A.2d 891, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1240 (1973).

The use of a juvenile record, though inadmissible evidence at a trial, could be used in the presentence report required by § 12-19-6 to assist the trial justice in imposing sentence, without violating the provisions of this section. Taylor v. Howard, 111 R.I. 527 , 304 A.2d 891, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1240 (1973).

The family court may admit in evidence a juvenile’s record of past adjudications of delinquency or waywardness. In re Bernard H., 557 A.2d 864, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 76 (R.I. 1989).

Impeachment.

Juvenile records may be used to impeach witnesses in criminal actions. State v. Myers, 115 R.I. 583 , 350 A.2d 611, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1562 (1976).

Proceeding.

A judicial procedure held for the purpose of imposing sentence upon a defendant after his guilt had been determined at a trial or admitted by a plea was not a proceeding within the meaning of this section. Taylor v. Howard, 111 R.I. 527 , 304 A.2d 891, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1240 (1973).

Collateral References.

Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile court proceedings. 5 A.L.R.4th 234.

14-1-41. Protection of religious faith.

In placing a child under the guardianship or custody of a private agency, society, or institution, the court may when practicable select an agency, society, or institution governed by persons of like religious faith of the parents of the child, or in case of a difference in the religious faith of the parents, then of the religious faith of the child, or, if the religious faith of the child is not ascertainable, then of the faith of either of the parents. When neither the religious faith of the parents nor the religious faith of the child is ascertainable, the foregoing principles shall not apply.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 26; P.L. 1946, ch. 1772, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-41 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 83, § 1.

Cross References.

Religion considered in adoption proceedings, § 15-7-13 .

14-1-42. Modification of order of commitment — Release, detention, or recommitment of child.

An order of commitment made by the court in the case of a child shall be subject to modification or revocation from time to time.
A parent, guardian, or next friend of a child or counsel for a child who has been committed or assigned by the court to the custody of the department of children, youth and families may at any time file with the court a verified petition, stating that the person or the department has denied an application for the release of the child or has failed to act upon the application within a reasonable time. If the court is of the opinion that an investigation should be had, it may, upon due notice to all concerned, proceed to hear and determine the question at issue. If a petition is filed, it shall be the duty of the court to determine by clear and convincing evidence that there has been a change of circumstances, and where the modification or revocation of the order of commitment is in the best interest of the child and the public, the court may:
1. Order that the child be restored to the custody of its parent or guardian or be detained in the custody of the person or the department;
2. Direct the person or the department to make any other arrangements for the child’s care and welfare that the circumstances of the case may require; or
3. A further order of commitment.
In any case where a child has been certified and adjudicated pursuant to §§ 14-1-7.2 and 14-1-7.3 , and sentenced pursuant to § 14-1-7.3(a)(2) , the court shall schedule a review of the child’s case thirty (30) days prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday or thirty (30) days prior to the one-year anniversary of the imposition of the sentence, whichever is greater. It shall be the responsibility of the attorney general or of the law enforcement agency making the arrest to notify the victim or victims of the crime for which the juvenile was certified and adjudicated of the pendency of the hearing and afford them the opportunity to be heard. The court shall not hear or determine any other motion for modification of the order of certification, except as provided for in this section. At that time and upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that demonstrates that the person has made sufficient efforts at rehabilitation and that the modification of the order of certification would not pose a threat to the safety of the public, the court may suspend, but shall not vacate, the balance of the sentence.
In the event that the court, after a hearing, determines that it has not been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the person has made sufficient efforts at rehabilitation and that the modification of the order of certification entered pursuant to § 14-1-7.3(a)(2) would pose a threat to the safety of the public, the court shall order either:
1. That the person be remanded to the training school for youth until further hearing to be held no later than one year thereafter in accordance with subsection (c) of this section; or
2. That the jurisdiction of the sentence be transferred to the department of corrections and that the balance of the sentence be served in facilities under the control of the department.
3. In any case where a child has been certified and adjudicated pursuant to § 14-1-7.3(a)(2) , upon motion by the attorney general and/or the department of children, youth and families, the court shall conduct a hearing to consider modification of the order of certification if the family court determines that the individual poses a serious threat to the safety of the public, other residents at the training school and/or training school staff. Upon that finding the court may order that the jurisdiction of the sentence be transferred to the department of corrections and that the balance of the sentence be served in facilities under the control of the department.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-42 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 380, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 425, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 334, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 23, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 239, § 24.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Sentence Modification.
Transfer to Correctional Institutions.

Sentence Modification.

This section does not authorize a trial justice to prospectively and unilaterally suspend the part of a defendant’s sentence that extends beyond his twenty-first birthday. The legislature has enacted specific procedures within this section and § 14-1-7.3 for sentence modification. In re Nicholas V., 622 A.2d 447, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 85 (R.I. 1993).

Transfer to Correctional Institutions.

Transfer of minor inmates to adult correctional institution under § 13-4-12 [repealed, see 42-56-35 ] does not prevent minors from being at all times subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile [now family] court and a judge of that court may be appealed to for a modification of the committing order. Long v. Langlois, 93 R.I. 23 , 170 A.2d 618, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1961).

14-1-43. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 4; impl. am. P.L. 1946, ch. 1774, §§ 1 and 2; impl. am. P.L. 1948, ch. 2114, § 1; P.L. 1963, ch. 93, § 1), concerning cost of maintenance of juveniles placed in institutions, was repealed by P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 32, § 1, effective July 1, 1996.

14-1-44. Effect of order for maintenance — Enforcement.

The order and decree shall be regarded as a judgment for debt on which suits may be brought or executions may issue for amounts due and unpaid, from time to time, to be shown by affidavits of the custodian of the child entitled to those amounts and the attorney of record, if any, of the custodian, the executions to run against the goods and chattels of the parent, and for want of goods and chattels against the body of the parent. The law officer of any town or city or the state attorney-general of the state may enter appearance for the purpose of obtaining or enforcing any order and decree for support in the case of a child in which the town, city, or state is an interested party.
The court shall have any and all of the powers of a court of equity for the purpose of enforcing any of these orders and decrees.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-44 .

14-1-45. Procedures in adult cases — Sentence.

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, all provisions of this chapter relative to procedure in cases of children, so far as practicable, shall also be construed as applying to cases against adults for offenses committed against state laws within the purview of this chapter. Upon trial of those cases, the court shall have the power to impose the sentence that the law provides, suspend the sentence, place on probation, revoke or continue suspension, or by order impose upon the adult any duty that shall be deemed for the best interests of the child, and exercise any additional powers over the defendant that is exercised by the superior court in other criminal cases under the provisions of chapter 19 of title 12.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-45 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 6; P.L. 1961, ch. 81, § 1.

Cross References.

Jurisdiction of adults, § 14-1-8 .

Power of family court to order restitution, § 12-19-33 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The first sentence of this section does not apply to affiliation proceedings. State v. Mullen, 87 R.I. 401 , 142 A.2d 543, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1958).

Collateral References.

Discrimination in punishment for same offense between juveniles and mature offenders. 3 A.L.R. 1614, 8 A.L.R. 854.

Recital of, or reference to, the offense in pronouncing sentence or judgment for contributing to juvenile delinquency. 14 A.L.R. 1001.

14-1-45.1. Compelling evidence in adult cases — Immunity.

In the hearing of any case in which an adult is charged with an offense committed against state laws within the purview of this chapter, if a person refuses to answer a question or produce other evidence of any kind on the ground that he or she may be incriminated by it, or if a child refuses to answer a question or produce other evidence of any kind on the ground that it supports a finding that he or she is delinquent or wayward, and if the attorney general, in writing, requests the chief judge of the family court or his or her designee to order that person or child to answer the question or produce the evidence, the court, in its discretion, after notice to the witness, may order the person or child to answer the question or produce the evidence. In deciding those matters, the chief judge or his or her designee shall consider whether the person may be incriminated or whether the evidence may support a finding that the child is delinquent or wayward in some other jurisdiction. After complying, and if, but for this section, he or she would have been privileged to withhold the answer given or the evidence produced by him or her, that person or child shall not be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which, in accordance with the order, he or she gave answer or produced evidence. But he or she may, nevertheless, be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for any perjury, false swearing, or contempt committed in answering or failing to answer, or in producing, or failing to produce, evidence in accordance with the order.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 217, § 2.

Cross References.

Compelling evidence generally, § 14-1-30.1 .

14-1-46. Institution of proceedings against adults — Process.

Proceedings against adults may be instituted by the officers duly authorized by law to institute those proceedings or by the court’s own motion. The court shall issue its summons, warrant of arrest, or other process in order to secure or compel the attendance of any necessary person.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-46 .

14-1-47. Trial by judge or jury.

If any adult is charged with an offense, the trial shall be by jury unless the accused shall in open court expressly waive trial by jury and request to be tried by the justice, in which case the trial shall be by the justice of the family court, and the judgment and sentence shall have the same force and effect in all respects as if the judgment and sentence had been entered and pronounced upon the verdict of a jury.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-47 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

Collateral References.

Right to jury trial in juvenile court delinquency proceedings. 100 A.L.R.2d 1241.

14-1-48. Jury trial in family court.

In every case in which trial is by jury in the family court, in accordance with the provisions of § 14-1-47 , the trial shall be held in the same manner and subject to the same provisions as jury trials in criminal prosecution in the superior court.
The presiding justice of the superior court may assign a room in the superior court building for any jury trial held by the family court. The general public shall be excluded and only those persons shall be admitted as provided in § 14-1-30 .

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-48 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 6; P.L. 1981, ch. 71, § 1.

Cross References.

Selection of juries in superior court, §§ 9-10-1 to 9-10-1 9.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction.

Even though the family court had conducted a criminal trial pursuant to this section on a charge that an adult defendant/son assaulted his mother with a dangerous weapon, it could not retain jurisdiction over the case and proceed to sentence the defendant since the court had no subject-matter jurisdiction of the case. State v. Kenney, 523 A.2d 853, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 438 (R.I. 1987).

14-1-48.1. Powers of chief judge in jury trials.

The chief judge of the family court, in the selection of petit jurors for family court service, shall be empowered to exercise all powers which the presiding judge of the superior court has in the selection of petit jurors in criminal cases to be tried before the superior court. All agencies of state government shall provide the necessary services as requested by the chief judge of the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 71, § 4.

14-1-49. Fees for service of process or attendance in court.

In proceedings under this chapter, no court or witness fees shall be taxed or allowed against any party to a petition, and no salaried officer of the state, or of any city or town, shall be entitled to receive any fee for the service of process or for attendance in court in any of these proceedings, but all other persons acting under orders of the court shall be allowed, for service of process and attendance in court, the fees provided by law for like services in criminal cases before the district court, the fees to be paid from the appropriation provided for by law, when certified to by a justice of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 29; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-49 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

Cross References.

Fees in criminal cases before district court, § 12-20-3 et seq.

14-1-50. [Obsolete.]

Obsolete Sections.

This section (P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 30; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-50 ), concerning offenses committed, penalties or forfeitures incurred or other actions taken under laws in effect prior to July 1, 1944, is obsolete.

14-1-51. Physical or mental examination and treatment.

The court may cause any person coming under its jurisdiction to be examined by a licensed physician who is expert in physical diagnosis or in neuropsychiatry.
Whenever a child who has been brought before the family court appears to be in need of medical or surgical care, the court may order the parent, guardian, or other custodian to provide treatment for the child in a hospital or otherwise. If the parent, guardian or other custodian fails to provide that care, the court may, after due notice, enter an order for it; and the expense of the medical care when approved by the court shall be charged to the state, if the parents are unable to pay it.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 31; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-51 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

14-1-52. Appeals.

From any final decree, judgment, order, decision, or verdict of the family court, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, there shall be an appeal to the supreme court, which appeal, in all civil cases except paternity proceedings under chapter 8 of title 15, shall follow the procedure for appeal in civil actions as provided in chapter 24 of title 9. A decision granting a divorce shall be appealable upon entry and, except as otherwise provided by law, the correctness of the decision shall not be reviewable upon an appeal from a final decree for divorce entered in pursuance of § 15-5-23 . Appeals in criminal cases in which the family court exercises jurisdiction over adults, and in paternity cases under chapter 8 of title 15, shall follow the procedure for appeal as provided in chapter 24 of title 9. The provisions of chapter 24 of title 9 and applicable procedural rules relating to the superior court shall apply to the family court in matters appealed from the family court; provided, that on appeal, the supreme court may by rule provide for certain circumstances as it may deem appropriate.
Every person aggrieved by any decree, judgment, order, decision, or verdict of the family court relating to modification of alimony or of child support, or a finding of contempt for failure to pay alimony or child support, may, within twenty (20) days after entry of the decree, judgment, order, decision, or verdict, seek review of questions of law in the supreme court by petition for writ of certiorari in accordance with the procedure contained in this chapter. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall set forth errors claimed. Upon the filing of a petition with the clerk of the supreme court, the supreme court may, if it sees fit, issue its writ of certiorari to the family court to certify to the supreme court the record of the proceeding under review, or so much of it as was submitted to the family court by the parties, together with any additional record of the proceeding in the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 32; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-52 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 6; P.L. 1965, ch. 55, § 59; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 28; P.L. 1981, ch. 329, § 1.

Cross References.

Appeal from the family court, § 15-7-19 .

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 421 (2003).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appealability.
Certiorari.
Jurisdiction of Family Court During Appeal.
Procedure.
Timeliness.

Appealability.

Where decree requiring wife to turn over certain property was not appealed from and could not be questioned in later appeal from finding of contempt, and where later hearing to determine punishment for contempt was terminated when trial justice learned that appeal had been taken, no appeal could be taken from the latter proceeding since there was nothing from which an appeal could be taken. Dupras v. Dupras, 103 R.I. 239 , 236 A.2d 260, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 605 (1967).

A respondent’s appeal from the decision of the trial justice granting a divorce is in fact an appeal from the decree entered pursuant to such decision and will be treated as such. Poirier v. Poirier, 107 R.I. 345 , 267 A.2d 390, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 779 (1970).

A decree ordering receivers and commissioners to appoint two appraisers for property involved in a divorce action was not reviewable. Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 118 R.I. 608 , 375 A.2d 911 (1977), but family court was without authority to order partition and sale of property while appeal was pending in Supreme Court. Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 119 R.I. 479 , 380 A.2d 964, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 2054 (1977).

Interlocutory decrees ordering the appointment of a receiver and the sale of real property were appealable to the supreme court. (See § 9-24-7 ). Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 119 R.I. 479 , 380 A.2d 964, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 2054 (1977).

Where a child’s foster parents bring an action in the family court seeking injunctive relief to prevent the department of children and their families from reuniting the child with his natural mother until there can be a hearing on their petition for adoption and the court determines that the foster parents lack standing and denies them relief, and the foster parents file an appeal, the Supreme Court will depart from its usual procedure and consider the appeal as a petition for certiorari in order to address the merits of the case, as the action of the court below has an element of finality. In re Joseph J., 465 A.2d 150, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1072 (R.I. 1983).

Order modifying payments of child support was not appealable as of right. Cok v. Cok, 558 A.2d 205, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 1989); Pontbriand v. Pontbriand, 608 A.2d 658, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 285 (R.I. 1992).

The defendant’s appeal was without merit since the order appealed from is a consent order that was entered into by agreement of the parties without hearing and the terms of that order cannot be challenged in the absence of fraud, mutual mistake, or actual absence of consent. Hasman v. Hasman, 655 A.2d 256, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 70 (R.I. 1995).

Since subsection (b) clearly provides that review of a Family Court decision is solely by petition for writ of certiorari, an appeal taken from a Family Court judgment is improper. Bonney v. Bonney, 695 A.2d 508, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 204 (R.I. 1997).

A party to a divorce may appeal an interlocutory decision or a decision pending entry of final judgment. Koziol v. Koziol, 720 A.2d 230, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 303 (R.I. 1998).

Certiorari.

Although the way to obtain review of an order granting a preliminary injunction entered in the superior court was by appeal within 20 days following entry, where third-party defendants in a divorce action filed a petition for certiorari to obtain such a review, the petition would be read as if it were a claim of appeal since it was claimed within the 20-day time limit. Johnson v. Johnson, 111 R.I. 46 , 298 A.2d 795, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1177 (1973).

The proper way to seek review of a decree or order of the family court relating to modification of child support is to petition the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari pursuant to subsection (b). Meehan v. Meehan, 603 A.2d 333, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 1992).

Since the case should properly have been by petition for writ of certiorari because an order that modifies child support is not appealable, the defendant’s appeal was interpreted as a common law writ of certiorari. Lentz v. Lentz, 651 A.2d 1242, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 310 (R.I. 1994).

The issue of whether a party was in contempt of an alimony provision of a final divorce judgment, and whether a court erred in denying a reinstatement of alimony, is reviewable only by certiorari and an appeal will be denied on procedural grounds. Armentrout v. Armentrout, 675 A.2d 415, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 128 (R.I. 1996).

Although this statute does not explicitly state that a denial of a contempt motion falls within the purview of the required procedure under this provision, the words “relating to” modify the words “finding of contempt,” irrespective of whether a finding of contempt was actually made, and thus review may be sought only by a petition for certiorari. Poisson v. Bergeron, 743 A.2d 1037, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 10 (R.I. 2000).

The father failed to demonstrate the exigency that qualified as an exception to R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-52(b) (1956), and his failure to purge the contempt also provides an independent basis for denying review. Codd v. Barrett, 798 A.2d 954, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 163 (R.I. 2002).

Orders modifying child support are reviewed by writ of certiorari, not appeal, even when such orders have been bundled with other issues; only in extreme circumstances will the court depart from this procedure. Africano v. Castelli, 837 A.2d 721, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 234 (R.I. 2003).

Father’s pro se, direct appeal filed in the state supreme court of the family court’s order denying the father’s motion to modify a child support order had to be denied and the family court’s order had to be affirmed; the proper procedure for reviewing questions involving the modification of child support were not reviewable by direct appeal, but instead required that a party file, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-52(b) , a petition for writ of certiorari in the state supreme court and the father’s case did not present the rare circumstance where the failure to file the R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-52(b) petition would be allowed. Fischer v. Walker, 874 A.2d 737, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 115 (R.I. 2005).

Wife’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of her motion for attorney’s fees in her contempt action against her husband was improper because, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-52(b) such orders were reviewable only by a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the wife sought review by appeal; the request for attorney’s fees could not have been detached from the denial of her motion to find the husband in contempt. Kashmanian v. Kashmanian, 924 A.2d 2, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 57 (R.I. 2007).

Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-52 (b), a petition for certiorari was the only proper vehicle for bringing the father’s claims where although he was never adjudged in contempt, the father’s appeals clearly resulted from the mother’s filing for contempt.14-1-52 DeCesare v. Delfarno, 112 A.3d 714, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 2015).

Even though a father’s motion was styled as a motion for credit for the Social Security Disability Insurance benefits received by the mother, it was in fact a motion to modify the amount of child support he was obligated to pay where the father was aware that the mother was receiving those benefits at the time the parties agreed on child support. Since matters related to the modification of child support are not appealable and the father had not filed a petition for a writ of certiorari as required by R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-52(b) , the appeal was not properly before the court. Evans v. Evans, 226 A.3d 135, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I. 2020).

Jurisdiction of Family Court During Appeal.

Where the object of the appeal was to secure the real estate, the family court’s order to sell the property outright did not constitute administration of the property during the pendency of the appeal and was improper. Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 119 R.I. 479 , 380 A.2d 964, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 2054 (1977).

Where the papers of an action concerning partition of real estate were transmitted to the supreme court and the appeal had been docketed, the family court was without authority to act on motions to sell the real estate and the decrees ordering sale were therefore void. Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 119 R.I. 479 , 380 A.2d 964, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 2054 (1977).

Procedure.

Where there is an appeal under this section from the family court, the appellate procedure for causes in equity must be followed and the supreme court will review the decree appealed from, not the decision of the trial justice; the ultimate findings of fact on which the decree is based should be incorporated therein and in the absence of such findings the supreme court must examine the decision of the family court to determine whether the findings are supported by the evidence and whether the decree is warranted by the facts established and the applicable law. Culpepper v. Martins, 96 R.I. 328 , 191 A.2d 285, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1963).

Alleged error of the family court in adjudicating a respondent a delinquent and wayward child could not be reviewed without a transcript of the evidence adduced at the hearing, which transcript it was incumbent upon the appealing respondent to bring up. State v. Cook, 99 R.I. 710 , 210 A.2d 577, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 506 (1965).

The appropriate procedure for review of a decree of a family court is by appeal and not by bill of exceptions. In re Loudin, 101 R.I. 35 , 219 A.2d 915, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 347 (1966); Burns v. Burns, 102 R.I. 183 , 229 A.2d 294, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 668 (1967).

Father chose the wrong procedural vehicle to bring his claim before the Supreme Court because he did not bring his case by a petition for certiorari as required by subsection (b) of this section but instead chose to seek review by appeal; although the family court’s order did not explicitly find the father in willful contempt, the order nevertheless resulted from the mother’s motion to adjudicate the father as in contempt. Lahoud v. Carvalho, 143 A.3d 1077, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 44 (R.I. 2016).

Timeliness.

Since the rule requiring the filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory, plaintiff’s notice of appeal from a divorce decree was untimely since it was not filed until more than three months after the entry of the decision and since no mention was made of excusable neglect. Bina v. Bina, 764 A.2d 191, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 207 (R.I. 2000).

A notice of appeal was untimely since it was filed more than 30 days after a decision pending entry of final judgment and no request for an extension was made. Craveiro v. Craveiro, 773 A.2d 896, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 171 (R.I. 2001).

14-1-53. Effect of pendency of appeal.

The pendency of an appeal in the case of a child shall not suspend the order or decree of the family court, nor shall it discharge the child from the custody of the court or of the person, institution, or agency to whose care the child shall have been committed, unless by writ of habeas corpus unless and until the supreme court or any justice of the supreme court shall so order.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 32; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-53 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Bail.

A juvenile does not have a right to postadjudication bail pending appeal. City of Warwick v. Robalewski, 120 R.I. 119 , 385 A.2d 669, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 642 (1978).

It is within the family court’s discretion to grant post conviction bail pending appeal to a juvenile. City of Warwick v. Robalewski, 120 R.I. 119 , 385 A.2d 669, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 642 (1978).

14-1-54 — 14-1-57. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 32; R.P.L. 1954, ch. 128, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 14-1-54 to 14-1-57) were repealed by P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 20. For present provisions see §§ 14-1-52 , 14-1-53 .

14-1-58. Counsel.

The attorney general or any attorney in his or her department designated by him or her shall, upon request of the petitioner, when directed by the court, appear and act for the petitioner in any criminal case under the provisions of this chapter; and the public defender shall, at the direction of the court, appear in criminal cases on behalf of defendants who are found by the court to be financially unable to engage counsel.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 32; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-58 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The child and his parents must also be notified that the child has a right to the assistance of counsel at the proceedings and that, if the family is indigent, counsel will be appointed to represent the child. Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1662 (R.I. 1980).

Collateral References.

Duty to advise accused as to right to assistance of counsel. 3 A.L.R.2d 1003.

Right to and appointment of counsel. 60 A.L.R.2d 691.

What constitutes waiver of right to counsel by minor accused. 71 A.L.R.2d 1160.

14-1-59. Cooperation of public and private agencies.

It is made the duty of every state, town, or municipal official or department, including, but not limited to, the department of children, youth, and families, the department of health, the department of human services, the department of elementary and secondary education, the office of substance abuse, and the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals, to render all assistance and cooperation within his, her, or its jurisdictional power which may further the objects of this chapter. All institutions or agencies providing services to any child are required to give to the court any information concerning the child that the court may require. The court is authorized to seek the cooperation of all societies or organizations having for their object the protection or aid of children, and their physical or spiritual welfare; and the court shall utilize the available services of all of those societies and organizations.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 33; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-59 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 244, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 77, art. 23, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted ‘’department of elementary and secondary education” for “department of education”.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction.

14-1-59.1. Procedural safeguards.

The family court, in cooperation with the department of children, youth, and families, shall develop policies for the purpose of identifying procedural safeguards to protect the rights of children in the process of discharge or emancipation and/or disposition of a petition.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 274, § 2.

14-1-60. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 115, § 7; P.L. 1897, ch. 475, § 4; P.L. 1908, ch. 1540, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 139, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 142, § 7; P.L. 1926, ch. 844, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 425, § 4; P.L. 1950, ch. 2416, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-60 ; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 69, § 1, effective June 29, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 100, § 1, effective June 30, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 14-1-60 concerned costs incurred by children’s friend and service.

14-1-61. Rules of court.

The court shall have the power to adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of the court not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 34; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-61 .

Collateral References.

Applicability of rules of evidence to juvenile court proceedings. 43 A.L.R.2d 1128.

14-1-62. Construction of chapter.

This chapter shall be liberally construed to accomplish the purposes sought in it.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-62 .

14-1-63. [Obsolete.]

Obsolete Sections.

This section (P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 35; G.L. 1956, § 14-1-63 ), providing for the severability of the provisions of this chapter, was declared obsolete by the 1994 Reenactment, P.L. 1994, ch. 134, § 1, in light of the enactment of § 14-1-71 .

14-1-64. Disposition of juvenile records.

All police records relating to the arrest, detention, apprehension, and disposition of any juveniles shall be kept in files separate and apart from the arrest records of adults and shall be withheld from public inspection, but the police report relating to the arrest or detention of a juvenile shall be open to inspection and copying upon request and upon payment of copying costs in accordance with § 38-2-4 by the parent, guardian, or attorney of the juvenile involved. After disposition of an offense and upon execution of an appropriate release and upon payment of copying costs in accordance with § 38-2-4 by the parent, guardian or attorney of the juvenile involved, records relating to the arrest, detention, apprehension and disposition of the juveniles shall be open to inspection and copying by the parent, guardian, or attorney of the juvenile involved.
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the identity of any juvenile waived pursuant to § 14-1-7.1 or certified and convicted pursuant to § 14-1-7.2 shall be made public.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 70, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 325, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 187, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

14-1-65. Hearings for out-of-state placement of children.

Prior to authorizing the placement of a child entrusted to the control of the department of children, youth, and families and in an out-of-state child caring facility, other than the home of a relative, the department shall petition the family court for a placement hearing. The family court shall grant approval for the placement if the following facts are found:
1. That no suitable in-state facilities are available for the placement of the child;
2. That the child will receive an individualized treatment plan, including, but not limited to, appropriate clinical treatment, education, training, and rehabilitation; and
3. That the proposed placement is in the best interest of the child.
This section shall not apply when the proposed placement is less than thirty-five (35) miles from the home of the parent previously having custody of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 84, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 74, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability to Foster Families.
Legislative Intent.

Applicability to Foster Families.

This section, which refers to “child caring facility”, is applicable to foster families. In re Peter G., 577 A.2d 996, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 137 (R.I. 1990).

Legislative Intent.

The legislature’s clear intent when enacting this statute was to ensure that the decision to place a child in department of children and their families’ (DCF) care outside the state be made only after a careful and comprehensive examination of the circumstances of the individual case. To allow DCF to place children outside the state, even in a foster home, with no judicial oversight would violate both the spirit and the letter of this statute. In re Peter G., 577 A.2d 996, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 137 (R.I. 1990).

14-1-66. Application by victim to obtain name of juvenile.

Upon written motion by the victim of a crime or his or her attorney, the family court may, in its discretion, and upon good cause shown, divulge the name and address of the juvenile accused of committing the crime solely for the purpose of allowing the victim to commence a civil action against the juvenile and/or his or her parents to recover for damages sustained as a result of the crime; provided, that written notice of the motion shall be given to the juvenile accused of committing the crime or his or her attorney, and further provided that the court shall order that the name and address of the juvenile accused of committing the crime not be divulged by the victim of a crime or his or her attorney to any other person unless and until the civil action is commenced, without further order of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 317, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Civil Actions.
Police Record.

Civil Actions.

The legislature intended and contemplated by this section that an act for which a juvenile is adjudged delinquent should be considered a crime in the context of a civil action brought by the victim of the crime; such acts likewise retain their criminal character under the Criminal Royalties Act (Chapter 25.1 of Title 12), which is also a civil remedy for victims of crime. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

Police Record.

This section also authorizes the release of a juvenile’s police record to the victims of a crime, solely for purposes of discovery and prosecution in respect to their civil action. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 637 A.2d 1047, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 58 (R.I. 1994).

14-1-67. Revocation or denial of motor vehicle operator’s license upon finding of delinquency or waywardness.

If the court finds that a child is delinquent, by reason of having violated any provision of chapter 28 of title 21 or is wayward in accordance with § 14-1-3(11)(i) — (11)(v), the court, in addition to any other penalty or punishment imposed, may prepare and send to the division of motor vehicles, within twenty-four (24) hours of the determination of delinquency or waywardness, an order of denial or an order of revocation of the driving privileges of the child found delinquent or wayward and/or may require the child to perform up to one hundred (100) hours of community restitution.
The court may review the order and may withdraw the order at any time the court deems appropriate, except the court may not withdraw an order for a period of ninety (90) days following issuance of the order.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 171, § 1.

14-1-67.1. Revocation of motor vehicle operator’s license for failure to make restitution.

If a child fails to make court ordered restitution within the time period provided for in an order of the court, a judge may prepare and send to the division of motor vehicles an order of revocation of the driving privileges of the child. The judge may order the revocation to be in effect until the child complies with the order to make restitution.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 350, § 2.

14-1-68. Child witness.

A videotape recording made by the department of children, youth, and families, a law enforcement officer, or a hospital, of an interview of or statement made by a child who is the subject of any petition filed by the department pursuant to §§ 40-11-7 , 14-1-11 , and/or 15-7-7 , is admissible in any court proceeding under those sections notwithstanding any objection to hearsay statements contained in the videotape, provided it is relevant and material, and provided its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the child’s parent, guardian, or other person responsible for the child’s welfare. The circumstances of the making of the videotape recording, including the maker’s lack of personal knowledge, may be proved to affect its weight.
Prior to the videotaped recording being introduced into evidence the court shall first determine that:
1. The statement is sworn to under oath by the child and the significance of the oath is explained to the child;
2. The recording is both visual and aural, and is recorded on film or videotaped or by other electronic means;
3. The recording equipment was capable of making an accurate recording, the operator of the equipment was competent, and the recording is accurate and has not been altered;
4. Every voice on the recording is identified;
5. The statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement;
6. The person conducting the interview of the child is available to testify at any court proceeding pursuant to this chapter; and
7. The child shall be available to testify at any court proceeding pursuant to this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 379, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Procedure.

Exclusion of videotaped interviews of child victim of sexual abuse was not reversible error, where the taped statement was not sworn to under oath. In re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 102 (R.I. 1989).

14-1-69. Hearsay.

In any custody and/or termination trial and/or a hearing on a motion or probable cause hearing where a petition has been filed by the department of children, youth, and families in accordance with §§ 14-1-11 , 40-11-7 and/or 15-7-7 in the family court, the court may, in its discretion, permit as evidence any statement by a child under the age of thirteen (13) years old about a prescribed act of abuse, neglect, or misconduct by a parent or guardian, if that statement was made spontaneously within a reasonable time after the act is alleged to have occurred, and if the statement was made to someone the child would normally turn to for sympathy, protection, or advice.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 381, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 303, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Acceptable Hearsay.
- — “Spontaneity” Defined.
Competency of Child.
Physical Abuse.
Reasonable Time.
Relaxed Standards Applicable.
Specific Cases.
Witness as to Child’s Testimony.

Acceptable Hearsay.

This section eliminated the requirement that the declarant must have been “laboring under the stress of nervous excitement” when the statement was made; to ensure reliability, the lawmakers instead required that the hearsay statement must have been made to someone the child would normally turn to for sympathy, protection, or advice. In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d 572, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 95 (R.I. 1988).

When a child’s statement is made spontaneously, within a reasonable time after the act is alleged to have occurred, and is made to someone the child would normally turn to for sympathy, protection or advice, that statement is within the realm of this section. In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 78 (R.I. 1989).

The crucial requirement under this section is that the person to whom the statement is made must be someone the child would normally turn to for protection. This section does not require that this person be previously known to the speaker. A physician occupies such a position of trust, even though he or she may be previously unknown to his or her patient. In re NE-KIA S., 566 A.2d 392, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 157 (R.I. 1989).

— “Spontaneity” Defined.

This section in no way requires that a statement must be initiated by the declarant in order to be spontaneous. The fact that a statement was made in response to an inquiry does not render the statement inadmissible. In re NE-KIA S., 566 A.2d 392, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 157 (R.I. 1989).

Competency of Child.

This section does not require that the child be found competent before his statement can be admitted into evidence. In re Thomas V., 540 A.2d 1027, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 55 (R.I. 1988); In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 78 (R.I. 1989); In re NE-KIA S., 566 A.2d 392, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 157 (R.I. 1989).

Physical Abuse.

In situations in which physical abuse alone is alleged, the resulting trauma to a child is not to such a degree less than the trauma attendant to sexual abuse, such that this section should not apply. In re NE-KIA S., 566 A.2d 392, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 157 (R.I. 1989).

In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, any error in admission of the testimony of a sexual-abuse therapist as to statements of a child that her father had physically abused both her and her sister did not prejudice the parents since they were absolved of sexual abuse, and there was ample independent, competent evidence to prove that the children had suffered physical abuse. In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d 612, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 314 (R.I. 1997).

Reasonable Time.

Where a child stated that she told her mother about the assaults by her mother’s boyfriend and also reported that her mother responded with indifference and instructed her not to disclose his wrongdoing to the department of children and their families, in light of the facts presented, the passing of four days between the date of the assault and its disclosure represents a reasonable interval. In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d 572, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 95 (R.I. 1988).

A child’s statements are both timely and spontaneous within the standards of this section, where such statements are made to her foster mother within three days of being placed in foster care, a reasonable time from when she was removed from the scene of her sexual abuse. In re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 102 (R.I. 1989).

Statements made by a child to a social worker and Department of Children, Youth and Families investigator approximately six months after he had been removed from the home where the alleged abuses occurred were not made spontaneously within a reasonable time. In re Rocco W., 706 A.2d 1302, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 1998).

Relaxed Standards Applicable.

The relaxed standards of spontaneity and timeliness apply to hearsay proffered under this section, which liberalized the common-law test for admission of children’s out-of-court statements concerning their physical abuse. In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d 572, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 95 (R.I. 1988).

Specific Cases.

Because of the significant lapse of time between the taking of the children into custody and the allegations of abuse, the ample opportunity for reflection and deliberation given the children, and numerous previous disclosures about abuse against others, the allegations of abuse against the parents may not have been made spontaneously or at the children’s fist safe opportunity to disclose the abuse, and thus the spontaneity and timeliness requirements of this section were not met. In re Jessica C., 690 A.2d 1357, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 79 (R.I. 1997).

Trial justice correctly allowed a nurse practitioner, a school nurse, and a school social worker to testify concerning various out-of-court statements made by a child when it was apparent that the child turned to these adults for sympathy, protection, or advice. In re Veronica T., 700 A.2d 1366, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 268 (R.I. 1997).

In a termination of parental rights action, the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of the child’s foster mother, in which the child indicated that the mother had hit the child, as the statement was made three months after the child began living with the foster mother; however, reversal was not required because the trial justice’s decision to terminate the mother’s parental rights was not based upon the abuse allegedly inflicted by the mother, but rather upon the mother’ failure to protect the child from the father’s abuse. In re Alexis L., 972 A.2d 159, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 74 (R.I. 2009).

Where a mother appealed a family court’s termination of her parental rights under several sections of R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 and she argued that the trial justice committed reversible error because he permitted witnesses to testify about hearsay statements made by the children under R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-69 due to the passage of time, it was clear, without question, that the children’s hearsay statements were not necessary for the trial justice to determine that abuse had occurred or that a termination of parental rights was appropriate. In re Rita F., 64 A.3d 1220, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 78 (R.I. 2013).

In a case where the family court found that the father abused and neglected his daughters, the older child’s statements to her former preschool teacher indicating that the younger child had told her that their mother had coached the younger child into making sexual abuse accusations by showing her a pornographic movie did not fit within the hearsay exception provided by this section. The older child’s statements related to the alleged motive underlying the younger child’s disclosures and were properly stricken as inadmissible hearsay; the statements were not statements of abuse made to a trusted adult as they were statements that the younger child’s accusations were fabricated; and, in any event, any purported error was harmless as the rejected testimony was cumulative of admitted testimony. In re Emilee K., 153 A.3d 487, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 2017).

Witness as to Child’s Testimony.

In enacting this section, the general assembly has seen fit to place no limitation regarding who may testify in regard to what a child may have said. In re Thomas V., 540 A.2d 1027, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 55 (R.I. 1988).

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of child hearsay statutes. 71 A.L.R.5th 637.

14-1-70. Proceedings under prior law.

No proceeding arising from an offense committed prior to April 11, 1990, shall be affected by the repeal or modification of the statutes in effect at the time an offense was committed, but proceedings may be instituted, continued, and brought to final determination in accord with the laws and regulations in effect prior to April 11, 1990.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 2.

14-1-71. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 2.

Chapter 2 Commitment of Defective Delinquents [Repealed.]

14-2-1 — 14-2-8. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This chapter (P.L. 1947, ch. 1852, §§ 2-5; P.L. 1953, ch. 3222, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1954, ch. 3263, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3782, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1956, §§ 14-2-1 — 14-2-8; P.L. 1960, ch. 111, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 238, § 1; Reorg. Plan No. 1, (1970), was repealed by P.L. 1969, ch. 238, § 2 and by P.L. 1979, c. 293, § 1.

For present law, see § 40.1-22-31.

Chapter 3 Orphanages

14-3-1. Power to take custody of children.

Any orphanage or society organized and incorporated under the laws of this state for the care of orphans and needy children, and having a license for that purpose from the department of children, youth, and families, is authorized and empowered to take and have, from time to time, the exclusive care, custody, and control of children during their minority, in cases as follows:

When any child shall have been committed to its care during minority, under the decree of any court; and
When any child shall have been committed to its care during minority, by the written consent of both parents of the child, unless their joint natural guardianship has been superseded by an order, decree, decision, or judgment, regarding the care and custody of the child, or by the appointment of a legal guardian of the person of the child, in which event written consent shall be signed by the person legally entitled to the care and custody of the child, or by the legal guardian of the person of the child.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 197, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 248, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 293, § 1; P.L. 1926, ch. 854, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 422, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 80; G.L. 1956, § 14-3-1 ; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970.

Cross References.

Exemption from sales tax, § 44-18-30 .

Exemption from taxation on property, § 44-3-3 .

Licensing of agencies by department for children and their families, § 42-72-5 .

Collateral References.

Right of one in whose custody child has been placed by society to retain custody as against society or privy. 80 A.L.R. 1129.

14-3-2. Proceedings to declare child in care of orphanage dependent or neglected.

If the parents of any child in the care of an institution are dead, and the child has no guardian, or if any child shall have been maintained by an institution for the space of one year without aid in its support from its parents or guardian, or demand for its custody by either parent or guardian, the child may be proceeded against as a dependent or neglected child by petition to the family court under the provisions of chapter 1 of this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 197, § 2; C.P.A. 1905, § 1137; G.L. 1909, ch. 248, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 293, § 2; P.L. 1926, ch. 854, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 422, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 14-3-2 ; impl. am. P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 14.

Chapter 4 O’Rourke Children’s Center

14-4-1. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 87, §§ 1, 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 102, §§ 1, 6; impl. am. P.L. 1917, ch. 1470, art. 1, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 114, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 66, § 1; P.L. 1948, ch. 2114, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2724, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 14-4-1 ; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 69, § 2, effective June 29, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 100, § 2, effective June 30, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 14-4-1 concerned responsibility for control and maintenance of center.

14-4-2. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 87, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 102, § 7; P.L. 1922, ch. 2211, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 114, § 2; P.L. 1930, ch. 1574, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 66, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2724, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 14-4-2 ; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 69, § 2, effective June 29, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 100, § 2, effective June 30, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 14-4-2 concerned receipt and care of children; release or return to other custodial authority.

14-4-3. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, 87, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 102, § 8; P.L.1909, ch. 403, § 1; P.L. 1912, ch. 833, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 114, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 66, § 3; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 80; impl. am. P.L. 1948, ch. 2114, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 14-4-3 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 203, § 1; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 69, § 2, effective June 29, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 100, § 2, effective June 30, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 14-4-3 concerned purposes of chapter, placement of children in institutions or homes and guardianship and control.

14-4-3.1. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 82, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 69, § 2, effective June 29, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 100, § 2, effective June 30, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 14-4-3.1 concerned transfer of children; hearing.

14-4-4. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 87, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 102, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 114, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 66, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 14-4-4 ; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 69, § 2, effective June 29, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 100, § 2, effective June 30, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 14-4-4 concerned registration of children under care of department.

14-4-5. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 192, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 69, § 2, effective June 29, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 100, § 2, effective June 30, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 14-4-5 concerned annual reports.

Chapter 5 Treatment of Juveniles for Chemical Dependency

14-5-1. Purpose of chapter.

The purpose of this chapter is to encourage juveniles who are chemically dependent to obtain treatment for substance abuse.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 665, § 1.

14-5-2. Definitions.

For the purpose of this chapter, the following definitions apply:

“Child” or “minor” means any person under eighteen (18) years of age who is not married, is not a parent, or is not emancipated.
“Chemical dependency” means addiction to alcohol and/or other drugs.
“Licensed treatment facilities” means:
1. A licensed hospital located in Rhode Island which is accredited by the joint commission on the accreditation of hospitals;
2. An inpatient facility with residential rehabilitation treatment and/or detoxification programs as licensed by the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals and accredited by the joint commission on accreditation of hospitals. Treatment must be rendered under the direct supervision of a licensed doctor of medicine;
3. Day/evening treatment services and/or partial hospitalization services in a licensed hospital located in Rhode Island or in a facility licensed by the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals for substance dependency and substance abuse treatment;
4. A facility located in Rhode Island with non-residential treatment programs and facilities approved and licensed by the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals; or
5. An out-of-state facility which has been approved by the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals.
“Non-custodial, non-invasive treatment” means any treatment where the juvenile is not detained overnight or in any way against his or her will, and which consists only of counseling. This counseling can include help for personal problems and for coping with parental alcohol and drug problems.
“Parent” means a natural or adoptive parent, or a legal guardian.
“Qualified professional” means a physician, nurse, credentialed substance abuse counselor, certified social worker, or a licensed psychologist.
“Substance abuse” means abuse of alcohol and/or other drugs.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch, 665, § 1.

14-5-3. Treatment of minors — Chemical abuse.

In all treatment of a child for substance abuse or chemical dependency, the licensed treatment facility shall require the parents of the child to participate in the treatment. Parental consent for treatment of a child shall be required, except as otherwise provided in § 14-5-4 .

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 665, § 1.

14-5-4. Treatment without parental consent.

In the event a child refuses permission to contact parents to seek parental consent and if, in the judgment of a qualified professional, that contact would not be helpful or would be deleterious to the child who is voluntarily seeking treatment for substance abuse or chemical dependency, then non-invasive, non-custodial treatment services may be provided by a qualified professional without parental consent; provided, during the course of treatment, the qualified professional shall make attempts to obtain permission from the child to obtain parental consent for and parental involvement in the treatment services.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 665, § 1.

14-5-5. Acknowledgment of treatment — Clinical record.

Before a licensed facility may provide treatment services to a child without parental consent, the facility must obtain written acknowledgement from the child authorizing his or her evaluation and receipt of treatment services. Before requesting that a minor sign that acknowledgment, the child must be:
1. Advised of the purpose and nature of treatment services;
2. Told that he or she may withdraw the signed acknowledgment and cease participation in the treatment service at any time;
3. Told that the facility will make attempts to convince the child of the need for involvement of other family members in treatment and the facility’s preference for parental consent for the rendering of treatment services; and
4. Advised that a medical/clinical record of his or her treatment services will be made and maintained by the facility.
The signed form shall be included in the child’s clinical record. The clinical record shall include full documentation of the reasons why treatment was provided without parental consent and of all attempts made prior to and during the course of treatment to obtain that consent.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 665, § 1.

14-5-6. Custodial treatment.

Whenever a juvenile voluntarily seeks custodial, invasive treatment for substance abuse or chemical dependency, the parents must be notified and their consent obtained, except as otherwise provided in § 14-5-7 .

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 665, § 1.

14-5-7. Parental refusal — Custodial treatment.

In the event that a minor voluntarily seeks custodial or invasive treatment, a qualified professional determines that that treatment is in the best interest of the minor, and the minor’s parents refuse to consent to treatment, the minor, or anyone on his or her behalf, may petition the family court for approval of treatment.
A judge of the family court shall, upon petition and after an appropriate hearing, authorize custodial or invasive treatment if the judge determines that the child is mature and capable of making his or her decision as to the need for treatment, or if the judge determines that the child is not mature but that the custodial invasive treatment requested by the child would be in the child’s best interests.
A child may participate in the hearing on his or her own behalf and shall be represented in the proceeding by legal counsel. Proceedings in the family court under this section shall be confidential and shall be given precedence over other pending matters, so that the court may reach a decision promptly and without delay so as to serve the best interests of the child.
A judge of the family court who conducts proceedings under this section shall make in writing specific factual findings and legal conclusions supporting his or her decision and shall order a record of the evidence to be maintained, including his or her own findings and conclusions.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 665, § 1.

14-5-8. Possession of one ounce (1 oz.) or less of marijuana.

Notwithstanding any public, special, or general law to the contrary, possession of one ounce (1 oz.) or less of marijuana, as defined in § 21-28-1.02 , by a child under seventeen (17) years of age and who is not exempted from penalties pursuant to chapter 28.6 of title 21, shall constitute a status offense pursuant to § 14-1-3(11)(vii) and forfeiture of the marijuana. The family court may order a substance-abuse assessment and, if recommended, substance-abuse treatment. The parents or legal guardian of any child under seventeen (17) years of age shall be notified of the offense.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 407, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 408, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 407, § 2, and P.L. 2016, ch. 408, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2016, ch. 407, § 4, provides that this section takes effect on September 1, 2016.

P.L. 2016, ch. 408, § 4, provides that this section takes effect on September 1, 2016.

Chapter 6 Interstate Compact on Juveniles

14-6-1 — 14-6-11. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This chapter (R.P.L. 1957, ch. 43, §§ 1-11), relating to the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, was repealed by P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 1, and by P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 1, effective July 10, 2003. For present comparable provisions, see § 14-6.1-1 et seq.

Chapter 6.1 The Interstate Compact for Juveniles

14-6.1-1. Execution of compact.

The governor on behalf of the state of Rhode Island is authorized to execute a compact, in substantially the following form, with state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the general assembly signifies in advance its approval and ratification of compact.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 2.

The Interstate Compact on Juveniles

The contracting states solemnly agree:

ARTICLE I PURPOSE

The compacting states to this interstate compact recognize that each state is responsible for the proper supervision or return of juveniles, delinquents and status offenders who are on probation or parole and who have absconded, escaped or run away from supervision and control and in so doing have endangered their own safety and the safety of others. The compacting states also recognize that each state is responsible for the safe return of juveniles who have run away from home and in doing so have left their state of residence. The compacting states also recognize that congress, by enacting the Crime Control Act, 4 U.S.C. § 112 (1965), has authorized and encouraged compacts for cooperative efforts and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime.

It is the purpose of this compact, through means of joint and cooperative action among the compacting states to: (1) ensure that the adjudicated juveniles and status offenders subject to this compact are provided adequate supervision and services in the receiving state as ordered by the adjudicating judge or parole authority in the sending state; (2) ensure that the public safety interests of the citizens, including the victims of juvenile offenders, in both the sending and receiving states are adequately protected; (3) return juveniles who have run away, absconded or escaped from supervision or control or have been accused of an offense to the state requesting their return; (4) make contracts for the cooperative institutionalization in public facilities in member states for delinquent youth needing special services; (5) provide for the effective tracking and supervision of juveniles; (6) equitably allocate the costs, benefits and obligations of the compacting states; (7) establish procedures to manage the movement between states of juvenile offenders released to the community under the jurisdiction of courts, juvenile departments, or any other criminal or juvenile justice agency which has jurisdiction over juvenile offenders; (8) insure immediate notice to jurisdictions where defined offenders are authorized to travel or to relocate across state lines; (9) establish procedures to resolve pending charges (detainers) against juvenile offenders prior to transfer or release to the community under the terms of this compact; (10) establish a system of uniform data collection on information pertaining to juveniles subject to this compact that allows access by authorized juvenile justice and criminal justice officials, and regular reporting of compact activities to heads of state executive, judicial, and legislative branches and juvenile and criminal justice administrators; (11) monitor compliance with rules governing interstate movement of juveniles and initiate interventions to address and correct noncompliance; (12) coordinate training and education regarding the regulation of interstate movement of juveniles for officials involved in such activity; and (13) coordinate the implementation and operation of the compact with the interstate compact for the placement of children, the interstate compact for adult offender supervision and other compacts affecting juveniles particularly in those cases where concurrent or overlapping supervision issues arise. It is the policy of the compacting states that the activities conducted by the interstate commission created herein are the formation of public policies and therefore are public business. Furthermore, the compacting states shall cooperate and observe their individual and collective duties and responsibilities for the prompt return and acceptance of juveniles subject to the provisions of this compact. The provisions of this compact shall be reasonably and liberally construed to accomplish the purposes and policies of the compact.

ARTICLE II DEFINITIONS

As used in this compact, unless the context clearly requires a different construction:

“Bylaws” mans: those bylaws established by the interstate commission for its governance, or for directing or controlling its actions or conduct.
“Compact administrator” means: the individual in each compacting state appointed pursuant to the terms of this compact, responsible for the administration and management of the state’s supervision and transfer of juveniles subject to the terms of this compact, the rules adopted by the interstate commission and policies adopted by the state council under this compact.
“Compacting state” means: any state which has enacted the enabling legislation for this compact.
“Commissioner” means: the voting representative of each compacting state appointed pursuant to Article III of this compact.
“Court” means: any court having jurisdiction over delinquent, neglected, or dependent children.
“Deputy compact administrator” means: the individual, if any, in each compacting state appointed to act on behalf of a compact administrator pursuant to the terms of this compact responsible for the administration and management of the state’s supervision and transfer of juveniles subject to the terms of this compact, the rules adopted by the interstate commission and policies adopted by the state council under this compact.
“Interstate commission” means: the interstate commission for juveniles created by Article III of this compact.
“Juvenile” means: any person defined as a juvenile in any member state or by the rules of the interstate commission, including:
1. Accused delinquent — a person charged with an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a criminal offense;
2. Adjudicated delinquent — a person found to have committed an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a criminal offense;
3. Accused status offender — a person charged with an offense that would not be a criminal offense if committed by an adult;
4. Adjudicated status offender — a person found to have committed an offense that would not be a criminal offense if committed by an adult; and
5. Nonoffender — a person in need of supervision who has not been accused or adjudicated a status offender or delinquent.
“Noncompacting state” means: any state which has not enacted the enabling legislation for this compact.
“Probation or parole” means: any kind of supervision or conditional release of juveniles authorized under the laws of the compacting states.
“Rule” means: a written statement by the interstate commission promulgated pursuant to Article VI of this compact that is of general applicability, implements, interprets or prescribes a policy or provision of the compact, or an organizational, procedural, or practice requirement of the commission, and has the force and effect of statutory law in a compacting state, and includes the amendment, repeal, or suspension of an existing rule.
“State” means: a state of the United States, the District of Columbia (or its designee), the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Marianas Islands.

ARTICLE III INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR JUVENILES

The compacting states hereby create the “Interstate commission for Juveniles.” The commission shall be a body corporate and joint agency of the compacting states. The commission shall have all the responsibilities, powers and duties set forth herein, and such additional powers as may be conferred upon it by subsequent action of the respective legislatures of the compacting states in accordance with the terms of this compact.
The interstate commission shall consist of commissioners appointed by the appropriate appointing authority in each state pursuant to the rules and requirements of each compacting state and in consultation with the state council for interstate juvenile supervision created hereunder. The commissioner shall be the compact administrator, deputy compact administrator or designee from that state who shall serve on the interstate commission in such capacity under or pursuant to the applicable law of the compacting state.
In addition to the commissioners who are the voting representatives of each state, the interstate commission shall include individuals who are not commissioners, but who are members of interested organizations. Such noncommissioner members must include a member of the national organizations of governors, legislators, state chief justices, attorneys general, interstate compact for adult offender supervision, interstate compact for the placement of children, juvenile justice and juvenile corrections officials, and crime victims. All noncommissioner members of the interstate commission shall be ex-officio (nonvoting) members. The interstate commission may provide in its bylaws for such additional ex-officio (nonvoting) members, including members of other national organizations, in such numbers as shall be determined by the commission.
Each compacting state represented at any meeting of the commission is entitled to one vote. A majority of the compacting states shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, unless a larger quorum is required by the bylaws of the interstate commission.
The commission shall meet at least once each calendar year. The chairperson may call additional meetings and, upon the request of a simple majority of the compacting states, shall call additional meetings. Public notice shall be given of all meetings and meetings shall be open to the public.
The interstate commission shall establish an executive committee, which shall include commission officers, members, and others as determined by the bylaws. The executive committee shall have the power to act on behalf of the interstate commission during periods when the interstate commission is not in session, with the exception of rulemaking and/or amendment to the compact. The executive committee shall oversee the day-to-day activities of the administration of the compact managed by an executive director and interstate commission staff; administers enforcement and compliance with the provisions of the compact, its bylaws and rules, and performs such other duties as directed by the interstate commission or set forth in the bylaws.
Each member of the interstate commission shall have the right and power to cast a vote to which that compacting state is entitled and to participate in the business and affairs of the interstate commission. A member shall vote in person and shall not delegate a vote to another compacting state. However, a commissioner, in consultation with the state council, shall appoint another authorized representative, in the absence of the commissioner from that state, to cast a vote on behalf of the compacting state at a specified meeting. The bylaws may provide for members’ participation in meetings by telephone or other means of telecommunication or electronic communication.
The interstate commission’s bylaws shall establish conditions and procedures under which the interstate commission shall make its information and official records available to the public for inspection or copying. The interstate commission may exempt from disclosure any information or official records to the extent they would adversely affect personal privacy rights or proprietary interests.
Public notice shall be given of all meetings and all meetings shall be open to the public, except as set forth in the rules or as otherwise provided in the compact. The interstate commission and any of its committees may close a meeting to the public where it determines by two-thirds (2/3) vote that an open meeting would be likely to:
1. Relate solely to the interstate commission’s internal personnel practice and procedures;
2. Disclose matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
3. Disclose trade secrets or commercial or financial information which is privileged or confidential;
4. Involve accusing any person of a crime, or formally censuring any person;
5. Disclose information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
6. Disclose investigative records compiled for law enforcement purposes;
7. Disclose information contained in or related to examination, operating or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of or for the use of, the interstate commission with respect to a regulated person or entity for the purpose of regulation or supervision of such person or entity;
8. Disclose information, the premature disclosure of which would significantly endanger the stability of a regulated person or entity; or
9. Specifically relate to the interstate commission’s issuance of a subpoena, or its participation in a civil action or other legal proceeding.
For every meeting closed pursuant to this provision, the interstate commission’s legal counsel shall publicly certify that, in the legal counsel’s opinion, the meeting may be closed to the public, and shall reference each relevant exemptive provision. The interstate commission shall keep minutes which shall fully and clearly describe all matters discussed in any meeting and shall provide a full and accurate summary of any actions taken, and the reasons therefore, including a description of each of the views expressed on any item and the record of any roll call vote (reflected in the vote of each member on the question). All documents considered in connection with any action shall be identified in such minutes.
The interstate commission shall collect standardized data concerning the interstate movement of juveniles as directed through its rules which shall specify the data to be collected, the means of collection and data exchange and reporting requirements. Such methods of data collection, exchange and reporting shall insofar as is reasonably possible conform to up-to-date technology and coordinate its information functions with the appropriate repository of records.

ARTICLE IV POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

The commission shall have the following powers and duties:

To provide for dispute resolution among compacting states.
To promulgate rules to effect the purposes and obligations as enumerated in this compact, which shall have the force and effect of statutory law and shall be binding in the compacting states to the extent and in the manner provided in this compact.
To oversee, supervise and coordinate the interstate movement of juveniles subject to the terms of this compact and any bylaws adopted and rules promulgated by the interstate commission.
To enforce compliance with the compact provisions, the rules promulgated by the interstate commission, and the bylaws, using all necessary and proper means, including, but not limited to, the use of judicial process.
To establish and maintain offices which shall be located within one (1) or more of the compacting states.
To purchase and maintain insurance and bonds.
To borrow, accept, hire or contract for services of personnel.
To establish and appoint committees and hire staff which it deems necessary for the carrying out of its functions including, but not limited to, an executive committee as required by Article III which shall have the power to act on behalf of the interstate commission in carrying out its powers and duties hereunder.
To elect or appoint such officers, attorneys, employees, agents, or consultants, and to fix their compensation, define their duties and determine their qualifications; and to establish the interstate commission’s personnel policies and programs relating to, inter alia, conflicts of interest, rates of compensation, and qualifications of personnel.
To accept any and all donations and grants of money, equipment, supplies, materials, and services, and to receive, utilize, and dispose of it.
To lease, purchase, accept contributions or donations of, or otherwise to own, hold, improve or use any property, real, personal, or mixed.
To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, abandon, or otherwise dispose of any property, real, personal or mixed.
To establish a budget and make expenditures and levy dues as provided in Article VIII of this compact.
To sue and be sued.
To adopt a seal and bylaws governing the management and operation of the interstate commission.
To perform such functions as may be necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this compact.
To report annually to the legislatures, governors, judiciary, and state councils of the compacting states concerning the activities of the interstate commission during the preceding year. Such reports shall also include any recommendations that may have been adopted by the interstate commission.
To coordinate education, training and public awareness regarding the interstate movement of juveniles for officials involved in such activity.
To establish uniform standards of the reporting, collecting and exchanging of data.
The interstate commission shall maintain its corporate books and records in accordance with the bylaws.

ARTICLE V ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

Bylaws — The interstate commission shall, by a majority of the members present and voting, within twelve (12) months after the first interstate commission meeting, adopt bylaws to govern its conduct as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the compact, including, but not limited to:
1. Establishing the fiscal year of the interstate commission;
2. Establishing an executive committee and such other committees as may be necessary;
3. Provide for the establishment of committees governing any general or specific delegation of any authority or function of the interstate commission;
4. Providing reasonable procedures for calling and conducting meetings of the interstate commission, and ensuring reasonable notice of each such meeting;
5. Establishing the titles and responsibilities of the officers of the interstate commission;
6. Providing a mechanism for concluding the operations of the interstate commission and the return of any surplus funds that may exist upon the termination of the compact after the payment and/or reserving of all of its debts and obligations;
7. Providing “start-up” rules for initial administration of the compact; and
8. Establishing standards and procedures for compliance and technical assistance in carrying out the compact.
Officers and staff:
1. The interstate commission shall, by a majority of the members, elect annually from among its members a chairperson and a vice chairperson, each of whom shall have such authority and duties as may be specified in the bylaws. The chairperson or, in the chairperson’s absence or disability, the vice-chairperson shall preside at all meetings of the interstate commission. The officers so elected shall serve without compensation or remuneration from the interstate commission; provided that, subject to the availability of budgeted funds, the officers shall be reimbursed for any ordinary and necessary costs and expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties and responsibilities as officers of the interstate commission.
2. The interstate commission shall, through its executive committee, appoint or retain an executive director for such period, upon such terms and conditions and for such compensation as the interstate commission may deem appropriate. The executive director shall serve as secretary to the interstate commission, but shall not be a member and shall hire and supervise such other staff as may be authorized by the interstate commission.
Qualified immunity — Defense and indemnification:
1. The commission’s executive director and employees shall be immune from suit and liability, either personally or in their official capacity, for any claim for damage to or loss of property or personal injury or other civil liability caused or arising out of or relating to any actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred, or that such person had a reasonable basis for believing occurred without he scope of commission employment, duties, or responsibilities; provided, that any such person shall not be protected from suit or liability for any damage, loss, injury, or liability caused by the intentional or willful and wanton misconduct of any such person.
2. The liability of any commissioner, or the employee or agent of a commissioner, acting within the scope of such person’s employment or duties for acts, errors, or omissions occurring within such person’s state may not exceed the limits of liability set forth under the constitution and laws of that state for state officials, employees, and agents. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to protect any such person from suit or liability for any damage, loss, injury, or liability caused by the intentional or willful and wanton misconduct of any such person.
3. The interstate commission shall defend the executive director or the employees or representatives of the interstate commission and, subject to the approval of the attorney general of the state represented by any commissioner of a compacting state, shall defend such commissioner or the commissioner’s representatives or employees in any civil action seeking to impose liability arising out of any actual or alleged act, error or omission that occurred within the scope of interstate commission employment, duties or responsibilities, or that the defendant had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of interstate commission employment, duties, or responsibilities; provided that the actual or alleged act, error, or omission did not result from intentional or willful and wanton misconduct on the part of such person.
4. The interstate commission shall indemnify and hold the commissioner of a compacting state, or the commissioner’s representatives or employees, or the interstate commission’s representatives or employees, harmless in the amount of any settlement or judgment obtained against such persons arising out of any actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred within the scope of interstate commission employment, duties, or responsibilities or that such persons had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of interstate commission employment, duties, or responsibilities; provided that the actual or alleged act, error, or omission did not result from intentional or willful and wanton misconduct on the part of such persons.

ARTICLE VI RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

The interstate commission shall promulgate and publish rules in order to effectively and efficiently achieve the purposes of the compact.
Rulemaking shall occur pursuant to the criteria set forth in this article and the bylaws and rules adopted pursuant thereto. Such rulemaking shall substantially conform to the principles of the “Model State Administrative Procedures Act,” 1981 Act, Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 15, p. 1 (2000), or such other administrative procedures act, as the interstate commission deems appropriate consistent with due process requirements under the U.S. Constitution as now or hereafter interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. All rules and amendments shall become binding as of the date specified, as published with the final version of the rule as approved by the Commission.
When promulgating a rule, the interstate commission shall, at a minimum:
1. publish the proposed rule’s entire text stating the reason(s) for that proposed rule;
2. allow and invite any and all persons to submit written data, facts, opinions and arguments, which information shall be added to the record, and be made publicly available;
3. provide an opportunity for an informal hearing if petitioned by ten (10) or more persons; and
4. promulgate a final rule and its effective date, if appropriate, based on input from state or local officials, or interested parties.
Allow, not later than sixty (60) days after a rule is promulgated, any interested person to file a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Federal District Court where the interstate commission’s principal office is located for judicial review of such rule. If the court finds that the interstate commission’s action is not supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record, the court shall hold the rule unlawful and set it aside. For purposes of this subsection, evidence is substantial if it would be considered substantial evidence under the Model State Administrative Procedures Act.
If a majority of the legislatures of the compacting states rejects a rule, those states may, by enactment of a statute or resolution in the same manner used to adopt the compact, cause that such rule shall have no further force and effect in any compacting state.
The existing rules governing the operation of the interstate compact on juveniles superceded by this act shall be null and void twelve (12) months after the first meeting of the interstate commission created hereunder.
Upon determination by the interstate commission that a state-of-emergency exists, it may promulgate an emergency rule which shall become effective immediately upon adoption, provided that the usual rulemaking procedures provided hereunder shall be retroactively applied to said rule as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than ninety (90) days after the effective date of the emergency rule.

ARTICLE VII OVERSIGHT, ENFORCEMENT AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

Oversight:
1. The interstate commission shall oversee the administration and operations of the interstate movement of juveniles subject to this compact in the compacting states and shall monitor such activities being administered in noncompacting states, which may significantly affect compacting states.
2. The courts and executive agencies in each compacting state shall enforce this compact and shall take all actions necessary and appropriate to effectuate the compact’s purposes and intent. The provisions of this compact and the rules promulgated hereunder shall be received by all the judges, public officers, commissions, and departments of the state government as evidence of the authorized statute and administrative rules. All courts shall take judicial notice of the compact and the rules. In any judicial or administrative proceeding in a compacting state pertaining to the subject matter of this compact which may affect the powers, responsibilities or actions of the interstate commission, it shall be entitled to receive all service of process in any such proceeding, and shall have standing to intervene in the proceeding for all purposes.
Dispute Resolution:
1. The compacting states shall report to the interstate commission on all issues and activities necessary for the administration of the compact as well as issues and activities pertaining to compliance with the provisions of the compact and its bylaws and rules.
2. The interstate commission shall attempt, upon the request of a compacting state, to resolve any disputes or other issues which are subject to the compact and which may arise among compacting states and between compacting and noncompacting states. The commission shall promulgate a rule providing for both mediation and binding dispute resolution for disputes among the compacting states.
3. The interstate commission, in the reasonable exercise of its discretion, shall enforce the provisions and rules of this compact using any or all means set forth in Article XI of this compact.

ARTICLE VIII FINANCE

The interstate commission shall pay or provide for the payment of the reasonable expenses of its establishment, organization and ongoing activities.
The interstate commission shall levy on and collect an annual assessment from each compacting state to cover the cost of the internal operations and activities of the interstate commission and its staff which must be in a total amount sufficient to cover the interstate commission’s annual budget as approved each year. The aggregate annual assessment amount shall be allocated based upon a formula to be determined by the interstate commission, taking into consideration the population of each compacting state and the volume of interstate movement of juveniles in each compacting state and shall promulgate a rule binding upon all compacting states which governs said assessment.
The Interstate commission shall not incur any obligations of any kind prior to securing the funds adequate to meet the same; nor shall the Interstate commission pledge the credit of any of the compacting states, except by and with the authority of the compacting state.
The Interstate commission shall keep accurate accounts of all receipts and disbursements. The receipts and disbursements of the Interstate commission shall be subject to the audit and accounting procedures established under its bylaws. However, all receipts and disbursements of funds handled by the Interstate commission shall be audited yearly by a certified or licensed public accountant and the report of the audit shall be included in and become part of the annual report of the Interstate commission.

ARTICLE IX THE STATE COUNCIL

Each member state shall create a state council for Interstate Juvenile Supervision. While each state may determine the membership of its own state council, its membership must include at least one (1) representative from the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government, victims groups, and the compact administrator, deputy compact administrator or designee. Each compacting state retains the right to determine the qualifications of the compact administrator or deputy compact administrator. Each state council will advise and may exercise oversight and advocacy concerning that state’s participation in Interstate commission activities and other duties as may be determined by that state, including, but not limited to, development of policy concerning operations and procedures of the compact within that state.

ARTICLE X COMPACTING STATES, EFFECTIVE DATE AND AMENDMENT

Any state, the District of Columbia (or its designee), the Com- monwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana’s Islands as defined in Article II of this compact is eligible to become a compacting state.
The compact shall become effective and binding upon legislative enactment of the compact into law by no less than thirty-five (35) of the states. The initial effective date shall be the latter of July 1, 2004 or upon enactment into law by the thirty-fifth (35th) jurisdiction. There- after it shall become effective and binding as to any other compacting state upon enactment of the compact into law by that state. The governors of nonmember states or their designees shall be invited to participate in the activities of the Interstate commission on a nonvoting basis prior to adoption of the compact by all states and territories of the United States.
The Interstate commission may propose amendments to the compact for enactment by the compacting states. No amendment shall become effective and binding upon the Interstate commission and the compacting states unless and until it is enacted into law by unanimous consent of the compacting states.

ARTICLE XI WITHDRAWAL, DEFAULT, TERMINATION AND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT

Withdrawal:
1. Once effective, the compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each and every compacting state; provided that a compacting state may withdraw from the compact by specifically repealing the statute, which enacted the compact into law.
2. The effective date of withdrawal is the effective date of the repeal.
3. The withdrawing state shall immediately notify the chairperson of the Interstate commission in writing upon the introduction of legislation repealing this compact in the withdrawing state. The Interstate commission shall notify the other compacting states of the withdrawing state’s intent to withdraw within sixty (60) days of its receipt thereof.
4. The withdrawing state is responsible for all assessments, obligations and liabilities incurred through the effective date of withdrawal, including any obligations, the performance of which extend beyond the effective date of withdrawal.
5. Reinstatement following withdrawal of any compacting state shall occur upon the withdrawing state reenacting the compact or upon such later date as determined by the Interstate commission.
Technical Assistance, Fines, Suspension, Termination and Default:
1. If the Interstate commission determines that any compacting state has at any time defaulted in the performance of any of its obligations or responsibilities under this compact, or the bylaws or duly promulgated rules, the Interstate commission may impose any or all of the following penalties:
  1. Remedial training and technical assistance as directed by the Interstate commission;
  2. Alternative Dispute Resolution;
  3. Fines, fees, and costs in such amounts as are deemed to be reasonable as fixed by the Interstate commission; and
  4. Suspension or termination of membership in the compact, which shall be imposed only after all other reasonable means of securing compliance under the bylaws and rules have been exhausted and the Interstate commission has therefore determined that the offending state is in default. Immediate notice of suspension shall be given by the Interstate commission to the Governor, the Chief Justice or the Chief Judicial Officer of the state, the majority and minority leaders of the defaulting state’s legislature, and the state council. The grounds for default include, but are not limited to, failure of a compacting state to perform such obligations or responsibilities imposed upon it by this compact, the bylaws, or duly promulgated rules and any other grounds designated in commission bylaws and rules. The Interstate commission shall immediately notify the defaulting state in writing of the penalty imposed by the Interstate commission and of the default pending a cure of the default. The commission shall stipulate the conditions and the time period within which the defaulting state must cure its default. If the defaulting state fails to cure the default within the time period specified by the commission, the defaulting state shall be terminated from the compact upon an affirmative vote of a majority of the compacting states and all rights, privileges and benefits conferred by this compact shall be terminated from the effective date of termination.
2. Within sixty (60) days of the effective date of termination of a defaulting state, the Commission shall notify the Governor, the Chief Justice or Chief Judicial Officer, the majority and minority leaders of the defaulting state’s legislature, and the state council of such termination.
3. The defaulting state is responsible for all assessments, obligations and liabilities incurred through the effective date of termination including any obligations, the performance of which extends beyond the effective date of termination.
4. The Interstate commission shall not bear any costs relating to the defaulting state unless otherwise mutually agreed upon in writing between the Interstate commission and the defaulting state.
5. Reinstatement following termination of any compacting state requires both a reenactment of the compact by the defaulting state and the approval of the Interstate commission pursuant to the rules.
Judicial Enforcement:
The Interstate commission may, by majority vote of the members, initiate legal action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, at the discretion of the Interstate commission, in the federal district where the Interstate commission has its offices, to enforce compliance with the provisions of the compact, its duly promulgated rules and bylaws, against any compacting state in default. In the event judicial enforcement is necessary the prevailing party shall be awarded all costs of such litigation including reasonable attorneys’ fees.
Dissolution of Compact:
1. The compact dissolves effective upon the date of the withdrawal or default of the compacting state, which reduces membership in the compact to one (1) compacting state.
2. Upon the dissolution of this compact, the compact becomes null and void and shall be of no further force or effect, and the business and affairs of the Interstate commission shall be concluded and any surplus funds shall be distributed in accordance with the bylaws.

ARTICLE XII SEVERABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION

The provisions of this compact shall be severable, and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision is deemed unenforceable, the remaining provisions of the compact shall be enforceable. Provided, further, that the provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

ARTICLE XIII BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS

Other Laws:
1. Nothing herein prevents the enforcement of any other law of a compacting state that is not inconsistent with this compact.
2. All compacting states’ laws other than state constitutions and other interstate compacts conflicting with this compact are superseded to the extent of the conflict.
Binding Effect of the Compact:
1. All lawful actions of the Interstate commission, including all rules and bylaws promulgated by the Interstate commission, are binding upon the compacting states.
2. All agreements between the Interstate commission and the compacting states are binding in accordance with their terms.
3. Upon the request of a party to a conflict over meaning or interpretation of Interstate commission actions, and upon a majority vote of the compacting states, the Interstate commission may issue advisory opinions regarding such meaning or interpretation.
4. In the event any provision of this compact exceeds the constitu- tional limits imposed on the legislature of any compacting state, the obligations, duties, powers or jurisdiction sought to be conferred by such provision upon the Interstate commission shall be ineffective and such obligations, duties, powers or jurisdiction shall remain in the compacting state and shall be exercised by the agency thereof to which such obligations, duties, powers or jurisdiction are delegated by law in effect at the time this compact becomes effective.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 2, and P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 2, enacted identical versions of this chapter.

In 2021, “state of Rhode Island” was substituted for “state of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations” in the first paragraph of this section at the direction of the Law Revision Director to reflect the 2020 amendments to the state constitution that changed the state’s name.

Comparative Legislation.

Interstate Compact on Juveniles:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17-76 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws Spec. L. § 97:1 et seq.

14-6.1-2. Amendment to compact.

The governor is authorized and directed to execute with any other state legally joining, an amendment to the compact in substantially the following form:

This amendment shall provide additional remedies, and shall be binding only as among and between those party states which specifically execute the same.
All provisions and procedures of the compact on juveniles shall be construed to apply to any juvenile charged with being a delinquent by reason of a violation of any criminal law. Any juvenile, charged with being a delinquent by reason of violating any criminal law, shall be returned to the requesting state upon a requisition to the state where the juvenile may be found. A petition in the case shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction in the requesting state where the violation of criminal law is alleged to have been committed. The petition may be filed regardless of whether the juvenile has left the state before or after the filing of the petition. The requisition described in the compact shall be forwarded by the judge of the court in which the petition has been filed.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 2.

14-6.1-3. Ratification procedure — Effective date.

When the governor shall have executed the compact on behalf of this state and shall have caused a verified copy to be filed with the secretary of state; and when the compact shall have been ratified by no less than thirty-five (35) of the states, and thereafter it shall become effective and binding as to any other compacting state upon the enactment of the compact into law by that state. The governor is authorized and directed to take any action that may be necessary to complete the exchange of official documents as between this state and any other state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, ratifying the compact.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

14-6.1-4. Compact administrator.

Pursuant to the compact, the governor is authorized and empowered to designate an officer who shall be the compact administrator and who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to more effectively carry out the terms of the compact. The compact administrator shall serve subject to the pleasure of the governor. The compact administrator is authorized, empowered, and directed to cooperate with all departments, agencies, and officers of and in the government of this state and its subdivisions in facilitating the proper administration of the compact or of any supplementary agreement or agreements entered into by this state under it.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 2.

14-6.1-5. Supplementary agreements.

The compact administrator is authorized and empowered to enter into supplementary agreements with appropriate officials of other states pursuant to the compact. In the event that a supplementary agreement shall require or contemplate the use of any institution or facility of this state or require or contemplate the provision of any service by this state, the supplementary agreement shall have no force or effect until approved by the head of the department or agency under whose jurisdiction the institution or facility is operated or whose department or agency will be charged with the rendering of the service.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 2.

14-6.1-6. Financial arrangements.

The compact administrator, subject to the approval of the director of administration, may make or arrange for any payments necessary to discharge any financial obligations imposed upon this state by the compact or by any supplementary agreement entered into under it.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 2.

14-6.1-7. Federal and other aid.

Any and all donations, gifts, and grants of money, equipment, and services from the federal or any local government, or any agency of it, and from any person, firm, or corporation, for any of the purposes and functions of the compact, may be accepted by and administered by the compact administrator, subject to the approval of the director of administration, who may receive and utilize the aid, subject to the terms, conditions, and regulations governing donations, gifts and grants.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 2.

14-6.1-8. Fees.

Any judge of this state who appoints counsel or guardian ad litem pursuant to the provisions of the compact may, in his or her discretion, fix a fee to be paid out of funds available for disposition by the court, but no fee shall exceed the sum of fifty dollars ($50.00).

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 2.

14-6.1-9. Responsibilities of state departments, agencies, and officers.

The courts, departments, agencies, and officers of this state and its subdivisions shall enforce the compact and shall do all things appropriate to the effectuation of its purposes and intent which may be within their respective jurisdictions.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 2.

14-6.1-10. “Delinquent juvenile” defined.

“Delinquent juvenile,” includes a wayward child as defined in chapter 1 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 2.

14-6.1-11. Appropriations.

The general assembly shall annually appropriate, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, any sum that it may deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter; and the state controller is authorized and directed to draw his or her orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of that sum, or so much of it as may be required from time to time, upon the receipt by him or her of properly authenticated vouchers.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 187, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 191, § 2.

Chapter 6.2 Interstate Compact for Juveniles

14-6.2-1. Execution of the Compact.

The governor on behalf of the state of Rhode Island is authorized to execute a compact, in substantially the following form, with any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the general assembly signifies in advance its approval and ratification of this compact:

Interstate Compact on Juveniles

The contracting states solemnly agree:

ARTICLE I

Findings and Purposes

That juveniles who are not under proper supervision and control, or who have absconded, escaped or run away, are likely to endanger their own health, morals and welfare, and the health morals and welfare of others. The cooperation of the states party to this compact is therefore necessary to provide for the welfare and protection of juveniles and of the public with respect to: (1) cooperative supervision of delinquent juveniles on probation or parole; (2) the return, from one state to another, of delinquent juveniles who have escaped or absconded; (3) the return, from one state to another, of non-delinquent juveniles who have run away from home; and (4) additional measures for the protection of juveniles and of the public, which any two (2) or more of the party states may find desirable to undertake cooperatively. In carrying out the provisions of this compact the party states shall be guided by the non-criminal, reformative and protective polices [policies] which guide their laws concerning delinquent, neglected or dependent juveniles generally. It shall be the policy of the states party to this compact to cooperate and observe their respective responsibilities for the prompt return and acceptance of juveniles and delinquent juveniles who become subject to the provisions of this compact. The provisions of this compact shall be reasonably and liberally construed to accomplish the purposes of Article I of this compact.

ARTICLE II

Existing Rights and Remedies

That all remedies and procedures provided by this compact shall be in addition to and not in substitution for other rights, remedies and procedures, and shall not be in derogation of parental rights and responsibilities.

ARTICLE III

Definitions

That, for the purposes of this compact, “delinquent juvenile” means any juvenile who has been adjudged delinquent and who, at the time the provisions of this compact are invoked, is still subject to the jurisdiction of the court that has made that adjudication or to the jurisdiction or supervision of an agency or institution pursuant to an order of the court; “probation or parole” means any kind of conditional release of juveniles authorized under the laws of the states party to the compact; “court” means any court having jurisdiction over delinquent, neglected or dependent children; “state” means any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and “residence” or any variant of it means a place at which a home or regular place of abode is maintained.

ARTICLE IV

Return of Runaways

That the parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to legal custody of a juvenile who has not been adjudged delinquent but who has run away without the consent of the parent, guardian, person or agency may petition the appropriate court in the demanding state for the issuance of a requisition for his or her return. The petition shall state the name and age of the juvenile, the name of the petitioner and the basis of entitlement to the juvenile’s custody, the circumstances of his or her running away, his location if known at the time application is made, and any other facts that may tend to show that the juvenile who has run away is endangering his or her own welfare or the welfare of others and is not an emancipated minor. The petition shall be verified by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicate, and shall be accompanied by two (2) certified copies of the document or documents on which the petitioner’s entitlement to the juvenile’s custody is base [based], such as birth certificates, letters of guardianship, or custody decrees. Any further affidavits and other documents that may be deemed proper may be submitted with the petition. The judge of the court to which this application is made may hold a hearing on it to determine whether for the purposes of this compact the petitioner is entitled to the legal custody of the juvenile, whether or not it appears that the juvenile has in fact run away without consent, whether or not he or she is an emancipated minor, and whether or not it is in the best interest of the juvenile to compel his or her return to the state. If the judge determines, either with or without a hearing, that the juvenile should be returned, he or she shall present to the appropriate court or to the executive authority of the state where the juvenile is alleged to be located a written requisition for the return of the juvenile. The requisition shall set forth the name and age of the juvenile, the determination of the court that the juvenile has run away without the consent of a parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to his or her legal custody, and that it is in the best interest and for the protection of the juvenile that he or she be returned. In the event that a proceeding for the adjudication of the juvenile as a delinquent, neglected or dependent juvenile is pending in the court at the time when the juvenile runs away, the court may issue a requisition for the return of the juvenile upon its own motion, regardless of the consent of the parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to legal custody, reciting in it the nature and circumstances of the pending proceeding. The requisition shall in every case be executed in duplicate and shall be signed by the judge. One copy of the requisition shall be filed with the compact administrator of the demanding state, there to remain on file subject to the provisions of law governing records of such court. Upon the receipt of a requisition demanding the return of a juvenile who has run away, the court or the executive authority to whom the requisition is addressed shall issue an order to any peace officer or other appropriate person directing him to take into custody and detain the juvenile. The detention order must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance under this article. No juvenile detained upon the order shall be delivered over to the officer whom the court demanding him or her shall have appointed to receive him or her, unless he or she shall first be taken immediately before a judge of a court in the state, who shall inform him or her of the demand made for his or her return, and who may appoint counsel or guardian ad litem for him or her. If the judge of the court shall find that the requisition is in order, he or she shall deliver the juvenile over to the officer whom the court demanding him or her shall have appointed to receive him or her. The judge, however, may fix a reasonable time to be allowed for the purpose of testing the legality of the proceeding. Upon reasonable information that a person is a juvenile who has run away from another state party to this compact without consent of a parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to his or her legal custody, the juvenile, consistent with section 14-1-26.1 , may be taken into custody without a requisition and brought immediately before a judge of the appropriate court who may appoint counsel or guardian ad litem for the juvenile and who shall determine after a hearing whether sufficient cause exists to hold the person, subject to the order of the court, for his or her own protection and welfare, for a time not exceeding ninety (90) days that will enable his or her return to another state party to this compact pursuant to the requisition for his or her return from a court of that state. If, at the time when a state seeks the return of a juvenile who has run away, there is pending in the state in which he or she is found any criminal charge, or any proceeding to have him or her adjudicated a delinquent juvenile for an act committed in that state, or if he or she is suspected of having committed within that state a criminal offense or an act of juvenile delinquency, he or she shall not be returned without the consent of that state until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment, detention or supervision for the offense or juvenile delinquency. The duly accredited officers of any state party to this compact, upon the establishment of their authority and the identity of the juvenile being returned, shall be permitted to transport the juvenile through any and all states party to this compact without interference. Upon his or her return to the state from which he or she ran away, the juvenile shall be subject to any further proceedings that may be appropriate under the laws of that state.
That the state to which a juvenile is returned under this article shall be responsible for payment of the transportation costs of that return.
That “juvenile” as used in this article means any person who is a minor under the law of the state of residence of the parent, guardian, person or agency entitled to the legal custody of the minor.

ARTICLE V

Return of Escapees and Absconders

That the appropriate person or authority from whose probation or parole supervision a delinquent juvenile has absconded or from whose institutional custody he or she has escaped shall present to the appropriate court or to the executive authority of the state where the delinquent juvenile is alleged to be located a written requisition for the return of the delinquent juvenile. The requisition shall state the name and age of the delinquent juvenile, the particulars of his or her adjudication as a delinquent juvenile, the circumstances of the breach of the terms of his or her probation or parole or of his or her escape from an institution or agency vested with his or her legal custody or supervision, and the location of the delinquent juvenile, if known, at the time the requisition is made. The requisition shall be verified by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicate, and shall be accompanied by two (2) certified copies of the judgment, formal adjudication, or order of commitment which subjects the delinquent juvenile to probation or parole or to the legal custody of the institution or agency concerned. Any further affidavits and other documents that may be deemed proper may be submitted with the requisition. One copy of the requisition shall be filed with the compact administrator of the demanding state, there to remain on file subject to the provisions of law governing records of the appropriate court. Upon the receipt of a requisition demanding the return of a delinquent juvenile who has absconded or escaped, the court or the executive authority to whom the requisition is addressed shall issue an order to any peace officer or other appropriate person directing him or her to take into custody and detain the delinquent juvenile. The detention order must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance under this article. No delinquent juvenile detained upon the order shall be delivered over to the officer whom the appropriate person or authority demanding him or her shall have appointed to receive him or her, unless he or she shall first be taken immediately before a judge of an appropriate court in the state, who shall inform him or her of the demand made for his or her return and who may appoint counsel or guardian ad litem for him or her. If the judge of the court shall find that the requisition is in order, he or she shall deliver the delinquent juvenile over to the officer whom the appropriate person or authority demanding him or her shall have appointed to receive him or her. The judge, however, may fix a reasonable time to be allowed for the purpose of testing the legality of the proceeding. Upon reasonable information that a person is a delinquent juvenile who has absconded while on probation or parole, or escaped from an institution or agency vested with his or her legal custody or supervision in any state party to this compact, the person may be taken into custody in any other state party to this compact without a requisition. But in that event, he or she must be taken immediately before a judge of the appropriate court, who may appoint counsel or guardian ad litem for the person and who shall determine, after a hearing, whether sufficient cause exists to hold the person subject to the order of the court for a time, not exceeding ninety (90) days, as will enable his or her detention under a detention order issued on a requisition pursuant to this article. If, at the time when a state seeks the return of a delinquent juvenile who has either absconded while on probation or parole or escaped from an institution or agency vested with his or her legal custody or supervision, there is pending in the state in which he or she is detained any criminal charge or any proceeding to have him or her adjudicated a delinquent juvenile for an act committed in the state, or if he or she is suspected of having committed within the state a criminal offense or an act of juvenile delinquency, he or she shall not be returned without the consent of the state until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment, detention or supervision for the offense or juvenile delinquency. The duly accredited officers of any state party to this compact, upon the establishment of their authority and the identity of the delinquent juvenile being returned, shall be permitted to transport the delinquent juvenile through any and all states party to this compact, without interference. Upon his or her return to the state from which he or she escaped or absconded, the delinquent juvenile shall be subject to any further proceedings that may be appropriate under the laws of that state.
That the state to which a delinquent juvenile is returned under this article shall be responsible for payment of the transportation costs of the return.

ARTICLE VI

Voluntary Return Procedure

That any delinquent juvenile who has absconded while on probation or parole, or escaped from an institution or agency vested with his or her legal custody or supervision in any state party to this compact, and any juvenile who has run away from any state party to this compact, who is taken into custody without a requisition in another state party to this compact under the provisions of article IV(a) or of article V(a), may consent to his or her immediate return to the state from which he or she absconded, escaped or ran away. Consent shall be given by the juvenile or delinquent juvenile and his or her counsel or guardian ad litem if any, by executing or subscribing a writing, in the presence of a judge of the appropriate court, which states that the juvenile or delinquent juvenile and his or her counsel or guardian ad litem, if any, consent to his or her return to the demanding state. Before the consent shall be executed or subscribed, however, the judge, in the presence of counsel or guardian ad litem, if any, shall inform the juvenile or delinquent juvenile of his or her rights under this compact. When the consent has been duly executed, it shall be forwarded to and filed with the compact administrator of the state in which the court is located and the judge shall direct the officer having the juvenile or delinquent juvenile in custody to deliver his [him] or her to the duly accredited officer or officers of the state demanding his or her return, and shall cause to be delivered to that officer or officers a copy of the consent. The court may, however, upon the request of the state to which the juvenile or delinquent juvenile is being returned, order him or her to return unaccompanied to the state and shall provide him or her with a copy of the court order; in that event a copy of the consent shall be forwarded to the compact administrator of the state to which the juvenile or delinquent juvenile is ordered to return.

ARTICLE VII

Cooperative Supervision of Probationers and Parolees

That the duly constituted judicial and administrative authorities of a state party to this compact (called “sending state”) may permit any delinquent juvenile within the state, placed on probation or parole, to reside in any other state party to this compact (called “receiving state”) while on probation or parole, and receiving state shall accept the delinquent juvenile, if the parent, guardian or person entitled to the legal custody of the delinquent juvenile is residing or undertakes to reside within the receiving state. Before granting permission, opportunity shall be given to the receiving state to make any investigations that it deems necessary. The authorities of the sending state shall send to the authorities of the receiving state copies of pertinent court orders, social case studies and all other available information which may be of value to and assist the receiving state in supervising a probationer or parolee under this compact. A receiving state, in its discretion, may agree to accept supervision of a probationer or parolee in cases where the parent, guardian or person entitled to the legal custody of the delinquent juvenile is not a resident of the receiving state, and if so accepted the sending state may transfer supervision accordingly.
That each receiving state will assume the duties of visitation and of supervision over any delinquent juvenile and in the exercise of those duties will be governed by the same standards of visitation and supervision that prevail for its own delinquent juveniles released on probation or parole.
That, after consultation between the appropriate authorities of the sending state and of the receiving state as to the desirability and necessity of returning a delinquent juvenile, the duly accredited officers of a sending state may enter a receiving state and there apprehend and retake any delinquent juvenile on probation or parole. For that purpose, no formalities will be required, other than establishing the authority of the officer and the identity of the delinquent juvenile to be retaken and returned. The decision of the sending state to retake a delinquent juvenile on probation or parole shall be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state, but if at the time the sending state seeks to retake a delinquent juvenile on probation or parole, there is pending against him or her within the receiving state any criminal charge or any proceeding to have him or her adjudicated a delinquent juvenile for any act committed in the state, or if he or she is suspected of having committed within the state a criminal offense or an act of juvenile delinquency, he or she shall not be returned without the consent of the receiving state until discharge from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment, detention or supervision for such offense or juvenile delinquency. The duly accredited officers of the sending state shall be permitted to transport delinquent juveniles being so returned through any and all states party to this compact, without interference.
That the sending state shall be responsible under this article for paying the costs of transporting any delinquent juvenile to the receiving state or of retuning any delinquent juvenile to the sending state.

ARTICLE VIII

Responsibility for Costs

That the provisions of articles IV(b), V(b), and VII(d) of this compact shall not be construed to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities for them.
That nothing in this compact shall be construed to prevent any party state or subdivision from asserting any right against any person, agency or other entity in regard to costs for which the party state or subdivision may be responsible pursuant to articles IV(b), V(b), or VII(d) of this compact.

ARTICLE IX

Detention Practices

That, to every extent possible it shall be the policy of states party to this compact that no juvenile or delinquent juvenile shall be placed or detained in any prison, jail or lockup nor be detained or transported in association with criminal, vicious or dissolute persons.

ARTICLE X

Supplementary Agreements

That the duly constituted administrative authorities of a state party to this compact may enter into supplementary agreements with any other state or states party to this compact for the cooperative care, treatment and rehabilitation of delinquent juveniles whenever they shall find that the agreements will improve the facilities or programs available for the care, treatment and rehabilitation. The care, treatment and rehabilitation may be provided in an institution located within any state entering into the supplementary agreement. Any supplementary agreements shall: (1) provide the rates to be paid for the care, treatment and custody of delinquent juveniles, taking into consideration the character of facilities, services and subsistence furnished; (2) provide that the delinquent juvenile shall be given a court hearing prior to his or her being sent to another state for care, treatment and custody; (3) provide that the state receiving such a delinquent juvenile in one of its institutions shall act solely as agent for the state sending the delinquent juvenile; (4) provide that the sending state shall at all times retain jurisdiction over delinquent juveniles sent to an institution in another state; (5) provide for reasonable inspection of the institutions by the sending state; (6) provide that the consent of the parent, guardian person or agency entitled to the legal custody of the delinquent juvenile shall be secured prior to his or her being sent to another state; and (7) make provision for such other matters and details as shall be necessary to protect the rights and equities of such delinquent juveniles and of the co-operating states.

ARTICLE XI

Acceptance of Federal and Other Aid

That any state party to this compact may accept any and all donations, gifts and grants of money, equipment and services from the federal or any local government, or any agency of the federal or any local government and from any person, firm or corporation, for any of the purposes and functions of this compact, and may receive and utilize the same subject to the terms, conditions and regulations governing donations, gifts and grants.

ARTICLE XII

Compact Administrators

That the governor of each state party to this compact shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this compact.

ARTICLE XIII

Executive of Compact

That this compact shall become operative immediately upon its execution by any state as between it and any other state or states so executing. When executed it shall have the full force and effect of law within the state, the form of execution to be in accordance with the laws of the executing state.

ARTICLE XIV

Renunciation

That this compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each executing state until renounced by it. Renunciation of this compact shall be by the same authority which executed it, by sending six (6) months notice in writing of its intention to withdraw from the compact to the other states party to it. The duties and obligations of a renouncing state under Article VII of this compact shall continue as to parolees and probationers residing in that state at the time of withdrawal until retaken or finally discharged. Supplementary agreements entered into under Article X of this compact shall be subject to renunciation as provided by any supplementary agreements, and shall not be subject to the six (6) months’ renunciation notice of the present article.

ARTICLE XV

Severability

That the provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any participating state or of the United States or its applicability to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and its applicability to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected by it. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state participating in it, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2, and P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2, enacted identical versions of this chapter.

In 2006, the compiler inserted the bracketed words in Articles I, IV and VI.

14-6.2-2. Amendment to compact.

The governor is authorized and directed to execute with any other state legally joining, an amendment to the compact in substantially the following form:

This amendment shall provide additional remedies, and shall be binding only as among and between those party state [states] which specifically execute the same.
All provisions and procedures of Articles V and VI of the interstate compact on juveniles shall be construed to apply to any juvenile charged with being a delinquent by reason of a violation of any criminal law. Any juvenile, charged with being a delinquent by reason of violating any criminal law, shall be returned to the requesting state upon a requisition to the state where the juvenile may be found. A petition in the case shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction in the requesting state where the violation of criminal law is alleged to have been committed. The petition may be filed regardless of whether the juvenile has left the state before or after the filing of the petition. The requisition described in Article V of the compact shall be forwarded by the judge of the court in which the petition has been filed.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2006, the compiler inserted the bracketed word in subdivision (1).

14-6.2-3. Ratification procedure — Effective date.

When the governor shall have executed the compact on behalf of this state and shall have caused a verified copy to be filed with the secretary of state; and when the compact shall have been ratified by one or more of the state [states], territories or possessions of the United States, the District of Columbia, and/or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, then the compact shall become operative and effective as between this state and those other state or states, territories or possessions of the United States, the District of Columbia, and/or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The governor is authorized and directed to take any action that may be necessary to complete the exchange of official documents as between this state and any other state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, ratifying the compact.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2006, the compiler inserted the bracketed word in the first sentence.

14-6.2-4. Compact administrator.

Pursuant to the compact, the governor is authorized and empowered to designate an officer who shall be the compact administrator and who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to more effectively carry out the terms of the compact. The compact administrator shall serve subject to the pleasure of the governor. The compact administrator is authorized, empowered and directed to cooperate with all departments, agencies and officers of and in the government of this state and its subdivisions in facilitating the proper administration of the compact or of any supplementary agreement or agreements entered into by this state under it.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2.

14-6.2-5. Supplementary agreements.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2.

14-6.2-6. Financial arrangements.

The compact administrator, subject to the approval of the director administration, may make or arrange for any payments necessary to discharge any financial obligations imposed upon this state by the compact or by any supplemental agreement entered into under it.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2.

14-6.2-7. Federal and other aid.

Any and all donations, gifts and grants of money, equipment and services from the federal or any local government, or any agency of it, and from any person, firm or corporation, for any of the purposes and functions of the compact, may be accepted by and administered by the compact administrator, subject to the approval of the director of administration, who may receive and utilize the aid, subject to the terms, conditions, and regulation governing donations, gifts and grants.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2.

14-6.2-8. Fees.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2.

14-6.2-9. Responsibilities of state departments, agencies and officers.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2.

14-6.2-10. “Delinquent juvenile” defined.

“Delinquent juvenile,” as used in § 14-6.2-1 , includes a wayward child as defined in chapter one of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2.

14-6.2-11. Appropriations.

The general assembly shall annually appropriate, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, any sum that it may deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter; and the state controller is authorized and directed to draw his or her orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of that sum, or so much of it as may be required from time to time, upon receipt by him or her of properly authenticated vouchers.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2.

14-6.2-12. Expiration date.

This section shall be repealed and the term of the compact shall expire upon the ratification of the Interstate Compact as referenced in chapter 6.1 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 178, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 179, § 2.

Chapter 7 Community Restitution

14-7-1. Community restitution.

The general assembly declares that the words “public community service” which appear throughout this title shall now be substituted with and referred to as “public community restitution”.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 454, § 3.