RICODE

Chapter 1 Action by Governor

43-1-1. “Measure” defined.

The term “measure,” wherever used in this chapter, means any bill, resolution, or vote, except those as relate to adjournment, the organization, or conduct of either or both houses of the general assembly, and resolutions proposing amendments to the Constitution, which shall have passed both houses.

History of Section. P.L. 1910, ch. 535, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 27, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 308, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 43-1-1 .

Cross References.

Enactment and style of laws, R.I. Const., Art. VI, Sec. 2 .

Comparative Legislation.

Submission to governor:

Conn. Const., Art. 4, § 15.

Mass. Const. Part II, Ch. I, Sec. I, Art. II.

43-1-2. Transmission of measures from governor to secretary of state.

Any measure not returned by the governor to the house in which it originated shall be transmitted by the governor to the secretary of state. Any measure approved and signed by the governor shall be transmitted as soon as signed, and any measure not signed by him or her shall be transmitted upon the expiration of the sixth day, Sundays excepted, after the measure has been presented to him or her, if the general assembly is in session, or if the general assembly has adjourned, then upon the expiration of the tenth day after the adjournment.

History of Section. P.L. 1910, ch. 535, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 27, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 308, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 43-1-2 .

Cross References.

Duties of governor, § 42-7-1 .

Duties of secretary of state, § 42-8-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

A governor who approves a statute is not thereby estopped from later challenging the validity of the statute. Roberts v. Board of Elections, 85 R.I. 203 , 129 A.2d 330, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 139 (1957).

Collateral References.

Adjournment, power of executive to sign bill after, or during recess of legislature. 64 A.L.R. 1468.

At what stage does a statute pass beyond the power of the legislative body to reconsider or recall. 96 A.L.R. 1309.

Devolution, in absence of governor, of veto and approval powers upon lieutenant governor or other officer. 136 A.L.R. 1053.

43-1-3. Notice to originating house of receipt of measure by secretary of state.

Whenever the secretary of state receives from the governor, while the general assembly is in session, any measure transmitted in accordance with the provisions of § 43-1-2 , he or she, at the next daily session of the house in which the measure originated, shall notify the presiding officer of the originating house that the measure has been received, and shall state the full title of the measure and whether or not the governor has signed it.

History of Section. P.L. 1910, ch. 535, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 27, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 308, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 43-1-3 .

Collateral References.

Effective date, failure of governor to sign bill until after. 146 A.L.R. 693.

43-1-4. Return of disapproved measures to originating house.

Whenever the governor returns to either house any measure, which he or she does not approve, he or she shall, if the house is in session, transmit the measure to the presiding officer. But if the house to which the measure is required by law to be returned has adjourned for the day, but not for the session, at the time the governor desires to make the return, then he or she shall deliver the measure, in the case of the senate, to the secretary or clerk, and, in the case of the house of representatives, to the reading or recording clerk. Delivery of the measure to any one of the officers shall constitute a delivery to the house of which he or she is an officer. Any officer receiving any measure shall certify thereon the day and hour of its receipt and shall, at the opening of the next daily session of the house of which he or she is an officer, deliver the measure to the presiding officer.

History of Section. P.L. 1910, ch. 535, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 27, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 308, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 43-1-4 .

Cross References.

Veto power of governor, R.I. Const., Art. IX, Sec. 14 .

Collateral References.

Disapproval by governor of a bill in part or with modifications. 35 A.L.R. 600, 99 A.L.R. 1277.

43-1-5. Notice to general assembly of return of measure or receipt by secretary of state.

Whenever either house receives a notice from the secretary of state as required by § 43-1-3 , or receives from the governor a measure returned with the governor’s objections to the measure, the presiding officer of the house shall immediately cause the house to be notified of the notice or the return of the measure, and shall order the notice, or the objections to the measure, as the case may be, entered upon the journal of the house, and the return of the measure and the receipt of the notice shall be communicated as soon as possible to the other house.

History of Section. P.L. 1910, ch. 535, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 27, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 308, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 43-1-5 .

Collateral References.

Validity of veto as affected by failure to give reasons for vetoing or objections to measure vetoed. 119 A.L.R. 1189.

43-1-6. Documents accompanying measures returned or transmitted to secretary of state.

The governor, in returning any measure to either house or transmitting any measure to the secretary of state, as required by this chapter, shall forward with the measure all papers and documents that accompanied it at the time it was originally presented to him or her.

History of Section. P.L. 1910, ch. 535, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 27, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 308, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 43-1-6 .

Chapter 2 Publication and Distribution of Acts

43-2-1. Numbering of public laws.

All acts of a public nature shall be numbered as chapters, continuously in the order of their passage commencing with the first act passed in the January session of each year and continuing to the end of the year.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 22, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 28, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2050, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 28, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 307, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 43-2-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Publication and distribution of statutes:

Conn. Gen. Stat., §§ 2-57 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 5, § 2 et seq.

43-2-2. References to public laws amended or repealed.

Every act amending or repealing a public law shall, immediately preceding the public law to be amended or repealed, refer to the law by the number and name of the chapter containing the law amended or repealed, and to the year of its passage; provided, that any failure to include the reference shall not invalidate or otherwise render void the act.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 22, § 2; P.L. 1907, ch. 1459, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 28, § 2; P.L. 1921, ch. 2050, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 28, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 307, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 43-2-2 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 2, § 1.

43-2-2.1. Assignment of official section number of general laws.

When an act of a general and permanent nature passed by the general assembly becomes a law and is filed with the secretary of state, the law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services shall examine the act and, if as enacted it has not been assigned to sections of the general laws or if section numbers of the general laws have been improperly assigned, the law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services shall assign each section of the act, which is proper for incorporation in the general laws, an official section number of the general laws. Where necessary, sections may be combined or divided in the assignment of the numbers. The assigned official section numbers shall be entered upon the original bill, as enacted. Sections of the general laws shall be cited and referred to by the assigned official numbers and may be amended by reference thereto. The official section numbers of the general laws as assigned by the law revision director of the joint committee on legislative services shall be used in the publication of the public laws, and internal section references in any act shall be changed to correspond to the assigned official numbers.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 91, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 304, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 153, § 4.

43-2-3. Deposit and safekeeping of original acts, resolutions, and proceedings.

The original acts, resolutions, and other proceedings of the general assembly shall be deposited and safely kept in the office of the department of state and shall not be removed from that office except upon the order of the general assembly or upon process issued by the supreme or superior court or by a justice of either of the courts.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 22, § 3; C.P.A. 1905, § 1085; G.L. 1909, ch. 28, § 3; P.L. 1921, ch. 2050, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 28, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 307, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 43-2-3 .

Cross References.

Duties of secretary of state, § 42-8-1 .

Original acts and resolves, preservation, § 42-8-3 .

43-2-4. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 22, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 28, § 4; P.L. 1921, ch. 2050, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 28, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 307, § 4; P.L. 1956, ch. 3704, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 43-2-4 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 55, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 201, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 43-2-4 concerned printing and binding of proceedings of general assembly.

43-2-5. Distribution of copies of proceedings.

The joint committee on legislative services shall, as soon as possible after publication of the public laws, acts of a local and private nature, and resolutions as provided in § 22-11-3.3 , transmit bound copies to each of the following officers, libraries, or societies. The copies shall be transmitted by the recipients to their successors in office:

One copy each to the governor, lieutenant governor, justices of the supreme, superior, family and district courts, general treasurer, state controller, the director of each state department, administrator of the division of public utilities and carriers, tax administrator, director of business regulation, the several town and city clerks, the several boards of canvassers and registration, the several probate courts where the clerk of the court is other than the city or town clerk, the several clerks or administrators of the supreme, superior, family and district courts, reporter of opinions of the supreme court, the several sheriffs, adjutant general, state judge advocate general, the division of occupational safety, the library of any accredited institution of higher education in the state of Rhode Island, Redwood Library and Athenaeum, the People’s Library, Newport, Providence Athenaeum, Providence Public Library, Pawtucket Free Public Library, any other incorporated library in the state or any library in the state receiving state aid that may apply for a copy, the social law library at Boston, Massachusetts, the New York Public Library, in New York, the library of the Worcester County Bar Association, Massachusetts, the library of the Johns Hopkins University, Maryland, the library at Cornell University, New York, the law schools at Cambridge and Boston in Massachusetts, at New York and at Albany in New York, at New Haven in Connecticut, the library of the University of West Virginia, in West Virginia, the bar library in Chicago, in Illinois, the library of the law school of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., the state libraries of the several states, the senate committees on judiciary, finance and commerce, housing and municipal government, the house of representatives committees on judiciary, finance and corporations, the legislative council and the house of representatives finance committee advisory staff, each member of the general assembly, the associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States assigned to the First Circuit, each district judge of the United States for the District of Rhode Island, the United States district attorney for the District of Rhode Island, the United States Marshal, the referee in bankruptcy for the District of Rhode Island, and the clerk of the United States District Court;
Four (4) copies to the Secretary of State of the United States;
Two (2) copies each to the state library, the state law library, the secretary of state, the attorney general, the public defender, the Legal Aid Society of Rhode Island, the Rhode Island Historical Society, the Newport Historical Society, and the Warden’s Court at New Shoreham.
The secretary of state shall keep two (2) copies for the use of his or her office.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 22, §§ 5-7; P.L. 1901, ch. 832, § 1; C.P.A. 1905, §§ 1218, 1219; G.L. 1909, ch. 28, §§ 5-7; P.L. 1910, ch. 541, § 1; P.L. 1921, ch. 2050, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 28, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 307, § 5; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 65; P.L. 1944, ch. 1457, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951 (s.s.), ch. 2870, § 18; impl. am. P.L. 1952, ch. 2973, §§ 2, 4; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3742, par. 16; G.L. 1956, § 43-2-5 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 4, § 1; P.L. 1960, ch. 6, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 522, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 410, § 25; P.L. 2010, ch. 239, § 36.

Cross References.

Printing and binding of public acts, § 22-11-3.3 .

43-2-6. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 22, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 28, §§ 6, 8; P.L. 1921, ch. 2050, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 28, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 307, § 6; P.L. 1944, ch. 1456, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3279, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 43-2-6 ; Repealed by P.L. 1970, ch. 55, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 43-2-6 concerned publication and distribution of public laws.

43-2-7. Distribution of public laws.

The secretary of state shall retain the residue of the bound and unbound copies of the public laws and of the proceedings of the general assembly in his or her office for sale at the actual cost, except as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 28, § 7; P.L. 1921, ch. 2050, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 28, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 307, § 7; P.L. 1944, ch. 1456, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 43-2-7 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 55, § 4; 1971, ch. 166, § 1.

43-2-8. Distribution of official documents by governor.

The governor may transmit to the executive departments of the several states, to the executive departments of the United States, to the senators and representatives in congress, to the agents of foreign countries in the United States authorized to make exchanges for the documents, to the libraries, and to the state officers, boards and commissions hereafter created by the general assembly for use in the performance of their duties, as he or she may think proper, copies of all acts, resolutions, reports and other documents published under the authority of this state or of any officer thereof. There shall also be reserved for the governor twenty (20) copies of all bound volumes of the acts, resolutions, reports, and other public documents published under authority of the state, during his or her term of office, to be distributed as he or she shall see fit, upon his or her order as governor.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 22, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 28, §§ 8, 9; P.L. 1921, ch. 2050, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 28, § 8; P.L. 1927, ch. 1007, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 307, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 43-2-8 .

43-2-9. Exchanges by secretary of state.

The secretary of state may in his or her discretion transmit copies of acts, resolutions and reports published by him or her to any state, territory, province, or country which extends a similar privilege to the state library and, upon recommendation of the state librarian, he or she shall send in exchange to a designated depository in the state, territory, province, or country, in accordance with the provisions of § 29-1-5 , copies of acts, resolutions and reports published by him or her. The secretary of state may also transmit to any official receiving publications, in accordance with § 43-2-5 , copies of publications issued under authority of the state, and in his or her custody, to replace volumes, which have been mutilated or have become defective, upon receipt of the mutilated or defective volume in exchange.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 28, § 10; P.L. 1928, ch. 1170, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 307, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 43-2-9 .

Chapter 3 Construction and Effect of Statutes

43-3-1. English statutes as common law.

In all cases in which provision is not made herein, the English statutes, introduced before the Declaration of Independence, which have continued to be practiced under as in force in this state, shall be deemed and taken as a part of the common law of this state and remain in force until otherwise specially provided.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 297, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 366, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 419, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 306, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Statutory construction:

Conn. Gen. Stat., § 1-1 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 4, § 1 et seq.

Charitable Uses.

The act of 9 George II, ch. 36, relating to deeds for charitable uses, was not in force in Rhode Island in 1775. Potter v. Thornton, 7 R.I. 252 , 1862 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1862).

Estates by Entirety.

Estates by the entirety were known to the common law prior to 1636, so are recognized by the common law of Rhode Island. Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452 , 25 A.2d 354, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1942).

Latin—use in Pleadings.

The act of 4 George II, ch. 26, prohibiting the use of Latin in pleadings is not among the English statutes referred to in this section. Nevertheless, the use of Latin terms is impermissible unless they have become so anglicized as to have been adopted as a part of the English language and are so clearly intelligible as not to require resort to a law dictionary by one whose education did not include a study of the ancient language. Their use so clouds a pleading with vagueness and indefiniteness as not sufficiently to inform the adverse party of what he may be called upon to meet. Williamson v. General Fin. Corp., 99 R.I. 626 , 210 A.2d 61, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 493 (1965).

43-3-2. Application of rules of construction.

In the construction of statutes the provisions of this chapter shall be observed, unless the observance of them would lead to a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the general assembly, or be repugnant to some other part of the statute.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Ambiguities Construed.
Legislative Intent.
Reenacted Volumes of General Laws.

Ambiguities Construed.

In the event that a real or seeming ambiguity is perceived in reading the language of a statute, the Supreme Court will attempt to ascertain the intention of a legislative body from a consideration of the entire statute, keeping in mind its nature, object, language and arrangement, and this doctrine is applicable to the ascertainment of the intent of the framers of a municipal charter. Algiere v. Fox, 122 R.I. 55 , 404 A.2d 72, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2062 (1979).

Legislative Intent.

The savings statute, § 43-3-23 , which would have operated to impose a harsher sentence under prior law, was held inapplicable since there was a manifest legislative intent to mitigate the penalty. State v. Macarelli, 118 R.I. 693 , 375 A.2d 944, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1509 (1977).

The trial justice did not err in determining that the preservation of abominable and detestable crime against nature charges against the defendant would have been inconsistent with the manifest intention of the legislature to decriminalize sodomy between consenting adults and that such preservation would be repugnant to the statute as amended. State v. Mullen, 740 A.2d 783, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 195 (R.I. 1999).

Legislature intended the minimum-damages provision of the Wrongful Death Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-7-2 , to apply on a per-claim—rather than per-defendant—basis; because application of the rule that words importing the singular number may be extended or applied to several persons or things would not lead to a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly, or be repugnant to some other part of the statute, the minimum-damages provision of § 10-7-2 applies to multiple actors. O'Connell v. Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 38 (R.I. 2017).

Reenacted Volumes of General Laws.

The meaning of a statute which is modified in the process of reenacting individual volumes of the General Laws is presumed to remain unchanged unless it can be shown that the specific proposed changes were first brought to the attention of the legislature. In re P., 451 A.2d 274, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1064 (R.I. 1982).

Collateral References.

“And/or,” construction of phrase. 118 A.L.R. 1371, 154 A.L.R. 866.

Automobiles as within descriptive term of criminal or penal statutes not specifically naming them. 129 A.L.R. 387.

Construction of statute, consulting amendments as aid in. 70 A.L.R. 22.

“Devise” or “devisee” in statute as including “legacy” or “legatee,” or vice versa. 4 A.L.R. 246.

Ejusdem generis, application of rule of, to statutes of limitation. 39 A.L.R. 1404.

Meaning of “by” as fixing time for performance of an act or happening of an event. 12 A.L.R. 1168, 21 A.L.R. 1543.

Presumption that, in reenacting statute, legislature adopted previous judicial construction thereof, as applied to construction by trial or intermediate appellate court. 146 A.L.R. 923.

“Radius,” meaning of term employed in statute as descriptive of area, location or distance. 10 A.L.R.2d 605.

Resort to constitutional or legislative debates, committee reports and journals as aid in construction of statute. 70 A.L.R. 5.

“Similar,” term construed. 17 A.L.R. 94, 101.

Suit against state, strict construction of statutes permitting. 42 A.L.R. 1475, 50 A.L.R. 1408.

Supplying omitted words in statute. 3 A.L.R. 404, 126 A.L.R. 1325.

Title of statutes as an element bearing upon their construction. 37 A.L.R. 927.

43-3-3. Gender of words.

Every word importing the masculine gender only may be construed to extend to and to include females as well as males.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 4-3-3 .

43-3-3.1. Gender of titles.

Whenever a title which denotes gender is applied to an individual, the title shall suit the gender of the individual. When the gender is unknown, all nouns and pronouns shall be sex inclusive; provided, that this section shall not be applied retroactively but shall be applied prospectively.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 278, § 1.

43-3-3.2. Use of appropriate gender language.

When the secretary of state produces a document to instruct the public on the tenets or purpose of a statute, he or she is authorized and empowered to change the language to make the unofficial reproduction of the statute gender-neutral; provided, that the reproduction shall clearly indicate that it is a revised reproduction of a statute by printing the word “unofficial” on its face in bold-letter type.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 378, § 1.

43-3-4. Singular and plural.

Every word importing the singular number only may be construed to extend to and to include the plural number also, and every word importing the plural number only may be construed to extend to and to embrace the singular number also.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.
Effect of Plural Usage.
Effect of Singular Usage.

In General.

This section extends to an affidavit made according to the literal terms of a statute and to a judgment entered pursuant to such affidavit. McMahon v. Perkins, 22 R.I. 116 , 46 A. 405, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1900).

Effect of Plural Usage.

Use of “corporations” did not render statute uncertain even though only one corporation was intended. In re Pawtucket & Cent. Falls Grade Crossing Comm'n, 36 R.I. 200 , 89 A. 695, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1914).

Effect of Singular Usage.

Where one party was empowered by statute to obtain a writ, it was not ground for demurrer that a writ issued at the instance of more than one party. Probate Court v. Potter, 24 R.I. 274 , 52 A. 1085, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 64 (1902).

43-3-5. Joint authority exercised by majority.

All words purporting to give a joint authority to three (3) or more officers or persons shall be so construed as to give the authority to a majority of them.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

This section did not authorize two qualified assessors to act as a board where third assessor elected had not qualified. Carr v. Capwell, 30 R.I. 325 , 75 A. 309, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1910).

43-3-6. “Person” defined.

The word “person” extends to and includes co-partnerships and bodies corporate and politic.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Statute providing for personal service on an individual applies equally to a corporation and authorizes personal service on a corporation by service on its officer. Barone Lumber Co. v. Sowden, 51 R.I. 166 , 153 A. 308, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1931).

43-3-7. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 6; Repealed by P.L. 1996, ch. 287, § 1, effective August 6, 1996.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 43-3-7 concerned the definition of “insane person”.

43-3-7.1. Use of appropriate disability language.

Whenever the terms “the handicapped,” “handicap person,” or “handicapped person” are used in the general laws, the law revision director shall, unless the director determines it could alter the intent of the statute, recommend that they be replaced with the words “persons with disabilities” or “person with a disability,” inclusive, and whenever the term “handicap” is used in the general laws, the law revision director shall, unless the director determines it could alter the intent of the statute, recommend that it be replaced with the word “disability.”
Whenever the terms “developmental disability” or “developmental disabilities” or “mentally retarded” or “retarded” are used in the general laws, the law revision director shall, unless the director determines it could alter the intent of the statute, recommend that they be replaced with the words “intellectual and developmental disability” or “person with an intellectual and developmental disability,” if the context so requires.
Whenever the terms “substance abuse” or “addict” are used in the general laws, the law revision director shall, unless the director determines it could alter the intent of the statute, recommend that they be replaced with the words “substance use disorder” or “person with a substance use disorder,” if the context so requires.
Whenever an act, resolution, statute, regulation, guideline, directive, or other document of a governmental entity refers to people with disabilities, terms that stigmatize, like “the handicapped,” “the disabled,” “the blind,” “the deaf,” “the hearing impaired,” “cerebral palsied,” “paralytic,” “epileptic,” “confined to a wheelchair,” “wheelchair bound,” “lunatic,” “idiot,” “defective,” “deformed,” “victim,” “suffers from,” “mentally retarded,” “retarded,” “addict,” “substance abuser,” etc., shall not be used. Language that puts the “person first,” rather than the impairment or assistive device, such as “person with a disability,” “child who has mental illness,” “worker who is deaf,” “voter who uses a wheelchair,” “person who is hard-of-hearing,” shall be used.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 287, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 122; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 122; P.L. 2019, ch. 40, § 3; P.L. 2019, ch. 53, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 40, § 3, and P.L. 2019, ch. 53, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2019, ch. 40, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2020.

P.L. 2019, ch. 53, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2020.

43-3-8. “United States” defined.

The words “United States” include the several states and the territories of the United States.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-8 .

43-3-9. Towns include cities.

The word “town” may be construed to include city; the words “town council” include city council; the words “town clerk” include city clerk; the words “ward clerk” include clerk of election district; the words “town treasurer” include city treasurer; and the words “town sergeant” include city sergeant.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Duties.
Powers.
Preferences in Insolvency.

Duties.

Cities have same duties as towns with respect to highway repair. Eaton v. Follett, 48 R.I. 189 , 136 A. 437, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1927).

Powers.

Cities have same power over nuisances as towns. State v. Smith, 35 R.I. 285 , 86 A. 887, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1913).

Preferences in Insolvency.

Preference of town taxes in insolvency extends to city taxes. Willits v. Jencks Mfg. Co., 54 R.I. 164 , 171 A. 234, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1934).

Collateral References.

Meaning of terms “city,” “town,” or the like as employed in restrictive covenants not to compete. 45 A.L.R.3d 1339.

What constitutes manufacturing and who is a manufacturer under tax laws. 17 A.L.R.3d 7.

43-3-10. “Land” and “real estate” defined.

The word “land” or “lands,” and the words “real estate,” may be construed to include lands, tenements, and hereditaments and rights thereto and interests therein.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Easements.

Easement in cemetery lot would be land within the meaning of the statute of frauds. Oakland Cemetery Co. v. Smith, 54 R.I. 136 , 170 A. 492, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1934).

43-3-11. Oaths and affirmations.

The word “oath” includes affirmation; the word “sworn” includes affirmed; and the word “engaged” includes either sworn or affirmed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-11 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Party who declined opportunity to have witness placed on affirmation as well as on oath could not object because witness was an atheist. State v. Riddell, 38 R.I. 506 , 96 A. 531, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1916).

43-3-12. “Month” and “year” defined.

The words “month” and “year” mean a calendar month and year.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 11; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-12 .

Collateral References.

What 12-month period constitutes “year” or “calendar year” as used in public enactment, contract, or other written instrument. 5 A.L.R.3d 584.

43-3-13. Computation of time.

Whenever time is to be reckoned from any day, date, or act done, or the time of any act done, the day, date, or the day when the act is done shall not be included in the computation.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 12; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-13 .

Cross References.

Time computation, Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6; Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 45.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.
Age.
Filing of Security Interest.
Levy.
Notice.
Vacation of Court.
Void Execution on Default Judgment.

In General.

This section mirrors the common law which in essence deemed that in computing the time during which an act is required to be done, the first day is excluded and the last day is included. Burke v. Rhode Island College, 671 A.2d 803, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 57 (R.I. 1996).

Age.

When computing a person’s age, the day upon which the person was born, even though he or she was born at the day’s last moment, is included, and the person, therefore, reaches his or her next year in age at the first moment of the day prior to the anniversary date of his or her birth. Leo v. Maro Display, 122 R.I. 737 , 412 A.2d 221, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1466 (1980).

Filing of Security Interest.

The first day a debtor receives possession of collateral is not counted in computing the ten-day filing period under § 6A-9-312(4) in view of this section. In re Acme Motors, Inc., 68 B.R. 701, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 4709 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986).

Levy.

Statute prescribing period of notification after levy and before sale required that both day of levy and day of sale be excluded in the computation. Goldsworthy v. Coyle, 19 R.I. 323 , 33 A. 466, 1895 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1895).

Notice.

Notice on March 14 of event on January 13 met sixty-day requirement since the day of the event is excluded. Beebe v. Greene, 34 R.I. 171 , 82 A. 796, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1912).

Vacation of Court.

Statutory provision for vacation from specified day did not prevent court from sitting on the specified day. Frey v. Rhode Island Co., 37 R.I. 96 , 91 A. 1, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1914).

Void Execution on Default Judgment.

Execution on a default judgment was issued prematurely, where the judgment was entered on October 25, 1978, and execution on the judgment was issued on October 27, 1978; and the execution was therefore void ab initio. Golderese v. Suburban Land Co., 590 A.2d 395, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 76 (R.I. 1991).

Collateral References.

Validity of statute or ordinance giving property tax exemption or favorable property tax rate to older persons. 45 A.L.R.3d 1147.

43-3-14. “Warden” and “warden’s court” included.

The words “justice of the peace” include warden of the peace and the words “district court” include warden’s court.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 13; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-14 .

43-3-15. “Seal” defined.

Whenever a seal is required to be affixed to any paper, the word “seal” shall be construed to include an impression of the seal made with or without the use of wax or wafer on the paper.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 14; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-15 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Instruments Under Seal.
Legislative Intent.

Instruments Under Seal.

A promissory note to which no seal is affixed is not an instrument under seal merely because of the words “Witness our hands and seals” and the word “Seal” within a scroll after each signature. Wallbaum v. Martin, 103 R.I. 10 , 234 A.2d 369, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 569 (1967).

Legislative Intent.

The legislature did not intend to dispense with the use of a seal. Providence ex rel. Malo v. Goldenberg, 44 R.I. 327 , 117 A. 225, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1922).

43-3-16. General definitions — Statutory references.

The word “magistrate” may be construed to mean a justice, or a clerk acting as a justice, of a district court.
The words “written” and “in writing” include printing, engraving, lithographing, and photo-lithographing, and all other representations of words in letters of the usual form.
The words “preceding” and “following,” whenever used by way of reference to any chapter or section of the general laws, shall be construed to mean the chapter or section next preceding or next following; and whenever reference is made in the general laws to a title, chapter, or section without further description, the reference shall be construed to mean the designated title, chapter, or section of the general laws.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 20; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-16 .

Collateral References.

Validity of statute or ordinance giving property tax exemption or favorable property tax rate to older persons. 45 A.L.R.3d 1147.

43-3-17. “Rhode Island highway system” defined.

Wherever the words “state highway system”, “state highways”, “state roads”, or any other words referring to public roads occur in any general law, public law, act, or resolution of the general assembly, they shall be defined as found in chapter 8 of title 24, unless the context of the law, act, or resolution requires a different construction as may be deemed necessary by the director of transportation.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 24; P.L. 1927, ch. 1054, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-17 ; P.L. 1988, ch. 633, § 7.

43-3-18. “Product of the farm” or “farm product” defined.

Whenever the words “product of the farm” or “farm product” are used, they shall be construed to include all agricultural, horticultural, vegetable, fruit, or other products of the soil, livestock products, poultry, eggs, dairy products, nuts, mushrooms, honey, and beeswax; provided, that this definition does not include forest products.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 25; P.L. 1929, ch. 1358, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-18 .

43-3-19. Registered and certified mail.

Wherever the term “registered mail” is used in the general or public laws of this state, or any amendment thereto, the term “registered or certified mail” shall be substituted therefor.

History of Section. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-19 .

43-3-20. Financial reports.

Wherever in any general law, public law, act, or resolution of the general assembly an officer, board, commission, state department, or agency is required to make a financial report of its receipts and disbursements or its requirements, the required report means a report to the state controller as required by chapter 6 of title 35; provided, that nothing in this section shall apply to the reports required to be made to the governor and to the general assembly by the state controller.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 26; P.L. 1931, ch. 1737, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 23; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 65; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-20 .

43-3-21. Incorporation acts in evidence.

Every act of incorporation shall be so far deemed a public act that the act may be declared on and given in evidence without specially pleading it.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 15; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-21 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Amendments.
Judicial Notice.

Amendments.

Act amending incorporation act could be placed in evidence without being specially pleaded. Gorham Mfg. Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 27 R.I. 35 , 60 A. 638, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1905).

Judicial Notice.

Court could take judicial notice of provision in incorporation act establishing place of business. American Elec. Works v. Devaney, 32 R.I. 292 , 79 A. 678, 1911 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1911).

43-3-22. Effect of repeal on prior rights and proceedings.

The repeal of any statute shall in no case affect any act done, any right accrued, acquired, or established, or any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil case before the time when the repeal takes effect.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 16; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-22 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.
Causes of Action.
Judgments.
Proceedings.
Workers’ Compensation.

In General.

Statute providing that the estate of an alien dying after passage of the act is transmitted to his heirs did not affect the inability of heirs to inherit from an alien who died prior to its enactment. Haigh v. Haigh, 9 R.I. 26 , 1868 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1868).

Causes of Action.

The effect of the 1974 amendment to § 9-1-25 was prospective only, and causes of action which accrued prior to the effective date of the amendment continued to be governed by the former one-year statute of limitations. Skaba v. Capasso, 117 R.I. 512 , 368 A.2d 570, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1719 (1977).

The general savings clause of this section did not save former § 30-21-3 , which conferred seniority rights or benefits on eligible veterans, from repeal, where the repealing act clearly indicated the legislature’s intent to repeal § 30-21-3 retroactively. Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 550 (R.I. 1987).

Judgments.

A judgment rendered after the original enactment of a law and before its amendment would be controlled by the law in its original form. Rhode Island Dairy Queen v. Burke, 101 R.I. 644 , 226 A.2d 420, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 813 (1967).

Proceedings.

Where not specifically provided, enactment of a statute prescribing new procedure for establishing highways did not affect proceedings wherein commissioners had been appointed prior to the enactment. In re Dyer St., 11 R.I. 166 , 1875 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1875).

Workers’ Compensation.

Although the legislature in 1992 repealed § 28-37-4(i), which authorized the workers’ compensation bonus incentive plan, there was nothing in the legislative act that indicated an intent to deprive any employee of a benefit to which he or she had become entitled by reason of a pre-existing agreement, a preliminary determination, or any other prior orders or decrees. Dunbar v. Tammelleo, 673 A.2d 1063, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 108 (R.I. 1996).

Collateral References.

Modification or repeal of statutory provision adopted by reference in another provision, effect of. 168 A.L.R. 627.

Power and duty of court where legislature renders constitutional mandate ineffectual by failing to enact statute necessary to make it effective or by repealing or amending statute previously passed for that purpose. 153 A.L.R. 522.

43-3-22.1. Enlargement of statutes of limitation — Effect on actions not yet expired.

Whenever any time limitation for the commencement of any cause of action is enlarged, the amendment shall be construed to enlarge to the new time limitation all of those causes of action which accrued within the new limitation of time.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 410, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Specific Statutes.

In view of the enactment of this section, the 1981 amendment of the wrongful death statutes extended the limitation period applied to a cause of action that was not time barred at the time the new limitation period took effect. Spunt v. Oak Hill Nursing Home, 509 A.2d 463, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 469 (R.I. 1986).

43-3-23. Effect of repeal on criminal prosecutions.

No suit, prosecution, or indictment pending at the time of the repeal of any statute for any offense committed or for the recovery of any fine, forfeiture, or penalty incurred under the statute so repealed shall in any case be affected by the repeal, but the suit, prosecution, or indictment may be proceeded with, and the act shall be deemed to be in force for the purpose of prosecuting the act to final judgment and execution or sentence, as the case may be.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 17; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-23 .

Law Reviews.

Andrew J. Piombino, 2015 Survey, Cases: Criminal Law. State v. Whiting, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 708 (2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.
Applicability.
Common-Law Abatement.
Legislative Intent.
Penalty Provisions.
Savings Clauses.

In General.

This section does not purport to limit or bind subsequent legislatures. State v. Lewis, 91 R.I. 110 , 161 A.2d 209, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1960).

Applicability.

Acts which constituted rape under former § 11-37-1 could be prosecuted even though the prosecution was commenced after the repeal of that section due to the simultaneous-repeal-and-reenactment exception to the abatement doctrine. State v. Babbitt, 457 A.2d 1049, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 829 (R.I. 1983).

Where, in a prosecution for indecent assault pursuant to former § 11-37-6 , the information was not filed until June 24, 1980, there was no prosecution pending when the legislature repealed the indecent-assault section on May 9, 1979. Therefore, the general savings clause of this section did not apply, and defendant’s conviction for indecent assault was reversed. State v. Souza, 456 A.2d 775, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 815 (R.I. 1983).

Common-Law Abatement.

The common-law rule of abatement holds that in the absence of a savings provision a defendant may not be convicted under a statute that has been repealed. State v. Souza, 456 A.2d 775, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 815 (R.I. 1983).

Criminal actions that have not yet commenced when the statute outlining the crime charged is repealed abated pursuant to the common-law rule and are not saved by this section. State v. Souza, 456 A.2d 775, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 815 (R.I. 1983).

The simultaneous-repeal-and-reenactment exception to the abatement doctrine holds that a new act should be considered a continuation of the old in situations in which no substantial changes have been made in the legislation. Under such circumstances, there is no abatement of any of the legal consequences of acts committed under the old statute. State v. Babbitt, 457 A.2d 1049, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 829 (R.I. 1983).

This section, by its express terms, saves prosecutions or indictments that are pending at the time of repeal of a criminal statute, thereby creating another exception to the common-law abatement doctrine. State v. Babbitt, 457 A.2d 1049, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 829 (R.I. 1983).

Legislative Intent.

Pursuant to § 43-3-2 , this section will not be applied where its application would contravene the manifest legislative intent in enacting the repealing statute. State v. Macarelli, 118 R.I. 693 , 375 A.2d 944, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1509 (1977).

Penalty Provisions.

This section, barring other considerations, preserves the penalty provisions of a repealed law. State v. Macarelli, 118 R.I. 693 , 375 A.2d 944, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1509 (1977).

This section does not apply to subsequent statutes mitigating the penalty for the crime charged. State v. Macarelli, 118 R.I. 693 , 375 A.2d 944, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1509 (1977).

Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the trial justice was correct in determining that the general savings clause, R.I. Gen. Laws § 43-3-23 , was applicable and that the 2012 amendment to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-5 should not have been applied retroactively. State v. Whiting, 115 A.3d 956, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 65 (R.I. 2015).

Defendant’s conviction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-5 was affirmed where the 2012 amendment to the statute concerned a mere increase in the monetary threshold, the amendment was not a qualitative shift altering the fundamental essence of larceny prosecutions, and defendant’s conduct had remained illegal at all times. State v. Whiting, 115 A.3d 956, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 65 (R.I. 2015).

Savings Clauses.

Where criminal statute is repealed and repealing statute contains no saving clause, this section has the effect of saving criminal proceedings pending at the time of the repeal unless such construction would be clearly repugnant to the express provisions of the repealing statute. State v. Lewis, 91 R.I. 110 , 161 A.2d 209, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1960).

43-3-24. Repeal not reviving.

The repeal of any statute shall not be construed to revive any other statute which has been repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 18; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-24 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Repeal by G.L. 1938, ch. 658, § 12, of P.L. 1931, ch. 1754, § 2, did not revive G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 22, which had been repealed by implication by the 1931 law. Illinois State Trust Co. v. Conaty, 104 F. Supp. 729, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4386 (D.R.I. 1952).

43-3-25. Effective date of statutes.

Every statute enacted on or prior to July 1 in a calendar year, which does not expressly prescribe the time it shall go into operation, shall take effect on the first day of July of the calendar year of its enactment into law by the general assembly. Any bill enacted after July 1 in a calendar year, which does not expressly prescribe the time it shall go into operation, shall take effect on the date of passage of the bill.
For any statute enacted which requires any new expenditure of money or any increased expenditure of money by a city or town which states that it shall take effect upon passage, the effective date shall be deemed to mean July 1st of the calendar year following the year of enactment unless a specific date of enactment is stated.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 19; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-25 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 99, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 349, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

This section did not apply to a resolution authorizing a named poor tort debtor to be admitted to take the poor debtor’s oath. Barry v. Viall, 12 R.I. 18 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1878).

Collateral References.

Date or event contemplated by term “passage,” “enactment,” “effective date,” etc., employed by statute in fixing time of facts or conditions within its operation. 132 A.L.R. 1048.

43-3-26. Conflicting general and special provisions.

Wherever a general provision shall be in conflict with a special provision relating to the same or to a similar subject, the two (2) provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both; and in those cases, if effect cannot be given to both, the special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 26, § 23; G.L. 1909, ch. 32, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 32, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 309, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 43-3-26 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.
Implied Repeals.
Legislative Enactments.
Proof of Financial Responsibility.
Special Act.
— Local Laws.

In General.

The provisions of § 45-19-1 requiring the payment of policeman’s or fireman’s salary during disability did not affect the provisions of the special retirement law (P.L. 1923, ch. 489) relating to the City of Providence. Landers v. Reynolds, 92 R.I. 403 , 169 A.2d 367, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1961).

Executive director of the statewide judicial information system was not entitled to full status as executive director under the general statute, R.I. Gen. Stat. § 36-4-59 , because the trumping-specific provision in R.I. Gen. Stat. § 8-15-4 stated that assistants to the court administrator served at the pleasure of the Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Plunkett v. State, 810 A.2d 787, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 222 (R.I. 2002).

Director of the Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation, acting as an insurance rehabilitator, acted within the broad grant of statutory authority under R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-14.3-18(d) in crafting a sale plan for an insurer and its subsidiary in order for the insurer to become a stock company for purposes of revitalization and avoidance of possible insolvency. The plan included deferral of payments to two state Fair Access to Insurance Requirements Plans; as there was no conflict with R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-33-6 , which did not prohibit such payment deferral, statutory principles under R.I. Gen. Laws § 43-3-26 were not applicable, and the sale plan was properly approved by the trial court. Marques v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 915 A.2d 745, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 21 (R.I. 2007).

Sentence 1 of the Injured-on-duty (IOD) statute, R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-19-1(a) , applied only while the beneficiary remained a member of the department and was never intended to supplement retirement benefits; Sentence 2 of the IOD statute, a general provision, conflicted with R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-19-19 , a more specific provision, which therefore acted as an exception pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 43-3-26 . Cahoon v. Shelton, 647 F.3d 18, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15034 (1st Cir. 2011).

Implied Repeals.

In view of this section, the statute removing the sovereign immunity of municipalities from tort actions against them did not impliedly repeal the earlier statute requiring notice to municipalities before actions for injuries received on highways. Tessier v. Ann & Hope Factory Outlet, 114 R.I. 315 , 332 A.2d 781, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1416 (1975).

Legislative Enactments.

Building inspector was properly dismissed without personnel board hearing, as town charter section providing that inspectors are to serve at town administrator’s pleasure was an exception to general provision requiring hearings for all dismissed town officials. Borromeo v. Personnel Bd. of Bristol, 117 R.I. 382 , 367 A.2d 711, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1705 (1977).

Although repeals by implication are not favored when two acts are irreconcilably repugnant, the court will imply a repeal and give effect to the more recently passed act, particularly, when the more recently enacted law is more comprehensive and specific than the older law. Providence by Water Supply Bd. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 414 A.2d 465, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1563 (R.I. 1980).

Proof of Financial Responsibility.

There is an apparent conflict between the Responsibility of Owners of Rental Vehicles Act (chapter 34 of title 31) and the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (chapter 47 of title 31), as the former does not require an out-of-state rental vehicle agency to give proof of financial responsibility for vehicles not registered in this state, whereas the latter statute does appear to require such a showing. The former statute, being the more specific, prevails, pursuant to this section (conflicting general and special provisions). Lopes v. Phillips, 680 A.2d 65, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 195 (R.I. 1996).

Special Act.

Where there was inconsistency between § 45-19-1 and a special statute regarding firemen’s pension plans, the conflict was resolved in favor of the special act and ordinances enacted pursuant to it properly applied to the plaintiff. St. Germain v. Pawtucket, 119 R.I. 638 , 382 A.2d 180, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 597 (1978).

Protecting the “full status” under § 36-5-7 of the plaintiff, a sheriff denied reappointment by the governor, conflicted with the express language of § 42-29-1 , which limits the sheriff ’s term of office to ten years. Since under this section, a special statute prevails over a conflicting general provision, the governor’s right to appoint his own sheriff under § 42-29-1 prevailed over the plaintiff ’s interest in continued employment under § 36-5-7 . Casey v. Sundlun, 615 A.2d 481, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 201 (R.I. 1992).

Where there was a conflicting general and special provision, based on a car buyer’s consumer fraud claim under the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1, a superior court had jurisdiction to hear the car buyer’s class action case regarding a truck’s missing $ 200 security system which was listed as a standard feature on a window sticker; the “any ascertainable loss” language of the DTPA trumped the “amount in controversy” threshold set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-14(a) . Park v. Ford Motor Co., 844 A.2d 687, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 35 (R.I. 2004).

— Local Laws.

Police officer who challenged the mandatory retirement provisions of a city retirement act failed to state a valid Fair Employment Practices Act claim because under this section, the act is a “special act” and Fair Employment Practices Act is a “general” law. Power v. City of Providence, 582 A.2d 895, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 170 (R.I. 1990).

43-3-27. Security interests.

“Pledge”, “mortgage”, “conditional sale”, “lien”, “assignment”, and like terms, when used in referring to a security interest in personal property, shall include a corresponding type of security interest under chapter 9 of title 6A.

History of Section. P.L. 1960, ch. 147, § 3.

43-3-28. Proclamation of emergency.

Whenever it shall be determined by the governor that a time of emergency exists in the state brought about by the disruption and/or interruption of transportation, communications, or postal service, and that rights and obligations are adversely affected by the time of emergency, the governor may issue a proclamation which shall set forth the reason for the determination and which shall have the full force and effect of law when a copy is filed in the office of the secretary of state.