Chapter 1 Identification and Apprehension of Criminals

12-1-1. Rewards offered by governor.

Whenever any murder, attempt at murder, robbery, or other high crime, shall be committed in the state, and the perpetrator shall escape detection, or shall escape from custody or imprisonment, either before or after conviction, the governor may issue his or her proclamation offering a suitable reward, not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), for the apprehension of the offender.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 15, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 21, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 20, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 6, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-1-1 .

Collateral References.

Construction of statute authorizing public authorities to offer reward for arrest and conviction of persons guilty of crime. 86 A.L.R. 579.

Knowledge of reward as condition of right thereto, 86 A.L.R.3d 1142.

Right to reward of furnisher of information leading to arrest and conviction of offenders, 100 A.L.R.2d 573.

12-1-2. Appropriations for expenses authorized by governor.

The general assembly shall annually appropriate any sums that it may deem necessary for the payment of any services that may be authorized by the governor in the execution of the laws, the detection of crime and the apprehension of offenders, not including in the appropriation the sum to be paid under § 12-1-1 as a reward for the apprehension of offenders.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 15, § 5; P.L. 1898, ch. 572, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 21, § 5; P.L. 1918, ch. 1645, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 20, § 5; P.L. 1935, ch. 2250, § 149; G.L. 1938, ch. 6, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 12-1-2 .

12-1-3. Rewards offered by towns and cities.

Every town council of any town, or mayor of any city acting with the advice of the city council, may offer a suitable reward, not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) in any one case, for the detention, apprehension and conviction of any offender committing a high crime or misdemeanor within the limits of the town or city, to be paid by the town treasurer or city treasurer upon the order of the town council, or mayor and city council, out of any funds of the town or city not otherwise specifically appropriated.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 40, § 20; G.L. 1909, ch. 50, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 51, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 333, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 12-1-3 .

12-1-4. Division of criminal identification — Chief and assistants.

There shall be a division of criminal identification in the department of the attorney general to be in charge of a chief who shall be appointed by the attorney general to serve at the pleasure of the attorney general, and who shall devote all of his or her time to the duties of his or her office. The chief with the approval of the attorney general may appoint any assistants that he or she may deem necessary to carry out the work of the division, within the limits of any appropriation made for that purpose, and may with the approval of the attorney general discontinue the employment of any assistants at any time. The chief shall perform the functions required by the provisions of this chapter. In addition to availability of records to law enforcement agencies and officers, the records shall be made available to any attorney of record in any criminal action, and any officials of businesses which are required by federal or state law or regulation to effectuate a criminal background check of potential or prospective employees. The information shall be confidential and shall be used only by the employer for the employee’s application of employment.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 135, § 1; P.L. 1927, ch. 977, § 1; P.L. 1935, ch. 2250, § 31; G.L. 1938, ch. 620, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 12-1-4 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 9.

Cross References.

Department of attorney-general, § 42-9-1 et seq.

12-1-5, 12-1-6. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1923, ch. 135, §§ 7, 8; P.L. 1927, ch. 977, § 1; P.L. 1935, ch. 2250, § 149; G.L. 1938, ch. 620, §§ 8, 9; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2727, art. 1, § 2; G.L. 1956, §§ 12-1-5 , 12-1-6), concerning office space and appropriations for the division of criminal identification, were repealed by P.L. 2002, ch 417, § 1, effective June 28, 2002.

12-1-7. Criminal identification records — Stolen property reports.

It shall be the duty of the attorney general to procure and file for record in the office of his or her department so far as the same can be procured, fingerprints, plates, photos, outline pictures, descriptions, information, and measurements of all persons who shall be or shall have been convicted of felony, or imprisoned for violating any of the military, naval, or criminal laws of the United States or of any state, and of all well-known and habitual criminals from wherever procurable. The attorney general shall procure and keep on file in the office of the department, so far as they can be procured, fingerprints, measurements, processes, operations, signalletic cards, plates, photographs, outline pictures, measurements, and descriptions of any person who shall have been or shall be confined in any penal institution of this state, taken in accordance with the system of identification in use in any penal institution of this state. The attorney general shall also keep on file in the office the reports of lost, stolen, found, pledged, or pawned property required to be furnished to him or her.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 135, § 2; P.L. 1927, ch. 977, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 620, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 12-1-7 ; P.L. 2004, ch. 6, § 9.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authority of Court.

The Superior Court lacked the inherent power to remove entries relating to criminal matters from a Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI) report since such power to disregard the specific criteria and limitations on the expungement and sealing of BCI records as set forth in the statute would render those criteria and limitations nugatory. State v. Manocchio, 743 A.2d 555, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2000).

When defendant pled nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge in exchange for the dismissal of a felony charge, defendant was not entitled to sealing of the felony charge because R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-7 , on the Attorney General’s duty to maintain criminal records, did not conflict with R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12.1(a) , allowing sealing only upon exoneration of all charges in a case, as each provision applied to a different governmental body. State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2014).

12-1-8. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1923, ch. 135, § 4; P.L. 1927, ch. 977, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 620, § 4; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 12-1-8 ), concerning methods of identification used by the department of criminal identification, was repealed by P.L. 2002, ch. 417, § 1, effective June 28, 2002.

12-1-8.1. Method of identification.

The bureau of criminal identification in the department of attorney general shall use fingerprints as the exclusive method of positive identification.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 417, § 2.

Collateral References.

Fingerprints as evidence. 28 A.L.R.2d 1115; 45 A.L.R.4th 1178.

Right to take fingerprints and photographs of accused before trial, or to retain same in police records after acquittal or discharge. 83 A.L.R. 127.

12-1-9. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1923, ch. 135, § 3; P.L. 1927, ch. 977, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2386, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 620, § 3; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 12-1-9 ), concerning assistance to state and local police in fingerprint identification, enforcement powers, and cooperation with federal bureau and other states, was repealed by P.L. 2002, ch. 417, § 1, effective June 28, 2002.

12-1-9.1. Duty of police officials to furnish fingerprints.

It shall be the duty of the superintendent of the state police and the chiefs of police or town sergeants to furnish the bureau of criminal identification of the department of attorney general within ten (10) days of arrest, the fingerprints and physical description of all persons arrested and all persons who are wanted for serious crimes or who are fugitives from justice. This section is not intended to include violations of city or town ordinances or of persons arrested for minor offenses.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 417, § 2.

12-1-10. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1923, ch. 135, § 5; P.L. 1927, ch. 977, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 620, § 5; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 12-1-10 ), concerning the duty of police officials to furnish fingerprints and stolen property lists, was repealed by P.L. 2002, ch. 417, § 1, effective June 28, 2002.

12-1-10.1. Photographs and descriptive information.

In the case of every offense for which an indictment has been returned or an information filed, the person for which an indictment or information has been filed, if not previously fingerprinted by the arresting police department for the offense, shall report to the bureau of criminal identification of the department of attorney general to submit to fingerprinting, a photograph and the collection of descriptive information. In the event the individual indicted or informed against has not previously been fingerprinted for the offense is in the custody of the department of corrections or detained at a similar detention facility, the investigating police department shall obtain fingerprints and a photograph from the individual charged and submit a set of said fingerprints to the department of attorney general’s bureau of criminal identification within twenty-one (21) days of arraignment on the indictment or information.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 417, § 2.

12-1-11. Photographs and descriptive information as to persons convicted.

In the case of every offense for which an indictment has been found or an information filed and in which the offender has been found guilty and sentenced, or has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, the attorney general shall cause to be taken: (1) a photograph, (2) the name, age, weight, height, and a general description of the offender, and (3) his or her fingerprints in accordance with the fingerprint system of identification of criminals and a history of the offender as shown upon trial. In the case of all offenses triable in the superior court for the counties of Providence and Bristol, the attorney general shall cause the fingerprints, photograph, and other information to be taken by his or her department, and in the case of all offenses triable in any other county he or she may make any arrangements for the taking of fingerprints, photographs, and information that may to him or her seem most desirable. In the case of offenses other than those that are indictable, for which an offender is committed under a sentence of imprisonment for a period of six (6) months or more, the warden or keeper of a place of detention or penal institution other than institutions designed primarily for the detention of juveniles, to which an offender is committed, shall cause to be taken, unless the court otherwise orders, a like description, photograph, fingerprints, and history of the person. The description, photographs, fingerprints, and history shall be taken by persons in the service of the state appointed by the attorney general for that purpose. All descriptions, photographs, fingerprints, and identifying matter shall be immediately transmitted to the attorney general.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 135, § 6; P.L. 1927, ch. 977, § 1; P.L. 1928, ch. 1191, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 620, § 6; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 12-1-11 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 9.

12-1-12. Destruction or sealing of records of persons acquitted or otherwise exonerated.

    1. Any fingerprint, photograph, physical measurements, or other record of identification, heretofore or hereafter taken by or under the direction of the attorney general, the superintendent of state police, the member or members of the police department of any city or town, or any other officer authorized by this chapter to take them, of a person under arrest, prior to the final conviction of the person for the offense then charged, shall be destroyed by all offices or departments having the custody or possession within sixty (60) days after there has been an acquittal, dismissal, no true bill, no information, or the person has been otherwise exonerated from the offense with which he or she is charged, and the clerk of court where the exoneration has taken place shall, consistent with § 12-1-12.1 , place under seal all records of the person in the case including all records of the division of criminal identification established by § 12-1-4 .
    2. [Deleted by P.L. 2021, ch. 141, §  1 and P.L. 2021, ch. 142, §  1.]
    3. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100).
  1. Requirements of this section shall also apply to persons detained by police, but not arrested or charged with an offense, or to persons against whom charges have been filed by the court, and the period of such filing has expired.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, any person who has been charged with a complaint for a crime involving domestic violence where the complaint was filed upon a plea of not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere pursuant to § 12-10-12 , must wait a period of three (3) years from the date of filing before the records associated with the charge can be expunged, sealed, or otherwise destroyed.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 341, § 2; P.L. 1987, ch. 390, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 638, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 386, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 438, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 303, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 301, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 416, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 141, § 1, effective July 3, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 142, § 1, effective July 3, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 301, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 416, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 141, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 142, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Repealed Sections.

For repeal of the former section, see the note under this heading following § 12-1-13 .

Cross References.

Expungement of criminal records, § 12-1.3-1 et seq.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Distinction in R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1 between felons and non-felons did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Maintaining records of felons’ arrests aided the State’s legitimate interest in law enforcement, and the distinction rationally related to this interest. State v. Faria, 947 A.2d 863, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 60 (R.I. 2008).

“Acquittal or Other Exoneration.”

Dismissal of charges amounts to “exoneration” for purposes of this section. Coalition of Black Leadership v. Doorley, 349 F. Supp. 127, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11764 (D.R.I. 1972).

A plea of nolo contendere to a complaint cannot be considered an exoneration. State v. Olink, 507 A.2d 443, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 442 (R.I. 1986).

The fact that a complaint was filed after a plea of nolo contendere was made did not transform the plea into an exoneration under this section. State v. Olink, 507 A.2d 443, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 442 (R.I. 1986).

Authority of Court.

The Superior Court lacked the inherent power to remove entries relating to criminal matters from a Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI) report since such power to disregard the specific criteria and limitations on the expungement and sealing of BCI records as set forth in the statute would render those criteria and limitations nugatory. State v. Manocchio, 743 A.2d 555, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2000).

Exoneration.

A plea of nolo contendere to a complaint cannot be considered an exoneration. State v. Olink, 507 A.2d 443, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 442 (R.I. 1986).

The fact that a complaint was filed after a plea of nolo contendere was made did not transform the plea into an exoneration under this section. State v. Olink, 507 A.2d 443, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 442 (R.I. 1986).

A plea of nolo contendere and a successfully served term of probation, while not constituting a “conviction” under § 12-18-3 , remains as a record and does not constitute exoneration of that charge. State v. Gervais, 607 A.2d 881, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 232 (R.I. 1992).

Mandatory Destruction.

The remedy of destruction of photographs provided for in this section was mandatory and not permissive and as photographs were not destroyed on request, they were destroyed by court order and the person violating the statute was fined. Coalition of Black Leadership v. Doorley, 349 F. Supp. 127, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11764 (D.R.I. 1972).

When defendant pled nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge in exchange for the dismissal of a felony charge, defendant was not entitled to sealing of the felony charge because R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12.1(a) , allowing sealing only on exoneration of all counts, did not conflict with R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12(a) , since R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12(a) required sealing only when permissible under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12.1(a) . State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2014).

Sealing of Records Allowed.

District court erred in denying defendant’s motion pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12.1 (a) to seal all records pertaining to her two dismissed misdemeanor arrests because defendant’s plea of nolo contendere did not constitute a conviction for “any purpose” that was unrelated to the original disposition under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-18-3(a) because defendant successfully complied with the conditions of her probationary sentence; nothing in R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-1-12 or 12-1-12.1 directs that a plea of nolo contendere followed by probation should be deemed a conviction under those statutory provisions. State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2013).

Plea of nolo contendere followed by probation would not preclude a defendant from sealing his or her records because in the sealing context, the affected person has been acquitted or exonerated, whereas a person seeking to have his or her records expunged has not; therefore, sealing should be more widely available to those individuals than to those seeking to have their records expunged. State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2013).

District court erred in denying defendant’s motion to seal his record because he was entitled to the benefits of subsection (a) of this section since he fell squarely within the purview of subsection (b) of this section as a person detained by police but not arrested or charged with an offense; defendant was not “charged with an offense” because the “criminal complaint” charged him with a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-11-18 and indicated it was his first violation, and thus, defendant was liable only for a civil penalty. State ex rel. Coventry Police Dep't v. Charlwood, 224 A.3d 467, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 12 (R.I. 2020).

Time for Destruction.

The privacy right conferred by the legislature in this section vested upon dismissal of felony charges against plaintiffs, and they were not required to wait for the statute of limitations on the felony charge to run before demanding destruction of photographs. Coalition of Black Leadership v. Doorley, 349 F. Supp. 127, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11764 (D.R.I. 1972).

Use of Undestroyed Records.

State’s use of inked fingerprints on file in violation of this section is harmless error and insufficient to warrant a reversal of defendant’s conviction of intent to commit larceny. State v. Jackson, 570 A.2d 1115, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 46 (R.I. 1990).

Collateral References.

Expunction of federal arrest records in absence of conviction. 97 A.L.R. Fed. 652.

Right of exonerated arrestee to have fingerprints, photographs, or other criminal identification or arrest records expunged or restricted, 46 A.L.R.3d 900; 58 A.L.R.4th 902.

12-1-12.1. Motion for sealing of records of persons acquitted or otherwise exonerated.

  1. Any person who is acquitted or otherwise exonerated of all counts in a criminal case, including, but not limited to, dismissal or filing of a no true bill or no information, may file a motion for the sealing of his or her court records in the case.
  2. Any person filing a motion for sealing his or her court records pursuant to this section shall give notice of the hearing date set by the court to the department of the attorney general and the police department that originally brought the charge against the person at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing.
  3. If the court, after the hearing at which all relevant testimony and information shall be considered, finds that the person is entitled to the sealing of the records, it shall order the sealing of the court records of the person in that case.
  4. The clerk of the court shall, within forty-five (45) days of the order of the court granting the motion, place under seal the court records in the case in which the acquittal, dismissal, no true bill, no information, or other exoneration has been entered.
  5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, in all cases involving a filing subsequent to a plea of not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere to a charge of a crime involving domestic violence, the court having jurisdiction over the case shall retain the records of the case for a period of three (3) years from the date of filing. The records shall not be expunged or sealed for a period of three (3) years from the date of the filing.
  6. The defendant shall be advised at the hearing that any and all bail money relating to a case that remains on deposit and is not claimed at the time of sealing shall be escheated to the state’s general treasury in accordance with chapter 12 of title 8.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 638, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 386, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 303, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 301, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 416, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 97, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 109, § 2; P.L. 2021, ch. 141, § 1, effective July 3, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 142, § 1, effective July 3, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 301, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 416, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2015, ch. 97, § 2, and P.L. 2015, ch. 109, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 141, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 142, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Distinction in R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1 between felons and non-felons did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Maintaining records of felons’ arrests aided the State’s legitimate interest in law enforcement, and the distinction rationally related to this interest. State v. Faria, 947 A.2d 863, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 60 (R.I. 2008).

Authority of Court.

The Superior Court lacked the inherent power to remove entries relating to criminal matters from a Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI) report since such power to disregard the specific criteria and limitations on the expungement and sealing of BCI records as set forth in the statute would render those criteria and limitations nugatory. State v. Manocchio, 743 A.2d 555, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2000).

When defendant pled nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge in exchange for the dismissal of a felony charge, defendant was not entitled to sealing of the felony charge because R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12.1(a) , allowing sealing only on exoneration of all counts, did not conflict with R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12(a) , since R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12(a) required sealing only when permissible under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12.1(a) . State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2014).

When defendant pled nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge in exchange for the dismissal of a felony charge, defendant was not entitled to sealing of the felony charge because R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-7 , on the Attorney General’s duty to maintain criminal records, did not conflict with R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12.1(a) , allowing sealing only upon exoneration of all charges in a case, as each provision applied to a different governmental body. State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2014).

Sealing of Records Allowed.

District court erred in denying defendant’s motion pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12.1 (a) to seal all records pertaining to her two dismissed misdemeanor arrests because defendant’s plea of nolo contendere did not constitute a conviction for “any purpose” that was unrelated to the original disposition under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-18-3(a) because defendant successfully complied with the conditions of her probationary sentence; nothing in R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-1-12 or 12-1-12.1 directs that a plea of nolo contendere followed by probation should be deemed a conviction under those statutory provisions. State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2013).

Plea of nolo contendere followed by probation would not preclude a defendant from sealing his or her records because in the sealing context, the affected person has been acquitted or exonerated, whereas a person seeking to have his or her records expunged has not; therefore, sealing should be more widely available to those individuals than to those seeking to have their records expunged. State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2013).

12-1-12.2. Sealing of arrest records for wrongful arrest due to mistaken identity or any other reason — Notification.

  1. Definitions.
    1. “Law enforcement agency” means the department of attorney general; the superintendent of the state police, or his or her designee; the member, or members, of the police department of any city or town; a state or local police organization of this or any other state; the enforcement division of the department of environmental management; the office of the state fire marshal; the capitol police; a law enforcement agency of the federal government; and any agency, department, or bureau of the United States government that has, as one of its functions, the gathering of intelligence data.
    2. “Destruction or sealing of records” means, and includes, any fingerprint, photograph, physical measurements, or other record of identification, heretofore or hereafter taken by, or under the direction of, the attorney general; the superintendent or his or her designees of state police; the member, or members, of the police department of any city or town; the enforcement division of the department of environmental management; the office of the state fire marshal; the capitol police; a law enforcement agency of the federal government; any agency, department, or bureau of the United States government that has as one of its functions the gathering of intelligence data; or any other officer authorized by this chapter to take them, of a person under arrest.
  2. Any law enforcement agency, subsequent to the arrest of any person, that determines that such person was wrongfully or incorrectly arrested as a result of mistaken identity or any other reason, or wrongfully fingerprinted, photographed, or otherwise has generated any record of arrest for investigatory purposes and, as a result of such wrongful arrest, no charges have been filed in any court of this state, shall, within sixty (60) days of such determination that the arrest was wrongful or without probable cause, seal all such arrest records and destroy all identifying information and indices of arrest, including, but not limited to, photographs and fingerprints. DNA samples obtained from such person shall be handled in accordance with the provisions of chapter 1.5 of title 12, “DNA detection of sexual and violent offenders” during, and related to, the investigation.
  3. Any law enforcement agency that arrests and reports such arrest to any other law enforcement agency shall, within sixty (60) days of making the determination that the arrest was wrongful or without probable cause, also notify all other agencies to which it has transmitted such identifying information and including, but not limited to, the state’s bureau of criminal identification (BCI), the National Crime Information Identity Center (NCIC), and/or any other state or federal agency that compiles, retains, or collects any arrest or identifying information of arrestees, that the arrest was wrongful and that any and all records transmitted or generated shall be sealed and/or destroyed as provided herein.
  4. Any such person arrested and not charged shall be entitled to have all records and indices of arrest sealed and/or destroyed as provided herein regardless of any prior record of arrest or conviction that may otherwise not be eligible for expungement, pursuant to § 12-1.3-1 et seq., or sealing, pursuant to § 12-1-12 et seq.
  5. Any law enforcement agency, upon making such determination that such an arrest was wrongful or without probable cause as provided herein, shall notify the person arrested that the charge was dismissed or that no charges have been filed and that all arrest records and indices of arrest have been sealed and/or destroyed consistent with this chapter.
  6. Any person arrested, detained, or otherwise identified as a suspect, and who is thereafter exonerated consistent with the provisions contained herein, may deny, for any purpose, that the arrest ever occurred and under no circumstances shall such an arrestee be required to disclose the arrest for any purpose including, but not limited to, any application for employment, professional license, concealed-weapons permit, or the purchase of a firearm or other weapon.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 425, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 426, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 425, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 426, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

12-1-13. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

Former §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-13 (P.L. 1911, ch. 719, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 135, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 135, § 9; P.L. 1927, ch. 977, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 620, § 7; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 12-1-12 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 285, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 71, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 256, § 1), concerning destruction of records of persons acquitted of crimes and expungement of records of persons convicted of misdemeanors, were repealed by P.L. 1983, ch. 224, § 1. For present provisions of law, see § 12-1-12 and § 12-1.3-1 et seq.

12-1-14. Body attachment — Nonsupport of children.

  1. Any body attachment issued by the family court in a case involving the bureau of family support relating to the nonsupport of children shall be entered into the state and police telecommunications system known as the Rhode Island Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, “RILETS.” The family court shall be responsible for transmitting all body attachments and cancellations of them to the attorney general’s bureau of criminal identification for distributing the body attachment information into RILETS. Within the body attachment, the information entered in RILETS shall include date of birth and social security number when available. The family court shall be responsible for transmitting information regarding all body attachments and cancellations to the attorney general’s bureau of criminal identification for entering the body attachment information into RILETS. The family court shall transmit the original body attachment to the attorney general’s bureau of criminal identification.
  2. Any peace officer as defined in § 12-7-21 or certified constable authorized pursuant to § 9-5-10.1 shall have the authority to execute a body attachment as issued by the family court pursuant to § 8-10-3.1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 12; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 12; P.L. 1996, ch. 241, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 19; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 19.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 19, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 19 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

12-1-15. Retaliation prohibited.

No employer shall discharge or take any disciplinary action against an employee based on the employer’s notification or obligation provisions contained in Chapter 370, Article 29 and Chapter 374 of the 1995 Public Laws.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 14; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 14.

12-1-16. Improvement of lineup procedures task force.

  1. In order to: (1) Prevent the injustice of a wrongful conviction caused by mistaken eyewitness identification; (2) Improve lineup procedures during criminal investigations; and (3) Further improve the already high quality of criminal justice in our state, the general assembly creates a taskforce to identify and recommend policies and procedures to improve the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.
  2. The task force shall be comprised of the following or their designees:
    1. Attorney general;
    2. Public defender;
    3. Superintendent of the Rhode Island state police;
    4. President of the Rhode Island police chiefs’ association;
    5. Head of the municipal police training academy;
    6. President of the Rhode Island bar association;
    7. President of the Rhode Island association of criminal defense lawyers;
    8. A representative from a Rhode Island university with expertise in the relevant social sciences as demonstrated by teaching, publication and other scholarly applications; and
    9. Executive director of the Rhode Island commission for Human Rights.
  3. The task force, in consultation with eyewitness identification practitioners and experts, shall develop guidelines for policies, procedures and training with respect to the collection and handling of eyewitness evidence in criminal investigations by law enforcement agencies in Rhode Island. The purpose of the guidelines is to provide law enforcement agencies with information regarding policies and procedures proven to increase the accuracy of the crime investigation process, thus also reducing the possibility of wrongful convictions.
  4. Guidelines for policies, procedures and training that may be considered and recommended by the task force include, but are not limited to:
    1. Use of blind administration of lineups;
    2. Specific instructions to be given to the eyewitness before and during the lineup to increase the accuracy of any identification, including that the purpose of the identification procedure is to exculpate the innocent as well as to identify the actual perpetrator;
    3. Number and selection of fillers to be in lineups;
    4. Use of sequential lineups versus nonsequential lineups;
    5. Inclusion of only one suspect in any lineup;
    6. Value of refraining from providing any confirmatory information to the eyewitness;
    7. Standards and protocols to be used in the administration and conduct of an identification procedure;
    8. Training, if any, should be made available to law enforcement personnel in the use of these procedures; and
    9. Taking a confidence statement from the person viewing the lineup.
  5. The task force shall submit a report on the guidelines developed and recommendations concerning their use. Minority reports may also be issued. These reports shall be presented to the governor, the chief justice of the Rhode Island supreme court, the speaker of the house of representatives, the president of the senate, and the chairpersons of the judiciary committees of both the house of representatives and the senate no later than January 1, 2011. The task force shall meet periodically thereafter in order to assess the impact of the recommendations made in the report; to conduct further research in the area of eyewitness identification; to specifically assess the use of sequential and simultaneous lineups by Rhode Island law enforcement agencies; and to consider whether, in light of that experience, the use of sequential lineups should be recommended as a “best practice.” Said meetings shall be called by agreement of the attorney general and public defender. A supplemental report from the task force shall be delivered in the same manner as its initial report and not later than April 30, 2012.

History of Section. P.L. 2010, ch. 165, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 169, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 110, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 104, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 110, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

12-1-17. Background checks for employees of religious organizations.

  1. In order to assist Rhode Island’s religious organizations and houses of worship (hereinafter religious organization) with the ability to ensure that their staff, teachers, and employees are of good moral character, all persons eighteen (18) years of age or older seeking to work or volunteer for any religious organization shall, at the specific request of the religious organization, be required to undergo a national criminal background check for the purpose of determining whether the prospective employee or volunteer has been convicted of any crime.
    1. Participation of any religious organization with the system of background checks created by this section is voluntary and any decision to request a national background check for any person may be made at the sole discretion of the religious organization.
    2. “Disqualifying information” for purposes of this section shall mean those offenses included in §§ 23-17-37 , 11-37-1 11-37-8.4 , and §§ 11-9-1 11-9-5.3 .
  2. Any religious organization may require any applicant for employment or volunteer activity, if that employment or activity involves routine contact with minors, to apply to the bureau of criminal identification (BCI), the department of the attorney general, the state police, or the local police department for a nationwide criminal records check. The check shall conform to the applicable federal standards, including the requirement that the applicant provide a set of fingerprints to facilitate the background check.
    1. It shall be the responsibility of the BCI to conduct the national criminal identification check within fourteen (14) days of the applicant’s request.
  3. If any disqualifying information is discovered with respect to the applicant, the BCI shall inform the religious organization in writing, without disclosing the nature of the disqualifying information, that an item of disqualifying nature has been discovered. In addition, the BCI shall inform the applicant, in writing, of the nature of the disqualifying information.
    1. Upon receipt of the disqualifying information from the BCI, the applicant may, within twenty (20) days of receipt thereof, request that the BCI provide a copy of the information to the religious organization which will have the discretion to determine whether the applicant is eligible for employment or volunteer status.
  4. If no disqualifying information is found upon completion of the background check, the BCI shall notify both the applicant and the religious organization, in writing, of this fact.
  5. Upon completion of the background check, and after the twenty-day (20) period referenced in subsection (c)(1) of this section, the BCI shall promptly destroy the fingerprints provided by the applicant.
  6. No religious organization that disqualifies an individual from employment or volunteer activity as a result of its receipt of disqualifying information, shall be liable for civil damages or subject to any claim, cause of action, or proceeding of any nature, as a result of such disqualification.
  7. The applicant shall be responsible for the costs of conducting the nationwide criminal records check.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 51, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 60, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 51, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 60, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 1.1 State Crime Laboratory Commission

12-1.1-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “State Crime Laboratory Commission.”

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2; G.L., § 12-1.2-1 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-1.1-2. Legislative findings and purpose.

The general assembly recognizes and declares that:

  1. Examining crime scenes for evidence is essentially a state and local problem;
  2. The establishment of appropriate goals, objectives, and standards for the examination of crime scenes and the training of appropriate personnel in such techniques must be a priority concern;
  3. The functions of a state crime lab must be coordinated in an efficient and effective manner;
  4. The full and effective use of resources affecting state and local crime scene investigations requires the complete cooperation of state and local law enforcement agencies; and
  5. Training, research, evaluation, and technical assistance activities must be encouraged and focused on the improvement of scientific criminal investigation in Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2; G.L. § 12-1.2-2 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1; G.L. § 12-1.1-2 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations.

12-1.1-3. Creation.

There is established the state laboratories for scientific criminal investigation commission, called throughout this chapter the state crime laboratory commission.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2; G.L. § 12-1.2-3 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1; G.L. § 12-1.1-3 .

12-1.1-4. Membership.

  1. The commission shall consist of five (5) members: the attorney general; the superintendent of state police; and a representative of the Rhode Island Police Chiefs Association appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate; and two (2) public members appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. Appointed public members shall serve two (2) year terms and shall be eligible to succeed themselves.
  2. Members shall serve until their successors are appointed and qualified. Each member of the board may designate a subordinate within his or her department or agency to represent him or her at all meetings of the board. Three (3) members of the board shall constitute a quorum and the vote of a majority of those present and voting shall be required for action.
  3. Members of the commission shall be removable by the governor pursuant to the provisions of § 36-1-7 of the general laws and for cause only, and removal solely for partisan or personal reasons unrelated to capacity or fitness for the office shall be unlawful.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2: G.L. § 12-1.2-3 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.1-4 ; P.L. 2006, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 70, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 54, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 70, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

12-1.1-5. Chairperson.

The attorney general shall be the chairperson of the commission. The board may elect from among its members such other officers as it deems necessary.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2: G.L. § 12-1.2-3 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.1-5 ; P.L. 2006, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 70, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 54, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 70, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

12-1.1-6. Executive secretary.

The dean of the College of Pharmacy at the University of Rhode Island shall serve as the executive secretary of the commission. The executive secretary shall oversee the administration of the state crime laboratory, including all budgetary and personnel matters, and shall provide timely reports to the commission regarding all matters pertaining to the state crime laboratory.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2: G.L. § 12-1.2-3 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.1-6 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 50, § 1.

12-1.1-7. Meetings.

The commission shall meet at the call of its chairperson and at least four (4) times each year, the time and place for the meetings to be fixed by the chairperson.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2: G.L. § 12-1.2-6 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.1-7 .

12-1.1-8. Powers and duties of commission.

The commission shall have the following powers and duties:

  1. Establish goals, priorities, standards, policies, plans, programs, and budgets for the operation of the state crime laboratory;
  2. Monitor the general operation of the state crime laboratory and evaluate its effectiveness;
  3. Apply for, contract for, receive, and expend for its purposes any appropriations or grants from the state and/or its political subdivisions, the federal government, or any other source, public or private, in accordance with the appropriations process;
    1. Accept funds appropriated by the general assembly out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated for effectuating the daily operation of the state crime laboratory;
    2. Accept any moneys made available through direct grants for its function and operation;
    3. Expend these sums of money for the purchase of equipment, payment of salaries, purchase of material, office supplies, and laboratory supplies, and for labor for publishing, for the benefit of law enforcement officers in the state of Rhode Island, for scientific advances in the field of criminalistics, and any other essentials that may be deemed necessary and expedient to the scientific criminal investigation and training of law enforcement officers and firefighters in modern scientific investigative techniques and research in the field of scientific criminal investigation;
  4. Recommend legislation to the governor and legislature in the field of scientific criminal investigation;
  5. Provide suitable badges and appropriate commissions to laboratory personnel in evidence of their authority;
  6. Establish any and all committees it deems necessary to carry out the mission of the state crime laboratory;
  7. Perform any other duties that may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter and chapter 1.2.
  8. Within ninety (90) days after the end of each fiscal year, the commission shall approve and submit an annual report to the governor, the speaker of the house of representatives, the president of the senate, and the secretary of state, of its activities during that fiscal year. The report shall provide: an operating statement summarizing meetings or hearings held, including meeting minutes, subjects addressed, decisions rendered, rules or regulations promulgated, studies conducted, policies and plans developed, approved, or modified, and programs administered or initiated; a consolidated financial statement of all funds received and expended including the source of the funds, a listing of any staff supported by these funds, and a summary of any clerical, administrative or technical support received; a summary of performance during the previous fiscal year including accomplishments, shortcomings and remedies; a synopsis of hearings, complaints, suspensions, or other legal matters related to the commission; a summary of any training courses held pursuant to this chapter; a briefing on anticipated activities in the upcoming fiscal year; and findings and recommendations for improvements. The report shall be posted electronically on the websites of the general assembly and the secretary of state pursuant to the provisions of § 42-20-8.2 . The director of the department of administration shall be responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this subsection;
  9. To approve or disapprove the director and all other positions of the state crime laboratory appointed by the University of Rhode Island.
  10. To conduct a training course for newly appointed and qualified members within six (6) months of their qualification or designation. The course shall be developed by the chair of the commission, be approved by the commission, and be conducted by the chair of the commission. The commission may approve the use of any commission and/or staff members and/or individuals to assist with training. The training course shall include instruction in the following areas: the provisions of chapters 42-46, 36-14 and 38-2; and the commission’s rules and regulations. The director of the department of administration shall, within ninety (90) days of the effective date of this act [June 7, 2006], prepare and disseminate training materials relating to the provisions of chapters 42-46, 36-14, and 38-2.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2: G.L. §§ 12-1.2-4 , 12-1.2-5 , 12-1.2-7 , 12-1.2-8 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.1-8 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 50, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 70, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the paragraphs in subdivisions (4) and (9).

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2006, the compiler inserted the bracketed date in subdivision (11) which is the effective date of the 2006 amendments to this act.

P.L. 2006, ch. 54, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 70, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

12-1.1-9. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-1.2-14; P.L. 1984, ch. 300, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-1.1-9 ), concerning user charges for the state crime lab, was repealed by P.L. 1985, ch. 120, art. IV, § 1, effective May 31, 1985.

12-1.1-10. Cooperation of departments — Using facilities of the University of Rhode Island.

All other departments, agencies, and bodies of state government are authorized and directed to cooperate with and furnish any information that the commission shall require. The commission is directed in carrying out the provisions and purposes of this chapter and chapter 1.2 to confer with the University of Rhode Island as to the continued utilization of facilities, scientific equipment, and personnel available.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2: G.L. § 12-1.2-12; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.1-10 .

12-1.1-11. Termination or modification of commission — Report to governor.

  1. For good cause, the commission, with the approval of the governor, shall determine a termination or modification date, and, upon that determination, the commission shall submit a report to the governor that will outline a plan for the orderly termination or modification of the commission.
    1. The report will be submitted at least four (4) months prior to the termination or modification date and will include, but not be limited to, a review of the performance and effectiveness of the commission.
    2. The report will include a recommendation that the purpose of this chapter or chapter 1.2 be reviewed or amended, that the commission be reorganized, or that this chapter or chapter 1.2 be repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2: G.L. § 12-1.2-13; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.1-11 .

Chapter 1.2 State Crime Laboratory

12-1.2-1. Creation.

There shall be a state crime laboratory located at the University of Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 205, art. VIII, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.1-1 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.2-1 .

12-1.2-2. Jurisdiction.

The state crime laboratory shall have the authority to investigate any and all evidence relating to state or local crimes when requested by appropriate agencies.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 205, art. VIII, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.1-3 ; P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2: G.L. § 12-1.2-11; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.2-2 .

12-1.2-3. Functions of the state crime laboratory.

The state crime laboratory shall be responsible for:

  1. Technical services.
    1. To examine and evaluate physical evidence collected at the scene of a crime or related to a crime. The examinations will be conducted in areas such as forensic serology, firearms, analyses of accelerants, explosives, scientific methodology in microscopy, including fiber, hair, blood, and plant microscopy, spectroscopy, ion emission, glass examination, tool impressions, fingerprint techniques, tire impressions, and other similar technology;
    2. To examine evidence upon submission by state and local fire departments and law enforcement agencies;
    3. To assure the safe custody of that evidence;
    4. To submit written reports of the results of examinations of evidence to the agency;
    5. To request the services of qualified consultants when deemed necessary;
    6. To render expert court testimony when requested;
    7. To assist in the processing of a crime scene upon request to the director. Transportation as needed for this function should be provided by the agency requesting assistance.
  2. Training.
    1. To offer a training course in scientific criminal investigation each year to all enforcement divisions both state and local;
    2. To offer refresher or in-service courses in specialty areas of scientific criminal investigation;
    3. To conduct training dealing with police science, when requested, for each of the Rhode Island State Municipal Police Training Academy classes, the Providence Police Academy classes, and the Rhode Island State Police Academy classes.
  3. Research.  To conduct ongoing research in areas of the forensic sciences.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 205, art. VIII, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.1-2 ; P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2: G.L. § 12-1.2-10; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.2-3 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the paragraphs in the subdivisions.

Cross References.

Municipal police training school at state police academy, § 42-28.2-2 et seq.

Municipal police training school at University of Rhode Island, § 42-28-25 et seq.

12-1.2-4. Funding.

The state crime laboratory shall be funded through the budget of the University of Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 120, art. 4, § 2; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 5, § 4; P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 9, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

The former section (P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-1.2-3 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-1.1-4 ), concerning a rotary fund for the state crime laboratory, was repealed by P.L. 1985, ch. 120, art. IV, § 2, effective May 31, 1985.

12-1.2-5. Director of state crime laboratory — Term.

  1. The crime laboratory shall be under the immediate supervision of a director, who shall be known as the “director — state crime laboratory” and who shall possess a Ph.D. degree or an equivalent combination of a M.S. degree and experience in an appropriate field and who has had forensic training or experience.
  2. The director shall serve for a period of five (5) years and may be reappointed by the commission thereafter to subsequent five (5) year terms.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2: G.L. § 12-1.2-9; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.2-5 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 50, § 2.

12-1.2-6. Candidates for director and other positions — Selection — Appointment — Dismissals.

  1. Candidates for the position of director and all other positions of the crime laboratory may be recommended to the commission by the executive secretary and/or other members of the commission as well as from all other sources.
  2. The director and all other positions of the state crime laboratory shall be considered employees of the council on postsecondary education and shall be subject to all employment policies, practices, and procedures of the council on postsecondary education and the University of Rhode Island.
  3. The appointive authority for the University of Rhode Island shall also be the appointing authority for the position of director and all other positions of the state crime laboratory subject to approval or disapproval by the commission.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2: G.L. § 12-1.2-9; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.2-6 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 50, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 52, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 61, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 52, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 61, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 421 (2003).

12-1.2-7. Powers and duties of director.

  1. The director shall have general supervision over the administration of and shall enforce the provisions of this chapter. He or she shall recommend to the commission any rules and regulations that he or she may deem necessary to effectuate the provisions of this chapter and shall be responsible for the administration of the policies established by the commission.
  2. The director shall be responsible for preparing an annual operating budget and submitting it to the dean of the College of Pharmacy at the University of Rhode Island, who will in turn submit it to the commission.
  3. The director shall collect, develop, and maintain statistical information, records, and reports as the executive secretary or as the commission may determine relevant to its functions and transmit quarterly to the executive secretary or the commission a report of the operations of the state crime laboratory for the preceding quarter.
  4. The director shall exercise all powers and perform all duties necessary and proper in carrying out his or her responsibilities that may be directed by the executive secretary or the commission.
  5. The director shall timely provide records, reports or other information pertaining to the operation of the crime laboratory whenever requested by the executive secretary or the commission.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 206, § 2: G.L. § 12-1.2-9; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1: G.L. § 12-1.2-7 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 50, § 2.

12-1.2-8 — 12-1.2-14. [Transferred.]

Transferred Sections.

For present location of these sections, which where transferred by the 1981 reenactment, see the following table:

Former Section Present Section 12-1.2-8 12-1.1-8 12-1.2-9 — 12-1.2-5 12-1.2-7 12-1.2-10 12-1.2-3 12-1.2-11 12-1.2-2 12-1.2-12 12-1.1-10 12-1.2-13 12-1.1-11 12-1.2-14 12-1.1-9

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Chapter 1.3 Expungement of Criminal Records

12-1.3-1. Definitions.

For purposes of this chapter only, the following definitions apply:

  1. “Crime of violence” includes murder, manslaughter, first degree arson, kidnapping with intent to extort, robbery, larceny from the person, first degree sexual assault, second degree sexual assault, first and second degree child molestation, assault with intent to murder, assault with intent to rob, assault with intent to commit first degree sexual assault, burglary, and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, or larceny.
  2. “Expungement of records and records of conviction” means the sealing and retention of all records of a conviction and/or probation and the removal from active files of all records and information relating to conviction and/or probation.
  3. “First offender” means a person who has been convicted of a felony offense or a misdemeanor offense, and who has not been previously convicted of or placed on probation for a felony or a misdemeanor and against whom there is no criminal proceeding pending in any court.
  4. “Law enforcement agency” means a state police organization of this or any other state, the enforcement division of the department of environmental management, the office of the state fire marshal, the capitol police, a law enforcement agency of the federal government, and any agency, department, or bureau of the United States government which has as one of its functions the gathering of intelligence data.
  5. “Records” and “records of conviction and/or probation” include all court records, all records in the possession of any state or local police department, the bureau of criminal identification and the probation department, including, but not limited to, any fingerprints, photographs, physical measurements, or other records of identification. The terms “records” and “records of conviction, and/or probation” do not include the records and files of the department of attorney general which are not kept by the bureau of criminal identification in the ordinary course of the bureau’s business.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 224, § 3; P.L. 1984, ch. 341, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 30, art. 28, § 4.

Cross References.

Destruction of records of persons acquitted, § 12-1-12 .

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authority of Court.

The Superior Court lacked the inherent power to remove entries relating to criminal matters from a Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI) report since such power to disregard the specific criteria and limitations on the expungement and sealing of BCI records as set forth in the statute would render those criteria and limitations nugatory. State v. Manocchio, 743 A.2d 555, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2000).

First Offender.

When reading the “first-offender” definition from R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1.3-1 in conjunction with R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1.3-3 , “first offender” meant one who had been convicted of only one offense; thus, defendants, who had multiple convictions, were not entitled to expungement. State v. Badessa, 869 A.2d 61, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 2005).

Sealing of Records.

Plea of nolo contendere followed by probation would not preclude a defendant from sealing his or her records because in the sealing context, the affected person has been acquitted or exonerated, whereas a person seeking to have his or her records expunged has not; therefore, sealing should be more widely available to those individuals than to those seeking to have their records expunged. State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2013).

Collateral References.

Expunction of federal arrest records in absence of conviction. 97 A.L.R. Fed. 652.

12-1.3-2. Motion for expungement.

  1. Any person who is a first offender may file a motion for the expungement of all records and records of conviction for a felony or misdemeanor by filing a motion in the court in which the conviction took place; provided, that no person who has been convicted of a crime of violence shall have his or her records and records of conviction expunged; and provided, that all outstanding court-imposed or court-related fees, fines, costs, assessments, charges, and/or any other monetary obligations have been paid, unless such amounts are reduced or waived by order of the court.
  2. Notwithstanding § 12-1.3-1(3) (“first offender”), any person who has been convicted of more than one misdemeanor, but fewer than six (6) misdemeanors, and has not been convicted of a felony may file a motion for the expungement of any or all of those misdemeanors by filing a motion in the court in which the convictions took place; provided that convictions for offenses under chapter 29 of title 12, § 31-27-2 or § 31-27-2.1 are not eligible for and may not be expunged under this subsection.
  3. Subject to subsection (a), a person may file a motion for the expungement of records relating to a misdemeanor conviction after five (5) years from the date of the completion of his or her sentence.
  4. Subject to subsection (a), a person may file a motion for the expungement of records relating to a felony conviction after ten (10) years from the date of the completion of his or her sentence.
  5. Subject to § 12-19-19(c) , and without regard to subsections (a) through (c) of this section, a person may file a motion for the expungement of records relating to a deferred sentence upon its completion, after which the court will hold a hearing on the motion.
  6. Subject to subsection (b) of this section, a person may file a motion for the expungement of records relating to misdemeanor convictions after ten (10) years from the date of the completion of their last sentence.
  7. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) through (f) of this section, a person may file a motion for the expungement of records related to an offense that has been decriminalized subsequent to the date of their conviction, after which the court will hold a hearing on the motion in the court in which the original conviction took place.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 224, § 3; P.L. 1988, ch. 638, § 3; P.L. 1993, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 97, § 3; P.L. 2015, ch. 109, § 3; P.L. 2016, ch. 202, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 204, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 316, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 188, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 247, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 97, § 3, and P.L. 2015, ch. 109, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 202, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 204, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 234, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 316, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 188, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 247, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2016, ch. 202, § 3 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [June 29, 2016], the provisions shall be given retroactive and prospective effect, and it shall apply to all matters pending upon the effective date of this act including anyone who after a hearing is determined by the court to have complied with all the terms and conditions of their deferred sentence agreement.”

P.L. 2016, ch. 204, § 3 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [June 29, 2016], the provisions shall be given retroactive and prospective effect, and it shall apply to all matters pending upon the effective date of this act including anyone who after a hearing is determined by the court to have complied with all the terms and conditions of their deferred sentence agreement.”

P.L. 2017, ch. 234, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [July 18, 2017] and shall apply to all convictions imposed before or after the effective date.

P.L. 2017, ch. 316, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 27, 2017] and shall apply to all convictions imposed before or after the effective date.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Discretion of Court.

At a hearing on a motion to expunge a conviction, the hearing justice may exercise his discretion whether to grant or deny the motion, but must first find from the evidence presented that during the five-year period following the complete service and satisfaction of the misdemeanor sentence concerned, or ten-year period for a felony sentence, the petitioner had not been “convicted or arrested” for any felony or misdemeanor, that no criminal proceedings involving the petitioner were pending, and that the petitioner had exhibited good moral character during that period of time. State v. Alejo, 723 A.2d 762, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 6 (R.I. 1999).

Jurisdiction.

Where motions to expunge their criminal convictions were filed prior to the expiration of the time period required under the criminal record expungement statute, defendants lacked legal standing to file their premature motions, and there was no justiciable matter properly before the trial justice upon which he could act. State v. Alejo, 723 A.2d 762, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 6 (R.I. 1999).

Defendant, who had pleaded nolo contendere to robbery, was disqualified from seeking expungement following the completion of a deferred sentence because robbery was a crime of violence under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1.3-1(1) . State v. Briggs, 934 A.2d 811, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 109 (R.I. 2007).

Defendants’ motions for expungement were filed prematurely because they were not entitled to relief under the expungement statute until ten years after their deferred sentence periods expired and they filed their motions before ten years had passed. State v. Briggs, 934 A.2d 811, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 109 (R.I. 2007).

Sealing of Records.

Plea of nolo contendere followed by probation would not preclude a defendant from sealing his or her records because in the sealing context, the affected person has been acquitted or exonerated, whereas a person seeking to have his or her records expunged has not; therefore, sealing should be more widely available to those individuals than to those seeking to have their records expunged. State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2013).

12-1.3-3. Motion for expungement — Notice — Hearing — Criteria for granting.

  1. Any person filing a motion for expungement of the records of his or her conviction pursuant to § 12-1.3-2 shall give notice of the hearing date set by the court to the department of the attorney general and the police department that originally brought the charge against the person at least ten (10) days prior to that date.
  2. The court, after the hearing at which all relevant testimony and information shall be considered, may, in its discretion, order the expungement of the records of conviction of the person filing the motion if it finds:
      1. That in the five (5) years preceding the filing of the motion, if the conviction was for a misdemeanor, or in the ten (10) years preceding the filing of the motion, if the conviction was for a felony, the petitioner has not been convicted nor arrested for any felony or misdemeanor; there are no criminal proceedings pending against the person; that the person does not owe any outstanding court-imposed or court-related fees, fines, costs, assessments, or charges, unless such amounts are reduced or waived by order of the court; and he or she has exhibited good moral character;
      2. That after a hearing held under the provisions of § 12-19-19(c) , the court finds that the person has complied with all of the terms and conditions of the deferral agreement including, but not limited to, the payment in full of any court-ordered fines, fees, costs, assessments, and restitution to victims of crimes; there are no criminal proceedings pending against the person; and he or she has established good moral character. Provided, that no person who has been convicted of a crime of violence shall have their records relating to a deferred sentence expunged; or
      3. Subject only to §§ 12-1.3-2(b) and (f), that in the ten (10) years preceding the filing of the motion, if the convictions were for multiple misdemeanors, the petitioner has not been convicted nor arrested for any felony or misdemeanor; there are no criminal proceedings pending against the person; and they have exhibited good moral character; and, provided that convictions for offenses under chapter 29 of title 12, § 31-27-2 or § 31-27-2 .1 are not eligible and may not be expunged under this subsection.
    1. That the petitioner’s rehabilitation has been attained to the court’s satisfaction and the expungement of the records of his or her conviction is consistent with the public interest.
  3. If the court grants the motion, it shall order all records and records of conviction relating to the conviction expunged and all index and other references to it removed from public inspection. A copy of the order of the court shall be sent to any law enforcement agency and other agency known by either the petitioner, the department of the attorney general, or the court to have possession of the records. Compliance with the order shall be according to the terms specified by the court.
  4. The defendant shall be advised at the hearing that any and all bail money relating to a case that remains on deposit and is not claimed at the time of expungement shall be escheated to the state’s general treasury in accordance with chapter 12 of title 8.
  5. In cases of expungement sought pursuant to § 12-1.3-2(g) , the court shall, after a hearing at which it finds that all conditions of the original criminal sentence have been completed, and any and all fines, fees, and costs related to the conviction have been paid in full, order the expungement without cost to the petitioner. At the hearing, the court may require the petitioner to demonstrate that the prior criminal conviction would qualify as a decriminalized offense under current law. The demonstration may include, but is not limited to, an affidavit signed by the petitioner attesting to the fact that the prior conviction qualifies as a decriminalized offense under current Rhode Island law.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 224, § 3; P.L. 1988, ch. 638, § 3; P.L. 1993, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 68, art. 11, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 97, § 3; P.L. 2015, ch. 109, § 3; P.L. 2016, ch. 202, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 204, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 316, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 188, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 247, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 141, § 2, effective July 3, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 142, § 2, effective July 3, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 97, § 3, and P.L. 2015, ch. 109, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 202, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 204, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 234, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 316, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 188, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 247, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 141, § 2, and P.L. 2021, ch. 142, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2016, ch. 202, § 3 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [June 29, 2016], the provisions shall be given retroactive and prospective effect, and it shall apply to all matters pending upon the effective date of this act including anyone who after a hearing is determined by the court to have complied with all the terms and conditions of their deferred sentence agreement.”

P.L. 2016, ch. 204, § 3 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [June 29, 2016], the provisions shall be given retroactive and prospective effect, and it shall apply to all matters pending upon the effective date of this act including anyone who after a hearing is determined by the court to have complied with all the terms and conditions of their deferred sentence agreement.”

P.L. 2017, ch. 234, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [July 18, 2017] and shall apply to all convictions imposed before or after the effective date.

P.L. 2017, ch. 316, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 27, 2017] and shall apply to all convictions imposed before or after the effective date.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

When reading the “first-offender” definition from R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1.3-1 in conjunction with R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1.3-3 , “first offender” meant one who had been convicted of only one offense. Thus, defendants, who had multiple convictions, were not entitled to expungement. State v. Badessa, 869 A.2d 61, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 2005).

In a citizen’s civil action alleging the unauthorized publication of a sealed criminal record, the trial court did not err in dismissing the citizen’s claims alleging violations of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-1.3-3(c) and -4(d) because the district court ordered the sealing and destruction of the citizen’s arrest record under R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-1-12 and -12.1, and that order did not in any way involve the actual expungement of a record of conviction. Tarzia v. State, 44 A.3d 1245, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 76 (R.I. 2012).

Discretion of Court.

At a hearing on a motion to expunge a conviction, the hearing justice may exercise his discretion whether to grant or deny the motion, but must first find from the evidence presented that during the five-year period following the complete service and satisfaction of the misdemeanor sentence concerned, or ten-year period for a felony sentence, the petitioner had not been “convicted or arrested” for any felony or misdemeanor, that no criminal proceedings involving the petitioner were pending, and that the petitioner had exhibited good moral character during that period of time. State v. Alejo, 723 A.2d 762, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 6 (R.I. 1999).

Jurisdiction.

Where motions to expunge their criminal convictions were filed prior to the expiration of the time period required under the criminal record expungement statute, defendants lacked legal standing to file their premature motions, and there was no justiciable matter properly before the trial justice upon which he could act. State v. Alejo, 723 A.2d 762, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 6 (R.I. 1999).

Defendants’ motions for expungement were filed prematurely because they were not entitled to relief under the expungement statute until ten years after their deferred sentence periods expired and they filed their motions before ten years had passed. State v. Briggs, 934 A.2d 811, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 109 (R.I. 2007).

12-1.3-4. Effect of expungement of records — Access to expunged records — Wrongful disclosure.

  1. Any person having his or her record expunged shall be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the crime of which he or she had been convicted, except, upon conviction of any subsequent crime, the expunged conviction may be considered as a prior conviction in determining the sentence to be imposed.
  2. In any application for employment, license, or other civil right or privilege, or any appearance as a witness, a person whose conviction of a crime has been expunged pursuant to this chapter may state that he or she has never been convicted of the crime; provided, that if the person is an applicant for a law enforcement agency position, for admission to the bar of any court, an applicant for a teaching certificate, under chapter 11 of title 16, a coaching certificate under § 16-11.1-1 , or the operator or employee of an early childhood education facility pursuant to chapter 48.1 of title 16, the person shall disclose the fact of a conviction.
  3. Whenever the records of any conviction and/or probation of an individual for the commission of a crime have been expunged under the provisions of this chapter, any custodian of the records of conviction relating to that crime shall not disclose the existence of the records upon inquiry from any source unless the inquiry is that of the individual whose record was expunged, that of a sentencing court following the conviction of the individual for the commission of a crime, or that of a bar admission, character and fitness, or disciplinary committee, board, or agency, or court which is considering a bar admission, character and fitness, or disciplinary matter, or that of the commissioner of elementary and secondary education, or that of any law enforcement agency when the nature and character of the offense with which an individual is to be charged would be affected by virtue of the person having been previously convicted of the same offense.
  4. The custodian of any records which have been expunged pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall only release or allow access to those records for the purposes specified in subsections (b) or (c) of this section or by order of a court. Any agency and/or person who willfully refuses to carry out the expungement of the records of conviction pursuant to § 12-1.3-2 , or this section or willfully releases or willfully allows access to records of conviction, knowing them to have been expunged, shall be civilly liable.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 224, § 3; P.L. 1984, ch. 341, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 198, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 249, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 153, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

In a citizen’s civil action alleging the unauthorized publication of a sealed criminal record, the trial court did not err in dismissing the citizen’s claims alleging violations of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-1.3-3(c) and -4(d) because the district court ordered the sealing and destruction of the citizen’s arrest record under R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-1-12 and -12.1, and that order did not in any way involve the actual expungement of a record of conviction. Tarzia v. State, 44 A.3d 1245, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 76 (R.I. 2012).

Collateral References.

Effect of expungement of conviction on § 241(a)(4), (11) of Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 USC § 1251(a)(4), (11)), making aliens deportable for crimes involving moral turpitude or drugs, 98 A.L.R. Fed. 750.

Chapter 1.4 Citizens’ Commission for the Safety and Care of the Elderly

12-1.4-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Citizens’ Commission for the Safety and Care of the Elderly.”

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 407, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-1.4-2. Creation.

There is established within the department of elderly affairs the citizens’ commission for the safety and care of the elderly.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 407, § 1; 1996, ch. 100, art. 45, § 1.

Cross References.

Department of elderly affairs, ch. 66 of title 42.

12-1.4-3. Purpose.

The purpose of the commission shall be to act as a liaison between the legislature, public safety officials, the office of healthy aging, and the older population of Rhode Island in the area of crime against the elderly, fire safety, and protective service options available to the elderly.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 407, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 275, § 1.

12-1.4-4. Membership.

  1. The commission shall consist of twenty-one (21) members, eight (8) of whom shall be older citizens appointed by the speaker and seven (7) of whom shall be older citizens appointed by the president of the senate. The speaker shall appoint three (3) members and the president of the senate shall appoint two (2) members for terms of three (3) years; the speaker shall appoint three (3) members and the president of the senate shall appoint two (2) members for terms of two (2) years; and the speaker shall appoint two (2) members and the president of the senate shall appoint three (3) members for a term of one year. These terms shall commence with the date of appointment and expire on the January 31 after the appointment corresponding with the number of years of the term to which appointed. Appointments shall be made for terms of three (3) years commencing on February 1 in the year of appointment and ending on January 31 in the third year after the appointment. Any vacancy among the members shall be filled by the appointing authority for the remainder of the unexpired term.
  2. The remaining six (6) members of the commission shall be the president of the Police Chiefs’ Association or his or her designee; the attorney general or his or her designee; the director of elderly affairs or his or her designee; a representative of the state police appointed by the superintendent of the state police, the president of the fire chief’s association, or his or her designee and the state fire marshal or his or her designee; all six (6) of whom shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years.
  3. The members of the commission shall meet at the call of the speaker of the house and organize and shall select a chairperson from among themselves.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 407, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 12; P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 10; P.L. 2005, ch. 275, § 1.

12-1.4-5. Compensation and expenses.

The membership of the commission shall receive no compensation for their services but shall be allowed their travel and necessary expenses.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 407, § 1.

12-1.4-6. Staff.

The commission may engage any clerical, technical, and other assistance that it may deem necessary, and spend any other funds necessary to accomplish its purpose.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 407, § 1.

12-1.4-7. Cooperation of departments.

  1. All departments and agencies of the state shall furnish any advice and information, documentary and otherwise, to the commission and its agents deemed necessary or desirable by the commission to facilitate the purposes of this chapter.
  2. Each local police and fire chief shall designate at least one police officer or fire fighter to serve as the department’s “senior citizen police advocate” to work as a liaison between the department and the elderly community to help address elderly safety and protection issues.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 407, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 275, § 1.

12-1.4-8. Quarters.

The speaker of the house is authorized and directed to provide suitable quarters for the commission.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 407, § 1.

12-1.4-9. Reports to general assembly.

The commission shall report its findings and recommendations regarding the improvement of elder safety issues to the general assembly on or before January 25 of each year.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 407, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 275, § 1.

12-1.4-10. Appropriation.

The sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000) shall be annually appropriated, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this chapter; and the state controller is authorized and directed to draw his or her orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of that sum, or as much of that sum as may be deemed necessary, from time to time, upon receipt by him or her of properly authenticated vouchers.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 407, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 44, art. 13, § 1.

Chapter 1.5 DNA Detection of Sexual and Violent Offenders

12-1.5-1. Policy. [Contingent amendment; see other version.]

The general assembly finds and declares that DNA databanks and DNA databases are important tools in criminal investigations, in the exclusion of individuals who are the subject of criminal investigations or prosecutions, and in deterring and detecting recidivism. Many states have enacted laws requiring persons arrested for, or convicted of, a crime of violence, or persons convicted of any felony, to provide genetic samples for DNA profiling. Moreover, it is the policy of this state to assist federal, state, and local criminal justice and law enforcement agencies in the identification and detection of individuals in criminal investigations. It is therefore in the best interest of the state to establish a DNA databank and a DNA database containing DNA samples and DNA records of individuals arrested for any crime of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2 , or convicted of certain sexual and violent offenses, or convicted of any felony as defined in the general laws of Rhode Island, and missing persons.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 455, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1.

12-1.5-1. Policy. [Contingent effective date; see note.]

The general assembly finds and declares that DNA databanks and DNA databases are important tools in criminal investigations, in the exclusion of individuals who are the subject of criminal investigations or prosecutions, and in deterring and detecting recidivism. Many states have enacted laws requiring persons arrested for, or convicted of, a crime of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2 to provide genetic samples for DNA profiling. Moreover, it is the policy of this state to assist federal, state, and local criminal justice and law enforcement agencies in the identification and detection of individuals in criminal investigations. It is in the best interest of the state to establish a DNA databank and a DNA database containing DNA samples and DNA records of individuals arrested for any crime of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2 or convicted of a crime of violence as defined in § 11-47-2 , or convicted of any felony as defined in the general laws of Rhode Island, and missing persons.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 42, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 455, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

Contingent Effective Dates.

P.L. 2001, ch. 42, § 3, and P.L. 2001, ch. 76, § 3, provide that the amendment to this section by those acts shall take effect upon receipt by the state of funding by the federal government.

12-1.5-2. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter:

  1. “CODIS” is derived from combined DNA index system, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s national DNA identification index system that allows the storage and exchange of DNA records submitted by state and local forensic DNA laboratories;
  2. “DNA” means deooxyribonucleic acid, which is located in the cells of the body and provides an individual’s personal genetic blueprint. DNA encodes genetic information that is the basis of human hereditary and forensic identification;
  3. “DNA record” means DNA identification information only, which is stored in the state DNA database or the combined DNA index system for the purpose of generating investigative leads or supporting statistical interpretation of DNA test results. The DNA record is the result obtained from the DNA typing tests. The DNA record is comprised of the characteristics of a DNA sample that are of value only in establishing the identity of individuals. The DNA record, however, does not include the DNA sample, and the DNA record may never include the results of tests of any structural genes. The results of all DNA identification tests on an individual’s DNA sample are also collectively referred to as the DNA profile of an individual;
  4. “DNA sample” means a blood or tissue sample provided by any person with respect to offenses covered by this chapter, or submitted to the department of health laboratory pursuant to this chapter for DNA analysis or storage, or both;
  5. “F.B.I.” means the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
  6. “State DNA databank” means the repository of DNA samples collected under this chapter, that is administered by the department of health; and
  7. “State DNA database” means the state-level DNA identification record system to support law enforcement that is administered by the department of health and that provides DNA records to the F.B.I. for storage and maintenance in CODIS. It is the collective capability to store and maintain DNA records related to forensic casework, the DNA records of those arrested for crimes of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2 and/or convicted offenders required to provide a DNA sample under state law, and anonymous DNA records used for research, quality control, and other DNA analysis support systems.
  8. “Crimes of violence” include murder, manslaughter, first-degree arson, kidnapping with intent to extort, robbery, larceny from the person, first-degree sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, first-and-second degree child molestation, assault with intent to murder, assault with intent to rob, assault with intent to commit first-degree sexual assault, burglary, and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, or larceny.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rearranged former subdivisions (5) and (7) into alphabetical order and redesignated them.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

12-1.5-3. Powers and duties of the department of health.

In addition to any other powers and duties conferred by this chapter, the department of health shall:

  1. Be responsible for the policy management and administration of the state DNA database and state DNA databank;
  2. Promulgate rules and regulations, within one hundred and eighty (180) days of June 29, 1998, to carry out the provisions of this chapter; and
  3. Provide for liaison with the F.B.I. and other criminal justice agencies in regard to the state’s participation in CODIS or in any DNA database designated by the department of health.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1.

12-1.5-4. State DNA database.

There is established the state DNA database. It shall be administered by the department of health and provide DNA records for the F.B.I. for storage and maintenance by CODIS. The state DNA database shall have the capability provided by computer software and procedures administered by the department of health to store and maintain DNA records related to:

  1. Forensic casework, including the identification of missing persons;
  2. Individuals arrested for any crime of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2 and convicted felony offenders required to provide a DNA sample under this chapter; and
  3. Anonymous DNA records used for research on identification technologies or quality control.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and operation of state DNA database statutes. 76 A.L.R.5th 239.

12-1.5-5. State DNA databank.

There is established the state DNA databank. It shall serve as the repository of DNA samples collected under this chapter and shall be administered by the department of health.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1.

12-1.5-6. Procedural compatibility with F.B.I.

The DNA database system as established by this chapter shall be compatible with the procedures specified by the F.B.I., including use of comparable test procedures, laboratory equipment, supplies and computer software.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1.

12-1.5-7. Scope and applicability. [Contingent amendment; see other version.]

For law enforcement purposes, this chapter is applicable to adult persons arrested for crimes of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2 and/or convicted of any felony as defined in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 455, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1.

12-1.5-7. Scope and applicability. [Contingent effective date; see note.]

For law enforcement purposes, this chapter is applicable to adult persons arrested for any crime of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2 and/or convicted of, or sentenced for, any felony.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 42, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 76, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 455, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

Contingent Effective Dates.

P.L. 2001, ch. 42, § 3, and P.L. 2001, ch. 76, § 3, provide that the amendment to this section by those acts shall take effect upon receipt by the state of funding by the federal government.

12-1.5-8. DNA sample required upon arrest or conviction for any crime of violence.

  1. Every person arrested for a crime of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2 , who pleads guilty or nolo contendere, or is convicted of any felony shall have a DNA sample taken for analysis as follows:
    1. Every person who is sentenced to a term of confinement to prison, for any crime of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2 , or any felony shall not be released prior to the expiration of his or her maximum term of confinement unless and until a DNA sample has been taken;
    2. Every person convicted of any crime of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2, or any felony, or who is sentenced thereon to any term of probation, or whose case is referred to a diversion program, or upon whose case sentencing is deferred shall have a DNA sample taken for analysis by the department of the health as a condition of any sentence which disposition will not involve an intake into prison.
  2. Every person arrested for any crime of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2 shall, at the time of booking, have a DNA sample taken for analysis and included in the Rhode Island DNA database and DNA databank respectively as required by this chapter and every such person shall be notified of his or her expungement rights under § 12-1.5-13 at or near the time the DNA sample is taken.
    1. The DNA sample shall be submitted by the arresting authority to the department of health. The department of health shall not test or place the sample in the statewide DNA database prior to arraignment unless one of the following conditions has been met:
      1. The arrestee appeared before any judicial officer for an arraignment and the judicial officer made a finding that there was probable cause for the arrest; or
      2. The defendant was released and then failed to appear for the initial hearing, or escaped custody prior to appearing before a judicial officer.
    2. If all qualifying criminal charges are determined to be unsupported by probable cause:
      1. The DNA sample shall be immediately destroyed; and
      2. Notice shall be sent by the prosecuting authority to the defendant and counsel of record for the defendant that the sample was destroyed.
    3. The arrestee requests or consents to having their DNA sample processed prior to arraignment for the sole purpose of having the sample checked against a sample that has been processed from the crime scene or the hospital, and is related to the charges against the person.
    4. A second DNA sample shall be taken if needed to obtain sufficient DNA for the statewide DNA database system or if ordered by the court for good cause shown.
  3. All DNA samples taken pursuant to this section shall be taken in accordance with regulations promulgated by the department of health.
  4. The director of the department of health shall promulgate rules and regulations governing the periodic review of the DNA identification database to determine whether or not the database contains DNA profiles that should not be in the database, including the steps necessary to expunge any profiles that the department determines should not be in the database.
  5. The requirements of this chapter are mandatory. In the event that an arrestee’s DNA sample is not adequate for any reason, the arrestee shall provide another DNA sample for analysis.
  6. A sample does not need to be collected if the person has previously provided a sample sufficient for DNA testing pursuant to the provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 13; P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections and subdivisions.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

12-1.5-9. Procedures for withdrawal, collection and transmission of DNA samples.

  1. Only those individuals qualified to withdraw DNA samples in a medically approved manner shall withdraw a DNA sample to be submitted for DNA analysis.
  2. Persons authorized to withdraw DNA samples under this section shall not be civilly or criminally liable for withdrawing a DNA sample and transmitting test results if they act in good faith and pursuant to this chapter.
  3. It shall be a complete defense to a civil or criminal action if the law enforcement and correction officials who physically restrain a person for the taking of a DNA sample, acted in good faith and under the instruction and supervision of medical personnel under this statute to withdraw DNA samples.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections.

12-1.5-10. Procedures for conduct, disposition and use of DNA analysis.

The department of health shall promulgate procedures to be used in the collection, submission, identification, analysis, storage and disposition of DNA samples and typing results of DNA samples submitted under this chapter. These procedures shall meet or exceed the current standards for quality assurance and proficiency testing for DNA analysis issued by the F.B.I. All DNA sample typing results, all DNA records and all DNA samples shall be securely stored in the state of Rhode Island DNA database and DNA databank respectively, in the following manner:

  1. All DNA sample typing results and the DNA records shall be stored in a computer database after all personal identifiers have been removed. Further, these records shall be accessed only through the use of an encryption code. The encryption code shall be confidential and only those persons authorized by the department of health and charged with responsibilities under this chapter shall have access to these records and shall be given the encryption code.
  2. All DNA samples shall be securely locked, with a coded locking system, in a DNA databank at the department of health and only the director of the department of health and the head of the DNA laboratory shall have access to these DNA samples to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
  3. The department of health is authorized to contract with third parties for purposes of creating a DNA record only. Any third party contracting to carry out the functions of this chapter shall be subject to the same restrictions and requirements of this chapter, and DNA samples provided to third parties pursuant to this section shall have all personal identification removed.
  4. Except as otherwise provided in § 12-1.5-11 , DNA samples and DNA records collected under this chapter shall be used only for law enforcement identification purposes or to assist in the recovery of identification of human remains from disasters or for other humanitarian identification purposes, including identification of missing persons; and
  5. DNA samples and DNA records collected under this chapter shall never be used under the provisions of this chapter for the purpose of obtaining information about physical characteristics, traits or predispositions for disease.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 13.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subdivisions.

12-1.5-11. DNA database exchange.

It shall be the duty of the department of health to collect DNA samples, to receive, store, and to perform analysis or to contract for DNA typing analysis with a qualified DNA laboratory that meets the regulations as established by the department of health, to classify and to file the DNA record of identification characteristic profiles of DNA samples submitted under this chapter and to make the information available as provided in this section. Access to the DNA databank shall be for identification analysis only and shall be limited upon a showing of need to duly constituted federal, state and local law enforcement agencies and their servicing forensic DNA laboratories and by court order to the defendant or his or her attorney in a criminal case. The contents of the DNA record of individuals in the state DNA database shall be made available:

  1. To criminal justice agencies or approved DNA forensic laboratories which serve these agencies; or
  2. Upon written or electronic request and in furtherance of an official investigation by a criminal justice agency or its designated forensic laboratory of a criminal offense or offender or suspected offender;
  3. To prosecuting attorneys who are actively involved in a case in which the DNA record of an individual is relevant; to grand juries and courts when such records are subpoenaed; to defense attorneys when the DNA record is relevant to a pending case.
  4. The department of health shall consistent with the provisions of this chapter promulgate regulations governing the methods of obtaining information from the state DNA database and CODIS and procedures for verification of the identity and authority of the requester; and
  5. The department of health may create a separate population database comprised of DNA samples obtained under this chapter after all personal identification is removed. The department of health may share or disseminate the population database with other criminal justice agencies or forensic DNA laboratories that serve to assist the department of health with statistical databases. The population database may be made available to and searched by other agencies participating in the CODIS system.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1.

12-1.5-12. Cancellation of authority to access or exchange DNA records.

The department of health shall be authorized, for good cause shown, to revoke or suspend the right of a forensic DNA laboratory within this state to access or exchange DNA identification records with criminal justice agencies.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1.

12-1.5-13. Expungement.

  1. A person whose DNA record or profile has been included in the databank pursuant to this act may request expungement on the grounds that the conviction on which authority for including that person’s DNA record or profile was based has been reversed. The department of health shall purge all records and identifiable information in the database pertaining to the person and destroy all samples from the person upon receipt of a written request for expungement pursuant to this section and a certified copy of the final court order reversing the conviction. The department of health shall purge and destroy all records and identifiable information in its database and all DNA samples taken pursuant to this chapter from convicted persons upon official proof that the person has been deceased for a period of at least three (3) years. Official proof shall include, but not be limited to, a certified copy of a death certificate.
  2. If the offense for which a DNA sample has been taken pursuant to § 12-1.5-8(b) does not result in a charge through information or indictment; or leads to voluntary dismissal of the charge by the state, or dismissal by a court; or by a not guilty verdict after trial; or upon the vacating or the reversal of a conviction in which the state does not retry the defendant or appeal the decision; or loses such appeal upon hearing; or upon any plea or conviction of a lesser offense that would not give rise to the mandatory sampling of the individual’s DNA; the record or profile shall be expunged from the state DNA identification database, regardless of any prior record for which DNA sampling would not have been authorized, except pursuant to subsection (e) herein.
    1. The prosecuting authority shall, within thirty (30) days of an event listed in this subsection, notify the department of health of such event for purposes of expunging the person’s DNA record and any samples, analyses, or other documents relating to the DNA testing of such individual in connection with the investigation, arrest, and/or prosecution of the crime that resulted in the arrest of the person. The department shall, within thirty (30) days of receiving such notification, destroy and expunge the person’s DNA record and any samples, analyses, or other documents relating to the DNA testing of such individual and shall notify the individual of such action.
  3. Upon receipt of a written request for expungement from the person whose DNA record or profile has been included in the database pursuant to this chapter and notification of the completion of a program of diversion or the completion of the term of a sentence of deferment, or of the granting of a pardon, the record or profile shall be expunged from the state DNA identification database, regardless of any prior record for which DNA sampling would not have been authorized, except pursuant to subsection (e) herein, and such individual may apply to the court for an order directing the expungement of their DNA record and any samples, analyses, or other documents relating to the DNA testing of such individual in connection with the investigation, arrest, and/or prosecution of the crime that resulted in the arrest of the person.
  4. A copy of the expungement motion shall be served on the attorney general and the arresting police department with ten (10) days’ notice prior to hearing, and an order directing expungement shall be granted if the court finds any of the appropriate conditions of the prior subsection are satisfied.
  5. The department of health shall, by rule or regulation, prescribe procedures to ensure that the DNA record in the state DNA identification database, and any samples, analyses, or other documents relating to such record, whether in the possession of the division, or any law enforcement or police agency, or any forensic DNA laboratory, including any duplicates or copies thereof are destroyed, including any records from CODIS. The director of health shall also adopt, by rule and regulation, a procedure for the expungement in other appropriate circumstances of DNA records contained in the database.
  6. No expungement shall be granted where an individual has a prior conviction requiring a DNA sample, or a pending charge for which collection of a sample was authorized pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
  7. The detention, arrest, or conviction of a person based upon a database match or database information is not invalidated if it is determined that the sample was obtained or placed in the database by mistake. Any identification, warrant, or probable cause to arrest based upon a database match is not invalidated due to a failure to expunge or a delay in expunging records.
  8. At the time of collection of the DNA sample upon arrest of any crime of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2 , the individual from whom a sample is collected shall be given written notice that the DNA record may be expunged and the DNA sample destroyed in accordance with this section. In addition, the department of health, the office of the attorney general, and the office of the public defender shall post on their websites the expungement provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

12-1.5-14. Prohibition and disclosure.

  1. Any person who, by virtue of employment or official position, or any person contracting to carry out any functions under this chapter, including any officers, employees and agents of a contractor, who has possession of or access to individually identifiable DNA information contained in the state DNA database or in the state DNA databank, shall not disclose it in any manner to any person or agency not authorized to receive it knowing that the person or agency is not authorized to receive it.
  2. No person shall obtain individually identifiable DNA information from the state DNA database or the state DNA databank without authorization pursuant to this chapter to do so.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections.

12-1.5-15. Criminal penalties — Civil remedies.

  1. Any person who, by virtue of employment or official position, or any person contracting to carry out any functions under this chapter, including any officers, employees and agents of a contractor, having possession of or access to individually identifiable DNA information contained in the state DNA database or in the state DNA databank and discloses it in any manner to any person or agency not authorized to receive it, commits a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
  2. Except as authorized by law, any person who, for purposes of having DNA analysis performed, obtains or attempts to obtain any DNA sample, or tampers or attempts to tamper with any DNA sample, commits a felony punishable by a fine not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both.
  3. Any person aggrieved by a violation of § 12-1.5-14 may, in addition, bring a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections.

12-1.5-16. Confidentiality of records.

All DNA profiles and samples submitted to the department of health pursuant to this chapter shall be treated as confidential and exempt from the provisions of chapter 2 of title 38 except as otherwise provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1.

12-1.5-17. Bailed and convicted persons — Refusal to give DNA sample.

Any person who is required to have a DNA sample taken after having been arrested and charged with any crime of violence as defined in § 12-1.5-2 or convicted of any felony, who refuses to do so, and who knowingly, violently resists the taking of a DNA sample duly authorized by medical personnel, shall be in violation of the terms of his or her release, regardless of whether or not the term was a special condition of his or her bail, release on probation, parole, or home confinement, or other form of supervised release.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 176, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 192, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2015.

12-1.5-18. Interpretation and severability.

The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed and shall be held to be in addition to, and not in substitution for or a limitation of, the provisions of any other law. If any provision or part of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the application of the provisions to any other persons or circumstances other than those to which it is held invalid shall not be affected.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 33, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 120, § 1.

Chapter 1.6 National Criminal Records Check System

12-1.6-1. Automated fingerprint identification system database.

The department of attorney general may establish and maintain an automated fingerprint identification system database that would allow the department to store and maintain all fingerprints submitted in accordance with the national criminal records check system. The automated fingerprint identification system database would provide for an automatic notification if, and when, a subsequent criminal arrest fingerprint card is submitted to the system that matches a set of fingerprints previously submitted in accordance with a national criminal records check. If the aforementioned arrest results in a conviction, the department shall immediately notify those individuals and entities with which that individual is associated and who are required to be notified of disqualifying information concerning national criminal records checks as provided in chapters 17, 17.4, 17.7.1 of title 23 or § 23-1-52 . The information in the database established under this section is confidential and not subject to disclosure under chapter 38-2.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 399, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 347, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 399, § 1 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

12-1.6-2. Long-term healthcare workers.

The department of attorney general shall maintain an electronic, web-based system to assist facilities, licensed under chapters 17, 17.4, 17.7.1 of title 23 or § 23-1-52 , required to check relevant registries and conduct national criminal records checks of routine contact patient employees. The department of attorney general shall provide for an automated notice, as authorized in § 12-1.6-1 , to those facilities if a routine-contact patient employee is subsequently convicted of a disqualifying offense, as described in the relevant licensing statute. The department of attorney general may charge a facility a one-time, set-up fee of up to one hundred dollars ($100) for access to the electronic web-based system under this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 399, § 1.

12-1.6-3. Immunity from liability.

The department of attorney general; the department of health; or an employer who disqualifies an applicant from employment or continued employment; on the basis of a disqualification notice as described in § 12-1.6-2 , or of a national criminal records check relating to disqualifying information, shall not be liable for civil damages or subject to any claim, demand, cause of action, or proceeding of any nature as a result of the disqualification.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 399, § 1.

12-1.6-4. Rules and regulations.

The department of attorney general may promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the intent of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 399, § 1.

Chapter 2 Railroad, Steamboat, and Bridge Police

12-2-1. Commissioning of special police — Revocation of commission.

The governor may from time to time, upon the application of any common carrier of passengers, or of the director of transportation, commission for an indefinite term one or more persons designated by that common carrier or the director of transportation who, having been duly sworn, may act at its expense as police officers upon the premises used by it in its business and upon its cars, vessels, and bridges. The commission may be revoked by and at the pleasure of the appointing or any succeeding governor, by certifying the revocation to the secretary of state, who shall notify the common carrier or the director of transportation upon whose application the commission was issued.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 107, § 1; P.L. 1902, ch. 972, § 1; C.P.A. 1905, § 1119; P.L. 1908, ch. 1555, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 128, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 134, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 615, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2847, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-2-1 .

12-2-2. Badges to be worn or carried by officers.

Every officer commissioned under this chapter shall, when on duty and in uniform, wear in plain sight a metallic badge inscribed with the words “railroad police” and the name or initials of the corporation for which he or she is appointed, or “steamboat police” according to his or her appointment. When not in uniform, the officer must carry a badge while on duty.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 107, § 4; G.L., ch. 107, § 2; P.L. 1902, ch. 972, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 128, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 134, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 615, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-2-2 ; P.L. 1987, ch. 88, § 1.

12-2-3. Power to preserve order.

  1. Railroad police officers may:
    1. Preserve order within and upon the premises and cars of the corporation upon whose petition they were appointed;
    2. Arrest without a warrant intoxicated or disorderly persons frequenting the premises or cars and by their presence or conduct, or by profane or indecent language obstructing or annoying travelers using them; and
    3. Take the persons to the nearest police station or other place of lawful detention.
  2. In addition to these powers, railroad police officers shall possess and exercise any other powers to arrest without a warrant on the premises, cars, vehicles, or any property in the custody or control of the corporations or companies and upon streets, highways, and lands immediately abutting the property or premises, that are conferred on police officers of the cities and towns of the state.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 107, § 5; G.L., ch. 167, § 3; P.L. 1902, ch. 972, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 128, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 134, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 615, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-2-3 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 134, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 88, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection and subdivision designations.

Cross References.

Special constables employed by steamship companies and railroads, powers, § 45-16-10 .

12-2-4. Arrest and detention of disorderly persons and persons refusing to pay.

If a passenger upon a railroad train refuses to pay his or her fare, or is noisy or disorderly, a railroad police officer may arrest him or her without a warrant, and remove him or her to the baggage or other suitable car of the train and confine him or her there until the arrival of the train at some station where the passenger can be placed in the charge of an officer, who shall take him or her to some place of lawful detention.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 107, § 6; G.L. 1896, ch. 107, § 4; P.L. 1902, ch. 972, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 128, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 134, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 615, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-2-4 .

12-2-5. Powers of steamboat police.

Steamboat police officers shall have similar powers upon the vessels and boats of the carriers upon whose petition they were appointed, and upon the premises and at the wharves and landing places owned or used by the carrier, to those given by §§ 12-2-3 and 12-2-4 to railroad police officers.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 107, § 7; G.L. 1896, ch. 107, § 5; P.L. 1902, ch. 972, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 128, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 134, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 615, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 12-2-5 .

12-2-6. Detention of persons arrested without warrant — Jurisdiction of offenses — Penalty.

Any person arrested without a warrant under the provisions of §§ 12-2-3 12-2-5 may be detained until a complaint can be made against him or her, and he or she is taken upon a warrant issued upon the complaint; provided, that arrest and detention without a warrant shall not continue longer than the space of six (6) hours when the arrest is made between the hours of four o’clock (4:00) in the morning and eight o’clock (8:00) in the evening, and when made at any other hours the person arrested shall not be so detained after ten o’clock (10:00) in the morning of the following day. The district court for the division in which the person is detained shall have jurisdiction of the offenses specified in §§ 12-2-3 12-2-5 , and any person found guilty of those offenses shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 107, § 8; G.L., ch. 107, § 6; as enacted by P.L. 1902, ch. 972, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 128, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 134, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 615, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 12-2-6 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 13.

12-2-7. Payment of officers — Liability for misconduct.

Railroad and steamboat police officers shall be paid by the corporation or carrier upon whose petition they were appointed, and the corporation or carrier shall be liable to parties for any official misconduct of the officers to the same extent as for torts of agents and servants in their employment, but no town or city shall be responsible for the acts of the officers.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 107, § 9; G.L. 1896, ch. 107, § 7; P.L. 1902, ch. 972, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 128, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 134, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 615, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 12-2-7 .

12-2-8. Bridge police included in chapter.

Whenever in this chapter, there appear the words “railroad police,” “steamboat police,” and/or “railroad and/or steamboat police,”, they are deemed to include “bridge police”.

History of Section. P.L. 1951, ch. 2847, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-2-8 ; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 22.

Chapter 2.1 Special Police for Private Institutions

12-2.1-1. Appointment of special police.

The superintendent of state police, upon the petition of a private college, university, junior college, or other private educational institution of higher learning located in this state, may from time to time appoint qualified employees of those institutions as special police officers. The petition shall contain the name, address, qualifications, and personal history of the person for whom appointment is requested. Any person so appointed must have satisfactorily completed the established course of training in the police training school as established in this state. Following appointment, the person shall hold office as a special police officer until: (1) his or her appointment is revoked by the superintendent of state police; (2) until the petitioning institution shall file written notice with the superintendent that the designation of the person as a special police officer should be revoked; or (3) until his or her employment with the petitioning institution is terminated. Upon appointment of a special police officer, the superintendent shall issue to the person a license to act as a special police officer and the license shall, in the courts of this state, be evidence of the validity of the appointment of the person named in it and of his or her authority to act as a special police officer.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 194, § 1.

12-2.1-2. Powers of special police officers.

Upon issuance of a license under § 12-2.1-1 , the person so designated as a special police officer shall have the same immunities and may exercise, in and upon the lands and buildings of the institution by which he or she is employed, and upon streets and highways immediately adjacent to those lands, the same powers and authority of a police officer as are conferred by the laws of this state upon members of the division of state police, including the power to arrest persons for violation of state criminal statutes or for violation of city or town ordinances of the city or town in which the institution is located.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 194, § 1.

Cross References.

Powers of capitol police officers, § 12-2.2-2 .

12-2.1-3. Record of appointments.

A record of all appointments under this chapter shall be kept in the division of state police and shall be open to public inspection.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 194, § 1.

12-2.1-4. Badges.

Any special police officer appointed under this chapter shall, when on duty and in uniform, wear in plain sight a metallic badge, inscribed with the words “college police,” “university police”, or “campus police” and the name or initials of the institution by which he or she is employed. When not in uniform, the officer must carry his or her badge on his or her person while on duty.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 194, § 1.

12-2.1-5. Continuing powers of state and local police.

Appointment of special police officers under this chapter shall in no way limit the powers, authority, and responsibility of state police and police of the various cities and towns to enforce state law and municipal ordinances on property owned by the educational institutions employing the special police officers. The division of state police and city and town police shall assist the special police officers in matters relating to the detention and arraignment of prisoners for court. The special police officers shall submit reports concerning an arrest to the department processing the arrest, whether the division of state police or the police in the city or town in which the educational institution is located.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 194, § 1.

Cross References.

Continuing powers of state and local police, § 12-2.2-4 .

12-2.1-6. Reciprocity.

Any individual who has been appointed as a police officer in a sister state or one of its municipalities and who has satisfactorily completed a required course of police officer training recognized and certified by the sister state may apply, in writing, to the superintendent of state police for a certificate to the effect that the applicant has completed a course of training equivalent to that required under § 12-2.1-1 . The application may be granted in whole or in part or denied. If granted in part, the exact extent of both any waiver of training and the training yet to be satisfactorily completed shall be set forth in full. The certification shall be granted only if the superintendent determines that the course of training previously taken, together with the satisfactory completion of any training not waived, is in compliance with and equivalent to the training required by § 12-2.1-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 142, § 1.

Chapter 2.2 Capitol Police for Public Buildings

12-2.2-1. Appointment of capitol police.

The director of public safety may appoint qualified persons to act as “capitol police officers,” who shall be members of the state classified service. Upon appointment of an officer, the director shall issue to the person a license to act as a capitol police officer and the license shall, in the courts of this state, be evidence of the validity of the appointment of the person named and of his or her authority to act as a capitol police officer at any of the buildings or grounds within the jurisdiction of the division of public buildings as assigned by the chief of public buildings.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 252, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 9, § 4.

12-2.2-2. Powers of capitol police officers.

Upon issuance of a license under § 12-2.2-1 , the person so designated as a capitol police officer shall have the same immunities and may exercise, in and upon the lands and buildings owned or leased by the state of Rhode Island and assigned to the Rhode Island public buildings authority, or to any municipal or private facility in which a state agency or a state court is convening a public meeting or public hearing, and upon streets and highways immediately adjacent to those lands, the same powers and authority of a police officer, as are conferred by the laws of this state upon members of the division of state police, including the power to arrest persons for violation of state criminal statutes or for violation of city or town ordinances of the city or town in which the state property is located.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 252, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 50, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 57, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 50, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 57, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Assault of police officers and firemen, § 11-5-5 .

Legislators parking lot, duties, § 37-8-14 .

12-2.2-3. Badges.

Any capitol police officer appointed under this chapter shall, when on duty and in uniform, wear in plain sight a metallic badge, inscribed with the words “capitol police of the state of Rhode Island.” When not in uniform, the officer must carry his or her badge on his or her person while on duty.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 252, § 1.

12-2.2-4. Continuing powers of state and local police.

Appointment of capitol police officers pursuant to this chapter shall in no way limit the powers, authority, and responsibility of state police and police of the various cities and towns to enforce state law and municipal ordinances on property owned or leased by the state of Rhode Island. The division of state police and city and town police shall assist capitol police officers in matters relating to the detention and arraignment of prisoners for court. Capitol police officers shall submit reports concerning an arrest to the department of public safety and the division processing the arrest, whether the division of state police or the police in the city or town the state owned property is located.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 252, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 9, § 4.

12-2.2-5. Classes in law enforcement.

All capitol police shall be required to attend and successfully complete any law enforcement courses that the director of public safety shall require. These law enforcement courses will be conducted by either the state police or the municipal police training school for the benefit of the capitol police.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 252, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 9, § 4.

12-2.2-6. Temporary assignment of capitol police officers.

  1. Upon the convening of the general assembly in each year, four (4) members of the capitol police will be assigned to these branches of government for security purposes. Two (2) capitol police officers will be chosen by the speaker of the house of representatives and two (2) capitol police officers will be chosen by the president of the senate to serve in these capacities. Duties assigned, clothing to be worn, and hours to be worked will be designated by the speaker of the house of representatives and the president of the senate. These four (4) capitol police officers will be considered “on assignment” whenever officially assigned to any place used by the general assembly to conduct its business, or any place used by the committee or members of the general assembly to conduct business.
  2. Following the adjournment of the general assembly, or at any other time designated by the speaker of the house of representatives or the president of the senate, these four (4) capitol police officers will return to their previously assigned duties as members of the capitol police.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 315, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 11.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 159, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect on January 7, 2003.

12-2.2-7. Powers of capitol police officers assigned to the general assembly.

  1. Capitol police officers who are assigned to the general assembly and its members for security purposes shall have the same immunities and may exercise, in any place used by the general assembly to conduct its business, or any place used by any committee or members of the general assembly to conduct business, the same powers and authority of a police officer as are conferred by the laws of this state upon the members of the department of the state police, including the power to arrest persons for violation of ordinances of the city or town.
  2. In conforming with the provisions of § 11-47-9 regarding the possession of firearms, the officers assigned to the general assembly will be considered “on assignment” when on designated duties.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 315, § 1.

Chapter 3 Jurisdiction and Venue of Offenses

12-3-1. Offenses triable by district court.

The district court shall have jurisdiction and cognizance of all crimes which are not expressly designated as felonies, offenses, misdemeanors, and violations, including offenses against town or city ordinances, if no special court exists or is created by charter or law for that purpose, punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, and of all other criminal matters which are or shall be declared specially to be within the jurisdiction of the court by the laws of the state, which shall legally be brought before the court, with power to try, render judgment, pass sentence, and award a warrant for execution of the sentence.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 150; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-3-1 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 14; P.L. 1976, ch. 173, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 462, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 200, § 1.

Rules of Court.

Place of prosecution and trial, Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 18.

Cross References.

Actions on penal statutes, jurisdiction, § 12-21-4 .

Exclusive original jurisdiction in district court, § 8-8-3 .

Superior court jurisdiction, § 8-2-15 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutional Questions.

The district court does not have power to certify a constitutional question in a case that it does not have power to try and determine under this section. State v. Collins, 27 R.I. 419 , 62 A. 1010, 1906 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1906).

Construction With § 45-24-6.

Former section 45-24-6 clearly provides a town with the authority to enact penalties for violations of town ordinances, but it in no way overrules this section in regard to which court has jurisdiction to try such offenses. Glocester v. Tillinghast, 416 A.2d 1178, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1667 (R.I. 1980).

Exclusive Jurisdiction.

Superior court had no original jurisdiction of an offense for which the penalty was within the amount prescribed by this section, and judgment of superior court would be arrested. State v. Heffernan, 28 R.I. 477 , 68 A. 364, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1907).

Had the legislature intended to remove from the district court jurisdiction over the misdemeanor, it would have done so by explicitly amending this section. State v. Zittel, 94 R.I. 235 , 94 R.I. 325 , 180 A.2d 455, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1962).

Misdemeanors.

A defendant charged with a misdemeanor can be tried in the superior court only if the misdemeanor is properly joined with a felony; otherwise, original jurisdiction over a misdemeanor charge is vested in the district court. State v. Sickles, 470 A.2d 220, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 442 (R.I. 1984).

Rhode Island superior court did not have original jurisdiction of misdemeanor crimes because R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-3-1 conferred original jurisdiction of misdemeanor offenses in the district court, thus, where defendant’s felony conviction was vacated, because at best, defendant’s violation was a misdemeanor, the case was remanded with directions to transfer the case to the district court. State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 180 (R.I. 2003).

Since it was clear that the district court had jurisdiction over misdemeanor prosecutions for driving under the influence, the superior court likewise had jurisdiction over an appeal de novo as of right from a guilty finding of the district court; whether the evidence actually showed the elements of the offense was an issue separate from subject matter jurisdiction. State v. DelBonis, 862 A.2d 760, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 187 (R.I. 2004).

Collateral References.

Jurisdiction and venue of criminal charge for child desertion or nonsupport as affected by nonresidence of parent or child, 44 A.L.R.2d 886.

Presumption or inference as to place of forgery, arising from unexplained possession or uttering of forged paper. 164 A.L.R. 649.

12-3-2. Power of district court over preliminary proceedings — Venue of offenses on public waters.

The district court for the division in which the court is situated shall have cognizance over all other crimes, offenses, and misdemeanors against the laws of the state other than those mentioned in § 12-3-1 , which shall be done or committed within the division and legally brought before the court, and may cause all persons guilty or suspected to be guilty to be apprehended, examined, bailed, or committed to jail, according to law, to answer for the offense before the superior court, and the jurisdiction over crimes, offenses and misdemeanors committed on the public waters of the state, and within the jurisdiction or cognizance of the district court, may be exercised by the district court for any division adjoining the waters.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 151; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-3-2 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 14.

Cross References.

Offenses committed on Narragansett Bay, § 12-3-4 .

Preliminary proceedings, § 12-10-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutional Questions.

The power granted by this section does not include the power to certify constitutional questions that may arise on the preliminary proceedings. State v. Collins, 27 R.I. 419 , 62 A. 1010, 1906 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1906).

12-3-3. Jurisdiction of New Shoreham wardens’ court.

The wardens’ court of the town of New Shoreham shall have exclusive jurisdiction and cognizance over all crimes, offenses, and misdemeanors committed or done or occurring within the town of New Shoreham and the adjacent waters within the jurisdiction of the state, punishable by fine not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200) or by imprisonment not exceeding three (3) months, and of all other criminal matters within the town limits, which are or shall be declared specially to be within the jurisdiction of a district or wardens’ court by the laws of the state, which shall legally be brought before such wardens’ court, with power to proceed to trial, render judgment, pass sentence, and award a warrant for execution of the sentence.

History of Section. P.L. 1899, ch. 712, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-3-3 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 50, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 74, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 50, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 74, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

12-3-4. Venue of offenses.

  1. Every indictment or information for offenses committed on the waters of Narragansett Bay may be tried in any county in the discretion of the attorney general, unless otherwise ordered by the presiding justice.
  2. For the purpose of prosecuting and punishing criminal offenses over which the superior court has jurisdiction, the state of Rhode Island is declared to be a single district. The offenses shall be prosecuted and punished at the following locations unless otherwise ordered by the presiding justice:
    1. For offenses committed in a city or town within Providence or Bristol counties, at the superior court in Providence;
    2. For offenses committed in the city of Warwick or a town within Kent county, at the superior court in Warwick;
    3. For offenses committed in a town within Washington county, at the superior court in South Kingstown; and
    4. For offenses committed in the city of Newport or a town within Newport county, at the superior court in Newport.
  3. For the purpose of prosecuting and punishing criminal offenses over which the district court has jurisdiction, the offenses shall be prosecuted and punished at the following locations unless otherwise ordered to be moved within the same county by the chief judge pursuant to this section or unless otherwise agreed to by the parties and the court: (1) for the offenses committed in a town within the first division, at the district court located within Bristol county; (2) for offenses committed in the city of Newport or a town within the second division, at the district court located within Newport county; (3) for offenses committed in the cities of Warwick or Cranston or a town within the third division, at the district court within the third division; (4) for offenses committed in a town within the fourth division, at the district court located within Washington county; (5) for offenses committed in a city or town within the fifth division, at the district court located within the fifth division; and (6) for offenses committed in a city within the sixth division, at the district court in Providence. The chief judge may order any criminal case or proceeding to be transferred to another division of the court within the same county. For purposes of this section, the first division shall be considered to be a part of Providence county.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 8; G.L., ch. 354, § 32; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 32; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 32; G.L. 1956, § 12-3-4 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 10; P.L. 1981, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 200, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 240, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations in subsection (b).

Cross References.

Actions based on penal statutes, venue, § 12-21-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

There is no constitutional impediment in the legislature’s designating the state a single judicial district for purposes of Superior Court criminal proceedings. Advisory Opinion to Governor, 437 A.2d 542, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1405 (R.I. 1981).

Narragansett Bay.

As the result of the 1981 amendment of subsection (a), which omitted the word “found” preceding “tried”, the power of the superior court to try an offense committed on Narragansett Bay in any county extends the jurisdiction to a grand jury in any county to indict for such an offense if so requested by the attorney general. This general power is not limited by the creation of a statewide grand jury by the 1981 amendment. State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 213 (R.I. 1996).

Providence County.

In a case charging defendant with 30 counts of obtaining money by false pretenses, transfer of venue was not an abuse of discretion, but appropriate due to considerations of judicial economy because even though the transferee court might have had the heaviest caseload, it had the greatest number of resources, which was necessary due to the significant number of motions and the expected three week duration of the case. State v. Kluth, 46 A.3d 867, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 126 (R.I. 2012).

Collateral References.

Libel in newspaper, venue of criminal action for. 15 A.L.R.3d 1249.

12-3-5. Offenses in vicinity of county or division boundary — Offenses at sea — Offenses aboard steamboat or train.

A criminal offense committed on or within one hundred (100) rods of the boundary line of two (2) counties may be alleged to have been committed and may be prosecuted and proceeded against in either county unless otherwise ordered by the presiding justice, and if committed on or within fifty (50) rods of the boundary line of two (2) divisions of the district court, it may be alleged to have been committed and may be proceeded against and prosecuted in either division unless otherwise ordered by the chief judge pursuant to § 12-3-4(c) . A criminal offense committed upon the sea within one league of the shore may be prosecuted and punished in any county. A criminal offense committed upon a steamboat or a railroad car may be alleged to have been so committed without specifying the division of the district court or county in which it was committed, and may be prosecuted and proceeded against in any county or in any division.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 34; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 34; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 34; G.L. 1956, § 12-3-5 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 14; P.L. 1981, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 200, § 1.

Cross References.

Kidnapping, venue, § 11-26-3 .

Offenses committed on Narragansett Bay, § 12-3-4 .

Treason and related offenses, venue, § 11-43-8 .

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of statute fixing venue of offense committed while upon a public conveyance, or at a station or depot upon the route thereof. 11 A.L.R. 1020.

Constitutionality of statute for prosecution of offense in county other than that in which it was committed. 76 A.L.R. 1034.

12-3-6. Act within state resulting in death outside state.

If a mortal wound is given, or if other violence or injury is inflicted, or if poison is administered, within this state, as a result of which death ensues outside this state, the homicide shall be prosecuted and punished at the location of the superior court as the presiding justice may by order designate.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 35; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 35; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 35; G.L. 1956, § 12-3-6 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 104, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Question of Fact for Jury.

The trial justice did not err by refusing to require that the state prove the victim died in Rhode Island since unchallenged evidence revealed that the fatal injuries were inflicted within the state, and an instruction was given to the jury that they must find as a question of fact the state where the wounds were inflicted. State v. Belloli, 766 A.2d 928, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 2001).

12-3-7. Jurisdiction based on importation of stolen property.

Whenever the property of another which has been taken or obtained in any other state or area within the jurisdiction of the United States, by the commission of any of the offenses described in §§ 11-8-6 , 11-41-1 11-41-4 , 11-41-6 11-41-9 , 11-41-11 , and 11-44-7 , is brought into this state by the person who took or obtained the property by the commission of the offense, the offense by which the property was taken or obtained may be alleged to have been committed, and the person may be prosecuted and proceeded against in the superior court at any location that may by order be designated by the presiding justice or in any division of the district court in which the person is found in possession of the property, or through which the person may have transported the property or at any location that may be designated by the chief judge pursuant to § 12-3-4(c) .

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 36; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 36; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 12-3-7 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 14; P.L. 1981, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 200, § 1.

12-3-8. Venue of larceny prosecutions.

Larceny, whether at common law, or as defined by §§ 11-41-1 11-41-4 , 11-41-6 , and 11-41-11 , may be prosecuted and proceeded against in the superior court at any location that may by order be designated by the presiding justice or in any division of the district court in which the offense was committed, or in which the defendant has possession of the money or property which is alleged to have been stolen, or in which the false pretense was made or used or in any division that may be ordered by the chief judge pursuant to § 12-3-4(c) .

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 33; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 33; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 33; G.L. 1956, § 12-3-8 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 14; P.L. 1981, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 200, § 1.

Collateral References.

Check, note, etc., or signature thereon, venue of criminal prosecution predicated upon fraudulent obtaining of, from the person executing the same. 141 A.L.R. 239.

Mail or telegraph, where offense of obtaining money by fraud through use of, is deemed to be committed. 43 A.L.R. 545.

Person who steals property in one state or country and brings it into another as subject to prosecution for larceny in latter. 156 A.L.R. 862.

12-3-9. Possession of property stolen outside state.

Whenever any property has been taken or obtained in any other state or area within the jurisdiction of the United States by robbery, stealing, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, or false pretenses with the intent to cheat and defraud, and the property is brought into this state by any person who knew it was so taken or obtained, that person shall be deemed guilty of the offense described in § 11-41-2 , and the offense may be alleged to have been committed in any county or in any division of the district court in which the person is found in possession of the property, or through which the person may have transported the property. The person may be prosecuted and proceeded against in the superior court at any location that may by order be designated by the presiding justice or in the division of the district court in which the offense is alleged to have been committed or in any division that may be ordered by the chief judge pursuant to § 12-3-4(c) .

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 37; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 37; G.L. 1956, § 12-3-9 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 14; P.L. 1981, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 200, § 1.

Collateral References.

Possession of stolen property as continuing offense. 24 A.L.R.5th 132.

12-3-10. Enumeration of statutes of limitation.

The following compilation of statutes of limitation for criminal offenses is set forth as an aid to the public and is not intended to replace the specific statutes referred to in this section. The omission of any statute of limitation from this list shall in no way affect the validity of the statute.

Section Offense Period of Limitations 4-4-26 Offenses relating to diseased animals 30 days 11-13-2 Prosecution of illegal sale, use or possession of fireworks 30 days 11-47-53 Prosecution for firing weapons or carrying loaded weapons in vehicles 30 days 12-12-17 Minor criminal offenses; time for indictment or information 3 years 12-12-18 New indictment or information to replace one stolen, lost or destroyed 1 year 17-23-11 Prosecution of election law offenses 1 year 28-39-32 Temporary disability insurance act offenses 5 years 30-13-46(a) Prosecution for desertion, AWOL during war, aiding the enemy or mutiny under the Rhode Island Code of Military Justice No limit 30-13-46(b) Prosecution for desertion in peacetime or perjury under the Rhode Island Code of Military Justice 3 years 30-13-46(c) Prosecution for summary court-martial offenses under the Rhode Island Code of Military Justice 2 years 31-23.2-8 To enforce liability for tampering with odometers 6 months 46-7-4 Proceedings for forfeitures for wrongfully making fast a vessel to a stake or buoy, or damaging same, in the Pawtucket River, Warren River or upper Narragansett Bay, or to markers or beacons in other areas 6 months

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History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 388, § 1.

Chapter 4 Recognizance to Keep the Peace

12-4-1. Examination on complaint of threat to commit offense.

Whenever complaint shall be made to any judge of the district court, or to any justice of the peace authorized to issue warrants within a division, that any person has, within the division, threatened to commit any crime or offense against the person or property of another, the judge or justice of the peace shall examine the complainant under oath or affirmation, and require his or her statement to be reduced to writing and be subscribed and sworn to by the complainant.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 152; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 12-4-1 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 15; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 12.

Cross References.

Bail and recognizance generally, § 12-13-1 et seq.

12-4-2. Warrant to apprehend accused.

If the complainant shall then, before the judge or justice of the peace, enter into a recognizance in a sum not exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00), and with this surety, as the judge or justice of the peace shall direct and approve, with condition to prosecute the complaint with effect, or in default of prosecution to pay the costs that may accrue to the state, the judge or justice of the peace shall issue a warrant returnable immediately, annexing to the warrant the complaint, or reciting its substance in it, directed to the sheriff, deputy sheriffs, town sergeants, and town constables in the county in which the division is, and to the like officers in the county in which the accused may be supposed to belong, reside, or be found, and requiring the officer who shall be charged with the service of the warrant immediately to apprehend the accused and have him or her before the district court for the division in which the offense shall be alleged to have been committed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 153; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 12-4-2 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 15; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 20; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 20.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 20, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 20 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

Rules of Court.

Warrant or summons upon complaint, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 4; Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 4.

Cross References.

Duties of sheriffs, § 42-29-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Form of Recognizance.

A recognizance which omitted the words “to final judgment” in its statement “to prosecute such complaint to final judgment with effect” was valid. State v. McCarty, 4 R.I. 82 , 1856 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1856); State v. Palmer, 15 R.I. 6 , 22 A. 944, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1885).

Private Prosecutions.

The supreme court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to establish a per se rule prohibiting private prosecutions since the legislature has authorized such prosecutions and the plaintiff had complied with the statutory procedure for initiation of such an action. Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 176 (R.I. 2001).

Collateral References.

What constitutes breach of peace bond. 54 A.L.R. 388.

12-4-3. Inquiry into truth of complaint — Sentence to enter recognizance.

Whenever any accused party shall be brought before the court, the court shall inquire into the truth of the complaint. If it shall appear that the complaint is true and that there is reasonable cause to fear that the threat would be carried into execution, the accused person shall be sentenced to enter into recognizance with sufficient surety or sureties, and in any sum that the court shall direct, with condition to keep the peace towards all the people of this state, and especially towards the person against whom or against whose property the threat shall have been made, for a certain time thereafter not exceeding eleven (11) months, and to pay all the costs of prosecution and conviction.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 154; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 12-4-3 .

Cross References.

Recognizance required after conviction, § 12-19-29 .

12-4-4. Discharge of accused — Commitment on failure to give recognizance.

Upon complying with the sentence, the accused shall be discharged; but on neglecting so to do, he or she shall be committed to the adult correctional institutions, there to remain during the term of which he or she was sentenced to give recognizance, and until the costs are paid, and also all the costs of his or her commitment, or until he or she shall enter into the recognizance required by the sentence before some judge of the district court or justice of the peace authorized to take bail in the county, and pay the required costs.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 155; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 8; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-4-4 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 15.

12-4-5. Exemption from recognizance — Domestic abuse.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no requirement shall be made of any complainant to enter into a recognizance of any sum to prosecute a complaint for domestic assault.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 156; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 12-4-5 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 23.

Cross References.

Domestic abuse, § 8-8.1-1 et seq.

Domestic Violence Protection Act, § 12-29-1 et seq.

12-4-6. Discharge on failure to find complaint supported by evidence — Costs.

If the district court before which the warrant shall be returned, or any warrant triable before it, upon which recognizance with surety for costs may be required by it, shall not consider the complaint, after trial, to be supported by the evidence adduced, the court shall immediately discharge the accused, and, as soon as may be, tax the costs that have accrued on it, including the attendance and travel of the witnesses summoned and present or sworn on the part of the complainant, and, if the costs are not paid within ten (10) days, shall issue execution for the costs against the complainant and his or her surety, returnable in twenty (20) days from the date of execution. The costs when collected shall be paid to the clerk, if there is any, or if not, to the justice, and be paid out by the clerk or justice to the several persons having right to them, or to the general treasurer.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 157; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 12-4-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Formalities to Be Observed.

Discharge must be by court under this section, rather than by failure of officer, on direction by complainant, to serve the warrant. Mitchell v. Donanski, 28 R.I. 94 , 65 A. 611, 1906 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1906).

Chapter 5 Search Warrants

12-5-1. Authority to issue.

  1. A search warrant may be issued by any judge of the district court. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be so construed as to restrain the power of the justices of the supreme or superior courts by virtue of § 8-3-6 to issue a search warrant.
  2. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be so construed as to restrain the power of the justices of the family court by virtue of §§ 8-10-3 , 8-10-4 , 8-10-3 8, and 11-9-9 to issue a search warrant.

History of Section. P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 16; P.L. 2002, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 262, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2002, ch. 210, § 1 and P.L. 2002, ch. 262, § 1 enacted nearly identical amendments to this section.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2002 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2002 amendment.

In 2002, the compiler added the subsection designations.

Rules of Court.

Search and seizure, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 41.

Comparative Legislation.

Search warrants:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-33a et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 276, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Retired Judge.

Search warrant was invalid because retired judge lacked authority to sign search warrants. Section 12-5-1 and Rule 41(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure empower only active judges with the authority to issue search warrants. The very language of the 1969 Judicial Reorganization Act, the act under which the judge retired, provides that retired justices possess “all powers and authority” of a District Court judge, but only “[w]hen so assigned and performing such service.” Since the retired judge was not performing those duties at the time he signed the search warrant, the search warrant was invalid. State v. Nunez, 634 A.2d 1167, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 260 (R.I. 1993).

Collateral References.

Propriety of Execution of No-Knock Search Warrant. 59 A.L.R. 6th 311.

Propriety of execution of search warrant at nighttime. 41 A.L.R.5th 171.

12-5-2. Grounds for issuance.

A warrant may be issued under this chapter to search for and seize any of the following:

  1. Property stolen or embezzled, or obtained by any false pretense, or pretenses, with intent to cheat or defraud within this state, or elsewhere;
  2. Property kept, suffered to be kept, concealed, deposited, or possessed in violation of law, or for the purpose of violating the law;
  3. Property designed or intended for use, or that is or has been used, in violation of law, or as a means of committing a violation of law;
  4. Property that is evidence of the commission of a crime;
  5. Samples of blood, saliva, hair, bodily tissues, bodily fluids, or dental impressions from the body of a person that may yield evidence of the identity of the perpetrator of a crime when subjected to scientific or other forensic analysis. The foregoing samples, and the results of any scientific or other forensic analysis, shall be admissible in all criminal proceedings, subject to application of the rules of evidence and criminal procedure. When any of the foregoing samples are seized for scientific or forensic analysis, the seizure shall be conducted in accordance with the regulations, guidelines, or protocols of the department of health or the state crime laboratory, as may be appropriate under the circumstances;
  6. Samples of blood or breath that may yield evidence of the presence of alcohol or a controlled substance when subjected to a chemical test, as contemplated in § 31-27-2 . When any of the foregoing samples are seized for purposes of performing the aforementioned chemical test, the seizure shall be conducted in accordance with the regulations of the department of health that apply to the consensual collection of such a sample for purposes of the chemical test contemplated by § 31-27-2 ; or
  7. Property of a respondent under chapter 8.3 of title 8 where firearms may be under the possession, custody, or control of the respondent.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 178; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 31; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 31; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 31; G.L. 1956, § 12-5-1 ; G.L., § 12-5-2 , as enacted by P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 13; P.L. 2004, ch. 441, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 493, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 2; P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2009, ch. 210, § 1, and P.L. 2009, ch. 211, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 6, § 2, and P.L. 2018, ch. 7, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2004, ch. 441, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2006, ch. 382, § 1, and by P.L. 2006, ch. 471, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect upon passage [July 7, 2004], and shall apply, without limitation, to all criminal investigations and prosecutions.

P.L. 2004, ch. 493, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2006, ch. 382, § 1, and by P.L. 2006, ch. 471, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect upon passage [July 7, 2004], and shall apply, without limitation, to all criminal investigations and prosecutions.

Cross References.

Allowance for service of warrant, § 9-29-11 .

Constitutional protection against unreasonable search, R.I. Const., art. 1, § 6 .

Cruelty to animals, search warrants, § 4-1-19 .

Federal lands, execution of state process, §§ 42-1-2 , 42-2-8 .

Fish and game laws, search without warrant, § 20-1-16 .

Fish and game laws, warrant for enforcement, § 20-1-12 .

Forfeited property, warrant to take, § 12-21-25 .

Gambling apparatus, § 11-19-24 .

Game unlawfully possessed, § 20-34-6.

House of ill fame, inmate, § 11-34-4.

Intoxicating liquors, unlawfully possessed, § 3-12-4 .

Military property, § 30-9-11 .

Obscene publications, § 11-31-2 .

Pawned property, search of premises, § 19-26-13 et seq.

Shellfish not complying with law or regulations, § 21-14-9 .

Sheriffs, duties, § 42-29-1 .

Law Reviews.

2004 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Criminal Law, see 10 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 875 (2005).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Identity of Perpetrator of Crime.

Superior court erred in suppressing the DNA results of a buccal swab taken from defendant while he was incarcerated because the court was statutorily authorized to issue the subject warrants, the manner of obtaining the swab was necessitated by defendant’s refusal to comply, despite being given multiple opportunities to do so, the State was not required to return to court to seek a contempt order, defendant’s reasons for refusing were pretextual, and there was nothing inappropriate or excessive about the force used in seizing the swab of a recalcitrant and hyperbolic suspect. State v. Querido, 229 A.3d 410, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 46 (R.I. 2020).

Property.

Blood sample was neither “property” within the ordinary meaning of the statute authorizing a superior court to issue search warrants nor under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 41 , which authorized issuance of warrants in appropriate cases; therefore, a court order for seizure of a child molestation suspect’s blood sample and a subsequent warrant authorizing the involuntary taking of a sample were both quashed. State v. Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 34 (R.I. 2004).

In light of the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s opinions in DiStefano and in Dearmas, a trial court erred in issuing a search warrant authorizing the seizure of samples of defendant’s blood, as this exceeded the trial court’s authority under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-5-2 , and accordingly, the DNA results and the conclusions drawn from the blood samples should not have been admitted into evidence at defendant’s trial; however, the error was deemed harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. State v. Gomes, 881 A.2d 97, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 169 (R.I. 2005).

Sufficiency of Complaint.

A warrant cannot issue on suspicion but must be on belief by the complainant. Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464 , 1850 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1850).

Description in complaint of place to be searched as “the premises of ” named persons was not sufficiently descriptive. Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464 , 1850 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1850).

Collateral References.

State constitutional requirements as to exclusion of evidence unlawfully seized—post-Leon cases. 19 A.L.R.5th 470.

12-5-3. Issuance and contents.

  1. A warrant shall issue only upon complaint in writing, under oath of:
    1. A chief of police, deputy chief of police or other members of the police force of any city or town, or deputy sheriff of any county, member of the division of state police, full time conservation officer of the department of environmental management, or other person specifically authorized by law to bring complaints for violation of the law which it is his or her responsibility to enforce;
    2. Additionally, in the case of property stolen, embezzled, or obtained by fraud or false pretenses, any person who has a right to the possession of the property.
    3. Additionally, a sworn law enforcement member of any city or town where that member is serving on a statewide task force.
  2. Within fourteen (14) days of the issuance of any warrant under this chapter, whether or not executed, the warrant, accompanied by any supporting affidavits and an inventory of any property seized, shall be returned to the district court having jurisdiction over the place of the search or, in the event of a warrant that is not executed, the court from which it was issued. The returns shall be maintained by the district court according to the date of issuance. If not otherwise indicated, the return shall note whether the warrant was executed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 178; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 31; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 31; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 31; G.L. 1956, § 12-5-1 ; G.L., § 12-5-3 , as enacted by P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 16; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 13; P.L. 1986, ch. 168, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 364, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 333, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 159, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 172, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 42.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by three acts (P.L. 2012, ch. 159, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 172, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 42) passed by the 2012 General Assembly. Since the three acts are not in conflict, the section is set out as amended by these three acts.

P.L. 2012, ch. 159, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 172, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Search warrants, contents, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 41.

Collateral References.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of adult defendant’s property or residence authorized by defendant’s minor child — state cases. 51 A.L.R.5th 425.

Admissibility of evidence discovered in search of defendant’s property or residence authorized by defendant’s adult relative other than spouse — state cases. 55 A.L.R.5th 125.

Application of “plain-feel” exception to warrant requirements — state cases. 50 A.L.R.5th 467.

Disputation of truth of matters stated in affidavit in support of search warrant — modern cases, 24 A.L.R.4th 1266.

Propriety and legality of issuing only one search warrant to search more than one place or premises occupied by same person, 31 A.L.R.2d 864.

Propriety of considering hearsay or other incompetent evidence in establishing probable cause for issuance of search warrant, 10 A.L.R.3d 359.

Propriety of search of nonoccupant visitor’s belongings pursuant to warrant issued for another’s premises. 51 A.L.R.5th 375.

Search Warrant: Sufficiency of showing as to time of occurence of facts relied upon, 100 A.L.R.2d 525.

Sufficiency of description of apartment or room to be searched in multiple-occupancy structure, 11 A.L.R.3d 1330.

Sufficiency of description of automobile or other conveyance to be searched, 47 A.L.R.2d 1444.

Sufficiency of description of person to be searched, 49 A.L.R.2d 1209.

Validity of anticipatory search warrants — state cases. 67 A.L.R.5th 361.

Validity and Application of Anticipatory Search Warrant — Federal Cases. 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 123.

12-5-3.1 — 12-5-3.13. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1972, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 93, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 349, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 403, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 350, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 378, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 12, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 83, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 221, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 11, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 184, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 219, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 298, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 82, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 220, § 1), concerning complaint for issuance of search and arrest warrants for the town of Westerly and the city of Providence, and complaint for issuance of search warrants for the towns of Glocester, Coventry, North Kingstown, Portsmouth, Warren, Narragansett, Barrington, Cumberland, Charlestown, Jamestown, and the city of Pawtucket, were repealed by P.L. 1991, ch. 364, § 2, effective June 18, 1991.

12-5-3.14. Complaint for issuance of search warrant — Medicaid Fraud Control Unit.

In addition to those persons specified in § 12-5-3(a)(1) , the director of investigations of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the department of attorney general is authorized to sign written complaints, under oath, for the issuance of search warrants.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 209, § 1.

12-5-3.15, 12-5-3.16. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1988, ch. 462, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 120, § 1), concerning complaint for issuance of search warrants in the town of East Greenwich and complaint for issuance of search and arrest warrants in the town of Little Compton, were repealed by P.L. 1991, ch. 364, § 2, effective June 18, 1991.

12-5-3.17. Complaint for issuance of search warrant — Town of North Kingstown.

In addition to those persons specified in § 12-5-3(a) , detectives, and any rank above, in the town of North Kingstown police department are hereby authorized to sign written complaints, under oath, for the issuance of search warrants.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 287, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 299, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 287, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 299, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

12-5-4. Complainant officer exempt from surety for costs.

  1. No officer or other person described in § 12-5-3(a)(1) complaining as required by that section shall be required at the time of making a complaint to give surety for costs, or in any way to become liable for the costs that may accrue on it or for any damage on account of the seizure.
  2. Any person described in § 12-5-3(a)(2) complaining as required by that section shall give recognizance in the sum of fifty dollars ($50.00).

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 178; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 31; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 31; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 31; G.L. 1956, § 12-5-1 ; G.L., § 12-5-4 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 1.

12-5-5, 12-5-6. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L., §§ 12-5-5 , 12-5-6; P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 1), concerning the execution and return of warrants and the return of papers to the clerk, were repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 14.

12-5-7. Disposition of seized property.

  1. The property seized shall be safely kept by the officer seizing it, under the direction of the court, so long as may be necessary for the purpose of being used as evidence in any case.
  2. As soon as may be thereafter, if the property is subject to forfeiture, further proceedings shall be had on the property for forfeiture as is prescribed by law in chapter 21 of this title.
  3. If the property seized was stolen or otherwise unlawfully taken from the owner, or is not found to have been unlawfully used or intended for unlawful use, or is found to have been unlawfully used without the knowledge of the owner, it shall be returned to the person legally entitled to its possession.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 179; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 32; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 32; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 32; G.L. 1956, § 12-5-2 ; G.L., § 12-5-7 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Determination of Ownership.

Where the state police determined that the insurance company was legally entitled to the possession of the seized vehicle, plaintiff in Superior Court action alleging that he was the owner carried the burden of proof. Santiano v. Auto Placement Ctr., 119 R.I. 419 , 379 A.2d 368, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1922 (1977).

Where plaintiff in a Superior Court action contested a state police determination that the defendant insurance company was legally entitled to possession of the vehicle which had been seized from him, this opportunity to prove that the vehicle was his before it was turned over to defendant satisfied plaintiff’s right to due process. Santiano v. Auto Placement Ctr., 119 R.I. 419 , 379 A.2d 368, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1922 (1977).

Preservation of Evidence.

Although police were sloppy in failing to preserve a surveillance videotape showing an area near the site of a robbery, and also failed to comply with statutes that required preservation of evidence, defendant failed to show denial of a fair trial that would have necessitated dismissal of the indictment where police had not regarded the videotape as showing any relevant activity and there was no evidence whatsoever of police bad faith. State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 1093, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 148 (R.I. 2004).

Retention of Seized Property.

Under this section an owner is barred from reclaiming seized property which he used or intended to use for unlawful purposes. State ex rel. Ricci v. Gottschalk, 115 R.I. 90 , 341 A.2d 45, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1123 (1975); State v. Gottschalk, 118 R.I. 257 , 373 A.2d 182, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1453 (1977).

Court’s denial of defendant’s motion for return of seized items was proper where the items could be used as burglar tools and where defendant’s criminal record and proclivities cast doubt on his testimony that the items were intended for legitimate purposes only. State v. Gottschalk, 118 R.I. 257 , 373 A.2d 182, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1453 (1977).

Defendant is entitled to return of all seized property belonging to him, provided that it is noncontraband, not subject to forfeiture, not stolen or otherwise unlawfully taken from the owner, and not found to have been unlawfully used or intended for unlawful use. State v. De Masi, 447 A.2d 1139, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1115 (R.I. 1982).

Where the Supreme Court is unable, on the record before it, to determine whether the government can reasonably justify its conduct in retaining the defendant’s property, it will remand the case to the district court for a hearing at which the state shall have an opportunity to present evidence to justify this conduct. State v. Shore, 522 A.2d 1215, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 435 (R.I. 1987).

Return of Property Having No Evidentiary Value.

Finding that some of the property seized might have possible evidentiary value did not justify retention of other property having no such use. State v. De Masi, 447 A.2d 1139, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1115 (R.I. 1982).

Return of Property Intended for Lawful Use.

A finding that some items seized were used or intended to be used unlawfully does not justify denial of recovery of other items seized with them but not subject to such a finding. State ex rel. Ricci v. Gottschalk, 115 R.I. 90 , 341 A.2d 45, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1123 (1975); State v. Gottschalk, 118 R.I. 257 , 373 A.2d 182, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1453 (1977).

12-5-8. Hearing upon seizure of matter alleged to be obscene.

Whenever any deputy sheriff, municipal or state police officer, or any other person authorized by law to execute a search warrant shall seize any property alleged to be obscene, pursuant to a search warrant issued under the provisions of this chapter, the person in whose possession it is found or who claims a proprietary interest in it shall be entitled to a hearing before the superior court on the question of whether or not the property is obscene within three (3) days of the time a written demand is submitted to a judge of the superior court and notice served upon the attorney general, or in the case of towns and cities the chief legal officer of the town or city, and if a hearing is held, the court shall render a decision on the question within forty-eight (48) hours of the conclusion of the hearing. If by the decision the court determines that the matter is not obscene, it shall be immediately returned to the person.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 258, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 244, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 42.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Time for Hearing.

Where allegedly obscene films were seized on Saturday, November 28, the petitioner demanded a hearing on Monday, November 30, and the hearing was held on Thursday, December 3, the state’s failure to grant a hearing within three days of the seizure violated this section, and the trial justice therefore properly ordered the return of the films to the petitioner. In re Desmairais, 476 A.2d 528, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 531 (R.I. 1984).

12-5-9. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 1: G.L. § 12-5-8 ; P.L. 1966, ch. 258, § 2: G.L. § 12-5-9 ), scope and definition, was repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 14.

12-5-10. Electronic communication services.

  1. Based on probable cause, a warrant may be issued to corporations located outside the state of Rhode Island that provide electronic communication services to the general public in connection with any communications sent to or received by customers or recipients located in Rhode Island. The warrant may require the provision of customer identity, data stored by or on behalf of the customer, the customer’s usage of those services, the recipient or destination of communications sent to or from those customers, or the content of those communications.
  2. Any warrant issued under this section shall be honored within the state of Rhode Island and also in any foreign jurisdiction which has any law in place providing for the honoring of such warrants.

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 198, § 1.

Chapter 5.1 Interception of Wire and Oral Communications

12-5.1-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Aggrieved person” means an individual who was a party to any intercepted wire, electronic, or oral communication or against whom the interception was directed.
  2. “Communications common carrier” has the same meaning given the term “common carrier” by 47 U.S.C. § 153(11).
  3. “Contents,” when used with respect to any wire, electronic, or oral communication, includes any information concerning the identity of the parties to that communication or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.
  4. “Designated offense” means the offenses of:
    1. Murder, robbery, kidnapping, extortion, assault with a dangerous weapon, and assault with intent to rob or murder;
    2. Arson in the first degree, arson in the second degree, or arson in the third degree;
    3. Bribery or larceny involving the receipt of stolen property of a value of more than five hundred dollars ($500);
    4. Any violation of chapter 28 of title 21 where the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
    5. Any violation of chapters 19, 47, or 51 of title 11, where the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
    6. The lending of money at a rate of interest in violation of law;
    7. Being a fugitive from justice for any of the offenses provided in this subdivision; and
    8. Conspiracy to commit any of the offenses provided in this subdivision.
  5. “Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system, but does not include:
    1. Any wire or oral communication;
    2. Any communication made through a tone-only paging device; or
    3. Any communication from a tracking device.
  6. “Electronic communication service” means any service which provides to users the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.
  7. “Electronic, mechanical, or other device” means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept wire, electronic, or oral communications other than:
    1. Any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment, or facility or any component of telephone or telegraph instruments, equipment, or facilities, furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business, and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his or her duties; or
    2. A hearing aid or similar device which is being used to correct subnormal hearing to normal.
  8. “Intercept” means aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.
  9. “Investigative or law enforcement officer” means any officer of the United States, this state, or a political subdivision of this state, who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of, or to make arrests for, the designated offenses, the attorney general, and his or her assistants.
  10. “Oral communications” means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying that expectation, but the term does not include any electronic communication.
  11. “Person” means any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation, whether or not any of the foregoing is an officer, agent, or employee of the United States, a state, or a political subdivision of a state.
  12. “User” means any person or entity who:
    1. Uses an electronic communication service; and
    2. Is duly authorized by the provider of the service to engage in that use; photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of the communications.
  13. “Wire communications” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception, (including the use of the connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating the facilities for the transmission of communications. The term includes any electronic storage of the communication.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 252, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 144, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 127, § 2; P.L. 1980, ch. 42, § 1; 1985, ch. 348, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 3, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 79, art. 2, § 4.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rearranged the definitions into alphabetical order and added the paragraph designations in subdivisions (4), (5), (7), and (12).

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

Comparative Legislation.

Wiretapping:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41a et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, §§ 99, 101.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Disclosure of Evidence.

This chapter is controlling on the extent to which recordings of intercepted wire and oral communications or documents containing transcriptions or recordations of such evidence may be disclosed. State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582 , 268 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1970).

Federal Law.

The Rhode Island wiretap statute, chapter 5.1 of title 12, closely parallels title III of the federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, but does not contain a provision similar to 18 U.S.C. § 2515, which forbids admissibility of the contents of an intercepted communication if disclosure of that information would be in violation of that chapter. Pulawski v. Blais, 506 A.2d 76, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 430 (R.I. 1986).

Liability.

Rhode Island wiretap act by its terms only provides for suits against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses the communications at issue, R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-5.1-13(a) . The language of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-5.1-1(11) makes clear that only officers, agents, or employees of municipal governments are “persons” who may be sued, not municipalities themselves. Walden v. City of Providence, 596 F.3d 38, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3652 (1st Cir. 2010).

Stationhouse Confession.

Arson suspect’s voluntarily-induced, secretly recorded statements at the police station were not “wire communications” as defined in subsection (a), nor were they “oral communications” for purposes of subsection (b), since the suspect did not have a justifiable expectation of privacy in those statements. Accordingly, the recording of the interview with defendant did not require compliance with the mandates of this chapter. State v. Marini, 638 A.2d 507, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 1994).

Videotape.

The audio portion of a video recorder, like a tape recorder, is covered by the scope of the state wiretap statute. State v. O'Brien, 774 A.2d 89, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 178 (R.I. 2001).

Collateral References.

“Caller ID” system, allowing telephone call recipient to ascertain number to telephone from which call originated, as violation of right to privacy, wiretapping statute, or similar protections. 9 A.L.R.5th 553.

Eavesdropping as violating right of privacy. 11 A.L.R.3d 1296.

Facial and As-Applied Validity of State Wiretapping Acts in Criminal Proceedings. 25 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2017)

12-5.1-2. Application for orders.

  1. The attorney general, or an assistant attorney general specially designated by the attorney general, may apply ex parte to the presiding justice of the superior court of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing the interception of any wire, electronic, or oral communications. Each application ex parte for an order must be in writing, subscribed and sworn to by the applicant.
  2. The application must contain:
    1. The identity of the officer making the application;
    2. A full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify his or her belief that an order should be issued, including:
      1. Details as to the particular designated offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed;
      2. A particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which, or the place where, the communication is to be intercepted;
      3. A particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted; and
      4. The identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted;
    3. A full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
    4. A statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such that the authorization of interception should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained, a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type will occur after the described type of communication has been first obtained;
    5. A full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications, known to the individual making the application, made to the presiding justice of the superior court for authorization to intercept wire, electronic, or oral communications involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the action taken by the presiding justice of the superior court on each application; and
    6. Where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain the results.
  3. The presiding justice of the superior court may require the applicant to furnish additional testimony or documentary evidence in support of the application.
  4. Allegations of fact in the application may be based either upon the personal knowledge of the applicant or upon information and belief. If the applicant personally knows the fact alleged, it must be so stated. If the facts establishing reasonable cause are derived in whole or in part from the statements of persons other than the applicant, the sources of the information and belief must be either disclosed or described, and the application must contain facts establishing the existence and reliability of the informant, or the reliability of the information supplied by the informant. The application must also state, so far as possible, the basis of the informant’s knowledge or belief. If the applicant’s information and belief is derived from tangible evidence or recorded oral evidence, a copy or detailed description of the evidence should be annexed to or included in the application. Affidavits of persons other than the applicant must be submitted in conjunction with the application if they tend to support any fact or conclusion alleged in the application. Accompanying affidavits may be based either on personal knowledge of the affiant, or information and belief with the source of the information and reason for the belief specified.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Application.

When an application specifically incorporates an affidavit by reference, the affidavit is presented to the presiding justice at the same time as the application, and the application and affidavit together provide the information required by this section, the requirements of the statute are satisfied. State v. Campbell, 528 A.2d 321, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 524 (R.I. 1987).

Informant’s Reliability.

Where the affidavits clearly set forth that the informant had always provided accurate information in the past and that such information had led to the arrests of eight individuals, three of whom were convicted, and to the seizure of 1,355 pounds of marijuana; the reliability requirement of subsection (d) was satisfied. State v. McGoff, 517 A.2d 232, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 542 (R.I. 1986).

Participant Monitoring.

In situations where an individual consents to having his communications monitored, § 11-35-21(c)(2) , and not this chapter, applies. State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1423 (R.I. 1981).

Participant monitoring is not governed by this chapter. State v. Williams, 752 A.2d 951, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 139 (R.I. 2000).

Strict Compliance.

Strict compliance with the terms of this section is required. State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1423 (R.I. 1981).

All that must be strictly complied with in this section is the requirement that the state provide a full statement setting forth why investigative procedures have failed or are reasonably likely to fail or that they are too dangerous. State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1423 (R.I. 1981).

Collateral References.

Use of Informant by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies as Infringement of Defendant’s Rights to Due Process. 36 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2018).

12-5.1-3. Where application may be made.

Application for an order to intercept wire, electronic, or oral communication may be made to the presiding justice of the superior court or the senior associate justice of the superior court whenever the presiding justice shall deem it necessary to disqualify himself or herself from entering the order.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 100, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 2.

12-5.1-4. Issuance of orders.

  1. Upon the application as provided in § 12-5.1-2 the presiding justice of the superior court, or the senior associate justice of the superior court when the presiding justice shall disqualify himself or herself from entering the order, may enter an ex parte order, as required or as modified, authorizing the interception of wire, electronic, or oral communications if the presiding justice of the superior court determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that:
    1. There is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular designated offense;
    2. There is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through the interception;
    3. Normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried, or to be too dangerous;
    4. There is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, electronic, or oral communications are to be intercepted, are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of the offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by the individual.
  2. If the facilities from which a wire, electronic, or oral communication is to be intercepted are public, no order of authorization shall be issued unless the court, in addition to the matters provided in subsection (a) of this section, determines that there is a special need to intercept wire communications over the facilities.
  3. If the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, electronic, or oral communications are to be intercepted, are being used, or are about to be used, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by, a licensed attorney-at-law, or an ordained minister of the gospel, priest, or rabbi of any denomination, or is a place used primarily for habitation by a husband and wife, no order shall be issued unless the presiding justice of the superior court, in addition to the matters provided in subsection (a) of this section, determines that there is a special need to intercept wire, electronic, or oral communications over those facilities or in those places, and that the interceptions will be so conducted as to minimize or eliminate interception of privileged communication between lawyers and clients, clergy and confidants, or husbands and wives.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 100, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 2.

12-5.1-5. Form and content of orders.

  1. Each order authorizing the interception of any wire, electronic, or oral communication shall specify:
    1. The identity, or a particular description of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted;
    2. The nature and location of the communications facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;
    3. A particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which they relate;
    4. The identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications; and
    5. The period of time during which the interception is authorized, including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first obtained.
  2. No order entered under this section may authorize the interception of any wire, electronic, or oral communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty (30) days. Extensions of an order may be granted, but only upon application for an extension made in accordance with § 12-5.1-2 and the court making the findings required by § 12-5.1-4 . The period of extension shall be no longer than the presiding justice of the superior court deems necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was granted and in no event for longer than thirty (30) days. Every order and extension shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty (30) days.
  3. Whenever an order authorizing interception is entered pursuant to this chapter, the order may require reports to be made to the presiding justice of the superior court who issued the order showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued interception. These reports shall be made at any intervals that the presiding justice of the superior court may require.
  4. A court order issued by a judge of competent jurisdiction authorizing the interception of a wire, electronic, or oral communication may direct an officer, employee, or agent of any communications common carrier or electronic communications service to provide information, facilities, and technical assistance to the applicant attorney general or an assistant attorney general specially designated by the attorney general or law enforcement officer or agency who, pursuant to this chapter, is designated to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication. The communications common carrier or electronic communication service shall, if ordered, immediately furnish the applicant attorney general or assistant attorney general specially designated by the attorney general all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services that the communications carrier or electronic communication service is according the person whose communications are to be intercepted. A communications common carrier or electronic communication service shall furnish the information, facilities, and technical assistance at its prevailing rate or tariffs to the applicant attorney general or assistant attorney general specially designated by the attorney general or law enforcement officer or agency so designated to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Description of Type of Communication.

All orders authorizing the interception of any wire or oral communications must contain within the four corners of the document a particular description of the type of communications to be intercepted. State v. Sitko, 460 A.2d 1, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 857 (R.I. 1983).

Even if requirement of particularized description of communications sought to be intercepted could be satisfied by reference to attorney general’s application for order authorizing interception, such application was insufficient where its description was not particularized, but rather covered a panoply of offenses including “conspiracies to do unlawful acts in violation of the General Laws of the State of Rhode Island.” State v. Sitko, 460 A.2d 1, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 857 (R.I. 1983).

Substantial Compliance.

In order for wiretaps to be admissible as evidence the state must show strict compliance with the statute as substantial compliance with the statute is constitutionally insufficient. State v. Luther, 116 R.I. 28 , 351 A.2d 594, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1238 (1976).

Termination of Order.

Evidence obtained by a series of wiretaps based upon an order which violated the express language of this section regarding termination was suppressed. State v. Maloof, 114 R.I. 380 , 333 A.2d 676, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1426 (1975).

12-5.1-6. Approval of interception of wire, electronic, or oral communication.

  1. An order of approval of the interception of any wire, electronic, or oral communication relating to an offense other than that specified in the order of authorization may be issued where the court finds on an application for an order of approval submitted in the same manner as an application for authorization as provided in § 12-5.1-2 that the interception was otherwise made in accordance with this chapter. This application shall be made as soon as practicable.
  2. In addition to any other right to appeal, the state, by the attorney general, shall have the right to appeal from a denial of an order of approval made under this section. The appeal shall be claimed and taken in the manner provided by law and rule of court for prosecuting appeals in civil actions.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 2.

12-5.1-7. Execution of orders.

  1. An order may be executed pursuant to its terms anywhere in the state.
  2. An order may be personally executed by the authorized applicant or by other investigative or law enforcement officer designated by him or her or the presiding justice of the superior court for the purpose.
  3. The order shall be executed according to its terms during the hours specified by the order, and for the authorized period, or a part of that period. Any device installed for the purpose of interception must be removed as soon after termination of the interception as practicable. Entry upon private premises for the removal of the device is deemed to be authorized by the warrant.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1.

12-5.1-8. Maintenance and custody of records.

  1. The contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication intercepted by any means authorized by this chapter shall, if practicable, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. The recording of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication under this section shall be done in such a way as will protect the recording from editing or other alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions of the order, the recordings shall be made available to the presiding justice of the superior court issuing the order and sealed under his or her directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the presiding justice of the superior court orders. They shall not be destroyed except upon an order of the presiding justice of the superior court, and in any event, shall be kept for ten (10) years. Duplicate recordings may be made for use or disclosure pursuant to the provisions of § 12-5.1-10(a) or (b) for investigations and bail hearings and any pre-trial hearings. The presence of the seal provided for by this section, or a satisfactory explanation for its absence, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication or evidence derived from them at any bail hearing or pre-trial hearing.
  2. Applications made and orders granted under this chapter shall be sealed by the presiding justice of the superior court. Custody of the applications and orders shall be wherever the presiding justice of the superior court directs. The applications and orders shall be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before the presiding justice of the superior court and shall not be destroyed except on order of the presiding justice of the superior court, and in any event shall be kept for ten (10) years.
  3. Any violation of the provisions of this section may be punished as contempt of the presiding justice of the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 282, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Seals.

Failure to seal a toxicology report, described in the affidavit in support of a wiretap, along with the balance of the application did not require suppression of the intercepts, where the noncompliance was clearly technical since the information in the report was detailed in the affidavit itself, which was placed under seal. State v. Campbell, 528 A.2d 321, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 524 (R.I. 1987).

As long as the authenticity of two simultaneous recordings was preserved by the sealing of one of the “originals”, there was no reason why the other could not be used as a duplicate, notwithstanding the possibility of some slight technical discrepancies between two recordings. State v. Campbell, 528 A.2d 321, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 524 (R.I. 1987).

Standing.

Defendant did not have to qualify as an aggrieved person to challenge a sealing violation regarding wiretap evidence; the sealing violation, as provided for in R.I. Gen. Law § 12-5.1-8(a) , was an independent remedy. State v. Oster, 922 A.2d 151, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 60 (R.I. 2007).

12-5.1-9. Return of inventory.

  1. Within a reasonable time but not later than ninety (90) days after the termination of the period of the order or of extensions of the order, the presiding justice of the superior court shall cause to be served on the person named in the order or application, and any other parties to the intercepted communications that the presiding justice of the superior court may determine in his or her direction to be in the interest of justice, an inventory which shall include:
    1. Notice of the entry of the order or the application for a denied order of approval;
    2. The date of the entry of the order or the denial of the application for an order of approval;
    3. The period of authorized, approved or disapproved interception;
    4. The fact that during the period wire, electronic, or oral communications were or were not intercepted.
  2. The judge, upon the filing of a motion, may in his or her discretion make available to the person or the person’s counsel for inspection any portions of the intercepted communications, applications, and orders that the judge determines to be in the interest of justice. On an ex parte showing of good cause to the judge, the serving of the inventory required by this section may be postponed.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 2.

12-5.1-10. Disclosure and use of intercepted wire or oral communications.

  1. Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication, or evidence derived from them, may disclose the contents to another investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure.
  2. Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication or evidence derived from them may use the contents to the extent that their use is appropriate to the proper performance of his or her official duties.
  3. Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter, any information concerning a wire, electronic, or oral communication, or evidence derived from them intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter may disclose the contents of that communication or the derivative evidence while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any criminal proceeding in any court of the United States or of this or any other state or in any federal or state grand jury proceeding.
  4. No otherwise privileged wire, electronic, or oral communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With § 12-17-16.

The legislature clearly intended, in enacting this section, to establish the precise circumstances under which intercepted oral or wire communications may be disclosed and that such communications, or documents containing transcriptions or recordations thereof, are not within the scope of § 12-17-16 . State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582 , 268 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1970).

Participant Monitoring.

In situations where an individual consents to having his communications monitored, § 11-35-21(c)(2) , and not this chapter, applies. State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1423 (R.I. 1981).

Collateral References.

Admissibility, in criminal prosecution, of evidence obtained by electronic surveillance of prisoner, 57 A.L.R.3d 172.

Admissibility, in criminal prosecution, of evidence secured by mechanical or electronic eavesdropping device, 97 A.L.R.2d 1283; 57 A.L.R.3d 172.

Omission or inaudibility of portions of sound recording as affecting its admissibility in evidence, 57 A.L.R.3d 746.

Sufficiency of identification of participants as prerequisite to admissibility of telephone conversation in evidence, 79 A.L.R.3d 79.

Waiver of evidentiary privilege by inadvertent disclosure — state law. 51 A.L.R.5th 603.

12-5.1-11. Notice of intention.

The contents of any intercepted wire, electronic, or oral communication or evidence derived from them shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any criminal proceeding unless each party, not less than ten (10) days before the proceeding has been furnished with a copy of the application, order, and inventory under which the interception was authorized or approved. This ten (10) day period may be waived by the judge if he or she finds that it was not possible to furnish the party with the information more than ten (10) days before the proceeding and that the party will not be prejudiced by the delay in receiving the information.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 2.

12-5.1-12. Suppression of evidence.

  1. Any aggrieved person may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire, electronic, or oral communication or evidence derived from them on the grounds that:
    1. The communication was unlawfully intercepted;
    2. The order under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face;
    3. The interception was not made in conformity with the order;
    4. Service was not made as provided in § 12-5.1-11 ; or
    5. The seal provided in § 12-5.1-8(b) is not present and there is no satisfactory explanation for its absence.
  2. A motion under this section shall be made before the trial, unless there was no opportunity to make the motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of the motion. If the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire, electronic, or oral communication, or evidence derived from them, shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this chapter. The judge, upon the filing of the motion by the aggrieved person, may in his or her discretion make available to the aggrieved person or the person’s counsel for inspection any portions of the intercepted communication or evidence derived from them that the judge determines to be in the interests of justice.
  3. If the motion shall be made before any court or judge other than the presiding justice of the superior court, the motion shall be transferred to the presiding justice of the superior court or to an associate justice of the superior court who shall be designated by the presiding justice, or by the associate justice in charge of the criminal calendar in Providence County whenever the presiding justice shall deem it necessary to disqualify himself or herself, for hearing and determination. No motion under this section shall be heard or determined by a district court in preliminary proceedings or otherwise.
  4. In addition to any other right of appeal, the state, by the attorney general, shall have the right to appeal from an order allowing a motion to suppress made under this section. The appeal shall be taken within thirty (30) days after the date of allowance of the motion to suppress. If the motion to suppress is allowed prior to trial, the appeal shall be decided prior to trial. If the motion to suppress is allowed during trial and the attorney general shall claim an appeal, the evidence shall be admitted at trial, and the question of admissibility reserved for the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 100, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Hearsay.

Objection that the evidence obtained by a wiretap was inadmissible hearsay, is not a ground for suppression under this section. State v. Franco, 437 A.2d 1362, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1408 (R.I. 1981).

Collateral References.

Federal Constitution as affecting admissibility of telegraph or telephone messages intercepted in violation of law, 84 A.L.R.2d 963.

Mode of establishing that information obtained by illegal wire tapping has or has not led to evidence introduced by prosecution, 28 A.L.R.2d 1055.

12-5.1-13. Civil remedy.

  1. Any person whose wire, electronic, or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses the communications, and shall be entitled to recover from that person:
    1. Actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages, computed at the rate of one hundred dollars ($100) per day for each day of violation, or one thousand dollars ($1,000), whichever is higher;
    2. Punitive damages; and
    3. Reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation disbursements reasonably incurred.
  2. Good faith reliance on a court order issued under this chapter shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this section or any other law. Any communications common carrier and its employees shall be deemed to have acted in good faith upon receipt of a certified copy of the court order issued under this chapter and the representations of the attorney general or an assistant attorney general specially designated by the attorney general.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 121, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Where city employees alleged that a city and its officials violated their rights by installing a call recording system at a public safety complex, defendants’ argument that the only conceivable violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-5.1-1 et seq. would be if they had disclosed the intercepted communications, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-5.1-10 , which was not alleged, failed; the use of the disjunctive in the statute suggested that, in fact, a violation could occur where a person’s wire, electronic, or oral communication was intercepted, not just disclosed, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-5.1-13 . Walden v. City of Providence, 495 F. Supp. 2d 245, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49194 (D.R.I. 2007).

Liability.

Rhode Island wiretap act by its terms only provides for suits against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses the communications at issue, R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-5.1-13(a) . The language of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-5.1-1(11) makes clear that only officers, agents, or employees of municipal governments are “persons” who may be sued, not municipalities themselves. Walden v. City of Providence, 596 F.3d 38, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3652 (1st Cir. 2010).

Statute of Limitations.

Terminated employee’s claims against his former employer—pertaining to the employer installing tracking software on the employee’s work computer—were barred by the three-year statute of limitations; the continuing violation doctrine was not applicable to the employee’s claim under the Rhode Island Wiretap Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-5.1-1 et seq. Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 108 (R.I. 2019).

12-5.1-14. Annual report of interceptions to the general assembly.

  1. On the second Friday of January, of each year, the attorney general shall submit a report to the general assembly stating the number of applications made for orders during the previous year and the number of orders issued. In addition, the report shall provide, for each wiretap order and renewal:
    1. A breakdown of the effective period of the wiretap;
    2. The designation of the offenses for which the wiretap was sought;
    3. The number of interceptions made by the wiretap during the reported year;
    4. An indication whether any indictments were obtained as a result of those intercepts; (5) An indication, if any motions to suppress were made, whether the motions were granted; and

      (6) The prosecutorial results, if any, of the wiretap, including the criminal sentences imposed on any individual who pleads or is convicted of a crime in which wiretaps were instituted.

  2. If the wiretap order is a renewal from a previous year, or a case is closed in which a wiretap order had been previously obtained, the report shall list with the information provided in subsection (a) of this section a separate breakdown of the information for prior years. The report shall not include any information of wiretaps which remain in operation at the time the report is filed. This report shall be a public document. The report shall also include the number of pen registers and trap and trace devices authorized.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 236, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 283, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection (b) designation.

12-5.1-15. Conformity to the law of the United States.

Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter, any court to which an application is made in accordance with this chapter may take any evidence, make any finding, or issue any order required to conform the proceedings or the issuance of any order of authorization or approval as provided in this chapter to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States or of any law of the United States.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1.

12-5.1-16. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, its invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 1.

Chapter 5.2 Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices

12-5.2-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Designated offense” means the offenses of:
    1. Murder, robbery, kidnapping, extortion, assault with a dangerous weapon, and assault with intent to rob or murder;
    2. Arson in the first degree, arson in the second degree, or arson in the third degree;
    3. Bribery; larceny involving the receipt of stolen property of a value of more than five hundred dollars ($500);
    4. Any violation of chapter 28 of title 21 where the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
    5. Any violation of chapters 19, 47, or 51 of title 11, where the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
    6. The lending of money at a rate of interest in violation of law; and
    7. Conspiracy to commit any of the offenses provided in this subdivision;
  2. “Pen register” means a device which records or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which the device is attached, but does not include any device used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by the provider or any device used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business;
  3. “Trap and trace device” means a device which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted;
  4. “Wire communications” has the meaning set forth in § 12-5.1-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 283, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the paragraph designations in subsection (1)

12-5.2-2. Application for an order for a pen register or a trap and trace device.

    1. The attorney general or an assistant attorney general designated by the attorney general may make application for an order or an extension of an order pursuant to the provisions of § 12-5.2-3 authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device under this chapter, in writing under oath or equivalent affirmation, to the presiding justice of the superior court or his or her designee in order to obtain information regarding a designated offense.
    2. Any law enforcement officer set forth in § 12-5-3 may make application for an order or an extension of an order under § 12-5.2-3 authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device under this chapter, in writing under oath or equivalent affirmation to the presiding justice of the superior court or his or her designee.
  1. An application pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall include:
    1. The identity of the attorney general, assistant attorney general, or the law enforcement officer making the application and the identity of the law enforcement agency conducting the investigation; and
    2. A certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained is relevant and necessary to an ongoing criminal investigation, that other investigative procedures have been or are being initiated or conducted, and that the request for the issuance of the pen register and/or trap and trace device is necessary to further an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that agency.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 283, § 1.

12-5.2-3. Issuance of an order for a pen register or a trap and trace device.

    1. Upon an application made pursuant to § 12-5.2-2 , the court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device if the court is reasonably satisfied that the information likely to be obtained by the installation and use is relevant and necessary to further an ongoing criminal investigation and that use of a pen register or trap and trace device is the least intrusive way to obtain the information sought.
    2. An order issued under this section shall specify:
      1. The identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached;
      2. The identity of the person who is the subject of the criminal investigation;
      3. The number and physical location of the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached and, in the case if a trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the trap and trace order;
      4. A statement of the offense to which the information likely to be obtained by the pen register or trap and trace device is relevant; and
      5. Shall direct, upon the request of the applicant, the furnishing of information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of the pen register or trap and trace device under § 12-5.2-4 .
  1. An order issued pursuant to this section shall authorize the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device for a period not to exceed sixty (60) days.
  2. Extensions of the order may be granted only upon an application for an order pursuant to § 12-5.2-2 , and upon the judicial finding required by subdivision (a)(1) of this section. The period of extension shall be a period not to exceed sixty (60) days.
  3. An order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device shall direct that:
    1. The order is sealed until otherwise ordered by the court; and
    2. The person owning or leasing the line to which the pen register or a trap and trace device is attached, or who has been ordered by the court to provide assistance to the applicant, not disclose the existence of the pen register or trap and trace device or the existence of the investigation to the listed subscriber, or to any other person, unless or until otherwise ordered by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 283, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the paragraphs in subdivision (a)(1).

12-5.2-4. Assistance in installation and use of pen register or a trap and trace device.

  1. Upon the request of the attorney general, assistant attorney general, or law enforcement officer authorized to install and use a pen register under this chapter, a provider of wire communication service shall immediately furnish the attorney general, assistant attorney general, or law enforcement officer all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of the pen register unobtrusively, and with a minimum of interference with the services that the person so ordered by the court accords the party with respect to whom the installation and use is to take place, if the assistance is directed by a court order as provided in § 12-5.2-3 .
  2. Upon the request of the attorney general, assistant attorney general, or an officer of a law enforcement agency authorized to receive the results of a trap and trace device under this chapter, a provider of a wire communication service shall immediately install the device on the appropriate line and shall furnish the investigative or law enforcement officer all additional information, facilities, and technical assistance including installation and operation of the device unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services that the person so ordered by the court accords the party with respect to whom the installation and use is to take place, if the installation and assistance is directed by a court order as provided in § 12-5.2-3 . Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the results of the trap and trace device shall be furnished to the attorney general, assistant attorney general, or officer of a law enforcement agency, designated by the court, at reasonable intervals during regular business hours for the duration of the order.
  3. A provider of a wire communication service who furnishes facilities or technical assistance pursuant to this section shall be reasonably compensated for reasonable expenses incurred in providing these facilities and assistance.
  4. No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of a wire communication service, its officers, employees, or agents, or other specified persons for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order under this chapter.
  5. Good faith reliance on a court order, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization shall be an absolute defense against any civil or criminal action brought pursuant to this chapter or any other law.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 283, § 1.

12-5.2-5. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, its invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 283, § 1.

Chapter 6 Warrants for Arrest

12-6-1. Examination on complaint of commission of offense.

Whenever any complaint shall be made to any judge of the district court, or to any justice of the peace authorized to issue warrants within a division of the district court, of the commission of any offense within the division, he or she shall examine the complainant under oath or affirmation and require the complainant’s statements to be reduced to writing and be subscribed and sworn to by the person or persons making them.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 158; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 12-6-1 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 17; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 15.

Cross References.

Fugitive from justice, § 12-9-16 .

Recognizance to keep the peace, § 12-4-1 et seq.

Treason and related offenses, endorsement of complaints, § 11-43-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Effect of Errors in Complaint.

Errors in the spelling of the victim’s name in a complaint and warrant for kidnapping and alleging that the offense took place at a town other than that shown by evidence at the trial were not prejudicial where the defendant was subsequently indicted by the grand jury and trial was on such indictment. Burke v. Langlois, 104 R.I. 391 , 244 A.2d 593, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 659 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1110, 89 S. Ct. 923, 21 L. Ed. 2d 807, 1969 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (1969).

Effect of Jurat.

By executing a jurat at the end of a complaint, a magistrate merely attested to the time, place and person before whom the complaint was sworn in accordance with the mandate of this section. State v. Berker, 120 R.I. 849 , 391 A.2d 107, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 733 (1978).

Nature of Duties.

This section does not require the justice or clerk to write the complaint with his own hand. State v. Guinness, 16 R.I. 401 , 16 A. 910, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1889).

The duties of a justice of the peace under this section are ministerial, not judicial or quasi-judicial, and require no finding of probable cause. State v. Winsor, 98 R.I. 447 , 204 A.2d 427, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 192 (1964).

In passing upon the sufficiency of the probable cause shown by a complaint under this section to support the issuance of a warrant thereon, the judge acts judicially and not ministerially and cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue the warrant. Brant v. McSoley, 106 R.I. 385 , 260 A.2d 443, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 935 (1970).

Since this section prescribes no judicial or quasi-judicial duties and requires no finding of probable cause, the duties imposed hereunder are purely ministerial and therefore outside the scope of activity circumscribed in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 (1927), which held that a defendant is unconstitutionally deprived of his right to due process of law when his liberty or property is subject to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him. State v. Berker, 120 R.I. 849 , 391 A.2d 107, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 733 (1978).

Presumption of Regularity.

The trial justice properly denied defendant’s plea in abatement when he failed to sustain the burden of overcoming the presumption that the signed complaint was properly sworn to. State v. Diggins, 92 R.I. 341 , 168 A.2d 469, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1961).

Standing to Challenge Judge’s Qualifications.

Although a complainant could complain that a person had unlawfully impersonated a public officer, plaintiff did not have standing to attack a judge’s qualifications where the judge was acting under color of right in litigation pending in his court. State v. Storms, 112 R.I. 454 , 311 A.2d 567, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1004 (1973).

Warranty Without Surety.

That complainant, a chief of police, neither furnished surety nor swore that he was within the class exempt from furnishing surety on his recognizance and did not request that the warrant issue without surety did not make the complaint fatally defective. State v. Raposa, 108 R.I. 185 , 273 A.2d 673, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1245 (1971).

Collateral References.

Who may take affidavit as basis for warrant of arrest. 16 A.L.R. 923.

12-6-2. Recognizance for cost on complaint within trial jurisdiction of district court.

Whenever any complaint shall allege the commission of any offense within the jurisdiction of the district court to try and determine, the judge or justice of the peace shall require the complainant, unless he or she is exempted by law, to enter into a like recognizance as is required when complaint is made for any threat.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 159; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 12-6-2 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 17.

Cross References.

Recognizance to keep the peace, § 12-4-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Forfeiture of Contraband.

This section does not apply to a proceeding for the forfeiture of contraband liquor. State v. Seymour, 46 R.I. 257 , 126 A. 755, 1924 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1924), overruled, State v. Le Blanc, 100 R.I. 523 , 217 A.2d 471, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 472 (1966).

Validity of Recognizance.

A recognizance to prosecute the complaint “with effect” or in default to pay “all lawful costs” meets the requirements of the statute since the words “with effect” mean to prosecute to final judgment and the reference to costs would include all the costs accruing to either the state or the person accused. State v. Palmer, 15 R.I. 6 , 22 A. 944, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1885).

Lines drawn through the provisions relating to costs in the recognizance form did not invalidate the recognizance nor the responsibility of the complainant to pay the costs if the prosecution was aborted. State v. Vinal, 113 R.I. 426 , 325 A.2d 81, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1194 (1974).

12-6-3. Surety for costs on complaint beyond trial jurisdiction of district court.

The judge or justice of the peace may, in all cases of complaint to any of them of the commission of any crime or offense which the district court has not jurisdiction to try and determine, before issuing any warrant on the complaint, require of the complainant surety for costs, as is required in cases which the court has jurisdiction to try and determine.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 160; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 12-6-3 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 17.

12-6-4. Issuance of warrant.

Upon the giving of a recognizance with surety, in the case where surety is required, and upon the giving of a recognizance without surety, where no surety is required, and upon the making of a complaint only where no recognizance is required, the judge or justice of the peace, if in his or her opinion there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that defendant has committed it, shall immediately issue his or her warrant.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 161; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 12-6-4 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 15.

Rules of Court.

Warrant or summons upon complaint, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 4; Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 4.

Cross References.

Delinquent, wayward, or neglected child, apprehension of parent, § 15-9-1 .

Extradition warrant signed by governor, § 12-9-9 et seq.

Juvenile court warrants for offenses against children, § 14-1-15 .

Parole violator, warrant for arrest, § 13-8-19 .

State park offenses, § 32-1-6 .

Warrant on complaint for threats, § 12-4-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Form of Warrant.

A warrant is valid though it does not contain the defendant’s name if it is preceded on the same paper by the complaint which states the defendant’s name and residence and if the warrant incorporates the complaint by reference. State v. Goyette, 11 R.I. 592 , 1877 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1877).

A warrant should be under the seal of the justice or clerk who issues it and not under the seal of the court to which it is returnable. State v. Goyette, 11 R.I. 592 , 1877 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1877).

A warrant returnable “before me” or “some other lawful authority,” while formally irregular, was not fatally defective. State v. Sherman, 16 R.I. 631 , 18 A. 1040, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1889).

Impartiality of Magistrate.

Where defendant pleaded not guilty and was released on his own recognizance, he could not later attack a warrant issued by a justice of the peace on complaint of the chief of police on the ground that the justice was also counsel for the chief of police and therefore not an impartial magistrate, since he was no longer held on the warrant. State v. Winsor, 98 R.I. 447 , 204 A.2d 427, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 192 (1964).

Issuance by Clerk.

The practice of allowing Superior Court clerks to issue administrative arrest warrants violates both statutory law and the Superior Court Rules of Procedure. Therefore, warrants so issued are invalid. State v. Santos, 498 A.2d 1024, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 586 (R.I. 1985).

Nature of Duties of Justice or Clerk.

In passing upon the sufficiency of the probable cause which would support the issuance of a warrant upon a private complaint under this section, a judge acts judicially rather than ministerially and cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue the warrant. Brant v. McSoley, 106 R.I. 385 , 260 A.2d 443, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 935 (1970).

Collateral References.

Authentication of warrant, formality in. 30 A.L.R. 700.

Jurat to, officer’s failure to sign. 1 A.L.R. 1574; 116 A.L.R. 589.

Private citizen’s right to institute mandamus to compel a magistrate or other appropriate official to issue a warrant, or the like, for an arrest, 49 A.L.R.2d 1285.

12-6-5. Recognizance not required on official complaints.

Whenever any agent of the children’s friend and service shall make complaint against any person for any of the offenses mentioned in §§ 11-9-1 11-9-8 ; or whenever any agent of the Rhode Island society for the prevention of cruelty to animals shall make any complaint against any person for any of the offenses mentioned in chapter 1 of title 4; or whenever the director of public welfare of any city or town shall make complaint against any person for the violation of any of the provisions contained in chapter 8 of title 15; or whenever the director or an agent of the department of labor and training, specifically designated for the purpose, shall make a complaint against any person for any of the offenses mentioned in chapters 3, 12, 14 and chapters 29 — 38 of title 28; or whenever the director or an agent of the department of human services, duly appointed for that purpose, or the director of any state institution appointed by the director of human services, or the superintendent of the Rhode Island training school for youth, or the warden of the adult correctional institutions shall make complaint against any person under any law governing the state department of human services, that director, agent, or officer shall not be required to enter into recognizance for costs.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 162; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 15; P.L. 1930, ch. 1569, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 15; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 80; impl. am. P.L. 1946, ch. 1774, §§ 1, 2; impl. am. P.L. 1950, ch. 2416, § 3; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-6-5 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 373, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 101, § 6; P.L. 1994, ch. 401, § 7.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “department of labor and training” for “department of labor” and substituted “department of human services” for “department of social and rehabilitative services”.

12-6-6. Surety for costs not required of police officers.

  1. Whenever any complaint shall be made by the sheriff or any deputy sheriff of any county, or by any member of the division of state police, any member of the campus police forces at the state colleges or universities, or any conservation officer of the department of environmental management, or by the chief of police, deputy chief of police, commander, captain, police inspector, or other member of the police force, or town sergeant of any city or town, within any division of the district court, to the judge of the district court or to any justice of the peace authorized to issue warrants in the division, against any person for any criminal offense committed within the division, the sheriff, deputy sheriff, member of the division of state police, member of the campus police forces at the state colleges or universities, conservation officer of the department of environmental management, chief of police, deputy chief of police, commander, captain, police inspector or other member of the police force, or city or town sergeant shall not be required to give surety for costs, but shall give his or her personal recognizance and be liable in his or her individual capacity for the costs.
  2. In addition to the officials specified in subsection (a) of this section, the following persons shall be subject to its provisions:
    1. Police sergeants, lieutenants, and detectives in the town of Bristol;
    2. All members of the town of Barrington police force above the rank of patrol officer;
    3. A police sergeant or his or her superior in the town of Johnston;
    4. Police lieutenants and sergeants in the city of Cranston;
    5. Any police lieutenant or police sergeant in the town of Coventry;
    6. Any police lieutenant in the town of North Kingstown;
    7. All members of the town of Lincoln police force above the rank of patrol officer;
    8. Police lieutenants, detective sergeants, and sergeants in the town of Westerly;
    9. All members of the town of Portsmouth police force above the rank of patrol officer;
    10. All members of the town of Burrillville police force above the rank of patrol officer;
    11. All members of the town of Glocester police force above the rank of patrol officer;
    12. All members of the town of Scituate police force above the rank of patrol officer;
    13. All members of the town of Middletown police force above the rank of patrol officer;
    14. All lieutenants and detective sergeants of the town of South Kingstown police force;
    15. Police sergeants in the town of Warren;
    16. Police sergeants and lieutenants in the city of Woonsocket;
    17. A police sergeant or his or her superior in the town of Foster;
    18. All members of the town of Hopkinton police force above the rank of patrol officer;
    19. All members of the campus police force at the University of Rhode Island, Rhode Island College, or the Community College of Rhode Island, above the rank of campus police officer;
    20. A police sergeant, the town sergeant or any officer of higher rank in the town of New Shoreham;
    21. All members of the town of Cumberland police force above the rank of patrol officer;
    22. Any police sergeant or his or her superior in the town of Charlestown;
    23. A police sergeant or his or her superior in the town of North Smithfield;
    24. All members of the town of East Greenwich police force above the rank of patrol officer;
    25. All members of the Richmond police department, designated by the chief of police;
    26. All lieutenants of the city of East Providence police department;
    27. All investigators of the department of attorney general appointed pursuant to § 42-9-8.1 ;
    28. All members of the town of West Greenwich police force above the rank of corporal;
    29. All inspectors and agents of the Rhode Island state fugitive task force appointed pursuant to § 12-6-7.2 ; and
    30. All members of the Rhode Island airport police department at or above the rank of inspector.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 163; P.L. 1906, ch. 1336, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 16; P.L. 1925, ch. 588, § 14; P.L. 1932, ch. 1901, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 12-6-6 ; P.L. 1967, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 17; P.L. 1976, ch. 83, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 322, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 140, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 167, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 284, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 404, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 34, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 16, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 16, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 75, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 283, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 462, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 501, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 52, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 83, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 84, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 364, § 3; P.L. 1991, ch. 376, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 286, § 3; P.L. 1993, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 423, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 74, § 2.

Repealed Sections.

The version of this section, as amended by P.L. 1991, ch. 364, § 3, was repealed by P.L. 1993, ch. 423, § 5, effective July 21, 1993.

Cross References.

Sheriffs, duties, § 42-29-1 .

State police, surety for costs not required § 42-28-24 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Form of Complaint and Warrant.

Complaint and warrant which referred to the arresting traffic officer as “of the RI State Police” instead of as a “member of the division of state police” was not defective where correct designation appeared on cover of the complaint, so as to prevent the state from obtaining its exemption from providing surety. State v. Perry, 112 R.I. 719 , 315 A.2d 60, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1495 (1974).

Interim Officials.

An interim chief of police is the same as a permanent chief of police and is exempted by this section from furnishing surety for costs. State v. Berberian, 416 A.2d 127, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1657 (R.I. 1980).

Recognizance Required.

A deputy chief of police cannot bring complaints without recognizing. State v. Collins, 12 R.I. 478 , 1879 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1879).

12-6-6.1 — 12-6-6.14. [Superseded.]

Superseded Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1966, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 81, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 265, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 266, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 49, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 211, § 2; P.L. 1975, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 88, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 94, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 82, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 37, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 322, § 1; G.L. §§ 12-6-6.1 12-6-6.1 4), exempting law enforcement officers in various municipalities from posting surety for costs, were superseded by the 1981 reenactment, which reworded § 12-6-6 in such a way as to incorporate the substance of the superseded sections.

12-6-7. Warrants issued to other divisions.

Whenever any judge of the district court, or any justice of the peace, shall issue his or her warrant against any person charged with an offense committed in a division of the district court, and the person so charged shall escape into, reside, or be in any other county than the one in which the division is, the judge or justice of the peace may direct his or her warrant to each and all deputy sheriffs, city or town sergeants, and town constables within the state, requiring them to apprehend the person and bring him or her before the division of the district court having jurisdiction of the offense, to be dealt with according to law; the officers shall obey and execute the warrant, and be protected from obstruction and assault in executing the warrant as in service of other process.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 174; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 27; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 27; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 12-6-7 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 17; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 43; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 21; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 21.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 21, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 21 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

12-6-7.1. Service of arrest warrants.

  1. Whenever any judge of any court shall issue his or her warrant against any person for failure to appear or comply with a court order, or for failure to make payment of a court ordered fine, civil assessment, or order of restitution, the judge may direct the warrant to each and all deputy sheriffs, the warrant squad, or any peace officer as defined in § 12-7-21 , requiring them to apprehend the person and bring him or her before the court to be dealt with according to law; and the officers shall obey and execute the warrant, and be protected from obstruction and assault in executing the warrant as in service of other process. The person apprehended shall, in addition to any other costs incurred by him or her, be ordered to pay a fee for service of this warrant in the sum of one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125). Twenty-five dollars ($25.00) of the above fee collected as a result of a warrant squad arrest shall be divided among the local law enforcement agencies assigned to the warrant squad. Any person apprehended on a warrant for failure to appear for a cost review hearing in the superior court may be released upon posting with a justice of the peace the full amount due and owing in court costs as described in the warrant or bail in an other amount or form that will ensure the defendant’s appearance in the superior court at an ability to pay hearing, in addition to the one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) warrant assessment fee described above. Any person detained as a result of the actions of the justice of the peace in acting upon the superior court cost warrant shall be brought before the superior court at its next session. Such monies shall be delivered by the justice of the peace to the court issuing the warrant on the next court business day.
  2. Any person arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a municipal court may be presented to a judge of the district court, or a justice of the peace authorized to issue warrants pursuant to § 12-10-2 , for release on personal recognizance or bail when the municipal court is not in session. The provisions of this section shall apply only to criminal and not civil cases pending before the courts.
  3. Any person arrested pursuant to a warrant issued hereunder shall:
    1. be immediately brought before the court;
    2. if the court is not in session then the person shall be brought before the court at its next session;
    3. be afforded a review hearing on his/her ability to pay within forty-eight (48) hours; and
    4. if the court is not in session at the time of the arrest, a review hearing on his/her ability to pay will be provided at the time for the first court appearance, as set forth in subsection (c)(3) of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 404, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 195, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 322, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 33, § 1; 1996, ch. 413, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 122, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 297, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 326, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 43.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 297, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 326, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

12-6-7.2. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 195 § 3; P.L. 1993, ch. 423, § 3; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 40; P.L. 1996, ch. 413, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 595, art. 32, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 117, art. 29, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 7, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 12-6-7.2 concerned the warrant squad. Former § 12-6-7.2 (P.L. 1988, ch. 387, § 1), concerning the same subject matter, was repealed by P.L. 1989, ch. 195, § 2, effective July 3, 1989.

12-6-8. Taxing and execution for costs on discharge of respondent.

Whenever any complaint shall be tried before a district court in which the complainant is required to recognize with surety, and the respondent is discharged, the district court shall immediately tax all the costs for which the complainant is liable; and if the costs are not paid within ten (10) days, execution for the costs shall issue against the complainant and his or her surety returnable in twenty (20) days from the date of execution.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 164; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 12-6-8 .

Chapter 7 Arrest

12-7-1. Temporary detention of suspects.

A peace officer may detain any person abroad whom he or she has reason to suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of the person his or her name, address, business abroad, and destination; and any person who fails to identify himself or herself and explain his or her actions to the satisfaction of the peace officer may be further detained and further questioned and investigated by any peace officer; provided, in no case shall the total period of the detention exceed two (2) hours, and the detention shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At the end of the detention period the person so detained shall be released unless arrested and charged with a crime.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-1 .

Cross References.

Detention of shoplifting suspects, § 11-41-21 .

Fingerprinting, § 12-1-9.1 .

Railroad, steamboat, and bridge police, authority, § 12-2-3 et seq.

State police powers, § 42-28-19 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Confession Obtained While Failing to Comply.

Motion to suppress admission of guilt to arresting officer because of violation of this section was properly overruled because defendant had opportunity to object to admission of confession at trial. State v. Olivieri, 86 R.I. 211 , 133 A.2d 767, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1957).

Distinction Between Detention and Arrest.

The legislature in the exercise of its broad police power can provide for a distinction between “detention” and “arrest” and a period of detention reasonably limited, unaccompanied by unreasonable or unnecessary restraint and based upon circumstances reasonably suggestive of criminal involvement is lawfully distinguished from an arrest, creating no deprivation of liberty, due process, right to bail, speedy trial, representation by counsel or habeas corpus. Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 93 R.I. 252 , 174 A.2d 560, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1961).

Where plaintiff was apprehended and taken to a police station, the mere act of asking plaintiff to produce his operator’s license did not convert the arrest into a detention under the provisions of this section. Barth v. Flad, 99 R.I. 446 , 208 A.2d 533, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 461 (1965).

The taking of defendant to the police station upon his failure to produce a driver’s license when requested by the police officer was not a detention under this section but an arrest. State v. Giragosian, 107 R.I. 657 , 270 A.2d 921, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 821 (1970).

Harassment.

A pattern of police conduct calculated to harass and intimidate and carried out in bad faith in an attempt to circumvent the criminal process by misuse of the temporary detention law caused irreparable injury and injunctive relief was appropriate. Dempsey v. McQueeney, 387 F. Supp. 333, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14533 (D.R.I. 1975).

Investigatory Seizures.

Investigatory seizures, such as the taking of a person to police headquarters, have been held to be arrests for constitutional purposes and consequently require for their legality the existence of probable cause. State v. Frazier, 421 A.2d 546, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1857 (R.I. 1980).

Liability of Officer.

This statute definitely prescribes a limitation of two hours within which the arresting authority must either decide to release the person detained or continue him in detention with the ultimate obligation of formally charging him with an offense and bringing him before a court for arraignment. When the arresting officer fails to follow that course and holds a person beyond the prescribed period of two hours, such detention becomes unlawful ab initio and subjects the arresting officer to liability for false imprisonment. State v. Kilday, 90 R.I. 91 , 155 A.2d 336, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 123 (1959).

Where the record shows no offense and the police officer in his testimony does not claim he had any reason to suspect that the plaintiff had committed or was about to commit an offense, and that he ordered plaintiff taken to the station to ascertain whether he, the officer, had authority to order the plaintiff to get off a certain bridge by returning the way he had come upon it, this section gives him no justification for an arrest or detention. Berberian v. Smith, 99 R.I. 198 , 206 A.2d 531, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 417 (1965).

In a suit against police officers for false arrest where defendants pled in justification a common-law arrest predicated upon probable cause therefor, thereby putting in issue the validity of an arrest at common law, the question of the legality of detention under this section is not in issue. Cioci v. Santos, 99 R.I. 308 , 207 A.2d 300, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 435 (1965).

Where plaintiff sues for false arrest the defendant officer’s special plea in justification that he did detain plaintiff in accordance with this section is on its face only a conclusion of law; fails to meet and justify the cause of action stated in the declaration and is therefore demurrable. Ahern v. Lynch, 99 R.I. 316 , 207 A.2d 296, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 436 (1965).

One who, for the purpose of bringing an action for false arrest, engaged in suspicious conduct, had a confederate direct attention of police to him, carried no identification on him, and refused to answer questions by police and who was taken to police headquarters without force, identified, and released without being booked had no cause of action for false arrest. Clark v. Bird, 354 F.2d 977, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 7514 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906, 86 S. Ct. 1341, 16 L. Ed. 2d 359, 1966 U.S. LEXIS 1850 (1966).

A peace officer is not liable on a false arrest charge for plaintiff’s temporary detention pursuant to statute, since a peace officer is entitled to rely upon its presumptive validity. Descoteaux v. Bonaventura, 115 R.I. 555 , 350 A.2d 396, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1559 (1976); Johnson v. Palange, 397 A.2d 528, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2357 (R.I. 1979).

Reasonable Suspicion.

While a reasonable suspicion might justify a brief investigatory stop of an individual to determine his identity or momentarily to maintain the status quo, probable cause remains a prerequisite to an arrest. State v. Frazier, 421 A.2d 546, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1857 (R.I. 1980).

Time for Bringing Charge.

The intent of this statute is to prohibit detention for an unreasonable period without formally charging the person so detained with an offense, but not to prescribe a limit of two hours within which the charge must be brought. State v. Kilday, 90 R.I. 91 , 155 A.2d 336, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 123 (1959).

Where defendant was formally charged and duly arraigned before the district court the next day, defendant’s plea in abatement was of no avail to him. State v. Kilday, 90 R.I. 91 , 155 A.2d 336, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 123 (1959).

12-7-2. Search of detained person for weapons.

A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person he or she is questioning or about to question concerning any crime or suspected crime, whenever the officer reasonably believes that he or she is in danger from the person carrying a weapon, and if the person is carrying a dangerous weapon, an officer may take and keep it until the completion of questioning, when he or she shall either return it or arrest the person.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-2 .

12-7-3. Arrest without warrant for misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor.

A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person is committing or has committed a misdemeanor or a petty misdemeanor, and the officer has reasonable ground to believe that person cannot be arrested later or may cause injury to himself or herself or others or loss or damage to property unless immediately arrested.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 75; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 75; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-3 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 71, § 1.

Cross References.

Animal or bird fights, arrest of persons attending, § 4-1-12 .

Common nuisance, persons failing to obey order to depart, § 11-30-8 .

Cruelty to animals, arrest for, § 4-1-18 .

Delinquent or wayward child, arrest without warrant, § 14-1-25 .

Felony and misdemeanor distinguished, § 11-1-2 .

Fighting by appointment, arrest, § 11-12-9 .

Fish and game laws, arrest in enforcement, § 20-1-12 .

Forest fires, arrest of persons setting or maintaining, § 2-11-10 .

Growing fruits and vegetables, persons taking, § 11-44-3 .

Immunity of United States senators and representatives from arrest, U.S. Const., art. 1, § 6.

Interrupting or disturbing school or meeting, arrest without warrant, § 45-16-9 .

Militia, persons interfering with, § 30-12-5 .

Motor vehicles, violation of laws relating to, § 31-27-12 .

Peddling without license, arrest for, § 5-11-12 .

Poultry house, arrest of person in, § 11-8-6 .

Railroad property, trespasser on, §§ 11-36-6 , 11-36-11 .

Riotous assembly, persons refusing to disperse, § 11-38-2.

Weights and measures violations, arrest without warrant, § 47-3-4 .

Wharves, landings, and railroad stations, vagrants and disorderly persons, arrest without warrant, § 45-16-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The term “probable cause” as it is used in U.S. Const., amend. 4 and the term “reasonable ground” as it is found in this section are practically synonymous. State v. Roach, 106 R.I. 280 , 259 A.2d 119, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 624 (1969).

It is a basic proposition that the legality of the arrest is to be determined by the existence of probable cause at the time of the arrest, not by what the subsequent search may disclose. State v. Roach, 106 R.I. 280 , 259 A.2d 119, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 624 (1969).

Probable cause may be present in cases where any information upon which an arrest is made comes from an unidentified informer provided there is a showing of the underlying circumstances of both the informer’s conclusion of guilt and the officer’s conclusion that his informant is reliable; such principle is to be tested in a common sense and realistic fashion. State v. Roach, 106 R.I. 280 , 259 A.2d 119, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 624 (1969).

A peace officer who, in the performance of his duty, makes an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor that was not committed in his presence, has reasonable grounds to make such an arrest if it was made while assisting a fellow officer in whose presence the misdemeanor in question was committed. State v. Costa, 111 R.I. 602 , 306 A.2d 36, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1253 (1973).

Probable cause to arrest depends upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made the facts and circumstances within the arresting officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense. State v. Belcourt, 425 A.2d 1224, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1041 (R.I.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 842, 102 S. Ct. 154, 70 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3400 (1981).

The probable cause inquiry may focus on the collective knowledge of the police department and is not limited to what the arresting officer knew. State v. Belcourt, 425 A.2d 1224, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1041 (R.I.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 842, 102 S. Ct. 154, 70 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3400 (1981).

Whether information an arresting officer receives through police channels can serve as the basis for a warrantless arrest depends in part on whether the information is reasonably trustworthy. State v. Belcourt, 425 A.2d 1224, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1041 (R.I.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 842, 102 S. Ct. 154, 70 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3400 (1981).

— Reasonable Grounds Not Present.

Facts of the case did not establish reasonable grounds or probable cause for the arrest. State v. Mercurio, 96 R.I. 464 , 194 A.2d 574, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 109 (1963); State v. McWeeney, 100 R.I. 394 , 216 A.2d 357, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 448 (1966); State v. Almeida, 105 R.I. 687 , 255 A.2d 151, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 805 (1969); State v. Roach, 106 R.I. 280 , 259 A.2d 119, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 624 (1969); State v. Haigh, 112 R.I. 740 , 315 A.2d 431, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1499 (1974); Berberian v. Mitchell, 113 R.I. 438 , 321 A.2d 431, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1197 (1974); Berberian v. Mitchell, 113 R.I. 951 , 326 A.2d 22, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1429 (1974); Berberian v. Mitchell, 115 R.I. 149 , 341 A.2d 56, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1134 (1975).

— Reasonable Grounds Present.

Facts of the case established reasonable grounds or probable cause for the arrest. State v. Cambio, 71 R.I. 228 , 43 A.2d 307, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1945).

Act Not Misdemeanor.

Arrest made by police officer of person who was making faces and sticking his tongue out at him from a poolroom, was without justification, since such person’s behavior, though derogatory, insulting and provocative, had not been declared to be a misdemeanor by the legislature. Tessier v. La Nois, 97 R.I. 414 , 198 A.2d 142, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 97 (1964).

Presence Requirement.

Since an “in the presence of an officer” requirement has not been held constitutionally indispensable to a valid arrest, former subdivision (c) of this section which authorized warrantless arrests in cases of flight or nonresidency but did not include a presence requirement was held constitutionally sound. State v. Berker, 120 R.I. 849 , 391 A.2d 107, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 733 (1978).

Reasonable Grounds or Probable Cause.
— Constitutionality.

The “reasonable grounds” standard of the predecessor statute met the requirements of probable cause and thus was not unconstitutional. State v. Haigh, 112 R.I. 740 , 315 A.2d 431, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1499 (1974).

Search of Person.

One legally placed under arrest may be searched for evidence with which the crime has been committed and such as is found upon him may be legally taken from him. State v. Chester, 46 R.I. 485 , 129 A. 596, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1925).

Driver of a car involved in a collision could be searched following his arrest for driving without a license. State v. Giragosian, 107 R.I. 657 , 270 A.2d 921, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 821 (1970).

Subsequent Release — Effect on Validity of Arrest.

Where officer had reasonable ground to believe plaintiff had committed a misdemeanor in his presence and, therefore, justified the arrest as being based on probable cause, the fact that plaintiff was subsequently released without being charged does not have the effect of rendering unlawful an arrest that at the time it was effected was lawful as being based on probable cause. Peltier v. Roy, 453 F. Supp. 1373, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16307 (D.R.I. 1978); Barth v. Flad, 99 R.I. 446 , 208 A.2d 533, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 461 (1965).

Collateral References.

Automobiles, arrest without warrant for driving while intoxicated. 42 A.L.R. 1512; 49 A.L.R. 1392; 68 A.L.R. 1356.

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance authorizing arrest without warrant. 1 A.L.R. 585.

Delay in making arrest without a warrant for misdemeanor or breach of peace. 58 A.L.R.2d 1056.

Power to enter private house or inclosure to make arrest, without a warrant, for a suspected misdemeanor. 76 A.L.R.2d 1432.

12-7-4. Arrest without warrant for felony.

A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a felony, whenever:

  1. The officer has reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been or is being committed and that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it.
  2. The person to be arrested in fact has committed or is committing a felony; and in that case it shall be immaterial that the officer did not believe him or her guilty or on unreasonable ground entertained belief in his or her guilt.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 75; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 75; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-4 .

Cross References.

Felony and misdemeanor distinguished, § 11-1-2 .

Treason, persons charged with, § 11-43-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

False Arrest.

Where plaintiff was arrested for the sale and possession of obscene literature and was discharged when trial court held statute under which plaintiff was charged unconstitutional, he had no action for false arrest against the officer making the arrest where the officer acted in good faith. Yekhtikian v. Blessing, 90 R.I. 287 , 157 A.2d 669, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1960).

Reasonable Grounds or Probable Cause.

As a matter of federal law, arrest warrants are not essential to legitimize arrests based upon probable cause. United States v. D'Alo, 486 F. Supp. 945, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10552 (D.R.I. 1979).

For the purposes of this section the terms “reasonable ground” and “probable cause” have substantially the same meaning. Palmigiano v. Mullen, 119 R.I. 363 , 377 A.2d 242, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1909 (1977); United States v. D'Alo, 486 F. Supp. 945, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10552 (D.R.I. 1979).

In a warrantless arrest case, the probability of criminal activity, and not a prima facie showing, is the standard of probable cause. Palmigiano v. Mullen, 119 R.I. 363 , 377 A.2d 242, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1909 (1977).

Probable cause to arrest depends upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made the facts and circumstances within the arresting officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense. State v. Belcourt, 425 A.2d 1224, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1041 (R.I.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 842, 102 S. Ct. 154, 70 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3400 (1981).

The probable-cause inquiry may focus on the collective knowledge of the police department and is not limited to what the arresting officer knew. State v. Belcourt, 425 A.2d 1224, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1041 (R.I.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 842, 102 S. Ct. 154, 70 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3400 (1981).

Whether information an arresting officer receives through police channels can serve as the basis for a warrantless arrest depends in part on whether the information is reasonably trustworthy. State v. Belcourt, 425 A.2d 1224, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1041 (R.I.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 842, 102 S. Ct. 154, 70 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3400 (1981).

— Reasonable Grounds Not Present.

Facts of the case did not establish reasonable grounds or probable cause for the arrest. State v. Dufour, 99 R.I. 120 , 206 A.2d 82, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 405 (1965).

— Reasonable Grounds Present.

Facts of the case established reasonable grounds or probable cause for the arrest. United States v. D'Alo, 486 F. Supp. 945, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10552 (D.R.I. 1979); State v. McParlin, 101 R.I. 265 , 221 A.2d 790, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 381 (1966); State v. Theroux, 111 R.I. 617 , 306 A.2d 44, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1255 (1973); Palmigiano v. Mullen, 119 R.I. 363 , 377 A.2d 242, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1909 (1977); State v. Johnson, 119 R.I. 749 , 383 A.2d 1012, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 618 (1978); State v. DeWolfe, 121 R.I. 676 , 402 A.2d 740, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2047 (1979).

Where detectives collected information from three independent sources before apprehending the defendant, four informants in total, all of whom implicated the defendant in the crime charged, they had probable cause to believe that the defendant murdered the victim. State v. Kryla, 742 A.2d 1178, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 224 (R.I. 1999).

Based on experience in narcotics, a surveillance detective determined that a suspected drug transaction had taken place between defendant and a buyer. He seized a bag suspected to be cocaine, and then relayed the information via police radio to an arresting detective who was told the location of defendant and a description of his vehicle. When the arresting officer responded to the call within minutes of the suspected drug deal, defendant’s car was still parked in the exact spot the first detective had described. The information the arresting officer received through official channels had the requisite probable cause to arrest defendant, thus, the arrest was lawful; accordingly, defendant’s extemporaneous statements were not fruits of a poisonous tree, and defendant’s motion to suppress his statements was properly denied. State v. Castro, 891 A.2d 848, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 2006).

12-7-5. Arrest on improper ground.

If a lawful cause of arrest exists, the arrest shall be lawful even though the officer made the arrest on an improper ground.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Probable Cause.

Where police officers have probable cause to arrest, they cannot be held liable for false arrest despite any “ulterior motive” for making the arrest since probable cause is dispositive, absent a facially unconstitutional statute. Mann v. Cannon, 731 F.2d 54, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 24048 (1st Cir. 1984).

Where a police officer relied upon a warrant issued by a justice of the peace not authorized to sign a complaint returnable in that district, that officer was free from liability for making a warrantless arrest (based on a voidable warrant) since probable cause existed at the time the arrest was made. Moody v. McElroy, 513 A.2d 5, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 524 (R.I. 1986).

Verdict on Charges.

Guilt or innocence of the underlying charge is not relevant to the determination of whether the arresting officer committed a false imprisonment. Moody v. McElroy, 513 A.2d 5, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 524 (R.I. 1986).

Collateral References.

Unlawful arrest as bar to prosecution under subsequent indictment or information. 56 A.L.R. 260.

12-7-6. Arrest on warrant not in possession of arresting officer.

A peace officer may, without having a warrant in his or her possession, arrest any person for whose arrest a warrant has been issued, but after arrest, the warrant shall be shown to him or her as soon as practicable.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 75; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 75; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-6 .

12-7-7. Methods of arrest.

An arrest is made by the restraint of the person to be arrested or by his or her submission of his or her person to the custody of the person making the arrest.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-7 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Restraint.

Where the record shows that plaintiff locked himself in his car, refused to go with police officers, and was prevented from driving away by the officer backing the police car so as to block plaintiff’s car; there was a restraint of plaintiff constituting an arrest within the meaning of the statute. Berberian v. Smith, 99 R.I. 198 , 206 A.2d 531, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 417 (1965).

Officers did not arrest defendant outside the officers’ jurisdiction because the officers’ interaction with defendant outside their jurisdiction did not constitute an arrest, as, inter alia, defendant’s freedom of movement was restricted only for a couple of minutes while defendant was in the back of a police cruiser, which defendant voluntarily entered and was let out of upon arrival at the scene of an accident in the officers’ jurisdiction. State ex rel. Town of Little Compton v. Simmons, 87 A.3d 412, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 32 (R.I. 2014).

Officers did not arrest defendant outside the officers’ jurisdiction because the officers’ interaction with defendant outside their jurisdiction did not constitute an arrest, as, inter alia, a reasonable person under like circumstances would have felt free to leave when the officers asked defendant to accompany the officers back to the officers’ jurisdiction. State ex rel. Town of Little Compton v. Simmons, 87 A.3d 412, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 32 (R.I. 2014).

Officers did not arrest defendant outside the officers’ jurisdiction because the officers’ interaction with defendant outside their jurisdiction did not constitute an arrest, as, inter alia, officers did not use force when asking defendant to accompany the officers back to the officers’ jurisdiction, as (1) a pat-down for officer safety was not such force, (2) defendant was not handcuffed, (3) no weapons were displayed, and (4) defendant was not surrounded by a large number of uniformed officers. State ex rel. Town of Little Compton v. Simmons, 87 A.3d 412, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 32 (R.I. 2014).

12-7-8. Restraint and force used.

No greater restraint than is necessary shall be used for the detention of any person, and no unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-8 .

Cross References.

Killing while resisting arrest, § 11-23-1 .

Rescue of prisoner, § 11-25-7 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Reasonable Force.

Where individuals were observed late at night throwing rocks on construction site that had been the scene of recent thefts, police officers were justified in arresting one of them who had to be subdued after refusing to disclose his identity and punching an officer in the mouth. State v. Ramsdell, 109 R.I. 320 , 285 A.2d 399, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1061 (1971).

It is a well-accepted principle that in effecting an arrest an officer has the right to use such force as he may reasonably believe necessary in order to discharge properly his duty. State v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1733 (R.I. 1980).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding an arrestee’s right to resist an arrest which was done with excessive force in his trial for resisting arrest because the police officers had used reasonable force in defendant’s arrest. The record revealed that defendant was uncooperative with police orders, had repeatedly attempted to escape, and had ultimately kicked out the police car window. State v. Hurteau, 810 A.2d 222, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 215 (R.I. 2002).

Collateral References.

Burden of proof in civil action for using unreasonable force in making arrest as to reasonableness of force used. 82 A.L.R.4th 598.

Peace officer’s liability for death or personal injuries caused by intentional force in arresting misdemeanant. 83 A.L.R.3d 238.

Private person’s authority, in making arrest for felony, to shoot or kill alleged felon. 32 A.L.R.3d 1078.

Propriety of police action involving application of choke hold, constriction of throat, or the like to prevent accused from swallowing evidence — state cases. 64 A.L.R.5th 741.

12-7-9. Conditions justifying force dangerous to life.

A police officer may use force dangerous to human life to make a lawful arrest for committing or attempting to commit a felony, whenever he or she reasonably believes that force dangerous to human life is necessary to effect the arrest and that the person to be arrested is aware that a peace officer is attempting to arrest him or her.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Liability for Use of Deadly Force.

When the force used by police officers was justified under this section, the officers were not liable for wrongful death under § 10-7-1 . Connors v. McNulty, 697 F.2d 18, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 27703 (1st Cir. 1983).

Collateral References.

Burden of proof in civil action for using unreasonable force in making arrest as to reasonableness of force used. 82 A.L.R.4th 598.

Modern status as to right of peace officer to use deadly force in attempting to arrest fleeing felon. 83 A.L.R.3d 174.

12-7-10. Resisting legal or illegal arrest.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use force or any weapon in resisting a legal or an illegal arrest by a peace officer, if the person has reasonable ground to believe that he or she is being arrested and that the arrest is being made by a peace officer.
  2. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both fine and imprisonment.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-10 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 351, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 114, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The abolition of defendant’s right to resist an unlawful arrest is a proper exercise of police power and cannot be considered as a deprivation of one’s liberty within the constitutional guarantee of due process. State v. Ramsdell, 109 R.I. 320 , 285 A.2d 399, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1061 (1971).

Aiding and Abetting.

One who comes to the aid of an arrestee must do so at his own peril and should be excused only when the individual would himself be justified in defending himself from the use of excessive force by the arresting officer. State v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1733 (R.I. 1980).

Construction With § 11-5-5.

Viewed in the light of § 12-7-10 , it is clear that the police-assault statute, § 11-5-5 , does not abrogate the defendant’s right to defend himself when excessive force is used against him. State v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1733 (R.I. 1980).

Lawful Resistance — Permissible Force.

When there is evidence tending to show the law-enforcement officer’s use of excessive force, the trial justice must instruct the jury that the force used against the law-enforcement officer was justified provided the defendant limited his assault to the use of reasonable force in defending himself from excessive force. State v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1733 (R.I. 1980).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding an arrestee’s right to resist an arrest which was done with excessive force in his trial for resisting arrest because the police officers had used reasonable force in defendant’s arrest. The record revealed that defendant was uncooperative with police orders, had repeatedly attempted to escape, and had ultimately kicked out the police car window. State v. Hurteau, 810 A.2d 222, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 215 (R.I. 2002).

Sufficient evidence existed to support a finding that a reasonable person in defendant’s position should have believed he was being arrested by the police where there were multiple police officers who announced their presence to defendant. State v. Mendoza, 889 A.2d 153, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 202 (R.I. 2005).

Liability of Arresting Officer.

Since the officer provoked the plaintiff ’s disorderly behavior when the officer arrested the plaintiff without probable cause, the officer cannot now be allowed to use the plaintiff’s subsequent conviction on the charge of disorderly conduct to avoid liability for false arrest. Dyson v. City of Pawtucket, 670 A.2d 233, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 16 (R.I.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192, 116 S. Ct. 1682, 134 L. Ed. 2d 784, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3091 (1996).

Probable Cause.

At the point when plaintiff took a full arm swing at an officer when the officer attempted to touch plaintiff there could be no probable cause for resisting arrest because there was no reasonable ground upon which plaintiff could have believed officers were attempting to arrest plaintiff. Petro v. Town of W. Warwick, 889 F. Supp. 2d 292, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127178 (D.R.I. 2012).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of resisting arrest because the lieutenant testified that a scuffle occurred when the officers attempted to handcuff defendant; and that he and the second officer attempted to get defendant on his stomach to complete the arrest, where the defendant actively combatted the officer’s efforts. State v. Edwards, 147 A.3d 982, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 108 (R.I. 2016).

University Police Officer.

In arresting the defendant, a university special officer possessed the same power and authority as a police officer in and upon the lands and buildings of the institution pursuant to this section. Consequently the university officer made a valid arrest. State v. Harris, 609 A.2d 944, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 132 (R.I. 1992).

Collateral References.

Application of “fireman’s rule” to preclude recovery by peace officer for injuries inflicted by defendant in resisting arrest. 25 A.L.R.5th 97.

Burden of proof in civil action for using unreasonable force in making arrest as to reasonableness of force used. 82 A.L.R.4th 598.

Modern status of rules as to right to forcefully resist illegal arrest, 44 A.L.R.3d 1078.

Right to resist excessive force used in accomplishing lawful arrest, 77 A.L.R.3d 281.

What constitutes obstructing or resisting officer, in absence of actual force. 66 A.L.R.5th 397.

12-7-11. Summons.

  1. In any case in which a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed or is committing a misdemeanor, he or she may issue a summons to the person substantially in the following form:

    Click to view

  2. Willful failure to appear in answer to this summons may be punished by a fine of not over fifty dollars ($50.00) or imprisonment for not over fifteen (15) days.

(Summons) STATE OF RHODE ISLAND To You are hereby summoned to appear before a judge of the District Court for the Division, located at in the (City)(Town) of , in the State of Rhode Island, on the day of , 20 at o'clock m., to answer to a complaint charging you with the crime of in violation of [statute, ordinance, etc.] If you fail to appear and answer, a warrant will issue for your arrest. Dated at the day of 20 Title Department

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-11 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 16; P.L. 1977, ch. 66, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 12, effective June 23, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 12, effective June 23, 2021.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 12, and P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 12 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Rules of Court.

Warrant or summons upon a complaint, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 4; Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 4.

Cross References.

Motor vehicles, summonses for violations, §§ 31-27-12 , 31-27-12 .1.

Service of process on lands ceded to United States, § 42-1-2 .

Special deputy sheriffs to execute process, § 42-29-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

No due process rights under state or federal constitutions were contravened by this statute which authorized police officers to discretionally give misdemeanants a summons rather than subject them to full custody arrest for a traffic violation. State v. Perry, 112 R.I. 719 , 315 A.2d 60, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1495 (1974).

Issuance Not Mandatory.

The word “may” as used in this section is directory and not mandatory. State v. Kilday, 90 R.I. 91 , 155 A.2d 336, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 123 (1959).

12-7-12. Release of arrested person by officer.

  1. The officer in charge of any police station shall consider the release of any person in his or her station who has been arrested without a warrant:
    1. Without requiring the person to appear in court, when the officer is satisfied that there is no ground for making criminal complaint against the person or when the person has been arrested for drunkenness but in the judgment of the officer need not be brought before a magistrate; or
    2. If the arrest is for a misdemeanor, upon that person signing an agreement to appear in court at a designated time.
  2. Any officer with custody of a person who has been arrested or detained without a warrant may recognize that the person suffers from a serious mental illness and may release and refer the person to the nearest appropriate inpatient mental health facility or outpatient treatment program.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 75; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 75; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-12 ; P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Release Not Mandatory.

The word “may” as used in this section is directory and not mandatory. State v. Kilday, 90 R.I. 91 , 155 A.2d 336, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 123 (1959).

12-7-13. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 75; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 75; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-13 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 24), maximum period of detention, was repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 17. For preliminary proceedings in district courts, see § 12-10-1 et seq. For bail and recognizance, see § 12-13-1 et seq.

12-7-14. Punitive damages for false arrest or imprisonment.

In an action for false arrest or false imprisonment, the plaintiff, if successful, may be awarded punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-14 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

This section applies to civil cases involving the torts of false imprisonment and false arrest. Soares v. Ann & Hope of R.I., Inc., 637 A.2d 339, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 38 (R.I. 1994), overruled in part, Berman v. Sitrin, 101 A.3d 1251, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 137 (R.I. 2014).

Defenses.

Since the officer provoked the plaintiff ’s disorderly behavior when the officer arrested the plaintiff without probable cause, the officer cannot now be allowed to use the plaintiff ’s subsequent conviction on the charge of disorderly conduct to avoid liability for false arrest. Dyson v. City of Pawtucket, 670 A.2d 233, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 16 (R.I.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192, 116 S. Ct. 1682, 134 L. Ed. 2d 784, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3091 (1996).

Jury Questions.

If a trial justice finds sufficient evidence to allow an underlying claim of false imprisonment or false arrest to be submitted to the jury, then if punitive damages are sought, the punitive-damages issue must go to the jury as well. Soares v. Ann & Hope of R.I., Inc., 637 A.2d 339, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 38 (R.I. 1994), overruled in part, Berman v. Sitrin, 101 A.3d 1251, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 137 (R.I. 2014).

Collateral References.

Arrest under warrant, excessiveness of verdict in action for false imprisonment based on mistake as to identity of person arrested. 10 A.L.R.2d 756.

Construction and application of Federal Tort Claims Act provision (28 USCA § 2680(h)) excepting from coverage claims arising out of false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, or abuse of process. 152 A.L.R. Fed. 605.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of compensatory damages for false imprisonment or arrest. 48 A.L.R.4th 165.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of punitive damages awarded in personal injury or death cases. 12 A.L.R.5th 195.

Free exercise of religion clause of First Amendment as defense to tort liability. 93 A.L.R. Fed. 754.

Officer’s liability for exemplary or punitive damages in action for false imprisonment. 48 A.L.R. 1386; 74 A.L.R. 1301.

Property left unprotected when owner was wrongfully arrested, liability for loss of. 5 A.L.R. 362.

Validity, construction, and application of statutes requiring that percentage of punitive damages awards be paid directly to state or court-administered fund. 16 A.L.R.5th 129.

12-7-15. Severability.

If any part of §§ 12-7-1 12-7-1 4 is for any reason declared void, its invalidity shall not affect the remaining portions of those sections.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-15 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-7-16. Arrest or seizure after commission of offense.

The authority given to any one to arrest any person or seize anything, while the person is actually engaged or the thing is actually used or employed in the commission of any offense, shall not be so construed as to prevent, if not so arrested or seized, the arrest of the person or the seizure of the thing after the commission of the offense, upon due process of law.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 64; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 64; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 76; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 76; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 69; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-16 .

12-7-17. Arrest of escapees and parole violators without warrant.

The director of the department of corrections, the warden of the adult correctional institutions, any superintendent or employees connected with any institution under the management and control of the department of corrections, or any police officer or town constable, may arrest, without a warrant, any person who has escaped from any institution, or who, being absent from the institution on parole, has violated the conditions of the parole, for the purpose of returning the person to the institution from which the escape was made or from which the parole was granted.

History of Section. P.L. 1922, ch. 2208, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 23; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 80; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-17 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 173, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 22; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 22.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 22, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 22 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

Cross References.

Return of probationers or parolees from outside state, § 12-18-2 .

Terms of parole, § 13-8-16 .

12-7-18. Temporary detention powers of National Guard.

A National Guard member of the rank of sergeant or higher who is on emergency state duty pursuant to the call of the governor may detain any person abroad who he or she has reason to suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of the person his or her name, address, business abroad, and destination; and any person who fails to identify himself or herself and explain his or her actions to the satisfaction of the national guard member may be further detained and further questioned and investigated by the peace officer; provided, in no case shall the total period of the detention exceed two (2) hours, and the detention shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At the end of the detention period the person so detained shall be released unless arrested and charged with a crime.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 120, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-7-19. Arrest after close pursuit by officers from cities or towns.

Any member of a duly organized municipal peace unit of another city or town of the state who enters any city or town in close pursuit and continues within any city or town in such close pursuit of a person in order to stop him or her for a suspected violation of any provision of the motor vehicle code committed in the other city or town, shall be vested with all of the same authority as a member of a duly organized municipal peace unit of the city or town.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 469, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 474, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 469, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 474, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Transportation Following Arrest.
No Hot Pursuit.

While the authority of a police officer to perform an arrest outside of the territorial boundaries of the city or town in which he was employed were limited to responses to requests for emergency assistance, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-42-1 , and arrests after “close pursuit,” under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-19 , an officer could transport a prisoner already in custody across territorial boundaries for legitimate law enforcement purposes, such as obtaining blood alcohol testing. State ex rel. Town of Portsmouth v. Hagan, 819 A.2d 1256, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 2003).

Pawtucket detectives’ actions in arresting defendant outside their jurisdiction without even attempting to get the assistance and approval of the Providence police were unauthorized and in excess of their authority; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-19 did not apply because the detectives were not in hot pursuit of defendant. State v. Morris, 92 A.3d 920, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 2014).

12-7-20. Right to use telephone for call to attorney — Bail bondsperson.

Any person arrested under the provisions of this chapter shall be afforded, as soon after being detained as practicable, not to exceed one hour from the time of detention, the opportunity to make use of a telephone for the purpose of securing an attorney or arranging for bail; provided, that whenever a person who has been detained for an alleged violation of the law relating to drunk driving must be immediately transported to a medical facility for treatment, he or she shall be afforded the use of a telephone as soon as practicable, which may exceed one hour from the time of detention. The telephone calls afforded by this section shall be carried out in such a manner as to provide confidentiality between the arrestee and the recipient of the call.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 122 § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 242, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 363, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Advisement of Right Mandatory.

A suspect’s right to a confidential telephone call in the course of a driving while under the influence arrest does not rise to the level of a constitutional right, although it is mandatory that he be informed of his right to the call if he is to enjoy the benefit mandated by this Code section. State v. Carcieri, 730 A.2d 11, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 111 (R.I. 1999).

The failure to notify a suspect of his right to use a telephone is not fatal to the state’s case unless a defendant is prejudiced thereby. State v. Carcieri, 730 A.2d 11, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 111 (R.I. 1999).

Construction With Other Statutes.

Duty to notify a defendant that bail has been pre-endorsed on his warrant and to provide him with an immediate opportunity to post bail need not be read into either R.I. Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P. 9(a) or R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-13-2 . Unlike R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-20 , where a suspect must be informed of his right to a confidential telephone call in order to exercise it, an arrested person will benefit from the rule requiring prompt presentment whether or not he is aware that it exists; R.I. Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P. 9(a) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-13-2 operate as procedural instructions or guidelines that notify the police of the steps that must be taken after they effectuate an arrest. State v. Brown, 898 A.2d 69, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 78 (R.I. 2006).

Harmless Error.

The defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of the charges against him since he made no showing of having suffered any substantial prejudice after the police failed to provide him with a free telephone call, since all the evidence used to convict the defendant had been obtained lawfully before he even arrived at the police barracks; the failure of the police to provide the defendant with the call at that late juncture therefore constituted only harmless error. State v. Veltri, 764 A.2d 163, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 18 (R.I. 2001).

Right to Confidentiality Did Not Attach.

While defendant was “arrested” as contemplated by § 12-7-20 and entitled to the protections afforded by the statute, the statute was not violated where the only evidence adduced concerning the nature of defendant’s telephone calls was an officer’s testimony that defendant called his friend that was coming to get him and his girlfriend who wouldn’t answer, and defendant did not present any evidence to show that the purpose of his telephone calls was to secure or to talk to an attorney; thus, the confidentiality requirement of § 12-7-20 did not attach. State v. Quattrucci, 39 A.3d 1036, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 24 (R.I. 2012).

Scope of Right.

A suspect is entitled, at a minimum, to a telephone call free of charge on an unrecorded line, provided that the call is “for the purpose of securing an attorney or arranging for bail.” State v. Carcieri, 730 A.2d 11, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 111 (R.I. 1999).

12-7-21. “Peace officer” defined.

“Peace officer,” as used within this chapter, means the following individuals or members of:

  1. Rhode Island state police;
  2. Any member of a municipal or local police department;
  3. Rhode Island airport corporation police;
  4. Rhode Island park police;
  5. Rhode Island capitol police;
  6. Rhode Island conservation officers;
  7. Rhode Island department of environmental management officers;
  8. Rhode Island fire marshals;
  9. Brown University police officers;
  10. University of Rhode Island campus police officers;
  11. Rhode Island College campus security;
  12. Campus security at the Community College of Rhode Island;
  13. Rhode Island sheriff’s department;
  14. The investigators of the department of attorney general appointed pursuant to § 42-9-8.1 ;
  15. Any federal law enforcement officer;
  16. Correctional investigators and correctional officers of the Rhode Island department of corrections;
  17. The witness protection coordinator of the department of attorney general;
  18. The warden, associate wardens, majors, captains, lieutenants, sergeants, correctional officers and investigators employed by a project operated by a municipal detention facility corporation, including, but not limited to, the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility; provided, such parties listed in this subsection (18) herein shall be deemed to be peace officers while in performance of their duties for the municipal detention facility only, and shall not be deemed to be peace officers at any time when they are not in performance of said duties;
  19. Retired non-permanent sworn members of any municipal police department shall be deemed to be peace officers only while in the performance of their duties for any municipal police department, and shall be permitted to carry their firearm while in the performance of their duties for the municipal police department, and shall be subject to in-service training requirements of title 42, chapter 28;
  20. Auto theft investigators appointed pursuant to § 31-50-1 ;
  21. Providence fire department arson investigators; provided, that the arson investigator is a graduate of a police-training academy; and
  22. Rhode Island School of Design police officers.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 245, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 286, § 4; P.L. 1993, ch. 273, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 423, § 4; P.L. 1998, ch. 121, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 290, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 329, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 390, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 263, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 392, § 3; P.L. 2008, ch. 222, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 7, § 6; P.L. 2011, ch. 287, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 398, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 400, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 164, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 234, § 3.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations and substituted “department of environmental management officers” for “department of environment officers”.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by three Acts (P.L. 2011, ch. 287, § 1, P.L. 2011, ch. 398, § 1, P.L. ch. 400, § 1) passed by the 2011 General Assembly. Since the three acts are not in conflict, the section is set out above as amended by all three acts.

P.L. 2011, ch. 287, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 400, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2013, ch. 164, § 3, and P.L. 2013, ch. 234, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 7, § 13, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2010.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Private Security Guards.

This section did not include a detention facility’s private security guards within the specific and precise enumeration of “peace officers,” and the endowing of “Rhode Island correctional officers” with the power to arrest did not include any group other than those officers that the state employed at its state-run correctional institutions. Huguenin v. Ponte, 29 F. Supp. 2d 57, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18641 (D.R.I. 1998).

12-7-22. Electronic recording of custodial interrogations task force.

  1. In order to:
    1. Minimize the likelihood of a wrongful conviction caused by a false confession; and
    2. Further improve the already high quality of criminal justice in our state, the general assembly creates a taskforce to investigate and develop policies and procedures for electronically recording custodial interrogations in their entirety.
  2. The task force shall be comprised of the following or their designees:
    1. Attorney general;
    2. Public defender;
    3. Superintendent of the Rhode Island state police;
    4. President of the Rhode Island Police Chiefs’ Association;
    5. Head of the municipal police training academy;
    6. President of the Rhode Island Bar Association;
    7. President of the Rhode Island Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers;
    8. Public safety commissioner of the city of Providence;
    9. Chief of police of a department with less than forty-five (45) sworn officers and that does not currently have an established policy concerning the electronic recording of custodial interrogations, to be agreed upon by the task force;
    10. Chief of police of a department (other than one separately designated herein) that already has established a policy concerning the regular, electronic recording of custodial interrogations, to be agreed upon by the task force; and
    11. Executive director of the Rhode Island commission for human rights.
  3. The attorney general and public defender shall serve as co-chairpersons of the task force and have the authority to call for and designate the time and place of meetings. A majority of members shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number may hold meetings. The task force shall act only on an affirmative vote of a majority of those voting. All departments and agencies of the state shall furnish such advice and information, documentary and otherwise, to the task force and its agents as is deemed necessary or desirable by the task force to facilitate the purposes of this section.
  4. The task force, in consultation with whatever experts it may deem appropriate, shall study and make recommendations concerning the establishment of a statewide law enforcement practice of electronically recording custodial interrogations in their entirety. In so doing, the task force shall consider, but not be limited to, the following:
    1. Models from other federal and state jurisdictions;
    2. Current policies, procedures, and practices of law enforcement statewide;
    3. Types of crimes, investigations, and settings where custodial interrogations should be electronically recorded;
    4. Whether custodial interrogations should be electronically recorded using audio-visual or strictly audio recording;
    5. Whether custodial interrogations should be electronically recorded with or without the knowledge of the suspect;
    6. Appropriate procedures to be followed when the suspect refuses to be, or exigent circumstances otherwise prevent, the electronic recording of the custodial interrogation;
    7. How to most effectively record interrogations in view of an individual police department’s fiscal, staffing, and space constraints;
    8. Appropriate policies and procedures concerning the transcription of the electronic recordings resulting from custodial interrogation;
    9. Appropriate policies and procedures concerning the long-term preservation and storage of the electronic recordings resulting from custodial interrogation; and
    10. The desirability of written policies, procedures, training, and/or additional legislation regarding the electronic recording of custodial interrogations in their entirety statewide.
  5. The task force shall submit a report on its recommendations concerning the investigation and development of policies and procedures for electronically recording custodial interrogations in their entirety. This report shall be presented to the governor, the chief justice of the Rhode Island supreme court, the speaker of the house of representatives, the president of the senate, and the chairpersons of the judiciary committees of both the house of representatives and the senate no later than February 1, 2012. Thereafter, the task force shall meet periodically in order to assess the impact of the recommendations it has made; conduct further research in the area of the electronic recording of custodial interrogations; assess the implementation of written policies in these areas by Rhode Island law enforcement agencies; and determine whether or not any additional legislation regarding the electronic recording of custodial interrogations in their entirety statewide is required. Said meetings shall be called by agreement of the attorney general and public defender. A supplemental report from the task force shall be delivered in the same manner as its initial report and not later than December 31, 2014.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 59, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 77, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 35, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 43, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 43, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 130, § 1 enacted nearly identical versions of this section.

P.L. 2012, ch. 59, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 77, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 35, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 43, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Chapter 8 Close Pursuit

12-8-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Act on Close Pursuit.”

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2383, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 628, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 12-8-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Pursuit:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-156.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 276, §§ 10A — 10D.

12-8-2. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter:

  1. “Felony” includes any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
  2. “State” includes the District of Columbia.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2383, §§ 4, 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 628, §§ 4, 5; P.L. 1950, ch. 2485, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-8-2 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subdivisions.

12-8-3. Arrest after close pursuit by officers from other states.

Any member of a duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit of another state of the United States who enters this state in close pursuit and continues within this state in that close pursuit of a person in order to arrest him or her on the ground that he or she has committed a felony in the other state shall have the same authority to arrest and hold in custody the person, as members of a duly organized state, county, or municipal peace unit of this state have to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he or she has committed a felony in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2383, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 628, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-8-3 .

Cross References.

Arrest after close pursuit by officers from cities or towns, § 12-7-19 .

Close pursuit by military forces, § 30-12-1 et seq.

12-8-4. Arrests otherwise unlawful.

Section 12-8-3 shall not be construed so as to make unlawful any arrest in this state which would otherwise be lawful.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2383, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 628, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-8-4 .

12-8-5. Commitment or discharge of person arrested.

If an arrest is made in this state by an officer of another state in accordance with the provisions of § 12-8-3 , he or she shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before the district court for the division in which the arrest was made and the court shall conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of the arrest. If the judge determines that the arrest was lawful, he or she shall commit the person arrested to await for a reasonable time the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor of this state. If the judge determines that the arrest was unlawful he shall discharge the person arrested.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2383, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 628, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-8-5 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 18.

12-8-6. Severability.

If any part of this chapter is for any reason declared void, it is declared to be the intent of this chapter that its invalidity shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2383, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 628, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 12-8-6 .

Chapter 9 Extradition

12-9-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 30; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Extradition:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-158 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 276, § 11 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Citizen of Asylum State as Agent for Demanding State.

Nothing in this chapter prohibits the demanding state from appointing a citizen of the asylum state as its agent for receiving a fugitive and delivering him to the demanding state. Bailey v. Laurie, 118 R.I. 184 , 373 A.2d 482, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1444 (1977).

Collateral References.

Application of doctrine of specialty to federal criminal prosecution of accused extradited from foreign country. 112 A.L.R. Fed. 473.

Test of “dual criminality” where extradition to or from foreign nation is sought. 132 A.L.R. Fed. 525.

12-9-2. Definitions.

Where appearing in this chapter:

  1. “Executive authority” includes the governor, and any person performing the functions of governor in a state other than this state.
  2. “Governor” includes any person performing the functions of governor by authority of the law of this state.
  3. “State,” referring to a state other than this state, includes any other state or territory, organized or unorganized, of the United States of America.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-2 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authority of Lieutenant Governor.

If a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus under this act wished to contest the authority of the lieutenant governor to sign the rendition warrant, it was incumbent on him to show that, at the time the document was signed, the governor was capable of performing his duties as the state’s chief executive. Brown v. Sharkey, 106 R.I. 714 , 263 A.2d 104, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 979 (1970).

Collateral References.

Sentences by different courts as concurrent. 57 A.L.R.2d 1410.

12-9-3. Governor’s duty to deliver fugitives from justice.

Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the provisions of the Constitution of the United States controlling, and any and all acts of Congress enacted in pursuance of the Constitution, it is the duty of the governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-3 .

Cross References.

Constitutional basis for extradition, U.S. Const., art. 4, § 2.

Parole violators, return, § 13-9-2 .

Reciprocal enforcement of support, interstate rendition of defaulting obligors, §§ 15-11-5, 15-11-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Discretion of Governor.

Under this section and § 12-9-22 the Governor of Rhode Island had discretion either to hold and to prosecute a person while that person remains a fugitive from justice in another state or to deliver the fugitive to the other state. State v. DeAngelis, 658 A.2d 7, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 136 (R.I. 1995).

Collateral References.

Extradition, as a fugitive from justice, of one who left demanding state by official permission. 67 A.L.R. 1480.

Extradition of one who violates parole. 78 A.L.R. 419.

One charged with desertion or failure to support wife or child as fugitive from justice subject to extradition. 32 A.L.R. 1167; 54 A.L.R. 281.

Reciprocal enforcement of duty to support dependents, extradition under statutes providing for. 42 A.L.R.2d 783.

Treaty regulation of extradition. 4 A.L.R. 1395; 134 A.L.R. 888.

12-9-4. Form of demand from another state.

No demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another state shall be recognized by the governor unless in writing alleging, except in cases arising under §§ 12-9-7 and 12-9-8 , that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and that after the commission of the alleged crime he or she fled from the state, and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a judge there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued, upon the indictment or information, or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution of the judgment, together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his or her bail, probation, or parole. The indictment, information, or affidavit made before the judge must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that state, and the copy of indictment, information, affidavit, judgment of conviction, or sentence must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-4 .

Collateral References.

Allegation or proof of presence of accused in demanding state at time of commission of alleged crime or that accused is a fugitive, sufficiency of statement in demanding papers as. 135 A.L.R. 973.

Necessity and sufficiency of identification of accused as the person charged, to warrant extradition. 93 A.L.R.2d 912.

Necessity that demanding state show probable cause to arrest fugitive in extradition proceedings. 90 A.L.R.3d 1085.

12-9-5. Investigation as to demanded person.

When a demand shall be made upon the governor of this state by the executive authority of another state for the surrender of a person so charged with a crime, the governor may call upon the attorney general or any prosecuting officer in this state to investigate or assist in investigating the demand and to report to him or her the situation and circumstances of the person so demanded, and whether he or she ought to be surrendered.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-4 .

Collateral References.

Bar of limitations as proper subject of investigation in extradition proceedings. 77 A.L.R. 902.

Mission or motive of defendant in going to asylum state as affecting right to extradite him. 13 A.L.R. 415.

Motive or ulterior purpose of officials demanding or granting extradition as proper subject of inquiry. 94 A.L.R. 1493.

Sanity or insanity or pendency of lunacy proceedings as matters for consideration in extradition proceedings. 114 A.L.R. 693.

12-9-6. Agreement to return person demanded from another state.

When it is desired to have returned to this state a person charged in this state with a crime, and the person is imprisoned or is held under criminal proceedings then pending against the person in another state, the governor of this state may agree with the executive authority of the other state for the extradition of the person before the conclusion of the proceedings or his or her term of sentence in the other state upon condition that the person be returned to the other state at the expense of this state as soon as the prosecution in this state is terminated.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-6 .

12-9-7. Surrender of person who left demanding state involuntarily.

The governor of this state may also surrender on demand of the executive authority of any other state any person in this state who is charged in the manner provided in § 12-9-4 with having violated the laws of the state whose executive authority is making the demand, even though the person left the demanding state involuntarily.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-7 .

Collateral References.

One not in demanding state at time of offense but who afterwards entered and left state, as fugitive from justice. 91 A.L.R. 1262.

12-9-8. Surrender of person committing an act in one state resulting in a crime in another.

The governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any other state, any person in this state charged in the other state in the manner provided in § 12-9-4 with committing an act in this state or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand, when the acts for which extradition is sought would be punishable by the laws of this state, and if the consequences claimed to have resulted from the crime in the demanding state had taken effect in this state. The provisions of this chapter, not otherwise inconsistent, shall apply to those cases, even though the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of the crime and has not fled from that state; provided, that the governor of this state may, in his or her discretion, make any surrender conditional upon agreement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person so surrendered will be held to answer no criminal charges of any nature except those set forth in the requisition upon which the person is so surrendered, at least until the person has been given reasonable opportunity to return to this state after his or her acquittal, if he or she shall be acquitted, or if he or she shall be convicted, after he or she shall be released from confinement. Nothing in §§ 12-9-7 and 12-9-8 shall apply to the crime of libel.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-8 .

Collateral References.

Statute authorizing extradition of one who commits an act within the state or a third state resulting in a crime in the demanding state, constitutionality, construction, and application. 151 A.L.R. 239.

12-9-9. Warrant of arrest on executive demand.

If the governor decides that the demand should be complied with, he or she shall sign a warrant of arrest, which shall be sealed with the state seal, and be directed to any peace officer or other person whom he or she may think fit to entrust with its execution. The warrant must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-9 .

Collateral References.

Charge of crime, warrant of arrest as prima facie evidence of sufficiency of. 81 A.L.R. 562; 40 A.L.R.2d 1158.

Recital in rendition warrant as to copy of indictment or affidavit, sufficiency of. 89 A.L.R. 595.

12-9-10. Authority granted by warrant.

The warrant shall authorize the peace officer or other person to whom directed to arrest the accused at any time and any place where he or she may be found within the state and to command the aid of all peace officers or other persons in the execution of the warrant, and to deliver the accused, subject to the provisions of this chapter, to the duly authorized agent of the demanding state.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-10 .

12-9-11. Commanding assistance in execution of warrant.

Every peace officer, or other person empowered to make the arrest, shall have the same authority, in arresting the accused, to command assistance in the arrest as peace officers have by law in the execution of any criminal process directed to them, with like penalties against those who refuse their assistance.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-11 .

12-9-12. Appearance of prisoner before judge — Application for habeas corpus.

No person arrested upon a warrant issued under § 12-9-9 shall be delivered over to the agent whom the executive authority demanding him or her shall have appointed to receive him or her unless he or she shall first be taken immediately before a judge of a court of record in this state, who shall inform him or her of the demand made for his or her surrender and of the crime with which he or she is charged, and that he or she has the right to demand and procure legal counsel. If the prisoner or his or her counsel shall state that he or she or they desire to test the legality of the arrest, the judge of the court of record shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed him or her within which to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. When the writ is applied for, notice of the writ, and of the time and place of hearing on the writ, shall be given to the prosecuting officer and to the agent of the demanding state.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-12 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cross-Examination.

Where petitioners on a writ of habeas corpus made confessions to a Rhode Island police officer concerning the crime committed out of state, they were entitled to cross-examine this officer in order to prove that the confessions were not voluntary and that no crime was committed out of state. Baker v. Laurie, 118 R.I. 539 , 375 A.2d 405, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1496 (1977).

Scope of Habeas Corpus Hearing.

In considering the habeas corpus petition under this section, the court is limited to an inquiry as to whether the petitioner is charged with a crime in the demanding state; whether the petitioner is in fact the person charged with the crime; whether the petitioner was in the demanding state at the time of the crime, left, and was found in the asylum state; and whether the requisition papers are in order. Brown v. Sharkey, 106 R.I. 714 , 263 A.2d 104, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 979 (1970); Baker v. Laurie, 118 R.I. 539 , 375 A.2d 405, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1496 (1977).

The heavy burden of conclusively establishing absence from the demanding state at the time of the crime is not met when there is merely contradictory evidence as to presence or absence. Baker v. Laurie, 118 R.I. 539 , 375 A.2d 405, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1496 (1977).

The court on a writ of habeas corpus may not concern itself with the question of petitioners’ innocence or guilt; however, petitioners cannot be barred from attempting to prove that they were not in the demanding state at the time the crime was committed merely because they might introduce evidence which also relates to issues properly left for trial on the merits in the demanding state. Baker v. Laurie, 118 R.I. 539 , 375 A.2d 405, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1496 (1977).

Collateral References.

Arrest warrant as prima facie evidence in extradition proceedings, or on habeas corpus in such proceedings, that a crime is charged. 40 A.L.R.2d 1158.

Demanding References. Demanding papers in extradition proceedings as making out prima facie case in habeas corpus proceedings that accused was present in demanding state at time of commission of alleged crime or that he is a fugitive. 135 A.L.R. 973.

Determination, in extradition proceedings, or on habeas corpus in such proceedings, whether a crime is charged. 40 A.L.R.2d 1151.

Discharge on habeas corpus of one held in extradition proceedings as precluding subsequent extradition proceedings. 33 A.L.R.3d 1443.

Duty of court, in federal criminal prosecution, to conduct inquiry into voluntariness of accused’s statement — modern cases. 132 A.L.R. Fed. 415.

Right of one arrested on extradition warrant to delay to enable him to present evidence that he is not subject to extradition. 11 A.L.R. 1410.

12-9-12.1. Extradition of juveniles.

  1. When the extradition of a child under the age of eighteen (18) years of age is demanded by another state, the child shall be summoned to appear or ordered to appear before the family court pursuant to the provisions of chapter 1 of title 14.
  2. The provisions of § 12-9-12 shall apply to the hearing conducted by the family court. In addition when the other state seeks the extradition of the child for trial as an adult, the family court shall determine whether or not the child would have been tried as an adult in this state if charged with the offense alleged to have been committed in the other state. The family court shall apply the provisions of §§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1 in making the determination.
  3. No person under the age of eighteen (18) years of age shall be extradited for trial in another state as an adult unless a justice of the family court determines that the person would have been tried as an adult in the state of Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 366, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The prohibition against the extradition of juveniles lies in the face of the U.S. Const., art. 4, § 2, cl. 2, and therefore is unconstitutional. In re Robert, 122 R.I. 356 , 406 A.2d 266, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2171 (1979).

Collateral References.

Extradition of juveniles. 73 A.L.R.3d 700.

12-9-13. Penalty for violating § 12-9-12.

Any officer who shall deliver to the agent for extradition of the demanding state a person in his or her custody under the governor’s warrant, in willful disobedience to § 12-9-12 , shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or be imprisoned not more than six (6) months, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-13 .

12-9-14. Confinement of prisoner pending extradition or en route.

The officer or persons executing the governor’s warrant or arrest, or the agent of the demanding state to whom the prisoner may have been delivered, may, when necessary, confine the prisoner in the jail of any county or city through which he or she may pass; and the keeper of the jail must receive and safely keep the prisoner until the officer or person having charge of the person is ready to proceed on his or her route, the officer or person being chargeable with the expense of keeping.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-14 .

12-9-15. Confinement of prisoners passing through state.

The officer or agent of a demanding state to whom a prisoner may have been delivered following extradition proceedings in another state, or to whom a prisoner may have been delivered after waiving extradition in the other state, and who is passing through this state with a prisoner for the purpose of immediately returning the prisoner to the demanding state may, when necessary, confine the prisoner in the jail of any county or city through which he or she may pass; and the keeper of the jail must receive and safely keep the prisoner until the officer or agent having charge of him or her is ready to proceed on his or her route, the officer or agent, however, being chargeable with the expense of keeping; provided, that the officer or agent shall produce and show to the keeper of the jail satisfactory written evidence of the fact that he or she is actually transporting the prisoner to the demanding state after a requisition by the executive authority of the demanding state, or waiver of the requisition. The person shall not be entitled to demand a new requisition while in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-15 .

12-9-16. Warrant of arrest on affidavit.

Whenever any person within this state shall be charged on the oath of any credible person before any judge of this state with the commission of any crime in any other state and, except in cases arising under §§ 12-9-7 and 12-9-8 , with having fled from justice, or with having been convicted of a crime in that state and having escaped from confinement, or having broken the terms of his or her bail, probation, or parole, or whenever complaint shall have been made before any judge in this state setting forth on the affidavit of any credible person in another state that a crime has been committed in that other state and that the accused has been charged in that state with the commission of the crime, and, except in cases arising under §§ 12-9-7 and 12-9-8 , has fled from justice, or with having been convicted of a crime in that state and having escaped from confinement, or having broken the terms of his or her bail, probation, or parole, and is believed to be in this state, the judge shall issue a warrant directed to any peace officer commanding him or her to apprehend the person named in the warrant, wherever he or she may be found in this state, and to bring him or her before the judge or any other judge or court who or which may be available in or convenient of access to the place where the arrest may be made, to answer the charges or complaint and affidavit, and a certified copy of the sworn charge or complaint and affidavit upon which the warrant is issued shall be attached to the warrant.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-16 .

12-9-17. Arrest without warrant.

The arrest of a person may also be lawfully made by any peace officer or a private person without a warrant, upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but when so arrested, the accused must be taken before a judge with all practicable speed, and complaint must be made against him or her under oath, setting forth the ground for the arrest as in § 12-9-16 ; and thereafter after that his or her answer shall be heard as if he or she had been arrested on a warrant.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-17 .

12-9-18. Commitment awaiting requisition.

If, from the examination before the judge, it appears that the person being held is the person charged with having committed the alleged crime and, except in cases arising under §§ 12-9-7 and 12-9-8 , that the person has fled from justice, the judge must, by a warrant reciting the accusation, commit him or her to the adult correctional institutions for a time not exceeding thirty (30) days and specified in the warrant, as will enable the arrest of the accused to be made under a warrant of the governor or on requisition of the executive authority of the state having jurisdiction of the offense, unless the accused give bail as provided in § 12-9-19 , or until he or she shall be legally discharged.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 15; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-18 .

12-9-19. Admission to bail.

Unless the offense with which the prisoner is charged is shown to be an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment under the laws of the state in which it was committed, a judge in this state may admit the person arrested to bail by bond, with sufficient sureties, and in any sum that the judge deems proper, conditioned for the person’s appearance before the judge at a time specified in the bond, but not later than thirty (30) days after the examination referred to in § 12-9-18 , and for his or her surrender, to be arrested upon the warrant of the governor of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-19 .

Rules of Court.

Release on bail, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 46.

Cross References.

Bail generally, § 12-13-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Extradition of convict at liberty on bail. 78 A.L.R. 419.

12-9-20. Failure to arrest on governor’s warrant within time specified.

If the accused is not arrested under warrant of the governor by the expiration of the time specified in the warrant or bond, a judge may discharge the accused or may recommit him or her for a further period not to exceed sixty (60) days, or a judge may again take bail for his or her appearance and surrender, as provided in § 12-9-19 , but within a period not to exceed sixty (60) days after the date of the new bond.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-20 .

12-9-21. Forfeiture of bail.

If the prisoner is admitted to bail, and fails to appear and surrender according to the conditions of his or her bond, the judge, by proper order, shall declare the bond forfeited and order his or her immediate arrest without warrant if he or she is within this state. Recovery may be had on the bond in the name of the state as in the case of other bonds given by the accused in criminal proceedings within this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-21 .

12-9-22. Persons under prosecution in this state.

If a criminal prosecution has been instituted against the person under the laws of this state and is still pending, the governor, in his or her discretion, either may surrender him or her on demand of the executive authority of another state or hold him or her until he or she has been tried and discharged or convicted and punished in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-22 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Discretion of Governor.

Under § 12-9-3 and this section the Governor of Rhode Island had discretion either to hold and to prosecute a person while that person remains a fugitive from justice in another state or to deliver the fugitive to the other state. State v. DeAngelis, 658 A.2d 7, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 136 (R.I. 1995).

12-9-23. Guilt or innocence as subject of inquiry.

The guilt or innocence of the accused as to the crime of which he or she is charged may not be inquired into by the governor or in any proceeding after the demand for extradition accompanied by a charge of crime in legal form as provided in this chapter shall have been presented to the governor, except as it may be involved in identifying the person held as the person charged with the crime.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-23 .

12-9-24. Recall or reissue of governor’s warrant.

The governor may recall his or her warrant of arrest or may issue another warrant whenever he or she deems it proper.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-24 .

12-9-25. Warrant to return prisoner from another state.

Whenever the governor of this state shall demand a person charged with crime or with escaping from confinement or breaking the terms of his or her bail, probation, or parole in this state, from the executive authority of any other state, or from the chief justice or an associate justice of the supreme court of the District of Columbia authorized to receive a demand under the laws of the United States, he or she shall issue a warrant under the seal of this state to some agent, commanding the agent to receive the person so charged if delivered to him or her and convey the person to the proper officer of the county in this state in which the offense was committed.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-25 .

12-9-26. Application for requisition of person charged with crime.

When the return to this state of a person charged with a crime in this state is required, the attorney general shall present to the governor his or her written application for a requisition for the return of the person charged, in which application shall be stated the name of the person so charged, the crime charged against the person, the approximate time, place and circumstances of its commission, the state in which the person is believed to be, including the location of the accused in that state at the time the application is made, and certifying that, in the opinion of the attorney general, the ends of justice require the arrest and return of the accused to this state for trial and that the proceeding is not instituted to enforce a private claim.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-26 .

12-9-27. Application for requisition of person convicted of crime.

When the return to this state is required of a person who has been convicted of a crime in this state and has escaped from confinement or broken the terms of his or her bail, probation, or parole, the attorney general or the warden of the institution from which escape was made shall present to the governor a written application for a requisition for the return of the person, in which shall be stated the name of the person, the crime of which the person was convicted, the circumstances of his or her escape from confinement or of the breach of the terms of his or her bail, probation, or parole, the state in which the person is believed to be, including the location of the person in that state at the time application is made.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-27 .

12-9-28. Affidavits and documents to support application.

The application shall be verified by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicate, and shall be accompanied by two (2) certified copies of the indictment returned, or information and affidavit filed, or of the complaint made of the judge, stating the offense with which the accused is charged, or of the judgment of conviction, or of the sentence. The attorney general, the director of corrections, or the warden may also attach any further affidavits and other documents in duplicate that he or she shall deem proper to be submitted with the application. One copy of the application, with the action of the governor indicated by endorsement on it, and one of the certified copies of the indictment, complaint, information, and affidavits, or of the judgment of conviction, or of the sentence shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state to remain on record in that office. The other copies of all papers shall be forwarded with the governor’s requisition.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 23; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2724, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-28 .

12-9-29. Immunity from civil process arising out of occurrence for which extradited.

A person brought into this state by, or after waiver of, extradition based on a criminal charge shall not be subject to service of personal process in civil actions arising out of the same facts as the criminal proceedings to answer which he or she is being or has been returned, until he or she has been convicted in the criminal proceeding, or, if acquitted, until he or she has had reasonable opportunity to return to the state from which he or she was extradited.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-29 .

Collateral References.

Immunity of extradited person from service of process. 20 A.L.R.2d 172.

12-9-30. Execution of waiver of extradition.

Any person arrested in this state charged, with having committed any crime in another state, or alleged to have escaped from confinement or broken the terms of his or her bail, probation, or parole, may waive the issuance and service of the warrant provided for in §§ 12-9-9 and 12-9-10 and all other procedure incidental to extradition proceedings, by executing or subscribing in the presence of a judge of any court of record within this state a writing which states that he or she consents to return to the demanding state; provided, that before the waiver shall be executed or subscribed by the person it shall be the duty of the judge to inform the person of his or her rights to the issuance and service of a warrant of extradition and to obtain a writ of habeas corpus as provided for in § 12-9-12 .

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-30 .

12-9-31. Filing of consent — Delivery of prisoner to extradition agents.

If and when consent pursuant to § 12-9-30 has been duly executed it shall be immediately forwarded to the office of the governor of this state and filed in that office. The judge shall direct the officer having the person in custody to immediately deliver the person to the duly accredited agent or agents of the demanding state and shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the agent or agents a copy of his or her consent; provided, that nothing in this section and § 12-9-30 shall be deemed to limit the rights of the accused person to return voluntarily and without formality to the demanding state, nor shall this waiver procedure be deemed to be an exclusive procedure or to limit the powers, rights, or duties of the officers of the demanding state or of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-31 .

12-9-32. State’s rights against extradited persons not waived.

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to constitute a waiver by this state of its right, power, or privilege to try the demanded person for a crime committed within this state, or of its right, power, or privilege to regain custody of the person by extradition proceedings or otherwise for the purpose of trial, sentence, or punishment for any crime committed within this state, nor shall any proceedings had under this chapter which result in, or fail to result in, extradition be deemed a waiver by this state of any of its rights, privileges, or jurisdiction in any way whatsoever.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-32 .

Collateral References.

Surrender of convict to authorities of other jurisdiction as precluding punishment or further punishment under original conviction. 147 A.L.R. 941.

12-9-33. Trial for crimes not specified in requisition.

After a person has been brought back to this state by, or after waiver of, extradition proceedings, he or she may be tried in this state for other crimes which he or she may be charged with having committed here as well as that specified in the requisition for his or her extradition.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-33 .

12-9-34. Uniformity of construction.

The provisions of this chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purposes to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-34 .

12-9-35. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, its invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provisions of application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1890, § 29; G.L. 1956, § 12-9-35 .

Chapter 10 Preliminary Proceedings in District Courts

12-10-1. Court open at all times.

The district court shall be open at all times for the transaction of criminal business.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 149; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-10-1 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 19.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Daily Hours.

This section does not contemplate that district courts must remain open twenty-four hours a day for the transaction of criminal business but only that the courts must be open at some time every day regardless of vacations, Sundays and holidays. State v. Wax, 83 R.I. 319 , 116 A.2d 468, 1955 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1955).

Collateral References.

Civil liability of witness in action under 42 USCS § 1983 for deprivation of civil rights, based on testimony given at pretrial criminal proceeding. 94 A.L.R. Fed. 892.

12-10-2. Powers of justices of the peace.

    1. The chief judge of the district court shall, from time to time, appoint, with power to revoke the appointments, from those qualified justices of the peace who shall be members of the bar of the state of Rhode Island within the cities and towns and divisions of the district court, as many justices of the peace as he or she may deem necessary, who shall be authorized to set and take bail in all complaints bailable before a division of the district court, except those offenses punishable by life imprisonment and, in default of bail, to commit to the adult correctional institutions all respondents arrested on those complaints. The chief judge shall authorize the justices of the peace, so appointed by him or her, to issue warrants and complaints returnable to the division of the district court for any offense for which, by law, a judge of the district court may issue a warrant and complaint, and all warrants so issued, and all warrants and complaints upon which bail is taken or commitments are made, shall be immediately returned to the divisions; provided, that the justices of the peace shall not in any case, or for any purpose, have the power to issue search warrants. The justices of the peace may also set and take bail, as provided in this section, and commit and issue warrants (except search warrants), in any division where the defendant is being held by the state police, the metropolitan park police, conservation officers of the department of environmental management, a sheriff or deputy sheriff, the capitol police, the campus security forces of the state colleges and universities, or city or town police forces.
    2. Whenever probable cause exists that a defendant is a violator of bail and/or probation in the district court or superior court, upon being presented with a violation report by the attorney general or the attorney general’s transmission of a violation report to the arresting agency or place of presentment, and upon making a finding that the defendant is subject to violation of bail and/or probation and that probable cause exists on the new charge being brought, the justice of the peace shall issue his or her writ of mittimus confining the defendant without bail and issue a writ of habeas corpus returnable to the next sitting of the district court and make a finding of probable violation in writing. If the attorney general transmits the violation report to the arresting agency or place of presentment, the law enforcement agency shall ensure that the defendant is presented with the violation report and the justice of the peace shall ensure the violation report is attached to his or her writs and other documentation of a district court violation or a superior court violation. The justice of the peace shall proceed to arraign the defendant on the new charge pursuant to subdivision (1). The justice of the peace shall return his or her writs and other documentation of a district court violation to the clerk of the district court; regarding any superior court violation, the attorney for the state shall notify the clerk of the superior court for the county where the case originated, for which a finding of probable violation was made, of the finding of probable violation and the attorney for the state shall, on the same date, request a judge or magistrate of the superior court to issue a writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of a violation presentation before the superior court returnable to the next sitting of the superior court in the county.
  1. In misdemeanor cases, a justice of the peace may accept pleas of not guilty, in which case the justice of the peace may schedule a pre-trial conference date before a judge of the district court.
  2. In non-capital felony cases, the justices of the peace may also schedule felony screening dates.
  3. The fee for the justices of the peace shall be fifty dollars ($50.00), paid by each individual who appears before him or her; provided, that when a special session is requested between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m., the fee shall be arranged between the defendant and the justice of the peace, but shall not exceed two hundred dollars ($200). Justices of the peace shall have immunity for any actions taken pursuant to the provisions of this section.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 181; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 34; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 34; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 34; P.L. 1948, ch. 2024, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-10-2 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 19; P.L. 1981, ch. 314, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 77, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 224, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 368, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 141, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 380, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 395, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “department of environmental management” for “department of environment” near the end of subsection (a).

Compiler’s Notes.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2002 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2002 amendment.

In 2002, the compiler made stylistic changes in subdivision (a)(2).

P.L. 2016, ch. 380, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 395, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2016, ch. 380, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2016.

P.L. 2016, ch. 395, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2016.

Cross References.

Jurisdiction in preliminary proceedings, § 12-3-2 .

Powers of supreme and superior court justices, § 8-3-6 .

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authority of Assistant Justice.

Assistant justice with general power to perform duties of justice had power to sign warrant and the warrant need not state inability of justice to act. State v. Chappell, 26 R.I. 375 , 58 A. 1009, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1904).

Impartiality of Justice.

Where defendant pleaded not guilty and was released on his own recognizance, he cannot later attack a warrant issued by a justice of the peace on complaint of the chief of police on the ground that the justice is also counsel for the chief of police and therefore not an impartial magistrate. State v. Winsor, 98 R.I. 447 , 204 A.2d 427, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 192 (1964).

12-10-3. Recording and certification of appointments and revocations — Signature of warrants.

Appointments and revocations shall be recorded in the records of the court and certified by the chief judge making them to the secretary of state, and the judge shall also issue to the justice or justices of the peace his or her warrant under the seal of the court, by which the justice or justices shall be authorized to perform the duties specified in this chapter, and shall also, whenever he or she shall revoke the appointment, notify the justice of the peace in writing of the revocation. Justices of the peace appointed to issue warrants shall sign all warrants by them issued as “Justice of the peace authorized to issue warrants.”

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 182; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 35; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 35; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 35; G.L. 1956, § 12-10-3 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 19.

12-10-4. Plea on offense beyond trial jurisdiction of district court.

Whenever any person shall be brought before a district court upon a complaint charging him or her with an offense which is not within the jurisdiction of the court to try and determine, the court may, with the written consent of the attorney general or his or her authorized designee, and with a waiver of indictment or information by such person, acting with the benefit of counsel, receive a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and may impose sentence. There shall be no appeal to the superior court. Any district court judge performing these duties shall receive the same salary as a superior court judge would receive.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 41; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 41; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 41; G.L. 1956, § 12-10-4 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 18; P.L. 2003, ch. 139, § 1.

12-10-5. Discharge of person charged with offense beyond trial jurisdiction of district court.

Whenever any person shall be brought before any district court, charged with any offense which it has not jurisdiction to try and determine, and, after hearing all the evidence adduced in relation to it, it shall not appear to the district court that the accused is probably guilty of the offense, or of any other offense substantially charged in the complaint, the accused shall be immediately discharged.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 165; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 12-10-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Effect of Dismissal on Subsequent Prosecution.

Where the offense charged was a felony, the ruling of district court granting motion to suppress evidence followed by dismissal of complaint charging possession of marijuana was not binding in superior court proceedings after defendant was indicted for the same offense, in view of statute vesting original jurisdiction over the offense in the superior court. State v. Conti, 110 R.I. 237 , 291 A.2d 623, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 904 (1972).

12-10-6. Recognizance or commitment on charge of offense beyond trial jurisdiction of district court.

Whenever any person shall be brought before the district court upon a complaint charging him or her with an offense which is not within the jurisdiction of the court to try and determine, and it shall appear to the court that the accused is probably guilty, the court shall, if the offense is bailable by it, require the accused to enter into a recognizance in any sum that the court shall direct, with sufficient surety to be approved by the court, with condition that the accused will appear at the superior court for the county in which the division is situated at the time fixed for the attendance of the grand jury in that court which is next after seven (7) days from the day when the recognizance was ordered, and not to depart the superior court without leave, and in the meantime keep the peace and be of good behavior toward all the people of this state. The recognizance shall be immediately certified as soon as may be by the district court to the court before which the accused shall recognize to appear. Whenever the district court shall require any person to enter into a recognizance for his or her appearance before it or before any other court, and shall not give the recognizance, the person shall be immediately committed to the adult correctional institutions, there to remain until he or she is discharged pursuant to law. If the required recognizance is for the appearance of the accused before the superior court, the fact of the commitment shall be immediately certified to the superior court before which the accused has been held to appear.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 166; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 19; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-10-6 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 19.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appeal.

Petitioner in a criminal proceeding was duty bound under this section and § 12-13-1 to appear in person for arraignment, and the superior court’s issuance of a capias for his appearance upon his failure to appear was lawful and the defendant was not entitled to a writ of certiorari to review the action of the lower court. Suitor v. State, 95 R.I. 469 , 187 A.2d 926, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1963).

Effect of District Court Dismissal.

Where the offense charged was a felony, the ruling of district court granting motion to suppress evidence followed by dismissal of complaint charging possession of cannabis marijuana was not binding in superior court proceedings after defendant was indicted for the same offense, in view of statute vesting original jurisdiction over the offense in the superior court. State v. Conti, 110 R.I. 237 , 291 A.2d 623, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 904 (1972).

Infant Defendant.

A recognizance given by an infant defendant is binding upon him and he is liable to his surety for amounts paid by the surety on account of the recognizance. Fagin v. Goggin, 12 R.I. 398 , 1879 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1879).

Presence of Counsel.

The ruling of the justice of the superior court that petitioner must appear in person to plead to the indictments was not a ruling that petitioner could not have the assistance of counsel; therefore there was no merit in his contention that the act of the court deprived him of his constitutional right to have the assistance of counsel in his defense. Suitor v. State, 95 R.I. 469 , 187 A.2d 926, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1963).

12-10-7. Transmission of papers to superior court.

Whenever a division of the district court, upon a criminal complaint, shall adjudge a defendant in any criminal complaint probably guilty of an offense, the complaint and all papers connected with it shall immediately be certified and be transmitted to the clerk of the superior court for the county in which the division is situated.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 172; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 12-10-7 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 19.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutional Questions.

District court does not have the power to certify to the supreme court a constitutional question raised during preliminary proceedings but should transmit the papers to the superior court pursuant to this section. State v. Collins, 27 R.I. 419 , 62 A. 1010, 1906 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1906).

12-10-8. Discharge of accused on acknowledgment of satisfaction by complainant.

Whenever any person shall be committed to a correctional institution, or shall be under recognizance, to answer to a charge of assault or battery, or both, or for any threat of committing an offense against the person or property of another, if the person injured or threatened shall appear before the judge of the district court who issued the warrant of commitment or took the recognizance, and acknowledge in writing that he or she has received satisfaction of the injury, or has ceased to fear the execution of the threat, the judge may, in his or her discretion, upon payment of all costs that may have accrued, including the board of the prisoner in the institution, if committed, discharge the recognizance, or supersede the commitment, by an order under his or her hand, which order shall be filed with the recognizance, or recorded in the records of the institution, as the case may require. That order shall forever bar all remedy by civil action for the injury.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 173; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 26; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 26; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-10-8 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 19.

12-10-9. Adjournment of trial or examination.

The district court may adjourn any trial or examination pending before it, from time to time, not exceeding fourteen (14) days at any one time, except with the consent or at the request of the accused, and to the same or to a different place in the same division.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 167; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 50, § 20; G.L. 1959, § 12-10-9 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 19.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Indictment Notwithstanding Loss of Jurisdiction.

Even assuming that the district court lost jurisdiction by adjourning the preliminary examination first for fifteen days and then for seven and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to bind the defendant over to the grand jury, the grand jury nevertheless had jurisdiction to indict him. Brady v. Langlois, 103 R.I. 301 , 243 A.2d 906 (1968).

Alleged offense of breaking and entering in the nighttime with intent to commit larceny remained cognizable by the grand jury even though trial thereof was continued more than 14 days without the consent of the accused. O'Neill v. Sharkey, 107 R.I. 524 , 268 A.2d 720, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 804 (1970).

Waiver.

Appearance of defendant without protest after adjournment for more than fourteen days was a waiver of the irregularity and supplied the necessary consent to such adjournment. State v. Spink, 29 R.I. 111 , 69 A. 364, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1908).

Collateral References.

Excuses for delay in preliminary examination. 79 A.L.R. 18.

12-10-10. Commitment or recognizance on adjournment.

In case of an adjournment, if the accused is charged with any offense not bailable by the district court, he or she shall, in the meantime, be committed to the adult correctional institutions; but if bailable, the accused may give recognizance in a sum and with surety or sureties to the satisfaction of the court for his or her appearance for further examination, and for want of recognizance may be committed to the institutions.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 168; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 21; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-10-10 .

12-10-11. Default on recognizance.

If the person recognized shall not appear according to the condition of the recognizance, the district court shall record the default and certify the recognizance with the record of the default to the superior court for the same county.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 169; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 12-10-11 .

12-10-12. Filing of complaints.

  1. Subject to any other provisions of law relative to the filing of complaints for particular crimes, any judge of the district court or superior court may place on file any complaint in a criminal case other than a complaint for the commission of a felony or a complaint against a person who has been convicted of a felony or a private complaint. The court may in its discretion require, as a condition of the filing, the performance of services for the public good or may attach any other conditions to it that the court shall determine; provided, in cases where the court ordered restitution totals less than two hundred dollars ($200) to an injured party pursuant to this section or § 12-19-34 , the court shall require that full restitution be made at the time of sentencing if the court determines that the defendant has the present ability to make the restitution.
  2. Express conditions of any filing in accordance with this section shall be that the defendant at all times during the one year keep the peace and be of good behavior and shall have paid all outstanding court-imposed or court-related fees, fines, costs, assessments, charges, and/or any other monetary obligations unless reduced or waived by order of the court. A violation of any condition set by the court may be deemed a violation of the filing and the matter that was filed may be resurrected by the court, or the court may impose a sanction. A determination of whether a violation has occurred shall be made by the court in accordance with the procedures relating to a violation of probation, §§ 12-19-9 and 12-19-14 .
  3. In the event the complaint was originally filed under this section subsequent to the defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere to the charges, the court, if it finds there to have been a violation but does not impose a sanction, may sentence the defendant. In the event the court filed the complaint under this section while the defendant maintained a plea of not guilty, if the court finds there to have been a violation but does not impose a sanction, it may proceed to the further disposition of the complaint according to law. If no action is taken on the complaint for a period of one year following the filing, the complaint shall be automatically expunged. No criminal record shall result; provided, that in any civil action for a tort, a plea of guilty or a finding of guilty should be admissible notwithstanding the fact that the complaint has been filed.
  4. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, in the event a complaint for a crime involving domestic violence was originally filed under this section subsequent to the defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere to the charges, the court, if it finds there to have been a violation, may sentence the defendant. In the event the court filed the complaint for a crime involving domestic violence under this section while the defendant maintained a plea of not guilty, if the court finds there to have been a violation, it may proceed to the further disposition of the complaint for a crime involving domestic violence according to law. If, for a period of one year after the date of filing, the defendant is not charged with a violation pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the filed complaint for the crime involving domestic violence shall be automatically quashed and shall not be resurrected. If, for a period of three (3) years after the date of filing, the defendant is not charged with a crime involving domestic violence, or if so charged, is acquitted or the complaint is dismissed, all records relating to the filed complaint for a crime involving domestic violence shall be expunged without the requirement of filing a motion pursuant to chapter 1.3 of title 12. No criminal records shall result, unless in any civil action for a tort, in which a plea of guilty or a finding of guilty is admissible notwithstanding the fact that the complaint has been filed. Provided, however, that in sentencing a defendant for a crime involving domestic violence of which the defendant was charged within three (3) years after the filing of a prior crime involving domestic violence to which the defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, the court may take the plea into consideration.
  5. The defendant shall be advised that any and all bail money relating to a case that remains on deposit and is not claimed at the time of expungement shall be escheated to the state’s general treasury in accordance with chapter 12 of title 8.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 193, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 296, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 224, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 251, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 285, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 98, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 434, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 303, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 97, § 4; P.L. 2015, ch. 109, § 4; P.L. 2016, ch. 511, art. 1, § 6; P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 3; P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 3.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 97, § 4, and P.L. 2015, ch. 109, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 3, and P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

Law Reviews.

Brendan Horan, Comment: The Ball Is in Whose Court? Rhode Island's Need for an Integrated Domestic Violence Court, 26 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 738 (2021).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appeal of Order.

Defendant in a criminal case had no right to appeal from a judgment convicting her of disorderly conduct where the trial justice filed her case for one year, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-10-12 the defendant was not sentenced. In a criminal case, the sentence constituted the final judgment, and absent that, there was no final judgment, no justiciable issue was presented, and no appeal was possible; R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-24-1 allowed appeals only from final judgments. State v. Brown, 899 A.2d 517, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 86 (R.I. 2006).

No Charges Filed.

District court erred in denying defendant’s motion to seal his record under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12 because he was a person detained by police but he neither was charged with a criminal offense nor were charges against him filed by the court; defendant was not “charged with an offense” because the “criminal complaint” charged him with a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-11-18 and indicated it was his first violation, and thus, defendant was liable only for a civil penalty. State ex rel. Coventry Police Dep't v. Charlwood, 224 A.3d 467, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 12 (R.I. 2020).

Plea of Nolo Contendere.

Because one who pleads nolo contendere pursuant to this section does not suffer a conviction based upon the imposition of a sentence, evidence of that plea is inadmissible to impeach credibility in a related civil proceeding. Beauchemin v. Sweeten, 471 A.2d 624, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 457 (R.I. 1984).

Chapter 11 County Grand Juries

12-11-1. Number of members.

The grand jury shall consist of not less than thirteen (13) nor more than twenty-three (23) persons. Whenever the attorney general shall by motion in writing make application to any justice of the superior court for a grand jury to consist of twenty-three (23) persons, the motion shall immediately be granted.

History of Section. P.L. 1920, ch. 1948, § 40; G.L. 1923, ch. 329, § 40; G.L. 1938, ch. 506, § 38; G.L., ch. 506, § 36; P.L. 1939, ch. 700, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-11-1 .

Rules of Court.

Grand jury, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 6.

Cross References.

Fees of jurors, § 9-29-5 .

Impaneling and instruction of grand juries, § 8-2-34 .

Jury lists, § 9-9-1 et seq.

Oath of jurors, § 9-10-20 .

Period of service of jurors, § 9-10-8 .

Selection of grand jury, § 9-10-1 et seq.

Stenographer detailed to grand jury, § 8-5-6 .

Collateral References.

Civil liability of witness in action under 42 USC § 1983 for deprivation of civil rights, based on testimony given at pretrial criminal proceeding. 94 A.L.R. Fed. 892.

Duty of prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to state grand jury. 49 A.L.R.5th 639.

12-11-2. Attendance on court — Providence and Bristol counties.

The grand jury shall attend the superior court at Providence for the counties of Providence and Bristol on the third Monday of September of each year; and on the first regular court day of every sixth week thereafter until the second Monday of July, unless at least ten (10) days prior to the day on which a grand jury is to commence its term the presiding justice orders in writing that a grand jury shall not be summoned for that term. However, the presiding justice or any other justice of the superior court may at the request of the attorney general in writing filed in the office of the clerk of the court of the county cause the grand jury in attendance on the superior court at Providence for the counties of Providence and Bristol to attend continuously for all or any part of its session in between the second Monday in September and the second Monday in July of the following year and also during all or any part of its vacation from the second Monday in July to the second Monday in September in each year, when in the discretion of the presiding justice or any other justice of the superior court for the counties it is for the public interest and the proper administration of justice to do so.

History of Section. P.L. 1920, ch. 148, § 39; G.L. 1923, ch. 329, § 39; P.L. 1931, ch. 1774, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 506, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 506, § 35; P.L. 1939, ch. 700, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3622, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3729, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-11-2 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 221, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Residence of Jurors.

By the enactment of this section the legislature expressly provided that the jurisdiction of the grand jury should be coextensive with that of the court when sitting for the counties of Providence and Bristol, both counties being treated as a single unit, and therefore statute which authorized residents of Bristol County to serve on grand jury sitting in Providence County was not unconstitutional. State v. Edwards, 89 R.I. 378 , 153 A.2d 153, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1959).

12-11-3. Attendance on court — Newport, Kent, and Washington counties.

  1. The grand jury shall attend the superior court:
    1. At Newport, for the county of Newport, on the second Mondays of September and June and the fourth Mondays of November and March in each year, unless at least ten (10) days prior to the day on which a grand jury is to commence its term the presiding justice orders in writing that a grand jury shall not be summoned for that term;
    2. At Warwick or at any other place in the county of Kent that may be designated by the presiding justice, for the county of Kent, on the third Monday of September, the first Monday of December, the second Monday of April and the fourth Monday of June in each year, unless at least ten (10) days prior to the day on which a grand jury is to commence its term the presiding justice orders in writing that a grand jury shall not be summoned for that term; and
    3. At South Kingstown, for the county of Washington, on the first Mondays of October and April, the second Monday of December and the third Monday of June, unless at least ten (10) days prior to the day on which a grand jury is to commence its term the presiding justice orders in writing that a grand jury shall not be summoned for that term.
  2. The presiding justice or any other justice of the superior court may at the request of the attorney general in writing filed in the office of the clerk of the county cause any grand juries attending the superior court for any of those counties to attend continuously for all or any part of its session and also during all or any part of its vacation, when in the discretion of the presiding justice or any other justice of the superior court for the county it is for the public interest and the proper administration of justice to do so.

History of Section. P.L. 1920, ch. 1948, § 39; G.L. 1923, ch. 329, § 39; P.L. 1931, ch. 1774, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 506, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 506, § 35; P.L. 1939, ch. 700, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3622, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3729, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-11-3 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 221, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 18, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection and subdivision designations.

12-11-3.1. Additional county grand juries.

Whenever the attorney general shall make application in writing, the presiding justice may order the impaneling of additional county grand juries to attend the superior court at such places and for any time, but not to exceed six (6) months, that he or she directs, and the county grand juries may sit simultaneously.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 319, § 1.

12-11-4. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1920, ch. 1948, § 39; G.L. 1923, ch. 329, § 39; P.L. 1931, ch. 1774, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 506, § 37; G.L., ch. 506, § 35; P.L. 1939, ch. 700, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3622, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3729, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-11-4 ), concerning the return day of recognizances and the summoning of the jury at any time, was repealed by P.L. 1974, ch. 221, § 3.

12-11-5. Administration of oaths to witnesses.

The foreperson of every grand jury shall have full power and authority to administer all necessary oaths and affirmations to witnesses who shall be examined before the grand jury.

History of Section. P.L. 1920, ch. 1948, § 34; G.L. 1923, ch. 329, § 34; G.L. 1938, ch. 506, § 32; G.L., ch. 506, § 30; P.L. 1939, ch. 700, § 1; G.L. 1956; § 12-11-5 .

Cross References.

Power to administer oaths. § 36-2-3 .

Chapter 11.1 Statewide Grand Juries

12-11.1-1. Statewide grand jury — Size and powers.

A statewide grand jury shall consist of not less than thirteen (13) nor more than twenty-three (23) persons. The jurisdiction of a statewide grand jury shall extend throughout the state and it may investigate and return indictments for crimes committed any place within the state. A statewide grand jury shall in all other respects possess the usual powers and duties of county grand juries.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 221, § 4.

Collateral References.

Civil liability of witness in action under 42 USC § 1983 for deprivation of civil rights, based on testimony given at pretrial criminal proceeding. 94 A.L.R. Fed. 892.

Duty of prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to state grand jury. 49 A.L.R.5th 639.

12-11.1-2. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1974, ch. 221, § 4), concerning regular statewide grand jury, was repealed by P.L. 1983, ch. 46, § 1.

12-11.1-3. Statewide grand juries — Impaneling.

Whenever the attorney general makes application in writing, the presiding justice shall order the impaneling of a statewide grand jury to attend the superior court at any places and for any period, not exceeding eighteen (18) months, that he or she directs. The attorney general may apply for the impaneling of as many statewide grand juries as he or she deems necessary.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 221, § 4; P.L. 1983, ch. 46, § 2.

12-11.1-4. Composition — Secretary of state required to inform jury commissioner.

A statewide grand jury shall be selected at random from the names of all prospective grand jurors appearing on current lists compiled pursuant to chapter 9 of title 9. In selecting the jurors, the jury commissioner shall select from each county a number of grand jurors which shall bear to the total number of grand jurors to be selected the same proportion as the current number of voters from the county bears to the total current number of voters for the state as a whole. For purposes of this section, Providence and Bristol counties shall be considered one county, and the size of the statewide grand jury shall be considered as twenty-three (23) members; provided, the actual size of the statewide grand jury shall conform to the provisions of § 12-11-1 and Rule 6(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 221, § 4; P.L. 1977, ch. 94, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 324, § 1.

12-11.1-5. When county grand jury in attendance.

A statewide grand jury may attend the superior court and exercise all of its powers in a county even though a regular county grand jury is simultaneously in attendance in the county. The attendance of a statewide grand jury at the same time as a county grand jury shall not affect or diminish the powers of a county grand jury.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 221, § 4.

Cross References.

County grand juries, § 12-11-1 et seq.

12-11.1-5.1. Unlawful grand jury disclosure.

  1. Any person who, when being a grand juror, a public prosecutor, a grand jury stenographer, a grand jury interpreter, a police officer or a peace officer guarding a witness in a grand jury proceeding, or a clerk, attendant, warden or other public servant having official duties in or about a grand jury room or proceeding, or a public officer or public employee, obtains information in his or her official capacity and intentionally discloses, prior to the report of the grand jury on the matter, to another the nature or substance of any grand jury testimony, or any decision, result, or other matter attending a grand jury proceeding which is required by law to be kept secret, except in the proper discharge of his or her official duties or upon written order of the court shall be guilty of grand jury disclosure. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a witness from disclosing his or her own testimony.
  2. Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000) or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 277, § 1.

Chapter 12 Indictments, Informations and Complaints

12-12-1. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-1 ) was repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 20.

12-12-1.1. Capital or life offenses.

An offense which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offense which may be punished by a term of life imprisonment shall be prosecuted by indictment unless the defendant, with the consent of the attorney general and leave of the court, waives indictment, in which event it may be prosecuted by information.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

Cross References.

Arraignment of persons presented, § 8-2-35 .

Return of indictments to superior court, § 8-2-15 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Elimination of Technicalities.

The legislature eliminated strict technicality in pleading in enacting this chapter. State v. McParlin, 422 A.2d 742, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1853 (R.I. 1980).

12-12-1.2. Felonies — Less than capital or life, penalty.

Except for offenses punishable by death or by a term of life imprisonment or offenses arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia in actual service in time of war or public danger, an offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and/or by a fine exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) may be prosecuted by indictment or information signed by the attorney general or one of the attorney general’s designated assistants.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11; P.L. 1986, ch. 318, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Assault With a Dangerous Weapon.

Assault with a dangerous weapon is not punishable either by death or by life imprisonment but is governed by the provisions of § 11-5-2 , which provides for a maximum penalty of ten years’ imprisonment; therefore, it is a crime that is clearly within the constitutional and statutory provisions permitting prosecution by information at the option of the Attorney General. Consequently, no waiver of indictment by a defendant charged with assault with a dangerous weapon is necessary under the provisions of Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. Rule 7(b). State v. Bianco, 501 A.2d 1183, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 607 (R.I. 1985).

Brendan’s Law.

Since a conviction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5.3 carried a minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-1.2 , a prosecution for violation of the statute could only be commenced via an information or indictment, and the felony complaint filed against defendant did not commence the prosecution. It merely provided an instrument under which bail could be set. State v. Jennings, 944 A.2d 171, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 35 (R.I. 2008).

Prosecution by Information.

When the felony is not punishable by death or life imprisonment, the state may choose to prosecute by information. State v. Padula, 551 A.2d 687, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 146 (R.I. 1988).

A plea was not invalid since the defendant was charged with possession of heroin with intent to deliver by criminal information rather than by indictment, since his offense fell within that category of offenses not punishable by death or life imprisonment. State v. Desir, 766 A.2d 374, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 42 (R.I. 2001).

12-12-1.3. Lesser offenses, penalty.

An offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) may be prosecuted by complaint.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11; P.L. 1986, ch. 269, § 1.

12-12-1.4. Contents of indictments, informations and complaints.

An indictment, information, or complaint shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the offense charged. An indictment, information, or complaint which provides the defendant and the court with adequate notice of the offense being charged shall be sufficient if the offense is charged either:

  1. By using the name given to the offense in terms of either the common law or by statute; or
  2. By stating the definition of the offense in terms of substantially the same meaning.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

Cross References.

Contents of indictment, information, complaint, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

This section is a codification of the well settled principle that the language of a complaint must be phrased so as to give a defendant adequate notice of the offense with which he is charged. State v. Hendershot, 415 A.2d 1047, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1650 (R.I. 1980).

Although a permissible practice, charging defendant with two separate counts of first-degree robbery is not the ideal manner in which to draft an indictment, and the rules are intended to discourage that practice; the preferable manner is to charge a single offense as one count, setting forth multiple theories that may be alleged. State v. Matthews, 88 A.3d 375, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 38 (R.I. 2014).

Joinder of Counts.

An indictment which charges the same offense in two different counts is not defective. State v. Doyle, 15 R.I. 527 , 9 A. 900, 1887 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1887).

Marital Status.

Though marital status need not be shown, an erroneous description of the defendant’s status is ground for abatement. State v. Daly, 14 R.I. 510 , 1884 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1884).

Specific Offenses.
— Murder.

The fact that defendant’s indictment referred to § 11-23-1 and stated that he “did murder” was constitutionally sufficient to give notice to him of a pending charge for first degree murder based on a premeditation theory. State v. Lanigan, 528 A.2d 310, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 520 (R.I. 1987).

Specificity of Counts Alleging Multiple Offenses.

Where, in an indictment charging various counts of sexual assault and child molestation, it was not clear whether the defendant was charged with a single act or multiple acts in each count, and a bill of particulars did not clarify, but affirmed the duplicity in some of the counts, convictions returned on the latter counts were vacated. State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 233 (R.I. 1998).

Sufficiency of Charge.

Complaint, which charged defendant with taking shellfish “from a polluted area” in violation of former §§ 21-14-4 — 21-14-8 was not subject to demurrer, since it was clear that the words “from a polluted area” were used in the sense appearing in the statute. State v. Merritt, 84 R.I. 313 , 124 A.2d 540, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1956).

Where the language of the complaint is sufficient to inform the defendant of the offense with which he is charged, the complaint is not demurrable. State v. McGuire, 90 R.I. 191 , 156 A.2d 496, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 135 (1959).

Where the complaint in no manner disclosed whether the unreasonable operation with which the defendant was charged was in excess of the speed limits provided in § 31-14-2 or resulted from a failure to reduce speed in the face of one of the hazards provided for in § 31-14-3 , it was obviously so vague and indefinite as to be violative of the Rhode Island Const. art. 1, § 10 and not within the contemplation of this section and must be dismissed. State v. Brown, 97 R.I. 115 , 196 A.2d 133, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 131 (1963).

Where the statute required a pharmacist to retain certain records with reference to the purchase of certain drugs for a specified time, an indictment charging him with failure to keep such records was sufficient. State v. Reardon, 101 R.I. 18 , 219 A.2d 767, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 344 (1966).

Sufficiency of Complaint.

A complaint charging defendant by using the name given to the offense by statute and by further specifically referring to the statute fully complied with the requirements of this section as well as with state and federal constitutional requirements. State v. Tweedie, 444 A.2d 855, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 850 (R.I. 1982).

Use of Technical Terms.

If the indictment charges an offense known to the common law in technical words which admit of but one meaning, the defendant’s constitutional guaranty is fully satisfied. State v. Domanski, 57 R.I. 500 , 190 A. 854, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1937).

Waiver of Defect.

The defendant by entering a plea waived a misnomer in the complaint. State v. Drury, 13 R.I. 540 , 1882 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1882); State v. O'Brien, 18 R.I. 105 , 25 A. 910, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1892).

Collateral References.

Identification of victim as person named in indictment or information. 86 A.L.R.2d 722.

Necessity and materiality of statement of place of death in indictment or information charging homicide. 59 A.L.R.2d 901.

Necessity of alleging in indictment or information limitation-tolling facts. 52 A.L.R.3d 922.

Sufficiency of indictment, information, or other form of criminal complaint, omitting or misstating middle name or initial of person named therein. 15 A.L.R.3d 968.

12-12-1.5. Informations — Exhibits to be attached.

When an offense is prosecuted by information, the attorney general shall attach to the information any exhibits, such as affidavits sworn to before the attorney general or one of his or her designated assistants, documents, photographs, recordings, or other materials or copies of them, upon which the attorney general relies to demonstrate the existence of probable cause to believe that the offense charged in the information has been committed and that the defendant committed it.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Exhibits.

Neither statutory requirements nor constitutional guarantees mandate the obtaining of affidavits from the complaining witness by the Attorney General’s office when prosecution is sought through information charging. State v. O'Brien, 441 A.2d 532, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 805 (R.I. 1982).

12-12-1.6. Defendant to receive copy of information.

A copy of the information and all exhibits appended to it shall be served on the defendant promptly after it is filed with the clerk of the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

12-12-1.7. Motion to dismiss information.

Within thirty (30) days after a defendant is served with a copy of an information charging him or her with an offense, he or she may move in the superior court to dismiss the information on the ground that the information and exhibits appended to it do not demonstrate the existence of probable cause to believe that the offense charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it. Upon the filing of the motion to dismiss the court shall schedule a hearing to be held within a reasonable time.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11; P.L. 2008, ch. 226, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Motion After Plea.

When a motion to quash is not made prior to a plea of not guilty, or simultaneously therewith, the court consenting, such a motion is addressed to the discretion of the court, which will be sustained if not abused. State v. Cucca, 102 R.I. 95 , 228 A.2d 572, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 651 (1967).

Probable Cause.

The probable-cause standard to be applied under this section is the same as that for an arrest. State v. Jenison, 442 A.2d 866, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 814 (R.I. 1982).

Whether in the Family Court or Superior Court, when addressing a motion to dismiss a criminal information, a trial justice is required to examine the information and any attached exhibits to determine whether the state has satisfied its burden to establish probable cause to believe that the offense charged was committed and that the defendant committed it. In performing this function, the trial justice should grant the state the “benefit of every reasonable inference” in favor of a finding of probable cause. State v. Strom, 941 A.2d 837, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 2008).

Any deficiency that may have existed in the criminal information package did not rise to the level of an absence of probable cause and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because, following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty on both counts charged in the criminal information. State v. Ceppi, 91 A.3d 320, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 70 (R.I. 2014).

Standard of Review.

In reviewing the decision of the justice below on a motion to dismiss, his findings are entitled to great weight and will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous or fail to do justice between the parties. State v. Ouimette, 415 A.2d 1052, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1653 (R.I. 1980).

Time for Filing.

There is an apparent dichotomy between R.I. Gen. L. § 12-12-1.7 , which provides that the defendant has ten days to file a motion to dismiss the information, and R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 9 .1, which provides for thirty days. The court rule trumps the statutory provision when in conflict. State v. Young, 941 A.2d 124, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2008).

12-12-1.8. Hearing to determine probable cause.

At the probable cause hearing the information and exhibits appended to it shall be before the court. The defendant may call witnesses and may introduce evidence bearing on the question of the existence of probable cause to charge him or her. The state may not call witnesses, introduce evidence, or otherwise supplement the exhibits appended to the information unless the court grants leave to do so.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Whether in the Family Court or Superior Court, when addressing a motion to dismiss a criminal information, a trial justice is required to examine the information and any attached exhibits to determine whether the state has satisfied its burden to establish probable cause to believe that the offense charged was committed and that the defendant committed it. In performing this function, the trial justice should grant the state the “benefit of every reasonable inference” in favor of a finding of probable cause. State v. Strom, 941 A.2d 837, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 2008).

12-12-1.9. Determining whether probable cause exists.

After conducting the hearing the court shall determine from an examination of the information and exhibits appended to it, and in light of any evidence presented at the hearing, whether there exists probable cause to believe that the offense charged has been committed and that defendant committed it. A finding of the existence of probable cause may be based in whole or in part upon hearsay evidence or on evidence which may ultimately be ruled to be inadmissible at the trial.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Abuse of Discretion.

The dismissal of a portion of the information was vacated where the trial justice failed to consider evidence, including evidence obtained from surveillance of the defendant and from informants, that supported the inference of the defendant’s intent to sell cocaine. State v. Reed, 764 A.2d 144, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 2001).

12-12-1.10. Dismissal of information — Effect.

If the court dismisses the information on the ground that the state has not demonstrated the existence of probable cause to believe that the offense charged has been committed or that defendant committed it the state may not after dismissal proceed against the defendant for the same offense, unless:

  1. On appeal the order of dismissal is reversed; or
  2. The court, upon motion of the state and a finding of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, the discovery of new evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered at the time the hearing on probable cause was held, or any other reason justifying the relief, enters an order permitting the state to proceed against the defendant for the same offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Whether in the Family Court or Superior Court, when addressing a motion to dismiss a criminal information, a trial justice is required to examine the information and any attached exhibits to determine whether the state has satisfied its burden to establish probable cause to believe that the offense charged was committed and that the defendant committed it. In performing this function, the trial justice should grant the state the “benefit of every reasonable inference” in favor of a finding of probable cause. State v. Strom, 941 A.2d 837, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 2008).

Dismissal.

Trial justice committed clear error by sua sponte dismissing a criminal information against defendant as defendant did not file a motion to dismiss, and the trial court failed to follow the procedural rules applicable to dismissals. By prohibiting the Attorney General from fully prosecuting the felony information in violation of R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 9 .1, the trial justice clearly erred and deprived the State of a fair proceeding. State v. Strom, 941 A.2d 837, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 2008).

12-12-1.11. “Indictment” construed.

Whenever “indictment” appears in the general or public laws or in rules of court, it includes the expression “information filed by the attorney general or one of the attorney general’s designated assistants,” except where ascribing that meaning to the term “indictment” is inconsistent with the intent or the manner in which the term was used or otherwise is inappropriate.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-12-2. Process in fictitious name or by description.

In case the name of the person to be proceeded against is unknown, the indictment, information, complaint, warrant, or other criminal process may be found or issued against him or her by a fictitious name or by any description that the prosecutor or complainant may select, and the error or defect may be afterwards amended by the court.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, §§ 2, 3; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-2 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

When a person who allegedly committed criminal acts is known, and he is positively identified by his accuser and himself as the person who perpetrated those acts, his name is superfluous to the trial of that crime. State v. O'Brien, 122 R.I. 749 , 412 A.2d 231, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1469 (1980).

Collateral References.

Propriety of use of fictitious name of defendant in federal district court. 139 A.L.R. Fed. 553.

12-12-3. Formal defects in process not ground for abatement or quashing.

No indictment, information, complaint or criminal process shall be abated or quashed for any want of form, or because it omits to allege that the offense was committed or the act was done “feloniously,” “burglariously,” “willfully,” “maliciously,” or with “malice aforethought,” “unlawfully,” “negligently,” or with “force and arms,” or because it omits to characterize similarly the manner of the commission of the offense, or because it omits to allege the means by which the offense was committed or omits to allege the time and place of the commission of the offense, unless the description, characterization, means, time, or place is an essential element of the offense; provided, that it contains such allegation of the offense that the accused is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 3, as enacted by P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 3; P.L. 1932, ch. 1954, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-3 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

Rules of Court.

Harmless error, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 52.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Ambiguous Description of Crime.

This section applies to matters of form only but does not reach substantial defects, so that a motion in arrest of judgment will be sustained where an indictment charging libel is ambiguous. State v. Corbett, 12 R.I. 288 , 1879 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1879).

Date of Presentment.

Court could take judicial notice of the date of presentment of an indictment so as to render admissible evidence of continuance of offense up to time of presentment. State v. Germain, 47 R.I. 269 , 132 A. 734, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1926).

Mistake in Reference.

In an action for violation of a no-contact order, the information’s reference to a temporary order in lieu of the permanent order was a mere formal defect, not a substantive one, and therefore did not constitute grounds for abating or quashing the information. State v. Bruneau, 822 A.2d 911, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 112 (R.I. 2003).

Name of State.

To bring a complaint merely in the name of “the state” instead of in the name of “the state of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations” is at most merely a defect in form and the validity of the complaint is saved by this section. State v. Raposa, 107 R.I. 712 , 271 A.2d 306, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 831 (1970).

Collateral References.

Necessity of alleging in information or indictment that act was “unlawful.” 169 A.L.R. 166.

12-12-4 — 12-12-9. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, §§ 3, 4; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 3; P.L. 1932, ch. 1954, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 3; G.L. 1956, §§ 12-12-4 — 12-12-9; P.L. 1970, ch. 307, § 1), concerning amendment of process, form of indictments, methods of alleging offenses, and bills of particulars, were repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 20. For new law, see § 12-12-1.4 and Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 7.

12-12-10. Variances of proof and immaterial mistakes.

A defendant shall not be acquitted or discharged on the ground of variance between the allegation and proof if the essential elements of the crime are correctly stated in the indictment, information, or complaint, unless the defendant is prejudiced in his or her defense by the variance. The defendant shall not be acquitted or discharged by reason of an immaterial misnomer of a third party, by reason of an immaterial mistake in the description of the property or its ownership, by reason of failure to prove unnecessary allegations in the description of the crime, or by reason of any other immaterial mistake in the indictment, information, or complaint.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 4; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-10 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Grounds for Reversal.

Under this section, as long as the essential elements of the crimes charged are stated in the indictment or information, a defendant’s conviction may be reversed only where the variance is prejudicial to his defense. State v. Markarian, 551 A.2d 1178, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 149 (R.I. 1988).

Immaterial Variances.

Since the essential elements of the crimes were set forth in the indictment, the clerical errors in respect to the amounts of the notes and the name of one of the parties did not constitute material variances. State v. Mollicone, 654 A.2d 311, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 1995).

Legislative Intent.

The legislature intended to require some showing of actual prejudice in order to discharge a defendant for variance. State v. McParlin, 422 A.2d 742, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1853 (R.I. 1980).

Location of Offense.

Where defendant moved to quash the indictment on the ground there was a variance between the indictment charging the defendant with a murder committed in Providence County and the proof relied upon which showed only that he took part in the beatings inflicted upon the decedent in Bristol County, the discrepancy between the averment and proof did not affect defendant’s substantial rights and, in order to be considered, such objections must be raised with clarity and particularity in the court below. State v. Harris, 111 R.I. 147 , 300 A.2d 267, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1189 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1008, 94 S. Ct. 369, 38 L. Ed. 2d 245, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 1300 (1973).

Misnomer.

An indictment cannot be amended to change the first name of the person against whom the crime was committed unless the defendant consents to the amendment or unless it is made in the presence of and with the concurrence of the grand jury. State v. McCarty, 17 R.I. 370 , 22 A. 282, 1891 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1891).

No Prejudice.

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the conspiracy charge where defendant was aware that the State intended to offer evidence of his involvement with another around a certain time and was not subjected to any surprise or prejudice from the evidence introduced at trial. State v. Grullon, 984 A.2d 46, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 139 (R.I. 2009).

Waiver of Defects.

By pleading to the complaint, defendant waived a variance between the dates in the jurat and the warrant. Cummings v. Church, 50 R.I. 71 , 145 A. 102, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1929).

Collateral References.

Naming offense covered by allegations of specific facts, error in. 121 A.L.R. 1088.

Sufficiency of indictment, information, or other form of criminal complaint, omitting or misstating middle name or initial of person named therein. 15 A.L.R.3d 968.

12-12-11. Conditions not required to be negated in allegations.

An excuse, exception, or proviso which is not stated in the enacting clause of a statute creating a crime, or which is stated only by reference to other provisions of the statute, need not be negated in the indictment, information, or complaint unless it is necessary for a complete definition of the crime. If a statute which creates a crime permits an act, which is declared to be criminal, to be performed without criminality under stated conditions, the conditions need not be negated.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 5; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-11 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Legislative Intent.

This section was intended as a reform of criminal pleading and did not purport to introduce a new rule of criminal evidence or alter the well-established principles of the substance law of crimes. State v. St. Angelo, 72 R.I. 412 , 52 A.2d 513, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1947).

Proof of Negative Averments.

This section does not absolve the state from the obligation to prove a negative averment set out in indictment where it constitutes an element of the offense. State v. St. Angelo, 72 R.I. 412 , 52 A.2d 513, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1947).

Collateral References.

Burden of averment as to exception in criminal statute on which the prosecution is based. 153 A.L.R. 1218.

Necessity of alleging in indictment or information limitation-tolling facts. 52 A.L.R.3d 992.

12-12-12. Description of written instruments.

If an allegation relative to a written instrument which consists wholly or in part of writing, print, or figures is necessary in any indictment, information, or complaint, the indictment, information, or complaint may describe the instrument by any name or designation by which it is usually known, or by its purport, without setting out a copy or facsimile of the whole or of any part; and no variance between the recital or description and the instrument produced at the trial shall be material if the identity of the instrument is evident and its purport is sufficiently described to prevent prejudice to the defendant.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 6; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-12 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

12-12-13. Allegations as to form of money.

If any allegation relative to any bullion, money, notes, bank notes, checks, drafts, bills of exchange, obligations, or other securities for money, of any country, state, county, city, town, bank, corporation, partnership, or person is necessary in any indictment, information, or complaint, the indictment, information, or complaint may describe it as money to a certain amount without specifying any particulars, and this descriptive allegation shall be sustained by proof of any amount of bullion, money, notes, or other securities for money, although its particular nature shall not be proved.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 7; P.L. 1915, ch. 1262, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-13 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

Collateral References.

Power of court to make or permit amendment of indictment with respect to allegations as to money. 16 A.L.R.3d 1076.

12-12-14. Allegations as to statutory larceny.

In prosecutions under §§ 11-41-3 , 11-41-4 , and 11-41-11 , it shall be sufficient to allege generally in the indictment, information, or complaint a stealing of money to a certain amount, or property of a certain value, without specifying any particulars of the stealing, and it shall be sufficient to maintain the charge in the indictment, information, or complaint, and it shall not be deemed a variance, if it is proved that any bullion, money, notes, bank notes, check, draft, bill of exchange, or other security or money, or other property of whatever amount, was stolen, embezzled, fraudulently appropriated, converted, or was obtained, received, taken or secreted by false pretenses or otherwise, with intent to cheat, defraud, embezzle, or fraudulently convert by the person prosecuted.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 8; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-14 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11; P.L. 1988, ch. 15, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Indictment for embezzlement which alleged generally all essential elements of crime without specifying any particulars did not violate R.I. Const., art. 1, § 10 or the due process clause of U.S. Const., amend. 14, even though such indictment did not give notice of the time when the offense was committed. State v. Davis, 39 R.I. 276 , 97 A. 818, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1916).

This section sets forth two periods of limitation for the proffer of evidence in connection with violations of §§ 11-41-3 (embezzlement and fraudulent conversion), 11-41-4 (obtaining property by false pretenses or personation), and 11-41-11 (embezzlement by bank officer or employee); the state may offer proof of the designated offenses for a period of three years before the bringing of an indictment, information, or complaint, and alternatively or additionally, the state may offer proof of the designated offenses within six months after the time stated in said indictment, information, or complaint. Therefore, a conviction predicated upon proof of facts that occurred more than three years before the bringing of an indictment must be reversed. State v. Ricci, 533 A.2d 844, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 564 (R.I. 1987).

Bill of Particulars.

Accused was entitled to be informed by bill of particulars or other specification whether prosecution would attempt to prove, as the offense of embezzlement charged, a single act or a series of takings. State v. Davis, 39 R.I. 276 , 97 A. 818, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1916).

Collateral References.

False pretenses, sufficiency of indictment or information in prosecution for, charging that defendant obtained money and also that he received and cashed a check, note, etc. 141 A.L.R. 220.

Larceny of real property or things savoring of real property, indictment for. 131 A.L.R. 146.

Theft of property, or receiving stolen property, belonging to different persons. 18 A.L.R. 1077.

12-12-15. Allegations in perjury indictments or informations.

In every indictment or information for perjury or subornation of perjury, or incitement to perjury, it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged upon the defendant, and by what court or before whom the oath or affirmation was taken, averring the court or person to have had competent authority to administer it, together with the proper averment or averments to falsify the matter in which the perjury is assigned, without setting forth any part of any record or proceeding, other than as above mentioned, and without setting forth the commission or authority of the court, or person or persons before whom the perjury was committed or was agreed, promised, procured, or incited to be committed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 9; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-15 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Foreign Language Testimony.

Where defendant spoke in foreign language, it was sufficient to set out in the indictment the substance in English of his testimony. State v. Terline, 23 R.I. 530 , 51 A. 204, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 147 (1902).

Form of Action.

Indictment did not need to allege with particularity the form of the action in which the false testimony was given. State v. Miller, 26 R.I. 282 , 58 A. 882, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1904).

Variance of Proof.

Proof that defendant testified that he stood at the corner of Spruce and Acorn streets, whereas indictment alleged that he testified that he stood at the corner of Spruce and Sutton streets was not a fatal variance, where the vital question was not whether he stood at the particular corner, but whether he swore falsely to the acts of another person. State v. Terline, 23 R.I. 530 , 51 A. 204, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 147 (1902).

Collateral References.

Description in indictment for perjury of proceeding in which perjury was committed. 24 A.L.R. 1137.

Privilege against self incrimination before grand jury as affecting validity of perjury indictment. 38 A.L.R.2d 285.

12-12-16. Allegations as to property held jointly, in common, or by partners.

In every indictment, information or complaint for any felony or misdemeanor, whenever it shall be requisite to state the ownership of any property whatsoever, whether real or personal, which shall belong to or be in possession of more than one person, whether the persons are partners in trade, joint tenants, tenants in common, members of joint stock companies, or trustees, and whenever it shall be necessary to mention, for any purpose whatsoever, any partners, joint tenants, tenants in common, members of joint stock companies, or trustees, it shall be sufficient to name one of the persons and state the property to belong to the person so named the and another or others, as the case may be.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 10; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-16 .

Collateral References.

Husband or wife, laying ownership of property in. 2 A.L.R. 352.

Incorporation or legal entity of owner of property not a natural person, necessity of alleging. 88 A.L.R. 485.

12-12-17. Statute of limitations.

  1. There shall be no statute of limitations for the following offenses: treason against the state; any homicide, arson, first-degree arson, second-degree arson, third-degree arson, burglary, counterfeiting, forgery, robbery, rape, first-degree sexual assault, first-degree child molestation sexual assault, second-degree child molestation sexual assault, bigamy; manufacturing, selling, distribution, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or distribute, a controlled substance under the Uniform Controlled Substance Act, chapter 28 of title 21; or any other offense for which the maximum penalty provided is life imprisonment.
  2. The statute of limitations for the following offenses shall be ten (10) years: larceny under § 11-41-2 (receiving stolen goods), § 11-41-3 (embezzlement and fraudulent conversion), § 11-41-4 (obtaining property by false pretenses or personation), § 11-41-11 (embezzlement by bank officer or employee), § 11-41-12 (fraudulent conversion by agent or factor), and § 11-41-13 (obtaining signature by false pretenses), or any larceny that is punishable as a felony; any violation of chapter 7 of title 11 (bribery); any violation of § 11-18-1 (giving false document to agent, employee, or public official); perjury; any violation of chapter 42 of title 11 (threats and extortion); any violation of chapter 15 of title 7 (racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations); any violation of chapter 57 of title 11 (racketeer violence); any violation of chapter 36 of title 6 (antitrust law); any violation of § 11-68-2 (exploitation of an elder); any violation of § 11-41-11.1 (unlawful appropriation); any violation of § 11-18-6 (false financial statement to obtain loan or credit); any violation of § 19-9-28 (false statement to obtain a loan); any violation of § 19-9-29 (bank fraud); or any violation of § 11-18-34 (residential mortgage fraud).
  3. The statute of limitations for any other criminal offense shall be three (3) years, unless a longer statute of limitations is otherwise provided for in the general laws.
  4. Any person who participates in any offense, either as a principal accessory or conspirator, shall be subject to the same statute of limitations as if the person had committed the substantive offense.
  5. The statute of limitations for any violation of chapter 18.9 of title 23 (refuse disposal), chapter 19 of title 23 (solid waste management corporation), chapter 19.1 of title 23 (hazardous waste management), chapter 12 of title 46 (water pollution), and chapter 13 of title 46 (public drinking water supply) shall be seven (7) years from the time that the facts constituting the offense or violation shall have become known to law enforcement authorities, unless a longer statute of limitations is otherwise provided for in the general laws.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 33; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 33; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 12; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 12; P.L. 1950, ch. 2463, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-17 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11; P.L. 1981, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 62, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 195, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 15, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 535, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 284, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 270, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 310, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 133, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 146, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 270, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 310, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 133, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 146, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Animal disease violations, limitation of prosecutions, § 4-4-26 .

Fines for use of complainant, limitation on actions to recover, § 12-21-2 .

Fireworks violations, limitations, § 11-13-2 .

Temporary disability insurance violations, limitation of prosecutions, § 28-39-32 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be raised at or before trial or it is waived. State v. Lambrechts, 585 A.2d 645, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 16 (R.I. 1991).

Prior finding that a confined juvenile who refused to participate in required psychiatric treatment was in civil contempt did not preclude, on double jeopardy grounds, a later prosecution for criminal contempt based on continued noncompliance; furthermore, the prosecution was not untimely, because there were repeated orders that the juvenile comply with the treatment plan, all of which were ignored. State v. Price, 820 A.2d 956, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 99 (R.I. 2003).

Embezzlement.

Since embezzlement is defined as larceny, prosecution therefor is not barred by the statute. Williams v. Smith, 28 R.I. 531 , 68 A. 306, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1907).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Inmate was not entitled to postconviction relief based on the alleged ineffective assistance of the inmate’s counsel in failing to raise a statute of limitations defense to the inmate’s child molestation convictions because (1) the defense was waived since the defense was not raised at trial, on appeal, or in the inmate’s initial postconviction-relief application, and (2) an amendment to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-17 excepted child molestation from that statute of limitations. Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 142 (R.I. 2011).

Lesser-Included Offenses.

A murder defendant is not entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction on manslaughter, where the statute of limitations bars prosecution for the lesser offense and there is no risk of capital punishment. State v. Sullivan, 541 A.2d 450, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 58 (R.I. 1988).

Collateral References.

Issuance or service of state-court arrest warrant, summons, citation, or other process as tolling criminal statute of limitations. 71 A.L.R.4th 554.

Necessity of alleging in indictment or information limitation-tolling facts. 52 A.L.R.3d 922.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes eliminating, extending, or rolling statute of limitations for sexual offense when DNA can provide identity of alleged perpetrator. 16 A.L.R.7th Art. 7 (2016).

Waivability of bar of limitations against criminal prosecution. 78 A.L.R.4th 693.

When does statute of limitations begin to run against civil action or criminal prosecution for conspiracy. 62 A.L.R.2d 1369.

When statute of limitations begins to run against criminal prosecution for embezzlement, fraud, false pretenses, or similar crimes. 77 A.L.R.3d 689.

When statute of limitations begins to run on charge of obstructing justice or of conspiring to do so. 77 A.L.R.3d 725.

12-12-18. Period of limitations extended by theft, loss or destruction of indictment or information.

If any indictment found or information filed within the time limited in and by this chapter shall be stolen, lost, or destroyed before a judgment shall have been rendered, a new indictment may be found or information filed for the same offense at any time within one year after the theft, loss or destruction of the original indictment or information.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 34; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 34; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 13; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-18 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Third Indictment.

This section did not validate a third indictment where the second indictment was not found within the three-year period and the third indictment was not found within one year of the first indictment, even though the second indictment was found within one year of the first and the third indictment was found within one year of the second. State v. Hazard, 8 R.I. 273 , 1866 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1866).

12-12-19. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 80; P.L. 1931, ch. 1759, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 73; P.L. 1942, ch. 1152, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-12-19 ) was repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 20. For new law, see Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 7.

12-12-20. Original and duplicates of charges to be filed.

In each and every criminal prosecution the original and duplicate of all complaints, warrants, informations, and/or indictments shall be filed with the appropriate court.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 262, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 19; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 11.

12-12-21. “Designated assistants” defined.

“Designated assistants” as used in this chapter means any one of the attorneys employed full time by the attorney general, including, but not limited to, the positions of assistant attorney general, special assistant attorney general, and special counsel, who has been designated by the attorney general as an attorney authorized to prosecute by information charging. The attorney general shall file notice of his or her designations with the secretary of state and the clerk of the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 251, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-12-22. Arraignments and pleas — Notices to aliens.

  1. At the time of criminal arraignment in the district or superior court, each defendant shall be informed that if he or she is an alien in the United States, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may affect his or her immigration status. Failure to so inform the defendant at the arraignment shall not invalidate any action subsequently taken by the court.
  2. Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in the district or superior court, the court shall inform the defendant that if he or she is not a citizen of the United States, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may have immigration consequences, including deportation, exclusion of admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States. Upon request, the court shall allow the defendant additional time to consider the appropriateness of the plea in light of this advisement.
  3. If the court fails to so inform the defendant as required by this section, and the defendant later shows that his plea and conviction may have immigration consequences, the defendant shall be entitled, upon a proper petition for post-conviction relief, to have the plea vacated. Absent a record that the court provided the advisement required by this section, the defendant shall be presumed not have received the advisement.
  4. The defendant shall not be required at the time of the plea to disclose to the court his or her legal status in the United States.
  5. In the first week of January, 2001 and each year thereafter, the attorney general shall submit to the general assembly a list of cases in which a disposition was vacated pursuant to this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 123, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 500, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 501, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2000, ch. 500, § 2, and P.L. 2000, ch. 501, § 2 provided that the amendment of this section by those Acts expires on January 15, 2003. However, P.L. 2000, ch. 501, § 2 was amended by P.L. 2003, ch. 1, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 2, § 1, to delete the provision relating to the expiration of the amendment.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

The version of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-22 as amended in 2000, which allowed for vacation of guilty pleas entered in the absence of an advisement regarding possible immigration repercussions, did not apply retroactively to defendant, who pled nolo contendere a few days before the statute took effect; since defendant believed defendant’s mother’s naturalization had made defendant a citizen, the trial justice was under no duty to inquire further, and defendant was not entitled to post-conviction relief from the plea. Tavarez v. State, 826 A.2d 941, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 59 (R.I. 2003).

Federal habeas petitioner could not have reasonably relied upon the availability of discretionary relief at the time he pleaded guilty to a second aggravated felony in a Rhode Island state court in 1994, given the advisement under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-22(b) of potential immigration consequences, including deportation that petitioner could face. Melo v. Ashcroft, 364 F. Supp. 2d 183, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6429 (D.R.I. 2005).

While R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-22(b) requires trial courts to advise defendants of the immigration consequences of a plea of nolo contendere, it was enacted years after defendant’s conviction and is not applied retroactively. And as defendant received a fair warning that his plea could have immigration consequences, his plea was voluntary and intelligent. Moniz v. State, 933 A.2d 691, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 100 (R.I. 2007).

Case on appeal in which defendant challenged the denial of her suppression motion was remanded because of concern that defendant’s stipulation to the evidence on record and her waiver of her right to a jury trial were actually a conditional plea, which was not recognized by R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 11 and which would not have preserved for appeal the denial of the motion to suppress; among other things, the trial court had informed defendant of the possible consequences to her immigration status as a result of her case’s disposition, which was an admonition required by statute for entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. The trial court was instructed to make findings and a determination of whether there was an agreed-upon disposition in exchange for a waiver of a jury trial. State v. Paiva, 967 A.2d 1103, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 35 (R.I. 2009).

Collateral Consequences.

There is no duty to inform alien defendants of the collateral consequence of possible or certain deportation. State v. Figueroa, 639 A.2d 495, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 1994).

This section does not impose on the trial court the duty of informing a defendant that pleas of guilty or nolo contendere may have immigration effects.

Defendant was properly denied post-conviction relief after pleading nolo contendere to two crimes and not being advised of possible immigration consequences because the version of the statute that was in effect at the time of the plea applied and under that version, there was no duty to inform defendant of the collateral consequence of possible or certain deportation. Gomez v. State, 816 A.2d 1277, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 42 (R.I. 2003).

Court admonishments given to a defendant and his counsel when defendant pled nolo contendere that deportation was a possibility were not in substantial compliance with the clear mandate of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-22 , as amended by R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 501, § 1, as they failed to convey that the plea could have three very serious and specific immigration implications. Machado v. State, 839 A.2d 509, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 208 (R.I. 2003).

Failure of counsel to inform a convict that a guilty plea could result in deportation did not violate the amendment to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-22 as: (1) the amendment was effective more than six years after the convict’s plea, and it was not retroactive; (2) under the previous law, the convict did not have to be advised of the possibility of deportation; and (3) the convict admitted that the convict read and understood the Spanish language version of the plea form, which clearly warned the convict about the possible immigration consequences of a plea. Rodrigues v. State, 985 A.2d 311, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 149 (R.I. 2009).

Notice Held Sufficient.

Where two defendants were made aware that possible immigration consequences could result from their pleas of nolo contendere: one by an immigration paragraph contained in the Spanish plea form, the other by his attorney, the requirement of this section was met in both actions. State v. Figueroa, 639 A.2d 495, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 1994).

Post-conviction relief was properly denied to an applicant who was a resident alien who claimed that the trial court had erred in not telling him of his right to additional time to consider his nolo contendere plea and that the plea forms he signed should have contained the statutory warnings from R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-22(b) of the possible immigration consequences of his plea; the statute did not require that such warnings had to appear on the plea forms. Dossantos v. State, 897 A.2d 39, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 73 (R.I. 2006).

Although the postconviction relief applicant’s plea of nolo contendere was accepted after the justice gave only one part of the tripartite immigration warnings required to be given under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-22(b) , the justice appropriately and timely rectified the mistake. The justice readdressed the applicant before the applicant left the courtroom and reviewed with the applicant all three of the immigration consequences as required by statute; although the justice did not vacate the original plea, the justice had the prosecutor reread the facts that the prosecution was to attempt to prove at trial; the justice elicited from the applicant an admission that the facts were correct, at which point the justice again found that the applicant knowingly and voluntarily had entered a plea; and the record did not indicate that the applicant asked for any additional time to consider the plea, but instead stated that he understood the consequences of the plea and how it might affect the his immigration status. Asare v. State, 945 A.2d 300, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 45 (R.I. 2008).

As there was sufficient evidence on the record that petitioner inmate was informed by his counsel and by the trial court about the possibility of deportation pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-22 , the inmate’s claim in his postconviction relief application of ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of U.S. Const. amend. VI, lacked merit. Neufville v. State, 13 A.3d 607, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 13 (R.I. 2011).

Chapter 13 Bail and Recognizance

12-13-1. Right to release pending trial on giving of recognizance.

Every person who is held on any criminal process to answer to any indictment, information, or complaint against him or her shall be released upon giving recognizance with sufficient surety or sureties before a justice of the supreme or superior court or before a justice of the district court, when the complaint is pending in that court or the person is held to answer to that court, in the sum named in the process, if any has been named in it, and if none is named, then in any sum that the justice shall deem reasonable, to appear before the court where the indictment, information, or complaint is pending against him or her, or to which he or she may be bound over to appear, to answer to the indictment, information, or complaint, and to answer to it whenever called upon so to do, and abide the final order of the court, and in the meantime keep the peace and be of good behavior. Any justice may take the recognizance in any place within the state, and the recognizance shall be returned to the court to which the accused has recognized to appear.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 14; C.P.A. 1905, § 1182; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 14; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 18; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-1 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 20; P.L. 1972, ch. 265, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 12.

Rules of Court.

Release on bail, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 46.

Cross References.

Admission to bail, when required, R.I. Const., art. 1, § 9 .

Civil process, bail of persons imprisoned on, § 10-11-1 et seq.

Delinquent, wayward, or neglected child, parent’s failure to support, recognizance, § 15-9-2 et seq.

Excessive bail prohibited, R.I. Const., art. 1, § 8 .

Extradition proceedings, bail, § 12-9-19 et seq.

Habeas corpus, bail, §§ 10-9-12 , 10-9-19 .

Recognizance to keep the peace, § 12-4-1 et seq.

Superior court power to admit to bail, § 8-2-36 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The action of the trial court in imposing the condition of good behavior on a defendant requesting release on bail is not unconstitutional. Mello v. Superior Court, 117 R.I. 578 , 370 A.2d 1262, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1729 (1977).

Bail Revocation.

Since a court with jurisdiction over a criminal case has the power to enforce its orders, it has inherent authority to revoke bail upon breach of a bail condition, and this action does not constitute preventive detention. Mello v. Superior Court, 117 R.I. 578 , 370 A.2d 1262, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1729 (1977).

Defendant’s conduct in trespassing upon a family court justice’s property in order to discuss a divorce controversy being litigated before the justice constituted a violation of the statutory condition for release on bail that the accused must “in the meantime keep the peace and be of good behavior”. State v. Demers, 525 A.2d 1308, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 498 (R.I. 1987).

— Hearing.

Since a defendant facing bail revocation is jeopardized at least as much as one facing revocation of parole, or probation, or imposition of sentence for breach of a deferred sentence agreement, the rights afforded defendants in those situations must attach to a defendant in a bail revocation proceeding. Mello v. Superior Court, 117 R.I. 578 , 370 A.2d 1262, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1729 (1977).

The requirements of due process apply to bail revocation proceedings, therefore, a defendant awaiting a revocation hearing has the right to a speedy determination of his status. Mello v. Superior Court, 117 R.I. 578 , 370 A.2d 1262, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1729 (1977).

A bail revocation hearing must be conducted with the same promptness as the hearing which follows state opposition to the granting of bail; a two-week delay in the bail revocation hearing is clearly unlawful. Mello v. Superior Court, 117 R.I. 578 , 370 A.2d 1262, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1729 (1977).

The standard of proof applicable in bail revocation hearings is that evidence must “reasonably satisfy that there had been a violation”; thus the standard of proof requires the state to go beyond probable cause and affords a defendant the necessary due process. Mello v. Superior Court, 117 R.I. 578 , 370 A.2d 1262, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1729 (1977).

Evidence, though illegally obtained, was admissible at a bail revocation hearing if it was factually reliable. Bridges v. Superior Court, 121 R.I. 101 , 396 A.2d 97, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 585 (1978).

Construction With § 10-9-31.

The power of the district court under this section is not limited or controlled by § 10-9-31 . Ex parte Quigg, 34 R.I. 504 , 84 A. 859, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1912).

Collateral References.

Acknowledgment of bail bond in open court, necessity of. 38 A.L.R. 1108.

Amount of bail required in criminal action. 53 A.L.R. 399.

Application of state statutes establishing pretrial release of accused on personal recognizance as presumptive form of release. 78 A.L.R.3d 780.

Bail for person charged with bribery in athletic contest. 49 A.L.R.2d 1238.

Bail pending determination of psychopathy under statutes relating to sexual psychopaths. 24 A.L.R.2d 373.

Disciplinary power of court in respect of suretyship in judicial proceedings. 91 A.L.R. 889.

Factors in fixing amount of bail in criminal cases. 72 A.L.R. 801.

Failure to appear, and the like, resulting in forfeiture or conditional forfeiture of bail, as affecting right to second admission to bail in same noncapital criminal case. 29 A.L.R.2d 945.

Insanity of accused as affecting right to bail in criminal case. 11 A.L.R.3d 1385.

Mandamus to compel judge or other officer to grant accused bail or to accept proffered sureties. 23 A.L.R.2d 803.

Pretrial preventive detention by state court. 75 A.L.R.3d 956.

Propriety of applying cash bail to payment of fine. 42 A.L.R.5th 547.

12-13-1.1. Hearings when state opposes bail — Medical disability of accused.

  1. In all cases where the state opposes the granting of bail in respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment for life and/or offenses involving the use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon by one already convicted of the an offense or of an offense punishable by imprisonment for life pursuant to the provisions of R.I. Const., Art. I, Sec. IX , hearings shall be held in the superior court unless arrangements are made by the parties for a stenographic or electronic recording of proceedings in the district court.
  2. In the event an accused person fails to appear in superior court for arraignment on the an offense and the accused is under the care of a private physician who has determined that the accused is medically unable to appear in court for arraignment, the justice of the superior court in charge of the criminal calendar shall order the immediate examination of the accused by a licensed physician, who shall file his or her medical report with the court within seven (7) days of his or her examination of the accused. Should the justice after hearing decide that the accused is medically unable to appear in superior court for arraignment, he or she shall make whatever arrangements are necessary to have the accused arraigned at a location other than the superior court.
  3. The accused person shall be liable for all expenses incurred by the state as a direct result of the inability of the accused to appear in court for arraignment and/or the inability to transfer the accused to the adult correctional institutions or hospital facility owned by the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 265, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 95, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 463, § 1.

Cross References.

Bail hearings, procedure in superior court, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. Rule 5.

12-13-1.2. Penalty for an offense committed while on release.

  1. Every person who commits a criminal offense while released on personal recognizance or bail pursuant to this chapter shall, if convicted of both offenses, be sentenced, in addition to the sentences prescribed, to:
    1. A term of imprisonment of not less than two (2) years and not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both, if the offense is a felony; or
    2. A term of imprisonment of not less than ninety (90) days and not more than one year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both, if the offense is a misdemeanor.
  2. A term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section shall be consecutive to any other sentence of imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 463, § 2.

Cross References.

Bail hearings, procedure in superior court, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. Rule 5.

12-13-1.3. Pretrial release.

  1. Unless otherwise provided, a detainee shall be eligible for pretrial release or reduced bail if he or she fails to post bail.
  2. “Pretrial release” means release of a defendant without bail but upon an order to abide by the conditions as set by the court. Release on non-monetary conditions shall be applied to secure the presence of the accused and protect the safety of the community.
  3. The department of corrections shall collect information concerning the background and circumstances of the pretrial detainee. The department’s investigation shall include the following information and any other factors as shall be appropriate to the case:
    1. Marital status.
    2. Name and address of dependents.
    3. Past and present employment, including place of employment, position held and length of employment.
    4. Whether the defendant is under the care of a licensed physician or uses medication prescribed by a licensed physician.
    5. Any physical or mental condition affecting the defendant’s behavior.
    6. Education.
    7. Prior criminal record, including facts indicating that the defendant is likely to be a danger to the community if released without restrictions.
    8. Prior court appearances and record of appearance or non-appearance.
    9. Ties to this community and to other communities.
    10. Financial resources.
  4. If, as a result of this investigation, the department of corrections concludes that the pretrial detainee is an appropriate candidate to be considered by the court for pretrial release or reduced bail, the department shall present its findings to the court.
  5. Upon a determination by the court that a defendant is suitable for release on recognizance subject to conditions set by the court, the court in its discretion may also impose the least onerous of the following conditions necessary to assure the defendant’s appearance in court:
    1. Imposition of condition of release involving field supervision with or without special conditions. Field supervision shall require notification to defendants released prior to trial of their court dates.
    2. Imposition of condition of release involving placement of defendant on intensive supervision, with or without special conditions. Intensive supervision shall require contact with the officials designated by the courts and prompt notification to the court of all apparent violations of pre-trial release conditions or arrest of persons released to its custody.
    3. Imposition of a condition of release involving placement of the defendant on community confinement pursuant to § 42-56-20.2 .
  6. This section shall not be construed to preclude review by the court of a defendant’s bail status at any time.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 430, § 1.

12-13-2. Warrant for apprehension of accused person.

Any court before which an indictment or information shall be found or be pending, and any court before which a complaint shall be made or be pending, against any person for an offense of which the court has cognizance, may issue a warrant directed to each and all deputy sheriffs, town sergeants, and town constables within the state requiring them to apprehend the person and bring him or her before the court, if the court is in session, or if not, to commit him or her to jail in the county in which the indictment, information, or complaint is pending, there to be kept until he or she shall be brought before the court, or until he or she shall give recognizance before some person authorized to take recognizance for the offense, with sufficient surety or sureties in the sum named in the warrant, if any sum is named in the warrant, and, if not, in the sum as the person taking the recognizance shall deem reasonable if the offense is bailable, to appear before the court in which the indictment, information, or complaint is pending, at the time required by the person so taking the recognizance, and to answer the indictment, information, or complaint; provided, that the prisoner may give the recognizance while in the custody of the officer before he or she is committed to jail before some person authorized to take recognizance for the offense, and upon taking recognizance the officer shall discharge the prisoner from his or her custody. The officers to whom the warrant shall be directed are required to obey and execute it, and in its execution shall be protected from obstruction and assault, as in the service of other process.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, §§ 10-12; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, §§ 10-12; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 19; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-2 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 21; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 12; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 44; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 23; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 23.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 23, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 23 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Arraignment.

Where defendant was in the custody of Rhode Island authorities only for the time necessary to transport him from Chicago to this state and he was arraigned on the day of his arrival, such arraignment was reasonable and in compliance with the law. State v. Crough, 89 R.I. 338 , 152 A.2d 644, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1959).

Bail.

Duty to notify a defendant that bail has been pre-endorsed on his warrant and to provide him with an immediate opportunity to post bail need not be read into either R.I. Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P. 9(a) or R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-13-2 . Unlike R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-20 , where a suspect must be informed of his right to a confidential telephone call in order to exercise it, an arrested person will benefit from the rule requiring prompt presentment whether or not he is aware that it exists; R.I. Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P. 9(a) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-13-2 operate as procedural instructions or guidelines that notify the police of the steps that must be taken after they effectuate an arrest. State v. Brown, 898 A.2d 69, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 78 (R.I. 2006).

R.I. Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P. 9(a) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-13-2 did not require suppression of defendant’s statements because defendant had not been notified immediately of his right to post pre-endorsed bail and to be released. Defendant had been in custody only 30 minutes before he began speaking to officers; his statement was not induced by the failure to present him to someone authorized to take bail within that 30 minutes; and the statute and the rule did not impose upon police an affirmative duty to notify an arrested person of his right to post pre-endorsed bail and obtain release. State v. Brown, 898 A.2d 69, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 78 (R.I. 2006).

Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the superior court to revoke a defendant’s suspension of sentence was not defeated by his arrest on capias and release without being brought before the court, where a subsequent legal capias was issued upon which he was brought before the court for hearing on proposed revocation of his probation. Walker v. Langlois, 104 R.I. 274 , 243 A.2d 733, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 645 (1968).

12-13-3. Guardian to give recognizance.

Whenever any person arraigned on an indictment or information before the superior court shall appear to the court to be non compos mentis and for that reason would be unable to give recognizance, the court in its discretion may appoint a guardian ad litem to give recognizance on behalf of the accused together with sureties, and the guardian ad litem shall be personally responsible for the compliance by the accused with the terms of recognizance; provided, that this procedure shall apply only when the offense is bailable.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 19; P.L. 1952, ch. 3020, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-3 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 12.

12-13-4. Persons authorized to bail jail prisoners.

  1. No person imprisoned in jail upon any criminal process shall be bailed, except by a justice of the supreme or superior court, or by the justice of the district court by which the person was committed, or by some person specially appointed for that purpose by a justice of the superior court; provided, that if the amount of bail for the prisoner has previously been set, then the bail shall be taken by the justice of the peace, duly authorized, or by the senior prison officer in charge at the adult correctional institution, if the prisoner or his or her counsel request the bail be taken.
  2. In all cases where bail is taken at the adult correctional institutions, an administrative fee of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) shall be paid to the department of corrections by each person bailed and shall be deposited as general revenues.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 15; C.P.A. 1905, § 1183; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 15; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 20; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-4 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 20; P.L. 1970, ch. 167, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 35, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

12-13-5. Justices authorized to bail on accusation of serious crime.

No person accused of an offense for which bail may be denied pursuant to the provisions of R.I. Const., Art. I, Sec. IX shall be bailed except by one of the justices of the supreme, superior, and district courts.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 13; C.P.A. 1905, § 1181; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 13; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 17; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-5 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 265, § 2; P.L. 1981, ch. 265, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 463, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Waiver of Right to Bail.

Where a defendant charged with murder pled “not guilty” and “not guilty by reason of insanity” and, while the court was awaiting the report of a psychiatric evaluation ordered at his request, demanded a trial and at the same time filed motions to quash the indictment, for a bill of particulars, to suppress evidence unlawfully and illegally obtained, to inspect the minutes of the grand jury, and to be admitted to bail, delay in trial was occasioned by his own conduct, but such dilatory tactics did not constitute a waiver of his right to be bailed. Ramsdell v. Langlois, 100 R.I. 468 , 217 A.2d 83, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 462 (1966).

12-13-5.1. Presumption of danger to the community.

Whenever a person is charged with, or indicted or informed against, for an offense involving the unlawful sale, distribution, manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or deliver any controlled substance, or by possession of any controlled substance punishable by imprisonment for ten (10) years or more, and the state objects to the setting of bail pursuant to the R.I. Const., Art. I, Sec. IX , if the court determines that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption great, then it shall be presumed that the person is a danger to the safety of the community unless that presumption is rebutted by the defendant.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 652, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality of Bail Denial.

It is constitutionally permissible to hold a defendant without bail in order to prevent danger to the community. Witt v. Moran, 572 A.2d 261, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 58 (R.I. 1990).

Findings of Fact by Judge Required.

This section is constitutional. However, the trial justice may not rely solely on the statute in denying a defendant’s bail. In deciding whether to grant bail, the trial justice must make findings of fact on the record that relate to the individual defendant’s dangerousness. Witt v. Moran, 572 A.2d 261, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 58 (R.I. 1990).

12-13-5.2. Drug testing required.

Every person who shall be charged with or indicted or informed against for an offense involving the unlawful sale, distribution, manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or deliver any controlled substance as classified in schedule I or II in chapter 28 of title 21, or for possession of a controlled substance as classified in schedule I or II in chapter 28 of title 21, may in the discretion of the court, as a condition of bail, be required at his or her own expense to submit to drug testing in accordance with the standards and procedures of the department of health, not less than once per month.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 457, § 1.

Collateral References.

Supreme Court’s views on mandatory testing for drugs or alcohol. 145 A.L.R. Fed. 335.

12-13-6. Bail or discharge for want of indictment or information.

Every person who shall be imprisoned upon suspicion of having committed an offense for which bail may be denied pursuant to the provisions of R.I. Const., Art. I, Sec. IX shall be bailed or discharged if not indicted or charged by information within six (6) months after the commitment.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 16; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 16; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 56; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 56; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 56; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-6 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 265, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 12; P.L. 1985, ch. 463, § 1.

12-13-7. Right to prompt trial on indictment or information for serious crime.

Every person who shall be indicted for or charged by information with an offense for which bail may be denied pursuant to the provisions of R.I. Const., Art. I, Sec. IX , and shall be imprisoned under the indictment or information, shall be tried or bailed within six (6) months next after the time at which he or she shall plead to the indictment or information if he or she demands a trial, unless it shall appear to the court that some material witness in behalf of the state has been enticed away or is prevented from attending court by some unavoidable accident.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 17; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 17; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 57; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 57; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 57; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-7 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 265, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 12; P.L. 1985, ch. 463, § 1.

Cross References.

Constitutional right to speedy trial, R.I. Const., art. 1, § 10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Delay Attributable to Defendant.

Where the accused himself has put his mental competency in issue, he cannot thereafter claim that his constitutional or statutory rights to a speedy trial have been violated. Genereux v. Pelosi, 96 R.I. 452 , 192 A.2d 630, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1963).

In a prosecution for murder where failure to accede to petitioner’s request for a prompt trial was partly occasioned by his own pre-trial maneuvering, indictments charging him with murder would not be dismissed under either statutory provisions for bail or constitutional guarantee of rights. Marzilli v. Howard, 108 R.I. 309 , 274 A.2d 902, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1264 (1971).

Where defendant was not tried within six months of indictment and his motion for bail was denied, the court held that a petitioner cannot claim a statutory right to bail when the delay between the indictment’s return and the start of trial is attributable to either his desire to wait upon the availability of counsel of his choice or his attempts to pass the case or seek a change of venue. Cochrane v. Laurie, 118 R.I. 903 , 371 A.2d 605, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1520 (1977).

Demand for Bail.

Demand for trial under this section includes a demand for admission to bail if there is no trial within the six-month period. In re Deslovers, 35 R.I. 248 , 86 A. 657, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1913).

Demand for Trial.

To obtain relief under this section petitioner must have made a request for trial. Sevigny v. Langlois, 94 R.I. 230 , 179 A.2d 496, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1962).

Unless demand for trial is made by the defendant, this section’s provision for trial or bail within six months of the indictment is not applicable. State v. Palmigiano, 111 R.I. 739 , 306 A.2d 830, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1271 (1973).

Discharge From Imprisonment.

An accused who was not tried or bailed within the six months is entitled to discharge from imprisonment after the six months and cannot be held to bail. In re Deslovers, 35 R.I. 248 , 86 A. 657, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1913).

Discharge of an accused under this section does not exculpate him or prevent his subsequent trial under a new indictment for the same offense. State v. Deslovers, 40 R.I. 89 , 100 A. 64, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1917).

Effect of Agreement to Late Trial Date.

Where defendant agreed to trial date he was not entitled to bail under the provisions of this section although it was beyond the six month period. Tillinghast v. Moran, 122 R.I. 334 , 406 A.2d 1246, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2190 (1979).

Effect of Previous Bail Denial.

The control of the attorney-general is regulated by Const., art. 1, § 10, and by this section providing that every person indicted for murder and certain other felonies and imprisoned under the indictment, must be tried or bailed within six months after pleading to the indictment, even though bail had been previously denied after a Taglianetti hearing when the state had presented evidence of his guilt. Tate v. Howard, 110 R.I. 952 , 296 A.2d 19, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1150 (1972).

Mentally Incompetent or Dangerous Persons.

The provisions of this statute do not intend that a person, mentally incompetent to stand trial, or who when admitted to bail would be potentially dangerous to be at large, should be included. Genereux v. Pelosi, 96 R.I. 452 , 192 A.2d 630, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1963).

— Mental Examinations.

Examinations to determine petitioner’s mental competence to stand trial do not have the effect of tolling the provisions of this section. Sevigny v. Langlois, 94 R.I. 230 , 179 A.2d 496, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1962).

Time for Demand.

Motion for assignment for trial filed seven weeks prior to expiration of six months allowed state sufficient time to bring the case to trial within the six months. In re Deslovers, 35 R.I. 248 , 86 A. 657, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1913).

Time Limit Upon Revocation of Bail.

While there is no statutory provision governing the time within which one formally released on bail must be tried, the Supreme Court proceeding under its broad grant of supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals held that not more than 90 days shall elapse between the time of bail revocation and trial on the charge upon which bail has been revoked. Bridges v. Superior Court, 121 R.I. 101 , 396 A.2d 97, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 585 (1978).

12-13-8. Qualifications of sureties.

  1. Whenever in any criminal case a defendant is required to recognize with surety or sureties, each surety, other than an incorporated surety company duly authorized by law to give the recognizance, must be a resident or freeholder within this state, and must be the owner of property of value to the amount expressed in the recognizance, over and above all incumbrances, but the justice or persons taking the recognizance may allow two (2) or more sureties to justify, provided they own in the aggregate property in value to the amount or sum for which the recognizance is given, over and above all incumbrances. The justice or person taking recognizance may require any surety offered to make affidavit or be examined orally under oath as to his or her qualifications as the surety.
  2. Bail affidavits required for the posting of surety bail shall be approved and signed by any clerk, authorized by the presiding justice for bail posted in the superior courts, and by any clerk authorized by the chief judge of the district court for bail posted in the district courts. Neither the attorney general, nor his or her designee shall be required to approve the affidavits.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 16; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-8 ; P.L. 1998, ch. 361, § 1.

Collateral References.

Lien or encumbrance on his real property as affecting qualifications of surety on bail bond. 56 A.L.R. 1097.

12-13-8.1. Penalty for false affidavit.

Any surety who knowingly makes a false affidavit regarding property to be offered as security for bail shall be subject to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) and/or shall be imprisoned for not more than one year.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 321, § 1.

12-13-9. Commitment of juveniles on failure to give recognizance.

Any accused person, under the age of eighteen (18) years, who shall be required by any court to enter into recognizance for his or her appearance before any court and shall not give the recognizance may, at the discretion of the court, be committed to the state training school for youth, there to remain until the required recognizance is given or he or she is otherwise discharged by law. The warrant or mittimus for the commitment of any the accused person to the school shall be, as nearly as the object of the commitment will admit, in the form prescribed in § 12-19-27 for the commitment of persons sentenced to the state training schools; and the director of corrections and his or her subordinates shall have the same authority over any accused person so committed to their custody which they have by law over persons sentenced to the school, except that they shall not have authority to bind out or discharge the accused persons.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, §§ 48, 49; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, §§ 48, 49; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 28; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 28; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 28; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 80; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Juvenile Denied Bail.

One may be held without bail only for the most serious offenses when the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption great. To allow such a person to be confined in a juvenile detention facility would require a specific mandate from the general assembly, not one that could be construed only by a strained interpretation. In re Joseph T., 575 A.2d 985, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 1990).

A juvenile offender who is held without bail on an offense serious enough to meet the constitutional requirements of art. I, § 9, has not been deemed by the legislature to be suitable for incarceration in the training school for youth. In re Joseph T., 575 A.2d 985, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 1990).

12-13-10. Deposit of money in lieu of bail.

Any person who is held in custody or committed upon a criminal charge, if entitled to be released on bail, may at any time, instead of giving surety or sureties, in the discretion of the court, give before the court in which he or she is held to appear his or her personal recognizance to appear and do as ordered by the court, and shall be allowed to deposit, either individually or by another on his or her behalf, with the court in money ten percent (10%) of the amount of bail which he or she is ordered to furnish, and the justice or clerk of the court shall give him or her a certificate, and upon delivery of the certificate to the officer in whose custody he or she is shall be released from custody, and the money shall be deposited in the registry of the court before which the person shall be recognized to appear. Consistent with Article 1, § 9 of the Rhode Island Constitution, the giving of surety, or in the alternative the deposit with the court of ten percent (10%) of the amount of bail set, shall be the sole monetary conditions of the release on bail, except as set forth herein. No court shall require the deposit of cash as the sole monetary condition of the release on bail, except in those cases where the defendant owes court-imposed restitution. Upon the default of the defendant, the court before which he or she is recognized to appear may, at any time thereafter, order the money deposited in the registry of the court be forfeited, subject to the provisions of §§ 12-13-16 , 12-13-16 .1 and 12-13-16.2 , and the money shall be paid to the general treasurer. If money has been deposited and the defendant at any time before forfeiture shall appear before the court to which he or she was recognized to appear, and shall surrender himself or herself, or shall recognize before the court with sufficient surety or sureties, in such an amount, to appear and do as the court may order, or be in any manner legally discharged, then the court shall order the return of the deposit to the defendant. If the money remains on deposit at the time of a judgment for the payment of a fine and costs, restitution, or any other assessment issued by the court, the clerk must apply the money in satisfaction of the judgment, and after satisfying the fine and costs, restitution, or any other assessment must refund the surplus, if any, to the defendant or to the individual who posted the money on behalf of the defendant, as the case may be.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 29; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 29; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 29; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-10 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 267, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 36, § 2; P.L. 1980, ch. 311, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 387, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 341, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 315, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 320, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 415, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 234, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 320, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

Survey Section: Criminal Procedure, see 3 R.W.U.L. Rev. 585 (1998).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

This section pertains to pretrial bail rather than post-conviction bail. State v. Von Bulow, 447 A.2d 380, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 955 (R.I. 1982).

Forfeiture.

The trial justice did not abuse his discretion by ordering a full forfeiture of a bond by a licensed bondsman where the trial justice was convinced that the bondsman had done nothing to discharge his obligations as a bondsman; moreover, it was proper to forfeit the bond as the bondsman had promised to do in the event the defendant failed to show up for trial. In re Procaccianti, 475 A.2d 211, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 500 (R.I. 1984).

The court appropriately ordered the forfeiture of the surety’s bail and the deposit of the full amount of the forfeited bail into the violent-crimes indemnity account. State v. Werner, 667 A.2d 770, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 254 (R.I. 1995).

Collateral References.

Right to recover cash bail taken without authority. 26 A.L.R. 211; 44 A.L.R. 1499; 48 A.L.R. 1430.

12-13-11. New or additional recognizance.

Whenever in any criminal case a defendant is required to recognize with surety or sureties, or has given a recognizance in the case, any justice of the district court, when the complaint is pending in the court or the person is held to answer to the court, or any justice of the superior court, may, on motion of the attorney general, require the defendant to be brought before the justice to show cause why he or she should not be required to give a new recognizance with surety or sureties in place of the one already required or given, and the justice in his or her discretion, if good cause is shown, may require the defendant to give in place of the recognizance already given or required a new recognizance in the same sum as that originally required or given with other and sufficient surety or sureties, or to give a new recognizance with surety or sureties in a different sum than that originally required or given, as to the justice may seem reasonable, to do and to perform the conditions of the recognizance already given or required. In case the defendant shall fail to give the new recognizance required of him or her, the defendant shall immediately be committed to the penal institution to which he or she would have been committed if he or she had failed to give the recognizance originally required there to remain until he or she shall give the new recognizance as required of him or her before some justice or person authorized to take it, or until he or she shall be discharged pursuant to law.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 30; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 30; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 30; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-11 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 20.

Cross References.

Additional bail on motion for new trial, § 12-22-12 .

Recognizance for discharge pending appeal, § 12-22-3 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Dismissal of Appeals Not Subject to § 12-13-4 .

It was error to dismiss appeals pursuant to this section when such appeals were not subject to recognizance requirements under § 12-13-4 . In re 125 Criminal Appeals, 113 R.I. 365 , 321 A.2d 294, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1187 (1974).

12-13-12 — 12-13-15. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1896, ch. 285, §§ 20, 21; C.P.A. 1905, §§ 170, 171, 1184; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, §§ 23, 24; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, §§ 20, 21; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, §§ 21, 22; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, §§ 23, 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, §§ 21, 22; P.L. 1928, ch. 1177, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, §§ 23, 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, §§ 21, 22; G.L. 1956, §§ 12-13-12 — 12-13-15; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 20), concerning the binding and commitment of witnesses, were repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 22.

12-13-16. Process on default of recognizance.

  1. Whenever any person under recognizance shall fail to perform the condition of his or her recognizance, or failed to appear as required by the terms and conditions of his or her bail or recognizance, the default shall be recorded and process shall be issued against the persons bound in the recognizance, or those of them as the attorney general shall direct.
  2. No process for forfeiture of bail nor any petition for forfeiture of bail may be filed by the attorney general, or designee, or otherwise initiated prior to the expiration of forty-five (45) days after any warrant issued by any court has been entered into the court’s database, the database of the bureau of criminal identification (BCI) for the state of Rhode Island, and the database for the National Crime Information Center (NCIC).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 25; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 25; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 23; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-16 ; P.L. 2017, ch. 415, § 1.

Cross References.

Execution against the body, § 9-25-15 .

Collateral References.

Appealability of order relating to forfeiture of bail. 78 A.L.R.2d 1180.

Enforceability of bail bond or recognizance against surety where, at time it was filed, prosecution of principal was barred by limitation of actions. 75 A.L.R.2d 1431.

Governor’s authority to remit forfeited bail bond. 77 A.L.R.2d 988.

12-13-16.1. Forfeiture of bail.

  1. In any criminal case, whenever, after a hearing, it has been shown to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant has left the jurisdiction of the court or has failed to appear as required or has failed to perform the condition of his or her recognizance, the court shall order that the bail and/or any security for bail be forfeited.
  2. Any person who has had bail posted with the assistance of a licensed bondsperson, and who is subsequently arrested on a bench warrant and brought before the court, or who fails to appear and is subsequently brought before the court without the intervention of or through a licensed bondsperson, shall not be released by the court on the same bail unless and until the licensed bondsperson who posted the original bail has been notified and been provided an opportunity to be heard regarding the licensed bondsperson’s willingness to continue as surety for the defendant/bailee. The court may, however, release the defendant within twenty-four (24) hours if the licensed bondsperson cannot be located or otherwise fails to appear to address the court relative to the original bail.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 435, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 415, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Breach of Condition of Recognizance.

Commission of four counts of malicious damage constitutes a breach of a condition of a recognizance and serves as a grounds for forfeiture of bail. State v. Saback, 534 A.2d 1155, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 569 (R.I. 1987).

The court appropriately ordered the complete forfeiture of the surety’s bail, posted by a professional bail bondsperson, following the bondsperson’s failure to fully comply with the conditions of the accused’s release, including the condition that the accused be present for all scheduled court sessions. This total forfeiture is appropriate notwithstanding the minimal expense incurred by the state. State v. Werner, 667 A.2d 770, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 254 (R.I. 1995).

Forfeiture.

The trial justice did not abuse his discretion by ordering a full forfeiture of a bond by a licensed bondsman where the trial justice was convinced that the bondsman had done nothing to discharge his obligations as a bondsman; moreover, it was proper to forfeit the bond as the bondsman had promised to do in the event the defendant failed to show up for trial. In re Procaccianti, 475 A.2d 211, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 500 (R.I. 1984).

The trial justice abused her discretion in holding that she was constrained to order a complete forfeiture of bail, without considering mitigating factors, when the defendant failed to perform a condition of his recognizance. State v. Saback, 534 A.2d 1155, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 569 (R.I. 1987).

12-13-16.2. Forfeiture of bail — Licensed bondsperson.

  1. In any criminal case, whenever a forfeiture of bail has been ordered pursuant to § 12-13-16.1 and where the bail and/or security for bail has been posted by a licensed bondsperson registered with the court, the court shall only order an amount to be forfeited up to, but not more than, ten percent (10%) of the original bail set and pledged as surety.
  2. Subsequent to any forfeiture of bail pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, and prior to the forfeiture of further surety pledged by a licensed bondsperson provided herein, the court shall:
    1. Provide the licensed bondsperson a period of time equal to six (6) months to return the fugitive to the court before further pledged surety shall be forfeited. Before ordering further forfeiture, the court shall conduct a hearing and provide the licensed bondsperson an opportunity to demonstrate all reasonable actions the bondperson took to locate, apprehend, and return the fugitive to the court. The court shall consider the due diligence of the licensed bondsperson in determining how much, if any, of the remaining amount of surety the bondsperson shall be ordered to forfeit for the failure or inability to locate, apprehend, and return the fugitive to the court. The court at that time may provide the licensed bondsperson with additional time in which to locate and return the fugitive.
    2. In the event that the licensed bondsperson fails or is unable to locate and return the fugitive, the court may order an amount to be forfeited up to, but not more than, ten percent (10%) of the original bail set and pledged as surety, plus the reasonable expenses incurred by the state in attempting to locate and apprehend the fugitive; and provided, further, that if the fugitive is found and presented before the court within six (6) months of the issuance of the warrant, there shall be no forfeiture.
    3. The bondsperson shall be responsible to pay all fees and costs associated with the entry of any warrant into the BCI or the NCIC prior to its entry into either database as required in § 12-13-16(b) . Upon request of the bondsperson, the clerk of the court shall provide a certified copy of the arrest warrant to the bondsperson without charge to insure the bondsperson’s ability to locate, apprehend, and return the fugitive from outside the state of Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 415, § 2.

12-13-17. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 26; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 26; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 24; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-17 ), settlement on defaulted recognizance, was repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 22.

12-13-18. Power of surety on recognizance over principal.

Every person who shall be surety in any recognizance to keep the peace, or for the appearance of any person accused or of any witness, or in any recognizance which shall be given on claiming an appeal, shall have the same power and authority over his or her principal as though he or she were bail for the principal in any civil cause.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 27; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 27; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 25; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-18 .

12-13-19. Surrender or commitment of principal.

The surety may at any time surrender the principal to the court or magistrate who took the recognizance; provided, that in case any recognizance shall have been certified to some other court, the surrender shall be made to the court when in session; or the surety may at any time commit the principal to the adult correctional institutions, leaving with the warden a certified copy of the recognizance; and upon the surrender or commitment, the surety shall be discharged and exempt from all liability for any subsequent act of the principal, which would have been a breach of the condition of the recognizance.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 28; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 28; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 26; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 26; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-19 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

No Discharge After Default.

Surety cannot discharge himself by surrendering principal after recognizance has been defaulted. State v. McGuire, 16 R.I. 519 , 17 A. 918, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1889).

Collateral References.

Bail: effect on surety’s liability under bail bond on principal’s incarceration in other jurisdiction. 33 A.L.R.4th 663.

Bail: effect on surety’s liability under bail bond of principal’s subsequent incarceration in same jurisdiction. 35 A.L.R.4th 1192.

Death of principal as exoneration, defense, or ground for relief, of sureties on bail or appearance bond. 63 A.L.R.2d 830.

Insanity of principal. 7 A.L.R. 394.

Passing an indictment to the files as discharging bail. 18 A.L.R. 1154.

Stage of proceedings at which sureties are discharged in criminal case. 20 A.L.R. 594.

Surrender of principal by sureties on bail bond. 3 A.L.R. 180; 73 A.L.R. 1369.

12-13-20. Status of person surrendered or committed.

The person so surrendered or committed may be recognized anew with sufficient surety and be in all respects dealt with in the like manner and with the same effect as though he or she had never given any recognizance in the case.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 29; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 29; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 27; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 27; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 12-13-20 .

Collateral References.

Failure to appear, and the like, resulting in forfeiture or conditional forfeiture of bail, as affecting right to second admission to bail in same noncapital criminal case. 29 A.L.R.2d 945.

12-13-21. Registration of sureties.

No person proposing to become bail or surety in a felony case for hire or reward, either received or to be received, shall be accepted unless he or she has been approved and registered as a professional bondsperson by the presiding justice of the superior court or his or her designee. This approval and registration may be revoked at any time by the court or justice, and shall be revoked in case the bondsperson fails for one hundred eighty (180) days after the issuance of process under § 12-13-16 to satisfy in full the recognizance to which he or she is bound, or the amount of the original recognizance as determined in the discretion of the court, in accordance with § 12-13-10 . All professional bondspersons shall be governed by rules which shall be established from time to time by the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 36, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 260, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 241, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 467, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 14.

12-13-22. Recordation of recognizance — Lien.

  1. Each recognizance with surety or sureties given in the supreme or superior court shall be recorded by the department of attorney general, and each recognizance with surety or sureties given in the family or district court shall be recorded by the clerk of the courts, within seven (7) days of acceptance of the recognizance by the court, in the office of land records in the city or town in which the real estate pledged as security is located. The fee for filing shall be paid by the defendant or by the defendant’s surety or sureties. The notice of recognizance shall contain the defendant’s name, the property owner’s name, the address of the property, and the assessor’s plat and lot number. The surety or sureties offering the property shall provide the clerk of the court with the above information before the property is accepted. The surety or sureties shall also provide the clerk of the court with an affidavit that they are the owners of the property or properties and that they will not transfer or further encumber the property or properties within thirty (30) days after the property or properties have been accepted by the court.
  2. Any recognizance notice so recorded shall be a lien on the property or properties pledged in favor of the state of Rhode Island until the attorney general or clerk of the family or district court executes a release of the lien.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 275, § 1.

12-13-23. Bail and bail bonds — Examination for sufficiency.

  1. Following the posting of a bail bond and the justifying affidavit or affidavits or the posting of cash bail, the court may conduct an inquiry for the purpose of determining the reliability of the obligors or person posting cash bail, the value and sufficiency of any security offered, and whether any feature of the undertaking contravenes public policy; provided, that before undertaking an inquiry of a person posting cash bail, the court, after application of the attorney general, must have had reasonable cause to believe that the person posting cash bail is not in rightful possession of money posted as cash bail or that the money constitutes the fruits of criminal or unlawful conduct. The court may inquire into any matter stated or required to be stated in the justifying affidavits, and may also inquire into other matters appropriate to the determination, which includes, but are not limited to, the following:
    1. The background, character and reputation of any obligor, and, in the case of a professional bondsperson, the qualifications of the surety-obligor and its executing agent;
    2. The source of any money or property delivered or agreed to be delivered by any obligor as security, and whether any of the money or property constitutes the fruits of criminal or unlawful conduct;
    3. The source of any money or property delivered or agreed to be delivered to any obligor as indemnification on the bond, and whether any of the money or property constitutes the fruits of criminal or unlawful conduct;
    4. The background, character and reputation of any person who had indemnified or agreed to indemnify an obligor upon the bond; and whether any the indemnitor, not being approved and registered by the superior court as a professional bondsperson, has within a period of two (2) months prior to the indemnity transaction given indemnification or security for the same purpose in more than two cases not arising out of the same transaction;
    5. The source of any money posted as cash bail, and whether any of the money constitutes the fruits of criminal or unlawful conduct; and
    6. The background, character and reputation of the person posting cash bail.
  2. Upon the inquiry provided in subsection (a) of this section, the court may examine, under oath or otherwise, the obligors and any other persons who may possess material information. The attorney general has a right to attend the inquiry, to call witnesses, and to examine any witness in the proceeding. The court may, upon request of the attorney general, adjourn the proceeding for a reasonable period to allow him or her to investigate the matter.
  3. At the conclusion of the inquiry, the court must issue an order either approving or disapproving the bail.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 55, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 12-13-23 (P.L. 1988, ch. 396, § 1), concerning source of bail money, was repealed by P.L. 1991, ch. 55, § 1, effective June 11, 1991.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Former § 12-13-23 (as enacted by P.L. 1988, ch. 396, § 1), which stated “If, after hearing, the party who has posted or is about to post bail or has furnished a fee, money or other consideration to another person who has posted or is about to post bail cannot establish to the satisfaction of the court by clear and convincing evidence that the source of money is from a legal enterprise the court need not accept the bail,” is unconstitutional, in that it shifts the burden of proof in a criminal proceeding from the state to the defendant, in violation of the Rhode Island Constitution, Article 1, Section 14. State v. Zorillo, 565 A.2d 1259, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1989).

12-13-24. Confidentiality of pretrial services program records.

  1. Information supplied by a defendant to a representative of the pretrial services program during the defendant’s initial interview or subsequent contacts, or information obtained by the pretrial services program as a result of the interview or subsequent contacts, shall be deemed confidential and shall not be subject to subpoena or to disclosure without the written consent of the defendant except in the following circumstances:
    1. Information relevant to the imposition of conditions of release shall be presented to the court on a standardized form when the court is considering what conditions of release to impose;
    2. Information furnished by the defendant to the pretrial services program and recorded on a completed interview form shall be furnished to law enforcement officials upon request only if the defendant fails to appear in court when required, after notice to the defendant or the defendant’s attorney of record;
    3. Information concerning compliance with any conditions of release imposed by the court shall be furnished to the court upon its request for consideration or modification of conditions of release or of sentencing or of probation;
    4. Information relevant to sentencing or probation shall be furnished to the court upon its request for consideration in imposing sentence or probation;
    5. At its discretion, the court may permit the probation officer, for the purpose of preparing the presentence investigation report, and the defense attorney to inspect the completed interview form;
    6. In felony cases, completed pre-arraignment reports shall be provided to the superior court; and
    7. Any person conducting an evaluation of the pretrial release program may have access to all completed interview forms upon order from the supreme court.
  2. At the beginning of the defendant’s initial interview with a representative of the pretrial services program, the defendant shall be advised of the above uses of information supplied by him or her or obtained as a result of information supplied by him or her.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 117, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 4; P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 4, and P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2018.

P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2018.

12-13-24.1. Pretrial services unit.

  1. Creation of unit; definitions.  There is created within the district court a pretrial services unit to provide pre-arraignment and post-arraignment services to defendants.
    1. “Pre-arraignment report” may include:
      1. The results of a risk screen;
      2. For a defendant who scores as high risk on the risk screen, additional validated screens for mental health and substance use needs, to determine whether more in-depth assessment is needed post-arraignment; and
      3. For a defendant charged with a domestic violence offense under § 12-29-2 , and who has prior domestic violence offenses or other indications of risk, a lethality or dangerousness assessment.
    2. “Post-arraignment service” includes completion of the pre-arraignment report, a post-arraignment report, if necessary, and monitoring of defendants released on conditions that are informed by the pre-arraignment report, including substance abuse treatment referrals and testing; referrals to the home confinement program; employment referrals; and any other referrals that may be necessary to carry out the intent of this section.
    3. “Risk screen” means a validated, empirically based pretrial risk tool composed of a brief set of questions that may be answered without interviewing the defendant and are designed to predict failure to appear and risk to re-offend.
  2. Pre-arraignment report.  Whenever any person shall be taken into custody by any peace officer for the purpose of bringing that person before a court for arraignment or any other proceeding which may result in that person being detained pending a final adjudication of the charge, if the person is charged with a felony, or a misdemeanor domestic violence offense under § 12-29-2 and has prior domestic violence offenses or other indications of risk, the pretrial services unit shall, time permitting, prepare a pre-arraignment report and any post-arraignment screening of the accused deemed necessary by the court or the pretrial services unit, and shall obtain relevant information, records, and documents that may be useful to the judicial officer in determining the form and type of recognizance and conditions placed on the defendant.
  3. Delivery of report.  The pre-arraignment report and any post-arraignment screening shall be immediately delivered to the judicial officer before whom the accused shall be brought for the purpose of determining the form and conditions of recognizance.
  4. [Deleted by P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 4 and P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 4].
  5. Confidentiality of communications.  The accused shall be advised orally and in a written waiver form for the signature of the accused that he or she has the right to remain silent and may voluntarily decline to respond to any or all questions that may be put by representatives of the pretrial services unit. Communications between the accused and representatives of the pretrial services unit shall be considered confidential pursuant to § 12-13-24 .

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 184, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 4; P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 4, and P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2017, ch. 342, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2018.

P.L. 2017, ch. 353, § 5, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2018.

12-13-25. Nonprofit bail corporations.

  1. “Nonprofit bail corporation” means Project Bail, a Rhode Island nonprofit charitable corporation, and other nonprofit charitable corporations organized for the purpose of providing bail or surety as may be designated by the presiding justice of the superior court from time to time.
  2. Nonprofit bail corporations are authorized to provide bail or surety in all courts of the state for all persons eligible under the provisions of this chapter entitled to be released on bail. Nonprofit bail corporations may appoint an agent or agents to act in their behalf.
    1. Nonprofit bail corporations shall not be required to furnish cash or other security for bail but shall be allowed to bail those entitled to be bailed solely on the written promise of the nonprofit bail corporation to pay, in the event a defendant fails to appear at trial or any other appearance in which the defendant is required to be present, the amount of cash bail imposed; provided, the aggregate amount for which any nonprofit bail corporation shall be liable at any one time shall not exceed an amount equal to five (5) times the amount of its capital.
    2. For the purposes of this section:
      1. “Cash bail” means the amount of cash bail set, or a sum of money equal to ten percent (10%) of the amount of surety bail if surety bail is set; and
      2. “Capital” means total assets less total liabilities, determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles consistently applied.
  3. Nonprofit bail corporations:
    1. Shall not be entitled to bail any individual for whom bail has been set in an amount exceeding fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) surety bail or five thousand dollars ($5,000) cash bail;
    2. Shall prescribe a program of supervision and counseling for all persons for whom it has furnished bail, which program shall be designed to assure attendance at trial or at any other appearance in which the appearance of the person is required; and the conditions of supervision shall become part of the bail and recognizance conditions of release and with any violation of the conditions the nonprofit bail corporation may move to release surety; and
    3. Shall not furnish bail for any person if the pending charge against the person involves a capital offense or a felony in which the use of force or violence is involved or the sale or delivery of or possession with the intent to sell or deliver over one ounce of a Schedule I or Schedule II controlled substance, as defined in chapter 28 of title 21.
  4. Nonprofit bail corporations shall not be required to deposit any money with the court as required by § 12-13-10 . However, upon default of any individual bailed by a nonprofit bail corporation to make any required appearance, the court may order the nonprofit bail corporation to pay any sum not to exceed the amount of the individual’s cash bail to the general treasurer. Nonprofit bail corporations shall not be liable for the payment of any fine or court costs which may be owing by any individual.
  5. The presiding justice of the superior court shall register and approve Project Bail and may register and approve other nonprofit bail corporations as bondspersons from time to time. The registration of any nonprofit bail corporation may be revoked at any time by the presiding justice of the superior court and shall be revoked if the nonprofit bail corporation fails to pay any amount for which it is liable under this chapter. Nonprofit bail corporations shall be exempt from the provisions of §§ 12-13-8 and 12-13-21 and rules promulgated pursuant to those sections and from other statutes and rules which are inconsistent with this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 126, art. 41, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 262, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the paragraph designations in subdivision (a)(2).

Chapter 14 Payment of Traffic Fines

12-14-1. Payment of fines for ordinance violations to clerk of district court.

The town council of any town or the legislative body of any city, except the cities of Providence, Newport, Central Falls, Cranston, and Warwick and the towns of Bristol, Charlestown, Johnston, Narragansett, North Kingstown, South Kingstown, Warren, Westerly, and North Providence may by ordinance provide that whenever a person shall be charged with a violation of a provision of any of its ordinances relating to traffic, the jurisdiction and cognizances of violations of which ordinance is in the district court, and the person is notified in writing by a police officer to appear on a day and hour stated in the notice to answer the charge before a division of the district court having jurisdiction, the person, instead of personally appearing in court, may, in person or by one duly authorized by him or her in writing, appear before the clerk of the division of the district court having jurisdiction, admit the truth of the charge and pay to the clerk any fine that the court may from time to time, by standing order or rule establish or as may be fixed by the ordinance enacted under this section as the fixed penalty for those violations, not to exceed in any case the maximum fine imposed by law; provided, that appearance, admission, and payment is made at the office of the clerk during the office hours of the clerk within seven (7) days of the notification, and failure to appear within that time shall be deemed a waiver of the right to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court. The payment of the fine to the clerk in the manner provided in this section shall operate as a final disposition of the charge and the proceedings shall not be deemed criminal. The notice shall indicate the offense charged and shall also contain any information that will enable the person charged to take advantage of the provisions of the ordinance enacted under this section.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 42; P.L. 1932, ch. 1924, § 1; P.L. 1938, ch. 2618, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 42; P.L. 1940, ch. 863, § 1; P.L. 1941, ch. 1008, § 1; P.L. 1942, ch. 1120, § 1; P.L. 1945, ch. 1546, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1912, § 1; P.L. 1948 ch. 2137, § 1; P.L. 1952, ch. 2976, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-14-1 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 16, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 49, § 1; P.L. 1962, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is set out to correct an error appearing in the 2000 Reenactment volume.

12-14-2. Violation of parking regulations in the city of Newport.

The city of Newport is authorized and empowered to fix any fines that the Newport city council may, from time to time, establish for violation of traffic ordinances. The city council may designate the police department for the purpose of collecting any fines, when the offender desires to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court within seven (7) days from notification of the fine. The police department is authorized to receive the fines, directly or by mail, from any person charged with violation of any provision of the ordinances of the city relating to traffic, and the money so received and collected shall be turned over by the police to the director of finance of the city. All charges, records and payments shall be immediately entered by the police in their books, containing records of the violations, their disposition, and money received as fines shall be audited not less than once every three (3) months by the finance director of the city. In the event the offender refuses or neglects to dispose of the charges within seven (7) days, then he or she shall be brought before the district court of the state of Rhode Island, second division, for trial and for any disposition of the case that the court may decide to be proper, in which case, the provisions of § 12-14-1 , relating to fines and their disposition, shall prevail.

History of Section. P.L. 1932, ch. 1907, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 43; P.L. 1951, ch. 2677, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-14-2 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25; P.L. 1971, ch. 118, § 1.

12-14-3. Violations of Central Falls ordinance.

The city of Central Falls is authorized and empowered to fix any fines that the council committee on police may, from time to time, establish for violation of traffic ordinances. The council committee on police may designate one person who shall act as clerk of the police department for the purpose of collecting fines as provided in this section, when the offender decides to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court, within seven (7) days from notification of the fine. The police clerk of the police department is authorized to receive the fines directly from any person charged with a violation of any provision of the ordinances of the city relating to traffic, and the money so received and collected shall be turned over by the police clerk to the city treasurer. All charges, records and payments shall be immediately entered by the clerk of police, and the books of the clerk of police containing records of the violations, their dispositions, and money received as fines shall be audited not less than once each month by the city auditor of the city. In the event the offender refuses or neglects to dispose of the charges before seven (7) days, then he or she shall be brought before the district court for the fifth division for trial and for any disposition of the case that the court may decide to be proper, in which case the provisions of § 12-14-1 relating to fines and their disposition shall prevail.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 43; P.L. 1938, ch. 2618, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 44; G.L. 1956, § 12-14-3 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25.

12-14-4. Violations of Bristol, Johnston, Narragansett, North Kingstown, South Kingstown, Warren, Westerly, West Warwick, and North Providence ordinances.

The towns of Bristol, Johnston, Narragansett, North Kingstown, South Kingstown, Warren, Westerly, West Warwick and North Providence are authorized and empowered to fix any fines that the respective town council may, from time to time, establish for violation of traffic ordinances. The town councils may designate the police department for the purpose of collecting the fines as provided in this section, when the offender decides to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court within seven (7) days from the notification. The police department is authorized to receive the fines directly from any person charged with a violation of any provision of the ordinances of the town relating to traffic, and the money so received and collected shall be turned over by the police to the town treasurer. All charges, records and payments shall be immediately entered by the police, and the books of the police containing records of the violations, their dispositions and money received as fines shall be audited not less than once every three (3) months by a town auditor of the town. In the event the offender refuses or neglects to dispose of the charges before seven (7) days, then he or she shall be brought before the district court for the first, fourth, or sixth divisions, as the case may be, for trial and for any disposition of the case that the court may decide to be proper, in which case the provisions of § 12-14-1 , relating to fines and their disposition, shall prevail.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 45; P.L. 1940, ch. 863, § 2; P.L. 1941, ch. 1008, § 2; P.L. 1942, ch. 1120, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-14-4 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 16, § 2; P.L. 1961, ch. 49, § 2; P.L. 1962, ch. 136, § 2; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25; P.L. 2001, ch. 298, § 1.

12-14-5. Violations of Cranston ordinance.

The city of Cranston is authorized and empowered to fix any fines that the committee on police of the city council may, from time to time, establish as fines for violation of traffic ordinances. The committee on police may designate the police department for the purpose of collecting the fines as provided in this section, when the offender decides to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court within seven (7) days from notification. The police department is authorized to receive the fines directly from any person charged with violation of any provision of the ordinances of the city relating to traffic, and the money so received and collected shall be turned over by the police to the city treasurer. All charges, records, and payments shall be immediately entered by the police and the books of the police containing records of the violations, their dispositions, and money received as fines shall be audited not less than once every three (3) months by the city auditor of the city. In the event the offender refuses or neglects to dispose of the charges within seven (7) days, then he or she shall be brought before the district court for the sixth division for trial and for any disposition of the case that the court may decide to be proper, in which case the provisions of § 12-14-1 , relating to fines and their disposition, shall prevail.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 46; P.L. 1945, ch. 1546, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-14-5 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25.

12-14-6. Violations of Warwick ordinances.

The city of Warwick is authorized and empowered to fix any fines that the police commission of the city of Warwick may, from time to time, establish for violation of traffic ordinances. The police department shall collect the fines as provided in this section, when the offender decides to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court within seven (7) days from notification. The police department is authorized to receive fines directly from any person charged with a violation of any provision of the ordinance of the city relating to traffic, and the money so received and collected shall be turned over by the police to the city treasurer. All charges, records, and payments shall be immediately entered by the police, and the books of the police containing the records of the violations, their dispositions, and money received as fines, shall be audited not less than once every three (3) months by the city auditor of the city. In the event the offender refuses or neglects to dispose of the charges within seven (7) days, then he or she shall be brought before the district court for the third division for trial and for any disposition of the case that the court may decide to be proper, in which case the provisions of § 12-14-1 , relating to fines and their disposition, shall prevail.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 47; P.L. 1947, ch. 1912, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-14-6 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25.

12-14-7. Violations of Pawtucket ordinances.

The city of Pawtucket is authorized and empowered to fix any fines that the public safety commission of the city of Pawtucket may, from time to time, establish for violation of traffic ordinances. The police department shall collect fines as provided in this section, when the offender decides to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court within seven (7) days from notification. The police department is authorized to receive fines directly from any person charged with a violation of any provision of the ordinance of the city relating to traffic, and the money so received and collected shall be turned over by the police to the city treasurer. All charges, records, and payments shall be immediately entered by the police, and the books of the police containing the records of the violations, their disposition, and money received as fines, shall be audited not less than once every three (3) months by the city auditor of the city. In the event the offender refuses or neglects to dispose of the charges within seven (7) days, then he or she shall be brought before the district court for the fifth division for trial and for any disposition of the case that the court may decide to be proper, in which case the provisions of § 12-14-1 , relating to fines and their disposition, shall prevail.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 48; P.L. 1948, ch. 2137, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-14-7 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25.

12-14-8. Violations of Charlestown ordinance.

The town of Charlestown is authorized and empowered to fix any fines that the committee on police of the town council may, from time to time, establish for violation of traffic ordinances. The committee on police may designate the police department for the purpose of collecting fines as provided in this section, when the offender decides to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court within seven (7) days from notification. The police department is authorized to receive the fines directly from any person charged with a violation of any provision of the ordinances of the town relating to traffic, and the money so received and collected shall be turned over by the police to the town treasurer. All charges, records, and payments shall be immediately entered by the police, and the books of the police containing records of the violations, their dispositions, and money received as fines shall be audited not less than once every three (3) months by the town auditor of the town. In the event the offender refuses or neglects to dispose of the charges within seven (7) days, then he or she shall be brought before the district court for the fourth division for trial and for any disposition of the case that the court may decide to be proper, in which case the provisions of § 12-14-1 , relating to fines, and their disposition, shall prevail.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 49; P.L. 1952, ch. 2976, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-14-8 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25.

12-14-9. Violations of Lincoln ordinances.

A person charged with a violation of any provision of the ordinances relating to traffic, ordained by the town council of the town of Lincoln, except as provided in this section, and notified in writing by a police officer to appear on a day and hour stated in the notice to answer the charge before the district court for the fifth division, instead of personally appearing in court, may in person or by one duly authorized by him or her in writing appear at the Lincoln town clerk’s office admit the truth of the charge and pay to the town clerk one dollar ($1.00) for the first violation, two dollars ($2.00) for the second violation, and three dollars ($3.00) for the third violation committed within the consecutive period of twelve (12) months next preceding the date of the violation; provided, that operators of cars registered out of the state may pay fines by mailing the tag and the amount of the fine, within three (3) days from the violation, if it is a first violation, or within three (3) days of receipt of notice from the officer in charge of traffic violations that the violation is a second or third violation, as the case may be, by certified mail postage prepaid, addressed to the town clerk, town clerk’s office, Lincoln, Rhode Island. Failure to appear and pay the fine or to mail the tag and the amount of the fine within three (3) days of the notice shall be deemed a waiver to dispose of the charge without personal appearance before the district court; provided, that person charged with passing a red light, stop signal, and/or the manual signal to stop of a properly authorized police officer may appear before the town clerk at the town clerk’s office and pay to him or her the sum of five dollars ($5.00) for the first violation and ten dollars ($10.00) for the second violation; and provided, further, that appearance, admission, and payment is made to the town clerk at the town clerk’s office within three (3) days of notification, and failure to appear within that time, shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appear and to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in the district court. The payment of the fine in the manner provided in this section shall operate as a final disposition of the charge, and the proceedings shall not be deemed criminal. The notice provided in this section shall indicate the offense charged and shall also contain any information that will enable the person charged to take advantage of the provisions of this section. The right to dispose of a charge without personal appearance in court may not be exercised by any person who in any consecutive period of twelve (12) months next preceding the charge has been three (3) times in the aggregate adjudged guilty by the court, or has admitted the truth of the charges made against him or her of a violation of the ordinance relating to traffic for illegal parking or twice for the traffic ordinance relating to passing a red light, stop signal, or manual signal of an authorized officer to stop under the provisions of this section.

History of Section. R.P.L. 1957, ch. 131, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25.

12-14-10. Violations of traffic and parking regulations in the town of Jamestown.

A person charged with the violation of any provision of the ordinances relating to parking and/or traffic ordained by the town council of the town of Jamestown, and a person charged with a violation of any parking regulation of the state traffic commission relating to parking in Jamestown, notified in writing by a police officer to appear on a day and hour stated in the notice to answer the charge before the district court of the second division, instead of personally appearing in court may in person or by one duly authorized by him or her in writing appear at the Jamestown police station, admit the truth of the charge and pay to the officer in charge of the police station the amount of the fine set forth in the ordinance or parking regulation of the state traffic commission for violations, and the police department shall collect the fines as provided in this section, when the offender decides to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court within seven (7) days from notification. The police department is authorized to receive fines directly from any person charged with a violation, and money so received and collected shall be turned over by the police to the town treasurer. All charges, records, and payments shall be immediately entered by the police and the books of the police containing the records of the violations, their dispositions and money received as fines, shall be audited not less than once every three (3) months by the town treasurer of the town. In the event the offender refuses or neglects to dispose of the charges within seven (7) days, then he or she shall be brought before the district court of the second division for trial and for any disposition of the case that the court may decide to be proper, in which case the provisions of § 12-14-1 , relating to fines and their disposition, shall prevail. In addition the offender may mail the fine in accordance with the applicable provisions of the general laws.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 181, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25; P.L. 1972, ch. 232, § 1.

12-14-11. Violations of parking regulations in the town of Barrington.

The town of Barrington is authorized and empowered to fix any fines that the Barrington town council may, from time to time, establish for violation of any provision of the ordinances relating to parking. The town council may designate the police department for the purpose of collecting fines as provided in this section, when the offender desires to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court, within seven (7) days from notification. The police department is authorized to receive the fines, directly or by mail, from any person charged with violation of any provision of the ordinances of the town relating to traffic, and the money so received and collected shall be turned over by the police to the town treasurer of Barrington. All charges, records, and payments shall be immediately entered by the police in their books containing records of violations, and their disposition, and money received as fines shall be audited not less than once every three (3) months by the town treasurer of the town. In the event the offender refuses or neglects to dispose of the charges within seven (7) days, then he or she shall be brought before the district court of the state of Rhode Island, first division, for trial and for any disposition of the case that the court may decide to be proper, in which case the provisions of § 12-14-1 , relating to fines and their disposition, shall prevail.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 134, § 2.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 12-14-11 (P.L. 1965, ch. 29, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25), concerning the same subject matter, was repealed by P.L. 1988, ch. 134, § 1, effective June 2, 1988.

12-14-12. Violations of parking regulations in the town of Smithfield.

The town of Smithfield is authorized and empowered to fix any fines that the Smithfield town council may, from time to time, establish for violation of any provision of the ordinances relating to parking. The town council may designate the police department for the purpose of collecting fines as provided in this section, when the offender desires to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court, within seven (7) days from notification. The police department is authorized to receive fines, directly or by mail, from any person charged with violation of any provision of the ordinances of the town relating to traffic, and the money so received and collected shall be turned over by the police to the town treasurer of Smithfield. All charges, records, and payments shall be immediately entered by the police in the books of the police containing records of violations and their disposition, and money received as fines shall be audited not less than once every three (3) months by the town treasurer of the town. In the event the offender refuses or neglects to dispose of the charges within seven (7) days, then he or she shall be brought before the district court of the state of Rhode Island, seventh division, for trial and for any disposition of the case that the court may decide to be proper, in which case the provisions of § 12-14-1 , relating to fines and their disposition, shall prevail.

History of Section. P.L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25; P.L. 1985, ch. 172, §§ 1, 2.

12-14-13. Violations of parking regulations in the town of Burrillville.

  1. The town of Burrillville is further authorized and empowered to fix any fines that the town council may, from time to time, establish for violation of its traffic ordinances. The town council may designate the police department for the purpose of collecting fines as provided in this section, when the offender decides to dispose of a charge without personal appearance in court within three (3) days from the date of notification.
  2. A person charged with the violation of any provision of the ordinances relating to parking ordained by the town council of the town of Burrillville and notified in writing by a police officer to appear on a day and hour stated in the notice to answer the charge before the district court for the seventh division instead of personally appearing in court may, in person or by one duly authorized by him or her in writing, appear at the Burrillville police station, admit the truth of the charge and pay the fine to the officer in charge of the police station; provided, that operators of cars registered out of the state may pay the fine by mailing the tag and the amount of the fine within three (3) days from the date of the violation, postage prepaid, addressed to the town clerk, town clerk’s office, Burrillville, Rhode Island; failure to appear and pay the fine or to mail the tag and the amount of the fine within three (3) days of the notice shall be deemed a waiver to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court; and provided, further, that the appearance, admission, and payment is made to the clerk within three (3) days of notification, and failure to appear within that time shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appear and to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court. The payment of the fine in the manner provided in this section shall operate as a final disposition of the charge and the proceedings shall not be deemed criminal. The notice provided pursuant to this section shall indicate the offense charged and shall also contain any information that will enable the person charged to take advantage of the provisions of this section. The right to dispose of a charge without personal appearance in court may not be exercised by any person who in any consecutive period of twelve (12) months next preceding the charge has been three (3) times in the aggregate adjudged guilty by the court, or has three (3) times admitted the truth of the charges made against him or her under the provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1965, ch. 159, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 25; P.L. 1985, ch. 320, § 1.

12-14-14. Violations of parking regulations in the town of Portsmouth.

The town of Portsmouth is authorized and empowered to fix any fines that the Portsmouth town council may, from time to time, establish for violation of any provision of the ordinances relating to parking. The town council may designate the police department for the purpose of collecting the fines as provided in this section, when the offender desires to dispose of the charge without personal appearance in court, within seven (7) days from notification. The police department is authorized to receive the fines, directly or by mail, from any person charged with violation of any provision of the ordinances of the town relating to traffic, and the money so received and collected shall be turned over by the police to the town treasurer of Portsmouth. All charges, records, and payments shall be immediately entered by the police in their books containing records of violations and their disposition, and money received as fines shall be audited not less than once every three (3) months by the town finance director’s office of the town. In the event the offender refuses or neglects to dispose of the charges within seven (7) days, then he or she shall be brought before the district court of the state of Rhode Island, second division, for trial and for any disposition of the case that the court may decide to be proper, in which case the provisions of § 12-14-1 , relating to fines and their disposition, shall prevail.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 266, § 1.

Chapter 15 Public Defender

12-15-1. Office created.

There is created the office of public defender.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1007, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-15-1 .

Collateral References.

Construction and effect of statutes providing for office of public defender. 36 A.L.R.3d 1403.

Right of indigent defendant in state criminal case to assistance of investigators. 81 A.L.R.4th 259.

12-15-2. Appointment and term of public defender.

The governor with the advice and consent of the senate shall appoint a member of the bar of this state who has been admitted to practice law for at least five (5) years to fill the office of the public defender. The public defender shall serve a term of six (6) years and until a successor is appointed and qualified.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1007, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-15-2 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 3, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 36, § 1.

Cross References.

Defender and employees in unclassified service, § 36-4-2 .

12-15-3. Duty to represent indigent defendants.

It shall be the duty of the public defender to represent and act as attorney for indigent defendants in those criminal cases referred to him or her by the supreme court, by the superior courts, by the district courts, and as are set forth in § 14-1-31 , and he or she shall be engaged full time in that capacity.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1007, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-15-3 ; P.L. 1966, ch. 271, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 3, § 2; P.L. 1974, ch. 49, § 1.

Rules of Court.

Assignment of counsel, Super. Ct. Crim. P. Rule 44.

Cross References.

Juvenile cases, appearance in, §§ 14-1-31 , 14-1-58 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Withdrawal of Counsel.

Defendant was not deprived of benefit of counsel contrary to U.S. Const., amend. 6 by virtue of withdrawal of counsel, where motion to withdraw was not filed until after verdict and where defendant had sufficient funds to hire other counsel but preferred to argue case himself in the supreme court. Lee v. Kindelan, 80 R.I. 212 , 95 A.2d 51, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 54 , cert. denied, 345 U.S. 1000, 73 S. Ct. 1146, 97 L. Ed. 1406, 1953 U.S. LEXIS 1975 (1953); Ex parte Lee, 123 F. Supp. 439, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3031 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 217 F.2d 647, 1954 U.S. App. LEXIS 3177 (1st Cir. 1954).

Collateral References.

Right to and appointment of counsel. 60 A.L.R.2d 691; 25 A.L.R.4th 1072.

12-15-4. Office facilities.

The public defender shall have an office in the Providence County Courthouse which shall be assigned to him or her for his or her use by the Providence county courthouse commission.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1007, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-15-4 .

12-15-5. Powers to accept grants and bequests.

The public defender shall have the power to apply for and accept grants and bequests of funds from other states, interstate agencies, and independent authorities, and private firms, individuals, and foundations, for the purpose of carrying out his or her lawful responsibilities. The funds shall be deposited with the general treasurer in a restricted receipt account established within the department to permit funds to be expended in accordance with the provisions of the grant or bequest.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 461, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

The former section (P.L. 1941, ch. 1007, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 12-15-5 ), concerning compensation of the public defender, was repealed by P.L. 1968, ch. 3, § 5.

12-15-6. Assistant defenders.

The public defender may appoint any assistants that may be deemed necessary, whose power and duties shall be similar to those imposed upon the public defender by law and shall be performed under and by the advice and direction of the public defender.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1007, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 12-15-6 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 3, § 3.

12-15-7. Appropriations for expenses.

The general assembly shall annually appropriate any sum or sums that it may deem necessary for the payment of the salaries of any clerical assistance that may be deemed necessary and for the payment of office expenses and other actual expenses incurred by the public defender in the performance of his or her duties; and the controller is authorized and directed to draw his or her orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of the sum or sums, or as much of the sum or sums as may from time to time be required, upon receipt by him or her of proper vouchers approved by the public defender.

History of Section. P.L. 1941, ch. 1007, § 7; P.L. 1942, ch. 1133, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-15-7 .

12-15-8. “Indigent defendants” defined.

For the purpose of assisting the public defender or his or her assistants to carry out their duties under this chapter, “indigent defendant,” when used in connection with representation and action as attorney by the public defender or one of his or her assistants in cases before the courts under this chapter, includes a person who after payment of necessary expenses for food, shelter and medical care, does not have sufficient income or assets to enable him or her to retain counsel nor is there any one to whom he or she is entitled to look for support who has that income or assets.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 271, § 2; P.L. 1968, ch. 3, § 4; P.L. 1996, ch. 175, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-15-9. Eligibility for assistance.

Every person who seeks the services of the office of the public defender under this chapter must make affidavit under oath that, after payment of necessary expenses for food, shelter and medical care, he or she does not have sufficient income or assets to enable him or her to retain counsel, nor is there any one to whom he or she is entitled to look for support who has that income or assets. The public defender, on his or her own instigation or at the request of a referring court, may require a further financial statement, may require relevant documents, and may conduct any investigation he or she deems appropriate. If the public defender, after examination and investigation of the financial statement, is satisfied that the person submitting it is an indigent defendant, the public defender or one of his or her assistants shall defend the person; provided, that if the public defender is satisfied that the person is not an indigent defendant, he or she shall notify the court which referred the person to the public defender’s office of the determination that the person is not an indigent defendant.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 271, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 175, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Judicial Review.

Trial court did not err in finding that defendant voluntarily waived counsel without the trial court first independently inquiring into defendant’s indigency status, after the Public Defender’s office had found him ineligible; defendant continuously said he had funds to hire counsel, even after claiming he was indigent but was deemed ineligible for Public Defender representation, and R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-15-9 , which defines eligibility requirements for indigent representation, does not expressly mandate or permit a trial justice to review the Public Defender’s finding of ineligibility. Moreover, defendant’s continuous failure to obtain representation demonstrated a voluntary waiver of counsel. State v. Souto, 210 A.3d 409, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 96 (R.I. 2019).

Collateral References.

Determination of indigency of accused entitling him to appointment of counsel. 51 A.L.R.3d 1108.

12-15-10. Confidential nature of financial statement.

The public defender, his or her assistants, and every employee of his or her office is expressly prohibited from divulging to any individual not officially connected with his or her office any information obtained by the public defender, his or her assistants, or any employee of that office in the regular course of their duty or from any financial statement submitted under § 12-15-9 or from the records and reports of their investigation, or from the permanent records of that office, which would reveal any of the information relative to the financial status or any person submitting a financial statement. Every request for information directed to the public defender shall be denied if the request would necessitate that individual to divulge any information which is declared in this section to be held confidential by the public defender; provided, the public defender is authorized to divulge the information confidentially held by that office to the court referring a defendant in a criminal case to the public defender’s office.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 271, § 2.

12-15-11. Penalty for false representation.

Whoever knowingly makes a false statement or representation to the public defender, assistants, or any employee of that office to obtain the legal services of the public defender or one of his or her assistants under this chapter, either for himself or herself or for any other person, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than three hundred dollars ($300), or by imprisonment not longer than thirty (30) days, or both. Each false statement or representation shall constitute a separate and distinct offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 196, § 1.

Chapter 16 Attendance of Witnesses from Without State

12-16-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal Cases.”

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Attendance of witnesses from another state.

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-82i, 54-82j.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 233, § 12 et seq.

Collateral References.

Validity of Uniform Act To Secure Attendance of Witnesses From Without A State In Criminal Proceedings. 44 A.L.R.2d 733.

12-16-2. Definitions.

  1. “State” includes any territory of the United States and the District of Columbia.
  2. “Witness” as used in this chapter includes a person whose testimony is desired in any proceeding or investigation by a grand jury or in a criminal action, prosecution, or proceeding.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-2 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections.

12-16-3. Certification by foreign judge as to witness from this state.

If a judge of a court of record in any state, which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons within that state to attend and testify in this state, certifies under the seal of the court: (1) that there is a criminal prosecution pending in the court or that a grand jury investigation has commenced or is about to commence, (2) that a person being within this state is a material witness in the prosecution or grand jury investigation, and (3) that the person’s presence will be required for a specified number of days, upon presentation of the certificate to any judge of a court of record in the county in which the person is, the judge shall fix a time and place for a hearing, and shall make an order directing the witness to appear at a certain time and place for the hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-3 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations.

12-16-4. Issuance of summons to appear in another state.

If at a hearing the judge determines: (1) that the witness is material and necessary, (2) that it will not cause undue hardship to the witness to be compelled to attend and testify in the prosecution or a grand jury investigation in the other state, and (3) that the laws of the state in which the prosecution is pending or grand jury investigation has commenced or is about to commence will give to him or her protection from arrest and the service of civil and criminal process, the judge shall issue a summons with a copy of the certificate attached, directing the witness to attend and testify in the court where the prosecution is pending or where a grand jury investigation has commenced or is about to commence at a time and place specified in the summons. In any hearing the certificate shall be prima facie evidence of all the facts stated in it.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-4 .

Cross References.

Subpoena and attendance of witnesses generally, § 9-17-1 et seq.

12-16-5. Taking into custody and delivery of witness.

If the certificate recommends that the witness be taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of the requesting state to assure his or her attendance in the requesting state, the judge may, in lieu of notification of the hearing, direct that the witness be immediately brought before him or her for the hearing; and the judge at the hearing, being satisfied of the desirability of custody and delivery, for which determination the certificate shall be prima facie proof of that desirability, may, in lieu of issuing subpoena or summons, order that the witness be immediately taken into custody and delivered to an officer of the requesting state.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-5 .

12-16-6. Punishment for disobedience of summons.

If a witness, who is summoned as provided in this chapter, after being paid or tendered by some properly authorized person the sum of ten cents ($0.10) a mile for each mile and five dollars ($5.00) for each day that he or she is required to travel and attend as a witness, fails without good cause to attend and testify as directed in the summons, he or she shall be punished in the manner provided for the punishment of any witness who disobeys a summons issued from a court of record in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-6 .

12-16-7. Certificate to summon witness from another state.

If a person in any state which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons within its borders to attend and testify in criminal prosecutions or grand jury investigations commenced or about to commence in this state is a material witness in a prosecution pending in a court of record in this state or in a grand jury investigation which has commenced or is about to commence, a judge of the court may issue a certificate under the seal of the court stating these facts and specifying the number of days the witness will be required. This certificate shall be presented to a judge of a court of record in the county in which the witness is found.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-7 .

Collateral References.

Availability under Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from without a State in criminal proceedings of subpoena duces tecum, 7 A.L.R.4th 836.

12-16-8. Receiving custody of witness from another state.

If the certificate recommends that the witness be taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of this state to assure his or her attendance in this state, the judge may direct that the witness be immediately brought before him or her; and the judge, being satisfied of the desirability of the custody and delivery, for which determination the certificate shall be prima facie proof, may order that the witness be immediately taken into custody and delivered to an officer of this state, which order shall be sufficient authority to the officer to take the witness into custody and hold him or her unless and until he or she may be released by bail, recognizance, or order of the judge issuing the certificate.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-8 .

12-16-9. Fees tendered — Duration of attendance required — Failure to testify.

If the witness is summoned to attend and testify in this state, he or she shall be tendered the sum of ten cents ($0.10) a mile for each mile and five dollars ($5.00) for each day that he or she is required to travel and attend as a witness. A witness who has appeared in accordance with the provisions of the summons shall not be required to remain within this state for a longer period of time than the period mentioned in the certificate, unless otherwise ordered by the court. If the witness fails without good cause to attend and testify as directed in the summons, he or she shall be punished in the manner provided for the punishment of any witness who disobeys a summons issued from a court of record in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-9 .

12-16-10. Exemption from process of witnesses entering state.

If a person comes into this state in obedience to a summons directing him or her to attend and testify in this state that person shall not, while in this state pursuant to the summons or order, be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his or her entrance into this state under the summons.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-10 .

12-16-11. Exemption from process of witnesses passing through state.

A person passing through this state while going to another state in obedience to a summons or order to attend and testify in that state or while returning from testifying, shall not, while so passing through this state, be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his or her entrance into this state under the summons or order.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-11 .

12-16-12. Uniformity of construction.

This chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of the states which enact it.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-12 .

12-16-13. Severability.

If any part of this chapter is for any reason declared void, its invalidity shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1936, ch. 2382, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 626, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 12-16-13 .

Chapter 16.1 Uniform Rendition of Prisoners as Witnesses in Criminal Proceeding Act

12-16.1-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Penal institutions” includes a jail, prison, penitentiary, house of correction, or other place of penal detention.
  2. “State” includes any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory of the United States.
  3. “Witness” means a person who is confined in a penal institution in any state and whose testimony is desired in another state in any criminal proceeding or investigation by a grand jury or in any criminal action before a court.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 4, § 1.

12-16.1-2. Summoning witness in this state to testify in another state.

  1. A judge of a state court of record in another state, which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons confined in penal institutions within that state to attend and testify in this state, may certify:
    1. That there is a criminal proceeding or investigation by a grand jury or a criminal action pending in the court;
    2. That a person who is confined in a penal institution in this state may be a material witness in the proceeding, investigation, or action; and
    3. That his or her presence will be required during a specified time.
  2. Upon presentation of the certificate to any judge having jurisdiction over the confined person, and upon notice to the attorney general, the judge in this state shall fix a time and place for a hearing and shall make an order directed to the person having custody of the prisoner requiring that the prisoner be produced before him or her at the hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 4, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

12-16.1-3. Court order.

If at the hearing the judge determines: (1) that the witness may be material and necessary, (2) that his or her attending and testifying are not adverse to the interests of this state or to the health or legal rights of the witness, (3) that the laws of the state in which he or she is requested to testify will give him or her protection from arrest and the service of civil and criminal process because of any act committed prior to his arrival in the state under the order, and (4) that as a practical matter the possibility is negligible that the witness may be subject to arrest or to the service of civil or criminal process in any state through which he or she will be required to pass, the judge shall issue an order with a copy of the certificate attached, directing the witness to attend and testify, directing the person having custody of the witness to produce him or her, in the court in which the criminal action is pending or where the grand jury investigation is pending, at a time and place specified in the order, and prescribing any conditions that the judge shall determine.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 4, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection and subdivision designations.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Continuance.

Where defendant knew in advance of need to secure testimony of incarcerated witness for his defense and neglected to make proper arrangements, existence of defendant’s right to procure his witness did not require an automatic continuance during trial but was within the trial court’s discretion. State v. Carillo, 113 R.I. 32 , 317 A.2d 449, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1133 (1974).

12-16.1-4. Terms and conditions.

The order to the witness and to the person having custody of the witness shall provide for the return of the witness at the conclusion of his or her testimony, proper safeguards on the witness’ custody, and proper financial reimbursement or prepayment by the requesting jurisdiction for all expenses incurred in the production and return of the witness, and may prescribe any other conditions that the judge thinks proper or necessary. The order shall not become effective until the judge of the state requesting the witness enters an order directing compliance with the prescribed conditions.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 4, § 1.

12-16.1-5. Exceptions.

This chapter does not apply to any person in this state confined as insane or mentally ill, or as a defective delinquent, or under sentence of death.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 4, § 1.

12-16.1-6. Prisoner from another state summoned to testify in this state.

  1. If a person confined in a penal institution in any other state may be a material witness in a criminal action pending in a court of record or in a grand jury investigation in this state, a judge of the court may certify:
    1. That there is a criminal proceeding or investigation by a grand jury or a criminal action pending in the court;
    2. That a person who is confined in a penal institution in the other state may be a material witness in the proceeding, investigation, or action; and
    3. That the person’s presence will be required during a specified time.
  2. The certificate shall be presented to a judge of a court of record in the other state having jurisdiction over the confined prisoner, and a notice shall be given to the attorney general of the state in which the prisoner is confined.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 4, § 1.

12-16.1-7. Compliance.

The judge of the court in this state may enter an order directing compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by the judge of the state in which the witness is confined.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 4, § 1.

12-16.1-8. Exemption from arrest and service of process.

If a witness from another state comes into or passes through this state under an order directing the witness to attend in this or another state, he or she shall not, while in this state pursuant to the order, be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, because of any act committed prior to his or her arrival in this state under the order.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 4, § 1.

Chapter 17 Trial

12-17-1. Trial in superior court only on indictment, information, or appeal — Venue.

No person shall be put on trial for any offense before the superior court except upon indictment found by a grand jury, or upon an information signed by the attorney general or one of the attorney general’s designated assistants, or upon appeal from the sentence of a district court, and, unless otherwise provided by law, the trial shall be held before the superior court in the county in which the offense may lawfully be alleged to have been committed or shall have been committed and not elsewhere, but this provision and all other general and special provisions fixing the venue of criminal actions shall be subject to the exception that proceedings by indictment, information, or on appeal for offenses alleged to have been committed or committed in the county of Bristol shall be had in the county of Providence.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, §§ 1, 7; C.P.A. 1905, §§ 1179, 1180; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, §§ 1, 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 31; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 31; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 31; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-1 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 13.

Cross References.

Constitutional rights of accused, R.I. Const., art. 1, § 10 .

Incompetency to stand trial, criminally insane persons, § 40.1-5.3-1 et seq.

Venue of offenses on Narragansett Bay, § 12-3-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Nature of Appeal.

On appeal to the superior court the statutes require and provide for a trial de novo of the cause in its entirety. It is an original hearing on the facts and the law and not an appellate proceeding to review the rulings and decisions of justices of the district courts. State v. McGuire, 90 R.I. 301 , 157 A.2d 657, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1960).

Venue.

Although the defendant contended that the superior court of Providence County lacked jurisdiction to try him for acts allegedly committed in Bristol County, this section provided that evidence that an offense had been committed either in Providence or Bristol County was available as proof under an indictment stating the venue as being in the county of Providence. State v. Harris, 111 R.I. 147 , 300 A.2d 267, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1189 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1008, 94 S. Ct. 369, 38 L. Ed. 2d 245, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 1300 (1973).

A superior court will lack jurisdiction to hear a criminal case if the crime occurred beyond its territorial boundaries. State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1643 (R.I. 1980).

To the extent that the valid exercise of the superior court’s subject matter jurisdiction is dependent on a factual determination of where the crime occurred, the trial justice may await the full development of the state’s evidence before ruling on a motion to dismiss. State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1643 (R.I. 1980).

It is sufficient to prove jurisdiction if the evidence, as viewed by the trial justice, indicates that the crime occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1643 (R.I. 1980).

— Specific Offenses.
— — Conspiracy.

An indictment for conspiracy may be brought in the place where the overt act was done by any of the conspirators in furtherance of the common design. State v. McElroy, 71 R.I. 379 , 46 A.2d 397, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1946).

— — Stolen Goods.

Defendant received stolen goods for the purposes of venue in the county where the goods were delivered to a carrier as his agent. State v. Habib, 18 R.I. 558 , 30 A. 462, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1894).

12-17-2. “Not guilty” plea inferred.

If any person on being arraigned for an offense shall stand mute or not answer directly, or shall peremptorily challenge a greater number of the persons summoned as jurors than he or she is by law entitled to challenge, the plea of “not guilty” shall be entered on the record, the supernumerary challenges shall be disregarded, and the trial shall proceed as if the prisoner had pleaded “not guilty” and as if he or she had not made the challenges.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 18; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 18; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 15; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-2 .

Collateral References.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude Caucasian persons, as a racial group, from criminal jury — post- Batson state cases. 47 A.L.R.5th 259.

12-17-3. Waiver of jury trial — Special findings and rulings.

In all criminal cases the accused may, if he or she shall so elect and with the leave of the court, waive a trial by jury, and in those cases the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try the cause without a jury and render judgment and pass sentence. In cases so tried the court shall, upon request of the accused, make special finding upon any issue of fact and special ruling upon any question of law arising in the case.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 78; P.L. 1929, ch. 1335, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 71; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-3 .

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is set out to correct an error appearing in the 2000 Reenactment volume.

Rules of Court.

Waiver of jury trial, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 23.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Factors Considered.

A trial justice may not consider any factors other than whether the defendant’s decision is made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner. If the defendant satisfies these criteria, the defendant has an absolute right to a jury-waived trial. State v. Moran, 605 A.2d 494, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 70 (R.I. 1992).

Knowing Waiver.

It was not error to grant defendant’s motion for trial without a jury where such motion was made through his attorney, who informed the court that he had fully advised the defendant of his rights, and, in response to questions by the court, the defendant stated that he understood that the court rather than a jury would hear the evidence and decide all questions, that that was his choice and desire, and that no promises or rewards had been made to induce such choice. State v. Franklin, 103 R.I. 715 , 241 A.2d 219, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 854 (1968), overruled in part, State v. Aurgemma, 116 R.I. 425 , 358 A.2d 46, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1291 (1976).

The judge rightfully determined that the defendants knowingly and intelligently waived their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury as well as the parallel right guaranteed by Art. I, § 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution by requiring that waivers be made by each and every defendant in open court after he had admonished the defendants of the nature and consequence of that waiver. State v. Cruz, 517 A.2d 237, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 546 (R.I. 1986).

Petition for Venue Change.

In view of the right granted by this section, a petition for change of venue on the ground of prejudice is premature if brought before the case is assigned for trial. State v. Burns, 79 R.I. 130 , 84 A.2d 801, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1951).

Collateral References.

Right of accused, in state criminal trial, to insist, over prosecutor’s or court’s objection, on trial by court without jury. 37 A.L.R.4th 304.

12-17-4. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 19; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 19; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 74; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 74; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 67; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-4 ), restricting peremptory juror challenges, was repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 24.

12-17-5. Continuance of trial to conclusion after opening to jury.

Notwithstanding the provisions of § 8-7-2 , and notwithstanding the provisions of any other law previously enacted, whenever a criminal trial shall have been opened to a jury the trial shall continue to its conclusion.

History of Section. P.L. 1949, ch. 2335, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-5 .

12-17-6. Control and disposition of property used as evidence.

All property, money, or estate taken or detained as evidence in any criminal cause shall be subject to the order of the court before which the indictment, information, or complaint shall be brought or pending, and shall, at the termination of the cause, be restored to the rightful owner.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 30; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 30; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 66; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 66; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 59; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-6 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Certiorari.

Supreme court could grant certiorari on petition of state to review order as to restoration of property. State v. Coleman, 58 R.I. 6 , 190 A. 791, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1937).

Garnishment.

Property taken from a prisoner at time of his arrest by an officer and retained as evidence in the criminal proceeding is subject to garnishment while in his hands, providing there is no collusion between officers and creditors. Fitzgerald v. Nickerson, 43 R.I. 396 , 113 A. 290, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1921).

Receipt of Evidence.

Court must receive evidence before ordering the restoration of property prior to trial. State v. Coleman, 58 R.I. 6 , 190 A. 791, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1937).

Return of Property.

A defendant is entitled to a return of all seized property belonging to him, provided that it is noncontraband, not subject to forfeiture, not stolen or otherwise unlawfully taken from the owner, and not found to have been unlawfully used or intended for unlawful use. State v. De Masi, 447 A.2d 1139, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1115 (R.I. 1982).

A finding that some of the property seized might have possible evidentiary value did not justify retention of other property having no such use. State v. De Masi, 447 A.2d 1139, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1115 (R.I. 1982).

Where the Supreme Court was unable, on the record before it, to determine whether the government can reasonably justify its conduct in retaining the defendant’s property, it remanded the case to the district court for a hearing at which the state shall have an opportunity to present evidence to justify this conduct. State v. Shore, 522 A.2d 1215, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 435 (R.I. 1987).

12-17-7. Release of property held as evidence after escape of defendant.

If any defendant charged with the commission of any crime or offense after arrest upon indictment, information, or complaint found shall have escaped, the court before which the indictment, information, or complaint shall be pending may, after the lapse of a reasonable time, return and restore any property or estate held pursuant to § 12-7-16 to its owner.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 31; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 31; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 67; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 67; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 60; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-7 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 13.

12-17-8. Compulsory process for defense witnesses.

Compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in favor of any person indicted or charged by information shall issue out of any court before which the person shall be brought for trial, upon a satisfactory showing that he or she is unable to procure witnesses at his or her own expense.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 65; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 65; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 68; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 68; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 61; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-8 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 23; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 13.

Cross References.

Constitutional right to compulsory process, R.I. Const., art. 1, § 10 .

Witnesses, § 9-17-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party’s failure to produce or examine that party’s attorney—modern cases. 78 A.L.R.4th 571.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party’s failure to produce or examine transferor, transferee, broker, or other person allegedly involved in transaction at issue — modern cases. 81 A.L.R.4th 939.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party’s failure to produce or examine witness who was occupant of vehicle involved in accident—modern cases. 78 A.L.R.4th 616.

Right of indigent defendant in state criminal case to assistance of fingerprint expert. 72 A.L.R.4th 874.

12-17-9. Defendant as witness.

No respondent in a criminal prosecution, offering himself or herself as a witness, shall be excluded from testifying because he or she is a respondent; and neglect or refusal so to testify shall create no presumption nor be used in argument against him or her.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 396; G.L. 1909, ch. 292, § 44; G.L. 1923, ch. 342, § 44; G.L. 1938, ch. 538, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-9 .

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is set out to correct an error appearing in the 2000 Reenactment volume.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Limitations on Testimony.

Trial court could have denied defendant’s motion to reopen defense so defendant could testify and did not abuse its discretion by granting motion subject to conditions that defendant could offer narrative without examination by counsel and that new counsel would not be appointed to assist defendant. State v. Feole, 797 A.2d 1059, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 116 (R.I. 2002).

Use in Argument.

Assessment of the propriety of prosecutorial argument to a jury requires review of the questioned statement in context and in light of attendant circumstances, rather than in isolation, and ascertainment of its meaning not in how it is read from the printed page, but in how a jury composed of ordinarily intelligent lay persons would understand it as they listened to the prosecutor’s closing argument. State v. Andrews, 120 R.I. 771 , 390 A.2d 926, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 723 (1978).

Remarks by a prosecutor which might have been construed as a reference to defendant’s failure to testify do not necessarily call for reversal. State v. Andrews, 120 R.I. 771 , 390 A.2d 926, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 723 (1978).

Although the prosecutor might have chosen his language more circumspectly in stating “[t]hose [the defendant and the victim] are the only two people who can say beyond a shadow of a doubt,” that language did not run afoul of the prohibition against commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify and is constitutionally permissible. State v. Andrews, 120 R.I. 771 , 390 A.2d 926, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 723 (1978).

Collateral References.

Accused who testifies in his own behalf is subject to cross-examination to show previous conviction in order to enhance punishment. 153 A.L.R. 1159.

Admissibility, in prosecution in another state’s jurisdiction, of confession or admission made pursuant to plea bargain with state authorities. 90 A.L.R.4th 1133.

Requirement that court advise accused of, and make inquiry with respect to, waiver of right to testify. 72 A.L.R.5th 403.

Right of defendant in a criminal case to cross-examine a co-defendant who has taken the stand in his own behalf. 33 A.L.R. 826.

12-17-10. Defendant’s spouse as witness.

The husband or wife of any respondent in a criminal prosecution, offering himself or herself as a witness, shall not be excluded from testifying because he or she is the husband or wife of the respondent.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 397; G.L. 1909, ch. 292, § 45; G.L. 1923, ch. 342, § 45; G.L. 1938, ch. 537, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-10 .

Cross References.

Pandering prosecution, spouse as witness, § 11-34-3.

Testimony in civil cases, § 9-17-13 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Legislative Intent.

In enacting this section the legislature intended to abrogate the common-law rule which prevailed in civil as well as criminal cases that, generally, a spouse could be precluded from testifying against the other spouse who was a party to the action. State v. LaPlume, 118 R.I. 670 , 375 A.2d 938, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1507 (1977).

Privilege Not to Testify.

Wife’s privilege not to testify against her husband is not affected by the fact that she has initiated divorce proceedings against him. State v. LaPlume, 118 R.I. 670 , 375 A.2d 938, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1507 (1977).

Collateral References.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party’s failure to produce or examine spouse — modern cases. 79 A.L.R.4th 694.

Competency of one spouse to testify against other in prosecution for offense against child of both or either. 93 A.L.R.3d 1018.

Competency of one spouse to testify against other in prosecution for offense against third party as affected by fact that offense against spouse was involved in same transaction. 74 A.L.R.4th 277.

Competency or privilege of one spouse as witness in prosecution against other for offense committed before marriage. 76 A.L.R. 1088; 11 A.L.R.2d 648.

Crimes against spouse within exception permitting testimony by one spouse against other in criminal prosecution — modern state cases. 74 A.L.R.4th 223.

Divorce or annulment, effect of, on competency of former spouse as witness against other in criminal prosecution. 38 A.L.R.2d 570.

Marital privilege under Rule 501 of Federal Rules of Evidence.46 A.L.R. Fed. 735.

Overhearing or seeing by third person of communication between husband and wife, effect of. 63 A.L.R. 107.

Waiver of objection at one trial as affecting right to make objection at subsequent trial of same case. 79 A.L.R. 173.

12-17-10.1. Spouse as witness in domestic or child abuse actions.

In any prosecution involving sexual assault, assault, or abuse committed against one’s spouse or against a minor child of the defendant or of the defendant’s spouse, the judge may order the spouse of the defendant to give testimony against the defendant notwithstanding the fact that the spouse may have been married to the defendant before, at the time of, or after the commission of the offense, and notwithstanding the fact that the spouse may be called as a witness during the existence of the marriage or after its dissolution.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 124, § 2.

12-17-11. Commitment of witness on presumption of perjury.

Whenever it shall appear to any court of record that any witness or party who has been legally sworn or affirmed and examined or has made an affidavit in the proceeding before the court has testified in such a manner as to induce a reasonable presumption that he or she has been guilty of perjury in the proceeding, the court may immediately commit the witness or party by an order or process for that purpose, or may take a recognizance with surety for his or her appearance to answer an indictment or information for perjury.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 22; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 22; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 72; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 72; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 65; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-11 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 13.

Cross References.

Perjury, § 11-33-1 .

Collateral References.

Admonitions against perjury or threats to prosecute potential defense witness, inducing refusal to testify, as prejudicial error. 88 A.L.R.4th 388.

12-17-12. Detention of evidence as to perjury.

If, in any proceeding in which perjury may be reasonably presumed pursuant to § 12-17-11 , any papers, books, or documents shall have been produced which shall be deemed necessary to be used in any prosecution for perjury, the court may by order detain them from the person producing them, so long as may be necessary, in order that they may be used in the prosecution.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 23; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 23; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 73; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 73; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 66; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-12 .

12-17-13. Jury ordered not to separate.

Upon motion of the attorney general or of the attorney for the defendant in a criminal case, the court may, in its discretion, order that the jury impaneled and sworn to serve shall not be permitted to separate until discharged according to law from the further consideration of the case; provided, notwithstanding the provisions of § 8-7-2 , whenever a criminal trial shall have been opened to a jury, the trial shall continue to its conclusion; and provided, further, that the jurors shall receive double pay. Sheriffs assigned to juries subject to an order not to separate shall receive double pay.

History of Section. P.L. 1920, ch. 1948, § 38; G.L. 1923, ch. 329, § 38; G.L. 1938, ch. 506, § 36; G.L. 1938, ch. 506, § 34; P.L. 1939, ch. 700, § 1; P.L. 1949, ch. 2333, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-13 .

Cross References.

Instructions to jury, § 8-2-38 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Requirements.

Sequestration of the jurors was properly denied since there was no prejudicial external influence. There was not the slightest indication that any prejudicial media reports or any other external reports came to the attention of the jurors throughout the trial, except in one instance when a juror was excused at the request of the defendant. Sequestration of a jury is not an end in itself, but is a means toward insulation of a jury from external influence, including media reports, that could dilute the jury’s impartiality. State v. Hightower, 661 A.2d 948, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 200 (R.I. 1995).

12-17-14. Conviction of lesser-included offense or attempt.

Whenever any person is tried upon an indictment, information, or complaint and the court or jury, as the case may be, shall not be satisfied that he or she is guilty of the whole offense, but shall be satisfied that he or she is guilty of so much of the offense as shall substantially amount to an offense of a lower nature, or that the defendant did not complete the offense charged, but that he or she was guilty only of an attempt to commit the same offense, the court or jury may find him or her guilty of the lower offense or guilty of an attempt to commit the offense, as the case may be, and the court shall proceed to sentence the person for the offense of which he or she shall be so found guilty, notwithstanding that the court had not otherwise jurisdiction of the offense.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 24; P.L. 1897, ch. 463, § 1; C.P.A. 1905, § 1185; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 24; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 11; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 12-17-14 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 13.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Rules of Court.

Conviction of an included offense, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 31; Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 31.

Law Reviews.

Matthew Gustaitis, 2016 Survey, Cases: In re B.H., 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 824 (2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Defendant convicted of lesser included offense was not deprived of rights under art. 1, § 7 (now replaced by amend. 40, § 1) of Rhode Island constitution. State v. Walsh, 113 R.I. 118 , 318 A.2d 463, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1146 (1974).

— Felony Murder.

Having been acquitted on a robbery charge, the defendant may still be found guilty of felony murder based upon the underlying felony of attempted robbery. Jefferson v. State, 472 A.2d 1200, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 461 (R.I. 1984).

In General.

This section merely affirms the common-law rule that when an indictment charges an offense that includes within it another lesser offense, it is sufficient to prove so much of the charge as demonstrates that the accused is guilty of a crime therein contained, although not to the full extent charged against him. As a result, defendant is charged with the knowledge that an accusation of the greater crime carries with it the charge that he has committed all the necessarily included lesser offenses that are part of the greater crime. State v. Sundel, 121 R.I. 638 , 402 A.2d 585, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2043 (1979).

An accusation of the greater crime carries with it the charge that the defendant has committed all necessarily included lesser offenses. State v. Walker, 667 A.2d 1242, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 276 (R.I. 1995).

Defendant’s judgment of conviction for criminal solicitation of murder had to be vacated, as the undisputed evidence showed that the intended recipient of the solicitation never received the soliciting instrument, a letter defendant sent from jail; as a result, the case had to be remanded to the trial court so defendant could be tried on a lesser charge of attempted criminal solicitation of murder in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-1-9 and § 12-17-14 . State v. Andujar, 899 A.2d 1209, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 83 (R.I. 2006).

Dismissal of Greater Offense.

Attorney-general may file a nolle prosequi as to an indictment and require defendant to answer charge as to a lesser and included offense. Ex parte McGrane, 47 R.I. 106 , 130 A. 804, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1925).

Evidence.

Each count of the petition charging defendant minor with first-degree child molestation necessarily included a charge on the lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation. There was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the contact between defendant and his victims could be reasonably construed as intended by defendant to be for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or assault. In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 65 (R.I. 2016).

Instructions.

Where trial judge pointed out to the jury that under this section if they found defendant not guilty of either degree of murder they could still find him guilty of manslaughter and he then charged that manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice expressed or implied and without premeditation, he also charged that if the jury found that death resulted from an accident as claimed by defendant they would have to acquit him but if they found that the state had proved that defendant without premeditation or malice aforethought did deliver the fatal blow or blows resulting in the child’s death their verdict must be guilty of manslaughter, such charges were correct as applied to the evidence. State v. Crough, 89 R.I. 338 , 152 A.2d 644, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1959).

Where indictments charged defendant with possession of cannabis and cocaine with intent to deliver, in order to be found guilty of these charges, one element that had to be proven was possession of the controlled substances; therefore it was not error to charge the jury regarding the lesser-included crime of possession. State v. Sundel, 121 R.I. 638 , 402 A.2d 585, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2043 (1979).

If trial counsel for the defendant believes that the evidence warrants a second degree murder instruction because the defendant acted in a wanton and reckless manner or in the course of an inherently dangerous felony, he should request a specific instruction regarding these theories of second degree murder. Trial counsel’s failure to make such a request precludes the Supreme Court from considering a challenge to the trial justice’s refusal to give a second degree murder instruction. State v. Tarvis, 465 A.2d 164, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1076 (R.I. 1983).

Where the state charges the defendant with two counts of assault with intent to murder in violation of § 11-5-1 , which statute requires only that the intent to murder be accompanied by some type of assault, and it is undisputed that the defendant effectuated the assault with a gun, the court acts correctly when it instructs the jury on the lesser included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon. State v. Dordain, 566 A.2d 942, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 160 (R.I. 1989).

The evidence did not warrant a lesser-included offense jury instruction, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-17-14 and R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 31 (c) on second-degree murder, since there was not even minimal evidence that would justify a conviction on a offense of second-degree murder and it was evident that premeditation existed for more than a mere moment. State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 2003).

Both R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-17-14 and R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 31 (c) serve to place a defendant on notice of all lesser-included offenses necessarily included in the stated charge; although only a minimal quantum of relevant evidence is necessary for a lesser-included offense to go to the jury, a trial justice is not required to instruct the jury on such an offense when the evidence adduced at trial shows no dispute as to an essential element that distinguishes the greater and the lesser offenses. State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 113 (R.I. 2003).

Defendant testified he: (1) repeatedly struck the victim in the head with a board with protruding nails after the victim attacked him with the board; (2) repeatedly hit the victim with the board after the victim tried to grab him and pull him down after defendant started to walk away; and (3) hit him again with the board, when the victim was on the ground and was trying to get up; therefore the evidence supported instructions for second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter and self-defense, but not involuntary manslaughter since the victim’s death was not the product of an unintentional killing. State v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 160 (R.I. 2003).

With regard to defendant’s convictions for second-degree murder and for failing to report a death with the intention of concealing a crime, involving the strangulation death of his wife and concealing her in a padlocked closet in the apartment they had previously rented, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that premeditation was not an element of second-degree murder and by instructing the jury on second-degree murder as a lesser included offense to first-degree murder. State v. Gillespie, 960 A.2d 969, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 114 (R.I. 2008).

Power of Jury.

This section did not authorize the jury to reduce a crime the degree of which is fixed by the law. State v. Saccoccio, 50 R.I. 356 , 147 A. 878, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1929).

Collateral References.

Conviction of lesser offense as bar to prosecution for greater on new trial under constitutional requirement of due process. 61 A.L.R.2d 1152.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge in federal prosecution of narcotics defendant. 106 A.L.R. Fed. 236.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge to jury in federal assault prosecution. 103 A.L.R. Fed. 880.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense charge to jury in federal prosecution for crime involving property rights. 105 A.L.R. Fed. 669.

Propriety of lesser-included-offense jury charge in prosecution of federal tax crime defendant. 102 A.L.R. Fed. 128.

When should jury’s deliberation proceed from charged offense to lesser-included offense. 26 A.L.R.5th 603.

12-17-15. Compelling evidence in criminal proceedings — Immunity.

Whenever a witness, including a child as defined in § 14-1-3 , refuses, on the basis of his or her privilege against self-incrimination, to answer a question or to produce other evidence of any kind in a criminal proceeding before any court or grand jury of this state, the attorney general may, in writing, request the presiding justice of the superior court or the chief judge of the family court or the district court to order the witness to answer the question or produce the evidence. The court, in its discretion, after notice to the witness, may order the witness to answer the question or produce the evidence. The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but the witness shall not be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for, or on account of, any transaction or matter regarding which, in accordance with the order, he or she gave answer or produced evidence and no testimony or other information compelled under the order or any information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony or other information shall be used against the witness in any criminal case, except he or she may be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for any perjury, false swearing, or contempt committed in answering or failing to answer, or in producing or failing to produce evidence, in accordance with the order. No court order directing a witness to answer a question or to produce evidence issued pursuant to this section shall operate to vacate, modify, or otherwise prevent the enforcement of any conviction, judgment, or sentence entered by any court against the witness prior to the grant of immunity, unless the order entered pursuant to this section expressly provides for it.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 217, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 243, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 513, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The immunity granted a witness pursuant to this section includes any and all criminal matters concerning which he is compelled to testify and precludes the use of any evidence discovered as a result of or derived from the testimony and evidence given by the witness. State v. Paquette, 117 R.I. 638 , 369 A.2d 1096, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1734 (1977).

This section confers full transactional immunity and a witness who takes the stand under grant of immunity pursuant to this section and who testifies truthfully cannot be prosecuted for perjury for giving prior false sworn statements. State v. Paquette, 117 R.I. 638 , 369 A.2d 1096, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1734 (1977).

Defendants in a criminal prosecution are without standing either to challenge grants of immunity or to seek immunity for a prosecution witness. State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1423 (R.I. 1981).

The immunity provisions of this section do not operate retroactively so as to preclude the execution of sentences which have been imposed prior to a defendant’s testimony in the trial of a codefendant for which the defendant has been granted immunity, where the sentences result solely from the defendant’s prior, voluntary plea of nolo contendere. State v. La Chappelle, 511 A.2d 296, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 503 (R.I. 1986).

The provisions of this statute provide that only the attorney general may seek immunity from prosecution. No one else has the statutory power. State v. Clark, 576 A.2d 1202, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 120 (R.I. 1990).

A police officer has no authority to enter into a binding agreement of nonprosecution without the consent of the attorney general. The remedy for the breach of such an unauthorized agreement would not be dismissal of charges, but the suppression of any self-incriminating evidence obtained as a result of such invalid promises. State v. Russell, 671 A.2d 1222, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 1996).

Fifth Amendment Privilege.

A witness who has been granted immunity under this section but who refuses to relinquish his fifth amendment privilege may not be held in contempt of court unless the trial justice clearly explains to him that the immunity granted is broader than his fifth amendment privilege. State v. Paquette, 117 R.I. 638 , 369 A.2d 1096, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1734 (1977).

A witness who has been given immunity from prosecution pursuant to the terms of this section cannot invoke his federal constitutional right against incrimination because of the threat of federal prosecution. State v. Marty, 501 A.2d 737, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 603 (R.I. 1985).

Where a witness invoked the right not to testify under U.S. Const. amend. V and then disappeared from the courtroom and was deemed “unavailable” pursuant to R.I. R. Evid. 804 (a)(5), the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate defendant’s confrontation rights under U.S. Const. amend. VI and R.I. Const. art. 1, § 10 by reading to the jury prior recorded testimony provided by the witness in a matter that had resulted in a mistrial; although initial attempts to obtain immunity for the witness pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-17-15 were made, immunity did not have to be obtained and the unavailability determination did not have to be changed. State v. Ramirez, 936 A.2d 1254, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 130 (R.I. 2007).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of DNA identification evidence. 84 A.L.R.4th 313.

Effect of defendant’s immunized statements on testimony by prosecution witness—post- Kastigar cases. 122 A.L.R. Fed. 429.

12-17-16. Defendant’s right of discovery.

In any criminal proceeding where the prosecution is in possession of tangible evidence which may be used at trial of any defendant, the defendant shall have the right upon demand given in writing to the prosecuting authorities to inspect, examine, and/or copy the evidence at a time and place to be fixed by a justice of a court of proper jurisdiction.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 203, § 1.

Rules of Court.

Discovery and inspection, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

The prescribed tests in this section are cumulative and not in the alternative. State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582 , 268 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1970).

Burden of Proving Admissibility.

The burden is on the petitioner to prove to the satisfaction of the trial judge that some circumstances exist in which that evidence could be used at trial. State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582 , 268 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1970).

“Fishing Expeditions” Prohibited.

This section indicates a legislative intent to require that the petitioner establish that he has reasonable grounds for believing the evidence he seeks to be in the possession of the prosecution and to be reasonably specific in identifying the particular items of evidence for which he seeks disclosure; the section was not intended to permit a defendant to cull through the evidence accumulated by the prosecution on a “fishing expedition” in the hope of uncovering something that would impeach a witness or exculpate the defendant. State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582 , 268 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1970).

Legislative Intent.

The purpose of the legislature in enacting this section was to strike a balance between the state and the accused and to enable an accused in appropriate circumstances to prepare an effective and intelligent defense; one of the important, if not expressed, purposes was to assist an accused in the preparation of his defense by enabling him to ascertain whether there is exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prosecution. State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582 , 268 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1970).

Tangible Evidence.

In using the phrase “tangible evidence” the legislature intended to limit an application of this section to evidence which partakes of a real or tangible character; the word “tangible” was used for exclusory purposes, that is, to exclude from its operation evidence the character of which is not real. State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582 , 268 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1970).

Many evidentiary documents other than those of testimonial origin may be “tangible evidence” within the meaning of that phrase as used in this section; however, for such a document to be within the operative effect of the statute, it must be admissible into evidence if and when offered for that purpose by the prosecution. State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582 , 268 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1970).

Included within the scope of this section would be real evidence such as weapons, clothing, photographs, maps, ammunition, knives, etc.; of course, such objects are subject to disclosure only when in some circumstance they would be admissible into evidence. State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582 , 268 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1970).

The legislature did not intend that the term “tangible evidence” include testimonial evidence whether or not it could have been used at trial; neither did the legislature intend to include within the term “tangible evidence” documents that contain recordations or transcriptions of evidence testimonial in its origin, such as the minutes of the grand jury. State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582 , 268 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1970).

— Excluded Evidence.

Such documents as lists of witnesses who testified before some tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial, are not evidence within the meaning of the phrase “tangible evidence”. State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582 , 268 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1970).

This section is without application to recordings of intercepted wire and oral communications, or documents containing transcriptions or recordations of such evidence. State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582 , 268 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1970).

12-17-17. Restrictions on the defense of provocation.

For purposes of determining sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation was not objectively reasonable if it resulted solely from the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, non-forcible romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic relationship.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 294, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 125, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 294, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

12-17-18. Restrictions on the defense of diminished capacity.

A defendant does not suffer from reduced mental capacity based solely on the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, non-forcible romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 294, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 125, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 294, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

12-17-19. Restrictions on the defense of self-defense.

A person is not justified in using force against another based solely on the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, non-forcible romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 294, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 125, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 294, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 18 Probation

12-18-1. Placement of offenders under director of corrections.

It shall be lawful for any court in the state, at any time before sentence, to provisionally place any offender, juvenile or adult, who can lawfully be admitted to bail, under the control and supervision of the director of corrections or the director’s designee or any probation officer that the director may designate, and whenever any offender shall be placed in the custody or under the control and supervision of the director or designee or of any designated probation officer, the director or designee and the probation officer shall have and exercise the same rights and powers in relation to the offender as are or may be possessed by a surety on a recognizance.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 405, § 2; P.L. 1926, ch. 861, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 405, § 3; P.L. 1932, ch. 1930, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 619, § 3; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2724, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-18-1 ; P.L. 1966, ch. 182, § 2; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; P.L. 1972, ch. 163, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 6.

Cross References.

Delinquent and wayward children, power of juvenile court, §§ 14-1-32 , 14-1-33 .

District court, suspension of sentence and probation, § 12-19-13 et seq.

Parole, § 13-8-1 et seq.

Superior court, suspension of sentence and probation, § 12-19-8 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Sufficiency of Allocution.

Because the trial court’s admonition during the plea colloquy about the potential consequences of an illegal reentry into the United States was not part of the plea agreement, but rather, was a warning about the normal conditions of defendant’s probation, the trial court properly denied defendant’s application for postconviction relief. Javier v. State, 926 A.2d 1017, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 74 (R.I. 2007).

Collateral References.

Power to impose sentence with direction that after defendant shall have served part of his time he be placed on probation for the remainder of term. 147 A.L.R. 656.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s submission to polygraph or other lie detector testing. 86 A.L.R.4th 709.

Propriety, in criminal case, of Federal District Court order restricting defendant’s right to re-enter or stay in United States. 94 A.L.R. Fed. 619.

12-18-2. Return of probationers or parolees from outside state.

Whenever any person who has been placed in custody of the director of corrections or the director’s designee or of a probation officer by any court in this state, or has been paroled by the parole board, has left this state while in custody or while on parole, the director or designee, in his or her discretion, with the advice of the attorney general, is authorized to cause the person to be brought back to this state.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 352, § 5; P.L. 1912, ch. 777, § 1; P.L. 1914, ch. 1052, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 405, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 405, § 3; P.L. 1926, ch. 861, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 405, § 4; P.L. 1932, ch. 1930, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 619, § 4; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2724, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-18-2 ; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; P.L. 1972, ch. 163, § 2; P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 6.

Cross References.

Arrest of parole violators without warrant, § 12-7-17 .

Terms of parole, § 13-8-16 .

Violation of terms of probation, effect, §§ 12-19-9 , 12-19-14 .

Collateral References.

Extradition of paroled convict. 78 A.L.R. 422.

12-18-3. Plea of nolo contendere followed by probation — Effect.

  1. Whenever any person shall be arraigned before the district court or superior court and shall plead nolo contendere, and the court places the person on probation pursuant to § 12-18-1 , then upon the completion of the probationary period, and absent a violation of the terms of the probation, the plea and probation shall not constitute a conviction for any purpose. Evidence of a plea of nolo contendere followed by a period of probation, completed without violation of the terms of the probation, may not be introduced in any court proceeding, except that records may be furnished to a sentencing court following the conviction of an individual for a crime committed subsequent to the successful completion of probation on the prior offense.
  2. This section shall not apply to any person who is sentenced to serve a term in the adult correctional institutions or who is given a suspended or deferred sentence in addition to probation.
  3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to persons making applications for the purchase of a firearm, or to persons making applications for permission to carry a concealable weapon, if the crime for which the plea was entered was a crime of violence as defined in § 11-47-2 or the plea was entered pursuant to chapter 28 of title 21. In these cases a plea of nolo contendere followed by probation shall be deemed a conviction for the purposes stated in this subsection.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 354, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 409, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 284, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Conviction.

Although this section does not affirmatively state that a nolo contendere plea followed by a sentence of imprisonment or a suspended sentence constitutes a conviction, it states that the provision that a nolo contendere plea is not a conviction does not apply when the plea is followed by such a sentence. By implication, this means that a nolo contendere plea followed by a sentence of imprisonment or a suspended sentence constitutes a conviction. United States v. Patrone, 948 F.2d 813, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26375 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 978, 112 S. Ct. 2953, 119 L. Ed. 2d 575, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3488 (1992).

Section 12-18-3 provides that upon completion of a probationary period subsequent to a nolo contendere plea, the plea and probation shall not constitute a conviction for any purpose, but the statute is silent as to whether a nolo plea followed by probation constitute a conviction while the probationary period still is being served. In re McEnaney, 718 A.2d 920, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 279 (R.I. 1998).

Federal Procedure.

Notwithstanding the language of this section, for purposes of federal gun control laws, a plea of nolo contendere followed by a sentence of probation is a “conviction” sufficient to result in a finding of “prohibited person” status. United States v. Cadden, 98 F. Supp. 2d 193, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7094 (D.R.I. 2000).

Sealing of Records.

District court erred in denying defendant’s motion pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1-12.1 (a) to seal all records pertaining to her two dismissed misdemeanor arrests because defendant’s plea of nolo contendere did not constitute a conviction for “any purpose” that was unrelated to the original disposition under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-18-3(a) because defendant successfully complied with the conditions of her probationary sentence; nothing in R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-1-12 or 12-1-12.1 directs that a plea of nolo contendere followed by probation should be deemed a conviction under those statutory provisions. State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2013).

Plea of nolo contendere followed by probation would not preclude a defendant from sealing his or her records because in the sealing context, the affected person has been acquitted or exonerated, whereas a person seeking to have his or her records expunged has not; therefore, sealing should be more widely available to those individuals than to those seeking to have their records expunged. State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2013).

12-18-4. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

Former §§ 12-18-3 and 12-18-4 (P.L. 1906, ch. 1367, §§ 1, 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 352, §§ 1, 3; P.L. 1922, ch. 2169, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 405, §§ 1, 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 405, §§ 5, 6; P.L. 1926, ch. 861, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 405, §§ 6, 7; P.L. 1932, ch. 1930, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 619, §§ 6, 7; G.L. 1956, §§ 12-18-3 , 12-18-4 ; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; P.L. 1972, ch. 163, § 2), concerning maintenance and maintenance reports and costs of females, were repealed by P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 7.

Chapter 18.1 Probation and Parole Support Act

12-18.1-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known as the “Probation and Parole Support Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 118, art. 9, § 1.

12-18.1-2. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1987, ch. 118, art. 9, § 1), concerning a probation and parole support account, was repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 166, effective July 1, 1995.

12-18.1-3. Court costs.

  1. The court shall assess as court costs, in addition to those otherwise provided by law, against all defendants charged with a felony, misdemeanor, or petty misdemeanor, and who plead nolo contendere or guilty or who are found guilty of the commission of those crimes, as follows:
    1. Where the offense charged is a felony and carries a maximum penalty of five (5) or more years imprisonment, three hundred dollars ($300) or ten percent (10%) of any fine imposed on the defendant by the court, whichever is greater;
    2. Where the offense charged is a felony and carries a maximum penalty of less than five (5) years imprisonment, one hundred eighty dollars ($180) or ten percent (10%) of any fine imposed on the defendant by the court, whichever is greater; and
    3. Where the offense charged is a misdemeanor, sixty dollars ($60.00) or ten percent (10%) of any fine imposed on the defendant by the court, whichever is greater.
  2. These costs shall be assessed whether or not the defendant is sentenced to prison and in no case shall they be remitted by the court.
  3. When there are multiple counts or multiple charges to be disposed of simultaneously, the judge shall have the authority to suspend the obligation of the defendant to pay on all counts or charges above two (2).
  4. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay the costs as set forth in this section, the judge may by specific order mitigate the costs in accordance with the court’s determination of the ability of the offender to pay the costs.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 118, art. 9, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 44, art. 40, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 297, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 326, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 297, § 2, and P.L. 2008, ch. 326, § 2, enacted identical amendments to this section.

12-18.1-4. Deposit of and use of proceeds.

All revenues collected under § 12-18.1-3 shall be deposited as general revenues.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 118, art. 9, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 41.

12-18.1-5. Report to governor and general assembly.

  1. Pursuant to § 12-18.1-4 there shall be annually transmitted to the governor and general assembly a report setting forth the amount of money in the fund at the beginning of each year, the amount collected during the year, and the total of money disbursed from the fund during the year.
  2. The annual report required by this section shall be filed by March 1 of each year.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 60, § 1.

Chapter 19 Sentence and Execution

12-19-1. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 78; P.L. 1929, ch. 1403, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 72; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-1 ), motion for sentence, bill of exceptions, bail, was repealed by P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 26. For new law, see Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rules 32, 46.

12-19-2. Selection of method and amount or term of punishment.

  1. Whenever it is provided that any offense shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment, the court imposing punishment may, in its discretion, select the kind of punishment to be imposed, and, if the punishment is fine or imprisonment, its amount or term within the limits prescribed by law; provided, if the punishment to be imposed is imprisonment, the sentence or sentences imposed shall be reduced by the number of days spent in confinement while awaiting trial and while awaiting sentencing; and provided, further, that in the case of a person sentenced to a life sentence, the time at which he or she shall become eligible to apply for parole shall be reduced by the number of days spent in confinement while awaiting trial and while awaiting sentencing; and any sentence or sentences in effect at present, including the provision as to a life sentence as described in this subsection may be reduced in like manner by the court which imposed the sentence upon application by the person serving the sentence to the court.
  2. The court upon the sentencing of a first time offender, excluding capital offense and sex offense involving minors, may in appropriate cases sentence the person to a term of imprisonment, and allow the person to continue in his or her usual occupation or education and shall order the person to be confined in a minimum security facility at the A.C.I. during his or her nonworking or study hours.
  3. The director of corrections or his or her designee may impose any conditions and restrictions upon the release of persons sentenced under this section that he or she deems necessary.
  4. The director of corrections may at any time, subject to the approval of the director, recall a prisoner from release status if he or she believes or has reason to believe the peace, safety, welfare, or security of the community may be endangered by the prisoner being under release status. Any prisoner recalled under this subsection shall be presented to the next regularly scheduled meeting of the classification board for its further consideration.
  5. A prisoner authorized to work at paid employment in the community under this section may be required to pay, and the director is authorized to collect, costs incident to the prisoner’s confinement as the director deems appropriate and reasonable. These collections shall be deposited with the treasurer as a part of the general revenue of the state.
  6. When a sentenced inmate’s parole release date or completion of sentence falls on a weekend or on a holiday, the department of corrections may release the inmate on the prior business day.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 47; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 47; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 48; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 48; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 48; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-2 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 298, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 8; P.L. 1988, ch. 619, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 124, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 153, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “director of corrections” for “assistant director of adult services” in subsection (d).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2009, ch. 124, § 1, and P.L. 2009, ch. 153, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

David R. Fitzpatrick, 2017 Survey, Cases: Criminal Law: State v. Parrillo, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 660 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Administrative Application.

As to all sentences imposed subsequent to May 22, 1968, the statute is subject to administrative rather than judicial application. State v. Holmes, 108 R.I. 579 , 277 A.2d 914, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1310 (1971).

A judge should impose a sentence without regard to whether a person sentenced has or has not been confined while awaiting disposition and it is for the warden into whose custody the sentenced person is given under § 12-19-25 to apply the provisions of the present section. State v. Holmes, 108 R.I. 579 , 277 A.2d 914, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1310 (1971).

Where a suspended sentence is ordered, executed after May 22, 1968, the mandatory provisions of the act become applicable at the time execution is ordered, and it is the administrative duty of the warden to compute the amount of such time so served while awaiting such disposition and credit it against the sentence. Santos v. Howard, 108 R.I. 666 , 278 A.2d 839, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1321 (1971).

Where the trial judge, after sentencing, denied a motion for reduction of sentence by the time spent in confinement awaiting trial and sentencing it was error since credit for time confined pending disposition is an administrative function for the warden. State v. Blackston, 114 R.I. 694 , 338 A.2d 166, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1473 (1975).

— Sentences Imposed Before 1968.

Where a sentence was imposed prior to May 22, 1968, application for credit of time spent in confinement awaiting disposition must be made to the court wherein sentence was imposed and such application shall be directed to the discretion of that court. State v. Holmes, 108 R.I. 579 , 277 A.2d 914, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1310 (1971).

Where the defendant spent 14 years in a mental hospital until able to stand trial at which he was convicted and sentenced to 25 years for robbery which carried a maximum sentence of life, the crediting of awaiting trial time on sentences imposed prior to May 22, 1968 was a discretionary matter for the sentencing court and, since the trial justice did consider the pre-trial confinement of defendant when he imposed the 25-year sentence instead of the maximum, there was no abuse of discretion. State v. Di Fraia, 111 R.I. 544 , 304 A.2d 902, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1243 (1973).

Appellate Review of Sentence.

The Supreme Court may review the imposition of a criminal sentence otherwise within the statutory maximum. However, it is in the rarest of circumstances that the court will exercise the power to set aside a sentence. State v. Wisehart, 569 A.2d 434, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 24 (R.I. 1990).

Credit Against Second Sentence.

Where prisoner by manslaughter had precipitated a prior deferred sentence, he was properly denied credit for jail time against a second concurrent sentence, while serving time imposed by the first sentence and awaiting trial for the second nonbailable offense. State v. Skirvin, 113 R.I. 443 , 322 A.2d 297, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1198 (1974).

Credit for Time Served.

A motion seeking credit for time served for each offense charged was properly denied since the defendant received credit for 170 days he served while awaiting trial, he received all the time to which he was entitled, and it was immaterial that he had more than one charge pending against him. State v. Ilacqua, 765 A.2d 822, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 26 (R.I. 2001).

A motion seeking credit for time served was properly denied, since the fact that the defendant was being held without bail on probation violation charges and that he did not have the ability to post bail in respect to other charges did not mean that he was being held without bail in respect to those charges. State v. Ilacqua, 765 A.2d 822, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 26 (R.I. 2001).

Defendant’s argument that his sentence had been made retroactive when he received credit for time served defied common sense, was illogical, was rife with practical problems, and was not legally viable. Since the credit did not make the probation sentence that he received retroactive, he was on probation at the time of the violation. State v. Bergevine, 883 A.2d 1158, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 188 (R.I. 2005).

Length of a probationer’s sentence was not miscalculated because the probationer’s credits for good conduct and participation in institutional industries, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-24 , and for time served awaiting disposition, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-2(a) , did not entitle the probationer to an acceleration of the end date of the probationer’s probationary term. Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 903, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 20 (R.I. 2014).

Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-2(a) , defendant was not entitled to credit for 12 days where he was serving the execution of a previously suspended sentences for drug-related charges, and the fact that he also happened to be awaiting trial and sentencing for the robbery charges did not change the nature of his incarceration with regard to the drug-related charges. State v. Wray, 101 A.3d 884, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 140 (R.I. 2014).

Defendant was entitled to credit for time served for the time he was held without bail on the pending robbery charges but had not yet begun serving his previously suspended sentences where all of his sentences were set to run concurrently, and credit was necessary to maintain the concurrent nature of those sentences. State v. Wray, 101 A.3d 884, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 140 (R.I. 2014).

Superior court erred in denying the State’s request to adjudge defendant a probation violator because he was on probation and subject to being adjudged a violator at the time of the incident; because defendant was sentenced to a 30-year term, and the effect of his good-time or time-served credits reduced his period of incarceration but did not reduce the overall length of his sentence, his sentence officially ended 30 years later. State v. Parrillo, 158 A.3d 283, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2017).

Facts did not present the proper circumstance for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply against the State; the letter from the Department of Correction stating that defendant’s probationary period had ended was not only in direct contradiction to the judicially-imposed 30-year sentence, it also contradicted §§ 42-56-24 and 12-19-2(a) , including the effect the credits had on the length of his sentence. The case was remanded, however, for consideration of defendant’s due process argument. State v. Parrillo, 158 A.3d 283, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2017).

Discretion of Court.

A sentence of 50 years for first degree arson and 10 years for conspiracy to commit arson, after the trial justice had rejected the state’s recommendation of a 25-year sentence, was not an abuse of discretion, where the justice weighed relevant factors against the disastrous consequences inflicted upon the victims of the crime. State v. Gordon, 539 A.2d 528, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 43 (R.I. 1988).

Juveniles.

Juvenile defendant who was charged with murder by complaint and warrant and was confined at training school for boys in connection with offense for which he was subsequently sentenced as adult when jurisdiction over him was waived by the family court, was entitled to credit against his sentence for time spent in confinement at the training school. State v. Da Fonseca, 109 R.I. 414 , 286 A.2d 592, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1202 (1972).

Reasons for Confinement.

The phrase “while awaiting trial and while awaiting sentencing” in this section embraces confinement time spent for any reason whatsoever in connection with an offense for which a defendant is subsequently sentenced. State v. Holmes, 108 R.I. 579 , 277 A.2d 914, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1310 (1971); State v. Da Fonseca, 109 R.I. 414 , 286 A.2d 592, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1202 (1972).

Dead time credit was not granted for therapeutic medical confinement requested by defendant, a drug addict, as the confinement was not due to a delay in sentencing or trial nor was it a part of his deferred or suspended sentence. State v. Savastano, 112 R.I. 702 , 315 A.2d 66, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1492 (1974).

Work Release.

This section and § 42-56-21 deal with the same subject matter in a consistent manner and are in pari materia. Except for minor differences, the two statutes are identical in their delegation of authority to the department to regulate a prisoner’s recall from work release. State v. Pari, 553 A.2d 135, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 7 (R.I. 1989).

The policy of removing prisoners with outstanding warrants or indictments involving felonies from work release is a logical extension of the eligibility requirements of the department of corrections for work release, properly established within the department director’s discretion. State v. Pari, 553 A.2d 135, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 7 (R.I. 1989).

Because there is no constitutional right to work release, and because the parole board could not order that the applicant be reclassified and granted work release, an assertion of denial of equal access to the legislatively created work release program failed. Estrada v. Walker, 743 A.2d 1026, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 230 (R.I. 1999).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.2 did not allow a trial court, almost two years after sentencing a defendant for driving under the influence, death resulting, to modify the sentence imposed and grant defendant’s motion to be placed in a work release program because the statute gave the court discretion that was only exercisable at sentencing and not thereafter, as sentencing was a discrete act and not an ongoing process. State v. Graff, 17 A.3d 1005, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 47 (R.I. 2011).

Collateral References.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b), Requiring Federal Sentence to Run Concurrently to Undischarged State Sentence When State Sentence Has Been Fully Taken into Account in Determining Offense Level for Federal Offense — Particular Events Preceding Federal Sentence and Sentencing Credit. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 191.

Defendant’s Right to Credit for Time Spent in Halfway House, Rehabilitation Center, or Similar Restrictive Environment as Condition of Pretrial Release. 46 A.L.R.6th 63.

Downward departure from United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG §§ 1A1.1 et seq.) based on aberrant behavior. 164 A.L.R. Fed. 61.

Downward departure from United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG §§ 1A1.1 et seq.) based on extraordinary family circumstances. 145 A.L.R. Fed. 559.

Downward departure from United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG §§ 1A1.1 et seq.) based on vulnerability to abuse in prison. 155 A.L.R. Fed. 327.

Downward departure under state sentencing guidelines based on extraordinary family circumstances. 106 A.L.R.5th 377.

Power of court to impose sentence providing for intermittent incarceration. 39 A.L.R.2d 985.

Propriety of general sentence covering several counts in information or indictment not exceeding in aggregate the sentences which might have been imposed cumulatively under the several counts. 91 A.L.R.2d 511.

Right of state or Federal prisoner to credit for time served in another jurisdiction before delivery to state or Federal authorities. 18 A.L.R.2d 511.

Right to credit for time served under erroneous or void sentence or invalid judgment of conviction necessitating new trial. 35 A.L.R.2d 1283.

Right to credit for time spent in custody prior to trial or sentence. 77 A.L.R.3d 182.

Right to credit on state sentence for time served under sentence of court of separate jurisdiction where state court fails to specify in the regard. 90 A.L.R.3d 408.

Validity, construction, and application of concurrent-sentence doctrine-state cases. 56 A.L.R.5th 385.

Validity of sentence fixing identical minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment. 29 A.L.R.2d 1344.

When does delay in imposing sentence violate speedy trial provision. 86 A.L.R.4th 340.

12-19-2.1. Crimes committed in a public housing for the elderly project.

  1. Whenever a person has been found guilty of an offense described in subsection (b) of this section which was committed while on the premises of a public housing for the elderly project and upon a resident of the project, the court shall sentence the person to imprisonment for not more than five (5) years in addition to any other punishment which the court, in its discretion, may impose.
  2. This section shall apply to any offense in the following categories: (1) assault and battery; (2) statutory burning of personal property; (3) larceny of property or money of a value not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500); (4) and any other crime, excluding motor vehicle offenses, which results in personal injury or death, unless a maximum sentence of greater than five (5) years is provided elsewhere in the general laws.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 238, § 1.

12-19-2.2. Alternative confinement.

    1. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, whenever a defendant is convicted of a nonviolent criminal offense and is between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-eight (28) and receives a maximum sentence of three (3) years or less to serve, and the department of corrections is satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public as well as the offender will be served by it, the director of the department of corrections may make application to the sentencing judge for an order that the convicted offender be placed in a well structured highly disciplined shock incarceration program administered by the department of corrections. The program shall include extensive physical regimentation, drug and alcohol abuse counseling, behavioral counseling and mandatory education courses and community restitution. This program will be open to first time offenders.
    2. For the purpose of this section, “first time offender” is defined as an individual who has not been incarcerated pursuant to a conviction.
    3. The written application by the director to the sentencing judge for an order directing that a sentenced person be confined in the shock incarceration program shall set forth his or her reason for seeking the order. The hearing on the application shall be held within ten (10) business days following the filing of the application. If the sentencing judge is unavailable to hear and consider the application the presiding justice of the superior court shall designate another judge to do so.
  1. The program shall be not less than one hundred eighty (180) days nor more than two hundred (200) days in duration and shall be operated in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the department of corrections and as otherwise provided for by law.
  2. The director or his or her designee shall report to the sentencing court whether the convicted offender completes or does not complete the program together with any additional information the director shall deem appropriate with respect to the offender’s conduct during the course of the program. Upon receipt of this report, the original sentencing judge may, upon his or her own order, in the event of successful completion, suspend but not vacate the remainder of the offender’s sentence and place the offender on probation as provided by this chapter; or upon his or her own order, in the event of unsuccessful completion, will confine the offender to the adult correctional institutions for the balance of the original sentence still remaining with credit being given for any time that may have been spent in the program. In the event that the unsuccessful completion of the program is the result of an additional criminal offense, then the additional sentence imposed for the new offense shall be in addition to and not concurrent with the original sentence.
    1. Defendants convicted of a violent felony or previously convicted of a crime of violence shall not be eligible for this program.
    2. “Violent felony” as used in this section means any one of the following crimes or an attempt to commit that crime:
      1. Murder;
      2. Manslaughter;
      3. Sexual assault;
      4. Mayhem;
      5. Robbery;
      6. Burglary;
      7. Assault with a dangerous weapon; and
      8. Assault or battery resulting in serious bodily injury.
  3. The director of the department of corrections shall annually review the operation of the program and report his or her findings to the general assembly.
  4. There shall be created within the department of corrections a special division which shall supervise those convicted offenders who were placed on probation as a result of completing this program.
  5. The supervision of persons confined under the provisions of this section shall be conducted by the director or his designee.
  6. The director shall have full power and authority to enforce any of the provisions of this section by regulation, subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 35 of title 42. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, the department of corrections may contract with private agencies to carry out the provisions of this section. The civil liability of private agencies and their employees, acting within the scope of their employment, and carrying out the provisions of this section, shall be limited in the same manner and dollar amount as if they were agencies or employees of the state.
  7. The state planning council established pursuant to the provisions of § 42-11-10 is authorized and directed to determine the most appropriate location for the program.
  8. Alternative confinement pursuant to this section shall commence upon the approval by the general assembly of funding sufficient to carry out the purposes of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 435, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated subsections (h) and (j), added the subdivision designations in subsections (a) and (d), and in subdivisions (d)(2) and (h), added the paragraph designations.

12-19-3. Deodands — Benefit of clergy — Petit treason.

Deodands, the plea of the benefit of clergy, and the distinction between petit treason and murder, are abolished. Petit treason shall be prosecuted and punished as murder.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 32; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 32; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 50; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 50; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 51; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-3 .

12-19-4. Corruption of blood — Forfeiture of estate.

No conviction or sentence for any offense whatsoever shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 58; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 58; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 58; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Convict’s Contest of Will.

Convict was entitled to contest will of his deceased wife and to prosecute appeal from decree admitting will to probate. Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R.I. 590 , 30 A. 470, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1894).

12-19-5. Imprisonment to commence at expiration of previous term of imprisonment.

Whenever any person shall be convicted of any offense punishable by imprisonment, that person being at the time under sentence of imprisonment on a former conviction, the court passing the subsequent sentence may sentence the person to the term of imprisonment provided by law to commence at the expiration of the term of imprisonment under the former sentence or sentences.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 43; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 43; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 49; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 49; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 49; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

This section is but a codification of the common law. State v. Upham, 415 A.2d 1029, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1646 (R.I. 1980).

In essence this section provides that whenever an individual appears before a judge for sentencing after having been convicted for an offense punishable by imprisonment, and such an individual is at the time under sentence of imprisonment on a former or another conviction, the judge imposing the second sentence may sentence such an individual to a term that will commence at the expiration of the former sentence or sentences. State v. Upham, 415 A.2d 1029, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1646 (R.I. 1980).

Where the imposition of a consecutive life sentence on a serial killer was otherwise legal, but the original sentencing court failed to allow an opportunity for allocution until after sentence had already been imposed, the sentencing court committed error in failing to vacate and resentence. The resulting sentence was only illegally imposed, however, rather than illegal, so that it could only be challenged within the 120-day time limit provided by rule. State v. DeCiantis, 813 A.2d 986, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 16 (R.I. 2003).

Application for Parole.

For an advisory opinion as to when an individual sentenced to consecutive life sentences may apply for parole, see In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 421 A.2d 535, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1841 (R.I. 1980).

Consecutive Life Sentences.

Where, when the defendant appeared for sentencing, he had been convicted of two incidents of murder, the trial justice had the legal authority to impose consecutive life sentences. State v. Fuentes, 433 A.2d 184, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1493 (R.I. 1981).

The trial justice had the legal authority to impose consecutive life sentences where the defendant had been convicted of two incidents of murder. State v. Fuentes, 433 A.2d 184, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1493 (R.I. 1981).

Time for Imposing Concurrency.

There is absolutely no requirement in this section that a defendant be actually serving a sentence before the consecutive sentence proviso becomes operative. State v. Upham, 415 A.2d 1029, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1646 (R.I. 1980).

12-19-6. Presentence reports.

Whenever an accused shall be found guilty after trial or shall plead guilty or nolo contendere on any charge for which a sentence of more than one year may be imposed, the court shall, before imposing sentence, have presented to it by the administrator of probation and parole a presentence report. All local and state police agencies shall furnish to the administrator of probation and parole any criminal records that the administrator may request.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 75; P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-6 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 190, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 25.

Rules of Court.

Presentence investigation, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 32.

Cross References.

Sentences by family court, § 14-1-45 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Purpose.

Purpose of this section is to aid the court in the exercise of its exclusive power to sentence and not to restrict or limit such power. Knowles v. Langlois, 90 R.I. 445 , 159 A.2d 616, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1960).

Juveniles.

Where the family court had waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile who was tried in superior court and sentenced as if he were an adult, the trial justice was entitled to receive the pre-sentence report as provided in this section. Taylor v. Howard, 111 R.I. 527 , 304 A.2d 891, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1240 (1973).

Mandatory Sentences.

For the reason that the legislature should not be accused of contemplating “an exercise in futility,” it is clear that it intended the requirements for the submission of a presentence report would be operative only in those instances where a judge had discretion in the punishments he could impose and, hence, would not apply to a conviction of murder in the first degree. State v. Bradshaw, 101 R.I. 233 , 221 A.2d 815, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 378 (1966).

Presumption of Regularity.

The supreme court will assume in the absence of proof to the contrary that in imposing sentence the superior court proceeded according to law. Powers v. Langlois, 90 R.I. 45 , 153 A.2d 535, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 109 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 905, 80 S. Ct. 615, 4 L. Ed. 2d 556, 1960 U.S. LEXIS 1585 (1960); State v. Crescenzo, 114 R.I. 242 , 332 A.2d 421, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1407 (1975); State v. Crescenzo, 118 R.I. 662 , 375 A.2d 933, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1506 (1977).

Reference to Report at Sentencing.

There is nothing in the statute requiring the court to make any reference to the presentence report when the defendant is sentenced. Evans v. Langlois, 99 R.I. 320 , 207 A.2d 380, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 437 (1965).

Substantial Compliance.

A presentence report dated more than three months prior to sentencing was a substantial compliance with the section although such report contained reference to fact that defendant was bound over to grand jury for breaking and entering but did not show that grand jury failed to return indictment, the latter event occurring after the date of the presentence report. Knowles v. Langlois, 90 R.I. 445 , 159 A.2d 616, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1960).

Collateral References.

Consideration of accused’s juvenile court record in sentencing for offense committed as adult. 64 A.L.R.3d 1291.

Court’s right, in imposing sentence, to hear evidence of, or to consider, other offenses committed by defendant. 96 A.L.R.2d 768.

Court’s right, in imposing sentence, to hear evidence of, or to consider, other offenses committed by defendant as violating due process of law in denying the right to be confronted by or to cross-examine adverse witnesses. 96 A.L.R.2d 796.

Defendant’s right to disclosure of presentence reports. 40 A.L.R.3d 681.

12-19-7. Recommendations of counsel as to sentence.

At the time sentence shall be imposed by the court, the recommendation of the department of the attorney general and of defense counsel shall be recorded and a copy of the record shall be filed with the director of corrections.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 77; P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-7 .

Collateral References.

Necessity and sufficiency of question to defendant as to whether he has anything to say why sentence should not be pronounced against him, 96 A.L.R.2d 1292.

12-19-8. Suspension of sentence and probation by superior or district court.

  1. Application.  Except where the suspension of sentence shall otherwise be prohibited by law, and subject to the purposes and limits imposed by this section and § 12-19-8.1 , whenever any defendant shall appear for sentence before the superior or district court, the court may impose a sentence and suspend the execution of the sentence, in whole or in part, or place the defendant on probation without the imposition of a suspended sentence. The suspension shall place the defendant on probation for the time of probation that the court may fix and pursuant to the terms and conditions set by § 12-19-8.1 .
  2. Duration.  The period of probation for a felony shall be set for a period of time as required by law, or in accordance with judicial sentencing benchmarks. The period of probation for a misdemeanor, where no sentence is imposed or where sentence is entirely suspended, may be for any period up to the maximum time of sentence provided by applicable statutes. Where sentence is imposed and suspended in part, the term ordered to be served and the period of probation together shall not exceed the maximum time of sentence provided by applicable statutes.
  3. [Deleted by P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1 and P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1].

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 18A; P.L. 1950, ch. 2462, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-8 ; P.L. 1966, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 224, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 518, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 554, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 518, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 554, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

Cross References.

Imprisonment, suspension after commencement prohibited, § 12-19-16 .

Life sentence, suspension prohibited, § 12-19-11 .

Placement of offenders under director of corrections, § 12-18-1 .

Law Reviews.

Timothy Baldwin & Olin Thompson, More Horse-Hair for the Sword of Damocles? The Rhode Island Probation System and Comparisons to Federal Law, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 244 (2016).

Lara Montecalvo, Kara Maguire, & Angela Yingling, No Exit, No End: Probation in Rhode Island, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 316 (2016).

David R. Fitzpatrick, 2017 Survey, Cases: Criminal Law: State v. Parrillo, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 660 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Commencement of Probation.

Under this section, the grant of authority is broad enough to permit the sentencing justice to fix the time when probationary status shall commence. Gonsalves v. Howard, 113 R.I. 544 , 324 A.2d 338, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1209 (1974).

Where a sentence of ten years which was to be served concurrently with two three year terms was suspended and the defendant placed on probation without setting a date for commencement and with the provision that the terms would be served consecutively if the probation was revoked, the period of probation began when the probation order was adopted. Gonsalves v. Howard, 113 R.I. 544 , 324 A.2d 338, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1209 (1974).

It was not error to find an inmate violated probation when serving an unrelated sentence because an implied condition of good behavior attached when the probation sentence was pronounced. Price v. Wall, 31 A.3d 995, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 143 (R.I. 2011).

Defendant was on probation and subject to being adjudged a violator at the time of the 2011 incident, even though the sentencing judge had specified that defendant’s 10-year probationary term would commence on his release from confinement and the Department of Correction had informed defendant by letter that his probation ended in 2009. Because defendant was sentenced to a 30-year term, and the effect of his good-time or time-served credits reduced his period of incarceration but did not reduce the overall length of his sentence, his sentence ended 30 years later, and any suspended or probationary period did not reduce the sentence. State v. Parrillo, 158 A.3d 283, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 50 (R.I. 2017).

Concurrent Sentences.

Whether two sentences, previously imposed at the same time and the execution of which has been suspended, are to be served concurrently or consecutively if and when such suspension is subsequently revoked, depends on what was intended by the sentencing justice. Pelliccia v. Sharkey, 110 R.I. 319 , 292 A.2d 862, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 916 (1972).

Construction With § 12-19-19.

Under this section, a suspended sentence is actually imposed, but the execution thereof is suspended, but under § 12-19-19 a deferred sentence is never imposed unless the defendant violates his written agreement with the attorney general. State v. Robalewski, 96 R.I. 296 , 191 A.2d 148, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1963).

Construction With § 12-19-2.

Although it appears that this section vests a sentencing court with the authority to fix when the period of a defendant’s probation is to commence, this statute must be read in conjunction with § 12-19-9 , which permits revocation of a defendant’s probation whenever the terms and conditions inherent in the very privilege of probation are violated by the defendant. Those inherent terms and conditions, one of which is the implied condition of good behavior, come into existence at the very moment that a sentence that includes probation is imposed and remain until the termination of the full sentence period. State v. Dantzler, 690 A.2d 338, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 1997).

Length of a probationer’s sentence was not miscalculated because the probationer’s credits for good conduct and participation in institutional industries, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-24 , and for time served awaiting disposition, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-2(a) , did not entitle the probationer to an acceleration of the end date of the probationer’s probationary term. Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 903, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 20 (R.I. 2014).

Home Confinement.

A defendant’s confinement in the home must be termed a condition of probation so as not to violate § 12-19-23 . State v. Paster, 524 A.2d 587, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 465 (R.I. 1987).

A trial justice does not abuse his or her discretion by sentencing a nondangerous defendant to home confinement as a condition of probation provided the trial justice incorporates a reasonable, practical plan for supervision and provides specific sanctions for violations of such supervision as part of the sentence. State v. Paster, 524 A.2d 587, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 465 (R.I. 1987).

Imposition of Sentence.

Superior Ct. R. Crim. P. Rule 35 does not authorize the suspension or probation of a sentence after it has been imposed. State v. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d 1328, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1048 (R.I. 1983).

Section 12-19-10 is one restriction on the general grant of authority in this section to suspend sentences which, by its plain language, absolutely prohibits the suspension of a sentence of imprisonment once it is commenced. State v. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d 164 (R.I. 1983).

Collateral References.

Ability to pay as necessary consideration in conditioning probation or suspended sentence upon reparation or restitution. 73 A.L.R.3d 1240.

Are sentences on different counts to be regarded as for a single term or for separate terms as regards suspension of sentence. 107 A.L.R. 634.

Constitutionality of statute conferring on court power to suspend sentence. 26 A.L.R. 399; 101 A.L.R. 402.

Convicted person’s acceptance of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence as waiver of right to appeal. 117 A.L.R. 929.

DNA evidence as newly discovered evidence which will warrant grant of new trial or other postconviction relief in criminal case. 125 A.L.R.5th 497.

Imposition or enforcement of sentence which has been suspended without authority. 141 A.L.R. 1225.

Inherent power of court to suspend for indefinite period execution of sentence in whole or in part. 73 A.L.R.3d 474.

Power of court to impose sentence providing for intermittent incarceration. 39 A.L.R.2d 985.

Probation conditioned on restitution in connection with application for, or receipt of public relief. 92 A.L.R.2d 458.

Propriety, in criminal case, of Federal District Court order restricting defendant’s right to reenter or stay in United States. 94 A.L.R. Fed. 619.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s not associating with particular person. 99 A.L.R.3d 967.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s remaining childless or having no additional children during probationary period. 94 A.L.R.3d 1218.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s serving part of probationary period in jail or prison. 6 A.L.R.4th 446.

Propriety of conditioning probation or suspended sentence on defendant’s refraining from political activity, protest, or the like. 45 A.L.R.3d 1022.

Propriety of probation condition exposing defendant to public shame or ridicule. 65 A.L.R.5th 187.

Propriety of Requirement, as Condition of Probation, That Defendant Refrain from Use of Intoxicants. 46 A.L.R.6th 241.

State court’s power to place defendant on probation without imposition of sentence. 56 A.L.R.3d 932.

Validity of condition of probation, supervised release, or parole restricting computer use or internet access. 4 A.L.R.6th 1.

Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, defendant submit to warrantless searches. 79 A.L.R.3d 1083; 99 A.L.R.5th 557.

Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, indigent defendant reimburse defense costs. 79 A.L.R.3d 1025.

Validity, construction, and application of conditions of probation or supervised release prohibiting contact with minors or frequenting places where minors congregate — State cases. 4 A.L.R.7th Art. 3 (2015).

What constitutes “good behavior” within statute or judicial order expressly conditioning suspension of sentence thereon. 58 A.L.R.3d 1156.

12-19-8.1. Conditions of probation.

  1. The following shall constitute basic conditions of probation applicable to all defendants upon whom a period of probation has been imposed:
    1. Obey all laws;
    2. Report to the probation officer and parole officer as directed;
    3. Remain within the state of Rhode Island except with the prior approval, specifically or as an agreed routine, of the probation and parole office;
    4. Notify the probation and parole officer immediately of any change of address, telephone number, or employment;
    5. Make every effort to keep steadily employed or attend school or vocational training;
    6. Waive extradition from anywhere in the United States to Rhode Island, if required to appear in any Rhode Island court;
    7. Provide a DNA sample if required by §§ 12-1.5-7 and 12-1.5-8 ;
    8. Pay restitution, court costs, and fines, if assessed, in one or several sums, based on the defendant’s ability to pay; and
    9. Submit to a risk and needs assessment.
  2. Special probation conditions related to community service, computer restrictions, no contact orders, or any other conditions deemed just and reasonable may be imposed at the discretion of the court.
  3. At any time during the term of a sentence imposed, the probation and parole unit of the department of corrections may seek permission of the superior or district court to modify a defendant’s basic conditions or special conditions of treatment or counseling by either imposing additional conditions or removing previously imposed conditions of probation to provide for more effective supervision of the defendant.
  4. Failure of the defendant to comply with modified conditions of probation constitutes a violation.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 3, provides that this section takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 3, provides that this section takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

Provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-8.1 codify what have long been recognized as conditions of probation in Rhode Island. State v. Chandler, 225 A.3d 946, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 21 (R.I. 2020).

Violation of Conditions.

Given the supreme court’s longstanding rule that keeping the peace and remaining on good behavior are conditions of probation, the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when he found that defendant violated the conditions of his probation to which he was sentenced after his conviction; neither the probationary sentence imposed nor its revocation were illegal sentences. State v. Chandler, 225 A.3d 946, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 21 (R.I. 2020).

12-19-9. Violation of terms of probation — Notice to attorney general — Revocation or continuation of suspension.

  1. Whenever any person who has been placed on probation pursuant to § 12-9-8 violates the terms and conditions of his or her probation as fixed by the court, the police or the probation authority shall inform the attorney general of the violation, and the attorney general shall cause the defendant to appear before the court. The department of corrections division of rehabilitative services shall promptly render a report relative to the conduct of the defendant, and the information contained in any report under § 12-13-24.1 . The division of rehabilitative services may recommend that the time served up to that point is a sufficient response to a violation that is not a new alleged crime. The court may order the defendant held without bail for a period not exceeding ten (10) days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays.
  2. The court shall conduct a hearing within thirty (30) days of arrest unless waived by the defendant to determine whether the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of his or her probation, at which hearing the defendant shall have the opportunity to be present and to respond. Upon a determination by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of his or her probation, the court, in open court and in the presence of the defendant, may:
    1. Remove the suspension and order the defendant committed on the sentence previously imposed, or on a lesser sentence;
    2. Impose a sentence if one has not been previously imposed;
    3. Stay all or a portion of the sentence imposed after removal of the suspension;
    4. Continue the suspension of a sentence previously imposed; or
    5. Convert a sentence of probation without incarceration to a suspended sentence.
  3. The court shall sentence for a violation under subsection (b) of this section in accordance with judicial sentencing benchmarks.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 18A; P.L. 1950, ch. 2462, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-9 ; P.L. 1966, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 87, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 25; P.L. 1982, ch. 215, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

Cross References.

Probation violation, court action, § 12-19-14 .

Return of probationers from outside state, § 12-18-2 .

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

Timothy Baldwin & Olin Thompson, More Horse-Hair for the Sword of Damocles? The Rhode Island Probation System and Comparisons to Federal Law, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 244 (2016).

Lara Montecalvo, Kara Maguire, & Angela Yingling, No Exit, No End: Probation in Rhode Island, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 316 (2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Additional Probationary Period.

An additional probationary period may not be imposed after a defendant who violated his probation is forced to serve the sentence previously imposed. State v. Taylor, 473 A.2d 290, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 483 (R.I. 1984).

An agreement cannot be made to extend a defendant’s probation period beyond that which was originally imposed by the sentencing court in order to give him more time in which to pay restitution. Consequently, when the period of probation had expired prior to the time when the defendant entered into such an agreement, was unable to fulfill the restitution, and received a probation-violation notice, the court erred in then adjudging the defendant a violator. The defendant’s duty to fulfill his obligation regarding restitution, however, was not vitiated and he remained civilly liable therefor. State v. Traudt, 679 A.2d 330, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 197 (R.I. 1996).

The trial court exceeded its statutory authority in imposing two additional years of probation upon the defendant, who had violated his probation and who was ordered to serve a portion of the sentence previously imposed. State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 233 (R.I. 1996).

Allocution.

It was error where the hearing justice failed to grant the defendant or defense counsel the opportunity to present argument concerning the amount of punishment, or to present any factors that might be considered in mitigation of the imposition of consecutive sentences, but instead adjudged the defendant a probation violator and abruptly terminated the proceeding after hearing several witnesses and rejecting defense counsel’s argument that the state failed to prove its case. State v. Ratchford, 732 A.2d 120, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 157 (R.I. 1999).

Trial court satisfied the requirements of both R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 32 (f) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 as it allowed defendant’s counsel to address the court before deciding whether defendant violated the terms of his probation. State v. Jones, 969 A.2d 676, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 2009).

After revoking defendant’s probation, the trial court did not err in failing to allow him or his defense counsel to address the court before sentencing, as allocution was not required prior to sentencing in a probation-violation case in which consecutive sentences are not imposed or a sentence on more than one case is not levied. State v. Delarosa, 39 A.3d 1043, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 33 (R.I. 2012).

Concurrent Sentences.

Whether two sentences, previously imposed at the same time and the execution of which has been suspended, are to be served concurrently or consecutively if and when such suspension is subsequently revoked, depends on what was intended by the sentencing justice. Pelliccia v. Sharkey, 110 R.I. 319 , 292 A.2d 862, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 916 (1972).

Whether a sentencing justice imposes several sentences at the same time or is aware of prior sentences imposed by another justice, he or she is in the position to exercise the choice of imposing consecutive or concurrent sentences and that choice is thereafter binding upon the justice who later revokes the suspension of such sentences. State v. Studman, 468 A.2d 918, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1122 (R.I. 1983).

A probation-violation court has the power to reinstate a previously suspended sentence and order it to run consecutively to a sentence imposed by another jurisdiction, such as a sentence imposed in federal court. State v. DeLuca, 692 A.2d 689, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 81 (R.I. 1997).

Construction With § 12-19-8.

Although it appears that § 12-19-8 vests a sentencing court with the authority to fix when the period of a defendant’s probation is to commence, that statute must be read in conjunction with this section, which permits revocation of a defendant’s probation whenever the terms and conditions inherent in the very privilege of probation are violated by the defendant. Those inherent terms and conditions, one of which is the implied condition of good behavior, come into existence at the very moment that a sentence that includes probation is imposed and remain until the termination of the full sentence period. State v. Dantzler, 690 A.2d 338, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 1997).

Counsel.

Because defendant was offered the choice to continue with the appointed counsel or self-representation, because there were no exceptional circumstances justifying the postponement of defendant’s probation violation hearing, because the grounds for defendant’s request did not call into doubt counsel’s capability to adequately represent defendant, because no other competent and prepared trial counsel was ready to pinch-hit, and because defendant did not believe defendant could self-represent, the hearing justice did not err in refusing defendant’s request for the appointment of alternate counsel. State v. Gilbert, 984 A.2d 26, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 136 (R.I. 2009).

Discretion of Court.

Where petitioner’s probation was conditioned upon not engaging in any antisocial conduct which would furnish cause for a court to believe probation order should be revoked in public interest, and petitioner was later charged with breaking and entering which was then dismissed after granting of motion to suppress evidence, revocation of probation was not arbitrarily or capriciously determined by the court. Charest v. Howard, 109 R.I. 360 , 285 A.2d 381, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1194 (1972).

In Supreme Court review of the trial justice’s decision to vacate suspension, defendant is limited to a consideration of whether or not the justice acted arbitrarily or capriciously. State v. Studman, 121 R.I. 766 , 402 A.2d 1185, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2054 (1979).

Where it was very clear that the trial justice did not believe the defendant’s version regarding virtually every aspect of an incident in which the defendant entered the victim’s home with an ice pick and stabbed him seven times in the back, although the defendant was acquitted on charges arising out of the stabbing, the trial justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the revocation of his probation. State v. Goddu, 638 A.2d 62 (R.I. 1994).

The trial justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in rejecting the testimony of certain witnesses and in determining that, despite factual inconsistencies, there existed reasonably satisfactory evidence to support a finding that defendant had violated the terms of his probation. State v. Kennedy, 702 A.2d 28, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 277 (R.I. 1997).

Through the use of the term “may” and “as to the court may seem just and proper,” the legislature intended that a violation-hearing justice would have considerable discretion in selecting which of the options provided for he would apply to a probation violator and in deciding how those options would be applied. State v. Tucker, 747 A.2d 451, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 53 (R.I. 2000).

A violation-hearing justice acted well within his authority when he ordered a continuation of the defendant’s remaining suspended sentence after he adjudged the defendant to be a probation violator and ordered him to serve a portion of his original suspended sentence in prison. State v. Tucker, 747 A.2d 451, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 53 (R.I. 2000).

In revoking defendant’s probation, trial court satisfied both R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 and R.I. Super Ct. R. Crim. P. 32(f) where defendant’s counsel was provided an opportunity to address the hearing justice before his decision on whether defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation; no error was committed, therefore, by ordering the suspension of sentence to be lifted and the sentence to be served on a single felony case. State v. Nania, 786 A.2d 1066, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 254 (R.I. 2001).

Trial court properly found that defendant had violated the terms of his probation pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 ; the trial justice properly determined that the testimony of a police officer who observed defendant involved in a robbery was more credible than testimony of defendant’s alibi witness, his girlfriend, and the trial justice properly rejected defendant’s argument that any lack of fingerprint evidence would be exculpatory. State v. Beverly, 822 A.2d 170, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 117 (R.I. 2003).

Once defendant was apprehended and the warrant was cancelled, it was incumbent upon the State to move on a probation violation hearing within a reasonable time; as the trial court was not precluded pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 from setting bail and scheduling a violation hearing within a reasonable amount of time. State v. Tavares, 837 A.2d 730, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 233 (R.I. 2003).

Where a hearing justice’s finding of a probation violation turned on a determination of the credibility of the State’s three witnesses, the ultimate disposition of defendant’s underlying convictions were immaterial to a review of the hearing justice’s decision under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 32 (f), that defendant failed to keep the peace. State v. DiChristofaro, 842 A.2d 1075, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 45 (R.I. 2004).

Defendant’s assertion that he had been of good behavior from 1995, when his probation was initially imposed, until he violated his probation in 2001 did not prevent the hearing justice from imposing the full original sentence; the hearing justice acted well within his discretion. State v. Vieira, 883 A.2d 1146, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 193 (R.I. 2005).

Although the complainants did not describe a probationer with exacting precision, a hearing justice found that they had made good identifications and that a photo array was not unduly suggestive; therefore, the justice properly determined that the probationer violated the terms of probation, and imposed a previously suspended sentence. State v. Wray, 919 A.2d 414, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 23 (R.I. 2007).

Because a hearing justice acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously in assessing witness credibility regarding a burglary that took place while defendant was on probation, defendant was properly found to be in violation of the terms and conditions of defendant’s probation. State v. Horton, 971 A.2d 606, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 63 (R.I. 2009).

Because there were no exceptional circumstances that called for an eleventh-hour discharge of counsel, because defendant failed to keep the peace and remain on good behavior while on probation, and because defendant’s sentence was based on the nature of the first offense, pursuant to R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 32 (f) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 , defendant’s probation was properly revoked. State v. Lancellotta, 35 A.3d 863, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2012).

Evidence.

In a probation violation hearing relating to a charge that defendant committed assault or battery while he was on probation, the hearing justice did not err in deciding to credit the testimony of the State’s witnesses rather than the testimony of defendant’s witnesses, in that it was reasonable for the hearing justice to give a lesser weight to the testimony of an eyewitness, who admitted that he had poor eyesight and who denied ever seeing defendant, from his vantage point across the street, strike the complaining witness. State v. Jackson, 966 A.2d 1225, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 30 (R.I. 2009).

Where a trial court found three witnesses to be credible because they shared the same description of the events that transpired and it found defendant’s testimony to be “one complete lie” that in no way refuted the testimony of the other witnesses, the trial court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it found that defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation. State v. Jones, 969 A.2d 676, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 52 (R.I. 2009).

Even though a hearing justice added a previously undisclosed fingerprint to the evidentiary scale, the hearing officer had sufficient evidence to conclude that defendant, by defendant’s own admission, was the intruder shown on a store’s surveillance tapes; accordingly, the hearing officer’s probation violation ruling was neither arbitrary nor capricious. State v. Tetreault, 973 A.2d 489, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 2009).

Defendant’s probation was properly revoked, as the trial court’s findings that a complainant was credible despite some inconsistencies in her testimony, and that defendant had committed an assault and battery and an assault upon her, supported its determination that he did not keep the peace and was not of good behavior. State v. Shepard, 33 A.3d 158, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 2011).

In a probation violation proceeding, the trial court did not err by crediting an accomplice’s testimony simply because she was offered a favorable plea bargain to testify against defendant, as it found that many details she provided were corroborated by testimony of the victims, and her credibility assessments were entitled to deference. State v. Delarosa, 39 A.3d 1043, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 33 (R.I. 2012).

Trial justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that defendant violated the terms of his probation because the trial justice carefully weighed the evidence and found the complaining witness’s testimony to be candid, credible, and corroborated by other evidence, notwithstanding some disparities, and found the testimony of defendant’s girlfriend to be biased. State v. Gromkiewicz, 43 A.3d 45, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 56 (R.I. 2012).

Hearing.

The language of the statute providing for “the presence of the defendant” in open court does not require that he be confronted by witnesses against him as in a trial upon a criminal charge. Nor was he entitled to demand as of right that the information upon which the trial justice based his revocation of suspension should conform to the established rules of evidence. Harris v. Langlois, 98 R.I. 387 , 202 A.2d 288, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 180 , cert. denied, 379 U.S. 866, 85 S. Ct. 138, 13 L. Ed. 2d 70, 1964 U.S. LEXIS 774 (1964).

Evidence at a revocation hearing that the defendant, while on probation, had sold thorazine to a federal narcotics agent on the representation that it was heroin and had subsequently sold heroin to such agent justified the superior court in revoking defendant’s suspension of sentence and committing him to serve the sentence previously imposed. Walker v. Langlois, 104 R.I. 274 , 243 A.2d 733, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 645 (1968).

The state must either hold violation of probation hearings and violation of deferred sentencing agreement hearings (see § 12-19-19 ) first and give the alleged violator use and derivative use immunity for any testimony he may give, or postpone the violation hearing until after the criminal trial; this rule was given prospective effect only. State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673 , 370 A.2d 1273, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1738 (1977).

Neither due process nor policy requires that the hearing to determine whether the defendant has violated probation or a deferred sentencing agreement (§ 12-19-19 ) by committing a crime be split into a probable cause hearing at the time of arrest and a final hearing following the criminal proceedings. State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673 , 370 A.2d 1273, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1738 (1977).

A hearing on violation of probation could not be held in the absence of the person on probation irrespective of whether such absence was voluntary or involuntary. State v. Arroyo, 121 R.I. 877 , 403 A.2d 1086, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2035 (1979).

At the violation hearing the state is not required to prove the violation beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the trial justice need only be reasonably satisfied that there has been a violation. Accordingly, acquittal on the underlying offense does not automatically preclude a violation. State v. Studman, 121 R.I. 766 , 402 A.2d 1185, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2054 (1979).

Given the nature and extent of the defendant’s conduct in contributing to the delay, the defendant could not complain that bail was withheld following the expiration of the ten-day period prescribed in this section. State v. Lawrence, 658 A.2d 890, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 121 (R.I. 1995).

Where, in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 , a full hearing was scheduled just 10 days after the defendant’s arrest, a probation revocation hearing was not unjustly delayed. State v. Vashey, 823 A.2d 1151, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 147 (R.I. 2003).

Because the hearing justice failed to conduct a threshold inquiry into whether the State had good cause for denying defendant the opportunity to confront anyone with personal knowledge of his probationary record in Massachusetts and failed to analyze the reliability of the State’s substitute evidence, the hearing justice committed reversible error by erroneously admitting the hearsay testimony. State v. Bernard, 925 A.2d 936, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 84 (R.I. 2007).

Because defendant failed to offer proof concerning the complainant’s expected testimony, failed to show that the complainant’s testimony would have been material, and failed to provide any facts demonstrating that defendant had been diligent in seeking to secure the complainant, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a continuance. State v. Gilbert, 984 A.2d 26, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 136 (R.I. 2009).

Where a witness revealed her second encounter with defendant for the first time at the probation violation hearing, because there was no written or recorded version of that statement, the trial court did not err in finding that the State did not violate defendant’s discovery rights under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 26 .1. State v. Delarosa, 39 A.3d 1043, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 33 (R.I. 2012).

Held Without Bail.

Since the reason the defendant was held more than 10 days without bail was his failed attempt to obtain private counsel and also the fact his public defender was unavailable to begin the hearing, the defendant clearly contributed to the delay and thus there is not violation of this section in this case. State v. LeBlanc, 687 A.2d 456, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 17 (R.I. 1997).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because of the delay in his probation violation hearing; given the nature and extent of defendant’s conduct in contributing to the delay, he could not complain that he was held without bail without a hearing past the 10-day period prescribed in this section, as the initial continuance extending the case beyond the 10-day period was granted at defendant’s request and there was a continuance granted by agreement after the State made an offer. State v. Molina, 251 A.3d 485, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 38 (R.I. 2021).

Implied Condition of Good Behavior.

No due process violation occurred when trial court revoked defendant’s probation while he was on escaped status from a correction institution because § 12-19-9 served to put the defendant on notice that his probation could be revoked at any time whenever he violated any term or condition of his probation; despite the fact that the trial court specifically stated that the defendant’s probationary term was to commence upon his official release from prison, the defendant was subject to, as part of his probationary sentence, an implied condition of good behavior that attached to the total length of his sentence at the time sentence was imposed. State v. Dantzler, 690 A.2d 338, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 1997).

Defendant’s aggressive conduct during an altercation with a victim, particularly his shoving the victim, was not in accordance with the good behavior expected of a person on probation; thus, sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court’s finding that defendant had engaged in aggressive conduct in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation. State v. House, 889 A.2d 231, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 221 (R.I. 2005).

Since the trial court considered the evidence presented and determined that the first complainant was a credible witness and that defendant admitted he provided alcohol to both complainants who he then had sex with while they were too intoxicated to resist, it hardly acted arbitrarily in concluding that defendant violated his probation as his conduct lacked the required good behavior expected and required by his probationary status. State v. Maciorski, 889 A.2d 699, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 204 (R.I. 2005).

It was not error to find an inmate violated probation when serving an unrelated sentence because an implied condition of good behavior attached when the probation sentence was pronounced. Price v. Wall, 31 A.3d 995, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 143 (R.I. 2011).

Defendant’s probation violation was properly found because (1) a failure to keep the peace and remain of good behavior did not have to be criminal, and (2) defendant’s acts were found to be sufficiently related to defendant’s prior sexual misconduct. State v. Brown, 140 A.3d 768, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 2016).

Jurisdiction.

A trial justice has jurisdiction to revoke a parolee’s probation for acts committed after a sentence has been imposed but prior to the expiration of the parole period. State v. Jacques, 544 A.2d 193 (R.I. 1989).

When the defendant, who was on probation and serving a suspended sentence, was adjudged a violator of the terms of his sentence and was ordered to serve six months, the trial court did not mention the remaining three and one-half years of the suspended sentence. In a subsequent adjudication, the second trial court properly imposed the remainder of the original sentence since the first trial court at the violation hearing did not possess the statutory power to amend or decrease the sentence as originally imposed and was bound by the terms of that sentence. State v. Heath, 659 A.2d 116, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 156 (R.I. 1995).

Report of Conduct.

In view of defendant’s misconduct over a lengthy period of time while on probation, the trial justice, in removing the suspension of sentence order without first obtaining the conduct report did not abuse his judicial discretion. State v. Sousa, 116 R.I. 411 , 358 A.2d 44, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1289 (1976).

The hearing justice did not err in allowing the state to amend an error in the report under this rule at a probation hearing since the amendment in no way prejudiced the defendant and such a hearing is civil in nature. State v. Barber, 767 A.2d 78, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 2001).

Sentence for Violation.

Where the defendant had over four years remaining in his original five year sentence at the time of his violation, the trial justice was within his authority to order that the defendant serve six months of the remaining sentence, the other four years to be suspended with probation. State v. Heath, 742 A.2d 1200, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2000).

Hearing justice has considerable latitude in deciding whether a probation violator’s suspended sentence should be removed in whole, in part, or not at all, pursuant to § 12-19-9 . State v. Dale, 812 A.2d 795, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 196 (R.I. 2002).

Defendant’s 91/2 year total sentence for probation violations was within the confines of a 14-year previously suspended sentence. State v. Dale, 812 A.2d 795, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 196 (R.I. 2002).

Where defendant failed to keep the peace, failed to remain on good behavior, and was found in possession of stolen property, the evidence was more than sufficient to find defendant violated the terms of probation. State v. Piette, 833 A.2d 1233, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 199 (R.I. 2003).

Sentencing justice properly denied defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 as no part of defendant’s suspended sentence began to run until either the end of the probationary period or until a determination that defendant violated probation; defendant was adjudged a probation violator and the order to serve the entire 10-years of his suspended sentence was not illegal despite less than two years remained on his 10-year period of probation. State v. Parson, 844 A.2d 178, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2004).

After finding that defendant had violated his probation by committing an assault or battery on the complaining witness, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a seven-year prison sentence on defendant as the hearing justice included in the record a multitude of factors leading to his determination that defendant should be sentenced to serve seven years of his ten-year suspended sentence, including detailing defendant’s history of violent crime. State v. Jackson, 966 A.2d 1225, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 30 (R.I. 2009).

Where the trial court found that defendant violated the terms of his probation by assaulting a woman, its revocation of three years of his suspended sentence was a sustainable exercise of its broad discretion. State v. Shepard, 33 A.3d 158, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 2011).

Defendant’s probation was properly revoked because defendant failed to keep the peace and be of good behavior when defendant violated two no-contact orders by making telephone calls to the complainant, one of which was actually made while a police officer was standing before defendant. State v. Bellem, 56 A.3d 432, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 141 (R.I. 2012).

Where defendant violated probation for a second time, as R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 did not allow the execution of his previously suspended sentence to be stayed, the trial court properly corrected its error pursuant to R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 (a), and did not abuse its discretion in determining what portion of his suspended sentence should be executed and what portion should remain suspended. State v. Roberts, 59 A.3d 693, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 27 (R.I. 2013).

Hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in executing the remaining eight and one-half years of defendant’s previously suspended sentence after finding that defendant was released from the correctional institution less than 48 hours before engaging in conduct that violated the terms of probation, defendant had engaged in physical violence during the original offense, and it appeared that defendant had preyed on the victim’s apparent vulnerability. State v. McKinnon-Conneally, 101 A.3d 875, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 138 (R.I. 2014).

Imposing an executed portion of defendant’s suspended sentence for a probation violation was not excessive because the gravity of defendant’s crimes and the crimes’ similarity to the basis of the probation violation were considered. State v. Brown, 140 A.3d 768, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 2016).

Upon finding defendant’s probation violation, it was error to impose additional probation conditions because the imposition of conditions not originally imposed was not statutorily permitted. State v. Brown, 140 A.3d 768, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 103 (R.I. 2016).

Time Period for Revocation.

The General Assembly did not limit the period in which revocation could occur to only after commencement of the probationary period noted in the overall sentence; the statute clearly permits probation to be revoked whenever a defendant who has been sentenced to a term that includes any period of probation imposed pursuant to § 12-19-8 is found, after hearing, to have committed any act that constitutes a violation of the implied condition of good behavior that comes into existence at the very moment the sentence is imposed and which remains until expiration of the total term of the sentence. State v. Dantzler, 690 A.2d 338, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 1997).

Collateral References.

Acquittal in criminal proceeding as precluding revocation of probation on same charge. 76 A.L.R.3d 564.

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure. 77 A.L.R.3d 636.

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of incriminating statement obtained in violation of Miranda Rule. 77 A.L.R.3d 669.

Determination that state failed to prove charges relied upon for revocation of probation as barring subsequent criminal action based on same underlying charges. 2 A.L.R.5th 262.

DNA evidence as newly discovered evidence which will warrant grant of new trial or other postconviction relief in criminal case. 125 A.L.R.5th 497.

Notice and hearing before revocation of probation or suspension of sentence. 29 A.L.R.2d 1074.

Propriety, in imposing sentence for original offense after revocation of probation, of considering acts because of which probation was revoked. 65 A.L.R.3d 1100.

Propriety of revocation of probation for subsequent criminal conviction which is subject to appeal. 76 A.L.R.3d 588.

Propriety of Requirement, as Condition of Probation, That Defendant Refrain from Use of Intoxicants. 46 A.L.R.6th 63.

Revocation, without notice and hearing, of probation or suspension of sentence, parole, or conditional pardon as a deprivation of right to counsel. 29 A.L.R.2d 1089.

Right and sufficiency of allocution in probation revocation proceeding. 70 A.L.R.5th 533.

Right of defendant sentenced after revocation of probation to credit for jail time served as condition of probation. 99 A.L.R.3d 781.

Right to assistance of counsel at proceedings to revoke probation. 44 A.L.R.3d 306.

Sufficiency of hearsay evidence in probation revocation hearings. 21 A.L.R.6th 771.

What constitutes “good behavior” within statute or judicial order expressly conditioning suspension of sentence thereon. 58 A.L.R.3d 1156.

Who may institute proceedings to revoke probation. 21 A.L.R.5th 275.

12-19-10. Suspension of imprisonment already commenced.

Imprisonment pursuant to a sentence, once commenced, shall not be subject to suspension by the superior court.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 18A; P.L. 1950, ch. 2462, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-10 .

Cross References.

Power of court to correct sentences generally, Super. Ct. R. Crim. Proc. Rule 35.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With Superior Court Rules.

Superior Ct. R. Crim. P. Rule 35 does not authorize the suspension or probation of a sentence after it has been imposed. State v. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d 1328, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1048 (R.I. 1983).

Superior Ct. R. Crim. P. Rule 35 has no effect upon the meaning or application of this section. State v. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d 1328, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1048 (R.I. 1983).

The state may reimpose a defendant’s suspended sentence where the suspension is illegal under this section because it takes place after the defendant commences serving his sentence. State v. DeWitt, 557 A.2d 845, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 60 (R.I. 1989).

Corrected Sentence.

Where sentence provided that it should commence after the expiration of the sentence petitioner was then serving and it was discovered that he was not then serving any prior sentence, a correction of the sentence four days later by omitting the provision as to commencement of sentence did not constitute a vacation of sentence and the imposition of a new one. Sanford v. Langlois, 93 R.I. 1 , 170 A.2d 283, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1961).

Violation of Probation.

This section applies only to persons who have been imprisoned. It does not address the reinstatement of a suspended sentence when defendant violates his probation outside of prison. State v. Johnson, 620 A.2d 1264, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 77 (R.I. 1993).

Collateral References.

Power of court to impose sentence providing for intermittent incarceration. 39 A.L.R.2d 985.

12-19-11. Suspension of life sentence.

Execution of sentence shall not be suspended, nor shall the defendant be placed on probation, if the offense is one punishable by mandatory life imprisonment.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 18A; P.L. 1950, ch. 2462, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-11 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section, preventing the court from mitigating a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment, did not violate R.I. Const., art. 1, § 10 guaranteeing the right of allocution. State v. Vaccaro, 121 R.I. 788 , 403 A.2d 649, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1981 (1979).

12-19-12. Powers of superior court additional.

The power and authority vested by §§ 12-19-8 12-19-11 in the superior court shall be deemed additional power and authority, and shall not be deemed to be in substitution or derogation of any other power and authority previously vested in the superior court.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 18A; P.L. 1950, ch. 2462, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-12 .

12-19-13. Suspension of sentence and probation by district court.

Whenever any defendant shall appear for sentence before a district court, the court may impose a sentence and suspend its execution, or place the defendant on probation without the imposition of a suspended sentence. The defendant may be placed on probation for the time and on any terms and conditions that the court may fix. The period of probation, together with any extension, shall not exceed one year, except that probation may be for a longer period in cases in which the district court may by law impose a sentence longer than one year; provided, that the period of probation shall not exceed the longest sentence which the court may impose.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 45A; P.L. 1954, ch. 3362, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-13 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 25.

Collateral References.

Ability to pay as necessary consideration in conditioning probation or suspended sentence upon reparation or restitution. 73 A.L.R.3d 1240.

Inherent power of court to suspend for indefinite period execution of sentence in whole or in part. 73 A.L.R.3d 474.

Power of court to impose sentence providing for intermittent incarceration. 39 A.L.R.2d 985.

Propriety, in criminal case, of Federal District Court order restricting defendant’s right to reenter or stay in United States. 94 A.L.R. Fed. 619.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s not associating with particular person. 99 A.L.R.3d 967.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s remaining childless or having no additional children during probationary period. 94 A.L.R.3d 1218.

Propriety of conditioning probation or suspended sentence on defendant’s refraining from political activity, protest, or the like. 45 A.L.R.3d 1022.

Propriety of probation condition exposing defendant to public shame or ridicule. 65 A.L.R.5th 187.

State court’s power to place defendant on probation without imposition of sentence. 56 A.L.R.3d 932.

Validity of condition of probation, supervised release, or parole restricting computer use or internet access. 4 A.L.R.6th 1.

Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, defendant submit to warrantless searches. 79 A.L.R.3d 1083.

Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, indigent defendant reimburse defense costs. 79 A.L.R.3d 1025.

What constitutes “good behavior” within statute or judicial order expressly conditioning suspension of sentence thereon. 58 A.L.R.3d 1156.

12-19-14. Violation of terms of probation — Notice to court — Revocation or continuation of suspension.

  1. Whenever any person who has been placed on probation by virtue of the suspension of execution of his or her sentence pursuant to § 12-19-13 violates the terms and conditions of his or her probation as fixed by the court by being formally charged with committing a new criminal offense, the police or department of corrections division of rehabilitative services shall cause the defendant to appear before the court. The department of corrections division of rehabilitative services shall determine when a technical violation of the terms and conditions of probation as fixed by the court that does not constitute a new criminal offense has occurred and shall cause the defendant to appear before the court. For technical violations, the division of rehabilitative services shall promptly render a written report relative to the conduct of the defendant, including, as applicable, a description of the clear and articulable public safety risk posed by a defendant accused of a technical violation, and, as available, the information contained in any report under § 12-13-24.1 . The division of rehabilitative services may recommend that the time served up to that point is a sufficient response to a violation that is not a new, alleged crime. The court may order the defendant held without bail for a period not exceeding ten (10) days excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays if the new criminal charge(s) constitutes a violent crime as defined in the Rhode Island General Laws, a domestic violence crime, or a crime involving driving under the influence or if the court determines in its discretion that public safety concerns and/or concerns regarding the defendant’s likelihood to appear before the court warrant holding the defendant without bail.
  2. The court shall conduct a hearing within thirty (30) days of arrest, unless waived by the defendant, to determine whether the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of his or her probation, at which hearing the defendant shall have the opportunity to be present and to respond. Upon a determination by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of his or her probation, the court, in open court and in the presence of the defendant, may as to the court may seem just and proper:
    1. Revoke the suspension and order the defendant committed on the sentence previously imposed, or on a lesser sentence;
    2. Impose a sentence if one has not been previously imposed;
    3. Stay all or a portion of the sentence imposed after removal of the suspension;
    4. Continue the suspension of a sentence previously imposed; or
    5. Convert a sentence of probation without incarceration to a suspended sentence.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 45A; P.L. 1954, ch. 3362, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-14 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 145, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 25; P.L. 1982, ch. 215, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 162, art. 13, § 1, effective July 6, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

Cross References.

Probation violation, court action, § 12-19-9 .

Law Reviews.

Timothy Baldwin & Olin Thompson, More Horse-Hair for the Sword of Damocles? The Rhode Island Probation System and Comparisons to Federal Law, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 244 (2016).

Lara Montecalvo, Kara Maguire, & Angela Yingling, No Exit, No End: Probation in Rhode Island, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 316 (2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Hearing.

The standard of proof in a hearing on violation of probationary status is met by evidence which reasonably satisfies the trial justice that a violation has occurred and where there was an abundance of evidence, both direct and corroborative, to support the finding that the probationer had participated in a robbery, he was properly adjudged a violator. State v. Turcotte, 400 A.2d 957, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1805 (R.I. 1979).

A hearing on violation of probation could not be held in the absence of the person on probation irrespective of whether such absence was voluntary or involuntary. State v. Arroyo, 121 R.I. 877 , 403 A.2d 1086, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2035 (1979).

The mere admission of hearsay testimony at an adjudication hearing or the revocation of probation does not require reversal of a finding of violation. State v. Tatro, 659 A.2d 106, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 147 (R.I. 1995).

Revocation of Suspension — Jurisdiction.

The ten-day limit of this section on holding the defendant without bail is not intended to limit the jurisdiction of the court to revoke the suspension of the defendant’s sentence to such ten-day period. State v. Sherman, 104 R.I. 383 , 244 A.2d 583, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 657 (1968).

Collateral References.

Acquittal in criminal proceeding as precluding revocation of parole on same charge. 76 A.L.R.3d 578.

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure. 77 A.L.R.3d 636.

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of incriminating statement obtained in violation of Miranda Rule. 77 A.L.R.3d 669.

Propriety, in imposing sentence for original offense after revocation of probation, of considering acts because of which probation was revoked. 65 A.L.R.3d 1100.

Propriety of revocation or probation for subsequent criminal conviction which is subject to appeal. 76 A.L.R.3d 588.

Right and sufficiency of allocution in probation revocation proceeding. 70 A.L.R.5th 533.

Right of defendant sentenced after revocation of probation to credit for jail time served as condition of probation. 99 A.L.R.3d 781.

Right to assistance of counsel at proceedings to revoke probation. 44 A.L.R.3d 306.

Sufficiency of hearsay evidence in probation revocation hearings. 21 A.L.R.6th 771.

What constitutes “good behavior” within statute or judicial order expressly conditioning suspension of sentence thereon. 58 A.L.R.3d 1156.

Who may institute proceedings to revoke probation. 21 A.L.R.5th 275.

12-19-15. Term of probation — Power to commit after termination of original sentence.

The power of the court to commit the defendant shall not be deemed to terminate with the termination of the period of the original sentence, but the court shall have power to enforce the sentence even though the original period of the sentence has expired. The term of the suspended sentence may be longer or shorter or for the same time as the probation period, and the time during which the defendant is on probation shall not be deemed by §§ 12-19-13 12-19-17 to be a part of the term of his or her sentence, although the court, in its discretion, may give consideration to the probationer’s conduct during the probationary period in imposing a sanction or enforcing the sentence originally imposed, or any lesser sentence.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 45A; P.L. 1954, ch. 3362, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-15 ; P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

12-19-16. Suspension of imprisonment already commenced.

Imprisonment pursuant to a sentence, once commenced, shall not be subject to suspension by the district court.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 45A; P.L. 1954, ch. 3362, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-16 .

Collateral References.

Power of court to impose sentence providing for intermittent incarceration. 39 A.L.R.2d 985.

12-19-17. Powers of district court additional.

The power and authority by §§ 12-19-13 12-19-16 vested in the district courts shall be deemed additional power and authority and shall not be deemed in substitution or derogation of any other power and authority previously vested in the district courts.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 45A; P.L. 1954, ch. 3362, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-17 .

Collateral References.

Power of court to impose sentence providing for intermittent incarceration. 39 A.L.R.2d 985.

12-19-18. Termination of imprisonment on deferred sentence on failure of grand jury to indict — Determinations of insufficient evidence lack of probable cause or exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

  1. Whenever any person has been sentenced to imprisonment for violation of a deferred sentence by reason of the alleged commission of a felony and the grand jury has failed to return any indictment or an information has not been filed on the charge which was specifically alleged to have constituted the violation of the deferred sentence, the sentence to imprisonment for the alleged violation of the deferred sentence shall, on motion made to the court on behalf of the person so sentenced, be quashed, and imprisonment shall be immediately terminated, and the deferred sentence shall have same force and effect as if no sentence to imprisonment had been imposed.
  2. Whenever any person, after an evidentiary hearing, has been sentenced to imprisonment for violation of a suspended sentence or probationary period by reason of the alleged commission of a felony or misdemeanor said sentence of imprisonment shall, on a motion made to the court on behalf of the person so sentenced, be quashed, and imprisonment shall be terminated when any of the following occur on the charge which was specifically alleged to have constituted the violation:
    1. After trial person is found “not guilty” or a motion for judgment of acquittal or to dismiss is made and granted pursuant to Superior or District Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 29;
    2. After hearing evidence, a “no true bill” is returned by the grand jury;
    3. After consideration by an assistant or special assistant designated by the attorney general, a “no information” based upon a lack of probable cause is returned;
    4. A motion to dismiss is made and granted pursuant to the Rhode Island general laws § 12-12-1.7 and/or Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.1; or
    5. The charge fails to proceed in District or Superior Court under circumstances where the state is indicating a lack of probable cause, or circumstances where the state or its agents believe there is doubt about the culpability of the accused.
  3. This section shall apply to all individuals sentenced to imprisonment for violation of a suspended sentence or probationary period by reason of the alleged commission of a felony or misdemeanor and shall not alter the ability of the court to revoke a suspended sentence or probationary period for an allegation of conduct that does not rise to the level of criminal conduct.

History of Section. P.L. 1948, ch. 2085, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-18 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 14; P.L. 2010, ch. 30, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 311, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 30, § 1, and P.L. 2010, ch. 311, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Although this section has been declared unconstitutional as an unlawful exercise of judicial power by the general assembly when applied to deferred sentence agreements entered into prior to its enactment; it is constitutional and must be given full force and effect with regard to deferred sentences agreed to after its enactment (citing State v. Plante, 109 R.I. 371 , 285 A.2d 395 (1972) and distinguishing State v. Taylor, 108 R.I. 114 , 272 A.2d 680 (1971)); State v. Garnetto, 75 R.I. 86 , 63 A.2d 777 (1949)). Hazard v. Howard, 110 R.I. 107 , 290 A.2d 603, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 885 (1972).

The fact that the benefits under this section do not apply to probationers does not violate equal protection. State v. McConaghy, 215 R.I. 120 , 386 A.2d 1380 (1978).

In deciding subsection (b) of this section was unconstitutional, the trial justice was without authority to raise and decide, sua sponte, a constitutional issue that was not squarely placed before him by the parties. State v. Beaudoin, 137 A.3d 717, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 56 (R.I. 2016).

Deferred Sentence Violators.

Because former R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-18 made no reference to a criminal information that had been filed and subsequently dismissed based on an application of the exclusionary rule, the trial justice did not err in denying defendant’s motion to quash and vacate the finding of a violation of defendant’s deferred sentence. State v. White, 37 A.3d 120, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 12 (R.I. 2012).

Effect of Amendment.

In a case in which a trial justice imposed a suspended sentence and probationary term on defendant in 2009 following a plea of nolo contendere entered before subsection (b) was added to this section in 2010, but who was adjudged to be a probation violator, imprisoned as a result, and then acquitted by a jury on the underlying charges after the 2010 amendment, the Supreme Court concluded that the case entailed prospective, not retroactive, application of subsection (b). The trial justice’s imposition of the suspended sentence in 2009 was not the event that triggered application of subsection (b). State v. Beaudoin, 137 A.3d 717, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 56 (R.I. 2016).

Evidence.

Where defendant was sentenced to prison upon being determined a deferred sentence violator in a hearing brought on by an alleged crime for which grand jury later refused to indict, trial court erred in its denial of defendant’s motion to quash the sentence by its consideration of evidence unrelated to the alleged crime and not presented at the hearing. State v. Marfeo, 112 R.I. 577 , 313 A.2d 646, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1471 (1974).

Probation Violators Not Covered.

The statute applies only to deferred sentence agreement violators and not probation violators. State v. Jones, 116 R.I. 148 , 352 A.2d 656, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1256 (1976).

Requirements.

Nothing more is required to find a probationer in violation of his deferred sentence agreement than that which will suffice to find violation of a suspended sentence. State v. Plante, 109 R.I. 371 , 285 A.2d 395, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1195 (1972).

12-19-19. Sentencing on plea of guilty or nolo contendere — Deferment of sentence.

  1. Whenever any person is arraigned before the superior court and pleads guilty or nolo contendere, he or she may be at any time sentenced by the court; provided, that if at any time the court formally defers sentencing, then the person and the court shall enter into a written deferral agreement to be filed with the clerk of the court. When a court formally defers sentence, the court may only impose sentence up to five (5) years from and after the date of the written deferral agreement, unless during the required period, the person shall be declared to have violated the terms and conditions of the deferment pursuant to subsection (b) in which event the court may impose sentence.
  2. The court may require that the person agreeing to said deferment of sentence shall not violate any condition of the written deferral agreement. A violation of any condition set forth by the written deferral agreement shall violate the terms and conditions of the deferment of sentence and the court may impose a sanction or impose sentence. The determination of whether a violation has occurred shall be made by the court in accordance with procedures relating to violation of probation in court rules and §§ 12-19-2 and 12-19-14 .
  3. If a person, after the completion of the deferment period is determined by the court after a hearing to have complied with all of the terms and conditions of the deferral agreement including, but not limited to, the payment in full of any court-ordered fines, fees, costs, assessments, and restitution to victims of crime, then the person shall become immediately eligible for consideration for expungement pursuant to the provisions of §§ 12-1.3-2 and 12-1.3-3 .

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 21; G.L. 1909, ch. 273, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 18; P.L. 1927, ch. 1063, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 18; P.L. 1945, ch. 1560, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-19 ; P.L. 2010, ch. 128, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 256, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 202, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 204, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 128, § 1, and P.L. 2010, ch. 256, § 1, enacted nearly identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 202, § 2, and P.L. 2016, ch. 204, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2016, ch. 202, § 3 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [June 29, 2016], the provisions shall be given retroactive and prospective effect, and it shall apply to all matters pending upon the effective date of this act including anyone who after a hearing is determined by the court to have complied with all the terms and conditions of their deferred sentence agreement.”

P.L. 2016, ch. 204, § 3 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [June 29, 2016], the provisions shall be given retroactive and prospective effect, and it shall apply to all matters pending upon the effective date of this act including anyone who after a hearing is determined by the court to have complied with all the terms and conditions of their deferred sentence agreement.”

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

Plain language of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-19 as amended in 2010, governing exoneration and sealing in cases of successful deferred sentences, indicated that it did not apply retroactively; moreover, it conferred a substantive right on persons who formerly were not subject to the law, further indicating prospective application. State v. Morrice, 58 A.3d 156, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 5 (R.I. 2013).

2010 amendment to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-19(c) , which exonerated any person who successfully complied with the terms and conditions of a written deferral agreement for a deferred sentence, did not apply retroactively to deferred sentences entered prior to the date of the amendment. State v. Briggs, 58 A.3d 164, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 6 (R.I. 2013).

This is a remedial statute and should receive a liberal construction. State v. Robalewski, 96 R.I. 296 , 191 A.2d 148, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1963).

Construction With § 12-19-8.

Under this section, a deferred sentence is never imposed unless the defendant violates his written agreement with the attorney general, while under § 12-19-8 a suspended sentence is actually imposed but the execution thereof is suspended. State v. Robalewski, 96 R.I. 296 , 191 A.2d 148, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1963).

Deferred Sentence Generally.

Defendant who agrees to the deferment of sentence cannot later complain of the delay. Orabona v. Linscott, 49 R.I. 443 , 144 A. 52, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1928).

Clearly the purpose of this section is to give the petitioner an opportunity to rehabilitate himself free from physical restraint and at the same time to afford society a means of protecting itself in the event that petitioner failed in his rehabilitation. Powers v. Langlois, 90 R.I. 45 , 153 A.2d 535, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 109 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 905, 80 S. Ct. 615, 4 L. Ed. 2d 556, 1960 U.S. LEXIS 1585 (1960).

This section confers a benefit upon the accused, and this benefit should be available to him whether he is accused of a felony or a misdemeanor. State v. Robalewski, 96 R.I. 296 , 191 A.2d 148, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1963).

This section provided a time limitation of five years in which a deferred sentence could be imposed so that the defendant did not have the threat of the sentence over him for the rest of his life and, at the same time, society had a means of protecting itself if the defendant was not successful in rehabilitation. State v. Taylor, 111 R.I. 653 , 306 A.2d 173, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1259 (1973).

The deferred sentence agreement goes into effect immediately and he may be charged with violation of such deferred sentence agreement for misconduct while incarcerated on another charge. State v. Ciarlo, 122 R.I. 529 , 409 A.2d 1216, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1419 (1980).

Duty of Attorney General.

In moving for sentence and presenting such circumstances as cause him to believe the interests of society would best be served by the imposition of sentence for the offense on which sentence was deferred, the attorney general is not exercising a judicial function, but simply conforming to the duty which he assumed in entering into the deferred sentence agreement. Shahinian v. Langlois, 100 R.I. 631 , 218 A.2d 461, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 489 (1966).

Five Year Limitation.

The five year limitation in this section with respect to imprisoned persons prevents the court from acting after the expiration of such period but does not prevent the court from sentencing the prisoner immediately where he violates his agreement while imprisoned. Giroux v. Superior Court, 86 R.I. 48 , 133 A.2d 636, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 919, 78 S. Ct. 349, 2 L. Ed. 2d 278, 1958 U.S. LEXIS 1741 (1958).

Where following petitioner’s release on parole on May 7, 1951, it does not appear that he was in the state until he was before the district court in December, 1957, there was no merit to the contention that the state had lost jurisdiction over a deferred sentence agreement by its neglect to act earlier than at the time a capias was issued from the superior court on January 2, 1958, for alleged violation of such sentence agreement. Powers v. Langlois, 90 R.I. 45 , 153 A.2d 535, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 109 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 905, 80 S. Ct. 615, 4 L. Ed. 2d 556, 1960 U.S. LEXIS 1585 (1960).

It did not matter that person who had entered into deferred sentence agreement was sentenced more than five years after deferment, where such sentence was within a five year period from the termination of an intervening sentence for another crime which was commenced less than five years after the deferred sentence agreement. Almeida v. Langlois, 97 R.I. 325 , 197 A.2d 498, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1964).

Where a defendant at liberty under a deferred sentence agreement is sentenced for another crime the five year period of conditional liberty is automatically reinstated at the termination of the sentence for this subsequent crime and it is not necessary that the defendant, upon his release from said subsequent term, be rearraigned and sentence again deferred. Shahinian v. Langlois, 100 R.I. 631 , 218 A.2d 461, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 489 (1966).

If a capias was issued under this section, the state had to make a diligent effort to complete service within a reasonable time after issuance and before the five-year period expired or be barred unless the defendant, by his failure to make his whereabouts known, made service of the capias impossible and tolled the running of the five years. State v. Taylor, 111 R.I. 653 , 306 A.2d 173, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1259 (1973).

Where two separate sentences were imposed on the same day, the deferred sentence must either precede or follow the imposition of the imprisonment sentence and if the deferred sentence preceded the prison sentence, the prison sentence would be for an intervening sentence and if it followed, then defendant would be serving a previously imposed sentence and in either case the five year time limit would run from defendant’s release from prison and not from the time the agreement was entered. State v. Johnson, 115 R.I. 550 , 349 A.2d 609, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1558 (1976).

— Tolling.

The reason for tolling the five-year period while defendant is serving a term of imprisonment is to ensure that the five-year period of good behavior required as part of the deferred sentence agreement applies only to time during which the defendant is at liberty. Giving a defendant credit for not committing crimes while imprisoned on another sentence would be inconsistent with the purpose of a deferred sentence agreement. Whitman v. Ventetuolo, 781 F. Supp. 95, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18775 (D.R.I. 1991).

Hearings on Deferred Sentence Violations.

Where defendant had to choose between silence at hearing on violation of deferred sentence after bank robbery indictment and risk of self-incrimination apropos to upcoming trial for the crime, the court found no denial of due process or privilege cast upon defendant under Rhode Island Const., art. 1, § 13 or U.S. Const., amend. 5 by the forced choice, nor by the sequence of proceedings. Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 7952 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026, 95 S. Ct. 505, 42 L. Ed. 2d 301, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3417 (1974).

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not required in deferred sentence violation hearing. Flint v. Mullen, 372 F. Supp. 213, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10493 (D.R.I. 1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d 100, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 7952 (1st Cir. 1974).

Petitioner’s conduct in being apprehended near scene of housebreak with over $70 in small change, no substantial alibi, and refusing to cooperate with police investigation was sufficient to violate his deferred sentence agreement. State v. Plante, 109 R.I. 371 , 285 A.2d 395, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1195 (1972).

Where person, under deferred sentence, was indicted for subsequent robbery, he was not entitled to be tried on such indictment before the circumstances which led to such indictment could be shown at deferred sentence violation hearing, even though he was subsequently acquitted on the later indictment. Flint v. Howard, 110 R.I. 223 , 291 A.2d 625, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 903 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078, 93 S. Ct. 694, 34 L. Ed. 2d 667, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 222 (1972).

The state must either hold violation of probation hearings (see § 12-19-9 ) and violation of deferred sentencing agreement hearings first and give the alleged violator use and derivative use immunity for any testimony he may give, or postpone the violation hearing until after the criminal trial; this rule was given prospective effect only. State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673 , 370 A.2d 1273, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1738 (1977).

Neither due process nor policy requires that the hearing to determine whether the defendant has violated probation (§ 12-19-9 ) or a deferred sentencing agreement by committing a crime be split into a probable cause hearing at the time of arrest and a final hearing following the criminal proceedings. State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673 , 370 A.2d 1273, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1738 (1977).

An alleged violator of a deferred-sentence agreement is entitled to the same constitutional protection as that afforded a parolee or a probationer at a revocation hearing. State v. Feng, 440 A.2d 732, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 789 (R.I. 1982).

— Right to Counsel.

The test for whether a defendant is entitled to counsel at a parole revocation hearing appears to be equally applicable to hearings regarding alleged violations of deferred sentencing agreements. Whitman v. Ventetuolo, 781 F. Supp. 95, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18775 (D.R.I. 1991).

Misrepresentation of Prior Record.

Where the deferred sentence was imposed upon defendant in reliance on his fraudulent misrepresentations to the trial judge that he had no prior conviction, the court was not foreclosed by double jeopardy from vacating the sentence and then imposing a more severe sentence, since the prior sentence was void. State v. Nardone, 114 R.I. 363 , 334 A.2d 208, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1423 (1975).

Out of State Convictions.

A defendant was not deprived of due process by action of the court in sentencing him on motion of the attorney general without a hearing, where the court indicated that sentence was being imposed solely on grounds defendant had violated good behavior proviso of deferred sentence agreement based on out of state convictions. Shahinian v. Langlois, 100 R.I. 631 , 218 A.2d 461, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 489 (1966).

Plea of Nolo Contendere.

Where the record shows that the court, in accepting the plea of nolo contendere, did not in any manner seek to ascertain defendant’s knowledge concerning the plea or its consequences and does not show that defendant was adequately informed by his counsel as to the nature of the plea or its effect as a plea of guilty, the entry of the plea was not a voluntary and intelligent relinquishment by the defendant of his right to a jury trial. Cole v. Langlois, 99 R.I. 138 , 206 A.2d 216, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 406 (1965).

The act of petitioner’s counsel in pleading nolo contendere must be regarded as having, for all practical purposes, constituted a plea of guilty under the indictment on which he was arraigned. Cole v. Langlois, 99 R.I. 138 , 206 A.2d 216, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 406 (1965).

Plea of nolo contendere implies confession of guilt and is equivalent to guilty plea for sentencing and double jeopardy purposes. Nardone v. Mullen, 113 R.I. 415 , 322 A.2d 27, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1192 (1974).

An attorney’s candid admission that he did not remember what he told a defendant did not establish “by a preponderance of the evidence” that the defendant was not informed about the deferred-sentence mechanism. Johnson v. Mullen, 120 R.I. 701 , 390 A.2d 909, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 720 (1978).

Review.

Although a jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict, the decision of a revoking justice is reversible only if such decision is arbitrary or capricious. Flint v. Howard, 110 R.I. 223 , 291 A.2d 625, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 903 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078, 93 S. Ct. 694, 34 L. Ed. 2d 667, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 222 (1972).

Collateral References.

Duty of court, upon plea of guilty or nolo contendere to offense involving several degrees, to hear evidence to determine degree. 34 A.L.R.2d 919.

Guilty plea as affected by fact that sentence contemplated by plea bargain is subsequently determined to be illegal or unauthorized. 87 A.L.R.4th 384.

Plea of nolo contendere or non vult contendere. 89 A.L.R.2d 540.

Review of discretion as to acceptance of plea of nolo contendere or non vult contendere. 89 A.L.R.2d 566.

12-19-20. [Obsolete.]

Obsolete Sections.

This section (G.L. 1923, ch. 323, § 18; P.L. 1927, ch. 1063, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 496, § 18; P.L. 1945, ch. 1560, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-20 ), which concerned the expiration of sentences of persons who were at liberty on suspended or deferred sentences on May 1, 1927, was treated as obsolete by the 1981 reenactment.

12-19-21. Habitual criminals.

  1. If any person who has been previously convicted in this or any other state of two (2) or more felony offenses arising from separate and distinct incidents and sentenced on two (2) or more occasions to serve a term in prison is, after the convictions and sentences, convicted in this state of any offense punished by imprisonment for more than one year, that person shall be deemed a “habitual criminal.” Upon conviction, the person deemed a habitual criminal shall be punished by imprisonment in the adult correctional institutions for a term not exceeding twenty-five (25) years, in addition to any sentence imposed for the offense of which he or she was last convicted. No conviction and sentence for which the person has subsequently received a pardon granted on the ground that he or she was innocent shall be considered a conviction and sentence for the purpose of determining whether the person is a habitual criminal.
  2. Whenever it appears a person shall be deemed a “habitual criminal,” the attorney general, within forty-five (45) days of the arraignment, but in no case later than the date of the pretrial conference, may file with the court a notice specifying that the defendant, upon conviction, is subject to the imposition of an additional sentence in accordance with this section; provided, that in no case shall the fact that the defendant is alleged to be a habitual offender be an issue upon the trial of the defendant, nor shall it be disclosed to the jury. Upon any plea of guilty or nolo contendere or verdict or finding of guilty of the defendant, a hearing shall be held by the court sitting without a jury to determine whether the person so convicted is a habitual criminal. Notice shall be given to the defendant and the attorney general at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing. Duly authenticated copies of former judgments and commitments which comprise the two (2) or more prior convictions and imprisonments required under this section shall be prima facie evidence of the defendant’s former convictions and imprisonments. If it appears by a preponderance of the evidence presented that the defendant is a habitual criminal under this section, he or she shall be sentenced by the court to an additional consecutive term of imprisonment not exceeding twenty-five (25) years; and provided further, that the court shall order the defendant to serve a minimum number of years of the sentence before he or she becomes eligible for parole.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 68; P.L. 1896, ch. 336, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 68; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 71; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 71; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 64; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-21 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 226, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 402, § 1.

Cross References.

Highway traffic laws and regulation, § 31-40-1 et seq.

Second or subsequent violation of controlled substances act, § 21-28-4.11 .

Law Reviews.

Caselaw Survey Section: Criminal Law, see 4 R.W.U.L. Rev. 663 (1999).

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Habitual-offender statutes have long been upheld as constitutional as long as the status of being a habitual offender is not considered a separate offense. State v. Tregaskis, 540 A.2d 1022, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 1988).

This section does not create a separate offense and does not violate either equal protection or due process under the state or federal constitutions. State v. Clark, 754 A.2d 73, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 116 (R.I. 2000).

— Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

Imposing an additional 25 years pursuant to this section, after the imposition of two life sentences without eligibility for parole, was not cruel and unusual punishment, where the defendant had two prior convictions for rape of a child under the age of 16 in Massachusetts for which he received prison sentences, and where he was found guilty and convicted of the murders and torture of two children with a screwdriver in Rhode Island. State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 18 (R.I. 1992).

Due Process.

There is no constitutional barrier that prevents the state from using § 12-19-21 as a means of attempting to obtain a defendant’s cooperation in other criminal investigations. State v. De Masi, 420 A.2d 1369, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1837 (R.I. 1980).

Presentation as a habitual criminal does not violate the due-process and equal-protection clauses where the decision to proceed under a habitual-offender statute is not deliberately based upon an “unjustifiable standard” such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. State v. Tregaskis, 540 A.2d 1022, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 1988).

Denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the State’s habitual offender notice as untimely–thus violating defendant’s due process rights–was appropriate because the notice that defendant received on the date of the pretrial conference complied with the requirements. Extensions are allowed to the 45-day statutory period and the notice advised defendant of the consequences of a conviction, which was all due process required. State v. Hampton-Boyd, 253 A.3d 418, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 2021).

Enhanced Punishment.

There is no requirement that prior sentences be completed before a defendant becomes eligible for enhanced punishment as a habitual offender. All this section requires is for the defendant to have been convicted and sentenced on two prior occasions. State v. Tregaskis, 540 A.2d 1022, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 1988).

In its application, this section plainly provides for the enhancement of a single criminal sentence, the one imposed for the single “triggering” offense of which the defendant was last convicted; it does not permit a sentencing judge to enhance sentences for more than the single “triggering” offense. State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 236 (R.I. 1998).

The trial justice erred as a matter of law when she enhanced by five years the defendant’s sentence for his second conviction for assault with intent to murder where she had already enhanced by 25 years his first conviction for assault with intent to murder. State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 236 (R.I. 1998).

Since the legislature intended to permit the trial court only to restrict defendant’s parole eligibility for a minimum number of years of the additional term of imprisonment to which he or she was sentenced under the habitual offender statute, when defendant was sentenced to serve an additional 10 years in prison pursuant to the habitual offender statute, he could have been ordered to serve an additional consecutive term of no more than 10 years in prison before becoming eligible for parole under that portion of his sentence. State v. Rice, 811 A.2d 1144, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 232 (R.I. 2002).

Defendant was properly classified by a trial court as a habitual offender pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-21(a) due to prior convictions, as such prior convictions did not have to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt under the jury trial right of U.S. Const. amend. VI. State v. Ramirez, 936 A.2d 1254, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 130 (R.I. 2007).

Defendant’s rights under the Rhode Island Constitution and the Sixth Amendment were not violated when the trial court found that defendant was a habitual offender pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-21 without submitting that question to the jury to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Recidivism was quite common and the fact of prior convictions was easily determined by resort to the public record, which meant that the fact of a prior conviction did not have to be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain habitual offender sentencing. State v. Hall, 940 A.2d 645, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 7 (R.I. 2008).

While defendant did not serve time in prison on a prior drug charge, R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-21 merely required a person to have been at least twice convicted and sentenced to serve a term in prison; consequently, as defendant’s conviction with a suspended sentence might properly constitute a predicate offense, defendant’s R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 motion was properly denied. State v. Lyons, 37 A.3d 118, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 11 (R.I. 2012).

Superior court did not err in denying an applicant’s petition for postconviction relief because the trial court did properly invoke the habitual-criminal statute, R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-21 , by finding the applicant a habitual criminal; the statute was not intended to only apply to someone with a more extensive criminal record. Spratt v. State, 41 A.3d 984, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 45 (R.I. 2012).

Defendant’s sentence of 25 years plus life was not erroneous because defendant’s particularly horrific crime and prior convictions supported the sentence. State v. Tejeda, 171 A.3d 983, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 106 (R.I. 2017).

Language of subsection (b) of this section is clear and unambiguous; the statutory language does not require that a sentencing justice set a particular date when a defendant will be eligible for parole, but rather, the statute simply provides that a defendant must serve a minimum number of years (to be determined by the sentencing justice) before being eligible for parole. State v. Paiva, 200 A.3d 665, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 16 (R.I. 2019).

Superior court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to correct his sentence because the sentencing justice complied with the habitual offender statute by ordering defendant to serve a minimum number of years of the sentence before he became eligible for parole. State v. Paiva, 200 A.3d 665, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 16 (R.I. 2019).

Legislative Intent.

Section 12-19-21 is consistent with the requirement of R.I. Const., art. 1, § 8 , that the punishment should be in proportion to the offense. The statute reflects the legislature’s determination that a third or subsequent offense is more serious than a first or second offense and accordingly should be punishable as such. State v. Tregaskis, 540 A.2d 1022, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 1988).

The legislature did not intend that the state should be deprived of its statutory right to seek enhanced sentencing under the habitual offender provisions where the intent to seek such sentencing was filed later than forty-five days after the arraignment, but prior to a continued pretrial conference. State v. Peterson, 722 A.2d 259, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 315 (R.I. 1998).

Procedure.

The state does not have the option of proceeding by separate information charging one with being a habitual criminal after sentence has been imposed for the last conviction. State v. Sitko, 457 A.2d 260, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 834 (R.I. 1983).

After the defendant is already sentenced for his last conviction, the state can no longer invoke the provisions of this section, and the court may no longer impose an enhanced sentence thereunder. State v. Sitko, 457 A.2d 260, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 834 (R.I. 1983).

The habitual-offender statute does not create a new substantive offense, but instead the statute merely prescribes a longer sentence for the subsequent offense which triggers the operation of the act; therefore, where the trial justice imposed a sentence as though the status of being an habitual offender constituted a separate substantive offense, the decision was vacated and remanded to the superior court. State v. Campaniello, 474 A.2d 1247, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 502 (R.I. 1984).

A failure to file a written notice with the court does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear a habitual-offender petition where the defendant receives timely notification in open court that he would be subject to habitual offender treatment. State v. Tregaskis, 540 A.2d 1022, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 69 (R.I. 1988).

This section does not create a separate substantive offense requiring a separate trial. State v. Morris, 744 A.2d 850, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 16 (R.I. 2000).

Failure to provide notice to defendant that habitual criminal sentencing would be sought required vacation of the extra sentence imposed, although the underlying sentences for defendant’s various convictions survived review. State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 1093, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 148 (R.I. 2004).

Trial justice did not err in imposing the additional sentence upon defendant as a habitual offender, as defendant received timely notice, 12 days after the triggering arraignment. State v. Brown, 9 A.3d 1232, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 115 (R.I. 2010).

State’s notice to defendant of its intent to seek a habitual-offender adjudication, while shoddy, was adequate, as attached was defendant’s criminal record with the felonies relied upon circled. State v. Marsich, 10 A.3d 435, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 118 (R.I. 2010).

Counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to the State’s allegedly untimely notice of intent to seek habitual offender sentencing because the notice was not untimely, as the notice was filed at a continued pretrial conference. Ricci v. State, 196 A.3d 292, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 115 (R.I. 2018).

Resentencing Upon Remand.

The supreme court remanded a case for resentencing because the trial justice sentenced the defendant on an independent habitual offender count. Upon remand, the trial justice vacated the sentence previously imposed for the substantive offense by changing the punishment from “three years” to “three years plus enhancement of five years”. The trial justice’s action fully complied with the supreme court’s mandate and did not deprive the defendant of any constitutional guarantees. See State v. Campaniello, 494 A.2d 898, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 553 (R.I. 1985).

— Proffer.

Because the state’s proffer of docket face sheets of the defendant’s state convictions was insufficient to meet its burden of proof under this section since it explicitly provides for authenticated copies of judgments and commitments, remand was required for determination of the issue of habitual criminal status. State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 2001).

Collateral References.

Chronological or procedural sequence of former convictions as affecting enhancement of penalty for subsequent offense under habitual criminal statutes. 24 A.L.R.2d 1247.

Chronological or procedural sequence of former convictions as affecting enhancement of penalty under habitual offender statutes. 7 A.L.R.5th 263.

Constitutionality and construction of statute enhancing penalty for second or subsequent offense. 58 A.L.R. 20; 82 A.L.R. 345; 116 A.L.R. 209; 132 A.L.R. 91; 139 A.L.R. 673.

Determination of character of former crime as a felony, so as to warrant punishment of an accused as a second offender. 19 A.L.R.2d 227.

Identity, necessity of proof of, for purposes of statute as to enhanced punishment in case of prior conviction. 11 A.L.R.2d 870.

Liquor law, violation of, as offense involving moral turpitude within statute as to punishment of third or subsequent offenses. 71 A.L.R. 218.

Pardon as affecting consideration of earlier conviction in applying habitual criminal statute. 31 A.L.R.2d 1186.

Pardoned or expunged conviction as “prior offense” under state statute or regulation enhancing punishment for subsequent conviction. 97 A.L.R.5th 293.

Propriety, under statute enhancing punishment for second or subsequent offense, of restricting new trial to issue of status as habitual criminal. 79 A.L.R.2d 826.

Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by trial court. 29 A.L.R. 334; 335; 89 A.L.R. 324.

Use of prior military conviction to establish repeat offender status. 11 A.L.R.5th 218.

What constitutes former “conviction” within statute enhancing penalty of second or subsequent offense. 5 A.L.R.2d 1080.

12-19-22. Infliction of punishment on sentence.

The various punishments prescribed for offenses shall be inflicted upon the offender upon the sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 63; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 63; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 51; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 51; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 50; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-22 .

12-19-23. Place of imprisonment.

Unless otherwise provided, every person now or hereafter sentenced to imprisonment shall be sentenced to and imprisoned in the adult correctional institutions.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 37; C.P.A. 1905, § 1186; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 37; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 38; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 38; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 38; P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-23 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

County Jail.

A defendant sentenced to county jail for ten days in Washington County could be confined in the Providence County jail. Dawley v. Wilcox, 25 R.I. 297 , 55 A. 753, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1903).

12-19-23.1. Intermediate punishments — Purpose.

The objectives of intermediate punishments include:

  1. The provision of a realistic criminal sentencing alternative to incarceration for offenders consistent with the public safety;
  2. protection of our citizenry through stringent supervision and monitoring of offenders;
  3. The accountability of offenders and satisfaction of the retributive goal of sentencing through the use and enforcement of intermediate punishments;
  4. The initiation and maintenance of an objectives-based plan of supervision that addresses personal and social development; and
  5. The emphasis and promotion of offenders’ adherence to program requirements of employment/education, community service, victim restitution, financial responsibility, participation in treatment programs, and strict adherence to all conditions of intermediate punishments.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 205, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

12-19-23.2. Intermediate punishments.

  1. As a part of or in lieu of the sentences otherwise provided by law, the court may unless specifically restricted or authorized by law sentence any person who has been adjudged guilty of any crime after trial before a judge or a judge and jury or before a judge accepting the person’s plea of nolo contendere or guilty to the offense in the following manner:
    1. By placement of the offender on unsupervised probation with or without special conditions;
    2. By imposition of a sentence involving placement of the offender in supervised probation with field supervision rather than intensive supervision, with or without special conditions;
    3. By imposition of a sentence of probation involving placement of the offender in intensive supervision or placement in an alternative confinement program established pursuant to § 12-19-2.2 without the necessity of an application of the director of the department of corrections or placement of the offender in community restitution, with or without special conditions;
    4. By imposition of a sentence involving placement of the offender in community confinement pursuant to § 42-56-20.2 ;
    5. By imposition of a sentence involving placement of the offender in a minimum security facility which houses offenders who are preparing for their reintegration into the community;
    6. By imposition of a fine as provided by law;
    7. By imposition of any combination of the intermediate punishments provided in this subsection that justice requires and which the court in its discretion deems appropriate under the circumstances.
  2. The director of corrections shall establish appropriate eligibility criteria and conditions for offenders sentenced to intermediate punishments as identified in subdivisions (a)(2) through (a)(5) of this section and may assign these functions to any subordinate employees and officers that may to him or her seem feasible or desirable.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 205, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 435, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “community restitution” for “community service” in subdivision (3).

12-19-24. Report of sentence and court recommendations.

After imposing sentence the court shall file with the director of corrections on forms that shall be provided by the director a report of any sentence and any recommendations that the director may deem necessary as to the security required for the proper custody of the accused so sentenced.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 76; P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-24 .

12-19-25. Warrant for commitment to institutions.

Whenever any person shall be sentenced to imprisonment, the clerk of the court passing the sentence shall immediately issue a warrant, under the seal of the court, directed to the division of sheriffs, reciting the sentence and requiring a deputy sheriff to take the person and deliver to the warden of the adult correctional institutions and the warden to receive the person into his or her custody and safely keep him or her in the institutions during the term specified in the sentence, and the warrant shall constitute the officer charged with it, while he or she has it in his or her possession for service, an officer in any county in this state into which it may be necessary for him or her to go, to all intents and purposes whatsoever.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 52; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 52; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 39; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 39; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 39; P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-25 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 45.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Pre-Sentence Confinement.

A judge should impose a sentence without regard to whether the person sentenced has or has not been confined while awaiting disposition and it is for the warden into whose custody the sentenced person is given under the present section to apply the provisions of § 12-19-2 . State v. Holmes, 108 R.I. 579 , 277 A.2d 914, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1310 (1971).

12-19-26. Sentence of minor to training school for youth.

Whenever any person under the age of eighteen (18) years shall be convicted by any court of any criminal offense, the court may sentence the person to the state training school for youth for a term not less than two (2) years, nor longer than his or her minority, or to any punishment that is otherwise provided by law for the same offense, and if the sentence is to the training school for youth, then it shall be in the alternative to the state training school for youth or to any punishment that would otherwise have been awarded; provided, that whenever the sentence is imposed, it shall be reduced by the number of days spent in confinement while awaiting trial and while awaiting sentencing.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 50; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 50; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 46; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 46; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 46; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-26 ; P.L. 1989, ch. 133, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Alternative Sentence.

Where minor was sentenced in alternative to state workhouse and house of correction, his transfer as incorrigible from reform school to workhouse and house of correction for six months was not removal under alternative sentence. In re Bonn, 17 R.I. 572 , 23 A. 1017, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1892).

Family Court.

The statute has no application to juveniles adjudged delinquent in the family court. In re Wilkinson, 116 R.I. 163 , 353 A.2d 199, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1260 (1976).

12-19-27. Commitment to training school for youth.

Whenever any person shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the state training school for youth, the court passing the sentence shall immediately issue a warrant, under the seal of the court, directed to the division of sheriffs, or to any town sergeant or constable of any county in which the court is held, reciting the sentence and requiring a deputy sheriff, town sergeant, or constable to take the person so sentenced and deliver him or her to the superintendent of the training school, and the warrant shall constitute the officer charged with it, while he or she has the warrant in his or her possession for service, an officer in any county in this state into which it may be necessary for him to go, to all intents and purposes whatsoever.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 51; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 51; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 47; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 47; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 47; impl. am. P.L. 1946, ch. 1774, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-27 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 45.

12-19-28. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (C.P.A. 1905, § 175; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 28; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-28 ), payment of district court costs, was repealed by P.L. 1960, ch. 114, § 1.

12-19-29. Sentence to give recognizance to keep the peace.

In addition to the punishment prescribed by law, the district court may require the person to enter into recognizance, with sufficient surety and in any sum that it shall direct, with condition to keep the peace toward all the people of this state for a certain time thereafter, not exceeding eleven (11) months; and upon the refusal or neglect of the person to comply with that requirement, the same course shall be pursued as is provided on neglecting to comply with sentence in case of threats.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 176; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 29; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 29; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 29; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-29 .

Cross References.

Recognizance to keep the peace, § 12-4-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Propriety of conditioning probation under defendant’s posting of bond guaranteeing compliance with terms of probation. 79 A.L.R.3d 1068.

12-19-30. Certification and default on recognizances.

Every recognizance pursuant to § 12-19-29 shall be immediately certified to the clerk of the superior court for the same county and filed by the clerk in his or her office; and in case any person under a recognizance shall fail to perform its conditions, his or her default shall be recorded and process shall issue against the persons bound in the recognizance, or any of them that the attorney general shall direct.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 177; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 30; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 30; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 30; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-30 .

12-19-31. Commitment for nonpayment of fines and costs.

Whenever any person shall be committed for nonpayment of fines and costs, the sheriffs of the several counties and their deputies, and the town sergeants and town constables of any town in the several counties, upon due warrant from the court before whom the person has been convicted, may lawfully remove and commit the persons to the adult correctional institutions and they shall be allowed any fees that are now provided by law in similar cases; provided, that in the counties of Newport and Washington, any person before removal from the county of Newport or the county of Washington, in which sentence is entered, may pay the fine and costs into the court or into the office of the clerk of the court in which sentence is imposed and upon payment shall be discharged.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 41; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 41; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; P.L. 1920, ch. 1938, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 41; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 41; P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-31 ; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 24; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 24.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 24, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 24 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

12-19-32. Restitution.

In addition to or in lieu of any non-mandatory sanction imposed as part of a sentence or as a condition of probation, a judge at the time of sentencing may order restitution which may be in the form of monetary payment or some type of community restitution. Provided, that any person sentenced to a period of incarceration at the adult correctional institutions shall be ineligible to participate in those programs established pursuant to chapter 8 of title 13, § 42-56-20.2 , 42-56-20.3 or 42-56-21 , unless and until the restitution has been paid in full, or satisfactory arrangements have been made with the court if the person has the ability to pay. Any agreement shall be in writing and it shall be the burden of the person seeking to participate in any of the programs to satisfy the appropriate authority of compliance. Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter may request an ability to pay hearing by filing the request with the court which imposed the original sentence.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 94, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “community restitution” for “community service” in the first sentence.

Repealed Sections.

The former section (G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 77; P.L. 1928, ch. 1193, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 70; G.L. 1956, § 12-19-32 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 329, § 26) concerning annual returns by clerks of court was repealed by P.L. 1975, ch. 247, § 3. For present law see § 8-15-7 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Conditions.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence in a case where the trial court granted defendant probation on defendant’s perjury charge in return for defendant executing a consent order regarding payment of previously-ordered restitution arising out of convictions entered against defendant for fraud crimes that defendant committed; the trial court’s sentencing authority was not so limited that it could not condition the probation sentence upon execution of the consent order even though the loss was not directly caused by the perjury but by the financial crimes, especially since the goal of the restitution was to get the victims repaid for their financial losses. State v. Laroche, 925 A.2d 885, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2007).

Collateral References.

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act — Constitutional issues. 20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 239.

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act — Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled. 51 A.L.R. Fed 2d 169.

Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled under State Criminal Statute — Payment for Installation of Alarm or Locks or Change of Locks Due to Burglary, Attempted Burglary, or Felonious Breaking and Entering. 44 A.L.R.6th 301.

Propriety of condition of probation which requires defendant convicted of crime of violence to make reparation to injured victim. 79 A.L.R.3d 976.

Propriety, Measure, and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled Under State Criminal Statute — Cruelty to, Killing, or Abandonment of, Animals. 45 A.L.R.6th 435.

12-19-32.1. Mandatory restitution.

Any person who sells, causes to be sold, or otherwise delivers or causes to be delivered any stolen article or metal to a person licensed pursuant to chapter 11.1 of title 6 shall make full monetary restitution to the person so licensed. For purposes of this section, the amount of monetary restitution shall equal the monetary value of the loss actually sustained by the licensed person. A licensed person who knowingly receives stolen goods shall not be entitled to restitution.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 473, § 1.

Collateral References.

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act — Constitutional issues. 20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 239.

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act — Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled. 51 A.L.R. Fed 2d 169.

Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled under State Criminal Statute — Payment for Installation of Alarm or Locks or Change of Locks Due to Burglary, Attempted Burglary, or Felonious Breaking and Entering. 44 A.L.R.6th 301.

Propriety, Measure, and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled Under State Criminal Statute — Cruelty to, Killing, or Abandonment of, Animals. 45 A.L.R.6th 435.

12-19-33. Restitution — Family court.

  1. In addition to the powers already vested in the family court, a justice may order restitution which may be in the form of monetary payment or some type of community restitution.
  2. The parent or parents of any unemancipated minor or minors, which minor or minors willfully or maliciously cause damage to any property or injury to any person, shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor or minors for the damage or injury to an amount not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000) if the minor or minors would have been liable for the damage or injury if they had been adults; and if a justice of the family court so finds, he or she may order the parent or parents to make financial restitution not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 235, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 550, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “community restitution” for “community service” in subsection (a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Calculation of Restitution.

Admission of two repair estimates at a restitution hearing did not violate a juvenile’s Fourteenth Amendment due process right because the family court could use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution which was reasonably calculated to make the victim whole and this could include a limited consideration of hearsay evidence. In re James C., 871 A.2d 940, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 76 (R.I. 2005).

Collateral References.

Propriety of condition of probation which requires defendant convicted of crime of violence to make reparation to injured victim. 79 A.L.R.3d 976.

12-19-34. Priority of restitution payments to victims of crime.

    1. If a person, pursuant to §§ 12-19-32 , 12-19-32 .1, or 12-19-33 , is ordered to make restitution in the form of monetary payment the court may order that it shall be made through the administrative office of state courts which shall record all payments and pay the money to the person injured in accordance with the order or with any modification of the order; provided, in cases where the court determines that the defendant has the present ability to make full restitution, payment shall be made at the time of sentencing.
    2. Payments made on account when both restitution to a third-party is ordered, and court costs, fines, and fees, and assessments related to prosecution are owed, shall be disbursed by the administrative office of the state courts in the following priorities:
      1. Upon determination of restitution, court ordered restitution payments shall be paid first to persons injured until such time as the court’s restitution is fully satisfied;
      2. Followed by the payment of court costs, fines, fees, and assessments related to prosecution.
    3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any interest which has been accrued by the restitution account in the central registry shall be deposited on a regular basis into the crime victim compensation fund, established by chapter 25 of this title. In the event that the office of the administrator of the state courts cannot locate the person or persons to whom restitution is to be made, the principal of the restitution payment shall escheat to the state pursuant to the provisions of chapter 12 of title 8.
  1. The state is authorized to develop rules and/or regulations relating to assessment, collection, and disbursement of restitution payments when any of the following events occur:
    1. The defendant is incarcerated or on home confinement or has completed probation without completing restitution but is able to pay some portion of the restitution; or
    2. The victim dies before restitution payments are completed.
  2. The state may maintain a civil action to place a lien on the personal or real property of a defendant who is assessed restitution, as well as to seek wage garnishment, and/or seek enforcement of civil judgment entered in accordance with § 12-28-5.1 consistent with state and federal law.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 96, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 25, § 2; P.L. 1992, ch. 351, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 297, § 3; P.L. 2008, ch. 326, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 231, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 238, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 28, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 43, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 231, § 3, and P.L. 2010, ch. 238, § 3, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2013, ch. 28, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 43, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

12-19-35. Evidence of damages sustained.

Evidence of damages sustained by the person injured may be admissible to the court either by means of an affidavit, signed by the injured person, with copies of appropriate receipts attached, or by hearing, the option being within the discretion of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 234, § 1.

12-19-36. Payment to violent crimes indemnity fund.

Whenever any person pleads nolo contendere to either a felony or misdemeanor, the court accepting the plea may, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized by statute for the offense, order the person to pay an amount not to exceed the maximum fine permitted by statute to the violent crimes indemnity fund established by chapter 25 of this title. The obligation to make a payment to the fund shall be considered a civil penalty and shall not constitute a sentence in the criminal case.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 258, § 2.

12-19-37. Aliens — Felony conviction records.

The attorney general shall, within seven (7) days of the final conviction of any alien of a felony offense within this state, forward copies of all records pertaining to the convicted alien to the United States immigration department.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 203, § 1.

12-19-38. Hate Crimes Sentencing Act.

  1. If any person has been convicted of a crime charged by complaint, information, or indictment in which he or she intentionally selected the person against whom the offense is committed or selected the property that is damaged or otherwise affected by the offense because of the actor’s hatred or animus toward the actual or perceived disability, religion, color, race, national origin or ancestry, sexual orientation, or gender of that person or the owner or occupant of that property, he or she shall be subject to the penalties provided in this section.
  2. Whenever it appears that a person may be subject to the Hate Crime Sentencing Act, the prosecuting agency, in no case later than the pretrial conference, shall file with the court a notice specifying that the defendant, upon conviction, is subject to the imposition of sentencing in accordance with this section.
  3. For misdemeanor offenses, upon any plea of guilty or nolo contendere or verdict or finding of guilty of the defendant, the district court shall conduct a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the court shall permit the prosecuting agency and the defense to present additional evidence relevant to the determination of whether the defendant intentionally selected the person against whom the offense is committed, or selected the property that is damaged, or otherwise affected by the offense because of his or her hatred or animus toward the actual or perceived race, religion, color, disability, national origin or ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation of that person or the owner or occupant of that property. If the finder of fact at the hearing, or in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the district court at sentencing, determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s actions were so motivated, he or she shall be sentenced to not less than thirty (30) days mandatory imprisonment, nor more than one year imprisonment for that crime: and for this penalty, he or she shall not be afforded the provisions of filing, suspension of sentence, or probation.
  4. For felony offenses and for misdemeanor offenses in which the defendant claims a jury trial either in the first instance or by appeal, upon any plea of guilt or nolo contendere or verdict or finding of guilt of the defendant, the court shall conduct a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the court shall permit the prosecuting agency and the defense to present additional evidence to the jury relevant to the determination of whether the defendant intentionally selected the person against whom the offense is committed, or selected the property that is damaged, or otherwise affected by the offense because of his or her hatred or animus toward the actual or perceived race, religion, color, disability, national origin or ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation of that person or the owner or occupant of that property. If the jury at the hearing, or in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court at sentencing, determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s actions were so motivated, he or she shall be sentenced for a misdemeanor in accordance with subsection (c) of this section and for a felony by the court to an additional, consecutive term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five (5) years, but in no case, more than double the original penalty for the crime.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 83, § 1.

Cross References.

Civil action for ethnic or religious intimidation, § 9-1-35 .

Law Reviews.

Legislation Survey Section: Sentence and Execution, see 4 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 831 (1999).

12-19-39. Criminal street gang enhancement.

  1. “Criminal street gang” means an ongoing organization, association, or group of three (3) or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of criminal or delinquent acts; having an identifiable name or common identifiable signs, colors, or symbols; and whose members individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.
  2. Any person who is convicted of any felony that is knowingly committed for the benefit, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang or criminal street gang member, with the intent to promote, further, or assist in the affairs of a criminal street gang or criminal conduct by criminal street gang members, in addition to the sentence provided for the commission of the underlying offense, shall be subject to imprisonment for an additional term of not more than ten (10) years.
  3. Whenever it appears that a person may be subject to the enhanced sentence in this section, the attorney general, in no case later than the first pretrial conference, shall file with the court a notice specifying that the defendant, upon conviction, is subject to the imposition of sentencing in accordance with this section.
  4. Upon any plea of guilt or nolo contendere, or verdict or finding of guilt of the defendant, the court shall conduct a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the court shall permit the attorney general and the defense to present additional evidence to the jury relevant to the determination of whether the defendant knowingly committed the offense for the benefit, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang or criminal street gang member, with the intent to promote, further, or assist in the affairs of a criminal street gang or criminal conduct by criminal street gang members. If the jury at the hearing, or in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court at sentencing, determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s actions were so motivated, he or she shall be sentenced as provided in subsection (b).
  5. This section does not create a separate offense but provides an additional enhanced sentence for the underlying offense.
  6. The enhanced sentence provided in this section shall run consecutively to the sentences provided for the underlying offenses.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 263, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 311, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 263, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 311, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

12-19-40. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2017, ch. 345, § 3, provides that this section takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

P.L. 2017, ch. 351, § 3, provides that this section takes effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and shall apply to all cases pending as of the effective date.

Chapter 19.1 Judicial Sentencing Disclosure Act

12-19.1-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Rhode Island Judicial Sentencing Disclosure Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 192, § 1.

12-19.1-2. Record of criminal sentences.

The clerks of the district and superior courts shall maintain a register listing under the name of each judge all criminal convictions over which the judge has presided, in chronological order, to include the following information:

  1. The name of the case;
  2. The charges against the defendant;
  3. The charges of which the defendant was convicted;
  4. The sentence handed down by the judge; and
  5. The date the sentence was handed down.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 192, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 15.

12-19.1-3. Public record.

The register shall be a public record of the state and shall be available for inspection at the office of the clerk during regular office hours and at any other times that may be provided by law.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 192, § 1.

Chapter 19.2 Sentencing to Life Imprisonment Without Parole

12-19.2-1. Sentencing procedures — Trial by jury.

In all cases tried by a jury in which the penalty of life imprisonment without parole may be imposed pursuant to § 11-23-2 or 11-23-2.1 , and in which the attorney general has recommended to the court in writing within twenty (20) days of the date of the arraignment that such a sentence be imposed, the court shall, upon return of a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree by the jury, instruct the jury to determine whether it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder committed by the defendant involved one of the circumstances enumerated in § 11-23-2 or 11-23-2.1 as the basis for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. If after deliberation the jury finds that one or more of the enumerated circumstances was present, it shall state in writing, signed by the foreperson of the jury, which circumstance or circumstances it found beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon return of an affirmative verdict, the court shall conduct a presentence hearing. At the hearing, the court shall permit the attorney general and the defense to present additional evidence relevant to a determination of the sentence to be imposed as provided for in § 12-19.2-4 . After hearing evidence and argument relating to the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating factors, the court shall, in its discretion, sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment. If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of error only in the presentence hearing, the new proceedings before the trial court which may be ordered shall pertain only to the issue of sentencing.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 221, § 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 362, § 2.

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

Mackenzie McBurney, Comment: Paying the Price: Eliminating Life Without Parole Sentences for Juveniles in Rhode Island, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 553 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Court’s Discretion.

Trial justice did not exceed his authority in finding the aggravating factor of torture, even though the jury had found only aggravated battery. State v. Washington, 581 A.2d 1031, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 160 (R.I. 1990).

Requisites for Hearing.

Pursuant to this section, the jury must find at least one aggravating factor in order to trigger the presentence hearing by the trial justice. State v. Washington, 581 A.2d 1031, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 160 (R.I. 1990).

Sentence Upheld.

Ample evidence supported the trial justice’s conclusion that the defendant should be subjected to the penalty of life imprisonment without parole since a murder was committed in a manner involving torture and aggravated battery to the victim, the record overwhelmingly supported a finding of premeditation, and there was only one isolated statement on the record concerning his having failed to take antipsychotic medication. State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 39 (R.I. 2001).

Where defendant waived the right to a jury trial and was found guilty of domestic murder in the first degree, the trial judge had authority to impose a life imprisonment sentence without parole where she found an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no requirement that R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 had to be included in the indictment because the Attorney General had given notice of his intent to seek such penalty within 20 days of the arraignment, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19.2-1 and such notice satisfied due process. State v. Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 217 (R.I. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980, 123 S. Ct. 1808, 155 L. Ed. 2d 670, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 2991 (2003).

12-19.2-2. Sentencing procedures — Trial by judge sitting without a jury.

In all cases tried by a judge sitting without a jury in which the penalty of life imprisonment without parole may be imposed pursuant to § 11-23-2 or 11-23-2.1 , and in which the attorney general has recommended to the court in writing within twenty (20) days of the date of the arraignment that such a sentence be imposed, the court shall, if the court finds the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, also render a finding as to whether it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder committed by the defendant involved one of the circumstances enumerated in § 11-23-2 or 11-23-2.1 as the basis for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. If the court finds that one or more of the enumerated circumstances was present, it shall state on the record which circumstance or circumstances it found beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon an affirmative finding by the court, it shall conduct a presentence hearing. At the hearing, the court shall permit the attorney general and the defense to present additional evidence relevant to a determination of the sentence to be imposed as provided for in § 12-19.2-4 . After hearing evidence and argument relating to the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating factors, the court shall, in its discretion, sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment. If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of error only in the presentence hearing, the new proceedings before the trial court which may be ordered shall pertain only to the issue of sentencing.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 221, § 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 362, § 2.

12-19.2-3. Sentencing procedures — Plea of guilty.

In all cases in which the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to an offense for which the penalty of life imprisonment without parole may be imposed pursuant to § 11-23-2 or 11-23-2.1 , and in which the attorney general has recommended to the court in writing within twenty (20) days of the date of the arraignment that such a sentence be imposed, the court shall conduct a presentence hearing. At the hearing, the court shall permit the attorney general and the defense to present additional evidence relevant to a determination of the sentence to be imposed as provided for in § 12-19.2-4 . After hearing evidence and argument relating to the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating factors, the court shall, in its discretion, sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment. If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of error only in the presentence hearing, the new proceedings before the trial court which may be ordered shall pertain only to the issue of sentencing.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 221, § 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 362, § 2.

Collateral References.

Right of access to federal district court guilty plea proceeding or records pertaining to entry or acceptance of guilty plea in criminal prosecution. 118 A.L.R. Fed. 621.

12-19.2-4. Consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

At the presentence hearing, following a finding that one or more of the circumstances enumerated in § 11-23-2 or 11-23-2.1 as the basis for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole was involved in the first degree murder of which the defendant has been convicted, the court shall consider evidence regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense and the personal history, character, record, and propensities of the defendant which are relevant to the sentencing determination. After hearing evidence and argument regarding the aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating to the offense and the defendant, the court shall, in its discretion, sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole or to life imprisonment. The court shall state on the record its reasons for imposing its sentence.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 221, § 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 362, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Sentence Upheld.

The trial justice was within her discretion in imposing the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole where, confronted with a first-time offender found guilty of a particularly gruesome and heinous murder, she carefully considered the nature of the offense and the personal character and propensities of the offender and concluded that he would “never change from the completely evil person that he is.” State v. Tassone, 749 A.2d 1112, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 101 (R.I. 2000).

Where defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 , and the evidence overwhelmingly supported the jury’s verdict, there was support for the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 ; in conducting a review of the sentence imposed pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-19.2-4 and 12-19.2-5 , the mitigating factors, the findings of the trial justice, and the personal character, record, and propensities of defendant did not outweigh the aggravating factors that were established. State v. Motyka, 893 A.2d 267, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 36 (R.I. 2006).

Sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole imposed upon second defendant for first degree murder was proper given, inter alia, the nature of the offenses, in which two person were brutally murdered and their hands cut off in an effort to thwart the investigation, and the failure to show remorse. State v. Quinlan, 921 A.2d 96, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 86 (R.I. 2007).

Defendant’s sentence of life without parole for the first-degree murder of his wife was proper, as defendant repeatedly stabbed his wife as the she lay crouched in a fetal position on the floor, vulnerable and defenseless, and continued to stab her even after rendering her helpless. State v. McManus, 941 A.2d 222, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 21 (R.I. 2008).

Sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was appropriate because: (1) the jury unanimously found that defendant murdered an innocent man whom defendant never before had met, in exchange for money; (2) defendant shot and killed the victim in front of the victim’s eight-year-old son, forever changing the lives of the young boy and the victim’s other family members; (3) defendant’s actions reflected a complete disregard for human life, and, thus, warranted the harshest penalty; (4) defendant’s troubling character, record, and propensity for criminal activity made it unlikely that he could have been rehabilitated; and (5) there was no indication that defendant showed any real remorse for the murder. State v. Graham, 941 A.2d 848, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 848, 129 S. Ct. 99, 172 L. Ed. 2d 82, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 6960 (2008).

Imposition of sentence of life without parole was not error, where the record supporting the trial court’s finding that the offense was a “most heinous” crime and nothing in the record indicated that defendant had shown any remorse for what he had done. State v. Mlyniec, 15 A.3d 983, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 25 (R.I. 2011).

Defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was appropriate considering defendant’s lack of remorse and the extreme brutality evident in the murder, where the victim was stabbed 40 times with a serrated knife. The brutal slaying undoubtedly fell within the definition of aggravated battery. State v. Lopez, 45 A.3d 1, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 91 (R.I. 2012).

Defendant, convicted of the first-degree murder of his girlfriend, was properly sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, because the evidence supported the jury’s finding that he committed the murder with aggravated battery and torture, as well as the trial court’s finding that his character and propensities made it unlikely that he would be rehabilitated. State v. Martinez, 59 A.3d 73, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 20 (R.I. 2013).

Sentencing Statement.

The trial court was not required to engage in a long oration about the rationale for imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole since it did satisfy, although with brevity, the requirements of this section in considering the nature and circumstances of the offense, a statement by the defendant, and the fact that the crime included juveniles in its perpetration. State v. Bustamante, 756 A.2d 758, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 178 (R.I. 2000).

Collateral References.

Vulnerability of victim as aggravating factor under state sentencing guidelines. 73 A.L.R.5th 383.

12-19.2-5. Review of life sentence without parole.

The defendant shall have the right to appeal a sentence of life imprisonment without parole to the supreme court of the state in accordance with the applicable rules of court. In considering an appeal of a sentence, the court, after review of the transcript of the proceedings below, may, in its discretion, ratify the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment without parole or may reduce the sentence to life imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 221, § 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 362, § 2.

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Sentence Upheld.

The state met its burden of proof of demonstrating torture or aggravated battery sufficient to support a sentence of life without parole since the evidence showed that the victim fell to the ground after a blow to her head with a metal bar, and that she was hit again and then stabbed and cut repeatedly while she was still conscious. State v. Pacheco, 763 A.2d 971, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 3 (R.I. 2001).

Where defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 , and the evidence overwhelmingly supported the jury’s verdict, there was support for the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 ; in conducting a review of the sentence imposed pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-19.2-4 and 12-19.2-5 , the mitigating factors, the findings of the trial justice, and the personal character, record, and propensities of defendant did not outweigh the aggravating factors that were established. State v. Motyka, 893 A.2d 267, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 36 (R.I. 2006).

First-degree murder defendant was properly sentenced to life imprisonment without parole as the victim’s slow, terrifying, and agonizing death justified the jury in finding the aggravating factors set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 ; defendant had 10 convictions in Rhode Island since 1995, including driving violations, drug offenses, and assaultive behavior; and defendant showed no remorse and took no responsibility for his actions. State v. Brown, 898 A.2d 69, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 78 (R.I. 2006).

Defendant’s four consecutive sentences of life without parole under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19.2-5 were upheld on independent review by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island because evidence presented at trial revealed that defendant had conspired and participated in the carjacking of a young couple with the intent to rob them as well as in the ultimate decision to kill them. State v. Day, 925 A.2d 962, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 91 (R.I. 2007).

Sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was appropriate because: (1) the jury unanimously found that defendant murdered an innocent man whom defendant never before had met, in exchange for money; (2) defendant shot and killed the victim in front of the victim’s eight-year-old son, forever changing the lives of the young boy and the victim’s other family members; (3) defendant’s actions reflected a complete disregard for human life, and, thus, warranted the harshest penalty; (4) defendant’s troubling character, record, and propensity for criminal activity made it unlikely that he could have been rehabilitated; and (5) there was no indication that defendant showed any real remorse for the murder. State v. Graham, 941 A.2d 848, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 848, 129 S. Ct. 99, 172 L. Ed. 2d 82, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 6960 (2008).

While appellate counsel did provide ineffective assistance by failing to seek a de novo review of the appropriateness of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that the murder was committed in a manner involving torture or aggravated battery to the victim and thus, the sentence was appropriate. Page v. State, 995 A.2d 934, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2010).

Sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole was appropriate, where the evidence showed, inter alia, that the murder was committed in a manner involving both torture and aggravated battery to the victim; the inmate’s actions served as signal to other potential informants they would not only be killed should they choose to inform, but that they would die in the torment that the victim did; and the inmate had a prior criminal history that included no fewer than 10 criminal charges. State v. Sifuentes, 996 A.2d 1130, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 2010).

Defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment without parole, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 , was appropriate because defendant brutally murdered a twenty-seven-year law enforcement veteran with the officer’s own firearm, abused drugs, had a history of violent crime, and any hope of defendant’s rehabilitation was far outweighed by his danger to the community. State v. Carpio, 43 A.3d 1, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 62 (R.I. 2012).

Defendant, convicted of the first-degree murder of his girlfriend, was properly sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, because the evidence supported the jury’s finding that he committed the murder with aggravated battery and torture, as well as the trial court’s finding that his character and propensities made it unlikely that he would be rehabilitated. State v. Martinez, 59 A.3d 73, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 20 (R.I. 2013).

12-19.2-6. Work release and furlough programs — Prohibited.

A person serving a sentence of life imprisonment without parole shall not be eligible for participation in the work release program as set forth in § 42-56-21 , the furlough program as set forth in § 42-56-18 , or any other program which allows a prisoner to be released from the confinement of the prison facility to which the prisoner has been assigned.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 362, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 16.

Chapter 19.3 Sentencing Standards

12-19.3-1. Legislative purpose.

In order that the sentences imposed upon convicted criminals by the courts of this state do justice to the victim, the offender, and the community, a system of sentencing standards is enacted. Those standards are intended to create a sentencing process which will allow for judicial consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances unique to the particular defendant and crime, while providing the structure necessary to impose consistent sentences upon similar offenders convicted of like crimes.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 412, § 1.

Collateral References.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, Providing Sentencing Guideline for Conspiracy Not Covered by Specific Offense Guideline. 37 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 449.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) Providing Sentencing Enhancement For Manager or Supervisor of Criminal Activity — Drug Offenses — Cocaine. 35 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 467.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(s) Providing Sentencing Enhancement for Organizer or Leader of Criminal Activity — Fraud Offenses. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 445.

Construction and Application of “Official Victim” Sentencing Enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c) Concerning Law Enforcement Officers and Prison Officials. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 371.

Construction and Application of United States Sentencing Guideline § 2A2.1(b)(1), 18 U.S.C., Providing Enhancement for Attempted Murder or Assault with Intent to Commit Murder Dependent Upon Nature or Degree of Injury. 30 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 385.

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G., § 3B1.1(a), Providing Sentencing Enhancement for Organizer or Leader of Criminal Activity — Drug Offenses. 43 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 365.

Downward Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 — Fraud Offenses. 33 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 477.

Validity, Construction, and Application of U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8, Providing for Upward Sentence Departure for Extreme Conduct. 36 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 95.

What constitutes “violent felony” for purpose of sentence enhancement under Armed Career Criminal Act (18 USCS § 924(e)(1)). 119 A.L.R. Fed. 319.

12-19.3-2. Adoption of presumptive sentences.

Each year the justices of the superior court shall by majority vote, and with the approval of the supreme court, adopt as a rule of court presumptive sentences to be imposed upon defendants who have been found guilty after a trial. The rule shall establish a presumptive sentence or sentencing range for each category of felony which constituted more than five percent (5%) of the criminal caseload in the superior court during the preceding year and for any additional categories of felonies that the justices deem appropriate. It shall also set forth the criteria for evaluation upon which the presumptive sentences are based. Prior to implementation, the rule shall be forwarded to the supreme court for its approval. A complete listing of the presumptive sentences so established shall be made public no less than thirty (30) days prior to implementation.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 412, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 17.

12-19.3-3. Procedures for sentencing.

In all cases where the defendant has been found guilty after trial of an offense for which a sentencing standard has been established pursuant to § 12-19.3-2 , the trial justice shall impose a sentence within the presumptive sentencing range unless he or she finds that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify imposition of an alternative sentence. This finding may be based upon the character and background of the defendant, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and/or the nature and quality of the evidence presented at trial. When justified by those factors, he or she may impose either a more lenient or a more severe sentence than provided for in the rule. If a sentence outside of the presumptive range is imposed, the trial justice shall set forth on the record the circumstances which he or she found as justification for imposition of the alternative sentence.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 412, § 1.

Collateral References.

Admissibility of Testimony at Sentencing, Within Meaning of U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, Which Requires Such Information Be Relevant and Have “Sufficient Indicia of Reliability to Support its Probable Accuracy”. 45 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 457.

Admissibility of Evidence, Other Than Testimony Given at Sentencing, Within Meaning of U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, Which Requires Such Information Be Relevant and Have “Sufficient Indicia of Reliability to Support Its Probable Accuracy” — Concerning Sworn Information. 46 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 151.

Downward departure under state sentencing guidelines permitting downward departure for defendants with significantly reduced mental capacity, including alcohol or drug dependency. 113 A.L.R.5th 597.

12-19.3-4. Review of sentence.

Within twenty (20) days of the imposition of a sentence which is outside the presumptive sentencing range for the offense, the attorney general, if the court imposes a less severe sentence, or the defendant, if the court imposes a more severe sentence, may appeal the sentence to the supreme court in accordance with procedures to be established by the supreme court.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 412, § 1.

Chapter 20 Costs

12-20-1, 12-20-2. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1896, ch. 295, §§ 2, 25; C.P.A. 1905, §§ 1201, 1228; G.L. 1909, ch. 364, §§ 2, 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 417, §§ 2, 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 633, §§ 2, 20; P.L. 1942, ch. 1214, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 12-20-1 , 12-20-2; P.L. 1960, ch. 72, § 2; P.L. 1961, ch. 89, §§ 3, 4), fees in superior and district courts, were repealed by P.L. 1966, ch. 209, § 1.

12-20-3. Sheriff’s fees on commitments and habeas corpus.

All commitments upon process issued in criminal cases by the supreme court, the superior court within and for the counties of Providence and Newport, and the district court for the second and sixth divisions shall be made by deputy sheriffs attending upon the courts respectively, and all writs of habeas corpus issued by the supreme court, the superior court within and for the counties of Providence and Newport, and the district court for the second and sixth divisions shall be served by deputy sheriffs attending upon the courts respectively, and the deputy sheriffs shall receive no fees for making the commitments or for serving the writs, but shall receive their actual expenses of travel, to be allowed by the court, and which shall not form a part of the bill of costs taxed against a convict under § 12-20-9 .

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 417, § 11; P.L. 1926, ch. 799, § 1; P.L. 1927, ch. 1036, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 633, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 12-30-3 ; P.L. 1966, ch. 209, § 2; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 27.

12-20-4. Sheriff’s fees on scire facias.

The fees chargeable by deputy sheriffs for serving writs and executions in scire facias against bail in criminal cases shall be the same as provided for similar service of writs and executions in civil cases.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 295, § 12; P.L. 1897, ch. 444, § 1; P.L. 1898, ch. 578, § 1; P.L. 1900, ch. 714, § 1; P.L. 1901, ch. 831, § 1; C.P.A. 1905, § 1200; G.L. 1909, ch. 364, § 11; P.L. 1918, ch. 1648, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 417, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 633, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 12-20-4 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 46.

12-20-5. Allowance for service of precept.

Any officer charged with the service of any precept in any criminal case, either original, intermediate, or final, shall be allowed by the court out of which the precept is issued, in a sum that the court may deem just and reasonable for the actual and necessary expense incurred by him or her in serving it, and which shall not form a part of the bill of costs taxed against a convict under § 12-20-9 .

History of Section. P.L. 1907, ch. 1443, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 364, § 11; P.L. 1918, ch. 1648, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 417, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 633, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 12-20-5 ; P.L. 1966, ch. 209, § 2.

12-20-6. Fees of city and town police departments and state agencies.

For each criminal complaint filed in the district court by a city or town police department, the state police, or a state agency, the clerk of the district court shall assess against the defendant and remit to the city or town or the state the sum of three dollars and fifty cents ($3.50), to be taxed as costs against the defendant.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 295, § 12; P.L. 1897, ch. 444, § 1; P.L. 1898, ch. 578, § 1; P.L. 1900, ch. 714, § 1; P.L. 1901, ch. 831, § 1; C.P.A. 1905, § 1200; P.L. 1908, ch. 1580, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 364, § 11; P.L. 1918, ch. 1648, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 417, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 633, § 12; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-20-6 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 72, § 2; P.L. 1961, ch. 89, § 5; P.L. 1980, ch. 397, §§ 1, 2.

Cross References.

Fees on seizure of gambling apparatus, § 11-19-28 .

12-20-7. Witness fees.

  1. The fees of witnesses shall be:
    1. For every day’s attendance before the supreme or superior court, or before any other tribunal or magistrate, including attendance in giving depositions, except that no officer or other employee of the state or of any city or town shall be entitled to receive a fee for attendance if he or she attends during his or her regular hours of employment for which he or she is entitled to receive his or her ordinary salary or if he or she appears outside his or her regular hours of employment and is entitled to receive additional compensation from his or her employer for attendance: $ 10.00
    2. For every mile’s travel: $ 0.10
    3. For every day’s commitment in jail upon default to enter into recognizance with surety: $ 2.00
    4. For any witness who shall come from without the jurisdiction of the state to testify in behalf of the state, in any criminal proceedings, any sum, in addition to this travel and attendance, that the court before which the proceedings are had shall deem proper.
  2. In addition to the fees provided in subsection (a) of this section, witnesses summoned and testifying as experts in behalf of the state, or any person acting as an interpreter, before the supreme, superior, or district court, may be allowed and paid any sum that the court may deem just and reasonable.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 295, § 10; C.P.A. 1905, § 1199; G.L. 1909, ch. 364, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 417, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 633, § 10; P.L. 1939, ch. 715, § 7; P.L. 1956, ch. 3624, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-20-7 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 153, § 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 182, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations in subsection (a).

12-20-8. Payment of costs where defendant committed to correctional institutions.

The costs of prosecution and conviction of persons imprisoned in the adult correctional institutions shall be paid by the state, and the payment of those costs shall form no part of the sentence of convicts. Nothing in this section shall be construed so as to prevent the imposition of costs provided for in chapter 25 of this title. The cost of commitment shall be paid by the state except as otherwise provided by the general laws; provided, that persons imprisoned in the adult correctional institutions shall be responsible for any assessments made pursuant to § 23-1-3 .

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 58; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 58; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 52; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 52; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 52; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-20-8 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 116, § 3; P.L. 1987, ch. 589, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 94, § 3.

Cross References.

Children’s Friend and Service, costs in prosecution by, § 11-9-7 .

Fees of police departments and state agencies taxed as costs against defendant, § 12-20-6 .

Taxing of costs on discharge of accused, § 12-6-8 .

Collateral References.

Briefs and other appellate costs as chargeable to defendant in criminal prosecution. 65 A.L.R.2d 912.

Costs of prosecution for which defendant may be held. 65 A.L.R.2d 854.

12-20-9. Costs as to other defendants.

The payment of costs shall, in all other cases, be a part of the sentence of a convict who shall be sentenced to be imprisoned until the costs are paid or remitted.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 59; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 59; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 53; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 53; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 53; G.L. 1956, § 12-20-9 .

Cross References.

Fees of police departments and state agencies taxed as costs against defendant, § 12-20-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Payment as Condition of Continuance.

Accused cannot be called upon to pay the costs of the state in advance of his conviction, but where he seeks a continuance, the court may require him to pay them as a condition for the continuance. In re Esten, 9 R.I. 191 , 1869 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1869).

12-20-10. Remission of costs — Prohibition against remitting restitution to victims of crime — Ability to pay — Indigency.

  1. The payment of costs in criminal cases may, upon application, be remitted by any justice of the superior court; provided, that any justice of a district court may, in his or her discretion, remit the costs in any criminal case pending in his or her court, or in the case of any prisoner sentenced by the court, and from which sentence no appeal has been taken. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section shall not limit the court’s inherent power to remit any fine, fee, assessment or other costs of prosecution, provided no order of restitution shall be suspended by the court.
  2. For purposes of §§ 12-18.1-3(d) , 12-21-20 , 12-25-28(b) , 21-28-4.01(c)(3)(iv) and 21-28-4.17.1 , the following conditions shall be prima facie evidence of the defendant’s indigency and limited ability to pay:
    1. Qualification for and/or receipt of any of the following benefits or services by the defendant:
      1. temporary assistance to needy families
      2. social security including supplemental security income and state supplemental payments program;
      3. public assistance
      4. disability insurance; or
      5. food stamps
    2. Despite the defendant’s good faith efforts to pay, outstanding court orders for payment in the amount of one-hundred dollars ($100) or more for any of the following:
      1. restitution payments to the victims of crime;
      2. child support payments; or
      3. payments for any counseling required as a condition of the sentence imposed including, but not limited to, substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 60; P.L. 1898, ch. 588, § 1; P.L. 1905, ch. 1241, § 1; C.P.A. 1905, § 1223; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 60; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 54; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 54; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 54; G.L. 1956, § 12-20-10 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 297, § 4; P.L. 2008, ch. 326, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 297, § 4, and P.L. 2008, ch. 326, § 4, enacted identical amendments to this section.

12-20-11. Apportionment of costs among defendants.

Whenever more than one defendant in the same process shall be convicted and sentenced to fine or imprisonment in jail, the court pronouncing sentence may apportion the costs of prosecution between and among the defendants as, in its discretion, shall appear to be just and proper.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 285, § 61; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 61; G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 55; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 55; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 55; G.L. 1956, § 12-20-11 .

12-20-12. Technology surcharge.

A technology surcharge shall be assessed as a cost against the defendant in accordance with § 8-15-11 .

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 34, § 7; P.L. 2014, ch. 42, § 7.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 34, § 7, and P.L. 2014, ch. 42, § 7 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 21 Recovery of Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures

12-21-1. Methods of recovering fines and forfeitures.

Unless otherwise specially provided:

  1. All fines of five hundred dollars ($500) and under shall be recovered by complaint and summons;
  2. All fines of upwards of five hundred dollars ($500), by indictment or information;
  3. All penalties and pecuniary forfeitures, by action of debt; and
  4. All forfeitures of personal property, by complaint and warrant or by information.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 1; C.P.A. 1905, § 1231; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-1 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 15; P.L. 1976, ch. 173, § 4.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations.

Cross References.

Commitment for nonpayment of fines and costs, § 12-19-31 .

Department heads, power to prosecute for penalties and forfeitures, § 42-20-13 .

Military courts, recovery of fines, penalties and forfeitures imposed by, § 30-13-20 .

Payment of fines and costs out of money deposited in lieu of bail, § 12-13-10 .

Public utilities and carriers, actions against, § 39-4-24 .

Schools, remission of fines and forfeitures, § 16-38-13 .

Traffic fines, payment, § 12-14-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Action by state for water pollution was properly filed by indictment since the fine prescribed was in excess of the minimum recoverable by indictment. State v. Providence Gas Co., 27 R.I. 142 , 61 A. 44, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 50 (1905).

It was improper to charge defendant by complaint with unlawful practice of dentistry, since the dentistry law provided that charge should be by indictment. State v. Rosenkrans, 28 R.I. 474 , 68 A. 309, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 74 (1907).

As bribery under § 11-7-5 is punishable by no more than a year’s imprisonment, the state was not required by the constitution to indict for the offense, and, since the potential fine of $1,000 removed the offense from the jurisdiction of the district court, the charge had to be prosecuted in the superior court by indictment under this section and § 12-21-4 . State v. Palmigiano, 110 R.I. 576 , 295 A.2d 44, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 956 (1972).

12-21-2. Limitation of prosecutions.

All suits or prosecutions founded upon any penal statute, which are wholly or in part for the use of the prosecutor, shall be brought within one year, and all other suits and prosecutions on a penal statute within two (2) years after the commission of the offense, unless otherwise specially provided.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-2 .

12-21-3. Venue of actions based on penal statutes.

Unless otherwise specially provided, all fines of and informations founded on any penal statute shall be brought within the county in which the offense was committed, and not elsewhere; provided, that the superior court for the county of Providence shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings for the recovery of more than five hundred dollars ($500) when the offense was committed in the county of Bristol.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 2; C.P.A. 1905, § 1190; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-3 .

12-21-4. Jurisdiction of district and superior courts.

All fines, penalties, and forfeitures, whether of money or property, of five hundred dollars ($500) and under or of the value of five hundred dollars ($500) and under, shall be prosecuted before a district court; if upwards of five hundred dollars ($500) in amount or value, before the superior court, unless otherwise specially provided.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 4; C.P.A. 1905, §§ 1216, 1231; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Bribery.

As bribery under § 11-7-5 was punishable by no more than a year’s imprisonment, the state was not required by the constitution to indict for the offense, and since the potential fine of $1,000 removed the offense from the jurisdiction of the district court, the charge had to be prosecuted in the superior court by indictment under § 12-2-1 and this section. State v. Palmigiano, 110 R.I. 576 , 295 A.2d 44, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 956 (1972).

Supreme Court Jurisdiction.

The supreme court has no original jurisdiction of actions to recover fines, penalties or forfeitures. Parker v. Barstow, 5 R.I. 232 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1858).

Want of Jurisdiction.

Motion in arrest of judgment should have been granted where defendant was convicted in superior court of an offense for which the fine was less than the minimum recoverable in superior court. State v. Heffernan, 28 R.I. 477 , 68 A. 364, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1907).

12-21-5. Action by town or city.

Whenever any penalty or forfeiture, or any part of a penalty or forfeiture, shall be given to any town by any penal statute, the town council may sue for the penalty or forfeiture in the name of the town, or the proper prosecuting officer in the name of any city which shall be entitled to the benefit of the penalty or forfeiture, and the town council may remit the whole of the penalty or forfeiture.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Delegation of Power.

The town council could not delegate to the town sergeant the discretionary power to bring an action under this section. East Greenwich v. Guenond, 32 R.I. 224 , 78 A. 1015, 1911 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1911).

Indictment.

This section does not prevent the recovery by indictment of a fine greater than the minimum amount prescribed for recovery by indictment. State v. Slocum, 9 R.I. 373 , 1869 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1869).

12-21-6. Commencement of period of neglect.

Whenever any penalty shall be imposed for neglect during any period of time, the neglect may be alleged to have commenced at any specified time, and shall be reckoned from the time so specified.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-6 .

12-21-7. Residence of court member in city or town to be benefited.

In actions for the recovery of any penalty or forfeiture before any court, it shall be no cause of exception that any member of the court resides or has property in the city or town in which the offense was committed, or that the penalty or any part of the penalty is recoverable to the use of the city or town.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-7 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-21-8. Plea of general issue.

The defendant to an action for a penalty may plead the general issue, and under it give any special matter in evidence.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-8 .

12-21-9. Commitment for failure to obey judgment or sentence.

If any person against whom sentence is passed or judgment rendered, under any penal statute, shall refuse or neglect to perform the sentence or to pay the judgment, he or she shall, by order of the court passing the sentence or by the officer charged with the execution issued on the judgment, be committed to the adult correctional institutions, and be imprisoned there until the sentence is performed or he or she is discharged by due course of law.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 10; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-9 .

Collateral References.

Indigency of offender as affecting validity of imprisonment as alternative to payment of fine. 31 A.L.R.3d 926.

12-21-10. Disposition of recoveries.

Unless otherwise specially provided:

  1. All fines recovered shall be to the use of the state;
  2. All penalties and pecuniary forfeitures, one-half (1/2) to the use of the state and one-half (1/2) to the use of the person who shall sue for it; and
  3. All forfeitures of personal property shall be disposed of as provided by law.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-10 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

12-21-11. Quarterly reports and payments by district court.

The clerk of each division of the district court, shall, between the first and fifteenth days of February, May, August, and November in each year, make an itemized return in writing to the city or town treasurer of every city or town in the division of all fines received by the clerk during the preceding quarter, which or part of which shall be due to the city or town, and of costs paid by the clerk out of money belonging to the city or town, and the amount and circumstances of all of these fines received by the clerk and costs paid by the clerk and not included in any previous return. The clerk making the return shall immediately thereafter cause to be paid to the city or town treasurer the balance of all moneys belonging to the city or town.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 183; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 36; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 36; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-11 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 28.

12-21-12. Payment of costs taxable to cities or towns out of fines due.

All costs taxed by courts in criminal prosecutions, which by law any city or town is or may be required to pay, may be paid by the clerk to the several persons entitled to them, out of fines in his or her hands belonging to the city or town; provided, that fines received by the clerk which are by law to be applied to the support of the public schools shall not be used in the payment of these costs.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 184; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 37; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 37; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-12 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 28.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-21-13. Accounting by clerk on vacation of office.

Whenever the clerk shall vacate his or her office he or she shall render account and pay over any money which may be due from him or her as clerk to the city or town within ten (10) days after vacating the office.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 185; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 38; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 38; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 38; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-13 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 28.

12-21-14. Forfeiture for failure to account.

Every clerk who shall neglect or refuse to account with the city or town treasurer as required in this chapter, or to pay over to him or her all moneys due the city or town at the time when they ought to be paid, shall forfeit thrice the amount of the moneys so withheld or not paid, to be recovered by an action of debt for the use of the city or town.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 186; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 39; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 39; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 39; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-14 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 28.

12-21-15. Access of city or town treasurer to district court records.

The city or town treasurer of any city or town in the division in which the district court is situated shall have access at all times to all books and papers in the office of the division, and may examine them for the purpose of verifying the returns of the clerk.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 187; G.L. 1909, ch. 281, § 40; G.L. 1923, ch. 331, § 40; G.L. 1938, ch. 501, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-15 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 28.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-21-16. Payment of amounts due to the state.

All fines and all penalties and forfeitures to the use of the state shall be paid over to the general treasurer, unless otherwise specially provided.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 11; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-17 .

Cross References.

Failure to pay over fines, forfeitures, or penalties, criminal liability, § 11-28-2 .

12-21-17. Payment and accounting for fines due other than to state.

All fines recovered under any statute of this state, the whole or any part of which may be due or payable to any city, town, or society, or to any person as complainant, shall be accounted for with the state controller, and be paid to the general treasurer. The general treasurer shall, upon the order of the state controller, pay to the city, town, society, or person so much of the amount of the fine so recovered as the city, town, society, or person may be entitled to, which order shall be drawn by the state controller whenever he or she shall receive a proper return or certificate from the clerk of the court in which the fine was imposed.

History of Section. P.L. 1898, ch. 536, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 12; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 65; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-17 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 28.

12-21-18. Payment of fine liquidated by labor.

Whenever a fine payable in whole or in part, to any city, town, or society, or to any person as complainant, shall have been liquidated by the labor of the person fined, or paid by him or her at any jail in the state, the general treasurer shall, upon the proper order of the state controller, pay to the city, town, society or person so much of the amount of the fine so liquidated or paid, as the city, town, society, or person may be entitled to, which order of the state controller shall be by him or her drawn on his or her receiving a proper return or certificate from the clerk of the court in which the fine was imposed, together with a proper return or certificate from the jailer.

History of Section. P.L. 1898, ch. 536, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 13; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 65; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-18 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 28.

12-21-19. Payment of fines to general treasurer — Accounting.

Whenever a fine is recovered under any statute of this state, the whole of which may be due the Rhode Island Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Children’s Friend and Service, or to any other society, or the one-half (1/2) of which may be due the state or any society, or to any person, as complainant, the whole of the fine shall be accounted for with the state controller and paid to the general treasurer. The fine due any society, or the one-half (1/2) fine due any society, or to any person, as complainant, shall be paid by the general treasurer upon order of the state controller and the state controller shall draw his or her order whenever he or she shall receive a proper return or certificate from the clerk of the court in which the fine was imposed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 12; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-19 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 28.

12-21-20. Order to pay costs and determination of ability to pay.

  1. If, upon any complaint or prosecution before any court, the defendant shall be ordered to pay a fine, enter into a recognizance or suffer any penalty or forfeiture, he or she shall also be ordered to pay all costs of prosecution, unless directed otherwise by law.
  2. In superior court, the judge shall make a preliminary assessment of the defendant’s ability to pay immediately after sentencing by use of the procedures specified in this section.
  3. In district court, the judge shall make a preliminary assessment of the defendant’s ability to pay immediately after sentencing or nearly thereafter as practicable by use of the procedures specified in this section.
  4. The defendant’s ability to pay and payment schedule shall be determined by use of standardized procedures including a financial assessment instrument. The financial assessment instrument shall be:
    1. based upon sound and generally accepted accounting principles;
    2. completed based on a personal interview of the defendant and includes any and all relevant information relating to the defendant’s present ability to pay including, but not limited to, the information contained in § 12-20-10 ; and
    3. made by the defendant under oath.
  5. The financial instrument may, from time to time and after hearing, be modified by the court.
  6. When persons come before the court for failure to pay fines, fees, assessments and other costs of prosecution, or court ordered restitution, and their ability to pay and payment schedule has not been previously determined, the judge, the clerk of the court, or their designee shall make these determinations by use of the procedures specified in this section.
  7. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the court’s ability, after hearing in open court, to revise findings about a person’s ability to pay and payment schedule made by the clerk of the court or designee, based upon the receipt of newly available, relevant, or other information.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 13; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-20 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 297, § 5; P.L. 2008, ch. 326, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 297, § 5, and P.L. 2008, ch. 326, § 5, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Payment of fines and costs out of money deposited in lieu of bail, § 12-13-10 .

12-21-21. Guilty plea and payment of fine by person outside state.

Whenever any person who is charged with the commission of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine shall be outside the confines of this state, the defendant may, with the approval of a judge of the district court for the division in which the complaint may be pending, or with the approval of the justice of the superior court in charge of criminal appeals if the cause is pending on appeal before the superior court, by instrument in writing and duly acknowledged before an appropriate officer, authorize his or her attorney of record to appear in open court and enter on his or her behalf a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and to pay the fine that may be assessed by the court, together with the costs of prosecution, if any, that may be assessed by the court. Every written authorization shall be filed with the clerk of the court, and shall be retained by the clerk, together with the original complaint, as a portion of the record of the case.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1680, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-21 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 28.

12-21-22. Payment of fines due to person or corporation from proceeds of forfeited recognizance.

If any recognizance shall be forfeited in any case in which, if the recognizor had been convicted, any sum might have been due to the complainant, or any person or corporation, the court in which the amount of the recognizance is, in whole or part, recovered, shall ascertain the just sum and costs, if any, which are due from the recognizor to the complainant, person, or corporation and grant a certificate for the amount, which, upon being audited by the state controller, shall be paid, upon his or her warrant for the amount upon the general treasurer.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 14; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 16; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 65; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-22 .

12-21-23. Seizure and retention of forfeited property.

Whenever any personal property shall be forfeited for any violation of law, any deputy sheriff, town sergeant, or town constable, or any person by law authorized to seize the property, may take and retain the property until he or she shall deliver it to a proper officer having a warrant to take and detain the property.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 15; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-23 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 47; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 25; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 25.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 25, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 25 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

Cross References.

Firearms, forfeiture and destruction, § 11-47-22 .

Gambling apparatus, seizure and forfeiture, § 11-19-26 et seq.

Collateral References.

Conviction or acquittal in criminal prosecution as bar to action for seizure, condemnation, or forfeiture of property. 27 A.L.R.2d 1137.

Lawfulness of seizure of property used in violation of law as prerequisite to forfeiture action or proceeding. 8 A.L.R.3d 473.

12-21-24. Complaint or information asking forfeiture.

The person making or directing a seizure shall without unnecessary delay make complaint on oath and in writing to a judge of the district court for the division in which the offense for which the forfeiture has accrued was committed, regardless of the value of the property seized, and jurisdiction is conferred on the district court to try and determine the matter notwithstanding the value of the property seized is in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 16; C.P.A. 1905, § 1222; P.L. 1906, ch. 1340, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-24 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 8; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 28.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is set out to correct an error appearing in the 2000 Reenactment volume.

12-21-25. Issuance of warrant to take and detain forfeited property.

Upon making a complaint or filing an information for a forfeiture, a warrant shall be issued to the proper officer, requiring him or her to take the property into his or her custody and to detain it until legally disposed of.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 17; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-25 .

12-21-26. Notice of complaint or information.

Notice of complaint or information shall be issued by the court to the owner, if known, otherwise notice shall be published in some newspaper published in the vicinity for a period of at least two (2) weeks, that all persons interested may appear, either in person or by attorney, at the time and place appointed in the notice for trial, and show cause, if they have any, why judgment of forfeiture should not be passed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 18; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-26 .

12-21-27. Sale of property pending judgment on forfeiture.

If any person shall appear and claim the property, it may be sold, by consent of parties, provided it is of such nature that it may be lawfully sold and used, and the law does not require it to be destroyed or otherwise in some special manner disposed of, or under like provision it may in any case be sold, if of a perishable, wasting, or expensive character to keep, in like manner as is provided for the sale of similar property when attached on civil process, in which case the proceeds of the sale, after deducting the charges of the sale, shall for all purposes represent the thing sold and be subject to the judgment and order of the court.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 19; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-27 .

12-21-28. Return of property to claimant on bond.

Unless by law the property seized is necessarily subject, upon judgment of forfeiture, to be destroyed, it shall, at the request of the claimant, be appraised by appraisers appointed for that purpose by the court and be delivered to the claimant upon his or her giving bond in double the amount of the appraised value, with sufficient sureties, running to the person or corporation to whom the property would be forfeited, or to the state, if the state is entitled in whole or part to the property upon forfeiture, to pay to them the appraised value of the property and costs in case final judgment or forfeiture is entered up.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 20; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-28 .

12-21-29. Trial and judgment.

The case may be tried by a jury, if in the superior court, upon the request of either party, or otherwise by the court, and the cause of forfeiture alleged being proved, the court which shall try the cause shall enter up judgment for the forfeiture and disposition of the property according to law.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 21; C.P.A. 1905, § 1216; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-29 .

12-21-30. Appeal from district court judgment of forfeiture.

An appeal may be claimed by either party from any judgment of forfeiture rendered by the district court, to be taken in like manner as by defendants in criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the district court to try and determine, to the superior court for the same county in which the division of the district court rendering judgment is situated and like proceedings may be had as in cases of informations for forfeitures originally filed in the court.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 22; C.P.A. 1905, § 1191; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-30 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 28.

12-21-31. Finality of superior court judgment.

The judgment of the superior court shall be final in all cases of forfeitures, whether originally commenced in the court or brought there by appeal under the provisions of this chapter, unless a new trial is ordered, for cause shown, by the supreme court.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 23; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-31 .

12-21-32. Costs and damages on forfeiture action.

Costs shall be awarded to the prosecutor if a reasonable cause of seizure appear, in which shall be included the necessary expenses of the seizure and detention of the property; but in case no reasonable cause of seizure shall appear, costs and damages, as well as the restoration of the property, shall be awarded to the claimant.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 288, § 24; G.L. 1909, ch. 357, § 26; G.L. 1923, ch. 410, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 631, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 12-21-32 .

12-21-33. Suspension of operators’ license for failure to pay costs, fines, fees, or assessments.

A judge of the superior or district court or the traffic tribunal may order the suspension of a person’s license issued pursuant to chapter 10 of title 31 if the person fails to pay court ordered costs, fines, fees, restitution or assessments within the time period provided for in an order of the court. The judge may order the suspension to be effective until the person complies with the court order.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 350, § 1.

Chapter 22 Appeals in Criminal Cases

12-22-1. Right to appeal from district to superior court.

Every person aggrieved by the sentence of the district court for any offense other than a violation may, within five (5) days after the sentence, appeal from the district court to the superior court for the county in which the division of the district court is situated, by claiming an appeal in the court or in the office of the clerk of the court appealed from or at any of the penal institutions of the state, before any justice of the supreme or superior court, or before a justice or clerk of the court appealed from, or before any of the persons authorized to take bail at the penal institutions.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 461; G.L. 1909, ch. 296, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 346, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 630, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-1 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 29; P.L. 1976, ch. 173, § 5.

Rules of Court.

Appeal to the Superior Court, Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 37.

Cross References.

Delinquency or waywardness of child, appeal from adjudication, §§ 14-1-52 , 14-1-53 , 14-1-58 .

Fighting birds or animals, appeals from judgments forfeiting, § 4-1-14 .

Transcript of proceedings, § 8-5-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1976 Amendment Unconstitutional.

The General Assembly acted unconstitutionally when in 1976 it established the classification “violation” and failed to provide a de novo appeal to the Superior Court as it did for those individuals who were charged with committing misdemeanors or petty misdemeanors. State v. Vinagro, 433 A.2d 945, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1247 (R.I. 1981).

The 1976 amendment to this section and enactment of § 12-22-1.1 were impermissible with respect to those violations which are criminal in nature because in 1842 a defendant could appeal de novo from any criminal conviction of a justice of the peace. State v. Vinagro, 433 A.2d 945, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1247 (R.I. 1981).

Nature of Appeal.

On appeal to the superior court the justice is required to hear the case de novo in its entirety under § 12-17-1 and he lacks authority to determine the correctness or legality of the rulings of the justice of the district court. State v. McGuire, 90 R.I. 301 , 157 A.2d 657, 1960 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1960); State v. Avila, 415 A.2d 180, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1676 (R.I. 1980).

Under state statutes the taking of an appeal operates to vacate a decision of a district or police court. State v. Diggins, 95 R.I. 166 , 185 A.2d 300, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 139 (1962).

Where conviction of the defendant in the police court where he was charged with violating a traffic ordinance of the city of Providence was not final and by his appeal the defendant, exercising his rights under the statute, asked for and was granted a trial de novo on the facts and the law in the superior court, his satisfying the sentence in the police court by paying the penalty was voluntary and gratuitous and was not such an act as would entitle him to claim double jeopardy in the imposition of a sentence by the superior court. State v. Diggins, 95 R.I. 166 , 185 A.2d 300, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 139 (1962).

The appeal to the Superior Court provided by this section is a de novo appeal and is to be tried by a jury unless the defendant waives his right to the jury trial. State v. Vinagro, 433 A.2d 945, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1247 (R.I. 1981).

Procedure to Be Followed.

Those charged with serious misdemeanors are entitled to a jury trial in the first instance and, pending appropriate action by the general assembly to so provide, the supreme court has ordered that, after August 11, 1971, a district court defendant charged with a misdemeanor for which he could be imprisoned for more than six months shall be advised of his right to a trial by jury and be given ten days after arraignment to file a waiver of such right, and his failure to file such waiver shall constitute a claim of his right to a jury and a waiver of his right to a non-jury trial in the district court and right of appeal to the superior court; and upon failure to file a waiver the clerk of the district court division in which he was arraigned shall send the record of the case to the clerk of the superior court in the county wherein the offense was alleged to have been committed, who shall docket it on the appropriate jury calendar. State v. Holliday, 109 R.I. 93 , 280 A.2d 333, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1029 (1971).

Defendants, who had waived a jury trial in the first instance and were subsequently convicted of nonpetty offenses in District Court, were entitled to a jury trial in their appeal pursuant to this section. State v. Avila, 415 A.2d 180, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1676 (R.I. 1980).

The Superior Court was without authority to undertake appellate review of a District Court’s finding that defendant was guilty; the Superior Court improperly evaluated the correctness of the District Court’s findings after defendant sought and obtained appellate review. When a District Court judgment is appealed under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-22-1 , the state, as well as the accused, is entitled to a trial de novo. State v. McManus, 950 A.2d 1180, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 72 (R.I. 2008).

Release Pending Appeal.

Where appeals were on traffic offenses, giving of recognizance for discharge pending appeal was not required for claims and certification under § 12-22-4 . In re 125 Criminal Appeals, 113 R.I. 365 , 321 A.2d 294, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1187 (1974).

Res Judicata.

An applicant’s second petition for postconviction relief was barred by R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-8 and the doctrine of res judicata when the applicant knew before the filing of the first petition that he and one of his codefendants had shared the same attorney, and he could have and should have raised the issue in his first petition; the applicant’s failure to raise the issue in his first petition resulted in a bar to the litigation of that issue and that claim for relief, and the applicant failed to show that the interest of justice required the supreme court to revisit the issue. Ferrell v. Wall, 971 A.2d 615, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 80 (R.I. 2009).

Sentence on Appeal.

The superior court possesses the power to impose a sentence after trial de novo more severe than that imposed by the district court. State v. Avila, 415 A.2d 180, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1676 (R.I. 1980).

Because the possibility of removal from work release was a collateral consequence of a prisoner’s plea, and neither the trial justice nor defense counsel had no obligation to inform the prisoner of that possibility, the fact that the prisoner might not have fully appreciated the possibility of his being removed from the work-release program for disciplinary infractions was not grounds for vacating his plea, and the prisoner’s motion for postconviction relief was properly denied. Smith v. State, 909 A.2d 40, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 161 (R.I. 2006).

Services of Stenographer and Transcript.

While the services of a stenographer and a transcript in a district court proceeding might be helpful to the defendant in exercising his right to appeal hereunder, such services are not required for the exercise of such right and the state is not mandated by U.S. Const., amend. 14, to provide such services for the defendant. State v. Gill, 115 R.I. 160 , 342 A.2d 256, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1137 (1975).

Statutory Period for Filing.

The statutory period within which an appeal from the decision of the lower court must be taken cannot be extended by judicial authority. Pickett v. Conley, 89 R.I. 261 , 152 A.2d 229, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1959).

Superior Court Jurisdiction.

Superior court had jurisdiction to conduct a trial de novo as to a charge that defendant violated Providence, R.I., Code of Ordinances § 16-93, barring loud noise in certain locations, because the indicia of criminality associated with defendant’s prosecution gave defendant a right to a jury trial, giving the superior court jurisdiction under R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-22-1 and 12-22-9 . State ex rel. City of Providence v. Auger, 44 A.3d 1218, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 72 (R.I. 2012).

Collateral References.

Appealability of acquittal from or dismissal of charge of contempt of court. 24 A.L.R.3d 650.

Convicted person’s acceptance of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence as waiver of right to appeal. 117 A.L.R. 929.

Effect of escape by, or fugitive status of, state criminal defendant on availability of appeal or other post-verdict or post-conviction relief — State cases. 105 A.L.R.5th 529.

Exclusion or inclusion of terminal Sunday or holiday in computing time for taking or perfecting appellate review. 61 A.L.R.2d 482.

Execution of judgment or voluntary payment of fine after plea of guilty in police, magistrate, municipal, or similar inferior court as precluding appeal. 42 A.L.R.2d 1007.

Nolo contendere or non vult contendere plea as affecting time for appeal. 89 A.L.R.2d 599.

Plea of guilty in police, magistrate, municipal, or similar inferior court as precluding appeal. 42 A.L.R.2d 995.

When criminal case becomes moot so as to preclude review of or attack on conviction or sentence. 9 A.L.R.3d 462.

12-22-1.1. Review by supreme court — Violations.

Every person aggrieved by the imposition of a fine by the district court upon the finding of a violation may, within twenty (20) days after entry of judgment imposing the fine, petition the supreme court of the state of Rhode Island for a writ of certiorari to review any errors involved. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall set forth the errors claimed. Upon the filing of a petition with the clerk of the supreme court, the supreme court may, if it sees fit, issue its writ of certiorari to the district court to certify to the supreme court the record of the proceedings in the case together with any transcript of the proceedings furnished by the petitioner at his expense.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 173, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Review Process Unconstitutional.

The General Assembly acted unconstitutionally when in 1976 it established the classification “violation” and failed to provide a de novo appeal to the Superior Court as it did in § 12-22-1 for those individuals who were charged with committing misdemeanors or petty misdemeanors. State v. Vinagro, 433 A.2d 945, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1247 (R.I. 1981).

The 1976 amendment to § 12-22-1 and enactment of this section were impermissible with respect to those violations which are criminal in nature because in 1842 a defendant could appeal de novo from any criminal conviction of a justice of the peace. State v. Vinagro, 433 A.2d 945, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1247 (R.I. 1981).

Collateral References.

Appealability of acquittal from or dismissal of charge of contempt of court. 24 A.L.R.3d 650.

Exclusion or inclusion of terminal Sunday or holiday in computing time for taking or perfecting appellate review. 61 A.L.R.2d 482.

Right of prosecution to writ of certiorari in criminal case. 91 A.L.R.2d 1095.

When criminal case becomes moot so as to preclude review of or attack on conviction or sentence. 9 A.L.R.3d 462.

12-22-2. Notation as to time of claiming appeal — Transmission of claim.

If an appeal is claimed in the court or in the office of the clerk of the court appealed from, the claim and the time when made shall be noted upon the complaint, and also upon the mittimus, if any, issued upon the sentence appealed from; and if claimed at any other place, it shall be claimed in writing, and the person before whom it is claimed shall note upon the claim of appeal the time when made and shall immediately transmit the claim to the court which passed the sentence.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 462; G.L. 1909, ch. 296, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 346, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 630, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-2 .

Collateral References.

Effect of escape by, or fugitive status of, state criminal defendant on availability of appeal or other post-verdict or post-conviction relief — State cases. 105 A.L.R.5th 529.

12-22-3. Fixing recognizance required for discharge pending appeal.

When a district court shall sentence a person for an offense, it shall fix the amount of the recognizance which shall be required to discharge the person from imprisonment if an appeal shall be claimed, and shall note the amount upon any mittimus issued upon the sentence.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 463; G.L. 1909, ch. 296, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 346, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 630, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-3 .

Rules of Court.

Release on bail, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 46.

12-22-4. Giving of recognizance for discharge pending appeal.

Upon a claim of appeal from the sentence of a district court, the appellant, in order to be discharged from immediate imprisonment upon the sentence, shall enter into a recognizance before one of the persons before whom an appeal may be claimed, in the sum fixed by the court, with or without surety or sureties to the satisfaction of the person taking the recognizance, conditioned that the appellant shall appear in the superior court upon the assignment day for the appeal, the exact date of the assignment day to be stated in the recognizance, and whenever his or her appeal is called for trial, and there prosecute the appeal with effect, and abide or perform the order or sentence which the superior court may make or impose in the case, and that he or she will in the meantime keep the peace.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 464; P.L. 1906, ch. 1337, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 296, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 346, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 630, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-4 ; P.L. 1967, ch. 85, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Action Against Surety.

After default on a recognizance binding principal and surety a scire facias can be brought against surety separately, since the recognizance binds parties severally and jointly. State v. Sutcliffe, 16 R.I. 410 , 16 A. 710, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1889).

Party Already at Liberty.

This section requiring a recognizance has no application where the party seeking the appeal is already at liberty. Pickett v. Conley, 87 R.I. 21 , 137 A.2d 408, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1958).

Regularity of Recognizance.

In an action of scire facias on a recognizance, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it may be presumed that the recognizance was taken where the trial justice had a right to take it. State v. Miner, 14 R.I. 303 , 1883 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1883).

Surrender of Principal.

A surety on a recognizance in a criminal case cannot obtain a discharge by surrendering the principal after a default. State v. McGuire, 16 R.I. 519 , 17 A. 918, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1889).

12-22-5. Commitment pending appeal — Discharge on payment of fine and costs by labor.

Every person claiming an appeal from a sentence of the district court who shall fail to enter into a recognizance in the court or in the office of the clerk of the court appealed from shall upon sentence immediately be committed to the penal institution as sentenced, there to remain until he or she enters into a recognizance as provided in this chapter or is discharged pursuant to law; provided, that in the counties of Newport and Washington any person before removal from the county or division in which sentence is entered may claim an appeal from the sentence of the district court to the superior court by claiming the appeal and entering into recognizance in like manner as required by law before the clerk of the court appealed from, or at the adult correctional institutions, before the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken, or before any of the persons authorized by law to take bail. Whenever an appellant has earned by labor at any penal institution a sum equal to the amount of the fine and costs in the case in which he or she was committed, including all costs accruing at that institution, and has served the full term of imprisonment for which he or she was sentenced, the warden or other person having charge of the institution shall apply with the consent of the appellant the amount so earned by him or her to the settlement of the fines and costs, and the appellant shall then be discharged.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 465; G.L. 1909, ch. 296, § 5; P.L. 1920, ch. 1936, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 346, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 630, § 5; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-5 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 29.

12-22-6. Forwarding and notice of recognizance to courts — Transmission of papers to superior court.

The person taking a recognizance shall immediately send it to the superior court, and if the recognizance is taken before some person other than a justice or clerk of the court appealed from, notice of the taking of the recognizance shall be certified under the hand of the person to the clerk or a justice of the court appealed from. On notice of a claim of appeal or of the taking of a recognizance, the clerk of the court appealed from shall immediately certify and transmit all the papers in the case to the clerk of the superior court, who shall receipt for the papers.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 466; G.L. 1909, ch. 296, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 346, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 630, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-6 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 239, § 29.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Certification of Appeal.

Where District Court and warden’s court clerks refused to certify appeals to the superior court, the duty of the clerks to certify the appeals was a ministerial duty subject to enforcement by mandamus on petition by the appealing defendants. Streeter v. Signorelli, 114 R.I. 744 , 339 A.2d 56, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1482 (1975).

Recognizance Not Essential to Appeal.

The recognizance given in a justice court is not an essential portion of the case which is required to be filed in the appellate court. State v. Almy, 3 R.I. 149 , 1855 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1855).

Time for Taking Recognizance.

The taking of a recognizance is not required prior to the certification of the papers of the case to the clerk of the superior court. Pickett v. Conley, 87 R.I. 21 , 137 A.2d 408, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1958).

12-22-7. Assignment day in superior court — Trial by attorney general.

The assignment day for appeals in criminal cases in the superior court shall be the assignment day in that court which occurs next after ten (10) days from the date of the sentence appealed from. All appeals shall be tried by the attorney general, except as otherwise provided.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 467; G.L. 1909, ch. 296, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 346, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 630, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-7 .

12-22-8. Admission of guilt before appellate court.

Whenever any appellant who has been sentenced to pay a fine and costs only, having given recognizance, shall at any time before the assignment day of the appeal appear before the court to which the appeal was taken and plead guilty to the complaint upon which the appeal was taken, or shall admit that the state has sufficient evidence to convict him or her on the complaint, the court shall adjudge him or her guilty of the offense as charged in the complaint, and shall sentence the appellant to pay the same fine that was imposed in the court from which his or her appeal was taken, together with all costs.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 468; G.L. 1909, ch. 296, § 8; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 346, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 630, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-8 .

12-22-9. Appeals from courts having jurisdiction of ordinance violations.

All appeals from any court having jurisdiction of offenses against town or city ordinances shall be taken and shall proceed according to the provisions of this chapter, and in those appeals the recognizance may be taken by either of the officers or persons designated and authorized to take recognizances.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 470; G.L. 1909, ch. 296, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 346, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 630, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Nature of Appeal.

Under state statutes, the taking of an appeal operates to vacate a decision of a district or police court. State v. Diggins, 95 R.I. 166 , 185 A.2d 300, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 139 (1962).

Where conviction of the defendant in the police court where he was charged with violating a traffic ordinance of the city of Providence was not final and by his appeal the defendant, exercising his rights under the statute, asked for and was granted a trial de novo on the facts and the law in the superior court, his satisfying the sentence in the police court by paying the penalty was voluntary and gratuitious and was not such an act as would entitle him to claim double jeopardy in the imposition of a sentence by the superior court. State v. Diggins, 95 R.I. 166 , 185 A.2d 300, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 139 (1962).

Superior court had jurisdiction to conduct a trial de novo as to a charge that defendant violated Providence, R.I., Code of Ordinances § 16-93, barring loud noise in certain locations, because the indicia of criminality associated with defendant’s prosecution gave defendant a right to a jury trial, giving the superior court jurisdiction under R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-22-1 and 12-22-9 . State ex rel. City of Providence v. Auger, 44 A.3d 1218, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 72 (R.I. 2012).

Statutory Period for Filing.

On petition for mandamus to compel the clerk of the police court of the city of Providence to certify to the superior court the petitioner’s appeal from a conviction by the police court of “indecent intoxication”, where the trial justice had found as a fact that petitioner did not file an appeal within the five-day period contemplated by statutory provisions the petition was properly denied, no cause having been shown for the issuance of such writ. Pickett v. Conley, 89 R.I. 261 , 152 A.2d 229, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1959).

The statutory period within which an appeal from the decision of the lower court must be taken cannot be extended by judicial authority. Pickett v. Conley, 89 R.I. 261 , 152 A.2d 229, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1959).

Collateral References.

Appealability of acquittal from or dismissal of charge of contempt of court. 24 A.L.R.3d 650.

When criminal case becomes moot so as to preclude review of or attack on conviction or sentence. 9 A.L.R.3d 462.

12-22-10. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (C.P.A. 1905, § 475; G.L. 1909, ch. 298, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 348, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 545, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-10 ), concerning the reservation of constitutional questions in criminal cases, was repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 334, § 1. For law concerning the certification of questions to the supreme court, see § 9-24-27 .

12-22-11. Failure to prosecute constitutional objection.

If the party raising any certified constitutional question shall fail to appear in the supreme court and prosecute the cause in which the question is raised, the cause shall be remanded to the court from which it was certified, and the court shall then proceed in the same manner as if the question had not been raised; and the question shall not be raised again in the cause.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 476; G.L. 1909, ch. 298, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 348, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 545, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-11 .

12-22-12. Additional bail on motion for new trial or appeal.

Whenever a person convicted of any crime shall file a motion for a new trial or notice of his or her intentions to appeal, the superior court may require the person to give additional bail.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 476; G.L. 1909, ch. 298, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 348, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 545, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-11 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 27.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Inherent Power of Court.

This section does not limit the inherent power of the court to require additional bail whenever deemed necessary. In re Mariano, 4 R.I. 534 , 84 A. 1086, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 81 (1912).

12-22-13. Errors in pleading.

No judgment, verdict, or decision shall be set aside, reversed, or new trial granted, in any criminal proceedings, for error as to any matter of pleading, unless in the opinion of the supreme court, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 354, § 14; P.L. 1915, ch. 1261, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 407, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 12-22-13 .

Rules of Court.

Harmless error, Super. Ct. R. Crim. P., Rule 52.

12-22-14. Refund of fine and costs.

The superior court, in any criminal case appealed to that court in which the defendant paid his or her fine and costs in the lower court, may, upon application made within three (3) years after a finding of not guilty or the deferring or suspension of sentence, order the amount of the fine and costs to be refunded to the defendant, and in that case the clerk of the superior court shall submit a properly authenticated voucher to the state controller who is authorized and directed to draw his or her order upon the general treasurer for the payment of that sum. The general assembly shall annually appropriate any sum that it shall deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 128, § 1.

Chapter 23 Criminal Law Advisory Commission

12-23-1. Commission created — Composition.

A commission is created to be known as the criminal law advisory commission and to consist of seven (7) members who shall be qualified electors of the state, six (6) of whom shall be appointed by the governor and the seventh member shall be the law revision director from the joint committee on legislative services, who shall be ex officio a member of the commission and its secretary.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 950, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 14, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-23-1 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 151, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2001, the compiler substituted “law revision director” for “law revision officer”.

12-23-2. Appointment and terms of members — Vacancies.

At the January session in each odd-numbered year the governor shall, with the advice and consent of the senate, appoint two (2) members of the commission to succeed the members whose terms will next expire and to hold office until the first day of February in the sixth year after their appointment. Any vacancy which may occur in the commission when the senate is not in session shall be filled by the governor until the next session of the general assembly, when he or she shall, with the advice and consent of the senate, appoint some person to fill the vacancy for the remainder of the term.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 950, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 14, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-23-2 .

12-23-3. Organization meeting — Chairperson.

The members of the commission shall meet for organization at the call of the secretary within two (2) weeks after each appointment by the governor, and shall at the meeting elect a chairperson who shall hold office during the pleasure of the commission.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 950, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 14, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-23-3 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-23-4. Studies and surveys.

For the purpose of improving and rendering more effective and efficient the administration of the criminal law in this state, the commission is authorized to make a complete study and survey of the subject including the detection, prosecution, and punishment of offenders, the probation, parole, and pardoning systems, and the duties, methods, and practices of the officers and agencies directly and indirectly connected with the enforcement of law, the suppression and prevention of crime and the care and treatment of the criminal, and for this purpose the commission may make any inquiry that it may deem necessary into the administration of the criminal law by the authorities of other states, the United States, and other countries.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 950, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 14, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-23-4 .

12-23-5. Cooperation of public officers — Visitation and inspection powers.

It shall be the duty of all officers of the state and of any city or town directly or indirectly connected with the administration of the criminal law to cooperate with the commission in the study and survey authorized by this chapter, and those officers shall furnish the commission upon request all records, data, and other information at their disposal relating to matters under consideration by the commission. Members of the commission may at any time visit and inspect the institutions and places in the state where criminals are confined and may interview the officers in charge of those institutions.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 950, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 14, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-23-5 .

12-23-6. Advisory committees — Hearings — General powers.

The commission may appoint advisory committees of judges, lawyers, or lay persons to consider and report upon special subjects within the scope of the study and survey, and may hold hearings and compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers and generally shall have any authority and power that may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 950, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 14, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 12-23-6 .

12-23-7. Annual report to general assembly.

The commission shall annually make a report to the general assembly of the results of its study and survey, together with any recommendations for changes in the laws and in the duties, methods, practices, and procedure of officers and other agencies that it may deem advisable or necessary to carry out the purpose of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 950, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 14, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 12-23-7 .

12-23-8. Expenses of commission — Printing.

The members of the commission shall not receive any pay for their services under the provisions of this chapter, but the general assembly shall from time to time appropriate any sums that may be necessary for clerical assistance and other actual expenses incurred by the members of the commission in the performance of their duties. All printing required by the commission, including the printing of its reports to the general assembly, shall be paid out of the appropriation for state printing upon vouchers approved by the chairperson of the commission and the state purchasing agent.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 950, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 14, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 12-23-8 .

Chapter 24 Uniform Crime Reporting System

12-24-1. Reporting system.

A uniform crime reporting system shall be established under the direction, control, and supervision of the superintendent of state police. The superintendent of state police shall have the power and duty, by any rules and regulations that he or she may deem necessary to collect and gather any information from local police departments and the enforcement division of the department of environmental management that may be and is prescribed in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 39, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “department of enviromental management” for department of environment”.

12-24-2. Reports.

The police department of each city and town and the enforcement division of the department of environmental management, once each quarter, upon a date and form prescribed and furnished by the superintendent of state police, shall forward to the division of state police a crime report. Each reporting department shall report only on cases within its jurisdiction and upon which it is making, or has made, the primary police investigation. The report shall be called the uniform crime report and shall cover crimes reported and otherwise processed during the reporting period. It shall contain the number and nature of offenses committed, the disposition of those offenses, and any other information that the superintendent of state police shall specify relating to the method, frequency, cause, and prevention of crime. Under no circumstances shall the name of any person be reported.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 39, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “department of environmental management” for “department of environment” in the first sentence.

12-24-3. Compilation of reports.

Upon receipt of the quarterly uniform crime reports from the reporting agencies, the division of state police shall prepare a statewide compilation of the statistics contained in the reports, and the resulting statistical compilation shall be available to any governmental law enforcement agency in the state, the judiciary committees of the senate and the house of representatives, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, upon request. The statistics made available through the uniform crime report shall be used for the purpose of studying the causes, trends, and effects of crime in this state and for intelligence upon which to base a sounder program of crime detection and prevention and the apprehension of criminals.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 39, § 1.

12-24-4. Other agencies.

Any governmental agency, not falling within the description of those required to submit the quarterly uniform crime report set forth in § 12-24-2 , which desires to submit a report, shall be furnished with the proper forms by the division of state police. When a report is received by the division of state police from a governmental police agency not required to make a report, the information contained in the report shall be included within the monthly compilation provided for in § 12-24-3 .

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 39, § 1.

Chapter 25 Criminal Injuries Compensation

12-25-1. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1972, ch. 254, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 2), which provided the title “Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1972,” was repealed by P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 1 and by P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 1, both effective September 1, 1999. For present similar provisions, see § 12-25-16 .

P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 4, and P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 4, provide that the repeal of this section by those acts shall take effect September 1, 1999, and shall be applicable to all offenses resulting in personal injury or death which occur on or after September 1, 1999.

12-25-1.1. Transition to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1996.

New cases shall be filed through the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1996, established pursuant to §§ 12-25-16 12-25-30 .

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 18.

12-25-2 — 12-25-8. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

Sections 12-25-2 — 12-25-8 (P.L. 1972, ch. 254, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 116, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 354, §§ 2, 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 451, §/ 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 355, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 25, § 3; P.L. 1988, ch. 618, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 410, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 82, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 317, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 2), concerning the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1972, were repealed by P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 1 and by P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 1, both chapters effective September 1, 1999. For present similar provisions, see §§ 12-25-16 through 12-25-30.1 .

P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 4, and P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 4, provide that the repeal of these sections by those acts shall take effect September 1, 1999, and shall be applicable to all offenses resulting in personal injury or death which occur on or after September 1, 1999.

12-25-9. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (as assigned, P.L. 1972, ch. 254, § 1), finality of decision, was repealed by P.L. 1980, ch. 116, § 2.

12-25-10. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1972, ch. 254, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 116, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 25, § 3; P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 2), concerning the recovery of compensation from a criminal offender, was repealed by P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 1 and by P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 1, both effective on September 1, 1999. For present similar provisions, see § 12-25-26 .

P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 4, and P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 4, provide that the repeal of this section by those acts shall take effect September 1, 1999, and shall be applicable to all offenses resulting in personal injury or death which occur on or after September 1, 1999.

12-25-11, 12-25-12. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1972, ch. 254, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 257, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 128, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 116, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 258, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 354, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 25, § 3; P.L. 1989, ch. 410, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 138, art. 8, § 1), relating to reports to the senate and house of representatives and special indemnity account for Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1972, were repealed by P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 1, effective August 21, 1996. For present comparable provisions, see §§ 12-25-27 and 12-25-28 .

12-25-12.1. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1984, ch. 354, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 2), concerning liens created pursuant to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1972, was repealed by P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 1 and by P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 1, both effective on September 1, 1999.

P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 4, and P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 4, provide that the repeal of this section by those acts shall take effect September 1, 1999, and shall be applicable to all offenses resulting in personal injury or death which occur on or after September 1, 1999.

12-25-12.2 — 12-25-14. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1978, ch. 128, § 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 354, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 25, § 3; P.L. 1988, ch. 444, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 138, art. 8, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 70, art. 1, § 9), relating to use of fund to inform victims of their rights, deposit of funds, and awards made when funds reach certain levels, were repealed by P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 1, effective August 21, 1996. For present comparable provisions, see §§ 12-25-29 and 12-25-30 .

12-25-15. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3), concerning the rules for transition from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1972 to the current provisions adopted in 1996, was repealed by P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 1 and by P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 1, both effective on September 1, 1999.

P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 4, and P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 4, provide that the repeal of this section by those acts shall take effect September 1, 1999, and shall be applicable to all offenses resulting in personal injury or death which occur on or after September 1, 1999.

12-25-16. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Criminal Injuries Compensation Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 4 provides that if any provision of that act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications which can be given effect without the invalid provisions or application, and to this end the provisions of that act are severable.

Comparative Legislation.

Criminal injuries compensation:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-201 — 54-215.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cross-Examination of Victim.

In a prosecution for robbery, the trial court did not commit reversible error by cutting short the defendant’s cross-examination of the victim regarding the victim’s lawsuit under this chapter. The victim had stated that he had filed for victim assistance and further inquiry into the amount of compensation sought would have been cumulative. State v. Thompson, 683 A.2d 378, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 249 (R.I. 1996).

Motion for New Trial.

Filing by a sexual molestation victim of a claim to recover compensation under this chapter did not constitute newly discovered evidence warranting defendant’s motion for a new trial where the defendant could have by reasonable diligence discovered the victim’s claim by calling the clerk of the superior court, and where the evidence established that an attorney for the defendant in a family court action had been given notice of the victim’s suit for compensation and had discussed this claim prior to the time of the trial. State v. Brown, 619 A.2d 828, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 22 (R.I. 1993).

Collateral References.

Measure and elements of restitution to which victim is entitled under state criminal statute. 15 A.L.R.5th 391.

Statutes providing for governmental compensation for victims of crime. 20 A.L.R.4th 63.

12-25-17. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Administrator” means the program administrator of this chapter.
  2. “Child” means an unmarried person who is under eighteen (18) years of age and includes a stepchild or an adopted child.
  3. “Court” means the superior court.
  4. “Dependent” means a person wholly or partially dependent upon the income of the victim at the time of his or her death or would have been so dependent but for the incapacity due to the injury from which the death resulted. The term includes a child of the victim born after the death of the victim.
  5. “Office” means the office of the general treasurer.
  6. “Pecuniary loss” includes:
    1. For personal injury:
      1. Medical expenses (including psychiatric care) for which the victim is not compensated by any other source;
      2. Hospital expenses for which the victim is not compensated by any other source;
      3. Loss of past earnings for which the victim is not compensated by any other source;
      4. Loss of future earnings because of a disability resulting from the personal injury for which the victim is not compensated by any other source; and
      5. Direct expenses related to the delivery or obtainment of medical or counseling services, or participation in criminal justice proceedings.
    2. For death:
      1. Funeral and burial expenses for which the victim’s estate is not compensated by any other source;
      2. Loss of support to the dependents of the victim for which the dependents are not compensated by any other source; and
      3. Direct expenses related to the participation in funeral services, counseling, or criminal justice proceedings.
    3. Any other expenses actually and necessarily incurred as a result of the personal injury or death for which the victim or his or her estate is not compensated by any other source, but it does not include property damage.
  7. “Personal injury” means actual bodily harm, mental or nervous shock, and a pregnancy resulting from sexual attack.
  8. “Relative” means a spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, and a spouse’s parents.
  9. “Resident” means any person who has his or her residence within the state of Rhode Island.
  10. “Secondary victim” means a child who suffers an emotional injury as a direct result of witnessing a homicide or incident of domestic violence.
  11. “State” includes the District of Columbia, the fifty (50) states, and the United States’ territories and possessions.
  12. “Treasurer” means the general treasurer of the state of Rhode Island or his or her designee.
  13. “Victim” means a person who is injured or killed by any act of a person or persons that is within the description of any of the offenses specified in § 12-25-20 and which act occurs in the state of Rhode Island. “Victim” also means a resident of the state of Rhode Island who is a victim of an act of terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331 occurring outside the United States or within the United States as referred to in 34 U.S.C. § 20105.
  14. “1972 Act” means the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1972, established pursuant to former §§ 12-25-1 12-25-1 2.1.
  15. “1996 Act” means the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1996, established pursuant to §§ 12-25-16 12-25-31 .

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3; P.L. 1997, ch. 183, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 317, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 16, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 110, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 174, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 341, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 350, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 451, § 4.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rearranged the definitions into alphabetical order and redesignated the subdivisions.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 16, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 18, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

This section was amended by five acts (P.L. 2017, ch. 110, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 174, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 341, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 350, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 451, § 4) as passed by the 2017 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all five acts.

P.L. 2017, ch. 110, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 174, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 341, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 350, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Personal Injury.

A victim who suffers an emotional injury need not satisfy the civil standard for recovery of damages for emotional distress in order to recover under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act. McCullough v. State, 490 A.2d 967, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 479 (R.I. 1985).

Victim.

There is no requirement that the victim be present or directly experience the offense in order to be entitled to compensation for her injuries. McCullough v. State, 490 A.2d 967, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 479 (R.I. 1985).

An indirect victim of a crime is entitled to compensation under the provisions of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act. Jones v. State, 495 A.2d 224, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 541 (R.I. 1985).

Plaintiffs, whose presence at the Adult Correctional Institution on the occasions in question was required so that they could properly discharge their duties as correctional officers, were injured in the performance of their duty and did not fall within the group of victims envisioned by the legislature. Brown v. State, 512 A.2d 875, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 528 (R.I. 1986).

Victims are those who were not there by choice or with knowledge of the risk they were incurring. Brown v. State, 512 A.2d 875, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 528 (R.I. 1986).

12-25-18. Program established.

  1. This chapter shall be administered by the office of the general treasurer.
  2. The office shall administer this chapter in accordance with the provisions of §§ 12-25-16 12-25-30 . The treasurer shall designate a program administrator.
  3. The administrator shall promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to effectuate the provisions and overall purpose of this chapter. The rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 42 of title 35.
  4. The rules and regulations shall include, but not be limited to, an application process for victims that is easy to understand. The process shall include, but not be limited to, the filing of claim forms, reference to bills and other documentation supporting the claim, and proof of dependency, if relevant. All claims must contain a release of information necessary to investigate the claim.
  5. All state and municipal departments and agencies, including law enforcement agencies, as well as hospitals, physicians, and other service providers, shall cooperate with the office in the investigation of claims filed pursuant to this chapter.
  6. The administrator shall investigate each application for compensation, verify the information contained on the application and in all supporting documentation and award or deny compensation under this chapter. The administrator shall mail notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, and first class mail, stating the amount of compensation to be awarded or denied, and the reasons for the award or denial.
  7. Within fifteen (15) days of the date of receipt of the notice of award or denial, the applicant may appeal the administrator’s decision, in writing, to the treasurer or the treasurer’s designee. The treasurer or treasurer’s designee shall reconsider any award of compensation for which an appeal is received. After reconsideration of the award, the treasurer or treasurer’s designee shall affirm the award or issue an amended award or denial.
  8. The administrator shall notify the applicant by certified mail, return receipt requested, and first class mail, of the decision upon appeal within thirty (30) days of receipt of the appeal. The notice shall include information regarding the applicants right to judicial review of the decision.
  9. Appeals of the treasurer’s or treasurer designee’s decision may be brought to superior court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 35 of title 42.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 2.

12-25-19. Awarding compensation.

  1. In any case in which a person is injured or killed by any act of a person or persons that is within the description of the offenses listed in § 12-25-20 , the victim, his or her guardian, the child advocate as provided in § 42-73-9.1 , or in the case of his or her death, a legal representative, may apply to the office for compensation. Additionally, a secondary victim or their guardian, the child advocate as provided in § 42-73-9.1 or a legal representative on behalf of a secondary victim, may apply to the office for compensation. The office shall provide notice of the application to the attorney general. The office may award compensation in accordance with the provisions of this chapter if the act occurs:
    1. Within the physical confines of the state of Rhode Island;
    2. Within the maritime jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island;
    3. Outside the state of Rhode Island to any victim who has his or her residence in the state of Rhode Island and had the residence in the state at the time that the offense occurred, and is not entitled to compensation of any kind from the state, possession, or territory or district of the United States in which the offense occurred; or
    4. Outside the state of Rhode Island to any victim, who had his or her residence in the state of Rhode Island at the time the offense occurred, who is injured or killed by an act of terrorism occurring either outside of the United States, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331, or within the United States as referred to in 34 U.S.C. § 20105.
  2. The office may award compensation as described in this section:
    1. To or on behalf of the injured person, or his or her guardian;
    2. In the case of the personal injury of the victim where the compensation is for pecuniary loss suffered or expenses incurred by any person responsible for the maintenance of the victim, to that person; or
    3. In the case of the death of the victim, to or for the benefit of the dependents or closest relative of the deceased victim, or any one or more of the dependents or to the legal representative of the victim.
  3. For the purposes of this chapter, a person shall be deemed to have intended an act notwithstanding that, by reason of age, insanity, drunkenness, or otherwise, he or she was legally incapable of forming a criminal intent.
    1. In determining whether to award compensation as described in this section and the amount of compensation, the office shall consider any circumstances it determines to be relevant, including, but not limited to:
      1. Compliance by the victim with the reasonable requests of law enforcement agencies and personnel;
      2. Violent felonious criminal conduct of the victim committed within the past five (5) years or subsequent to his or her injury;
      3. Any conviction of a crime of violence by the victim; and
      4. The behavior of the victim, including past behavior, that directly or indirectly contributed to his or her injury or death, unless the injury or death resulted from the victim’s lawful attempt to prevent the commission of a crime or to apprehend an offender. The office may reduce or deny an award based on these circumstances.
    2. Any individual who is incarcerated at any criminal institutional facility at the time of his or her injury shall be deemed ineligible to receive an award of compensation as described in this section.
  4. No compensation may be awarded unless the office so directs upon a finding that:
    1. The act did occur; and
    2. The injury or death resulted from the act.
  5. An award may be made under this section whether or not any person is prosecuted or convicted of any offense arising out of the act, or if the act is the subject of any other legal action. Upon application from the attorney general, the office shall suspend proceedings under this chapter until the application is withdrawn or until a prosecution for an offense arising out of the act is no longer pending or imminent. The office may suspend proceedings in the interest of justice if a criminal or civil action arising from the act is pending or imminent.
  6. The office shall pay to the person named in the award of compensation, and the payments shall be made from the violent crimes indemnity account and from any federal moneys available as coordinated by the office.
  7. Where compensable medical services have been rendered, any award made payable to a medical provider shall be based on the current final adjustment to charge ratio approved by the department of labor and training pursuant to chapter 33 of title 28 and applied by the Rhode Island workers’ compensation unit in establishing payout ratios for inpatient charges, emergency room charges, and ambulatory surgery charges. Amounts awarded for all other medical services shall be based on the current Rhode Island workers’ compensation medical fee schedule. If the provider employs a sliding scale fee structure for any category of patient or service, the award shall not exceed the amount the applicant would be charged if he or she qualified under the provider’s sliding scale fee structure. Medical service providers shall be required to accept these awards as full payment for services rendered and shall be prohibited from assessing any additional charges against the victim or secondary victim.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3; P.L. 1997, ch. 183, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 317, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 110, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 174, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 341, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 350, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations in subsection (d).

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by four acts (P.L. 2017, ch. 110, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 174, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 341, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 350, § 1) as passed by the 2017 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all four acts.

P.L. 2017, ch. 110, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 174, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 341, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 350, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Award Denied.

The plaintiffs, as the mother and siblings of a murdered child, fell within the definition of victim; however, compensation was unavailable to the plaintiffs following settlement of a lawsuit due to the § 12-25-6 (see now § 12-25-22 ) limitation on damages and the § 12-25-7 (see now § 12-25-23 ) requirement that recovered expenses be deducted. Cormier v. State, 667 A.2d 1263, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 272 (R.I. 1995).

Conviction Not Prerequisite.

The language of subsection (f) of former § 12-25-3, of which subsection (f) of this section is similar, clearly precluded the necessity of a conviction before recovery. State v. Doctor, 690 A.2d 321, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 47 (R.I. 1997).

Process.

“Forwarding” of process by mail was not sufficient to “commence” an action under the former Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, § 12-25-1 et seq., within the two-year limitation period in the act, where there was no evidence of delivery to the sheriff ’s office, and the plaintiff had obtained only inconclusive information concerning the status of process. Taveira v. Solomon, 528 A.2d 1105, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 546 (R.I. 1987).

Victim’s Behavior Contributing to Injury.

Although the plaintiff was injured as a result of a fight between rival groups of youths, and was hospitalized for approximately three weeks, his decision to stay at the fight and use his knife disqualified him as being a victim within the meaning of the former statute. Venable v. Solomon, 580 A.2d 483, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 151 (R.I. 1990).

12-25-20. Offenses to which chapter applies.

The office may award compensation in accordance with the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death which resulted from offenses in the following categories:

  1. Assault with intent to commit murder, robbery, or rape;
  2. Assault with a dangerous weapon;
  3. Assault and battery;
  4. Mayhem;
  5. Indecent assault and battery on a child under thirteen (13) years of age;
  6. Arson or statutory burning;
  7. Kidnapping;
  8. Robbery or larceny from that person;
  9. Murder;
  10. Manslaughter;
  11. First or second degree sexual assault;
  12. Child molestation, first or second degree;
  13. The abominable and detestable crime against nature or assault with intent to commit the abominable and detestable crime against nature;
  14. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs;
  15. Refusal by a driver to submit to a chemical test for alcohol or drugs in the immediate aftermath of a collision;
  16. Driving so as to endanger, resulting in death, pursuant to § 31-27-1 ;
  17. Driving so as to endanger, resulting in personal injury, pursuant to § 31-27-1.1 ;
  18. Any other crime excluding motor vehicle offenses other than those enumerated in this section which results in personal injury or death; and
  19. Failure to stop by a driver in circumstances which result in the death of any person, pursuant to § 31-26-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3; P.L. 1997, ch. 183, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 317, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-25-21. Nature of compensation.

  1. The office may award compensation under this chapter for:
    1. Expenses actually and reasonably incurred as a result of the personal injury or death of the victim;
    2. Pecuniary loss to the dependents of the deceased victim;
    3. Any other pecuniary loss resulting from the personal injury or death of the victim, the amount of which the office finds upon the evidence to be reasonable and necessary;
    4. The administrator may issue a supplemental award for compensation for additional medical expenses, including psychiatric care and mental health counseling, provided that the victim provides proper documentation that the additional medical expenses have been actually and reasonably incurred as a direct result of the personal injury. The administrator shall issue a supplemental award as long as the total award does not exceed the maximum award allowable under this chapter;
    5. The administrator may issue an award for expenses related to psychiatric care and mental health counseling for a parent, spouse, sibling or child of a victim who dies as a direct result of a violent crime as defined in this chapter, provided that the parent, spouse, sibling or child provide proper documentation that the psychiatric care and mental health counseling have been actually and reasonably incurred as a direct result of the death of the victim; and
    6. The administrator may issue an award for expenses related to psychiatric care and mental health counseling for a secondary victim, provided that the secondary victim provides proper documentation that the psychiatric care and mental health counseling have been actually and reasonably incurred as a direct result of witnessing the homicide of a victim or the domestic violence incident against a victim. An award issued to a secondary victim for psychiatric care and mental health counseling shall not exceed one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) and shall not be paid upon a secondary victim reaching the age of eighteen (18).
  2. In determining the amount of the judgment or order approving a settlement, the office shall take into consideration the rates and amounts payable for injuries and death under other statutes of this state and of the United States, and the amount of revenue in the violent crimes indemnity account and the number and nature of claims pending against it. The office shall make every effort to ensure that compensation awards are paid within six (6) months of the date of application.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 205, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 110, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 174, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment deleted former subdivisions (2) and (4) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 125, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 205, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 110, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 174, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Death Following Claim.

When a victim of a violent crime claims compensation for pain and suffering and later dies, that claim survives the death and the estate of the victim may recover such compensation. Ayers-Schaffner v. Solomon, 461 A.2d 396, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 968 (R.I. 1983).

Pain and Suffering.

The amount to be awarded for pain and suffering is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, and the award will not be disturbed unless the amount shocks the conscience or indicates that the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice or that it proceeded on some erroneous basis. Jones v. State, 495 A.2d 224, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 541 (R.I. 1985).

12-25-21.1. Emergency fund for victims.

  1. The office may award emergency compensation under this chapter for the: (1) Burial expenses of a victim who dies as a direct result of a violent crime as defined in this chapter; (2) Cost of the crime scene clean up; and (3) Relocation expenses.
  2. The award for emergency compensation shall be awarded at the sole discretion of the program administrator. The administrator may promulgate rules and regulations to administer the provisions of this section.
  3. An award for emergency compensation for burial expenses shall not exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
  4. An award for emergency compensation for crime scene clean up shall not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000).
  5. An award for emergency compensation for relocation costs shall not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000).
  6. The award for emergency compensation for burial expenses, crime scene clean up, and relocation costs shall be deducted from the final award. In the event the victim is not eligible for an award, the victim shall repay the amount of the emergency award to the fund.
  7. Any payments made for the emergency compensation shall be deducted from the final award. In no event shall the final award exceed the maximum award of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 299, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 272, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 356, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 15, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 17, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 187, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 299, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2013, ch. 272, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 356, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 15, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 17, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

12-25-22. Limitations upon awarding compensation.

  1. Actions for compensation under this chapter shall be commenced within three (3) years after the date of the injury or death, and no compensation shall be awarded for an injury or death resulting from a crime that was not reported to the appropriate law enforcement authority within fifteen (15) days of its occurrence; provided, that the office shall have the authority to allow a claim that was not reported pursuant to this section when the victim or secondary victim was below the age of eighteen (18) years of age, or of unsound mind, or for good cause shown.
  2. No compensation shall be awarded under this chapter to the victim, or in the case of death to dependent relatives or to the legal representative, in a total amount in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) plus any attorney fees awarded upon appeal to the treasurer or to the superior court pursuant to § 12-25-25 .
  3. No compensation shall be awarded under this chapter to a secondary victim in a total amount in excess of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500).
  4. No compensation shall be awarded when the office, in its discretion, determines that unjust enrichment to or on behalf of the offender would result. Compensation under this chapter shall not be awarded to any victim or dependent relative or legal representative if the award would directly or indirectly inure to the benefit of the offender.
  5. No interest shall be included in or added to an award of compensation under this chapter.
  6. When the plaintiff is the victim’s estate, it shall only be awarded compensation for the victim’s actual medical, hospital, funeral, and burial expenses for which the victim or his or her estate is not compensated by any other source and for the loss of support to the dependents of the victim.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 110, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 174, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 341, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 350, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by four acts (P.L. 2017, ch. 110, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 174, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 341, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 350, § 1) as passed by the 2017 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all four acts.

P.L. 2017, ch. 110, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 174, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 341, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 350, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

The plaintiffs, as the mother and siblings of a murdered child, fell within the definition of victim under § 12-25-3 (see now § 12-25-17 ); however, compensation was unavailable to the plaintiffs following settlement of a lawsuit due to this section’s limitation on damages and the § 12-25-7 (see now § 12-25-23 ) requirement that recovered expenses be deducted. Cormier v. State, 667 A.2d 1263, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 272 (R.I. 1995).

Recovery by Estate.

The 1984 amendment (P.L. 1984, ch. 354, § 2) to former § 12-25-6 adding subsection (e) was applicable to a case which was being appealed at the time the amendment became effective and precluded recovery by the estate of a deceased victim for the victim’s pain and suffering, as well as compensation for “pecuniary loss”. Pezzulli v. State, 494 A.2d 540, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 534 (R.I. 1985).

12-25-23. Terms of the award.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, any award of compensation under this chapter may be made on terms that the office deems appropriate.
  2. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act shall be regarded as a fund of last resort. Accordingly, the office shall deduct from any payments awarded under this chapter any payments received by the victim or by any of his or her dependents from the offender or from any person on behalf of the offender, or from the United States (except those received under this chapter), the state of Rhode Island or any state or any of its subdivisions, or from any insurance carrier, for personal injury or death compensable under this chapter, including lost wages, but only to the extent that the sum of the payments and any award under this chapter are in excess of the total compensable injuries suffered by the victim as determined by the office.
  3. Any person who: (1) submits a false or fraudulent application; (2) intentionally makes or causes to be made any false statement or representation of a material fact in relation to any claim pending before the office; or (3) intentionally conceals or fails to disclose information affecting the amount or the initial or continued right to any award; shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations in subsection (c).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

The plaintiffs, as the mother and siblings of a murdered child, fell within the definition of victim under § 12-25-3 (see now § 12-25-17 ); however, compensation was unavailable to the plaintiffs following settlement of a lawsuit due to the § 12-25-6 (see now § 12-25-22 ) limitation on damages and this section’s requirement that recovered expenses be deducted. Cormier v. State, 667 A.2d 1263, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 272 (R.I. 1995).

Life Insurance.

Subsection (b) precludes an award to the estate of the victim where the plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate, has already received life insurance proceeds in excess of the amount of damages calculated by the court. Lake v. State, 507 A.2d 1349, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 449 (R.I. 1986).

12-25-24. Subrogation — Prohibited.

No third party which has provided any compensation to the injured victim shall have any claim against the funds awarded pursuant to this chapter to the victim or in the case of death to the victim’s estate.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3.

12-25-25. Attorneys’ fees.

  1. The treasurer may award attorneys’ fees pursuant to this section from the violent crimes indemnity account for successful appeals of the administrator’s awards of compensation brought pursuant to § 12-25-18(g) .
  2. The superior court may award attorneys’ fees pursuant to this section from the violent crimes indemnity account for successful appeals of treasurer’s office awards of compensation brought pursuant to § 12-25-18(i) .
    1. At the conclusion of the appeal proceedings, the attorney representing the plaintiff shall file a statement with the treasurer or court setting forth the amount of fee proposed to be charged in connection with his or her efforts and services rendered in the proceedings.
    2. In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded an attorney, the treasurer or the court shall consider the time expended by the plaintiff ’s attorney in preparation, in settlement negotiations, and in court or hearing attendance, the total amount awarded to the plaintiff for injuries incurred, and the amount of revenue in the violent crimes indemnity account, together with the number and the nature of claims pending against it.
    3. The amount of compensation awarded to plaintiff ’s attorney shall not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the total amount awarded to the plaintiff, or fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), whichever is less; provided, that in unusual circumstances, the treasurer or court may award a larger attorney’s fee if it finds that a departure from the limits set forth in this subsection is warranted, stating specific reasons upon which the finding and award is based.
    4. Attorneys’ fees shall not be awarded in those cases brought by the office of the child advocate.
  3. After the fee information is filed by an attorney under subsection (a) of this section, the treasurer or court shall determine whether the proposed fee conforms with the standards set forth in subsection (a) of this section. If the treasurer or court initially determines that the proposed fee does not so conform, the treasurer or court shall, upon notice to the attorney, determine the amount of a reasonable fee to be awarded in accordance with those standards.
  4. Any attorney who charges, demands, receives or collects for services rendered in connection with any proceedings under this chapter any amount in excess of that allowed under this section, if any compensation is paid, shall be subject to disciplinary action and other appropriate action to be taken by the bar association of the state of Rhode Island.
  5. Upon certification by the treasurer or court to the effect that the fee has been established, the administrator shall pay to the attorney named in the certification the amount of the counsel fee which shall be paid from the violent crimes indemnity account.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evaluating Appropriate Fee.

After the plaintiff’s attorney has filed a statement setting forth the amount proposed, the trial justice, in awarding a fee, shall consider the time expended by the attorney in preparation and in court attendance, the total amount awarded to the plaintiff for injuries incurred, and the amount of revenue in the indemnity fund (now account), together with the number and nature of the claims pending against it. Jones v. State, 495 A.2d 224, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 541 (R.I. 1985).

Rejection of Proposed Fee.
— Hearing.

If the trial justice rejects the proposed fee, the trial justice shall, upon notice to the attorney, hold a hearing to determine the amount of the fee. Jones v. State, 495 A.2d 224, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 541 (R.I. 1985).

12-25-26. Recovery from offender.

  1. Whenever any person is convicted of an offense and compensation is awarded under this chapter or under the 1972 Act for a personal injury or death resulting from the act constituting the offense, the state of Rhode Island shall institute an action against that person for the recovery of the whole or any specified part of the compensation in the superior court of the state of Rhode Island in any county, or in the state or federal court of any other state or district in which that person resides or is found, or make a finding in writing, of the reasons why it is impractical or impossible to institute that action. The office shall pursue the recovery whenever possible in order to provide additional funds for the violent crimes indemnity account. The administrator shall develop rules and regulations pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 35 of title 42, to identify those so convicted, determine their ability to compensate the fund, and file whatever action is appropriate to recoup those funds.
  2. Process of the superior court for any county in any action under this section may be served by the sheriff of the county. Whenever it appears to the court in which any action under this section is pending that other parties should be brought before the court in the action, the court may cause those other parties to be summoned.
  3. An order for the payment of compensation under this chapter or under the 1972 Act shall not affect the right of any person to recover damages from any other person by a civil action for the injury or death.
  4. An action instituted by the state of Rhode Island against any person for the recovery of the whole or any specified part of the compensation awarded under this chapter or under the 1972 Act shall be commenced within ten (10) years from the date compensation is awarded, and not thereafter.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 2.

12-25-27. Reports to the senate and the house of representatives.

The office shall coordinate the violent crimes indemnity funds and any federal moneys available, and shall transmit to the governor and to the legislature an annual report setting forth:

  1. The amount of money in the fund at the start of the year;
  2. The amount of payments ordered to be contributed to the fund during the year;
  3. The amount of funds collected during the year;
  4. The number of claims filed during the year;
  5. The number of claims adjudicated during the year;
  6. The number of claims adjudicated in which the victim was awarded compensation;
  7. The number of claims adjudicated in which the victim was denied compensation;
  8. The total amount of money disbursed from the fund during the year;
  9. The projected wait to receive compensation for cases filed that year; and
  10. Any proposed legislative and other changes in the program.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations.

12-25-28. Special indemnity account for criminal injuries compensation.

  1. It is provided that the general treasurer establish a violent crimes indemnity account within the general fund for the purpose of paying awards granted pursuant to this chapter. The court shall assess as court costs in addition to those provided by law, against all defendants charged with a felony, misdemeanor, or petty misdemeanor, whether or not the crime was a crime of violence, and who plead nolo contendere, guilty or who are found guilty of the commission of those crimes as follows:
    1. Where the offense charged is a felony and carries a maximum penalty of five (5) or more years imprisonment, one hundred and fifty dollars ($150) or fifteen percent (15%) of any fine imposed on the defendant by the court, whichever is greater.
    2. Where the offense charged is a felony and carries a maximum penalty of less than five (5) years imprisonment, ninety dollars ($90.00) or fifteen percent (15%) of any fine imposed on the defendant by the court, whichever is greater.
    3. Where the offense charged is a misdemeanor, thirty dollars ($30.00) or fifteen percent (15%) of any fine imposed on the defendant by the court, whichever is greater.
  2. These costs shall be assessed whether or not the defendant is sentenced to prison and in no case shall they be waived by the court unless the court finds an inability to pay.
  3. When there are multiple counts or multiple charges to be disposed of simultaneously, the judge shall have the authority to suspend the obligation of the defendant to pay on all counts or charges above two (2).
  4. Up to fifteen percent (15%) of the state funds raised under this section, as well as federal matching funds, shall be available to pay administrative expenses necessary to operate this program. Federal funds for this purpose shall not supplant currently available state funds, as required by federal law.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3; P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 25, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 297, § 6; P.L. 2008, ch. 326, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by three acts (P.L. 2008, ch. 100, art. 25, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 297, § 6; P.L. 2008, ch. 326, § 6) passed by the 2008 General Assembly. Since the changes are not in conflict with each other, this section is set out as amended by all three acts.

P.L. 2008, ch. 297, § 6, and P.L. 2008, ch. 326, § 6, enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Bail Forfeiture.

The court appropriately ordered the forfeiture of the surety’s bail and the deposit of the full amount of the forfeited bail into the violent-crimes indemnity account. State v. Werner, 667 A.2d 770, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 254 (R.I. 1995).

12-25-29. Use of funds to inform victims of their rights.

There is appropriated to the annual budget of the administrative office of the state courts fifteen percent (15%) of the fund collected annually under § 12-25-28 , not to exceed one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000), to be used at the direction of the chief justice of the supreme court for the purpose of informing the victims of crime of their rights established by chapter 28 of this title and assisting victims in the exercise of these rights. In addition, the treasurer and administrator shall seek to inform victims of violent crime of this chapter using every available means at their disposal.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3; P.L. 2012, ch. 365, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 387, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 365, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 387, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

12-25-30. Deposit of funds.

All moneys assessed pursuant to § 12-25-28 as costs against defendants as provided in this chapter shall be paid by the clerks of the family, district and superior courts to the treasurer, who shall keep the funds in the violent crimes indemnity account. Funds received by the treasurer in excess of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) shall be made available and distributed within thirty (30) days of receipt in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 434, § 3.

12-25-30.1. Disclosure of records as to claims; confidentiality.

All medical records, mental health counseling records, employment information, personal financial information and investigative records received, obtained or maintained by the administrator in connection with any application for compensation shall be maintained as confidential investigative material and shall not be released or disclosed to any person or entity whatsoever, except as authorized by the applicant or as otherwise provided by law. The application and the notice of award or denial shall be deemed public records.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 125, § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 128, § 3.

12-25-31. Severability.

If any provision to this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter, which can be given effect without the invalid provisions or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 183, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 317, § 2.

Chapter 25.1 Criminal Royalties

12-25.1-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Criminal Royalties Distribution Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 328, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The Criminal Royalties Act is unconstitutional; not only is the act overbroad because it affects all expressive activity and thus violates the First Amendment, it also suffers from underinclusiveness. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

— Severability.

Although the act contains a severability clause, § 12-25.1-12 , the unconstitutional portion of the act is indispensable to the rest of the act and cannot be severed without destroying legislative intent; the act is therefore invalid in its entirety. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

12-25.1-2. Definitions.

For purposes of this chapter:

  1. “Alleged criminally responsible person” means a person who has been indicted or against whom a criminal information has been proferred for the commission of a felony committed within the state of Rhode Island which caused another person to suffer personal injury or loss of property, but who has not yet been either convicted or acquitted of the charge nor had the charge dismissed.
  2. “Child” means an unmarried person who is under eighteen (18) years of age and includes a stepchild or an adopted child.
  3. “Commercial exploitation” means any significant commercial exploitation by means of any publication, reenactment, dramatization, interview, depiction, explanation, or expression through any medium of communication which is undertaken for financial consideration, except tangential and incidental references to a crime. The term includes, but is not limited to, a movie, book, magazine or newspaper article, tape recording, still photograph, radio or television program, live presentation, or reproduction or presentation of any kind.
  4. “Convicted,” as used in this chapter only, means a person who has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of a felony offense, regardless of the fine, sentence or other punishment imposed or who has been found guilty after a trial on a charge of a felony offense.
  5. “Court” means the superior court.
  6. “Criminally responsible person” means a person who has been convicted of a felony committed within the state of Rhode Island which caused another person to suffer personal injury or loss of property, or who has been adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity after a trial on a charge of the offense, or who has voluntarily admitted the commission of the offense.
  7. “Dependent” means a person wholly or partially dependent upon the income of the victim at the time of his or her death or would have been so dependent but for the incapacity due to the injury from which the death resulted, and includes a child of the victim born after the death of the victim.
  8. “Pecuniary loss” includes:
    1. For personal injury:
      1. Medical expenses (including psychiatric care);
      2. Hospital expenses;
      3. Loss of past earnings; and
      4. Loss of future earnings because of a disability resulting from personal injury;
    2. For death:
      1. Funeral and burial expenses; and
      2. Loss of support to the dependents of the victim; and
    3. Any other expenses actually and necessarily incurred as a result of the personal injury or death.
  9. “Personal injury” means actual bodily harm, mental or nervous shock, or a pregnancy.
  10. “Relative” means a spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, and a spouse’s parents.
  11. “Victim” means a person who suffers personal injury or loss of property as a direct result of the conduct of another person in perpetration of a criminal offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 328, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 240, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the paragraphs in subdivision (8).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The Criminal Royalties Act is unconstitutional; not only is the act overbroad because it affects all expressive activity and thus violates the First Amendment, it also suffers from underinclusiveness. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

— Severability.

Although the act contains a severability clause, § 12-25.1-12 , the unconstitutional portion of the act is indispensable to the rest of the act and cannot be severed without destroying legislative intent; the act is therefore invalid in its entirety. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

Juvenile Crimes.

The legislature intended and contemplated that an act for which a juvenile is adjudged delinquent should be considered a crime in the context of a civil action brought by the victim of the crime; such acts likewise retain their criminal character under the Criminal Royalties Act, which is also a civil remedy for victims of crime. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

The felonious nature of the defendant’s behavior was not negated, for purposes of the Criminal Royalties Act, by the defendant’s status as a juvenile at the time he committed the murders. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

12-25.1-3. Confiscation of criminal royalties — Criminal royalties fund — Priority of claims against criminal royalties fund.

  1. Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal entity contracting with a criminally responsible person, alleged criminally responsible person, or with the legal representative or assignee of the person regarding the commercial exploitation of the events and circumstances constituting and/or surrounding and/or motivating the crime or alleged crime shall submit a copy of the contract, within ten (10) days of the making of the contract, to the general treasurer and shall pay over to the general treasurer, within ten (10) days of it becoming due and payable, any and all monies or other compensation which would otherwise by the terms of the contract be due and payable to or distributed at the direction of that person. All rights, causes of action, or other entitlements accruing to any criminally responsible person, alleged criminally responsible person, or the legal representative or assignee of the person for the commercial exploitation shall inure to and be enforceable by the general treasurer for the benefit of the criminal royalties fund established by this chapter.
  2. All monies paid to or recovered by the general treasurer pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be collectively known as the “criminal royalties fund.” Except as required for payment of awards under this chapter, the general treasurer shall manage and invest the criminal royalties fund in accordance with § 35-10-11 .
    1. Claims against any portion of the criminal royalties fund attributable to a specific criminally responsible person shall have the following priorities:
      1. Claims by the state for costs incurred in providing defense counsel for the criminally responsible person by means of the public defender or a court appointed attorney;
      2. Claims by the state and its political subdivisions for costs incurred in the investigation of the crime and the prosecution and trial of the criminally responsible person;
      3. Claims by the victim or victims of the criminally responsible person pursuant to § 12-25.1-4 ;
      4. Claims by the state pursuant to § 12-25-26 ;
      5. Civil judgments in favor of the victim or victims of the criminally responsible person;
      6. After claims arising under paragraphs (i) — (v) of this subdivision have been resolved and the statute of limitations for the claims has expired, one-half (1/2) of the remainder of the funds attributable to a specific criminally responsible person shall be transferred to the violent crimes indemnity fund established by § 12-25-28 ;
      7. Claims by other creditors of the criminally responsible person; and
      8. Claims by the criminally responsible person or persons claiming through him or her.
    2. Claims against the criminal royalties fund shall be made against the portion of the fund attributable to the specific criminally responsible person and not against the fund as a whole. No payment shall be made out of the fund when that payment would be in derogation of claims, either present or pending, entitled to a higher priority under this subsection. The general treasurer may bring an action of interpleader or an action for a declaratory judgment where he or she cannot determine the priority of claims and the proper disposition of funds. Monies in the fund shall not be subject to execution, levy, attachment, or lien except in accordance with the priorities set forth in this subsection. Any party aggrieved by a final determination and order of the general treasurer arising from his administration of the criminal royalties fund may seek judicial review of the decision pursuant to The Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 35 of title 42.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 328, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 24.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the paragraphs in subdivision (c)(1).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The Criminal Royalties Act is unconstitutional; not only is the act overbroad because it affects all expressive activity and thus violates the First Amendment, it also suffers from underinclusiveness. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

— Severability.

Although the act contains a severability clause, § 12-25.1-12 , the unconstitutional portion of the act is indispensable to the rest of the act and cannot be severed without destroying legislative intent; the act is therefore invalid in its entirety. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

Juvenile Crimes.

The legislature intended and contemplated that an act for which a juvenile is adjudged delinquent should be considered a crime in the context of a civil action brought by the victim of the crime; such acts likewise retain their criminal character under the Criminal Royalties Act, which is also a civil remedy for victims of crime. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

The felonious nature of the defendant’s behavior was not negated, for purposes of the Criminal Royalties Act, by the defendant’s status as a juvenile at the time he committed the murders. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

12-25.1-4. Awards of compensation from the criminal royalties fund.

  1. A victim, his or her guardian, or in the case of a deceased victim, his or her legal representative, within three (3) years of the last payment to or recovery by the criminal royalties fund of monies attributable to the criminally responsible person whose portion of the fund is to be charged, may petition the court for compensation from that portion of the fund. Notice of the action shall be accorded the criminally responsible person in the manner and in the form prescribed by the court after filing of the petition. In the event that the whereabouts of the criminally responsible person are neither known nor discoverable through diligent and reasonable inquiry, the circumstance shall be made a matter of record by affidavit to the court. The criminally responsible person whose portion of the fund is to be charged shall have the right to contest any petition pursuant to this section.
  2. No award of compensation may be entered unless the court, sitting without a jury, finds that:
    1. The victim did suffer personal injury or loss of property as a result of conduct in this state in perpetration of a criminal offense by the criminally responsible person whose portion of the fund is to be charged;
    2. That the victim was not a co-conspirator with or an accessory to the criminally responsible person in the perpetration of the criminal offense;
    3. That the person whose portion of the fund is to be charged has been convicted of the criminal offense or otherwise determined to be the criminally responsible person within the meaning of this chapter; and
    4. The portion of the criminal royalties fund sought to be charged is attributable to the criminally responsible person shown to have caused the victim’s personal injury.
    1. The court may award compensation:
      1. To or on behalf of the victim, or his or her guardian;
      2. In the case of the personal injury of the victim, where the compensation is for pecuniary loss suffered or expenses incurred by any person responsible for the maintenance of the victim, to that person; or
      3. In the case of the death of the victim, to or for the benefit of the dependents or closest relative of the deceased victim, or any one or more of those dependents, or to the legal representative of the victim.
    2. An award of compensation shall be limited to:
      1. Expenses actually and reasonably incurred as a result of the personal injury or death of the victim;
      2. Pecuniary loss to the personally injured victim or the dependents of the deceased victim;
      3. Pain and suffering of the personally injured victim;
      4. Any other pecuniary loss resulting from the personal injury or death of the victim, the amount of which the court finds upon the evidence to be reasonable and necessary; and
      5. The amount of the fair market value of the lost or stolen property.
    3. In determining the amount of an award, the court may consider any circumstances it determines to be relevant, including the behavior of the victim which directly or indirectly contributed to his or her injury or death or loss of property, unless the injury or death resulted from the victim’s lawful attempt to prevent the commission of a crime or to apprehend a criminally responsible person. No interest shall be included in or added to an award of compensation under this chapter. No compensation shall be awarded if the victim was at the time of the personal injury or death or loss of property of the victim living with the criminally responsible person as his wife or her husband or in other situations, when the court, in its discretion, feels unjust enrichment to or on behalf of the criminally responsible person would result. Compensation under this chapter shall not be awarded to any victim or dependent relative or legal representative if the award would, directly or indirectly, inure to the benefit of the criminally responsible person.
  3. Upon certification by the court, the general treasurer shall pay to the person named in the award the amount specified in it from the appropriate portion of the criminal royalties fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 328, § 1.

12-25.1-4.1. Assets available.

A victim, his or her guardian, or in the case of a deceased victim, his or her legal representative, in addition to any rights conveyed pursuant to this chapter, may seek recovery from any of the criminally responsible person’s assets. A victim may proceed against the defendant’s assets, whether or not these assets represent royalties obtained from the commercial exploitation of the crime.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 240, § 2.

12-25.1-5. Attorneys’ fees.

At the conclusion of the proceedings under § 12-25.1-4 , the attorney representing a claimant who has received an award of compensation shall file a statement with the court setting forth the amount of fee proposed to be charged in connection with his or her efforts and services rendered in the proceedings. After the fee information is filed by the attorney, the court shall determine whether the proposed fee is reasonable. If the court initially determines that the proposed fee is unreasonable, the court shall, upon notice to the attorney, determine the amount of a reasonable fee. Upon certification by the court to the effect that the fee has been established, the general treasurer shall pay to the attorney named in the certification the amount of the counsel fee which shall be paid from the appropriate portion of the criminal royalties fund. Any attorney who charges, demands, receives, or collects for services rendered in connection with any proceedings under this chapter any amount in excess of that allowed under this section, if any compensation is paid, shall be subject to disciplinary action and other appropriate action to be taken by the supreme court of the state of Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 328, § 1.

12-25.1-6. Return of monies to criminally responsible person.

  1. No funds attributable to a specific alleged criminally responsible person shall be distributed unless and until that person is determined to be criminally responsible as defined in this chapter. Immediately upon the dismissal of charges or the acquittal of the person for the crime which was the subject of the commercial exploitation, all funds recovered by the general treasurer attributable to that person shall be paid to him or her together with any interest which accrued on those funds.
  2. Subject to the disposition of all claims and pending claims which have been brought against the funds attributable to the criminally responsible person, he or she may recover the remainder of the funds pursuant to § 12-25.1-3(c)(1)(viii) three (3) years and six (6) months following the last payment to or recovery by the general treasurer of the funds.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 328, § 1.

12-25.1-7. Statute of limitations.

Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of the general or public laws with respect to the timely bringing of an action, all claims brought against the criminal royalties fund shall be brought within three (3) years of accrual or three (3) years of the last payment to or recovery by the general treasurer of funds or other compensation attributable to the criminally responsible person, whichever is later.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 328, § 1.

12-25.1-8. Public notice.

The general treasurer, at least once every six (6) months for three (3) years from the date he or she receives those moneys, shall cause to have published a legal notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the state advising potential claimants that those funds are available to satisfy money judgments pursuant to this chapter. The general treasurer may, in his or her discretion, provide for any additional notice that he or she deems necessary. The expenses of the advertisements shall be charged against the appropriate portion of the fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 328, § 1.

12-25.1-9. Legal expenses of criminally responsible person.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the general treasurer shall make payments from the portion of the criminal royalties fund attributable to a criminally responsible person to that person upon order of the court after a showing that the monies shall be used exclusively for the purpose of retaining legal representation at any stage of the criminal proceedings against the person with respect to the events or conduct being the subject of the commercial exploitation giving rise to the monies paid to or recovered by the criminal royalties fund; provided, that the total of all payments made pursuant to this section shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the total monies in the applicable portion of the criminal royalties fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 328, § 1.

12-25.1-10. Subterfuge.

Any action taken by or on behalf of any criminally responsible person to circumvent, impede, or frustrate the purpose of this chapter shall be null and void.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 328, § 1.

12-25.1-11. Failure to comply.

Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal entity which enters into a contract within the scope of § 12-25.1-3 but fails to comply with the provisions of this chapter shall be liable to the criminal royalties fund for double the amount which the person or entity should have paid over to the general treasurer pursuant to the contract.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 328, § 1.

12-25.1-12. Severability.

If any of the provisions of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, its invalidity shall not affect other provisions or application of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 328, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Although the act contains this section, the unconstitutional portion of the act is indispensable to the rest of the act and cannot be severed without destroying legislative intent; the act is therefore invalid in its entirety. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (R.I. 1997).

Chapter 26 Special Commission on Criminal Justice

12-26-1. Special commission on criminal justice established.

  1. There is created a commission to be known as the special commission on criminal justice. The commission shall consist of nineteen (19) members: three (3) of whom shall be from the house of representatives, not more than two (2) of whom shall be from the same political party, to be appointed by the speaker; three (3) of whom shall be from the senate, not more than two (2) of whom shall be from the same political party, to be appointed by the president of the senate; eight (8) of whom shall be the chief justice of the supreme court, the presiding justice of the superior court, the chief judge of the family court, the chief judge of the district court, the attorney general, the public defender, the mental health advocate, and the state court administrator, all of whom shall serve ex officio; one of whom shall be a member of the bar association who has experience in criminal practice to be appointed by the governor; four (4) of whom shall be representative of the public to be appointed by the governor and to serve for terms of two (2) years. All ex officio members shall have the right to vote on all matters which are considered by the commission.
  2. Vacancies on the commission shall be filled in like manner as the original appointment.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 113, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 12.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 159, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect on January 7, 2003.

12-26-2. Purpose.

The purpose of the commission established by this chapter shall be to develop and implement, on a continuing basis, standards and priorities designed to accomplish the comprehensive and orderly reform of the criminal justice system, and to make recommendations to both the general assembly and the courts for the improvement of the criminal justice system.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 113, § 1.

12-26-3. Organization.

The members of the commission shall meet at the call of the speaker of the house of representatives and organize and shall select a chairperson from among themselves.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 113, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 19.

12-26-4. Duties.

The duties of the commission shall include:

  1. Completion and publication of a comparative analysis of Rhode Island’s criminal procedures and practices with those standards for criminal justice recommended by the American Bar Association and by the President’s National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals;
  2. Conducting a study for the purpose of revising the statutes relating to crimes and punishments;
  3. Conducting a study of sentencing criteria and procedures;
  4. Reviewing court organization;
  5. Developing a comprehensive strategy to resolve problems encountered in the administration of criminal justice;
  6. Studying any matter relating to the criminal justice system deemed worthy by the commission; and
  7. Recommending legislation and rules of court for the improvement of criminal justice.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 113, § 1.

12-26-5. Annual report.

The commission shall report its findings and recommendations to the general assembly annually, on or before April 1 of each year.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 113, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 19.

12-26-6. Compensation — Clerical assistance — Cooperation of departments and agencies — Quarters.

  1. The membership of the commission shall receive no compensation for their services but shall be allowed their travel and necessary expenses.
  2. The commission may engage any clerical, technical, and other assistance that it may deem necessary, and spend other funds to accomplish its purpose.
  3. All departments and agencies of the state shall furnish any advice and information, documentary and otherwise, to the commission and its agents that is deemed necessary or desirable by the commission to facilitate the purposes of this chapter.
  4. The director of administration is authorized and directed to provide suitable quarters for the commission.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 113, § 1.

Chapter 27 Adjudication of Obscene Publications

12-27-1. Authority of attorney general.

Whenever the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that a person is engaged in the sale, exhibition, or commercial distribution of any obscene book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material, the attorney general may institute a proceeding in the superior court in the county in which the sale, exhibition, or commercial distribution of the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material occurs for an adjudication of the obscenity of the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 257, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31.1-1 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Cross References.

Obscene publications, § 11-31-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Modern concept of obscenity. 5 A.L.R.3d 1158.

Validity of procedures designed to protect the public against obscenity. 5 A.L.R.3d 1214; 93 A.L.R.3d 217.

12-27-2. Contents of petition.

The proceedings shall be instituted by filing with the court a petition:

  1. Directed against the book, print, picture, films, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballard, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material;
  2. Alleging its obscene nature; and
  3. Listing the names and addresses if known, of the author, publisher, and all other persons interested in its sale, exhibition, or commercial distribution.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 257, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31.1-2; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

12-27-3. Court examination — Order of notice.

Upon the filing of a petition pursuant to § 12-27-2 , the court shall immediately examine the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material alleged to be obscene. If an examination is not possible, the court may rely upon sworn allegations contained in the petition. If the court finds no probable cause to believe that the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material is obscene, the court shall dismiss the petition. If the court finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material is obscene, the court may issue an order of notice returnable in or within thirty (30) days, directed against the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photographs, figment, or other material by name or suitable identity, and addressed to all persons interested in the publication, sale, distribution, or exhibition of it. The petition shall then come on for a hearing to determine whether or not the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material is obscene. Notice of the order shall be published once a week for two (2) successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation within the county or city in which the proceeding is filed, and if their names and addresses are known a copy of the order shall be served by registered mail upon the author, publisher, exhibitor, and all other persons interested in the sale or commercial distribution of the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 257, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31.1-3; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

12-27-4. Restraining order.

When an order of notice is issued pursuant to § 12-27-3 , the court may issue a temporary restraining order against the sale, exhibition, or commercial distribution of the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material alleged to be obscene; and in that event, the matter shall be heard on the question of whether or not the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material is obscene one day after the joinder of issue, and the court shall render a decision within forty-eight (48) hours of the conclusion of the hearing. If, in the event that a restraining order is issued, no hearing on the question of obscenity is commenced within one day after the joinder of issue through no fault of the respondent, or within forty-eight (48) hours of the conclusion of the hearing no decision is rendered by the court, the restraining order shall expire and it shall not be renewed. In determining the time periods set forth in this section, Saturdays, Sundays, and court holidays shall not be counted, and the court shall not be required to hear matters on those days.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 257, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31.1-4; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

Rules of Court.

For procedure for injunction, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P., Rule 65.

12-27-5. Parties to hearing.

On or before the return date specified in the order of notice issued pursuant to § 12-27-3 , the author, publisher, and any person interested in the sale, exhibition, or commercial distribution of the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material may appear and file an answer. The court shall by order permit any other person or persons, not to exceed five (5), to appear and file answers as amicus curiae. In the absence of any other answer having been filed in the court, amicus curiae may participate in hearings thereafter as a party or parties.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 257, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31.1-5; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-27-6. Unanswered cases.

If no one appears and files an answer on or before the return date specified in the order of notice, the court, upon being satisfied that the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material is obscene, may order the clerk of court to enter a decree or order that the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material is obscene, but the court, in its discretion, may except from its decree a restricted category of persons to whom the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material may be exhibited, sold, or distributed.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 257, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31.1-6; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

12-27-7. Hearing in answered case.

If an appearance is entered and an answer filed, the court shall order the proceedings set on the calendar for a prompt hearing, which in the event a temporary restraining order has been issued, shall occur within the time limit specifically set forth in § 12-27-4 . The court shall conduct the hearing in accordance with the rules of civil procedure applicable to the trial of cases by the court without a jury. At the hearing, the court shall receive evidence, pertaining to the obscenity involved, as the term “obscene” is defined in § 11-31-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 257, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31.1-7; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

12-27-8. Written decision of court.

In making a decision on the obscenity of the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material, the court shall consider, among other things, the evidence offered pursuant to § 12-27-7 , if any, and shall make a written determination upon every consideration relied upon in the proceeding in its findings of fact and conclusions of law or in a memorandum accompanying them. No book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material shall be found to be obscene unless the court expressly finds it to be obscene beyond a reasonable doubt.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 257, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31.1-8; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

Collateral References.

Admissiblility of evidence of public opinion polls or surveys in obscenity prosecutions on issue whether materials in question are obscene. 59 A.L.R.5th 749.

12-27-9. Decree in answered case — Automatic vacation of restraining order.

  1. If the court finds the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material not obscene, the court shall order the clerk of the court to enter a decree or order accordingly. If it finds the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material obscene, the court shall order the clerk of the court to enter a decree or order to that effect, but the court, in its discretion, may except from its judgment a restricted category of persons to whom the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material may be sold, exhibited, or distributed.
  2. In the event that a restraining order has been entered pursuant to § 12-27-4 , it shall be automatically vacated if no decree or order is entered within three (3) days after the conclusion of the hearing on the merits or if a decree or order that the material is not obscene is entered within that period.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 257, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31.1-9; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

12-27-10. Sale while order or decree in effect.

While a temporary restraining order made pursuant to § 12-27-4 is in effect, or after the entry of a decree or order pursuant to § 12-27-6 , or after the entry of a decree or order pursuant to § 12-27-9(a) , any person who sells, exhibits, commercially distributes, or commercially publishes or who has the book, print, picture, film, motion picture film, magazine, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, written material, photograph, figment, or other material with intent to sell, exhibit, or commercially distribute or commercially publish it, is presumed to have knowledge that it is obscene under chapter 31 of title 11.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 257, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31.1-10; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

12-27-11. Appeals.

Any party to the proceeding, including the petitioner, may appeal to the supreme court, as provided by law, from the decree or order of the court entered pursuant to § 12-27-9(a) .

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 257, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31.1-11; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

12-27-12. Applicability.

The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to be a necessary prerequisite to the filing of criminal charges under any other statute.

History of Section. P.L. 1963, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 257, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31.1-12; P.L. 1981, ch. 300, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Chapter 28 Victim’s Rights

12-28-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Victim’s Bill of Rights”.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 265, § 1.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of state constitutional or statutory victims’ bill of rights. 91 A.L.R.5th 343.

12-28-2. Legislative purpose.

In recognition of the responsibility of the community to the victims of crime, the general assembly declares its intent to ensure:

  1. That all crime victims are treated with dignity, respect, and sensitivity at all phases of the criminal justice process;
  2. That whenever possible they receive financial compensation for their injury or loss from the perpetrator of the crime; and
  3. That the full impact of the crime upon the victim is brought to the attention of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 265, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Compensation for Losses.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence in a case where the trial court granted defendant probation on defendant’s perjury charge in return for defendant executing a consent order regarding payment of previously-ordered restitution arising out of convictions entered against defendant for fraud crimes that defendant committed; the trial court’s sentencing authority was not so limited that it could not condition the probation sentence upon execution of the consent order even though the loss was not directly caused by the perjury but by the financial crimes, especially since the goal of the restitution was to get the victims repaid for their financial losses. State v. Laroche, 925 A.2d 885, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2007).

12-28-3. General rights.

  1. Each victim of a criminal offense who makes a timely report of the crime and who cooperates with law enforcement authorities in the investigation and prosecution of the offense shall have the following rights:
    1. To be notified no less frequently than every three (3) months by law enforcement authorities of the status of the investigation, until the time that the alleged perpetrator is apprehended or the investigation closed. In the case of a criminal offense that results in the victim’s death, the law enforcement authorities shall provide notification to a designated family member of the victim;
    2. To be notified by law enforcement authorities of the arraignment of the alleged perpetrator before a court empowered to set bail; and to be informed of the release of the alleged perpetrator on bail or personal recognizance;
    3. To receive protection from harm and threats of harm arising out of the victim’s cooperation with law enforcement and prosecution efforts, and to be provided with information as to the means of protection available;
    4. To be notified of all court proceedings at which the victim’s presence is required in a reasonable amount of time prior to the proceeding, and to be notified of the cancellation of any scheduled court proceeding in sufficient time to prevent an unnecessary appearance at the courthouse;
    5. To be provided, whenever feasible, with a secure waiting area during court proceedings that does not require the victim to be in close proximity to the defendant and the family and friends of the defendant;
    6. To be informed of the procedure to be followed in order to apply for and receive any witness fee to which the victim is entitled;
    7. To be provided with appropriate employer intercession services to ensure that the employer of the victim will cooperate with the criminal justice process in order to minimize the employee’s loss of pay and other benefits resulting from court appearances;
    8. To have any stolen or other personal property expeditiously returned by law enforcement agencies when no longer needed as evidence;
    9. To be informed of financial assistance and other social services available to crime victims and the manner of applying for them. All eligible victims shall be informed of the existence of the criminal injuries compensation fund and the manner of applying for it;
    10. To be consulted by the administrator of probation and parole in the course of his or her preparation of the presentence report on felony cases and to have included in that report a statement regarding the impact which the defendant’s criminal conduct has had upon the victim;
    11. To be afforded the right to address the court prior to sentencing in those cases where the defendant has been adjudicated guilty following a trial;
    12. To be informed of the disposition of the case against the alleged offender;
    13. To be notified in felony cases whenever the defendant or perpetrator is released from custody at the adult correctional institutions. When release is ordered prior to final conviction, it shall be the responsibility of the governmental entity having final responsibility for the defendant’s supervised custody to give notice to the victim. When release is granted by parole, the notice to the victim shall be given by the parole board. In all other cases when release is granted, the notice to the victim shall be given by the department of corrections. Victims who wish to be notified by the department of corrections shall register their names and the addresses they wish the notices to be sent with the department of corrections. Department of corrections notification shall also include furlough, transfer out of state, escape and death;
    14. To be afforded the opportunity to make a statement, in writing and signed, regarding the impact which the defendant’s criminal conduct had upon the victim. The statement shall be inserted into the case file maintained by the attorney general or prosecutor and shall be presented to the court for its review prior to the acceptance of any plea negotiation. The statement shall be submitted to the parole board for inclusion in its records regarding the defendant’s conduct against the victim; and
    15. To be informed by the prosecuting officer of the right to request that restitution be an element of the final disposition of a case.
  2. The rights afforded to the victim of a crime by this section shall be afforded as well to the immediate families of homicide victims.
  3. Unless otherwise specified, in felony cases it shall be the responsibility of the attorney general and the victims’ services unit as described in § 12-28-9 to make certain that the victim receives the notification that is required by this section. In misdemeanor cases, it shall be the responsibility of the law enforcement agency making the arrest and of the victims’ service unit as described in § 12-28-9 to make certain that the victim receives the notification that is required by this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 265, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 411, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 405, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 25, § 5; P.L. 1988, ch. 444, § 2; P.L. 1991, ch. 302, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 345, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 214, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 381, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 214, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 381, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2006, ch. 214, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on February 1, 2007.

P.L. 2006, ch. 381, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on February 1, 2007.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Liability for Noncompliance.

Failure by state or municipal officials to notify crime victims of their rights as required by this section does not give rise to an implied civil cause of action for monetary damages. Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 259 (R.I. 1998).

12-28-4. Right to address court prior to sentencing.

  1. Prior to the imposition of sentence upon a defendant who has been adjudicated guilty of a crime in a trial, the victim of the criminal offense shall be afforded the opportunity to address the court regarding the impact which the defendant’s criminal conduct has had upon the victim. The victim shall be permitted to speak prior to counsel for the state and the defendant making their sentencing recommendations to the court and prior to the defendant’s exercise of his or her right to address the court.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “victim” is one who has sustained personal injury or loss of property directly attributable to the felonious conduct of which the defendant has been convicted. In homicide cases, a member of the immediate family of the victim shall be afforded the right created by this section.
  3. “Community impact statement” means a written statement providing information about the financial, emotional and physical effects of a crime on a community. “Community” means a society or body of people living in the same place or neighborhood sharing common interests arising from social, business, religious, governmental, scholastic or recreational associations.
  4. In addition to the right of a victim as identified in subsection (b) of this section, if the crime has an impact on the community where the incident took place, any person, association or other group of persons may file a community impact statement with the court prior to the imposition of sentence on a defendant.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 265, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 411, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 405, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 444, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 230, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 402, § 1.

Collateral References.

Admissibility of victim impact evidence in noncapital state proceedings. 8 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2016).

Victim impact evidence in capital sentencing hearings — post-Payne v. Tennessee. 79 A.L.R.5th 33.

12-28-4.1. Right to address court regarding plea negotiation.

  1. Prior to acceptance by the court of a plea negotiation and imposition of sentence upon a defendant who has pleaded nolo contendere or guilty to a crime, the victim of the criminal offense shall, upon request, be afforded the opportunity to address the court regarding the impact which the defendant’s criminal conduct has had upon the victim. The victim shall be permitted to speak prior to counsel for the state and the defendant making their sentencing recommendations to the court and prior to the defendant’s exercise of his or her right to address the court.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “victim” is one who has sustained personal injury or loss of property directly attributable to the criminal conduct of which the defendant has been charged. In homicide cases, a member of the immediate family of the victim shall be afforded the right created by this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 387, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 405, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 444, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Inquiry Sua Sponte.

A court is not barred from inquiring of the victim about the impact of the crime in the absence of a request to address the court pursuant to this section. State v. Lessard, 754 A.2d 756, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 158 (R.I. 2000).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of victim impact evidence in noncapital state proceedings. 8 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2016).

12-28-4.2. Representative of incapacitated victim.

A member of the immediate family of a victim who is under the age of twelve (12) at the time of sentencing, or who is personally unable to exercise the rights established by this chapter due to physical incapacity resulting from the crime, shall, upon request, be afforded the opportunity to exercise those rights on the victim’s behalf.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 387, § 2; P.L. 1998, ch. 312, § 1.

12-28-4.3. Pretrial conferences — Misdemeanors in district court.

  1. In all misdemeanor cases heard before the district court, the victim of the alleged criminal offense shall be afforded the opportunity to address the court during the pretrial conference, unless the judge determines, based on the facts of the particular case, that the presence of the victim would substantially interfere with the court’s ability to administer justice. At the pretrial conference, the victim shall be afforded the opportunity to explain the impact which the defendant’s criminal conduct has had upon the victim and to comment on the proposed disposition of the case.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “victim” is one who has sustained personal injury or loss of property directly attributable to the criminal conduct with which the defendant has been charged.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 405, § 2.

12-28-5. Civil judgment against defendant.

  1. Upon his or her final conviction of a felony after a trial by jury, a civil judgment shall automatically be entered by the trial court against the defendant conclusively establishing his or her liability to the victim for any personal injury and/or loss of property that was sustained by the victim as a direct and proximate cause of the felonious conduct of which the defendant has been convicted. The court shall notify the victim at his or her last known address of the entry of the civil judgment in his or her favor and inform him or her that he or she must establish proof of damages in an appropriate judicial proceeding in order to recover for his or her injury or loss. This section shall not apply to crimes set forth in title 31 arising from the operation of a motor vehicle.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “victim” is one who has sustained personal injury or loss of property directly attributable to the felonious conduct of which the defendant has been convicted. In homicide cases, judgment shall enter for the benefit of those parties eligible to commence a wrongful death action pursuant to chapter 7 of title 10.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 265, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 444, § 2.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams Univ. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section, both on its face and as applied to a defendant who elects not to take the stand in his own defense at the criminal trial, does not violate that defendant’s constitutional rights of due process, since the defendant had the opportunity to testify and elected not to testify. Seddon v. Bonner, 755 A.2d 823, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 166 (R.I. 2000).

In General.

This provision is merely a procedural mechanism or shortcut, whereby the liability of the defendant is established with damages still to be proven in an “appropriate judicial proceeding,” and does not operate to preclude a crime victim from pursuing other avenues of relief, including a claim for punitive damages, against the defendant. Seddon v. Bonner, 755 A.2d 823, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 166 (R.I. 2000).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence in a case where the trial court granted defendant probation on defendant’s perjury charge in return for defendant executing a consent order regarding payment of previously-ordered restitution arising out of convictions entered against defendant for fraud crimes that defendant committed; the trial court’s sentencing authority was not so limited that it could not condition the probation sentence upon execution of the consent order even though the loss was not directly caused by the perjury but by the financial crimes, especially since the goal of the restitution was to get the victims repaid for their financial losses. State v. Laroche, 925 A.2d 885, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2007).

Underlying criminal indictments against club owners, which alleged involuntary manslaughter, neither initiated a civil proceeding nor alleged damages, nor did the General Assembly intend to transform criminal prosecutions into civil proceedings by enacting R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-28-5 ; thus, the club owners could not rely upon the statute to require their insurer to provide a defense to the criminal proceedings. Derderian v. Essex Ins. Co., 44 A.3d 122, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 54 (R.I. 2012).

Entry of Judgment.

Where plaintiffs sued defendants, a church and officials, based on a sexual assault committed by a priest, automatic judgment of liability was not warranted against defendants due to the fact that the priest was convicted of first-degree sexual assault, because the nonperpetrator defendants were not convicted of first-degree sexual assault. Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 941 A.2d 174, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 12 (R.I.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 955, 129 S. Ct. 422, 172 L. Ed. 2d 305, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 7508 (2008).

— Request Not to Enter Judgment.

Because this section is in the nature of a summary procedural mechanism intended to expedite a civil suit brought by a crime victim, a court should honor a victim’s request that a judgment pursuant to this provision not be entered. Seddon v. Bonner, 755 A.2d 823, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 166 (R.I. 2000).

Punitive Damages.

An award of punitive damages does not fall within the ambit of this section. Trainor v. North Kingstown, 625 A.2d 1349, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 158 (R.I. 1993), limited, Seddon v. Bonner, 755 A.2d 823, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 166 (R.I. 2000).

12-28-5.1. Restitution.

When the court orders a defendant to make financial restitution to the victim of a crime of which the defendant has been convicted or to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, a civil judgment shall automatically be entered by the trial court against the defendant on behalf of the victim for that amount. If payment is not made by the defendant within the period set by the court, the civil judgment for the amount of the restitution ordered, plus interest at the statutory amount from the date of the offense, plus costs of suit, including reasonable attorney’s fees, shall be enforceable by any and all means presently available in law for the collection of delinquent judgments in civil cases generally.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 405, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is set out to correct an error appearing in the 2000 Reenactment volume.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Civil Judgment.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence in a case where the trial court granted defendant probation on defendant’s perjury charge in return for defendant executing a consent order regarding payment of previously-ordered restitution arising out of convictions entered against defendant for fraud crimes that defendant committed; the trial court’s sentencing authority was not so limited that it could not condition the probation sentence upon execution of the consent order even though the loss was not directly caused by the perjury but by the financial crimes, especially since the goal of the restitution was to get the victims repaid for their financial losses. State v. Laroche, 925 A.2d 885, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2007).

Collateral References.

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act — Constitutional issues. 20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 239.

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act — Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled. 51 A.L.R. Fed 2d 169.

12-28-6. Right to address parole board.

  1. Prior to acting upon the petition or any continuance of the petition of an inmate at the adult correctional institutions or the women’s reformatory, the parole board shall notify the victim, if he or she is identified and his or her residence is known, of the criminal conduct for which the inmate has been incarcerated and of the pendency of the proceedings before the board. The victim shall upon request be afforded the opportunity to address the board regarding the impact of the crime upon the victim; provided, that the board may, in its discretion, permit the parent and/or legal guardian of a victim who is a minor at the time of the hearing to address the board on behalf of the minor.
  2. Should the parole board be unable to locate the victim, the board shall seek the assistance of the local police department of the city or town where the victim was last known to have resided. The police department shall make every effort to locate the victim and shall, no later than thirty (30) days from the date its assistance was sought, send a written report to the parole board detailing its efforts to locate the victim.
  3. Whenever the parole board shall seek the assistance of any police department in locating a victim, the board shall not act upon the inmate’s petition until it has reviewed the written report from the assisting police department.
  4. For the purposes of this section, “victim” is one who has sustained personal injury or loss of property directly attributable to the criminal conduct for which the inmate has been incarcerated. In homicide cases, a member of the immediate family of the victim shall be afforded the right created by this section.
  5. The board shall also make a reasonable effort to notify the victim of the crime committed by the prisoner, or, in homicide cases, the victim’s next of kin, and/or, in cases where the victim is a minor, the victim’s parent and/or legal guardian, not less than thirty (30) days prior to the meeting, of his or her right to provide a victim impact statement to the board.

    As used in this chapter, “victim impact statement” means a statement providing information about the financial, emotional, and physical effects of a crime on the victim and the victim’s family, and specific information about the victim, the circumstances surrounding the crime, and the manner in which it was perpetrated.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 265, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 411, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 419, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 472, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection (f) designation.

12-28-7. Noncompliance not affecting validity of conviction, sentence, or parole.

Failure to afford the victim of a felony offense any of the rights established by this chapter shall not constitute grounds for vacating an otherwise lawful conviction, or for voiding an otherwise lawful sentence or parole determination.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 265, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Liability for Noncompliance.

Failure by state or municipal officials to notify crime victims of their rights as required by § 12-28-3 does not give rise to an implied civil cause of action for monetary damages. Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 259 (R.I. 1998).

12-28-8. Child victims.

  1. The general assembly finds that it is necessary to provide child victims and witnesses in family, district or superior court with special consideration and treatment beyond that usually afforded to adults. It is the intent of this section to provide these children with additional rights and protection during their involvement with the criminal justice system.
  2. As used in this section, “child” is anyone who is less than fifteen (15) years of age.
  3. Child victims of felony offenses, or offenses which would be considered felony offenses if committed by adults, shall have the following rights in addition to those set forth elsewhere in this chapter:
    1. To have explanations, in language understandable to a child of the victim’s age, of all investigative and judicial proceedings in which the child will be involved;
    2. To be accompanied at all investigative and judicial proceedings by a relative, guardian, or other person who will contribute to the child’s sense of well being, unless it is determined by the party conducting the proceeding that the presence of the particular person would substantially impede the investigation or prosecution of the case;
    3. To have all investigative and judicial proceedings in which the child’s participation is required arranged so as to minimize the time when the child must be present;
    4. To be permitted to testify at all judicial proceedings in the manner which will be least traumatic to the child, consistent with the rights of the defendant;
    5. To be provided information about and referrals to appropriate social service programs to assist the child and the child’s family in coping with the emotional impact of the crime and the subsequent proceedings in which the child is involved.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 265, § 1; 12-28-9 .

12-28-9. Victims’ services unit.

  1. There is created within the state court system a victims’ services unit which shall be responsible for assisting victims of crimes adjudicated in the superior, family, and district courts in the exercise of their rights as set forth in this chapter, and it shall be administered by the state court administrator through the administrative office of the state courts. The state court administrator may in his or her discretion contract for any services to be provided to victims of crimes pursuant to this chapter or pursuant to § 12-25-29 . Services provided to victims of crimes shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
    1. Identification of and outreach to victims to inform them of their rights and of the services available to them;
    2. Counseling and support, including referral to specialized counseling resources;
    3. Assistance in seeking return of property, restitution, and in filing claims for compensation under the violent crimes indemnity fund or under the criminal royalties fund;
    4. Assistance in preparing for and making court appearances and in making victim impact statements;
    5. Notification about the status of their cases in coordination with representatives of the attorney general or the relevant law enforcement agency; and
    6. Any other assistance that may further the rights of victims.
  2. In determining the allocation of resources available to implement this section, victims who have suffered personal injury and the immediate families of homicide victims shall be given priority over victims who have suffered only loss of property.
  3. The state court administrator shall report annually on the services provided through this unit.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 411, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 413, § 1; 12-28-10 ; P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Questioning of Child.

Preliminary questioning of the victim without the jury was allowed because it was conducted to help the child feel at ease on the witness stand. State v. Micheli, 656 A.2d 980, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 97 (R.I. 1995).

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of child victims’ and child witnesses’ rights statute (18 USCS § 3509). 121 A.L.R. Fed. 631.

12-28-10. Victims of domestic abuse — Employment discrimination.

  1. No employer, employment agency or licensing agency shall refuse to hire any applicant for employment, or discharge an employee or discriminate against him or her with respect to any matter related to employment, solely by reason of his or her seeking or obtaining a protective order pursuant to chapter 15 of title 15 or chapter 8.1 of title 8 or refusing to seek or obtain a protective order.
  2. In any civil action alleging a violation of this chapter, the court may:
    1. Award to a prevailing applicant or employee actual damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and, where the challenged conduct is shown to be motivated by malice or ill will, punitive damages; provided, punitive damages shall not be available against the state or its political subdivisions; and
    2. Afford injunctive relief against any employer, employment agency or licensing agency who commits or proposes to commit a violation of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 405, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 129, art. 25, § 4; P.L. 1988, ch. 444, § 2; 12-28-11 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsection and subdivision designations.

12-28-11. Notification to immediate family members of homicide victims.

  1. For purposes of this section, “immediate family members” means a spouse and any dependent children of the victim as well as a person who is related to the victim whether by blood, adoption or marriage, as any of the following: father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, grandfather, grandmother, grandson, granddaughter, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, stepfather, stepmother, stepson, stepdaughter, stepbrother, stepsister, half-brother, half-sister, stepgrandmother or stepgrandfather.
  2. In addition to any other rights given to victims of crimes under this title, the immediate family members of the victim of any homicide shall be afforded reasonable written or oral notification from the office of the attorney general of the pendency of a bail hearing, pretrial, trial or disposition relating to a party accused of the homicide, and that notice shall be provided at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to the hearing, pretrial, trial or disposition. The notification provided by this section shall be required only as to those immediate family members who have filed a request with a court which has asserted jurisdiction over the accused/defendant. The attorney general shall promulgate forms to effect the request.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 409, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 431, § 1; 12-28-12 .

12-28-12. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 425, § 1; 12-28-8 .

12-28-13. Victim’s economic security and safety.

  1. Every employer in the state, with fifty (50) or more employees, shall allow an employee who is a victim of a crime to leave work to attend court proceedings related to the crime.
  2. An employer may not dismiss an employee who is a victim of a crime because the employee exercises the right to leave work pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.
  3. An employer is not required to compensate an employee who is a victim of a crime when the employee leaves work pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.
  4. If an employee leaves work pursuant to subsection (a) of this section the employee may elect to use or an employer may require the employee to use the employee’s accrued paid vacation, personal leave or sick leave.
  5. An employee who is a victim of a crime shall not lose seniority or precedence while absent from employment pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.
  6. Before an employee may leave work pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the employee shall provide the employer with a copy of notification of court proceedings provided pursuant to § 12-28-3 .
  7. An employer may limit the leave provided under this section if the employee’s leave creates an undue hardship to the employer’s business.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 32, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 180, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 32, § 1, and P.L. 2004, ch. 180, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 29 Domestic Violence Prevention Act

12-29-1. Legislative purpose.

  1. The purpose of this chapter is to recognize the importance of domestic violence as a serious crime against society and to assure victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can provide.
  2. While the legislature finds that the existing criminal statutes are adequate to provide protection for victims of domestic violence, previous societal attitudes have been reflected in policies and practices of law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and courts which have resulted in differing treatment of crimes occurring between family or household members and of the same crimes occurring between strangers. Only recently has public perception of the serious consequences of domestic violence to society and to the victims led to the recognition of the necessity for early intervention by law enforcement agencies.
  3. It is the intent of the legislature that the official response to cases of domestic violence shall stress the enforcement of the laws to protect the victim and shall communicate the attitude that violent behavior is not excused or tolerated. Furthermore, it is the intent of the legislature that criminal laws be enforced without regard to whether the persons involved are or were married, cohabitating, or involved in a relationship.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 6.

Cross References.

Domestic assaults, § 8-8.1-1 et seq.

Law Reviews.

Nicole Verdi, Comment: Releasing the Stranglehold on Domestic Violence Victims: Implications and Effects of Rhode Island’s Domestic Assault Strangulation Statute, 18 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 255 (2013).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Purpose.

Because the courts were not in the business of supplying essential elements of a felony offense by implication, and because a conviction for a violation of a no-contact order was not an enumerated offense in R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2 thus, holding that a violation of a no-contact order was not a domestic violence misdemeanor conviction for purposes of sentencing enhancement did not render meaningless the declared purpose in R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-1 which was to assure victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforced the law could provide. State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 180 (R.I. 2003).

Defendant’s claim that his prosecution for disorderly conduct pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-1 and R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2 was barred because his violent behavior following an argument with his wife did not occur in a public place, but in his private residence, had to be rejected; nothing in the language of those statutes or in constitutional provisions prohibited those laws from applying to crimes committed in the home, especially since the state had an interest in trying to prevent domestic violence. State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 9 (R.I. 2006).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of expert testimony concerning domestic-violence syndromes to assist jury in evaluating victim’s testimony or behavior. 57 A.L.R.5th 315.

Legal Protection Against Domestic Violence in Same-Sex Relationships. 19 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2017).

12-29-1.1. Full faith and credit.

  1. Any protective order issued by another jurisdiction, as defined in § 12-29-2 , shall be given full faith and credit throughout the state and enforced as if it were issued in the state for as long as the order is in effect in the issuing jurisdiction.
  2. A person entitled to protection under a protective order issued by another jurisdiction may file the order in the superior court, family court, or district court by filing with the court a certified copy of the order which shall be entered into the restraining order, no contact order system (R.O.N.C.O.). The person shall swear under oath in an affidavit, to the best of the person’s knowledge, that the order is presently in effect as written. A law enforcement officer shall presume the validity of the order and enforce the order issued by another jurisdiction which has been provided to the law enforcement officer; provided, that the officer is also provided with a statement by the person protected by the order that the order remains in effect. Law enforcement officers shall rely on the statement by the person protected by the order.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 195, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

12-29-1.2. Issuance of protective orders.

Every order of this court made pursuant to chapter 8.1 of title 8, chapter 15 of title 15, and this chapter, after proper notice and hearing, shall contain the following language:

“THIS COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES AND THE SUBJECT MATTER WHEN IT ISSUED THIS PROTECTIVE ORDER. RESPONDENT WAS AFFORDED BOTH NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IN THE HEARING THAT GAVE RISE TO THIS ORDER. PURSUANT TO THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1994, 18 USC 2265, THIS ORDER IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE IN ALL FIFTY STATES, ANY TERRITORY OR POSSESSION OF THE UNITED STATES, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO AND TRIBAL LANDS.”

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 195, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 20.

12-29-2. Definitions.

  1. “Domestic violence” includes, but is not limited to, any of the following crimes when committed by one family or household member against another:
    1. Simple assault (§ 11-5-3 );
    2. Felony assaults (chapter 5 of title 11);
    3. Vandalism (§ 11-44-1 );
    4. Disorderly conduct (§ 11-45-1 );
    5. Trespass (§ 11-44-26 );
    6. Kidnapping (§ 11-26-1 );
    7. Child-snatching (§ 11-26-1.1 );
    8. Sexual assault (§§ 11-37-2 , 11-37-4 );
    9. Homicide (§§ 11-23-1 and 11-23-3 );
    10. Violation of the provisions of a protective order entered pursuant to § 15-5-19 , chapter 15 of title 15, or chapter 8.1 of title 8 where the respondent has knowledge of the order and the penalty for its violation, or a violation of a no contact order issued pursuant to § 12-29-4 ;
    11. Stalking (chapter 59 of title 11);
    12. Refusal to relinquish or to damage or to obstruct a telephone (§ 11-35-14 );
    13. Burglary and Unlawful Entry (chapter 8 of title 11);
    14. Arson (chapter 4 of title 11);
    15. Cyberstalking and cyberharassment (§ 11-52-4.2 );
    16. Domestic assault by strangulation § 11-5-2.3 ; and
    17. Electronic tracking of motor vehicles (§ 11-69-1 ).
  2. “Family or household member” means spouses, former spouses, adult persons related by blood or marriage, adult persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past three (3) years, and persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together, or persons who are, or have been, in a substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year which shall be determined by the court’s consideration of the following factors:
    1. The length of time of the relationship;
    2. The type of the relationship;
    3. The frequency of the interaction between the parties.
  3. “Protective order” means an order issued pursuant to § 15-5-19 , chapter 15 of title 15, or chapter 8.1 of title 8.
  4. “Victim” means a family or household member who has been subjected to domestic violence.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 6; P.L. 1990, ch. 390, § 2; P.L. 1994, ch. 314, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 144, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 259, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 300, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 475, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 97, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 278, § 2; P.L. 2012, ch. 284, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 39, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 41, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 73, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 97, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2012, ch. 278, § 2, and P.L. 2012, ch. 284, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 39, § 2, and P.L. 2016, ch. 41, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Disorderly Conduct.

Defendant’s claim that his prosecution for disorderly conduct pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-1 and R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2 was barred because his violent behavior following an argument with his wife did not occur in a public place, but in his private residence, had to be rejected; nothing in the language of those statutes or in constitutional provisions prohibited those laws from applying to crimes committed in the home, especially since the state had an interest in trying to prevent domestic violence. State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 9 (R.I. 2006).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of domestic simple assault and domestic disorderly conduct because neither the purported inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony nor any contradictory evidence undermined defendant’s convictions as the victim told the responding officer that defendant had beat her and kicked her, punched her, and stomped on her; the officer observed bruises on her forehead, face, and chin area; defendant admitted to the officer that he had hit and punched the victim after she had slapped him; and an emergency room physician testified that the victim presented with an ear contusion and lacerations, hand contusion, ankle abrasion, and a blow to the head, and that she was discharged after receiving 10 sutures. State v. Van Dongen, 132 A.3d 1070, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 2016).

Domestic Violence.

In a prosecution for domestic assault, when determining whether a couple has been in a “substantive dating relationship,” R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2 directs the court to look to three factors—length, nature, and frequency—as indicative of the substance of the relationship as a whole. Section 12-29-2 does not require a specific demonstration or finding as to each of the factors, nor does it limit the court to only those three factors. State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 88 (R.I. 2011).

In a prosecution for domestic assault with a deadly weapon, the following evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant and the victim had been in a “substantive dating relationship” for purposes of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(b) : 1) the couple dated for six months; 2) they had an intimate relationship; 3) they had communication since their breakup relative to affairs of the heart; 4) they met on the night of the assault so the victim could return jewelry defendant had given her; and 5) defendant said at the scene that he had “an argument with his girlfriend.” State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 88 (R.I. 2011).

Felony Convictions.

Since defendant’s conviction for domestic disorderly conduct could not be a basis for subjecting him to a felony conviction pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5 , the felony conviction had to be vacated and the case remanded for entry of judgments of conviction for the lesser included misdemeanor offenses of twice violating the no-contact order. State v. John, 881 A.2d 920, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 182 (R.I. 2005).

No-Contact Order.

Defendant’s conviction in the superior court under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5(c)(1)(ii) , based on a third violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(a)(10) (amended 2001), which included violations of a protective order, but which made no mention of no-contact orders, was vacated because defendant’s second conviction was under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-3(d)(1) for violating a no-contact order issued under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-4 , and a conviction for a violation of a no-contact order was not an enumerated offense in R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2 (amended 2001); at best, defendant committed a misdemeanor violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-3 , an offense cognizable in the district court. State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 180 (R.I. 2003).

Collateral References.

“Cohabitation” for purposes of domestic violence statutes. 71 A.L.R.5th 285.

12-29-3. Law enforcement officers — Duties and immunity.

  1. The primary duty of law enforcement officers when responding to a domestic violence situation is to enforce the laws allegedly violated and to protect the victim.
    1. When a law enforcement officer responds to a domestic violence situation and has probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, the officer shall exercise arrest powers pursuant to §§ 12-7-3 and 12-7-4 ; provided, that the officer shall arrest and take into custody the alleged perpetrator of the crime when the officer has probable cause to believe that any of the following acts has occurred:
      1. A felonious assault;
      2. An assault that has resulted in bodily injury to the victim, whether or not the injury is observable by the responding officer;
      3. Physical action that was intended to cause another person reasonably to fear imminent serious bodily injury or death. “Bodily injury” means physical pain, illness, or an impairment of physical condition; or
      4. Violation of a protective order and the violator has previous knowledge of the order and the terms of it;
      5. Violation of a no-contact order issued pursuant to § 12-29-4 .
    2. The decision to arrest and charge shall not:
      1. Be dependent on the specific consent of the victim;
      2. Consider the relationship of the parties; or
      3. Be based solely on a request by the victim.
    3. An arrest without warrant made under this section shall be made within twenty-four (24) hours of the alleged crime.
    4. If an arrest without warrant cannot be made pursuant to this section, the officer shall advise the victim of the right to file a criminal complaint and shall seek a warrant for arrest if there is probable cause to do so.
    1. When more than one family or household member involved in a domestic violence incident states a complaint, the officer shall investigate each complaint to determine whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed. The officer shall not dismiss the incident by presuming two-party (2) guilt.
    2. When the officer has probable cause to believe that family or household members have assaulted each other, the officer is not required to arrest both persons. The officer shall arrest the person whom the officer believes to be the primary physical aggressor.
  2. A law enforcement officer shall not be held liable for false arrest in any civil action for an arrest based on probable cause or for enforcement in good faith of a court order issued pursuant to this chapter or pursuant to § 15-5-19 , chapter 15 of title 15, or chapter 8.1 of title 8.
  3. It shall be the responsibility of the law enforcement officer at the scene of a domestic violence incident to provide immediate assistance to the victim. This assistance shall include, but not be limited to:
    1. Assisting the victim to obtain medical treatment if treatment is required, including transportation to an emergency medical treatment facility;
    2. Giving the victim notice of her or his right to obtain a protective order in family court pursuant to chapter 15 of title 15 or district court pursuant to chapter 8.1 of title 8 as appropriate according to the relationship of the parties. This notice shall be provided by handing the victim a copy of the following statement written in English, Portuguese, Spanish, Cambodian, Hmong, Laotian, Vietnamese, and French and by reading the notice to that person when possible:

      “If you are in need of medical treatment, you have the right to have the officer present drive you to the nearest hospital or otherwise assist you.

      “If you believe that police protection is needed for your physical safety, you have the right to have the officer present remain at the scene until you and your children can leave or until your safety is otherwise obtained.

      “You have the right to file a criminal complaint with the responding officer or your local police department if the officer has not arrested the perpetrator.

      “Married/blood relatives/children in common. If your attacker is your spouse, former spouse, person to whom you are related by blood or marriage, or if you are not married to your attacker, but have a child in common, you have the right to go to family court and ask the court to issue:

      1. An order restraining your attacker from abusing you or your minor child;
      2. An order awarding you exclusive use of your domicile; and
      3. An order awarding you custody of your minor child(ren).

        “Unmarried. If you are not married or related to your attacker, but have resided with him or her within the past three (3) years, or you or your attacker are in, or have been in, a substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year, you have the right to go to district court and request:

        (i) An order restraining your attacker from abusing you; and

        (ii) An order directing your attacker to leave your household, unless he or she has the sole legal interest in the household”;

    3. Informing the victim of available services; and
    4. In cases where the officer has determined that no cause exists for an arrest, assistance shall also include:
      1. Remaining at the scene as long as there is danger to the safety of the person or until the person is able to leave the dwelling. The officer shall transport the person if no reasonable transportation is available; and
      2. Informing the person that she or he has the right to file a criminal complaint with the responding officer or the local police department.
  4. An officer responding to a domestic violence call shall complete a domestic violence report pursuant to § 12-29-8 .
    1. It shall be the responsibility of the attorney general to develop a model Uniform Policy for Police Response to Domestic Violence which is consistent with the provisions of this section. This written policy shall be developed after conferring with the staff of the department of human services’ domestic violence unit and with the council on domestic violence and shall be made available to any law enforcement agency.
    2. Each law enforcement agency shall develop a Policy for Police Response to Domestic Violence which is consistent with the Uniform Policy for Police Response to Domestic Violence developed by the attorney general and shall file a copy of the policy with the attorney general within sixty (60) days of receiving the model policy.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 6; P.L. 1993, ch. 404, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 314, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 20; P.L. 2014, ch. 83, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 86, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 83, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 86, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

12-29-4. Restrictions upon and duties of court.

    1. Because of the likelihood of repeated violence directed at those who have been victims of domestic violence in the past, when a person is charged with or arrested for a crime involving domestic violence, that person may not be released from custody on bail or personal recognizance before arraignment without first appearing before the court or bail commissioner. The court or bail commissioner authorizing release shall issue a no-contact order prohibiting the person charged or arrested from having contact with the victim.
    2. At the time of arraignment or bail hearing the court or bail commissioner shall determine whether a no-contact order shall be issued or extended.
    3. Willful violation of a court order issued under subdivision (1), (2), or as part of disposition of this subdivision of this subsection is a misdemeanor. The written order releasing the person charged or the written order issued at the time of disposition shall contain the court’s directive and shall bear the legend: “Violation of this order is a criminal offense under this section and will subject a violator to arrest”. A copy of the order shall be provided to the victim.
    4. Whenever an order prohibiting contact is issued, modified, or terminated under subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection, the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order on or before the next judicial day to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order.
  1. Because of the serious nature of domestic violence, the court in domestic violence actions:
    1. Shall not dismiss any charge or delay disposition because of concurrent dissolution of marriage or other civil proceedings;
    2. Shall not require proof that either party is seeking a dissolution of marriage prior to instigation of criminal proceedings;
    3. Shall identify by reasonable means on docket sheets those criminal actions arising from acts of domestic violence; and
    4. Shall make clear to the defendant and victim that the prosecution of the domestic violence action is determined by the prosecutor and not the victim.
  2. To facilitate compliance with the provisions of this section, the district court shall assure that the misdemeanor and felony complaint forms indicate whether the crime charged involves domestic violence and, if so, the relationship of the victim and defendant.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 12-10-12 , the filing of any complaint for a crime involving domestic violence shall be conditioned upon the defendant keeping the peace and being of good behavior for a period of three (3) years. In the event a particular case involving domestic violence is filed on a plea of not guilty, guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to section 12-10-12 , the court having jurisdiction shall retain the records of the case for a period of three (3) years from the date of the filing. These records shall not be expunged, sealed, or otherwise destroyed for a period of three (3) years from the date of filing. Furthermore, the destruction or sealing of records in the possession of the department of attorney general bureau of criminal identification, the superintendent of the state police, or the police departments of any city or town after a filing related to a crime involving domestic violence shall be governed by section 12-1-12 .

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 6; P.L. 1990, ch. 369, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 134, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 76, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 421, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 426, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 303, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jury Instructions.

Where defendant was charged with violating a no contact order by sending two cards to his former wife, the trial justice’s instruction adequately covered the law by informing the members of the jury that they must find that defendant was aware of the restriction on his behavior by reason of the no-contact order. State v. John, 881 A.2d 920, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 182 (R.I. 2005).

Merger.

Trial justice erred in ruling that two no-contact order violations did not merge because the conduct that predicated one no-contact order violation and the conduct that resulted in a second violation were part of a single and continuous act; the violations flowed from defendant and his ex-girlfriend being at an establishment together and then arriving at the ex-girlfriend’s home shortly thereafter. State v. Narcovich, 244 A.3d 549, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2021).

No-Contact Order.

The defendant’s conduct was not sufficient to support a finding that he violated a no-contact order since all of the alleged incidents were mere coincidence, and the defendant’s only conduct in each of the incidents was to acknowledge the victim with a simple greeting. State v. Conti, 672 A.2d 885, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 109 (R.I. 1996).

Defendant’s conviction in the superior court under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5(c)(1)(ii) , based on a third violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(a)(10) (amended 2001), which included violations of a protective order, but which made no mention of no-contact orders, was vacated because defendant’s second conviction was under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-3(d)(1) for violating a no-contact order issued under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-4 , and a conviction for a violation of a no-contact order was not an enumerated offense in R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2 (amended 2001); at best, defendant committed a misdemeanor violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-3 , an offense cognizable in the district court. State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 180 (R.I. 2003).

Sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find that defendant willfully violated a no-contact order where defendant testified that he was aware of the order and knew that he was violating it when he had an altercation with the ex-wife at her home and the order said that defendant was enjoined or restrained from any contact with his ex-wife; it did not include an exception permitting him to contact his ex-wife to discuss visitation or the well-being of his children. State v. Lopes, 884 A.2d 397, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 194 (R.I. 2005).

12-29-4.1. Speedy trial.

In any action under this chapter, the court and the attorney general’s office shall take appropriate action to ensure a speedy trial to minimize the length of time the victim must endure the stress of involvement in the proceeding. In ruling on any motion or request for a delay or continuance of proceedings, the court shall consider any adverse impact the delay or continuance may have on the well-being of the victim. This provision establishes a right to a speedy trial to the victim and shall not be construed as creating any additional rights for, or diminishing any rights of the defendant.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 92, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 105, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 92, § 1, and P.L. 2005, ch. 105, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

12-29-5. Disposition of domestic violence cases.

  1. Every person convicted of, or placed on probation for, a crime involving domestic violence or whose case is filed pursuant to § 12-10-12 where the defendant pleads nolo contendere, in addition to any other sentence imposed or counseling ordered, shall be ordered by the judge to attend, at his or her own expense, a batterer’s intervention program appropriate to address his or her violent behavior; provided, however, that the court may permit a servicemember or veteran to complete any court-approved counseling program administered or approved by the Veterans’ Administration. This order shall be included in the conditions of probation. Failure of the defendant to comply with the order shall be a basis for violating probation and/or the provisions of § 12-10-12 . This provision shall not be suspended or waived by the court.
  2. Every person convicted of, or placed on probation for, a crime involving domestic violence as enumerated in § 12-29-2 , or whose case is filed pursuant to § 12-10-12 where the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere, in addition to other court costs or assessments imposed, shall be ordered to pay a one hundred twenty-five dollar ($125) assessment. Eighty percent (80%) of the assessment collected pursuant to this section shall be provided to the Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence for programs to assist victims of domestic violence and twenty percent (20%) of the assessment shall be deposited as general revenue.
    1. Every person convicted of an offense punishable as a misdemeanor involving domestic violence as defined in § 12-29-2 shall:
      1. For a second violation, be imprisoned for a term of not less than ten (10) days and not more than one year.
      2. For a third and subsequent violation, be deemed guilty of a felony and be imprisoned for a term of not less than one year and not more than ten (10) years.
    2. No jail sentence provided for under this section can be suspended.
    3. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as limiting the discretion of the judges to impose additional sanctions authorized in sentencing.
  3. The court shall determine, for every person who pleads nolo contendere to, or is convicted of, an offense involving domestic violence as enumerated in § 12-29-2 , whether, as a result of the plea or conviction, the defendant is prohibited under § 11-47-5(a)(3) or § 11-47-5(a)(4) from purchasing, owning, carrying, transporting, or having in his or her possession any firearm.
    1. Prior to the entry of a plea of nolo contendere to an offense involving domestic violence as enumerated in § 12-29-2 , the court shall advise the defendant that a plea of nolo contendere has the same legal effect and collateral consequences as a plea of guilty.
    2. Prior to the entry of a plea of nolo contendere to an offense punishable as a felony involving domestic violence as enumerated in § 12-29-2, or an offense enumerated in § 11-47-5(a)(4) , the court shall advise the defendant that, in addition to any other sentence or penalty, the defendant shall, as result of the plea, be prohibited from purchasing, owning, carrying, transporting, or having in their possession any firearm under § 11-47-5 .
    3. The person required to surrender his or her firearms pursuant to this section shall not be responsible for any costs of storage of any firearms surrendered pursuant to this section.
  4. For the purposes of this section, “batterers intervention program” means a program that is certified by the batterers intervention program standards oversight committee according to minimum standards, pursuant to §§ 12-29-5.1 , 12-29-5.2 , and 12-29-5.3 .
  5. For purposes of this section, “servicemember” means a person who is presently serving in the armed forces of the United States, including the Coast Guard, a reserve component thereof, or the National Guard. “Veteran” means a person who has served in the armed forces, including the Coast Guard of the United States, a reserve component thereof, or the National Guard, and has been discharged under other than dishonorable conditions.
  6. The court shall indicate on every record of conviction or a plea of nolo contendere for an offense punishable as a felony involving domestic violence, as defined in § 12-29-2 , that the defendant is prohibited under §§ 11-47-5 and 11-47-5.3 from purchasing, owning, carrying, transporting, or having in their possession, any firearm(s). The court shall inform the defendant of their prohibited status and shall order the defendant to surrender any firearm(s) in their ownership, possession, care, custody or control in accordance with § 11-47-5.3 .
  7. The court shall indicate on every record of conviction or a plea of nolo contendere for an offense enumerated in § 11-47-5(a)(4) that the defendant is prohibited under §§ 11-47-5 and 11-47-5.4 from purchasing, owning, carrying, transporting, or having in their possession, any firearm(s). The court shall inform the defendant of their prohibited status, shall order the defendant to surrender any firearm(s) in their ownership, possession, care, custody or control, and shall ensure that surrender is made in accordance with § 11-47-5.4 .
  8. No proceeds shall be provided to any person if the firearm(s) is destroyed pursuant to this section.
  9. Any firearm(s) used in the commission of the offense leading to the conviction pursuant to this section shall be forfeited to the state upon conviction.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 6; P.L. 1990, ch. 368, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 223, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 214, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 42; P.L. 1997, ch. 164, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 373, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 386, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 58, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 96, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 212, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 214, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 4; P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 4.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision and paragraph designations in subsection (c).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 58, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 96, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 212, § 2, and P.L. 2016, ch. 214, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 4, and P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2016, ch. 212, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2017.

P.L. 2016, ch. 214, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2017.

Cross References.

Restraining orders, § 40-11-12.4 .

Law Reviews.

Brendan Horan, Comment: The Ball Is in Whose Court? Rhode Island's Need for an Integrated Domestic Violence Court, 26 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 738 (2021).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Admissibility of Evidence.

In a prosecution for domestic simple assault, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to impeach defendant with seven prior convictions, two of which involved assaultive behavior, because the similarity between the charged offense and the prior convictions did not preclude admission of those convictions. State v. McRae, 31 A.3d 785, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 131 (R.I. 2011).

As defense counsel sought to convince the jury that defendant was guilty of second-degree murder because he “snapped,” testimony that he had previously assaulted the victim, his girlfriend, was properly admitted under R.I. R. Evid. 404 (b) for the limited purpose of proving he formed the intent necessary to be convicted of first-degree murder. State v. Martinez, 59 A.3d 73, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 20 (R.I. 2013).

In a case resulting in defendant’s conviction for domestic assault with a dangerous weapon based on her assault of her half-sister with a knife, where defendant claimed self-defense, the trial justice did not err in excluding Facebook videos illustrating the victim’s acts of violence because the trial justice determined that the videos were cumulative to the victim’s testimony, would inflame the passion of the jurors, and would cause confusion as to what the ultimate issue in the case was. State v. Medina, 222 A.3d 1246, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2020).

In a case resulting in defendant’s conviction for domestic assault with a dangerous weapon based on her assault of her half-sister with a knife, the trial justice provided adequate grounds to support the granting of the State’s motion in limine to prevent defendant from mentioning that the victim had been arrested on gun charges; the charges were eventually dismissed as to the victim and use of a gun was not in issue in the current case. State v. Medina, 222 A.3d 1246, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 1 (R.I. 2020).

Denial of Motion to Pass.

In a prosecution for domestic simple assault, the victim’s testimony that defendant had been drinking at the time of the incident did not obligate the trial court to pass the case, as the comment was not sufficiently prejudicial as to prevent the jury from dispassionately considering the evidence, and there was no indication that it failed to obey the trial court’s instruction to disregard the victim’s statement. State v. McRae, 31 A.3d 785, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 131 (R.I. 2011).

Felony Convictions.

Since defendant’s conviction for domestic disorderly conduct could not be a basis for subjecting him to a felony conviction pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5 , the felony conviction had to be vacated and the case remanded for entry of judgments of conviction for the lesser included misdemeanor offenses of twice violating the no-contact order. State v. John, 881 A.2d 920, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 182 (R.I. 2005).

Instructions.

In light of the reference to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-3 in the criminal information and the trial evidence indicating that defendant put the victims in reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on both assault and battery. Ultimately, defendant was convicted of two counts of felony domestic assault, as charged in the information; he was neither convicted of nor sentenced for a criminal battery. State v. Cardona, 969 A.2d 667, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 54 (R.I. 2009).

Merger.

Trial justice erred in ruling that two no-contact order violations did not merge because the conduct that predicated one no-contact order violation and the conduct that resulted in a second violation were part of a single and continuous act; the violations flowed from defendant and his ex-girlfriend being at an establishment together and then arriving at the ex-girlfriend’s home shortly thereafter. State v. Narcovich, 244 A.3d 549, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 8 (R.I. 2021).

Motion for Mistrial.

In a prosecution for domestic first-degree sexual assault, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to declare a mistrial when a police officer improperly bolstered the victim’s credibility by testifying that she seemed “sincere” when she accused defendant, her husband, of sexual assault, in view of the brevity of the remark, the jurors’ opportunity to judge the victim’s truthfulness before the remark was made, and the trial court’s instruction to disregard the remark. State v. Rushlow, 32 A.3d 892, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 140 (R.I. 2011).

In a prosecution for domestic first-degree sexual assault, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to declare a mistrial when the victim, defendant’s wife, testified that the police had issued to her a no-contact order against him, because 1) the trial court gave a cautionary instruction that the jurors could not use this testimony to find that defendant engaged in any prior misconduct; 2) the testimony was not sufficiently prejudicial as to prevent the jury from dispassionately considering the evidence; and 3) there was abundant evidence of defendant’s guilt. State v. Rushlow, 32 A.3d 892, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 140 (R.I. 2011).

No-Contact Order.

The defendant’s conduct was not sufficient to support a finding that he violated a no-contact order since all of the alleged incidents were mere coincidence, and the defendant’s only conduct in each of the incidents was to acknowledge the victim with a simple greeting. State v. Conti, 672 A.2d 885, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 109 (R.I. 1996).

Defendant’s conviction in the superior court under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5(c)(1)(ii) , based on a third violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(a)(10) (amended 2001), which included violations of a protective order, but which made no mention of no-contact orders, was vacated because defendant’s second conviction was under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-3(d)(1) for violating a no-contact order issued under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-4 , and a conviction for a violation of a no-contact order was not an enumerated offense in R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2 (amended 2001); at best, defendant committed a misdemeanor violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-3 , an offense cognizable in the district court. State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 180 (R.I. 2003).

Because the allegations that defendant committed a felony were sufficient to invoke the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-15 , and because defendant failed to preserve defendant’s R.I. Super. Ct. R. Prac. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, defendant was properly convicted of violating a no-contact order and simple assault. State v. Tower, 984 A.2d 40, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 137 (R.I. 2009).

Sentencing.

Defendant’s R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 motion was properly denied because defendant unequivocally waived all nonjurisdictional defects in a criminal information charging defendant with violating a no-contact order by pleading nolo contendere, and defendant’s sentence was well within the prescribed statutory limits of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5(c)(1)(ii) . State v. Murray, 44 A.3d 139, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 67 (R.I. 2012).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Since defendant was expressly enjoined from any contact with his former wife, his sending birthday cards constituted contact; thus, there was sufficient evidence to support his violation of the no-contact order. State v. John, 881 A.2d 920, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 182 (R.I. 2005).

In a domestic assault prosecution, defendant’s wife recanted her statements to police that he hit and kicked her son and tried to slap the phone out of her hand to prevent her from calling police. However, her trial testimony that it looked like defendant was hitting her son, and that defendant tapped her arm and swore at her to prevent her from calling police, created a jury question of whether he committed acts that put her and her son in reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm. State v. Cardona, 969 A.2d 667, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 54 (R.I. 2009).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of domestic simple assault and domestic disorderly conduct because neither the purported inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony nor any contradictory evidence undermined defendant’s convictions as the victim told the responding officer that defendant had beat her and kicked her, punched her, and stomped on her; the officer observed bruises on her forehead, face, and chin area; defendant admitted to the officer that he had hit and punched the victim after she had slapped him; and an emergency room physician testified that the victim presented with an ear contusion and lacerations, hand contusion, ankle abrasion, and a blow to the head, and that she was discharged after receiving 10 sutures. State v. Van Dongen, 132 A.3d 1070, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 31 (R.I. 2016).

12-29-5.1. Oversight committee created — Composition.

  1. There is created a batterers intervention standards oversight committee, referred to in this chapter as the committee pursuant to the provisions of § 12-29-5 .
  2. The committee shall meet no fewer than four (4) times per year at the call of the chairperson or upon petition of a majority of committee members.
  3. The committee shall consist of thirteen (13) members to be appointed as follows: The director of the department of corrections or his or her designee who shall serve as chairperson of the committee; the director of the Rhode Island justice commission or his or her designee; the executive director of the Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence or his or her designee; a representative from the law enforcement community appointed by the chairperson of the Rhode Island Police Chiefs Association; the attorney general or his or her designee; the director of Justice Assistance or his or her designee; a qualified elector of this state appointed by the governor; the director of the domestic violence training and monitoring unit or his or her designee; the chief justice of the supreme court or his or her designee; the director of the department of health or his or her designee; a representative of a batterers intervention program appointed by the director of the Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence; the chief judge of the district court or his or her designee; and the director of the Urban League of Rhode Island or his or her designee.
  4. Each member of the committee may appoint a permanent designee to attend committee meetings in his or her absence. A quorum of the committee shall consist of a majority of its members.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 165, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

12-29-5.2. Duties and responsibilities of committee.

  1. The committee shall have the duties and responsibilities to:
    1. Establish and promulgate minimum standards for batterers intervention programs serving persons mandated pursuant to § 12-29-5 ; revise the standards as is deemed necessary; ensure the standards comport with evidence-informed practices designed to reduce risk; and make the standards available to the public, provided that the standards shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
      1. Batterers intervention programs shall be conducted using evidence-informed programming and dosage levels designed to reduce the risk of future violent behavior;
      2. The duration of batterers intervention programs shall be a minimum of forty (40) contact hours over the course of twenty (20) weeks;
      3. Batterers intervention programs shall require that all mandated batterers pay fees for the programs in accordance with the provisions of § 12-29-5 ; provided, that programs shall accommodate varying levels of ability to pay by means of sliding-fee scales and may elect to offer alternatives to payment in the form of community restitution and/or deferred payment for a portion of the fees; and
      4. Provisions shall be established defining the circumstances under which defendants who have attended a batterers program while incarcerated, and/or a batterers program in another jurisdiction that is certified under that jurisdiction’s standards or not subject to standards in that jurisdiction, may request that their documented participation in such program be accepted in satisfaction of some portion of their obligation to attend forty (40) hours of a certified batterers intervention program as described in subsection (a)(1)(ii).
    2. Monitor and review batterers intervention programs seeking certification with respect to compliance with the standards, including periodic, on-site review;
    3. Certify those batterers intervention programs that are in compliance with the standards established pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and
    4. Investigate and decide appeals, complaints, requests for variances, and post-enrollment certification applications.
  2. For purposes of this chapter, “post-enrollment certification applications” means those applications made to the committee by a batterer mandated to attend a certified batterers intervention program in accordance with § 12-29-5 who has, prior to adjudication, enrolled in a program not certified by the committee. The application shall include supporting documentation from the batterers intervention program and a request that participation in the batterers intervention program be accepted in lieu of the equivalent number of hours of a certified batterers intervention program. The committee shall act upon a post-enrollment certification application within thirty (30) days of receipt of the application.
  3. The state public safety grant administration office may provide grants to provide for the access to, and expansion and improvement of, community-based batterers intervention programs. The batterers intervention standards oversight committee shall make recommendations to the public safety grant administration policy board regarding the distribution of funds in the form of grants to programs to cover the costs of delivering quality services to indigent offenders, and to assist community providers and their staffs to utilize outcome-based best practices and effective programming methods.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 165, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 477, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 343, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 349, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations and redesignated the subdivisions in subsection (a).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 343, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 349, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

12-29-5.3. Subcommittees, task forces, focus groups and advisory committees.

  1. The committee may establish and appoint any subcommittees, task forces, focus groups and advisory committees that it deems necessary from time to time to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
  2. The committee shall promulgate its rules of procedure governing its operations in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 35 of title 42.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 165, § 1.

12-29-6. Training.

  1. The curriculum for new law enforcement officers presented at the Providence police academy, the state police academy, and the municipal police academy shall include at least eight (8) hours of training on domestic violence issues. That training shall stress the enforcement of criminal law in domestic violence cases and shall include:
    1. The nature, extent, and causes of domestic violence;
    2. Legal rights of and remedies available to victims of domestic violence;
    3. Services and facilities available to victims and batterers;
    4. Legal duties imposed on police officers to make arrests and to offer protection and assistance; and
    5. Techniques for handling incidents of domestic violence that minimize the likelihood of injury to the officer and promote the safety of the victim.
  2. Each law enforcement agency shall provide four (4) hours of in-service training to its officers on issues of domestic violence. This training shall stress the enforcement of criminal law in domestic violence cases and shall include:
    1. The nature, extent and causes of domestic violence;
    2. Legal rights of and remedies available to victims of domestic violence;
    3. Services and facilities available to victims and batterers;
    4. Legal duties imposed on police officers to make arrests and to offer protection and assistance; and
    5. Techniques for handling incidents of domestic violence that minimize the likelihood of injury to the officer and promote the safety of the victim.
  3. There is established within the court system a domestic violence training and monitoring unit, whose responsibilities shall include:
    1. Development of curricula for recruit and in-service training of law enforcement personnel;
    2. Delivery of that curricula at in-service trainings and at the academies;
    3. Development and delivery of training for medical providers concerning the requirements of this section;
    4. Development and delivery of training for probation officers in screening abusers for appropriate counseling; and
    5. Development of forms, as required in §§ 12-29-8 and 12-29-9 , and development of any other assessment tools that are necessary to monitor the implementation of this chapter.
  4. The administrative office of the supreme court shall establish an ongoing training program for judges, court personnel, bail commissioners, and clerks to inform them of the policies and procedures of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 6; P.L. 1989, ch. 469, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 20.

12-29-6.1. Creation of domestic violence training and monitoring unit.

There is created the domestic violence training and monitoring unit, which shall be administered under the direction of the state court administrator.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 223, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 40, § 42.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

12-29-7. Domestic abuse court advocacy project.

  1. There is established within the court system a domestic abuse court advocacy project to provide the services as set forth in subsection (b) of this section. The administrator of the court system may contract with a nonprofit agency or organization which has a demonstrated record of service to victims of domestic violence for the purpose of operating the project.
  2. The responsibilities of the project shall include, but not be limited to:
    1. Advising victims of domestic violence crimes of their rights pursuant to chapter 28 of this title, and assisting victims in securing those rights;
    2. Informing victims of the availability of protective orders and assisting victims in obtaining those orders as appropriate;
    3. Referring victims to shelter services, counseling, and other social services, as appropriate; and
    4. Monitoring the justice system’s response to and treatment of victims of domestic violence crimes.
  3. The project shall assure coordination with other victims services programs, shelters, and other organizations or agencies offering services to victims of domestic abuse.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 6.

12-29-8. Domestic violence reports.

  1. A law enforcement officer who responds to or investigates a domestic violence incident shall complete a domestic violence report, whether or not an arrest occurs.
  2. For the purpose of establishing accurate data on the extent and severity of domestic violence in the state and on the degree of compliance with the requirements of § 12-29-3 , the domestic violence training and monitoring unit of the court system shall prescribe a form for making domestic violence reports. The form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information:
    1. Name of the parties;
    2. Relationship of the parties;
    3. Sex of the parties;
    4. Date of birth of the parties;
    5. Time and date of the incident;
    6. Whether children were involved or whether the alleged act of domestic violence was committed in the presence of children;
    7. Type and extent of the alleged abuse;
    8. Number and types of weapons involved;
    9. Existence of any prior court order; and
    10. Any other data that may be necessary for a complete analysis of all circumstances leading to the arrest.
  3. Each police department shall forward copies of the reports to the unit at the end of each month.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 6; P.L. 1994, ch. 134, § 7.

12-29-8.1. Restraining order no-contact order system (R.O.N.C.O.).

  1. All domestic violence and sexual assault protective orders must be filed in the R.O.N.C.O. system at the attorney general’s bureau of criminal identification (B.C.I.) unit.
    1. All protective orders from district court, superior court, family court, police departments and bail commissioners must be filed upon issuance by faxing or delivering the orders to the B.C.I. unit no later than the end of the day of issuance. Orders shall include the following: the terms of the order, the date of issuance, the date of the second hearing (if any), the dates of birth of the parties, and the date of expiration.
    2. All modifications and terminations of the orders must also be faxed or delivered to the B.C.I. unit no later than the end of the day of the modification. Any protective order issued pursuant to chapter 15 of title 15, chapter 8.1 of title 8, and chapter 5 of title 15 which is terminated or expires for any reason, and any no-contact order issued by any superior court, district court or family court which is removed, rescinded or expired for any reason shall be expunged within thirty (30) days from the R.O.N.C.O. system and the prior existence of the protective order or no-contact order shall not be disclosed except by court order.
  2. A person entitled to protection under an existing protection order shall, upon request, be given a certified copy of the order by the court clerk. The attorney general’s B.C.I. unit shall accept the certified copy and enter that copy into the R.O.N.C.O. system.
  3. For purposes of this section, “protective orders” includes all family, district, and superior court restraining orders, as well as district and superior court no-contact orders.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 384, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection and subdivision designations.

12-29-9. Medical data collection reports.

    1. For the purpose of documenting incidents of family violence resulting in injuries treated at medical facilities or by medical providers and of providing statistically valid information on the extent of family violence, the domestic violence training and monitoring unit of the court system shall prescribe a form for making medical data collection reports. The form shall include, but is not limited to the following:
      1. Relationship of the parties;
      2. Sex of the parties;
      3. Date of birth of the parties;
      4. Time and date of the incident;
      5. Whether the incident is verified by the victim;
      6. Type of injuries;
      7. Whether medical attention or hospitalization is required;
      8. Whether the victim has previously sustained injuries as a result of family violence;
      9. Action taken;
      10. Source of the report;
      11. Address of the reporter.
    2. The report shall not contain the name of the parties nor any other identifying information.
  1. A report shall be completed for any victim being treated for injuries which the victim states resulted from domestic violence or which the mandated medical provider has reasonable cause to believe resulted from domestic violence.
  2. The report shall be submitted to the unit on a quarterly basis for quarters ending on September 30, December 31, March 31, and June 30.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 6; P.L. 1994, ch. 134, § 7.

12-29-10. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 6.

12-29-11. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 12-29-11 (P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 6), concerning appropriations for carrying out the purposes of this chapter, was repealed by P.L. 1989, ch. 542, § 8, effective July 10, 1989.

12-29-12. Deborah DeBare domestic violence prevention fund — Policy.

  1. The general assembly finds and declares that domestic violence is a serious public health concern in the state of Rhode Island, and that evidence-based domestic violence prevention programs are important tools in decreasing the continuing toll that domestic violence takes on Rhode Island communities, cities, and towns. It is therefore in the best interest of the state to establish a fund to promote effective programs working toward the primary prevention of domestic violence in Rhode Island.
  2. Deborah DeBare domestic violence prevention fund:
    1. There is created the Deborah DeBare domestic violence prevention fund program, to be administered by the Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence.
    2. The Deborah DeBare domestic violence prevention fund program monies shall be used to fund evidence-based programs with the purpose of primary prevention of domestic violence and dating violence in the state of Rhode Island.
    3. The Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence shall convene a statewide prevention fund advisory committee comprised of those with knowledge, experience, training, and/or expertise in the field of prevention of domestic violence and dating violence. The committee members shall include, but are not limited to, the executive director of the Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence, or his or her designee; the director of the department of health, or his or her designee; the director of the department of human services, or his or her designee; the attorney general, or his or her designee; and representative organizations providing domestic violence and dating violence primary prevention services in Rhode Island.
  3. The committee shall be responsible for implementation of programs to prevent domestic and dating abuse and shall:
    1. Develop a plan and budget for distribution of funds;
    2. Develop criteria for awarding and distributing funds received to develop plans and programs for the prevention of domestic and dating violence;
    3. Issue requests for proposals to providers, organizations, firms, or entities that will provide services to the committee;
    4. Review proposals for the funds and present recommendations to the board of directors of the Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence;
    5. Monitor and account for the expenditure of funds and produce an annual report on the activities of the Deborah DeBare domestic violence prevention fund. Annual reports shall be submitted to the senate and house finance committees of the general assembly for review on or before February 28 of each year; and
    6. Promote the general development of domestic violence primary prevention programs and activities.
  4. Organizations submitting proposals for funds shall not participate in the review of proposals or expenditure of funds. The Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence shall not be eligible to submit proposals for the committee’s programs nor shall it be eligible to receive any funds from the committee except as hereinafter provided.
  5. The Rhode Island Coalition Against Domestic Violence may utilize up to ten percent (10%) of the sums collected for the Deborah DeBare domestic violence prevention fund for the purpose of administering the program and it shall also be required to submit an annual report detailing the expenditure of funds to the senate and house finance committees on or before February 28 of each year.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 131, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 135, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 233, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 280, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 131, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 135, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 233, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 280, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2016, ch. 131, § 2, provides that this section takes effect on September 1, 2016.

P.L. 2016, ch. 135, § 2, provides that this section takes effect on September 1, 2016.

Chapter 29.1 Elderly Violence Prevention Act

12-29.1-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Elderly Violence Prevention Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 416, § 1.

12-29.1-2. Legislative purpose.

  1. The purpose of this chapter is to recognize the importance of violence against the elderly as a serious crime against society and to assure elderly victims of violence the maximum protection from violence which the law and those who enforce the law can provide.
  2. It is the intent of the legislature that the official response to cases of crimes of violence against the elderly shall stress the enforcement of the laws to protect the victim and shall communicate the attitude that violent behavior is not excused or tolerated.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 416, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Legislation Survey Section: Criminal Procedure, see 4 Roger Williams U.L Rev. 833 (1999).

12-29.1-3. Definitions.

The following words as used in this chapter have the following meanings:

  1. “Elderly person” means any person over the age of sixty (60) years.
  2. “Victim” means any elderly person who has been subjected to a crime of violence.
  3. “Violent crimes” includes, but is not limited to, any of the following crimes:
    1. Breaking and entering (§ 11-8-2.3 );
    2. Felony assaults (§§ 11-5-1 , 11-5-2 , 11-5-4 , 11-5-10 , 11-5-10 .1, 11-5-10.4 );
    3. Simple Assaults (§ 11-5-3 );
    4. Kidnapping (§ 11-26-1 );
    5. Sexual Assault (§§ 11-37-2 , 11-37-4 ); and
    6. Homicide (§§ 11-23-1 , 11-23-3 ).

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 416, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rearranged the definitions in alphabetical order and redesignated the subdivisions and paragraphs.

12-29.1-4. Law enforcement officers — Duties and immunity.

  1. The primary duty of law enforcement officers when responding to a violent crime against the elderly situation is to enforce the laws allegedly violated and to protect the victim.
    1. When a law enforcement officer responds to a violent crime against an elderly person and has probable cause to believe that a crime of violence has been committed, the officer shall exercise arrest powers pursuant to §§ 12-7-3 and 12-7-4 ; provided, that the officer may arrest and take into custody the alleged perpetrator of the crime when the officer has probable cause to believe that the person being arrested has committed any of the following acts:
      1. A felonious assault;
      2. An assault which has resulted in bodily injury to the victim, whether or not the injury is observable by the responding officer;
      3. Physical action which was intended to cause another person reasonably to fear imminent serious bodily injury or death. “Bodily injury” means physical pain, illness, or an impairment of physical condition;
      4. Violation of a protective order and the violator has previous knowledge of the order and the terms of the order; or
      5. Violation of a no-contact order issued pursuant to § 12-29.1-5 .
    2. The decision to arrest and charge a person under the provisions of this chapter shall not:
      1. Be dependent on the specific consent of the victim;
      2. Consider the relationship of the parties; or
      3. Be based solely on a request by the victim.
    3. An arrest without warrant made under this section shall be made within twenty-four (24) hours of the alleged crime.
    4. If an arrest without warrant cannot be made pursuant to this section, the officer shall advise the victim of the right to file a criminal complaint and shall seek a warrant for arrest if there is probable cause to do so.
  2. A law enforcement officer shall not be held liable for false arrest in any civil action for an arrest based on probable cause or for enforcement in good faith of a court order issued pursuant to this chapter.
  3. It shall be the responsibility of the law enforcement officer at the scene of a violent crime against the elderly to provide immediate assistance to the victim. This assistance shall include, but not be limited to, assisting the victim to obtain medical treatment if treatment is required, including transportation to an emergency medical treatment facility.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 416, § 1.

12-29.1-5. Restrictions upon and duties of court.

    1. Because of the likelihood of repeated violence directed at those who have been victims in the past, when a person is charged with or arrested for a crime of violence against an elderly person that person may not be released from custody on bail or personal recognizance before arraignment without first appearing before the court or bail commissioner. The court or bail commissioner authorizing release shall issue a no-contact order prohibiting the person charged or arrested from having contact with the victim.
    2. At the time of arraignment or bail hearing the court or bail commissioner shall determine whether a no-contact order shall be issued or extended.
    3. Willful violation of a court order issued under subdivision (2) of this subsection is a misdemeanor. The written order releasing the person charged or the written order issued at the time of disposition shall contain the court’s directive and shall bear the legend: “Violation of this order is a criminal offense under this section and will subject a violator to arrest”. A copy of the order shall be provided to the victim.
    4. Whenever an order prohibiting contact is issued, modified, or terminated under subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection, the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order on or before the next judicial day to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 416, § 1.

12-29.1-6. Speedy trial.

In any action involving a victim sixty-five (65) years of age or older, the court shall take appropriate action to ensure a speedy trial to minimize the length of time the victim must endure the stress of involvement in the proceeding. In ruling on any motion or request for a delay or continuance of proceedings, the court shall consider any adverse impact the delay or continuance may have on the well-being of the victim or witness. This provision establishes a right to speedy trial to the victim and shall not be construed as creating any additional rights in the defendant.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 161, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 204, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 161, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 204, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 30 Protection and Supervision of Criminal Witnesses

12-30-1. Statement of purpose.

The effective prosecution of persons involved in organized criminal activity often requires the development and use of testimony obtained from witnesses who were themselves involved in crime. These witnesses include victims of crime, material witnesses or any person prepared to provide relevant testimony or information to law enforcement officers engaged in an ongoing criminal investigation, or to any court. These witnesses are to be protected from actions wrongfully taken against them, or their family, because of their participation as a witness. The standards set forth in this chapter are intended:

  1. To encourage the cooperation of potential witnesses with law enforcement authorities;
  2. To assure the safety and security of those witnesses;
  3. To provide accountability in the cost and operation of the witness program; and
  4. To protect the community from those with a history of criminal behavior.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 331, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 65, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 244, § 1.

12-30-2. Agreement with witness.

Whenever any law enforcement official of the state or any city or town determines that a person who is: (1) incarcerated upon conviction for a felony; (2) indicted or informed against for a felony; or (3) the subject of a felony investigation; is willing to give evidence regarding the commission of felony offenses within the state in exchange for a reduction of his or her sentence, assistance in obtaining parole, the dismissal or reduction of charges pending against him or her, and/or immunity from prosecution, the official shall immediately notify the attorney general. An assistant attorney general and the law enforcement official shall interview the prospective witness to determine what information he or she possesses and what consideration he or she is seeking for his or her testimony. If they determine that the evidence proffered is reliable and that the consideration sought is reasonable, the assistant attorney general shall prepare a written memorandum setting forth all of the terms of the agreement which shall be signed by the witness, a representative of the law enforcement agency initiating the case, and representative of the attorney general’s office. The terms of the agreement shall include the length and manner of custodial supervision to be provided in order to accomplish both the protection and incarceration of the criminal witness. The document shall explicitly state that the agreement will become void if the criminal witness violates the terms of his or her confinement, fails to provide the promised information and assistance to the prosecution, or commits a new crime. The prospective witness shall be afforded the right to counsel during the negotiation and execution of the agreement. The memorandum shall not become binding and enforceable by the parties until approved in accordance with the procedures set forth in § 12-30-3 .

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 331, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Noncompliance.

Even if, as the defendant alleges that the informant’s agreement with the police did not comply with this section, this section is intended to protect the informant. The defendant, therefore, has no standing to challenge the parties’ noncompliance. State v. Reyes, 671 A.2d 1236, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 51 (R.I. 1996).

12-30-3. Witness protection review board.

  1. There is created within the attorney general’s office a witness protection review board, consisting of an assistant attorney general appointed by the attorney general, an officer of the state police appointed by the superintendent of state police, and a municipal police chief appointed by the president of the Rhode Island Police Chiefs’ Association.
  2. No agreement which obligates any law enforcement agency of the state or its municipalities to provide protection for and/or to release from custody, or dismiss pending charges against any criminal witness (i.e., a person who is incarcerated upon conviction for a felony, who is indicted or informed against for a felony, or who is the subject of a felony investigation) in exchange for his or her testimony, shall take effect until it has been approved by a majority vote of the review board. The board shall review each agreement to determine whether:
    1. The evidence proffered justifies the reduction of sentence and/or dismissal of charges;
    2. Adequate provision has been made to insure the safety of the witness and his or her immediate family, if any, during the times in which he or she will be cooperating with law enforcement authorities and during his or her resettlement thereafter;
    3. The witness will serve any sentence of confinement imposed upon him or her for his or her crimes in a sufficiently restrictive environment;
    4. The cost of maintaining the witness in the protection program is reasonable; and
    5. The witness will pose any threat of future criminality if released into the community pursuant to the terms of the agreement.
  3. In determining whether to approve the agreement, the board shall consider whether the particular witness could be better managed if responsibility for his or her custody were transferred to the witness protection program, operated by the United States Justice Department.
  4. The recommendation of the review board shall be presented to the attorney general, whose approval shall be required prior to implementation of the agreement. Once approved by the review board and the attorney general, any provision of the agreement reducing the sentence of, transferring the custody of, dismissing the charges against, and/or agreeing to immunize the witness must be presented to the superior court for its approval in accordance with applicable statutes and the rules of that court.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 331, § 1.

12-30-4. Noncriminal witnesses.

Whenever any law enforcement official of the state or any city or town determines that a prospective witness who is not incarcerated, charged, or under investigation for commission of a felony requires custodial protection and/or assistance with relocation due to a threat to the safety of that witness or his or her family, the official shall immediately notify the attorney general. An assistant attorney general and the law enforcement official shall interview the prospective witness to determine what information he or she possesses and what level of protection is required. If they determine that the evidence proffered is reliable and that the protection is necessary, the assistant attorney general shall prepare a written memorandum setting forth a summation of the information to be provided and the nature and cost of the protection to be afforded. This memorandum shall be presented to the witness protection review board for its review and approval pursuant to § 12-30-3 .

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 331, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

Rhode Island’s “witness protection statute,” R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-30-1 et seq., did not imposed a duty on government defendants to protect an individual who witnessed a murder such that the alleged failure to comply with the statute violated the individual’s substantive and procedural due process rights; a failure to comply with state law did not establish the basis for a federal due process violation. Rivera v. R.I., 312 F. Supp. 2d 175, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5975 (D.R.I. 2004), aff'd, 402 F.3d 27, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4626 (1st Cir. 2005).

12-30-5. Supervision.

Whenever the terms of an agreement with a criminal witness provide for him or her to serve a period of incarceration in the state, his or her confinement shall be either at the adult correctional institutions (ACI) or at a facility maintained and supervised by the state police. The court by order shall set forth whether custody of the criminal witness shall be maintained by the department of corrections or the state police. If the place of confinement is other than at the ACI, the witness shall be under guard by law enforcement officials at all times. He or she shall not be permitted to leave the place of confinement unless escorted by a law enforcement guard. The officers selected to guard the witness shall have no other involvement in the case or cases in which the witness is providing evidence.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 326, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 327, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 331, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is set out to correct an error appearing in the 2000 Reenactment volume.

12-30-6. Record of supervision.

  1. The agency responsible for supervision of the protected criminal witness shall maintain a daily record of the witness’ activities. That record shall include, but not be limited to:
    1. The identity of all persons assigned to guard the witness and the hours of their duty;
    2. The identity of all persons visiting the witness and the purpose and duration of those visits;
    3. The identity of all persons making telephone calls to or being called by the witness and the purposes and duration of those calls;
    4. The destination and purpose of any movement of the witness from his or her place of confinement, the identity of any persons traveling with the witness, and the duration of the trip; and
    5. An itemization of all expenditures of public funds made by or on behalf of the witness and who authorized those expenditures.
  2. The record shall be made available to the witness protection review board for its examination, in furtherance of the monitoring process set forth in § 12-30-9 .

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 331, § 1.

12-30-7. Preparation of witness.

The law enforcement agency which developed the criminal witness protection program together with the attorney general’s office shall be primarily responsible for debriefing the witness and preparing his or her testimony. Those officers involved in the investigation and prosecution of the cases in which the witness is providing evidence shall not be assigned to guard the witness.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 331, § 1.

12-30-8. Funding.

The cost of maintaining a protected criminal witness in custody shall be paid by the attorney general from funds appropriated to his or her office for that purpose. Expenditures shall be monitored by the witness protection review board, which shall determine an appropriate budget for the maintenance of each witness. In determining that budget, the board shall consider the standard of living provided for inmates at the adult correctional institutions.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 331, § 1.

12-30-9. Monitoring.

The witness protection review board shall examine the status of each case involving a protected criminal witness at three (3) month intervals. Any change in the terms of confinement of the witness must be reported to the board within five (5) days of its occurrence.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 331, § 1.

12-30-10. Rules and regulations.

The attorney general and the state police shall promulgate rules and regulations in furtherance of the administration of their responsibilities pursuant to this chapter. Those rules and regulations shall be submitted to the witness protection review board. Any amendment of or addition to those rules shall be submitted to the board within thirty (30) days of their promulgation.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 326, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 327, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 331, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 21.

12-30-11. Priority for trial.

In order to minimize the period of time during which protection must be provided for the witness, the trial of cases in which a protected witness will be testifying shall, upon application of the attorney general, be given priority on the criminal trial calendar by the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 331, § 1.

12-30-12. Annual report.

  1. On the second Friday of January of each year, the attorney general shall submit a report to the general assembly stating the number of proposed agreements submitted to the witness protection review board during the previous year and the number of agreements approved by the board and the attorney general.
  2. In addition, the report shall provide:
    1. The number of witnesses currently in the program;
    2. The number of witnesses in the custody of the department of corrections and in the custody of the state police;
    3. The charges pending against each witness and the proposed disposition resulting from his or her cooperation;
    4. The number of indictments that have resulted from information obtained from each witness;
    5. The number of convictions that have resulted from the information obtained from each witness and the sentences imposed by the court; and
    6. An itemization of all expenditures of public funds made by or on behalf of each witness, listed by the purpose of the expenditure.
  3. The report shall not disclose the identity of any witness not already publicly known to be participating in the program, nor shall it disclose any specific information that might tend to reveal the location of the witness.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 326, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 327, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 331, § 1.

12-30-13. Confidentiality of information.

  1. All personally descriptive information, including, but not limited to, names, addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, social security numbers, license or identification card numbers, automobile registration numbers, or any other data that may compromise the identity or security of a witness protection program participant, applicant, or former participant or applicant, is not subject to disclosure pursuant to chapter 2 of title 38.
  2. Except as provided for in this chapter and any superior court rule of criminal procedure, all information regarding the whereabouts of or expenditures concerning a witness who is participating in witness protection, or whose participation has ended, been terminated, or revoked by the witness protection review board, shall not be released where that release of information would tend to compromise security or endanger witnesses participating in the witness protection program.
  3. All information concerning any meetings of the witness protection review board shall not be subject to disclosure pursuant to chapter 46 of title 42.
  4. The witness protection review board shall be exempt from the provisions of chapter 2 of title 37 in connection with its procurement of any goods, equipment, or services necessary to the implementation of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 65, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 244, § 2.

Chapter 31 Community Restitution

12-31-1. Community restitution.

The general assembly declares that the words “public community service” which appear through this title shall now be substituted with and referred to as “public community restitution”.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 454, § 2.

Chapter 32 Cell Phone Tracking

12-32-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Adverse result” means:
    1. Endangering the life or physical safety of an individual;
    2. Flight from prosecution;
    3. Destruction of, or tampering with, evidence;
    4. Intimidation of potential witnesses; or
    5. Otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.
  2. “Electronic device” means any device that enables access to, or use of, an electronic communication service (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15)), remote computing service (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2)), or location information service.
  3. “Location information” means any information concerning the location of an electronic device that, in whole or in part, is generated by, or derived from, the operation of that device.
  4. “Location information service” means a global positioning service or other mapping, locational, or directional information service.
  5. “Service provider” means the provider of an electronic communications service, remote computing service, or location information service.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 411, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 412, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 411, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 412, § 1 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

12-32-2. Requirement for warrant.

No agent of the state, or any political subdivision of the state, shall obtain location information without a warrant unless a warrant requirement exception applies.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 411, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 412, § 1.

12-32-3. Notice.

  1. Unless delayed under subsection (b), notice to the affected customer or subscriber is required not later than five (5) days after an agent of the state, or any political subdivision of the state, receives location information under this chapter that is obtained with or without a warrant; provided no notice shall be required if the location information was obtained pursuant to § 12-32-4(a) . The agent of the state, or any political subdivision of the state, shall serve the following upon, or deliver to, the affected customer or subscriber by registered mail, or first-class mail, or electronic mail, or any other means permitted by the court issuing the warrant to be as effective:
    1. A copy of the warrant, if applicable; and
    2. A statement of the general nature of the law enforcement inquiry; and
    3. If applicable, an affirmation that location information maintained by a service provider was supplied to a law enforcement officer; and
    4. If such location information was obtained, an identification of the service provider from which the information was obtained; and
    5. If applicable, a statement indicating the identifying number associated with the electronic device; and
    6. If applicable, the dates for which the location information was supplied; and
    7. A statement of whether notification of such customer(s) or subscriber(s) was delayed pursuant to subsection (b); and
    8. If applicable, an identification of the court that made the certification or determination pursuant to which that delay was made.
  2. Delay of notification.  An agent of the state, or any political subdivision of the state, acting under this chapter may include in the application a request for an order delaying the notification required pursuant to this section for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days, and the court shall issue the order if the court determines that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of the warrant may have an adverse result.
  3. Upon expiration of the period of delay granted under this section, the agent of the state, or any political subdivision of the state, shall provide the affected customer(s) or subscriber(s) a copy of the warrant, together with any notice required.
  4. Preclusion of notice to subject of governmental access.  An agent of the state, or any political subdivision of the state, acting under this chapter may include in the application a request for an order directing a service provider to which a warrant is directed not to notify any other person of the existence of the warrant for a period of not more than ninety (90) days, and the court shall issue the order if the court determines that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of the warrant may have an adverse result.
  5. The court may, upon application, grant one or more extensions of orders granted under this chapter for an additional ninety (90) days.
  6. Failure to comply with the notice provisions shall not be grounds for the suppression of any evidence.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 411, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 412, § 1.

12-32-4. Exceptions.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, an agent of the state, or any political subdivision of the state, may obtain location information from a service provider without obtaining a warrant under the following circumstances:
    1. In order to respond to the user’s call for emergency services;
    2. In order to respond to a call for emergency services, including a request from an E-911 supervisor to determine the location of a cellular telephone, when required pursuant to an emergency involving actual or potential death, serious physical injury, or major damage to property and the information is needed without delay;
    3. If an agent of the state, or any political subdivision of the state, believes that an emergency involving immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires the obtaining of information relating to the emergency without delay, and/or pursuant to the Kelsey Smith Act, as codified in § 39-2-20 ;
    4. If the location information was generated by an electronic device used as a condition of release from a penal institution, as a condition of pre-trial release, probation, conditional discharge, parole, mandatory supervised release, or other sentencing order;
    5. With the express consent of the owner or user of the electronic communications device concerned;
    6. With the express, informed consent of the parent or foster parent of a minor who is the owner or user, or the legal guardian or next of kin of the owner or user, if the owner or user is believed to be deceased or reported missing and unable to be contacted;
    7. If the electronic device is reported lost or stolen by the owner or user of the electronic device; or
    8. If the government entity is the owner of the electronic device and has issued it to an employee or it is attached to property owned by the government entity.
  2. Not later than five (5) days after the date on which an agent of the state, or any political subdivision of the state, obtains access to records under this section, a governmental entity shall file with the appropriate court a signed, sworn statement of a supervisory official of a rank designated by the head of the governmental entity setting forth the grounds for the access to information in this section. Should the courts not be open upon the expiration of the five (5) days, the statement shall be filed the next day the court is open to receive such statement.
  3. When location information is sought pursuant to this chapter, and unless otherwise permitted by a warrant, any acquisition of information shall immediately terminate when the location information sought is obtained.
  4. In the event an application for a warrant is denied, or in any other case where the interception is made or terminated without a warrant having been issued where required by this chapter, notice shall be served to all owners or known users of electronic devices about which location information was acquired in violation of this chapter.
  5. The notice required by § 12-32-3 shall also be provided when location information is obtained pursuant to subdivisions (a)(2) or (a)(3).
  6. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit law enforcement from obtaining, without a court order, location information when the information, including metadata attached to images and video, is otherwise publicly available on a social networking website.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 411, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 412, § 1.

12-32-5. Reporting requirements.

  1. By January 31 of each calendar year, each law enforcement agency that collected any location information from electronic devices in the previous calendar year shall issue a report identifying the number of warrants issued for location information for an electronic device that were approved and denied in the previous year, including:
    1. The identity of the agency making the application; and
    2. The offense specified in the warrant or application therefor; and
    3. The number of warrants granted, in full or in part, and the number denied; and
    4. The number and duration of any extensions of the warrant.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 411, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 412, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 451, § 5.

12-32-6. Immunity from liability.

No cause of action shall lie in any court against a service provider or such provider’s officers, employees, agents, or other specified persons, for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of any court order, warrant, or for providing information in reliance on representations by law enforcement that the location information may be obtained without a warrant pursuant to § 12-32-4 .

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 411, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 412, § 1.

Chapter 33 Claims for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment

12-33-1. Legislative intent.

  1. The general assembly finds that innocent persons who have been wrongfully convicted of crimes through no fault of their own have been uniquely victimized, and are deserving of consideration and remuneration for this miscarriage of justice.
  2. For the purposes of this chapter, a “wrongful conviction” is a finding of guilt by a jury or judge, later proven incorrect, that results in incarceration for more than one year.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 235, § 1, effective July 8, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 236, § 1, effective July 8, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 235, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 236, § 1 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

12-33-2. Statement of claim for compensation.

  1. In order to present an actionable claim pursuant to this chapter, the claimant must establish by documentary evidence that:
    1. Claimant has been convicted of one or more crimes and, as a result of the conviction, was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and has served all or part of said sentence; and
    2. On grounds not inconsistent with innocence:
      1. Claimant was pardoned of the crime or crimes upon which claimant was sentenced and that are the grounds for the complaint; or
      2. The judgment of conviction was vacated for reasons other than the ineffective assistance of counsel; or
      3. The judgment of conviction was reversed for reasons other than the ineffective assistance of counsel; and
      4. The accusatory instrument was dismissed; and
    3. The claim is not time-barred by the provisions of this chapter.
  2. The claims shall be verified by the claimant.
  3. If the court determines after an examination of the claim that the claimant has not alleged sufficient facts to succeed at trial it shall dismiss the claim, either on its own motion or on the state’s motion.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 235, § 1, effective July 8, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 236, § 1, effective July 8, 2021.

12-33-3. Presentation of claim.

All claims of wrongful conviction and imprisonment under this chapter shall be presented to and heard by the presiding justice of the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 235, § 1, effective July 8, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 236, § 1, effective July 8, 2021.

12-33-4. Judgment and award.

  1. In order to obtain a judgment in their favor, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
    1. Claimant was convicted of one or more crimes, and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment for more than one year, and has served all or any part of the sentence; and
      1. Claimant has been pardoned for the crime or crimes upon which claimant was sentenced, and that are the grounds for the complaint; or
      2. Claimant’s judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated for reasons other than the ineffective assistance of counsel and the accusatory instrument was dismissed; and
    2. Claimant did not commit any of the crimes charged in the accusatory instrument; and
    3. Claimant did not commit or suborn perjury, or fabricate evidence, to cause or bring about claimant’s own conviction.
    4. Neither a confession nor an admission later found to be false or a guilty plea shall constitute committing or suborning perjury, fabricating evidence, or causing or bringing about the conviction under this subsection.
  2. If the court finds that the claimant was wrongfully convicted and incarcerated pursuant to this section the court shall grant:
    1. An award for wrongful conviction and incarceration calculated at fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) at the time of release and paid for each year served in a correctional facility. For incarceration of less than a year, this amount shall be prorated to one three hundred sixty fifth’s (1/365) of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for every day served. The award may be expanded to include, at the discretion of the court, in the interest of justice:
      1. Release from any child support payments owed the state by the claimant that became due, and interest on child support arrearages that accrued, during the time served in prison but were not paid as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees where legal proceedings are required to remedy outstanding obligations resulting from an order to pay child support;
      2. Access to and eligibility for any services provided by the state for offenders who have been adjudicated by the courts and are residing in the community. Coordination of these services shall be through the department of probation and parole;
      3. Reasonable attorneys’ fees for bringing a claim under this chapter, not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000). Any such fees granted shall not be deducted from the compensation due to the claimant, nor is counsel entitled to receive additional fees from the client.
  3. No damages or amounts awarded pursuant to this chapter shall be subject to:
    1. Any cap or limit that may be applicable to private parties in civil lawsuits;
    2. Any taxes, except for those portions of the judgment awarded as attorneys’ fees for bringing a claim under this chapter; or
    3. Treatment as gross income to a claimant under the provisions of title 44.
  4. The claimant shall not receive compensation for any period of incarceration during which the claimant was concurrently serving a sentence for a conviction of another crime for which the claimant was lawfully incarcerated.
  5. The acceptance by a claimant of any such award, compromise, or settlement shall:
    1. Be memorialized in writing, which shall include a provision, signed by the claimant, voluntarily relinquishing any and all rights to pursue any other action or remedy at law or in equity that such person may have arising out of such wrongful conviction and incarceration;
    2. Except when procured by fraud, be final and conclusive on the claimant.
  6. The court shall, upon determining that the claimant is entitled to compensation under this chapter, forward to the general treasurer an inventory and description of the award, including any attorneys’ fees awarded, for disbursement.
    1. If at the time of the judgment entry referred to in subsection (b) of this section, the claimant has won a monetary award on or after the effective date of this statute [July 8, 2021] as the result of a federal civil rights lawsuit under federal statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the amount of the award in the action or the amount received in the settlement agreement, less any sums paid to attorneys or for costs litigating the other civil action or obtaining the settlement agreement, shall be deducted from the sum of money to which the claimant is entitled under this section.
    2. If subsection (g)(1) of this section does not apply and if, after the time of the judgment entry referred to in subsection (b) of this section, the claimant wins a monetary award as the result of a federal civil rights lawsuit under federal statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the claimant shall reimburse the state for the sum of money paid under the judgment entry referred to in subsection (b) of this section, less any sums paid to attorneys or for costs in litigation of the other civil action or obtaining the settlement agreement. A reimbursement required under this subsection shall not exceed the amount of the monetary award the claimant wins for damages in the other civil action or the amount received in the settlement agreement.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 235, § 1, effective July 8, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 236, § 1, effective July 8, 2021.

12-33-5. Funding.

Any awards, amounts, or fees awarded pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall, at the direction of the court, be provided by the general treasurer from the general fund.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 235, § 1, effective July 8, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 236, § 1, effective July 8, 2021.

12-33-6. Non-exclusivity.

The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to prohibit a person who has been wrongfully convicted and incarcerated as a result of the misfeasance or malfeasance on the part of the state or any of its political subdivisions from seeking compensation or relief pursuant to any other action or suit authorized by law.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 235, § 1, effective July 8, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 236, § 1, effective July 8, 2021.

12-33-7. Limitations.

Any person claiming compensation under this section based on a pardon that was granted or the vacated or reversed judgment of conviction that occurred before June 30, 2021, shall file such claim not later than three (3) years after June 30, 2021. Any person claiming compensation under this section based on a pardon that was granted or the vacated or reversed judgment of conviction on or after June 30, 2021, shall file such claim not later than three (3) years after the date of such pardon or the vacated or reversed judgment of conviction.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 235, § 1, effective July 8, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 236, § 1, effective July 8, 2021.