Chapter 1 General Provisions

11-1-1. Common law offenses not covered by statute.

Every act and omission which is an offense at common law, and for which no punishment is prescribed by the general laws, may be prosecuted and punished as an offense at common law. Every person who shall be convicted of any offense which is a misdemeanor at common law shall be imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500). Every person who shall be convicted of any offense which is a felony at common law shall be imprisoned for a term not exceeding five (5) years or be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 284, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 350, § 1; P.L. 1922, ch. 2233, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 402, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 621, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-1-1 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 283, § 1.

Cross References.

Civil liability for offenses, § 9-1-2 .

Comparative Legislation.

Common law, applicability:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 43a-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Since this section makes every act which is an offense at common law punishable in Rhode Island, the legislature intended to preserve and not impair or abrogate the common law. State v. LaPlume, 118 R.I. 670 , 375 A.2d 938, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1507 (1977).

The inherent power of the courts to punish for contempt of their authority is not controlled by this section. This section addresses offenses at common law for which the General Laws do not prescribe punishment. This statute assured that a person who had committed an offense at common law could not evade prosecution and punishment because the offense had not been declared a crime in the laws of the state. State v. Price, 672 A.2d 893, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 94 (1996).

Champerty.

Champerty is a common law offense. Martin v. Clarke, 8 R.I. 389 , 1866 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1866).

Conspiracy.

As conspiracy was and still is an offense at common law, a defendant may be prosecuted for conspiracy under this section by an indictment which alleged conspiracy and also referred to specific acts perpetrated in the course of the conspiracy which were separate substantive criminal offenses and were not mutually exclusive crimes and still satisfied the constitutional burden of reasonably apprising the defendant of the charges against him. State v. Giorgi, 115 R.I. 1 , 339 A.2d 268, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1110 (1975). But see State v. LaPlume, 118 R.I. 670 , 375 A.2d 938, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1507 (1977).

Although conspiracy to commit an unlawful act outside the state is now covered by § 11-1-7 , it was an indictable offense under this section. State v. LaPlume, 118 R.I. 670 , 375 A.2d 938, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1507 (1977).

Since § 11-1-6 now prescribes a specific punishment for the common law crime of conspiracy, the applicability of this section to conspiracy prosecutions has been impliedly repealed. State v. Macarelli, 118 R.I. 693 , 375 A.2d 944, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1509 (1977).

One defendant in a prosecution for conspiracy cannot be convicted when all of his alleged coconspirators, be they one or more, have been acquitted or been discharged under circumstances which amount to an acquittal. State v. Donato, 414 A.2d 797, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1642 (1980).

No action in furtherance of the conspiracy beyond the making of the unlawful agreement need occur for the crime to be committed. State v. Sabitoni, 434 A.2d 1339, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1265 (1981).

The crime of conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons to commit an unlawful act or to do a lawful act for an unlawful purpose. State v. Sabitoni, 434 A.2d 1339, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1265 (1981).

Rhode Island follows the common-law rule of conspiracy, which punishes the combination of two or more persons to commit an unlawful act or a lawful act for an unlawful purpose. State v. Brown, 486 A.2d 595, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 419 (1985).

A conspiracy continues as long as its purposes have neither been abandoned nor accomplished. State v. Brown, 486 A.2d 595, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 419 (1985).

False Evidence.

The willful misleading of a court by the production of false evidence may be prosecuted as a common law offense. State v. Horton, 47 R.I. 341 , 133 A. 236 (1926).

Misprision of Felony.

Misprision of felony is an indictable offense. State v. Flynn, 100 R.I. 520 , 217 A.2d 432, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 471 (1966).

Monopoly.

Conspiracy to create a monopoly was a common law offense. State v. Eastern Coal Co., 29 R.I. 254 , 70 A. 1, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1908).

Suicide.

At common law, suicide was a serious felony, and Rhode Island recognizes all common-law offenses that have not been specifically abrogated or superseded by statute. In re Marlene B., 540 A.2d 1028, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1988).

11-1-2. Felony, misdemeanor — Petty misdemeanor, and violation distinguished.

Unless otherwise provided, any criminal offense which at any given time may be punished by imprisonment for a term of more than one year, or by a fine of more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), is declared to be a felony; any criminal offense which may be punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both, is declared to be a misdemeanor; any criminal offense which may be punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six (6) months or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both, is declared to be a petty misdemeanor; and any offense which may be punished by only a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) is declared to be a violation.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 74; P.L. 1941, ch. 983, § 1; P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-1-2 ; P.L. 1971, ch. 115, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 173, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 222, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 462, § 3.

Comparative Legislation.

Felony and misdemeanor defined:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-25 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 274, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Dismissal of information against defendant charging disorderly conduct, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-45-1 , 12-29-5 , and 12-29-2 , was upheld on appeal where defendant demonstrated that, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-1-2 , disorderly conduct was classified as a petty misdemeanor and, by its terms, R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5(c) provided for enhanced penalties for anyone convicted of an offense punishable as a misdemeanor; therefore a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-45-1 (a) was exempt from the sentencing enhancements of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5 . State v. Martini, 860 A.2d 689, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 178 (2004).

Collateral References.

Felony, character of offense as, affected by discretion of court or jury as regards punishment. 95 A.L.R. 1115.

Felony or misdemeanor, character as, of offense for which a fine is provided as affected by provision for imprisonment until fine is satisfied. 127 A.L.R. 1286.

11-1-2.1. Violations — Effect of conviction — Standard of proof.

Conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense. Conviction of a violation shall be supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 173, § 2.

11-1-3. Liability for aiding, abetting, counseling, hiring, or commanding offenses.

Every person who shall aid, assist, abet, counsel, hire, command, or procure another to commit any crime or offense, shall be proceeded against as principal or as an accessory before the fact, according to the nature of the offense committed, and upon conviction shall suffer the like punishment as the principal offender is subject to by this title.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 284, § 2; C.P.A. 1905, § 1178; G.L. 1909, ch. 350, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 402, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 623, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-1-3 .

Cross References.

Burglar tools, making or repairing, § 11-8-7 .

Electric or communication lines, aiding injury to, § 11-35-4 .

Policy game, aiding and abetting, § 11-19-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Ultimately, what combination of evidence and inferences will be legally sufficient to support a verdict of guilty as an aider and abettor must be determined on a case-by-case basis. State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1820 (1980).

Beyond mere presence, the circumstances must establish that a defendant shared in the criminal intent of the principal and there must be a community of unlawful purpose at the time the act is committed. State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1820 (1980); State v. Manning, 447 A.2d 393, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 958 (1982).

Factors not alone dispositive, but which will be considered in their totality to determine a defendant’s guilty participation as an aider and abettor include association or relationship between the perpetrator and those accused of aiding and abetting, knowledge that a crime has been committed and flight from the scene of the crime. State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1820 (1980).

One who aids and abets in the commission of the crime and is also present at the scene may be charged and convicted as a principal. State v. McMaugh, 512 A.2d 824, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 506 (1986).

One need not have actually “pulled the trigger” in order to have committed first-degree murder. State v. Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1995).

Aider and abettor may be convicted of a more serious offense or suffer a greater penalty than the principal, because under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-1-3 , all who participated in a crime are severally responsible as principals, as though each had committed the offense alone. Jaiman v. State, 55 A.3d 224, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 137 (2012).

Defendant was not prejudiced by what he challenged as an additional offense rather than defending against his potential liability as an aider and abettor because one who aided and abetted the commission of a crime and was present at the scene could be charged and convicted as a principal. State v. Parrillo, 228 A.3d 613, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 39 (2020).

“Aiding and Abetting.”

The term “aiding and abetting” assumes some participation in the criminal act in furtherance of the common design, either before or at the time the criminal act is committed. State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1820 (1980); State v. Manning, 447 A.2d 393, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 958 (1982); State v. Eddy, 519 A.2d 1137, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 389 (1987).

The term “aiding and abetting” implies some conduct of an affirmative nature and mere negative acquiescence is not sufficient. State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1820 (1980); State v. Manning, 447 A.2d 393, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 958 (1982); State v. Eddy, 519 A.2d 1137, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 389 (1987).

It is unnecessary that every act of the person who aids and abets should coincide with the act of the principal perpetrator. State v. Medeiros, 535 A.2d 766, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 578 (1987).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction on one count of aiding and abetting the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-1-3 where defendant, a police officer, gave a friend affirmative assistance to help the friend’s drug dealing. The evidence showed that defendant did more than merely acquiesce in the friend’s conduct, and that defendant assisted the friend by checking license plates of suspicious cars in the friend’s neighborhood and telling the friend when to “lay low” because police might have learned of the friend’s drug operation. State v. Grant, 946 A.2d 818, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 56 (2008).

Plaintiff could not show that the social hosts were liable pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-2 for supplying the plaintiff and her boyfriend with alcohol for more than a three-hour period, which resulted in the boyfriend driving into a utility pole after the boyfriend and plaintiff left the residence. The plaintiff did not show that the social hosts had the intent necessary pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-1-3 to aid and abet a criminal act. Willis v. Omar, 954 A.2d 126, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 84 (2008).

In a murder prosecution, the trial court’s aiding and abetting instruction accurately reflected the law with respect to intent because it explained that only if defendant knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted could he be held responsible for the natural or probable consequences of that act. Thus, his due process rights were not violated by a conclusive or burden-shifting presumption. State v. Delestre, 35 A.3d 886, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 6 , cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1015, 132 S. Ct. 2442, 182 L. Ed. 2d 1071, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3824 (2012).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on a charge of aiding and abetting the manufacture and cultivation of marijuana because testimony by a witness, who entered into a cooperation agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, placed defendant at the rented property when the marijuana grow operations were underway, defendant’s actions demonstrated a shared unlawful intent to manufacture or cultivate marijuana and, further, a community of unlawful purpose existed between and among defendant, the witness, and a third person. State v. Long, 61 A.3d 441, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2013).

Since there was sufficient evidence to convict the inmate under an aiding and abetting theory, the hearing justice erred when she held that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to propose a jury instruction or challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the aiding and abetting theory and the grant of postconviction relief was erroneous. A jury certainly could have found, and did find, that the defendant brought a gun to the scene of the crime Whitaker v. State, 199 A.3d 1021, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 15 (R.I. 2019).

Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 88 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2014), did not establish a new rule, nor did it impose a new obligation on state law pertaining to the aiding and abetting doctrine. Whitaker v. State, 199 A.3d 1021, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 15 (2019).

Common Law.

This section did not repeal the common law rule that an accessory at the fact is a principal. State v. Shapiro, 29 R.I. 133 , 69 A. 340, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1908).

Conviction and Sentence.

That an applicant’s accomplice was the shooter and was convicted of second-degree murder did not preclude the applicant’s conviction and sentence for first-degree murder, because under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-1-3 , an aider and abettor could be convicted of a more serious offense and suffer a greater penalty than the principal. Jaiman v. State, 55 A.3d 224, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 137 (2012).

Felony or Misdemeanor.

Offenders should be prosecuted either as principals or as accessories before the fact according to whether the offense is misdemeanor or felony. State v. Shapiro, 29 R.I. 133 , 69 A. 340, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1908).

Jury Instructions.

Trial justice did not err when instructing the jury that it could convict defendant of manufacturing or cultivating marijuana as an aider or abettor because testimony by a witness, who entered into a cooperation agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, demonstrated that defendant was involved in the growing process both before and after the process commenced, present when the witness arrived to inspect the marijuana plants, and, once the cultivation was underway, the witness discussed the operation with defendant approximately every other day; thus, the witness’s testimony that defendant was at the property on a number of occasions was sufficient to support the jury charge with respect to aiding and abetting. State v. Long, 61 A.3d 441, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2013).

Where several witnesses described a chaotic scene in which defendant was one of several individuals who were simultaneously attacking the victim, thus making it difficult to determine which specific attacker delivered which specific blows to the victim’s body and face, the testimony made it clear that defendant was a participant in a community of unlawful purpose at the time the act was committed. and the trial justice did not err giving an aiding-and-abetting instruction to the jury. State v. Haffner, 242 A.3d 468, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 82 (2020).

Presence at Crime.

Persons prosecuted under this section need not have been present at the time of the crime. State v. Sprague, 4 R.I. 257 , 1856 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1856).

Mere presence at the scene of a crime, in and of itself, is insufficient to warrant a conviction as an aider or abettor, but it is a factor that must form part of a court’s determination of the guilt of the defendant. State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1820 (1980).

The fact that the aider or abettor was not present at the commission of the crime did not mitigate his culpability. State v. Ouimette, 479 A.2d 702, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 532 (1984).

Collateral References.

Attempt to commit assault as criminal offense. 93 A.L.R.5th 683.

Conviction or acquittal of attempt to commit particular crime as bar to prosecution for conspiracy to commit same crime, or vice versa. 53 A.L.R.2d 622.

Criminal liability of person as aider and abettor, or other participant, for assault and similar offenses by excessive or improper punishment inflicted on child by parent, teacher, or one in loco parentis. 89 A.L.R.2d 458.

Criminal responsibility of one who furnishes instrumentality of a kind ordinarily used for legitimate purposes, with knowledge that it is to be used by another for a criminal purpose. 108 A.L.R. 331.

Criminal responsibility of parent or child for act of child done under fear of or compulsion by parent. 16 A.L.R. 1470.

Decoy to detect commission of crime, criminal responsibility of. 120 A.L.R. 1506.

Incapacity personally to commit the offense as affecting criminal responsibility of one co-operating in offense. 5 A.L.R. 782; 74 A.L.R. 1110; 131 A.L.R. 1322.

Innocence of the person threatened as affecting contract made or money paid to prevent or suppress a criminal prosecution. 17 A.L.R. 325.

Medical or surgical attendance, liability as accessory for failure to provide. 100 A.L.R.2d 483.

11-1-4. Harboring criminal.

Except where subsection 11-37-8.2.1(d) applies, every person not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, or brother or sister, by consanguinity or affinity, to another who shall have committed any offense or been accessory before the fact to the commission of any offense, who shall be convicted of knowingly harboring or relieving the offender, with intent that he or she shall escape or avoid detection, arrest, trial, or punishment, shall be imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years or be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 284, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 350, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 402, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 622, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-1-4 ; P.L. 2006, ch. 206, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 207, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 206, § 2, and P.L. 2006, ch. 207, § 2, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

Comparative Legislation.

Harboring criminal:

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 274, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Elements of Offense.

The trial justice erred in declining to grant the defendant attorney’s motion for judgment of acquittal where the conscious decision on the part of the state police to misrepresent to him the fact of the existence of warrants and to conceal the existence of probable cause completely negated as a matter of law the element of his knowingly shielding his clients from arrest. State v. Acciardo, 748 A.2d 811, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 57 (2000).

Indictments.

Indictment must allege that the defendant knew of the particular crime committed by the person he is charged with harboring. State v. Davis, 14 R.I. 281 , 1883 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1883).

11-1-5. Compounding or concealing felony.

Every person who shall be convicted of having knowledge of the commission of any felony offense, and of taking any money, gratuity, or reward, or any engagement, upon an agreement or understanding, express or implied, to compound or conceal that crime or offense, or not to prosecute for the offense, or not to give evidence relative to the offense, shall be imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years or be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), provided that the person shall not be subject to a fine or imprisonment exceeding the felony pertaining to this offense.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 20; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 11-1-5 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 177, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Comparative Legislation.

Compounding or concealing felony:

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 268, § 36.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Lesser Included Offense.

Since convictions for the offenses of robbery and compounding a felony required proof of elements quite distinct from each other, the latter was not a lesser included offense of the former. State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 141 (1999).

Collateral References.

Agreement to use one’s influence to have punishment for crime mitigated as contrary to public policy. 24 A.L.R. 1453.

Release to ancestor by heir expectant, part of consideration for which is ancestor’s promise not to institute criminal proceedings. 28 A.L.R. 433.

Repayment of embezzled money, validity of contract for, in consideration of suppression of criminal prosecution. 32 A.L.R. 427.

Validity of note or obligation given to prevent or discourage prosecution as affected by fact that criminal prosecution had already been commenced when obligation was given. 129 A.L.R. 1153.

11-1-5.1. Reports of crimes to law enforcement officials.

A person who knows that another person is a victim of sexual assault, murder, manslaughter, or armed robbery and who is at the scene of the crime shall, to the extent that the person can do so without danger of peril to the person or others, report the crime to an appropriate law enforcement official as soon as reasonably practicable. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six (6) months, or by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 285, § 1.

11-1-6. Conspiracy.

Except as otherwise provided by law, every person who shall conspire with another to commit an offense punishable under the laws of this state shall be subject to the same fine and imprisonment as pertain to the offense which the person shall have conspired to commit, provided that imprisonment for the conspiracy shall not exceed ten (10) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 283, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The common law crime of conspiracy involves a combination of two or more persons to commit some unlawful act or do some lawful act for an unlawful purpose; it does not require that any overt acts have been committted in execution of the unlawful agreement. State v. LaPlume, 118 R.I. 670 , 375 A.2d 938, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1507 (1977).

Since this section now prescribes a specific punishment for the common-law crime of conspiracy, the applicability of § 11-1-1 to conspiracy prosecutions has been impliedly repealed. State v. Macarelli, 118 R.I. 693 , 375 A.2d 944, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1509 (1977).

The rule is well established, sound, and viable that where several persons combine or conspire to commit an unlawful act, each is criminally responsible for the acts of his associates or confederates in the furtherance of any prosecution of the common design for which they combine. Each is responsible for everything done by one or all of his confederates, in the execution of the common design, as one of its probable and natural consequences, even though the act was not a part of the original design or plan, or was even forbidden by one or more of them. State v. Barton, 424 A.2d 1033, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1015 (1981).

It is totally immaterial that the unlawful agreement be successfully or substantially carried out because once the agreement is made, the offense of conspiracy is complete. State v. Barton, 427 A.2d 1311, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1095 (1981).

Under this section, the agreement itself constitutes the crime, and the conspiracy is committed at the moment the agreement is struck. It is immaterial whether the conspiracy agreement succeeds or fails. State v. LaRoche, 683 A.2d 989, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 228 (1996).

Coconspirators.

One defendant in a prosecution for conspiracy cannot be convicted when all of his alleged coconspirators, be they one or more, have been acquitted or been discharged under circumstances which amount to an acquittal. State v. Donato, 414 A.2d 797, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1642 (1980).

Elements of Offense.
— Identity of Conspirators.

When an information specifically alleges that only two named persons conspired, the identity of those two individuals becomes an essential element of the offense. State v. DeSanto, 603 A.2d 744, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1992).

Evidence — Admissibility.

Where witness against defendant on trial for conspiracy to murder was not an indicted conspirator and where he testified to acts and to the declaration of defendant himself which were used solely against defendant at his own trial, witness’ testimony was admissible. State v. LaPlume, 118 R.I. 670 , 375 A.2d 938, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1507 (1977).

The conspirators’ goals may be inferentially established by proof of the relations, conduct, circumstances, and actions of the parties. State v. Barton, 427 A.2d 1311, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1095 (1981).

Although the defendant was found not guilty of murder, evidence of the murder was properly admitted at the defendant’s conspiracy trial since the evidence was offered only to show some motive or plan in connection with the conspiracy. State v. Hewes, 666 A.2d 402, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 235 (1995).

Evidence — Sufficiency.

Where defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery in the lower court, but the only evidence which linked defendant with the man who attempted the robbery was that he was seen to leave in a car with the robber before the crime was committed and was seen to return afterward, the inference of conspiracy was too speculative to support a conviction. State v. Distante, 118 R.I. 532 , 375 A.2d 212, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1495 (1977).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for acquittal on charge of conspiracy to statutorily burn where record established that codefendant and defendant had met on various occasions at which they discussed the burning of codefendant’s warehouse, that defendant agreed to slow down the fire department’s response to the fire in order to enable the warehouse to burn, to point out the broken door hasp (which would indicate a forced entry), and to keep codefendant informed of any investigations, and that codefendant set the date of the fire after determining from defendant the nights on which he would be working as battalion commander at the fire department. State v. Parente, 460 A.2d 430, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 916 (1983).

Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to prove conspiracy in filing a false document beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 662 A.2d 1171, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 194 (1995).

Because there was eyewitness testimony from the homeowner who saw three men removing items from his home and placing them in a car, the trial court was clearly justified in finding the State’s witnesses to be credible and in rejecting defendant’s motion for a new trial in regard to defendant’s convictions for breaking and entering a dwelling and conspiracy. State v. Becote, 864 A.2d 598, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 7 (2005).

Trial justice properly denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of conspiracy because there was more than sufficient evidence for a jury to find that defendant and another man were engaged in a conspiracy to murder the victim. The evidence included: (1) defendant’s testimony that defendant and the other man drove together in the other man’s car to the motel where the victim was shot immediately before the shooting; (2) defendant’s friends and cell mate testified that defendant said that the other man hired defendant to do the job; and (3) a rough diagram of the motel where the shooting occurred was found in the other man’s car. State v. Graham, 941 A.2d 848, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 22 , cert. denied, 555 U.S. 848, 129 S. Ct. 99, 172 L. Ed. 2d 82, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 6960 (2008).

Because defendant participated in a coordinated attack on a defenseless man that began with an ambush of the victim’s vehicle and ended with a robbery and severe beating, based on the totality of the evidence, the jury reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant entered into an agreement with others to commit the crime of robbery. State v. Perkins, 966 A.2d 1257, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 33 (2009).

Evidence that defendant and another agreed unlawfully to enter the dwelling with the intent to rob its occupants, and that defendant and another assembled disguises, weapons, and duct tape to further that purpose, was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary. State v. Abdullah, 967 A.2d 469, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2009).

Defendant’s convictions of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, possession of one ounce to one kilo of a controlled substance, and conspiracy to violate Rhode Island’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act, R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 21, ch. 28, were vacated. As the evidence was insufficient to prove he knew of and intended to exercise control over cocaine found in his passengers’ purses, the evidence did not support the inference that he agreed with them to traffic in drugs. State v. Berroa, 6 A.3d 1095, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 102 (2010).

Conspiracy convictions were supported by evidence that there was an agreement between defendants and a third person to shoplift. State v. Cipriano, 21 A.3d 408, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 101 (2011).

Juvenile was properly adjudicated delinquent for conspiracy to commit robbery because (1) the State produced sufficient evidence of the crime’s corpus delicti to permit admission of the juvenile’s confession through reports of the robbery, apprehension of the juvenile and another nearby within 30 minutes of the reports, the other’s BB gun and cash when arrested, and the juvenile’s footprints leading to another gun, gloves, and a ski mask about 20 feet from where he was arrested, and (2) the confession and other circumstantial evidence proved the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Joseph C., 178 A.3d 288, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 16 (2018).

Intent.

Conspirators’ goals may be inferentially established by proof of the relations, conduct, circumstances, and actions of the parties. State v. Gordon, 508 A.2d 1339, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 464 (1986).

Legislative Intent.

This section was passed because the legislature thought it inequitable to punish a conspiracy to commit a crime more harshly than the underlying substantive offense itself. State v. Macarelli, 118 R.I. 693 , 375 A.2d 944, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1509 (1977).

Multiple Offenses.

Verdicts of guilty of murder in the second degree and of conspiracy to murder, each a separate and distinct crime are not legally incompatible where the evidence is sufficient to support convictions on both charges. State v. Leonardo, 119 R.I. 7 , 375 A.2d 1388, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1855 (1977).

RICO Violation.

For a conviction for conspiracy to violate the Rhode Island Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute, a defendant must agree to become a member of the enterprise and only agree that members of the enterprise violate the Rhode Island RICO statute. State v. Porto, 591 A.2d 791, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1991).

Sentence.

All those whose cases have not been reduced to final judgment prior to the enactment of this ameliorative section should be accorded the more lenient treatment provided herein; the savings statute, § 43-3-23 , which would operate to impose the harsher sentence under the prior law, § 11-1-1 , is inapplicable. State v. Macarelli, 118 R.I. 693 , 375 A.2d 944, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1509 (1977).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a defendant’s motion to reduce sentence because the two and one-half year difference between his sentence for breaking and entering and his co-hort’s sentence was not disproportionate as they did not have to receive equal sentences and their were departure factors applicable to the defendant, which the trial justice justified in his findings such as the defendant being a career criminal, the crime turned into one of violence, he lacked remorse, and he had lied on the stand. Further, the trial court did not err by ordering the sentences for the breaking and entering, consipracy to commit breaking and entering, simple assault, and driving a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner to run consecutively rather than concurrently since the trial court justified its order by finding that it was not just a run-of-the-mill breaking and entering, the lives of the victims were changed forever, the defendant had no remorse for the crimes, and took no personal responsibility for his actions. State v. Coleman, 984 A.2d 650, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 143 (2009).

Collateral References.

Availability of defense of entrapment where one accused of conspiracy denies participation in offense. 61 A.L.R.2d 677.

Comment note on impossibility of consummation of substantive crime as defense in criminal prosecution for conspiracy or attempt to commit crime. 37 A.L.R.3d 375.

Comment note on necessity and sufficiency of independent evidence of conspiracy to allow admission of extrajudicial statements of co-conspirators. 46 A.L.R.3d 1148.

Conspiracy in connection with application for, or receipt of, public relief or welfare payments. 92 A.L.R.2d 449.

Conviction or acquittal of attempt to commit particular crime as bar to prosecution for conspiracy to commit same crime, or vice versa. 53 A.L.R.2d 622.

Criminal conspiracies as to gambling. 91 A.L.R.2d 1148.

Criminal conspiracy between spouses. 74 A.L.R.3d 838.

Imprisonment as constituting withdrawal from conspiracy. 100 A.L.R.6th 225.

Jurisdiction to prosecute conspirator who was not in state at time of substantive criminal act, for offense committed pursuant to conspiracy. 5 A.L.R.3d 887.

Prosecution or conviction of one party to alleged conspiracy as affected by disposition of case against other parties. 91 A.L.R.2d 700.

Sentence and punishment for criminal conspiracy as to gambling. 91 A.L.R.2d 1205.

11-1-7. Conspiracy to commit offense outside the state.

Every person who shall, within this state, conspire with another to engage in conduct in another state punishable under the laws of that state, which conduct would also be punishable under the laws of this state, shall be subject to the same fine and imprisonment as under the law of this state pertain to the offense which the person shall have conspired to commit, provided that imprisonment for the conspiracy shall not exceed ten (10) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 283, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Although conspiracy to commit an unlawful act outside the state is now covered by this section, it was an indictable offense under § 11-1-1 . State v. LaPlume, 118 R.I. 670 , 375 A.2d 938, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1507 (1977).

Prior to the enactment of this section, an indictment for common law conspiracy could be obtained only pursuant to the statutory authority set forth in § 11-1-1 . State v. LaPlume, 118 R.I. 670 , 375 A.2d 938, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1507 (1977).

Collateral References.

Availability of defense of entrapment where one accused of conspiracy denies participation in offense. 61 A.L.R.2d 677.

Prosecution or conviction of one conspirator as affected by disposition of case against coconspirators. 19 A.L.R.4th 192.

11-1-8. Bail jumping.

Every person accused of a felony offense who, by court order, has been released from custody or allowed to remain at liberty, either upon the person’s own recognizance or with surety or sureties, upon condition that he or she appear before the court where the felony is pending, or to which he or she may be bound over, to answer the felony whenever called upon to so do, who does not appear personally on the required date or voluntarily within thirty (30) days thereafter, or who fails to appear for any court session during the trial or on the day for sentencing, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be subject to the same fine and imprisonment as pertain to the offense for which he or she failed to answer, provided that imprisonment for the offense shall not exceed ten (10) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 35, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 195, § 1.

Comparative Legislation.

Bail jumping:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-172 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 276, § 67 et seq.

Collateral References.

Failure of person, released pursuant to provisions of Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 (18 USCS secs. 3141 et seq.), to make appearance as subjecting person to penalty provided for by 18 USCS sec. 3150. 66 A.L.R. Fed. 668.

Statutes making default on bail a separate criminal offense. 63 A.L.R.4th 1064.

11-1-9. Soliciting another to commit a crime.

Every person who solicits another to commit or join in the commission of a felony under the laws of this state shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be subject to the same fine and imprisonment as pertain to the offense which the person did solicit another to commit, provided that imprisonment for the solicitation shall not exceed ten (10) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 245, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Criminal Law: State v. Andujar, 899 A.2d 1209 (R.I. 2006), see 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 533 (2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

For the crime of solicitation to be completed, it is only necessary that the person solicit another to commit a crime. At that point, the solicitor is guilty of solicitation, regardless of the response the solicitee makes to the proposal. State v. Rossi, 520 A.2d 582, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 406 (1987).

Defendant’s judgment of conviction for criminal solicitation of murder had to be vacated, as the undisputed evidence showed that the intended recipient of the solicitation never received the soliciting instrument, a letter defendant sent from jail; as a result, the case had to be remanded to the trial court so defendant could be tried on a lesser charge of attempted criminal solicitation of murder in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-1-9 and § 12-17-14 . State v. Andujar, 899 A.2d 1209, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 83 (2006).

Defendant’s conviction for soliciting a child to commit perjury was not barred by the fact that the child, as a minor, could not be convicted of the crime of perjury. State v. Rossi, 520 A.2d 582, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 406 (1987).

Collateral References.

Construction and effect of statutes making solicitation to commit crime a substantive offense. 51 A.L.R.2d 953.

11-1-10. Soliciting an incompetent person.

Every person who knowingly or willfully encourages, aids, contributes to, or in any way causes any person who as a result of mental and/or physical disability has had a guardian appointed for his or her person or estate to violate any law of this state or the ordinances of any town or city in the state, or who knowingly and willfully encourages, aids, contributes to, or in any way causes that disabled person to be guilty of any vicious or immoral conduct, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or be imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 82, § 1.

11-1-11. Felons prohibited from possession of radio scanners.

No person: (1) who has been convicted of a felony violation of chapter 28 of title 21 involving the illegal manufacture, sale or delivery or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver a controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II; or (2) who has been convicted of a felony in violation of chapter 8 of this title involving the burglary or breaking and entering of a dwelling house or apartment, whether the house or apartment is occupied or not, any business place, or public building, with the intent to commit larceny; shall carry, transport, or have in his or her possession, or under his or her control outside of his or her own home, any operational police radio, police scanner, or any other device capable of monitoring police broadcasts. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 515, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 330, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added subdivision designations.

Chapter 2 Abandonment and Nonsupport

11-2-1. Abandonment or nonsupport of spouse or children.

Every person who shall abandon his or her spouse or children, leaving them in danger of becoming a public charge, or who shall neglect to provide according to his or her means for the support of his or her spouse or children, or who shall neglect or refuse to aid in the support of his or her spouse and/or children, except as otherwise provided for in § 11-2-1.1 , shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months.

[See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 38; P.L. 1907, ch. 1447, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 39; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 38; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 38; G.L. 1956, § 11-2-1 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 304, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law relating to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator ; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Cross References.

Full enforcement of support, § 15-11.1-1 et seq.

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, § 15-23.1-101 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Abandonment and nonsupport:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-23, 53-304 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 209, § 30 et seq.; ch. 273, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Complaint or Indictment.

Complaint charging nonsupport of both wife and children was not bad for duplicity, since acts forbidden disjunctively may be charged conjunctively in one count. State v. Wood, 14 R.I. 151 , 1883 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1883).

Means of Support.

Evidence that defendant had the capacity to earn money during period of failure to support was sufficient to make a prima facie case, and it was not necessary to show that defendant had actually received money during such period. State v. Bartley, 38 R.I. 414 , 96 A. 305, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1916).

Misconduct of Wife.

Duty to support may be terminated by misconduct of the wife, even though divorce petitions had been denied, since state is not a party or bound by the divorce proceedings. State v. Downing, 54 R.I. 455 , 175 A. 248, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 109 (1934).

Separation Agreement.

Separation agreement providing for full settlement of right of support and maintenance did not bar a criminal proceeding for failure to provide according to his means. State v. Karagavoorian, 32 R.I. 477 , 79 A. 1111, 1911 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1911).

Verdict.

On complaint for nonsupport of wife and children, verdict of guilty could be supported by finding that the defendant was guilty as to children, though not guilty as to wife. State v. Sutcliffe, 18 R.I. 53 , 25 A. 654, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1892).

Collateral References.

Adopted child, abandonment of. 44 A.L.R. 820.

Adultery of wife as affecting criminal charge of abandonment against husband. 17 A.L.R. 999.

Aiding and abetting abandonment of child, criminal responsibility. 5 A.L.R. 786; 74 A.L.R. 1110; 131 A.L.R. 1322.

Application, to illegitimate children, of criminal statutes relating to abandonment, neglect, and nonsupport of children. 99 A.L.R.2d 746.

Child’s possession of independent means, or fact that other persons supply his needs or are able to do so, as affecting criminal responsibility of parent under desertion or nonsupport statute. 131 A.L.R. 482.

Civil suit by wife for support as affected by right to resort to a criminal action. 10 A.L.R.2d 543; 36 A.L.R.4th 502.

Criminal liability of father for desertion of or failure to support child where divorce decree awards custody to another. 73 A.L.R.2d 960.

Criminal responsibility for abandonment or nonsupport of children who are being cared for by charitable institution. 24 A.L.R. 1075.

Criminal responsibility of husband for abandonment or nonsupport of wife who refuses to live with him. 3 A.L.R. 107; 8 A.L.R. 1314.

Divorce or separation, criminal responsibility of father for nonsupport of child as affected by decree of, requiring support by him. 23 A.L.R. 864; 73 A.L.R.2d 960.

Extent or character of support contemplated by statute making nonsupport of wife an offense. 36 A.L.R. 866.

Failure to provide medical attention for child as criminal neglect. 12 A.L.R.2d 1047.

Illegitimate child as within statute relating to duty to support child. 30 A.L.R. 1075.

“Infamous offense,” failure to support wife or children as, within constitutional or statutory provision in relation to indictment or presentment by grand jury. 24 A.L.R. 1014.

Jurisdiction and venue of criminal charge for child desertion or nonsupport as affected by nonresidence of parent or child. 44 A.L.R.2d 886.

Power to make abandonment, desertion or nonsupport of wife or family a criminal offense. 48 A.L.R. 1193.

Vagrancy, abandonment of wife as. 14 A.L.R. 1485.

11-2-1.1. Failure to pay child support.

  1. Every person who is obligated to pay child support pursuant to an order or decree established by or registered with the family court pursuant to chapter 11 of title 15, who has incurred arrearage of past-due child support in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), and who shall willfully thereafter, having the means to do so, fail to pay three (3) or more installments of child support in an amount previously set by the court, according to the terms previously set by the court, shall be guilty of a felony for each instance of failure to make the subsequent payments and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceed five (5) years.
  2. Every person who has for a period of three (3) years willfully failed to pay any installments of child support in an amount previously set by the court, according to the terms previously set by the court, and who shall thereafter, having the means to do so, fail to pay three (3) or more installments of child support in an amount previously set by the court, according to the terms previously set by the court, shall be guilty of a felony for each instance of failure to make the subsequent payments and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceed five (5) years.
  3. For purposes of this section, “subsequent payments” means those payments or installments due and owing after a person has incurred an arrearage of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as specified in subsection (a) of this section or those payments or installments due and owing after a person has failed to pay an installment for a period of three (3) years.
  4. The court may in its discretion direct that the sentence be served pursuant to § 12-19-2(b) . [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 2; P.L. 1996, ch. 404, § 7; P.L. 2003, ch. 208, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 367, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law relating to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator ; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

P.L. 2003, ch. 208, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 367, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 8 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 421 (2003).

Jacqueline G. Kelley, Rehabilitate, Don’t Recidivate: A Reframing of the Ban the Box Debate, 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 590 (2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The application of this provision to a defaulting parent did not render it an invalid ex post facto law, even when a substantial portion of arrearage occurred prior to the enactment of this provision, since no criminal liability was incurred until after the arrearage totaled $30,000 and the defendant had willfully failed to make a scheduled installment payment after the provision’s enactment. State v. Pelz, 765 A.2d 824, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 30 (2001).

Construction.

This section encompasses both current child support installments and court-ordered payments for past arrearage. State v. Pelz, 765 A.2d 824, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 30 (2001).

Because the termination of defendant’s parental rights under R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a) did not terminate defendant’s parental obligations, namely his obligation to pay child support, the trial court erred in calculating the amount of child support defendant owed and in dismissing the information accusing defendant of violating R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-2-1.1 . State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 157 (2002).

Probable Cause.

There was requisite probable cause to establish violation of the child support provision since, at the time of his arrest, the defendant owed over $30,000 exclusive of interest and after his arrearage had reached the statutory minimum, he had failed to make any payments for a period of four months despite having the financial means to do so. State v. Pelz, 765 A.2d 824, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 30 (2001).

11-2-2. Desertion by leaving state — Decree as evidence.

Any husband or father who without just cause deserts his wife or minor child by going into another state, and leaves them or any or either of them without making reasonable provisions for their support, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both. No civil proceeding in any court shall be held to be a bar to a prosecution pursuant to this section for desertion or nonsupport. In a prosecution pursuant to this section for desertion or nonsupport against a husband, a decree or judgment of any court in a proceeding in which the husband appeared or was personally served with process, establishing the right of the wife to live apart, or her freedom to convey and deal with her property, or the right to the custody of the children, shall be admissible and shall be prima facie evidence of that right.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 423, § 9; P.L. 1949, ch. 2238, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-2-2 .

Collateral References.

Jurisdiction and venue of criminal charge for child desertion or nonsupport as affected by nonresidence of parent or child. 44 A.L.R.2d 886.

11-2-3. Complaints for nonsupport — Liability for costs.

  1. The director of the department of human services or his or her designee, or chief of police, or director of public welfare of any city or town, or any officer that the town council of any town or the city council of any city may appoint for the purpose, may make a complaint against any person for any of the offenses mentioned in § 11-2-1 ; and whenever any complaint shall be made by any of the officers listed in this subsection on account of the violation of § 11-2-1 , the officer complainant shall not be required to give surety for costs, but shall give his or her personal recognizance and be liable in his or her individual capacity.
  2. Pursuant to § 11-2-1.1 , the department of human services, after an investigation to determine the extent of an arrearage and the ability of the obligor to pay the arrearage or some portion of it may refer the case to the attorney general for prosecution in the family court for the county in which the obligor resides, unless the person does not reside within the state, then the prosecution may be brought in the family court for Providence County. [See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 304, § 3; P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1996, ch. 100, art. 12, provides that any reference in any general or special law relating to child support enforcement, collections and establishment duties of the department of human services, Rhode Island child support services and bureau of family support shall be construed to refer to the division of taxation within the department of administration, any reference to the director of the department of human services, with reference to the child support enforcement and collection of revenues, shall be construed to refer to the tax administrator within the department of administration, and any revenue collection duties conferred upon the department of human services or the director of the department of human services shall be construed to refer to the department of administration division of taxation or the tax administrator; provided, however, that the tax administrator may delegate in writing to the director of the department of human services such duties and responsibilities as he or she may deem appropriate.

Chapter 3 Abortion

11-3-1. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 3; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 27, § 2, effective June 19, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-3-1 concerned procuring, counseling or attempting miscarriage.

11-3-2. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 3; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 27, § 2, effective June 19, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-3-2 concerned murder charged in same indictment or information.

11-3-3. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 3; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 27, § 2, effective June 19, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-3-3 concerned dying declarations admissible.

11-3-4. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 3; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 27, § 2, effective June 19, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-3-4 concerned construction and application of § 11-3-1 .

11-3-5. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 15, § 2; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 3; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 27, § 2, effective June 19, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-3-5 concerned constitutionality.

Chapter 4 Arson and Fires

11-4-1. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-4-1 ; P.L. 1971, ch. 207, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 216, § 1), concerning the general crime of arson, was repealed by P.L. 1981, ch. 77, § 1.

11-4-2. Arson — First degree.

Any person who knowingly causes, procures, aids, counsels or creates by means of fire or explosion a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or damage to any building the property of that person or another, whether or not used for residential purposes, which is occupied or in use for any purpose or which has been occupied or in use for any purpose during the six (6) months preceding the offense or to any other residential structure, shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five (5) years and may be imprisoned for life, or shall be fined not less than three thousand dollars ($3,000) nor more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or both; provided, further, that whenever a death occurs to a person as a direct result of the fire or explosion or to a person who is directly involved in fighting the fire or explosion, imprisonment shall be for not less than twenty (20) years. In all such cases, the justice may only impose a sentence less than the minimum if he or she finds that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify imposition of the alternative sentence. That finding may be based upon the character and background of the defendant, the cooperation of the defendant with law enforcement authorities, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and/or the nature and quality of the evidence presented at trial. If a sentence which is less than imprisonment for the minimum term is imposed, the trial justice shall set forth on the record the circumstances which he or she found as justification for imposition of the lesser sentence.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 2; P.L. 1917, ch. 1473, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 2; P.L. 1927, ch. 1043, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-4-2 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 247, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 185, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 214, § 1.

Cross References.

Breaking and entering dwelling in possession of fire setting material or equipment, § 11-8-2.1 .

Felony murder, § 11-23-1 .

Law Reviews.

Molly R. Hamlin, 2016 Survey, Cases: Criminal Law: State v. Gaudreau, 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 793 (2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Any Person.

The term “any person” in this section defies the exclusion of any class of persons, and the legislature made a conscious choice that if a firefighter were, in fact, placed in substantial risk of serious harm as the result of an intentionally set fire, first-degree arson is the appropriate crime. State v. Caprio, 477 A.2d 67, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 515 (1984).

Evidence.

Trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting a note from defendant to his girlfriend which was probative of his consciousness of guilt of the crimes charged. State v. Gordon, 508 A.2d 1339, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 464 (1986).

Trial justice did not abuse his discretion in allowing testimony regarding the theft of a medical-treatment card which belonged to the owner of the building burned and was found in the car owned by defendant’s girlfriend. State v. Gordon, 508 A.2d 1339, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 464 (1986).

Defendant is entitled to a new trial, but not a judgment of acquittal, where the trial justice, after independently assessing the evidence in light of his jury charge, determines that the state has failed to prove that the defendant knowingly caused the fire. State v. Dame, 560 A.2d 330, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 123 (1989).

Trial justice did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial after he was convicted of first-degree arson because the trial justice concluded that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant willfully set fire to the building where his business was located; credible evidence suggested that the business was not as successful a venture as defendant described, an eyewitness saw defendant at the business on the night of the fire, and burns were found on defendant’s legs. The trial justice acted well within her discretion to reject as incredible defendant’s testimony as to how he got burned, why he was driving in the middle of a snowstorm, and how his fanny pack was stolen. State v. Gaudreau, 146 A.3d 848, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 127 (2016).

Instruction.

No abuse of discretion in counsel’s declining to press issue of reading of statutory definition of crime in course of trial justice’s instruction. See Gordon v. State, 638 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1994).

Trial justice properly instructed jury on elements of first-degree arson. See State v. Garcia, 643 A.2d 180, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 182 (1994).

Occupied Building.

The term “during the six (6) months preceding the offense” in this section does not require a continuous occupancy throughout the entire six-month period; rather, any point during the six-month period suffices. State v. Caprio, 477 A.2d 67, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 515 (1984).

Sentence.

Sentence of 50 years for first-degree arson and 10 years for conspiracy to commit arson, after the trial justice had rejected the state’s recommendation of a 25-year sentence, was not an abuse of discretion, where the justice weighed relevant factors against the disastrous consequences inflicted upon the victims of the crime. State v. Gordon, 539 A.2d 528, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1988).

Sentence of 30 years, 20 years to serve, after the state had recommended 30 years, 15 to serve, was within the statutory limits for the offense. State v. Marini, 638 A.2d 507, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1994).

Because defendant’s 20-year sentence for first-degree arson was authorized by R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-4-2 , it was not an illegal sentence; therefore, defendant’s R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 motion was properly denied. State v. Tapia, 47 A.3d 344, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 99 (2012).

Specific Cases.

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction. State v. Cooke, 479 A.2d 727, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 567 (1984).

Unoccupied Building.

A dwelling structure that is not occupied at the time of the burning is covered by this section. State v. Baccaire, 470 A.2d 1147, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 445 (1984).

Collateral References.

Burning as element of offense. 1 A.L.R. 1160.

Burning of building by mortgagor as burning property of another so as to constitute arson. 76 A.L.R.2d 524.

“Outhouse” or “outbuilding,” what is. 20 A.L.R. 234.

Ownership of property as affecting criminal liability for burning thereof. 17 A.L.R. 1168.

Ratification or sanction by owner of property or interest therein as affecting criminal liability of person burning same. 54 A.L.R. 1236.

Vacancy or nonoccupancy of building as affecting its character as “dwelling” as regards arson. 44 A.L.R.2d 1456.

11-4-2.1. Arson — Custody.

Any person who while under arrest or incarcerated knowingly causes, procures, aids, counsels or creates by means of fire or explosion the damage or destruction of any occupied or unoccupied building shall be guilty of arson in the first degree and shall be sentenced as provided in § 11-4-2 .

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 136, § 1.

11-4-3. Arson — Second degree.

Any person who knowingly causes, aids, procures or counsels by means of fire or explosion the damage or destruction of any unoccupied building, structure or facility the property of that person or another shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two (2) years nor more than twenty (20) years, or shall be fined not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or both; provided, that if death occurs to a person as a direct result of the fire or explosion or to a person who is directly involved in fighting the fire or explosion, imprisonment shall be for not less than twenty (20) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 2; P.L. 1917, ch. 1473, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 2; P.L. 1927, ch. 1043, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-4-3 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 247, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 185, § 1.

Cross References.

Felony murder, § 11-23-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Aid, Counsel or Procure.

Mere presence at the scene of the crime, in and of itself, is insufficient to warrant a conviction, but where there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant was posted at the front of the property for the specific purpose of aiding and abetting the codefendants “in any way should the necessity arise,” the trial justice did not commit error in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial. State v. Gianoulos, 122 R.I. 67 , 404 A.2d 81, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2065 (1979).

Circumstantial Evidence.

Where defendant was observed running from the scene of an incendiary fire in the early morning hours, his clothes smelling of gasoline and entering car waiting with the engine running, the driver of which had the top of a gasoline can in his pocket; and the passenger attempted to dispose of a blank pistol, circumstantial evidence was sufficient. State v. Wilbur, 115 R.I. 7 , 339 A.2d 730, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1111 (1975), overruled in part, State v. Aurgemma, 116 R.I. 425 , 358 A.2d 46, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1291 (1976).

Collateral References.

Burning of building by mortgagor as burning property of another so as to constitute arson. 76 A.L.R.2d 524.

11-4-4. Arson — Third degree.

Any person who knowingly causes, procures, aids or counsels or creates by means of fire or explosion the damage or destruction of any property of that person or another with the purpose to defraud an insurer shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two (2) years nor more than twenty (20) years or shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both; provided, that if death occurs to a person as a direct result of the fire or explosion or to a person who is directly involved in fighting the fire or explosion, imprisonment shall be for not less than twenty (20) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 4; G.L., ch. 397, § 3; P.L. 1927, ch. 1043, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-4-5 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 247, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 185, § 1.

11-4-5. Arson — Fourth degree.

Any person who knowingly causes, procures, aids, counsels or creates by means of fire or explosion damage to or destruction of any personal property valued in excess of one hundred dollars ($100) and the property of another person shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than three (3) years, or shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, §§ 2, 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, §§ 2, 3; P.L. 1917, ch. 1473, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, §§ 2, 3; P.L. 1927, ch. 1043, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-4-4 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 247, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 185, § 1.

11-4-6. Arson — Fifth degree.

Any person who knowingly attempts to cause, procure, aid, or counsel by fire or explosion the damage or destruction of any property mentioned in §§ 11-4-2 11-4-5 shall, upon conviction, be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than twenty (20) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, §§ 2-4; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, §§ 2-4; P.L. 1917, ch. 1473, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, §§ 2-4; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 4; P.L. 1927, ch. 1043, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-4-6 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 247, § 1.

Cross References.

Breaking and entering dwelling in possession of fire setting material and equipment, § 11-8-2.1 .

11-4-7. Arson — Sixth degree.

Any person who knowingly causes, procures, aids or counsels the destruction of woodlands by fire which shall run and spread at large shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned not exceeding two (2) years, or shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-4-8 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 247, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 185, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 11-4-7 (G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 11-4-7 ) concerning a married woman destroying her husband’s property was impliedly repealed by P.L. 1980, ch. 247, § 1.

11-4-8. Arson — Seventh degree.

Every person who shall make a bonfire in any public street, road, square, land or rotary, without special permission from the local governing body, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100). No complaint for a violation of any of the provisions of this section shall be sustained unless it shall be brought within thirty (30) days after the commission of the offense, and all fines for the violation shall inure one-half (1/2) of the fine to the complainant and one-half (1/2) of the fine to the state. The local governing body may appoint a designee to grant permission under the provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 247, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 11-4-8 (G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-4-8 ) concerning bonfires, was repealed by P.L. 1980, ch. 247, § 2.

11-4-9. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1896, ch. 110, §§ 2, 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 134, §§ 2, 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 177, §§ 2, 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 406, §§ 2, 7; G.L. 1956, § 11-4-9 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 178, § 1), concerning unauthorized bonfires was repealed by P.L. 1980, ch. 247, § 2. For present law see § 11-4-8 .

11-4-10. Interference with fire alarm apparatus — Penalty.

Every person who unlawfully and without just cause willfully or knowingly tampers with, interferes with or in any way impairs any public fire alarm apparatus, wire or associated equipment shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand ($1,000) nor more than five thousand ($5,000) dollars, or shall be imprisoned for not less than one nor more than five (5) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 212, § 1.

Chapter 5 Assaults

11-5-1. Assault with intent to commit specified felonies.

Every person who shall make an assault with intent to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, burglary, or the abominable and detestable crime against nature, shall be imprisoned not exceeding twenty (20) years nor less than one year.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 18; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 11-5-1 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 76, § 1.

Cross References.

Inmate of adult correctional institutions, assault by, §§ 11-25-2 to 11-25-4 .

Mayhem, § 11-29-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Assaults:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-59 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section does not violate R.I. Const. or U.S. Const., Amend. 14, § 1. State v. Davis, 39 R.I. 276 , 97 A. 818, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1916).

In General.

Defendant was not placed in double jeopardy when he was convicted for both assault with intent to rob and assault with intent to murder, because each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not. State v. Fournier, 448 A.2d 1230, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1129 (1982).

Assault With Intent to Murder.

Where defendant deliberately and willfully fed boric acid to a 22-month-old child, with the awareness of potentially grave medical consequences, this conduct exhibited an “unjustified disregard for the possibility of death or great bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the sanctity of human life,” and supported a finding of intent to murder despite defendant’s contention he was merely seeking to get the child’s mother’s attention and not kill the child. State v. Charette, 434 A.2d 280, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1260 (1981).

Specific intent to kill victim may be inferred from firing of a deadly weapon at vital part of victim’s body. State v. Fournier, 448 A.2d 1230, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1129 (1982).

— Lesser-Included Offenses.

Where the state charges the defendant with two counts of assault with intent to murder in violation of this section, which requires only that the intent to murder be accompanied by some type of assault, and it is undisputed that the defendant effectuated the assault with a gun, the court acts correctly when it instructs the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon. State v. Dordain, 566 A.2d 942, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 160 (1989).

Consolidated Trial.

Where, in each of three incidents, defendant drove up to women who were walking on the street and convinced them to get into his car, then either successfully forced them to perform fellatio or attempted to force them to perform fellatio, and used a firearm in two incidents, the offenses were properly consolidated pursuant to R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 13 as the offenses were of the “same or similar character” under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 8 (a), and defendant’s acts could be construed as part of a common scheme or plan under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 8 (a) as defendant displayed the same modus operandi. State v. Hernandez, 822 A.2d 915, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 123 (2003).

Instructions.

The jury instructions on a violation of this section, even if erroneous, were not prejudicial where defendant was convicted of the lesser offense of assault with a dangerous weapon. State v. Carillo, 112 R.I. 6 , 307 A.2d 773, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 954 (1973).

Robbery Defined.

The word “robbery” when used in statutes has a technical meaning which incorporates all the elements of the common law crime. State v. Domanski, 57 R.I. 500 , 190 A. 854, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1937).

— Assault With Intent to Rob.

Although evidence of prior criminal conduct is generally inadmissible for lack of relevance, an exception to the rule occurs where such evidence tends to establish guilty knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan, scheme, system or the like, and evidence of the theft of a starter’s pistol 20 minutes prior to an alleged assault with intent to rob where the victim testified having seen the gun barrel of a small black handgun being held by the assailant falls within the exception as tending to establish a plan, even though the events described are dissimilar. State v. Delahunt, 121 R.I. 565 , 401 A.2d 1261, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1872 (1979).

Double jeopardy was found in a particular case where, in order to prove both extortion and assault with intent to rob, the state had to demonstrate the identical elements of an intentional threat to the victim that placed him in fear of actual bodily harm, the purpose of which was to force him to give the defendant money, and proof of no additional fact was required to establish both crimes. State v. Pope, 414 A.2d 781, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1640 (1980), overruled in part, State v. Acquisto, 463 A.2d 122, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1012 (1983).

Defendant committed assault with intent to rob when he pointed gun at victim and demanded money. State v. Fournier, 448 A.2d 1230, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1129 (1982).

An assault-with-intent-to-rob charge requires proof that the defendant unlawfully attempted to take from the person of another goods or money of any value by violence or by putting him in fear. State v. Agin, 535 A.2d 321, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1988).

Sexual Assault.

The legislature, when it amended this section in 1981, intended to substitute for the word “rape” that crime which was later defined as first-degree sexual assault, not any of the lesser degrees that describe differing, and in some instances less serious, offenses. State v. McDonald, 602 A.2d 923, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1992).

Collateral References.

Acquittal on homicide charge as bar to subsequent prosecution for assault and battery or vice versa. 37 A.L.R.2d 1068.

Admissibility, in prosecution for assault or similar offense involving physical violence, of extent or effect of victim’s injuries. 87 A.L.R.2d 926.

Admissibility of evidence of uncommunicated threats on issue of self-defense in prosecution for assault. 98 A.L.R.2d 195.

Admissibility of threats to defendant made by third parties to support claim of self-defense in criminal prosecution for assault or homicide. 55 A.L.R.5th 449.

Assault with intent to commit unnatural sex act upon minor as affected by latter’s consent. 65 A.L.R.2d 748.

Assault with intent to kill in connection with use of automobile for unlawful purpose or in violation of law. 99 A.L.R. 756.

Assault with intent to ravish consenting female under age of consent. 81 A.L.R. 599.

Attempt to commit assault as criminal offense. 93 A.L.R.5th 683.

Attempted robbery, or assault to commit robbery, as affected by intent to collect or secure debt or claim. 88 A.L.R.3d 1309.

Consent as defense to charge of criminal assault and battery. 58 A.L.R.3d 662.

Criminal responsibility for assault and battery by operation of mechanically defective motor vehicle. 88 A.L.R.2d 1165.

Entrapment defense in sex offense prosecutions. 12 A.L.R.4th 413.

Liability of adult assailant’s family to third party for physical assault. 25 A.L.R.5th 1.

Malice or intent to kill where killing is by blow without weapon. 22 A.L.R.2d 854.

Standard for determination of reasonableness of criminal defendant’s belief, for purposes of self-defense claim, that physical force is necessary — modern cases. 73 A.L.R.4th 993.

11-5-2. Felony assault.

  1. Every person who shall make an assault or battery, or both, upon the person of another, with a dangerous weapon, or with acid or other dangerous substance, or by fire, or an assault or battery that results in serious bodily injury shall be guilty of a felony assault. If such assault results in serious bodily injury, it shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years. Every other felony assault which results in bodily injury or no injury shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six (6) years.
  2. Where the provisions of “The Domestic Violence Prevention Act,” chapter 29 of title 12, are applicable, the penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties as provided in § 12-29-5 .
  3. “Serious bodily injury” means physical injury that:
    1. Creates a substantial risk of death;
    2. Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part, member, or organ;
    3. Causes serious permanent disfigurement or circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of a person; or
    4. Results in the termination of a pregnancy where the person making the assault or battery is someone other than the pregnant person and knows or has reason to know that the person upon whom the assault or battery is made is pregnant.
  4. This section shall not apply to acts committed by:
    1. Any person relating to the performance of an abortion pursuant to chapter 4.13 of title 23, the Reproductive Privacy Act, for which the consent of the pregnant person, or a person authorized by law on her behalf, has been obtained or for which such consent is implied by law; or
    2. Any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant person or the fetus.
  5. “Bodily injury” means physical injury that causes physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 19; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 19; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 19; P.L. 1925, ch. 657, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 11-5-2 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 76, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 8; P.L. 1990, ch. 241, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 324, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 81, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 344, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 354, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 27, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 344, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 354, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2017, ch. 344, § 3, provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and applies to offenses committed on or after the effective date.”

P.L. 2017, ch. 354, § 3, provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and applies to offenses committed on or after the effective date.”

Cross References.

Additional penalty for carrying arms while committing crime, §§ 11-47-3 , 11-47-20 .

Domestic assault, § 8-8.1-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Admissibility of Evidence.

In a case resulting in defendant’s conviction for domestic assault with a dangerous weapon based on her assault of her half-sister with a knife, where defendant claimed self-defense, the trial justice did not err in excluding Facebook videos illustrating the victim’s acts of violence because the trial justice determined that the videos were cumulative to the victim’s testimony, would inflame the passion of the jurors, and would cause confusion as to what the ultimate issue in the case was. State v. Medina, 222 A.3d 1246, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 1 (2020).

In a case resulting in defendant’s conviction for domestic assault with a dangerous weapon based on her assault of her half-sister with a knife, the trial justice provided adequate grounds to support the decision to grant the State’s motion in limine to prevent defendant from mentioning that the victim had been arrested on gun charges; the charges were eventually dismissed as to the victim and use of a gun was not in issue in the current case. State v. Medina, 222 A.3d 1246, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 1 (2020).

Apprehension of Immediate Injury.

Close proximity is not required to prove a reasonable apprehension of immediate injury. State v. Clifton, 777 A.2d 1272, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 136 (2001).

Domestic Violence.

In a prosecution for domestic assault, when determining whether a couple has been in a “substantive dating relationship,” R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2 directs the court to look to three factors—length, nature, and frequency—as indicative of the substance of the relationship as a whole. Section 12-29-2 does not require a specific demonstration or finding as to each of the factors, nor does it limit the court to only those three factors. State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 88 (2011).

Evidence Sufficient.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support the trial justice’s finding that defendant assaulted the victim with a dangerous weapon; the trial justice expressly found that a witness’s oral statement that she saw defendant threatening the victim with knives was credible. State v. Harris, 871 A.2d 341, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 53 (2005).

Conviction for felony assault under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2 was supported by sufficient evidence, where the evidence showed that the attack on the victim resulted in eight staples to the victim’s scalp and two permanent scars, and the victim’s clothing was covered with blood after the incident, thus, allowing the jury to reasonably conclude that the victim’s wounds were serious and resulted in a permanent disfigurement to the victim’s scalp. State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 91 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to withstand defendant’s motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, where the case principally revolved around the credibility of various witnesses and the jury was entitled to believe the victim’s version of events, even though there were discrepancies in the victims’ recollection at trial and to the police. State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 22 (2011).

In a prosecution for domestic assault with a deadly weapon, the following evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant and the victim had been in a “substantive dating relationship” for purposes of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-2(b) : 1) the couple dated for six months; 2) they had an intimate relationship; 3) they had communication since their breakup relative to affairs of the heart; 4) they met on the night of the assault so the victim could return jewelry defendant had given her; and 5) defendant said at the scene that he had “an argument with his girlfriend.” State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 88 (2011).

Defendant’s motions for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal were properly denied as the totality of the evidence of a brutal assault, including the multiple blows to the victim’s head, the resultant bleeding and bruised raccoon eyes, her elevated vital signs, combined with the classification of the victim as critical upon her arrival at the hospital and the hospital’s response to the injuries as life-threatening, was sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of death for R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2 purposes; indeed, the risk of death was considered substantial enough that the hospital’s medical staff contacted the victim’s family, and the readily apparent signs of the victim’s injuries were indicative of a variety of life-threatening conditions, such as a skull fracture, brain bleed, spine injury, and the risk of cardiac arrest. State v. Gaffney, 63 A.3d 888, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 62 (2013).

Because a witness’s testimony was bordering on farfetched and so inconsistent with testimony given by the other witnesses, the trial justice was not clearly wrong in his evaluation of the evidence; the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was consistent with guilt because defendant held the victim to restrain her and prevent her from protecting her husband while he was being assaulted by defendant’s employees, at a location defendant selected, and made no effort to stop them. State v. Parrillo, 228 A.3d 613, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 39 (2020).

Identification.

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress identification evidence, pursuant to R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 12 , where the police had shown the victim of defendant’s felonious assault a photographic array based on the victim’s extensive description, which was found not to be unduly suggestive, and where the victim also identified defendant in a courtroom reliably and independently. State v. Jones, 818 A.2d 649, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 48 (2003).

Intent.

There was sufficient evidence to warrant an objective inference that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to harm since, after discharging a weapon less than two blocks away by pumping multiple bullets into his victim’s head, he immediately ran up the street, slowed down as he approached two boys, and then lifted his gun and pointed it at one of the boys’ heads. State v. Clifton, 777 A.2d 1272, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 136 (2001).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2 is a divisible statute, and felony assault with a dangerous weapon under the statute is satisfied with a mens rea of recklessness; therefore, it does not qualify as an Armed Career Criminal Act predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924 for enhanced sentencing purposes, and multiple defendants’ motions to set aside or correct their enhanced sentences, based on the statute incorrectly being considered a violent felony predicate offense, were granted. United States v. Sabetta, 221 F. Supp. 3d 210, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146476 (D.R.I. 2016), aff'd, 896 F.3d 104, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19849 (1st Cir. 2018).

Defendants’ convictions for the Rhode Island offense of assault with a dangerous weapon under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2(a) no longer qualified as predicate convictions triggering the federal Armed Career Criminals Act’s mandatory 15-year sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because Rhode Island’s unclear (and possibly even conflicting) precedent regarding assault with a dangerous weapon’s requisite mental state prevented the court from concluding it was categorically a violent felony. United States v. Rose, 896 F.3d 104, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19849 (1st Cir. 2018).

Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the offense defined in this section, where the victim is the defendant’s wife, is in the family court and, upon discovery of that fact, the superior court may transfer the trial of the indictment to the family court, notwithstanding the fact that the family court has no grand jury. State v. Perry, 103 R.I. 6 , 234 A.2d 115, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 568 (1967).

The family court in a matter involving an information charge of assault with a dangerous weapon upon a mother by her adult son pursuant to this section did not have the requisite subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct a criminal trial since the defendant/son so charged was an adult. State v. Kenney, 523 A.2d 853, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 438 (1987).

Once the family court had conducted a criminal trial pursuant to § 14-1-48 on a charge that an adult defendant/son assaulted his mother with a dangerous weapon, it could not retain jurisdiction over the case and proceed to sentence the defendant since the court had no subject-matter jurisdiction of the case. State v. Kenney, 523 A.2d 853, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 438 (1987).

Jury Instructions.

Trial court properly omitted a jury instruction on self-defense where there was not a scintilla of evidence that entitled defendant to such an instruction, and defendant’s self-defense hypotheses was distinct from the criminal charge she was facing and would not have been legally sufficient to avoid a conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon, thus, confusing the jury. State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 22 (2011).

Defendant did not waive an objection to a trial court’s failure to give a self-defense instruction as to a felony assault charge because (1) defendant clearly claimed self-defense at trial, (2) after the trial justice noted defendant’s exception to the court’s denial of a self-defense instruction, defendant did not have to restate the exception when asked if defendant objected to the instructions, and (3) defendant specifically argued supporting evidence in the record. State v. Soler, 140 A.3d 755, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 101 (2016).

Motion for a New Trial Denied.

Where the evidence that defendant sought to present upon any reopening of a non-jury criminal trial for felony assault with a dangerous weapon and malicious destruction of property could not be considered “newly discovered” and merely presented a question of credibility, the trial justice’s denial of a new trial pursuant to to R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 was correct; defendant failed to set forth the particular grounds upon which defendant sought the relief requested in compliance with R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 47 . State v. Brooks, 818 A.2d 665, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 50 (2003).

Defendant’s conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon, after he struck two victims in the back with a broken bottle, was supported by sufficient evidence where the court considered defendant’s motion for new trial and properly reviewed the testimony, addressed the credibility of each witness, and considered the evidence in the light of the jury’s charge and found the elements of assault with a dangerous weapon were satisfied. State v. DiChristofaro, 848 A.2d 1127, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 101 (2004).

Denial of motion for a new trial on charges of violating R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2 was not an abuse of discretion. The trial justice articulated adequate reasoning by noting discrepancies in the witnesses’ testimony, understanding material and relevant evidence, and correctly choosing which testimony to accept and reject; the justice appropriately determined that the evidence could cause reasonable minds to differ as to the outcome of the case. State v. Cerda, 957 A.2d 382, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 96 (2008).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial as to a felony assault conviction because the trial justice (1) agreed with the jury’s verdict and (2) considered factors used to find the credibility of eyewitness testimony. State v. Lopez, 78 A.3d 773, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 141 (2013).

Superior court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial because the trial justice articulated adequate grounds for denying the motion, carefully reviewed the testimony, and weighed the evidence before him, he specifically noted the shortcomings and inconsistencies of certain witnesses, but ultimately concluded, based on his own credibility determinations, that the weight of the evidence supported guilty verdicts as to the counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and malicious injury to property, and determined that he would have reached the same conclusion as the jury—that defendant cut the victim with a machete and broke the car and basement windows with the machete. State v. Najera, 211 A.3d 938, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 103 (2019).

Multiple Offenses.

Convicting defendant for both assault with a deadly weapon pursuant to this section and possession of a pistol during the commission of a crime of violence pursuant to § 11-47-3 is unconstitutional, as both convictions stem from the same incident as defined by State v. Boudreau, 113 R.I. 497 , 322 A.2d 626 (1974), thereby violating the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution. State v. Grullon, 117 R.I. 682 , 371 A.2d 265, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1739 (1977).

The state, by proving the elements of the crime of kidnapping, does not automatically prove the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon used in the kidnapping; therefore, the offenses do not merge under the double-jeopardy clause. State v. Ballard, 439 A.2d 1375, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 796 (1982).

There is nothing inconsistent with finding a defendant guilty of both assault with a dangerous weapon and burglary, and acquitting him of assault with intent to commit murder, where the jury finds an entry with the intent to commit a felony and assault with a dangerous weapon. State v. Ranieri, 586 A.2d 1094, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1991).

The term “accident” in § 31-26-1 (leaving the scene of an accident) includes all collisions, intentional as well as unintentional. Therefore, a defendant can be found guilty of both the intentional act of assault and the act of leaving the scene of an accident, since each crime requires proof of a separate element distinct from the other. State v. Sabetta, 672 A.2d 451, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 64 (1996).

Where the State moved to vacate defendant’s conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon, defendant’s conviction of assault resulting in serious bodily injury was vacated because that conviction arose from the same course of conduct. State v. Bolarinho, 850 A.2d 907, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 152 (2004).

Defendant was not entitled to acquittal on double jeopardy grounds as to convictions for discharging a firearm in commission of a crime of violence and assault with intent to murder because the legislature clearly intended multiple sentences for such convictions arising from one incident. State v. Young, 78 A.3d 787, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 142 (2013).

Present Ability.

The jury could properly infer that the defendant had the present ability to carry out his threat since, even though the weapon was not recovered, two witnesses testified that they saw and heard the defendant shoot a gun as he leapt from a vehicle and that, moments later, the defendant pointed the weapon at one of the witnesses while he was fleeing from the murder scene. State v. Clifton, 777 A.2d 1272, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 136 (2001).

Self-Defense.

Evidence supported a trial justice’s finding that, after a brawl had subsided and the individuals involved were leaving, defendant, who had been a participant in the brawl, ran back and landed a punch to the head of the victim. The trial justice did not find any credible evidence that supported defendant’s claim of self-defense, and, based on the testimony of witnesses and the events depicted in a surveillance video, determined that the initial confrontation had concluded before defendant punched the victim. State v. Lussier, 186 A.3d 581, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 87 (2018).

Sentence.

Total sentence of 45 years, with 30 years to serve and the remaining 15 years suspended, was proper for assault convictions, and denial of defendant’s R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 (a) motion to reduce his sentence was proper, because, inter alia, the penalty for felony assault under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2(a) was imprisonment for not more than 20 years, and a 15-year sentence for each of these counts was not statutorily infirm; the trial justice articulated numerous reasons for giving defendant a stiff punishment including the viciousness of the crimes, defendant’s criminal record, his refusal to take responsibility or show remorse, his efforts to control the behavior of his child’s mother, and the fact that the commission of the crime was by ambush. Further, the trial justice’s exhaustive explanation justified the consecutive terms. State v. Snell, 11 A.3d 97, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 11 (2011).

Victim’s Medical Condition.

The trial court correctly ruled that the current medical condition of the victim was not relevant to the charge of felony assault. State v. Johnson, 688 A.2d 285, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 210 (1997).

Trial court erred in limiting defendant in defendant’s felony assault case from cross-examining a man, the accusing witness, other than as to the single question about whether the man planned to civilly sue defendant. As a result of the limitation, defendant was not permitted to fully confront the man about the man’s bias toward defendant and potential need to exaggerate the man’s injuries after the man stated that the man did indeed intend to civilly sue defendant. State v. Tiernan, 941 A.2d 129, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 5 (2008).

Evidence that the victim suffered a dislocated shoulder was sufficient to allow the jury to find that the victim suffered a “protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part” under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2 . State v. Scanlon, 982 A.2d 1268, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 127 (2009).

— Substantial Risk of Death

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2 focuses on the conduct of a defendant and whether his or her assault upon another results in serious bodily injury, that is, results in a physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death under § 11-5-2(a) and 11-5-2 (c)(1); the statute does not require that the victim of the assault be rendered objectively or clinically at risk of death but frames the issue as whether the conduct of a defendant, in assaulting the victim, creates a substantial risk of death under § 11-5-2(c)(1) . State v. Gaffney, 63 A.3d 888, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 62 (2013).

What Constitutes.

The firing of a pistol in the general direction of another with intent to frighten him is an assault with a deadly weapon. State v. Baker, 20 R.I. 275 , 38 A. 653, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 103 (1897).

If a citizen protects himself with the use of a “dangerous weapon” from arrest by an officer using excessive force, he runs the risk of a felony conviction under the terms of this statute. State v. Ramsdell, 109 R.I. 320 , 285 A.2d 399, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1061 (1971).

If a citizen protects himself from arrest by an officer using excessive force with a force which is greater than necessary, he forfeits his right to self-defense and may be convicted of a simple assault pursuant to this statute. State v. Ramsdell, 109 R.I. 320 , 285 A.2d 399, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1061 (1971).

Where abuse was effectively criminal, assault with a dangerous weapon would lie even though victims were unaware of the assault at the time. State v. Boudreau, 113 R.I. 497 , 322 A.2d 626, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1203 (1974).

The ability of the defendant at the time of the assault to inflict harm on the victim by means of a dangerous weapon is an element of the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon. State v. Milazzo, 116 R.I. 443 , 358 A.2d 35, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1293 (1976).

Mayhem and assault resulting in serious bodily injury are not the same crime because proof of different additional facts would be required to establish each of these crimes. State v. Glynn, 658 A.2d 6, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 133 (1995).

Police officers who went to plaintiff’s apartment after plaintiff told a counselor that he planned to kill himself were not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 false arrest claim because evidence indicating that plaintiff agreed to comply with the officers’ third order to drop a knife and that plaintiff’s forward movement was not threatening in nature might have supported a jury’s potential conclusion that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff for assault with a dangerous weapon, a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2(a) . Mucci v. Town of N. Providence, 815 F. Supp. 2d 541, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114711 (D.R.I. 2011).

— Dangerous Weapon.

An individual’s hands, when employed in such a manner as to be likely to produce substantial bodily harm, may properly be qualified as a dangerous weapon. State v. Zangrilli, 440 A.2d 710, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 798 (1982).

An individual armed with operable guns and an arsenal of ammunition can be characterized as having the present ability to inflict injury with a dangerous weapon, even where the guns are unloaded. State v. Jackson, 752 A.2d 5, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 109 (2000).

A dangerous weapon can be either an implement that is clearly dangerous per se, such as a knife or a loaded gun, or an implement that is used in such a way that it had the capability of producing serious bodily harm. State v. Golembewski, 808 A.2d 622, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 184 (2002).

Any error by the trial court in instructing a jury that a knife was a dangerous weapon was harmless error pursuant to R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 52 , because defense counsel admitted that the victim had been stabbed, and specifically mentioned that a knife was used, and therefore, the omitted element of § 11-5-2(b) , that a dangerous weapon was used, could not have contributed to the verdict. State v. Golembewski, 808 A.2d 622, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 184 (2002).

Evidence that defendant committed an assault with a dangerous weapon was insufficient to support conviction, and motion for acquittal should have been granted, where the alleged victim’s identification of the object brandished by defendant as a gun was equivocal at best; this was an insufficient basis for drawing an inference that an alleged weapon was operable. State v. Caba, 887 A.2d 370, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 210 (2005).

In a prosecution for assault with a dangerous weapon under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2 , testimony that witnesses heard a gun brandished by defendant “click” and that defendant stated “he would shoot a bitch” was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that the gun was operable, even though it had not been recovered by police and entered in evidence. State v. Tillery, 922 A.2d 102, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 53 (2007).

In the context of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2 , defendant’s hand, and by extension defendant’s feet, when employed in such a manner as to be likely to produce substantial bodily harm, properly qualified as a dangerous weapon. State v. Cerda, 957 A.2d 382, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 96 (2008).

Boom box was a dangerous weapon within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2 because: (1) defendant had the present ability to inflict bodily harm on a victim; (2) he was capable of striking the victim, who was standing about 6 feet away from him, with the boom box; (3) he looked directly at her before throwing the 14-pound, hard-plastic boom box directly at her head; and (4) although she was able to duck, the boom box struck her back, leaving a mark. State v. Forand, 958 A.2d 134, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 98 (2008).

It was not error to deny defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to defendant’s felony assault conviction arguing the evidence did not show a perpetrator’s hands were used as a dangerous weapon because (1) the trial justice properly found a choke, carried to its natural conclusion, would probably cause death, and (2) the test was whether an object was so used that serious bodily injury may have resulted, not whether such injury actually occurred. State v. Lopez, 78 A.3d 773, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 141 (2013).

— Objects Not Inherently Weapons.

An automobile in and of itself is not considered a dangerous weapon, but it may become so if it is employed in such a manner to render it capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury. State v. Mercier, 415 A.2d 465, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1677 (1980).

There may be a conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon when the object used in the assault is not per se a dangerous weapon if it appears that the object was used in such a way that it had the capability of producing serious bodily harm. The test is not whether serious bodily harm results, rather it is whether the object was so used that serious bodily harm may have resulted. State v. Mercier, 415 A.2d 465, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1677 (1980).

Defendant was properly convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon when defendant wrapped a boot cord around a paramour’s neck and tightened it because the cord, while not inherently dangerous, was capable of producing serious injury or death and whether the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon was committed did not turn on the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries, but whether the instrumentality was used in such a way that it could produce serious bodily injury. State v. Gore, 820 A.2d 978, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 86 (2003).

Collateral References.

Acquittal on homicide charge as bar to subsequent prosecution for assault and battery or vice versa. 37 A.L.R.2d 1068.

Admissibility of expert opinion stating whether a particular knife was, or could have been, the weapon used in a crime. 83 A.L.R.4th 660.

Attempt to commit assault as criminal offense. 93 A.L.R.5th 683.

Automobile as dangerous or deadly weapon within meaning of assault or battery statute. 89 A.L.R.3d 1026.

Cane as deadly weapon. 30 A.L.R. 815.

Criminal responsibility for injury resulting from hunting accident. 23 A.L.R.2d 1401.

Dangerous weapon, unloaded firearm as. 74 A.L.R. 1206.

Dog as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statutes aggravating offense such as assault and robbery. 124 A.L.R.5th 657.

Firearm used as bludgeon as a deadly weapon. 8 A.L.R. 1319.

Intent to do physical harm as essential element of crime of assault with deadly or dangerous weapon. 92 A.L.R.2d 635.

Kicking as aggravated assault, or assault with dangerous or deadly weapon. 19 A.L.R.5th 823.

Pocket or clasp knife as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statute aggravating offenses such as assault, robbery, or homicide. 100 A.L.R.3d 287.

Standard for determination of reasonableness of criminal defendant’s belief, for purposes of self-defense claim, that physical force is necessary — modern cases. 73 A.L.R.4th 993.

Sufficiency of bodily injury to support charge of aggravated assault. 5 A.L.R.5th 243.

What constitutes “otherwise using” weapon under sentencing guideline § 2A2.2(b)(2), providing enhancement of sentence for aggravated assault. 120 A.L.R. Fed. 589.

11-5-2.1. Felony assault by use of devices similar in appearance to a firearm.

  1. Every person who shall make an assault or battery, or both, with any device manufactured and designed to be substantially similar in appearance to a firearm shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years if serious injury results, and in the event that serious bodily injury does not result, punishment shall be imprisonment for not more than three (3) years.
  2. “Serious bodily injury” means physical injury that:
    1. Creates a substantial risk of death;
    2. Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part, member or organ; or
    3. Causes serious permanent disfigurement.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 604, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 324, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Consolidated Trial.

Where, in each of three incidents, defendant drove up to women who were walking on the street and convinced them to get into his car, then either successfully forced them to perform fellatio or attempted to force them to perform fellatio, and used a firearm in two incidents, the offenses were properly consolidated pursuant to R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 13 as the offenses were of the “same or similar character” under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 8 (a), and defendant’s acts could be construed as part of a common scheme or plan under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 8 (a) as defendant displayed the same modus operandi. State v. Hernandez, 822 A.2d 915, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 123 (2003).

11-5-2.2. Battery — Criminal negligence.

  1. When serious bodily injury, as defined in § 11-5-2 , of any person, occurs as a proximate result of criminal negligence, the person committing the criminal negligence shall be guilty of battery and shall be deemed to have committed a felony and shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years or fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.
  2. For the purposes of this section: (i) “Criminal negligence” shall mean: Conduct which is such a departure from what would be that of an ordinary prudent or careful person in the same circumstance as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life or an indifference to consequences. Criminal negligence is negligence that is aggravated, culpable or gross; (ii) “Person” shall mean an individual or any business entity recognized by the laws of the state of Rhode Island including, but not limited to, corporations, limited liability corporations, partnerships or limited liability partnerships.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 194, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 204, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 194, § 1, and P.L. 2004, ch. 204, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2004, ch. 194, § 2, and P.L. 2004, ch. 204, § 2, provide that this section takes effect upon passage [July 28, 2004] and applies to actions which occur after that date.

11-5-2.3. Domestic assault by strangulation.

  1. Every person who shall make an assault or battery, or both, by strangulation, on a family or household member as defined in subsection 12-29-2(b) , shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years.
  2. Where the provisions of “The Domestic Violence Prevention Act,” chapter 29 of title 12, are applicable, the penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties as provided in § 12-29-5 .
  3. “Strangulation” means knowingly and intentionally impeding normal breathing or circulation of the blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of another person, with the intent to cause that person harm.

History of Section. P.L. 2012, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 284, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 278, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 284, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Law Reviews.

Nicole Verdi, Comment: Releasing the Stranglehold on Domestic Violence Victims: Implications and Effects of Rhode Island’s Domestic Assault Strangulation Statute, 18 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 255 (2013).

11-5-3. Simple assault or battery.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in § 11-5-2 , every person who shall make an assault or battery or both shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year or fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
  2. Where the provisions of “The Domestic Violence Prevention Act”, chapter 29 of title 12, are applicable, the penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties as provided in § 12-29-5 .

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 20; C.P.A. 1905, § 1171; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 11-5-3 ; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 8; P.L. 1992, ch. 329, § 1.

Cross References.

Public conveyance, shooting or throwing missiles at, § 11-36-3 .

Domestic assault, § 8-8.1-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has defined “battery” as an act that is intended to cause, and does cause, an offensive contact with, an unconsented touching of, or trauma upon the body of another, thereby generally resulting in the consummation of an assault. Aside from the obvious higher standard of proof required to establish criminal battery, the law recognizes no distinction between criminal and civil battery. Fenwick v. Oberman, 847 A.2d 852, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 85 (2004).

Admissibility of Evidence.

In a prosecution for domestic simple assault, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to impeach defendant with seven prior convictions, two of which involved assaultive behavior, because the similarity between the charged offense and the prior convictions did not preclude admission of those convictions. State v. McRae, 31 A.3d 785, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 131 (2011).

Defects in Indictment.

Failure to allege the time of an offense in an indictment is a defect of form, rather than substance, and will not affect the conviction. Kenney v. State, 5 R.I. 385 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1858).

Denial of Motion to Pass.

In a prosecution for domestic simple assault, the victim’s testimony that defendant had been drinking at the time of the incident did not obligate the trial court to pass the case, as the comment was not sufficiently prejudicial as to prevent the jury from dispassionately considering the evidence, and there was no indication that it failed to obey the trial court’s instruction to disregard the victim’s statement. State v. McRae, 31 A.3d 785, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 131 (2011).

Instructions.

Instruction to jury that complaint under this section did not charge a crime was reversible error. State v. Burns, 79 R.I. 134 , 84 A.2d 803, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1951).

In light of the reference to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-3 in the criminal information and the trial evidence indicating that defendant put the victims in reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on both assault and battery. Ultimately, defendant was convicted of two counts of felony domestic assault, as charged in the information; he was neither convicted of nor sentenced for a criminal battery. State v. Cardona, 969 A.2d 667, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 54 (2009).

Multiple Offenses.

Defendant’s contention that he was placed twice in jeopardy by being prosecuted for extortion pursuant to § 11-42-2 subsequent to a conviction for assault and battery pursuant to this section was without merit, since assault and battery, which is the intentional and unlawful application of the slightest force to the person of another, and extortion, which consists of a verbal threat to place a victim in peril of actual bodily harm accompanied by an intent to compel that victim to do an act against his will, require proof of different elements and hence do not satisfy the “same evidence” test applied by the court. State v. Davis, 120 R.I. 82 , 384 A.2d 1061, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 764 (1978).

Nature of Offense.

An assault is an unlawful attempt or offer, with force or violence, to do a corporal hurt to another, whether from malice or wantonness. State v. Pope, 414 A.2d 781, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1640 (1980), overruled in part, State v. Acquisto, 463 A.2d 122, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1012 (1983).

A threat to kill without accompanying force or violence does not constitute assault. State v. Pule, 453 A.2d 1095, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1116 (1982).

Alien was subject to removal under 8 U.S.C.S. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on a conviction for an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(43)(F), since the state-court record indicated that the alien was convicted of assault under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-3(a) and, under state law, assault necessarily involved the use of physical force and was thus a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.S. § 16(a). Lopes v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 58, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25161 (1st Cir. 2007).

Preservation for Review.

Trial court properly convicted defendant of simple assault because defendant’s arguments were not properly before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island where her speedy trial contention was never raised at trial and the criteria for invoking the narrow exception to that rule were entirely absent. State v. Connery, 139 A.3d 401, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 75 (2016).

Reduction of Sentence Properly Denied.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an inmate’s motion to reduce sentence under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 , as the sentence was justified based on his multiple first- and second-degree sexual assaults of two women, and his simple assault of a third, all of whom were developmentally disabled women who were entrusted to his care, and who continued to live in fear as a result of the assaults. State v. Rivera, 64 A.3d 742, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 69 (2013).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Sufficient evidence existed to convict defendant of assault where defendant punched the victim in the face, threw him to the floor, and choked him by the neck, defendant admitted to the responding police officer that he committed the assault, and defendant’s admission that he did not feel threatened by the victim undercut his suggestion that he acted in self-defense. State v. Bolduc, 822 A.2d 184, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 119 (2003).

In a probation violation hearing relating to a charge that defendant committed assault or battery while he was on probation, the hearing justice did not err in deciding to credit the testimony of the State’s witnesses rather than the testimony of defendant’s witnesses, in that it was reasonable for the hearing justice to give a lesser weight to the testimony of an eyewitness, who admitted that he had poor eyesight and who denied ever seeing defendant, from his vantage point across the street, strike the complaining witness. State v. Jackson, 966 A.2d 1225, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 30 (2009).

In a domestic assault prosecution, defendant’s wife recanted her statements to police that he hit and kicked her son and tried to slap the phone out of her hand to prevent her from calling police. However, her trial testimony that it looked like defendant was hitting her son, and that defendant tapped her arm and swore at her to prevent her from calling police, created a jury question of whether he committed acts that put her and her son in reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm. State v. Cardona, 969 A.2d 667, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 54 (2009).

Because the allegations that defendant committed a felony were sufficient to invoke the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-15 , and because defendant failed to preserve defendant’s R.I. Super. Ct. R. Prac. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, defendant was properly convicted of violating a no-contact order and simple assault. State v. Tower, 984 A.2d 40, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 137 (2009).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s new trial motion, as the evidence was legally sufficient to support his convictions for first-degree and second-degree sexual assault, as well as simple assault, as the trial justice acted within his province in choosing to find the victims’ testimony more credible than that of defendant. State v. Rivera, 987 A.2d 887, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 24 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 29 with respect to a charge of simple assault, as the State provided sufficient evidence to show that defendant acted with wrong intention or ill will when he struck a victim. State v. Lomba, 37 A.3d 615, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 17 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of simple assault or battery because the lieutenant testified that defendant jumped out of his car and on top of him, which sufficed to satisfy the element of an offensive touching upon another’s body. State v. Edwards, 147 A.3d 982, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 108 (2016).

Because a witness’s testimony was bordering on farfetched and so inconsistent with testimony given by the other witnesses, the trial justice was not clearly wrong in his evaluation of the evidence; the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was consistent with guilt because defendant held the victim to restrain her and prevent her from protecting her husband while he was being assaulted by defendant’s employees, at a location defendant selected, and made no effort to stop them. State v. Parrillo, 228 A.3d 613, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 39 (2020).

Collateral References.

Acquittal on charge as to one as bar to charge as to the other, where one person is assaulted by acts directed at another. 2 A.L.R. 606.

Acquittal on homicide charge as bar to subsequent prosecution for assault and battery or vice versa. 37 A.L.R.2d 1068.

Assault by excessive or improper punishment inflicted on child by parent or one in loco parentis. 89 A.L.R.2d 396.

Assault in attempting to prevent elopement. 8 A.L.R. 660.

Assault in connection with use of automobile for unlawful purpose or in violation of law. 99 A.L.R. 835.

Assault in defense of habitation or property. 25 A.L.R. 537; 32 A.L.R. 1541; 34 A.L.R. 1488.

Assault in forcibly retaking property sold conditionally. 9 A.L.R. 180; 105 A.L.R. 926.

Attempt to commit assault as criminal offense. 93 A.L.R.5th 683.

Consent as defense to charge of criminal assault and battery. 58 A.L.R.3d 662.

Criminal responsibility for assault and battery by operation of mechanically defective motor vehicle. 88 A.L.R.2d 1165.

Criminal responsibility for injury resulting from hunting accident. 23 A.L.R.2d 1401.

Franchisor’s tort liability for injuries allegedly caused by assault or other criminal activity on or near franchise premises. 2 A.L.R.5th 369.

Indecent proposal to woman as criminal assault. 12 A.L.R.2d 971.

“Infamous offense,” assault as, within constitutional or statutory provision in relation to presentment or indictment by grand jury. 24 A.L.R. 1007.

Liability of owner or operator of shopping center, or business housed therein, for injury to patron on premises from criminal attack by third party. 31 A.L.R.5th 550.

Peace officer’s criminal responsibility for wounding one whom they wished to investigate or identify. 18 A.L.R. 1368; 61 A.L.R. 321.

Right of one in loco parentis other than teacher to punish child. 43 A.L.R. 507.

Right to use force to obtain possession of real property to which one is entitled. 141 A.L.R. 273.

Standard for determination of reasonableness of criminal defendant’s belief, for purposes of self-defense claim, that physical force is necessary — modern cases. 73 A.L.R.4th 993.

“Third degree”, police officers’ criminal liability in respect of examination of persons under arrest. 79 A.L.R. 457.

11-5-3.1. Assault or battery upon delivery person.

  1. “Delivery person” means any person engaged in the commercial delivery of any item, food product, or anything else of value to any home, residence, or business.
  2. Every person who shall make an assault or battery upon any delivery person in the execution of the delivery person’s duty shall be imprisoned not exceeding three (3) years or fined not exceeding three thousand dollars ($3,000), or both.
  3. Every person who shall make an assault or battery, or both, with a dangerous weapon, or with acid or other dangerous substance, or by fire, or an assault or battery that results in serious bodily injury, to any delivery person shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than five (5) years, but not more than twenty (20) years.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 436, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 437, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 436, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 437, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-5-4. Assault with dangerous weapon in dwelling house.

Whoever, being armed with a dangerous weapon, assaults another with intent to rob or murder, shall, if the assault is committed within a dwelling house, be punished by imprisonment in the adult correctional institution for not less than ten (10) years to life.

History of Section. R.P.L. 1957, ch. 99, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial on the assault with a dangerous weapon count, as he was the only person in the house to assault the victim, he was there when she woke up stabbed and bleeding, and there was evidence of defendant’s intent to murder the victim, including the severity of the victim’s wounds, which included a stab wound to her chest, ligature marks, a collapsed lung, and bleeding in her brain. State v. Grantley, 149 A.3d 124, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 118 (2016).

Although the victim did not identify defendant in an initial photo array, her identification of defendant was sufficient because a Facebook search by her of a name provided by the Attorney General’s office yielded profiles and photos that she scrolled through before seeing one with a familiar face that was defendant. Moreover, at trial, the victim emphasized that her in-court identification of defendant was based on his height, how big he was, and his eyes. State v. Johnson, 199 A.3d 1046, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 17 (2019).

Victim’s testimony as to the actions and statements of defendant and his accomplices led to a reasonable inference that the gun used in a robbery was operable; the victim testified that she was in fear—as demonstrated by her question to an accomplice about whether he thought the others involved in the robbery were going to kill her, defendant threatened to return if she called the police, and the gun was pointed at her for the duration of the incident. State v. Johnson, 199 A.3d 1046, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 17 (2019).

Collateral References.

Dog as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery. 124 A.L.R.5th 657.

11-5-5. Assault of police officers and other officials.

Any person who shall make an assault or battery, or both, by knowingly and willfully either (1) striking, or (2) spraying with a noxious chemical, commonly used as a personal defense weapon, including Mace and an oleoresin capsicum product or like products, a uniformed member of the state police or metropolitan park police, environmental police officer, state properties patrol officer, probation and parole officers, state government case worker or investigator, judge of the supreme, superior, family, district court, traffic tribunal or municipal court, deputy sheriff, city or town police officer or firefighter, member of the capitol police, member of campus security force of state colleges and universities, member of the Rhode Island airport police department, member of the Rhode Island fugitive task force, Rhode Island public transit authority bus driver, or on-duty plainclothes member of the town, city, or state police force, investigator of the department of the attorney general appointed pursuant to § 42-9-8.1 , or member of the railroad police after proper identification is displayed, or uniformed dog officer, or out-of-state police officer called into Rhode Island under a cooperative agreement to provide mutual aid at the request of the state of Rhode Island pursuant to chapter 37 of title 42, or assistant attorney general or special assistant attorney general, or employees of the department of environmental management responsible for administrative inspections or any constable authorized by chapter 45-16 of the Rhode Island general law causing bodily injury while the officer or official is engaged in the performance of his or her duty, shall be deemed to have committed a felony, and shall be imprisoned not exceeding three (3) years, or fined not exceeding fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1965, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 188, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 76, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 66, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 249, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 305, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 362, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 277, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 78, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 266, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 428, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 200, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 59, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 56, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 152, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 332, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 74, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 491, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 60, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 71, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 74, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 81, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 29.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subdivision designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 74, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 81, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

Crimes of criminal contempt and assault of a police officer, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-5 , constitute separate crimes with different elements for each because only contempt requires an attack on the dignity of the court, and a conviction under § 11-5-5 requires proof of an unlawful striking of a uniformed officer. Therefore, even where contempt and the assault charges arise out of the same incident, each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not. State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 143 (2004).

Definition of Terms.

The terms “knowingly” and “wilfully” in this section are defined in accordance with the nature of the offense charged. State v. Contreras, 105 R.I. 523 , 253 A.2d 612, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 783 (1969).

A police officer assigned to a “paid detail” at a motel restaurant when he was not scheduled by the police department to work a regular shift, in uniform, considered “on duty” by the department and retaining the same benefits as accorded to him when he worked regular duty hours though he was paid by the motel management was a uniformed police officer engaged in the performance of his duties. State v. Botelho, 459 A.2d 947, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 911 (1983).

Evidence.

Since bodily injury of a police officer sustained in the course of duty is an essential element of the offense charged under this section, a photograph showing the officer’s injuries was properly introduced in evidence in the absence of any showing that it was introduced solely to inflame the jury. State v. Pombo, 110 R.I. 133 , 290 A.2d 855, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 889 (1972).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony assault of a police officer because a lieutenant testified that when he asked for a license, registration, and proof of insurance, defendant swore at him; defendant exited the vehicle, and jumped on top of the lieutenant; when the second officer walked around the car, a scuffle occurred, leading defendant to eventually bite the second officer in three different areas; and the trial justice reviewed hospital records and photographs evidencing those bite marks, which he referred to as showing unquestionable injury. State v. Edwards, 147 A.3d 982, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 108 (2016).

Instructions.

An instruction as to the meaning of the terms “knowingly” and “wilfully” although not completely explaining the words in conventional language was sufficient where it adequately defined them according to the nature of the offense charged. State v. Contreras, 105 R.I. 523 , 253 A.2d 612, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 783 (1969).

It was not error to instruct the jury that there was no need to define the word “strike” because “it has the same meaning in the law under this statute as it does and is understood by all of us”, and that it is a word of common usage and has “no particular legal definition other than the definition we would find in the ordinary dictionary”. State v. Amado, 109 R.I. 53 , 280 A.2d 324, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1023 (1971).

Instruction to jury that knowingly and wilfully meant voluntarily and intentionally was not error. State v. Lima, 113 R.I. 6 , 316 A.2d 501, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1129 (1974).

Motion for Directed Verdict.

Where there was direct conflict on the essential issue of “bodily injury” when policeman said he had bruises caused by the accused parties, but doctor testified that he did not see any external evidence of injury, such conflict was not open for resolution on the motion for a directed verdict. State v. Contreras, 105 R.I. 523 , 253 A.2d 612, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 783 (1969).

Officer in Performance of Duties.

An officer is occupied in the exercise of his duty when he is carrying out official orders. State v. Cook, 440 A.2d 137, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 799 (1982).

When a police officer, in compliance with the order of his superior officer, leaves the municipality of his employer, the officer still retains the protection afforded by this section. State v. Cook, 440 A.2d 137, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 799 (1982).

Self-Defense.

To constitute felonious conduct proscribed by this statute, the assault must be on a police officer who is actually engaged in the performance of his duties, however an officer is under no duty to use excessive force, therefore the suspect’s right to defend himself against excessive force of arresting officer is not abrogated. State v. Ramsdell, 109 R.I. 320 , 285 A.2d 399, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1061 (1971).

If police officer used reasonable force in making an arrest, application of principle of self-defense is not warranted and the felony provisions of this statute apply. State v. Ramsdell, 109 R.I. 320 , 285 A.2d 399, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1061 (1971).

Viewed in the light of § 12-7-10 , it is clear that this section does not abrogate the defendant’s right to defend himself when excessive force is used against him. State v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1733 (1980).

One who comes to the aid of an arrestee must do so at his own peril and should be excused only when the individual would himself be justified in defending himself from the use of excessive force by the arresting officer. State v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1733 (1980).

When there is evidence tending to show the law-enforcement officer’s use of excessive force, the trial justice must instruct the jury that the force used against the law-enforcement officer was justified provided the defendant limited his assault to the use of reasonable force in defending himself from excessive force. State v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1733 (1980).

If a police officer uses reasonable force, the application of the principle of self-defense is not warranted and the felony provisions of this section apply; it is only when a police officer engages in excessive force, that a citizen maintains his right of self-defense. State v. Botelho, 459 A.2d 947, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 911 (1983).

Collateral References.

Scienter as element of offense of assaulting, resisting, or impeding federal officer. 10 A.L.R.3d 833.

When Is Federal Officer Assaulted “While Engaged In, or on Account of, Performance of Official Duties” for Purposes of Offense of Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Federal Officer Under 18 U.S.C. § 111. 36 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 475.

11-5-6. Assault and battery in the collection of a loan.

Any person who commits an assault and battery upon another for the purpose of collecting any loan shall be punished upon the first conviction by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years and upon a second or subsequent conviction by imprisonment for not less than three (3) years nor more than ten (10) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 264, § 1.

11-5-7. Assault of schoolteachers, school officials or other school department employees.

Any person who shall knowingly and willfully strike a schoolteacher, student teacher, school security officer or school administrator, causing bodily injury, while the teacher, student teacher, security officer, administrator, or school department employee is engaged in the performance of his or her duty, shall be deemed to have committed a felony, and shall be imprisoned not exceeding three (3) years, or fined not exceeding fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 208, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 70, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 203, § 1.

11-5-8. Assault on correctional officer, or training school employee.

Any person who shall knowingly and willfully strike a uniformed member of the correctional officer staff at the adult correctional institutions causing bodily injury, or willfully strikes a member who is out of uniform, knowing the person to be such a member, while the member is engaged in the performance of his or her duty, or who knowingly and without consent removes or attempts to remove a firearm from a correctional officer engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, or who knowingly and willfully strikes a training school employee at the training school for youth, causing bodily injury to the employee while the employee is engaged in the performance of his or her duty, shall be imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years, or fined not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 147, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 58, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 86, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 349, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 192, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 138, § 1.

11-5-8.1. Assault with bodily fluid.

Any person incarcerated or in custody at a state correctional facility including the juvenile training school who shall knowingly and willfully commit an assault upon a correctional officer or any other employee of the department of corrections with any bodily fluid, while the employee is engaged in the performance of his or her duty, shall be imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years, or fined not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 35, § 1.

11-5-9. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 11-5-9 (P.L. 1977, ch. 259, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 131, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 248, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 525, § 1), concerning domestic assault, was repealed by P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 7, effective June 9, 1988.

11-5-10. Assault on persons 60 years of age or older causing bodily injury.

Any person who shall commit an assault and battery upon a person sixty (60) years of age or older, causing bodily injury, shall be deemed to have committed a felony and shall be imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years, or fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 158, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.

In defendant’s trial for assault and battery upon a person over the age of sixty, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-10 , for causing the victim to fall against a granite marker, defendant’s proffer of a model of the granite marker was properly denied because: (1) the model was made of a different substance than the marker, (2) the model was of a different shape than the marker, and (3) the trial justice properly considered the model’s physical appearance, compared the model to a photograph of the marker, and assessed the model’s prejudicial nature. State v. Dominick, 968 A.2d 279, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 44 (2009).

When defendant was prosecuted for assault and battery upon a person over the age of sixty, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-10 , defendant’s proffer of testimony about other incidents between defendant and the victim was properly rejected because such evidence attempted to do what R.I. R. Evid. 608 (b) prohibited: introducing extrinsic evidence of the victim’s conduct to impeach the victim. State v. Dominick, 968 A.2d 279, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 44 (2009).

Collateral References.

Criminal assault or battery statutes making attack on elderly person a special or aggravated offense. 73 A.L.R.4th 1123.

What constitutes unusually “vulnerable” victim under sentencing guideline § 3A1.1 permitting increase in offense level. 114 A.L.R. Fed. 355.

11-5-10.1. Assault on persons 60 years of age or older causing serious bodily injury.

  1. Any person who shall commit an assault or battery, or both, upon a person sixty (60) years of age or older, causing serious bodily injury, shall be deemed to have committed a felony and shall be imprisoned for not less than three (3) years but not more than twenty (20) years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both. Every person so convicted shall be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense or to perform up to five hundred (500) hours of public community restitution work or attend violence counseling and/or substance abuse counseling, or any combination of them imposed by the sentencing judge. The court may not waive the obligation to make restitution and/or public community restitution work. The restitution and/or public community restitution work shall be in addition to any fine or sentence which may be imposed and not in lieu of the fine or sentence.
  2. “Serious bodily injury” means physical injury that:
    1. Creates a substantial risk of death;
    2. Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part, member or organ; or
    3. Causes serious permanent disfigurement.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 123, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 491, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 324, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 119, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “restitution” for “service” throughout subsection (a).

Collateral References.

Criminal assault or battery statutes making attack on elderly person a special or aggravated offense. 73 A.L.R.4th 1123.

11-5-10.2. Assault on persons with severe impairments causing serious bodily injury.

  1. Any person who shall commit an assault or battery, or both, upon a person, with severe impairments causing serious bodily injury, shall be deemed to have committed a felony and shall be imprisoned for not less than two (2) years but not more than twenty (20) years, or fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both. Every person so convicted shall be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense or to perform up to five hundred (500) hours of public community restitution work, or both, or any combination of them imposed by the sentencing judge. The court may not waive the obligation to make restitution and/or public community restitution work. The restitution and/or public community restitution work shall be in addition to any fine or sentence which may be imposed and not in lieu of the fine or sentence.
  2. “Serious bodily injury” means physical injury that:
    1. Creates a substantial risk of death, serious disfigurement;
    2. Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part, member or organ; or
    3. Causes serious permanent disfigurement.
  3. For the purposes of this section:
    1. “Adult” means a person over the age of eighteen (18).
    2. “Major life activities” means: (i) mobility; (ii) self-care; (iii) communication; (iv) receptive and/or expressive language; (v) learning; (vi) self-direction; (vii) capacity for independent living; or (viii) economic self-sufficiency.
    3. “Person with severe impairments” means a child or adult who has a disability which is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental and physical impairments and results in substantial functional limitations in one or more major life activities.
  4. Violations of this section shall be reported to the local police department.
  5. After July 1, 2007 pursuant to § 40-8.5-2 , the local police department may request the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals provide crisis intervention services for the adult victim with severe impairments when:
    1. Necessary to ensure the immediate health and safety of the adult victim;
    2. The adult victim relies on the person believed to have committed the assault and/or battery, for assistance in performing three (3) or more major life activities; and
    3. After the victim is informed of his or her right to refuse crisis intervention and/or supportive services.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 358, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 422, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 324, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 175, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 268, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 254, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 264, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “restitution” for “service” in subsection (a).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 175, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 268, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2012, ch. 254, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 264, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

What constitutes unusually “vulnerable” victim under sentencing guideline § 3A1.1 permitting increase in offense level. 114 A.L.R. Fed. 355.

11-5-10.3. Assault on persons 60 years of age or older by caretaker causing bodily injury.

Any person who shall commit an assault and battery upon a person sixty (60) years of age or older, causing bodily injury, and who was, at the time of the assault and battery, responsible for the care and treatment of the victim, shall be deemed to have committed a felony and shall be imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years, or fined not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or both. Further, if at the time of the assault and battery the person committing the act was employed by a health care facility that either condoned the act or attempted to conceal it, the health care facility shall be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 442, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Collateral References.

Criminal assault or battery statutes making attack on elderly person a special or aggravated offense. 73 A.L.R.4th 1123.

11-5-10.4. Assault on persons 60 years of age or older by caretaker causing serious bodily injury.

  1. Any person who shall commit an assault or battery, or both, upon a person sixty (60) years of age or older, causing serious bodily injury, and who was, at the time of the assault and battery, responsible for the care and treatment of the victim, shall be deemed to have committed a felony and shall be imprisoned for not less than two (2) years but not more than twenty (20) years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both. Further, if at the time of the assault and battery the person committing the act was employed by a health care facility that either condoned the act or attempted to conceal it, the health care facility shall be fined not exceeding fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000). Every person so convicted shall be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense or to perform up to five hundred (500) hours of public community restitution work or attend violence counseling and/or substance abuse counseling, or any combination of them imposed by the sentencing judge. The court may not waive the obligation to make restitution and/or public community restitution work. The restitution and/or public community restitution work shall be in addition to any fine or sentence which may be imposed and not in lieu of the fine or sentence.
  2. “Serious bodily injury” means physical injury that:
    1. Creates a substantial risk of death;
    2. Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part, member or organ; or
    3. Causes serious permanent disfigurement.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 442, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 324, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 119, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading and substituted “restitution” for “service” throughout subsection (a).

Collateral References.

Criminal assault or battery statutes making attack on elderly person a special or aggravated offense. 73 A.L.R.4th 1123.

11-5-11. Assault on persons with severe impairments.

  1. For the purposes of this section:
    1. “adult” means a person over the age of eighteen (18).
    2. “major life activities” means: (i) mobility; (ii) self-care; (iii) communication; (iv) receptive and/or expressive language; (v) learning; (vi) self-direction; (vii) capacity for independent living; or (viii) economic self-sufficiency.
    3. “person with severe impairments” means a child or adult who has a disability which is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental and physical impairments which results in a substantial limitation on the person’s ability to function independently in the family or community and in one or more major life activities.
  2. Any person who shall commit an assault and battery upon a person who is severely impaired as defined in subsection (a) of this section, causing bodily injury, shall be deemed to have committed a felony and shall be imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years, or fined not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or both.
  3. Violations of this section shall be reported to the local police department.
  4. After July 1, 2007 pursuant to § 40-8.5-2 , the local police department may request the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals provide crisis intervention services for the adult victim with severe impairments when:
    1. Necessary to ensure the immediate health and safety of the adult victim;
    2. The adult victim relies on the person believed to have committed the assault and/or battery, for assistance in performing three (3) or more major life activities; and
    3. After the victim is informed of his or her right to refuse crisis intervention and/or supportive services.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 445, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 374, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 423, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 10; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 10; P.L. 2006, ch. 175, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 268, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 254, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 264, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 175, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 268, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2012, ch. 254, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 264, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

What constitutes unusually “vulnerable” victim under sentencing guideline § 3A1.1 permitting increase in offense level. 114 A.L.R. Fed. 355.

11-5-12. Abuse, neglect and/or exploitation of adults with severe impairments.

  1. Any person primarily responsible for the care of an adult with severe impairments who shall willfully and knowingly abuse, neglect or exploit that adult shall be subject to a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or imprisoned not more than five (5) years, or both, and ordered to make full restitution of any funds as the result of any exploitation which results in the misappropriation of funds. Every person convicted of or placed on probation for violation of this section shall be ordered by the sentencing judge to attend appropriate professional counseling to address his or her abusive behavior.
  2. As used in this section:
    1. “Abuse” means the subjection of an adult with a severe impairment to willful infliction of physical pain, willful deprivation of services necessary to maintain the physical or mental health of the person, or unreasonable confinement.
    2. “Adult with severe impairments” means a person over the age of eighteen (18) who has a disability which is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental and physical impairments and results in substantial functional limitations in one or more of the following areas of major life activity: (i) mobility; (ii) self-care; (iii) communication; (iv) receptive and/or expressive language; (v) learning; (vi) self-direction; (vii) capacity for independent living; or (viii) economic self-sufficiency.
    3. “Exploitation” means an act or process of taking pecuniary advantage of impaired persons by use of undue influence, harassment, duress, deception, false representation, false pretenses, or misappropriation of funds.
    4. “Neglect” means the willful refusal to provide services necessary to maintain the physical or mental health of an adult with severe impairments.
    5. “Person primarily responsible for care” or “caregiver” means any person who is for a significant period of time the primary caregiver or is primarily responsible for the management of the funds of an adult with severe impairments.
  3. Violations of this section shall be reported to the local police department.
  4. After July 1, 2007 pursuant to § 40-8.5-2 , the local police department may request the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals provide crisis intervention services for the adult victim with severe impairments when:
    1. necessary to ensure the immediate health and safety of the adult victim;
    2. the adult victim relies on the person believed to have committed the abuse, neglect and/or exploitation, for assistance in performing three (3) or more major life activities; and
    3. After the victim is informed of his or her right to refuse crisis intervention and/or supportive services.
  5. Any person who fails to report known or suspected abuse or neglect shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be subject to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500).
  6. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to apply to the discontinuance of life-support systems or life-sustaining treatment for an adult for whom, if the treatment were terminated, death may result.
  7. Any person participating in good faith in making a report pursuant to this chapter, excluding any perpetrator or conspirator of the acts, shall have immunity from any civil liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed.
  8. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to prohibit the use of any medical or psychological treatment procedure designed and conducted in accordance with applicable professional standards when performed by appropriately trained personnel under the supervision of a person or facility licensed or approved by the state of Rhode Island and when any consent as is required by law has been obtained.
  9. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to mean a person is abused or neglected for the sole reason that the person is being furnished or relies upon treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a church or religious denomination recognized by the laws of this state.
  10. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to mean a person is abused or neglected when the parent or legal guardian of an adult with severe impairments, who is the person primarily responsible for care of the adult, (1) decides, in good faith, not to accept support services from a governmental agency, which in the opinion of the parent or legal guardian and the adult, is considered to be inappropriate or inconsistent with the best interests of that adult; or (2) decides, in good faith, to reduce or discontinue assistance to that adult who is developing, acquiring or practicing independent decision-making or living skills.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 456, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 169, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 175, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 268, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 254, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 264, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the paragraphs in subdivision (b)(2).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 175, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 268, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

This section was amended by four acts (P.L. 2006, ch. 169, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 175, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 268, § 1) passed by the 2006 General Assembly. Since the changes made by the acts are not in conflict with each other, this section is set out as amended by all four acts.

P.L. 2012, ch. 254, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 264, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-5-13. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

Section 11-5-13 (P.L. 1991, ch. 214, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 329, § 1), prescribing penalties for bias-motivated assault, was repealed by P.L. 1998, ch. 83, § 2. For present provisions concerning sentencing for hate crimes, see § 12-19-38 .

11-5-14. Assault on child in care of department of children, youth and families.

Any employee of the department of children, youth and families, or any employee of any public or private agency with which the department contracts for services in furtherance of the care or custody of children, who shall commit an assault and battery upon a child in the care of the department shall be deemed to have committed a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three (3) years but not more than ten (10) years and a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 258, § 1.

11-5-14.1. Assault on child in care of department of children, youth and families causing serious bodily injury.

  1. Any employee of the department of children, youth and families, or any employee of any public or private agency with which the department contracts for services in furtherance of the care or custody of children who shall commit an assault or battery upon a child in the care of the department, causing serious bodily injury, shall be deemed to have committed a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five (5) years but not more than twenty (20) years and a fine of not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000).
  2. “Serious bodily injury” means physical injury that:
    1. Creates a substantial risk of death;
    2. Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part, member or organ; or
    3. Causes serious permanent disfigurement.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 258, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

11-5-14.2. Battery by an adult upon child ten (10) years of age or younger causing serious bodily injury.

  1. Any person eighteen (18) years of age or older who shall commit a battery upon a child ten (10) years of age or younger, causing serious bodily injury, shall be deemed to have committed a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five (5) years but not more than twenty (20) years and a fine of not less than five thousand ($5,000) dollars nor more than twenty thousand ($20,000) dollars.
  2. “Serious bodily injury” means physical injury that:
    1. Creates a substantial risk of death;
    2. Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part, member or organ; or
    3. Causes serious permanent disfigurement.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 90, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 109, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

11-5-15. Aggravated harassment of a deputy sheriff by an inmate.

Every prisoner confined in a custodial unit of the adult correctional institutions or in the custody of the warden or other correctional employee while outside the confines of the institutions who causes or attempts to cause any deputy sheriff to come into contact with blood, seminal fluid, urine or feces, by throwing, tossing or expelling the fluid or material with the intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm, shall be imprisoned not exceeding two (2) years, or fined not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 467, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 29.

11-5-16. Assault of health care providers or emergency services medical personnel.

  1. Any person who shall knowingly and willfully assault a health care provider and/or emergency medical services personnel while that provider is engaged in providing health care services shall be deemed to have committed a felony, and may be imprisoned no more than three (3) years and fined not more than fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), or both.
  2. The following terms, as used in this section, are defined as follows:
    1. “Health care provider” has the same meaning as defined in § 5-37.3-3 and includes any personnel directed by them.
    2. “Emergency medical services personnel” means anyone who provides emergency medical transportation services and anyone directed by them.
    3. “Health care services” has the same meaning as defined in § 5-37.3-3 and includes any personnel directed by them.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 74, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 201, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added “or” preceding “emergency” in the section heading.

11-5-17. Assault or battery for purpose of causing unconsciousness.

Any person who shall make an assault or battery, or both, by causing, or attempting to cause, another person to be rendered unconscious by a single punch, kick, or other singular striking motion to the head of such person for the purpose of bringing about the loss of consciousness of such person, or who shall knowingly assist, aid, abet, solicit, encourage, counsel, command, or conspire to coerce any person to commit such an act, shall be deemed to have committed a felony and shall be imprisoned for not more than three (3) years or fined not more than one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 483, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 546, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 483, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 546, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 6 Bigamy and Adultery

11-6-1. Bigamy.

Every person who shall be convicted of being married to another, or of cohabiting with another as husband and wife, having at the time a former husband or wife living, shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000); provided, that this shall not extend to any person whose husband or wife shall be continually remaining without the limits of this state for the space of seven (7) years together, the party being married after the expiration of the seven (7) years, not knowing the other to be living within that time, nor to any person who shall be divorced at the time of the second marriage, nor to any person by reason of any former or prior marriage made when the man was less than fourteen (14) and the woman less than twelve (12) years of age.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-6-1 ; P.L. 1989, ch. 214, § 1.

Cross References.

Bigamous marriages void, § 15-1-5 .

Knowingly performing bigamous marriage, § 15-3-11 .

Comparative Legislation.

Adultery:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-81.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 14.

Bigamy:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-190.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 15.

Fornication:

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 18.

Incest:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-191.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 17.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Admissions.

Admissions by defendant as to first marriage are admissible in bigamy trial. State v. Gallagher, 20 R.I. 266 , 38 A. 655, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1897).

Elements of Offense.

Second marriage is a necessary element of the offense. In re Watson, 19 R.I. 342 , 33 A. 873, 1896 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1896).

Indictment.

Indictment under this section need not negative the proviso. State v. Gallagher, 20 R.I. 266 , 38 A. 655, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1897).

Collateral References.

Aiding and abetting, reduction by appellate court of punishment for. 29 A.L.R. 331; 89 A.L.R. 295.

Common law marriage, prosecution based on. 70 A.L.R. 1036.

Crimes against spouse within exception permitting testimony by one spouse against other in criminal prosecution — modern state cases. 74 A.L.R.4th 223.

Decree of annulment of marriage, admissibility in prosecution for bigamy and polygamy. 87 A.L.R. 1264.

Dissolution of former marriage, presumption as to, in prosecution for bigamy. 34 A.L.R. 482; 56 A.L.R. 1273; 77 A.L.R. 738; 14 A.L.R.2d 19.

Liability of church or religious society for sexual misconduct of clergy. 5 A.L.R.5th 530.

Marital privilege under Rule 501 of Federal Rules of Evidence.46 A.L.R. Fed. 735.

Mistake as to validity or effect of divorce as defense to. 56 A.L.R.2d 915.

Mistaken belief in existence, validity, or effect of divorce or separation as mitigating punishment for bigamy or allied offense. 56 A.L.R.2d 938.

Presumption from lapse of time of death of former spouse, marriage in reliance on, while former spouse is still living and undivorced, as sustaining prosecution for bigamy. 144 A.L.R. 747.

Privileged communications and letters between husband and wife in prosecution for bigamy. 63 A.L.R. 107.

Religious belief as affecting crime of bigamy. 24 A.L.R. 1237.

Single person who marries one already married, criminal responsibility of. 5 A.L.R. 783; 74 A.L.R. 1110; 131 A.L.R. 1323.

Validation of marriage by death of former spouse. 95 A.L.R. 1292.

11-6-2. Adultery.

Every person who shall commit adultery shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500); and illicit sexual intercourse between any two (2) persons, where either of them is married, shall be deemed adultery in each.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-6-2 ; P.L. 1989, ch. 214, § 1.

Cross References.

Adultery as ground for divorce, § 15-5-2 .

Law Reviews.

Thomas M. Wall, Comment: The Pitfalls of Polyamorous Parenting in Rhode Island: The Crime of Adultery and the Best Interests of the Child Under the Uniform Parentage Act, 26 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 766 (2021).

Collateral References.

Cohabitation under marriage contracted after divorce decree as adultery, where decree is later reversed or set aside. 63 A.L.R.2d 816.

Criminal charge of abandonment against husband, adultery of wife as affecting. 17 A.L.R. 999.

Discontinuance by injured spouse of prosecution for. 4 A.L.R. 1340; 61 A.L.R. 973.

Isolated acts of sexual intercourse as constituting criminal offense of adultery. 74 A.L.R. 1361.

Liability of church or religious society for sexual misconduct of clergy. 5 A.L.R.5th 530.

Mistaken belief in existence, validity, or effect of divorce or separation as defense to prosecution for adultery. 56 A.L.R.2d 915.

Mistaken belief in existence, validity, or effect of divorce or separation as mitigating punishment for bigamy or allied offense. 56 A.L.R.2d 938.

Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by trial court. 29 A.L.R. 313; 89 A.L.R. 300.

Validity of statute making adultery and fornication criminal offense. 41 A.L.R.3d 1338.

Venereal disease as evidence of. 5 A.L.R. 1020; 8 A.L.R. 1540.

Weight and sufficiency of blood grouping tests to establish adultery. 46 A.L.R.2d 1027; 43 A.L.R.4th 579.

Witnesses, adultery as a crime against other spouse within statute relating to competency of husband or wife as witness against the other. 11 A.L.R.2d 646; 74 A.L.R.4th 223; 46 A.L.R. Fed. 735.

11-6-3, 11-6-4. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

Sections 11-6-3 and 11-6-4 (G.L. 1896, ch. 281, §§ 8, 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, §§ 8, 9; P.L. 1915, ch. 1219, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 9; G.L. 1956, §§ 11-6-3 , 11-6-4), concerning fornication and incest, respectively, were repealed by P.L. 1989, ch. 214, § 1, effective July 5, 1989.

Chapter 7 Bribery

11-7-1. Bribery of juror or person exercising judicial function.

Every person who shall give any sum of money or any bribe, present, reward or unsecured loan, or any promise or security for any, to obtain or influence the opinion, judgment, verdict, sentence, report or award of any judge, justice of the peace, warden, juror, auditor, referee, arbitrator, master in chancery, or person summoned as a juror, in any matter or cause pending or to be tried before him or her alone or before him or her with others, shall be imprisoned not exceeding seven (7) years or be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-7-1 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 95, § 1.

Cross References.

Investigation and proceedings against racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations, §§ 7-15-1 7-15-11 .

Comparative Legislation.

Bribery:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-147 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 268, § 7 et seq.

11-7-2. Acceptance of bribe by juror or person exercising judicial function.

Every judge, justice of the peace, warden, juror, auditor, referee, arbitrator, master in chancery, or person summoned as a juror, who shall accept, receive, or agree for in any way any bribe, present, reward, or unsecured loan, to him or her offered, for the purpose of obtaining or influencing his or her opinion, judgment, verdict, sentence, report, or award in any matter or cause depending or to be tried before him or her alone or before him or her with others, shall be imprisoned not exceeding seven (7) years or fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 11-7-2 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 95, § 1.

Collateral References.

Contempt by juror’s attempt to secure, or acceptance of bribe. 125 A.L.R. 1279.

11-7-3. Solicitation or acceptance of bribe by agent, employee, or public official.

  1. No person in public or private employ, or public official shall corruptly accept, or obtain or agree to accept, or attempt to obtain from any person, for himself or herself or any other person, any gift or valuable consideration as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do, or for having done or forborne to do, any act in relation to the business of his or her principal, master, employer, or state, city, or town of which he or she is an official, or for showing or forbearing to show favor or disfavor to any person in relation to the business of his or her principal, master, employer, or state, city, or town of which he or she is an official.
  2. It shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that the person did not have the power or authority to perform the act or omission for which the reward or inducement was offered, solicited, accepted, or agreed upon.

History of Section. P.L. 1905, ch. 1219, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 11-7-3 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 139, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

As illustrated in part by R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-7-3 to -4, nothing in Rhode Island law purports to authorize or protect quid pro quo bribery of a state official. United States v. Urciuoli, 613 F.3d 11, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14854 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1045, 131 S. Ct. 612, 178 L. Ed. 2d 436, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 8960 (2010).

Evidence.
— Sufficient.

Evidence sufficient for conviction. See State v. Mattera, 671 A.2d 1227, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1996).

Testimony that the defendant had requested “a point” for himself and that he had delivered an envelope containing cash was sufficient in and of itself to allow a jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of bribery. State v. Salvatore, 763 A.2d 985, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 1 (2001).

Official Duty.

This section did not extend to a case where an official promised to influence a decision in which he did not have the power to participate. State v. Nadeau, 81 R.I. 505 , 105 A.2d 194, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 120 (1954).

Solicitation Sufficient.

Solicitation of a bribe is punishable under this section even though no agreement is reached. State v. Nadeau, 81 R.I. 505 , 105 A.2d 194, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 120 (1954).

Collateral References.

Candidate, statement by, regarding salary or fees of office as bribery. 106 A.L.R. 493.

Charge of bribery or cognate offense predicated upon an unaccepted offer by or to an official. 52 A.L.R. 816.

Co-conspirator, liability of one co-operating in bribery which he was incapable of committing personally. 5 A.L.R. 783; 74 A.L.R. 1114; 131 A.L.R. 1323.

Construction and application of § 2C1.1 of United States Sentencing Guidelines (18 USCS Appx. § 2C1.1) pertaining to offenses involving public officials offering, giving, soliciting, or receiving bribes, or extortion under color of official right. 144 A.L.R. Fed. 615.

Criminal liability of corporation for bribery or conspiracy to bribe public official. 52 A.L.R.3d 1274.

Criminal offense of bribery as affected by lack of authority of state public officer or employee. 73 A.L.R.3d 374.

Criminal offense of bribery as affected by lack of legal qualification of person assuming to be an officer. 115 A.L.R. 1263.

Effect of McDonnell v. U.S. Definition of “Official Act” upon Bribery Prosecution Involving Public Official Under 18 U.S.C. § 201. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (2018).

Furnishing public official with meals, lodging, or travel, or receipt of such benefits, as bribery. 67 A.L.R.3d 1231.

Nonexistence of duty upon part of official to do, or refrain from doing, the act in respect of which it was sought to influence him, as defense to prosecution for bribery or acceptance of bribe. 158 A.L.R. 323.

Solicitation or receipt of funds by public officer or employee for political campaign expenses or similar purposes as bribery. 55 A.L.R.2d 1137.

Validity and construction of statutes punishing commercial bribery. 1 A.L.R.3d 1350; 58 A.L.R. Fed. 797.

Who is public official within meaning of federal statute punishing bribery of public official (18 U.S.C.S. § 201). 161 A.L.R. Fed. 491.

11-7-4. Bribery of agent, employee, or public official.

  1. No person shall corruptly give or offer any gift or valuable consideration to any person in public or private employ, or any public official as an inducement or reward for doing or forebearing to do, or for having done or forborne to do, any act in relation to the business of his or her principal, master, or employer, or the state, city, or town of which he or she is an official, or for showing or forbearing to show favor or disfavor to any person in relation to the business of his or her principal, master, employer, or state, city, or town of which he or she is an official.
  2. It shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that the person did not have the power or authority to perform the act or omission for which the reward or inducement was offered, solicited, accepted, or agreed upon.

History of Section. P.L. 1905, ch. 1219, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 11-7-4 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 136, § 1.

Cross References.

Bribery of voters, § 17-23-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

As illustrated in part by R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-7-3 to -4, nothing in Rhode Island law purports to authorize or protect quid pro quo bribery of a state official. United States v. Urciuoli, 613 F.3d 11, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14854 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1045, 131 S. Ct. 612, 178 L. Ed. 2d 436, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 8960 (2010).

Extortion Defense.

It is not acceptable to pay under-the-table compensation to a public servant, even if such payment is required in order to obtain official action rightfully due. Such conduct constitutes a degree of cooperation in the undermining of governmental integrity that is inconsistent with the complete exoneration from criminal liability. Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 906 F. Supp. 78 (D.R.I. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 96 F.3d 566 (1st Cir. 1996).

Collateral References.

Criminal liability of corporation for bribery or conspiracy to bribe public official. 52 A.L.R.3d 1274.

Criminal offense of bribery as affected by lack of authority of state public officer or employee. 73 A.L.R.3d 374.

Effect of McDonnell v. U.S. Definition of “Official Act” upon Bribery Prosecution Involving Public Official Under 18 U.S.C. § 201. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (2018).

Furnishing public official with meals, lodging, or travel, or receipt of such benefits, as bribery. 67 A.L.R.3d 1231.

Solicitation or receipt of funds by public officer or employee for political campaign expenses or similar purposes as bribery. 55 A.L.R.2d 1137.

Validity and construction of statutes punishing commercial bribery. 1 A.L.R.3d 1350; 58 A.L.R. Fed. 797.

Who is public official within meaning of federal statute punishing bribery of public official (18 U.S.C.S. § 201). 161 A.L.R. Fed. 491.

11-7-5. Penalty for violations.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of § 11-7-3 or 11-7-4 shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or three times the monetary equivalent of the gift or valuable consideration, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than twenty (20) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1905, ch. 1219, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 11-7-5 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 193, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 89, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Habeas Corpus.

On petition for habeas corpus on ground that petitioner should have been tried in district court rather than superior court since bribery was a misdemeanor, court remarked that the potential punishment for the offense seemingly qualifies it as felony under § 11-1-2 , although the writ of habeas corpus was dismissed on ground the objection should be raised with other questions on bill of exceptions. Palmigiano v. Howard, 109 R.I. 417 , 286 A.2d 588, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 1203 (1972).

Indictment.

In view of the fact that bribery under this section was punishable by no more than a year’s imprisonment, the state was not required by the constitution to indict for the offense, however, since the potential fine of $1,000 removed the offense from the jurisdiction of the district court, the charge had to be prosecuted in the superior court by indictment under §§ 12-21-1 and 12-21-4 . State v. Palmigiano, 110 R.I. 576 , 295 A.2d 44, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 956 (1972).

Jurisdiction.

Defendant who was indicted on charge of attempted bribery under § 11-7-4 , was properly tried in superior court since jurisdiction of district court was limited to those crimes punishable by fine, not exceeding $500 and by imprisonment not exceeding one year, and the penalty for bribery was imprisonment of a term not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding $1,000. State v. Palmigiano, 110 R.I. 576 , 295 A.2d 44, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 956 (1972).

Prejudice.

Defendant charged with bribery under § 11-7-4 was not prejudiced in any manner by action of the state in proceedings by way of indictment rather than by criminal complaint as the penalty for bribery was imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding $1,000 and infamous crime requiring an indictment as required by the state constitution was any crime punishable by more than a year imprisonment. State v. Palmigiano, 110 R.I. 576 , 295 A.2d 44, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 956 (1972).

11-7-6. Civil liability for violating § 11-7-3 or 11-7-4.

Any person injured by any violation of the provisions of § 11-7-3 or 11-7-4 may recover from the person or persons inflicting the injury twice the amount of the injury.

History of Section. P.L. 1905, ch. 1219, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 11-7-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction.

Where plaintiffs in a federal action could not establish diversity jurisdiction, and where the district court had dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to consider claims under the civil liability provision of the state anti-bribery statute. Lares Group, II v. Tobin, 47 F. Supp. 2d 223, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6078 (D.R.I. 1999), aff'd, 221 F.3d 41, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19078 (1st Cir. 2000).

Collateral References.

Recovery of money paid, or property transferred, as a bribe. 60 A.L.R.2d 1273.

11-7-7. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1905, ch. 1219, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 26; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 11-7-7 ) was repealed by P.L. 1969, ch. 54, § 2.

11-7-8. Accepting bribe to obtain preferential military treatment.

Any person obtaining anything of value from a spouse, parent, or other blood relative of any citizen of this state in the armed forces of the United States or subject to the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 451 et seq., by claiming that he or she has obtained, can or will obtain for that citizen any exception, deferment, promotion, leave, furlough, preference, change of duty or place of service or the like, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be imprisoned not less than five (5) nor more than twenty-five (25) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 58; P.L. 1943, ch. 1352, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-7-8 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added “59 U.S.C. App. § 451 et seq.” following “Military Selective Service Act”.

Collateral References.

Selective Training and Service Act, bribery under. 147 A.L.R. 1337; 154 A.L.R. 1452; 1453.

11-7-9. Corruption of sports participant or official.

Whoever corrupts or attempts to corrupt a player, coach, manager, trainer, umpire, referee, or other person engaged in playing, arranging, staging, officiating at, or promoting any amateur or professional athletic game or contest or jai alai match to be played or held within the state of Rhode Island, or who corrupts or attempts to corrupt any owner, trainer, groom, jockey, racing official, or other person in any manner engaged in or connected with the running, officiating at or promoting any horse race or dog race run or to be run within the state of Rhode Island by giving, offering, or promising any gift or gratuity whatever, directly or indirectly, with intent to improperly influence the conduct of the person in the playing, running, or carrying out of any athletic game or contest or jai alai match or any horse race, or officiating at the game or contest, whether the offer, promise, gift, or gratuity is made at or away from the playing field, boxing or ice arena, race course or fronton, or other place where the athletic game, contest, or horse race is scheduled to take place with intent to improperly influence the conduct of the person in connection with the proper playing or promoting of the athletic game or contest or jai alai match or officiating at the game, contest or match, or the proper running or promoting of any horse race or dog race or officiating at any horse or dog race, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment of not more than seven (7) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1950, ch. 2556, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-7-9 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 193, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 24, § 3.

Collateral References.

Recovery in tort for wrongful interference with chance to win game, sporting event, or contest. 85 A.L.R.4th 1048.

11-7-10. Acceptance of bribe by sports participant or official.

Any player, coach, manager, official, or other person engaged in the playing, arranging, or promotion of any amateur or professional athletic game or contest or jai alai match or officiating at the game, contest or match, or any owner, trainer, groom, jockey, racing official or other person participating in any horse race or dog race or in any manner engaged in conducting, arranging, or promoting any horse race or officiating at any horse or dog race, who accepts any gift or gratuity, directly or indirectly, from any person who gives, offers, or promises any gift or gratuity with intent to improperly influence the conduct of the person in the arranging, holding, or playing of the athletic game or contest or jai alai match or officiating at the game, contest or match, or the running or promoting of the horse race or dog race or officiating at the horse or dog race, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment of not more than seven (7) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1950, ch. 2556, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-7-10 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 193, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 24, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section is not so vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt as to deny a defendant his constitutional right under the U.S. Const., amends. 6 and 14 to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. State v. Capone, 115 R.I. 426 , 347 A.2d 615, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1166 (1975).

Gift or Gratuity.

Where a horse trainer injected, or permitted another to inject, a drug into a horse to affect its performance in a race, with the expectation that he would subsequently be paid $200 and be given information regarding “live combinations” in that or other races, this constituted a gift or gratuity with intent to influence defendant’s conduct within the meaning of the statute, although the payment was made after the horse was “bit”. State v. Capone, 115 R.I. 426 , 347 A.2d 615, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1166 (1975).

Collateral References.

Recovery in tort for wrongful interference with chance to win game, sporting event, or contest. 85 A.L.R.4th 1048.

11-7-11. Bribery of witness.

Any person who shall corruptly give or offer to give any sum of money or any bribe, present, or reward, or any promise or security to obtain or influence the testimony of any witness to any crime or to induce the witness to absent himself or herself from, or otherwise avoid or seek to avoid appearing or testifying at, any hearing shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be imprisoned for not more than seven (7) years, or fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both. Nothing in this section shall be construed to make an agreement between the victim and the defendant to dismiss a criminal charge unlawful.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 430, § 1.

11-7-12. Failure to report corruption of sports participant or official.

Any person who knows or has reason to know that corruption of a player, coach, manager, trainer, umpire, referee, or other person engaged in playing, arranging, staging, officiating at, or promoting any amateur or professional athletic game or contest or jai alai match to be played or held within the state of Rhode Island, or any owner, trainer, groom, jockey, racing official, or other person in any manner engaged in or connected with the running, officiating at, or promoting any horse race or dog race run or to be run within the state of Rhode Island by giving, offering or promising any gift or gratuity whatever, directly or indirectly, with intent to improperly influence the conduct of the person in the playing, running or carrying out of any athletic game or contest or jai alai match or any horse race or dog race has taken place in his or her presence or that any attempt to corrupt that person has taken place in his or her presence shall immediately notify the state police or the police department of the city or town in which the corruption or attempt to corrupt has taken place. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 24, § 4.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

11-7-13. Acceptance of gratuity by employees of banking division of department of business regulation.

  1. No person who is an employee of the banking division of the department of business regulation or an employee of the department with jurisdiction over the banking division, shall accept a gratuity from a financial institution governed by title 19 or from any officer, director, or employee of the financial institution.
  2. If the gratuity, so accepted, is valued at less than one hundred dollars ($100), the person who violates this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned for not more than one year, or fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
  3. If the gratuity, so accepted, is valued at one hundred dollars ($100) or more, or if the aggregate of the gratuities so accepted within a year equal or exceed one hundred dollars ($100), the person who violated this section shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned not more than three (3) years, or fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or three (3) times the amount of the gratuity so given, whichever is greater, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 140, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

11-7-14. Offer of gratuity by employees of financial institutions.

  1. No person who is an officer, director, or employee of a financial institution governed by title 19 shall give any gratuity to any individual who is an employee of the banking division of the department of business regulation, or to any employee of the department with jurisdiction over the banking division.
  2. If the gratuity, so accepted, is valued at less than one hundred dollars ($100), the person who violates this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  3. If the gratuity, so accepted, is valued at one hundred dollars ($100) or more or if the aggregate of the gratuities, so accepted, within a year equals or exceeds one hundred dollars ($100), the person who violated this section shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned not more than three (3) years, or fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or three (3) times the amount of the gratuity so given, whichever is greater, or both fine and imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 467, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Chapter 8 Burglary and Breaking and Entering

11-8-1. Burglary.

Every person who shall commit burglary shall be imprisoned for life or for any term not less than five (5) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 11-8-1 .

Cross References.

Additional penalty for carrying arms while committing offense, §§ 11-47-3 , 11-47-20 .

Assault with intent to commit, § 11-5-1 .

Killing in perpetration of burglary, § 11-23-1 .

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

Comparative Legislation.

Burglary:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-100 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 266, § 14 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Elements of Offense.

It is elementary that the offense of burglary does not necessarily include stealing or theft either at common law or by the statutes. C. & G. Mfg. Co. v. Columbia Ins. Co., 89 R.I. 62 , 150 A.2d 641, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1959).

The burglary statute incorporates the common-law definition of that crime which has been defined as “breaking and entering the dwelling house of another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony therein, whether the felony be actually committed or not”. State v. O'Rourke, 121 R.I. 434 , 399 A.2d 1237, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1798 (1979); State v. Ranieri, 586 A.2d 1094, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1991).

Where defendant in the nighttime broke into apartment which was used as a dwelling and from inside the apartment partially broke through a wall into an adjoining drugstore, there could be no conviction for burglary since there was no intent to commit a felony “therein” since the intent was to commit the felony in the drugstore. State v. O'Rourke, 121 R.I. 434 , 399 A.2d 1237, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1798 (1979).

For purposes of determining whether a burglary took place during the nighttime, the burglary is considered complete at the time the breaking and entering took place with felonious intent, and not at the later point in time when the defendant encountered the victim. State v. Lefebvre, 609 A.2d 957, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 153 (1992).

The word “breaking” in the definition of burglary is used in a technical rather than popular sense, so that there is a breaking if the intruder, by the use of force no matter how slight, removes an obstacle which if left untouched would prevent entrance. Accordingly, the trial justice properly denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to a burglary charge where the trier of fact may properly have concluded that the defendant had gained entrance to the victim’s apartment by the opening or removal of the screen to a bedroom window, which, if left as found, would have prevented the entering. State v. Simpson, 611 A.2d 1390, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 135 (1992).

The defendant had to open the screen door before the defendant could knock either on the front door or attack the poor victim. That opening action was enough to constitute a breaking. State v. Charette, 688 A.2d 1286, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1997).

The victim’s bedroom was a “dwelling” within the meaning of the law of burglary since the room had a lock on the doorknob and an additional dead-bolt lock and thus was entitled to the same level of security and protection as that afforded a dormitory room or a private apartment within a bed-and-breakfast. State v. Contreras-Cruz, 765 A.2d 849, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 36 (2001).

Multiple Offenses.

There is nothing inconsistent with finding a defendant guilty of both assault with a dangerous weapon and burglary, and acquitting him of assault with intent to commit murder, where the jury finds an entry with the intent to commit a felony and assault with a dangerous weapon. State v. Ranieri, 586 A.2d 1094, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1991).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence, and reasonable and legitimate inferences therefrom, sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt that defendant participated in breaking and entering without consent. See State v. Ortiz, 609 A.2d 921, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 99 (1992).

Defendant was entitled to a new trial where defense counsel’s representation was so wanting in all respects as to amount to a complete absence of a defense in that she neglected to move for a judgment of acquittal on the offense of burglary in spite of the fact that the record was devoid of any evidence that the defendant entered a dwelling with the specific intent to commit a felony therein, and that she failed to request discovery from the prosecution, to submit a request to charge any lesser-included offenses, to present any defense based upon the defendant’s intoxication, and to file a motion for a new trial prior to the expiration of the appropriate limitation period. Heath v. Vose, 747 A.2d 475, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 72 (2000), overruled, Reyes v. State, 141 A.3d 644, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 99 (2016).

A conviction of burglary was upheld since there was no evidence that the defendant had asked permission to enter the victim’s bedroom, knocked on the door, or attempted to wake her, but rather the record reflected that the victim in no way gave her consent but instead woke to find the defendant having sexual intercourse with her. State v. Contreras-Cruz, 765 A.2d 849, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 36 (2001).

Evidence that defendant and another agreed unlawfully to enter the subject dwelling with the intent to rob its occupants, and that defendant and another assembled disguises, weapons, and duct tape to further that purpose, was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary. State v. Abdullah, 967 A.2d 469, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2009).

Collateral References.

Breaking and entering of inner door of building as burglary. 43 A.L.R.3d 1147.

Burglary or breaking and entering of. 79 A.L.R.2d 286.

Burglary without breaking. 23 A.L.R. 288.

Consideration of sales tax in determining value of stolen property or amount of theft. 63 A.L.R.5th 417.

Entrapment to commit crime. 18 A.L.R. 155; 66 A.L.R. 487; 86 A.L.R. 263.

Entry through partly opened door or window as burglary. 70 A.L.R.3d 881.

Gambling or lottery paraphernalia as subject of larceny, burglary, or robbery. 51 A.L.R.2d 1396.

Maintainability of burglary charge, where entry into building is made with consent. 58 A.L.R.4th 335.

Minor’s entry into home of parent as sufficient to sustain burglary charge. 17 A.L.R.5th 111.

Receiving or concealing the stolen property, may participant in burglary be convicted of. 136 A.L.R. 1087.

Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by trial court. 29 A.L.R. 322; 332; 89 A.L.R. 302.

Retaking of money lost at gambling as robbery or larceny. 77 A.L.R.3d 1363.

Sufficiency of showing that burglary was committed at night. 82 A.L.R.2d 643.

Use of fraud or trick as “constructive breaking” for purpose of burglary or breaking and entering offense. 17 A.L.R.5th 125.

What is “building” or “house” within burglary or breaking and entering statute. 68 A.L.R.4th 425.

11-8-1.1. Attempted breaking and entering.

  1. Whoever attempts to commit the breaking and entering of any structure as set out in §§ 11-8-2 , 11-8-2.1 , 11-8-2.2 , 11-8-2.3 , 11-8-3 , 11-8-4 or 11-8-5.1 by doing any overt act toward the commission of the offense while in the curtilage of the structure, but fails in its perpetration, shall, unless otherwise provided, suffer the same punishment which might have been imposed if the attempted offense had been committed.
  2. An “overt act” is defined as any act of an individual by which the individual physically attempts to gain entrance into a type of structure set forth in the sections listed in subsection (a) of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 288, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 87, § 2.

11-8-2. Unlawful breaking and entering of dwelling house.

  1. Every person who shall break and enter at any time of the day or night any dwelling house or apartment, whether the dwelling house or apartment is occupied or not, or any outbuilding or garage attached to or adjoining any dwelling house, without the consent of the owner or tenant of the dwelling house, apartment, building, or garage, shall be imprisoned for not less than two (2) years and not more than ten (10) years for the first conviction, and for the second and subsequent conviction shall be imprisoned for not less than four (4) years and not more than fifteen (15) years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.
  2. Every person convicted pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense or to perform up to five hundred (500) hours of public community restitution work, or both, or any combination of them approved by the sentencing judge. The court may not waive the obligation to make restitution and/or public community restitution work. The restitution and/or public community restitution work shall be in addition to any fine or sentence which may be imposed and not in lieu of the fine or sentence.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 9; P.L. 1928, ch. 1209, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 11-8-2 ; P.L. 1978, ch. 288, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 154, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 426, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 171, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “restitution” for “service” throughout subsection (b).

Cross References.

Additional penalty for carrying arms while committing crime, §§ 11-47-3 , 11-47-20 .

Attempted breaking and entering, § 11-8-1.1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The distinguishing element between a criminal trespass and breaking and entering is the element of a “break”. State v. Turner, 655 A.2d 693, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 87 (1995).

Because there was eyewitness testimony from the homeowner who saw three men removing items from his home and placing them in a car, the trial court was clearly justified in finding the State’s witnesses to be credible and in rejecting defendant’s motion for a new trial in regard to defendant’s convictions for breaking and entering a dwelling and conspiracy. State v. Becote, 864 A.2d 598, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 7 (2005).

State did not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed breaking and entering in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-2 to show that defendant violated his probation where defendant was arrested on that charge while on probation for breaking and entering. Rather, the presiding judicial officer only had to be “reasonably satisfied” that defendant breached a condition of probation by failing to keep the peace or remain on good behavior, and that showing was made in defendant’s case. State v. Bouffard, 945 A.2d 305, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 43 (2008).

State introduced sufficient evidence to revoke defendant’s probation, which had been granted to defendant on nine years of defendant’s 10-year sentence for breaking and entering in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-2 . The evidence showed that defendant failed to remain on good behavior when, while on probation, defendant confronted a group, sought a fight, and threw rocks that struck a witness. Also, defendant could not challenge the original sentence as being illegal pursuant to R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 because defendant did not challenge the original sentence within 120 days of that sentence being imposed. State v. Christodal, 946 A.2d 811, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 55 (2008).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a defendant’s motion to reduce sentence because the two and one-half year difference between his sentence for breaking and entering and his co-hort’s sentence was not disproportionate as they did not have to receive equal sentences and their were departure factors applicable to the defendant, which the trial justice justified in his findings such as the defendant being a career criminal, the crime turned into one of violence, he lacked remorse, and he had lied on the stand. Further, the trial court did not err by ordering the sentences for the breaking and entering, consipracy to commit breaking and entering, simple assault, and driving a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner to run consecutively rather than concurrently since the trial court justified its order by finding that it was not just a run-of-the-mill breaking and entering, the lives of the victims were changed forever, the defendant had no remorse for the crimes, and took no personal responsibility for his actions. State v. Coleman, 984 A.2d 650, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 143 (2009).

Apartments.

An indictment which charged the defendant with entering an apartment intending to commit larceny was quashed for failure to charge an offense under former § 11-8-3 as the terms “apartment” and “dwelling house” were used with specificity by the legislature in originally drafting §§ 11-8-2 and 11-8-3 as a single statute, and the legislature thus distinguished the terms by using them in contrasting ways. State v. Neary, 122 R.I. 26 , 404 A.2d 65, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2060 (1979).

A common hallway in an apartment building that is collectively secured from the general public by a locked door is part of a person’s dwelling house, as that term is employed in this section. State v. Ranieri, 560 A.2d 350, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 127 (1989).

Trial justice properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial with respect to the breaking and entering count, as the three witnesses who lived at the house testified that defendant did not have permission to be there, defendant had his own apartment and did not have keys to the victim’s home, and the victim was deemed to be a credible witness. State v. Grantley, 149 A.3d 124, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 118 (2016).

Entry.

There is an entry when any part of the defendant’s person passes the line of the threshold. State v. Fernandes, 783 A.2d 913, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 217 (2001).

Force.

The defendant, who walked through an already open door to enter a dwelling, was entitled to a judgment of acquittal since the record was devoid of any evidence that the defendant exerted force to effectuate a break-in. State v. Beeley, 653 A.2d 722, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1995).

Intent.

Because the lack of a criminal intent requirement places the offense of unlawful breaking and entering of a dwelling house outside the realm of a violent felony, the defendant’s conviction under this section did not qualify as a burglary for purposes of federal career criminal sentencing laws. United States v. Peterson, 233 F.3d 101, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31157 (1st Cir. 2000).

Jury Instructions.

A general charge given by the trial justice fairly covered a requested charge for jury instructions where it adequately informed the jury that a “break” requires more than walking through an open door. State v. Turner, 746 A.2d 700, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 43 (2000).

Collateral References.

Opening closed but unlocked door as breaking which will sustain charge of burglary or breaking and entering. 23 A.L.R. 112.

Outbuildings or the like as part of “dwelling house.” 43 A.L.R.2d 831.

“Outhouse” or “outbuilding”, what is, within the meaning of statutes as to breaking and entering. 20 A.L.R. 236.

Vacancy or nonoccupancy of building as affecting its character as a “dwelling” as regards burglary. 85 A.L.R. 428.

11-8-2.1. Unlawful breaking and entering of dwelling with possession of instruments relating to wrongful setting of fires.

Every person who shall break and enter, at any time of the day or night, any dwelling house or apartment, whether it is occupied or not, or any outbuilding or garage attached to or adjoining any dwelling house or apartment, without the consent of the owner or tenant of the dwelling house, apartment, building, or garage, and who shall have in his or her possession any instrument or instrumentality or equipment of any kind that is reasonably related to the wrongful setting of fires shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three (3) years and not more than fifteen (15) years. “Possession” means in the actual or constructive control or custody of the person while in the dwelling. “Wrongful” excludes those items which are ordinarily used for the lighting of smoking paraphernalia.

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 234, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 109, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 536, § 1.

Cross References.

Attempted breaking and entering, § 11-8-1.1 .

11-8-2.2. Breaking and entering of a dwelling when resident on premises.

  1. Every person who shall break and enter into any dwelling house or apartment without the consent of the owner or tenant at a time when the resident or residents of the dwelling house or apartment are on the premises, after having been previously convicted of such an offense, shall be imprisoned for not less than one year and not more than ten (10) years and shall not be afforded the provisions of suspension or deferment of sentence nor probation and may in addition be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).
  2. Every person convicted pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense, or to perform up to five hundred (500) hours of public community restitution work, or both, or any combination of them approved by the sentencing judge. The court may not waive the obligation to make restitution and/or public community restitution work. Restitution and/or public community restitution work shall be in addition to any fine or sentence which may be imposed and not in lieu of the fine or sentence; provided, that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to require the payment of restitution while the convicted person is imprisoned.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 426, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “restitution” for “service” throughout subsection (b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.

In view of a child’s multiple identifications of defendant as the man who had entered her bedroom and touched her vagina, his fingerprints being found on package of gum she said he left in her room, and his admissions that he was familiar with the location of her home and that he had purchased the same brand of gum, the evidence was sufficient to establish that he violated his probation. State v. Jensen, 40 A.3d 771, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 40 (2012).

11-8-2.3. Breaking and entering of dwelling house of persons 60 years of age or older when resident on premises.

  1. Every person who shall break and enter any dwelling house or apartment, without the consent of the owner or tenant at a time when a resident of the dwelling house or apartment who is sixty (60) years of age or older is on the premises, shall be imprisoned for not less than four (4) years and not more than twenty (20) years for the first conviction, and for the second and subsequent convictions shall be imprisoned for not less than six (6) years and not more than twenty (20) years, and may in addition be fined not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for a first conviction and not more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) for second and subsequent convictions.
  2. Every person convicted pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense, or to perform up to five hundred (500) hours of public community restitution work, or both, or any combination of them imposed by the sentencing judge. The court may not waive the obligation to make restitution and/or public community restitution work. Restitution and/or public community restitution work shall be in addition to any fine or sentence which may be imposed and not in lieu of the fine or sentence; provided, that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to require the payment of restitution while the convicted person is imprisoned.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 87, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 543, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “restitution” for “service” throughout subsection (b).

11-8-2.4. Breaking and entering of dwelling house of a person who is severely impaired.

  1. Every person who shall break and enter any dwelling house or apartment, without the consent of the owner or tenant at a time when a resident of the dwelling house or apartment who is a person who is severely impaired as defined by the provisions of § 11-5-11 is on the premises, shall be imprisoned for not less than five (5) years and not more than twenty-five (25) years and may in addition be fined not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for a first conviction and not more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) for second and subsequent convictions.
  2. Every person convicted pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense, or to perform up to five hundred (500) hours of public community restitution work, or both, or any combination of them imposed by the sentencing judge. The court may not waive the obligation to make restitution and/or public community restitution work. Restitution and/or public community restitution work shall be in addition to any fine or sentence which may be imposed and not in lieu of the fine or sentence; provided, that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to require the payment of restitution while the convicted person is imprisoned.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 11; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 11; P.L. 2011, ch. 356, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “restitution” for “service” throughout subsection (b).

11-8-3. Entry of building or ship with felonious intent.

Every person who, with intent to commit murder, sexual assault, robbery, arson or larceny, shall enter any dwelling house or apartment at any time of the day or night, or who with such intent shall, during the daytime, enter any other building, or ship or vessel, shall be imprisoned not more than ten (10) years, or be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 9; P.L. 1922, ch. 2233, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 9; P.L. 1928, ch. 1209, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 11-8-3 ; P.L. 1978, ch. 288, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 50, § 1.

Cross References.

Attempted breaking and entering, § 11-8-1.1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. State v. Perry, 118 R.I. 89 , 372 A.2d 75, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1433 (1977).

Apartment.

An indictment which charged the defendant with entering an apartment intending to commit larceny was quashed for failure to charge an offense under this section as the terms “apartment” and “dwelling house” were used with specificity by the legislature in originally drafting § 11-8-2 and this section as a single statute, and the legislature thus distinguished the terms by using them in contrasting ways. State v. Neary, 122 R.I. 26 , 404 A.2d 65, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2060 (1979) (decision prior to 1980 amendment).

A dormitory room occupied by a student which was broken into during the vacation break, came within the meaning of the term “apartment” as it is used in this section. State v. Riely, 523 A.2d 1225, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 447 (1987).

Construction With Other Laws.

Although R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-3 was broader than a generic burglary statute, defendant’s violation of § 11-8-3 constituted a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 4B1.1(a) and 4B1.2(a)(2) because defendant’s admission during his plea colloquy that he entered a victim’s dwelling with intent to commit larceny and without the victim’s consent showed that defendant committed a burglary as defined in § 4B1.2(a)(2). Thus, defendant’s § 11-8-3 conviction was properly taken into account in classifying defendant as a career offender under § 4B1.1(a). United States v. Major, 694 F. Supp. 2d 131, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24651 (D.R.I. 2010).

Although a jury found defendant guilty of entering a building with the intent to commit larceny, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-3 , but not guilty of larceny in excess of $ 500, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-1 , the verdicts were not inconsistent because even though an employee saw defendant carrying something out of a business, which was closed for a holiday, and two laptops were missing from the business, the jury could have found defendant not guilty on the actual physical possession or larceny of the item because defendant was not found with the laptops in his possession. State v. Guerra, 12 A.3d 759, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 14 (2011).

Evidence Held Sufficient.

Evidence is sufficient to support denial of defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, where police find a broken window in a building which they entered, and, after finding a ransacked office therein, encounter the defendant inside the building. State v. Lamoureaux, 558 A.2d 951, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 94 (1989).

Evidence was sufficient to support denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal for the charge of entering a dwelling house with the intent to commit larceny. See State v. McLaughlin, 621 A.2d 170, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 34 , cert. denied, 510 U.S. 858, 114 S. Ct. 168, 126 L. Ed. 2d 128, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 5581 (1993).

Identification.

Where the prosecuting witness saw defendant for a few seconds in good light while he was in her home and identified him two days later in a police line-up of three men, in-court identification was not vitiated by mere fact that the witness was shown pictures of defendant several days before trial. State v. Giragosian, 107 R.I. 657 , 270 A.2d 921, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 821 (1970).

Intent to Commit Larceny.

All that is required under the entry with intent to commit larceny portion of the statute is an intent to steal and the value of what is taken is immaterial. State v. Johnson, 116 R.I. 449 , 358 A.2d 370, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1294 (1976).

Trial justice did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial after a jury found defendant guilty of entering a building with the intent to commit larceny, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-3 , because there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that defendant entered a construction business with the requisite intent to commit some kind of larceny; an employee saw defendant carrying something out of the building, when the business was closed for a holiday, and the employee then discovered two laptops were missing from the business. State v. Guerra, 12 A.3d 759, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 14 (2011).

New Trial.

After a jury found defendant guilty of entering a dwelling with the intent to commit larceny, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-3 , a trial court performed the correct analysis and properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial because the fact that defendant disagreed with the trial justice’s credibility determinations regarding the victim was not a sufficient basis to warrant the granting of a new trial. State v. Kelly, 20 A.3d 655, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 73 (2011).

11-8-4. Breaking and entering business place, public building, or ship with felonious intent.

Every person who shall break and enter any bank, shop, office or warehouse, not adjoining to or occupied as a dwelling house, any meeting house, church, chapel, courthouse, town house, college, academy, schoolhouse, library or other building erected for public use or occupied for any public purpose, or any ship or vessel, with intent to commit murder, sexual assault, robbery or larceny, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-8-4 ; P.L. 1987, ch. 140, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 314, § 1.

Cross References.

Additional penalty for carrying arms while committing offense, §§ 11-47-3 , 11-47-20 .

Attempted breaking and entering, § 11-8-1.1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Elements of Crime.

There are four elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before a conviction can lie pursuant to this section: a break, entry, nighttime, and the intent to commit larceny. State v. Di Muccio, 431 A.2d 1212, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1182 (1981); State v. Austin, 462 A.2d 359, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 972 (1983).

Instructions.

There was no error in refusing to instruct the jury to acquit defendant if they found that at the time he broke and entered a cafe he was too intoxicated to form the necessary criminal intent, where the only evidence on such defense was that he had, prior to closing of the cafe, ordered one drink, most of which the proprietor had poured out because he had failed on demand to finish it before closing time. State v. Amaral, 108 R.I. 755 , 279 A.2d 428, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1337 (1971).

In a prosecution under this section, the fact that “in the nighttime” was erroneously included in the trial justice’s charge in no way supplanted or diminished any of the offense’s required elements and was harmless error. State v. Johnson, 683 A.2d 373, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 251 (1996).

Intent.

Evidence of an illegal break and entry coupled with fact that several coin-operated machines located in the building were broken clearly warranted the inference that defendant entered the building with the intent to steal. State v. Austin, 462 A.2d 359, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 972 (1983).

Larceny and Embezzlement Distinguished.

The basic distinction between embezzlement and larceny is that in embezzlement, the property comes lawfully into the possession of the offender, whereas in larceny the offender takes it unlawfully in the first instance. State v. Di Muccio, 431 A.2d 1212, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1182 (1981).

Night.

Where break-in occurred after 5:03 a.m. and sunrise was at 5:32 a.m., the break-in could not have been in the “nighttime” as charged, since under the inference arising from § 31-24-1 it would have been light enough at such time to see a distance of 500 feet. State v. Mollicone, 95 R.I. 59 , 182 A.2d 612, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 127 (1962).

Inference that defendant committed the break and entry of a cafeteria in the nighttime based on the direct evidence that a meat slicer taken in the break and entry was placed in his car outside the cafeteria at about 11 p.m. was a reasonable one and one that the jury could properly draw. State v. Di Muccio, 431 A.2d 1212, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1182 (1981) (decided prior to 1993 amendment).

Requirements.

Neither an allegation of ownership of the building entered nor proof thereof is necessary in a prosecution under this section; all that is required is that there be sufficient identification of the premises (1) to inform the defendant of the charge against him so that he may prepare his defense, and (2) to protect him against double jeopardy. State v. Murphy, 107 R.I. 737 , 271 A.2d 310, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 836 (1970).

Shop.

The term “shop” in this section refers to business establishments. State v. Austin, 462 A.2d 359, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 972 (1983).

A nightclub or lounge is a shop under this section. State v. Austin, 462 A.2d 359, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 972 (1983).

11-8-5. Breaking and entering other buildings with criminal intent — Railroad cars — Tractor trailers.

Every person who shall break and enter or enter in the nighttime, with intent to commit larceny or any felony or misdemeanor in it, any barn, stable, carriage house, or other building, for the breaking and entering or entering of which with that intent no punishment is otherwise prescribed by this title, and every person who shall at any time break and enter or enter any railroad car or the trailer portion of a tractor trailer or break any lock or seal on it with intent to commit larceny or other crime, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 10; P.L. 1897, ch. 454, § 1; P.L. 1908, ch. 1568, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 10; P.L. 1922, ch. 2233, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 11-8-5 ; P.L. 1987, ch. 533, § 1.

Cross References.

Additional penalty for carrying arms while committing offense, §§ 11-47-3 , 11-47-20 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Sentence Enhancement.

Defendant’s predicate offense qualified as “burglary” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because the defendant was convicted under the first clause of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-5 , involving the burglary of “other buildings,” and the types of buildings to which the Rhode Island statute referred clearly fit within the definition of generic burglary under United States v. Taylor , 495 U.S. 575. Because there was a split among the circuits on the “unlawful or unprivileged” element of generic burglary under Taylor , and because the issue was not raised below, any error by the district court was not obvious, and therefore it was not plain error. United States v. Bennett, 469 F.3d 46, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28847 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1312, 127 S. Ct. 1894, 167 L. Ed. 2d 377, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 3702 (2007).

Collateral References.

Burglary, breaking, or entering of motor vehicle. 72 A.L.R.4th 710.

11-8-5.1. Unlawful breaking and entering of business place, public building or ship during the daytime.

Every person who shall break and enter any bank, shop, office or warehouse, not adjoining to or occupied as a dwelling house, any meeting house, church, chapel, courthouse, town house, college, academy, schoolhouse, library, or other building erected for public use or occupied for any purpose, or any ship or vessel during the daytime, shall be imprisoned not more than three (3) years, or fined not more than three hundred dollars ($300), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 157, § 1.

Cross References.

Attempted breaking and entering, § 11-8-1.1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Conviction Upheld.

A commercial lessor does not have the right to enter premises while wielding an ax and exhibiting generally uncontrolled behavior, even though he has the right to enter the premises at all reasonable times. State v. Jeremiah, 546 A.2d 183, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 123 (1988).

Specific Intent.

Unlawful breaking and entering in the daytime does not require proof of specific intent to commit a crime. State v. Jeremiah, 546 A.2d 183, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 123 (1988).

11-8-6. Entry to steal poultry — Arrest — Fine.

Every person who breaks and enters, or enters in the nighttime without breaking, any building or enclosure in which are kept or confined any kind of poultry, with intent to steal any of the poultry, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both. Every person who is discovered in the act of willfully entering any building or enclosure in which are kept or confined any kind of poultry, with intent to steal any of the poultry, may be arrested without a warrant by a deputy sheriff, town constable, guard, police officer, or other person and detained in jail or otherwise until a complaint can be made against him or her for the offense, and until he or she is taken on a warrant issued upon the complaint, but detention without a warrant shall not continue more than twenty-four (24) hours. One-half (1/2) of any fine imposed under this section shall inure to the complainant.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 26; P.L. 1912, ch. 853, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 11-8-6 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 30; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 12; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 12.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 12, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 12 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

Cross References.

Arrest generally, § 12-7-1 et seq.

Theft of poultry, § 11-41-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

“Steal.”

The word “steal” is used to approximate or describe the act of larceny at common law. State v. Smith, 56 R.I. 168 , 184 A. 494, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 90 (1936).

11-8-7. Making, repairing, or possessing burglar tools.

Whoever makes or mends, or does any work connected with the making or reparation of, or has in his or her possession any engine, machine, tool, false key, pick lock, nippers, or implement of any kind adapted and designed for cutting through, forcing, breaking open, or entering a building, room, vault, safe, or other depository, in order to steal from it money or other property, or to commit any other crime, knowing the equipment to be adapted and designed for this purpose, with intent to use or employ, or allow the equipment to be used or employed, for this purpose, shall be imprisoned not more than ten (10) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1896, ch. 302, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 42; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 42; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-8-7 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Burglar Tools Defined.

Though a flashlight could not be used to break and enter, evidence as to the possession thereof was admissible to show intent in the possession of other tools. State v. Widenski, 50 R.I. 148 , 146 A. 407, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1929).

In prosecution for possession of burglar tools, testimony of carpenter as to what use could be made of the tools was admissible. State v. Moore, 106 R.I. 92 , 256 A.2d 197, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 599 (1969).

Indictment.

Where indictment charged defendant with possession of implements for opening and entering a building “in order to steal money for other property therefrom” but did not mention “or to commit any other crime” and trial justice in its instructions read both the statute and the indictment to the jury and there was evidence of other criminal activity, it was necessary that the jury be able to understand from the instructions that the state had the burden to prove the intent to steal money or other property beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. O'Rourke, 121 R.I. 434 , 399 A.2d 1237, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1798 (1979).

Jury Instructions.
— Elements of Offense.

Where the possession-of-burglary-tools count of an indictment charged that the defendant possessed implements designed and adapted for entering a building “in order to commit the crime of burglary” the trial court erred when, in its instructions to the jury, it paraphrased the indictment and substituted for the statutory langauge “in order to commit a crime,” thus inserting in place of the specific intent element of burglary, a general-intent element. State v. Ortiz, 609 A.2d 921, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 99 (1992).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

There was sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty on the charge of possession of burglary tools when the evidence showed that the defendant was sitting in the passenger seat of the car used by the burglars, that there were several burglary tools around the seat, and that the defendant severed the telephone wires of the burglarized home. State v. Ortiz, 609 A.2d 921, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 99 (1992).

Collateral References.

Validity, construction and application of statutes relating to burglars’ tools. 33 A.L.R.3d 798.

11-8-8. Injury or death — Defense.

In the event that any person shall die or shall sustain a personal injury in any way or for any cause while in the commission of any criminal offense enumerated in §§ 11-8-2 11-8-6 , it shall be rebuttably presumed as a matter of law in any civil or criminal proceeding that the owner, tenant, or occupier of the place where the offense was committed acted by reasonable means in self-defense and in the reasonable belief that the person engaged in the criminal offense was about to inflict great bodily harm or death upon that person or any other individual lawfully in the place where the criminal offense was committed. There shall be no duty on the part of an owner, tenant, or occupier to retreat from any person engaged in the commission of any criminal offense enumerated in §§ 11-8-2 11-8-6 .

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 216, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 17, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 212, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Burden of Proof.

When a defendant produces some evidence of self-defense, the burden falls on the state to disprove this defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Caron, 423 A.2d 823, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1862 (1980).

As in the defense of self-defense, the plea of justification in defense of a third person, if raised by defendant must be negated by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, provided the defense is supported by sufficient evidence to raise a factual issue. State v. Caron, 423 A.2d 823, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1862 (1980).

Instructions.

Due process requires that the jury must receive clear instructions that the prosecution must persuade them beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense once the defendant produces evidence of self-defense. State v. Caron, 423 A.2d 823, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1862 (1980).

During defendant’s trial on a charge of second-degree murder, a trial court did not err by refusing defendant’s requested instruction for the presumption of reasonable means of self-defense under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-8 because the statute was triggered by evidence of a breaking and entering and the victim entered through an unblocked, open door; there was no evidence the victim struck defendant to enter the house by removing an obstruction. State v. Gianquitti, 22 A.3d 1161, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 81 (2011).

Invader Not Entitled to Claim Self-Defense.

If one is feloniously present in the dwelling house of another, he may not attack the victim and then rely upon the doctrine of self-defense in order to protect himself from the consequences of his felonious presence and aggression. State v. Lamoureux, 573 A.2d 1176, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 91 (1990).

Presumption Defined.

The presumption created by this section is that the victim’s action in repelling the invader was in implementation of the right of self-defense. In re Paul F., 543 A.2d 255, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 90 (1988).

Retreat.

A person assailed in his residence by a cohabitant is not entitled to employ deadly force and kill the cohabitant assailant, but is obligated to attempt any available avenue of retreat. State v. Quarles, 504 A.2d 473, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 401 (1986); State v. Ordway, 619 A.2d 819, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 216 (1992).

When a dwelling house is entered or attempted to be entered by force and under such circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable belief that the occupant’s life is endangered or that the intruder intends to commit a felony, the occupant may use deadly force, if reasonably necessary, to prevent or terminate such entry. State v. Fetzik, 577 A.2d 990, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 138 (1990).

One who is attacked in his dwelling by one who initially entered as a social guest but who has become a trespasser by remaining after being ordered to leave is not required to retreat from the dwelling before he is permitted to use fatal force to repel an attack that he reasonably believes has placed him in imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm. State v. Walton., 615 A.2d 469, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 196 (1992).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of evidence of battered child syndrome on issue of self-defense. 22 A.L.R.5th 787.

11-8-9. Aiding and abetting a minor.

  1. Every person eighteen (18) years of age or older who shall aid, assist, abet, counsel, hire, command, or procure a person under the age of eighteen (18) years to commit any offense as set forth in this chapter shall be imprisoned for not less than four (4) years and not more than twenty (20) years and/or fined not less than twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500) nor more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or both, for each such offense.
  2. Every person convicted pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be ordered by the sentencing judge to perform up to one hundred (100) hours of public community restitution work. The court may not waive the obligation to perform public community restitution work. Public community restitution work shall be in addition to any fine or sentence which may be imposed and not in lieu of the fine or sentence.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 482, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 541, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 464, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 226, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “restitution” for “service” throughout subsection (b).

Chapter 9 Children

11-9-1. Exploitation for commercial or immoral purposes.

  1. Every person having the custody or control of any child under the age of sixteen (16) years who shall exhibit, use, or employ, or shall in any manner or under pretense sell, give away, let out or otherwise dispose of any child under the age of sixteen (16) years to any person for or in the vocation, occupation, service, or purpose of rope or wire walking, or as a gymnast, wrestler, contortionist, equestrian performer, acrobat, or rider upon any bicycle or mechanical contrivance, or in any dancing, theatrical, or musical exhibition unless it is in connection with churches, school or private instruction in dancing or music, or unless it is under the auspices of a Rhode Island society incorporated, or organized without incorporation for a purpose authorized by § 7-6-4 ; or for or in gathering or picking rags, or collecting cigar stumps, bones or refuse from markets, or in begging, or in any mendicant or wandering occupation, or in peddling in places injurious to the morals of the child; or for or in the exhibition of any child with a disability, or in any illegal, obscene, indecent, or immoral purpose, exhibition, or vocation, injurious to the health or morals or dangerous to the life or limb of the child, or who shall cause, procure or encourage any child under the age of sixteen (16) years to engage in that activity, or who, after being notified by an officer mentioned in § 11-9-3 to restrain the child from engaging in that activity, shall neglect or refuse to do so, shall be held guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, for every such offense, be imprisoned not exceeding one year, or be fined not exceeding two hundred fifty dollars ($250), or both, and shall forfeit any right which he or she may have to the custody of the child; provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any child, not a resident of this state, who is engaged in any dancing, theatrical, or musical performance in this state and is accompanied by a parent, guardian, or tutor, when a permit for the appearance of the child is granted by the mayor of the city or the president of the town council of the town, where the performance is to be given; provided, further, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any child, a resident of this state, who is engaged in any dancing, theatrical, or musical performance in this state on a day when the public schools are not in session in the town or city where the dancing, theatrical or musical performance shall be given (not however on Sunday) if the child is accompanied by a parent, guardian or tutor, when a permit for the appearance of the child is granted by the mayor of the city or the president of the town council of the town where the performance is to be given.
  2. Any person who shall in any manner or under any pretense sell, distribute, let out or otherwise permit any child under eighteen (18) years of age to be used in any book, magazine, pamphlet, or other publication, or in any motion picture film, photograph or pictorial representation, in a setting which taken as a whole suggests to the average person that the child has engaged in, or is about to engage in any sexual act, which shall include, but not be limited to, sodomy, oral copulation, sexual intercourse, masturbation, or bestiality, shall, upon conviction for the first offense be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both; upon conviction of a subsequent offense, be punished by imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) years, a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both.
  3. Every person who shall exhibit, use, employ or shall in any manner or under pretense so exhibit, use, or employ any child under the age of eighteen (18) years to any person for the purpose of prostitution or for any other lewd or indecent act shall be imprisoned not exceeding twenty (20) years, or be fined not exceeding twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 115, § 4; P.L. 1897, ch. 475, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 139, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 142, § 4; P.L. 1926, ch. 845, § 1; P.L. 1931, ch. 1756, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 425, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-1 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 131, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 380, § 3; P.L. 1984, ch. 444, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 12; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 12.

Cross References.

Employment of children generally, § 28-3-1 et seq.

Family court warrants for offenses against children, § 14-1-15 .

Obscene publications, § 11-31-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Exhibitions or entertainments by children, construction and application of child labor law as regards. 72 A.L.R. 141.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes Prohibiting Child Luring as Applied to Cases Involving Luring of Child by Means of Electronic Communications. 33 A.L.R.6th 373.

11-9-1.1. Child nudity prohibited in publications.

Every person, firm, association, or corporation which shall publish, sell, offer for sale, loan, give away, or otherwise distribute any book, magazine, pamphlet, or other publication, or any photograph, picture, or film which depicts any child, or children, under the age of eighteen (18) years and known to be under the age of eighteen (18) years of age by the person, firm, association, or corporation in a setting which taken as a whole suggests to the average person that the child, or children, is about to engage in or has engaged in, any sexual act, or which depicts any child under eighteen (18) years of age performing sodomy, oral copulation, sexual intercourse, masturbation, or bestiality, shall, for the first offense, be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both; for any subsequent offense, by imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) years, or by a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both. Provided, that artistic drawings, sketches, paintings, sculptures, or other artistic renditions, shall be exempt from the provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 131, § 2; P.L. 1978, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 210, § 1.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes or ordinances regulating sexual performance by child. 42 A.L.R.5th 291.

11-9-1.2. Rebuttable presumption of minority upon testimony of physician.

Whenever any person, firm, association or corporation is charged with a violation of the provisions of this chapter, testimony by a physician, duly authorized pursuant to the provisions of § 5-37-2 , that based upon the physician’s examination of the book, magazine, pamphlet, or other publication, or photograph, picture, or film which allegedly depicts any child or children under the age of eighteen (18) years, the physician is of the opinion, based upon a reasonable medical certainty, that any person depicted in it is under the age of eighteen (18) years, then there shall be created a rebuttable presumption of that fact.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 210, § 2.

11-9-1.3. Child pornography prohibited.

  1. Violations.  It is a violation of this section for any person to:
    1. Knowingly produce any child pornography;
    2. Knowingly mail, transport, deliver or transfer by any means, including by computer, any child pornography;
    3. Knowingly reproduce any child pornography by any means, including the computer; or
    4. Knowingly possess any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, computer file or any other material that contains an image of child pornography.
  2. Penalties.
    1. Whoever violates or attempts or conspires to violate subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3) of this section shall be subject to a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or imprisoned for not more than fifteen (15) years, or both.
    2. Whoever violates or attempts or conspires to violate subdivision (a)(4) of this section shall be subject to a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or imprisoned not more than five (5) years, or both.
  3. Definitions.  For purposes of this section:
    1. “Child pornography” means any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct where:
      1. The production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
      2. Such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
      3. Such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to display an identifiable minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
    2. “Computer” has the meaning given to that term in section 11-52-1 ;
    3. “Minor” means any person not having reached eighteen (18) years of age;
    4. “Identifiable minor.”
      1. Means a person:
        1. (I) Who was a minor at the time the visual depiction was created, adapted, or modified; or (II) Whose image as a minor was used in creating, adapting, or modifying the visual depiction; and
      2. Who is recognizable as an actual person by the person’s face, likeness, or other distinguishing characteristic, such as a unique birthmark or other recognizable feature; and (B) Shall not be construed to require proof of the actual identity of the identifiable minor.
    5. “Producing” means producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing or advertising;
    6. “Sexually explicit conduct” means actual:
      1. Graphic sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, or lascivious sexual intercourse where the genitals, or pubic area of any person is exhibited;
      2. Bestiality;
      3. Masturbation;
      4. Sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
      5. Graphic or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person;
    7. “Visual depiction” includes undeveloped film and videotape and data stored on a computer disk or by electronic means, which is capable of conversion into a visual image;
    8. “Graphic,” when used with respect to a depiction of sexually explicit conduct, means that a viewer can observe any part of the genitals or pubic area of any depicted person or animal during any part of the time that the sexually explicit conduct is being depicted.
  4. Affirmative defenses.
    1. It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating subdivision (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of this section that:
      1. The alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
      2. Each such person was an adult at the time the material was produced; and
      3. The defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe or distribute the material in such a manner as to convey the impression that it is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
    2. It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating subdivision (a)(4) of this section that the defendant:
      1. Possessed less than three (3) images of child pornography; and
      2. Promptly and in good faith and without retaining or allowing any person, other than a law enforcement agency, to access any image or copy of it:
        1. Took reasonable steps to destroy each such image; or
        2. Reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and afforded that agency access to each such image.
  5. Severability.  If any provision or provisions of this section, or the application of this section to any person or circumstance is held invalid by a court of competent authority, that invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this section which can be given effect without that invalid provision or provisions or application of the provision or provisions, and to this end the provisions of this section are declared to be separable and severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 143, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 586, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 612, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rearranged and redesignated the definitions in subsection (c).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 586, § 2, and P.L. 2004, ch. 612, § 2, enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction

By adopting language identical to its federal counterpart, the General Assembly intended that R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-1.3 serve the same purposes specifically expressed in 18 U.S.C.S. § 2251, and that those purposes provide context to the phrase lascivious exhibition in the statute. State v. Hansen, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 85 (R.I. Apr. 27, 2020).

Subjective reaction or intent of the viewer implicates a scienter element that is not required in the statute, and it is appropriate to look to objective criteria within the composition to determine whether a visual depiction is designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. State v. Hansen, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 85 (R.I. Apr. 27, 2020).

Because defendant was charged with a single count of possession of child pornography, no more than one image was required to support a conviction, and here, there were six. State v. Hansen, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 85 (R.I. Apr. 27, 2020).

Rhode Island Supreme Court disagrees that a close-up of the genitals or pubic area is necessary to satisfy the focal-point factor; genitals or pubic areas that are plainly visible, with some characteristic of the composition drawing attention to these areas of the body, will satisfy this factor. State v. Hansen, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 85 (R.I. Apr. 27, 2020).

Lascivious exhibition

Each image constituted a lascivious exhibition of the pubic area of each minor subject therein, within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-1.3(c)(6)(v) ; with hair to the back and number cards to the side, the girls’ fully exposed breasts and pubic areas were the obvious focal point of the images, the settings were sexually suggestive, and the exploitative nature of these compositions, as depicting the children’s vulnerability and availability, was more than capable of being translated as sexual coyness to the viewer. State v. Hansen, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 85 (R.I. Apr. 27, 2020).

Probable Cause for Search Warrant.
— Not Found.

In a case in which defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography, probable cause did not exist for a warrant because the detective’s affidavit described a display of nudity in a public place, but it did not indicate that there was a lascivious exhibition of the depicted child’s genitals or pubic area; it did not aver that the genitals or pubic area were the focal points; the described setting (a beach) was not particularly sexually suggestive; there was no indication that the image suggested sexual coyness, a willingness to engage in sexual activity, or that the image was intended or designed to elicit a sexual response; and the title of the file was not on its face suggestive of child pornography. State v. Reisner, 253 A.3d 1273, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 87 (R.I. 2021).

Right to free speech

State’s interest in protecting children from the sexual exploitation portrayed in the images overwhelmingly outweighed defendant’s so-called expressive interests in possessing them. State v. Hansen, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 85 (R.I. Apr. 27, 2020).

11-9-1.4. Minor electronically disseminating indecent material to another person — “Sexting” prohibited.

  1. Definitions as used in this section:
    1. “Minor” means any person not having reached eighteen (18) years of age;
    2. “Computer” has the meaning given to that term in § 11-52-1 ;
    3. “Telecommunication device” means an analog or digital electronic device which processes data, telephony, video, or sound transmission as part of any system involved in the sending and/or receiving at a distance of voice, sound, data, and/or video transmissions;
    4. “Indecent visual depiction” means any digital image or digital video of the minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and includes data stored on any computer, telecommunication device, or other electronic storage media which is capable of conversion into a visual image;
    5. “Sexually explicit conduct” means actual masturbation or graphic focus on or lascivious exhibition of the nude genitals or pubic area of the minor.
  2. No minor shall knowingly and voluntarily and without threat or coercion use a computer or telecommunication device to transmit an indecent visual depiction of himself or herself to another person.
  3. A violation of this section shall be a status offense and referred to the family court.
  4. Any minor adjudicated under subsection (b) shall not be charged under § 11-9-1.3 and, further, shall not be subject to sex offender registration requirements set forth in § 11-37.1-1 et seq., entitled “Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 270, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 295, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 415, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 270, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 295, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Collateral References.

Construction and Application of State Laws Relating or Applied to Sexting Involving Juveniles. 18 A.L.R.7th Art. 8 (2018).

11-9-1.5. Electronically disseminating indecent material to minors prohibited.

  1. Definitions as used in this section:
    1. “Minor” means any person not having reached eighteen (18) years of age.
    2. “Computer” has the meaning given to that term in § 11-52-1 .
    3. “Telecommunication device” means an analog or digital electronic device that processes data, telephone, video, or sound transmission as part of any system involved in the sending and/or receiving at a distance of voice, sound, data, and/or video transmissions.
    4. “Indecent visual depiction” means any digital image or digital video depicting one or more persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct, is obscene as defined in § 11-31-1(b) , and includes:
      1. Data stored on any computer, telecommunication device, or other electronic storage media that is capable of conversion into a visual image; or
      2. Digital video depicting sexually explicit conduct transmitted live over a computer online service, internet service, or local electronic bulletin board service. If a digital image or digital video is part of a larger work, that larger work shall be the subject for the purpose of § 11-31-1(b) analysis.
    5. “Sexually explicit conduct” means actual:
      1. Graphic sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, or lascivious sexual intercourse where the genitals or pubic area of any person is exhibited;
      2. Bestiality;
      3. Masturbation;
      4. Sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
      5. Graphic or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.
  2. No person shall knowingly and intentionally use a computer or telecommunication device to transmit an indecent visual depiction to a person he or she knows is, or believes to be, a minor.
  3. No minor shall be charged under this section if his or her conduct falls within § 11-9-1.4 , “Minor Electronically Disseminating Indecent Material to Another Person — ‘Sexting’ Prohibited.”
  4. No person shall be charged under this section if the minor to whom the indecent visual depiction was transmitted was fifteen (15) years of age or older and the person transmitting the indecent visual depiction was not more than four (4) years older than the minor.
  5. The fact that an undercover operative or law enforcement officer was involved in the detection and investigation of an offense under this section shall not constitute a defense to a prosecution under this section.
  6. Those in violation of this section shall be guilty of a felony and subject to imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  7. Those in violation of this section shall be subject to sex offender registration requirements set forth in § 11-37.1-1 et seq., entitled “Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act.”
  8. Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon the following entities as a result of content or information provided by another person:
    1. An interactive computer service;
    2. A provider of public or private mobile service; or
    3. A telecommunications network provider.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 416, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 448, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 416, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 448, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Collateral References.

Construction and Application of State Laws Relating or Applied to Sexting Involving Juveniles. 18 A.L.R.7th Art. 8 (2018).

11-9-1.6. Child erotica prohibited.

  1. Definitions as used in this section:
    1. “Minor” means any person not having reached eighteen (18) years of age.
    2. “Produces” means produces, directs, manufactures, issues, publishes, or advertises.
    3. “Visual portrayal” means any visual depiction as defined in § 11-9-1.3 , including, but not limited to, any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer-generated image or picture whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means.
  2. Any person age eighteen (18) or over who knowingly and voluntarily, without threat or coercion, produces, possesses, displays, or distributes, in any form, any visual portrayals of minors who are partially clothed, where the visual portrayals are used for the specific purpose of sexual gratification or sexual arousal from viewing the visual portrayals, is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be confined in jail for not more than one year, or fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
  3. Affirmative defenses.
    1. It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating this section that:
      1. The alleged child erotica was produced using an actual person or persons who was an adult at the time the material was produced;
      2. The defendant promptly and in good faith and without retaining or allowing any person, other than a law enforcement agency, to access any visual portrayal or copy of it:
        1. Took reasonable steps to destroy each such visual portrayal; or
        2. Reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and afforded that agency access to each such image.
      3. That the possessor, displayer, or distributor of child erotica is the parent or legal guardian of the child depicted in the visual portrayals and there is no competent evidence to prove an intent to use the visual portrayals for sexual gratification or sexual arousal from viewing the visual portrayals.
  4. Severability.  If any provision or provisions of this section, or the application of this section to any person or circumstance is held invalid by a court of competent authority, that invalidity does not affect the other provisions or applications of this section which can be given effect without that invalid provision or provisions or application of the provision or provisions, and to this end the provisions of this section are declared to be separable and severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 354, § 1, effective July 12, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 355, § 1, effective July 12, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 354, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 355, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-9-2. Employment of children for unlawful purposes.

Every person who shall take, receive, hire, employ, exhibit, or have in custody, or who shall cause to be taken, hired, employed, exhibited, or held in custody, any child under the age of sixteen (16) years, for any of the purposes prohibited in § 11-9-1 , shall be held guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished for every such offense in the manner provided in that section.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 15, § 5; P.L. 1897, ch. 475, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 139, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 142, § 5; P.L. 1926, ch. 844, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 425, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-2 .

11-9-3. Seizure and custody of exploited child — Proceedings as against neglected child.

The town sergeant of any town, the chief of police of any city, or any agent of the director of children, youth and families may enter any place where any child may be held, detained or employed in violation of §§ 11-9-1 11-9-8 , and, without process of law, seize and detain the child and hold him or her as a witness to testify upon the trial of any person charged with violating the provisions of §§ 11-9-1 11-9-8 ; and if prior to or upon conviction of the offender, no person shall appear who is entitled to the custody of the child, the officer having the child in custody may bring proceedings against the child as a neglected child under the provisions of chapter 1 of title 14.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 115, § 6; P.L. 1897, ch. 475, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 139, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 142, § 6; P.L. 1926, ch. 844, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 425, § 3; P.L. 1950, ch. 2416, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-3 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 242, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “director of children, youth and families” for “director for children and their families”.

11-9-4. Contributing to delinquency.

Every person who knowingly or willfully encourages, aids, contributes to, or in any way causes any child under the age of sixteen (16) years to violate any law of this state, or the ordinances of any town or city in this state, or who knowingly or willfully encourages, aids, contributes to, or in any way causes any child under the age of sixteen (16) years to be guilty of any vicious or immoral conduct, or who, being the parent, parents, legal guardian, or person having the custody or the control of any such child, permits or suffers the child to habitually associate with vicious, immoral, or criminal persons, or to grow up in ignorance, idleness, or crime, or to wander about the streets of any city or town in the nighttime without being in any lawful business or occupation, or to enter any house of ill fame, policy shop, or place where any gambling is carried on or gaming device is operated, or to enter any place where intoxicating liquors are sold, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or be imprisoned not exceeding one year.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1544, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 139, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 142, § 9; P.L. 1926, ch. 844, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 425, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-4 .

Cross References.

Distribution of controlled substance to minor, § 21-28-4.07 .

Indecent publications, pictures, or articles, § 11-31-10 .

Sexual assault, § 11-37-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Acts in connection with marriage of infant below marriageable age as contributing to delinquency. 68 A.L.R.2d 745.

Applicability of statute against contributing to the delinquency of children of a specified age, with respect to a child who has passed the anniversary date of such age. 73 A.L.R.2d 874.

Criminal liability for contributing to delinquency of minor as affected by the fact that minor has not become a delinquent. 18 A.L.R.3d 824.

Criminal liability for contributing to delinquency of minor by sexually immoral acts as affected by fact that minor was married at time of acts charged. 84 A.L.R.2d 1254.

Giving, selling, or prescribing dangerous drugs as contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 36 A.L.R.3d 1292.

Mens rea or guilty intent as necessary element of offense of contributing to delinquency or dependency of minor. 31 A.L.R.3d 848.

Recital of, or reference to, the offense in pronouncing sentence or judgment for contributing to juvenile delinquency. 14 A.L.R. 1001.

11-9-5. Cruelty to or neglect of child.

  1. Every person having the custody or control of any child under the age of eighteen (18) years who shall abandon that child, or who shall treat the child with gross or habitual cruelty, or who shall wrongfully cause or permit that child to be an habitual sufferer for want of food, clothing, proper care, or oversight, or who shall use or permit the use of that child for any wanton, cruel, or improper purpose, or who shall compel, cause, or permit that child to do any wanton or wrongful act, or who shall cause or permit the home of that child to be the resort of lewd, drunken, wanton, or dissolute persons, or who by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, or depravity, shall render the home of that child a place in which it is unfit for that child to live, or who shall neglect or refuse to pay the reasonable charges for the support of that child, whenever the child shall be placed by him or her in the custody of, or be assigned by any court to, any individual, association, or corporation, shall be guilty of a felony and shall for every such offense be imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than three (3) years, or be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both, and the child may be proceeded against as a neglected child under the provisions of chapter 1 of title 14.
  2. In addition to any penalty provided in this section, any person convicted or placed on probation for this offense may be required to receive psychosociological counseling in child growth, care and development as a part of that sentence or probation. For purposes of this section, and in accordance with § 40-11-15 , a parent or guardian practicing his or her religious beliefs which differ from general community standards who does not provide specified medical treatment for a child shall not, for that reason alone, be considered an abusive or negligent parent or guardian; provided, the provisions of this section shall not: (1) exempt a parent or guardian from having committed the offense of cruelty or neglect if the child is harmed under the provisions of (a) above; (2) exempt the department from the provisions of § 40-11-5 ; or (3) prohibit the department from filing a petition, pursuant to the provisions of § 40-11-15 , for medical services for a child, where his or her health requires it.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 139, § 10; P.L. 1910, ch. 550, § 1; P.L. 1922, ch. 2214, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 142, § 10; P.L. 1926, ch. 844, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 425, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-5 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 128, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 129, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 155, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 439, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 270, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 599, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 270, § 2, and P.L. 2004, ch. 599, § 2, enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.
— Admissibility.

Autopsy photographs of deceased child and evidence that child’s twin was admitted to hospital at same time with multiple body bruises were admissible to show mother’s tendency to abuse children. State v. Ryan, 113 R.I. 343 , 321 A.2d 92, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1185 (1974).

Evidence of the defendant’s prior shoplifting and breaking into apartments and the relation that this criminal activity bore to her compulsion to obtain cocaine was relevant to the issue of whether she possessed the requisite intent to commit the crime of wrongfully permitting her child to be a habitual sufferer and was therefore properly admitted. State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 201 (1995).

Evidence of the defendant’s attempt to return unused baby formula to a grocery store after the death of her child by dehydration, and her subsequently spending $20.00 given her by the store manager to purchase cocaine, tended to show the ruthless determination on her part to obtain cocaine in any circumstances and was probative of her intent to permit her son to be a habitual sufferer for want of the food and proper care that was essential for his survival, and was therefore admissible. State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 201 (1995).

— Sufficient.

The defendant’s repeated voluntary and intentional ingestion of crack cocaine while her seven-week-old son, who eventually died from dehydration, was in her care, in addition to her testimony that she knew that she was incapable of properly caring for her children during these extended periods of cocaine intoxication, supported a finding that she intentionally permitted her son to be a habitual sufferer for want of food and proper care. There is a distinction between “intentionally depriving” a child of food and proper care, and “intentionally permitting” a child to be a habitual sufferer for want of food or proper care. State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 201 (1995).

Failure to Act.

By imposing criminal liability for wrongful conduct rather than for intentional conduct, the legislature expressed an intent that this section could be violated even absent a conscious purpose to cause or permit a child to be a habitual sufferer, as long as no legal justification or legal excuse existed. Thus, this section can be violated by an unintentional omission to act by one who has a duty to act, as well as by active conduct. State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 201 (1995).

Felony Murder.

In a prosecution for second-degree felony murder, rather than determine if the crime of wrongfully permitting a child to be a habitual sufferer, the predicate felony underlying the felony-murder charge, was inherently dangerous in the abstract, the state had the opportunity to prove at trial that the crime was inherently dangerous in the manner that it was committed. State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 201 (1995).

Procedure.

Trial justice committed clear error by sua sponte dismissing a criminal information against defendant as defendant did not file a motion to dismiss, and the trial court failed to follow the procedural rules applicable to dismissals. By prohibiting the Attorney General from fully prosecuting the felony information in violation of R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 9 .1, the trial justice clearly erred and deprived the State of a fair proceeding. State v. Strom, 941 A.2d 837, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 3 (2008).

Waiver of Jury Trial.

New trial was required because there was nothing in the record demonstrating that the trial justice was assured by defendant that her waiver of a jury trial was made intelligently and with full knowledge of the consequences of her waiver; defendant was charged with cruelty to or neglect of a child, a felony offense, and therefore she was constitutionally guaranteed a jury trial, absent a determination by the trial justice that she knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived that right. State v. Michaud, 251 A.3d 9, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 46 (2021).

Collateral References.

Criminal liability of nonparent for failure to obtain medical treatment for minor based on duty of one acting in loco parentis. 97 A.L.R.6th 539.

Criminal Prosecutions and Civil Actions for Leaving Child in Unattended Hot or Cold Vehicle. 26 A.L.R.7th Art. 5 (2018).

Parents’ criminal liability for failure to provide medical attention to their children. 118 A.L.R.5th 253.

11-9-5.1. Investigation upon report of cruelty or neglect.

In order to protect a child from cruelty or neglect, where any person has reasonable cause to believe that any child is being neglected or cruelly treated as defined in § 14-1-3 and reports such incident to the department of children, youth, and families, the department must cause an immediate investigation.

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 199, § 1.

11-9-5.2. Immunity from liability.

Any person participating in good faith in the making of a report pursuant to this chapter shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Any such participant shall have the same immunity with respect to participation in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report.

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 199, § 1.

11-9-5.3. Child abuse — Brendan’s Law.

  1. This section shall be known and may be referred to as “Brendan’s Law.”
  2. Whenever a person having care of a child, as defined by § 40-11-2(2) , whether assumed voluntarily or because of a legal obligation, including any instance where a child has been placed by his or her parents, caretaker, or licensed or governmental child placement agency for care or treatment, knowingly or intentionally:
    1. Inflicts upon a child serious bodily injury, shall be guilty of first degree child abuse.
    2. Inflicts upon a child any other physical injury, shall be guilty of second degree child abuse.
  3. For the purposes of this section, “serious bodily injury” means physical injury that:
    1. Creates a substantial risk of death;
    2. Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily parts, member or organ, including any fractures of any bones;
    3. Causes serious disfigurement; or
    4. Evidences subdural hematoma, intercranial hemorrhage and/or retinal hemorrhages as signs of “shaken baby syndrome” and/or “abusive head trauma.”
  4. For the purpose of this section, “other physical injury” is defined as any injury, other than a serious bodily injury, which arises other than from the imposition of nonexcessive corporal punishment.
  5. Any person who commits first degree child abuse shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty (20) years, nor less than ten (10) years and fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000). Any person who is convicted of second degree child abuse shall be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, nor less than five (5) years and fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).
  6. Any person who commits first degree child abuse on a child age five (5) or under shall not on the first ten (10) years of his or her sentence be afforded the benefit of suspension or deferment of sentence nor of probation for penalties provided in this section; and provided further, that the court shall order the defendant to serve a minimum of eight and one-half (81/2) years or more of the sentence before he or she becomes eligible for parole.
  7. Any person who has been previously convicted of first or second degree child abuse under this section and thereafter commits first degree child abuse shall be imprisoned for not more than forty (40) years, nor less than twenty (20) years and fined not more than twenty thousand ($20,000) dollars and shall be subject to subsection (f) of this section if applicable. Any person who has been previously convicted of first or second degree child abuse under this section and thereafter commits second degree child abuse shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty (20) years, nor less than ten (10) years and fined not more than ten thousand ($10,000) dollars.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 134, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 109, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 271, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 318, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading and redesignated the subsections.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 271, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 318, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Repealed Sections.

P.L. 1995, ch. 211, § 1 repealed former § 11-9-5.3 (P.L. 1979, ch. 129, § 3; P.L. 1983, ch. 179, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 174, § 1), concerning child abuse, and enacted the above section, effective July 1, 1995.

Law Reviews.

Survey Section: Criminal Law, see 3 R.W.U.L. Rev. 583 (1998).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutionally vague, because it clearly provided defendant with notice that his conduct was unlawful and did not create a situation where the innocent was trapped by inadequate warning. State v. Allen, 68 A.3d 512, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 110 (2013).

Commencement of Prosecution.

Since a conviction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5.3 carried a minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-1.2 , a prosecution for violation of the statute could only be commenced via an information or indictment, and the felony complaint filed against defendant did not commence the prosecution. It merely provided an instrument under which bail could be set. State v. Jennings, 944 A.2d 171, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 35 (2008).

Although a child abuse felony complaint under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5.3(e) was filed against defendant in family court in June 2006, it was merely an initial bail-setting instrument, and as the information charging defendant and formally commencing the prosecution was not filed until November 2006, the July 2006 amendment to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-9 divested the family court of jurisdiction. State v. Jennings, 944 A.2d 171, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 35 (2008).

Evidence.

Conviction for first-degree child abuse was supported by sufficient evidence where the child was walking, talking, and functioning when the child’s mother left the child with defendant and the evidence presented at trial permitted a reasonable juror to conclude that the child was in defendant’s exclusive care all day, that the injury occurred when defendant was caring for the child, and that it was defendant who caused the nonaccidental head trauma. State v. Sivo, 925 A.2d 901, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 92 (2007).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5.3 , as currently drafted, contains the word “serious” in § 11-9-5.3 (b)(2); accordingly, an adjudication that a defendant is guilty of second degree child abuse requires a determination as to whether or not the defendant inflicted a serious physical injury. State v. Sampson, 24 A.3d 1131, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 112 (2011).

Following defendant’s conviction for sexual molestation of his infant daughter in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37-8.1 , 11-9-5.3(b)(1) , 11-9-5.3(c)(2) and 11-9-5.3(f) , the trial justice articulated sufficient reasoning for agreeing with the jury and denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, based in part on defendant’s confession, which described in detail how he had inflicted the various injuries to his daughter, demonstrating personal knowledge and not speculation. State v. Baptista, 79 A.3d 24, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 146 (2013).

In convicting defendant, the victim’s half-brother, of second-degree child abuse under subsection (b)(2) of this section (“any other physical injury”), the trial justice did not need to reach the question of a lesser-included offense (simple assault) because the trial justice determined that the elements of the statute had been met; the trial justice clearly articulated a basis for his finding that the injury requirement had been met, relying on credible witness testimony from the victim, her sister, and her mother, in addition to the medical records and photographs of the victim’s injury. State v. Cahill, 196 A.3d 744, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 120 (2018).

— Privilege.

In a first-degree child abuse case, the trial justice did not err by requiring a licensed clinical social worker to testify about statements defendant made to her while seeking mental-health treatment because any privilege under the Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act, § 5-37.3-6 , was rendered a nullity by § 40-11-11 , which unambiguously abrogated all privileges that might otherwise attach to communications between any professional person and his or her patient or client in situations involving known or suspected child abuse or neglect and any such privileges could not justify a failure to give or accept evidence in any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse or neglect. State v. Lefebvre, 198 A.3d 521, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 5 (2019).

Jurisdiction.

Family court had jurisdiction over defendant’s criminal trial for child abuse. State v. Sivo, 925 A.2d 901, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 92 (2007).

Because a felony prosecution commences only after a charge by information, the prosecution for violating R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5.3 was not pending as of the 2006 amendment of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-9 because the state had not filed the information until more than three months after the amendment removed jurisdiction to the Superior Court. The Family Court properly dismissed the prosecution for lack of jurisdiction. State v. Machado, 944 A.2d 865, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 41 (2008).

Jury Instruction on Intent.

A failure to instruct the jury on intent as a necessary element of the crime of child abuse is reversible error; intent is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect to the allegedly abusive acts. State v. Lima, 546 A.2d 770, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 87 (1988).

Because R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5.3 requires only that a person knowingly inflict a serious bodily injury upon a child and does not require that the person do some further act, attain some additional consequences, or have the subjective purpose to seriously injure the child, it is a general-intent crime, and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that it could convict defendant if the jurors found that defendant acted intentionally, regardless of whether defendant had the specific intent to bring about the particular result. State v. Sivo, 925 A.2d 901, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 92 (2007).

Second-Degree Felony Murder.

Although the indictment did not expressly charge defendant with second-degree felony murder or with felony child abuse and the trial justice gave an instruction on second-degree felony murder using felony child abuse as the predicate felony, (1) defendant was not deprived of fair notice and an opportunity to present a meaningful defense; and (2) there was substantial evidence for the jury to determine that defendant committed an inherently dangerous felony when he hit the six-year-old victim in the stomach. State v. Patino, 188 A.3d 646, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 103 , cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 490, 202 L. Ed. 2d 384, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 6674 (2018).

The merger doctrine does not apply in Rhode Island to second-degree felony murder; instead, in Rhode Island, a felony may serve as the predicate felony for second-degree felony murder if the factfinder determines that a defendant committed an inherently dangerous felony. State v. Patino, 188 A.3d 646, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 103 , cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 490, 202 L. Ed. 2d 384, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 6674 (2018).

Although the trial justice’s language “however slight” may have deviated to some extent from the definition of any “other physical injury” set forth in § 11-9-5.3 , the trial justice’s instruction to the jury on second-degree murder, using felony child abuse as the predicate felony, on the whole, was detailed and thorough, and more than adequately covered the law. State v. Patino, 188 A.3d 646, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 103 , cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 490, 202 L. Ed. 2d 384, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 6674 (2018).

Collateral References.

Validity and construction of penal statute prohibiting child abuse. 1 A.L.R.4th 38.

11-9-6. Proceedings against parents of delinquent children unaffected.

No proceedings instituted under any of the provisions of §§ 11-9-1 11-9-8 shall in any manner affect or be affected by any proceedings which may be instituted under any of the provisions of chapter 9 of title 15.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 139, § 11; P.L. 1910, ch. 550, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 142, § 11; P.L. 1926, ch. 844, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 425, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-6 .

11-9-7. Children’s Friend and Service excused from costs.

Whenever any agent of the Children’s Friend and Service shall make complaint against any person for any of the offenses mentioned in §§ 11-9-1 11-9-8 , the agent shall not be required to enter into any recognizance for costs. All costs and expenses attending the making of any complaint by any agent of the service and the proceedings on it under the provisions of §§ 11-9-1 11-9-8 , or under the provisions of chapter 1 of title 14, shall be paid by the state.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 115, § 7; P.L. 1897, ch. 475, § 4; P.L. 1908, ch. 1540, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 139, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 142, § 7; P.L. 1926, ch. 844, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 425, § 4; P.L. 1950, ch. 2416, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-7 .

11-9-8. Appropriations for prevention of cruelty to children.

The general assembly shall annually appropriate any sum that it may deem necessary, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended by the department of children, youth and families for the purpose of preventing cruelty to children, and the department may, in its discretion, pay the sum to the Children’s Friend and Service for that purpose, and the state controller is authorized and directed to draw his or her orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of the sum or so much of it as may be required upon receipt by the state controller of proper vouchers approved by the director of the department.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 115, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 139, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 142, § 8; P.L. 1923, ch. 431, § 2; P.L. 1926, ch. 844, § 1; P.L. 1929, ch. 1374, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 425, § 5; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, §§ 65, 80; P.L. 1950, ch. 2416, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-8 .

11-9-9. Powers of family court.

Where in §§ 11-9-1 11-9-8 any authority is vested in any court, the authority vested in the court or courts mentioned is transferred to the family court. The family court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any and all complaints and offenses set forth in §§ 11-9-2 , 11-9-4 , 11-9-8 , 11-9-1 2, 11-9-14 [repealed], and 11-9-15 , and shall have the authority to impose sentence as set forth in chapter 1 of title 14. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, jurisdiction for violations of §§ 11-9-1, 11-9-1.1 , 11-9-1.2 , 11-9-1.3 , 11-9-1.5 , 11-9-5 , and 11-9-5.3 shall be vested in the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1441, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-9 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 73, § 4; P.L. 2004, ch. 586, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 612, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 260, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 290, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 40, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 44, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 260, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 290, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 163, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 40, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 44, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Section 11-9-14 , referred to in this section, was repealed by P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 3, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 3, effective July 7, 2021.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Effect of 2006 Amendment.

Although a child abuse felony complaint under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5.3(e) was filed against defendant in Family Court in June 2006, it was merely an initial bail-setting instrument, and since the information charging defendant and formally commencing the prosecution was not filed until November 2006, the July 2006 amendment to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-9 divested the Family Court of jurisdiction. State v. Jennings, 944 A.2d 171, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 35 (2008).

Because a felony prosecution commences only after a charge by information, the prosecution for violating R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5.3 was not pending as of the 2006 amendment of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-9 because the state had not filed the information until more than three months after the amendment removed jurisdiction to the Superior Court. The Family Court properly dismissed the prosecution for lack of jurisdiction. State v. Machado, 944 A.2d 865, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 41 (2008).

Misdemeanor Jurisdiction.

The family court would not have jurisdiction over offense of assault upon an infant son which is a misdemeanor under the law. State v. Zittel, 94 R.I. 235 , 94 R.I. 325 , 180 A.2d 455, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1962).

Collateral References.

Age of child at time of alleged offense or delinquency, or at time legal proceedings are commenced, as criterion of jurisdiction of juvenile court. 89 A.L.R.2d 506.

Contempt, power of juvenile courts to punish for. 8 A.L.R. 1548; 54 A.L.R. 321.

Continuing jurisdiction over infant delinquent or offender, power of juvenile court to exercise. 76 A.L.R. 657.

Homicide by juvenile as within jurisdiction of juvenile court. 48 A.L.R.2d 663.

Marriage as affecting jurisdiction of juvenile court over delinquent or dependent. 14 A.L.R.2d 336.

Power of juvenile court to require children to testify. 151 A.L.R. 1229.

Rules of evidence, application in juvenile delinquency proceeding. 43 A.L.R.2d 1128.

11-9-10. Abandonment of refrigerator in place accessible to children.

Whoever, having been the owner of any refrigerator, icebox, chest, or other similar article, abandons that refrigerator, icebox, chest, or other similar article in any place accessible to children if the abandoned unit has an attached lid or door which cannot be opened easily from the inside, and who fails to remove the door or doors from it before abandoning the unit, unless the unit may be easily opened from the inside, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. P.L. 1955, ch. 3523, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-10 .

11-9-11. Designation of curfew streets.

The police commissioners of any city or town having a police commission, and the chief of police of any other city or town, may designate certain streets in the city or town as curfew streets. No minor under sixteen (16) years of age shall be allowed to loiter on any curfew street after 9 o’clock (9:00) p.m., unless accompanied by some adult person.

History of Section. P.L. 1911, ch. 718, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 43; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 43; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-11 .

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and effect of juvenile curfew regulations. 83 A.L.R.4th 1056.

11-9-12. Penalty for loitering on curfew street.

Any minor under sixteen (16) years of age, not accompanied by an adult person, who shall loiter on any curfew street after being directed by any police constable to cease loitering, shall be fined not exceeding five dollars ($5.00).

History of Section. P.L. 1911, ch. 718, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 44; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 44; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-12 .

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of loitering statutes and ordinances. 72 A.L.R.5th 1.

Validity, construction, and effect of juvenile curfew regulations. 83 A.L.R.4th 1056.

11-9-13. Sale or delivery of tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products to individuals under twenty-one (21) — Posting notice of law.

No person shall sell, give, or deliver to any individual under twenty-one (21) years of age, any tobacco product in the form of cigarettes, bidi cigarettes, cigars, little cigars, flavored cigars known as “blunts,” unflavored “blunts,” flavored and unflavored blunt wraps, cigarette rolling papers of any size or composition, cigarillos and tiparillos, pipe tobacco, chewing tobacco, snuff, electronic nicotine-delivery system products, or any and all products as defined in § 44-20-1 . Any person, firm, or corporation that owns, manages, or operates a place of business in which tobacco products are sold, including sales through tobacco product vending machines, shall post notice of this law conspicuously in the place of business in letters at least three-eighths of an inch (3/8") high.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 28; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 29; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 28; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-13 ; P.L. 1987, ch. 84, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 159, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 2; P.L. 2001, ch. 124, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 88, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, effective July 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1, effective July 7, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 88, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 98, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of anti-cigarette legislation. 20 A.L.R. 926.

11-9-13.1. Cigarette and tobacco vending machines.

  1. No cigarettes, nor any other tobacco product, nor electronic nicotine-delivery system product shall be sold from any device or vending machine that is in an area not continuously supervised and in direct line of sight of an authorized person employed by the person, firm, or corporation that owns the business occupying the premises in which the device or vending machine is located, nor shall any tobacco product, nor electronic nicotine-delivery system product be sold from any device or vending machine that is in an area supervised by such an authorized person unless the device or vending machine is equipped with an electronic locking device that will not allow the device or vending machine to dispense a pack of cigarettes, or any other tobacco product, or electronic nicotine-delivery system product unless it is electronically unlocked from a secured position inaccessible to the public and under the supervision of an authorized person employed by the person, firm, or corporation that owns the business occupying the premises in which the device or vending machine is located. “Direct line of sight” means that the vending machine and the purchaser of cigarettes or electronic nicotine-delivery system product must be visible to the authorized person pressing the unlock button while the unlock button is being activated. Provided, a locking device shall not be required in an establishment licensed to sell alcoholic beverages that limits access to persons over the age of twenty-one (21) years.
  2. No cigarettes, nor any other tobacco product, nor electronic nicotine-delivery system product shall be sold from any device or vending machine from which non-tobacco products are sold.
  3. No cigarettes shall be sold in packs that contain less than twenty (20) cigarettes.
  4. Any person, firm, or corporation who or that owns a business occupying the premises in which a device or vending machine that dispenses cigarettes, or any other tobacco product or electronic nicotine-delivery system product is located who or that shall violate any of the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall for the first offense be subject to a fine of seventy-five dollars ($75.00), for the second offense, be subject to a fine of one hundred fifty dollars ($150), and for the third and any subsequent offense, be subject to a fine of five hundred dollars ($500); provided, that in the event that there are no offenses in three (3) successive years from the date of the last offense, then the next offense shall be treated as the first offense.
  5. Any person, firm, or corporation who or that shall violate subsection (c) of this section shall, for the first offense, be subject to a fine of seventy-five dollars ($75.00), for the second offense, be subject to a fine of one hundred fifty dollars ($150), and for the third and any subsequent offense, be subject to a fine of five hundred dollars ($500); provided, that in the event that there are no offenses in three (3) successive years from the date of the last offense, then the next offense shall be treated as the first offense.
  6. One-half (1/2) of all the fines collected pursuant to this section shall be transferred to the municipalities in which the citations originated. One-half (1/2) of all the fines collected pursuant to this section shall be transferred to the general fund.
  7. Severability.  If any provision of this section or the application of it to any person or circumstance is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this section, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this section are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 77, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

Allowable Regulation of Electronic Cigarettes (E-Cigarettes). 46 A.L.R.7th Art. 5 (2019).

11-9-13.2. Short title.

§§ 11-9-13.2 11-9-13.19 shall be cited as “An Act to Stop the Illegal Sale of Tobacco Products to Individuals Under Twenty-One (21) Years of Age.”

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, effective July 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1, effective July 7, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-9-13.3. Legislative intent — Purpose.

The use of tobacco by Rhode Island children is a health and substance abuse problem of the utmost severity. The legislature finds that tobacco product usage by children in Rhode Island is rampant and increasing with over thirty percent (30%) of high school students smoking. The present law prohibiting the sale of tobacco to children is being ignored by many retailers. Rhode Island tobacco retailers illegally sell four million eight hundred thousand (4,800,000) packs, over eleven million dollars ($11,000,000) in tobacco product sales, to children annually. Tobacco industry advertising targets children as the replacement smokers for the one thousand one hundred forty-five (1,145) adults who die daily from tobacco product usage. Approximately seventy percent (70%) of the Rhode Island high school seniors who are smoking today will be the addicted adult smokers of tomorrow. According to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), smoking-related direct medical costs in Rhode Island in 1990 climbed to one hundred eighty-six million dollars ($186,000,000). This is an ongoing, escalating financial burden borne by every business, large and small, and every person, smoker and nonsmoker, in Rhode Island. This is a health and economic drain created by each new generation of children who begin using tobacco products and become addicted to nicotine. It is the intent of this legislation to preserve and protect the health of children by: (1) stopping the illegal sale of tobacco to children, and (2) by severely punishing those who disregard the laws relating to the illegal sale of tobacco products to children.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1.

11-9-13.4. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Bidi cigarette” means any product that (i) Contains tobacco that is wrapped in temburni or tender leaf, or that is wrapped in any other material identified by rules of the department of health that is similar in appearance or characteristics to the temburni or tender leaf, and (ii) Does not contain a smoke filtering device.
  2. “Court” means any appropriate district court of the state of Rhode Island.
  3. “Dealer” is synonymous with the term “retail tobacco products dealer.”
  4. “Department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals” means the state of Rhode Island behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals department, its employees, agents, or assigns.
  5. “Department of taxation” means the state of Rhode Island taxation division, its employees, agents, or assigns.
  6. “Electronic nicotine-delivery system” means an electronic device that may be used to simulate smoking in the delivery of nicotine or other substance to a person inhaling from the device, and includes, but is not limited to, an electronic cigarette, electronic cigar, electronic cigarillo, electronic little cigars, electronic pipe, or electronic hookah, “heat not burn products,” e-liquids, e-liquid products, or any related device and any cartridge or other component of such device.
  7. “Electronic nicotine-delivery system product” means any combination of electronic nicotine-delivery system and/or e-liquid and/or any derivative thereof, and/or any e-liquid container. Electronic nicotine-delivery system products shall not include hemp-derived consumable cannabidiol (CBD) products as defined in § 2-26-3 .
  8. “E-liquid” and “e-liquid products” means any liquid or substance placed in or sold for use in an electronic nicotine-delivery system  that generally utilizes a heating element that aerosolizes, vaporizes, or combusts a liquid or other substance containing nicotine or nicotine derivative:
    1. Whether the liquid or substance contains nicotine or a nicotine derivative; or
    2. Whether sold separately or sold in combination with a personal vaporizer, electronic nicotine-delivery system, or an electronic inhaler.
  9. “License” is synonymous with the term “retail tobacco products dealer license” or “electronic nicotine-delivery system license” or any license issued under chapter 20 of title 44 or chapter 1 of title 23.
  10. “License holder” is synonymous with the term “retail tobacco products dealer” or “electronic nicotine-delivery system license” or any licenses issued under chapter 20 of title 44 or chapter 1 of title 23.
  11. “Little cigars” means and includes any roll, made wholly or in part of tobacco, irrespective of size or shape, and irrespective of whether the tobacco is flavored, adulterated, or mixed with any other ingredient, where such roll has a wrapper or cover made of tobacco wrapped in leaf tobacco or any substance containing tobacco paper or any other material and where such roll has an integrated filter, except where such wrapper is wholly or in greater part made of tobacco and where such roll has an integrated filter and weighs over four (4) pounds per thousand (1,000).
  12. “Person” means any individual person, firm, fiduciary, partnership, trust, association, or corporation licensed as a retail dealer to sell tobacco products within the state.
  13. “Retail tobacco products dealer” means the holder of a license to sell tobacco products at retail and shall include holders of all other licenses issued under chapter 20 of title 44 or chapter 1 of title 23.
  14. “Retail tobacco products dealer license” means a license to sell tobacco products at retail as issued by the department of taxation.
  15. “Spitting tobacco” also means snuff, powdered tobacco, chewing tobacco, dipping tobacco, pouch tobacco, or smokeless tobacco.
  16. “Tobacco product(s)” means any product(s) containing, made of, or derived from tobacco or nicotine that is intended for human consumption or is likely to be consumed, whether inhaled, absorbed, or ingested by any other means, including, but not limited to, a cigarette, a little cigar as defined in § 44-20.2-1 , and any and all products as defined in § 44-20-1 , electronic nicotine-delivery system products, or any added substance that may be aerosolized, vaporized, or otherwise delivered by such an electronic nicotine-delivery system device, whether or not that substance contains nicotine.
    1. “Tobacco product(s)” does not include drugs, devices, or combination products intended to treat tobacco or nicotine dependence that are authorized by the United States Food and Drug Administration, as those terms are defined in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Nor does it include such authorized drugs, devices, or combination products with such treatment purpose by individuals under age twenty-one (21) if prescribed by a licensed prescriber such as a physician, nurse practitioner, or physician assistant.
  17. “Underage individual” or “underage individuals” means any individual under the age of twenty-one (21).

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 124, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 104, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, effective July 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1, effective July 7, 2021.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rearranged the definitions alphabetically and redesignated the subdivisions.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Federal Act References.

The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, referred to in this section, is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.

Collateral References.

Allowable Regulation of Electronic Cigarettes (E-Cigarettes). 46 A.L.R.7th Art. 5 (2019).

11-9-13.5. Responsibility for tobacco or health issues.

The Rhode Island department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals shall develop, monitor, and aggressively enforce health rules and regulations pertaining to stopping the illegal sale of tobacco products which include electronic nicotine-delivery system products to individuals under twenty-one (21) years of age.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, effective July 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1, effective July 7, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-9-13.6. Duties of the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals.

The department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals shall:

  1. Coordinate and promote the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and serve as the primary liaison from this department to other state or local agencies, departments, or divisions on issues pertaining to stopping individuals’ under twenty-one (21) years of age access to tobacco products, which include electronic nicotine-delivery system products.
  2. Provide retail tobacco products dealers and electronic nicotine-delivery system products dealers signs concerning the prohibition of sales to individuals under twenty-one (21) years of age. The signs, conforming to the requirements of this chapter, shall be sold at cost. This sign, or an exact duplicate of it made privately, shall be displayed in all locations where tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, are sold.
  3. Investigate concurrently with other state and local officials violations of this chapter.
    1. Utilize unannounced statewide compliance checks of tobacco product sales, including electronic nicotine-delivery system product sales; retail tobacco product over-the-counter sales, which include electronic nicotine-delivery system product over-the-counter sales; mail-order sales initiated via mail, facsimile, telephone, or internet ordering or other types of electronic communications; and tobacco product, including electronic nicotine-delivery system product vending machine sales, as part of investigating compliance with the provisions of this chapter. Underage individuals, acting as agents for the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals and with the written permission of a parent or guardian for individuals under eighteen (18) years of age, may purchase, with impunity from prosecution, tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, for the purposes of law enforcement or government research involving monitoring compliance with this chapter, provided that the underage individuals are supervised by an adult law enforcement official. Any individual participating in an unannounced compliance check of over-the-counter or vending machine sales must state his or her accurate age if asked by the sales representative of the retail establishment being checked.
    2. In fulfilling the requirement of unannounced statewide compliance checks, the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals shall maintain complete records of the unannounced compliance checks, detailing, at least, the date of the compliance check; the name and address of the retail establishment checked or the mail order company; the results of the compliance check (sale/no sale); whether the sale was made as an over-the-counter sale, a mail-order purchase or a tobacco product, including an electronic nicotine-delivery system product vending machine sale; and if a citation was issued for any violation found. The records shall be subject to public disclosure. Further, the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals shall report to the owner of each retail establishment checked or mail-order company the results of any compliance check (sale/no sale) whether the sale was made as an over-the-counter sale, a mail-order purchase, or a tobacco and/or electronic nicotine-delivery system product vending machine sale, and if a citation was issued for any violation found.
  4. Seek enforcement, concurrently with other state and local officials, of the penalties as detailed in this chapter.
  5. Develop and disseminate community health education information and materials relating to this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, effective July 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1, effective July 7, 2021.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the paragraph designations in subdivision (4).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2015.

11-9-13.7. Signs concerning sales to individuals under age twenty-one (21).

Signs provided by the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals, or an exact duplicate of it made privately, shall:

  1. Contain in red bold lettering a minimum of three-eighths inch (3/8") high on a white background the following wording in both English and Spanish:

    Click to view

  2. Contain the phone number at the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals, where violations of §§ 11-9-13.2 11-9-13.19 can be reported, in addition to any other information required by the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals.
  3. Be displayed prominently for public view, wherever tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, are sold at each cash register, each tobacco product vending machine, including each electronic nicotine-delivery system product vending machine, or any other place from which tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, are sold. The signs shall be electronically available in both English and Spanish online at the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals’ website.

THE SALE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS, INCLUDING CIGARETTES AND ELECTRONIC NICOTINE-DELIVERY SYSTEM PRODUCTS TO INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE AGE OF 21 IS AGAINST RHODE ISLAND LAW (, Rhode Island Statutes) PHOTO ID FOR PROOF OF AGE IS REQUIRED FOR PURCHASE. § 11-9-13.8(1)

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 336, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 429, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, effective July 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1, effective July 7, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 336, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 429, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-9-13.8. Prohibitions applicable to license holders and their employees and agents.

A person holding a license issued under chapter 20 of title 44 and/or § 23-1-56 , or an employee or agent of that person, is prohibited from selling, distributing, or delivering a tobacco product, including an electronic nicotine-delivery system product:

  1. To any individual who is under twenty-one (21) years of age; or
  2. In any form other than an original, factory-wrapped package as sealed and certified by the manufacturer; or
  3. As a single-cigarette sale (§ 44-20-31 ) or as a sale of cigarettes by the individual piece known as “loosies.”

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, effective July 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1, effective July 7, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Preemption.

City’s Price and Flavor Ordinances on tobacco sales, regulating certain discounting and prohibiting certain flavored tobacco sales were not preempted by Rhode Island’s state law regulating tobacco sales, minimum pricing, and advertising, because the Rhode Island General Assembly had at no time disclosed, by implication or otherwise, its intent to occupy exclusively the field of regulating smoking. Nat'l Ass'n of Tobacco Outlets v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19928 (1st Cir. 2013).

11-9-13.8.1. Signs concerning the health effects of tobacco.

Signs provided by the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals, or an exact duplicate of it made privately, shall:

  1. Contain in red bold lettering a minimum of one-quarter of an inch (1/4") high on a white background the following wording, in both English and Spanish:

    WARNING: SMOKING CIGARETTES CONTRIBUTES TO LUNG DISEASE, CANCER, HEART DISEASE, STROKE AND RESPIRATORY ILLNESS AND DURING PREGNANCY MAY RESULT IN LOW BIRTH WEIGHT AND PREMATURE BIRTH.

  2. The signs shall also include information regarding resources available to Rhode Island residents who would like to quit smoking.
  3. The signs shall be displayed prominently for public view wherever tobacco products are sold at each cash register, each tobacco vending machine, or any other place from which tobacco products are sold. The signs shall be electronically available in both English and Spanish online at the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals’ website.
  4. The department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals shall have the power and authority to develop and disseminate signs pursuant to the requirements of this section for other tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products. The messaging included in the signs shall be based on the most current scientific evidence.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 336, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 429, § 2; P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, effective July 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1, effective July 7, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 336, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 429, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-9-13.9. Multiple citations prohibited.

No person shall be liable under this chapter for more than one citation on any one day. However, a single citation may list one or more violations of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1.

11-9-13.10. Prohibition on the distribution of free tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products.

The distribution and/or redemption of free tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products or coupons or vouchers redeemable for free or discounted tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, to any individual under twenty-one (21) years of age shall be prohibited. Further, the distribution and/or redemption of free tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products or coupons or vouchers redeemable for free or discounted tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, shall be prohibited, regardless of the age of the individual to whom the products, coupons, or vouchers are distributed, within five hundred feet (500´) of any school. The attorney general, or any local or state of Rhode Island police department, or their officers or agents, shall bring an action for any violation of this section. Every separate, free or discounted tobacco product, including an electronic nicotine-delivery system product or coupon or voucher redeemable for a free or discounted tobacco product, including an electronic nicotine-delivery system or product, in violation of this section shall constitute a separate offense subject to a fine of five hundred dollars ($500). The penalty shall be assessed against the person or individual responsible for initiating the Rhode Island distribution of the free or discounted tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products or coupons or vouchers redeemable for free or discounted tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, and/or against the person or individual responsible for the redemption of such coupons or vouchers.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 2; P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, effective July 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1, effective July 7, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 4 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2018.

P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 4 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Preemption.

City’s Price and Flavor Ordinances on tobacco sales, regulating certain discounting and prohibiting certain flavored tobacco sales were not preempted by Rhode Island’s state law regulating tobacco sales, minimum pricing, and advertising, because the Rhode Island General Assembly had at no time disclosed, by implication or otherwise, its intent to occupy exclusively the field of regulating smoking. Nat'l Ass'n of Tobacco Outlets v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19928 (1st Cir. 2013).

11-9-13.11. Prohibition on the sale or distribution of tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, through the mail — Conveyance of tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, through the mail to individuals under twenty-one (21) — Proof of age of purchaser required — General rule.

  1. The distribution, or sale or conveyance of tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, to individuals under the age of twenty-one (21) via the United States Postal Service, or by any other public or private postal or package delivery service, shall be prohibited.
  2. Any person selling or distributing tobacco products in the form of little cigars as defined in § 44-20.2-1 , snuff, any and all products defined in § 44-20-1 , or electronic nicotine-delivery system products directly to a consumer via the United States Postal Service, or by any other public or private postal or package delivery service, including orders placed by mail, telephone, facsimile, or internet, shall: (1) before distributing or selling the tobacco product, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, through any of these means, receive both a copy of a valid form of government identification showing date of birth to verify the purchaser is age twenty-one (21) years or over and an attestation from the purchaser certifying that the information on the government identification truly and correctly identifies the purchaser and the purchaser’s current address, and (2) deliver the tobacco product, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, to the address of the purchaser given on the valid form of government identification and by a postal or package delivery service method that either limits delivery to that purchaser and requires the purchaser to sign personally to receive the delivery or requires a signature of an individual age twenty-one (21) or over at the purchaser’s address to deliver the package.
  3. The attorney general shall bring an action for any violation of this chapter. Any distribution, or sale or conveyance of a tobacco product, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, to an individual under twenty-one (21) years of age via the United States Postal Service, or by any other public or private postal or package delivery service, shall be subject to an action against the distributor, or seller or conveyor by the attorney general of the state of Rhode Island. A minimum fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000) shall be assessed against any distributor, or seller or conveyor convicted of distributing, or selling or conveying tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, via the United States postal service, or by any other public or private postal or package delivery service, for each delivery, or sale or conveyance of a tobacco product, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, to an individual under twenty-one (21) years of age.
  4. For the purpose of this section, “distribution,” “distributing,” “selling” and “sale” do not include the acts of the United States Postal Service or other common carrier when engaged in the business of transporting and delivering packages for others or the acts of a person, whether compensated or not, who transports or delivers a package for another person without any reason to know of the package’s contents.
  5. Any delivery sale of cigarettes shall be made pursuant to the provisions of chapter 20.1 of title 44. The provisions of this section shall apply to each tobacco product listed in subsection (b) herein, which include electronic nicotine-delivery system products, but shall not apply to any delivery sale of cigarettes.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 346, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 392, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, effective July 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1, effective July 7, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 346, § 1, and P.L. 2005, ch. 392, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-9-13.12. Enforcement and penalties — Citation for violation.

  1. Any local or state of Rhode Island police department or the attorney general, their officers or agents, shall issue a citation for any violation of the requirements or prohibitions of this chapter.
  2. The license holder receiving the citation may elect to plead guilty to the violation(s) and pay the fine(s) through the mail within ten (10) days, or appear in court to answer to the citation.
  3. All recipients of third and subsequent citations within any thirty-six (36) month period shall appear in court for a hearing on the citation.
  4. The failure of a license holder to either pay the citation through the mail within ten (10) days, where permitted under this section, or to appear in court on the date specified shall be cause for the court to hold the license holder in contempt of court with the penalty assessed a suspension of license for six (6) months and a five hundred dollar ($500) fine.
  5. The court shall impose court costs and any other court fee(s) on anyone convicted in court of a violation of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1.

11-9-13.13. Nature and size of penalties.

  1. Any license holder who violates a requirement of § 11-9-13.6(2) or § 11-9-13.7 , display of specific signage, shall be subject to a fine in court of not less than thirty-five dollars ($35.00), nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), per civil violation.
  2. The license holder is responsible for all violations of this section that occur at the location for which the license is issued. Any license holder who or that violates the prohibition of § 11-9-13.8(1) or § 11-9-13.20 shall be subject to civil fines as follows:
    1. A fine of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for the first violation within any thirty-six-month (36) period;
    2. A fine of five hundred dollars ($500) for the second violation within any thirty-six-month (36) period;
    3. A fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000) and a fourteen-day (14) suspension of the license to sell tobacco products or electronic nicotine-delivery systems for the third violation within any thirty-six-month (36) period;
    4. A fine of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) and a ninety-day (90) suspension of the license to sell tobacco products or electronic nicotine-delivery systems for each violation in excess of three (3).
  3. Any person who or that violates a prohibition of § 11-9-13.8(3) , sale of single cigarettes; or § 11-9-13.8(2) , regarding factory-wrapped packs as sealed and certified by the manufacturer; shall be subject to a penalty of five hundred dollars ($500) for each violation.
  4. The department of taxation and/or the department of health shall not issue a license to any individual, business, firm, fiduciary, partnership, trust, association, or corporation, the license of which has been revoked or suspended; to any corporation, an officer of which has had his or her license revoked or suspended; or to any individual who is, or has been, an officer of a corporation the license of which has been revoked or suspended so long as such revocations or suspensions are in effect.
  5. The court may suspend the imposition of a license suspension of the license secured from the Rhode Island tax administrator or department of health for a violation of subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4) of this section if the court finds that the license holder has taken measures to prevent the sale of tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, to an underage individual and the license holder can demonstrate to the court that those measures have been taken and that employees have received training. No person or individual shall sell tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, at retail without first being trained in the legal sale of tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products. Training shall teach employees what constitutes a tobacco product, including an electronic nicotine-delivery system product; legal age of sale; acceptable identification; how to refuse a direct sale to an underage individual or secondary sale to an individual twenty-one (21) years or older; and all applicable laws on tobacco sales and distribution. Dealers shall maintain records indicating that the provisions of this section were reviewed with all employees who conduct, or will conduct, tobacco product sales, including electronic nicotine-delivery system product sales. Each employee who sells or will sell tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, shall sign an acknowledgement form attesting that the provisions of this section were reviewed with him or her. Each form shall be maintained by the retailer for as long as the employee is so employed and for no less than one year after termination of employment. The measures to prevent the sale of tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products, to underage individuals shall be defined by the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals in rules and regulations.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 103, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 366, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 336, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 386, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 2; P.L. 2018, ch. 346, § 18; P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, effective July 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1, effective July 7, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 336, § 1, and P.L. 2005, ch. 386, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 3, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2015.

P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 4 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2018.

P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 4 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2018.

11-9-13.14. Notification to the Department of Taxation of fines imposed.

The court shall maintain records of any penalty, fine or suspension imposed under this chapter and notify within sixty (60) days the tax administrator of the penalty, fine or suspension imposed.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1.

11-9-13.15. Penalty for operating without a dealer license.

  1. Any individual or business who or that violates this chapter by selling or conveying a tobacco product without a retail tobacco products dealer license shall be cited for that violation and shall be required to appear in court for a hearing on the citation.
  2. Any individual or business cited for a violation under this section of this chapter shall:
    1. Either post a two-thousand-five-hundred-dollar ($2,500) bond with the court within ten (10) days of the citation; or
    2. Sign and accept the citation indicating a promise to appear in court.
  3. An individual or business who or that has accepted the citation may:
    1. Pay a ten-thousand-dollar ($10,000) fine, either by mail or in person, within ten (10) days after receiving the citation; or
    2. If that individual or business has posted a bond, forfeit the bond by not appearing at the scheduled hearing. If the individual or business cited pays the ten-thousand-dollar ($10,000) fine or forfeits the bond, that individual or business is deemed to have admitted the cited violation and to have waived the right to a hearing on the issue of commission on the violation.
  4. The court after a hearing on a citation shall make a determination as to whether a violation has been committed. If it is established that the violation did occur, the court shall impose a ten-thousand-dollar ($10,000) fine, in addition to any court costs or other court fees.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 151, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 168, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 512, art. 1, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 151, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 168, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-9-13.16. Rules and regulations.

The department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to fulfill the intent of §§ 11-9-13.2 11-9-13.2 0.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 5; P.L. 2001, ch. 391, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 4 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2018.

P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 4 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2018.

11-9-13.17. Fines collected.

  1. One-half (1/2) of all the fines collected pursuant to §§ 11-9-13.2 11-9-13.2 0 shall be transferred to the municipalities in which the citation originated.
  2. One-half (1/2) of all the fines collected pursuant to §§ 11-9-13.2 11-9-13.2 0 shall be transferred to the general fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 4 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2018.

P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 4 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2018.

11-9-13.18. Prohibition on the sale or distribution of certain excise tax stamps.

The division of taxation shall not sell or distribute cigarette excise tax stamps, or permit the use of a metering machine as described in § 44-20-20 for any cigarette product packaged with less than twenty (20) cigarettes per package. The sale or distribution of cigarettes in packages of less than twenty (20) is prohibited.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1.

11-9-13.19. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application of it to any individual or circumstances is held invalid in a court test, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 321, § 1.

11-9-13.20. Packaging of electronic nicotine-delivery system liquid.

  1. No liquid, whether or not such liquid contains nicotine, that is intended for human consumption and used in an electronic nicotine-delivery system, as defined in § 11-9-13.4 , shall be sold unless the liquid is contained in child-resistant packaging.
  2. Any liquid nicotine container that is sold at retail in this state must satisfy the child-resistant effectiveness standards set forth in 16 C.F.R. § 1700.15(b), when tested in accordance with the method described in 16 C.F.R. § 1700.20. All licensees under § 23-1-56 shall ensure that any liquid sold by the licensee intended for human consumption and used in an electronic-nicotine delivery system, as defined in § 11-9-13.4 , is sold in a liquid nicotine container that meets the requirements described and referenced in this subsection.
  3. For the purposes of this section, “liquid nicotine container” means a bottle or other container of a liquid or other substance where the liquid or substance is sold, marketed, or intended for use in a vapor product. A “liquid nicotine container” does not include a liquid or other substance in a cartridge that is sold, marketed, or intended for use in a vapor product, provided that such cartridge is prefilled and sealed by the manufacturer and not intended to be opened by the consumer.
  4. Any licensee or any person required to be licensed under § 23-1-56 who or that fails to comply with this section shall be subject to the penalties provided in § 11-9-13.13 .
  5. The licensee is responsible for all violations of this section that occur at the location for which the license is issued.
  6. No licensee or person shall be found in violation of this section if the licensee or person relied in good faith on documentation provided by or attributed to the manufacturer of the packaging of the aforementioned liquid that such packaging meets the requirements of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § 4 provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2018.

P.L. 2017, ch. 426, § 4 provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2018.

11-9-14. [Repealed.]

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 29; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 30; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 29; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 29; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-14 ; P.L. 2001, ch. 124, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 148, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 251, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 426, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 182, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 223, § 1; repealed by P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 3, effective July 7, 2021; repealed by P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 3, effective July 7, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-9-14 concerned use of tobacco by minors.

11-9-14.1. Compliance with federal statutes and regulations.

The provisions of §§ 11-9-13 , 11-9-13 .1, 11-9-13.4 , 11-9-13.6 , 11-9-13.7 , 11-9-13.8 , 11-9-13.1 0, 11-9-13.1 1, and 11-9-13.12 shall be interpreted so as not to be less restrictive than the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 387 et seq., including 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d), or than Section 1926 of the federal Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26, or than any regulation promulgated or updated by the United States Food and Drug Administration or the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services arising from the acts; so as to comply with the provisions of the acts and related regulations in regard to prohibiting the sale of tobacco products, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products to individuals under the age of twenty-one (21) years; and so that the state may maintain qualification for federal funding regarding tobacco, the use and cessation of tobacco, including electronic nicotine-delivery system products. Nothing herein shall prohibit the state from enacting a statute or promulgating a regulation that is more restrictive than any provision of 21 U.S.C. § 387 et seq., or any provision of 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26.

History of Section. P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 2, effective July 7, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 2, effective July 7, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 204, § 2, and P.L. 2021, ch. 205, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-9-15. Tattooing of minors.

  1. Every person who shall tattoo any minor under the age of eighteen (18), except in accordance with subsection (b) for medical purposes, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding three hundred dollars ($300). For the purposes of this section, “tattooing” means the practice of marking the skin with indelible patterns or pictures by making punctures and inserting pigments. Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the removal of tattoo markings from the body of any person of whatsoever age.
  2. Every person who shall tattoo the body of a minor under the age of eighteen (18), for medical purposes, the following shall apply:
    1. The minor child shall be accompanied by his or her parent or legal guardian;
    2. The minor child and his or her parent or legal guardian shall each submit proof of his or her identity by producing a government-issued photo identification;
    3. The parent or legal guardian shall submit his or her written notarized consent in the format prescribed by the department;
    4. The parent or legal guardian shall submit proof that he or she is the parent or legal guardian of the minor child;
    5. The parent or legal guardian shall submit notarized consent by a physician licensed in accordance with chapter 5-37, authorizing the tattooing of a minor child for medical purposes;
    6. The tattooing is performed by a tattoo artist licensed in accordance with § 23-1-39 ; and
    7. The tattoo artist shall maintain all necessary records in a manner specified by the department.
  3. Every person who tattoos the body of a minor child younger than eighteen (18) years of age may not violate the provisions of this section, if:
    1. The person carefully inspects what appears to be a government-issued photo identification that represents that the minor child is eighteen (18) years of age or older.
    2. The minor child falsely represents himself or herself as being eighteen (18) years of age or older and presents a fraudulent identification.
    3. The person demonstrates clear and convincing standards in reviewing the authenticity of the documents, notarized consent and identification submitted in accordance with subsection (b).
  4. Any person who violates the provisions of this chapter shall, upon a first conviction, be deemed guilty of a violation and fined not more than three hundred dollars ($300), and upon a second or subsequent conviction, shall be deemed guilty of a petty misdemeanor and fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500).
  5. The director of the department of health shall have the following powers and duties:
    1. To promulgate regulations relative to administering this section; and
    2. To create all necessary applications and certificates necessary to implement the provisions of this section.
  6. If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 45; P.L. 1932, ch. 1922, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 45; P.L. 1956, ch. 3713, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-9-15 ; P.L. 2013, ch. 148, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 197, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 148, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 197, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Tattooing or permanent disfigurement of students, § 11-21-3 .

11-9-16. Plastic bags — Labeling.

  1. “Plastic bag” means a polyethylene bag, other than one used for food products weighing not more than five (5) pounds, intended for household use or for packaging articles intended for household use, which is larger than five inches (5") in diameter at the opened end, and is made of thin film less than one mil (0.001 inch) in thickness (according to standards established under the commodity standards division of the United States Department of Commerce).
  2. No person shall package, deliver or sell any article for use in or around the household in a plastic bag, or shall sell or distribute any plastic bag for use in or around the household, unless the bag bears a warning against the hazard of suffocation by children in the following or substantially equivalent wording:

    “Keep from children — may cause suffocation”

    “WARNING: Keep this bag away from babies and children. Do not use in cribs, beds, carriages, or playpens. The thin film may cling to nose and mouth and prevent breathing.”

  3. The warning shall be printed on, attached to, or accompany each bag; provided, that it shall be permissible to print the warning on the outside wrapper of packages of bags intended only for home processing use, such as freezer bags and garbage disposal bags, in lieu of on each individual bag. The warning shall be conspicuously displayed in bold face type, in accordance with the following table:

    Click to view

  4. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this section shall upon conviction be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100).

Total of the length and width of the bag, combined Font Size 60 inches or more 24 points 40 inches, but less than 60 inches 18 points 30 inches, but less than 40 inches 14 points Less than 30 inches 10 points

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 82, § 1; P.L. 1960, ch. 171, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

11-9-17. Sterilization.

Every person who performs or aids and abets in the performance of a sterilization procedure on any person under the age of eighteen (18), unless the sterilization is incidental to, or is rendered necessary or unavoidable by, some other medical treatment or procedure required to preserve the life or health of that person, shall be guilty of a felony punishable by up to five (5) years imprisonment and a fine of up to five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 187, § 1.

11-9-18. Care of babies born alive during attempted abortions.

Any physician, nurse, or other licensed medical person who knowingly and intentionally fails to provide reasonable medical care and treatment to an infant born alive in the course of an abortion shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years, or both. Any physician, nurse, or other licensed medical person who knowingly and intentionally fails to provide reasonable medical care and treatment to an infant born alive in the course of an abortion, and, as a result of that failure, the infant dies, shall be guilty of the crime of manslaughter.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 280, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

The former section (P.L. 1978, ch. 355, § 1), concerning the children’s code commission, was repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 248, § 8. For present similar provisions of law, see § 42-74-1 .

11-9-19. Sale of spray paint to minors.

  1. No person shall knowingly sell to any child under eighteen (18) years of age any aerosol container of paint capable of defacing property.
  2. For purposes of this section, bona fide evidence of majority, identity of majority and identity of the person is a document issued by a federal, state, county, or municipal government, or subdivision or agency of them, including, but not limited to, a motor vehicle operator’s license, a registration certificate issued under the federal Selective Service Act, 50 App. U.S.C. § 451 et seq., or an identification card issued to a member of the armed forces.
  3. Proof that the defendant, or his employee or agent, demanded, was shown and acted in reliance upon bona fide evidence in any sale transaction forbidden by subsection (a) of this section, shall be a defense to any criminal prosecution for that violation.
  4. Any person who owns, manages or operates a place of business where aerosol containers of paint capable of defacing property are sold shall conspicuously post notice of this law in the place of business in letters at least three-eighths of an inch (3/8") high.
  5. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 394, § 1.

11-9-19.1. Possession of spray paint by a minor.

  1. No person under the age of eighteen (18) years shall have in his or her possession or under his or her control any aerosol container of spray paint. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be subject to a requirement of up to fifty (50) hours of community restitution work.
  2. Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to possession or use of aerosol spray paint containers on property owned or rented by the minor or his or her parent(s) or guardian(s).

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 361, § 1.

11-9-20. Sale of matches.

  1. No person, firm or corporation that owns, manages or operates a place of business including vending machines shall knowingly sell, give or deliver matches to any child under the age of twelve (12) years. The owner, operator or manager of a place of business where matches are sold shall post a notice of this law conspicuously in the place of business in letters at least three-eighths of an inch (3/8") high. Signs required by this section may be provided, at cost, by the department of health.
  2. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be fined one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 159, § 2.

11-9-21. Prohibition of sale of certain dietary supplements to minors.

  1. It shall be a misdemeanor for any manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, or other person, to sell, transfer, or otherwise furnish any of the following to a person under 18 years of age:
    1. A dietary supplement containing an ephedrine group alkaloid.
    2. A dietary supplement containing any of the following:
      1. Androstanedoil.
      2. Androstanedione.
      3. Androstenedione.
      4. Noradrostenediol.
      5. Norandrostenedione.
      6. Dehydroepiandrosterone.
  2. The seller shall request valid identification from any individual who attempts to purchase a dietary supplement set forth in subsection (a) if that individual reasonably appears to the seller to be under 18 years of age.
  3. Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), a retail clerk who fails to request identification pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall not be guilty of a misdemeanor, subject to any civil penalties, or subject to any disciplinary action or discharge by his or her employer.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 244, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 246, § 2.

Chapter 9.1 Commercial Transactions

11-9.1-1. Receipts for installment payments for merchandise.

Any person selling merchandise on the installment plan shall give to every purchaser of the merchandise on the plan a receipt in writing for every installment paid on account of the price of the merchandise, and every such receipt shall show the balance of the price remaining unpaid after giving credit for the payment. Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be fined twenty dollars ($20.00).

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1596, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 184, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 210, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 384, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1956, § 6-15-1 .

11-9.1-2. Fraudulent issuance of bill of lading.

Any officer, agent or servant of a carrier who, with intent to defraud issues or aids in issuing a bill of lading knowing that all or any part of the goods for which the bill is issued have not been received by the carrier, or by an agent of the carrier or by a connecting carrier, or are not under the carrier’s control at the time of issuing the bill, shall be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1914, ch. 1029, § 44; G.L. 1923, ch. 320, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 473, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 6-24-45.

11-9.1-3. False statements in bill of lading.

Any officer, agent, or servant of a carrier who, with intent to defraud, issues or aids in issuing a bill of lading for goods knowing that it contains any false statement, shall be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1914, ch. 1029, § 45; G.L. 1923, ch. 320, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 473, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 6-24-46.

11-9.1-4. Unlawful issuance of duplicate bill of lading.

Any officer, agent, or servant of a carrier who, with intent to defraud, issues or aids in issuing a duplicate or additional negotiable bill of lading for goods without placing plainly upon the face of each bill the word “duplicate” or some other word or words indicating that the document is not an original bill of lading, knowing that a former negotiable bill of lading for the same goods or any part of them is outstanding and uncanceled, shall be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1914, ch. 1029, § 46; G.L. 1923, ch. 320, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 473, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 6-24-47.

11-9.1-5. Unlawful shipment on negotiable bill of lading.

Any person who ships goods to which he or she does not have title, or upon which there is a lien or mortgage, and who takes for the goods a negotiable bill of lading which he or she afterwards negotiates for value with intent to deceive and without disclosing his or her want of title or the existence of the lien or mortgage, shall be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1914, ch. 1029, § 47; G.L. 1923, ch. 320, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 473, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 6-24-48.

11-9.1-6. Transfer of bill of lading for goods not in control of carrier.

Any person who, with intent to deceive, negotiates or transfers for value a bill of lading knowing that any or all of the goods which, by the terms of the bill, appear to have been received for transportation by the carrier which issued the bill of lading, are not in the possession or control of the carrier, or of a connecting carrier, without disclosing this fact, shall be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1914, ch. 1029, § 48; G.L. 1923, ch. 320, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 473, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 6-24-49.

11-9.1-7. Fraudulently procuring issuance of bill of lading.

Any person who, with intent to defraud, secures the issue by a carrier of a bill of lading knowing that at the time of the issue any or all of the goods described in the bill, as received for transportation, have not been received by the carrier, or an agent of the carrier or a connecting carrier, or are not under the carrier’s control, by inducing an officer, agent, or servant of the carrier falsely to believe that the goods have been received by the carrier, or are under its control, shall be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1914, ch. 1029, § 49; G.L. 1923, ch. 320, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 473, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 6-24-50.

11-9.1-8. Failure to mark nonnegotiable bill of lading.

Any person who, with intent to defraud, issues or aids in issuing a nonnegotiable bill of lading without the words “not negotiable” placed plainly upon the face of it shall be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1914, ch. 1029, § 50; G.L. 1923, ch. 320, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 473, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 6-24-51.

11-9.1-9. Issuance of fraudulent warehouse receipt.

A warehouse operator, or any officer, agent, or servant of a warehouse operator, who issues or aids in issuing a warehouse receipt knowing that the goods for which the receipt is issued have not been actually received by the warehouse operator, or are not under his or her actual control at the time of issuing the receipt, shall be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1549, § 50; G.L. 1909, ch. 270, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 315, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 468, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 6-25-51.

11-9.1-10. False statements in warehouse receipt.

A warehouse operator, or any officer, agent, or servant of a warehouse operator, who fraudulently issues or aids in fraudulently issuing a warehouse receipt for goods knowing that it contains any false statement, shall be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1549, § 51; G.L. 1909, ch. 270, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 315, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 468, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 6-25-52.

11-9.1-11. Failure to mark duplicate warehouse receipt.

A warehouse operator, or any officer, agent, or servant of a warehouse operator, who issues or aids in issuing a duplicate or additional negotiable receipt for goods knowing that a former negotiable receipt for the same goods or any part of them is outstanding and uncanceled, without plainly placing upon the face of it the word “Duplicate,” except in the case of a lost or destroyed receipt after proceedings as provided for in § 6A-7-601 , shall be guilty of a crime and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1549, § 52; G.L. 1909, ch. 270, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 315, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 468, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 6-25-53.

11-9.1-12. Failure to state warehouse operator’s title in warehouse receipt.

Where there are deposited with or held by a warehouse operator goods of which he or she is owner, either solely or jointly or in common with others, the warehouse operator, or any of his or her officers, agents, or servants who, knowing this ownership, issues or aids in issuing a negotiable receipt for the goods which does not state that ownership, shall be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1549, § 53; G.L. 1909, ch. 270, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 315, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 468, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 6-25-54.

11-9.1-13. Failure to take up warehouse receipt on delivery of goods.

A warehouse operator, or any officer, agent, or servant of a warehouse operator, who delivers goods out of the possession of the warehouse operator, knowing that a negotiable receipt the negotiation of which would transfer the right to the possession of the goods is outstanding and uncanceled, without obtaining the possession of the receipt at or before the time of the delivery, shall, except in the cases provided for in §§ 6A-7-210 and 6A-7-601 , be found guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1549, § 54; G.L. 1909, ch. 270, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 315, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 468, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 6-25-55.

11-9.1-14. Failure of depositor to disclose lien or want of title on negotiation of warehouse receipt.

Any person who deposits goods to which he or she does not have title, or upon which there is a lien or mortgage, and who takes for those goods a negotiable receipt which he or she afterwards negotiates for value with intent to deceive and without disclosing his or her want of title or the existence of the lien or mortgage, shall be guilty of a crime, and upon conviction shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1549, § 55; G.L. 1909, ch. 270, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 315, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 468, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 6-25-56.

11-9.1-15. Laundering of monetary instruments.

  1. Whoever conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction: (1) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or (2) with the intent to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or (3) with the intent to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state law; or (4) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part: (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under the laws of this state or of the United States; shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years, or both.
  2. Whoever conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction: (1) knowing that the property involved in the transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, or has been or is being used to conduct or facilitate some form of unlawful activity; or (2) involving property represented as the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, by a law enforcement officer or other person working at the direction or with the approval of an official authorized to investigate or prosecute violations of this section; shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years, or both.
  3. Whoever is convicted of conducting or attempting to conduct a financial transaction described in subsection (a) or (b) of this section is liable to the state of Rhode Island for a civil penalty of not more than the greater of:
    1. The value of the property, funds, or monetary instruments involved in the transaction; or
    2. Ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
  4. As used in this section:
    1. “Conducts” includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating or concluding a transaction;
    2. “Financial institution” means any institution organized under title 19, or any institution having the definition given that term in 31 U.S.C. § 5312, where applicable, including, but not limited to, banks, savings banks, bank associations, trust companies, loan and investment companies, savings and loan companies, building-loan associations, credit unions, deposit-insurance companies, and any other depository required by law to file reports with the Rhode Island department of business regulation;
    3. “Financial transaction” means a transaction involving the movement of funds;
    4. “Knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity” means that the person knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under state law, regardless of whether or not the activity is specified in subdivision (7) of this subsection.
    5. “Monetary instruments” means coin or currency of the United States or any other country, travelers’ checks, personal checks, bank checks, money orders, investment securities in bearer form or in such form that title to them passes upon delivery, and negotiable instruments in bearer form or in such form that title to them passes upon delivery;
    6. “Specified unlawful activity” includes:
      1. Any act or activity declared a felony pursuant to title 19;
      2. Any act or activity declared a felony pursuant to chapter 28 of title 21;
      3. Any act or acts prohibited by the Rhode Island Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), chapter 15 of title 7;
      4. Any act constituting a felony pursuant to this title.
    7. “Transaction” includes a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and with respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means effected.
  5. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to duplicate or prevent the application or effect of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, or of any provision of state or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 51, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 82, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 95, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the paragraph designations in subsection (a).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 82, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 95, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

Construction and application of The United States Sentencing Guideline § 2S1.1 (18 USCS Appx § 2S1.1), pertaining to sentencing for money laundering. 139 A.L.R. Fed. 323.

Validity, construction, and application of 18 USCS § 1956, which criminalizes money laundering. 121 A.L.R. Fed. 525.

What is considered property “involved in” money laundering offense, and thus subject to civil or criminal forfeiture, for purposes of Money Laundering Control Act (18 USCS § 981(a)(1)(A) and 982(a)(1)). 135 A.L.R. Fed. 367.

Chapter 10 Crime Against Nature

11-10-1. Abominable and detestable crime against nature.

Every person who shall be convicted of the abominable and detestable crime against nature, with any beast, shall be imprisoned not exceeding twenty (20) years nor less than seven (7) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 12; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 11-10-1 ; P.L. 1998, ch. 24, § 1.

Cross References.

Assault with intent to commit, § 11-5-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Crime against nature:

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 34.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Compilers Note.

Most of the annotations appearing below were decided prior to the 1998 amendment to this section, which deleted “mankind” from the section.

Constitutionality.

Court rejected defendant’s argument that he could not be constitutionally convicted under this section for fellatio because the statute is so vague and uncertain as to violate his due process rights, reasoning that since the judicial construction in State v. Milne, 95 R.I. 315 , 187 A.2d 136 (1962), appeal dismissed, 373 U.S. 542, 83 S. Ct. 1539, 10 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1963) held that fellatio falls within the statutory proscription, defendant had clear notice that his conduct was criminal under this section as construed. State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32 , 371 A.2d 596, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1426 (1977).

Where defendant was convicted pursuant to this section of having forced victim to perform fellatio, he could not challenge the constitutionality of the statute as applied hypothetically to consenting adults. State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32 , 371 A.2d 596, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1426 (1977).

This section is not unconstitutional because it is impermissibly vague and does not deprive defendants of their constitutional right of privacy. State v. Gibbons, 418 A.2d 830, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1732 (1980).

Criminal prosecution under this section of an unmarried consenting heterosexual adult who engages in an act of cunnilingus is not prohibited by the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. State v. Chiaradio, 660 A.2d 276, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 184 (1995).

— Right to Privacy.

The right of privacy is inapplicable to the private unnatural copulation between unmarried adults. State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799 , 413 A.2d 58, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1473 (1980).

A decision of unmarried adults to engage in private consensual sexual activities is not of such a fundamental nature and is not so implicit in the concept of ordered liberty as to warrant its inclusion in the guarantee of personal privacy. Therefore, the prosecution of an unmarried person for a violation of this section was constitutional. State v. Lopes, 660 A.2d 707, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 175 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1123, 116 S. Ct. 934, 133 L. Ed. 2d 861, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1105 (1996).

Construction.

The court was of the opinion that when the provisions of this section are read in the context of the entire title, the legislative intent becomes obvious that all unnatural sexual copulation was to be made unlawful along with normal extra-marital sexual intercourse. State v. Milne, 95 R.I. 315 , 187 A.2d 136, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 167 (1962).

The Legislature purposely chose the term “crime against nature” to achieve a degree of comprehensiveness that would not have been possible with an enumeration. State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799 , 413 A.2d 58, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1473 (1980).

Since the legislative purpose in enacting title 11 was to proscribe all natural copulation that takes place outside of the marriage status, this section in this light necessarily proscribes all unnatural sexual copulation. State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799 , 413 A.2d 58, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1473 (1980).

This section is intended to punish a wide variety of unnatural acts of sexual copulation. State v. McParlin, 422 A.2d 742, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1853 (1980).

— With Sexual Assault Statute.

In enacting chapter 37 of title 11, it is clear that the legislature did not intend to pardon any of the activity that is covered under this section. Accordingly, this section retains viability notwithstanding the enactment of the sexual-assault statute in chapter 37 of title 11. State v. Souza, 456 A.2d 775, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 815 (1983).

The offense of an abominable and detestable crime against nature is a lesser included offense of the offense of first-degree sexual assault, where the physical act required to consummate both offenses is identical and the only difference is a material factual dispute concerning whether the acts are consensual in nature or the result of force or coercion. State v. Yates, 571 A.2d 575, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1990).

Anal Intercourse.

The act of anal intercourse for which defendant was convicted, being an act of “unnatural sexual copulation,” was clearly proscribed by this section. State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799 , 413 A.2d 58, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1473 (1980).

Consent is not a defense to a charge of a crime against nature under this section. State v. Lopes, 660 A.2d 707, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 175 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1123, 116 S. Ct. 934, 133 L. Ed. 2d 861, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 1105 (1996).

Effect of Amendments.

The trial justice did not err in determining that the preservation of abominable and detestable crime against nature charges against the defendant would have been inconsistent with the manifest intention of the legislature to decriminalize sodomy between consenting adults and that such preservation would be repugnant to the statute as amended. State v. Mullen, 740 A.2d 783, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 195 (1999).

Evidence — Admissibility.

Testimony regarding the defendant’s harassment of the victim is relevant, material, and reasonably necessary to prove his consciousness of guilt, where the defendant’s harassment is well documented and his threats are corroborated by the victim’s neighbor. State v. Woodson, 551 A.2d 1187, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 153 (1988).

Fellatio and Cunnilingus.

Fellatio is criminal under the provisions of this section and therefore is an indecent act within the purview of the pertinent provisions of § 11-34-5. State v. Milne, 95 R.I. 315 , 187 A.2d 136, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 167 (1962); State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799 , 413 A.2d 58, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1473 (1980).

Although both fellatio and cunnilingus are crimes against nature, they are distinct in definition. Fellatio is “the offense committed with the male sexual organ and the mouth.” Cunnilingus is an act of sex perversion committed with the mouth and the female sex organ. State v. McParlin, 422 A.2d 742, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1853 (1980).

Indictment.

The word sodomy when used in conjunction with the charge of “committing an abominable and detestable crime against nature” is nothing more than surplusage. State v. Castore, 435 A.2d 321, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1335 (1981).

Where criminal information charged defendant with the commission of “the abominable and detestable crime against nature, sodomy” the term “sodomy” was nothing more than surplusage and need not have been established by the state to obtain a conviction under this section where another “abominable and detestable crime against nature” was proven during the course of the trial. State v. Castore, 435 A.2d 321, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1335 (1981).

Penetration.

In proving the element of penetration, the state is not required to offer evidence corroborating that of the complainant and the testimony of the complainant was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction even though a physician who examined the complainant several weeks after the alleged assault testified he found no evidence of penetration. State v. Correia, 106 R.I. 655 , 262 A.2d 619, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 970 (1970).

Collateral References.

Consent as defense in prosecution for sodomy. 58 A.L.R.3d 636.

Entrapment defense in sex offense prosecutions. 12 A.L.R.4th 413.

Liability of church or religious society for sexual misconduct of clergy. 5 A.L.R.5th 530.

Chapter 11 Disorderly Conduct

11-11-1. Disturbance of public assemblies generally.

Every person who shall willfully interrupt or disturb any town or ward meeting, any assembly of people met for religious worship, any military funeral or memorial service, any public or private school, any meeting lawfully and peaceably held for purposes of moral, literary or scientific improvement, or any other lawful meeting, exhibition or entertainment, either within or without the place where the meeting or school is held, shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 278, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 344, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 396, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-11-1 ; P.L. 2007, ch. 183, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 212, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 183, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 212, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Disorderly conduct, § 11-45-1 .

Town meeting, disorderly conduct at, § 45-3-19 .

Comparative Legislation.

Disorderly conduct:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

School Disturbances.

Interruption or disturbance of a public school is a breach of the public peace for which an offender may be arrested by an officer without a warrant when the act is done in his view. Douglass v. Barber, 18 R.I. 459 , 28 A. 805, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1894).

Collateral References.

“Choice of evils,” necessity, duress, or similar defense to state or local criminal charges based on acts of public protest. 3 A.L.R.5th 521.

Conduct amounting to offense of disturbing public or religious meeting. 12 A.L.R. 650.

Vagrancy, disorderly conduct in public place as. 14 A.L.R. 1489.

Vagueness as invalidating statutes or ordinances dealing with disorderly persons or conduct. 12 A.L.R.3d 1448.

Validity, construction, and operation of federal disorderly conduct regulation (36 C.F.R. § 2.34). 180 A.L.R. Fed. 637.

11-11-2. Use of dangerous or offensive instruments or substances to disturb public assemblies.

Any person who shall willfully place in, on, about, or upon any theater, motion picture house, hall, or other building or place where people are assembled for the purpose of entertainment or instruction, any substance or thing that does or is liable to interrupt and disturb the peace and order of that place, or is liable to interrupt, disturb, or throw into confusion or endanger the life and limb of persons assembled in that place, or which is liable to or does cause injury to the property of the owner, lessee, tenant, or other occupant of the theater, motion picture house, hall, or other building or place, or whoever willfully throws into, against or upon, or puts, places, and explodes or causes to be placed or exploded in or upon any theater, motion picture house, hall, or any other building or place of public assemblage, any bomb, torpedo, or other instrument or package loaded or filled with any explosive or offensive substance with intent unlawfully to destroy or injure the theater, motion picture house, hall, or other building or place of public assemblage, shall be imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years, or shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 76; P.L. 1932, ch. 1921, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 86; G.L. 1956, § 11-11-2 .

11-11-3. Carrying on business or entertainment in vicinity of religious meeting.

Whenever any religious society shall hold any camp, tent, grove or other out-door meeting, or the Society of General Six-principle Baptists of Rhode Island and Massachusetts shall hold their annual “general meeting,” for any purpose connected with the object for which the religious society was organized, no person, without the consent of the religious society or of its proper officers, shall keep in any shop, tent, booth, wagon or carriage or other place, for sale, or expose for sale any spirituous or intoxicating liquors or other drinks or food or merchandise of any kind, or hawk or peddle any liquors or merchandise mentioned in this section within one mile of the place of the meeting, nor shall any person engage in gaming, horse racing, or exhibit or offer to exhibit any show or play within the like distance of one mile of a meeting; and every person violating any provision of this section shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00) nor less than five dollars ($5.00) or be imprisoned not exceeding thirty (30) days; provided, that nothing contained in this section shall be so construed as to prevent innkeepers, grocers, or other persons from pursuing their ordinary business at their usual place of doing business, nor to prevent any person from selling victuals in his or her usual place of abode.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 121, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 147, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 152, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 11-11-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This statute is not unconstitutional under R.I. Const., art. 1, § 16 , but is a proper exercise of the police power. State v. Read, 12 R.I. 137 , 1879 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1879).

Complaint.

Clerical error in the name of the society was not ground for quashing complaint. State v. Read, 12 R.I. 135 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1878).

Where complaint alleged that camp meeting was taking place and that society was a religious society, it was not necessary to allege that meeting was for a purpose connected with the object for which the society was organized. State v. Read, 12 R.I. 135 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1878).

Elements of Offense.

That the society was a religious society, that a camp meeting was taking place, and that the defendant did not fall within the proviso, were necessary elements of the offense. State v. Read, 12 R.I. 135 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1878).

11-11-4. Prevention from carrying on employment.

Every person who, by himself or herself or in concert with other persons, shall attempt by force, violence, threats or intimidation of any kind to prevent, or who shall prevent, any other person from entering upon and pursuing any employment, upon any terms and conditions as that person may think proper, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) or be imprisoned not exceeding ninety (90) days.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 278, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 344, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 396, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 11-11-4 .

11-11-5. Profanity.

Every person who shall be guilty of profane swearing and cursing shall be fined not exceeding five dollars ($5.00).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 16; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 11-11-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Although this section is not by its terms limited to a situation in which the use of profanity rises to the level of fighting words, and is thus capable of an overbroad interpretation encompassing protected speech, the court construed this section to proscribe only fighting words to preserve its constitutional validity. State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42 , 385 A.2d 642, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 637 (1978).

Profanity can only be constitutionally punished if the penal statute is restricted to the proscription of fighting words. State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42 , 385 A.2d 642, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 637 (1978).

Given the commonly understood and established meaning of the word “profane” and its inclusion in criminal statutes by both state and federal legislatures, the use of the term in this section was a sufficient warning to protect defendant’s due process rights. State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42 , 385 A.2d 642, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 637 (1978).

“Profane.”

“Profane” means any words imparting an imprecation of divine vengeance or implying divine condemnation or irreverence toward God or holy things. State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42 , 385 A.2d 642, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 637 (1978).

— Fighting Words.

The test to be applied in determining whether defendant’s profanity amounted to fighting words is whether defendant’s words, when directed to the average person, would cause that person to fight. State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42 , 385 A.2d 642, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 637 (1978).

Crude words uttered by defendant which were not directed at the police officer did not constitute fighting words. State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42 , 385 A.2d 642, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 637 (1978).

Collateral References.

Words as disorderly conduct. 48 A.L.R. 87.

11-11-6. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 15; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 11-11-6 ), concerning the penalty for blasphemy, was repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 336, § 1, effective July 3, 2004.

11-11-7. Overcrowded assembly.

  1. The occupant load permitted in any assembly building structure, or portion of it, shall be determined by dividing the net floor area or space assigned to that use by the square feet per occupant as follows:
    1. An assembly area of concentrated use without fixed seats such as an auditorium, gymnasium, church, chapel, dance floor, and lodge room, seven square feet (7 sq. ft.) per person.
    2. An assembly area of less concentrated use such as conference rooms, dining room, drinking establishments, exhibit room, or lounge, fifteen square feet (15 sq. ft.) per person.
    3. Standing room or waiting space, five square feet (5 sq. ft.) per person; provided, that aisle area, except rear cross aisles, shall not be considered in determining the number of standing patrons allowed.
  2. Any residential structure, or portion of it, that is used by persons to assemble for consumption of food or drink shall not exceed the occupant load as determined by dividing the net floor area or space assigned to that use by the square feet per occupant as follows:
    1. Any individual single family dwelling or any unit in a multi-family dwelling or apartment house, fifteen (15) net square feet per person;
    2. A public space associated with a single family dwelling or any multi-family dwelling or apartment house, fifteen (15) net square feet per person.
  3. Penalty.  If any person in control or possession of a building or structure, or portion of it, fails to comply with the provisions of this section, the assembly shall be reduced to the limit set forth by this section and the person in control or possession of a building or structure shall be guilty of a petty misdemeanor and fined an amount not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for the first offense with notice of the offense sent by certified mail to the owner of the building or structure. The fine shall double for the second offense and triple for the third offense with all notices of the offenses sent to the owner of the building by certified mail. In the event there are more than three (3) offenses at a building or structure, the owner shall also be guilty of a petty misdemeanor and fined an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 79, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 219, § 1.

Chapter 12 Dueling and Fighting

11-12-1. Engaging in duel.

Every person who shall voluntarily engage in a duel with any dangerous weapon, to the hazard of life, shall be imprisoned not exceeding seven (7) years nor less than one year.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 11-12-1 .

Collateral References.

Disbarment for dueling. 9 A.L.R. 205; 43 A.L.R. 107; 55 A.L.R. 1373.

11-12-2. Challenging or accepting challenge to duel.

Every person who shall challenge another to fight a duel with any dangerous weapon, to the hazard of life, and every person who shall accept a challenge to fight such duel, although no duel be fought, shall be imprisoned not exceeding seven (7) years nor less than one year.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-12-2 .

11-12-3. Duel without state resulting in death within state.

Every person, being an inhabitant of or resident in this state, who shall fight a duel outside the jurisdiction of this state, by previous appointment or engagement made within this state, and in the duel shall inflict a mortal wound upon any person of which the person so injured shall afterwards die within this state, shall be deemed to be guilty of murder within this state and may be indicted or charged by information, tried, convicted and sentenced in the county in which the death shall happen.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 11-12-3 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 4.

11-12-4. Seconding fatal duel outside state.

Every person being an inhabitant of or resident in this state who shall, by previous appointment or engagement made within this state, be the second of either party in any duel as is mentioned in § 11-12-3 and shall be present as the second when the mortal wound is inflicted, of which death shall ensue within this state, shall be deemed to be an accessory before the fact to the crime of murder within this state, and may be indicted or charged by information, tried, convicted and sentenced within the county where the death shall happen.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 11-12-4 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 4.

11-12-5. Plea of former jeopardy.

Any person indicted under either § 11-12-3 or 11-12-4 may plead a former conviction or acquittal of the same offense in the state or county in which the duel was fought, and that plea, if admitted or established, shall bar all further proceedings against the person for the same offense within this state.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 11; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 11-12-5 .

11-12-6. Fighting by appointment.

Every person who shall, by previous appointment or arrangement, meet another person and engage in a fight, shall be imprisoned not more than ten (10) years or be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 12; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 11-12-6 .

Cross References.

Boxing and wrestling matches, § 41-5-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Boxing and Wrestling.

Chapter 5 of title 41 is an exception to this section, so should be strictly construed. Zannelli v. Di Sandro, 84 R.I. 76 , 121 A.2d 652, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1956).

11-12-7. Aiding fight by appointment.

Every person who shall be present at any fight as provided in § 11-12-6 as an aid, second or surgeon, or who shall advise, encourage or promote the fight, shall be imprisoned not more than five (5) years or be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 13; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 11-12-7 .

11-12-8. Leaving state to fight by appointment.

Every person who shall, by previous appointment or engagement, leave this state and engage in a fight with another person outside the limits of this state shall be imprisoned not more than five (5) years or be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), and may be indicted or charged by information, tried, convicted and sentenced in any county in this state.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 14; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 11-12-8 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 4.

11-12-9. Arrest of fighters.

A deputy sheriff, town sergeant, town constable, or police officer shall immediately arrest in any county any person violating any of the provisions of §§ 11-12-6 11-12-8 , and shall detain the person until a warrant can be obtained for his or her arrest.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 15; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 11-12-9 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 31; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 13; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 13.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 13, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 13 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

Chapter 13 Explosives and Fireworks

11-13-1. Sale, use or possession of fireworks.

  1. No person shall offer for sale at retail or at wholesale, shall possess or have under his or her control, use or explode, or cause to explode for exhibition or amusement, display fireworks or aerial consumer fireworks unless permits are obtained pursuant to this chapter and chapter 23-28.11. Display fireworks are defined in the American pyrotechnic association standard 87-1 (APA 87-1) 2001 Edition section 2.7.2 and are classified as explosives 1.3G by the U.S. department of transportation (U.S. DOT), UN0335. Aerial consumer fireworks are defined in APA 87-1 2001 Edition section 3.1.2. and are classified 1.4G U.S. DOT, UN 0336. Certain fireworks and devices that are exempt from the definitions of display fireworks and aerial consumer fireworks shall include, but are not limited to, the following: ground-based and hand-held sparkling devices (non-aerial fireworks) as defined in APA 87-1 2001 Edition sections 3.1.1 and 3.5, and include the following: fountains, illuminating torches, wheels, ground spinners, flitter sparklers, sparkers; novelties, which are defined in the APA 87-1 2001 Edition section 3.2 and include the following: party poppers, snappers, toy smoke devices, snakes, glow worms, wire sparklers and dipped sticks; paper caps containing not more than twenty-five hundredths (0.025) grains of explosive mixture ammunition to be consumed by weapons used for sporting and hunting purposes, and model rockets and model rocket engines, designed, sold and used for the purpose of propelling recoverable aero models). The storage, possession, sale, transportation and use of the items in the above reference section that are not included in the definition of display fireworks and aerial consumer fireworks shall be allowed at all times throughout the state for persons at least sixteen (16) years of age. Permits for display fireworks and aerial consumer fireworks for commercial display may be issued in accordance with provisions of the Rhode Island Fire Safety Code, chapters 28.1 — 28.39 of title 23. Fireworks display of display and aerial consumer fireworks by any municipality, fair association, amusement park, or other organization or group of individuals is permitted, on condition that the display shall be made by a competent operator approved by the local fire authority and shall be of such character as in the opinion of the fire authority will not be hazardous to persons or property; and, provided further, that the foregoing shall not apply the use of display and aerial consumer fireworks by common carriers for signal or illumination purposes, the use of blank cartridges in any show or theater, the use of explosives for blasting, the use of display and aerial consumer fireworks as signals in any athletic or sporting event, the use of display and aerial consumer fireworks for ceremonial or military purposes, the sale of fireworks for shipment out of this state, or the sale of fireworks for any use permitted pursuant to this section, provided the person who sells, stores or transports display and aerial consumer fireworks has a permit as required by the Rhode Island Fire Safety Code, chapters 28.1 — 28.39 of title 23.
  2. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a felony and shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each offense and/or imprisoned for not more than one year for each offense; except that any person using or having in his or her possession without a permit with intent to use display and aerial consumer fireworks with a value of under five hundred dollars ($500) shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon conviction be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense and/or imprisoned for not more than one year for each offense.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 110, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 134, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 177, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 406, §§ 4, 5; P.L. 1942, ch. 1130, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-13-1 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 236, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 299, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 376, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 326, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 284, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 25, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 28, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 25, § 1, and P.L. 2010, ch. 28, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Comparative Legislation.

Explosives:

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 266, § 101 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Implied License.

Appointment by city council of committee for Fourth of July celebration did not in itself imply a license to conduct a fireworks display. Sroka v. Halliday, 39 R.I. 119 , 97 A. 965, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1916).

Liability of Town.

Town is not liable for injuries resulting from negligence of licensees. Hassett v. Thurston, 43 R.I. 47 , 110 A. 394, 1920 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1920).

Collateral References.

Common-law liability for injury caused by fireworks or firecracker. 21 A.L.R.6th 81.

Validity, construction, and application of state or local laws regulating the sale, possession, use, or transport of fireworks. 48 A.L.R.5th 659.

11-13-1.1. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1974, ch. 236, § 2), concerning limitations on prosecutions and fines under § 11-13-1 , was repealed by P.L. 2001, ch. 86, § 21, effective July 6, 2001.

11-13-2. Limitation of prosecutions — Fines.

No complaint for a violation of any of the provisions of § 11-13-1 shall be sustained unless it shall be brought within thirty (30) days after the commission of the offense, and all fines for such violation shall enure one-half (1/2) to the complainant and one-half (1/2) to the state.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 110, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 134, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 177, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 406, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 11-13-2 .

Compiler’s Notes.

See also § 11-13-1.1 , enacted by P.L. 1974, ch. 236, § 2. That section may supersede this section.

11-13-3. Sale of fulminate cartridges or contrivances to minors.

  1. No person shall sell to any child under the age of fifteen (15) years, without the written consent of a parent or guardian of the child, any cartridge or fixed ammunition of which any fulminate is a component part, or any gun, pistol or other mechanical contrivance arranged for the explosion of the cartridge or of any fulminate. Nothing in this section shall authorize the sale of any blank cartridge except as provided in § 11-13-5 .
  2. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall be fined not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than twenty dollars ($20.00) for each offense.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 110, §§ 7, 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 134, §§ 7, 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 177, §§ 7, 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 406, §§ 8, 9; G.L. 1956, § 11-13-3 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Cross References.

Firearms, sale to or possession by minors, § 11-47-30 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Negligence.

In civil action for injuries from sale of weapon to minor, it was not necessary for plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the minor. Bernard v. Smith, 36 R.I. 377 , 90 A. 657, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1914).

There was no negligence in the sale of a rifle to a father for the use of his fifteen year old son. Corey v. Kaufman & Chernick, 70 R.I. 27 , 36 A.2d 103, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1944).

11-13-4. Toy canes or devices for firing blanks.

No person or persons shall sell, expose for sale, possess with intent to sell or use, or discharge or use, within this state, any repeating toy cane for discharging any explosive, any toy pistol, or any other toy device designed or used for the discharge of blank cartridges.

History of Section. P.L. 1905, ch. 1244, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 134, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 177, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 406, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 11-13-4 .

11-13-5. Sale of blanks to minors.

No person shall sell or offer to sell blank cartridges to any person under twenty-one (21) years of age.

History of Section. P.L. 1905, ch. 1244, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 134, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 177, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 406, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 11-13-5 .

11-13-6. Penalty for unlawful devices.

Any person violating any of the provisions of § 11-13-4 or 11-13-5 shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00) for each offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1905, ch. 1244, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 134, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 177, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 406, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 11-13-6 .

11-13-7. Unlawful firecrackers.

Every person who shall sell, expose for sale, possess with intent to sell, use, or explode, or use or explode any firecracker containing any explosive other than gunpowder shall be fined not more than twenty dollars ($20.00).

History of Section. P.L. 1896, ch. 342, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 134, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 177, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 406, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 11-13-7 .

11-13-8. Delivery or transportation of unmarked explosives or inflammable substances.

Every person who shall knowingly deliver or cause to be delivered to any person or carrier any box, can, or other package of nitroglycerine, gunpowder, naphtha, or other equally inflammable and explosive substance, material, or fluid, not marked with a plain and legible label describing its contents, or who shall remove or cause to be removed any such label or mark, or who shall carry or cause to be carried on any vessel, car, or vehicle operated in the transportation of passengers by a common carrier, which vessel, car, or vehicle is carrying passengers for hire, any box, can, or other package of nitroglycerine, gunpowder, naphtha, guncotton or substance or material containing guncotton, or any other equally inflammable and explosive material, substance, or fluid, shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or imprisoned not more than five (5) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 47; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 50; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 50; P.L. 1926, ch. 857, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 50; G.L. 1956, § 11-13-8 .

Cross References.

Placing explosives near highways, buildings, or tracks, § 11-36-1 .

Possession or carrying of explosives or noxious substances, § 11-47-21 .

11-13-9. Placing of explosive devices — Threats — Possession of readily convertible components.

  1. Every person who, without lawful authority, places a bomb, explosive device, or any destructive or incendiary device or substance, or falsely reports the placing of a bomb, explosive device, or any destructive or incendiary device or substance, shall upon conviction be imprisoned not less than three (3) years nor more than twenty (20) years and fined not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
  2. Every person who threatens to place a bomb, explosive device, or any destructive or incendiary device or substance shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned not less than one year nor more than ten (10) years and fined not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).
  3. Whoever, without lawful authority, has in their possession or under their control any bomb, explosive device, or any destructive or incendiary device or substance, or combination of materials that are readily convertible to a bomb, explosive device, or any destructive or incendiary device or substance, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three (3) years nor more than twenty (20) years, or by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.

History of Section. R.P.L. 1957, ch. 18, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 215, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 100, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 232, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 281, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 308, art. 2, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 232, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 281, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The words of the statute, if viewed in their plain and ordinary meaning, convey a clear and unmistakable message; therefore, there can be no attack based upon vagueness or overbreadth. State v. Berberian, 459 A.2d 928, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 861 (1983).

Building Defined.

Not only is an area in which persons may lawfully assemble as provided in § 11-11-1 protected by this section, but also protected is any public or private building without limitation. State v. Berberian, 459 A.2d 928, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 861 (1983).

Intent.

In order to violate this section, it is sufficient that a threat be made, regardless of the subjective intention of the defendant. State v. Berberian, 459 A.2d 928, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 861 (1983).

Legislative Intent.

The legislative intent in enacting this section was clearly to protect persons not only from the placing of bombs but from the undesirable effects of the exercise of a macabre sense of humor by those who would make false reports. State v. Berberian, 459 A.2d 928, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 861 (1983).

Unoccupied or Occupied Buildings.

Whether a bomb or a grenade is placed in a building in a spot where no person is present or placed in the hands or possession of a person who is on the premises does not control the application of this section. State v. Berberian, 459 A.2d 928, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 861 (1983).

11-13-10. Definitions.

For purposes of this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Destructive or incendiary device or substance” means an explosive, article or device designed or adapted to cause physical harm to persons or property by means of fire, explosion, deflagration, or detonation and consisting of any substance capable of being ignited, whether or not contrived to ignite or explode automatically.
  2. “Explosive” means any chemical compound, mechanical mixture, or device that contains any oxidizing and combustible units, or other ingredients, in such proportions, quantities, or packing that ignition by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of the compound, mixture, or device, or any part thereof, may cause an explosion; any chemical compound, mixture, or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion; the term includes, but is not limited to, high and low explosives, black powder, smokeless powder, pellet powder, initiating explosives, detonators, safety fuses, squibs, detonating cord, igniter cord, igniters; and other materials that are classified as Division 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 or 1.6 explosives by the United States Department of Transportation or listed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 841 or 27 C.F.R. 555.23. “Explosive” shall not include a pyrotechnic, small-arms ammunition, small-arms ammunition primers, smokeless powder and black powders possessed in quantities allowable by law pursuant to § 23-28.28-5 unless possessed or used for an illegal purpose.
  3. “Hoax explosive,” “hoax destructive or incendiary device or substance,” or “hoax chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon” means any device, article, or substance that would cause a person to reasonably believe that the device, article, or substance is: (i) An explosive; (ii) A destructive or incendiary device or substance; or (iii) A chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon, harmful radioactive substance or poison capable of causing bodily injury that is actually an inoperable facsimile.
  4. “Oxidizer” means a substance that yields oxygen readily to stimulate the combustion of organic matter or other fuel.
  5. “Places” means to set or put in a particular space.
  6. “Pyrotechnic” means any commercially manufactured combustible or explosive composition or manufactured article designed and prepared for the purpose of producing an audible effect or a visible display including, but not limited to: (i) Fireworks, firecrackers; and (ii) Flares, fuses and torpedoes, so-called, and similar signaling devices.
  7. “Readily converted” means any combination of components that have been brought together in a manner for assembly that is designed or adapted to cause physical harm to persons or property by means of fire, explosion, deflagration, or detonation but are not yet in a completed stage. Elements to determine whether an item is “readily converted” include, but are not limited to: (i) Time required to convert the components; (ii) Ease of conversion; (iii) Expertise needed; (iv) Necessary equipment; (v) Availability of parts and the ease in which they can be obtained; (vi) Expense; (vii) Scope to which the item(s) have already been modified; and (viii) Feasibility.
  8. “Small-arms ammunition” means any shotgun, rifle, pistol, or revolver cartridge and cartridges for propellant-actuated power devices and industrial guns.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2018, ch. 281, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 232, § 2, and P.L. 2018, ch. 281, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 14 False Personation

11-14-1. Impersonation of public officer.

Every person who shall falsely assume or pretend to be a judge, justice of the peace, warden, deputy sheriff, alderman, member of any city or town council, city or town clerk, city sergeant, constable, correctional officer, any other officer of any city or town in this state as well as any out-of-state police, or the attorney general, deputy attorney general, assistant or special assistant attorney general, and shall act as such, shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 17; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 11-14-1 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 318, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 245, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 586, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 32; P.L. 2013, ch. 327, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 392, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 327, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 392, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Obtaining property by personation as larceny, § 11-41-4 .

State police, impersonation, § 42-28-24 .

Comparative Legislation.

False personation:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-378, 53a-130.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Judges.

Although a complainant could complain pursuant to § 12-6-1 that an offense had been committed in violation of this statute, plaintiff did not have standing to attack a judge’s qualifications where the judge was acting under color of right in litigation pending in his court. State v. Storms, 112 R.I. 454 , 311 A.2d 567, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1004 (1973).

Police Officers.

A police officer is “any other officer” within the meaning of this section; consequently when the legislature enacted this section, it intended to declare the act of falsely impersonating a police officer to be a criminal offense. State v. Dussault, 121 R.I. 751 , 403 A.2d 244, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2191 (1979).

Collateral References.

Criminal liability for false personation during stop for traffic infraction. 26 A.L.R.5th 378.

Intent as affecting offense of false personation. 95 A.L.R. 1510.

11-14-2. Impersonation of town sealer, auctioneer, corder, or fence-viewer.

Every person who shall falsely assume or pretend to be a town sealer of weights and measures, auctioneer, corder of wood, or fence-viewer, and shall act as such, shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 18; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 11-14-2 .

11-14-3. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 30; P.L. 1908, ch. 1562, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 45; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 48; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 46; G.L. 1956, § 11-14-3 .), concerning the unauthorized wearing of military uniforms, was repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 336, § 2, effective July 3, 2004.

11-14-4. Unauthorized wearing of organizational insignia.

Any person not a member, respectively, of the Society of Cincinnati; Society of the War of 1812; Aztec Club of 1847; Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States; Grand Army of the Republic; National Association of Naval Veterans of the United States; Society of the Army of the Potomac; Society of the Army of the Cumberland; Society of the Army of Ohio; Society of the Army of Tennessee; Society of the Burnside Expedition; Society of the Ninth Army Corps; Sons of Veterans, United States of America; Society of the Sons of the American Revolution; Sons of the Revolution; United Spanish-American War Veterans; Women’s Relief Corps; Ladies’ Aid Society; Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution; Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the United States; Knights of Pythias; Dramatic Order of Knights of Khorassan; American Legion; Military Order of Foreign Wars of the United States; Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States; Fraternal Order of Police; International Brotherhood of Police Officers (IBPO), the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF) whether it be IAFF windshield decals or IAFF license plate emblems or both; or any person not a member respectively of any other society or association or of any labor union which shall have registered in the office of the secretary of state a facsimile or duplicate or description of its name, badge, decoration, insignia, button, emblem, or rosette, who shall use or wear, respectively, the name, badge, decoration, insignia, button, emblem, or rosette of that organization, unless he or she shall be entitled to use or wear it, respectively under the constitution, bylaws, or rules and regulations of the societies or orders, respectively, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 22; P.L. 1900, ch. 742, § 1; P.L. 1906, ch. 1358, § 1; P.L 1907, ch. 1448, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 31; P.L. 1909, ch. 439, § 1; P.L. 1918, ch. 1642, § 1; P.L. 1920, ch. 1833, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 31; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 30; G.L. 1956, § 11-14-4 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 117, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 259, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 474, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 390, § 1.

11-14-5. Unauthorized use of American Federation of Musicians label.

Any person who willfully uses or displays the label or logo of the American Federation of Musicians without the written permission of, or in any manner not authorized by, the federation shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 70, § 1.

11-14-6. Impersonation of a public utility company employee.

Every person who shall falsely assume or pretend to be an employee of a public utility company, or the employee of a nonregulated power producer, and act as such so as to gain or attempt to gain entry into any residence or business, for any purpose, shall be imprisoned not exceeding six (6) months, or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 128, § 1.

Chapter 15 Flags and Emblems

11-15-1. Definition of terms.

“Flag,” “standard,” “color,” or “ensign,” as used in §§ 11-15-1 — 11-15-3, includes any flag, standard, color, ensign, or any picture or representation of either of them, made of any substance, or represented on any substance, and of any size, evidently purporting to be either of the flag, standard, color, or ensign of the United States of America, or a picture or a representation of either of them, upon which shall be shown the colors, the stars, and the stripes, in any number of either of them, or by which the person seeing the picture or representation, without deliberation, may believe it to represent the flag, colors, standards, or ensign of the United States of America.

History of Section. P.L. 1902, ch. 986, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 40; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 40; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 39; G.L. 1956, § 11-15-1 .

11-15-2, 11-15-3. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1902, ch. 986, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 39; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 39; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 38; G.L. 1956, § 11-15-2 ; P.L. 1902, ch. 986, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 41; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 41; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 11-15-3), concerning illegal or permitted uses of the American flag or its image, were repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 336, § 3, effective July 3, 2004.

11-15-4. Use of state emblems for commercial purposes.

No person, firm or corporation shall use the state seal, the state coat of arms, or a facsimile or imitation of them, for commercial purposes. The use of the state seal, the state coat of arms, or a facsimile or imitation of them as a portion of any letterhead, or in any advertisement, shall create a presumption that the use is for commercial purposes. Any person who violates any provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1703, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-15-4 .

11-15-4.1. Unauthorized use of the emblem of the attorney general.

No person, firm or corporation shall use, without authorization, the emblem of the department of the attorney general that is authorized by the attorney general or any such emblem used to imitate an emblem of the department of the attorney general, for any fraudulent purpose, or for any purpose intended to deceive, harm, or defraud any person. Any person who violates any provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, is subject to imprisonment for up to one year, a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 327, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 392, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 327, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 392, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-15-5. Injunctive relief.

The attorney general of the state of Rhode Island shall, upon the submission of proof of any violation of the provisions of § 11-15-4 , seek injunctive relief against further violation.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1703, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-15-5 .

11-15-6. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 48; P.L. 1914, ch. 1030, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 51; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 49; G.L. 1956, § 11-15-6 ), was repealed by P.L. 2004, ch 336, § 3, effective July 3, 2004.

11-15-7. Display of foreign flags on public buildings.

It shall be unlawful to display the flag or emblem of any foreign country upon the flagstaff of any state, county, city or town building or public schoolhouse within this state; provided, that when any foreigner shall become the guest of the United States, or of this state, the flag of the country of which the public guest shall be a citizen or subject may be displayed upon public buildings, except public schoolhouses. Every person who shall violate the provisions of this section shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 29; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 38; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 38; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 37; G.L. 1956, § 11-15-7 .

Chapter 16 Food and Beverages

11-16-1. Sale of unwholesome meat or drink.

Except as otherwise provided, in respect to specific articles of meat or drink, every person who shall sell any kind of diseased, corrupted, or unwholesome provisions, whether for meat or drink, shall be imprisoned not exceeding six (6) months or be fined not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 282, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 348, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 400, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 611, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-16-1 .

Collateral References.

Ignorance or mistake of fact, lack of criminal intent, or presence of good faith, as affecting penal offense predicated upon violation of food law. 152 A.L.R. 755.

11-16-2. Sale or killing of young calves.

Every person who shall kill or cause to be killed, for the purpose of sale, or who shall sell to any person engaged in the business of killing of animals to be used for food purposes, any calf less than four (4) weeks old and the weight of which is less than seventy-five (75) pounds, or shall sell, or possess with intent to sell, the flesh of any calf which he or she knows to have been killed when less than four (4) weeks old, or the weight of which calf before being killed he or she knows to have been less than seventy-five (75) pounds, shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 282, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 348, § 2; P.L. 1914, ch. 1055, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 400, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 611, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-16-2 .

11-16-3. Wrapping of food in second-hand paper.

No dealer in groceries, meats, provisions, or any articles of food whatsoever shall use or cause to be used newspapers, printed paper or other second-hand paper for the purpose of wrapping up such articles of food, unless the food shall first be placed in paper carton boxes, jars, tins, or other sanitary receptacles. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00) for each offense.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 348, § 4; P.L. 1911, ch. 708, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 400, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 611, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-16-3 .

11-16-4. Furnishing wood alcohol for beverage purposes.

Every person who sells, furnishes, or gives away wood alcohol or any preparation or compound containing wood alcohol, knowing that it is to be used for beverage purposes, shall be punished by imprisonment for life or any term of years, and he or she shall be liable to an action for damages for injuries to the person of anyone using the wood alcohol or the preparation or compound for beverage purposes, or if death results from that use, to an action for damages for the death of the person under the provisions of §§ 10-7-1 10-7-4 .

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 34; P.L. 1932, ch. 1857, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 34; G.L. 1956, § 11-16-4 .

Cross References.

Wood alcohol, unlawful sale or possession, § 21-30-4 .

11-16-5. Poisoning with intent to kill.

Every person who shall mingle any poison with any food, drink, or medicine, with intent to kill or injure any person, and every person who shall willfully poison any spring, well or reservoir of water with that intent, shall be imprisoned for life or for any term of years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 16; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 11-16-5 .

11-16-6. Poisoning in general.

Every person who shall knowingly offer, give or entice any other person to take or accept any treat, candy, gift, or food for consumption which is poisonous shall be subject to imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than twenty (20) years and may be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 154, § 1.

11-16-7. Tampering with packaging.

Every person who tampers with the contents of a package or container for sale to the public with the intent to injure a potential user of the contents shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than three (3) years nor more than ten (10) years, or a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 193, § 1.

Chapter 17 Forgery and Counterfeiting

11-17-1. Forgery and counterfeiting in general.

Every person who shall falsely make, alter, forge, or counterfeit, or procure to be falsely made, altered, forged, or counterfeited, any public record, or any writ, process, or proceeding in any court of justice in this state, any certificate or attestation of any judge, justice of the peace, warden, notary public, clerk of any court, town clerk, city clerk or other public officer, in any matter in which the certificate or attestation may be received as legal proof, any charter, deed, will, testament, bond, or writing obligatory, letter of attorney, policy of insurance, bill of exchange, bill of lading, railroad ticket, promissory note, order, acquittance, discharge for or upon the payment of money or delivery of goods, or any acceptance of a bill of exchange or any indorsement, assignment, or guaranty of any bill of exchange or promissory note, or any certificate, or accountable receipt for money, goods, or any other thing, or any warrant, order, or request for the payment of money or delivery of goods, or for the delivery of any note, bill, or other security for money or goods, or any lottery ticket, or part or share of any lottery ticket in any lottery authorized by the laws of any state, territory, or country, or any writing whatsoever purporting to contain evidence of any debt, contract, or promise, or of the discharge, payment of satisfaction of any debt, contract, or promise, with intent to defraud, or who shall utter and publish as true or shall procure to be uttered and published as true any such false, forged, altered, or counterfeited record, deed, or other writing as provided in this section, knowing it to be false, forged, altered, or counterfeited, with intent to defraud, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 280, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 346, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 398, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 609, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-17-1 .

Cross References.

Bank’s liability on forged instruments, § 6A-4-406 .

Bedding inspection stamps, counterfeiting, § 23-26-11 .

Cigarette tax stamps, licenses, discs or markers, forgery and counterfeiting, § 44-20-39 .

False representation to obtain controlled substance, § 21-28-4.05 .

Negotiable instrument, effect of forged signature, §§ 6A-3-404 , 6A-8-202 , 6A-8-205 .

Obtaining signature by false pretenses, § 11-41-13 .

Comparative Legislation.

Forgery and counterfeiting:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-137 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 267, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Civil Liability Suit.

In a suit brought by plaintiffs alleging a fraudulent scheme involving annuity insurance investments, the federal district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to plaintiffs’ counts alleging civil liability for crimes and offenses under Rhode Island law because under the pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, the court found that the catchall phrase “any writing whatsoever purporting to contain evidence of any debt, contract, or promise” in R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-17-1 arguably encompassed the annuity applications, which contained evidence of a promise. W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. v. Caramadre, 847 F. Supp. 2d 329, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14327 (D.R.I. 2012), aff'd, 793 F.3d 168, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12505 (1st Cir. 2015).

Duplicity in Indictment.

An indictment which charged in the same count that the defendant had custody of a forged order and had uttered and published it as true was not bad for duplicity. State v. Murphy, 17 R.I. 698 , 24 A. 473, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1892).

Imitation.

Where the indictment charges the uttering of an imitation, it must be proved that there is a bank which issues genuine notes. State v. Brown, 4 R.I. 528 , 1857 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1857).

Uttering and Publishing.

Under the provisions of the forgery statute, the crime of forgery and the crime of uttering and publishing are separate offenses, since the forger need not be the utterer, the utterer need not be the forger, and neither are even required to be aware of the other. State v. Oliveira, 730 A.2d 20, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 115 (1999).

Where the defendant was charged in the state’s criminal information with only the crime of uttering and publishing four checks, and not with the forging of the checks, the trial justice’s supplemental instruction after a request for clarification from the jury, in which he instructed them that the defendant could be found guilty of forgery, constituted both clear and prejudicial error. State v. Oliveira, 730 A.2d 20, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 115 (1999).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial on the charge of uttering and publishing, where the trial justice conducted a proper review of the trial proceedings and explained that the trial justice did not believe defendant’s testimony and that the jury was within its domain as fact-finder to credit the state’s witness’ version of events, that defendant knew the check was a forgery when defendant asked the witness to deposit the check in the witness’ bank account. State v. Kizekai, 19 A.3d 583, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 61 (2011).

Victim Not Essential Element.

A victim is not an essential element of either obtaining property by false pretenses or forgery. State v. Markarian, 551 A.2d 1178, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 149 (1988).

Collateral References.

Admissibility, in forgery prosecution, of other acts of forgery. 34 A.L.R.2d 777.

Alteration of written instrument in order to conform to actual intention as forgery. 93 A.L.R. 864.

Altering receipt, cancelled check, or other voucher as forgery. 26 A.L.R. 1058.

Appellate review of evidence as to genuineness of handwriting. 12 A.L.R. 212; 27 A.L.R. 319.

Blanks in paper, filling in, in terms other than authorized. 87 A.L.R. 1169.

Cloud on title, forged instrument as. 78 A.L.R. 182.

Criminal liability for wrongfully obtaining unemployment benefits. 80 A.L.R.3d 1280.

Criminal liability under state laws in connection with application for, or receipt of, public welfare payments. 22 A.L.R.4th 534.

Entrapment to commit crime. 18 A.L.R. 160; 66 A.L.R. 487; 86 A.L.R. 267.

Evidence of intent to defraud in state forgery prosecution. 108 A.L.R.5th 593.

Experiments to show erasure of writing by use of chemicals. 8 A.L.R. 40; 85 A.L.R. 479.

Falsifying of money order as forgery. 65 A.L.R.3d 1307.

Fictitious or assumed name, use of. 49 A.L.R.2d 852.

Genuine making of instrument for purpose of defrauding as constituting forgery. 41 A.L.R. 229; 46 A.L.R. 1529; 51 A.L.R. 568.

Procuring signature by fraud as forgery. 11 A.L.R.3d 1074.

Promise by one whose name is forged to take care of paper, effect of. 48 A.L.R. 1368; 1374.

Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by trial court. 29 A.L.R. 333; 89 A.L.R. 295.

Sentence or judgment, necessity and sufficiency of recital of, or reference to the offense in pronouncing. 14 A.L.R. 999.

Signing of credit cardcharge or credit sales slip as forgery. 90 A.L.R.2d 822.

Stolen money or property obtained by forgery. 89 A.L.R.2d 1439.

Unexplained possession or uttering of forged paper as sufficient evidence of place of forging. 164 A.L.R. 649.

Validity, construction, and application of 18 U.S.C. § 2320, criminalizing trafficking in counterfeit goods or services. 90 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 113.

What constitutes a public record or document within a statute making falsification, forgery, mutilation, removal, or other misuse thereof an offense. 75 A.L.R.4th 1067.

11-17-1.1. Forgery — Public assistance check or authorization.

  1. Any person who shall knowingly forge or cause to be forged one or more public assistance benefit check or authorization issued pursuant to chapter 6 of title 40, when the total value of the check or authorization so forged or caused to be forged in any period of twelve (12) consecutive months exceeds five hundred dollars ($500), shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
  2. Any person who shall knowingly forge or cause to be forged any public assistance benefit check or authorization issued pursuant to chapter 6 of title 40, when the value of the check or authorization forged or caused to be forged shall not exceed five hundred dollars ($500), shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.
  3. All criminal actions for any violation of this section shall be prosecuted by the attorney general.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 234, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

11-17-1.2. Forgery and counterfeiting of registration plates.

Every person who shall forge, counterfeit, or cause to be forged or counterfeited, any registration plate or special use identification tag, or knowingly possess any forged or counterfeited registration plate or special use identification tag, as provided in § 31-3-40 , shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2012, ch. 128, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 180, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 128, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 180, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-17-2. Forgery, counterfeiting, or alteration of state debt certificate or bank bill or note.

Every person who shall falsely make, forge, counterfeit, or falsely alter any note, certificate, or other security, in imitation of and purporting to be a note, certificate, or other security, which has been or hereafter may be issued for any debt of this state, or any bank bill or note in imitation of or purporting to be a bank bill which has been or hereafter may be issued by any corporation which is or hereafter may be established as a bank, in this state or elsewhere, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years nor less than two (2) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 280, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 346, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 398, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 609, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-17-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.

In prosecution under this section it must be shown that the bank actually exists and is a corporation. State v. Brown, 4 R.I. 528 , 1857 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1857).

11-17-3. Passing of counterfeit certificates, bills, or notes.

Every person who shall utter, publish, pass, or tender in payment as true, any false, forged, counterfeited, or altered certificate, security or bank bill or note, knowing it to be false, forged, counterfeited, or altered, with intent to defraud, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years nor less than two (2) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 280, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 346, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 398, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 609, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-17-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

“Note.”

The notes referred to in this section are those described in § 11-17-2 . State v. Brown, 4 R.I. 528 , 1857 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1857).

Collateral References.

Entrapment to commit offense of passing forged instrument. 18 A.L.R. 179; 66 A.L.R. 506; 86 A.L.R. 272.

11-17-4. Importation or possession of counterfeit certificate, bill, or note.

Every person who shall bring into this state or have in his or her possession or custody within this state, any false, forged, counterfeited, or altered certificate or security, bank bill, or note, knowing it to be false, forged, counterfeited or altered, with intent to utter, pass or, tender it in payment the same as true, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years nor less than two (2) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 280, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 346, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 398, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 609, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-17-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

“Note.”

The notes referred to in this section are those described in § 11-17-2 . State v. Brown, 4 R.I. 528 , 1857 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1857).

11-17-5. Manufacture, repair, or possession of counterfeiting devices.

Every person who shall engrave, form, make, or mend, or begin to engrave, form, make, or mend any plate, stone, paper, rolling press, or other instrument or material devised, adapted, and designed for the stamping, forging, or making any false, forged, and counterfeited bank bill or note, in imitation of bank bills or notes which have been or shall be issued by any bank which is or hereafter may be established as a bank in this state or elsewhere, or shall have in his or her possession or custody any plate or stone engraved in any part, or any paper, rolling press, or other instrument or material devised, adapted, or designed as provided in this section, with intent to use and employ it or to cause or permit it to be used and employed in making any false and counterfeited bank bill or note, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years nor less than two (2) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 280, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 346, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 398, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 609, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 11-17-5 .

11-17-6. Evidence as to handwriting.

In no prosecutions for forging, counterfeiting, or altering any bank bill or note or for uttering, passing, or tendering in payment as true any false, forged, counterfeited, or altered bank bill or note, or for bringing into this state or for having in possession or custody any false, forged, counterfeited, or altered bank bill or note with intent to pass it as true, knowing it to be false, forged, counterfeited, or altered, shall the testimony of any person whose name is purported to be signed to the bill or note or his or her personal attendance as a witness be requisite, when he or she shall be absent from this state at the time of the trial or when his or her place of residence shall be outside the limits of this state or more than thirty (30) miles from the place of trial, but the testimony of any competent witness who is acquainted with the handwriting of the person or who has knowledge of the difference between true and counterfeit or altered bank bills and who is skilled in the difference shall be received as competent evidence to prove any bank bill or note to be false, forged, counterfeited, or altered.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 280, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 346, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 398, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 609, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-17-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Witnesses.

Witnesses who had never seen a genuine bank bill such as the defendant is charged with imitating, but had only seen facsimiles printed in a trade publication, were not competent witnesses to testify on the genuineness of the bills in question. State v. Brown, 4 R.I. 528 , 1857 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1857).

11-17-7. Forgery or counterfeiting of coins.

Every person who shall forge or counterfeit any coin in imitation or similitude of any gold or silver coin current within this state by law or usage shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years nor less than two (2) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 280, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 346, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 398, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 609, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 11-17-7 .

Cross References.

Manufacture or distribution of slugs, § 11-18-22 .

Collateral References.

“Infamous offense,” conspiracy to make counterfeit coin as, within constitutional or statutory provision in relation to presentment or indictment by grand jury. 24 A.L.R. 1008.

11-17-8. Passing of counterfeit coins.

Every person who shall utter or tender in payment as true any false, forged or counterfeit coin, made and forged in imitation and similitude of any gold or silver coin current within this state by law or usage, knowing it to be false or counterfeit, with intent to defraud, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years nor less than two (2) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 280, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 346, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 398, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 609, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-17-8 .

11-17-9. Importation or possession of counterfeit coin with intent to pass.

Every person who shall bring into this state or have in his or her possession or custody any false or counterfeit coin, made and forged in imitation and similitude of any gold or silver coin current within this state by law or usage, knowing it to be false or counterfeit, with intent to utter or pass it in payment as true, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years nor less than two (2) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 280, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 346, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 398, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 609, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 11-17-9 .

11-17-10. Manufacture, repair, or possession of device for counterfeit of coins.

Every person who shall cast, stamp, engrave, form, make, or mend or begin to cast, stamp, engrave, form, make, or mend, or have in his or her possession or custody any mould, pattern, die, punch, press, or other tool or instrument whatsoever, devised, adapted, and designed for the forging or making any false or counterfeit coin in imitation and similitude of any gold or silver coin current within this state by law or usage, with intent to use and employ it or to cause it to be used or employed in forging or making any false or counterfeit coin as provided in this section, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years nor less than two (2) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 280, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 346, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 398, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 609, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 11-17-10 .

11-17-11. Seizure and destruction of counterfeits and counterfeiting devices.

Whenever the existence of any false, forged, or counterfeit bank bills or notes, or any plates, dies, or other tools, instruments, or implements used by counterfeiters or designed for the forging or making of any false or counterfeit notes, coin, or bills, shall come to the knowledge of any deputy sheriff, town constable, or police officer in this state, the officers shall immediately seize and take possession of it and deliver it into the custody of the superior court for the county in which it shall be, and the court shall, as soon as the ends of justice will permit, cause it to be destroyed by an officer of the court, which officer shall make a return to the court of his or her doings in the premises.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 280, § 11; C.P.A. 1905, § 1222; G.L. 1909, ch. 346, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 398, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 609, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 11-17-11 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 33; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 14; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 14.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 14, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 14 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

11-17-12. Disposition of plates and dies of defunct banks.

Whenever the charter of any bank in this state shall expire or become forfeited, and whenever any bank in this state shall close its business for any cause whatsoever, the directors of the bank who shall have been last in office shall immediately deliver up all their plates and dies to the superior court for the county in which the bank shall have been located or established, and the court shall cause the plates and dies to be disposed of in any manner that the court shall deem expedient, in order to prevent their being afterwards used for any unlawful purpose. Every director who shall willfully neglect or refuse to comply with the requirements of this section shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 280, §§ 12, 13; C.P.A. 1905, § 1222; G.L. 1909, ch. 346, §§ 12, 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 398, §§ 12, 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 609, §§ 12, 13; G.L. 1956, § 11-17-12 .

11-17-13. Forgery, counterfeiting, or alteration of trademark, service mark, or identification mark.

  1. As used in this chapter, “forged” or “counterfeited trademark”, “service mark”, or “identification mark” means any mark or design which is: (1) identical to, substantially indistinguishable from, or an imitation of a trademark, service mark, or identification mark which is registered for those types of goods or services with the secretary of state pursuant to chapter 2 of title 6 or registered on the principal register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office or registered under the laws of any other state or protected by the Federal Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Title 36 USC § 380, or if a registered or unregistered use of the trademark or design or data plate, serial number, or part identification number; and (2) which has not been authorized by the owner of it and is done for pecuniary gain and with the intent to defraud the holder of the trademark, service mark, or identification mark.
  2. Any person who knowingly and willfully forges or counterfeits any trademark, service mark, or identification mark, without the consent of the owner of the trademark, service mark or identification mark, or who knowingly possesses any tool, machine device, or other reproduction instrument or material with the intent to reproduce any forged or counterfeited trademark, service mark, or identification mark, shall be guilty of the offense of trademark counterfeiting.
    1. Any person who knowingly and willfully sells, offer to sell, or possesses with the intent to sell goods which contain a counterfeit trademark, service mark, or identification mark or sells or offers for sale a service in conjunction with a service mark the person knows is counterfeit, shall be guilty of the offense of trafficking in trademark counterfeits.
    2. If the goods or service to which the forged or counterfeit trademarks, service marks, or identification marks are attached or affixed, or in connection with which they are used, or to which the offender intended they be attached or affixed, or in connection with which the offender intended they be used, have, in the aggregate, a retail value of the goods if they were not forged or counterfeited of five thousand dollars ($5,000) or more, the person shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned up to five (5) years and fined up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
    3. If the goods or service to which the forged or counterfeit trademarks, service marks, or registered designs are attached or affixed, or in connection with which they are used, or to which the offender intended they be attached or affixed, or in connection with which the offender intended they be used, have, in the aggregate, a retail value of the goods if they were not forged or counterfeited of less than five thousand dollars ($5,000), the person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be imprisoned up to one year and fined up to one thousand dollars ($1,000).
    4. Any person who knowingly: (i) uses an object, tool, machine, or other device to produce or reproduce a counterfeit mark, or (ii) has possession, custody, or control of any object, tool, machine, or device with intent to produce or reproduce a counterfeit mark, is guilty of a felony and may be imprisoned up to five (5) years and fined up to five thousand dollars ($5,000).
    5. The possession, custody, or control of more than twenty-five (25) items having a counterfeit mark used on or in connection with them creates a presumption that the person having possession, custody, or control of the items intended to sell those items.
    6. If a person who violates this section previously has been convicted of violating this section, the person shall be guilty of a felony and may be imprisoned up to five (5) years and fined up to five thousand dollars ($5,000).
    1. Any personal property, including any item, object, tool, machine, device, or vehicle of any kind, employed as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of a violation of this section, or proceeds derived directly from a violation of this section, is subject to seizure and forfeiture and further proceedings shall be had for their forfeiture as is prescribed by law in chapter 21 of title 12; provided, that no property used by any person shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section unless it shall appear that the owner of the property had knowledge, actual or constructive, and was a consenting party to the illegal act.
    2. Property taken or detained under this section shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure and whenever property is forfeited under this chapter it shall be utilized as follows:
      1. Where the seized property is a vessel, vehicle, aircraft, or other personal property, it may be retained and used by the law enforcement agency that seized that property where the use of the property is reasonably related to the law enforcement duties of the seizing agency. If the seized property is a motor vehicle which is inappropriate for use by the law enforcement agency due to style, size or color, the seizing agency shall be allowed to apply the proceeds of sale or the trade-in value of the vehicle for activities reasonably related to law enforcement duties.
      2. Eighty percent (80%) of the proceeds shall be divided among the state and local law enforcement agencies proportionately based upon their contribution to the investigation of the criminal activity related to the asset being forfeited; the balance shall go to the department of attorney general for purposes related to law enforcement.
    3. At the conclusion of any criminal matter brought under this chapter any property seized pursuant to this chapter containing a counterfeit trademark, service mark, copyrighted or registered design shall be destroyed unless the owner of the trademark, service mark, or identification mark gives prior written consent to the use or sale of the property and the trademark, service mark, or identification mark is obliterated or removed from the property prior to the disposition of it.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 53, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 100, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subdivisions in subsections (c) and (d).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

8 USCS § 1101(a)(43)(R) subsumed all the elements of the offense under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-17-13(c)(1) . Accordingly, the fact of conviction alone established the alien’s status as an aggravated felon, and thus, the alien’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ declaration that the alien was removable as an aggravated felon was denied. Magasouba v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 13, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 20697 (1st Cir. 2008).

Collateral References.

Federal and State Copyright in Pre-1972 Sound Recordings. 38 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4 (2019).

Chapter 18 Fraud and False Dealing

11-18-1. Giving false document to agent, employee, or public official.

  1. No person shall knowingly give to any agent, employee, servant in public or private employ, or public official any receipt, account, or other document in respect of which the principal, master, or employer, or state, city, or town of which he or she is an official is interested, which contains any statement which is false or erroneous, or defective in any important particular, and which, to his or her knowledge, is intended to mislead the principal, master, employer, or state, city, or town of which he or she is an official.
  2. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for a term not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1905, ch. 1219, §§ 3, 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, §§ 23, 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, §§ 23, 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, §§ 23, 24; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-1 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Cross References.

Bank tax, false or fraudulent return, §§ 44-14-32 , 44-14-33 .

Business corporation tax, false or fraudulent return, §§ 44-11-32 , 44-11-33 .

Cigarette tax, false or fraudulent report, § 44-20-43 .

Employment security, false representations to obtain benefits or avoid contributions, §§ 28-42-62 , 28-42-62 .1.

Public service corporation tax, false or fraudulent return, §§ 44-13-28 , 44-13-29 .

Sales and use taxes, false or fraudulent return, § 44-19-31 .

State pension, fraudulent claim or statement, § 36-10-33 .

Temporary disability insurance, false statements to avoid contributions or obtain benefits, §§ 28-39-23 , 28-39-24 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The purpose of the fraud and false dealing statute is to protect the named public and private entities from fraud and deceit. State v. Salvatore, 763 A.2d 985, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 1 (2001).

Construction With Other Law.

Neither this section nor § 11-18-6 relate to the protection of the same interest as does § 19-19-1 because the two misdemeanor statutes are designed to control external transmissions of false information whereas the felony statute is designed to protect the integrity of the internal records of a bank for the protection of its depositors; therefore, neither of the misdemeanors bears the necessary inherent relationship to the felony offense to make it a lesser included offense. State v. Mollicone, 654 A.2d 311, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1995).

There was no evidence that a physician reported any false information in preparing a death certificate, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-18-1(a) , 23-3-16(c) , or 23-4-7 , as plaintiff failed to establish that the decedent’s death was caused by any condition not listed on the death certificate and failed to present sufficient evidence showing any “suspicion of accident” or that the death occurred in an “unusual manner” or in any “unnatural manner, or as the apparent result of the negligence of another person.” Malinou v. Miriam Hosp., 24 A.3d 497, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 94 (2011).

Criminal History.

Omission of arrest history, in employment application specifically asking for it, justified prosecution under this section. State v. Ricci, 704 A.2d 210, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 301 (1997).

Defenses.

Section 28-5-7 , which prohibits an employer from inquiring about any criminal charges, does not provide an absolute defense to a charge of filing a false document under this section. The fact that the question on the job application may have been improper does not permit the applicant to lie. State v. Ricci, 668 A.2d 320, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 287 (1995).

Evidence Sufficient.

Offense is complete if account known to be false and intended to deceive town is presented, even though no money was obtained as a result thereof. State v. Barrette, 124 A. 657, 1924 R.I. LEXIS 93 (1924).

Defendant, former superintendent of a town’s department of public works, was found guilty of violating this section where evidence demonstrated that he had drawn up a “sham” requisition order indicating purchase of three truck tires, the delivery of which he was unable to establish, where purchase price matched that of five automobile tires purchased with town funds and placed on defendant’s personal automobile. State v. Chatell, 121 R.I. 528 , 401 A.2d 436, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1866 (1979).

Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to prove conspiracy in filing a false document beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 662 A.2d 1171, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 194 (1995).

The trial justice applied the proper standard in finding that there was sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find the defendant guilty of the charge of filing a false document since he found that witness testimony and the document signed by the defendant, taken in the light most favorable to the state, was sufficient to prove the elements of fraud proscribed by this provision. State v. Salvatore, 763 A.2d 985, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 1 (2001).

11-18-1.1. Fraudulent insurance claims for stolen motor vehicles.

Any person who knowingly and with criminal intent shall file a fraudulent claim with an insurance company for the purpose of securing money based on a claim of a stolen motor vehicle when, in fact, the motor vehicle did not exist or was not stolen, shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 221, § 13.

11-18-1.2. False statement to obtain replacement public assistance check or authorization.

Any person who shall knowingly and intentionally file or cause to be filed with the department of human services, or any employee or agent of the department, any statement or affidavit in writing which is false or erroneous, or defective in any important particular, and which, to his or her knowledge, is intended to report that one or more public assistance benefit checks or authorizations issued pursuant to chapter 6 of title 40, has been lost, destroyed, or stolen and is intended to induce or cause the department or its employees or agents, to issue a replacement check or authorization, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both, if the total value of the replacement checks or authorization(s) so issued in any period of twelve (12) consecutive months shall exceed five hundred dollars ($500), or shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both, if the value of the replacement check or authorization so issued shall not exceed five hundred dollars ($500). All criminal actions for any violation of this section shall be prosecuted by the attorney general. The statement or affidavit shall contain language notifying the signer, in conspicuous language, that any false statement on the statement or affidavit is punishable by up to five (5) years imprisonment and a five thousand dollar ($5,000) fine.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 237, § 1.

11-18-1.3. False statement to fraudulently obtain license or registration.

Any person who shall knowingly and intentionally prepare, file or cause to be filed with the division of motor vehicles, or any employee or agent of the division of motor vehicles, any application, statement or affidavit in writing which is knowingly false in any important particular, and which, to his or her knowledge, is intended to fraudulently induce or cause the department or its employees or agents, to issue a registration or license, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2010, ch. 148, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 150, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 148, § 1, and P.L. 2010, ch. 150, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

11-18-2. False information to registrar of vital statistics.

Every person who shall knowingly furnish or cause to be furnished to the registrar of vital statistics of any city or town false information concerning any birth, marriage, death and/or divorce shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or imprisoned not exceeding one year, or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 46; P.L. 1949, ch. 2310, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-2 .

11-18-3. Fraudulent notice to newspaper of birth, marriage, or death.

Every person who shall willfully send to the publishers of any newspaper, for the purpose of publication, a fraudulent notice of the birth of a child or of the marriage of any persons or of the death of any person, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 27; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 27; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-3 .

11-18-4. Concealment of birth out of wedlock.

Every woman who shall conceal the birth of any issue of her body, which, if it were born alive, would be born out of wedlock, so that it may not be known whether it was born dead or alive, or shall conceal the death of any infant child born of her body out of wedlock, so that it may not be known whether the child was murdered or not, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) months or be fined not exceeding three hundred dollars ($300).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 10; P.L. 1926, ch. 858, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-4 .

Cross References.

Joinder of murder count with count for concealment of birth, § 11-23-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Aiding and Abetting.

Persons other than the mother may be convicted as principals under this section if they were present and aided and abetted the offense but only if the mother at least concurs in the concealment. State v. Sprague, 4 R.I. 257 , 1856 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1856).

Collateral References.

Sexual partner’s tort liability to other partner for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding sterility or use of birth control resulting in pregnancy. 2 A.L.R.5th 301.

11-18-5. Misrepresentation of circulation of periodical.

Every proprietor or publisher of a newspaper or periodical, or any agent or employee of the proprietor or publisher, who shall knowingly misrepresent the circulation of the newspaper or periodical for the purpose of securing advertising or other patronage, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1905, ch. 1251, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 43; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 43; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 41; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-5 .

11-18-6. False financial statement to obtain loan or credit.

No person shall knowingly make or cause to be made, either directly or indirectly, or through any agency whatsoever, any false statement in writing, with intent that it shall be relied upon, respecting the financial condition, or means or ability to pay, of himself or herself, or any other person, firm, or corporation in whom he or she is interested, or for whom he or she is acting, for the purpose of procuring in any form whatsoever, either the delivery of personal property, the payment of cash, the making of a loan or credit, the extension of a credit, the discount of an account receivable, or the making, acceptance, discount, sale, or endorsement of a bill of exchange, or promissory note, for the benefit of either himself or herself or of such person, firm, or corporation.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 809, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 53; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 50; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-6 .

Cross References.

False statements to obtain bank loan, § 19-19-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorney Misconduct.

Furnishing false information to a credit union, in regard to a loan application by the attorney’s client, clearly violates Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (misconduct). In re DiPippo, 678 A.2d 454, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 199 (1996).

Construction With Other Law.

Neither § 11-18-1 nor this section relate to the protection of the same interest as does § 19-19-1 because the two misdemeanor statutes are designed to control external transmissions of false information whereas the felony statute is designed to protect the integrity of the internal records of a bank for the protection of its depositors; therefore, neither of the misdemeanors bears the necessary inherent relationship to the felony offense to make it a lesser included offense. State v. Mollicone, 654 A.2d 311, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1995).

Collateral References.

Loan, may offense of obtaining money or property by false pretenses be predicated on statement in writing concerning financial ability of one seeking. 24 A.L.R. 400; 52 A.L.R. 1169.

11-18-7. Procuring loan or credit on faith of false statement.

No person knowing that a false statement in writing has been made, respecting the financial condition or means or ability to pay, of himself or herself, or the person, firm, or corporation in which he or she is interested, or for whom he or she is acting, shall procure, upon the faith of the statement, for the benefit either of himself or herself, or of such person, firm, or corporation, either or any of the things of benefit as provided in § 11-18-6 .

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 809, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 54; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 51; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-7 .

11-18-8. False representations as to continuing truth of financial statements.

No person knowing that a statement in writing has been made, respecting the financial condition or means or ability to pay, of himself or herself or the person, firm, or corporation, in which he or she is interested, or for whom he or she is acting, shall represent on a later day, either orally or in writing, that the statement previously made, if then again made on that day, would be then true, when in fact, that statement if then made would be false, and procure upon the faith of it, for the benefit either of himself or herself or of the person, firm, or corporation, either or any of the things of benefit as provided in § 11-18-6 .

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 809, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 55; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 52; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-8 .

11-18-9. Penalty for financial misrepresentations.

Any person violating the provisions of §§ 11-18-6 11-18-8 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punished for each offense by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1912, ch. 809, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 56; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 53; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-9 .

11-18-10. False statements in advertising.

  1. No person, firm, corporation, or association with intent to sell or in any way dispose of merchandise, securities, service or anything offered by that person, firm, corporation or association, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale or distribution, or with intent to increase the consumption of or to induce the public in any manner to enter into any obligation relating to the merchandise or service, or to acquire title to it or an interest in it, shall make, publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before the public, or cause directly or indirectly to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public, in this state, in a newspaper or other publication, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, poster, sign, billboard, bill, circular, pamphlet, or letter, or by means of a photograph, motion pictures, radio, loudspeaker, television, telephone, telegraph, or in any other way, an advertisement of any sort regarding merchandise, securities, service or anything so offered to the public, which advertisement contains any assertion, representation, or statement of fact which is untrue and designed to be deceptive or misleading or is intended or designed not to sell the merchandise, securities, service, or anything so advertised at the price stated in it, or otherwise communicated or with intent not to sell the merchandise, securities, service, or anything so advertised.
  2. Any person, firm, corporation, or association who shall violate any of the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or be imprisoned not more than ninety (90) days, or shall suffer both fine and imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1914, ch. 1073, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 57; P.L. 1928, ch. 1199, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 54; P.L. 1956, ch. 3761, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-10 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Cross References.

False advertising as to terms of small loans, § 19-25-20.

Collateral References.

False or fraudulent statements in advertisements, validity, construction and application of statutes or ordinances directed against. 89 A.L.R. 1004.

11-18-11. Immunity of publishers and advertising media.

The provisions of § 11-8-10 shall not apply to any radio station, television station, publisher of a newspaper, magazine or other publication or any other recognized advertising media or printer who publishes or prints the advertisement without actual knowledge of its falsity. The fact of the publishing or printing of the advertisement shall not be prima facie evidence of actual knowledge of falsity or deceptiveness.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 54; P.L. 1956, ch. 3761, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-11 .

11-18-12. Injunction of false advertising.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, when it appears to the director of business regulation of the state of Rhode Island that any person, firm, corporation, or association is violating any of the provisions of § 11-18-10 , the director of business regulation may cause to be instituted an action, commenced in the name of the director of business regulation in his or her capacity as director of business regulation, to enjoin the violation in the superior court and the court shall have jurisdiction to enjoin and/or restrain any person, firm, corporation or association from violating any of the provisions of § 11-18-10 without regard to whether criminal proceedings have been or may be instituted.
  2. When it appears to the director of labor and training of the state of Rhode Island that any person, firm, corporation, or association is violating any of the provisions of § 11-18-10 with respect to the offer or sale of liquid fuels, lubricating oils or other similar products, the director of labor and training may cause to be instituted an action, commenced in the name of the director of labor and training in his or her capacity as director of labor and training, to enjoin the violation in the superior court and the court shall have jurisdiction to enjoin and/or restrain any person, firm, corporation, or association from violating any of the provisions of § 11-18-10 with respect to the offer or sale of liquid fuels, lubricating oils or other similar products without regard to whether criminal proceedings have been or may be instituted.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 54; P.L. 1956, ch. 3761, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-12 ; P.L. 2019, ch. 88, art. 3, § 2.

11-18-13. Deception in sale of fuels and lubricants.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, to store, sell, expose for sale, or offer for sale, any liquid fuels, lubricating oils, or other similar products, in any manner whatsoever, so as to deceive or tend to deceive the purchaser as to the nature, quality, and identity, of the product so sold or offered for sale.

History of Section. P.L. 1928, ch. 1189, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 51; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-13 .

Cross References.

Enforcement of provisions, § 31-37-21 .

Regulation of gasoline sales generally, § 31-37-1 et seq.

11-18-14. Sale of fuels and lubricants other than those shown by trade name on container.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, to store, keep, expose for sale offer for sale, or sell, from any tank or container, or from any pump, or other distributing device or equipment, any liquid fuels, lubricating oils, or other similar products other than those indicated by the name, trade name, symbol, sign, or other distinguishing mark, or device, of the manufacturer or distributor, appearing upon the tank, container, pump, or other distributing equipment, from which the products are sold, offered for sale, or distributed.

History of Section. P.L. 1928, ch. 1189, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 52; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-14 .

11-18-15. Imitation of trade symbols of fuels and lubricants.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, to disguise or camouflage that person’s or firm’s own equipment, by imitating the design, symbol or trade name of the equipment under which recognized brands of liquid fuels, lubricating oils, and similar products are generally marketed.

History of Section. P.L. 1928, ch. 1189, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 53; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-15 .

11-18-16. Sale of fuels and lubricants under false trademark or name — Adulteration.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, to expose for sale, offer for sale, or sell under any trademark or trade name in general use, any liquid fuels, lubricating oils, or other like products, except those manufactured or distributed by the manufacturer or distributor marketing liquid fuels, lubricating oils, or other like products, under the trademark or trade name, or to substitute, mix, or adulterate, the liquid fuels, lubricating oils, or other similar products, sold, offered for sale, or distributed, under the trademark or trade name.

History of Section. P.L. 1928, ch. 1189, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 54; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-16 .

11-18-17. Delivery of fuels and lubricants into container bearing false trade name.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, to aid or assist any other person, firm, or corporation, in the violation of §§ 11-18-13 11-18-16 by depositing or delivering into any tank, receptacle, or other container, any other liquid fuels, lubricating oils, or like products, than those intended to be stored in and distributed from it, as indicated by the name of the manufacturer or distributor or the trademark or trade name of the product displayed on the container itself, or on the pump or other distributing device used in connection with it.

History of Section. P.L. 1928, ch. 1189, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 55; G.L. 1956, §§ 11-18-17 .

11-18-18. Penalty for violations with respect to fuels and lubricants.

Any person, firm, or corporation or any officer, agent, servant, or employee who shall violate any provision of §§ 11-18-13 11-18-17 shall be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than three hundred dollars ($300), or be imprisoned ninety (90) days, or shall suffer both fine and imprisonment, and each separate sale or attempt to sell in violation of these provisions shall be deemed a separate offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1928, ch. 1189, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 56; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-18 .

11-18-19. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 39; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 43; P.L. 1913, ch. 920, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 43; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 43; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-19 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 179, § 1), concerning deception in the hiring of a horse or carriage, was repealed by P.L. 2001, ch. 319, § 1, effective July 13, 2001.

11-18-20. Obtaining vehicles with intent to defraud.

  1. By trick or false representation.  Whoever with intent to defraud the owner or any person lawfully possessing any motor vehicle obtains the custody of the motor vehicle by trick, deceit, fraudulent or willful false representation, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished as provided in this section.
  2. Hiring with intent to defraud.  Whoever with intent to defraud the owner or any person lawfully possessing any motor vehicle, or the rental of a motor vehicle, hires a vehicle from the owner, or the owner’s agents or any person in lawful possession of it, shall, upon conviction, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. The absconding without paying or offering to pay the hire shall be prima facie evidence of fraudulent intent.
  3. Failure to redeliver hired vehicle.  Whoever, after hiring a motor vehicle under an agreement to redeliver the vehicle to the person letting the motor vehicle or that person’s agent, at the termination of the period for which it was let, shall, without the consent of that person or those persons and with intent to defraud, abandon, or willfully refuse or neglect to redeliver the vehicle as agreed shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor. The failure to return the motor vehicle within seventy-two (72) hours of the time agreed shall be prima facie evidence of fraudulent intent and the vehicle shall be considered “stolen” for purposes of reporting the offense to the local police.
  4. Tampering with mileage device.  Whoever, after hiring a motor vehicle from any person or persons under an agreement to pay for the use of the motor vehicle a sum of money determinable either in whole or in part upon the distance the motor vehicle travels during the period for which hired, removes, attempts to remove, tampers with, or attempts to tamper with or otherwise interfere with any odometer or other mechanical device attached to the hired motor vehicle for the purpose of registering the distance the vehicle travels, with the intent to deceive the person or persons letting the vehicle or their lawful agent as to the actual distance traveled, shall, upon conviction, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person who shall knowingly aid, abet or assist another in violating the provisions of this subsection shall be proceeded against as a principal or as an accessory before the fact, and, upon conviction, shall suffer the same punishment as that to the principal offender is subject. Any person violating the provisions of this subsection may be charged with a violation in the city or town or county, as the case may be, where the odometer or other mechanical device:
    1. Is removed, or attempted to be removed, or tampered with; or attempted to be tampered with, or is otherwise interfered with;
    2. Where the persons knowingly aid, abet, or assist another to so remove, tamper with or otherwise interfere with the odometer or other mechanical device; or
    3. Where any part of the motor vehicle upon which is attached the odometer or other mechanical device is removed or attempted to be removed.
  5. Penalty.  Any person convicted of violation of any provision of subsection (a), (b), (c) or (d) of this section shall be imprisoned for a term of not more than one year, or by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 40; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 44; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 44; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 44; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-20 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 179, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 78, § 1.

Collateral References.

Construction and application of state statute making it unlawful to tamper with motor vehicle odometer. 76 A.L.R.3d 981.

Criminal liability in connection with rental of motor vehicles. 38 A.L.R.3d 949.

11-18-20.1. Possession of false identification.

The possession of a motor vehicle operator’s license card or other documents commonly used to identify the bearer containing a photograph of the possessor, but with the name, or date of birth of a person other than that of the possessor, shall be punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 2002, ch. 106, § 2; P.L. 2002, ch. 148, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2002, ch. 106, § 2 and P.L. 2002, ch. 148, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

In 2002, the compiler made a minor punctuation change near the end of the section.

11-18-21. Cheating of coin-operated devices.

Whoever: (1) operates or causes to be operated, or attempts to operate or to cause to be operated, any automatic vending machine, slot machine, turnstile, meter, register, coin-box telephone, or other receptacle designed to receive lawful coin of the United States in connection with the sale, use, or enjoyment of property, transportation, or other service, by means of a slug or any false, counterfeited, mutilated, or sweated coin or by any means, method, trick, or device whatsoever not lawfully authorized by the owner, lessee, or licensee of the machine, turnstile, meter, register, coin-box telephone, or receptacle; or (2) takes, obtains, or receives from or in connection with any automatic vending machine, slot machine, turnstile, meter, register, coin-box telephone, or other receptacle designed to receive lawful coins of the United States in connection with the sale, use, or enjoyment of property or service, any goods, wares, merchandise, transportation, gas, electric current, article of value, or the use or enjoyment of any transportation or any telephone or telegraph facilities or service, or of any musical instrument, phonograph, or other property, without depositing in and surrendering to the machine, turnstile, coin-box telephone, or other receptacle lawful coin to the amount required by the owner, lessee, or licensee of the machine, turnstile, coin-box telephone, or receptacle, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100), or by imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) days, or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 76; P.L. 1932, ch. 1891, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 84; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-21 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations.

Cross References.

Wrongfully obtaining telecommunication service, distinct offense, § 11-35-16 .

11-18-22. Manufacture or distribution of slugs.

Whoever manufactures for sale, advertises for sale, sells, offers for sale, or gives away any slug, device, or substance whatsoever, designed or calculated to be placed or deposited in any automatic vending machine, slot machine, turnstile, meter, register, coin-box telephone, or other receptacle, depository, or contrivance, designed to receive lawful coin of the United States in connection with the sale, use, or enjoyment of property or service, with the intent that the slug, device, or substance shall be used to cheat or defraud the person entitled to the contents of the machine, turnstile, meter, register, coin-box telephone, or other the receptacle, depository, or contrivance, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 77; P.L. 1932, ch. 1891, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 85; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-22 .

Cross References.

Counterfeit coins, § 11-17-7 et seq.

11-18-23. Defacement or alteration of manufacturer’s serial number.

Any person who: (1) willfully removes, defaces, covers, alters, or destroys the manufacturer’s serial number or any other distinguishing number or identification mark on any machine or any electrical or mechanical device for the purpose of preventing the detection of a crime or defrauding the manufacturer or any seller or any purchaser of the machine or the electrical or mechanical device; or (2) being a dealer in merchandise or the agent, employee, or representative of a dealer, knowingly buys, sells, receives, disposes of, conceals, or knowingly has in his or her possession any machine or any electrical or mechanical device from which the manufacturer’s serial number or any other distinguishing number or identification mark has been removed, defaced, covered, altered, or destroyed for a purpose specified in subdivision (1) of this section, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

History of Section. P.L. 1951, ch. 2704, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-23 .

Collateral References.

Criminal liability, under state law, concerning illegal removal or alteration of vehicle identification number, including sale or possession of altered motor vehicles or parts. 107 A.L.R.5th 567.

Identification, constitutionality of statute making possession of automobile from which identifying marks have been removed a crime. 4 A.L.R. 1538; 42 A.L.R. 1149.

11-18-24. Penalty for serial number violations.

Every person convicted of a misdemeanor for the violation of any provision of § 11-18-23 shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both fine and imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1951, ch. 2704, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-24 .

Collateral References.

Criminal liability, under state law, concerning illegal removal or alteration of vehicle identification number, including sale or possession of altered motor vehicles or parts. 107 A.L.R.5th 567.

11-18-25. Concealment or transfer of property with intent to defraud creditors.

Every person who, while insolvent, shall, with intent to defraud his or her creditors, remove from out of the state, secrete, or unlawfully transfer or otherwise dispose of any property belonging to his or her estate, which is not exempt from attachment by law, or who, having made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, shall secrete, destroy, or withhold from his or her assignee any books, deeds, documents, or writings relating to the property, shall, upon conviction of the offense, be imprisoned not exceeding two (2) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 67; P.L. 1902, ch. 1000, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 70; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 70; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 77; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-25 .

Cross References.

Effect of voidable conveyance, § 6-16-1 .

Workers’ compensation, fraudulent conveyances by uninsured employer, § 28-36-16 .

Collateral References.

Criminal liability for removal or sale of mortgaged property without consent of mortgagee. 33 A.L.R. 1161.

11-18-26. Obtaining food or accommodations with intent to defraud.

  1. Every person who shall obtain credit or accommodation at any hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house, or lodging house by means of any false pretense, or who, with intent to defraud the proprietor, or the proprietor’s agent or servant, obtains any credit or accommodation at a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house or lodging house, without paying, shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00) or be imprisoned not exceeding thirty (30) days.
  2. Proof that lodging, food or other accommodation was obtained by false or fictitious showing or pretense of baggage, or that the person refused or neglected to pay for the food, lodging, or other accommodation, or removed or caused to be removed his or her baggage from the premises, without paying for the food, lodging, or other accommodation, shall be presumptive evidence of the fraudulent intent referred to in subsection (a) of this section; but this provision shall not apply where there has been a special agreement for delay in payment.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 51; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 54; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 54; P.L. 1927, ch. 1047, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 62; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-26 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of statutes making certain facts prima facie evidence of intent to defraud innkeeper. 51 A.L.R. 1160; 86 A.L.R. 179; 162 A.L.R. 495.

Hotel or inn, what constitutes. 19 A.L.R. 517; 53 A.L.R. 988.

Restaurant, what constitutes. 122 A.L.R. 1399.

11-18-27. Sale of false diplomas or certificates.

Any person who unlawfully sells, buys, creates, duplicates, alters, gives, or obtains or attempts to buy, sell, create, duplicate, alter, give, or obtain a diploma or certificate of enrollment, conferred by an accredited institution of education in any country, with the intent to use fraudulently the document or to allow the fraudulent use of the document, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be sentenced for not more than two (2) years in jail or fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 62; P.L. 1952, ch. 2895, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-27 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 104, § 1.

11-18-28. False animal registrations and pedigrees.

Every person who by any false pretense shall obtain from any club, association, society, or company for improving the breed of cattle, horses, sheep, swine, or other domestic animals, the registration of any animal in the herd register or other register of the club, association, society or company, or who knowingly shall obtain a transfer of that registration, and every person who shall knowingly give a false pedigree of any animal, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 19; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-28 .

11-18-29. Fraudulent stock certificates.

Every president, secretary, cashier, treasurer, or other officer or agent of any incorporated company or institution, who shall fraudulently issue any stock or certificate of stock of the company or institution, shall be fined not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years, nor less than one year.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 20; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 11-18-29 .

Cross References.

Public utility official, false statement to secure issue of securities, penalty, § 39-3-21 .

11-18-30. Prearranged funerals — Receipt of money with intent to defraud.

No person may arrange, promote, enter into, or sell any funeral service contract on behalf of a funeral service establishment unless the person is an embalmer or funeral director licensed in accordance with the provisions of chapter 33.2 of title 5. All monies received under these contracts shall be placed into segregated escrow accounts and marked accordingly. Any funeral director or licensed employee who receives monies under the contracts with intent to defraud the purchaser shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). Failure to hold such monies under the contract in segregated escrow accounts shall be prima facie evidence of the intent to defraud.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 382, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 103, § 2.

11-18-31. Solicitation in name of law enforcement agency.

  1. No professional solicitor shall solicit money from any individual or business in the name of any law enforcement agency or any organization which would reasonably appear to be affiliated in any way with any law enforcement agency or personnel. For the purposes of this section, “professional solicitor” means any firm or corporation or any person other than a sworn police officer or retired police officer in the agency or organization for which the solicitation is being made, who, for compensation or other consideration, solicits contributions for or on behalf of another.
  2. No person shall solicit money in the name of any law enforcement agency or any organization which would reasonably appear to be affiliated in any way with any law enforcement agency or personnel, unless notification is given to the superintendent of the state police and the police chief of the municipality in which solicitations shall be conducted.
  3. Only sworn police officers and retired police officers shall solicit money in the name of any law enforcement agency or any organization which would reasonably appear to be affiliated in any way with any law enforcement agency or personnel. Every sworn police officer and retired police officer so soliciting shall identify himself or herself by name, rank, department and status as an active or retired police officer to each person solicited. If the solicitation is done by telephone, the same officer or retired officer who makes the telephone solicitation shall personally appear before the donor to accept the donation.
  4. Any person, firm, or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding two (2) years and/or fined in an amount not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 208, § 1.

11-18-32. Video, audio and publication rentals.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person to reveal, transmit, publish, or disseminate in any manner, any records which would identify the names and addresses of individuals, with the titles or nature of video films, records, cassettes, or the like, which they purchased, leased, rented, or borrowed, from libraries, book stores, video stores, or record and cassette shops or any retailer or distributor of those products, whether or not the identities and listings are kept in a remote computing service or electronic storage or the disclosure is made through or by a remote computing service. It shall not be unlawful to make disclosures to other employees of the library or business incident to the normal course of their work or pursuant to lawful compulsion.
  2. All records of such transactions shall be maintained as confidential and may only be released by written waiver.
  3. Any person, firm, or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine in an amount not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both.
  4. Any person injured as a result of a violation of this section may bring a civil action against the violator for actual damages or two hundred fifty dollars ($250), whichever is greater, for each violation, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 94, § 1.

11-18-33. Defrauding the administration of a drug or alcohol test.

  1. As used in this section, “defraud the administration of a drug or alcohol test” means to submit a substance that purports to be from a person other than its actual source, or purports to have been excreted or collected at a time other than when it was actually excreted or collected, or to otherwise engage in conduct intended to produce a false or misleading outcome of a test for the presence of alcohol or a chemical, drug or controlled dangerous substance, or metabolite of a drug or controlled dangerous substance, in the human body. It shall specifically include, but not be limited to, the furnishing of urine with the purpose that the urine be submitted for urinalysis as a true specimen of a person.
  2. Any person who offers for sale or rental, or who manufactures, markets, sells, transfers or gives to any person, any instrument or tool, devise or substance adapted, designed or commonly used to defraud the administration of a drug or alcohol test with the intent to defraud the administration, is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to imprisonment for up to one year and a fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
  3. Any person who knowingly defrauds the administration of a drug or alcohol test that is administered as a condition of monitoring a person on bail, in custody or on parole, probation or pretrial intervention, or any other form of supervision administered in connection with a criminal offense or juvenile delinquency matter, is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to imprisonment for up to one year and a fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 141, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2009, ch. 120, § 1, and P.L. 2009, ch. 141, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

11-18-34. Residential mortgage fraud.

  1. For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:
    1. “Mortgage lending process” means the process through which a person seeks or obtains a residential mortgage loan including, but not limited to, solicitation, application, or origination, negotiation of terms, real estate appraisals and surveys, third-party provider services, underwriting, signing and closing, and funding of the loan.
    2. “Pattern of residential mortgage fraud” means one or more violations of subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section that involve two (2) or more residential mortgage loans and that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, or methods of commission or otherwise result from comparable actions or omissions.
    3. “Person” means an individual, corporation, company, limited liability company, partnership, trustee, association, or any other entity.
    4. “Residential mortgage loan” means a loan or agreement to extend credit made to a person, which loan is secured by a deed to secure debt, security deed, mortgage, security interest, deed of trust, promissory note, or any other document representing a security interest or lien upon any interest in a one-to-four-family residential property including the renewal, modification, or refinancing of any such loan.
    5. “Victim” means a person who experienced personal loss, including, but not limited to monetary loss, due to a violation of subsection (b) of this section.
  2. A person commits residential mortgage fraud when, with the intent to defraud, such person:
    1. Knowingly makes an omission of a material fact or a written misrepresentation or misstatement of a material fact during the mortgage lending process with the intention that a mortgage lender, a borrower, or any other person who or that is involved in the mortgage lending process will rely on the absence of such material fact or the making of such material misrepresentation or misstatement; or
    2. Knowingly uses or facilitates the use, or attempts to use or facilitate the use, of any omission of a material fact or written misrepresentation or misstatement of a material fact during the mortgage lending process with the intention that a mortgage lender, a borrower, or any other person who or that is involved in the mortgage lending process will rely on the absence of such material fact or the making of such material misrepresentation or misstatement; or
    3. Knowingly receives, or attempts to receive, proceeds or any other funds in connection with a residential mortgage transaction that resulted from an act or acts constituting a violation of subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section; or
    4. Conspires with or solicits another to engage in an act or acts constituting a violation of subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section; or
    5. Files, or causes to be filed, with a city or town clerk any document involved in the mortgage lending process that the person knows to contain an omission of a material fact or a written misrepresentation or misstatement of a material fact.
  3. Any person who violates this section, upon conviction, shall be subject to the following penalties:
    1. Any person who commits an offense under subsection (b) of this section shall be guilty of a felony and subject to imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.
    2. Any person who engages or participates in a pattern of residential mortgage fraud, or conspires or endeavors to engage or participate in a pattern of residential mortgage fraud, shall be guilty of a felony and subject to imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years, a fine of not more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), or both.
    3. Any person who commits an offense and knew that the victim was vulnerable due to age, disability, infirmity, reduced physical or mental capacity, or national origin shall be guilty of a felony and subject to imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) years, a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both.
    4. The court shall order restitution to any victim.
    5. In addition to any criminal penalties above, any person found in violation of this section shall forfeit anything of value received by them in the course of such violation, less any restitution they actually paid pursuant to subsection (c)(4) of this section. Action for recovery of these amounts shall be brought in the superior court of any county in which any element of the crime occurred. The actions shall be brought in the name of the state by the attorney general for the benefit and use of the state.
  4. It shall be sufficient in any prosecution for residential mortgage fraud to show that the party accused did the act with the intent to defraud. It shall be unnecessary to show that any particular person was harmed financially in the transaction or that the person to whom the material misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission was made relied upon the misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 146, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 133, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 146, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 19 Gambling and Lotteries

11-19-1. Forms of gambling prohibited.

Every person who shall, directly or indirectly, set up, put forth, carry on, promote, or draw, publicly or privately, any lottery, chance, game, or device of any nature or kind whatsoever, or by whatsoever name it may be called, for the purpose of exposing, setting for sale or disposing of any money, houses, lands, merchandise, or articles of value, or shall sell or expose to sale lottery policies, purporting to be governed by the drawing of any public or private lottery, or shall sign or endorse any book, document, or paper whatsoever, for the purpose of enabling others to sell, or expose to sale, lottery policies, except as authorized in this chapter and in title 41 and chapters 61 and 61.2 of title 42, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned not exceeding two (2) years or be fined not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-1 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 41, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 309, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 389, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 406, § 4; P.L. 1982, ch. 72, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 279, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 84, § 1.

Cross References.

Games of chance, § 11-50-1 et seq.

Investigation and proceedings against racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations, § 7-15-1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Gambling:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-278 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 137, § 1 et seq.; ch. 271, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

By granting the right to conduct a raffle and/or “20-week club” to political parties whose gubernatorial candidates poll at least five percent of the vote (i.e., in practice and effect, limiting the grant to the Republican and Democratic parties), this section benefits those with popular views, seriously impugns the first amendment rights of minority organizations without necessarily serving the avowed purpose of the regulation — the control of gambling — in a rational way and, thus, does not pass constitutional muster. Rhode Island Chapter of Nat'l Women's Political Caucus, Inc. v. Rhode Island Lottery Comm'n, 609 F. Supp. 1403, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637 (D.R.I. 1985) (decided prior to 1993 amendment; see, now, § 11-19-1.1 ).

The provision in this section which extends to certain political party committees the right to conduct lotteries was declared unconstitutional and permanently enjoined, but the remainder of the section, relating to barring lotteries in general, and to the right of duly certified candidates to undertake raffles, was not invalidated. See Rhode Island Chapter of Nat'l Women's Political Caucus, Inc. v. Rhode Island Lottery Comm'n, 609 F. Supp. 1403, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637 (D.R.I. 1985) (decided prior to 1993, amendment; see, now § 11-19-1.1 ).

Elements of Offense.

To constitute a lottery, there must be present a prize, chance and consideration, and the consideration must have a pecuniary value not just such as would be consideration for an executory contract. State v. Big Chief Corp., 64 R.I. 448 , 13 A.2d 236, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1940).

Three elements must be necessary in order to constitute a lottery and these are a prize, distribution by chance, and a consideration having a pecuniary value. Goodwill Advertising Co. v. Elmwood Amusement Corp., 86 R.I. 6 , 133 A.2d 644, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1957).

Evidence — Sufficiency.

Conviction was reversed where participants of weekly bank night needed only to register at store and attend, without purchasing goods, although purpose was to improve business generally, even though registration cards had to be qualified each week to be eligible. State v. Big Chief Corp., 64 R.I. 448 , 13 A.2d 236, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1940).

Collateral References.

Entrapment to commit offense with respect to gambling or lotteries. 31 A.L.R.2d 1212.

Game of chance, lottery as. 135 A.L.R. 168.

Loan or investment association as a lottery. 28 A.L.R. 1311.

Punchboard as a lottery. 163 A.L.R. 1279.

Scheme by which award depends upon votes as a lottery. 41 A.L.R. 1484.

Scheme for advertising or stimulating legitimate business as a lottery. 48 A.L.R. 1115; 57 A.L.R. 424; 103 A.L.R. 866; 109 A.L.R. 709; 113 A.L.R. 1121.

Validity, construction, and application of statute or ordinance prohibiting or regulating use or occupancy of premises for bookmaking or pool selling. 82 A.L.R.4th 356.

11-19-1.1. Lotteries permitted.

  1. Any state, city, town, ward, or district committee elected pursuant to the provisions of title 17 or certified candidates, but not both, as defined in title 17, shall be allowed to conduct that lottery commonly known as a “twenty (20) week club” or conduct a raffle once within a twelve (12) month period subsequent to notification to the Rhode Island lottery commission. For the purposes of this section a “certified candidate” does not include any state, city, town, ward, or district committee person.
  2. Credit unions may conduct “savings promotion raffles” as authorized by § 19-5-29 .

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 84, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 222, § 3.

11-19-2. Unauthorized sale of lottery tickets.

Every person not authorized by the Rhode Island state police who shall sell or expose to sale any ticket, or certificate in the nature of a ticket, or share in any ticket or certificate in the nature of a ticket, in any lottery set up within or without this state, shall be fined for every such ticket, certificate or share of the ticket or certificate by that person sold or exposed to sale not exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-2 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 41, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 309, § 1.

Collateral References.

Criminal Actions for Fraudulently Passing or Redeeming Lottery Tickets or Tampering with Lottery Equipment. 32 A.L.R.7th Art. 7 (2018).

11-19-3. Instruments given for lottery tickets void.

All notes, obligations, securities, or promises whatsoever, given for the purchase of any lottery ticket or certificate, lottery policy, or of any document or paper taken or received for the purpose of enabling others to sell or dispose of lottery tickets or lottery policies, shall be null and void.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contract Not Voided.

Contract for use of promotion plan known as “bank night” in which it was expressly stated that participation was to be free of charge was not rendered void by fact that defendant failed to comply with the contract and required ticket purchases to qualify, in the absence of any separate agreement between the owner of the plan and the defendant. Goodwill Advertising Co. v. Elmwood Amusement Corp., 86 R.I. 6 , 133 A.2d 644, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1957).

Collateral References.

Recovery of money or property lost through cheating or fraud in forbidden gambling or game. 39 A.L.R.2d 1213.

11-19-4. Recovery of lottery ticket value by holder.

The purchaser or receiver of any lottery ticket or certificate in the nature of a lottery ticket, or share in either, not authorized by the Rhode Island state police whether it shall have been paid for in money, or however received, even though by way of gift, for the purpose of enabling the seller or giver to dispose of any article or piece of property, real, personal, or mixed, shall recover back the amount paid by him or her, or the value at which, according to the proof, the ticket or certificate may be reckoned in the transaction, as the case may be, from the person from whom the ticket or policy was purchased or received, in an action of the case for money had and received.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-4 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 41, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 309, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

This statute is to be strictly construed. Finch v. Rhode Island Grocers Ass'n, 93 R.I. 323 , 175 A.2d 177, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1961).

Consideration.

Where grocery association in celebrating its golden anniversary invited the general public and, as an added feature to enhance public interest, made arrangements for a drawing in the nature of a door prize, no consideration being required to participate in the drawing other than to attend as a spectator and fill out a card bearing name and address of individual participating and the association made arrangements to sponsor an air trip as such door prize via an airline paying for such air trip by assuming certain obligations to the airline, there was no consideration within the meaning of this section as far as the winning person was concerned and therefore there was no lottery. Finch v. Rhode Island Grocers Ass'n, 93 R.I. 323 , 175 A.2d 177, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1961).

Collateral References.

Recovery of money or property lost through cheating or fraud in forbidden gambling or game. 39 A.L.R.2d 1213.

11-19-5. Acts in aid of policy game.

Whoever not authorized by the Rhode Island state police keeps, sets up, promotes, or is concerned as owner, agent clerk, or in any other manner, in managing any policy-lottery or policy-shop, or writes, prints, sells, transfers, or delivers any ticket, certificate, slip, bill, token, or other device purporting or designed to guarantee or assure to any person, or to entitle any person to a chance of drawing or obtaining any prize or thing of value to be drawn in any lottery, or in the game or device commonly known as policy-lottery or policy, or for that person or another person writes, prints, sells, or transfers or delivers, or has in his or her possession for the purpose of sale, transfer, or delivery, or in any way aids in selling, exchanging, negotiating, transferring, or delivering, a chance or ticket in any lottery, or in the game or device commonly known as policy-lottery or policy, or any such bill, slip, certificate, token, or other device, or who sells or offers to sell what are commonly called lottery-policies, or who endorses a book or other document, for the purpose of enabling others to sell or offer to sell lottery-policies, or shall receive, register, record, forward or purport or pretend to forward, or undertake to forward, or receive, and agree to forward, to or for a lottery, or to or for any particular lottery, or to any person, within or without this state, any money, thing, or consideration of value, to purchase an interest or share in any lottery, or to obtain or secure for any person what is commonly called a lottery-policy, or a chance of drawing or obtaining any prize or thing of value to be drawn in any lottery, or in the game or device commonly called policy-lottery or policy, or who shall receive or offer to receive any money, thing, or consideration of value to be forwarded to or for a lottery, or to or for any particular lottery, or to any person to invest in a lottery within or outside this state, whether it actually exists or not, or whether any drawing of it, or any act to allot any prize or thing of value, takes place or not, or whether there is any such person or not, or whoever shall have in his or her possession, knowingly, any bill, slip, certificate, token, or other device, or article of any kind such as is used in carrying on, promoting, or playing the game commonly known as policy-lottery or policy, shall, upon conviction, be punished by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisonment not exceeding one year, and upon a second conviction of a violation of this section shall be imprisoned for a period not less than one nor more than five (5) years. Provided, that the prohibition against possession of these items shall not apply to lottery tickets of any kind if the state of origin of the tickets or devices has legally authorized its issuance or sale.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 28; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 37; P.L. 1909, ch. 376, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-5 ; P.L. 1972, ch. 50, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 41, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 309, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section does not violate R.I. Const., art. 1, §§ 6 , 10 or 14. State v. Gaines, 32 R.I. 462 , 79 A. 1107, 1911 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1911); State v. Scotti, 104 R.I. 683 , 248 A.2d 327, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 707 (1968).

Evidence — Sufficiency.

Evidence justified conviction of knowingly having in possession a slip or paper used in game of policy-lottery, where it was shown that slip in defendant’s possession was a record of drawing. State v. Gaines, 32 R.I. 462 , 79 A. 1107, 1911 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1911).

Where defendant was convicted for possession of lottery slips, admission of a slip of paper with the notation “6 days” was sufficient to connect it with carrying on a lottery game on the basis of the testimony of the detective who participated in the raid even if other numbers on the slip were not policy lottery numbers and if there was error in admitting this slip, it was not prejudicial error. State v. Sangermano, 111 R.I. 196 , 301 A.2d 80, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1197 (1973).

Indictment or Complaint.

The complaint does not need to allege that the possession of the lottery slips was for an unlawful purpose. The statute makes it a criminal offense, subject to the exception specifically provided, for any person knowingly to have lottery slips in his possession whatever the purpose of that possession may be. It is the possession without more which constitutes the offense, and not possession accompanied by an unlawful purpose. State v. Tutalo, 99 R.I. 14 , 205 A.2d 137, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1964).

“Possession.”

The word “possession” as used in the statute does not require that an accused be the owner of or have a qualified property right in the lottery slips as distinguished from having them in hand. The violation is not concerned with whether the violator was the possessor of a property right in the lottery slips or was the custodian of such slips. State v. Tutalo, 99 R.I. 14 , 205 A.2d 137, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1964).

Fact that lottery slips found on defendant all related to bets placed on events that had already transpired was no defense to prosecution under this section. State v. Scotti, 104 R.I. 683 , 248 A.2d 327, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 707 (1968).

It is possession without more of a lottery slip which constitutes an offense under this section, and not possession accompanied by an unlawful purpose. State v. Scotti, 104 R.I. 683 , 248 A.2d 327, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 707 (1968).

In a conviction for possession of lottery slips, the testimony of the detective who participated in the raid was sufficient to establish identification and prove that slips were in substantially the same condition as at the time of the raid so that they could be admitted as evidence. State v. Sangermano, 111 R.I. 196 , 301 A.2d 80, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1197 (1973).

Probable Cause.

Information from reliable informer that defendant was seen in possession of lottery tickets and that he would be at backstretch of the race track that afternoon because his companion, a bookie, carried on his business there did not justify a reasonable inference that at 5 p.m. of that afternoon defendant would have the tickets on his person; accordingly, there was no probable cause for his arrest at that time. State v. Roach, 106 R.I. 280 , 259 A.2d 119, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 624 (1969).

Where defendant was arrested in a small variety store that he operated and charged with a violation of this section, the finding of a yellow slip of paper with a recorded bet thereon, the presence of a brown paper bag, and the information from an alleged reliable informer that defendant “carried the action and the money in a brown paper bag,” was sufficient to constitute probable cause for defendant’s arrest and to support a conviction for a violation of this section and there was no error in denying a motion for a directed verdict for violation of this section. State v. Doukales, 111 R.I. 443 , 303 A.2d 769, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1226 (1973).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of state or municipal enactments relating to policy or numbers games. 70 A.L.R.3d 897.

Numbers game or policy game as a lottery. 105 A.L.R. 305.

11-19-6. Possession of policy devices as evidence of knowledge.

The possession, by any person not authorized by the Rhode Island state police other than a public official in the course of his or her duty, of any bill, slip, certificate, token, or other device, or article of any kind such as is used in carrying on, promoting, or playing the game commonly known as lottery-policy or policy, shall be presumptive evidence of possession of that item knowingly and in violation of § 11-19-5 .

History of Section. P.L. 1909, ch. 376, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-6 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 41, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 309, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

It is a legitimate exercise of police power for the legislature to suppress lotteries and there is a legislative right to prescribe evidentiary rules. In the exercise of that right the legislature may, with limitations, and even in criminal cases, provide that when certain facts have been proved, they shall be prima facie or presumptive evidence of other facts; where the inference is not purely arbitrary and there is a rational relation between the two facts, and the accused is not deprived of a proper opportunity to submit all the facts bearing upon the issue, the statute does not violate the requirements of due process of law. State v. Tutalo, 99 R.I. 14 , 205 A.2d 137, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1964).

Collateral References.

Validity of criminal legislation making possession of gambling or lottery devices or paraphernalia presumptive or prima facie evidence of other incriminating facts. 17 A.L.R.3d 491.

11-19-7. Judicial notice of policy methods.

Any court or magistrate having criminal jurisdiction may take judicial notice of the general methods and character of lotteries, policy-lotteries, of the game called policy, pools, or combination bets, and the buying and selling of pools and registering of bets, not authorized by the Rhode Island state police.

History of Section. P.L. 1909, ch. 376, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-7 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 41, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 309, § 1.

11-19-8. Policy devices as evidence of existence of game.

In the trial of a complaint or indictment to which it may be relevant any lottery, policy, or pool ticket, certificate, slip, or check, manifold, or other policy or pool book or sheet, or memorandum of any pool or sale of pools, or of a bet or odds, or combination bet, or any other implement, apparatus, materials, or articles of a character commonly employed in or in connection with lotteries, policy-lotteries, or policy, the buying or selling of pools, or registering of bets, or other form of gaming not authorized by the Rhode Island state police shall be prima facie evidence of the existence and unlawful character of a lottery, policy-lottery, or game, pool or pools, bet, game, or hazard, or other form of gaming in which like articles are commonly used, and that the article has relation to it.

History of Section. P.L. 1909, ch. 376, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-8 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 41, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 309, § 1.

Collateral References.

Validity of criminal legislation making possession of gambling or lottery devices or paraphernalia presumptive or prima facie evidence of other incriminating facts. 17 A.L.R.3d 491.

11-19-9. Illegal trading stamps and coupons.

All schemes and devices by which any person or corporation shall sell, give, or distribute any stamp, trading-stamp, cash discount stamp, amusement stamp, check, coupon, or other similar device to any purchaser of goods, wares, or merchandise, which will entitle the holder of the stamp, trading-stamp, cash discount stamp, amusement stamp, check, coupon, or other similar device, on presentation of it, either singly or in definite numbers, to receive either directly from the vendor or indirectly through any other person or corporation, some indefinite and undescribed article, the nature and value of which are unknown to the purchaser of the goods, wares, and merchandise at the time of the purchase of the merchandise, are declared to partake so much of the nature of a lottery as to be detrimental to the public morals, and are declared to be illegal.

History of Section. P.L. 1901, ch. 842, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

P.L. 1899, ch. 652, prohibiting entirely the use of trading-stamps, had no relation to the public health, safety, or morals, and interfered with the right of an individual to make contracts regarding sale and disposition of his own property in violation of U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1, and R.I. Const., art. 1, § 10 . State v. Dalton, 22 R.I. 77 , 46 A. 234, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 50 (1900).

Collateral References.

Giving of trading-stamps, premiums, or the like, as violation of fair trade law. 22 A.L.R.2d 1212.

11-19-10. Distribution of illegal stamps or coupons.

No person or corporation shall sell, give, or distribute any stamp, trading-stamp, cash discount stamp, amusement stamp, check, coupon or other similar device, to any purchaser of goods, wares, or merchandise, which will entitle the holder of the stamp, trading-stamp, cash discount stamp, amusement stamp, check, coupon, or other similar device, on presentation of it, either singly or in definite numbers, to receive either directly from the vendor or indirectly through any other person or corporation, some indefinite and undescribed article, the nature and value of which are unknown to the purchaser of the goods, wares, and merchandise at the time of their purchase.

History of Section. P.L. 1901, ch. 842, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-10 .

11-19-11. Stamps and coupons as inducement to purchase goods.

No person or corporation shall, either directly or indirectly, give, sell, or distribute any stamp, trading-stamp, cash discount stamp, amusement stamp, check, coupon, or other similar device with the promise, expressed or implied, as an inducement to the purchase of some article of goods, wares, or merchandise, that the holder of the stamp, trading-stamp, cash discount stamp, amusement stamp, check, coupon, or other similar device is to receive in return, on presentation, some gift, prize, or gratuity, the nature and value of which are unknown to the purchase of the goods, wares, or merchandise at the time of their purchase, the promise to be fulfilled only upon the presentation of the stamp, trading-stamp, cash discount stamp, amusement stamp, check, coupon, or other similar device, together with the number of like stamps, trading-stamps, cash discount stamps, amusement stamps, checks, coupons, or other similar devices, as the issuer or redeemer may elect shall be redeemed at any one time.

History of Section. P.L. 1901, ch. 842, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-11 .

11-19-12. Penalty for stamp and coupon violations.

Whoever shall violate any provision of §§ 11-19-9 11-19-11 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and for each offense shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three (3) months.

History of Section. P.L. 1901, ch. 842, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 8; P.L. 1931, ch. 1691, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-12 .

11-19-13. Door prizes exempt.

Nothing in §§ 11-19-1 11-19-4 or in §§ 11-19-9 11-19-1 1 shall be deemed to prohibit or make illegal the annual or semiannual distribution by chance, of prizes, souvenirs, or favors by any club, society, lodge, or association at its dance, dinner, entertainment, or outing where the distribution is purely incidental to the dance, dinner, entertainment or outing or when the entire net proceeds of the dance, dinner, entertainment or outing is devoted to charity, if the club, society, lodge or association has first obtained the written permission for the distribution, in towns, from the town sergeant, in cities, from the police commission or police commissioner, if there is such an official, otherwise from the chief of police of the town or city where the dance, dinner, entertainment or outing is held, and that permitting authority is authorized to grant the permit when he or she is satisfied that the distribution comes within this section.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 8; P.L. 1931, ch. 1691, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-13 .

11-19-14. Bookmaking.

Except as provided in chapter 4 of title 41 and excluding activities authorized by the division of lottery under chapters 61 and 61.2 of title 42, any person who shall engage in pool selling or bookmaking, or shall occupy or keep any room, shed, tenement, tent, or building, or any part of them, or shall occupy any place upon any public or private grounds within this state, with books, apparatus, or paraphernalia for the purpose of recording or registering bets or wagers or of buying or selling pools, or who shall record or register bets or wagers or sell pools upon the result of any trial or contest of skill, speed, or power of endurance of man or beast, or upon the result of any political nomination, appointment, or election, or, being the owner or lessee or occupant of any room, tent, tenement, shed, booth, or building, or part of them, knowingly shall permit it to be used or occupied for any of these purposes, or shall keep, exhibit, or employ any device or apparatus for the purpose of recording or registering bets or wagers, or the selling of pools, or shall become the custodian or depositary for gain, hire, or reward of any money, property, or thing of value staked, wagered, or pledged or to be wagered or pledged upon the result, or who shall receive, register, record, forward, or purport or pretend to forward to or for any race course, or person, within or outside this state, any money, thing, or consideration of value bet or wagered, or money, thing, or consideration of value offered for the purpose of being bet or wagered upon the speed or endurance of any man or beast; or who shall occupy any place or building or part of it with books, papers, apparatus, or paraphernalia for the purpose of receiving or pretending to receive, or for recording or registering, or for forwarding or pretending or attempting to forward in any manner whatsoever, any money, thing, or consideration of value bet or wagered or to be bet or wagered for any other person, or who shall receive or offer to receive any money, thing, or consideration of value bet or to be bet at any race track within or without this state, or who shall aid, assist, or abet in any manner in any of the acts forbidden by this section, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisonment not exceeding one year, and upon a second conviction of a violation of this section shall be imprisoned for a period not less than one nor more than five (5) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 27; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 36; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 36; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 35; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-14 ; P.L. 2018, ch. 47, art. 4, § 7.

Severability.

P.L. 2018, ch. 47, art. 4, § 16 provides: “If any provisions of the article or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this article, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this article are declared to be severable.”

Cross References.

Animal or bird fights, betting on, § 4-1-9 .

Boxing or wrestling match, betting on, §§ 41-5-18 , 41-5-21 .

Mutuel betting on horse races, § 41-4-1 et seq.

Racetrack or fronton, bookmaking and entry by convicted bookmakers, § 11-19-14.1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

The word “record” as used in this section clearly refers to making a memorandum of some sort by the person charged, but the word “register” is broader in scope and includes the acceptance of a memorandum of a bet made by another and received by the person charged as a memorandum of a bet. State v. Mazzarella, 105 R.I. 253 , 236 A.2d 446 (1967).

Bets on Sporting Events.

A stipulation that defendant conducted a gambling business involving bets on sporting events was an admission of a violation of this section. United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 30942 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823, 104 S. Ct. 89, 78 L. Ed. 2d 97, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 1140 (1983).

Evidence.

Corporation could not obtain an injunction against police interference with its business where petitioner failed to prove that it was not engaged in the business of pool selling in violation of this section. Electric News & Money Transfer Co. v. Perry, 75 F. 898, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 2840 (C.C.D.R.I. 1896).

Where police officers testified that they heard defendant communicating information concerning a horse race by telephone and there was in evidence a scratch sheet having been marked by defendant, question of whether defendant did aid and assist in the recording of a bet on a horse race was for the jury. State v. Marderosian, 87 R.I. 165 , 139 A.2d 79, 1958 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1958).

Where a search warrant was issued upon the complaint of the chief of police that the defendant was keeping certain “books, apparatus, or paraphernalia . . . used in the recording or registering bets and wagers” in his dwelling house, supported by the affidavit of two police officers that the defendant was “conducting a resort for gambling,” that it had been reported to them that the defendant registered a bet on a certain date, and that they had long had the defendant under surveillance, there was an insufficient showing of probable cause and evidence seized in a search under this warrant should have been suppressed. State v. Le Blanc, 100 R.I. 523 , 217 A.2d 471, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 472 (1966).

It was not error to admit evidence of the arrest of defendant’s employer at his place of employment while looking at a racing sheet in defendant’s presence to impeach defendant’s testimony that he had never seen such a racing sheet on the premises. State v. Harris, 106 R.I. 643 , 262 A.2d 374, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 968 (1970).

Joinder of Offenses.

The joinder of two offenses in the indictment, namely, a conspiracy to violate the gambling laws and a violation of this section which was not an indictable offense as was the first but was only a misdemeanor and not indictable, was not duplicitous. State v. Edwards, 89 R.I. 378 , 153 A.2d 153, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1959).

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of statute or ordinance prohibiting or regulating use of messenger services to place wagers in pari-mutuel pool. 78 A.L.R.4th 483.

11-19-14.1. Bookmaking at racetrack or fronton — Entry by convicted bookmakers prohibited.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of § 11-19-14 , any person who shall engage in bookmaking activities while on the premises of a racetrack or fronton facility shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) and/or imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of the crime of bookmaking in the state of Rhode Island or other state to enter or visit any racetrack or fronton facility and, upon conviction, that person shall be punished by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) and/or imprisonment not exceeding one year.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 236, § 1.

11-19-15. Betting on horses.

Except as provided in chapter 4 of title 41, every person who shall make any bet or lay any wager of any kind upon any horse, to start, run, or trot, shall be fined one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 13; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-15 .

Collateral References.

Game of chance, racing as. 135 A.L.R. 183.

11-19-16. Forfeiture of horses used in unlawful race.

Except as provided in title 41, every person who shall knowingly suffer or permit any horse belonging to him or her or of which he or she has the care and charge to start, run, or trot for any bet or wager shall forfeit the horse starting, running, or trotting to the use of the state.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 14; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-16 .

11-19-17. Invalidity of instruments won in bets on races or fights.

All bonds, notes, judgments, mortgages, deeds or other securities, as well as promises, given or made for money, lands, houses, or other property, or article or piece of property, real, personal, or mixed, won at any game, or by betting at any race or fight, or for the repayment of money knowingly lent for such gaming or betting, shall be utterly void.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 16; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-17 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Betting on Game.

This section applies to betting on a game as well as to money won by the winner of the game. McGrath v. Kennedy, 15 R.I. 209 , 2 A. 438, 1866 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1866).

Recovery From Stakeholder.

A plaintiff who had denounced his bet before the game was terminated and had notified the stakeholder not to pay over his money was entitled to recover from the stakeholder who had paid the amount to the winner. McGrath v. Kennedy, 15 R.I. 209 , 2 A. 438, 1866 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1866).

11-19-18. Keeping of gambling places or devices — Acting as dealer, banker, or lookout.

Every person who shall keep or suffer to be kept any building, room, booth, shed, tent, arbor, or any other place, or any automobile, bus, coach, van, truck, trainer, railway or railroad car, or any other vehicle in any city or town of this state, or in any vessel, boat, or raft upon any of the waters of Narragansett Bay, to be used or occupied for the purpose of gambling, or playing at any game or games of chance of any kind whatsoever, for money or other valuable consideration, or shall keep, exhibit, or suffer to be kept or exhibited upon premises or in a vehicle belonging to that person under his or her control, any cards, dice, table, bowls, wheel of fortune, shuffleboard, or billiard table, or any device, implement, or apparatus whatsoever to be used in gambling or playing at any game or games of chance for money or other valuable consideration, or who shall be guilty of dealing Faro, or banking for others to deal Faro, or acting as lookout, gamekeeper, or assistant for the game of Faro or any other banking game where money or property is dependent on the result, shall be taken and held to be a common gambler and shall be imprisoned not exceeding two (2) years or be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor less than five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 9; P.L. 1956, ch. 3759, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-18 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Banker.

Poker player who took charge of the game, took a cut out of each pot, settled arguments, and made change was not a banker within the meaning of this section. State v. Bradley, 51 R.I. 4 , 149 A. 863, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 32 (1930).

Certiorari.

Supreme court would grant certiorari from interlocutory order restraining police from enforcing this section, since irreparable injury in these exceptional circumstances would be suffered by the public in any long delay. Conte v. Roberts, 58 R.I. 353 , 192 A. 814, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1937).

Continuing Offense.

On prosecution for being a common gambler on a specified date, evidence of acts before and after that date could be received even though the indictment did not contain a continuando. State v. Groves, 21 R.I. 252 , 43 A. 181, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1899).

Due Process.

The provisions of this section are not so vague and indefinite as to be violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process. State v. Picillo, 105 R.I. 364 , 252 A.2d 191, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 765 (1969).

Equity Jurisdiction.

Equity did not have jurisdiction to restrain police officers from interfering with complainants’ business in the enforcement of this section where it was not contended that this section was unconstitutional or that officers did not have general authority to enforce the section. Conte v. Roberts, 58 R.I. 353 , 192 A. 814, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1937).

Evidence.

Where there was no showing that defendant’s premises were put for the purpose of gambling therein, the alleged unlawful use did not constitute violation of the section although evidence of telephone calls made by persons betting on horses and written evidence of number pool operations was available and racing forms and thousands of number policy slips were found in garage. State v. Hindle, 108 R.I. 389 , 275 A.2d 915, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1279 (1971).

Although the defendant owned and operated a cafe where police officers found betting slips, newspapers turned to the racing section, and received a telephone call on a pay telephone in which callers attempted to place a bet, the fact that the defendant’s cafe was a place open to the public did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly kept the cafe as a place designed to be used by persons assembled therein for the purpose of gambling and such evidence was not sufficient for conviction under this section. State v. Zajac, 111 R.I. 397 , 303 A.2d 368, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1218 (1973).

Where the defendant was arrested in a small variety store that he operated and charged with keeping a gambling place in violation of this section and of § 11-19-5 , and request for directed verdict was denied, this was error as the building referred to in this section had to be one designed to be used by persons assembled there for the purpose of gambling. State v. Doukales, 111 R.I. 443 , 303 A.2d 769, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1226 (1973).

Keeping and Using.

Where it was shown that the room was kept for gambling purposes and that defendant was temporarily in charge, it was not necessary to show that the room was actually used for gambling while defendant was in charge. State v. Marchant, 15 R.I. 539 , 9 A. 902, 1887 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1887).

Number of Violations Required.

A person who deals “faro” once is guilty of the offense charged by this section. State v. Melville, 11 R.I. 417 , 1877 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1877).

Sufficiency of Charge.

An indictment for violation of this section is sufficient if it alleges that the defendant dealt “faro”, “a certain banking game where money and other property was then and there dependent on the result”, since such an allegation excludes any assumption that the indictment may be proved and the defendant still innocent. State v. Melville, 11 R.I. 417 , 1877 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1877).

An indictment charging violation of this section in the words of the statute was not defective for failing to allege that the defendant “then and there” kept the room to be used for gambling. State v. Marchant, 15 R.I. 539 , 9 A. 902, 1887 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1887).

Collateral References.

Bridge as within gambling laws. 97 A.L.R.2d 1420.

Coin-operated pinball machine or similar device, played for amusement only or confining reward to privilege of free replays, as prohibited or permitted by antigambling laws. 89 A.L.R.2d 815.

Connection with place where gaming is carried on which will render one guilty as keeper thereof. 15 A.L.R. 1202.

Criminal conspiracies as to gambling. 91 A.L.R.2d 1148.

Each bet or play at gaming on a single occasion as constituting a distinct offense. 35 A.L.R. 89.

Gambling in private residence as prohibited or permitted by antigambling laws. 27 A.L.R.3d 1074.

Married woman’s criminal responsibility for keeping gaming house. 4 A.L.R. 282; 71 A.L.R. 1116.

Paraphernalia or appliances used for recording gambling transactions or receiving or furnishing gambling information as gaming “devices” within criminal statute or ordinance. 1 A.L.R.3d 726.

Possession of gambling device as offense not requiring showing that device was used for gambling or kept for gambling purposes. 162 A.L.R. 1188.

Sentence and punishment for criminal conspiracy as to gambling. 91 A.L.R.2d 1205.

Slot and vending machines as gambling devices. 38 A.L.R. 73; 81 A.L.R. 177; 135 A.L.R. 138.

What is a game of chance. 135 A.L.R. 104.

11-19-19. Revocation of license of gambling place.

If a person in violation of § 11-19-18 is a tavernkeeper, innholder, retailer, or keeper of any other house or place of public resort which is licensed, that license shall in addition be declared null and void by the court in which he or she shall be convicted.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-19 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 134, § 4.

11-19-20. Inducing others to visit gambling place.

Every person who shall, on any pretext whatsoever, invite, entice, persuade, or induce any other person to visit any house, room, or other place kept for the purpose of gambling, with the intent that that other person shall at that place engage in gambling or playing at any game of chance, for money or other valuable consideration, shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars ($500) and be imprisoned one year.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-20 .

11-19-21. Frequenting gambling place.

Every person who shall frequent any gambling house or place where gaming is practiced or carried on, not in the performance of official duty and not being the landlord of that place entering to view the premises, shall be imprisoned not exceeding thirty (30) days.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 19; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 28; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-21 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.

Witness could not be compelled to answer question as to whether he had ever played roulette in a certain place even though it would have taken proof of more than one offense to convict him under this section. Ex parte Werner, 46 R.I. 1 , 124 A. 195, 1924 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1924).

Testimony of officers that they called a phone number listed at the house in question and placed bets on horses and that, while at the house during a raid, they received several bets on horses over the phone in question was admissible to prove that the house was being used for placing bets. State v. White, 107 R.I. 306 , 267 A.2d 414, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 774 (1970).

Collateral References.

Disbarment or suspension of attorney for gambling. 9 A.L.R 203; 43 A.L.R. 107; 55 A.L.R. 1373.

Sentence or judgment for gambling, necessity and sufficiency of recital of, or reference to, the offense. 14 A.L.R. 1000.

11-19-22. Renting for gambling purposes.

Every person who shall let or knowingly permit to be occupied any house, shop, or place belonging to or under the control of that person, to be used as a gambling house or place where gambling is carried on, or as a place where pools are sold, shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 20; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 29; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 29; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-22 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.

Testimony of officers that they called a phone number listed at the house in question and placed bets on horses and that, while at the house during a raid, they received several bets on horses over the phone in question was admissible to prove that the house was being used for placing bets. State v. White, 107 R.I. 306 , 267 A.2d 414, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 774 (1970).

11-19-23. Lease voided by gambling.

Every lease of any house, shop, or place used as a gambling house or place where gaming is practiced or carried on, or where pools are bought or sold, shall be void, and no notice to the occupant other than a demand for the possession of the premises, shall be necessary to eject the occupant.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 21; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 30; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 30; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 29; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-23 .

11-19-24. Search warrants and forfeitures of gambling apparatus.

    1. Search warrants to search for and seize gambling implements, apparatus, paraphernalia, slips, tickets, and other property and devices kept, possessed or used in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, or as a means of committing a violation of this chapter, may be issued as provided by law in chapter 5 of title 12; and all implements, apparatus, paraphernalia, slips, tickets, or other gambling apparatus or devices found by any officer in executing a search warrant or which shall be produced and brought into court shall be forfeited to the state, and further proceedings shall be had thereon for their forfeiture as is prescribed by law in chapter 21 of title 12 and upon entry of final judgment of forfeiture shall be destroyed by order of the court.
    2. In addition, those items of personal property other than gambling apparatus and devices, including, but not limited to, motor vehicles and money or negotiable instruments which were kept, possessed, or used in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter and which have a monetary value may be seized and forfeited, and further proceedings shall be had for their forfeiture as is prescribed by law in chapter 21 of title 12 and the further provisions of this section; provided, that no property or money used by any person shall be forfeited under the provisions of this chapter unless it shall appear that the owner of the property or money had knowledge, actual or constructive, and was a consenting party to the alleged illegal act.
  1. Property taken or detained under this section shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure and whenever property or money is forfeited under this chapter it shall be utilized as follows:
    1. Where the seized property is a vessel, vehicle, aircraft, or other personal property, it may be retained and used by the law enforcement agency that seized the property where the use of the property is reasonably related to the law enforcement duties of the seizing agency. If the seized property is a motor vehicle which is inappropriate for use by law enforcement agency due to style, size or color, the seizing agency shall be allowed to apply the proceeds of sale or the trade in value of the vehicle towards the purchase of an appropriate vehicle for use for activities reasonably related to law enforcement duties.
    2. The law enforcement agency may sell any forfeited property which is not required by this chapter to be destroyed and which is not harmful to the public. The proceeds from the sale are to be distributed in accordance with subdivision (3) of this subsection.
    3. As to the proceeds from the sale of seized property as referred to in subdivision (2) of this subsection and as to personal property referred to in subsection (a) of this section, the distribution shall be as follows:
      1. All proceeds of the forfeiture of real or personal property shall be distributed as follows:
        1. Twenty percent (20%) of the proceeds shall be provided to the attorney general’s department to be used to further law enforcement activities pursuant to this chapter including, but not limited to, investigations, prosecutions, and the administration of this chapter.
        2. Eighty percent (80%) of the proceeds shall be divided among the state and local law enforcement agencies proportionately based upon their contribution to the investigation of the criminal activity related to the asset being forfeited.
      2. The law enforcement agencies involved in the investigation with the assistance of the attorney general shall by agreement determine the respective proportionate share to be received by each agency. If the agencies are unable to reach agreement, application shall be made by one or more of the agencies involved to the presiding justice of the superior court, who shall determine the respective proportionate share attributable to each law enforcement agency. The proceeds from all forfeitures shall be held by the general treasurer in a separate account until such time as an allocation is determined by agreement of the agencies or by the presiding justice. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the general treasurer to disburse the allocated funds from the separate account to the respective law enforcement agencies.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 12; P.L. 1912, ch. 835, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 12; P.L. 1950, ch. 2464, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-24 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 7; P.L. 1989, ch. 232, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 175, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 370, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added paragraph designations in subdivision (b)(3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.

Evidence gained through federal warrant may be used in state court even though federal warrant did not comply with this section. State v. Davis, 105 R.I. 247 , 251 A.2d 394, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 746 (1969).

This section is not an exclusionary statute and has no application when evidence obtained under federal warrant is used in state court. State v. Davis, 105 R.I. 247 , 251 A.2d 394, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 746 (1969).

Gambling Instrument.

Machine was a gambling instrument where it could be used for such purposes, even though ostensible rules precluded such use. State v. Certain Gambling Instruments, 46 R.I. 347 , 128 A. 12, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1925).

Probable Cause.

The visits of several people, however brief, to a dwelling house, is insufficient to show probable cause for belief that dwelling house was being used for gambling. State v. Butts, 97 R.I. 147 , 196 A.2d 415, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1964).

Affidavit that affiants have reason to believe that the defendant is conducting a resort for gambling, that they were informed and had investigated that the defendant on a certain date registered a bet, and that they had long had him under surveillance, without setting out reasons for such belief, the source of their information, or the results of their investigation and surveillance was not a sufficient basis for finding of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. State v. Le Blanc, 100 R.I. 523 , 217 A.2d 471, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 472 (1966).

Time Limit.

Where the first date in an affidavit containing allegations relative to two dates, Dec. 3 and Dec. 6, was more than 48 hours previous to the making of the complaint, observation on that date cannot be considered as a fact upon which to base belief that dwelling house was being used for gambling as is required by this section. State v. Butts, 97 R.I. 147 , 196 A.2d 415, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1964).

Collateral References.

Forfeiture of money used in connection with gambling or lottery, or seized by officers in connection with an arrest or search on premises where such activities took place. 19 A.L.R.2d 1228.

Jury trial in case of seizure of gaming devices. 17 A.L.R. 573; 50 A.L.R. 98.

Money in gambling machine or other receptable, used in connection with gambling, seized by public authorities, rights and remedies in respect of. 79 A.L.R. 1007.

Money used in connection with gambling or seized by officers in connection with arrest or search on premises where such activities took place, forfeiture of. 19 A.L.R.2d 1228.

Paraphernalia or appliances used for recording gambling transactions or receiving or furnishing gambling information as gaming “devices” within criminal statute or ordinance. 1 A.L.R.3d 726.

Property used in connection with gaming, forfeiture before trial of individual offender. 3 A.L.R.2d 751.

Recovery of money or property lost through cheating or fraud in forbidden gambling or game. 39 A.L.R.2d 1213.

11-19-25. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 12; P.L. 1912, ch. 835, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 12; P.L. 1950, ch. 2464, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-25 ), concerning search warrants, seizure, and forfeiture, was repealed by P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 10.

11-19-26. Destruction of apparatus seized.

Upon final judgment of forfeiture of implements or apparatus pursuant to § 11-19-24 , either in the original or appellate court, or upon forfeiture of the recognizance given by the claimant to prosecute his or her appeal according to law, the court shall order in writing those implements and apparatus to be destroyed by any officer authorized to serve the criminal process of the court, which officer shall make return of his or her doings upon the order to the court as in other cases.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-26 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 134, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Gambling Instrument.

Machine was a gambling instrument where it could be used for such purpose, even though ostensible rules prohibited such use. State v. Certain Gambling Instruments, 46 R.I. 347 , 128 A. 12, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1925).

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of statute providing for destruction of gambling devices. 14 A.L.R.3d 336; 46 A.L.R. Fed. 657.

11-19-27. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-27 ), providing immunity for law enforcement officers, was repealed by P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 10.

11-19-28. Fees for seizure and removal of gambling apparatus.

In addition to the fees allowed by law, the officer who shall serve any warrant for the seizure of any gambling implements or apparatus under the provisions of this chapter shall be allowed the sum of one dollar ($1.00), and for the removing of any gambling implements or apparatus so seized to a place of safety, one dollar ($1.00) and all necessary expenses incurred in removal. These fees shall be included in the bill of costs and taxed by the court.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 11; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-28 .

11-19-29. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 12; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-29 ), relating to testimony and immunity therefor, was repealed by P.L. 1969, ch. 54, § 3.

11-19-30. Definitions.

The following definitions apply within this chapter:

  1. “Charitable organization” means any benevolent, educational, philanthropic, humane, patriotic, social service, civic, fraternal, police, labor, religious, eleemosynary person, and/or persons holding themselves out to be a charitable organization.
  2. “Charitable purpose” means any benevolent, educational, humane, patriotic, social service, civic, fraternal, police, labor, religious, or eleemosynary purpose, provided that no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
  3. “Department” means the division of state police unless otherwise described.
  4. “Director” means the superintendent of state police or the director’s designee.
  5. “Permitted game of chance” means the game commonly known as “Bingo” or “Beano” or substantially the same game under any other name, or a raffle or lottery or that lottery commonly known as a “twenty (20) week club”.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 84, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is set out to correct an error appearing in the bound volume.

Repealed Sections.

The former section (G.L., ch. 401, § 59; P.L. 1937, ch. 2495, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 56; P.L. 1941, ch. 1072, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-30 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 35, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 41, § 1; P.L. 1976, ch. 246, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 137, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 309, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 265, § 1), concerning organizations permitted to operate bingo games, was repealed by P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 1.

Collateral References.

Validity and construction of statute exempting gambling operations carried on by religious, charitable, or other nonprofit organizations from general prohibitions against gambling. 42 A.L.R.3d 663.

11-19-30.1 — 11-19-30.3. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1969, ch. 253, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 289, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 41, § 1; as assigned, P.L. 1977, ch. 137, § 2; P.L. 1979, ch. 309, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 49, § 1), concerning regulation of games other than bingo conducted by non-profit organizations, announcement of prizes at bingo games, and use of pull-tab lottery tickets, were repealed by P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 1. For present similar provisions of law, see §§ 11-19-33 , 11-19-35 and 11-19-36 .

11-19-31. Registration of charitable organizations.

  1. No charitable organization which intends to conduct a permitted game of chance within the state of Rhode Island shall conduct a game unless it shall file a registration statement with the department upon prescribed forms and receives a certificate of approval.
  2. In addition, in order to obtain a renewal of registration, charitable organizations shall file the statements required by this chapter prior to June 1st of each year.
  3. It shall be the duty of the president, chair, or principal officer of a charitable organization to file the statements required under this chapter. These statements shall be sworn to and shall contain the following information:
    1. The name of the organization and the purpose for which it was organized.
    2. The principal address of the organization and the address of any offices in this state. If the organization does not maintain an office, the name and address of the person having custody of its financial records.
    3. The place where and the date when the organization was legally established and the form of its organization.
    4. The names and addresses of the officers, directors, and/or trustees of the organization and the names and addresses of officers, staff, and/or members who receive a salary or any other form of compensation, the source of which is the proceeds from the permitted games of chance subject to subdivision (9) of this subsection.
    5. A copy of the annual financial statement of the organization audited by an independent public accountant licensed by the state of Rhode Island for the organization’s immediately preceding fiscal year, or a copy of a financial statement covering, in a consolidated report, complete information as to all the preceding year’s fund-raising from the above-mentioned games showing kind and amount of funds raised, costs and expenses incidental to it, and allocation or disbursements of funds raised.
    6. The general purpose or purposes for which the proceeds from the game shall be used.
    7. The name or names under which it intends to conduct the game.
    8. The names of the individuals or officers of the organization who will have final responsibility for the custody of the proceeds from the game.
    9. A listing of the names, addresses and the compensation of all individuals, directors, officers, agents, servants, and/or employees of the organization who receive compensation, commission, or other remuneration, directly or indirectly, from the gross receipts of such games in excess of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) annually.
    10. The names of the individuals or officers of the organization responsible for the final distribution of the proceeds. The director or the director’s designee shall examine each initial application of charitable organizations for the right to conduct the above-mentioned games and each renewal application of charitable organizations for the right to conduct such games and if found to be in conformity with the requirements of this chapter and all relevant rules and regulations it shall be approved for registration.
  4. The registration forms and any other documents prescribed by the department shall be signed by an authorized officer, an independent public accountant, and by the chief fiscal officer of the charitable organization and shall be verified under oath.
  5. The department shall make or cause to be made any investigation of any applicant that it shall deem necessary. As a result of its investigation and action, the department shall certify to the local police department or local licensing authority its approval or disapproval of the application. No applicant shall be approved if one or more of the following facts is found to exist:
    1. That one or more of the statements in the application are not true;
    2. That the applicant is or has engaged in a fraudulent transaction or enterprise;
    3. That the game would be a fraud upon the public;
    4. That game expenses during any of the three (3) years immediately preceding the date of application have exceeded twenty-five percent (25%) of the total gross money or gross receipts raised or received by reason of the games. In the event special facts or circumstances are presented showing that expenses higher than twenty-five percent (25%) were not unreasonable, the department, pursuant to rule and regulation, has the discretion to allow the higher expenses;
    5. That the expected cost of conducting the games for the specific year for which the application will exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the total gross money or receipts to be raised or received by reason of the games; or
    6. That the activities to be financed will be incompatible with the health, safety, or welfare of the state of Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 23, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 321, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 84, § 1.

Repealed Sections.

The former section (G.L., ch. 401, § 60, as enacted by P.L. 1937, ch. 2495, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 57; G.L. 1956, § 11-19-31 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 265, § 1), concerning the improper conduct of bingo, was repealed by P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Rhode Island’s bingo laws are not facially void for vagueness. Allendale Leasing, Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17165 (D.R.I. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 830, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 24760 (1st Cir. 1986).

11-19-32. Operation of bingo games.

Any charitable organization approved by the department may promote, carry on, or conduct the game of bingo provided as follows:

  1. The game is conducted by members of the organization; provided, however, that the members shall be permitted to employ one or more persons to carry on or conduct the game who are not members of the organization; and provided, further, that any person who is a member or a worker of the organization which promotes, carries on or conducts the game shall be permitted to be a member or worker of another organization that promotes, carries on or conducts the game of bingo.
  2. No person in the actual or constructive management and control of the game receives any compensation for services connected to the game or receives any compensation from the gross receipts of the game.
  3. The entire net receipts of the game are applied solely to the charitable purposes of the organization. All expenses deducted from gross receipts must be reasonable and related to the actual conduct of the game.
  4. The total amount of all expenses deducted from the gross receipts shall not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the total annual gross receipts raised through bingo, not including monies raised through the sale of pull-tab lottery tickets.
  5. The total prizes, in the form of cash and/or retail merchandise including prizes from winner-take-all games, which are offered or awarded do not exceed the sum of seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) in any one night.
  6. The game is carried on or conducted not more than twice in any period of one calendar week under a license issued pursuant to the provisions of § 11-19-37 .
  7. That there be only one sponsor for each date of the proposed game and that the game shall be conducted only on the premises affiliated with the organization in conformance with rules and regulations.
  8. That any building in which a game is played or conducted shall be used no more than three (3) times in any calendar week for conducting a game, and that no annex or subdivision of any building shall be permitted to be used to conduct a game in an attempt to increase the number of times the building may be used for bingo purposes.
  9. The organization shall keep and maintain financial records relating to the game in accordance with rules and regulations and have the records available for inspection upon demand.
  10. Payment of a prize in excess of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) shall be made by check.
  11. “Winner-take-all” games are prohibited, with the exception that each organization shall be permitted to play one optional “winner-take-all” game per night.
  12. No person under the age of eighteen (18) years shall be permitted to play the game.
  13. Notwithstanding any regulation to the contrary, any approved charitable organization conducting a lawful game of bingo pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be permitted to advertise their game in print media. As used in this chapter, “advertise” means an advertisement or announcement in print media containing the date, time, and place of the game, the charitable organization sponsoring and/or benefiting from the game, whether the game shall provide for a bonus building/prize pool, and the total amount of the prize pool as set forth in subdivision (14) of this section.
  14. The game may provide for a bonus building/prize pool which would start at five hundred dollars ($500) and increase at one hundred dollar ($100) increments each week until it reaches a maximum amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  15. Game workers may be compensated with a non-monetary gift, valued at not more than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per quarter and/or a total of one hundred dollars ($100) per year. Beverages and food provided without charge to volunteer workers at the game of bingo shall not be considered to be compensation for purposes of the subsection.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 181, art. 23, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 84, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 96, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 380, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 447, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 439, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 356, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 419, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 337, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 356, § 1, and P.L. 2005, ch. 419, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Rhode Island’s bingo laws are not facially void for vagueness. Allendale Leasing, Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17165 (D.R.I. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 830, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 24760 (1st Cir. 1986).

Rhode Island’s bingo laws and regulations (§ 11-19-1 et seq.) are a legitimate and reasonable exercise of the state police power. Allendale Leasing, Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17165 (D.R.I. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 830, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 24760 (1st Cir. 1986).

11-19-32.1. Senior citizens housing — Bingo allowed.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, any organization of senior citizens may promote, carry on or conduct within their own senior citizens housing project, a bingo game, with total daily prizes not to exceed four hundred dollars ($400). The game shall be for recreational purposes and shall be open only to senior citizens who are residents of the housing project where the game is held and their guests. Bingo games shall be limited to three (3) days per calendar week and shall be operated and managed solely by residents of the housing projects. Admission to a bingo game shall only be by admission ticket which may be purchased only by a resident. Each resident shall be allowed to purchase one ticket for a guest. The guest ticket must clearly indicate that the holder is a guest and must be purchased at least three (3) hours prior to the start of the bingo game.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 273, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 341, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 453, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 531, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 453, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 531, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-19-32.2. Senior citizens’ center — Bingo allowed.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, any organization which operates a public senior citizens center or senior center may obtain a permit approved by the department to conduct bingo games in said senior citizens center or senior center for up to five (5) calendar days per week, excluding Sundays.
  2. As used herein, the terms “senior citizens center” or “senior center” means an organization whose goal is the promotion of various recreational and educational activities to senior citizens and which receives a combination of federal, state, municipal and private funds to provide such services at a community facility.
  3. A senior citizens center or senior center may conduct bingo games if it complies with all of the following requirements:
    1. All bingo games are conducted only on the premises of the center’s facility;
    2. All participants are age fifty-five (55) years of age or older; provided, this shall not prohibit a person who is less than fifty-five (55) years of age from assisting a senior citizen in playing the game;
    3. All bingo game operators are sixty (60) years of age or older and receive no compensation for serving as operators;
    4. The total daily prizes shall not exceed four hundred dollars ($400); and
    5. All proceeds of the game shall be limited in use to the following:
      1. To pay winners monetary prizes;
      2. To defray any costs directly related to conducting the games; and/or
      3. To defray costs of services the center’s facility provides.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 515, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 529, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 515, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 529, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-19-33. Bingo games — Announcement of prizes.

Prior to each drawing or contest conducted in any game of “bingo” or “beano” as provided in this chapter, the sponsor shall announce or cause to be announced openly and clearly, so as to provide the participants with a clear understanding of the amount to be paid as a prize for each individual drawing or contest in any game of “bingo” or “beano” as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2.

11-19-34. Use of name of charitable organization to conduct permitted games of chance.

A charitable organization, within the provisions of § 11-19-30 or 11-19-31 , shall not allow or permit any individual, partnership, corporation, or any other entity to utilize the name of the charitable organization for the purpose of conducting or promoting bingo or other permitted games of chance.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 84, § 1.

11-19-34.1. Senior citizens housing — Raffles allowed.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, any organization of senior citizens may promote, carry on, or conduct within their own senior citizens housing project, a lottery, commonly known as a raffle, with total prizes not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500). Raffles shall be for recreational purposes and shall be open only to senior citizens who are residents of the housing project where the game is held. Raffles shall be limited to three (3) times per year and shall be operated and managed solely by residents of the housing projects.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 257, § 1.

11-19-35. Pull-tab lottery tickets.

  1. The Rhode Island lottery is empowered to sell and regulate the sale of pull-tab lottery tickets to religious, fraternal, civic, educational, veterans’, or charitable organizations. The lottery shall determine, consistent with this section, those organizations that are authorized to sell pull-tab lottery tickets. As part of such determination, the Rhode Island lottery shall require criminal background checks of the applicant and any individual the lottery deems appropriate and said individuals shall apply to the bureau of criminal investigation of the Rhode Island state police or the Rhode Island department of the attorney general for a national criminal records check with fingerprinting. The individual whose criminal records check is being conducted shall be responsible for the payment of the costs of said criminal records check. The Rhode Island state police or the Rhode Island department of attorney general, as applicable, shall send the results of such criminal check to the Rhode Island lottery. Once said results are sent to and received by the Rhode Island Lottery, the Rhode Island state police and the Rhode Island department of attorney general shall promptly destroy said fingerprint record(s). On or before February 1, 2011, the agency shall adopt rules and regulations establishing criteria to be used in determining whether based upon a criminal records check an application will be approved.
  2. The lottery shall insure that the pull tab lottery tickets to be distributed are secured for the purposes under which they are to be sold in terms of concealing the result of the tickets until the time that they are sold to the general public. Consistent with this section, those organizations authorized to sell the tickets are authorized to retain net profits as shall have been provided for by the commission.
  3. Notwithstanding any other section of the general laws to the contrary, pull-tab lottery tickets authorized by this section are declared to be legal.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 252, § 1.

11-19-36. Organizations permitted to conduct other permitted games of chance.

Any charitable organization may promote, carry on, or conduct any permitted game of chance authorized by the division of state police in connection with which prizes or prize monies are offered or awarded, provided as follows:

  1. The game is conducted by members of the organization.
  2. No person in the actual or constructive management and control of the game receives any compensation for services connected to the game.
  3. The entire net receipts of the game, including the charges for admission to and participation in the game, are applied solely to the bona fide charitable purposes of the organization.
  4. That the organization is granted a license issued pursuant to the provisions of § 11-19-37 .
  5. That the provisions of this section shall not apply to that lottery commonly known as a “twenty-week club” or a raffle conducted by a charitable organization.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 84, § 1.

11-19-37. Issuance of licenses.

  1. Any charitable organization within the provisions of §§ 11-19-30 and/or 11-19-31 may be granted a license to conduct the game of bingo or other permitted game of chance authorized by the department.
  2. Bingo.  A license for the game of bingo shall be obtained as follows:
    1. The charitable organization shall annually apply for approval to the department pursuant to § 11-19-31 and shall pay to the department an application fee of five dollars ($5.00).
    2. Upon the receipt of notification of approval from the department, the charitable organization shall apply to the local licensing authorities upon forms furnished and pay the local licensing fee, if any;
    3. The local licensing authority shall issue the license. A copy of the license shall be forwarded to the department by the local licensing authority;
    4. The local licensing authority shall issue the license for a specific date or dates or a specific day or days during each calendar week;
    5. Within seven (7) calendar days of the completion of every game of bingo, the charitable organization shall file a financial report, upon forms furnished by the department with the department and with the local licensing authority if it so requires.
  3. Other permitted games of chance.
    1. The charitable organization shall apply for approval to the department pursuant to this section and shall pay to the department an application fee of five dollars ($5.00).
    2. Upon the receipt of a notification of approval from the department, the charitable organization shall apply to the local licensing authority upon forms furnished by the department and pay the local licensing fee, if any;
    3. The local licensing authority shall issue the license. A copy of the license shall be forwarded to the department by the local licensing authority;
    4. The local licensing authority shall issue the license for a specific date or specific day or days;
    5. The application for the local license shall be made at least thirty (30) days prior to the date or day for which the license is issued;
    6. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of the permitted game of chance, the charitable organization shall file a financial report upon forms furnished by the department, with the department.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 84, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 138, art. 45, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations and redesignated the subdivisions.

11-19-38. Change of information.

If, subsequent to approval by the department pursuant to § 11-19-31 , there is a change in any information furnished by the organization to the department, the organization shall so inform the department within seven (7) days of the change. Failure to inform the department within seven (7) days will result in the automatic suspension of approval for a period of three (3) months.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2.

11-19-39. Enforcement and penalties.

  1. If any charitable organization fails to file any registration application or statement, report, or other information required to be filed by the department under this chapter, or otherwise violates the provisions of this chapter, the department shall notify the delinquent charitable organization, by mailing a notice, certified mail, with return receipt requested, to its last known address. If the required registration application or statement, annual report, or other information is not filed or if the existing violation is not discontinued within ten (10) days after the formal notification or receipt of the notice, the department may cancel, suspend the registration, or refuse to accept a delinquent report from the charitable organization.
  2. The department, upon its own motion or upon complaint of any person, may, if it has reasonable ground to suspect a violation, investigate any charitable organization, to determine whether it has violated the provisions of this chapter or has filed any application or other information required under this chapter which contains false or misleading statements. If the department finds that any application or other information contains false or misleading statements, or that a registrant under this chapter has violated its provisions, the registration may be suspended or cancelled. Any person whose registration is suspended or cancelled may, within fifteen (15) days from the date of written notification of the suspension or cancellation request in writing, a hearing before the department. This hearing shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date of the request. Any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the department in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act (chapter 35 of title 42), and who is aggrieved by a final decision of the department, is entitled to judicial review in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (chapter 35 of title 42).
  3. The certificate of approval of any charitable organization which knowingly makes a false or misleading statement in any registration application or statement, report, or other information required to be filed by the department or this chapter shall be revoked.
  4. Any person who willfully and knowingly violates any provisions of this chapter, or who shall willfully and knowingly give false or incorrect information to the department in filing statements or reports required by this chapter, whether the report or statement is verified or not, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Upon conviction, that person shall be sentenced for the first offense to pay a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or undergo imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. For the second and any subsequent offense, that person shall pay a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or undergo imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both.
  5. Whenever the attorney general shall have reason to believe or the attorney general has been advised by the director (who shall have given due notice and full hearing to the charitable organization) that the charitable organization: (1) is operating in violation of the provision of this chapter; (2) has knowingly and willfully made any false statements in any initial or any renewal application or in any other information required to be filed by this chapter; (3) has failed to file a registration statement required by this chapter; (4) there is employed or is about to be employed by a charitable organization any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of any false pretense, representation, or promise; (5) the officers or representatives of any charitable organization failed after notice to produce any records of the organization; or (6) the funds raised by the game are not devoted or will not be devoted to the charitable purposes of the charitable organization; in addition to all other actions authorized by law, the attorney general of the state of Rhode Island may bring an action in the name of the state of Rhode Island against the charitable organization and its officers, or any other person who has violated this chapter to enjoin that charitable organization or person from continuing the violation or doing any acts in furtherance of it, and for any other relief that the court deems appropriate. The court may make any additional orders and/or judgments that may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any monies or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of any practice in this chapter declared to be unlawful. The department may refuse to grant an initial application to conduct a game, may refuse to renew an application, and may revoke a registration of any charitable organization which knowingly makes a false statement in any initial registration application or renewal application or statement, annual report, or other information required to be filed by the department or the chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Hearings.

Claims by various individuals and organizations that the enforcement provisions of subsection (b) offended the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process by failing to provide for adequate hearings following the suspension of a registration to conduct bingo games were nonjusticiable, as such suspension procedures had not been invoked against any of the plaintiffs, nor was such a suspension imminent. Allendale Leasing, Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17165 (D.R.I. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 830, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 24760 (1st Cir. 1986).

11-19-40. Rules and regulations.

  1. The director shall adopt and issue rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of §§ 11-19-30 11-19-40 . These rules and regulations shall be promulgated in accordance with chapter 35 of title 42.
  2. In promulgating the rules and regulations, the director shall, in addition to the standards set forth in other provisions of this chapter, be guided by the following standards setting forth conduct, conditions and activity deemed undesirable:
    1. Fraud.  The practice of any fraud or deception upon a participant in a permitted game of chance;
    2. Unsafe premises.  The conduct of permitted games of chance in, at or upon premises which may be unsafe due to fire hazard or other conditions;
    3. Charitable funds.  To assure that all the funds raised through bingo and permitted charitable games are maintained and expended for bona fide charitable purposes;
    4. Advertising.  That advertising for all permitted games of chance and bingo is conducted in accordance with rules and regulations.
  3. The director may promulgate less stringent regulations for those charitable organizations that do not intend to run any permitted games more than once in any consecutive six (6) month period, and also for those charitable organizations where the prize for any permitted game will not exceed three hundred dollars ($300).

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 113, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 84, § 1.

Collateral References.

Construction and application of statute or ordinance prohibiting or regulating bookmaking or pool selling. 84 A.L.R.4th 740.

11-19-41. Police regulation of bingo and permitted games of chance.

The division of state police shall have the power and authority to license, regulate, supervise and exercise general control over the operation of bingo and permitted games of chance including, but not limited to, the conduct of permitted games of chance, the distribution of prizes, and the use and licensing of equipment specifically designed to be utilized to conduct bingo and permitted games of chance, as well as the licensing of persons, firms, corporations in the business of the sale and rental of equipment concerning bingo and permitted games of chance. The Rhode Island state police shall have the power and authority to investigate as to the direct or indirect ownership or control of any licenses and to revoke or suspend any license for just cause after a hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 84, § 1.

11-19-42. Forfeiture of charter rights and privileges.

  1. Upon conviction for a violation of this chapter or upon revocation of a certificate of approval, the attorney general may apply to the superior court:
    1. For the forfeiture of any charter rights, franchise privileges or powers of the corporation held by the convicted person under the laws of this state;
    2. For dissolution, if the person is a corporation or limited partnership organized under the laws of this state; or
    3. For the suspension of the privilege to exist within this state.
  2. The court, after giving due consideration to the public interest and to relevant competitive and economic circumstances, may grant as much of the requested relief as is deemed appropriate. A dissolution shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures specified by law for either voluntary or judicial dissolution of the particular type of corporation, association, firm, or partnership.
  3. If any corporation, association, partnership, or limited partnership shall be dissolved or have its privilege to exist in this state suspended or revoked as provided in subsection (a) of this section, no assignee, transferee, or successor-in-interest of the corporation, association, partnership, or limited partnership shall be permitted to incorporate or to transact business in this state without first applying to the court for and receiving an order permitting incorporation or transaction of business. No order shall be granted unless the applicant proves to the satisfaction of the court that it will conduct its affairs in accordance with all applicable laws.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2.

11-19-43. Acts of officers, directors, representatives, or agents acting within the scope of their authority.

  1. A corporation, association, firm, partnership, or limited partnership is liable for the acts of its officers, directors, representatives, or agents acting within the scope of their authority. Proof of the acts of any officer, director, representative, or agent shall be received as prima facie proof of the acts of the corporation, association, firm, partnership, or limited partnership itself.
  2. When a corporation, association, firm, partnership, or limited partnership violates this chapter, the violation shall be deemed to be that of the individual directors, members, officers, managers, employees, or agents of the corporation, association, firm, partnership, or limited partnership who knowingly authorized, ordered, aided, abetted, or advised in the acts or omissions constituting in whole or in part the violation, whether the individuals acted on their own behalf and for their own benefit, or for the corporation, association, firm, partnership, or limited partnership and in their representative capacity. The individuals, in their capacity as individuals, are subject to the provisions of this chapter and may be joined, if subject to personal jurisdiction, as additional parties defendant in the proceedings against the corporation, association, partnership, or limited partnership.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2.

11-19-44. Remedies cumulative.

The remedies provided in this chapter are cumulative of each other and of existing powers and remedies inherent in the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2.

11-19-45. Severability.

If any section of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of the chapter and the application of the section to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected. The invalidity or unconstitutionality of any section or sections or part of any section or sections of this chapter shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this chapter and to this end the sections of this chapter are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 188, § 2.

Chapter 20 Graves and Corpses

11-20-1. Disinterment of body.

Every person who shall, without proper authorization, disinter, dig up, remove, or carry away any human body from its place of sepulture, or who shall knowingly conceal any such body so disinterred or carried away, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years or fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 21; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 11-20-1 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 66, § 1.

Collateral References.

Construction and application of graverobbing statutes. 52 A.L.R.3d 701.

Liability for desecration of graves and tombstones. 77 A.L.R.4th 108.

11-20-1.1. Mutilation of dead human bodies — Penalties — Exemptions.

  1. Except as provided in this section, a person who dissects or mutilates a dead human body is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than three (3) years, or a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  2. This section does not apply to:
    1. A physician or surgeon acting on the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, a coroner or other qualified officer, a licensed funeral director or a licensed embalmer;
    2. Dissection to determine the cause of death when authorized by the nearest living kin of the deceased;
    3. Unclaimed dead human bodies delivered by state or county authorities to regularly chartered institutions for scientific research;
    4. The necessary mutilation incident to embalming a dead human body when authorized by nearest living kin, a court of competent jurisdiction or other qualified officer; or
    5. Conduct authorized by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, chapter 18.6 of title 23.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 433, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subdivisions.

11-20-1.2. Necrophilia.

Any person who performs the act of first degree sexual assault upon a dead human body shall be guilty of the crime of necrophilia. Any person convicted of the crime of necrophilia shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten (10) years and may be fined in an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 433, § 1.

11-20-2. Desecration of grave.

Every person who shall willfully and maliciously destroy, mutilate, deface, cover over, injure or remove any tomb, monument, gravestone, American Flag, or other structure or thing placed or designed for a memorial of the dead, or any fence, railing, curb, or other thing intended for the protection or for the ornament of any tomb, monument, gravestone, or other structure of the like character and designed for that purposes, or of any enclosure for the sepulture of the dead, or dig or plow up, cultivate or build upon or within any enclosure or plot of ground used and occupied for the sepulture of the dead, or shall commit any nuisance in it, or wantonly disturb, remove, or in any way desecrate the contents of any grave in any enclosure or plot of ground, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned not less than one year and not exceeding three (3) years, and/or be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both and shall, in addition to imprisonment and/or fine, be ordered to make full restitution to any person, business or entity incurring the expense of repairing the grave.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 22; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 11-20-2 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 229, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 141, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 82, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 341, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 375, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 341, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 375, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Cemeteries generally, § 23-18-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Criminal statute specifically denouncing offense affecting cemeteries, tombstones and the like. 132 A.L.R. 557.

Liability for desecration of graves and tombstones. 77 A.L.R.4th 108.

Policy of law to protect dead from disturbance and maintain sanctity of grave. 44 A.L.R.2d 1156; 72 A.L.R. 3d 8.

Right to protect grave of relative from desecration. 110 A.L.R. 384; 120 A.L.R. 655; 127 A.L.R. 1502; 141 A.L.R. 1030; 147 A.L.R. 698.

11-20-3. Removal of marker on veteran’s grave.

  1. Every person who maliciously or without authorization removes an American Flag in the vicinity of a veteran’s grave or from a flag staff in a cemetery shall be imprisoned not exceeding sixty (60) days or fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100).
  2. Every person who shall, without right, remove from any grave a marker that was authorized to be placed by the cemetery to designate that the grave was the grave of a deceased veteran shall be imprisoned not exceeding one hundred and twenty (120) days or fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) for a first offense, and shall be imprisoned not exceeding one hundred and twenty (120) days or fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) for a second offense.
  3. Every person, firm, partnership or corporation who shall purchase, sell or destroy any veteran’s grave marker shall be subject to the same penalties provided in subsection (b) of this section.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 46; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 49; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 49; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 49; G.L. 1956, § 11-20-3 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 219, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 490, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 66, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 6.

Cross References.

Veterans’ graves generally, § 30-25-5 et seq.

Chapter 21 Hazing

11-21-1. Penalty for hazing.

  1. Any organizer of, or participant in, an activity constituting hazing, as defined in subsection (b) of this section, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty (30) days nor more than one year, or both.
  2. “Hazing” as used in this chapter, means any conduct or method of initiation into any student organization, whether on public or private property, which willfully or recklessly endangers the physical or mental health of any student or other person. This conduct shall include, but not be limited to, whipping, beating, branding, forced calisthenics, exposure to the weather, forced consumption of any food, liquor, beverage, drug, or other substance, or any brutal treatment or forced physical activity which is likely to adversely affect the physical health or safety of the student or any other person, or which subjects the student or other person to extreme mental stress, including extended deprivation of sleep or rest or extended isolation.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 277, § 29; P.L. 1909, ch. 431, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 31; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 31; G.L. 1956, § 11-21-1 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 194, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 494, § 1.

Cross References.

Exclusive clubs prohibited in public schools, §§ 16-38-4 , 16-38-12 .

Collateral References.

Tort liability for hazing or initiation rituals associated with schools, colleges, or universities. 100 A.L.R.6th 365.

Validity, construction, and application of “hazing” statutes. 30 A.L.R.5th 683.

11-21-2. Penalty for school official permitting hazing.

Every person, being a teacher, superintendent, commandant, or other person in charge of any public, private, parochial, or military school, college or other educational institution, who shall knowingly permit any activity constituting hazing, as defined in § 11-21-1 , shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 277, § 30; P.L. 1909, ch. 431, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 32; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 32; G.L. 1956, § 11-21-2 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 195, § 1.

Collateral References.

Tort liability for hazing or initiation rituals associated with schools, colleges, or universities. 100 A.L.R.6th 365.

Validity, construction, and application of “hazing” statutes. 30 A.L.R.5th 683.

11-21-3. Tattooing or permanent disfigurement.

Every person being a student, or being a person in attendance at any public, private, parochial, or military school, college, or other educational institution, who shall tattoo or knowingly and willfully permanently disfigure the body, limbs, or features of any fellow student or person attending the institution by the use of nitrate of silver or any like substance, or by any other means, shall be held guilty of a crime of the degree of mayhem, and shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years nor less than one year.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 277, § 31; P.L. 1909, ch. 431, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 33; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 33; G.L. 1956, § 11-21-3 .

Cross References.

Tattooing of minors, § 11-9-15 .

Chapter 22 Highways

11-22-1. Injuring highway boundary markers.

Every person who shall willfully break down, remove, injure, or destroy any monuments, walls, fences, or bounds, erected for the purpose of designating the boundaries of any public highway, shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year or fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500). In addition, any and all costs incurred by the state of Rhode Island due to damages/loss under this section shall be fully reimbursed by the party or parties causing the damage.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 39; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 39; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 39; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-1 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 494, § 1.

11-22-2. Injuries to road signs — Advertising on highway.

A person who willfully or maliciously: (1) displaces, removes, injures, destroys, or places a political advertisement on a mile board, mile stone, danger sign or signal, or guide sign or post, or any inscription on it, lawfully within a public highway; (2) in any manner paints, prints, places, puts, or affixes, or causes to be painted, printed, placed, or affixed, any business, commercial advertisement on or to any stone, tree, fence, stump, pole, building, or other object which is the property of another, without first obtaining the written consent of the owner, or (3) in any manner paints, prints, places, puts, or affixes, or causes to be painted, placed, or affixed, an advertisement on or to any stone, tree, fence, stump, pole, mile board, mile stone, danger sign, danger signal, guide sign, guide post, billboard, building, or other object within the limits of a public highway, without first obtaining the written consent of the chief of police of the city or town in which the highway is located; is punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) days, or both. In addition, the person shall be required to pay any and all expenses incurred in the repair or replacement of the mile board, mile stone, danger sign or signal, or guide sign or post. Any advertisement in or upon a public highway in violation of the provisions of this section may be taken down, removed or destroyed by anyone. Any and all costs incurred by the state of Rhode Island due to damages/loss under this section shall be fully reimbursed by the party or parties causing the damage.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 37; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 41; P.L. 1915, ch. 1203, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 41; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 41; P.L. 1953, ch. 3207, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-2 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 250, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 281, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 494, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-22-2(3), on its face, operates as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech because it grants a local official unbridled discretion to approve or deny sign postings on even private property that overlaps with a public highway right of way. As currently constructed, § 11-22-2(3) is not sufficiently narrow and violates the First Amendment, and concomitantly, R.I. Const. art. I, § 21 . Driver v. Town of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 2d 269, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58485 (D.R.I. 2008).

Perennial political candidate was entitled to partial summary judgment on liability because the removal of his political signs from roadside locations by a police chief violated his rights of free speech and he was entitled to declaratory relief on his claim that R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-22-2(3) was unconstitutional on its face as its vested unbridled discretion in local officials to permit or deny expressive activity. Driver v. Town of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 2d 269, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58485 (D.R.I. 2008).

11-22-3. Billboards near grade crossings or intersections.

No person, partnership, or corporation shall erect, construct, or maintain any billboard along the line of any public highway or street within three hundred (300) feet of any place where a railroad crosses a public highway or street at grade, nor within a distance of fifty (50) feet of the intersection of any public highway or street. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to apply to the erection, construction, or maintenance of any billboard whenever it shall be erected, constructed, or maintained upon the top of any building or buildings not less than ten (10) feet in height. Any person, partnership, or corporation violating any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00).

History of Section. P.L. 1914, ch. 1075, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 119, §§ 26, 27; G.L. 1938, ch. 376, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-3 .

Cross References.

Regulation of outdoor advertising, § 5-18-1 et seq.

11-22-4. Windmills in proximity to highway.

No windmill shall be erected, placed, or continued within twenty-five (25) rods of any traveled street or road.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 125, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 151, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 181, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 385, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-4 .

11-22-5. Penalty for unlawful windmill.

Every person who shall erect, locate, or run any windmill within twenty-five (25) rods of any traveled street or road shall be fined for every offense not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) nor less than one hundred dollars ($100), one-half (1/2) inuring to the use of the city or town where the offense shall have been committed and one-half (1/2) to the use of the state.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 125, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 151, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 181, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 385, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-5 .

11-22-6. Removal of unlawful windmills.

The city council of any city and the town council of any town may remove all windmills within their cities and towns respectively that are located, continued, or run contrary to the provisions of § 11-22-4 .

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 125, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 151, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 181, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 385, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-6 .

11-22-7. Council authority for location of windmill.

The city council of any city and town council of any town may, upon petition in writing to them presented, authorize or continue the location of any mill in their discretion at any place within the limits of their respective towns.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 125, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 151, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 181, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 385, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-7 .

11-22-8. Windmills exempt.

The provisions of §§ 11-22-4 11-22-7 shall not apply to any mill which shall be located by decree of the town council of the town in which it is situated, nor to any mill situated in the towns of New Shoreham or Jamestown, nor to any patented wind engine or mill.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 125, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 151, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 181, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 385, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-8 .

11-22-9. Letting team go at large.

Every person having charge of any wheel carriage of any kind, or sled or sleigh, with any kind of team, who shall negligently or willfully let the team go at large in any highway, shall be fined five dollars ($5.00).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 74, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 87, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 99, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 81, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Negligence.

In view of the duty prescribed by this section, it was not error to refuse to apply a prudent man test to determine in a civil case whether defendant was negligent in not hitching an unattended team left in a public highway. Robinson v. Morris & Co., 30 R.I. 132 , 73 A. 611, 1909 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1909).

11-22-10. Scattering debris on highway.

Every person who shall knowingly throw or place or cause to be thrown or placed, in or upon any highway, or bridge any tacks, nails, wire, scrap metal, glass, crockery, or other substance injurious to the feet of persons or animals, or to the tires or wheels of bicycles or other vehicles, shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500). Any violation shall be heard by the traffic tribunal in accordance with chapter 41.1 of title 31.

History of Section. P.L. 1896, ch. 318, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 87, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 99, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 81, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-10 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 287, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 325, § 1.

Cross References.

Throwing debris on highway, §§ 31-22-9 , 31-27-13 .

11-22-11. Testing speed of horse.

Every person who shall drive any horse over any of the public highways, for the purpose of racing or trying the speed of the horse, shall be fined not more than twenty dollars ($20.00) or imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) days.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 74, § 6; P.L. 1901, ch. 925, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 87, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 99, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 81, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-11 .

11-22-12. Crawford Street Bridge in Providence.

Every person who shall fasten any vessel to any part of Crawford Street Bridge shall forfeit twenty dollars ($20.00) for each offense to the use of city of Providence.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 75, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 89, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 101, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 84, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-12 .

Collateral References.

Measure and elements of damages for injury to bridge. 31 A.L.R.5th 171.

11-22-13. Apponaug River Bridge.

Every person who shall lay any sloop or other vessel to the bridge over Apponaug River, or there load or unload wood or other heavy merchandise, shall forfeit twenty dollars ($20.00) for each offense; one-half (1/2) to the use of the city of Warwick and one-half (1/2) to the use of the person who shall sue for it.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 75, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 89, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 101, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 84, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-13 .

11-22-14. Pawtuxet Falls bridge.

Every person who shall make fast any canoe or boat to either of the abutments or any part of the bridge at Pawtuxet Falls, or throw any stones off from the bridge, shall forfeit five dollars ($5.00); one-half (1/2) to the use of the city of Warwick and the city of Cranston and one-half (1/2) to the use of the person who shall sue for it. The city of Warwick and the city of Cranston may each appoint one suitable person to take care of the bridge and to prevent damage or injury being done to it. Each of the persons so appointed shall prosecute for every forfeiture incurred under this section.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 75, §§ 3-5; G.L. 1909, ch. 89, §§ 3-5; G.L. 1923, ch. 101, §§ 3-5; G.L. 1938, ch. 84, §§ 3-5; G.L. 1956, § 11-22-14 .

11-22-15. Wire strung across highways.

No wire shall be strung across a highway less than fourteen (14) feet above the surface of the highway. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 203, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 325, § 1.

11-22-16. Motorist aid call system — False reports — Damage to equipment.

Any person who willfully gives or causes to be given a false report or false information through the use of a telephone call-box installed along any highway by the department of transportation through its motorist aid call system, or who willfully damages, destroys, or removes any telephone call-box or other equipment of the system, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined two hundred dollars ($200). For a second or subsequent conviction under this section, a fine of five hundred dollars ($500) shall be imposed.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 290, § 1.

Chapter 23 Homicide

11-23-1. Murder.

The unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is murder. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing, or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson or any violation of § 11-4-2 , 11-4-3 , or 11-4-4 , rape, any degree of sexual assault or child molestation, burglary or breaking and entering, robbery, kidnapping, or committed during the course of the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of felony manufacture, sale, delivery, or other distribution of a controlled substance otherwise prohibited by the provisions of chapter 28 of title 21, or committed against any law enforcement officer in the performance of his or her duty or committed against an assistant attorney general or special assistant attorney general in the performance of his or her duty, or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him or her who is killed, is murder in the first degree. Any other murder is murder in the second degree. The degree of murder may be charged in the indictment or information, and the jury may find the degree of murder, whether the murder is charged in the indictment or information or not, or may find the defendant guilty of a lesser offense than that charged in the indictment or information, in accordance with the provisions of § 12-17-14 .

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 1; P.L. 1929, ch. 1392, § 1; P.L. 1932, ch. 1943, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-23-1 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 5; P.L. 1979, ch. 178, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 247, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch. 259, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 284, § 4; P.L. 1996, ch. 152, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 128, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 199, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 128, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 199, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Act within state resulting in death outside state, venue, § 12-3-6 .

Additional penalty for carrying arms while committing crime, §§ 11-47-3 , 11-47-20 .

Adult correctional institutions, homicide by prisoner, § 11-25-3 .

Adulterated liquors, death caused by, § 3-9-11 .

Assault with intent to murder, § 11-5-1 .

Civil liability for wrongful death, § 10-7-1 et seq.

Death occurring as result of arson, § 11-4-2 et seq.

Duel outside state resulting in death within state, § 11-12-3 .

Entry with intent to commit murder, § 11-8-3 et seq.

Investigation and proceedings against racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations, § 7-15-1 et seq.

Petit treason as murder, § 12-19-3 .

Rewards offered by governor, § 12-1-1 .

Willful killing of unborn child, § 11-23-5 .

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

Comparative Legislation.

Homicide generally:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-45 et seq.

Murder:

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 265, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Where the Rhode Island Supreme Court received more than 40 nearly identical petitions for writ of certiorari seeking review of the superior court’s denial of the respective petitioner’s postconviction relief application, all the petitions for writ of certiorari were denied as the statutes for murder, first-degree sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, third-degree sexual assault, first-degree child molestation sexual assault, and second-degree child molestation sexual assault were not unconstitutional for setting out the prohibited conduct in one section of a chapter in Rhode Island’s General Laws, and setting out the penalty in the subsequent section because that arrangement did not somehow render those statutes without legal force and effect. In re Writ of Certiorari Seeking Review of Denials of Applications, 219 A.3d 320, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 124 (2019).

Aider and Abettor.

Where there is overwhelming evidence that the defendant did more than sit idly by while his codefendant committed a murder and that the defendant shared in his codefendant’s criminal intent, the trial justice is correct in allowing the jury to decide whether or not the defendant aided and abetted his codefendant’s criminal activity. State v. Tarvis, 465 A.2d 164, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1076 (1983).

A jury instruction on aiding and abetting which omitted any reference to the “intent of the principal” and referred only to the “criminal intent” was not improper where, before giving the instruction, the trial justice instructed the jury on the charge of murder, including the element of intent. Then, following the aiding and abetting instruction, the trial justice explained the element of intent. State v. Leuthavone, 640 A.2d 515, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 119 (1994).

In a murder prosecution, the trial court’s aiding and abetting instruction accurately reflected the law with respect to intent because it explained that only if defendant knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted could he be held responsible for the natural or probable consequences of that act. Thus, his due process rights were not violated by a conclusive or burden-shifting presumption. State v. Delestre, 35 A.3d 886, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 6 , cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1015, 132 S. Ct. 2442, 182 L. Ed. 2d 1071, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3824 (2012).

That an applicant’s accomplice was the shooter and was convicted of second-degree murder did not preclude the applicant’s conviction and sentence for first-degree murder, because under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-1-3 , an aider and abettor could be convicted of a more serious offense and suffer a greater penalty than the principal. Jaiman v. State, 55 A.3d 224, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 137 (2012).

— Severance.

The trial justice properly denied a severance motion made by a defendant charged with aiding and assisting in a commission of murder, who was seeking a separate trial from the codefendant charged with the principal crime. See State v. Vasquez, 620 A.2d 1248, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1993).

Bail.

Although first-degree murder is the only crime which carries a mandatory life sentence under § 11-23-2 , defendant may be denied bail under R.I. Const., art. I, § 9 even for crimes not enumerated in this section where death or life imprisonment could possibly be imposed as penalties for the crime committed. Fountaine v. Mullen, 117 R.I. 262 , 366 A.2d 1138, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1622 (1976).

Battered-Woman’s Syndrome.

When the issue of battered-woman’s syndrome is raised as a defense in a criminal trial, the state will not be required to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, a defendant will be required to prove existence of the condition as an affirmative defense by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The defendant must bear the burden to prove the existence of facts that would constitute the battered-woman’s syndrome defense. McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 181 (1992).

Common Law Definition.

This statute does not change the crime of murder as it existed at common law but merely provides for degrees. State v. Hathaway, 52 R.I. 492 , 161 A. 366, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1932).

Murder in this state is entirely statutory but the statute does not change the crime from what it was at common law. State v. Jefferds, 89 R.I. 272 , 152 A.2d 231, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1959).

The Legislature statutorily addressed the crime of murder in 1915 when it separated the offense into degrees and provided various punishments for those degrees, but this codification did not change the elements of the crime of murder from those that existed at common law. State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 463 (1987).

— Year-And-A-Day Rule.

The year-and-a-day rule, which established a conclusive presumption that when death occurs more than a year and a day after the criminal act, the death was due to natural causes rather than a result of the criminal act, was in effect and hence accepted by our State Legislature as part of our jurisprudence, both before and after the enactment of our constitution in 1842, as being part of the body of common law that had not been specifically abrogated by the writers of the constitution. The rule, however, does not remain viable in light of the state of modern medical and forensic science and the structure of procedural protections afforded criminal defendants by various statutes, case law, and rules of practice and procedure and is therefore abrogated. State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 463 (1987).

Retroactive application of the abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule, would “aggravate” the crime of assault and battery, making it greater than it was when committed or greater than it could have been before the expiration of a year and a day, and, although the ex post facto prohibition applies to legislation only, the due-process clause prevents the accomplishment by judicial construction of that which is not permitted by statute, therefore, the abrogation of the rule will not be applied retroactively. State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 463 (1987).

Construction With § 11-47-5.

A trial justice did not err by failing to apply the “rule of lenity” when he entered judgments of conviction both under § 11-47-5 and this section because these sections represent two distinct statutory offenses and one requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not. State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1852 (1980).

Corpus Delicti.

In a homicide prosecution the state must establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt by showing that a person has died and that the death was caused by the criminal agency of another, and the state may not rely solely on a defendant’s confession in proving corpus delicti. State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1643 (1980).

Defense of Insanity.

In a murder prosecution, the burden is on a criminal defendant to prove his or her insanity by a fair preponderance of the evidence. State v. Capalbo, 433 A.2d 242, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1248 (1981).

In light of deference to the fact-finder, and because the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence, the trial justice did not commit reversible error in finding defendant failed to prove legal insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, and therefore defendant’s murder conviction was proper. The trial justice agreed that the deliberateness with which defendant had obtained the murder weapon, along with defendant’s clear recollection of the events and calm and cooperative demeanor following the murder, taken together, indicated defendant had not killed in a psychotic delusion. State v. Collazo, 967 A.2d 1106, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 38 (2009).

Double Jeopardy.

Double jeopardy does not bar the state from proceeding on all three available theories of murder in the second degree where a charge of second degree murder had been reinstated without limitation one day after the grant of a judgment of acquittal on the charge. State v. Iovino, 554 A.2d 1037, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1989).

Although first-degree murder and second-degree murder constitute the “same offense” under Rhode Island law, the defendant’s retrial for second-degree murder, the lesser-included offense, following his acquittal on the charge of first-degree murder, did not violate his constitutional rights against double jeopardy embodied in R.I. Const., art. 1, § 7 , and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, since first-degree murder also requires proof of premeditation of more than a momentary duration and proof of deliberation, whereas second-degree murder does not, thus satisfying the applicable “same evidence” test. State v. Grabowski, 644 A.2d 1282, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 196 (1994).

Since the state relied only upon the robbery evidence to establish a violation of the defendant’s probationary status, the state is not collaterally estopped from prosecuting the defendant on two counts of murder pursuant to the indictment now pending. State v. Perry, 657 A.2d 164, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1995).

Defendant waived an argument that convictions and separate sentences for second-degree murder and carrying a dangerous weapon in the commission of a crime of violence violated double jeopardy guarantees by failing to raise the issues in a pretrial motion; nonetheless, the court ruled on the merits and held in furtherance of Rodriguez, that the two crimes were separate for double jeopardy purposes as each required an element that the other did not, namely, commission of a murder and the carrying of a dangerous weapon. State v. McGuy, 841 A.2d 1109, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 209 (2003).

Erroneous Instruction.

Mere negligence or carelessness cannot support the malice that would be necessary to a finding of murder in the second degree (an intentional killing), and trial justice’s instruction which suggested otherwise warranted vacation of conviction. State v. Wilding, 638 A.2d 519, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1994).

Evidence.

Admission of evidence from defendant’s divorce attorney concerning her consultation in respect to a domestic-relations case was not error. State v. Wilshire, 509 A.2d 444, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 470 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037, 107 S. Ct. 891, 93 L. Ed. 2d 843, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 146 (1987).

Evidence of forgery was directly relevant to defendant’s motivation for committing the murder, and therefore declining to give a cautionary or limiting instruction concerning that evidence was not error. State v. Wilshire, 509 A.2d 444, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 470 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037, 107 S. Ct. 891, 93 L. Ed. 2d 843, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 146 (1987).

The defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated by allowing the jury to consider incriminating statements he made to police officers after having expressed a desire to consult an attorney. Lionberg v. Moran, 779 F. Supp. 672, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18800 (D.R.I. 1991).

Trial court’s denial of the defendants’ attempts to cross-examine the state’s witness regarding a written statement given to the police was reversible error because the amount of corroborating evidence was not so extensive as to render the impeachment of the witness with prior-inconsistent-statement evidence unimportant. Although defense counsel did have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness regarding his prior criminal record and his ability to perceive the events on the night of the attack, the cross-examination was cut short and defense counsel could not probe the highly relevant area that the witness himself may have been firing a gun at the defendants during the attack. Evidence of gunfire coming from the victim’s car would have undermined the state’s first-degree-murder case because such evidence implied a question of self-defense or absence of premeditation. State v. Doctor, 644 A.2d 1287, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 217 (1994).

Although all the evidence adduced at trial may not have been credible, all of the elements of second degree murder were proven as the evidence presented by the state showed that the defendant shot the victim with no provocation after a chance encounter. State v. Banach, 648 A.2d 1363, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 253 (1994).

The trial testimony of the witness who placed the defendant at the scene with motive and with the handgun, whom the trial court found to be “extremely credible,” coupled with the additional probative evidence, both direct and circumstantial, from the police officers, the crime lab expert and the medical examiner was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Vorgvongsa, 670 A.2d 1250, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1996).

State supreme court refused to consider defendant’s argument refuting the evidence where defendant did not raise the issues in support of his motion for a new trial. State v. Rivera, 839 A.2d 497, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 204 (2003).

In a first-degree murder case, testimony by the State’s second expert that he agreed with the first expert’s DNA analysis was not impermissible bolstering, as the first expert’s methodology had been vigorously attacked during cross-examination, and the second expert did not testify about the first expert’s credibility or truthfulness, but testified that the basis for his opinion was the objective scientific data and observations in the first expert’s worksheets. State v. Richardson, 47 A.3d 305, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 123 (2012).

As defense counsel sought to convince the jury that defendant was guilty of second-degree murder because he “snapped,” testimony that he had previously assaulted the victim, his girlfriend, was properly admitted under R.I. R. Evid. 404 (b) for the limited purpose of proving he formed the intent necessary to be convicted of first-degree murder. State v. Martinez, 59 A.3d 73, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 20 (2013).

In a Rhode Island murder case, the trial justice properly exercised his discretion when he admitted evidence of a Florida murder because the evidence showed that defendant had a motive to kill the victim as she might later expose defendant, or his girlfriend, to prosecution for the Florida murder, something defendant was determined to prevent from happening by killing the victim; the trial justice determined that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the potential for prejudice as the State refrained from referring to the Florida incident as a murder; and the trial justice provided multiple limiting instructions to the jury throughout trial. State v. Tucker, 111 A.3d 376, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 46 (2015).

In a second-degree murder case, although three-and-a-half-minutes of the “seven minute-plus video” focused on the deceased eight-year-old girl in her bed and was a disturbing sight, the video was not offered solely to inflame the passions of the jury, as would be required to prevent its admission, and it was admissible because it was probative. The video displayed the pathway of the struggle which presumably ensued between defendant and her child; and the video allowed the jury to see imagery of the floor next to the bed where the final struggle allegedly occurred and the bed in which defendant ultimately placed the child’s body. State v. Fry, 130 A.3d 812, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 17 (2016).

Evidence Sufficient.

See State v. Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1995).

Evidence that established that: (1) defedant was involved in two spatially distinct fight scenarios; (2) that in each fight, defendant kicked the victim in the head; (3) blunt force trauma caused the victim’s death; and (4) defendant’s actions were intentional and resulted from more than just a fleeting or momentary thought, was sufficient to support defendant’s first-degree murder conviction and the denial of his motions for acquittal and for a new trial. State v. Texieira, 944 A.2d 132, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 34 (2008).

As a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the weapon used in the murder and both rounds which hit the victim were fired from the same weapon and from the same direction and that defendant fired those rounds, defendant was not entitled to a judgment of acquittal as to the charges of second-degree murder, discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence resulting in the death of another, and unlicensed possession of a firearm. State v. Reyes, 984 A.2d 606, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 144 (2009).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial after his conviction of first-degree murder and burglary, as it found there was overwhelming evidence that defendant was the only person who would have had the knowledge, opportunity, and access to the premises to perpetrate the crimes and that the DNA evidence directly tied him to the case. State v. Richardson, 47 A.3d 305, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 123 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant for the second-degree murder of her new-born child because the State showed that she took affirmative steps to prevent the discovery of her child’s birth by refusing her sisters’ access to the bathroom where the birth occurred, by hiding the body of her infant immediately upon birth, by protesting when her family sought medical attention for her after the birth, by rebuffing physicians’ suspicions that she had given birth, by not seeking medical care while pregnant, and by not seeking medical attention for the child, and by exposing her to conditions that resulted in her death. State v. Robat, 49 A.3d 58, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 124 (2012).

Where defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and three related crimes, as the evidence, including his confession, was sufficient to withstand his motion for a new trial, it was sufficient to withstand the less stringent review applicable to his motion for a judgment of acquittal. State v. Musterd, 56 A.3d 931, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 133 (2012).

As the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that more than a mere moment had elapsed during defendant’s fatal assault on the victim, it properly denied his motion for a new trial because the evidence was sufficient to establish premeditation and thus to convict him of first-degree murder. State v. Martinez, 59 A.3d 73, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 20 (2013).

Felony Murder.

It is incumbent upon a trial justice to determine (by instruction) the basis for a jury’s verdict of guilty on a murder count when a felony murder theory has been advanced at trial, and when a murder conviction is based upon a felony murder theory the underlying felony must be merged into the murder. State v. Innis, 120 R.I. 641 , 391 A.2d 1158, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 738 (1978), vacated, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 94 (1980).

Under the double jeopardy clause, a defendant may not be convicted and punished for both murder in the first degree under a felony murder theory and for the underlying felony. State v. Innis, 120 R.I. 641 , 391 A.2d 1158, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 738 (1978), vacated, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 94 (1980).

Respondent committed a felony inherently dangerous to life when he, along with others, set fire to furniture and other debris in the day room which was then occupied by a number of persons, including not only those who were aiding and abetting in the enterprise, but also certain inactive bystanders, one of whom died as a result of the fire. In re Leon, 122 R.I. 548 , 410 A.2d 121, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1422 (1980).

The fact that the victim was an accomplice to the felony does not prevent the defendant from being convicted of felony murder, so long as an act of the felon foreseeably produced the fatal injury. In re Leon, 122 R.I. 548 , 410 A.2d 121, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1422 (1980).

Because the state must prove all the elements of arson as well as all of the elements of murder for a felony-murder conviction under this section and because only one of the offenses requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the underlying arson-felony necessarily merges with the murder. Accordingly, separate though concurrent sentences for the two offenses constitute double punishment for the same offense, thereby violating the double-jeopardy clauses of both the federal and state constitutions. State v. Doyon, 416 A.2d 130, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1663 (1980).

Having been acquitted on a robbery charge, the defendant may still be found guilty of felony murder based upon the underlying felony of attempted robbery. Jefferson v. State, 472 A.2d 1200, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 461 (1984).

Double jeopardy bars a conviction of an underlying offense when that offense is used to form a basis of felony-murder. State v. Baton, 488 A.2d 696, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 449 (1985).

If a homicide committed during the commission of another crime can be proven under a theory other than felony-murder, the underlying charge may be separately considered by the jury and separately punished. State v. Baton, 488 A.2d 696, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 449 (1985).

Felony murder is murder in the first degree simply because the Legislature has said so. State v. Villani, 491 A.2d 976, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 480 (1985).

Felony-murder acquires first degree-murder status without the necessity of proving such elements as premeditation and deliberation. State v. Villani, 491 A.2d 976, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 480 (1985).

Felony-murder is any homicide committed while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any of the enumerated felonies. State v. Villani, 491 A.2d 976, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 480 (1985).

Trial justice erred by instructing the jury that if it was to render a guilty verdict under the felony-murder theory, it must find that all the elements of first degree murder (including malice and premeditation) were established beyond a reasonable doubt and that the killing occurred while the defendant was robbing or attempting to rob the deceased. State v. Villani, 491 A.2d 976, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 480 (1985).

Any homicide committed during the course of a felony enumerated in this section is first-degree murder. State v. Washington, 581 A.2d 1031, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 160 (1990).

First-degree felony murder convictions of defendants were reversed since the trial court erred by denying defendants’ motion for a judgment of acquittal; their proven attempt to acquire a large amount of a controlled substance ($43,000 worth), without some further act directed at delivery or distribution of the contraband, did not satisfy the substantial step required to constitute attempted distribution or delivery to support a conviction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 . R.I. Gen. Laws § 21-284.01(a)(1) criminalized possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, whereas R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 omitted any reference to possession with intent to deliver and instead incorporated the language referring to a sale or other distribution, which was not the offense defendants’ felony-murder charge was predicated upon. State v. Oliveira, 882 A.2d 1097, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 161 (2005).

In Rhode Island, drug distribution crimes can form the predicate felony for a felony murder charge. Torres v. State, 19 A.3d 71, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 63 (2011).

— Burden of Proof.

In a prosecution for second-degree felony murder, rather than determine if the crime of wrongfully permitting a child to be a habitual sufferer, the predicate felony underlying the felony-murder charge, was inherently dangerous in the abstract, the state had the opportunity to prove at trial that the crime was inherently dangerous in the manner that it was committed. State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 201 (1995).

First and Second Degree Murder Distinguished.

First and second degree murder are distinguishable by evidence of the extent of a defendant’s premeditation. Tarvis v. Moran, 551 A.2d 699, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 154 (1988).

In order to prove the commission of murder in the second degree, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that the defendant unlawfully killed the deceased with malice. Premeditation and deliberation are not elements of murder in the second degree. State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 32 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838, 113 S. Ct. 117, 121 L. Ed. 2d 74, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 5879 (1992).

Grand Jury Instructions.

The limited nature of the prosecutor’s charge adequately informed the members of the grand jury with respect to the elements of murder so as to enable them to make a determination about the existence of probable cause, and the prosecutor’s omission of the specific elements of first-degree murder in his instruction to the grand jury is not an “extreme circumstance” that merits dismissal of the indictment. State v. Simpson, 658 A.2d 522, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 150 (1995).

Indictment.

The fact that defendant’s indictment referred to this section and stated that he “did murder” was constitutionally sufficient to give notice to him of a pending charge for first degree murder based on a premeditation theory. State v. Lanigan, 528 A.2d 310, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 520 (1987).

Instructions as to Lesser Offense.

Defendants presented no evidence of malice as a basis for voluntary manslaughter, nor did they present evidence of involuntary manslaughter, thus there was no basis for a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense to murder. State v. DePina, 810 A.2d 768, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 221 (2002).

Defendant testified he: (1) repeatedly struck the victim in the head with a board with protruding nails after the victim attacked him with the board; (2) repeatedly hit the victim with the board after the victim tried to grab him and pull him down after defendant started to walk away; and (3) hit him again with the board, when the victim was on the ground and was trying to get up; therefore the evidence supported instructions for second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter and self-defense, but not involuntary manslaughter since the victim’s death was not the product of an unintentional killing. State v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 160 (2003).

Where the evidence did not show that defendant was acting under extreme provocation of fear of violence, and where defendant also had cooling down time between earlier altercations and a final confrontation with the victim, there was no reason to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of second-degree murder. State v. McGuy, 841 A.2d 1109, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 209 (2003).

— Manslaughter.

Omission of manslaughter from instruction as to possible verdicts was not error where the evidence was inconsistent with manslaughter and the defense was complete innocence. State v. Hathaway, 52 R.I. 492 , 161 A. 366, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1932).

It was not necessary to give a manslaughter instruction where there was no showing of provocation by the victim. State v. Winston, 105 R.I. 447 , 252 A.2d 354, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 774 (1969).

Where the defendant presents evidence that the victim entered defendant’s apartment uninvited, ignored repeated warnings to leave, and then attempted to draw a weapon, the jury could conclude that the defendant’s decision to fire his weapon was the result of fear generated by the victim’s actions. Therefore, an instruction on voluntary manslaughter is entirely appropriate. State v. Fetzik, 577 A.2d 990, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 138 (1990).

Testimony that the defendant drank on the afternoon and evening of the murder and that the defendant drank frequently fell well short of demonstrating that the defendant’s will was so paralyzed that he was unable to withstand evil impulses or to form any sane design. Therefore, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on manslaughter by reason of diminished capacity. State v. Johnson, 667 A.2d 523, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 265 (1995).

In a prosecution for murder in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 , defendant was not entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, as her assertion that the victim assaulted her and tried to rob her was not supported by admissible evidence, and failed to establish that she acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. State v. Garcia, 883 A.2d 1131, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 189 (2005).

In a trial for first-degree murder, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, because there was no evidence presented as to defendant’s level of intoxication following defendant’s alcohol consumption and defendant’s numerous voluntary and conscious actions on the night in questions illustrated that defendant’s intoxication was not of such a degree as to completely paralyze defendant’s will. State v. Motyka, 893 A.2d 267, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 36 (2006).

Defendant’s testimony that he felt frightened and scared spoke to defendant’s theory of self-defense to murder in second degree but was insufficient to allow the jury to have found that defendant acted in the heat of passion; thus, the evidence did not support an instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. State v. Ruffner, 911 A.2d 680, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 190 (2006).

— Second Degree Murder.

Where the fixity and duration of the intent to kill was questionable, it was error not to instruct the jury as to second degree murder. State v. Fenik, 45 R.I. 309 , 121 A. 218, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1923).

Where the charge was murder in the commission of a robbery and the defense was an alibi or lack of knowledge of the plan to rob, it was not error to refuse to instruct the jury as to second degree murder. State v. Saccoccio, 50 R.I. 356 , 147 A. 878, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1929).

It was not error to charge as to second degree murder where the killing was in the perpetration of an offense not specifically named in this section and where premeditation was questionable. State v. Miller, 52 R.I. 440 , 161 A. 222, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 87 (1932).

In a trial for murder in the first degree it was not error for the trial justice to refuse to instruct the jury that it might return a verdict of murder in the second degree or manslaughter where there was no evidence in the case to support a finding of murder in the second degree or manslaughter. State v. Cline, 122 R.I. 297 , 405 A.2d 1192, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2159 (1979).

If trial counsel for the defendant believes that the evidence warrants a second degree murder instruction because the defendant acted in a wanton and reckless manner or in the course of an inherently dangerous felony, he should request a specific instruction regarding these theories of second degree murder. Trial counsel’s failure to make such a request precludes the Supreme Court from considering a challenge to the trial justice’s refusal to give a second-degree murder instruction. State v. Tarvis, 465 A.2d 164, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1076 (1983).

Before the trial justice is required to give lesser included offense instruction on manslaughter, the evidence must show, however minimally, that the defendant acted without malice, either in the heat of passion with adequate provocation or in the commission of an unlawful nonfelonious act or in the performance of a lawful act with criminal negligence. State v. Kaner, 463 A.2d 1348, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1051 (1983).

Trial court’s failure to instruct the jury properly on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter was reversible error, where the court did not explain to the jury that the absence of a specific intent to kill owing to a defendant’s diminished capacity resulting from the use of drugs and alcohol would reduce the crime of murder to the lesser included crime of voluntary manslaughter. State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 491 (1987).

Before a trial justice is required to give an instruction on manslaughter by reason of diminished capacity the evidence, however minimal, must permit a reasonable jury to find that the defendant, due to his or her diminished capacity, was incapable of forming a specific intent upon which malice could be predicated. State v. Amazeen, 526 A.2d 1268, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 506 (1987).

Trial justice did not err in declining an instruction on manslaughter by reason of diminished capacity, where even if defendant was cognitively impaired due to his voluntary ingestion of alcohol, he could still have possessed the capacity to premeditate and to form the specific intent to kill. State v. Amazeen, 526 A.2d 1268, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 506 (1987).

A murder defendant is not entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction on manslaughter, where the statute of limitations bars prosecution for the lesser offense and there is no risk of capital punishment. State v. Sullivan, 541 A.2d 450, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1988).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request for an instruction on second degree murder. In order to be entitled to this jury charge, there must be minimal evidence tending to show either the defendant did not act with premeditation, or that he lacked capacity, or that he acted in the heat of passion. The defendant did not present a scintilla of evidence of these mediating circumstances, indeed there was ample evidence that defendant had threatened to harm the victim, had contemplated the killing of the victim for days before the murder, and additionally, his sole defense was mistaken identity, totally inconsistent with a defense of diminished capacity or heat of passion. State v. Figueras, 644 A.2d 291, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 203 (1994).

The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that the defendant and his aider and abetter intended to kill the victim before they returned to the party armed with guns. Thus, no rational jury could have found the defendant guilty of merely murder in the second degree, and the trial court did not commit error by refusing to give a second-degree murder instruction. State v. Vorgvongsa, 692 A.2d 1194, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 119 (1997).

A second-degree murder instruction that encompassed both a momentary premeditation and a wanton, reckless theory of killing and set forth the elements of first- and second-degree murder and the factors distinguishing the two offenses was adequate. State v. Parkhurst, 706 A.2d 412, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1998).

Defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder was affirmed where the court’s instructions to the jury on intent sufficiently covered the subject matter of defendant’s request for a mistake-of-fact instruction such that the court’s refusal to give the latter instruction did not constitute reversible error. State v. Dumas, 835 A.2d 438, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 206 (2003).

Trial justice did not err in refusing to give a second-degree murder instruction as: (1) defendant’s decision to kill the victim was not instantaneous; and (2) demonstrated sustained determination to come within firing range of the victim, further supported the conclusion that defendant exhibited more than momentary resolve to commit the murder. State v. Sosa, 839 A.2d 519, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 232 (2003).

With regard to defendant’s convictions for second-degree murder and for failing to report a death with the intention of concealing a crime, involving the strangulation death of his wife and concealing her in a padlocked closet in the apartment they had previously rented, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that premeditation was not an element of second-degree murder and by instructing the jury on second-degree murder as a lesser included offense to first-degree murder. State v. Gillespie, 960 A.2d 969, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 114 (2008).

Rhode Island precedent recognizes three theories of second-degree murder, each based in a different aspect of malice aforethought: (1) killings in which defendant formed a momentary intent to kill contemporaneous with the homicide; (2) felony murder for inherently dangerous felonies that are not expressly listed within the statutory definition of first-degree murder; and (3) killings in which the defendant killed with wanton recklessness or conscious disregard for the possibility of death or of great bodily harm. State v. Patino, 188 A.3d 646, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 103 , cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 490, 202 L. Ed. 2d 384, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 6674 (2018).

Intent.

A prior threat to kill is evidence of motive relevant even to the mere momentary formation of an intent to kill that is necessary for second degree murder. State v. Pule, 453 A.2d 1095, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1116 (1982).

— Intoxication.

If a defendant charged with a specific-intent crime presents sufficient evidence of his or her voluntary intoxication, the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not so intoxicated so as to be unable to harbor the requisite specific intent. But where the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence of intoxication to negate his intent to kill the victim, it was not necessary for the trial justice to charge the jury that the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not so intoxicated so as to be unable to form the intent to kill. State v. Sanden, 626 A.2d 194, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 155 (1993).

In a prosecution for first-degree murder, trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial based on alleged evidence of his diminished capacity due to his intoxication, because as it performed the required review of the evidence and had sufficient reasons for denying the motion, including its finding that his conscientious effort to conceal the body with debris showed his clarity of mind. State v. Payette, 38 A.3d 1120, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 27 (2012).

— Use of Deadly Weapon.

From the fact of the use of a deadly weapon, a reasonable inference may be drawn, directly and without speculation, that the defendant formed an intent to kill the victim. This type of circumstantial evidence not only would support such an inference but would also almost compel the drawing of the inference. State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 32 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838, 113 S. Ct. 117, 121 L. Ed. 2d 74, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 5879 (1992).

Defendant’s convictions satisfied the Blockburger different-crimes test (separate elements of murder and using a firearm), and even if the test was not satisfied, the legislature clearly intended consecutive sentences under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-3.2(c) such that defendant’s sentences did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy in R.I. Const. art. 1, § 7 . State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 113 (2003).

Involuntary Manslaughter.

A defendant must have killed unintentionally to be guilty of involuntary manslaughter. State v. Tarvis, 465 A.2d 164, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1076 (1983).

Involuntary manslaughter occurs when, without malice aforethought, an unintentional death results from a voluntary act, one that a reasonable person, acting in a similar manner, would not expect to cause death or serious injury; voluntary manslaughter, on the other hand, occurs when an intentional death results from a voluntary act—that is, one that a reasonable person acting in a similar manner would expect to cause death or serious injury—that occurs without malice aforethought, in the heat of passion, and is the product of adequate legal provocation. State v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 160 (2003).

Denial of an involuntary manslaughter instruction is proper where it is clear from the evidence presented at trial and from the defendant’s own testimony that the victim’s death is not the product of an unintentional killing. State v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 160 (2003).

Malice.

In this state it is well settled that malice, express or implied, is an element of first or second-degree murder. State v. McGranahan, 415 A.2d 1298, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1652 (1980).

Malice consists of an unjustified disregard for the possibility of death or great bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the sanctity of human life. State v. McGranahan, 415 A.2d 1298, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1652 (1980).

Legal malice can arise from either an express intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm or from a hardness of the heart, cruelty, wickedness of disposition, recklessness of consequence, and a mind dispassionate of social duty. State v. McGranahan, 415 A.2d 1298, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1652 (1980).

Malice may be inferred from the attending circumstances surrounding a defendant’s conduct. State v. McGranahan, 415 A.2d 1298, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1652 (1980).

Malice can be inferred from circumstances where there is disparity in size and strength between the victim and an assailant. State v. McGranahan, 415 A.2d 1298, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1652 (1980).

Malice may be inferred from a single blow of the hand if it was likely to cause severe injuries to a young child. State v. McGranahan, 415 A.2d 1298, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1652 (1980).

This section, in defining murder, does not require that the “malice aforethought” be actual. Inferred or imputed malice may also fall within the definition. State v. Washington, 581 A.2d 1031, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 160 (1990).

Malice aforethought, express or implied, is an element of both first degree murder and second degree murder. Malice may consist of an unjustified disregard for the possibility of death or great bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the sanctity of human life. Therefore, the evidence presented at trial need only demonstrate a recklessness of consequence or an extreme indifference to the sanctity of human life as a basis to sustain a conviction of second degree murder. State v. Mattatall, 586 A.2d 1061, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1991).

Malice may be inferred from the very nature of the killing itself. State v. Mattatall, 586 A.2d 1061, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1991).

Malice aforethought is the sole element of second degree murder that the state must demonstrate by evidence capable of generating proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mattatall, 586 A.2d 1061, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1991).

Defendant’s conduct in holding a loaded .357 magnum pistol aimed point blank at the victim’s face when the gun discharged constituted a recklessness of consequence, capable of supporting an inference of malice aforethought. State v. Mattatall, 586 A.2d 1061, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1991).

Legal malice can arise from either an express intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm or from wanton recklessness. State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 32 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838, 113 S. Ct. 117, 121 L. Ed. 2d 74, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 5879 (1992).

Evidence of malice was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder, as the evidence presented by the prosecution at trial established that defendant was holding a loaded gun that was pointed at the face of the victim and defendant admitted to shooting the victim in the face. State v. Diaz, 46 A.3d 849, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 122 (2012).

Multiple Offenses.

Verdicts of guilty of murder in the second degree and of conspiracy to murder, each a separate and distinct crime are not legally incompatible where the evidence is sufficient to support convictions on both charges. State v. Leonardo, 119 R.I. 7 , 375 A.2d 1388, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1855 (1977).

Perpetration of Offenses Not Named.

A killing in the commission or attempted commission of an offense not among those enumerated in this section is not necessarily murder in the first degree. State v. Miller, 52 R.I. 440 , 161 A. 222, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 87 (1932).

Premeditation.

Under the provisions of this statute the premeditation necessary to establish murder in the first degree must be more than momentary and must have existed for more than a barely appreciable period of time. State v. Fenik, 45 R.I. 309 , 121 A. 218, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1923).

The evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that defendant had adequate time to develop a conscious design and intent to kill the victim. State v. Smith, 121 R.I. 495 , 401 A.2d 41, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1809 (1979).

The mens rea element of murder, premeditation, clearly focuses on volition and intendment. State v. Arpin, 122 R.I. 643 , 410 A.2d 1340, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1435 (1980).

While killing a person in self-defense and killing “unlawfully” are inconsistent, even mutually exclusive, killing with premeditation, the requisite criminal intent for murder in Rhode Island, and killing while legally insane are not inconsistent or mutally exclusive. State v. Arpin, 122 R.I. 643 , 410 A.2d 1340, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1435 (1980).

It could be entirely possible for a defendant to suffer from cognitive impairments and yet to premeditate and intend the results of his actions. State v. Arpin, 122 R.I. 643 , 410 A.2d 1340, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1435 (1980).

An intent to kill, necessary to support a finding of second-degree murder, may be inferred from an assault on a child or by blows without a weapon. State v. McGranahan, 415 A.2d 1298, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1652 (1980).

The evidence was sufficient to support a finding of premeditation and intent since the evidence presented by the state demonstrated that in addition to a heinous attack with multiple blows by a heavy object and the discovery at the scene of gloves that had obviously been removed after the murder, the medical examiner testified that before the fatal blows were inflicted the victim was rendered unconscious by strangulation. State v. Hornoff, 760 A.2d 927, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 191 (2000).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion in limine to exclude three letters that he wrote to his girlfriend while they were both incarcerated pending charges against them from their criminal conduct, as the letters were relevant pursuant to R.I. R. Evid. 401 and the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect; two of the letters suggested defendant’s motives for killing the victim and were probative of premeditation for purposes of first-degree murder, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 , and the third letter was reflective of defendant’s guilty knowledge by indicating to the girlfriend that she should comply with a cover-up scheme. State v. Drew, 919 A.2d 397, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 40 (2007).

Premeditation is not a requirement of malice aforethought and, thus, is not an element of second-degree murder. State v. Gillespie, 960 A.2d 969, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 114 (2008).

Trial justice placed adequate weight on defendant’s actions prior to the victim’s death in determining that her murder was premeditated. The trial justice did not err when she determined that the evidence was adequate to support a conviction for first-degree murder. State v. Greenslit, 135 A.3d 1192, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 35 (2016).

In a first-degree murder case, defendant’s motion for a new trial was properly denied as the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence because the circumstantial evidence supported a finding that defendant was the perpetrator—the evidence placed defendant at the victim’s home before and around the time of the murder and fire, showed the victim’s increasing anger at defendant in the hours leading up to the murder, and showed that the victim’s cell phone was eventually retrieved with defendant’s belongings; and the defensive wounds on the victim’s hand, together with the vicious, forceful nature of the throat slashing, supported a finding of a murder that was willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated. State v. Gumkowski, 223 A.3d 321, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 4 (2020).

Proper Instruction.

Trial court had not been required to charge the jury that it had to be unanimous as to the theory supporting a finding of guilt of second degree murder—i.e., whether defendant was guilty either as a principal, or as an aider and abettor, or as a coconspirator. The jury did not have to agree on the underlying facts, but only on the “bottom line” elements: whether there was an unlawful killing done with malice aforethought. State v. Delestre, 35 A.3d 886, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 6 , cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1015, 132 S. Ct. 2442, 182 L. Ed. 2d 1071, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3824 (2012).

In a prosecution for first-degree murder, the trial court properly charged the jury that it could infer malice from the disparity in size or strength between the victim and defendant, as defendant was 44 and weighed 163 pounds, and the victim was 66 and weighed 147 pounds, was in poor health, and had a blood alcohol level of 0.152 percent at the time of his death. State v. Payette, 38 A.3d 1120, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 27 (2012).

In a case where defendant was found guilty of the second-degree murder of her eight-year-old daughter, the trial justice’s instructions adequately conveyed that the jury could not find defendant guilty of second-degree murder if the child’s death occurred by accident because, specifically, the instructions indicated that second-degree murder had to be committed willfully and that, if the death were accidental, then it could not be willful; and the instructions further described that, if defendant’s actions were accidental, then they could not be considered intentional acts of defendant for purposes of the jury’s determination of second-degree murder. State v. Fry, 130 A.3d 812, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 17 (2016).

Although the indictment did not expressly charge defendant with second-degree felony murder or with felony child abuse and the trial justice gave an instruction on second-degree felony murder using felony child abuse as the predicate felony, (1) defendant was not deprived of fair notice and an opportunity to present a meaningful defense; and (2) there was substantial evidence for the jury to determine that defendant committed an inherently dangerous felony when he hit the six-year-old victim in the stomach. State v. Patino, 188 A.3d 646, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 103 , cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 490, 202 L. Ed. 2d 384, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 6674 (2018).

The merger doctrine does not apply in Rhode Island to second-degree felony murder; instead, in Rhode Island, a felony may serve as the predicate felony for second-degree felony murder if the factfinder determines that a defendant committed an inherently dangerous felony. State v. Patino, 188 A.3d 646, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 103 , cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 490, 202 L. Ed. 2d 384, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 6674 (2018).

Although the trial justice’s language “however slight” may have deviated to some extent from the definition of any “other physical injury” set forth in § 11-9-5.3 , the trial justice’s instruction to the jury on second-degree murder, using felony child abuse as the predicate felony, on the whole, was detailed and thorough, and more than adequately covered the law. State v. Patino, 188 A.3d 646, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 103 , cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 490, 202 L. Ed. 2d 384, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 6674 (2018).

When defendant contended that the conduct of the minor victim’s mother in failing to call for medical help superseded defendant’s physical abuse of the child as the proximate cause of the child’s death, the trial justice’s instructions to the jury regarding causation, in their entirety, adequately and correctly covered the law as the jurors were properly informed about the law of proximate cause and the doctrine of intervening causation. State v. Patino, 188 A.3d 646, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 103 , cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 490, 202 L. Ed. 2d 384, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 6674 (2018).

Self-Defense.

Once the defendant introduces some evidence of self-defense, the burden of persuasion is on the prosecution to negate that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Doe, 120 R.I. 732 , 390 A.2d 920, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 722 (1978); Infantolino v. State, 414 A.2d 793, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1641 (1980); State v. Caron, 423 A.2d 823, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1862 (1980); State v. Pule, 453 A.2d 1095, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1116 (1982).

Requiring a defendant seeking to excuse a killing by a plea of self-defense to prove that defense by a preponderance of the evidence is no longer permissible under the due process clause of the U.S. Const., 14th amend.In re Doe, 120 R.I. 732 , 390 A.2d 920, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 722 (1978); State v. Arpin, 122 R.I. 643 , 410 A.2d 1340, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1435 (1980).

In re John Doe, 390 A.2d 920 (R.I. 1978), must be applied retroactively. Infantolino v. State, 414 A.2d 793, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1641 (1980).

A defendant may independently raise the issue of self-defense without reliance on a specific statute. State v. Caron, 423 A.2d 823, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1862 (1980).

Due process requires that the jury must receive clear instructions that the prosecution must persuade them beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense once the defendant produces evidence of self-defense. State v. Caron, 423 A.2d 823, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1862 (1980).

It is reversible error for a trial justice simply to discuss the issue of self-defense and to instruct that the jurors may label the homicide justifiable if they find defendant acted in self-defense. State v. Caron, 423 A.2d 823, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1862 (1980).

The law relating to self-defense proclaims that one may defend himself whenever he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of bodily harm at the hands of another. State v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1107 (1981).

A person harboring a fear of imminent danger of bodily harm at the hands of another need not wait for the other to strike the first blow; however, such person must use only such force as is reasonably necessary for his own protection. State v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1107 (1981).

A defendant who asserts the defense of self-defense is now entitled to adduce relevant evidence of specific acts of violence perpetrated by the victim against third parties, provided however that the defendant was aware of these acts at the time of his encounter with the victim. State v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1107 (1981).

When a defendant asserts the defense of self-defense, he may introduce evidence of the victim’s reputation for violent behavior either for the purpose of showing the reasonableness of his fear of imminent bodily harm or for the purpose of showing that the victim was the aggressor. State v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1107 (1981).

Before a trial justice can admit evidence of violent acts perpetrated by the victim against third parties, the defendant must show that he was aware of the specific act or acts of violence and that the act or acts sought to be introduced are not too remote in time and are of such a quality as to be capable of contributing to the defendant’s fear of the victim. State v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1107 (1981); State v. Pule, 453 A.2d 1095, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1116 (1982).

The assertion of self-defense refutes the element of “unlawfulness” necessary for murder in this state. State v. Pule, 453 A.2d 1095, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1116 (1982).

A person assailed in his residence by a cohabitant is not entitled to employ deadly force and kill the cohabitant assailant, but is obligated to attempt any available avenue of retreat. State v. Quarles, 504 A.2d 473, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 401 (1986).

Defendant is not entitled to claim lack of malice nor submit jury instructions for criminally negligent involuntary manslaughter, even if defendant entertained an honest but unreasonable belief that lethal force was necessary to defend himself. State v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 160 (2003).

Use of deadly force with an honest but mistaken belief that such conduct is required for self-defense is another name for the doctrine of imperfect self-defense and purports to reduce the crime of murder to voluntary manslaughter under the underlying theory that when a defendant uses deadly force with an honest but unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend himself, the element of malice, necessary for a murder conviction, is lacking; Rhode Island does not recognize the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. State v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 160 (2003).

Rhode Island rejects the doctrine of imperfect self-defense as a means to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter; the theory of imperfect self-defense does not entitle defendant to an involuntary-manslaughter jury instruction because a killing committed in self-defense is, nevertheless, an intentional killing. State v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 160 (2003).

Proof of probable cause to arrest does not require the same degree of proof needed to convict the defendant at trial; when considering the existence of probable cause, appeals courts deal in probabilities which are not technical and which are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act. State v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 160 (2003).

Where the issue is not the alleged diminished capacity of a defendant, but whether the circumstances of a killing amounted to self-defense, murder, or voluntary manslaughter, the victim’s impairment because of his consumption of alcohol is relevant in assessing the credibility of what the defendant tells the police about his encounter with the victim. State v. Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 160 (2003).

In a prosecution for murder, the trial court properly excluded evidence of the victim’s alleged prior armed robberies, offered to corroborate defendant’s self-defense claim. This testimony was not admissible under R.I. R. Evid. 404 (b) because there was no evidence that defendant knew of the alleged robberies at the time she shot the victim. State v. Garcia, 883 A.2d 1131, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 189 (2005).

During defendant’s trial on a charge of second-degree murder, a trial court did not err by refusing defendant’s requested instruction for the presumption of reasonable means of self-defense under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-8 because the statute was triggered by evidence of a breaking and entering and the victim entered through an unblocked, open door; there was no evidence the victim struck defendant to enter the house by removing an obstruction. State v. Gianquitti, 22 A.3d 1161, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 81 (2011).

— Defense of Another.

As in the defense of self-defense, the plea of justification in defense of a third person, if raised by defendant, must be negated by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, provided the defense is supported by sufficient evidence to raise a factual issue. State v. Caron, 423 A.2d 823, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1862 (1980).

Sentence.

Ample evidence supported the trial justice’s conclusion that the defendant should be subjected to the penalty of life imprisonment without parole since a murder was committed in a manner involving torture and aggravated battery to the victim, the record overwhelmingly supported a finding of premeditation, and there was only one isolated statement on the record concerning his having failed to take antipsychotic medication. State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 39 (2001).

Defendant was not entitled to a correction of his sentence of life imprisonment because once defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 , the sentence of life imprisonment was not only authorized by law, it was mandatory. State v. Texieira, 944 A.2d 132, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 34 (2008).

Defendant, convicted of the first-degree murder of his girlfriend, was properly sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, because the evidence supported the jury’s finding that he committed the murder with aggravated battery and torture, as well as the trial court’s finding that his character and propensities made it unlikely that he would be rehabilitated. State v. Martinez, 59 A.3d 73, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 20 (2013).

Statutory Definition.

The indictment in this case invoked a statutory definition in that the short form indictment charged “did murder one Eleanor Erminelli” and that invoked by the use of such phraseology the statutory definition contained in the first sentence of this section. State v. Jefferds, 89 R.I. 272 , 152 A.2d 231, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1959).

The trial justice’s instruction on the point of first degree murder being based on the statutory definition was correct in law. State v. Crough, 89 R.I. 338 , 152 A.2d 644, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1959).

To be “unlawful,” a homicide must be neither justifiable nor excusable, that is, not in self-defense, so that the defense of self-defense necessarily refutes an element of the crime of murder, as defined by this section. In re Doe, 120 R.I. 732 , 390 A.2d 920, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 722 (1978).

Evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the first defendant and second defendant’s convictions on the same nine offenses as to each defendant, arising out of their conduct in running into the street and firing a “fusillade of shots” into a departing vehicle with five occupants inside. As a result, the trial court was authorized to deny the first defendant and second defendant’s R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, especially as to charges such as R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 first-degree murder, as the evidence supported a finding that the first defendant and second defendant had engaged in a premeditated act that involved the unlawful killing of another human being. State v. Ros, 973 A.2d 1148, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 96 (2009).

Collateral References.

Acquittal on homicide charge as bar to subsequent prosecution for assault and battery or vice versa. 37 A.L.R.2d 1068.

Adequacy of defense counsel’s representation of criminal client — conduct occurring at time of trial regarding issues of diminished capacity, intoxication, and unconsciousness. 78 A.L.R.5th 197.

Adequacy of defense counsel’s representation of criminal client — pretrial conduct or conduct at unspecified time regarding issues of diminished capacity, intoxication, and unconsciousness. 79 A.L.R.5th 419.

Admissibility, as part of res gestae, of accusatory utterances made by homicide victim after act. 4 A.L.R.3d 149.

Admissibility, as res gestae, of accusatory utterances made by homicide victim before the act. 74 A.L.R.3d 963.

Admissibility in homicide prosecution for purpose of showing motive of evidence as to insurance policies on life of deceased naming accused as beneficiary. 28 A.L.R.2d 857.

Admissibility, in homicide prosecution, of deceased’s clothing worn at time of killing. 68 A.L.R.2d 903.

Admissibility, in homicide prosecution, of evidence as to tests made to ascertain distance from gun to victim when gun was fired. 11 A.L.R.5th 497.

Admissibility, in homicide prosecution, of opinion evidence that death was or was not self-inflicted. 56 A.L.R.2d 1447.

Admissibility of dying declaration with respect to transaction prior to homicide. 14 A.L.R. 757.

Admissibility of evidence in homicide case that victim was threatened by one other than defendant. 11 A.L.R.5th 831.

Admissibility of evidence of prior physical acts of spousal abuse committed by defendant accused of murdering spouse or former spouse. 24 A.L.R.5th 465.

Admissibility of evidence of uncommunicated threats on issue of self-defense in prosecution for homicide. 98 A.L.R.2d 6.

Admissibility of expert opinion stating whether a particular knife was, or could have been, the weapon used in a crime. 83 A.L.R.4th 660.

Admissibility of testimony of coroner or mortician as to cause of death in homicide prosecution. 71 A.L.R.3d 1265.

Admissibility of threats to defendant made by third parties to support claim of self-defense in criminal prosecution for assault or homicide. 55 A.L.R.5th 449.

Admissibility on behalf of accused in homicide case of evidence that killing was committed at victim’s request. 71 A.L.R.2d 617.

Amendment of verdict to correct defect in omitting to find degree or nature of crime, reassembling jury after discharge for purpose of. 66 A.L.R. 557.

Application of Defense of Necessity to Murder. 23 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

Application of felony-murder doctrine where person killed was co-felon. 89 A.L.R.4th 683.

Application of felony-murder doctrine where the felony relied upon is an includible offense within the homicide. 40 A.L.R.3d 1341.

Arson, death resulting from, as within contemplation of statute making homicide in perpetration of a felony murder in the first degree. 87 A.L.R. 414.

Burden of proof on defense that killing was accidental. 63 A.L.R.3d 936.

Causing one, by threats or fright, to leap or fall to his death. 25 A.L.R.2d 1186.

Comment Note: Criminal Liability for Death Resulting from Unlawfully Furnishing Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs to Another. 29 A.L.R.7th Art. 8 (2018).

Corporation’s criminal liability for homicide. 45 A.L.R.4th 1021.

Criminal liability for death resulting from unlawfully furnishing intoxicating liquor or drugs to another. 32 A.L.R.3d 589.

Criminal liability of parent, teacher, or one in loco parentis for homicide by excessive or improper punishment inflicted on child. 89 A.L.R.2d 417.

Degree of homicide as affected by accused’s religious or occult belief in harmlessness of ceremonial ritualistic acts directly causing fatal injury. 78 A.L.R.3d 1132.

Druggist’s criminal responsibility for death or injury in consequence of mistake. 55 A.L.R.2d 714.

Earlier prosecution for offense during which homicide was committed as bar to prosecution for homicide. 11 A.L.R.3d 834.

Entrapment to attempt to commit murder. 66 A.L.R. 504; 86 A.L.R. 263.

Escape from scene of crime, homicide by companion of defendant while attempting to make, as murder in first degree. 108 A.L.R. 847.

Homicide as affected by lapse of time between injury and death. 60 A.L.R.3d 1323.

Homicide based on killing of unborn child. 40 A.L.R.3d 444.

Homicide by automobile as murder. 21 A.L.R.3d 116.

Homicide by fright or shock. 47 A.L.R.2d 1072.

Homicide by lawful act aimed at another. 18 A.L.R. 917.

Homicide: liability where death immediately results from treatment or mistreatment of injury inflicted by defendant. 50 A.L.R.5th 467.

Homicide predicated on improper treatment of disease or injury. 45 A.L.R.3d 114.

Ineffective assistance of counsel: Battered spouse syndrome as defense to homicide or other criminal offense. 11 A.L.R.5th 871.

Instruction as to lesser degree of crime, duty of court as to, where statute fixes degree of homicide in perpetration of a felony. 21 A.L.R. 628; 27 A.L.R. 1097; 102 A.L.R. 1019.

Instructions, applying rule of reasonable doubt as to intent or malice as curing error in instruction placing burden of proof upon defendant in that regard. 120 A.L.R. 610.

Insulting words as provocation of homicide or as reducing the degree thereof. 2 A.L.R.3d 1292.

Intoxication as affecting deliberation and premeditation. 79 A.L.R. 904.

Malice or intent to kill where killing is by blow without weapon. 22 A.L.R.2d 854.

Necessity and effect, in homicide prosecution, of expert medical testimony as to cause of death. 65 A.L.R.3d 283.

Official death certificate as evidence of cause of death in civil or criminal action. 21 A.L.R.3d 418.

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as defense to murder, assault, or other violent crime. 4 A.L.R.7th Art. 5 (2015).

Presumption of deliberation or premeditation from the circumstances attending the killing. 96 A.L.R.2d 1435.

Presumption of deliberation or premeditation from the fact of killing. 86 A.L.R.2d 656.

Private person’s authority, in making arrest for felony, to shoot or kill alleged felon. 32 A.L.R.3d 1078.

Right of accused in homicide case to cross-examine prosecution’s witness as to latter’s pending or contemplated civil action against accused arising out of same transaction. 41 A.L.R.2d 1205.

Spouse’s confession of adultery as affecting degree of homicide involved in killing spouse or his or her paramour. 93 A.L.R.3d 925.

Standard for determination of reasonableness of criminal defendant’s belief, for purposes of self-defense claim, that physical force is necessary — modern cases. 73 A.L.R.4th 993.

Validity and construction of “extreme indifference” murder statute. 7 A.L.R.5th 758.

What constitutes attempted murder. 54 A.L.R.3d 612.

What constitutes “imminently dangerous” act within homicide statute. 67 A.L.R.3d 900.

What constitutes “lying in wait.” 89 A.L.R.2d 1140.

What constitutes termination of felony for purpose of felony-murder rule. 58 A.L.R.3d 851.

What felonies are inherently or forseeably dangerous to human life for purposes of felony-murder doctrine. 50 A.L.R.3d 397.

Withholding food, clothing, or shelter, homicide by. 61 A.L.R.3d 1207.

11-23-2. Penalties for murder.

Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall be imprisoned for life. Every person guilty of murder in the first degree: (1) committed intentionally while engaged in the commission of another capital offense or other felony for which life imprisonment may be imposed; (2) committed in a manner creating a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device or substance which would normally be hazardous to the life of more than one person; (3) committed at the direction of another person in return for money or any other thing of monetary value from that person; (4) committed in a manner involving torture or an aggravated battery to the victim; (5) committed against any member of the judiciary, law enforcement officer, corrections employee, assistant attorney general or special assistant attorney general, or firefighter arising from the lawful performance of his or her official duties; (6) committed by a person who at the time of the murder was committed to confinement in the adult correctional institutions or the state reformatory for women upon conviction of a felony; or (7) committed during the course of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of felony manufacture, sale, delivery or other distribution of a controlled substance otherwise prohibited by the provisions of chapter 28 of title 21; shall be imprisoned for life and if ordered by the court pursuant to chapter 19.2 of title 12 that person shall not be eligible for parole from imprisonment. Every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be imprisoned for not less than ten (10) years and may be imprisoned for life.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-23-2 ; P.L. 1973 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 280, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 221, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 284, § 4; P.L. 1996, ch. 152, § 1.

Cross References.

Sentencing to life imprisonment without parole, § 12-19.2-1 et seq.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

Mackenzie McBurney, Comment: Paying the Price: Eliminating Life Without Parole Sentences for Juveniles in Rhode Island, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 553 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The mandatory death provisions of this section violate the prohibition in U.S. Const., amend. 8 against cruel and unusual punishments. State v. Anthony, 121 R.I. 954 , 398 A.2d 1157, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2285 (1979), vacated, 448 A.2d 744, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 963 (1982); State v. Cline, 121 R.I. 299 , 397 A.2d 1309, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1774 (1979) (decided prior to 1984 amendment).

A mandatory life sentence for first-degree murder is not cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Vaccaro, 121 R.I. 788 , 403 A.2d 649, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1981 (1979).

Even though the penalty of execution has been determined to be constitutionally impermissible the intention of the legislature to create a specific and separate category of crime by the third sentence of this section is clear and phrase in indictment “while committed to confinement . . . in violation of . . . § 11-23-2 ” was not required to be stricken. State v. Cline, 122 R.I. 297 , 405 A.2d 1192, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2159 (1979) (decided prior to 1984 amendment).

In evaluating the Rhode Island sentencing procedures in regard to the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, the penalty cannot be equated with that of death, and cases involving the death penalty are of limited usefulness in assessing the constitutionality of a sentence of a term of life imprisonment without parole. State v. Lassor, 555 A.2d 339, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1989).

There is no constitutional limitation upon the power of the legislature to define one of the aggravating circumstances as murder commited in the course of a robbery, even though such a definition would be applicable to felony murder. State v. Travis, 568 A.2d 316, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1990).

Defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated because the Rhode Island Legislature, by enacting the mandatory sentencing scheme in R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 , did not usurp the judicial power by depriving the trial justice of his or her sentencing discretion as it was for the Legislature, not the courts, to prescribe the scope of punishments. Sosa v. State, 949 A.2d 1014, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 77 (2008).

Construction.

Since the penalties for murder listed in this provision are enumerated in the alternative, a jury’s finding that aggravated battery or torture was present under subsection (b)(4) is sufficient to authorize a judge to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole regardless of whether subsection (b)(3) is interpreted to apply to the person who arranged for a killing or only to the person who actually executed it. State v. Pacheco, 763 A.2d 971, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 3 (2001).

Bail.

Although first-degree murder is the only crime which carries a mandatory life sentence under this section, defendant may be denied bail pursuant to R.I. Const., art. I, § 9 even for crimes where death or life imprisonment could possibly be imposed as penalties for the crime committed. Fountaine v. Mullen, 117 R.I. 262 , 366 A.2d 1138, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1622 (1976).

Life Without Parole.

The state has the burden of proof regarding torture or aggravated battery for a sentence of life without parole. State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1992).

The trial justice was within her discretion in imposing the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole where, confronted with a first-time offender found guilty of a particularly gruesome and heinous murder, she carefully considered the nature of the offense and the personal character and propensities of the offender and concluded that he would “never change from the completely evil person that he is.” State v. Tassone, 749 A.2d 1112, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 101 (2000).

The trial justice did not err in imposing sentences of life without parole upon the defendant for having participated in the murder of two children where the evidence demonstrated his knowledge of the potential presence of children in the house, where his actions in pouring and igniting gasoline in the dead of night represented conduct creating a great risk of death to more than one person, and where no evidence of any mitigating factors emerged at trial. State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 14 (2000).

The state met its burden of proof of demonstrating torture or aggravated battery sufficient to support a sentence of life without parole since the evidence showed that the victim fell to the ground after a blow to her head with a metal bar, and that she was hit again and then stabbed and cut repeatedly while she was still conscious. State v. Pacheco, 763 A.2d 971, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 3 (2001).

Enlargements of injury photographs were admissible since the state sought a life sentence without parole for the defendant and they provided direct evidence relevant to proving the element of torture or aggravated battery. State v. Belloli, 766 A.2d 928, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 52 (2001).

Where defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 , and the evidence overwhelmingly supported the jury’s verdict, there was support for the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 ; in conducting a review of the sentence imposed pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-19.2-4 and 12-19.2-5 , the mitigating factors, the findings of the trial justice, and the personal character, record, and propensities of defendant did not outweigh the aggravating factors that were established. State v. Motyka, 893 A.2d 267, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 36 (2006).

First-degree murder defendant was properly sentenced to life imprisonment without parole as the victim’s slow, terrifying, and agonizing death justified the jury in finding the aggravating factors set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 ; defendant had 10 convictions in Rhode Island since 1995, including driving violations, drug offenses, and assaultive behavior; and defendant showed no remorse and took no responsibility for his actions. State v. Brown, 898 A.2d 69, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 78 (2006).

In a murder case, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2(1) permitted the trial justice to impose four consecutive life sentences as a result of defendant’s participation in a carjacking that resulted in the death of a young couple; the justice properly concluded that the brutality of the murders alone justified a life sentence without parole, even though acknowledging that defendant had had a troubled childhood, because the justice emphasized that defendant possessed a free will and a modicum of intelligence. State v. Day, 925 A.2d 962, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 91 (2007).

Defendant’s sentence of life without parole for the first-degree murder of his wife was proper, as defendant repeatedly stabbed his wife as the she lay crouched in a fetal position on the floor, vulnerable and defenseless, and continued to stab her even after rendering her helpless. State v. McManus, 941 A.2d 222, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 21 (2008).

Trial justice in determining whether to impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2(3), appropriately asked the jury to determine whether the killing of the victim was a murder for hire because ample evidence was presented at trial that defendant killed the victim at the request of the victim’s brother-in-law in exchange for money, and there was no requirement that defendant was to have been paid in advance for the murder. State v. Graham, 941 A.2d 848, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 22 , cert. denied, 555 U.S. 848, 129 S. Ct. 99, 172 L. Ed. 2d 82, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 6960 (2008).

Where the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that the murder was committed in a manner involving torture or aggravated battery to the victim, a sentence of life in prison without the possibility for parole was appropriate. Page v. State, 995 A.2d 934, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 67 (2010).

Sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole was appropriate, where the evidence showed, inter alia, that the murder was committed in a manner involving both torture and aggravated battery to the victim; the inmate’s actions served as signal to other potential informants they would not only be killed should they choose to inform, but that they would die in the torment that the victim did; and the inmate had a prior criminal history that included no fewer than 10 criminal charges. State v. Sifuentes, 996 A.2d 1130, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 80 (2010).

Defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment without parole, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 , was appropriate because defendant brutally murdered a twenty-seven-year law enforcement veteran with the officer’s own firearm, abused drugs, had a history of violent crime, and any hope of defendant’s rehabilitation was far outweighed by his danger to the community. State v. Carpio, 43 A.3d 1, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 62 (2012).

Defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was appropriate considering defendant’s lack of remorse and the extreme brutality evident in the murder, where the victim was stabbed 40 times with a serrated knife. The brutal slaying undoubtedly fell within the definition of aggravated battery. State v. Lopez, 45 A.3d 1, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 91 (2012).

Defendant, convicted of the first-degree murder of his girlfriend, was properly sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, because the evidence supported the jury’s finding that he committed the murder with aggravated battery and torture, as well as the trial court’s finding that his character and propensities made it unlikely that he would be rehabilitated. State v. Martinez, 59 A.3d 73, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 20 (2013).

Practice and Procedure.

Nothing in this section forbids granting counsel an opportunity to argue to the jury prior to its deliberation on the existence or nonexistence of an aggravating circumstance. In fact, the section should be construed as permitting such argument to be made. State v. Lassor, 555 A.2d 339, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1989).

A defendant should be given the opportunity to present any reasonably relevant factors as mitigating circumstances to the trial justice. The trial justice may then determine whether such mitigating circumstances should result in his or her declining to impose the penalty of life imprisonment without parole. State v. Travis, 568 A.2d 316, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1990).

Trial justice’s failure to define the terms “torture” and “aggravated battery” for the jury do not constitute error that invalidates the finding of that aggravating circumstance by the jury. State v. Travis, 568 A.2d 316, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1990).

Murder was committed in a manner involving torture or aggravated battery to the victim, where the victim was subjected to twenty-three stab wounds, and the victim’s hands were bound behind her back so that at least a portion of the brutal stabbing could be inferred to have taken place after she had been rendered helpless to resist. State v. Travis, 568 A.2d 316, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1990).

Where defendant waived the right to a jury trial and was found guilty of domestic murder in the first degree, the trial judge had authority to impose a life imprisonment sentence without parole where she found an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt; there was no requirement that R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 had to be included in the indictment because the Attorney General had given notice of his intent to seek such penalty within 20 days of the arraignment, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19.2-1 and such notice satisfied due process. State v. Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 217 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980, 123 S. Ct. 1808, 155 L. Ed. 2d 670, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 2991 (2003).

Where the imposition of a consecutive life sentence on a serial killer was otherwise legal, but the original sentencing court failed to allow an opportunity for allocution until after sentence had already been imposed, the sentencing court committed error in failing to vacate and resentence; the resulting sentence was only illegally imposed, however, rather than illegal, so that it could only be challenged within the 120-day time limit provided by rule. State v. DeCiantis, 813 A.2d 986, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 16 (2003).

Defendant was not entitled to a correction of his sentence of life imprisonment because once defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 , the sentence of life imprisonment was not only authorized by law, it was mandatory. State v. Texieira, 944 A.2d 132, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 34 (2008).

As the trial court heard the R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 motion to reduce sentence and concluded that there were no mitigating circumstances warranting a sentence reduction of the defendant’s life sentence for second degree murder related to his inadvertent shooting of a bystander, instead, it focused on the impact of defendant’s actions had on the victim’s family, defendant failed to establish that the trial court improperly denied the motion and that his sentence was without justification. State v. Mendoza, 958 A.2d 1159, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 103 (2008).

Presentence Reports.

The enactment of § 12-19-6 , providing for a presentence investigation and report did not repeal by implication the mandatory life imprisonment provision of this section, but such section would not be applicable to a conviction of murder in the first degree. State v. Bradshaw, 101 R.I. 233 , 221 A.2d 815, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 378 (1966).

Collateral References.

Propriety of carrying out death sentences against mentally ill individuals. 111 A.L.R.5th 491.

Propriety of imposing capital punishment on mentally retarded individuals. 20 A.L.R.5th 177.

Recital of, or reference to, the offense in pronouncing sentence or judgment. 14 A.L.R. 1000.

Reduction of punishment imposed by trial court by appellate court. 89 A.L.R. 312.

11-23-2.1. Penalty for murder of a kidnapped person under the age of eighteen (18).

If any person under the age of eighteen (18) who is kidnapped in violation of § 11-26-1 by a person other than his or her natural or adopted parent dies as a direct result of the kidnapping, then the person convicted of the offense shall be guilty of murder in the first degree and shall be punished by imprisonment for life, and the court may, pursuant to chapter 19.2 of title 12, order that that person not be eligible for parole.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 362, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Mackenzie McBurney, Comment: Paying the Price: Eliminating Life Without Parole Sentences for Juveniles in Rhode Island, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 553 (2018).

11-23-2.2. Penalty for murder in the first degree.

Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall serve not less than fifteen (15) years of his or her sentence before being eligible for parole.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 415, § 1.

11-23-3. Manslaughter.

  1. Every person who shall commit manslaughter shall be imprisoned not exceeding thirty (30) years.
  2. Where the provisions of The Domestic Violence Prevention Act, chapter 29 of title 12, are applicable, the penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties as provided in § 12-29-5 .

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-23-3 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 421, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 9.

Cross References.

Additional penalty for carrying arms while committing crime, §§ 11-47-3 , 11-47-20 .

Domestic assault, § 8-8.1-1 et seq.

Reckless vehicular homicide, § 31-27-1 .

Willful killing of unborn child, § 11-23-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Aiders and Abettors.

It was not necessary that defendant have any intention of killing the victim, in order to be convicted of manslaughter, where he aided and assisted in a physical attack upon the victim before a codefendant fatally stabbed him. State v. Medeiros, 535 A.2d 766, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 578 (1987).

Common Law.

The definition of manslaughter remains as it was at common law. State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 463 (1987).

Essential Elements.

Since manslaughter is not defined by the statute, it has the same meaning as at common law. State v. Fenik, 45 R.I. 309 , 121 A. 218, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1923).

An essential element of this offense is the presence of provocation offered by person slain. State v. Winston, 105 R.I. 447 , 252 A.2d 354, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 774 (1969).

This state follows the common-law definition of manslaughter. State v. Vargas, 420 A.2d 809, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1817 (1980).

At common law, manslaughter is classified as either voluntary or involuntary. State v. Vargas, 420 A.2d 809, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1817 (1980).

Voluntary manslaughter is a separate offense that is defined as an intentional homicide without malice aforethought in the heat of passion as a result of adequate provocation. State v. Vargas, 420 A.2d 809, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1817 (1980).

Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, either express or implied. State v. Lillibridge, 454 A.2d 237, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1117 (1982).

Involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional homicide without malice aforethought, committed either in the performance of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony or in the performance of a lawful act with criminal negligence. State v. Lillibridge, 454 A.2d 237, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1117 (1982); State v. Robbio, 526 A.2d 509, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 500 (1987).

Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional homicide without malice aforethought in the heat of passion as a result of adequate provocation. State v. Lillibridge, 454 A.2d 237, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1117 (1982).

To find criminal liability for involuntary manslaughter under the criminal negligence theory, evidence of the defendant’s awareness of the victim’s peril and his failure to act are not sufficient to support a conviction. To find criminal liability for failing to act, there must first exist a legal duty to act, imposable by either the common law or by statutory mandate. State v. McLaughlin, 621 A.2d 170, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 34 , cert. denied, 510 U.S. 858, 114 S. Ct. 168, 126 L. Ed. 2d 128, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 5581 (1993).

Evidence.

Autopsy photographs of deceased child plus evidence that child’s twin was admitted to hospital at same time with multiple body bruises were admissible to show mother’s tendency to abuse children. State v. Ryan, 113 R.I. 343 , 321 A.2d 92, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1185 (1974).

Failure to Provide Medical Assistance.

Criminal culpability premised on a failure to provide medical attention requires that proximate causation be established, i.e., it must appear that decedent’s death was imputable to such failure, or that life might have been prolonged if proper medical attention had been provided. State v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 1382, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 572 (1985).

Fair Trial.

Where the defendant was charged with manslaughter for allegedly stabbing her husband during an argument, the prosecutor’s question to the defendant regarding an unsubstantiated allegation that the defendant had stabbed her former husband was inherently prejudicial to her right to a fair and impartial trial and its destructive impact was not cured by the cautionary instructions given to the jury by the trial justice. State v. Ordway, 619 A.2d 819, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 216 (1992).

Instructions.

A person convicted of manslaughter is not prejudiced by an erroneous murder instruction. State v. Lillibridge, 454 A.2d 237, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1117 (1982).

Testimony that the defendant drank on the afternoon and evening of the murder and that the defendant drank frequently fell well short of demonstrating that the defendant’s will was so paralyzed that he was unable to withstand evil impulses or to form any sane design. Therefore, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on manslaughter by reason of diminished capacity. State v. Johnson, 667 A.2d 523, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 265 (1995).

Where the evidence did not show that defendant was acting under extreme provocation of fear of violence, and where defendant also had cooling down time between earlier altercations and a final confrontation with the victim, there was no reason to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of second-degree murder. State v. McGuy, 841 A.2d 1109, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 209 (2003).

In a prosecution for murder in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 , defendant was not entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, as her assertion that the victim assaulted her and tried to rob her was not supported by admissible evidence, and failed to establish that she acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. State v. Garcia, 883 A.2d 1131, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 189 (2005).

In a trial for first-degree murder, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, because there was no evidence presented as to defendant’s level of intoxication following defendant’s alcohol consumption and defendant’s numerous voluntary and conscious actions on the night in question illustrated that defendant’s intoxication was not of such a degree as to completely paralyze defendant’s will. State v. Motyka, 893 A.2d 267, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 36 (2006).

— Self-Defense.

The trial court properly denied the defendant’s request for a proposed instruction on self-defense that concerned the difference between the developmental skills of men and women. State v. Ordway, 619 A.2d 819, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 216 (1992).

In a manslaughter case where the defendant presented evidence concerning battered woman’s syndrome, defendant’s conviction was upheld because she failed to prove, under the totality of the circumstances, that the victim was about to inflect death or serious bodily injury upon her when she grabbed a kitchen knife and stabbed the victim. State v. Urena, 899 A.2d 1281, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 110 (2006).

Motion to Reduce Sentence.

As defendant inmate’s sentence for two counts of manslaughter was authorized by R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-3(a) , he agreed to serve it as part of a plea bargain, and the State had not moved to increase it, due process did not require that he be appointed counsel to represent him in his R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 motion to reduce his sentence. State v. Chase, 9 A.3d 1248, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 122 (2010).

Resentencing.

A trial justice did not abuse his discretion in resentencing the defendant to the maximum term for manslaughter after having sentenced him to a term exceeding the maximum, at which time the justice had stated that if he had heard the case without a jury, his verdict would have been first degree murder, not manslaughter. State v. Gil, 543 A.2d 1296, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1988).

Collateral References.

Adequacy of defense counsel’s representation of criminal client — conduct occurring at time of trial regarding issues of diminished capacity, intoxication, and unconsciousness. 78 A.L.R.5th 197.

Adequacy of defense counsel’s representation of criminal client — pretrial conduct or conduct at unspecified time regarding issues of diminished capacity, intoxication, and unconsciousness. 79 A.L.R.5th 419.

Admissibility, in homicide prosecution, of opinion evidence that death was or was not self-inflicted. 56 A.L.R.3d 1447.

Admissibility of evidence of uncommunicated threats on issue of self-defense in prosecution for homicide. 98 A.L.R.2d 6.

Admissibility on behalf of accused in homicide case of evidence that killing was committed at victim’s request. 71 A.L.R.2d 617.

Airplane, manslaughter by negligence in handling. 69 A.L.R. 337.

Automobile, contributory negligence as defense in prosecution for homicide in connection with use of. 99 A.L.R. 833.

Automobile, homicide in connection with use for unlawful purpose or in violation of law. 99 A.L.R. 756.

Automobile, sleep or drowsiness of operator as affecting charge of negligent homicide. 63 A.L.R.2d 983.

Burden of proof on defense that killing was accidental. 63 A.L.R.3d 936.

Corporation’s criminal liability for homicide. 45 A.L.R.4th 1021.

Criminal homicide by excessive or improper punishment inflicted upon child by parent or one in loco parentis. 89 A.L.R.2d 396.

Criminal liability for death resulting from unlawfully furnishing intoxicating liquor or drugs to another. 32 A.L.R.3d 589.

Criminal liability of parent, teacher, or one in loco parentis for homicide by excessive or improper punishment inflicted on child. 89 A.L.R.2d 417.

Criminal responsibility of peace officers for killing one whom they wish to investigate or identify. 18 A.L.R. 1368; 61 A.L.R. 321.

Discharge of firearm without intent to inflict injury as proximate cause of homicide resulting therefrom. 55 A.L.R. 921.

Druggist’s criminal responsibility for death or injury in consequence of mistake. 55 A.L.R.2d 714.

Earlier prosecution for offense during which homicide was committed as bar to prosecution for homicide. 11 A.L.R.3d 834.

Elopement, homicide in attemting to prevent. 8 A.L.R. 660.

Failure to provide medical or surgical attention. 100 A.L.R.2d 483.

Homicide predicated on improper treatment of disease or injury. 45 A.L.R.3d 114.

Hunting accident, criminal responsibility for death resulting from. 23 A.L.R.2d 1401.

Necessity and effect, in homicide prosecution, of expert medical testimony as to cause of death. 65 A.L.R.3d 283.

Negligent homicide as affected by negligence or other misconduct of the decedent. 67 A.L.R. 922.

Propriety of predicating manslaughter conviction on violation of local ordinance or regulation not dealing with motor vehicles. 85 A.L.R.3d 1072.

Standard for determination of reasonableness of criminal defendant’s belief, for purposes of self-defense claim, that physical force is necessary — modern cases. 73 A.L.R.4th 993.

Test or criterion of term “culpable negligence,” or “gross negligence,” in determining manslaughter. 161 A.L.R. 10.

Wanton or reckless use of firearms without express intent to inflict injury. 5 A.L.R. 603; 23 A.L.R. 1554.

Who other than actor is liable for manslaughter. 95 A.L.R.2d 175.

Withholding food, clothing, or shelter, homicide by. 61 A.L.R.3d 1207.

11-23-4. Joinder of murder count with count for concealment of birth.

Any woman, who shall be indicted or charged by information for the murder of her infant child born out of wedlock, may also be charged in the same indictment or information with either or both of the offenses mentioned in § 11-18-4 , and if, upon trial, the jury shall acquit her on the charge of murder and find her guilty of the other offenses, or either of them, judgment and sentence may be awarded against her accordingly.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 11; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 11; P.L. 1926, ch. 858, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 11-23-4 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 5.

Cross References.

Concealment of birth out of wedlock, § 11-18-4 .

11-23-5. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 231, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 27, § 4, effective June 19, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-23-5 concerned willful killing of unborn quick child.

11-23-6. Controlled substance transaction resulting in death of minor.

Any person who sells, delivers, or distributes a controlled substance, the sale of which would constitute a felony under chapter 28 of title 21, to a minor, or knowingly provides a controlled substance for sale, delivery, or distribution to a minor, and death has resulted to the minor because of the ingestion orally or the injection or inhalation of the controlled substance, shall be imprisoned for life.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 287, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 105, § 2; P.L. 2018, ch. 111, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 105, § 1 and P.L. 2018, ch. 111, § 1, provides: “This act shall be known and may be cited as ‘Kristen’s Law.’”

P.L. 2018, ch. 105, § 2, and P.L. 2018, ch. 111, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The delivery of a controlled substance to a child, not under the direction of a physician in regard to dosage, is an act that is inherently dangerous warranting a conviction under the felony murder doctrine if the delivery results in the death of the child. State v. Taylor, 623 A.2d 453, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 107 (1993).

Collateral References.

Comment Note: Criminal Liability for Death Resulting from Unlawfully Furnishing Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs to Another. 29 A.L.R.7th Art. 8 (2018).

11-23-7. Controlled substance delivery resulting in death.

  1. A person is guilty of a controlled substance delivery resulting in death when, as a result of an unlawful delivery of a controlled substance in exchange for anything of value to an adult, death results to that adult because of the ingestion orally, or the injection or inhalation of the controlled substance.
  2. A person is guilty of a controlled substance delivery resulting in death when, as a result of an unlawful delivery of a controlled substance to another person who subsequently delivers such controlled substance to an adult, death results to that adult because of the ingestion orally or the injection or inhalation of the controlled substance.
  3. Those in violation of subsection (a) or (b), upon conviction, shall be imprisoned up to life.
  4. For the purposes of this section only, any person who, in good faith, without malice and in the absence of evidence of an intent to defraud, seeks medical assistance for someone experiencing a controlled substance overdose shall not be charged or prosecuted for a violation of this section, if the evidence for the charge was gained as a result of the seeking of medical assistance.
  5. The phrase “in exchange for anything of value” does not apply to the act of sharing a controlled substance when the sharing results in the proximate cause of a person’s death under this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 105, § 3; P.L. 2018, ch. 111, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 105, § 1 and P.L. 2018, ch. 111, § 1 provides: “This act shall be known and may be cited as ‘Kristen’s Law.’”

P.L. 2018, ch. 105, § 3, and P.L. 2018, ch. 111, § 3 enacted identical versions of this section.

Collateral References.

Comment Note: Criminal Liability for Death Resulting from Unlawfully Furnishing Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs to Another. 29 A.L.R.7th Art. 8 (2018).

Chapter 24 Hotels and Public Places

11-24-1. All persons entitled to full and equal accommodations.

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 27; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 28; P.L. 1925, ch. 658, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 28; P.L. 1952, ch. 2958, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-24-1 .

Cross References.

Common drinking cups and towels, penalty, § 23-6-1 .

Spitting in public places, penalty, § 23-6-2 .

Comparative Legislation.

Discrimination:

Conn. Gen. Stat., §§ 46a-63, 46a-64.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Showing of Undesirability Required.

Without factual determination that patron’s presence at race track was undesirable and disruptive of track operations proprietor was unable to deprive patron of enjoyment of public place. Burrillville Racing Ass'n v. Garabedian, 113 R.I. 134 , 318 A.2d 469, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1149 (1974).

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of “civil rights” legislation by state. 49 A.L.R. 505.

Exclusion of person for reason other than color or race from place of public entertainment or amusement. 1 A.L.R.2d 1165.

Racial segregation in use of public recreational facilities. 38 A.L.R.2d 1190.

Restaurant, applicability of Civil Rights Acts to. 31 A.L.R. 339.

Right of exclusion from or discrimination against patrons of library. 64 A.L.R. 304.

Right to admission to parking ground or to service at gas station or garages. 35 A.L.R. 557.

What constitutes private club or association not otherwise open to public that is exempt from state civil rights statute. 83 A.L.R.5th 467.

11-24-2. Discriminatory practices prohibited.

No person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person on account of race or color, religion, country of ancestral origin, disability, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of that public place. No person shall directly or indirectly publish, circulate, issue, display, post, or mail any written, printed or painted communication, notice, or advertisement, to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any public accommodation place shall be refused, withheld from, or denied to any person on account of race or color, religion, country of ancestral origin, disability, sex or sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or age or that the patronage or custom at that place of any person belonging to or purporting to be of any particular race or color, religion, country of ancestral origin, disability, age, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression is unwelcome, objectionable, or not acceptable, desired, or solicited. The production of any written, printed, or painted communication, notice, or advertisement, purporting to relate to any public place and to be made by any person being its owner, lessee, proprietor, superintendent, or manager, shall be presumptive evidence in any action that its production was authorized by that person.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 27; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 28; P.L. 1925, ch. 658, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 28; P.L. 1952, ch. 2958, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-24-2 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 144, § 5; P.L. 1988, ch. 227, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 126, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 5.

Collateral References.

Discrimination on Basis of Sexual Orientation as Form of Sex Discrimination Proscribed by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. 28 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4 (2018).

11-24-2.1. Discrimination based on disability, age, or sex prohibited.

  1. Whenever in this chapter there shall appear the words “ancestral origin” there shall be inserted immediately thereafter the words “disability, age, or sex.”
  2. “Disability” means a disability as defined in § 42-87-1 .
  3. The terms, as used regarding persons with disabilities, “auxiliary aids and services” and “reasonable accommodation” have the same meaning as those terms are defined in § 42-87-1.1 .
  4. “Otherwise qualified” means a person with a disability who meets the essential eligibility requirements for participation in or receipt of benefits from the program or activity.
  5. Any person with a disability shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members of the general public to all public accommodations, subject to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.
  6. Every person with a disability who has a personal assistive animal or who obtains a personal assistive animal, shall be entitled to full and equal access to all public accommodations provided for in this chapter, and shall not be required to pay extra compensation for a personal assistive animal, but shall be liable for any damage done to the premises by a personal assistive animal.
  7. Nothing in this section shall require any person providing a place of public accommodation to, in any way, incur any greater liability or obligation, or provide a higher degree of care for a person with a disability than for a person who is not disabled.
  8. “Sexual orientation” means having or being perceived as having an orientation for heterosexuality, bisexuality, or homosexuality.
  9. “Gender identity or expression” includes a person’s actual or perceived gender, as well as a person’s gender identity, gender-related self image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related expression, whether or not that gender identity, gender-related self image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related expression is different from that traditionally associated with the person’s sex at birth.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 144, § 5; P.L. 1988, ch. 227, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 499, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 507, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 5; P.L. 2009, ch. 96, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 97, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 124, § 2, effective July 2, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 125, § 2, effective July 2, 2021.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations and redesignated the subdivisions in subsection (b).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2009, ch. 96, § 1, and P.L. 2009, ch. 97, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 124, § 2, and P.L. 2021, ch. 125, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of § 302 of Americans with Disabilities Act (42 USCS § 12182), prohibiting discrimination on basis of disability by owners or operators of places of public accommodation. 136 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

11-24-2.2. Discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Whenever in this chapter the terms “race or color, religion or country of ancestral origin, handicap, age or sex” shall appear, there shall be inserted immediately thereafter the words “sexual orientation”.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 7.

11-24-2.3. Discrimination based on gender identity or expression.

Whenever in this chapter the terms “race or color, religion, country of ancestral origin, handicap, age, sex, or sexual orientation” shall appear, there shall be inserted immediately thereafter the words “gender identity or expression”.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 6.

11-24-3. “Places of public accommodation” construed.

A “Place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement” within the meaning of §§ 11-24-1 11-24-3 includes, but is not limited to: (1) inns, taverns, roadhouses, hotels, whether conducted for the entertainment or accommodation of transient guests or of those seeking health, recreation or rest; (2) restaurants, eating houses or any place where food is sold for consumption on the premises; (3) buffets, saloons, barrooms, or any stores, parks, or enclosures where spirituous or malt liquors are sold; (4) ice cream parlors, confectioneries, soda fountains, and all stores where ice cream, ice and fruit preparations or their derivatives, or beverages of any kind are retailed for consumption on the premises; (5) retail stores and establishments, dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, rest rooms, bath houses, barber shops, beauty parlors, theaters, motion picture houses, music halls, airdromes, roof gardens, race courses, skating rinks, amusement and recreation parks, fairs, bowling alleys, golf courses, gymnasiums, shooting galleries, billiard and pool parlors, swimming pools, seashore accommodations and boardwalks, and public libraries; (6) garages; (7) all public conveyances operated on land, water or in the air as well as their stations and terminals; (8) public halls and public elevators of buildings occupied by two (2) or more tenants or by the owner and one or more tenants; and (9) public housing projects. Nothing in this section shall be construed to include any place of accommodation, resort, or amusement which is in its nature distinctly private.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 28; P.L. 1952, ch. 2958, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-24-3 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading and added the subdivision designations.

Collateral References.

Hotel or inn, what constitutes, within meaning of civil rights statute. 19 A.L.R. 532; 53 A.L.R. 990.

11-24-3.1. Sex discrimination — Limitation on prohibition.

Nothing contained in this chapter that refers to “sex” shall be construed to mandate joint use of restrooms, bath houses, and dressing rooms by males and females.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 144, § 5.

11-24-3.2. Age discrimination — Limitation on prohibition.

For the purposes of this chapter, “age” is construed as anyone over the age of eighteen (18).

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 144, § 5.

11-24-4. Enforcement of anti-discrimination provisions.

The Rhode Island commission for human rights is empowered and directed, as provided in this section, to prevent any person from violating any of the provisions of §§ 11-24-1 11-24-3 ; provided, that before instituting a formal hearing it shall attempt by informal methods of conference, persuasion, and conciliation to induce compliance with those sections. Upon the commission’s own initiative or whenever an aggrieved individual or an organization chartered for the purpose of combating discrimination or racism or of safeguarding civil liberties, or rights of persons with disabilities (that individual or organization being subsequently referred to as the complainant), makes a charge to the commission that any person, agency, bureau, corporation, or association, subsequently referred to as the respondent, has violated or is violating any of the provisions of §§ 11-24-1 11-24-3 the commission may proceed in the same manner and with the same powers as provided in §§ 28-5-16 28-5-26 and the provisions of §§ 28-5-13 and 28-5-16 28-5-36 as to the powers, duties and rights of the commission, its members, hearing examiners, the complainant, respondent, interviewer and the court shall apply in any proceedings under this section.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 29; P.L. 1952, ch. 2958, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-24-4 ; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 1.

Cross References.

Commission for human rights, § 28-5-8 et seq.

11-24-5. Liberal construction of provisions.

The provisions of §§ 11-24-1 11-24-6 shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of their purposes, and any law inconsistent with their provisions shall not apply. Nothing contained in these sections shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of any law of this state relating to discrimination because of race or color, religion or country of ancestral origin, disability, age, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression.

History of Section. P.L. 1952, ch. 2958, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-24-5 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 144, § 5; P.L. 1988, ch. 227, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 32, § 6; P.L. 1997, ch. 150, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 340, § 5.

11-24-6. Severability of provisions.

If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of §§ 11-24-1 11-24-6 or their application to any person or circumstances shall, for any reason, be adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder of the sections or their application to other persons or circumstances.

History of Section. P.L. 1952, ch. 2958, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 11-24-6 .

11-24-7. Discrimination against members of armed forces prohibited.

It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, innkeeper, or proprietor or lessee of any place of public amusement or entertainment, or any agent, servant, or representative of any common carrier, innkeeper, proprietor, or lessee, to debar from the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any public conveyance on land or water, of any inn, or of any place of public amusement or entertainment, any person in the military, air, or naval service of the United States or of this state wearing the uniform prescribed for him or her at that time or place by law, regulation of the service, or custom, on account of his or her wearing the uniform, or being in the military service.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 31; P.L. 1908, ch. 1562, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 46; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 49; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 47; G.L. 1956, § 11-24-7 .

Cross References.

Extension to merchant marine, § 30-22-2 .

11-24-8. Civil action for discrimination against armed forces.

Any person who is debarred from the enjoyment, contrary to the provision of § 11-24-7 , shall be entitled to recover, in a civil action, from any corporation, association, or person guilty of the violation, his or her actual damages and one hundred dollars ($100) in addition, and evidence that the person debarred was at the time sober, orderly, and able and willing to pay for enjoyment in accordance with the rates fixed therefor for civilians shall be prima facie evidence in an action that he or she was debarred on account of his or her wearing the uniform or being in the military service.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 32; P.L. 1908, ch. 1562, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 47; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 50; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 48; G.L. 1956, § 11-24-8 .

Chapter 25 Jails and Prisons

11-25-1. Escape from correctional institutions.

Every prisoner who shall attempt to escape, or who shall escape, from the lawful custody of the warden of the adult correctional institutions, or from the custody of the director of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals pursuant to the provisions of § 40.1-5.3-1 , shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned not more than three (3) years or be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500). However, nothing in this section shall be construed to include the offense of breaking jail.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 13; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 13; P.L. 1920, ch. 1856, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 13; P.L. 1931, ch. 1791, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 13; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-25-1 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 244, § 1.

Comparative Legislation.

Escape:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-168 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 268, § 15 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Custody.

Custody under this section does not require physical force. State v. McInerney, 53 R.I. 203 , 165 A. 433, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1933).

Failure of guard to notice the escape for period did not constitute an abandonment of his custody. State v. McInerney, 53 R.I. 203 , 165 A. 433, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1933).

Defendant, in escaping from the institution barn or pasture, did escape “while . . . undergoing sentence in any county jail” since wherever a prisoner is assigned to work, he is, until discharged, still in custody. State v. McInerney, 53 R.I. 203 , 165 A. 433, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1933).

Collateral References.

Conviction for escape where prisoner fails to leave confines of prison or institution. 79 A.L.R.4th 1060.

Duress, necessity, or conditions of confinement as justification for escape from prison. 54 A.L.R.5th 141.

Escape or prison breach as affected by means employed to effect it. 96 A.L.R.2d 520.

Extradition of escaped convict. 78 A.L.R. 420.

Failure of prisoner to return at expiration of work furlough or other permissive release period as crime of escape. 76 A.L.R.3d 658.

Recital of, or reference to, the offense on pronouncing sentence or judgment for escape or aiding escape. 14 A.L.R. 998.

Temporary unauthorized absence of prisoner as escape or attempted escape. 76 A.L.R.3d 695.

What justifies escape or attempt to escape, or assistance in that regard. 70 A.L.R.2d 1430; 69 A.L.R.3d 678.

11-25-1.1. Escape from municipal detention facility.

Every prisoner, detainee, or other person incarcerated or confined at the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility in the City of Central Falls who shall attempt to escape, or who shall escape, from the lawful custody of the director of the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility created under chapter 54 of title 45 shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned at the adult correctional institutions not more than three (3) years or be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500). This term shall commence at the expiration of the original term of imprisonment of the prisoner.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 362, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 477, § 1.

11-25-2. Assault or escape by a custodial unit inmate.

Every prisoner confined in any custodial unit of the adult correctional institutions or in the custody of the warden or other correctional employee while outside the confines of the institutions or in the custody of the director of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals pursuant to the provisions of § 40.1-5.3-1 , who shall assault the warden, or other correctional employee of the institution, or shall escape, or attempt to effect an escape, shall be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment in the adult correctional institutions for not less than one year nor more than twenty (20) years, that term to commence from the expiration of the original term of the prisoner.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 14; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 14; P.L. 1936, ch. 2388, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 14; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-25-2 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 244, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 65, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 56, § 1.

Cross References.

Arrest of escapees without warrant, § 12-7-17 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Assault or Escape.

The word “assault” as used in the statute should be accorded its ordinary meaning. State v. Camerlin, 116 R.I. 726 , 360 A.2d 862, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1328 (1976).

As a matter of statutory construction, an assault under this section perpetrated in the course of an escape under this section does not necessarily merge in the escape. State v. Robalewski, 418 A.2d 817, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1717 (1980).

A prisoner who is serving a period of confinement in a correctional institution remains in the custody of the warden during the time that the prisoner is temporarily outside the confines of the institution. That someone other than the warden is responsible for transporting or guarding the prisoner while outside the confines of the adult correctional institutions in no way diminishes the fact that the warden is ultimately responsible for and in control of the prisoner, and an escape by a prisoner during such period of transportation, constitutes a violation of this section. State v. Tregaskis, 540 A.2d 1022, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1988).

Legislative Intent.

The legislature clearly intended to insure the imposition of additional punishment for the crime of escape, independent of any other sentence under which a prisoner was serving or being held. State v. D'Amico, 92 R.I. 194 , 167 A.2d 542, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1961).

Original Sentence.

The legislature used the words “original term” in this section to mean the aggregate term of consecutive sentences under which the prisoner was being held at the time of the escape and it was the legislative intent that the escape sentence was to begin at the expiration of the last of such consecutive sentences. State v. D'Amico, 92 R.I. 194 , 167 A.2d 542, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1961).

Where legislature enacted a statute setting out that escapee from maximum custodial unit be sentenced for not less than one nor more than twenty years “except where the original sentence was imprisonment for life,” said term to commence following the expiration of the original term of such prisoner, it did not intend to favor life termer by exempting him from judicial punishment, and thus such statute in order to avoid patently absurd result would be construed as if it read that escapee be sentenced not less than one nor more than twenty years, said term to commence from the expiration of the original term of such prisoner except where the original sentence was imprisonment for life. State v. Goff, 110 R.I. 202 , 291 A.2d 416, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 901 (1972); State v. Robalewski, 418 A.2d 817, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1717 (1980).

Collateral References.

Conviction for escape where prisoner fails to leave confines of prison or institution. 79 A.L.R.4th 1060.

11-25-2.1. Assault by a municipal detention inmate.

Every prisoner, detainee, or other person incarcerated or confined in the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility, created under chapter 54 of title 45 who shall assault the director or other detention center employees, shall be sentenced by the court to imprisonment at the adult correctional institutions, for not less than one year and no more than twenty (20) years. This term shall commence at the expiration of the original term of imprisonment of the prisoner.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 362, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 477, § 1.

11-25-3. Fatal assault by maximum custodial inmate deemed murder.

In case the warden or any under-keeper or any other officer of a maximum custodial unit is killed in any assault by a prisoner, the killing shall be deemed to be a murder.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 15; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 15; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; P.L. 1956, § 11-25-3 .

11-25-4. Assault or escape by prisoner of medium or minimum custodial unit.

Every prisoner confined in the medium or minimum custodial unit of the adult correctional institutions or in the custody of the warden or other officer while outside the confines of the custodial unit, or in the custody of the director of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals pursuant to the provisions of § 40.1-5.3-1 who shall assault the warden or other officer of that institution, or shall escape, or attempt to effect an escape, either from those institutions or the custody of the warden or officers, or the director, including that custody which pertains to the work release program, shall be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment in the adult correctional institutions for not less than one year nor more than twenty (20) years. This term shall commence from the expiration of the original term of the prisoner.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 394, § 25, as enacted by P.L. 1936, ch. 2388, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 25; P.L. 1950, ch. 2467, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-25-4 ; P.L. 1970, ch. 70, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 105, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 244, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 58, § 1.

Cross References.

Arrest of escapees without warrant, § 12-7-17 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Custody.

Where inmate had been allowed to engage in work release program and was permitted to travel to and from place of employment without custodial supervision he was in “custody” while outside correctional institution and his failure to return to said institution after the working day had ended constituted an “escape” within the meaning of the statute. State v. Furlong, 110 R.I. 174 , 291 A.2d 267, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 895 (1972).

Collateral References.

Conviction for escape where prisoner fails to leave confines of prison or institution. 79 A.L.R.4th 1060.

11-25-4.1. Sentence for assault or escape by prisoner — Consecutive term.

The sentence for assault or escape, as prescribed in § 11-25-4 , shall run consecutively to the original term of incarceration.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 145, § 1.

11-25-5. Officer voluntarily allowing prisoner to escape.

Every jailer or other officer, who shall voluntarily suffer any prisoner in his or her custody upon conviction or upon any criminal charge to escape, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 8; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-25-5 .

11-25-6. Officer negligently allowing escape.

Every jailer or other officer, who shall be convicted of negligently suffering any prisoner in his or her custody upon conviction or upon any criminal charge to escape, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 9; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 11-25-6 .

Collateral References.

Peace officer’s liability for acts of assistant or deputy in permitting escape. 1 A.L.R. 240; 102 A.L.R. 174; 116 A.L.R. 1064; 71 A.L.R.2d 1140.

11-25-7. Rescue of prisoner.

Every person who shall set at liberty or rescue, either by force or stratagem, any person convicted of any crime or offense or in the custody of any officer upon any criminal charge, or confined in any jail, lock-up, police station or other place of detention upon any criminal charge, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 6; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-25-7 .

11-25-8. Conveyance to prisoner of instruments for escape.

Every person who shall convey to any prisoner confined upon any criminal charge or upon conviction in any prison, jail, lock-up, police station, or other place of detention, without the knowledge of the warden, jailer, or officer in charge of the prison, jail, lock-up, police station, or place of detention, any disguise, instrument, tool, weapon, or other thing which is adapted or useful to aid a prisoner in making his or her escape, shall if any prisoner escapes by means of a disguise, instrument, tool, weapon, or other thing so conveyed, be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both. If there is no escape by means of the disguise, instrument, tool, weapon, or other thing so conveyed, then the person so conveying it shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 10; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 5; P.L. 1920, ch. 1857, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 11-25-8 .

11-25-9. Assisting inmate of correctional institutions to escape.

Every person who shall convey any tools to, or shall have any communication without lawful authority therefor or hold any conversation with any prisoner confined in the adult correctional institutions, from the outside of the institutions, or shall convey any tools or instruments to or in any way assist in the escape or attempted escape of any person from any institution under the management and control of the department of corrections, or shall harbor or assist that person, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or be imprisoned not exceeding three (3) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 11; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 11; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 5; P.L 1922, ch. 2216, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 11; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 80; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-25-9 .

Collateral References.

Criminal responsibility of one cooperating to aid prisoner to escape as affected by inability to commit offense personally. 5 A.L.R. 789; 74 A.L.R. 1110; 131 A.L.R. 1322.

Homicide, responsibility of persons participating in jail delivery for homicide committed by one of their number. 15 A.L.R. 456.

What justifies escape or attempt to escape or assistance in that regard. 70 A.L.R.2d 1430; 69 A.L.R.3d 678.

11-25-10. Conveyance of intoxicants to prisoner.

Every person who shall convey or cause to be conveyed to any prisoner committed to the adult correctional institutions any wine or strong liquor, without the consent of the warden, shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars ($50.00).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 12; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 12; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-25-10 .

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of state statute criminalizing possession of contraband by individual in penal or correctional institution. 45 A.L.R.5th 767.

11-25-11. Prisoners committed for violation of city or town ordinances.

The several cities and towns shall have the right to use the correctional institutions of the state for the confinement of persons committed under the authority of the ordinances of the cities or towns; provided, that the director of corrections shall not be liable for damages or costs in any suit which may be brought by any person or persons who may be committed to the correctional institutions under the authority of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 9.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

11-25-12. Earnings of city or town prisoners.

No law of this state shall be so construed as to give any city or town a claim upon the state for the labor or services of any person committed to the correctional institutions under its authority.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 9.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

11-25-13. Federal prisoners.

Prisoners arrested within this state under the authority of the United States or sentenced under the authority of any court under the authority of the United States held within the territorial limits of the first, second, or third judicial circuit of the United States as constituted on April 26, 1956, except Puerto Rico, shall be committed under the authority of the United States to any adult correctional institution and payment shall be made of the expense of maintaining and supervising those prisoners. The director of corrections of the adult correctional institutions shall receive the prisoners and safely keep them in the institutions until they are discharged by due course of the laws of the United States, under the like penalties and liabilities, civil and criminal, as in the case of prisoners committed by the authority of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 9.

11-25-14. Conveyance of unauthorized articles to or from institutions.

  1. Every person who shall convey or cause to be conveyed into the adult correctional institutions any article without first obtaining the consent of the director of corrections, or who shall convey from the institutions any article without the consent of the director of corrections, shall be punished, upon conviction, by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  2. Every person who shall convey or cause to be conveyed to any prisoner any drugs, tobacco or any article that could be used as a weapon, without first obtaining the consent of the director of corrections, may be punished, upon conviction, by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  3. For the purposes of subsection (b), “prisoner” includes all persons committed to the adult correctional institution, in the custody of the warden, in the custody of any other officer while outside the confines of the custodial unit, in the custody of the state director of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals pursuant to § 40.1-5.3-1 , regardless of whether that prisoner is held upon conviction or upon any criminal charge. “Prisoner” shall not include persons on home confinement.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 9; P.L. 2008, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 170, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 146, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 170, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of state statute criminalizing possession of contraband by individual in penal or correctional institution. 45 A.L.R.5th 767.

11-25-14.1. Unlawful possession of telecommunications devices.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any prisoner to possess any portable electronic communication device, including, but not limited to, cellular telephones, cloned cellular telephones, two-way radios, pagers, personal digital assistants, or any other device capable of transmitting or intercepting cellular or radio signals between providers and users of telecommunication and data services. Any violation of this provision shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), a prison term not to exceed five (5) years, or both.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “prisoner” includes all persons incarcerated at the adult correctional institution, in the custody of any other officer while outside the confines of the custodial unit, or in the custody of the state director of behavioral health, developmental disabilities and hospitals pursuant to § 40.1-5.3-1 . It shall not include those offenders on home confinement pursuant to § 42-56-20.2 , nor those offenders serving on parole.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 78, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 83, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 78, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 83, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-25-15. Imprisonment for failure to appear at a court ordered hearing.

  1. This section shall apply to every person who has been or shall be detained at or in the adult correctional institutions for failure to appear at a court ordered ability to pay hearing. After that person has completed his or her detention for lack of bail for failure to appear at an ability to pay hearing, he or she shall receive a reduction in fines and fees owed to the court, if any, in the amount of fifty dollars ($50.00) per day served (or any fraction thereof) to be applied against the amount of his/her outstanding fines or costs, or both.
  2. Provided further, any person detained at the adult correctional institution for failure to appear who also claims an inability to pay his or her fines or costs shall be entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the district court within forty-eight (48) hours of the detention on the issue of ability to pay. Should the forty-eight (48) hours fall on a weekend or holiday, the hearing shall be scheduled on the next available court date. If, after the hearing, it is determined there is no ability to pay, then that person shall immediately be released from detention. This section shall not deter or preclude any available alternatives to payment of the fines or costs.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 9; P.L. 2006, ch. 374, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 443, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 367, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 374, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 443, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-25-16. Juvenile escapees.

  1. Any person sixteen (16) years or older who shall escape from the Rhode Island training school for youth after having been placed in the institution by the order of a family court judge, or who shall escape from the adult correctional institutions after having been placed in the institution by an order of a family court judge, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding two (2) years and/or a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  2. In any case provided by subsection (a) of this section, the family court shall hold a hearing to determine whether or not the family court’s jurisdiction over the child shall be waived and may, if it so finds, order the child held for trial under the regular procedure of the district and/or superior courts.
  3. If the family court elects to keep jurisdiction over the child, the court shall follow its regular procedure.
  4. In the adjudication of any case under this section, the fact that the person has been found delinquent for the offense of escaping from the Rhode Island training school for youth on one or more occasions shall be prima facie evidence that the person cannot be rehabilitated under chapter 10 of title 8. The superintendent of the Rhode Island training school shall notify the department of attorney general, the Rhode Island state police, and the Cranston Police Department of any escape, or attempted escape from the Rhode Island training school.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 9; P.L. 1994, ch. 107, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 183, § 1.

Collateral References.

Conviction for escape where prisoner fails to leave confines of prison or institution. 79 A.L.R.4th 1060.

Validity, construction, and application of juvenile escape statutes. 46 A.L.R.5th 523.

11-25-16.1. Escape after certification.

  1. Any person who violates the provisions of § 11-25-16 after having been certified and adjudicated by the family court pursuant to § 14-1-7.2 may, after a hearing by a justice of the family court to determine that probable cause exists to believe that the child has escaped from the institution, have the jurisdiction over his or her sentence transferred to the department of corrections to be served in facilities under the control of the department.
  2. A finding pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall constitute presumptive evidence of the nonamenability of the person of further treatment in facilities available to the family court. The court shall transfer the jurisdiction over his or her sentence to the department of corrections to be served in facilities under the control of that department, unless the presumption is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence which demonstrates that the person is amenable to treatment in facilities available to the family court.
  3. A finding pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall constitute presumptive evidence of the nonamenability of the person to further treatment in facilities available to the family court and the court shall waive jurisdiction over the offense and all subsequent offenses. The child shall be prosecuted for those offenses by the court which would have jurisdiction if committed by an adult, unless the presumption is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence which demonstrates that the person is amenable to treatment in the facilities available to the family court.
  4. A waiver of jurisdiction over a child pursuant to subsection (c) of this section shall constitute a waiver of jurisdiction over the child for that offense, as well as for all subsequent offenses of whatever nature. The child shall be referred to the court which would have had jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by an adult.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 15, § 4; P.L. 1990, ch. 18, § 4.

11-25-17. Receipt, safekeeping and record of prisoners.

The director of corrections shall receive into his or her custody and safely keep in the institutions every person who shall be committed to the adult correctional institutions until the prisoner shall be legally discharged. The liability of the committing officer shall cease and the liabilities of the director of corrections shall commence immediately upon the entering and signing of the commitment by the committing officer in the book of those institutions kept for that purpose. The director shall cause to be maintained a record in which shall be entered the reception, discharge, death, pardon or escape of every prisoner, all disciplinary action for breach of institution regulations, and all medical care received.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 9.

Collateral References.

Mandamus, under 28 USCS § 1361, to obtain change in prison condition or release of federal prisoner. 114 A.L.R. Fed. 225.

11-25-18. Receipt of gifts by employees of department of corrections.

No employee of the department of corrections shall receive from any prisoner confined in the adult correctional institutions, nor from anyone on behalf of such a prisoner, any reward or gift, or promise of any reward or gift, either for services or supplies or as a gratuity. Any employee in violation of this provision shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) days and shall, upon final conviction, be immediately dismissed from employment.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 9.

11-25-19. Record of visitors.

A record of every visitor to any institution within the department of corrections including, but not limited to, the adult correction institutions, women’s division, adult correctional institutions, and training school for youth, shall be maintained and each visitor shall identify himself or herself and shall sign his or her proper legal name. Any person who shall give false information for that record shall be punished, upon conviction, by imprisonment for not more than three (3) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 9.

11-25-20. Habeas corpus for production of prisoner.

Whenever a writ of habeas corpus shall issue from either the supreme or superior court for the production and appearance before it of a prisoner confined in the adult correctional institutions, the writ shall be delivered to the division of sheriffs. Whenever the writ is issued from any other court, it shall be delivered to the division of sheriffs or to any town sergeant or chief of police or police constable, who shall duly present it to the director of corrections of the institutions. The director of corrections shall upon receipt of the writ deliver the prisoner to the custody of the officer. The officer shall take and receive the prisoner into his or her custody, shall duly present the prisoner before the court pursuant to the command of the writ, and shall keep and hold the prisoner until by order of the court he or she shall be recommitted to the institutions or otherwise disposed of. Upon the delivery of the custody of the prisoner by the director of corrections to the officer, the director of corrections shall endorse the delivery upon the writ, and the officer shall receipt on the books of the institutions for custody. The officer, upon the production of the prisoner in court, shall further endorse that fact on the writ and deliver it to the clerk or (if there is no clerk) the presiding justice; but shall, as an officer of the court, maintain safe custody of the prisoner until he or she is, by further order, recommitted or discharged.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 9; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 34.

11-25-21. Habeas corpus — Training school for youth.

Whenever a writ of habeas corpus shall issue from either the supreme, superior or family court for the production and appearance before it of a prisoner confined in the training school for youth, the writ shall be delivered to the division of sheriffs. Whenever the writ is issued from any other court, it shall be delivered to the division of sheriffs or to any town sergeant or chief of police or police constable who shall duly present it to the superintendent of the training school for youth. The superintendent shall upon receipt of the writ deliver the prisoner to the custody of the officer. The officer shall take and receive the prisoner into his or her custody, shall duly present him or her before the court pursuant to the commands of the writ, and shall keep and hold the prisoner until by order of the court the prisoner shall be recommitted to the institution or otherwise disposed of. Upon the delivery of the custody of the prisoner by the superintendent to the officer, the superintendent shall endorse the delivery upon the writ, and the officer shall receipt on the books of the training school for youth for the custody. The officer, upon the production of the prisoner in court, shall further endorse that fact on the writ and deliver it to the clerk or (if there is no clerk) the presiding justice; but shall, as an officer of the court, maintain safe custody of the prisoner until he or she is, by further order, recommitted or discharged.

History of Section. P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 9; P.L. 1977, ch. 69, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 34.

11-25-22. Escape from custody.

Any person who shall attempt to escape, or who shall escape, from any lawful custody where a penalty is not otherwise provided by law, shall, upon conviction, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 116, § 1.

Cross References.

Escape from training school for youth, § 11-25-16 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section is not constitutionally infirm since the phrase “escape from lawful custody” is unambiguous, its meaning is obvious to, and commonly understood by, persons of ordinary intelligence. In re Steven, 510 A.2d 955, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 490 (1986).

Applicability.

All escapees, whether juveniles or adults, fall within the purview of this section, subject only to the proviso that the conduct complained of cannot be punishable under any other statute. In re Steven, 510 A.2d 955, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 490 (1986).

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of juvenile escape statutes. 46 A.L.R.5th 523.

What constitutes “custody” under 18 USCS § 751(a) defining offense of escape from custody. 114 A.L.R. Fed. 581.

11-25-23. Allowing prisoners to have controlled substances.

  1. Every person who shall voluntarily permit any prisoner to unlawfully have access to any controlled substances as defined in § 21-28-1.02 shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “prisoner” includes all persons committed to the adult correctional institutions, in the custody of the warden, in the custody of any other officer while outside the confines of the custodial unit, in the custody of the state director of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals pursuant to § 40.1-5.3-1 , or the Rhode Island training school for youth, regardless of whether that prisoner is held upon conviction or upon any criminal charge.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 393, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of state statute criminalizing possession of contraband by individual in penal or correctional institution. 45 A.L.R.5th 767.

11-25-24. Correctional employees — Sexual relations with inmates — Felony.

Every employee of the department of corrections or the employee of a contractor who is under contract to provide services in a correctional institution who engages in sexual penetration as defined in § 11-37-1 with an inmate confined in a correction institution or who is otherwise under the direct custodial supervision and control of that employee shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 119, § 1.

Chapter 26 Kidnapping

11-26-1. Kidnapping.

  1. Whoever, without lawful authority, forcibly or secretly confines or imprisons another person within this state against his or her will, or forcibly carries or sends another person out of this state, or forcibly seizes or confines or inveigles or kidnaps another person with intent either to cause him or her to be secretly confined or imprisoned within this state against his or her will or to cause him or her to be sent out of this state against his or her will, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years.
  2. Where the provisions of The Domestic Violence Prevention Act, chapter 29 of title 12, are applicable, the penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties as provided in § 12-29-5 .

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 21; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 21; P.L. 1909, ch. 455, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 21; P.L. 1932, ch. 1866, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 11-26-1 ; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 10.

Cross References.

Investigation and proceedings against racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations, § 7-15-1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Kidnapping:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-91 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 265, § 26.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Confinement or Asportation During Commission of Crime.

Confinements that are incidental to the commission of a crime are not punishable as kidnapping. State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1238 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1980, 72 L. Ed. 2d 447, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 1754 (1982).

Conduct that was traditionally considered to be an integral element of another crime cannot be punished as kidnapping. State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1238 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1980, 72 L. Ed. 2d 447, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 1754 (1982).

Any movement of a victim during the course of a crime cannot be punished as a kidnapping unless such movement exceeds that necessary to facilitate the crime at hand. State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1238 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1980, 72 L. Ed. 2d 447, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 1754 (1982).

In order to come within the scope of this section, a confinement or imprisonment must have some independent significance. State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1238 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1980, 72 L. Ed. 2d 447, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 1754 (1982).

Confinement and asportation of a cab driver had no significance independent of the robbery and murder committed by the defendant, therefore, the trial justice erred by failing to grant a motion for acquittal as it related to defendant’s kidnapping count. State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1238 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1980, 72 L. Ed. 2d 447, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 1754 (1982).

The decision in State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646 (R.I. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 942, 102 S. Ct. 1980, 72 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1982), holding that in order to come within the reach of this section, any confinement or imprisonment must have some independent significance, and thus any movement of a victim during the course of a crime cannot be punished as kidnapping unless such movement exceeds that necessary to facilitate the crime at hand, shall apply prospectively to those cases tried 30 or more days after July 29, 1981, the date on which Innis was published. State v. Lambert, 463 A.2d 1333, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1046 (1983).

To fall within the kidnapping statute, the confinement or imprisonment must have some independent significance from other crimes committed, and cannot be merely that confinement necessary for the commission of other crimes. A confinement that is incidental to the commission of a crime is not punishable under this section. State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 143 (1989).

The confinement and asportation of the victim has legal significance separate and apart from sexual assaults, where, for approximately four hours and at several locations, the defendant raped the victim repeatedly, and kept his leg hooked about the victim’s leg to prevent her escape from her car. State v. Barnes, 559 A.2d 136, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1989).

The independent-significance requirement promulgated in State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646 (R.I. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 942, 102 S. Ct. 2005, 72 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1982), is a judicially created rule designed to protect defendants against enhancement of offenses by the additional charge of kidnapping when the detention or asportation of the person is merely incidental to the commission of another crime. The implementation of this judicially treated rule is best entrusted to the trial justice and is therefore a question of law as opposed to a jury question. State v. Warner, 626 A.2d 205, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 163 (1993).

The kidnapping of a minor statute, unlike the kidnapping statute, does not require that the act of confinement have “independent significance” from the act of child-molestation sexual assault and, in fact, expressly prohibits the confinement or seizure of a child under sixteen years of age “with the intent of sexually assaulting or molesting the child.” State v. Suero, 721 A.2d 426, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 306 (1998).

Evidence that the first victim was forced into a car, thrown against the vehicle’s backseat floor, and traveled in at least three cities before being taken to wooded area, pulled out of the car, and dragged into dark woods, far exceeding what was necessary to commit a sexual assault, provided “independent significance” sufficient to support a kidnapping conviction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-26-1 . State v. Pablo, 925 A.2d 894, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 72 (2007).

Evidence supported a kidnapping charge; confining the victims to a small closet after they had been physically assaulted and sprayed with Mace and then leaving them there after the robberies were completed exposed the victims to a greater harm than the robberies initially posed. The confinement clearly exceeded that necessary for the commission of the robberies, could not be classified as having been merely incidental to the robberies, and made it significantly more difficult for the victims to escape, thereby concealing defendant’s criminal activity for a time. State v. Diefenderfer, 970 A.2d 12, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 55 (2009).

Historical Background.

For a discussion of the common law and legislative history of the law relating to kidnapping, see State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1238 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1980, 72 L. Ed. 2d 447, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 1754 (1982).

“Inveiglement” Defined.

“Inveiglement” means to persuade a person to do something bad or hurtful by deceptive acts or by flattery, to seduce, to lead astray by false representations or other deceitful means. There need be no physical force, but mental control such as an instillation of fear is sufficient to satisfy the element of inveiglement. State v. Collins, 543 A.2d 641, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1988), overruled, State v. Rios, 702 A.2d 889, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 295 (1997).

Lack of Consent.

The requirement of lack of consent by the victim was satisfied by defendant’s deceit or misrepresentation in enticing the victim to accompany him. State v. Collins, 543 A.2d 641, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1988), overruled, State v. Rios, 702 A.2d 889, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 295 (1997).

Multiple Offenses.

The state, by proving the elements of the crime of kidnapping, does not automatically prove the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon used in the kidnapping; therefore, the offenses do not merge under the double-jeopardy clause. State v. Ballard, 439 A.2d 1375, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 796 (1982).

“Secretly Confined” Defined.

The defendant “secretly confined” the victim, by concealing him from lawful authorities interested in enforcing the laws of their respective states, where the victim was held in circumstances making it highly likely that neither the police nor his parents would ever find him. State v. Collins, 543 A.2d 641, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1988), overruled, State v. Rios, 702 A.2d 889, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 295 (1997).

Collateral References.

Belief in legality of act as affecting offense of abduction or kidnapping. 114 A.L.R. 870.

False imprisonment as included offense with charge of kidnapping. 68 A.L.R.3d 828.

Forcing another to transport one as constituting offense of kidnapping or of abduction. 62 A.L.R. 200.

Kidnapping by fraud or false pretenses. 95 A.L.R.2d 450.

Kidnapping or related offense by taking or removing of child by or under authority of parent or one in loco parentis. 20 A.L.R.4th 823.

Necessity and sufficiency of showing, in kidnapping prosecution, that detention was with intent to “secretly” confine victim. 98 A.L.R.3d 733.

Presumption of coercion of wife. 4 A.L.R. 279; 71 A.L.R. 1123.

Seizure of prison official by inmates as kidnapping. 59 A.L.R.3d 1306.

Seizure or detention for purpose of committing rape, robbery or similar offense as constituting separate crime of kidnapping. 17 A.L.R.2d 1003; 43 A.L.R.3d 699.

Validity, construction, and application of “hold to service” provision of kidnapping statute. 28 A.L.R.5th 754.

11-26-1.1. Childsnatching.

  1. Any person who intentionally removes, causes the removal of, or detains any child under the age of eighteen (18) years, whether within or without the state of Rhode Island, with intent to deny another person’s right of custody under an existing decree or order of the family court, shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not more than two (2) years, or a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.
  2. It shall be an affirmative defense that:
    1. The person at the time of the alleged violation had lawful custody of the child pursuant to a court order granting legal custody or visitation rights;
    2. The person had physical custody of the child pursuant to a court order granting legal custody or visitation rights and failed to return the child as a result of circumstances beyond his or her control, and the person notified and disclosed to the other parent or legal custodian the specific whereabouts of the child and a means by which the child could be contacted or made a reasonable attempt to notify the other parent or lawful custodian of the child of the circumstances and made that disclosure within twenty-four (24) hours after the visitation period had expired and returned the child as soon as possible; or
    3. The person was fleeing an incidence or pattern of domestic violence.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 217, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 251, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 349, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 10; P.L. 1989, ch. 542, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisidiction.

The defendant’s criminal act of child snatching in violation of a valid Rhode Island family court order was within the superior court’s subject-matter jurisdiction even though the criminal acts occurred outside Rhode Island. This section criminalizes the act of child snatching if the act violates a Rhode Island family court order, whether it occurs within or without the state. State v. Kane, 625 A.2d 1361, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 156 (1993).

Collateral References.

Parties’ misconduct as ground for declining jurisdiction under § 8 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). 16 A.L.R.5th 650.

11-26-1.2. Abduction of child prior to court order.

  1. Any parent, or any person acting pursuant to directions from the parent, who shall, after being served with process in an action affecting the family, but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody of a minor child, take or entice a child away from the family unit, whether within or without the state of Rhode Island, for the purpose of depriving the other parent of physical custody of the child for a period greater than fifteen (15) days, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term up to two (2) years, or a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.
  2. No person shall be deemed to have violated this section if the action:
    1. Is taken to protect the child from imminent physical harm;
    2. Is taken by a parent fleeing from imminent physical harm to himself or herself;
    3. Is consented to by both parents; or
    4. Is otherwise authorized by law.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 251, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 349, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 542, § 6.

Collateral References.

Parties’ misconduct as ground for declining jurisdiction under § 8 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). 16 A.L.R.5th 650.

11-26-1.3. Missing child — Duty to investigate.

Whenever a parent notifies a local or state police department that his or her minor child and the child’s other parent have been missing for at least one week and that their whereabouts are unknown, the police department shall immediately conduct an investigation to ascertain the location of the missing parent and child. However, there shall not be a duty to investigate when the notification is provided by a noncustodial parent denied visitation pursuant to an order of the family court and the parent in possession of the child has custody of the child pursuant to an order of the family court.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 251, § 2.

11-26-1.4. Kidnapping of a minor.

Whoever, without lawful authority, forcibly or secretly confines or imprisons any child under the age of sixteen (16) years within this state against the child’s will, or forcibly carries or sends the child out of this state, or forcibly seizes, confines, inveigles, or kidnaps the child with intent either to cause the child to be secretly confined or imprisoned within this state against his or her will, or with the intent of sexually assaulting or molesting the child as defined in chapter 37 of this title, or with the intent to abuse the child as defined in chapter 9 of this title, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for life or for any term not less than twenty (20) years. However, nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to make the reasonable lawful acts of a parent in caring for his or her child a violation of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 192, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 451, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

“Independent Significance.”

The kidnapping of a minor statute, unlike the kidnapping statute, does not require that the act of confinement have “independent significance” from the act of child-molestation sexual assault and, in fact, expressly prohibits the confinement or seizure of a child under sixteen years of age “with the intent of sexually assaulting or molesting the child.” State v. Suero, 721 A.2d 426, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 306 (1998).

11-26-1.5. Enticement of children.

  1. A person shall be guilty of a felony if that person attempts to persuade, or persuades a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years, whether by words or actions or both, with intent to engage in felonious conduct against that child to either:
    1. Leave the child’s home or school;
    2. Enter a vehicle or building; or
    3. Enter an area, with the intent that the child shall be concealed from public view; while the person is acting without the authority of: (i) the custodial parent of the child, (ii) the state of Rhode Island or a political subdivision of the state, or (iii) one having legal custody of the minor child. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent the lawful detention of a minor child or the rendering of aid or assistance to a minor child.
  2. Every person convicted of a violation of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both fine and imprisonment.
  3. Every person convicted of, or placed on probation for a violation of this section, may be ordered to attend appropriate professional counseling to address his or her behavior.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 122, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 135, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 203, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections and subdivisions.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 135, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 203, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Motion for New Trial.

After defendant’s conviction of child enticement, the trial judge properly denied his motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence—the victim’s mental health records—as there was no indication that the records would have been admissible, that they would have been anything other than cumulative or impeaching, or that they would have changed the outcome of the trial. State v. Price, 66 A.3d 406, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 66 (2013).

11-26-2. Kidnapping with intent to extort.

Whoever commits any of the offenses mentioned in this chapter with intent to extort money or other valuable thing shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for life or for any term not less than five (5) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 21; P.L. 1932, ch. 1866, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 11-26-2 .

11-26-3. Venue of prosecutions.

Any violation of the provisions of this chapter may be alleged to have been committed, and the offender may be prosecuted and punished, in any county from, through, or into which he or she has transported or carried or caused to be transported or carried another, or in which the person so transported may be found or in which the offender may be found.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 21; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 21; P.L. 1932, ch. 1866, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 11-26-3 .

Rules of Court.

Place of prosecution and trial, Super. Ct. Crim. P. Rule 18.

Chapter 27 Law Practice

11-27-1. “Hold himself or herself out” and “person” defined.

  1. “Hold himself or herself out” as used in this chapter includes the following: the assumption, use, or advertisement of the title of lawyer, attorney, attorney at law, counselor, counselor at law, solicitor, or any term or terms conveying the idea that the person in connection with whose name they or any of them are used is competent, qualified, authorized, or entitled to practice law, or the use of any kind of sign, token, symbol, card, letterhead, envelope, stationery, circular, or other writing, printing, or painting, or any representation by word or act, the purpose or tendency of which is to convey that idea.
  2. “Person” when used in the phrase “another person” in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, includes partnerships, corporations, and associations.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 44; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 42; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-1 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Cross References.

Admission of Attorneys and Others to Practice Law, Supreme Court Rules, Article II.

Power of supreme court over admission of attorneys, § 8-1-2 .

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This chapter is not violative of due process clause of U.S. Const., amend. 14, § 1, but is valid exercise of police power. Creditors' Serv. Corp. v. Cummings, 57 R.I. 291 , 190 A. 2, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1937).

This chapter is not an impairment of the obligation of contracts in violation of R.I. Const., art. 1, § 12 , but is a valid exercise of the police power which can affect contracts of individuals. Creditors' Serv. Corp. v. Cummings, 57 R.I. 291 , 190 A. 2, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1937).

Judicial Power.

The only way to acquire the right to practice law in this state is through the procedure prescribed by the supreme court. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122 , 179 A. 139, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1935).

This chapter is in aid of rather than derogation of the power of the supreme court. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122 , 179 A. 139, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1935).

That an act is not made punishable by this chapter does not prevent the court from finding such act to be unauthorized practice of law and prohibiting such act by its own power. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122 , 179 A. 139, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1935).

Collateral References.

Matters Constituting Unauthorized Practice of Law in Bankruptcy Proceedings. 32 A.L.R.6th 531.

11-27-2. “Practice of law” defined.

“Practice law” as used in this chapter means the doing of any act for another person usually done by attorneys at law in the course of their profession, and, without limiting the generality of the definitions in this section, includes the following:

  1. The appearance or acting as the attorney, solicitor, or representative of another person before any court, referee, master, auditor, division, department, commission, board, judicial person, or body authorized or constituted by law to determine any question of law or fact or to exercise any judicial power, or the preparation of pleadings or other legal papers incident to any action or other proceeding of any kind before or to be brought before the court or other body;
  2. The giving or tendering to another person for a consideration, direct or indirect, of any advice or counsel pertaining to a law question or a court action or judicial proceeding brought or to be brought;
  3. The undertaking or acting as a representative or on behalf of another person to commence, settle, compromise, adjust, or dispose of any civil or criminal case or cause of action;
  4. The preparation or drafting for another person of a will, codicil, corporation organization, amendment, or qualification papers, or any instrument which requires legal knowledge and capacity and is usually prepared by attorneys at law.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 45; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 43; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-2 .

Law Reviews.

For article, “Protecting the Public Without Protectionism: Access, Competence and Pro Hac Vice Admission to the Practice of Law,” see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 285 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section, by defining all debt collection activities as the practice of law and limiting those activities to members of the Rhode Island bar, places an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce because it bars out-of-staters from offering a commercial service within its borders and confers the right to provide that service and to reap the associated economic benefit upon a class largely composed of Rhode Island citizens. National Revenue Corp. v. Violet, 807 F.2d 285, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 34811 (1st Cir. 1986).

Arbitration.

Nonlawyer public labor union employee representing a union in a grievance arbitration was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-27-2 , when a collective-bargaining agreement was the governing document dictating arbitration as the mechanism for conflict resolution. In re Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d 85, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 16 (2012).

Claim Adjustment.

Soliciting claims for fire losses and representing claimants in negotiations for settlements with insurance companies for a percentage fee amounted to practice of law as contemplated in this section, and such activities could be enjoined. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Lesser, 68 R.I. 14 , 26 A.2d 6, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1942).

Effect of Unauthorized Practice.

An appeal filed through the business agent of the union was substantial compliance with the requirements of the Workers’ Compensation Act although insofar as the agent was personally concerned his action was contrary to the provisions of this chapter. Lorraine Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 73 R.I. 313 , 55 A.2d 861, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 90 (1947).

Judicial Power.

The supreme court may regulate the practice of law outside the courtroom and not directly connected therewith. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122 , 179 A. 139, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1935).

Collateral References.

Ambulance chaser, acting as, as practice of law. 151 A.L.R. 796.

Authority of attorney to compromise action — modern cases. 90 A.L.R.4th 326.

Business of debt adjusting as practice of law. 95 A.L.R.2d 1355.

Drafting of will or other estate-planning activities as illegal practice of law. 22 A.L.R.3d 1112; 71 A.L.R.3d 1000.

Drafting of will or other estate-planning activities as illegal or unauthorized practice of law. 25 A.L.R.6th 323.

Drafting, or filling in blanks in printed forms, of instruments relating to land by real-estate agents, brokers, or managers as constituting practice of law. 53 A.L.R.2d 788.

Handling, preparing, presenting, or trying workers’ compensation claims or cases as practice of law. 58 A.L.R.5th 449.

Liability in tort for interference with attorney-client relationship. 90 A.L.R.4th 621.

Measure and elements of damages recoverable for attorney’s negligence in preparing or conducting litigation—twentieth century cases. 90 A.L.R.4th 1033.

Operations of collection agency as unauthorized practice of law. 27 A.L.R.3d 1152.

Propriety and effect of corporation’s appearance pro se, through agent who is not attorney. 8 A.L.R.5th 653.

Representation of another before state public utilities or service commission as involving practice of law. 13 A.L.R.3d 812.

Tax matters, services in connection with, as practice of law. 9 A.L.R.2d 797.

Title examination activities by lending institution, insurance company, or title and abstract company, as illegal practice of law. 85 A.L.R.2d 184.

Title or probate matters, services in, as practice of law. 111 A.L.R. 31; 125 A.L.R. 1173; 151 A.L.R. 781.

Trust company’s acts as fiduciary as practice of law. 69 A.L.R.2d 404.

What activities of stock or security broker constitute unauthorized practice of law. 34 A.L.R.3d 1305.

What amounts to practice of law. 151 A.L.R. 781.

11-27-3. Receipt of fees as practice of law.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b), any person, partnership, corporation, or association that receives any fee or any part of a fee for the services performed by an attorney at law shall be deemed to be practicing law contrary to the provisions of this chapter.
  2. A lawyer or law firm may agree to share a statutory or tribunal-approved fee award, or a settlement in a matter eligible for such an award, with an organization that referred the matter to the lawyer or law firm if: (i) the organization is one that is not for profit; (ii) the organization is tax-exempt under federal law; (iii) the fee award or settlement is made in connection with a proceeding to advance one or more of the purposes by virtue of which the organization is tax-exempt; and (iv) the client consents in a written representation that a division of fees will be made.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 46; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 44; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-3 ; P.L. 2006, ch. 578, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

This section does not come into play until such time as an assignee actually receives a portion of the attorney’s fee. Pearlman v. Rowell, 121 R.I. 466 , 401 A.2d 19, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1806 (1979).

The proposed amendments to R.I. Sup. Ct. art. V, R. 5.4(a) and 7.2(c) allowing attorneys to share their fees with nonprofit entities would violate public policy and condone criminal conduct. In re Rule Amendments to Rules 5.4 & 7.2(c) of the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, 815 A.2d 47, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 260 (R.I. 2002).

Appearance Before Agency or Commission.

Since § 11-27-13 does not extend to § 11-27-3 an out-of-state attorney who receives any fee for his services pertaining to any action before a state agency, board or commission would be subject to possible criminal prosecution. In re Ferrey, 774 A.2d 62, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 175 (2001).

Federal Preemption.

Allowing the State of Rhode Island, in reliance on R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-27-3 , to withhold attorneys’ fees due the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) would have frustrated the articulated purposes of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, which included, inter alia, attracting competent counsel to pursue civil rights litigation on behalf of indigent people. Consequently, to the extent that R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-27-3 and 11-27-6 operated to prevent the ACLU from collecting the attorneys’ fees in dispute, they were inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and were preempted as a matter of federal law; however, the disciplinary rules, R.I. Sup. Ct. art. V, R. 5.4(a) and 7.2(c) posed a less formidable obstacle since they did not impede the payment of legal fees to non-profit organizations such as the ACLU. Inmates of the R.I. Training Sch. v. Martinez, 465 F. Supp. 2d 131, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88213 (D.R.I. 2006).

11-27-4. Forwarding of claim not deemed practice of law.

The sending of a claim of a nonresident by a nonresident collection agency to an attorney at law in this state, who is to act solely as agent of the creditor and who is not to be subject to the direction or control of the collection agency, and who does not divide with the collection agency either his or her commission or fee for legal services, shall not be deemed to be practicing law.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 46; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 44; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-4 .

11-27-5. Practice restricted to members of bar.

No person, except a duly admitted member of the bar of this state, whose authority as a member to practice law is in full force and effect, shall practice law in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1917, ch. 1494, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 45; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 43; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Presumptions.

Fact that collection agency could not act as attorney tended to show that attorney employed was agent of the claimant, rather than of the collection agency. Wanelik v. Franklin Auto Supply Co., 64 R.I. 76 , 10 A.2d 349, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1940).

Professional Corporations.

The violation of this section in the organization of attorneys to practice law in corporate form is precluded by § 7-5.1-3 of the Professional Service Corporation Act. In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 106 R.I. 752 , 263 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 985 (1970).

Title Insurers.

Title insurer and agents did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law by conducting real estate closings because no harm was shown, and this century-old statutorily authorized practice did not subvert the authority of the Rhode Island Supreme Court to determine what is, and is not, the practice of law. In re Paplauskas, 228 A.3d 43, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2020).

To avoid engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, a non-attorney closing agent must: (1) communicate to the buyer and the seller that the closing agent is not an attorney, does not represent the buyer or the seller, cannot and will not give legal advice, and, if the buyer or seller has a legal question, the buyer or seller should suspend the closing and seek counsel from an attorney; (2) present a written notice to the buyer and seller containing these warnings, which shall be the first document presented and signed, and require the buyer and the seller to read the document, (3) require the buyer and seller to sign a copy of the notice; (4) sign the notice; and (5) retain a signed copy of the notice. In re Paplauskas, 228 A.3d 43, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2020).

Title insurer’s drafting of a durable power of attorney for the limited purpose of a real estate closing does not constitute unauthorized practice of law if the durable power of attorney is strictly limited. If the durable power of attorney goes further than that limited authority, then, in such context, the drafter is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. In re Paplauskas, 228 A.3d 43, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2020).

Notwithstanding § 11-27-16 and § 27-2.6-1 et seq., a title insurer and agents engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by drafting a deed in a real estate transaction because this document was central to the transaction, as it stated the title transferred and defined the tenancy and property interest conveyed. In re Paplauskas, 228 A.3d 43, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2020).

Title insurer and agents engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by conducting a title examination because an attorney was best able to determine the marketability of title. In re Paplauskas, 228 A.3d 43, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2020).

Title insurer and agents did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law by drafting a residency affidavit in a real estate transaction because this document was merely a standardized form into which non-technical information was entered. In re Paplauskas, 228 A.3d 43, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2020).

Collateral References.

Activities of law clerks as illegal practice of law. 13 A.L.R.3d 1137.

Criminal defendant’s representation by person not licensed to practice law as violation of right to counsel. 19 A.L.R.5th 351.

Malicious prosecution, lack of license to practice as affecting rule regarding advice of counsel in action for. 81 A.L.R. 516.

Removal of member of bar from state, effect of. 160 A.L.R. 1372.

11-27-6. Compensation of unqualified persons for legal services prohibited.

No person, who is not a member of the bar under § 11-27-5 , shall receive any pay or compensation, directly or indirectly, except any forwarding fee of an attorney at law of another state, for any services of any legal nature that are usually done by attorneys at law pertaining to any action or proceeding in any court or before any referee, master, auditor, commission, division, department, board, or other judicial person or body, or for the preparation of any legal instrument, and no court or other judicial person or body shall allow any pay or fee for that service to any person not a member of the bar under § 11-27-5 , nor shall any executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, fiduciary, or another person employ or pay for the services any person not a member of the bar under § 11-27-5.

This section shall not be deemed to apply to an organization, or its representatives, meeting the criteria contained in subsection 11-27-3(b) .

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 45; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 43; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-6 ; P.L. 2006, ch. 578, § 1.

Law Reviews.

For article, “Protecting the Public Without Protectionism: Access, Competence and Pro Hac Vice Admission to the Practice of Law,” see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 285 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Federal Preemption.

Allowing the State of Rhode Island, in reliance on R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-27-3 , to withhold attorneys’ fees due the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) would have frustrated the articulated purposes of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, which included, inter alia, attracting competent counsel to pursue civil rights litigation on behalf of indigent people. Consequently, to the extent that R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-27-3 and 11-27-6 operated to prevent the ACLU from collecting the attorneys’ fees in dispute, they were inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and were preempted as a matter of federal law; however, the disciplinary rules, R.I. Sup. Ct. art. V, R. 5.4(a) and 7.2(c) posed a less formidable obstacle since they did not impede the payment of legal fees to non-profit organizations such as the ACLU. Inmates of the R.I. Training Sch. v. Martinez, 465 F. Supp. 2d 131, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88213 (D.R.I. 2006).

Collateral References.

Failure to procure license or permit as affecting validity or enforceability of contract. 118 A.L.R. 652.

Liability of attorney for services rendered to him by one not admitted to the bar as affected by fact that they amounted to practice of law by latter. 90 A.L.R. 288.

Right of one not admitted to practice, or unlicensed, to recover compensation for legal services. 4 A.L.R. 1087; 118 A.L.R. 646.

11-27-7. Filling out and signing of process and communications — Business association with laymen.

No attorney at law shall sell any writ of judicial process to any person, except to a member of the bar under § 11-27-5 , nor shall he or she deliver any writ or judicial process to another person, and authorize him, her, or it to fill out and issue the writ or judicial process with his or her name on it as the attorney at law, except that the attorney may so authorize any clerk employed by him or her or registered student in his or her office, acting under his or her direction, or any person who is a member of the bar under § 11-27-5 , and no person, who is not a member of the bar under § 11-27-5, or not a clerk or student so acting, shall fill out or issue any writ or judicial process for another person, except that nothing in this section shall apply to any justice, or judge or clerk of court, or any notary public or justice of the peace or other official or public boards or commissions acting within his, her, or their authority under the laws of this state. No attorney at law shall authorize any person, except a clerk employed by him or her or a registered student in his or her office acting under his or her direction, or a member of the bar, to use or sign the attorney’s name in writing or print in or to any letter or communication calling for the payment of any bill or account or threatening any suit or legal proceeding. No attorney at law shall, together with any other person who is not a member of the bar under § 11-27-5, have or conduct, or advertise or represent in any manner, that they have or conduct a law office or a law and collection office.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 45; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 43; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-7 .

11-27-8. Solicitation of business by agents prohibited.

No person, partnership, corporation, or association shall act in any manner or in any capacity as an agent for an attorney at law in the solicitation or procurement of any law business, and every contract for professional services secured by an attorney at law through the services of an agent shall be void.

This section shall not be deemed to apply to an organization, or its representatives, meeting the criteria contained in subsection 11-27-3(b) .

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 45; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 43; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-8 ; P.L. 2006, ch. 578, § 1.

11-27-9. Restriction on acts of insurance claim adjusters.

No insurance claim adjuster or claim agent of any insurance company or public utility corporation shall advise any claimant, who has suffered injury or damage to his or her person or property, or his or her parent, guardian, next friend or other personal representative in respect to his or her legal rights or lack of legal rights arising out of any claim for that injury or damage, or advise any of them not to employ an attorney at law relative to that injury, damage or claim, or represent to any of them that if an attorney at law should be employed the claim would not be settled, or convey that idea by any other words, and no insurance claim adjuster, claim agent, or other agent of the corporation or company shall compromise, or attempt to compromise, any claim through or by means of the intervention of any person other than the claimant, a member of his or her family, his or her guardian or other personal representative, or his or her attorney at law; provided, that a violation of this section shall in no way affect civil rights.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 45; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 43; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-9 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 169, § 6.

Cross References.

Licensing and regulation of adjusters, § 27-10-1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Claim adjusters as engaged in practice of law. 111 A.L.R. 44; 125 A.L.R. 1173; 151 A.L.R. 781.

11-27-10. Agreement or offer to furnish legal services.

No person or persons, except members of the bar, either in his, her or their own name or names or under any firm or trade name, shall furnish or agree to furnish legal advice, service or counsel, nor furnish or agree to furnish an attorney at law, nor advertise in any manner that he, she, or they will furnish or agree to furnish legal services or advice or the services of an attorney at law. This prohibition shall not be deemed to apply to an organization, or its representatives, meeting the criteria contained in subsection 11-27-3(b) . Nothing in this section shall be deemed to permit members of the bar to advertise contrary to the ethics of their profession.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 45; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 43; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-10 ; P.L. 2006, ch. 578, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Pecuniary Benefit Unnecessary.

This section does not require proof that the giving of legal advice resulted in pecuniary benefit. State v. Bucci, 430 A.2d 746, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1148 (1981).

Suspended Attorneys.

A suspended attorney’s activities in counseling and advising persons regarding their legal rights constituted the unauthorized practice of law and justified additional suspension, denial of reinstatement, and/or permanent disbarment. Carter v. Bucci, 442 A.2d 865, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1167 (1982).

Collateral References.

Unauthorized practice of law — Real estate closings. 119 A.L.R.5th 191.

11-27-11. Practices permitted to persons not members of bar.

Nothing in §§ 11-27-5 11-27-11 shall be construed to limit or prevent:

  1. Clerks of court and recorders of deeds from the drafting of any legal instruments that may be necessary for the proper conduct and discharge of their respective offices and duties.
  2. Clerks or registered students in law offices from acting under the direction of a member of the bar of this state whose authority as a member to practice law is in full force and effect.
  3. Any person from occasionally collecting or adjusting any unassigned claim of or against any member of his or her household or of or against his or her regular and principal employer.
  4. The performance of any service personally performed by any natural person acting as administrator, executor, guardian, trustee, or other fiduciary in the preparation, rendering, and allowance of inventories, accounts, tax returns, or other services personally performed by him or her in relation to the fiduciary estate without the intervention of another person.
  5. Town clerks from drafting deeds and mortgages and transfers and discharges of deeds and mortgages for recording in their own offices.
  6. Any person from drawing, in the regular course of his or her regular business or employment, any note, bill, draft, bill of sale, conditional bill of sale, or any ordinary business agreement, to which he or she or his or her regular and principal employer is a party.
  7. Any certified public accountant or member of the American Institute of Accountants from appearing or acting as a representative of another person before any federal, state, or municipal department, board, division, department, commission, agency, or any body other than a court, authorized or constituted by law to determine any question of fact, affecting the imposition or adjustment of taxes or regarding any financial or accounting matter, or from preparing for or on behalf of another person any federal, state, or municipal return or report of any nature or description, or advising another person in relation to the preparation of any such return or report.
  8. Any person registered to practice before the Interstate Commerce Commission or member of the Association of Practitioners before the Interstate Commerce Commission from appearing or acting as representative of another person before any federal, state, or municipal department, board, commission, agency, or any body other than a court, authorized or constituted by law to determine any question of fact, affecting the rights of any carrier of persons or property in intrastate or interstate commerce, or from preparing for or on behalf of another person any federal, state, or municipal application, report or other writing of any nature or description, or advising another person in relation to the preparation of the application, report, or other writing.
  9. Any public accountant from advising a taxpayer in connection with the imposition or adjustment of taxes or any person from preparing for or on behalf of a taxpayer any federal, state, or municipal tax return or tax report, provided the person or public accountant regularly audits or examines the accounting records of the taxpayer or any person from preparing for or on behalf of a taxpayer any federal, state, or municipal personal income tax return.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 45; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 43; P.L. 1940, ch. 947, § 1; P.L. 1954, ch. 3319, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-11 ; P.L. 1983, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 416, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 7.

Cross References.

Certified public accountants, § 5-3-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Accountants.

Insurance broker who was also an accountant, but not a certified public accountant, was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law where he prepared tax returns and gave advice thereon. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Libutti, 81 R.I. 182 , 100 A.2d 406, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1953).

Bankruptcy Proceedings.

An appearance by an agent or employee of a corporate creditor at a bankruptcy meeting under 11 U.S.C. § 341 without counsel to inquire of a debtor within the examination scope permitted under § 343 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004, does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law within the meaning of this chapter, and such activity is permitted in this jurisdiction. Messier v. Filene's, 144 B.R. 617, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1471 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992).

Employee Assistants in Informal Worker Compensation Hearings.

Workers’ compensation law provisions allowing employee assistants to assist injured employees in informal hearings before the department are not unconstitutional as violative of the supreme court’s exclusive power to regulate the practice of law. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Department of Workers' Compensation, 543 A.2d 662, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 71 (1988).

Judicial Power.

The supreme court has power to regulate the practice of law outside the courtroom and not directly connected therewith. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122 , 179 A. 139, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1935).

Collateral References.

Activities of law clerks as illegal practice of law. 13 A.L.R.3d 1137.

Drafting of will or other estate-planning activities as illegal or unauthorized practice of law. 25 A.L.R.6th 323.

Handling, preparing, presenting, or trying workers’ compensation claims or cases as practice of law. 58 A.L.R.5th 449.

Operations of collection agency as unauthorized practice of law. 27 A.L.R.3d 1152.

Unauthorized practice of law — Real estate closings. 119 A.L.R.5th 191.

11-27-12. Unauthorized holding out as qualified to practice law.

No person, except a duly admitted member of the bar of this state, whose authority as a member to practice law is in full force and effect, shall assume to be an attorney or counselor at law or hold himself or herself out in any manner to the public or to another person as being competent, qualified, authorized, or entitled to practice law in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1907, ch. 1450, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 44; P.L. 1917, ch. 1494, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, §§ 44, 45; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 42; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-12 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Remedies.

The unauthorized practice of law may constitute a violation of the criminal law and may constitute at the same time a contempt of court which may be forbidden by injunction. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122 , 179 A. 139, 1935 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1935).

Collateral References.

Unauthorized Practice of Law as Contempt. 40 A.L.R.6th 463.

11-27-13. Visiting attorneys.

The provisions of §§ 11-27-1 , 11-27-2 , and 11-27-5 11-27-1 4 shall not apply to visiting attorneys at law, duly authorized to practice law before the courts of record in another state, while temporarily in this state on legal business, or while permitted to conduct or argue any case in this state according to the rules of practice of the supreme court, but no visiting attorney shall issue or indorse, as attorney, any writ of any court of this state.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 44; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 42; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-13 .

11-27-14. Penalties for violations.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this chapter shall, upon a first conviction, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year, or fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or both. Any firm, corporation, or other entity violating any of the provisions of this chapter shall, upon a first conviction, be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500). Every person having been convicted of a subsequent offense involving the unauthorized practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction shall, for each offense, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding five (5) years, or be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both. Every firm, corporation, or other entity having been convicted of a subsequent offense involving the unauthorized practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction shall, for each offense, be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1907, ch. 1450, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 44; P.L. 1917, ch. 1494, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, §§ 44, 45; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, §§ 42, 43; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-14 ; P.L. 1987, ch. 161, § 1.

11-27-15. [Superseded.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (P.L. 1917, ch. 1494, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 46; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 44; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-15 ), prohibiting practice by corporations and associations, is superseded by § 7-5.1-1 et seq.

11-27-16. Practices permitted to corporations and associations.

  1. Nothing in §§ 11-27-2 11-27-11 or §§ 11-27-16 11-27-18 shall be construed to limit or prevent:
    1. Any corporation, or its officers or agents, lawfully engaged in the insuring of titles to real property from conducting its business, and the drawing of deeds, mortgages, and other legal instruments in or in connection with the conduct of the business of the corporation;
    2. Any public utility corporation or insurance company, or its officers or agents, from adjusting claims against the corporation or company or those insured by the company with the restrictions provided in § 11-27-9 , or the company, or its officers or agents, from advertising to furnish or from furnishing any attorney at law to represent those insured by the company as provided in its policies;
    3. Any corporation or association, or its officers or agents, from drawing, in the regular course of its business, any note, bill, draft, bill of sale, conditional bill of sale, or any ordinary business agreement to which it is a party;
    4. Any corporate administrator, executor, guardian, trustee, or other fiduciary, or its officers or agents, from preparing and filing inventories and accounts and income, inheritance, and estate tax returns, and from attending to the allowance of uncontested accounts in relation to the fiduciary estates;
    5. Any nonprofit sharing credit corporation or association, or its officers or agents, licensed under former Chapter 1782 of the Public Laws, 1931, from collecting or adjusting, as incidental to its main purposes, contract claims of its own members. However, if the aid of any court is to be invoked on a claim, it shall be turned back to the creditor member for reference to his or her own attorney at law;
    6. Any nonprofit sharing automobile service corporation or association, or its officers or agents, from furnishing the services of an attorney at law, who resides and practices exclusively in another state or country, to its members who reside in this state;
    7. Any person or corporation, or its officers or clerks, whose principal source of income is his or its commissions or profits from his, her, or its selling or leasing real estate, or both, and who regularly maintains an office for that purpose, from drafting deeds, mortgages, leases, and agreements in connection with sales or leases made or negotiated by him, her, or it; provided, that in every such case the drafter shall so endorse his or her full name and business address upon the face of the instrument that the endorsement will be recorded if the instrument is recorded;
    8. Any automobile club or association from paying or agreeing to pay for the services of an attorney to advise and defend its members, providing the attorney is of the member’s own selection and is not subject to the control of the club or association; or
    9. Any nonprofit credit counseling corporation or association, or its officers or agents, from providing financial and budgetary advice and judgment to individuals in connection with:
      1. The creation of a budgetary plan;
      2. The creation of a plan whereby an individual turns over an agreed amount of his or her income to a nonprofit credit counseling corporation which distributes it to his or her creditors in accordance with a plan which they have approved and which may provide for smaller payments or a longer term than the original contract;
      3. The providing of educational services relating to the use of credit; or
      4. Any combination of paragraphs (i) through (iii) of this subdivision.
  2. No corporation established for the purpose of providing credit counseling shall engage in the practice of law, and an individual receiving credit counseling shall, when necessary, be referred to an attorney of his or her own choice, the local bar association referral service, or a local legal aid program, whichever may seem most appropriate.

History of Section. P.L. 1917, ch. 1494, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 46; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 44; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-16 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 349, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 368, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Subdivision (5) is not in violation of equal protection clause of U.S. Const., amend. 14, § 1, since classification was reasonable and had a relation to the object of the chapter. Creditors' Serv. Corp. v. Cummings, 57 R.I. 291 , 190 A. 2, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1937).

Bankruptcy Proceedings.

An appearance by an agent or employee of a corporate creditor at a bankruptcy meeting under 11 U.S.C. § 341 without counsel to inquire of a debtor within the examination scope permitted under § 343 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004, does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law within the meaning of this chapter, and such activity is permitted in this jurisdiction. Messier v. Filene's, 144 B.R. 617, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1471 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992).

The negotiation and drafting of a reaffirmation agreement falls squarely within the definition of “any other business agreement to which the corporation is a party” in subdivision (3). Messier v. Filene's, 144 B.R. 617, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1471 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992).

Nonprofit Corporations.

The term “nonprofit sharing corporation or association” under subdivision (5) exempts a corporation or voluntary association without capital stock organized for mutual benefit of members and not for profit, which limits membership to persons doing business wholly or partly on credit where its main purpose is maintenance of a credit rating service. Creditors' Serv. Corp. v. Cummings, 57 R.I. 291 , 190 A. 2, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1937).

Practice of Law.

Title insurer and agents did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law by conducting real estate closings because no harm was shown, and this century-old statutorily authorized practice did not subvert the authority of the Rhode Island Supreme Court to determine what is, and is not, the practice of law. In re Paplauskas, 228 A.3d 43, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2020).

To avoid engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, a non-attorney closing agent must: (1) communicate to the buyer and the seller that the closing agent is not an attorney, does not represent the buyer or the seller, cannot and will not give legal advice, and, if the buyer or seller has a legal question, the buyer or seller should suspend the closing and seek counsel from an attorney; (2) present a written notice to the buyer and seller containing these warnings, which shall be the first document presented and signed, and require the buyer and the seller to read the document, (3) require the buyer and seller to sign a copy of the notice; (4) sign the notice; and (5) retain a signed copy of the notice. In re Paplauskas, 228 A.3d 43, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2020).

Notwithstanding § 11-27-16 and § 27-2.6-1 et seq., title insurer and agents engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by drafting a deed in a real estate transaction because this document was central to the transaction, as it stated the title transferred and defined the tenancy and property interest conveyed. In re Paplauskas, 228 A.3d 43, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2020).

Title insurer and agents engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by conducting a title examination because an attorney was best able to determine the marketability of title. In re Paplauskas, 228 A.3d 43, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2020).

Collateral References.

Propriety and effect of corporation’s appearance pro se through agent who is not attorney. 8 A.L.R.5th 653.

11-27-17. Penalty for violations by corporation.

Any corporation violating any of the provisions of §§ 11-27-3 , 11-27-4 , and 11-27-16 11-27-18 shall be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), and every officer, director, trustee, agent, or employee of any corporation or association who, directly or indirectly, engages in any of the acts prohibited in this chapter, or assists a corporation or association to do any prohibited acts, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be subject to the penalty prescribed in § 11-27-14 . The fact that any officer, trustee, director, agent, or employer shall be entitled to practice law in this state shall not be held to permit or allow any corporation or association to do any of the acts prohibited in this chapter, nor shall that fact be a defense upon the trial of any corporation or of any of the persons mentioned in this section for a violation of any of the provisions of §§ 11-27-3 , 11-27-4 , and 11-27-16 11-27-18 .

History of Section. P.L. 1917, ch. 1494, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 46; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 44; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-17 .

11-27-18. Legal Aid Society — Powers of supreme court.

Nothing in §§ 11-27-1 11-27-1 7 shall be deemed to apply to the Legal Aid Society of Rhode Island, or be construed in any way as an attempt to affect or as affecting the right of the supreme court to regulate and discipline members of the bar for breach of their duties.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 46; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 44; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-18 .

11-27-19. Unauthorized practice of law committee — Powers and duties — Duties of attorney general.

  1. There is established an unauthorized practice of law committee to be appointed by the supreme court consisting of any number that shall be determined by the supreme court.
  2. It shall be the duty of the attorney general and the unauthorized practice of law committee to enforce the provisions of this chapter and to investigate and prosecute all violations. It shall be the duty of the attorney general to prosecute all criminal violations. The superior court shall have jurisdiction to restrain and enjoin any of the acts prohibited in this chapter upon a complaint brought by the attorney general, by any member of the bar of this state whose authority as a member to practice law is in full force and effect, or by the unauthorized practice of law committee.
  3. The unauthorized practice of law committee may sue in its own name for the purpose of civil litigation as provided by this section.
  4. The unauthorized practice of law committee shall have the following duties and powers:
    1. To adopt, amend, and rescind any rules and regulations that it deems necessary to carry out the provisions of this section which shall be approved and promulgated by the supreme court;
    2. To investigate all reports of activities that may constitute unauthorized practice of law and to hold hearings to determine whether the charges are substantiated or unsubstantiated;
    3. To appoint legal counsel and any assistants that the committee deems necessary to act for the committee in investigating complaints brought before it;
    4. To make contracts and arrangements for the performance of administrative and similar services required or appropriate in the performance of the committee’s duties;
    5. To issue subpoenas and administer oaths in connection with any investigations, hearings, or other proceedings held under the authority of this chapter;
    6. To take or cause depositions to be taken as needed in any investigation, hearing, or proceeding; and
    7. To summon and examine witnesses during any investigation, hearing, or proceeding conducted by the committee.
  5. There shall be no liability on the part of, and no cause of action of any nature shall arise against, the unauthorized practice of law committee, its agents, or its employees, or its members or against any organization or its members or other witnesses and parties to the committee’s proceedings for any statements made by them in documents, reports, communications, or testimony concerning any investigation of the conduct of any person, firm, corporation, or other entity alleged to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
  6. Subpoenas may be issued by the committee on its own motion to compel the production of documents or other written records or the attendance of witnesses at any investigation or hearing. The committee may issue subpoenas at the request and on behalf of the accused. In the event that any person contumaciously refuses to obey a subpoena or answer any proper question put to that person during a hearing or proceeding, the superior court shall have jurisdiction upon application by the committee to issue that person an order requiring the person to appear before the committee, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony concerning the matter under investigation. The committee shall have the power to request the superior court to punish all intentional disregard of the court orders as contempt.
  7. Within thirty (30) days, if practical, after holding a hearing, the committee shall make a written report of its findings of fact and its recommendation, and the report shall be immediately transmitted to the chief justice of the supreme court with a transcript of the evidence. A copy of the report shall be furnished to the accused.
  8. The administration of the committee shall be funded from annual fees to be determined by the supreme court. These fees shall be charged to and apportioned among the licensed attorneys and counselors of the supreme court of this state, the payment of which shall be a condition to practicing in the state of Rhode Island. Monies shall be received by the supreme court in the same manner as lawyers’ registration fees and credited to a fund known as the unauthorized practice of law committee administration fund. All monies in the fund shall be utilized only for the purpose of maintaining, managing, operating, and administering the unauthorized practice of law committee in carrying out its functions. The committee shall make an annual financial report to the supreme court of Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 1917, ch. 1494, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 47; P.L. 1935, ch. 2190, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 45; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-19 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 420, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 407, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 56, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 64, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 127, § 1, effective July 2, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 128, § 1, effective July 2, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 56, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 64, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 127, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 128, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Rules of Court.

For procedure for injunction, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 65.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This chapter does not violate R.I. Const., art. 3 by usurpation by the legislature of judicial power, since the chapter was passed to aid the judicial power and does not grant any right to practice law. Creditors' Serv. Corp. v. Cummings, 57 R.I. 291 , 190 A. 2, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1937).

Collecting corporation in suit to enjoin enforcement of this chapter could not question constitutionality of chapter under R.I. Const., art. 1, § 10 , since that section is applicable only to the rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions. Creditors' Serv. Corp. v. Cummings, 57 R.I. 291 , 190 A. 2, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1937).

Appearance Before Agency or Commission.

Since § 11-27-13 does not extend to § 11-27-3 , an out-of-state attorney who receives any fee for his services pertaining to any action before a state agency, board or commission would be subject to possible criminal prosecution. In re Ferrey, 774 A.2d 62, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 175 (2001).

Collateral References.

What constitutes “unauthorized practice of law” by out-of-state counsel? 83 A.L.R.5th 497.

11-27-20. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

Section 11-27-20 (G.L., ch. 281, § 37; P.L. 1905, ch. 1221, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 38; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 37; G.L. 1956, § 11-27-20 ), concerning advertising assistance in divorce, annulment, or alimony proceedings, was repealed by P.L. 1991, ch. 144, § 1, effective June 16, 1991.

Chapter 28 Malfeasance and Misfeasance in Office

11-28-1. Failure to pay state funds into treasury.

Every officer or other person receiving or having in his or her hands money belonging to the state that should be paid into the state treasury, shall pay that money to the general treasurer within seven (7) business days after he or she shall receive it or at any other times that may be deemed necessary by the general treasurer. In the case of funds which have been received by the state court system, he or she shall pay at any other times that may be initially approved by the director of finance of the supreme court and then approved by the general treasurer or unless otherwise provided by law. Every person who shall, without just cause, neglect or refuse to pay over that money, shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or be imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1896, ch. 29, § 20; G.L. 1909, ch. 39, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 37, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 11-28-1 ; P.L. 1987, ch. 137, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 418, § 1.

Cross References.

Exacting excessive fees, § 11-42-1 .

Collateral References.

Imprisonment for withholding of state funds by public officer. 40 A.L.R. 82.

11-28-2. Failure of officer to pay over fines, forfeitures, or penalties.

Every officer who shall receive any fines, forfeitures, or penalties shall immediately pay them into the proper office where by law they ought to be paid. Every judicial, executive, or ministerial officer who shall refuse or neglect for three (3) months to pay over any fine, forfeiture, or penalty or any part of which that may have come to his or her hands to the proper officer to whom by law they should be paid or delivered, shall be fined three (3) times the value or amount of the fine, forfeiture, or penalty that was withheld or not paid over.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 22; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 11-28-2 .

Cross References.

Fines, forfeitures and penalties, § 12-21-1 et seq.

11-28-3. Failure of presiding officer or clerk of municipal governing body to perform duties.

The presiding officer of any city council or town council who shall refuse or neglect, when acting as the presiding officer, to put to a vote of the body over which he or she presides any appeal made by a member of the body from any ruling of the presiding officer, or who, when the appeal has been sustained, shall refuse or willfully neglect to put to the body the question which caused the appeal to be made, and any clerk or recording officer of any body who shall refuse or neglect to record in full the proceedings of any body of which he or she may be clerk as described in this section, shall be fined for each neglect or refusal not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), and be disqualified for the term of five (5) years from holding the office of the presiding officer or the office by virtue of which he is the presiding officer.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 19; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 11-28-3 .

11-28-4. Omission or delay of duty by sheriff, sergeant, or constable.

A deputy sheriff, town sergeant, city sergeant or constable, who shall receive from any defendant or any other person any money or other valuable thing as a consideration, reward, or inducement for omitting or delaying to perform any duty pertaining to his or her office, shall be imprisoned not exceeding six (6) months or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 21; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 11-28-4 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 35.

Chapter 29 Mayhem

11-29-1. Penalty for mutilation or disabling.

Every person who shall voluntarily, maliciously or of purpose put out an eye, slit the nose, ear, or lip, or cut off, bite off, or disable any limb or member of another, shall be imprisoned not exceeding twenty (20) years nor less than one year.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-29-1 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 84, § 1.

Cross References.

Additional penalty for carrying arms while committing crime, §§ 11-47-3 , 11-47-20 .

Assaults generally, § 11-5-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Defenses.

Because mayhem is a general intent crime, the defense of intoxication is not available. State v. Glynn, 658 A.2d 6, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 133 (1995).

Mayhem and Assault.

Mayhem and assault resulting in serious bodily injury are not the same crime because proof of different additional facts would be required to establish each of these crimes. State v. Glynn, 658 A.2d 6, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 133 (1995).

Collateral References.

Consent as defense to charge of mayhem. 86 A.L.R.2d 268.

Mayhem as dependent on part of body injured and extent of injury. 16 A.L.R. 955; 58 A.L.R. 1320.

Poison or acid, mayhem by use of. 58 A.L.R. 1328.

Chapter 30 Nuisances

11-30-1. Definitions.

For the purpose of this chapter and chapter 1 of title 10, the terms “nuisance or common nuisance”, “person”, or “place” are defined as follows:

  1. “Nuisance” or “common nuisance” means and includes any place as defined in this section in or upon which lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is conducted, permitted, continued, or exists, and the personal property used in conducting or maintaining any place for that purpose, and all buildings, places, or tenements used as houses of ill fame, for illegal gaming, or where intemperate, idle, dissolute, noisy, or disorderly persons are in the habit of resorting;
  2. “Person” includes any individual, corporation, association, partnership, trustee, lessee, agent, or assignee; and
  3. “Place” includes any building, structure, or tenement, or any separate part or portion of a building or structure, or the ground itself.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 92, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 108, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 1925, ch. 672, § 1; P.L. 1932, ch. 1858, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 598, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-1 .

Cross References.

Abatement of nuisances, § 10-1-1 et seq.

City or town council, abatement of nuisance by, § 23-19.2-7 .

Filth, order for removal, § 23-19.2-4 et seq.

Licensing of pharmacies, § 5-19.1-1 et seq.

Noxious trades, prohibition by cities and towns, § 23-23.5-1 et seq.

Railroad built without charter or license, §§ 39-6-2 , 39-6-3 .

Schools, maintenance of nuisance in proximity to, penalty, §§ 16-38-3 , 16-38-12 .

Tidewaters, unauthorized encroachments, § 46-6-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This statute is not unconstitutional. State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1858).

Character of Defendant.

The character of a defendant is not at issue in a charge of maintaining a house of ill fame, unless he puts his character in issue either by becoming a witness in his own behalf or offering evidence in support of his character. State v. Hull, 18 R.I. 207 , 26 A. 191, 1893 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1893).

Common Law Offense.

That an indictment did not charge an offense at common law was immaterial. State v. Plastridge, 6 R.I. 76 , 1859 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1859).

Description of Building.

Indictment was not bad for uncertainty for failure to describe the building. State v. Tracey, 12 R.I. 216 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1878).

Destruction of Buildings.

Statute does not by defining a nuisance authorize destruction of described buildings. State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1858).

Duplicity in Indictment.

An indictment under this section is properly framed if it charges, in the language of the statute, that the offense has been committed in each of the several modes set forth in the section, and the defendant may be convicted upon proof that the offense was committed in any one of the modes charged. State v. Plastridge, 6 R.I. 76 , 1859 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1859).

Indictment was not bad for duplicity because it alleged use of the building for more than one of the prohibited purposes. State v. Tracey, 12 R.I. 216 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1878); State v. Towler, 13 R.I. 661 , 1882 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1882).

Intemperate and Disorderly Persons.

Merely renting rooms to prostitutes would not be a violation if the rooms were not to be used for illegal purposes. State v. Smith, 15 R.I. 24 , 22 A. 1119, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1885).

The indictment need not allege the names of the persons described as intemperate, idle, etc. State v. Doyle, 15 R.I. 527 , 9 A. 900, 1887 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1887).

Knowledge of Defendant.

Householder who rented rooms that to her knowledge were used for prostitution could be convicted. State v. Smith, 15 R.I. 24 , 22 A. 1119, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1885).

Proof of Purpose.

On an indictment for keeping a place for the illegal sale of liquors and for the resort of intemperate persons, proof of either purpose was sufficient. State v. Plastridge, 6 R.I. 76 , 1859 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1859).

Collateral References.

Disorderly character of house as affected by number of females who reside therein or resort thereto for immoral purposes. 12 A.L.R. 529.

Massage parlor as nuisance. 80 A.L.R.3d 1020.

11-30-2. Unlicensed manufacture or distribution of intoxicating liquor.

  1. All buildings, places, tenements, vehicles, or vessels used for the manufacture for sale, the transportation for sale, the sale, or the keeping for sale, of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes are declared to be common nuisances unless it shall be used, manufactured, kept for sale, or sold under a validly existing license issued for that purpose by some board, body, or official authorized to issue it.
  2. “Liquor” or “intoxicating liquor” means any liquid fit for beverage purposes containing more than three and two-tenths per cent (3.2%) of alcohol by weight.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 92, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 108, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 1932, ch. 1858, § 1; P.L. 1933, ch. 2045, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 598, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This chapter is not unconstitutional as an ex post facto law merely because it limits the sale of beverages owned before its passage. State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1858).

Statutory definition of intoxicating liquors to include beverages containing 2% or more alcohol was constitutional as a legitimate exercise of the police power. State v. Gravelin, 16 R.I. 407 , 16 A. 914, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1889).

Effect of License.

Illegal sales by a licensed dealer in intoxicating liquors constituted a nuisance. State v. Morehead, 22 R.I. 272 , 47 A. 545, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1900).

Evidence.

Evidence of a federal license to sell intoxicating beverages was admissible against defendant. State v. Mellor, 13 R.I. 666 , 1882 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1882).

Evidence of Sunday sale of beverages was admissible, even though it also indicated violation of a separate statute. State v. Morehead, 22 R.I. 272 , 47 A. 545, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1900).

Indictment.
— Duplicity.

Indictment was not bad for duplicity because it alleged use of the building for more than one of the prohibited purposes. State v. Plastridge, 6 R.I. 76 , 1859 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1859); State v. Tracey, 12 R.I. 216 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1878); State v. Towler, 13 R.I. 661 , 1882 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1882).

Indictment was not bad for multifariousness where it charged the keeping of more than one building for the illegal purpose. State v. Brady, 16 R.I. 51 , 12 A. 238, 1888 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1888).

— Uncertainty.

Indictment was not bad for uncertainty for failure to describe the building. State v. Tracey, 12 R.I. 216 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1878).

Intoxicating Beverages.

Ale and lager beer have been recognized as intoxicating beverages without statutory definition. State v. Gravelin, 16 R.I. 407 , 16 A. 914, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1889).

— Alcoholic Content.

Evidence of alcoholic content was admissible to aid the jury in determining whether beverages were intoxicating. State v. Hughes, 16 R.I. 403 , 16 A. 911, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1889).

— Reference to Other Laws.

Reference may be made to the intoxicating liquor laws to determine whether a particular sale was illegal. State v. Hughes, 16 R.I. 403 , 16 A. 911, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1889).

Knowledge of Defendant.

Knowledge by defendant that the liquors are intoxicating is not necessary to conviction. State v. Hughes, 16 R.I. 403 , 16 A. 911, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1889).

Proof of Purpose.

On an indictment for keeping a place for the illegal sale of liquors and for the resort of intemperate persons, proof of either purpose was sufficient. State v. Plastridge, 6 R.I. 76 , 1859 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1859).

It need not be shown that the illegal sale was the main purpose of keeping the building but it is sufficient if illegal sale was one of the purposes, though incidental or subordinate. State v. Hoxsie, 15 R.I. 1 , 22 A. 1059, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1885).

Collateral References.

Saloons or taverns as nuisance. 5 A.L.R.3d 989.

11-30-3. Penalty for common nuisance.

Every person keeping or maintaining any common nuisance enumerated in § 11-30-1 shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), and be imprisoned not less than thirty (30) days nor more than three (3) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 92, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 108, § 2, G.L. 1923, ch. 120, § 2; P.L. 1928, ch. 1176, § 1; P.L. 1932, ch. 1858, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 598, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Compromise.

The practice of compromising by which attorney general enters nol pros and accused pays agreed sum to state is disapproved. State v. Conway, 20 R.I. 270 , 38 A. 656, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1897).

Jurisdiction of Courts.

Maximum amount of penalty put this offense beyond the jurisdiction of the district court. State v. Collins, 27 R.I. 419 , 62 A. 1010, 1906 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1906) (decision before 1928 amendment).

11-30-4. Penalty for nuisance involving intoxicating liquors.

Every person keeping or maintaining any common nuisance enumerated in § 11-30-2 , or aiding in so doing, shall for the first offense be punished by a fine of not more than six hundred dollars ($600), and for a second and each subsequent offense shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or be imprisoned for not more than two (2) years in the adult correctional institutions, or both, in the discretion of the court. Money arising from fines imposed under this section shall be paid one-half (1/2) to the general treasurer of the state and one-half (1/2) to the treasurer of the town or city where the offense occurred.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 92, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 108, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 120, § 2; P.L. 1928, ch. 1176, § 1; P.L. 1932, ch. 1858, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 598, § 2; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-4 ; P.L. 1997, ch. 291, § 1.

11-30-5. Evidence as to intoxicating liquors.

It shall not be necessary to prove an actual sale of intoxicating liquors in any building, place, or tenement, in order to establish the character of such premises as a common nuisance as provided in § 11-30-2 The notorious character of any premises, the notoriously bad or intemperate character of persons visiting them, the keeping of the implements or appurtenances usually appertaining to grog-shops, tippling-shops, or places where intoxicating liquors are sold, shall be evidence that the premises are nuisances within the meaning of §§ 11-30-1 and 11-30-2 . Evidence of the sale or keeping of intoxicating liquors for sale in any building, place or tenement shall be evidence that the sale or keeping is illegal, and that the premises are nuisances within the meaning of §§ 11-30-1 and 11-30-2.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 92, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 108, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 120, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 598, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Former statute making reputation prima facie evidence against accused was unconstitutional. State v. Beswick, 13 R.I. 211 , 1881 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1881).

The general assembly had power to make evidence of sale evidence of illegal sale. State v. Mellor, 13 R.I. 666 , 1882 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1882).

This section is not unconstitutional because it allows reputation to be given in evidence since it leaves the jury free to acquit or convict according to the whole evidence. State v. Wilson, 15 R.I. 180 , 1 A. 415, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1885).

The provision permitting testimony as to reputation does not violate the confrontation requirement contained in R.I. Const., art. 1, § 10 . State v. Waldron, 16 R.I. 191 , 14 A. 847, 1888 R.I. LEXIS 29 (1888).

Credibility of Witnesses.

Credibility of informers or spotters testifying as witnesses was for the jury. State v. Hoxsie, 15 R.I. 1 , 22 A. 1059, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1885).

Evidence of Sale or Keeping.

The state was not required to prove that defendant was not licensed where there was evidence that liquor was kept and sold on the premises. State v. Mellor, 13 R.I. 666 , 1882 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1882); State v. Hoxsie, 15 R.I. 1 , 22 A. 1059, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1885).

An instruction to the jury understood to have meant that the state could not, by evidence of sales, throw on the defendants the burden of defending themselves or support a conviction, would have been contrary to the statute. State v. Hoxsie, 15 R.I. 1 , 22 A. 1059, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1885).

Reputation Evidence.

Evidence of reputation prior to the time charged in the indictment was inadmissible. State v. Kingston, 5 R.I. 297 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1858).

The word “character” where first used in this section is used in its strict sense, but where next used, it is synonymous with “reputation.” State v. Wilson, 15 R.I. 180 , 1 A. 415, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1885).

11-30-6. Annulment of lease by maintenance of nuisance.

If any person, being a tenant or occupant under any lawful title of any building or tenement not owned by him or her, shall use the premises or any part for any of the purposes enumerated in §§ 11-30-1 and 11-30-2 , that use shall annul the lease or other title under which the occupant holds, and, without any act of the owner, shall cause the right of possession to revert and vest in him or her, and the owner may make immediate entry on it and repossess himself or herself of the premises without process of law.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 92, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 108, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 120, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 598, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Knowledge of Lessor.

Lessee could not avoid the lease by virtue of this section, even where lessor had knowledge of the illegal purpose, where lessor did not participate further. Almy v. Greene, 13 R.I. 350 , 1881 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1881).

Participation by Lessor.

Where a tenant permits his lessor to use the property for illegal sale of intoxicating liquors upon agreement that rental payments will be waived, the landlord cannot treat the agreement as void where the tenant does not participate in the illegal acts of the landlord. Allen v. Keilly, 18 R.I. 197 , 30 A. 965, 1893 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1893).

The fact that lessor caused its employees to purchase whisky from lessee in order to obtain proof of illegal sales did not prevent cancelation of the lease. Guay Bros. v. Gauvreau, 47 R.I. 400 , 133 A. 797, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1926).

Prerequisites to Ejectment.

Conviction of lessee in a criminal prosecution is not a prerequisite to trespass and ejectment by lessor under this section. Pettis v. Jennings, 10 R.I. 70 , 1871 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1871).

Declaration in ejectment for ouster of tenant must allege a wrongful detainer. Whipple v. McGinn, 18 R.I. 55 , 25 A. 652, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1892).

11-30-7. Landlord’s liability for nuisance.

Every person who shall let any building or tenement owned by him or her or under his or her control, for any of the purposes enumerated in §§ 11-30-1 and 11-30-2 , or who shall knowingly permit any building, tenement, or part of one to be so used while under his or her control, or who shall after five (5) days notice from any officer or magistrate of that use of the building or tenement omit to take all reasonable measures to eject the tenant or occupant from the premises as soon as it may lawfully be done, shall be deemed and taken to be guilty of aiding in the maintenance of the nuisance, and shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or be imprisoned in the adult correctional institutions not less than sixty (60) days nor more than one year.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 92, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 108, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 120, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 598, § 4; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-7 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Indictment.

Indictment under this section must allege that the purpose was actually carried out and the nuisance maintained. State v. Worden, 27 R.I. 484 , 63 A. 486, 1906 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1906).

Knowing Permission.

Householder who rented rooms that to her knowledge were used for prostitution could be convicted. State v. Smith, 15 R.I. 24 , 22 A. 1119, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1885).

11-30-8. Entry by police officers of premises — Commanding departure of persons found.

The sheriffs of the several counties and their deputies, and the town sergeants, constables, and chiefs of police of the several towns and cities may, within their respective towns and counties, enter any house or building that they have cause to suspect to be inhabited for purposes of prostitution and lewdness, to be resorted to by persons of ill fame or by persons of dissolute, idle, or disorderly character, or in which they have reasonable cause to believe intoxicating liquors are sold in violation of law, or unlawful games are carried on or permitted, or in which they have reasonable cause to believe a common nuisance is kept or maintained. Upon entering the house or building, they may command all persons assembled there to immediately depart from the house or building. In the event of the neglect or refusal of any person so commanded to leave, they may arrest that person and hold him or her for a period not exceeding twenty-four (24) hours for prosecution. Every person who shall so refuse or neglect shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00) or be imprisoned not exceeding thirty (30) days.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 92, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 108, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 120, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 598, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-8 ; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 15; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 15.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 15, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 15 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

11-30-9. Officers commanding aid in execution.

Any of the officers referred to in § 11-30-8 may command aid in the execution of the authority conferred to them by that section.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 92, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 108, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 120, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 598, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-9 .

11-30-10. Unlawful sale of beverages by club or association.

All buildings, places, or tenements located within any town or city used by any club or other association, whether incorporated or not, for the purpose of selling, distributing, or dispensing intoxicating liquors to its members or others for beverage purposes, shall be deemed to be common nuisances, unless it shall be used for the sale, distribution, or dispensing of intoxicating or alcoholic beverages to its members under a validly existing license issued for that purpose by some board, body or official authorized to issue it. Whoever keeps, maintains, or assists in keeping or maintaining, a common nuisance shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and all costs of prosecution and conviction. Upon the conviction of any incorporated club or association or any officer, member, agent, or employee, under the provisions of this chapter, the charter of the club or association shall become null and void.

History of Section. P.L. 1905, ch. 1235, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 108, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 120, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 598, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-10 .

11-30-11. Injunction.

Any person who shall use, occupy, establish, or conduct a nuisance, or aid or abet in it, either as principal or as the agent of any other person, shall be guilty of maintaining a nuisance and shall be enjoined as provided in chapter 1 of title 10.

History of Section. P.L. 1925, ch. 672, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 598, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-11 .

Cross References.

City or town council, abatement of nuisance by, § 23-19.2-7 .

11-30-12. Slaughterhouses, rendering plants, garbage plants, and brick kilns.

All buildings, places, or lands used as slaughterhouses, rendering establishments, garbage plants, or brick kilns, and located within three hundred (300) feet of any public park or public hospital, are declared to be common nuisances. This section shall not apply to any slaughterhouse or rendering establishment previously located by the proper authorities of any city or town. Every person who shall maintain any common nuisance of this type shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1905, ch. 1240, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1906, ch. 1345, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 109, §§ 6, 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 122, §§ 6, 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 600, §§ 6, 7; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-12 .

Collateral References.

Animal rendering or bone-boiling plant or business as nuisance. 17 A.L.R.2d 1269.

Offensive odors, validity of statute or ordinance declaring plant or establishment emitting, to be a public nuisance. 141 A.L.R. 285.

11-30-13. Burning of decaying and waste substances.

No owner, lessee, or occupant of any land used or suffered to be used as a dumping ground shall burn or suffer to be burned on it, and no other person shall ignite or burn on it, any refuse or decaying animal, fish or vegetable substances, or any waste materials or substances of any kind, in any manner that the burning shall be a nuisance to any person or persons owning or occupying any adjoining or neighboring land. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this section shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00) for each offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1523, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 109, §§ 8, 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 122, §§ 8, 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 600, §§ 8, 9; G.L. 1956, § 11-30-13 .

Chapter 31 Obscene and Objectionable Publications and Shows

11-31-1. Circulation of obscene publications and shows.

  1. Every person who willfully or knowingly promotes for the purpose of commercial gain within the community any show, motion picture, performance, photograph, book, magazine, or other material which is obscene shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for not more than two (2) years, or both.
  2. For the purpose of this section:
    1. In determining whether or not a show, motion picture, performance, photograph, book, magazine, or other material is obscene the trier of the fact must find:
      1. That the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
      2. That the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by this chapter; and
      3. That the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
    2. “Community standards” means the geographical area of the state of Rhode Island.
    3. “Knowingly” means having knowledge of the character and content of the material or failure on notice to exercise reasonable inspection which would disclose the content and character of it.
    4. “Material” means anything tangible which is capable of being used or adapted to arouse prurient interest through the medium of reading, or observation.
    5. “Patently offensive” means so offensive on its face as to affront current standards of decency.
    6. “Performance” means any play, motion picture, dance, or other exhibition performed before an audience.
    7. “Promote” means to manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, or advertise or to offer or agree to do it for resale.
    8. “Sexual conduct” means:
      1. An act of sexual intercourse, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, including genital-genital, anal-genital, or oral-genital intercourse, whether between human beings or between a human being and an animal.
      2. Sado-masochistic abuse, meaning flagellation or torture by or upon a person in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification.
      3. Masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibitions of the genitals.
    9. “Standards of decency” means community standards of decency.
  3. If any of the depictions and descriptions of sexual conduct described in this section are declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unlawfully included because the depictions or descriptions are constitutionally protected or for any other reason, that declaration shall not invalidate this chapter as to other sexual conduct included in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 218, § 2; P.L. 1979, ch. 406, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated former subparagraphs (b)(2)(B) through (b)(2)(G) as subdivisions (b)(3) through (b)(8), and redesignated the paragraphs in subdivision (b)(1).

Compiler's Notes.

In 2021, “and Providence Plantations” was deleted following “state of Rhode Island” in this section at the direction of the Law Revision Director to reflect the 2020 amendments to the state constitution that changed the state's name.

Repealed Sections.

The former section (G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 13; P.L. 1900, ch. 752, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 11-31-1 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 86, § 1; P.L. 1960, ch. 134, § 1; P.L. 1966, ch. 259, § 2), concerning circulation of obscene publications was repealed by P.L. 1978, ch. 218, § 1.

Cross References.

Child pornography, § 11-9-1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Obscenity:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-193 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 28 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Whereas this section reaches conduct that may be constitutionally protected because it is not legally obscene, the entire statute was declared unconstitutional on the ground that it improperly defined what constitutes “an obscene work” in defining the broader concept of “patently offensive sexual conduct,” rather than the narrower term “sexual conduct,” and thus established a conclusive presumption and predetermined “patently offensive sexual conduct” rather than leaving that determination to the jury as required by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881, 94 S. Ct. 26, 38 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1973). D & J Enters. v. Michaelson, 121 R.I. 537 , 401 A.2d 440, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1868 (1979).

Arrest.

Where officers who made arrest without warrant had been informed of possession and defendant has stated to an officer “I have the film, * * * Show me some identification and I will give you the film. * * * for all I know you may be John Law. I could be handing you the film and you put the handcuffs on me,” such arrest was held to have been made upon mere suspicion with no overt act by defendant and therefore there were no grounds of probable cause that a felony had beem committed or that defendant was committing one and the arrest was unlawful. State v. Dufour, 99 R.I. 120 , 206 A.2d 82, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 405 (1965) (decided under prior law).

Character of Devices.

Court could find devices so obviously indecent and obscene as to leave no question for the jury as to their character. Manes Co. v. Glass, 41 R.I. 135 , 102 A. 964, 1918 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1918) (decided under prior law).

Defenses.

A general license to exhibit films, issued in the absence of established procedures for determining obscenity, was not a defense to a prosecution for violating this section. State v. Tavone, 482 A.2d 693, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 606 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010, 105 S. Ct. 1879, 85 L. Ed. 2d 171, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 287 (1985).

Effect of License.

It is clear from a reading of § 5-22-5 that the legislature delegated its police power to regulate obscenity to the cities and towns in accordance with the procedural safeguards delineated in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S. Ct. 734, 13 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1965). State v. Berberian, 427 A.2d 1298, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1056 (1981).

The issuance of a license by the local licensing board under § 5-22-5 for the subject films constituted an official and express assurance from which, absent a final judicial determination that the films were obscene, no criminal prosecutions against defendants under this section could attach. State v. Berberian, 427 A.2d 1298, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1056 (1981).

Intent.

If the defendant possessed obscene material with intent to exhibit such matter, whether for sale or any other reason, he was guilty of the offense charged. State v. Ephraim, 80 R.I. 321 , 96 A.2d 641, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1953) (decided under prior law).

Evidence that book dealer had purchased obscene literature in large quantities and kept it in his store tended to prove intent to exhibit. State v. Ephraim, 80 R.I. 321 , 96 A.2d 641, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1953) (decided under prior law).

Collateral References.

Admissiblility of evidence of public opinion polls or surveys in obscenity prosecutions on issue whether materials in question are obscene. 59 A.L.R.5th 749.

Construction and application of United States Sentencing Guideline § 2G2.1 et seq., pertaining to child pornography. 145 A.L.R. Fed. 481.

Entrapment to commit offense against obscenity laws. 77 A.L.R.2d 792.

Entrapment to commit offense of selling obscene matter. 18 A.L.R. 171; 66 A.L.R. 478; 86 A.L.R. 263.

Exclusion from evidence of parts of publication, or mail matter, other than those charged to be obscene, or oral testimony relating to purpose of effect of publication as a whole. 69 A.L.R. 644.

Modern concept of obscenity. 5 A.L.R.3d 1158.

Scientific, educational or instructive publications regarding sex relations as within statutes relating to obscene or immoral publications. 76 A.L.R. 1099.

What amounts to an obscene play or book within prohibition of statute. 81 A.L.R. 801.

What constitutes “public place” within meaning of state statute or local ordinance prohibiting indecency or commission of sexual act in public place. 95 A.L.R.5th 229.

11-31-2. Forfeiture of obscene publications.

Any obscene book, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, or other thing mentioned in § 11-31-1 found by any officer in executing a search warrant or which shall be produced and brought into court shall be forfeited to the state. Further proceedings shall be had on them for their forfeiture as is prescribed by law in chapter 21 of title 12, and upon entry of final judgment of forfeiture the item shall be destroyed by order of the court. However, if any book, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper or other thing mentioned in § 11-31-1 is seized by any officer in executing a search warrant, it shall not be forfeited to the state unless the person, firm, corporation, or association claiming a proprietary interest in and to it or in whose possession it is found has been accorded the opportunity for a hearing on the question of whether it is obscene as provided by § 12-5-8 .

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 14; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 15; P.L. 1915, ch. 1219, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 11-31-2 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 6; P.L. 1966, ch. 259, § 2.

11-31-3. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L., ch. 103, § 8, as enacted by P.L. 1900, ch. 745, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 124, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 129, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 362, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-31-3 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 134, § 2; P.L. 1966, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 1978, ch. 218, § 3), concerning the reproduction of obscene pictures or sounds by use of mechanical contrivances, was repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 406, § 3. For new law, see § 11-31-1 .

11-31-4. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L., ch. 103, § 9, as enacted by P.L. 1900, ch. 745, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 124, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 129, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 362, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 11-31-4 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 134, § 2; P.L. 1966, ch. 259, § 2) concerning the promotion of obscene shows was repealed by P.L. 1978, ch. 218, § 4. For present provisions, see § 11-31-1 .

11-31-5. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L., ch. 103, § 10, as enacted by P.L. 1900, ch. 745, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 124, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 129, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 362, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 11-31-5 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 6; P.L. 1966, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 1978, ch. 218, § 3), concerning the seizure of equipment used in obscene shows, was repealed by P.L. 1978, ch. 406, § 3.

11-31-6. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L., ch. 103, § 11, as enacted by P.L. 1900, ch. 745, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 124, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 129, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 362, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 11-31-6 ), providing immunity for law enforcement officers, was repealed by P.L. 1965, ch. 168, § 10.

11-31-7. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L., ch. 103, § 12, as enacted by P.L. 1900, ch. 745, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 124, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 129, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 362, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 11-31-7 ), fees for seizure and removal of property, was repealed by P.L. 1966, ch. 259, § 1.

11-31-8. Entry of premises by deputies.

Any deputy sheriff, when so directed by the director of the department of public safety, may, in the discharge of their duties, enter any exhibition, performance, or place mentioned in this chapter or chapter 22 of title 5.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 103, § 8; P.L. 1905, ch. 1249, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 124, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 129, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 362, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 11-31-8 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 36.

Cross References.

Duties of sheriffs, § 42-29-1 .

11-31-9. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L., ch. 610, § 47, as enacted by P.L. 1956, ch. 3686, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31-9 ), concerning objectionable comic books, was repealed by P.L. 1966, ch. 259, § 1.

11-31-10. Sale or exhibition to minors of indecent publications, pictures, or articles.

  1. Every person who shall willfully or knowingly engage in the business of selling, lending, giving away, showing, advertising for sale, or distributing to any person under the age of eighteen (18) years, has in his or her possession with intent to engage in that business or to otherwise offer for sale or commercial distribution to any person under the age of eighteen (18) years, or who shall display at newsstands or any other business establishment frequented by persons under the age of eighteen (18) years or where persons under the age of eighteen (18) years are or may be invited as a part of the general public, any motion picture, any still picture, photograph, or any book, pocket book, pamphlet, or magazine of which the cover or content consists of explicit representations of “sexual conduct”, “sexual excitement”, “nudity” and which is indecent for minors or which is predominantly made up of descriptions of “sexual conduct”, “sexual excitement”, “nudity” and which is indecent, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for not more than two (2) years, or both.
  2. As used in this section, the following words have the following meaning:
    1. “Indecent for minors” means:
      1. Appealing to the prurient interest in sex of minors;
      2. Patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
      3. Lacking serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors;
    2. “Knowingly” means having knowledge of the character and content of the publication or failure on notice to exercise reasonable inspection which would disclose its content and character;
    3. “Nudity” means less than completely and opaquely covered; human genitals, pubic regions, buttock, and female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola;
    4. “Sexual conduct” means act of human masturbation, sexual intercourse, sodomy, fondling, or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttock, or female breasts; and
    5. “Sexual excitement” means human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 48; P.L. 1956, ch. 3686, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31-10 ; P. L. 1960, ch. 134, § 3; P.L. 1966, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 1971, ch. 30, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 406, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 221, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the paragraph designations in subdivision (b)(1).

Cross References.

Unescorted minors, admission to shows, § 5-22-23 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutional because the penalty clause makes it punishable either as a misdemeanor or as a felony. State v. Settle, 90 R.I. 195 , 156 A.2d 921, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 138 (1959).

The statute is not so vague and indefinite as to be unconstitutional. State v. Settle, 90 R.I. 195 , 156 A.2d 921, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 138 (1959).

Applicability.

This section is directed against those who are dealing in such publications as a business. State v. Settle, 90 R.I. 195 , 156 A.2d 921, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 138 (1959).

The provisions of this section are not directed against and do not embrace the father who gives to a youthful member of his family a book which comes under the ban of the law. State v. Settle, 90 R.I. 195 , 156 A.2d 921, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 138 (1959).

As a necessary element for conviction under this section the state must prove that the accused engaged in the conduct covered by this section for commercial gain. State v. Koohy, 105 R.I. 197 , 250 A.2d 711, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 739 (1969). (Decision prior to 1966 amendment.)

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of state statutes banning distribution of sexual devices. 94 A.L.R.5th 497.

Validity, construction, and effect of statutes or ordinances prohibiting the sale of obscene materials to minors. 93 A.L.R.3d 297.

11-31-11. Severability.

If any section or provision or the application of the section or provision of this chapter to any person or circumstances shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the sections and the applicability of the sections or provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 276, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 406, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment deleted “of provisions” in the section heading.

Repealed Sections.

The former § 11-31-11 (G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 49, as enacted by P.L. 1956, ch. 3686, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-31-11 ), also concerning severability, was repealed by P.L. 1978, ch. 218, § 4.

11-31-12. Penalty for making receipt of obscene publications a condition to delivery of other publications.

  1. Any person, firm, corporation, or association who shall as a condition to a sale, allocation, consignment, or delivery for resale of any book, periodical, publication, pamphlet, magazine, ballad, printed paper, print, photograph, or any other thing require that the purchaser or consignee receive for resale any other book, periodical, publication, pamphlet, magazine, ballad, printed paper, print, picture, photograph, or other thing which is obscene or shall deny or threaten to deny any franchise or impose or threaten to impose any penalty financial or otherwise, by reason of the failure of any person to accept the book, periodical, publication, pamphlet, magazine, ballad, printed paper, print, picture, photograph, or other thing, or by reason of the return of it, shall be imprisoned for a term not to exceed two (2) years or shall pay a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor less than one hundred dollars ($100).
  2. For the purpose of this section, “obscene” has the same meaning as defined in § 11-31-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 86, § 2; P.L. 1966, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 1978, ch. 218, § 3; P.L. 1979, ch. 406, § 1.

11-31-13. Injunctive proceedings by attorney general.

The attorney general, upon complaint being made to him or her under oath that any person is violating any of the provisions of §§ 11-31-1 and 11-31-1 2, may institute in his or her name as attorney general of the state of Rhode Island an action to enjoin the violation in a court of competent jurisdiction. The Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to all such actions whenever possible. Any person against whom an action has been brought shall be entitled to a trial of the issues within one day after the joinder of issue and to a decision by the court within forty-eight (48) hours of the conclusion of the trial. No restraining orders or preliminary injunctions shall be issued under this section, and the hearing shall be upon the merits of the case. After the hearing, the court may restrain and/or enjoin any person, firm, corporation, or association from violating any of the provisions of §§ 11-31-1 and 11-31-12 with regard to whether criminal proceedings have already been or may be instituted.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 86, § 2; P.L. 1966, ch. 259, § 2; P.L. 1978, ch. 218, § 3; P.L. 1979, ch. 406, § 1.

11-31-14. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1966, ch. 268, § 1), concerning dissemination of indecent publications to minors, was repealed by P.L. 1978, ch. 218, § 4. For present provisions, see § 11-31-10 .

11-31-15. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1968, ch. 133, § 1), concerning the criminal liability of operators of obscene motion pictures, was repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 406, § 3. For new law, see § 11-31-1 .

Chapter 31.1 Adjudication of Obscene Publications

11-31.1-1 — 11-31.1-12. [Transferred.]

Compiler’s Notes.

Transferred Sections.

These sections, relating to adjudication of obscene publications, were transferred to §§ 12-27-1 12-27-1 2 by the 1981 Reenactment.

Chapter 32 Obstructing Justice

11-32-1. Obstructing officer in execution of duty.

Every person who shall obstruct any officer, civil, military, or otherwise, including any state, city, or town police, deputy sheriff, or fire fighter, while in the execution of his or her office or duty, shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 11-32-1 ; G.L. 1971, ch. 220, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 186, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 37.

Cross References.

Interference with agent of society for prevention of cruelty to animals, § 4-1-21 .

Obstructing sheriff or deputy entering place where exhibition is conducted, § 5-22-22 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Arrest.

Probable cause to arrest for obstruction of justice may arise, in certain circumstances, from the spoken word rather than an actual physical interference with the police officer. De Fusco v. Brophy, 112 R.I. 461 , 311 A.2d 286, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1005 (1973).

Where officers responded to call concerning a disturbance, and in attempting to enforce city ordinance were met with shouting of obscenities at the officers for eight or nine minutes, evidence was sufficient for jury to find that officers had probable cause to arrest such persons for obstructing an officer. Johnson v. Palange, 122 R.I. 361 , 406 A.2d 360, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1551 (1979).

Constitutionality of Official Action.

The constitutionality of a regulation does not affect the duty of a citizen to obey a police officer enforcing the regulation. State v. Duffy, 441 A.2d 524, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 800 (1982).

Execution of Official Duty.

With respect to defendant’s conviction for obstruction of a firefighter, defendant’s return to the basement stairs after being removed from a home certainly impeded a fire lieutenant in the execution of his official duty. State v. Greenslit, 135 A.3d 1192, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 35 (2016).

Indictment or Complaint.

An indictment or complaint under this statute violates due process afforded by U.S. Const., amend. 14 and R.I. Const., art. 1, § 10 where it does not aver that the defendant knew the officer to be an officer when he obstructed him. State v. Drew, 112 R.I. 129 , 308 A.2d 516, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 963 (1973).

In the case of a complaint for a violation of an obstructing-justice statute, four elements must be averred for it not to be constitutionally defective. The complaint must state: (1) that the defendant acted knowingly, (2) that the defendant “resisted” or “obstructed” a peace officer, (3) that the defendant knew the peace officer was in fact a peace officer, and (4) that the peace officer was performing an authorized act within his official capacity. State v. Berberian, 416 A.2d 127, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1657 (1980).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of obstructing officers in executing their duty because the lieutenant testified that defendant defied the officers’ authority and used every effort to avoid handcuffs; and the lieutenant testified that the second officer came to his assistance and as a result of defendant’s actions, a scuffle occurred where punches were thrown and force was exchanged. State v. Edwards, 147 A.3d 982, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 108 (2016).

Collateral References.

Arrest dispute over custody as affecting charge of obstructing or resisting. 3 A.L.R. 1290.

“Choice of evils,” necessity, duress, or similar defense to state or local criminal charges based on acts of public protest. 3 A.L.R.5th 521.

Criminal liability for obstructing process as affected by invalidity or irregularity of the process. 10 A.L.R.3d 1146.

Defenses to state obstruction of justice charge relating to interfering with criminal investigation or judicial proceeding. 87 A.L.R.5th 597.

“Infamous offense,” obstruction of justice as, within constitutional provision in relation to presentment or indictment by grand jury. 24 A.L.R. 1015.

Obstruction of Justice Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c). 40 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (2019).

What constitutes obstructing or resisting an officer, in the absence of actual force. 44 A.L.R.3d 1018.

What constitutes offense of obstructing or resisting officer. 48 A.L.R. 746.

11-32-2. False report of crime.

Every person who shall knowingly make or cause to be made a false statement of a crime, either oral or written, with intent that it be relied upon by a police officer of any city or town or by any member of the state police, shall be deemed guilty of obstructing an officer and shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year and/or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), and shall in addition to this imprisonment and/or fine be ordered to make restitution to the person falsely accused of a crime for any damage which the person sustained as a result of the false complaint.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 184, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 176, § 1.

11-32-3. Obstruction of the judicial system.

Whoever corruptly, maliciously, recklessly, by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror or officer in or of any court of this state or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any justice, magistrate, or other officer of the court, in the discharge of his or her duty; or injures any party on his or her person or property on account of his or her attending or having attended such court or examination before such justice, magistrate, or other officer, or on account of his or her testifying or having testified to any matter pending in it; or injures any grand or petit juror in his or her person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him or her, or on account of being or having been a juror, or injures any justice, magistrate, or other officer in his or her person or property on account of the performance of his or her official duties; or corruptly, maliciously, recklessly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice; shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or imprisoned not more than five (5) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 193, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 91, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 442, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

The language indicates a legislative intention to make this section applicable to both civil and criminal proceedings. State v. Demers, 576 A.2d 1221, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1098, 111 S. Ct. 991, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1075, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 790 (1991).

Guardian Ad Litem as Officer of the Court.

A guardian ad litem is not merely a lawyer for the child but is a court-appointed officer of the family court. State v. Demers, 576 A.2d 1221, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1098, 111 S. Ct. 991, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1075, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 790 (1991).

Guardian Ad Litem’s Discharge of Duty.

The “discharge of duty” of a guardian ad litem is inherently fluid; the performance of her court-directed responsibilities and obligations are not fixed to a definite time, location, or manner. State v. Demers, 576 A.2d 1221, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1098, 111 S. Ct. 991, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1075, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 790 (1991).

Submitting Falsified Records to Grand Jury.

The turning over of falsified records to a grand jury subpoena is not an obstruction of justice absent a showing that the defendant affirmatively vouched for the accuracy of the documents. State v. Pari, 546 A.2d 175, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 119 (1988).

Collateral References.

Criminal liability of attorney for tampering with evidence. 49 A.L.R.5th 619.

Defenses to state obstruction of justice charge relating to interfering with criminal investigation or judicial proceeding. 87 A.L.R.5th 597.

Obstruction of Justice Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c). 40 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (2019).

11-32-4. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter, the following terms mean:

  1. “Malice” means an intent to vex, annoy, harm, or injure in any way another person, or to thwart or interfere in any manner with the orderly administration of justice.
  2. “Victim” means any natural person against whom any crime as defined under the laws of this state or any other state or of the United States is being or has been perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated.
  3. “Witness” means any natural person:
    1. Having knowledge of the existence or nonexistence of facts relating to any crime;
    2. Whose declaration under oath is received or has been received as evidence for any purpose;
    3. Who has reported any crime to any peace officer, prosecutor, probation or parole officer, correctional officer or judicial officer;
    4. Who has been served with a subpoena issued under the authority of any court in the state, or of any other state or of the United States; or
    5. Who would be believed by any reasonable person to be an individual described in paragraphs (i) — (iv) of this subdivision.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 91, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the paragraph designations in subdivision (3).

11-32-5. Intimidation of witnesses and victims of crimes.

  1. Any person who, by expressly or impliedly threatening to commit any unlawful act, maliciously and knowingly communicates with another person with the specific intent to intimidate a victim of a crime or a witness in any criminal proceeding with respect to that person’s participation in any criminal proceeding shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
  2. Any person who, with the specific intent to intimidate a victim of a crime or a witness in any criminal proceeding with respect to that person’s participation in any criminal proceeding, causes a physical injury to or damages the property of any person or expressly or impliedly threatens to cause physical injury to or damage to the property of any person, or, with specific intent to intimidate, acts for pecuniary gain shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or imprisoned not more than five (5) years, or both.
  3. As used in this section, “criminal proceeding” means the filing of a criminal complaint, any grand jury proceedings, any trial or hearing conducted in any court relating to a criminal matter, any proceeding before the parole board or any official inquiry into an alleged criminal violation.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent an attorney from interviewing any witness or victim or from otherwise investigating a matter on behalf of a client in an otherwise lawful manner.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 91, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 372, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Abandonment.

Abandonment is an affirmative defense to a charge of attempted intimidation of a witness which the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Latraverse, 443 A.2d 890, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 827 (1982).

Elements.

Whether the defendant actually instilled fear in the victim is not an element of the crime of witness intimidation. State v. Martini, 460 A.2d 936, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 956 (1983).

Evidence.

Evidence of defendant’s presence outside undercover policeman’s residence in automobile which contained gasoline, rags, matches and note threatening policeman was sufficient to uphold guilty verdict for attempting to intimidate a witness. State v. Latraverse, 443 A.2d 890, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 827 (1982).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of federal witness tampering statute, § 18 U.S.C. 1512(b). 185 A.L.R. Fed. 1.

Validity, construction, and application of federal witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). 183 A.L.R. Fed. 611.

11-32-6. Jurisdiction of district, superior and family courts.

  1. Any court with jurisdiction over any criminal matter, including the family court when it has jurisdiction of a juvenile by virtue of a wayward or delinquent petition alleging the violation of any criminal statute of the state of Rhode Island, may, in its discretion, upon good cause (which may include, but is not limited to, credible hearsay or the declaration of the prosecutor or defense attorney) that intimidation or dissuasion of any person who is a victim or who is a witness, has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, issue orders including, but not limited to, the following:
    1. An order that a defendant not violate any provision of this chapter.
    2. An order that a person before the court other than a defendant, including, but not limited to, a subpoenaed witness or other person entering the courtroom of the court, not violate any provisions of this chapter.
    3. An order that any person described in this subsection maintain a prescribed geographic distance from any specified witness or victim.
    4. An order that any person described in this subsection have no communication whatsoever with any specified witness or any victim, except through an attorney under any reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.
    5. An order calling for a hearing to determine if an order as described in subdivisions (1) through (4) of this subsection should be issued.
    6. An order that a particular law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction of the court provide protection for a victim and/or witness.
  2. Every person violating any order made pursuant to subsection (a) of this section may be punished in any or all manner as follows:
    1. For any substantive offense described in § 11-32-5 .
    2. As a contempt of the court making the order. No finding of contempt shall be a bar to prosecution for a substantive offense under § 11-32-5 , but any conviction or acquittal for any substantive offense under § 11-32-5 shall be a bar to subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
    3. By revocation of any form of pretrial release and/or the forfeiture of bail and the issuance of a bench warrant for the defendant’s arrest or remanding him or her into custody. Revocation may, after a hearing and upon showing by clear and convincing evidence, in the sound discretion of the court, be made whether the violation order complained of has been personally committed by the defendant or was in any way caused or encouraged to have been committed by the defendant.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 91, § 2; P.L. 1981, ch. 134, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction of Family Court.

Charge of witness intimidation in domestic assault case was properly heard in the Superior Court, as the Family Court was not vested with jurisdiction to hear and decide criminal cases of witness intimidation, but was authorized to take appropriate steps to prevent witness or victim intimidation with respect to cases over which the court had jurisdiction. State v. Burke, 783 A.2d 917, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 218 (2001).

11-32-7. Pretrial release.

  1. Any pretrial release of any defendant, whether on bail or under any other form of recognizance, shall be deemed as a matter of law to include a condition that the defendant neither do nor cause to be done nor knowingly permit to be done on his or her behalf any act proscribed in this chapter.
  2. Every person who willfully violates this condition of pretrial release is subject to revocation of release and for the forfeiture of bail and the issuance of a bench warrant for the defendant’s arrest or remanding him or her into custody whether or not the defendant was the subject of an order under § 11-32-6 .
  3. From and after May 8, 1980, any receipt for any bail or bond given by any court by any surety or bondsman and/or any written promise to appear on one’s own recognizance shall contain, in a conspicuous location, notice of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 91, § 2.

Chapter 33 Perjury and False Swearing

11-33-1. Perjury.

  1. Every person under oath or affirmation who knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, knowing it contains any false material declaration, shall be deemed guilty of perjury.
  2. An indictment or information for violation of this section alleging that on oath or affirmation the defendant has knowingly made two (2) or more declarations which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false need not specify which declaration is false if:
    1. Each declaration was material to the point in question; and
    2. Each declaration was made within the period of the statute of limitations established in § 12-12-17 .
  3. In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration set forth in the indictment or information shall be established sufficient for conviction by proof that the defendant on oath or affirmation made irreconcilably contradictory declarations material to the point in question. It shall be a defense to an indictment or information made pursuant to this subsection that the defendant, at the time he or she made each declaration, believed the declaration was true.
  4. Where in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making the declaration admits the declaration to be false, that admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the admission is made, the declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that the falsity has been or will be exposed.
  5. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary that proof be made by any particular number of witnesses or by documentary or other type of evidence.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-33-1 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 244, § 1.

Cross References.

Allegations in indictment, § 12-12-15 .

Cigarette tax, false statements, § 44-20-44 .

Closing out sale, false statements as to, § 6-14-5 .

Estate and transfer taxes, false statement, § 44-23-4 .

Franchise tax report, false statement, § 44-12-12 .

Gasoline tax reports or statements wilfully false, § 31-36-8 .

Insurance tax returns, false statement, § 44-17-11 .

Liquor control matters, false swearing, § 3-2-5 .

Military court, false swearing before, § 30-13-116 .

Tax reports to tax administrator, false statements, § 44-1-12 .

Writ, false swearing in affidavit to support, § 9-5-22 .

Comparative Legislation.

Perjury and false swearing:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-156, 53a-157.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 268, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

False Statement on Material Issue.

This section makes it unnecessary to show that the false statement was on a material issue. State v. Miller, 26 R.I. 282 , 58 A. 882, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1904).

A statement that party to an action had offered witness money to fail to appear in court was a statement on a material issue. State v. Miller, 26 R.I. 282 , 58 A. 882, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1904).

The two witnesses rule for a conviction of perjury has been abrogated and circumstantial evidence without regard to the number of prosecution witnesses is sufficient to support a conviction in accordance with § 11-33-5 . State v. Casala, 113 R.I. 690 , 325 A.2d 540, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1224 (1974).

One false statement given under oath can be sufficient to constitute the crime of perjury; thus, defendant’s conviction for providing a false alibi for a family member’s fiance was proper because defendant knowingly made the false material statement under oath. State v. Sivo, 809 A.2d 481, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 211 (2002).

Misleading Response.

A defendant’s responses to questions, if literally true even though perhaps shrewdly misleading, are not perjurious. State v. Ouimette, 415 A.2d 1052, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1653 (1980).

Sworn Statement Under Oath.

Although the clerk at the motion hearing testified that he did not specifically recall administering the oath to the defendant, he did testify that it was his usual practice to do so and the record shows that defendant was sworn prior to his testimony, the state’s evidence on pleading and proving that defendant swore an oath was sufficient to warrant a finding of fact. State v. Casala, 113 R.I. 690 , 325 A.2d 540, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1224 (1974).

Collateral References.

Acquittal as bar to a prosecution of accused for perjury committed at trial. 89 A.L.R.3d 1098.

Administrative requirement, oath taken in pursuance of, as predicate for criminal offense of perjury. 108 A.L.R. 1240.

Attorneys, commission of perjury as ground for disbarment or suspension of. 9 A.L.R. 200; 43 A.L.R. 107; 55 A.L.R. 1373.

Construction and application of § 2J1.3 of United States Sentencing Guidelines (18 USCS Appx 1.3 § 2J), pertaining to sentencing for perjury, subornation of perjury, witness bribery, and departures therefrom. 130 A.L.R. Fed. 269.

Conviction of perjury where one or more of elements is established solely by circumstantial evidence. 88 A.L.R.2d 852.

Correction of false testimony, effect of, or of attempt to make. 64 A.L.R.2d 276.

Criminal liability for wrongfully obtaining unemployment benefits. 80 A.L.R.3d 1280.

Criminal liability under state laws in connection with application for, or receipt of, public welfare payments. 22 A.L.R.4th 534.

Entrapment to commit offense. 66 A.L.R. 508; 86 A.L.R. 273.

Evidence, admissibility in prosecution for perjury, of judgment in civil case. 87 A.L.R. 1267.

Fear or compulsion, false statement made under, as perjury. 4 A.L.R. 1319.

Incomplete, misleading, or unresponsive but literally true statement as perjury. 69 A.L.R.3d 993.

Invalidity of statute or ordinance giving rise to proceedings in which false testimony was received as defense for prosecution for perjury. 34 A.L.R.3d 413.

Marriage license, perjury as predicated upon statements upon application for. 101 A.L.R. 1263.

Offense of perjury as affected by lack of jurisdiction by court or government body before which false testimony was given. 36 A.L.R.3d 1038.

Perjury conviction as affected by notary’s nonobservance of formalities for administration of oath to affiant. 80 A.L.R.3d 278.

Perjury in verifying pleadings. 7 A.L.R. 1283.

Privilege against self incrimination as affecting admissibility in prosecution for perjury of testimony given before grand jury. 38 A.L.R.2d 225.

Recantation as defense in perjury prosecution. 64 A.L.R.2d 276.

Right of defendant in prosecution for perjury to have the “two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances” rule included in charge to jury. 156 A.L.R. 499.

Right of defendant in prosecution for perjury to have the “two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances,” rule included in charge to jury — state cases. 41 A.L.R.5th 1.

Statement of belief or opinion as perjury. 66 A.L.R.2d 791.

11-33-2. Penalty for perjury.

Every person who shall be guilty of perjury or of subornation of perjury by procuring another to commit perjury, shall be imprisoned not exceeding twenty (20) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-33-2 .

Cross References.

Allegations in indictment, § 12-12-15 .

Commitment of witness on presumption of perjury, §§ 12-17-11 , 12-17-12 .

Collateral References.

Entrapment as defense to prosecution for attempted subornation of perjury. 18 A.L.R. 191.

11-33-3. Attempt to procure perjury.

Every person who shall endeavor to incite or procure another to commit perjury, though the person incited does not commit perjury, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-33-3 .

Cross References.

Allegations in indictment, § 12-12-15 .

Collateral References.

Admissibility in subornation of perjury prosecution of evidence of alleged perjurer’s plea of guilty to charge of perjury. 63 A.L.R.2d 825.

11-33-4. False swearing pertaining to sale or conveyance of property.

Every person over the age of eighteen (18) years who shall willfully swear or affirm falsely before any notary public, justice of the peace, or other officer authorized to administer oaths, concerning any material fact relating to any contract, lease, or other document pertaining to the sale or conveyance of real or personal property shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 24; P.L. 1925, ch. 656, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 11-33-4 .

11-33-5. Manner of proof.

In the trial of any complaint or indictment or information charging any offense under this chapter, the guilt of the accused may be established by circumstantial evidence without regard to the number of witnesses who may testify against the defendant.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 56, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Circumstantial Evidence.

In order to sustain a conviction of perjury, the knowledge or intent with which a person acted is not susceptible of proof by direct evidence, but proof of such knowledge or intent can be drawn from the facts and circumstances. State v. Casala, 113 R.I. 690 , 325 A.2d 540, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1224 (1974).

11-33-6. Perjury before general assembly committees.

  1. Every person who shall testify before any committee, sub-committee, or commission of the general assembly may be required to do so under oath or affirmation by the committee, sub-committee, or commission. If required to testify a stenographic record shall be kept of that testimony after approval by the speaker of the house of representatives and the president of the senate.
  2. Any person who shall willfully swear or affirm falsely in regard to any testimony before any committee, sub-committee, or commission of the general assembly shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or be imprisoned not exceeding one year.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 382, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 7.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 159 provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect January 7, 2003.

Collateral References.

Offense of perjury as affected by lack of jurisdiction by court or government body before which false testimony was given. 36 A.L.R.3d 1038.

11-33-7. Perjury or false swearing — Child support.

Every person who shall violate any provision of this chapter in any case or controversy involving the abandonment or nonsupport of a child pending before the family court or any other tribunal or agency of competent jurisdiction shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for a term not to exceed twenty (20) years.

[See § 12-1-15 of the General Laws.]

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 370, art. 29, § 3; P.L. 1995, ch. 374, § 3.

Chapter 34 Prostitution and Lewdness

11-34-1 — 11-34-8.2. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1896, ch. 281, §§ 6, 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 6, 7, 41 — 43; P.L. 1910, ch. 543, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1219, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1919, ch. 1788, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, §§ 6, 7, 40 — 42; P.L. 1925, ch. 657, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, §§ 6, 7, 40 — 42; impl. am. P.L. 1939, ch. 660, § 180; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 11-34-1 — 11-34-7; P.L. 1978, ch. 54, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 279, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1980, ch. 370, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1983, ch. 130, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 196, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 200, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 108, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 110, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 125, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 193, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 313, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 303, §§ 1, 2), relating to prostitution, were repealed by P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 2, and by P.L. 2009 ch. 186, § 2, effective November 3, 2009. For comparable provisions, see chapter 34.1 of this title.

11-34-8.3. Criminal forfeiture procedures.

  1. Any criminal complaint charging an offense under §§ 11-34-8.1 or 11-34-8.2 shall set forth with reasonable particularity:
    1. Whether the law enforcement agency seeks to have forfeited property pursuant to this section; and
    2. What property the law enforcement agency seeks to have forfeited.
  2. The court may, upon application of the law enforcement agency, enter a restraining order or injunction, require any person claiming any interest in the subject motor vehicle to execute a satisfactory performance bond to the state, or take any other action to preserve the availability of the motor vehicle subject to forfeiture described in § 11-34-8.2 whether prior to or subsequent to the filing of a complaint. Written notice and an opportunity for a hearing shall be afforded to persons appearing to have an interest in the motor vehicle. The hearing is limited to the issues of whether:
    1. There is a substantial probability that the law enforcement agency will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will result in the motor vehicle being destroyed, conveyed, encumbered or further encumbered, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeitures; and
    2. The need to preserve the availability of property through the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered.
    1. An order under this section may be entered upon application of the law enforcement agency without notice or opportunity for a hearing when a complaint has not yet been filed with respect to the property if the law enforcement agency demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that the property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under § 11-34-8.2 and that provision of notice will jeopardize the availability of the motor vehicle for forfeiture. The order shall expire within ten (10) days of the date on which it is entered unless for good cause shown or unless the party against whom it is entered consents to an extension for a longer period.
    2. A hearing requested by any party in interest concerning an order entered under this subsection shall be held at the earliest possible time and prior to the expiration of the temporary order.
    3. The court may receive and consider, at the hearing held pursuant to this subsection, evidence and information that would be inadmissible in court.
  3. Upon conviction of a person for an offense under § 11-34-8.1, the court may enter a judgment of forfeiture of the property described in §§ 11-34-8.2 and 11-34-8.3 to the city or town and shall also authorize the law enforcement agency to seize the motor vehicle ordered forfeited upon any terms and conditions that the court shall deem proper. Following the entry of an order declaring the property forfeited, the court may, upon application of the law enforcement agency, enter any appropriate orders, require the execution of satisfactory performance bonds, appoint receivers, conservators, appraisers, accountants, or trustees, or take any other action to protect the interest of the law enforcement agency in the motor vehicle ordered forfeited.
  4. All right, title, and interest in the motor vehicle described in § 11-34-8.1 vests in the city or town upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section subject to the limitations of § 11-34-8.2. Any such motor vehicle that is subsequently transferred to any person may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the state, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing that he or she is a bona fide purchaser for value of the motor vehicle who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the motor vehicle was subject for forfeiture.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 303, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 8.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations in subsection (c).

11-34-9, 11-34-10. Repealed.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2009, ch. 196, § 2 and P.L. 2009, ch. 289, § 2 purported to amend § 11-34-10. However, this section had already been repealed by P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 2, and by P.L. 2009 ch. 186, § 2.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1980, ch. 279, § 2; P.L. 1980, ch. 370, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 405, § 8; P.L. 1990, ch. 169, § 4; P.L. 1998, ch. 391, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 599, § 1), concerning severability and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), were repealed by P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 2, and by P.L. 2009 ch. 186, § 2, effective November 3, 2009. For comparable provisions, see chapter 34.1 of this title.

11-34-11. Loitering for indecent purposes in or near schools.

Any person who violates this section by attempting to engage a person for the purpose of prostitution or other indecent act, or to patronize or induce or otherwise secure a person to commit any indecent act in the building or on the grounds or within three hundred (300) yards of the grounds of a public or private elementary, vocational, or secondary school, shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of not more than one year and a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 53, § 1.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of loitering statutes and ordinances. 72 A.L.R.5th 1.

Chapter 34.1 Commercial Sexual Activity

11-34.1-1. Definitions.

The following words and phrases, when used in this chapter, have the following meanings:

  1. “Sexual conduct” means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, and digital intrusion or intrusion by any object into the genital opening or anal opening of another person’s body, or the stimulation by hand of another’s genitals for the purposes of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either person.
  2. “Commercial sexual activity” means any sexual conduct which is performed or promised in return for a fee.
  3. “Fee” means any thing of monetary value, including but not limited to money, given as consideration for sexual conduct.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2009, ch. 185, §§ 1 and 3, and P.L. 2009, ch. 186, §§ 1 and 3, enacted identical versions of this chapter.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Fellatio.

The legislature being aware that the very comprehensiveness it sought to attain in § 11-10-1 by using the phrase “crime against nature” would be nullified by any attempt to enumerate, it is the court’s opinion that fellatio is criminal under the provisions of such § 11-10-1 and therefore is an indecent act within the purview of the pertinent provisions of this section. State v. Milne, 95 R.I. 315 , 187 A.2d 136, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 167 (1962) (Decided under prior law).

11-34.1-2. Prostitution.

  1. A person is guilty of prostitution when such person engages, or agrees, or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee. Any person found guilty under this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six (6) months, or to a fine of not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
  2. Any person found guilty of a subsequent offense under this section shall be subject to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
  3. In any prosecution for a violation under this section, it shall be an affirmative defense if the accused was forced to commit a commercial sexual activity by:
    1. Being threatened or subjected to physical harm;
    2. Being physically restrained or threatened to be physically restrained;
    3. Being subject to threats of abuse of law or legal process;
    4. Being subject to destruction, concealment, removal, or confiscation, of any passport or other immigration document or any other actual or purported governmental identification document; or
    5. Being subject to intimidation in which the accused’s physical well being was perceived as threatened.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 70, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 75, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 70, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 75, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Evidence to establish nuisance, § 10-1-5 .

Investigation and proceedings against racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations, § 7-15-1 et seq.

Law Reviews.

Caselaw Survey Section: Criminal Procedure, see 4 R.W.U.L. Rev. 678 (1999).

Amanda LaRocca, Comment: The Full Swede: Revising Rhode Island’s Prostitution Law to Decriminalize the Selling of Sex While Still Criminalizing the Buying of Sex, 25 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 437 (2020).

Comparative Legislation.

Prostitution:

Conn. Gen. Stat § 53a-82 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Criteria.

Since establishing “rigid legislative criteria” when dealing with sex crimes is impractical, a reasonable certainty in regard to the conduct proscribed is all that this section need provide. State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799 , 413 A.2d 58, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1473 (1980) (Decided under prior law).

Prostitution Defined.

“Prostitution” is not limited to the sexual acts associated with reproduction. State v. McKee, 442 A.2d 440, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 816 (1982) (Decided under prior law).

Receiving Into House.

Where the defendant telephoned the tenant of certain premises and arranged for a detective to meet a prostitute there for prostitution and all further contacts of the detective were with the tenant and the prostitute, such facts did not show sufficient control of the defendant over the premises in question to convict her of receiving the prostitute into the premises for the commission of prostitution under this section. State v. Mangum, 101 R.I. 518 , 225 A.2d 512, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 794 (1967) (Decided under prior law).

Right to Privacy.

The right of privacy is inapplicable to the private unnatural copulation between unmarried adults. State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799 , 413 A.2d 58, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1473 (1980) (Decided under prior law).

Selective Enforcement.

Where plaintiffs’ complaint charged the city of Providence police department with engaging in an intentional and purposeful practice of enforcing this section almost exclusively against women, there was no legal bar to plaintiffs’ recovery of attorney’s fees from defendant chief of police in his official capacity if evidence to be adduced at a subsequent hearing revealed a causal connection between the lawsuit and a change in the police department’s patterns of enforcement, despite consent dismissal of court action as moot. Coyote v. Roberts, 502 F. Supp. 1342, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15461 (D.R.I. 1980) (Decided under prior law).

Collateral References.

“Infamous crime,” keeping house of ill fame as, within constitutional or statutory provision in relation to presentment or indictment by grand jury. 24 A.L.R. 1011.

Laws prohibiting or regulating “escort services,” “outcall entertainment,” or similar services used to carry on prostitution. 15 A.L.R.5th 900.

Number of females who reside in house or resort thereto for immoral purposes as affecting disorderly character thereof. 12 A.L.R. 529.

Recital of, or reference to, the offense in pronouncing sentence or judgment for keeping bawdyhouse. 14 A.L.R. 997.

Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by trial court for living on the earnings of prostitute. 29 A.L.R. 339; 89 A.L.R. 295.

Separate acts of taking earnings of or support from prostitute as separate or continuing offenses of pimping. 3 A.L.R.4th 1195.

Vagrancy, prostitution as. 14 A.L.R. 1501.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance proscribing solicitation for purposes of prostitution, lewdness, or assignation — modern cases. 77 A.L.R.3d 519.

Woman who connives or consents to her own transportation for immoral purposes, criminal responsibility. 84 A.L.R. 376.

11-34.1-3. Procurement of sexual conduct for a fee.

  1. A person is guilty of procuring or attempting to procure sexual conduct for the payment of a fee if they engage or seek to engage in sexual conduct for any type of fee and/or pay or agree to pay any type of fee for sexual conduct, regardless of the time, place or location of the procurement, attempted procurement, payment, attempted payment or conduct. Any person found guilty under this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or to a fine of not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
  2. Any person found guilty of a subsequent offense under this section shall be subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Amanda LaRocca, Comment: The Full Swede: Revising Rhode Island’s Prostitution Law to Decriminalize the Selling of Sex While Still Criminalizing the Buying of Sex, 25 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 437 (2020).

11-34.1-4. Loitering for prostitution.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person to stand or wander in or near any public highway or street, or any public or private place, and attempt to engage passersby in conversation, or stop or attempt to stop motor vehicles, for the purpose of prostitution or other commercial sexual activity. Any person found guilty of the crime of loitering for prostitution shall be subject to a sentence of up to six (6) months incarceration or by a fine of not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
  2. Any person found guilty of a subsequent offense under this section shall be subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Caselaw Survey Section: Criminal Procedure, see 4 R.W.U.L. Rev. 678 (1999).

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of loitering statutes and ordinances. 72 A.L.R.5th 1.

What constitutes “public place” within meaning of state statute or local ordinance prohibiting indecency or commission of sexual act in public place. 95 A.L.R.5th 229.

11-34.1-5. Expungement of certain criminal records.

  1. Records defined in § 12-1.3-1 of any person convicted, placed on probation, or whose case was filed pursuant to § 12-10-12 , for a violation of § 11-34.1-2 or § 11-34.1-4 may be expunged one year after completion of that person’s sentence.
  2. The motion shall be filed in accordance with a chapter 12-1.3 and may be granted in the court’s discretion regardless of the person’s first offender status.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 3.

11-34.1-6. Soliciting from motor vehicles for indecent purposes — Forfeiture of motor vehicle.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person, while an operator or passenger in a motor vehicle to stop, or attempt to stop another vehicle or pedestrian, or to engage or attempt to engage persons in another vehicle or pedestrians in conversation, for the purposes of prostitution or other indecent act, or to patronize, induce, or otherwise secure another person to commit any commercial sexual activity. Any person found guilty under this section shall be subject to a sentence of up to six (6) months incarceration or a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
  2. Any person found guilty of a subsequent offense under this section shall be subject to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year and a fine of not less than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). No fine imposed under this section may be suspended.
  3. The motor vehicle being unlawfully operated as defined in this chapter by a person convicted of a second or subsequent offense of soliciting from a motor vehicle for indecent purposes pursuant to this chapter which vehicle is owned by the operator, may be seized by the law enforcement agency and forfeited at the discretion of the court. Any funds received from the forfeiture shall be deposited in the victim’s of crimes indemnity fund (VCIF).

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section does not lack the certainty required by the constitution; the phrase “an indecent act” conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when it is viewed in the light of common understanding and practice. State v. Milne, 95 R.I. 315 , 187 A.2d 136, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 167 (1962) (Decided under prior law).

11-34.1-7. Pandering or permitting prostitution — Not allowed.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person, by any promise or threat, by abuse of person, or by any other device or scheme, to cause, induce, persuade, or encourage a person to become a prostitute or to come into this state or leave this state for the purpose of prostitution. It shall be unlawful for any person to receive or give, or agree to receive or give, any money or thing of value for procuring or attempting to procure any person to become a prostitute or to come into this state or leave this state for the purpose of prostitution.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly permit, allow, transport, or offer or agree to receive any person into any place, structure, house, building, room, or business for the purpose of committing any commercial sexual activity, or knowingly permit any person to remain in the premises for those purposes, or to, in any way, aid or abet or participate in any of the acts or things enumerated in this chapter. Any person, knowing a person to be a prostitute, who shall live or derive support or maintenance, in whole or in part, from the earnings or proceeds of commercial sexual activity, from moneys loaned, advanced to, or charged against the prostitute by a landlord, manager, owner of a spa or business, or any other place where commercial sexual activity is practiced or allowed, or who shall share in the earnings, proceeds, or moneys shall be guilty of the crime of permitting prostitution.
  3. Every person who commits any of the offenses described in subsection (a) of this section, or who assists, abets, or aids another to commit any of those offenses, shall be guilty of pandering. For the first offense, that person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year and not more than five (5) years and a fine of not less than two thousand dollars ($2,000), nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000). For every subsequent offense, that person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three (3) years and not more than ten (10) years and a fine of not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000), nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
  4. Any proceeds derived directly from a violation of this section are subject to seizure and forfeiture and further proceedings shall be required for their forfeiture as is prescribed by law in chapter 21 of title 12.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 70, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 75, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 70, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 75, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

Amanda LaRocca, Comment: The Full Swede: Revising Rhode Island’s Prostitution Law to Decriminalize the Selling of Sex While Still Criminalizing the Buying of Sex, 25 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 437 (2020).

11-34.1-8. Venue of pandering or permitting prostitution prosecutions.

It shall not be a defense to any prosecution of any of the offenses described in this chapter that the offense or any part of the offense shall have been committed outside the state, and any offense described in this chapter may be alleged to have been committed. The offender may be prosecuted and punished in any county in which the offender or the person upon or against whom the offense was committed may be found, or in which the offense was consummated, or in which any overt acts in furtherance of the offenses shall have been committed.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 3.

11-34.1-9. Spouse as witness in pandering or permitting prostitution.

In any prosecution for any offense under this chapter, any person shall be a competent witness against the offender in relation to any offense committed by the offender upon or against him or her, or by the offender against or upon another person or persons in his or her presence, notwithstanding that person may have been married to the offender before or after the commission of the offense, and notwithstanding that person may be called as witness during the existence of the marriage or after its dissolution.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 3.

11-34.1-10. Reputation testimony as evidence.

In the trial of any person charged with a violation of this chapter, testimony concerning the reputation of the place where the violation occurred or of persons who frequent or reside in it shall be admissible in evidence in support of the charge.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 3.

11-34.1-11. Examination and treatment for venereal disease.

Any person convicted for any violation of this chapter or of any other statute relating to lewd or lascivious behavior or unlawful sexual intercourse, and who shall be confined or imprisoned in any correctional institution for more than ten (10) days, may be examined by the department of health for venereal disease, through duly appointed, licensed physicians as agents. Any person that is examined may be detained until the result of the examination is duly reported. If found with venereal disease in an infectious stage, the person shall be treated, and if a menace to the public, quarantined, in accordance with rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, of the director of health, who is authorized to formulate and issue them. Refusal to comply with or obey the rules or regulations shall constitute a misdemeanor and be punishable by fine not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250), or a sentence of incarceration of up to three (3) months, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 3.

Collateral References.

Venereal disease, compulsory examination for. 2 A.L.R. 1332; 22 A.L.R. 1189.

Venereal diseases, constitutionality, construction and application of statutes, ordinances and regulations concerning prevention and cure of. 127 A.L.R. 421.

11-34.1-12. Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).

  1. Any person convicted of a violation of any provisions of this chapter shall be required to be tested for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). No consent for the testing shall be required.
  2. The department of health shall maintain sites for providing both anonymous and confidential HIV testing, and HIV counseling and referral. Each site, funded by the department of health, shall offer free testing, counseling and referral for indigent parties and other individuals without health insurance, offer a sliding scale for payment for all other individuals and, in the case of confidential testing, screen for ability to pay through a third-party insurer. In the case of nonfunded sites for HIV testing, organizations and/or institutions performing the test shall offer free testing, counseling and referral for indigent parties and other individuals without health insurance.
  3. All persons tested under this section shall be provided pre-test and post-test counseling by individuals trained by the department of health, as an HIV testing counselor, in accordance with regulations promulgated by the department of health; provided, that the counseling shall be in accordance with acceptable medical standards.
  4. All persons who are tested under this section, who are determined to be injecting drug users, shall be referred to appropriate sources of substance abuse treatment by the HIV testing counselor and/or the attending practitioner as follows:
    1. Those persons who test positive for HIV infection shall be given priority for those outpatient substance abuse treatment programs that are sponsored or supported by the appropriate state agency responsible for these services.
    2. Those persons who are injecting drug users and test negative for HIV infection shall be referred, by the HIV testing counselor and/or attending practitioner, to the appropriate state agency responsible for these services for earliest possible evaluation and treatment.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 3.

11-34.1-13. Reporting.

On or before January 15, 2010, and semi-annually thereafter, each law enforcement agency in this state shall file with the Governor, the Attorney General, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate a report concerning the agency’s enforcement of this chapter during the preceding six (6) month period. Each semi-annual report shall contain, but need not be limited to, the following information:

  1. The number of persons arrested pursuant to subsection 11-34.1-2(a) , subsection 11-34.1-2(b) , § 11-34.1-3 , § 11-34.1-4 , subsection 11-34.1-6(a) , subsection 11-34.1-6(b) and subsection 11-34.1-7 of this chapter;
  2. Of those arrested, the number of persons convicted, placed on probation, whose case is filed pursuant to § 12-10-12 , whether those persons pled guilty or nolo contendere or were found guilty after trial by judge or jury;
  3. The fines and/or sentences of those persons identified pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section; and
  4. A summary of the amounts of fines levied and the lengths of sentences identified pursuant to subdivision (3) of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 3.

11-34.1-14. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 185, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 186, § 3.

Chapter 35 Public Utilities

11-35-1. Consent of property owner required for electric lines — Tree-trimming — Removal on notice.

No person shall place any electric wire, apparatus, pole, bracket, insulator, or other device or appliance for the purpose of conducting currents of electricity upon any private property without the consent of the owners or of the agent of the owners; nor shall any electric wire, apparatus, pole, bracket, insulator, or other device or appliance for the purpose of conducting currents of electricity be passed through or affixed to any tree useful for shade or ornamental purposes, nor shall a tree be cut, trimmed, or interfered with, except under the direction and immediate supervision of the surveyor of highways in whose district the tree is located; provided, that any owner or agent may give notice in writing to the person or corporation owning any electric wire, apparatus, pole, bracket, insulator, or other device or appliance for the purpose of conducting currents of electricity when it shall have been so placed with the consent of the owner or agent, to remove it or any of them from any private property within thirty (30) days after the delivery of the notice, and that, in default of the removal in accordance with the terms of the notice, the owner or agent may remove them or any of them.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 56; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 59; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 59; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 67; G.L. 1956, § 11-35-1 .

11-35-2. Badges of telegraph and telephone workers.

No person shall labor upon the work of erecting or repairing any telegraph or telephone line belonging to any telegraph or telephone company without having conspicuously attached to his or her dress a medal or badge, on which shall be legibly inscribed the name of the owners by whom he or she is employed, and a number by which he or she can be readily identified.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 56; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 59; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 59; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 67; G.L. 1956, § 11-35-2 .

11-35-3. Penalty for violating §§ 11-35-1, 11-35-2.

Every person who shall violate any of the provisions of §§ 11-35-1 and 11-35-2 shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00) or be imprisoned not exceeding three (3) months.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 57; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 60; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 60; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 68; G.L. 1956, § 11-35-3 .

11-35-4. Injuries to electric or communication lines.

Every person who shall wantonly or willfully and maliciously cut, destroy, break down, or injure, or attempt to cut, destroy, break down, or injure any machine, appliance, or apparatus used for generating electric currents or any electric wire or other appliance or apparatus used for the purpose of conducting or transmitting electric currents for using and furnishing power, motive power, light, or heat, or used for the purpose of transmitting intelligence by means of telegraphic or telephonic apparatus or by means of fire-alarm signals, burglar-alarm signals, police signals, railway signals, or other apparatus or appliance for the transmission of intelligence, or shall cut, destroy, break down, or injure or shall attempt to cut, destroy, break down, or injure any pole, bracket, insulator or other device, apparatus, or appliance for supporting or carrying any electric wire, or shall do any other act interrupting or intended to interrupt the transmission of the electric current over any electric wire, shall be liable to indictment for it, and upon conviction shall be fined not exceeding three thousand dollars ($3,000) or imprisoned not exceeding two (2) years; provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize or permit the attachment, erection, use, operation, or maintenance of any electric wire, apparatus, pole, bracket, insulator, or other device or appliance, upon the property of any person or corporation, without the consent of the owner or owners; nor to prevent any properly authorized person from removing any electric wire, apparatus, pole, bracket, insulator, or other device or appliance for the purpose of permitting the passage of any building or structure, the moving of which has been duly authorized by any city or town council.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 61; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 64; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 64; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 73; G.L. 1956, § 11-35-4 .

Cross References.

Cheating of coin telephones, §§ 11-18-21 , 11-18-22 .

11-35-4.1. Installation of live wires or electrical equipment.

  1. Whoever being engaged in the business of transmitting electricity or installing or repairing live wires or electrical equipment knowingly permits a journeyperson line worker, while on a pole or structure, to work on live wires in excess of seven hundred and fifty (750) volts to ground unless he or she is assisted on or at the base of each pole or structure by a journeyperson line worker, a second year apprentice, or a line worker having a title commonly accepted as the equivalent of the foregoing, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100).
  2. Each violation of this section shall be a separate offense.
  3. This section shall not apply to work done by any person who is commonly called a troubleshooter, who would be employed in the performance of making emergency repairs, locating electrical faults, clearing defective apparatus, and answering service calls.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 195, § 1.

11-35-5. Aiding, abetting, counseling, or procuring line injuries.

Every person who shall aid, assist, abet, counsel, hire, command, or procure any person to do or attempt any of the acts mentioned in § 11-35-4 shall be subject to like fine or imprisonment as provided in that section.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 62; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 65; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 65; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 74; G.L. 1956, § 11-35-5 .

11-35-6. Interference with gas or electric or water meters.

Every person who shall willfully or fraudulently injure or shall knowingly suffer to be injured any wire, meter, pipe, or fittings connected with or belonging to any electric company or gaslight company or connected with or belonging to the waterworks of any corporation in this state supplying water at a stipulated rate of payment, or shall willfully tamper or meddle with any other of the appliances or appurtenances connected with or belonging to any electric company or gaslight company or to the waterworks of a corporation in a manner as to cause loss or damage to the company or corporation, or who shall willfully or fraudulently prevent any meter used for registering the quantity of electricity, gas, or water supplied through it from duly registering the quantity so passing through it, or alter the index of any meter or in any way hinder or interfere with its proper action or just registration, or shall fraudulently use the electricity or fraudulently burn the gas of the company or fraudulently use the water passing through the wire, meter, pipe, fittings, or other of the appliances or appurtenances connected with or belonging to the electric company or gas company or to the waterworks of the corporation, or willfully waste electricity, gas, or water, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000). In any prosecution under this section proof that any wire, meter, pipe, or fittings have been injured, or that any meter has been prevented from duly registering the quantity of electricity, gas, or water supplied through it, while on the premises occupied by the defendant, shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant caused the injury or prevented the meter from duly registering the quantity of electricity, gas, or water supplied through it, willfully and fraudulently and with intent to injure or defraud.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 48; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 51; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 51; P.L. 1930, ch. 1620, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 57; G.L. 1956, § 11-35-6 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 544, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 152, § 1.

11-35-7. Bypassing meters — Use of electricity, gas or water with intent to defraud.

Every person who, with intent to injure or defraud any gaslight company or any electric company, or corporation supplying water in this state at a stipulated rate of payment, shall make or cause to be made any wire, pipe, tube, or other instrument or contrivance, and connect it or cause it to be connected with any main, service pipe, or other pipe, appliance, or appurtenance used for or in connection with the works or apparatus employed for conducting or supplying electricity, illuminating gas, or water, in any manner that is calculated to supply electricity, gas, or water to any burner, orifice, faucet, or other outlet whatsoever, without the electricity, gas, or water passing through a meter provided or used for measuring or registering its quantity so passing through, or without the consent of the company or corporation to the connections, or who shall otherwise use any electricity, gas, or water with the intent to defraud the company or corporation of payment, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000). In any prosecution under this section, proof that any of the acts specified in this section were done on or about the premises occupied by the defendant, or proof of the presence on or about the premises, of any device which affects the diversion of electricity, gas, or water without it being measured or registered by the meter provided, shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant committed the acts, or aided or abetted in their commission, maliciously and with intent to injure or defraud.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 49; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 52; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 52; P.L. 1930, ch. 1620, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 58; G.L. 1956, § 11-35-7 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 544, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 152, § 1.

11-35-8. Interference with electric meter.

Every person who shall willfully or fraudulently injure, or shall knowingly suffer to be injured, any meter, or any wire, fittings, or appliances connected with any meter belonging to any corporation furnishing electric current for light, heat, power, or other purposes at a stipulated rate of payment, or shall willfully tamper or meddle with any other of the appliances or appurtenances connected with any meter belonging to any corporation, in any manner as to cause loss or damage to the corporation, or who shall willfully or fraudulently prevent any meter used for registering the quantity of the electric current supplied through it from duly registering the quantity so passing through it or alter the index in the meter, or in any way hinder or interfere with its proper action or just registration, or shall fraudulently use the electric current of the corporation passing through the meter, wire, fittings, or other of the appliances or appurtenances connected with or belonging to the corporation, or willfully waste electric current, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned not exceeding thirty (30) days or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500). In any prosecution under this section proof that any meter, or any wire, fitting, appliance, or appurtenance connected with it, has been injured, or tampered, or meddled with, or that any meter has been prevented from duly registering the quantity of electric current supplied through it, while on the premises occupied by the defendant, shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant caused the injury or tampered or meddled with the meter, wire, fitting, appliance, or appurtenance, or prevented the meter from duly registering the quantity of electric current supplied through it, willfully and fraudulently and with intent to injure or defraud.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 63; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 66; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 66; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 59; P.L. 1940, ch. 948, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-35-8 .

11-35-9. Bypassing electric meter — Use of electricity with intent to defraud.

Every person who, with intent to injure or defraud any person, persons, association, or corporation generating, conducting, using, or supplying the electric current, either for the purposes of his, her, its or their own business or for the purpose of selling the electric current at a stipulated rate of payment, shall make or cause to be made any wire or other instrument or contrivance and connect it or cause it to be connected with any electric wire, appliance, apparatus or appurtenance used for or in connection with the wires or apparatus employed for generating, conducting, using, or supplying electric current, in any manner that is calculated either to waste and dissipate the electric current or to supply the electric current to any lamp, burner, heater, machine, motor or other apparatus or appliance whatsoever, without the electric current passing through a meter provided by the person, persons, association, or corporation and used for registering the quantity so passing through, or without the consent of the person, persons, association, or corporation to the connections, or who shall otherwise use any electric current with the intent to defraud the person, persons, association or corporation of payment, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned not exceeding thirty (30) days or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500). In any prosecution under this section proof that any of the acts specified in this section was done on or about the premises occupied by the defendant, or proof of the presence on or about the premises of any wire or other instrument or contrivance which effects the waste or dissipation or the diversion of electric current without the electric current being measured or registered by a meter provided for it or without the consent of the person, persons, association, or corporation, shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant committed the acts, or aided or abetted in their commission, maliciously and with intent to injure or defraud.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 60; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 67; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 67; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 60; P.L. 1940, ch. 948, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-35-9 .

11-35-10. Excessive gas or water charges — False meters.

Every person or corporation who shall willfully collect of any person or persons a larger sum for gas or water than appears to be due on inspection of the meter put in to regulate and register it, or shall willfully furnish a meter that shall not correctly register the quantity of gas or water consumed, shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 50; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 53; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 53; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 61; G.L. 1956, § 11-35-10 .

Cross References.

Price discrimination, § 39-2-2 .

Rebates, § 39-2-4 .

Unreasonable preferences, § 39-2-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Monthly Service Charge.

This section does not prevent the collection of a flat monthly charge for service on the meter. Rivelli v. Providence Gas Co., 44 R.I. 76 , 115 A. 461, 1921 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1921).

11-35-11 — 11-35-13. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 44; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 47; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 47; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 47; G.L. ch. 612, §§ 60, 61; P.L. 1949, ch. 2325, § 1; G.L. 1956, §§ 11-35-11 to 11-35-13), concerning wiretapping and the unauthorized disclosure of telegram contents, were repealed by P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 2.

11-35-14. Refusal to relinquish or to damage or to obstruct telephone.

  1. Any person who willfully refuses to relinquish a party line or who obstructs or damages an individual telephone line or telephone set when he or she knows or should have known that the party line, individual telephone line or telephone set is needed for an emergency call to a fire department or police department or for medical aid or ambulance service shall be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than three hundred dollars ($300) or be imprisoned ninety (90) days, or both, or any person who secures the use of a party line by falsely stating that the line is needed for an emergency call shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00) or be imprisoned not exceeding three (3) months.
  2. As used in this section:
    1. “Party line” means a subscriber line telephone circuit consisting of two (2) or more main telephone stations connected with it, each station with a distinctive ring or telephone number; and
    2. “Emergency” means a situation in which property or human life are in jeopardy and the prompt summoning of aid is essential.

History of Section. P.L. 1958, ch. 145, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 346, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations in subsection (b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence of Emergency.

Supreme Court would not consider defendant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence produced at trial to prove that he was guilty of obstructing or damaging a telephone needed for an emergency call in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-35-14 . Because defendant did not raise at trial the issue of whether an emergency existed, as contemplated by § 11-35-14 (b)(2), application of the “raise-or-waive” rule precluded review. State v. Forand, 958 A.2d 134, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 98 (2008).

11-35-15. Notice on telephone book.

A copy of § 11-35-14 , preceded by the word “Warning” in large type, shall be printed in a prominent place in every telephone directory distributed to the members of the general public in this state or in any portion of it after June 1, 1958, which lists the calling numbers of telephones of any telephone exchange located in this state; provided, the provisions of this section shall not apply to those directories distributed solely for business advertising purposes, commonly known as classified directories.

History of Section. P.L. 1958, ch. 145, § 1.

11-35-16. Wrongfully obtaining telecommunication service.

  1. Any person who, with intent to injure or defraud any person, persons, association, or corporation furnishing telecommunications service of the whole or any part of the lawful charge for any service, obtains, attempts to obtain, or aids or abets another in obtaining any telecommunications service by any false representation, false statement, or stratagem, by the unauthorized charging to the account of another, by installing or tampering with any facilities or equipment or by any other means, commits a criminal offense and shall be subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(a) , if the value of or the charges for the service obtained in violation of this section does not exceed one hundred dollars ($100) in any six (6) month period, or be subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(b) , if the value of or the charges for the service exceed one hundred dollars ($100) in any six (6) month period; provided, that this section shall not apply to conduct constituting a violation of the provisions of § 11-18-21 .
  2. As used in this section, “telecommunication service” includes the transmission of any video, audio, or other signal by a community antenna television system licensed pursuant to the provisions of chapter 19 of title 39.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 198, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 316, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

11-35-17. Crank or obscene telephone calls.

  1. Whoever shall originate a transmission by facsimile machine, or other telecommunication device or shall telephone any person repeatedly or cause any person to be telephoned repeatedly for the sole purpose of harassing, annoying, or molesting the other person or his or her family, whether or not conversation ensues; or whoever shall originate a transmission by facsimile machine, or other telecommunication device or shall telephone any person for the purpose of using any threatening, vulgar, indecent, obscene, or immoral language over the telephone, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
  2. This section shall not be construed to impose any liability upon providers of telecommunications services.

History of Section. P.L. 1965, ch. 195, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 278, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

This section sets forth two related but separate offenses, and conviction of juvenile in delinquency proceeding for making threatening calls, when he had been charged with making harassing and annoying calls, violated his due process right to be tried on a specific charge. In re Fiske, 117 R.I. 454 , 367 A.2d 1069, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1710 (1977).

Intent.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-35-17 clearly mandates that the caller’s intent to violate the statute had to exist when the telephone call was initiated. State v. Marshall, 793 A.2d 196, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 50 (2002).

In determining whether defendant had the specific intent to harass or use obscene language at the time of making a telephone call, a fact-finder may draw reasonable inferences from the nature and contents of the entire telephone call in order to determine if the caller’s intent to threaten did or did not exist when the telephone call was initiated. State v. Marshall, 793 A.2d 196, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 50 (2002).

Collateral References.

Validity, construction and application of Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 USCS § 227). 132 A.L.R. Fed. 625.

11-35-18. Bomb threats and similar false reports.

Whoever, knowing the report to be false, transmits or causes to be transmitted to any person by telephone or other means a communication falsely reporting the location of any explosive or other dangerous substance or contrivance, causing anxiety, unrest, fear, or personal discomfort by that false report to any person or group of persons, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment at the adult correctional institutions for not more than ten (10) years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both fine and imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1965, ch. 195, § 1.

Collateral References.

Imposition of state or local penalties for threatening to use explosive devices at schools or other buildings. 79 A.L.R.5th 1.

Validity, construction, and application of 18 U.S.C.S. § 844(e), prohibiting use of mail, telephone, telegraph, or other instrument of commerce to convey bomb threat. 160 A.L.R. Fed. 625.

11-35-19. Prosecution for violations of §§ 11-35-17, 11-35-18.

The crimes described in §§ 11-35-17 and 11-35-18 may be prosecuted and punished in the territorial jurisdiction in which the communication originates or is received.

History of Section. P.L. 1965, ch. 195, § 1.

11-35-20. Termination of service.

Every person or corporation who shall willfully for non-payment of charges cut off, discontinue, or otherwise terminate gas, electric, water, telephone, light, heat, or power service to any domestic or institutional user on either Friday, Saturday, or Sunday or at any time when the office of the person or corporation is not open for business or the day before any legal holiday shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 1968, ch. 38, § 1.

11-35-20.1. Wrongful termination or disruption of service.

  1. Any person who has been served an order issued pursuant to chapter 8.1 of title 8, or chapters 5 or 15 of title 15 who causes the interruption of any utility service by false presentation or other means at the residence of the person(s) protected by a protective order issued pursuant to chapter 8.1 of title 8, or chapters 5 or 15 of title 15 shall constitute harassment.
  2. Any person subject to an order issued pursuant to chapter 8.1 of title 8, or chapters 5 or 15 of title 15 who wishes to remove their name from a utility bill and terminate their future financial responsibility for making payments on that bill must first seek approval from the court that issued the protective order.
    1. The court shall not allow any person, upon his or her own motion, to remove his or her name from a utility bill and terminate their financial responsibility with respect to the utility bill without first ensuring that the preexisting balance owed to the utility has been satisfied and that the person(s) covered by the protective order is able to establish an account under his or her own name without the need to make a deposit that causes hardship, and is capable of fulfilling their financial obligations towards the utility in the future.
  3. Nothing in this section shall prevent a person protected by an order issued pursuant to chapter 8.1 of title 8, or chapters 5 or 15 of title 15 from transferring a utility bill into his or her name and assuming any and all obligations to the utility.
  4. Any person who shall wrongfully terminate or disrupt any utility service in violation of this section shall be guilty of a violation and subject to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 447, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 448, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 447, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 448, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-35-21. Unauthorized interception, disclosure or use of wire, electronic, or oral communication.

  1. Except as otherwise specifically provided in chapter 5.1 of title 12, any person: (1) who willfully intercepts, attempts to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or attempt to intercept, any wire, electronic, or oral communication; (2) who willfully discloses or attempts to disclose to any person the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication, knowing, or having reason to know that the information was obtained through interception of a wire, electronic, or oral communication in violation of this section; or (3) who willfully uses or attempts to use the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication, knowing, or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through interception of a wire, electronic, or oral communication in violation of this section; shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years.
  2. The provisions of subdivisions (a)(2) and (3) of this section shall not apply to the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication, or evidence derived from those contents, which has become common knowledge or public information.
  3. It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for:
    1. An operator of a switchboard, or an officer, agent, or employee of a communication common carrier, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire, electronic, or oral communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his or her employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his or her service or to the protection of the rights or property of the carrier of the communication. No communication common carrier shall utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks;
    2. A person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication, where that person is a party to the communication, or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception; or
    3. A person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication, where the person is a party to the communication, or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in the violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of any state or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55 § 3; P.L. 1999, ch. 167, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Instructions.

The trial court’s failure to read to the jury the statutory definition of “intercept” and “intercepting device” was not reversible error since he read § 11-35-21(a) to the jury verbatim and he carefully instructed the jurors that the defendant could not be convicted of the offense charged unless there was an interception of an “oral communication.” State v. O'Brien, 774 A.2d 89, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 178 (2001).

The trial court’s refusal to give a “for the purpose of” instruction did not constitute reversible error since remarks by the court that the state had to show that the violation was “willful” injected into its instructions the correct reading of the law, since “willful” means “intentional” in the context of the state wiretapping statute, and since intentional in this context is functionally equivalent to “for the purpose of.” State v. O'Brien, 774 A.2d 89, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 178 (2001).

Participant Monitoring.

Participant monitoring of phone conversations does not entail a significant invasion of privacy so as to violate R.I. Const., art. 1, § 6 . State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1423 (1981).

In situations where an individual consents to having his communications monitored, subsection (c)(2) of this section, and not chapter 5.1 of title 12, applies. State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1423 (1981).

Videotape.

The audio portion of a video recorder, like a tape recorder, is covered by the scope of the state wiretap statute. State v. O'Brien, 774 A.2d 89, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 178 (2001).

Collateral References.

Applicability, in civil action, of provisions of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, prohibiting interception of communications (18 USCS § 2511(1)), to interception by spouse, or spouse’s agent, of conversations of other spouse. 139 A.L.R. Fed. 517.

11-35-22. Offenses in connection with authorized interception of communications.

Except as otherwise specifically provided in chapter 5.1 of title 12, any person: (1) who willfully edits, alters, or tampers with any tape, transcription, or other sound recording, or knows of the editing, altering, or tampering, and presents the recording in any judicial proceeding or proceeding under oath, without fully indicating the nature of the changes made and the original state of the recording; or (2) who willfully discloses to any person any information concerning or contained in the application for or the granting or denial of orders for interception, renewals, notice, or return on an ex parte order granted pursuant to this section, or the contents of any document, tape, or recording kept in accordance with chapter 5.1 of title 12; shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 3.

11-35-23. Failure to report to law enforcement officers.

An employee of any communication common carrier who has knowledge obtained during the course of that employment of any violation of this chapter and willfully fails to report that knowledge within seven (7) days to the attorney general shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 3.

11-35-24. Possession, sale, distribution, manufacture and advertising of intercepting device.

  1. Any person who willfully and knowingly possesses, sells, distributes, manufactures, assembles, or places in any publication any advertisement of, an intercepting device, the design of which renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of a wire or oral communication shall be imprisoned not more than five (5) years and fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000);
  2. It shall not be unlawful under this section for a communication common carrier or an officer, agent, or employee of, or a person under contract with, a communication common carrier, in the usual course of the communication common carrier’s business, or a person under contract with the United States or a state or a political subdivision of it, or an officer, agent, or employee of a state or a political subdivision of it, to possess, sell, distribute, manufacture, assemble, or advertise any intercepting device, while acting in furtherance of the appropriate activities of the United States or a state or political subdivision of it or a communication common carrier.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 55, § 3.

11-35-25. Fraudulent communication devices.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person to willfully make, manufacture, assemble, possess, possess with intent to sell, sell, give, or otherwise transfer to another, or offer or place in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement to sell, give, or otherwise transfer to another or purchase or in any other manner obtain, receive, or conceal any electronic, mechanical, or other device, instrument, apparatus, or equipment, or plans, specifications, instructions, or other information for making, manufacturing, assembling, or using any device, instrument, apparatus, or other equipment or to publish any plans, specifications, instructions, or other information with intent to use it or know or have reason to know that it is intended to be used or that its design renders it primarily useful to obtain any communication or community antenna television service from a company providing that service, by rearranging, tampering with, or making any unauthorized connection, whether physically, electronically, acoustically, inductively, or otherwise to any telephone or community antenna television instrument, equipment, or facility of any company, to avoid the payment, in whole or in part, of the lawful charge for the communication or community antenna television service or to conceal from any company or from lawful authority the existence or place of origin or termination of any communication, or by using any communication or community antenna television service knowing or having reason to know that the rearrangement, tampering, or connection existed at the time of use.
  2. Any person who is convicted of willfully making, manufacturing, assembling, or possessing with the intent to sell, or who sells, gives or otherwise transfers to another, or offers or places in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement to sell, or give, or otherwise transfers to another any devices and/or instruments as described in this section shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, may be imprisoned for not more than three (3) years, or fined not more than three thousand dollars ($3,000), or both.
  3. Any person who is convicted of having possession of any devices, instruments and/or plans as described in this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, may, except as provided in this section, be imprisoned for not more than one year, or fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both; provided, that any person who is convicted of having possession of any devices, instruments, and/or plans relative to a community antenna television system or instruments, equipment or facilities in connection with it as described in this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, may be fined up to one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 60, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 316, § 1.

Cross References.

Fraudulent use of telecommunication services through credit cards, § 11-49-6.1 .

11-35-26. Automatic telephone dialing systems failing to disconnect.

  1. Any person who operates an automatic telephone dialing system in this state which fails within five (5) seconds after the called party hangs up to automatically create a disconnect signal or an on-hook condition which allows the called party’s line to be released shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars ($200) for each occurrence.
  2. As used in this section, “automatic telephone dialing system” means any automatic terminal equipment which is capable of storing numbers to be called or producing numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and with the ability to call those numbers, and which is capable of delivering a prerecorded message to the number called with or without manual assistance.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 59, § 1.

11-35-27. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1989, ch. 539, § 1), concerning unsolicited facsimile machine advertising, was repealed by P.L. 1999, ch. 479, § 2, effective July 8, 1999. For similar provisions, see chapter 47 of title 6.

11-35-28. Trespassing on utility right-of-way.

Every person who, without right, knowingly makes attachments to, or disposes on, the facilities or the rights-of-way of any electric, gas, telephone, or water utility, shall be subject to a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) per incident, plus the cost of repair of the facility or right-of-way from the action. The fine shall be payable to the general fund of the municipality where the incident occurred.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 482, § 1.

11-35-29. Trespassing on utility property.

Every person who, without right, willfully trespasses and remains upon the land or premises of any utility, after having been forbidden to do so by the owner, agent, or the person having control over the premises of the facility, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or be imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 378, § 1.

Chapter 35.1 Theft of Telecommunication Services

11-35.1-1. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter:

  1. “Manufacture of an unlawful telecommunications device” means to design, produce, assemble, duplicate, modify, alter, program or reprogram a telecommunication device that:
    1. Duplicates the identity of an authorized telecommunication service used for sale and distribution without the consent of the telecommunication service provider; or
    2. Is capable of acquiring or facilitating the acquisition of telecommunication service without the consent of the telecommunication service provider.
  2. “Sell” means to transfer for consideration or agree to do so.
  3. “Telecommunication device” means any type of instrument, device, apparatus, machine or equipment which is designed to or is capable of transmitting or receiving telephonic, electronic, or radio communications or any part of an instrument, device, machine or equipment, or computer circuit, computer chip, electronic mechanism or any other component, which is capable of facilitating the transmission or reception of telephonic, electronic or radio communications.
  4. “Telecommunication service” means any service provided for a charge or compensation to facilitate the origination, transmission, emission or reception of signs, signals, data, writing, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by telephone, including cellular or wireless telephones, wire, radio, television, video, optical or other electromagnetic system.
  5. “Telecommunication provider” means a person or entity providing telecommunication service including, but not limited to, a commercial mobile radio service company or other person or entity which, for a fee, supplies the facility, cell site, mobile telephone switching office or other equipment or telecommunication service.
  6. “Unlawful telecommunication device” means any electronic serial number, mobile identification number, personal identification number of any telecommunication device that is manufactured, altered, modified, programmed or reprogrammed alone or in conjunction with another device or other equipment for the purpose of intentionally acquiring or facilitating the acquisition of a telecommunication service without the consent of the telecommunication service provider. These unlawful devices include, but are not limited to, tumbler phones, clone phones, tumbler microchips, clone microchips and other instruments capable of disguising their identity or location or of gaining access to a communications system operated by a telecommunication service provider.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 181, § 1.

Collateral References.

Civil Liability Under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) for Unauthorized Interception or Viewing of Satellite Television Broadcasts. 55 A.L.R. Fed 2d 419.

11-35.1-2. Criminal offense.

  1. A criminal offense is committed by:
    1. Any person who intentionally obtains or attempts to obtain telecommunication service by the use of an unlawful telecommunication device.
    2. Any person who makes, distributes, possesses or assembles an unlawful telecommunication device, or plans or instructions for making the same, under circumstances evidencing an intent to use or employ such unlawful telecommunication device.
    3. Any person who engages in the business for profit or economic gain of selling or offering for sale an unlawful telecommunication device.
    1. A person is guilty of theft of telecommunications service for profit or economic gain when he or she:
      1. Engages in the business for profit or economic gain of tampering or making connection with the equipment of a supplier of a telecommunication service without the consent of the supplier, for the purpose of supplying that service on one or more occasions;
      2. Engages in the business for profit or economic gain of offering for sale to any person other than the supplier of a telecommunication service any decoder, descrambler or other device or the unauthorized use of a confidential identification or authorization code, the principal function of which defeats the electronic signal encryption jamming or individually addressed switching imposed by the supplier for the purpose of restricting the delivery of that service to persons who pay for the service;
      3. Without the consent of the supplier of the service, engages in the business for profit or economic gain of connecting or disconnecting the fiber optic, cables, conduits, wires, conductors, attachments or other electromagnetic system of the supplier;
      4. Conceals or assists another to conceal from any telecommunication service provider or from any lawful authority the existence or place of origin or destination of any telecommunication.
    2. There shall be a rebuttable presumption of intent that a person is engaged in the business for profit or economic gain of offering for sale a decoder, descrambler or other device or a confidential identification or authorization code in violation of paragraph (1)(ii) of this subsection if the person has three (3) or more decoders, descramblers or other devices or confidential identification or authorization codes in his or her possession or under his or her control.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 181, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision and paragraph designations in subsection (b).

11-35.1-3. Civil actions.

Any person aggrieved by acts constituting a violation of § 11-35.1-2 may bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district where the violation occurred for relief including a temporary or permanent injunction and damages. In addition to any other relief, the court may, in its discretion, award costs and reasonable attorney’s fee.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 181, § 1.

11-35.1-4. Penalties.

A person who commits an offense in violation of this chapter shall be fined not more than thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), or by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five (5) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 181, § 1.

Chapter 36 Railroads and Carriers

11-36-1. Hindering passage of trains — Placing explosives near highways, buildings, or tracks.

Every person who shall willfully place upon any railroad track any substance or thing with intent to hinder or impede the passage of any locomotive engine or car over the railroad, or shall willfully do any other act, matter, or thing, with intent to hinder, impede, or interrupt the passage of the locomotive engine or car, or whoever willfully throws into, against, or upon, or puts, places, or explodes, or causes to be exploded, in, upon or near a public highway, building, monument, bridge, railroad track, or car on it, or vessel, any gunpowder or other explosive substance, or a bombshell, torpedo, or any instrument or package filled or loaded with an explosive substance, with intent unlawfully to destroy or injure the highway, building, monument, bridge, railroad track, car, or vessel, or any person or property, in, on or near the highway, building, monument, highway, bridge, railroad track, car, or vessel, shall be imprisoned not less than two (2) years nor more than twenty (20) years, or be fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 29; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 30; P.L. 1909, ch. 429, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 30; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 30; G.L. 1956, § 11-36-1 ; P.L. 1987, ch. 76, § 1.

Cross References.

Blocking of frogs, switches, and guardrails, § 39-7-2 .

11-36-2. Unauthorized stopping of train.

Whoever willfully or maliciously stops, or causes to be stopped, a train on a railroad for the purpose of entering, leaving, or wantonly delaying it shall be fined not less than five dollars ($5.00) nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 30; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 31; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 31; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 31; G.L. 1956, § 11-36-2 .

Collateral References.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance specifically criminalizing passenger misconduct on public transportation. 78 A.L.R.4th 1127.

11-36-3. Throwing missiles at train.

Whoever willfully throws or shoots a missile at a locomotive engine, railroad, or street railway car, or other means of public conveyance, or at a person on the engine or car or conveyance, or in any way assaults or interferes with a conductor, engineer, brake operator, driver, or motor operator while in discharge of his or her duty on or near a railroad engine, car, or train, or on or near a street railway car or other means of public conveyance, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or be imprisoned not more than one year. Any violation of the provisions of this section which results in a personal injury to an employee or passenger shall be considered a felony, punishable by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding three (3) years, or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 31; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 32; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 32; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 32; G.L. 1956, § 11-36-3 ; P.L. 1962, ch. 144, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 154, § 1.

11-36-4. Injuring railroad signals or signal lines.

Whoever unlawfully and intentionally injures, molests, or destroys any electric or other signal of a railroad corporation, or any line, wire, post, or other structure or mechanism used in connection with a signal on a railroad, or destroys, or in any way interferes with, the proper working of the signal, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment not exceeding two (2) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 32; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 33; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 33; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 33; G.L. 1956, § 11-36-4 .

11-36-5. Loitering on railroad or bus line property.

Every person who shall loiter or remain about or in any station house of any railroad corporation or the station house or terminal of any bus line or bus company or upon the platforms, tracks, or grounds of any company or corporation, adjoining any station or terminal, after being requested to leave by any officer or agent of the company operating or using the facilities, shall be fined not less than five dollars ($5.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 33; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 34; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 34; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 34; G.L. 1956, § 11-36-5 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 22, § 1.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of loitering statutes and ordinances. 72 A.L.R.5th 1.

11-36-6. Trespassing on railroad right-of-way.

Every person who without right knowingly stands or walks, or rides a bicycle or other vehicle on the private right-of-way of any railroad or railway operated by steam or other power, except for the purpose of crossing it at a highway or other authorized crossing, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or be imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Any person violating this section may be arrested without a warrant by any police officer or any special railroad police officer and proceeded against according to law.

History of Section. P.L. 1899, ch. 613, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 35; P.L. 1913, ch. 953, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 35; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 35; G.L. 1956, § 11-36-6 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 76, § 1.

Cross References.

Duties of sheriffs, § 42-29-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Burden of Proof.

Where accused walked down the ties between railroad tracks and was charged with a violation of this section pertaining to such conduct, the state has the burden of proof as to every element of the offense and where it did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that accused was on the tracks without right, the conviction was reversed. State v. Clark, 105 R.I. 709 , 254 A.2d 765, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1969).

Duty of Railroad.

Railroad owed no greater duty to one violating this section than to abstain from wilfully or wantonly injuring him, even though public may have been in habit of trespassing at same place over a long period. Boday v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 53 R.I. 207 , 165 A. 448, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1933).

11-36-7. Posting of statute.

A printed copy of § 11-36-6 shall be conspicuously posted in a public place in or upon each passenger station of every railroad and railway operated by steam or other power in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1899, ch. 613, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 36; P.L. 1913, ch. 953, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 36; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 11-36-7 .

11-36-8. Removal of waste or packing from journal boxes.

Every person who shall willfully and maliciously take or remove the waste or packing from out of any journal box or boxes of any locomotive, engine, tender, carriage, coach, car, caboose, or truck used or operated upon any railroad, whether operated by steam or electricity, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned not more than three (3) years or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 1905, ch. 1217, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 37; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 37; G.L. 1956, § 11-36-8 .

11-36-9. Obstruction of street railway company.

Every person who shall willfully and maliciously obstruct a street railway company in the use of its tracks, or willfully and maliciously delay or obstruct the passing of its cars or carriages, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding three thousand dollars ($3,000) or by imprisonment not exceeding two (2) years; provided, that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to interfere with the necessary work of laying and repairing any gas or water pipes or sewers, or the necessary and reasonable obstruction of tracks by vehicles in the process of loading and unloading not prohibited by any town or city ordinance. Every person who shall aid, assist, abet, counsel, hire, command, or procure any person to do or attempt any of the acts mentioned in this section shall be subject to fine or imprisonment pursuant to this section.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, §§ 65, 66; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, §§ 68, 69; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, §§ 68, 69; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, §§ 75, 76; G.L. 1956, § 11-36-9 .

Cross References.

Obstruction of highway crossing, § 39-8-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Speed of Trains.

In view of this section, the speed of a railway car need be governed only so as to give others the time to get off the track on warning of the approach of the car, rather than so as to permit the car to be stopped within the range of its headlight. Vizacchero v. Rhode Island Co., 26 R.I. 392 , 59 A. 105, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 94 (1904).

11-36-10. Evasion of payment of fare.

Every person who shall fraudulently evade or attempt to evade the payment of any fare, rate or toll lawfully established by any railroad company, or a street railway company, or a toll bridge company, or by the owners or charterers of any steamboat or ferryboat, or by any steamship company, or by any owner or operator of a motor bus holding a certificate from the public utility commission, or by the Rhode Island public transit authority, either by giving a false answer to the collector of the fare, rate, or toll, or by presenting for his or her fare, rate, or toll a ticket good only for the transportation of another person, or by traveling beyond the point to which he or she may have paid his or her fare, rate, or toll, or by leaving the train, car, bridge, steamboat, ferryboat, or steamship without having paid the fair, rate, or toll established for the distance traveled, or otherwise, shall be fined twenty dollars ($20.00) for each offense.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 43; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 46; P.L. 1916, ch. 1391, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 46; P.L. 1930, ch. 1534, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 46; G.L. 1956, § 11-36-10 ; P.L. 1997, ch. 151, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “commission” for “administration”.

Cross References.

Certificates for excess fare paid on train, failure to redeem, § 39-9-12 .

Ejection of passenger, § 39-7-8 .

Collateral References.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance specifically criminalizing passenger misconduct on public transportation. 78 A.L.R.4th 1127.

11-36-11. Unauthorized presence on locomotive or freight train.

Every person who shall without right attach himself or herself to or shall be in or upon any locomotive, locomotive tender, freight car, or freight train upon any railroad track shall be fined not more than twenty dollars ($20.00), or be imprisoned not more than ten (10) days, or both. Any person violating this section may be arrested without a warrant by any police officer, or any railroad police officer, and proceeded against according to law.

History of Section. P.L. 1909, ch. 373, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 73; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 81; G.L. 1956, § 11-36-11 .

Collateral References.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance specifically criminalizing passenger misconduct on public transportation. 78 A.L.R.4th 1127.

11-36-12. Profiteering on tickets.

No person shall resell or offer for resale a ticket or tickets for passage of a person on a common carrier at an increase in price in excess of one dollar ($1.00) over the established rate for the passage and, whenever the resale is completed, the seller shall give to the purchaser a receipt indicating the amount paid for the ticket or tickets. Any person found guilty of violating the provisions of this section shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 59; P.L. 1944, ch. 1415, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-36-12 .

Cross References.

Rebates, penalty, § 39-2-4 .

11-36-13. Tampering with railroad switches.

Whoever unlawfully removes, turns, destroys, or tampers with any railroad switch or in any way interferes with the proper working of a switch shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment not exceeding three (3) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 76, § 1.

11-36-14. “Railroad corporation” and “company” defined.

“Railroad corporation” and “railroad company,” wherever used in this chapter, include in their meaning the National Railroad Foundation and Museum.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 60, § 1.

Chapter 37 Sexual Assault

11-37-1. Definitions.

The following words and phrases, when used in this chapter, have the following meanings:

  1. “Accused” means a person accused of a sexual assault.
  2. “Force or coercion” means when the accused does any of the following:
    1. Uses or threatens to use a weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon.
    2. Overcomes the victim through the application of physical force or physical violence.
    3. Coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence on the victim and the victim reasonably believes that the accused has the present ability to execute these threats.
    4. Coerces the victim to submit by threatening to at some time in the future murder, inflict serious bodily injury upon or kidnap the victim or any other person and the victim reasonably believes that the accused has the ability to execute this threat.
  3. “Intimate parts” means the genital or anal areas, groin, inner thigh, or buttock of any person or the breast of a female.
  4. “Mentally disabled” means a person who has a mental impairment which renders that person incapable of appraising the nature of the act.
  5. “Mentally incapacitated” means a person who is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance administered to that person without his or her consent, or who is mentally unable to communicate unwillingness to engage in the act.
  6. “Physically helpless” means a person who is unconscious, asleep, or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.
  7. “Sexual contact” means the intentional touching of the victim’s or accused’s intimate parts, clothed or unclothed, if that intentional touching can be reasonably construed as intended by the accused to be for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or assault.
  8. “Sexual penetration” means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, by any part of a person’s body or by any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, or the victim’s own body upon the accused’s instruction, but emission of semen is not required.
  9. “Spouse” means a person married to the accused at the time of the alleged sexual assault, except that such persons shall not be considered the spouse if the couple are living apart and a decision for divorce has been granted, whether or not a final decree has been entered.
  10. “Victim” means the person alleging to have been subjected to sexual assault.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2; P.L. 1980, ch. 273, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 152, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 204, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 13; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 13.

Repealed Sections.

The former chapter (G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 5; G.L. 1896, ch. 281, §§ 3 — 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, §§ 3 — 5; G.L., ch. 347, § 8, as enacted by P.L. 1915, ch. 1219, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, §§ 3 — 5, 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, §§ 3 — 5, 8; G.L. 1956, §§ 11-37-1 11-37-6 ; R.P.L. 1957, ch. 31, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 7; P.L. 1979, ch. 141, § 1), concerning rape and seduction, was repealed by P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 1, and the present material substituted therefor.

Cross References.

Additional penalty for carrying arms while committing crime, §§ 11-47-3 , 11-47-20 .

Assault with intent to commit sexual assault, § 11-5-1 .

Entry with intent to commit sexual assault, § 11-8-3 et seq.

Killing in perpetration of sexual assault, § 11-23-1 .

Law Reviews.

Caselaw Survey Section: Tort Law, see 4 R.W.U.L. Rev. 808 (1999).

Matthew Gustaitis, 2016 Survey, Cases: In re B.H., 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 824 (2017).

Comparative Legislation.

Sexual assault:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-70 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Effect of Amendments to Crime Against Nature Statute.

The trial justice did not err in determining that the preservation of abominable and detestable crime against nature charges against the defendant would have been inconsistent with the manifest intention of the legislature to decriminalize sodomy between consenting adults and that such preservation would be repugnant to the statute as amended. State v. Mullen, 740 A.2d 783, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 195 (1999).

Force and Coercion.

Subdivision (2)(C) encompasses implied, as well as express threats. State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 433 (1987), limited, State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 54 (2007).

Where the evidence tended to show that defendant, a uniformed police officer armed with handcuffs and a gun, used his position of authority to intimidate an alcoholic young woman into performing oral sex upon him, it was held that the defendant’s position of authority, in and of itself, carried with it an implied threat, and this appearance of authority, combined with the fact that defendant was armed, and the peculiar vulnerability of the victim, were sufficient to support a jury verdict that defendant coerced submission by impliedly threatening the victim within the meaning of subdivision (2)(C). State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 433 (1987), limited, State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 54 (2007).

There is an element of forcible compulsion, or the threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution, inherent in the situation in which an adult who is with a child who is younger, smaller, less psychologically and emotionally mature, and less sophisticated than the adult, instructs the child to submit to the performance of sexual acts. State v. St. Amant, 536 A.2d 897, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1988).

There is no requirement in paragraph (C) that the threat be made during the actual commission of the sexual act. State v. Maggs, 588 A.2d 601, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1991).

The trial justice properly denied defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal where the only disputed issue was the use of force or coercion. Although the defendant made no specific threats of bodily harm, a guilty verdict could still be reached based on defendant’s threats of impending anger, physical restrictions of the victim and demand for sexual acts. State v. Lamoureux, 623 A.2d 9, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1993).

A defendant who used his position of authority in the household to order his step-daughter into the bedroom and, after placing her in a position of vulnerability, engaged in sexual contact with her, made “implied threats” constituting the use of force or coercion within this meaning of this section. State v. Brown, 619 A.2d 828, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1993).

With regard to defendant’s conviction for sexual assault wherein a trial justice found that all of the ingredients were present and his conclusion that all of the relevant hallmarks of force or coercion, both physical and psychological, were part of defendant’s misconduct, the appellate court vacated the conviction and remanded the case for the trial justice to conduct an independent examination of the evidence to determine whether the State had established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of the charged crimes based solely on physical force. Because the trial justice erroneously found force and coercion by implied threats, the appellate court was uncertain about whether defendant was convicted based on a finding of force and coercion by physical force beyond a reasonable doubt which was separate and apart from the error. State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 54 (2007).

— Evidence.

The victim’s testimony that the defendant pulled her down, that he physically prevented her from getting away from him and that he attempted to push her legs apart with his own so that he could penetrate her is sufficient to establish that the sexual activity was “by force or coercion” rather than by consent. State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1080 (1983), limited, State v. Bernier, 491 A.2d 1000, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 495 (1985).

There is sufficient evidence of force to warrant submitting second degree sexual assault charges to the jury, where defendant, a schoolteacher, touched and grabbed a student unexpectedly on three occasions and there is ample proof that the student did not consent to the touchings. State v. Goodreau, 560 A.2d 318, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1989).

Jury could infer that defendant’s prior beating of the victim had the effect of coercing her to engage in a sexual act, where only a few minutes passed between the beating and the sexual act. State v. Maggs, 588 A.2d 601, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1991).

Where the evidence showed that defendant, a 200-pound man, physically forced the complainant, a teenage boy, to his knees for oral sex, while the teenage boy was crying and the complainant was unable to move and was in a position of helplessness, the State proved “force or coercion.” State v. Lynch, 19 A.3d 51, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 54 (2011).

Mental Disability.

Where defendant was accused of first-degree sexual assault of a developmentally disabled woman under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 , the expert’s testimony was sufficient to establish that the victim was mentally disabled under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(4) , as the expert testified that the victim lacked the ability to make informed decisions about sexual contact. State v. Gardiner, 895 A.2d 703, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 55 (2006).

Nolo Contendere Plea.

Denial of an inmate’s postconviction relief petition was proper because the inmate’s Alford plea to second-degree child molestation was voluntary, intelligent, and knowing for R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 11 purposes and the inmate was well aware of the nature of the charges against him at the time he pled to them; it was acceptable for the trial justice to rely on the prosecutor’s recitation of the State’s evidence to establish the factual basis. The inmate failed to satisfy his burden of proving that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Camacho v. State, 58 A.3d 182, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 10 (2013).

Penetration.

Defendant’s motion for acquittal based on lack of actual penetration failed under this section, which only requires “sexual penetration,” which includes the act of cunnilingus. State v. Cembrola, 469 A.2d 362, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1124 (1983).

Repeal of Indecent Assault Law.

Where in a prosecution for indecent assault pursuant to former § 11-37-6 , the information was not filed until June 24, 1980, there was no prosecution pending when the legislature repealed the indecent-assault section on May 9, 1979. Therefore, the general savings clause of § 43-3-23 did not apply, and defendant’s conviction for indecent assault was reversed. State v. Souza, 456 A.2d 775, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 815 (1983).

Repeal of Rape Law.

The effect of the repeal of former § 11-37-1 (rape) and enactment of present chapter 37 of title 11 as it relates to the crime of rape was merely amendatory in nature; there was never a time when the elements of that offense were not considered criminal and capable of prosecution. State v. Babbitt, 457 A.2d 1049, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 829 (1983).

Sexual Contact.

The trial justice committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jurors that they were required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s contact with his niece was for the purpose of his sexual arousal, gratification, or assault, in order to convict under the second-degree sexual-assault statutes, i.e., this section and § 11-37-4 . State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1992).

The evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction where, regardless of any specific physical arousal of the defendant, the victim’s testimony taken as a whole clearly indicated that the defendant committed the touching for the purpose of sexual gratification. In re David G., 741 A.2d 863, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 212 (1999).

Evidence that a defendant accused of molesting his young granddaughter was impotent was not dispositive of whether he was capable of committing second-degree child molestation; sexual contact with a purpose of arousal could occur even in the absence of the ability to be physically aroused. State v. Silvia, 798 A.2d 419, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 143 (2002).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motions for a judgment of acquittal, R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 29 , and for a new trial, R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 , following defendant’s conviction of second-degree child molestation pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.3 . Defendant’s deliberate act of fondling his 10 year old stepdaughter could not be characterized as accidental and could reasonably be construed as intended by defendant for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification, and therefore constituted sexual conduct as defined by R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(7) . State v. Tracy, 816 A.2d 1275, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 41 (2003).

Juvenile was properly adjudicated as a delinquent for engaging in second-degree child molestation sexual assault because the evidence showed that the juvenile entered the room where the victim was sleeping on two occasions and touched the victim on the second occasion by placing the juvenile’s fingers over the victim’s vagina and underwear for the purpose of the juvenile’s sexual gratification. In re Kyle A., 137 A.3d 706, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 52 (2016).

Although the minor victim did not explicitly offer testimony that defendant’s hand touched her vagina in describing every occasion of sexual assault, the victim’s testimony on certain counts sufficiently referred back to an earlier assault in that defendant was “doing the same thing as the other times” and created a nexus between her testimony and the body part delineated in the statute, her genital area. State v. Cavanaugh, 158 A.3d 268, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 48 (2017).

Sexual Penetration.

The definition of sexual penetration is unambiguous and specific; the Attorney General and the courts do not have unlimited discretion as to what constitutes the crime of sexual assault. When the court instructs a jury or when the state seeks an indictment, neither may exercise any discretion because this section specifically defines sexual penetration. Jacques v. State, 669 A.2d 1124, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 292 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1212, 116 S. Ct. 1833, 134 L. Ed. 2d 937, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3335 (1996).

All that is required to establish the first-degree sexual offense of cunnilingus is for the defendant to lick or kiss the female genitalia, and penetration of the vagina is not necessary. State v. Beaulieu, 674 A.2d 377, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1996).

The mere fact that a minor victim closed her lips, made a pouting motion, and exhaled during her demonstration on the stand did not necessarily indicate a lack of the requisite oral contact with the respondent’s penis for fellatio to have occurred, and the trial justice was not clearly wrong in concluding that the evidence was both legally competent and sufficient to establish the act of fellatio. In re Ryan B., 739 A.2d 232, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 188 (1999).

Victim’s testimony that defendant touched her genitalia with his mouth when he sucked on her private part was sufficient to constitute cunnilingus and thus, sexual penetration. State v. Higham, 865 A.2d 1040, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 202 (2004).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal because there was sufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt of first-degree child molestation beyond a reasonable doubt; the victim’s testimony as to the incident showed that defendant vaginally penetrated her, and the victim’s testimony, in light of her clarification, was sufficiently “precise” and “specific” to prove penetration beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rainey, 175 A.3d 1169, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 5 (2018).

Where the trial justice denied defendant’s motion for a new trial after the jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and two counts of second-degree child molestation sexual assault of his daughter, the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive any material evidence, nor did she clearly err; the trial justice applied the appropriate standard to her review of the evidence, and after finding that reasonable minds could differ with her own conclusions, she properly denied the motion. State v. Mensah, 227 A.3d 474, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 32 (2020).

Collateral References.

Acquittal, directing for insufficiency of the evidence. 17 A.L.R. 923.

Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-related offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal fluids. 75 A.L.R.4th 897.

Admissibility of actuarial risk assessment testimony in proceeding to commit sex offender. 20 A.L.R.6th 607.

Competency of prosecutrix as witness in prosecution for rape of feeble-minded female. 26 A.L.R. 1502; 148 A.L.R. 1153.

Compulsory examination of one accused of rape for venereal disease. 2 A.L.R. 1332; 22 A.L.R. 1189.

Crimes against spouse within exception permitting testimony by one spouse against other in criminal prosecution — modern state cases. 74 A.L.R.4th 223.

Criminal responsibility of husband for rape, or assault to commit rape, on wife. 24 A.L.R.4th 105.

Denial or restriction of visitation rights to parent charged with sexually abusing child. 1 A.L.R.5th 776.

Evidence of complaint by victim of rape who is not a witness. 157 A.L.R. 1359.

Exhibition of child in prosecution for seduction. 1 A.L.R. 622.

Forgiveness or compromise as defense to prosecution for seduction. 80 A.L.R. 833.

“Infamous offense,” rape as, within constitutional or statutory provision in relation to presentment or indictment by grand jury. 24 A.L.R. 1016.

Marital privilege under Rule 501 of Federal Rules of Evidence.46 A.L.R. Fed. 735.

Marriage subsequent to crime as bar to prosecution for rape. 9 A.L.R. 339.

Offer of marriage as defense to prosecution for seduction. 80 A.L.R. 845.

Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by trial court. 29 A.L.R. 333; 89 A.L.R. 317.

Running of limitations against action for civil damages for sexual abuse of child. 9 A.L.R.5th 321.

Sufficiency of allegations or evidence of serious bodily injury to support charge of aggravated degree of rape, sodomy, or other sexual abuse. 103 A.L.R.6th 507.

Sufficiency of allegations or evidence of victim’s mental injury or emotional distress to support charge of aggravated degree of rape, sodomy, or other sexual offense. 44 A.L.R.5th 651.

Valid marriage between prosecutrix and defendant, facts preventing, as defense. 85 A.L.R. 123.

What constitutes penetration in prosecution for rape or statutory rape. 76 A.L.R.3d 163.

11-37-2. First degree sexual assault.

A person is guilty of first degree sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person, and if any of the following circumstances exist:

  1. The accused knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically helpless.
  2. The accused uses force or coercion.
  3. The accused, through concealment or by the element of surprise, is able to overcome the victim.
  4. The accused engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or stimulation.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2; P.L. 1980, ch. 273, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 119, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 59, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 355, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 238, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 75, § 1, effective June 23, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 76, § 1, effective June 23, 2021.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 75, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 76, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Where the Rhode Island Supreme Court received more than 40 nearly identical petitions for writ of certiorari seeking review of the superior court’s denial of the respective petitioner’s postconviction relief application, all the petitions for writ of certiorari were denied as the statutes for murder, first-degree sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, third-degree sexual assault, first-degree child molestation sexual assault, and second-degree child molestation sexual assault were not unconstitutional for setting out the prohibited conduct in one section of a chapter in Rhode Island’s General Laws, and setting out the penalty in the subsequent section because that arrangement did not somehow render those statutes without legal force and effect. In re Writ of Certiorari Seeking Review of Denials of Applications, 219 A.3d 320, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 124 (2019).

Common Law Rape.

Common law rape is the act of sexual intercourse committed by a man with a woman not his wife and without her consent, committed when the victim’s resistance is overcome by force or fear, or under other prohibited conditions. State v. Golden, 430 A.2d 433, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1158 (1981) (decided under former § 11-37-1 ).

Today the law does not expect a woman, as part of her proof of opposition or lack of consent, to engage in heroics when such behavior could be useless, fruitless or foolhardy. State v. Carvalho, 122 R.I. 461 , 409 A.2d 132, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1564 (1979).

Where defendant was accused of first-degree sexual assault of a developmentally disabled woman under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 , the expert’s testimony was sufficient to establish that the victim was mentally disabled under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(4) , as the expert testified that the victim lacked the ability to make informed decisions about sexual contact. State v. Gardiner, 895 A.2d 703, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 55 (2006).

Evidence.

The victim’s testimony concerning the rape need not be corroborated. State v. Wiggin, 106 R.I. 69 , 256 A.2d 219, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 596 (1969) (decided under prior law).

Where the only issue was the voluntariness of intercourse, it was error to admit examining physician’s testimony of the victim’s case history consisting of her out-of-court statements about the alleged rape when such statements narrated details not connected with either diagnosis or treatment of the alleged sexual assault. State v. Pina, 455 A.2d 313, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 792 (1983).

Testimony of 14-year old, mentally retarded victim was sufficient to establish penetration. State v. Pettis, 488 A.2d 704, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 448 (1985).

State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176 (R.I. 1983), involving evidence of a defendant’s sexual conduct with a child not named in the indictment, is limited to situations in which the testimony of siblings of tender years is both necessary in order for the state to meet its burden of proof and relevant, material, and highly probative of the accused’s lecherous conduct toward the victims over whom the defendant exercised discipline, control, and supervision. State v. Bernier, 491 A.2d 1000, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 495 (1985).

It was proper for the trial justice to inform the jury during his charge that the state did not have to prove that the alleged sexual assault took place within the dates stated in the indictment and that the jury need only find that the alleged act occurred on some day. State v. McKenna, 512 A.2d 113, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 509 (1986).

Where, in a trial for first degree sexual assault on a 14-year-old child, in the context of the evidence, asking defendant whether he had a sexual problem, though concededly improper, would not have had the effect of inflaming the jury in such manner as to deprive its members of their ability to pass upon the evidence in the case in accordance with the trial justice’s instructions, thus the trial justice did not err in denying the motion for mistrial on that ground. State v. Brown, 522 A.2d 208, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 425 (1987).

Defendant’s conviction was affirmed where, although the only testimony relative to the sexual act came from the victim, the trial justice clearly believed her version of what happened and pointed out that defendant was less than truthful in his testimony at trial. State v. Jacques, 536 A.2d 535, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1988).

In a prosecution under subsection (C), the judge properly admits into evidence photographs depicting the injuries to the victim’s face, lower back, buttocks, legs and thighs, and vaginal area. The pictures are probative of an element of the crime, namely, force and coercion, and they depict the brutality of the beating the victim underwent at the hands of the defendant, thereby calling the defendant’s credibility into question. State v. Griffin, 567 A.2d 796, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 170 (1989).

Evidence sustained the defendant’s conviction, where, only minutes before declaring his desire to have sexual intercourse with her, defendant had hit the victim so violently that he fractured her cheekbone, and the victim then acquiesced to defendant’s request for sex rather than risk the consequences of screaming for help or running away. State v. Maggs, 588 A.2d 601, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1991).

Even though the victim’s testimony was the only direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt, her evidence, in addition to the testimony given by others at the trial, was sufficient to allow the jury to draw reasonable inferences to substantiate the defendant’s guilt. State v. Lemos, 743 A.2d 558, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 7 (2000).

Defendant was properly convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual assault, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 , of his minor stepdaughter; evidence of uncharged sexual assaults and other abusive behavior against the victim was admissible under R.I. R. Evid. 404 (b), because the evidence demonstrate lewd disposition or intent toward the victim. State v. Baptista, 894 A.2d 911, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 40 (2006).

Despite the fact that the rape kit produced no evidence of seminal fluid, the trial judge did not err in convicting defendant of sexual assault based on the victim’s testimony and the trial court’s decision to discount the absence of evidence that the rape kit produced. State v. Pablo, 925 A.2d 894, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 72 (2007).

Trial court did not make findings that were clear error, and did not overlook or mischaracterize the evidence in ruling on the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Since the evidence in the case supported a finding that the woman allegedly victimized had not engaged in consensual sex and the trial court’s credibility findings supported denial of the motion for a new trial, the defendant’s motion had to be denied. State v. Russell, 950 A.2d 418, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 80 (2008).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s new trial motion, as the evidence was legally sufficient to support his convictions for first-degree and second-degree sexual assault, as well as simple assault, and the trial justice acted within his province in choosing to find the victims’ testimony more credible than that of defendant. State v. Rivera, 987 A.2d 887, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 24 (2010).

Evidence that defendant physically forced the complainant to his knees for oral sex, while the teenage boy was crying, and that the complainant was unable to move and was in a position of helplessness, was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for first-degree sexual assault. State v. Lynch, 19 A.3d 51, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 54 (2011).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree sexual assault and three counts of second-degree child molestation, defendant’s motion for a new trial was properly denied because the trial justice stated that reasonable minds could differ as to what the verdict should be; the trial justice did not overlook the evidence of the victim’s potential motive for testifying as she did or the evidence that her poor relationship with defendant started only after he allegedly violated her confidence; and the trial justice did not overlook the lack of independent evidence as there was no requirement of independent corroboration for sex offense cases. State v. Acosta, 247 A.3d 489, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 24 (2021).

— Other Sex Crimes.

While evidence of other, not too remote sex crimes with the particular person concerned in the crime on trial may be introduced to show the accused’s “lewd disposition or intent” towards the person, this type of evidence should be used by the prosecution only when reasonably necessary and such evidence should be excluded if the trial justice believes it is purely cumulative and not essential to the state’s case. State v. Cardoza, 465 A.2d 200, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1093 (1983).

Evidence of a defendant’s sexual conduct with a child not named in the indictment will be admissible in an action charging a sexual offense against the named child when the uncharged conduct is closely related in time, place, age, family relationships of the victims and the form of the sexual acts, provided that such evidence is reasonably necessary for the state to meet its burden of proof and the evidence is presented to the jury with proper instructions. State v. Cardoza, 465 A.2d 200, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1093 (1983).

Trial justice erred when he permitted victim’s grandmother to testify concerning sexual assault incident occurring prior to charged offense. State v. Cardoza, 465 A.2d 200, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1093 (1983).

In a prosecution for sexual assault, testimony concerning uncharged and unrelated sexual encounters was extremely prejudicial and was a violation of Rule 404(b), Rules of Evidence, in that it could not be admitted to demonstrate the accused’s propensity to commit the crime charged nor could it be admitted to show the elements of motive, intent, and identity which were not at issue. State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 213 (1996).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior sexual misconduct with a seventeen-year-old female victim, R.I. R. Evid. 404 (b), because the evidence was reasonably necessary to rebut defendant’s defense of consent to charges of first-degree sexual assault involving a seventeen-year-old male victim, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2(1) . State v. Cook, 45 A.3d 1272, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 114 (2012).

— Penetration.

Penetration is an element of the crime of common law rape and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Golden, 430 A.2d 433, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1158 (1981) (decided under former 11-37-1 ).

Proof of penetration need not be in any particular form. State v. Golden, 430 A.2d 433, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1158 (1981) (decided under former 11-37-1 ).

Penetration may be proven by circumstantial evidence. State v. Golden, 430 A.2d 433, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1158 (1981) (decided under former 11-37-1 ).

Testimony of the prosecutrix, that defendant “had intercourse” with her was sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury on the issue of penetration. State v. Golden, 430 A.2d 433, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1158 (1981) (decided under former 11-37-1 ).

The sixteen-year-old victim’s testimony that her father had touched her “in the vagina” and “in the breasts” was insufficient to support an inference that would justify a finding of digital penetration beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McDonald, 602 A.2d 923, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1992).

Force or Coercion.

Proof of force beyond that which is used in the consummation of the act is required to sustain a conviction for first degree sexual assault. The use or threatened use of force must occur before the penetration occurs. State v. Jacques, 536 A.2d 535, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1988).

Evidence showed defendant’s application of physical force or violence, where he took the victim to his studio, pushed against her and caused her to kneel in a chair, and forced her into a position of helplessness. State v. Jacques, 536 A.2d 535, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1988).

With regard to defendant’s conviction for sexual assault wherein a trial justice found that all of the ingredients were present and his conclusion that all of the relevant hallmarks of force or coercion, both physical and psychological, were part of defendant’s misconduct, the appellate court vacated the conviction and remanded the case for the trial justice to conduct an independent examination of the evidence to determine whether the State had established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of the charged crimes based solely on physical force. Because the trial justice erroneously found force and coercion by implied threats, the appellate court was uncertain about whether defendant was convicted based on a finding of force and coercion by physical force beyond a reasonable doubt which was separate and apart from the error. State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 54 (2007).

— Evidence.

In a criminal assault trial, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in allowing the jury to hear an audio-tape recording of the assault and the victim’s commentary on the same. Because it is incumbent upon the state to prove that the accused used force or coercion, the use of the audio tape offered probative evidence of such force and coercion. In regard to the use of the audio tape during the state’s direct examination of the victim, the probative value offered by this narrative exercise was to determine where each of the parties was and what each was doing at the time the tape was paused. State v. Mora, 618 A.2d 1275, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1993).

Where the defendant had lost significant weight, the state had a demonstrable need to admit mug-shot photographs as evidence of the defendant’s relative size at the time of the alleged sexual assault, a need which was not nullified by the fact that defense counsel agreed not to object to testimony regarding the defendant’s weight loss; however, where the photographs were still clearly mug shots that the public ordinarily associates with persons having some criminal record, their admission constituted error. State v. Dinagen, 639 A.2d 1353, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1994).

Because the victim’s state of mind is irrelevant in cases of physical helplessness, the trial justice properly omitted any instruction on the victim’s resistance to the defendant’s actions in a prosecution for rape under subdivision (1). State v. Thorsteinsson, 625 A.2d 219, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 146 (1993).

Indictment.

Though the indictment charging the defendant with sexual assault was inartfully drawn in that it did not refer directly to the subsection of this section under which he was being charged, the count was otherwise sufficient because the defendant, having been put on notice that he was being charged with first degree sexual assault, suffered no prejudice; furthermore, the bill of particulars for which defendant moved with respect to other charges was sufficient to provide him with the specific circumstance of force or coercion underlying the first charge. State v. Waite, 484 A.2d 887, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 631 (1984).

An indictment charging the defendant with sexual penetration of the victim in violation of §§ 11-37-2 and 11-37-3 and indicating the time and place the offense was committed set forth the charge with legal sufficiency to notify the defendant of the substantial elements of the charge and to prevent the defendant’s being put upon trial a second time for the same offense. State v. Waite, 484 A.2d 887, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 631 (1984).

Where, in an indictment charging various counts of sexual assault and child molestation, it was not clear whether the defendant was charged with a single act or multiple acts in each count, and a bill of particulars did not clarify, but affirmed the duplicity in some of the counts, convictions returned on the latter counts were vacated. State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 233 (1998).

Prosecutors were not required to introduce “substantially exculpatory” evidence to the grand jury, where the exculpatory evidence in a charge of first degree sexual assault under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 was merely the defendants’ claim of consensual sex. The proposed evidence in the case that the two defendants had consensual sex with the woman allegedly victimized was not clearly substantially exculpatory, but instead went to the competency of the state’s evidence. State v. Russell, 950 A.2d 418, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 80 (2008).

Trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars because the State provided defendant with adequate notice that it intended to proceed under both theories that the victim was physically helpless and that defendant used force or coercion when he assaulted her; and the State was not under a duty to elect, prior to trial, which theory it would pursue. State v. Gregson, 113 A.3d 393, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 57 (2015).

Instructions.

Trial justice’s failure to define “penetration,” “force” or “consent” was not prejudicial, where the victim appeared on the witness stand and testified, in very simple and direct language, that there was vaginal penetration and that the penetration was accomplished through the use of force and fear. State v. Agin, 535 A.2d 321, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1988).

An instruction on force and coercion stating that, in “a situation of an adult who is with a child”, “forcible compulsion derives from the respective capacities of the child and the adult” circumvented the state’s required burden of proof on the element of force and coercion and was error. State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 233 (1998).

Motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial were properly denied since the trial justice’s analysis made clear that the victim’s state of mind at the time of sexual intercourse was a question of fact on which the jury could find that she was asleep and thus physically helpless during the penetration. State v. Contreras-Cruz, 765 A.2d 849, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 36 (2001).

Jury instruction that was given in defendant’s case was not erroneous because, pursuant to established jurisprudence, there was no proper basis to apply the rule announced in a later case regarding the element of force and coercion to the final judgment in defendant’s case as the later ruling did not alter or shift the burden of proof or plow any new ground. Pierce v. Wall, 941 A.2d 189, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 14 (2008).

Although defendant’s requested jury instruction on the “force or coercion” element of first-degree sexual assault under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 was refused and the term “lack of consent” was not explicitly utilized, a trial court’s instruction did employ the verb “overcomes,” which, when the instructions were read in their entirety, meant that as a precondition of guilt, the jury had to find a lack of consent by a victim. State v. Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 31 (2010).

Jury instructions adequately apprised the jury of the operative legal concepts that were in play because the instruction adequately conveyed to the jury that, to find defendant guilty of first-degree sexual assault, it also needed to conclude that the victim did not consent to the penetration, and the trial justice did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on a consent defense that was unsupported by the testimony. State v. Martin, 68 A.3d 467, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 103 (2013).

Lesser Included Offenses.

Second degree sexual assault is a lesser-included offense of first degree sexual assault. State v. Malouin, 433 A.2d 176, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1237 (1981).

The offense of an abominable and detestable crime against nature is a lesser included offense of the offense of first degree sexual assault, where the physical act required to consummate both offenses is identical and the only difference is a material factual dispute concerning whether the acts are consensual in nature or the result of force or coercion. State v. Yates, 571 A.2d 575, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1990).

Motion for Mistrial.

In a prosecution for domestic first-degree sexual assault, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to declare a mistrial when a police officer improperly bolstered the victim’s credibility by testifying that she seemed “sincere” when she accused defendant, her husband, of sexual assault, in view of the brevity of the remark, the jurors’ opportunity to judge the victim’s truthfulness before the remark was made, and the trial court’s instruction to disregard the remark. State v. Rushlow, 32 A.3d 892, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 140 (2011).

In a prosecution for domestic first-degree sexual assault, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to declare a mistrial when the victim, defendant’s wife, testified that the police had issued to her a no-contact order against him, because 1) the trial court gave a cautionary instruction that the jurors could not use this testimony to find that defendant engaged in any prior misconduct; 2) the testimony was not sufficiently prejudicial as to prevent the jury from dispassionately considering the evidence; and 3) there was abundant evidence of defendant’s guilt. State v. Rushlow, 32 A.3d 892, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 140 (2011).

Multiple Counts.

It is not inconsistent for the jury to convict defendant on only one of three first degree sexual assault charges, where there are three separate counts of sexual assault, one alleging penetration by penis, another alleging penetration with a stick of pepperoni, and another alleging digital penetration; the jury could have found that penetration was not accomplished other than by the penis or that if it was, force or coercion was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jette, 569 A.2d 438, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1990).

Defendant, who is convicted on two counts of first-degree sexual assault, is not placed in double jeopardy, where two separate acts, one occurring outdoors in the woods and one in a bathroom, properly constitute the basis for two separate charges of first degree sexual assault. State v. Purro, 593 A.2d 450, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 133 (1991).

— Waiver.

Defendant’s argument that the literal language of this section does not permit one act of sexual penetration to be punished twice even if that one act results in violations of more than one subsection of this section was waived because it was never adequately and properly addressed to the trial court for its consideration. State v. Thomas, 654 A.2d 327, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1995).

Penetration.

The type of penetration is unimportant under the sexual-assault statute. The fact that only digital penetration occurred would not lessen the victim’s fear and humiliation. Under the statute, every male and female has an interest in bodily integrity. That integrity is violated regardless of the type or length of time of the penetration. State v. Jacques, 536 A.2d 535, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1988).

Repeal of Rape Law.

Acts which constituted rape under former § 11-37-1 could be prosecuted even though the prosecution was commenced after the repeal of that section due to the simultaneous-repeal-and-reenactment exception to the abatement doctrine. State v. Babbitt, 457 A.2d 1049, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 829 (1983).

Statutory Rape.

Every element needed to prove a violation under former § 11-37-1 for rape is also needed to prove first degree sexual assault under this section. State v. Babbitt, 457 A.2d 1049, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 829 (1983) (decided under prior law).

Collateral References.

Admissibility, in nonstatutory rape prosecution, of evidence of pregnancy. 62 A.L.R.2d 1083.

Defense of mistake of fact as to victim’s consent in rape prosecution. 102 A.L.R.5th 447.

Fact that murder-rape victim was dead at time of penetration as affecting conviction for rape. 76 A.L.R.4th 1147.

Impotency as defense to charge of rape, attempt to commit rape or assault with intent to commit rape. 23 A.L.R.3d 1351.

Liability of church or religious society for sexual misconduct of clergy. 5 A.L.R.5th 530.

Multiple instances of forcible intercourse involving same defendant and same victim as constituting multiple crimes of rape. 81 A.L.R.3d 1228.

Offense of Rape After Withdrawal of Consent. 33 A.L.R.6th 353.

Rape by fraud or impersonation. 91 A.L.R.2d 591.

Rape or similar offense based on intercourse with woman who is allegedly mentally deficient. 31 A.L.R.3d 1227.

Sufficiency of allegations or evidence of serious bodily injury to support charge of aggravated degree of rape, sodomy, or other sexual abuse. 103 A.L.R.6th 507.

Validity and construction of statute defining crime of rape to include activity traditionally punishable as sodomy or the like. 3 A.L.R.4th 1009.

What constitutes penetration in prosecution for rape or statutory rape. 76 A.L.R.3d 163.

11-37-2.1. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1982, ch. 304, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 355, § 1), concerning first degree sexual assault by spouses, was repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 238, § 2, effective June 28, 1987.

11-37-3. Penalty for first degree sexual assault.

Every person who shall commit sexual assault in the first degree shall be imprisoned for a period not less than ten (10) years and may be imprisoned for life.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence Sufficient.

Even though the victim’s testimony was the only direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt, her evidence, in addition to the testimony given by others at the trial, was sufficient to allow the jury to draw reasonable inferences to substantiate the defendant’s guilt. State v. Lemos, 743 A.2d 558, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 7 (2000).

Jury Instruction.

Jury instruction that was given in defendant’s case was not erroneous because, pursuant to established jurisprudence, there was no proper basis to apply the rule announced in a later case regarding the element of force and coercion to the final judgment in defendant’s case as the later ruling did not alter or shift the burden of proof or plow any new ground. Pierce v. Wall, 941 A.2d 189, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 14 (2008).

Sentence Upheld.

There was no abuse of discretion in sentencing the defendant to a total of 45 years for 10 separate offenses of sexual assault, since his sentences would have totaled 96 years had the minimum sentences called for and required to be imposed by the relevant statutes been imposed consecutively. State v. Souza, 754 A.2d 107, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 97 (2000).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an inmate’s motion to reduce sentence under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 , as the sentence was justified based on his multiple first- and second-degree sexual assaults of two women, and his simple assault of a third, all of whom were developmentally disabled women who were entrusted to his care, and who continued to live in fear as a result of the assaults. State v. Rivera, 64 A.3d 742, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 69 (2013).

11-37-3.1. Duty to report sexual assault.

Any person, other than the victim, who knows or has reason to know that a first degree sexual assault or attempted first degree sexual assault is taking place in his or her presence shall immediately notify the state police or the police department of the city or town in which the assault or attempted assault is taking place of the crime.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 268, § 1.

11-37-3.2. Necessity of complaint from victim.

No person shall be charged under § 11-37-3.1 unless and until the police department investigating the incident obtains from the victim a signed complaint against the person alleging a violation of § 11-37-3.1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 268, § 1.

11-37-3.3. Failure to report — Penalty.

Any person who knowingly fails to report a sexual assault or attempted sexual assault as required under § 11-37-3.1 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, or fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 268, § 1.

11-37-3.4. Immunity from liability.

Any person participating in good faith in making a report pursuant to § 11-37-3.1 shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Any participant shall have the same immunity with respect to participation in any judicial proceeding resulting from the report.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 268, § 1.

11-37-3.5. Duty to report sexual misconduct conviction.

If a public school teacher or employee is convicted of a new violation of this chapter, the chief of police of the arresting department shall notify the appropriate school district, superintendent of schools, the department of public safety, and the commissioner of elementary and secondary education.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 484, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 178, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment substituted “commissioner of elementary and secondary education” for “commissioner of education”.

11-37-4. Second degree sexual assault.

A person is guilty of a second-degree sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual contact with another person and if any of the following circumstances exist:

  1. The accused knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically helpless.
  2. The accused uses force, element of surprise, or coercion.
  3. The accused engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or stimulation.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2; P.L. 1980, ch. 273, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 119, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 59, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 164, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 164, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Where the Rhode Island Supreme Court received more than 40 nearly identical petitions for writ of certiorari seeking review of the superior court’s denial of the respective petitioner’s postconviction relief application, all the petitions for writ of certiorari were denied as the statutes for murder, first-degree sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, third-degree sexual assault, first-degree child molestation sexual assault, and second-degree child molestation sexual assault were not unconstitutional for setting out the prohibited conduct in one section of a chapter in Rhode Island’s General Laws, and setting out the penalty in the subsequent section because that arrangement did not somehow render those statutes without legal force and effect. In re Writ of Certiorari Seeking Review of Denials of Applications, 219 A.3d 320, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 124 (2019).

Conviction Overturned.

Defendant’s second-degree sexual assault conviction is vacated, where there is evidence that defendant and the thirteen-year old victim were “horsing around” or “wrestling” and the trial justice, who was not misled by a request to charge on “simple assault,” should have instructed the jury that if it found the touching to have been offensive, but not intended to be for sexual gratification, it might return a verdict of battery as a lesser included offense. State v. Messa, 594 A.2d 882, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 215 (1991).

Crime of Violence.

Second degree child molestation poses a serious potential risk of physical injury, and constitutes a crime of violence. United States v. Sherwood, 156 F.3d 219, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23261 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1113, 119 S. Ct. 888, 142 L. Ed. 2d 787, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 725 (1999).

Evidence.

Court did not abuse its discretion where it terminated defense counsel’s questioning of thirteen-year-old victim to determine her qualifications to testify, since her answers had already established her qualifications. State v. Mandarelli, 105 R.I. 696 , 254 A.2d 738, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 879 (1969).

State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176 (R.I. 1983), involving evidence of a defendant’s sexual conduct with a child not named in the indictment, is limited to situations in which the testimony of siblings of tender years is both necessary in order for the state to meet its burden of proof and relevant, material, and highly probative of the accused’s lecherous conduct toward the victims over whom the defendant exercised discipline, control, and supervision. State v. Bernier, 491 A.2d 1000, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 495 (1985).

Evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual assault on a child not known by the victims of the alleged offenses is relevant, where the theory of defense is that the victims have fabricated the evidence against the defendant and have colluded in planning their testimony. State v. Messa, 542 A.2d 1071, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1988).

Testimony regarding the defendant’s harassment of the victim is relevant, material, and reasonably necessary to prove his consciousness of guilt, where the defendant’s harassment is well documented and his threats are corroborated by the victim’s neighbor. State v. Woodson, 551 A.2d 1187, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 153 (1988).

There is sufficient evidence of force to warrant submitting second degree sexual assault charges to the jury, where defendant, a schoolteacher, touched and grabbed a student unexpectedly on three occasions and there is ample proof that the student did not consent to the touchings. State v. Goodreau, 560 A.2d 318, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1989).

A defendant who ordered his stepdaughter to lie on a bed, felt her upper body, including her breasts, and felt and opened her vagina, touched her for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or assault within the meaning of this section. State v. Brown, 626 A.2d 228, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 171 (1993).

Although the alleged sexual assault of a “special needs” student by a teacher took place in front of other students and a teaching assistant, their testimony was not required to find probable cause in lieu of the credible complaint of the victim and thus the teacher’s 4th and 5th Amendment 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims failed as a matter of law because the actions of the police department in arresting the teacher on second degree assault charges under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-4 , did not “shock the conscience.” Forest v. Pawtucket Police Dep't, 290 F. Supp. 2d 215, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18838 (D.R.I. 2003), aff'd, 377 F.3d 52, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15527 (1st Cir. 2004).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s new trial motion, as the evidence was legally sufficient to support his convictions for first-degree and second-degree sexual assault, as well as simple assault, as the trial justice acted within his province in choosing to find the victims’ testimony more credible than that of defendant. State v. Rivera, 987 A.2d 887, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 24 (2010).

It could not be concluded that the trial justice in this close and credibility-intensive sexual assault case was either clearly wrong or that he overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence in his denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial; accordingly, the trial justice properly denied defendant’s motion. State v. Barrios, 88 A.3d 1123, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 43 (2014).

Evidence of defendant’s conduct relating to a shower incident provided the basis for a conviction on only one charge of second-degree sexual assault, and an additional conviction was vacated; defendant’s convictions for six counts of first-degree sexual assault and two counts of second-degree sexual assault, relating to conduct involving his daughter, were upheld. State v. Perez, 161 A.3d 487, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 77 (2017).

In a sexual assault case, the trial justice properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial because there was no indication that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence; although defendant contended that the jury’s acquittal on the counts of first-degree sexual assault and assault with intent to commit first-degree sexual assault established that the jury discounted the victim’s version of events, the trial justice found that the victim’s overall appearance, testimony, and recollection of the events were credible and worthy of belief in relation to the five counts of second-degree sexual assault defendant was convicted of. State v. Rogers, 207 A.3d 457, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 70 (2019).

Force or Coercion.

Incidents where defendant psychiatrist placed his arms around plaintiff and pressed his genital area against her did not involve assault using “force or coercion” within the meaning of subdivision (2) or a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981. Palazzolo v. Ruggiano, 993 F. Supp. 45, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2062 (D.R.I. 1998).

The evidence was sufficient to establish the offense charged where it clearly showed that the victim believed that the defendant would carry out his threats to harm him if he did not do as he was told. In re David G., 741 A.2d 863, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 212 (1999).

With regard to defendant’s conviction for sexual assault wherein a trial justice found that all of the ingredients were present and his conclusion that all of the relevant hallmarks of force or coercion, both physical and psychological, were part of defendant’s misconduct, the appellate court vacated the conviction and remanded the case for the trial justice to conduct an independent examination of the evidence to determine whether the State had established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of the charged crimes based solely on physical force. Because the trial justice erroneously found force and coercion by implied threats, the appellate court was uncertain about whether defendant was convicted based on a finding of force and coercion by physical force beyond a reasonable doubt which was separate and apart from the error. State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 54 (2007).

Indictment.

Trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars because the State provided defendant with adequate notice that it intended to proceed under both theories that the victim was physically helpless and that defendant used force or coercion when he assaulted her; and the State was not under a duty to elect, prior to trial, which theory it would pursue. State v. Gregson, 113 A.3d 393, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 57 (2015).

Instructions.

Jury instruction that was given in defendant’s case was not erroneous because, pursuant to established jurisprudence, there was no proper basis to apply the rule announced in a later case regarding the element of force and coercion to the final judgment in defendant’s case as the later ruling did not alter or shift the burden of proof or plow any new ground. Pierce v. Wall, 941 A.2d 189, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 14 (2008).

— Sexual Contact.

The trial justice committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jurors that they were required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s contact with his niece was for the purpose of his sexual arousal, gratification, or assault, in order to convict under the second-degree sexual-assault statutes, i.e., this section and § 11-37-1 . State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1992).

Medical Treatment of Victim.

The use or threat of physical force is not an element of the offense described in subdivision (3) and, therefore, does not satisfy the definition of a crime of violence for purposes of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981. Palazzolo v. Ruggiano, 993 F. Supp. 45, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2062 (D.R.I. 1998).

Collateral References.

Admissibility, in nonstatutory rape prosecution, of evidence of pregnancy. 62 A.L.R.2d 1083.

Criminal responsibility of husband for rape, or assault to commit rape, on wife. 24 A.L.R.4th 105.

Impotency as defense to charge of rape, attempt to commit rape, or assault with intent to commit rape. 23 A.L.R.3d 1351.

Liability of church or religious society for sexual misconduct of clergy. 5 A.L.R.5th 530.

Rape by fraud or impersonation. 91 A.L.R.2d 591.

Rape or similar offense based on intercourse with woman who is allegedly mentally deficient. 31 A.L.R.3d 1227.

Sufficiency of allegations or evidence of serious bodily injury to support charge of aggravated degree of rape, sodomy, or other sexual abuse. 103 A.L.R.6th 507.

Validity and applicability of Title II of Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261 to 2266. 12 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 2.

11-37-5. Penalty for second degree sexual assault.

Every person who shall commit sexual assault in the second degree shall be imprisoned for not less than three (3) years and not more than fifteen (15) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Sentence Upheld.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an inmate’s motion to reduce sentence under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 , as the sentence was justified based on his multiple first- and second-degree sexual assaults of two women, and his simple assault of a third, all of whom were developmentally disabled women who were entrusted to his care, and who continued to live in fear as a result of the assaults. State v. Rivera, 64 A.3d 742, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 69 (2013).

11-37-6. Third degree sexual assault.

A person is guilty of third degree sexual assault if he or she is over the age of eighteen (18) years and engaged in sexual penetration with another person over the age of fourteen (14) years and under the age of consent, sixteen (16) years of age.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 219, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Law Reviews.

Notes and Comments: Protective Cruelty: State v. Yanez and Strict Liability as to Age in Statutory Rape, see 5 R.W.U.L. Rev. 499 (2000).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Where the Rhode Island Supreme Court received more than 40 nearly identical petitions for writ of certiorari seeking review of the superior court’s denial of the respective petitioner’s postconviction relief application, all the petitions for writ of certiorari were denied as the statutes for murder, first-degree sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, third-degree sexual assault, first-degree child molestation sexual assault, and second-degree child molestation sexual assault were not unconstitutional for setting out the prohibited conduct in one section of a chapter in Rhode Island’s General Laws, and setting out the penalty in the subsequent section because that arrangement did not somehow render those statutes without legal force and effect. In re Writ of Certiorari Seeking Review of Denials of Applications, 219 A.3d 320, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 124 (2019).

Crime of Violence.

Because statutory rape can encompass both violent and non-violent conduct, it was permissible for a district court to examine the indictment to learn of the circumstances of the crime, but it was error for the court to delve into the facts of the crime in order to determine whether his conviction was for a violent or non-violent crime. United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18749 (1st Cir. 1999).

Because of the risk, seriousness and likelihood of injury and disease resulting from the defendant’s criminal actions, there was no error in the conclusion of the sentencing court that he had been convicted of a violent felony and that he should be sentenced as an “armed career criminal” under the federal statute governing such offenders. United States v. Sacko, 103 F. Supp. 2d 85, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9110 (D.R.I. 2000).

For purposes of federal “armed career criminal” laws the analysis of what constitutes a “violent felony” does not turn on state law, since a state’s classification of a crime generally reflects different policy considerations than the federal classification. United States v. Sacko, 247 F.3d 21, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7595 (1st Cir. 2001).

When a victim is unable to consent, the proscribed conduct inherently involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense; therefore, an immigrant was subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C.S. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because the offense of third degree sexual assault under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-6 was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.S. § 16 since it involved a substantial risk of physical force due to the presumed higher age and experience of the perpetrator. Aguiar v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 86, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 3659 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1213, 127 S. Ct. 1251, 167 L. Ed. 2d 87, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 2183 (2007).

Effect of Amendments to Crime Against Nature Statute.

The trial justice did not err in determining that the preservation of abominable and detestable crime against nature charges against the defendant would have been inconsistent with the manifest intention of the legislature to decriminalize sodomy between consenting adults and that such preservation would be repugnant to the statute as amended. State v. Mullen, 740 A.2d 783, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 195 (1999).

Motion for New Trial.

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial in her first-degree child molestation and third-degree sexual assault case because, inter alia, the trial court clearly articulated sound reasons for denying the motion, noted that the prosecution had presented four witnesses, summarized the testimony, and dismissed defendant’s contention that if the events actually occurred, the victim would have reported it to his father, noting that their father-son relationship was not such that such disclosure likely would occur; the trial court explained that it was impressed with the manner by which the victim testified and had no concern or suspicion surrounding any of the witnesses. The trial court believed that the jury could have concluded that defendant’s remarks about the paternity of her son were an admission of having engaged in sexual relationships with the victim. State v. Barry, 982 A.2d 1050, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 126 (2009).

Other Acts Evidence.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim’s testimony that defendant sexually assaulted her over 100 times over the course of three years because the testimony was highly probative of defendant’s lewd disposition toward the victim and was indicative of a common opportunity, intent, and plan with the offense for which defendant was being tried, child molestation. State v. Thibedau, 157 A.3d 1063, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 44 (2017).

Physical Force.

The statutory rape statute does not include as an element the use or threat of physical force. United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18749 (1st Cir. 1999).

Collateral References.

Applicability of rape statute covering children of a specified age, with respect to a child who has passed the anniversary date of such age. 73 A.L.R.2d 874.

Impotency as defense to charge of rape, attempt to commit rape, or assault with intent to commit rape. 23 A.L.R.3d 1351.

Liability of church or religious society for sexual misconduct of clergy. 5 A.L.R.5th 530.

Mistake or lack of information as to victim’s age as defense to statutory rape. 46 A.L.R.5th 499.

Mistake or lack of information as to victim’s chastity, as defense to statutory rape. 44 A.L.R.3d 1434.

Statute protecting minors in a specified age range from rape or other sexual activity as applicable to defendant minor within protected age group. 18 A.L.R.5th 856.

Statutory rape of female who is or has been married. 32 A.L.R.3d 1030.

Sufficiency of allegations or evidence of serious bodily injury to support charge of aggravated degree of rape, sodomy, or other sexual abuse. 103 A.L.R.6th 507.

What constitutes penetration in prosecution for rape or statutory rape. 76 A.L.R.3d 163.

11-37-7. Penalty for third degree sexual assault.

Every person who shall commit sexual assault in the third degree shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2.

11-37-8. Penalty for assault with intent to commit first degree sexual assault.

Every person who shall commit assault with intent to commit first degree sexual assault shall be imprisoned for not less than three (3) years or more than twenty (20) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2.

Collateral References.

Impotency as defense to charge of rape, attempt to commit rape, or assault with intent to commit rape. 23 A.L.R.3d 1351.

Liability of church or religious society for sexual misconduct of clergy. 5 A.L.R.5th 530.

11-37-8.1. First degree child molestation sexual assault.

A person is guilty of first degree child molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual penetration with a person fourteen (14) years of age or under.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 219, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Law Reviews.

Caselaw Survey Section: Criminal Law, see 4 R.W.U.L. Rev. 673 (1999).

Matthew Gustaitis, 2016 Survey, Cases: In re B.H., 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 824 (2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Where the Rhode Island Supreme Court received more than 40 nearly identical petitions for writ of certiorari seeking review of the superior court’s denial of the respective petitioner’s postconviction relief application, all the petitions for writ of certiorari were denied as the statutes for murder, first-degree sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, third-degree sexual assault, first-degree child molestation sexual assault, and second-degree child molestation sexual assault were not unconstitutional for setting out the prohibited conduct in one section of a chapter in Rhode Island’s General Laws, and setting out the penalty in the subsequent section because that arrangement did not somehow render those statutes without legal force and effect. In re Writ of Certiorari Seeking Review of Denials of Applications, 219 A.3d 320, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 124 (2019).

Age of Victim.

With respect to the age requirement, first degree child molestation sexual assault is a strict liability offense and a defendant charged with the offense may not introduce evidence that he was mistaken about the victim’s age. State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 273 (1998).

— Implied Mens Rea.

The first-degree child-molestation sexual-assault statute, like its second-degree sexual-assault counterpart, has an implied mens rea requirement requiring that the state must prove that a defendant must act with the intent of sexual arousal or gratification in order to be found guilty of the offense. It is true that the Legislature can enact strict liability statutes devoid of any mens rea; however, first-degree child-molestation sexual assault, which carries a minimum twenty-year sentence, is not a strict liability offense. Therefore, since the trial court failed to give an instruction requiring the jury to find that the defendant’s act of penetration was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, the defendant’s conviction must be vacated and the case must be remanded for a new trial. State v. Griffith, 660 A.2d 704, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 170 (1995).

The Griffith doctrine, which holds that a trial court’s failure to charge a jury in a prosecution under this section that the defendant’s act was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification is error, is not applicable to purposeful penile penetration (as opposed to digital penetration), which as a matter of law precludes innocent touching. In re Odell, 672 A.2d 457, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1996).

Burden of Proof.

Under the terms of this section the state need not offer proof that the act was committed against the wishes of the victim. The state is required merely to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant in fact engaged in the sexual penetration of the victim and (2) the victim was 13 (now 14) years of age or under. State v. Collins, 543 A.2d 641, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1988), overruled, State v. Rios, 702 A.2d 889, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 295 (1997).

Consensual Sexual Activity.

Consensual sexual activity with a person who has passed the thirteenth (now fourteenth) anniversary of his or her birth does not constitute the offense of first degree child molestation sexual assault. State v. Jordan, 528 A.2d 731, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 535 (1987).

This section is inapplicable to victims after the thirteenth (now fourteenth) anniversary of birth. State v. Collins, 543 A.2d 641, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1988), overruled, State v. Rios, 702 A.2d 889, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 295 (1997).

Duplicity.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was not duplicitous; the allegations for count one specifed one incident of child molestation, and the bill of particulars narrowed that incident to “the first time” penetration occurred. The victim testified about the first incident and her testimony about the more than 100 acts of uncharged conduct was vague and simply acknowledged that “the same thing happened every time.” State v. Thibedau, 157 A.3d 1063, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 44 (2017).

Elements of Crime.

There are two essential elements to first degree child molestation sexual assault. First, the defendant must engage in sexual penetration of the victim. Second, the victim is age 13 (now 14) or younger. State v. Girouard, 561 A.2d 882, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 137 (1989).

The victim’s testimony that she was unable to recall dates of sexual abuse because they “blurred together” went directly to the question of whether intercourse had occurred prior to the victim’s fourteenth birthday. Thus, the dates were crucial to the determination of defendant’s guilt or innocence and the trial judge should have reread all of the victim’s direct and cross-examination testimony about the timing rather than merely portions which the judge deemed relevant. State v. Pierce, 689 A.2d 1030, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1997).

A minor witness’ testimony about her sister’s biting the defendant’s penis, causing him to say “ow” in response, was consistent with and highly probative of the fact that the defendant inserted his penis into the mouth of the child. In re Ryan B., 739 A.2d 232, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 188 (1999).

District court committed plain error when it characterized defendant as a Tier III sex offender and when it then utilized that designation in its guidelines calculation with regard to his conviction for child molestation under Rhode Island law because R.I. Gen. Laws . § 11-37-8.1 was not comparable to the federal offenses listed in Tier III of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 16911(4). United States v. Morales, 801 F.3d 1, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15140 (1st Cir. 2015).

Trial court was well within its discretion to deny defendant’s motion for new trial; although the victim’s testimony did contain disparities, the disparities reflected no more than minor details. The daughter’s inconsistent statements regarding defendant’s ejaculation did not concern a detail “integral to the sexual assault itself”, because ejaculation is not required for a conviction of first-degree child molestation. State v. Rainey, 175 A.3d 1169, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 5 (2018).

Evidence.

Testimony by the victim of a first degree sexual assault of describing sexual acts committed by the defendant commencing some seven years before the acts with which the defendant was charged, clearly fit the exception to the rule regarding proof of uncharged sexual misconduct to show “lustful disposition or sexual propensity” pertinent to proof of prior incestuous relations; therefore, admission of the testimony was not error. State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 134 (1994).

In a prosecution under this section, it was error to preclude the defendant from informing the jury that the victim was five months pregnant at the time of the trial, as it was highly relevant that at the time she testified concerning incidents of sexual abuse, she had a source of sexual knowledge, independent of any of these acts, from which she could have learned the details of the sexual acts that she described. State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 211 (1995).

Testimony that the defendant and his daughter shared the same bed was not evidence of “other crimes” under Rule 404(b), R.I. Rules of Evidence. Rather, the testimony provided a good description of the defendant’s relationship with the minor child and the trial court correctly admitted such evidence, which was wholly relevant to the charge of first-degree child molestation. State v. Yelland, 676 A.2d 1335, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 158 (1996).

Testimony by the victim about uncharged acts that were committed against her by the defendant was held admissible. State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1997).

The mere fact that a minor victim closed her lips, made a pouting motion, and exhaled during her demonstration on the stand did not necessarily indicate a lack of the requisite oral contact with the respondent’s penis for fellatio to have occurred, and the trial justice was not clearly wrong in concluding that the evidence was both legally competent and sufficient to establish the act of fellatio. In re Ryan B., 739 A.2d 232, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 188 (1999).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding, on relevance grounds, not to allow defendant to testify regarding his freedom from sexually transmitted diseases where the charges involved statutory rape, not infecting a sexual partner; defendant’s failure to make an offer of proof made it nearly impossible for the high court to second-guess the trial court. State v. Pena-Rojas, 822 A.2d 921, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 130 (2003).

Where a victim’s credibility was buttressed by an earlier handwritten note, as well as by the defendant’s sister, who testified about a subsequent violent reaction that the victim had when confronted with the possibility of being alone with her father, the finding of a probation violation under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.1 and R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.2 was proper. State v. Vashey, 823 A.2d 1151, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 147 (2003).

Victim’s testimony that defendant touched her genitalia with his mouth when he sucked on her private part was sufficient to constitute cunnilingus and thus, to support a conviction for first degree child molestation sexual assault. State v. Higham, 865 A.2d 1040, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 202 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of first-degree child molestation sexual assault; the trial justice did not err in denying a motion for a new trial where despite certain weaknesses in the child victim’s identification testimony, defendant’s own testimony bolstered the identification of defendant as the molester. State v. Horton, 871 A.2d 959, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 80 (2005).

In a prosecution for first-degree child molestation sexual assault, the State properly asked the 11-year-old victim leading questions, as she had difficulty grasping the legal significance of penetration and she was reluctant to recount the events of her molestation. Further, as the leading questions were asked to clarify the already existing record, defendant was not substantially prejudiced. State v. Merced, 933 A.2d 172, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 99 (2007).

Where a child’s father caught defendant molesting the child, defendant’s first-degree child molestation conviction was upheld because: (1) the recording of the father’s 911 call was properly admitted as an excited utterance and a present sense impression; (2) the father’s statement to a police officer was properly admitted as an excited utterance; and (3) defendant’s new trial motion was properly denied. State v. Bergevine, 942 A.2d 974, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 25 (2008).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial in her first-degree child molestation and third-degree sexual assault case because, inter alia, the trial court clearly articulated sound reasons for denying the motion, noted that the prosecution had presented four witnesses, summarized the testimony, and dismissed defendant’s contention that if the events actually occurred, the victim would have reported it to his father, noting that their father-son relationship was not such that such disclosure likely would occur; the trial court explained that it was impressed with the manner by which the victim testified and had no concern or suspicion surrounding any of the witnesses. The trial court believed that the jury could have concluded that defendant’s remarks about the paternity of her son were an admission of having engaged in sexual relationships with the victim. State v. Barry, 982 A.2d 1050, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 126 (2009).

Where defendant was tried for committing offenses which, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree child molestation sexual assault, his claim that his due process right to present a defense was violated because the charges lacked specificity as to time and place was meritless. The victim testified about the location where and the approximate time period when the events occurred; as defendant denied ever spending time alone with the victim, whether he did not do so on a specific date was irrelevant. In re Miguel A., 990 A.2d 1216, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 38 (2010).

Where defendant was tried for committing offenses which, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree child molestation sexual assault, his psychiatrist’s proffered testimony that he had no history of inappropriate sexual behavior was properly excluded because it was irrelevant under R.I. R. Evid. 401 and would not serve to prove any pertinent character trait under R.I. R. Evid. 404 (1)(a). In re Miguel A., 990 A.2d 1216, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 38 (2010).

Following defendant’s conviction for sexual molestation of his infant daughter in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37-8.1 , 11-37-8.2.2, 11-9-5.3(b)(1) , 11-9-5.3(c)(2) and 11-9-5.3(f) , the trial justice articulated sufficient reasoning for agreeing with the jury and denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, based in part on defendant’s confession, which described in detail how he had inflicted the various injuries to his daughter, demonstrating personal knowledge and not speculation. State v. Baptista, 79 A.3d 24, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 146 (2013).

It was not error to refuse to pass defendant’s first-degree child molestation sexual assault prosecution, because (1) after a statement of the consistency of the victim’s disclosure with sexual abuse was stricken from an expert’s testimony, the jury could decide the probative value of the rest of the testimony, and (2) under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-11 , no corroboration of the victim’s testimony was required. State v. Rathbun, 184 A.3d 211, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 51 (2018).

— Expert Testimony.

In a prosecution under this section, although an expert witness’ testimony that she had been counseling the victim for “sex abuse recovery” was not a literal statement of her belief in the victim’s truthfulness, it had the same substantive impact and would have been perceived by the jury as a conclusive opinion that the victim had testified truthfully. Because the victim was the complaining witness, her credibility was a crucial issue and the expert witness’ testimony, therefore, constituted impermissible vouching for the credibility of the victim. State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 211 (1995).

In a prosecution under this section, the testimony of a pediatrician who examined the victim that the victim had “probably” been rectally penetrated should not have been admitted, as the witness had relied to a greater extent upon the history related by the victim in reaching her conclusion than she had relied upon the results of the physical examination she administered. Because the witness’ opinion was based on evidence that was not within the realm of her medical capabilities or expertise, it amounted to nothing more than her assessment of the credibility of the victim’s testimony. State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 211 (1995).

In a first-degree child molestation sexual assault prosecution, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the remainder of an expert’s testimony after the trial court struck the expert’s statement regarding the consistency of the victim’s disclosure with sexual abuse and cautioned the jury to disregard the statement. State v. Rathbun, 184 A.3d 211, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 51 (2018).

— Insufficient.

The state did not prove a violation of this section since the evidence showed that at the suggestion of defendant the child inserted her own finger into her vaginal area. State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1996).

The evidence was more than sufficient for a jury to convict the defendant of second-degree molestation while acquitting him on first-degree molestation charges, since the victim provided vivid descriptions of the acts constituting second-degree molestation but could not remember specific events relating to the first-degree molestation counts. State v. Allessio, 762 A.2d 1190, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 210 (2000).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain the family court’s adjudications of delinquency on two charges of first-degree child molestation. The testimony of the two victims that their penises were “in” and “inside” defendant minor’s “butt” was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual penetration of defendant’s anal opening occurred. In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 65 (2016).

— Lesser Included Offenses.

In a trial for child molestation, the trial court correctly declined to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of simple assault and battery because the evidence did not invite such a charge. State v. Haigh, 666 A.2d 803, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 247 (1995).

Each count of the petition charging defendant minor with first-degree child molestation necessarily included a charge on the lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation. There was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the contact between defendant and his victims could be reasonably construed as intended by defendant to be for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or assault. In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 65 (2016).

— Other Acts.

In a prosecution for child molestation, instructing the jury that evidence of the defendant’s criminal acts with persons other than the victim was to be received “solely on the issue of credibility” was tantamount to saying that the jury could receive and apply such evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence. Relying on this instruction, the jury could have found the defendant guilty if it believed that he had engaged in anal intercourse with his wife, a crime under § 11-10-1 . The instruction, therefore, was both erroneous and highly prejudicial. State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 211 (1995).

Trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s touching a child victim’s sister because the evidence was non-remote and sufficiently similar to the charged offenses, was relevant to show defendant’s specific intent to sexually gratify, was reasonably necessary to support the victim’s credibility, and defendant waived the adequacy of the trial court’s cautionary instruction by not raising an objection prior to the jury’s deliberations. State v. Mitchell, 80 A.3d 19, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 153 (2013).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim’s testimony that defendant sexually assaulted her over 100 times over the course of three years because the testimony was highly probative of defendant’s lewd disposition towards the victim and was indicative of a common opportunity, intent, and plan with the offense for which defendant was being tried, child molestation. State v. Thibedau, 157 A.3d 1063, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 44 (2017).

— Sufficient.

Trial justice did not abuse her discretion in denying defendant’s motion for new trial, because the trial justice assessed the complainant’s credibility and found the complainant to be a witness worthy of belief, found that defendant offered no compelling reason for overturning the trial justice’s credibility determination, and the trial justice agreed with the jury’s finding and clearly articulated a reason for doing so. State v. Guerrero, 996 A.2d 86, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 69 (2010).

Trial justice did not err in failing to grant defendant’s motion for a new trial on the charges of first-degree sexual assault, where the trial justice thoroughly reviewed and summarized the testimony of all witnesses while also noting that there were some inconsistencies, and it was clear from the trial justice’s bench ruling that the trial justice concluded that reasonable minds could differ but was satisfied that the complainant and her sister were believable and credible. State v. Rosario, 35 A.3d 938, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 10 (2012).

In a prosecution for first- and second-degree child molestation, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, as it independently assessed the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, explicitly found that the complaining witness was credible and honest, and then determined that it would have reached the same result as the jury. State v. Gonzalez, 56 A.3d 96, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 153 (2012).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial after he was convicted of multiple counts of first- and second-degree child molestation, because its determination that the testimony of the victim and other State witnesses was credible while defendant’s testimony was not was entitled to deference and was not clearly wrong. State v. Lapierre, 57 A.3d 305, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 159 (2012).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial as to convictions for first-degree child molestation and second-degree child molestation because (1) the victim’s testimony was found sufficient, without corroborating testimony and defendant’s confession, to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the prosecutor was admonished for comments about defendant looking at counsel while testifying, and (3) defendant’s limiting instruction on the issue was given. State v. Buchanan, 81 A.3d 1119, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 5 (2014).

Trial justice conducted the proper three-step analysis in passing on defendant’s motion for a new trial and properly denied it, in connection with defendant’s conviction of first and second-degree child molestation; the minor victim’s younger brother’s testimony corroborated the victim’s testimony, the trial justice concluded that there was no way they fabricated the accusations, and defendant’s various arguments essentially amounted to nothing more than a disagreement with the trial justice’s assessment of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence. State v. Muralles, 154 A.3d 925, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 27 (2017).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal because the victim’s clarification was “precise” and “specific” as to vaginal penetration, and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it was adequate to prove penetration beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rainey, 175 A.3d 1169, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 5 (2018).

Finding of “Delinquency”.

Nothing contained in this section prevents a finding of “delinquency” pursuant to § 14-1-3(5) upon one under the age of 14, even though such a minor would be within the class of persons sought to be protected by the criminal molestation statute. In re Odell, 672 A.2d 457, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1996).

Indictment.

Defendant was not denied a fair trial because the counts in an indictment for first-degree child molestation sexual assault, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2 , were not duplicitous, and a bill of particulars made clear that a single act was charged in each of the counts. Furthermore, defense counsel was afforded considerable latitude on cross-examination to explore with the complaining witness dates, times, locations, and circumstances regarding the different and disparate instances that were alleged in the indictment. Pierce v. Wall, 941 A.2d 189, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 14 (2008).

Multiple Offenses.

On the basis of the victim’s testimony, it was not inconsistent for the jury to find defendant guilty of first degree child molestation sexual assault for fellatio and not guilty of second degree child molestation sexual assault for vaginal contact. State v. Frye, 713 A.2d 1232, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 166 (1998).

Even though the state lacks authority to charge child sexual assault as a continuing course of conduct crime, this will not impede the conviction, upon a properly constituted indictment or bill of particulars, of a defendant who has repeatedly sexually abused a child; it is only necessary that each count should charge a single offense. State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 233 (1998).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of evidence that juvenile prosecuting witness in sex offense case had prior sexual experience for purposes of showing alternative source of child’s ability to describe sex acts. 83 A.L.R.4th 685.

Denial or restriction of visitation rights to parent charged with sexually abusing child. 1 A.L.R.5th 776.

Sufficiency of allegations or evidence of serious bodily injury to support charge of aggravated degree of rape, sodomy, or other sexual abuse. 103 A.L.R.6th 507.

11-37-8.2. Penalty for first degree child molestation sexual assault.

Every person who shall commit first degree child molestation sexual assault shall be imprisoned for a period of not less than twenty-five (25) years and may be imprisoned for life.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 206, § 3; P.L. 2006, ch. 207, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 206, § 3, and P.L. 2006, ch. 207, § 3, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

Caselaw Survey Section: Criminal Law, see 4 R.W.U.L. Rev. 673 (1999).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Calculation of Sentence.

Length of a probationer’s sentence was not miscalculated because the probationer’s credits for good conduct and participation in institutional industries, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-24 , and for time served awaiting disposition, under R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-2(a) , did not entitle the probationer to an acceleration of the end date of the probationer’s probationary term. Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 903, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 20 (2014).

Correction Not Required.

Discrepancy between a judgment of conviction and a sentencing transcript did not require correction of defendant’s sentence for first-degree child molestation sexual assault under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 as: (1) defense counsel admitted twice that sentence for first-degree child molestation sexual assault was 50 years’ concurrent; (2) a five-year sentence would have been illegal under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.2 ; and (3) the trial justice stated during sentencing that the convictions were just as egregious as the first first-degree child molestation sexual assault count, for which defendant was sentenced to life in prison. State v. Rice, 986 A.2d 247, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 11 (2010).

Because the trial justice thoughtfully considered defendant’s past, because the sentence imposed was below the maximum penalty under R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37-8.2 , 11-37-8.4 , and because defendant’s assertion that defendant might be subject to indefinite immigration detention was wholly speculative, defendant’s R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 motion to reduce the sentence was properly denied. State v. Chhoy Hak, 30 A.3d 626, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 128 (2011).

Indictment.

Defendant was not denied a fair trial because the counts in an indictment for first-degree child molestation sexual assault, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2 , were not duplicitous, and a bill of particulars made clear that a single act was charged in each of the counts. Furthermore, defense counsel was afforded considerable latitude on cross-examination to explore with the complaining witness dates, times, locations, and circumstances regarding the different and disparate instances that were alleged in the indictment. Pierce v. Wall, 941 A.2d 189, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 14 (2008).

Sentence Upheld.

The trial justice acted within his discretion in imposing a sentence significantly longer than the sentence imposed at the defendant’s first trial where he appropriately considered factors subsequent to the first trial, such as the defendant’s flight, that shed light on the defendant’s propensities, and where he affirmatively placed his reasons on the record. State v. Sorel, 746 A.2d 704, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 45 (2000).

There was no abuse of discretion in sentencing the defendant to a total of 45 years for 10 separate offenses of sexual assault, since his sentences would have totaled 96 years had the minimum sentences called for and required to be imposed by the relevant statutes been imposed consecutively. State v. Souza, 754 A.2d 107, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 97 (2000).

Defendant’s challenge to the legality of his sentence for first-degree child molestation sexual assault in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.1 was not properly before the court on direct appeal because defendant did not demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances necessary to circumvent the procedures set forth in R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 , since the imposed sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, with six years to serve, fell within the bounds of defendant’s plea agreement, and was also within the statutory parameters of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.2 and was consistent with the superior court sentencing benchmarks. State v. Pallister, 916 A.2d 759, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 9 (2007).

11-37-8.2.1. Penalty for first degree child molestation sexual assault — Jessica Lunsford Child Predator Act of 2006.

  1. Title and Legislative Intent.  The title of this section shall be “The Jessica Lunsford Child Predator Act of 2006.” In enacting this section the general assembly intends that in order to ensure the safety of victims the most dangerous child predators be electronically monitored via an active global positioning system in order to ensure that their whereabouts can be easily ascertained by law enforcement and other responsible authorities at all times while providing treatment to offenders.
  2. Every person who shall violate the provisions of subdivisions 11-37-8.2.1(b)(1) 11-37-8.2.1(b)(2) listed herein shall be electronically monitored via an active global positioning system for life and, as a condition of parole and probation, and for the duration of any period of his or her probation following his or her parole shall attend a sex offender treatment program to address his or her criminally offensive behavior, as determined by the department of probation and parole. The persons subject to this condition of parole shall include:
    1. Persons who commit first degree child molestation sexual assault on or after January 1, 2007 and the victim of the sexual assault is twelve (12) years of age or younger; or
    2. Persons who shall violate the conditions of § 11-37-8.1 on or after January 1, 2007 and be determined a high-risk of re-offense (level 3) offender under the conditions of § 11-37.1-12 , and the person is deemed a child predator as defined in subsection 11-37-8.2.1(g) or have committed the offense in conjunction with circumstances involving kidnapping, torture or aggravated battery, and provided further that the victim to the offense is fourteen (14) years of age or younger.
    3. Any person who violates the terms of the global position monitoring conditions shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
  3. Any costs associated with the requirements of this section shall be borne by the offender and the court is hereby authorized and empowered to utilize all resources available to collect the funds for these costs unless the court finds that the defendant is indigent. In such cases costs shall be waived in order to promote this section’s legislative intent.
  4. Harboring.
    1. Any person who has reason to know that a person convicted of first degree child molestation as defined by § 11-37-8.1 or 11-37-8.2.1 is not complying or has not complied with the requirements of this section where applicable and who with the intent to assist the child molester in eluding a law enforcement agency that is seeking to find the child molester to question the child molester about or to arrest the child molester for his or her non-compliance with the requirements of this section and who:
      1. knowingly withholds information from or willfully fails to notify the law enforcement agency about the child molester’s non-compliance with the requirements of this section; or
      2. harbors or attempts to harbor or assists another person in harboring or attempting to harbor the child molester; or
      3. knowingly conceals or attempts to conceal or assists another person in concealing or attempting to conceal the child molester; or
      4. provides information to the law enforcement agency regarding the child molester that the person knows to be false information commits a felony and shall be subject to imprisonment for a period of five (5) years. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as limiting the discretion of the judges to impose additional sanctions authorized in sentencing.
    2. Any person who permits a child predator as defined by this section to reside with them knowing that the child predator has failed to comply with the requirements of subsection 11-37-8.2.1 (b) commits a felony punishable by up to five (5) years imprisonment and/or a five thousand dollar ($5,000) fine.
  5. Any person who intentionally tampers with damages or destroys any electronic monitoring equipment required by this section pursuant to a court order or parole board order unless such person is the owner of the equipment or an agent of the owner performing ordinary maintenance and repairs commits a felony and shall be imprisoned for not less than one nor more than five (5) years.
  6. The department of corrections, prior to the release from incarceration of any child predator, shall ensure that the child predator’s fingerprints are taken and forwarded to the bureau of criminal identification (BCI) division within the department of attorney general within forty-eight (48) hours after release from incarceration. The fingerprint card shall be clearly marked “Child Predator Registration Card.”
  7. For the purposes of this section “child predator” shall be defined as any person convicted of any violation of § 11-37-8.1 , and who on a prior occasion has been convicted of a violation of § 11-37-8.1 or § 11-37-8.3 .

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 207, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 206, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 207, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

11-37-8.3. Second degree child molestation sexual assault.

A person is guilty of a second degree child molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual contact with another person fourteen (14) years of age or under.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 59, § 2; P.L. 1988, ch. 219, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Law Reviews.

Matthew Gustaitis, 2016 Survey, Cases: In re B.H., 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 824 (2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Where the Rhode Island Supreme Court received more than 40 nearly identical petitions for writ of certiorari seeking review of the superior court’s denial of the respective petitioner’s postconviction relief application, all the petitions for writ of certiorari were denied as the statutes for murder, first-degree sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, third-degree sexual assault, first-degree child molestation sexual assault, and second-degree child molestation sexual assault were not unconstitutional for setting out the prohibited conduct in one section of a chapter in Rhode Island’s General Laws, and setting out the penalty in the subsequent section because that arrangement did not somehow render those statutes without legal force and effect. In re Writ of Certiorari Seeking Review of Denials of Applications, 219 A.3d 320, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 124 (2019).

Evidence.

Evidence showing that defendant removed the victim’s clothes, exposed his penis and with it made contact with the child’s vaginal area was sufficient to sustain his conviction, notwithstanding his contention that the sole purpose of any contact he might have had with the victim was to set up a sexual assault charge against his landlord with the aid of false testimony from the victim. State v. Rossi, 520 A.2d 582, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 406 (1987).

Evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual assault on a child not known by the victims of the alleged offenses is relevant, where the theory of defense is that the victims have fabricated the evidence against defendant and have colluded in planning their testimony. State v. Messa, 542 A.2d 1071, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1988).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction, where the victim testified that defendant touched her private parts and put his penis between her legs, the victim’s testimony was corroborated by testimony given by her sister, and the testimony was buttressed by sexually explicit photographs of defendant and the victim. State v. Shatney, 572 A.2d 872, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 75 (1990).

Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted, where the evidence presented at trial showed, at the most, an ambiguous touch from which a jury would have to speculate to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that its purpose was for sexual arousal or gratification. State v. Brown, 586 A.2d 1085, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1991).

Testimony by the victim about uncharged acts that were committed against her by the defendant was held admissible. State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1997).

The evidence was more than sufficient for a jury to convict the defendant of second-degree molestation while acquitting him on first-degree molestation charges, since the victim provided vivid descriptions of the acts constituting second-degree molestation but could not remember specific events relating to the first-degree molestation counts. State v. Allessio, 762 A.2d 1190, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 210 (2000).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motions for a judgment of acquittal, R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 29 , and for a new trial, R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 , following defendant’s conviction of second-degree child molestation pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.3 . Defendant’s deliberate act of fondling his 10 year old stepdaughter could not be characterized as accidental and could reasonably be construed as intended by defendant for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification, and therefore constituted sexual conduct as defined by R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(7) . State v. Tracy, 816 A.2d 1275, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 41 (2003).

Family court did not err in finding defendant juvenile guilty of second-degree child molestation sexual assault. The family court’s finding that the victim was a credible witness was rationally supported by competent evidence; the victim was able to testify about three different events, and the inconsistencies in her testimony were insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt with respect to the State’s case. In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 54 (2008).

Where the victim’s birth date clearly made the victim 14 years of age or younger at the time of the alleged offense and two witnesses credibly testified that defendant intentionally touched the victim’s naked buttocks with his penis, contact that could reasonably be construed as intended to be for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or assault, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial. State v. Erminelli, 991 A.2d 1064, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 68 (2010).

Trial court committed clear error by admitting highly incriminating evidence pursuant to the “lewd disposition” exception in R.I. R. Evid. 404 (b) during defendant’s trial for second-degree child molestation sexual assault, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-9.3, because the State violated R.I. Super Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(8) by not turning the evidence over until the second day of trial; the supplemental answer to discovery presented to defendant on the second day of trial indicated the State intended to produce evidence of alleged sexual contact in a shower between defendant and the victim, defendant’s teenage daughter, despite the original information package containing no mention of any alleged contact. State v. Langstaff, 994 A.2d 1216, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 58 (2010).

Trial justice did not abuse her discretion in denying defendant’s motion for new trial, because the trial justice assessed the complainant’s credibility and found the complainant to be a witness worthy of belief, found that defendant offered no compelling reason for overturning the trial justice’s credibility determination, and the trial justice agreed with the jury’s finding and clearly articulated a reason for doing so. State v. Guerrero, 996 A.2d 86, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 69 (2010).

Where evidence from other accusers was admitted at a prisoner’s child molestation trial, the prisoner’s federal habeas petition was properly denied because the prisoner failed to exhaust the claim that the admission of prior bad acts evidence violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the claim failed on the merits since the state court’s approval of the introduction of the prior bad acts evidence was well within the universe of plausible evidentiary rulings. Coningford v. Rhode Island, 640 F.3d 478, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10159 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 954, 132 S. Ct. 426, 181 L. Ed. 2d 277, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7274 (2011).

In view of a child’s multiple identifications of defendant as the man who had entered her bedroom and touched her vagina, his fingerprints being found on package of gum she said he left in her room, and his admissions that he was familiar with the location of her home and that he had purchased the same brand of gum, the evidence was sufficient to establish that he violated his probation. State v. Jensen, 40 A.3d 771, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 40 (2012).

In a prosecution for first- and second-degree child molestation, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, as it independently assessed the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, explicitly found that the complaining witness was credible and honest, and then determined that it would have reached the same result as the jury. State v. Gonzalez, 56 A.3d 96, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 153 (2012).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial after he was convicted of multiple counts of first- and second-degree child molestation, because its determination that the testimony of the victim and other State witnesses was credible while defendant’s testimony was not was entitled to deference and was not clearly wrong. State v. Lapierre, 57 A.3d 305, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 159 (2012).

Trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant’s touching a child victim’s sister because the evidence was non-remote and sufficiently similar to the charged offenses, was relevant to show defendant’s specific intent to sexually gratify, was reasonably necessary to support the victim’s credibility, and defendant waived the adequacy of the trial court’s cautionary instruction by not raising an objection prior to the jury’s deliberations. State v. Mitchell, 80 A.3d 19, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 153 (2013).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial as to convictions for first-degree child molestation and second-degree child molestation because (1) the victim’s testimony was found sufficient, without corroborating testimony and defendant’s confession, to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the prosecutor was admonished for comments about defendant looking at counsel while testifying, and (3) defendant’s limiting instruction on the issue was given. State v. Buchanan, 81 A.3d 1119, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 5 (2014).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of second-degree child molestation where the six-year-old victim testified that on the night of the incident she woke up, felt something on her vagina, and saw defendant standing at her bed. Her mother’s testimony corroborated the victim’s statements and defendant told a detective that he touched the victim’s vagina. State v. Armour, 110 A.3d 1195, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2015).

Juvenile was properly adjudicated as a delinquent for engaging in second-degree child molestation sexual assault because the evidence showed that the juvenile entered the room where the victim was sleeping on two occasions and touched the victim on the second occasion by placing the juvenile’s fingers over the victim’s vagina and underwear for the purpose of the juvenile’s sexual gratification. In re Kyle A., 137 A.3d 706, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 52 (2016).

Each count of the petition charging defendant minor with first-degree child molestation necessarily included a charge on the lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation. There was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the contact between defendant and his victims could be reasonably construed as intended by defendant to be for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or assault. In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 65 (2016).

Trial justice conducted the proper three-step analysis in passing on defendant’s motion for a new trial and properly denied it, in connection with defendant’s conviction of first and second-degree child molestation; the minor victim’s younger brother’s testimony corroborated the victim’s testimony, the trial justice concluded that there was no way they fabricated the accusations, and defendant’s various arguments essentially amounted to nothing more than a disagreement with the trial justice’s assessment of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence. State v. Muralles, 154 A.3d 925, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 27 (2017).

Although the minor victim did not explicitly offer testimony that defendant’s hand touched her vagina in describing every occasion of sexual assault, the victim’s testimony on certain counts sufficiently referred back to an earlier assault in that defendant was “doing the same thing as the other times” and created a nexus between her testimony and the body part delineated in the statute, her genital area. State v. Cavanaugh, 158 A.3d 268, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 48 (2017).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree sexual assault and three counts of second-degree child molestation, defendant’s motion for a new trial was properly denied because the trial justice stated that reasonable minds could differ as to what the verdict should be; the trial justice did not overlook the evidence of the victim’s potential motive for testifying as she did or the evidence that her poor relationship with defendant started only after he allegedly violated her confidence; and the trial justice did not overlook the lack of independent evidence as there was no requirement of independent corroboration for sex offense cases. State v. Acosta, 247 A.3d 489, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 24 (2021).

— Other Acts.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim’s testimony that defendant sexually assaulted her over 100 times over the course of three years because the testimony was highly probative of defendant’s lewd disposition toward the victim and was indicative of a common opportunity, intent, and plan with the offense for which defendant was being tried, child molestation. State v. Thibedau, 157 A.3d 1063, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 44 (2017).

Guilty Plea.

Even if a post-conviction relief applicant had shown improper advice by his attorney at his plea to child molestation, he failed to show that prejudice resulted from the advice becuase, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.4 , he could have been sentenced to 6-30 years for each of two counts, potentially consecutive to the robbery sentence he was already serving, but instead he received a ten-year suspended sentence with ten years probation, concurrent to the robbery sentence. Perkins v. State, 78 A.3d 764, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 137 (2013).

Jury Instructions.

Notwithstanding initial misstatements, that had to be corrected after bench conferences, a trial justice’s explanation of the elements of child molestation sufficiently clarified that any touching had to be for purposes of sexual arousal; furthermore, the justice’s explanation of burden of proof was unequivocal and correct. State v. Ibrahim, 862 A.2d 787, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 203 (2004).

Multiple Offenses.

Even though the state lacks authority to charge child sexual assault as a continuing course of conduct crime, this will not impede the conviction, upon a properly constituted indictment or bill of particulars, of a defendant who has repeatedly sexually abused a child; it is only necessary that each count should charge a single offense. State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 233 (1998).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial after the jury found him guilty on two out of fourteen counts of child molestation because the trial court: (1) addressed with specificity the multiple incidents of alleged sexual assault; (2) found the victim, her mother, and her sister to be credible witnesses; and (3) concluded the inconsistent verdicts could have resulted from jury compromise. State v. Hie, 93 A.3d 963, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 103 (2014).

New Trial.

Trial justice did not err by denying defendant’s new trial motion because the trial justice (1) did not overlook or misconceive any material evidence, (2) appropriately analyzed the evidence, (3) evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, including the victim’s sometimes contradictory testimony, and (4) assessed the weight of the evidence, and, (5) having done so, determined sufficient credible evidence supported the verdict. State v. Tabora, 198 A.3d 516, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 2 (2019).

Nolo Contendere Plea.

Denial of an inmate’s postconviction relief petition was proper because the inmate’s Alford plea to second-degree child molestation was voluntary, intelligent, and knowing for R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 11 purposes and the inmate was well aware of the nature of the charges against him at the time he pled to them; it was acceptable for the trial justice to rely on the prosecutor’s recitation of the State’s evidence to establish the factual basis. The inmate failed to satisfy his burden of proving that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Camacho v. State, 58 A.3d 182, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 10 (2013).

Records.

In a prosecution for child molestation sexual assault, denial of defendant’s request for copies of the victim’s Department of Children, Youth and Families records did not violate his constitutional right to confrontation because in camera inspection of the records by the trial justice adequately protected his rights and properly furthered the victim’s and the state’s interest in shielding confidential information. State v. Holmes, 715 A.2d 576, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 235 (1998).

Collateral References.

Sufficiency of allegations or evidence of serious bodily injury to support charge of aggravated degree of rape, sodomy, or other sexual abuse. 103 A.L.R.6th 507.

11-37-8.4. Penalty for second degree child molestation sexual assault.

Every person who shall commit second degree child molestation sexual assault shall be imprisoned for not less than six (6) years nor more than thirty (30) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 59, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Reduction of Sentence.

The trial court did not improperly consider in a motion to reduce sentence the defendant’s exercise of his right to stand trial or his corollary right to hold the state to its burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt through the presentation of testimony from the child victim, since the defendant forced the child to testify about the molestation in open court by exercising his right to stand trial and by presenting false testimony to the court in the hopes of escaping conviction and punishment, and had indicated his intention to appeal while knowing full well that what the little girl said from the stand was absolutely true. State v. Tiernan, 645 A.2d 482, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 219 (1994).

Because the trial justice thoughtfully considered defendant’s past, because the sentence imposed was below the maximum penalty under R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37-8.2 , 11-37-8.4 , and because defendant’s assertion that defendant might be subject to indefinite immigration detention was wholly speculative, defendant’s R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 motion to reduce the sentence was properly denied. State v. Chhoy Hak, 30 A.3d 626, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 128 (2011).

Sentence Upheld.

There was no abuse of discretion in sentencing the defendant to a total of 45 years for 10 separate offenses of sexual assault, since his sentences would have totaled 96 years had the minimum sentences called for and required to be imposed by the relevant statutes been imposed consecutively. State v. Souza, 754 A.2d 107, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 97 (2000).

The trial justice acted within his discretion in imposing a sentence significantly longer than the sentence imposed at the defendant’s first trial where he appropriately considered factors subsequent to the first trial, such as the defendant’s flight, that shed light on the defendant’s propensities, and where he affirmatively placed his reasons on the record. State v. Sorel, 746 A.2d 704, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 45 (2000).

Defendant’s appeal from the denial of his R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence was denied and dismissed where, on each count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault, defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 15 years, six of which were to be served with the remaining nine years being suspended; defendant’s sentences were clearly permitted and authorized by R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.4 . State v. Murray, 788 A.2d 1154, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 267 (2001).

Because defendant’s sentence for second-degree child molestation was clearly within the limits of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.4 , it was not illegal; therefore, because defendant’s second motion to reduce the sentence was filed many months after the expiration of the statutory 120-day time limit in R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 (a), it was untimely. State v. Elliott, 899 A.2d 520, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 100 (2006).

Defendant’s sentence for second-degree child molestation of 20 years, with 15 years to be served at the Adult Correctional Institutions and the other five years suspended, did not constituted cruel and unusual punishment under U.S. Const. amend. VIII or R.I. Const. art. 1, § 8 because the sentence fell within the range set out in R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.4 and a departure from the sentencing benchmarks was proper based on defendant’s criminal history. Alessio v. State, 924 A.2d 751, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 71 (2007).

Suspended Sentence.

Even if a post-conviction relief applicant had shown improper advice by his attorney at his plea to child molestation, he failed to show that prejudice resulted from the advice because, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.4 , he could have been sentenced to 6-30 years for each of two counts, potentially consecutive to the robbery sentence he was already serving, but instead he received a ten-year suspended sentence with ten years probation, concurrent to the robbery sentence. Perkins v. State, 78 A.3d 764, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 137 (2013).

11-37-8.5. Identification of victims of child molestation sexual assault.

  1. All court records which concern the identity of a victim of child molestation sexual assault shall be confidential and shall not be made public.
  2. Every agency of state or local government shall protect the confidentiality of documents containing the identity of victims of child molestation sexual assault.
  3. A defendant charged with child molestation sexual assault may make application to the trial court for an order of disclosure of identifying information concerning the child victim in order to prepare his or her defense. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the disclosure of the victim’s identity to the defendant at the time of his or her arraignment, provided, that the defendant shall make no disclosure of the victim’s identity other than to his or her attorney and others directly involved in the preparation of his or her defense. Any disclosure by a defendant other than permitted in this section shall constitute contempt.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 380, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Policy Analysis.

An interpretation of this section which would allow access to redacted copies of all court documents or records in child molestation sexual assault cases assumes incorrectly that a child victim possesses a legitimate privacy interest only in his or her name or other identifying information, and an interpretation which would bar inspection of any record that contains a reference to the victim’s name or identity impermissibly restricts the right of access to information on criminal prosecutions. Providence Journal Co. v. Rodgers, 711 A.2d 1131, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 169 (1998).

In order to balance the protection of the identity of child victims of sexual assault with safeguarding the public’s interest in the fairness of criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court directed the establishment of rules of practice for specific procedures to be followed in implementing a policy explained in detail in this case. Providence Journal Co. v. Rodgers, 711 A.2d 1131, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 169 (1998).

11-37-8.6. Special assessment — Payment for treatment or counseling.

In addition to all other statutory costs and assessments, every person, adjudged guilty of the provisions of § 11-37-8.1 or 11-37-8.3 , whether by trial, plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere, shall pay a special assessment of one hundred dollars ($100). In addition to any other penalty provided by law, any person convicted under §§ 11-37-8.1 11-37-8.3 may be required, as part of the sentence imposed by the court, to pay the cost of any necessary medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment of the child resulting from the act or acts for which the defendant is convicted.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 319, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 137, § 1.

11-37-8.7. Parole of violators.

In the case of any person convicted and imprisoned for an offense under §§ 11-37-8.1 11-37-8.3 , it shall be required that:

  1. The department of attorney general or local prosecutor be informed by the parole board ninety (90) days prior to a parole hearing of the date of hearing, and the attorney general or local prosecutor provide the parole board with a complete statement of circumstances surrounding a conviction within forty-five (45) days prior to the scheduled parole hearing date.
  2. The parole board shall notify the victim and his or her family of a scheduled parole hearing at least forty-five (45) days prior to the date of hearing, and the victim and/or family shall be permitted an opportunity to provide a statement for review by the parole board.
  3. The convicted person shall be examined prior to parole by one independent psychiatrist to determine whether the person is a continued danger to children.
  4. The convicted person shall receive outpatient treatment at his or her own expense after parole or release from hospitalization for a period of time to be set by the parole board, and the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals shall oversee and provide these services. Any person willfully violating this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall serve not more than one year imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 528, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated former subsections (a) through (d) as subdivisions (1) through (4).

11-37-8.8. Indecent solicitation of a child.

  1. A person is guilty of indecent solicitation of a child if he or she knowingly solicits another person under eighteen (18) years of age or one whom he or she believes is a person under eighteen (18) years of age for the purpose of engaging in an act of prostitution or in any act in violation of chapter 9, 34, or 37 of this title.
  2. As used in this section, the word “solicit” or “solicitation” means to command, authorize, urge, incite, request, or advise another to perform an act by any means including, but not limited to, in person, over the phone, in writing, by computer, through the Internet, or by advertisement of any kind.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 586, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 612, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 586, § 1, and P.L. 2004, ch. 612, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

11-37-8.9. Penalty for indecent solicitation of a child.

Every person who shall commit indecent solicitation of a child shall be imprisoned for not less than five (5) years.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 586, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 612, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 586, § 1, and P.L. 2004, ch. 612, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

11-37-9. Joinder of offenses.

Any person who shall be indicted for first, second, or third degree sexual assault and/or first or second degree child molestation sexual assault and/or § 11-37-8 may also be charged in the same indictment with either or all of the offenses described in §§ 11-37-2 , 11-37-4 , 11-37-6 , 11-37-8 , 11-37-8.1 , and 11-37-8.3 . If upon trial the jury shall acquit the person of any of the charges of sexual assault and shall find him or her guilty of any of the other offenses, judgment and sentence may be entered against him or her accordingly.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 59, § 1.

11-37-10. Subsequent offenses.

If a person is convicted of a second or subsequent offense under the provisions of §§ 11-37-2 , 11-37-4 , 11-37-8 , 11-37-8.1 , and 11-37-8.3 , the sentence imposed under these sections for the second or subsequent offenses shall not be less than twice the minimum number of years of sentence for the most recent offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 59, § 1.

11-37-11. Corroboration of victim’s testimony unnecessary.

The testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

By its adoption of this section, the General Assembly has rejected, as a discredited anachronism, the corroboration requirement which arbitrarily singled out victims of sex offenses as a class whose credibility is immediately suspect. State v. Cabral, 122 R.I. 623 , 410 A.2d 438, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1431 (1980).

Corroboration is not necessary to prove sex crimes. State v. Clark, 603 A.2d 1094, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1992).

It was not error to refuse to pass defendant’s first-degree child molestation sexual assault prosecution, because (1) after a statement of the consistency of the victim’s disclosure with sexual abuse was stricken from an expert’s testimony, the jury could decide the probative value of the rest of the testimony, and (2) under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-11 , no corroboration of the victim’s testimony was required. State v. Rathbun, 184 A.3d 211, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 51 (2018).

Specific Cases.

In a case in which defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree sexual assault and three counts of second-degree child molestation, defendant’s motion for a new trial was properly denied because the trial justice stated that reasonable minds could differ as to what the verdict should be; the trial justice did not overlook the evidence of the victim’s potential motive for testifying as she did or the evidence that her poor relationship with defendant started only after he allegedly violated her confidence; and the trial justice did not overlook the lack of independent evidence as there was no requirement of independent corroboration for sex offense cases. State v. Acosta, 247 A.3d 489, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 24 (2021).

11-37-11.1. [Reserved.]

Reserved Sections.

This section number is reserved for future use.

11-37-11.2. Speedy trial.

In any action under this chapter involving a child victim age fourteen (14) years or under or a victim sixty-five (65) years or older, the court and the attorney general’s office shall take appropriate action to ensure a speedy trial to minimize the length of time the victim must endure the stress of involvement in the proceeding. In ruling on any motion or request for a delay or continuance of proceedings, the court shall consider any adverse impact the delay or continuance may have on the well-being of the victim or witness. This provision establishes a right to a speedy trial to the victim and shall not be construed as creating any additional rights to the defendant.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 354, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 219, § 1.

11-37-12. Proof of resistance unnecessary.

In any prosecution brought under this chapter, it shall not be necessary to prove that the victim physically resisted the accused if the victim reasonably believed that resistance would be useless and might result in his or her serious bodily injury.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2; P.L. 1980, ch. 273, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is set out to correct an error appearing in the 2000 Reenactment volume.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jury Instructions.

The trial justice is not in error when he instructs the jury that the degree of resistance a victim must offer in a sexual-assault case may be affected by the familial relationship between the victim and the defendant and the defendant’s degree of control and discipline over her. State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1080 (1983), limited, State v. Bernier, 491 A.2d 1000, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 495 (1985).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of prosecution evidence on issue of consent, that victim was a virgin, absent defense attack on her chastity. 35 A.L.R.3d 1452.

11-37-13. Prior sexual conduct of complainant — Admissibility of evidence.

If a defendant who is charged with the crime of sexual assault intends to introduce proof that the complaining witness has engaged in sexual activities with other persons, he or she shall give notice of that intention to the court and the attorney for the state. The notice shall be given prior to the introduction of any evidence of that fact; it shall be given orally out of the hearing of spectators and, if the action is being tried by a jury, out of the hearing of the jurors. Upon receiving the notice, the court shall order the defendant to make a specific offer of the proof that he or she intends to introduce in support of this issue. The offer of proof, and all arguments relating to it, shall take place outside the hearing of spectators and jurors. The court shall then rule upon the admissibility of the evidence offered.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence Irrelevant.

Evidence of a 19-year-old sexual assault victim’s prior sexual activities, which occurred during a previous sexual assault perpetrated upon her by someone else and for which that person was tried and convicted, was protected by the rape shield law because it was not relevant with respect to the victim’s credibility, and, having occurred seven or eight years prior to the assault charges against her father, was not relevant. State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 166 (2004).

Evidence of Prior Allegations by Victim.

Evidence of a complaining witness’ prior allegations of sexual assault may be admitted “to challenge effectively the complaining witness’s credibility,” even if the allegations were not proven false or withdrawn. State v. Oliveira, 576 A.2d 111, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 115 (1990).

Offer of Proof.

Prior statement made by the alleged rape victim to an examining physician concerning her prior sexual activity fulfilled the requirement of independent support for introduction of proof of the victim’s past sexual activity. State v. Lemon, 456 A.2d 261, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 799 (1983).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s new trial motion, as evidence regarding incidents between one of his sexual assault victims and two other men was not presented to the court, nor was an offer of proof made with respect thereto; further, the incidents had little or no probative value. State v. Rivera, 987 A.2d 887, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 24 (2010).

Defendant, charged with child molestation, was properly precluded from cross-examining the victim about her purported prior sexual activity with third parties, as he failed to give the court and prosecutor notice that he intended to pursue the issue or to make an offer of proof, as required by R.I. R. Evid. 412 and R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-13 . State v. Burnham, 58 A.3d 889, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 14 (2013).

Collateral References.

Admissibility in prosecution for sex offense of evidence of victim’s sexual activity after the offense. 81 A.L.R.4th 1076.

Admissibility of evidence that juvenile prosecuting witness in sex offense case had prior sexual experience for purposes of showing alternative source of child’s ability to describe sex acts. 83 A.L.R.4th 685.

Admissibility of prosecution evidence on issue of consent, that victim was a virgin, absent defense attack on her chastity. 35 A.L.R.3d 1452.

Constitutionality of “rape shield” statute restricting use of evidence of victim’s sexual experiences. 1 A.L.R.4th 283.

Cross-examination of prosecuting witness as to sexual morality. 65 A.L.R. 421.

Modern status of admissibility, in forcible rape prosecution, of complainant’s prior sexual acts. 94 A.L.R.3d 257.

Modern status of admissibility, in statutory rape prosecution, of complainant’s prior sexual acts or general reputation for unchastity. 90 A.L.R.3d 1300.

Offense of Rape After Withdrawal of Consent. 33 A.L.R.6th 353.

Presumption and burden of proof as to chastity. 3 A.L.R. 1462.

11-37-13.1. Recording — Grand jury testimony — Child assault.

  1. In any grand jury proceeding investigating a sexual assault alleged to have been committed against a child, a recording of a statement from the alleged victim who is fourteen (14) years of age or younger at the time of the proceeding shall be admissible into evidence at the proceeding if:
    1. The statement is sworn to under oath by the child, and the significance of the oath is explained to the child;
    2. The recording is both visual and aural and is recorded on film or videotape or by other electronic means;
    3. The recording equipment was capable of making an accurate recording, the operator of the equipment was competent, and the recording is accurate and has not been altered;
    4. Every voice on the recording is identified;
    5. The statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement;
    6. The person conducting the interview is an attorney in the department of the attorney general or another person chosen by the attorney general to make the proceeding less intimidating to the child, and the interviewer is available to testify at the proceeding;
    7. The child is available to testify if requested by the grand jurors; and
    8. The recording is made a part of the record of the grand jury.
  2. In any grand jury proceeding investigating a sexual assault alleged to have been committed against a child, a recording of a statement from the alleged victim who is more than fourteen (14) years of age and less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the proceeding shall be admissible into evidence at the proceeding if:
    1. The attorney general petitions the court for permission to introduce the recording at the proceeding; and
    2. The court grants the petition upon a finding that the child would suffer unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional harm if required to appear personally before the grand jury in order to testify; and
    3. All of the conditions as set forth in subsection (a) of this section are followed.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 124, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 385, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 473, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 385, § 1, and P.L. 2004, ch. 473, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-37-13.2. Alternative methods of victim testimony — Child victim.

  1. In any judicial proceeding in which a person has been charged with sexual assault of a child who at the time of trial is seventeen (17) years of age or less, the court may order, upon a showing that the child is unable to testify before the court without suffering unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional harm, that the testimony of the child be taken in a room other than the courtroom and either be recorded for later showing before the court and/or the finder of fact in the proceeding or be broadcast simultaneously by closed circuit television to the court and/or finder of fact in the proceeding. When the child is fourteen (14) years of age or younger at the time of trial, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the child is unable to testify before the court without suffering unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional harm. Only the judge, attorneys for the parties, persons necessary to operate the recording or broadcasting equipment, and any person whose presence would contribute to the welfare and well-being of the child may be present in the room with the child during his or her testimony. Examination and cross-examination shall proceed in the same manner as permitted at the trial or hearing.
  2. The persons operating the equipment shall be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror which permits them to see and hear the child during his or her testimony, but does not permit the child to see or hear them. The court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony of the child in person, but ensure that the child cannot hear or see the person alleged to have committed the assault. The defendant shall be afforded a means of communicating with his or her attorney throughout the proceedings, and, upon request of the defendant or his or her attorney, recesses shall be permitted to allow them to confer. The court shall ensure that:
    1. The recording or broadcast is both visual and aural and is recorded on film or videotape or by other electronic means;
    2. The recording equipment was capable of making an accurate recording, the operator of the equipment was competent, and the recording is accurate and has not been altered;
    3. Each voice on the recording is identified;
    4. Each party is afforded an opportunity to view any recording made prior to trial before it is shown in the courtroom; and
    5. The statement is sworn to under oath by the child.
  3. If the court orders the testimony of a child to be so recorded or broadcast, the child shall not be required to testify at the proceeding for which the testimony was taken, and the testimony shall be used in lieu of the live testimony of the child.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 355, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 385, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 473, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 385, § 1, and P.L. 2004, ch. 473, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 143 (1989).

This section’s rebuttable presumption that the child is unable to testify before the court without suffering unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional harm violates the confrontation clause of both the federal and Rhode Island Constitutions. State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 143 (1989).

This section does not violate a defendant’s right of self-representation, as he or she is able to undertake self-representation, albeit in a slightly modified form. State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 143 (1989).

Even if a United States Supreme Court decision stating the findings necessary to allow the victim to testify outside of the defendant’s presence stated a new rule, that rule did not apply retroactively to defendant’s trial because that decision did not prohibit the criminalization of, or punishment for, the acts of which defendant was convicted, nor did it alter the understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. Taylor v. Wall, 821 A.2d 685, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 103 (2003).

When the testimony of defendant’s victim was presented by videotape, the trial court’s findings that the victim unequivocally would suffer unreasonable and unnecessary mental and emotional harm if required to testify in defendant’s presence satisfied the requirements of a United States Supreme Court decision issued subsequent to the denial of defendant’s direct appeal. Taylor v. Wall, 821 A.2d 685, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 103 (2003).

Applicability.

State had no basis whatsoever to point to R.I.Gen. Laws § 11-37-13.2(a) , in seeking an order to close the courtroom in a child sexual assault prosecution; the statute provided for alternate means for relieving child rape victims from the trauma associated with facing their alleged abusers in a courtroom, however, closing the courtroom was not among them. The statute did not apply because the child testified at trial, not outside the courtroom, as provided for by § 11-37-13.2(a) . State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 73 , cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1071, 129 S. Ct. 740, 172 L. Ed. 2d 729, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 9079 (2008).

Although R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-13.2(a) reflects the Legislature’s effort to establish procedures for the protection of child victims, it does not anticipate that a trial justice summarily will exclude the public from attending a trial. After all, itt is the defendant who is accused and whose right to a public trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 73 , cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1071, 129 S. Ct. 740, 172 L. Ed. 2d 729, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 9079 (2008).

Mandatory Jury Instructions for Videotaped Testimony.

When a trial judge allows videotaped or broadcast testimony into evidence under this section, it is mandatory that an instruction be given which informs the jury that they are not to infer that the child is afraid of the defendant or that he or she is guilty. State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 143 (1989).

Testimony at Trial.

State’s reliance on R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-13.2 , as support for its motion for the closure of the courtroomwhile a child witness testified, was misplaced. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37-13.2 and 12-28-8(c) were not to be read as allowing trial justices to bar the public from attending a criminal trial. State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 73 , cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1071, 129 S. Ct. 740, 172 L. Ed. 2d 729, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 9079 (2008).

11-37-13.3. Sexual assault reports.

  1. A law enforcement officer who responds to or investigates a sexual assault or child molestation sexual assault incident, shall, upon determination of probable cause for arrest or referral to the attorney general’s office, complete a sexual assault report (DV/SA-1).
  2. For the purpose of establishing data on the extent and severity of arrests for sexual assault and child molestation sexual assault in the state and on the degree of compliance with the requirements of this section the domestic violence training and monitoring unit of the court system shall prescribe a form for making sexual assault reports. The form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information:
    1. Name of the parties;
    2. Relationship of the parties;
    3. Sex of the parties;
    4. Date of birth of the parties;
    5. Time and date of the alleged incident;
    6. Whether children were allegedly involved or whether the alleged act of sexual assault or child molestation sexual assault was committed in the presence of children;
    7. Type and extent of the alleged abuse;
    8. Number and types of alleged weapons involved;
    9. Existence of any prior court order; and
    10. Any other data that may be necessary for a complete analysis of all circumstances leading to the arrest.
  3. Each police department shall forward copies of the reports to the unit at the end of each month.
  4. Upon adjudication of acquittal, dismissal or other exoneration the sexual assault report form will be expunged by the domestic violence training and monitoring unit.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 381, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 411, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2002 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2002 amendment.

11-37-14. Severability.

If the provisions of this chapter or their application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, their invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 302, § 2.

11-37-15, 11-37-16. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1986, ch. 527, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 196, § 1), concerning notice of release or parole of certain sex offenders and registration of sex offenders, were repealed by P.L. 1996, ch. 104, §§ 2 and 3, effective July 24, 1996. For present similar provisions, see chapter 37.1 of this title.

11-37-17. Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) — Mandatory testing.

  1. Any person who has admitted to or been convicted of or adjudicated wayward or delinquent by reason of having committed any sexual offense involving sexual penetration, as defined in § 11-37-1 , whether or not sentence or fine is imposed or probation granted, shall be ordered by the court upon the petition of the victim, immediate family members of the victim or legal guardian of the victim, to submit to a blood test for the presence of a sexually transmitted disease including, but not limited to, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) which causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as provided for in chapter 23-6.3.
  2. Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by §§ 23-6.3-7 and 5-37.3-4 , the results of the HIV test shall be reported to the court, which shall then disclose the results to any victim of the sexual offense who requests disclosure. Review and disclosure of blood test results by the courts shall be closed and confidential, and any transaction records relating to them shall also be closed and confidential.
  3. [Deleted by P.L. 2009, ch. 196, § 3, and by P.L. 2009, ch. 289, § 3].
  4. [Deleted by P.L. 2009, ch. 196, § 3, and by P.L. 2009, ch. 289, § 3].
  5. [Deleted by P.L. 2009, ch. 196, § 3, and by P.L. 2009, ch. 289, § 3].

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 105, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 196, § 3; P.L. 2009, ch. 289, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 239, § 17.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2009, ch. 196, § 3, and P.L. 2009, ch. 289, § 3, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Chapter 37.1 Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification

11-37.1-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and be cited as the “Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act”.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Defendant juvenile, who was adjudicated delinquent for committing second-degree child molestation sexual assault, was properly required to register under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-3(a) ; the Registration Act is constitutional as applied to juveniles. The confidentiality generally afforded to a juvenile is not absolute; sometimes confidentiality has to give way to other legitimate societal priorities. In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 54 (2008).

Vacation of Adjudication of Delinquency.

In the unique position where one offender was deprived of an admonition that would be given to all future offenders of the same or similar category, due to the passage of the state’s version of “Megan’s Law,” it did not constitute an error of law for the Family Court justice to vacate an adjudication of delinquency. In re Matthew A., 743 A.2d 553, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 2 (2000).

Collateral References.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901 et seq., its Enforcement Provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2250, and Associated Regulations. 30 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 213.

11-37.1-2. Definitions.

  1. “Abscond” means to not register as required, or to relocate to some unknown place other than the registered place of residence, or to conceal himself or herself in an attempt to avoid registration or verification of registration.
  2. “Aggravated offense” means, and includes, offenses involving sexual penetration of victims of any age through the use of force, or the threat of use of force, or offenses involving sexual penetration of victims who are fourteen (14) years of age or under.
  3. “Board,” “board of review,” or “sex offender board of review” means the sex offender board of review appointed by the governor pursuant to § 11-37.1-6 .
    1. “Conviction” or “convicted” means, and includes, any instance where:
      1. A judgment of conviction has been entered against any person for any offense specified in subsection (f) or (v), or a federal offense, a foreign offense, or a military offense, regardless of whether an appeal is pending; or
      2. There has been a finding of guilty for any offense specified in subsection (f) or (v), or a federal offense, a foreign offense, or a military offense, regardless of whether an appeal is pending; or
      3. There has been a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for any offense specified in subsection (f) or (v), or a federal offense, a foreign offense, or a military offense, regardless of whether an appeal is pending; or
      4. There has been an admission of sufficient facts or a finding of delinquency for any offense specified in subsection (f) or (v), or a federal offense, a foreign offense, or a military offense, regardless of whether or not an appeal is pending.
    2. Provided, in the event that a conviction, as defined in this subsection, has been overturned, reversed, or otherwise vacated, the person who was the subject of the conviction shall no longer be required to register as required by this chapter and any records of a registration shall be destroyed. Provided, further, that nothing in this section shall be construed to eliminate a registration requirement of a person who is again convicted of an offense for which registration is required by this chapter.
  4. [Deleted by P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1 and by P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1].
  5. “Criminal offense against a victim who is a minor” means, and includes, any of the following offenses or any offense in another jurisdiction that is substantially the equivalent of the following or for which the person is or would be required to register under 34 U.S.C. § 20911 as amended:
    1. Kidnapping or false imprisonment of a minor, in violation of §§ 11-26-1.4 , 11-26-1 or 11-26-2 , where the victim of the offense is sixteen (16) years of age or older and under the age of eighteen (18) years;
    2. Enticement of a child in violation of § 11-26-1.5 with the intent to violate §§ 11-37-6 , 11-37-8 , 11-37-8.1 , 11-37-8 .3;
    3. Any violation of §§ 11-37-6 , 11-37-8, 11-37-8.1 , or 11-37-8.3 ;
    4. Any violation of § 11-1-10 , where the underlying offense is a violation of chapter 34 of this title and the victim, or person solicited to commit the offense, is under the age of eighteen (18) years;
    5. Any violation of § 11-9-1(b) or (c);
    6. Any violation of § 11-9-1.3 ;
    7. Any violation of § 11-9-1.5 ;
    8. [Deleted by P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1 and by P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1].
    9. Any violation of § 11-37-8.8 ;
    10. Any violation of § 11-64-2 , where the victim is under the age of eighteen (18) years;
    11. Murder in violation of § 11-23-1 , where the murder was committed in the perpetration of, or attempted perpetration of, kidnapping and where the victim of the offense is under eighteen (18) years of age;
    12. Any violation of §§ 11-67-6 , 11-67.1-3(b) , 11-67.1-4(b) , 11-67.1-5(c) , 11-67.1-6(b) , or 11-67.1-7(b) ; or
    13. Any conviction for an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense enumerated in this subsection.
  6. “Designated state law enforcement agency” means the attorney general, or his or her designee.
  7. “Employed, carries on a vocation” means and includes the definition of “employed, carries on a vocation” under 34 U.S.C. § 20911.
  8. “Federal offense” means, and includes, any conviction for an offense that was obtained under federal law which, if committed within the jurisdiction of this state, would require the person to register, any conviction for an offense under 34 U.S.C. § 20911 as amended, or any conviction for an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense requiring registration under this subsection.
  9. “Foreign offense” means, and includes, any conviction for an offense which, if committed within the jurisdiction of this state, would require the person to register that was obtained under the laws of Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, or under the laws of any foreign country when the United States state department in its country reports on human rights practices has concluded that an independent judiciary generally or vigorously enforced the right to a fair trial in that country during the year in which the conviction occurred, or any conviction for an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense enumerated in this subsection.
  10. “Habitually lives or sleeps” means living in a place with some regularity, and with reference to where a person required to be registered under this chapter actually lives, which could be some place other than a mailing address or primary address but would entail a place where the person lives on an intermittent basis regardless of whether it pertains to a location otherwise identifiable by street or address.
  11. “Homeless” means a person required to be registered under this chapter who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; has a primary nighttime residence that is a public or private place not designed for or ordinarily used as a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings, including a car, park, abandoned building, bus or train station, airport, or camping ground; living in a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designated to provide temporary living arrangements (including hotels and motels paid for by federal, state, or local government programs for low-income individuals or by charitable organizations, congregate shelters, and transitional housing); or who resided in a shelter or place not meant for human habitation and who is exiting an institution where he or she temporarily resided.
  12. “Immediate” or “Immediately” means upon receipt of information provided by or regarding a person required to register under this chapter but not later than three (3) business days.
  13. “Institutions of higher education” means any university, two- or four-year (2 or 4) college or community college.
  14. “Jurisdiction” means any of the fifty (50) states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the United States Virgin Islands, and any Indian tribe that has elected to function as a registration and notification jurisdiction pursuant to 34 U.S.C. § 20929.
  15. “Mental abnormality” means a congenital or acquired condition of a person that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to the health and safety of other persons.
  16. “Military offense” means, and includes, any conviction for any military offense specified by the secretary of defense under § 115(a)(8)(C)(i) of Pub. L. 105-119, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 951 note, or any conviction for an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense enumerated in this subsection.
  17. “Parole board” means the parole board or its designee.
  18. “Predator” means a person whose act(s) is (are) or was (were) directed at a stranger, or at a person with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.
  19. “Public or private educational institution” means early childhood facilities (nursery school, pre-kindergarten and kindergarten), elementary, middle, secondary, institutions of higher education, and postsecondary educational institutions authorized or licensed by the State of Rhode Island.
  20. “School” means the buildings and real property of kindergarten, elementary, middle, and secondary institutions, whether public or private.
  21. “Sexually violent offense” means, and includes, any violation of §§ 11-37-2 , 11-37-4 , 11-37-6 , 11-37-8 , 11-37-8.1 , 11-37-8.3 , 11-67-2 (where the victim was subject to commercial sexual activity), 11-67-3(a), 11-67-3(b) (where the victim was subject to commercial sexual activity), 11-67.1-3(c) (where the victim was subject to sexual servitude), 11-67.1-5(d) , 11-67.1-6(c) ;  or 11-5-1 , where the specified felony is sexual assault; or § 11-23-1 , where the murder was committed in the perpetration of, or attempted perpetration of, rape or any degree of sexual assault or child molestation; or any offense in another jurisdiction that is substantially the equivalent of any offense listed in this subsection or for which the person is or would be required to register under 34 U.S.C. § 20911 as amended, or any conviction for an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense enumerated in this subsection.
  22. “Sexually violent predator” means a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who has a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.
  23. “Student” means, and includes, the definition of “student” under 34 U.S.C. § 20911.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 14; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 14; P.L. 1999, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 155, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 202, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 416, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 448, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 65, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 3; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 3; P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rearranged the definitions alphabetically and redesignated the subsections.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2002 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2002 amendment.

In 2002, the compiler redesignated the subsection added by P.L. 2002, ch. 330, § 1 as subsection (h).

In 2003, the compiler made a stylistic change in subsection (n).

P.L. 2008, ch. 155, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 202, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 416, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 448, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 65, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 68, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 3, and P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 1 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 2 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

11-37.1-3. Registration required — Persons covered.

  1. Any person who, in this or any other jurisdiction: (1) has been convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor, (2) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, (3) has been determined to be a sexually violent predator, (4) has committed an aggravated offense as defined in § 11-37.1-2 , (5) is a recidivist, as defined in § 11-37.1-4 , (6) has been convicted of a federal offense, (7) has been convicted of a foreign offense, (8) has been convicted of a military offense, or (9) has been convicted of a violation of § 11-37.1-10 shall be required to register his or her current address with the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the city or town in which the person having the duty to register resides for the time period specified in § 11-37.1-4 .
  2. Any person who is: (1) a nonresident worker who has committed an offense that is subject to registration in the jurisdiction of his or her residence and who is employed or carrying on a vocation in Rhode Island as defined in § 11-37.1-2(h) , or (2) a nonresident student as defined by § 11-37.1-2(x) who has committed an offense that is subject to registration in the jurisdiction of his or her residence and who is attending a public or private educational institution in Rhode Island, shall be required to register his or her current address and the address of his or her place of employment or a public or private educational institution attended with the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the city or town in which the nonresident worker or student is employed or attending a public or private educational institution.
  3. Any person having a duty to register as a sex offender in subsection (a) of this section who is enrolled at, employed at, or carrying on a vocation at an institution of higher education shall have an additional duty to register the information described in subsection (a) of this section with the local law enforcement agency in the city or town where the primary campus of the institution of higher education at which the person is enrolled, employed, or carrying on a vocation is located for the period of time they are enrolled at, employed at or carrying on a vocation at the institution of higher education.
  4. If a person is registered as a sex offender in another jurisdiction for an offense which, if committed within the jurisdiction of this state, would require the person to register as a sex offender, then that person, upon moving to or returning to this state, shall register as a sex offender in the same manner as if the offense were committed within Rhode Island.
  5. Registration information.  In addition to the requirements of subsections (a) through (d) of this section, the person required to register under this section shall provide the local law enforcement agency the following information:
    1. Relating to the person’s name:
      1. The person’s full primary given or legal name;
      2. Any and all names the person has used in the past, valid or otherwise; and
      3. Any and all nicknames, aliases, and pseudonyms regardless of the context in which they are used.
    2. Relating to the person’s date of birth:
      1. The person’s actual date of birth; and
      2. Any other date of birth used by the person.
    3. Relating to the person’s social security number:
      1. A valid social security number for the person; and
      2. Any social security number the person has used in the past, valid or otherwise.
    4. A current digitized photograph of the person.
    5. An accurate description of the person as follows:
      1. A general description of the person’s physical appearance or characteristics; and
      2. Any identifying marks, such as, but not limited to, scars, moles, birthmarks, or tattoos.
    6. A photocopy of all of the person’s valid driver’s licenses issued by any jurisdiction.
    7. A photocopy of all of the identification cards issued to the person.
    8. A photocopy of any passports issued to the person.
    9. Relating to the person’s residence:
      1. The address of each residence at which the person resides or will reside;
      2. Any location or description that identifies where the person habitually lives or sleeps regardless of whether it pertains to a permanent residence or location otherwise identifiable by a street or address; and
      3. Whether the person is homeless.
    10. Any and all telephone numbers of the person.
    11. Relating to the person’s internet-related activity:
      1. Any and all email addresses used by the person;
      2. Any and all instant message addresses and identifiers;
      3. Any and all other designations or monitors used for self-identification in internet communications or postings; and
      4. Any and all designations used by the person for the purpose of routing or self-identification and internet communications or postings.
    12. Relating to all vehicles owned or operated by the person for work or personal use including land vehicles, aircraft, and watercraft:
      1. License plate numbers;
      2. Registration numbers or identifiers;
      3. General description of the vehicle to include color, make, model, and year; and
      4. Any permanent or frequent location where any covered vehicle is kept.
    13. Relating to the person’s employment, any and all places where the person is employed in any means including volunteer and unpaid positions:
      1. The name of the person’s employer;
      2. The address of the person’s employer; and
      3. Similar information related to any transient or day labor employment.
    14. All licensing information that authorizes the person to engage in an occupation or carry out a trade or business.
    15. Relating to the person’s public or private educational institution:
      1. The name of each public or private educational institution at which the person is or will be a student; and
      2. The address of each public or private educational institution where the person is or will be a student.
    16. Relating to the person’s criminal history:
      1. The date of all arrests;
      2. The date of all convictions;
      3. The person’s status of parole, probation, or supervised release;
      4. The person’s registration status; and
      5. Any outstanding arrest warrants.
    17. The fingerprints and palm prints of the person in a digitized format that shall be submitted to the FBI Central Database, Next Generation Identification Program.
    18. If the person’s DNA is not already contained in the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), the person shall provide a sample of his or her DNA. Any DNA sample obtained from a person shall be submitted to an appropriate lab for analysis and entry of the resulting DNA profile into CODIS.
    19. The text of each provision of law defining the criminal offense(s) for which the person is registered.
    20. When the person will be absent from his/her residence for seven (7) days or more:
      1. Identifying information of the temporary lodging locations including addresses and names; and
      2. The dates the person will be staying at each temporary lodging location.
    21. If the person will be traveling outside of the United States, the person must notify the local law enforcement agency at least twenty-one (21) days in advance of the travel date and provide any necessary information regarding his or her international travel in accordance with § 11-37.1-9(g) .
    22. A signed copy of the person’s notice of registration and notification obligations as provided in § 11-37.1-5(b)(6) .
    23. The local law enforcement agency and the designated state law enforcement agency shall maintain all information obtained under this chapter in a digitized format.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 410, § 7; P.L. 2006, ch. 370, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 440, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2002 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2002 amendment.

In 2002, the compiler made a stylistic change near the beginning of subsection (c).

P.L. 2006, ch. 370, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 440, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 1 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 2 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Even if they had been properly preserved, a registrant’s constitutional challenges to the registrant’s sex offender risk-level classification would fail, because the registrant was afforded a meaningful hearing and failed to demonstrate that his right to procedural due process was violated. Furthermore, the registrant’s constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence and against double jeopardy were not violated because sex-offender registration did not constitute criminal punishment. DiCarlo v. State, 212 A.3d 1191, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 106 (2019).

Registrant’s challenge to the registrant’s sex offender risk-level classification failed as the Rhode Island Sex Offender Board of Review’s decision was not based solely on underlying facts of the first-degree child molestation charges of which the registrant was acquitted. Looking at the full extent of the material the board set forth as having reviewed—including the registrant’s failure to participate in sex-offender treatment programs and denial of the underlying offense—the board considered numerous factors in making its determination. DiCarlo v. State, 212 A.3d 1191, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 106 (2019).

Applicability.

Defendant juvenile, who was adjudicated delinquent for committing second-degree child molestation sexual assault, was properly required to register under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-3(a) ; the Registration Act is constitutional as applied to juveniles. The confidentiality generally afforded to a juvenile is not absolute; sometimes confidentiality has to give way to other legitimate societal priorities. In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 54 (2008).

Collateral References.

Court’s Duty to Advise Sex Offender as to Sex Offender Registration Consequences or Other Restrictions Arising from Plea of Guilty, or to Determine that Offender Is Advised Thereof. 41 A.L.R.6th 141.

State Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Persons Previously Convicted of Crime to Register with Authorities as Applied to Juvenile Offenders — Expungement, Stay or Deferral, Exceptions, Exemptions, and Waiver. 39 A.L.R.6th 577.

State Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Persons Previously Convicted of Crime to Register with Authorities as Applied to Juvenile Offenders — Duty to Register, Requirements for Registration, and Procedural Matters. 38 A.L.R.6th 1.

State Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Persons Previously Convicted of Crime to Register with Authorities as Applied to Juvenile Offenders — Constitutional Issues. 37 A.L.R.6th 55.

Validity and Applicability of State Requirement That Person Convicted or Indicted of Sex Offenses Be Subject to Electronic Location Monitoring, Including Use of Satellite or Global Positioning System. 57 A.L.R.6th 1.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes Imposing Criminal Penalties for Failure to Register as Required Under Sex Offender or Other Criminal Registration Statutes. 33 A.L.R.6th 91.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutory and Municipal Enactments and Conditions of Release Prohibiting Sex Offenders from Parks. 40 A.L.R.6th 419.

Validity of statutes imposing residency restrictions on registered sex offenders. 25 A.L.R.6th 227.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutory Requirement that Person Convicted of Sexual Offense in Other Jurisdiction Register or Be Classified as Sexual Offender in Forum State. 34 A.L.R.6th 171.

11-37.1-4. Duration of registration — Frequency of registration.

  1. Annual registration.  Any person required to register under § 11-37.1-3(a)(1) or (2) shall annually register with the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the city or town in which the person having the duty to register resides for a period of ten (10) years from the expiration of sentence for the offense and shall verify his or her address with the agency on a quarterly basis for the first two (2) years of the period unless the person has been determined to be a sexually violent predator in accordance with § 11-37.1-6 or unless the person is required to register for the life of that person in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of this section.
  2. Sexually violent predators.  Any person who has been determined to be a sexually violent predator in accordance with the provisions of § 11-37.1-6 shall be required to annually register in person with the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the city or town in which the person having the duty to register resides for the life of that person and to verify his or her address on a quarterly basis for the life of that person.
  3. Recidivists and aggravated crime offenders.  Any person required to register under § 11-37.1-3 and who has one or more prior convictions for any offense described in § 11-37.1-2 or has been convicted of an aggravated offense as defined in § 11-37.1-2 shall annually register in person with the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the city or town in which the person having the duty to register resides for the life of that person and to verify his or her address on a quarterly basis for the life of that person.
  4. Nonresident workers and students.  Any nonresident person required to register pursuant to § 11-37.1-3(b)(1) or (2) shall annually register in person with the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the city or town in which the person having the duty to register is employed or attends a public or private educational institution for the period of time that the person is employed in Rhode Island or is attending a public or private educational institution in Rhode Island.
  5. Initial registration; Incarcerated individuals.  All persons required to register under this chapter who are sentenced to a period of confinement shall perform their initial registration by appearing in person at the local law enforcement agency in the city or town in which the person intends to reside within twenty-four (24) hours of their release from confinement.
  6. Initial registration; Non-incarcerated individuals.  All persons required to register under this chapter who are convicted in Rhode Island and who are not sentenced to serve a term of incarceration or confinement shall perform their initial registration by appearing in person at the local law enforcement agency in the city or town in which the person intends to reside within twenty-four (24) hours of being sentenced.
  7. Initial registration; Individuals relocating to Rhode Island.  All persons required to register under this chapter who are moving their residence to Rhode Island from another jurisdiction shall perform their initial registration by appearing in person at the local law enforcement agency in the city or town in which the person intends to reside within twenty-four (24) hours of their arrival in Rhode Island.
  8. Initial registration; Nonresident workers and students.  All nonresident workers or students who are required to register under this chapter shall perform their initial registration by appearing in person at the local law enforcement agency in the city or town in which the person is employed or is attending a public or private educational institution within twenty-four (24) hours of their first day of their personal attendance at their place of employment or a public or private educational institution.
  9. Tolling provision.  Where, during the period in which any person is required to register, a person required to register under this chapter is incarcerated or re-incarcerated for any offense or is civilly committed, the person’s registration requirements shall be tolled during the subsequent incarceration, re-incarceration or commitment.
  10. Juveniles.  Any juvenile having the duty to register under subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be required to annually register in person with the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the city or town in which the juvenile having the duty to register resides for fifteen (15) years subsequent to the date of release from confinement or placement in the community or probation for such offense or offenses and to verify his or her address on a quarterly basis for said fifteen (15) years. However, if a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent under § 11-37-8.1 or 11-37-8.3 , the court shall assess the totality of the circumstances of the offense and if the court makes a finding that the conduct of the parties is criminal only because of the age of the victim, the court may have discretion to order the juvenile to register as a sex offender as long as the court deems it appropriate to protect the community and to rehabilitate the juvenile offender. Registration shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter.
  11. Annual registration for federal, foreign, or military offenses.  Any person who is required to register under this chapter due to a conviction of a federal offense, a foreign offense, or a military offense shall register for the duration and frequency in the same manner as if the offense were committed within Rhode Island.
  12. Homeless persons.  In addition to the other requirements of this section, a person who is required to register under this chapter and is homeless shall verify their presence in the community with the local law enforcement agency where they are required to register three (3) times a week for the duration of their being homeless.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 156, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 358, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 462, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections and redesignated the subdivisions in subsection (a).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

In 2003, the compiler made minor punctuation changes to subsection (a).

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 1 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 2 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Where defendant was convicted in 1994 for a 1993 child molestation sexual assault offense, and the statutes were subsequently amended in 1996, 1997, and 2003 extending the duration of a defendant’s duty to register as a sex offender and increasing the penalty for registration violations, defendant’s failure-to-notify convictions in 2007, 2009, and 2010 did not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. The duration of defendant’s duty to register was merely a condition attached to a civil, nonpunitive regulatory measure, not the imposition of retroactive punishment. State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 98 (2018).

Duration of Duty to Register.

For a defendant who was convicted before the passage of § 11-37.1 et seq., language in R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-18 preserves defendant’s duty to register as a sex offender under the former law, not its duration. The duration of the duty to register as a sex offender is governed by § 11-37.1-4 . State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 98 (2018).

Where defendant was convicted in 1994 for a 1993 child molestation sexual assault offense, the current version of § 11-37.1-4 governed and therefore defendant’s duty to register as a sex offender expired 10 years from the expiration of sentence for the offense. State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 98 (2018).

Juvenile’s Duty to Register.

Trial justice appropriately applied the plain language of this section in determining that she had no discretion and that defendant, a juvenile, was required to register as a sex offender based on the trial justice’s determination that this was not a case of willing sexual exploration between curious adolescents but there was coercion, manipulation, and an abuse of trust making the conduct criminal apart from the victims’ ages. In re B.H., 194 A.3d 260, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 110 (2018).

Defendant’s statutory duty to register as a sex offender ran for 10 years from the expiration of defendant’s sentence, rather than for life; while the registration statute in place at the time of defendant’s conviction governed defendant’s duty to register, the current statute, § 11-37.1-4 , controlled that duty’s duration (case remanded for further factfinding). Atryzek v. State, 197 A.3d 334, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 124 (2018).

11-37.1-5. Registration requirement upon release, parole, or probation.

    1. Duty of state officials.  If a person who is required to register under this chapter is released from prison, including those placed on parole, then the official in charge of the place of confinement or his or her designee shall comply with the provisions of subsection (b) of this section;
    2. [Deleted by P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1 and P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1.]
    3. If a person who is required to register under this chapter is released on probation or placed on home confinement, then the assistant administrator or the division of probation shall comply with the provisions of subsection (b) of this section;
    4. If a person who is required to register under this chapter is released from a juvenile correctional facility, either outright or on some form of supervised release, then the person in charge of the institution shall comply with the provisions of subsection (b) of this section;
    5. If a person who is required to register under this chapter is placed on juvenile probation, then the person in charge of the program shall comply with the provisions of subsection (b) of this section; or
    6. If a person who is required to register under this chapter has moved into this state under the provisions of an interstate compact providing for supervision of the terms of his or her release by agents of this state, then the administrator of the interstate compact shall comply with the provisions of subsection (b) of this section.
  1. Notification of registration requirements.  The person designated with the responsibility for the notification requirements of this chapter shall, prior to the release of any person required to register under this chapter:
    1. Inform the person of the duty to register and obtain the information required for registration under subsection (c) of this section;
    2. Inform the person that if the person changes his or her residence address, the person shall give the new address to the designated state law enforcement agency in writing within twenty-four (24) hours;
    3. Inform the person that if the person changes residence to another jurisdiction, the person shall register the new address with the law enforcement agency with whom the person last registered, and the person is also required to register with a designated law enforcement agency in the new jurisdiction in accordance with the new jurisdiction’s sex offender registration statute;
    4. Inform the person that if the person works or attends a public or private educational institution in another jurisdiction in which he or she does not reside, the person shall register his or her employment address or address of the educational institution he or she attends as required by the other jurisdiction;
    5. Obtain fingerprints and a photograph of the person if these have not already been obtained in connection with the offense that triggers registration; and
    6. Require the person to read and sign a form approved by the attorney general stating that the duty of the person to register under this section has been explained.
  2. Registration information.  In addition to the requirements of subsection (b) of this section, for a person required to register under § 11-37.1-3 , then the person responsible for the notification required under subsection (b) of this section shall obtain the following information in a digitized format:
    1. Relating to the person’s name:
      1. The person’s full primary given or legal name;
      2. Any and all names the person has used in the past, valid or otherwise; and
      3. Any and all nicknames, aliases, and pseudonyms regardless of the context in which they are used.
    2. Relating to the person’s date of birth:
      1. The person’s actual date of birth; and
      2. Any other date of birth used by the person.
    3. Relating to the person’s social security number:
      1. A valid social security number for the person; and
      2. Any social security number the person has used in the past, valid or otherwise.
    4. A current digitized photograph of the person.
    5. An accurate description of the person as follows:
      1. A general description of the person’s physical appearance or characteristics; and
      2. Any identifying marks, such as, but not limited to, scars, moles, birthmarks, or tattoos.
    6. Relating to the person’s residence:
      1. The address of each residence at which the person resides or will reside; and
      2. Whether the person is homeless.
    7. Any and all telephone numbers of the person.
    8. A signed copy of the person’s notice of registration and notification obligations as provided in subsection (b)(6).
  3. For purposes of subsection (c) of this section, the provisions of chapter 37.3 of title 5 pertaining to healthcare privileges, the provisions of § 9-17-24 pertaining to the privilege of witnesses, or the provisions of § 42-72-8 pertaining to confidentiality of records of the department of children, youth and families, shall not be effective so as to prevent the transfer of information or the testimony of any person possessing any information required by this subsection. Any information so obtained may be transferred to the sex offender board of review and may be used by them in making a determination of whether or not the person is a sexually violent predator or in determining the level of notification under § 11-37.1-12 . The information may also be used by the sentencing court or by any court reviewing the level of notification determined by the sex offender board of review or reviewing any conviction or sentence which requires registration under this chapter. Provided, information so obtained shall not be admissible in any other judicial proceeding against the subject of the information except to determine a person’s status as a sexually violent predator or to determine or review the level of notification to the community which has been made by a court or the sex offender board of review. Provided, further, that this subsection shall not be applicable to any person for whom an appeal is pending for which a final judgment of conviction has not been entered, until the time that a final conviction has been entered.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 326, § 35; P.L. 1999, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

In 2003, the compiler made a minor punctuation change in subdivision (b)(3).

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 1 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 2 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

11-37.1-6. Community notification.

    1. Sex Offender Board of Review.  The governor shall appoint eight (8) persons including experts in the field of the behavior and treatment of sexual offenders by reason of training and experience, victim’s rights advocates, and law enforcement representatives to the sex offender board of review. At least one member of the sex offender board of review shall be a qualified child/adolescent sex offender treatment specialist. These persons shall serve at the pleasure of the governor or until their successor has been duly qualified and appointed.
    2. Duties of the board.  Upon passage of this legislation, the sex offender board of review will utilize a validated risk assessment instrument and other material approved by the parole board to determine the level of risk an offender poses to the community and to assist the sentencing court in determining if that person is a sexually violent predator. If the offender is a juvenile, the Department of Children, Youth and Families shall select and administer a risk instrument appropriate for juveniles and shall submit the results to the sex offender board of review.
    3. Duties of other state agencies.  Six (6) months prior to release of any person having a duty to register under § 11-37.1-3 , or upon sentencing of a person having a duty to register under § 11-37.1-3 , if the offender is not incarcerated, the agency having supervisory responsibility and the Interstate Compact Unit of the Rhode Island department of corrections upon acceptance of supervision of a sexual offender from the sending jurisdiction shall refer the person to the sex offender board of review, together with any reports and documentation that may be helpful to the board, for a determination as to the level of risk an offender poses to the community and to assist the sentencing court in determining if that person is a sexually violent predator.
    1. The board shall within thirty (30) days of a referral of a person shall conduct the validated risk assessment, review other material provided by the agency having supervisory responsibility and assign a risk of re-offense level to the offender. In addition, the board may find that, based on the assessment score and other material, that the person may possess a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in sexually violent predatory offenses. In these cases, the committee shall ask the parole board psychiatrist or if the offender is a juvenile, a DCYF psychiatrist to conduct a sex offender evaluation to determine if the offender possesses a mental abnormality or personality disorder that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to the health and safety of other persons.
    2. Upon receipt of a sex offender evaluation that suggests there is sufficient evidence and documentation to suggest that a person may be a sexually violent predator, the sex offender board of review shall forward a report to the attorney general for consideration by the court.
    3. Upon receipt of a report from the attorney general, the court, after notice to the offender and his or her counsel, shall upon consideration of the report and other materials, make a determination as to whether or not a person is a sexually violent predator.
    4. Effect of determination.  In the event that a determination is made by the court that a person is a sexually violent predator, that person shall be required to register and verify his or her address in accordance with §§ 11-37.1-3 , 11-37.1-4 and 11-37.1-8(b) .
  1. No cause of action or liability shall arise or exist against the committee or any member or agent of the board as a result of the failure of the board to make any findings required by this section within the time period specified by subsection (2) of this section.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the board shall have access to all relevant records and information in the possession of any state official or agency having a duty under § 11-37.1-5(a)(1) through (6), relating to the juvenile and adult offenders under review by the board, including, but not limited to, police reports; prosecutor’s statements of probable cause, presentence investigations and reports, complete judgments and sentences, current classification referrals, juvenile and adult criminal history records, violation and disciplinary reports, all psychological evaluations and psychiatric evaluations, psychiatric hospital records, sex offender evaluations and treatment reports, substance abuse evaluations and treatment reports to the extent allowed by federal law. Records and information obtained by the board of review under this subsection shall remain confidential, provided that the board of review may disclose the records and information to the sentencing court in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
  3. Duties of the director of the department of corrections/director of the department of children, youth and families.  Not less than sixty (60) days prior to release of any person subject to this chapter, the director of the department of corrections or, in the event the person is a juvenile, the director of the department of children, youth and families, or their respective designees, shall seek verification that the duties of the sex offender board of review and any other state agency have been fulfilled as specified in § 11-37.1-6 et seq. In the event that the director of the department of corrections or, in the event the person is a juvenile, the director of the department of children, youth and families, cannot obtain verification, he or she shall, no less than thirty (30) days prior to the release of a person subject to this chapter, file with the presiding judge of the superior court or, in the case of a juvenile, the chief judge of the family court, a petition in the nature of mandamus, seeking compliance with this chapter. The court shall promptly, but no less than ten (10) days from the filing of the petition, hold a hearing on the petition. The court may, in its discretion, enter any orders consistent with this chapter to compel compliance, however, the court may not delay the release of any person subject to this chapter for the failure of the sex offender board of review or any state agency to fulfill its obligations under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 206, § 4; P.L. 2006, ch. 207, § 4; P.L. 2008, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2006, the compiler corrected typographical errors in subdivisions (c)(2)(i) and (c)(4).

P.L. 2006, ch. 206, § 4, and P.L. 2006, ch. 207, § 4, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 1 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 2 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 11-37.1-6 (P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 255, § 1), relating to violent sexual predators, was repealed by P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1, and by P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1; effective July 10, 2003, and present § 11-37.1-6 was enacted by the same acts.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Risk Assessment.

Superior court magistrate did not err when ruling that external factors warranted a deviation between the risk level indicated by the objective tests and the ultimate finding of the Sex Offender Board of Review because the Board thoroughly considered many of the Sex Offender Risk of Re-Offense Assessment Factors in combination with the validated risk assessment tools, and although the Board did make some rather conclusory findings, it nevertheless properly relied upon a range of materials to formulate its decision; the Board is entitled to utilize additional materials and documentation to conduct its risk assessment in order to adequately determine an individual’s risk to the community. State v. Dennis, 29 A.3d 445, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 125 (2011).

Language of the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-6 , paired with the Sexual Offender Community Notification Guidelines, suggests that a sexual offender assessment should not take place in a vacuum or solely rest on the results of the risk assessment tools; the classification of an individual’s future risk of sexual recidivism is not a one-size-fits-all application. State v. Dennis, 29 A.3d 445, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 125 (2011).

Registrant’s challenge to the registrant’s sex offender risk-level classification failed as the Rhode Island Sex Offender Board of Review’s decision was not based solely on underlying facts of the first-degree child molestation charges of which the registrant was acquitted. Looking at the full extent of the material the board set forth as having reviewed—including the registrant’s failure to participate in sex-offender treatment programs and denial of the underlying offense—the board considered numerous factors in making its determination. DiCarlo v. State, 212 A.3d 1191, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 106 (2019).

Even if they had been properly preserved, a registrant’s constitutional challenges to the registrant’s sex offender risk-level classification would fail, because the registrant was afforded a meaningful hearing and failed to demonstrate that his right to procedural due process was violated. Furthermore, the registrant’s constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence and against double jeopardy were not violated because sex-offender registration did not constitute criminal punishment. DiCarlo v. State, 212 A.3d 1191, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 106 (2019).

Sex Offender Board of Review did not err in classifying petitioner as a Risk Level III sex offender under the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act as the board considered the results of three validated assessment tools as well as other available documentation to determine the level of risk petitioner posed to the community; in the risk-assessment report, the board detailed additional external factors it considered in elevating petitioner to a high-risk sex offender level, including that petitioner exploited his position of authority as a high school soccer coach by targeting teenage males; and the board considered that he possessed over 970 images and videos of child pornography. Matteson v. R.I. Dep't of AG, 266 A.3d 1237, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 5 (2022).

11-37.1-7. Transfer of information to designated state law enforcement agency.

  1. The person required to provide notice in accordance with § 11-37.1-5(b) and the local law enforcement agencies required to register persons who have a duty to register in accordance with § 11-37.1-4 and receive changes in the person’s registration information under § 11-37.1-9 , shall immediately forward it to the designated state law enforcement agency. The designated state law enforcement agency shall immediately enter the information into the appropriate state law enforcement record system.
  2. Whenever a person required to be registered under this chapter initially registers or updates his or her information, the designated state law enforcement agency shall immediately notify:
    1. Any jurisdiction where the person is registered or is required to register due to the person’s residency, public or private educational institution attendance, or employment;
    2. All jurisdictions where a person was required to register prior to the updated information being given;
    3. All jurisdictions where a person intends to reside, work, or attend a public or private educational institution;
    4. The Federal Bureau of Investigation or other federal agencies as designated by the Attorney General of the United States in order that the information may be updated on the National Sex Offender Registry or other relevant databases;
    5. If the person intends to commence residency, attend a public or private educational institution, or commence employment outside of the United States, the United States Marshals Service;
    6. Any agency, department, or program within the state that is responsible for criminal investigation, prosecution, child welfare, or sex offender supervision functions; and
    7. National Child Protection Act agencies, which includes any agency responsible for conducting employment-related background checks under section 3 of the National Child Protection Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 5119a.
  3. The designated state law enforcement agency shall ensure there is an automated community notification process in place that ensures the following:
    1. Upon a person’s initial registration or update of information, the state’s public sex offender registry website is immediately updated; and
    2. The state’s public sex offender registry has a function that enables the general public to request an email notice that will notify them when a person commences residence, employment, or a public or private educational institution attendance with the state, within a specified zip code, or within a certain geographic radius. This email notice shall include the person’s identity so that the public can access the public registry for the new information.
  4. The notification requirements of subsections (b)(7) and (c) do not apply to persons who were adjudicated delinquent of an offense requiring registration or a person tiered as a level 1 sex offender.
  5. Notwithstanding the aforementioned notification requirements, the designated state law enforcement agency and local law enforcement agencies where the person resides, is employed, or attends a public or private educational institution, may utilize other forms of community notification consistent with the provisions and intent of this chapter.
  6. In the event a person required to register under this chapter fails to register or fails to verify or update his or her registration information, the local law enforcement agency shall immediately inform the local law enforcement agency of the city or town where the person resides, is employed, or attends a public or private educational institution; the jurisdiction that provided notification that the person was to commence residency, employment, or public or private educational institution attendance; and the designated state law enforcement agency that the person failed to appear for registration or failed to verify or update their registration information.
    1. Upon notification by the designated state law enforcement agency, the local law enforcement agency where the person resides, is employed, or attends a public or private educational institution, shall:
      1. Make an effort to determine if the person is actually residing, employed or attending a public or private educational institution within their city or town; and
      2. Seek a warrant for the person’s arrest for failing to register or verify or update his or her registration in compliance with this chapter. The U.S. Marshals Service or Federal Bureau of Investigation may be contacted in an attempt to obtain a federal warrant for the person’s arrest.
      3. The designated state law enforcement agency shall update the registry to reflect that the person is not in compliance with his or her duty to register.
  7. If the designated state law enforcement agency receives information that a person has absconded or local law enforcement cannot determine whether the person is actually residing, employed, or attending a public or private educational institution in the city or town using the measures outlined in subsection (f) of this section, the designated state law enforcement agency, with the assistance of local law enforcement, shall make an effort to determine if the person has actually absconded.
    1. If the information indicating the possible absconding came through notice from another jurisdiction or federal authorities, they shall be informed that the person has failed to appear and register.
    2. If an absconded person cannot be located then the designated state law enforcement agency shall take the following steps:
      1. Update the registry to reflect the person has absconded or is otherwise not capable of being located;
      2. Notify the local law enforcement agency where the person resides, is employed, or attends a public or private educational institution, so the local law enforcement agency can seek a warrant for the person’s arrest.
      3. Notify the U.S. Marshals Service or Federal Bureau of Investigation so they may attempt, if necessary, to obtain a federal warrant for the person’s arrest;
      4. Update the National Sex Offender Registry to reflect the sex offender’s status as an absconder, or is otherwise not capable of being located; and
      5. Enter the person into the National Crime Information Center Wanted Person file.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 1 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 2 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

Federal Act References.

42 U.S.C. § 5119a, referred to in this section, has been transferred to 34 U.S.C. § 40102 by the compilers of the United States Code.

11-37.1-8. Verification of address.

  1. For a person required to register under § 11-37.1-3(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(8), or (a)(9) on each anniversary of the person’s initial registration date during the period in which the person is required to register:
    1. The designated state law enforcement agency or local law enforcement agency shall mail a non-forwardable verification form to the last reported address of the person;
    2. The person shall mail the verification form to the designated state law enforcement agency or local law enforcement agency within ten (10) days after receipt of the form;
    3. The verification form shall be signed by the person, and state that the person still resides at the address last reported to the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the city or town in which the person having the duty to register resides; and
    4. If the person fails to mail the verification form to the designated state law enforcement agency or local law enforcement agency within ten (10) days after receipt of the form, the person shall be in violation of this chapter unless the person proves that the person has not changed the residence address from that which he or she last registered.
  2. The provisions of subsections (a)(1) — (a)(4) of this section shall apply to a person required to register under § 11-37.1-3(a)(3), (4), or (5), except that the registration address verification shall take place quarterly.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsection designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2003, the compiler made stylistic changes in subsection (b).

P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 1 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 2 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

11-37.1-9. Notification of local law enforcement agencies of changes in address.

  1. Duty of local law enforcement agency; interstate and intrastate moves.  For any person required to register under this chapter, the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction where the person is residing, shall, if the person changes residence to another jurisdiction or within the state, notify the law enforcement agency with which the person must register in the new jurisdiction, or the city or town within the state, and notify the designated jurisdiction law enforcement agency. The designated state law enforcement agency shall provide immediate notice as provided under § 11-37.1-7 .
  2. Duty of person required to register; interstate moves.  A person who has been convicted of an offense that required registration under this chapter shall register the new address with a designated state law enforcement agency in another jurisdiction to which the person moves in accordance with the new jurisdiction’s sex offender registration statute. Prior to the change of residence to a new jurisdiction, the person shall notify the local law enforcement agency within this state with which the person is registered of the intended move and of the new address within the new jurisdiction. The local law enforcement agency shall notify the designated state law enforcement agency and the designated state law enforcement agency shall provide immediate notice as provided under § 11-37.1-7 .
  3. Duty of law enforcement agency; changes of residence within the state.  For any person required to register under this chapter, the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction where the person is residing, shall, if the person changes residence to another city or town in Rhode Island, notify the local law enforcement agency with which the person must register in the new city or town and notify the designated state law enforcement agency. The designated state law enforcement agency shall provide immediate notice as provided under § 11-37.1-7 .
  4. Duty of person required to register; changes of residence within the state.  A person who has been convicted of an offense that requires registration under this chapter and who changes his or her residence address to another city or town in Rhode Island, shall notify the local law enforcement agency in the city or town from which the person is moving before the person establishes residence in the new location, and shall register with the local law enforcement agency in the city or town in which the person is moving not later than twenty-four (24) hours after the person establishes residence in the new city or town. A person who has been convicted of an offense that requires registration under this chapter and who changes his or her residence within a city or town in Rhode Island shall notify the local law enforcement agency in the city or town not later than twenty-four (24) hours after the person changes the residence within the city or town. The local law enforcement agency shall notify the designated state law enforcement agency and the designated state law enforcement agency shall provide immediate notice as provided under § 11-37.1-7 .
  5. Duty of person required to register; changes in required registration information.  A person who has been convicted of an offense that requires registration under this chapter shall immediately notify the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction where the person is residing, is employed, or attending a public or private educational institution of any changes to his or her required registration information as provided in § 11-37.1-3(e) . The local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction shall also notify the designated state law enforcement agency. The designated state law enforcement agency shall provide immediate notice as provided under § 11-37.1-7 .
  6. In the event of a change in temporary lodging, the person who have been convicted of an offense that requires registration under this chapter and the local law enforcement agency shall immediately notify the jurisdiction in which the person will be temporarily staying. The local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction shall also notify the designated state law enforcement agency who shall provide immediate notice as provided under § 11-37.1-7 .
  7. In the event the person who has been convicted of an offense that requires registration under this chapter will be traveling outside of the United States, the person must notify the local law enforcement agency at least twenty-one (21) days in advance of the travel date and provide any necessary information regarding his or her international travel. The local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction shall also notify the designated state law enforcement agency. The designated state law enforcement agency shall provide immediate notice as provided under § 11-37.1-7 . Upon notification of a person’s intention to travel internationally, the designated state law enforcement agency shall immediately notify and provide the person’s travel information to the United States Marshals Service.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 155, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 202, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsection designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by three acts (P.L. 2008, ch. 155, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 191, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 202, § 1) passed by the 2008 General Assembly. Since the changes are not in conflict with each other, this section is set out as amended by all three acts.

P.L. 2008, ch. 155, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 202, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 1 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 2 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Where defendant was convicted in 1994 for a 1993 child molestation sexual assault offense, and the statutes were subsequently amended in 1996, 1997, and 2003 extending the duration of a defendant’s duty to register as a sex offender and increasing the penalty for registration violations, defendant’s failure-to-notify convictions in 2007, 2009, and 2010 did not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. The duration of defendant’s duty to register was merely a condition attached to a civil, nonpunitive regulatory measure, not the imposition of retroactive punishment. State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 98 (2018).

Where defendant was convicted in 1994 for a 1993 child molestation sexual assault offense, and the sex offender registration statutes were subsequently amended in 1996 and 2003, increasing the penalty for registration violations, defendant’s failure-to-notify convictions in 2007, 2009, and 2010 did not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. The increased penalty was already in effect before defendant’s failures to notify occurred, and the failures to notify were offenses separate and apart from the second-degree child molestation sexual assault of 1993, rendering them insufficiently annexed to that crime as to trigger an ex post facto violation. State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 98 (2018).

Collateral References.

Validity of statutes imposing residency restrictions on registered sex offenders. 25 A.L.R.6th 227.

11-37.1-10. Penalties.

  1. Any person who is required to register or verify his or her address or give notice of a change of address or residence who knowingly fails to do so shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, be imprisoned not more than ten (10) years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.
  2. Any person who is required to register or verify his or her address or give notice of a change of address or residence who knowingly fails to do so shall be in violation of the terms of his or her release, regardless of whether or not the term was a special condition of his or her release on probation, parole, home confinement or other form of supervised release.
  3. Except in the case of a level-three (3) sex offender, any person who is required to register or verify his or her address, who knowingly resides within three hundred feet (300´) of any school as defined in § 11-37.1-2 , which distance shall be measured from the nearest boundary line of the real property supporting the residence of the person to the nearest boundary line of the real property that supports or upon which there exists a school shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, may be imprisoned not more than five (5) years, or fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  4. Any level-three (3) sex offender who knowingly resides within one thousand feet (1,000´) of any school as defined in § 11-37.1-2 , which distance shall be measured from the nearest boundary line of the real property supporting the residence of the person to the nearest boundary line of the real property that supports or upon which there exists a school shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, may be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, or fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 155, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 189, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 202, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 219, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by three acts (P.L. 2008, ch. 155, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 189, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 202, § 1) passed by the 2008 General Assembly. Since the changes are not in conflict with each other, this section is set out as amended by all three acts.

P.L. 2008, ch. 155, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 202, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2015, ch. 219, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 240, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 1 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 2 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Where defendant was convicted in 1994 for a 1993 child molestation sexual assault offense, and the sex offender registration statutes were subsequently amended in 1996 and 2003, increasing the penalty for registration violations, defendant’s failure-to-notify convictions in 2007, 2009, and 2010 did not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. The increased penalty was already in effect before defendant’s failures to notify occurred, and the failures to notify were offenses separate and apart from the second-degree child molestation sexual assault of 1993, rendering them insufficiently annexed to that crime as to trigger an ex post facto violation. State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 98 (2018).

11-37.1-11. Release of information.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by this chapter or as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, no information obtained under this chapter shall be released or transferred without the written consent of the person or his or her authorized representative.
  2. No consent for release or transfer of information obtained under this chapter shall be required in the following instances:
    1. Information may be disclosed to law enforcement agencies for law enforcement purposes;
    2. Information may be disclosed to government agencies conducting confidential background checks;
    3. The designated state law enforcement agency and any local law enforcement agency authorized by the state agency may release relevant information that is necessary to protect individuals concerning a specific person required to register under this chapter, except that the identity of a victim of an offense that requires registration under this section shall not be released;
    4. Information may be released or disseminated in accordance with the provisions of § 11-37.1-12 ;
    5. Information shall be disclosed by the local police department to the general public in a city or town for those registered offenders determined to be either a level 2 or level 3 offender as determined consistent with parole board guidelines; and
    6. Information shall be disclosed by the local police department to the local school department for those registered offenders determined to be level 3 offenders by the parole board for the purposes of notifying parents of students whose school bus stop is within one thousand feet (1,000´) of a level 3 sex offender’s residence, which distance shall be measured from the nearest boundary line of the real property supporting the residence of the level 3 sex offender to the school bus stop.
  3. Any local law enforcement agency shall release relevant information collected pursuant to § 11-37.1-3(c) to any campus police agency appointed pursuant to § 16-52-2 or police for private institutions appointed pursuant to § 12-2.1-1 for any person having a duty to register who is enrolled in, employed by, or carrying on a vocation at an institution of higher education. That agency may release relevant information that is necessary to protect individuals concerning a specific person required to register under this chapter, except that the identity of a victim of an offense that requires registration under this section shall not be released.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 80, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 339, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 348, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2002 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2002 amendment.

P.L. 2005, ch. 75, § 1, and P.L. 2005, ch. 80, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 339, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 348, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2005, ch. 75, § 2, and P.L. 2005, ch. 80, § 2, state that the amendments to this section by those acts take effect on January 1, 2006.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 1 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 2 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

11-37.1-12. Rules and regulations for community notification.

  1. The parole board shall promulgate guidelines and procedures for notification required pursuant to the provisions of this section.
  2. The regulations shall provide for three (3) levels of notification depending upon the risk of re-offense level of the sex offender determined by the sex offender board of review as outlined in § 11-37.1-6(1)(b) :
    1. If risk of re-offense is low, law enforcement agencies and any individuals identified in accordance with the parole board guidelines shall be notified;
    2. If risk of re-offense is moderate, organizations in the community likely to encounter the person registered shall be notified in accordance with the parole board’s guidelines, in addition to the notice required by subsection (b)(1);
    3. If risk of re-offense is high, the members of the public likely to encounter the person registered shall be notified through means in accordance with the parole board’s guidelines designed to reach members of the public likely to encounter the person registered, in addition to the notice required by subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2).
    4. The designated state law enforcement agency is authorized and directed to utilize the Rhode Island state police website and the Rhode Island unified court system website for the public release of identifying information of level two and level three sex offenders who have been convicted, provided that no identifying information of a juvenile shall be listed on the website.
      1. The website shall have the capability of conducting searches by name, county, city, and town; and zip code and/or geographic radius.
      2. The website shall include:
        1. Links to sex offender safety and education resources;
        2. Instructions on how a person can seek correction of information that the individual contends is erroneous;
        3. A warning that the information contained on the website should not be used to unlawfully injure, harass, or commit a crime against any individual named in the registry or residing or working at any reported addresses and that any such action could result in civil or criminal penalties; and
        4. All field search capabilities needed for full participation in the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public website and shall participate in that website as provided by the attorney general of the United States.
      3. The following information regarding the person required to register under this chapter shall be made available to the public on the website:
        1. Notice that the person is in violation of his or her registration requirements or cannot be located if the person has absconded;
        2. All offenses that require registration under this chapter for which the person has been convicted;
        3. The offense(s) for which the person is currently registered;
        4. The name of the person, including all aliases;
        5. A current photograph of the person;
        6. A physical description of the person; and
        7. The person’s residential addresses and, if relevant, a description of a location where the person habitually lives or sleeps, and if the person is homeless;
        8. The following information shall not be available to the public on the sex offender registry website:
        9. Any arrest that did not result in conviction; (II) The person’s social security number; (III) Any travel documents; (IV) The identity of the victim; (V) Internet identifiers (as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 16911); and (VI) Any information of a person who was adjudicated delinquent of an offense requiring registration.
      4. For persons who are under a witness protection program, the designated state law enforcement agency may honor the request of the United States Marshals Service or other agency responsible for witness protection by not including the original identity of the person on the publicly accessible sex offender registry website.
    5. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the sex offender review board shall have access to all relevant records and information in the possession of any state official or agency having a duty under § 11-37.1-5(a)(1) through (6) relating to juvenile and adult offenders under review by the sex offender review board, including, but not limited to: police reports; prosecutors statements of probable cause; pre-sentence investigations and reports; complete judgments and sentences; current classification referrals; juvenile and adult criminal history records; violation and disciplinary reports; all psychological evaluations and psychiatric evaluations; psychiatric hospital records; sex offender evaluations and treatment reports; and substance abuse evaluations and treatment reports to the extent allowed by federal law. Records and information obtained by the sex offender review board under this subsection shall remain confidential, provided that the parole board may disclose the records and information to the board of review, the sentencing court, and law enforcement agencies in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 360, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 8; P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 80, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added subsection designations and redesignated the subdivisions and paragraphs.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 75, § 1, and P.L. 2005, ch. 80, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2005, ch. 75, § 2, and P.L. 2005, ch. 80, § 2, state that the amendments to this section by those acts take effect on January 1, 2006.

P.L. 2018, ch. 157, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 1 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 1, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

P.L. 2018, ch. 259, § 2, as amended by P.L. 2019, ch. 28, § 2 and P.L. 2019, ch. 31, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on July 1, 2020, and shall apply to all persons who have been convicted of an offense that required or will require registration as provided by this act.

Federal Act References.

42 U.S.C. § 16911, referred to in this section, has been transferred to 34 U.S.C. § 20911 by the compilers of the United States Code.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Due Process.

Even if they had been properly preserved, a registrant’s due process challenges to the registrant’s sex offender risk-level classification would fail, because the registrant was afforded a meaningful hearing and failed to demonstrate a violation. DiCarlo v. State, 212 A.3d 1191, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 106 (2019).

Registrant’s challenge to the registrant’s sex offender risk-level classification failed as the Rhode Island Sex Offender Board of Review’s decision was not based solely on underlying facts of first-degree child molestation charges of which the registrant was acquitted. Looking at the full extent of the material the board set forth as having reviewed—including the registrant’s failure to participate in sex-offender treatment programs and denial of the underlying offense—the board considered numerous factors in making its determination. DiCarlo v. State, 212 A.3d 1191, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 106 (2019).

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes authorizing community notification of release of convicted sex offender. 78 A.L.R.5th 489.

11-37.1-13. Notification procedures for tiers two (2) and three (3).

If after review of the evidence pertaining to a person required to register according to the criteria set forth in § 11-37.1-12 , the board is satisfied that risk of re-offense by the person required to register is either moderate or high, the sex offender community notification unit of the parole board shall notify the person, in writing, by letter or other documentation:

  1. That community notification will be made not less than ten (10) business days from the date of the letter or other document evidencing an intent to promulgate a community notice in accordance with § 11-37.1-12(b) , together with the level, form and nature that the notification will take;
  2. That unless an application for review of the action is filed within the time specified by the letter or other documentation, which in any case shall not be less than ten (10) business days, by the adult offender subject to community notification, with the criminal calendar judge of the superior court for the county in which the adult offender who is the subject of notification resides or intends to reside upon release, or by the juvenile offender subject to community notification over whom the family court exercises jurisdiction, with the clerk of the family court for the county in which the juvenile offender resides or intends to reside upon release, whose name shall be specified in the letter or other document, requesting a review of the determination to promulgate a community notification, that notification will take place;
  3. That the person has a right to be represented by counsel of their own choosing or by an attorney appointed by the court, if the court determines that he or she cannot afford counsel; and
  4. That the filing of an application for review may be accomplished, in the absence of counsel, by delivering a letter objecting to the notification and/or its level, form or nature, together with a copy of the letter or other documentation describing the proposed community notification, addressed to the judge described in the communication to the clerk of the superior court in the county in which the adult offender resides or intends to reside upon release, or in the case of juvenile offenders over whom the family court exercises jurisdiction, addressed to the judge described in the communication to the clerk of the family court in the county in which the juvenile offender resides or intends to reside upon release.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 40, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 227, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 410, § 7; P.L. 2010, ch. 103, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 109, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subdivisions.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 103, § 1, and P.L. 2010, ch. 109 § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-37.1-14. Preliminary proceedings on objection to community notification — Procedures.

Upon receipt of a request from a person subject to community notification under § 11-37.1-12(b) , the superior court, or the family court of the county in which the person resides or intends to reside upon release, shall:

  1. Set a date for hearing and decision on the matter;
  2. Provide notice of the date for the hearing to both the applicant or his or her counsel and to the attorney general;
  3. Appoint counsel for the applicant if he or she cannot afford one; and
  4. Direct that the attorney general promptly provide copies of all papers, documents and other materials which formed the basis for the determination of the level and manner of community notification be provided to the court and the applicant or his or her counsel.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 40, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 227, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 410, § 7.

11-37.1-15. Application hearing procedures.

  1. On the date set for the hearing on the review of the application the court shall:
    1. In camera, review the materials provided in accordance with § 11-37.1-14(4) ;
    2. Determine whether and to what extent the production of witnesses and cross examination shall be required or permitted depending on the complexities of the matter involved, the extent of doubt concerning the correctness of the level, nature and extent of the notification proposed; and
    3. Presume the need for a prompt determination.
  2. In any application hearing proceeding the rules of evidence shall not apply and the court may rely on documentary presentations, including expert opinion on all issues.
  3. Nothing in this section should be construed to allow the applicant to relitigate the adjudication of guilt.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsection and subdivision designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 170 § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

While R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-15(a)(2) could be considered unconstitutional in some circumstances, insofar as it granted the Superior Court discretion to deny a sexual offender the right to a meaningful hearing as a part of judicial review of any risk level classification, there was no constitutional violation in the instant action, because defendant was granted a meaningful hearing. State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 68 (2009).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-15(a)(2) , as applied to defendant’s case, did not violate defendant’s right to substantive due process, because the Sex Offender Board of Review did, at a basic level, consider all the factors required by the guidelines in assessing appellant’s risk of re-offense. State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 68 (2009).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-15 did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws, because the sex offender registration process was a civil regulatory process. State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 68 (2009).

Because the question of whether or not the risk of reoffense of an individual sex offender was left open to judicial determination on the basis of the proof offered by the alleged offender and/or the state, the legislatively mandated presumption was not permissibly “conclusive,” but was rebuttable, and R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-15 did not violate the separation of powers clause. State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 68 (2009).

Due Process.

Defendant was afforded a meaningful hearing to review his classification as a Level III, high risk sexual offender under the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act, and he failed to show that his right to procedural due process was violated because the superior court magistrate considered all written memoranda and exhibits submitted prior to the hearing, and both attorneys were granted the opportunity to develop their arguments and present further evidence at the hearing; defendant agreed to proceed on the basis of written memoranda and oral argument, and his attorney raised no objection to the scope of the hearing, nor did she inform the magistrate that she intended to call any witnesses to the stand. State v. Dennis, 29 A.3d 445, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 125 (2011).

Even if they had been properly preserved, a registrant’s due process challenges to the registrant’s sex offender risk-level classification would fail, because the registrant was afforded a meaningful hearing and failed to demonstrate a violation. DiCarlo v. State, 212 A.3d 1191, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 106 (2019).

Registrant’s challenge to the registrant’s sex offender risk-level classification failed as the Rhode Island Sex Offender Board of Review’s decision was not based solely on underlying facts of first-degree child molestation charges of which the registrant was acquitted. Looking at the full extent of the material the board set forth as having reviewed—including the registrant’s failure to participate in sex-offender treatment programs and denial of the underlying offense—the board considered numerous factors in making its determination. DiCarlo v. State, 212 A.3d 1191, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 106 (2019).

Collateral References.

Validity and Applicability of State Requirement That Person Convicted or Indicted of Sex Offenses Be Subject to Electronic Location Monitoring, Including Use of Satellite or Global Positioning System. 57 A.L.R.6th 1.

11-37.1-16. Application review — Burden of production and persuasion.

  1. In any proceeding under this chapter, the state shall have the burden of going forward, which burden shall be satisfied by the presentation of a prima facie case that justifies the proposed level of and manner of notification.
  2. For purposes of this section, “prima facie case” means:
    1. A validated risk assessment tool has been used to determine the risk of re-offense;
    2. Reasonable means have been used to collect the information used in the validated assessment tool.
  3. Upon presentation of a prima facie case, the court shall affirm the determination of the level and nature of the community notification, unless it is persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that the determination on either the level of notification of the manner in which it is proposed to be accomplished is not in compliance with this chapter or the guidelines adopted pursuant to this chapter. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the release of information pertaining to a person who has been convicted of any of the violations of any offense listed in § 11-37.1-2 , so long as the information has been gathered or obtained through sources other than the registration process provided by this chapter. Provided further, that nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorize the release of any information pertaining to any victim of any offense listed in § 11-37.1-2 .

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations and redesignated the subdivisions in subsectiion (b).

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Prima Facie Case.

State satisfied the first prong of its prima facie case justifying defendant’s Level III categorization pursuant to the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-16(a) and (b), because the State introduced STATIC-99 and STABLE 2000 test results as validated risk assessment tools used to predict defendant’s risk of re-offense; STATIC-99 and STABLE 2000 tests are nationally recognized, well-established risk assessment tools. State v. Dennis, 29 A.3d 445, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 125 (2011).

Risk Assessment.

Sex Offender Board of Review did not err in classifying petitioner as a Risk Level III sex offender under the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act as the board considered the results of three validated assessment tools as well as other available documentation to determine the level of risk petitioner posed to the community; in the risk-assessment report, the board detailed additional external factors it considered in elevating petitioner to a high-risk sex offender level, including that petitioner exploited his position of authority as a high school soccer coach by targeting teenage males; and the board considered that he possessed over 970 images and videos of child pornography. Matteson v. R.I. Dep't of AG, 266 A.3d 1237, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 5 (2022).

11-37.1-17. Immunity for good faith conduct.

Any person who performs any act or fails to perform any act pursuant to this chapter shall have good faith immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might be incurred as a result of the performance of or the failure to perform any act pursuant to this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1.

11-37.1-18. Continuation of prior duty to register.

Any person who pursuant to the provisions of former § 11-37-16 had a duty to register under that section after having been convicted of any violation of the provisions of chapter 37 of this title, or for a conviction in another state of first degree sexual assault which if committed in this state would constitute a violation of chapter 37 of this title, shall have the duty to register in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Nothing in this section shall be construed to abrogate any duty to register which exists or existed under the provisions of former § 11-37-16.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Where defendant was convicted in 1994 for a 1993 child molestation sexual assault offense, and the statutes were subsequently amended in 1996, 1997, and 2003 extending the duration of a defendant’s duty to register as a sex offender and increasing the penalty for registration violations, defendant’s failure-to-notify convictions in 2007, 2009, and 2010 did not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. The duration of defendant’s duty to register was merely a condition attached to a civil, nonpunitive regulatory measure, not the imposition of retroactive punishment. State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 98 (2018).

Where defendant was convicted in 1994 for a 1993 child molestation sexual assault offense, and the sex offender registration statutes were subsequently amended in 1996 and 2003, increasing the penalty for registration violations, defendant’s failure-to-notify convictions in 2007, 2009, and 2010 did not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. The increased penalty was already in effect before defendant’s failures to notify occurred, and the failures to notify were offenses separate and apart from the second-degree child molestation sexual assault of 1993, rendering them insufficiently annexed to that crime as to trigger an ex post facto violation. State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 98 (2018).

Duration of Duty to Register.

For a defendant who was convicted before the passage of § 11-37.1 et seq., language in R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-18 preserves defendant’s duty to register as a sex offender under the former law, not its duration. The duration of the duty to register as a sex offender is governed by § 11-37.1-4 . State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 98 (2018).

Where defendant was convicted in 1994 for a 1993 child molestation sexual assault offense, the current version of § 11-37.1-4 governed and therefore defendant’s duty to register as a sex offender expired 10 years from the expiration of sentence for the offense. State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 98 (2018).

Portion of the judgment that vacated the convictions for the 2009 and 2010 offenses was quashed; because the prosecution for those crimes commenced before June 19, 2010, the offenses occurred while defendant still had a duty to register under this provision. Atryzek v. State, 268 A.3d 37, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 11 (2022).

Duty to Register Under § 11-37-16.

Under this section, a person who was charged with child molestation while former § 11-37-16 was in effect, but who was not convicted until after passage of the new act in 1996, was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the requirements in effect at the time he was charged. State v. Flores, 714 A.2d 581, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 224 (1998).

Defendant, a person convicted of sexual assault and incarcerated before July 1, 1992, but released after that date, was not required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-16, because he was not in the pool of individuals upon whom the duty in § 11-37-16(a) was imposed and because § 11-37-16(b) could not be read as broadening the pool of those upon whom duty was imposed, as it instructed officials to inform those offenders to whom § 11-37-16(a) applied of their duty to register. State v. Santos, 870 A.2d 1029, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 52 (2005).

11-37.1-19. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid or unconstitutional, the invalidity or unconstitutionality shall not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid or unconstitutional provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 104, § 1.

11-37.1-20. Remand to sex offender board of review.

Upon application by the attorney general or counsel for the sex offender, the court may remand any case pending adjudication of sexually violent predator status back to the sex offender board of review for further determination of sexually violent predator status and community notification level pursuant to § 11-37.1-6 .

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 162, § 2, and P.L. 2003, ch. 170, § 2, enacted identical versions of this section.

11-37.1-21. Duty of shelters and homeless shelters to notify law enforcement of the presence of sex offenders.

  1. If any person convicted of any offense that requires sex offender registration pursuant to this title, or otherwise has a duty to register his or her address with the law enforcement agency in the municipality in which they reside, is provided residence in any homeless shelter, that person shall be required to inform the shelter of his or her status and duty to register and to provide his or her name and date of birth to each shelter or homeless shelter where he or she resides overnight.
  2. The obligation of the sex offender to provide the information required in subsection (a) of this section, shall be on a continuing daily and nightly basis and he or she shall provide said information to each and every shelter or homeless shelter at which he or she takes up temporary residence regardless of the length of time he or she stays at such shelter.
  3. The homeless shelter that receives information from any sex offender shall be required to transmit that information to the local law enforcement agency and if there be none, to the closest Rhode Island state police barracks before midnight of that day of the offender registering or signing in for the day, night, or any portion of a day.
  4. Any homeless shelter that violates the provisions of this section shall upon a first violation, be fined a civil penalty of up to five hundred dollars ($500); for a second violation, by a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000); and for a third or subsequent violation, by a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars ($5,000).
  5. Jurisdiction over any violation by a homeless shelter shall be in the district court in the county in which the shelter is physically located.
  6. Any sex offender who fails to disclose information as required by this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as set forth in § 11-37.1-10 .

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 233, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 325, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 233, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 325, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 37.2 Sexual Assault Protective Orders

11-37.2-1. Filing of complaint.

  1. Proceedings under this chapter shall be filed, heard and determined in the district court of the division in which the moving party resides except when either party is a juvenile. Any proceedings under this chapter shall not preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies. A party filing a complaint under this chapter may do so without payment of any filing fee. There shall be no minimum residence requirements for the bringing of an action under this chapter.
  2. Answers to the summons and complaint shall be made within ten (10) days of service upon the defendant and the action shall take precedence on the calendar. If no answer is filed within the time prescribed, judgment shall enter forthwith.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 2010, ch. 216, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 236, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2010, ch. 216, § 2, and P.L. 2010, ch. 236, § 2, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-37.2-2. Protective orders — Penalty — Jurisdiction.

  1. A person who is a victim of sexual assault as defined in § 11-37-1 , 11-37-2 , 11-37-4 , 11-37-6 , 11-37-8.1 , 11-37-8.3 or 11-59-2 , may file a complaint in the district court requesting any order which will protect him or her from the future abuse, including, but not limited to, the following:
    1. Ordering that the defendant be restrained and enjoined from contacting, assaulting, molesting or otherwise interfering with the plaintiff at home, on the street or elsewhere, whether the defendant is an adult or minor;
    2. Upon motion by the plaintiff, his or her address shall be released only at the discretion of the district court judge.
  2. Nothing in this section shall limit a defendant’s right under existing law to petition the court at a later date for modification of the order.
  3. Any violation of the aforementioned protective order shall subject the defendant to being found in contempt of court.
  4. The contempt order shall not be exclusive and shall not preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies. Any relief granted by the court shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed three (3) years, at the expiration of which time the court may extend any order upon motion by the plaintiff for such additional time as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse. The court may modify its order at any time upon motion of either party.
  5. Any violation of a protective order under this chapter of which the defendant has actual notice shall be a misdemeanor which shall be punished by a fine of no more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
  6. “Actual notice” means that the defendant has received a copy of the order by service thereof or by being handed a copy of the order by a police officer pursuant to § 8-8.1-7 .

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 240, § 1.

11-37.2-3. Temporary orders — Ex parte proceedings.

    1. Upon the filing of a complaint under this chapter, the court may enter any temporary orders that it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse.
    2. If it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the plaintiff, before notice can be served and a hearing held, the court may enter any temporary order without notice that it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff. Every order granted without notice shall expire by its terms within the time after entry, not to exceed twenty-one (21) days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order: (i) By consent; or (ii) Due to a failure to make service of process upon the defendant despite diligent efforts; or (iii) For good cause shown and after hearing of argument by the parties or counsel, is extended for an additional period. In case a temporary order is granted without notice, the matter shall be set down for hearing within a reasonable time and shall be given precedence over all matters except older matters of the same character, and when the matter comes on for hearing the party who obtained the temporary order shall proceed with the complaint for an order pursuant to § 11-37.2-2 , and, if he or she does not do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary order.
    1. When the court is unavailable after the close of business a complaint may be filed before any available district court judge who may grant relief to the plaintiff under this chapter upon cause shown in an ex parte proceeding.
    2. No temporary order shall be granted pursuant to the provisions of this section unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by the affidavit or by verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the plaintiff before notice can be served and a hearing held.
  1. Any order issued under this section and any documentation in support of an order shall be filed immediately with the clerk of the district court. The filing shall have the effect of commencing proceedings under this chapter and invoking the other provisions of this chapter.
  2. The clerk of the district court shall have a certified copy of any order issued under this chapter forwarded immediately to the law enforcement agency designated by the plaintiff. The clerk shall also provide the plaintiff with two (2) certified copies of any order issued under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 240, § 1.

11-37.2-4. Report to law enforcement agency.

Whenever the court grants a temporary order pursuant to § 11-37-8.3 based on a complaint alleging that a minor is suffering from sexual abuse, the court shall ensure that the appropriate law enforcement agency is notified of the complaint.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 240, § 1.

11-37.2-5. Return of service — Alternate service.

  1. The complaint and any order issued under this chapter shall be personally served upon the defendant by a sheriff or constable except as provided in subsection (c), (d) and (f) of this section. Service shall be made without payment of any fee when service is made by a deputy sheriff. At the election of the plaintiff, service pursuant to this subsection may also be made by a constable licensed to serve process of the district court pursuant to § 45-16-4.1 . The constable shall be entitled to receive the fee allowed by law for the service of a district court summons.
  2. Return of service shall be forwarded by the deputy sheriff or constable to the clerk of the court prior to the date set down for hearing on the complaint. If service has not been made, the deputy sheriff or constable shall indicate on the summons the reason therefor and the attempts made to serve the defendant.
  3. At the time the return of service is sent to the clerk of the court, the deputy sheriff or constable shall cause a copy of the return of service to be sent to the plaintiff and to the appropriate law enforcement agency.
  4. If, at the time of hearing on the complaint, the court determines that after diligent effort the deputy sheriff or constable has been unable to serve the defendant personally, the judge may order an alternate method of service designed to give reasonable notice of the action to the defendant and taking into consideration the plaintiff’s ability to afford the means of service ordered. Alternative service shall include, but not be limited to: service by certified and regular mail at defendant’s last known address (excluding the residence which he or she has been ordered to vacate) or place of employment, leaving copies at the defendant’s dwelling or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by publication in a newspaper for two (2) consecutive weeks. The court shall set a new date for hearing on the complaint and shall extend the temporary order until that date.
  5. If the defendant appears in person before the court, the necessity for further service is waived and proof of service of that order is not necessary.
  6. If the defendant is served notice regarding the complaint and hearing, but does not appear at the hearing, the clerk of the district court shall mail the defendant a copy of the resulting order.
  7. When service of the temporary order issued pursuant to this section has not been made and/or after a permanent order is entered, a police officer shall give notice of the order to the defendant by handing him or her a certified copy of the order. The officer shall indicate that he or she has given notice by writing on the plaintiff’s copy of the order and the police department’s copy of the order the date and time of giving notice and the officer’s name and badge number. The officer shall indicate on the offense report that actual notice was given.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 38.

11-37.2-6. Notice of penalties — Notice of renewal.

Each protective order issued under this chapter, including a temporary exparte order, shall have the following statements printed in bold-faced type or in capital letters:

A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS ORDER MAY BE GUILTY OF A MISDEMEANOR AND MAY BE PUNISHED BY A FINE OF AS MUCH AS $1,000 AND/OR BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR AS LONG AS ONE YEAR, AND MAY BE ORDERED TO ATTEND COUNSELING. IF THE VICTIM WANTS THIS ORDER TO CONTINUE BEYOND THE EXPIRATION DATE, THE VICTIM MUST APPLY FOR A RENEWAL OF THE ORDER BEFORE THE EXPIRATION DATE.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 240, § 1.

11-37.2-7. Form of complaint.

  1. A form in substantially the following language shall suffice for the purpose of filing a complaint under this chapter:

    Click to view

  2. A form in substantially the following language shall suffice for the purpose of requesting temporary orders under this chapter:

    Click to view

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DISTRICT COURT COUNTY OF DIVISION Plaintiff: VS: NO: : Defendant: COMPLAINT FOR PROTECTION FROM ABUSE Pursuant to chapter 8.1 of title 8, I request that the court enter an order protecting me from abuse. (a)(1) My full name, present street address, city and telephone number are as follows: (b)(2) The full name, present street address, city and telephone number of the person causing me abuse (the defendant) are as follows: (c)(3) On or about , without cause or provocation, I suffered abuse when the defendant: [ ] Threatened or harmed with a weapon: (type of weapon used) [ ] Attempted to cause me physical harm; [ ] Caused me physical harm; [ ] Placed me in fear of imminent physical harm; [ ] Caused me to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat of force or duress; [ ] Attempted to cause me to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat of force or duress; Specifically, the defendant: (d) I ask that: [ ] The court order that the defendant be restrained and enjoined from contacting, assaulting, molesting or otherwise interfering with the plaintiff at home, on the street or elsewhere. [ ] I request that the above relief be ordered without notice because it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that I will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon. I understand that the court will schedule a hearing no later than twenty-one (21) days after such order is entered on the question of continuing such temporary order. (e) I have not sought protection from abuse from any other judge of the district court arising out of the same facts or circumstances alleged in this complaint. (Signature) (Date) Subscribed and sworn to before me in in the County of in the State of Rhode Island, this day of A.D. Notary Public Note: If this complaint is filed by an attorney, the attorney's certificate should appear below: ATTORNEY CERTIFICATE Signed: Attorney for Plaintiff Address: Date: WHITE COPY [ ] Court YELLOW COPY [ ] Plaintiff PINK COPY [ ] Defendant GOLDENROD COPY [ ] Police Department

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DISTRICT COURT COUNTY OF DIVISION : Plaintiff: VS: NO:

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 240, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 11, effective June 23, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 11, effective June 23, 2021.

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 77, § 11, and P.L. 2021, ch. 78, § 11 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-37.2-8. Appeal.

An order granting relief pursuant to § 8-8.1-3 shall remain in effect during the pendency of the appeal to the superior court unless the order is stayed by a justice of the superior court.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 239, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 240, § 1.

Chapter 37.3 Child Safe Zones

11-37.3-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Employee” means an individual hired directly by the entity; a contractual employee of the entity; an individual hired by a third party who has contracted with the entity; an independent contractor of the entity; or a volunteer of the entity.
  2. “Child Safe Zone” means the following entities:
    1. Any private, municipal, county, or state fair or carnival;
    2. Any children’s arcade, amusement center having coin-or token-operated devices for entertainment, movie theatre, or facilities providing programs or services intended primarily for minors;
    3. A public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school, child care facility, or public library:
    4. Any place intended primarily for use by minors including, but not limited to, a playground, a children’s play area, recreational or sport-related activity area, a swimming or wading pool, or a beach; and
    5. Any healthcare facility intended primarily for minors.
  3. “Minor” means a person under the age of eighteen (18) years old.
  4. “Offender” means a person who is, or is required to be, registered as a sex offender in this state or any other jurisdiction and whose victim was a minor.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 506, § 1.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 506, § 2, provides that this chapter takes effect on August 1, 2014.

11-37.3-2. Prohibition from employment.

  1. Any entity that is a child safe zone is prohibited from employing a person who is an offender.
  2. The individual who made the final hiring decision for an entity that is a child safe zone that knowingly employs an offender as prohibited in § 11-37.3-3(a) shall be subject to a fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each day the offender is employed.
  3. Any offender who knowingly misrepresents or omits his or her sex offender registration status to obtain employment in a child safe zone shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, be subject to imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 506, § 1.

11-37.3-3. Prohibition from ownership or operation.

  1. Any offender is prohibited from owning or operating an entity that is a child safe zone. This prohibition shall not apply to any offender who owned or operated an entity that is a child safe zone prior to August 1, 2014.
  2. Any offender who knowingly owns or operates an entity that is a child safe zone shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, be subject to imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 506, § 1.

11-37.3-4. Immunity from liability.

An entity that is a child safe zone that declines to hire, or declines to continue an offender’s employment, on the basis of the employment prohibition in § 11-37.3-2(a) shall not be liable for civil damages or subject to any claim, demand, cause of action, or proceeding of any nature as a result of the prohibition.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 506, § 1.

Chapter 38 Riotous Assembly

11-38-1 — 11-38-4. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1896, ch. 278, § 1; C.P.A. 1905, § 1228; G.L. 1909, ch. 344, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 396, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-38-1 ; G.L. 1896, ch. 278, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 344, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 396, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-38-2; G.L. 1896, ch. 278, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 344, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 396, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-38-3; G.L. 1896, ch. 278, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 344, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 396, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-38-4), concerning riotous assembly, were repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 336, § 4, effective July 3, 2004.

11-38-5. Inciting riot at correctional institution.

Any person who, with intent to cause a riotous assembly at the adult correctional institutions, shall incite a riot or a continuance of a riot or destruction of property while rioting, shall, upon being found guilty of the offense, be fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 148, § 1.

11-38-6. Inciting riot at municipal detention facility.

Any prisoner, detainee, or other person incarcerated or confined at the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility in the city of Central Falls who, with intent to cause a riotous assembly at the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility created under chapter 54 of title 45, incites a riot or any continuance of a riot or destruction of property while rioting shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned at the adult correctional institutions for a term not to exceed ten (10) years, or be fined an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both; that term commences at the expiration of the original term of imprisonment of the prisoner.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 362, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 477, § 2.

Chapter 39 Robbery

11-39-1. Penalty for robbery.

  1. Every person who shall commit: (1) robbery by use of a dangerous weapon; (2) robbery where a victim is injured; or (3) robbery where the victim is a person who is severely impaired or an elderly person; shall be guilty of first degree robbery and shall be imprisoned for not less than ten (10) years and may be imprisoned for life, or fined not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both.
  2. Every person who shall commit robbery or other larceny from the person by force or threat, where there is no weapon and no injury and the victim is neither a severely impaired person or an elderly person, shall be guilty of second degree robbery and shall be imprisoned for not less than five (5) years nor more than thirty (30) years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.
  3. For the purposes of this section:
    1. “Person who is severely impaired” has the same definition as provided in § 11-5-11 ; and
    2. “Elderly person” means a person sixty (60) years of age or older.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-39-1 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 94, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 201, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 15; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 15.

Cross References.

Additional penalty for carrying arms while committing crime, §§ 11-47-3 , 11-47-20 .

Assault with intent to commit robbery, § 11-5-1 .

Entry with intent to commit robbery, § 11-8-3 et seq.

Fish nets and weirs, robbing, § 11-41-10 .

Investigation and proceedings against racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations, § 7-15-1 et seq.

Killing in perpetration of robbery, § 11-23-1 .

Larceny from the person, § 11-41-7 .

Rewards offered by governor, § 12-1-1 .

Stolen property recovered by apprehending officer, disposition, § 11-41-15 .

Comparative Legislation.

Robbery:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-118 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 265, §§ 17-21.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Common Law Definition.

The word “robbery” when used in statutes has a technical meaning which incorporates all the elements of the common law crime. State v. Domanski, 57 R.I. 500 , 190 A. 854, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1937); State v. Robalewski, 418 A.2d 817, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1717 (1980).

Although robbery is a statutory offense in Rhode Island, the statute merely incorporates the common law elements of the offense. State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1238 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1980, 72 L. Ed. 2d 447, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 1754 (1982).

Because the statute establishing the penalties for robbery fails to set forth the elements of the crime, the common law definition of “the felonious taking of money or goods of any value from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence, or putting him in fear,” is applicable. State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 141 (1999).

Although the statute does not define robbery, it has been held to incorporate the common-law definition. State v. Robertson, 740 A.2d 330, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 182 (1999).

In a first-degree robbery case, the trial court’s instruction defining “permanent deprivation of property” to include deprivation for an unreasonable length of time, or the intent to use the property in such a way that the owner would probably be deprived of it, was proper because it was consistent with the definitions of felonious intent to steal used by other common-law jurisdictions. State v. McWilliams, 47 A.3d 251, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 111 (2012).

Double Jeopardy.

Dual convictions for carrying a dangerous weapon when committing a crime of violence and first-degree robbery did not constitute a double jeopardy violation because each offense included an additional element of proof that was not contained in the other; the jury could have returned a verdict of guilty on the robbery charge based on either defendant’s use of a dangerous weapon or the injury inflicted upon the victim, while the conviction for committing a crime of violence while armed or having available a firearm did not require that the weapon be used or that there be an injury to the victim. State v. Stone, 924 A.2d 773, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 77 (2007).

Evidence.

Where the defendant was the getaway driver and the lookout person, the trial justice was correct in finding evidence of asportation to support the robbery charge, and that evidence supported the conviction of robbery. State v. Firby, 636 A.2d 1330, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1994).

The admission into evidence of a photograph of the victim grimacing in pain was not prejudical error, since it was introduced to prove that the victim was injured during the robbery, a requirement under this section. In light of the extensive injuries sustained by the victim, it was unlikely that his facial expression evoked the jurors’ passions and resulted in undue prejudice to the defendant. State v. Beauchamp, 671 A.2d 1238, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1996).

Evidence that $100 bill was found in the area where the struggle between defendant and the victim occurred, in the vicinity of other material belonging to defendant, including defendant’s backpack, was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for first-degree robbery because it permitted the jury to infer that defendant took the money defendant had previously given the victim, a cab driver, after defendant shot the victim. State v. Stone, 924 A.2d 773, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 77 (2007).

Because defendant participated in a coordinated attack on a defenseless man that began with an ambush of the victim’s vehicle and ended with a robbery and severe beating, based on the totality of the evidence, the jury reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant entered into an agreement with others to commit the crime of robbery. State v. Perkins, 966 A.2d 1257, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 33 (2009).

In an armed robbery case, as a detective did not give his opinion on the ability of another witness to describe defendant accurately, but was asked to compare independently the physical description given in dispatches with defendant’s actual appearance, a task that was common to his responsibilities as a police officer, his testimony was not impermissible bolstering; therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. State v. Wray, 38 A.3d 1102, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 25 (2012).

Where defendant argued that the victims’ identifications of him at trial as the man who robbed them at gunpoint were unreliable and not substantial enough to prove his guilt, as the trial court reviewed all the testimony, including cross-examination designed to weaken the credibility of the victims’ identifications, and agreed with the jury that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, its decision to deny his motion for a new trial was deferred to on appeal. State v. Wray, 38 A.3d 1102, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 25 (2012).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of second-degree robbery and denied his motion for a new trial because an eyewitness testified that he got a good look at defendant when he stopped at a driveway where defendant was standing under a light, identified defendant within one or two days when the photo array was shown to him, and made an unequivocal in-court identification of defendant. State v. Pittman, 160 A.3d 1015, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 75 (2017).

Juvenile was properly adjudicated delinquent for first-degree robbery because (1) the State produced sufficient evidence of the crime’s corpus delicti to permit admission of the juvenile’s confession, and (2) other circumstantial evidence also demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile perpetrated the crime. In re Joseph C., 178 A.3d 288, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 16 (2018).

Although the victim did not identify defendant in an initial photo array, her identification of defendant was sufficient because a Facebook search by her of a name provided by the Attorney General’s office yielded profiles and photos that she scrolled through before seeing one with a familiar face that was defendant. Moreover, at trial, the victim emphasized that her in-court identification of defendant was based on his height, how big he was, and his eyes. State v. Johnson, 199 A.3d 1046, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 17 (2019).

Victim’s testimony as to the actions and statements of defendant and his accomplices led to a reasonable inference that the gun used in a robbery was operable; the victim testified that she was in fear—as demonstrated by her question to an accomplice about whether he thought the others involved in the robbery were going to kill her, defendant threatened to return if she called the police, and the gun was pointed at her for the duration of the incident. State v. Johnson, 199 A.3d 1046, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 17 (2019).

Force.

Because the risk of bodily injury that underlies the more severe treatment of robbery is present when the item that is being snatched is attached to the body or clothing of the victim, the snatching of two chains from the neck of the victim constituted sufficient force to satisfy the denial of defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. State v. Robertson, 740 A.2d 330, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 182 (1999).

Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal was properly denied as sufficient evidence of force supported defendant’s robbery conviction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-39-1(a) since the physical evidence of two cut purse straps with slice marks and a knife suggested that when defendant took her purse from the victim, she was aware of the taking and resisted it, or that the purse was so attached to her as to afford resistance. State v. Rolon, 45 A.3d 518, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 84 (2012).

Larceny and Robbery Distinguished.

The taking of goods of value from an unconscious person is larceny, not robbery, but when death or a comatose state is caused in order to facilitate the taking it is robbery. State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1238 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1980, 72 L. Ed. 2d 447, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 1754 (1982).

Lesser Included Offense.

Since convictions for the offenses of robbery and compounding a felony required proof of elements quite distinct from each other, the latter was not a lesser included offense of the former. State v. Rodriquez, 731 A.2d 726, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 141 (1999).

Sentence.

Sentence of 45 years with 15 suspended was not cruel or unusual punishment, or disproportionate to those received by other defendants similarly situated. State v. Ouimette, 479 A.2d 702, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 532 (1984).

Specific Intent.

A specific intent to steal is an essential element of the crime of robbery, and once the defendant satisfied the burden of going forward with sufficient evidence to justify the existence of doubt on the issue of whether his intoxication was such as to negate his specific intent, it became the state’s burden to establish that he was not so intoxicated by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McGehearty, 121 R.I. 55 , 394 A.2d 1348, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 754 (1978); State v. Robalewski, 418 A.2d 817, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1717 (1980).

The specific intent to deprive another permanently of his or her property is an essential element of robbery. State v. Brown, 549 A.2d 1373, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 132 (1988).

The defendant was not so intoxicated from drug use as to prevent him from forming the requisite intent to commit the crime of robbery, since the defendant waited until a customer in the store had left before carrying out the robbery, and since the defendant testified that although he was under the influence of drugs during the night in question he was not so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing or where he was. State v. Bruno, 656 A.2d 948, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1995).

Verdict.

Verdicts of guilty of robbery and not guilty of conspiracy to rob were not legally inconsistent verdicts. State v. Firby, 636 A.2d 1330, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1994).

Defendant’s conviction of first-degree robbery, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-39-1(a) was affirmed where the court properly certified a police detective as an expert pursuant to R.I. R. Evid. 702 , based on the detective’s training in fingerprint analysis and the fact that he processed the crime scene, and the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial pursuant to R.I. R. Evid. 702 , as the court complied with the applicable standard of review, and the record demonstrated that the evidence adduced at trial supported the jury’s verdict. State v. Arroyo, 844 A.2d 163, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 62 (2004).

Collateral References.

Acquittal, directing for insufficiency of evidence, duty of court as to. 17 A.L.R. 925.

Admissibility of evidence. 42 A.L.R.2d 854.

Admissibility of expert opinion stating whether a particular knife was, or could have been, the weapon used in a crime. 83 A.L.R.4th 660.

Attempt to commit robbery, what constitutes. 55 A.L.R. 714.

Attempted robbery, or assault to commit robbery, as affected by intent to collect or secure debt or claim. 88 A.L.R.3d 1309.

Coercion, compulsion, or duress as defense to charge of robbery, larceny, or related crime. 1 A.L.R.4th 481.

Consideration of sales tax in determining value of stolen property or amount of theft. 63 A.L.R.5th 417.

Dog as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery. 124 A.L.R.5th 657.

Effect of failure or refusal of court, in robbery prosecution, to instruct on assault and battery. 58 A.L.R.2d 808.

Entrapment to commit robbery. 66 A.L.R. 506; 86 A.L.R. 272.

Fact that gun was unloaded as affecting criminal responsibility for robbery. 68 A.L.R.4th 507.

Gambling or lottery paraphernalia as subject of larceny, burglary, or robbery. 51 A.L.R.2d 1396.

Gambling, retaking of money lost at, as robbery. 35 A.L.R. 1461; 42 A.L.R. 741; 116 A.L.R. 997.

“Infamous offense,” robbery as, within constitutional or statutory provision in relation to presentment or indictment by grand jury. 24 A.L.R. 1016.

“Intimidation” as element of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C.S. § 2113(a). 163 A.L.R. Fed. 225.

Outlawed liquor as subject of robbery. 75 A.L.R. 1480.

Prosecution for robbery of one person as bar to subsequent prosecution for robbery of another person committed at the same time. 51 A.L.R.3d 693.

Purse snatching as robbery or theft. 42 A.L.R.3d 1381.

Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by trial court. 29 A.L.R. 341; 89 A.L.R. 319.

Robbery by means of toy or simulated gun or pistol. 81 A.L.R.3d 1006.

Robbery: Identification of victim as person named in indictment or information. 4 A.L.R.6th 577.

Soldiers, sailors and militiamen, criminal liability of. 158 A.L.R. 1462.

Stolen money or property as subject of robbery or larceny. 89 A.L.R.2d 1435.

Taking property from the person by stealth as robbery. 58 A.L.R. 359; 144 A.L.R. 554.

Threats to arrest or prosecute and acts in connection therewith as force or putting in fear for purposes of robbery. 27 A.L.R. 1299.

Use of force or intimidation in retaining property or in attempting to escape, rather than in taking property, as element of robbery. 93 A.L.R.3d 643.

11-39-2. Robbery of the owner, lessor, or occupant of a motor vehicle.

  1. Every person who shall unlawfully seize a motor vehicle from its lawful owner, lessor, or occupant by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon against the owner, lessor, or occupant resulting in serious bodily injury, as defined in § 11-5-10.2 , shall be guilty of first degree robbery and shall be imprisoned for not less than ten (10) years and may be imprisoned for life, or fined not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both. In all such cases, the justice imposing sentence shall impose a minimum sentence of ten (10) years imprisonment and may only impose a sentence less than the minimum if he or she finds that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify imposition of the alternative sentence. That finding may be based upon the character and background of the defendant, the cooperation of the defendant with law enforcement authorities, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and/or the nature and quality of the evidence presented at trial. If a sentence which is less than imprisonment for a term of ten (10) years is imposed, the trial justice shall set forth on the record the circumstances which he or she found as justification for imposition of the lesser sentence. A person sentenced to prison for violation of this subsection shall not be eligible for parole until at least one-half (1/2) of the sentence has been served in prison.
  2. Every person who shall unlawfully seize a motor vehicle from its lawful owner, lessor, or occupant by force or threat of force against the owner, lessor, or occupant shall be guilty of second degree robbery and shall be imprisoned for not less than five (5) years nor more than thirty (30) years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.
  3. Every person who shall commit robbery of a motor vehicle by seizing it from its lawful owner, lessor, or occupant under the circumstances set forth in subsection (a) or (b) of this section, resulting in the death of the owner, lessor or occupant, shall be guilty of first degree murder and shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, and may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole if ordered by the court pursuant to chapter 19.2 of title 12. A person sentenced to life imprisonment for violation of this subsection shall not be eligible for parole until at least twenty (20) years of the sentence has been served in prison.

History of Section. P.L. 1994, ch. 177, § 1.

Collateral References.

Robbery: Identification of victim as person named in indictment or information. 4 A.L.R.6th 577.

Validity, construction, and application of state carjacking statutes. 100 A.L.R.5th 67.

Chapter 40 Sunday Laws [Repealed.]

11-40-1 — 11-40-4. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1896, ch. 281, § 17-20; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, § 18-21; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, § 18-21; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 18-21), relating to work on Sunday, were repealed by P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 9, effective July 7, 2000.

Chapter 41 Theft, Embezzlement, False Pretenses, and Misappropriation

11-41-1. Stealing as larceny.

Every person who shall steal any money, goods, or chattels, or any note of the general treasurer of this state for the payment of money, any bank bill, any certificate of any bank or of any public officer or corporation securing the payment of money to any person or certifying it to be due, any certificate of stock in any corporation, any order entitling a person to money or other article, or any bill of exchange, bill of lading, railroad ticket, bond, warrant, obligation, bill, or promissory note for the payment of money, or other valuable property, or any record or paper belonging to any public officer, or any writ, warrant, or other legal process, or any book or part of one containing an account, any receipt for money or other article paid or delivered, any adjustment or document of any kind relating to the payment of money or delivery of any article, any indenture of apprenticeship, or any deed, covenant, indenture, or assurance whatsoever respecting any property, real or personal, shall be deemed guilty of larceny.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 11; C.P.A. 1905, § 1172; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 11; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-1 .

Cross References.

Allegations in indictment as to ownership of property, § 12-12-16 .

Civil liability for larceny, § 9-1-2 .

Driving vehicle without consent of owner, §§ 31-9-1 , 31-27-13 .

Entry with intent to commit larceny, § 11-8-3 et seq.

Habitual offenders, § 11-41-24 .

Investigation and proceedings against racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations, § 7-15-1 et seq.

Larceny of a firearm, § 11-47-5.1 .

Vehicles, theft and embezzlement, § 31-9-7 et seq.

Venue of larceny prosecutions, § 12-3-8 .

Comparative Legislation.

Embezzlement:

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 266, § 30.

Larceny:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-118 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With Other Laws.

Although a jury found defendant guilty of entering a building with the intent to commit larceny, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-3 , but not guilty of larceny in excess of $ 500, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-1 , the verdicts were not inconsistent because even though an employee saw defendant carrying something out of a business, which was closed for a holiday, and two laptops were missing from the business, the jury could have found defendant not guilty on the actual physical possession or larceny of the item because defendant was not found with the laptops in his possession. State v. Guerra, 12 A.3d 759, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 14 (2011).

Intent.

One who knowingly receives and carries away money given to him by mistake, having formed the intent to appropriate that money at the time he received it, is guilty of larceny. State v. Hector, 121 R.I. 685 , 402 A.2d 595, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2045 (1979).

There was sufficient evidence to show that defendant intended to steal $7,200 mistakenly given to him by a credit union teller who misread a check the defendant presented for cashing, where there was evidence that defendant knew an extra $7,200 was being given to him and he silently accepted and walked out of the credit union with the overpayment. State v. Hector, 121 R.I. 685 , 402 A.2d 595, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 2045 (1979).

Creditor’s larceny claim failed because the creditor failed to prove that at the time of the sale the debtor intended to “wrongfully and permanently deprive” the creditor of the $4,000 he paid for the motorcycle when, despite the misrepresentation he made to the creditor about having to pay off a loan to obtain the title, the debtor did make some post-sale efforts in this regard, albeit unsuccessfully. Taylor v. Calise (In re Calise), 513 B.R. 16, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 2939 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2014).

Shoplifting.

Shoplifting is defined in the same manner as the word “steal,” i.e., “to wrongfully and with the intent of committing a felony or crime thereby, take and carry away the property of another,” with the additional element that the goods must be taken from a retail establishment. State v. Lewis, 467 A.2d 1387, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1118 (1983).

“Steal.”

The word “steal” has been used consistently to approximate or describe the act of larceny at common law. State v. Smith, 56 R.I. 168 , 184 A. 494, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 90 (1936).

Collateral References.

Computer programs as property subject to theft. 18 A.L.R.3d 1121.

Consideration of sales tax in determining value of stolen property or amount of theft. 63 A.L.R.5th 417.

Gambling or lottery paraphernalia as subject of larceny, burglary, or robbery. 51 A.L.R.2d 1396.

Participation in larceny or theft as precluding conviction for receiving or concealing the stolen property. 29 A.L.R.5th 59.

Purse snatching as robbery or theft. 42 A.L.R.3d 1381.

Stolen money or property as subject of robbery or larceny. 89 A.L.R.2d 1435.

What Is “Intent to Deprive” Sufficient to Establish Liability for Civil, or Statutory, Theft. 35 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

What is “Property of Another” Within Statute Proscribing Larceny, Theft, or Embezzlement of Property of Another. 57 A.L.R.6th 445.

11-41-2. Receiving stolen goods.

Every person who shall fraudulently receive any stolen money, goods, securities, chattels, or other property, knowing it to be stolen, shall be deemed guilty of larceny, although the person who stole the property may not have been prosecuted or convicted for it. The possession of any stolen property shall be evidence of guilty knowledge by the person having possession that the property was stolen, unless the person shows that it was acquired in the due course of trade and for adequate consideration.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 13; C.P.A. 1905, § 1173; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 13; P.L. 1928, ch. 1208, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-2 .

Cross References.

Habitual offenders, § 11-41-24 .

Importation of stolen property, jurisdiction of offense, § 12-3-7 .

Pawnbroker accepting pawns from thieves, § 19-26-12 .

Pawnbroker hindering inspection of articles appearing to have been stolen, § 19-26-6 .

Possession of property stolen outside state, venue of prosecution, § 12-3-9 .

Possession of stolen vehicle, §§ 31-9-2 , 31-27-14 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section does not deprive the defendant of his constitutional presumption of innocence and the burden of proving guilty knowledge is still upon the state. State v. Kurowski, 100 R.I. 25 , 210 A.2d 873, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 348 (1965).

Civil Liability.

A fraudulent receiver knowing the goods to be stolen is guilty of larceny so is liable for twice the value of the goods under § 9-1-2 . O'Brien v. Moskol, 45 R.I. 486 , 123 A. 568, 1924 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1924).

Where the defendant towed to his garage at the request of the police, the plaintiff’s car after it had been stolen and abandoned, if defendant was guilty of any wrongful taking and detention of plaintiff’s property, it was merely technical and the damage if any was so minimal as to call for the application of the maxim “de minimis non curat lex.” Manufacturers Supply Co. v. Mullins, 92 R.I. 191 , 167 A.2d 755, 1961 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1961).

Constructive Possession.

Unless the instructions on constructive possession clearly established the conscious possession of stolen goods, the mere fact that the goods were located within the premises under the control of defendant did not constitute constructive possession nor meet the requirements of this section. State v. Motyka, 111 R.I. 38 , 298 A.2d 793, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1175 (1973).

The mere claim to possession or ownership of property does not constitute constructive possession of the property within the meaning of this section. In re Malstrom, 115 R.I. 208 , 341 A.2d 437, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1143 (1975).

Evidence.

Evidence tending to show that defendant acquired the goods in the due course of trade was improperly excluded on the issue of knowledge. State v. O'Neill, 53 R.I. 497 , 167 A. 263, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 132 (1933).

Evidence that at a time prior to time of crime charged defendant purchased the same kind of goods from the same persons was admissible to show knowledge on the part of the defendant that the goods were stolen. State v. Peters, 86 R.I. 447 , 136 A.2d 620, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 127 (1957).

Where defendant failed to show under what authority stolen suits had been stored in another’s unoccupied apartment, defendant had no standing to challenge the admissibility of those suits which were seized in a police search and resulted in his conviction for receiving stolen goods. State v. Jardine, 110 R.I. 491 , 293 A.2d 901, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 944 (1972).

A statutory presumption or legislatively authorized inference does not obviate the necessity of a determination by the trier of fact that the totality of evidence in the case, including such inferences, must constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Vincent, 122 R.I. 848 , 413 A.2d 78, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1477 (1980).

Evidence held insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that either defendant pawn broker was aware, on the date of the purchase, that the property in question was either significantly valuable or that it had been stolen. State v. Williams, 461 A.2d 385, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 964 (1983).

— Sufficient.

Evidence sufficient for conviction. See State v. Mastracchio, 672 A.2d 438, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1996).

Where defendant failed to keep the peace, failed to remain on good behavior, and was found in possession of stolen property, the evidence was more than sufficient to find defendant violated the terms of probation. State v. Piette, 833 A.2d 1233, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 199 (2003).

Evidence that thousands of items were found at second defendant’s house spread out like a gift shop, those items were the same kind a witness testified the witness had stolen and sold to second defendant, and it could have been found that first defendant constructively possessed the items which were found in areas of the house she used was sufficient to support convictions for receipt of stolen goods. State v. Cipriano, 21 A.3d 408, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 101 (2011).

Indictment.

Name of person from whom goods were received need not be set forth in the indictment. State v. Hazard, 2 R.I. 474 , 1853 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1853).

It is not necessary to allege and prove the specific value of the stolen goods so long as the description of the stolen goods indicates an intrinsic value. State v. Watson, 3 R.I. 114 , 1855 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1855).

Instructions.
— Knowledge.

The trial justice properly instructs the jury on the element of knowledge when he says that the state must prove that the defendant knew that the property in question was stolen goods, or at the time of receiving the property he knew of facts sufficient to satisfy a reasonable person that the property was stolen, and when he repeatedly instructs the jury that the state must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Ricci, 472 A.2d 291, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 450 (1984).

Knowledge of Defendant.

Knowledge that the goods were stolen is an essential element of the offense. State v. O'Neill, 53 R.I. 497 , 167 A. 263, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 132 (1933).

The test of knowledge is whether a reasonable man ought under the circumstances to have known that the goods were stolen. State v. O'Neill, 53 R.I. 497 , 167 A. 263, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 132 (1933).

The phrase “guilty knowledge” as used in the second clause refers back to the phrase “knowing the same to be stolen” in the first clause and means a fraudulent intent concurrent with the act. State v. Kurowski, 100 R.I. 25 , 210 A.2d 873, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 348 (1965).

This section creates a purported presumption of guilty knowledge when one is found in possession of stolen goods, and this presumption has been construed as a legislatively authorized inference that does not obviate the necessity of a determination by a trier of fact, that the totality of evidence in the case, including the inference, must constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sciarra, 575 A.2d 180, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 102 (1990).

Motion to Quash.

Where a defendant charged under this section did not make a motion to quash the complaint until the conclusion of the state’s evidence, such motion was addressed to the discretion of the court which will be sustained if not abused. State v. Cucca, 102 R.I. 95 , 228 A.2d 572, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 651 (1967).

Receipt of Property.

Defendant received the property within the meaning of this section when it was by previous arrangement delivered to a common carrier addressed to defendant. State v. Habib, 18 R.I. 558 , 30 A. 462, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1894).

Receiver of stolen goods must be someone other than the thief. State v. Silva, 110 R.I. 290 , 292 A.2d 228, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 911 (1972).

Statute of Limitations.

This section defines receiving stolen goods as larceny for the purpose of exempting it from the three-year statute of limitations of § 12-12-17 . State v. St. Pierre, 118 R.I. 45 , 371 A.2d 1048, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1427 (1977).

Collateral References.

Conviction of receiving stolen property, or related offenses, where stolen property previously placed under police control. 72 A.L.R.4th 838.

Entrapment to commit crime. 18 A.L.R. 187; 66 A.L.R. 506; 86 A.L.R. 272.

Evidence of acquisition or possession of money, source of which is not traced, as admissible against defendant in criminal case. 91 A.L.R.2d 1046.

Larceny or theft, may party to, be convicted of the offenses of receiving or concealing the stolen property. 136 A.L.R. 1087.

Modern status as to instruction allowing presumption of inference of guilt from possession of recently stolen property as violation of defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination. 88 A.L.R.3d 1178.

Participation in larceny or theft as precluding conviction for receiving or concealing the stolen property. 29 A.L.R.5th 59.

Possession of recently stolen goods by one charged with receiving them as evidence on question of guilty knowledge. 68 A.L.R. 187.

Possession of stolen property as continuing offense. 24 A.L.R.5th 132.

Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by trial court. 29 A.L.R. 340; 89 A.L.R. 295.

Sufficiency of description of stolen property in indictment or information for receiving it. 99 A.L.R.2d 813.

What amounts to “exclusive” possession of stolen goods to support inference of burglary or other felonious taking. 51 A.L.R.3d 727.

What constitutes “recently” stolen property within rule inferring guilt from unexplained possession of such property. 89 A.L.R.3d 1202.

Wife’s criminal responsibility for receiving stolen goods from husband. 4 A.L.R. 281; 71 A.L.R. 1126.

11-41-3. Embezzlement and fraudulent conversion.

Every official of a financial institution and every officer, agent, clerk, servant, or other person to whom any money or other property shall be entrusted for any specific purpose, and every person acting as executor, administrator, conservator, guardian, receiver, assignee, custodian, or trustee appointed by order, decree or judgment of court, or by deed, will or other instrument in writing, who shall embezzle or fraudulently convert to his or her own use, or who shall take or secrete, with intent to embezzle or fraudulently convert to his or her own use, any money or other property which shall have come into his or her possession or shall be under his or her care or charge by virtue of his or her employment or for that specific purpose or by virtue of his or her acting as executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, receiver, assignee, custodian, or trustee, and every person who shall collect or receive money or property from another for a commission to be retained out of the money or other property so collected or received, and who shall fraudulently retain out of that money or property so collected or received more than the amount of the commission, and shall embezzle or fraudulently convert it to his or her own use, or shall take or secrete it with intent to embezzle or fraudulently to convert the same to his or her own use, shall be deemed guilty of larceny and shall be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or three (3) times the value of the money or property thus embezzled or converted, whichever is greater, or imprisoned not more than twenty (20) years, or both, except that if the sum or value of the property embezzled is less than one hundred dollars ($100), he or she shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 16; C.P.A. 1905, § 1175; P.L. 1908, ch. 1521, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 16; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-3 ; P.L. 1991, ch. 138, § 1.

Cross References.

Agent or factor, fraudulent conversion by, § 11-41-12 .

Allegations in complaint or indictment, § 12-12-14 .

Bank officer or employee, embezzlement by, § 11-41-11 .

Military property, misappropriation, §§ 30-12-8 , 30-12-12 .

Law Reviews.

2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Criminal Law: State v. Lough, 899 A.2d 468, 469 (R.I. 2006), see 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 551 (2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Agency.

There was not sufficient proof of agency where the defendant had at least as great an interest in the misapplied fund as did the purported principal. State v. Snell, 9 R.I. 112 , 1868 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1868).

A del credere factor may be convicted under this section, even though he has guaranteed to his principal the payment of accounts by customers. State v. McAvoy, 40 R.I. 437 , 101 A. 109, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1917).

An agent selling as agent and authorized to collect his principal’s accounts was guilty of embezzlement where he collected accounts and deposited same for his own use, even though under his contract he was charged interest on late payments. State v. McAvoy, 40 R.I. 437 , 101 A. 109, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1917).

A real estate closing attorney who diverted funds to the attorney’s own personal account and returned the money approximately four years later only after an investigation could be found guilty of embezzlement, since a reasonable inference of an intent to permanently deprive the true owner of that money was clear. State v. Champagne, 668 A.2d 311, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 280 (1995).

Civil Action.

Since this section makes embezzlement the equivalent of larceny, a felony at common law, the former statute requiring criminal prosecution before a civil action would apply to such a case. Struthers v. Peckham, 22 R.I. 8 , 45 A. 742, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1900).

Elements.

The elements to be proven in order to establish the offense of embezzlement are (1) that defendant was entrusted with the property for a specific use, (2) that he came into possession of the property in a lawful manner, often as a result of his employment, and (3) that defendant intended to appropriate and convert the property to his own use and permanently deprive that person of the use. State v. Oliveira, 432 A.2d 664, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1223 (1981).

Proof of the employer’s ownership of the property is not an essential element of the crime of embezzlement. State v. Oliveira, 432 A.2d 664, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1223 (1981).

Even though indictment alleged that the money embezzled was “the property of the city of Providence,” the issue of ownership was not an essential element of the crime to be proven in order to sustain a conviction for embezzlement. State v. Oliveira, 432 A.2d 664, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1223 (1981).

Defendant, a police officer, who offered to take an allegedly stolen minibike to the police station for storage but who instead discarded the minibike behind a dumpster, thinking that it would never be claimed, was properly convicted of embezzlement and fraudulent conversion under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-3 . When the officer discarded the property, he had treated it as his own; it did not matter that he did not benefit or gain personally from his actions. State v. Lough, 899 A.2d 468, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 97 (2006).

Embezzlement and Larceny Distinguished.

Defendant could be convicted under this section although the proof showed an offense that would have been larceny at common law. State v. Taberner, 14 R.I. 272 , 1883 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1883).

The basic distinction between embezzlement and larceny is that, in embezzlement, the property comes lawfully into the possession of the offender, while in larceny the offender takes it unlawfully in the first instance. State v. Crescenzo, 114 R.I. 242 , 332 A.2d 421, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1407 (1975).

Statute of Limitations.

Embezzlement, as a form of larceny, is excepted from the statute of limitations set out in § 12-12-17 . Williams v. Smith, 28 R.I. 531 , 68 A. 306, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1907).

Pursuant to § 12-12-14 , a conviction under this section may only be predicated upon proof of offenses that occurred within three years of the bringing of an indictment, information, or complaint and within six months after the time stated in the indictment, information, or complaint. State v. Ricci, 533 A.2d 844, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 564 (1987).

Sufficiency of Indictment.

An indictment that set forth the essential elements of the offense described in the section and left the defendant in no doubt about the crime with which he was charged was sufficient to withstand the constitutional attacks of failure to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. State v. Crescenzo, 114 R.I. 242 , 332 A.2d 421, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1407 (1975).

State did not make out a prima facie case of embezzlement against the defendant, who was employed as director of maintenance for city, and who ordered delivery of carpeting, ceiling tiles, and two steel fire-door units valued at approximately $1,200 to an environmental testing company which in turn rendered services to the city. Although the items were ordered by the defendant and charged to the school department, the defendant secured from the testing company training services for his employees in the removal of hazardous substances and four steel doors, valued at significantly more than $1,200. There was nothing contained in the information package which indicated that the defendant converted the property to his own use. State v. Powers, 644 A.2d 828, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 205 (1994).

Weight of the Evidence.

Defendant’s embezzlement convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, as evidence showed that defendant, an attorney, failed to disburse monies to the proper payees from his trust account and actually spent much of the money on himself, moving money from his trust account at the same time he was taking vacations. State v. McDonald, 157 A.3d 1080, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 46 (2017).

Collateral References.

Acceptance of defendant’s note or other contractual obligation as affecting charge of embezzlement. 70 A.L.R. 208.

Appropriating money or proceeds of paper mistakenly delivered in excess of the amount due or intended as embezzlement. 14 A.L.R. 894.

Bankruptcy: what constitutes embezzlement of funds giving rise to nondischargeable debt under 11 USCS § 523(a)(4). 99 A.L.R. Fed. 124.

Criminal responsibility of one co-operating in offense of embezzlement which he is incapable of committing personally. 5 A.L.R. 784; 74 A.L.R. 1110; 131 A.L.R. 1322.

Depositary or bailee, misappropriation by officer or employee of, as sustaining a criminal charge against him of embezzlement of property of depositor or bailor. 45 A.L.R. 933.

Determination of loss caused by crime involving fraud or deceit, under United States sentencing guidelines § 2F1.1 (18 USCS Appx.). 118 A.L.R. Fed. 585.

Embezzlement by independent collector or collection agency working on commission or percentage. 56 A.L.R.2d 1156.

Embezzlement, larceny, false pretenses or allied criminal fraud by a partner. 82 A.L.R.3d 822.

“Embezzlement” within fidelity bond. 56 A.L.R. 967.

Employee or subordinate, statutes relating to embezzlement of public money by officer in charge thereof as applicable to. 144 A.L.R. 590.

Gambling or lottery paraphernalia as subject of larceny, burglary, or robbery. 51 A.L.R.2d 1396.

Independence of contract considered with relation to embezzlement acts. 43 A.L.R. 356.

Individual criminal responsibility of officer or employee for embezzlement, through corporate act, of property of third person. 33 A.L.R. 787.

“Infamous offense,” embezzlement as, within constitutional or statutory provision in relation to presentment or indictment by grand jury. 24 A.L.R. 1009.

Larceny and embezzlement distinguished. 146 A.L.R. 532.

Misappropriation of executor, administrator, guardian or trustee as embezzlement. 75 A.L.R. 299.

Outlawed liquor as subject of embezzlement. 75 A.L.R. 1479.

Partner as trustee of person acting in fiduciary capacity within statute relating to embezzlement. 41 A.L.R. 474.

Purpose to take or retain property in payment of, or as security for, a debt or claim as affecting embezzlement. 13 A.L.R. 142; 116 A.L.R. 997.

Receivers, assignees in insolvency and trustees in bankruptcy as within classes of persons described in statute denouncing offense of embezzlement. 113 A.L.R. 744.

Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by trial court. 29 A.L.R. 333; 89 A.L.R. 295.

Spouse, embezzlement by, of other’s property. 55 A.L.R. 558.

Statute relating to offense of misappropriation or embezzling public money or property as applicable to one not in possession. 128 A.L.R. 1373.

Variance between allegation and proof as to the capacity in which one charged with embezzlement received the property. 12 A.L.R. 603.

Verdict on conviction of, which fails to state value of property, sufficiency of. 79 A.L.R. 1180.

What constitutes violation of 15 USC § 714m(c), proscribing larceny or conversion of property owned by or pledged to Commodity Credit Corporation. 109 A.L.R. Fed. 871.

11-41-4. Obtaining property by false pretenses or personation.

Every person who shall obtain from another designedly, by any false pretense or pretenses, any money, goods, wares, or other property, with intent to cheat or defraud, and every person who shall personate another or who shall falsely represent himself or herself to be the agent or servant of another and shall receive any money or other property intended to be delivered to the person so personated, or to the alleged principal or master of that agent or servant, shall be deemed guilty of larceny.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, §§ 14, 15; C.P.A. 1905, § 1174; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, §§ 14, 15; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-4 .

Cross References.

Allegations in complaint or indictment, § 12-12-14 .

Signature, obtaining by false pretenses, § 11-41-13 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The crime is committed at the moment the victim is fraudulently induced to part with his money or property; it is the amount of that money or the worth of that property that is pivotal, and the extent of a victim’s ultimate loss is immaterial on the issue of the degree of the offense charged, for even proof that a victim has suffered no loss or that the money fraudulently obtained has been returned will not suffice as a defense. State v. Aurgemma, 116 R.I. 425 , 358 A.2d 46, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1291 (1976); State v. Auregemma, 117 R.I. 903 , 362 A.2d 155, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1652 (1976).

This section does not require that the person charged have the intent to permanently deprive a victim of his or her money or property; the crime is committed at the moment the victim is fraudulently induced to part with his money or property. State v. LaRoche, 683 A.2d 989, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 228 (1996).

Future Transactions.

A misrepresentation with regard to a future transaction, no less than one relating to an existing fact, is a false pretense within the meaning of the statute. State v. Aurgemma, 116 R.I. 425 , 358 A.2d 46, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1291 (1976); State v. Auregemma, 117 R.I. 903 , 362 A.2d 155, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1652 (1976).

Sufficient evidence existed to support a trial court’s finding that in light of a 50-plus job backlog, continuing bad weather, and personnel and equipment problems, defendant deliberately misrepresented his intention to perform homeowners’ paving job within a reasonable time after a certain date; defendant’s misrepresentation of his intention to perform the future obligation of paving constituted a false pretense within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-4 . State v. Letts, 986 A.2d 1006, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 13 (2010).

Indictment.

An indictment for obtaining money under false pretenses which followed substantially the express language contained in the statute did not have to allege all of the means or evidentiary facts by which the false pretenses were accomplished. State v. Jorjorian, 82 R.I. 334 , 107 A.2d 468, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1954).

Insurance.

Policy which insured against “theft” covered loss of car by false pretenses. Brady v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y, 47 R.I. 416 , 133 A. 799, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1926).

A motion for judgment of acquittal is properly denied, where there is evidence that the defendant filed a proof of loss with his insurer listing a silver tray as stolen, received a check from the insurer, cashed it, and then later sold the tray without ever notifying the insurer that the tray was not stolen. State v. Henshaw, 557 A.2d 1204, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1989).

Intent.

Defendant’s acceptance of a $ 400 deposit from homeowners for a paving job, after intentionally using false pretenses to obtain the deposit, established defendant’s intent to cheat and defraud the homeowners within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-4 . State v. Letts, 986 A.2d 1006, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 13 (2010).

Racketeering.

A fraudulent scheme to obtain real property would be larceny, a racketeering activity. National Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Regine, 795 F. Supp. 59, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7577 (D.R.I. 1992).

Trial court erred by granting employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury trial on an employee’s claim for damages against a former employer who allegedly issued two paychecks for work the employee did on jobs financed by the State of Rhode Island and the federal government and then required the employee to return one of his paychecks or risk losing his job. Mello v. DaLomba, 798 A.2d 405, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 138 (2002).

Statute of Limitations.

Pursuant to § 12-12-14 , a conviction under this section may only be predicated upon proof of offenses that occurred within three years of the bringing of an indictment, information, or complaint and within six months after the time stated in the indictment, information, or complaint. State v. Ricci, 533 A.2d 844, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 564 (1987).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of obtaining property by false pretenses because it showed that defendant’s promise to build the leadership building, the construction of which was never completed, constituted a false pretense, through which defendant obtained almost $550,000 from the victim. State v. Letts, 986 A.2d 1006, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 13 (2010).

Use of “Straw” Borrowers.

In a prosecution for obtaining money by false pretenses, the defendant’s motion for acquittal was denied since the defendant was found to have intentionally utilized token or “straw” borrowers in an effort to circumvent the lending limits at certain credit unions, which he had exceeded or nearly exceeded, and since his deceptive actions resulted in the transfer by them of their money. The defendant’s exculpatory testimony, explaining his motives and denying any intent to defraud, were not relevant at the time of his motion under the judgment-of-acquittal standard. State v. LaRoche, 683 A.2d 989, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 228 (1996).

Use of Token.

The statute does not require the proof of use of a token. State v. McMahon, 49 R.I. 107 , 140 A. 359, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1928).

Victim Not Essential Element.

A victim is not an essential element of either obtaining property by false pretenses or forgery. State v. Markarian, 551 A.2d 1178, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 149 (1988).

Collateral References.

Admissibility, in prosecution for obtaining money or property by fraud or false pretenses, of evidence of subsequent payments made by accused to victim. 10 A.L.R.3d 572.

Attempt to obtain property by false pretenses as affected by failure to deceive prosecutor or fact that he did not rely on pretenses. 6 A.L.R.3d 241.

Attempts to commit offenses of larceny by trick, confidence game, false pretenses, and the like. 6 A.L.R.3d 241.

Benevolent or charitable purpose, criminal offense of obtaining property by false pretenses predicated upon promissory representations incident to raising of funds for. 145 A.L.R. 302.

Check, note, etc., or signature thereon, criminal charge predicated upon fraudulent obtaining of, from the person executing the same. 141 A.L.R. 210.

Conditional sale, offense of obtaining property by false pretenses predicated upon transaction involving. 134 A.L.R. 874.

Criminal liability of corporation for extortion, false pretenses or similar offenses. 49 A.L.R.3d 820.

Criminal responsibility for fraud or false pretenses in connection with home repairs or installations. 99 A.L.R.2d 925.

Embezzlement, larceny, false pretenses or allied criminal fraud by a partner. 82 A.L.R.3d 822.

Entrapment to commit offense. 18 A.L.R. 161; 66 A.L.R. 478; 86 A.L.R. 263.

Evidence in prosecution for false pretense in obtaining money under promise of marriage, of similar attempts on other occasions, to establish fraudulent purpose or intent. 80 A.L.R. 1328; 78 A.L.R.2d 1359.

False statement as to existing encumbrance on chattel in obtaining loan or credit as criminal false pretense. 53 A.L.R.2d 1215.

Governmental agency, presentation of and attempt to establish fraudulent claim against. 21 A.L.R. 180.

Illegal or fraudulent intent of prosecuting witness or person defrauded as defense. 95 A.L.R. 1249; 128 A.L.R. 1520.

Insurance policy, criminal offense of obtaining money under false pretenses predicated upon receipt or claim of benefits under. 135 A.L.R. 1157.

Intent as affecting offense of false personation. 95 A.L.R. 1510.

Loans and renewal thereof, false pretenses. 24 A.L.R. 397; 52 A.L.R. 1167.

“Merger” clause in written contract as precluding conviction for false pretenses based on earlier oral false representations. 94 A.L.R.2d 570.

Obtaining money for goods not intended to be delivered as false pretenses. 17 A.L.R. 199.

Obtaining payment by debtor on valid indebtedness by false representation as criminal false pretense. 20 A.L.R.2d 1266.

Record, false statement as to matter of, as false pretense within criminal statute. 56 A.L.R. 1217.

Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by trial court for obtaining or attempt to obtain money or goods by false pretenses. 29 A.L.R. 332; 89 A.L.R. 295.

Telephone conversation as false pretense. 8 A.L.R. 656.

Use of fraud or trick as “constructive breaking” for purpose of burglary or breaking and entering offense. 17 A.L.R.5th 125.

11-41-4.1. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (G.L., § 11-41-4.1 as assigned, P.L. 1962, ch. 163, § 1), fraudulent use of credit cards, was repealed by P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 1. For new law see §§ 11-49-1 11-49-1 3.

11-41-5. Penalties for larceny.

  1. Any person convicted of any offense under §§ 11-41-1 11-41-6 , except § 11-41-3 , shall be punished as follows, according to the value of the property or money stolen, received, embezzled, fraudulently appropriated, converted, or obtained, received, taken, or secreted by false pretenses or otherwise with intent to cheat, defraud, embezzle, or fraudulently convert:
    1. If the value exceeds one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500), and is less than five thousand dollars ($5,000), by imprisonment for not more than three (3) years or by a fine of not more than one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500), or both;
    2. If the value exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000), but is less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), by imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or by a fine of not more than three thousand dollars ($3,000), or both; and
    3. If the value exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or if the property is a firearm as defined in § 11-47-5.1 , regardless of its value, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both. If the value does not exceed one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500), the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both. Any person convicted of an offense under § 11-41-2 who shall be found to have knowingly obtained the property from a person under eighteen (18) years of age, notwithstanding the value of the property or money, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  2. Any person convicted of an offense in violation of §§ 11-41-1 11-41-7 , except § 11-41-3 , that involves a victim who is a person sixty-five (65) years of age or older at the time of the offense and which involves property or money stolen, received, embezzled, fraudulently appropriated, converted, or obtained, received, taken, or secreted by false pretenses or otherwise with intent to cheat, defraud, embezzle, or fraudulently convert, with a value in excess of five hundred dollars ($500), shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two (2) years but not more than fifteen (15) years or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both. If the value of the property or money does not exceed five hundred dollars ($500), the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year but not more than five (5) years or by a fine of not more than three thousand dollars ($3,000), or both.
  3. In addition to any other penalties pursuant to this section, an elected official or candidate for office convicted of violating § 11-41-1 , § 11-41-2 , § 11-41-3 , or § 11-41-4 where the theft is a campaign account created, pursuant to title 17, for the benefit of the person so convicted, all restitution shall be deposited into the Rhode Island crime victim compensation program fund and not into the campaign account of that person convicted of the offense.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 11; G.L., ch. 279, § 16; C.P.A. 1905, § 1175; P.L. 1908, ch. 1521, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 16; G.L., ch. 345, § 18; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-5 ; P.L. 1979, ch. 224, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 318, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 287, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 90, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 271, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 38, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 324, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 137, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 344, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 354, § 2; P.L. 2021, ch. 383, § 1, effective July 13, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 384, § 1, effective July 13, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 137, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 176, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2017, ch. 344, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 354, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 383, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 384, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2017, ch. 344, § 3, provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and applies to offenses committed on or after the effective date.”

P.L. 2017, ch. 354, § 3, provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [September 28, 2017] and applies to offenses committed on or after the effective date.”

Law Reviews.

Andrew J. Piombino, 2015 Survey, Cases: Criminal Law. State v. Whiting, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 708 (2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction With § 11-8-5.

The nature of the penalty for larceny of property under $500 in value shows that it was a lower offense than breaking and entering contrary to § 11-8-5 . State v. Shapiro, 29 R.I. 133 , 69 A. 340, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1908).

Multiple Acts.

A series of wrongful acts will constitute a single offense if the evidence discloses “any intention, one general impulse, and one plan” and the acts can be lumped together to provide the more than $500 requisite to constitute a felony. State v. Aurgemma, 116 R.I. 425 , 358 A.2d 46, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1291 (1976); State v. Auregemma, 117 R.I. 903 , 362 A.2d 155, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1652 (1976).

Prospective Application.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the trial justice was correct in determining that the general savings clause, R.I. Gen. Laws § 43-3-23 , was applicable and that the 2012 amendment to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-5 should not have been applied retroactively. State v. Whiting, 115 A.3d 956, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 65 (2015).

Defendant’s conviction under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-5 was affirmed where the 2012 amendment to the statute concerned a mere increase in the monetary threshold, the amendment was not a qualitative shift altering the fundamental essence of larceny prosecutions, and defendant’s conduct had remained illegal at all times. State v. Whiting, 115 A.3d 956, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 65 (2015).

Collateral References.

Acceptance of defendant’s note or other contractual obligation as affecting charge of larceny. 70 A.L.R. 208.

Acquittal, directing for insufficiency of the evidence, duty of trial court as to. 17 A.L.R. 923.

Appropriating money or proceeds of paper mistakenly delivered in excess of the amount due or intended. 14 A.L.R. 894.

Appropriation of property after obtaining possession by fraud as larceny. 26 A.L.R. 381.

Appropriation or removal without payment of property delivered in expectation of cash payment. 83 A.L.R. 441.

Asportation of motor vehicle as necessary element to support charge of larceny. 70 A.L.R.3d 1202.

“Asportation” which will support charge of larceny. 19 A.L.R. 724; 144 A.L.R. 1383.

Assisting in transportation or disposal of property known to have been stolen as rendering one guilty of larceny. 29 A.L.R. 1031.

Attempts to commit offenses of larceny by trick, confidence game, false pretenses, and the like. 6 A.L.R.3d 241.

Coercion, compulsion, or duress as defense to charge of robbery, larceny, or related crime. 1 A.L.R.4th 481.

Criminal liability for wrongfully obtaining unemployment benefits. 80 A.L.R.3d 1280.

Criminal liability under state laws in connection with application for, or receipt of, public welfare payments. 22 A.L.R.4th 534.

Criterion of value for purpose of fixing degree of larceny of automobile license plates. 48 A.L.R. 1167.

Distinction between larceny and embezzlement. 146 A.L.R. 532.

Electrical energy as subject of larceny. 113 A.L.R. 1283.

Embezzlement, larceny, false pretenses or allied criminal fraud by a partner. 82 A.L.R.3d 822.

Entrapment to commit offense. 18 A.L.R. 172; 66 A.L.R. 478; 86 A.L.R. 263.

Experimental evidence in prosecution for larceny. 8 A.L.R. 40; 85 A.L.R. 479.

Finder of property, larceny by. 36 A.L.R. 372.

Fixed or controlled price as affecting value of goods for purpose of determining degree of larceny. 157 A.L.R. 1303.

Gaming, larceny by appropriation of property obtained by fraudulent gaming. 26 A.L.R. 386.

Gas a subject of larceny. 113 A.L.R. 1282.

General owner, larceny by, of property in which another has a special interest or right in possession of bailee or pledgee. 58 A.L.R. 330.

Incapacity of one cooperating in offense of larceny to commit the crime personally as affecting his criminal responsibility. 5 A.L.R. 785; 74 A.L.R. 1110; 131 A.L.R. 1322.

Individual criminal responsibility of officer or employee for larceny, through corporate act, of property of third person. 33 A.L.R. 787.

“Infamous offense,” larceny as, within constitutional or statutory provision in relation to presentment or indictment by grand jury. 24 A.L.R. 1011.

Intent to convert property to one’s own use or to the use of a third person as element of larceny. 12 A.L.R. 804.

Joyriding or similar charge as lesser-included offense of larceny or similar charge. 78 A.L.R.5th 567.

Larceny as affected by purpose to take or retain property in payment of, or as security for, a claim. 13 A.L.R. 142; 116 A.L.R. 997.

Larceny: Entrapment or consent. 10 A.L.R.3d 1121.

Larceny or embezzlement by one spouse of other’s property. 55 A.L.R. 558.

“Larceny” within fidelity bond. 56 A.L.R. 967.

Lost property as subject of larceny. 36 A.L.R. 373.

Married woman’s criminal responsibility for stealing from husband. 71 A.L.R. 1126.

Oil as subject of larceny. 113 A.L.R. 1285.

Outlawed liquors as subject of larceny or kindred offenses. 75 A.L.R. 1479.

Ownership of property, laying in husband or wife in an indictment for larceny. 2 A.L.R. 352.

Participation by spouse of owner in or consent to taking of property, effect of. 14 A.L.R. 1271.

Pendency of charge of larceny as bar to charge in another county of offense involving both felonious breaking and felonious taking of same property. 19 A.L.R. 636.

Power as subject of larceny. 113 A.L.R. 1285.

Purchase of property on credit without intending to pay for it as larceny. 35 A.L.R. 1336.

Recital of, or reference to, the offense in pronouncing sentence or judgment. 14 A.L.R. 1001.

Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by trial court. 29 A.L.R. 324; 89 A.L.R. 304.

Retaking of money lost at gambling as robbery or larceny. 77 A.L.R.3d 1363.

Series of takings over a period of time as involving single or separate larcenies. 53 A.L.R.3d 398.

Taking, and pledging or pawning, another’s property as larceny. 82 A.L.R.2d 863.

Unauthorized use of another’s property by one lawfully in possession thereof as larceny. 62 A.L.R. 354.

Vagrancy, thieving as. 14 A.L.R. 1505.

Verdict on conviction of, which fails to state value of property, sufficiency of. 79 A.L.R. 1180.

Water as subject of larceny. 113 A.L.R. 1284.

11-41-6. Attempted larceny.

Whoever attempts to commit larceny by doing any act toward the commission of the offense, but fails in its perpetration, shall, unless otherwise provided, suffer the same punishment which might have been inflicted if the attempted offense had been committed.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 402, § 4; P.L. 1923, ch. 480, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-6 .

Collateral References.

What conduct amounts to an overt act or acts done toward commission of larceny so as to sustain charge of attempt to commit larceny. 76 A.L.R.3d 842.

11-41-7. Larceny from the person.

Every person who shall steal or attempt to steal from the person of another any money, goods, chattels, or other article enumerated in § 11-41-1 , shall be imprisoned not less than one year nor more than ten (10) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 12; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-7 .

Cross References.

Robbery, § 11-39-1 .

Collateral References.

What constitutes larceny “from a person.” 74 A.L.R.3d 271.

11-41-8. Stealing of animals.

Every person who shall steal or attempt to steal any horse or other domestic animal shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both; in case a fine is imposed, one-half (1/2) shall inure to the use of the complainant.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 68; P.L. 1908, ch. 1569, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 71; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 71; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 78; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-8 .

Collateral References.

Animals kept at pasture, larceny by general owner. 58 A.L.R. 338.

Bees, larceny of. 39 A.L.R. 358.

Cats, larceny of. 73 A.L.R.2d 1032; 8 A.L.R.4th 1287.

Dog as subject of larceny. 92 A.L.R. 212.

Single or separate larceny predicated upon stealing property from different owners at the same time. 37 A.L.R.3d 1407.

Stealing carcass as within statute making it larceny to steal cattle or livestock. 78 A.L.R.2d 1100.

Unauthorized use of horse. 62 A.L.R. 354.

11-41-9. Theft of poultry — Receiving stolen poultry.

Every person who steals poultry from any building or enclosure in which poultry are kept or confined, or whoever shall receive poultry, knowing it to have been stolen, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or by both. One-half (1/2) of any fine imposed under this section shall inure to the complainant.

History of Section. P.L. 1899, ch. 672, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 26; P.L. 1912, ch. 853, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-9 .

Cross References.

Entry to steal poultry, § 11-8-6 .

Importation of stolen property, jurisdiction of offense, § 12-3-7 .

11-41-10. Robbing of fish nets and weirs.

Every person who shall rob or draw any fishpot, weir, or net belonging to any other person shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 25; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-10 .

11-41-11. Embezzlement by bank officer or employee.

Every officer, agent, or servant of any bank, savings bank, or trust company who shall embezzle or appropriate to his or her own use any moneys, goods, effects, or funds of any bank, savings bank or trust company with intent to cheat or defraud it or any person, shall be deemed guilty of larceny, and shall be fined not exceeding twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) or be imprisoned for a term not exceeding twenty (20) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 17; P.L. 1908, ch. 1590, § 81; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-11 .

Cross References.

Allegations in complaint or indictment, § 12-12-14 .

Fiduciaries, embezzlement and fraudulent conversion by, § 11-41-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

“Bank.”

Since a loan and investment company had all the powers that would be conferred upon a bank, including a power that it did not exercise, to offer checking accounts, it was a “bank” within the meaning of the statute. State v. Mollicone, 654 A.2d 311, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1995).

Peremptory Juror Challenge.

The nature of the case and the volume of evidence, including financial documents, extensive records, and technical testimony from forensic experts, made the level of education and intellectual capability of a juror a significant reason for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. State v. Mollicone, 654 A.2d 311, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1995).

Statute of Limitations.

Pursuant to § 12-12-14 , a conviction under this section may only be predicated upon proof of offenses that occurred within three years of the bringing of an indictment, information, or complaint and within six months after the time stated in the indictment, information, or complaint. State v. Ricci, 533 A.2d 844, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 564 (1987).

11-41-11.1. Unlawful appropriation.

Any person to whom any money or other property of another shall be entrusted or delivered for a particular purpose, who shall intentionally appropriate to his or her own use that money or property, shall be deemed guilty of unlawful appropriation and shall be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or three (3) times the value of the money or property thus appropriated, whichever is greater, or imprisoned not more than twenty (20) years, or both. However, if the sum or value of the property so appropriated is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), he or she shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 154, § 1.

11-41-12. Fraudulent conversion by agent or factor.

Every agent or factor who shall deposit or pledge any goods, wares, or merchandise or any bill of lading, receipt, or certificate of a warehouse keeper or inspector, or any warrant or order for the delivery of goods with which he or she shall have been entrusted, or which shall have been consigned to him or her as a security for any money or other property borrowed or received by the agent or factor, and shall apply or dispose of the proceeds to his or her own use, in violation of good faith, and with intent to defraud any owner of the goods, shall be deemed and taken to be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) or be imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 21; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-12 .

11-41-13. Obtaining signature by false pretenses.

Every person who, by any false pretense or pretenses, with intent to cheat or defraud, shall obtain the signature of any person to any written instrument, the false making of which would be punished as forgery, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 15; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 15; G.L., ch. 345, § 14, as enacted by P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-13 .

Cross References.

Obtaining property by false pretenses or personation, § 11-41-4 .

Collateral References.

Check, note, etc., or signature thereon, criminal charge predicated upon fraudulent obtaining of, from the person executing the same. 141 A.L.R. 210.

11-41-14. Failure to return book or other library property.

  1. Any person who shall take or borrow any book or other library property from any of the libraries or collections as defined in § 11-44-15(b) , and who, upon neglect to return it within the time required and specified in the bylaws, rules, or regulations of the library owning the property, after receiving notice in writing by the librarian or other proper custodian of the property that it is overdue, shall upon further neglect to return it within sixty (60) days from the date of the notice be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than twenty-five dollars ($25.00), the fine to be for the use of the library. A written or printed notice given personally or sent by mail to a last known or registered place of residence shall be considered a sufficient notice. In addition, if the book should be lost, destroyed, or not returned, the person shall within sixty (60) days after being so notified pay to the custodian the replacement value of the book, including all reasonable processing costs, as determined by the governing board having jurisdiction.
  2. All library users shall be notified of the penalties provided in subsection (a) of this section at the time they obtain or renew their library privileges. The final notice provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall also contain notice of the penalties.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 53; P.L. 1907, ch. 1463, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 56; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 56; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 64; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-14 ; P.L. 1983, ch. 296, §§ 1, 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 436, § 1.

11-41-14.1. Concealment of book or other property while on premises of library — Removal of book or other property from library.

  1. Whoever, without authority, with the intention of converting to his or her own or another’s use, willfully conceals a book or other library property, while still on the premises of the library, or willfully or without authority removes any book or other library property from any of the libraries or collections set forth in § 11-44-15 , shall be deemed guilty of larceny, and upon, conviction, shall be punished as provided by § 11-41-5 and shall be ordered to make restitution to the library in the full retail value of the books or library property.
  2. Any person reasonably believed to have committed or to be committing the crime set forth in subsection (a) of this section shall be subject to detention by a police officer in accordance with § 12-7-1 .
  3. Any employee or agent of a library, eighteen (18) years of age or older, who observes any person willfully concealing or attempting to conceal books or other library property on his or her person or amongst his or her belongings or upon the person or amongst the belongings of another, and leaving the premises with the books or other library property without first having an employee or agent record the removal of the property, or injuring or destroying books and other library property as set forth in § 11-44-15 , may stop the person. Immediately upon stopping the person the library employee shall identify himself or herself and state the reason for stopping the person. If after the initial confrontation with the person under suspicion, the library employee has reasonable grounds to believe that at the time stopped the person was committing or attempting to commit the crime of larceny as set forth in this section or the misdemeanor set forth in § 11-44-15 , the employee or agent may detain the person for a time sufficient to summon a police officer to the library. In no case shall the detention be for a period of more than one-half (1/2) hour. The detention must be accomplished in a reasonable manner without unreasonable restraints or excessive force, and may take place only on the premises of the library where the alleged crime occurred. Library premises includes the interior of a building, structure, or other enclosure in which a library facility is located, the exterior appurtenances to any building, structure, or enclosure, and the land on which the building, structure, or other enclosure is located. Any person so stopped by an employee or agent of a library shall promptly identify himself or herself by name and address. Once placed under detention, no other information shall be required of the person and no written and/or signed statement shall be elicited from him or her until a police officer has taken him or her into custody. The employee or agent may however examine, for the purposes of ascertaining whether any book or other library property has been properly checked out by the person, the property which the employee has reasonable grounds to believe were unlawfully taken in violation of this chapter or injured or destroyed in violation of chapter 44 of title 11. Should the person detained refuse to surrender the item for examination, a limited and reasonable search may be conducted. Only packages, shopping bags, handbags, or other property in the immediate possession of the person detained, but not including any clothing worn by the person, may be searched.
  4. For the purposes of this chapter, “reasonable grounds” includes knowledge that a person has concealed or injured a book or other library property while on the premises or is leaving the premises with the library property without having an employee of the library record the removal of the property from the premises.
  5. In detaining a person whom the employee or agent of the library has reasonable grounds to believe is committing the crime of larceny set forth in this chapter or the misdemeanor set forth in chapter 44 of title 11, the employee or agent may use a reasonable amount of non-deadly force when and only when that force is necessary to protect himself or herself or to prevent the escape of the person being detained or the loss of his or her property.
  6. In any civil action by a person detained under these sections against the library or employee or agent of the library so detaining him or her arising out of the detention, evidence that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiff was at the time in question committing or attempting to commit the crime set forth in either section shall create a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff was so committing or attempting to commit the crime.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 296, § 2; P.L. 1985, ch. 436, § 1.

11-41-15. Recovered stolen property.

  1. The officer who shall apprehend any person as principal or accessory in any robbery or larceny shall secure the property alleged to be stolen and shall be answerable for the property, and shall annex a schedule of it to his or her return. Upon receipt of the property from the apprehending officer, the clerk or person in charge of the storage of alleged stolen property for a police department shall enter into a book a description of every article of property alleged to be stolen which was brought to the police department and shall attach a number to each article.
    1. The clerk or person in charge of the storage of alleged stolen property may deliver the property to the owner of the property upon satisfactory proof of ownership, provided that the following steps are followed:
      1. A complete photographic record of the property is made;
      2. The person from whom custody of the property was taken is served with a notice of the claim of ownership and is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to why the property should not be delivered to the person claiming ownership;
      3. A signed declaration of ownership under penalty of perjury is obtained from the person to whom the property is delivered.
    2. The delivery of property to the owner shall be without prejudice to the state or any other person who may have a claim to the property. Any property subject to forfeiture under any provision of law shall not be returned pursuant to this section.
  2. Upon application to the superior court by the person from whom custody of the property was taken, a review of the determination of the clerk or the person in charge of the storage of alleged stolen property shall be made within thirty (30) days of the receipt of that application. The court shall have the power to order the property taken into the custody of the court upon a finding that the person to whom the property was delivered was not entitled to it.
  3. The clerk or person in charge of the storage of alleged stolen property shall not be liable for damages for any official act performed in good faith in the course of carrying out the provisions of this section.
  4. The photographic record of the alleged stolen property required by paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section shall be allowed to be introduced as evidence in any court of this state in place of the actual alleged stolen property.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 26; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 27; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 27; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-15 ; P.L. 1976, ch. 170, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the paragraph designations in subsection (b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Photographic Record.

Failure to make a photographic record of shoplifted property which could be introduced as evidence in place of the actual items did not require automatic reversal since defendant was not prejudiced by it. State v. Lewis, 467 A.2d 1387, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1118 (1983).

The police department’s noncompliance with this section by merely returning a robbery victim’s wallet to him without making a complete photographic inventory of its contents did not bar admission of photographs of the wallet into evidence, where the record revealed no evidence of bad faith or negligence on the part of the department. State v. Morejon, 603 A.2d 730, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1992).

“Robbery.”

The word robbery in this state when used in statutes has a legal technical meaning which incorporates all the elements of the common law crime of robbery. State v. Domanski, 57 R.I. 500 , 190 A. 854, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 128 (1937).

Shoplifting.

The provisions of this section are applicable to shoplifting cases since shoplifting is a form of larceny. State v. Lewis, 467 A.2d 1387, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1118 (1983).

11-41-16. Sale or concealment of property leased or purchased on conditional sale.

Whoever, being in possession of personal property, other than wearing apparel, received upon a written and conditional contract of sale or acquired upon a written lease, or in which any person, firm, or corporation shall have a valid and perfected security interest in accordance with the provisions of title 6A, sells, conveys, conceals, or aids in concealing the property, or any part of it, or refuses to return the property with intent to defraud, before performance of the conditions precedent to acquiring its title, shall be guilty of larceny and be subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-41-5 .

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 58; P.L. 1926, ch. 828, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 55; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-16 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 173, § 1; P.L. 1984, ch. 249, § 1.

Collateral References.

Conditional sale of personal property as creating or reserving “lien” within criminal statute prohibiting acts tending to prevent enforcement of lien. 153 A.L.R. 919.

Conversion, liability for, of purchaser under conditional sales contract. 73 A.L.R. 799.

Criminal provisions of statute relating expressly to conditional sales of personal property, validity, construction and application of. 129 A.L.R. 1077.

11-41-16.1. Sale or concealment of leased personal property.

  1. Any person being in possession of personal property under a lease who sells, transfers, conceals, or aids in concealing the property, or any part of it, or refuses to return the leased personal property after the time of expiration of the lease with the intent of depriving the owner of the property, shall be guilty of larceny and be subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-41-5 .
  2. The use of a false or fictitious name or address in obtaining leased personal property shall constitute prima facie evidence of intent to violate this section.
  3. “Leased personal property”, as used in this section, means any personal property received pursuant to a written contract, by which one owning the property (lessor) grants to another (lessee) the right to possess, use, and enjoy the personal property for a specified period of time for a specified sum.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 249, § 2.

11-41-17. Unauthorized transfer of vehicle sold on conditional sale.

Every person who, with intent to place beyond the control of the vendor, any motor vehicle sold on condition that the title shall remain in the vendor after delivery, shall remove, conceal, or aid or abet the removal or concealment of the vehicle, and any vendee of a conditional sale who shall sell or convey the property without the consent of the vendor, and without informing the person to whom he or she sells or conveys that it is subject to the conditional sale, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or be imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1926, ch. 803, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 79; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-17 .

11-41-18. Defacement or conversion of rental battery.

Any person, other than the owner or the owner’s duly authorized agent, who shall wrongfully or maliciously remove, deface, alter, or destroy, or cause to be removed, defaced, altered, or destroyed, the word “rental” printed, painted, stamped upon or attached to any electric storage battery, or who shall wrongfully sell, give, or attempt to sell or give to any person any electric storage battery so marked, or who shall, without the written consent of the owner, retain in his or her possession any electric storage battery so marked, with intent to wrongfully keep or dispose of the battery by sale or gift, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 75; P.L. 1927, ch. 1041, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 82; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-18 .

11-41-19. Refusal to return rental battery.

Every person having in his or her possession any electric storage battery, the property of another, who neglects or refuses for a period of fourteen (14) days after demand for it shall have been made to deliver it to its owner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than twenty dollars ($20.00), and shall be liable to the owner in an action of the case for the value of the electric storage battery at the time it was delivered to the person. Demand for the return of an electric storage battery shall be made in writing and shall be served upon the person upon whom demand is made by leaving it in his or her hands and possession or by sending it to him or her, postage fully prepaid, by registered or certified mail, to the address given by him or her at the time he or she received the battery.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 76; P.L. 1932, ch. 1882, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 83; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-41-19 .

11-41-20. Shoplifting.

  1. For the purpose of this section:
    1. “Conceal” means to place merchandise in such a manner that it is not visible through ordinary observation.
    2. “Full retail value” means the merchant’s stated price of the merchandise.
    3. “Merchandise” means any items of tangible personal property offered for sale within a retail mercantile establishment.
    4. “Merchant” means an owner or operator of any retail mercantile establishment or any agent, employee, lessee, officer, or director of the owner or operator.
    5. “Premises of a retail mercantile establishment” includes the retail mercantile establishment, and common use areas in shopping centers, and all parking areas set aside by a merchant or on behalf of a merchant for the parking of vehicles for the convenience of the patrons of the retail mercantile establishment.
    6. “Retail mercantile establishment” means any place where merchandise is displayed, held, stored or offered for sale to the public.
    7. “Shopping cart” means those push carts of the type or types which are commonly provided by grocery stores, drug stores, or other retail mercantile establishments for the use of the public in transporting commodities on or from the premises of the retail mercantile establishment.
  2. Whoever shall engage in the following shall be guilty of the crime of shoplifting:
    1. Take possession of, carry away, transfer or cause to be carried away or transferred any merchandise displayed, held, stored, or offered for sale by a retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of all or any part of the full retail value of the merchandise;
    2. Alter, transfer, or remove a label, price tag, marking, indicia of value or any other markings which aid in determining value affixed to any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment and attempt to purchase or purchase the merchandise personally or in consort with another at less than the full retail value with the intention of depriving the merchant of all or any part of the full retail value of such merchandise;
    3. Transfer any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment from one container to another in an attempt to purchase or purchase the merchandise personally or in consort with another at less than the full retail value with the intention of depriving the merchant of all or any part of the full retail value of the merchandise; or
    4. Remove a shopping cart from the premises of a retail mercantile establishment without the consent of the merchant given at the time of the removal with the intention of depriving the merchant of the possession, use, or benefit of the cart.
  3. The fact that a person conceals upon his person, among his or her belongings, or upon the person or among the belongings of another merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment, for which he or she has not paid the full retail value, and the merchandise has been taken beyond the area within the retail mercantile establishment where payment for it is to be made, shall be prima facie evidence that the person has possessed, carried away, or transferred the merchandise with the intention of depriving the merchant of all or part of the full retail value of the merchandise without paying the full retail value of the merchandise.
  4. Any person convicted of the crime of shoplifting shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) or two times the full retail value of the merchandise, whichever is greater, but not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both; provided, any person convicted of the crime of shoplifting merchandise with a retail value of over one hundred dollars ($100) who has previously been convicted of shoplifting shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprisonment of not more than five (5) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 396, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 208, §§ 1, 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This statute does not impose sanctions for intent without the commission of any crime or any actual attempt; nor is it unconstitutionally vague, violative of due process or void by reason of duplicity. State v. D'Amico, 110 R.I. 356 , 293 A.2d 304, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 922 (1972).

Jury Instructions.

Trial justice’s jury instruction in shoplifting case, in which she quoted the language of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-20(b)(3) , was correct. State v. Cardin, 987 A.2d 248, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 19 (2010).

Nature of Offense.

Shoplifting is a form of larceny even though the shoplifting statute creates a separate and distinct offense with some elements that differ from larceny. State v. Lewis, 467 A.2d 1387, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1118 (1983).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

Conviction of shoplifting, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-20 , was supported by sufficient evidence because a supervisor testified that defendant took a retention wire from one box of wheel covers, put it in a second box, and paid for the box with the extra retention wire; if defendant had wanted to legally obtain a fifth retention wire, he would have had to purchase another box at the full price of $ 11.66. Clearly a box containing only three retention wires lost some, if not all, of its value. State v. Cardin, 987 A.2d 248, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 19 (2010).

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and effect of statutes establishing shoplifting or its equivalent as separate criminal offense. 64 A.L.R.4th 1088.

What Is “Intent to Deprive” Sufficient to Establish Liability for Civil, or Statutory, Theft. 35 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

11-41-20.1. Shoplifting — Use of implements in concealment.

Whoever shall willfully take possession of any goods, wares, or merchandise offered for sale by any store or other mercantile establishment, or whoever shall willfully conceal upon his or her person, among his belongings, or upon the person or among the belongings of another unpurchased goods, wares, or merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment either inside the store or other mercantile establishment or outside, but in its immediate vicinity, with the intention of converting it to his or her own use without paying the purchase price, with intention of depriving the owner of all or some part of the value, while wearing any article of clothing, or carrying any implement of any kind specifically designed or adapted for the purpose of concealing, carrying away, or otherwise unlawfully removing any merchandise from a store, knowing the clothing or implement to be designed or adapted for that purpose, with the intent to use or employ it or allow it be used or employed for an unlawful purpose, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) or by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 214, § 1.

11-41-21. Shoplifting — Enforcement.

  1. Any person reasonably believed to have committed or to be committing the crime of shoplifting as defined in § 11-41-20 shall be subject to detention by a police officer in accordance with § 12-7-1 .
  2. Any merchant who observes any person concealing or attempting to conceal merchandise on his person or amongst his or her belongings or upon the person or amongst the belongings of another, transporting merchandise beyond the area within the retail mercantile establishment where payment for it is to be made without making payment for it, removing or altering price tags on merchandise, or switching the containers of merchandise may stop the person. Immediately upon stopping the person, the merchant shall identify himself or herself and state his or her reason for stopping the person. If after his or her initial confrontation with the person under suspicion, the merchant has reasonable grounds to believe that at the time stopped the person was committing or attempting to commit the crime of shoplifting on the premises, the merchant may detain the person for a reasonable time sufficient to summon a police officer to the premises. In no case shall the detention be for a period exceeding one hour. Detention must be accomplished in a reasonable manner without unreasonable restraint or excessive force, and may take place only on the premises of the retail mercantile establishment where the alleged shoplifting occurred. Any person so stopped by a merchant pursuant to this section shall promptly identify himself or herself by name and address. Once placed under detention, no other information shall be required of the person and no written and/or signed statement, except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, shall be elicited from the person until a police officer has taken him or her into custody. The merchant may, however, examine for the purposes of ascertaining ownership any merchandise which is in plain view which the merchant has reasonable grounds to believe was unlawfully taken or otherwise tampered with in violation of § 11-41-20 .
    1. A merchant may request a person detained for shoplifting to sign a statement waiving his or her right to bring a civil action arising from the detention in return for a signed statement from the merchant waiving the right to bring criminal charges based upon the alleged shoplifting. Any statement shall state in writing in large print at the top of the form that the person detained has a right to remain silent and a right not to make or sign any statement and a right to call an attorney.
    2. It shall be unlawful to circulate or cause to be circulated any signed statement or the name of any person signing the statement to a person or persons not employed by the retail mercantile establishment which obtained the statement, other than in defense of a legal action arising from the detention. Any person circulating or causing to be circulated this information shall be civilly liable to the person who signed the statement.
  3. For the purposes of this section, “reasonable grounds” includes knowledge that a person has concealed unpurchased merchandise of the establishment while on the premises, or has altered or removed identifying labels on merchandise while on the premises, or is leaving the premises with unpurchased concealed or altered merchandise in his or her possession.
  4. In detaining a person whom the merchant has reasonable grounds to believe is committing the crime of shoplifting, the merchant may use a reasonable amount of non-deadly force when and only when that force is necessary to protect himself or herself, or to prevent the escape of the person being detained or the loss of his or her property.
  5. In any civil action by a person detained under this section against the merchant so detaining him or her arising out of the detention, evidence that the defendant had reasonable grounds as defined in subsection (d) of this section to believe that the plaintiff was at the time in question committing or attempting to commit the crime of shoplifting as defined in § 11-41-20 shall create a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff was so committing or attempting to commit the crime.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 133, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 208, § 3; P.L. 1985, ch. 105, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the common law rule, rather than Rhode Island law, relating to the shopkeeper’s privilege to temporarily detain a shopper; the shopper did not have to be charged with shoplifting for the store to be protected by R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-21(c) , but, under § 11-41-21(c) , to have the privilege, the store or its agent had to be actually observe the shopper shoplifting and not just have reasonable suspicion. Cruz v. Johnson, 823 A.2d 1157, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 156 (2003).

Rhode Island Supreme Court does not require that a plaintiff need be charged with shoplifting for a merchant to be protected under the R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-21 privilege. Cruz v. Johnson, 823 A.2d 1157, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 156 (2003).

Observation Required.

Privilege to detain suspected shoplifters exists only if, as R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-21 indicates, a merchant or its agent observes any person concealing or attempting to conceal merchandise on his person or amongst his or her belongings or amongst the person or belongings of another R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-21 (b). Cruz v. Johnson, 823 A.2d 1157, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 156 (2003).

Merchant’s belief about the plaintiff’s shoplifting involvement is irrelevant to assert the R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-21 privilege because § 11-41-21 first requires an observation. Cruz v. Johnson, 823 A.2d 1157, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 156 (2003).

Waiver Form.

Judgment in favor of alleged shoplifter who was forced to sign a waiver form by a supermarket prior to being allowed to leave the store, which form contained the statement that she admitted to the wrongful conduct of misappropriating the merchandise, went beyond the allowable language of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-21 and accordingly, there was no waiver of the shoplifter’s right to sue for false imprisonment and coercion. The supermarket’s objections to instructions by the trial court as to the unlawfulness of the waiver form could not be raised on appeal where no objection was made on the trial level, pursuant to R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 51 (b). Bourque v. Stop & Shop Cos., 814 A.2d 320, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 15 (2003).

11-41-22. Severability of shoplifting provisions.

If any section, clause, sentence, paragraph or part of §§ 11-41-20 11-41-22 shall for any reason be adjudged invalid, the remainder of §§ 11-41-20 11-41-22 shall not be affected.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 133, § 2.

11-41-23. Larceny of marine equipment.

Every person who shall steal or attempt to steal any boat, marine motor, marine electronic equipment, marine rescue or safety equipment, or navigational equipment, or who shall fraudulently receive any boat, marine motor, marine electronic equipment, marine safety or navigation equipment, or marine equipment with serial numbers removed, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten (10) years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 209, § 1.

11-41-24. Habitual offender.

Any person who shall be convicted three (3) times for the crime of shoplifting as defined in § 11-41-20 or larceny as defined in § 11-41-1 or receiving stolen goods as defined in § 11-41-2 , or who shall have been convicted three (3) times of any combination of the crimes described in this section, shall also be charged as an habitual offender and, upon conviction, shall be fined not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) and shall be imprisoned not less than six (6) months nor more than one year.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 142, § 1.

11-41-25. Siphoning of gasoline.

Every person who shall siphon or otherwise steal gasoline from a motor vehicle shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars ($200) for the first offense, and thereafter by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 145, § 1.

11-41-25.1. Theft of motor fuel.

Every person who shall leave the premises of a retail motor fuel dealer without paying said dealer for fuel taken shall be guilty of larceny. Any person convicted of violating this section, and the retail value of the fuel taken was five hundred dollars ($500) or less, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or both. Any person convicted of violating this section, and the retail value of the fuel taken exceeds five hundred dollars ($500), shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 340, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 439, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 340, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 439, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

11-41-26. Two-way mirrors and video cameras in retail store’s dressing rooms prohibited.

No person who owns or operates a retail mercantile establishment as defined in § 11-41-20(a)(6) which sells clothing to the public shall maintain in any dressing room on the premises any two-way mirror or electronic video camera or any similar device capable of filming or projecting an image of a person inside the dressing room or booth. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 316, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Legitimate Purpose.

Defendant’s conduct in going upon a family court justice’s property to discuss a divorce controversy being litigated before the justice constituted a trespass. State v. Demers, 525 A.2d 1308, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 498 (1987).

11-41-27. Wrongful conversion by officer or state or municipal employee.

Whoever, being an officer or employee of the state of Rhode Island, or any department, agency, instrumentality or political subdivision of the state, or any city or town, embezzles or wrongfully converts to his or her own use or benefit, or to the use or benefit of any other, any money or property which comes into his or her possession or control in the execution of that office or employment, shall be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or three (3) times the value of the money or property thus embezzled or converted, whichever is greater, or imprisoned not more than twenty (20) years, or both; except that if the sum or value of the property embezzled is less than one hundred dollars ($100) he or she shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 153, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Theft of Services.

This section does not apply to the theft of services of an employee. State v. Smith, 662 A.2d 1171, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 194 (1995).

11-41-28. Civil restitution for shoplifting.

  1. An adult or emancipated minor who commits or attempts to commit a larceny of goods for sale on the premises of a merchant as set forth in § 11-41-20 shall be civilly liable to the merchant in an amount consisting of:
    1. Not more than the retail value of the merchandise if not recovered in merchantable condition; plus
    2. A penalty of not more than one hundred dollars ($100); plus
    3. Court costs.
  2. A store employee shall be liable in a civil action for larceny of goods for sale on the premises of his or her merchant employer and for larceny of cash from the merchant. The civil liability to the merchant shall be in the amount consisting of:
    1. Not more than the value of the goods or cash; plus
    2. A penalty assessed of not more than one hundred dollars ($100); plus
    3. Court costs.
  3. A conviction or a plea of guilty to the offense of shoplifting is not a prerequisite to the bringing of a civil suit, obtaining a judgment, or collecting that judgment under this section.
  4. The fact that a merchant may bring action against an individual as provided in this section shall not limit the right of the merchant to demand, orally or in writing, that a person who is liable for damages and penalties under this section remit the damages prior to the consideration of the commencement of any legal action.
  5. An action for recovery of damages and penalties under this section may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction, including the small claims court of a district court, if the total damages do not exceed the jurisdictional limit of the small claims court.
  6. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to prohibit or limit any other course of action permitted by law which a merchant may have against a person who unlawfully takes merchandise from the merchant’s premise.
  7. If the person to whom a written demand is made complies with the demand within twenty (20) days after the receipt of the demand, that person shall be given a written release from further civil liability with respect to the specific act of retail theft; provided, that written demand shall not include penalties.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 228, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 576, § 1.

11-41-29. Insurance fraud — Prohibited activities.

  1. When used in this section:
    1. “Insurer” means, but is not limited to, an authorized insurer, self-insurer, re-insurer, broker, producer, or any agent of them.
    2. “Larceny” means the crime of larceny established in this chapter and by common law, including the requirement of specific intent.
    3. “Person” means any individual, partnership, association, firm, corporation, or any other legal entity.
    4. “Statement” means, but is not limited to, any written notice, statement, proof of loss, bill of lading, receipt for payment, invoice, account, estimate of property damages, bills for services, diagnosis, prescription, hospital or doctor records, x-rays, test result or other evidence of loss, injury or expense.
    1. Every person who, with the intent to deceive, prepares or assists, abets, or solicits another to prepare or make any written statement that is intended to be presented to any insurer in connection with, or in support of, any application for the issuance of an insurance policy, knowing that the statement contains any false information material to the application, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for a period of not more than one year, or both.
    2. Every person who, with the intent to deceive, prepares or assists, abets, or solicits another to prepare or make any written statement, including computer-generated documents, that is intended to be presented to any insurer in connection with, or in support of, any claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that the statement contains any false information material to the claim, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for a period of not more than one year, or both.
    3. Every person who, with the intent to deceive, presents or causes to be presented to any insurer any written statement, including computer-generated documents, as part of or in support of a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that the statement contains false information material to the claim, shall be deemed guilty of larceny.
    4. Every person who, with the intent to deceive, presents or causes to be presented to any claimant any written statement, including computer-generated documents, as part of or in support of its contest of any claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that the statement contains any false information material to the claim, shall be deemed guilty of larceny.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 350, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Civil Liability.

In a suit brought by plaintiffs alleging a fraudulent scheme involving annuity insurance investments, the federal district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to plaintiffs’ counts alleging civil liability for crimes and offenses under Rhode Island law because under the pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, the court found that the catchall phrase “any writing whatsoever purporting to contain evidence of any debt, contract, or promise” in R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-17-1 arguably encompassed the annuity applications, which contained evidence of a promise. W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. v. Caramadre, 847 F. Supp. 2d 329, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14327 (D.R.I. 2012), aff'd, 793 F.3d 168, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12505 (1st Cir. 2015).

Collateral References.

Negligent misrepresentation as “accident” or “occurrence” warranting insurance coverage. 58 A.L.R.5th 483.

11-41-30. Fraud as to health insurer.

Every person who shall obtain health care services from a provider of those services by any false pretense or pretenses with intent to cheat or defraud a health care services insurer or a service corporation organized under chapters 18, 19, 20, 20.1, 20.2 or 41 of title 27 shall be deemed guilty of larceny.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 64, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 263, § 1.

11-41-31. Pension revocation.

  1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, any person who is convicted or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to any offense, and the offense is related to his or her public office of employment pursuant to § 36-10.1-2 , the judge, as part of any sentence imposed, may revoke or reduce any retirement or any benefit or payment to which the public official or public employee is otherwise entitled under titles 36, 16, 45, and 8, under chapter 30 of title 28, under chapter 43 of title 31 or under chapter 28 of title 42.
    1. In determining whether the retirement or other benefit shall be revoked or reduced the court shall consider and make a finding on the following factors:
      1. The fact that the allowance of retirement or other benefits or payments for service under this title, under title 16, under title 45, under title 8, under chapter 30 of title 28, under chapter 43 of title 31, and under chapter 28 of title 42 presumes and requires that the service shall have been honorably rendered;
      2. The severity of the crime related to public office or public employment of which the public official or public employee has been convicted or to which the public official or public employee has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere;
      3. The amount of monetary loss suffered by the public official’s or public employee’s employer or by any other person as a result of the subject crime related to public office or public employment;
      4. The degree of public trust reposed in the subject public official or public employee by virtue of his or her public office or public employment; and
      5. Any other factors that, in the judgment of the superior court, justice may require.
    2. If the superior court determines that the retirement or other benefits or payments of a public official or public employee should be revoked or reduced under this chapter, it may, in its discretion and after taking into consideration the status of the pension as marital property and the financial needs and resources of any innocent spouse, dependent and/or designated beneficiaries of the public official or public employee, order that some or all of the revoked or reduced benefits or payments be paid to any innocent spouse, dependent or beneficiary as justice may require.
    3. If the court determines that the retirement or other benefits or payments of a public official or public employee should not be revoked or reduced under this chapter, it shall order that the retirement or other benefits or payments be made to the public official or public employee.
  2. Prior to revoking or reducing the benefit, the court shall order a pre-sentence report pursuant to § 12-19-6 .
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an innocent party from notifying the court by motion of an interest in the pension benefit.
  4. For purposes of this chapter, “domestic partner” shall be defined as a person who, prior to the decedent’s death, was in an exclusive, intimate and committed relationship with the decedent, and who certifies by affidavit that their relationship met the following qualifications:
    1. Both partners were at least eighteen (18) years of age and were mentally competent to contract;
    2. Neither partner was married to anyone else;
    3. Partners were not related by blood to a degree which would prohibit marriage in the state of Rhode Island;
    4. Partners resided together and had resided together for at least one year at the time of death; and
    5. Partners were financially interdependent as evidenced by at least two (2) of the following:
      1. Domestic partnership agreement or relationship contract;
      2. Joint mortgage or joint ownership of primary residence;
      3. Two (2) of: (A) joint ownership of motor vehicle; (B) joint checking account; (C) joint credit account; (D) joint lease; and/or
      4. The domestic partner had been designated as a beneficiary for the decedent’s will, retirement contract or life insurance.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 291, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 510, § 5.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subdivisions and paragraphs in subsection (b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

Enactment of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-31 which provided an alternative manner in which a dishonest public servant’s pension benefits could be revoked after 1996, did not prevent a former governor’s pension benefits from being revoked after a conviction on guilty plea before 1996 under R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-10.1-3 , which provided the original method for effecting such a revocation. Ret. Bd. of the Emples. Ret. Sys. of R.I. v. DiPrete, 845 A.2d 270, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 61 (2004).

11-41-32. Theft of historic stone walls.

  1. This section shall be known as the “Leona Kelley Act.”
  2. “Property”, as defined in § 11-41-1 , includes an historic stone wall as defined in subsection (c) of this section, and any person convicted of the theft of an historic stone wall, or portions of a wall, shall be subject to the penalties for larceny as provided in § 11-41-5 .
  3. For the purposes of this chapter, “historic stone wall” is defined as a vertical structure of aligned natural stone, originally constructed in the 17th, 18th, 19th or 20th centuries, to designate a property boundary between farmsteads or to segregate agricultural activities with a single farmstead or to designate property lines. This definition includes new stone walls which closely approximate the appearance of adjoining stone walls with respect to coursing, stone type, joint width, construction and distribution of stones by size.
  4. Anyone convicted of the larceny of an historic stone wall, or portions of a wall, or convicted of attempt to commit larceny, shall be civilly liable to the property owner for the cost of replacing the stones and any other compensable damages related to the larceny.
  5. Any person who makes any plea to a charge under this section, or any person found guilty or convicted under this section, may be ordered to make restitution as a part of his or her sentence and/or disposition. That restitution shall include, but not be limited to, the value of the historic stone wall or portions of it, the reasonable value of any labor and other materials necessary to repair and/or return the wall to the condition it was in prior to the theft, and any other reasonable expenses that, in the discretion of the sentencing judge, are necessary to do justice in disposing of the case. This section is in addition to any other sanctions a sentencing judge may impose in his or her discretion.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 251, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Expert Testimony.

Trial court abused its discretion in precluding an expert’s testimony on the subject of historic stone walls because there was sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find the expert’s methods were grounded in valid and reliable science and any lack of formalism in the peer review of the expert’s theories was for the jury to weigh; the dispute concerned a neighbor’s claim that an abutting landowner destroyed a stone wall on the neighbor’s property. Morabit v. Hoag, 80 A.3d 1, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 155 (2013).

11-41-33. Larceny of farm products.

  1. Definitions.  As used in this section:
    1. “Farm product” means goods used in a farming operation, including, but not limited to:
      1. Crops grown, growing, or to be grown, including, but not limited to, crops produced on trees, vines, and bushes, aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations, and horticultural and forestry products;
      2. Livestock, born or unborn, including aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations;
      3. Supplies used or produced in a farming operation; or
      4. Products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states.
    2. “Farming operation” means the commercial raising, cultivating, propagating, fattening, grazing, or any other farming, livestock, or aquacultural, horticultural or forestry operation, whereby the operation is eligible to be classified as a farm pursuant to the provisions of chapter 27 of title 44.
    3. “Value” means credible evidence that establishes the worth of the farm product on the day of the theft in comparison with a farm product of the same variety and weight.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any person to steal a farm product that is the property of a farming operation, from the farm itself, or the place where the farm product is sold.
  3. Any person found in violation of this section shall be guilty of a felony if the wholesale value of the farm product is two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) or more, and, upon conviction, shall be subject to imprisonment of not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  4. Any person found in violation of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if the wholesale value of the farm product is less than two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) and, upon conviction, shall be subject to imprisonment of no more than one year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 154, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 166, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 154, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 166, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-41-34. Fraud against the department of human services.

  1. The following establishments and/or retail outlets are prohibited from accepting electronic benefit transfer cards issued by the department of human services:
    1. Liquor stores;
    2. Casinos or at facilities that conduct casino gaming as defined in chapter 61.2 of title 42;
    3. Gambling facilities as defined by chapter 9 of title 41;
    4. Retail establishments that provide adult-oriented entertainment in which performers disrobe or perform in an unclothed state for entertainment as defined in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 608(a).
  2. A store owner who knowingly allows a prohibited, electronic-benefit transaction in violation of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for a first offense; by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for a second offense; and for a third, or subsequent, offense shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by a fine of not less than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).
  3. In addition to the penalties imposed by subsection (b), the department of human services is further authorized to suspend and/or revoke any license necessary to conduct business.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 377, § 2; P.L. 2016, ch. 499, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 377, § 2, and P.L. 2016, ch. 499, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Cross References.

Prohibited uses of electronic benefit transfer cards, § 40-6-8.1 .

Chapter 41.1 Grocery and Laundry Carts, Milk Cases, Egg Baskets, and Bakery Containers

11-41.1-1. Definitions.

For the purpose of this chapter:

  1. “Bakery container” means any permanent type of container which is used by a bakery, distributor, retailer, or food service establishment or the agent of any of them as a means to transport, store, or carry bakery products.
  2. “Dairy case” means a wire or plastic container which holds 16 quarts or more of beverages and is used by distributors, retailers, or their agents as a means to transport, store, or carry dairy products.
  3. “Dispenser case” means a plastic container which holds up to twenty-four (24) quarts of beverage and is used by distributors, retailers, or their agents as a means to transport, store, or carry dairy products for use in individual serving dispenser machines.
  4. “Egg basket” means any permanent type of container which contains four (4) dozen or more shell eggs and is used by distributors, retailers, or their agents as a means to transport, store, or carry eggs.
  5. “Laundry cart” means a basket which is mounted on wheels and used in a coin-operated laundry or drycleaning establishment by a customer or an attendant for the purpose of transporting laundry and laundry supplies.
  6. “Name or mark” means any permanently affixed or permanently stamped name or mark which has been registered with the secretary of state pursuant to § 11-41.1-2 and is used for the purpose of identifying the registered owner of dairy cases, egg baskets, poultry boxes, bakery containers, or plastic bulk merchandise containers.
  7. “Parking area” means a lot or other property provided by a retail establishment for the use of customers to park automobiles or other vehicles while doing business in that establishment.
  8. “Plastic bulk merchandise container” means a plastic crate or shell used by a product producer, distributor, or retailer, or an agent of the product producer, distributor, or retailer as a means for the bulk transportation, storage or carrying of retail containers of milk, eggs, bakery, or bottled beverage products.
  9. “Poultry box” means any permanent type of container which is used by processors, distributors, retailers, food service establishments, or their agents as a means to transport, store, or carry poultry.
  10. “Registered owner” means any person, firm, corporation, or association registered with the secretary of state as the owner of an identifying name or mark described in subdivisions (6) and (10) of this section.
  11. “Secretary” means the secretary of state.
  12. “Shopping cart” means a basket which is mounted on wheels, or a similar device, generally used in a retail establishment by a customer for the purpose of transporting goods of any kind.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-41.1-2. Shopping carts, laundry carts, dairy cases, dispenser cases, egg baskets, bakery containers, poultry boxes, and plastic bulk merchandise containers.

Any person, firm, corporation, or association owning shopping carts, laundry carts, dairy cases, dispenser cases, egg baskets, bakery containers, poultry boxes, or plastic bulk merchandise containers may register with the secretary of state a description of the name or mark affixed or stamped on those cases, baskets, containers or boxes for identification purposes. If the secretary of state determines that the name or mark is not a duplication of any name or mark previously recorded in its files and does not so closely resemble any other recorded name or mark as to be misleading or deceiving, the secretary of state shall register and record the name or mark in a file to be provided and kept by the secretary of state for that purpose, along with the name and address of the registering owner of the name or mark. If the secretary of state determines that the name or mark so applied for is a duplication of any name or mark previously recorded by the secretary of state or so closely resembles a name or mark as to be misleading or deceiving, the application shall be denied and the applicant may register some other name or mark in the manner described in this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-41.1-2.1. Bakery containers — Designation of owners.

Any person, firm, corporation, or association engaged in receiving, packing, handling, or selling bakery products in permanent containers may, in order to designate the ownership of those containers or distinguish them from other similar containers, adopt, own, and use any name or mark and permanently affix that name or mark on any bakery container it owns, except a cardboard, fiberboard, or corrugated container.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 158, § 3.

11-41.1-3. Illegal use of shopping carts, laundry carts, dairy cases, dispenser cases, egg baskets, bakery containers, poultry boxes, or plastic bulk merchandise containers.

No person, firm, corporation, or association other than the registered owner of the name or mark shall use for any purpose any container which is identified with or by any name or mark registered with the secretary of state as provided by § 11-41.1-2 . No person, firm, corporation, or association shall deface, obliterate, destroy, cover up, or otherwise remove or conceal any name or mark without the written consent of the registered owner.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-41.1-4. Possession of shopping carts, laundry carts, dairy cases, dispenser cases, egg baskets, bakery containers, poultry boxes, orplastic bulk merchandise containers.

Any person who is in possession of any shopping cart, laundry cart, dairy case, dispenser case, egg basket, bakery container, poultry box, or plastic bulk merchandise container with a registered name or mark shall be presumed to be in possession of stolen property and shall be guilty of larceny and punished as provided in § 11-41-5 .

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

Possession of stolen property as continuing offense. 24 A.L.R.5th 132.

11-41.1-5. Transportation of shopping carts, dairy cases, dispenser cases, egg baskets, bakery containers, poultry boxes, and plastic bulk merchandise containers — Bill of lading.

It shall be unlawful for any common carrier or private carrier for hire, except those engaged in the transporting of dairy products, eggs, poultry, or bakery products to and from farms or bakeries where they are produced, to receive or transport any container marked with a registered name or mark unless the carrier has in his or her possession a bill of lading or invoice for the container.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-41.1-6. Unlawful removal of shopping carts, dairy cases, dispenser cases, egg baskets, bakery containers, and plastic bulk merchandise containers.

It is a violation of this chapter for any person not in lawful possession of a shopping cart, dairy case, dispenser case, egg basket, bakery container, or plastic bulk merchandise container to remove a shopping cart or dairy case or dispenser case or egg basket or bakery container or plastic bulk merchandise container from the premises, parking area, or any other area of any retail establishment, or from any dairy or bakery delivery vehicle, if:

  1. The shopping cart, dairy case, bakery container, dispenser case, egg basket or plastic bulk merchandise container is marked on at least two (2) sides with a registered name or mark; and
  2. A notice to the public, warning that use by any person other than the registered owner is punishable by law, is visibly displayed on the dairy case.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-41.1-7. Egg baskets — Designation of owner.

Any person, firm, corporation, or association engaged in receiving, packing, handling, or selling eggs in permanent baskets which contain four (4) dozen or more shell eggs may adopt, own, and use any name or mark and permanently affix or stamp that name or mark on any egg basket, except cardboard, fiberboard, or corrugated containers, owned by that person, firm, corporation, or association, in order to designate the ownership of those baskets or distinguish them from other similar baskets.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1.

11-41.1-8. Poultry boxes, designation of owners.

Any person, firm, corporation, or association engaged in receiving, packing, handling, or selling poultry in permanent boxes may adopt, own, and use any name or mark and permanently affix or stamp that name or mark on any poultry box, except cardboard, fiberboard, or wood containers, owned by the person, firm, corporation, or association, in order to designate the ownership of those boxes or distinguish them from other similar boxes.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1.

11-41.1-9. Unlawful removal of shopping carts, dairy cases, dispenser cases, egg baskets, poultry boxes, bakery containers, and plastic bulk or merchandise containers.

It is a violation of this chapter for any person not in lawful possession of a shopping cart or dairy case or dispenser case or egg basket or poultry box or bakery container, or plastic bulk merchandise container to remove an egg basket, poultry box, or plastic bulk merchandise container from the premises, parking area or any other area of any processor, distributor, retailer, or food service establishment.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 475, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-41.1-10. Illegal use of shopping carts, laundry carts, dairy cases, dispenser cases, egg baskets, bakery containers and plastic bulk merchandise containers.

It is a violation of this chapter:

  1. To remove any shopping cart, laundry cart, dairy case, dispenser case, egg basket, bakery container, or plastic bulk merchandise container from the premises or parking area of a retail establishment with intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of the cart, dairy case, dispenser case, egg basket, bakery container, or plastic bulk merchandise container or the retailer of possession of the cart, dairy case, dispenser case, egg basket, bakery container, or plastic bulk merchandise container;
  2. To remove a shopping cart, laundry cart, dairy case, dispenser case, egg basket, bakery container, or plastic bulk merchandise container without written authorization, from its owner or from the premises or parking area of any retail establishment;
  3. To remove, obliterate, or alter any serial number or sign affixed to a shopping cart, laundry cart, dairy case, dispenser case, egg basket, bakery container, or plastic bulk merchandise container.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-41.1-11. Deposits.

The requiring, taking, or accepting of any deposit upon delivery of any dairy case, egg basket, poultry box, shopping cart, laundry cart, bakery container, dispenser case, or plastic bulk merchandise container shall not be deemed a sale of the case, basket, box, cart, or container, optional or otherwise.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-41.1-12. Penalty.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter is guilty of larceny, punishable as provided in § 11-41-5 .

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1.

11-41.1-13. Scope of chapter.

This chapter shall not apply to the owner of a shopping cart or laundry cart, or dairy case or egg basket or poultry box, or bakery container, dispenser case, or plastic bulk merchandise container or to a retailer, or to their agents or employees, or to a customer who has written consent from the owner of a shopping cart, laundry cart, dairy case, dispenser case, egg basket, or poultry box, or bakery container or plastic bulk merchandise container or from a retailer, to possess the cart, case, basket, box bakery container, or plastic bulk merchandise container or to remove it from the premises or the parking area of the retail establishment.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 395, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-41.1-14. Purchase of shopping carts, dairy cases, dispenser cases, egg baskets, bakery containers or plastic bulk merchandise containers for recycling, shredding, or destruction — Verification of seller’s identity — Proof of ownership record.

  1. Any person or entity purchasing shopping carts, dairy cases, dispenser cases, egg baskets, bakery containers or plastic bulk merchandise containers, who is in the business of recycling, shredding, or destruction of shopping carts, dairy cases, dispenser cases, egg baskets, bakery containers or plastic bulk merchandise containers shall obtain a proof of ownership record from a person selling five (5) or more shopping carts, dairy cases, dispenser cases, egg baskets, bakery containers or plastic bulk merchandise containers that shows that the person selling the carts, cases, baskets, or containers has lawful possession or ownership of the carts, cases, baskets, or containers, and shall also verify the seller’s identity by a driver’s license or other government-issued photo identification. The proof of ownership record shall include all of the following information:
    1. The name, address, telephone number, and signature of the seller or the seller’s authorized representative.
    2. The name and address of the buyer or consignee if not sold.
    3. A description of the product including number of units.
    4. The date of the transaction.
  2. The information required to be collected by this section shall be kept for one year from the date of purchase or delivery, whichever is later.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 475, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 139, § 2, and P.L. 2007, ch. 282, § 2, enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 41.2 Alteration of Electronic Equipment — Serial Numbers

11-41.2-1. Definitions.

  1. “Alter” means to change or remove any identification number affixed by the maker or owner of equipment described in this chapter.
  2. “Electronic equipment” means any television receiver, radio receiver, transmitter, transceiver, tuner, amplifier, speaker, earphone, video recorder or playback device, audio recorder or playback device, mobile telephone, computer, or accessory having an identification number unique to the item of equipment.
  3. “Identification number” means any number or letter-number combination, unique to the specific item of equipment, engraved or embossed on the equipment by either the maker or owner of the equipment.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 233, § 1.

11-41.2-2. Alteration of identification numbers.

Any person who shall alter the identification number of any item of electronic equipment as defined in this chapter shall, upon conviction, be sentenced as follows:

  1. If the value of the property exceeds five hundred dollars ($500), by imprisonment for not more than three (3) years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both;
  2. If the value of the property does not exceed five hundred dollars ($500), the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 233, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

11-41.2-3. Possession of electronic equipment with altered identification numbers.

Any person who shall knowingly be in possession of any item of electronic equipment as defined in this chapter with altered identification numbers shall, upon conviction, be sentenced as follows:

  1. If the value of the property exceeds five hundred dollars ($500), by imprisonment for not more than two (2) years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both;
  2. If the value of the property does not exceed five hundred dollars ($500), the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 233, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations.

Chapter 42 Threats and Extortion

11-42-1. Excessive fees or bond demanded by public officer.

Every officer appointed by the state or by any city or town in the state, whose fees are stated by law, who shall corruptly exact or extort any more or greater fees for any service than are stated and allowed by law, or who shall corruptly levy, demand, receive, or take, under color of his or her office, any bond, bill, note, or other assurance or promise whatsoever, securing the payment of a greater sum of money for any service than he or she is authorized to demand and receive by law, shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 276, § 16; G.L. 1909, ch. 342, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 394, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 605, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 11-42-1 .

Cross References.

Investigation and proceedings against racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations, § 7-15-1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Threats, extortion:

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 265, § 25 et seq.

Collateral References.

Construction and application of § 2C1.1 of United States Sentencing Guidelines (18 USCS Appx. § 2C1.1) pertaining to offenses involving public officials offering, giving, soliciting, or receiving bribes, or extortion under color of official right. 144 A.L.R. Fed. 615.

11-42-1.1. Extortion by public official.

Any person, being an elected or appointed official or employee of the state, or of any political subdivision of the state, or of any city or town of the state, or representing himself or herself to be, or assuming to act as an official or employee, who, under color or pretense of office, commits or attempts to commit an act of extortion, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for a term of not more than fifteen (15) years or fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or both, and shall forfeit all unjust enrichment.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 359, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 461, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Elements of Offense.
— Threat, Force, or Duress.

An instruction concerning the offense of extortion as explained to the grand jury by the prosecutor, who told the grand jury that “no proof of threat or force or duress” was required, was arguably a viable interpretation of this section and, absent any egregious, flagrant, or overbearing conduct on behalf of the prosecutor, the indictment returned by the grand jury should not have been dismissed. State v. DiPrete, 682 A.2d 1373, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 226 (1996).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of § 2C1.1 of United States Sentencing Guidelines (18 USCS Appx. § 2C1.1) pertaining to offenses involving public officials offering, giving, soliciting, or receiving bribes, or extortion under color of official right. 144 A.L.R. Fed. 615.

11-42-1.2. Kickbacks from public works projects.

Any person who by force, intimidation, or threat of procuring dismissal from employment, or loss of loan or grant from the state or political subdivision thereof or city or town, induces any person employed in the construction, completion, or repair of any public building, public work, or building or work financed in whole or in part by loans or grants by the state or any political subdivision or any city or town of the state, or any person receiving or benefiting from a grant or loan, to give up any part of the compensation to which the person is entitled under a contract of employment, shall be imprisoned for a term not more than fifteen (15) years, or be fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or both, and shall forfeit all unjust enrichment.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 359, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 461, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability to Government Contracts.

Trial court erred by granting employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury trial on an employee’s claim for damages against a former employer who allegedly issued two paychecks for work the employee did on jobs financed by the State of Rhode Island and the federal government and then required the employee to return one of his paychecks or risk losing his job. Mello v. DaLomba, 798 A.2d 405, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 138 (2002).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of § 2C1.1 of United States Sentencing Guidelines (18 USCS Appx. § 2C1.1) pertaining to offenses involving public officials offering, giving, soliciting, or receiving bribes, or extortion under color of official right. 144 A.L.R. Fed. 615.

11-42-2. Extortion and blackmail.

Whoever, verbally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse another of a crime or offense or by a verbal or written communication maliciously threatens any injury to the person, reputation, property, or financial condition of another, or threatens to engage in other criminal conduct with intent to extort money or any unlawful pecuniary advantage, or with intent to compel any person to do any act against his or her will, or to prohibit any person from carrying out a duty imposed by law, shall be punished by imprisonment in the adult correctional institutions for not more than fifteen (15) years or by a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 277, § 17; G.L. 1909, ch. 343, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 395, § 17; P.L. 1934, ch. 2113, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 606, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 11-42-2 ; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 95, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 461, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Circumstantial Evidence.

In determining whether the natural purport and effect of words was to convey a threat, it would be proper to receive evidence of any circumstance, even if criminal in nature, provided it was connected with the offense charged in such a way that it tends either to establish an intent, motive, plan, design of scheme. State v. Mancini, 108 R.I. 261 , 274 A.2d 742, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1258 (1971).

Evidence Sufficient.

Defendant’s letters to his ex-wife included statements that clearly evinced defendant’s subjective intent both to harm his ex-wife and to compel her to pay him money or reconcile against her will; as such, they constituted genuine threats in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-42-2 and were unprotected by the First Amendment. Thus, there was sufficient evidence about the credibility of defendant’s threats to support defendant’s convictions for extortion and blackmail. State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 143 (2004).

Government-Funded Contracts.

Trial court erred by granting employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury trial on an employee’s claim for damages against a former employer who allegedly issued two paychecks for work the employee did on jobs financed by the State of Rhode Island and the federal government and then required the employee to return one of his paychecks or risk losing his job. Mello v. DaLomba, 798 A.2d 405, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 138 (2002).

Multiple Offenses.

Defendant’s contention that he was placed twice in jeopardy by being prosecuted for extortion pursuant to this section subsequent to a conviction for assault and battery pursuant to § 11-5-3 was without merit, since assault and battery, which is the intentional and unlawful application of the slightest force to the person of another, and extortion, which consists of a verbal threat to place a victim in peril of actual bodily harm accompanied by an intent to compel that victim to do an act against his will, require proof of different elements and hence do not satisfy the “same evidence” test applied by the court. State v. Davis, 120 R.I. 82 , 384 A.2d 1061, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 764 (1978).

Double jeopardy was found in a particular case where, in order to prove both extortion and assault with intent to rob, the state had to demonstrate the identical elements of an intentional threat to the victim that placed him in fear of actual bodily harm, the purpose of which was to force him to give the defendant money, and proof of no additional fact was required to establish both crimes. State v. Pope, 414 A.2d 781, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1640 (1980), overruled in part, State v. Acquisto, 463 A.2d 122, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1012 (1983).

Conviction for extortion and blackmail under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-42-2 requires proof of both a threat and of intent to force someone to act against his or her will, and unique to a conviction for violating a no-contact order is the requirement that a no-contact order be in place; thus, the two crimes require proof of separate and additional facts that the other does not. State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 143 (2004).

Refusal to Discharge Mortgage.

Because the mortgagee acted well within its rights when refusing to give advance assurance that it would discharge the property mortgage, the defendants’ counterclaims based upon alleged violations of this section and the state’s anti-racketeering law, §§ 7-15-1 through 7-15-11 , must be dismissed; the mortgagee’s duty to discharge was simply never triggered. National Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Regine, 795 F. Supp. 59, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7577 (D.R.I. 1992).

Requirements.

Irrespective of how the crime of extortion may be defined in other states, the only requirement for establishment of the crime under the statute is that the specified threat be made with intent to extort. State v. Mancini, 108 R.I. 261 , 274 A.2d 742, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1258 (1971).

In applying this section, the focus should be on the defendant and his or her subjective intent as demonstrated by his or her conduct and by the words he or she used; how the incident would be perceived by a reasonable person is not an element of the crime of extortion. State v. Price, 706 A.2d 929, 1998 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1998).

The requirement of a threat of injury to the person is ambiguous and being penal in nature requires narrow construction and does not include danger to reputation. State v. Simmons, 114 R.I. 16 , 327 A.2d 843, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1053 (1974).

The crime of extortion consists of two basic elements: a verbal threat to place a victim in peril of bodily harm or of harm to his property, accompanied by an intent to compel the victim to do an act against his will. State v. Sabitoni, 434 A.2d 1339, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1265 (1981).

Injury threatened without the intent to compel the person threatened to act unwillingly in the future is not extortion. State v. Pule, 453 A.2d 1095, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1116 (1982).

Collateral References.

Criminal liability of corporation for extortion, false pretenses or similar offenses. 49 A.L.R.3d 820.

Danger to reputation as within penal extortion statute statute requiring threat of “injury to the person”. 74 A.L.R.3d 1255.

Extortion predicated upon statement or intimations regarding criminal liability in connection with attempt to collect or settle a claim which defendant believed to be valid. 135 A.L.R. 728.

Injury to reputation or mental well-being as within penal extortion statutes requiring threat of “injury to the person.” 87 A.L.R.5th 715.

Threats as criminal offense. 48 A.L.R. 90.

Validity and construction of “terroristic threat” statutes. 45 A.L.R.4th 949.

What constitutes “property” obtained within extortion statute. 67 A.L.R.3d 1021.

11-42-3. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

Section 11-42-3 (P.L. 1982, ch. 373, § 1), concerning intimidation on the basis of race, religion, or national origin, was repealed by P.L. 1998, ch. 83, § 3, effective July 2, 1998. For present sentencing provisions for hate crimes, see § 12-19-38 .

11-42-4. Threats to public officials.

  1. Whoever knowingly and willfully delivers or conveys, directly or indirectly, a verbal or written threat to take the life of, or to inflict bodily harm upon, a public official or a member of his or her immediate family because of the performance or nonperformance of some public duty; because of hostility of the person making the threat toward the status or position of the public official; or because of some other factor related to the official’s public existence, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, or fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  2. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Public official” means a person who is elected or appointed to office in accordance with the constitution, a statute, or a city or town charter, or who is a judge, magistrate, assistant attorney general, special assistant attorney general, or law enforcement officer, or in the case of an elective office, any person who has filed the required documents for nomination or election to that office or who is appointed by the governor to serve as the director or his or her designee of a state department that is established and the qualifications and duties of which are prescribed by statute to discharge a public duty for the state of Rhode Island;
    2. “Immediate family” means a public official’s spouse, child, or children.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 248, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 83, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 299, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 44, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 46, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 44, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 46, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-42-4 sets out a single offense, that of threatening a public official, which can take the form of either a threat to that official’s life, or of a threat to that official’s bodily safety; the plain language of § 11-42-4 indicates, therefore, that the General Assembly intended to create only one offense under that statute. Thus, a State’s charge that defendant threatened public officials with death was charge of violating § 11-42-4, and the trial justice was not obligated to instruct the jurors that they could convict defendant only if they found he had threatened public officials with death. State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 143 (2004).

Illustrative Cases.

Motion court properly dismissed an information charging defendant with violating R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-42-4 , as the State, based on the information package, could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s statements were directed to a state legislator while he was engaged in the discharge of his professional, political, or public responsibilities. State v. Baillargeron, 58 A.3d 194, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 15 (2013).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of § 2A6.1 of United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG § 2A6.1), pertaining to sentence to be imposed for making threatening communications. 148 A.L.R. Fed. 501.

11-42-5. Simulating legal process.

  1. No person, firm, corporation, association, agent or employee shall in any manner coerce, intimidate, threaten, retaliate against or attempt to coerce or intimidate or threaten any public official as defined in § 11-42-4 in connection with any claim, demand or account, by the issuance, utterance or delivery of any matter, printed, typed or written, which is unauthorized by a statute or court of this state and that simulates in form and substance legal process of a court of this state.
  2. No person shall prepare, send, deliver, issue, serve, execute, or otherwise act to further the operation of any unauthorized process.
  3. As used in this section:
    1. “Legal process” means a summons, complaint, pleading, writ, warrant, injunction, notice, subpoena, lien, order, or other document issued or entered by or on behalf of a court or lawful tribunal or lawfully filed with or recorded by a governmental agency that is used as a means of exercising or acquiring jurisdiction over a person or property, or a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or other filing with the secretary of state or any city or town recorder that creates or purports to create a lien or cloud on the title of real or personal property, or to assert or give notice of a legal claim against a person or property, or to direct persons to take or refrain from an action.
    2. “Unauthorized process” means any of the following:
      1. A document simulating legal process that is prepared or issued by or on behalf of an entity that purports or represents itself to be a lawful tribunal or a court, public employee, or other agency created, established, authorized, or sanctioned by law but is not a lawful tribunal or court, public officer, or other agency created, established, authorized, or sanctioned by law.
      2. A document that by its form, wording, use of the name of the state of Rhode Island or any lawful tribunal, public employee, or subdivision thereof, use of seals or insignia, or general appearance has a tendency meant to create in the mind of the ordinary person the false impression that it has judicial or other official authorization, sanction or approval.
      3. A document that would otherwise be legal process except that it was not authorized, issued or entered by or on behalf of a court or lawful tribunal or lawfully filed with, authorized by or recorded by a governmental agency as required by law. However, this subparagraph does not apply to a document that would otherwise be legal process but for one or more technical defects, including, but not limited to, errors involving names, spelling, addresses, or time of issue or filing or other defects that do not relate to the substance of the claim or action underlying the document.
    3. A person who violates this section shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, or fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 94, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 108, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 94, § 1, and P.L. 2005, ch. 108, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 43 Treason and Related Offenses

11-43-1. Treason.

Every person who shall be convicted of treason against this state by levying war against the state or by adhering to the enemies of this state, giving them aid and comfort, shall be imprisoned during life.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 275, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 341, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 392, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 603, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-1 .

11-43-2. Proof required for treason.

No person shall be convicted of treason against this state by levying war against the state, or by adhering to the enemies of this state, giving them aid and comfort, but by testimony of two (2) lawful witnesses to the same overt act for which he or she shall then be on trial, unless he or she shall confess it in open court.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 275, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 341, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 392, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 603, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-2 .

11-43-3. Misprision of treason.

Every person who shall have knowledge of the commission of treason against this state by levying war against this state or by adhering to the enemies of the state, giving them aid and comfort, and who shall conceal it, and shall not as soon as possible, disclose and make known the treason to the governor or to some magistrate, shall be deemed guilty of misprision of treason against this state and shall be imprisoned not exceeding twenty (20) years, nor less than five (5) years, or be fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 275, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 341, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 392, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 603, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-3 .

11-43-4 — 11-43-6. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (G.L. 1896, ch. 275, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 341, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 392, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 603, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-4 ; G.L. 1896, ch. 275, § 7; C.P.A. 1905, § 1228; G.L. 1909, ch. 341, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 392, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 603, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-5; G.L. 1896, ch. 275, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 341, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 392, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 603, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-6), concerning illegal town meetings, assemblies and elections, were repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 336, § 5, effective July 3, 2004.

11-43-7. Unlawful exercise of functions of state office.

Every person, except as duly elected according to the laws of this state, who shall assume or exercise any of the legislative, executive, or ministerial functions of the office of governor, lieutenant-governor, senator, member of the house of representatives, secretary of state, attorney general, or general treasurer of this state, within the territorial limits of the state, as they are now actually had and enjoyed, either separately or with others, or shall assemble with others, for the purpose of exercising any of those functions, shall be imprisoned during life.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 275, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 341, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 392, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 603, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-7 .

11-43-8. Venue of indictments or information and prosecutions.

Indictments or informations under this chapter may be preferred and found in the discretion of the attorney general, without reference to the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed, but they shall be tried in the court for the county where found, unless the court shall for good cause remove it into some other county.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 275, § 8; C. P. A. 1905, § 1170; G.L. 1909, ch. 341, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 392, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 603, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-8 ; P.L. 1974, ch. 118, § 8.

Rules of Court.

Place of prosecution and trial, Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 18.

11-43-9. Indorsement of complaints.

No warrant shall issue to apprehend any person for any violation of this chapter, unless the complaint shall be first allowed of and indorsed or countersigned by the governor or by the attorney general.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 275, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 341, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 392, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 603, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-9 .

11-43-10. Arrest and commitment of persons charged.

Whenever any person shall be adjudged to be probably guilty of any offense under this chapter, he or she may be committed to the adult correctional institutions in any county, there to remain until discharged by order of law, and warrant of commitment shall issue accordingly, directed to the division of sheriffs or to either of the city or town sergeants or town constables in the same county with himself or herself, and to the warden of the adult correctional institutions, which warrant may be executed by the officer charged with it, although beyond his or her precinct, and shall constitute him or her, while charged with it, an officer, the obstructing of whom, while in the execution of this office, shall be punished as is or may be by law in other cases provided.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 275, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 341, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 392, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 603, § 10; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-10 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 39; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 16; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 16.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 16, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 16 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

11-43-11 — 11-43-14. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1919, ch. 1771, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 393, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 604, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-11 ; P.L. 1919, ch. 1771, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 393, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 604, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-12; P.L. 1919, ch. 1771, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 393, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 604, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-13; P.L. 1919, ch. 1771, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 393, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 604, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-43-14), concerning anarchy, the destruction of property and the forcible overthrow of government, were repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 336, § 5, effective July 3, 2004.

Chapter 44 Trespass and Vandalism

11-44-1. Vandalism — Obstruction of lawful pursuits.

  1. Every person who shall willfully and maliciously or mischievously injure or destroy or write upon, paint, or otherwise deface the property of another, or obstruct the use of the property of another, or obstruct another in the prosecution of his or her lawful business or pursuits, in any manner, the punishment of which is not specifically provided for by statute, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) and/or be imprisoned not exceeding one year, and shall be liable to make restitution for the injury or damage caused. Every person convicted of a first offense under this section shall be required to perform up to one hundred (100) hours of public community restitution work, and for a second or subsequent conviction shall be required to perform up to two hundred (200) hours of public community restitution work. Provided, further that every person who shall willfully and maliciously or mischievously injure or destroy or write upon, paint or otherwise deface government property, or obstruct the use of that property, shall be punished in accordance with this statute. Jurisdiction for matters involving government property shall be concurrent with the district court or the respective city or town police or municipal court.
  2. Where the provisions of The Domestic Violence Prevention Act, chapter 29 of title 12, are applicable, the penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties as provided in § 12-29-5 .

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 45; P.L. 1902, ch. 964, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 48; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 48; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 48; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-1 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 296, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 85, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 11; P.L. 1995, ch. 89, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 167, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 221, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 300, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 10.

Cross References.

Civil penalties for vandalism in cemeteries, § 23-18-12 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Defenses.
— Necessity or Justification.

In a case involving entering upon the premises of a corporation and spray-painting nuclear missile tubes with the words “thou shall not kill, ” as well as attaching posters to the tubes, the defenses of necessity and justification were not available. State v. Champa, 494 A.2d 102, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 533 (1985).

—Self-Defense.

Defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction as to a vandalism charge because self-defense was not recognized as justifying conduct leading to vandalism. State v. Soler, 140 A.3d 755, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 101 (2016).

Evidence Sufficient.

Superior court properly denied defendant’s motion for a new trial because the trial justice articulated adequate grounds for denying the motion, carefully reviewed the testimony, and weighed the evidence before him, he specifically noted the shortcomings and inconsistencies of certain witnesses, but ultimately concluded, based on his own credibility determinations, that the weight of the evidence supported guilty verdicts as to the counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and malicious injury to property, and determined that he would have reached the same conclusion as the jury—that defendant cut the victim with a machete and broke the car and basement windows with the machete. State v. Najera, 211 A.3d 938, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 103 (2019).

Collateral References.

Escape of harmful gases or fumes onto another’s premises as trespass. 54 A.L.R.2d 778.

11-44-2. Injury or removal of vegetation — Buildings and fences.

Every person who shall take and carry away, without the consent of the owner, any corn, grain, fruit, or growing vegetable out of any field, garden, or orchard, or who shall willfully and without the consent of the owner root up, cut down, or otherwise injure or destroy or take and carry away any tree or underwood growing or standing upon the land of another, or remove any cord wood, or shall maliciously root up, cut down, or otherwise injure or destroy any tree, root, fruit, or vegetable growing in any garden, field, orchard, highway, common, or public square, or who shall take and carry away, without the consent of the owner, any cultivated plant, tree, or shrub from any graveyard or from any public or private grounds, or who shall wantonly or maliciously injure or destroy any plant or shrub growing upon the land or in the building of another, or who shall poison the earth about any plant or shrub so as to prevent or injure its growth, or who shall maliciously or wantonly in any way injure or deface any building not his or her own, or break the glass or any part of it in any building, or shall maliciously injure any fence or stone wall on or enclosing lands not his or her own, shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding triple the value of the damage or one thousand dollars ($1,000), whichever is lower; and shall be required to pay the party injured a penalty not to exceed triple the value of the damage caused by the person; provided, that if any person shall knowingly use or permit to be used any vehicle for the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this section, he or she shall also be penalized in the manner specified in title 31.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 23; P.L. 1900, ch. 736, § 1; C.P.A. 1905, § 1177; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 23; P.L. 1928, ch. 1215, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-2 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 276, § 2; P.L. 1982, ch. 237, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 426, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Claim of Right.

Clause pertaining to growing vegetables did not apply where defendant acted under a good faith claim of right. State v. Luther, 8 R.I. 151 , 1865 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1865).

Malice.

The word maliciously, as used in this statute, meant the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse. State v. Gilligan, 23 R.I. 400 , 50 A. 844, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 160 (1901).

Malice need not have been directed toward either the owner or the lessee. State v. Gilligan, 23 R.I. 400 , 50 A. 844, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 160 (1901).

Ownership.

Allegation of ownership in lessor was not improper, even though proof showed possession to be in lessee with agreement by lessee to repair. State v. Gilligan, 23 R.I. 400 , 50 A. 844, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 160 (1901).

Place of Offense.

Complaint alleging the offense at a certain place necessarily implies that the building is in the same place. State v. Lake, 16 R.I. 511 , 17 A. 552, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1889).

Wantonness.

The word wantonly, as used in this statute, meant “done in a licentious spirit, perversely, recklessly, without regard to propriety or the rights of others, careless of consequences, and yet without settled malice.” State v. Gilligan, 23 R.I. 400 , 50 A. 844, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 160 (1901).

11-44-3. Arrest and detention of persons taking fruits and vegetables.

Every deputy sheriff, town or city sergeant, town constable, or police officer, who shall discover any person or persons in the act of taking and carrying away any growing fruit or vegetables as prohibited by § 11-44-2 , shall arrest that person or persons and detain the person or persons in custody until a complaint can be made against him, her, or them for the offense for which he, she, or they shall have been arrested and until he, she, or they be taken on a warrant issued upon the complaint; provided, that the arrest and detention without a warrant shall not continue longer than the space of twenty-four (24) hours.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 24; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 24; P.L. 1928, ch. 1215, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-3 ; P.L. 1994, ch. 134, § 5; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 40; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 17; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 17.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 17, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 17 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

Cross References.

Duties of sheriffs, § 42-29-1 .

11-44-4. Shooting, trapping or fishing on posted lands — Destruction of signs.

Whoever shall enter upon the land of another without the owner’s permission for the purpose of either shooting, trapping, or fishing when that land shall be conspicuously posted with clear and legible signs stating that shooting, trapping or fishing, as the case may be, is prohibited, or whoever shall remain upon the premises of another for the purpose of shooting, trapping, or fishing after having been forbidden to do so by the owner of the premises or the owner’s authorized agent, or whoever shall without right mutilate, destroy, or remove any sign stating that shooting, trapping or fishing, as the case may be, is prohibited, shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00).

History of Section. P.L. 1902, ch. 1006, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 136, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 137, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 248, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-4 ; P.L. 1971, ch. 186, § 1.

Cross References.

Firing without landowner’s permission or in compact area, § 11-47-50 .

11-44-5. Willful damage while hunting, trapping or fishing.

Whoever shall enter upon land of another for the purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing, and while upon the land shall do any willful damage to the property of the owner of the land, shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00). The owner of the property may recover from any person convicted of a violation of the provisions of this section, in an action of the case, twice the amount of the damages so sustained; and the license to pursue, hunt, and kill game in the state of Rhode Island during the open season issued under the provisions of chapter 13 of title 20 to any persons who shall thereafter be convicted of a violation of the provisions of this section shall be forfeited and no license shall be issued to him or her under the provisions of title 20 for a period of one year after that conviction.

History of Section. P.L. 1921, ch. 2097, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 137, § 32; G.L. 1938, ch. 248, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-5 .

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

11-44-6. Defacement of bank bills and notes.

Every person who shall willfully and mischievously tear, cut, burn, or in any other manner damage and impair the integrity, strength, or usefulness for circulation of any bank bill or note issued by any corporation which is established as a bank in this state, or shall willfully and mischievously write, print, blot, or stamp any impression on a bill or note, or shall aid and abet in any of the offenses provided in this section, shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year nor less than one month.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 36; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 40; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 40; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-6 .

11-44-7. Misappropriation of vehicle, boat, or animal.

Every person who shall willfully, mischievously, or without right, take, drive, ride, or use any carriage, wagon, or other vehicle other than a motor vehicle, or any boat, or any horse, ox, or cow, or milk any cow, the property of another, without the consent of the owner or of the person having the lawful custody of the property, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both; provided that nothing contained in this section shall be construed to apply to any case where property is taken with the intent to steal the property or where it is taken under a claim of right.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 41; P.L. 1902, ch. 963, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 45; P.L. 1909, ch. 460, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 45; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 45; impl. am. P.L. 1950, ch. 2595, art. 12, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-7 ; P.L. 1989, ch. 214, § 2.

Cross References.

Importation of stolen property, jurisdiction of offense, § 12-3-7 .

Vehicles, injuring or tampering with, §§ 31-9-3 , 31-9-4 , 31-27-13 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

“Steal.”

The word “steal” has been used consistently to approximate or describe the act of larceny at common law. State v. Smith, 56 R.I. 168 , 184 A. 494, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 90 (1936).

11-44-8. Injury to or interference with water-control structures.

Every person who shall willfully and maliciously break down, injure, remove, or destroy any dam, reservoir, canal, or trench, or any gate, flume, flash-board, or other appurtenance, or any of the wheels, mill-gear, or machinery of a water-mill, or willfully or wantonly, without color of right, draw off the water contained in a millpond, reservoir, canal, or trench, or willfully and maliciously, without color of right, obstruct the water of a mill-pond, reservoir, canal, or trench from flowing out of it, shall be imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years or be fined not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 38; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 42; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 42; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 42; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-8 .

11-44-9. Firing of weapon near baiting place.

Every person who, between the first day of April and the first day of November in any year, shall maliciously fire any gun, musket, blunderbuss, or pistol, within eighty (80) rods of any baiting place, not his or her own property, and actually used in the proper season for the baiting and netting of wild pigeons, shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00), nor less than five dollars ($5.00).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 27; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 28; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-9 .

11-44-10. Injurious substances on baiting places.

Every person who shall strew or place any powder or brimstone or other sulfurous substance upon any baiting place not his or her own property, or shall burn upon that place any of those substances saturated with tar or turpentine, shall be fined not less than five dollars ($5.00) nor more than twenty dollars ($20.00).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 28; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 29; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 29; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 29; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-10 .

11-44-11. Injury to boundary or line markers.

Every person who shall willfully break down, remove, injure, obscure, or destroy any monument erected for the purpose of designating the boundaries of any town or city or any tract or lot of land, or any tree marked for that purpose, or any stake set up to mark the line or grade of any railroad, or any marker erected for the purpose of designating a public right-of-way to water areas of the state, shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 34; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 38; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 38; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 38; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-11 ; P.L. 1971, ch. 27, § 1.

11-44-12. Injury to public property.

Every person who shall willfully cut or deface or otherwise injure any public building or fence or other property shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) unless the amount of damage exceeds one hundred dollars ($100). If that amount shall exceed one hundred dollars ($100), then he or she shall be punished by a fine which is not less than three (3) times the amount of the damage nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, and, in addition to any sentence, shall be ordered to make restitution in the full amount of damage done.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 278, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 344, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 396, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-12 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 243, §§ 1, 2.

11-44-12.1. Damage to instrumentality of public transportation.

Every person who shall willfully cut or deface or otherwise injure any instrumentality of public transportation managed by or belonging to a public corporation shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment not exceeding thirty (30) days, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 238, § 1.

11-44-13. Injury to public statues and monuments.

Every person who shall willfully trespass upon, deface, mutilate, cover or keep covered, or otherwise injure the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Monument in the city of Providence, or any other public statue or monument, may be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) and/or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, and shall, in addition to imprisonment and/or fine, be ordered to make full restitution to the public or governmental entity incurring the expense of repairing the statue or monument.

History of Section. P.L. 1908, ch. 1542, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 344, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 396, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-13 ; P.L. 2009, ch. 326, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 327, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 341, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 375, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 341, § 2, and P.L. 2011, ch. 375, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-44-14. Breaking lamps or windows.

Every person who shall willfully break any lamp, lantern, or window shall, for every lamp, lantern, or window broken, be fined not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200).

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 278, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 344, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 396, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-14 ; P.L. 1978, ch. 285, § 1.

11-44-15. Injuring or destroying books and other property of libraries, archives, or other records repositories.

  1. Any person who willfully, maliciously, or wantonly writes upon, injures, defaces, tears, cuts, mutilates, or destroys any book, record, or other property belonging to or in the custody of any public county or regional library, the state library, the state archives, the state records center or other repository of public records, museum, or any library or collection belonging to or in the custody of any educational, eleemosynary, benevolent, hereditary, or historical library, or patriotic institution, organization, or society, or state or local agency, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be ordered to make restitution in the full retail value of the books, records or other property, and may be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100), to be for use of the library, archives, or records repository.
  2. “Book, records, or other property” as used in this section includes any book, plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting, drawing, map, newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, broadside, manuscript, document, letter, public record, equipment, microform, sound recording, audiovisual materials in any format, magnetic or other tapes, electronic data processing records, artifacts, or other documentary, written, or printed material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, belonging to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of, any library, museum, archives, or repository of public or other records institution.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 52; P.L. 1907, ch. 1463, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 55; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 55; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 63; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-15 ; P.L. 1983, ch. 296, §§ 3, 4; P.L. 1985, ch. 436, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 499, § 1.

11-44-16. Removal of gravel from or deposit of debris on Easton’s Beach.

Every person who shall remove any sand or any gravel from any part of Easton’s Beach, as defined in § 11-44-18 , shall be fined twenty dollars ($20.00) for every offense. Every person who shall deposit or leave on the beach any dead animal, offal, filth, rubbish, or refuse matter, shall be fined twenty dollars ($20.00) for every offense.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 58; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 61; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 61; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 69; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-16 .

11-44-17. Enforcement of § 11-44-16.

Any police constable of Newport or of Middletown, viewing any offense committed in violation of § 11-44-16 , shall immediately arrest the offender, whether in Newport or in Middletown, and cause him or her to be prosecuted for the offense as soon as may be possible before the district court.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 59; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 62; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 62; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 70; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-17 .

11-44-18. Bounds of Easton’s Beach.

Easton’s Beach, for the purposes of §§ 11-44-16 and 11-44-17 , shall embrace all the lands bounded and described as follows: a tract of land in Newport, bounded northerly on land now or formerly of George H. Norman, easterly on the division line between the town of Middletown and the city of Newport, southerly on the ocean at low-water mark, and westerly on land now or formerly of the Gibbs Land Company to the Bath Road, and along and across that road to and along the cliffs at land now or formerly of J. W. Chandler; and a tract of land in Middletown, bounded northerly on the northern side of a road which runs from the foot of Bath Road in Newport, easterly through the above bounded beach or land, and then onward over the lands between Easton’s Beach and Sachuest Beach, easterly on the line of the old fence or wall which has hitherto separated the upland of the Benjamin Easton Farm from Easton’s Beach and the sandy tract adjoining it, southerly on the ocean at low-water mark, and westerly on the division line between Newport and Middletown.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 279, § 60; G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 63; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 63; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 71; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-18 .

11-44-19. Deposit of debris on Middletown beaches.

Every person who shall deposit or leave on any beach in the town of Middletown, any dead animal, offal, filth, rubbish, waste, or refuse matter, shall be fined twenty dollars ($20.00) for every offense.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 73; P.L. 1922, ch. 2225, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 74; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 72; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-19 .

11-44-20. Property of life saving corps — Interference or deception.

Every person who shall willfully destroy any of the property or apparatus of the United States Volunteer Life Saving Corps, or steal or misappropriate it, or any part of it, or willfully interfere with any of its life savers in the performance of their duty, or who shall call for help or aid while in or on the water with intent to deceive any of the life savers, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned not more than six (6) months, or fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 345, § 72; P.L. 1911, ch. 663, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 397, § 72; G.L. 1938, ch. 608, § 80; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-20 .

11-44-21. Vandalizing alarms or call boxes — False alarms.

Whoever opens a signal box connected with a police, fire, or motorist aid call system for the purpose of giving or causing to be given a false alarm, or interferes in any way with a signal box by breaking, cutting, injuring, or defacing it; or, without authority, opens, tampers, or meddles with a signal box, or with any part or parts of it, or with the police signal wires, or with anything connected with it, or, with that purpose, willfully or knowingly tampers or meddles with a signal box connected with a fire signal system or with any part or thing connected with it, or, with that purpose, willfully or knowingly tampers or meddles with a motorist aid call box, or by any means gives or aids or abets in the giving of a false alarm of fire or emergency or falsely summons an ambulance or rescue apparatus, shall be subject to punishment by imprisonment for up to one year, or fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both. Upon conviction for any offense referred to in this section, the court shall, in addition to imposing a fine and/or imprisonment, order the offender to make restitution to the appropriate state, city, or town authority or agency for any expenditures necessitated by the commission of the offense.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 278, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 344, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 396, § 7; P.L. 1928, ch. 1155, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, § 7; P.L. 1941, ch. 1009, § 1; P.L. 1942, ch. 1238, § 1; P.L. 1952, ch. 2881, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-44-21 ; P. L. 1971, ch. 211, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 153, §§ 1, 2.

11-44-21.1. Graffiti — Defacing private residences, offices, businesses or commercial property.

    1. Every person who shall willfully, maliciously or mischievously write upon, paint, or otherwise deface the private property or residence of another, any office building, business or commercial property or public building or public property, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, for the first and second offense, said penalty shall not exceed a one thousand dollars ($1,000) fine and community service not exceeding two hundred (200) hours. Every person convicted of a third or subsequent offense under this section shall be guilty of a felony, subject to imprisonment not exceeding two (2) years, a fine of up to two thousand dollars ($2,000), and shall be required to perform up to three hundred (300) hours of community service. The court, upon conviction or adjudication, shall order restitution to the victim in the amount of removal, repair, or replacement costs.
    2. If the graffiti is positioned on an overpass or an underpass and requires that traffic be interfered with in order to remove it, or the entity responsible for the area in which the clean-up is to take place must provide assistance in order for the removal to take place safely, the court shall order an additional assessment of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  1. If the person is a minor, upon adjudication, in addition to the penalties in subsection (a):
    1. The family court may, in addition to any other order or decree the court makes under this chapter, order the division of motor vehicles to:
      1. Suspend the minor’s operator’s license; or
      2. Invalidate the minor’s learner’s permit; for one year beginning the date of the order.
    2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the family court may order the parent or legal guardian of any minor found to have committed the crime of graffiti, to submit restitution to the victim or victims of such graffiti by payment in money if the minor is in the custody of and residing with such parent or guardian, and if the family court finds, after hearing, that the graffiti was a direct result of the parent or legal guardian having neglected to exercise reasonable supervision and control of the minor’s conduct. For the purposes of this section, liability for compensation shall be limited to ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
    3. If the person violates the family court’s order to submit restitution under this section, such person shall be guilty of contempt. The court may permit payments under this section to be made in installments, for a period of up to seven (7) years, to be administered by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 311, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 497, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 508, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 497, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 508, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-44-21.2. Restitution or removal of graffiti — Rescission of order suspending or invalidating operator’s license or learner’s permit.

If a court of suitable jurisdiction has entered an order for suspension or invalidation of a minor’s operator’s license or a learner’s permit pursuant to § 11-44-21.1 , and if the same court subsequently determines that the minor has fulfilled his or her restitution obligation, the court may:

  1. Rescind the order for suspension or invalidation; and/or
  2. Allow the minor to receive a license or permit before the period of suspension or invalidation ends.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 497, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 508, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 497, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 508, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-44-22. Throwing articles at moving vehicles.

Every person who shall willfully throw, shoot, or in any other manner propel a snowball or any other object at any moving motor or other vehicle in use upon the roads or highways of this state shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1967, ch. 124, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence — Sufficiency.

Where there was no evidence introduced that would prove the police car was moving at the time the rock was thrown by the juvenile, the state did not meet its burden to show a violation of this section. In re Pereira, 111 R.I. 712 , 306 A.2d 821, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 1267 (1973).

Where the evidence that defendant sought to present upon any reopening of a non-jury criminal trial for felony assault with a dangerous weapon and malicious destruction of property could not be considered “newly discovered” and merely presented a question of credibility, the trial justice’s denial of a new trial pursuant to to R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 was correct; defendant failed to set forth the particular grounds upon which defendant sought the relief requested in compliance with R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 47 . State v. Brooks, 818 A.2d 665, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 50 (2003).

11-44-23. Throwing objects at police officer, firefighter or police or fire vehicles.

Every person who shall willfully throw, shoot, or in any other manner propel a rock or any other object at any police officer, firefighter, or any police or fire vehicle, whether moving or not, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 268, § 1; P.L. 1971, ch. 221, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

11-44-24. Blocking or obstructing public rights-of-way to water.

Every person who shall obstruct or block or cause any obstruction of any public rights-of-way to water areas of the state shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 23, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 142, § 1.

11-44-25. Deposit of debris on public rights-of-way to water.

Every person who shall deposit or leave on any public right-of-way to water areas of the state, any dead animal, offal, filth, rubbish, waste, or refuse matter, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) for every offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 22, § 1.

11-44-26. Willful trespass — Remaining on land after warning — Exemption for tenants holding over.

  1. Every person who willfully trespasses or, having no legitimate purpose for his or her presence, remains upon the land of another or upon the premises or curtilage of the domicile of any person legally entitled to the possession of that domicile, after having been forbidden to do so by the owner of the land or the owner’s duly authorized agent or a person legally entitled to the possession of the premises, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or both.
  2. This section shall not apply to tenants or occupants of residential premises who, having rightfully entered the premises at the commencement of the tenancy or occupancy, remain after that tenancy or occupancy has been or is alleged to have been terminated. The owner or landlord of the premises may recover possession only through appropriate civil proceedings.
  3. Where the provisions of The Domestic Violence Prevention Act, chapter 29 of title 12, are applicable, the penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties as provided in § 12-29-5 .

History of Section. P.L. 1973, ch. 279, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 175, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 360, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 52, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 119, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 11.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The distinguishing element between a criminal trespass and breaking and entering is the element of a “break”. State v. Turner, 655 A.2d 693, 1995 R.I. LEXIS 87 (1995).

Interest in Property.

The existence of an ownership interest in property did not preclude the possibility that the owner was trespassing because the right to possession, not ownership, is the more dispositive consideration. Peltier v. Roy, 453 F. Supp. 1373, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16307 (D.R.I. 1978).

Legitimate Purpose.

Where the sole purpose for a husband’s presence in house was to test his right to use of the marital home, which had been denied by a family court decree, that reason was not a “legitimate purpose” within the meaning of this section. Peltier v. Roy, 453 F. Supp. 1373, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16307 (D.R.I. 1978).

Defendant’s conduct in going upon a family court justice’s property to discuss a divorce controversy being litigated before the justice constituted a trespass. State v. Demers, 525 A.2d 1308, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 498 (1987).

Lesser-Included Offense.

Trial court properly convicted defendant of willful trespass as a lesser-included offense of breaking and entering a dwelling because defendant’s arguments were not properly before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island where defense counsel explicitly suggested that the trial justice look at the facts before him through the lens of the willful trespass statute rather than the breaking and entering statute, which the State had initially invoked, and the trial justice never ultimately ruled on the defendant’s motion to dismiss the breaking and entering charge. State v. Connery, 139 A.3d 401, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 75 (2016).

Collateral References.

“Choice of evils,” necessity, duress, or similar defense to state or local criminal charges based on acts of public protest. 3 A.L.R.5th 521.

11-44-26.1. Mandatory minimum fine for willful trespass within school buildings.

Every person who willfully trespasses or, having no legitimate purpose for his or her presence, or having been suspended from attendance at any school, remains within a building used for a public or private school, college, university, junior college, or other public or private educational institution, or on the school grounds or campus grounds of any public or private school, college, university, junior college, or other public or private educational institution after having been forbidden so to do by a local or state police officer or a guard, security officer, or an official of the school, college, university, junior college or other educational institution, shall for the first offense be punished at least by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), and shall for the second offense be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), and for the third or any subsequent offense by a fine of not less than one hundred fifty dollars ($150) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), and may in addition, be imprisoned not exceeding six (6) months.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 52, § 2; P.L. 1986, ch. 183, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 197, § 1.

11-44-27. Fishing from Jamestown Bridge prohibited.

No person shall take or attempt to take any fish from the waters of Narragansett Bay while the person is on any part of the roadway, walkway, or railings of the Jamestown Bridge, except a special walkway as may be constructed exclusively for the purpose of fishing. Any person violating any provision of this section shall, upon conviction, be fined twenty-five dollars ($25.00) or imprisoned for not more than thirty (30) days, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 284, § 1.

11-44-28. Trespass upon premises of private recreational facilities.

Every person who willfully trespasses and remains upon the land or premises of private recreational facilities, after having been forbidden to do so by the owner or the person having control over the facility, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500); provided, the existing rights of fishers shall not be infringed. “Facilities” as used in this section means private property used for games, sports, or entertainment, including, without limitation, golf courses, beaches, and bathing facilities.

History of Section. P.L. 1974, ch. 68, § 1.

11-44-29. Willful breaking of glass.

Every person who shall willfully break glass on any public highway, public property, or public building within this state shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 188, § 1.

11-44-30. Posting of signs — Types.

Whenever any signs are required to be posted to indicate no trespassing, shooting, trapping, fishing, or the like, it shall be sufficient to post the land conspicuously with clear and legible signs which signs can be affixed with cloth, metal, or paperboard, or by conspicuously stencil-painting the word “Posted.”

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 195, § 1.

11-44-31. Desecration of places of public assemblage.

Every person who shall, willfully and maliciously or mischievously, injure or destroy or write upon, paint, or otherwise damage or deface: (1) any church, synagogue, or other building, structure, or place used for religious worship or other religious purpose; (2) any cemetery, mortuary, or other facility used for the purpose of burial or memorializing the dead; (3) any building used for educational purposes or as a community meeting place and which is owned by an organization exempt from taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 501; (4) any public building owned and/or operated by the government of the United States or by the government of the state of Rhode Island or its political subdivisions; (5) the grounds adjacent to and owned or rented by any institution, facility, building, structure, or place described in subdivisions (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this section; or (6) any personal property contained in any institution, facility, building, structure, or place described in subdivisions (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of this section; shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 374, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 512, § 1.

Cross References.

Civil action for desecration of places of public assemblage, § 9-1-39 .

Collateral References.

Liability for desecration of graves and tombstones. 77 A.L.R.4th 108.

11-44-32. Clearance of public rights of way.

  1. Every person, firm, or corporation who is the owner of land abutting a public sidewalk shall keep the sidewalk free of any shrubs or other debris under the control of the owner. The owner shall also be required to see that the branches of any tree under his or her control which overhang a public sidewalk are at least seven (7) feet above the sidewalk.
  2. Any person, firm, or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall, upon adjudication be subject to a civil penalty of not more than five hundred dollars ($500).

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 396, § 1.

Chapter 45 Disorderly Conduct

11-45-1. Disorderly conduct.

  1. A person commits disorderly conduct if he or she intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly:
    1. Engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior;
    2. In a public place or near a private residence that he or she has no right to occupy, disturbs another person by making loud and unreasonable noise which under the circumstances would disturb a person of average sensibilities;
    3. Directs at another person in a public place offensive words which are likely to provoke a violent reaction on the part of the average person so addressed;
    4. Alone or with others, obstructs a highway, street, sidewalk, railway, waterway, building entrance, elevator, aisle, stairway, or hallway to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access or any other place ordinarily used for the passage of persons, vehicles, or conveyances;
    5. Engages in conduct which obstructs or interferes physically with a lawful meeting, procession, or gathering;
    6. Enters upon the property of another and for a lascivious purpose looks into an occupied dwelling or other building on the property through a window or other opening; or
    7. Who without the knowledge or consent of the individual, looks for a lascivious purpose through a window, or any other opening into an area in which another would have a reasonable expectation of privacy, including, but not limited to, a restroom, locker room, shower, changing room, dressing room, bedroom, or any other such private area, notwithstanding any property rights the individual may have in the location in which the private area is located.
    8. [Deleted by P.L. 2008, ch. 183, § 1].
  2. Any person, including a police officer, may be a complainant for the purposes of instituting action for any violation of this section.
  3. Any person found guilty of the crime of disorderly conduct shall be imprisoned for a term of not more than six (6) months, or fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.
  4. In no event shall subdivisions (a)(2) — (5) of this section be construed to prevent lawful picketing or lawful demonstrations including, but not limited to, those relating to a labor dispute.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 304, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 44, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 539, § 12; P.L. 1998, ch. 124, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 301, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 193, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 195, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 202, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 330, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 183, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 202, § 1, and P.L. 2004, ch. 206, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Repealed Sections.

Former chapter 45 of this title (G.L. 1896, ch. 281, §§ 24-26, 30-36, 40; P.L. 1907, ch. 1447, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 347, §§ 25-27, 31-37; P.L. 1909, ch. 378, § 1; P.L. 1911, ch. 652, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1219, § 2; P.L. 1920, ch. 1881, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 399, §§ 24, 25, 30-36, 39; P.L. 1932, ch. 1902, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 610, § 24, 25, 30-36, 39; P.L. 1950, ch. 2600, § 1; P.L. 1951, ch. 2818, § 1; P.L. 1952, ch. 3031, § 1; P.L. 1960, ch. 165, § 1; P.L. 1961, ch. 176, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 192, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 43, § 1), consisting of §§ 11-45-1 11-45-1 1 and concerning vagrants and drunkards, was repealed by P.L. 1977, ch. 98, §§ 1, 2.

The following explanatory notes accompanied P.L. 1979, ch. 304, § 1:

“This act revises chapter 11-45 of the general laws by repealing sections 11-45-1 through 11-45-1 1 and replacing them with section 11-45-1 entitled, ‘Disorderly conduct.’ The provisions originally contained in chapter 11-45 covered vagrancy, drunkards, disorderly conduct and a plethora of minor offenses and status crimes many of which have their origins in English legislation of the feudal era when vagrancy laws served both to deter serfs from leaving their lords as well as to control scarce labor in the aftermath of the plagues that swept England in the fourteenth century. Subsequently these statutes were expanded and used to control wandering bands of robbers as well as beggars. For a fuller description, see text to accompany Tent. Draft No. 13, Model Penal Code 60-65 (1961). Similar provisions were adopted in some form or other by most of the American states. The provisions contained in sections 11-45-1 through 11-45-11 are fairly typical. In a series of relatively recent decisions, the United States supreme court has held restrictions similar to those contained in chapter 11-45 to be unconstitutionally vague as well as to infringe rights of free speech and assembly. See e.g., Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 90 S. Ct. 1312, 25 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1970); Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 91 S. Ct. 1563, 29 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1971); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 859, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972). See also Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). As a result, Rhode Island has not for some time had an enforceable law dealing with a variety of activities which are generally classified as disorderly conduct.

“This act is designed to fill that gap in Rhode Island law by prohibiting six specific types of conduct, which, if carefully delineated, can be regulated by the state. The statute has been drafted so as to explicitly define the prohibited conduct while not intruding upon constitutionally protected activities. Essentially, the act prescribes types of conduct which are breaches of the peace or create serious nuisances. For example, subsections (a) and (c) are intended to prevent or to punish violent behavior which the state has an interest in controlling under its obligations to maintain the public peace. See e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942). In addition, the statute seeks to control conduct which is essentially a nuisance, although not leading to an imminent breach of peace. Examples of these are found in subdivisions (b) and (f).

“With the exception of verbal expressions ‘which by this very utterance . . . tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,’ the act does not attempt to regulate or punish other varieties of, so-called, ‘offensive language’. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra at 572. The commission deliberated at length over the question of whether in the light of recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court it is reasonably possible to draft a constitutionally valid statute dealing with this problem. After a review of the various authorities, it was the commission’s considered judgment that, other than the prohibition contained in subdivision (c) against ‘fighting word’, it is not feasible to draft legislation dealing with other types of offensive utterance. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S. Ct. 1780, 29 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1971); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 94 S. Ct. 1028, 39 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1974). See also Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 334 N.E. 2d 617 (Mass. 1975). It is the commission’s judgment, however, that to a large extent the most serious problems in this area of concern are encompassed in the act.

“By repealing chapter 11-45 of the general laws, section 11-45-2 was also repealed. Contained in that section were certain procedural guidelines for the prosecution of nonsupport cases. Those provisions were transferred to chapter 11-2 and the vague provisions of ‘habitual drunkard’ was deleted from section 11-2-1 .”

Cross References.

Disorderly conduct, § 11-11-1 et seq.

Law Reviews.

2006 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Constitutional Law: State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453 (R.I. 2006), see 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 520 (2007).

Laura Pickering, 2015 Survey, Cases: Constitutional Law. State v. Matthews, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 648 (2016).

Comparative Legislation.

Disorderly conduct:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Since defendant could appreciate that throwing furniture around his residence during a violent disagreement with his wife, in which he threatened to destroy the home if he did not get his way, was prohibited conduct that would subject him to arrest, prosecution and, potentially, a domestic abuse restraining order, this section was not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 9 (2006).

In General.

Dismissal of information against defendant charging disorderly conduct, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-45-1 , 12-29-5 , and 12-29-2 , was upheld on appeal where defendant demonstrated that, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-1-2 , disorderly conduct was classified as a petty misdemeanor and, by its terms, R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5(c) provided for enhanced penalties for anyone convicted of an offense punishable as a misdemeanor; therefore a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-45-1 (a) was exempt from the sentencing enhancements of R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-5 . State v. Martini, 860 A.2d 689, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 178 (2004).

Disorderly conduct statute was not void for vagueness and did not prohibit arrest and prosecution where defendant’s alleged disorderly conduct occurred inside his home; the statute put him on notice that he violated that statute if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly engaged in fighting, threatening, violent, or tumultuous behavior without regard to the location where that happened, and, thus, defendant could appreciate that throwing furniture around his residence during a violent argument with his wife, in which he threatened to destroy the home if he did not get his way, was prohibited conduct. State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 9 (2006).

State did not have to prove that defendant’s behavior occurred in a public place or disturbed another member of the public to prove disorderly conduct under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-45-1(a)(1) . State v. Hesford, 900 A.2d 1194, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 129 (2006).

Evidence Sufficient.

Where the trial justice found the State’s witnesses credible, and that defendant struck the victim and engaged in other tumultuous behavior, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct. State v. Hesford, 900 A.2d 1194, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 129 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of domestic simple assault and domestic disorderly conduct because neither the purported inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony nor any contradictory evidence undermined defendant’s convictions as the victim told the responding officer that defendant had beat her and kicked her, punched her, and stomped on her; the officer observed bruises on her forehead, face, and chin area; defendant admitted to the officer that he had hit and punched the victim after she had slapped him; and an emergency room physician testified that the victim presented with an ear contusion and lacerations, hand contusion, ankle abrasion, and a blow to the head, and that she was discharged after receiving 10 sutures. State v. Van Dongen, 132 A.3d 1070, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 31 (2016).

Fighting Words.

Where defendant, convicted under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-45-1 , contended that his speech constituted protected speech under the First Amendment and not “fighting words”, the trial court did not err in denying his motion for a new trial after finding that the troopers’ testimony was credible, defendant directed his speech at the two troopers, the troopers were concerned and alarmed by defendant’s words, and defendant was not a mere bystander or uninvolved in the troopers’ immediate purpose in coming to the scene. State v. Matthews, 111 A.3d 390, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 44 (2015).

Jury Instructions.

Trial court properly denied defendant’s request to instruct the jury that it could find him not guilty of disorderly conduct if it found that the police had initiated the disturbance, as this was not a correct statement of the law. State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 45 (2013).

Loud and Unreasonable Noise.

Subsection (a)(2) is inapplicable to speech and is neither vague nor overbroad when applied to conduct other than speech. State v. Tavarozzi, 446 A.2d 1048, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 908 (1982).

Although speech may be noisy and profane, it may nevertheless be protected save for the rather narrow “fighting words” exception. State v. Tavarozzi, 446 A.2d 1048, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 908 (1982).

Motion for Acquittal.

Defendant’s motions for a judgment of acquittal on a disorderly conduct charge under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-45-1 were properly denied as § 11-45-1 (b) explicitly stated that a police officer could be a complainant; exposure of defendant’s genitals to the officer’s view established the violation, even if no other person witnessed the exposure. State v. Pitts, 990 A.2d 185, 2010 R.I. LEXIS 34 (2010).

Collateral References.

“Choice of evils,” necessity, duress, or similar defense to state or local criminal charges based on acts of public protest. 3 A.L.R.5th 521.

Larceny as within disorderly conduct statute or ordinance. 71 A.L.R.3d 1156.

Participation of student in demonstration on or near campus as warranting imposition of criminal liability for breach of peace, disorderly conduct, trespass, unlawful assembly, or similar offense. 32 A.L.R.3d 551.

Vagueness as invalidating statutes or ordinances dealing with disorderly persons or conduct. 12 A.L.R.3d 1448.

Validity, construction, and effect of “hate crimes” statutes, “ethnic intimidation” statutes, or the like. 22 A.L.R.5th 261.

11-45-2. Indecent exposure — Disorderly conduct.

  1. A person commits indecent exposure/disorderly conduct when for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or stimulation, such person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly:
    1. Exposes his or her genitals to the view of another under circumstances in which his or her conduct is likely to cause affront, distress, or alarm to that person;
  2. Any person may be a complainant for the purposes of instituting action for any violation of this section. This act shall not apply to any conduct between consenting adults where the complainant is an unintended witness;
  3. Any person found guilty of, or who pleads nolo contendere to the crime of indecent exposure/disorderly conduct, shall be imprisoned for a term of not more than one year, or fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both. Any subsequent offense shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of up to three (3) years;
  4. Counseling.  Every person convicted of, or placed on probation for a violation of this section, may be ordered to attend appropriate professional counseling to address his or her behavior;
  5. In no event shall the provisions of this section be construed to apply to breastfeeding in public.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 183, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Defendant’s probation was properly revoked under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 32 (f), because even assuming that his masturbating in his van near a school did not satisfy the elements of disorderly conduct under former R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-45-1(a)(7) (now this section), it did not meet the test of good behavior expected of a probationer, especially in light of his prior child molesting convictions. State v. Pitts, 960 A.2d 240, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 116 (2008).

Expectation of Privacy.

Defendant, whom an officer saw masturbating while in a van parked near a school, had no expectation of privacy as to his behavior while occupying a motor vehicle on a public highway. State v. Pitts, 960 A.2d 240, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 116 (2008).

Chapter 45.1 Unreasonable Noise Levels

11-45.1-1. Declaration of policy.

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state to prohibit unreasonable, excessive and annoying noise levels from all sources subject to its police power. At certain levels, low frequency sound (between 100-20 cps) when substantially amplified, often referred to as sub-woofer frequency, can be extremely penetrating, disturbing and poses a danger to the health and safety of the individual using equipment creating the sound, and to other individuals in the immediate area from which the sound is being generated. The noise being generated may originate from radios, CD players, DVD players, tape players, televisions and other audio-producing equipment.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 194, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 203, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 194, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 203, § 1, enacted identical versions of this chapter.

11-45.1-2. Violations of acceptable noise levels.

It shall be unlawful for any person to operate any equipment as set forth in § 11-45.1-1 from which the sound created by this equipment is capable of penetrating a closed vehicle from twenty (20) feet away from the location at which the sound is being generated, or heard from one hundred (100) feet away by a person outside from which the sound is originating. This section shall include, but not be limited to, sound electronically generated by autos, trucks, motor homes, mobile homes, houses, apartment buildings, condominiums, commercial buildings, or from any type of portable sound producing equipment that can be carried or placed outdoors which through its operation exceeds the provision of this chapter. All state and municipal vehicles shall be exempt from the provisions of this chapter, nor any person firm, corporation or other legal entity which holds a valid state or municipal entertainment license to sponsor a parade, carnival or other similar special event.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 194, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 203, § 1.

Cross References.

Motor vehicles generally, § 31-1-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Preemption.

R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-45.1-2 and 31-45-5 did not preempt Providence, R.I., Code of Ordinances § 16-93, prohibiting loud noise in certain locations, because (1) the ordinance did not conflict with the statutes but, rather, furthered the policy of the general assembly as stated in the statutes by creating a specific standard for a particular set of devices in a specific area, (2) the general assembly did not intend to completely occupy the field of noise regulation, and (3) R.I. Const. art. 13 allowed local governments to regulate noise in residential areas. State ex rel. City of Providence v. Auger, 44 A.3d 1218, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 72 (2012).

11-45.1-3. Penalties.

Any person who violates the provisions of this chapter shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100) for a first offense, two hundred dollars ($200) for a second offense, and three hundred dollars ($300) for the third and any subsequent offense.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 194, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 203, § 1.

Chapter 46 Waters

11-46-1. Boats required to have underwater exhaust.

It shall be unlawful to use a boat propelled in whole or in part by gas, gasoline, naphtha, or other explosive material unless the engine operated by the gas, gasoline, naphtha, or other explosive material is provided with an underwater exhaust or a muffler.

History of Section. P.L. 1910, ch. 593, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 119, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 602, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-46-1 .

Cross References.

Fishing grounds, protection, § 20-3-1 et seq.

Waters and navigation, § 46-1-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This statute is not vague and uncertain. State v. Huxford, 35 R.I. 387 , 87 A. 171, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1913).

Disconnection of Exhaust.

This statute is violated if operator of boat disconnects engine from underwater exhaust or muffler and permits the engine to exhaust directly into the open air. State v. Huxford, 35 R.I. 387 , 87 A. 171, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1913).

11-46-2. Penalty for violations.

Any person operating or causing to be operated upon the public waters of this state a boat in violation of the provisions of § 11-46-1 shall be punished by a fine of not less than five dollars ($5.00) nor more than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1910, ch. 593, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 119, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 602, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-46-2 .

11-46-3. Power boats on Spring Lake.

It shall be unlawful to use fuel powered motor boats, with the exception of emergency boats, on Spring Lake in the town of Burrillville.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 189.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

11-46-4. Enforcement.

Enforcement of § 11-46-3 shall be within the jurisdiction of the director of environmental management.

History of Section. P.L. 1961, ch. 189, § 1.

Chapter 46.1 Intertidal Salt Marshes

11-46.1-1. Disturbing intertidal salt marshes — Penalty.

  1. Whereas:
    1. Article I, § 17 of the constitution of the state of Rhode Island guarantees to the people the free right of fishery; and
    2. The free right of fishery cannot be enjoyed unless both finfish and shellfish are in abundance to be caught; and
    3. The metabolism and catabolism of plants and animals which constitute the estuarine complex found in salt marshes furnishes the nitrates, phosphates, sugars, plankton, and organic chemicals necessary for the nurture of finfish and shellfish throughout the Narragansett Bay area and its environs; and
    4. All the salt marshes of this state are in jeopardy of despoliation by persons unmindful of the economic and esthetic consequences of that spoliation.
  2. Any person who dumps or deposits mud, dirt, or rubbish upon, or who excavates and disturbs the ecology of, intertidal salt marshes, or any part of one, without first obtaining a permit issued by the department of environmental management shall be fined for each offense five hundred dollars ($500), one half (1/2) to the use of the state and one half (1/2) to the use of the complainant.
  3. Any person who violates an order of the director of the department of environmental management to cease dumping or excavating shall be fined fifty dollars ($50.00) for each day he or she continues the dumping or excavating.
  4. Any person who so disturbs the ecology of an intertidal salt marsh may, upon complaint of the director of the department, filed in the superior court, be required to restore the salt marsh to the extent practical.
  5. For the purposes of this chapter an intertidal salt marsh shall be prima facie presumed to be those areas upon which grow some, but not necessarily all, of the following: salt marsh grass (Spartina Alterniflora), black grass (Juncus gerardi), seaside lavender (Limonium carolinianum), saltwort (Salicornea europaea), salt meadow grass (Spartina patens), spike grass (Distichlis spicata), salt marsh bullrush (Scirpus maritima) and sand spurrey (Spergularia marina), and upon which exists salt marsh peat.
  6. The director of natural resources shall refuse to issue such permit if, in his or her judgment, the dumping or depositing of mud, dirt or rubbish or excavation would disturb the ecology of intertidal salt marshes.

History of Section. P.L. 1965, ch. 26, § 1; P.L. 1967, ch. 73, § 1; P.L. 1969, ch. 175, § 1.

In 2021, “and Providence Plantations” was deleted following “state of Rhode Island” in this section at the direction of the Law Revision Director to reflect the 2020 amendments to the state constitution that changed the state’s name.

Cross References.

Waters and navigation, § 46-1-1 et seq.

Chapter 47 Weapons

11-47-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Firearms Act”.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-1 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

Comparative Legislation.

Firearms:

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 140, § 121 et seq.

Weapons:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-202 — 53-206; 53a-174a, 53a-211, 53a-212.

Collateral References.

Fact that gun was broken, dismantled, or inoperable as affecting criminal responsibility under weapons statute. 81 A.L.R.4th 745.

Stationary object or attached fixture as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statute aggravating offenses such as assault, robbery, or homicide. 8 A.L.R.5th 775.

Validity and construction of gun control laws. 28 A.L.R.3d 845; 86 A.L.R.4th 931; 37 A.L.R. Fed 696; 60 A.L.R. Fed 305.

Validity of state gun control legislation under state constitutional provisions securing the right to bear arms. 86 A.L.R.4th 931.

11-47-2. Definitions.

When used in this chapter, the following words and phrases are construed as follows:

  1. “3D printing process” means 3D printing or additive manufacturing which is a process of making three (3) dimensional solid objects from a computer file and shall include any of various processes in which material is joined or solidified under computer control to create a three (3) dimensional object, with material being added together including liquid molecules, or powder grains.
  2. “Antique firearm” is defined as that term is defined under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 921.
  3. “Binary trigger” means a device that replaces a standard trigger on a semi-automatic weapon and is designed to fire one round on the pull of the trigger and another round upon release of the trigger.
  4. “Bump-fire stock” means any device that replaces a semi-automatic weapon’s standard stock and is designed to slide back and forth rapidly, harnessing the weapon’s recoil to rapidly fire the weapon.
  5. “Crime of violence” means and includes any of the following crimes or an attempt to commit any of them: murder, manslaughter, rape, first- or second-degree sexual assault, first- or second-degree child molestation, kidnapping, first- and second-degree arson, mayhem, robbery, burglary, breaking and entering, any felony violation involving the illegal manufacture, sale, or delivery of a controlled substance, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver a controlled substance classified in schedule I or schedule II of § 21-28-2.08 , any violation of § 21-28-4.01.1 or § 21-28-4.01.2 or conspiracy to commit any violation of these statutes, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault or battery involving grave bodily injury, or assault with intent to commit any offense punishable as a felony; upon any conviction of an offense punishable as a felony offense under § 12-29-5 .
  6. “Firearm” includes any machine gun, pistol, rifle, air rifle, air pistol, “blank gun,” “BB gun,” or other instrument from which steel or metal projectiles are propelled, or that may readily be converted to expel a projectile, except crossbows, recurve, compound, or longbows, and except instruments propelling projectiles that are designed or normally used for a primary purpose other than as a weapon. The frame or receiver of the weapon shall be construed as a firearm under the provisions of this section.
  7. “Fugitive from justice” means any person who has fled from any state, territory, the District of Columbia, or possession of the United States to avoid prosecution for a crime of violence or to avoid giving testimony in any criminal proceeding.
  8. “Ghost gun” means a firearm, including a frame or receiver, that lacks a unique serial number engraved or cased in metal alloy on the frame or receiver by a licensed manufacturer, maker, or importer under federal law or markings in accordance with 27 C.F.R. § 479.102. It does not include a firearm that has been rendered permanently inoperable, or a firearm that is not required to have a serial number in accordance with the federal Gun Control Act of 1968.
  9. “Licensing authorities” means the board of police commissioners of a city or town where the board has been instituted, the chief of police or superintendent of police of other cities and towns having a regular organized police force, and, in towns where there is no chief of police or superintendent of police, it means the town clerk who may issue licenses upon the recommendation of the town sergeant, and it also means any other person or body duly authorized by the city or town charter or by state law.
  10. “Machine gun” means any weapon that shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term also includes the frame or receiver of the weapon, any combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a weapon into a machine gun, and any combination of parts from which a machine gun can be assembled if the parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.
  11. “Major component” means, with respect to a firearm:
    1. The slide or cylinder or the frame or receiver of the firearm; and
    2. In the case of a rifle or shotgun, includes the barrel of the firearm.
  12. “Person” includes an individual, partnership, firm, association, or corporation.
  13. “Pistol” includes any pistol or revolver, and any shotgun, rifle, or similar weapon with overall length less than twenty-six inches (26"), but does not include any pistol or revolver designed for the use of blank cartridges only.
  14. “Sawed-off rifle” means any rifle with overall length of less than twenty-six inches (26") or barrel length of less than sixteen inches (16").
  15. “Sawed-off shotgun” means any shotgun with overall length of less than twenty-six inches (26") or barrel length of less than eighteen inches (18").
  16. “Sell” includes let or hire, give, lend, and transfer, and “purchase” includes hire, accept, and borrow, and “purchasing” shall be construed accordingly.
  17. “Trigger crank” means a trigger actuator that attaches to the trigger of a semi-automatic weapon and causes the weapon to fire by turning the crank handle.
  18. “Undetectable firearm” means any firearm that:
    1. After removal of all parts, other than a major component, is not as detectable by walk-through metal detectors commonly used at airports or other public buildings; or
    2. Any major component of which, if subjected to inspection by the types of detection devices commonly used at airports or other public buildings for security screening, would not generate an image that accurately depicts the shape of the component; or
    3. Is manufactured wholly of plastic, fiberglass, or through a 3D printing process; or
    4. Upon which the frame or receiver lacks a unique serial number engraved or cased into on the frame or receiver by a licensed manufacturer, maker, or importer under federal law, or markings in accordance with 27 C.F.R. § 479.102. Provided, however, this subsection shall not apply to any firearm rendered permanently inoperable or a firearm manufactured prior to 1968.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 1; P.L. 1950, ch. 2452, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-2 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1974, ch. 184, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 660, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 542, § 7; P.L. 1991, ch. 333, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 153, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 275, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 213, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 232, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 5, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 8, § 1; P.L. 2020, ch. 9, § 1; P.L. 2020, ch. 10, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 213, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 232, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2018, ch. 5, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 8, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2020, ch. 9, § 1, and P.L. 2020, ch. 10, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2018, ch. 5, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect ninety (90) days after passage. The act was signed by the Governor on June 1, 2018.

P.L. 2018, ch. 8, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect ninety (90) days after passage. The act was signed by the Governor on June 1, 2018.

P.L. 2020, ch. 9, § 4 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [June 23, 2020] and its provisions shall be enforceable thirty (30) days after passage.”

P.L. 2020, ch. 10, § 4 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [June 23, 2020] and its provisions shall be enforceable thirty (30) days after passage.”

Severability.

P.L. 2020, ch. 9, § 3 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2020, ch. 10, § 3 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

Federal Act References.

The Gun Control Act of 1968, referred to in this section, is codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Child Molestation.

Second degree child molestation poses a serious potential risk of physical injury, and constitutes a crime of violence. United States v. Sherwood, 156 F.3d 219, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23261 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1113, 119 S. Ct. 888, 142 L. Ed. 2d 787, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 725 (1999).

Crime of Violence.

Since it was the Rhode Island General Assembly’s clear and unambiguous intent, manifested just as lucidly in R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-5 and R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-2(4) , that Rhode Island law governed whether a foreign conviction qualified as a predicate “crime of violence” under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-5 , the use of defendant’s Arizona arson conviction under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1703 as a predicate offense under R.I. § 11-47-5 was proper as the mens rea requirement in Arizona exceeded the mens rea requirement in R.I. Gen. Laws 11-4-3 and thus was merely superfluous. State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 216 (2005).

Definition of a firearm is properly construed to mean an instrument such as a pistol which either has the capability to expel a projectile or be readily convertible to do so, including an instrument which is a mere frame or receiver. State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 108 (2013).

Defendant violated the conditions of probation after a conviction for a crime of violence by possession of a replica of an antique revolver with a damaged cylinder, which was a firearm since the cylinder on the revolver could be replaced in a matter of minutes without difficulty and the revolver was thus readily convertible to expel a projectile. State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 108 (2013).

Defendant violated the conditions of probation after a conviction for a crime of violence by possession of a replica of an antique revolver with a damaged cylinder which was a firearm, since the revolver was suitable for use by a simple replacement of the damaged cylinder and thus was not exempted from the definition of a firearm as an antique firearm. State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 108 (2013).

Murder.

Defendant’s convictions satisfied the Blockburger different-crimes test (separate elements of murder and using a firearm), and even if the test was not satisfied, the legislature clearly intended consecutive sentences under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-3.2(c) such that defendant’s sentences did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy in R.I. Const. art. 1, § 7 . State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 113 (2003).

11-47-3. Carrying dangerous weapons or substances when committing crime of violence.

No person shall commit or attempt to commit a crime of violence when armed with or having available any firearm, explosive substance, noxious liquid, gas or substance, or acid. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished: (1) for the first conviction by imprisonment for not less than three (3) nor more than ten (10) years; (2) for a second conviction under this section by imprisonment for not less than ten (10) nor more than twenty (20) years; and (3) for a third or subsequent conviction the person convicted shall be sentenced to not less than fifteen (15) years to life imprisonment. For the penalties provided in this section he or she shall not be afforded the provisions of suspension or deferment of sentence, nor of probation.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-3 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 183, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 16, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 544, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Double Jeopardy.

Conviction for crime of violence following conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, where all elements of the former crime are included in proof of the latter, was double jeopardy. State v. Boudreau, 113 R.I. 497 , 322 A.2d 626, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1203 (1974).

Convicting defendant of both assault with a deadly weapon pursuant to § 11-5-2 and possession of a pistol during commission of a crime of violence pursuant to this section was unconstitutional, as both convictions stemmed from the same incident. State v. Grullon, 117 R.I. 682 , 371 A.2d 265, 1977 R.I. LEXIS 1739 (1977).

Where two crimes of violence — robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon — were committed at the same time as part of the same criminal transaction, the state could not single out the robbery as the underlying crime of violence for a charge of committing a crime of violence while armed and thereby evade the double-jeopardy violation that would result from using the assault charge as the underlying crime of violence. State v. Ashness, 461 A.2d 659, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 959 (1983).

Where possession of the same shotgun and possession of the same cocaine served as the basis for charges of possession of cocaine while having available a shotgun, and possession of a shotgun while committing a crime of violence, being in possession of cocaine, double jeopardy attached. In re Malik D., 730 A.2d 1070, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1999).

Defendant waived an argument that convictions and separate sentences for second-degree murder and carrying a dangerous weapon in the commission of a crime of violence violated double jeopardy guarantees by failing to raise it in a pretrial motion; nonetheless, the court ruled on the merits and held in furtherance of Rodriguez, that the two crimes were separate for double jeopardy purposes as each required an element that the other did not, namely, commission of a murder and the carrying of a dangerous weapon. State v. McGuy, 841 A.2d 1109, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 209 (2003).

Dual convictions for carrying a dangerous weapon when committing a crime of violence and first-degree robbery did not constitute a double jeopardy violation because each offense included an additional element of proof that was not contained in the other; the jury could have returned a verdict of guilty on the robbery charge based on either defendant’s use of a dangerous weapon or the injury inflicted upon the victim, while the conviction for committing a crime of violence while armed or having available a firearm did not require that the weapon be used or that there be an injury to the victim. State v. Stone, 924 A.2d 773, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 77 (2007).

Collateral References.

Fact that gun was unloaded as affecting criminal responsibility. 68 A.L.R.4th 507.

Firearm used as bludgeon as a deadly weapon. 8 A.L.R. 319.

Tear gas gun as a dangerous or deadly weapon. 92 A.L.R. 1098.

What constitutes “possession” of firearm for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), providing penalty for possession of firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking crime or crime of violence. 89 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 37.

What constitutes “use” of firearm for purposes of 18 USCS § 924(c)(1), providing penalty for use of firearm during drug trafficking crime or crime of violence. 125 A.L.R. Fed. 545.

11-47-3.1. Carrying a stolen firearm when committing a crime of violence.

No person shall commit a crime of violence when armed with or having available a stolen firearm. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished: (1) for the first conviction by imprisonment for not less than five (5) nor more than fifteen (15) years; (2) for a second conviction under this section by imprisonment for not less than fifteen (15) nor more than twenty (20) years; and (3) for a third or subsequent conviction under this section by imprisonment for not less than twenty (20) years and may be imprisoned for life. The sentence imposed shall be consecutive to the underlying sentence for the crime of violence.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 438, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 455, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 464, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 455, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 464, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

What constitutes “possession” of firearm for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), providing penalty for possession of firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking crime or crime of violence. 89 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 37.

What constitutes “use” of firearm for purposes of 18 USCS § 924(c)(1), providing penalty for use of firearm during drug trafficking crime or crime of violence. 125 A.L.R. Fed. 545.

11-47-3.2. Using a firearm when committing a crime of violence.

  1. No person shall use a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished: (1) for the first offense by imprisonment for ten (10) years; however, if the violation was committed by use of a machine gun as defined in § 11-47-2(10) , the term of imprisonment shall be thirty (30) years; (2) for a second conviction under this section by imprisonment for twenty (20) years; however, if the violation was committed by use of a machine gun as defined in § 11-47-2(10) , the term of imprisonment shall be life; and (3) for a third or subsequent conviction, the person shall be sentenced to life, or life without the possibility of parole by the sentencing judge after consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances contained in §§ 12-19.2-3 and 12-19.2-4 . Any sentence imposed upon a person pursuant to this section shall be imposed consecutively to and not concurrently with any sentence imposed for the underlying crime or attempted crime, and the person shall not be afforded the benefits of deferment of sentence or parole; provided, that unless sentenced to life without the possibility of parole pursuant to subdivision (3) of this subsection, a person sentenced to life under this section may be granted parole.
  2. Every person who, while committing an offense violating subsection (a) of this section, discharges a firearm shall be guilty of a felony and be imprisoned as follows:
    1. Ten (10) years, if no injury to any other person results from the discharge;
    2. Twenty (20) years, if a person other than a police officer is injured by the discharge of the firearm, or if a police officer who is engaged in the performance of his or her duty is deliberately endangered by the person’s discharge of the firearm;
    3. Life, if a police officer who is engaged in the performance of his or her duty is injured by the discharge of the firearm; and
    4. Life, if the death or permanent incapacity of any person (other than the person convicted) results from the discharge of the firearm; provided that, involuntary manslaughter shall not be considered a “crime of violence” for the purpose of subdivision (b)(4) only.
  3. The penalties defined in subsection (b) of this section shall run consecutively, and not concurrently, to any other sentence imposed and, notwithstanding the provisions of chapter 8 of title 13, the person shall not be afforded the benefits of deferment of sentence or parole; provided, that a person sentenced to life under subdivision (b)(3) or (b)(4) of this section may be granted parole.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2000, ch. 285, § 2; P.L. 2012, ch. 216, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 230, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 216, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 230, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Imposition of two consecutive terms of life imprisonment for first-degree murder and using a firearm while committing a crime of violence resulting in death did not violate Eighth Amendment or R.I. Const. art. I, § 8 ; the sentence imposed was mandatory and the crime was precisely that type the Legislature intended to address when it provided for a mandatory consecutive life sentence for using a firearm while committing murder. State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 81 (2007).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-3.2(b)(3) and (c), imposing a mandatory consecutive sentence for discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence with death resulting, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Killers who used firearms during a robbery were not a suspect class, and the legislature could rationally conclude that making penalties harsher for people using a firearm during a robbery which resulted in death would act as a deterrence that would save lives. State v. DeJesus, 947 A.2d 873, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 64 (2008).

Defendant’s convictions and sentences for using a firearm to commit second-degree murder and second degree murder did not violate double jeopardy because (1) each crime required proof of a fact the other did not, and (2) the legislature intended consecutive sentences under the circumstances. Linde v. State, 78 A.3d 738, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 135 (2013).

Defendant’s consecutive life sentence for using a firearm to commit second-degree murder did not violate the Eighth Amendment or R.I. Const. art. I, § 8 because (1) no violation had been found in the context of first-degree murder, and that holding did not depend on the classification of murder, and (2) the legislature intended the sentence to apply to crimes such as defendant’s. Linde v. State, 78 A.3d 738, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 135 (2013).

Applicability.

Defendant’s convictions satisfied the Blockburger different-crimes test (separate elements of murder and using a firearm), and even if the test was not satisfied, the legislature clearly intended consecutive sentences under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-3.2(c) such that defendant’s sentences did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy in R.I. Const. art. 1, § 7 . State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 113 (2003).

Constitutional challenges to the imposition of a mandatory life sentence of imprisonment upon defendant’s conviction for discharge of a firearm while committing a crime of violence resulting in death, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-3.2 , which was to run consecutive to a sentence imposed for his conviction of second-degree murder, were not improper in a R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 motion, as the sentence was not illegal; the trial court had no discretion but to impose the mandatory, consecutive life sentence in the circumstances. State v. Linde, 965 A.2d 415, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 20 (2009).

First defendant and second defendant’s contention, that the singular-person language of R.I. Gen. Laws 11-47-3.2(b)(3) required the State to prove a particular defendant personally discharged a firearm resulting in death or injury, dictated that they be acquitted because the State could not do so had to be rejected. Vicarious liability applied to that firearm statute, and R.I. Gen. Stat. § 43-3-4 dictated that in interpreting a state statute, every word importing the singular number only could be construed to extend to and to include the plural number also. State v. Ros, 973 A.2d 1148, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 96 (2009).

Admissibility of Evidence.

In a prosecution for using a firearm while committing a crime of violence, the trial court properly admitted a statement the victim made to police, soon after defendant shot him, to tell his father he loved him, as it tended to establish that he was injured by the discharge of the firearm, and any prejudice to defendant paled in comparison to the impact of seeing the victim testify from a wheelchair about the incidents leading to his permanent paralysis. State v. Covington, 69 A.3d 855, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 123 (2013).

Consecutive Sentences.

Superior court properly denied defendant’s application for postconviction relief because, inter alia, defendant’s contention that the trial justice erred by sentencing him to life without parole for first-degree murder followed by a consecutive life sentence under § 11-47-3.2 —was barred by the doctrine of res judicata in § 10-9.1-8 ; further, defendant did not file a motion to reduce his sentence under R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35 , and § 11-47-3.2 mandated that his sentence under that statute was to run consecutively to any other sentence imposed. Graham v. State, 229 A.3d 63, 2020 R.I. LEXIS 43 (2020).

Double Jeopardy.

Defendant was not entitled to acquittal on double jeopardy grounds as to convictions for discharging a firearm in commission of a crime of violence and assault with intent to murder because the legislature clearly intended multiple sentences for such convictions arising from one incident. State v. Young, 78 A.3d 787, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 142 (2013).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

As a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the weapon used in the murder and both rounds which hit the victim were fired from the same weapon and from the same direction and that defendant fired those rounds, defendant was not entitled to a judgment of acquittal as to the charges of second-degree murder, discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence resulting in the death of another, and unlicensed possession of a firearm. State v. Reyes, 984 A.2d 606, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 144 (2009).

Collateral References.

What constitutes “possession” of firearm for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), providing penalty for possession of firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking crime or crime of violence. 89 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 37.

11-47-4. Being armed prima facie evidence of intention.

In the trial of a person for committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence, the fact that he or she was armed with or had available a pistol or revolver without license to carry it, or was armed with or had available a machine gun, shall be prima facie evidence of his or her intention to commit the crime of violence.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-3 ; G.L., § 11-47-4 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

11-47-5. Possession of firearms by certain persons prohibited.

  1. No person shall purchase, own, carry, transport, or have in his or her possession any firearm if that person:
    1. Has been convicted in this state or elsewhere of a crime of violence;
    2. Is a fugitive from justice;
    3. Has, in this state or elsewhere, entered a plea of nolo contendere to or been convicted of an offense punishable as a felony under § 12-29-5 ; or
    4. Has, in this state or elsewhere, entered a plea of nolo contendere to or been convicted of any of the following offenses punishable as a misdemeanor under § 12-29-5 :
      1. Simple assault (§ 11-5-3 );
      2. Cyberstalking and cyberharassment (§ 11-52-4.2 );
      3. Violation of a protective order (as set forth in § 12-29-2(a)(10) ; or
      4. Disorderly conduct (§ 11-45-1 ).
        1. A disorderly conduct conviction shall result in prohibition under this section if and only if the offense involves the use or attempted use of force or the threatened use of a dangerous weapon.
    5. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all persons who enter a plea of nolo contendere to or have been convicted of any of the offenses specified in subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) of this section, unless and until that person’s matter has been expunged, or upon the completion of the sentence of a one-year filing, or the end of a one-year probationary period that no longer constitutes a conviction pursuant to § 12-18-3 .
  2. No person shall purchase, carry, transport, or have in his or her possession any firearm if that person is subject to an order issued pursuant to chapter 15 of title 15, chapter 8.1 of title 8, or an equivalent order in this state or elsewhere, which order was issued after the person restrained has received notice of the proceedings and had an opportunity to be heard.
  3. No person who is in community confinement pursuant to the provisions of § 42-56-20.2 , or who is otherwise subject to electronic surveillance or monitoring devices as a condition of parole, shall purchase, carry, transport, or have in his or her possession any firearm. This subsection shall not apply to any person who has not been convicted of (or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to) a crime of violence in a court of competent jurisdiction.
  4. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not less than two (2) nor more than ten (10) years; and for penalties provided in this section he or she shall not be afforded the benefit of suspension or deferment of sentence nor of probation.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-4 ; G.L., § 11-47-5 , as enacted by P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 183, § 2; P.L. 1995, ch. 50, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 275, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Sale of arms to criminal or fugitive, § 11-47-37 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The statutory language of this section is unambiguous and requires no interpretation. State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1852 (1980).

Constructive Possession.

The evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s constructive possession of a firearm since it was clearly established that the gun was seized from the defendant’s apartment over which he exercised dominion and control. State v. Mastracchio, 672 A.2d 438, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1996).

Since defendant was also convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon in addition to possessing it as a convicted felon, a jury instruction regarding constructive possession was superfluous and harmless. State v. Fisher, 844 A.2d 112, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 55 (2004).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial because there was ample evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant was in constructive possession of a gun found in his girlfriend’s apartment; the testimony reflected that defendant spent considerable time at the apartment, his name was on the mailbox, and the girlfriend testified that she had no experience with or understanding of firearms. State v. Yon, 161 A.3d 1118, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 83 (2017).

Evidence — Sufficiency.

Convictions under this section were upheld where firearms were in plain view of arresting officers. Ouimette v. Howard, 468 F.2d 1363, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 6891 (1st Cir. 1972); State v. Ouimette, 108 R.I. 283 , 274 A.2d 732, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1261 (1971); State v. Carillo, 113 R.I. 32 , 317 A.2d 449, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1133 (1974).

Prior Convictions.

When the state introduced evidence that the defendant had previously been convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon in order to establish the pending charge of possession of a firearm after conviction of a crime of violence, the trial court was under no obligation to, sua sponte , give an immediate limiting instruction, but properly addressed the matter in his final charge to the jury. State v. Mastracchio, 672 A.2d 438, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1996).

Since it was the Rhode Island General Assembly’s clear and unambiguous intent, manifested just as lucidly in R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-5 and R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-2(4) , that Rhode Island law governed whether a foreign conviction qualified as a predicate “crime of violence” under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-5 , the use of defendant’s Arizona arson conviction under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1703 as a predicate offense under R.I. § 11-47-5 was proper as the mens rea requirement in Arizona exceeded the mens rea requirement in R.I. Gen. Laws 11-4-3 and thus was merely superfluous. State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 216 (2005).

Prior Juvenile Adjudication.

A prior juvenile adjudication constitutes a conviction within the context of this section for the exclusive purposes of family court proceedings. In re Bernard H., 557 A.2d 864, 1989 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1989).

Sentence.

A trial justice did not err by failing to apply the “rule of lenity” when he entered judgments of conviction both under this section and § 11-23-1 because these sections represent two distinct statutory offenses and one requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not. State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1852 (1980).

Speedy Trial.

The defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated, requiring vacating of his conviction for possession of a firearm charge in violation of this section that was brought to trial almost 11 years after the defendant’s indictment. State v. Powers, 643 A.2d 827, 1994 R.I. LEXIS 201 (1994).

Collateral References.

Carrying concealed weapon, offense of, as affected by manner of carrying or place of concealment. 43 A.L.R.2d 492.

Carrying weapon on person, offense of, as affected by place where defendant was at the time. 73 A.L.R. 839.

What constitutes actual or constructive possession of unregistered or otherwise prohibited firearm in violation of 26 USCS § 5861. 133 A.L.R. Fed. 347.

What constitutes “constructive possession” of unregistered or otherwise prohibited weapon under state law. 88 A.L.R.5th 121.

11-47-5.1. Larceny of a firearm.

  1. Every person who shall steal any firearm shall be deemed guilty of larceny. “Firearm”, as utilized in this section only, shall not apply to an air rifle, air pistol, “blank gun,” or “BB gun.” Every person violating the provisions of this section shall be sentenced, upon conviction, to not less than one year nor more than ten (10) years.
  2. No person shall steal any firearm as defined in this section and then sell, lend, or transfer the firearm or firearms. Any person convicted of violating the provisions of this subsection shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten (10) years nor more than twenty (20) years, and the sentence shall be consecutive to any other sentence he or she may receive or is serving.

History of Section. P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 285, § 1.

11-47-5.2. Possession of a stolen firearm.

It shall be unlawful for any person to possess a stolen firearm, knowing it to be stolen. Any person in violation of this section shall be guilty of a felony and subject to imprisonment for not less than three (3) years nor more than fifteen (15) years.

History of Section. P.L. 2013, ch. 455, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 464, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 455, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 464, § 2 enacted nearly identical versions of this section.

11-47-5.3. Surrender of firearms by persons convicted of domestic violence offenses.

  1. Pleading nolo contendere to or conviction of an offense under § 12-29-2 which is punishable as a felony shall prohibit the defendant from purchasing, owning, carrying, transporting, or having in their possession or control any firearm. Upon such a plea or conviction, the court shall issue an order declaring that the defendant surrender all firearm(s) owned by the defendant, or in the defendant’s possession, care, custody, or control as described in this section.
    1. Surrender shall be made within twenty-four (24) hours of prohibition to a law enforcement agency or to a federally licensed firearms dealer. The arresting law enforcement agency shall be immediately notified of the order to surrender firearm(s). A law enforcement agency or federally licensed firearms dealer taking possession of a firearm(s) shall issue proof of surrender to the person surrendering the firearm(s). The proof of surrender shall include the name of the person; the name of the law enforcement agency or federally licensed firearms dealer; the date of surrender; the serial number; the manufacturer; and model of all surrendered firearm(s).
    2. The defendant may transport their firearm(s) during the twenty-four hour (24) surrender period directly to the law enforcement agency or federally licensed firearms dealer, provided that the firearm(s) is broken down, unloaded, and carried as openly as circumstances will permit, or provided that the pistols or revolvers are unloaded and secured in a separate container suitable for the purpose.
    3. The defendant shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after being served with the order, either:
      1. File a copy of proof of surrender with the court and attest that all firearm(s) owned by the defendant, or in the defendant’s possession, care, custody, or control at the time of the plea or conviction, have been surrendered in accordance with this section and that the defendant currently owns no firearm(s) or has any firearm(s) in their care, custody, or control; or
      2. Attest that, at the time of the plea or conviction, the defendant owned no firearm(s) and had no firearm(s) in their care, custody, or control, and that the defendant currently owns no firearm(s) and has no firearm(s) in their possession, care, custody, or control.
    4. The list of firearm(s) surrendered shall be kept under seal and shall not be part of the public record.
      1. If the defendant chooses to surrender a firearm(s) to a law enforcement agency, the law enforcement agency shall follow the policies established by the police officer’s commission on standards and training for the return or disposal of the firearm(s).
      2. The police officer’s commission on standards and training shall establish policies for the return or disposal of firearms that are surrendered pursuant to any court order, provided that such policies require that the defendant be notified of the return or disposal, and that the owner receive any financial value received from the disposal, less the cost associated with taking possession of, storing, and disposing of the firearm(s) and provided that no disposal shall occur while any appeal of the conviction is pending.
    5. If the defendant, or their designee, transfers a firearm(s) to a federally licensed firearms dealer pursuant to this section, the defendant may instruct the federally licensed firearms dealer to sell the firearm(s) or to transfer ownership pursuant to state and federal law to a qualified named individual who is not a member of the defendant’s dwelling house. The owner of any firearm(s) sold shall receive any financial value received from their sale, less the cost associated with taking possession of, storing, and transferring of the firearm(s).
    6. Every individual, to whom ownership of a firearm(s) is transferred pursuant to this section, shall be prohibited from transferring or returning any firearm(s) to the defendant and shall be informed of this prohibition.
  2. (i) Any knowing violation of subsection (a)(7) of this section is a felony which shall be punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment for a term of not less than one year and not more than five (5) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 212, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 214, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 212, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 214, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2016, ch. 212, § 3, provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2017.

P.L. 2016, ch. 214, § 3, provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2017.

11-47-5.4. Surrender of firearms after domestic violence offenses.

  1. A plea of nolo contendere, resulting in a filing or probation or conviction shall prohibit the defendant from purchasing, carrying, transporting, or having in his or her possession any firearm. Upon such a plea or conviction, the court shall order the defendant to surrender all firearms owned by the person or in the person’s possession as described in this section.
    1. Surrender shall be made within twenty-four (24) hours of prohibition to the Rhode Island state police or local law enforcement or to a licensed gun dealer. The arresting law enforcement agency shall be immediately notified by the court of the order to surrender firearms. A law enforcement agency or licensed gun dealer taking possession of a firearm shall issue a proof of surrender to the person surrendering the firearm. The proof of surrender must include the name of the person, the date of surrender, and the serial number, manufacturer, and model of all surrendered firearms.
    2. A defendant transporting a firearm to surrender in accordance with this section shall not be liable to prosecution under §§ 11-47-5(d) or 11-47-8 .
    3. The defendant shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after being served with the order, either:
      1. File a copy of proof of surrender with the court of jurisdiction, and attest that all firearms owned by the person or in the person’s possession at the time of plea or conviction have been surrendered in accordance with this section and that the person currently owns no firearms and has no firearms in his or her possession; or
      2. Attest that, at the time of plea or conviction, the person owned no firearms and had no firearms in their possession, and that the person currently owns no firearms and has no firearms in his or her possession.
    4. The court of jurisdiction’s copy of proof of surrender shall be kept under seal and shall not be part of the public record.
    5. The Rhode Island state police are authorized to develop rules, regulations and procedures pertaining to the storage of firearms that are surrendered pursuant to this section. The Rhode Island state police may consult with the Rhode Island Police Chiefs’ Association in developing rules and procedures. Law enforcement agencies and departments shall observe due care in the receipt and storage of any firearm surrendered pursuant to this section. No law enforcement agency shall dispose of any firearm surrendered pursuant to this section unless that firearm is abandoned as provided in this section. The Rhode Island state police may consult with the Rhode Island Police Chiefs’ Association in developing rules and procedures.
    6. A firearm surrendered to the Rhode Island state police or a local police department under this section shall be deemed abandoned if:
      1. Six (6) years have passed from the date of the completion of the defendant’s sentence for an offense enumerated in § 11-47-5(a)(4) ; and
      2. During the two (2) years following the six-year (6) period described in subsection (a)(6)(i) of this section, the Rhode Island state police or local police department has provided notice to the defendant, on at least two (2) separate occasions, that if the firearm is not reclaimed it shall be disposed of; and
      3. After the two-year (2) period described in subsection (a)(6)(ii) of this section and after notice to the defendant, the defendant fails to reclaim the firearm.
    7. The Rhode Island state police may dispose of an abandoned firearm at any time, provided that no disposal shall occur while any appeal of the conviction for a crime enumerated in § 11-47-5(a)(4) is pending and provided that the owner of the firearm receives any financial value generated from its disposal less the cost associated with disposing of the firearm.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 3; P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 3, and P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 3 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-47-5.5. Motion to lift firearms prohibition for persons convicted of specified misdemeanor domestic violence offenses — Consecutive prohibitions — Return of surrendered firearms.

  1. A person prohibited from purchasing, owning, carrying, transporting, or having in their possession any firearm solely because of a plea of nolo contendere to or a conviction of an offense enumerated in § 11-47-5(a)(4) may file a motion in the district court to have that firearm prohibition lifted in accordance with this section. A person who is otherwise prohibited under state law from purchasing, owning, carrying, transporting, or having in their possession any firearm shall not be eligible for relief under this section.
  2. Except for those cases where the defendant is eligible to reclaim firearms after the one year completion of a filing or probation under § 12-18-3 , a person shall become eligible to file a motion seeking relief under this section after five (5) years from the date of the completion of his or her sentence, unless, during that five (5)-year period, the person enters a plea of nolo contendere to or is convicted of any new offense enumerated in § 11-47-5(a)(4) .
    1. A person already prohibited from purchasing, owning, carrying, transporting, or having in their possession any firearm under § 11-47-5(a)(4) who pleads nolo contendere to or is convicted of any new offense enumerated in § 11-47-5(a)(4) shall be subject to an additional six (6)-year firearm prohibition under § 11-47-5(a)(4). That additional prohibition shall run consecutively to the prohibition already in effect at the time the person pleaded nolo contendere to or was convicted of the new offense.
    2. A person made subject to consecutive firearms prohibitions in accordance with this subsection shall not become eligible to file a motion seeking relief under this section until their consecutive prohibition periods have fully elapsed.
  3. No filing fee shall be charged for the filing of a motion seeking relief under this section.
  4. The district court shall schedule a hearing on a motion seeking relief under this section no later than thirty (30) days from the date the motion is filed.
  5. The district court shall only consider whether the required amount of time to retrieve the firearms has expired, and that no other legal prohibition exists to prevent the respondent from recovering his or her firearms. If the court lifts a person’s firearm prohibition pursuant to this section, the court shall issue the person written notice that the person is no longer prohibited from purchasing, owning, carrying, transporting, or having in his or her possession any firearm under § 11-47-5(a)(4) .
  6. A firearm surrendered to the Rhode Island state police or a local police department by a person formerly prohibited under § 11-47-5(a)(4) who is granted relief under this section shall be returned to the person upon his or her request when:
    1. The person formerly prohibited under § 11-47-5(a)(4) provides written proof issued by the court indicating that the firearm prohibition has been lifted pursuant to this section; and
    2. The Rhode Island state police or a local police department determines that the person formerly prohibited under § 11-47-5(a)(4) is not otherwise prohibited from possessing a firearm under state or federal law.
  7. A court’s grant of relief pursuant to this section shall not constitute an expungement, nor shall it in any way impact, negate, or otherwise modify the person’s prior conviction of an offense enumerated in § 11-47-5(a)(4) .

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 6; P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 374, § 6, and P.L. 2017, ch. 385, § 6 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-47-6. Mental incompetents and drug addicts prohibited from possession of firearms.

No person who is under guardianship or treatment or confinement by virtue of being a mental incompetent, or who has been adjudicated or is under treatment or confinement as a drug addict, shall purchase, own, carry, transport, or have in his or her possession or under his or her control any firearm. Any person affected by the provisions of this section, other than a person who has been pronounced criminally insane by competent medical authority, after the lapse of a period of five (5) years from the date of being pronounced cured by competent medical authority, may, upon presentation of an affidavit issued by competent medical authority to the effect that he or she is a mentally stable person and a proper person to possess firearms, make application for the purchase of the firearm(s). Any person affected by the provisions of this section, in making application for the purchase of firearms and in executing the application, voluntarily waives his or her right to refuse or refrain from disclosing any confidential information, including, but not limited to, any information arising from the physician-patient relationship, pertinent to a determination by the proper authorities regarding the approval or disapproval of this application. Any person affected by the provisions of this section, in making application for the purchase of firearms and in executing the application, further agrees to allow the proper authorities to investigate any and all medical records of the applicant pertinent to a determination by the authorities regarding the approval or disapproval of this application. In the event that the application is approved, and if the person has no other disqualifying record, he or she will be allowed to purchase and possess firearms.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 346, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 391, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 346, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 391, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Sale of pistol or revolver to mental incompetent, drug addict or habitual drunkard prohibited, § 11-47-37 .

Society for prevention of cruelty to animals, exemption of agents, § 4-1-21 .

Collateral References.

Proscription of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) That Persons Who Are Unlawful Users of or Addicted to Any Controlled Substance Cannot Possess Any Firearm or Ammunition in or Affecting Commerce. 44 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3 (2019).

What constitutes actual or constructive possession of unregistered or otherwise prohibited firearm in violation of 26 USCS § 5861. 133 A.L.R. Fed. 347.

11-47-7. Possession of firearm by alien.

  1. No unnaturalized foreign born person who entered the United States in violation of the laws of the United States or, having legally entered the United States in a lawful manner, but now remains in the United States in violation of the laws of the United States, shall purchase, own, carry, transport, or have in his or her possession or under his or her control any firearm.
  2. When any person is charged under this section, the law enforcement agency bringing the charge shall, prior to arraignment, notify the United States Office of Immigration and Naturalization of the charge and further notify the court, at arraignment, of the alleged status of the person so charged.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 300, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 146, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Collateral References.

What constitutes actual or constructive possession of unregistered or otherwise prohibited firearm in violation of 26 USCS § 5861. 133 A.L.R. Fed. 347.

11-47-8. License or permit required for carrying pistol — Other weapons prohibited.

  1. No person shall, without a license or permit issued as provided in §§ 11-47-11 , 11-47-12 , and 11-47-18 , carry a pistol or revolver in any vehicle or conveyance or on or about his or her person whether visible or concealed, except in his or her dwelling house or place of business or on land possessed by him or her or as provided in §§ 11-47-9 and 11-47-10 . The provisions of these sections shall not apply to any person who is the holder of a valid license or permit issued by the licensing authority of another state, or territory of the United States, or political subdivision of the state or territory, allowing him or her to carry a pistol or revolver in any vehicle or conveyance or on or about his or her person whether visible or concealed, provided the person is merely transporting the firearm through the state in a vehicle or other conveyance without any intent on the part of the person to detain him or herself or remain within the state of Rhode Island. No person shall manufacture, sell, purchase, or possess a machine gun except as otherwise provided in this chapter. Every person violating the provision of this section shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten (10) years, or by a fine up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both, and except for a first conviction under this section, shall not be afforded the provisions of suspension or deferment of sentence, nor a probation.
  2. No person shall have in his or her possession or under his or her control any sawed-off shotgun or sawed-off rifle as defined in § 11-47-2 . Any person convicted of violating this subsection shall be punished by imprisonment for up to ten (10) years, or by a fine of up to five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  3. No person shall have in his or her possession or under his or her control any firearm while the person delivers, possesses with intent to deliver, or manufactures a controlled substance. Any person convicted of violating this subsection shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two (2) years nor more than twenty (20) years, and the sentence shall be consecutive to any sentence the person may receive for the delivery, possession with intent to deliver, or the manufacture of the controlled substance. It shall not be a defense to a violation of this subsection that a person has a license or permit to carry or possess a firearm.
  4. It shall be unlawful for any person to possess a bump-fire device, binary trigger, trigger crank, or any other device that when attached to a semi-automatic weapon allows full-automatic fire. Individuals who possess these items shall have ninety (90) days from the enactment of this section to either sell, destroy, or otherwise remove these items from the state of Rhode Island. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten (10) years, or by a fine up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both, and, except for a first conviction under this section, shall not be afforded the provisions of suspension or deferment of sentence, nor a probation.
  5. No person shall manufacture, sell, offer to sell, transfer, purchase, possess, or have under his or her control a ghost gun or an undetectable firearm or any firearm produced by a 3D printing process. Any person convicted of violating this subsection shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than ten (10) years, or by a fine up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both and except for a first conviction under this section shall not be afforded the provisions of suspension or deferment of sentence, probation, nor fine. These provisions shall not apply to federally licensed manufacturers (FLN) pursuant to Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) regulations.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-5 ; G.L., § 11-47-8 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 183, § 3; P.L. 1974, ch. 184, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 389, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 227, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 422, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 460, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 11; P.L. 2018, ch. 5, § 3; P.L. 2018, ch. 8, § 3; P.L. 2020, ch. 9, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 10, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 5, § 3, and P.L. 2018, ch. 8, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2020, ch. 9, § 2, and P.L. 2020, ch. 10, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2018, ch. 5, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect ninety (90) days after passage. The act was signed by the Governor on June 1, 2018.

P.L. 2018, ch. 8, § 4, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect ninety (90) days after passage. The act was signed by the Governor on June 1, 2018.

P.L. 2020, ch. 9, § 4 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [June 23, 2020] and its provisions shall be enforceable thirty (30) days after passage.”

P.L. 2020, ch. 10, § 4 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [June 23, 2020] and its provisions shall be enforceable thirty (30) days after passage.”

Severability.

P.L. 2020, ch. 9, § 3 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

P.L. 2020, ch. 10, § 3 provides: “If any provisions of the act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provisions or applications of this act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The statute is not an unconstitutional infringement of the right to keep and bear arms assured by Rhode Island Const., art. 1, § 22. State v. Storms, 112 R.I. 121 , 308 A.2d 463, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 962 (1973).

This statute is not unconstitutional because Rhode Island Const., art. 1, § 23, providing that the enumeration of rights in the declaration of rights is not to be construed to impair rights retained by the people, does not guarantee a right of self-defense. State v. Storms, 112 R.I. 121 , 308 A.2d 463, 1973 R.I. LEXIS 962 (1973).

Burden of Proof.

Where defendant is charged with carrying a pistol without a license the defendant has the burden of raising the issue of license or justification in the first instance and once the issue has been raised the burden would be upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense charged. State v. Neary, 122 R.I. 506 , 409 A.2d 551, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1569 (1979).

Although § 11-47-27 creates an implication that possession of a handgun in violation of § 11-47-8 constitutes evidence that such possession was unlawful, such a statutory inference does not relieve the state of its constitutional burden to prove that defendant’s possession of the weapon was unlawful. Section 11-47-27 does nothing more than shift the evidentiary burden of production to the defendant, and once the defendant has raised the issue of justification and has satisfied the burden of production, the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s possession was unlawful shifts back to the state. In re Samuel P., 626 A.2d 224, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 170 (1993).

Since it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove every element of charged offenses the prosecutor, in his opening to the trial jury, had every right to outline in good faith the evidence that the state intended to present, even if included in the recitation were details relating to other uncharged substantive offenses. State v. Morris, 744 A.2d 850, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 16 (2000).

“Carrying” or “Possession.”

“Carry” and “possession” involve largely the same legal ramifications. State v. Benevides, 425 A.2d 77, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1030 (1981).

The essential element of “carry” in this section means an intentional control of the designated object with the knowledge of its nature. State v. Benevides, 425 A.2d 77, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1030 (1981).

The element of possession or carrying is not conditioned on the time that a person has an item under control: knowing or conscious contact with an item, albeit fleeting and momentary, is sufficient to constitute possession or carrying. State v. Benevides, 425 A.2d 77, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1030 (1981).

Evidence sufficiently supported the inference that a discarded gun had been carried by the defendant and discarded by him, and that it was operable until damaged in being discarded. State v. Benevides, 425 A.2d 77, 1981 R.I. LEXIS 1030 (1981).

Evidence was sufficient for a conviction under subsection (c) since the defendant, while a passenger in a van, had in his possession heroin that he later transferred to an informant and, en route to the delivery, he was aware of a gun which was loaded and strategically positioned toward the passenger side of the van. Constructive possession can occur when an individual exercises dominion and control over an object even though it is not within his physical possession. State v. Reyes, 671 A.2d 1236, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1996).

Evidence was sufficient under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-8(a) to establish that defendant had constructive possession of the firearm that was found in a vehicle that was registered to defendant’s girlfriend, because defendant was the only driver of the vehicle who was aware of the gun’s presence, as defendant had admitted to knowledge of the gun’s presence, and defendant’s girlfriend, the only other driver of the vehicle, denied knowledge of the gun’s presence. State v. Arenas, 800 A.2d 432, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 155 (2002).

Double Jeopardy.

Where possession of the same shotgun and possession of the same cocaine served as the basis for charges of possession of cocaine while having available a shotgun, and possession of a shotgun while committing a crime of violence, being in possession of cocaine, double jeopardy attached. In re Malik D., 730 A.2d 1070, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 136 (1999).

Defendant’s convictions satisfied the Blockburger different-crimes test (separate elements of murder and using a firearm), and even if the test was not satisfied, the legislature clearly intended consecutive sentences under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-3.2(c) such that defendant’s sentences did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy in R.I. Const. art. 1, § 7 . State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 113 (2003).

Dwelling-House Exception.

The dwelling-house exception set forth in this section was applicable in a case in which the defendant was found in possession of a handgun in the attic of a building designed or once used as a multifamily dwelling, where the evidence showed that the defendant’s family, by use of the building, had exclusive control over the hallway and the attic so as to constitute the premises of the dwelling house pursuant to this section and the state did not present any evidence showing the existence of any tenancies or independent living units within the building. In re Samuel P., 626 A.2d 224, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 170 (1993).

Joinder.

Charge of malicious killing of an animal was properly not severed from a charge of possession of a sawed-off shotgun, when defendant argued the denial of defendant’s motion to sever denied defendant the ability to testify in defense of the first charge due to a risk defendant would be cross-examined to fill a gap in the State’s evidence as to the second charge because defendant did not sufficiently show prejudice, as defendant’s testimony was not required to prove the State’s case as to the second charge, since the State had overwhelming evidence supporting that charge. State v. Goulet, 21 A.3d 302, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 80 (2011).

Knowledge and Intent.

Conviction required a knowing or conscious carrying of an unlicensed pistol or revolver and trial court’s failure to instruct on question of knowledge was error. State v. Russo, 113 R.I. 248 , 319 A.2d 655, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1167 (1974).

Since the sole issue in a case under this section is whether defendant was licensed to carry a weapon, his reasons for carrying the weapon were irrelevant. State v. Pope, 414 A.2d 781, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1640 (1980), overruled in part, State v. Acquisto, 463 A.2d 122, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1012 (1983).

Trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that defendant was not guilty, under R.I. Gen Laws § 11-47-8(a) , if he honestly and reasonably believed that he had unloaded the gun before transporting it; defendant’s proposed instruction was legally incorrect, because even if the unloaded requirement was met by defendant’s mistaken belief that such was the case, he could have been convicted of a violation of § 11-47-8(a) on the ground that the gun was not securely wrapped, as was required by R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-9 . State v. Keiser, 796 A.2d 471, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 71 (2002).

Search and Seizure.

As defendant was not under arrest when a police officer handcuffed him and placed him in her cruiser for her own safety, she did not need probable cause to do so; and as he was detained only long enough for her to search his car for weapons, the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress a revolver and ammunition she found in his car. State v. Santos, 64 A.3d 314, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 65 (2013).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress a gun and ammunition seized from his car, as a police officer had a reasonable belief that he might be armed and dangerous based on her observation of loose bullets in his car; his furtive movements and avoidance of eye contact; his positioning of his hands so she could not see them; and her discovery of a knife during a cursory pat-down of his clothing. State v. Santos, 64 A.3d 314, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 65 (2013).

Sufficiency of Evidence.

As a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the weapon used in the murder and both rounds which hit the victim were fired from the same weapon and from the same direction and that defendant fired those rounds, defendant was not entitled to a judgment of acquittal as to the charges of second-degree murder, discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence resulting in the death of another, and unlicensed possession of a firearm. State v. Reyes, 984 A.2d 606, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 144 (2009).

As an officer found a revolver within reaching distance of defendant, in a vehicle he was operating, and as he had moved toward the area where the gun was later found, the evidence was sufficient to convict him of violating R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-8(a) ; therefore, the trial court properly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal. State v. Santos, 64 A.3d 314, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 65 (2013).

Collateral References.

Burden of proof as to lack of license in criminal prosecution for carrying or possession of weapon without license, 69 A.L.R.3d 1054.

Constitutionality of State Statutes and Local Ordinances Regulating Concealed Weapons. 33 A.L.R.6th 407.

Scope and effect of exception, in statute forbidding carrying of weapons, as to person on his own premises or at his place of business, 57 A.L.R.3d 938.

What constitutes actual or constructive possession of unregistered or otherwise prohibited firearm in violation of 26 USCS § 5861. 133 A.L.R. Fed. 347.

What constitutes “constructive possession” of unregistered or otherwise prohibited weapon under state law. 88 A.L.R.5th 121.

11-47-8.1. Modification of semi-automatic weapon.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person within this state to modify any semi-automatic weapon such that it can shoot, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot full-automatic fire with a single pull or hold of the trigger. The possession of such a modified semi-automatic weapon shall be evidence of guilty knowledge by the person having possession that the semi-automatic weapon was modified. Every person violating the provisions of this subsection shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten (10) years, or by a fine up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both, and, except for a first conviction under this section, shall not be afforded the provisions of suspension or deferment of sentence, nor a probation.
  2. This section shall not apply to the purchase of any such device by the Rhode Island state police, by any city or town police department of the state of Rhode Island, or by the department of environmental management for display as a part of a firearms training course under its auspices.
  3. Weapons otherwise considered legal that are found modified by devices pursuant to this section shall be subject to forfeiture pursuant to § 11-47-22 .
  4. This section shall not be construed to prohibit use of a replacement trigger or trigger components designed and intended to decrease the weight of the trigger pull or to improve the quality and release of the trigger pull in a semi-automatic weapon.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 5, § 2; P.L. 2018, ch. 8, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 5, § 2, and P.L. 2018, ch. 8, § 2 enacted identical versions of this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2018, ch. 5, § 4, provides that this section shall take effect ninety (90) days after passage. The act was signed by the Governor on June 1, 2018.

P.L. 2018, ch. 8, § 4, provides that this section shall take effect ninety (90) days after passage. The act was signed by the Governor on June 1, 2018.

11-47-9. Persons exempt from restrictions.

  1. The provisions of § 11-47-8 shall not apply to sheriffs; deputy sheriffs; the superintendent and members of the state police; members of the Rhode Island airport police department; members of the Rhode Island state marshals; Rhode Island state fire marshal; chief deputy state fire marshals; deputy state fire marshals assigned to the bomb squad, and those assigned to the investigation unit; Providence fire department arson investigators, provided that the investigator receiving the permit is a graduate of a police-training academy; correctional officers, within the department of corrections; members of the city or town police force; capitol police investigators of the department of attorney general appointed pursuant to § 42-9-8.1 ; the witness protection coordinator for the witness protection review board as set forth in chapter 30 of title 12 and subject to the minimum qualifications of § 42-9-8.1 ; automobile theft investigators of the Rhode Island state police pursuant to § 31-50-1 ; railroad police while traveling to and from official assignments or while on assignments; conservation officers; or other duly appointed law enforcement officers; nor to members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps of the United States, the National Guard, or organized reserves, when on duty; nor to members of organizations by law authorized to purchase or receive firearms from the United States or this state, provided these members are at, or going to or from, their places of assembly or target practice; nor to officers or employees of the United States authorized by law to carry a concealed firearm; nor to any civilian guard or criminal investigator carrying sidearms or a concealed firearm in the performance of his or her official duties under the authority of the commanding officer of the military establishment in the state of Rhode Island where he or she is employed by the United States; nor to any civilian guard carrying sidearms or a concealed firearm in the performance of his or her official duties under the authority of the adjutant general where he or she is employed guarding a national guard facility, provided, that the commanding officer of the military establishment shall have on file with the attorney general of this state a list of the names and addresses of all civilian guards and criminal investigators so authorized; nor to duly authorized military organizations when on duty; nor to members when at, or going to or from, their customary places of assembly; nor to any individual employed in the capacity of warden, associate warden, major, captain, lieutenant, sergeant, correctional officer or investigator at any project owned or operated by a municipal detention facility corporation, including the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility; nor to the regular and/or ordinary transportation of pistols or revolvers as merchandise; nor to any person while transporting a pistol, or revolvers, unloaded from the place of purchase to their residence; or place of business, from their residence to their place of business or from their place of business to their residence, or to a federal firearms licensee for the purpose of sale, to or from a bona fide gunsmith, or firearms repair facility, to any police station or other location designated as a site of a bona fide “gun buy-back” program, but only if said pistol or revolver is unloaded and any ammunition for said pistol or revolver is not readily or directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such vehicle while transporting same and further provided, that in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the passenger compartment, the firearm or the ammunition shall be stored in a locked container.
  2. Persons exempted by the provisions of this section from the provisions of § 11-47-8 shall have the right to carry concealed firearms everywhere within this state; provided, that this shall not be construed as giving the right to carry concealed firearms to a person transporting firearms as merchandise or as household or business goods.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 5; P.L. 1953, ch. 3135, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-6 ; G.L., § 11-47-9 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1972, ch. 134, § 2; P.L. 1974, ch. 252, § 2; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 100, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 371, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 208, § 5; P.L. 1992, ch. 286, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 423, § 2; P.L. 1999, ch. 412, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 329, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 390, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 263, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 392, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 503, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 520, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 94, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 156, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 475, § 2; P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 7, § 4; P.L. 2013, ch. 164, § 4; P.L. 2013, ch. 234, § 4; P.L. 2013, ch. 501, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 492, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 525, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section is set out to correct an error appearing in the 2000 Reenactment volume.

This section was amended by three acts (P.L. 2008, ch. 94, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 156, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 475, § 2) passed by the 2008 General Assembly. Since the changes are not in conflict with each other, this section is set out as amended by all three acts.

P.L. 2008, ch. 94, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 156, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

This section was amended by three acts (P.L. 2013, ch. 164, § 4; P.L. 2013, ch. 234, § 4; P.L. 2013, ch. 501, § 3) as passed by the 2013 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all three acts.

P.L. 2013, ch. 164, § 4, and P.L. 2013, ch. 234, § 4 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 492, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 525, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2010, ch. 23, art. 7, § 13, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on January 1, 2010.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

“Goods.”

The “goods” exemption afforded by this section means that a license is not required if, while one is moving from one place of residence to another place of residence or transferring his business endeavors from one site to another, there is within the “goods” being transported an unloaded, wrapped firearm. State v. Pope, 414 A.2d 781, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1640 (1980), overruled in part, State v. Acquisto, 463 A.2d 122, 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1012 (1983).

Violations.

Trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that defendant was not guilty, under R.I. Gen Laws § 11-47-8(a) , if he honestly and reasonably believed that he had unloaded the gun before transporting it; defendant’s proposed instruction was legally incorrect, because even if the unloaded requirement was met by defendant’s mistaken belief that such was the case, he could have been convicted of a violation of § 11-47-8(a) on the ground that the gun was not securely wrapped, as was required by R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-9 . State v. Keiser, 796 A.2d 471, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 71 (2002).

11-47-9.1. Additional exemptions.

The provisions of §§ 11-47-8 and 11-47-11 shall not apply to members of the state police, members of city or town police forces, and members of the Rhode Island airport police department. Persons exempted by the provisions of this section from the provisions of § 11-47-8 shall have the right to carry concealed firearms everywhere within this state; provided, that this shall not be construed as giving the right to carry concealed firearms to a person transporting firearms as merchandise or as household or business goods.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 379, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 412, § 1.

11-47-10. License or permit not required to carry to target range.

No license or permit shall be required for the purpose of carrying or transporting any pistol or revolver from one’s home or place of business to a bona fide target practice range, nor from a bona fide target practice range to one’s home or place of business, to engage in any shoot meet, or practice, provided that the pistol or revolver is broken down, unloaded and carried as openly as circumstances will permit, or provided that the pistols or revolvers are unloaded and secured in a separate container suitable for the purpose.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 5(a); P.L. 1954, ch. 3322, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-7 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-10 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1.

11-47-11. License or permit to carry concealed pistol or revolver.

  1. The licensing authorities of any city or town shall, upon application of any person twenty-one (21) years of age or over having a bona fide residence or place of business within the city or town, or of any person twenty-one (21) years of age or over having a bona fide residence within the United States and a license or permit to carry a pistol or revolver concealed upon his or her person issued by the authorities of any other state or subdivision of the United States, issue a license or permit to the person to carry concealed upon his or her person a pistol or revolver everywhere within this state for four (4) years from date of issue, if it appears that the applicant has good reason to fear an injury to his or her person or property or has any other proper reason for carrying a pistol or revolver, and that he or she is a suitable person to be so licensed. The license or permit shall be in triplicate in form to be prescribed by the attorney general and shall bear the fingerprint, photograph, name, address, description, and signature of the licensee and the reason given for desiring a license or permit and in no case shall it contain the serial number of any firearm. The original shall be delivered to the licensee. Any member of the licensing authority, its agents, servants, and employees shall be immune from suit in any action, civil or criminal, based upon any official act or decision, performed or made in good faith in issuing a license or permit under this chapter.
  2. Notwithstanding any other chapter or section of the general laws of the state of Rhode Island, the licensing authority of any city or town shall not provide or release to any individual, firm, association or corporation the name, address, or date of birth of any person who has held or currently holds a license or permit to carry a concealed pistol or revolver. This section shall not be construed to prohibit the release of any statistical data of a general nature relative to age, gender and racial or ethnic background nor shall it be construed to prevent the release of information to parties involved in any prosecution of § 11-47-8 or in response to a lawful subpoena in any criminal or civil action which the person is a party to that action.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-8 ; G.L., § 11-47-11 , as enacted by P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 270, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 414, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 342, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 268, § 1.

Law Reviews.

For article, The Obfuscation of Rhode Island’s Clearly Expressed Constitutional Right to Bear Arms, see 11 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 651 (2006).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

When viewed in its entirety, the statutory framework of the Firearms Act, R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 11, ch. 47, serves to vindicate an individual’s right to keep and bear arms and the licensing scheme set forth in the Firearms Act, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-47-11(a) and 11-47-18 , is reasonable legislative regulation of weapons that falls squarely within the State’s police power. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 120 (2004).

Application Improperly Denied.

Decision denying an application for a license to carry a concealed weapon was quashed where the chief of police incorrectly required a proper showing of need, a showing of need was not a component under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-11 , and there was no evidence to show that the individual was untruthful as to the reasons for his application. Gadomski v. Tavares, 113 A.3d 387, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 56 (2015).

Remand.

In an applicant’s action seeking review of a police chief’s decision to deny his application for a permit or license to carry a concealed weapon, a remand was the appropriate remedy because a determination as to the applicant’s suitability required findings of fact best left to the licensing authority and not the Supreme Court; the documents the police chief submitted revealed a troubling history of events that called into question the applicant’s suitability to carry a concealed weapon. Paiva v. Parella, 176 A.3d 480, 2018 R.I. LEXIS 7 (2018).

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of State Statutes and Local Ordinances Regulating Concealed Weapons. 33 A.L.R.6th 407.

Construction and application of state statutes and local ordinances regulating licenses or permits to carry concealed weapons. 12 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2016).

Who is entitled to permit to carry concealed weapons. 51 A.L.R.3d 504.

11-47-12. License or permit fee.

A fee of forty dollars ($40.00) shall be charged and shall be paid for each license or permit to the licensing authority issuing it. Every license or permit shall be valid for four (4) years from the date when issued unless sooner revoked. The fee charged for issuing of the license or permit shall be applied for the use and benefit of the city, town, or state of Rhode Island.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-9 ; G.L., § 11-47-12 , as enacted by P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 426, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 342, § 1.

11-47-13. Revocation of license or permit.

Any license or permit may be revoked for just cause at any time by the authority granting it, and, upon revocation, the authority shall give immediate notice to the attorney general, who shall immediately note the revocation, with the date of revocation, upon the copy of the license or permit on file in his or her office.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-10 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-13 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1.

11-47-14. Licenses and permits to banks and carriers.

The attorney general may issue a license or permit to any banking institution doing business in this state or to any public carrier who is in the business of transporting mail, money, securities, or other valuables, to possess and use machine guns under any regulations that the attorney general may prescribe.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 7; P.L. 1941, ch. 991, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-11 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-14 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1.

11-47-15. Proof of ability required for license or permit.

No person shall be issued a license or permit to carry a pistol or revolver concealed upon his or her person until he or she has presented certification as prescribed in § 11-47-16 that he or she has qualified with a pistol or revolver of a caliber equal to or larger than the one he or she intends to carry, that qualification to consist of firing a score of one hundred ninety-five (195) or better out of a possible score of three hundred (300) with thirty (30) consecutive rounds at a distance of twenty-five (25) yards on the army “L” target, firing “slow” fire. The “slow” fire course shall allow ten (10) minutes for the firing of each of three (3) ten (10) shot strings.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1.

Cross References.

Certification of qualification, § 11-47-16 .

11-47-15.1. Qualifications required of law enforcement officers appointed after June 6, 1970.

  1. Except as provided in § 11-47-15.3 , all law enforcement officers of this state and its political subdivisions whose permanent appointment shall take place later than June 6, 1970, shall qualify on the official National Rifle Association B-21 police combat target firing a score of one hundred sixty-five (165) or better out of a possible score of two hundred fifty (250) with fifty (50) rounds in the distance, time period, and position required in the course:
    1. Stage A: Seven (7) yards, ten (10) shots crouch position, time twenty-five (25) seconds.
    2. Stage B: twelve (12) yards, five (5) shots point shoulder left hand, five (5) shots point shoulder right hand, both unsupported, and five (5) shots kneeling, time seventy-five (75) seconds.
    3. Stage C: twenty-one (21) yards, five (5) shots point shoulder left hand supported, five (5) shots point shoulder right hand supported, time forty-five (45) seconds.
    4. Stage D: twenty-five (25) yards, five (5) shots prone, five (5) shots left hand barricade, five (5) shots right hand barricade, time one minute forty-five (1:45) seconds.
  2. All stages are started with the weapon loaded with 5 rounds and holstered.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 282, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 364, § 2.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection and subdivision designations.

Cross References.

Certification of qualification, § 11-47-16 .

11-47-15.2. Definitions of law enforcement firing positions.

  1. “Barricade” means standing on both feet drawing the weapon and using the free hand to support it, with the use of the barricade.
  2. “Crouch position” means exerted effort to reduce the size of the body, weapon may be fired with one or two hands, the shooter may not drop to his or her knee(s).
  3. “Kneeling” means kneeling on one knee, the other extended towards the target. One arm may be supported on the forward knee. The weapon may be fired with either hand and may be supported by the free hand.
  4. “Point shoulder” means a semi-crouch position with weapon held at shoulder level.
  5. “Prone” means body extended on the ground, head towards the target. The weapon may be supported by both hands which are extended towards the target. The shooter shall assume this position by dropping to his or her knees. Weapon shall be drawn while in kneeling position, free hand shall be extended forward to support shooter as he or she continues into the prone position.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 282, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rearranged the definitions into alphabetical order and redesignated the subsections.

11-47-15.3. Commission on law enforcement standards and training.

  1. In lieu of the provisions of §§ 11-47-15.1 , 11-47-15.2 and 11-47-17 , each law enforcement department of this state and its political subdivisions may, on an annual basis, submit to the commission on law enforcement standards and training, referred to in this section as the “commission”, a proposal for the training and qualification of their officers on all firearms which they are authorized to carry or use in the performance of their official duties.
  2. Each proposal shall include training and qualification in the following areas:
    1. Decision shooting;
    2. Reduced light shooting;
    3. Moving targets;
    4. Use of cover;
    5. Non-dominate hand shooting;
    6. Alternate position shooting;
    7. Reloading drills;
    8. Malfunction drills.
  3. A minimum number of one hundred (100) rounds shall be fired by each officer during the training and qualification.
  4. Qualification shall be no less than twenty percent (20%) nor more than fifty percent (50%) of the total rounds fired. A minimum qualifying score shall be sixty-six percent (66%) of the rounds fired during the qualification phase.
  5. The commission shall review each proposal and, within fourteen (14) days, notify the department, in writing, whether the proposal is accepted or rejected. In the case of rejection, the commission shall make recommendations to the department which, if implemented, would make the proposal acceptable. Upon receipt of this notification, the department shall have fourteen (14) days to submit a new proposal that is acceptable to the commission.
  6. In the event that a department neglects to submit a proposal to the commission or fails to submit a proposal that is approved by the commission, the officers of that department shall be required to fulfill the requirements for qualification as set out in § 11-47-15.1 , 11-47-15.2 , 11-47-17 or 11-47-17.1 .
  7. All law enforcement officers of this state and its political subdivisions whose permanent appointment shall take place after July 1, 1997, will be required to qualify under the provisions of this section with all weapons which they are authorized to carry or use in the execution of their official duties.
  8. Any law enforcement officer of this state and its political subdivisions whose permanent appointment took place prior to July 1, 1997, may elect to qualify under the applicable provisions of § 11-47-15.1 , 11-47-15.2 , 11-47-17 or 11-47-17.1 .

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 364, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections.

11-47-16. Certification of qualification.

The range officer of the Rhode Island state police, the range officer of any city or town police department maintaining a regular and continuing firearms training program, a pistol instructor certified by the National Rifle Association and/or the United States Revolver Association, and any other qualified persons that the attorney general may designate are authorized to certify the qualification required by §§ 11-47-15 and 11-47-15 .1. The certification required by §§ 11-47-15, 11-47-15.1 and § 11-47-15.3 shall be accomplished on a form to be prescribed by the attorney general.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 282, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 364, § 2.

11-47-16.1. Special commission on law enforcement weapons qualifications of retired officers.

  1. There is hereby created a special commission to be known as the “Law Enforcement Weapons Qualifications of Retired Officers Commission.”
  2. The purpose and charge of said commission shall be to study all aspects of firearms qualifications, standards, and certifications for all retired law enforcement officers appointed after June 17, 1959, from each of the city and town police departments of this state.
  3. The commission shall consist of eight (8) members: one of whom shall be the president of the State Fraternal Order of Police, or designee; one of whom shall be the president of the Providence Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 3, or designee; one of whom shall be the superintendent of the Rhode Island state police, or designee; one of whom shall be a representative of a local branch of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, to be appointed by the national president of the IBPO; one of whom shall be the executive director of the New England Police Chiefs Association, or designee; one of whom shall be the chairman of the Rhode Island commission on law enforcement standards and training, or designee; one of whom shall be the Rhode Island attorney general, or designee; and one of whom shall the president of the Rhode Island State Rifle and Revolver Association or designee.
  4. Vacancies in said commission shall be filled in like manner as the original appointment.
  5. The membership of said commission shall receive no compensation for their services.
  6. All departments and agencies of the state shall furnish such advice and information, documentary and otherwise, to said commission and its agents as is deemed necessary or desirable by the commission to facilitate the purposes of this resolution.
  7. The commission shall report its findings and recommendations to the general assembly annually, on or before January 2, commencing in 2009.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 368, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 383, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 368, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 383, § 1, enacted identical versions of this section.

11-47-17. Qualifications required of law enforcement officers appointed after June 17, 1959.

Except as provided in § 11-47-15 .3, all law enforcement officers of this state and its political subdivisions whose permanent appointment shall take place after June 17, 1959, will be required to qualify with the pistol or revolver with which they are armed prior to their permanent appointment, that qualification to be the same as that required in § 11-47-15 . Town constables or police constables, special officers, and all law enforcement officers, who by law are authorized to carry side arms and whose appointments are made on a recurring basis, will be required to qualify not later than one year following the date of enactment of this section and their commissions or warrants will be plainly marked or stamped “QUALIFIED WITH PISTOL OR REVOLVER” and will be signed and dated by the certifying authority attesting to that fact. The failure of any law enforcement officer to qualify under the provisions of this section revokes his or her privilege of carrying a pistol or revolver, whether concealed or not, on or about his or her person. All law enforcement officers of this state and its political subdivisions will repeat this qualification at periods of not more than one year, except for correctional officers who must repeat this qualification every two (2) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 364, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 15; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 18; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 18.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 18, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 18 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Weapons Qualification.

Trial court properly confirmed an arbitration award for a union in dispute over weapons training for correctional officers (COs) and refused to vacate the award where: (1) the director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections’ (DOC) duty and authority under R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-10(14) to establish training programs for correctional officers (COs) was not exclusive; (2) the union was entitled to negotiate over matters that directly affected its members’ work and welfare; (3) § 42-56-10(14) did not prevent the DOC director from exercising his power in consultation with the union; (4) the dispute was arbitrable; and (5) the arbitrator’s reading of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-17 as meaning that COs had to undergo weapons qualification at least every two years, and prescribing a maximum time period, rather than a minimum or fixed time period, within which COs had to complete weapons qualification was passably plausible. State v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 64 A.3d 734, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 63 (2013).

11-47-17.1. Mandatory or discretionary nature of § 11-47-15.1 requirements — Qualification reports to be filed.

  1. All law enforcement officers of this state and its political subdivisions, whose permanent appointment shall take place later than June 6, 1970, shall be required to qualify with the pistol or revolver with which they are armed prior to their permanent appointment, that qualification to be as required in §§ 11-47-15 .1 and 11-47-15 .3. All permanent appointed law enforcement officers of this state and its political subdivisions who are required to qualify under § 11-47-17 may, at the discretion of the officer, qualify under either § 11-47-15, 11-47-15.1 or 11-47-15.3 . The failure of any law enforcement officer to qualify under the provisions of this section revokes his or her privilege of carrying a pistol or revolver, whether concealed or not, on or about his or her person. Qualification under this section will be required at periods of not more than one year, except for correctional officers who must repeat this qualification every two (2) years.
  2. Copies of all of the qualification reports shall be filed with the office of the attorney general.

History of Section. P.L. 1970, ch. 282, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 279, § 1; P.L. 1997, ch. 364, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 15.

11-47-18. License or permit issued by attorney general on showing of need — Issuance to retired police officers.

  1. The attorney general may issue a license or permit to any person twenty-one (21) years of age or over to carry a pistol or revolver, whether concealed or not, upon his or her person upon a proper showing of need, subject to the provisions of §§ 11-47-12 and 11-47-15 ; that license or permit may be issued notwithstanding the provisions of § 11-47-7 .
  2. All state police officers and permanent members of city and town police forces of this state who have retired in good standing after at least twenty (20) years of service, or retired in good standing due to a physical disability other than a psychological impairment, may be issued a license or permit by the attorney general subject to the provisions of §§ 11-47-12 and 11-47-15 . The term “in good standing” means that at the time of retirement, the police officer was not facing disciplinary action that could have resulted in his or her termination for misconduct or unfitness for office. Any member of the licensing authority, and its agents, servants, and employees shall be immune from suit in any action, civil or criminal, based upon any official act or decision, performed or made in good faith in issuing a license or permit under this chapter.
  3. Notwithstanding any other chapter or section of the general laws of the state of Rhode Island, the attorney general shall not provide or release to any individual, firm, association or corporation the name, address, or date of birth of any person who has held or currently holds a license or permit to carry a concealed pistol or revolver. This section shall not be construed to prohibit the release of any statistical data of a general nature relative to age, gender and racial or ethnic background nor shall it be construed to prevent the release of information to parties involved in any prosecution of § 11-47-8 or in response to a lawful subpoena in any criminal or civil action which said person is a party to such action.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 7; P.L. 1950, ch. 2452, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-13 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-18 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 387, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 396, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 414, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 268, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 368, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 438, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 368, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 438, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

For article, The Obfuscation of Rhode Island’s Clearly Expressed Constitutional Right to Bear Arms, see 11 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 651 (2006).

2004 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Case: Constitutional Law, see 10 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 859 (2005).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-18 does not impose an express limitation on the Rhode Island Department of the Attorney General’s decision-making authority. Thus, § 11-47-18 does not implicitly require a hearing, and filing an application to carry a concealed weapon under that statute does not create a “contested case” under the Administrative Procedure Act, R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 42, ch. 35. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 120 (2004).

Appeal.

Rhode Island Attorney General must adhere to minimum procedural requirements when rejecting an application filed under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-18 ; a rejected applicant is entitled to know the evidence upon which the Rhode Island Department of the Attorney General based its decision and the rationale for the denial. Armed with this information, an aggrieved applicant can petition the Supreme Court of Rhode Island for a writ of certiorari so that it may review the department’s decision for error of law, and, in conducting such a review, the court will not weigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder, but, rather, it will inspect the record to determine whether the department’s findings are supported by any legally competent evidence. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 120 (2004).

Jurisdiction.

Trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act, R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 42, ch. 35, to review the denial of an applicant’s request to carry a concealed weapon under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-18 by the Rhode Island Department of the Attorney General because: (1) the application did not have an impact on the right of the people to keep and bear arms under R.I. Const. art. I, § 2 ; and (2) R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-18 did not require a hearing on an individual’s application for a gun permit; thus, the decision was not a contested case. The only method to obtain judicial review of a denial of an application filed under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-18 is to seek a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 120 (2004).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of state statutes and local ordinances regulating licenses or permits to carry concealed weapons. 12 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2016).

11-47-19. Machine gun manufacturers’ licenses or permits.

The attorney general may issue to any person, firm, or corporation, engaged in manufacturing in this state, a license or permit to manufacture and sell machine guns and any or all machine gun parts under any regulations that the attorney general may prescribe.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 7; P.L. 1941, ch. 991, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-12 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-19 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1.

11-47-20. Sale or possession of silencers.

It shall be unlawful within this state to manufacture, sell, purchase, or possess any muffler, silencer, or device for deadening or muffling the sound of a firearm when discharged. Violations of this section shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year and one day.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-14 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-20 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

11-47-20.1. Armor-piercing bullets.

It shall be unlawful within this state for any person to import, manufacture, sell, purchase, or otherwise transfer any bullets which have steel inner cores or cores of equivalent hardness and truncated cones and which are designed for use in pistols as armor-piercing or metal-piercing bullets. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three (3) years, or a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both. This section shall not apply to the purchase of those bullets by the Rhode Island state police, by any city or town police department of the state of Rhode Island, or by the department of environmental management for display as a part of a firearms training course under its auspices.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 218, § 1.

11-47-20.2. Possession during commission of a felony.

Any person who uses bullets referred to in § 11-47-20.1 in the commission of a felony or who carries bullets of that kind in any weapon during the commission of a felony shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of the felony, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten (10) years, or a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 218, § 1.

11-47-20.3. Injury or death of law enforcement officer.

Any person who uses bullets as defined in § 11-47-20.1 in the shooting of any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his or her official duties so as to cause injury or death to the officer shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to life imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 462, § 1.

11-47-20.4. Body armor.

  1. It shall be unlawful within this state for any person to purchase, own or possess body armor, if that person has been convicted of a felony that is a crime of violence. It shall be an affirmative defense under this section that the defendant obtained prior written certification from his or her employer that the defendant’s purchase, use or possession of body armor was necessary for the safe performance of lawful business activity. It shall also be an affirmative defense for a confidential informant or witness with a conviction for a crime of violence to possess body armor when that person is engaged by a law enforcement agency, for a legitimate law enforcement purpose, and is under the direct supervision and acting under the direct authorization of the colonel or chief of police of that law enforcement agency. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three (3) years, or a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  2. Definitions.  For the purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:
    1. “Crime of violence” means murder, manslaughter, first degree arson, kidnapping with intent to extort, robbery, larceny from the person, first degree sexual assault, second degree sexual assault, first and second degree child molestation, assault with intent to murder, assault with intent to rob, assault with intent to commit first degree sexual assault, burglary, and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, or larceny.
    2. “Body armor” means any product sold or offered for sale, in interstate or foreign commerce, as personal protective body covering intended to protect against gunfire, regardless of whether the product is to be worn alone or is sold as a complement to another product or garment.

History of Section. P.L. 2012, ch. 135, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 144, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 135, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 144, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-47-21. Restrictions on possession or carrying of explosives or noxious substances.

Any person, except a member of the state police, division of sheriffs, a member of the police force of any city or town, or a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps of the United States, or of the National Guard or organized reserves when on duty, who possesses, or carries on or about his or her person or in a vehicle, a bomb or bombshell, except for blasting or other commercial use, or who, with intent to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another, possesses or carries any explosive substance, or any noxious liquid, gas, or substance, shall be guilty of a violation of this chapter and punished as provided in § 11-47-26 .

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-15 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-21 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 134, § 6; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 41.

Cross References.

Explosives, § 23-28.28-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

“Bomb.”

A Molotov cocktail which was a makeshift incendiary bomb made of a breakable container filled with flammable liquid and provided with a wick composed of any substance capable of bringing a flame into contact with the liquid was within the meaning of bomb as used in this statute. State v. Arruda, 113 R.I. 59 , 317 A.2d 437, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1137 (1974).

Separate Offenses.

The acts forbidden are disjunctively prohibited and an indictment charging that defendant “did unlawfully have in his possession a bomb and did have in his possession an explosive substance with intent * * *” charged two separate offenses. State v. Pelliccia, 109 R.I. 106 , 280 A.2d 330, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1030 (1971).

Collateral References.

Possession of bomb, molotov cocktail, or similar device as criminal offense. 42 A.L.R.3d 1230.

Validity and construction of regulations governing carrying, possession, or use of tear gas or similar chemical weapons. 30 A.L.R.3d 1416.

11-47-22. Forfeiture and destruction of unlawful firearms.

  1. No property right shall exist in any firearm unlawfully possessed, carried, or used, and all unlawful firearms are hereby declared to be nuisances and forfeited to the state.
  2. When a firearm is lawfully seized, confiscated from or turned in by any person, it shall be placed in the custody of the superintendent of state police or the chief of police in the city or town in which it was seized, confiscated or turned in to. The officer who takes custody of the firearm shall promptly ascertain, using available record keeping systems, including, but not limited to, the National Crime Information Center, whether the firearm has been reported stolen and if stolen shall notify the reporting law enforcement agency of the recovery of said firearm. If the police department in the city or town in which the firearm was seized or confiscated has not been notified by a justice of the superior court or the attorney general that the firearm is necessary as evidence in a criminal or civil matter, it shall be returned to the lawful owner. However, any owner of a firearm who shall knowingly fail to report the loss or theft of the firearm to the proper law enforcement authorities shall not be entitled to its return.
  3. If a firearm is found not to be stolen and the owner cannot be readily ascertained within ninety (90) days subsequent to the seizure or confiscation of said firearm and the firearm is no longer necessary as evidence in a criminal or civil matter, the police department having custody of the firearm shall have the option of either: (1) destroying said firearm by rendering it permanently and irretrievably inoperable; (2) transferring custody of said firearms to the state crime laboratory for the purpose of criminal investigation; or (3) holding an auction of those firearms seized, confiscated or turned in to said police department; provided, however, any firearms to be transferred at auction shall be limited to antique firearms or curios or relics. For purposes of this section, “an antique firearm” shall be defined as any firearm (including any firearm with a matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar type of ignition system) manufactured on or before 1899, and any replica of such firearm if such replica is not designed or redesigned for using rim-fire or conventional center fire fixed ammunition, or uses rim-fire or conventional center fire fixed ammunition which is no longer manufactured in the United States and which is not readily available in the ordinary channels of commercial trade. “Curios or relics” shall be defined as firearms which are of special interest to collectors by reason of some quality other than is associated with firearms intended for sporting use or as offensive or defensive weapons. To be recognized as curios or relics, firearms must be manufactured at least fifty (50) years prior to the current date, but not including replicas thereof, and firearms which derive a substantial part of their monetary value from the fact that they are novel, rare, bizarre, or because of their association with some historical figure, period, or event.
  4. In the event that an auction is held, bidders shall be limited to bona fide holders of a valid Federal Firearms License for Retail Sale or a Federal Firearms Collector License. Any auction shall be advertised at least once a week for a period of three (3) weeks preceding the date of the auction in a newspaper of general circulation, said notice clearly stating the time, location and terms of said auction. All funds realized shall be used to purchase and provide necessary safety equipment, including, but not limited to, bulletproof vests, for the police department holding the auction and shall not revert to any general fund of the state, city or town, as the case may be.
  5. All firearms received by any police department in any manner shall be entered in the department’s permanent records and listed by make, model, caliber and serial number and the manner in which said firearm was disposed of and, if by auction, the name and federal license number of the buyer. A copy of said record shall be forwarded to the office of the Rhode Island Attorney General and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of the United States Treasury Department on at least an annual basis.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-16 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-22 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 418, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 432, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 267, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 417, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 267, § 1, and P.L. 2008, ch. 417, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

Forfeiture of weapon unlawfully carried before trial of individual offender. 3 A.L.R.2d 752.

11-47-23. False information in securing firearm or license — Straw purchases.

  1. No person shall, in purchasing or otherwise securing delivery of a shotgun, rifle, pistol, or revolver, or in applying for a license or permit to carry it, give false information or offer false evidence of his or her identity.
  2. No person shall knowingly purchase or otherwise obtain a shotgun, rifle, pistol, or revolver on behalf of another person, or transfer a shotgun, rifle, pistol, or revolver to another person, whom the transferor knows or reasonably should know is prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal or state law.
  3. A first violation of the provisions of this section may be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both. A second or subsequent violation of the provisions of this section may be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1025, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-17 ; G.L., § 11-47-23 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 37, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 300, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 455, § 3; P.L. 2013, ch. 464, § 3; P.L. 2021, ch. 339, § 1, effective July 12, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 340, § 1, effective July 12, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 455, § 3, and P.L. 2013, ch. 464, § 3 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 339, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 340, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Sale of pistol or revolver to person falsifying information on application, § 11-47-37 .

11-47-24. Alteration of marks of identification on firearms.

  1. No person shall change, alter, remove, or obliterate the name of the maker, model, manufacturer’s number, or if there is no name of the maker, model, or manufacturer’s number then any other mark of identification on any firearm.
  2. No person shall, absent recertification paperwork, knowingly receive, transport, or possess any firearm which has had the name of the maker or manufacturer’s serial number removed, altered, or obliterated, or if there is no name of the maker, model, or manufacturer’s number then any other mark of identification on any firearm.
  3. Possession of any firearm, absent recertification paperwork, upon which the name of the maker, model, manufacturer’s number, or if there is no name of the maker, model, or manufacturer’s number then any other mark of identification on any firearm has been changed, altered, removed, or obliterated shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has changed, altered, removed, or obliterated.
  4. A person in possession of a firearm, with proof of ownership and/or transfer from a FFL dealer, may apply for recertification of that firearm from a Rhode Island based licensed firearms business owner who also is an FFL dealer or a local police chief and/or police department official if the name of the maker, model, manufacturer’s number, or if there is no name of the maker, model, or manufacturer’s number then any other mark of identification on the firearm has been only partially damaged.
  5. The Rhode Island based licensed firearms business owner who is also an FFL dealer or a local police chief and/or police department official shall, within sixty (60) days of the application if he or she is reasonably able to verify the firearm ownership and identifying marks recertify the firearm or return the firearm to the person who presented it, certify by written notarized documentation that the firearm’s name of the maker, model, manufacturer’s number, or if there is no name of the maker, model, or manufacturer’s number then any other mark of identification on the firearm has been partially damaged and is still identifiable and traceable to the record owner.
  6. The sale or transfer of a recertified firearm and/or the submission of a report by the record owner that the firearm was stolen immediately voids all recertification documentation.
  7. Violation of the provisions of this section may be punished by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years.
  8. This section shall not apply to the lawful exchange of component parts of any firearms, nor to any antique and collectible weapons legally possessed by collectors and dealers of firearms as provided in § 11-47-25 .

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-18 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-24 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 454, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 481, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 454, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 481, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-47-25. Antique firearms and collections.

This chapter shall not apply to antique firearms unsuitable for use, nor to collections of firearms utilized and maintained for educational, scientific, or any similar purpose without intent to use the firearms.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-19 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-25 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1.

11-47-26. Penalties for violations.

Unless otherwise specified, any violation of any provision of this chapter shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both; provided, that a violation of any of the provisions of §§ 11-47-1 11-47-34 with relation to air rifle, air pistol, “blank gun,” “BB gun,” or other instrument other than a machine gun, shotgun, rifle, or pistol, from which steel or other metal projectiles are propelled, shall for the first offense be punished by a fine of not more than fifty dollars ($50.00) and for the second or any subsequent offense by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100), or by imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) days, or both; and provided, further, that the provisions of chapter 1 of title 14 shall apply in the case of any person under the age of eighteen (18) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 14; P.L. 1929, ch. 1421, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 405, § 3; P.L. 1950, ch. 2452, § 3; G.L. 1956, §§ 11-47-20 , 11-47-31 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-26 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

11-47-27. Standard of proof under §§ 11-47-1 — 11-47-34.

No negative allegation of any kind need be averred or proved in any complaint under §§ 11-47-1 11-47-34 , and the carrying or use of any firearm contrary to the provisions of those sections shall be evidence that the possession, carrying or use of any firearm is unlawful, but the respondent in any case brought under those sections may show any fact that would render the possession, or use, or carrying of the firearm lawful.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-21 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-27 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section does not violate one’s right to due process. State v. Neary, 122 R.I. 506 , 409 A.2d 551, 1979 R.I. LEXIS 1569 (1979).

Burden of Proof.

Although this section creates an implication that the possession of a handgun in violation of § 11-47-8 constitutes evidence that such possession was unlawful, such a statutory inference does not relieve the state of its constitutional burden to prove that the defendant’s possession of the weapon was unlawful. This section does nothing more than shift the evidentiary burden of production to the defendant, and once the defendant has raised the issue of justification and has satisfied the burden of production, the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s possession was unlawful shifts back to the state. In re Samuel P., 626 A.2d 224, 1993 R.I. LEXIS 170 (1993).

Essential Elements.

The statutory presumption made defendant’s carrying of an unlicensed pistol or revolver unlawful but did not go to the question of defendant’s knowledge which was an essential element of the crime. State v. Russo, 113 R.I. 248 , 319 A.2d 655, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1167 (1974).

Instructions.

Where defendant complained that trial judge’s reading of this section in instructions to jury caused jury to believe defendant had burden of proving his possession of firearms to be lawful, his complaint was rejected, since the trial judge also instructed the jury that the burden of proof was on the state throughout the trial and never shifted to any defendant. State v. Maloney, 109 R.I. 166 , 283 A.2d 34, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1038 (1971).

Possession of License.

When the state has introduced evidence sufficient to warrant a finding of possession of a firearm, it then becomes incumbent upon the defendant to raise the issue of the fact of his possession of a license. State v. Ballard, 439 A.2d 1375, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 796 (1982).

11-47-28. Arrest and detention for possession of firearms.

Every officer authorized to make an arrest may, without complaint and warrant, arrest any person who has in his or her possession any firearm whenever the officer has reasonable ground to suspect that the person possesses or is using or is carrying the firearm contrary to law. Any person so arrested may be detained a reasonable time, not exceeding twenty-four (24) hours, for the purpose of making an investigation concerning the person, but no person so arrested shall be detained longer than twenty-four (24) hours without complaint being made against him or her before some proper court or justice. If the officer making the arrest shall at any time within the twenty-four (24) hours satisfy himself or herself that there is no ground for making a criminal complaint against the person, he or she shall be discharged from custody.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-22 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-28 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

Cross References.

Search of detained person for weapons, § 12-7-2 .

11-47-29. Certification of conviction of alien.

In the case of the conviction under §§ 11-47-1 11-47-34 of a person who is not a citizen of the United States, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court in which conviction is secured to certify the fact of the conviction to the proper officer of the United States government having supervision of the deportation of aliens.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-23 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-29 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

11-47-30. Sale, transfer or delivery of firearms to minors.

  1. It shall be unlawful within this state for any person to sell, transfer, give, convey, or cause to be sold, transferred, given or conveyed any firearm to any person under eighteen (18) years of age, when the person knows or has reason to know that the recipient is under eighteen (18) years of age, except for the limited purposes set forth in §§ 11-47-33 and 11-47-34 and with the prior approval or consent of the parent or legal guardian of the minor.
  2. Every person violating this section shall be punished, upon conviction, by imprisonment for not less than ten (10) years and not more than twenty (20) years. The prohibitions of this section shall not apply to any federally and state licensed retail dealer who makes reasonable efforts to verify a purchaser’s age and shall not apply to the sale of an air rifle, air pistol, “blank gun” or “BB gun.”

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 21; P.L. 1950, ch. 2452, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-24 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-30 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 389, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 285, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Cross References.

Sale of pistols or revolvers to persons under 21 prohibited, § 11-47-37 .

11-47-31. Sale, transfer or delivery of ammunition to minors.

  1. It shall be unlawful within this state for any person to sell, transfer, give, convey, or cause to be sold, transferred, given or conveyed any ammunition, including any priming charge of powder, propelling charge of powder, or any form of missile or projectile to be ejected from a firearm to any person under eighteen (18) years of age when the person knows or has reason to know that the recipient is under eighteen (18) years of age, except for the limited purposes set forth in §§ 11-47-33 and 11-47-34 and with the prior approval or consent of the parent or legal guardian of the minor.
  2. Every person violating this section shall be punished, upon conviction, by imprisonment for a term not to exceed ten (10) years. The prohibitions of this section shall not apply to any federally and state licensed retail dealer who makes reasonable efforts to verify a purchaser’s age and shall not apply to the sale of ammunition for an air rifle, air pistol, “blank gun” or “BB gun.”

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 22; P.L. 1950, ch. 2452, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-25 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-31 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 389, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 285, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

11-47-32. Possession of ammunition by minor.

Except as provided in § 11-47-33 , it shall be unlawful within this state for any person under eighteen (18) years of age to possess and use ammunition, including any priming charge of powder, propelling charge of powder, or any form of missile or projectile to be ejected from a firearm.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 23; P.L. 1950, ch. 2452, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-26 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-32 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 374, § 1.

11-47-33. Possession of firearms by minors.

  1. It shall be unlawful within this state for any person under eighteen (18) years of age to possess and use any firearm unless he or she shall hold a permit as provided in § 11-47-34 , and unless the person is in the presence of a parent or guardian or supervising adult at any regular and recognized camp or rifle range approved by the Rhode Island state police or by the chief of police of the city or town in which the camp or rifle range is located; provided, that this provision shall not apply to minors engaged in lawful hunting activity under the supervision of a parent or guardian or qualified adult, minors participating in Reserve Officer Training Corps programs, ceremonial parade activities, competitive and target shooting, participants in state militia activities and minors participating in a basic firearms education program; provided, further, that a person under eighteen (18) years of age may carry a firearm, unloaded, in a suitable case to and from his or her home and the camp or range and from the camp or range to other camp or range when accompanied by a parent, guardian or supervising adult.
  2. For purposes of this section only, “qualified adult” means any person twenty-one (21) years of age or older and permitted by law to possess and use the firearm.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 24; P.L. 1950, ch. 2452, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-27 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-33 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 374, § 1.

11-47-34. Firearms permits to minors.

The Rhode Island state police or the chief of police of the city or town in which the person resides shall issue permits to any person under eighteen (18) years of age only upon satisfactory proof of being engaged in a course of training in the use of firearms at a regular and recognized camp or rifle range, and provided that the person has the written consent of a parent or guardian. Valid membership cards of junior gun clubs or of junior divisions of senior gun clubs incorporated in the state of Rhode Island shall be prima facie evidence of the person under eighteen (18) years of age being engaged in a course of training in the use of firearms at a regular and recognized camp or rifle range.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 25; P.L. 1950, ch. 2452, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-28 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-34 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 374, § 1.

11-47-35. Sale of concealable weapons — Safety courses and tests — Issuance of permits to certain government officers.

    1. No person shall deliver a pistol or revolver to a purchaser until seven (7) days shall have elapsed from twelve o’clock (12:00) noon of the day following the day of application for the purchase, and when delivered, the pistol or revolver shall be unloaded and securely wrapped, with the bill of sale to be enclosed within the wrapper with the pistol or revolver. Any citizen of the United States and/or lawful resident of this state who is twenty-one (21) years of age or older, and any nonresident member of the armed forces of the United States who is stationed in this state and who is twenty-one (21) years of age or older, may, upon application, purchase or acquire a pistol or revolver. At the time of applying for the purchase of a concealable firearm, the purchaser shall: (i) Complete and sign in triplicate and deliver to the person selling the pistol or revolver the application form described in this section, and in no case shall it contain the serial number of the pistol or revolver; and (ii) Present to the person selling the pistol or revolver a pistol/revolver safety certificate issued by the department of environmental management. The certificate shall be retained in the possession of the buyer. The pistol/revolver safety certificate shall certify that the purchaser has completed a basic pistol/revolver safety course as shall be administered by the department of environmental management.
    2. The person selling the pistol or revolver shall on the date of application sign and forward by registered mail, by delivery in person, or by electronic mail if approved by the applicable police department, the original and duplicate copies of the application to the chief of police in the city or town in which the purchaser has his or her residence or to the superintendent of the Rhode Island state police in the instance where the purchaser either resides in the town of Exeter or resides out of state. The superintendent of the Rhode Island state police or the chief of police in the city or town in which the purchaser has his or her residence shall mark or stamp the original copy of the application form with the date and the time of receipt and return it by the most expeditious means to the person who is selling the pistol or revolver. The triplicate copy duly signed by the person who is selling the pistol or revolver shall within seven (7) days be sent by him or her by registered mail, by delivery in person, or by electronic mail to the attorney general. The person who is selling the pistol or revolver shall retain the original copy duly receipted by the police authority to whom sent or delivered for a period of six (6) years with other records of the sale. It shall be the duty of the police authority to whom the duplicate copy of the application form is sent or delivered to make a background check of the applicant to ascertain whether he or she falls under the provisions of § 11-47-5 , § 11-47-6 , § 11-47-7 , or § 11-47-23 . If, after the lapse of seven (7) days from twelve o’clock (12:00) noon of the day following application, no disqualifying information has been received from the investigating police authority by the person who is selling the pistol or revolver, he or she will deliver the firearm applied for to the purchaser. Upon the finding of no disqualifying information under the provisions of the above cited sections of this chapter, and in no case later than thirty (30) days after the date of application, the duplicate and triplicate copies of the application will be destroyed. Retention of the duplicate and triplicate copies in violation of this section or any unauthorized use of the information contained in the copies by a person or agency shall be punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). The provisions of this section shall not apply to bona fide sales at wholesale to duly licensed retail dealers, nor to purchases by retail dealers duly licensed under the provisions of § 11-47-39 .
    Click to view
    1. The department of environmental management shall establish the basic pistol/revolver safety course required by this section. The safety course shall consist of not less than two (2) hours of instruction in the safe use and handling of pistols and revolvers and the course shall be available to buyers continually throughout the year at convenient times and places but at least monthly at locations throughout the state, or more frequently as required. Proficiency in the use of pistols or revolvers shall not be prerequisite to the issuance of the safety certificate. No person shall be required to complete the course more than once; provided, that any person completing the course who is unable to produce the safety certificate issued by the department of environmental management shall be required to take the course again unless the person provides evidence to the department that he or she has successfully completed the course.
    2. The administration of the basic pistol/revolver safety course required by this section shall not exceed the cost of thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) in any fiscal year.
  1. Proof of passage of the department of environmental management’s basic hunter safety course will be equivalent to the pistol/revolver safety certificate mandated by this section.
  2. Any person who has reason to believe that he or she does not need the required handgun safety course may apply by any written means to the department of environmental management to take an objective test on the subject matter of the handgun safety course. The test shall be prepared, as well as an instruction manual upon which the test shall be based, by the department. The manual shall be made available by any means to the applicant who may, within the time limits for application, take the objective test at the department or at any location where the handgun safety course is being given. Any person receiving a passing grade on the test shall be issued a pistol/revolver safety certificate by the department.
  3. [Deleted by P.L. 2005, ch. 20, § 11 and P.L. 2005, ch. 27, § 11.]
  4. The following persons shall be issued basic pistol/revolver permits by the department of environmental management: sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, the superintendent and members of the state police, prison or jail wardens or their deputies, members of the city or town police force, members of the park police, conservation officers, members of the airport police and officers of the United States government authorized by law to carry a concealed firearm and, at the discretion of the department of environmental management, any person who can satisfactorily establish that he or she formerly held one of these offices or were so authorized.
  5. Any person who is serving in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard on active duty shall not be required to obtain a basic pistol/revolver safety certificate or basic pistol/revolver permit under this section so long as he or she remains on active duty.
  6. Any person who is serving in the active reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard, or any person in an active duty paid status in the Rhode Island National Guard, shall not be required to obtain a basic pistol/revolver safety certificate under this section so long as he or she remains in active status.

(Face of application form) Application to Purchase Pistol or Revolver Date Hour A.M. P.M. Name Address (Street and number)(City or town)(State) Date of Birth Place of Birth Height Weight Color hair Color eyes Scars Tattoos Other identifying marks Are you a citizen of the United States Are you a citizen of Rhode Island How long Where stationed (Armed Forces only) Number of pistols and/or revolvers to be purchased Have you ever been convicted of a crime of violence (See ) § 11-47-2 Have you ever been adjudicated or under confinement as addicted to a controlled substance Have you ever been adjudicated or under confinement for alcoholism Have you ever been confined or treated for mental illness From whom is pistol or revolver being purchased Seller’s address Seller’s signature Applicant’s signature (See for penalty for false information on this application) § 11-47-2 3 (Reverse side of application form) AFFIDAVIT: I certify that I have read and am familiar with the provisions of — , inclusive, of the general laws of the State of Rhode Island, and that I am aware of the penalties for violation of the provisions of the cited sections. I further certify that I have completed the required basic pistol/revolver safety course. §§ 11-47-1 11-47-55 Signed (over) County of State of Rhode Island Subscribed and sworn before me this day of A.D. 20. Notary Public

History of Section. P.L. 1929, ch. 1421, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 405, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-29 ; G.L., § 11-47-35 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 376, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 439, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 530, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 37, § 2; P.L. 1990, ch. 300, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 109, § 11; P.L. 2000, ch. 128, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 9; P.L. 2005, ch. 20, § 11; P.L. 2005, ch. 27, § 11; P.L. 2007, ch. 497, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 519, § 1; P.L. 2020, ch. 61, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 68, § 2; P.L. 2021, ch. 339, § 1, effective July 12, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 340, § 1, effective July 12, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 497, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 519, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2020, ch. 61, § 1 and P.L. 2020, ch. 68, § 1, provide: “This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Julie Lynn Cardinal Act.’”

P.L. 2020, ch. 61, § 2, and P.L. 2020, ch. 68, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 339, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 340, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Safety Certification.

Requirement that handgun purchasers present a certification of successful completion of firearms-safety course at time of purchase does not apply to handgun retailers purchasing from wholesalers for purpose of resale. Rhode Island Arms & Sports Ctr. v. Wood, 451 A.2d 817, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 1092 (1982).

11-47-35.1. Persons exempt from § 11-47-35.

The provisions of § 11-47-35 shall not apply to full-time members of the state police, full-time members of the state marshal’s office, full-time members of city or town police departments, or state marshals or correctional officers or persons licensed under § 11-47-11 .

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 135, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 383, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 202, § 1.

11-47-35.2. Sale of rifles/shotguns.

  1. No person shall deliver a rifle or shotgun to a purchaser until seven (7) days shall have elapsed from twelve o’clock (12:00) noon of the day following the day of application for the purchase, and when delivered, the rifle or shotgun shall be unloaded and securely wrapped, with the bill of sale for it to be enclosed within the wrapper with the rifle or shotgun. Any citizen of the United States and/or lawful resident of this state who is eighteen (18) years of age or older, and any nonresident member of the armed forces of the United States who is stationed in this state and who is eighteen (18) years of age or older, may, upon application, purchase or acquire a rifle or shotgun. At the time of applying for the purchase of a shotgun or rifle the purchaser shall complete and sign in triplicate and deliver to the seller the application form described in this section, and in no case shall it contain the serial number of the rifle or shotgun.

    Click to view

  2. The person who is selling the rifle or shotgun shall, on the date of application, sign and forward by registered mail or by delivery in person, or by electronic mail if approved by the applicable police department, the original and duplicate copies of the application to the chief of police in the city or town in which the purchaser has his or her residence or to the superintendent of the Rhode Island state police in the instance where the purchaser either resides in the town of Exeter or resides out of state. The superintendent of the Rhode Island state police or the chief of police in the city or town in which the purchaser has his or her residence shall mark or stamp the original copy of the application form with the date and time of receipt and return it by the most expeditious means to the seller. The triplicate copy duly signed by the seller shall within seven (7) days be sent by him or her by registered mail, by delivery in person, or by electronic mail, to the attorney general. The person who is selling the rifle or shotgun shall retain the original copy duly receipted by the police authority to whom sent or delivered for a period of six (6) years with other records of the sale. It shall be the duty of the police authority to whom the duplicate copy of the application form is sent or delivered to make a background check of the applicant to ascertain whether he or she falls under the provisions of § 11-47-5 , § 11-47-6 , § 11-47-7 , or § 11-47-23 . If, after the lapse of seven (7) days from twelve o’clock (12:00) noon of the day following application, no disqualifying information has been received from the investigating police authority by the person who is selling the rifle or shotgun, he or she will deliver the firearm applied for to the purchaser. Upon the finding of no disqualifying information under the provisions of the above cited sections of this chapter, and in no case later than thirty (30) days after the date of application, the duplicate and triplicate copies of the application will be destroyed. Retention of the duplicate and triplicate copies in violation of this chapter or any unauthorized use of the information contained in them by a person or agency shall be punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). The provisions of this section shall not apply to bona fide sales at wholesale to duly licensed retail dealers, nor to purchases by retail dealers duly licensed under the provisions of § 11-47-39 .
  3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to full-time members of the state police, full-time members of city or town police departments, persons licensed under §§ 11-47-9 and 11-47-11 , or to sales of air rifles or “BB guns” or to sales of antique firearms as defined in § 11-47-2 .

(Face of application form) Application to Purchase Shotgun or Rifle Date Hour A.M. P.M. Name Address (Street and number)(City or town)(State) Date of Birth Place of Birth Height Weight Color hair Color eyes Scars Tattoos Other identifying marks Are you a citizen of the United States Are you a citizen of Rhode Island How long Where stationed (Armed Forces only) Number of rifles and/or shotguns to be purchased Have you ever been convicted of a crime of violence (See ) § 11-47-2 General Laws of Rhode Island Have you ever been adjudicated or under confinement as addicted to a controlled substance Have you ever been adjudicated or under confinement for alcoholism Have you ever been confined or treated for mental illness From whom is shotgun or rifle being purchased Seller’s address Seller’s signature Applicant’s signature (See for penalty for false information on this application) § 11-47-2 3 (Reverse side of application form) AFFIDAVIT: I certify that I have read and am familiar with the provisions of — , inclusive, of the general laws of the State of Rhode Island, and that I am aware of the penalties for violation of the provisions of the cited sections. §§ 11-47-1 11-47-59 Signed County of State of Rhode Island Subscribed and sworn before me this day of A.D. 20. Notary Public

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 37, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 300, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 128, § 1; P.L. 2020, ch. 61, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 68, § 2; P.L. 2021, ch. 339, § 1, effective July 12, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 340, § 1, effective July 12, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2020, ch. 61, § 1 and P.L. 2020, ch. 68, § 1, provide: “This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Julie Lynn Cardinal Act.’”

P.L. 2020, ch. 61, § 2, and P.L. 2020, ch. 68, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2021, ch. 339, § 1, and P.L. 2021, ch. 340, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-47-35.3. Annual report on application process administration.

The attorney general shall provide the judiciary committees of the senate and house of representatives an annual report including the number of applications made pursuant to this section for the prior calendar year. The report shall include, but not be limited to, the number of applications received from sellers, the number of applications resulting in a determination that the potential buyer or transferee was prohibited from receipt or possession of a firearm pursuant to Rhode Island or federal law, the estimated costs of administering this chapter, and the number of instances in which a person requests amendment of the record pertaining to the person pursuant to §§ 11-47-35 and 11-47-35 .2.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 300, § 2.

11-47-36. Purchase of concealable firearms from out of state dealers.

No citizen of this state shall purchase any concealable firearm outside of the state of Rhode Island unless he or she has duly executed the application form prescribed in § 11-47-35 , the application form to be obtained by the purchaser from the city or town clerk of the city or town in which he or she resides or has his place of business. The original and duplicate copies of the application shall be delivered in person, duly executed, by the purchaser to the superintendent of the Rhode Island state police or to the chief of police of the city or town in which the purchaser resides. The purchaser shall send the triplicate copy of the application by registered mail to the attorney general within twenty-four (24) hours of the time of filing with the appropriate police authority. It shall be the duty of the police authority to whom the original and duplicate copies of the application are delivered to check the applicant’s record to ascertain whether he or she falls under the provisions of § 11-47-5 , 11-47-6 , 11-47-7 , or 11-47-23 . If, after the lapse of seventy-two (72) hours from twelve o’clock (12:00) noon of the day following the date of application, no disqualifying record has been found by the investigating police authority, the original and duplicate copies of the application marked or stamped “approved” and signed by the investigating police authority will be returned to the applicant by the most expeditious means. The approved duplicate copy of the application shall be sent by the purchaser to the out-of-state dealer as proof of lawful purchase, and the original shall be retained by the purchaser along with the bill of sale for the firearm purchased for a period of six (6) years as proof of lawful purchase. The triplicate copy of the application shall be retained by the attorney general for a period which shall in no case exceed ninety (90) days, provided that no evidence of the nature as would disqualify the applicant has been found.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

Collateral References.

Federal Interstate Handgun Transfer Ban, as Implemented by 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(3) and 922(b)(3), and 27 C.F.R. § 478.99(a). 43 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2019).

11-47-37. Sale to minors and others forbidden.

No person shall sell a pistol or revolver to any person under the age of twenty-one (21) or to one who he or she has reasonable cause to believe falls under the provisions of § 11-47-5 , 11-47-6 , 11-47-7 , or 11-47-23 .

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1.

11-47-38. Dealers to be licensed.

No retail dealer shall sell or otherwise transfer, or expose for sale or transfer, or have in his or her possession with intent to sell or otherwise transfer, any pistol, revolver, or other firearm without being licensed as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1.

11-47-39. Issuance and conditions of dealer’s license.

The duly constituted licensing authorities of any city, town, or political subdivision of this state may grant licenses in form prescribed by the attorney general effective for not more than one year from date of issue permitting the licensee to sell pistols and revolvers at retail within this state, subject to the following conditions in addition to those specified in §§ 11-47-35 and 11-47-36 , for breach of any of which the license shall be forfeited and the licensee subject to punishment as provided in this chapter:

  1. The business shall be carried on only in the building designated in the license.
  2. The license or a copy of it, certified by the issuing authority, shall be displayed on the premises where it can easily be read.
  3. No pistol or revolver shall be sold in violation of any provision of this chapter, nor shall a pistol or revolver be sold under any circumstances unless the purchaser is personally known to the seller or shall present clear evidence of his or her identity.
  4. The fee for issuing the license shall be five dollars ($5.00). The fee charged for the issuing of the license shall be applied for the use and benefit of the city or town.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

11-47-40. Register of sales of firearms — Display of firearms.

  1. Every person, firm, or corporation selling a pistol, revolver, or other firearm whether the seller is a retail dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise shall keep a register in which shall be entered at the time of sale the date of sale, name, age, and residence of every purchaser of the a pistol, revolver, or other firearm, together with the caliber, make, model, manufacturer’s number, or other mark of identification on the pistol, revolver, or other firearm. Every person, firm, or corporation who shall fail to keep a register and to enter the acts required by this section shall, upon conviction, be punished as provided in this chapter. The register shall be open at all reasonable hours for the mandatory monthly inspection of licensed firearm dealers to be conducted by state and/or local police officials.
  2. This section shall not apply to wholesale dealers’ bona fide sales at wholesale to duly licensed retail dealers. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation dealing in firearms to display any pistol, revolver, or imitation, or any firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person, or placard advertising the sale of one, in any part of the premises of the person, firm, or corporation where it can be readily seen from the outside. “Firearm” as utilized in this section only does not apply to an air rifle, air pistol, “blank gun,” or “BB gun.”

History of Section. P.L. 1929, ch. 1421, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 405, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-30 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-40 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1.

11-47-41. Government firearm registration prohibited.

No government agency of this state or its political subdivisions shall keep or cause to be kept any list or register of privately owned firearms or any list or register of the owners of those firearms; provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to firearms which have been used in committing any crime of violence, nor to any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

11-47-42. Weapons other than firearms prohibited.

    1. No person shall carry or possess or attempt to use against another any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack, slingshot, billy, sandclub, sandbag, metal knuckles, slap glove, bludgeon, stun-gun, or the so called “Kung-Fu” weapons.
    2. No person shall with intent to use unlawfully against another, carry or possess a crossbow, dagger, dirk, stiletto, sword-in-cane, bowie knife, or other similar weapon designed to cut and stab another.
    3. No person shall wear or carry concealed upon his person, any of the above-mentioned instruments or weapons, or any razor, or knife of any description having a blade of more than three (3) inches in length measuring from the end of the handle where the blade is attached to the end of the blade, or other weapon of like kind or description.

      Any person violating the provisions of these subsections shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, and the weapon so found shall be confiscated.

      Any person violating the provisions of these subsections while he or she is incarcerated within the confines of the adult correctional institutions shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than three thousand dollars ($3,000), or by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five (5) years, or both, and the weapon so found shall be confiscated.

  1. No person shall sell to a person under eighteen (18) years of age, without the written authorization of the minor’s parent or legal guardian, any stink bomb, blackjack, slingshot, bill, sandclub, sandbag, metal knuckles, slap glove, bludgeon, stungun, paint ball gun, so called “kung-fu” weapons, dagger, dirk, stiletto, sword-in-cane, bowie knife, razor, or knife of any description having a blade of more than three inches (3") in length as described in subsection (a) of this section, or any multi-pronged star with sharpened edges designed to be used as a weapon and commonly known as a Chinese throwing star, except that an individual who is actually engaged in the instruction of martial arts and licensed under § 5-43-1 may carry and possess any multi-pronged star with sharpened edges for the sole purpose of instructional use. Any person violating the provisions of this subsection shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than three thousand dollars ($3,000), or by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five (5) years, or both, and the weapons so found shall be confiscated.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, §§ 23, 24; P.L. 1907, ch. 1436, § 1; P.L. 1908, ch. 1572, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, §§ 32, 33; P.L. 1910, ch. 591, § 1; P.L. 1911, ch. 709, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 32; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 31; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-32 ; G.L., § 11-47-42 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 310, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 79, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 281, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 292, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Purpose.

The purpose of the “concealed carrying” provision of this section is to protect the public from the peril of the enumerated instruments or weapons when they are concealed about the person. State v. Johnson, 414 A.2d 477, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1636 (1980).

Concealment.

The “concealed carrying” provision of this section is free of ambiguity and conveys a definite and sensible meaning. State v. Johnson, 414 A.2d 477, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1636 (1980).

Intent.

Corrections officer was qualified as an expert to explain that a “shank” was a weapon and failure to strike his comment about revenge was harmless error; jurors could infer possession and intent to harm and evidence of a post-conviction discipline was not prejudicial. State v. Page, 792 A.2d 748, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 36 (2002).

Knives.

This section punishes the mere concealed carrying of a knife having a blade more than three inches in length. State v. Johnson, 414 A.2d 477, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1636 (1980).

Collateral References.

Double jeopardy: various acts of weapons violations as separate or continuing offense. 80 A.L.R.4th 631.

11-47-43. Collectors and police officers exempt from § 11-47-42.

The provisions of § 11-47-42 , so far as they forbid the possession of certain instruments or weapons, shall not apply to any person who possesses or is making a collection of the weapons as curios or for educational, professional, scientific, or any other lawful purpose, without intent to use the instrument or weapon unlawfully. Nor shall the provisions of § 11-47-42 , so far as they relate to the possession or carrying of any billy, apply to sheriffs, town constables, police constables, police, or other officers or guards whose duties require them to arrest or to keep and guard prisoners or property, nor to any person summoned by those officers to aid them in the discharge of their duties while actually engaged in their duties.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 23; P.L. 1908, ch. 1572, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 32; P.L. 1910, ch. 591, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 33; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 33; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 32; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-33 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-43 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 18; P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 18.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 18, and P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 18 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 260, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

P.L. 2015, ch. 275, § 41, provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect on September 1, 2015.

11-47-44. Standard of proof under §§ 11-47-42 and 11-47-43.

No negative allegation of any kind need be averred or proved in any complaint under §§ 11-47-42 and 11-47-43 , and the possession of any blackjack, slungshot, billy, sandclub, sandbag, metal knuckles, bludgeon, dirk, dagger, stiletto, or other similar weapon designed to cut and stab another, and the carrying or use of any the instrument or weapons or of any of the instruments or weapons forbidden by § 11-47-42 to be carried, worn, or used shall be evidence that the possession, use, wearing, or carrying, as the case may be, of any the instrument or weapon, is unlawful, but the respondent in any the case may show any fact that would render the possession or use, or wearing or carrying of the instrument or weapon lawful.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 283, § 26; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 34; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 34; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 33; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-34 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-44 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

11-47-45. Arrest and detention for possession of weapon prohibited by § 11-47-42.

Every officer authorized to make an arrest for any criminal offense may arrest without complaint and warrant any person who has in his or her possession any instrument or weapon described in § 11-47-42 whenever the officer has reasonable ground to suspect that the person possesses, or is using, wearing or carrying the instrument or weapon contrary to law. Any person so arrested may be detained a reasonable time, not exceeding twenty-four (24) hours, for the purpose of making an investigation concerning the person, but no person so arrested shall be detained longer than twenty-four (24) hours without complaint being made against him or her before some proper court or justice. If the officer making the arrest shall at any time within the twenty-four (24) hours satisfy himself or herself that there is no ground for making a criminal complaint against the person, he or she shall be discharged from custody.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 349, § 35; P.L. 1915, ch. 1258, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 401, § 35; G.L. 1938, ch. 612, § 34; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-35 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-45 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

Cross References.

Search of detained person for weapons, § 12-7-2 .

11-47-46. Sections 11-47-42 — 11-47-45 inapplicable to firearms.

The provisions of §§ 11-47-42 11-47-45 shall not be construed to relate to the possession and carrying of air guns, pistols or firearms of any description.

History of Section. P.L. 1927, ch. 1052, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 404, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-36 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-46 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

11-47-47. Display of weapons.

No person, firm, or corporation shall display in a place of business by means of a window display any pistol, revolver, or other firearm, as defined in § 11-47-2 , or any dagger, dirk, bowie knife, stiletto, metal knuckles, or blackjack; provided, that dealers in sporting goods may include in a window display pistols or revolvers upon a permit issued by the chief of police or town sergeant of any city or town. Any person, firm, or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine not exceeding twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for the first offense and one hundred dollars ($100) for every subsequent offense.

History of Section. P.L. 1929, ch. 1380, §§ 1, 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, §§ 11, 12; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-37 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-47 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1.

11-47-48. Report of gunshot wounds.

Every physician attending or treating a case of bullet wound, gunshot wound, powder burn, or any other injury arising from or caused by the discharge of a gun, pistol, or other firearm, or whenever any case is treated in a hospital, sanitarium, dispensary, or other institution the person in charge of it, shall report the case at once to the police authorities of the town or city where the physician, hospital, sanitarium, dispensary or institution is located. This section shall not apply to wounds, burns, or injuries received by any member of the armed forces of the United States or of this state while engaged in the actual performance of duty. Whoever violates any provision of this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. P.L. 1929, ch. 1384, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 607, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-38 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-48 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

11-47-48.1. Report of lost or stolen weapons.

Every person who owns a firearm shall report the loss or theft of their firearm to the local law enforcement agency within twenty-four (24) hours of the discovery of the loss or theft. Whoever knowingly violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 87, § 1.

11-47-49. Firing across highways prohibited.

Every person who shall discharge any firearm or other contrivance arranged to discharge shot, bullets, arrows, darts, or other missiles in or across any public road, street, square, or lane shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be subject to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or one year in prison, or both.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 110, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 134, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 177, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 406, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-39 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-49 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1.

11-47-49.1. Firing in Blackstone Valley Flood Plain prohibited.

Every person who shall hunt or discharge any firearm within the Blackstone Valley Flood Plains or Marshes, also known as the “Valley Marshes,” shall be subject to:

  1. A fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) for the first offense;
  2. A fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or imprisonment for sixty (60) days, or both, for the second offense; and
  3. For any subsequent offense a fine of not less than one hundred fifty dollars ($150) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or imprisonment for ninety (90) days, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1980, ch. 43, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations.

11-47-50. Firing without landowner’s permission — Firing in compact area.

  1. Every person, not being at the time under military duty, who shall discharge any firearm, “BB gun”, or other contrivance arranged to discharge shot, bullets, arrows, darts, or other missiles within the compact part of any city or town, or who shall discharge a firearm or other contrivance elsewhere, except upon land owned or occupied by him or her or by permission of the owner or occupant of the land on or into which he or she may shoot, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be subject to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or one year in prison, or both; provided, that any city or town may by ordinance permit the discharge on non-posted land.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to the owner of land who uses, or who gives permission to another to use without charge, a recurve, compound or longbow, provided that they are not used within two hundred fifty feet (250´) of a dwelling house.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 110, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 134, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 177, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 406, § 3; P.L. 1954, ch. 3280, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-40 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-50 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1; P.L. 1991, ch. 333, § 1.

Cross References.

Posted lands, shooting, trapping or fishing on, § 11-44-4 .

11-47-51. Loaded weapons in vehicles.

It is unlawful for any person to have in his or her possession a loaded rifle or loaded shotgun or a rifle or shotgun from the magazine of which all shells and cartridges have not been removed in or on any vehicle or conveyance or its attachments while upon or along any public highway, road, lane, or trail within this state; provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to deputy sheriffs, the superintendent and members of the state police, prison or jail wardens or their deputies, members of the city or town police force, investigators of the department of attorney general appointed pursuant to § 42-9-8.1 , the director, assistant director and other inspectors and agents at the Rhode Island state fugitive task force appointed pursuant to § 12-6-7.2 , nor to other duly appointed law enforcement officers, including conservation officers, nor to members of the Army, Navy, Air force, or Marine Corps of the United States, or the National Guard or organized reserves, when on duty, nor to officers or employees of the United States authorized by law to carry a concealed firearm, nor to any civilian guard or criminal investigator carrying sidearms or a concealed firearm in the performance of his or her official duties under the authority of the commanding officer of the military establishment in the state of Rhode Island where he or she is employed by the United States.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 286, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 423, § 2; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 41.

11-47-51.1. Discharge of firearm or incendiary or explosive substance or device from motor vehicle.

    1. No person shall unlawfully discharge a firearm or incendiary or explosive substance or device from a motor vehicle in a manner which creates a substantial risk of death or serious personal injury to another person. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten (10) years nor more than twenty (20) years and shall be fined not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), or both.
    2. In all cases under this subsection, the justice imposing sentence shall impose not less than the minimum sentence of ten (10) years imprisonment and may only impose a sentence less than that minimum if he or she finds that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify imposition of the alternative sentence. The finding may be based upon the character and background of the defendant, the cooperation of the defendant with law enforcement authorities, the nature and circumstances of the offense and/or the nature and quality of the evidence presented at trial. If a sentence which is less than imprisonment for a term of ten (10) years is imposed, the trial justice shall set forth on the record the circumstances which he or she found as justification for imposition of the lesser sentence.
  1. Any person injured as a result of a violation of this section shall be entitled to the civil remedies provided by § 7-15-4 .

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 312, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jury Instructions.

Even though a trial justice’s instructions foreclosed any independent jury consideration of whether the facts proven established the firearm element of a drive-by shooting offense, and thus the jury was not able to render a complete verdict on every element of the charged offense, the error was harmless and did not infect the entire trial process where the jury made a plethora of findings that were the functional equivalent of the firearm element. State v. Hazard, 745 A.2d 748, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 25 (2000).

11-47-52. Carrying of weapon while under the influence of liquor or drugs.

It is unlawful to carry or transport any firearm in this state when intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section, as applied to a defendant who failed four field sobriety tests, was not unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.State v. Sahady, 694 A.2d 707, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 172 (1997).

Accidental Homicide.

Evidence, which included the fact that the defendant, convicted of manslaughter, was carrying a weapon while intoxicated, itself a felony under this section, did not justify a verdict of accidental homicide. State v. Sullivan, 674 A.2d 412, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 112 (1996).

11-47-53. Limitation of prosecutions under §§ 11-47-49 — 11-47-52 — Fines.

No complaint for a violation of any of the provisions of §§ 11-47-49 11-47-52 shall be sustained unless brought within thirty (30) days after the commission of the offense, and all fines for the violation shall inure to the state.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 110, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 134, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 177, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 406, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-42 ; G.L. 1956, § 11-47-53 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 1975, ch. 278, § 1.

11-47-54. Licensing of shooting galleries.

Every person who shall keep any pistol gallery, rifle gallery, or other building or other enclosure in any city or town of this state where firearms are used without a license from the duly constituted licensing authority of the city or town shall, upon conviction, be fined two hundred dollars ($200) for the first offense, and five hundred dollars ($500) for each subsequent offense; provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to organizations that receive arms and ammunition from the United States or this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

11-47-55. Enforcement of chapter.

Deputy sheriffs, the superintendent and members of the state police, members of the city or town police force, or other duly appointed law enforcement officers, including conservation officers, shall have the power to enforce the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 41.

11-47-56. Constitutionality.

If any part of this chapter is for any reason declared void, its invalidity shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1.

11-47-57. “Mace” or similar substances.

Any person eighteen (18) years of age or over may carry on his or her person and use, unless otherwise prohibited by law, any non-lethal noxious substance or liquid for his or her protection or the protection of others; however, the use of any non-lethal noxious substance or liquid for any other purpose shall be punishable by a fine of not more than twenty-five dollars ($25.00).

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 406, § 1.

11-47-58. Firearms — State preemption.

The control of firearms, ammunition, or their component parts regarding their ownership, possession, transportation, carrying, transfer, sale, purchase, purchase delay, licensing, registration, and taxation shall rest solely with the state, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 443, § 1.

11-47-59. Possession of knife during commission of crime.

No person shall commit or attempt to commit any crime of violence while having in his or her possession a knife with a blade more than three (3) inches long. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, be sentenced for a term not less than one year nor more than five (5) years and/or fined not exceeding three thousand dollars ($3,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 248, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Sufficiency of Evidence.

The evidence and inferences drawn therefrom sufficiently supported a verdict of guilty on the charges of unlawful possession of a knife where the evidence showed that the defendant was sitting in the passenger seat of the car used for a burglary, that there were two knives over three inches in length around that seat and a police officer testified that he observed the defendant throw “something” into the car, and a later search of the car revealed the knives around the passenger seat. State v. Ortiz, 609 A.2d 921, 1992 R.I. LEXIS 99 (1992).

11-47-60. Possession of firearms on school grounds.

    1. No person shall have in his or her possession any firearm or other weapons on school grounds.
    2. For the purposes of this section, “school grounds” means the property of a public or private elementary or secondary school or in those portions of any building, stadium, or other structure on school grounds that were, at the time of the violation, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school in this state or while riding school-provided transportation.
    3. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five (5) years, or shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).
    4. Any juvenile adjudicated delinquent pursuant to this statute shall, in addition to whatever other penalties are imposed by the family court, lose his or her license to operate a motor vehicle for up to six (6) months. If the juvenile has not yet obtained the necessary age to obtain a license, the court may impose as part of its sentence a delay in his or her right to obtain the license when eligible to do so, for a period of up to six (6) months.
  1. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any person who shall be exempt pursuant to the provisions of § 11-47-9 , who is a “peace officer” as defined in § 12-7-21 ; a retired law enforcement officer permitted under § 11-47-18(b) or pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B and 926C; or an individual in accordance with a contract entered into between a school and the individual or an employer of the individual to provide security services to the school; or to the following activities when the activities are officially recognized and sanctioned by the educational institution:
    1. Firearm instruction and/or safety courses;
    2. Government-sponsored military-related programs such as ROTC;
    3. Interscholastic shooting and/or marksmanship events;
    4. Military history and firearms collection courses and/or programs; and
    5. The use of blank guns in theatrical and/or athletic events.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to colleges, universities, or junior colleges.
  3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to the possession of a firearm that is not loaded and is in a locked container or a locked rack that is in a motor vehicle.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 209, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 258, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 67, § 1; P.L. 2021, ch. 338, § 2, effective July 12, 2021; P.L. 2021, ch. 343, § 2, effective July 12, 2021.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations in subsection (a).

Compiler's Notes.

P.L. 2021, ch. 338, § 1 and P.L. 2021, ch. 343, § 1 provide: “This act shall be known as the ‘Harold M. Metts School Safety Act of 2021.’”

P.L. 2021, ch. 338, § 2, and P.L. 2021, ch. 343, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-47-60.1. Safe storage.

  1. Nothing in this section shall be construed to reduce or limit any existing right to purchase and own firearms and/or ammunition or to provide authority to any state or local agency to infringe upon the privacy of any family, home or business except by lawful warrant.
  2. A person who stores or leaves on premises under his or her control a loaded firearm and who knows or reasonably should know that a child is likely to gain access to the firearm without the permission of the child’s parent or guardian, and the child obtains access to the firearm and causes injury to himself or herself or any other person with the firearm, is guilty of the crime of criminal storage of a firearm and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. For purposes of this section, a “child” is defined as any person who has not attained the age of sixteen (16) years.
  3. The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply whenever any of the following occurs:
    1. The child obtains the firearm as a result of an illegal entry of any premises by any person or an illegal taking of the firearm from the premises of the owner without permission of the owner;
    2. The firearm is kept in a locked container or in a location which a reasonable person would believe to be secured;
    3. The firearm is carried on the person or within such a close proximity so that the individual can readily retrieve and use the firearm as if carried on the person;
    4. The firearm is locked with a locking device;
    5. The child obtains or obtains and discharges the firearm in a lawful act of self-defense or defense of another person;
    6. The person who keeps a loaded firearm on any premises which is under his or her custody or control has no reasonable expectations, based on objective facts and circumstances, that a child is likely to be present on the premises.
    1. If the person who allegedly violated this section is the parent or guardian of a child who is injured or who dies as the result of an accidental shooting, the attorney general’s department shall consider among other factors, the impact of the injury or death on the person who has allegedly violated this section when deciding whether to prosecute an alleged violation.
    2. It is the intent of the general assembly that a parent or guardian of a child who is injured or who dies of an accidental shooting shall be prosecuted only in those instances in which the parent or guardian behaved in a grossly negligent manner.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 62, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections and added subdivison designations in subsection (d).

11-47-60.2. Possession of weapons on school grounds — Notification.

  1. If a student is found to be carrying a weapon, as defined in § 11-47-42 , a firearm or replica of a firearm, or commits an aggravated assault on school grounds as defined in § 11-47-60 , the principal or designee shall immediately notify the student’s parents and the local police and turn the weapon over, if any, to the local enforcement agency.
  2. Any person who has reasonable cause to know that any person is in violation of this statute shall notify the principal or designee. The principal or designee shall immediately notify the student’s parents and the local police. Any person acting in good faith who makes a report under this section shall have immunity from any civil liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed as a result of making the report.
  3. School superintendents shall receive notice from the clerk of the family court regarding the disposition of all cases involving juveniles from their school districts adjudged pursuant to this statute. This information shall remain confidential and be shared with school officials who deal directly with the student.
  4. The provisions of this section should not apply to the following activities when the activities are officially recognized and sanctioned by the educational institution:
    1. Firearm instructed and/or safety course;
    2. Government-sponsored military-related programs such as ROTC;
    3. Interscholastic shooting and/or marksmanship events;
    4. Military history and firearms collection courses and/or programs; and
    5. The use of blank guns in theatrical and/or athletic events.
  5. The provisions of this section shall not apply to colleges, universities or junior colleges.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 313, § 1.

11-47-60.3. Trigger lock required.

No licensed retail dealer shall deliver any pistol to any purchaser without providing a trigger lock or other safety device designed to prevent an unauthorized user from operating the pistol.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 208, § 1; P.L. 2000, ch. 221, § 1.

11-47-61. Drive-by shootings.

Every person who shall discharge a firearm from a motor vehicle in a manner which creates a substantial risk of death or serious injury shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or imprisoned for not less than ten (10) years nor more than twenty (20) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 284, § 3.

11-47-62. Rifle ranges — Immunity from prosecution — Criminal or civil.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or special law, rule or regulation to the contrary, it shall be lawful for an owner of a rifle, pistol, silhouette, archery, skeet, trap, black powder, or other similar range to operate the range in excess of the applicable noise or noise pollution, law, ordinance or bylaw, provided the owner of the range continues to be in compliance with any applicable noise control law, ordinance or bylaws in existence at the time of the construction of the range. No owner shall be liable in any action for nuisance, and no court shall enjoin the use or operation of the range on the basis of noise or noise pollution, provided the owner continues to be in compliance with any noise control law, ordinance or bylaws in effect at the time of the construction of the range.
  2. No standards in rules adopted by any state, city or town agency for limiting levels of noise in terms of decibel level which may occur in the outdoor atmosphere shall apply to the ranges exempted from liability under the provisions of this section.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize or permit an owner of a rifle, pistol, silhouette, archery, skeet, trap, black powder, or other similar range to change the use and/or type of the range, or to expand the use and/or type of the range.

History of Section. P.L. 1997, ch. 225, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading and added subsection designations.

11-47-63. Relief from disqualifiers program.

  1. Establishment of board.  There is hereby established a board known as the relief from disqualifiers board to consider petitions for relief from a firearms prohibition due to an adjudication of commitment in Rhode Island.
    1. The board shall be comprised of five (5) members to be appointed by the governor subject to the following qualifications:
      1. One of whom shall be a licensed psychiatrist;
      2. One of whom shall be a licensed psychologist;
      3. One of whom shall be an active member of law enforcement in the state of Rhode Island;
      4. One of whom shall be the director of the department of behavioral health, developmental disabilities and hospitals, or his/her designee; and
      5. One of whom shall be the attorney general or his/her designee.
    2. Each member shall serve for a term of three (3) years; provided, however, that of the initial members appointed to the board by the governor, two (2) shall be appointed for a term of two (2) years and three (3) shall be appointed to a term of three (3) years. As the term of office of a member of the board expires, his or her successor shall be appointed in a like manner for a term of three (3) years provided that a member shall continue to serve until an appointment is made by the governor. Any vacancy shall be filled by the governor for the unexpired term.
  2. Relief from disqualifiers program.  A person who is subject to the disqualifiers of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) and/or § 40.1-5-8 because of an adjudication commitment under the laws of this state may petition for relief from a firearms prohibition from the relief from disqualifiers board. The board shall consider the petition for relief in accordance with the following:
    1. The board shall give the petitioner the opportunity to present evidence to the board in a closed and confidential hearing on the record;
    2. A record of the hearing shall be maintained by the board for purposes of appellate review; and
    3. The board shall conduct said hearing within thirty (30) days of the filing of a petition for relief.
  3. In determining whether to grant relief, the board shall consider evidence regarding the following:
    1. The circumstances regarding the firearms disqualifiers pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4);
    2. The petitioner’s record, that must include at a minimum, the petitioner’s mental health record, including a certificate of a medical doctor or psychiatrist licensed in this state certifying that the person is no longer suffering from a mental disorder that interferes or handicaps the person from handling deadly weapons;
    3. All records pertaining to the petitioner’s criminal history; and
    4. Evidence of the petitioner’s reputation through character witness statements, testimony, or other character evidence.
  4. The board shall have the authority to require that the petitioner undergo a clinical evaluation and risk assessment, the results of which may also be considered as evidence in determining whether to approve or deny the petition for relief.
  5. After a hearing on the record, the board shall grant relief provided that it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:
    1. The petitioner is not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety; and
    2. Granting the relief will not be contrary to the public interest.
  6. The board shall issue a decision in writing justifying the reasons for a denial or grant of relief.
  7. Any person whose petition for relief has been denied by the board shall have a right to a de novo judicial review in the superior court. The superior court shall consider the record of the board hearing on the petition for relief, the decision of the board, and, at the court’s discretion, any additional evidence it deems necessary to conduct its review.
  8. Upon notice that a petition for relief has been granted, the district court shall, as soon as practicable:
    1. Cause the petitioner’s record to be updated, corrected, modified, or removed from any database maintained, and made available to, the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) and reflect that the petitioner is no longer subject to a firearms prohibition as it relates to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); and
    2. Notify the attorney general of the United States that the petitioner is no longer subject to a firearms prohibition pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
  9. The district court shall adopt rules relating to the transmission of information relating to civil commitments pursuant to § 40.1-5-8(l) and to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), and the relief from disqualifiers process as set forth herein. In preparing such rules, the district court shall consult with the department of behavioral health, developmental disabilities and hospitals, the attorney general, and such other entities as may be necessary or advisable. Such regulations shall include provisions to protect the identity, confidentiality, and security of all records and data provided pursuant to this section and § 40.1-5-26 .
  10. Any member of the relief from firearms disqualifications board, its agents, servants, and employees shall be immune from suit in any action, civil or criminal, based upon any official act or decision, related to this section, performed or made in good faith.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 423, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 455, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 423, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 455, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 423, § 3, provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2015.

P.L. 2014, ch. 455, § 3, provides that this section takes effect on January 1, 2015.

Chapter 48 Substances Releasing Toxic Vapors

11-48-1. “Person” defined.

“Person”, as used in this chapter, includes any individual, firm, or corporation.

History of Section. P.L. 1968, ch. 25, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

11-48-2. Sale, possession, and use.

No person shall intentionally smell or inhale the fumes of any substance having the property of releasing toxic vapors for the purpose of causing a condition of intoxication, euphoria, excitement, exhilaration, stupefaction, or dulled senses or nervous system, nor possess, buy, or sell any substance for the purpose of violating or aiding another to violate this chapter; provided, that this chapter shall not apply to the inhalation of anesthesia for medical or dental purposes.

History of Section. P.L. 1968, ch. 25, § 1.

Collateral References.

Penal offense of sniffing glue or similar volatile intoxicants. 32 A.L.R.3d 1438.

Products liability: recovery for injury or death resulting from intentional inhalation of product’s fumes or vapors to produce intoxicating or similar effect. 50 A.L.R.5th 275.

11-48-3. Penalty for violation.

Any person who violates the provisions of this chapter shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1968, ch. 25, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 191, § 1.

Chapter 49 Credit Card Crime Act

11-49-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Cardholder” means the person or organization named on the face of a credit card to whom or for whose benefit the credit card is issued by an issuer.
  2. “Credit card” means any instrument or device, whether known as a credit card, credit plate, or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for the use of the card holder in obtaining money, goods, services, or anything else of value on credit.
  3. “Expired credit card” means a credit card which is no longer valid because the term shown on it has elapsed.
  4. “Issuer” means the business organization or financial institution, or its duly authorized agent, which issues a credit card.
  5. “Receives” or “receiving” means acquiring possession or control or accepting as security for a loan a credit card.
  6. “Revoked credit card” means a credit card which is no longer valid because permission to use it has been suspended or terminated by the issuer.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2.

Comparative Legislation.

Credit card crime:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-128a et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 266, §§ 37B, 37C.

11-49-2. False statement as to financial condition or identity.

A person who makes or causes to be made, either directly or indirectly, any false statement as to a material fact in writing, knowing it to be false and with intent that it be relied on respecting his or her identity or that of any other person, firm, or corporation or his or her financial condition or that of any other person, firm, or corporation, for the purpose of procuring the issuance of a credit card, violates this section and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(a) .

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2.

11-49-3. Theft — Obtaining credit card through fraudulent means.

  1. Theft by taking or retaining possession of card taken.  A person who takes a credit card from the person, possession, custody, or control of another without the cardholder’s consent, or who, with knowledge that it has been so taken, receives the credit card with intent to use it, to sell it, or to transfer it to a person other than the issuer or the cardholder, is guilty of credit card theft and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(a) . Taking a credit card without consent includes obtaining it by conduct defined or known as statutory larceny, common law larceny by trespassory taking, common law larceny by trick or embezzlement, or obtaining property by false pretense, false promise, or extortion.
  2. Theft of credit card lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake.  A person who receives a credit card that he or she knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the identity or address of the cardholder and who retains possession with intent to use it, to sell it, or to transfer it to a person other than the issuer or the cardholder, is guilty of credit card theft and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(a) .
  3. Purchase or sale of credit card of another.  A person other than the issuer who sells a credit card, or a person who buys a credit card from a person other than the issuer, violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(a) .
  4. Obtaining control of credit card as security for debt.  A person who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a person or organization providing money, goods, services, or anything else of value, or any other person, obtains control over a credit card as security for debt violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(a) .
  5. Dealing in credit cards of another.  A person other than the issuer who during any twelve (12) month period receives two (2) or more credit cards issued in the name or names of different cardholders, which he or she has reason to know were taken or retained under circumstances which constitute credit card theft or a violation of this law, violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(b) .
  6. Forgery of credit card.  A person who, with intent to defraud a purported issuer or a person or organization providing money, goods, services, or anything else of value or any other person, falsely makes or embosses a purported credit card or utters a credit card is guilty of credit card forgery and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(b) . A person other than the purported issuer who possesses two (2) or more credit cards which are falsely made or falsely embossed is presumed to have violated this subsection. A person falsely makes a credit card when he or she makes or draws in whole or in part a device or instrument which purports to be the credit card of a named issuer but which is not a credit card of the named issuer because the issuer did not authorize the making or drawing, or alters a credit card which was validly issued. A person falsely embosses a credit card when, without the authorization of the named issuer, he or she completes a credit card by adding any of the matter, other than the signature of the cardholder, which an issuer requires to appear on the credit card before it can be used by a cardholder.
  7. Signing credit card of another.  A person other than the cardholder or a person authorized by the cardholder who, with intent to defraud the issuer or a person or organization providing money, goods, services, or anything else of value or any other person, signs a credit card violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(a) .

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2.

11-49-4. Fraudulent use of credit cards.

A person who, with intent to defraud the issuer or a person or organization providing money, goods, services, or anything else of value or any other person, uses, for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, services, or anything else of value, a credit card obtained or retained in violation of this law or a credit card which he or she knows is forged, expired, or revoked, or who obtains money, goods, services, or anything else of value by representing, without the consent of the cardholder, that he or she is the holder of a specified card or by representing that he or she is the holder of a card and the card has not in fact been issued, violates this section and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(a) , if the value of all moneys, goods, services, and other things of value obtained in violation of this subsection does not exceed one hundred dollars ($100) in any six (6) month period. The violator is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(b) if the value does exceed one hundred dollars ($100) in any six (6) month period. Knowledge of revocation shall be presumed to have been received by a cardholder four (4) days after it has been mailed to him or her at the address set forth on the credit card or at his or her last known address by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and, if the address is more than five hundred (500) miles from the place of mailing, by air mail. If the address is located outside the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone or Canada, notice shall be presumed to have been received ten (10) days after mailing by registered or certified mail.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attempt.

Legislature intended to prohibit the unlawful use of a credit card with intent to defraud even where that attempt is unsuccessful, and the actions of an individual in presenting a stolen or falsified card with the intent to defraud fall within the prohibition of this section. State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 1984 R.I. LEXIS 496 (1984).

Collateral References.

Criminal liability for unauthorized use of credit card. 24 A.L.R.3d 986.

Signing of credit cardcharge or credit sales slip as forgery. 90 A.L.R.2d 822.

Successful negotiation of commercial transaction as element of state offense of credit card fraud or false pretense in use of credit card. 106 A.L.R.5th 701.

11-49-5. Fraud by person authorized to provide goods or services.

  1. Illegally obtained or illegally possessed credit card; forge.  A person who is authorized by an issuer to furnish money, goods, services, or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by the cardholder or any agent or employees of the person who, with intent to defraud the issuer or the cardholder, furnishes money, goods, services, or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card obtained or retained in violation of this law or a credit card which he or she knows is forged, expired, or revoked, violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(a) , if the value of all money, goods, services, and other things of value furnished in violation of this subsection does not exceed one hundred dollars ($100) in any six (6) month period. The violator is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(b) if the value does exceed one hundred dollars ($100) in any six (6) month period.
  2. Misrepresentation to issuer.  A person who is authorized by an issuer to furnish money, goods, services, or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by the cardholder or any agent or employee of the person who, with intent to defraud the issuer or the cardholder, fails to furnish money, goods, services, or anything else of value which he or she represents in writing to the issuer that he has furnished, violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(a) , if the difference between the value of all money, goods, services, and anything else of value actually furnished and the value represented to the issuer to have been furnished, does not exceed five hundred dollars ($500) in any six (6) month period. The violator is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(b) if the difference does exceed five hundred dollars ($500) in any six (6) month period.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2.

11-49-6. Possession of machinery, plates or other contrivance or incomplete credit cards.

A person other than the cardholder possessing two (2) or more incomplete credit cards with intent to complete them without the consent of the issuer or a person possessing with knowledge of its character any machinery, plates, or any other contrivance designed to reproduce instruments purporting to be the credit cards of an issuer who has not consented to the preparation of the credit cards violates this section and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(b) . A credit card is incomplete if part of the matter other than the signature of the cardholder, which an issuer requires to appear on the credit card before it can be used by a cardholder, has not yet been stamped, embossed, imprinted, or written on it.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2.

11-49-6.1. Publishing information for fraudulent purposes.

    1. It shall be unlawful for any person to publish or cause to be published the number or code of an existing, cancelled, revoked, expired, or nonexistent credit card issued by a company providing telecommunication services or the numbering or coding system which is employed in the issuance of those credit cards, or any method, scheme, instruction, or information on how to fraudulently avoid payment for telecommunication services, with the intent that the number or coding system or information be used or with knowledge that the system or information are to be used to fraudulently avoid the payment of any lawful charges imposed by the telecommunications company.
    2. As used in this section, “publishes” means the communication of information to any one or more persons, either orally, in person, or by telephone, radio, or television, or in writing of any kind, including a letter or memorandum, circular, poster, or handbill, newspaper or magazine article, or book with the intent that the information be used or employed in violation of this section.
  1. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, may be imprisoned for not more than one year, or fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.
  2. Any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense of this section shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, may be imprisoned for not more than three (3) years or fined not more than three thousand dollars ($3,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 60, § 2.

Cross References.

Fraudulent communication devices, § 11-35-25 .

11-49-7. Receipt of money, goods and services obtained by fraudulent use of credit cards.

A person who receives money, goods, services, or anything else of value obtained in violation of § 11-49-4 , knowing or believing that it was so obtained, violates this section and is subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49-10(a) . A person who obtains at a discount price a ticket issued by an airline, railroad, steamship, or other transportation company, which was acquired in violation of § 11-49-4 without reasonable inquiry to ascertain that the person from whom it was obtained had a legal right to possess it, shall be presumed to know that the ticket was acquired under circumstances constituting a violation of § 11-49-4.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2.

11-49-8. Defense not available.

In any prosecution for violation of this chapter, the state is not required to establish and it is no defense that a person, other than the defendant, who violated this chapter has not been convicted, apprehended, or identified.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2.

11-49-9. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2), concerning presumptions, was repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 381, § 6. Section 7 of P.L. 1987, ch. 381 provides that the repeal of this section by that Act shall take effect on the date that Rhode Island Rules of Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court take effect. Those Rules took effect October 1, 1987.

11-49-10. Penalties.

  1. A person who is subject to the penalties of this subsection shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
  2. A person who is subject to the penalties of this subsection shall be fined not more than three thousand dollars ($3,000), or imprisoned not more than three (3) years, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2.

Cross References.

Applicability of penalties to crime of wrongfully obtaining telecommunication service, § 11-35-16 .

11-49-11. Chapter not exclusive.

This chapter shall not be construed to preclude the applicability of any other provision of the criminal law of this state which presently applies or may in the future apply to any transaction which violates this chapter, unless that provision is inconsistent with the terms of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2.

11-49-12. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2.

11-49-13. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Credit Card Crime Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 1969, ch. 129, § 2.

Chapter 49.1 Impersonation and Identity Fraud

11-49.1-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Impersonation and Identity Fraud Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 105, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2000 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 593 (2001).

11-49.1-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Document-making implement” means any implement, impression, electronic device, or computer hardware or software, that is specifically configured or primarily used for making an identification document, a false identification document, or another document-making implement;
  2. “Identification document” means a document made or card issued by or under the authority of the United States Government, a state, political subdivision of a state, a foreign government, political subdivision of a foreign government, an international governmental or an international quasi-governmental organization which, when completed with information concerning a particular individual, is of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals;
  3. “Means of identification” means any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including any:
    1. Name, social security number, date of birth, official state or government issued driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number;
    2. Unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation;
    3. Unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code; or
    4. Telecommunication identifying information or access device as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e).
  4. “Produce” means to manufacture, alter, authenticate, or assemble an identification document;
  5. “State” includes any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any other commonwealth, possession, or territory of the United States; and
  6. “Financial information” means any of the following information identifiable to an individual that concerns the amount and/or condition of an individual’s assets, liabilities or credit:
    1. Account numbers and balances;
    2. Transactional information concerning any account; or
    3. Codes, passwords, social security numbers, tax identification numbers, driver’s license numbers or any other information held for the purpose of account access or transaction initiation.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 105, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 64, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 75, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subsections, and in subsection (3), redesignated the paragraphs.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 64, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 75, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2003, ch. 64, § 2 provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect upon passage [June 27, 2003] and shall apply to those offenses which occur after that date.

P.L. 2003, ch. 75, § 2 provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect upon passage [June 27, 2003] and shall apply to those offenses which occur after that date.

11-49.1-3. Identity fraud.

  1. Any person who shall: (1) knowingly and without lawful authority produce an identification document or a false identification document; (2) knowingly transfer an identification document or a false identification document knowing that the document was stolen or produced without lawful authority; (3) knowingly possess with intent to use unlawfully or transfer unlawfully five (5) or more identification documents (other than those issued lawfully for the use of the possessor) or false identification documents; (4) knowingly possess an identification document (other than one issued lawfully for the use of the possessor) or a false identification document, or financial information with the intent that the document or financial information be used to defraud the United States, the State of Rhode Island, any political subdivision of it or any public or private entity; (5) knowingly transfer, or possess a document-making implement with the intent that the document-making implement will be used in the production of a false identification document or another document-making implement which will be so used; (6) knowingly possess a false identification document that is or appears to be a genuine identification document of the United States, the State of Rhode Island or any political subdivision of it or any public or private entity which is stolen or produced without lawful authority knowing that the document was stolen or produced without such authority; or (7) knowingly transfer or use with intent to defraud, without lawful authority, a means of identification or financial information of another person living or dead, with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of federal, state or local law; shall be guilty of a felony and shall be subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-49.1-4 .
  2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any person who has not reached his or her twenty-first (21st) birthday who misrepresents or misstates his or her age through the presentation of any document in order to enter any premises licensed for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of purchasing or having served or delivered to him or her alcoholic beverages or attempting to purchase or have another person purchase for him or her any alcoholic beverage pursuant to § 3-8-6 .

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 105, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 64, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 75, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2003, ch. 64, § 1, and P.L. 2003, ch. 75, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2003, ch. 64, § 2 provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect upon passage [June 27, 2003] and shall apply to those offenses which occur after that date.

P.L. 2003, ch. 75, § 2 provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect upon passage [June 27, 2003] and shall apply to those offenses which occur after that date.

11-49.1-4. Penalties.

  1. Every person who violates the provisions of § 11-49.1-3 shall be imprisoned for not more than three (3) years and may be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both, for a first conviction.
  2. Every person who violates the provisions of § 11-49.1-3 may be imprisoned for not less than three (3) years nor more than five (5) years and shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both, for a second conviction.
  3. Every person who violates the provisions of § 11-49.1-3 shall be imprisoned for not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years and shall be fined not less than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both, for a third or subsequent conviction.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 105, § 1.

11-49.1-5. Search warrants and forfeitures apparatus.

    1. Search warrants to search for and seize implements, apparatus, paraphernalia and other property and devices kept, possessed or used in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, or as a means of committing a violation of this chapter, may be issued as provided by law in chapter 5 of title 12; and all implements, apparatus, paraphernalia or other apparatus or devices found by any officer in executing a search warrant or which shall be produced and brought into court shall be forfeited to the state, and further proceedings shall be had for their forfeiture as is prescribed by law in chapter 21 of title 12 and upon entry of final judgment or forfeiture shall be destroyed by order of the court.
    2. In addition, those items which were kept, possessed, or used in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter and which have a monetary value may be seized and forfeited, and further proceedings shall be had for their forfeiture as is prescribed by laws in chapter 21 of title 12 and the further provisions of this section; provided, that no property or money used by any person shall be forfeited under the provisions of this chapter unless it shall appear that the owner of the property or money had knowledge, actual or constructive, and was a consenting party to the alleged illegal act.
  1. Property taken or detained under this section shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure and whenever property or money is forfeited under this chapter it shall be utilized as follows:
    1. The law enforcement agency may sell any forfeited property which is not required by this chapter to be destroyed and which is not harmful to the public. The proceeds from the sale are to be distributed in accordance with subdivision (2) of this subsection.
    2. As to the proceeds from the sale of seized property as referred to in subdivision (1) of this subsection and as to personal property referred to in subsection (a) of this section, the distribution shall be as follows:
      1. All proceeds of the forfeiture of real or personal property shall be distributed as follows:
        1. Twenty percent (20%) of the proceeds shall be provided to the attorney general’s department to be used to further law enforcement activities pursuant to this chapter including, but not limited to, investigations, prosecutions, and the administration of this chapter;
        2. Eighty percent (80%) of the proceeds shall be divided among the state and local law enforcement agencies proportionately based upon their contribution to the investigation of the criminal activity related to the asset being forfeited.
      2. The law enforcement agencies involved in the investigation with the assistance of the attorney general shall by agreement determine the respective proportionate share to be received by each agency. If the agencies are unable to reach agreement, application shall be made by one or more of the agencies involved to the presiding justice of the superior court, who shall determine the respective proportionate share attributable to each law enforcement agency. The proceeds from all forfeitures shall be held by the general treasurer in a separate account until such time as an allocation is determined by agreement of the agencies or by the presiding justice. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the general treasurer to disburse the allocated funds from the separate account to the respective law enforcement agencies.

History of Section. P.L. 2000, ch. 105, § 1.

Chapter 49.2 Identity Theft Protection

11-49.2-1. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 225, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 1, effective June 26, 2016; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 1, effective July 2, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-49.2-1 concerned short title.

11-49.2-2. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 225, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 1, effective June 26, 2016; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 1, effective July 2, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-49.2-2 concerned legislative findings.

11-49.2-3. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 225, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 1, effective June 26, 2016; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 1, effective July 2, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-49.2-3 concerned notification of breach.

11-49.2-4. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 225, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 1, effective June 26, 2016; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 1, effective July 2, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-49.2-4 concerned notification of breach and consultation with law enforcement.

11-49.2-5. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 225, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 1, effective June 26, 2016; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 1, effective July 2, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-49.2-5 concerned definitions.

11-49.2-6. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 225, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 1, effective June 26, 2016; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 1, effective July 2, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-49.2-6 concerned penalties for violation.

11-49.2-7. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 225, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 1, effective June 26, 2016; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 1, effective July 2, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-49.2-7 concerned agencies with security breach procedures.

Chapter 49.3 Identity Theft Protection Act of 2015

11-49.3-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Rhode Island Identity Theft Protection Act of 2015.”

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 2, and P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 2 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 3, provides that this chapter takes effect on June 26, 2016.

P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 3, provides that this chapter takes effect on July 2, 2016.

11-49.3-2. Risk-based information security program.

  1. A municipal agency, state agency, or person who or that stores, collects, processes, maintains, acquires, uses, owns, or licenses personal information about a Rhode Island resident shall implement and maintain a risk-based information security program that contains reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the size and scope of the organization; the nature of the information; and the purpose for which the information was collected in order to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, use, modification, destruction, or disclosure and to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of such information. A municipal agency, state agency, or person shall not retain personal information for a period longer than is reasonably required to provide the services requested; to meet the purpose for which it was collected; or in accordance with a written retention policy or as may be required by law. A municipal agency, state agency, or person shall destroy all personal information, regardless of the medium that such information is in, in a secure manner, including, but not limited to, shredding, pulverization, incineration, or erasure.
  2. A municipal agency, state agency, or person who or that discloses personal information about a Rhode Island resident to a nonaffiliated third party shall require by written contract that the third party implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the size and scope of the organization; the nature of the information; and the purpose for which the information was collected in order to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, use, modification, destruction, or disclosure. The provisions of this section shall apply to contracts entered into after the effective date of this act.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 2.

11-49.3-3. Definitions.

  1. The following definitions apply to this section:
    1. “Breach of the security of the system” means unauthorized access or acquisition of unencrypted, computerized data information that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by the municipal agency, state agency, or person. Good-faith acquisition of personal information by an employee or agent of the agency for the purposes of the agency is not a breach of the security of the system; provided, that the personal information is not used or subject to further unauthorized disclosure.
    2. “Encrypted” means the transformation of data through the use of a one hundred twenty-eight (128) bit or higher algorithmic process into a form in which there is a low probability of assigning meaning without use of a confidential process or key. Data shall not be considered to be encrypted if it is acquired in combination with any key, security code, or password that would permit access to the encrypted data.
    3. “Health insurance information” means an individual’s health insurance policy number, subscriber identification number, or any unique identifier used by a health insurer to identify the individual.
    4. “Medical information” means any information regarding an individual’s medical history, mental or physical condition, or medical treatment or diagnosis by a healthcare professional or provider.
    5. “Municipal agency” means any department, division, agency, commission, board, office, bureau, authority, quasi-public authority, or school, fire, or water district within Rhode Island, other than a state agency, and any other agency that is in any branch of municipal government and exercises governmental functions other than in an advisory nature.
    6. “Owner” means the original collector of the information.
    7. “Person” shall include any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, association, corporation, joint venture, business, legal entity, trust, estate, cooperative, or other commercial entity.
    8. “Personal information” means an individual’s first name or first initial and last name in combination with any one or more of the following data elements, when the name and the data elements are not encrypted or are in hard copy, paper format:
      1. Social security number;
      2. Driver’s license number, Rhode Island identification card number, or tribal identification number;
      3. Account number, credit, or debit card number, in combination with any required security code, access code, password, or personal identification number, that would permit access to an individual’s financial account;
      4. Medical or health insurance information; or
      5. E-mail address with any required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual’s personal, medical, insurance, or financial account.
    9. “Remediation service provider” means any person who or that, in the usual course of business, provides services pertaining to a consumer credit report including, but not limited to, credit report monitoring and alerts, that are intended to mitigate the potential for identity theft.
    10. “State agency” means any department, division, agency, commission, board, office, bureau, authority, or quasi-public authority within Rhode Island; either branch of the Rhode Island general assembly or an agency or committee thereof; the judiciary; or any other agency that is in any branch of Rhode Island state government and that exercises governmental functions other than in an advisory nature.
  2. For purposes of this section, personal information does not include publicly available information that is lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, or local government records.
  3. For purposes of this section, “notice” may be provided by one of the following methods:
    1. Written notice;
    2. Electronic notice, if the notice provided is consistent with the provisions regarding electronic records and signatures set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 7001; or
    3. Substitute notice, if the municipal agency, state agency, or person demonstrates that the cost of providing notice would exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or that the affected class of subject persons to be notified exceeds fifty thousand (50,000), or the municipal agency, state agency, or person does not have sufficient contact information. Substitute notice shall consist of all of the following:
      1. E-mail notice when the municipal agency, state agency, or person has an e-mail address for the subject persons;
      2. Conspicuous posting of the notice on the municipal agency’s, state agency’s or person’s website page, if the municipal agency, state agency, or person maintains one; and
      3. Notification to major statewide media.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 2.

11-49.3-4. Notification of breach.

    1. Any municipal agency, state agency, or person that stores, owns, collects, processes, maintains, acquires, uses, or licenses data that includes personal information shall provide notification as set forth in this section of any disclosure of personal information, or any breach of the security of the system, that poses a significant risk of identity theft to any resident of Rhode Island whose personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person or entity.
    2. The notification shall be made in the most expedient time possible, but no later than forty-five (45) calendar days after confirmation of the breach and the ability to ascertain the information required to fulfill the notice requirements contained in subsection (d) of this section, and shall be consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement as provided in subsection (c) of this section. In the event that more than five hundred (500) Rhode Island residents are to be notified, the municipal agency, state agency, or person shall notify the attorney general and the major credit reporting agencies as to the timing, content, and distribution of the notices and the approximate number of affected individuals. Notification to the attorney general and the major credit reporting agencies shall be made without delaying notice to affected Rhode Island residents.
  1. The notification required by this section may be delayed if a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency determines that the notification will impede a criminal investigation. The federal, state, or local law enforcement agency must notify the municipal agency, state agency, or person of the request to delay notification without unreasonable delay. If notice is delayed due to such determination, then, as soon as the federal, state, or municipal law enforcement agency determines and informs the municipal agency, state agency, or person that notification no longer poses a risk of impeding an investigation, notice shall be provided as soon as practicable pursuant to subsection (a)(2). The municipal agency, state agency, or person shall cooperate with federal, state, or municipal law enforcement in its investigation of any breach of security or unauthorized acquisition or use, which shall include the sharing of information relevant to the incident; provided however, that such disclosure shall not require the disclosure of confidential business information or trade secrets.
  2. Any municipal agency, state agency, or person required to make notification under this section and fails to do so is liable for a violation as set forth in § 11-49.3-5 .
  3. The notification to individuals must include the following information to the extent known:
    1. A general and brief description of the incident, including how the security breach occurred and the number of affected individuals;
    2. The type of information that was subject to the breach;
    3. Date of breach, estimated date of breach, or the date range within which the breach occurred;
    4. Date that the breach was discovered;
    5. A clear and concise description of any remediation services offered to affected individuals including toll free numbers and websites to contact: (i) The credit reporting agencies; (ii) Remediation service providers; (iii) The attorney general; and
    6. A clear and concise description of the consumer’s ability to file or obtain a police report; how a consumer requests a security freeze and the necessary information to be provided when requesting the security freeze; and that fees may be required to be paid to the consumer reporting agencies.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 2.

11-49.3-5. Penalties for violation.

  1. Each reckless violation of this chapter is a civil violation for which a penalty of not more than one hundred dollars ($100) per record may be adjudged against a defendant.
  2. Each knowing and willful violation of this chapter is a civil violation for which a penalty of not more than two hundred dollars ($200) per record may be adjudged against a defendant.
  3. Whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that a violation of this chapter has occurred and that proceedings would be in the public interest, the attorney general may bring an action in the name of the state against the business or person in violation.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 2.

11-49.3-6. Agencies or persons with security breach procedures.

  1. Any municipal agency, state agency, or person shall be deemed to be in compliance with the security breach notification requirements of § 11-49.3-4 if:
    1. The municipal agency, state agency, or person maintains its own security breach procedures as part of an information security policy for the treatment of personal information and otherwise complies with the timing requirements of § 11-49.3-4 , and notifies subject persons in accordance with such municipal agency’s, state agency’s, or person’s notification policies in the event of a breach of security; or
    2. The person maintains a security breach procedure pursuant to the rules, regulations, procedures, or guidelines established by the primary or functional regulator, as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 6809(2), and notifies subject persons in accordance with the policies or the rules, regulations, procedures, or guidelines established by the primary or functional regulator in the event of a breach of security of the system.
  2. A financial institution, trust company, credit union, or its affiliates that is subject to and examined for, and found in compliance with, the Federal Interagency Guidelines on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice shall be deemed in compliance with this chapter.
  3. A provider of health care, healthcare service plan, health insurer, or a covered entity governed by the medical privacy and security rules issued by the federal Department of Health and Human Services, Parts 160 and 164 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, established pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) shall be deemed in compliance with this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 138, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 148, § 2.

Chapter 50 Games of Chance

11-50-1. Filing requirement.

Any person, firm, or corporation proposing to engage in any game, contest, or other promotion or advertising scheme or plan in which a retail establishment offers the opportunity to receive gifts, prizes, or gratuities, as determined by chance, in order to promote its retail business, where the total announced value of the prizes offered to the general public is in excess of five hundred dollars ($500), shall file with the secretary of state upon a form that he or she shall provide a statement setting forth: (1) the minimum number of participating objects to be made available; (2) the minimum number of prize winning objects that will be included in the promotion or advertising scheme or plan; (3) the proportionate opportunity of winning prizes; (4) the minimum value of prizes to be made available; and (5) the rules and regulations pertaining to the promotion or advertising scheme or plan which shall include the period of time and the geographic area to be covered by the contest. There shall be a filing fee of one hundred and fifty dollars ($150) when the statement is filed. Failure to file a statement shall be a misdemeanor.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 199, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 65, art. 43, § 9.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations.

Cross References.

Gambling and lotteries, § 11-19-1 et seq.

Organized criminal gambling, §§ 11-51-1 , 11-51-2 .

11-50-2. Posting of available prizes — Rules and winners.

Every person, firm, or corporation engaging in any promotion or advertising game or contest of the type set forth in § 11-50-1 shall cause to be posted in a conspicuous and prominent location in every retail establishment offering the opportunity to participate in the game or contest the minimum number and value of prizes available to be won over a stated period of time and slated geographic area, and the rules and regulations pertaining to the promotion or advertising scheme or plan and the names and addresses of prize winners. Failure to cause this posting shall be a misdemeanor.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 199, § 1.

11-50-3. Records.

Every person, firm, or corporation engaging in any promotion or advertising scheme or plan of the type set forth in § 11-50-1 shall maintain for six (6) months following the completion of the promotion or advertising scheme or plan adequate records to enable the person, firm, or corporation to report to the secretary of state, upon his or her request, the name and address of each winner of every prize having a value of more than twenty-five dollars ($25.00), the description of the prize won by each person, and the date when the prize was delivered to each person. Failure to file that information with the secretary of state upon his or her request within six (6) months shall be a misdemeanor.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 199, § 1.

11-50-4. Manipulation of games.

Every person, firm, or corporation who manipulates or rigs any promotion or advertising scheme or plan of the type set forth in § 11-50-1 so that gifts, prizes, or gratuities are dispersed to predetermined individuals or retail establishments shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, provided, that this section shall not prevent distribution of gifts, prizes, or gratuities of equal value to retail establishments in a uniform ratio to the number of participating objects distributed to those establishments.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 199, § 1.

Collateral References.

Recovery in tort for wrongful interference with chance to win game, sporting event, or contest. 85 A.L.R.4th 1048.

11-50-5. Failure to distribute prizes.

Every person, firm, or corporation who engages in any promotion or advertising scheme or plan of the type set forth in § 11-50-1 and who fails to distribute the offered gifts, prizes, or gratuities to designated winners shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 199, § 1.

11-50-6. Deceptive advertising practices.

Every person, firm, or corporation who prints, publishes, or circulates literature or advertising material, used in connection with any promotion or advertising scheme or plan of the type set forth in § 11-50-1 , which is false, deceptive, or misleading, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 199, § 1.

11-50-7. Dealer coercion.

Every person, firm, or corporation who coerces a retail dealer to participate in any promotion or advertising scheme or plan of the type set forth in § 11-50-1 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Coercion includes, but is not limited to, circumstances in which a course of business conduct extending over a period of one year or longer between a supplier and a dealer is materially changed for no legitimate business reason, coincident with a failure or refusal of the dealer to participate in an above-mentioned promotion or advertising scheme or plan.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 199, § 1.

11-50-8. Injunction.

Whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that any promotion or advertising scheme or plan of the type set forth in § 11-50-1 is being operated in violation of this chapter, he or she may bring an action in the superior court, in the name and on behalf of the people of the state, to enjoin the continued operation of the promotion or advertising scheme or plan.

History of Section. P.L. 1972, ch. 199, § 1.

Chapter 51 Organized Criminal Gambling

11-51-1. Definitions.

  1. “Gambling” includes, but is not limited to, pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining slot-machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, Policy, Bolita, or numbers games or selling chances in them.
    1. “Organized criminal gambling business” as used in this chapter means a gambling business which involves three (3) or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, operate, or own all or part of the business and which has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of fifteen (15) days, or which has conducted operations on at least two (2) days in each of two (2) consecutive weeks, or which has a combined gross revenue of at least one thousand dollars ($1,000) in any single day, or which has entered into a total of at least one hundred (100) gambling transactions in any single day.
    2. “Organized criminal gambling business” does not refer to betting specifically authorized by chapter 4 of title 41 or any act in amendment of that chapter, nor to any form of gambling otherwise licensed or permitted by specific statutory enactment.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 127, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rearranged the definitions into alphabetical order and redesignated the subsections.

Cross References.

Gambling and lotteries, § 11-19-1 et seq.

Games of chance, § 11-50-1 et seq.

11-51-2. Organized criminal gambling business.

Whoever shall conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own all or part of an organized criminal gambling business, as defined in this chapter, shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years and fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000).

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 127, § 1.

Chapter 52 Computer Crime

11-52-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Access” means to approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in, enter data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of, a computer, computer system, or computer network.
  2. “Computer” means an electronic, magnetic, optical, hydraulic or organic device or group of devices which, pursuant to a computer program, to human instruction, or to permanent instructions contained in the device or group of devices, can automatically perform computer operations with or on computer data and can communicate the results to another computer or to a person. The term “computer” includes any connected or directly related device, equipment, or facility which enables the computer to store, retrieve or communicate computer programs, computer data or the results of computer operations to or from a person, another computer or another device.
  3. “Computer data” means any representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, or instructions which is being prepared or has been prepared and is intended to be processed, is being processed, or has been processed in a computer or computer network. “Computer data” may be in any form, whether readable only by a computer or only by a human or by either, including, but not limited to, computer printouts, magnetic storage media, punched cards, or data stored internally in the memory of the computer.
  4. “Computer network” means a set of related, remotely connected devices and any communications facilities including more than one computer with the capability to transmit data among them through the communications facilities.
  5. “Computer operation” means arithmetic, logical, monitoring, storage or retrieval functions and any combination of them, and includes, but is not limited to, communication with, storage of data to, or retrieval of data from any device or human hand manipulation of electronic or magnetic impulses. A “computer operation” for a particular computer may also be any function for which that computer was generally designed.
  6. “Computer program” means a series of instructions or statements or related data that, in actual or modified form, is capable of causing a computer or a computer system to perform specified functions in a form acceptable to a computer, which permits the functioning of a computer system in a manner designed to provide appropriate products from the computer systems.
  7. “Computer services” includes computer time or services, data processing services, Internet service providers’ networks and facilities located in the state or information or data stored in connection with them.
  8. “Computer software” means a set of computer programs, procedures, and associated documentation concerned with the operation of a computer, computer program or computer network.
  9. “Computer system” means a set of related, connected or unconnected, computer equipment, devices, and software.
  10. “Data” means any representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, or instructions which are being prepared or have been prepared and are intended to be entered, processed, or stored, are being entered, processed, or stored or have been entered, processed, or stored in a computer, computer system, or computer network.
  11. “Electronic mail service provider” means any business or organization qualified to do business in the state of Rhode Island that provides registered users the ability to send or receive electronic mail through equipment located in this state and that is an intermediary in sending or receiving electronic mail.
  12. “Financial instrument” includes, but is not limited to, any check, draft, warrant, money order, note, certificate of deposit, letter of credit, bill of exchange, credit or debit card transaction authorization mechanism, marketable security, or any computerized representation of any of these.
  13. “Owner” means an owner or lessee of a computer or a computer network or an owner, lessee, or licensee of computer data, computer programs, or computer software.
  14. “Person” shall include any individual, partnership, association, corporation or joint venture.
  15. “Property” includes, but is not limited to:
    1. Real property;
    2. Computers and computer networks;
    3. Financial instruments, computer data, computer programs, computer software and all other personal property regardless of whether they are:
      1. Tangible or intangible;
      2. In a format readable by humans or by a computer;
      3. In transit between computers or within a computer network or between any devices which comprise a computer; or
      4. Located on any paper or in any device on which it is stored by a computer or by a human; and
      5. Computer services.
    4. A person “uses” a computer or computer network when he or she:
      1. Attempts to cause or causes a computer or computer network to perform or to stop performing computer operations;
      2. Attempts to cause or causes the withholding or denial of the use of a computer, computer network, computer program, computer data or computer software to another user; or
      3. Attempts to cause or causes another person to put false information into a computer.
    5. A person is “without authority” when: (A) he or she has no right or permission of the owner to use a computer, or, he or she uses a computer in a manner exceeding his or her right or permission or (B) he or she uses an Internet service e-mail system offered by a Rhode Island based Internet service provider in contravention of the authority granted by or in violation of the policies set by the Internet service provider.
    6. Transmission of electronic mail from an organization to its members shall not be deemed to be unsolicited bulk electronic mail.
  16. “Services” includes, but is not limited to, computer time, data processing, and storage functions.
  17. “Source document” means an original document or record which forms the basis of every electronic entry put into a computer, computer system, or computer network.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 217, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 136 § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 421, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the paragraphs in subdivision (15).

Collateral References.

Form and sufficiency of copyright notice with respect to computer programs under 17 USC § 401. 113 A.L.R. Fed. 605.

11-52-2. Access to computer for fraudulent purposes.

Whoever directly or indirectly accesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, or computer network for the purpose of: (1) devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) obtaining money, property, or services by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises; or (3) damaging, destroying, altering, deleting, or removing any program or data contained in it in connection with any scheme or artifice to defraud, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-52-5 .

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 217, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 246, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 136, § 1.

Collateral References.

Computer fraud. 70 A.L.R.5th 647.

11-52-3. Intentional access, alteration, damage, or destruction.

Whoever, intentionally, without authorization, and for fraudulent or other illegal purposes, directly or indirectly, accesses, alters, damages, or destroys any computer, computer system, computer network, computer software, computer program, or data contained in a computer, computer system, computer program, or computer network shall be guilty of a felony and shall be subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-52-5 .

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 217, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 246, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 347, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 483, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2007, ch. 347, § 1, and P.L. 2007, ch. 483, § 1, enacted nearly identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authorization.

Where a former city independent contractor claimed that defendant city mayor and two city employees, accessed a computer without authority and searched his personal e-mail account in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4.1 , defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because the contractor had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal e-mail account and there was a material and disputed issue as to whether the contractor voluntarily consented to a search of his e-mail records. Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55310 (D.R.I. 2006), aff'd, 492 F.3d 50, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15509 (1st Cir. 2007).

11-52-4. Computer theft.

Whoever, intentionally and without claim of right, takes, transfers, conceals or retains possession of any computer, computer system, computer network, computer software, computer program, or data contained in a computer, computer system, computer program, or computer network with a value in excess of five hundred dollars ($500) shall be guilty of a felony and shall be subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-52-5 . If the value is five hundred dollars ($500) or less, then the person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1983, ch. 246, § 2; P.L. 1989, ch. 71, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 136, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 373, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 461, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 373, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 461, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-52-4.1. Computer trespass.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use a computer or computer network without authority and with the intent to:
    1. Temporarily or permanently remove, halt, or otherwise disable any computer data, computer programs, or computer software from a computer or computer network;
    2. Cause a computer to malfunction regardless of how long the malfunction persists;
    3. Alter or erase any computer data, computer programs, or computer software;
    4. Effect the creation or alteration of a financial instrument or of an electronic transfer of funds;
    5. Cause physical injury to the property of another;
    6. Make or cause to be made an unauthorized copy, in any form, including, but not limited to, any printed or electronic form of computer data, computer programs, or computer software residing in, communicated by, or produced by a computer or computer network;
    7. Forge e-mail header information or other Internet routine information for the purpose of sending unsolicited bulk electronic mail through or into the facilities of an electronic mail service provider or its subscribers; or
    8. To sell, give or otherwise distribute or possess with the intent to sell, give or distribute software which is designed to facilitate or enable the forgery of electronic mail header information or other Internet routing information for the purpose of sending unsolicited bulk electronic mail through or into the facilities of an electronic mail service provider or its subscribers.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere with or prohibit terms or conditions in a contract or license related to computers, computer data, computer networks, computer operations, computer programs, computer services, or computer software or to create any liability by reason of terms or conditions adopted by, or technical measures implemented by, a Rhode Island-based electronic mail service provider to prevent the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail in violation of this chapter. Whoever violates this section shall be guilty of a felony and shall be subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-52-2 . If the value is five hundred dollars ($500) or less, then the person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 421, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 373, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 461, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 373, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 461, § 1, enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Expectation of Privacy.

Where a former city employee claimed that defendant city mayor and two city employees accessed a computer without authority and made unauthorized copies of data in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4.1 , defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data stored on his workplace computer and, accordingly, he could demonstrate no injury to a Fourth Amendment-protected interest, nor could he demonstrate any other injury of any kind. Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55310 (D.R.I. 2006), aff'd, 492 F.3d 50, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15509 (1st Cir. 2007).

Where a former city independent contractor claimed that defendant city mayor and two city employees, accessed a computer without authority and searched his personal e-mail account, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4.1 , defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because the contractor had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal e-mail account and there was a material and disputed issue as to whether the contractor voluntarily consented to a search of his e-mail records. Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55310 (D.R.I. 2006), aff'd, 492 F.3d 50, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15509 (1st Cir. 2007).

Collateral References.

Validity of state statutes and administrative regulations regulating internet communications under commerce clause and First Amendment of federal constitution.98 A.L.R.5th 167.

11-52-4.2. Cyberstalking and cyberharassment prohibited.

  1. Whoever transmits any communication by computer or other electronic device to any person or causes any person to be contacted for the sole purpose of harassing that person or his or her family is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. For the purpose of this section, “harassing” means any knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or bothers the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be of a kind that would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, or be in fear of bodily injury. “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of conduct.”
  2. A second or subsequent conviction under subsection (a) of this section shall be deemed a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than two (2) years, by a fine of not more than six thousand dollars ($6,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 215, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 272, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 120, § 1.

Collateral References.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Cyberstalking Laws. 26 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2018).

11-52-4.3. Violation of restraining order.

  1. Whenever there is a restraining order or injunction issued by a court of competent jurisdiction enjoining one person from harassing another person, and the person so enjoined is convicted of the crime as set forth in section 11-52-4.2 for actions against the person protected by the court order or injunction, he or she shall be guilty of a felony which shall be punishable by imprisonment for not more than two (2) years, or by a fine of not more than six thousand dollars ($6,000), or both.
  2. A second or subsequent conviction under subsection (a) of this section shall be punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 215, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 272, § 1.

11-52-5. Penalties.

  1. Any person who is convicted of an offense which is classified as a felony under this chapter shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, or both.
  2. Any person who is convicted of an offense which is classified as a misdemeanor under this chapter shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 217, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 11-52-4 ; P.L. 1983, ch. 246, § 3; P.L. 1989, ch. 71, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 136, § 1.

11-52-6. Civil action.

  1. Any person injured as a result of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the violator for compensatory damages, punitive damages, court costs, and any other relief that the court deems appropriate, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.
  2. If the injury arises from the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail, the injured person, other than an electronic mail service provider, may also recover attorney’s fees and costs and may elect, in lieu of actual damages, to recover the lesser of five hundred dollars ($500) for each and every unsolicited bulk electronic mail message transmitted in violation of this chapter up to a maximum of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) per day. The injured person shall not have a cause of action against the electronic mail service provider which merely transmits the unsolicited bulk electronic mail over its computer network.
  3. If the injury arises from the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail, an injured electronic mail service provider may also recover attorneys fees and costs, and may elect, in lieu of actual damages, to recover the greater of five hundred dollars ($500) for each and every unsolicited bulk electronic mail message transmitted in violation of this chapter up to a maximum of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) per day.
  4. At the request of any party to an action brought pursuant to this section, the court may, in its discretion, conduct all legal proceedings in such a way as to protect the secrecy and security of the computer, computer network, computer data, computer program and computer software involved in order to prevent possible recurrence of the same or a similar act by another person and to protect any trade secrets of any party.
  5. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit any person’s right to pursue any additional civil remedy otherwise allowed by law.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 115 § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 421, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Expectation of Privacy.

Where a former city employee claimed that defendant city mayor and two city employees accessed a computer without authority and made unauthorized copies of data in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4.1 , defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data stored on his workplace computer and, accordingly, he could demonstrate no injury to a Fourth Amendment-protected interest, nor could he demonstrate any other injury of any kind. Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55310 (D.R.I. 2006), aff'd, 492 F.3d 50, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15509 (1st Cir. 2007).

Where a former city independent contractor claimed that defendant city mayor and two city employees, accessed a computer without authority and searched his personal e-mail account, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4.1 , defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because the contractor had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal e-mail account and there was a material and disputed issue as to whether the contractor voluntarily consented to a search of his e-mail records. Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55310 (D.R.I. 2006), aff'd, 492 F.3d 50, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15509 (1st Cir. 2007).

11-52-7. Use of false information.

Whoever intentionally or knowingly makes a transmission of false data for the purpose of submitting a claim for payment, or makes, presents, or uses or causes to be made, presented, or used any data for the purpose of submitting a claim for payment with knowledge of its falsity and with knowledge that it will be used for any claim for payment, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be subject to the penalties set forth in § 11-52-5 .

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 136 § 2; P.L. 2012, ch. 314, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 349, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2012, ch. 314, § 1, and P.L. 2012, ch. 349, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

Computer fraud. 70 A.L.R.5th 647.

11-52-7.1. Online impersonation.

  1. Definitions, as used in this section:
    1. “Commercial social networking site” means a business, organization, or other similar entity that operates a website and permits persons to become registered users for the purpose of establishing personal relationships with other users through direct or real-time communication with other users or the creation of web pages or profiles available to the public or to other users.
    2. “Electronic mail” means an electronic mail message sent through the use of an electronic mail program or a message board program.
    3. “Identifying information” means information that alone, or in conjunction with other information, identifies a person, including a person’s:
      1. Name, social security number, date of birth, or government-issued identification number;
      2. Unique biometric data, including the person’s fingerprint, voice print, or retina or iris image;
      3. Unique electronic identification number, electronic mail address, routing code, or financial institution account number; and
      4. Telecommunication identifying information or access device.
    4. “Public official” means a person elected by the public, or elected or appointed by a governmental body, or an appointed official in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the state or any political subdivision thereof.
  2. A person commits the crime of online impersonation if the person:
    1. Uses the name or persona of another person to create a web page on or to post one or more messages on a commercial social networking site or sends an electronic mail, instant message, text message, or similar communication without obtaining the other person’s consent and with the intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten any person;
    2. Sends an electronic mail, instant message, text message, or similar communication that references a name, domain address, telephone number, or other item of identifying information belonging to any person without obtaining the other person’s consent with the intent to cause a recipient of the communication to reasonably believe that the other person authorized or transmitted the communication and with the intent to harm or defraud any person; or
    3. Uses the name or persona of a public official to create a web page on, or to post one or more messages on, a commercial social networking site or sends an electronic mail, instant message, text message, or similar communication without obtaining the public official’s consent and with the intent to induce another to submit to such pretended official authority, to solicit funds, or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense to the other person’s detriment.
  3. Every person convicted of an offense under this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor for the first offense and shall be subject to imprisonment not exceeding one year, a fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both, and an order of restitution as provided herein. Every person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this section shall be guilty of a felony and shall be subject to imprisonment not exceeding three (3) years, a fine of three thousand dollars ($3,000), or both, and an order of restitution as provided herein.
  4. Every person convicted of an offense under this section shall be subject to an order for restitution, if appropriate, which shall be in addition to any other applicable penalty.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 202, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 215, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 202, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 215, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

11-52-8. Tampering with computer source documents.

  1. Whoever intentionally or knowingly conceals, destroys, or alters or intentionally or knowingly causes another to conceal, destroy, or alter any computer source document used for a computer, computer program, computer system, or computer network, when the computer source document is required to be kept by law, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be subject to the provisions of § 11-52-5 .
  2. Whoever intentionally or knowingly conceals, destroys, or alters or intentionally, knowingly conceals, destroys, or alters or intentionally or knowingly causes another to conceal, destroy, or alter any computer source document used for a computer, computer program, computer system, or computer network, when the computer source document is required to be kept by law, with the intent to obstruct an official investigation by any state agency authorized by law to conduct any civil or criminal investigation, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be subject to the provisions of § 11-52-5 .

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 136 § 2.

Collateral References.

Computer fraud. 70 A.L.R.5th 647.

Chapter 52.1 Internet Misrepresentation of Business Affiliation Act

11-52.1-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Internet Misrepresentation of Business Affiliation Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 558, § 1.

11-52.1-2. Definitions.

The following definitions apply to this section:

  1. “Electronic mail message” means a message sent to a unique destination that consists of a unique user name or mailbox and a reference to an Internet domain, whether or not displayed, and to which an electronic mail message can be sent or delivered.
  2. “Identifying information” means a piece of information that can be used to access an individual’s financial account or to obtain goods or services, and includes an individual’s:
    1. Social security number;
    2. Driver’s license number;
    3. Bank account number;
    4. Credit or debit card number;
    5. Personal identification number;
    6. Automated or electronic signature;
    7. Unique biometric data; or
    8. Account password.
  3. “Internet” means, collectively, the myriad of computer and telecommunications facilities, including equipment and operating software, that comprise the interconnected worldwide network of networks that employ the transmission control protocol or Internet protocol, or any predecessor or successor protocols to such protocol, to communicate information of all kinds by wire or radio.
  4. “Person” shall include any individual, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability company, joint venture or any other type of entity.
  5. “Web page” means allocation with respect to the worldwide web that has a single uniform resource locator or other single location with respect to the Internet.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 558, § 1.

11-52.1-3. Prohibition.

A person shall not, by means of a webpage or electronic mail message or otherwise, using the Internet, solicit, request or take any action to induce another person to provide identifying information by representing that the person, either directly or by implication, is an online business without the express authority or approval of the online business purported to be represented by the person.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 558, § 1.

11-52.1-4. Penalties.

Any person who is convicted of a violation of this chapter shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) per offense, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 558, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2006, the compiler deleted the subsection (a) designation.

11-52.1-5. Civil action.

  1. The attorney general, or any person who either is engaged in the business of providing Internet access service to the public or owns a webpage or trademark and is adversely affected by reason of a violation of the chapter, may bring a civil action against a person who violates this chapter in order to:
    1. enjoin further violations of this chapter; and
    2. recover the greater of: (i) the actual damages incurred as a result of such violation(s); or (ii) five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) for each violation of this chapter.
  2. In any action brought pursuant to this section, the court may increase the damage award to an amount equal to not more than three (3) times the amount otherwise available under this section, if the court determines that the violating party has engaged in a pattern and practice of violating this chapter. The attorney general or other aggrieved party may also recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other relief that the court deems appropriate.
  3. For purposes of this chapter, multiple violations resulting from any single action shall constitute one violation.
  4. A the request of any party to an action brought pursuant to this section, the court may, in its discretion, conduct all legal proceedings in such a way as to protect the secrecy and security of the information involved in order to prevent possible recurrence of the same or a similar act by another person and to protect any trade secrets of any party.
  5. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit any person’s right to pursue any additional civil remedy otherwise allowed by law.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 558, § 1.

Chapter 52.2 Software Fraud

11-52.2-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Advertisement” means a communication, the purpose of which is the promotion of a commercial product or service, including a communication on an internet website that is operated for a commercial purpose.
  2. “Computer software” means a sequence of instructions written in any programming language that is executed on a computer. “Computer software” does not include computer software that is a web page, or are data components of web pages that are not executable independently of the web page.
  3. “Computer virus” means a computer program or other set of instructions that is designed to degrade the performance of or disable a computer or computer network and is designed to have the ability to replicate itself on other computers or computer networks without the authorization of the owners of those computers or computer networks.
  4. “Damage” means any significant impairment to the integrity or availability of data, computer software, a system, or information.
  5. “Execute” means the performance of the functions or the carrying out of the instructions of the computer software.
  6. “Intentionally deceptive” means any of the following:
    1. An intentionally and materially false or fraudulent statement;
    2. A statement or description that intentionally omits or misrepresents material information in order to deceive an owner or operator; and
    3. An intentional and material failure to provide any notice to an owner or operator regarding the installation or execution of computer software in order to deceive the owner or operator.
  7. “Internet” means the global information system that is logically linked together by a globally unique address space based on the internet protocol (IP), or its subsequent extensions, and that is able to support communications using the transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) suite, or its subsequent extensions, or other IP-compatible protocols, and that provides, uses, or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services layered on the communications and related infrastructure described in this subsection.
  8. “Owner or operator” means the owner or lessee of a computer, or someone using such computer with the owner’s or lessee’s authorization. “Owner or operator” does not include any person who owns a computer before the first retail sale of such computer.
  9. “Person” means any individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, or other organization, or any combination thereof.
  10. “Personally identifiable information” means any of the following with respect to an individual who is an owner or operator:
    1. First name or first initial in combination with last name;
    2. A home or other physical address including street name;
    3. An electronic mail address;
    4. A credit or debit card number, bank account number, or a password or access code associated with a credit or debit card or bank account;
    5. Social security number, tax identification number, driver’s license number, passport number, or any other government-issued identification number; and
    6. Any of the following information in a form that personally identifies an owner or operator:
      1. Account balances;
      2. Overdraft history; and
      3. Payment history.
  11. “Transmit” means to transfer, send, or make available computer software, or any component thereof, via the internet or any other medium, including local area networks of computers, other nonwire transmission, and disc or other data storage device. “Transmit” does not include any action by a person providing:
    1. The internet connection, telephone connection, or other means of transmission capability such as a compact disk or digital video disk through which the software was made available; or
    2. The storage or hosting of the software program or a web page through which the software was made available.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 583, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

As enacted by P.L. 2006, ch. 583, § 1, this chapter was designated as chapter 52.1 of title 11. The chapter was redesignated by the director of law revision of the joint committee on legislative services pursuant to § 43-2-2.1 .

11-52.2-2. Unlawful modification of computer settings.

It is unlawful for a person who is not an owner or operator to transmit computer software to the owner or operator’s computer with actual knowledge or with conscious avoidance of actual knowledge and to use such software to do any of the following:

  1. Modify, through intentionally deceptive means, settings that control any of the following:
    1. The page that appears when an owner or operator launches an internet browser or similar computer software used to access and navigate the internet;
    2. The default provider or web proxy the owner or operator uses to access or search the internet; and
    3. The owner or operator’s list of bookmarks used to access web pages;
  2. Collect, through intentionally deceptive means, personally identifiable information:
    1. Through the use of a keystroke-logging function that records all keystrokes made by an owner or operator and transfers that information from the computer to another person;
    2. In a manner that correlates such information with data respecting all or substantially all of the websites visited by an owner or operator, other than websites operated by the person collecting such information; and
    3. Described in subsection (10)(d), (e), or (f)(i) or (ii) of § 11-52.2-1 by extracting the information from the owner or operator’s hard drive;
  3. Prevent, through intentionally deceptive means, an owner or operator’s reasonable efforts to block the installation or execution of, or to disable, computer software by causing the software that the owner or operator has properly removed or disabled automatically to reinstall or reactive [reactivate] on the computer;
  4. Intentionally misrepresent that the computer software will be uninstalled or disabled by an owner or operator’s action; and
  5. Through intentionally deceptive means, remove, disable, or render inoperative security, antispyware, or antivirus computer software installed on the computer.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 583, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2006, the compiler inserted the bracketed word in subdivision (3).

11-52.2-3. Unlawful control of a computer.

It is unlawful for a person who is not an owner or operator to transmit computer software to the owner or operator’s computer with actual knowledge or with conscious avoidance of actual knowledge and to use the software to do any of the following:

  1. Take control of the computer by:
    1. Accessing or using the modem or internet service for such computer to cause damage to the computer or cause an owner or operator to incur financial charges for a service that is not authorized by the owner or operator;
    2. Opening multiple, sequential, stand-alone advertisements in the owner or operator’s internet browser without the authorization of an owner or operator and that a reasonable computer user cannot close without turning off the computer or closing the internet browser;
  2. Modify any of the following settings related to the computer’s access to, or use of, the internet:
    1. Settings that protect information about the owner or operator in order to steal the owner or operator’s personally identifiable information; and
    2. Security settings in order to cause damage to a computer; and
  3. Prevent an owner or operator’s reasonable efforts to block the installation of, or to disable, computer software by doing any of the following:
    1. Presenting the owner or operator with an option to decline installation of computer software with knowledge that, when the option is selected, the installation nevertheless proceeds; and
    2. Falsely representing that computer software has been disabled.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 583, § 1.

11-52.2-4. Deceptive sale of software.

It is unlawful for a person who is not an owner or operator to do any of the following with regard to the owner or operator’s computer:

  1. Induce an owner or operator to install a computer software component onto the computer by intentionally misrepresenting the extent to which installing the software is necessary for security or privacy reasons or in order to open, view, or play a particular type of content; and
  2. Deceptively cause the execution on the computer of a computer software component with the intent of causing an owner or operator to use the component in a manner that violates any other provision of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 583, § 1.

11-52.2-5. Exemptions.

Section 11-52.2-3 or 11-52.2-4 does not apply to any monitoring of, or interaction with, a subscriber’s internet or other network connection or service, or a computer, by a telecommunications carrier, cable operator, computer hardware or software provider, or provider of information service or interactive computer service for network or computer security purposes, diagnostics, technical support, maintenance, repair, authorized updates of software or system firmware, authorized remote system management, or detection or prevention of the unauthorized use of a fraudulent or other illegal activities in connection with a network, service, or computer software, including scanning for and removing software under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 583, § 1.

11-52.2-6. Civil action.

  1. A person who is injured under this chapter may bring a civil action in the superior court to enjoin further violations, or to seek up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or actual damages, whichever is greater. The injured individuals may bring their cause of action as a class action. Nothing in this section prohibits the attorney general from bringing a class action suit under § 6-13.1-5 .
  2. In an action under subsection (1) of this section, a court may increase the damages up to three (3) times the damages allowed by subsection (1) of this section if the defendant has engaged in a pattern and practice of violating this chapter. The court may also award costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 583, § 1.

11-52.2-7. Legislative intent.

It is the intent of the legislature that this chapter is a matter of statewide concern. This chapter supersedes and preempts all rules, regulations, codes, ordinances, and other laws adopted by a city, county, city and county, municipality, or local agency regarding spyware and notices to consumers from computer software providers regarding information collection.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 583, § 1.

11-52.2-8. Severability.

If any one or more sections, clauses, sentences or parts of this chapter shall for any reason be adjudged unconstitutional or otherwise invalid in any court, that judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remaining provisions of this chapter but shall be confined in its operation to the specific provisions so held unconstitutional or invalid and the inapplicability or invalidity of any section, clause or provisions of this chapter in any one or more instances or circumstances shall not be taken to affect or prejudice in any way its applicability or validity in any other instance.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 583, § 1.

Chapter 52.3 Online Property Offenses

11-52.3-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Access” means to use, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve or intercept data from, or otherwise utilize any services of a computer.
  2. “Computer” means a device that accepts, processes, stores, retrieves or outputs data, and includes, but is not limited to, auxiliary storage and telecommunications devices connected to computers.
  3. “Internet” means an interactive computer service or system or an information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, and includes, but is not limited to, an information service, system, or access software provider that provides access to a network system commonly known as the Internet, or any comparable system or service and also includes, but is not limited to, a World Wide Web page, newsgroup, message board, mailing list, or chat area on any interactive computer service or system or other online service.
  4. “Online” means the use of any electronic or wireless device to access the Internet.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 467, § 1.

11-52.3-2. Online sale of stolen property.

A person commits the offense of online sale of stolen property when he or she uses or accesses the Internet with the intent of selling property gained through unlawful means.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 467, § 1.

11-52.3-3. Online theft by deception.

A person commits the offense of online theft by deception when he or she uses the Internet to purchase or attempt to purchase property from a seller with a mode of payment that he or she knows is fictitious, stolen, or lacking the consent of the valid account holder.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 467, § 1.

11-52.3-4. Online fencing.

A person commits the offense of online fencing when he or she sells stolen property using the Internet, knowing that the property was stolen. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to a person who unknowingly purchases stolen property over the Internet.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 467, § 1.

11-52.3-5. Penalties.

  1. Any person convicted of any offense under §§ 11-52.3-2 and 11-52.3-4 , if the value of the property is less than five hundred dollars ($500), shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both. If the property has a value of five hundred dollars ($500) or more, the person shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 467, § 1.

Chapter 53 Defamation [Repealed.]

11-53-1 — 11-53-3. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This chapter (P.L. 1981, ch. 60, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 60, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 237, § 1), consisting of §§ 11-53-1 to 11-53-3 and proscribing hate crimes, was repealed by P.L. 1998, ch. 83, § 4, effective July 2, 1998. For present similar provisions, see § 12-19-38 .

Chapter 54 Experimentation on Human Fetuses

11-54-1. Experimentation on human fetuses.

  1. No person shall use any live human fetus, whether before or after expulsion from its mother’s womb, for scientific, laboratory research, or other kind of experimentation. This section shall not prohibit procedures incident to the study of a human fetus while it is in its mother’s womb, provided that in the best medical judgment of the physician, made at the time of the study, the procedures do not substantially jeopardize the life or health of the fetus, and provided the fetus is not the subject of a planned abortion. In any criminal proceeding the fetus shall be conclusively presumed not to be the subject of a planned abortion if the mother signed a written statement at the time of the study that she was not planning an abortion.
  2. This section shall not prohibit or regulate diagnostic or remedial procedures, the purpose of which is to determine or to preserve the life or health of the fetus involved or the mother involved.
  3. A fetus is a live fetus for purposes of this section when, in the best medical judgment of a physician, it shows evidence of life as determined by the same medical standards as are used in determining evidence of life in a spontaneously aborted fetus at approximately the same stage of gestational development.
  4. No experimentation may knowingly be performed upon a dead fetus unless the consent of its mother has first been obtained, provided, that such consent shall not be required in the case of a routine pathological study. In any criminal proceeding, consent shall be conclusively presumed to have been granted for the purposes of this section by a written statement, signed by the mother, who is at least eighteen (18) years of age, to the effect that she consents to the use of her fetus for scientific, laboratory, research, or other kind of experimentation or study; that written consent shall constitute lawful authorization for the transfer of the dead fetus.
  5. No person shall perform or offer to perform an abortion where part or all of the consideration for the performance is that the fetal remains may be used for experimentation or other kinds of research or study.
  6. No person shall knowingly sell, transfer, distribute, or give away any fetus for a use which is in violation of the provisions of this section. For purposes of this section, the word “fetus” includes an embryo or neonate.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 231, § 1.

11-54-2. Penalties.

Any person who performs any of the acts prohibited by this chapter shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by a fine of at least one thousand dollars ($1,000) or shall be imprisoned for a period of at least one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1981, ch. 231, § 1.

Chapter 55 Paramilitary Training

11-55-1. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter:

  1. “Civil disorder” means any public disturbance involving acts of violence by assemblages of three (3) or more persons, which causes an immediate danger of, or results in, damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual.
  2. “Explosive or incendiary device” means:
    1. Dynamite and all other forms of high explosives;
    2. Any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or similar device; and
    3. Any incendiary bomb or grenade, fire bomb, or similar device, including any device which:
      1. Consists of or includes a breakable container including a flammable liquid or compound, and a wick composed of any material which, when ignited, is capable of igniting the flammable liquid or compound; and
      2. Can be carried or thrown by one individual acting alone.
  3. “Firearm” means any weapon which is designed to, or may readily be converted to, expel any projectile by the action of an explosive; or the frame or receiver of any weapon of that type.
  4. “Law enforcement officer” means any officer or employee of the United States, any state, or any political subdivision of a state acting in his or her official capacity; the term shall specifically include, but shall not be limited to, members of the National Guard, as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101(9), the naval militia, the independent chartered military organizations set forth in § 30-1-4 and the department of environmental management in the operation of a firearm training course under its auspices.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 391, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the paragraph designations in subdivision (2).

11-55-2. Paramilitary training prohibited.

  1. Any person who teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application, or making of any firearm, explosive or incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, knowing or having reason to know or intending that it will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder; or any person who assembles with one or more persons for the purpose of training with, practicing with, or being instructed in the use of any firearm, explosive, or incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, intending to employ it unlawfully for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder shall be guilty of a felony.
  2. Nothing contained in this section shall make unlawful any act of any law enforcement officer which is performed in the lawful performance of his or her official duties.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 391, § 1.

11-55-3. Penalty for violation.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, or be fined not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 187, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 391, § 1.

Chapter 56 Duty to Render Assistance

11-56-1. Duty to assist.

Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is exposed to, or has suffered, grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he or she can do so without danger or peril to himself or herself or to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a petty misdemeanor and shall be subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six (6) months, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1984, ch. 416, § 1.

Law Reviews.

For article, Samaritans: Good, Bad and Ugly: A Comparative Law Analysis, see 11 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 77 (2005).

Mackenzie C. McBurney, 2017 Survey, Cases: Insurance Law: Hudson v. GEICO Ins. Agency, Inc., 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 693 (2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Uninsured Motorist Coverage.

Plaintiff, who was injured after exiting an insured vehicle to render aid to victims of an auto collision, was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under the vehicle’s policy because, reading the policy broadly, (1) there was a sufficient nexus between the plaintiff’s injuries and the vehicle, as she was in the vehicle when she heard the collision and exited to offer assistance, (2) she was “vehicle oriented,” as the collision was a temporary interruption compelling her to immediately exit the vehicle and give aid, and (3) she was engaged in a transaction essential to the vehicle’s use at the time of the injuries, in light of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-56-1 and long-standing public policy to encourage the rescue of others. Hudson v. GEICO Ins. Agency, Inc., 161 A.3d 1150, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 86 (2017).

Chapter 57 Racketeer Violence

11-57-1. Violent crime in aid of racketeering.

Every person who either: (1) as consideration for anything of pecuniary value from a person or persons engaged in racketeering activity as defined in chapter 15 of title 7; or (2) as the means of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing his financial position in an enterprise in violation of chapter 15 of title 7; commits murder, kidnapping, mayhem, assault with a dangerous weapon, or assault resulting in serious bodily injury, or threatens a person with the commission of such an offense against him or her, or attempts or conspires to commit that offense, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced, in addition to the sentence for the offense, to a term of imprisonment of not less than two (2) years and not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand ($10,000) dollars, or both. A term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section shall be served consecutively to any other sentence of imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 449, § 1.

Collateral References.

Criminal prosecutions under state RICO statutes for engaging in organized criminal activity. 89 A.L.R.5th 629.

Offense of Committing Murder In Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) in Drug Enterprise Under 18 U.S.C. § 1959. 47 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2020).

11-57-2. Solicitation to commit a violent crime in aid of racketeering.

Every person who solicits another to commit a violation of § 11-57-1 shall be guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced, in addition to any other sentence imposed, to a term of imprisonment of not less than two (2) years and not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand ($10,000) dollars, or both. A term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section shall be served consecutively to any other sentence of imprisonment.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 449, § 1.

Collateral References.

Criminal prosecutions under state RICO statutes for engaging in organized criminal activity. 89 A.L.R.5th 629.

Offense of Committing Murder In Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) in Drug Enterprise Under 18 U.S.C. § 1959. 47 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5 (2020).

Chapter 58 Falsifying Educational Records

11-58-1. Purpose.

The purpose of this chapter shall be to:

  1. Prohibit forgery, counterfeiting, or alteration of a transcript, diploma, or grade report of a postsecondary educational institution;
  2. Prohibit certain uses of a forged, counterfeit, or altered transcript, diploma, or grade report, including, but not limited to, obtaining employment or any license; and
  3. Provide a certain penalty for violation of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 185, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

11-58-2. Uses prohibited.

  1. A person shall not falsely make, forge, counterfeit, or cause or procure to be falsely made, forged, or counterfeited, or willingly aid or assist in falsely making, forging, or counterfeiting a transcript, diploma, or grade report of a postsecondary educational institution.
  2. A person shall not use, offer, or present as genuine a false, forged, counterfeited, or altered transcript, diploma, or grade report of a postsecondary educational institution.
  3. A person shall not use, offer, or present a transcript, diploma, or grade report of a postsecondary educational institution in a fraudulent manner.

History of Section. P.L. 1988, ch. 185, § 1.

11-58-3. Penalties for violation.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or shall be imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 185, § 1.

Chapter 59 Stalking

11-59-1. Definitions.

For the purpose of this chapter:

  1. “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of “course of conduct.”
  2. “Harasses” means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person with the intent to seriously alarm, annoy, or bother the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, or be in fear of bodily injury.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 201, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 382, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 358, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 250, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 183, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2002 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2002 amendment.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

Since the language defining harassment is phrased in the alternative, the fact that a victim may not have been in fear of bodily injury is irrelevant if the defendant’s conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 61 (2001).

Harass.

An envelope, which was sent by defendant to his ex-wife, and its contents, which were materials related to the prevention of domestic violence, were properly admitted in defendant’s trial for violation of a no-contact order and stalking because although the contents of the envelope did not make it any more or less probable that defendant intentionally contacted his ex-wife in violation of the no-contact order, they were relevant to the charges of stalking under R.I. Gen. Law § 11-59-1(2) to show that defendant intended to “seriously alarm, annoy, or bother” her, in contravention of R.I. Gen. Law § 11-59-2 . Moreover, the probative value did not substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice under R.I. R. Evid. 403 . State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 143 (2004).

Defendant’s conviction of misdemeanor stalking, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-59-2 was affirmed; under the version of the law in effect at the time the crime was committed, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the action, as the State presented conclusive evidence that defendant was aware that his advances toward the victim were unwelcome, which satisfied the definition of harassment under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-59-1 . State v. Stierhoff, 879 A.2d 425, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 70 (2005).

Collateral References.

Validity of state stalking statutes. 6 A.L.R.7th 6.

11-59-2. Stalking prohibited.

  1. Any person who: (1) harasses another person; or (2) willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows another person with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of bodily injury, is guilty of the crime of stalking.
  2. Stalking shall be deemed a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 382, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 358, § 3; P.L. 1995, ch. 7, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 65, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 184, § 1; P.L. 2002, ch. 183, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subdivision designations in subsection (a).

Compiler’s Notes.

The section as it appears above has been edited by the compiler to include the changes made by the 2002 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2002 amendment.

Repealed Sections.

Former § 11-59-2 (P.L. 1992, ch. 201, § 1), concerning the prohibition of stalking, was repealed by P.L. 1993, ch. 358, § 2, effective July 27, 1993.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

The language of this section prior to the 1995 amendment gave adequate warning to potential offenders of the conduct that was prohibited; it defies logic to conclude that a defendant would have to commit more than one series of harassing acts in order to be found guilty of stalking. Thus, this section as originally enacted passed constitutional muster and was not so ambiguously worded as to have been unconstitutionally vague. State v. Fonseca, 670 A.2d 1237, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1996).

Defendant’s conviction of misdemeanor stalking, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-59-2 was affirmed; the version of the statute in effect at the time the crime was committed was unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant pursuant to U.S. Const. amend. XIV, as the evidence established that defendant’s unsolicited contact with the victim was unwelcome. State v. Stierhoff, 879 A.2d 425, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 70 (2005).

Evidence Sufficient.

Once an earlier episode of stalking had been recounted to the jury for the purpose of reflecting on the victim’s state of mind, the timing and circumstances of four new communications, unthreatening though they may have been in isolation, became clear, and the evidence was sufficient for a finding of harassment beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 61 (2001).

An envelope, which was sent by defendant to his ex-wife, and its contents, which were materials related to the prevention of domestic violence, were properly admitted in defendant’s trial for violation of a no-contact order and stalking because although the contents of the envelope did not make it any more or less probable that defendant intentionally contacted his ex-wife in violation of the no-contact order, they were relevant to the charges of stalking under R.I. Gen. Law § 11-59-1(2) to show that defendant intended to “seriously alarm, annoy, or bother” her, in contravention of R.I. Gen. Law § 11-59-2 . Moreover, the probative value did not substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice under R.I. R. Evid. 403 . State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 143 (2004).

Defendant’s conviction of misdemeanor stalking, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-59-2 was affirmed; under the version of the law in effect at the time the crime was committed, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the action, as the State presented conclusive evidence that defendant was aware that his advances toward the victim were unwelcome, which satisfied the definition of harassment under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-59-1 . State v. Stierhoff, 879 A.2d 425, 2005 R.I. LEXIS 70 (2005).

Defendant was not entitled to dismissal of stalking charges because defendant was not entitled to prior notice that defendant’s acts were disturbing or unwanted, as this section barred willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following another to put that person in reasonable fear of bodily injury, and required no direct victim contact. State v. Kolsoi, 126 A.3d 487, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 118 (2015).

Three of five victims’ testimony was not required to show the victims’ reasonable fear of bodily injury because (1) the victims traveled together and the State said their testimony would have been the same as those who testified, so the testimony would have been cumulative, (2) this section required only proof of defendant’s intent to put another in reasonable fear of bodily injury, and (3) testifying victims and surveillance footage sufficiently showed defendant directed defendant’s acts toward all five victims. State v. Kolsoi, 126 A.3d 487, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 118 (2015).

Legitimate Purpose.

The absence of a precise statutory definition of “legitimate purpose” was not fatal to the state’s case against a defendant accused of stalking in light of the substantial evidence that the defendant was amply aware that his continued communications were unwelcome. State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 61 (2001).

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of stalking statutes. 29 A.L.R.5th 487.

11-59-3. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

This section (P.L. 1992, ch. 201, § 1), concerning the violation of a restraining order, was repealed by P.L. 2002, ch. 183, § 2, effective June 25, 2002.

Chapter 60 Assisted Suicide

11-60-1. Legislative findings.

The General Assembly finds and declares that the welfare of the citizens of the state requires that vulnerable persons be protected from suicide and that the cost to the taxpayers of enforcing laws preventing assisted suicides will be reduced by promoting civil enforcement of such laws.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 181, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 183, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Camille Caron Capraro, Comment: Physician-Assisted Death with Dignity: Expanding Palliative Care in Rhode Island, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 499 (2018).

11-60-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Licensed health care professional” means a physician, surgeon, podiatrist, osteopath, osteopathic physician and surgeon, physician assistant, nurse, nurse anesthetist, dentist, or pharmacist licensed pursuant to title 5.
  2. “Suicide” means the act or instance of taking one’s own life voluntarily and intentionally.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 181, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 183, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment rewrote the section heading.

11-60-3. Prevention of assisted suicide.

An individual or licensed health care practitioner who with the purpose of assisting another person to commit suicide knowingly:

  1. Provides the physical means by which another person commits or attempts to commit suicide; or
  2. Participates in a physical act by which another person commits or attempts to commit suicide is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be punished by imprisonment for up to ten (10) years, by a fine of up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or both.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 181, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 183, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment redesignated the subdivisions.

Law Reviews.

Camille Caron Capraro, Comment: Physician-Assisted Death with Dignity: Expanding Palliative Care in Rhode Island, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 499 (2018).

11-60-4. Acts and omissions exempted.

  1. A licensed health care professional who administers, prescribes, or dispenses medications or procedures to relieve another person’s pain or discomfort, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or increase the risk of death, does not violate the provision of this chapter unless the medications or procedures are knowingly administered, prescribed, or dispensed to cause death.
  2. A licensed health care professional who withholds or withdraws a life-sustaining procedure in compliance with chapter 4.10 of title 23 does not violate the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 181, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 183, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Law Reviews.

Camille Caron Capraro, Comment: Physician-Assisted Death with Dignity: Expanding Palliative Care in Rhode Island, 23 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 499 (2018).

11-60-5. Injunctive relief.

  1. The attorney general is empowered to seek an injunction against any person violating the provisions of this chapter. The person who has been assisted or counseled in an attempt to commit suicide, may seek an injunction against all future unlawful assisted suicides by the particular individual who assisted or attempted to assist the suicide.
  2. A cause of action for injunctive relief under this section may be maintained by the attorney general against any individual or licensed health care practitioner who is reasonably believed to be about to violate or who is in the course of violating this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 181, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 183, § 1.

Reenactments.

The 2002 Reenactment added the subsection designations.

Chapter 61 The Rhode Island Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act [Repealed.]

11-61-1 — 11-61-8. Repealed.

Repealed Sections.

These sections (P.L. 1997, ch. 125, § 1), relating to criminal street gang activity, were repealed by § 11-61-8, as enacted by P.L. 1997, ch. 125, § 1, effective June 30, 2000.

Chapter 62 Community Restitution

11-62-1. Community restitution.

The general assembly declares that the words “public service” which appear throughout this title shall now be substituted with, and referred to as “public community restitution”.

History of Section. P.L. 1998, ch. 454, § 1.

Chapter 63 Use of Theft Detection Devices

11-63-1. Unlawful use and/or removal of theft detection shielding devices.

  1. A person commits unlawful use of a theft detection shielding device when he or she knowingly manufactures, sells, offers for sale or distributes in any way a laminated or coated bag or device peculiar to and marketed for shielding and intended to shield merchandise from detection by an electronic or magnetic theft alarm sensor.
  2. A person commits unlawful possession of a theft detection shielding device when he or she knowingly possesses any laminated or coated bag or device peculiar to and designed for shielding and intended to shield merchandise from detection by an electronic or magnetic theft alarm sensor, with the intent to commit theft or retail theft.
  3. A person commits unlawful possession of a theft detection device remover when he or she knowingly possesses any tool or device designed to allow the removal of any theft detection device from any merchandise with the intent to use the tool to remove any theft detection device from any merchandise without the permission of the merchant or person owning or holding the merchandise.
  4. A person commits unlawful removal of a theft detection device when he or she intentionally removes the device from merchandise prior to purchase.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 282, § 1.

11-63-2. Detention of persons suspected of unlawful use and/or removal of theft detection devices — Reasonable cause.

  1. The activation of an anti-shoplifting or inventory control device as a result of a person exiting the establishment or a protected area within the establishment shall constitute reasonable cause for the detention of the person exiting by the owner or operator of the establishment or by an agent or employee of the owner or operator, provided sufficient notice has been posted to advise the patrons that the device is being utilized. Each detention shall be made only in a reasonable manner and only for a reasonable period of time sufficient for any inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the activation of the device or for the recovery of goods.
  2. The taking into custody and detention by a law enforcement officer, merchant, or merchant’s employee, if done in compliance with all the requirements of this section, shall not render law enforcement officer, merchant, or merchant’s employee criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false imprisonment, or unlawful detention.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 282, § 1.

11-63-3. Penalties for violation.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or shall be imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 282, § 1.

Chapter 64 Electronic Imaging Devices

11-64-1. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter the following definitions apply:

  1. “Disseminate” means to make available by any means to any person.
  2. “Harm” means bodily injury, emotional distress, financial loss, or reputational injury.
  3. “Identifiable” means identifiable by any person from the visual image or information offered in connection with the visual material.
  4. “Imaging device” means any electronic instrument capable of capturing, recording, storing, or transmitting visual images.
  5. “Intimate areas” means the naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola of a person that the person intended to be protected from public view.
  6. “Legal entity” means any partnership, firm, association, corporation, or any agent or servant thereof.
  7. “Publish” means to:
    1. Disseminate with the intent that the image or images be made available by any means to any person or other legal entity;
    2. Disseminate with the intent the images be sold by another person or legal entity;
    3. Post, present, display, exhibit, circulate, advertise, or allow access by any means, so as to make an image or images available to the public; or
    4. Disseminate with the intent that an image or images be posted, presented, displayed, exhibited, circulated, advertised, or made accessible by any means, and to make the images available to the public.
  8. “Sell” means to disseminate to another person, or to publish, in exchange for something of value.
  9. “Sexually explicit conduct” means actual:
    1. Graphic sexual intercourse, including: genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, or lascivious sex where the genitals or pubic area of any person is exhibited;
    2. Bestiality;
    3. Masturbation; or
    4. Sadistic or masochistic abuse.
  10. “Visual image” means any photograph, film, video, or digital image or recording, whether produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means.

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 202, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 206, § 2; P.L. 2018, ch. 27, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 28, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2004, ch. 202, § 2, and P.L. 2004, ch. 206, § 2, enacted identical versions of this chapter.

P.L. 2018, ch. 27, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 28, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

11-64-2. Video voyeurism.

  1. A person is guilty of video voyeurism when, for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or stimulation, such person:
    1. Uses, installs or permits the use or installation of an imaging device to capture, record, store or transmit visual images of the intimate areas of another person without that other person’s knowledge and consent, and under circumstances in which that other person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
    2. Intentionally, and with knowledge that the image was obtained in violation of subsection (a), disseminates, publishes, or sells such image of the captured representation of another person or persons depicted in the representation or reproduction, and who did not consent to the dissemination, publication or sale.
  2. A person is also guilty of video voyeurism when that person, for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or stimulation, looks into an occupied dwelling or other building by use of an imaging device that provides images of the interior of a dwelling.
  3. A person found guilty of the crime of video voyeurism shall be imprisoned for not more than three (3) years in jail and/or fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5000).

History of Section. P.L. 2004, ch. 202, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 206, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.

In a prosecution for video voyeurism, as a reasonable inference could be drawn from the facts alleged in a detective’s affidavit that defendant would take home the easily transportable digital camera he used to take photos beneath a child’s skirt, a warrant to search defendant’s home for cameras was supported by probable cause under U.S. Const. amend. IV and R.I. Const. art. I, § 6 . Therefore, photographic images of the child found on a camera seized pursuant to the warrant were admissible. State v. Byrne, 972 A.2d 633, 2009 R.I. LEXIS 78 (2009).

11-64-3. Unauthorized dissemination of indecent material.

  1. A person is guilty of unauthorized dissemination of a sexually explicit visual image of another person when the person intentionally, by any means, disseminates, publishes, or sells:
    1. A visual image that depicts another identifiable person eighteen (18) years or older engaged in sexually explicit conduct or of the intimate areas of that person;
    2. The visual image was made, captured, recorded, or obtained under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private;
    3. The visual image was disseminated, published, or sold without the consent of the depicted person; and
    4. With knowledge or with reckless disregard for the likelihood that the depicted person will suffer harm, or with the intent to harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the depicted person.
  2. Subsection (a) shall not apply to:
    1. A visual image that involves voluntary exposure of intimate areas or of sexually explicit conduct in a public or commercial setting, or in a place where a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy;
    2. Dissemination made in the public interest, scientific activities, or educational activities;
    3. Dissemination made in the course of a lawful public proceeding;
    4. Dissemination made for purposes of law enforcement, criminal reporting, corrections, legal proceedings, the reporting of unlawful conduct, or for medical treatment; or
    5. Dissemination of an image that constitutes a matter of public concern, such as a matter related to a newsworthy event or related to a public figure.
  3. For the purposes of this section, “intimate areas” means the naked genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola of a person that the person intended to protect from public view.
  4. A first violation of this section shall be a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, subject to imprisonment of not more than one year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both. A second or subsequent violation of this section shall be a felony and, upon conviction, subject to imprisonment for not more than three (3) years, a fine of not more than three thousand dollars ($3,000), or both.
  5. Any person who intentionally threatens to disclose any visual image described in subsection (a) and makes the threat to obtain a benefit in return for not making the disclosure or in connection with the threatened disclosure, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, be subject to imprisonment for up to five (5) years, a fine of up to five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  6. Any person who demands payment of money, property, services, or anything else of value from a person in exchange for removing any visual image described in subsection (a) from public view shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, be subject to imprisonment for up to five (5) years, a fine of up to five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both.
  7. Those in violation of this section shall not be subject to sex offender registration requirements as set forth in chapter 37.1 of title 11 entitled “Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act.”
  8. A violation of this section is committed within this state if any conduct that is an element of the offense, or any harm to the depicted person resulting from the offense, occurs in this state.
  9. Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability on an interactive computer service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), an information service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 153, or a telecommunications service, as defined in § 44-18-7.1 , for content provided by another person.

History of Section. P.L. 2018, ch. 27, § 2; P.L. 2018, ch. 28, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2018, ch. 27, § 2, and P.L. 2018, ch. 28, § 2 enacted nearly identical versions of this section.

Chapter 65 Unlawful Operation of a Recording Device

11-65-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. The term “audiovisual recording function” means the capability of a device to record or transmit a motion picture, or any part thereof, by means of any technology now in use or later developed.
  2. The term “motion picture theater” means a movie theater, screening room, or other venue that is being utilized primarily for the exhibition of a motion picture at the time of the offense provided for in § 11-65-2 of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 164, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2005, ch. 162, § 1, and P.L. 2005, ch. 164, § 1, enacted identical versions of this chapter.

11-65-2. Unlawful operation of a recording device.

  1. Any person who knowingly operates the audiovisual recording function of any device in a motion picture theater, while a motion picture is being exhibited with the intention of recording the movie or picture being played, and without the consent of the motion picture theater owner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
  2. A person found guilty of the crime of unlawful operation of a recording device shall be imprisoned for not more than one year, or fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
  3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to the operation of an audiovisual recording function of a device by any authorized employee or agent of a local, state or federal law enforcement agency while such employee or agent is engaged in authorized investigative, protective, law enforcement or intelligence gathering activities.
  4. Nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution of a person under any other provision of the general statutes.
  5. Any person reasonably believed to have committed or to be committing the crime of unlawful operation of a recording device as defined in § 11-65-2 shall be subject to detention by a police officer in accordance with § 12-7-1 .

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 164, § 1.

11-65-3. Immunity of motion picture theater owner.

  1. Any theater owner or lessee, or an employee or agent of a theater owner or lessee, who observes any person committing an offense or attempting to commit an offense in violation of this chapter may stop the person. Immediately upon stopping the person, the theater owner, an employee or agent of a theater owner shall identify himself or herself and state his or her reason for stopping the person. If after his or her initial confrontation with the person under suspicion, the theater owner or lessee, or employee or agent of a theater owner or lessee, has reasonable grounds to believe that at the time stopped, the person was committing or attempting to commit the crime of unlawful operation of a recording device on the premises, the theater owner or lessee, or employee or agent of a theater owner or lessee, may detain the person for a reasonable time sufficient to summon a police officer to the premises. In no case shall the detention be for a period exceeding one hour. Detention must be accomplished in a reasonable manner without unreasonable restraint or excessive force, and may take place only on the premises of the “motion picture theater” establishment where the alleged crime occurred. Any person so stopped by a theater owner or lessee, or employee or agent of an owner or lessee pursuant to this section shall promptly identify himself or herself by name and address. Once placed under detention, no other information shall be required of the person and no written and/or signed statement shall be elicited from the person until a police officer has taken him or her into custody.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “reasonable grounds” includes knowledge that a person appeared to be operating a recording device on the premises in violation of § 11-65-2 , or appeared to be attempting to operate a recording device in violation of § 11-65-2 while on the premises.
  3. In detaining a person whom the theater owner, or an employee or agent of a theater owner has reasonable grounds to believe is committing the crime of unlawful operating of a recording device, the theater owner, or an employee or agent of a theater owner may use a reasonable amount of nondeadly force when and only when that force is necessary to protect himself or herself, or to prevent the escape of the person being detained or the loss of the unlawful audiovisual recording.
  4. The owner or lessee of a motion picture theater, or the agent or employee of such owner or lessee, who alerts law enforcement authorities of an alleged violation of this chapter shall not be liable in any civil action arising out of measures taken by such owner, lessee, agent or employee in the course of reasonably detaining a person that the owner, lessee, agent or employee had reasonable grounds to believe violated this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 162, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 164, § 1.

Chapter 66 Hydrant Tampering

11-66-1. Interference with fire hydrants.

Every person or entity engaged who for the purposes of commercial activity, who willfully or fraudulently injures or knowingly allows to be injured any fire hydrant or “dry hydrant,” so called as constructed and maintained by a fire company or district, connected with or belonging to any public waterworks or water service owned and furnished by the city of Providence or willfully tampers or meddles with any other of the appliances or appurtenances connected with or belonging to the public waterworks or water service owned and furnished by the city of Providence in a manner that causes loss or damage, shall be fined not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).

This chapter shall not apply to any person who is under the age of eighteen (18) years.

History of Section. P.L. 2006, ch. 581, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 593, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2006, ch. 581, § 1, and P.L. 2006, ch. 593, § 1, enacted identical versions of this chapter.

In 2006, the compiler deleted the subsection (b) designation.

Chapter 67 Trafficking of Persons and Involuntary Servitude

11-67-1. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 123, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 217, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 1, effective July 18, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 1, effective July 19, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

For the effect of the repeal of this chapter on criminal prosecutions, see § 11-67.1-26 .

Former § 11-67-1 concerned definitions. For comparable provisions, see § 11-67.1-1 et seq.

11-67-2. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 123, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 217, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 188, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 192, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 1, effective July 18, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 1, effective July 19, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-67-2 concerned involuntary servitude. For comparable provisions, see § 11-67.1-1 et seq.

11-67-3. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 123, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 217, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 1, effective July 18, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 1, effective July 19, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-67-3 concerned trafficking of persons for forced labor or commercial sexual activity. For comparable provisions, see § 11-67.1-1 et seq.

11-67-4. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 123, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 217, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 1, effective July 18, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 1, effective July 19, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-67-4 concerned restitution. For comparable provisions, see § 11-67.1-1 et seq.

11-67-5. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 123, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 217, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 1, effective July 18, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 1, effective July 19, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-67-5 concerned forfeitures. For comparable provisions, see § 11-67.1-1 et seq.

11-67-6. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 188, § 2; P.L. 2009, ch. 192, § 2; P.L. 2015, ch. 42, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 45, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 1, effective July 18, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 1, effective July 19, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-67-6 concerned sex trafficking of a minor. For comparable provisions, see § 11-67.1-1 et seq.

11-67-7. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 188, § 2; P.L. 2009, ch. 192, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 1, effective July 18, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 1, effective July 19, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-67-7 concerned interagency task force on trafficking in persons created; composition; and duties and responsibilities. For comparable provisions, see § 11-67.1-1 et seq.

11-67-8. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 188, § 2; P.L. 2009, ch. 192, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 1, effective July 18, 2017; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 1, effective July 19, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 11-67-8 concerned reporting. For comparable provisions, see § 11-67.1-1 et seq.

Chapter 67.1 Uniform Act on Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking

11-67.1-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and cited as the “Uniform Act on Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking.”

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes proscribing human trafficking. 101 A.L.R.6th 417.

11-67.1-2. Definitions.

  1. For purposes of this chapter:
    1. “Adult” means an individual eighteen (18) years of age or older.
    2. “Coercion” means:
      1. The use or threat of force against, abduction of, serious harm to, or physical restraint of, an individual;
      2. The use of a plan, pattern, or statement with intent to cause an individual to believe that failure to perform an act will result in the use of force against, abduction of, serious harm to, or physical restraint of, an individual;
      3. The abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process;
      4. Controlling or threatening to control an individual’s access to a controlled substance as defined in § 21-28-1.02 ;
      5. The destruction or taking of or a threatened destruction or taking of an individual’s identification document or other property;
      6. The use of debt bondage;
      7. The use of an individual’s physical or mental impairment when the impairment has a substantial adverse effect on the individual’s cognitive or volitional function; or
      8. The commission of civil or criminal fraud.
    3. “Commercial sexual activity” means sexual activity for which anything of value is given to, promised to, or received, by a person.
    4. “Debt bondage” means inducing an individual to provide:
      1. Commercial sexual activity in payment toward or satisfaction of a real or purported debt; or
      2. Labor or services in payment toward or satisfaction of a real or purported debt if:
        1. The reasonable value of the labor or services is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt; or
        2. The length of the labor or services is not limited and the nature of the labor or services is not defined.
    5. “Human trafficking” means the commission of an offense created by §§ 11-67.1-3 11-67.1-7 .
    6. “Identification document” means a passport, driver’s license, immigration document, travel document, or other government-issued identification document, including a document issued by a foreign government.
    7. “Labor or services” means activity having economic value.
    8. “Minor” means an individual less than eighteen (18) years of age.
    9. “Person” means an individual, estate, business or nonprofit entity, or other legal entity. The term does not include a public corporation or government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality.
    10. “Serious harm” means harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, economic, or reputational, to an individual that would compel a reasonable individual of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or continue to perform labor or services or sexual activity to avoid incurring the harm.
    11. “Sexual activity” means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or the intentional touching of the victim’s or accused’s intimate body parts, clothed or unclothed, if the touching is for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or assault. The term includes a sexually-explicit performance.
    12. “Sexually explicit performance” means an act or show, intended to arouse, satisfy the sexual desires of, or appeal to the prurient interests of patrons or viewers, whether public or private, live, photographed, recorded, or videotaped.
    13. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian tribe or band recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
    14. “Victim” means an individual who is subjected to human trafficking or to conduct that would have constituted human trafficking had this chapter been in effect when the conduct occurred, regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted, or convicted.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-3. Trafficking an individual.

  1. A person commits the offense of trafficking an individual if the person knowingly recruits, transports, transfers, harbors, receives, provides, obtains, isolates, maintains, or entices an individual in furtherance of:
    1. Forced labor in violation of § 11-67.1-4 ; or
    2. Sexual servitude in violation of § 11-67.1-5 .
  2. Every person who shall commit trafficking of a minor shall be guilty of a felony, subject to not more than fifty (50) years imprisonment, a fine of up to forty thousand dollars ($40,000), or both.
  3. Every person who shall commit trafficking of an adult shall be guilty of a felony, subject to not more than twenty (20) years imprisonment, a fine of up to twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Amanda LaRocca, Comment: The Full Swede: Revising Rhode Island’s Prostitution Law to Decriminalize the Selling of Sex While Still Criminalizing the Buying of Sex, 25 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 437 (2020).

11-67.1-4. Forced labor.

  1. A person commits the offense of forced labor if the person knowingly uses coercion to compel an individual to provide labor or services, except when such conduct is permissible under federal law or law of this state other than this chapter.
  2. Every person who shall commit forced labor of a minor shall be guilty of a felony, subject to not more than fifty (50) years imprisonment, a fine of up to forty thousand dollars ($40,000), or both.
  3. Every person who shall commit forced labor of an adult shall be guilty of a felony, subject to not more than twenty (20) years imprisonment, a fine of up to twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-5. Sexual servitude.

  1. A person commits the offense of sexual servitude if the person knowingly:
    1. Maintains or makes available a minor for the purpose of engaging the minor in commercial sexual activity; or
    2. Uses coercion or deception to compel an adult to engage in commercial sexual activity.
  2. It is not a defense in a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) of this section that the minor consented to engage in commercial sexual activity or that the defendant believed the minor was an adult.
  3. Every person who shall commit sexual servitude of a minor shall be guilty of a felony, subject to not more than fifty (50) years imprisonment, a fine of up to forty thousand dollars ($40,000), or both.
  4. Every person who shall commit sexual servitude of an adult shall be guilty of a felony, subject to not more than twenty (20) years imprisonment, a fine of up to twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

Law Reviews.

Amanda LaRocca, Comment: The Full Swede: Revising Rhode Island’s Prostitution Law to Decriminalize the Selling of Sex While Still Criminalizing the Buying of Sex, 25 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 437 (2020).

11-67.1-6. Patronizing a victim of sexual servitude.

  1. A person commits the offense of patronizing a victim of sexual servitude if the person knowingly gives, agrees to give, or offers to give anything of value so that an individual may engage in commercial sexual activity with another individual and the person knows that the other individual is a victim of sexual servitude.
  2. Every person who shall patronize a minor for purposes of sexual servitude of a minor shall be guilty of a felony, subject to not more than twenty (20) years imprisonment, a fine of up to twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), or both.
  3. Every person who shall patronize an adult for purposes of sexual servitude of an adult shall be guilty of a felony, subject to not more than ten (10) years imprisonment, a fine of up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-7. Patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity.

  1. A person commits the offense of patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity if:
    1. With the intent that an individual engage in commercial sexual activity with a minor, the person gives, agrees to give, or offers to give anything of value to a minor or another person so that the individual may engage in commercial sexual activity with a minor; or
    2. The person gives, agrees to give, or offers to give anything of value to a minor or another person so that an individual may engage in commercial sexual activity with a minor.
  2. Every person who shall patronize a minor for purposes of commercial sexual activity with a minor shall be guilty of a felony, subject to not more than ten (10) years imprisonment, a fine of up to twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-8. Business entity liability.

  1. A person that is a business entity may be prosecuted for an offense under §§ 11-67.1-3 11-67.1-7 only if:
    1. The entity knowingly engages in conduct that constitutes human trafficking; or
    2. An employee or nonemployee agent of the entity engages in conduct that constitutes human trafficking and the conduct is part of a pattern of activity in violation of this chapter for the benefit of the entity, which the entity knew was occurring and failed to take effective action to stop.
  2. When a person that is a business entity is prosecuted for an offense under §§ 11-67.1-3 11-67.1-7 , the court may consider the severity of the entity’s conduct and order penalties in addition to those otherwise provided for the offense, including:
    1. A fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) per offense;
    2. Disgorgement of profit from activity in violation of this chapter; and
    3. Debarment from state and local government contracts.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-9. Aggravating circumstance.

  1. An aggravating circumstance during the commission of an offense under §§ 11-67.1-3 , 11-67.1-4 , or 11-67.1-5 occurs when:
    1. The defendant recruited, enticed, or obtained the victim of the offense from a shelter that serves individuals subjected to human trafficking, domestic violence, or sexual assault, runaway youth, foster children, or the homeless; or
    2. Kidnaps, holds hostage, or otherwise keeps the victim against his or her will.
  2. Whenever it appears that a person may be subject to the enhanced sentence pursuant to this section, the attorney general, in no case later than the first pretrial conference, shall file with the court a notice specifying that the defendant, upon conviction, is subject to the imposition of sentencing in accordance with this section.
  3. Upon any plea of guilt or nolo contendere, or verdict or finding of guilt of the defendant, the court shall conduct a sentencing hearing to determine if evidence of aggravating circumstances exist. At the hearing, the court shall permit the attorney general and the defense counsel to present additional evidence to the jury relevant to the determination of whether aggravating circumstances exist. If the jury at the hearing, or in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere the court at sentencing, determines beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances exist, they shall be sentenced as provided in subsection (d) of this section.
  4. If the trier of fact finds that an aggravating circumstance occurred during the commission of an offense under §§ 11-67.1-3 , 11-67.1-4 , or 11-67.1-5 , the defendant may be imprisoned for up to five (5) years in addition to the period of imprisonment prescribed for the offense. Any such sentence may run consecutively to any other sentence imposed.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-10. Restitution.

  1. The court shall order a person convicted of an offense under §§ 11-67.1-3 , 11-67.1-4 , or 11-67.1-5 to pay restitution to the victim of the offense for:
    1. Expenses incurred or reasonably certain to be incurred by the victim as a result of the offense, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and
    2. An amount equal to the greatest of the following, with no reduction for expenses the defendant incurred to maintain the victim:
      1. The gross income to the defendant for, or the value to the defendant of, the victim’s labor or services or sexual activity;
      2. The amount the defendant contracted to pay the victim; or
      3. The value of the victim’s labor or services or sexual activity, calculated under the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the “Fair Labor Standards Act,” 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., or subsection (a)(2) of this section, whichever is greater, even if the provisions do not apply to the victim’s labor or services or sexual activity.
  2. The court shall order restitution under subsection (a) of this section even if the victim is unavailable to accept payment of restitution.
  3. If the victim does not claim restitution ordered under subsection (a) of this section for five (5) years after entry of the order, the restitution must be paid to the criminal injuries compensation fund, as established in chapter 25 of title 12.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-11. Forfeiture.

  1. On motion, the court shall order a person convicted of an offense under §§ 11-67.1-3 , 11-67.1-4 , or 11-67.1-5 to forfeit any interest in real or personal property that:
    1. Was used or intended to be used to commit or facilitate the commission of the offense; or
    2. Constitutes proceeds or was derived from proceeds that the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of the offense.
  2. In a proceeding against real or personal property under this section, the person convicted of the offense may assert a defense that the forfeiture is manifestly disproportional to the seriousness of the offense. The person has the burden to establish the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
  3. Proceeds from the public sale or auction of property forfeited under subsection (a) of this section must be distributed in the manner provided for the distribution of the proceeds of criminal forfeitures act pursuant to §§ 21-28-5.04.1 and 21-28-5.04.2 .

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-12. Statute of limitations.

A prosecution for an offense under this chapter must be commenced not later than ten (10) years after commission of the offense.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-13. Victim confidentiality.

In an investigation of or a prosecution for an offense under this chapter, every agency of state or local government shall keep confidential the identity, pictures, and images of the alleged victim and the family of the alleged victim, except to the extent that disclosure is:

  1. Necessary for the purpose of investigation or prosecution;
  2. Required by law or court order; or
  3. Necessary to ensure provision of services or benefits to the victim or the victim’s family.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-14. Past sexual behavior of victim.

In a prosecution for an offense under this chapter or a civil action under § 11-67.1-18 , evidence of a specific instance of the alleged victim’s past sexual behavior or reputation, or opinion evidence of past sexual behavior of the alleged victim, is not admissible unless the evidence is:

  1. Admitted in accordance with § 11-37-13 ; or
  2. Offered by the prosecution to prove a pattern of human trafficking by the defendant.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-15. Immunity of minor.

  1. An individual is not criminally liable or subject to a delinquency proceeding in the family court for prostitution or solicitation to commit a sexual act if the individual was a minor at the time of the offense and committed the offense as a direct result of being a victim.
  2. An individual who has engaged in commercial sexual activity is not criminally liable or subject to a delinquency proceeding in the family court for prostitution or solicitation to commit a sexual act if the individual was a minor at the time of the offense.
  3. A minor who under subsection (a) or (b) of this section is not subject to criminal liability or a delinquency proceeding in family court is presumed to be an abused and/or neglected child as defined in § 40-11-2 .
  4. This section does not apply in a prosecution or a delinquency proceeding for patronizing a prostitute.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-16. Affirmative defense of victim.

An individual charged with prostitution or solicitation to commit a sexual act, committed as a direct result of being a victim, may assert an affirmative defense that the individual is a victim.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-17. Motion to vacate and expunge conviction.

  1. An individual convicted of prostitution or solicitation to commit a sexual act, committed as a direct result of being a victim, may apply by motion to the court having jurisdiction over the offense to vacate the conviction and seal or expunge the record of conviction. The court may grant the motion after a hearing and upon a finding that the individual’s participation in the offense was a direct result of being a victim.
  2. An official determination or documentation from a federal, state, local, or tribal agency that the individual was a victim at the time of the offense creates a presumption that the individual’s participation was a direct result of being a victim.
  3. A motion filed under subsection (a) of this section, any hearing conducted on the motion, and any relief granted shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of §§ 12-1-12 , 12-1-12 .1, and 12-1-12.2 , or chapter 1.3 of title 12.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-18. Civil action.

  1. A victim may bring a civil action against a person who or that commits an offense against the victim under §§ 11-67.1-3 , 11-67.1-4 , or 11-67.1-5 for compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, and any other appropriate relief.
  2. If a victim prevails in an action under this section, the court shall award the victim reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
  3. An action under this section must be commenced not later than ten (10) years after the later of the date on which the victim:
    1. No longer was subject to human trafficking; or
    2. Attained eighteen (18) years of age.
  4. Damages awarded to a victim under this section for an item must be offset by any restitution paid to the victim pursuant to § 11-67.1-10 .
  5. This section does not preclude any other remedy available to a victim under federal law or other general or public law of this state other than this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-19. Council on human trafficking.

  1. The council on human trafficking is created in the executive branch. The governor shall appoint the chair and members of the council. Members must include representatives of:
    1. Department of the attorney general, the department of health, the department of children, youth and families, the department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals, and law enforcement, that have contact with victims or perpetrators;
    2. Nongovernmental organizations that represent, advocate for, or provide services to victims; and
    3. Other organizations and individuals, including victims, whose expertise would benefit the council.
  2. The state agencies represented on the council created under this section shall provide staff to the council.
  3. The council created under this section shall meet on a regular basis and:
    1. Develop a coordinated and comprehensive plan to provide victims with services;
    2. Collect and evaluate data on human trafficking in this state and submit an annual report to the governor and legislature;
    3. Promote public awareness about human trafficking, victim remedies and services, and trafficking prevention;
    4. Create a public awareness sign that contains the state and national human trafficking resource center hotline information;
    5. Coordinate training on human trafficking prevention and victim services for state and local employees who may have recurring contact with victims or perpetrators; and
    6. Conduct other appropriate activities.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-20. Display of public-awareness sign — Penalty for failure to display.

  1. Any public or quasi-public transportation agency shall display a public-awareness sign that contains the state and national human trafficking resource center hotline information in every transportation station, rest area, and welcome center in the state that is open to the public.
  2. An employer shall display the public-awareness sign described in subsection (a) of this section in a place that is clearly conspicuous and visible to employees and the public at each of the following locations in this state at which the employer has employees:
    1. A strip club or other sexually-oriented business;
    2. A business entity previously found to be a nuisance for prostitution;
    3. A job-recruitment center;
    4. A hospital; or
    5. An emergency-care provider.
  3. The department of labor and training shall impose a fine of three hundred dollars ($300) per violation on an employer that knowingly fails to comply with subsection (b) of this section. The fine shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to comply.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-21. Eligibility for benefit or service.

  1. A victim is eligible for a benefit or service available through the state in any plan established by the council on human trafficking [and identified in the plan developed under § 11-67.1-19(c)(1) ], including compensation under the criminal injuries compensation act pursuant to chapter 25 of title 12, regardless of immigration status.
  2. A minor who has engaged in commercial sexual activity is eligible for a benefit or service available through the state in any plan established by the council on human trafficking, regardless of immigration status.
  3. As soon as practicable after a first encounter with an individual who reasonably appears to any state or local agency to be a victim or a minor who has engaged in commercial sexual activity, the agency shall notify the department of attorney general, a state or local law enforcement agency, or the department of health that the individual may be eligible for a benefit or service pursuant to this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-22. Law enforcement protocol.

  1. On request from an individual whom a law enforcement officer or agent thereof reasonably believes is a victim who is, or has been, subjected to a severe form of trafficking or criminal offense required for the individual to qualify for a nonimmigrant T or U visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T), or 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U), or for continued presence under 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3), the law enforcement officer, as soon as practicable after receiving the request, shall complete, sign, and give to the individual the Form I-914B or Form I-918B provided by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services on its Internet website and request assistance from the local Immigration and Naturalization office.
  2. If the law enforcement agency or officer determines that an individual does not meet the requirements for the agency to comply with subsection (a) of this section, the agency shall inform the individual of the reason and that the individual may make another request under subsection (a) of this section and submit additional evidence satisfying the requirements.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-23. Grant to or contract with service provider.

  1. To the extent that funds are appropriated for this purpose, the council on human trafficking may make a grant to, or contract with, a unit of state or local government or nongovernmental victim’s service organization to develop or expand service programs for victims.
  2. A recipient of a grant or contract under subsection (a) of this section shall report annually to the council on human trafficking the number and demographic information of all victims receiving services under the grant or contract.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-24. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-25. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

11-67.1-26. Effect of repeal on criminal prosecutions.

  1. For the purposes of this chapter, the term “event” means and includes any conduct, investigation, suit, prosecution, complaint, information, or indictment related to violations committed before the date of repeal of chapter 67 of title 11.
  2. No event occurring or committed under chapter 67 of title 11, as repealed, shall in any case be affected by the repeal.
  3. All of the events may be proceeded with pursuant to chapter 67 of title 11, which shall be deemed to be in force for the purpose of prosecuting any of the events to final judgment and execution or sentence, as the case may be.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 2.

Chapter 68 Exploitation of Elders

11-68-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Business relationship” means a relationship between two (2) or more individuals or entities where there exists an oral or written contract or agreement for goods or services.
  2. “Caregiver” means a person who has been entrusted with or has assumed responsibility for the care or the property of an elder person. Caregiver includes, but is not limited to, relatives, court-appointed or voluntary guardians, adult household members, neighbors, healthcare providers, and employees and volunteers of elder care facilities.
  3. “Deception” means misrepresenting or concealing a material fact relating to:
    1. Services rendered, disposition of property, or use of property, when such services or property are intended to benefit an elder person; or
    2. Terms of a contract or agreement entered into with an elder person; or
    3. An existing or preexisting condition of any property involved in a contract or agreement entered into with an elder person; or
    4. Using any misrepresentation, false pretense, or false promise in order to induce, encourage or solicit an elder person to enter into a contract or agreement.
  4. “Elder person” means a person sixty-five (65) years of age or older.
  5. “Intimidation” means the communication by word or act to an elder person that the elder person will be deprived of food, nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine, medical services, money, or financial support or will suffer physical violence.
  6. “Lacks capacity to consent” means an impairment by reason of mental illness, developmental disability, organic brain disorder, physical illness or disability, short-term memory loss, or other cause, that causes an elder person to lack sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate reasonable decisions concerning the elder person’s person or property.
  7. “Position of trust and confidence” with respect to an elder person means the position of a person who:
    1. Is a spouse, adult child, or other relative by blood or marriage of the elder person;
    2. Is a joint tenant or tenant in common with the elder person;
    3. Has a legal or fiduciary relationship with the elder person including, but not limited to, a court-appointed or voluntary guardian, trustee, attorney, or conservator;
    4. Is the caregiver of the elder person; or
    5. Is any other person who has been entrusted with or has assumed responsibility for the use or management of the elder person’s funds, assets, or property.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 161, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 204, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2008, ch. 161, § 2, and P.L. 2008, ch. 204, § 2, enacted identical versions of this chapter.

11-68-2. Exploitation of an elder.

  1. A person is guilty of exploitation of an elder person if that person:
    1. Knowingly, by deception or intimidation, obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or use, an elder person’s funds, assets or property with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the elder person of the use, benefit, or possession of the funds, assets or property, or to benefit someone other than the elder person by a person who:
      1. Stands in a position of trust and confidence with the elder person; or
      2. Has a business relationship with the elder person; or
    2. Knowingly, by deception or intimidation, obtains or uses, endeavors to obtain or use, or conspires with another to obtain or use an elder person’s funds, assets, or property with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the elder person of the use, benefit, or possession of the funds, assets, or property, or to benefit someone other than the elder person, by a person who knows or reasonably should know that the elder person lacks the capacity to consent.
  2. Any person who shall exploit an elder person as defined in this chapter shall be guilty of a felony.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 161, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 204, § 2.

11-68-3. Penalties for violations.

  1. Any person convicted of exploiting an elder person as provided under this chapter shall be punished as follows:
    1. If the funds, assets, or property involved in the exploitation of the elder person are valued at less than five hundred dollars ($500), the person shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than five (5) years or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) or both.
    2. If the funds, assets, or property involved in the exploitation of the elder person are valued at five hundred dollars ($500) or more, but less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), the person shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) years or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or both.
    3. If the funds, assets, or property involved in the exploitation of the elder person are valued at one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) or more, the person shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) years or by a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 161, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 204, § 2.

Chapter 69 Electronic Tracking of Motor Vehicles

11-69-1. Electronic tracking of motor vehicles.

    1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, it is an offense for a person to knowingly install, conceal, or otherwise place or use an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle without the consent of the operator and all occupants of the vehicle for the purpose of monitoring or following the operator, occupant, or occupants of the vehicle.
    2. Definitions.  As used in this section:
      1. The term “dealer” has the same meaning as set forth in § 31-5-5 and includes, for purposes of this section, an assignee of the dealer;
      2. The term “person” does not include the manufacturer of the motor vehicle, provider of telematics equipment and services, or entities that rent motor vehicles; and
      3. The term “starter interrupt technology” means technology used to remotely disable the starter of a motor vehicle.
    1. It shall not be a violation if the installation, concealment, placement, or use of an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle is by, or at the direction of, a law enforcement officer in furtherance of a criminal investigation and is carried out in accordance with the applicable state and federal law.
    2. If the installation, concealment, placement, or use of an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle is by, or at the direction of, a parent or legal guardian who owns or leases the vehicle, and if the device is used solely for the purpose of monitoring the minor child of the parent or legal guardian when the child is an occupant of the vehicle, then the installation, concealment, placement, or use of the device in or on the vehicle without the consent of any or all occupants in the vehicle shall not be a violation, unless the person utilizing the tracking device has an active restraining order or no contact order against them for the protection of any vehicle occupant.
    3. It shall not be a violation of this section if an electronic tracking device is attached to stolen goods for the purpose of tracking the location of the stolen goods, whether or not they may be transported in a vehicle, or if installed, concealed, placed, or used in or on a vehicle as a vehicle theft recovery device.
    4. It shall not be a violation of this section if an electronic tracking device, including but not limited to devices also containing technology used to remotely disable the starter of a motor vehicle, is installed and/or used by a motor vehicle dealer in connection with the credit sale, loan, or lease of a motor vehicle with the express written consent of the vehicle’s purchaser, lessor, or lessee.
    5. It shall not be a violation of this section if an electronic tracking device is installed and/or used by a business that is authorized to transact business in this state and the tracking device is used by the business for the purpose of tracking vehicles that are owned or leased by the business and driven by employees of that business, its affiliates, or contractors of that business or its affiliates.
  1. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a tracking system installed by the manufacturer of a motor vehicle, a provider of telematics equipment and services, or installed and/or used by an entity renting out vehicles, or installed or provided by an insurance company with the vehicle owner’s or vehicle lessee’s permission to monitor driving habits for insurance rating purposes.
  2. A violation of this section is a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison, or up to a one thousand dollar ($1,000) fine, or both.

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 39, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 41, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 39, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 41, § 1 enacted identical versions of this chapter.