Chapter 1. Code of Virginia.

Sec.

§ 1-1. Contents and designation of Code.

The laws embraced in this and the following titles, chapters, articles and sections of this act shall constitute, and be designated and cited as the "Code of Virginia," hereinafter referred to as "the Code" or "this Code."

(Code 1919, § 1; R. P. 1948, § 1-1 .)

Cross references. - As to rules of construction, see §§ 1-200 through 1-257 and notes thereto.

History of Code of 1950 and cumulative supplement. - The proposed Code of Virginia, submitted by the then Commission on Code Recodification to the 1948 session of the General Assembly, with certain amendments fully explained in the preface and known as the "Reorganization Provisions of the Code of Virginia," was adopted as the Code of Virginia, to be effective as provided in §§ 1-2 and 1-2.1 , by an act approved April 6, 1948.

Under authority and direction of chapter 262 of the Acts of 1948, codified as former §§ 9-66 through 9-77 (see now § 30-152 et seq.), the Commission, now styled the Virginia Code Commission, prepared and had published an annotated edition, in ten volumes including the index, of the Code so adopted, with the reorganization provisions and the general acts of the 1948 session incorporated therein.

This edition was submitted to the General Assembly for approval at its 1950 session and was adopted by an act approved January 27, 1950.

The final paragraph of that act, which has not been codified, read in part: ". . . the body of the statute law contained in the foregoing ten volumes is to take effect February one, nineteen hundred fifty as the official Code of Virginia, sometimes for brevity called the Code of 1950."

The general acts of the 1950 through 2014 sessions have been codified and published, under authority of § 30-152 et seq., in the supplements and in the added and replacement volumes.

CASE NOTES

The 1948 enactment of the Code submitted to that session of the General Assembly was a valid enactment and did not violate Va. Const., Art. IV, § 11, or § 12, which provides that no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. Article IV, § 12, was not intended to apply to a general code revision, and adoption of a code by general title is broad enough to cover any lawful enactment. McClain v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 847 , 55 S.E.2d 49 (1949). See notes to Va. Const., Art. IV, §§ 11 and 12.

§ 1-2. Effective date of Code.

All the provisions of this Code shall be in force on and after February 1, 1950, except as provided in § 1-2.1 .

(Code 1919, § 6567; R. P. 1948, § 1-2 .)

Cross references. - As to rules of construction, see §§ 1-200 through 1-257 and notes thereto.

Applied in Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518 , 65 S.E.2d 575 (1951).

§ 1-2.1. Effective date of certain provisions.

The following provisions of this Code shall become effective July 1, 1948, namely:

Chapter 1 of Title 1; Chapters 1, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, and 16 of Title 2; Chapter 13 of Title 3; Chapter 11 of Title 6; Chapters 2 and 5 of Title 9; all of Title 10; Article 7 of Chapter 1 of Title 14; Article 3 of Chapter 6 of Title 18; Chapter 2 of Title 19; Chapter 3 of Title 24; Chapter 3 of Title 27; Chapters 15 and 19 of Title 32; all of Title 41; Article 4 of Chapter 6 of Title 42; Articles 2 and 12 of Chapter 1 of Title 44 and all of Chapter 2 of Title 44; Chapter 3 of Title 51; Chapter 1 of Title 52; Chapters 1 through 14, inclusive, of Title 53; Chapter 24 of Title 54; Chapters 12 and 13 of Title 59; Chapter 7 of Title 62; all of Title 63 except Chapter 13.

(R. P. 1948, § 1-2.1 .)

Cross references. - As to rules of construction, see §§ 1-200 through 1-257 and notes thereto.

Editor's note. - Title 2, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1966, c. 677. Title 3, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1966, c. 702. Title 6, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1966, c. 584. Chapter 2 of Title 9, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1970, c. 463; Acts 1978, c. 580. Chapter 5 of Title 9, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 2001, c. 844. Title 10, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1988, c. 891. Title 14, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1964, c. 386. Title 18, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1960, c. 358. Title 19, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1960, c. 366. Title 24, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1970, c. 462. Chapter 15 of Title 32, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1968, c. 578. Chapter 19 of Title 32, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1979, c. 711. Title 41, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1970, c. 291. Title 42, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1970, c. 606. Chapter 3 of Title 51, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1952, c. 1. Chapter 1 of Title 53, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1956, c. 386; Acts 1970, c. 648; Acts 1972, c. 175; Acts 1974, cc. 44, 45. Chapters 2 through 14 of Title 53, referred to above, were repealed by Acts 1982, c. 636. Chapter 24 of Title 54, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1974, c. 534; Acts 1976, c. 651; Acts 1977, c. 640; Acts 1979, c. 408. Title 59, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1968, c. 439. Title 62, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1968, c. 659. Title 63, referred to above, was repealed by Acts 1968, c. 578.

§ 1-3. Repeal of acts of a general nature.

All acts and parts of acts of a general nature, in force at the time of the adoption of this Code, shall be repealed from and after February 1, 1950, with such limitations and exceptions as are hereinafter expressed; and all acts and parts of acts of a general nature in force at the time of the adoption of this Code, and in conflict with any of the provisions of this Code which by virtue of § 1-2.1 become effective on July 1, 1948, shall be repealed from and after July 1, 1948, with such limitations and exceptions as are hereinafter expressed.

(Code 1919, § 6567; R. P. 1948, § 1-3 .)

CASE NOTES

Special act not repealed. - The Code of 1919 was a revision of the general statutes of the Commonwealth, and it did not repeal a special act of 1910 establishing a road law for Augusta County. Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 572 , 130 S.E. 383 (1925).

Omission of acts of a general nature. - An act providing a different rule of ejectment procedure in three named counties, being a general law, was held repealed by being omitted from the Code of 1887. Carter's Heirs v. Edwards, 88 Va. 205 , 13 S.E. 352 (1891).

An act authorizing the voluntary incorporation of building fund associations, being an act of a general nature, was repealed by being omitted from the Code of 1887. Crabtree v. Old Dominion Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 95 Va. 670 , 29 S.E. 741 (1898).

§ 1-4. Effect of such repeal generally; effect of revision or amendment of state Constitution.

No such repeal nor any amendment or revision of the Constitution of Virginia shall affect any offense or act committed or done, or any penalty or forfeiture incurred, or any right established, accrued, or accruing before the day upon which such repeal, amendment or revision takes effect, or any prosecution, suit, or proceeding pending on that day, except that the proceedings thereafter had shall conform, so far as practicable, to the provisions of this Code; and where any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment is mitigated by those provisions, such provisions may, with the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment to be pronounced after that day; and such repeal, amendment or revision as to any statute of limitations, under which the bar of a right of action or remedy is complete at the time the repeal, amendment or revision takes effect, shall not be deemed a removal of such bar, but the bar shall continue, notwithstanding such repeal, amendment or revision.

(Code 1919, § 6569; R. P. 1948, § 1-4 ; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 14.)

CASE NOTES

Acts done under a statute while in force remain valid, though the statute may afterwards be repealed, but the rule goes no farther than to render valid things actually done. Crawford v. Halsted & Putnam, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 211 (1871).

An election held under an act subsequently repealed by being omitted from the Code of 1887 was not invalidated by such repeal. Thomas v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 92 , 17 S.E. 788 (1893).

Section not controlling in action arising under federal act. - This section is not expressly controlling or directly in point on a legal question presented in an action arising under the Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947 to recover damages and attorney's fees for rentals charged in excess of the maximum rent that could be charged, where such act is later repealed, because the alleged right of action asserted arose under a federal act. Levinson v. Bott, 193 Va. 47 , 67 S.E.2d 923 (1951).

As to change of mode of procedure in a pending case to conform to the then new Code of 1887, see Edmunds' Ex'r v. Bruce, 88 Va. 1007 , 14 S.E. 840 (1892).

Applied in Southworth v. Sullivan, 162 Va. 325 , 173 S.E. 524 (1934).

§ 1-5. Effect of such repeal as to persons in office.

All persons who, at the time when such repeal takes effect, shall hold any office under any of the acts hereby repealed, shall continue to hold the same according to the tenure thereof, except those offices which may have been abolished, and those as to which a different provision is made by this Code.

(Code 1919, § 6571; R. P. 1948, § 1-5 .)

§ 1-6. Effect of repeal of validating statutes.

The repeal by any provisions of this Code of a statute validating previous acts, contracts or transactions shall not affect the validity of such acts, contracts or transactions, but the same shall remain as valid as if there had been no such repeal, but no further.

(Code 1919, § 8; R. P. 1948, § 1-6 .)

§ 1-7. Acts passed between certain dates not affected.

The enactment of this Code shall not affect any act passed by the General Assembly, which shall have become a law after January 14, 1948, and before February 1, 1950; but every such act shall have full effect, and so far as the same varies from or conflicts with any provision contained in this Code it shall have effect as a subsequent act, and as repealing any part of this Code inconsistent therewith; provided, however, that any such act which becomes a law between said dates and which amends and reenacts, or reenacts any previously existing provisions of law conferring any power or imposing any duty upon any department, board, commission, agency or officer of the state government whose functions, powers and duties are affected by any of the provisions of this Code becoming effective July 1, 1948, shall be construed as conferring the powers and imposing the duties specified therein upon the department, board, commission, agency or officer of the state government to which or to whom the duties and powers imposed or conferred by such previously existing provisions of law were transferred by the provisions of this Code becoming effective July 1, 1948.

(Code 1919, § 6568; R. P. 1948, § 1-7 .)

CASE NOTES

Under former Codes. - As to application of similar provisions of the Codes of 1887 and 1919, see Virginia Dev. Co. v. Crozer Iron Co., 90 Va. 126 , 17 S.E. 806 (1893), aff'd on rehearing, 90 Va. 126 , 19 S.E. 782 (1894); Somers v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 759 , 33 S.E. 381 (1899); Southern Ry. v. Russell, 133 Va. 292 , 112 S.E. 700 (1922); Campbell v. City of Danville, 138 Va. 817 , 122 S.E. 120 (1924).

§ 1-8. Notice, recognizance or process given, taken or issued before Code in force.

Although a notice, recognizance or process shall have been given, taken or issued before the day prescribed for the commencement of this Code, or of any provisions of this Code, it may, nevertheless, be given, taken or returnable to a day after such commencement, or to a court established by this Code or the clerk's office of such court, in like manner as if this Code had commenced before the same was given, taken, or issued.

(Code 1919, § 6570; R. P. 1948, § 1-8 .)

§ 1-9. Pending cases; parties; where books, records and papers to remain.

Nothing in this Code shall operate to discontinue any cause or matter, civil or criminal, which shall be pending and undetermined in any court on the day before this Code, or any provision of this Code, takes effect; but every such cause and matter shall be proceeded in, tried and determined in such court, or in the court which succeeds to or has its jurisdiction, and in the names of the same parties, or in the names of any officers, boards, commission, or other persons or bodies who may have succeeded under the provisions of this Code to the rights or obligations of such parties, or any of them. The papers and records of such causes and matters, and all books, records and papers whatever which on such day may be in the custody of any clerk of a court shall remain in custody of the clerk of the same, or of such court as succeeds to or has its jurisdiction.

(Code 1919, § 6570; R. P. 1948, § 1-9 .)

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Operability of statute. - Section 1-219.1 did not prohibit the housing authority from acquiring the owners' property because § 1-239 and case precedent made clear that Acts 2007, c. 926, cl. 3, allowed proceedings instituted by redevelopment and housing authorities before July 1, 2010, to continue until resolution. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Cent. Radio, Inc., 82 Va. Cir. 240, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 85 (Norfolk Feb. 17, 2011).

Condemnation proceeding. - Section 1-219.1 did not apply to a condemnation proceeding because, although the proceeding was not finalized before the July 1, 2010, effective date of the statute, the proceeding was instituted under the former law and before the new law took effect; to hold otherwise would have improperly discontinued a pending matter in violation of § 1-9 . Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Pryer,, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 84 (Norfolk May 16, 2011).

Chapter 2. Common Law, Statutes and Rules of Construction.

§§ 1-10 through 1-17.2.

Repealed by Acts 2005, c. 839, cl. 10, effective October 1, 2005.

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, c. 839, recodified Chapters 2 and 3 of Title 1, and all of Title 7.1, as Chapters 2.1 through 5 of Title 1, effective October 1, 2005. In addition to revision by Acts 2005, c. 839, Titles 1 and 7.1 were also amended by other acts passed at the 2005 Session. As required by § 30-152, the Code Commission has incorporated the majority of these amendments into the new sections. Where appropriate, the historical citations to former sections have been added to corresponding new sections. For tables of corresponding former and new sections, see the tables in Volume 10.

Former § 1-13.4 was repealed by Acts 1986, c. 155. Former § 1-13.11 was repealed by Acts 1981, c. 228. Former § 1-13.39 was repealed by Acts 1983, c. 260. Former § 1-14 was repealed by Acts 1975, c. 547.

Chapter 3. Citizenship.

§§ 1-18 through 1-21.

Repealed by Acts 2005, c. 839, cl. 10, effective October 1, 2005.

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, c. 839, recodified Chapters 2 and 3 of Title 1, and all of Title 7.1 as Chapters 2.1 through 5 of Title 1, effective October 1, 2005. In addition to revision by Acts 2005, c. 839, Titles 1 and 7.1 were also amended by other acts passed at the 2005 Session. As required by § 30-152, the Code Commission has incorporated the majority of these amendments into the new sections. Where appropriate, the historical citations to former sections have been added to corresponding new sections. For tables of corresponding former and new sections, see the tables in Volume 10.

Chapter 2.1. Common Law and Rules of Construction.

Common Law and Acts of Parliament.

Rules of Construction and Definitions.

Article 1. Common Law and Acts of Parliament.

§ 1-200. The common law.

The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly.

(Code 1919, § 2, § 1-10 ; 2005, c. 839.)

Transition provisions. - Chapters 2 and 3 of Title 1 and Title 7 have been rewritten, primarily as new Chapters 2.1 through 5 of Title 1, by Acts 2005, c. 839, effective October 1, 2005.

In addition to revision by Acts 2005, c. 839, §§ 1-13.23:1 [see now § 1-237 ] and 7.1-40.7:1 [see now § 1-510 ] were also amended by other acts passed at the 2005 Session. As required by § 30-152, the Code Commission has incorporated these amendments into the new sections.

Where appropriate, the historical citations to former sections have been added to corresponding new sections.

The case notes appearing under new sections were decided under corresponding former sections or under prior law.

For tables of corresponding former and new sections, see the tables in Volume 10.

Acts 2005, c. 839, cl. 2, provides: "That whenever any of the conditions, requirements, provisions or contents of any section or chapter of Titles 1 and 7.1 or any other title of the Code of Virginia as such titles existed prior to October 1, 2005, are transferred in the same or modified form to a new section or chapter of Title 1 or any other title of the Code and whenever any such former section or chapter is given a new number in Title 1 or any other title, all references to any such former section or chapter of Title 1 or other title appearing in this Code shall be construed to apply to the new or renumbered section or chapter containing such conditions, requirements, provisions, contents or portions thereof."

Acts 2005, c. 839, cl. 3, provides: "That the regulations of any department or agency affected by the revision of Titles 1 or 7.1 or such other titles in effect on the effective date of this act shall continue in effect to the extent that they are not in conflict with this act and shall be deemed to be regulations adopted under this act."

Acts 2005, c. 839, cl. 4, provides: "That the title revisions of Titles 1 and 7.1 as Chapters 2.1, 3.1, 4, and 5 of Title 1 shall not be construed to require the reappointment of any officer or any member of a board, council, committee or other appointed body referred to in Titles 1 and 7.1 and each such officer and member shall continue to serve for the term for which appointed pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of Title 1 and Title 7.1."

Acts 2005, c. 839, cl. 5, provides: "That the provisions of § 30-152 of the Code of Virginia shall apply to the revision of Titles 1 and 7.1 so as to give effect to other laws enacted by the 2005 session of the General Assembly notwithstanding the delay in the effective date of this act."

Acts 2005, c. 839, cl. 6, provides: "That the repeal of Chapters 2 and 3 of Title 1 and Title 7.1, effective as of October 1, 2005, shall not affect any act or offense done or committed, or any penalty incurred, or any right established, accrued or accruing on or before such date, or any proceeding, prosecution, suit or action pending on that day. Except as otherwise provided in this act, neither the repeal of Chapters 2 and 3 of Title 1 and Title 7.1 nor the enactment of Chapters 2.1, 3.1, 4 and 5 of Title 1 shall apply to offenses committed prior to October 1, 2005, and prosecution for such offenses shall be governed by the prior law, which is continued in effect for that purpose. For the purpose of this enactment, an offense was committed prior to October 1, 2005, if any of the essential elements of the offense occurred prior thereto."

Acts 2005, c. 839, cl. 7, provides: "That any notice given, recognizance taken, or process or writ issued before October 1, 2005, shall be valid although given, taken or to be returned to a day after such date, in like manner as if Chapters 2.1, 3.1, 4 and 5 of Title 1 had been effective before the same was given, taken or issued."

Acts 2005, c. 839, cl. 8, provides: "That if any clause, sentence, paragraph, subdivision or section of Chapters 2.1, 3.1, 4 and 5 of Title 1 shall be adjudged in any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to the clause, sentence, paragraph, subdivision or section thereof directly involved in the controversy in which the judgment shall have been rendered, and to this end the provisions of Title 1 are declared severable."

Acts 2005, c. 839, cl. 9, provides: "All actions of any county, city or town or political subdivision of the Commonwealth or any combination thereof identified by population classification under an act of the Assembly enacted prior to July 1, 1960, and of the officers thereof and of the clerks of courts thereof in the operation of their respective offices either on a fee or salary basis for the calendar year of 1961, and until March 30, 1962, are hereby ratified, validated and confirmed."

Effective date. - This chapter became effective October 1, 2005.

Law review. - For article, "A Century of Tort Immunities in Virginia," see 4 U. Rich. L. Rev. 238 (1970). For survey of Virginia law on torts for the year 1970-71, see 57 Va. L. Rev. 1501 (1971). For note on law revision and reform in the common-law countries, see 13 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 253 (1971). For survey of Virginia law on taxation for the year 1972-73, see 59 Va. L. Rev. 1584 (1973). For survey of Virginia criminal procedure for the year 1977-1978, see 64 Va. L. Rev. 1419 (1978). For a re-examination of sovereign tort immunity in Virginia, see 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 247 (1981). For article on discovery penalties, see 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 283 (1981).

For comment, "Picking Up the Tab For Your Competitors: Innovator Liability After PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing," see 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1257 (2012).

For comment, see "Commonwealth and Constitution," 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 415 (2013).

For article, "The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law," see 101 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2015). For article "Making the Case to Avoid Entering the eBay Marketplace: A Recommended Analytical Framework for Evaluating Requests for Permanent Injunctions in Virginia," see 32 Regent U.L. Rev. 1 (2019).

Research References. - Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure (Matthew Bender). Chapter 2. Potential Jurisdiction. § 2.02 Subject matter jurisdiction, etc. Bryson.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 17 M.J. Statutes, § 48.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases annotated below were decided under former law.

CASE NOTES

The common law of England is in force in Virginia in conformity to the terms of this section. Wiseman v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 631 , 130 S.E. 249 (1925); Elliott v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 595 , 1 S.E.2d 273 (1939); Brown v. Brown, 183 Va. 353 , 32 S.E.2d 79 (1944); Needam v. Needam, 183 Va. 681 , 33 S.E.2d 288 (1945); Rosenberger v. Rosenberger, 184 Va. 1024 , 37 S.E.2d 55 (1946); Carter v. Hinkle, 189 Va. 1 , 52 S.E.2d 135 (1949).

Insofar as applicable to our circumstances. - Such of the doctrines and principles of the common law as are repugnant to the nature and character of our political system, or which the different and varied circumstances of our country render inapplicable to us, are either not in force here or must be so modified in their application as to adapt them to our condition. It is a reasonable and substantial compliance with the common law, rather than a literal one, which is exacted by its adoption. Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306 , 31 S.E. 503 (1898). See Baring v. Reeder, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 154 (1806); Coleman v. Moody, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 1 (1809); Findlay v. Smith, 20 Va. (6 Munf.) 134 (1818); Stout v. Jackson, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 132 (1823); Stokes & Smith v. Upper Appomattox Co., 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 318 (1831).

Such of English common-law doctrines and principles as are repugnant to the nature and character of the political system, or which the different and varied circumstances of the country render inapplicable to the State, are either not in force here, or must be so modified in their application as to adapt them to the condition. Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389 , 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).

Except where modified by statute. - Virginia is a common-law State, except where modified by statute. Carey v. Foster, 221 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Va. 1963), aff'd, 345 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1965).

Although the General Assembly can abrogate the common law, its intent to do so must be plainly manifested. Wackwitz v. Roy, 244 Va. 60 , 418 S.E.2d 861 (1992).

Legislative intent to change the common law must be clear or plainly manifested. Chandler v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 882 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Va. 1995).

This section does not mean that common-law rules are forever chiseled in stone, never changing. The common law is dynamic, evolves to meet developing societal problems, and is adaptable to society's requirements at the time of its application by the court. Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350 , 350 S.E.2d 621 (1986).

But the common law cannot be enlarged by judicial decision in the absence of authority. - Virginia law, including the common law of England incorporated into the Virginia Code by § 1-10 [now § 1-200 ], does not provide a basis for recognizing a common law right to use force to resist an illegal detention; in the absence of authority requiring such a right, there was no reason for enlarging, by judicial decision, the scope of the common law on the subject. Commonwealth v. Hill, 264 Va. 541 , 570 S.E.2d 805, 2002 Va. LEXIS 170 (2002).

Virginia courts have applied this section to justify reliance on contemporary as well as preenactment common-law doctrines. Long v. Vlasic Food Prods. Co., 439 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1971).

Before English common law can be applied in Virginia it must be analyzed in light of this section and the cases interpreting it. Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389 , 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).

Rule that wife may not unilaterally revoke implied consent to marital intercourse is rejected. - So much of the English common-law rule regarding a husband's marital exemption from a charge of raping his wife and the implied consent to marital intercourse as provides that a wife cannot unilaterally revoke her implied consent to marital intercourse is rejected. Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389 , 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).

Stranger to title doctrine applied. - Under Virginia's stranger to title doctrine, which it retained from the common law, debtor wife, who did not have title in property prior to a conveyance of debtor husband's half interest to his daughter, did not become a grantor by virtue of the fact that the deed purported to reserve her a life estate. Applying the formula set forth in the Virginia statutes for valuing debtor husband's single life estate in the real property, the court determined that debtor husband was not insolvent or rendered insolvent by the conveyance and thus, the transfer was not avoidable as constructively fraudulent under the Bankruptcy Code and Virginia law. Fraley v. Fraley (In re Fraley),, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 916 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Mar. 28, 2018).

Illustrative cases. - This section was applied as to embracery in Wiseman v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 631 , 130 S.E. 249 (1925); as to right of political subdivision to preference in payment of debts, in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Carter, 161 Va. 381 , 170 S.E. 764 (1933); as to owner keeping fowls on his own land, in Graeme v. Adams, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 225 (1873); as to bastardy, in State Hwy. & Transp. Comm'r v. Cardinal Realty Co., 232 Va. 434 , 350 S.E.2d 660 (1986); as to single tort, resulting in damage to both person and property, giving rise to two distinct causes of action, in Dodson v. Remco Enters., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Va. 1980); as to ownership of beds of streams granted prior to 1802, in Brockenbrough's Ex'rs v. Spindle's Adm'rs, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 21 (1866).

This section was applied as to suicide as a Common-law crime, in Wackwitz v. Roy, 244 Va. 60 , 418 S.E.2d 861 (1992).

This section was applied to prevent a grantor from reserving an interest in real property for the benefit of a stranger to the deed. Shirley v. Shirley, 259 Va. 513 , 525 S.E.2d 274 (2000).

Supreme Court of Virginia rejected defendant's argument that § 1-10 [now § 1-200 ] required the Commonwealth of Virginia to prove that she knew she had a firearm in her possession when she carried the firearm onto school property, in violation of subsection B of § 18.2-308.1, and found that subsection B of § 18.2-308.1 created strict criminal liability. Esteban v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 605 , 587 S.E.2d 523, 2003 Va. LEXIS 106 (2003).

In a negligence action, a tenant could not recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a landlord's alleged noncompliance with duties imposed by § 55-248.13 of the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, §§ 55-248.2 through 55-248.40, because the Act does not, either through the express language of §§ 55-248.40, 55-248.21, and 55-248.4 or by necessary implication, abrogate the common-law rule that a landlord was not liable in tort for a tenant's personal injuries caused by the landlord's failure to repair premises under the tenant's control and possession. Sections 55-248.3:1, 55-248.4, 55-248.21, and 55-248.40 revealed that the Act provided a comprehensive scheme governing contractual relationships between landlords and tenants instead of creating a statutory cause of action allowing a tenant to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a landlord's noncompliance with the Act. Isbell v. Commercial Inv. Assocs., 273 Va. 605 , 644 S.E.2d 72, 2007 Va. LEXIS 52 (2007).

Defendant was properly convicted of misdemeanor destruction of property, under § 18.2-137, as a principal in the first degree, for driving a getaway car in which those who actually damaged a victim's mailbox tried to escape, because: (1) § 18.2-18, concerning felony principals and accessories before the fact, did not abrogate the common-law rule that, in misdemeanors, all participants were principals; and (2) defendant admitted participating in this criminal episode. Wade v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 689, 696 S.E.2d 258, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 321 (2010).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the victim's statements identifying defendant as the shooter under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule because the victim's statements constituted dying declarations, which were admissible under the common law and categorically outside the reach of the Confrontation Clause; dying declarations serve as an exception both to the common-law hearsay rule and the constitutional right of a defendant to confront his or her accusers. Satterwhite v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 557, 695 S.E.2d 555, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 302 (2010).

Tortious interference with parental rights existed in English common law in 1607, it could be construed in a manner not repugnant to the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and no affirmative steps had been taken by the legislature to renounce the tort, such that it was recognized in Virginia pursuant to § 1-200 . Wyatt v. McDermott, 283 Va. 685 , 725 S.E.2d 555, 2012 Va. LEXIS 92 (2012).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Common law rule regarding a landlord's duty is the law of Virginia: absent concealment or fraud by the landlord as to some defect in the premises, known to him and unknown to the tenant, the tenant takes the premises in whatever condition they may be in, thus assuming all risk of personal injury from defect therein; since the statutory provision does not seem to plainly manifest an intent to change the common law, the statute does not create a new statutory duty. Lawrence v. Neumaier-Farnsworth Enters., 105 Va. Cir. 5, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 24 (Newport News Feb. 25, 2020).

Applied in Brown v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 107, 676 S.E.2d 326, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 226 (2009); Collins v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 263 , 720 S.E.2d 530 (2012); Whitt v. Commonwealth, No. 0885-11-3, 61 Va. App. 637, 739 S.E.2d 254, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 100 (2013); Va. Marine Res. Comm'n v. Chincoteague Inn, 287 Va. 371 , 757 S.E.2d 1, 2014 Va. LEXIS 51 (2014); Forest Lakes Cmty. Ass'n v. United Land Corp. of Am., 293 Va. 113 , 795 S.E.2d 875 (2017); In re Brown, 295 Va. 202 , 810 S.E.2d 444, 2018 Va. LEXIS 26 (2018).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Illustrative cases. - In holding that the crime of conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor existed in Virginia, the court noted that, under the common law of England, a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor was an offense. Commonwealth v. Howlett, 61 Va. Cir. 509, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 136 (Norfolk 2003).

Pedestrian's case against a landlord arising from an attack by two dogs owned by the landlord's tenant was dismissed because, under § 1-200 , the common law applied, and under the common law, the landlord had no duty to protect a passerby from the tenant's dogs; the pedestrian, in derogation of the common law, sought to place the tenant's duties on the landlord. Walisser v. Harris, 81 Va. Cir. 14, 2010 Va. Cir. LEXIS 248 (Nelson County Feb. 26, 2010).

§ 1-201. Acts of Parliament.

The right and benefit of all writs, remedial and judicial, given by any statute or act of Parliament, made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, of a general nature, not local to England, shall still be saved, insofar as the same are consistent with the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth and the Acts of Assembly.

(Code 1919, § 3, § 1-11; 2005, c. 839.)

Law review. - For note on law revision and reform in the common-law countries, see 13 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 253 (1971).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 17 M.J. Statutes, § 36.

CASE NOTES

Scire facias. - As to preservation by this section of scire facias in personal actions, see Dykes & Co. v. Woodhouse's Adm'r, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 287 (1825) (decided under prior law).

Article 2. Rules of Construction and Definitions.

§ 1-202. General rule of construction.

The rules and definitions set forth in this chapter shall be used in the construction of this Code and the acts of the General Assembly, unless the construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intention of the General Assembly.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 20; 2005, c. 839.)

Effective date. - This chapter became effective October 1, 2005.

Law review. - For article, "Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation," see 76 Va. L. Rev. 1295 (1990).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 17 M.J. Statutes, § 80; 18 M.J. Taxation, § 10.

Editor's note. - The cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Section applies to statutes, not to deeds, wills, etc. - This section applies only "in the construction of this Code and of all statutes." It says nothing about deeds, contracts, wills, or other documents, but is restricted to statutes, and in reference to the latter, it applies to all statutes. Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160 , 112 S.E. 757 (1922).

Code is one act and construed as a whole. - The Code of 1887 was held to be one act, which must be construed as a whole. Gaines' Adm'r v. Marye, 94 Va. 225 , 26 S.E. 511 (1897); First Nat'l Bank v. Holland, 99 Va. 495 , 39 S.E. 126 (1901); South & N.W. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 104 Va. 314 , 51 S.E. 824 (1905); Bertram v. Commonwealth, 108 Va. 902 , 62 S.E. 969 (1908).

The Code of 1919 was held a single act, and its different sections were regarded, not as prior and subsequent acts, but as simultaneous expressions of the legislative will. It was further held that all provisions therein dealing with the same subject should be construed together and reconciled whenever possible. Shepherd v. F.J. Kress Box Co., 154 Va. 421 , 153 S.E. 649 (1930), citing Piedmont Fin. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 146 Va. 287 , 135 S.E. 673 (1926).

Resort to original statutes. - Notwithstanding the fact that the Codes of 1887 and 1919 were revisions of the statute law, if the various sections of one of the Codes were harmonious and their meaning plain, resort could not be had in construing them to the original statutes to see if any error was committed in the revision. If, however, there was a substantial doubt as to the meaning of the sections, the law which was the subject of the revision could be looked to in ascertaining their meaning. If they were inconsistent and could not stand together, the original statutes, and the respective dates of their enactment, could be examined to see what was the last expression of the will of the legislature on the subject. Gaines' Adm'r v. Marye, 94 Va. 225 , 26 S.E. 511 (1897); W.S. Forbes & Co. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 130 Va. 245 , 108 S.E. 15 (1921); Xippas v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 497 , 126 S.E. 207 (1925). And see Shepherd v. F.J. Kress Box Co., 154 Va. 421 , 153 S.E. 649 (1930).

Intention to alter old law by revision must plainly appear. - The settled rule in construing the Code is that the old law was not intended to be altered, unless such intention plainly appears. Durrett v. Davis, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 302 (1874); Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 572 , 130 S.E. 383 (1925). See Parramore v. Taylor, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 220 (1854); Davis v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 617 (1867); Owners of Steamboat Wenonah v. Bragdon, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 685 (1872); Vaughan v. Jones, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 444 (1873); Thomas' Adm'r v. Lewis, 89 Va. 1 , 15 S.E. 389 (1892); Harrison v. Wissler, 98 Va. 597 , 36 S.E. 982 (1900); Puckett v. Mullins' Adm'r, 106 Va. 248 , 55 S.E. 676 (1906); Wright v. Collins' Adm'r, 111 Va. 806 , 69 S.E. 942 (1911); Chapman v. Richardson, 123 Va. 388 , 96 S.E. 776 (1918).

Change in phraseology is not important. Code revisors often make such changes and shorten statutes with no intention to change their substance, and no change in substance will be construed as intended unless it plainly appears. Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157 , 96 S.E. 315 (1918); Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass'n v. Drewry, 161 Va. 833 , 172 S.E. 282 (1934).

Revised or substituted statute omitting provisions in original. - It is a general rule that when a revised statute, or one reenacted for another, omits provisions contained in original act, the omitted part cannot be supplied by construction. Richmond-Ashland Ry. v. Commonwealth ex rel. City of Richmond, 162 Va. 296 , 173 S.E. 892 (1934).

When a statute is revised, or when one act is framed from another, and portions of the former are omitted, the missing part will not be revived by statutory construction but will be considered as annulled and revoked. Godlewski v. Gray, 221 Va. 1092 , 277 S.E.2d 213 (1981).

Construction of one section considered in construing similar sections. - The construction placed upon language used in one section of the Code may be considered in determining the meaning of similar or the same language used in other sections. First Nat'l Bank v. Holland, 99 Va. 495 , 39 S.E. 126 (1901).

That the section of a Code last adopted in sequence will prevail where the difference in language is irreconcilable, see Building Supplies Corp. v. Willcox, 284 F. 113 (4th Cir. 1922).

If there is conflict between the body of a statute and a proviso, then the proviso must prevail, as the later expression of the legislative intent. Loyd Corp. v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 39 , 100 S.E. 833 (1919).

When a statute has been construed by the courts and is then reenacted by the legislature, the construction given to it is presumed to be sanctioned by the legislature and therefore becomes obligatory upon the courts. Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160 , 112 S.E. 757 (1922).

When the General Assembly enacts a statute in language with a long history of definition by the Supreme Court, it intends that the words carry their historical construction. Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127 , 295 S.E.2d 643 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029, 103 S. Ct. 1280, 75 L. Ed. 2d 501, rehearing denied, 461 U.S. 940, 103 S. Ct. 2113, 77 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1983).

Subsequent legislation is enacted in the light of and with knowledge of an interpretative statute, such as this section, and hence the latter controls unless there be a clear legislative intent to substitute a different interpretation. Alphonse Custodis Chimney Constr. Co. v. Molina, 183 Va. 512 , 32 S.E.2d 726 (1945). See Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160 , 112 S.E. 757 (1922).

The rule that taxing statutes must be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer when they are doubtful or ambiguous remains unaffected by this section. Williams v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 477 , 14 S.E.2d 287 (1941).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Illustrative cases. - In holding that the crime of conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor existed in Virginia, the court noted that, under the common law of England, a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor was an offense. Commonwealth v. Howlett, 61 Va. Cir. 509, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 136 (Norfolk 2003).

§ 1-203. Adult.

"Adult" means a person 18 years of age or more.

(1972, cc. 824, 825, § 1-13.42; 2005, c. 839.)

Applied in McDonald v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 249 , 645 S.E.2d 918, 2007 Va. LEXIS 87 (2007).

§ 1-204. Age of majority.

For the purposes of all laws of the Commonwealth including common law, case law, and the acts of the General Assembly, unless an exception is specifically provided in this Code, a person shall be an adult, shall be of full age, and shall reach the age of majority when he becomes 18 years of age.

(1972, cc. 824, 825, § 1-13.42; 2005, c. 839.)

Editor's note. - Most of the cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Minority is a legal status subject to change by the legislature rather than a vested right. For cases under prior law, see Mack v. Mack, 217 Va. 534 , 229 S.E.2d 895 (1976); Hurdle v. Prinz, 218 Va. 134 , 235 S.E.2d 354 (1977).

Application to plaintiffs under age 21 when causes of action accrued prior to enactment of section. - There was no retroactive application of this section where the statute was applied to plaintiffs, both of whom were under the age of 21 at the time their causes of action accrued prior to the enactment of the statute, causing the statute of limitations to run from the time plaintiffs reached 18 rather than from the age of 21 as at common law. Hurdle v. Prinz, 218 Va. 134 , 235 S.E.2d 354 (1977).

Application of the age of majority statute to the plaintiff's, both of whom were under the age of 21 at the time their causes of action accrued prior to the enactment of the statute, causing the statute of limitations to run from the time plaintiff's reached the age of 18 rather than from the age of 21 as at common law, was not error. Hurdle v. Prinz, 218 Va. 134 , 235 S.E.2d 354 (1977).

Former § 8-30 in no event could properly be read to delay until age 21 the running of the statute of limitations in cases where causes of action for personal injury accrued while plaintiffs were under 21 years of age, but where this section, changing the age of majority and therefore changing the status of plaintiffs, was enacted before plaintiffs reached 21. Hurdle v. Prinz, 218 Va. 134 , 235 S.E.2d 354 (1977).

Child support payments. - When contract provisions as to child support entered into prior to the change in the age of majority were supplanted by a later court order in a divorce suit entered after the change in majority, the court order controls and support payments were not owing for children over 18 despite contract's provision for payments until age 21. Eaton v. Eaton, 215 Va. 824 , 213 S.E.2d 789 (1975).

Where a divorce decree incorporated the terms of a property settlement contract, by which the husband agreed to make child support payments until his child reached the age of 21, where the chancellor subsequently ordered a consent decree awarding the husband custody of the child and reduced child support payments until further order of the court, and where custody of the child was subsequently restored to the wife by court order and monthly payment required for the child's support was reinstated for the same period fixed in the property settlement contract, the consent decree did not supplant the child support provisions of the contract and did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to order support beyond 18, despite the statutory reduction of the age of majority from 21 to 18 enacted subsequently. Gazale v. Gazale, 219 Va. 775 , 250 S.E.2d 365 (1979).

Where no specific age for termination was set forth, but support payments were required until the child reached his majority, the parties intended not to extend the duty of child support beyond the period within which, in the absence of an agreement, the father would have been liable under Virginia law for such support. Meredith v. Meredith, 216 Va. 636 , 222 S.E.2d 511 (1976).

The parties intended that the father's duty to support his "minor" children terminated on the day when, in the absence of any agreement, his legal liability for such support under Virginia law ended and that was his child's eighteenth birthday. Mack v. Mack, 217 Va. 534 , 229 S.E.2d 895 (1976).

Attorney's claim for fees barred by client's infancy. - Trial court properly determined that an attorney's claim for legal services was barred by the client's infancy; the attorney's services to the client concerning his potential inheritance were not actually necessary to the client's position and condition, as any distribution from the estate of the client's grandfather would not have come until several years after the client turned 18. Zelnick v. Adams, 269 Va. 117 , 606 S.E.2d 843, 2005 Va. LEXIS 4 (2005).

Applied in McDonald v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 249 , 645 S.E.2d 918, 2007 Va. LEXIS 87 (2007).

§ 1-205. Bond with surety.

"Bond with surety" includes the payment in cash of the full amount of the required bond and, in such case, no surety shall be required.

(1977, c. 156, § 1-13.1:1; 2005, c. 839.)

Research References. - Friend's Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 31 Proceedings in General District Courts. § 31.12 Pleadings. Friend.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 154.

§ 1-206. Certified mail equivalent to registered mail; certain subsequent mail or notice may be sent by regular mail.

  1. If any mail or notice is required to be sent by registered mail, it shall constitute compliance with this requirement if such mail or notice is sent by certified mail.
  2. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, whenever a state agency is required to send any mail or notice by certified mail and such mail or notice is sent certified mail, return receipt requested, then any subsequent, identical mail or notice that is sent by such state agency may be sent by regular mail.
  3. As used in this section, "state agency" means the same as that term is defined in § 2.2-4347 . (1956, c. 647, § 1-15.1; 2005, c. 839; 2011, c. 566.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2011, c. 566, cl. 2 provides: "That whenever in the Code of Virginia a state agency is required to send any mail or notice by certified mail and such mail or notice is sent certified mail, return receipt requested, then any subsequent, identical mail or notice that is sent by such state agency may be sent by regular mail. 'State agency' means the same as that term is defined in § 2.2-4347 of the Code of Virginia."

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 566 designated the existing provisions of the section as subsection A; and added subsections B and C.

§ 1-207. Child; juvenile; minor; infant.

"Child," "juvenile," "minor," "infant," or any combination thereof means a person less than 18 years of age.

(1972, cc. 824, 825, § 1-13.42; 2005, c. 839.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 9B M.J. Infants and Juveniles, § 2.

CASE NOTES

Minority is a legal status subject to change by the legislature rather than a vested right. For cases under prior law, see Mack v. Mack, 217 Va. 534 , 229 S.E.2d 895 (1976); Hurdle v. Prinz, 218 Va. 134 , 235 S.E.2d 354 (1977).

Attorney's claim for fees barred by client's infancy. - Trial court properly determined that an attorney's claim for legal services was barred by the client's infancy; the attorney's services to the client concerning his potential inheritance were not actually necessary to the client's position and condition, as any distribution from the estate of the client's grandfather would not have come until several years after the client turned 18. Zelnick v. Adams, 269 Va. 117 , 606 S.E.2d 843, 2005 Va. LEXIS 4 (2005) (decided under prior law).

Sodomy statute constitutional as applied where defendant is adult and victim is minor. - As defendant's victims, 16 and 17, were "minors" as defined by § 1-207 , his as-applied constitutional challenge to the sodomy statute, § 18.2-361, failed because nothing in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), or Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (2005), prohibited the application of the sodomy statute to conduct between adults and minors. McDonald v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 249 , 645 S.E.2d 918, 2007 Va. LEXIS 87 (2007).

§ 1-208. City.

"City" means an independent incorporated community which became a city as provided by law before noon on July 1, 1971, or which has within defined boundaries a population of 5,000 or more and which has become a city as provided by law.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 21; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 49, § 1-13.2; 1995, c. 155; 2005, c. 839.)

Cross references. - As to local government, see Va. Const., Art. VII and § 15.2-100 et seq.

Law review. - For note, "Securing a Valid Annexation in Virginia," see 10 U. Rich. L. Rev. 557 (1976).

§ 1-208.1. Carbon-free energy; clean energy.

"Carbon-free energy" or "clean energy" includes electric energy generated from a source that does not emit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere during the process of generating the electric energy, including electric energy generated by the conversion of sunlight, wind, falling water, wave motion, tides, geothermal or nuclear energy.

(2020, c. 811.)

§ 1-209. Collegial body.

"Collegial body" means a governmental entity whose power or authority is vested within its membership.

(2004, c. 651, § 1-13.4:1; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-210. Computation of time.

  1. When an act of the General Assembly or rule of court requires that an act be performed a prescribed amount of time before a motion or proceeding, the day of such motion or proceeding shall not be counted against the time allowed, but the day on which such act is performed may be counted as part of the time. When an act of the General Assembly or rule of court requires that an act be performed within a prescribed amount of time after any event or judgment, the day on which the event or judgment occurred shall not be counted against the time allowed.
  2. When the last day for performing an act during the course of a judicial proceeding falls on a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or any day or part of a day on which the clerk's office is closed as authorized by an act of the General Assembly, the act may be performed on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day or part of a day on which the clerk's office is closed as authorized by an act of the General Assembly.
  3. When an act of the General Assembly specifies a maximum period of time in which a legal action may be brought and the last day of that period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day or part of a day on which the clerk's office is closed as authorized by an act of the General Assembly, the action may be brought on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day or part of a day on which the clerk's office is closed as authorized by an act of the General Assembly.
  4. Any court or proceeding authorized to be adjourned from day to day shall not be required to meet on a Sunday or legal holiday.
  5. When an act of the General Assembly or local governing body, order of the court, or administrative regulation or order requires, either by specification of a date or by a prescribed period of time, that an act be performed or an action be filed on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday or on any day or part of a day on which the state or local government office where the act to be performed or the action to be filed is closed, the act may be performed or the action may be filed on the next business day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day on which the state or local government office is closed.
  6. For the purposes of this section, any day on which the Governor authorizes the closing of the state government shall be considered a legal holiday.

    (Code 1919, § 5; 1932, p. 24; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, pp. 21, 23, §§ 1-13.3, 1-13.27; 1962, cc. 104, 284, § 1-13.3:1; 1977, c. 93; 1986, c. 166; 1987, c. 92; 2005, c. 839; 2008, c. 816; 2010, c. 96; 2014, c. 596.)

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 816 added subsection C and redesignated former subsection C as subsection D.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 96 added subsection E.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 596 added subsection F.

Law review. - For article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 183 (2010).

Research References. - Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure (Matthew Bender). Chapter 6. Pleading. § 6.01 Filing of Pleadings, et seq. Bryson.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 127; 12A M.J. Limitation of Actions, § 2; 13A M.J. Motions for Judgment, § 18; 18 M.J. Sundays and Holidays, § 3; 18 M.J. Time, § 5.

Editor's note. - Most of the cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

In general. - Acts 1932, p. 24, added the latter part of the section [now subsection A of this section], relating to notice or act required by statute within a certain time after an event or judgment. With this exception, this rule of construction as to computation of time has been on the statute books of the State, with a brief intermission, for over a century. Acts 1916, ch. 290, p. 508, made radical changes in the language of this provision, and extended the rule of construction to contracts, but the language of the old section was restored by the Code of 1919, which went into effect January 8, 1920. Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160 , 112 S.E. 757 (1922). See School Bd. v. Alexander, 126 Va. 407 , 101 S.E. 349 (1919).

Excluding day on which event or judgment occurred. - Hence, where a final decree, from which an appeal was obtained, was entered on April 24, the period for executing the appeal bond did not begin to run until April 25. Hurley v. Bennett, 163 Va. 241 , 176 S.E. 171 (1934).

Prior to 1932, a different holding prevailed. See Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160 , 112 S.E. 757 (1922) (time for filing bill of exceptions); Swift & Co. v. Wood, 103 Va. 494 , 49 S.E. 643 (1905) (time for return of notice of motion for judgment); Jennings v. Pocahontas Consol. Collieries Co., 114 Va. 213 , 76 S.E. 298 (1912) (time for filing declaration).

Under this section, when a statute or rule of court requires a notice to be given or any other act to be done within a certain time after any event or judgment, that time shall be in addition to the day on which the event or judgment took place; thus here, the five month speedy trial time allowance under § 19.2-243 did not begin to run until the day after defendant's probable cause hearing. Randolph v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 334, 470 S.E.2d 132 (1996).

In matters of private contract, such as the notice of sale required by a deed of trust, this section does not now apply; but it is the rule in Virginia that if a contract is to be performed or some act is to be done within a certain number of days from a specified date, the first or specified day is not to be counted. Dickerson v. McNulty, 142 Va. 559 , 129 S.E. 242 (1925).

Saving provision applicable. - The court erred in holding that no judgment could be entered in favor of appellants because Rule 3:3 [see now § 8.01-275.1 ] effectively "fixes" the 365th day after commencement of the action as the "last day" for the motion for judgment "to be served [or] delivered," thereby subjecting the one-year period of Rule 3:3 to the saving provision in former § 1-13.3:1 [now § 1-210 ]; therefore, since the 365th day was a Saturday, former § 1-13.3:1 extended the date for service to be completed until the next day that was not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Frey v. Jefferson Homebuilders, Inc., 251 Va. 375 , 467 S.E.2d 788 (1996).

Court overruled appellee corporation's motion to dismiss because the argument that former § 1-13.3:1 [now § 1-210 ] is inapplicable because former Rule 3:3 [see now § 8.01-275.1 ] neither establishes a "last day" to serve process on a defendant, nor invalidates the service of process in this case, but merely prohibits the court from entering judgment for a plaintiff who fails to serve process within a year after his action is commenced, results in the absurd construction "validating a delayed service but effectively nullifying that service." Frey v. Jefferson Homebuilders, Inc., 251 Va. 375 , 467 S.E.2d 788 (1996).

Occupational disease portion of an employee's workers' compensation claim was not time-barred because the employee timely filed the claim within the five-year limitations period as the limitations period ended on a Sunday and the employee filed the claim on the following Monday. Iglesias v. QVC Suffolk, Inc., No. 1292-18-1, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 86 (Apr. 16, 2019).

Sections govern how time period in § 34-17 should be calculated. - This section and former § 1-13.3:1 [now subsections A and B of this section], and not the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, govern how the five-day period provided for in § 34-17 should be calculated to determine whether debtors failed to file their homestead deed in a timely fashion. In re Haynesworth, 145 Bankr. 222 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).

Trustee's objection to debtors' claim of exemptions, under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(b)(2)(A), was overruled as debtors timely filed their amended homestead deeds on November 16, 2005, pursuant to § 34-17, because: (1) a legal proceeding was not in ordinary parlance considered to have been "held" until it was over; (2) a meeting of creditors had not "occurred," pursuant to subsection A of § 1-210 , until it actually concluded; and (3) the original meeting of creditors was not concluded on October 17, 2005, but was continued to November 23, 2005, at which time the meeting was concluded according to trustee. In re Shelton, 343 Bankr. 545, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1401 (W.D. Va. 2006).

Chapter 7 debtor was not entitled to claim the homestead exemption under § 34-4 because the debtor did not record a homestead deed in the proper jurisdiction within five days after the 11 U.S.C.S. § 341 meeting of creditors, as required by § 34-17. The debtor recorded the deed two days after the end of the five-day period as calculated under § 1-210 . In re Conner, 408 Bankr. 88, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2409 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009).

Sunday being dies non juridicus, it is not one of the days of the term of a court. Michie v. Michie's Adm'rs, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 109 (1866); Read v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 924 (1872); Bowles v. Brauer, 89 Va. 466 , 16 S.E. 356 (1892).

An entry of a vacation decree on Sunday was held void. Lee v. Willis, 99 Va. 16 , 37 S.E. 826 (1900).

Computation of time. - When a statute prescribes a certain number of days within which an act is to be done, and says nothing about Sunday, it is to be included, unless the last day falls on Sunday, in which case the act may generally be on the succeeding day. But, if the act may be lawfully done on Sunday, and the last day falls on Sunday, then Sunday is not to be excluded. Bowles v. Brauer, 89 Va. 466 , 16 S.E. 356 (1892). See Harris v. Sparrow, 146 Va. 747 , 132 S.E. 694 (1926), with reference to computation of time within which bill of exception must be filed.

Dismissal of a negligence complaint was not warranted because an injured party's complaint was timely filed due to subsection C of § 1-210 . Closures due to snow were authorized under § 17.1-207, even though a presiding judge did not authorize such. Allie v. Whole Foods Mkt. Group, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 2d 773, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112606 (E.D. Va. 2010).

Saturday and Sunday counted. - Virginia law was to be applied in determining whether a debtor had set apart homestead property within the number of days required by statute and Saturday and Sunday were to be included in counting those days. Mayer v. Quy Van Nguyen (In re Quy Van Nguyen), 211 F.3d 105, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8271 (4th Cir. 2000).

Saturday is not a legal holiday for the purpose of exclusion in the computation of time in which a procedural act should be done. Cousins v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 506 , 47 S.E.2d 391 (1948).

Section not intended to remedy unauthorized closing of clerk's office. - See Hutchins v. Carrillo, 27 Va. App. 595, 500 S.E.2d 277 (1998).

Discretion to accept statement filed after due date. - It was within the commission's discretion to accept the employer's written statement, which was due on a Saturday, but was filed on the following Monday. James v. Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc., No. 2115-93-1 (Ct. of Appeals May 10, 1994).

Plaintiff could still file her motion for judgment recommencing her action on the following Monday, where six months from her voluntary nonsuit fell on a Saturday. Ward v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 253 Va. 232 , 482 S.E.2d 795 (1997).

Complaints timely, even though filed before nonsuit orders. - Dismissal of later actions as untimely was error because, under subdivision E 3 of § 8.01-229 , a new action had to be filed within six months from the date of the nonsuit order in a prior action; because the complaints were refiled within six months of nonsuit orders, they were timely, even though the second complaints were filed before the nonsuit orders in prior case. Laws v. McIlroy, 283 Va. 594 , 724 S.E.2d 699, 2012 Va. LEXIS 85 (2012).

Applied in Browning v. Browning, 68 Va. App. 19, 802 S.E.2d 178 (2017).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Applicability. - Where the Virginia Property Owner's Association Act, § 55-508 et seq., expressly required that notice of the cancellation of a real estate sales contract actually be received within three days after the prospective purchasers received an association disclosure packet, the time for receiving actual notice could not be extended even though the third day was a legal holiday; this section cannot be applied to extend a contractual period of cancellation between two private parties such as the prospective purchasers and the sellers. Taylor v. Boehm, 58 Va. Cir. 229, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 6 (Albemarle County 2002).

Because the last day to file a motion to vacate an arbitration award within ninety days after delivery of the award was a Sunday, the applicant had until the following Monday to file the motion to vacate the award. Priority Imps. Battlefield, Inc. v. Reese, 91 Va. Cir. 63, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 132 (Chesapeake July 28, 2015).

§ 1-211. Constitutional references.

Whenever any act of the General Assembly in effect at noon on July 1, 1971, refers to any section, article, or provision of the prior Constitution of Virginia, such reference shall apply to any comparable section, article, or provision of the Constitution of Virginia then in effect unless the construction would be contrary to the legislative intent of the act.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 49, § 1-13.41; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-211.1. Courthouse; posting of notices.

If any notice, summons, order, or other official document of any type is required to be posted on or at the front door of a courthouse or on a public bulletin board at a courthouse, it shall constitute compliance with this requirement if the notice, summons, order, or other official document is posted with other such documents where such notice, summons, order or other official document is posted or at or near the principal public entrance to the courthouse in a location that is conspicuous to the public and approved by the chief judge of the circuit in which the courthouse is situated, or both. The requirement to post any notice, summons, order, or other official document of any type is satisfied if such notice, summons, order, or other official document is posted on the public government website of the locality served by the court or the website of the circuit court clerk.

(2007, c. 734; 2014, c. 269; 2015, c. 631.)

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 269, inserted "either on the public government website of the locality served by the court where such notice, summons, order or other official document is posted or" and added "or both" at the end.

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 631 deleted "either on the public government website of the locality served by the court" following "other such documents" in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

§ 1-212. Courts of record.

"Courts of record" means the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Court of Appeals of Virginia, and the circuit courts.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 49, § 1-13.5:1; 2005, c. 839.)

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on practice and pleading for the year 1970-71, see 57 Va. L. Rev. 1561 (1971).

§ 1-213. Delegation of duties assigned to political subdivision.

The governing body of a political subdivision shall be responsible for any duty or responsibility imposed upon its political subdivision.

(1986, c. 239, § 1-17.2; 1987, c. 471; 1988, c. 273; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-214. Effective dates.

  1. All laws enacted at a regular session of the General Assembly, including laws which are enacted by reason of actions taken during the reconvened session following a regular session, but excluding general appropriation acts, decennial reapportionment acts, and emergency acts, shall take effect on the first day of July following the adjournment of the regular session at which they were enacted, unless a subsequent date is specified.
  2. All laws enacted at a special session of the General Assembly, including laws which are enacted by reason of actions taken during the reconvened session following a special session, but excluding general appropriations acts, decennial reapportionment acts, and emergency acts, shall take effect on the first day of the fourth month following the month of adjournment of the special session at which they were enacted, unless a subsequent date is specified.
  3. A general appropriation act shall take effect from its passage, unless another effective date is specified in the act.
  4. An emergency act shall take effect from its passage, or on a subsequent date if specified in the act, provided that the emergency shall be expressed in the body of the act and that the emergency shall be approved by a four-fifths vote of the members voting in each house of the General Assembly. The name of each member voting and how he voted shall be recorded in the journal.
  5. A decennial reapportionment act to reapportion the Commonwealth into electoral districts shall take effect immediately.

    (Code 1919, § 4; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 49, § 1-12; 1981, c. 329; 2005, c. 839.)

Cross references. - For implementation of changes to Title 24.2, see § 24.2-101.1.

See Va. Const., Art. IV, § 13.

CASE NOTES

As to what constitutes a case of emergency referred to in this section, see Couk v. Skeen, 109 Va. 6 , 63 S.E. 11 (1908) (decided under prior law).

Act without emergency clause under former law. - An act which contained no emergency clause did not take effect until the lapse of 90 days after the adjournment of the General Assembly, but became effective immediately upon the expiration of the suspension period. Burks v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 763 , 101 S.E. 230 (1919), decided under § 53 of the Constitution of 1902 and a prior version of this section as it stood before the 1971 amendment.

Computation of effective date under former law. - An event which took place June 1, 1914, occurred "seventeen days before " an act approved March 20, 1914, "took effect, " the session of the General Assembly having adjourned sine die March 20, 1914. Burks v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 763 , 101 S.E. 230 (1919), decided under § 53 of the Constitution of 1902 and a prior version of this section as it stood before the 1971 amendment.

An act approved March 3, 1932, the 1932 session of the Assembly having adjourned sine die March 22, 1932, became law on June 21, 1932. Allen v. Mottley Constr. Co., 160 Va. 875 , 170 S.E. 412 (1933), decided under § 53 of the Constitution of 1902 and a prior version of this section as it stood before the 1971 amendment.

§ 1-215. Ex officio.

"Ex officio" means service by virtue of one's office and includes voting privileges for ex officio members unless otherwise provided.

(2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-216. Gender.

A word used in the masculine includes the feminine and neuter.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 21, § 1-13.7; 1997, c. 406; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-217. Headlines of sections.

The headlines of the sections printed in black-face type are intended as mere catchwords to indicate the contents of the sections and do not constitute part of the act of the General Assembly.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 21, § 1-13.9; 2005, c. 839.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 17 M.J. Statutes, § 109.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Statute heading just informative convenience. - It is well-settled that the words of the statute, not its heading, carry the force of law. The heading of the statute is purely a matter of informative convenience. The court must construe the body of the statute. Jones v. Division of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Owens, 19 Va. App. 184, 450 S.E.2d 172 (1994); Foster v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 235 , 623 S.E.2d 902, 2006 Va. LEXIS 6 (2006).

Related to titles of acts. - In the construction of an act, its title is entitled to its due share of consideration, and while a headline is not strictly a title, it occupies a closely related position. It contains catchwords which are intended to indicate the contents of a section. Jordan v. Town of South Boston, 138 Va. 838 , 122 S.E. 265 (1924). See Chambers v. Higgins, 169 Va. 345 , 193 S.E. 531 (1937).

Retaining a heading after an amendment similar to that which appeared prior to the amendment does not control the classification of the section or take precedence over the language adopted by the legislature. Shaw v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 331, 387 S.E.2d 792 (1990).

Not applicable to federal law. - Parental rights of a mother were properly terminated where the mother was convicted in federal court of abusive sexual contact, a felony, as felony sexual assault in Virginia included all felonies proscribed by the article within the Virginia Code captioned "Criminal Sexual Assault"; unlike the contents of § 1-13.9 [now § 1-217 ] regarding the "headlines" of Virginia Code "sections," the federal law contained no provision stating that captions of subtitles, chapters, or articles were intended as mere catchwords, and it expressly provided that a subtitle, chapter, or article could be cited by its caption where no section or provision established or authorized a short title citation for such subtitle, chapter, or article. M. G. v. Albemarle County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 41 Va. App. 170, 583 S.E.2d 761, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 406 (2003).

§ 1-218. Includes.

"Includes" means includes, but not limited to.

(2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-219. Land; real estate.

"Land," "lands," or "real estate" includes lands, tenements and hereditaments, and all rights and appurtenances thereto and interests therein, other than a chattel interest.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 22, § 1-13.12; 2005, c. 839.)

Editor's note. - Some of the cases annnotated below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Leasehold is not real property. - At common law, an estate for years was considered personalty. Absent statutory modification, this remains the law in Virginia. There is no statutory modification of this common-law rule. Therefore, leasehold interests are not considered to be real estate. CSB, Inc. v. Cradle of Democracy Broadcasting Co., 547 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Va. 1982).

A chattel real or leasehold is intangible personal property and not real property. CSB, Inc. v. Cradle of Democracy Broadcasting Co., 547 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Va. 1982).

"Real estate" does not include unattached building. - The words used in this section to define "real estate" plainly do not encompass a building that is unattached to land. Pardoe & Graham Real Estate, Inc. v. Schulz Homes Corp., 259 Va. 398 , 525 S.E.2d 284 (2000).

"Land" embraces underlying minerals. - Land sold without reservation of any kind embraces the underlying minerals. Steinman v. Vicars, 99 Va. 595 , 39 S.E. 227 (1901).

And includes ground rents. - The word "land" as defined in this section is sufficient to include ground rents. Willis's Ex'r v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 667 , 34 S.E. 460 (1899).

Transferrable development rights. - Transferrable development rights are entirely creatures of statute and they are governed by a specific statutory regime. Two things must occur for transferrable development rights to come into being. First, the county must approve an application from an eligible sending site, and, second, the county must approve a receiving site. The dedication of density or other rights, i.e., the creation of transferrable development rights, occurs under § 15.2-750 when both conditions have been fulfilled. The transferrable development rights have potential value before that, but until the county approves a sending site and a receiving site, in the eyes of the law, the transferrable development rights remain an inchoate interest or right. Once the transferrable development rights are created by the county's approval of a sending and a receiving site, they become a right or interest in real estate under the broad definition found in § 1-219 and they may be taxed under § 58.1-3201. Johnson v. Arlington Cnty., 292 Va. 843 , 794 S.E.2d 389, 2016 Va. LEXIS 200 (2016).

Water mains, gates, hydrants and pipes of a city water system were to be regarded as fixtures and taxable as "land" under § 183 (g) of the Constitution of 1902, notwithstanding the statutory definition of "land" contained herein. City of Newport News v. Warwick County, 159 Va. 571 , 166 S.E. 570 (1932).

§ 1-219.1. Limitations on eminent domain.

  1. The right to private property being a fundamental right, the General Assembly shall not pass any law whereby private property shall be taken or damaged for public uses without just compensation. The term "public uses" mentioned in Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia is hereby defined as to embrace only the acquisition of property where: (i) the property is taken for the possession, ownership, occupation, and enjoyment of property by the public or a public corporation; (ii) the property is taken for construction, maintenance, or operation of public facilities by public corporations or by private entities provided that there is a written agreement with a public corporation providing for use of the facility by the public; (iii) the property is taken for the creation or functioning of any public service corporation, public service company, or railroad; (iv) the property is taken for the provision of any authorized utility service by a government utility corporation; (v) the property is taken for the elimination of blight provided that the property itself is a blighted property; or (vi) the property taken is in a redevelopment or conservation area and is abandoned or the acquisition is needed to clear title where one of the owners agrees to such acquisition or the acquisition is by agreement of all the owners.
  2. For purposes of this section:

    "Blighted property" means any property that endangers the public health or safety in its condition at the time of the filing of the petition for condemnation and is (i) a public nuisance or (ii) an individual commercial, industrial, or residential structure or improvement that is beyond repair or unfit for human occupancy or use.

    "Government utility corporation" means any county or municipality, or entity or agency thereof, which provides or operates one or more of the following authorized utility services: gas, pipeline, electric light, heat, power, water supply, sewer, telephone, or telegraph.

    "Public corporation" means the Commonwealth of Virginia or any political subdivision thereof or any incorporated municipality therein or any public agency of the Commonwealth or of any political subdivision thereof or of any municipality therein.

    "Public facilities" means (i) airports, landing fields, and air navigation facilities; (ii) educational facilities; (iii) flood control, bank and shore protection, watershed protection, and dams; (iv) hospital facilities; (v) judicial and court facilities; (vi) correctional facilities, including jails and penitentiaries; (vii) library facilities; (viii) military installations; (ix) parks so designated by the Commonwealth or by the locality in its comprehensive plan; (x) properties of historical significance so designated by the Commonwealth; (xi) law enforcement, fire, emergency medical, and rescue facilities; (xii) sanitary sewer, water or stormwater facilities; (xiii) transportation facilities including highways, roads, streets, and bridges, traffic signals, related easements and rights-of-way, mass transit, ports, and any components of federal, state, or local transportation facilities; (xiv) waste management facilities for hazardous, radioactive, or other waste; (xv) office facilities occupied by a public corporation; and (xvi) such other facilities that are necessary to the construction, maintenance, or operation of a public facility as listed in clauses (i) through (xv) and directly related thereto.

  3. No more private property may be taken than that which is necessary to achieve the stated public use.
  4. Except where property is taken (i) for the creation or functioning of a public service corporation, public service company, or railroad; (ii) for the provision of any authorized utility service by a government utility corporation; or (iii) for sanitary sewer, water or stormwater facilities, or transportation facilities, including highways, roads, streets, and bridges, traffic signals, related easements and rights-of-way, mass transit, ports, and any components of federal, state, or local transportation facilities, by a public corporation, property can only be taken where: (a) the public interest dominates the private gain and (b) the primary purpose is not private financial gain, private benefit, an increase in tax base or tax revenues, an increase in employment, or economic development.
  5. During condemnation proceedings, the property owner may challenge whether the taking or damaging is for a public use, the stated public use is a pretext for an unauthorized use, or the taking or damaging of property is a violation of subsection D. Nothing in this section shall be construed as abrogating any defenses or rights otherwise available to the property owner independently of this section.
  6. Subject to the provisions of subsection D, the limitations contained in this section shall not abrogate any other provision of law that authorizes a condemnor to dispose of property taken for a public use as surplus property, as otherwise provided by law.
  7. If the acquisition of only part of a property would leave its owner with an uneconomic remnant, the condemnor shall offer to acquire the entire property for its fair market value as otherwise provided by law, but the condemnor shall not acquire an uneconomic remnant if the owner objects and desires to maintain ownership of the excess property.
  8. The provisions of this section shall control to the extent there are any inconsistencies between this section and any other general or special law; otherwise, nothing herein shall be construed as abrogating the power of eminent domain delegated independently of this section.
  9. The provisions of this section shall not apply to the forfeiture of property under Chapters 22.1 (§ 19.2-386.1 et seq.) and 22.2 (§ 19.2-386.15 et seq.) of Title 19.2.
  10. The provisions of this section shall not apply to real property that is subject to a certificate of take or a certificate of deposit recorded prior to July 1, 2007, in the circuit court clerk's office for the circuit where the real property is located or real property that is the subject of a petition for condemnation filed prior to July 1, 2007.
  11. For the purposes of any taking of private property in accordance with Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, a government utility corporation shall be considered to be acting as a public service corporation or public service company where the property is taken for the provision of an authorized utility service only; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall modify or affect the jurisdiction of the State Corporation Commission.

    (2007, cc. 882, 901, 926; 2012, cc. 283, 626, 756.)

The number of this section was assigned by the Virginia Code Commission, the number in the 2007 acts having been § 1-237.1.

Editor's note. - Acts 2007, cc. 882, 901, and 926, cl. 3, provides: "That, until July 1, 2010, the provisions of this act shall not affect the ability of a redevelopment and housing authority organized pursuant to Title 36 of the Code of Virginia to acquire property pursuant to any redevelopment or conservation plan adopted prior to January 1, 2007. However, the provisions of this act shall be applicable to all redevelopment and conservation plans adopted after January 1, 2007."

Acts 2007, cc. 882, 901, and 926, cl. 4, as amended by Acts 2010, c. 203, provides: "Nothing contained in this act shall prohibit the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority or the City of Norfolk to acquire property located at Map Number 24488500 and Map Number 41138940, both located in the City of Norfolk, through the use of eminent domain for the location of a recreational facility open to the public to be owned or operated by a not-for-profit entity, provided such acquisitions are instituted prior to January 1, 2011."

Acts 2009, cc. 181 and 551, added § 15.2-907.1 giving localities the authority to require removal, repair, etc., of buildings or structures declared to be derelict. Acts 2009, cc. 181 and 551, cl. 2 provides: "That nothing in this act shall be construed to supersede the provisions of § 1-219.1 ."

Acts 2012, cc. 220 and 761, enacted § 15.2-907.2, which authorizes localities to act as receiver to repair derelict and blighted buildings in certain limited circumstances. Acts 2012, cc. 220 and 761, cl. 2 provides: "That nothing in this act shall be construed to supersede the provisions of § 1-219.1 of the Code of Virginia."

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendments by cc. 283 and 756 are identical, and substituted "Chapters 22.1 ( § 19.2-386.1 et seq.), and 22.2" for "Chapters 22 ( § 19.2-369 et seq.), 22.1 ( § 19.2-386.1 et seq.), and 22.2" in subsection I.

The 2012 amendment by c. 626, in subsection D, inserted clause (iii) and made related changes, and substituted "tax revenues, an increase in employment, or economic development" for "tax revenues, or an increase in employment" at the end; and added subsection K.

Law review. - For article on real estate law covering judicial opinions from 2006 to 2008, and the 2007 and 2008 sessions of the Virginia General Assembly, see 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 379 (2008).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 9B M.J. Housing, § 1.

CASE NOTES

Applicability. - Housing and redevelopment authority could not acquire unblighted property within a blighted redevelopment area by eminent domain because the authority sought to do so after the deadline in § 1-219.1 for doing so. PKO Ventures, LLC v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 286 Va. 174 , 747 S.E.2d 826, 2013 Va. LEXIS 100 (2013).

Rights were prospective. - When § 1-219.1 prevented a housing and redevelopment authority from acquiring unblighted property within a blighted redevelopment area by eminent domain, the authority was not improperly deprived of a vested right because the authority had no substantive right to acquire the property that could not be impaired by a later statute, as the authority did not acquire title until after § 1-219.1 's deadline, so the authority's rights were prospective when the statute applied to the authority. PKO Ventures, LLC v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 286 Va. 174 , 747 S.E.2d 826, 2013 Va. LEXIS 100 (2013).

When § 1-219.1 prevented a housing and redevelopment authority from acquiring unblighted property within a blighted redevelopment area by eminent domain, the statute did not impair the authority's rights to the property in violation of § 1-239 because the authority held no rights to the property when § 1-219.1 terminated the authority's ability to acquire the unblighted property by eminent domain, so the statute affected no "claim arising" before the statute took effect. PKO Ventures, LLC v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 286 Va. 174 , 747 S.E.2d 826, 2013 Va. LEXIS 100 (2013).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Operability of statute. - Section 1-219.1 did not prohibit a housing authority from acquiring the owners' real property because § 1-239 and case precedent made clear that 2007 Va. Acts, c. 926, cl. 3, allowed proceedings instituted by redevelopment and housing authorities before July 1, 2010, to continue until resolution. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Cent. Radio, Inc., 82 Va. Cir. 240, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 85 (Norfolk Feb. 17, 2011).

Applicability. - This section did not apply to a condemnation proceeding because, although the proceeding was not finalized before the July 1, 2010, effective date of the statute, the proceeding was instituted under the former law and before the new law took effect; to hold otherwise would have improperly discontinued a pending matter in violation of § 1-9 . Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Pryer,, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 84 (Norfolk May 16, 2011).

When a landowner claimed inverse condemnation against a city for issuing a fill permit to the landowner's neighbors, no violation of Va. Const. art. I, § 11 was sufficiently stated because (1) the landowner did not allege the landowner was deprived of all economic use of the landowner's land, (2) the landowner did not allege the permit was issued for a public purpose, under subsection A of § 1-219.1 , and (3) it was not alleged that the city's stormwater disposal system contributed to the landowner's alleged damage. Collett v. City of Norfolk, 85 Va. Cir. 258, 2012 Va. Cir. LEXIS 177 (Norfolk Aug. 24, 2012).

Common law provides a remedy to a takings claim. - Motion to strike and dismiss a landowner's objections to a condemnation petition filed by the Commissioner of Highways was denied because the common law provided a remedy to an Art. I, § 11 takings claim; although subsection G of § 1-219.1 and subdivision A 9 of § 25.1-417 did not expressly delineate a remedy to VDOT's finding that the portion of the land that was not subject to the taking was not an "uneconomic remnant," the language of those sections also did not state that there was no remedy for an alleged wrongful determination that a parcel of land was not an "uneconomic remnant." Comm'r of Hwys v. W. Dulles Props., L.L.C., 86 Va. Cir. 284, 2013 Va. Cir. LEXIS 16 (Fairfax County Mar. 4, 2013).

Construction of hotel not a public use. - Property owners and business tenants failed to state a cause of action for inverse condemnation under Va. Const., Art. I, § 11, where they alleged that the city denied them access to their property in order to accommodate the construction of a hotel, which was not a public use under § 1-219.1 . Close v. City of Norfolk, 82 Va. Cir. 636, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 203 (Norfolk Dec. 23, 2009).

Construction or repair of utilities is a public use. - Property owners and business tenants stated a cause of action for inverse condemnation under Va. Const., Art. I, § 11, where they alleged that the city denied them access to their property in order to build and repair public utilities, which was a public use under § 1-219.1 . Close v. City of Norfolk, 82 Va. Cir. 636, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 203 (Norfolk Dec. 23, 2009).

Taking of more property than necessary for public use. - Dismissal of a city's petition for condemnation was appropriate because the city's motion for and filing of an amended petition and certificate, substantially different from the initial petition and certificate, followed by an insistence that there was no legal difference between the documents, demonstrated that the city in fact was attempting to take more property than was necessary to achieve the stated public purpose of a utility easement. City of Chesapeake v. KH HR Two Great Bridge, LLC, 91 Va. Cir. 16, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 129 (Chesapeake June 9, 2015).

Pipeline for public use. - Natural gas company did not seek to condemn more property than necessary to achieve the stated public use because the proposed pipeline would go underground in an area already subject to a power easement; no evidence refuted that of the company that future access rights to the properties were needed for future maintenance and safety. Va. Natural Gas, Inc. v. Sumner, 98 Va. Cir. 167, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 21 (Chesapeake Feb. 23, 2018).

Public use sufficiently alleged. - Landowner's inverse condemnation suit sufficiently alleged a public use because the suit alleged a city closed part of a road, extinguishing the owner's easement, and kept ownership of the property. Hooked Grp., L.L.C. v. City of Chesapeake, 100 Va. Cir. 303, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 616 (Chesapeake Nov. 9, 2018), aff'd, 842 S.E.2d 413, 2020 Va. LEXIS 59 (2020).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Proposed constitutional amendment. - Damages sustained when a major cross-town highway is converted to a limited access only highway that eliminates all direct access to the major highway by abutting landowners are compensable under the current Constitution and will remain compensable under the amendment. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Jackson H. Miller, Member, House of Delegates, 11-135, 2012 Va. AG LEXIS 3 (1/26/12).

Amendment, if adopted, would not expand the meaning of "damages" to such an extent that it would enable the owners of property located in the vicinity of, or affected by, an unpopular public facility to recover damages when none of their land has been taken for the facility. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Jackson H. Miller, Member, House of Delegates, 11-135, 2012 Va. AG LEXIS 3 (1/26/12).

Design and construction of highways and roads, including the installation of medians and other traffic management and safety features, represent the exercise of the Commonwealth's police power, the exercise of which generally is not compensable under the current Constitution, provided that a reasonable means of ingress and egress for an abutting property remains; whether limitations on vehicular access will be compensable under the proposed amendment will depend on how the General Assembly defines by statute "lost access" and "lost profits," but a property owner likely will have an opportunity to present to the body determining just compensation evidence of the damages alleged to have been sustained. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Jackson H. Miller, Member, House of Delegates, 11-135, 2012 Va. AG LEXIS 3 (1/26/12).

Temporary closure of street for a weekend festival or to accommodate a parade represents the reasonable exercise of police power by a locality, is not a taking or damaging of property and, thus, would not be compensable if the proposed amendment is adopted. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Jackson H. Miller, Member, House of Delegates, 11-135, 2012 Va. AG LEXIS 3 (1/26/12).

§ 1-220. Local ordinances incorporating state law by reference.

When counties, cities and towns are empowered to incorporate by reference provisions of the Code, acts of the General Assembly, or state regulations into a local ordinance, any ordinance incorporating by reference provisions of the Code, acts of the General Assembly or state regulations may include future amendments to the provisions of the Code, acts of the General Assembly or state regulations provided such intent is specifically stated in such ordinance.

(1993, c. 710, § 1-13.39:2; 2001, c. 771; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-221. Locality.

"Locality" means a county, city, or town as the context may require.

(2005, c. 839.)

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A regional planning district commission is not a locality, authority, or sanitation district for purposes of competitive negotiation as defined in § 2.2-4301 of the Virginia Public Procurement Act. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Robert D. "Bobby" Orrock, Member, House of Delegates, 10-020, 2010 Va. AG LEXIS 20 (4/27/10).

§ 1-222. Majority authority.

Whenever authority is conferred by law to three or more persons, a majority of such persons shall have the power to exercise such authority, unless otherwise provided.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 21, § 1-13.1; 2005, c. 839.)

CASE NOTES

This section is a rule of construction which only confers power on a majority of a valid commission when acting pursuant to their authority. Dillon v. Davis, 201 Va. 514 , 112 S.E.2d 137 (1960) (decided under prior law).

Persons deriving authority from statutory source. - This subsection refers only to the construction of statutes and to public officers or other persons deriving their authority from a statutory source. It has no application to arbitrators acting under a private agreement of submission. Fraley v. Nickels, 121 Va. 377 , 93 S.E. 636 (1917) (decided under prior law).

Bank directors. - If a majority of a board of bank directors be present and qualified to vote and do vote, an election may be made by a majority of the votes given, although they be not a majority of the whole board; and this although others of the directors be present, but do not vote. Booker v. Young, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 303 (1855) (decided under prior law).

Applied in Hitt Constr. v. Pratt, 53 Va. App. 422, 672 S.E.2d 904 (2009).

§ 1-222.1. Manufacturer.

"Manufacturer" shall not include any farm or aggregation of farms that owns and operates facilities within the Commonwealth for the generation of electric energy from waste-to-energy technology. As used in this definition, (i) "farm" means any person that obtains at least 51 percent of its annual gross income from agricultural operations and produces the agricultural waste used as feedstock for the waste-to-energy technology, (ii) "agricultural waste" means biomass waste materials capable of decomposition that are produced from the raising of plants and animals during agricultural operations, including animal manures, bedding, plant stalks, hulls, and vegetable matter, and (iii) "waste-to-energy technology" means any technology, including but not limited to a methane digester, that converts agricultural waste into gas, steam, or heat that is used to generate electricity on-site.

(2009, c. 746.)

Law review. - For annual survey article, see "Environmental Law," see 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 423 (2009).

§ 1-223. Month; year.

"Month" means a calendar month and "year" means a calendar year.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, pp. 22, 24, §§ 1-13.13, 1-13.33; 2005, c. 839.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 18 M.J. Time, § 2.

CASE NOTES

The word "month" in a statute means a month as designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain, and is to be computed not by counting the days but by looking at the calendar. It runs from a given day in one month to a corresponding number in the next month, except where the last month has not so many days, in which event it expires on the last day of that month. Cousins v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 506 , 47 S.E.2d 391 (1948) (decided under prior law).

And not 30 days. - Where the minimum punishment for an offense is confinement in jail for not less than one month, it is error for the jury, in view of this section, to fix the punishment at 30 days in jail when the calendar month consists of 31 days. But as the error is in the accused's favor it is harmless. Barrack v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 596 , 128 S.E. 638 (1925) (decided under prior law).

Courts are required to employ calendar years and not "365-day periods" when computing whether a statute of limitations has expired. Ward v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 253 Va. 232 , 482 S.E.2d 795 (1997) (decided under prior law).

§ 1-224. Municipality; incorporated communities; municipal corporation.

"Municipality," "incorporated communities," "municipal corporation," and words or terms of similar import mean cities and towns.

(2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-225. Nonlegislative citizen member.

"Nonlegislative citizen member" means any natural person who is not a member of the General Assembly of Virginia.

(2004, c. 709, § 1-13.13:1; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-226. Notary.

"Notary" means notary public.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 22, § 1-13.14; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-227. Number.

A word used in the singular includes the plural and a word used in the plural includes the singular.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 22, § 1-13.15; 2005, c. 839.)

CASE NOTES

The article "a" does not necessarily denote the singular. Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 486 , 189 S.E. 320 (1937) (decided under prior law).

Regulatory interpretation. - Trial court wrongly interpreted 18 Va. Admin. Code § 150-20-140 to require multiple acts of a veterinarian's unprofessional conduct because Va. Code Ann. § 1-227 said a word used in the plural included the singular. Va. Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Leonard, No. 0252-14-2, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 370 (Nov. 12, 2014).

§ 1-228. Oath.

"Oath" includes affirmation.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 22, § 1-13.16; 2005, c. 839.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 14A M.J. Oath, § 2.

§ 1-229. Optional form of county government; effect of change in form.

Whenever any county, city, town, political subdivision, or combination thereof is identified in an act of the General Assembly by reference to its proximity to a county that has adopted an optional form of government provided in Title 15.2, and that county changes its form of government, the act shall continue to apply to such county, city, town, political subdivision, or combination thereof and shall cease to apply only upon the subsequent enactment by the General Assembly of a measure in which such intent clearly is stated.

(1990, c. 253, § 1-13.35:1; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-230. Person.

"Person" includes any individual, corporation, partnership, association, cooperative, limited liability company, trust, joint venture, government, political subdivision, or any other legal or commercial entity and any successor, representative, agent, agency, or instrumentality thereof.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 22, § 1-13.19; 1988, c. 36; 2005, c. 839.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 4B M.J. Corporations, § 6; 17 M.J. Statutes, § 60.

Editor's note. - The cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Corporations. - Corporations are included under the term "persons" as used in a statute, unless they are exempted by its terms or by the nature of the subject to which the statute relates. Miller's Ex'r v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 110 (1876). See Portsmouth Gas Co. v. Sanford, 97 Va. 124 , 33 S.E. 516 (1899).

When the word "person" is used in a statute, corporations as well as natural persons are included for civil purposes. B & O R.R. v. Gallahue's Adm'rs, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 655 (1855). See Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Bailey, 101 Va. 443 , 44 S.E. 692 (1903).

The word "person" in a former statute relating to persons paying taxes on real estate was held to include "corporations." Crafford v. Board of Supvrs., 87 Va. 110 , 12 S.E. 147 (1890).

In support of the rule that corporations are to be deemed and taken as persons when the circumstances in which they are placed are identical with those of natural persons, see Stribling v. Bank of Valley, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 132 (1827); Bank of United States v. Merchants' Bank, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 573 (1843); B & O R.R. v. Gallahue's Adm'rs, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 655 (1855).

But it has been held that a city charter giving authority to impose a license tax upon persons engaged in certain enumerated callings, and "upon any other person or employment," did not empower the city to impose such tax upon a railroad corporation, which is neither a person nor employment within the ordinary acceptation of these words. City of Lynchburg v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 80 Va. 237 (1885).

Counties and cities may be included in the word "person." Commonwealth v. Schmelz, 116 Va. 62 , 81 S.E. 45 (1914). See Portsmouth Gas Co. v. Sanford, 97 Va. 124 , 33 S.E. 516 (1899).

A city is a "person" whose rights may be prejudiced by a forgery. Hanbury v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 182 , 122 S.E.2d 911 (1961).

Municipal corporations have a dual identity, existing both as a body politic and a body corporate; in the latter identity, a municipal corporation may be a "person" just as any corporation or other legal entity is a person. City of Va. Beach v. Flippen, 251 Va. 358 , 467 S.E.2d 471 (1996).

Board of public welfare (now board of social services) held person aggrieved for appeal purposes. - See Board of Pub. Welfare v. Blackburn, 214 Va. 425 , 201 S.E.2d 777 (1974).

Sanctions error where issue as to whether city was person undetermined. - Where district judge awarded sanctions to city since plaintiffs should have known that the city was incapable of forming the criminal intent necessary for liability under the Virginia Conspiracy Act, where the Virginia Conspiracy Act itself does not clearly state whether cities can be subjected to liability, where the Virginia Supreme Court has not been confronted directly with whether a city is a person within the meaning of the Virginia Conspiracy Act, and where a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in a Virginia Conspiracy Act case seemed to have left open the possibility that a city could be sued under that act, the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning plaintiffs since the court of appeals was unable to say that plaintiffs had "absolutely no chance of success" in bringing a Virginia Conspiracy Act claim against the city. Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1991).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Registered limited liability partnership. - A registered limited liability partnership organized under the laws of the Commonwealth may serve as a trustee under a deed of trust covered by § 55-58.1. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Gregory D. Habeeb, Member, House of Delegates, 11-131, 2012 Va. AG LEXIS 13 (3/23/12).

§ 1-231. When "person" includes business trust and limited liability company.

Whenever the term "person" is defined to include both "corporation" and "partnership," such term shall also include "business trust and limited liability company."

(2002, c. 621, § 1-13.19:1; 2005, c. 839.)

Cross references. - For the Virginia Business Trust Act, see § 13.1-1200 et seq.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 12A M.J. Limited Liability Companies, § 3.

§ 1-232. Person under disability.

"Person under disability" includes a person less than 18 years of age.

(1972, cc. 824, 825, § 1-13.42; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-233. Personal estate.

"Personal estate" includes chattels real and such other estate as, upon the death of the owner intestate, would devolve upon his personal representative.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 22, § 1-13.20; 2005, c. 839.)

CASE NOTES

Bank stock is personal property. West v. City of Newport News, 104 Va. 21 , 51 S.E. 206 (1905)(decided under prior law).

§ 1-234. Personal representative.

"Personal representative" includes the executor of a will or the administrator of the estate of a decedent, the administrator of such estate with the will annexed, the administrator of such estate unadministered by a former representative, whether there is a will or not, any person who is under the order of a circuit court to take into his possession the estate of a decedent for administration, and every other curator of a decedent's estate, for or against whom suits may be brought for causes of action that accrued to or against the decedent.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 22, § 1-13.21; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 49; 2005, c. 839.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 8A M.J. Executors and Administrators, § 13.

CASE NOTES

The primary sense of the word "representatives," when used in a bequest of personal property, is the same as that of "legal representatives" or "personal representatives." Each of them is equivalent to executors or administrators. But this primary sense of the word "representatives" may be controlled, where an intention is clearly indicated to employ it in a different sense. Brent v. Washington's Adm'rs, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 526 (1868) (decided under prior law).

An administrator with the will annexed - that is, an ancillary administratrix - is among those who can be a "personal representative" under this section. Higgins v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 507 F. Supp. 984 (D.D.C. 1981) (decided under prior law).

Standing. - Testator's daughters did not have standing to bring the claims asserted because the testator's son remained the personal representative of the testator's estate, and he was the only party entitled to bring suit on behalf of the estate; the daughters' claims relating to the rescission of inter vivos transfers were inherently on behalf of the estate as they would have belonged to the testator during his lifetime. Platt v. Griffith,, 2021 Va. LEXIS 59 (May 27, 2021).

Applied in In re Woodley, 290 Va. 482 , 777 S.E.2d 560, 2015 Va. LEXIS 141 (2015).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Administrator as personal representative. - Consultant's claim that a wrongful death suit was improperly filed by an administratrix rather than a personal representative as required by § 8.01-50 was rejected as the definition of personal representative in § 1-234 included an administrator. Rodriguez v. N. Va. Elec. Coop., 79 Va. Cir. 266, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 236 (Loudoun County Sept. 14, 2009).

§ 1-235. Population; inhabitants.

"Population" or "inhabitants" means with reference to any county, city, town, political subdivision of the Commonwealth or any combination thereof, the natural persons in such county, city, town, political subdivision or combination as shown by the unadjusted United States decennial census last preceding the time at which any provision dependent upon population is being applied or the time as of which it is being construed. Where two or more political subdivisions are consolidated, the population of the consolidated county or city or other political subdivision shall be the combined population of the consolidating subdivisions, under the last preceding unadjusted United States decennial census.

(1942, p. 668; Michie Code 1942, § 5a; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 23, § 1-13.22; 1954, c. 295, § 1-13.10:1; 1958, c. 330; 1966, c. 78; 2005, c. 839.)

Cross references. - For effect of population changes on statutes containing population classifications, see § 1-236 . See Va. Const., Art. VII, § 1.

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Relevant evidence. - A census report was properly admitted, pursuant to §§ 1-13.22 and 1-13.35 [now § 1-236 ], as evidence to establish that a city was large enough to use laser speed devices. Commonwealth v. Fagin, 61 Va. Cir. 428, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 225 (Charlottesville 2003) (decided under prior law).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Inmate population. - The General Assembly has not authorized local governing bodies to exclude out-of-state prisoners housed in a state adult correctional facility from the locality's population for the purposes of the decennial reapportionment if the total population of inmates housed at the facility does not exceed twelve percent of the locality's population pursuant to subsection C of § 24.2-304.1. See opinion of Attorney General to J. Vaden Hunt, Esquire, County Attorney, Pittsylvania County, 11-011, 2011 Va. AG LEXIS 15 (3/1/11).

§ 1-236. Population classifications.

Any act of the General Assembly with a population classification applicable to any county, city, town, or subdivision of the Commonwealth or any combination thereof shall continue to apply to any such body notwithstanding any subsequent change in population and shall apply to any county, city, town, or political subdivision of the Commonwealth or any combination thereof subsequently falling within such population classification. The provisions of this section shall not apply to, or limit, the distribution of any state funds, grants-in-aid, or other allocation from the state treasury, to any county, city, town, or other political subdivision of the Commonwealth.

(1950, pp. 464, 465, §§ 1-13.35, 1-13.36; 1960, cc. 251, 307; 1962, c. 315; 1964, c. 404; 1966, c. 78; 2005, c. 839.)

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Relevant evidence. - A census report was properly admitted, pursuant to §§ 1-13.22 and 1-13.35 [now §§ 1-235 and 1-236 ], as evidence to establish that a city was large enough to use laser speed devices. Commonwealth v. Fagin, 61 Va. Cir. 428, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 225 (Charlottesville 2003) (decided under prior law).

§ 1-237. Process.

"Process" includes subpoenas, the summons and complaint in a civil action, and process in statutory actions.

(1954, c. 543, § 1-13.23:1; 1986, c. 155; 2005, cc. 681, 839.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, c. 681, effective January 1, 2006, amended former § 1-13.23:1, from which this section is derived. Pursuant to § 30-152 and Acts 2005, c. 839, cl. 5, the 2005 amendment by c. 681 has been given effect in this section as set out above. The phrase "the summons and complaint in a civil action" was substituted for "in chancery, notices to commence actions at law."

§ 1-238. Reenacted.

"Reenacted," when used in the title or enactment of a bill or act of the General Assembly, means that the changes enacted to a section of the Code of Virginia or an act of the General Assembly are in addition to the existing substantive provisions in that section or act, and are effective prospectively unless the bill expressly provides that such changes are effective retroactively on a specified date.

The provisions of this section are declaratory of existing public policy and law.

(2001, c. 720, § 1-13.39:3; 2005, c. 839.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2001, c. 720, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act are intended to reverse the ruling in Rubio v. Rubio , 33 Va. App. 74, 531 S.E. 2 nd 612 (2000)."

CASE NOTES

Declaratory of existing law. - Amendments to the law surrounding the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act were effective prospectively, as the phrase "declaratory of existing law" did not state retroactive intent and the language of the amended laws did not support retroactivity. Berner v. Mills, 265 Va. 408 , 579 S.E.2d 159, 2003 Va. LEXIS 52 (2003) (decided under prior law).

Retrospective application of reenacted laws. - Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to be sentenced under a version of § 18.2-308.4 that became effective after the crime was committed; the language of the statute did not clearly allow for retroactive application of the amendment, and the statute also could not be applied retroactively pursuant to this section. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 179, 604 S.E.2d 103, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 512 (2004) (decided under prior law).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Applicability of amendments. - Although defendant's alleged offense took place before statutory amendment went into effect, and defendant was not arrested or charged until the indictment after the enactment of the amended statute, the amended version of the statute applied in defendant's case because the proceedings were governed by the procedural laws in effect at the time of the proceeding and the amendments to the statute were procedural and not substantive. Commonwealth v. Weatherholtz,, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 202 (Frederick County Oct. 2, 2020).

§ 1-239. Repeal not to affect liabilities; mitigation of punishment.

No new act of the General Assembly shall be construed to repeal a former law, as to any offense committed against the former law, or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or done, or any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising before the new act of the General Assembly takes effect; except that the proceedings thereafter held shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceedings; and if any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment be mitigated by any provision of the new act of the General Assembly, such provision may, with the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new act of the General Assembly takes effect.

(Code 1919, § 6, § 1-16; 2005, c. 839.)

Cross references. - As to proceedings pending when Code takes effect, see §§ 1-4 , 8.01-1 .

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on criminal law and procedure for the year 2007-2008, see 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 149 (2008).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, §§ 4, 84; 9B M.J. Housing, § 1; 17 M.J. Statutes, §§ 73, 91, 96, 105; 18 M.J. Taxation, § 12.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

General comment. - This section or a predecessor has been the law of Virginia for more than 100 years and has long been held to apply to civil as well as criminal cases. Pursuant to it, both substantive and vested rights are protected from retroactive application of statutes. Garraghty v. Virginia, Dep't of Cors., 52 F.3d 1274 (4th Cir. 1995).

Under the former law the rule was different in Virginia. See Scutt v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 54 (1817); Commonwealth v. Leftwich, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 657 (1827); Pitman v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 800 (1843).

When rights and claims are subject to protection of due process. - It is only when a right has accrued or a claim has arisen that it is subject to the protection of the due process clause. Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 240 Va. 49 , 392 S.E.2d 817 (1990).

Application to both criminal and civil cases. - A former statute corresponding to this section was held to apply to forfeitures in civil as well as criminal cases. White's Adm'x v. Freeman, 79 Va. 597 (1884), citing Mosby v. St. Louis Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 629 (1879).

Substantive rights and vested rights protected from retroactive application of statutes. - "Substantive" rights, as well as "vested" rights, are included within those interests protected from retroactive application of statutes. City of Norfolk v. Kohler, 234 Va. 341 , 362 S.E.2d 894 (1987); Brushy Ridge Coal Co. v. Blevins, 6 Va. App. 73, 367 S.E.2d 204 (1988).

After obtaining a judgment relieving appellant of quarterly reregistration requirements under former § 19.2-298.4 for sex offenders, appellant was not entitled to enjoin the reposting of his information on a sex offender internet registry after the 2006 amendment to § 9.1-909 as appellant did not have an accrued right under § 1-239 affected by the statute's retroactive application as the removal remedy under § 9.1-909 was self-executing and could be altered "at will" by the legislature. Morency v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 569 , 649 S.E.2d 682, 2007 Va. LEXIS 114 (2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1717, 170 L. Ed. 2d 524, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2757 (2008).

When § 1-219.1 prevented a housing and redevelopment authority from acquiring unblighted property within a blighted redevelopment area by eminent domain, the statute did not impair the authority's rights to the property in violation of § 1-239 because the authority held no rights to the property when § 1-219.1 terminated the authority's ability to acquire the unblighted property by eminent domain, so the statute affected no "claim arising" before the statute took effect. PKO Ventures, LLC v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 286 Va. 174 , 747 S.E.2d 826, 2013 Va. LEXIS 100 (2013).

Prospective construction approved by section. - The general principle that statutes should be given a prospective rather than a retrospective construction has been given statutory approval by this section. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 169 Va. 77 , 192 S.E. 774 (1937).

New laws generally presumed prospective in operation. - New laws, except as to matters of remedy which may be applied retrospectively, are usually presumed to be prospective and not retrospective in their operation. Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 651 , 203 S.E.2d 123 (1974).

Consistent with § 64.1-62, requiring that wills be construed as if the testator died immediately before death, unless the will showed a contrary intent, inter vivos trusts were to be construed according to the law in effect at the time the trust was executed, absent language showing a contrary intent, as such a rule recognized that the interests of trust beneficiaries accrued when the trust was executed and protected those interests, and such a rule was compelled by § 1-16 [a former version of this section], mandating that no new law should be construed in any way whatever to affect any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law took effect. McGehee v. Edwards, 268 Va. 15 , 597 S.E.2d 99 (2004).

Retroactive application of law did not breach plea agreement. - As § 9.1-902 's reclassification of carnal knowledge of a minor as a "sexually violent offense," which retroactively subjected a convicted sex offender to heightened registration requirements, was an exercise of the state's regulatory police power, the Commonwealth's retroactive enforcement of those requirements did not breach its plea agreement with the offender or violate Va. Const. art. I, § 11 and § 1-239 . Smith v. Commonwealth, 286 Va. 52 , 743 S.E.2d 146, 2013 Va. LEXIS 76 (2013).

What procedural provisions control. - The procedural provisions of the statute in effect on the date of trial control the conduct of trial insofar as practicable. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455 , 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S. Ct. 2419, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1074 (1979).

The procedural provisions of the statute in effect on the date of trial control the conduct of trial insofar as practicable. Riley v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 330, 464 S.E.2d 508 (1995).

Sentencing discretion with trial court. - Where statute changed the status of the offense charged from a felony to a misdemeanor after entry of the defendants' guilty plea but prior to his sentencing and the Commonwealth agreed to pursue misdemeanor sentencing, it was discretionary with the trial court, and not with the Commonwealth, whether misdemeanor or felony punishment should be imposed. Awkard v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 40, 461 S.E.2d 419 (1995).

Instances of prospective operation. - A deposition of a party, to be read in a pending cause at law, commenced before the passage of the statute which required that parties should testify, ore tenus, but which was not completed until that law went into effect, is inadmissible as evidence. Crawford v. Halsted & Putnam, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 211 (1871).

A statute which amended the former law as to payment of decedents' debts by inserting in the third class "debts of trustee for persons under disabilities," was only prospective in its operation and did not authorize the placing of a debt as trustee in the third class, though the estate was not distributed until the act went into operation. Price's Ex'r v. Harrison's Ex'r, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 114 (1878).

Where a provision of a curative act amending a former law with reference to the assessment of land for taxes, if construed retrospectively, would deprive a citizen of the opportunity to be heard as to the correctness and justice of an assessment made under the original act, which opportunity was afforded by the original act, such provision will, if possible, be construed prospectively only, and the remedy given under the original act as to acts done prior to the passage of the curative act will be preserved. Whitlock v. Hawkins, 105 Va. 242 , 53 S.E. 401 (1906).

Subdivision ordinance without "grandfather" clause. - Local government body could not, after amending subdivision ordinance without making any provision to "grandfather" pending applications, lawfully invoke unwritten "practice" of applying prior law to pending application and thereafter approve subdivision prohibited by the amendment. Parker v. County of Madison, 244 Va. 39 , 418 S.E.2d 855 (1992).

A local governing body's obligation to act in accordance with the new law, not the former, is not reduced by the mere filing of a subdivision application before the new law becomes effective, unless the new law expressly so provides. Parker v. County of Madison, 244 Va. 39 , 418 S.E.2d 855 (1992).

Repealing statute referring solely to matters of remedy and procedure. - This section prescribes a rule of construction of a new law repealing a former law where rights have accrued or arise under the former law. It has no application to a repealing statute referring solely to matters of remedy and procedure where the legislature expressly declares it shall have retroactive operation. Appellants are given no right in the strict sense to a particular mode of procedure unless they avail themselves of it while the statute is in force. Phipps v. Sutherland, 201 Va. 448 , 111 S.E.2d 422 (1959); Virginia & W. Va. Coal Co. v. Charles, 251 F. 83 (W.D. Va. 1917), aff'd, 254 F. 379 (4th Cir. 1918), appeal dismissed, 252 U.S. 569, 40 S. Ct. 345, 64 L. Ed. 720 (1920).

Statute repealing rule of evidence. - This section saves from the operation of a repealing statute substantive claims and rights, but has no application to a change by repeal of a mere rule of evidence; and it cannot bind a future legislature which expressed a contrary intention in a repealing statute. Virginia & W. Va. Coal Co. v. Charles, 254 F. 379 (4th Cir. 1918), appeal dismissed, 252 U.S. 569, 40 S. Ct. 345, 64 L. Ed. 720 (1920).

The intention of the legislature to repeal Act March 13, 1912, relating to the effect to be given as evidence to deeds recorded prior to 1865, as shown by Act March 14, 1914, cannot be overthrown by this section, prescribing a rule for the construction of statutes in case of repeals. Virginia & W. Va. Coal Co. v. Charles, 251 F. 83 (W.D. Va. 1917), aff'd, 254 F. 379 (4th Cir. 1918), appeal dismissed, 252 U.S. 569, 40 S. Ct. 345, 64 L. Ed. 720 (1920).

Since rules of evidence are procedural, rather than substantive rights or claims, they are not protected from the effect of a repealing statute. Wyatt v. Virginia Dep't of Social Servs., 11 Va. App. 225, 397 S.E.2d 412 (1990).

When there is no ambiguity in the repealing statute, this section, prescribing a rule of construction in the case of repeals, has no application. Virginia & W. Va. Coal Co. v. Charles, 251 F. 83 (W.D. Va. 1917), aff'd, 254 F. 379 (4th Cir. 1918), appeal dismissed, 252 U.S. 569, 40 S. Ct. 345, 64 L. Ed. 720 (1920).

Election to accept mitigation of punishment. - Although the punishment for murder of the first degree was mitigated by the 1914 amendment to former § 18.1-22, a prisoner who committed the offense prior to the amendment but was tried subsequent thereto was not obliged to accept the mitigation provided by the amendment. This section was to be read in connection with former § 18.1-22. Conaway v. Commonwealth, 118 Va. 792 , 88 S.E. 75 (1916).

Where a defendant commits an offense before a new, mitigatory statute goes into effect but comes to trial after the new statute goes into effect, the penalty in existence at the time of the offense should be applied unless the Commonwealth first elects to proceed under the new statute and obtains the consent of the defendant to do so. Ruplenas v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 972 , 275 S.E.2d 628 (1981).

Legislative reduction of penalty after prisoner sentenced. - The fact that the legislature reduces the penalty for a crime after a prisoner is sentenced, and he does not benefit from that mitigation of punishment, does not constitute an arbitrary classification or deny the prisoner equal protection of the law. Abdo v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 473 , 237 S.E.2d 900 (1977).

This section did not mandate that the trial court mitigate the defendant's punishment in accordance with a new law which became effective after final judgment of conviction, where the defendant's motion for reduction of sentence was filed after the effective date of the new law and prior to completion of appellate review. Abdo v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 473 , 237 S.E.2d 900 (1977).

The election of the Commonwealth to prosecute under a new law which mitigates punishment and the privilege of an accused to consent to be tried thereunder, must be exercised before judgment is pronounced. Abdo v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 473 , 237 S.E.2d 900 (1977).

Application of former § 1-13.42. - There was no retroactive application of § 1-13.42 [see now § 1-204 ], specifying the age of majority, where the statute was applied to plaintiffs, both of whom were under the age of 21 at the time their causes of action accrued prior to the enactment of the statute, causing the statute of limitations to run from the time plaintiffs reached 18 rather than from the age of 21 as at common law. Hurdle v. Prinz, 218 Va. 134 , 235 S.E.2d 354 (1977).

Retroactive application of § 18.2-23.1. - Since the effect of § 18.2-23.1 is to mitigate punishment by barring conviction for the underlying conspiracy if a defendant has been convicted of the completed substantive offense, the Commonwealth's consent was necessary for application of § 18.2-23.1 to a defendant's trial on offenses that occurred prior to the effective date thereof. Naito v. Commonwealth, No. 1421-86-4 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 22, 1988).

Retroactive application of former § 2.1-116 [see now § 2.2-2905 ]. - Of course, a state official who simply enforces a presumptively valid state statute will rarely lose his immunity from suit. However, two defendants in the instant case did not simply enforce a presumptively valid state statute. Rather, totally disregarding long-standing Virginia law prohibiting new legislation from being construed to eliminate pre-existing substantive rights, they attempted to apply the 1985 amendment to § 2.1-116 retroactively to do precisely this. Moreover, they did this in the face of several holdings of this court that the act established a property interest in continued public employment, and a holding of the Virginia Supreme Court that the right to continued public employment is substantive and cannot be retroactively eliminated. Garraghty v. Virginia, Dep't of Cors., 52 F.3d 1274 (4th Cir. 1995).

Retroactive application of § 65.2-602. - Because the statute created a new substantive right through the use of the 1991 amending language, the commission erred in applying retroactively amended § 65.2-602. B.E. & K. Constr. Co. v. Stanley, No. 1863-94-2 (Ct. of Appeals April 4, 1995).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to be sentenced under a version of § 18.2-308.4 which became effective after the crime was committed; the language of the statute did not clearly allow for retroactive application of the amendment. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 179, 604 S.E.2d 103, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 512 (2004).

Burden of proof in paternity action. - The statutory provisions establishing the burden of proof in a paternity proceeding as set forth in § 20-49.4 are procedural provisions. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining the defendant's paternity in accordance with the clear and convincing standard set forth in § 20-49.4, the standard in effect on the date of trial. Wyatt v. Virginia Dep't of Social Servs., 11 Va. App. 225, 397 S.E.2d 412 (1990).

Rights of employees in classified service could not be affected by new law excluding certain persons from such service. - Provisions in city charter conferring upon selected city employees a package of job guarantees that no employee in the classified service could be discharged except for cause and upon written charges, and after an opportunity to be heard, created a substantive right, and in the language of this section, a right accrued under the former law which could not be repealed or in any way whatever affected by the enactment of a new law providing that assistant heads of administrative departments except for the departments of fire and police shall not be included in classified service. City of Norfolk v. Kohler, 234 Va. 341 , 362 S.E.2d 894 (1987).

Applied in Bd. of Supervisors of James County v. Windmill Meadows, LLC, 287 Va. 170 , 752 S.E.2d 837, 2014 Va. LEXIS 7 (2014).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Applicability of amendments. - Pursuant to the second clause of former § 1-16 [see now § 1-239 ], the 2004 amendment to § 8.01-262(3) applied to a product liability personal injury case; venue in Norfolk was thus improper since neither the manufacturer nor the distributor had any facility there. Spruill v. Jugs, Inc., 66 Va. Cir. 75, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 348 (Norfolk Sept. 29, 2004) (decided under prior law).

Section 1-219.1 did not prohibit the housing authority from acquiring the owners' property because § 1-239 and case precedent made clear that 2007 Va. Acts, c. 926, cl. 3, allowed proceedings instituted by redevelopment and housing authorities before July 1, 2010, to continue until resolution. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Cent. Radio, Inc., 82 Va. Cir. 240, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 85 (Norfolk Feb. 17, 2011).

Although defendant's alleged offense took place before statutory amendment went into effect, and defendant was not arrested or charged until the indictment after the enactment of the amended statute, the amended version of the statute applied in defendant's case because the proceedings were governed by the procedural laws in effect at the time of the proceeding and the amendments to the statute were procedural and not substantive. Commonwealth v. Weatherholtz,, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 202 (Frederick County Oct. 2, 2020).

Rights of city employees not vested. - Plaintiffs, active or retired firefighters and police officers, had no vested right to retirement benefits provided under a 1972 city ordinance since their rights to benefits vested only after they performed all requirements completely; the city's enactment of an ordinance in 1996 which modified plaintiffs' employment benefits could not be set aside under former § 1-16 [now this section] since the city could reasonably modify such benefits as long as it had no punitive purpose. Avery v. City of Norfolk, 61 Va. Cir. 453, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 139 (Norfolk 2003) (decided under prior law).

Sex offender registry. - Defendants who had previously reported to the sex offender registry and were thereafter excused from the 90-day reporting requirement pursuant to § 9.1-909 and a court order did not have a substantial and vested right under § 1-239 to be permanently removed from the State Police registry on the Internet based on the police's removal of their names therefrom after the court order was issued, as the trial court's order did not require the State Police to remove their names from the registry; such removal was not a vested property right and accordingly, amendments to § 9.1-909 allowed the police to re-record defendants' names on the Internet registry, and defendants' declaratory relief request under § 8.01-184 to be permanently removed from the registry failed. Doe v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. Cir. 75, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 130 (Fairfax County 2007).

Condemnation proceedings. - Section 1-219.1 did not apply to a condemnation proceeding because, although the proceeding was not finalized before the July 1, 2010, effective date of the statute, the proceeding was instituted under the former law and before the new law took effect; to hold otherwise would have improperly discontinued a pending matter in violation of § 1-9 . Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Pryer,, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 84 (Norfolk May 16, 2011).

§ 1-240. Repeal not to revive former act.

When an act of the General Assembly that has repealed another act shall itself be repealed, the previous act shall not be revived without express words to that effect, unless the act repealing it be passed during the same session.

(Code 1919, § 7, § 1-17; 2005, c. 839.)

CASE NOTES

This section applies to statutes and not to the common law. For cases under prior law, see Booth v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 519 (1861); Insurance Co. v. Barley's Adm'r, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 363 (1863).

Omitted portions annulled. - When a statute is revised, or one act framed from another, and some parts are omitted, the omitted parts are not revived by construction, but are annulled. Combined Saw & Planer Co. v. Flournoy, 88 Va. 1029 , 14 S.E. 976 (1892) (decided under prior law).

§ 1-240.1. Rights of parents.

A parent has a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the upbringing, education, and care of the parent's child.

(2013, cc. 668, 678.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2013, cc. 668 and 678, cl. 2 provides: "That it is the expressed intent of the General Assembly that this act codify the opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia in L.F. v. Breit, issued on January 10, 2013, as it relates to parental rights."

CASE NOTES

Right to litigate paternity issue. - Trial court erred in dismissing a petition to determine parentage filed by the child's biological father, as subdivision A 3 of § 20-158 and subsection D of § 32.1-257 did bar an unmarried, biological father from establishing legal parentage of his child conceived through assisted conception, pursuant to a voluntary written agreement as authorized by subdivision B 2 of § 20-49.1. L.F. v. Breit, 285 Va. 163 , 736 S.E.2d 711, 2013 Va. LEXIS 4 (2013).

§ 1-241. Seal.

"Seal," when required to be affixed by any court or public office to any paper, includes an impression or print of such official seal made upon the paper. When the seal of any natural person is required, it shall be sufficient for the person to place a mark intended as a seal.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 23, § 1-13.25; 1975, c. 500; 2005, c. 839.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 16 M.J. Seals and Sealed Instruments, § 1.

§ 1-242. Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections.

"Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections," whenever the Committee is referred to as an appointing authority, means the Senate Committee designated under the Rules of the Senate to make Senate appointments to study committees and commissions.

(2004, c. 709, § 1-13.25:1; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-243. Severability.

The provisions of acts of the General Assembly or the application thereof to any person or circumstances that are held invalid shall not affect the validity of other acts, provisions, or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provisions or applications. The provisions of all acts, except for the title of the act, are severable unless (i) the act specifically provides that its provisions are not severable; or (ii) it is apparent that two or more acts or provisions must operate in accord with one another.

(1986, c. 239, § 1-17.1; 1987, c. 56; 2005, c. 839.)

Law review. - For 2003/2004 survey of criminal law and procedure, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 133 (2004).

Editor's note. - Acts 2015, c. 709, cl. 3 provides: "That the General Assembly has determined that all severability clauses removed from the Code of Virginia pursuant to this act are removed because the Code sections that they purport to make severable are already severable pursuant to § 1-243 of the Code of Virginia and shall continue to be severable after the passage of this act."

CASE NOTES

The test of severability in the commonwealth of Virginia is whether the legislature would be satisfied with what remains after the invalid part has been eliminated.(decided under prior law) Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d 941, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 538 (W.D. Va. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r, Va. DMV, 288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002); mot. granted, vacated, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103603 (W.D. Va. 2015).

Provision is not inextricably intertwined with the rest of the statute. - The fact that the prima facie evidence provision is not inextricably intertwined with the rest of the statute is illustrated by the fact that the cross burning statute, now codified at § 18.2-423, existed for 16 years, from 1952 to 1968, without the prima facie evidence provision.(decided under prior law) Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 464 , 593 S.E.2d 263, 2004 Va. LEXIS 41 (2004).

The General Assembly impermissibly delegated taxing power to the local area transportation authority through enactment of Acts 2007, c. 896, because it did not have the constitutional power to delegate taxing authority to an unelected political subdivision, pursuant to Va. Const., Art. I, § 6. However, the parts of the enactment that were unconstitutional could be severed from the rest of the enactment because the enactment's provisions did not have to operate with regard to each other and enactment did not state that its provisions could not be severed. Marshall v. N. Va. Transp. Auth., 275 Va. 419 , 657 S.E.2d 71, 2008 Va. LEXIS 25 (2008).

Ordinance held not severable. - Where ordinance's restrictions on commercial and noncommercial speech were inextricably intertwined, severability provision within the ordinance could not save any part, section, or clause of the ordinance as it applied to billboards where its restrictions on noncommercial speech were found unconstitutional. Adams Outdoor Adv. v. City of Newport News, 236 Va. 370 , 373 S.E.2d 917 (1988) (decided under prior law).

Severability of allegedly unconstitutional provision. - Even if a provision of subdivision A 6 of § 56-585.1 were found to violate the dormant Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, severance of the allegedly impermissible language, "utilizes Virginia coal," would save subdivision A 6 from invalidation. Appalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm'n, 277 Va. 509 , 675 S.E.2d 458, 2009 Va. LEXIS 61 (2009).

§ 1-244. Short title citations.

Whenever a subtitle, chapter, or article does not have a section or provision establishing or authorizing a short title citation for such subtitle, chapter or article, such subtitle, chapter or article may be cited by its caption. The caption is that word or group of words appearing directly below the numerical designation given the subtitle, chapter or article. Captions are intended as mere catchwords to indicate the contents of the subtitles, chapters, and articles and do not constitute part of the act of the General Assembly.

(1993, c. 308, § 1-13.9:1; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-245. State.

"State," when applied to a part of the United States, includes any of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the United States Virgin Islands.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 23, § 1-13.26; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 49; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-246. Stricken language or italics.

Stricken language for deletions and italics for additions or changes may be used in legislative drafts, printed bills, enrolled bills, and printed Acts of Assembly, in an attempt to call attention to amendments to existing acts of the General Assembly. The stricken language and italics shall not be construed as evidence of amendments to acts of the General Assembly.

(1950, p. 24, § 1-13.34; 1986, c. 155; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-247. Summaries of legislation.

Any legislative summary associated with a bill, joint resolution or resolution, including any summary appearing on the face of such legislation, shall not constitute a part of the legislation considered, agreed to, or enacted, and shall not be used to indicate or infer legislative intent.

(1997, c. 375, § 30-19.03:2; 2005, c. 839.)

Applied in Davis v. MKR Dev., LLC, 295 Va. 488 , 814 S.E.2d 179, 2018 Va. LEXIS 63 (2018).

§ 1-248. Supremacy of federal and state law.

The Constitution and laws of the United States and of the Commonwealth shall be supreme. Any ordinance, resolution, bylaw, rule, regulation, or order of any governing body or any corporation, board, or number of persons shall not be inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States or of the Commonwealth.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 22, § 1-13.17; 2005, c. 839.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 13B M.J. Municipal Corporations, §§ 60, 61.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

An ordinance may not conflict with state law. Board of Supvrs. v. Pumphrey, 221 Va. 205 , 269 S.E.2d 361 (1980).

It is, of course, fundamental that local ordinances must conform to and not be in conflict with the public policy of the state as embodied in its statutes. Blanton v. Amelia County, 261 Va. 55 , 540 S.E.2d 869, 2001 Va. LEXIS 16 (2001).

Municipal ordinances must be consistent with the general law and policy of the State. National Linen Serv. Corp. v. City of Norfolk, 196 Va. 277 , 83 S.E.2d 401 (1954). See Allen v. City of Norfolk, 196 Va. 177 , 83 S.E.2d 397 (1954).

The provision of the Norfolk City Code making possession of certain indicia of a lottery prima facie evidence of guilt was contrary to state policy and void because inconsistent with former § 18.1-340, in that it prescribed a different method of proof, imposing on accused a burden not contemplated by the legislature. Allen v. City of Norfolk, 196 Va. 177 , 83 S.E.2d 397 (1954). See Allen v. City of Norfolk, 195 Va. 844 , 80 S.E.2d 605, modified, 196 Va. 177 , 83 S.E.2d 397 (1954).

Under § 15.2-1429, no punishment for violation of an ordinance may exceed the penalties prescribed by general law for like offenses; Virginia Beach, Va., Code § 23-38, which punished destruction of property by fine of up to $2,500 and up to 12 months in jail, manifested a conflict with state law because the penalty that attached exceeded the penalty under the state code destruction of property statute, § 18.2-137, a violation of which was punishable only by a fine not exceeding $500, and defendants' convictions for violations of Virginia Beach, Va., Code § 23-38 were reversed. Strout v. City of Va. Beach, 43 Va. App. 99, 596 S.E.2d 529, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 240 (2004).

But may enlarge thereon. - The fact that an ordinance enlarges upon statutory provisions does not necessarily create an inconsistency therewith, since some state statutes are not sufficiently comprehensive to cover local exigencies. Allen v. City of Norfolk, 196 Va. 177 , 83 S.E.2d 397 (1954).

The mere fact that the State, in the exercise of the police power, has made certain regulations does not prohibit a municipality from exacting additional requirements, so long as there is no conflict. King v. County of Arlington, 195 Va. 1084 , 81 S.E.2d 587 (1954).

The fact that an ordinance enlarges upon the provisions of a statute by requiring more than the statute requires creates no conflict therewith, unless the statute limits the requirement for all cases to its own prescription. Blanton v. Amelia County, 261 Va. 55 , 540 S.E.2d 869, 2001 Va. LEXIS 16 (2001).

Where both an ordinance and a statute are prohibitory and the only difference between them is that the ordinance goes further in its prohibition, but not counter to the prohibition under the statute, and the municipality does not attempt to authorize by the ordinance what the legislature has forbidden or forbid what the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, or required, there is nothing contradictory between the provisions of the statute and the ordinance because of which they cannot coexist and be effective. Blanton v. Amelia County, 261 Va. 55 , 540 S.E.2d 869, 2001 Va. LEXIS 16 (2001).

And provide greater penalty than statute. - The fact that the penalty for the violation of an ordinance prohibiting the use of common towels is greater than that provided for in the statute on the subject does not invalidate the ordinance. National Linen Serv. Corp. v. City of Norfolk, 196 Va. 277 , 83 S.E.2d 401 (1954).

Ordinance held not invalid because it enlarged on the statute by prescribing a heavier penalty for the second offense. Allen v. City of Norfolk, 196 Va. 177 , 83 S.E.2d 397 (1954).

If both the statute and ordinance can stand together, courts are obliged to harmonize them, rather than nullifying the ordinance. Board of Supvrs. v. Pumphrey, 221 Va. 205 , 269 S.E.2d 361 (1980); Granny's Cottage, Inc. v. Town of Occoquan, 3 Va. App. 577, 352 S.E.2d 10 (1987).

There can be no conflict between a statute and an ordinance where there is no statute dealing with the same subject matter. Kisley v. City of Falls Church, 212 Va. 693 , 187 S.E.2d 168, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 907, 93 S. Ct. 237, 34 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1972).

An ordinance may forbid an act not prohibited by state law. - A local legislative body, in the exercise of its police powers, may forbid the doing of an act where state legislation is silent on the subject. Kisley v. City of Falls Church, 212 Va. 693 , 187 S.E.2d 168, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 907, 93 S. Ct. 237, 34 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1972).

An ordinance may prohibit an act upon which state law is silent or proscribe conduct already proscribed by state law where the ordinance is not inconsistent with state law. Board of Supvrs. v. Pumphrey, 221 Va. 205 , 269 S.E.2d 361 (1980); Granny's Cottage, Inc. v. Town of Occoquan, 3 Va. App. 577, 352 S.E.2d 10 (1987).

Powers of condominium owners limited. - While the Condominium Act, § 55-79.39 et seq., is designed to and does permit the exercise of wide powers by an association of unit owners, these powers are limited by general law and the Act itself. Unit Owners Ass'n of Buildamerica-1 v. Gillman, 223 Va. 752 , 292 S.E.2d 378 (1982).

Public nudity ordinances. - State laws do not prevent a local governing body, under its police power, from enacting public nudity ordinances not inconsistent with the state law prohibiting conduct which the local governing body reasonably deems to be contrary to the morals, health, safety and general welfare of the community. Wayside Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 215 Va. 231 , 208 S.E.2d 51 (1974).

County ordinance prohibiting the keeping of a dog addicted to attacking human beings was held valid and not in conflict with the state law which prohibits the keeping of a dog addicted to attacking livestock and poultry. King v. County of Arlington, 195 Va. 1084 , 81 S.E.2d 587 (1954).

Statute governing use of biosolids. - The general assembly, by its enactment former § 32.1-164.5 [see now § 62.1-44.19:3 et seq.], has expressly authorized the land application of biosolids conditioned upon the issuance of a permit and a county's ordinances were inconsistent with that section and invalid because the ordinances forbid certain plaintiffs from using biosolids on their farmland even though those plaintiffs had obtained licenses to use biosolids pursuant to the statutory and regulatory scheme established by the general assembly. Blanton v. Amelia County, 261 Va. 55 , 540 S.E.2d 869, 2001 Va. LEXIS 16 (2001).

An ordinance punishing forgery of city cigarette tax stamp was a nullity. This was not a case where a specific statute takes precedence over a general statute relating to the same offense, but a case where a general state statute (former § 18.1-96) controlled as against a later city ordinance in conflict with it. Hanbury v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 182 , 122 S.E.2d 911 (1961).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Public expenditure of funds. - Trial court found that the taxpayers had standing to bring their claims against the town and county, as the taxpayers claimed that the town and county were violating state, federal, and local laws by creating and operating with public funds a site for temporary day workers involving some people who entered and were in the United States illegally. Karunakarum v. Town of Herndon, 70 Va. Cir. 208, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 33 (Fairfax County 2006).

State health commissioner's issuance of certificate did not deprive county of ability to make land use decisions. - That the Virginia State Heath Commissioner issued a hospital owner a certificate of public need to build an acute care hospital did not prevent a county board of supervisors from denying the owner's application to build it in a specific location. Pursuant to former § 1-13.17, the board could exercise its authority to make land use decisions without undermining the Commissioner's authority to evaluate health needs and to authorize the construction of health care facilities where needed. N. Va. Cmty. Hosp., L.L.C. v. Loudoun County Bd. of Supervisors, 70 Va. Cir. 283, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 168 (Loudoun County March 9, 2006).

Tattooing ban. - City ordinance's total ban on tattooing violated § 1-248 , as it conflicted with Virginia's policy of restricting but not banning tattooing, as expressed in §§ 15.2-912 and 18.2-371.3. Thus, the city's demurrer to petitioner's claim that the ordinance was inconsistent with state law was denied. Blue Horseshoe Tattoo, V, Ltd. v. City of Norfolk, 72 Va. Cir. 388, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 151 (Norfolk 2007).

City code not preempted by statute. - Chesapeake, Va., City Code § 62-88(7)(b) was not preempted by subsection C because, when read in context, subsection C was, in essence, a savings provision and did not preempt the city from regulating a power company's electric power plant on the basis that it was permitted; the General Assembly has not expressly preempted the field of waste management. Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. City of Chesapeake, 95 Va. Cir. 106, 2017 Va. Cir. LEXIS 7 (Chesapeake Jan. 27, 2017).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Virginia locality may not enact an ordinance that preempts or nullifies state or federal law; further, a locality may not enact an ordinance that diminishes, alters, or eliminates legal rights, particularly where the state or federal government may be said to 'occupy the field,' unless given specific authority to do so by the General Assembly or the Congress of the United States. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Riley E. Ingram, Member, House of Delegates 08-072 (11/14/08).

A local governing body may adopt a zoning ordinance that places restrictions on the location and siting of oil and gas wells that are reasonable in scope and consistent with the Virginia Gas and Oil Act and the Commonwealth Energy Policy. See opinion of Attorney General The Honorable Terry G. Kilgore, Member, House of Delegates, 12-102, 2013 Va. AG LEXIS 4 (1/11/13) (To the extent the opinion can be read to say that localities cannot prohibit fracking through zoning ordinances, it is overruled by 2015 Va. AG LEXIS 12 (5/5/15)).

Local resolutions to opt out of gun safety laws have no legal effect. - Localities and local constitutional officers cannot nullify state laws and must comply with gun violence prevention measures that the General Assembly may enact. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Jerrauld C. Jones, Member, Virginia House of Delegates, 19-059, 2019 Va. AG LEXIS 38 (12/20/19).

Fracking. - The General Assembly intended to permit localities to prohibit fracking operations through duly enacted land use or zoning ordinances, and the Code of Virginia so provides. Localities may enact zoning restrictions on fracking only if and to the extent that the restrictions are reasonable in scope and are not inconsistent with the Virginia Gas and Oil Act or regulations properly enacted pursuant to the Act. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Richard H. Stuart, Member, Senate of Virginia, No. 14-084, 2015 Va. AG LEXIS 12 (5/5/15).

§ 1-249. Supreme Court.

"Supreme Court" means the Supreme Court of Virginia.

(1975, c. 36, § 1-13.27:2; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-250. Swear; sworn.

"Swear" or "sworn" means "affirm" or "affirmed."

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 23, § 1-13.28; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-251. Systems of state highways.

"Systems of state highways" means all systems of highways within the Commonwealth over which the Commonwealth Transportation Board exercises jurisdiction and control. In context, such words shall apply to the extent, but only to the extent, that the Commonwealth Transportation Board exercises such jurisdiction and control.

(1970, c. 136, § 1-13.40; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-252. Tier-city.

"Tier-city" means an incorporated community within a consolidated county that (i) has within defined boundaries a population of 5,000 or more, (ii) has been designated as a tier-city by the General Assembly, and (iii) has both the powers of a town and such additional powers as may be granted tier-cities by the General Assembly. All references in this Code and the acts of the General Assembly to towns shall be deemed references to tier-cities, except to the extent tier-cities may be specifically excluded or where the context requires otherwise.

(1984, c. 695, §§ 1-13.28:1, 1-13.28:2; 1989, c. 493; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-253. Time zone.

The United States Eastern Standard Time shall be in effect in all parts of the Commonwealth except during the period when the United States Eastern Daylight Time shall be in effect as provided by federal law. This section shall not be construed to be in contravention of federal law, or duly authorized orders of the United States Secretary of Transportation with respect to the time zones of the United States and the application of standard time to interstate commerce and other matters within such zones.

In all laws, statutes, orders, decrees, rules and regulations relating to the time of performance of any act by any officer or agency of the Commonwealth, or any political subdivision thereof, or relating to the time in which any rights shall accrue or determine, or within which any act shall or shall not be performed by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, and in all public schools, institutions of the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions, and contracts or choses in action made or to be performed in the Commonwealth, it shall be understood and intended that the time applicable thereto or referred to or implied therein shall be the United States Eastern Standard Time, or the United States Eastern Daylight Time, when and during such is in effect.

(1946, p. 103; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 5b; 1952, c. 637, § 1-15; 1962, c. 617; 1964, c. 646; 1966, c. 581; 1988, c. 177; 2005, c. 839.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 18 M.J. Time, § 2.

§ 1-254. Town.

"Town" means any existing town or an incorporated community within one or more counties which became a town before noon, July 1, 1971, as provided by law or which has within defined boundaries a population of 1,000 or more and which has become a town as provided by law.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 24, § 1-13.29; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 49; 1995, c. 155; 2005, c. 839.)

Cross references. - For definition of "town" under article relating to local government, see Va. Const., Art. VII, § 1.

Law review. - For note, "Securing a Valid Annexation in Virginia," see 10 U. Rich. L. Rev. 557 (1976).

§ 1-255. United States.

"United States" includes the 50 states, the District of Columbia the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands and the United States Virgin Islands.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 24, § 1-13.31; 2005, c. 839.)

CASE NOTES

Applies to all statutes. - The definition of "United States" herein applies to all statutes. Alphonse Custodis Chimney Constr. Co. v. Molina, 183 Va. 512 , 32 S.E.2d 726 (1945) (decided under prior law).

Puerto Rico was one of the "territories" referred to as a part of the "United States" and its citizens and residents were citizens and residents of the United States within former § 65-62. Alphonse Custodis Chimney Constr. Co. v. Molina, 183 Va. 512 , 32 S.E.2d 726 (1945) (decided under prior law).

"So-called" means "commonly named." For case construing "the several territories so-called" under former law, see Alphonse Custodis Chimney Constr. Co. v. Molina, 183 Va. 512 , 32 S.E.2d 726 (1945) (decided under prior law).

§ 1-256. Weights and measurements; metric equivalents.

Words or terms relating to the customary system of weights and measurements include their International System (SI) metric equivalents, but shall not require the posting or publishing of the equivalents along with the customary system of weights and measurements.

(1980, c. 465. § 1-15.2; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-257. Written; writing; in writing.

"Written," "writing," and "in writing" include any representation of words, letters, symbols, numbers, or figures, whether (i) printed or inscribed on a tangible medium or (ii) stored in an electronic or other medium and retrievable in a perceivable form and whether an electronic signature authorized by Chapter 42.1 (§ 59.1-479 et seq.) of Title 59.1 is or is not affixed.

(Code 1919, § 5; Code 1950, § 1-13; 1950, p. 24, § 1-13.32; 1999, c. 145; 2000, c. 995; 2005, c. 839.)

CASE NOTES

Videotape evidence. - Trial court did not err by admitting the testimony of a police officer regarding what he observed on a surveillance video on the ground that the testimony violated the best evidence rule because the best evidence rule applied only to writings. Since a videotape was not a writing as understood in common law and as defined by § 1-257 , the best evidence rule was inapplicable to the videotape evidence in question. Brown v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 107, 676 S.E.2d 326, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 226 (2009).

Text messages. - Text messages were "writings," because they consisted of letters, words, or numbers. Cobb v. Commonwealth, No. 1526-12-1, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 301 (Oct. 22, 2013).

Chapter 3.1. Boundaries of the Commonwealth.

Sec.

§ 1-300. Boundaries.

The territory and boundaries of the Commonwealth shall be and remain the same as they were after the Constitution of Virginia was adopted on June 29, 1776, except for the territory that constitutes West Virginia and its boundaries, and other boundary adjustments as provided in this chapter.

(Code 1950, § 7-1 ; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-1 ; 2005, c. 839.)

Effective date. - This chapter became effective October 1, 2005.

CASE NOTES

The Code asserts jurisdiction over the Virginia shores and strands of the Potomac, in accordance with the claim in the Virginia Constitution; and it is admitted that these terms include the lands between high and low water mark. Washington Airport, Inc. v. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp., 44 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1930), rev'd, 283 U.S. 348, 51 S. Ct. 474, 75 L. Ed. 1109 (1931) (decided under prior law). The majority opinion in the reversing case, which actually dealt with the boundary line between Virginia and the District of Columbia, declared that the original boundary of Maryland was the high-water mark on the southern bank of the Potomac, and that the compact of 1785 between Maryland and Virginia and the case of Maryland v. West Virginia , 217 U.S. 577, 30 S. Ct. 630, 54 L. Ed. 888 (1910), settling a controversy between those states, could not affect the rights of the District of Columbia. The decision was in effect a holding that the boundary between Virginia and the District of Columbia was the high-water mark on the southern bank of the Potomac. But see dissenting opinion. And see provisions of § 1-312 establishing present boundary between Virginia and the District.

§ 1-301. Extent of territory of the Commonwealth after the Constitution of 1776.

The authorities in determining the extent of the territory of the Commonwealth after the adoption of the Constitution of 1776 shall consist of:

  1. The charter of April 10, 1606, granted by James the First, in the fourth year of his reign, that authorized the first plantation at any place upon the coast of the Commonwealth between the thirty-fourth and forty-first degrees of north latitude; and granted the territory from the seat of the plantation (which under this charter was begun at Jamestown), for 50 miles along the coast towards the west and southwest, as the coast lay, and for 50 miles along the coast, towards the east and northeast, or towards the north, as the coast lay, together with all the islands within 100 miles directly over against the seacoast, and all the territory from the same 50 miles every way on the seacoast, directly into the mainland for the space of 100 miles.
  2. The second charter of James, dated May 23, 1609, in the seventh year of his reign, that granted all the territory from the point of land called Cape or Point Comfort, all along the seacoast to the northward 200 miles, and from the point of Cape Comfort all along the seacoast to the southward 200 miles, and all that space and circuit of land lying from the seacoast of the precinct, up into the land, throughout from sea to sea, west and northwest, and also all the islands lying within 100 miles along the coast of both seas of the precinct aforesaid.
  3. The third charter of James, dated March 12, 1611-12, in the ninth year of his reign, that granted all the islands in any part of the seas within 300 leagues of any territory granted in the former patents.
  4. The 1763 treaty of peace between Great Britain and France that established a line along the middle of the river Mississippi and became the Commonwealth's western boundary.
  5. Section 21 of the Constitution of Virginia adopted June 29, 1776, that ceded, released, and confirmed to the people of Maryland, Pennsylvania, North and South Carolina, such parts of the territory of the Commonwealth as were contained within the charters erecting those colonies, with all the rights in those parts that might have been claimed by the Commonwealth, except the free navigation of the Rivers Potomac and Pocomoke, with the property of the Commonwealth shore or strands bordering on either of the rivers, and all improvements thereon; and that at the same time laid down in the section that the western and northern extent of the Commonwealth should in all other respects stand as fixed by the charter of James the First, granted in 1609, and by the treaty of peace between Great Britain and France in 1763, unless by act of the legislature one or more territories should thereafter be laid off, and governments established, westward of the Alleghany mountains. (Code 1950, § 7-1 ; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-1 ; 2005, c. 839.)

CASE NOTES

The Code asserts jurisdiction over the Virginia shores and strands of the Potomac, in accordance with the claim in the Virginia Constitution; and it is admitted that these terms include the lands between high and low water mark. Washington Airport, Inc. v. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp., 44 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1930), rev'd, 283 U.S. 348, 51 S. Ct. 474, 75 L. Ed. 1109 (1931) (decided under prior law). The majority opinion in the reversing case, which actually dealt with the boundary line between Virginia and the District of Columbia, declared that the original boundary of Maryland was the high-water mark on the southern bank of the Potomac, and that the compact of 1785 between Maryland and Virginia and the case of Maryland v. West Virginia , 217 U.S. 577, 30 S. Ct. 630, 54 L. Ed. 888 (1910), settling a controversy between those states, could not affect the rights of the District of Columbia. The decision was in effect a holding that the boundary between Virginia and the District of Columbia was the high-water mark on the southern bank of the Potomac. But see dissenting opinion. And see provisions of § 1-312 establishing present boundary between Virginia and the District.

§ 1-302. Jurisdiction and ownership of Commonwealth over offshore waters and submerged lands.

  1. The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth shall extend to and over, and be exercisable with respect to:
    1. Waters offshore from the coasts of the Commonwealth for a distance of three geographical miles as determined by appropriate metes and bounds surveys approved by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science and the Virginia Marine Resources Commission in consultation with the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management pursuant to a decree of the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Maine, 423 U.S. 1 (1975), and the Submerged Lands Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.
    2. All submerged lands, including the subsurface thereof, lying under the waters listed in subdivision 1.
  2. The ownership of the waters and submerged lands enumerated or described in subsection A shall be in the Commonwealth unless it shall be, with respect to any given parcel or area, in any other person or entity by virtue of a valid and effective instrument of conveyance or by operation of law.
  3. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to limit or restrict in any way:
    1. The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth over any person or with respect to any subject within or without the Commonwealth which jurisdiction is exercisable by reason of citizenship, residence, or for any other reason recognized by law.
    2. The jurisdiction or ownership of or over any other waters or submerged lands, within or forming part of the boundaries of the Commonwealth. Nor shall anything in this section be construed to impair the exercise of legislative jurisdiction by the United States over any area to which such jurisdiction has been validly ceded by the Commonwealth and that remains in the ownership of the United States.
  4. Nothing in this section shall alter the geographic area to which any act of the General Assembly applies if the act specifies the area precisely in miles or by some other numerical designation of distance or position. However, nothing in the act or in this section shall be construed as a waiver or relinquishment of jurisdiction or ownership by the Commonwealth over or in any area to which such jurisdiction or ownership extends by virtue of this section or any other provision or rule of law.

    (Code 1950, § 7-1.1; 1960, c. 518; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-2; 1972, c. 689; 2005, c. 839; 2016, c. 371.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2016, c. 371, cl. 2 provides: "That the Secretary of Natural Resources shall execute the metes and bounds surveys described in subsection A of § 1-302 of the Code of Virginia and request the filing of appropriate motions by the Attorney General in the Supreme Court of the United States to fix the three-mile boundary, which shall thereafter constitute the seaward boundary of the Commonwealth and the extent of its territorial sea."

The 2016 amendments. - The 2016 amendment by c. 371, in subsection A, inserted the subdivision 1 designation and substituted "for a distance of three geographical miles as determined by appropriate metes and bounds surveys approved by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science and the Virginia Marine Resources Commission in consultation with the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management pursuant to a decree of the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Maine, 423 U.S. 1 (1975), and the Submerged Lands Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq." for "as follows: 1. The marginal sea and the high seas to the extent claimed in the Virginia Constitution of 1776 and not thereafter ceded by action of the General Assembly"; and made minor stylistic changes.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Authority of localities to regulate state-owned submerged lands. - Virginia localities do not have the authority to extend the application of their land use ordinances to state-owned submerged lands, therefore, for small renewable energy projects located on or in the waters above state-owned bottomland, there are no "applicable land use ordinances" for purposes of the certification requirement of subdivision B 2 of § 10.1-1197.6 . See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. David K. Paylor, Director, Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, 10-091, 2010 Va. AG LEXIS 88 (12/30/10).

§ 1-303. Cession of territory northwest of Ohio River.

  1. The territory northwest of the Ohio River ceded by the Commonwealth shall be and remain the same as provided by:
    1. An act of the General Assembly passed on January 2, 1781, that resolved that this Commonwealth would on certain conditions yield for the benefit of the United States all her right to the territory northwest of the Ohio River.
    2. An act of the General Assembly passed on December 20, 1783, that authorized the transfer to the United States, subject to the terms and conditions contained in the act of the United States Congress passed on September 13, 1783 and the deed of cession that was made accordingly.
    3. An act of the General Assembly passed on December 30, 1788, whereby, after referring to an ordinance for the government of the territory, passed by the United States Congress on July 13, 1787, and reciting a particular article declared in the ordinance to be part of the compact between the original states and the people and states in the territory, the article of compact was ratified and confirmed.
  2. Such cession shall be deemed and taken according to the true intent and meaning of the acts and deed, and subject to all the terms and conditions therein expressed.

    (Code 1950, § 7-2; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-3; 2005, c. 839.)

Editor's note. - For historical purposes, the text of the original acts have been set out in the Compacts volume.

§ 1-304. Boundary with North Carolina.

The boundary line between the Commonwealth and North Carolina shall be and remain the same as the line run by Fry and Jefferson, and afterwards extended by Walker and Smith and approved on December 7, 1791, by an act of the General Assembly.

(Code 1950, § 7-3; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-4; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-305. Boundary with North Carolina eastward from low-water mark of Atlantic Ocean.

The boundary line between the Commonwealth and North Carolina eastward from the low-water mark of the Atlantic Ocean shall be and remains the line beginning at the intersection with the low-water mark of the Atlantic Ocean and the existing North Carolina-Virginia boundary line; thence due east to the seaward jurisdictional limit of Virginia; such boundary line to be extended on the true 90 degree bearing as far as a need for further delimitation may arise.

(1970, c. 343, § 7.1-4.1; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-306. Boundary with Tennessee.

The boundary line between the Commonwealth and Tennessee shall be and remain the same as established by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Tennessee v. Virginia, 190 U.S. 64 (1903), and the compact between the Commonwealth and Tennessee approved on February 9, 1901, by an act of the General Assembly.

(Code 1950, § 7-4; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-5; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-307. Compact and boundary with Kentucky.

  1. Except such part as may constitute the boundary line between West Virginia and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the boundary between this Commonwealth and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, shall be and remain as the line approved on January 13, 1800, by an act of the General Assembly.
  2. The articles set forth in the act of separation of the Commonwealth of Kentucky from this Commonwealth adopted by the General Assembly on December 18, 1789, shall be and remain a solemn compact mutually binding on the Commonwealths of Virginia and Kentucky, and unalterable by either without the consent of the other.

    (Code 1950, § 7-5; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-6; 2005, c. 839.)

Editor's note. - The text of the original acts have been set out in the Compacts volume for historical purposes.

§ 1-308. Boundary with Maryland.

The Black-Jenkins Award, which established the boundary line between the Commonwealth and Maryland and was ratified on March 14, 1878, by an act of the General Assembly shall be and remain obligatory on this Commonwealth and the citizens thereof, and shall be forever observed and kept by the Commonwealth and all of its citizens according to the true intent and meaning of the same, and to that end the faith of the Commonwealth stands pledged.

(Code 1950, § 7-6; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-7; 2005, c. 839.)

Editor's note. - The text of the original act has been set out in the Compacts volume for historical purposes.

Editor's note. - The cases annotated below were decided under the original acts or prior law, and set out below for reference.

For cases construing the Maryland-Virginia Compact of 1785, see Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 934 (1882); Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 14 S. Ct. 783, 38 L. Ed. 669 (1894); Evans v. United States, 31 App. D.C. 544 (1908). For text of the 1785 Compact, see the Appendix at the end of the Compacts volume.

CASE NOTES

The Maryland-Virginia Compact of 1785, and the description of boundary lines and rights in the Potomac river contained therein, does not apply to the District of Columbia; when Maryland and Virginia ceded land to the District, they relinquished any joint interest in, and control over, that part of the river located within the District. Consequently, a Virginia resident, fishing from the Virginia shore, was subject to the laws of the District of Columbia when fishing with a dip net in that part of the Potomac river controlled by the District of Columbia. Evans v. United States, 31 App. D.C. 544 (1908).

Maryland has a uniform southern boundary along Virginia and West Virginia at low-water mark on the south bank of the Potomac River to the intersection of the north and south line between Maryland and West Virginia. Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U.S. 577, 30 S. Ct. 630, 54 L. Ed. 888 (1910). But see Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Washington Airport, Inc., 283 U.S. 348, 51 S. Ct. 474, 75 L. Ed. 1109 (1931).

Article 4 of the Award precluded regulation by Maryland of Virginia's sovereign riparian rights. - Portion of a binding arbitration award set out at § 7.1-7 [now § 1-308 ], Fourth, clearly established Virginia's dominion over the soil to the low-water mark on the Virginia shore of the Potomac River by prescription, and clearly established Virginia's sovereign riparian right to use the river beyond the low water mark without regulation by Maryland. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 124 S. Ct. 598, 157 L. Ed. 2d 461, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 9192 (2003).

Rights granted under Article 7 of the Compact are not subject to regulation by Maryland. - Plain language of § 7.1-7 [now § 1-308 ], Seventh, grants to the citizens of Maryland and Virginia full property rights in the shores of the Potomac River and the privilege of building improvements from the shore and, especially since the scope of Maryland's sovereignty over the river was vigorously disputed both before and after ratification of the interstate compact, there was no grant or recognition of sovereign authority to permit Maryland to regulate the exercise of this privilege by Virginia citizens. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 124 S. Ct. 598, 157 L. Ed. 2d 461, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 9192 (2003).

Article 8 of the compact gives Virginia concurrent jurisdiction with Maryland, over the Potomac River from shore to shore, and over that part of the Pocomoke River which is within the limits of Virginia, to enact such laws, with the consent and approval of Maryland, as may be deemed necessary and proper for the preservation of fish in said waters. Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 934 (1882), criticized. Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 14 S. Ct. 783, 38 L. Ed. 669 (1894).

Article 10 of the compact refers only to offenses against the citizen or individual. When the offense is against the state, and not against an individual or citizen, there is no declaration as to the court of which state shall take cognizance of it. Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 934 (1882). And see Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 14 S. Ct. 783, 38 L. Ed. 669 (1894), holding that such article of the compact does not forbid the State of Virginia from trying and convicting citizens of Maryland for offenses committed in Virginia against its laws regulating oyster fisheries.

Mutual rights of fishery. - The provisions of articles 7 and 8 of the compact, which give mutual rights of fishery to the citizens of the two states, refer only to the Potomac River, and do not operate to give such rights in the Pocomoke river and sound. Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 14 S. Ct. 783, 38 L. Ed. 669 (1894), criticizing Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 934 (1882).

Determination of location of murder victim's body. - The exact physical location of a murder victim's body within river constituted a factual question which the jury could appropriately decide. However, the exact location of the boundary between Virginia and Maryland involves an interpretation of this section and represents a legal question outside the jury's province. If it were impossible for the jurors to interpret the evidence concerning the body's exact placement so as to conclude under this section that the body lay in Virginia, the trial court should not have submitted the issue of venue to the jury. Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 366 S.E.2d 719 (1988).

Where body of murder victim was found six to seven and one-half feet from Virginia shoreline, and the only evidence introduced concerning the low water mark showed that, on the day the body was found, the river level was at the actual low water mark, unless a line could be drawn between two headlands in order to form a new low water mark, the body's placement would have been six to seven and one-half feet beyond the Virginia border. Since victim's body lay six to seven and one-half feet from the Commonwealth of Virginia, venue did not lie in Loudoun County and the appellant's conviction would be reversed. Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 366 S.E.2d 719 (1988).

§ 1-309. Boundary with Maryland eastward from Assateague Island.

The boundary line between the Commonwealth and Maryland eastward from Assateague Island shall be and remain as follows: Beginning at a point on the Maryland-Virginia line located on Assateague Island designated as station "Pope Island Life Saving Station (1907)" defined by latitude 38 ø 01'36.93" and longitude 75 ø 14'47.105"; thence running N 84 ø 05'43.5" E (true) - 1,100.00 feet to station "Atlantic"; thence due east (true) to the Maryland-Virginia jurisdictional limit.

(1970, c. 342, § 7.1-7.1; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-310. Boundary with Maryland in upper reaches of Pocomoke sound and lower reaches of Pocomoke River.

  1. The boundary line between the Commonwealth and Maryland in the previously undescribed portion of the Maryland-Virginia line in the upper reaches of the Pocomoke sound and lower reaches of the Pocomoke River shall be and remain as follows:

    Beginning at a point which is corner D defined by latitude 37 ø 56'28.00" and longitude 75 ø 45'43.56"; which is the last point on the Maryland-Virginia line that was defined by the "joint report of engineers on relocating and remarking Maryland-Virginia boundary line across Tangier and Pocomoke sounds December 1916"; thence running N 73 ø 34'31.9" E about 17,125.11 feet to corner H a point defined by latitude 37 ø 57'115.82" and longitude 75 ø 42'18.48"; thence running N 85 ø 39'33.9" E about 3,785.82 feet to corner J a point defined by latitude 37 ø 57'18.65" and longitude 75 ø 41'31.25"; thence running S 74 ø 16'00.8" E about 7,278.41 feet to corner K a point defined by latitude 37 ø 56'59.13" and longitude 75 ø 40'03.89"; thence running S 61 ø 57'55.7" E about 3,664.73 feet to corner L a point defined by latitude 37 ø 56'42.10" and longitude 75 ø 39'23.51"; thence running N 76 ø 15'24.5" E about 2,263.49 feet to corner M a point defined by latitude 37 ø 56'47.65" and longitude 75 ø 38'54.85"; thence running N 00 ø 49'51.5" W about 7,178.56 feet to corner N a point defined by latitude 37 ø 57'58.61" and longitude 75 ø 38'56.15"; thence northeasterly about 3 1/2 miles following the middle thread of the meandering Pocomoke river to corner P a point defined by latitude 37 ø 59'39.37" and longitude 75 ø 37'26.52", which is at or near the point of intersection with the Scarborough and Calvert boundary line of May 28, 1668; corners N and P are connected by a line running N 35 ø 08'33.5" E about 12,465.32 feet; thence N 83 ø 45'59.9" E about 24,156.95 feet to the boundary monument near triangulation station Davis on the Scarborough and Calvert boundary line of May 28, 1668. Geographic positions are based on 1927 datum.

  2. No vested right of any individual, partnership or corporation within the area affected by this section shall in any wise be impaired, restricted or affected thereby. This section shall not be retrospective in its operation nor shall it in any way affect the rights of any individual, partnership or corporation in any suit now pending in any of the courts of this Commonwealth or of the United States wherein such cause of action arose over, or is in any way based upon, the area affected. This section shall in no wise preclude the Commonwealth from prosecuting any individual, partnership or corporation for violation of any of the criminal laws of this Commonwealth within such area until this section shall become effective.

    (1970, c. 315, § 7.1-7.2; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-311. Recession of portion of District of Columbia.

That portion of the District of Columbia which, by an act of the General Assembly, passed December 3, 1789, was ceded to the United States and receded and forever relinquished to this Commonwealth by an act of Congress approved July 9, 1846, and accepted by the Commonwealth by an act of the General Assembly adopted on February 3, 1846, shall be and remain reannexed to this Commonwealth and constitutes a portion thereof, subject to such reservation and provisions respecting the public property of the United States, as the United States Congress has enacted in its act of recession.

(Code 1950, § 7-8; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-9; 2005, c. 839.)

Editor's note. - The text of the original act has been set out in the Compacts volume for historical purposes.

CASE NOTES

Act making cession of territory. - See Suckley v. Rotchford, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 60 (1855) (decided under prior law).

§ 1-312. Boundary with District of Columbia.

The boundary line between the Commonwealth and the District of Columbia shall be and remain as described by the United States Public Law 208, Seventy-Ninth Congress, approved October 31, 1945, and amended by Chapter 772 of the 1968 Acts of Assembly and Chapter 94 of the 2002 Acts of Assembly.

(Code 1950, § 7-9; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-10; 1968, c. 772; 2002, c. 94; 2005, c. 839.)

CASE NOTES

Virginia has ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the territory embraced within the Washington National Airport, reserving, however, the power to levy a tax on the sale of oil and gasoline sold on the airport for use in vehicles. This reservation does not include the power to levy taxes for the privilege of doing business on the airport. Hence one whose business is the sale of oil and gasoline there is not properly assessed under Arlington County's business privilege tax ordinance or the state's merchants' license tax, since they are not taxes on the sale of the products. Floyd v. Fischer, 199 Va. 363 , 99 S.E.2d 612 (1957) (decided under prior law).

Under the grant from Virginia to the United States in § 107 of the act of Congress set out in this section, the Commonwealth is presumed to have specifically reserved all taxing rights which it intended to reserve, and the Virginia retail merchants' license tax and the county's business privilege license tax, not having been reserved, are necessarily excluded. Floyd v. Fischer, 199 Va. 363 , 99 S.E.2d 612 (1957) (decided under prior law).

Grant of exclusive jurisdiction over Washington National Airport to the federal government does not exclude all state jurisdiction relating to the federal area. Bartsch v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 357 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1966) (decided under prior law).

Virginia law governs employment relationships. - At Washington National Airport, Virginia law governs employment relationships between private employers and their employees. Singleton v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. 141, Local Lodge No. 1747, 240 Va. 403 , 397 S.E.2d 856 (1990) (decided under prior law).

§ 1-313. Boundary line between Loudoun County, Virginia, and Jefferson County, West Virginia.

  1. The boundary line between Loudoun County, Virginia, and Jefferson County, West Virginia shall be the watershed line of the top of the ridge of the Blue Ridge Mountains as established by the survey approved by the Commission on April 29, 1997, and recorded in the land books in the courthouses of Loudoun County, Virginia, and Jefferson County, West Virginia.
  2. No vested right of any individual, partnership, or corporation within the territory affected by this act shall in any wise be impaired, restricted, or affected by this act. This act shall not be retrospective in its operation nor shall it in any way affect the rights of any individual, partnership, or corporation in any suit now pending in any of the courts of this Commonwealth or of the United States wherein the cause of action arose over, or is in any way based upon, the territory affected.

    (1993, c. 141, § 7.1-10.1; 1998, c. 123; 2005, c. 839.)

Chapter 4. Jurisdiction Over Lands Acquired by the United States.

Sec.

§ 1-400. Conditional consent given to acquisition of lands by United States; concurrent jurisdiction ceded.

  1. On and after July 1, 1981, the conditional consent of the Commonwealth is hereby given in accordance with clause 17, § 8, Article 1 of the United States Constitution to the acquisition by the United States, or under its authority, by purchase, lease, condemnation, or otherwise, of any lands in the Commonwealth, whether under water or not, required for customhouses, post offices, arsenals, forts, magazines, dockyards, military reserves, or for needful public buildings.
  2. The acquisition by condemnation of any property within the Commonwealth, not expressly consented to in subsection A of this section, shall require the prior approval of the General Assembly.
  3. Over all lands hereafter acquired by the United States, the Commonwealth hereby cedes to the United States concurrent governmental, judicial, executive and legislative power and jurisdiction.
  4. There is hereby expressly reserved in the Commonwealth, over all lands so acquired by the United States the following:
    1. Tax on motor vehicle fuels and lubricants. - The Commonwealth shall have the jurisdiction and power to levy a tax on oil, gasoline and all other motor fuels and lubricants thereon owned by others than the United States and a tax on the sale thereof, on such lands, except sales to the United States for use in the exercise of essentially governmental functions.
    2. Service of civil and criminal process. - The Commonwealth shall have the jurisdiction and power to serve criminal and civil process on such lands.
    3. Sale of intoxicating liquors. - The Commonwealth shall have the jurisdiction and power to license and regulate, or to prohibit, the sale of intoxicating liquors on any such lands.
    4. Tax on property and businesses. - The Commonwealth shall have the jurisdiction and power to tax all property, including buildings erected thereon, not belonging to the United States, and to require licenses and impose license taxes upon any business or businesses conducted thereon.
  5. For all purposes of taxation and of the jurisdiction of the courts of the Commonwealth over persons, transactions, matters and property on such lands, the lands shall be deemed to be a part of the county or city in which they are situated.
  6. Any such acquisition by or conveyance or lease to the United States, as provided in this section, shall be deemed to have been secured or made upon the express condition that the reservations of power and limitations provided in this section are recognized as valid by the United States and, in the event the United States shall deny the validity of the reservations, as to all or any part of such lands, then and in that event, the title and possession of all or any such part of such lands, conveyed to the United States by the Commonwealth, shall immediately revert to the Commonwealth.
  7. Nothing contained in this section shall affect any special act adopted ceding jurisdiction to the United States, nor any deeds executed pursuant to § 1-401 . (1976, c. 211, § 7.1-18.1; 1981, c. 533; 2005, c. 839.)

Effective date. - This chapter became effective October 1, 2005.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 9; 19 M.J. United States, § 5.

Editor's note. - The cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

The question whether a federal area within a state is subject to exclusive jurisdiction of the United States is complicated and often difficult to decide. A determination depends upon many factors, jurisdiction being subject to the terms, conditions, restrictions, limitations and provisions of the acquisition by the United States, including the consent of the State and acceptance by the United States. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. SCC, 204 Va. 421 , 132 S.E.2d 407 (1963).

The presumption prevails that the State has jurisdiction over land which is owned by United States unless a defendant shows that the United States was deeded the land and accepted jurisdiction over it. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455 , 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S. Ct. 2419, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1074 (1979).

Jurisdiction may be transferred to the general government by cession. The terms of cession, to the extent that they may lawfully be prescribed, determine the extent of the federal jurisdiction. United States v. Schuster, 220 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Va. 1963).

The argument that a state is powerless to surrender its jurisdiction to the United States over privately owned lands is without merit. United States v. Schuster, 220 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Va. 1963).

The reservation in an act of cession of concurrent jurisdiction with the United States over land, so that the courts and officers of the State may take such cognizance, execute such process and discharge such legal functions within the same as may not be incompatible with the consent given, is subject to the provisions of Article 1, § 8 of the federal Constitution, that is, as may not be incompatible with the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, and may operate to authorize the service by the officers of the State of the civil and criminal process of its courts, with reference to acts done within the acknowledged territory of the State outside of the ceded lands. This reservation is valid and is intended to prevent such places from becoming harbors of refuge for debtors and criminals. Foley v. Shriver, 81 Va. 568 (1886).

Retention of right to serve process does not prevent cession of jurisdiction. - The mere fact that the State has retained the right to serve criminal and civil process on land described in this section is not effective to prevent cession of exclusive or concurrent criminal jurisdiction to the federal government. The purpose of this reservation is to prevent the land involved from becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice. United States v. Schuster, 220 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Va. 1963).

And practice is to permit federal government to prosecute. - The practice which exists in this area with respect to crimes committed on lands "acquired" in any manner by the United States is to permit - indeed, to require - the federal government to prosecute. The State adopts a "hands off" policy. United States v. Schuster, 220 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Va. 1963).

Reservation of right to execute process. - See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274, 29 S. Ct. 613, 53 L. Ed. 994 (1909) (Norfolk Navy Yard); Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line R.R. v. Parker, 152 Va. 484 , 147 S.E. 461 (1929).

Does not affect personal status of resident. - The right of the State to serve process in territory ceded to the United States does not affect the personal status of a resident in such territory. Such person does not thereby acquire a residence in this State so as to defeat the right of a creditor to attach his property in this State on the ground that he is a nonresident. Bank of Phoebus v. Byrum, 110 Va. 708 , 67 S.E. 349 (1910).

State ceded concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed on lands transferred to the federal government. - Virginia consented to cede only "concurrent jurisdiction" to the United States to prosecute crimes committed on lands transferred to the federal government; the presumption in favor of concurrent jurisdiction was rebuttable, but only by a clear manifestation of a specific intent to do so. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 180, 571 S.E.2d 906, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 681 (2002).

State has ceded concurrent jurisdiction of crimes committed on private property leased for naval base. - Virginia has ceded concurrent jurisdiction to the federal government for crimes committed on private property leased by the United States for purposes of the operation of a naval base. United States v. Schuster, 220 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Va. 1963).

Virginia laws in force at Old Point Comfort. - The general laws of Virginia, other than criminal, which are not in conflict with those of the United States relating to forts, and which do not interfere with the military control, discipline, and use by the United States of Fortress Monroe as a military post, are in force at Old Point Comfort, and are especially in force in those parts and places at Old Point Comfort which have been appropriated to other than the military purposes of the United States. Crook, Horner & Co. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel Co., 54 F. 604 (E.D. Va. 1893).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Jurisdiction over military base. - In the absence of a notice of acceptance filed with the Governor whereby the United States has accepted concurrent jurisdiction over the land on which certain facilities are located, the United States does not hold concurrent legislative jurisdiction over the land on which the facilities are located. See opinion of Attorney General to Cynthia E. Hudson, Esquire, City Attorney for the City of Hampton and John F. Haugh, Esquire, Acting Commonwealth's Attorney, 12-053, 2013 Va. AG LEXIS 7 (1/17/13).

§ 1-401. Ceding additional jurisdiction to United States.

  1. Whenever the head or other authorized officer of any department or independent establishment or agency of the United States shall deem it desirable that additional jurisdiction or powers be ceded over any lands in the Commonwealth acquired or proposed to be acquired by the United States under his immediate jurisdiction, custody or control, and whenever the Governor and Attorney General of the Commonwealth shall agree to the same, the Governor and Attorney General shall execute and acknowledge a deed in the name of and under the lesser seal of the Commonwealth ceding such additional jurisdiction. The deed shall accurately and specifically describe the area and location of the land over which the additional jurisdiction and powers are ceded and shall set out specifically what additional jurisdiction and powers are ceded, and may set out any reservations in the Commonwealth of jurisdiction which may be deemed proper in addition to those referred to in subsection D.
  2. No such deed shall become effective or operative until the jurisdiction therein provided for is accepted on behalf of the United States as required by 40 U.S.C. § 255. The head or other authorized officer of a department or independent establishment or agency of the United States shall indicate such acceptance by executing and acknowledging such deed and admitting it to record in the office of the clerk of the court in which deeds conveying the lands affected would properly be recorded.
  3. When such deed has been executed and acknowledged on behalf of the Commonwealth and the United States, and admitted to record as provided in subsection B, it shall have the effect of ceding to and vesting in the United States the jurisdiction and powers therein provided for and none other.
  4. Every such deed as is provided for in this section shall reserve in the Commonwealth over all lands therein referred to the jurisdiction and power to serve civil and criminal process on such lands and in the event that the lands or any part thereof shall be sold or leased to any person, under the terms of which sale or lease the vendee or lessee shall have the right to conduct thereon any private industry or business, then the jurisdiction ceded to the United States over any such lands so sold or leased shall cease and determine, and thereafter the Commonwealth shall have all jurisdiction and power she would have had if no jurisdiction or power had been ceded to the United States. This provision, however, shall not apply to post exchanges, officers' clubs and similar activities on lands acquired by the United States for purposes of national defense. It is further provided that the reservations provided for in this subsection shall remain effective even though they should be omitted from any deed executed pursuant to this section.
  5. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as repealing any special acts ceding jurisdiction to the United States to acquire any specific tract of land.

    (Code 1950, § 7-24; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-21; 1972, c. 597; 1976, c. 211; 2005, c. 839.)

CASE NOTES

The presumption prevails that the State has jurisdiction over land which is owned by United States unless a defendant shows that the United States was deeded the land and accepted jurisdiction over it. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455 , 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S. Ct. 2419, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1074 (1979) (decided under prior law).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Jurisdiction over naval base. - Although the United States government exercises exclusive jurisdiction over a naval base, such jurisdiction does not prohibit a locality from assessing a business professional and occupation license tax on activities carried out by a private company on that land. See opinion of Attorney General to Ronald S. Hallman, Esquire, City Attorney for the City of Chesapeake, 11-029, 2012 Va. AG LEXIS 9 (2/24/12).

Jurisdiction over military base. - In the absence of a notice of acceptance filed with the Governor whereby the United States has accepted concurrent jurisdiction over the land on which certain facilities are located, the United States does not hold concurrent legislative jurisdiction over the land on which the facilities are located. See opinion of Attorney General to Cynthia E. Hudson, Esquire, City Attorney for the City of Hampton and John F. Haugh, Esquire, Acting Commonwealth's Attorney, 12-053, 2013 Va. AG LEXIS 7 (1/17/13).

§ 1-402. Shenandoah National Park.

The respective jurisdiction and powers of the Commonwealth and the United States over all lands within the Shenandoah National Park, as it is now constituted or may hereafter be extended, shall be as follows:

  1. Criminal and police jurisdiction. - The United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction, legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to the commission of crimes, and the arrest, trial and punishment therefor, and exclusive general police jurisdiction thereover.
  2. Sale of alcoholic beverages. - The United States shall have the power to regulate or prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages on such lands; provided, that, if the sale of alcoholic beverages is prohibited by general law in the Commonwealth outside of such lands, no such alcoholic beverages shall be sold on the lands contained in the Park area; and provided further, that if the general laws of the Commonwealth permit the sale of alcoholic beverages, then the regulations of the United States relating to such sales on such lands shall conform as nearly as possible to the regulatory provisions in accordance with which such sales are permitted in the Commonwealth outside of such Park lands. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as reserving in the Commonwealth power to require licenses of persons engaged in the sale of intoxicating beverages on such lands, nor the power to require that any sales be made through official liquor stores.
  3. Service of civil and criminal process. - The Commonwealth shall have jurisdiction to serve civil process within the limits of the Park in any suits properly instituted in any of the courts of the Commonwealth and to serve criminal process within such limits in any suits or prosecutions for or on account of crimes committed in the Commonwealth but outside of the Park.
  4. Tax on alcoholic beverages. - The Commonwealth shall have jurisdiction and power to levy a nondiscriminatory tax on all alcoholic beverages possessed or sold on such lands.
  5. Tax on motor vehicle fuels and lubricants. - The Commonwealth shall have jurisdiction and power to tax the sales of oil and gasoline, and other motor vehicle fuels and lubricants for use in motor vehicles. This subsection shall not be construed as a consent by the United States to the taxation by the Commonwealth of such sales for the exclusive use of the United States.
  6. Tax on businesses. - The Commonwealth shall have jurisdiction and power to levy nondiscriminatory taxes on private individuals, associations and corporations, their franchises and properties, on such lands, and on their businesses conducted thereon.
  7. Jurisdiction of courts. - The courts of the Commonwealth shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of the United States of all civil causes of action arising on such lands to the same extent as if the cause of action had arisen in the county or city in which the land lies outside the Park area, and the state officers shall have jurisdiction to enforce on such lands the judgments of the state courts and the collection of taxes by appropriate process.
  8. Voting residence. - Persons residing in or on any of the lands embraced in the Park shall have the right to establish a voting residence in the Commonwealth by reason thereof, and the consequent right to vote at all elections within the county or city in which the land or lands upon which they reside are located upon like terms and conditions, and to the same extent as they would be entitled to vote in such county or city if the lands on which they reside had not been deeded or conveyed to the United States.
  9. Fugitives. - All fugitives from justice taking refuge in the Park shall be subject to the same laws as refugees from justice found in the Commonwealth.

    (Code 1950, § 7-22; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-19; 2005, c. 839.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 14A M.J. Parks, Public Squares and Playgrounds, § 2.

CASE NOTES

Section merely preserves traditional jurisdiction of State. - Having no power to confer jurisdiction on federal courts, Virginia, in enacting this section, intended only to preserve its traditional jurisdiction, and Congress, in adopting the very language of subdivision (g) of this section in a subsequent statute, intended no more. Fowler v. Dodson, 159 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (decided under prior law).

Jurisdiction of action arising from automobile collision in Park. - Absent diversity of citizenship, a federal district court had no jurisdiction of an action arising from an automobile collision occurring in Shenandoah National Park. Fowler v. Dodson, 159 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (decided under prior law).

Jurisdiction to serve process within the limits of the Park was not reserved by the Commonwealth in Chapter 371 of the Acts of 1928, under which lands in the Park were conveyed to the United States; and the jurisdiction was denied in Buttery v. Robbins, 177 Va. 368 , 14 S.E.2d 544 (1941) (decided under prior law) But such jurisdiction is now reserved by subdivision 3 of this section.

§ 1-403. Conveyances of certain waste and unappropriated lands and marshlands to the United States.

  1. The Governor is authorized to execute in the name of the Commonwealth deeds conveying, subject to the jurisdictional and other limitations and reservations contained in §§ 1-400 and 1-405 , to the United States such title as the Commonwealth may have in waste and unappropriated lands entirely surrounded by lands owned by the United States, when the same are certified as being vacant and unappropriated by a duly authorized agent of the United States and are described by metes and bounds descriptions filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth and with the clerk of the court in the county wherein such unappropriated land is situated.
  2. The Governor is authorized to execute, in the name and on behalf of the Commonwealth, a deed or other appropriate instrument conveying to the United States, without any consideration but subject to the jurisdictional limitations and reservations contained in §§ 1-400 and 1-405 , such right, title and interest in or easement over and across the marshes lying along the seaside of the Counties of Accomack and Northampton as may be necessary and proper for the construction, operation and maintenance of a canal or channel for small boats over and through such marshlands. (Code 1950, § 7-23; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-20; 1976, c. 211; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-404. Licensing sale of mixed alcoholic beverages on lands ceded to or owned by United States.

The Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Authority may license the sale of mixed alcoholic beverages as defined in Chapter 1 (§ 4.1-100 et seq.) of Title 4.1 at places primarily engaged in the sale of meals on lands ceded by the Commonwealth to the United States or owned by the government of the United States or any agency thereof provided that such lands are used as ports of entry or egress to and from the United States, and provided that such lands lie within or partly within the boundaries of any county in this Commonwealth which permits the lawful dispensing of mixed alcoholic beverages. The Board of Directors of the Authority may adopt rules and regulations governing the sale of such spirits, and to fix the fees for such licenses, within the limits fixed by general law.

(1968, c. 511, § 7.1-21.1; 1993, c. 866; 2005, c. 839; 2015, cc. 38, 730.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2015, cc. 38 and 730, cl. 4, as amended by Acts 2017, cc. 698 and 707, cl. 2, provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on January 15, 2018, except that the provisions of the (i) thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth enactments of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2015; (ii) third enactment of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2018; and (iii) eleventh enactment of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2019."

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendments by cc. 38 and 730, effective January 15, 2018, substituted "Authority" for "Board" in the first sentence and "of Directors of the Authority may" for "is hereby authorized to" in the last sentence.

§ 1-405. Reversion to Commonwealth; recorded title prerequisite to vesting jurisdiction.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context requires otherwise:

    "Corrective action" means the response and remediation to environmental contamination to the extent required by any applicable environmental law or regulation applicable to the property.

    "Environmental contamination" means any hazardous waste, substance or toxic material, or its discharge or release, that is regulated under any environmental law or regulation applicable to the property, and shall include petroleum (including crude oil), natural gas, liquefied natural gas, ordnance, unexploded munitions, and asbestos.

  2. If the United States shall cease to be the owner of any lands, or any part thereof, granted or conveyed to it by the Commonwealth; if the purposes of any such grant or conveyance to the United States shall cease; or if the United States shall for five consecutive years fail to use any such land for the purposes of the grant or conveyance, then, and in that event, the right and title to such land, or such part thereof, shall immediately revert to the Commonwealth unless such land, or part thereof, contains environmental contamination. No land containing environmental contamination shall be transferred or revert to the Commonwealth, unless and until all corrective action necessary to protect human health and the environment with respect to any environmental contamination on the lands, or portion thereof, has been completed to the satisfaction of the Commonwealth and approved by the Governor pursuant to § 2.2-1149 , and the United States has executed and delivered a transfer instrument including covenants warranting that (i) all corrective action necessary to protect human health and the environment with respect to any environmental contamination on the land or any portion thereof has been taken, and (ii) any corrective action for environmental contamination occurring before the date of transfer found to be necessary after the date of the transfer of the title of the land or any portion thereof shall be conducted by the United States. In cases where the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC Commission) established pursuant to P.L. 101-510 (1990), as amended, identifies United States military bases located in the Commonwealth for closure, the Commonwealth shall have, in addition to the foregoing, the right to enter upon such lands so identified for the purpose of inspection for environmental contamination. Upon completion of such inspection, the Commonwealth shall report its findings to the Governor and the appropriate federal agencies.
  3. All deeds, conveyances or title papers for the transfer of title of lands to the United States shall be recorded in the county or city wherein the land or the greater part thereof lies, but no tax shall be required on any such instrument made to the United States by which they acquire lands for public purposes.
  4. The jurisdiction ceded by § 1-400 shall not vest until the United States shall have acquired the title of record to such lands, or rights or interest therein, by purchase, condemnation, lease or otherwise. So long as the lands, or any rights or interest therein, are held in fee simple by the United States, and no longer, such lands, rights or interest, as the case may be, shall continue exempt and exonerated, from all state and local taxes which may be levied or imposed under the authority of the Commonwealth. (Code 1950, § 7-25; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-22; 1975, c. 449; 1976, c. 211; 1994, c. 23; 2005, c. 839.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2007, c. 490, provides: " § 1. Notwithstanding the limitation on the transfer or reversion of lands to the Commonwealth contained in subsection B of § 1-405 of the Code of Virginia, lands located within the Northern Virginia Planning District that contain environmental contamination may revert or transfer to the Commonwealth if the United States enters into a written agreement with the Commonwealth pursuant to § 2.2-1149 to indemnify the Commonwealth against all costs and liabilities associated with such environmental contamination and related corrective action or otherwise provides satisfactory assurances that all corrective action necessary to protect human health and the environment will be taken at the sole expense of the United States. The written agreement shall be in a form approved by the Attorney General of Virginia.

" § 2. In addition to the requirements set forth in § 1, such transfer or reversion shall not occur unless and until the United States has agreed, and provides assurances satisfactory to the Commonwealth, to provide all transportation infrastructure improvements required to accommodate the development of any property owned by the United States and contiguous or adjacent to the property subject to the transfer or reversion.

" § 3. Except as provided in § 1, the provisions of § 1-405 of the Code of Virginia shall apply mutatis mutandis to this act.

" § 4. As used in this act, 'corrective action' and 'environmental contamination' shall mean the same as those terms are defined in § 1-405 of the Code of Virginia."

§ 1-406. Conveyances to political subdivisions of lands ceded to and no longer used by United States.

Whenever any land in the Commonwealth has been or is conveyed to the United States with a provision in the deed that upon abandonment or use for any purpose other than that stated in the deed such land shall revert to the Commonwealth, and if any such land is abandoned or is no longer used for the purpose for which conveyed, the Governor is hereby authorized to convey to the political subdivision in which such land is situated, all right, title and interest of the Commonwealth in and to such land. This section shall not affect any lease made under Chapter 321 of the Acts of 1952.

(Code 1950, § 7-25.1; 1954, c. 170; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-23; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-407. Concurrent jurisdiction of Commonwealth and United States over certain lands leased to political subdivisions.

Whenever the United States government has exclusive jurisdiction over property located in the Commonwealth of Virginia, and leases the property, or part thereof, to any political subdivision to be used by it for a public purpose, the exclusive jurisdiction shall cease as to the property so leased and the Commonwealth and the United States government shall have concurrent jurisdiction over the property so long as the lease continues. At the termination of the lease the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth shall cease and the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction thereof.

(Code 1950, § 7-25.2; 1964, c. 362; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-24; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-408. Relinquishment by United States of jurisdiction over lands in the Commonwealth.

Whenever a duly authorized official or agent of the United States, acting pursuant to authority conferred by the United States Congress, notifies the Governor that the United States desires or is willing to relinquish to the Commonwealth the jurisdiction, or a portion thereof, held by the United States over lands located in the Commonwealth, as designated in such notice, the Governor may, in his discretion, accept such relinquishment. Such acceptance shall be made by sending a notice of acceptance to the official or agent designated by the United States to receive such notice of acceptance. The Governor shall send a signed copy of the notice of acceptance, together with the notice of relinquishment received from the United States, to the Secretary of the Commonwealth, who shall maintain a permanent file of said notices.

Upon the sending of the notice of acceptance to the designated official or agent of the United States, the Commonwealth shall immediately have such jurisdiction over the lands designated in the notice of relinquishment as the notice shall specify.

Upon receipt of a copy of the notice of relinquishment and a copy of the notice of acceptance, the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall immediately give written notice of such change in jurisdiction to the Attorney General and the attorney for the Commonwealth of the city or county in which such lands are located. The Secretary of the Commonwealth shall also certify a copy of each of the notices to the clerk of court in which deeds are admitted to record for the city or county in which such lands are located. The clerk shall record the notices in his deed book and index them in the name of the United States and the Commonwealth.

(1975, c. 411, § 7.1-25.1; 2005, c. 839.)

Chapter 5. Emblems.

Symbols of Sovereignty.

Emblems, Designations, and Honors.

Article 1. Symbols of Sovereignty.

§ 1-500. The great seal.

The great seal of the Commonwealth shall consist of two metallic discs, two and one-fourth inches in diameter, with an ornamental border one fourth of an inch wide, with such words and figures engraved as follows: On the obverse, Virtus, the genius of the Commonwealth, dressed as an Amazon, resting on a spear in her right hand, point downward, touching the earth; and holding in her left hand, a sheathed sword, or parazonium, pointing upward; her head erect and face upturned; her left foot on the form of Tyranny represented by the prostrate body of a man, with his head to her left, his fallen crown nearby, a broken chain in his left hand, and a scourge in his right. Above the group and within the border conforming therewith, shall be the word "Virginia," and, in the space below, on a curved line, shall be the motto, "Sic Semper Tyrannis." On the reverse, shall be placed a group consisting of Libertas, holding a wand and pileus in her right hand; on her right, Aeternitas, with a globe and phoenix in her right hand; on the left of Libertas, Ceres, with a cornucopia in her left hand, and an ear of wheat in her right; over this device, in a curved line, the word "Perseverando."

(Code 1950, § 7-26; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-26; 2005, c. 839.)

Effective date. - This chapter became effective October 1, 2005.

§ 1-501. The lesser seal.

The lesser seal of the Commonwealth shall be one and nine sixteenths inches in diameter, and be engraved with the device and inscriptions contained in the obverse of the great seal.

(Code 1950, § 7-27; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-27; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-502. Custody; impressions displayed in The Library of Virginia.

The seals of the Commonwealth described in §§ 1-500 and 1-501 shall be kept by the Secretary of the Commonwealth and used as provided by law, and at least three clear impressions of the seals shall be kept and displayed by the Librarian of Virginia in some suitable place in The Library of Virginia, for public inspection.

(Code 1950, § 7-28; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-28; 1994, c. 64; 1998, c. 427; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-503. Uses and tax on great seal.

The great seal shall be affixed to documents, signed by the Governor, which are to be used before tribunals, or for purposes outside of the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth; and in every such case, except where the Commonwealth is a party concerned in the use to be made of the document, the tax imposed by § 58.1-1725 on the seal of the Commonwealth shall be collected and accounted for by the Secretary of the Commonwealth.

(Code 1950, § 7-30; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-30; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-504. Uses and tax on lesser seal.

The lesser seal shall be affixed to all grants for lands and writs of election issued by the Governor; to all letters of pardon and reprieve; to all commissions, civil and military, signed by the Governor, and to all other papers, requiring a seal, authorized to be issued by the Governor for the purpose of carrying the laws into effect within the Commonwealth; and also, when deemed necessary by the Secretary of the Commonwealth, may be used by him as an authentication of his official signature. No tax shall be imposed on the use of such lesser seal, except upon commissions appointing notaries, and commissioners in other states for taking acknowledgments, and upon certificates of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, when, at the request of the parties desiring such certificates, the seal is attached. In all such cases the tax shall be the same as upon the great seal, and shall be collected and accounted for in the same manner.

(Code 1950, § 7-31; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-31; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-505. Seals deemed property of Commonwealth; unauthorized use; penalty.

The seals of the Commonwealth shall be deemed the property of the Commonwealth; and no persons shall exhibit, display, or in any manner utilize the seals or any facsimile or representation of the seals of the Commonwealth for nongovernmental purposes unless such use is specifically authorized by law.

Except for the authorized commercial use of the seal as provided in § 2.2-122 , any person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $100, or by imprisonment for not more than 30 days or both.

(1966, c. 102, § 7.1-31.1; 1995, c. 295; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-506. Flag of the Commonwealth.

The flag of the Commonwealth shall be a deep blue field, with a circular white centre of the same material. Upon this circle shall be painted or embroidered, to show on both sides alike, the coat of arms of the Commonwealth, as described in § 1-500 for the obverse of the great seal of the Commonwealth; and there may be a white fringe on the outer edge, furthest from the flagstaff. This shall be known and respected as the flag of the Commonwealth.

(Code 1950, § 7-32; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-32; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-507. Governor to prescribe size of flag.

The Governor shall regulate the size and dimensions of the flag proper for forts, arsenals and public buildings, for ships-of-war and merchant marine, for troops in the field, respectively, and for any other purpose, according to his discretion by proclamation.

(Code 1950, § 7-33; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-33; 2005, c. 839.)

§ 1-508. Director of General Services to have available flags of the Commonwealth for sale.

The Director of the Department of General Services shall have available at all times flags of the Commonwealth, to be offered for sale to the public in such manner as the Director may determine.

Such flags shall be of good quality, shall conform to the specifications prescribed in § 1-506 , shall be offered in the various sizes prescribed by the Governor pursuant to § 1-507 , and shall be purchased in compliance with the provisions of § 2.2-4323.1 .

The prices to be charged for such flags shall be at cost as determined by the Director.

(Code 1950, § 7-33.1; 1958, c. 553; 1960, c. 347; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-34; 2005, c. 839; 2016, cc. 289, 297.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2016, cc. 289 and 297, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2017."

The 2016 amendments. - The 2016 amendments by cc. 289 and 297 are identical, effective July 1, 2017, and inserted "and shall be purchased in compliance with the provisions of § 2.2-4323.1 " and made a related change in the second paragraph.

§ 1-509. When flag to be suspended over Capitol.

During the sessions of either house of the General Assembly the flag of the Commonwealth shall be kept raised over the respective chambers of the Capitol, or other place of session, if practicable, as directed by the Director of the Department of General Services and the Chief of the Virginia Capitol Police in consultation with the Clerk of the House of Delegates and the Clerk of the Senate.

(Code 1950, § 7-34; 1966, c. 102, § 7.1-35; 1970, c. 561; 2005, c. 839.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 8B M.J. Flags and Emblems, § 1; 1A M.J. Administrative Law, § 10.

Article 2. Emblems, Designations, and Honors.

§ 1-510. Official emblems and designations.

The following are hereby designated official emblems and designations of the Commonwealth:

Artisan Center - "Virginia Artisans Center," located in the City of Waynesboro.

Bat - Virginia Big-eared bat (Corynorhinos townsendii virginianus).

Beverage - Milk.

Bird - Northern Cardinal (Cardinalis cardinalis).

Blue Ridge Folklore State Center - Blue Ridge Institute located in the village of Ferrum.

Boat - "Chesapeake Bay Deadrise."

Cabin Capital of Virginia - Page County.

Coal Miners' Memorial - The Richlands Coal Miners' Memorial located in Tazewell County.

Covered Bridge Capital of the Commonwealth - Patrick County.

Covered Bridge Festival - Virginia Covered Bridge Festival held in Patrick County.

Dog - American Foxhound.

Fish (Freshwater) - Brook Trout.

Fish (Saltwater) - Striped Bass.

Flag of Remembrance of September 11, 2001 - Freedom Flag, designed by a Virginian, as the flag of remembrance of September 11, 2001.

Fleet - Replicas of the three ships, Susan Constant, Godspeed, and Discovery, which comprised the Commonwealth's founding fleet that brought the first permanent English settlers to Jamestown in 1607, and which are exhibited at the Jamestown Settlement in Williamsburg.

Flower - American Dogwood (Cornus florida).

Folk dance - Square dancing, the American folk dance that traces its ancestry to the English Country Dance and the French Ballroom Dance, and is called, cued, or prompted to the dancers, and includes squares, rounds, clogging, contra, line, the Virginia Reel, and heritage dances.

Fossil - Chesapecten jeffersonius.

Gold mining interpretive center - Monroe Park, located in the County of Fauquier.

Insect - Tiger Swallowtail Butterfly (Papilio glaucus Linne).

Maple Festival - The Highland County Maple Festival.

Motor sports museum - "Wood Brothers Racing Museum and Virginia Motor Sports Hall of Fame," located in Patrick County.

Opry - The Virginia Opry.

Outdoor drama - "The Trail of the Lonesome Pine Outdoor Drama," adapted for the stage by Clara Lou Kelly and performed in the Town of Big Stone Gap.

Outdoor drama, historical - "The Long Way Home" based on the life of Mary Draper Ingles, adapted for the stage by Earl Hobson Smith, and performed in the City of Radford.

Rock - Nelsonite.

Salamander - Red Salamander (Pseudotriton ruber).

Shakespeare festival - The Virginia Shakespeare Festival held in the City of Williamsburg.

Shell - Oyster shell (Crassostrea virginica).

Snake - Eastern Garter Snake (Thamnophis sirtalis sirtalis).

Song emeritus - "Carry Me Back to Old Virginny," by James A. Bland, as set out in the House Joint Resolution 10, adopted by the General Assembly of Virginia at the Session of 1940.

Song (Popular) - "Sweet Virginia Breeze," by Robbin Thompson and Steve Bassett.

Song (Traditional) - "Our Great Virginia," lyrics by Mike Greenly and arranged by Jim Papoulis with music from the original American folk song "Oh Shenandoah."

Spirit - George Washington's rye whiskey produced at Mount Vernon, Virginia.

Sports hall of fame - "Virginia Sports Hall of Fame," located in the City of Portsmouth.

Television series - "Song of the Mountains."

Tree - American Dogwood (Cornus florida).

War memorial museum - "Virginia War Museum," (formerly known as the War Memorial Museum of Virginia), located in the City of Newport News.

(Code 1950, §§ 7-35, 7-36, 7-37; 1966, cc. 102, 547, §§ 7.1-37, 7.1-38, 7.1-39; 1974, c. 24, § 7.1-40; 1982, c. 191, § 7.1-40.1; 1986, c. 138, § 7.1-40.2; 1988, c. 317, § 7.1-40.3; 1991, cc. 71, 575, §§ 7.1-40.4, 7.1-40.5; 1993, cc. 251, 509, § 7.1-40.6; 1994, cc. 33, 134, 220, 464, §§ 7.1-40.2:1, 7.1-40.8; 1995, cc. 12, 180, § 7.1-40.2:2; 1996, c. 52, § 7.1-40.9; 1997, cc. 66, 576, § 7.1-40.10; 1999, cc. 69, 336, § 7.1-40.11; 2001, cc. 97, 134, § 7.1-40.12; 2001, c. 228, § 7.1-40.13; 2005, cc. 557, 839; 2006, c. 128; 2007, cc. 391, 685; 2008, c. 262; 2009, cc. 145, 227; 2011, c. 671; 2013, c. 702; 2014, c. 553; 2015, cc. 586, 587; 2016, cc. 278, 675; 2017, cc. 15, 576, 577; 2018, cc. 284, 684; 2020, c. 583.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, c. 557, enacted former § 7.1-40.7:1 designating the Virginia big-eared bat as the official bat of the Commonwealth. The substance of the provisions were included in § 1-510 as enacted by Acts 2005, c. 839.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 128 substituted "Corynorhinus" for "Corynorhinos" in the paragraph of Bat; and inserted the paragraph "Fish - Brook Trout."

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendments by cc. 391 and 685 are identical, and inserted "Covered Bridge Festival - Virginia Covered Bridge Festival held in Patrick County."

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 262 inserted "Covered Bridge Festival - Virginia Covered Bridge Festival held in Patrick County."

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendment by c. 145 inserted "Coal Miners' Memorial - The Richlands Coal Miners' Memorial located in Tazewell County."

The 2009 amendment by c. 227 inserted "Cabin Capital of Virginia - Page County."

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 671 inserted "(Freshwater)" following "Fish" and added "Fish (Saltwater) - Striped Bass."

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 702 inserted "Shakespeare festival - The Virginia Shakespeare Festival held in the City of Williamsburg."

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 553 added the designation of "Maple Festival."

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendments by cc. 586 and 587 are identical, and substituted "Virginny" for "Virginia" following "Old" in the designation for "Song emeritus"; and added the designations for "Song (Popular)" and "Song (Traditional)."

The 2016 amendments. - The 2016 amendment by c. 278 inserted "Bird - Northern Cardinal (Cardinalis cardinalis)," "Snake - Eastern Garter Snake (Thamnophis sirtalis sirtalis)," and "Tree - American Dogwood (Cornus florida)."

The 2016 amendment by c. 675, added "Bird - Northern Cardinal (Cardinalis cardinalis),"deleted "Emergency medical services museum - 'To The Rescue,' located in the City of Roanoke," and added "Rock - Nelsonite"and "Tree - American Dogwood (Cornus florida)."

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendments by cc. 15 and 577 are identical, and inserted "Television series - 'Song of the Mountains."'

The 2017 amendment by c. 576 inserted "Spirit - George Washington's rye whiskey produced at Mount Vernon, Virginia."

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 284 inserted "Salamander - Red Salamander (Pseudotriton ruber)."

The 2018 amendment by c. 684 inserted the entry for "Flag of Remembrance of September 11, 2001."

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 583 added "Opry - The Virginia Opry" to the list of the official emblems and designations of the Commonwealth.

§ 1-511. English designated the official language of the Commonwealth.

English shall be designated as the official language of the Commonwealth. Except as provided by law, no state agency or local government shall be required to provide and no state agency or local government shall be prohibited from providing any documents, information, literature or other written materials in any language other than English.

(1996, c. 829, § 7.1-42; 2005, c. 839.)

Law review. - For comment, "The Fiber of the Common Bond," see 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 367 (2005).

§ 1-512. Poet laureate.

The honorary position of Poet Laureate of Virginia is hereby created. The Governor may appoint a poet laureate from a list of nominees submitted by the Poetry Society of Virginia. Each poet laureate shall serve a term of two years with no restrictions on reappointment.

(1997, c. 299, § 7.1-43; 2005, c. 839.)

Chapter 6. Virginia Coordinate Systems.

Sec.

§ 1-600. Virginia coordinate systems designated.

The systems of plane coordinates that have been established by the National Ocean Service/National Geodetic Survey or its successors for defining and stating the positions or locations of points on the surface of the earth within the Commonwealth are to be known and designated as the "Virginia Coordinate System of 1927" and the "Virginia Coordinate System of 1983."

(1946, p. 166; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 2849(1); Code 1950, § 55-287; 1984, c. 726; 2019, c. 712.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2019, c. 712, recodified Title 55 as Title 55.1, effective October 1, 2019. As part of the recodification, former Chapter 17 ( § 55-287 et seq.) of Title 55 was recodified as Chapter 6 ( § 1-600 et seq.) of this title. Where appropriate, the historical citations to former sections have been added to corresponding new sections. For transition provisions, see § 55.1-100. For tables of corresponding former and new sections, see the tables in Volume 10.

Acts 2019, c. 712, cl. 13 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2019."

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 18 M.J. Surveys and Surveyors, § 1.

§ 1-601. North and South Zones.

For the purpose of the use of the Virginia Coordinate System of 1927 and the Virginia Coordinate System of 1983, the Commonwealth is divided into a "North Zone" and a "South Zone."

The area now included in the following counties and cities shall constitute the North Zone: Arlington, Augusta, Bath, Caroline, Clarke, Culpeper, Fairfax, Fauquier, Frederick, Greene, Highland, King George, Loudoun, Madison, Orange, Page, Prince William, Rappahannock, Rockingham, Shenandoah, Spotsylvania, Stafford, Warren, and Westmoreland Counties and the Cities of Alexandria, Fairfax, Falls Church, Fredericksburg, Harrisonburg, Manassas, Manassas Park, Staunton, Waynesboro, and Winchester.

The area now included in the following counties and cities shall constitute the South Zone: Accomack, Albemarle, Alleghany, Amelia, Amherst, Appomattox, Bedford, Bland, Botetourt, Brunswick, Buchanan, Buckingham, Campbell, Carroll, Charles City, Charlotte, Chesterfield, Craig, Cumberland, Dickenson, Dinwiddie, Essex, Floyd, Fluvanna, Franklin, Giles, Gloucester, Goochland, Grayson, Greensville, Halifax, Hanover, Henrico, Henry, Isle of Wight, James City, King and Queen, King William, Lancaster, Lee, Louisa, Lunenburg, Mathews, Mecklenburg, Middlesex, Montgomery, Nelson, New Kent, Northampton, Northumberland, Nottoway, Patrick, Pittsylvania, Powhatan, Prince Edward, Prince George, Pulaski, Richmond, Roanoke, Rockbridge, Russell, Scott, Smyth, Southampton, Surry, Sussex, Tazewell, Washington, Wise, Wythe, and York Counties and the Cities of Bristol, Buena Vista, Charlottesville, Chesapeake, Colonial Heights, Covington, Danville, Emporia, Franklin, Galax, Hampton, Hopewell, Lexington, Lynchburg, Martinsville, Newport News, Norfolk, Norton, Petersburg, Poquoson, Portsmouth, Radford, Richmond, Roanoke, Salem, Suffolk, Virginia Beach, and Williamsburg.

(Code 1950, § 55-288.1; 1984, c. 726; 2006, c. 861; 2016, cc. 164, 312; 2019, c. 712.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2019, c. 712, cl. 13 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2019."

§ 1-602. Designation of systems in land description.

  1. As established for use in the North Zone, the Virginia Coordinate System of 1927 or the Virginia Coordinate System of 1983 shall be named, and in any land description in which it is used, it shall be designated the "Virginia Coordinate System of 1927, North Zone" or "Virginia Coordinate System of 1983, North Zone."
  2. As established for use in the South Zone, the Virginia Coordinate System of 1927 or the Virginia Coordinate System of 1983 shall be named, and in any land description in which it is used, it shall be designated the "Virginia Coordinate System of 1927, South Zone" or "Virginia Coordinate System of 1983, South Zone."

    (1946, p. 167; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 2849(2); Code 1950, § 55-289; 1984, c. 726; 2019, c. 712.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2019, c. 712, cl. 13 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2019."

§ 1-603. Plane coordinates used in systems.

The plane coordinates of a point on the earth's surface, to be used in expressing the position or location of such point in the appropriate zone of these systems, shall be expressed in U.S. survey feet and decimals of a foot. One of these distances, to be known as the "x-coordinate," shall give the position in an east-and-west direction; the other, to be known as the "y-coordinate," shall give the position in a north-and-south direction. These coordinates shall be made to depend upon and conform to the coordinate values for the monumented points of the North American Horizontal Geodetic Control Network as published by the National Ocean Service/National Geodetic Survey, or its successors, and whose plane coordinates have been computed on the systems defined in this chapter. Any such station may be used for establishing a survey connection to either Virginia coordinate system.

When converting coordinates in the Virginia Coordinate System of 1983 from meters and decimals of a meter to feet and decimals of a foot, the U.S. survey foot conversion factor (one foot equals 1200/3937 meters) shall be used. This requirement does not preclude the continued use of the International foot conversion factor (one foot equals 0.3048 meters) in those counties and cities where this factor was in use prior to July 1, 1992. The plat or plan shall contain a statement of the conversion factor used and the coordinate values of a minimum of two project points in feet.

(1946, p. 167; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 2849(3); Code 1950, § 55-290; 1984, c. 726; 1992, c. 1; 2019, c. 712.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2019, c. 712, cl. 13 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2019."

§ 1-604. Tract of land lying in both coordinate zones.

When any tract of land to be defined by a single description extends from one into the other of the two coordinate zones established in this chapter, the positions of all points on its boundaries may be referred to either of the two zones, with the zone that is used being specifically named in the description.

(1946, p. 167; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 2849(4); Code 1950, § 55-291; 2019, c. 712.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2019, c. 712, cl. 13 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2019."

§ 1-605. Definition of systems by National Ocean Service/National Geodetic Survey; adopted.

  1. For purposes of more precisely defining the Virginia Coordinate System of 1927, the following definition by the National Ocean Service/National Geodetic Survey is adopted:

    The Virginia Coordinate System of 1927, North Zone, is a Lambert conformal projection of the Clarke spheroid of 1896, having standard parallels at north latitudes 38 ø 02' and 39 ø 12', along which parallels the scale shall be exact. The origin of coordinates is at the intersection of the meridian 78 ø 30' west of Greenwich with the parallel 37 ø 40' north latitude, such origin being given the coordinates: x = 2,000,000", and y = 0'.

    The Virginia Coordinate System of 1927, South Zone, is a Lambert conformal projection of the Clarke spheroid of 1896, having standard parallels at north latitudes 36 ø 46' and 37 ø 58', along which parallels the scale shall be exact. The origin of coordinates is at the intersection of the meridian 78 ø 30' west of Greenwich with the parallel 36 ø 20' north latitude, such origin being given the coordinates: x = 2,000,000', and y = 0'.

  2. For purposes of more precisely defining the Virginia Coordinate System of 1983, the following definition by the National Ocean Service/National Geodetic Survey is adopted:

    The Virginia Coordinate System of 1983, North Zone, is a Lambert conformal conic projection based on the North American Datum of 1983, having standard parallels at north latitudes 38 ø 02' and 39 ø 12', along which parallels the scale shall be exact. The origin of coordinates is at the intersection of the meridian 78 ø 30' west of Greenwich and the parallel 37 ø 40' north latitude, such origin being given the coordinates: x = 3,500,000 meters and y = 2,000,000 meters.

    The Virginia Coordinate System of 1983, South Zone, is a Lambert conformal conic projection based on the North American Datum of 1983, having standard parallels at north latitudes 36 ø 46' and 37 ø 58', along which parallels the scale shall be exact. The origin of coordinates is at the intersection of the meridian 78 ø 30' west of Greenwich and the parallel 36 ø 20' north latitude, such origin being given the coordinates: x = 3,500,000 meters and y = 1,000,000 meters.

    (1946, p. 167; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 2849(5); Code 1950, § 55-292; 1984, c. 726; 2019, c. 712.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2019, c. 712, cl. 13 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2019."

§ 1-606. Position of systems.

The position of the Virginia coordinate systems shall be as marked on the ground by triangulation or traverse stations established in conformity with the standards of accuracy and specifications for first-order and second-order geodetic surveying as prepared and published by the Federal Geodetic Control Subcommittee of the Federal Geographic Data Committee of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The geodetic position of stations defining the position of the Virginia Coordinate System of 1927 shall have been rigidly adjusted on the North American Datum of 1927, and the plane coordinates shall have been computed on the Virginia Coordinate System of 1927. The geodetic position of stations defining the position of the Virginia Coordinate System of 1983 shall have been rigidly adjusted on the North American Datum of 1983, and the plane coordinates shall have been computed on the Virginia Coordinate System of 1983. Any such station may be used for establishing a survey connection with the Virginia coordinate systems.

(1946, p. 168; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 2849(5); Code 1950, § 55-293; 1984, c. 726; 2019, c. 712.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2019, c. 712, cl. 13 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2019."

§ 1-607. Limitation on use of systems.

No coordinates based on the Virginia coordinate systems, purporting to define the position of a point on a land boundary, shall be presented to be recorded in any public land records or deed records unless such point is within two kilometers of a public or private monumented horizontal control station established in conformity with the standards of accuracy and specifications for second-order, class II or better geodetic surveying as prepared and published by the Federal Geodetic Control Subcommittee of the Federal Geographic Data Committee of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Standards and specifications of the Federal Geodetic Control Subcommittee or its successor in force on the date of such survey shall apply. The publishing of the existing control stations, or the acceptance with intent to publish the new established control stations, by the National Ocean Service/National Geodetic Survey constitutes evidence of adherence to the Federal Geodetic Control Subcommittee specifications. The two kilometers' limitation may be modified by a duly authorized state agency to meet local conditions. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be interpreted as preventing the use of the Virginia coordinate systems in any unrecorded deeds, maps, or computations.

(1946, p. 168; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 2849(6); Code 1950, § 55-294; 1984, c. 726; 2019, c. 712.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2019, c. 712, cl. 13 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2019."

§ 1-608. Limitation on use of name of systems.

The use of the terms "Virginia Coordinate System of 1927" or "Virginia Coordinate System of 1983" on any map, report of survey, or other document shall be limited to coordinates based on the Virginia coordinate systems as defined in this chapter.

(1946, p. 168; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 2849(7); Code 1950, § 55-295; 1984, c. 726; 2019, c. 712.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2019, c. 712, cl. 13 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2019."

§ 1-609. Use of system not compulsory.

For purposes of describing the location of any survey station or land boundary corner in the Commonwealth, it shall be considered a complete, legal, and satisfactory description of such location to give the position of such survey station or land boundary corner on the system of plane coordinates defined in this chapter. Nothing contained in this chapter shall require any purchaser or mortgagee to rely on a description any part of which depends exclusively upon either Virginia coordinate system.

(1946, p. 168; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 2849(8); Code 1950, § 55-296; 1984, c. 726; 2019, c. 712.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2019, c. 712, cl. 13 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2019."

§ 1-610. Old Dominion University designated as administrative agency.

Old Dominion University is designated as the authorized state agency to collect and distribute information, to authorize such modifications as are referred to in § 1-607 , and generally to advise with and assist appropriate state and federal agencies and individuals interested in the development of the provisions of this chapter.

(1946, p. 168; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 2849(10); Code 1950, § 55-297; 1966, c. 55; 1968, c. 223; 1977, c. 114; 2019, c. 712.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 187 C, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "Notwithstanding § 1-610 , Code of Virginia, Old Dominion University is hereby designated as the administrative agency for the Virginia Coordinate System."

Acts 2019, c. 712, cl. 13 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2019."