Chapter 1. General Provisions and Administration.

General Provisions.

Administration.

Representation.

Article 1. General Provisions.

§ 60.2-100. Short title.

This title shall be known and may be cited as the "Virginia Unemployment Compensation Act."

(Code 1950, § 60-1 ; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-1 ; 1986, c. 480.)

Cross references. - As to transitional severance benefits, see § 2.2-3203 .

Editor's note. - House Joint Resolution No. 195 of the 1985 Acts of Assembly directed the Virginia Code Commission to make a study of former Title 60.1 and report to the Governor and the General Assembly its findings in the form of a revision of that title. In January, 1986, its report, containing a proposed revision of former Title 60.1, was sent to the Governor and the General Assembly. The report was published as House Document No. 11 of the 1986 Session and served as the basis for Title 60.2, which was enacted by Acts 1986, c. 480, effective January 1, 1987.

In addition to its revision by Acts 1986, c. 480, former Title 60.1 was amended by certain other acts during the 1986 Session. These amendments have been incorporated, as appropriate, into comparable provisions of Title 60.2, pursuant to § 30-152.

Many of the cases cited in the notes under the various sections of this title were decided under corresponding provisions of former Title 60.1 or prior law.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia employment law for the year 1989-1990, see 24 U. Rich. L. Rev. 567 (1990).

Research References. - Employee Rights Litigation: Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Goodman.

Larson on Employment Discrimination (Matthew Bender). Larson.

Unjust Dismissal (Matthew Bender). Larson.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 12A M.J. Limitation of Actions, § 21; 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 2.

Editor's note. - Some of the notes below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Remedial character of Act. - Legislative acts of this character which provide funds for those temporarily unemployed are remedial in character. Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 191 Va. 812 , 63 S.E.2d 28 (1951).

The problem of the Supreme Court (now Court of Appeals) is, in the final analysis, to recognize the remedial aim and purpose of the Act and then interpret and construe the language and apply it to the facts proved. Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 191 Va. 812 , 63 S.E.2d 28 (1951).

The Act as a whole should be so interpreted as to effectuate that remedial purpose implicit in its enactment. Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 191 Va. 812 , 63 S.E.2d 28 (1951).

The Act should be liberally construed. - The Unemployment Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effect its beneficent aims. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944); R.C. Huffman Constr. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 184 Va. 727 , 36 S.E.2d 641 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 191 Va. 812 , 63 S.E.2d 28 (1951).

The primary purpose of the Act is to provide temporary financial assistance to workmen who become unemployed through no fault of their own. Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 191 Va. 812 , 63 S.E.2d 28 (1951); Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463 , 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951).

The Unemployment Compensation Act is primarily a public welfare measure and the levying of taxes thereunder is merely incidental to its purpose, which is to assure a measure of security against the hazard of unemployment in our economic life. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944); R.C. Huffman Constr. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 184 Va. 727 , 36 S.E.2d 641 (1946); VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983).

And it is not merely declaratory of common-law principles. - The great weight of authority is that unemployment compensation statutes are not merely declaratory of common-law principles, but are more inclusive in their scope. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202 , 18 S.E.2d 390 (1942).

The trend of the courts is to recognize its beneficent purposes and to hold parties bound by the Act. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202 , 18 S.E.2d 390 (1942).

And to extend its coverage. - The judicial trend is to extend and not to restrict the coverage of the Unemployment Compensation Act. R.C. Huffman Constr. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 184 Va. 727 , 36 S.E.2d 641 (1946).

The judicial trend is to hold that the Unemployment Compensation Act covers borderline cases. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944).

Employees who are discharged from employment due to "misconduct connected with his work" are disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Kennedy's Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc. v. Cooper, 14 Va. App. 701, 419 S.E.2d 278 (1992).

Burden of proof. - The employer bears the burden of proving misconduct. Absent circumstances in mitigation of such conduct, the employee is "disqualified for benefits," and the burden of proving mitigating circumstances rests upon the employee. Kennedy's Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc. v. Cooper, 14 Va. App. 701, 419 S.E.2d 278 (1992).

Definition of misconduct has two prongs. The first prong defines misconduct as a deliberate violation of a company rule. The definition of misconduct under the second prong contemplates actions or omissions of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of the employer's interests and the duties and obligations the employee owes the employer. Kennedy's Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc. v. Cooper, 14 Va. App. 701, 419 S.E.2d 278 (1992).

Misconduct not proven. - Employee's use of vulgar language was not of such a nature as to manifest a willful disregard of employer business interests or employee's duties and obligations to his employer. Employee's remarks, while vulgar and offensive, were not a lengthy barrage. They were a part of an isolated outburst following a private two and one-half hour meeting of management officials. The chief executive officer initiated the discussion of union organization at employer's place of business, and repeatedly demanded employee's resignation. Employee had been an employee of employer for almost 20 years. There was no evidence that he had a record of misconduct. There was no evidence that employee's remarks were overheard by store employees or customers. Misconduct had not been proven. Kennedy's Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc. v. Cooper, 14 Va. App. 701, 419 S.E.2d 278 (1992).

§ 60.2-101. Disclosure of social security account number.

The Commission shall continue to require disclosure of the social security account number of any individual for any purpose relating to a claim for benefits and for any purpose relating to the provision of employment or employment-related services, including verification of the identity of any individual. Additionally, the Commission shall continue to require any employing unit to disclose the social security account number of any individual who performed services for such employing unit for any purpose relating to the unemployment insurance programs administered by the Commission.

(1976, c. 708, § 60.1-22.1; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-102. Limitations on payment of benefits; nonliability of Commonwealth and Commission.

Benefits shall be deemed to be due and payable under this title only to the extent provided in this title and to the extent that moneys are available to the credit of the Unemployment Compensation Fund. Neither the Commonwealth nor the Commission shall be liable for any amount in excess of such sums.

(Code 1950, § 60-24; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-28; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-103. Contingencies affecting operation of title.

  1. In the event that Chapter 23 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.) is repealed, amended or otherwise changed by the Congress of the United States, or is finally adjudged invalid or unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, with the result that no portion of the taxes required by this title can be credited against any tax imposed by Chapter 23 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.), the Governor shall, within sixty days from the date of such repeal, amendment or change, or from the date that such act is so finally adjudged invalid or unconstitutional, by proclamation so state. Upon the issuance of such proclamation, the provisions of this title shall expire by limitation and thereafter have no force and effect, except that the Commission shall thereupon requisition all moneys standing to the credit of the Commonwealth in the Unemployment Trust Fund established by Section 904 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1104). All such moneys so refunded, repaid or returned to the Commonwealth, together with such other money paid to the Commonwealth as taxes under the terms of this title and then held by the Commonwealth, less the cost of making the refund and repayment, shall forthwith be refunded or repaid by the State Treasurer, upon warrants of the Comptroller, issued upon vouchers signed by the Commissioner, or by such other person as the Commissioner may designate for that purpose, to the individual employers, ratably in proportion to the amounts paid by each such employer, who have paid taxes under the terms of this title.
  2. In the event that the Secretary of Labor of the United States shall withdraw his approval of this title, with the result that no portion of the taxes required by this title with respect to employment during any year can be credited against any tax imposed by Chapter 23 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.) with respect to employment for such year, the provisions of this title requiring the payment of taxes shall become and remain suspended until such credit can be had.

    (Code 1950, § 60-25; 1956, c. 440; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-29; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-104. Reservation of right to amend or repeal.

The General Assembly reserves the right to amend or repeal all or any part of this title at any time. There shall be no vested private right of any kind against such amendment or repeal. All the rights, privileges, or immunities conferred by this title or by acts done pursuant thereto shall exist subject to the power of the General Assembly to amend or repeal this title at any time.

(Code 1950, § 60-25.1; 1954, c. 203; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-30; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-105. Publication and distribution of law, regulations, etc.

The Commission shall cause to be printed for distribution to the public the text of this title, the Commission's regulations and general rules, its annual reports to the Governor, and any other material the Commission deems relevant and suitable. The Commission shall furnish these materials to any person upon request.

(Code 1950, § 60-31; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-36; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-106. Employer to post and maintain posters.

Each employer shall post and maintain in places readily accessible to individuals in its services all such posters related to unemployment insurance as furnished it by the Commission.

(Code 1950, § 60-48; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-60; 1977, c. 445; 1986, c. 480.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 9.

§ 60.2-107. Waiver of rights void.

Any agreement other than an agreement made pursuant to § 60.2-608 by an individual to waive, release or commute his rights to benefits or any other rights under this title shall be void. Any agreement by any individual in the employ of any person or concern to pay all or any portion of an employer's taxes, required under this title from such employer, shall be void. No employer shall directly or indirectly make, require or accept any deduction from wages to finance the employer's taxes required from him, or require or accept any waiver of any right under this title by any individual in his employ. Any employer or officer or agent of any employer who violates any provision of this section shall, for each offense, be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.

(Code 1950, § 60-106; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-123; 1982, c. 237; 1986, c. 480.)

Cross references. - As to punishment for Class 1 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

Article 2. Administration.

§ 60.2-108. The Commission; appointment, term of office and compensation of Commissioner.

The Virginia Employment Commission shall consist of one Commissioner, who shall be appointed by the Governor for a term of four years, subject to confirmation by the General Assembly, if in session when such appointment is made, and if not in session, then at its next succeeding session. Appointments to fill vacancies shall be for the unexpired terms. The Commissioner may be suspended or removed by the Governor at his pleasure, and he shall receive such compensation as may be provided in accordance with law.

(Code 1950, § 60-26; 1960, c. 136; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-31; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-109. Bond of Commissioner.

The Commissioner shall be bonded in accordance with § 2.2-1840 , conditioned upon the faithful discharge of his duties.

(Code 1950, § 60-27; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-32; 1986, c. 480; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 152.)

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 152, effective July 1, 2021, rewrote the section, which formerly read: "The Commissioner shall, before entering upon the discharge of his duties, give bond payable to the Commonwealth, in a form approved by the Attorney General, in such penalty as shall be fixed by the Governor, with some surety or guaranty company duly authorized to do business in this Commonwealth. The bond shall be approved by the Governor as security and conditioned upon the faithful discharge of his duties. The premium of such bond shall be paid by the Commission, and the bond shall be filed with and preserved by the Comptroller."

§ 60.2-110. State Job Service and Unemployment Insurance Services Division.

The Commission may establish two coordinate divisions: the Virginia State Job Service, created pursuant to § 60.2-400 , and the Unemployment Insurance Services Division. Each division shall be responsible for the discharge of its distinctive functions. Each division shall be a separate administrative unit, with respect to personnel, budget, and duties, except insofar as the Commission may find that such separation is impracticable. In lieu, however, of establishing the two divisions the Commission may cooperate with and utilize the personnel and services of employment offices or services operated by the United States or any of its authorized agencies but only to the extent necessary for the federal employment offices or services to perform the functions imposed upon employment offices by § 60.2-601 and subdivision 5 of § 60.2-612 .

(Code 1950, § 60-28; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-33; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-111. Duties and powers of Commission.

  1. It shall be the duty of the Commission to administer this title. It shall have power and authority to adopt, amend, or rescind such rules and regulations, to employ such persons, make such expenditures, require such reports, make such investigations, and take such other action, including the appointment of advisory groups, as it deems necessary or suitable to that end. Such rules and regulations shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 40 (§ 2.2-4000 et seq.) of Title 2.2, except as to the subject matter of subdivisions 2 and 3 of § 60.2-515 , which shall become effective in the manner prescribed by § 2.2-4103 . The Commission shall determine its own organization and methods of procedure in accordance with provisions of this title, and shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.
  2. The Commission shall prepare an annual balance sheet of the moneys in the fund and in the Unemployment Trust Fund to the credit of the Commonwealth in which there shall be provided, if possible, a reserve against the liability in future years to pay benefits in excess of the then current taxes. That reserve shall be set up by the Commission in accordance with accepted actuarial principles on the basis of statistics of employment, business activity, and other relevant factors for the longest possible period. Whenever the Commission believes that a change in tax or benefit rates is necessary to protect the solvency of the Fund, it shall promptly so inform the Governor and the General Assembly and make recommendations with respect thereto.

    (Code 1950, § 60-29; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-34; 1977, c. 445; 1984, c. 734; 1986, c. 480.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2018, c. 344, cl. 1 provides: " § 1. The Department of Taxation (Department) and the Virginia Employment Commission (Commission) shall consider the feasibility of permitting taxpayers to submit tax reports and payments electronically for both the Virginia Employment Commission and the Department of Taxation using a single sign-on. The Department and the Commission shall also consider the feasibility, merits, and costs of developing and implementing an identity management system or retaining a contractor to do so."

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Private cause of action prohibited. - Former police officer was not entitled to seek relief from his indefinite suspension in a private action, as subsection C of § 40.1-51.4:4 did not provide for such an action by the officer, and it was the duty of the Commissioner to administer the Virginia Unemployment Compensation Act, § 60.2-111 , for any violation of § 60.2-114 . Serrano v. City of Norfolk, 64 Va. Cir. 282, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 181 (Norfolk 2004).

§ 60.2-112.

Repealed by Acts 1999, cc. 840 and 855.

§ 60.2-113. Employment stabilization.

The Commission shall take all necessary steps through its appropriate divisions and with the advice of such advisory boards and committees as it may have to:

  1. Establish a viable labor exchange system to promote maximum employment for the Commonwealth of Virginia with priority given to those workers drawing unemployment benefits;
  2. Provide Virginia State Job Service services, as described in this title, according to the provisions of the Wagner-Peyser Act (29 U.S.C. 49f), as amended by the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act;
  3. Maintain a solvent trust fund financed through equitable employer taxes that provide temporary partial income replacement to involuntarily unemployed covered workers;
  4. Coordinate and conduct labor market information research studies, programs and operations, including the development, storage, retrieval and dissemination of information on the social and economic aspects of the Commonwealth and publish data needed by employers, economic development, education and training entities, government and other users in the public and private sectors;
  5. Encourage and assist in the adoption of practical methods of vocational guidance, training and retraining; and
  6. Establish the Interagency Migrant Worker Policy Committee, comprised of representatives from appropriate state agencies, including the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission, whose services and jurisdictions involve migrant and seasonal farmworkers and their employees. All agencies of the Commonwealth shall be required to cooperate with the Committee upon request.

    (Code 1950, § 60-34; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-39; 1986, c. 480; 1989, c. 108; 1999, c. 357; 2004, cc. 14, 154, 592; 2008, cc. 98, 222; 2011, cc. 594, 681; 2014, c. 815; 2015, cc. 275, 292; 2017, c. 20; 2018, c. 225.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2018, c. 225, cl. 2 provides: "That the Virginia Employment Commission shall submit a plan to the Virginia Board of Workforce Development and the Governor's Chief Workforce Advisor describing a process and timeline for developing and implementing a statewide workforce dashboard fed by an automated data pipeline by August 1, 2018. Full implementation of the plan shall begin no later than November 1, 2018."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 14 deleted "the Governor's Employment and Training Department" preceding "the Department of Education" in the last sentence of subdivision 4 and substituted "long-range" for "long range" in subdivision 5.

The 2004 amendment by c. 154 deleted "the Governor's Employment and Training Department" preceding "the Department of Education" in the last sentence of subdivision 4; deleted former subdivision 7, which read: "Develop a plan for implementation during times of economic recession, natural disaster or military mobilization whereby necessary workers can be provided"; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2004 amendment by c. 592 added subdivision 7 and made related changes.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 98 and 222 are identical, and inserted present subdivision 2 and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendments by cc. 594 and 681 are identical, and deleted the former second sentence in subdivision 8, which read: "The Committee shall coordinate its activities with the Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers Board established in § 2.2-2407 ."

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 815 substituted "Virginia Board of Workforce Development" for "Virginia Workforce Council" in subdivision 5.

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendments by cc. 275 and 292 are identical, and substituted "Innovation and Opportunity Act" for "Investment Act" in subdivision 2.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 20 deleted former subdivision 6 which read: "Prepare official short and long-range population projections for the Commonwealth for use by the General Assembly and state agencies with programs which involve or necessitate population projections" and redesignated subsequent subdivisions accordingly.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 225 deleted former subdivision 5, which read "Determine and publish a list of jobs, trades, and professions for which a high demand of qualified workers exists or is projected by the Commission. The Commission shall consult with the Virginia Board of Workforce Development in making such determination. Such information shall be published biennially and disseminated to employers; education and training entities, including public two-year and four-year institutions of higher education; government agencies, including the Department of Education and public libraries; and other users in the public and private sectors"; and made related changes.

CASE NOTES

Absolute immunity found. - Virginia Employment Commission had absolute immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XI, from a shareholder's claims as: (1) the commissioner answered to the Virginia Secretary of Commerce and Trade, who answered to the Virginia Governor; (2) its responsibilities stretched across the state; (3) the commission did not have any significant degree of autonomy or independence from the Commonwealth of Virginia, and any recovery from the commission would come from the state treasury; and (4) the commission was an instrumentality of the Commonwealth. Brown v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110704 (W.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2012).

§ 60.2-113.1. Veterans Skills Database.

  1. The Commission, in cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce and Trade and the Department of Veterans Services, shall establish the Veterans Skills Database (the database), an Internet-accessible database of veterans and their workforce skills, for the purpose of marketing and promoting the workforce skills of veterans to potential employers.
  2. The Commission may contract with one or more third parties to develop, implement, and maintain the database. The database provider shall (i) maintain the database and (ii) take all actions to ensure the protection of the confidentiality and security of the information contained in the database in accordance with the requirements established by the Commission.
  3. The following provisions shall apply to the database:
    1. Any veteran may register to create a free profile on the database and supply information relating to his workforce skills and experience.
    2. Potential employers may register to create a free profile and access the database to identify potential employees with relevant workforce skills and experience.

      (2010, c. 277.)

§ 60.2-114. Records and reports.

  1. Each employing unit shall keep true and accurate work records, containing such information as the Commission may prescribe. Such records shall be open to inspection and be subject to being copied by the Commission or its authorized representatives at any reasonable time and as often as may be necessary. The Commission may require from any employing unit any sworn or unsworn reports, with respect to persons employed by it, which the Commission deems necessary for the effective administration of this title. Information thus obtained shall not be published or be open to public inspection, other than to public employees in the performance of their public duties, in any manner revealing the employing unit's identity, except as the Commissioner or his delegates deem appropriate, nor shall such information be used in any judicial or administrative proceeding other than one arising out of the provisions of this title; however, the Commission shall make its records about a claimant available to the Workers' Compensation Commission if it requests such records. However, any claimant at a hearing before an appeal tribunal or the Commission shall be supplied with information from such records to the extent necessary for the proper presentation of his claim. Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, the Commissioner, or his delegate, may, in his discretion, reveal information when such communication is not inconsistent with the proper administration of this title.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A, the Commission shall, on a reimbursable basis, furnish wage and unemployment compensation information contained in its records to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Division of Child Support Enforcement of the Department of Social Services for their use as necessary for the purposes of the National Directory of New Hires established under § 453(i) of the Social Security Act.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A, the Commission shall, upon written request, furnish:
    1. Any agency or political subdivision of the Commonwealth, or its designated agent, such information as it may require for the purpose of collecting fines, penalties, and costs owed to the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions. Such information shall not be published or used in any administrative or judicial proceeding, except in matters arising out of the collection of fines, penalties, and costs owed to the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions; and
    2. The Virginia Economic Development Partnership Authority such information as it may require to facilitate the administration and enforcement by the Authority of performance agreements with businesses that have received incentive awards. Any information provided to the Authority under this subdivision shall be confidential pursuant to 20 C.F.R. Part 603 and shall only be disclosed to members of the Authority who are public officials or employees of the Authority for the performance of their official duties. No public official or employee shall redisclose any confidential information obtained pursuant to this subdivision to nonlegislative citizen members of the Authority or to the public. Any information so provided shall be used by the Authority solely for the purpose of verifying employment and wage claims of those businesses that have received incentive awards.
  4. Each employing unit shall report to the Virginia New Hire Reporting Center the employment of any newly hired employee in compliance with § 63.2-1946 .
  5. Any member or employee of the Commission and any member, employee, or agent of any agency or political subdivision of the Commonwealth who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.

    (Code 1950, § 60-35; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-40; 1972, c. 764; 1986, c. 480; 1988, c. 766; 1993, cc. 246, 806; 1996, c. 220; 1997, c. 385; 1998, cc. 91, 108, 745; 2003, c. 721; 2013, c. 329; 2017, cc. 804, 824.)

Cross references. - As to punishment for Class 2 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

Editor's note. - For "the National Directory of New Hires established under § 453(i) of the Social Security Act," referred to above, see 42 USCS § 653(i).

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 721 inserted "or its designated agent" following "of the Commonwealth" in the first sentence of subsection C.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 329 substituted "report to the Virginia New Hire Reporting Center the employment of any newly hired employee" for "report only to the Virginia New Hire Reporting Center the initial employment of any person as defined in § 60.2-212 " in subsection D.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by cc. 804 and 824, effective April 5, 2017, are identical, and inserted the subdivision C 1 designation and added subdivision C 2; and made a minor stylistic change.

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 11-1112 Report to Determine Liability for State Unemployment Tax.

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Polygraph results prohibited in a proceeding. - City's demurrer to a former police officer's suit to rescind a certificate of indefinite suspension was granted as polygraph results could be submitted before an administrative panel hearing under § 60.2-114 . Serrano v. City of Norfolk, 64 Va. Cir. 282, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 181 (Norfolk 2004).

Private cause of action barred. - Former police officer was not entitled to seek relief from his indefinite suspension in a private action, as subsection C of § 40.1-51.4:4 did not provide for such an action by the officer, and it was the duty of the Commissioner to administer the Virginia Unemployment Compensation Act, § 60.2-111 , for any violation of § 60.2-114 . Serrano v. City of Norfolk, 64 Va. Cir. 282, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 181 (Norfolk 2004).

§ 60.2-114.01. Furnishing information to consumer reporting agencies.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A of § 60.2-114 , the Commission shall be authorized to enter into agreements with any consumer reporting agency pursuant to which the consumer reporting agency is provided secure electronic access to information contained in quarterly wage reports submitted to the Commission by employing units, as set forth in this section.
  2. The Commission shall:
    1. Establish minimum audit, security, net worth, and liability insurance standards, technological requirements, and any other terms and conditions deemed necessary in the discretion of the Commission to safeguard the confidentiality of the information and to otherwise serve the public interest;
    2. Require a contracting consumer reporting agency to pay all costs associated with the establishment or maintenance of the access to information provided for by this section, including but not limited to the costs of any audits of the consumer reporting agency or users by the Commission;
    3. Be authorized to cancel any contract authorized by this section if the consumer reporting agency fails to comply with any requirement of this section or of the contract;
    4. Be authorized to provide to a consumer reporting agency only information regarding the amount of wages for an individual reported by each employing unit, with the employing unit's name and address, as may be further specified in the terms of the contract; and
    5. Deposit any fees received by the Commission from a consumer reporting agency pursuant to this section into the state treasury for credit to the Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund pursuant to § 60.2-314 .
  3. The consumer reporting agency shall:
    1. Require that any user of the information shall, prior to obtaining the wage report information, obtain a written consent from the individual to whom that wage report information pertains. The written consent shall prominently contain language specifying the following:
      1. The individual's consent to the Commission's disclosure of the wage report information is voluntary, and the individual's refusal to consent to the disclosure of wage information shall not be the basis for the denial of credit;
      2. If the consent is granted, the information shall be released to specified parties;
      3. Authorization by the individual is necessary for the release of wage and employment history information;
      4. The specific application or transaction that constitutes the sole purpose for which the release is made;
      5. That Commission files containing wage and employment history information submitted by employers may be accessed; and
      6. The identity and address of parties authorized to receive the released information.
    2. Require the use of the information only for purposes permitted under § 604 of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b; and
    3. Require that the information released shall be used only to verify the accuracy of the wage or employment information previously provided by an individual in connection with a specific transaction, to satisfy the user's standard underwriting requirements or those imposed upon the user, and to satisfy the user's obligations under applicable state or federal fair credit reporting laws.
  4. In addition to any limitation on the use or release of the wage reporting information set forth in this section, release and use of the information shall be subject to the privacy laws of the Commonwealth and the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.
  5. Except in cases of willful and malicious misconduct, the Commission and its employees shall be immune from any liability in connection with information provided under this section, including but not limited to liability with regard to the accuracy or use of the information.
  6. An annual audit of a contracted consumer reporting agency shall be conducted by an independent certified public accountant to ensure compliance with the provisions of this section, and such audit shall be reviewed by the Auditor of Public Accounts.
  7. For the purposes of this section, "consumer reporting agency" has the meaning assigned by § 603(f) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).

    (2005, c. 944.)

Effective date. - This section became effective January 1, 2007.

§ 60.2-114.1.

Repealed by Acts 2018, c. 457, cl. 1.

Editor's note. - Former § 60.2-114.1 , pertaining to notification of withholding order, derived from Acts 1993, c. 165.

§ 60.2-115. State-federal cooperation.

  1. In the administration of this title, the Commission shall cooperate with the United States Department of Labor to the fullest extent consistent with the provisions of this title. The Commission shall make such reports, in such form and containing such information as the United States Department of Labor may require, and shall comply with such provisions as the United States Department of Labor may find necessary to assure the correctness and verification of such reports. The Commission shall take such action, through the adoption of appropriate rules, regulations, administrative methods and standards, as may be necessary to secure to this Commonwealth and its citizens all advantages available under the provisions of the Social Security Act that relate to unemployment compensation, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, the Wagner-Peyser Act (29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq.), and the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act (See notes following 26 U.S.C. § 3304).
  2. In the administration of the provisions in §§ 60.2-610 and 60.2-611 , which are enacted to conform with the requirements of the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act (See notes following 26 U.S.C. § 3304), the Commission shall take such action as may be necessary (i) to ensure that the provisions are so interpreted and applied as to meet the requirements of such federal act as interpreted by the United States Department of Labor, and (ii) to secure to this Commonwealth the full reimbursement of the federal share of extended benefits paid under this title that are reimbursable under the federal act.
  3. The Commission shall further make its records available to the Railroad Retirement Board and shall furnish to the Railroad Retirement Board at the expense of the Railroad Retirement Board, such copies thereof as the Board shall deem necessary for its purposes in accordance with the provisions of § 303 (c) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 503 (c)).
  4. The Commission shall afford reasonable cooperation with every agency of the United States charged with the administration of any unemployment insurance law.
  5. Upon request therefor, the Commission shall furnish to any agency of the United States charged with the administration of public works or assistance through public employment, the name, address, ordinary occupation, and employment status of each recipient of benefits and such recipient's rights to further benefits under this title.

    (Code 1950, § 60-39; 1956, c. 440; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-44; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-116. Reciprocal agreements.

  1. Subject to the approval of the Governor, the Commission is hereby authorized to enter into arrangements with the appropriate agencies of other states or the federal government whereby individuals performing services in this and other states for a single employing unit under circumstances not specifically provided for in §§ 60.2-212 through 60.2-219 , or under similar provisions in the unemployment compensation laws of such other states, shall be deemed to be engaged in employment performed entirely within this Commonwealth or within one of such other states. Such arrangements may set forth terms whereby the potential right to benefits accumulated under the unemployment compensation laws of one or more states or under such a law of the federal government, or both, may constitute the basis for the payment of benefits through a single appropriate agency of any state under terms which the Commission finds will be fair and reasonable as to all affected interests and will not result in any substantial loss to the fund.
  2. Subject to the approval of the Governor, the Commission is also authorized to enter into arrangements with the appropriate agencies of other states or of the federal government:
      1. Whereby wages or services, upon the basis of which an individual may become entitled to benefits under the unemployment compensation law of another state or of the federal government, shall be deemed to be wages for employment by employers for the purposes of §§ 60.2-602 , 60.2-606 , 60.2-607 , 60.2-609 , 60.2-610 , 60.2-611 , subdivision 1 of § 60.2-612 and §§ 60.2-614 through 60.2-617 , provided such other state agency or agency of the federal government has agreed to reimburse the fund for such portion of benefits paid under this title upon the basis of such wages or services as the Commission finds will be fair and reasonable as to all affected interests; and
      2. Whereby the Commission will reimburse other state or federal agencies charged with the administration of unemployment compensation laws with such reasonable portion of benefits, paid under the law of any such other states or of the federal government upon the basis of employment or wages for employment by employers, as the Commission finds will be fair and reasonable as to all affected interests.
    1. Reimbursements so payable under subdivision 1 b of this subsection shall be deemed to be benefits for the purposes of §§ 60.2-300 through 60.2-304 , but no reimbursement so payable shall be charged against any employer's account for the purposes of §§ 60.2-526 through 60.2-531 . The Commission is hereby authorized to make to other state or federal agencies and receive from such other state or federal agencies, reimbursements from or to the fund, in accordance with arrangements pursuant to this section.
  3. Subject to the approval of the Governor, the Commission is also authorized to enter into arrangements with the appropriate agencies of other states or of the federal government:
    1. Whereby the Commission may deduct, in accordance with the provisions of § 60.2-633 , from unemployment benefits otherwise payable to an individual an amount equal to any overpayment made to such individual under an unemployment benefit program of the United States or of any other state, and not previously recovered. The amount so deducted shall be paid to the jurisdiction under whose program such overpayment was made and in accordance with the arrangement between the Commission and the jurisdiction.
    2. Whereby the United States agrees to allow the Commission to recover from unemployment benefits otherwise payable to an individual under an unemployment benefit program of the United States any overpayments made by the Commission to such individual under this title and not previously recovered, in accordance with the same procedures that apply under subdivision 1 of this subsection.
    3. The amendments made by this subsection shall apply to recoveries made on or after July 1, 1987, and shall apply with respect to overpayments made before, on, or after such date. (Code 1950, § 60-40; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-45; 1986, c. 480; 1987, c. 113.)

§ 60.2-117. Use of collections in financing administrative expenditures.

If § 303 (a) (5) of Title III of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 503 (a) (5)) and § 3304 (a) (4) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.) are amended to permit a state agency to use, in partial or complete substitution for grants under such Title III, for financing administrative expenditures incurred in carrying out its employment security functions, some part of the moneys collected or to be collected under the state unemployment compensation law, this title shall, by Commission proclamation and rules to be issued with the Governor's approval, be modified in the manner and to the extent and within the limits necessary to permit such use by the Commission under this title. Such modifications shall become effective on the same date as such use becomes permissible under such federal amendments.

(Code 1950, § 60-64; 1956, c. 440; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-76; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-118. Civil action to enforce title; actions on behalf of other states.

  1. In any civil action to enforce the provisions of this title the Commission and the Commonwealth may be represented by the Office of the Attorney General.
  2. The Office of the Attorney General may commence actions in this Commonwealth as agent for, or on behalf of, any other state:
    1. To enforce judgments and liability for unemployment insurance taxes due such other state; or
    2. To collect unemployment benefit overpayments of such state if such state extends like comity to this Commonwealth.
  3. Venue for such actions shall be the same as for actions to enforce the provisions of this title.

    (Code 1950, § 60-109; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-126; 1972, c. 764; 1977, c. 445; 1986, c. 480.)

Research References. - Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure (Matthew Bender). Chapter 4 Venue. § 4.02 Preferred Venue. Bryson.

§ 60.2-119. Criminal cases.

All criminal actions for violation of any provision of this title, or of any rules or regulations issued pursuant to this title, shall be prosecuted by the attorney for the Commonwealth of the county or city in which the offense, or a part thereof, was committed, except that the offense set out in § 60.2-518 or 60.2-632 shall be deemed to be committed and venue for the prosecution shall lie in the county or city wherein the statement, representation, or nondisclosure is received by the Commission. However, if a defendant resides in this Commonwealth and the courthouse of the county or city in which he resides is more than 100 miles from the City of Richmond, venue for such prosecution shall lie in the city or county where he resides, and the offense shall be prosecuted by the attorney for the Commonwealth for the city or county where the defendant resides. If, in the opinion of the Commission, the prosecution should be conducted by the Office of the Attorney General, that office, upon the request of the Commission, shall have authority to conduct or supervise such prosecution.

(Code 1950, § 60-110; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-127; 1972, c. 764; 1980, c. 674; 1986, c. 480; 2005, c. 105.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendments by c. 105 substituted " § 60.2-518 or 60.2-632 " for " § 60.2-632 or § 60.2-518 " in the first sentence and deleted "as determined in § 30-19.17" following "Richmond" in the second sentence.

§ 60.2-120. Reimbursement of expenses of Office of Attorney General.

The compensation of the assistant attorneys general, together with their proper expenses incurred in the performance of their duties, shall be chargeable as administrative expense of the Commission and paid in the manner in which the compensation and expenses of employees of the Commission are paid.

(Code 1950, § 60-111; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-128; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-121. Violation of title or rule or regulation.

Any person who willfully violates any provision of this title or any valid rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to it, for which a penalty is not provided, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. Each day that such violation continues shall be deemed to be a separate offense.

(Code 1950, § 60-114; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-131; 1986, c. 480.)

Cross references. - As to punishment for Class 1 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

§ 60.2-121.1. Communications with parties.

In any action commenced under this title, the Commission may, if the party elects, send notices and other communications to such party through email or other electronic means. The Commission shall allow any party to change its election regarding receiving communications through electronic means. If an electronic notice is not successfully transmitted through electronic means, the Commission shall send a new notice by first-class mail to the party's alternative address on record.

(2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 290.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 290, cl. 2 provides: "That the Virginia Employment Commission (Commission) shall report to the Commission on Unemployment Compensation and the Chairs of the House Committee on Labor and Commerce and the Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor (i) the number of unemployment insurance claimants who elect to receive their communications by email or other electronic means pursuant to § 60.2-121.1 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, and (ii) how such use of electronic communications impacts the Commission's operations no later than December 31, 2022.”

Effective date. - This section is effective July 1, 2021.

Article 3. Representation.

§ 60.2-122. Limitation of fees.

No individual claiming benefits shall be charged fees of any kind in any proceeding under this title by the Commission or its representatives. Any person who violates any provision of this section shall, for each such offense, be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.

(Code 1950, § 60-107; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-124; 1981, c. 249; 1986, c. 480.)

Cross references. - As to punishment for Class 1 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Costs, § 3.

§ 60.2-123. Representation.

Any individual or employing unit appearing before an officer of the Commission may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent. However, no such counsel or agent representing a claimant shall either charge or receive for such services more than an amount approved by the Commission.

(1981, c. 249, § 60.1-124.1; 1986, c. 480.)

Chapter 2. Definitions.

Sec.

§ 60.2-200. Definitions generally.

As used in this title, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the terms defined in this chapter shall have the meanings there ascribed to them.

(Code 1950, § 60-2; 1964, c. 3; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-2; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-201. Agricultural labor.

  1. The term "agricultural labor" includes all service performed:
    1. On a farm, in the employ of any person, in connection with cultivating the soil, or in connection with raising or harvesting any agricultural or horticultural commodity, including the raising, shearing, feeding, caring for, training, and management of livestock, bees, poultry, and fur-bearing animals and wildlife.
    2. In the employ of the owner or tenant or other operator of a farm, in connection with the operation, management, conservation, improvement, or maintenance of such farm and its tools and equipment, or in salvaging timber or clearing land of brush and other debris left by a hurricane, if the major part of such service is performed on a farm.
    3. In connection with the production or harvesting of any commodity defined as an agricultural commodity in 12 U.S.C. § 1141j of the Federal Agricultural Marketing Act, or in connection with the ginning of cotton, or in connection with the operation or maintenance of ditches, canals, reservoirs, or waterways not owned or operated for profit used exclusively for supplying and storing water for farming purposes.
      1. In the employ of the operator of a farm in handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, processing, freezing, grading, storing, or delivering to storage or to market or to a carrier for transportation to market, in its unmanufactured state, any such agricultural or horticultural commodity; but only if such operator produced more than one-half of the commodity with respect to which such service is performed;
      2. In the employ of a group of operators of farms (or a cooperative organization of which such operators are members) in the performance of service described in subdivision 4 a of this subsection, but only if such operators produced more than one-half of the commodity with respect to which such service is performed;
      3. The provisions of subdivisions 4 a and 4 b of this section shall not be deemed to be applicable with respect to service performed in connection with commercial canning or commercial freezing or in connection with any agricultural or horticultural commodity after its delivery to a terminal market for distribution for consumption.
    4. On a farm operated for profit if such service is not in the course of the employer's trade or business or is domestic service in a private home of the employer.
  2. As used in this section, the term "farm" includes stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, fur-bearing animal and truck farms, plantations, ranches, nurseries, ranges, greenhouses or other similar structures used primarily for the raising of agricultural or horticultural commodities and orchards.

    (Code 1950, § 60-3; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-3; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1972, c. 764; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-202. Annual payroll.

"Annual payroll" means the total amount of wages payable by an employer, regardless of the time of payment, for employment during a calendar year.

(Code 1950, § 60-4; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-4; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-203. Average annual payroll.

"Average annual payroll" means the average of the annual payrolls of any employer for the last three or five preceding calendar years, whichever is higher.

(Code 1950, § 60-5; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-5; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-204. Base period.

"Base period" means the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of the claimant's benefit year; however, if the claimant has earned insufficient wages in the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters to become eligible for benefits, then such claimant's "base period" shall be the four most recent completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of the claimant's benefit year.

(Code 1950, § 60-6.1; 1956, c. 440; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-6; 1974, c. 466; 1986, c. 480; 2003, c. 383.)

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 383 substituted "claimant's" for "individual's," and added the language beginning "however, if the claimant" at the end of the section.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 9.

§ 60.2-205. Benefits.

"Benefits" means the money payments payable to an individual, as provided in this title, with respect to his unemployment.

(Code 1950, § 60-7; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-7; 1986, c. 480.)

Applied in Carter v. Extra's, Inc., 14 Va. App. 535, 420 S.E.2d 713 (1992).

§ 60.2-206. Benefit year.

"Benefit year" with respect to any individual means a period of fifty-two consecutive weeks beginning with the first day of the week in which an individual files a new valid claim for benefits except that the benefit year shall be fifty-three weeks if filing of a new valid claim would result in overlapping any quarter of the base period of a previously filed new claim. An initial claim for benefits filed in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission under the provisions of this title shall be deemed to be a valid claim within the purposes of this definition if the individual has been paid wages in his base period sufficient to make him eligible for benefits under the provisions of Chapter 6 (§ 60.2-600 et seq.) of this title.

(Code 1950, § 60-8.1; 1956, c. 440; 1964, c. 3; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-8; 1974, c. 466; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-207. Calendar quarter.

"Calendar quarter" means the period of three consecutive calendar months ending on March 31, June 30, September 30 or December 31, or the equivalent thereof, as the Commission may by regulation prescribe.

(Code 1950, § 60-9; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-9; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-208. Commission.

"Commission" means the Virginia Employment Commission. Wherever in this Code, or any act of the General Assembly the term "Unemployment Compensation Commission" is used, it shall mean the Virginia Employment Commission.

(Code 1950, § 60-10; 1960, c. 136; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-10; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-209. Taxes.

"Taxes" means the money imposed by and collectible under this title and includes payments in lieu of taxes collectible under §§ 60.2-501 through 60.2-507 .

(Code 1950, § 60-11; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-11; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-210. Employer.

  1. The term "employer" means any employing unit which:
    1. In any calendar quarter in either the current or preceding calendar year paid for some service in employment wages of $1,500 or more or such other amount as provided by federal law pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 3306; or
    2. For some portion of a day in each of twenty different weeks, whether or not such weeks were consecutive, in either the current or the preceding calendar year, has or had in its employment at least one individual, irrespective of whether the same individual was in employment in each such day.
  2. The term "employer" shall also mean:
    1. Any employing unit which acquired the organization, trade, separate establishment or business or substantially all the assets thereof, of another which at the time of such acquisition was an employer subject to this title;
    2. Any employing unit which acquired the organization, trade or business or substantially all the assets thereof, of another employing unit and which, if treated as a single unit with such other employing unit, would be an employer under subsection A of this section;
    3. Any employing unit which together with one or more other employing units, is owned or controlled, by legally enforceable means or otherwise, directly or indirectly by the same interests, or which owns or controls one or more other employing units, by legally enforceable means or otherwise, and which if treated as a single unit with such other employing unit, would be an employer under subsection A or B of this section;
    4. Any employing unit which having become an employer under subsection A of this section or subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 or 8 of this subsection has not, under § 60.2-509 , ceased to be an employer subject to this title;
    5. For the effective period of its election pursuant to § 60.2-510 , any other employing unit which has elected to become fully subject to this title;
    6. Any employing unit not an employer by reason of any other subdivision of this section (i) for which, within either the current or preceding calendar year, service is or was performed with respect to which such employing unit is liable for any federal tax against which credit may be taken for taxes required to be paid into a state unemployment fund; or (ii) which, as a condition for approval of this title for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, is required, pursuant to such act, to be an "employer" under this title;
    7. Any employing unit for which service in employment, as defined in subdivisions 1 through 3 of subsection A of § 60.2-213 , is performed;
    8. Any employing unit, for which service in employment, as defined in subdivision 4 of subsection A of § 60.2-213 , is performed;
    9. For the purposes of subdivision 2 of subsection A of this section and subdivisions 8 and 10 of this subsection if any week includes both December 31 and January 1, the days of that week up to January 1 shall be deemed one calendar week and the days beginning January 1 another such week;
    10. Any employing unit for which agricultural labor in employment as defined in § 60.2-214 is performed; or
    11. Any employing unit for which domestic service in employment as defined in § 60.2-215 is performed.
    1. In determining whether an employing unit for which service other than domestic service is also performed is an employer under subsection A or subdivision 10 of subsection B of this section, the wages earned or the employment of an employee performing domestic service shall not be taken into account. C. 1.  In determining whether an employing unit for which service other than domestic service is also performed is an employer under subsection A or subdivision 10 of subsection B of this section, the wages earned or the employment of an employee performing domestic service shall not be taken into account.
    2. In determining whether an employing unit for which service other than agricultural labor is also performed is an employer under subsection A or subdivision 11 of subsection B of this section, the wages earned or the employment of an employee performing service in agricultural labor shall not be taken into account. If an employing unit is determined an employer of agricultural labor, such employing unit shall be determined an employer for the purpose of subsection A of this section.

      (Code 1950, § 60-12; 1956, c. 440; 1964, c. 3; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-12; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1974, c. 466; 1977, c. 330; 1979, c. 637; 1986, c. 480.)

Cross references. - As to worker misclassification, see § 58.1-1900 et seq.

CASE NOTES

Common ownership of employing units. - An individual was sole proprietor of a jewelry company and owned a controlling stock interest in five corporations, each owning one or more stores and engaging in the retail jewelry business. Only the sole proprietorship had enough employees to be liable for contributions under the Unemployment Compensation Act. None of the corporations had a sufficient number of employees but all were liable under subdivision B 3 of this section, because of common ownership. They did not, however, collectively constitute a single employer for rating purposes; rather, each was a separate employer to be rated individually in accordance with its unemployment experience. Rogers Jewelry Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 199 Va. 696 , 101 S.E.2d 552 (1958) (decided under prior law).

§ 60.2-211. Employing unit.

  1. "Employing unit" means any of the following which has or had in its employ one or more individuals performing services for it within this Commonwealth:
    1. Any individual or type of organization, including the state government and its instrumentalities;
    2. Any of the political subdivisions of this Commonwealth and their instrumentalities;
    3. Any instrumentalities wholly owned (i) by this Commonwealth and one or more political subdivisions, (ii) by a combination of political subdivisions or (iii) by any of the foregoing and one or more other states or their political subdivisions;
    4. Any partnership, association, trust, estate, joint-stock company, insurance company or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, or the receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, trustee or successor thereof; or
    5. The legal representative of a deceased person.
  2. All individuals performing services within this Commonwealth for any employing unit which maintains two or more separate establishments within this Commonwealth shall be deemed to be employed by a single employing unit for all the purposes of this title. Whenever any employing unit contracts with any person for any service which is a part of such employing unit's usual trade, occupation, profession or business, that employing unit shall be deemed to employ all individuals employed by such person for such service unless such person performs service or is in fact actually available to perform service for anyone who may wish to contract with him and is also found to be engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business. Each individual employed to perform or to assist in performing the work of any agent or employee of an employing unit shall be deemed to be employed by such employing unit for all the purposes of this title, whether such individual was hired or paid directly by such employing unit or by such agent or employee, provided the employing unit had actual or constructive knowledge of such work.

    (Code 1950, § 60-13; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-13; 1974, cc. 466, 660; 1977, c. 330; 1986, c. 480.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 3.

§ 60.2-212. Employment.

  1. "Employment" means:
    1. Any service including service in interstate commerce, performed for remuneration or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied; and
    2. Any service, of whatever nature, performed by an individual for any employing unit, for remuneration or under any contract of hire, written or oral, and irrespective of citizenship or residence of either,
      1. Within the United States, or
      2. On or in connection with an American vessel or American aircraft under a contract of service which is entered into within the United States or during the performance of which and while the individual is employed on the vessel or aircraft it touches at a port in the United States, if such individual performs such services on or in connection with such vessel or aircraft when outside the United States, provided that the operating office, from which the operations of the vessel or aircraft are ordinarily and regularly supervised, managed, directed or controlled, is within the Commonwealth.
  2. Notwithstanding subdivision 2 b of subsection A of this section, "employment" means all service performed by an officer or member of the crew of an American vessel on or in connection with such vessel, if the operating office from which the operations of such vessel operating on navigable waters within, or within and without, the United States are ordinarily and regularly supervised, managed, directed and controlled is within the Commonwealth.
  3. Services performed by an individual for remuneration shall be deemed to be employment subject to this title unless the Commission determines that such individual is not an employee for purposes of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, based upon an application of the standard used by the Internal Revenue Service for such determinations.
  4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection C, an individual who performs services as a real estate salesperson, under direction of a real estate broker under Chapter 21 (§ 54.1-2100 et seq.) of Title 54.1, or as a real estate appraiser under Chapter 20.1 (§ 54.1-2009 et seq.) of Title 54.1 pursuant to an executed independent contractor agreement and for remuneration solely by way of commission or fee, shall not be an employee for purposes of this chapter.
  5. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection C, a hiring party providing an individual with personal protective equipment in response to a disaster caused by a communicable disease of public health threat for which a state of emergency has been declared pursuant to § 44-146.17 shall not be considered in any determination regarding whether such individual is an employee or independent contractor. For the purposes of this subsection, the terms "communicable disease of public health threat," "disaster," and "state of emergency" have the same meaning as provided in § 44-146.16. (Code 1950, § 60-14; 1952, cc. 30, 184; 1956, c. 440; 1962, c. 71; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-14; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1972, c. 824; 1974, cc. 466, 660; 1976, c. 304; 1977, c. 330; 1979, c. 637; 1980, cc. 520, 522; 1981, cc. 28, 369, 374, 375; 1982, c. 25; 1983, c. 14; 1984, cc. 120, 139, 204; 1985, cc. 152, 254; 1986, c. 480; 1996, c. 244; 2005, c. 892; 2020, c. 1261; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 448.)

Cross references. - As to reports by employers to the Virginia New Hire Reporting Center, operated under the authority of the Division of Child Support Enforcement, of the employment of persons defined in § 60.2-212 , see § 63.2-1946 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2021, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received adequate funding from the U.S. Department of Labor that covers the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. The amendments by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 4 provides: "That, if not sooner expired pursuant to the provisions of the third enactment of this act, this act shall expire on July 1, 2022." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. The amendments by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 892 rewrote subsection C.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 1261, substituted "standard used by the Internal Revenue Service for such determinations" for "20 factors set forth in Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling 87-41, issued pursuant to 26 C.F.R. 31.3306(i)-1 and 26 C.F.R. 31.3121(d)-1" in subsection C at the end.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 448, effective July 1, 2021, added subsection E.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on governmental services and social welfare for the year 1976-77, see 63 Va. L. Rev. 1440 (1977).

For annual survey of Virginia labor and employment law, see 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 241 (2005).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, §§ 3, 5.

CASE NOTES

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Editor's note. - Many of the cases below were decided under prior law.

This section is to be liberally construed to effect its beneficent purpose and in borderline cases "employment" should be found to exist. VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983).

Legislature may define employment subject to taxation. - In the absence of constitutional restraint the legislature may determine and define what shall constitute employment subject to taxation without regard to the common-law conception of that term, and such was the purpose of and result obtained by the Unemployment Compensation Act. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202 , 18 S.E.2d 390 (1942).

And such definition is binding on the courts. - In determining the meaning of "employment," as used in the Unemployment Compensation Act, the courts are bound by the statutory definition contained in this section, rather than by the common-law meaning of the master and servant relation. It was the intent of the legislature, as expressed in the language used, to make the Act broader and more inclusive than the ordinary relation of master and servant. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 178 Va. 46 , 16 S.E.2d 357 (1941); Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202 , 18 S.E.2d 390 (1942).

This section includes individuals who would have been excluded under the common-law concepts of master and servant, and, on the other hand, excludes a great number of persons, domestic servants, agricultural laborers and others who, under common-law concepts of master and servant, are deemed employees. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 189 Va. 692 , 54 S.E.2d 72 (1949).

The term "employment" should be accorded a broader and more inclusive meaning than in the common-law context of master and servant. VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983).

Determination of relationship from actual practice supplementing contract between parties. - In attempting to solve the question whether one was performing services for another and was in the latter's employment under the Unemployment Compensation Act, the courts are not so much concerned with what a contract between the parties says as they are with actual practice of the parties which supplemented their written agreement. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944).

The existence of the relation of master and servant under the Unemployment Compensation Act does not depend upon how the parties designate each other in their contract. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 189 Va. 692 , 54 S.E.2d 72 (1949).

As at common law, and in the worker's compensation context, the existence of the master-servant relationship under the act does not depend upon how the parties designate each other in their contract. Rather, the individual's status in relation to the alleged employer is to be determined from all the facts and circumstances adduced by the evidence, including the provisions of any written agreement. VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983).

Power of control determines relationship. - Where the party for whom the work is to be done has the power to direct the means and methods by which the other does the work, an employer-employee relationship exists; if the latter is free to adopt such means and methods as he chooses to accomplish the result, he is not an employee but an independent contractor. Among the tests used to determine if the right to control exists are: whether instructions have to be obeyed, and whether either of the parties possesses the right to terminate services at will without incurring liability to the other. VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983).

In any master-servant analysis, be it in the area of tort liability, worker's compensation, or unemployment compensation, the power of control is the determining factor in ascertaining the parties' status. The potential power of control, not the actual exercise of control, is the important element. And the right of control does not include only the power to specify the result to be accomplished, but, in the language of the act, it must include the power over the performance of such services, both under the contract of service and in fact. VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983).

Drywall contractor failed to prove that drywall installers were free from its control or direction where evidence in the record was sufficient to show that contractor had the potential right to discharge installers for disobedience with the company's standards while work was in progress; therefore the service performed by installers was within the Act's definition of employment and contractor was required to pay taxes on the remuneration it paid to them. VEC v. Porter-Blaine Corp., 27 Va. App. 153, 497 S.E.2d 889 (1998).

Service for remuneration. - The services individuals perform for remuneration under a contract for hire are deemed "employment" unless they are exempt under both subdivisions C 1 and C 2. VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983).

Employee held to have performed service for remuneration within the meaning of subsection A. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944).

Persons held in "employment." - Persons with whom defendant contracted to cut and saw timber, and to whom defendant contracted to sell sawmill, held in his "employment" within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act, and he was, therefore, amenable to its provisions. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944).

Under "contract of hire." - Individual operatives who paid the owner of beauty establishments a fixed amount per week as so-called rental on booths which were assigned to them, who were required to wear uniforms furnished at their expense, and who had no fixed hours, but were required to keep their appointments and complete their work, were in the "employment" of the owner under "contract of hire" as that term is used in subsection A. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202 , 18 S.E.2d 390 (1942).

Employees converted into lessees or vendees. - An employer may not evade the consequences of the Unemployment Compensation Act by the simple expedient of converting, for a short period, his employees into "lessees" or "vendees" of the identical equipment through the use of which these employees have performed services for him. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944).

General contractors. - Where all but three of two-hundred subcontractors used Social Security numbers that were issued to individuals, general contractor was liable for unemployment taxes for the subcontractors. Brothers Constr. Co. v. VEC, 26 Va. App. 286, 494 S.E.2d 478 (1998).

Construction contractors did not qualify for the exemption under subsection C of this section where although siding installers provided their own tolls and transportation, the construction contractors provided all the materials for the jobs, the installers were not free to purchase their own materials from other resources, the work had to be performed in accordance to the general contractors' standards, specification, and satisfaction, made periodic inspections, and retained the right to terminate the installers at will. Brothers Constr. Co. v. VEC, 26 Va. App. 286, 494 S.E.2d 478 (1998).

II. EXEMPTIONS UNDER SUBSECTION C.

Provisions of subsection C furnish the guide in determining whether the Unemployment Compensation Act should be applied in a given situation. Under the subsection, services performed by an individual for remuneration shall be deemed to be "employment" unless such individual is free from control, both under his contract and in fact, and his service comes within one of the conditions in subdivision C 2. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 189 Va. 692 , 54 S.E.2d 72 (1949).

Burden is on employer to show exemption. - In order to be exempt from the Unemployment Compensation Act under subsection C of this section, the alleged employer must show himself to be within the exception of subdivision 1 of said subsection, and within one of the alternative exceptions enumerated in subdivision 2 of the same subsection. Since the two subdivisions 1 and 2 are in the conjunctive the burden of proof is on him to show that he is under both. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944); Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202 , 18 S.E.2d 390 (1942); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 189 Va. 692 , 54 S.E.2d 72 (1949), holding that the alleged employer failed to carry this burden.

The burden is on the putative employer to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it is within the statutory exemptions. VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983).

Subsection C requires that in order to be exempt from the provisions of the Act, the putative employer has to establish that it meets the criteria of both subdivision C 1 and one of the three exceptions of subdivision C 2. Therefore, if the putative employer fails to demonstrate that it is within the terms of either subdivision C 1 or one of the three exceptions in subdivision C 2, it fails to meet its burden of proof, and an "employment" relationship exists. Rovan Enters., Inc. v. VEC, No. 0206-86-2 (Ct. of Appeals June 8, 1987).

Exemptions should be strictly construed against the alleged employer. VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983).

To bring its agents under either one of the exemptions in the provisions designated as 1 and 2 under subsection C the company must demonstrate that they have no control or direction over the services of the agents and that the services are either outside the usual course of customary business, or that the services are performed outside of appellants' places of business; or that the agents were "engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business." Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 178 Va. 46 , 16 S.E.2d 357 (1941); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 189 Va. 692 , 54 S.E.2d 72 (1949).

"Free from control." - Advertising salesperson was not free from control within meaning of subdivision C 1 where he was free to ignore reporting and meeting attendance duties with impunity only if he met his sales quota and his failure to perform could trigger oversight over the means and methods of his performance. VEC v. Thomas Regional Directory, Inc., 13 Va. App. 610, 414 S.E.2d 412 (1992).

Places of business, within the meaning of subdivision C 2 of this section, are not confined to the headquarters or office premises of the alleged employer, but embrace all of the latter's places of business. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944).

In the case of insurance agents the places of business were held to include territory in which they worked. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 178 Va. 46 , 16 S.E.2d 357 (1941), cited in Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944).

Service performed by parties with whom defendant contracted to cut and saw timber was held not "outside of all the places of business" of defendant, within the meaning of subdivision C 2 of this section, but within at least some of them. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944).

An "established" business, within the meaning of subdivision C 2 of this section, is one that is permanent, fixed, stable, or lasting. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944).

Engaged in independently established trade, etc. - Parties with whom defendant contracted to cut and saw timber, in the performance of their services, were held not to be "engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business," within the meaning of subdivision C 2 of this section. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426 , 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944).

Where the contract under which insurance agents operated showed, among other things, that a strong effort was made to have the agents report to the company every day; that they were required to file reports of business obtained and collections made; that they were urged to be present at staff meetings; that they were furnished materials for their work and were also provided with a debit assigning them territory for collections, although they were at liberty to solicit business outside of this territory, and all applications had to be approved by the home office, it was held that the agents were not engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 178 Va. 46 , 16 S.E.2d 357 (1941).

Failure to show business was permanent or independently established. - Where advertising salesperson had no business license, business card, business phone, or business location and he was in business 75 days before quitting to become a social worker, the facts undermined any claim that his business was permanent, lasting, or independently established. VEC v. Thomas Regional Directory, Inc., 13 Va. App. 610, 414 S.E.2d 412 (1992).

A putative employer failed to meet its burden of establishing that exotic dancers were engaged in permanent, fixed, stable or lasting business enterprises where the evidence suggested that the dancers' "enterprises" were temporary and short-lived; the fact that the dancers had business licenses and business cards, that they performed at other clubs while employed by the putative employer, that the putative employer issued 1099 to the dancers and that the relationship may not have been deemed employment under federal law did not require a finding that the dancers were independent contractors. Yard Bird, Inc. v. VEC, 28 Va. App. 215, 503 S.E.2d 246 (1998).

Beauty establishment operatives not within exceptions. - Individual operatives who paid the owner of beauty establishments a fixed amount per week as so-called rental on booths which were assigned to them, who were required to wear uniforms furnished at their expense, and who had no fixed hours, but were required to keep their appointments and complete their work, did not come within the exceptions provided by subsection C of this section. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202 , 18 S.E.2d 390 (1942).

Insurance agents. - The use of the word "or" prior to the last exception found in subdivision C 2 does not have the effect of excluding insurance agents from the Act. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 178 Va. 46 , 16 S.E.2d 357 (1941). As to exclusion of insurance agents remunerated solely by way of commission, see subdivision 13 of § 60.2-219 .

Physicians offering emergency room medical services not within exemptions. - The evidence offered by a corporation which provided emergency room medical services fell short of showing the physicians were engaged in an independently established profession that was permanent, stable and lasting, where the full-time physicians did not have separate practices other than their work at the hospital and the outpatient facility, but all of the part time doctors were engaged either in practice with the military or were in residency programs at a medical school; not all of the full time doctors were paid in the same manner; evidence that all doctors shared some of the risk of unpaid patient bills was nothing more than use of standard business practices, and not all of the doctors were shareholders. VEC v. Peninsula Emergency Physicians, Inc., 4 Va. App. 621, 359 S.E.2d 552 (1987).

Exotic dancers not within exemptions. - Exotic dancers were under the direction and control of the putative employer and not engaged in independently established businesses where the employer required that the dancers comply with certain rules it had established and with state laws and regulations, the employer could terminate the dancers' services at will, the dancers were guaranteed an hourly rate of pay, and there was insufficient evidence that the dancers were engaged in permanent, fixed, stable or lasting business enterprises. Yard Bird, Inc. v. VEC, 28 Va. App. 215, 503 S.E.2d 246 (1998).

§ 60.2-212.1. Employment; special exclusion.

  1. In the trucking industry, an owner-operator or lessee of a vehicle which is licensed and registered as a truck, tractor, or truck-tractor by a governmental motor vehicle regulatory agency is an independent contractor, not an employee, while performing services in the operation of his truck, if each of the following factors is substantially present:
    1. The individual owns the equipment or holds it under a bona fide lease arrangement;
    2. The individual is responsible for the maintenance of the equipment;
    3. The individual bears the principal burdens of the operating costs, including fuel, repairs, supplies, vehicle insurance, and personal expenses while on the road;
    4. The individual is responsible for supplying the necessary personal services to operate the equipment;
    5. The individual's compensation is based on factors related to the work performed including a percentage of any schedule of rates or lawfully published tariff and not on the basis of the hours or time expended;
    6. The individual generally determines the details and means of performing the services, in conformance with regulatory requirements, operating procedures of the carrier and specifications of the shipper; and
    7. The individual enters into a contract that specifies the relationship to be that of an independent contractor and not that of an employee.
  2. No such owner-operator or lessee who qualifies under the criteria set forth in subsection A of this section shall be considered by the Commission to be an employee covered by this title for any services performed prior to or after January 1, 1987. Taxes paid or benefits collected prior to January 1, 1987, that would be affected by the provisions of this section, shall not be subject to refund.

    (1987, c. 539.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 5.

§ 60.2-212.2. Obtaining a determination or opinion.

If an employing unit is unsure of the status of an individual performing services for it, the employing unit may obtain a written determination pursuant to § 60.2-500 .

(1987, c. 539.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 5.

§ 60.2-213. Employment with hospital, higher education, state, subdivision, or certain religious or charitable organizations.

  1. "Employment" includes:
    1. Service performed by an individual (i) in the employ of the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions or instrumentalities or (ii) in the employ of the Commonwealth and one or more other states or their political subdivisions or instrumentalities, for a hospital or institution of higher education located in this Commonwealth provided that such service is excluded from "employment" as defined in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act solely by reason of § 3306(c)(7) of that act and is not excluded from "employment" under subsection B;
    2. Service performed by an individual (i) in the employ of the Commonwealth or any of its wholly owned instrumentalities or (ii) in the employ of the Commonwealth and one or more other states or their instrumentalities, provided that such service is excluded from "employment" as defined in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (26 U.S.C.) by § 3306(c)(7) of that act and is not excluded from "employment" under subsection B;
    3. Service performed by an individual (i) in the employ of any political subdivision of the Commonwealth or any of its wholly owned instrumentalities or (ii) in the employ of any instrumentality wholly owned by this Commonwealth, any of its political subdivisions or instrumentalities, or any instrumentality wholly owned by any of the foregoing and one or more other states or their political subdivisions, provided that such service is excluded from "employment" as defined in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act by § 3306(c)(7) of that act and is not excluded from "employment" under subsection B;
    4. Service performed by an individual in the employ of a religious, charitable, educational or other organization but only if the following conditions are met:
      1. Their service is excluded from "employment" as defined in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (26 U.S.C.) solely by reason of § 3306(c)(8) of that act; and
      2. The organization had four or more individuals in employment for some portion of a day in each of 20 different weeks, whether or not such weeks were consecutive, within either the current or preceding calendar year, regardless of whether they were employed at the same moment of time.
  2. For the purposes of subdivisions A 3 and 4, the term "employment" does not apply to service performed:
    1. In the employ of (i) a church or convention or association of churches, or (ii) an organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches;
    2. By a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his ministry or by a member of a religious order in the exercise of duties required by such order;
    3. In a facility conducted for the purpose of carrying out a program of rehabilitation for individuals whose earning capacity is impaired by age, physical deficiency, mental illness, intellectual disability, or injury or providing remunerative work for individuals who because of their impaired physical or mental capacity cannot be readily absorbed in the competitive labor market by an individual receiving such rehabilitation or remunerative work;
    4. As part of an unemployment work-relief or work-training program assisted or financed in whole or in part by a federal agency or an agency of a state or political subdivision thereof, by an individual receiving such work relief or work training;
    5. By an inmate of a custodial or penal institution; or
    6. In the employ of the Commonwealth, or any political subdivision thereof or any instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing as set forth in subdivisions A 1 through 3, if such service is performed by an individual in the exercise of duties:
      1. As an elected official;
      2. As a member of a legislative body, or a member of the judiciary;
      3. As a member of the state National Guard or Air National Guard;
      4. As an employee serving on a temporary basis in case of fire, storm, snow, earthquake, flood, or similar emergency; or
      5. In a position which, under or pursuant to the laws of the Commonwealth, is designated as (i) a major nontenured policymaking or advisory position or (ii) a policymaking or advisory position the performance of the duties of which ordinarily does not require more than eight hours per week.

        (Code 1950, § 60-14; 1952, cc. 30, 184; 1956, c. 440; 1962, c. 71; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-14; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1972, c. 824; 1974, cc. 466, 660; 1976, c. 304; 1977, c. 330; 1979, c. 637; 1980, cc. 520, 522; 1981, cc. 28, 369, 374, 375; 1982, c. 25; 1983, c. 14; 1984, cc. 120, 139, 204; 1985, cc. 152, 254; 1986, c. 480; 2012, cc. 476, 507.)

Cross references. - As to benefits based on service in employment defined in subsection A of this section, see § 60.2-615 .

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendments by cc. 476 and 507 are identical, and substituted "is impaired by age, physical deficiency, mental illness, intellectual disability, or injury" for "is impaired by age or physical or mental deficiency, or injury" in subdivision B 3; and made minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

§ 60.2-214. Agricultural employment.

  1. "Employment" includes service performed by an individual in agricultural labor as defined in § 60.2-201 when:
    1. Such service is performed for a person who:
      1. During any calendar quarter in either the current or the preceding calendar year paid wages of $20,000 or more to individuals employed in agricultural labor, including labor performed by an alien referred to in subdivision 2 of this subsection, or
      2. For some portion of a day in each of twenty different calendar weeks, whether or not such weeks were consecutive, in either the current or the preceding calendar year, employed in agricultural labor, including labor performed by an alien referred to in subdivision 2 of this subsection, ten or more individuals, regardless of whether they were employed at the same moment of time.
    2. Such service is not performed in agricultural labor by an individual who is an alien admitted to the United States to perform service in agricultural labor pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 214 (c) and 8 U.S.C. § 101 (a) (15) (H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Services performed and wages received by such alien workers after January 1, 1980, shall be counted in determining whether an employer is subject to the Virginia unemployment tax for his other farmworkers.
  2. For the purposes of this section any individual who is a member of a crew furnished by a crew leader to perform service in agricultural labor for any other person shall be treated as an employee of such crew leader if:
    1. Such crew leader holds a valid certificate of registration under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act of 1983 (29 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.) or substantially all the members of such crew operate or maintain tractors, mechanized harvesting or crop dusting equipment, or any other mechanized equipment, which is provided by such crew leader, and
    2. Such individual is not an employee of such other person within the meaning of subdivision 1 of subsection A of § 60.2-212 .
  3. For the purposes of this section, in the case of any individual who is furnished by a crew leader to perform service in agricultural labor for any other person and who is not treated as an employee of such crew leader under subsection B of this section then:
    1. Such other person and not the crew leader shall be treated as the employer of such individual, and
    2. Such other person shall be treated as having paid wages to such individual in an amount equal to the amount of wages paid to such individual by the crew leader, either on his own behalf or on behalf of such other person, for the service in agricultural labor performed for such other person.
  4. For the purposes of this section, the term "crew leader" means an individual who:
    1. Furnishes individuals to perform service in agricultural labor for any other person,
    2. Pays, either on his own behalf or on behalf of such other person, the individuals so furnished by him for the service in agricultural labor performed by them, and
    3. Has not entered into a written agreement with such other person under which such individual is designated as an employee of such other person.

      (Code 1950, § 60-14; 1952, cc. 30, 184; 1956, c. 440; 1962, c. 71; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-14; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1972, c. 824; 1974, cc. 466, 660; 1976, c. 304; 1977, c. 330; 1979, c. 637; 1980, cc. 520, 522; 1981, cc. 28, 369, 374, 375; 1982, c. 25; 1983, c. 14; 1984, cc. 120, 139, 204; 1985, cc. 152, 254; 1986, c. 480; 1987, c. 113; 1993, c. 250; 1996, c. 745.)

Editor's note. - Former provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., referred to in subdivision A 2 above, were transferred to 8 U.S.C. § 1552. Former section 214 of Title 8 of the United States Code was repealed.

Acts 1996, c. 745, cl. 2 provides, "[t]hat the provisions of this act shall become effective (i) on the effective date of amendments or changes to § 3306 (c) (1) B of the Federal Unemployment Taxation Act made by the Congress of the United States, or (ii) on the date such provision is finally adjudged invalid or unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States rendering, in either event, the provisions of subdivision A 2 of § 60.2-214 stricken by this act invalid or without further effect. In such event, the Governor shall, within sixty days of the effective date of such amendment or change to § 3306 (c) (1) B of the Federal Unemployment Taxation Act, or from the date that such provision is finally adjudged invalid or unconstitutional, by proclamation so state."

The contingency necessary for the 1996 amendment to this section to take effect has been satisfied, with the signing by the President of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996.

Acts 1996, c. 745, cl. 3 provides: "[t]hat any employer taxes paid pursuant to the provisions of subdivision A 2 of § 60.2-214 after § 3306 (c) (1) B of the Federal Unemployment Taxation Act is amended or otherwise changed by the Congress of the United States, or is finally adjudged invalid or unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States shall be refunded pursuant to § 60.2-524 . Such refunds shall be retroactive to the effective date of such amendment, change or adjudication, which date shall be set forth in the Governor's proclamation as provided in the second enactment herein."

§ 60.2-215. Domestic employment.

"Employment" includes domestic service performed by an individual in a private home, local college club or local chapter of a college fraternity or sorority for a person who paid wages of $1,000 or more to individuals employed in such domestic service in any calendar quarter in the current calendar year or the preceding calendar year. The term "domestic service" shall not include any medical services performed by personnel such as a nurse, nurse's aide, private nurse, practical nurse, student nurse or attendant rendering medical services in a private residence or a medical institution where such personnel are employed by the person receiving such services.

(Code 1950, § 60-14; 1952, cc. 30, 184; 1956, c. 440; 1962, c. 71; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-14; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1972, c. 824; 1974, cc. 466, 660; 1976, c. 304; 1977, c. 330; 1979, c. 637; 1980, cc. 520, 522; 1981, cc. 28, 369, 374, 375; 1982, c. 25; 1983, c. 14; 1984, cc. 120, 139, 204; 1985, cc. 152, 254; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-216. Employment outside of United States.

  1. "Employment" includes any service of an individual who is a citizen of the United States, performed outside the United States, except in Canada, in the employ of an American employer other than service which is deemed "employment" under the provisions of subsections A and B of § 60.2-217 or the parallel provisions of another state's law, if:
    1. The employer's principal place of business in the United States is located in this Commonwealth;
    2. The employer has no place of business in the United States, but
      1. The employer is an individual who is a resident of this Commonwealth,
      2. The employer is a corporation which is organized under the laws of this Commonwealth, or
      3. The employer is a partnership or a trust and the number of the partners or trustees who are residents of this Commonwealth is greater than the number who are residents of any one other state; or
    3. None of the criteria of subdivisions 1 and 2 of this subsection is met but the employer has elected coverage in this Commonwealth or, the employer having failed to elect coverage in any state, the individual has filed a claim for benefits, based on such service, under the law of this Commonwealth.
  2. An "American employer," for purposes of this section, means a person who is:
    1. An individual who is a resident of the United States;
    2. A partnership, if two-thirds or more of the partners are residents of the United States;
    3. A trust, if all of the trustees are residents of the United States; or
    4. A corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any state.
  3. As used in this section, the term "United States" shall be defined as "state" is defined in § 60.2-225 . (Code 1950, § 60-14; 1952, cc. 30, 184; 1956, c. 440; 1962, c. 71; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-14; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1972, c. 824; 1974, cc. 466, 660; 1976, c. 304; 1977, c. 330; 1979, c. 637; 1980, cc. 520, 522; 1981, cc. 28, 369, 374, 375; 1982, c. 25; 1983, c. 14; 1984, cc. 120, 139, 204; 1985, cc. 152, 254; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-217. Employment within and without Commonwealth.

  1. The term "employment" shall include an individual's entire service, performed within or both within and without this Commonwealth if:
    1. The service is localized in this Commonwealth; or
    2. The service is not localized in any state but some of the service is performed in this Commonwealth and (i) the base of operations, or, if there is no base of operations, then the place from which such service is directed or controlled, is in this Commonwealth; or (ii) the base of operations or place from which such service is directed or controlled is not in any state in which some part of the service is performed, but the individual's residence is in this Commonwealth.
  2. Services performed within this Commonwealth and not covered under subsection A of this section shall be deemed to be employment subject to this title if taxes are not required and paid with respect to such services under an unemployment compensation law of any other state or of the federal government.
    1. Services not covered under subsection A of this section, and performed entirely without this Commonwealth, with respect to no part of which taxes are required and paid under an unemployment compensation law of any other state or of the federal government, shall be deemed to be employment subject to this title if (i) the individual performing such services is a resident of this Commonwealth and (ii) the Commission approves the election of the employing unit, for whom such services are performed, that the entire service of such individual shall be deemed to be employment subject to this title. C. 1.  Services not covered under subsection A of this section, and performed entirely without this Commonwealth, with respect to no part of which taxes are required and paid under an unemployment compensation law of any other state or of the federal government, shall be deemed to be employment subject to this title if (i) the individual performing such services is a resident of this Commonwealth and (ii) the Commission approves the election of the employing unit, for whom such services are performed, that the entire service of such individual shall be deemed to be employment subject to this title.
    2. Services covered by an arrangement between the Commission and the agency charged with the administration of any other state or federal unemployment compensation law, pursuant to which all services performed by an individual for an employing unit are deemed to be performed entirely within this Commonwealth, shall be deemed to be employment if the Commission has approved an election of the employing unit for whom such services are performed, pursuant to which the entire service of such individual during the period covered by such election is deemed to be insured work.
    3. The Commission is hereby authorized to enter into reciprocal arrangements with appropriate and duly authorized agencies of other states or the federal government whereby services performed by an individual for a single employing unit for which services are customarily performed in more than one state shall be deemed to be services performed entirely within any one of the states (i) in which any part of such individual's service is performed, (ii) in which such individual has his residence, or (iii) in which the employing unit maintains a place of business. Any such arrangement shall be authorized if there is in effect, as to such services, an election, approved by the agency charged with the administration of such state's unemployment compensation law, pursuant to which all the services performed by such individual for such employing unit are deemed to be performed entirely within such state.
    4. To the extent permissible under the laws and Constitution of this Commonwealth and the United States, the Commission is authorized to enter into or cooperate in arrangements whereby facilities and services provided under this title and facilities and services provided under the unemployment compensation law of any foreign government established on the continent of North America, may be utilized for the taking of claims and the payment of benefits under this title or under a similar law of such foreign government.
    1. Service shall be deemed to be localized within a state if: D. 1.  Service shall be deemed to be localized within a state if:
      1. The service is performed entirely within such state; or
      2. The service is performed both within and without such state, but the service performed without such state is incidental to the individual's service within the state, for example is temporary or transitory in nature or consists of isolated transactions.
    2. Services performed outside the state in which the base of operations is located shall be deemed to be incidental to the services performed within such state.

      (Code 1950, § 60-14; 1952, cc. 30, 184; 1956, c. 440; 1962, c. 71; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-14; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1972, c. 824; 1974, cc. 466, 660; 1976, c. 304; 1977, c. 330; 1979, c. 637; 1980, cc. 520, 522; 1981, cc. 28, 369, 374, 375; 1982, c. 25; 1983, c. 14; 1984, cc. 120, 139, 204; 1985, cc. 152, 254; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-218. Employment taxed by federal law.

Notwithstanding any other provision of §§ 60.2-212 through 60.2-217 and § 60.2-219 , the term "employment" shall mean service with respect to which a tax is required to be paid under any federal law imposing a tax against which credit may be taken for taxes required to be paid into a state unemployment fund or which as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act is required to be covered under this title.

(Code 1950, § 60-14; 1952, cc. 30, 184; 1956, c. 440; 1962, c. 71; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-14; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1972, c. 824; 1974, cc. 466, 660; 1976, c. 304; 1977, c. 330; 1979, c. 637; 1980, cc. 520, 522; 1981, cc. 28, 369, 374, 375; 1982, c. 25; 1983, c. 14; 1984, cc. 120, 139, 204; 1985, cc. 152, 254; 1986, c. 480.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 7.

§ 60.2-219. Services not included in term "employment."

The term "employment" shall not include:

  1. Service performed in the employ of the United States government or of any instrumentality of the United States which is wholly or partially owned by the United States or which is exempt from the tax imposed by § 3301 of the Federal Internal Revenue Code by virtue of any provision of law which specifically refers to such section (or the corresponding section of prior law) in granting such exemption;
  2. Service with respect to which unemployment compensation is payable under an unemployment compensation system established by an act of Congress, including service performed after June 30, 1939, for an employer determined to be subject to the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (45 U.S.C. § 351 et seq.) by the agency or agencies empowered to make such determination by an act of Congress, and service as an employer representative determined to be subject to such act by such agency or agencies. The Commission is hereby authorized and directed to enter into agreements with the proper agencies under such act of Congress, which agreements shall become effective 10 days after publication thereof, in the manner provided in § 60.2-111 for general rules, to provide reciprocal treatment to individuals who have, after acquiring potential rights to benefits under this title, acquired rights to unemployment compensation under such act of Congress, or who have, after acquiring potential rights to unemployment compensation under such act of Congress, acquired rights to benefits under this title;
  3. Agricultural labor as defined in § 60.2-201 except as provided for in § 60.2-214 ;
  4. Domestic service in a private home, local college club or local chapter of a college fraternity or sorority except as provided for in § 60.2-215 ;
  5. Service performed on or in connection with a vessel or aircraft not an American vessel or American aircraft by an employee, if the employee is employed on and in connection with such vessel or aircraft when outside the United States;
  6. Service performed by an individual in, or as an officer or member of the crew of, a vessel while it is engaged in the catching, taking, harvesting, cultivating or farming of any kind of fish, shellfish, crustacea, sponges, seaweeds or other aquatic forms of animal and vegetable life, including service performed by any such individual as an ordinary incident to any such activity, except (i) service performed in connection with the catching or taking of salmon or halibut for commercial purposes and (ii) service performed on or in connection with a vessel of more than 10 net tons, determined in the manner provided for determining the register tonnage of merchant vessels under the laws of the United States;

    6a. Service performed by an individual on a boat engaged in catching fish or other forms of aquatic life under an arrangement with the owner or operator of such boat pursuant to which:

    1. Such individual does not receive any cash remuneration, other than as provided in subdivision b;
    2. Such individual receives a share of the boat's, or the boats' in the case of a fishing operation involving more than one boat, catch of fish or other forms of aquatic animal life, or a share of the proceeds from the sale of such catch; and
    3. The amount of such individual's share depends on the amount of the boat's, or the boats' in the case of a fishing operation involving more than one boat, catch of fish or other forms of aquatic animal life, but only if the operating crew of such boat, or each boat from which the individual receives a share in the case of a fishing operation involving more than one boat is normally made up of fewer than 10 individuals;
  7. Service performed by an individual in the employ of his son, daughter, or spouse and service performed by a child under the age of 21 in the employ of his father or mother;
  8. Service performed in any calendar quarter in the employ of any organization exempt from income tax (i) under § 501(a) of the Federal Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.), other than an organization described in § 401(a) of such Code, or (ii) under § 521 of the Federal Internal Revenue Code, if the remuneration for such service is less than $50;
  9. Service performed in the employ of a school or institution of higher education, if such service is performed by a student who is enrolled and is regularly attending classes at such school or institution;
  10. Service performed as a student nurse in the employ of a hospital or a nurses' training school by an individual who is enrolled and is regularly attending classes in a nurses' training school chartered or approved pursuant to state law;
  11. Service performed as an intern in the employ of a hospital by an individual who has completed a four-year course in a medical school chartered or approved pursuant to state law;
  12. Service performed by an individual for an employing unit as an insurance agent or as an insurance solicitor, if all such service performed by such individual for such employing unit is performed for remuneration solely by way of commission;
  13. Service performed by an individual for an employing unit as a real estate salesman, if all such service performed by such individual for such employing unit is performed for remuneration solely by way of commission;
  14. Service covered by an arrangement between the Commission and the agency charged with the administration of any other state or federal unemployment compensation law pursuant to which all services performed by an individual for an employing unit during the period covered by such employing unit's duly approved election are deemed to be performed entirely within such agency's state or under such federal law;
  15. Service performed by an individual for an employing unit as an agent in the wholesale distribution and sale of gasoline and other petroleum products, if all such service performed by such individual for such employing unit is performed for remuneration solely by way of commission;
  16. Service not in the course of the employer's trade or business performed in any calendar quarter by an employee, unless the cash remuneration paid for such service is $50 or more and such service is performed by an individual who is regularly employed by such employer to perform such service. For the purposes of this subdivision, an individual shall be deemed to be regularly employed by an employer during a calendar quarter only if (i) on each of some 24 days during such quarter such individual performs for such employer for some portion of the day service not in the course of the employer's trade or business, or (ii) such individual was regularly employed, as determined under clause (i) of this subdivision, by such employer in the performance of such service during the preceding calendar quarter;
    1. Service performed by an individual who is enrolled at a nonprofit or public educational institution which normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly organized body of students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are carried on. In order for such services to be excluded from "employment":
      1. The individual shall be enrolled as a student in a full-time program,
      2. The program shall be taken for credit at such institution,
      3. The program combines academic instruction with work experience, and
      4. Such service shall be an integral part of such program.
    2. Such institution shall certify to the employer that subdivisions 17 a (1) through 17 a (4) have been met.
    3. This subdivision shall not apply to service performed in a program established for or on behalf of an employer or group of employers;
  17. Service performed in the employ of a hospital, if such service is performed by a patient of the hospital, as defined in § 60.2-221 ;
  18. Services provided by an individual pursuant to an agreement among the service recipient, a public human services agency as defined in § 15.2-2811 , and such individual to an eligible service recipient in his own home or the home of the service provider, unless coverage of such services is required by the provisions of § 3304(a)(6)(A) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act;
  19. Services performed by an individual as a "direct seller" provided that:
    1. Such person:
      1. Is engaged in the trade or business of selling, or soliciting the sale of, consumer products to any buyer on a buy-sell basis, a deposit-commission basis, or any similar basis which the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes by regulations for resale by the buyer or any other person in the home or otherwise than in a permanent retail establishment;
      2. Is engaged in the trade or business of selling, or soliciting the sale of, consumer products to a consumer in the home or otherwise than in a permanent retail establishment; or
      3. Is engaged in the trade or business of the delivery or distribution of newspapers or shopping news (including any delivery services directly related to such trade or business).
    2. Substantially all of the remuneration for the services performed as a direct seller, whether or not paid in cash, is directly related to sales or output, including the performances of services, rather than to the number of hours worked;
    3. The services performed by the person are performed pursuant to a written contract between such person and the person for whom the services are performed and such contract provides that the person will not be treated as an employee with respect to such services for federal tax purposes;
  20. Service performed after July 1, 1984, by an individual as a taxicab driver, or as a driver of an executive sedan, provided the Commission is furnished evidence that such individual is excluded from taxation by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act;
  21. Services performed by an individual as a "contract carrier courier driver" provided the Commission is furnished evidence that such individual is excluded from taxation by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act;
  22. Services performed by a full-time student in the employ of an organized camp if:
    1. Such camp:
      1. Did not operate for more than seven months in the calendar year and did not operate for more than seven months in the preceding calendar year; or
      2. Had average gross receipts for any six months in the preceding calendar year which were not more than 33- 1/3 percent of its average gross receipts for the other six months in the preceding calendar year; and
    2. Such full-time student performed services in the employ of such camp for less than 13 calendar weeks in such calendar year;
  23. Services performed by an individual as a court reporter for an employing unit if all such service performed by the individual for the employing unit is performed for remuneration solely by way of commission;
  24. Services performed by an individual as a cosmetologist or as a barber provided the Commission is furnished evidence that such individual is excluded from taxation by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act;
  25. Services performed by a licensed clinical social worker as defined in § 54.1-3700 , licensed psychologist as defined in § 54.1-3600 , licensed professional counselor as defined in § 54.1-3500 , licensed psychiatrist, or licensed marriage and family therapist as defined in § 54.1-3500 , if such individual:
    1. Operates under a contract specifying that the individual is free from control or direction over the performance of such services;
    2. Is licensed in the Commonwealth to perform independent clinical services;
    3. Is compensated solely by way of fees charged for services rendered by such individual; and
    4. Has a valid business license issued by the locality in which such individual performs such services; and
  26. Services performed by an inmate for a penal or custodial institution or while participating in the community corrections alternative program pursuant to § 19.2-316.4 . (Code 1950, § 60-14; 1952, cc. 30, 184; 1956, c. 440; 1962, c. 71; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-14; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1972, c. 824; 1974, cc. 466, 660; 1976, c. 304; 1977, c. 330; 1979, c. 637; 1980, cc. 520, 522; 1981, cc. 28, 369, 374, 375; 1982, c. 25; 1983, c. 14; 1984, cc. 120, 139, 204; 1985, cc. 152, 254; 1986, c. 480; 1987, c. 113; 1988, c. 678; 1989, c. 339; 1992, c. 4; 1997, cc. 171, 189; 2000, c. 438; 2003, c. 609; 2004, c. 977; 2005, c. 110; 2019, c. 618.)

Editor's note. - In subdivision 21, the reference to "executive sedan as defined in § 46.2-2000 " is now obsolete. That definition no longer exists in § 46.2-2000 .

At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, the following changes were made to conform to Acts 2016, c. 588: in subdivision 9, substituted "institution of higher education" for "college or university" and "or institution" for "college or university"; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 438 inserted "clause" near the end of subdivision 16, and added "unless coverage of such services is required by the provisions of § 3304(a) (6) (A) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act" at the end of subdivision 19.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 609 substituted "10" for "ten," "13" for "thirteen," "21" for "twenty-one," and "24" for "twenty-four" throughout the section; substituted "$50" for "fifty dollars" in subdivisions 8 and 16; deleted "and" at the end of subdivision 24; inserted "and" at the end of subdivision 25; and added subdivision 26.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 977 substituted "33 1/3" for "thirty-three and one-third" in subdivision 23 a 2; added subdivision 27; and made a related change.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 110, in subdivision 26, deleted "or" preceding "licensed psychiatrist" and inserted "or licensed marriage and family therapist as defined in § 54.1-3500 ."

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 618 substituted "community corrections alternative program pursuant to § 19.2-316.4 " for "Diversion Center Incarceration Program pursuant to § 19.2-316.3 " in subdivision 27.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, §§ 4, 6.

CASE NOTES

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases below were decided under prior law.

Delivery people not within exemption. - To include delivery people under the direct seller exemption would expand the direct seller exemption to any number of employees. Appellant's argument that sales and delivery are interdependent could be applied to all functions of its business and would allow for exemption of all employees. This expansive reading of the direct seller exemption is not in keeping with the statutory purpose; thus, delivery representatives employed by gift box telephone solicitors were not exempt under subdivision 21. Smoky Mt. Secrets, Inc. v. VEC, 12 Va. App. 331, 404 S.E.2d 71 (1991).

"Substantially all" remuneration not shown. - Where the record failed to disclose what percentage of remuneration paid to telephone solicitors was from commissions earned, employer failed to prove its exemption on the basis of commission sales under subdivision 21. Smoky Mt. Secrets, Inc. v. VEC, 12 Va. App. 331, 404 S.E.2d 71 (1991).

II. INSURANCE AGENTS.
A. IN GENERAL.

Original Unemployment Compensation Act carried no exemption provision with respect to insurance agents or solicitors such as is now contained in subdivision 13 of this section. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 181 Va. 811 , 27 S.E.2d 159 (1943).

And the Act was intended to cover such agents. Consequently industrial life insurance agents were classified as employees within the meaning of the Act. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 178 Va. 46 , 16 S.E.2d 357 (1941); Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 181 Va. 811 , 27 S.E.2d 159 (1943).

Tort cases and those arising under the Workers' Compensation Act are not relevant in determining whether insurance agents are in "employment" under the Unemployment Compensation Act. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 178 Va. 46 , 16 S.E.2d 357 (1941). See Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202 , 18 S.E.2d 390 (1942).

B. EXEMPTION DEPENDENT UPON REMUNERATION.

Agents remunerated solely by commissions are excluded from Act. - Subdivision 13 of this section, which was added by the amendment of 1940, excludes from the Unemployment Compensation Act the service of insurance agents and solicitors, provided they are remunerated "solely by way of commission." The term "insurance agent" as used in such subdivision includes both an "insurance solicitor" and an "insurance collector." And an industrial life insurance agent comes within the term. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 181 Va. 811 , 27 S.E.2d 159 (1943).

And an insurance company is not liable for payroll taxes based on the earnings of agents and solicitors who are remunerated "solely by way of commission." Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 181 Va. 811 , 27 S.E.2d 159 (1943).

But an agent receiving both salary and commission is covered by Act. - Where an insurance agent is compensated during a calendar year partly by a guaranteed minimum salary and partly by a commission on the amount of his weekly collections, he is covered by the Unemployment Compensation Act, and the unemployment tax is to be computed on the basis of his aggregate remuneration for that year. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 181 Va. 811 , 27 S.E.2d 159 (1943).

A guaranteed weekly minimum payment made to an insurance agent prior to the time that his weekly debit collections amounted to a specified sum was a salary and not a commission and, consequently, his remuneration was not solely by way of commission and hence his service was not excluded by subdivision 13 of this section. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 181 Va. 811 , 27 S.E.2d 159 (1943).

In determining whether the amount to be received is upon a commission or salary basis, the controlling element is whether that amount, by whatever name it may be called, is absolute and fixed, regardless of what the lawful commissions may be, or is made contingent upon earning that amount as commissions. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 181 Va. 811 , 27 S.E.2d 159 (1943); Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Union Life Ins. Co., 184 Va. 54 , 34 S.E.2d 385 (1945).

Agent on commission where compensation varies with efforts. - Where under the terms of the employment contract the agent's compensation varies with his efforts, his remuneration is "solely by way of commission." Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Union Life Ins. Co., 184 Va. 54 , 34 S.E.2d 385 (1945).

An agent's remuneration is "solely by way of commission" when his compensation is computed strictly on a percentage of his collections. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 181 Va. 811 , 27 S.E.2d 159 (1943).

"Salary" is generally defined as a fixed periodical payment for services, depending upon the time and not upon the amount of services rendered. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 181 Va. 811 , 27 S.E.2d 159 (1943); Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Union Life Ins. Co., 184 Va. 54 , 34 S.E.2d 385 (1945).

§ 60.2-220. Institution of higher education.

"Institution of higher education," for the purposes of this title, means an educational institution which:

  1. Admits as regular students only individuals having a certificate of graduation from a high school, or the recognized equivalent of such a certificate;
  2. Is legally authorized in this Commonwealth to provide a program of education beyond high school;
  3. Provides an educational program for which it awards a bachelor's or higher degree, or provides a program which is acceptable for full credit toward such a degree, a program of postgraduate or postdoctoral studies, or a program of training to prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation;
  4. Is a public or other nonprofit institution; and
  5. Notwithstanding any of the foregoing provisions of this subsection, all colleges and universities in this Commonwealth are institutions of higher education for purposes of this section.

    (1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235, § 60.1-14.1; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-221. Hospital.

"Hospital" means an institution as defined in §§ 32.1-123 and 37.2-100 .

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235, § 60.1-14.2; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-222. Employment office.

"Employment office" means a free public employment office, or branch thereof, operated (i) by this Commonwealth or maintained as a part of a state-controlled system of public employment offices or (ii) by a federal agency charged with the administration of free public employment offices.

(Code 1950, § 60-15; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-15; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-223. Fund.

"Fund" means the Unemployment Compensation Fund established by this title, to which all taxes required and from which all benefits provided under this title shall be paid.

(Code 1950, § 60-16; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-16; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-224. Insured work.

"Insured work" means employment for employers.

(Code 1950, § 60-17; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-17; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-225. State.

"State" refers to the Commonwealth of Virginia, including land or premises located therein, owned, held or possessed by the United States, the states of the United States of America, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

(Code 1950, § 60-18; 1962, c. 71; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-21; 1977, c. 330; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-226. Unemployment.

  1. An individual shall be deemed "unemployed" in any week during which he performs no services and with respect to which no wages are payable to him, or in any week of less than full-time work if the wages payable to him with respect to such week are less than his weekly benefit amount. Wages shall be deemed payable to an individual with respect to any week for which wages are due.  An individual's week of unemployment shall be deemed to commence only after his registration at an employment office, except as the Commission may by regulation otherwise prescribe.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, no individual shall be deemed unemployed with respect to any week he earns less than his weekly benefit amount solely because he did not work on a legal holiday as defined in § 2.2-3300 . (Code 1950, § 60-20; 1954, c. 203; 1956, c. 440; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-23; 1980, c. 463; 1986, c. 480; 1992, c. 5.)

CASE NOTES

The involuntary unemployment for which the Act is designed to provide presupposes a lack of available work. Where work is available there can be no involuntary unemployment within the meaning of the Act. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463 , 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951) (decided under prior law).

The relationship between employer and on-call employee constituted employment within the definition of § 60.2-212 , although during certain weeks employee was partially separated because his earnings fell below a threshold amount. Eastern Motor Inns, Inc. v. VEC, 14 Va. App. 783, 418 S.E.2d 915 (1992).

A person who is an on-call employee, without a definite commitment from the employer, is unemployed under the Act if he earns less than his weekly benefit amount. Eastern Motor Inns, Inc. v. VEC, 14 Va. App. 783, 418 S.E.2d 915 (1992).

§ 60.2-227. Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund.

"Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund" means the Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund established by this title, from which administrative expenses under this title shall be paid.

(Code 1950, § 60-21; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-24; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-228. American vessel and American aircraft.

The term "American vessel" means any vessel documented or numbered under the laws of the United States, and includes any vessel which is neither documented or numbered under the laws of the United States nor documented under the laws of any foreign country, if its crew is employed solely by one or more citizens or residents of the United States or corporations organized under the laws of the United States or of any state. The term "American aircraft" means an aircraft registered under the laws of the United States.

(Code 1950, § 60-21.1; 1962, c. 71; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-25; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-229. Wages.

  1. "Wages" means all remuneration paid, or which should have been paid, for personal services, including commissions, bonuses, tips, back pay, dismissal pay, severance pay and any other payments made by an employer to an employee during his employment and thereafter and the cash value of all remuneration payable in any medium other than cash. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection, wages paid in back pay awards shall be allocated to, and reported as being paid during, the calendar quarter or quarters in which such back pay would have been earned. Severance pay paid at the time of, or subsequent to, separation from employment shall be allocated to the last day of work unless otherwise allocated by the employer. If otherwise allocated, severance pay shall be allocated at a rate not less than the average weekly wage of such employee during the last calendar quarter, and reported as such. Severance pay shall be deducted from any benefits payable after the Commission's receipt of notification of severance pay by the employer pursuant to § 60.2-603 . The reasonable cash value of remuneration payable in any medium other than cash shall be estimated and determined in accordance with rules prescribed by the Commission.
  2. The term "wages" shall not include:
    1. Subsequent to December 31, 1990, for purposes of taxes only, that part of the remuneration, other than remuneration referred to in the succeeding subdivisions of this subsection, that is greater than $8,000 and is payable during any calendar year to an individual by any employer with respect to employment in this Commonwealth or any other state. If an employer, hereinafter referred to as "successor employer," during any calendar year acquires substantially all of the property used in a trade or business of another employer, hereinafter referred to as a "predecessor," or used in a separate unit of a trade or business of a predecessor, and immediately after the acquisition employs in his trade or business an individual who immediately prior to the acquisition was employed in the trade or business of such predecessor, then, for the purpose of determining whether remuneration, other than remuneration referred to in the succeeding subdivisions of this subsection, with respect to employment equal to $8,000 is payable by the successor to such individual during such calendar year, any remuneration, other than remuneration referred to in the succeeding subdivisions of this subsection, with respect to employment payable, or considered under this subdivision as payable, to such individual by such predecessor during such calendar year and prior to such acquisition shall be considered as payable by such successor employer;
    2. The amount of any payment, including any amount paid by an employer for insurance or annuities, or into a fund, to provide for any such payment, made to, or on behalf of, an employee or any of his dependents under a plan or system established by an employer which makes provisions for (i) his employees generally, (ii) for his employees generally and their dependents, (iii) for a class or classes of his employees, or (iv) for a class or classes of his employees and their dependents, on account of:
      1. Retirement;
      2. Sickness or accident disability payments which are received under a workers' compensation law;
      3. Medical or hospitalization expenses in connection with sickness or accident disability;
      4. Death; or
      5. Unemployment benefits under any private plan financed in whole or in part by an employer;
    3. The payment by an employer, without deduction from the remuneration of the employee, of the tax imposed upon an employer under § 3101 of the Federal Internal Revenue Code;
    4. Any payment on account of sickness or accident disability, or medical or hospitalization expenses in connection with the sickness or accident disability, made by an employer to, or on behalf of, an employee after the expiration of six calendar months following the last calendar month in which the employee worked for such employer;
    5. Remuneration paid in any medium other than cash to an employee for service not in the course of the employer's trade or business;
    6. Any payment, other than vacation or sick pay, made to an employee after the month in which he attains the age of sixty-five, if he did not work for the employer in the period for which such payment is made; or
    7. Any payment made to, or on behalf of, an employee or his beneficiary under a cafeteria plan, as defined in § 125 of the Internal Revenue Code, if such payment would not be treated as wages under the Internal Revenue Code.

      (Code 1950, § 60-22; 1952, c. 184; 1954, c. 203; 1956, c. 440; 1968, c. 9; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-26; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1974, c. 466; 1976, c. 591; 1977, c. 330; 1979, cc. 629, 637; 1982, c. 363; 1983, c. 14; 1984, cc. 204, 408; 1986, c. 480; 1990, c. 908; 1993, c. 576; 1995, c. 515; 2020, c. 1261.)

Cross references. - As to transitional severance benefits, see § 2.2-3203 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2021, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received adequate funding from the U.S. Department of Labor that covers the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. The amendments by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 4 provides: "That, if not sooner expired pursuant to the provisions of the third enactment of this act, this act shall expire on July 1, 2022." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. The amendments by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 1261 added subdivision B 7 and made related changes.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law of governmental services and social welfare for the year 1976-1977, see 63 Va. L. Rev. 1440 (1977).

CASE NOTES

Manner in which remuneration is achieved is never controlling. VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983) (decided under prior law).

Where an employee purchases products from his employer at a discount from the wholesale price and, in turn, sells them at wholesale, his remuneration is at least equal to the discount. Manifestly, while such employees may not have been paid cash in hand, they nevertheless have been "paid" within the meaning of this section. VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983) (decided under prior law).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Absent agreement to contrary, employee's severance pay was allocated at the time it was paid by employer. - Where employee's termination agreement with employer did not allocate severance pay to any particular period of time, pursuant to § 60.2-229 A, severance pay was allocated at the time it was paid by the employer, which could occur after the filing of a claim for benefits with the Commission. Stempin v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 57 Va. Cir. 108, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 421 (Fredericksburg 2001).

§ 60.2-230. Week.

"Week" means calendar week, ending at midnight Saturday, or the equivalent thereof as determined in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission, except as provided for in subdivision 9 of subsection B of § 60.2-210 .

(Code 1950, § 60-23; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-27; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-231. Certain federal acts and statutes defined.

The following federal acts and laws as used in this title shall mean the following:

  1. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act shall mean those provisions found in Chapter 23 (26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.) of Title 26 of the United States Code.
  2. The Federal Internal Revenue Code shall mean those provisions found in Title 26 of the United States Code.
  3. The Social Security Act shall mean those provisions found in Chapter 7 (42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) of Title 42 of the United States Code.

    (Code 1950, § 60-19; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-22; 1986, c. 480.)

Chapter 3. Funds.

Unemployment Compensation Fund.

Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund.

Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund.

Workforce Development Training Fund.

Article 1. Unemployment Compensation Fund.

§ 60.2-300. Fund continued; accounts maintained.

The special fund established in the state treasury and known as the Unemployment Compensation Fund is continued. The Comptroller shall maintain within the fund two separate accounts:

  1. A clearing account; and
  2. A benefit account.

    (Code 1950, § 60-90; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-106; 1986, c. 480.)

CASE NOTES

Eleventh Amendment does not bar claim based on Commission's attempt to recover overpayments. - The Eleventh Amendment, which bars suits which would cause funds to be paid out of the general treasury of a state, did not bar a claim that action taken by the VEC in attempting to recover overpayments violated the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since Virginia's unemployment compensation fund is a special fund. Brewer v. Cantrell, 622 F. Supp. 1320 (W.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1986) (decided under prior law).

§ 60.2-301. Clearing account; payment to credit of federal Unemployment Trust Fund.

All taxes and other moneys required by this title to be paid to the Unemployment Compensation Fund and collected by the Commission, and any interest or earnings upon any moneys or property belonging to the fund shall, promptly upon collection, be paid into the state treasury and credited to the clearing account. Any interest collected on taxes shall be paid into the Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund continued by § 60.2-314 . Refunds, except for interest collected payable pursuant to § 60.2-524 , may be paid from the clearing account. After clearance thereof, all other moneys in the clearing account, including undeliverable payments, shall immediately be paid over to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, to the credit of the Unemployment Trust Fund established by the Social Security Act, to be held for the Commonwealth upon the terms and conditions provided in the Social Security Act.

(Code 1950, § 60-91; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-107; 1986, c. 480; 1993, c. 249; 1995, c. 515.)

§ 60.2-302. Benefit account; requisitions from federal Unemployment Trust Fund.

Moneys shall be requisitioned from this Commonwealth's account in the Unemployment Trust Fund solely for the payment of benefits and in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission, except that money credited to this Commonwealth's account, pursuant to § 903 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1103), shall be used exclusively as provided in § 60.2-305 . The Commission shall requisition from the Unemployment Trust Fund such amounts, not exceeding the amount standing to its credit, as it deems necessary for the payment of benefits for a reasonable future period. Upon receipt of such amounts, the same shall be paid into the state treasury to the credit of the benefit account, and shall be used solely to pay the benefits provided for in this title. Any balance of moneys requisitioned from the Unemployment Trust Fund which remains unclaimed or unpaid in the benefit account, including undeliverable payments, after the expiration of the period for which such sums were requisitioned shall either (i) be deducted from estimates for, and may be utilized for the payment of, benefits during succeeding periods, or (ii) in the discretion of the Commission, be paid over to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, as provided in § 60.2-301 . All benefits shall be paid through public employment offices provided for in this title.

(Code 1950, § 60-92; 1960, c. 54; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-108; 1986, c. 480; 1993, c. 249.)

§ 60.2-303. Moneys appropriated to Commission.

All moneys paid into the state treasury and credited to the Unemployment Compensation Fund are hereby appropriated to the Commission for the purposes set forth in this article.

(Code 1950, § 60-93; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-109; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-304. Disbursements by State Treasurer upon warrants of Comptroller.

All payments and disbursements from the Unemployment Compensation Fund shall be made by the State Treasurer upon warrants of the Comptroller issued upon vouchers signed by the Commissioner or by such other person as the Commissioner may designate for that purpose.

(Code 1950, § 60-94; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-110; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-305. Requisition or use of money credited to Commonwealth in Unemployment Trust Fund.

    1. Money credited to the account of this Commonwealth in the Unemployment Trust Fund by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, pursuant to § 903 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1103), may not be requisitioned from this Commonwealth's account or used except for the payment of benefits and for the payment of expenses incurred for the administration of this title. A. 1.  Money credited to the account of this Commonwealth in the Unemployment Trust Fund by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, pursuant to § 903 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1103), may not be requisitioned from this Commonwealth's account or used except for the payment of benefits and for the payment of expenses incurred for the administration of this title.
    2. Such money may be requisitioned, pursuant to § 60.2-302 , for the payment of benefits. Such money may also be requisitioned and used for the payment of expenses incurred for the administration of this title but only pursuant to a specific appropriation by the General Assembly and only if the expenses are incurred and the money requisitioned after the enactment of an appropriation law which:
      1. Specifies the purpose for which such money is appropriated and the amount appropriated therefor;
      2. Limits the period within which such money may be obligated to a period ending not more than two years after the date of the enactment of the appropriation law; and
      3. Limits the amount which may be obligated during any twelve-month period beginning on July 1 and ending on the next June 30 to an amount which does not exceed the amount by which (i) the aggregate of the amount credited to the account of this Commonwealth, pursuant to § 903 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1103), during the same twelve-month period and the thirty-four preceding twelve-month periods, exceeds (ii) the aggregate of the amounts obligated for administration and paid out for benefits and charged against the amounts credited to the account of this Commonwealth pursuant to such section during such thirty-five twelve-month periods.
  1. Amounts credited to this Commonwealth's account in the Unemployment Trust Fund under § 903 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1103) which are obligated for administration or paid out for benefits shall be charged against equivalent amounts which were first credited and which are not already so charged. However, no amount obligated for administration during a twelve-month period specified in subdivision 2 of subsection A of this section may be charged against any amount credited during such a twelve-month period earlier than the thirty-fourth preceding such period.
  2. Money requisitioned as provided for the payment of expenses of administration shall be deposited in the Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund, but, until expended, shall remain a part of the Unemployment Trust Fund. The Commission shall maintain a separate record of the deposit, obligation, expenditure and return of funds so deposited.

    (Code 1950, § 60-94.1; 1960, c. 54; 1968, c. 131; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-111; 1970, c. 732; 1972, c. 23; 1986, c. 480.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2018, Sp. Sess. I, c. 2, as amended by Acts 2019, c. 854, Item 123 B 2, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2020, provides: "Reed Act funds distributed by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and credited to the unemployment trust fund with respect to federal fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002, under § 1103 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.), as amended, shall be used only for the administration of the unemployment compensation program, under the direction of the Virginia Employment Commission, and shall not be subject to the requirements of § 60.2-305 , Code of Virginia. Reed Act funds from the Balanced Budget Act are hereby appropriated (up to $2.2 million, not to exceed the balance of said Reed Act funds) to pay for upgrading the information technology systems at the Virginia Employment Commission."

Article 2. Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund.

§ 60.2-306. Fund continued; available to Commission.

The special fund in the state treasury known as the Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund is continued. All moneys which are deposited or paid into this fund shall be held for use by the Commission.

(Code 1950, § 60-95; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-112; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-307. Moneys constituting fund.

The fund shall consist of all moneys appropriated by this Commonwealth, and all moneys received from the United States, any agency thereof or any other source, for the purpose declared in § 60.2-308 . Notwithstanding any provision of this article, all moneys requisitioned and deposited in this fund pursuant to the provisions of subsection C of § 60.2-305 shall remain part of the Unemployment Trust Fund and shall be used only in accordance with the conditions specified in § 60.2-305 .

(Code 1950, § 60-96; 1956, c. 440; 1960, c. 54; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-113; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-308. Expenditures solely for cost of administration.

  1. All moneys in this fund shall be expended solely for the purpose of defraying the cost of the administration of this title and for no other purpose whatsoever.
  2. All moneys received by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of § 302 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 502), shall be expended solely for the purposes and in the amounts found necessary by the Secretary of Labor of the United States for the proper and efficient administration of this title.

    (Code 1950, § 60-97; 1956, c. 440; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-114; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-309. Special employment service account.

A special employment service account shall be maintained as a part of the Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund for the purposes (i) of maintaining the public employment offices established pursuant to § 60.2-400 , and (ii) of cooperating with the United States Employment Service.

(Code 1950, § 60-99; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-116; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-310. Financing.

The State Treasurer is authorized to receive all grants of money apportioned to this Commonwealth under the federal law referred to in § 60.2-400 . All funds so received shall be paid into the separate employment service account in the Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund, and are to be held for appropriation to the Commission for the purposes for which they are granted to this Commonwealth.

As a part of any such agreement as is mentioned in subsection C of § 60.2-400 the Commission may accept moneys, services or quarters as a contribution to the employment service account.

(Code 1950, § 60-88; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-104; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-311. Replacing funds lost or expended for unnecessary purposes.

The Commission is authorized and directed to replace in the Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund, within a reasonable time, out of any funds appropriated by the General Assembly for such purpose, any moneys received by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of § 302 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 502), which because of any action or contingency (i) are lost or (ii) are expended for purposes other than, or in amounts in excess of those found necessary by the Secretary of Labor of the United States for the proper administration of this title. The Commission is directed to report to the Governor in accordance with the provisions of subdivision 3 of § 2.2-1501 the amount necessary to make such replacement to the Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund. The Governor shall include in the budget reported to the General Assembly and in the budget bill submitted under § 2.2-1508 the amount necessary to be appropriated for such purposes.

(Code 1950, § 60-98; 1956, c. 440; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-115; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-312. Disbursements by State Treasurer upon warrants of Comptroller.

All payments and disbursements from the Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund shall be made by the State Treasurer upon warrants of the Comptroller issued upon vouchers signed by the Commissioner or by such other person as the Commissioner may designate for that purpose.

(Code 1950, § 60-100; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-117; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-313. Expenses incurred by Auditor of Public Accounts, Comptroller and State Treasurer.

All expenses incurred by the Auditor of Public Accounts in auditing the books, records and accounts of the Commission and in rendering other services to the Commission and all expense incurred by the Comptroller and the State Treasurer in performing the services required by this title, may be treated as administrative expenses of the Commission and accordingly paid by the Commission.

(Code 1950, § 60-101; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-118; 1986, c. 480.)

Article 3. Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund.

§ 60.2-314. Fund continued; interest and penalties paid into fund.

The special fund in the state treasury known as the Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund is continued. All interest, penalties, fees, and costs regardless of when the same became payable, collected from employers and claimants under the provisions of this title, shall be paid into this fund.

(Code 1950, § 60-102; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-119; 1986, c. 480; 1990, c. 687.)

§ 60.2-315. Proper expenditures from fund.

No part of the Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund shall be expended or available for expenditure in lieu of federal funds made available to the Commission for the administration of this title. Such fund shall be used by the Commission for the payment of costs and charges of administration, including the cost of capital projects of the Virginia Employment Commission, and discretionary expenditures not to exceed $375,000 per fiscal year authorized in the general appropriations act, which are found by the Commission not to be proper and valid charges payable out of any funds in the Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund received from any source. Such costs and charges shall include any interest due on Title XII advances to the trust fund for the payment of benefits. Refunds of interest, allowable under § 60.2-524 , shall be made from this special fund, provided such interest was deposited in such fund.

(Code 1950, § 60-103; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-120; 1983, c. 16; 1985, c. 323; 1986, c. 480; 2007, c. 241.)

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 241 substituted "$375,000" for "$200,000" in the second sentence.

§ 60.2-316. Disbursements by State Treasurer upon warrants of Comptroller.

All payments and disbursements from the Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund shall be made by the State Treasurer upon warrants of the Comptroller issued upon vouchers signed by the Commissioner, or by such other person as the Commissioner may designate for that purpose.

(Code 1950, § 60-104; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-121; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-317. Moneys in fund continuously available to Commission.

The moneys in the Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund shall be continuously available to the Commission for expenditure in accordance with the provisions of this article.

(Code 1950, § 60-105; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-122; 1986, c. 480.)

Article 4. Workforce Development Training Fund.

§§ 60.2-318 through 60.2-322.

Repealed by Acts 2004, c. 872.

Chapter 4. Job Service.

Sec.

§ 60.2-400. Virginia State Job Service; cooperation with U.S. Employment Service agencies.

  1. The Commission shall have all rights, powers and duties with respect to the establishment, maintenance and operation of free employment offices in the Commonwealth and shall possess, exercise and perform the same through a division known as the Virginia State Job Service. The Commission through the division shall establish and maintain free public employment offices in such number and in such places as may be necessary for the proper administration of this title.
  2. The Commission through the Virginia State Job Service, is designated as the state agency and vested with all powers necessary to cooperate with the United States Employment Service in accordance with the terms and conditions expressed in Chapter 4B (§ 49 et seq.) of Title 29 of the United States Code.
  3. The Commission may cooperate with or enter into agreements with the Railroad Retirement Board, or any other agency of the United States charged with the administration of an unemployment compensation law, with respect to the maintenance and use of free employment service facilities.
  4. Chapter 13 of the Acts of Assembly of 1933 providing for cooperation between the Commonwealth and the United States Employment Service is, subject to the provisions of this chapter, continued in effect.

    (Code 1950, §§ 60-85, 60-87, 60-89; 1968, c. 738, §§ 60.1-101, 60.1-103, 60.1-105; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-400.1. Human trafficking hotline; posted notice required.

Within each employment office, the Commission shall post notice of the existence of a human trafficking hotline to alert possible witnesses or victims of human trafficking to the availability of a means to report crimes or gain assistance. The notice required by this section shall (i) be posted in a place readily visible and accessible to the public and (ii) meet the requirements specified in subsection C of § 40.1-11.3 .

(2019, c. 388.)

§ 60.2-401. Financial literacy courses.

The Commission, either by itself or in collaboration with workforce service partner entities, shall provide information to all claimants and job seekers on courses in financial literacy. Such courses shall be at no cost to claimants and to job seekers and may be offered online or in any other medium the Commission deems appropriate.

(2014, c. 449.)

Chapter 5. Taxation.

Employer Taxation.

Employer Reporting Requirements.

Collection of Taxes.

Computation of Tax Rate.

Article 1. Employer Taxation.

§ 60.2-500. Determination with respect to whether employing unit is employer; whether services constitute employment; or whether business transfer is illegal.

  1. The Commission may, upon its own motion or upon application of an employing unit, and after not less than 30 days' notice in writing mailed to the last known address of such employing unit and an opportunity for hearing, make findings of fact, and on that basis, determine whether:
    1. An employing unit constitutes an employer;
    2. Services performed for or in connection with the business of an employing unit constitute employment for such employing unit; or
    3. There has been a transfer as defined in § 60.2-536.1 .
  2. All testimony at any hearing pursuant to this section shall be recorded but need not be transcribed unless a petition for judicial review from such determination is filed in the manner herein prescribed. At such hearing the interests of the Commonwealth may be represented by the Office of the Attorney General. The Commissioner shall have the power to designate a special examiner to hold such hearings, and may authorize and empower such special examiner to decide any matter so heard, in which event the decision of such special examiner shall be the final decision of the Commission under this section, subject to judicial review under subsection C. The Commissioner or his designee shall promptly inform the appropriate attorney for the Commonwealth of any final decision that an employer transferred or attempted to transfer a trade or business for the primary or sole purpose of obtaining a lower unemployment tax rate, or was advised to do so.
  3. Judicial review of any such determination made in subsection B may be initiated within 30 days after mailing notice of such findings and determination to the employing unit or, in the absence of mailing, within 30 days after delivering such notice and determination, in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. Such judicial review shall be commenced by the filing of a petition, which need not be verified but which shall state the grounds upon which a review is sought. Service of two copies of such petition upon the Commissioner shall be deemed completed service and such petition shall be filed with the clerk of the court within five days after service thereof. With its answer the Commission shall certify and file with the court all documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the matter, together with its findings of fact and decision therein. In any judicial proceedings under this article, the Commission's findings of facts, if supported by the evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law. Such actions shall be given preference on the docket over all other cases except cases to which the Commonwealth is a party.
  4. An appeal may be taken from the decision of such court to the Court of Appeals, in conformity with Part Five A of the Rules of Supreme Court and other applicable laws. In any such proceedings for judicial review, the Commission shall be represented by the Office of the Attorney General. A determination by the Commission from which no judicial review has been commenced shall be conclusive in any subsequent judicial proceeding involving liability for taxes against the employing unit or its successor under the provisions of subdivision B 1 of § 60.2-210 and of subsection B of § 60.2-523 . (Code 1950, §§ 60-58, 60-59; 1968, c. 738, §§ 60.1-70, 60.1-71; 1970, c. 104; 1977, c. 445; 1981, c. 99; 1984, c. 703; 1986, c. 480; 2005, cc. 47, 91; 2012, cc. 65, 161.)

Cross references. - As to penalty for transfer of a trade or business for the sole purpose of obtaining lower unemployment tax rate, see § 18.2-204.3 .

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendments by cc. 47 and 91, effective March 20, 2005, are nearly identical and in subsection A, redesignated clauses (i) and (ii) as subdivisions A 1 and A 2, substituted "30" for "ten" in the introductory language, and added subdivision A 3; in subsection B, inserted the subsection B designation and added the last sentence; redesignated subdivisions B 1 and B 2 as subsections C and D and made related changes.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendments by cc. 65 and 161 are identical, and substituted "may be represented" for "shall be represented" following "Commonwealth" in the first sentence in subsection B.

Research References. - Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure (Matthew Bender). Chapter 4 Venue. § 4.02 Preferred Venue. Bryson.

CASE NOTES

The Commission does not lack standing to seek review of an order as to whether an employment relation existed. It is a person "aggrieved" within the meaning of § 8.01-670 . VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983) (decided under prior law).

Petitions for judicial review under this section governed by Chapter 8 of Title 8.01 and Rule 2A. - Petitions for judicial review under this section must comply with the requirements of Chapter 8 of Title 8.01 and Part 2A of the Rules of the Supreme Court; the "curing statute" ( § 8.01-288 ) applies to the service of petitions under this section because this section does not specifically prescribe a particular method of service. VEC v. Porter-Blaine Corp., 27 Va. App. 153, 497 S.E.2d 889 (1998).

Insufficiency of petition for judicial review cured by actual receipt of copies by mail. - Circuit court did not err when it denied Virginia Employment Commission's motion to dismiss petition for judicial review due to insufficient service. Although service of petition upon the Commissioner by overnight mail failed to comply with the requirements for personal service set forth in Chapter 8 of Title 8.01, the commissioner actually received the two copies of the petition by mail within the time limits prescribed by law, making service sufficient under § 8.01-288 . VEC v. Porter-Blaine Corp., 27 Va. App. 153, 497 S.E.2d 889 (1998).

§ 60.2-501. Financing of benefits to employees of nonprofit organizations.

  1. Benefits paid to employees of nonprofit organizations shall be financed in accordance with the provisions of this section. For the purpose of this section, a nonprofit organization is an organization, or group of organizations, described in § 501 (c) (3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code which is exempt from income tax under § 501 (a) of that Code.
  2. Any nonprofit organization which, pursuant to subdivision 8 of subsection B of § 60.2-210 , is or becomes subject to this title shall pay taxes under the provisions of § 60.2-511 , unless it elects, in accordance with this subsection, to pay to the Commission for the unemployment fund an amount equal to the amount of regular benefits and of one-half of the extended benefits paid, that is attributable to service in the employ of such nonprofit organization, and that is for weeks of unemployment which begin during the effective period of such election.
    1. Any nonprofit organization which is or becomes subject to this title may elect to become liable for payments in lieu of taxes for a period of not less than one taxable year beginning with January 1 of each year, provided it files with the Commission a written notice of its election within the thirty-day period immediately following such date.
    2. Any nonprofit organization which becomes subject to this title may elect to become liable for payments in lieu of taxes for a period of not less than twelve months beginning with the date on which such subjectivity begins by filing a written notice of its election with the Commission not later than thirty days immediately following the date of the determination of such subjectivity.
    3. Any nonprofit organization which makes an election in accordance with subdivision 1 or 2 of this subsection shall continue to be liable for payments in lieu of taxes until it files with the Commission a written notice terminating its election not later than thirty days prior to the beginning of the taxable year for which such termination shall first be effective.
    4. Any nonprofit organization which has been paying taxes under this title may change to a reimbursable basis by filing with the Commission, not later than thirty days prior to the beginning of any taxable year, a written notice of election to become liable for payments in lieu of taxes. Such election shall not be terminable by the organization for that and the next year.
    5. The Commission may for good cause extend the period within which a notice of election, or a notice of termination, shall be filed and may permit an election to be retroactive but not any earlier than January 1 of the current calendar year.
    6. The Commission, in accordance with such regulations as it may prescribe, shall notify each nonprofit organization of any determination which it may make of its status as an employer and of the effective date of any election which it makes and of any termination of such election. Such determinations shall be subject to reconsideration, appeal and review in accordance with the provisions of § 60.2-500 .
  3. Payments in lieu of taxes shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this subsection, including either subdivision 1 or 2.
      1. At the end of each calendar quarter, or at the end of any other period as determined by the Commission, the Commission shall bill each nonprofit organization, or group of such organizations, which has elected to make payments in lieu of taxes for an amount equal to the full amount of regular benefits plus one-half of the amount of extended benefits paid during such quarter or other prescribed period that is attributable to service in the employ of such organization.
      2. If the final adjudication of a disputed claim finds the claimant totally or partially ineligible for benefits, the nonprofit organization shall be liable for any bill resulting from payments made to the claimant during or prior to the appeal process, whether made by erroneous statutory interpretation, administrative error, or incorrect wage reporting.
      1. Each nonprofit organization that has elected payments in lieu of taxes may request permission to make such payments as provided in this paragraph. Such method of payment shall become effective upon approval by the Commission.
      2. At the end of each calendar quarter, or at the end of such other period as determined by the Commission, the Commission shall bill each nonprofit organization for an amount representing one of the following:
        1. One-tenth of one percent of its total payroll for the preceding calendar year.
        2. Such percentage of its total payroll for the immediately preceding calendar year as the Commission shall determine. Such determination shall be based each year on the average benefit costs attributable to service in the employ of nonprofit organizations during the preceding calendar year.
        3. For any organization which did not pay wages throughout the four calendar quarters of the preceding calendar year, such percentage of its payroll during such year as the Commission shall determine.
      3. At the end of each taxable year, the Commission may modify the quarterly percentage of payroll thereafter payable by the nonprofit organization in order to minimize excess or insufficient payments.
      4. At the end of each taxable year, the Commission shall determine whether the total of payments for such year made by a nonprofit organization is more or less than the total amount of regular benefits plus one-half of the amount of extended benefits paid to individuals during such taxable year based on wages attributable to service in the employ of such organization. Each nonprofit organization whose total payments for such year are less than the amount so determined shall be liable for payment of the unpaid balance to the fund in accordance with subdivision 3 of this subsection. If the total payments exceed the amount so determined for the taxable year, all or a part of the excess may, at the discretion of the Commission, be refunded from the fund or retained in the fund as part of the payments which may be required for the next taxable year.
    1. Payment of any bill rendered under subdivision 1 or 2 of this subsection shall be made not later than thirty days after such bill was mailed to the last known address of the nonprofit organization or was otherwise delivered to it, unless there has been an application for review and redetermination in accordance with subdivision 5 of this subsection.
    2. Payments made by any nonprofit organization under the provisions of this subsection shall not be deducted or deductible, in whole or in part, from the remuneration of individuals in the employ of the organization.
    3. The amount due specified in any bill from the Commission shall be conclusive on the organization unless, not later than thirty days after the bill was mailed to its last known address or otherwise delivered to it, the organization files an appeal with the Commission, setting forth the grounds for such appeal. Proceedings on appeal to the Commission from the amount of a bill rendered under this subsection or a redetermination of such amount shall be in accordance with the provisions of § 60.2-500 . The decision of the Commission shall be subject to the provisions of § 60.2-500 .
    4. Past-due payments of amounts in lieu of taxes shall be subject to the same interest and penalties that, pursuant to § 60.2-519 , apply to past-due taxes. (1974, c. 466, § 60.1-89; 1981, cc. 248, 252; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-502. Bonding of nonprofit organizations.

  1. In the discretion of the Commission, any nonprofit organization that elects to become liable for payments in lieu of taxes shall be required within thirty days after the effective date of its election (i) to execute and file with the Commission a surety bond approved by the Commission or (ii) to deposit with the Commission money or securities. The amount of such bond or deposit shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this section.
  2. The amount of the bond or deposit required by this section shall be a percentage, determined by the Commission, of the organization's taxable wages paid for employment as defined in subdivision 4 of subsection A of § 60.2-213 for the four calendar quarters immediately preceding the effective date of the election, the renewal date in the case of a bond, or the biennial anniversary of the effective date of election in the case of a deposit of money or securities, whichever date is most recent and applicable. If the nonprofit organization did not pay wages in each of such four calendar quarters, the amount of the bond or deposit shall be as determined by the Commission.
  3. Any bond deposited under this section shall be in force for a period of not less than two taxable years and shall be renewed with the approval of the Commission, at such time as the Commission may prescribe, but not less frequently than at two-year intervals as long as the organization continues to be liable for payments in lieu of taxes. The Commission shall require adjustments to be made in a previously filed bond as it deems appropriate. If the bond is to be increased, the adjusted bond shall be filed by the organization within thirty days of the date notice of the required adjustment was mailed or otherwise delivered to it. Failure by any organization covered by such bond to pay the full amount of payments in lieu of taxes when due, together with any applicable interest and penalties provided for in subdivision 6 of subsection C of § 60.2-501 , shall render the surety liable on such bond to the extent of the bond, as though the surety was such organization.
  4. Any deposit of money or securities made in accordance with this section shall be retained by the Commission in an escrow account until liability under the election is terminated, at which time it shall be returned to the organization, less any deductions as hereinafter provided. The Commission may deduct from the money deposited under this section by a nonprofit organization or sell the securities it has so deposited to the extent necessary to satisfy any due and unpaid payments in lieu of taxes and any applicable interest and penalties provided for in subdivision 6 of subsection C of § 60.2-501 . The Commission shall require the organization within thirty days following any deduction from a money deposit or sale of deposited securities under the provisions of this subsection to deposit sufficient additional money or securities to make whole the organization's deposit at the prior level. Any cash remaining from the sale of such securities shall be a part of the organization's escrow account. The Commission may review the adequacy of the deposit made by any organization. If, as a result of such review, it determines that an adjustment is necessary, the organization shall be required to make additional deposit within thirty days of written notice of the determination or the Commission shall return to it such portion of the deposit as it no longer considers necessary, whichever action is appropriate. Disposition of income from securities held in escrow shall be governed by the applicable provisions of the state law.
  5. If any nonprofit organization fails to file a bond or make a deposit, or to file a bond in an increased amount or to increase or make whole the amount of a previously made deposit, as provided under this subsection, the Commission may terminate such organization's election to make payments in lieu of taxes and such termination shall continue for not less than the four consecutive calendar quarter period beginning with the quarter in which such termination becomes effective; however, the Commission may extend for good cause the applicable filing, deposit or adjustment period by not more than thirty days.

    (1974, c. 466, § 60.1-89; 1981, cc. 248, 252; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-503. Authority to terminate elections.

If any nonprofit organization is delinquent in making payments in lieu of taxes as required under subsection C of § 60.2-501 , the Commission may terminate such organization's election to make payments in lieu of taxes as of the beginning of the next taxable year, and such termination shall be effective for that and the next taxable year.

(1974, c. 466, § 60.1-89; 1981, cc. 248, 252; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-504. Allocation of benefit costs.

If benefits paid to an individual are based on wages paid by more than one employer and one or more of such employers are liable for payments in lieu of taxes, the amount payable to the fund by each employer that is liable for such payments shall be an amount which bears the same ratio to the total benefits paid to the individual as the total base period wages paid to the individual by such employer bear to the total base period wages paid to the individual by all of his base period employers.

(1974, c. 466, § 60.1-89; 1981, cc. 248, 252; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-505. Group accounts.

  1. Two or more employers that have become liable for payments in lieu of taxes, in accordance with the provisions of § 60.2-501 , may file a joint application to the Commission for the establishment of a group account for the purpose of sharing the cost of benefits paid that are attributable to service in the employ of such employers. Each such application shall identify and authorize a group representative to act as the group's agent for the purposes of this section. Upon approval of the application, the Commission shall establish a group account for such employers effective as of the beginning of the calendar quarter in which it receives the application and shall notify the group's representative of the effective date of the account. Such account shall remain in effect for not less than two years and thereafter until terminated at the discretion of the Commission or upon application by the group.
  2. Upon establishment of the account, each member of the group shall be liable for payments in lieu of taxes with respect to each calendar quarter in the amount that bears the same ratio to the total benefits paid in such quarter that are attributable to service performed in the employ of all members of the group as the total wages paid for service in employment by such member in such quarter bear to the total wages paid during such quarter for service performed in the employ of all members of the group.
  3. The Commission shall prescribe such regulations as it deems necessary:
    1. With respect to application for establishment, maintenance and termination of group accounts that are authorized by this section;
    2. For addition of new members to, and withdrawal of active members from, such accounts; and
    3. For the determination of the amounts that are payable under this section by members of the group and the time and manner of such payments.

      (1974, c. 466, § 60.1-89; 1981, cc. 248, 252; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-506. Financing of benefits to state employees.

  1. The Commonwealth of Virginia shall have the option to:
    1. Treat all of its branches of government and all of its instrumentalities as one employer;
    2. Treat each branch of government, judicial, executive, and legislative, as an individual employer; or
    3. Treat each of its instrumentalities as an individual employer.
    4. The option described herein shall be exercised by the Governor.
  2. If the option contained in subdivision 1 of subsection A of this section is exercised, the Commonwealth may elect to finance benefits to its employees by either taxes, as set forth in §§ 60.2-526 through 60.2-533 , or payments in lieu of taxes.
  3. If the option contained in either subdivision 2 or 3 of subsection A of this section is exercised, each such individual employer may elect to finance benefits to its employees by either taxes, as set forth in §§ 60.2-526 through 60.2-533 , or payments in lieu of taxes.
  4. If the election to make payments in lieu of taxes is exercised, payments shall be made into the fund in an amount equivalent to the amount of regular and extended benefits paid that is attributable to service in the employ of the Commonwealth. If benefits paid to an individual are based on wages paid by more than one employer and one or more employers are liable for payments in lieu of taxes, the amount payable to the fund by each employer that is liable for such payments shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of § 60.2-504 .
  5. Payments made in lieu of taxes by the Commonwealth into the Unemployment Trust Fund shall be made at such times and in such manner as the Commission may determine and prescribe.

    (1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235, § 60.1-89.1; 1977, c. 330; 1979, c. 634; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-507. Financing of benefits to employees of governmental entities.

  1. Any governmental entity which is an employer by virtue of subdivision 7 of subsection B of § 60.2-210 shall be permitted to join with one or more other governmental entities to form a joint account in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission.
  2. Each governmental entity which is an employer by virtue of subdivision 7 of subsection B of § 60.2-210 and each joint account formed pursuant to subsection A of this section may elect to finance benefits to its employees by either taxes as set forth in §§ 60.2-526 through 60.2-533 , or payments in lieu of taxes. Any such election to make payments in lieu of taxes shall be made in accordance with the provisions of subdivisions 1, 2 and 4 of subsection B of § 60.2-501 . Termination of such election to make payments in lieu of taxes shall be made in accordance with subdivision 3 of subsection B of § 60.2-501 .
  3. If the election to make payments in lieu of taxes is exercised, payments shall be in an amount equivalent to the full amount of regular and extended benefits paid that is attributable to service in the employ of such governmental entity. If benefits paid to an individual are based on wages paid by more than one employer and one or more employers are liable for payments in lieu of taxes, the amount payable to the fund by each employer that is liable for such payments shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of § 60.2-504 . Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, if the final adjudication of a disputed claim finds the claimant totally or partially ineligible for benefits, the governmental entity shall be liable for any payment made to the claimant during or prior to the appeal process, whether made by erroneous statutory interpretation, administrative error, or incorrect wage reporting.
  4. Payments in lieu of taxes by governmental entities as set forth in this section shall be made at such times and in such manner as the Commission may determine and prescribe by regulation.

    (1977, c. 330, § 60.1-89.2; 1979, c. 634; 1981, c. 248; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-507.1. Financing of benefits to employees of Indian tribes.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context requires a different meaning: "Employer" includes any Indian tribe for which service in employment as defined under this title is performed. "Employment" includes service performed in the employ of an Indian tribe, as defined in § 3306(u) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), provided such service is excluded from "employment" as defined in FUTA solely by reason of § 3306(c)(7) of FUTA, and is not otherwise excluded from "employment" under this title. For purposes of this section, any exclusions from employment in § 60.2-219 that relate to services performed in the employ of state or local government shall be applicable to services performed in the employ of an Indian tribe. "Tribal units" means subdivisions, subsidiaries, or business enterprises wholly owned by an Indian tribe.
  2. Benefits based on service included in the definition of employment as provided in subsection A shall be payable in the same amount, on the same terms, and subject to the same conditions as benefits payable on the basis of other service subject under this title.
  3. Indian tribes or tribal units subject to this title shall pay taxes as set forth in §§ 60.2-526 through 60.2-533 under the same terms and conditions as all other subject employers, unless they elect to pay into the fund amounts equal to the amount of benefits attributable to service in the employ of the Indian tribe.
  4. Indian tribes that elect to make payments to reimburse the fund for benefits paid shall make such election in the same manner and under the same conditions as provided in subsection C of § 60.2-507 pertaining to governmental entities that elect to make payments in lieu of taxes. Indian tribes shall determine if reimbursement for benefits paid will be elected by the tribe as a whole, by individual tribal units, or by combinations of individual tribal units.
  5. Indian tribes or tribal units that elect to make payments in lieu of taxes shall be billed for the full amount of benefits attributable to service in the employ of the Indian tribe or tribal unit on the same schedule as nonprofit organizations that have elected to make payments in lieu of taxes as provided in § 60.2-501 .
  6. At the discretion of the Commission, any Indian tribe or tribal unit that elects to become liable for payments in lieu of taxes shall be required within 30 days after the effective date of its election (i) to execute and file with the Commission a surety bond approved by the Commission or (ii) to deposit with the Commission money or securities on the same basis as nonprofit organizations that are required to post a bond or deposit pursuant to § 60.2-502 .
  7. Failure of the Indian tribe or tribal unit to make any required payment, including any assessment of interest and penalty, within 90 days of its due date shall cause the Indian tribe to lose the option to make payments in lieu of taxes, as provided in subsection C, for the following tax year unless payment in full is received before tax rates for next tax year are computed.
  8. Any Indian tribe that loses the option to make payments in lieu of taxes due to late payment or nonpayment, as described in subsection G, shall have such option reinstated if, after a period of one year, all taxes have been made timely, provided that no taxes, payments in lieu of taxes for benefits paid, penalties or interest remain outstanding.
  9. Failure of the Indian tribe or any tribal unit thereof to make required payments, including assessments of interest and penalty, after all collection activities deemed necessary by the Commission have been exhausted, shall cause services performed for such tribe to not be treated as "employment" as provided in subsection A.
  10. The Commission may determine that any Indian tribe that loses coverage under subsection I may have services performed for such tribe again included as "employment" as provided in subsection A if all taxes, payments in lieu of taxes, penalties, and interest have been paid.
  11. The Commission shall notify the United States Internal Revenue Service and the United States Department of Labor of any termination or reinstatement of coverage made under subsection I or subsection J.
  12. Notices of payment and reporting delinquency to Indian tribes or their tribal units shall include information that failure to make full payment within the prescribed time frame:
    1. Shall cause the Indian tribe to be liable for taxes under FUTA;
    2. Shall cause the Indian tribe to lose the option to make payments in lieu of taxes; and
    3. May cause the Indian tribe to be excepted from the definition of "employer," as provided in subsection A, and services in the employ of the Indian tribe, as provided in subsection A, to be excepted from "employment."
  13. Extended benefits paid that are attributable to service in the employ of an Indian tribe and not reimbursed by the federal government shall be financed in their entirety by such Indian tribe.

    (2008, cc. 100, 247.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2008, cc. 100 and 247, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall not be deemed in any way to affect, at the effective date of this act or at any time in the future, the sovereignty of any Indian tribe recognized by the Commonwealth."

§ 60.2-508. Period of coverage generally; account required.

Any employing unit which is or becomes an employer subject to this title within any calendar year shall be subject to this title during the whole of such calendar year. Any such employing unit shall establish an account with the Commission by the end of the calendar quarter in which it becomes subject to this title.

(Code 1950, § 60-82; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-98; 1986, c. 480; 2020, c. 1261.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2021, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received adequate funding from the U.S. Department of Labor that covers the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. The amendments by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 4 provides: "That, if not sooner expired pursuant to the provisions of the third enactment of this act, this act shall expire on July 1, 2022." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. The amendments by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 1261 added the second sentence.

§ 60.2-509. Termination of coverage.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this section and § 60.2-510 , an employing unit shall cease to be an employer subject to this title as of January 1 of any year subsequent to December 31, 1972, only if:
    1. The employer files with the Commission a written application for termination of coverage;
    2. The Commission finds that (i) there were no twenty different days, each day being in a different week within the preceding calendar year, or (ii) there were no twenty different days, each day being in a different week within the current calendar year, within which such employing unit employed one or more individuals in employment subject to this title; and
    3. The Commission finds that such employing unit did not pay in any calendar quarter in the preceding or current calendar year for service in employment wages of $1,500 or more.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in this section and § 60.2-510 , an employing unit as defined in subdivisions 1 through 4 of subsection A of § 60.2-213 or § 60.2-214 or § 60.2-215 , shall cease to be an employer subject to this title as of January 1 of any year, only if it files with the Commission a written application for termination of coverage and the Commission finds that no services performed for such employing unit constitute employment as defined in subdivisions 1 through 4 of subsection A of § 60.2-213 or § 60.2-214 or § 60.2-215 .
  3. Any employing unit which is an employer at the end of any calendar year solely by acquisition during such year as provided in subdivision 1 of subsection B of § 60.2-210 , shall cease to be an employer subject to this title as of January 1 of the succeeding calendar year without the filing of the written application required of all other employers, if the Commission finds that there were no twenty different days, each day being in a different week within the preceding or current calendar year that such employing unit and its predecessors in title, treated as a single employing unit:
    1. Employed one or more individuals subject to this title; and
    2. Did not pay in any calendar quarter in the preceding or current calendar year for service in employment wages of $1,500 or more.
  4. Whenever any employer, during any completed calendar year, fails to be subject to the payment of taxes solely because no individual has earned wages from such employer during such calendar year, the Commission may, after not less than thirty days' notice in writing mailed to such employer at his last known address, cause such employer to cease to be an employer subject to this title as of January 1 of the calendar year in which such notice is given.

    (Code 1950, § 60-83; 1956, c. 440; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-99; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1972, c. 764; 1979, c. 636; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-510. Election as to coverage.

  1. Any employing unit, not otherwise subject to this title, which files with the Commission its written election to become an employer subject to this title for not less than two calendar years, shall, with the written approval of the Commission, become an employer subject to this title to the same extent as all other employers. Such employer shall be subject as of January 1 of the calendar year for which such election is approved, and shall cease to be subject as of January 1 of any calendar year subsequent to such two calendar years if it has filed with the Commission a written notice to that effect. However, the Commission may, on its own motion, and after ten days' written notice mailed to such employing unit at its last known address, without regard to the two-year calendar period, revoke such written approval. As of the date of such revocation, such employing unit shall cease to be an employer.
  2. Any employing unit for which services are performed which do not constitute employment as defined in this title may file with the Commission a written election that all such services performed by individuals in its employ in one or more distinct establishments or places of business shall be deemed to constitute employment for all the purposes of this title for not less than two calendar years. Upon the Commission's written approval, such services shall be deemed to constitute employment subject to this title from the date stated in such approval. Such services shall cease to be deemed employment subject thereto as of January 1 of any calendar year subsequent to such two calendar years, only if at least thirty days prior to such January 1 such employing unit has filed with the Commission a written notice to that effect.

    (Code 1950, § 60-84; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-100; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1974, c. 660; 1977, c. 330; 1986, c. 480.)

Article 2. Employer Reporting Requirements.

§ 60.2-511. How and when taxes payable.

Taxes, as set forth in this and the succeeding article, shall accrue and become payable by each employer for each calendar year in which he is subject to this title. Such taxes shall be based upon wages payable for employment, as defined in §§ 60.2-212 through 60.2-219 , occurring in such calendar year. Such taxes shall become due and be paid by each employer to the Commission for the fund in accordance with such regulations as the Commission may prescribe. Payment of such taxes and the filing of related returns shall be deemed to have been made as of the date of the postmark affixed to such payment and returns by the United States Postal Service, or by receipt given by such representative of the Commission if physical delivery of such payment and related returns is made to an office of the Commission.

(Code 1950, § 60-60; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-72; 1974, c. 466; 1986, c. 480; 1997, c. 137.)

CASE NOTES

Taxes may be owed even where no money transferred. - The fact that no money is transferred from the employer to the employee as remuneration for services does not mean that there is no basis for determining the amount of tax owed, where the employee purchases products from his employer at a discount from the wholesale price and, in turn, sells them at wholesale, his remuneration being at least equal to the discount. VEC v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338 , 302 S.E.2d 534 (1983) (decided under prior law).

§ 60.2-512. Requiring payroll and tax reports and payment of taxes.

  1. The Commission is hereby expressly authorized to require the filing of payroll and tax reports, and the payment of the taxes required by § 60.2-511 in monthly, quarterly, semiannual or annual payments as shall be determined by the Commission; however, if the due date for filing of reports or payment of taxes falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the due date shall be extended to the next business day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. Beginning January 1, 2013, employers may file payroll and tax reports, and pay the taxes required by § 60.2-511 , annually, in the time, form and manner prescribed by the Commission, if the employment that is the subject of the report of taxes due under this chapter consists exclusively of domestic service in a private home of the employer, as defined in §§ 31.3121 (a)(7)-1, 31.3306 (c)(2)-1, and 31.3401 (a)(3)-1 of the Employment Tax Regulations promulgated pursuant to §§ 3121, 3306, and 3401 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended. The aggregate amount of taxes shall be fully paid to the Commission on or before January 31 of each year next succeeding the year with respect to employment during which year such taxes are imposed, or in the event the time is extended for filing the return of the taxes imposed by Title IX of the Social Security Act for the year for which such taxes are imposed, then before the expiration of such extension. Taxes due and payable in an amount less than five dollars shall be deemed to be fully paid; however, this does not relieve an employer from filing payroll and tax reports as herein required.
  2. Beginning January 1, 2021, all employers shall file quarterly reports on an electronic medium using a format prescribed by the Commission. Waivers will be granted only if the Commission finds this requirement creates an unreasonable burden on the employer. All requests for waiver must be submitted in writing. Beginning January 1, 2021, if any employer who has not obtained a waiver by the date the employer's quarterly report is due, fails, without good cause shown, to file electronically, the Commission shall assess upon the employer a penalty of $75, which penalty shall be in addition to the taxes due and payable with respect to such report and to any penalty assessed under subsection B of § 60.2-513 . Penalties collected pursuant to this section shall be paid into the Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund established pursuant to § 60.2-314 .
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A, no payroll and tax reports shall be filed with respect to an employee of a state or local agency performing intelligence or counterintelligence functions, if the head of such agency has determined that filing such a report could endanger the safety of the employee or compromise an ongoing investigation or intelligence mission.

    (Code 1950, § 60-61; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-73; 1981, c. 99; 1984, c. 458; 1986, c. 480; 1993, c. 249; 1996, c. 264; 1997, c. 385; 2007, cc. 426, 638; 2012, c. 316; 2020, c. 1261.)

Editor's note. - The Employment Tax Regulations promulgated pursuant to §§ 3121, 3306, and 3401 of the Internal Revenue Code, are codified as 26 C.F.R. 31.3121(a)(7)-1, 31.3306 (c)(2)-1, and 31.3401 (a)(3)-1.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2021, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received adequate funding from the U.S. Department of Labor that covers the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. The amendments by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 4 provides: "That, if not sooner expired pursuant to the provisions of the third enactment of this act, this act shall expire on July 1, 2022." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. The amendments by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 426, effective January 1, 2009, inserted the second sentence in subsection A.

The 2007 amendment by c. 638, in subsection B, inserted "through December 31, 2008," near the beginning and substituted "shall file quarterly" for "must file quarterly" near the middle of the first sentence; and added the last two sentences.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 316, effective January 1, 2013, in subsection A, in the second sentence, substituted "January 1, 2013" for "January 1, 2009" and deleted "however, in order to qualify for this election, an employer shall have a total payroll in each calendar quarter that does not exceed $5,000, regardless of the number of persons providing such domestic service."

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 1261, in subsection B, deleted the first sentence, which read: "Beginning January 1, 1994, through December 31, 2008, employers who report 250 or more employees in any calendar quarter shall file quarterly reports on a magnetic medium using a format prescribed by the Commission"; in the second sentence, substituted "2021, all employers" for "2009, employers who report 100 or more employees in any calendar quarter in 2009, or thereafter" and in the fourth sentence, substituted "2021, if any employer who" for "2009, if any employer who reports 100 or more employees in any calendar quarter in 2009, or thereafter, and who."

Law review. - For 2007 annual survey article, "Labor and Employment Law," see 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 489 (2007).

§ 60.2-513. Failure of employing unit to file reports; assessment and amount of penalty.

  1. If any employing unit fails to file with the Commission any report which the Commission deems necessary for the effective administration of this title within 30 days after the Commission requires the same by written notice mailed to the last known address of such employing unit, the Commission may determine on the basis of such information as it may have whether such employing unit is an employer, unless such determination has already been made. Also, on the basis of such information, the Commission may assess the amount of tax due from such employer and shall give written notice of such determination and assessment to such employer. Such determination and assessment shall be final (i) unless such employer, within 30 days after the mailing to the employer at his last known address or other service of the notice of such determination or assessment, applies to the Commission for a review of such determination and assessment or (ii) unless the Commission, on its own motion, sets aside, reduces or increases the same.
  2. If any employer had wages payable for a calendar quarter and fails, without good cause shown, to file any report as required of him under this title with respect to wages or taxes, the Commission shall assess upon the employer a penalty of $100, which shall be in addition to the taxes due and payable with respect to such report.
  3. For the purposes of this subsection, "newly covered" refers to the time at which an employer initially becomes subject to liability under the provisions of this title. A newly covered employer shall file by the due date of the calendar quarter in which such employer becomes subject to liability under the provisions of this title. If such employer's report is not filed by that date, and in the absence of good cause shown for the failure to so file, a $100 penalty shall be assessed for each report. Penalties collected pursuant to this section shall be paid into the Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund.

    (Code 1950, § 60-62; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-74; 1974, c. 466; 1976, c. 708; 1977, c. 445; 1978, c. 238; 1984, c. 458; 1986, c. 480; 1999, c. 79; 2004, c. 495; 2018, c. 227; 2020, c. 1261.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2021, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received adequate funding from the U.S. Department of Labor that covers the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. The amendments by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 4 provides: "That, if not sooner expired pursuant to the provisions of the third enactment of this act, this act shall expire on July 1, 2022." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. The amendments by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 495 twice substituted "30" for "thirty" in subsection A; and in subsection B, in the first sentence, inserted "without good cause shown" and substituted "$75" for "thirty dollars" and in the next-to-last sentence, inserted "and in the absence of good cause shown for the failure to so file" and substituted "$75" for "thirty dollar."

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 227 substituted "$100" for "$75" twice in subsection B.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 1261 divided subsection B into subsections B and C by moving the former second, third and fourth sentences of subsection B to C; and in subsection C, added the first sentence, and rewrote the second sentence, which read: "A newly covered employer may file by the due date of the quarter in which his account number is assigned by the Commission, without penalty."

Law review. - For 2003/2004 survey of state labor and employment law, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 285 (2004).

§ 60.2-514. Limitation on proceeding to establish liability for taxes.

No suit or proceeding for the purpose of establishing liability for taxes under this chapter shall be begun for any period occurring more than three years prior to January 1 of the year within which such suit or proceeding is instituted. However, this section shall not apply in any case of willful attempt in any manner to defeat or evade the payment of any contributions due under this chapter. A proceeding shall be deemed to have been instituted or begun upon the date of issuance of an order by the Commission directing a hearing to be held to determine liability or nonliability, under this chapter, of an employing unit, or upon the date notice of the establishment of liability is mailed to the last known address of the employing unit. The order or notice mentioned herein shall be deemed to have been issued on the date such order or notice is mailed to the last known address of the employing unit.

(1968, c. 9, §§ 60-62.1, 60.1-74.1; 1977, c. 445; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-515. Amount of taxes; increase of rate.

Each employer shall pay taxes equal to the following percentages of wages payable by him with respect to employment:

  1. Except as otherwise provided in Article 4 (§ 60.2-525 et seq.) of this chapter, 6.2 percent with respect to employment during the calendar year. Wages payable beyond the last pay period in December shall be considered as wages payable in the first pay period of the succeeding year, and included in reports required for the first reporting period of such year.
  2. If the Federal Unemployment Tax Act is at any time amended to permit a higher maximum rate of credit against the federal tax now levied under § 3301 of the Internal Revenue Code than the credit that is now permitted under § 3302 of the Internal Revenue Code, to an employer with respect to any state unemployment compensation law whose standard tax rate on payroll under such law is more than 5.4 percent, the standard tax rate for all employers under this title shall, by Commission rule promulgated under § 60.2-111 , be increased from 5.4 percent on wages to that percentage on wages which corresponds to the higher maximum rate of credit thus permitted against the federal unemployment tax. Such increase shall become effective on the same date as such higher maximum rate of credit becomes permissible under such federal amendment.
  3. If the Federal Unemployment Tax Act is at any time amended to increase the rate of excise tax each employer pays for employing individuals, the Commission may, by rules promulgated under § 60.2-111 , increase the rate of taxes under this title to the rate which corresponds to the highest maximum rate of credit permitted against such higher federal unemployment excise tax. Such increase shall become effective on the same date as such higher rate of federal unemployment excise tax becomes effective. (Code 1950, § 60-63; 1950, p. 360; 1956, c. 440; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-75; 1974, c. 466; 1977, c. 330; 1980, c. 480; 1981, c. 606; 1985, c. 152; 1986, c. 480.)

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on governmental services and social welfare for the year 1976-77, see 63 Va. L. Rev. 1440 (1977).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 4.

§ 60.2-516. Taxes and payments in lieu of taxes not deducted from wages.

Taxes imposed by this title and payments by employers in lieu of taxes shall not be deducted, in whole or in part, from the wages of individuals employed by any employer.

(Code 1950, § 60-65; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-77; 1972, c. 764; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-517. How fractional part of cent computed.

In the payment of any such taxes, a fractional part of a cent shall be disregarded, unless it amounts to one-half cent or more, in which case it shall be increased to one cent.

(Code 1950, § 60-66; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-78; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-518. False statements, etc., by employing units; failure to furnish reports, etc.

  1. Any employing unit or any officer or agent of an employing unit or any other person shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor if it or he:
    1. Makes a false statement or representation knowing it to be false, or who knowingly fails to disclose a material fact (i) to prevent or reduce the payment of benefits to any individual entitled thereto, (ii) to avoid becoming or remaining subject to this title or (iii) to avoid or reduce any tax or other payment required from an employing unit under this title; or
    2. Willfully fails or refuses (i) to furnish any reports required by this title or (ii) to produce or permit the inspection or copying of records as required hereunder.
  2. Each such false statement, representation or failure to disclose a material fact listed in this section, and each day of such failure or refusal shall constitute a separate offense.

    (Code 1950, § 60-113; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-130; 1986, c. 480.)

Cross references. - As to punishment for Class 1 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

Article 3. Collection of Taxes.

§ 60.2-519. Interest on past-due taxes.

Taxes unpaid on the date on which they are due and payable, as prescribed by the Commission pursuant to § 60.2-511 , shall bear interest at the rate of one and one-half percent per month from and after such date until payment plus accrued interest is received by the Commission. Interest collected pursuant to this article shall be paid into the Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund continued by § 60.2-314 .

(Code 1950, § 60-77; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-92; 1982, c. 363; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-519.1. Bad check charge.

Any check submitted for payment of taxes due as prescribed by § 60.2-511 , which is dishonored by the payer, shall bear a bad check charge of twenty-five dollars. Charges collected pursuant to this section shall be paid into the Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund established by § 60.2-314 .

(1987, c. 114.)

§ 60.2-519.2. Service charge for payment of taxes by certain means.

If the Commission accepts a form of payment by a means that incurs a charge, the Commission shall add that charge to such payment as described in subsection B of § 2.2-614.1 .

(1990, c. 687; 2002, c. 719.)

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 719 rewrote the section, which formerly read: "The Commission is authorized to accept payment of taxes by use of a credit card. In addition to any penalties and interest, the Commission shall add to such payment a service charge for the acceptance of such card. Such service charge shall not exceed the percentage charged to the Virginia Employment Commission for the use of such card."

§ 60.2-520. Taxes which accrued while employer was in armed forces.

No interest shall be assessed against or collected from any employer upon any taxes which accrued against such employer during the period of active service of such employer in the armed forces of the United States. Any proof of such service satisfactory to the Commission shall be sufficient. Any such employer who has already paid to the Commission any interest on taxes which would have been abated under this provision shall be entitled to a refund for the amount of interest so paid upon the filing of an application therefor.

(Code 1950, § 60-77.1; 1952, c. 184; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-93; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-521. Collection by civil action; persons subject to civil actions; other remedies; compromise and adjustment.

If, after notice, any employer defaults in any payment of taxes or payment in lieu of taxes or interest or any penalty assessed pursuant to subsection C of § 60.2-501 and § 60.2-513 , the amount due shall be collected by civil action in the name of the Commission. The employer adjudged in default shall pay the fees and costs of such action. Civil actions brought under this article to collect taxes or interest or any penalty from an employer shall be heard by the court at the earliest possible date. Such civil actions may be brought against any officer, employee, or agent of a corporation or partnership in his individual, personal capacity when that person willfully fails to cause the employer to pay the appropriate taxes and he had the authority to do so. No person shall be subject to this section unless it is proved (i) that such person had knowledge of the failure or attempt to make such payment and (ii) that such person had authority to prevent such failure or attempt. In addition to the foregoing remedies the Commission shall have such other remedies as are available to the State Tax Commissioner and county and city treasurers for the collection of taxes generally. The Commission is authorized to compromise, settle and adjust any tax or taxes, including interest, or any penalty assessed against any employer where in the judgment of the Commission the best interests of the Commonwealth will be promoted or served. The Commission may in such cases accept in full settlement of the tax assessed an amount less than that assessed.

(Code 1950, § 60-78; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-94; 1974, c. 466; 1977, c. 445; 1979, c. 634; 1986, c. 480; 1990, c. 687.)

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on governmental services and social welfare for the year 1978-1979, see 66 Va. L. Rev. 301 (1980).

CASE NOTES

Conclusiveness of Commission's findings of fact. - A suit to recover payroll taxes under this section is not a "court review" of a decision of the Commission, in which the latter's findings of fact are conclusive as provided in § 60.2-625 . Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202 , 18 S.E.2d 390 (1942) (decided under prior law).

Submission on transcript of testimony. - In a suit to recover payroll taxes under this section, where the matter, by stipulation of counsel, was submitted to the court on a transcript of the testimony taken before the Commission, it was held that since the witnesses were not heard ore tenus by the trial court, the matter was before the Supreme Court (now Court of Appeals) as if it had been heard by the court below on depositions. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202 , 18 S.E.2d 390 (1942) (decided under prior law).

As to application of res judicata, see Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202 , 18 S.E.2d 390 (1942) (decided under prior law).

§ 60.2-522. Injunction.

When an unsatisfied execution has been returned by an officer, and the employer against whom the judgment has been obtained on which the execution was issued continues in default of payment of taxes, or any portion thereof, such employer may be enjoined from operating and doing business in this Commonwealth until such taxes have been paid. The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to grant such injunction upon the complaint of the Commission. Notice of the time and place when the application for the injunction will be made shall be served on the employer, and a copy of the bill of complaint shall be served with the notice.

(Code 1950, § 60-79; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-95; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-523. Priorities under legal dissolutions or distributions.

    1. In the event of any distribution of an employer's assets, taxes, interest and penalty then or thereafter due shall be a lien against such assets, prior to all claims of lien and general creditors. Taxes accruing by reason of an employment for an employer who is a receiver, trustee or other fiduciary shall be a lien against all the assets in the custody or control of such receiver, trustee or other fiduciary, prior and paramount to all other claims of lien and general creditors. A. 1.  In the event of any distribution of an employer's assets, taxes, interest and penalty then or thereafter due shall be a lien against such assets, prior to all claims of lien and general creditors. Taxes accruing by reason of an employment for an employer who is a receiver, trustee or other fiduciary shall be a lien against all the assets in the custody or control of such receiver, trustee or other fiduciary, prior and paramount to all other claims of lien and general creditors.
    2. Nothing in this article shall be construed in derogation of any prior lien of the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions, nor any mortgage, deed of trust or other lien duly perfected prior to the date the taxes or any part thereof first accrued. However, no such lien in favor of the Commonwealth or any of its subdivisions, nor any mortgage, deed of trust or other lien shall in any case be preferred, paramount or prior to the lien for taxes due by any such receiver, trustee or other fiduciary upon payrolls earned in the employment of such receiver, trustee or other fiduciary.
    1. Any taxes, interest or penalty imposed by this chapter shall be a lien upon the assets of the business of any employer, subject to this chapter's provisions, who leases, transfers or sells out his business, or ceases to do business. Such employer shall be required, by the next reporting date as prescribed by the Commission, to file with the Commission all reports and pay all taxes due with respect to wages payable for employment up to the date of such lease, transfer, sale or cessation of the business. Such employer's successor in business shall be required to withhold sufficient of the purchase money to cover the amount of the taxes due and unpaid until such time as the former owner or employer produces a receipt from the Commission showing that the taxes have been paid, or produces a certificate from the Commission that no taxes are due. B. 1.  Any taxes, interest or penalty imposed by this chapter shall be a lien upon the assets of the business of any employer, subject to this chapter's provisions, who leases, transfers or sells out his business, or ceases to do business. Such employer shall be required, by the next reporting date as prescribed by the Commission, to file with the Commission all reports and pay all taxes due with respect to wages payable for employment up to the date of such lease, transfer, sale or cessation of the business. Such employer's successor in business shall be required to withhold sufficient of the purchase money to cover the amount of the taxes due and unpaid until such time as the former owner or employer produces a receipt from the Commission showing that the taxes have been paid, or produces a certificate from the Commission that no taxes are due.
    2. If the purchaser of a business or successor of such employer fails to withhold purchase money or any money due to such employer in consideration of a lease or other transfer and the taxes are due and unpaid after the next reporting date, as set forth in subdivision 1 of this subsection, such successor shall be personally liable to the extent of the assets of the business so acquired for the payment of the taxes accrued and unpaid on account of the operation of the business by the former owner or employer.
    3. Whenever the purchaser or successor of such employer files with the Commission a written request for a statement showing the amount of any tax due by such employer, unless such statement is furnished to such purchaser or successor within ninety days from the date such written request was filed, such purchaser or successor shall not be liable for any tax or taxes due by such employer, and the lien created by this section shall thereupon be released and discharged.

      (Code 1950, § 60-80; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-96; 1977, c. 445; 1986, c. 480.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 4.

CASE NOTES

The lien of a landlord for rent was held a "lien duly perfected" within the meaning of this section. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 182 Va. 351 , 28 S.E.2d 741 (1944), reversed as to priority of federal claim in, 323 U.S. 353, 65 S. Ct. 304, 89 L. Ed. 294 (1945) (decided under prior law).

§ 60.2-524. Refunds.

  1. If within three years after the date on which any taxes or interest are paid an employing unit which paid such taxes or interest applies (i) for adjustment in connection with subsequent tax payments, or (ii) for a refund thereof because such adjustment cannot be made, and the Commission determines that such taxes or interest or any portion thereof was erroneously collected, or within sixty days from the final determination of any change or correction in the liability of the employing unit for any tax payable under this chapter, whichever is later, subject to the availability of Commission records, the Commission shall allow such employing unit to make an adjustment, without interest, in connection with subsequent tax payments by it. If such adjustment cannot be made, the Commission shall refund the amount, without interest, from the fund. For like cause and within the same period, an adjustment or refund may be so made on the Commission's own initiative.
  2. Where the Commission finds upon satisfactory proof that any employing unit has erroneously paid to this Commonwealth taxes or interest upon wages earned by individuals in employment in another state, or under the provisions of the Federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, a refund or adjustment shall be made, without interest, and without regard to the due date.
  3. Where the Commission finds that an instrumentality of the United States has paid to this Commonwealth taxes or interest upon wages for any year with respect to which this Commonwealth is not certified by the Secretary of Labor of the United States under § 3304 of the Internal Revenue Code, a refund shall be made to such instrumentality, without interest, and without regard to the date of payment.

    (Code 1950, § 60-81; 1956, c. 440; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-97; 1986, c. 480; 1989, c. 144; 1994, c. 161.)

Editor's note. - The Federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, referred to above, is codified generally as 45 U.S.C. § 351 et seq.

Article 4. Computation of Tax Rate.

§ 60.2-525. Statement of employer's benefit charges and taxes.

The Commission, by December 31 every year, shall provide every covered employer with a statement of the employer's benefit charges and taxes for the preceding fiscal year. For any period in which benefit charges are not available, benefit charges shall be calculated as provided in § 60.2-530 .

(1981, c. 606, § 60.1-40.1; 1986, c. 480; 2003, c. 382.)

Cross references. - For requirement that an employer charged with benefit wages shall be notified of the charges quarterly by the Commission, see § 60.2-528 .

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 382 substituted "December 31" for "July 1" and "fiscal" for "calendar."

§ 60.2-526. General provisions.

  1. For each calendar year commencing after December 31, 1981, the tax rate of each employer, whose experience rating account has been chargeable with benefits during the most recent twelve completed calendar month period ending on June 30 of the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year for which a tax rate is being determined, shall be computed as provided in this chapter.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A of this section, the tax rate of each employer newly subject to this title, including any nonprofit organization which has elected to become liable for payments in lieu of taxes under the provisions of subsection B of § 60.2-501 and thereafter terminates such election, shall be 2.5 percent, except that at such time as it is eligible for computation as hereinafter provided, the tax rate shall become the computed rate. The Commission shall notify each such employer of his tax rate for such calendar year not later than December 31 immediately preceding such year, but the failure of any such employer to receive such notice shall not relieve him from liability for such tax. (Code 1950, § 60-67; 1952, c. 184; 1954, c. 203; 1956, c. 440; 1960, c. 136; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-79; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1974, c. 466; 1980, c. 406; 1981, c. 606; 1982, c. 370; 1983, c. 16; 1986, c. 480; 1995, c. 323; 1997, c. 298; 1999, c. 313.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1995, c. 323, cl. 3, as amended by Acts 1997, c. 298, cl. 1, which provided for the expiration of the 1995 amendment to this section on January 1, 2000, was repealed by Acts 1999, c. 313, cl. 1. Therefore the 1995 amendment to this section no longer expires January 1, 2000.

Acts 1997, cc. 530 and 674, cl. 5 provides: "That notwithstanding the provisions of § 60.2-526 , changes in employer unemployment compensation tax rates resulting from fund adequacy multiplier and adequate fund balance recalculations made pursuant to this act [which amended §§ 60.2-533 and 60.2-602 ] shall become effective on July 1, 1997. The Virginia Employment Commission shall immediately notify employers of their recomputed tax rates for wages paid during the final two quarters of 1997."

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 4.

§ 60.2-527. Tax rate of certain foreign contractors.

  1. For each calendar year, the tax rate of each foreign contractor doing business in Virginia shall be the maximum rate allowable by law for three years. At the end of the three-year period, such employer shall be eligible for the computed rate as provided in § 60.2-530 .
  2. As used in this section, "foreign contractor" means (i) an out-of-state "contractor" as defined in § 54.1-1100 or (ii) an out-of-state "highway contractor" engaged in the type of contracting activities referred to in § 33.2-1106 , who does not maintain a principal place of business in Virginia as determined by the Commission, except that such employer need not be a member of any highway contractors association. Such determination by the Commission shall be final and not subject to judicial review. (1982, c. 200, § 60.1-79.1; 1984, c. 468; 1986, c. 480.)

Editor's note. - References in this section were updated at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission to conform to the recodification of Title 33.2 by Acts 2014, c. 805, effective October 1, 2014.

§ 60.2-528. Individual benefit charges.

  1. An individual's "benefit charges" shall be computed in the following manner:
    1. For each week benefits are received, a claimant's "benefit charges" shall be equal to his benefits received for such week.
    2. For each week extended benefits are received, pursuant to § 60.2-610 or 60.2-611 , a claimant's "benefit charges" shall be equal to one-half his benefits received for such week. However, a claimant's "benefit charges" for extended benefits attributable to service in the employ of a governmental entity referred to in subdivisions 1 through 3 of subsection A of § 60.2-213 shall be equal to the full amount of such extended benefit.
    3. For each week partial benefits are received, the claimant's "benefit charges" shall be computed (i) in the case of regular benefits as in subdivision 1 of this subsection, or (ii) in the case of extended benefits as in subdivision 2 of this subsection.
    1. The employing unit from whom such individual was separated, resulting in the current period of unemployment, shall be the most recent employing unit for whom such individual has performed services for remuneration (i) during 30 days, whether or not such days are consecutive, or (ii) during 240 hours. If such individual's unemployment is caused by separation from an employer, such individual's "benefit charges" for such period of unemployment shall be deemed the responsibility of the last employer for (i) 30 days or (ii) 240 hours prior to such period of unemployment. B. 1.  The employing unit from whom such individual was separated, resulting in the current period of unemployment, shall be the most recent employing unit for whom such individual has performed services for remuneration (i) during 30 days, whether or not such days are consecutive, or (ii) during 240 hours. If such individual's unemployment is caused by separation from an employer, such individual's "benefit charges" for such period of unemployment shall be deemed the responsibility of the last employer for (i) 30 days or (ii) 240 hours prior to such period of unemployment.
    2. Any employer charged with benefits paid shall be notified of the charges quarterly by the Commission. The amount specified shall be conclusive on the employer unless, not later than 30 days after the notice of benefit charges was mailed to its last known address or otherwise delivered to it, the employer files an appeal with the Commission, setting forth the grounds for such an appeal. Proceedings on appeal to the Commission regarding the amount of benefit charges under this subsection or a redetermination of such amount shall be in accordance with the provisions of § 60.2-500 . The decision of the Commission shall be subject to the provisions of § 60.2-500 . Any appeal perfected pursuant to the provisions of this section shall not address any issue involving the merits or conditions of a claimant's separation from employment.
  2. No "benefit charges" shall be deemed the responsibility of an employer of:
    1. An individual whose separation from the work of such employer arose as a result of a violation of the law by such individual, which violation led to confinement in any jail or prison;
    2. An individual who voluntarily left employment in order to accept other employment, genuinely believing such employment to be permanent;
    3. An individual with respect to any weeks in which benefits are claimed and received after such date as that individual refused to accept an offer of rehire by the employer because such individual was in training with approval of the Commission pursuant to § 60.2-613 ;
    4. An individual who voluntarily left employment to enter training approved under § 236 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2296 et seq.);
    5. An individual hired to replace a member of the Reserve of the United States Armed Forces or the National Guard called into active duty in connection with an international conflict and whose employment is terminated concurrent with and because of that member's return from active duty;
    6. An individual who left employment voluntarily with good cause due to a personal bona fide medical reason caused by a non-job-related injury or medical condition;
    7. An individual participating as an inmate in (i) state or local work release programs pursuant to § 53.1-60 or 53.1-131 ; (ii) community residential programs pursuant to §§ 53.1-177 , 53.1-178 , and 53.1-179 ; or (iii) any similar work release program, whose separation from work arose from conditions of release or parole from such program;
    8. An individual who was unable to work at his regular employment due to a disaster for which the Governor, by executive order, has declared a state of emergency, if such disaster forced the closure of the employer's business. In no case shall more than four weeks of benefit charges be waived; or
    9. An individual who leaves employment to accompany his spouse to the location of the spouse's new duty assignment if (i) the spouse is on active duty in the military or naval services of the United States; (ii) the spouse's relocation to a new military-related assignment is pursuant to a permanent change of station order; (iii) the location of the spouse's new duty assignment is not readily accessible from the individual's place of employment; and (iv) the spouse's new duty assignment is located in a state that, pursuant to statute, does not deem a person accompanying a military spouse as a person leaving work voluntarily without good cause. (Code 1950, § 60-68; 1952, c. 184; 1954, c. 203; 1956, c. 440; 1958, c. 36; 1960, c. 136; 1962, cc. 12, 83; 1964, c. 3; 1966, c. 30; 1968, c. 9; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-80; 1970, c. 104; 1972, c. 764; 1974, c. 466; 1976, c. 708; 1977, c. 330; 1978, c. 493; 1979, c. 634; 1980, c. 463; 1981, cc. 250, 606; 1986, c. 480; 1989, c. 104; 1991, c. 249; 1991, Sp. Sess., c. 9; 1997, c. 202; 2001, c. 721; 2004, cc. 583, 977; 2005, cc. 44, 105; 2009, c. 878; 2014, c. 442.)

Cross references. - For requirement that the Commission furnish an annual statement of employers' benefit charges, see § 60.2-525 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2009, c. 878, which had added a subdivision C 9 to this section and was contingent on adequate federal funding, was repealed by Acts 2014, c. 442, cl. 2. Both the 2009 and 2014 amendments to this section added substantially similar provisions in subdivision C 9.

Acts 2014, c. 442, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act enhance the benefits payable to an individual pursuant to Title 60.2 of the Code of Virginia. Pursuant to § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia, the Virginia Employment Commission, in consultation with the Department of Planning and Budget, estimates that over the ensuing eight years (i) the provisions of this act are projected to reduce the solvency level of the Unemployment Trust Fund by an average of 0 percent in each of the eight years and (ii) the projected average annual increase in state unemployment tax liability of employers on a per-employee basis that would result from the provisions of this act is $0.40."

Acts 2014, c. 442, which added subdivision C 9, in cl. 4 provides: "That the provisions of the first enactment of this act shall expire on December 31, 2020."

Acts 2014, c. 442, cl. 4, which would have made subdivision C 9 expire on December 31, 2020, was repealed by Acts 2020, c. 261, cl. 1.

Acts 2014, c. 442, cl. 5 provides: "That the Virginia Employment Commission shall provide in its reports to the Commission on Unemployment Compensation information detailing (i) the number of claims that are paid as a result of the first enactment of this act, (ii) the effect of the payment of such claims on the solvency level and balance of the Unemployment Trust Fund, and (iii) the effect of such claims on pool taxes paid by employers in the Commonwealth."

Acts 2020, c. 261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act enhance the benefits payable to an individual pursuant to Title 60.2 of the Code of Virginia. Pursuant to § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia, the Virginia Employment Commission, in consultation with the Department of Planning and Budget, estimates that over the ensuing eight years (i) the provisions of this act are projected to reduce the solvency level of the Unemployment Trust Fund by an average of 0.1 percent in each of the eight years and (ii) the projected average annual increase in state unemployment tax liability of employers on a per-employee basis that would result from the provisions of this act is $0."

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 721, in subsection C, deleted "or" at the end of subdivision 5, added "or" at the end of subdivision 6, and added subdivision 7.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 583, in subsection B, substituted "30" for "thirty" in three places; added subdivision C 8; and made related changes.

The 2004 amendment by c. 977, in subsection B, substituted "30" for "thirty" in three places; and in subdivision C 7, deleted clause (i), which formerly read: "the Diversion Center Incarceration Program pursuant to § 19.2-316.3 " and redesignated former clauses (ii) through (iv) as present clauses (i) through (iii).

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 44 deleted "and if the individual returned to his regular full-time employment once the business reopened" at the end of the first sentence of subdivision C 8, and made stylitic changes.

The 2005 amendment by c. 105 substituted "in connection with an international conflict" for "as a result of Operation Desert Shield or Operation Desert Storm" in subdivision C 5 and made minor stylistic changes.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on governmental services and social welfare for the year 1978-1979, see 66 Va. L. Rev. 301 (1980).

For annual survey article, "Labor and Employment Law," see 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 513 (2009).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 4.

§ 60.2-528.1. Charging of benefits relating to certain overpayments; penalty for pattern of failure to respond to requests for information.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context requires a different meaning: "Employer," with regard to the timeliness and adequacy of responses, includes an agent of the employer used by the employer to respond to the Commission on the employer's behalf; however, an employer's agent's failure to respond timely or adequately to requests for information with regard to claims involving the agent's other clients shall not be used in determining whether the employer has established a pattern of failing to respond timely or adequately to written requests for information. "Erroneous payment" means a payment of benefits under this title made prior to a determination by the Commission that the claimant is not eligible or qualified for the benefits paid. "Information relating to a claim" means information material to a determination or decision by the Commission relating to the payment of benefits under this title, including separation information and information required by the Commission for the establishment of a claim for compensation and information about wages, days, and hours worked. "Review period" means the 48 consecutive calendar month period ending on the June 30 that precedes the Commission's next annual calculation of the employer's benefit ratio pursuant to subdivision A 1 a of § 60.2-530 . "Written request" includes a request sent electronically.
  2. An employer's account shall not be relieved of charges relating to an erroneous payment if the Commission determines that:
    1. The erroneous payment was made because the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to a written request by the Commission for information relating to the claim; and
    2. The employer has established a pattern of failing to respond timely or adequately to written requests by the Commission for information relating to claims.
  3. For purposes of this section, an employer's response to a written request by the Commission for information relating to a claim shall be deemed not to be:
    1. "Adequate" if it fails to provide sufficient material facts to enable the Commission to make a correct determination regarding a claim for benefits; however, (i) a response shall not be deemed inadequate if the Commission failed to request the necessary information or if information is provided in a format other than as requested, provided that the information is capable of being read by the recipient, and (ii) there shall be a rebuttable presumption that an employer that participates in a fact-finding interview or responds fully to the questions set out on the written request for information has provided an adequate response; or
    2. "Timely" if it is not made within 10 calendar days after the delivery or mailing of the Commission's request for information.
  4. An employer shall be deemed to have established a pattern of failing to respond timely or adequately to written requests for information relating to claims if the Commission determines that the employer has failed to respond timely or adequately to a written request for information relating to a claim on four or more occasions within the applicable review period. The Commission shall not find that an employer has established a pattern of failing to respond timely or adequately to written requests for information relating to claims unless the Commission has provided the employer with the notices required pursuant to subsection E.
  5. The Commission shall provide the employer with a written notice following the employer's first, second, and third determinations that the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to a written request for information relating to a claim within the applicable review period. Each such notice shall be delivered or mailed to the employer's last known address of agency record and shall advise the employer of the potential implications of the employer's failure to respond timely or adequately to written requests for such information.
  6. Upon the Commission's third determination within the applicable review period that an employer failed to respond timely or adequately to a written request for information relating to a claim, the Commission shall assess upon the employer a civil penalty of $75. A copy of the notice of assessment of a civil penalty shall be delivered or mailed to the employer with the notice of the employer's third such failure as required pursuant to subsection E. Civil penalties collected pursuant to this subsection shall be paid into the Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund established pursuant to § 60.2-314 . The Commission may compromise, settle, and adjust any such penalty as authorized by § 60.2-521 .
  7. An employer shall not be found to have failed to respond timely or adequately to a written request by the Commission for information relating to a claim if the Commission finds good cause for such failure. The Commission may not find good cause for an employer's failure to respond timely or adequately to such a written request unless the failure is due to compelling and necessitous circumstances beyond the employer's control.
  8. If the Commission has determined that an employer has established a pattern of failing to respond timely or adequately to written requests for information relating to claims, such determination shall remain in effect until the end of the applicable review period. Any benefit charges for an erroneous payment that the Commission has determined are not to be relieved from the employer's account pursuant to subsection B shall remain chargeable to the employer's account through the period ending on the fourth June 30 following the Commission's determination.
  9. The issue of whether an employer's account shall be relieved of charges relating to an erroneous payment, including whether an erroneous payment was made because the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to a written request by the Commission for information relating to the claim, shall be decided in every Commission proceeding arising from an employer's appeal of an award of benefits. Any such decision shall be subject to appeal pursuant to § 60.2-620 . Final decisions shall be used in determining whether the employer has established a pattern of failing to respond timely or adequately to written requests for information relating to claims, whether the employer is subject to a civil penalty pursuant to subsection F, and whether the Commission has given the notices required pursuant to subsection E.
  10. The costs of benefits charged to any governmental entity, Indian tribe, or nonprofit entity that is a reimbursable employing unit under this title shall not include any credits of benefit overpayments actually collected by the Commission if the Commission finds that the overpayment was made because the entity or its agent was at fault for failing to respond timely or adequately to a written request for information relating to a claim and the entity or agent has established a pattern of failing to respond timely or adequately to such requests.
  11. If the erroneous payment results from a combined-wage claim, the determination of noncharging for the combined-wage claim shall be made by the paying state. If the response from the employer does not meet the criteria established by the paying state for an adequate or timely response, the paying state shall promptly notify the transferring state of its determination, and the employer shall be appropriately charged.
  12. This section applies to erroneous payments established on or after July 7, 2013.

    (2013, c. 771.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2013, c. 771, cl. 2 provides: "That the Virginia Employment Commission shall monitor the implementation of § 60.2-528.1 created by this act and shall submit a report thereon to the Commission on Unemployment Compensation biennially commencing July 1, 2015. Each report of the Virginia Employment Commission shall provide information, aggregated so as not to identify specific employers or claimants, regarding the number of employers that have been deemed to have established a pattern of failing to respond timely or adequately to written requests for information, the amount of benefit charges not relieved from employers' accounts as a result of the implementation of such section, the assessment of civil penalties pursuant to such section, the effectiveness of the section in reducing the number and amount of erroneous payments made to claimants and in increasing the percentage of employers that provide timely and adequate responses to requests for information relating to claims for compensation, and the effect thereof on the solvency level of the Unemployment Trust Fund and the average state unemployment tax per employee. Each report shall include information regarding the burden of complying with and administering the section and recommendations for legislative changes that would ease such burdens and increase the section's effectiveness."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, cl. 5, which expires on July 1, 2022, provides: "That all costs to the Unemployment Compensation Fund (the Fund) resulting from the provisions of this act for overpayments of benefits under Chapter 6 ( § 60.2-600 et seq.) of Title 60.2 of the Code of Virginia shall be reimbursed to the Fund from the general fund in the general appropriation act. For an overpayment waived pursuant to this act, no employer shall be responsible for (i) reimbursing benefits or (ii) benefits charges, except as provided in § 60.2-528.1 of the Code of Virginia."

§ 60.2-529. Employer's benefit charges.

Any employer's benefit charges for a given calendar year shall be the total of the "benefit charges" which, pursuant to the provisions of § 60.2-528 , are deemed to be the responsibility of such employer.

(Code 1950, § 60-69; 1954, c. 203; 1962, c. 6; 1964, c. 3; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-81; 1974, c. 466; 1977, c. 330; 1981, c. 606; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-530. Benefit ratio.

    1. The "benefit ratio" of each employer for a given calendar year shall be the percentage, rounded to the nearest one-tenth of a percent, equal to the employer's benefit charges for the 12 consecutive calendar month period ending on June 30 immediately preceding that calendar year, divided by the total of his payroll for the same period except that: A. 1.  The "benefit ratio" of each employer for a given calendar year shall be the percentage, rounded to the nearest one-tenth of a percent, equal to the employer's benefit charges for the 12 consecutive calendar month period ending on June 30 immediately preceding that calendar year, divided by the total of his payroll for the same period except that:
      1. For an employer whose account has been chargeable with benefit charges for 48 or more consecutive completed calendar months, the "benefit ratio" shall be the percentage, rounded to the nearest one-tenth of a percent, equal to the employer's benefit charges for the most recent 48 consecutive completed calendar month period ending on June 30 immediately preceding that calendar year, divided by the total of his payrolls for the same period;
      2. For an employer whose account has been chargeable with benefit charges for 36 but less than 48 consecutive completed calendar months the "benefit ratio" shall be the percentage equal to the employer's benefit charges for the most recent 36 consecutive completed calendar month period ending on June 30 immediately preceding that calendar year divided by his payroll for the same period; and
      3. For an employer whose account has been chargeable with benefit charges for 24 but less than 36 consecutive completed calendar months the "benefit ratio" shall be the percentage, rounded to the nearest one-tenth of a percent, equal to the employer's benefit charges for the most recent 24 consecutive completed calendar month period ending on June 30 immediately preceding that calendar year divided by his payroll for the same period.
    2. The term "payroll" as used in this section means the greater of (i) the taxable payroll on which taxes have been paid on or before September 30 immediately following such June 30 or (ii) $1.
  1. Where benefit charges are not available for any or all of the periods used to determine an employer's benefit ratio, benefit wages divided by three shall be used in lieu of benefit charges for those periods benefit charges are not available, in combination with benefit charges, where available to determine an employer's benefit ratio.

    (Code 1950, § 60-70; 1954, c. 203; 1956, c. 440; 1960, c. 136; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-82; 1977, c. 330; 1981, c. 606; 1986, c. 480; 2014, c. 191.)

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 191 substituted "12" for "twelve" in subdivision A 1; in subdivision A 1 a, substituted "48" for "forty-eight" twice; in subdivision A 1 b, substituted "36" for "thirty-six" twice and "48" for "forty-eight"; in subdivision A 1 c, substituted "24" for "twenty-four" twice and "36" for "thirty-six"; and in subdivision A 2, substituted "in this section" for "herein" and inserted "the greater of (i)" and "or (ii) $1."

§ 60.2-531. Experience rating tax; table.

Subject to the provisions of § 60.2-533 , the experience rating tax rate for each employer for the calendar year 1982 and subsequent years shall be the percent in the column corresponding to the employer's benefit ratio, except that if the employer's benefit ratio exceeds 6.2 percent, the column under 6.2 percent shall be the appropriate column, and in the line corresponding to the fund balance factor for the year pursuant to § 60.2-533 .

BENEFIT RATIOS .00 .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 IN PERCENTUM FUND BALANCE TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX FACTOR RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % 120 0.00 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.30 0.37 0.45 0.52 115 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.48 0.56 110 0.00 0.08 0.17 0.25 0.34 0.42 0.51 0.59 105 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.27 0.36 0.45 0.54 0.63 100 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 95 0.10 0.10 0.21 0.31 0.42 0.52 0.63 0.73 90 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.55 0.66 0.77 85 0.10 0.11 0.23 0.34 0.46 0.57 0.69 0.80 80 0.10 0.12 0.24 0.36 0.48 0.60 0.72 0.84 75 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.37 0.50 0.62 0.75 0.87 70 0.10 0.13 0.26 0.39 0.52 0.65 0.78 0.91 65 0.10 0.13 0.27 0.40 0.54 0.67 0.81 0.94 60 0.10 0.14 0.28 0.42 0.56 0.70 0.84 0.98 55 0.10 0.14 0.29 0.43 0.58 0.72 0.87 1.01 50 0.10 0.15 0.30 0.45 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.05

BENEFIT RATIOS .80 .90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 IN PERCENTUM FUND BALANCE TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX FACTOR RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % 120 0.60 0.67 0.75 0.82 0.90 0.97 1.05 1.12 115 0.64 0.72 0.80 0.88 0.96 1.04 1.12 1.20 110 0.68 0.76 0.85 0.93 1.02 1.10 1.19 1.27 105 0.72 0.81 0.90 0.99 1.08 1.17 1.26 1.35 100 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 95 0.84 0.94 1.05 1.15 1.26 1.36 1.47 1.57 90 0.88 0.99 1.10 1.21 1.32 1.43 1.54 1.65 85 0.92 1.03 1.15 1.26 1.38 1.49 1.61 1.72 80 0.96 1.08 1.20 1.32 1.44 1.56 1.68 1.80 75 1.00 1.12 1.25 1.37 1.50 1.62 1.75 1.87 70 1.04 1.17 1.30 1.43 1.56 1.69 1.82 1.95 65 1.08 1.21 1.35 1.48 1.62 1.75 1.89 2.02 60 1.12 1.26 1.40 1.54 1.68 1.82 1.96 2.10 55 1.16 1.30 1.45 1.59 1.74 1.88 2.03 2.17 50 1.20 1.35 1.50 1.65 1.80 1.95 2.10 2.25

BENEFIT RATIOS 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.30 IN PERCENTUM FUND BALANCE TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX FACTOR RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % 120 1.20 1.27 1.35 1.42 1.50 1.57 1.65 1.72 115 1.28 1.36 1.44 1.52 1.60 1.68 1.76 1.84 110 1.36 1.44 1.53 1.61 1.70 1.78 1.87 1.95 105 1.44 1.53 1.62 1.71 1.80 1.89 1.98 2.07 100 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.30 95 1.68 1.78 1.89 1.99 2.10 2.20 2.31 2.41 90 1.76 1.87 1.98 2.09 2.20 2.31 2.42 2.53 85 1.84 1.95 2.07 2.18 2.30 2.41 2.53 2.64 80 1.92 2.04 2.16 2.28 2.40 2.52 2.64 2.76 75 2.00 2.12 2.25 2.37 2.50 2.62 2.75 2.87 70 2.08 2.21 2.34 2.47 2.60 2.73 2.86 2.99 65 2.16 2.29 2.43 2.56 2.70 2.83 2.97 3.10 60 2.24 2.38 2.52 2.66 2.80 2.94 3.08 3.22 55 2.32 2.46 2.61 2.75 2.90 3.04 3.19 3.33 50 2.40 2.55 2.70 2.85 3.00 3.15 3.30 3.45

BENEFIT RATIOS 2.40 2.50 2.60 2.70 2.80 2.90 3.00 3.10 IN PERCENTUM FUND BALANCE TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX FACTOR RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % 120 1.80 1.87 1.95 2.02 2.10 2.17 2.25 2.32 115 1.92 2.00 2.08 2.16 2.24 2.32 2.40 2.48 110 2.04 2.12 2.21 2.29 2.38 2.46 2.55 2.63 105 2.16 2.25 2.34 2.43 2.52 2.61 2.70 2.79 100 2.40 2.50 2.60 2.70 2.80 2.90 3.00 3.10 95 2.52 2.62 2.73 2.83 2.94 3.04 3.15 3.25 90 2.64 2.75 2.86 2.97 3.08 3.19 3.30 3.41 85 2.76 2.87 2.99 3.10 3.22 3.33 3.45 3.56 80 2.88 3.00 3.12 3.24 3.36 3.48 3.60 3.72 75 3.00 3.12 3.25 3.37 3.50 3.62 3.75 3.87 70 3.12 3.25 3.38 3.51 3.64 3.77 3.90 4.03 65 3.24 3.37 3.51 3.64 3.78 3.91 4.05 4.18 60 3.36 3.50 3.64 3.78 3.92 4.06 4.20 4.34 55 3.48 3.62 3.77 3.91 4.06 4.20 4.35 4.49 50 3.60 3.75 3.90 4.05 4.20 4.35 4.50 4.65

BENEFIT RATIOS 3.20 3.30 3.40 3.50 3.60 3.70 3.80 3.90 IN PERCENTUM FUND BALANCE TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX FACTOR RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % 120 2.40 2.47 2.55 2.62 2.70 2.77 2.85 2.92 115 2.56 2.64 2.72 2.80 2.88 2.96 3.04 3.12 110 2.72 2.80 2.89 2.97 3.06 3.14 3.23 3.31 105 2.88 2.97 3.06 3.15 3.24 3.33 3.42 3.51 100 3.20 3.30 3.40 3.50 3.60 3.70 3.80 3.90 95 3.36 3.46 3.57 3.67 3.78 3.88 3.99 4.09 90 3.52 3.63 3.74 3.85 3.96 4.07 4.18 4.29 85 3.68 3.79 3.91 4.02 4.14 4.25 4.37 4.48 80 3.84 3.96 4.08 4.20 4.32 4.44 4.56 4.68 75 4.00 4.12 4.25 4.37 4.50 4.62 4.75 4.87 70 4.16 4.29 4.42 4.55 4.68 4.81 4.94 5.07 65 4.32 4.45 4.59 4.72 4.86 4.99 5.13 5.26 60 4.48 4.62 4.76 4.90 5.04 5.18 5.32 5.46 55 4.64 4.78 4.93 5.07 5.22 5.36 5.51 5.65 50 4.80 4.95 5.10 5.25 5.40 5.55 5.70 5.85

BENEFIT RATIOS 4.00 4.10 4.20 4.30 4.40 4.50 4.60 4.70 IN PERCENTUM FUND BALANCE TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX FACTOR RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % 120 3.00 3.07 3.15 3.22 3.30 3.37 3.45 3.52 115 3.20 3.28 3.36 3.44 3.52 3.60 3.68 3.76 110 3.40 3.48 3.57 3.65 3.74 3.82 3.91 3.99 105 3.60 3.69 3.78 3.87 3.96 4.05 4.14 4.23 100 4.00 4.10 4.20 4.30 4.40 4.50 4.60 4.70 95 4.20 4.30 4.41 4.51 4.62 4.72 4.83 4.93 90 4.40 4.51 4.62 4.73 4.84 4.95 5.06 5.17 85 4.60 4.71 4.83 4.94 5.06 5.17 5.29 5.40 80 4.80 4.92 5.04 5.16 5.28 5.40 5.52 5.64 75 5.00 5.12 5.25 5.37 5.50 5.62 5.75 5.87 70 5.20 5.33 5.46 5.59 5.72 5.85 5.98 6.11 65 5.40 5.53 5.67 5.80 5.94 6.07 6.20 6.20 60 5.60 5.74 5.88 6.02 6.16 6.20 6.20 6.20 55 5.80 5.94 6.09 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 50 6.00 6.15 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20

BENEFIT RATIOS 4.80 4.90 5.00 5.10 5.20 5.30 5.40 5.50 IN PERCENTUM FUND BALANCE TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX FACTOR RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % 120 3.60 3.67 3.75 3.82 3.90 3.97 4.05 4.12 115 3.84 3.92 4.00 4.08 4.16 4.24 4.32 4.40 110 4.08 4.16 4.25 4.33 4.42 4.50 4.59 4.67 105 4.32 4.41 4.50 4.59 4.68 4.77 4.86 4.95 100 4.80 4.90 5.00 5.10 5.20 5.30 5.40 5.50 95 5.04 5.14 5.25 5.35 5.46 5.56 5.67 5.77 90 5.28 5.39 5.50 5.61 5.72 5.83 5.94 6.05 85 5.52 5.63 5.75 5.86 5.98 6.09 6.20 6.20 80 5.76 5.88 6.00 6.12 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 75 6.00 6.12 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 70 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 65 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 60 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 55 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 50 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20

BENEFIT RATIOS 5.60 5.70 5.80 5.90 6.00 6.10 6.20 IN PERCENTUM FUND BALANCE TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX FACTOR RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % IN % 120 4.20 4.27 4.35 4.42 4.50 4.57 5.40 115 4.48 4.56 4.64 4.72 4.80 4.88 5.40 110 4.76 4.84 4.93 5.01 5.10 5.18 5.40 105 5.04 5.13 5.22 5.31 5.40 5.49 5.58 100 5.60 5.70 5.80 5.90 6.00 6.10 6.20 95 5.88 5.98 6.09 6.19 6.20 6.20 6.20 90 6.16 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 85 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 80 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 75 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 70 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 65 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 60 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 55 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 50 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20

(1981, c. 606, § 60.1-84.1; 1986, c. 480; 1987, c. 114; 1988, c. 766; 1995, c. 515.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 4.

§ 60.2-532. Pool cost charges.

  1. As of January 1 of each year, to all experience rating tax rates established pursuant to § 60.2-531 , to all assigned tax rates established pursuant to §§ 60.2-515 , 60.2-526 , 60.2-527 and 60.2-538 , there shall be added the pool cost charges as determined in subsection B of this section.
  2. The pool cost charge rate rounded to the nearest one-hundredth of a percent shall be determined as follows:
    1. Pool costs for a given calendar year shall be those costs defined in subdivision 2 of this subsection for the thirty-six consecutive calendar month period ending on June 30 immediately preceding that calendar year. The pool cost charge rate shall be pool costs divided by payrolls for such period.
    2. Pool costs shall consist of (i) benefit charges which cannot be assigned to an individual employer pursuant to §§ 60.2-210 , 60.2-212 through 60.2-219 , or subsection C of § 60.2-528 , or cannot be charged to an individual employer due to his becoming an inactive account pursuant to § 60.2-210 or § 60.2-509 , (ii) the difference in the amount the Commission pays pursuant to subdivision 2 of subsection A of § 60.2-609 and the amount the Commission receives pursuant to subdivision 3 of subsection A of § 60.2-609 , and (iii) the difference between the benefit charges of all employers with a maximum experience rating tax rate and the amount of the taxes resulting from applying the maximum experience rating tax rate against the payrolls of the same employers. The term "payrolls" as used in this section shall mean the taxable payroll on which taxes have been paid on or before September 30 immediately following such June 30.
    3. When the fund balance factor for the most recent twelve-month period ending on June 30 of the immediately preceding calendar year is greater than fifty percent, interest earned on the balance which shall stand to the credit of the account of the Commonwealth of Virginia in the Unemployment Trust Fund in the treasury of the United States shall be subtracted from pool costs, except that in no instance shall pool costs be less than zero. (1981, c. 606, § 60.1-84.2; 1984, c. 458; 1986, c. 480; 1987, c. 114; 1990, c. 908; 1993, c. 249.)

§ 60.2-533. Fund balance factor.

  1. As of July 1 of each calendar year, a fund balance factor, rounded to the nearest one-tenth of a percent, shall be determined as follows:

    The net assets which shall be compared with the "adequate balance" as determined in subsection B of this section, shall be comprised of the balance which shall stand to the credit of the account of the Commonwealth of Virginia in the Unemployment Trust Fund in the Treasury of the United States; amounts withdrawn therefrom but not expended; employer payments not yet transferred to such account; net employer taxes receivable; and amounts due from claimants and other states, minus payables due to claimants, employers, other funds of the Virginia Employment Commission, and other states. The resulting percent shall be termed the "fund balance factor," except that if the percent determined is less than fifty percent, the fund balance factor shall be fifty percent.

  2. As of July 1 of each calendar year, the Commission shall determine the "adequate balance" for the trust fund as follows:

    For the twenty-year period ending July 1 of the year of determination, the highest ratios of benefits divided by total wages of three separate consecutive four-quarter periods shall be averaged and multiplied by 1.38 to determine the fund adequacy multiplier. The fund adequacy multiplier shall be multiplied by the total wages for the year in question to determine the "adequate fund balance" for that year.

  3. A fund building rate of two-tenths percent shall be added to all experience rating rates established pursuant to § 60.2-531 , and to all assigned tax rates established pursuant to §§ 60.2-515 , 60.2-526 , 60.2-527 and 60.2-538 , except that such rate shall not be applied if the fund balance factor determined pursuant to subsection A of this section exceeds fifty percent. (1981, c. 606, § 60.1-85.1; 1986, c. 480; 1993, c. 249; 1996, c. 305; 1997, cc. 530, 674.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1997, cc. 530 and 674, cl. 5 provides: "That notwithstanding the provisions of § 60.2-526 , changes in employer unemployment compensation tax rates resulting from fund adequacy multiplier and adequate fund balance recalculations made pursuant to this act [which amended §§ 60.2-533 and 60.2-602 ] shall become effective on July 1, 1997. The Virginia Employment Commission shall immediately notify employers of their recomputed tax rates for wages paid during the final two quarters of 1997."

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 4.

§ 60.2-534. Tax rate defined.

As used in this article "tax rate" means the tax or percentage of wages payable by an employer with respect to employment.

(Code 1950, § 60-74; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-87; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-535. Employing unit acquiring business, etc., of another employing unit.

  1. Except as provided in subsection B, whenever any employing unit in any manner succeeds to or acquires the organization, trade, separate establishment or business, or substantially all the assets thereof, of another which at the time of such acquisition was an employer subject to this title, the succeeding or acquiring unit shall be assigned the experience record of the predecessor. Such record shall be deemed the experience record of the successor solely for rate computation purposes as of July 1 of the year in which the acquisition occurred. Such successor, unless already an employer subject to this title, shall, during the remainder of the current calendar year, be subject to the rate of taxation of the predecessor. If such successor is at the time of the acquisition an employer subject to this title, such successor's rate of tax to which it is then subject shall remain the same until the next determination of rates under this chapter for all employers. When a successor acquires an employing unit by partial acquisition, the predecessor employer shall provide within thirty days of notification by the Commission, information relating to the division of taxable payroll for partial acquisitions. Such information shall be provided on a form supplied by the Commission.
  2. Upon written notification to the Commission that it does not desire the experience record of its predecessor, a succeeding or acquiring unit shall not be assigned such record. This notification shall be made to the Commission within sixty days of the later of (i) such acquisition or succession or (ii) the effective date of this section on a form approved by the Commission. Upon receipt thereof, the Commission shall assign the notifying unit the rate of a new employer. If the notification is not received within such sixty-day period, however, the Commission shall assign the succeeding or acquiring unit the experience record of its predecessor. The provisions of this subsection shall not be applicable to any successor that, at the time of the acquisition, was an employer subject to this title.

    (1979, c. 634, § 60.1-88.01; 1983, c. 13; 1986, c. 480; 1995, c. 515; 1997, c. 409.)

§ 60.2-536. Review of decision under § 60.2-535.

  1. Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Commission under the provisions of § 60.2-535 shall have the right to review before the Commission. Such review before the Commission shall be instituted by a request filed by the aggrieved party with the Commission within thirty days from the date of mailing of the decision.
  2. Any party aggrieved by the Commission decision on review may secure judicial review of any decision pursuant to the provisions of § 60.2-500 , such provisions applying mutatis mutandis. (1974, c. 198, § 60.1-88.1; 1981, c. 252; 1986, c. 480; 1999, c. 79.)

§ 60.2-536.1. Transfers for the purpose of obtaining a lower unemployment compensation tax rate; assignment of rates.

  1. If an employer shall transfer any trade or business to another employer where, at the time of transfer, there is substantially common ownership, management, or control of the trade or business, then the unemployment experience attributable to the transferred business shall also be transferred to, and combined with the unemployment experience attributable to, the employer to whom such business is transferred. If the sole or primary purpose of such transfer is to obtain a lower unemployment tax rate, that employer shall be subject to the penalties established by § 60.2-536.3 .
  2. If an employer shall transfer any trade or business to a person who is not otherwise an employer at the time of such transfer, and the sole or primary purpose of such transfer is to obtain a lower unemployment tax rate:
    1. The unemployment experience of the acquired business shall not be transferred to such person; instead, such person shall be assigned the higher of the transferred business' calculated rate or the new employer rate under § 60.2-526 ; and
    2. Such person shall be subject to the penalties established by § 60.2-536.3 .
  3. Any person who shall knowingly advise another person to engage in a transfer of any trade or business, where the sole or primary purpose of such transfer is to obtain a lower unemployment tax rate, shall be subject to the penalties established by § 60.2-536.3 .
  4. The Commission shall establish methods to identify and investigate the transfer or acquisition of a business for purposes of this section.
    1. For the purposes of determining whether there is "substantially common ownership, management, or control of two or more employers," the Commission shall consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including the extent of commonality or similarity of: (i) ownership, (ii) any familial relationships, (iii) principals or corporate officers, (iv) organizational structure, (v) day-to-day operations, (vi) assets and liabilities, and (vii) stated business purpose.
    2. For the purposes of determining whether a business was transferred solely or primarily to obtain a lower unemployment tax rate, the Commission shall consider the facts and circumstances of the transfer, including: (i) the cost of acquiring the business, (ii) how long such business was continued, and (iii) whether a substantial number of new employees was hired to perform duties unrelated to the business activity conducted prior to the transfer.

      (2005, cc. 47, 91.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, cc. 47 and 91, cl. 4 provides: "That for the purposes of this act the term 'rate year' shall mean the 12 consecutive calendar month period ending June 30 for which the employer's benefit charges are divided by the total of his payroll for the same period to determine his benefit ratio for the succeeding calendar year; however, nothing contained herein shall prohibit the Commission from applying tax rates on a calendar year basis."

Acts 2005, cc. 47 and 91, cl. 5 provides: "That the provisions of §§ 60.2-536.1 and 60.2-536.3 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in the first rate year as set forth in P.L. 108-295 Section 2 (c)." Set out as effective January 1, 2007, at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

Law review. - For annual survey of Virginia labor and employment law, see 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 241 (2005).

§ 60.2-536.2. Advisory opinion by the Commission.

Upon application by an employer who is a party to a transfer or potential transfer of any trade or business, the Commission shall issue an advisory opinion as to whether such transfer constitutes a transfer pursuant to § 60.2-536.1 , or is solely or primarily for the purpose of obtaining a lower unemployment tax rate. The application shall be under oath or affirmation, in a form prescribed by the Commission, and shall fully set forth all relevant facts regarding the proposed transfer. The Commission may require such additional information and documentary evidence as deemed necessary for a fair and informed opinion. Such opinion shall be issued within 60 days after the Commission has received all of the information and evidence requested. An employer who proceeds with the transfer of a trade or business in reliance upon a favorable advisory opinion issued under this section shall not subsequently be found to have violated the provisions of § 18.2-204.3 , and shall not be subject to the penalties of § 60.2-536.3 , provided such employer has made full disclosure of all relevant facts to the Commission. If an employer disagrees with the Commission's advisory opinion, it shall have the right to a hearing and decision pursuant to § 60.2-500 , provided that an application for a hearing is filed with the Commission within 30 days from the date the advisory opinion was mailed.

(2005, cc. 47, 91.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, cc. 47 and 91, cl. 2 provides: "That an emergency exists and this act is in force from its passage [March 20, 2005]."

§ 60.2-536.3. Violations; penalties.

  1. If a person knowingly transfers, or attempts to transfer, any trade or business where the sole or primary purpose is to obtain a lower unemployment tax rate, or if a person knowingly advises another person to engage, or attempt to engage, in such transfer, such person shall be subject, in addition to the criminal penalties set forth in § 18.2-204.3 , to the following additional rate of contributions and civil penalty:
    1. If the person is an employer, he shall be assigned the highest rate assignable under this chapter for the calendar year during which such violation or attempted violation occurred, and for the next calendar year immediately following such year. However, if the employer is already at such highest rate for that year, or if the amount of increase in the employer's rate would be less than two percent for any such year, then an additional rate of contributions of two percent of taxable wages shall be imposed for such year, which shall be paid into the benefit account of the Unemployment Compensation Fund pursuant to § 60.2-301 .
    2. If the person is not an employer, he shall be subject to a civil penalty of $5,000, which shall be paid into the Special Unemployment Compensation Administration Fund pursuant to § 60.2-314 .
  2. Final orders of the Commission with respect to the provisions of § 60.2-536.1 may be recorded, enforced, and satisfied as orders or decrees of a circuit court upon certification of such orders by the Clerk of the Commission. Such orders may be appealed pursuant to § 60.2-500 . (2005, cc. 47, 91.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, cc. 47 and 91, cl. 4 provides: "That for the purposes of this act the term 'rate year' shall mean the 12 consecutive calendar month period ending June 30 for which the employer's benefit charges are divided by the total of his payroll for the same period to determine his benefit ratio for the succeeding calendar year; however, nothing contained herein shall prohibit the Commission from applying tax rates on a calendar year basis."

Acts 2005, cc. 47 and 91, cl. 5 provides: "That the provisions of §§ 60.2-536.1 and 60.2-536.3 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in the first rate year as set forth in P.L. 108-295 Section 2 (c)." Set out as effective January 1, 2007, at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

§ 60.2-536.4. Interpretation.

The provisions of §§ 60.2-536.1 through 60.2-536.3 shall be interpreted and applied in such a manner as to meet the requirements contained in Public Law 108-295.

(2005, cc. 47, 91.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, cc. 47 and 91, cl. 2 provides: "That an emergency exists and this act is in force from its passage [March 20, 2005]."

§ 60.2-536.5. Definitions.

As used in §§ 60.2-536.1 through 60.2-536.3 , unless the context requires a different meaning:

"Knowingly" means having actual knowledge of or acting with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard for the prohibition involved.

"Person" shall have the meaning given such term by § 7701 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

"Trade" or "business" includes the employer's workforce.

"Violates" or "attempts" to violate includes intent to evade, misrepresentation, or willful nondisclosure.

(2005, cc. 47, 91.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, cc. 47 and 91, cl. 2 provides: "That an emergency exists and this act is in force from its passage [March 20, 2005]."

§ 60.2-537. Reduced tax rate permissible under federal amendment.

Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 60.2-500 through 60.2-536 , if § 3303 of the Internal Revenue Code is amended so as to allow an additional credit under § 3302 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code to employers not otherwise eligible for a reduced rate by reason of the lapse of insufficient time since first becoming subject to this title, the Commission, by a regulation promulgated under § 60.2-111 , shall fix and determine the tax rate of all such employers at such reduced rate as shall then be permissible under such federal amendment.

(Code 1950, § 60-76.1; 1956, c. 440; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-90; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-538. Where employer's taxes are delinquent.

Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 60.2-500 through 60.2-537 , if on July 31 of any year the taxes or any portion thereof or the interest due thereon for any previous quarter is delinquent and unpaid and has been delinquent and unpaid for ninety days or more, the Commission may issue a notice of delinquency demanding payment. If the amount due is not paid within thirty days after such notice is mailed to the delinquent employer at his last known address, such delinquent employer's rate for the calendar year immediately following the calendar year in which such notice is sent shall not be computed under the provisions of this article, but shall be 6.2 percent.

(Code 1950, § 60-76.2; 1956, c. 440; 1960, c. 136; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-91; 1977, c. 445; 1980, c. 480; 1981, c. 606; 1982, c. 363; 1986, c. 480.)

Chapter 6. Benefits.

General Provisions.

Benefit Computation.

Extended Benefits.

Eligibility Criteria.

Claims Adjudication.

Violations, Penalties, and Liabilities.

Article 1. General Provisions.

§ 60.2-600. No assignment of benefits; exemptions.

Any assignment, pledge or encumbrance of any right to benefits which are or may become due or payable under this title shall be void except as provided in this section and in §§ 60.2-608 , 60.2-608 .1, 60.2-608.2 , and 60.2-633 . Such rights to benefits shall be exempt from levy, execution, attachment, garnishment or any other legal process provided for the collection of debt, even if the compensation is used for purchase of shares in a credit union, or deposited into an account with a financial institution or other organization accepting deposits and is thereby commingled with other funds, except debts incurred for necessaries furnished to such individual, his spouse or dependents during the time when such individual was unemployed. Any waiver of any exemption provided for in this section shall be void.

Upon an order of garnishment, attachment or other levy addressed to a financial institution in which the principal defendant claims to have exempt funds hereunder, the principal defendant may file an answer asserting the exemption hereunder. From the time of service of such garnishment, attachment or levy, the financial institution, until further order of the court, shall hold the amount subject to such garnishment, attachment or levy, or such lesser amount or sum as it may have, which amount shall be set forth in its answer. It shall hold such amount free of any person drawing against such funds whether by check against such account or otherwise. The financial institution shall be subject to such further order or subpoena for discovery of its records, for which it shall be entitled an order or agreement for compensation for the expense of such service, and in a case deemed appropriate to the court by such an order directing deposit of funds or further security prior to such records being ordered produced.

(Code 1950, § 60-108; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-125; 1986, c. 480; 1987, c. 331; 1996, c. 107; 1997, c. 385.)

Research References. - Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure (Matthew Bender). Chapter 18 Enforcement of Judgments and Decrees. § 18.02 Exemptions from Execution. Bryson.

Enforcement of Judgments and Liens in Virginia (Matthew Bender). Chapter 3. The Writ Firea Facies: Execution. § 3.3 Relief from Levy, etc. Rendleman.

Friend's Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 22 Enforcement of Judgments. § 22.08 Garnishment. Friend.

Article 2. Benefit Computation.

§ 60.2-601. Payment of benefits.

All benefits shall be paid through public employment offices, in accordance with such regulations as the Commission may prescribe.

(Code 1950, § 60-41; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-46; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-602. Weekly benefit amount.

  1. Beginning July 6, 2008, for claims effective on or after July 6, 2008, but before July 6, 2014, an eligible individual's weekly "benefit amount" shall be the amount appearing in Column B in the "Benefit Table" in this section on the line on which in Column A of such table, there appears the total wages for insured work paid to such individual in the two quarters of his base period in which such total wages were highest.

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  2. Beginning July 6, 2014, for claims effective on or after July 6, 2014, an eligible individual's weekly "benefit amount" shall be the amount appearing in Column B in the "Benefit Table" in this section on the line on which in Column A of such table, there appears the total wages for insured work paid to such individual in the two quarters of his base period in which such total wages were highest.

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    (Code 1950, § 60-42; 1952, c. 184; 1954, c. 203; 1956, c. 440; 1960, c. 136; 1962, c. 12; 1964, c. 3; 1966, c. 30; 1968, c. 9; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-47; 1970, c. 104; 1972, c. 764; 1974, c. 466; 1976, c. 708; 1977, c. 330; 1978, c. 493; 1979, c. 691; 1980, c. 463; 1981, c. 606; 1984, c. 468; 1985, c. 516; 1986, cc. 480, 493; 1988, c. 131; 1990, c. 908; 1996, c. 367; 1997, cc. 530, 674; 2000, c. 573; 2002, cc. 122, 892; 2003, c. 926; 2005, cc. 23, 918; 2006, c. 258; 2007, c. 628; 2008, c. 725; 2009, c. 789; 2010, c. 412; 2011, c. 16; 2012, c. 312.)

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 573, effective retroactive to November 28, 1999, substituted "November 28, 1999" for "July 2, 2000" in two places, substituted "November 28, 1999" for "July 1, 2000" in the first paragraph, and added table listings for weekly benefit amounts of 233 through 268.

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendments by cc. 122 and 892 are identical and, effective retroactively to September 9, 2001, in subsection A, substituted "September 9, 2001, and expiring January 1, 2003" for "November 28, 1999" at the beginning of the first sentence, substituted "September 9, 2001, and for claims for which a claimant had established a benefit year as of September 9, 2001" for "November 28, 1999" in the middle of the first sentence, and deleted the former second paragraph, which read: "For claims filed prior to November 28, 1999, an eligible individual's weekly 'benefit amount' shall be computed under the provisions of this section in force on the date such claim was filed," and increased the weekly benefit amount as set out in Column B of the table immediately following the text of subsection A; and added subsections B and C.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 926 substituted "January 5, 2003" for "January 1, 2003" in subsection A; in subsection B, twice substituted "January 5, 2003" for "January 1, 2003," and substituted "July 6, 2003" for "January 1, 2004"; in subsection C, substituted "July 6, 2003" for "January 1, 2004," substituted "July 6, 2003 but before July 4, 2004" for "January 1, 2004," and added entries beginning at "13450.01" through the end to the benefits table; and added subsection D and its benefit table.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 23 deleted subsections A through C which referred to obsolete benefit tables; and deleted the subsection D designator.

The 2005 amendment by c. 918 inserted "but before July 3, 2005" in the introductory paragraph of subsection A; and added subsection B.

This section is set out in the form above at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 258 deleted former subsection A which referred to obsolete benefit tables, redesignated former subsection B as present subsection A, and added subsection B.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 628 inserted "but before July 1, 2007" in subsection B; and added subsection C.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 725 inserted "but before July 6, 2008" following "after July 1, 2007" in subsection C, and added subsections D and E.

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendment by c. 789 substituted "July 4, 2010" for "July 5, 2009" in subsection D and twice in subsection E.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 412 deleted former subsections A through C and redesignated D and E accordingly.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 16 substituted "July 1, 2012" for "July 3, 2011" in the introductory paragraph of subsections A and B.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 312 substituted "July 6, 2014" for "July 1, 2012" in the introductory paragraph of subsections A and B.

§ 60.2-603. Weekly benefit for unemployment.

  1. Each eligible individual who is unemployed in any week shall be paid for such week a benefit equal to his weekly benefit amount less any part of the wages payable to him for such week which is in excess of $50. Where such excess is not a multiple of $1, it shall be computed to the next highest multiple of $1.
  2. Wages earned on a shift commencing Saturday and ending Sunday shall be allocated to the week in which the claimant earns the majority of wages for such work.

    (Code 1950, § 60-43; 1964, c. 3; 1966, c. 30; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-48; 1970, c. 104; 1984, cc. 458, 468; 1986, c. 480; 1992, c. 482; 2005, c. 125.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 125, in subsection A, substituted "$50" for "twenty-five dollars" in the first sentence and substituted "$1" for "one dollar" twice in the second sentence.

§ 60.2-604. Reduction of benefit amount by amount of pension.

The weekly benefit amount payable to an individual for any week which begins in a period for which such individual is receiving a governmental or other pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or any other similar periodic payment under a plan maintained or contributed to by a base period or chargeable employer based on the previous work of such individual, including payments received by such individual in accordance with § 65.2-500 or 65.2-502 , shall be reduced, but not below zero, by an amount equal to the amount of such pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or other payment, which is reasonably attributable to such week; however, in consideration of the employee's contributions thereto, the weekly benefit amount payable to an individual for any week shall not be reduced by any amount of Social Security Act or Railroad Retirement Act retirement benefits received by such individual and attributable to such week.

(1977, c. 330, § 60.1-48.1; 1978, c. 269; 1986, c. 480; 1987, c. 3; 2003, cc. 534, 555; 2005, c. 1; 2011, cc. 748, 751.)

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendments by cc. 534 and 555 are identical, and inserted "except that the weekly benefit amount payable to an individual for any week shall be reduced, but not below zero, by an amount equal to 50 percent of Social Security Act or Railroad Retirement Act retirement benefits received by such individual and attributable to such week" at the end of the section.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 1 inserted "(i) where the fund balance factor determined pursuant to subsection A of § 60.2-533 is below 50 percent, effective the first Sunday in January following the determination of the fund balance factor," added clause (ii), and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendments by cc. 748 and 751 are identical, and substituted "however, in consideration of the employee's contributions thereto" for "except that (i) where the fund balance factor determined pursuant to subsection A of § 60.2-533 is below 50 percent, effective the first Sunday in January following the determination of the fund balance factor, the weekly benefit amount payable to an individual for any week shall be reduced, but not below zero, by an amount equal to 50 percent of Social Security Act or Railroad Retirement Act benefits received by such individual and attributable to such week or (ii) where the fund balance factor determined pursuant to subsection A of § 60.2-533 meets or exceeds 50 percent, effective the first Sunday in January following the determination of the fund balance factor."

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on governmental services and social welfare for the year 1976-1977, see 63 Va. L. Rev. 1440 (1977).

CASE NOTES

Section does not violate due process. - The contention that this section arbitrarily and unlawfully deprives unemployment compensation claimants receiving pensions of a protected property interest, viz., unemployment benefits, in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is meritless. Watkins v. Cantrell, 736 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1984) (decided under prior law).

Section not unconstitutionally arbitrary or irrational. - Because ease of administration and preservation of the financial integrity of a state's unemployment insurance compensation program are legitimate state interests that can justify the classifications created by the Virginia pension offset provision, the Virginia pension offset provision is not so patently arbitrary or irrational as to be constitutionally infirm. Watkins v. Cantrell, 736 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1984) (decided under prior law).

Section does not contravene federal pension offset requirement, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15). Watkins v. Cantrell, 736 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1984) (decided under prior law).

The language "is receiving" in this section is not limited to the contemporaneous payment of benefits. It also includes a later lump sum payment that is reasonably attributable to the period in which unemployment benefits were received. Thus, benefits in the instant case were subject to a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the amount of the subsequent lump sum social security benefit payout for that period. VEC v. Nunery, 24 Va. App. 617, 484 S.E.2d 609 (1997).

§ 60.2-605. Benefit rights based on benefit year.

Benefit rights of individuals shall be based solely upon the benefit year as defined in § 60.2-206 .

(Code 1950, § 60-44; 1960, c. 136; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-49; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-606. Benefits when wages irregular.

If the remuneration payable to an individual is not based upon a fixed period or duration of time or if the individual's wages are payable at irregular intervals or in such manner as not to extend regularly over the period of employment, the wages for any week or for any calendar quarter for the purpose of computing an individual's right to unemployment benefits only shall be determined in such manner as may by regulation be prescribed. Such regulations shall, so far as possible, secure results reasonably similar to those which would prevail if the individual's wages were payable at regular intervals.

(Code 1950, § 60-45.1; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-50; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-607. Maximum total benefit amounts.

The maximum total amount of benefits payable to any individual during any benefit year shall be determined from the "Benefit Table" shown in § 60.2-602 but shall not exceed twenty-six times such individual's weekly benefit amount, except when benefits are paid pursuant to the provisions of § 60.2-610 or § 60.2-611 . Such determination shall be based only upon wages paid for insured work during such individual's base period. The Commission shall maintain a separate account for each individual who is paid wages for insured work. After the expiration of each calendar quarter the Commission shall credit each individual's account with the wages paid to him for insured work in such calendar quarter.

(Code 1950, § 60-45.2; 1956, c. 440; 1960, c. 136; 1962, c. 12; 1964, c. 3; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-51; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-608. Child support intercept of unemployment benefits.

  1. Any individual filing a new claim for unemployment compensation shall, at the time of filing such claim, disclose whether or not the individual owes child support obligations as defined under subsection G of this section. If any such individual discloses that he or she owes child support obligations, and is determined to be eligible for unemployment compensation, the Commission shall notify the state or local child support enforcement agency enforcing such obligation that the individual has been determined to be eligible for unemployment compensation.
  2. The Commission shall deduct and withhold the following from any unemployment compensation payable to such an individual:
    1. The amount specified by the individual to the Commission to be deducted and withheld under this subsection, if neither the provisions of subdivision 2 of this subsection nor the provisions of subdivision 3 of this subsection are applicable;
    2. The amount, if any, determined pursuant to an agreement submitted to the Commission under § 454 (20) (B) (i) of the Social Security Act by the state or local child support enforcement agency, unless the provisions of subdivision 3 of this subsection are applicable; or
    3. Any amount otherwise required to be so deducted and withheld from such unemployment compensation pursuant to legal process, as defined in § 462 (e) of the Social Security Act, properly served upon the Commission.
  3. Any amount deducted and withheld under subsection B shall be paid by the Commission to the appropriate state or local child support enforcement agency.
  4. Any amount deducted and withheld under subsection B shall be treated as if it were paid to the individual as unemployment compensation and paid by such individual to the state or local child support enforcement agency in satisfaction of the individual's child support obligations.
  5. For purposes of subsections A through D of this section, "unemployment compensation"  means any compensation payable under this title, including amounts payable by the Commission pursuant to an agreement under any federal law providing for compensation, assistance, or allowances with respect to unemployment.
  6. This section applies only if appropriate arrangements have been made for reimbursement by the state or local child support enforcement agency for the administrative costs incurred by the Commission under this section which are attributable to child support obligations being enforced by the state or local child support enforcement agency.
  7. The term  "child support obligations"  as defined for purposes of this section includes only obligations which are being enforced pursuant to a plan described in § 454 of the Social Security Act which has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under Part D of Title IV (42 U.S.C. 651 et seq.) of the Social Security Act.
  8. The term  "state or local child support enforcement agency" as used in this section means any agency of any state or a political subdivision thereof operating pursuant to a plan described in subsection G of this section.

    (1982, c. 237, § 60.1-52.6; 1986, c. 480.)

Cross references. - As to remedies for delinquency in support obligations, including attachment of unemployment benefits and workers' compensation benefits and suspension of an individual's driver's license, see § 63.2-1941 .

§ 60.2-608.1. Deduction and withholding of federal income tax.

  1. For all payments made after December 31, 1996, federal income tax may be deducted and withheld from a benefit payment if the individual receiving such benefits voluntarily requests such deduction and withholding. The deduction shall be an amount equal to fifteen percent of such payment, or the amount determined by the Internal Revenue Service.
  2. Any amount deducted and withheld under subsection A of this section shall remain in the Unemployment Compensation Fund until transferred to the Internal Revenue Service as a payment of income tax.
  3. Any amount deducted and withheld under subsection A of this section shall be treated as if it were paid to the individual as unemployment benefits.
  4. Amounts shall be deducted and withheld under this section only after amounts are deducted and withheld for any unemployment benefit overpayments, child support obligations, or any other amounts required to be deducted and withheld under this title.
  5. The Commission shall follow all procedures specified by the United States Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service pertaining to the deducting and withholding of federal income tax from unemployment benefits.

    (1996, c. 107.)

§ 60.2-608.2. Withholding of benefits; food stamp overissuance.

  1. Any individual filing a new claim for unemployment compensation shall, at the time of filing such claim, disclose whether or not the individual owes an uncollected overissuance of food stamp coupons, as such is defined in § 13(c) (1) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. § 2022(c) (1). If any such individual discloses that he or she owes food stamp obligations and is determined to be eligible for unemployment compensation, the Commission shall notify the state food stamp agency enforcing such obligation that the individual has been determined to be eligible for unemployment compensation.
  2. The Commission shall deduct and withhold the following from any unemployment compensation payable to an individual who owes an uncollected overissuance:
    1. The amount specified by the individual to the Commission to be deducted and withheld under this subsection, if neither the provisions of subdivision 2 nor the provisions of subdivision 3 of this subsection are applicable; or
    2. The amount, if any, determined pursuant to an agreement submitted to the Commission by the state food stamp agency under § 13(c) (3) (A) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. § 2022 (c) (3) (A); or
    3. Any amount otherwise required to be so deducted and withheld from such unemployment compensation pursuant to § 13(c) (3) (B) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. § 2022(c) (3) (B).
  3. Any amount deducted and withheld under subsection B shall be paid by the Commission to the appropriate state food stamp agency.
  4. Any amount deducted and withheld under subsection B shall for all purposes be treated as if it were paid to the individual as unemployment compensation and paid by such individual to the state food stamp agency as repayment of the individual's uncollected overissuance.
  5. For purposes of subsections A through D of this section, the term "unemployment compensation" means any compensation payable under this title including amounts payable by the Commission pursuant to an agreement under any federal law providing for compensation, assistance, or allowances with respect to unemployment.
  6. The provisions of this section shall be applicable only if appropriate arrangements have been made for reimbursement by the state food stamp agency for the administrative costs incurred by the Commission under this subsection which are attributable to the repayment of uncollected overissuances to the state food stamp agency.

    (1997, c. 385.)

§ 60.2-609. Reciprocal arrangements with agencies of other states or federal government.

    1. The Commission shall participate in any arrangements for the payment of compensation on the basis of combining an individual's wages and employment covered under the unemployment compensation laws of two or more states. Such arrangements shall be approved by the United States Secretary of Labor, in consultation with the state unemployment compensation agencies, to assure the prompt and full payment of compensation in such situations. Such arrangements include provisions for: A. 1.  The Commission shall participate in any arrangements for the payment of compensation on the basis of combining an individual's wages and employment covered under the unemployment compensation laws of two or more states. Such arrangements shall be approved by the United States Secretary of Labor, in consultation with the state unemployment compensation agencies, to assure the prompt and full payment of compensation in such situations. Such arrangements include provisions for:
      1. Applying the base period of a single state law to a claim involving the combining of an individual's wages and employment covered under two or more state unemployment compensation laws, and
      2. Avoiding the duplicate use of wages and employment by reason of such combining.
    2. The Commission shall periodically reimburse any other state agency, up to the amount of benefit credits thus transferred to it by the Commission for payments actually made by such other state agency based on such transfers.
    3. Similarly, such other state agency shall periodically reimburse the Commission, for payments it actually made based on the benefit credits transferred to it by such other state agency.
  1. Amounts paid under such reciprocal arrangement by another state agency on behalf of the Commission shall, when reimbursed by the Commission, be chargeable to the same accounts and in the same amounts as if such benefits had been paid without regard to such reciprocal arrangement.
  2. Amounts paid under any such reciprocal arrangement by the Commission on behalf of another state agency shall be chargeable to the Commission's benefit account fund and the corresponding reimbursements shall be credited to the same account.

    (Code 1950, § 60-47.1; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-59; 1970, c. 104; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235; 1979, c. 675; 1986, c. 480.)

Article 3. Extended Benefits.

§ 60.2-610. Extended benefits defined.

  1. As used in this article, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, "extended benefit period" means a period which:
    1. Begins with the third week following a week for which there is a state "on" indicator; and
    2. Ends with either of the following weeks, whichever occurs later:
      1. The third week after the first week for which there is a state "off" indicator; or
      2. The thirteenth consecutive week of such period; however, no extended benefit period may begin by reason of a state "on" indicator before the fourteenth week following the end of a prior extended benefit period which was in effect with respect to this Commonwealth.
  2. "Rate of insured unemployment," for purposes of subsections H and I of this section, means the percentage derived by dividing:
    1. The average weekly number of individuals filing claims for regular compensation in this Commonwealth for weeks of unemployment with respect to the most recent, 13 consecutive week period, as determined by the Commission on the basis of its reports to the United States Secretary of Labor, by
    2. The average monthly employment covered under this act for the first four of the most recent six completed calendar quarters ending before the end of such 13-week period.
  3. "Regular benefits" means benefits, other than extended benefits, payable to an individual under this title or under any other state law, including benefits payable to federal civilian employees and to ex-servicemen pursuant to Chapter 85 (5 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq.) of Title 5 of the United States Code.
  4. "Extended benefits" means benefits, including benefits payable to federal civilian employees and to ex-servicemen pursuant to Chapter 85 (5 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq.) of Title 5 of the United States Code, payable to an individual under the provisions of § 60.2-611 for weeks of unemployment in his eligibility period.
  5. "Eligibility period" of an individual means the period consisting of the weeks in his benefit year which begin in an extended benefit period and, if his benefit year ends within such extended benefit period, any weeks thereafter which begin in such period.
    1. "Exhaustee" means an individual who, with respect to any week of unemployment in his eligibility period: F. 1.  "Exhaustee" means an individual who, with respect to any week of unemployment in his eligibility period:
      1. Has received, prior to such week, all of the regular benefits that were available to him under this title or any other state law, including dependents' allowances and benefits payable to federal civilian employees and ex-servicemen under Chapter 85 (5 U.S.C. § 8501 et seq.) of Title 5 of the United States Code, in his current benefit year that includes such week;
      2. His benefit year having expired prior to such week, has no, or insufficient, wages or employment on the basis of which he could establish a new benefit year that would include such week; and
      3. (i) Has no right to unemployment benefits or allowances, under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (45 U.S.C. § 351 et seq.), the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965 (19 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq.) and such other federal laws as are specified in regulations issued by the United States Secretary of Labor, and (ii) has not received and is not seeking unemployment benefits under the unemployment compensation law of Canada. However, if he is seeking such benefits and the appropriate agency finally determines that he is not entitled to benefits under such law he is considered an exhaustee.
    2. For the purposes of subdivision 1 a of this subsection, an individual shall be deemed to have received all of the regular benefits that were available to him although (i) as a result of a pending appeal with respect to wages or employment that were not considered in the original monetary determination in his benefit year, he may subsequently be determined to be entitled to added regular benefits, or (ii) he may be entitled to regular benefits with respect to future weeks of unemployment.
  6. "State law" means the unemployment insurance law of any state, approved by the United States Secretary of Labor under 26 U.S.C. § 3304.
  7. There is a "state 'on' indicator" for this Commonwealth for a week if:
    1. The Commission determines, in accordance with the regulations of the United States Secretary of Labor, that for the period consisting of such week and the immediately preceding 12 weeks, the rate of insured unemployment, not seasonally adjusted, under this title:
      1. Equaled or exceeded 120 percent of the average of such rates for the corresponding 13-week period ending in each of the preceding two calendar years; and
      2. Equaled or exceeded five percent, provided that the determination of whether there has been a state trigger "on" indicator shall be made as if this subsection did not contain subdivision 1 a, if the rate of insured unemployment as defined in this subsection equaled or exceeded six percent, except that any week for which there would otherwise be a state "on" indicator shall continue to be such a week and shall not be determined to be a week for which there is a state "off" indicator; or
    2. With respect to weeks of unemployment beginning on or after February 1, 2009, and thereafter until the week ending three weeks prior to the last week for which federal sharing is authorized by Section 2005(a) of Public Law 111-5, or by an extension thereof or amendment thereto, the United States Secretary of Labor determines that, for the period consisting of the most recent three months for which data for all states are published before the close of such week, the average rate of total unemployment in this Commonwealth, seasonally adjusted:
      1. Equaled or exceeded 110 percent of the average of such rates for either or both of the corresponding three month periods ending in the two preceding calendar years; and
      2. Equaled or exceeded a six and one half percent.
  8. There is a "state 'off' indicator" for this Commonwealth for a week if the Commission determines, in accordance with the regulations of the United States Secretary of Labor, that for the period consisting of such week and the immediately preceding 12 weeks the requirements of subsection H of this section have not been satisfied.

    (1982, c. 237, § 60.1-51.2; 1986, c. 480; 2009, c. 789; 2011, c. 303.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2011, c. 303, cl. 2, repealed Acts 2009, c. 789, cl. 3, which had provided that the 2009 amendments would expire three weeks prior to the last week for which federal sharing is authorized by Section 2005(a) of Public Law 111-5.

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendment by c. 789, in subsection H, added the 1. designator, redesignated former 1. and 2. as a. and b., and made stylistic changes throughout; and added subdivision H 2.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 303, in subsection H, inserted the present subdivision H 1 designation, redesignated former subdivisions H 1 and 2 as present paragraphs H 1 a and b, inserted subdivision H2, made related changes; and made minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 6.

CASE NOTES

Federal 13-week limitation of compensation to ex-servicemembers, 5 U.S.C. § 8521(c)(2), preempts Virginia provisions permitting Federal Supplemental Compensation benefits to Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers exhaustees. Hill v. Cantrell, 769 F.2d 218 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under prior law).

§ 60.2-611. Receipt of extended benefits.

  1. Except when the result would be inconsistent with the other provisions of this section, as provided in the regulations of the Commission, the provisions of this title which apply to claims for, or the payment of, regular benefits shall apply to claims for, and the payment of, extended benefits.
  2. An individual shall be eligible to receive extended benefits with respect to any week of unemployment in his eligibility period only if the Commission finds that for such week:
    1. He is an "exhaustee" as defined in subsection F of § 60.2-610 ;
    2. He has satisfied the requirements of this title for the receipt of regular benefits that are applicable to individuals claiming extended benefits, including not being subject to a disqualification for the receipt of benefits; and
    3. He had during his base period 20 weeks of full-time insured employment, or the equivalent in insured wages. For purposes of this subdivision, "or the equivalent in insured wages" means more than 40 times the individual's most recent weekly benefit amount.
  3. The weekly extended benefit amount payable to an individual for a week of total unemployment in his eligibility period shall equal the weekly benefit amount payable to him during his applicable benefit year.
  4. The total extended benefit amount payable to any eligible individual for his applicable benefit year shall be the least of the following amounts:
    1. Fifty percent of the total amount of regular benefits which were payable to him under this title in his applicable benefit year;
    2. Thirteen times his weekly benefit amount which was payable to him under this title for a week of total unemployment in the applicable benefit year; or
    3. Thirty-nine times his weekly benefit amount which was payable to him under this title for a week of total unemployment in the applicable benefit year, reduced by the total amount of regular benefits which were paid or deemed paid to him under this title for the benefit year.
    1. Whenever an extended benefit period is to become effective in this Commonwealth as a result of a state "on" indicator, or an extended benefit period is to be terminated in this Commonwealth as a result of state "off" indicators, the Commission shall make an appropriate public announcement. E. 1.  Whenever an extended benefit period is to become effective in this Commonwealth as a result of a state "on" indicator, or an extended benefit period is to be terminated in this Commonwealth as a result of state "off" indicators, the Commission shall make an appropriate public announcement.
    2. Computations required by the provisions of subsection B of § 60.2-610 shall be made by the Commission, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the United States Secretary of Labor.
    3. An "on" or "off" indicator for this Commonwealth shall be determined without regard to subdivision 1 of subsection H of § 60.2-610 for any period that waiver of such provisions is authorized under § 203 (d) of the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act (26 U.S.C. § 3304) and any amendments thereto, or as authorized by any provision of federal law.
    1. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A of this section, an individual shall be ineligible for payment of extended benefits for any week of unemployment in his eligibility period if the Commission finds that during such period: F. 1.  Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A of this section, an individual shall be ineligible for payment of extended benefits for any week of unemployment in his eligibility period if the Commission finds that during such period:
      1. He failed to accept any offer of suitable work or failed to apply for any suitable work, as defined under subdivision 3 of this subsection, to which he was referred by the Commission; or
      2. He failed to actively engage in seeking work as prescribed under subdivision 5 of this subsection.
    2. Any individual who has been found ineligible for extended benefits by reason of the provisions in subdivision 1 of this subsection shall also be denied benefits beginning with the first day of the week following the week in which such failure occurred and until he has been employed in each of four subsequent weeks, whether or not consecutive, and has earned remuneration equal to not less than four times the extended weekly benefit amount.
      1. For purposes of this subsection, "suitable work" means, with respect to any individual, any work which is within the individual's capabilities and for which the gross average weekly remuneration payable for the work exceeds the sum of:
        1. The individual's average weekly benefit amount as determined under subsection C of this section, plus
        2. Any amount of supplemental unemployment benefits, as defined in § 501(c)(17)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code, payable to the individual for such week.
      2. Such gross average weekly remuneration shall pay wages equal to the higher of:
        1. The minimum wages provided by § 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.), without regard to any exemption; or
        2. The state or local minimum wage.
      3. No individual, however, shall be denied extended benefits for failure to accept an offer or referral to any job which meets the definition of suitable work as described in subdivision 3a of this subsection if:
        1. The position was not offered to such individual in writing or was not listed with the Job Service;
        2. Such failure could not result in a denial of benefits under the definition of suitable work for regular benefit claimants in subdivision 3 of § 60.2-618 to the extent that the criteria of suitability in that section are not inconsistent with the provisions of this subdivision; or
        3. The individual furnishes satisfactory evidence to the Commission that his prospects for obtaining work in his customary occupation within a reasonably short period are good. If the evidence is deemed satisfactory for this purpose, the determination of whether any work is suitable with respect to such individual shall be made in accordance with the definition of suitable work in subdivision 3 of § 60.2-618 without regard to the definition specified by this subdivision.
    3. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, no work shall be deemed to be suitable work for an individual which does not accord with the labor standard provisions required by § 3304(a)5 of the Internal Revenue Code and set forth under subdivision 3 of § 60.2-618.
    4. For the purposes of subdivision 1 b of this subsection, an individual shall be treated as actively engaged in seeking work during any week if:
      1. The individual has engaged in a systematic and sustained effort to obtain work during such week; and
      2. The individual furnishes tangible evidence that he has engaged in such effort during such week.
    5. The Job Service shall refer any claimant entitled to extended benefits under this title to any suitable work which meets the criteria prescribed in subdivision 3 of this subsection.
    6. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, if the benefit year of any individual ends within an extended benefit period, the remaining balance of extended benefits that such individual would, but for this section, be entitled to receive in that extended benefit period, for weeks of unemployment beginning after the end of the benefit year, shall be reduced, but not below zero, by the product of the number of weeks for which the individual received any amounts as trade readjustment allowances within that benefit year, multiplied by the individual's weekly benefit amount for extended benefits.
    7. No claim for extended benefits shall be subject to subdivisions 1, 2, 3 or 6 of this subsection for weeks of unemployment beginning after March 6, 1993, and before January 1, 1995. If the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 is at any time amended to preclude enforcement of any provision of this section, such provision shall not apply to any claim for weeks beginning on the date said amendment becomes effective.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision 2 of this subsection, an individual shall not be eligible for extended benefits for any week if: G. 1.  Except as provided in subdivision 2 of this subsection, an individual shall not be eligible for extended benefits for any week if:
      1. Extended benefits are payable for such week pursuant to an interstate claim filed in any state under the interstate benefit plan; and
      2. No extended benefit period is in effect for such week in such state.
    2. Subdivision 1 of this subsection shall not apply to the first two weeks for which extended benefits are payable, determined without regard to this subsection, pursuant to an interstate claim filed under the interstate benefit payment plan to the individual from the extended benefit account established for the individual with respect to the benefit year.
  5. Effective with respect to weeks beginning in a high unemployment period that commenced on or after February 1, 2009, and thereafter until the week ending three weeks prior to the last week for which federal sharing is authorized by Section 2005(a) of Public Law 111-5, or by an extension thereof or amendment thereto, subsection D shall be applied by substituting (i) "eighty percent" for "fifty percent" in subdivision D 1; (ii) "twenty" for "thirteen" in subdivision D 2; and (iii) "forty-six" for "thirty-nine" in subdivision D 3. As used in this subsection, "high unemployment period" means any period during which an extended benefit period would be in effect if subdivision H 2 b of § 60.2-610 were applied by substituting "eight percent" for "six and one-half percent." (1982, c. 237, § 60.1-51.2; 1986, c. 480; 1993, c. 153; 2008, Sp. Sess. II, c. 11; 2009, c. 789; 2011, c. 303.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2011, c. 303, cl. 2, repealed Acts 2009, c. 789, cl. 3, which had provided that the 2009 amendments would expire three weeks prior to the last week for which federal sharing is authorized by Section 2005(a) of Public Law 111-5.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by Sp. Sess. II, c. 11, effective November 1, 2008, inserted subdivision B 3.

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendment by c. 789 added subdivision B 3 identical to the subdivision B 3 added by 2008 Sp. Sess., c. 11; and added subsection H. See Editor's note for contingent expiration.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 303 inserted "that commenced on or after February 1, 2009, and thereafter until the week ending three weeks prior to the last week for which federal sharing is authorized by Section 2005(a) of Public Law 111-5, or by an extension thereof or amendment thereto" in the first sentence of subsection H.

Article 4. Eligibility Criteria.

§ 60.2-612. Benefit eligibility conditions.

An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits for any week only if the Commission finds that:

  1. He has, in the highest two quarters of earnings within his base period, been paid wages in employment for employers that are equal to not less than the lowest amount appearing in Column A of the "Benefit Table" appearing in § 60.2-602 on the line which extends through Division C and on which in Column B of the "Benefit Table" appears his weekly benefit amount. Such wages shall be earned in not less than two quarters.
    1. His total or partial unemployment is not due to a labor dispute in active progress or to shutdown or start-up operations caused by such dispute which exists (i) at the factory, establishment, or other premises, including a vessel, at which he is or was last employed, or (ii) at a factory, establishment or other premises, including a vessel, either within or without this Commonwealth, which (a) is owned or operated by the same employing unit which owns or operates the premises at which he is or was last employed and (b) supplies materials or services necessary to the continued and usual operation of the premises at which he is or was last employed. This subdivision shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Commission that:
      1. He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute; and
      2. He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the labor dispute, there were members employed at the premises, including a vessel, at which the labor dispute occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute.
    2. If separate branches of work which are commonly conducted as separate businesses at separate premises are conducted in separate departments of the same premises, each such department shall, for the purposes of this subdivision, be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment or other premises. Membership in a union, or the payment of regular dues to a bona fide labor organization, however, shall not alone constitute financing a labor dispute.
  2. He is not receiving, has not received or is not seeking unemployment benefits under an unemployment compensation law of any other state or of the United States; however, if the appropriate agency of such other state or of the United States finally determines that he is not entitled to such unemployment benefits, this subdivision shall not apply.
  3. He is not on a bona fide paid vacation. If an individual is paid vacation pay for any week in an amount less than the individual's weekly benefit amount his eligibility for benefits shall be computed under the provisions of § 60.2-603 .
  4. He has registered for work and thereafter has continued to report at an employment office in accordance with such regulations as the Commission may prescribe. The Commission may, by regulation, waive or alter either or both of the requirements of this subdivision for certain types of cases when it finds that compliance with such requirements would be oppressive, or would be inconsistent with the purposes of this title.
  5. He has made a claim for benefits in accordance with regulations the Commission may prescribe.
    1. He is able to work, is available for work, and is actively seeking and unable to obtain suitable work. Every claimant who is totally unemployed shall report to the Commission the names of employers contacted each week in his effort to obtain work. This information may be subject to employer verification by the Commission through a program designed for that purpose. The Commission may determine that registration by a claimant with the Virginia State Job Service may constitute a valid employer contact and satisfy the search for work requirement of this subsection in labor market areas where job opportunities are limited. The Commission may determine that an individual, whose usual and customary means of soliciting work in his occupation is through contact with a single hiring hall which makes contacts with multiple employers on behalf of the claimant, meets the requirement that he be actively seeking and unable to obtain suitable work by contacting that hiring hall alone. In areas of high unemployment, as determined by the Commission, the Commission has the authority to adjust the requirement that he be actively seeking and unable to obtain suitable work.
    2. An individual who leaves the normal labor market area of the individual for the major portion of any week is presumed to be unavailable for work within the meaning of this section. This presumption may be overcome if the individual establishes to the satisfaction of the Commission that the individual has conducted a bona fide search for work and has been reasonably accessible to suitable work in the labor market area in which the individual spent the major portion of the week to which the presumption applies.
    3. An individual whose type of work is such that it is performed by individuals working two or more shifts in a 24-hour period shall not be deemed unavailable for work if the individual is currently enrolled in one or more classes of education related to employment or is continuing in a certificate or degree program at an institution of higher education, provided that the enrollment would only limit the individual's availability for one shift and the individual is otherwise available to work any of the other shifts.
  6. He has given notice of resignation to his employer and the employer subsequently made the termination of employment effective  prior to the date of termination as given in the notice, but in no case shall unemployment compensation benefits awarded under this subdivision exceed two weeks; provided, that the claimant could not establish good cause for leaving work pursuant to § 60.2-618 and was not discharged for misconduct as provided in § 60.2-618 .
  7. Beginning January 6, 1991, he has served a waiting period of one week during which he was eligible for benefits under this section in all other respects and has not received benefits, except that only one waiting week shall be required of such individual within any benefit year. For claims filed effective November 28, 1999, and after, this requirement shall be waived for any individual whose unemployment was caused by his employer terminating operations, closing its business or declaring bankruptcy without paying the final wages earned as required by § 40.1-29 of the Code of Virginia. Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, if an employer who terminates operations, closes its business or declares bankruptcy pays an individual his final wages after the period of time prescribed by § 40.1-29 of the Code of Virginia, such payment shall not be offset against the benefits the individual was otherwise entitled to receive and shall not, under any circumstances, cause such individual to be declared overpaid benefits.
  8. He is not imprisoned or confined in jail.
  9. He participates in reemployment services, such as job search assistance services, if he has been determined to be likely to exhaust regular benefits and need reemployment services pursuant to a profiling system established by the Commission, unless the Commission determines that (i) such claimant has completed such services or (ii) there is good cause for such claimant's failure to participate in such services.

    (Code 1950, § 60-46; 1954, c. 203; 1956, c. 440; 1962, c. 270; 1966, c. 30; 1968, c. 9; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-52; 1970, c. 104; 1974, c. 264; 1976, c. 708; 1977, c. 445; 1980, c. 463; 1981, c. 606; 1982, c. 265; 1983, c. 359; 1984, c. 458; 1985, c. 563; 1986, c. 480; 1988, c. 521; 1990, c. 908; 1993, c. 249; 1995, c. 436; 2000, c. 573; 2004, c. 496.)

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 573, effective retroactive to November 28, 1999, added subdivision 7 c, and added the last two sentences in subdivision 9.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 496 substituted "24" for "twenty-four" in subdivision 7 c; and in subdivision 8, substituted "prior to the date of termination as given in the notice" for "immediately" and "in no case shall unemployment compensation benefits awarded under this subdivision exceed two weeks" for "in no case to exceed two weeks for which he would have worked had the employee separated from employment on the date of termination as given in the notice."

Law review. - For note on employee's misconduct as a bar to unemployment compensation, see 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 119 (1962).

For 2003/2004 survey of state labor and employment law, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 285 (2004).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, §§ 8, 8.1, 9.

CASE NOTES

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases below were decided under prior law.

Eligibility under this section differs from that under § 60.2-618 . - Where claimants contended, under this section, that their unemployment was not caused by a directive of their labor union restricting work to three days per week, but by economic conditions, such argument was held to be entirely beside the point, because the issue was eligibility to compensation under this section, which is a different matter from disqualification because of a labor dispute under § 60.2-618 . Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463 , 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951), commented on in 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 109 (1952).

This section and § 60.2-618 deal with different matters. A claimant must be eligible for benefits under this section before his disqualification under § 60.2-618 need be inquired into. Dan River Mills, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 195 Va. 997 , 81 S.E.2d 620 (1954).

Conditions in this section do not relate to cause of separation from employment. - Eligibility for benefits under this section is not conditioned upon whether the employee has voluntarily quit his employment. Indeed, none of the conditions in this section relate to the cause of the employee's separation from his employment. Dan River Mills, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 195 Va. 997 , 81 S.E.2d 620 (1954).

Burden on claimant. - In order to recover compensation benefits under the Act the burden is on the claimant to show that he has met the benefit eligibility conditions, which in this case is unrestricted availability for work. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463 , 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951), commented on in 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 109 (1952); VEC v. Coleman, 204 Va. 18 , 129 S.E.2d 6 (1963).

The claimant has the burden of proving he or she has met the eligibility conditions; once a claimant has met this burden, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the claimant is disqualified. Actuarial Benefits & Design Corp. v. VEC, 23 Va. App. 640, 478 S.E.2d 735 (1996).

The burden is on a claimant to prove that he is "available for work" under the requirements of this section before he is eligible to receive benefits. VEC v. Meredith, 206 Va. 206 , 142 S.E.2d 579 (1965).

"Eligible and not disqualified" requirement. - In order to receive unemployment benefits, a claimant must be eligible and not disqualified under the appropriate statutes. Actuarial Benefits & Design Corp. v. VEC, 23 Va. App. 640, 478 S.E.2d 735 (1996).

"Establishment" defined. - The word "establishment," coupled as it is in subdivision 2 with the words "factory" and "other premises," means the place of business where the worker was employed. It is not intended to widen and extend the area or territorial scope beyond that encompassed by the companion words "factory" and "other premises," but rather to make more inclusive and thus broaden the type of enterprise or business covered by these associate words. The words "factory," "establishment" and "premises" each characterize and designate the kind of place at which the employees work and not the manner of its operation. Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 191 Va. 812 , 73 S.E.2d 28 (1951).

Eligibility relationship to "good cause for leaving employment." - This case was reversed and remanded for a determination of whether claimant's eligibility was limited to the twelve days of her notice period that were unpaid because she could not establish a good cause for her leaving her employment, pursuant to this section. Actuarial Benefits & Design Corp. v. VEC, 23 Va. App. 640, 478 S.E.2d 735 (1996).

Relation to Social Security benefits. - In an action in which a social security claimant challenged the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, denying disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 423, the action was remanded for the administrative law judge to determine precisely when the claimant received unemployment benefits and take that into consideration if disability benefits were awarded; in order to receive unemployment benefits, an individual must hold himself out as willing and able to work. Holding oneself out as able to work is in direct contravention to a disability claim. McGhee v. Barnhart, 366 F. Supp. 2d 379, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7423 (W.D. Va. 2005).

II. ABILITY AND AVAILABILITY FOR WORK.

Meaning of "able to work." - Reason and justice demand that the words "able to work," as used in subdivision 7 of this section, should mean no more than that an applicant possess physical and mental ability to perform some substantial saleable service. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 197 Va. 816 , 91 S.E.2d 642 (1956).

Claimant must be able to accept substantial employment. - The requirements of this section are not met by a claimant whose ability to work and availability for work are so limited because of ill health that he is not able to accept some substantial employment. The Act was not intended as health insurance. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 197 Va. 816 , 91 S.E.2d 642 (1956).

Meaning of "available for work." - As used in this section, the words "available for work" imply that in order that an unemployed individual may be "eligible to receive benefits" he must be willing to accept any suitable work which may be offered to him, without attaching thereto restrictions or conditions not usual and customary in that occupation but which he may desire because of his particular needs or circumstances. Stated conversely, if he is unwilling to accept work in his usual occupation for the usual and customary number of days or hours, or under the usual and customary conditions at or under which the trade works, or if he restricts his offer or willingness to work to periods or conditions to fit his particular needs or circumstances, then he is not available for work within the meaning of the section. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463 , 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951), commented on in 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 109 (1952).

The phrase "available for work," as used in this section, requires a claimant to actively and unrestrictively endeavor to obtain suitable employment in the market where he resides. Stated in another way, a claimant must actively seek employment and be willing to accept any suitable work which may be offered him, without attaching conditions not usual and customary in that occupation but which he may desire because of his particular needs or circumstances. VEC v. Meredith, 206 Va. 206 , 142 S.E.2d 579 (1965) (But see 1982 amendment to subdivision 7).

The courts have universally held that a claimant who undertakes to limit or restrict his willingness to work to certain hours, types of work, or conditions, not usual and customary in the trade, is not "available for work." Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463 , 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951), commented on in 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 109 (1952).

To be "available for work" a claimant must be actively and unrestrictively seeking suitable employment in the market where he resides. Dan River Mills, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 195 Va. 997 , 81 S.E.2d 620 (1954) (But see 1982 amendment to subdivision 7).

Whether a claimant is available for work during a specific period is a question of fact to be determined by the Commission. VEC v. Coleman, 204 Va. 18 , 129 S.E.2d 6 (1963); VEC v. Meredith, 206 Va. 206 , 142 S.E.2d 579 (1965).

And the Commission's finding will not be reversed if based on credible evidence. VEC v. Coleman, 204 Va. 18 , 129 S.E.2d 6 (1963).

The fact that an employee voluntarily quit employment is a circumstance to be considered in determining whether he is "available for work" and hence eligible for benefits, but does not ipso facto show ineligibility. Dan River Mills, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 195 Va. 997 , 81 S.E.2d 620 (1954).

Refusal to work after notice of future termination. - Because an employee's refusal to work out a notice period, after being informed of a future discharge, was a voluntary leaving or an intervening cause of unemployment, the employee voluntarily left employment; therefore, the employee was not eligible to collect unemployment benefits under §§ 60.2-612 and 60.2-618 . Nemetz v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 0482-08-1, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 563 (Ct. of Appeals Dec. 23, 2008).

The availability requirement of this section is satisfied where a claimant is willing, able and ready to accept suitable work which he does not have good cause to refuse. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 197 Va. 816 , 91 S.E.2d 642 (1956).

Claimant need not be available for unsuitable work. - Under this remedial legislation a claimant is not required to be available for work which has been shown to be unsuitable. The problem of determining when work is suitable and when it is unsuitable, under the facts and circumstances of each particular case, has been delegated to the Commission. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 197 Va. 816 , 91 S.E.2d 642 (1956).

A practical test of the availability for work is the action of the employee in accepting or refusing to accept a job that comes within the provisions of the Act as suitable employment. An employee cannot, without good cause, refuse to accept suitable employment and claim benefit payments, but his right to the payment is unaffected by his refusal to accept work which is manifestly unsuitable in the light of existing circumstances. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 197 Va. 816 , 91 S.E.2d 642 (1956).

There is no requirement that claimant be available for work in any particular locality. - The mere fact that a claimant has quit his job without good cause and due to no fault of his employer and moved to another locality does not ipso facto show that he is not "available for work" and not eligible for benefits under the provisions of subdivision 7 of this section. There is no requirement that claimant be available for work in any particular place, such as the locality where claimant last resided or was last employed. Dan River Mills, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 195 Va. 997 , 81 S.E.2d 620 (1954). (But see 1982 amendment to subdivision 7.)

Availability of claimant where no work available. - That there is no work available does not preclude a finding that claimants were not available for work. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463 , 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951), commented on in 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 109 (1952).

Mere unemployment arising from the economic troubles of the employer does not satisfy the eligibility requirements of this section and entitle the unemployed person to compensation benefits. To be entitled to such benefits the individual must be unemployed because of lack of work and yet must be available for work. He must be ready and willing to accept work without attaching to his willingness to work restrictions or conditions not usual or customary in the occupation, and this is so even though there be no work at hand or available to him. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463 , 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951), commented on in 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 109 (1952).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Cap on benefits. - Virginia Employment Commission erred in finding that the employee was ineligible to receive benefits because she was unemployed without fault on her part, and the cap of subdivision 8 did not apply; the employee did not tender or "give" notice because she took no affirmative action to effectively give her notice. Harvey v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 94 Va. Cir. 86, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 119 (Fairfax County Aug. 3, 2016).

Cap on benefits contained in subdivision 8 does not apply unless an employee gives notice of his or her resignation to the employer; plain meaning mandated by subdivision 8, requires that an employee take some step of affirmative action by granting, bestowing, putting into possession, transferring, conveying, delivering, or offering the notice of resignation to his or her employer. Harvey v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 94 Va. Cir. 86, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 119 (Fairfax County Aug. 3, 2016).

Many employees consider leaving their employment or make undirected comments about finding a new place of work, and such comments could be based in truth or simply autoschediastic; thus, courts should be hesitant about opening the door for employers to presume resignation and act without investigation, and a fact intensive, case-by-case determination is necessary in determining whether an employee gives notice of her resignation by taking an action to deliver such notice. Harvey v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 94 Va. Cir. 86, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 119 (Fairfax County Aug. 3, 2016).

§ 60.2-613. Benefits not denied to individuals in training with approval of Commission.

  1. No otherwise eligible individual shall be denied benefits for any week because he is in training with the approval of the Commission, including training under Section 134 of the Workforce Investment Act, nor shall such individual be denied benefits for any week in which he is in training with the approval of the Commission, including training under Section 134 of the Workforce Investment Act, by reason of the application of the provisions in subdivision 7 of § 60.2-612 relating to availability for work, or the provisions of subdivision 3 of § 60.2-618 relating to failure to apply for, or a refusal to accept, suitable work.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, no otherwise eligible individual shall be denied benefits for any week because he is in training approved under § 2296 of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq.), nor shall such individual be denied benefits by reason of leaving work to enter such training, provided the work left is not suitable employment, or because of the application to any such week in training of provisions in this law (or any applicable federal unemployment compensation law), relating to availability for work, active search for work, or refusal to accept work.
  3. For purposes of this section, "suitable employment" means, with respect to an individual, work of a substantially equal or higher skill level than the individual's past adversely affected employment, as defined for purposes of the Trade Act, and wages for such work at not less than eighty percent of the individual's average weekly wage as determined for the purposes of the Trade Act.

    (1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235, § 60.1-52.1; 1982, c. 237; 1984, c. 204; 1985, c. 152; 1986, c. 480; 1995, c. 436; 2000, c. 687.)

Editor's note. - Section 134 of the Workforce Investment Act, referred to above, is codified as 29 U.S.C.S. § 3174.

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 687, in subsection A, substituted "Section 134 of the Workforce Investment" for "Title III of the Job Training Partnership" in two places.

CASE NOTES

The intent of subsection B is clearly to enable qualified persons to resign employment to participate in a training program under the federal Trade Act, without incurring a loss of unemployment benefits. Consistent with this purpose, the statute expressly preserves such benefits upon voluntary termination "to enter" such program. VEC v. Fitzgerald, 19 Va. App. 491, 452 S.E.2d 692 (1995).

§ 60.2-614. Service required during immediately preceding benefit year in which individual received benefits.

No individual may receive benefits in a benefit year unless, subsequent to the beginning of the immediately preceding benefit year during which he received benefits, he performed service for an employer as defined in § 60.2-210 for remuneration (i) during thirty days, whether or not such days were consecutive, or (ii) for 240 hours, and subsequently became totally or partially separated from such employment.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235, § 60.1-52.2; 1977, c. 445; 1981, c. 369; 1984, c. 458; 1986, c. 480; 1997, c. 202.)

CASE NOTES

Thirty-day time period. - In reversing an award of benefits for an employee who worked 24 days, the statute was given its plain meaning, specifically that to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must have performed services for an employer for a minimum of thirty days during the relevant time period. That the legislature intended the term "during thirty days" to define a number of days, not a period of time, is verified by the legislative inclusion of the clause "whether or not such days were consecutive." Virginia Empl. Comm'n v. Davenport, 29 Va. App. 26, 509 S.E.2d 522, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 36 (1999).

The Commission has consistently interpreted § 60.2-614 to require thirty days of service, and that construction is therefore entitled to great weight in the courts. Virginia Empl. Comm'n v. Davenport, 29 Va. App. 26, 509 S.E.2d 522, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 36 (1999).

The relationship between employer and on-call employee constituted employment within the definition of § 60.2-212 , although during certain weeks employee was partially separated because his earnings fell below a threshold amount. Eastern Motor Inns, Inc. v. VEC, 14 Va. App. 783, 418 S.E.2d 915 (1992).

A person who is an on-call employee, without a definite commitment from the employer, is unemployed under the Act if he earns less than his weekly benefit amount. Eastern Motor Inns, Inc. v. VEC, 14 Va. App. 783, 418 S.E.2d 915 (1992).

§ 60.2-615. Benefits based on employment by state or political subdivision, certain hospitals, educational institutions and charitable, etc., organizations.

Benefits based on service in employment defined in subsection A of § 60.2-213 shall be payable in the same amount on the same terms and subject to the same conditions as benefits payable on the basis of other service subject to this title, except that:

    1. Benefits based on service in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity for an educational institution shall not be paid to an individual for any week of unemployment commencing during the period between two successive academic years or terms, or during a similar period between two regular but not successive terms, or during a period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual's contract, if the individual performs such services in the first of such academic years or terms and if there is a contract or a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform services in any such capacity for any educational institution in the second of such academic years or terms. A. 1. Benefits based on service in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity for an educational institution shall not be paid to an individual for any week of unemployment commencing during the period between two successive academic years or terms, or during a similar period between two regular but not successive terms, or during a period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual's contract, if the individual performs such services in the first of such academic years or terms and if there is a contract or a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform services in any such capacity for any educational institution in the second of such academic years or terms.
    2. The provisions of this subsection relating to the denial of benefits shall apply to an individual who performs such services on a part-time or substitute basis.
    1. Benefits based on service in any capacity, other than an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity, for an educational institution shall not be paid to any individual for any week which commences during a period between two successive academic years or terms if such individual performs such services in the first of such academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform such services in the second of such academic years or terms. B. 1. Benefits based on service in any capacity, other than an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity, for an educational institution shall not be paid to any individual for any week which commences during a period between two successive academic years or terms if such individual performs such services in the first of such academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform such services in the second of such academic years or terms.
    2. The provisions of this subsection relating to the denial of benefits shall apply to an individual who performs such services on a part-time or substitute basis.
    3. If compensation is denied to any individual for any week which occurs during the period between academic years or terms under this subsection and such individual was not offered an opportunity to perform such services for the educational institution for the second of such academic years or terms, such individual shall be entitled to a retroactive payment of the compensation for each week for which the individual filed a timely claim for compensation and for which compensation was denied solely by reason of this subsection.
  1. Benefits based on services performed in an educational institution while employed by an educational service agency shall not be payable to any individual who provided such services under the same circumstances and subject to the same terms and conditions as described in subsections A, B and E of this section. For purposes of this subsection "educational service agency" means a governmental agency or governmental entity which is established and operated exclusively for the purpose of providing such services to one or more educational institutions.
  2. Benefits based on services provided to or on behalf of an educational institution while employed by a governmental entity or nonprofit organization shall not be payable to any individual who provided such services under the same circumstances and subject to the same terms and conditions as described in subsections A, B, C and E of this section.
  3. For services described in subsections A and B of this section, compensation payable on the basis of such services shall be denied to any individual for any week which commences during an established and customary vacation period or holiday recess if such individual performs such services in the period immediately before such vacation period or holiday recess, and there is a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform such services in the period immediately following such vacation period or holiday recess.

    (1971, Ex. Sess., c. 235, § 60.1-52.3; 1977, c. 330; 1979, c. 652; 1981, c. 328; 1983, c. 14; 1984, cc. 204, 458; 1985, c. 152; 1986, c. 480.)

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on governmental services and social welfare for the year 1976-1977, see 63 Va. L. Rev. 1440 (1977).

§ 60.2-616. Benefits based on services in connection with sports.

Benefits based on services, substantially all of which consist of participating in sports or athletic events or training or preparing to so participate, shall not be paid to any individual for any week of unemployment which commences during the period between two successive sport seasons, or similar periods, if such individual performed such services in the first of such seasons, or similar periods, and there is a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform such services in the later of such seasons, or similar periods.

(1977, c. 330, § 60.1-52.4:1; 1986, c. 480.)

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on governmental services and social welfare for the year 1976-1977, see 63 Va. L. Rev. 1440 (1977).

§ 60.2-617. Benefits denied to certain aliens.

  1. Benefits shall not be paid on the basis of services performed by an alien unless such individual was lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time such services were performed, was lawfully present for purposes of performing such services, or was permanently and lawfully residing in the United States under color of law at the time such services were performed. The provisions of this subsection shall include aliens who were lawfully present in the United States as a result of the application of the provisions of § 1153 (a) (7) or § 1182 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.). Additionally, any modifications to the provisions of § 3304 (a) (14) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq.) which specify other conditions or other effective dates than stated herein for the denial of benefits based on services performed by aliens and which modifications are required to be implemented under state law as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, shall be deemed applicable under the provisions of this section.
  2. Any data or information required of individuals claiming benefits to determine whether benefits are not payable to them because of their alien status shall be uniformly required from all applicants for benefits.
  3. In the case of an individual whose claim for benefits would otherwise be approved, no determination that benefits to such individual are not payable because of his alien status shall be made except upon a preponderance of the evidence.

    (1977, c. 330, § 60.1-52.5:1; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-618. Disqualification for benefits.

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits upon separation from the last employing unit for whom he has worked 30 days or 240 hours or from any subsequent employing unit:

  1. For any week benefits are claimed until he has performed services for an employer (i) during 30 days, whether or not such days are consecutive, or (ii) for 240 hours, and subsequently becomes totally or partially separated from such employment, if the Commission finds such individual is unemployed because he left work voluntarily without good cause.

    If (a) at the time of commencing employment with such employing unit an individual is enrolled in an accredited academic program of study provided by an institution of higher education for students that have been awarded a baccalaureate degree, which academic program culminates in the awarding of a master's, doctoral, or professional degree; (b) the individual's employment with such employing unit commenced and ended during the period between spring and fall semesters of the academic program in which the individual is enrolled; and (c) the individual returned to such academic program following his separation from such employing unit, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the individual left work voluntarily.

    As used in this chapter, "good cause" shall not include (1) voluntarily leaving work with an employer to become self-employed or (2) voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany or to join his or her spouse in a new locality, except where an individual leaves employment to accompany a spouse to the location of the spouse's new duty assignment if (A) the spouse is on active duty in the military or naval services of the United States; (B) the spouse's relocation to a new military-related assignment is pursuant to a permanent change of station order; (C) the location of the spouse's new duty assignment is not readily accessible from the individual's place of employment; and (D) except for members of the Virginia National Guard relocating to a new assignment within the Commonwealth, the spouse's new duty assignment is located in a state that, pursuant to statute, does not deem a person accompanying a military spouse as a person leaving work voluntarily without good cause. An individual shall not be deemed to have voluntarily left work solely because the separation was in accordance with a seniority-based policy.

    1. For any week benefits are claimed until he has performed services for an employer (i) during 30 days, whether or not such days are consecutive, or (ii) for 240 hours, and subsequently becomes totally or partially separated from such employment, if the Commission finds such individual is unemployed because he has been discharged for misconduct connected with his work.
    2. For the purpose of this subdivision, "misconduct" includes, but shall not be limited to:
      1. An employee's confirmed positive test for a nonprescribed controlled substance, identified as such in Chapter 34 (§ 54.1-3400 et seq.) of Title 54.1, where such test was conducted at the direction of his employer in conjunction with the employer's administration and enforcement of a known workplace drug policy. Such test shall have been performed, and a sample collected, in accordance with scientifically recognized standards by a laboratory accredited by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, or the College of American Pathology, or the American Association for Clinical Chemistry, or the equivalent, or shall have been a United States Department of Transportation-qualified drug screen conducted in accordance with the employer's bona fide drug policy. The Commission may consider evidence of mitigating circumstances in determining whether misconduct occurred.
      2. An employee's intentionally false or misleading statement of a material nature concerning past criminal convictions made in a written job application furnished to the employer, where such statement was a basis for the termination and the employer terminated the employee promptly upon the discovery thereof. The Commission may consider evidence of mitigating circumstances in determining whether misconduct occurred.
      3. A willful and deliberate violation of a standard or regulation of the Commonwealth, by an employee of an employer licensed or certified by the Commonwealth, which violation would cause the employer to be sanctioned or have its license or certification suspended by the Commonwealth. The Commission may consider evidence of mitigating circumstances in determining whether misconduct occurred.
      4. Chronic absenteeism or tardiness in deliberate violation of a known policy of the employer or one or more unapproved absences following a written reprimand or warning relating to more than one unapproved absence. The Commission may consider evidence of mitigating circumstances in determining whether misconduct occurred.
      5. An employee's loss of or failure to renew a license or certification that is a requisite of the position held by the employee, provided the employer is not at fault for the employee's loss of or failure to renew the license or certification. The Commission may consider evidence of mitigating circumstances in determining whether misconduct occurred.
    1. If it is determined by the Commission that such individual has failed, without good cause, either to apply for available, suitable work when so directed by the employment office or the Commission or to accept suitable work when offered him. The disqualification shall commence with the week in which such failure occurred, and shall continue for the period of unemployment next ensuing until he has performed services for an employer (i) during 30 days, whether or not such days are consecutive, or (ii) for 240 hours, and subsequently becomes totally or partially separated from such employment.
    2. In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the Commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his experience, his length of unemployment and the accessibility of the available work from his residence.
    3. No work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied under this title to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions:
      1. If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute;
      2. If the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality; or
      3. If as a condition of being employed the individual would be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization.
    4. No individual shall be qualified for benefits during any week that such individual, in connection with an offer of suitable work, has a confirmed positive test for a nonprescribed controlled substance, identified as such in Chapter 34 (§ 54.1-3400 et seq.) of Title 54.1, if the test is required as a condition of employment and (i) performed, and a sample is collected, in accordance with scientifically recognized standards by a laboratory accredited by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, or the College of American Pathology, or the American Association for Clinical Chemistry, or the equivalent, or (ii) a United States Department of Transportation-qualified drug screen conducted in accordance with the employer's bona fide drug policy. The disqualification shall commence with the week in which such a test was conducted, and shall continue for the period of unemployment next ensuing until he has performed services for an employer (i) during 30 days, whether or not such days are consecutive, or (ii) for 240 hours, and subsequently becomes totally or partially separated from such employment.
  2. For 52 weeks, beginning with the date of the determination or decision, if the Commission finds that such individual, within 36 calendar months immediately preceding such determination or decision, has made a false statement or representation knowing it to be false, or has knowingly failed to disclose a material fact, to obtain or increase any benefit or payment under this title, the unemployment compensation of any other state, or any other program of the federal government which is administered in any way under this title, either for himself or any other person. Overpayments that have been fraudulently obtained and any penalty assessed against the individual pursuant to § 60.2-636 shall be recoverable as provided in § 60.2-633 .
  3. If such separation arose as a result of an unlawful act which resulted in a conviction and after his release from prison or jail until he has performed services for an employer for (i) 30 days, whether or not such days are consecutive, or (ii) 240 hours, and subsequently becomes totally or partially separated from such employment.
  4. If such separation arose as a condition of the individual's parole or release from a custodial or penal institution and such individual was participating in the community corrections alternative program pursuant to § 19.2-316.4 . (Code 1950, § 60-47; 1952, c. 184; 1954, c. 203; 1956, c. 440; 1960, c. 136; 1962, c. 12; 1966, c. 30; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-58; 1972, c. 764; 1974, c. 466; 1977, c. 286; 1979, cc. 675, 681; 1981, c. 251; 1982, cc. 319, 363; 1983, c. 559; 1984, c. 458; 1986, c. 480; 1991, c. 296; 1993, c. 249; 1996, cc. 175, 182, 194, 199; 1997, c. 202; 1998, c. 241; 1999, c. 919; 2004, cc. 525, 977; 2005, c. 464; 2008, c. 719; 2009, c. 878; 2013, cc. 175, 771; 2014, cc. 201, 442; 2019, c. 618.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2009, c. 878, which had added an exception in subdivision 1 that was contingent on adequate federal funding, was repealed by Acts 2014, c. 442, cl. 2. Both the 2009 and 2014 amendments added similar provisions.

Acts 2014, c. 442, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act enhance the benefits payable to an individual pursuant to Title 60.2 of the Code of Virginia. Pursuant to § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia, the Virginia Employment Commission, in consultation with the Department of Planning and Budget, estimates that over the ensuing eight years (i) the provisions of this act are projected to reduce the solvency level of the Unemployment Trust Fund by an average of 0 percent in each of the eight years and (ii) the projected average annual increase in state unemployment tax liability of employers on a per-employee basis that would result from the provisions of this act is $0.40."

Acts 2014, c. 442, cl. 4, which would have made the 2014 amendments to this section expire on December 31, 2020, was repealed by Acts 2020, c. 261, cl. 1.

Acts 2014, c. 442, cl. 5 provides: "That the Virginia Employment Commission shall provide in its reports to the Commission on Unemployment Compensation information detailing (i) the number of claims that are paid as a result of the first enactment of this act, (ii) the effect of the payment of such claims on the solvency level and balance of the Unemployment Trust Fund, and (iii) the effect of such claims on pool taxes paid by employers in the Commonwealth."

Acts 2020, c. 261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act enhance the benefits payable to an individual pursuant to Title 60.2 of the Code of Virginia. Pursuant to § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia, the Virginia Employment Commission, in consultation with the Department of Planning and Budget, estimates that over the ensuing eight years (i) the provisions of this act are projected to reduce the solvency level of the Unemployment Trust Fund by an average of 0.1 percent in each of the eight years and (ii) the projected average annual increase in state unemployment tax liability of employers on a per-employee basis that would result from the provisions of this act is $0."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 525, throughout the section, substituted "30" for "thirty"; added subdivision 2 b (3); and in subdivision 4, substituted "52" for "fifty-two," "36" for "thirty-six" and "that" for "which."

The 2004 amendment by c. 977, throughout the section, substituted "30" for "thirty"; in subdivision 4, substituted "52" for "fifty-two" and "36" for "thirty-six"; and added subdivision 6.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 464 inserted subdivision 2 b (4).

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 719 inserted "or shall have been a United States Department of Transportation-qualified drug screen conducted in accordance with the employer's bona fide drug policy" at the end of the second sentence in subparagraph 2 b (1); and in subparagraph 3 d, deleted the clause (i) designation following "if the test is," redesignated former clause (ii) as clause (i), and inserted clause (ii) in the first sentence.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 175 added subdivision 2 b (5).

The 2013 amendment by c. 771 rewrote the second sentence of subdivision 4, which formerly read: "Additionally, such individual shall be ineligible for benefits until he has repaid the Commission the sum that has been fraudulently obtained."

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 201, in subdivision 1, added the second paragraph and in the last paragraph, substituted "(1)" for "(a)," "(2)" for "(b)," "(A)" for "(1)," "(B)" for "(2)," "(C)" for "(3)," and "(D)" for "(4)."

The 2014 amendment by c. 442, in the last paragraph in subdivision 1, substituted "(a)" for "(i)" and "(b)" for "(ii)" in the first sentence and added the language beginning "except where an individual leaves" at the end of the second sentence.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 618 substituted "community corrections alternative program pursuant to § 19.2-316.4 " for "Diversion Center Incarceration Program pursuant to § 19.2-316.3 " in subdivision 6.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on governmental services and social welfare for the year 1976-1977, see 63 Va. L. Rev. 1440 (1977). For survey of Virginia law on governmental services and social welfare for the year 1978-1979, see 66 Va. L. Rev. 301 (1980).

For annual survey of Virginia labor and employment law, see 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 241 (2005).

CASE NOTES

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases below were decided under prior law.

"Eligible and not disqualified" requirement. - In order to receive unemployment benefits, a claimant must be eligible and not disqualified under the appropriate statutes. Actuarial Benefits & Design Corp. v. VEC, 23 Va. App. 640, 478 S.E.2d 735 (1996).

Eligibility burden of proof. - The claimant has the burden of proving he or she has met the eligibility conditions; once a claimant has met this burden, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the claimant is disqualified. Actuarial Benefits & Design Corp. v. VEC, 23 Va. App. 640, 478 S.E.2d 735 (1996).

Where employer has failed to show that employee has engaged in disqualifying conduct, burden does not shift to employee to present evidence in mitigation. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., Inc. v. VEC, 24 Va. App. 377, 482 S.E.2d 841 (1997).

Statutory scheme for determining a claimant's qualification for benefits contemplated a shifting of the burden of proof between the claimant and the employer. Physical Therapy Works, Inc. v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 2777-00-1, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 558 (Ct. of Appeals Oct. 16, 2001).

Because the legal standards for § 60.2-618 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17, were not identical, the findings of the Virginia Employment Commission made in connection with the employee's claim for unemployment compensation benefits could not be given preclusive effect. Pettis v. House of Ruth Md., Inc.,, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 29574 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 2005).

Employee must take reasonable steps to retain employment. - An employee must take those steps that could be reasonably expected of a person desirous of retaining his employment before hazarding the risks of unemployment. VEC v. Fitzgerald, 19 Va. App. 491, 452 S.E.2d 692 (1995).

Employer suffered no disruption as result of claimant's incarceration. - Evidence supported the commission's factual finding that employer suffered no disruption as a result of claimant's incarceration, where the employer's director of human resources testified that claimant's absence did not disrupt operations and that claimant was not replaced immediately because business was "slow." VEC v. Rockingham Poultry, Inc., No. 0093-89-4 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 24, 1990).

This section and § 60.2-612 deal with different matters. - A claimant must be eligible for benefits under § 60.2-612 before his disqualification under this section need be inquired into. Dan River Mills, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 195 Va. 997 , 81 S.E.2d 620 (1954).

Commission responsibility as factfinder. - As the factfinder, the commission is charged with the responsibility of resolving questions of credibility and of controverted facts and the commission must also determine whether the employee's evidence sufficiently mitigates the violation or behavior so as to avoid disqualification because of misconduct. VEC v. Gantt, 7 Va. App. 631, 376 S.E.2d 808 (1989).

This section is constitutional; it does not directly and substantially interfere with fundamental right to marry or fundamental right to live together as family. Austin v. Berryman, 878 F.2d 786 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 941, 110 S. Ct. 343, 107 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1989) (decided under former § 60.1-58).

Subdivision 1 (ii) does not violate equal protection. - Subdivision 1 (ii) of this section which provides that some claimants who leave work for compelling personal reasons not involving relocation with a spouse can receive benefits while those claimants who relocate for personal compelling reasons to accompany a spouse are denied benefits does not violate equal protection, because the legislature could rationally believe that someone who relocates with a spouse could rely on that spouse's income and would not need unemployment compensation. Austin v. Berryman, 670 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 878 F.2d 786 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 941, 110 S. Ct. 343, 107 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1989).

The provision of this section which disqualifies an individual otherwise eligible to receive unemployment compensation if he or she voluntarily resigns "to accompany or to join his or her spouse in a new locality" is not a gender-based classification in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Austin v. Berryman, 768 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. Va. 1991).

Applied in Craft v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 607, 383 S.E.2d 271 (1989); Helmick v. Martinsville-Henry County Economic Dev. Corp., 14 Va. App. 853, 421 S.E.2d 23 (1992); VEC v. Davenport, 29 Va. App. 26, 509 S.E.2d 522 (1999).

II. VOLUNTARILY LEFT WORK.

Claim that subdivision 1 (ii) violated fundamental right to travel was properly dismissed. - The claimant's claim that the spousal relocation provision of subdivision 1(ii) of this section violated her fundamental right to travel was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Claimant moved from Salem, Virginia to Castlewood, Virginia. Neither the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia nor the Supreme Court has recognized a right to intrastate travel. Austin v. Berryman, 670 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 878 F.2d 786 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 941, 110 S. Ct. 343, 107 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1989).

An employee may not rely upon his or her own "reasonable and purely subjective perception" to justify voluntary unemployment. Davis v. VEC, No. 2373-93-4, 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 432 (Ct. of Appeals July 5, 1994).

"Good cause" determination is mixed question of law and fact. - The determination of what constitutes "good cause" is a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore, is subject to review on appeal. Umbarger v. VEC, 12 Va. App. 431, 404 S.E.2d 380 (1991).

Determining whether an employee voluntarily quit without good cause is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable on appeal. Snyder v. VEC, 23 Va. App. 484, 477 S.E.2d 785 (1996).

"Good cause" requires employee take all reasonable steps to resolve conflict. - "Good cause" in the context of an employee who voluntarily leaves employment requires that an employee take all reasonable steps to resolve his conflicts with his employer and retain his employment before voluntarily leaving that employment. Umbarger v. VEC, 12 Va. App. 431, 404 S.E.2d 380 (1991).

The record supported the finding that the only ongoing pattern of conflict was a personality dispute between the service manager and defendant. A personality dispute among coworkers, without more, is not a "reasonable employment dispute" amounting to "good cause" to quit voluntarily within the meaning of this section. Vick v. VEC, No. 0722-96-2, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 178 (Ct. of Appeals Mar. 18, 1997).

Although employee had a legitimate complaint regarding conduct of her supervisors, she did not make reasonable efforts to resolve the situation before quitting, and thus she was properly considered to have voluntarily left her position without good cause. Smith v. S.W. Rodgers Co., No. 0003-99-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 436 (Ct. of Appeals July 20, 1999).

Before relinquishing his employment, the claimant must have made every effort to eliminate or adjust with his employer the differences or conditions of which he complains; he must take those steps that could be reasonably expected of a person desirous of retaining his employment before hazarding the risks of unemployment. Stasko v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 2835-00-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 222 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 24, 2001).

Determining whether good cause existed for claimant to leave employment. - When determining whether good cause existed for a claimant to voluntarily leave employment, the Commission and the reviewing courts must first apply an objective standard to the reasonableness of the employment dispute and then to the reasonableness of the employee's efforts to resolve that dispute before leaving the employment; in making this two-part analysis, the claim must be viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable employee. Umbarger v. VEC, 12 Va. App. 431, 404 S.E.2d 380 (1991).

Determining good cause requires a two-part analysis: first, it must be determined whether the employee's dispute with his employer is reasonable and, second, if the dispute is reasonable, then it must be determined whether the employee made reasonable efforts to resolve the dispute before quitting his employment. Stasko v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 2835-00-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 222 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 24, 2001).

Burden of proof as to good cause. - Under this section, a claimant is disqualified if "he left work voluntarily without good cause"; the burden is on the employer to prove that the claimant left work voluntarily. If the employer proves that the employee left work voluntarily, the burden shifts again to the claimant to prove that he or she left employment for good cause. Actuarial Benefits & Design Corp. v. VEC, 23 Va. App. 640, 478 S.E.2d 735 (1996).

Employee exhausted all reasonable alternatives to resolve complaint. - Where based upon the initial determination that employee reasonably believed she was being discriminated against, she took steps that could be reasonably expected of a person desirous of retaining her employment; there was no evidence that employee had the benefit of an established, designated procedure for addressing employee grievances; employee exhausted all reasonable alternatives within to resolve her complaint of discrimination when she confronted her manager and he failed to respond to that complaint; further, it was unreasonable to require an aggrieved employee to seek relief through an out-of-state parent corporation, particularly when that parent corporation was not shown to be actively involved in the management of its subsidiary; finally, based on her reasonable belief of an unlawful act by the employer, employee was not required to seek assistance from an undesignated agency or organization, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in order to establish "good cause" to terminate voluntarily her employment with employer. Umbarger v. VEC, 12 Va. App. 431, 404 S.E.2d 380 (1991).

Good cause did not exist where employee resigned without pursuing other remedies. - Where an employee of a federal agency resigned his position because he was dissatisfied with the agency's attempts to comply with his individual development plan and did not pursue administrative remedies, but chose the unilateral and drastic step of terminating his employment, even if the agency had breached the agreement, the court could not conclude that the employee had good cause to terminate his employment when an available remedy for that breach was ignored. Lee v. VEC, 1 Va. App. 82, 335 S.E.2d 104 (1985).

Plaintiff made no reasonable efforts to resolve the workers' compensation dispute without terminating his employment and the record disclosed no effort by him to negotiate that provision of the settlement requiring his termination with the insurance carrier; he chose not to pursue his normal remedies before the workers' compensation commission, instead, hoping to find another job, he chose the course that he believed was more advantageous to him financially; this record supported the finding that he lacked good cause to terminate the employment. Whitt v. Race Fork Coal Corp., 18 Va. App. 71, 441 S.E.2d 357 (1994).

Employer's failure to maintain workers' compensation insurance as required by law did not amount to "good cause" for leaving employment since the claimant quit without exploring the other statutory avenues though which he would have been entitled to compensation for his injury or giving the employer a reasonable time in which to comply with the law. Lindeman v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 1842-03-3, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 88 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 24, 2004).

Because an employee quit a job immediately upon learning that babysitter would no longer be available and made no effort to find another babysitter prior to quitting, the trial court and the unemployment commission properly determined that the employee was ineligible for unemployment benefits. Waldemar v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 1393-05-2, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 502 (Ct. of Appeals Dec. 13, 2005).

"Good cause" must be demonstrated by the employee in the record. - The record supports the Commission's determination that the plaintiff did not qualify for unemployment benefits because she did not have good cause to leave her employment because she demonstrated no medical reason sufficient to compel her to resign. Webster v. VEC, No. 1323-95-4, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 230 (Ct. of Appeals April 2, 1996).

Refusal to work after notice of future termination. - An employee's refusal to work out a notice period, after being informed of a future discharge, is a voluntary leaving or an intervening cause of unemployment which disqualifies individual from receipt of unemployment benefits. Shifflett v. VEC, 14 Va. App. 96, 414 S.E.2d 865 (1992).

Here claimant had notice that if she did not return her short-term disability forms to her employer, she would be considered to have resigned; because claimant did not prove that she timely returned the forms and because no evidence was offered to show good cause for not returning them, employer met its burden of proof and the VEC was correct in finding that claimant voluntarily quit her job without good cause. Snyder v. VEC, 23 Va. App. 484, 477 S.E.2d 785 (1996).

Because an employee's refusal to work out a notice period, after being informed of a future discharge, was a voluntary leaving or an intervening cause of unemployment, the employee voluntarily left employment; therefore, the employee was not eligible to collect unemployment benefits under subdivision 1 of this section or subsection B of § 60.2-612 . Nemetz v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 0482-08-1, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 563 (Ct. of Appeals Dec. 23, 2008).

Employee who voluntarily left employment was not entitled to unemployment benefits. - Determination by the Virginia Employment Commission to deny employee unemployment benefits on the ground that he voluntarily left his employment without good cause was not erroneous where the employee left his telemarketing job after the employer promoted another employee rather than him, and he gave no notice before quitting his job and did not discuss his reasons for leaving. Davis v. VEC, No. 2373-93-4, 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 432 (Ct. of Appeals July 5, 1994).

Resignation submitted in anticipation rather than in lieu of discharge. - Where claimant did not give any reason for leaving at that time for her resignation, did not seek medical treatment prior to her resignation, and did not inform her employer that she could not continue working because of the workplace tobacco smoke nor did she request a transfer, she voluntarily left her employment without good cause, and became disqualified for unemployment compensation. Gardner v. VEC, No. 2240-94-3, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 22 (Ct. of Appeals Jan. 16, 1996).

Where the Virginia Unemployment Commission found that although a claimant did offer testimony that would seem to indicate that her resignation was submitted only after she was told that she would be fired, the prior statement she gave concerning her separation that made no mention of such a scenario substantially undermined her later testimony, its finding supported its ruling that the claimant's resignation was submitted in anticipation of rather than in lieu of discharge so that it could still be considered as a voluntary leaving and adjudicated under the provisions of this section. Va. Empl. Comm'n v. Hill, No. 1436-03-3, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 210 (Ct. of Appeals May 4, 2004).

Because an employee voluntarily left a job in anticipation of being discharged, the employee did not establish "good cause" under subdivision 1of § 60.2-618 ; therefore, the circuit court correctly affirmed the Virginia Employment Commission's order disqualifying the employee from receiving unemployment benefits. Smith v. Va. Empl. Comm'n & Swift Transp. Co., 59 Va. App. 516, 721 S.E.2d 18, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 22 (2012).

Temporary employment. - As a claimant entered into an employment contract with her employer for a specific term, she did not leave the employment "voluntarily" when that term expired. Accordingly, the claimant was entitled to unemployment benefits under subdivision 1 of § 60.2-618 . Chauncey F. Hutter, Inc. v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 50 Va. App. 590, 652 S.E.2d 151, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 405 (2007).

When an individual leaves work solely because that individual entered into a contract of employment for a defined term, that individual does not leave work "voluntarily," as that word is used in subdivision 1 of § 60.2-618 . Chauncey F. Hutter, Inc. v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 50 Va. App. 590, 652 S.E.2d 151, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 405 (2007).

The burden of proof applicable to an appeal from a circuit court decision upholding the Commission's determination that claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause is clearly defined in § 60.2-625 , and does not require a finding that the evidence was "substantial" for the reviewing court to uphold the findings of the Commission. Robinson v. VEC, No. 1114-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 3, 1986).

Evidence did not support the finding that employee voluntarily quit her employment where the uncontradicted testimony indicates that employee's three day absence was authorized and the evidence only supported a finding of a misunderstanding between the parties regarding whether employee was authorized to take an extended vacation and employee's conduct in contacting the plant manager on her return from vacation and requesting an appointment to discuss the situation was consistent with an intent to keep rather than quit her job. Shuler v. VEC, 9 Va. App. 147, 384 S.E.2d 122 (1989).

Quitting with good cause shown. - Circuit court did not err when it found that the employee quit her employment with good cause where employee attempted on several occasions to contact her employer to explain the situation, the commission accepted as fact that the employee's mother was seriously ill and hospitalized in England, on the recommendation of the case social worker, the employee remained with her mother, and the employee explained to the employer, through her husband, that she would not be returning to work on her designated return date and supported her statements with documentation which stated she needed two-to-three weeks with her mother. These were steps that could be reasonably expected of a person desirous of retaining her employment. American Auto. Ass'n v. George, No. 2344-94-4, 1995 Va. App. LEXIS 556 (Ct. of Appeals July 5, 1995).

Trial court properly upheld the Virginia Employment Commission's order denying an employee unemployment benefits because the Commission's decision that the employee voluntarily quit his job without good cause was supported by the evidence; the employee did not reasonably try to resolve his dispute with his employer before he resigned; and he resigned right after receiving a notice of a proposed five-day suspension without pay. Borden v. Va. Empl. Comm'n & Fairfax Cnty., No. 1406-16-4, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 123 (May 9, 2017).

Quitting with good cause not shown. - Virginia Employment Commission did not err by finding a claimant ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits because the claimant's dispute with a supervisor over the employer's leave policy did not constitute good cause for leaving work and the claimant's failure to elevate the dispute with the supervisor to the company president was not reasonable. Hampton v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 1163-13-4, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 59 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 25, 2014).

No duty to further investigate status found. - Although the employer complained that the employee had a duty upon her return to the United States to investigate the status of her job by reporting to work, the certified letter to her from employer clearly and expressly stated the employer's position that employer considered that she had voluntarily resigned. By returning six days after the letter's stated date, the appellee did not have reason to investigate further. American Auto. Ass'n v. George, No. 2344-94-4, 1995 Va. App. LEXIS 556 (Ct. of Appeals July 5, 1995).

III. MISCONDUCT.

Test under section for misconduct is not same test for Title VII. - In Virginia, an employer using misconduct in connection with employment as a basis for denying an employee unemployment compensation benefits must show that the employee deliberately and willfully engaged in conduct evincing a complete disregard for the employer's workplace standards and policies. In an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, the standard is quite different; all the employer must do to meet its burden of production is to provide the finder of fact with any lawful nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge; therefore, the findings of the Virginia Employment Commission on the issue of misconduct in connection with employment, reached during a hearing to determine plaintiff's entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits, could not be given preclusive effect in the Title VII action. Guiden v. Southeastern Public Serv. Auth., 760 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D. Va. 1991).

Employees who are discharged from employment due to "misconduct connected with his work" are disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Kennedy's Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc. v. Cooper, 14 Va. App. 701, 419 S.E.2d 278 (1992).

The employer bears the burden of proving misconduct. Absent circumstances in mitigation of such conduct, the employee is "disqualified for benefits," and the burden of proving mitigating circumstances rests upon the employee. Kennedy's Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc. v. Cooper, 14 Va. App. 701, 419 S.E.2d 278 (1992).

When an employee is discharged for poor performance, he or she is entitled to unemployment compensation unless the employer shows that the conduct resulting in the employee's discharge constituted acts or omissions of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest willful disregard for the employer's interests. Moreover, the record must establish that an employee's poor performance did not result merely from inexperience or an inability to perform the task assigned. Whitt v. Ervin B. Davis & Co., 20 Va. App. 432, 457 S.E.2d 779 (1995).

This section provides for disqualification from receipt of unemployment benefits if the commission finds that the employee was discharged for work misconduct but, to establish misconduct, an employer has the burden of proving that the employee deliberately or willfully violated a company rule. Bistawros v. Virginia Empl. Comm'n &, No. 2207-00-4, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 77 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 20, 2001).

It was not part of the employer's burden of proof to disprove the existence of other causes for claimant's lapses in performance. Rather, once the burden of going forward with the evidence had shifted to her, claimant was required to produce credible evidence of such causes to rebut employer's prima facie case of willful misconduct. On appeal, she cannot rely on the mere possibility that such explanations might have been proven before the Commission. Whitt v. Ervin B. Davis & Co., 20 Va. App. 432, 457 S.E.2d 779 (1995).

Definition of misconduct has two prongs. The first prong defines misconduct as a deliberate violation of a company rule. The definition of misconduct under the second prong contemplates actions or omissions of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of the employer's interests and the duties and obligations the employee owes the employer. Kennedy's Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc. v. Cooper, 14 Va. App. 701, 419 S.E.2d 278 (1992).

Willfulness. - Absent direct proof of willfulness, the Virginia Employment Commission must consider both the nature and frequency of the acts from which willfulness is inferred. Whitt v. Ervin B. Davis & Co., 20 Va. App. 432, 457 S.E.2d 779 (1995).

Facts of the individual case dictate whether individually or in combination, the nature and frequency of poor performance were sufficient to support the inference of willfulness. Whitt v. Ervin B. Davis & Co., 20 Va. App. 432, 457 S.E.2d 779 (1995).

Finding that the employee was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under subdivision 2 of § 60.2-618 because she was discharged from her employment due to misconduct was inappropriate because it relied on conduct without finding that she deliberately violated a company rule reasonably designed to protect legitimate business interests of her employer or engaged in acts or omissions of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of those interests and the duties and obligations she owed employer. Hall v. Va. Empl. Comm'n & Process Mgmt. Techs., Inc., No. 1876-12-3, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 187 (Ct. of Appeals June 18, 2013).

What constitutes misconduct. - An employee is guilty of "misconduct connected with his work" when he deliberately violates a company rule reasonably designed to protect the legitimate business interests of his employer, or when his acts or omissions are of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of those interests and the duties and obligations he owes his employer. Absent circumstances in mitigation of such conduct, the employee is "disqualified for benefits." Branch v. VEC, 219 Va. 609 , 249 S.E.2d 180 (1978).

In order to constitute misconduct, the total circumstances must be sufficient to find a deliberate act of the employee which disregards the employer's business interest. VEC v. Gantt, 7 Va. App. 631, 376 S.E.2d 808 (1989).

The employer's need and desire to have employees available to assist customers, its right not to pay employees for time spent eating, and the need to protect the merchandise from being soiled are all legitimate business interests furthered by the company rule regarding food. VEC v. Gantt, 7 Va. App. 631, 376 S.E.2d 808 (1989).

An employee is guilty of "misconduct connected with his work" when he deliberately violates a company rule reasonably designed to protect the legitimate business interests of his employer, or when his acts or omissions are of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of those interests and the duties and obligations he owes his employer. Duncan v. Data Servs. Am., No. 0431-00-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 646 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 5, 2000).

Insubordination can constitute misconduct connected with work. Bistawros v. Virginia Empl. Comm'n &, No. 2207-00-4, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 77 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 20, 2001).

A former employee was properly denied unemployment benefits where his termination resulted from his refusal to make a truck delivery. Denisar v. Hauling, No. 2861-03-4, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 393 (Ct. of Appeals Aug. 17, 2004).

A single, isolated instance of vulgar or offensive language addressed to a superior may, in certain instances, amount to willful misconduct. Wood v. VEC, 20 Va. App. 514, 458 S.E.2d 319 (1995).

Absenteeism without notice is misconduct connected with work. Davis v. VEC, No. 1192-94-4, 1995 Va. App. LEXIS 115 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 14, 1995).

Appellant's failure to notify employer of his absence from work until noon constituted "misconduct connected with his work" that disqualified him from receiving unemployment benefits. Hunter v. VEC, No. 0947-97-3, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 771 (Ct. of Appeals Dec. 23, 1997).

Employee's failure to comply with employer's policy to provide proper notice to his supervisor regarding his absences constituted misconduct connected with work, disqualifying him from benefits. Henderson v. VEC, No. 1056-99-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 532 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 14, 1999).

Crimes of moral turpitude. - Finding that the employee was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits was appropriate pursuant to subdivision 2 a of § 60.2-618 because she was in a position of trust and welfare fraud was a crime of moral turpitude. Therefore, her actions in committing welfare fraud manifested a willful disregard of her employer's interests and the duties and obligations owed to the employer. Francis v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 59 Va. App. 137, 717 S.E.2d 438, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 374 (2011).

When conduct resulting in garnishment constitutes misconduct. - The conduct of an employee which results in garnishment is conduct connected with his work and where such conduct is recurrent, knowingly violative of a company rule, and unexcused by mitigating circumstances, it constitutes misconduct within the intendment of this section. Branch v. VEC, 219 Va. 609 , 249 S.E.2d 180 (1978).

Employee fired for what employer considers good cause may be entitled to unemployment compensation. - Even employees who are fired for what the employer considers good cause may be entitled to unemployment compensation. The question is whether a company rule was deliberately violated or whether the employee's acts were of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of those interests and the duties and obligations he owed his employer. Blake v. Hercules, Inc., 4 Va. App. 270, 356 S.E.2d 453 (1987).

Misconduct not found. - Employee's use of vulgar language was not of such a nature as to manifest a willful disregard of employer business interests or employee's duties and obligations to his employer. Employee's remarks, while vulgar and offensive, were not a lengthy barrage. They were a part of an isolated outburst following a private two and one-half hour meeting of management officials. The chief executive officer initiated the discussion of union organization at employer's place of business, and repeatedly demanded employee's resignation. Employee had been an employee of employer for almost 20 years. There is no evidence that he had a record of misconduct. There is no evidence that employee's remarks were overheard by store employees or customers. Misconduct has not been proven. Kennedy's Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc. v. Cooper, 14 Va. App. 701, 419 S.E.2d 278 (1992).

Commission erred in holding that three violations of security procedures by correctional officer constituted misconduct where there was no evidence that her acts were volitional, where although all three incidents involved breaches of prison security, they were violations of three otherwise unrelated procedures, and where the record contained no evidence that she ever demonstrated an ability to perform her job satisfactorily. Borbas v. VEC, 17 Va. App. 720, 440 S.E.2d 630 (1994).

Because the Virginia Employment Commission's determination regarding the witness's credibility was not plainly wrong, the circuit court did not err in upholding the Commission's decision to credit an unemployment compensation claimant's testimony over an employer's; the Commission's finding that claimant received a Christmas bonus with a note indicating that it was for a job well done was supported by the evidence, and the Commission's statement that the check was for "a job well done," after its express finding that the note accompanying the check said, "Thank you for your help," constituted a reasonable inference from the evidence. McNamara v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 54 Va. App. 616, 681 S.E.2d 67, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 364 (2009).

Circuit court did not err in concluding that credible evidence supported the Virginia Employment Commission's determination that an unemployment compensation claimant was entitled to unemployment benefits because the evidence supported the Commission's finding that an employer failed to make a prima facie showing that she discharged claimant for misconduct connected with his work, and, therefore, the Commission was not required to assess claimant's evidence of mitigation in order to conclude he was entitled to benefits; the Commission assessed the witnesses' credibility and weighed the evidence as a whole before concluding subjectively that the employer had not proved that claimant engaged in willful misconduct, and the evidence revealed that claimant worked at his job in what he believed was a diligent manner for the duration of his employment. McNamara v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 54 Va. App. 616, 681 S.E.2d 67, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 364 (2009).

Unemployment benefits claimant was not guilty of misconduct under subdivision 2 of § 60.2-618 in refusing to sign a company policy addressing the use of company vehicles because the policy required employees to waive legal rights and protection and was not reasonably designed to protect the employer's legitimate business interests. Williamson v. Va. Empl. Comm'n & Mills Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 56 Va. App. 14, 690 S.E.2d 304, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 129 (2010).

Misconduct not found where, though drugs were in urine sample, employee was not under the influence. - Where company rule only required that employee not report to work "under the influence" and not possess alcohol or drugs on the premises, the trial court erred in ruling that employee was, as a matter of law, barred from receiving unemployment compensation by virtue of misconduct, on grounds that he had 161 nanograms per milliliter of cannabinoid in his urine, where there was no evidence that this amount of cannabinoid would affect his duties at work, and no evidence to establish at what time he may have ingested the marijuana or whether it was done actively or passively, and further, where there was no evidence (apart from an anonymous tip) to refute his claim that he had not personally used marijuana, but had been merely in the presence of persons smoking marijuana while away from work. Blake v. Hercules, Inc., 4 Va. App. 270, 356 S.E.2d 453 (1987).

Misconduct found. - A telephone conversation between employee and a supervisor, was "connected with" his work. The sole subject of the conversation was appellant's work schedule and employee's anger over his schedule was the sole reason he became "belligerent" toward his supervisor. The evidence concerning this phone call was sufficient to support the commission's finding that employee's behavior manifested "a willful disregard" of his employer's "legitimate business interests." Britt v. VEC, 14 Va. App. 982, 420 S.E.2d 522 (1992).

Where employee's vulgarity and insubordination was not an isolated incident - she had been cautioned before - it was not simply a mode of expression under circumstances of provocation, and it was deliberately offensive and was calculated to challenge the organizational authority of the company and to repudiate her duty to her employer and her superiors, the evidence supported the commission's holding of willful misconduct. Wood v. VEC, 20 Va. App. 514, 458 S.E.2d 319 (1995).

In light of claimant's prior satisfactory performance of identical duties and the provision of counseling and warnings received from employer, the nature of claimant's lapses in satisfactory performance, combined with their frequency, supported the Virginia Employment Commission's determination that the decline in her job performance was the result of a willful disregard of the interests of her employer and, thus, constituted misconduct connected with her employment. Whitt v. Ervin B. Davis & Co., 20 Va. App. 432, 457 S.E.2d 779 (1995).

A garbage collector was discharged for misconduct and, therefore, was not eligible for unemployment benefits where he refused to follow the employer's instructions to completely empty customers' cans and to bag loose trash if necessary, as evidenced by complaints from customers. Hale v. Southwest Sanitation Co., Inc., No. 1071-98-3, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 594 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 24, 1998).

Cemetery employee did not deliberately violate a company rule in connection with sale of burial plot, and her actions did not manifest a willful disregard of her employer's best interests; employee was therefore not disqualified from receiving benefits on grounds of misconduct. Calvary Mem. Park v. VEC, No. 1730-98-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 391 (Ct. of Appeals June 29, 1999).

An employee was discharged for misconduct where he had previously been warned about being late to work and leaving work without permission, had completed a three-day suspension for tardiness just two days before the unexcused absence for which he was fired, and the employer's evidence established that the employee intentionally missed work because he did not want to work with a certain co-worker; the employee's recurrent attendance problems, coupled with his intentional absence following so closely after a suspension, constituted misconduct connected with work. Garland v. Virginia Empl. Comm'n, No. 0433-00-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 585 (Ct. of Appeals Aug. 8, 2000).

An emplyee's actions constituted misconduct connected with work where the employee had sent the president of his employer a letter written in a threatening and accusatory tone, which contained very serious and at that time, unsubstantiated and defamatory allegations against the employer; the employee's actions demonstrated a deliberate and willful disregard of his duties and obligations to the employer which were designed to protect its legitimate business interests. Duncan v. Data Servs. Am., No. 0431-00-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 646 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 5, 2000).

A teacher at a before-and-after school had been insubordinate and was discharged due to misconduct where he persisted in accusing his coworker of witchcraft after having been specifically warned that further discussions concerning witchcraft could lead to his discharge and after having been instructed to bring such matters to his employer rather than airing them in public. Bistawros v. Virginia Empl. Comm'n &, No. 2207-00-4, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 77 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 20, 2001).

Employee was properly found to be disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits because the employer discharged the employee for misconduct connected with work, § 60.2-618(2) . There was no error in the Virginia Employment Commission's legal conclusion that an email sent by the employee regarding a mayor's race, using the employer's computer and the company email account, constituted partisan political activity. Scarborough v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 2248-07-3, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 462 (Ct. of Appeals Oct. 14, 2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support the Virginia Employment Commission's finding that a claimant was ineligible for unemployment benefits due to misconduct. In one incident, despite instructions to the contrary from the claimant's supervisor, the claimant sat at the counsel table with a client in court during a protective order hearing.

Factual findings by the Virginia Employment Commission in an unemployment benefits case were conclusive that an attorney claimant was not entitled to benefits because he failed to advise the D.C. Bar that his Virginia law license had been revoked, which constituted misconduct associated with his employment, and he failed to demonstrate the existence of any mitigating circumstances. Rodriguez v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 0291-09-4, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 425 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 29, 2009).

As an in-home caregiver deliberately and willfully violated a known business policy by telling a patient's legal guardian that the patient was out of medication, the caregiver was properly found to have committed misconduct connected with work pursuant to § 60.2-618 . Hampson v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 0218-12-3, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 378 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 27, 2012).

Failing drug test. - As the Virginia Employment Commission misapplied subdivision 2 b(1) of § 60.2-618 when it awarded an employee unemployment benefits after she was fired for violating her employer's drug-free workplace policy, the benefit award was properly reversed; the employee had tested positive on a drug test and the test, without a separate chain-of-custody affirmation, was sufficient to support a prima facie case of misconduct. Va. Empl. Comm'n v. Cmty. Alternatives, Inc., 57 Va. App. 700, 705 S.E.2d 530, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 49 (2011).

Where employee admitted smoking marijuana, employer not required to present test results or chain of custody. - The employer was not required to present evidence of the actual drug test results or the chain of custody of the employee's specimen since the employee admitted smoking marijuana. Barkley v. Peninsula Transp. Dist. Comm'n, 11 Va. App. 317, 398 S.E.2d 94 (1990).

Once the employer has borne the burden of showing misconduct connected with the work, either by violation of a rule or by an act manifesting a willful disregard of the employer's interest, the burden shifts to the employee to prove circumstances in mitigation of his or her conduct. VEC v. Gantt, 7 Va. App. 631, 376 S.E.2d 808 (1989).

Mitigating circumstances are likely to be those considerations which establish that the employee's actions were not in disregard of the employer's business interests. Evidence of mitigation may appear in many forms which, singly or in combination, to some degree explain or justify the employee's conduct. Various factors to be considered may include: the importance of the business interest at risk; the nature and purpose of the rule; prior enforcement of the rule; good cause to justify the violation; and consistency with other rules. VEC v. Gantt, 7 Va. App. 631, 376 S.E.2d 808 (1989).

Personal plans do not constitute mitigating factors so as to avoid the disqualifying provisions. Denisar v. Hauling, No. 2861-03-4, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 393 (Ct. of Appeals Aug. 17, 2004).

The burden of proving mitigating circumstances with regard to misconduct connected with his work rests upon the employee. Branch v. VEC, 219 Va. 609 , 249 S.E.2d 180 (1978).

If the employee's evidence or the entire evidence fails to show mitigating circumstances, the commission must find that benefits are barred because a rule reasonably designed to protect a legitimate business interest was violated. If, however, the record contains evidence which mitigates the rule violation, the trier-of-fact must balance this against the legitimate business interest being protected to determine whether the employee demonstrated a willful disregard of the employer's interest. VEC v. Gantt, 7 Va. App. 631, 376 S.E.2d 808 (1989).

Condonation mitigated employee's conduct. - Evidence was sufficient to support the Commission's finding that the delay in dismissing employee constituted condonation, which mitigated the employee's misconduct and qualified her for unemployment insurance benefits. Robinson v. Hurst Harvey Oil, Inc., 12 Va. App. 936, 407 S.E.2d 352 (1991).

Evidence presented in mitigation insufficient. - Employee was disqualified from receiving benefits under this section where the evidence established that the employee intentionally violated the employer's policy rule: that is, she was informed of the employer's substance abuse policy at a group meeting and was aware she would be suspended if she tested positive for drugs; however, she admitted smoking marijuana. The fact she did not believe she would test positive three weeks after smoking the marijuana only indicated she did not believe she would be caught violating the rule; her belief provided no legitimate basis in mitigation of her conduct. The employee also presented evidence in mitigation which, when balanced against the employer's substantial interest in ensuring the safety of its passengers, was not sufficient to excuse her intentional violation of company policy and thus excuse her from the bar of work-related misconduct. Barkley v. Peninsula Transp. Dist. Comm'n, 11 Va. App. 317, 398 S.E.2d 94 (1990).

Where an employee was properly denied benefits under subdivision 2 of § 60.2-618 because she was terminated for violating a workplace rule prohibiting certain purchases through a payroll deduction, and the rule served legitimate employer interests, the employee's mitigation evidence was insufficient to show that the employer inconsistently enforced the rule since she did not provide the names of any employees who had violated the policy but who had not been fired. Va. Empl. Comm'n v. Trent, 55 Va. App. 560, 687 S.E.2d 99, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 2 (2010).

Finding of misconduct not binding on Industrial (now Workers' Compensation) Commission in subsequent proceeding. - Where an injured employee was dismissed from his selective employment for misconduct and subsequently sought unemployment benefits and reinstatement of his workers' compensation benefits, the Virginia Employment Commission's ruling that the claimant was guilty of misconduct was not binding upon the Industrial Commission, since that issue was not the same as the issue litigated by claimant before the Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission's inquiry focuses on whether the claimant's benefits may continue in light of his dismissal from selective employment. The key determination is whether the dismissal was "justified." Richmond Cold Storage Co. v. Burton, 1 Va. App. 106, 335 S.E.2d 847 (1985).

Nurse having her own prescription refilled not guilty of misconduct. - Where claimant, a nurse, ran into difficulty when she attempted to have a prescription for herself refilled, she asked another employee to call her employer's pharmacy for her, and the employee made the call, representing that she was calling from the office of claimant's physician, by whom claimant was employed part-time and who had given claimant authority to telephone a pharmacy to request a refill of a prescription for herself or another patient, claimant did not deliberately violate a work rule or willfully disregard her employer's interests or her duties to the employer, and she was not barred from receiving unemployment compensation on grounds of misconduct. Brady v. Human Resource Inst., of Norfolk, Inc., 231 Va. 28 , 340 S.E.2d 797 (1986).

Involuntary or nonintentional behavior not misconduct. - An employer cannot circumvent the statutory requirement requiring, as an element of misconduct, proof of a deliberate violation of a company rule by adopting a rule which makes involuntary or nonintentional behavior misconduct. VEC v. Sutphin, 8 Va. App. 325, 380 S.E.2d 667 (1989).

No misconduct was found on the part of an employee driver who was discharged after being involved in two accidents within approximately one week, where the employee driver had been employed for over three years and the evidence presented did not support a finding that his acts or omissions were of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of his employer's business interests or the duties and obligations owed to his employer. Israel v. VEC, 7 Va. App. 169, 372 S.E.2d 207 (1988).

Employment Commission's decision that sales representative had not engaged in disqualifying misconduct was supported by the evidence where employer presented nothing to show policies which employee was alleged to have violated, and even if in violation, employee's conduct was approved by his superiors at all stages. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., Inc. v. VEC, 24 Va. App. 377, 482 S.E.2d 841 (1997).

IV. SUITABLE WORK.

Interpretation of subdivision (a). - The beneficent purpose of the act requires that the disqualifying provisions of subdivision (a) must be interpreted in a manner which allows for the advancement in the work force that occurs when an employee has acquired new job skills through training and experience and in determining suitability of work, prior training and experience are inevitable touchstones of deliberation upon which the commission must focus. Johnson v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476 (1989).

"Suitability" defined. - Generally "suitability" entails an evaluation limited to the nature and characteristics of the job in relation to the skills, training, and experience of the particular employee and the length of unemployment. Johnson v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476 (1989).

Suitable employment not synonymous with equivalent employment. - When an employee with special skills and training has become unemployed, he or she will not be deprived of unemployment compensation benefits because of an offer of employment which would not be reasonably acceptable to an employee with that same background; however, suitable employment is not synonymous with equivalent employment. Johnson v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476 (1989).

"Suitability" determinations require consideration of a broad range of criteria, many of which subdivision 3 b enumerates. Johnson v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476 (1989).

"Suitability" of employment and "good cause" for refusal involve separate determinations but they are not mutually exclusive and the same factors may, but will not necessarily, be considered in each determination. Johnson v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476 (1989).

Determination of "good cause" to refuse employment will involve a much broader inquiry than merely considering whether the intrinsic aspects of the job are acceptable to the prospective employee, and good cause to refuse a job offer may arise from factors totally independent of those criteria used to determine whether a job is suitable to a particular employee; however, some or all of those factors intrinsic to the job may be considered in combination with extrinsic circumstances to determine whether good cause exists for the employee to refuse the employment. Johnson v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476 (1989).

Prospective employee is entitled to suitable work, but he cannot without forfeiting unemployment benefits choose to remain unemployed because the prospective employer does not offer the highest available job for which the employee may be qualified. Johnson v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476 (1989).

Good cause for refusal of job offer not shown. - The claimant failed to establish good cause for her refusal of an offer by her employer to go back to her previous job at the same rate of pay, although without seniority, with no accrued vacation time and with a requirement that she miss no work for the first 60 days; the loss of seniority and 60 day probation period did not constitute punitive conditions, and she showed no real and substantial reasons for her refusal of the job offer. Sword v. Automotive Industries, Inc., No. 1373-98-3, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 198 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 6, 1999).

This section contemplates that suitable work shall be offered and refused before any penalty attaches. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 197 Va. 816 , 91 S.E.2d 642 (1956).

Factors that do not directly affect job suitability. - Where the conditions were that employee would work the day shift, she would be on probation for one year, she could not bid other jobs for one year, and she accept her discharge as a suspension without pay, those conditions were not factors intrinsic to the particular job and thus, while those factors were important to determine whether she had good cause to refuse the offer, they did not affect the determination whether the job was suitable, since factors that do not directly affect a job's suitability but rather are peculiar to the employee and her situation are factors which are appropriately considered as to whether good cause existed to refuse suitable employment. Johnson v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476 (1989).

Fact that the position from which the employee had been discharged remained vacant was not a factor in determining suitability of the offered employment. Johnson v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476 (1989).

Commission erred by failing to address factors extrinsic to the nature of the job and the employee's qualifications which might have justified her refusal of the offer of reemployment since good cause was not limited to a consideration of whether employer offered the job in good faith, and the claimant had the burden to show that good cause existed for her refusal to accept suitable employment. Johnson v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476 (1989).

Employer refusal of employment justified. - Considering the conditions imposed upon the offer of reemployment for discharged employee, the circumstances surrounding her discharge, the rights which she would have to forfeit, and the requirement that she would tacitly admit her misconduct, employee was justified in refusing employer's offer of employment. Johnson v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476 (1989).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Voluntarily leaving work. - Where a claimant refused to alter her personal schedule in response to a change in her work schedule, but instead chose to not report on the date in question, such act was voluntary and thus supported an order denying her unemployment compensation benefits. Kosiek v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 59 Va. Cir. 277, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 378 (Norfolk July 23, 2002).

Virginia Employment Commission decision that a claimant was not entitled to unemployment benefits because the claimant quit the claimant's job voluntarily without good cause pursuant to § 60.2-618 was proper, as the claimant made the understandable decision, as a single parent with no family in Virginia, suffering from multiple sclerosis, to return to Michigan, where the claimant had family. Hagood v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 82 Va. Cir. 273, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 182 (Roanoke Feb. 22, 2011).

Under subdivision 1 of § 60.2-618 , the claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because her challenge to her direct supervisor's request for submission of a leave form after she returned from taking a sick day was not objectively reasonable and did not constitute good cause for voluntarily quitting her employment. Hampton v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 87 Va. Cir. 7, 2013 Va. Cir. LEXIS 37 (Fairfax County May 21, 2013).

Virginia Employment Commission did not err in denying an employee unemployment compensation because its finding that the employee did not voluntarily leave work without cause was supported by the evidence; while the employee walked off the job of her own volition, she did not actually state she was quitting, and she attempted to return to work. Swenson v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 90 Va. Cir. 158, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 27 (Richmond Apr. 7, 2015).

Good cause for leaving work found. - Former employee was not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits, following the employee's release from a hospital after emergency surgery, because the employee's medical emergency and resulting limited physical condition constituted good cause for the employee's voluntarily leaving the employee's employment with the employer, when the employer, after being advised by the employee of the employee's restriction to light duty work, did not offer the employee light duty work. Battle v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 88 Va. Cir. 116, 2014 Va. Cir. LEXIS 72 (Norfolk Mar. 26, 2014).

Good cause for leaving work not found. - As an unemployment benefits claimant failed to investigate his employer's offer to transfer him to another location to determine whether his time and expenses incurred travelling there would be reimbursed, and he elected to be laid off instead, the Virginia Employment Commission properly ruled that the claimant did not carry his burden under subdivision 1 of § 60.2-618 to show that he had good cause to leave his job. Roseberry v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 101 (Fairfax County Sept. 3, 2008).

It appears contrary to the statutory scheme to allow a claimant to qualify for benefits by preempting his imminent termination for past misconduct. Alexander v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 115 (Norfolk July 3, 2018).

Virginia Employment Commission's properly disqualified an employee from receiving unemployment benefits because its decision was based on sufficient evidence that the employee voluntarily terminated his employment without good cause; the employer proved that the employee left his job voluntarily because by voluntarily departing and not returning to work despite the background check not yet having been conducted, the employee's actions constituted an intervening cause of his own unemployment. Alexander v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 115 (Norfolk July 3, 2018).

Virginia Employment Commission's properly disqualified an employee from receiving unemployment benefits because its decision was based on sufficient evidence that the employee voluntarily terminated his employment without good cause; the employee voluntarily left his employment because after he was informed of his future discharge if a background checked revealed he was a convicted felon, he voluntarily departed and did not return to work. Alexander v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 115 (Norfolk July 3, 2018).

Burden of proof as to good cause. - Where there was credible evidence that an employee left employment without good cause as provided in subdivision 1, the employer met its burden of proof; an unemployment examiner properly ruled that the employee was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. Tulloh v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 64 Va. Cir. 469, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 188 (Richmond 2004).

Absenteeism without notice is misconduct. - In an appeal pursuant to § 60.2-625 , an employment commission's denial of a worker's claim for unemployment benefits was upheld; the worker failed to report his absence to the employer, which was disqualifying misconduct pursuant to § 60.2-618 , and the fact that the worker was in jail and unable to make telephone calls did not excuse the failure, as the worker's deliberate act of refusing to take a polygraph test as ordered by a probation officer was the cause of the worker's incarceration. King v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 62 Va. Cir. 222, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 102 (Fairfax County 2003).

Employer bears the burden of proving misconduct. - Virginia Employment Commission's decision that a former employee did qualify for unemployment benefits and was not disqualified under subdivision 2 of § 60.2-618 was affirmed because the findings of fact were insufficient in law to constitute work-related misconduct, and an employer had not borne his burden of showing work-related misconduct by the employee. Brockwell v. Bowman, 78 Va. Cir. 269, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 146 (Prince George County Apr. 10, 2009).

Use of hearsay testimony appropriate. - Denial of unemployment benefits to the employee under subdivision 2 of § 60.2-618 was appropriate because the Virginia Employment Commission appropriately accepted the supervisor's statement under subsection A of § 60.2-623 even though it was hearsay. The decision of how much weight should be accorded hearsay evidence was purely discretionary; there was no allegation of fraud in the case; and the weight and credibility given to the testimony was appropriately reserved to the commission. Levister v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 78 Va. Cir. 361, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 176 (Richmond June 5, 2009).

Failure to promote employer's event. - Employee was not entitled to unemployment benefits pursuant to subdivision 2 of § 60.2-618 because he was terminated for failing to promote a fight night event at his employer, a fitness center, and such promotion was part of his written job description. The employee's contention that the fight was not properly sanctioned was not supported by evidence or authority. Novotny v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 128 (Fairfax County Oct. 4, 2011).

Misconduct found. - Because an employee with a long history of insubordination refused to answer questions from the employer about a disk containing nude images that the employee downloaded from the employer's computer and delivered to a sheriff, and because the employee was assured that the employee was not subject to criminal charges, and because the employee did not place the images on the computer, the employee had no basis to refuse to answer the questions; consequently, the employee was not entitled to unemployment benefits when the employee was terminated for insubordination. County of Nelson v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 68 Va. Cir. 1, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 96 (Nelson County 2005).

Evidence supported a determination that a worker was discharged due to misconduct and was thus not entitled to unemployment benefits; the worker admitted that she knew it was wrong to raise her voice in the call center where she worked and that a prior supervisor had asked her to keep her voice down in the call center. The worker accused her supervisor of harassment during the business hours of a call center and in front of other employees, which conduct was not provoked by her supervisor. Opitz v. Va. Unemployment Comm'n, 72 Va. Cir. 435, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 23 (Fairfax County 2007).

Decision to grant unemployment benefits to former faculty member under subdivision 1 of § 60.2-618 was not supported by the record where his adulterous relationship with a student affected other students and compromised his employer's goals and functions. The faculty member's misconduct was connected with work because it was a conflict of interest to which his employer was subjected. Va. Commonwealth Univ. v. Hsia, 73 Va. Cir. 381, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 211 (Richmond June 27, 2007).

Shoe sales associate was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to subdivision 2 of § 60.2-618 because the associate's dismissal was due to behavior constituting misconduct where in the presence of customers the associate confronted a coworker regarding a commission dispute and used profane language that was racially and sexually demeaning. Nelson v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 78 Va. Cir. 381, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 165 (Norfolk June 16, 2009).

Virginia Unemployment Commission did not err in finding that an employee was ineligible for unemployment compensation under subdivision 2(a) of § 60.2-618 because it properly concluded that the employee was discharged for misconduct due to a recurrent pattern of willful disregard of the interests and duties he owed to the employer; the employee, who was a general manager of a restaurant, failed four restaurant inspections in a short period of time, received written warnings, including one that informed him that his conduct constituted insubordination, and knew that the final two inspections were coming but failed to take sufficient action to pass the inspections. Singh v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2010 Va. Cir. LEXIS 137 (Fairfax Nov. 2, 2010).

Virginia Employment Commission had sufficient evidence to determine that an employee's termination was for willful misconduct, and thus, she was ineligible for unemployment compensation, where the testimony and documentary evidence showed that she had willfully violated the employer's policy prohibiting insubordination, threats, intimidation, disrespect, and assault, and the employee had not proved any mitigating circumstances. Bellamy v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 98 Va. Cir. 198, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 25 (Norfolk Feb. 28, 2018).

Misconduct not found. - Finding that a firefighter was not terminated for misconduct under subdivision 2 of § 60.2-618 for conduct in leaving the scene of an emergency call was proper because there was evidence supporting the commission's finding that the firefighter's action was not willful or deliberate; the firefighter made a judgment, based on the circumstances, that the woman had long since expired, with the police authorities there the scene was covered and protected, and, further, the firefighter was asked to leave by the woman's son-in-law. However, the commission's decision that the city abandoned its claim as to a separate charge had no support in the record, and this charge should have been addressed on its merits. City of Richmond v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 338 (Richmond Mar. 17, 2006).

Petitioner employee's conduct in affirmatively changing her timecard to reflect the actual time that she arrived at her workplace did not amount to disqualifying misconduct under § 60.2-618 ; the actions were not a deliberate violation of company policy or of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of the employer's interest and the duties and the obligations that the employee owed the employer. Depalma v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 72 Va. Cir. 396, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 19 (Fairfax County 2007).

Virginia Employment Commission did not err as a matter of law when it determined that an employee was not discharged for misconduct because it was within its competence to determine that the inattentiveness manifested by the employee was the product of simple negligence, reasonably drawing inferences from the evidence and the facts as the Commission found them. T.E. Gardner Co. v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 89 Va. Cir. 202, 2014 Va. Cir. LEXIS 60 (Roanoke Sept. 15, 2014).

Virginia Employment Commission erred in finding that an employee was discharged for misconduct because the employer averred, argued, and admitted that the employee voluntarily left work, and thus, it could carry its burden to prove that the employee was discharged for misconduct. Swenson v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 90 Va. Cir. 158, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 27 (Richmond Apr. 7, 2015).

Employment Commission erred in disqualifying an employee from receiving unemployment benefits for "misconduct connected with his work" because, while the employee's conduct in falling asleep at work on at least one occasion was "clearly inappropriate," it did not rise to the level of "misconduct" where the employer had no written policy regarding sleeping, the employee's uncontroverted testimony explained that his conduct was caused by recent symptoms of his previously diagnosed sleep apnea, he provided medical documents to the Commission substantiating that he suffered from sleep apnea, and his explanation was corroborated by the fact that, prior to his discharge, he had scheduled a medical appointment to discuss his recent symptoms. Peart v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 103 Va. Cir. 109, 2019 Va. Cir. LEXIS 456 (Campbell County Sept. 16, 2019).

Remand for determination of question of fraud. - Employee's petition for judicial review against a former employer and the Virginia Employment Commission was granted and the unemployment benefits matter was remanded where the appeals examiner contrived the requirement upon which he relied to exclude a doctor's letter claiming responsibility for interlineation, the appeals examiner's erroneous instructions on how the employee was to submit evidence did not support the decision to exclude a second letter from the doctor, and thus, no reasonable mind could have come to the conclusion that the employee had altered the note. Bailey v. Va. Empl. Comm'n & Quest Diagnostics, Inc.,, 2017 Va. Cir. LEXIS 138 (Fairfax County Aug. 18, 2017).

Remand for determination of willful disregard. - Given that the applicable standard for willful disregard under subdivision 2 of § 60.2-618 required a showing of utter or reckless indifference, it was impossible for the Virginia Employment Commission, as a matter of law, to determine whether a lab technician acted with such indifference without knowing the context of her actions. Therefore, a remand was necessary for the Commission to take further evidence and to make additional findings concerning the number of blood and tissue specimens the technician registered from the time she began working at the a central processing department until she was terminated, the complexity and time requirements of the registration process, and any other facts that would have demonstrated her indifference (or lack thereof) to her duties. Laryea v. INOVA, 102 Va. Cir. 277, 2019 Va. Cir. LEXIS 250 (Fairfax County July 1, 2019).

Article 5. Claims Adjudication.

§ 60.2-619. (Effective until July 1, 2022) Determinations and decisions by deputy; appeals therefrom.

    1. A representative designated by the Commission as a deputy, shall promptly examine the claim. On the basis of the facts found by him, the deputy shall either: A. 1.  A representative designated by the Commission as a deputy, shall promptly examine the claim. On the basis of the facts found by him, the deputy shall either:
      1. Determine whether or not such claim is valid, and if valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and the maximum duration thereof; or
      2. Refer such claim or any question involved therein to any appeal tribunal or to the Commission, which tribunal or Commission shall make its determination in accordance with the procedure described in § 60.2-620 .
    2. When the payment or denial of benefits will be determined by the provisions of subdivision 2 of § 60.2-612 , the deputy shall promptly transmit his full finding of fact with respect to that subdivision to any appeal tribunal, which shall make its determination in accordance with the procedure described in § 60.2-620 .
  1. Upon the filing of an initial claim for benefits, the Commission shall cause an informatory notice of such filing to be mailed to the most recent 30-day or 240-hour employing unit of the claimant and all subsequent employing units, and any reimbursable employing units that may be liable for reimbursement to the Commission for any benefits paid. However, the failure to furnish such notice shall not have any effect upon the claim for benefits. If a claimant has had a determination of initial eligibility for benefits under this chapter, as evidenced by the issuance of compensation or waiting-week credit, payments shall continue, subject to a presumption of continued eligibility and in accordance with the terms of this subsection, until a determination is made that provides the claimant notice and an opportunity to be heard. When a question concerning continued eligibility for benefits arises, a determination shall be made as to whether it affects future weeks of benefits or only past weeks. With respect to future weeks, presumptive payment shall not be made until but no later than the end of the week following the week in which such issue arises, regardless of the type of issue. With respect to past weeks, presumptive payment shall be issued immediately, regardless of the type of issue. Notice shall be given to individuals who receive payments under such presumption that pending eligibility may affect their entitlement to the payment and may result in an overpayment that requires repayment.
  2. Notice of determination upon a claim shall be promptly given to the claimant by delivering or by mailing such notice to the claimant's last known address. In addition, notice of any determination that involves the application of the provisions of § 60.2-618 , together with the reasons therefor, shall be promptly given in the same manner to the most recent 30-day or 240-hour employing unit by whom the claimant was last employed and any subsequent employing unit which is a party. The Commission may dispense with the giving of notice of any determination to any employing unit, and such employing unit shall not be entitled to such notice if it has failed to respond timely or adequately to a written request of the Commission for information, as required by § 60.2-528.1 , from which the deputy may have determined that the claimant may be ineligible or disqualified under any provision of this title. The deputy shall promptly notify the claimant of any decision made by him at any time which in any manner denies benefits to the claimant for one or more weeks.
  3. Such determination or decision shall be final unless the claimant or any such employing unit files an appeal from such determination or decision (i) within 30 calendar days after the delivery of such notification, (ii) within 30 calendar days after such notification was mailed to his last known address, or (iii) within 30 days after such notification was mailed to the last known address of an interstate claimant. For good cause shown, the 30-day period may be extended.
  4. Benefits shall be paid promptly in accordance with a determination or redetermination under this chapter, or decision of an appeal tribunal, the Commission, the Board of Review or a reviewing court under §§ 60.2-625 and 60.2-631 upon the issuance of such determination, redetermination or decision, regardless of the pendency of the period to file an appeal or petition for judicial review that is provided in this chapter, or the pendency of any such appeal or review. Such benefits shall be paid unless or until such determination, redetermination or decision has been modified or reversed by a subsequent redetermination or decision, in which event benefits shall be paid or denied for weeks of unemployment thereafter in accordance with such modifying or reversing redetermination or decision. If a decision of an appeal tribunal allowing benefits is affirmed in any amount by the Commission, benefits shall continue to be paid until such time as a court decision has become final so that no further appeal can be taken. If an appeal is taken from the Commission's decision, benefits paid shall result in a benefit charge to the account of the employer under § 60.2-530 only when, and as of the date on which, as the result of an appeal, the courts finally determine that the Commission should have awarded benefits to the claimant or claimants involved in such appeal. (Code 1950, § 60-49; 1954, c. 203; 1966, c. 30; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-61; 1970, c. 104; 1972, c. 692; 1974, c. 466; 1976, c. 708; 1980, cc. 408, 426; 1982, c. 363; 1986, c. 480; 1995, c. 515; 1997, c. 202; 1999, c. 79; 2013, c. 771; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until July 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective July 1, 2022, see the following section also numbered § 60.2-619 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, cl. 2 provides: "That the Virginia Employment Commission (the Commission) shall notify each person with an unpaid overpayment of benefits established for claim weeks paid commencing March 15, 2020, under Chapter 6 ( § 60.2-600 et seq.) of Title 60.2 of the Code of Virginia, or under an unemployment benefit program of the United States or any other state, that such individual may be entitled to a waiver of obligation to repay such overpayment and shall provide 30 days from the date of such notification for the individual to request a waiver of repayment. For good cause shown, the Commission may extend the 30-day period for requesting a waiver. The Commission shall conduct an individualized review and adjudicate any request received in accordance with the provisions of § 60.2-619 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, and any individual who is denied a waiver shall have the right to appeal as provided in subsection D of § 60.2-619 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act. In ruling on any waiver request, the Commission shall apply the provisions of Title 60.2 or, if applicable, the overpayment waiver provisions of any unemployment compensation program of the United States."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act that allow the waiver of any obligation to repay overpayments established for the week commencing March 15, 2020, through the week commencing June 27, 2021, shall apply only to overpayment balances that remain outstanding. Amounts already paid or collected against such overpayments shall not be reimbursed to the claimant, except for benefits paid under the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, cl. 4 provides: "That notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, the Virginia Employment Commission may suspend or forgo referring any overpayment established since March 15, 2020, to the collections process established under § 2.2-4806 of the Code of Virginia. However, the authority to suspend or forgo such referrals shall expire on July 1, 2022."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, cl. 5 provides: "That all costs to the Unemployment Compensation Fund (the Fund) resulting from the provisions of this act for overpayments of benefits under Chapter 6 ( § 60.2-600 et seq.) of Title 60.2 of the Code of Virginia shall be reimbursed to the Fund from the general fund in the general appropriation act. For an overpayment waived pursuant to this act, no employer shall be responsible for (i) reimbursing benefits or (ii) benefits charges, except as provided in § 60.2-528.1 of the Code of Virginia."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on July 1, 2022."

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 771 substituted "respond timely or adequately to a written request of the Commission for information, as required by § 60.2-528.1 , from which the deputy may have determined" for "indicate prior to the determination, as required by regulation promulgated by the Commission" in the third sentence of subsection C, and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, effective July 1, 2021, added the third through seventh sentences in subsection B; and made stylistic changes. For expiration date, see Editor's note.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 10.

CASE NOTES

The pretermination and post-termination procedures under this section satisfy the due process mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. Klimko v. VEC, 216 Va. 750 , 222 S.E.2d 559, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 849, 97 S. Ct. 136, 50 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1976) (decided under prior law).

Different treatment under this section and § 60.2-633 constitutional. - Persons who fall under this section are in a different situation than those under § 60.2-633 . Because they are in different situations, the Commission may treat them differently. This does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The Commission treats all people who are under this section alike. The Commission also treats all people who are under § 60.2-633 alike. Brewer v. Cantrell, 622 F. Supp. 1320 (W.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1986) (decided under prior law).

Intrinsic fraud. - If the Commission's decision was procured by intrinsic fraud, its decision is voidable until it becomes final. Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602 , 299 S.E.2d 504 (1983) (decided under prior law).

Extrinsic fraud. - If the Commission's decision was procured by extrinsic fraud, then its decision is void, the claim must be considered ab initio, and a new decision must be rendered. Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602 , 299 S.E.2d 504 (1983) (decided under prior law).

Promptness requirement. - Promptness requirement of the statute is mandatory for the Virginia Employment Commission; therefore, in a case involving unemployment compensation, the "promptness requirement" language prevented the Virginia Employment Commission from deciding that a claimant had to repay unemployment compensation more than two years after receiving it. An untimely determination that she was ineligible and required to repay the unemployment compensation was incorrect and unenforceable. Va. Empl. Comm'n v. Cole, No. 1268-15-2, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 104 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 5, 2016).

Appeal summarily dismissed. - Where none of the issues raised by an employee in his unemployment compensation matter related to the rulings by the Employment Commission and the trial court regarding failure to timely file his appeal of the appeals examiner's decision to the Commission and failure to show good cause as to why the 30-day period might be extended in his case, his appeal was summarily dismissed; moreover, endorsing a decree as "seen and objected to" did not preserve an issue for appeal where the record further revealed that the issues were properly raised for consideration by the trial court. Jones v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 0362-04-4, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 571 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 23, 2004).

Standing. - Subsequent employer for whom an employee worked for one day after being laid off from a prior employer had standing to appeal an award of unemployment compensation to the employee, even though the subsequent employer was not financially liable for the employee's benefits, because the subsequent employer was a "subsequent employing unit," under subsection C of § 60.2-619 and 16 VAC § 5-80-10, as the subsequent employer received notice of the employee's claim, participated in administrative proceedings, received notice of a deputy's decision, and timely appealed that decision. Offield v. Virginia Empl. Comm'n, No. 2133-08-1, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 309 (July 14, 2009).

Subsequent employer for whom an employee worked for one day after being laid off from a prior employer had standing to appeal an award of unemployment compensation to the employee, even though the subsequent employer was not financially liable for the employee's benefits, because the issue before a deputy was the nature of the employee's voluntary resignation from the employee's job with the subsequent employer, concerning which the employee and the subsequent employer had adverse positions, and the subsequent employer's interest in that issue showed a subsequent employing unit did not have to have a pecuniary interest in a claim to be a party. Offield v. Virginia Empl. Comm'n, No. 2133-08-1, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 309 (July 14, 2009).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Diligence required in addition to good cause for extension of time to note appeal. - In order to show good cause for an extension of time to note an appeal an appellant must show not only that uncontrollable, necessitous, and compelling circumstances prevented filing an appeal within the enunciated statutory time limit, but also that the appellant acted with diligence, under whatever circumstances existed, in noting the appeal. Tindall v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 66 Va. Cir. 125, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 344 (Richmond Oct. 20, 2004).

Employer's lack of diligence in noting appeal meant extension of time was erroneously granted. - Where employer knew that claims deputy awarded unemployment benefits, yet waited 14 days before sending a letter stating that it did not receive a copy of the determination, then did not follow up the letter for 34 days when it received a copy of the deputy's determination, and then waited another three weeks before filling a notice of appeal, the employer did not demonstrate good cause for the delay or diligence in noting the appeal, both of which were required for an extension of time. An appeals examiner improperly granted the employer an extension after a 71-day delay in filing the notice and, even though the examiner affirmed the award, the Virginia Employment Commission's reversal of that award was invalid since the employer's initial appeal from the deputy was untimely. Tindall v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 66 Va. Cir. 125, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 344 (Richmond Oct. 20, 2004).

§ 60.2-619. (Effective July 1, 2022) Determinations and decisions by deputy; appeals therefrom.

    1. A representative designated by the Commission as a deputy, shall promptly examine the claim. On the basis of the facts found by him, the deputy shall either: A. 1.  A representative designated by the Commission as a deputy, shall promptly examine the claim. On the basis of the facts found by him, the deputy shall either:
      1. Determine whether or not such claim is valid, and if valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and the maximum duration thereof; or
      2. Refer such claim or any question involved therein to any appeal tribunal or to the Commission, which tribunal or Commission shall make its determination in accordance with the procedure described in § 60.2-620 .
    2. When the payment or denial of benefits will be determined by the provisions of subdivision 2 of § 60.2-612 , the deputy shall promptly transmit his full finding of fact with respect to that subdivision to any appeal tribunal, which shall make its determination in accordance with the procedure described in § 60.2-620 .
  1. Upon the filing of an initial claim for benefits, the Commission shall cause an informatory notice of such filing to be mailed to the most recent 30-day or 240-hour employing unit of the claimant and all subsequent employing units, and any reimbursable employing units which may be liable for reimbursement to the Commission for any benefits paid. However, the failure to furnish such notice shall not have any effect upon the claim for benefits.
  2. Notice of determination upon a claim shall be promptly given to the claimant by delivering or by mailing such notice to the claimant's last known address. In addition, notice of any determination which involves the application of the provisions of § 60.2-618 , together with the reasons therefor, shall be promptly given in the same manner to the most recent 30-day or 240-hour employing unit by whom the claimant was last employed and any subsequent employing unit which is a party. The Commission may dispense with the giving of notice of any determination to any employing unit, and such employing unit shall not be entitled to such notice if it has failed to respond timely or adequately to a written request of the Commission for information, as required by § 60.2-528.1 , from which the deputy may have determined that the claimant may be ineligible or disqualified under any provision of this title. The deputy shall promptly notify the claimant of any decision made by him at any time which in any manner denies benefits to the claimant for one or more weeks.
  3. Such determination or decision shall be final unless the claimant or any such employing unit files an appeal from such determination or decision (i) within 30 calendar days after the delivery of such notification, (ii) within 30 calendar days after such notification was mailed to his last known address, or (iii) within 30 days after such notification was mailed to the last known address of an interstate claimant. For good cause shown, the 30-day period may be extended.
  4. Benefits shall be paid promptly in accordance with a determination or redetermination under this chapter, or decision of an appeal tribunal, the Commission, the Board of Review or a reviewing court under §§ 60.2-625 and 60.2-631 upon the issuance of such determination, redetermination or decision, regardless of the pendency of the period to file an appeal or petition for judicial review that is provided in this chapter, or the pendency of any such appeal or review. Such benefits shall be paid unless or until such determination, redetermination or decision has been modified or reversed by a subsequent redetermination or decision, in which event benefits shall be paid or denied for weeks of unemployment thereafter in accordance with such modifying or reversing redetermination or decision. If a decision of an appeal tribunal allowing benefits is affirmed in any amount by the Commission, benefits shall continue to be paid until such time as a court decision has become final so that no further appeal can be taken. If an appeal is taken from the Commission's decision, benefits paid shall result in a benefit charge to the account of the employer under § 60.2-530 only when, and as of the date on which, as the result of an appeal, the courts finally determine that the Commission should have awarded benefits to the claimant or claimants involved in such appeal. (Code 1950, § 60-49; 1954, c. 203; 1966, c. 30; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-61; 1970, c. 104; 1972, c. 692; 1974, c. 466; 1976, c. 708; 1980, cc. 408, 426; 1982, c. 363; 1986, c. 480; 1995, c. 515; 1997, c. 202; 1999, c. 79; 2013, c. 771.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective July 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until July 1, 2022, see the preceding section also numbered § 60.2-619 .

§ 60.2-620. Hearing and decision on appeal.

  1. Appeals filed under § 60.2-619 shall be heard by an appeal tribunal appointed pursuant to § 60.2-621 . Such appeal tribunal, after affording the claimant and any other parties reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing, shall have jurisdiction to consider all issues with respect to the claim since the initial filing thereof. Such tribunal shall affirm, set aside, reverse, modify, or alter the findings of fact and decision of the deputy, and may enter such order or decision with respect to the claim as such appeal tribunal finds should have been entered. However, no such order or decision shall affect benefits already paid except in accordance with the provisions of § 60.2-633 .
  2. The parties shall be duly notified of such tribunal's decision, together with its reasons therefor, which shall be deemed to be the final decision of the Commission, unless within thirty days after the date of notification or mailing of such decision, further appeal is initiated pursuant to § 60.2-622 . However, for good cause shown the thirty-day period may be extended. (Code 1950, § 60-50; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-62; 1976, c. 708; 1980, c. 426; 1986, c. 480; 1995, c. 515; 1999, c. 79.)

CASE NOTES

The pretermination and post-termination procedures under this section satisfy the due process mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. Klimko v. VEC, 216 Va. 750 , 222 S.E.2d 559, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 849, 97 S. Ct. 136, 50 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1976) (decided under prior law).

No requirement that notice be provided by registered mail or personal service. - There is no statutory or regulatory requirement that notice of hearing must be provided by registered mail or personal service. Agnew v. Baker Roofing Co., No. 1004-97-2, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 82 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 10, 1998).

Appeal summarily dismissed. - Where none of the issues raised by an employee in his unemployment compensation matter related to the rulings by the Employment Commission and the trial court regarding failure to timely file his appeal of the appeals examiner's decision to the Commission and failure to show good cause as to why the 30-day period might be extended in his case, his appeal was summarily dismissed; moreover, endorsing a decree as "seen and objected to" did not preserve an issue for appeal where the record further revealed that the issues were properly raised for consideration by the trial court. Jones v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 0362-04-4, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 571 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 23, 2004).

§ 60.2-621. Appeal tribunals.

In order to hear and decide disputed claims expeditiously, the Commissioner shall establish one or more impartial appeal tribunals consisting in each case of either (i) a salaried examiner or (ii) a tribunal consisting of three members, one of whom shall be a salaried examiner, who shall serve as chairman, one of whom shall be a representative of employers and the other of whom shall be a representative of employees. Each of the latter two members of the tribunal in (ii) of this section shall serve at the pleasure of the Commissioner and be paid a fee of not more than ten dollars per day of active service on such tribunal plus necessary expenses. No person shall participate on behalf of the Commission in any case in which he is an interested party. The Commissioner may designate alternates to serve in the absence or disqualification of any member of an appeal tribunal. The chairman shall act alone in the absence or disqualification of any other member and his alternates. In no case shall the hearings proceed unless the chairman of the appeal tribunal is present.

(Code 1950, § 60-51; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-63; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-622. Commission review.

  1. The Commission (i) may on its own motion affirm, modify, or set aside any decision of an appeal tribunal on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in such case, or direct the taking of additional evidence by an appeal tribunal, or receive such evidence itself, or (ii) shall permit any of the parties to such decision to initiate further appeals before it. The Commission may remove to itself or transfer to another appeal tribunal the proceedings on any claim pending before an appeal tribunal. Any proceeding so removed to the Commission shall be heard in accordance with the requirements of § 60.2-620 . The Commission shall promptly notify the interested parties of its findings and decision.
    1. Any decision of the Commission, upon a hearing on appeal, shall become final 10 days after the date of notification or mailing, and judicial review shall be permitted the claimant or any interested party claiming to be aggrieved. The Commission shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action involving any such decision, and shall be represented in any such judicial action by the Office of the Attorney General. B. 1.  Any decision of the Commission, upon a hearing on appeal, shall become final 10 days after the date of notification or mailing, and judicial review shall be permitted the claimant or any interested party claiming to be aggrieved. The Commission shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action involving any such decision, and shall be represented in any such judicial action by the Office of the Attorney General.
    2. Any such decision by the Commission involving (i) whether an employing unit constitutes an employer or (ii) whether services performed for or in connection with business of an employing unit constitute employment for such employing unit, from which no judicial review is had pursuant to subsections C and D of § 60.2-500 , shall be conclusive in any subsequent judicial proceedings involving liability for taxes by the Commission against any employing unit which was a party to the proceedings held before the Commission.
  2. The Commissioner shall have the power to designate a special examiner to hear appeals to the Commission under this section. The Commissioner may authorize and empower such special examiner to decide any appeal so heard, in which event the decision of the special examiner shall be the final decision of the Commission under this section, subject to judicial review under § 60.2-625 . (Code 1950, § 60-52; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-64; 1977, c. 445; 1986, c. 480; 1995, c. 515; 1996, c. 106; 2005, cc. 47, 91.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendments by cc. 47 and 91, effective March 20, 2005, are identical and in subdivision B 2, substituted "subsections C and D" for "subsection B."

Research References. - Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure (Matthew Bender). Chapter 2 Potential Jurisdiction. § 2.03 Courts. Bryson.

CASE NOTES

"Notification" does not mean receipt of the mailing. G.S. Foods, Inc. v. VEC, 12 Va. App. 541, 404 S.E.2d 741 (1991).

Plaintiff's failure to name the VEC in the caption of her petition did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction since subdivision (B)(1) deems the commission a party to any appeal. Sink v. American Furn. Co., No. 1160-88-3, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 165 (Ct. of Appeals Aug. 29, 1989).

De novo review. - Because the statute governing the Virginia Employment Commission's review of an appeals examiner's decision provides that the Commission may receive additional evidence itself, subsection A of § 60.2-622 , thereby permitting de novo review, just as in matters before the Workers' Compensation Commission, the Employment Commission is not bound by the appeals examiner's prior findings on questions of witness credibility; the Commission must explain any credibility determinations it makes that are contrary to the appeals examiner's only if the appeals examiner made an explicit finding of credibility based upon a witness' demeanor or appearance at the hearing, and absent a specific, recorded observation by the appeals examiner regarding the behavior, demeanor or appearance of a particular witness, the Commission has no duty to explain its reasons for finding that witness more credible than another. McNamara v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 54 Va. App. 616, 681 S.E.2d 67, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 364 (2009).

§ 60.2-623. Procedure generally; confidentiality of information.

  1. The manner in which disputed claims shall be presented, reports required from the claimant and from employers, the conduct of hearings and appeals before any deputy, appeal tribunal or the Commission, and transcripts prepared shall be in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission for determining the rights of the parties. Such regulations need not conform to common law or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure. A full and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings in connection with a disputed claim. All testimony at any hearing upon a disputed claim shall be recorded, but need not be transcribed unless the disputed claim is further appealed and a timely request for a hearing before the Commission has been made in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission. In lieu of providing a transcript, and with the consent of all parties who participated in the hearing, the Commission may provide a digital or other electronic recording of the testimony taken at any hearing, which recording may be transmitted in any medium provided that the recording is protected from unauthorized interception by reasonable security measures.
  2. Information furnished the Commission under the provisions of this chapter shall not be published or be open to public inspection, other than to public employees in the performance of their public duties. Neither such information, nor any determination or decision rendered under the provisions of § 60.2-619 , 60.2-620 or 60.2-622 , shall be used in any judicial or administrative proceeding other than one arising out of the provisions of this title; however, the Commission shall make its records about a claimant available to the Workers' Compensation Commission if it requests such records. The Commission may also, in its discretion, furnish copies of the transcript of hearings to any party.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection B, the Commission shall, on a reimbursable basis, furnish wage and unemployment compensation information contained in its records to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and Virginia's child support enforcement agency for their use as necessary for the purposes of the National Directory of New Hires established under § 453 (i) of the Social Security Act.
  4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection B, the Commission shall, upon written request, furnish any agency or political subdivision of the Commonwealth such information as it may require for the purpose of collecting fines, penalties, and costs owed to the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions. Such information shall not be published or used in any administrative or judicial proceeding, except in matters arising out of the collection of fines, penalties, and costs owed to the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions.

    (Code 1950, § 60-53; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-65; 1972, c. 764; 1986, c. 480; 1988, c. 766; 1994, c. 203; 1996, cc. 108, 130; 1997, c. 385; 1998, cc. 91, 745; 2012, c. 50.)

Editor's note. - Section 453(i) of the Social Security Act, referred to in subsection C, is codified as 42 U.S.C.S. § 653(i).

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 50 added the last sentence of subsection A and made minor stylistic changes.

Law review. - For a review of administrative procedure in Virginia for year 1999, see 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 727 (1999).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 7B M.J. Evidence, § 221; 12A M.J. Libel and Slander, § 12; 19 M.J. Unemployment Compensation, § 7.

CASE NOTES

The pretermination and post-termination procedures under this section satisfy the due process mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. Klimko v. VEC, 216 Va. 750 , 222 S.E.2d 559, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 849, 97 S. Ct. 136, 50 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1976) (decided under prior law).

Applicability of evidentiary rule shifting burden. - The evidentiary rule shifting the burden of going forward with the evidence to the opposing party upon establishment of a prima facie case by the party with the burden of proof applies in quasijudicial administrative proceedings before the Virginia Employment Commission. Whitt v. Ervin B. Davis & Co., 20 Va. App. 432, 457 S.E.2d 779 (1995).

Intrinsic fraud. - If the Commission's decision was procured by intrinsic fraud, its decision is voidable until it becomes final.(decided under prior law) Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602 , 299 S.E.2d 504 (1983).

Extrinsic fraud. - If the Commission's decision was procured by extrinsic fraud, then its decision is void, the claim must be considered ab initio, and a new decision must be rendered.(decided under prior law) Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602 , 299 S.E.2d 504 (1983).

Hearsay evidence is admissible in VEC proceedings. - Baker v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 11 Va. App. 419, 399 S.E.2d 630 (1990).

Absolute privilege. - Supreme Court held that subsection B of § 60.2-623 grants absolute privilege to statements made during proceedings before the Virginia Employment Commission. Bryant-Shannon v. Hampton Rds. Cmty. Action Program, Inc., 856 S.E.2d 575, 2021 Va. LEXIS 34 (Apr. 8, 2021).

Use of VEC reports to support defamation claim prohibited. - Former employee was prohibited, under § 60.2-623 , from using two reports submitted by his former employer to the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC) to support his defamation claim; there was no evidence that the reports were published to anyone other than the VEC and the employer. Moore v. PYA Monarch, LLC, 238 F. Supp. 2d 724, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25171 (E.D. Va. 2002).

Individual was prohibited from using reports submitted to the Virginia Employment Commission to support his claim for defamation because such reports were privileged. Shabazz v. PYA Monarch, LLC, 271 F. Supp. 2d 797, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12501 (E.D. Va. 2003).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Hearsay evidence admissible. - Denial of unemployment benefits to the employee under subdivision 2 of § 60.2-618 was appropriate because the Virginia Employment Commission appropriately accepted the supervisor's statement under subsection A of § 60.2-623 even though it was hearsay. The decision of how much weight should be accorded hearsay evidence was purely discretionary; there was no allegation of fraud in the case; and the weight and credibility given to the testimony was appropriately reserved to the commission. Levister v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 78 Va. Cir. 361, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 176 (Richmond June 5, 2009).

Hearsay evidence was admissible in an unemployment compensation hearing where the employer's statement concerning discharge included information about the claimant's use of profane language that was racially and sexually demeaning. The supporting evidence in the record was not solely hearsay in nature and there was sufficient nonhearsay evidence available in the record to verify information from the hearsay evidence. Nelson v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 78 Va. Cir. 381, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 165 (Norfolk June 16, 2009).

§ 60.2-623.1. Party's recording of hearing.

  1. Any party to a compensation hearing of the Virginia Employment Commission may employ the use of a court reporter to record for transcription the proceeding, provided it is done at the party's own expense.
  2. In the event the Commission's transcript of the proceeding is lost, damaged, or parts are missing, a transcript existing as a result of subsection A of this section may be used in addition to any full or partial Commission transcript.

    (1986, c. 129, § 60.1-65.1.)

Editor's note. - This section was enacted as § 60.1-65.1. Pursuant to § 30-152, this section has been incorporated into Title 60.2 as § 60.2-623.1 .

§ 60.2-624. Witness expenses.

Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to this chapter shall be allowed expenses at a rate fixed by the Commission. Such expenses shall be deemed a part of the expense of administering this title.

(Code 1950, § 60-54; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-66; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-625. Judicial review.

  1. Within thirty days after the decision of the Commission upon a hearing pursuant to § 60.2-622 has been mailed, any party aggrieved who seeks judicial review shall commence an action in the circuit court of the county or city in which the individual who filed the claim was last employed. In such action against the Commission, the Commission and any other party to the administrative procedures before the Commission shall be named a defendant in a petition for judicial review. Such petition shall also state the grounds upon which a review is sought; it shall be served upon a member of the Commission or upon such person as the Commission may designate, and such service shall be deemed completed service on all parties. There shall be left with the party so served as many copies of the petition as there are defendants, and the Commission shall forthwith mail one such copy to each such defendant. With its answer, the Commission shall certify and file with the court all documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the matter, together with its findings of fact and decision therein. In any judicial proceedings under this chapter, the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law. Such actions and the questions so certified shall be heard in a summary manner at the earliest possible date. An appeal may be taken from the decision of the court to the Court of Appeals in conformity with Part Five A of the Rules of Supreme Court and other applicable laws.
  2. From any circuit court decision involving (i) the provisions of § 60.2-612 or § 60.2-618 , (ii) whether an employing unit constitutes an employer or (iii) whether services performed for or in connection with the business of an employing unit constitute employment for such employing unit, the Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction to review such decision regardless of the amount involved in any claim for benefits. It shall not be necessary, in any proceeding under this chapter, to enter exceptions to the rulings of the Commission or an appeal tribunal, and no bond shall be required upon an appeal to any court. Upon the final determination of such judicial proceeding, the Commission shall administer the Unemployment Compensation Fund in accordance with such determination.
  3. The Commission shall have the right to appeal a decision of a circuit court in any proceeding under this chapter.

    (1980, c. 463, § 60.1-67.1; 1982, c. 24; 1984, c. 703; 1986, c. 480; 1987, c. 567; 1988, c. 766; 1996, c. 573.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1996, c. 573, cl. 2, provides: "[t]hat the provisions of this act shall not apply to any agency action or the review of any agency action commenced prior to July 1, 1996."

Law review. - For a review of administrative procedure in Virginia for year 1999, see 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 727 (1999).

For 2003/2004 survey of state labor and employment law, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 285 (2004).

Research References. - Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure (Matthew Bender). Chapter 2 Potential Jurisdiction. § /v 2.03 Courts. Bryson.

Friend's Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 37 Appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia. § 37.26 Other Appeals. Friend.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

In general. - In undertaking judicial review of a commission decision pursuant to subsection A, the courts must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding by the Commission. VEC v. Fitzgerald, 19 Va. App. 491, 452 S.E.2d 692 (1995).

Venue is where claimant was last employed. - The proper venue for judicial review under this section is in the court of record where claimant was last employed in this State. VEC v. Coleman, 204 Va. 18 , 129 S.E.2d 6 (1963) (decided prior to 1987 amendment).

In this State. - The phrase "was last employed," formerly contained in this section, means "was last employed in this State." VEC v. Coleman, 204 Va. 18 , 129 S.E.2d 6 (1963) (decided prior to 1987 amendment).

Objection based on last place of employment cannot be raised after decision. - An objection to the jurisdiction of the reviewing court on grounds that claimant was not last employed in that county or city is a venue objection and therefore cannot be raised for the first time after the court has decided the case. VEC v. Coleman, 204 Va. 18 , 129 S.E.2d 6 (1963) (decided prior to 1987 amendment).

Lack of evidence in record to support Commission's findings. - This section does not preclude review when no evidence in the record supports the Commission's findings of fact. Flowers v. VEC, No. 0778-90-3 (Ct. of Appeals Oct. 22, 1991).

Finding that the employee was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under subdivision 2 of § 60.2-618 because she was discharged from her employment due to misconduct was inappropriate because it relied on conduct without finding that she deliberately violated a company rule reasonably designed to protect legitimate business interests of her employer or engaged in acts or omissions of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of those interests and the duties and obligations she owed employer. Hall v. Va. Empl. Comm'n & Process Mgmt. Techs., Inc., No. 1876-12-3, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 187 (Ct. of Appeals June 18, 2013).

This section merely sets forth proper venue for petitions for judicial review of a decision of the State Employment Commission, and dismissal was an inappropriate remedy for failure to file in the proper forum. Downs v. VEC, 4 Va. App. 454, 358 S.E.2d 737 (1987).

The General Assembly has enacted procedural requirements which are clear and unambiguous; because this section is unequivocal, it must be followed exactly. Miller v. VEC, No. 0923-90-4, 1991 Va. App. LEXIS 333 (Ct. of Appeals May 7, 1991).

Compliance with requirement that other parties be joined as defendants is mandatory. - Compliance with the requirements of this section that other parties to the administrative proceedings be joined as defendants is mandatory to confer jurisdiction. Miller v. VEC, No. 0923-90-4, 1991 Va. App. LEXIS 333 (Ct. of Appeals May 7, 1991).

Filing period was jurisdictional. - The circuit court was correct when it concluded that the filing period was jurisdictional, and thus, it did not have the authority or ability to extend the period. G.S. Foods, Inc. v. VEC, 12 Va. App. 541, 404 S.E.2d 741 (1991).

No right to amend petition after expiration of appeal period. - This section does not provide for amending a petition after the appeal period has expired and does not expressly incorporate Rule 1:8, which is a rule of general civil procedure; since granting permission to amend a pleading outside the statutory appeal period is not an implicit right of an appellate tribunal, a trial court did not commit error in refusing to permit such an amendment. Garland v. Virginia Empl. Comm'n, No. 0433-00-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 585 (Ct. of Appeals Aug. 8, 2000).

Jurisdictional amount. - Under this section the Supreme Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commission pertaining to benefit claims regardless of the amount involved. VEC v. Coleman, 204 Va. 18 , 129 S.E.2d 6 (1963).

Issues of suitability of work and good cause are mixed questions of law and fact reviewable by the appellate court on appeal. Johnson v. VEC, 8 Va. App. 441, 382 S.E.2d 476 (1989).

Intrinsic fraud. - If the Commission's decision was procured by intrinsic fraud, its decision is voidable until it becomes final. Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602 , 299 S.E.2d 504 (1983).

Extrinsic fraud. - If the Commission's decision was procured by extrinsic fraud, then its decision is void, the claim must be considered ab initio, and a new decision must be rendered. Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602 , 299 S.E.2d 504 (1983).

Extrinsic fraud is conduct which prevents a fair submission of the controversy to the court. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., Inc. v. VEC, 24 Va. App. 377, 482 S.E.2d 841 (1997).

Scope of review of questions of fraud. - Under this section, circuit courts have original jurisdiction over questions of fraud allegedly committed by a member or agent of the Commission, but with respect to questions of fraud allegedly committed by an employer or an employee, their jurisdiction is limited to appellate review of the record of the administrative proceedings. Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602 , 299 S.E.2d 504 (1983).

Commission responsibility as factfinder. - As the factfinder, the commission is charged with the responsibility of resolving questions of credibility and of controverted facts, and the commission must also determine whether the employee's evidence sufficiently mitigates the violation or behavior so as to avoid disqualification because of misconduct. VEC v. Gantt, 7 Va. App. 631, 376 S.E.2d 808 (1989).

Commission's findings of fact conclusive. - A suit to recover payroll taxes brought under § 60.2-521 is not a "court review" of a decision of the Commission, in which the latter's findings of fact are conclusive, as provided in this section. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202 , 18 S.E.2d 390 (1942).

The Commission's findings of fact, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, are made conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the circuit courts is confined to questions of law. VEC v. City of Virginia Beach, 222 Va. 728 , 284 S.E.2d 595 (1981).

On review of a decision of the Virginia Employment Commission, Court of Appeals must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings of fact, which are conclusive if support by evidence and in the absence of fraud. Bell Atlantic Network Servs. v. VEC, 16 Va. App. 741, 433 S.E.2d 30 (1993).

Because the finding of no sexual harassment was supported by evidence in the record, it was binding on the Court of Appeals. Pizzino v. J. Dillard Hutchens Corp., No. 2958-95-3, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 604 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 17, 1996).

Because the Virginia Unemployment Commission's findings of fact, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, are made conclusive by subsection A, and the jurisdiction of the circuit courts is confined to questions of law, a circuit court erred in making its own "findings of fact," thereby deviating from its jurisdiction. Va. Empl. Comm'n v. Hill, No. 1436-03-3, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 210 (Ct. of Appeals May 4, 2004).

Factual findings by the Virginia Employment Commission in an unemployment benefits case were conclusive that an attorney claimant was not entitled to benefits because he failed to advise the D.C. Bar that his Virginia law license had been revoked, which constituted misconduct associated with his employment, and he failed to demonstrate the existence of any mitigating circumstances. Rodriguez v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, No. 0291-09-4, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 425 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 29, 2009).

Where an employee was properly denied benefits, since she was terminated for violating a workplace rule prohibiting certain purchases through a payroll deduction, and the rule served legitimate employer interests, a circuit court erred as a matter of law in reversing this decision because under subsection A of § 60.2-625 , the Commission's factual findings were binding on review since they were supported by evidence and there was no showing of fraud. Va. Empl. Comm'n v. Trent, 55 Va. App. 560, 687 S.E.2d 99, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 2 (2010).

Power of court to remand cause to Commission. - This section does not expressly empower a reviewing court to remand a cause to the Commission. But absent a specific mandate to the contrary, a statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction necessarily implies such a power. Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602 , 299 S.E.2d 504 (1983); Hoyle v. VEC, 24 Va. App. 533, 484 S.E.2d 132 (1997).

Remand for determination of question of fraud. - While a trial court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate de novo any question of fraud on the part of the employer, intrinsic or extrinsic, it has jurisdiction implicit in this section to remand the cause to the Commission for determination of the issue raised by claimant. Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602 , 299 S.E.2d 504 (1983).

When a party aggrieved by a decision of the Commission alleges in his petition for review that the decision was procured by extrinsic fraud committed by the successful party and submits with the petition a proffer of proof, verified by affidavits of witnesses, the circuit court shall remand the cause to the Commission for a hearing on the issue if, upon review of the proffer and argument by counsel, the court finds the proffer sufficient as a matter of law to establish a prima facie case of such fraud. Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602 , 299 S.E.2d 504 (1983).

Burden of proof applicable to an appeal from a circuit court decision upholding the Commission's determination that claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause is clearly defined in this section, and does not require a finding that the evidence was "substantial" for the reviewing court to uphold the findings of the Commission. Robinson v. VEC, No. 1114-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 3, 1986).

Findings supported by the evidence. - Trial court properly upheld the Virginia Employment Commission's order denying an employee unemployment benefits because the Commission's decision that the employee voluntarily quit his job without good cause was supported by the evidence; the employee did not reasonably try to resolve his dispute with his employer before he resigned; and he resigned right after receiving a notice of a proposed five-day suspension without pay. Borden v. Va. Empl. Comm'n & Fairfax Cnty., No. 1406-16-4, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 123 (May 9, 2017).

Employer has burden to show employee disqualified from benefits. - The commission has long held that the employer must show that the employee left work voluntarily, and the commission's determination that the employer assumes the risk of nonpersuasion in this regard is a reasonable construction of the statute. Shuler v. VEC, 9 Va. App. 147, 384 S.E.2d 122 (1989).

Trial court applied proper standard of review. - The record did not support plaintiff's contention that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review by considering the commission's decision a finding of fact and according it conclusiveness under subsection A of this section where the trial court recited the factual findings of the commission and noted the deference required to be given those findings, then in light of those findings, it rendered a decision under the applicable rule of law. Whitt v. Race Fork Coal Corp., 18 Va. App. 71, 441 S.E.2d 357 (1994).

Applied in Baker v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 11 Va. App. 419, 399 S.E.2d 630 (1990); McNamara v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 54 Va. App. 616, 681 S.E.2d 67, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 364 (2009).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Commission's findings of fact conclusive. - Virginia Employment Commission's finding that an employee's version of an encounter with his employer, after which the employee left his employment, evolved, progressing from an incident in which the employer was very angry to an incident in which the employer was in a "towering rage," and the employee felt physically threatened, was supported by the record and conclusive, and the Commission could choose to believe the employee's earliest version of the incident, which did not show that the employee left his employment with good cause. Mills v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 61 Va. Cir. 443, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 45 (Spotsylvania County 2003).

Because the existence of good cause was a mixed question of law and fact, a circuit court found that it had the authority to review additional facts in the record, other than those recited in the Virginia Employment Commission's decision, because the Commission's factual recitations did not shed any light on the question of whether an employer had light duty work to offer an employee when the employee returned from emergency surgery. Battle v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 88 Va. Cir. 116, 2014 Va. Cir. LEXIS 72 (Norfolk Mar. 26, 2014).

Commission's finding supported by the evidence. - Virginia Employment Commission did not err in denying an employee unemployment compensation because its finding that the employee did not voluntarily leave work without cause was supported by the evidence; while the employee walked off the job of her own volition, she did not actually state she was quitting, and she attempted to return to work. Swenson v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 90 Va. Cir. 158, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 27 (Richmond Apr. 7, 2015).

Virginia Employment Commission had sufficient evidence to determine that an employee's termination was for willful misconduct, and thus, she was ineligible for unemployment compensation, where the testimony and documentary evidence showed that she had willfully violated the employer's policy prohibiting insubordination, threats, intimidation, disrespect, and assault, and the employee had not proved any mitigating circumstances. Bellamy v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 98 Va. Cir. 198, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 25 (Norfolk Feb. 28, 2018).

Virginia Employment Commission's properly disqualified an employee from receiving unemployment benefits because its decision was based on sufficient evidence that the employee voluntarily terminated his employment without good cause. Alexander v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 115 (Norfolk July 3, 2018).

Scope of review. - Court had no authority to review decisions of a hearing officer that involved the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to subsection B of § 2.2-3006 , based on the plain wording therein and the explicit references to evidentiary support contained in §§ 8.01-680 , 2.2-4027 , and 60.2-625 , with respect to the hearing officer's reversal of a university's termination of a university police officer and the hearing officer's award of attorney's fees to the officer. Old Dominion Univ. v. Birkmeyer, 73 Va. Cir. 341, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 131 (Norfolk 2007).

Review generally. - In an appeal pursuant to § 60.2-625 , an employment commission's denial of a worker's claim for unemployment benefits was upheld; the worker failed to report his absence to the employer, which was disqualifying misconduct pursuant to § 60.2-618 , and the fact that the worker was in jail and unable to make telephone calls did not excuse the failure, as the worker's deliberate act of refusing to take a polygraph test as ordered by a probation officer was the cause of the worker's incarceration. King v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 62 Va. Cir. 222, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 102 (Fairfax County 2003).

Decision to grant unemployment benefits to former faculty member under subdivision 1 of § 60.2-618 was not supported by the record where his adulterous relationship with a student affected other students and compromised his employer's goals and functions. The faculty member's misconduct was connected with work because it was a conflict of interest to which his employer was subjected. Va. Commonwealth Univ. v. Hsia, 73 Va. Cir. 381, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 211 (Richmond June 27, 2007).

Employee was not entitled to unemployment benefits pursuant to subdivision 2 of § 60.2-618 because he was terminated for failing to promote a fight night event at his employer, a fitness center, and such promotion was part of his written job description. The employee's contention that the fight was not properly sanctioned was not supported by evidence or authority. Novotny v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 128 (Fairfax County Oct. 4, 2011).

Disqualification from receiving benefits based on misconduct. - Virginia Employment Commission's decision to disqualify the claimant from receiving unemployment benefits was affirmed as his violations were directly related to his role as a security officer and his actions constituted willful misconduct because his failure to report a museum alarm that sounded while he was on duty clearly was contrary to the business interest of keeping the museum secure and safe; although improperly clocking time was more attenuated from the primary business interest, the claimant failed to watch the security monitors while clocked in and eating lunch; and the claimant did not prove any mitigating circumstances related to his breach of the museum's policies. Whitehurst v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2017 Va. Cir. LEXIS 343 (Norfolk Dec. 21, 2017).

Remand for determination of question of fraud. - Employee's petition for judicial review against a former employer and the Virginia Employment Commission was granted and the unemployment benefits matter was remanded where the appeals examiner contrived the requirement upon which he relied to exclude a doctor's letter claiming responsibility for interlineation, the appeals examiner's erroneous instructions on how the employee was to submit evidence did not support the decision to exclude a second letter from the doctor, and thus, no reasonable mind could have come to the conclusion that the employee had altered the note. Bailey v. Va. Empl. Comm'n & Quest Diagnostics, Inc.,, 2017 Va. Cir. LEXIS 138 (Fairfax County Aug. 18, 2017).

Commission's legal conclusion upheld. - As an unemployment benefits claimant failed to investigate his employer's offer to transfer him to another location to determine whether his time and expenses incurred travelling there would be reimbursed, and he elected to be laid off instead, the Virginia Employment Commission properly ruled that the claimant did not carry his burden under subdivision 1 of § 60.2-618 to show that he had good cause to leave his job. Roseberry v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 101 (Fairfax County Sept. 3, 2008).

Lack of evidence in record to support Commission's findings. - Denial of benefits was not supported by evidence under subsection A of § 60.2-625 because the record did not establish that the claimant was terminated for misconduct by failing to service a customer for two weeks after he was instructed to do so, as alleged by the employer. Carter v. Va. Empl. Comm'n,, 2010 Va. Cir. LEXIS 30 (Fairfax County Feb. 24, 2010).

Error in finding employee discharged for misconduct. - Virginia Employment Commission erred in finding that an employee was discharged for misconduct because the employer averred, argued, and admitted that the employee voluntarily left work, and thus, it could carry its burden to prove that the employee was discharged for misconduct. Swenson v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 90 Va. Cir. 158, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 27 (Richmond Apr. 7, 2015).

Employment Commission erred in disqualifying an employee from receiving unemployment benefits for "misconduct connected with his work" because, while the employee did fall asleep at work on at least one occasion, it did not rise to the level of "misconduct" where the employer had no written policy regarding sleeping, and because the Commission made no factual findings as to the existence or substance of any such company policy, the Court could look to the record for evidence of such company policy or rule. Peart v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 103 Va. Cir. 109, 2019 Va. Cir. LEXIS 456 (Campbell County Sept. 16, 2019).

§ 60.2-626. Oaths and witnesses; subpoenas.

In the discharge of the duties imposed by this title, the chairman of an appeal tribunal and any duly authorized representative or member of the Commission shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations, take depositions, certify to official acts, and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records deemed necessary as evidence in connection with a disputed claim or the administration of this title.

(Code 1950, § 60-36; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-41; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-627. Failure to obey subpoenas; orders of court; penalty.

  1. In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, any court of this Commonwealth within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which such person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the Commission or its duly authorized representative, shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before an appeal tribunal, a commissioner, the Commission, or its duly authorized representative, in order to produce evidence or to give testimony concerning the matter under investigation or in question. Any failure to obey such court order may be punished by the court as contempt.
  2. Any person subpoenaed by the Commission who, without just cause, fails or refuses to attend and testify or to answer to any lawful inquiry or to produce books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records, when it is within his power to do so, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
  3. Each day any violation of such court-issued subpoena, court order, or Commission-issued subpoena continues shall be deemed to be a separate offense.

    (Code 1950, § 60-37; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-42; 1986, c. 480; 2020, c. 1261.)

Cross references. - As to punishment for Class 1 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2021, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received adequate funding from the U.S. Department of Labor that covers the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. The amendments by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 4 provides: "That, if not sooner expired pursuant to the provisions of the third enactment of this act, this act shall expire on July 1, 2022." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. The amendments by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 1261 designated the former first and second sentences of the section as subsection A and the former third sentence of the section as subsection B; and rewrote the former last sentence of the section, which read: "Each day such violation continues shall be deemed to be a separate offense" and designated it as subsection C.

§ 60.2-628. Protection against self-incrimination.

No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records before the Commission in any cause or proceeding before the Commission, on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. However, no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

(Code 1950, § 60-38; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-43; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-629. Redetermination of claims.

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, the Commission may, at any time within one year from the date the deputy's determination becomes final pursuant to § 60.2-619 , redetermine any monetary determination issued by a deputy from which no appeal was taken by the claimant. Notice of any such redetermination shall be given promptly to the interested parties, and an appeal from such redetermination may be filed within the time and in the manner prescribed for an appeal from any original determination. If no such appeal is filed such redetermination shall be final. Any redetermination hereunder shall be limited to monetary determinations containing (i) an error in computation or (ii) newly discovered wages of the claimant pertinent to such determination.

(Code 1950, § 60-56; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-68; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-630. Authority to set aside or vacate determinations and decisions.

The Commission may, in its discretion, at any time before a determination or decision becomes final pursuant to §§ 60.2-619 , 60.2-621 , or § 60.2-622 , with good cause set aside or modify any such determination or decision.

(1981, c. 74, § 60.1-68.1; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-631. Board of Review.

  1. The Commissioner, in his discretion, is hereby authorized to appoint a Board of Review consisting of three members, one of whom shall be designated chairman for a term of six years. The terms of the members first taking office shall be two, four, and six years, respectively, as designated by the Commissioner at the time of the appointment. Vacancies shall be filled by appointment by the Commissioner for the unexpired term. During his term of membership on the Board no member shall serve as an officer or committee member of any political organization. The members of the Board shall be compensated in a manner determined by the Commission. The Commission shall furnish the Board such stenographic and clerical assistance as the Board may require. All compensation of the members of the Board and all necessary expenses for the operation thereof shall be paid out of the administrative fund provided for in §§ 60.2-306 through 60.2-309 and §§ 60.2-311 through 60.2-313 . The Commissioner may at any time, after notice and hearing, remove any member for cause. The Commissioner may, after thirty days' notice to the members of the Board and upon a finding that the Board is no longer needed, abolish the same.
    1. The Board shall meet upon the call of the chairman. It shall have the same powers and perform the same functions vested in the Commission in this title for review of decisions by an appeal tribunal, including the power to administer oaths and affirmations, take depositions, certify to official acts, and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records deemed necessary as evidence in connection with disputed claims. B. 1.  The Board shall meet upon the call of the chairman. It shall have the same powers and perform the same functions vested in the Commission in this title for review of decisions by an appeal tribunal, including the power to administer oaths and affirmations, take depositions, certify to official acts, and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records deemed necessary as evidence in connection with disputed claims.
    2. The Board may hold its hearings in the county or city where the claimant was last employed, except that hearings involving the provisions of subdivision 2 of § 60.2-612 shall be held in the county or city where the claimant was last employed. When the same or substantially similar evidence is relevant and material to matters in issue in claims by more than one individual or in claims by a single individual with respect to two or more weeks of unemployment, the same time and place for considering each such claim may be fixed, hearings thereon jointly conducted, and a single record of the proceedings made.
  2. The Commission may issue such regulations as it deems necessary for the procedure of the Board in the conduct of its hearings. During the time the Board is organized under authority of the Commissioner, the Commission shall have no jurisdiction under § 60.2-622 . Any decision of the Board shall become final ten days after the date of notification or mailing and judicial review shall be permitted the claimant, the Commission or any interested party claiming to be aggrieved. In any judicial action involving any such decision the Commission shall be represented by the Office of the Attorney General. Any decision of the Board from which no judicial review is sought within the time prescribed in § 60.2-625 shall be conclusive against any party to the hearing before the Board and the Commission in any subsequent judicial proceedings involving liability for taxes under this title.
  3. Within the time specified in § 60.2-625 the Commission, or any party to the proceedings before the Board, may obtain judicial review by filing in the circuit court of the county or city in which the individual who filed the claim was last employed, in the Commonwealth, a petition for review of such decision. In any such proceeding any other party to the proceeding shall be made a party respondent. The Commission shall be deemed to be a party to any such proceeding. The petition need not be verified. A copy of such petition shall be served upon the Commission and each party to the proceeding held before the Board at least thirty days prior to the placing of the petition upon the docket. The mailing of a copy of such petition to each party at his last known address shall be sufficient service. The Commission shall file along with its petition or answer a certified copy of the record of the case, including all documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the matter, together with the Board's findings, conclusions and decision therein.
  4. In any proceeding under this section the Board's findings of facts, if supported by the evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law. The court may order additional evidence to be taken by the Board, which such additional evidence, findings of fact or conclusions, together with the additional transcript of the record, shall be certified by the chairman of the Board and filed by him with the court. Such petition for review shall be heard in a summary manner and shall have preference over all other cases on the docket, except cases in which the Commonwealth is a party.
  5. An appeal may be taken from the decision of such court to the Court of Appeals in conformity with Part Five A of the Rules of Supreme Court and other applicable laws. From any such decision involving (i) the provisions of § 60.2-612 or § 60.2-618 , (ii) whether an employing unit constitutes an employer or (iii) whether services performed for or in connection with the business of an employing unit constitute employment for such employing unit, the Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction to review such decision regardless of the amount involved in any claim for benefits. It shall not be necessary, in any proceeding before the Board, to enter exceptions to its ruling, and no bond shall be required upon any appeal to any court. Upon the final determination of such judicial proceeding, the Board shall enter an order in accordance with such determination. (Code 1950, § 60-57; 1966, c. 30; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-69; 1974, c. 466; 1984, c. 703; 1986, c. 480.)

Article 6. Violations, Penalties, and Liabilities.

§ 60.2-632. False statements, etc., to obtain or increase benefits.

Whoever makes a false statement or representation knowing it to be false or knowingly fails to disclose a material fact, with intent to obtain or increase any benefit or other payment under this title, the unemployment compensation act of any other state, or any program of the federal government which is administered in any way under this title, either for himself or for any other person, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. Each such false statement or representation or failure to disclose a material fact shall constitute a separate offense.

(Code 1950, § 60-112; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-129; 1970, c. 104; 1986, c. 480.)

Cross references. - As to punishment for Class 1 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

CASE NOTES

Violation is offense involving moral turpitude. - Since an offense under this section, although a misdemeanor, involved moral turpitude, evidence of a witness' conviction was admissible as bearing on his credibility. C & O Ry. v. Hanes, 196 Va. 806 , 86 S.E.2d 122 (1955) (decided under prior law).

§ 60.2-633. (Effective until July 1, 2022) Receiving benefits to which not entitled.

  1. Any person who has received any sum as benefits under this title to which he was not entitled shall be liable to repay such sum to the Commission. For purposes of this section, "benefits under this title" includes benefits under an unemployment benefit program of the United States or of any other state. In the event the claimant does not refund the overpayment, the Commission shall deduct from any future benefits such sum payable to him under this title. The Commission shall waive the requirement to repay the overpayment after an individual case review if (i) the overpayment was made without fault on the part of the individual and (ii) requiring repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience. For the purposes of this section:
    1. An overpayment made "without fault on the part of the individual" shall include overpayments that (i) result from administrative error; (ii) are the result of inducement, solicitation, or coercion on the part of the employer; or (iii) result from the employer's failure to respond timely or adequately to the Commission's request for information, as required by § 60.2-528.1 . An overpayment shall not be considered "without fault on the part of the individual" if such overpayment was the result of (a) a reversal in the appeals process, unless the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the Commission's request for information regarding the individual's separation from employment; (b) a programming, technological, or automated system error not directly associated with an individual claim that results in erroneous payments to a group of individuals; or (c) fraud.
    2. It shall be contrary to equity and good conscience if requiring repayment of an overpayment would deprive the individual of the income required to provide for basic necessities, including shelter, food, medicine, child care, or any other essential living expenses.
  2. For any overpayment where repayment is not forgiven, the Commission shall have the authority to negotiate the terms of repayment, which shall include (i) deducting up to 50 percent of the payable amount for any future week of benefits claimed, rounded down to the next lowest dollar until the overpayment is satisfied; (ii) forgoing collection of the payable amount until the recipient has found employment as defined in § 60.2-212 ; or (iii) determining and instituting an individualized repayment plan. The Commission shall collect an overpayment of benefits under this chapter caused by administrative error only by offset against future benefits or a negotiated repayment plan; however, the Commission may institute any other method of collection if the individual fails to enter into or comply with the terms of the repayment plan. Administrative error shall not include decisions reversed in the appeals process. Overpayments where the obligation to repay has not been waived may be collectible by civil action in the name of the Commission. Amounts collected in this manner may be subject to an interest charge as prescribed in § 58.1-15 from the date of judgment and may be subject to fees and costs. Collection activities for any benefit overpayment established of $5 or less may be suspended. The Commission may, for good cause, determine as uncollectible and discharge from its records any benefit overpayment which remains unpaid after the expiration of seven years from the date such overpayment was determined, or immediately upon the death of such person or upon his discharge in bankruptcy occurring subsequently to the determination of overpayment. Any existing overpayment balance not equal to an even dollar amount shall be rounded to the next lowest even dollar amount.
  3. The Commission is authorized to accept repayment of benefit overpayments by use of a credit card. The Virginia Employment Commission shall add to such payment a service charge for the acceptance of such card. Such service charge shall not exceed the percentage charged to the Virginia Employment Commission for use of such card.
  4. No determination with respect to benefit overpayments shall be issued until after a determination or decision that finds a claimant ineligible or disqualified for benefits previously paid has become final.
  5. Final orders of the Commission with respect to benefit overpayments may be recorded, enforced, and satisfied as orders or decrees of a circuit court upon certification of such orders by the Commissioner as may be appropriate.

    (Code 1950, § 60-115; 1962, c. 138; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-132; 1974, c. 466; 1979, c. 675; 1980, c. 751; 1981, c. 251; 1984, c. 458; 1985, c. 151; 1986, c. 480; 1988, c. 544; 1990, c. 687; 1996, c. 95; 2008, c. 492; 2010, c. 327; 2013, c. 683; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until July 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective July 1, 2022, see the following section also numbered § 60.2-633 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, cl. 2 provides: "That the Virginia Employment Commission (the Commission) shall notify each person with an unpaid overpayment of benefits established for claim weeks paid commencing March 15, 2020, under Chapter 6 ( § 60.2-600 et seq.) of Title 60.2 of the Code of Virginia, or under an unemployment benefit program of the United States or any other state, that such individual may be entitled to a waiver of obligation to repay such overpayment and shall provide 30 days from the date of such notification for the individual to request a waiver of repayment. For good cause shown, the Commission may extend the 30-day period for requesting a waiver. The Commission shall conduct an individualized review and adjudicate any request received in accordance with the provisions of § 60.2-619 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, and any individual who is denied a waiver shall have the right to appeal as provided in subsection D of § 60.2-619 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act. In ruling on any waiver request, the Commission shall apply the provisions of Title 60.2 or, if applicable, the overpayment waiver provisions of any unemployment compensation program of the United States."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act that allow the waiver of any obligation to repay overpayments established for the week commencing March 15, 2020, through the week commencing June 27, 2021, shall apply only to overpayment balances that remain outstanding. Amounts already paid or collected against such overpayments shall not be reimbursed to the claimant, except for benefits paid under the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, cl. 4 provides: "That notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, the Virginia Employment Commission may suspend or forgo referring any overpayment established since March 15, 2020, to the collections process established under § 2.2-4806 of the Code of Virginia. However, the authority to suspend or forgo such referrals shall expire on July 1, 2022."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, cl. 5 provides: "That all costs to the Unemployment Compensation Fund (the Fund) resulting from the provisions of this act for overpayments of benefits under Chapter 6 ( § 60.2-600 et seq.) of Title 60.2 of the Code of Virginia shall be reimbursed to the Fund from the general fund in the general appropriation act. For an overpayment waived pursuant to this act, no employer shall be responsible for (i) reimbursing benefits or (ii) benefits charges, except as provided in § 60.2-528.1 of the Code of Virginia."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on July 1, 2022."

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 492 added subsection C.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 327, in subsection A, in the second sentence, substituted "have the authority to negotiate the terms of repayment, which shall include (i) deducting up to 50" for "deduct only fifty," and inserted clauses (ii) and (iii), and inserted the third sentence.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 683, effective February 24, 2013, in subsection A, inserted the second sentence, divided the third sentence, deleted "unless" following "this title," inserted "However, if an" and "of benefits under this chapter, but not under an unemployment benefit program of the United States or of any other state," deleted "in which case" following "administrative error," and substituted "forgoing" for "foregoing" in clause (ii), and inserted "of benefits under this chapter" in the fourth sentence.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 539, effective July 1, 2021, in subsection A, added the last sentence in the first paragraph and added the second paragraph including subdivisions A 1 and A 2; in subsection B, substituted "B. For any overpayment where repayment is not forgiven" for "However, if an overpayment of benefits under this chapter, but not under an unemployment benefit program of the United States or of any other state, occurred due to administrative error" in the first paragraph and "Overpayments where the obligation to repay has not been waived" for "In addition, the overpayment" in the second paragraph; redesignated former subsections B and C as subsections C and E, respectively, and added subsection D. For expiration date, see Editor's note.

CASE NOTES

Section does not violate due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brewer v. Cantrell, 622 F. Supp. 1320 (W.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1986) (decided under prior law).

Different treatment under this section and § 60.2-619 constitutional. - Persons who fall under § 60.2-619 are in a different situation than those under this section. Because they are in different situations, the Commission may treat them differently. This does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The Commission treats all people who are under § 60.2-619 alike. The Commission also treats all people who are under this section alike. Brewer v. Cantrell, 622 F. Supp. 1320 (W.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1986) (decided under prior law).

Eleventh Amendment does not bar claim based on Commission's attempt to recover overpayments. - The Eleventh Amendment, which bars suits which would cause funds to be paid out of the general treasury of a state, did not bar a claim that action taken by the VEC in attempting to recover overpayments violated the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since Virginia's unemployment compensation fund is a special fund. Brewer v. Cantrell, 622 F. Supp. 1320 (W.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1986) (decided under prior law).

Section does not violate "when due" provision of 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1). It is a statute that is needed under the requirements of the Social Security Act and is not in violation of the Act. Brewer v. Cantrell, 622 F. Supp. 1320 (W.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1986) (decided under prior law).

Promptness requirement. - Promptness requirement of the statute is mandatory for the Virginia Employment Commission; therefore, in a case involving unemployment compensation, the "promptness requirement" language prevented the Virginia Employment Commission from deciding that a claimant had to repay unemployment compensation more than two years after receiving it. An untimely determination that she was ineligible and required to repay the unemployment compensation was incorrect and unenforceable. Va. Empl. Comm'n v. Cole, No. 1268-15-2, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 104 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 5, 2016).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Employee is liable for overpayment. - Decision of the Virginia Employment Commission, which ultimately found that the former employee was not entitled to benefits, and that the employee was required to pay back benefits already paid, was affirmed because the employee's job was terminated when he took a hard drive off of the employer's property, conduct that was clearly against the employer's policy. Zugg v. Va. Empl. Comm'n, 63 Va. Cir. 429, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 338 (Loudoun County 2003).

§ 60.2-633. (Effective July 1, 2022) Receiving benefits to which not entitled.

  1. Any person who has received any sum as benefits under this title to which he was not entitled shall be liable to repay such sum to the Commission. For purposes of this section, "benefits under this title" includes benefits under an unemployment benefit program of the United States or of any other state. In the event the claimant does not refund the overpayment, the Commission shall deduct from any future benefits such sum payable to him under this title. However, if an overpayment of benefits under this chapter, but not under an unemployment benefit program of the United States or of any other state, occurred due to administrative error, the Commission shall have the authority to negotiate the terms of repayment, which shall include (i) deducting up to 50 percent of the payable amount for any future week of benefits claimed, rounded down to the next lowest dollar until the overpayment is satisfied; (ii) forgoing collection of the payable amount until the recipient has found employment as defined in § 60.2-212 ; or (iii) determining and instituting an individualized repayment plan. The Commission shall collect an overpayment of benefits under this chapter caused by administrative error only by offset against future benefits or a negotiated repayment plan; however, the Commission may institute any other method of collection if the individual fails to enter into or comply with the terms of the repayment plan. Administrative error shall not include decisions reversed in the appeals process. In addition, the overpayment may be collectible by civil action in the name of the Commission. Amounts collected in this manner may be subject to an interest charge as prescribed in § 58.1-15 from the date of judgment and may be subject to fees and costs. Collection activities for any benefit overpayment established of five dollars or less may be suspended. The Commission may, for good cause, determine as uncollectible and discharge from its records any benefit overpayment which remains unpaid after the expiration of seven years from the date such overpayment was determined, or immediately upon the death of such person or upon his discharge in bankruptcy occurring subsequently to the determination of overpayment. Any existing overpayment balance not equal to an even dollar amount shall be rounded to the next lowest even dollar amount.
  2. The Commission is authorized to accept repayment of benefit overpayments by use of a credit card. The Virginia Employment Commission shall add to such payment a service charge for the acceptance of such card. Such service charge shall not exceed the percentage charged to the Virginia Employment Commission for use of such card.
  3. Final orders of the Commission with respect to benefit overpayments may be recorded, enforced and satisfied as orders or decrees of a circuit court upon certification of such orders by the Commissioner as may be appropriate.

    (Code 1950, § 60-115; 1962, c. 138; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-132; 1974, c. 466; 1979, c. 675; 1980, c. 751; 1981, c. 251; 1984, c. 458; 1985, c. 151; 1986, c. 480; 1988, c. 544; 1990, c. 687; 1996, c. 95; 2008, c. 492; 2010, c. 327; 2013, c. 683.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective July 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until July 1, 2022, see the preceding section also numbered § 60.2-633 .

§ 60.2-634. Receiving back pay after reinstatement.

Whenever the Commission finds that a discharged employee has received back pay at his customary wage rate from his employer after reinstatement such employee shall be liable to repay any benefits paid to such person during the time he was unemployed. When such an employee is liable to repay benefits to the Commission, such sum shall be collectible without interest by civil action in the name of the Commission.

(Code 1950, § 60-116; 1962, c. 138; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-133; 1974, c. 466; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-635. Deprivation of further benefits.

Any person who has been finally convicted under this chapter shall be deprived of any further benefits for the one-year period next ensuing after the date of conviction.

(Code 1950, § 60-117; 1962, c. 138; 1968, c. 738, § 60.1-134; 1974, c. 466; 1986, c. 480.)

§ 60.2-636. Penalty for fraudulent claim.

  1. Any person who has been disqualified for benefits under subdivision 4 of § 60.2-618 and who, because of those same acts or omissions, has received any sum as benefits under this title to which the person is not entitled shall be assessed a penalty in an amount equal to 15 percent of the amount of the payment to which the person was not entitled. All penalties collected by the Commission shall be paid into the state treasury and credited to the clearing account of the Fund established pursuant to § 60.2-300 . The penalty applies to an erroneous payment made under any state program providing for the payment of unemployment compensation as well as an erroneous payment made under any federal program providing for the payment of unemployment compensation. The notice of determination or decision advising the person that benefits have been denied or adjusted pursuant to subdivision 4 of § 60.2-618 shall include the reason for the finding of an erroneous payment, the penalty amount assessed under this section, and the reason the penalty has been applied.
  2. The amount of the penalty assessed pursuant to this section may be collected in any manner allowed for the recovery of the erroneous payment. When a recovery with respect to an erroneous payment is made, any recovery shall be applied first to the principal of the erroneous payment, then to the penalty amount imposed under this section, and finally to any other amounts due.

    (2013, c. 771.)

§ 60.2-637. Notice of penalties for false or misleading statements.

  1. The Commission shall provide to each claimant notices of the sanctions to which the claimant is subject as a consequence of providing false or misleading statements to obtain unemployment benefits. The notices shall, at a minimum, (i) identify the penalties and sanctions to which any person is liable as a result of providing false or misleading statements to obtain benefits; (ii) inform the claimant that making a false statement or representation knowing it to be false or knowingly failing to disclose a material fact, with intent to obtain or increase any benefit or other payment under this title, is punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor; and (iii) provide a summary of all remedies available to the Commission to collect overpayments made to a claimant as a result of his making false or misleading statements to obtain benefits.
  2. The notices required by subsection A shall be included with the written statement advising claimants of their benefit rights and responsibilities that is provided by the Commission to claimants following the filing of the initial claim. In addition, the notices shall be provided to claimants at the time of the filing of initial and weekly claims by the same medium, including telephone or the Internet, that is used by the claimant to file his claim.
  3. The failure of the claimant to receive any of the notices set out in subsection A shall not constitute a defense to any criminal prosecution for unemployment insurance fraud under § 60.2-632 , to an administrative fraud disqualification under subdivision 4 of § 60.2-618 , or to any overpayment of benefits under § 60.2-633 that the claimant would be required to repay as a result of the fraudulent act or acts. (2013, c. 740.)

The number of this section was assigned by the Virginia Code Commission, the number in the 2013 act having been § 60.2-636 .

Cross references. - As to punishment for Class 1 misdemeanors, see § 18.2-11 .

Chapter 7. Short-Time Compensation Program.

Sec.

§§ 60.2-700 through 60.2-709.

Expired pursuant to Acts 2014, c. 818, cl. 5, effective July 1, 2016.

Editor's note. - Acts 2014, c. 818, cl. 5 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on July 1, 2016, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received a grant or grants from the U.S. Department of Labor that cover the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission the chapter has been set out as expired July 1, 2016.

§ 60.2-710.

Repealed by Acts 2015, c. 709, cl. 2.

Editor's note. - Former § 60.2-710 , pertaining to severability, derived from 2014, c. 818.

§ 60.2-711. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context requires a different meaning:

"Affected unit" means a specific plant, department, shift, or other definable unit of an employing unit that has at least two employees to which an approved short-time compensation plan applies.

"Health and retirement benefits" means employer-provided health benefits and retirement benefits under a defined benefit pension plan as defined in § 414(j) of the Internal Revenue Code or contributions under a defined contribution plan as defined in § 414(i) of the Internal Revenue Code that are incidents of employment in addition to the cash remuneration earned.

"Program" means the short-time compensation program established pursuant to this chapter.

"Short-time compensation" means the unemployment benefits payable to employees in an affected unit under an approved short-time compensation plan, as distinguished from the unemployment benefits otherwise payable under the unemployment compensation provisions of this title.

"Work sharing plan" or "plan" means a plan submitted by an employer to the Commission for approval to participate in the Program.

(2020, c. 1261.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2021, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received adequate funding from the U.S. Department of Labor that covers the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. This section as enacted by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 4 provides: "That, if not sooner expired pursuant to the provisions of the third enactment of this act, this act shall expire on July 1, 2022." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. This section as enacted by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

§ 60.2-712. Application to participate in short-time compensation program.

  1. The Commission shall establish and implement a short-time compensation program by January 1, 2022. The Program shall meet the requirements of 22 U.S.C. § 3306(v) and all other applicable federal and state laws.
  2. An employer that wishes to participate in the Program shall submit to the Commission a signed, written work sharing plan for approval. The Commission shall develop an application form to request approval of a plan and an approval process. The application shall include:
    1. The affected unit covered by the plan, including the number of employees in the unit; the percentage of employees in the affected unit covered by the plan; identification of each individual employee in the affected unit by name, social security number, and the employer's unemployment tax account number; and any other information required by the Commission to identify plan participants.
    2. A description of how employees in the affected unit will be notified of the employer's participation in the plan if such application is approved, including how the employer will notify those employees in a collective bargaining unit as well as any employees in the affected unit who are not in a collective bargaining unit. If the employer does not intend to provide advance notice to employees in the affected unit, the employer shall explain in a statement in the application why it is not feasible to provide such notice.
    3. A requirement that the employer identify, in the application, the usual weekly hours of work for employees in the affected unit and the specific percentage by which their hours will be reduced during all weeks covered by the plan. The percentage of reduction for which a work sharing plan application may be approved shall be not less than 10 percent and not more than 60 percent. If the plan includes any week for which the employer regularly does not provide work, including incidences due to a holiday or other plant closing, then such week shall be identified in the application.
    4. Certification by the employer that, if the employer provides health benefits and retirement benefits to any employee whose usual weekly hours of work are reduced under the Program, such benefits will continue to be provided to employees participating in the Program under the same terms and conditions as though the usual weekly hours of work of such employee had not been reduced or to the same extent as other employees not participating in the Program. For defined benefit retirement plans, the hours that are reduced under the plan shall be credited for purposes of participation, vesting, and accrual of benefits as though the usual weekly hours of work had not been reduced. The dollar amount of employer contributions to a defined contribution plan that are based on a percentage of compensation may be less due to the reduction in the employee's compensation.
    5. Certification by the employer that the aggregate reduction in work hours is in lieu of layoffs, whether temporary or permanent layoffs or both. The application shall include an estimate of the number of employees who would have been laid off in the absence of the plan. The employer shall also certify that new employees will not be hired in or transferred to an affected unit for the duration of the plan.
    6. Certification by the employer that participation in the plan and its implementation is consistent with the employer's obligations under applicable federal and state laws.
    7. Agreement by the employer to (i) furnish reports to the Commission relating to the proper conduct of the plan; (ii) allow the Commission access to all records necessary to approve or disapprove the plan application and, after approval of a plan, monitor and evaluate the plan; and (iii) follow any other directives the Commission deems necessary to implement the plan and that are consistent with the requirements for plan applications.
    8. Any other provision added to the application by the Commission that the U.S. Secretary of Labor determines to be appropriate for purposes of a work sharing plan.

      (2020, c. 1261; 2020, Sp. Sess. I, c. 8.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2021, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received adequate funding from the U.S. Department of Labor that covers the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. This section as enacted by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 4 provides: "That, if not sooner expired pursuant to the provisions of the third enactment of this act, this act shall expire on July 1, 2022." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. This section as enacted by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

The 2020 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2020 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, effective October 21, 2020, "substituted "January 1, 2022" for "January 1, 2021" in subsection A.

§ 60.2-713. Approval and disapproval of plan.

The Commission shall approve or disapprove a work sharing plan in writing within 10 working days of its receipt and promptly communicate the decision to the employer. A decision disapproving the plan shall clearly identify the reasons for the disapproval. If a plan is disapproved, the employer may submit a different work sharing plan for approval.

(2020, c. 1261.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2021, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received adequate funding from the U.S. Department of Labor that covers the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. This section as enacted by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 4 provides: "That, if not sooner expired pursuant to the provisions of the third enactment of this act, this act shall expire on July 1, 2022." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. This section as enacted by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

§ 60.2-714. Effective date, duration, and modification of plan.

  1. A work sharing plan shall be effective on the date that is mutually agreed upon by the employer and the Commission, which shall be specified in the notice of approval to the employer. The plan shall expire on the date specified in the notice of approval, which shall be either the date at the end of the twelfth full calendar month after its effective date or an earlier date mutually agreed upon by the employer and the Commission. However, if a work sharing plan is revoked by the Commission under subsection B, the plan shall terminate on the date specified in the Commission's written order of revocation. An employer may terminate a plan at any time upon written notice to the Commission. Upon receipt of such notice from the employer, the Commission shall promptly notify each member of the affected unit of the termination date. An employer may submit a new application to participate in another plan at any time after the expiration or termination date.
  2. The Commission may revoke approval of a work sharing plan for good cause at any time, including upon the request of any of the affected unit's employees. The revocation order shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for the revocation and the date the revocation is effective. The Commission may periodically review the operation of each employer's plan to assure that no good cause exists for revocation of the approval of the plan. Good cause shall include failure to comply with the assurances given in the plan, unreasonable revision of productivity standards for the affected unit, conduct or occurrences tending to defeat the intent and effective operation of the plan, and violation of any criteria on which approval of the plan was based.
  3. An employer may request a modification of an approved plan by filing a written request to the Commission. The request shall identify the specific provisions proposed to be modified and provide an explanation of why the proposed modification is appropriate for the plan. The Commission shall approve or disapprove the proposed modification in writing within 10 working days and promptly communicate the decision to the employer. An employer is not required to request approval of a plan modification from the Commission if the change is not substantial, but the employer shall report every change to the plan to the Commission promptly and in writing.

    (2020, c. 1261.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2021, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received adequate funding from the U.S. Department of Labor that covers the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. This section as enacted by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 4 provides: "That, if not sooner expired pursuant to the provisions of the third enactment of this act, this act shall expire on July 1, 2022." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. This section as enacted by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

§ 60.2-715. Eligibility for short-time compensation.

  1. An employee is eligible to receive short-time compensation under a work sharing plan with respect to any week only if the employee is monetarily eligible for unemployment compensation, not otherwise disqualified for unemployment compensation, and:
    1. During the week, the employee is employed as a member of an affected unit under an approved work sharing plan that was approved prior to that week, and the plan is in effect with respect to the week for which short-time compensation is claimed; and
    2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title relating to availability for work and actively seeking work, the employee is available for the employee's usual hours of work with the short-time compensation employer, which may include, for purposes of this section, participating in training, including employer-sponsored training or training funded under the federal Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014, to enhance job skills that is approved by the Commission.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an employee covered by a work sharing plan is deemed unemployed in any week during the duration of that plan if the employee's remuneration as an employee in an affected unit is reduced based on a reduction of the employee's usual weekly hours of work under an approved work sharing plan.
  3. The short-term compensation program shall not serve as a subsidy of seasonal employment during the off-season, nor as a subsidy of temporary part-time or intermittent employment.

    (2020, c. 1261.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2021, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received adequate funding from the U.S. Department of Labor that covers the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. This section as enacted by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 4 provides: "That, if not sooner expired pursuant to the provisions of the third enactment of this act, this act shall expire on July 1, 2022." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. This section as enacted by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

§ 60.2-716. Benefits.

  1. The short-time compensation weekly benefit amount shall be the product of the regular weekly unemployment compensation amount for a week of total unemployment multiplied by the percentage of reduction in the individual's usual weekly hours of work.
  2. An individual may be eligible for short-time compensation or unemployment compensation, as appropriate, except that (i) no individual shall be eligible for combined benefits in any benefit year in an amount more than the maximum entitlement established for regular unemployment compensation and (ii) no individual shall be paid short-time compensation benefits for more than 26 weeks under a plan.
  3. Provisions applicable to unemployment compensation claimants shall apply to short-time compensation claimants to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Program's provisions. An individual who files an initial claim for short-time compensation benefits shall receive a monetary determination.
  4. An employee who is not provided any work during a week by the short-time compensation employer, or any other employer, and who is otherwise eligible for unemployment compensation shall be eligible for the amount of regular unemployment compensation to which he would otherwise be eligible.
  5. An employee who is not provided any work by the short-time compensation employer during a week, but who works for another employer and is otherwise eligible, may be paid unemployment compensation for that week subject to the disqualifying income and other provisions applicable to claims for regular compensation.
  6. An employee who has received all of the short-time compensation or combined unemployment compensation and short-time compensation available in a benefit year shall be considered an exhaustee for purposes of extended benefits and, if otherwise eligible under those provisions, shall be eligible to receive extended benefits.

    (2020, c. 1261.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 30-19.03:1.2 of the Code of Virginia shall not apply to this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2021, if the Virginia Employment Commission has not, on or before such date, received adequate funding from the U.S. Department of Labor that covers the costs of information technology upgrades, training, publicity, and marketing that are incurred by the Virginia Employment Commission in connection with establishing the short-time compensation program pursuant to the first enactment of this act." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. This section as enacted by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.

Acts 2020, c. 1261, cl. 4 provides: "That, if not sooner expired pursuant to the provisions of the third enactment of this act, this act shall expire on July 1, 2022." Acts 2020 Sp. Sess. I, c. 8, cl. 2, effective October 21, 2020, repealed clauses 3 and 4 of Acts 2020, c. 1261. This section as enacted by Acts 2020, c. 1261 will not expire.