Chapter 1. General Provisions.

Sec.

§ 17.1-100. Judicial performance evaluation program.

  1. The Supreme Court, by rule, shall establish and maintain a judicial performance evaluation program that will provide a self-improvement mechanism for judges and a source of information for the reelection process. By December 1 of each year, the Supreme Court, or its designee, shall transmit a report of the evaluation in the final year of the term of each justice and judge whose term expires during the next session of the General Assembly to the Chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Such report shall include the number of cases during the judge's term in which a judge imposed a sentence that is either greater or less than that indicated by the sentencing guidelines and did not file a written explanation of such departure required pursuant to subsection B of § 19.2-298.01. The Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission shall provide such information to the Supreme Court by November 1.
  2. The reporting requirement of this section shall become effective when funds are appropriated for this program and shall apply to the evaluation of any justice or judge who has had at least one interim evaluation conducted during his term. For any judge or justice elected or reelected on or after January 1, 2014, an interim evaluation of each individual justice or judge shall be completed during his term. Such interim evaluation shall be commenced by the judicial performance evaluation program no later than the midpoint of his term.
  3. All records created or maintained by or on behalf of the judicial performance evaluation program related to an evaluation of any individual justice or judge are confidential and shall not be disclosed, except that any report provided to the General Assembly pursuant to this section shall be a public record that is open to inspection.

    (2002, c. 726; 2005, c. 633; 2014, c. 808; 2018, c. 727.)

Transition provisions. - Acts 1998, c. 872 repealed Title 17, relating to Courts of Record, and added Title 17.1.

Acts 1998, c. 872, cl. 2 provides: "That whenever any of the conditions, requirements, provisions or contents of any section or chapter of Title 14.1 or Title 17 or any other title of the Code of Virginia as such title existed prior to October 1, 1998, are transferred in the same or modified form to a new section or chapter of Title 17.1 or any other title of the Code and whenever any such former section or chapter is given a new number in Title 17.1 or any other title, all references to any such former section or chapter of Title 14.1 or Title 17 or other title appearing in this Code shall be construed to apply to the new or renumbered section or chapter containing such conditions, requirements, provisions, contents or portions thereof."

Acts 1998, c. 872, cl. 3 provides: "That the repeal of Title 14.1 and the revision of Title 17 as Title 17.1 shall not be construed to require the reappointment of any officer or any member of a board, council, committee or other appointed body referred to in Title 14.1 or Title 17 and each such officer and member shall continue to serve for the term for which appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 14.1 or Title 17."

Acts 1998, c. 872, cl. 4 provides: "That the repeal of Title 14.1 and the revision of Title 17 as Title 17.1 shall not be construed to affect the term of office of any elected officeholder holding office on October 1, 1998."

Acts 1998, c. 872, cl. 5 provides: "That the provisions of § 9-77.11 [now § 30-152] of the Code of Virginia shall apply to the codification of Title 17.1 so as to give effect to other laws enacted by the 1998 Session of the General Assembly notwithstanding the delay in the effective date of this act."

Acts 1998, c. 872, cl. 6 provides: "That the repeal of Title 14.1 or §§ 17-1 through 17-124 and 17-127.21 through 17-238 effective October 1, 1998, shall not affect any act or offense done or committed, or any penalty incurred, or any right established, accrued or accruing on or before such date, or any proceeding, prosecution, suit or action pending on that day. Except as otherwise provided in this act, neither the repeal of Title 14.1 or §§ 17-1 through 17-124 and 17-127.21 through 17-238 nor the enactment by this act of any new section of the Code or of Title 17.1 shall apply to offenses committed prior to October 1, 1998, and prosecution for such offenses shall be governed by the prior law, which is continued in effect for that purpose. For the purpose of this enactment, an offense was committed prior to October 1, 1998, if any of the essential elements of the offense occurred prior thereto."

Acts 1998, c. 872, cl. 7 provides: "That any notice given, recognizance taken, or process or writ issued before October 1, 1998, shall be valid although given, taken or to be returned on a day after such date, in like manner as if this title had been effective before the same was given, taken or issued."

Acts 1998, c. 872, cl. 8 provides: "That if any clause, sentence, paragraph, subdivision, section or part of this act shall be adjudged in any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to the clause, sentence, paragraph, subdivision, section or part thereof directly involved in the controversy in which the judgment shall have been rendered, and to this end the provisions of this title are declared severable."

Acts 1998, c. 872, cl. 9 provides: "That whenever in this act a section is set out twice, the second version of that section is the family court version which is contingently effective June 1, 1998."

Acts 1998, c. 872, cl. 11 provides: "That Chapter 71 of the 1966 Acts of Assembly (carried by reference as § 17-117.1), and Chapter 83 of the 1954 Acts of Assembly (carried by reference as § 17-118.1) as amended by Chapter 346 of the 1956 Acts of Assembly are repealed."

Acts 1998, c. 872, cl. 12 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 1998, provided that §§ 17.1-255 through 17.1-258 , and § 17.1-279 shall become effective on July 1, 1998."

Some of the cases cited in the notes under the various sections in this title were decided under former Title. 17.

Editor's note. -

Acts 2014, c. 808, cl. 2 provides: "That any evaluation of a justice or judge previously conducted by the judicial performance evaluation program in the court to which the judge or justice is currently elected shall satisfy the requirements for an interim evaluation under subsection B of § 17.1-100 of the Code of Virginia as amended by this act."

Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 39 J, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "Included in this appropriation, $240,000 the first year and $240,000 the second year from the general fund is provided to implement the Judicial Performance Evaluation Program established by § 17.1-100 of the Code of Virginia."

The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "the Chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary" for "the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice" in subsection A. March 10, 2021.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 633 rewrote the last sentence.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 808, inserted subsection designations; in subsection A, substituted "December" for "September"; in subsection B, substituted "shall apply to the evaluation of any justice or judge who has had at least one interim evaluation conducted during his term" for "the first justice or judge is evaluated" at the end of the first sentence and added the second and third sentences; and added subsection C.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 727 added the third and fourth sentences to subsection A.

Law review. - For essay, "Reconsidering Virginia Judicial Selection," see 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 37 (2008).

Research References. - Bryson on Virginia Civil Procedure (Matthew Bender). Chapter 2 Potential Jurisdiction. § 2.01 Judges. Bryson.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Duties of clerk. - A locality or a circuit court judge does not have the statutory authority to direct how a circuit court clerk uses the Technology Trust Fund monies allocated to such clerk's office pursuant to § 17.1-279 . See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable John T. Frey, Fairfax County Circuit Court Clerk, 09-055, 2009 Va. AG LEXIS 40 (10/8/09).

§ 17.1-101. Time within which a judge may qualify; failure vacates office.

Any judge of this Commonwealth may qualify at any time after receiving his commission and before the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of his term of office. If any judge does not receive his commission until after the commencement of his term of office he may qualify within thirty days from the date of receiving the same. The failure of any judge to qualify within these time limits shall vacate his office.

(Code 1919, § 5978, § 17-2; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-102. Justices and judges not permitted to practice law or seek or hold elective or other office.

No justice or judge shall, during his continuance in office, engage in the practice of law within or without the Commonwealth, or seek or accept any nonjudicial elective office, or hold any other office of public trust, or engage in any other incompatible activity.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 50, § 17-3.1; 1998, c. 872.)

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on practice and pleading for the year 1970-1971, see 57 Va. L. Rev. 1561 (1971).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judges, § 6.

§ 17.1-103. Residence requirements of judges.

Each judge of a circuit court shall, during his term of office, reside within the circuit to which he was appointed or elected and his removal therefrom shall vacate his office. Where the boundary of the jurisdiction of a court is changed by annexation or otherwise, a judge thereof shall not become disqualified from office or ineligible for reelection if, except for such annexation or change, he would otherwise be qualified.

(Code 1919, § 5977, § 17-5; 1964, c. 108; 1970, c. 122; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 50; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - For constitutional provisions as to residence, see Va. Const., Art. VI, § 7.

§ 17.1-104. In election by court, votes to be recorded.

In every appointment or election by a court to fill any office or post, the votes shall be made in writing and recorded in the order or minute book.

(Code 1919, § 5961, § 17-6; 1986, c. 294; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-105. Designation of judges to hold courts and assist other judges.

  1. If a judge of any court of record is absent, sick or disabled or for any other reason unable to hold any regular or special term of the court, or any part thereof, or to perform or discharge any official duty or function authorized or required by law, a judge or retired judge of any court of record may be obtained by personal request of the disabled judge, or another judge of the circuit to hold the court for the whole or any part of such regular or special term and to discharge during vacation such duty or function, or, if the circumstances require, to perform all the duties and exercise all the powers and jurisdiction as judges of such circuit until the judge is again able to attend his duties. The designation of such judge shall be entered in the civil order book of the court, and a copy thereof sent to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice shall be notified forthwith at the time any disabled judge is able to return to his duties.
  2. If all the judges of any court of record are so situated in respect to any case, civil or criminal, pending in their court as to render it improper, in their opinion, for them to preside at the trial, unless the cause or proceeding is removed, as provided by law, they shall enter the fact of record and the clerk of the court shall at once certify the same to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall designate a judge of some other court of record or a retired judge of any such court to preside at the trial of such case.
  3. If a vacancy occurs in the office of a judge of a court of record that fact shall be immediately certified by the clerk of such court to the Governor, who may, instead of appointing a successor at once, request the Chief Justice to designate a judge of some other court of record or a retired judge of any such court to carry out the duties of the office, if there are insufficient judges in the circuit to carry out the work of the court, until the office has been filled in the mode prescribed by law. If any judge so designated shall be prevented by the duties of his court, or by sickness, from performing the duties required, he shall so inform the Chief Justice, who may designate another judge in his place.
  4. Due to congestion in the work of any court of record or when in his opinion the administration of justice so requires, the Chief Justice may, upon his own initiative or upon application of the judge desiring assistance, designate a judge or retired judge of any court of record to assist the judge in the performance of his duties and every judge so designated shall have the same powers and jurisdiction and be authorized to perform the same duties as the judge whom he is designated to assist.
  5. Any judge or retired judge sitting under any provision of this section or sitting by designation on any three-judge court shall receive from the state treasury actual expenses for the time he is actually engaged in holding court, except in those cases where the payment of such expenses is otherwise specifically provided by law.
  6. The powers and duties herein conferred and imposed upon the Chief Justice may be exercised and performed by any justice, or any committee of justices, of the Court, designated by the Chief Justice for such purpose.
  7. If the chief judge of any circuit is unable to perform the duties required by law, he shall notify the Chief Justice, who shall designate another judge of the same circuit to perform such duties.
  8. If any judge refuses unreasonably to serve as requested under the provisions of this section, the chief judge may report his refusal to the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.
  9. As used in this section, "retired judge" means a judge eligible for recall pursuant to § 17.1-106 . (Code 1919, § 5898, § 17-7; 1928, p. 746; 1936, p. 405; 1938, p. 138; 1948, p. 535; 1950, p. 52; 1954, c. 165; 1973, c. 544; 1998, c. 872; 2006, cc. 144, 306; 2014, c. 776.)

Cross references. - As to definition of "judge" generally, see § 17.1-900 .

As to constitutional provision dealing with disabled and unfit judges, see Va. Const., Art. VI, § 10.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 144 inserted "or when in his opinion the administration of justice so requires" in subsection D.

The 2006 amendment by c. 306 substituted "civil" for "common law" in the second sentence of subsection A.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 776, effective April 23, 2014, added subsection I.

Law review. - For article, "Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia?" see 57 Va. L. Rev. 3 (1971).

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 9-1705. Judicial Designation.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 4A M.J. Commonwealth's and State's Attorney, § 9; 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 38; 11A M.J. Judges, §§ 14, 19.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

This section allows any trial judge in Virginia to preside over the court of any other judge in the State upon the mere request or procurement of the latter, without any designation by the Governor [now Chief Justice]. Bukva v. Matthews, 149 Va. 500 , 140 S.E. 674 (1924).

Substitute judge has full power. - A judge designated by the Governor [now Chief Justice] to hold the court of another judge, who has been rendered permanently unable to act, is clothed with every function that pertained to the judge of the court, and is competent to pass upon every case then remaining upon the docket, including a motion to set aside a verdict on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence, so that his decision may be reviewed by the appellate court although he never heard the witnesses testify, and the verdict was rendered before his designation. Southhall v. Evans, 114 Va. 461 , 76 S.E. 929 (1910). See also Conway v. Commonwealth, 118 Va. 792 , 88 S.E. 75 (1916).

Regular judge need enter nothing on record unless disqualified. - This section clearly provides that only in the event of one contingency is it necessary for the regular judge to enter anything on the record, i.e., when, in his opinion, he is disqualified. Akers v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1046 , 156 S.E. 763 (1931). See Gresham v. Ewell, 85 Va. 1 , 6 S.E. 700 (1888).

And in any event no order is required. - This section, covering every contingency which might prevent a judge from holding his own court, requires no order in any event. A mere statement of fact is required to be entered when the resident judge is disqualified, and that fact certified to the Governor (now Chief Justice). Akers v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1046 , 156 S.E. 763 (1931).

Compliance with statute adequately shown. - Because the record contained an order entered by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court prior to defendant's trial, pursuant to subsection B of § 17.1-105 , designating an Eleventh Judicial Circuit to preside over defendant's trial after the judges of the Sixth Judicial Circuit recused themselves, the appeals court rejected defendant's contrary claim. Bennett v. Commonwealth, No. 3047-05-2, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 155 (Apr. 17, 2007).

Failure to hold regular term contemplated. - This section and former §§ 17-22 and 17-23 (now § 17.1-120 ) contemplate that a regular term of court may not be held at all. Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 741 , 21 S.E. 364 (1895).

Substitute in disciplinary proceeding against attorney. - Former § 54-74 as it stood prior to the 1980 amendment did not prohibit the appointment of a substitute Commonwealth's attorney pursuant to § 19.2-155 or the designation of a substitute judge in accordance with this section in a disciplinary proceeding brought against an attorney. Blue v. Virginia State Bar ex rel. First Dist. Comm., 222 Va. 357 , 282 S.E.2d 6 (1981).

§ 17.1-106. Temporary recall of retired judges.

  1. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may call upon any judge of a circuit court who is retired under the Judicial Retirement System (§ 51.1-300 et seq.) and who has been found qualified within the preceding three years by the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to sit in recall either to (i) hear a specific case or cases pursuant to the provisions of § 17.1-105 , such designation to continue in effect for the duration of the case or cases, or (ii) perform for a period of time not to exceed 90 days at any one time such judicial duties in any circuit court as the Chief Justice shall deem in the public interest for the expeditious disposition of the business of the courts.
  2. It shall be the obligation of any retired judge who is recalled to temporary service under this section and who has not attained age 70 to accept the recall and perform the duties assigned. It shall be within the discretion of any judge who has attained age 70 to accept such recall.
  3. Any judge recalled to duty under this section shall have all the powers, duties, and privileges attendant on the position he is recalled to serve.
  4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A, the Chief Justice may call upon and authorize any judge of a circuit court whose retirement becomes effective during the interim period between regularly scheduled sessions of the General Assembly to sit in recall either to (i) hear a specific case or cases pursuant to the provisions of § 17.1-105 , and such designation shall continue in effect for the duration of the case or cases, or (ii) perform, for a period of time not to exceed 90 days at any one time, such judicial duties in any circuit court as the Chief Justice shall deem in the public interest for the expeditious disposition of the business of the courts. (1990, c. 832, § 17-7.01; 1998, c. 872; 2001, c. 59; 2014, c. 776; 2018, c. 709.)

Cross references. - As to definition of "judge" generally, see § 17.1-900 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2018, c. 709, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2019."

The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary” for "the Senate and House Committees for Courts of Justice” in subsection A. March 10, 2021.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 59 inserted "or who is retired under the Virginia Retirement System following transfer from the Judicial Retirement System under the provisions of subsection C of § 51.1-303 " in subsection A.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 776, effective April 23, 2014, deleted "or who is retired under the Virginia Retirement System following transfer from the Judicial Retirement System under the provisions of subsection C of § 51.1-303 " following "( § 51.1-300 et seq.)" in subsection A.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 709, effective July 1, 2019, rewrote this section.

CASE NOTES

Challenge to constitutionality of retirement system held properly dismissed. - Suit brought by four former Virginia judges for a declaration that certain provisions of the Commonwealth's judicial retirement system covering them were unconstitutional, both under the equal protection clause of Amendment Fourteen of the Federal Constitution and under the Virginia Constitution, held properly dismissed. Thompson v. Walker, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Virginia acted reasonably in setting up its recall system, whether it be obligatory or merely discretionary, for retired judges under 70 years of age. Thompson v. Walker, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Purpose of recall/retirement system. - The clear purpose of the recall/retirement system is to insure the availability of a pool of auxiliary judges so that Virginia courts can more effectively address the problem of case backlogs. This system of benefits and burdens is rationally calculated to achieve this legitimate purpose; its general structure is well within any limitations imposed by the equal protection clause. Thompson v. Walker, 583 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

This section, by giving retired judges over 70 discretion to refuse recall, strikes a sensible balance between the needs of the recall system, on the one hand, and the realities of aging, on the other. The Constitution does not forbid this eminently reasonable accommodation of conflicting concerns. Thompson v. Walker, 583 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Retired judge under 70 must serve if recalled. - The language of subsection D of this section is plain and unmistakable. It could not be clearer: A retired judge under 70 must serve if recalled. Thompson v. Walker, 583 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Retired judge who both received retirement benefits and appeared in Virginia courts violated former § 51-179 and Canon 8(C) (now 6 C) of the Canons of Judicial Conduct, which incorporates and interprets this section. Thompson v. Walker, 583 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Retired judge not required to retake oath when designated. - Judge, who took the oath of office at the commencement of his term of service to the Commonwealth, and whose oath of office continued in effect at the time of his retirement, was not required to retake the oath of office prior to presiding over defendant's trial; a retired judge, who took the oath of office at the commencement of the term of office in effect at the time of his or her retirement, is not required to retake the oath when designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Lux v. Commonwealth, No. 1476-12-4, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 329 (Nov. 12, 2013).

Applied in Layne v. Crist Elec. Contr., Inc., 62 Va. App. 632, 751 S.E.2d 679 (2013).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Retired judge. - A retired judge may perform marriages, even if he has voluntarily had his name removed from the Supreme Court's recall list; he is still a "retired judge" so long as he remains in good standing with the Supreme Court of Virginia, and is a "public official" subject to possible recall under §§ 16.1-69.22:1 or 17.1-106 . See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Colleen K. Killilea, Judge, Williamsburg / James City County General District Court, 15-044, 2016 Va. AG LEXIS 15 (9/1/16).

§ 17.1-107. Designation of judge to assist regular judge holding case under advisement for unreasonable length of time.

  1. In any civil action, a judge of a circuit court who fails to act on any matter, claim, motion, or issue that has been submitted to the court for a decision or render a final decision in the action shall report, in writing, to the parties or their counsel on any such matter, claim, motion, issue, or action held under advisement for more than 60 days after such submission stating an expected time of a decision. In any civil action in which a judge fails to report as required by this section or fails to render a decision within the expected time stated in the report, any party or their counsel may notify the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Whenever the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or any justice designated by him, has reasonable cause to believe that any judge of a court of record may be holding any matter, claim, motion, issue, or case under advisement for an unreasonable length of time, he shall inquire into the cause of such delay, and if he finds it necessary in order to expedite the administration of justice, he shall designate a judge or retired judge of a court of record to assist the regular judge in the performance of his duties.
  2. Complaints made hereunder shall be absolutely privileged and the name of the complainant shall not be disclosed without his consent.

    (1962, c. 285, § 17-7.1; 1973, c. 544; 1998, c. 872; 2008, c. 813; 2014, c. 62.)

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 813, in subsection A, added the first two sentences and deleted "has reasonable cause to believe that any judge of a court of record may be holding one or more civil cases under advisement for an unreasonable length of time, he" following "designated by him" in the third sentence, and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 62 in subsection A, rewrote the first sentence, which formerly read "A judge of a circuit court in a civil case shall report, in writing, to the parties or their counsel on any cause held under advisement for more than 90 days after final submission stating an expected time of a decision," substituted "In any civil action in which a judge fails" for "In any civil case in which a judge holds any cause under advisement for more than 90 days after final submission, fails" in the second sentence, substituted "any matter, claim, motion, issue, or case" for "one or more civil cases" in the third sentence, and made a minor stylistic change.

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 9-1703. Order of Judicial Recusal; No. 9-1704. Order of Judicial Recusal - Another Form.

CASE NOTES

Relief. - Circuit court's ultimate termination decision regarding one child rendered moot any justiciable challenge to the delay in making that decision, and because the circuit court decided to deny the petition to terminate, it no longer mattered how much time it took to do so, but this did not leave the parties without a remedy in future cases, as they could seek relief by filing a complaint under the statute. Bristol Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Welch, 64 Va. App. 34, 764 S.E.2d 284, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 365 (Nov. 4, 2014).

§ 17.1-108.

Reserved.

§ 17.1-109. Judges pro tempore.

Any cause pending in a circuit court, when the judge of the court is disqualified or unable for any reason to try the same, may be tried by a judge pro tempore who shall be a citizen of this Commonwealth and shall be licensed to practice law in this Commonwealth.

(Code 1919, § 5899, § 17-8; 1996, c. 616; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - As to definition of "judge" generally, see § 17.1-900 .

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judges, §§ 19, 20.

§ 17.1-110. Their appointment and powers.

When all the parties to any cause pending in a circuit court, or their attorneys of record, shall enter into a written stipulation appointing a judge pro tempore for the trial of the cause and approved by a judge of said court in his discretion, and the person appointed shall take and subscribe an oath faithfully to try and determine the issues joined between the parties, the clerk of the court in which such action or suit is pending shall record the stipulation and oath. The person appointed shall be vested with the same power and authority and shall be charged with the same duties as to the cause in and as to which he is appointed as though he were the regularly elected and qualified judge of such court. However, the parties may, by the terms of their stipulation, limit the power of the judge pro tempore to the trial and determination of any specified issue or issues, either of law or fact and in such cases the oath of the person appointed shall correspond to the terms of the stipulation.

The provisions of this section and § 17.1-109 shall be in addition to the provisions of § 17.1-105 .

(Code 1919, § 5900, § 17-9; 1977, c. 237; 1996, c. 616; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judges, § 20.

CASE NOTES

Authority of judge pro tempore. - Where husband and wife consented to the appointment of the judge pro tempore and failed to limit the judge pre tempore's authority in any manner, the judge pro tempore had the same power and authority to decide matters as a regularly elected and qualified judge of such court; the judge pro tempore did not err in providing specific acreage, upon remand, for the disputed real property in the instant action. Hart v. Hart, No. 0952-02-3, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 26 (Ct. of Appeals Jan. 28, 2003).

§ 17.1-111. Compensation.

Judges pro tempore shall serve without compensation from any public treasury, but it shall be lawful for the parties to agree upon and express in their written stipulation any mode or amount of compensation, together with any further agreement as to the taxing of the same as costs.

(Code 1919, § 5901, § 17-10; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-112. Sheriff to attend court as its officer.

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals shall be attended by any sheriff in the City of Richmond. In all other cases, the sheriff of the county or city in which any court is held shall attend it and act as its officer.

(Code 1919, § 5963, § 17-13; 1984, c. 703; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 19 M.J. Trial, § 3.

§ 17.1-113. Places of holding courts; certain orders and decrees entered elsewhere.

Every circuit court for any county or city shall be held at the courthouse of such county or city, except when some other place is prescribed by law or lawfully appointed. However, the judge of the circuit court of any county or city may enter any order or decree at his home or office or elsewhere within his circuit.

In the interest of justice, the chief judges of the Twenty-first and the Twenty-third Judicial Circuits may, by order, designate one or more of the courtrooms of any circuit court within their respective circuits as the courtroom or courtrooms in which civil or criminal cases whose venue is laid within the circuit may be tried. In criminal cases, jurors summoned to appear at such courtroom or courtrooms shall reside in the locality in which the crime was committed, except as otherwise provided by law.

(Code 1919, § 5964, § 17-14; 1940, p. 325; 1998, c. 872; 2005, c. 389.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 389 added the last paragraph.

CASE NOTES

In order to justify transfer of trial from courthouse to another location, the trial court must adopt and implement adequate measures that will not unduly infringe upon the public trial guarantee and will assure freedom of access to the trial. Provision should be made for reasonable notice to the parties and general population who have a right to expect the trial to be held at the courthouse in accordance with the statute. Furthermore, administrative convenience is insufficient, standing alone, to justify a transfer of a criminal trial from the courthouse. These standards govern the decision to transfer a criminal trial from a courthouse courtroom to a prison courtroom. Vescuso v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 59, 360 S.E.2d 547 (1987) (decided under prior law).

Trial inside prison. - The burden was upon defendants to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they were denied a public trial. However, upon a showing that the trial was held within the perimeter walls of a medium security prison, the defendants proved a prima facie case of denial of a public trial. Although the burden of persuasion remains upon defendant throughout the trial, once the prima facie case is made, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the Commonwealth and it is incumbent upon it to produce evidence to justify the transfer of the trial from the regular courthouse to another location. Vescuso v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 59, 360 S.E.2d 547 (1987) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-114. When and how changed.

Whenever in the opinion of a circuit court or the judge thereof, the courthouse or other place wherein it is required to hold its session cannot or should not for any reason be occupied by it, or if the same has been destroyed, or is being repaired, renovated, or enlarged, the court may hold its session at such places within the geographical limits of the same judicial circuit as the court may direct by an order to its clerk. The court shall continue to hold its sessions in such other place until the courthouse or its lawful place of session can be occupied, or until another has been built and fitted for the court's occupation, or until such repairs, renovations or additions have been completed, or until some other place is designated by the court. Except as provided in subsection C of § 17.1-330 or this section or as agreed to by all parties to an action, no session of a circuit court shall be held outside the geographical limits of the county or city of which it is the court.

In the interest of justice, the chief judges of the Twenty-first and the Twenty-third Judicial Circuits may, by order, designate one or more of the courtrooms of any circuit court within their respective circuits as the courtroom or courtrooms in which civil or criminal cases whose venue is laid within the circuit may be tried. In criminal cases, jurors summoned to appear at such courtroom or courtrooms shall reside in the locality in which the crime was committed, except as otherwise provided by law.

(Code 1919, § 5965, §§ 17-15, 17-18; 1962, c. 405; 1966, c. 348; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 156; 1998, c. 872; 2005, c. 389; 2010, cc. 451, 757.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 389 added the last paragraph.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendments by cc. 451 and 757 are identical, and inserted "subsection C of § 17.1-330 or" in the first paragraph.

CASE NOTES

In order to justify transfer of trial from courthouse to another location, the trial court must adopt and implement adequate measures that will not unduly infringe upon the public trial guarantee and will assure freedom of access to the trial. Provision should be made for reasonable notice to the parties and general population who have a right to expect the trial to be held at the courthouse in accordance with the statute. Furthermore, administrative convenience is insufficient, standing alone, to justify a transfer of a criminal trial from the courthouse. These standards govern the decision to transfer a criminal trial from a courthouse courtroom to a prison courtroom. Vescuso v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 59, 360 S.E.2d 547 (1987) (decided under prior law).

Trial inside prison. - The burden was upon defendants to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they were denied a public trial. However, upon a showing that the trial was held within the perimeter walls of a medium security prison, the defendants proved a prima facie case of denial of a public trial. Although the burden of persuasion remains upon defendant throughout the trial, once the prima facie case is made, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the Commonwealth and it is incumbent upon it to produce evidence to justify the transfer of the trial from the regular courthouse to another location. Vescuso v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 59, 360 S.E.2d 547 (1987) (decided under prior law).

County courthouse may be in city within the county. - The courthouse must be located within the boundaries of the county, but the fact that a city is established within the territorial limits of a county does not alter the county boundaries, and the county may still keep its courthouse and other public buildings and hold its court within the city limits. Board of Norfolk County Supvrs. v. Cox, 98 Va. 270 , 36 S.E. 380 (1900) (decided under prior law).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Circuit court is permitted to hold court in another judicial circuit only when all the parties agree. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Kenneth R. Melvin, Member, House of Delegates, 06-050, 2006 Va. AG LEXIS 26 (6/20/06).

§ 17.1-115. How order or warrant making change posted.

A copy of every order of court of a judge issued under § 17.1-114 shall, if practicable, be posted by the clerk of the court at the door of his office and at the courthouse door, and also at the place where the court has designated that its session be held.

(Code 1919, § 5966, § 17-16; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-116. Change of place or time for holding session of Supreme Court.

Whenever, by reason of the destruction, possession by a public enemy, or infection with contagious disease of any building in which the Supreme Court is to be held, it seems necessary to the Chief Justice, he shall, by proclamation, designate a place at which the Court shall be held, so long as such reason may continue, and when the circumstances require it, may postpone the time for holding the Court. In the case of the destruction of the building, the place designated by the Chief Justice shall be within the same county, city or town as the destroyed building. A copy of such designation shall be sent to the clerk and to each of the justices of the Court and published in some newspaper at the seat of government and near the regular place of session of the Court.

(Code 1919, § 5967, § 5968, §§ 17-17, 17-18; 1962, c. 405; 1966, c. 348; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 156; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - For rule of court on sessions, see Rule 5:2.

CASE NOTES

County courthouse may be in city within the county. - The courthouse must be located within the boundaries of the county, but the fact that a city is established within the territorial limits of a county does not alter the county boundaries, and the county may still keep its courthouse and other public buildings and hold its court within the city limits. Board of Norfolk County Supvrs. v. Cox, 98 Va. 270 , 36 S.E. 380 (1900) (decided under former § 17-18).

§ 17.1-117. Certain acts of courts held at improper places confirmed.

When any court has at any time prior to June 13, 1919, been held at a place not authorized by law, in consequence of the destruction of the courthouse, or other unavoidable cause, the acts and proceedings of such court shall be as valid as if the court had been held at the proper place.

(Code 1919, § 5969, § 17-19; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-118. Display of flags in courtrooms.

There shall be displayed inside each courtroom of a court of record in the cities and counties of the Commonwealth the flag of the United States of America and the flag of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The governing bodies of the respective counties and cities shall make provision for such display and may accept gifts or flags for such purpose.

(1954, c. 132, § 17-19.1; 1998, c. 872.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2002, c. 485, cl. 1, provides: "In every courtroom in the Commonwealth '"In God We Trust," the National Motto, enacted by Congress in 1956', shall be posted."

Acts 2002, c. 485, cl. 2, provides: "That this act shall become effective when such funds as are necessary to implement its provisions are appropriated by the General Assembly." As of publication of this replacement volume, no funding had been provided.

§ 17.1-119. Courts may adjourn for a period not exceeding thirty days.

Any court of record may at any term, whether regular or special, adjourn from time to time for a period not exceeding thirty days until the business before it is dispatched, or until the end of its term. The judge of the court shall, during the period of such adjournment, have the power and authority to hold regular or special terms at any other place as if there had been a final adjournment of such term.

(Code 1919, § 5959, § 17-21; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-120. Adjournment from day to day; effect of failure to sit on day to which adjourned.

After a court is opened it shall, during the term, adjourn from day to day, unless the court shall order otherwise, and if it fails to sit on any day to which it is adjourned it may nevertheless sit on any subsequent day of the term.

(Code 1919, § 5970, § 17-23; 1944, p. 399; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - As to adjournment from day to day skipping Sunday and legal holidays, see § 1-210 .

§ 17.1-121. Effect of change of time or place of court or failure to sit generally.

When the place for holding any court or the day for commencing any term is changed or when a court fails to sit on any day appointed for it or to which it may have adjourned there shall be no discontinuance, but every notice, recognizance or process given, taken or returnable to the day on which the failure occurred, or to any day between that day and the next that the court may sit, or to the day and place as it was before such change, and all matters ready for the court to act upon if it had been held on any such day shall be in the same condition and have the same effect as if given, taken, returnable, or continued to the substituted term or place, or to the next day of the same term that the court may sit, or to the next court in course, as the case may be.

In the interest of justice, the chief judges of the Twenty-first and the Twenty-third Judicial Circuits may, by order, designate one or more of the courtrooms of any circuit court within their respective circuits as the courtroom or courtrooms in which civil or criminal cases whose venue is laid within the circuit may be tried. In criminal cases, jurors summoned to appear at such courtroom or courtrooms shall reside in the locality in which the crime was committed, except as otherwise provided by law.

(Code 1919, § 5971, § 17-24; 1998, c. 872; 2005, c. 389.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 389 added the last paragraph.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 6A M.J. Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 26.

CASE NOTES

If the record fails to disclose that a term of court was held on the day appointed for it, none may have been held and the case should stand continued until the next term. Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 741 , 21 S.E. 364 (1895) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-122. Matters not determined to stand continued.

All causes on the docket of any court and all other matters ready for its decision which have not been determined before the end of a term, whether regular or special, shall, without any order of continuance, stand continued to the next term.

(Code 1919, § 5972, § 17-25; 1998, c. 872.)

CASE NOTES

Judgment on verdict rendered at former term. - In an action of unlawful detainer, the court held that it was within the power of a county court (now general district court) at its July term to enter judgment nunc pro tunc, which it had omitted on the verdict at its April term. Van Gunden v. Kane, 88 Va. 591 , 14 S.E. 334 (1892) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-123. How orders are recorded and signed.

  1. All orders that make up each day's proceedings of every circuit court shall be recorded by the clerk in a book known as the order book. Orders that make up each day's proceedings that have been recorded in the order book shall be deemed the official record pursuant to § 8.01-389 when (i) the judge's signature is shown in the order, (ii) the judge's signature is shown in the order book, or (iii) an order is recorded in the order book on the last day of each term showing the signature of each judge presiding during the term.
  2. If a judge dies, retires or resigns before orders recorded in the order book have been authenticated, the orders shall have the same force and effect and shall be deemed authenticated when the signature of another judge of the same circuit court or the signature of the judge appointed to fill the vacancy or to preside over the court until the vacancy is filled is authenticated as provided in subsection A.

    (Code 1919, § 5962, § 17-27; 1940, p. 364; 1954, c. 175; 1966, c. 385; 1990, c. 566; 1998, c. 872; 2014, c. 291.)

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendments by c. 291, substituted "the official record pursuant to § 8.01-389 " for "authenticated" in subsection A.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Courts, § 24; 7B M.J. Evidence, § 84; 11A M.J. Judgments and Decrees, §§ 29, 35; 11B M.J. Jury, § 14.

Research References. - Enforcement of Judgments and Liens in Virginia (Matthew Bender). Chapter 12 Foreign Judgments. § 12.4 Collecting a Judgment from another State in Virginia Other Than Under UEFJA. Rendleman.

CASE NOTES

I. DECIDED UNDER CURRENT LAW.

Failure to sign a conviction order. - Conviction was affirmed as a trial judge's failure to sign the conviction order did not deny defendant his right to due process and his right to equal protection under the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miller v. Commonwealth, No. 2971-02-2, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 64 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 15, 2005).

Authentication of orders. - Nothing in this section required the Commonwealth to introduce a document that was signed by a judge who convicted defendant of rape to have that document considered by the trial court that convicted defendant of robbery, and the court that convicted defendant of robbery did not err when it considered documents that were not signed by the judge but were properly authenticated by his clerk. Seaton v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 739, 595 S.E.2d 9, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 165 (2004).

Absent contrary evidence, the courts presumed that public officials properly discharged their official duties; even though an order showing defendant's prior conviction did not show the trial judge's signature, it was authenticated and certified by the clerk of the court, and became prima facie evidence of the conviction it showed. Brooks v. Commonwealth, No. 2714-03-1, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 65 (Feb. 15, 2005).

Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony in violation of subsection A of § 18.2-308.2 was reversed because the circuit court orders showing his prior convictions were not authenticated by a judge's signature as required by subsection A of § 17.1-123 . Waller v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 731 , 685 S.E.2d 48, 2009 Va. LEXIS 100 (2009).

As subsection A of § 17.1-123 did not make a conviction order's authentication, and subsequent admissibility, contingent upon the admission of an order showing the beginning of the term of court during which the conviction was entered, and as the trial court could have taken judicial notice of the beginning of the term, defendant's prior conviction order was properly admitted; therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's third domestic assault conviction. Lampkin v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 726, 706 S.E.2d 51, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 76 (2011).

Circuit court did not err in admitting pages from an order book because it was maintained in conformity with clause (ii) of subsection A of § 17.1-123 ; even if subsection A of § 17.1-123 required that the identity of the presiding judge be ascertainable, the sequence of the various orders and the respective signatures of the judges indicated that one judge presided over the case under which his signature appeared and the other judge presided over the cases, including defendant's, under which his signature appeared. Hubbard v. Commonwealth, No. 0865-16-3, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 186 (Aug. 1, 2017).

Although clause (i) of subsection A of § 17.1-123 provides that an order book page shall be admissible when the judge's signature is shown in the order, neither of the other permissible methods require that the judge's signature appear on the individual order for it to be admissible. Hubbard v. Commonwealth, No. 0865-16-3, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 186 (Aug. 1, 2017).

Circuit court did not err in admitting into evidence the pages from an order book as proof of defendant's prior convictions because the book was maintained in conformity with clause (ii) of subsection A, and thus, the pages were admissible as the records of a judicial proceeding and as official records of a court of this Commonwealth; the signatures of both judges who presided in the circuit court where the prior convictions were rendered shown in the order book. Hubbard v. Commonwealth, No. 0865-16-3, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 186 (Aug. 1, 2017).

Court orders were properly admitted under subsection A, and since defendant had only assigned error to the admissibility of the orders, the authenticity of the records was not properly before the court of appeals. Raspberry v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 19, 833 S.E.2d 894, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 241 (2019).

II. DECIDED UNDER PRIOR LAW.

The purpose of this section is to provide for keeping the records of every court correctly, by making it the duty of the clerk to enter them in a book, and to read them in open court to the judge, and in the presence of the bar, so that any errors in or omissions from them might be corrected. Barnes v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794 , 23 S.E. 784 (1895). See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Barton, 166 Va. 426 , 186 S.E. 65 (1936).

A court speaks only through its orders. Cunningham v. Smith, 205 Va. 205 , 135 S.E.2d 770 (1964).

Which must comply with law. - In those cases where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon compliance with certain mandatory provisions of law, the court's order, spread upon its order book, must show such compliance or jurisdiction is not obtained. Cunningham v. Smith, 205 Va. 205 , 135 S.E.2d 770 (1964).

Court proceedings should be recorded as of the day they take place. Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 851 , 71 S.E.2d 377 (1952).

And should be entered chronologically. - Courts of record are required to maintain order books for the purpose of recording systematically the daily proceedings had in court. Orders should be entered by the clerk chronologically. McDowell v. Dye, 193 Va. 390 , 69 S.E.2d 459 (1952).

All orders need not be recorded immediately. - It is not the practice in this State, and indeed it would be physically impossible, for the clerk to record all of the orders on the order book immediately, or for the judge forthwith to sign them. The universal practice is that the clerk extends the orders upon the permanent record of the court just as soon as possible, and they are thereafter read in open court and signed as orders of the date when the judgments were pronounced. This practice is recognized by this section. Daley v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 621 , 111 S.E. 111 (1922).

Court order carrying into effect its prior oral pronouncement should have been spread upon the order book under the date upon which it was approved and endorsed for entry and should not have been antedated as of the date of the oral pronouncement. McDowell v. Dye, 193 Va. 390 , 69 S.E.2d 459 (1952).

Signing orders of last day of term authenticates all orders. - If only the orders of the last day of the term are signed, this is sufficient authentication of all the orders of the term which are spread on the record and which precede the signature of the judge, though the reasonable inference from this section is that the orders of each day should be separately signed. Weatherman v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 796 , 22 S.E. 349 (1895).

Presence of accused not necessary when orders signed. - It is not necessary that the accused should be present when orders are signed. Weatherman v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 796 , 22 S.E. 349 (1895).

Amendment of record after the term. - After the term at which a case is tried the court cannot amend its records, unless there is something in the record by which amendments can be safely made. They cannot be made upon the individual recollection of the judge, or upon proof aliunde. Barnes v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794 , 23 S.E. 784 (1895). See also Sydnor v. Burke, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 161 (1826).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Orders not signed by justices. - The court's procedures allowing routine orders to be endorsed by the clerk's office and permitting the identities of panel members to remain undisclosed pose no constitutional problems. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable James M. Shuler, Member, House of Delegates, 11-010, 2011 Va. AG LEXIS 12 (2/18/11).

Order book. - An electronic case management system that provides the contents of an order book as prescribed in § 17.1-124 , that is created using an electronic recording process compliant with the archival standards as recommended by the Library of Virginia, and that follows state electronic records guidelines as provided in § 42.1-82 , fulfills the requirement of an order book as described in § 17.1-124 . See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Michele B. McQuigg, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Prince William County, No. 13-091, 2014 Va. AG LEXIS 7 (1/10/14).

§ 17.1-124. Order books; automated systems.

Except as otherwise provided herein, each circuit court clerk shall keep order books or, in lieu thereof, an automated system recording all proceedings, orders and judgments of the court in all matters, all decrees, and decretal orders of such court and all matters pertaining to trusts, the appointment and qualification of trustees, committees, administrators, executors, conservators and guardians shall be recorded, except when the same are appointed by the clerk of court, in which event the order appointing such administrators or executors, shall be made and entered in the clerk's order book. In any circuit court, the clerk may, with the approval of the chief judge of the court, by order entered of record, divide the order book into two sections, to be known as the civil order book and the criminal order book. All (i) proceedings, orders, and judgments of the court in all matters at civil law and (ii) trust fund orders, which shall include money held by a general receiver of the court pursuant to § 8.01-582 or by the clerk of the circuit court pursuant to § 8.01-600 , shall be recorded in the civil order book, and all proceedings, orders and judgments of the court in all matters at criminal law shall be recorded in the criminal order book. In any proceeding brought for the condemnation of property, all proceedings, orders, judgments and decrees of the court shall be recorded in the civil order book of the court. The recordation prior to January 1, 1974, of all proceedings, orders, judgments and decrees in such cases, whether entered in the common-law order book or the chancery order book of any court, is hereby declared a valid and proper recordation of the same. Orders in cases appealed from the juvenile and domestic relations district courts shall be maintained as provided in this section and, to the extent inconsistent with this section, § 16.1-302.

The clerk shall ensure that these order books have been microfilmed or converted to or created in an electronic format. Such microfilm and microphotographic processes and equipment shall meet state microfilm standards, and such electronic format shall follow state electronic records guidelines, pursuant to § 42.1-82 . The clerk shall further provide the master reel of any such microfilm for storage in the Library of Virginia and shall provide for the secured, off-site back up of any electronic copies of such records.

(1926, p. 750, § 17-28; 1932, p. 765; 1936, p. 557; Michie Code 1942, § 5962a; 1962, c. 233; 1973, c. 9; 1974, c. 524; 1990, c. 258; 1997, c. 801; 1998, c. 872; 2005, c. 681; 2007, c. 567; 2010, cc. 717, 760; 2014, c. 460; 2017, c. 35.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 681, effective January 1, 2006, deleted "common law" preceding "order book" throughout, combined the first and former second sentences and deleted "two" following "keep," substituted "to be known as the common-law order book and the chancery order book. In the common-law order book" for "recording," deleted "at common law shall be recorded. In the chancery order book" following "all matters" deleted the former fifth sentence, which read: "The action of any court which has established a separate criminal common-law order book prior to July 1, 1973, is hereby validated" and substituted "civil order book" for "common-law order book" in the fourth sentence.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 567 added the last paragraph.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendments by cc. 717 and 760 are identical, and inserted "or created in" in the first sentence of the second paragraph.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 460 added "automated systems" in the first paragraph inserted "or, in lieu thereof, an automated system."

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 35 inserted "(i)" and "and (ii) trust fund orders, which shall include money held by a general receiver of the court pursuant to § 8.01-582 or by the clerk of the circuit court pursuant to § 8.01-600 " in the third sentence.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11B M.J. Jury, § 14.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Order book. - An electronic case management system that provides the contents of an order book as prescribed in § 17.1-124 , that is created using an electronic recording process compliant with the archival standards as recommended by the Library of Virginia, and that follows state electronic records guidelines as provided in § 42.1-82 , fulfills the requirement of an order book as described in § 17.1-124 . See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Michele B. McQuigg, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Prince William County, No. 13-091, 2014 Va. AG LEXIS 7 (1/10/14).

§ 17.1-125. Civil order book.

The clerk shall record (i) trust fund orders pursuant to §§ 17.1-123 and 17.1-124 and (ii) the annual trust fund report required pursuant to subsection G of § 8.01-600 in a book known as the civil order book, in which shall be recorded all reports, orders, and decrees concerning moneys received or to be received by general receivers pursuant to § 8.01-582 and by clerks pursuant to § 8.01-600 .

(1988, c. 553, § 17-28.1; 1998, c. 872; 2017, c. 35.)

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 35 rewrote the section which formerly read: "There shall be kept in the office of the clerk of every circuit court an order book to be known as the trust fund order book, in which shall be recorded all reports, orders, and decrees concerning moneys received or to be received by general receivers pursuant to § 8.01-582 and by clerks pursuant to § 8.01-600 . Recording of orders and decrees pursuant to this section shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any recording otherwise required by statute."

§§ 17.1-126, 17.1-127.

Repealed by Acts 2001, c. 836, cl. 2.

§ 17.1-128. Recording evidence and incidents of trial in certain civil cases and cost thereof; cost of transcripts; preservation of original notes or records; certified transcript prima facie correct.

In all civil cases, the court or judge trying the case may by order entered of record provide for the recording verbatim of the evidence and incidents of trial either by a court reporter or by mechanical or electronic devices approved by the court. The expense of reporting and recording the trial of a civil case shall be paid by the litigants in the manner and in the proportion as the court may in its discretion direct. A transcript of the record, when required by any party, shall be paid for by such party. The court on appeal may provide that such cost may, in civil cases, be reimbursed to the party prevailing. The failure to secure the services of a reporter, or the failure to have the case reported or recorded for any other reason, shall not affect the proceeding or trial. The reporter or other individual designated to report and record the trial shall preserve the original shorthand notes or other original records for not less than five years. The transcript in any case certified by the reporter or other individual designated to report and record the trial shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of the evidence and incidents of trial.

The administration of this section shall be under the direction of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

(1952, c. 642, § 17-30.1; 1956, c. 699; 1962, c. 419; 1964, c. 533; 1968, c. 358; 1975, c. 640; 1984, c. 752; 1994, c. 496; 1998, c. 872.)

Law review. - For article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 183 (2010).

For Survey article, see "Civil Practice and Procedure," 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1 (2013).

For essay, see "Terminating Parental Rights through a Backdoor in the Virginia Code: Adoptions Under section 63.2-1202 (H)," 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 371 (2013).

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 8-203. Notice of Appeal; No. 8-213. Notice of Filing of Transcript; No. 8-227. Notarized Bill of Costs.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Costs, § 12.

CASE NOTES

Dismissal for failure to secure court reporter. - Dismissal of suit for failure to obtain a court reporter violated § 17.1-128 , which unambiguously provided that the failure to secure the services of a reporter should not affect a proceeding or trial. Shapiro v. Younkin, 279 Va. 256 , 688 S.E.2d 157, 2010 Va. LEXIS 3 (2010).

§ 17.1-128.1. Recording evidence and incidents of trial in certain misdemeanor cases.

In any misdemeanor case in circuit court for which no recording verbatim of the evidence and incidents of trial either by a court reporter or by mechanical or electronic devices approved by the court will be used, the court shall allow the defendant, the Commonwealth, or both to record the evidence and incidents of trial by mechanical or electronic device to aid counsel in producing a thorough, complete, and accurate written statement of facts in lieu of transcript for purposes of any appeal. The recording shall not be made a part of the record unless otherwise permitted.

(2014, c. 78.)

§ 17.1-129. Filing date and time to be noted on papers.

Whenever a pleading in any civil action is filed in a circuit court, the clerk or his designee shall stamp or mark the date and time of filing on the face of such pleading.

(1985, c. 369, § 17-30.3; 1998, c. 872.)

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Clerk must treat pleadings as filed when received without passing on their validity. - Court's mandamus ordered clerk to do ministerial act: to treat woman's personal injury pleadings as received, filed, and on docket as of day they were presented to clerk (statute of limitation's last day) even though caption named wrong court; the clerk had no authority to pass upon the validity of instruments presented for filing. Burkholder v. McGraw, 63 Va. Cir. 537, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 360 (Roanoke County 2003).

§ 17.1-130. Execution of judgments and decrees of courts no longer existing.

Every judgment, decree or order entered in a court which has ceased to exist shall be executed by the court in the custody of whose clerk the record of such judgment, decree or order may be. Every judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court effecting any judgment, decree or order shall be certified by the court and the case shall be proceeded in as if such court had rendered the same.

(Code 1919, § 5974, § 17-32; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-131. Jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus in matters pertaining to action of service district commission.

The circuit court of a county or city having original and general jurisdiction of civil actions in which county or city is situated the seat of government of a service district, shall have original exclusive jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus in all matters or proceedings arising from or pertaining to the action of the service district commission.

(1968, c. 225, § 17-32.1; 1998, c. 872; 2005, c. 681.)

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 6-1201. Petition for Writ of Mandamus Against Officer of a Corporation; No. 6-1207. Petition for Writ of Mandamus Against Sheriff.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 681, effective January 1, 2006, substituted "civil actions" for "suits in chancery and civil cases at law."

§ 17.1-132. Courts Technology Fund.

  1. There is hereby established the Courts Technology Fund as a special nonreverting fund to be administered by the Supreme Court of Virginia. A portion of the sums collected pursuant to §§ 16.1-69.48:2, 17.1-275 , 17.1-328 , and 17.1-418 as specified in each section shall be deposited into the state treasury to the credit of the Fund.
  2. The Fund shall be established on the books of the Comptroller. Any funds remaining in the Fund at the end of the biennium shall not revert to the general fund, but shall remain in the Fund. Interest earned on the Fund shall be credited to the Fund. Except for transfers pursuant to this section, there shall be no transfers out of the Fund, including transfers to the general fund.
  3. Money in the Fund shall be allocated at the direction of the Supreme Court of Virginia to staff, advance, update, maintain, replace, repair, and support the telecommunications and technology systems of the judicial system. The revenue raised in support of the Fund shall not be used to supplant current funding to the judicial branch.

    (2006, cc. 623, 718.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 39 G, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "In addition to any filing fee or other fee permitted by law, an electronic access fee may be charged for each case filed electronically pursuant to Rule 1:17 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The amount of this fee shall be set by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Moneys collected pursuant to this fee shall be deposited into the State Treasury to the credit of the Courts Technology Fund established pursuant to § 17.1-132 , to be used to support the costs of statewide electronic filing systems."

Chapter 2. Clerks, Clerks' Offices and Records.

Clerk of Supreme Court.

Other Clerks and Clerks' Offices.

Records, Recordation and Indexing Generally.

Electronic Filing.

Electronic Filing.

Master and Incorporating Deeds of Trust.

Names, Discharges, etc., of War Service Men.

Fees.

Secure Remote Access.

Article 1. Clerk of Supreme Court.

§ 17.1-200. Clerk of Supreme Court; appointment; removal.

There shall be a clerk of the Supreme Court, who shall be appointed by and shall hold office at the pleasure of the Court. In addition to his regular duties as clerk, he shall perform such other duties and services as the Court may require, without additional compensation.

(Code 1919, § 3378, § 17-33; 1934, p. 427; 1938, p. 131; 1998, c. 872.)

Research References. - Friend's Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 1. Courts. § 1.02 Supreme Court of Virginia. Friend.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Circuit court clerk's statutory duties do not extend to the preparation of sketch orders in criminal cases. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Judy L. Worthington, Clerk of Circuit Court of Chesterfield County, 05-054, 2005 Va. AG LEXIS 37 (9/19/05).

Statutory duties of a circuit court clerk do not require the preparation of sketch orders in civil cases. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Judy L. Worthington, Chesterfield County Circuit Court Clerk, 09-007, 2009 Va. AG LEXIS 19 (2/27/09).

A locality or a circuit court judge does not have the statutory authority to direct how a circuit court clerk uses the Technology Trust Fund monies allocated to such clerk's office pursuant to § 17.1-279 . See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable John T. Frey, Fairfax County Circuit Court Clerk, 09-055, 2009 Va. AG LEXIS 40 (10/8/09).

§ 17.1-201. Appointment of deputies; their duties; how removed, etc.

The Supreme Court, or any four of the justices thereof in vacation concurring in the appointment, may appoint one or more deputy clerks, who may discharge any of the official duties of the clerk during their continuance in office. Any deputy clerk may be removed from office by the Court or by any four of the justices thereof in vacation. Any such appointment or removal in vacation shall be in writing and shall be maintained with the records of the Court.

(Code 1919, § 3379, § 17-34; 1934, p. 427; 1938, p. 131; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - As to appointment of deputies by clerks of any circuit court, see § 15.2-1603 .

§ 17.1-202. Clerk, etc., of Supreme Court not to act as counsel.

No clerk, deputy clerk or employee of the Supreme Court shall act as counsel in any case pending in the Court or which may be taken to the Court by appeal or otherwise. Any clerk, deputy clerk or employee violating this section shall be removed from office or employment, as the case may be, in the manner provided in § 17.1-201 .

(Code 1919, § 3380, § 17-35; 1938, p. 131; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-203. Where clerk's offices to be kept.

The clerk of the Supreme Court shall maintain a clerk's office at Richmond, at such place as the Court shall direct.

(Code 1919, § 3385, § 17-37; 1938, p. 132; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-204. Examination of office and accounts of clerk.

The books and accounts of the clerk of the Supreme Court shall be audited as determined necessary by the Auditor of Public Accounts, who shall make reports of his findings to the Governor and file a copy of such report with the Court within 30 days after the completion of any such audit.

(Code 1919, § 3383, § 17-39; 1934, p. 427; 1938, p. 132; 1998, c. 872; 2018, cc. 57, 307.)

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendments by cc. 57 and 307 are identical, and substituted "as determined necessary" for "annually and at such other times as the Court may deem proper" and substituted "30 days" for "thirty days."

§ 17.1-205. Pro Hac Vice Fund.

There is hereby established the Pro Hac Vice Fund, a special, nonreverting fund comprised of moneys collected pursuant to Rule 1A:4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and subsection B of § 17.1-328 . The Fund shall be established on the books of the Comptroller. All moneys received by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for this Fund shall be paid into the state treasury and credited to the Fund. Interest earned on moneys in the Fund shall remain in the Fund and be credited to it. Any moneys remaining in the Fund, including interest thereon, at the end of each fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund but shall remain in the Fund. Moneys in the Fund shall be used solely for the purpose of improving the administration of justice. Expenditures and disbursements from the Fund shall be made by the State Treasurer on warrants issued by the Comptroller upon written authorization of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court.

(2007, cc. 113, 372.)

§ 17.1-205.1. Sealing Fee Fund.

There is hereby created in the state treasury a special nonreverting fund to be known as the Sealing Fee Fund, referred to in this section as "the Fund." The Fund shall be established on the books of the Comptroller. All funds accruing to the Fund pursuant to §§ 19.2-392.12 and 19.2-392.16 and all funds appropriated for such purpose and any gifts, donations, grants, bequests, and other funds received on its behalf shall be paid into the state treasury and credited to the Fund. Interest earned on moneys in the Fund shall remain in the Fund and be credited to it. Any moneys remaining in the Fund, including interest thereon, at the end of each fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund but shall remain in the Fund. The Fund shall be administered by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court, who shall use such funds solely to fund the costs for the compensation of court-appointed counsel under the provisions of subsection L of § 19.2-392.12. Expenditures from the Fund shall be limited by an appropriation in the general appropriation act. Expenditures and disbursements from the Fund shall be made by the State Treasurer on warrants issued by the Comptroller upon request of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court.

(2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524, 542.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542, cl. 17 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities; therefore, Chapter 1289 of the Acts of Assembly of 2020 requires the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to assign a minimum fiscal impact of $50,000. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

Effective date. - This section is effective July 1, 2021.

Article 2. Other Clerks and Clerks' Offices.

§ 17.1-206. Where offices to be located.

The clerk's office of every circuit court, or any division thereof, of any county or city shall be kept at the courthouse of such county or city, unless there is a failure by the proper authorities to provide an office there, in which case the clerk's office may be kept at such other place within the county or city as the court may direct. However, nothing in this section shall prohibit the establishment of a clerk's office satellite facility or annex which is not located at the courthouse; provided that recording of all land records, docketing of all monetary judgments, filing of U.C.C. financing statements, and filing of matters at law and in equity shall be conducted at the courthouse location. All expenses related to the establishment and operation of a satellite facility or annex shall be the responsibility of the locality.

(Code 1919, § 3385, § 17-40; 1938, p. 132; 1973, c. 406; 1997, c. 325; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-207. Days of operation of clerks' offices.

  1. The clerk's office of every court shall be kept open on every day except Saturday, except as provided in subsection B, and Sunday, and the days provided for in § 2.2-3300 , for the transaction of business; provided that:
    1. The clerk's office of the circuit court of any county or city may be closed on any day which is established as a general holiday for the employees of such county or city by a resolution duly adopted by the governing body of such county or city and approved by the judge or judges of the circuit court and filed in the office of the clerk; provided that such general holiday shall have the same force and effect as a legal holiday as set forth in subsection B of § 1-210 ;
    2. The judge or judges of any circuit court in any county or city may authorize the clerk of such court to close the clerk's office on Christmas Eve; provided that the closing of any clerk's office as provided by this subdivision shall have the same force and effect as a legal holiday as set forth in subsection B of § 1-210 ;
    3. The chief judge or presiding judge of any circuit court may authorize the clerk of the court to close the clerk's office on any day when the chief judge or presiding judge determines that operation of the clerk's office, under prevailing conditions, would constitute a threat to the health and safety of the clerk's office personnel or the general public. Closing of the clerk's office pursuant to this subdivision shall have the same effect as provided in subsection B of § 1-210;
    4. The judge or judges of the circuit court of any county or city may authorize the clerk of such court to close the clerk's office on any day or portion of a day which the Governor declares as a holiday for state employees, or on any day or portion of a day on which the Governor authorizes state offices to be closed; provided that such closing of any clerk's office shall have the same force and effect as a legal holiday as set forth in subsection B of § 1-210. Except for closings pursuant to subdivision 3, whenever the authorization of the judge is necessary to close a clerk's office and a court has more than one judge, the authorization of all such judges shall be necessary. The judge of the circuit court of any county or city may require the clerk's office to be kept open continuously for the transaction of business during convenient hours on all the days on which it is required by this section to be kept open.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the clerk, with the approval of the chief judge, to open the clerk's office on Saturdays, during such hours as the chief judge may authorize, solely for the purposes of (i) permitting examination and copying of court records, (ii) accepting applications for and granting licenses pursuant to applicable law, and (iii) recording instruments. For all other purposes, including without limitation the filing of actions at law and suits in equity and all pleadings, pleas and motions therein, such clerk's office shall be closed with the force and effect of a statutory closing as provided in subsection B of § 1-210 . (Code 1919, § 3388, § 17-41; 1920, p. 242; 1930, p. 353; 1936, p. 16; 1942, p. 242; 1944, p. 39; 1946, p. 55; 1947, p. 95; 1950, p. 1166; 1952, c. 434; 1954, c. 304; 1956, c. 24; 1959, Ex. Sess., c. 64; 1960, cc. 25, 482; 1962, c. 409; 1966, c. 250; 1970, c. 61; 1972, c. 128; 1974, cc. 279, 569; 1986, c. 166; 1993, c. 429; 1996, cc. 588, 592; 1998, c. 872; 2000, cc. 412, 444; 2001, c. 287; 2005, c. 839.)

Cross references. - As to days when circuit court shall be open, see § 17.1-705.2 .

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendments by cc. 412 and 444 are identical, and in the introductory language, added the subsection A designation, and inserted "except as provided in subsection B," and added subsection B.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 287, in subsection B, deleted "and" preceding "(ii)," inserted "and (iii) recording instruments," and deleted "recordation of instruments and the" following "including without limitation the."

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 839, effective October 1, 2005, substituted "subsection B of § 1-210 " for " § 1-13.3:1" in subdivisions A 1, A 2, A 3, A 4, and subsection B.

CASE NOTES

Clerk must transact business during convenient hours. - It is a violation of the spirit of this section to permit a public officer to transact public business outside of his usual and convenient hours, so that among those entitled to an equal opportunity, one or more shall receive preferential treatment. It will, perhaps, be admitted that one cannot require a clerk of court to perform a public service outside of the convenient hours adopted for the transaction of business and outside of his office. It ought not, therefore, to be left to the public official to voluntarily assume such responsibility, especially when the rights of others are affected thereby. Brumley v. Grimstead, 170 Va. 340 , 196 S.E. 668 (1938) (decided under prior law).

While not required by statute to be kept open during specified hours, the office hours for the transaction of business shall be "during convenient hours." It can hardly be seriously contended that the hours between 12:00 midnight and 8:00 a.m. may be considered convenient, either for the great majority of persons having business to transact at that office, or for the employees of the office. Brumley v. Grimstead, 170 Va. 340 , 196 S.E. 668 (1938) (decided under prior law).

Weather related closure. - Dismissal of a negligence complaint was not warranted because an injured party's complaint was timely filed due to subsection C of § 1-210 . Closures due to snow were authorized under § 17.1-207 , even though a presiding judge did not authorize such. Allie v. Whole Foods Mkt. Group, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 2d 773, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112606 (E.D. Va. 2010).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Clerk of court can close the office when a county has failed to adopt a budget. - Clerk of court can close the office when a county has failed to adopt a budget and the clerk cannot pay his employees. A clerk, or the employees of the clerk's office, can serve on a volunteer basis until the budget impasse is resolved. To the extent particular functions, including electronic filing procedures, can be kept operational in the absence of funding from the county and without staffing, the clerk should do so. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Jack Kennedy, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Wise County and City of Norton, 11-063, 2011 Va. AG LEXIS 34 (6/22/11).

§ 17.1-208. Records, etc., open to inspection; copies; exception.

  1. For the purposes of this section, "confidential court records," "court records," and "nonconfidential court records" shall have the same meaning as set forth in § 17.1-292 .
  2. Except as otherwise provided by law, any records that are maintained by the clerks of the circuit courts shall be open to inspection in the office of the clerk by any person and the clerk shall, when requested, furnish copies thereof subject to any reasonable fee charged by the clerk pursuant to § 17.1-275 . No person shall be permitted to use the clerk's office for the purpose of making copies of records in such manner, or to such extent, as will, in the determination of the clerk, interfere with the business of the office or with its reasonable use by the general public. The certificate of the clerk to copies furnished by the clerk shall, if the paper copied be recorded in a bound volume, contain the name and number of the volume and the page or folio at which the recordation of the paper begins, or the instrument number as applicable, and the clerk may charge a fee therefor pursuant to § 17.1-275 . The certificate of the circuit court clerk to such copies may be provided electronically subject to the provisions of § 17.1-258.3:2 . Such electronic certificate may reference an instrument number, bound volume, or other case number, but is not required to do so.
  3. Requests for copies of nonconfidential court records maintained in individual case files shall be made to the clerk of the circuit court.
  4. Requests for reports of aggregated, nonconfidential case data fields that are viewable through the online case information systems maintained by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall be made to the Office of the Executive Secretary. Such reports of aggregated case data shall not include the name, date of birth, or social security number of any party, and shall not include images of the individual records in the respective case files. However, nothing in this section shall be construed to permit any reports of aggregated case data to be sold or posted on any other website or in any way redistributed to any third party. The clerk or the Executive Secretary, in his discretion, may deny such request to ensure compliance with these provisions. However, such data may be included in products or services provided to a third party, provided that such data is not made available to the general public.
  5. Any clerk or the Executive Secretary, as applicable, may require that the request be in writing and that the requester provide his name and legal address. A request for nonconfidential court records or reports of aggregated, nonconfidential case data shall identify the requested records with reasonable specificity. Any clerk or the Executive Secretary, as applicable, may determine the costs for providing the requested records to the requester, advise the requester of such costs, and, before continuing to process the request, require the requester to agree to payment of a deposit not to exceed the amount of the advance determination, which shall be credited to the final cost of supplying the requested records. Neither a clerk nor the Executive Secretary shall be required to create a new record if the record does not already exist or provide a report of aggregated, nonconfidential case data in a format not regularly used by the clerk or the Executive Secretary; however, a clerk or the Executive Secretary, as applicable, may abstract or summarize information under such terms and conditions as agreed to by the requester and the clerk or Executive Secretary, as provided herein.
  6. Except as otherwise provided by law, the requested court records or reports of aggregated, nonconfidential case data shall be provided to the requester within a reasonable period of time, given the nature of the request and the availability of staff to respond to the request, but in no event longer than 30 days from the date of a complete request made by a requester that is fully compliant with the requirements of this section and other applicable law. Any objection or assertion of confidentiality shall be provided to the requester within a reasonable period of time, but in no event longer than 30 days from the date of a complete request made by a requester.
  7. Any clerk or the Executive Secretary may require payment in advance of all reasonable costs, not to exceed the actual cost incurred in accessing, duplicating, reviewing, supplying, or searching for the requested court records or reports of aggregated, nonconfidential case data, including removing any confidential information contained in the court records from the nonconfidential court records being provided, excluding any extraneous, intermediary, or surplus fees or expenses to recoup the general overhead costs associated with creating or maintaining records or transacting the general business of the clerk or the Office of the Executive Secretary. Before processing a request for court records or reports of aggregated, nonconfidential case data, any clerk or the Executive Secretary may require the requester to pay any amounts owed to the clerk or the Office of the Executive Secretary for previous requests for court records or reports of aggregated, nonconfidential case data that remain unpaid 30 days or more after billing.
  8. Any clerk and the Executive Secretary shall be immune from any suit arising from the production of court records or reports of aggregated, nonconfidential case data in accordance with this section absent gross negligence or willful misconduct.
  9. Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to court records transferred to the Library of Virginia for permanent archiving pursuant to the duties imposed by the Virginia Public Records Act (§ 42.1-76 et seq.). In accordance with § 42.1-79 , the Library of Virginia shall be the custodian of such permanently archived records and shall be responsible for responding to requests for such records. (Code 1919, § 3388, § 17-43; 1920, p. 242; 1930, p. 353; 1936, p. 17; 1942, p. 242; 1944, p. 40; 1946, p. 56; 1947, p. 96; 1952, c. 286; 1998, c. 872; 2002, c. 299; 2007, cc. 548, 626; 2013, c. 77; 2015, c. 641; 2018, cc. 127, 584.)

Cross references. - As to who may have access to discharge certificates and reports of separation from active duty, notwithstanding the provisions of this section, see § 17.1-265 .

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 299 added "Except as otherwise provided by law" at the beginning of the first sentence.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendments by cc. 548 and 626 are identical, and in the first sentence, substituted "any" for "the," inserted "that are maintained by the clerk of the circuit court" following "circuit court" and substituted "requested" for "required"; and added "and may charge a fee therefor pursuant to § 17.1-275 " at the end of the second sentence.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 77 deleted "and papers of every circuit court" following "any records" and inserted "subject to any fee charged by the clerk pursuant to § 17.12-275" and "by statute" in the first sentence; inserted "or the instrument number as applicable," and "the clerk" in the second sentence; inserted the third and fourth sentences; and in the fifth sentence, inserted "in the determination of the clerk."

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 641 added the second sentence; substituted "copies furnished by the clerk" for "such copies" in the third sentence; and deleted the last sentence which read: "No person shall be permitted to use the clerk's office for the purpose of making copies of records in such manner, or to such extent, as will, in the determination of the clerk, interfere with the business of the office or with its reasonable use by the general public."

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendments by cc. 127 and 584 are identical, and added subsections A, and C through I; and redesignated the former text as subsection B; in the first sentence of subsection B, inserted "in the office of the clerk" and "reasonable," and deleted "except in cases in which it is otherwise specially provided by statute" at the end; and in the fourth sentence, inserted "circuit court" preceding "clerk"; and made stylistic changes.

Law review. - For annual survey article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 269 (2009).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Courts, § 26.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Common-law rule of openness subject to statutory exception. - Construing the language of this section as it has endured for more than a century, the court concluded that the General Assembly intended to recognize the generally accepted common-law rule of openness and to declare its power to make statutory exceptions to the rule. Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235 Va. 253 , 368 S.E.2d 253 (1988).

No distinction between criminal and civil proceedings. - The broad sweep of this section is significant. It makes no distinction between criminal and civil proceedings. Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235 Va. 253 , 368 S.E.2d 253 (1988).

Intent of statutes. - Given the salutary purpose of § 8.01-55 , the court could not conceive that the General Assembly intended to permit the confidentiality provisions allowed but not required by § 8.01-581.22 to trump the provisions of § 8.01-55 and, consequently, the right of public access provided for by § 17.1-208 in the context of the records of court approval of the compromise settlement of a wrongful death claim achieved through mediation. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err when the court ruled that in approving the compromise settlements in the present cases, the court was not subject to a de jure requirement under § 8.01-581.22 to place the record, or at least that portion of the record detailing the financial terms of the compromise settlements, under seal. Perreault v. Free Lance-Star, 276 Va. 375 , 666 S.E.2d 352, 2008 Va. LEXIS 96 (2008).

Section 2.2-3704 , restricting access to information under Virginia's Freedom of Information Act to Virginia citizens did not abridge the ability of petitioner, an out-of-state searcher for his title company clients, to engage in a common calling in the sense the Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibited and a claim of constitutional violation by defendant state officials for denying the information sought failed; most of the information sought was available through §§ 8.01-241 , 17.1-208 , 55-106, 55-142.1, 58.1-314 , 58.1-908 , 58.1-1805 , 58.1-2021 (A), 58.1-3122 . McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 185 L. Ed. 2d 758, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 3317 (2013).

Interpretation. - Section 17.1-208 explicitly states that any records and papers maintained by the clerk shall be open to inspection by any person. With respect to the court's analysis, § 17.1-208 's statutory presumption of access is equivalent to the constitutional right of access. Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 447 , 739 S.E.2d 636, 2013 Va. LEXIS 30 (2013).

Presumption of public access applies in civil proceedings to judicial records. - In light of the legislative history of this section and its common-law underpinnings, subject to statutory exceptions, a rebuttable presumption of public access applies in civil proceedings to judicial records and to overcome that presumption, the moving party must bear the burden of establishing an interest so compelling that it cannot be protected reasonably by some measure other than a protective order. Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235 Va. 253 , 368 S.E.2d 253 (1988).

Circuit court did not err in unsealing the evaluations of a patient contained in the report for the review of the continuation of secure inpatient treatment of the patient, who was sexually violent predator (SVP), which report was prepared under subsection B of § 37.2-910 and § 37.2-100 , as the report was introduced into evidence during the SVP annual review hearing in that the patient failed to rebut the presumption of public access under § 17.1-208 . Lotz v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 345 , 672 S.E.2d 833, 2009 Va. LEXIS 31 (2009).

Public access to records. - Section 2.2-3704 , restricting access to information under Virginia's Freedom of Information Act to Virginia citizens did not abridge the ability of petitioner, an out-of-state searcher for his title company clients, to engage in a common calling in the sense the Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibited and a claim of constitutional violation by defendant state officials for denying the information sought failed; many records were available through other means, such as through § 17.1-208 , or the under the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act, subdivision A 3 of § 2.2-3806 . McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 185 L. Ed. 2d 758, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 3317 (2013).

Audio tape recording open to inspection. - When the audio tape recording of a felony criminal trial is the only record of that trial, it is a "record" of the court as contemplated by the provisions of this section and, thus, open to inspection by any person. Smith v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 261 Va. 113 , 540 S.E.2d 878, 2001 Va. LEXIS 21 (2001).

Inapplicability to pretrial discovery materials. - The common law right of access to "judicial records" does not extend to pretrial discovery materials collected by the parties but not yet a part of the judicial record in the proceedings. In re Worrell Enters., Inc., 14 Va. App. 671, 419 S.E.2d 271 (1992).

Damage to professional reputation not sufficient to seal records. - Trial court did not err in vacating its own order sequestering the record in a divorce action under § 20-124 . The husband's undefined concern for his professional reputation did not rebut the presumption of openness of judicial records provided in § 17.1-208 . Shiembob v. Shiembob, 55 Va. App. 234, 685 S.E.2d 192, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 520 (2009).

Wrongful death claims. - Where the judicial records in issue were accumulated in a wrongful death action, and in Virginia, settlements of wrongful death claims must be approved by the courts, and the public has a societal interest in learning whether compromise settlements are equitable and whether the courts are administering properly the powers conferred upon them, therefore, the trial court erred in sealing that class of data. Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235 Va. 253 , 368 S.E.2d 253 (1988).

Circuit court did not err in denying the settling parties' request to have the financial terms of the compromise settlements redacted in the court records because the medical companies' assertion that the circuit court's order denying the request to redact the settlement agreements would deny the companies' the benefit of the bargain was based on the legally flawed presumption that private parties could agree to deprive the public of the right of access to judicial records guaranteed by § 17.1-208 and concerns of emotional damage or financial harm when stated in the abstract did not constitute sufficient reasons to seal judicial records. Perreault v. Free Lance-Star, 276 Va. 375 , 666 S.E.2d 352, 2008 Va. LEXIS 96 (2008).

Mandamus is the proper remedy to direct a clerk to permit a petitioner to listen to audio tape recordings of a felony trial. Smith v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 261 Va. 113 , 540 S.E.2d 878, 2001 Va. LEXIS 21 (2001).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Legislative interpretation. - If the legislative purpose of § 8.01-55 is to serve the public's societal interest in learning whether compromise settlements are equitable and whether the courts are administering properly the powers conferred on them, the same interest is served by the disclosure of any basis for reducing a lien claimed by the Commonwealth. Chan v. Commonwealth,, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 210 (Charlottesville July 28, 2015).

If the policy consideration of § 8.01-55 applies to an intrafamilial distribution of proceeds recovered in a wrongful death action, it applies in a case in which one party is asking the Commonwealth to reduce a lien claimed by it for services rendered to that party. Chan v. Commonwealth,, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 210 (Charlottesville July 28, 2015).

If the policy of § 8.01-55 applies to what is essentially a private affair, surely it must apply with even greater force when the public is being asked, even for good reasons, to subsidize medical care to an individual by foregoing all or some portion of an amount specifically reserved to, and protected by lien for, the Commonwealth (and, by extension, the public). Chan v. Commonwealth,, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 210 (Charlottesville July 28, 2015).

While a presumption of openness exists, the General Assembly has granted judges the authority to seal in domestic relations cases but discretion does not extend to all domestic relations matters, as the statute on sealing records expressly refers to the chapter dealing with divorce, affirmation, and annulment, and therefore excludes the chapter dealing with custody and visitation. Falkoff v. Falkoff, 103 Va. Cir. 405, 2019 Va. Cir. LEXIS 1168 (Fairfax County Dec. 6, 2019).

While § 20-124 is a grant of discretion absent from § 17.1-208 , it is not an exception from the openness principles of § 17.1-208 . Falkoff v. Falkoff, 103 Va. Cir. 405, 2019 Va. Cir. LEXIS 1168 (Fairfax County Dec. 6, 2019).

Discretionary authority. - Both the open records law and the expungement law grant the circuit court discretionary authority to close records using the permissive word "may" but judicial records are presumed to be open, persons are presumed innocent, and those who have their cases dismissed thereafter occupy the status of innocent; thus, the presumption against sealing can be lifted when a party points to a real harm that has occurred as opposed to a theoretical, to-be-determined harm. Falkoff v. Falkoff, 103 Va. Cir. 405, 2019 Va. Cir. LEXIS 1168 (Fairfax County Dec. 6, 2019).

No distinction between criminal and civil proceedings. - Trial court found that the first employee's motion to quash should be denied as to the former employee's subpoenas issued in her civil case against, inter alia, the first employee for sexual assault and harassment where the records sought pertained to the first employee's presentence investigation and risk assessment in his related criminal case since no showing was made under the relevant statute, § 17.1-208 , that those records should be kept confidential, and no distinction was made between criminal and civil proceedings concerning whether disclosure should be made; however, the first employee's motion to quash had to be granted as to his sex offender treatment records, as those records, pursuant to subsection B of § 32.1-127.1:03 , were protected health records. Doe v. Paradigm Mgmt. Co., 69 Va. Cir. 446, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 86 (Arlington County January 20, 2006).

Public access to records. - Petitioner's motion to keep a mediated agreement confidential was denied because the General Assembly indicated its inclination that the public be aware of the expenditure, or decision not to pursue, public funds. Chan v. Commonwealth,, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 210 (Charlottesville July 28, 2015).

Deputy county executive's motion to seal the court record was denied as to the Virginia Freedom of Information Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct because the intent behind the Freedom of Information Act was not sufficiently consistent with the stated purpose of the statute to constitute a compelling interest that could rebut the presumption of openness for judicial records, and sealing of the record based on an ethical violation would be the kind of "extra-disciplinary consequence" that the Preamble to the Rules stated was an inappropriate use of the Rules. Tianti v. Rohrer, 91 Va. Cir. 111, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 165 (Fairfax County Aug. 14, 2015).

Circuit court found that it could not seal settlement terms in infant settlement approvals because infant settlements were conditional pending judicial approval, the Virginia mediation confidentiality statute did not bind the court as it did not participate in the mediation, and infant settlements were not to be automatically sealed absent a particularized harm to a child from open records. Brown v. Tashman, 105 Va. Cir. 152, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 54 (Fairfax County Apr. 21, 2020).

Attorney-client and work-product privileges. - Deputy county executive's motion to seal the court record was granted to the extent that the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine provided a sufficient interest to outweigh the public's interest in the openness of the judicial records. Tianti v. Rohrer, 91 Va. Cir. 111, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 165 (Fairfax County Aug. 14, 2015).

Motion to seal denied. - Because the judicial records in this case did not fall within a specific statutory exception to the statute's broad mandate, there was no statutory authority to sustain plaintiff's motion to file his amended complaint under seal; plaintiff's and unnamed defendants' collective desire to have the records sealed and their unarticulated risks of damage to professional reputation, emotional damage, or financial harm, stated in the abstract, did not constitute sufficient reasons to seal judicial records. Stern v. John Doe, Inc.,, 2021 Va. Cir. LEXIS 180 (Henrico County Aug. 5, 2021).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Access to digital copies of court records. - The Virginia Freedom of Information Act and this section impose a duty on circuit court clerks to furnish copies of records requested by a citizen, without distinction between paper and digital formats, provided the records are not sealed by court order or otherwise exempt from disclosure by law. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable J. Jack Kennedy, Jr., Clerk, Circuit Court for Wise County and City of Norton, 02-095, 2002 Va. AG LEXIS 159 (12/19/02).

Statutory duties of a circuit court clerk do not require attendance at civil or criminal docket call proceedings, though it is the duty of the clerk to ensure that accurate records of such proceedings are maintained. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Judy L. Worthington, Chesterfield County Circuit Court Clerk, 09-007, 2009 Va. AG LEXIS 19 (2/27/09).

Where judgment does not detail a specific monetary award, it may be entered in the judgment docket or in the order book, or in any other record deemed suitable, in accord with local practice and the sound discretion of the clerk. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable John T. Frey, Clerk, Fairfax County Circuit Court, 10-011, 2010 Va. AG LEXIS 26 (7/8/10).

Public may access marriage licenses and certificates. - Original marriage licenses and certificates maintained by the clerk of the circuit court constitute vital records; such records are open to inspection by the public and the public may have access to microfilmed copies of such records. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Michael M. Foreman, Clerk, Circuit Court of the City of Winchester, 00-058, 2000 Va. AG LEXIS 54 (9/27/00).

Competency evaluation report ordered by and submitted to a court as part of the court's record is open to inspection under § 17.1-208 , provided such report is not sealed by court order. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable George E. Schaefer, Clerk of Norfolk Circuit Court, 08-099, 2009 Va. AG LEXIS 13 (2/25/09).

§ 17.1-209.

Repealed by Acts 2012, c. 802, cl. 2.

Editor's note. - Former § 17.1-209 , pertaining to preservation of papers in clerk's office, derived from Code 1919, § 3386, § 17-44; 1998, c. 872; 2008, cc. 53, 142.

§ 17.1-210. Removal of records or papers prohibited; exceptions.

None of the records or papers of a circuit court shall be removed by the clerk nor allowed by him to be removed out of the county or city wherein the clerk's office is kept, except: (i) on the order of the court or judge; (ii) the clerk, court or judge may allow the records and papers of a pending case to be removed by an attorney of record in that case to any location within the Commonwealth unless the court or judge shall enter an order prohibiting the removal of such records or paper; (iii) on an occasion of invasion or insurrection, when, in the opinion of the court, or, in a very sudden case, of the clerk, the same will be endangered, after which they shall be returned as soon as the danger ceases; and (iv) in such other cases as are specially provided for by law.

(Code 1919, § 3387, § 17-45; 1973, c. 54; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Courts, § 23.

CASE NOTES

Records of county court may be kept in city office. - Neither the keeping of the records and papers of the county courts (now general district courts) in a city office, the city being within the county limits, nor the transfer of a portion of them to an extension thereof, constitute such removal as is prohibited by this section. Board of Norfolk County Supvrs. v. Cox, 98 Va. 270 , 36 S.E. 380 (1900) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-211. Maintenance and disposition of certain receipt books, cancelled checks and statements.

The clerk of each court of record shall maintain in his office all official receipt books showing receipt of any funds in his custody or that of the court, all canceled checks showing payments from any such funds, and all statements of bank accounts in which funds of the clerk's office or of the court are deposited. Such books, checks and statements shall be maintained until they have been audited by the Auditor of Public Accounts, and for a further period of three years, in the case of receipt books, canceled checks, and bank statements. Thereafter, the clerk may destroy such records in accordance with retention regulations for records maintained by the clerk established under the Virginia Public Records Act (§ 42.1-76 et seq.).

(1962, c. 445, § 17-46.1; 1981, c. 637; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-212. Copying of records becoming illegible.

The judge or, if so designated by the judge, the clerk of each court of record, when satisfied that the records and papers in the office of the clerk of court are becoming illegible or are wearing out and is of the opinion that the same should be preserved, may order the records and papers copied or photographed or otherwise duplicated at the expense of the county or city in which the clerk's office is located.

The copies of the records and papers shall be examined and compared by the clerk with the originals and when he is satisfied that the copies are exact he shall certify them as true copies. The certified copies shall be kept in the same place in which the originals are kept and the latter shall continue to be carefully preserved.

(1944, p. 195, § 17-47; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 3387a; 1997, c. 836; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-213. Disposition of papers in ended cases.

  1. All case files for cases ended prior to January 1, 1913, shall be permanently maintained in hardcopy form, either in the locality served by the circuit court where such files originated or in The Library of Virginia in accordance with the provisions of § 42.1-86 and subsection C of § 42.1-87 .
  2. The following records for cases ending on or after January 1, 1913, shall be retained for 10 years after conclusion:
    1. Conditional sales contracts;
    2. Concealed weapons permit applications;
    3. Minister appointments;
    4. Petitions for appointment of trustee;
    5. Name changes;
    6. Nolle prosequi cases;
    7. Civil actions that are voluntarily dismissed, including nonsuits, cases that are dismissed as settled and agreed, cases that are dismissed with or without prejudice, cases that are discontinued or dismissed under § 8.01-335 , and district court appeals dismissed under § 16.1-113 prior to 1988;
    8. Misdemeanor and traffic cases, except as provided in subdivision C 3, including those which were commenced on a felony charge but concluded as a misdemeanor;
    9. Suits to enforce a lien;
    10. Garnishments;
    11. Executions except for those covered in § 8.01-484 ; and
    12. Miscellaneous oaths and qualifications, but only if the order or oath or qualification is spread in the appropriate order book.
  3. All other records or cases ending on or after January 1, 1913, shall be retained subject to the following:
    1. All civil case files to which subsection D does not pertain shall be retained 20 years from the court order date.
    2. All criminal cases dismissed, including those not a true bill, acquittals, and not guilty verdicts, shall be retained 10 years from the court order date.
    3. Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, criminal case files involving a felony conviction and all criminal case files involving a misdemeanor conviction under § 16.1-253.2, 18.2-57.2 , or 18.2-60.4 shall be retained (i) 20 years from the sentencing date or (ii) until the sentence term ends, whichever comes later. Case files involving a conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in § 37.2-900 , a violent felony as defined in § 17.1-805 , or an act of violence as defined in § 19.2-297.1 shall be retained (a) 50 years from the sentencing date or (b) until the sentence term ends, whichever comes later.
  4. Under the provisions of subsections B and C, the entire file of any case deemed by the local clerk of court to have historical value, as defined in § 42.1-77 , or genealogical or sensational significance shall be retained permanently as shall all cases in which the title to real estate is established, conveyed or condemned by an order or decree of the court. The final order for all cases in which the title to real estate is so affected shall include an appropriate notification thereof to the clerk.
  5. Except as provided in subsection A, the clerk of a circuit court may cause (i) any or all papers or documents pertaining to civil and criminal cases; (ii) any unexecuted search warrants and affidavits for unexecuted search warrants, provided at least three years have passed since issued; (iii) any abstracts of judgments; and (iv) original wills, to be destroyed if such records, papers, documents, or wills no longer have administrative, fiscal, historical, or legal value to warrant continued retention, provided such records, papers, or documents have been microfilmed or converted to an electronic format. Such microfilm and microphotographic processes and equipment shall meet state archival microfilm standards pursuant to § 42.1-82 , or such electronic format shall follow state electronic records guidelines, and such records, papers, or documents so converted shall be placed in conveniently accessible files and provisions made for examining and using same. The clerk shall further provide security negative copies of any such microfilmed materials for storage in The Library of Virginia. (1981, c. 637, § 17-47.4; 1989, c. 445; 1990, c. 583; 1994, cc. 64, 822; 1997, c. 561; 1998, c. 872; 2001, c. 836; 2002, c. 832; 2004, c. 433; 2005, c. 681; 2006, c. 60; 2008, c. 749; 2011, cc. 445, 480; 2012, c. 802; 2015, c. 552; 2016, c. 180; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 463.)

Cross references. - As to recordation of wills, see § 64.2-455 et seq.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 836, in subsection E., deleted "and" at the end of clause (i) and inserted "and (iii) any abstracts of judgments."

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 832, in subsection E, deleted "and" preceding clause (iii), inserted "and (iv) original wills," and substituted "documents, or wills" for "or documents" in the first sentence and substituted "copies of such microfilmed materials" for "microfilm copies of such ended cases" in the last sentence.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 433, in subsection E, inserted "or converted to an electronic format" at the end of the first sentence, in the next-to-last sentence, substituted "processes" for "process," inserted "or such electronic format shall follow state electronic records guidelines," and substituted "records, papers, or documents so converted" for "microfilm"; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 681, effective January 1, 2006, substituted "Civil actions" for "Law and chancery matters" in subdivision B 7; deleted "and chancery" following "civil" in subdivision C 1; and substituted "civil and" for "law, chancery, and" in subsection E.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment, in subsection A, deleted " § 42.1-83 , and" following "provisions of" and inserted "and subsection C of § 42.1-87 ."

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 749 inserted "except as provided in subdivision C 3" in subdivision B 8; and inserted "or a misdemeanor conviction under § 16.1-253.2 or 18.2-57.2 " in subdivision C 3.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendments by cc. 445 and 480 are identical, and substituted "felony conviction and all criminal case files involving a misdemeanor conviction under § 16.1-253.2, 18.2-57.2 , or 18.2-60.4 " for "felony conviction or a misdemeanor conviction under § 16.1-253.2 or 18.2-57.2 " in subdivision C 3.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 802, substituted "shall be retained" for "may be destroyed in their entirety at the discretion of the clerk of each circuit court after having been retained" in subsection B; substituted "shall be retained subject to the following:" for "may be destroyed in their entirety at the discretion of the clerk of each circuit court subject to the following guidelines:" in subsection C; substituted "shall be retained" for "may be destroyed after" in subdivisions C 1 and C 2; substituted "shall be retained" for "may be destroyed" in subdivision C 3; substituted "20 years" for "after 20 years" in C 3 (i); substituted "until the sentence" for "when the sentence" in C 3 (ii); and substituted "papers or documents pertaining to civil and criminal cases" for "papers, or documents pertaining to civil and criminal cases which have been ended for a period of three years or longer" in E (i).

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 552 in subdivision C 3, substituted "Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision" for "All" at the beginning and added the second sentence.

The 2016 amendments. - The 2016 amendment by c. 180 inserted "a violent felony as defined in § 17.1-805 , or an act of violence as defined in § 19.2-297.1" in subdivision C 3.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 463, effective July 1, 2021, deleted former B 13, which read: "Civil cases pertaining to declarations of habitual offender status and full restoration of driving privileges" and made stylistic changes.

Law review. - For 2002 survey of Virginia law on wills, trusts, and estates, see 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 357 (2002).

§ 17.1-214. Clerk to deliver or send process to sheriff.

The clerk of the circuit court from whose office may be issued any process, original, mesne or final, or any order or decree to be served on any person, shall, unless the party interested, or his attorney, direct otherwise, deliver the same to the sheriff of the county or city for which the court is held, if it is to be executed therein, and if it is to be executed in any other county or city, shall enclose the same to the sheriff thereof, properly addressed, put it in the post office and pay the postage thereon.

(Code 1919, § 3403, § 17-50; 1946, p. 54; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 14B M.J. Process, § 7.

CASE NOTES

This section requires the clerk to make actual or constructive delivery to the sheriff. Cockrill v. Cooper, 175 Va. 45 , 7 S.E.2d 96 (1940) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-215. Process book.

The clerk of a circuit court shall keep a process book or file or, in lieu thereof, an automated system, in which the clerk shall enter every such process, order or decree, showing its nature, date, return day and the person to whom, and the time when, it was delivered, or, if it was mailed, the time thereof and the person to whom it was addressed. From any officer, to whom there is such delivery, the clerk shall take a receipt in the process book or file or enter the receipt on the automated system.

(Code 1919, § 3403, § 17-51; 1946, p. 54; 1989, c. 137; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 14B M.J. Process, § 7.

§ 17.1-216. Handling fee for service of process.

The fee for serving such process, order or decree may be delivered to the clerk, who shall transmit it with the papers to be served to the sheriff and the fee paid shall be taxed by the clerk as a part of the costs of the proceeding.

(Code 1919, § 3403, § 17-52; 1946, p. 55; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-217. Power of clerk to administer oath.

Any clerk of a court may administer an oath in any case wherein an affidavit is necessary or proper as the foundation of an official act to be performed by him.

(Code 1919, § 3389, § 17-53; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 3C M.J. Clerks of Court, § 5.

CASE NOTES

The words "or proper" have been inserted in the statute since the decision of Commonwealth v. Williamson, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 554 (1847), wherein it was held that a clerk, under the statute as it then was, had no authority, when applied to for a marriage license, to examine a witness on oath as to the age of the parties. The court construed the law as it then stood to apply only to such cases in which, without regard to circumstances, the making of the affidavit was necessary as a prerequisite to the performance of the official act required of the clerk. But the legislature soon after that decision, by the revisal of 1849 having amended the law by inserting the words above recited, evidently designed to authorize the clerks and their deputies to administer an oath in such cases, because it is highly proper that the clerk, before issuing a marriage license to parties who had not the consent of parents or guardians, or such evidence of it as the law required, should have authority to examine a witness on oath as to the age of the parties. The authority is given by the statute as it now stands. Maybush v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 857 (1878) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-218.

Repealed by Acts 2011, c. 63, cl. 1.

Editor's note. - Former § 17.1-218 , pertaining to certified lists of county, district, town and city officers, and constitutional officers and the vacancies and appointments of each, was derived from Code 1919, § 3407, § 17-54; 1956, c. 217; 1973, c. 218; 1975, c. 37; 1979, c. 390; 1981, c. 49; 1998, c. 872; 2010, c. 352.

§ 17.1-219. Clerk to prepare bonds.

Every clerk of a court of record shall prepare, in a proper manner, any bond to be taken by, or given before, him or his court or the judge thereof.

(Code 1919, § 3390, § 17-55; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-219.1. Transportation orders; authorization for clerk to issue orders to custodian.

In a criminal proceeding, upon authorization by the judge, the clerk of a circuit court may issue orders for commitment of the defendant or orders for release of the defendant to the appropriate custodian when the judge has ordered the defendant (i) to be committed to custody upon a denial of bail, upon a revocation of bail or upon a change in bail condition, (ii) to be continued in custody upon a continuance of the proceeding, or (iii) to be released upon meeting bail requirements, upon being sentenced to time already served or upon being found not guilty.

(2002, c. 832.)

§ 17.1-220. Duplicate certificate of allowance prohibited, unless ordered by court.

Upon proof by the oath of a party or otherwise of the loss or destruction of an original certificate of any allowance to be paid out of the state treasury, the court shall order a duplicate which shall show on its face that it is a duplicate issued by order of the court.

(Code 1919, § 3404, § 17-56; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 12A M.J. Lost Instruments & Records, § 9.

§ 17.1-221. Reports by clerks of the business of courts of record.

The clerk of each court of record in this Commonwealth, including the clerk of the Court of Appeals, within fifteen days from the end of each calendar month, shall make to the Supreme Court a report of the business disposed of by his court during the month just ended. The report shall be made upon a form furnished by the Executive Secretary and shall contain such information as the Supreme Court deems proper to enable it to gain a fair knowledge of the business of the several courts of the Commonwealth.

The reports shall be filed in the office of the Executive Secretary and the General Assembly or any other body or officer of this Commonwealth shall have access thereto.

(Code 1919, § 3405, § 17-57; 1928, p. 1121; 1938, p. 129; 1944, p. 131; 1964, c. 10; 1984, c. 703; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-222. Failure to make report.

The Executive Secretary, at the direction of the Court, shall report every clerk who fails to make the report mentioned in § 17.1-221 to the chief judge of the clerk's court.

(Code 1919, § 3406, § 17-58; 1938, p. 130; 1964, c. 10; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-222.1. Collection of fees, etc., by court clerks in lieu of money.

The clerks of the several courts of the Commonwealth may, in lieu of money, collect or secure all fees, and fines and penalties collected for offenses committed against the Commonwealth or against any county, city or town, and for payment of spousal or child support, by any means provided in § 2.2-614.1 . Such clerks shall not by virtue of acceptance of any such payment be held to be guarantors of the payment thereof, but they shall exercise ordinary care in such acceptance.

(1977, c. 139, § 14.1-3.1; 1978, c. 117; 1998, c. 872; 2002, c. 719.)

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 719 substituted "any means provided in § 2.2-614.1 " for "check, draft, credit card or order for the payment of money" at the end of the first sentence, and substituted "payment" for "check, draft, credit card or order" in the final sentence.

Article 3. Records, Recordation and Indexing Generally.

§ 17.1-223. Duty of clerk to record writings, etc., and make index.

  1. Every writing authorized by law to be recorded, with all certificates, plats, schedules or other papers thereto annexed or thereon endorsed, upon payment of fees for the same and the tax thereon, if any, shall, when admitted to record, be recorded by or under the direction of the clerk on such media as are prescribed by § 17.1-239 . However, unless a cover sheet is submitted with the writing in accordance with § 17.1-227.1 , the clerk has the authority to reject any writing for recordation unless (i) as to any individual who is a party to such writing, the surname only of such individual is underscored or written entirely in capital letters in the first clause of the writing that identifies the names of the parties; (ii) each page of the writing is numbered consecutively; (iii) in the case of a writing described in § 58.1-801 or 58.1-807 , the amount of the consideration and the actual value of the property conveyed is stated on the first page of the writing; (iv) the laws of the United States or the Commonwealth under which any exemption from recordation taxes is claimed is clearly stated on the face of the writing; and (v) the name of each party to such writing under whose name the writing is to be indexed as grantor, grantee, or both is listed in the first clause of the writing that identifies the names of the parties and identified therein as grantor, grantee, or both, as applicable. Such writing, once recorded, may be returned to any party to such writing who is identified therein as a grantee unless otherwise indicated clearly on the face of the writing, or any cover sheet, including an appropriate current address to which such writing shall be returned.
  2. The attorney or party who prepares the writing for recordation shall ensure that the writing satisfies the requirements of subsection A and that (i) the social security number is removed from the writing prior to the instrument being submitted for recordation, (ii) a deed conveying residential property containing not more than four residential dwelling units states on the first page of the document the name of the title insurance underwriter insuring such instrument or a statement that the existence of title insurance is unknown to the preparer, and (iii) a deed conveying residential property containing not more than four residential dwelling units states on the first page of the document that it was prepared by the owner of the real property or by an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth where such statement by an attorney shall include the name and Virginia State Bar number of the attorney who prepared the deed, provided, however, that clause (iii) shall not apply to deeds of trust or to deeds in which a public service company, railroad, or cable system operator is either a grantor or grantee, and it shall be sufficient for the purposes of clause (iii) that deeds prepared under the supervision of the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia so state without the name of an attorney or bar number.
  3. If the clerk has an eRecording System as defined in § 55.1-661 , the clerk shall follow the provisions of this section, and the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act (§ 55.1-661 et seq.), for recordation of documents. If the clerk does not have an eRecording System, the clerk shall record a legible paper copy of an electronic document, provided that such copy (i) otherwise meets the requirements of this section for recordation and (ii) is certified to be a true and correct copy of the electronic original by the attorney, settlement agent, or other party who submits the document for recordation. If a clerk's eRecording System is not operational at any time, or the eRecording System does not accept the type of electronic document being submitted, such clerk shall use the process for recording a legible paper copy of an electronic copy as set out herein. An affidavit under this section may be made in the following form, or to the same effect: Affidavit of Submitter The undersigned affiant, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows, prepared pursuant to § 17.1-223 of the Code of Virginia, that the attached electronic document is a true and correct copy of the electronic original. (Name of submitter) ________________________________ (Signature of submitter) ________________________________ (Address of submitter) ________________________________ (Telephone of submitter) ________________________________ (Email of submitter) ________________________________ The foregoing affidavit was acknowledged before me this ______________ day of ______________, 20____, by Notary public: ________________________________ My commission expires: ________________________________. Notary Registration Number: ________________________________.
  4. A writing that appears on its face to have been properly notarized in accordance with the Virginia Notary Act (§ 47.1-1 et seq.) shall be presumed to have been notarized properly and shall be recorded by the clerk, if such document otherwise meets the requirements of this section for recordation.
  5. If the writing is accepted for recordation in the deed books, it shall be deemed to be validly recorded for all purposes. Such books shall be indexed by the clerk as provided by § 17.1-249 and carefully preserved. Upon admitting any such writing or other paper to record, the clerk shall endorse thereon the day and time of day of such recordation. More than one book may be used contemporaneously under the direction of the clerk for the recordation of the writings mentioned in this section whenever it may be necessary to use more than one book for the proper conduct of the business of the clerk's office. (Code 1919, § 3392, § 17-59; 1926, p. 465; 1934, p. 514; 1979, c. 527; 1983, c. 293; 1985, c. 246; 1986, c. 167; 1990, c. 374; 1996, c. 454; 1998, c. 872; 2004, c. 336; 2007, c. 451; 2008, cc. 117, 814, 823, 833; 2012, c. 74; 2013, c. 193; 2014, c. 338; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 78.)

Cross references. - As to recordation of inventories and accounts of sales, see § 64.2-1310 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2008, cc. 117 and 814, cl. 2 provides: "That any document notarized prior to July 1, 2008, shall not be affected or invalidated by amendments to this Act effective July 1, 2008."

Acts 2014, c. 338, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2014, except that the provisions of this act amending §§ 17.1-223 and 17.1-227.1 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective on January 1, 2015."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 336 substituted "No" for "In addition, no" at the beginning of the third sentence, added the fourth sentence, and substituted "If" for "However, if" at the beginning of the fifth sentence.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 451 inserted subsection designations; in subsection A, substituted "has the authority to reject" for "may refuse to accept" in the second sentence and added the third sentence; rewrote the former third and fourth sentences, now subsection B, which had read: "No deed shall be accepted for record by the clerk unless it is accompanied by a current business or residence address of the grantee or a designee. The person or entity submitting a deed or deed of trust conveying not more than four residential dwelling units may state on the first page of the document the name of the title insurance underwriter insuring such instrument and the title insurance policy number or a statement that there is no title insurance in effect with respect to the document or a statement that such identifying number is not available or is unknown."

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 117 and 814 are identical, and added subsection C, and redesignated former subsection C as subsection D.

The 2008 amendments by cc. 823 and 833 are identical, and inserted "and if a cover sheet is used pursuant to § 17.1-227.1 , that the names of all grantors and grantees on the face of such writing are the same on the cover sheet" in clause (iv) of subsection A.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 74 inserted the third and fourth sentences in subsection A.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 193, in subsection A, combined the former third and next-to-last sentences into the present next-to-last sentence by substituting "that does not comply with this section" for "except for deeds in which a public service company, railroad, or cable system operator is either a grantor or grantee, unless the deed states on the first page of the document that it was prepared by the owner of the real property or by an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth where such statement by an attorney shall include the name and Virginia State Bar number of the attorney who prepared the deed. However, it shall be sufficient that deeds prepared under the supervision of the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia so state without the name of an attorney or bar number"; and in subsection B, added clause (iii) and made a related change.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 338, effective January 1, 2015, rewrote subsection A; in subsection B inserted "residential property containing" in clauses (ii) and (iii); in subsection C substituted "writing that" for "document which"; in subsection D substituted "If the writing is accepted for recordation in the deed books" for "If the writing or deed is accepted for record and spread on the deed books" in the first sentence and deleted the last sentence, which read "After being so recorded such writings may be delivered to the party entitled to claim under the same"; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 78, effective March 11, 2021, inserted subsection C; redesignated former subsections C and D as subsections D and E; and in subsection D, substituted "shall" for "may" and added "if such document otherwise meets the requirements of this section for recordation" at the end.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia property law for the year 1989-1990, see 24 U. Rich. L. Rev. 725 (1990).

For annual survey article, see "Wills, Trusts, and Estates," 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 189 (2013).

Research References. - Harrison on Wills and Administration for Virginia and West Virginia (Matthew Bender). Chapter 23 Assets of Estate. § 23.20 Virginia Uniform Real Property Transfer on Death Act. Cox.

Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 16-500. Virginia Land Records Cover Sheet for Recordation of Deed, et seq.

CASE NOTES

Careful reading of statute's plain language indicates that deed recordation involves it first being admitted to record and then spread on the deed books. In re Nguyen, 226 Bankr. 547 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Mayer v. Quy Van Nguyen, 211 F.3d 105 (4th Cir. 2000) (decided under prior law).

When homestead deed admitted to record. - If no deficiencies exist as to a deed's form or in the fees tendered, a homestead deed is admitted to record when properly received by the clerk's office. To hold otherwise would deny debtor's rights, as given to him by the legislature, and make them contingent to the malfeasance of an individual clerk who should have properly performed the duties of the office. In re Nguyen, 226 Bankr. 547 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Mayer v. Quy Van Nguyen, 211 F.3d 105 (4th Cir. 2000) (decided under prior law).

Clerk's responsibility. - A properly presented deed for recordation requires the clerk to at once admit it to record. A clerk's failure to do so cannot defeat the rights of the party presenting the instrument. In re Nguyen, 226 Bankr. 547 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Mayer v. Quy Van Nguyen, 211 F.3d 105 (4th Cir. 2000) (decided under prior law).

Deed may not be admitted to record by mere mental act. - The intent of the amendment of 1926, which added the third sentence, was to abolish admission to record by mere mental act, and to make the physical act of endorsing on the document the day and time of day of admission the one and only act capable of evidencing admission to record. To hold that a deed may be admitted to record by mere mental act on the part of the clerk is simply to ignore and nullify the amendment of 1926. Fooshee v. Snavely, 58 F.2d 772 (W.D. Va. 1931), aff'd, 58 F.2d 774 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 635, 53 S. Ct. 85, 77 L. Ed. 550 (1932) (decided under prior law).

The words "such recordation," as used in this section, mean admission to record. Fooshee v. Snavely, 58 F.2d 772 (W.D. Va. 1931), aff'd, 58 F.2d 774 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 635, 53 S. Ct. 85, 77 L. Ed. 550 (1932) (decided under prior law).

Defective acknowledgement. - Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee was not allowed to avoid a deed of trust under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544(a), which Chapter 7 debtors gave to a title company two and a half years before they declared bankruptcy, even though the deed had a defective acknowledgement. The defect was cured under § 55-106.2 or 17.1-223 when it was accepted by the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, and recorded in county records, and even if the defect was not cured under state law, a hypothetical lien creditor or bona fide purchaser would have had constructive notice, at the time the debtors declared bankruptcy, that the debtors gave the title company a deed of trust, thereby defeating the trustee's avoidance claim. Tyler v. Ownit Mortg. Loan Trust (In re Carrillo), 431 Bankr. 692, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 180 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010).

Mere notice, whether actual or constructive, of a defectively acknowledged deed of trust, will not, under Virginia law, defeat a bankruptcy trustee's "strong-arm" powers as a hypothetical judgment lien creditor. Tyler v. Ownit Mortg. Loan Trust (In re Carrillo),, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4379 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2010).

"Deemed to be validly recorded" language of § 17.1-223 is intended to address only the requirements for recording specifically imposed by § 17.1-223 , and is not a general curative statute that - at least as it read in 2006 - would extend to defectively acknowledged deeds of trust. Thus, mere recordation by the clerk of the defectively acknowledged deed of trust did not provide constructive notice of a lender's interest in the property. Tyler v. Ownit Mortg. Loan Trust (In re Carrillo),, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4379 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2010).

§ 17.1-224. Copy of illegible instrument used for making permanent record.

In offices of clerks of courts of record in which instruments are recorded by any photographic or electronic imaging process, the clerk may, in the event any such instrument is in such condition that a perfect and legible record cannot be produced by such process, make and certify a copy of such instrument, for which he shall be entitled to such fees as are prescribed by law for making and certifying copies of instruments, and use such copy for making permanent records of his office by such photographic or electronic imaging process. Such original instrument shall be preserved in the clerk's office, in the same manner as is prescribed by law for preserving wills.

(1948, p. 776; Michie Suppl. 1948, § 3387b, § 17-59.1; 1998, c. 872; 2010, cc. 717, 760.)

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendments by cc. 717 and 760 are identical, and twice inserted "or electronic imaging" in the first sentence.

Law review. - For article, "Wills, Trusts, and Estates," see 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 845 (2001).

§ 17.1-225. Remote access to nonconfidential court records.

The clerk of the circuit court of any county or city may provide remote access, including Internet access, to all nonconfidential court records on an automated case management or other system maintained by his office and described in § 17.1-242 . The clerk shall be responsible for insuring that proper security measures are implemented and maintained to prevent remote access users from obtaining any data that are confidential under this Code and to prevent the modification or destruction of any records by remote access users. For purposes of this section, remote access users are those individuals who are not employees of the clerk's office. Secure remote access to land records shall be governed by § 17.1-294 .

(1985, c. 489, § 17-59.2; 1993, c. 445; 1997, c. 413; 1998, c. 872; 2001, c. 497; 2008, cc. 823, 833; 2014, c. 460.)

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 497 inserted "and described in § 17.1-242 " at the end of the first sentence, substituted "that are" for "which is" in the second sentence, and added the last sentence.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 823 and 833 are identical, and added the last sentence.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 460 inserted "on an automated case management or other system" in the first sentence.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Internet access provided by circuit court clerk. - A circuit court clerk may provide Internet access to case management data maintined by the clerk's office, but may not provide Internet access to data provided by the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia through a direct dial-up service known as the Law Office and Public Access System. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable J. Jack Kennedy Jr., Clerk, Circuit Court for Wise County and the City of Norton, 00-031, 2000 Va. AG LEXIS 43 (7/27/00).

A circuit court clerk has the discretion to grant access to an automated case management system. - A circuit court clerk, as custodian of the records maintained in an automated case management system, has the discretion to grant access to such a system. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Judy L. Worthington, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County, 02-026, 2002 Va. AG LEXIS 62 (4/4/02).

§ 17.1-226. Remote access to certain agencies from clerk of court.

The governing body of any locality may give the clerk of its circuit court information from local agencies that the clerk may provide to remote access users.

(1985, c. 489, § 17-59.3; 1998, c. 872; 2008, cc. 823, 833.)

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by cc. 823 and 833 are identical, and rewrote this section.

§ 17.1-227. Documents to be recorded in deed books; social security numbers.

All deeds, deeds of trust, deeds of release, certificates of satisfaction or certificates of partial satisfaction, quitclaim deeds, homestead deeds, grants, transfers and mortgages of real estate, releases of such mortgages, powers of attorney to convey real estate, leases of real estate, notices of lis pendens and all contracts in reference to real estate, which have been acknowledged as required by law, and certified copies of final judgments or decrees of partition affecting the title or possession of real estate, any part of which is situated in the county or city in which it is sought to be recorded, and all other writings relating to or affecting real estate which are authorized to be recorded, shall, unless otherwise provided, be recorded in a book to be known as the deed book. All deeds, deeds of trust, deeds of release, quitclaim deeds, grants, transfers, and mortgages of real estate or any addendum or memorandum relating to any of these instruments submitted for recordation in the deed books of the appropriate office of the clerk of court shall be prepared according to the requirements for deeds and deeds of trust as set forth in §§ 55.1-300 and 55.1-316 , as applicable. The clerk may refuse to accept any instrument submitted for recordation that includes a social security number. However, the attorney or party who prepares or submits the instrument has responsibility for ensuring that the social security number is removed from the instrument prior to the instrument being submitted for recordation. The clerk shall be immune from suits arising from the recordation of any document, or the content of any document recorded, in the land records pursuant to this or any other applicable provision of this Code unless the clerk was grossly negligent or engaged in willful misconduct. Each instrument shall be indexed under all such names in accordance with the provisions of § 17.1-249 .

(Code 1919, § 3393, § 17-60; 1920, p. 313; 1932, p. 333; 1975, c. 469; 1976, c. 561; 1977, c. 282; 1990, c. 374; 1994, c. 64; 1997, c. 579; 1998, c. 872; 2003, cc. 862, 914, 918; 2004, c. 352; 2014, c. 338.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2003, c. 918, cl. 2 provides: "The Office of the Attorney General shall, on or before January 1, 2004, establish procedures for the management of identity theft information."

To conform to the recodification of Title 55 by Acts 2019, c. 712, effective October 1, 2019, the following substitution was made at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission: substituted "55.1-300 and 55.1-316 " for "55-48 and 55-58."

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendments by cc. 862, 914 and 918 are identical, and inserted the next-to-last sentence.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 352 inserted the present fourth sentence.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 338 substituted "deeds and deeds of trust as set forth in §§ 55-48 and 55-58, as applicable" for "deeds as set forth in §§ 55-48 and 55-58 and shall include the names of all grantors and grantees in the first clause of each such instrument" in the second sentence; deleted "grantor's, grantee's or trustee's" preceding "social security number" in the third sentence; and inserted the fifth sentence.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on property for the year 1974-1975, see 61 Va. L. Rev. 1834 (1975).

For survey article on judicial decisions in real estate law from June 1, 2002 through June 1, 2003, see 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 223 (2003).

For survey article on the law pertaining to wills, trusts, and estates, see 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 267 (2003).

For 2003/2004 survey of real estate and land use law, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 357 (2004).

For 2003/2004 survey of the law of wills, trusts and estates, see 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 447 (2004).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 2C M.J. Bankruptcy, § 93; 12A M.J. Lis Pendens, § 4; 15 M.J. Public Lands, §§ 11, 12.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Recordation taxes on documents intended to allow individuals of the Islamic faith to acquire real estate without violating a tenet of their religion. - A circuit court clerk should base the recordation taxes for a "Security Instrument," which allows for the payment of profits as opposed to a traditional deed of trust that is secured by a note requiring the payment of interest, on the original acquisition balance as defined in the instrument, and should assess separate fees for recording an "Assignment Agreement," since the document contains two instruments of equal dignity that serve independent purposes at law. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable John T. Frey, Clerk of the Fairfax County Circuit Court, 02-041, 2002 Va. AG LEXIS 67 (6/24/02).

§ 17.1-227.1. Use of cover sheets on deeds or other instruments by circuit court clerks.

  1. Circuit court clerks may require that any deed or other instrument conveying or relating to an interest in real property be submitted for recordation with a cover sheet detailing the information contained in the deed or other instrument necessary for the clerk to properly index such instrument. The cover sheet shall be developed in conjunction with the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall include the following information: (i) the name of each party to be indexed as grantor and the name of each party to be indexed as grantee and, in the case of any individual grantor or grantee, the surname of each individual identified as such; (ii) in the case of a deed or other instrument described in § 58.1-801 or 58.1-807 , the amount of the consideration and the actual value of the property conveyed; (iii) the Virginia or federal law under which any exemption from recordation taxes is claimed; (iv) if required under § 17.1-252 , the tax map reference number or numbers, or the parcel identification number (PIN) or numbers, of the affected parcel or parcels; and (v) the name and current address of the person to whom the instrument should be returned after recordation.
  2. In any clerk's office that does not require a cover sheet, the attorney or other party presenting a deed or other instrument conveying or relating to an interest in real property may submit a cover sheet with such deed or other instrument containing all of the information required under subsection A, and in such case the deed or other instrument need not contain the information otherwise required to be included under subsection A of § 17.1-223 , except that each page thereof shall be numbered consecutively as provided in subsection A of § 17.1-223 .
  3. The attorney or other party who prepares the cover sheet submitted with any deed or other instrument conveying or relating to an interest in real property for recordation has the responsibility for ensuring the accuracy of the information contained in the cover sheet, and the clerk may rely on the information provided therein. The cover sheet may be recorded with the deed or other instrument with which it is submitted, but it shall not be included as a page for determining the amount of any applicable filing fees pursuant to subdivision A 2 of § 17.1-275 except in the case of a cover sheet submitted pursuant to subsection B. The cover sheet shall be provided only for information purposes to facilitate the recordation of the deed or other instrument with which it is submitted. The cover sheet shall not be construed to convey title to any interest in real property, purport to be a document in the chain of title conveying any interest in real property, or be considered a part of, or affect the interpretation of, the deed or other instrument with which it is submitted, regardless of whether the clerk records the cover sheet with such instrument. (1999, cc. 363, 369; 2000, cc. 440, 446; 2008, cc. 823, 833; 2014, c. 338.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2014, c. 338, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2014, except that the provisions of this act amending §§ 17.1-223 and 17.1-227.1 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective on January 1, 2015."

Acts 2014, c. 338, cl. 3 provides: "That by January 1, 2015, (i) the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia shall develop a nonelectronic, hard copy form of cover sheet, consistent with § 17.1-227.1 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, for use by attorneys or other parties who choose to submit a cover sheet to those circuit court clerks who do not require cover sheets and (ii) those circuit court clerks who require cover sheets using a software program not provided by the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia shall revise such program to ensure that their cover sheets will include the information required by § 17.1-227.1 ."

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendments by cc. 440 and 446 are identical, and in the first paragraph, substituted "Circuit court clerks may" for "The clerk of the circuit court in any (i) county with a population between 7,000 and 7,500, (ii) county with a population between 39,500 and 42,000, (iii) county with a population between 10,250 and 10,400, and (iv) city with a population between 4,000 and 4,500 may request, but shall not" at the beginning of the first sentence, and in the last sentence, substituted "developed in conjunction with" for "in a form approved by" and deleted "and used in connection with the Financial Management System and Record Indexing System provided to such circuit court clerks by the Supreme Court of Virginia" at the end of the sentence; and deleted the former third paragraph, which read: "The provisions of this section shall expire on July 1, 2002."

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 823 and 833 are identical, and added the last sentence of the first paragraph.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 338, effective January 1, 2015, rewrote the section.

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Equitable estoppel did not bar deed of trust. - Bank's deed of trust was not barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel because an erroneous cover sheet did not rise to the level of a misrepresentation of a material fact; a mortgagor did not rely upon the cover sheet but upon the index of the clerk of court. Mega Int'l Commerce Bank v. MCAP Capital, L.L.C., 74 Va. Cir. 132, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 289 (Norfolk 2007).

Duty to record deed of trust. - Clerk of court had a duty under § 17.1-249 to record a bank's deed of trust correctly because the clerk was required to index consistently with the instrument itself, not the cover sheet, which contained erroneous information; nothing in § 17.1-227.1 repeals or otherwise modifies the clerk's duty to properly index the recorded instrument, and the statute does exonerate the clerk for his failure to do so, notwithstanding an erroneous cover sheet. Mega Int'l Commerce Bank v. MCAP Capital, L.L.C., 74 Va. Cir. 132, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 289 (Norfolk 2007).

§ 17.1-228. Recording releases of deeds of trust, partial releases of deeds of trust, court ordered releases, or other liens or assignments in cities and counties using microfilm.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whenever the writings required by law to be recorded in the deed book in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of any city or county are recorded by a microphotographic process or by any other method or process which renders impractical or impossible the subsequent entering of marginal notations upon a recorded instrument, an appropriate certificate, certificate of satisfaction, certificate of partial satisfaction, certified copy of order, or other separate instrument setting forth the necessary information shall be recorded and indexed according to law.

When existing deed books in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of any county or city are to be microfilmed or digitally reproduced for security purposes, the clerk may provide that marginal notations to accomplish the release of deeds of trust or other liens shall not be made in such deed book so microfilmed or digitally reproduced.

(1975, c. 469, § 17-60.1; 1978, c. 629; 1991, c. 414; 1998, c. 872; 2008, cc. 823, 833.)

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 823 and 833 are identical, and inserted "or digitally reproduced" twice in the second paragraph.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on property for the year 1974-1975, see 61 Va. L. Rev. 1834 (1975).

§ 17.1-229. Additional documents to be recorded in deed book.

All deeds, homestead deeds and leases of personal property, bills of sale, and all other contracts or liens as to personal property, which are by law required or permitted to be recorded, all mechanics' liens, all other liens not directed to be recorded elsewhere and all other writings relating to or affecting personal property which are authorized to be recorded shall, unless otherwise provided, be recorded in the deed book and shall be indexed in the general index book; provided, however, the clerk may reject any writing for recordation that is not specifically authorized by law and set out in the Code of Virginia.

(Code 1919, § 3393, § 17-61; 1920, p. 313; 1932, p. 333; 1985, c. 392; 1998, c. 872; 2010, c. 352.)

Cross references. - For requirement that, on and after July 1, 1964, documents previously required to be recorded in the miscellaneous lien book be recorded in the deed book and indexed in the general index of deeds, see § 43-4.1 .

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 352 inserted "provided, however, the clerk may reject any writing for recordation that is not specifically authorized by law and set out in the Code of Virginia" at the end.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 2C M.J. Bankruptcy, § 93.

CASE NOTES

The recordation of a mortgage in the conditional sales book, where only conditional sale contracts were required to be recorded, was not constructive notice to a purchaser of goods and chattels from a seller in actual possession of the property. Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 152 Va. 520 , 147 S.E. 220 (1929) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-230. Documents to be recorded in bond book.

All bonds taken of officers, executors, administrators, trustees or other fiduciaries and all bonds of commissioners and receivers, and all suspending bonds, appeal bonds, injunction bonds, attachment bonds, cost bonds, and all other bonds required to be recorded, shall be recorded in a book known as the bond book.

(Code 1919, § 3393, § 17-62; 1920, p. 313; 1932, p. 333; 1981, c. 295; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 15 M.J. Receivers, § 22.

§ 17.1-231. Documents to be recorded in will book.

All wills, inventories, appraisements, lists of sales and settlements of accounts of executors, administrators, curators, trustees or other fiduciaries shall be recorded in a book to be known as the will book. Provided, that the judges of the several courts of the Commonwealth before whom fiduciaries qualify may, by order, prescribe that inventories, appraisements, accounts of sale and settlement of accounts of fiduciaries, together with all reports and decrees or orders, or portions thereof, proper to be recorded therewith, shall be recorded either in the current will book or in a book to be kept by the clerk for that purpose. Such courts may prescribe that the settlements of accounts of fiduciaries be recorded in the mode prescribed by § 64.2-1214 .

(Code 1919, § 3393, § 17-63; 1920, p. 313; 1932, p. 333; 1998, c. 872.)

Editor's note. - At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, the reference to "26-35" was changed to "64.2-1214" to conform to the recodification of Title 64.1 by Acts 2012, c. 614, effective October 1, 2012.

Law review. - For article, "Wills, Trusts, and Estates," see 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 845 (2001).

§ 17.1-232. What to be recorded in judgment docket.

Abstracts of all judgments authorized or required by law to be docketed or recorded shall be recorded in a book to be known as the judgment docket.

(Code 1919, § 3393, § 17-64; 1920, p. 314; 1932, p. 334; 1998, c. 872; 2002, c. 832.)

Cross references. - As to manner of docketing judgments, see § 8.01-449 .

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 832 deleted "and abstracts of all executions issued on any judgment" preceding "shall be recorded."

§ 17.1-233. What to be recorded in marriage register.

All marriage licenses and all matters relating to marriages required or authorized to be recorded under § 20-20 shall be recorded in a book to be known as the marriage register.

(Code 1919, § 3393, § 17-65; 1920, p. 314; 1932, p. 334; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 15 M.J. Recording Acts, § 6.

§ 17.1-234. Documents to be recorded in "writings partially proved."

All deeds and other instruments which have been only partially proved shall be recorded in a separate book to be known as "writings partially proved."

(Code 1919, § 3393, § 17-66; 1920, p. 314; 1932, p. 334; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-235. Recordation of federal farm loan mortgages.

The clerks of the circuit courts shall keep a separate book, which shall be known as the federal farm loan mortgage book, in which shall be recorded mortgages executed to secure the payment of loans made by federal land banks under authority of the act of Congress, approved July 17, 1916, known as the Federal Farm Loan Act, which mortgages, when so recorded in such book shall be indexed in the proper general index book, as well as in the index to such farm loan mortgage book; provided that any such clerk instead of providing such separate book may immediately spread upon the book in which deeds are recorded in his office any and all proper mortgages or deeds of trust executed to secure such loans and all of such mortgages and deeds of trust shall be immediately spread upon such records when received, so that the original thereof may be returned to the federal land bank as soon as possible.

(1918, p. 437, § 17-67; Michie Code 1942, § 3393b; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 15 M.J. Recording Acts, § 2.

§ 17.1-236. Recordation of plats and maps.

All plats and maps may in the discretion of the clerks of the several circuit courts be recorded in a book to be known as the plat book. In case of such recordation of any plat or map which is attached to or made a part of any deed, deed of trust or writing which is recorded in the deed book, an appropriate note shall be made on the deed book where such deed, deed of trust or other writing is recorded, referring to the plat book and page where the plat or map is recorded and the clerk shall endorse on the plat and plat book the date of the recordation and a reference by book and page to the recorded instrument of which it is a part and shall sign the certificate. In those courts where deeds and other writings are recorded by a procedural microfilm recording system, all plats shall be recorded with the deeds and other writings and indexed in the general index to deeds. Wherever plats are maintained singly, as in a cabinet or on microfilm aperture cards, they shall be cross-referenced with the deed books in the same manner as prescribed herein when plats are recorded in a separate plat book. All plats submitted for recordation shall meet the standards for plats as adopted under § 42.1-82 of the Virginia Public Records Act (§ 42.1-76 et seq.).

(1918, p. 504, § 17-68; Michie Code 1942, § 3393a; 1944, p. 472; 1983, c. 180; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-237. Validation of recordations in certain plat books.

All books in which prior to June 24, 1944, plats were recorded separately from the deed books in all the clerks' offices of this Commonwealth are hereby validated and made parts of the official records of the offices.

(1918, p. 504, § 17-69; Michie Code 1942, § 3393a; 1944, p. 472; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-238. State highway plat book.

The state highway plat book, which shall be provided by the Department of Transportation, shall be installed in the circuit court clerk's office of each county of the Commonwealth and in the clerk's office of the circuit court of any city wherein the Department of Transportation has acquired any interest in land, and all highway plats pertaining to the primary and secondary highway systems, and all plats in connection therewith, shall be filed therein by the clerk. The state highway plat book may be produced in one of the following forms: (i) paper; (ii) microfilm, microfiche, or any other microphotographic process, that meets state archival microfilm standards and state electronic records guidelines pursuant to § 42.1-82 ; or (iii) electronic process. The clerk shall note on each recorded deed relating to such plats and in the deed book, wherein such deed is recorded, or through recordation of a separate instrument referencing the page where such deed is recorded, the numbers of the state highway plat book and page wherein such plats are filed. The clerk so filing the plats and so noting the same shall receive a fee of $5. All plats filed prior to July 1, 1950, in such state highway plat book are hereby validated.

(1950, p. 477, § 17-69.1; 1956, c. 19; 1994, c. 432; 1998, c. 872; 2014, c. 330; 2015, c. 641.)

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 330 substituted "in" for "on the margin of the page of."

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 641 substituted "The" for "A loose-leaf book known as" in the first sentence, added the second sentence; inserted "or through recordation of a separate instrument referencing the page where such deed is recorded" in the third sentence, deleted "be and the same" following "state highway plat book" in the last sentence; and made minor stylistic changes.

§ 17.1-239. Character of books used for recording; standards for microfilm, etc.

All books used in the clerk's office for the permanent recordation of deeds, wills and other instruments shall either be made of high quality record paper, strictly number one rag stock, or permanent-durable, acid-free paper composed of strong, well-purified chemical wood fibers as prescribed by regulations pursuant to subdivision A 2 of § 42.1-82 , or, if microfilm, microfiche, or microphotographic process is used in the clerk's office, the deeds, wills or other instruments shall be processed in accordance with standards established pursuant to § 42.1-82 . All books are to be substantially bound, with a durable cloth or plastic cover over all.

(Code 1919, § 3399, § 17-70; 1934, p. 174; 1972, c. 501; 1975, c. 58; 1983, c. 293; 1988, c. 35; 1998, c. 872.)

Law review. - For article, "Wills, Trusts, and Estates," see 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 845 (2001).

§ 17.1-240. Recording by microphotographic or electronic process.

A procedural microphotographic process, digital reproduction, or any other micrographic process that stores images of documents in reduced size or in electronic format may be used to accomplish the recording of writings otherwise required by any provision of law to be spread in a book or retained in the circuit court clerk's office, including the civil and criminal order books, the Will Book or Fiduciary Account Book, the Juvenile Order Book, the Adoption Order Book, the Trust Fund Order Book, the Deed Book, the Plat Book, the Land Book, the Bond Book, the Judgment Docket Book, the Partnership or Assumed Name Certificate Book, marriage records, and financing statements. Any such micrographic, microphotographic, or electronic recording process shall meet archival standards as recommended by The Library of Virginia.

(1977, c. 142, § 17-70.1; 1983, c. 293; 1997, c. 579; 1998, c. 872; 2005, c. 681; 2018, c. 523.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 681, effective January 1, 2006, in the first sentence, substituted "civil and criminal order books" for "Common Law Order Book, the Chancery Order Book, the Clerk's Order Books" and "Will Book or" for "Will Book and/or."

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 523 substituted "that" for "which," deleted "but not limited to" following "including" and inserted "the Bond Book" in the first sentence.

CASE NOTES

Validity of indictment. - Trial court correctly held that the indictments against defendant were valid because an oral verbatim reading or a physical order book were not required, the court's order reflected the grand jury proceedings, and established that the written indictments were returned by the grand jury in the required manner: they were presented in open court, recorded in electronic format, and made a part of the permanent record of the proceedings through the court's order. Howard v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 580, 760 S.E.2d 828, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 275 (2014).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Order book. - An electronic case management system that provides the contents of an order book as prescribed in § 17.1-124 , that is created using an electronic recording process compliant with the archival standards as recommended by the Library of Virginia, and that follows state electronic records guidelines as provided in § 42.1-82 , fulfills the requirement of an order book as described in § 17.1-124 . See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Michele B. McQuigg, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Prince William County, No. 13-091, 2014 Va. AG LEXIS 7 (1/10/14).

§ 17.1-241. Clerks to procure books for record.

Every circuit court clerk shall procure appropriate books for records as the business of his office requires. But orders for the same shall first be obtained by the clerks from the governing bodies of their respective counties or cities.

(Code 1919, § 3400, § 17-71; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-242. Custody of books, records, etc.

The circuit court clerks shall have custody of and shall keep all court records, including books, evidence, records, maps, and papers, deposited in their offices or at such location otherwise designated by the clerk, as well as records stored in electronic format whether the storage media for such electronic records are on premises or elsewhere.

(Code 1919, § 3400, § 17-72; 1998, c. 872; 2001, c. 497; 2014, c. 460.)

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 497 added "as well as records stored in electronic format whether the storage media for such electronic records are on premises or elsewhere."

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 460 inserted "court records, including," "evidence," and "or at such location otherwise designated by the clerk," and made minor stylistic changes.

CASE NOTES

Record custodians. - Circuit court properly denied a petition for mandamus filed by a newspaper and a reporter to compel the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia for a searchable version of a database hosted on servers operated and housed at the Executive Secretary's offices because the Virginia Freedom of Information Act directed persons who wished to obtain public records to direct the request to the custodian of the records and circuit court clerks were statutorily designated as the custodians of the court records and that they remained custodians even if the electronic records were stored off premises. Daily Press, LLC v. Office of the Exec. Sec'y, 293 Va. 551 , 800 S.E.2d 822, 2017 Va. LEXIS 98 (2017).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A circuit court clerk has the discretion to grant access to an automated case management system. - A circuit court clerk, as custodian of the records maintained in an automated case management system, has the discretion to grant access to such a system. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Judy L. Worthington, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County, 02-026, 2002 Va. AG LEXIS 62 (4/4/02).

§ 17.1-243. Clerks to have land books bound.

Except those clerks using an automated system, clerks shall bind, in volumes of convenient size, all books in their respective clerks' offices not currently bound showing the assessments of lands since the year 1850, and shall bind in like volumes such books hereafter filed in their clerks' offices at intervals of not more than five years.

(Code 1919, § 5979, § 17-73; 1998, c. 872; 2014, c. 460.)

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 460 substituted "Except those clerks using an automated system, clerks" for "The circuit courts."

§ 17.1-244. Books, etc., in clerks' offices rebound, transcribed, microfilmed or digitally reproduced; credit given to transcripts, etc.

Any court of record or, if so designated by the judge, the clerk thereof may cause any of the books or records in the clerk's office which may be in need thereof to be rebound, transcribed, microfilmed or digitally reproduced. The same faith and credit shall be given to such transcript or reproductions from the microfilm or digitally reproduced record as the book or record transcribed would have been entitled to.

(Code 1919, § 5980, § 17-74; 1972, c. 549; 1976, c. 630; 1997, c. 836; 1998, c. 872; 2008, cc. 823, 833.)

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 823 and 833 are identical, and inserted "or digitally reproduced record" in the second sentence.

§ 17.1-245. Books may be taken from clerk's office to be rebound, etc.

The court or, if so designated by the judge, the clerk directing any book or books to be bound, rebound, microfilmed or digitally reproduced may allow the same to be taken from the clerk's office in which such book or books may be on file, but shall take all necessary and proper precautions, by requiring bonds or otherwise, to insure the preservation and return and to prevent the mutilation thereof.

(Code 1919, § 5981, § 17-75; 1976, c. 630; 1997, c. 836; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-246. How costs thereof certified and paid.

The cost incurred shall be certified by the court or, if so designated by the judge, the clerk, to the governing body of the county or city in whose clerk's office the books or records so bound, rebound, microfilmed, transcribed or digitally reproduced are on file, to be paid by such county or city.

(Code 1919, § 5982, § 17-76; 1976, c. 630; 1997, c. 836; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-247.

Repealed by Acts 2013, c. 263, cl. 2.

Editor's note. - Former § 17.1-247 , pertaining to when and how clerk to verify his record, derived from Code 1919, § 3401, § 17-77; 1998, c. 872.

§ 17.1-248. Clerk to make index to each of his books.

The clerk of every circuit court shall have an index to each book he is required to keep, except those for which general indexes are required or permitted, and kept, making convenient reference to every order, record or entry therein. Every execution and every judgment or decree for money shall be indexed, in the name of the person against whom and in the name of the person in whose favor the judgment or decree was rendered.

(Code 1919, § 3391, § 17-78; 1942, p. 179; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 15 M.J. Recording Acts, § 13.

CASE NOTES

Judgments not regarded as docketed as to defendant in whose name it is not indexed. - Sections 8.01-449 , 8.01-450 , former 8-390 and this section, with respect to indexing and docketing judgments, require that a docketed judgment shall be indexed in the names of all the parties to the judgment, and should not be regarded as docketed as to any defendant in whose name it is not indexed. These names must be set out, and the omission of the christian name is fatal to the judgment. Richardson v. Gardner, 128 Va. 676 , 105 S.E. 225 (1920) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-249. General indexes for clerks' offices; daily index.

  1. There shall be kept in every clerk's office modern, family name or ledgerized alphabetical key-table general indexes to all deed books, miscellaneous liens, will books, judgment dockets and court order books. The clerk shall enter daily, either in such general indexes or in the daily index to instruments admitted to record, every deed, corrected or amended deed, deed of release, deed of trust, contract of sale, or any addendum, modification, or memorandum relating to any of these instruments, indexing each instrument in the names of all parties identified in the instrument as grantor, grantee, or both, as required by § 17.1-223 , or identified in the cover sheet as grantor, grantee, or both, pursuant to § 17.1-227.1 , as applicable.
  2. A deed of trust made to one or more trustees to secure the payment of an indebtedness, and any certificate of satisfaction or certificate of partial satisfaction, assignment, loan modification agreement, substitution of trustees or similar instrument subsequently recorded with respect to such deed, shall be sufficiently indexed if the clerk enters in the appropriate places in the general index to deeds provided for in subsection A the names of the grantor and the name of the beneficiary or, in lieu of the name of the beneficiary, the first listed trustee as grantee. The beneficiary need not be named in the first clause of the deed as a condition of recordation.
  3. A deed made by a person in a representative capacity, or by devisees or coparceners, shall be indexed in the names of the grantors and grantees and the name of the former record title owner listed in the first clause of the instrument.
  4. The general indexes of civil causes shall be sufficiently kept if the clerk indexes such causes under the short style or title thereof, except that in multiple suits brought under § 58.1-3968 , the names of all of the defendants disclosed by the pleadings shall be entered in the general index or book.
  5. Every deed of conveyance of real estate in which a vendor's lien is reserved shall be indexed twice so as to show not only the conveyance from the grantor to the grantee in the instrument, but also the reservation of the lien as if it were a grant of such lien from the grantee to the grantor by a separate instrument and the fact of the lien shall be noted in the index.
  6. At the time of qualification of an executor, every will shall be indexed in the name of the decedent and such executor.
  7. All deed books, miscellaneous liens, will books, judgment dockets, and court order books shall be numbered or otherwise adequately designated and the clerk upon the delivery of any writing to him for record required by law to be recorded shall duly index it upon the general index in the manner hereinbefore required. When the writing has been actually transcribed on the book, the clerk shall add to the general index the number of the book in which, and the page on which, the writing is recorded.
  8. The clerk on receipt of any such writing for record may immediately index it in a book to be known as the "daily index of instruments admitted to record" and within 90 days after its admission to record the clerk shall index all such writings indexed in the daily index in the appropriate general index as hereinbefore provided. The daily index book shall, at all times, be kept in the office of the clerk and conveniently available for examination by the public. During the period permitted for transfer from the daily index to the general index, indexing in the daily index shall be a sufficient compliance with the requirements of this section as to indexing.
  9. The judge of any circuit court may make such orders as he deems advisable as to the time and method of indexing the order books in the clerk's office of the court and may dispense with a general index for order books of the court.
  10. The clerk may maintain his indexes on computer, word processor, microfilm, microfiche, or other micrographic medium and, in addition, may maintain his grantor and grantee indexes on paper.

    (Code 1919, § 3394, § 17-79; 1920, p. 105; 1926, p. 125; 1936, p. 82; 1944, p. 355; 1952, c. 34; 1960, c. 146; 1974, c. 515; 1983, c. 293; 1990, c. 374; 1991, cc. 203, 204; 1998, c. 872; 2002, cc. 276, 832; 2005, c. 681; 2008, cc. 823, 833; 2014, c. 338; 2020, c. 1063.)

Cross references. - For other provisions concerning docketing and indexing of judgments, see §§ 8.01-446 through 8.01-452.1 .

For requirement that, on and after July 1, 1964, documents previously required to be recorded in the miscellaneous lien book be recorded in the deed book and indexed in the general index of deeds, see § 43-4.1 .

As to recordation of report of accounts, and debts and demands, by commissioner of accounts, see § 64.2-1214 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1063, cl. 2 provides: "That for any clerk of a circuit court that does not have an electronic program capable of indexing wills by the name of both the testator and the executor as of July 1, 2020, the provisions of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2022."

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 276 inserted "and, in addition, may maintain his grantor and grantee indexes on paper" at the end of subsection I.

The 2002 amendment by c. 832 inserted "and any certificate of satisfaction . . . with respect to such deed" in the first sentence of subsection B.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 681, effective January 1, 2006, substituted "civil causes" for "law and chancery causes" in subsection D; and made a minor stylistic change in subsection G.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 823 and 833 are identical, and added "unless the instrument is submitted for recordation with a cover sheet pursuant to § 17.1-227.1 , in which case, the instrument may be indexed by the information contained in the cover sheet. The clerk shall comply with the provisions of § 17.1-223 " to the end of subsection A.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 338 rewrote subsection A; in subsection B inserted "of trust"; and in subsection E deleted "double" preceding "indexed," inserted "twice," and substituted "such lien" for "the same."

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 1063 inserted subsection F and redesignated accordingly. For applicability clause, see Editor's note.

Law review. - For article on the mechanics of an examination of title to real property in Virginia, see 11 U. Rich. L. Rev. 471 (1977). For article on title examination in Virginia, see 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 229 (1983).

For 1991 survey on property law, see 25 U. Rich. L. Rev. 859 (1991).

For article surveying developments in real estate and land use law in Virginia from June 1, 2001 through June 1, 2002, see 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 271 (2002).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Duty to record deed of trust. - Clerk of court had a duty under § 17.1-249 to record a bank's deed of trust correctly because the clerk was required to index consistently with the instrument itself, not the cover sheet, which contained erroneous information; nothing in § 17.1-227.1 repeals or otherwise modifies the clerk's duty to properly index the recorded instrument, and the statute does exonerate the clerk for his failure to do so, notwithstanding an erroneous cover sheet. Mega Int'l Commerce Bank v. MCAP Capital, L.L.C., 74 Va. Cir. 132, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 289 (Norfolk 2007).

§ 17.1-250. Correction of indexes.

No clerk or deputy clerk of any court in which deeds are recorded shall correct any indexing mistake by insertion, or alter or reprint the page, unless, at the time of such insertion, alteration or reprinting, he (i) notes the date and nature of the change in the index or (ii) by any other means capable of maintaining a permanent record of the change together with the original recording, indicates the date and nature of the change and the name of the person who made it.

(1966, c. 403, § 17-79.1; 1991, c. 652; 1998, c. 872; 2014, c. 330.)

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 330 in clause (i) deleted "margin of the" following "change in the" and "and places his name or initials upon same" following "index."

§ 17.1-251. Indexing of certain subdivision plats or maps.

When any plat or map of a subdivision which contains fifteen lots or more is recorded in the general index, the clerk shall, in addition to complying with the requirements set forth in § 17.1-249 , add the magisterial district wherein the subdivision is located. Such plat or map shall also show the source of title of the immediate grantor.

(1974, c. 349, § 17-79.2; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-252. Indexing by tax map reference number.

Circuit court clerks in those localities with a unique parcel identification system shall require that any deed or other instrument conveying or relating to an interest in real property bear, on the first page of the deed or other instrument, or state in the cover sheet submitted with the deed or other instrument, the tax map reference number or numbers, or the parcel identification number (PIN) or numbers, of the affected parcel or parcels. Upon admitting the deed or other instrument to record, the clerk may, in addition to any other indexing required by law, index the deed or other instrument by the tax map reference number or numbers or by the parcel identification number or numbers.

(1982, c. 597, § 17-79.3; 1986, c. 21; 1988, c. 116; 1992, c. 478; 1996, c. 231; 1997, cc. 224, 902; 1998, cc. 75, 872; 1999, cc. 133, 163; 2000, cc. 440, 446; 2014, c. 338.)

The 1999 amendments. - The 1999 amendments by cc. 133 and 163 are identical, and substituted "Circuit court clerks" for "The Clerks of the Circuit Courts of Arlington, Augusta, Chesterfield, Fairfax, Fauquier, Henrico, Loudoun, Montgomery, Prince William, Roanoke, Rockingham, Spotsylvania and Wise Counties and the Cities of Alexandria, Fairfax, Falls Church, Norton, Richmond, Roanoke, and Virginia Beach" in the first sentence.

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendments by cc. 440 and 446 are identical, and in the first sentence, substituted "in those localities with a unique parcel identification system shall" for "may", and substituted "on" for "in the left margin of."

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 338 inserted "or state in the cover sheet submitted with the deed or other instrument" in the first sentence.

§ 17.1-253. Committee to inquire into necessity of general index; report; plan adopted; locality to cover cost.

  1. Whenever the circuit court, or the judge thereof, finds that there is need of an improved system of general indexing to any of the records kept by the clerk of court, it shall be the duty of the court or judge, in its or his discretion, to appoint a committee to inquire into the necessity for such indexing, and make a report to the court, or the judge thereof.
  2. If the committee reports that the work is needed, the court or judge shall authorize and direct the committee to make a written contract with some responsible and experienced person or persons, but such contract shall be approved by the court or judge before it becomes effective.
  3. When such index is installed in any clerk's office the same plan of index to current records shall be adopted and used by the clerk of such court.
  4. The governing body of the county or city wherein such indexing shall be directed by the court or judge to be done shall, if necessary, provide a sufficient sum to pay for such indexing and materials.

    (Code 1919, §§ 3395, 3396, 3397, 3398, §§ 17-80, 17-81, 17-82, 17-83; 1948, p. 62; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-254. Validation of judgment records in office of clerk of Circuit Court of Norfolk.

The "General Index to Judgment Lien Docket and Execution Books" designated "A-D," "E-K," "L-R" and "S-Z," respectively, in the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk is hereby validated, and is and shall be for all purposes whatever the legal record of judgments docketed as provided by law in the office of such clerk for the period beginning January 2, 1917.

(1948, p. 59, § 17-83.1; 1998, c. 872.)

Article 4. Electronic Filing.

§§ 17.1-255, 17.1-256.

Expired.

Editor's note. - Acts 1996, c. 674, which enacted this section, in cl. 2, as amended by Acts 1998, c. 651, provides for the expiration of this section July 1, 2004.

§ 17.1-257.

Repealed by Acts 2000, c. 800, cl. 2.

§ 17.1-258.

Expired.

Editor's note. - Acts 1996, c. 674, which enacted this section, in cl. 2, as amended by Acts 1998, c. 651, provides for the expiration of this section July 1, 2004.

§ 17.1-258.1.

Repealed by Acts 2003, c. 127, cl. 2.

Article 4.1. Electronic Filing.

§ 17.1-258.2. Definition.

As used in this article, "electronic filing of documents" means the filing or recordation with a circuit court clerk of written information as defined in § 1-257 , for the purpose of creating an electronic record as defined in subdivision 7 of § 59.1-480.

(2005, c. 744.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, c. 744, cl. 2, provides: "That the provisions of §§ 17.1-258.2 through 17.1-258.5 , 55-108 and 55-142.13 shall become effective on July 1, 2005."

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Clerk of court can close the office when a county has failed to adopt a budget. - Clerk of court can close the office when a county has failed to adopt a budget and the clerk cannot pay his employees. A clerk, or the employees of the clerk's office, can serve on a volunteer basis until the budget impasse is resolved. To the extent particular functions, including electronic filing procedures, can be kept operational in the absence of funding from the county and without staffing, the clerk should do so. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Jack Kennedy, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Wise County and City of Norton, 11-063, 2011 Va. AG LEXIS 34 (6/22/11).

§ 17.1-258.3. Electronic filing in civil or criminal proceedings.

Any clerk of circuit court may establish and operate a system for electronic filing in civil or criminal proceedings that shall be governed by the Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia. The circuit court clerk may require each person whom the clerk authorizes to file documents electronically to provide proof of identity to the clerk and to enter into an agreement specifying the electronic filing procedures to be followed, including, but not limited to, security procedures, as defined in the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (§ 59.1-479 et seq.), for transmitting signed or notarized documents. The clerk may charge copy fees per page, as provided in subdivision A 8 of § 17.1-275 , and obtain reimbursement for fees paid by subscribers to its designated application service providers for the technology systems used to operate electronic filing in civil and criminal cases in the clerk's office. The fees and reimbursements collected shall be deposited by the clerk into the clerk's nonreverting local fund to be used to cover operational expenses as defined in § 17.1-295 . Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the clerk from entering into agreements with designated application service providers to provide all or part of the network or system for electronic filing of civil or criminal records as provided herein. Further, nothing herein shall be construed to require the electronic filing of any civil or criminal record, and such records may continue to be filed in paper form.

Any clerk of circuit court with an electronic filing system established in accordance with the Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia may charge an additional $5 fee for every civil case initially filed by paper, except that a person who is determined to be indigent pursuant to § 19.2-159 shall be exempt from the payment of such fee. The fee shall be paid to the clerk's office and deposited by the clerk into the clerk's nonreverting local fund to be exclusively used to cover the operational expenses as defined in § 17.1-295 .

(2005, c. 744; 2008, cc. 823, 833; 2010, cc. 430, 717, 760; 2013, cc. 74, 77; 2014, c. 460; 2015, c. 317.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, c. 744, cl. 2, provides: "That the provisions of §§ 17.1-258.2 through 17.1-258.5 , 55-108 and 55-142.13 shall become effective on July 1, 2005."

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 823 and 833 are identical, and deleted "or recordation of documents pursuant to the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act ( § 59.1-479 et seq.). Once established, any person, as defined in subdivision 11 of § 59.1-480, may electronically file land records, instruments, judgments, and UCC financing statements. Electronic filing of papers" following "electronic filing" and inserted "that" following "criminal actions" in the first sentence.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by cc. 430, 717 and 760 are nearly identical, and substituted "any clerk" for "a clerk," "proceedings" for "actions," "the Rules of the Supreme Court" for "Rule 1.17 of the Rules of Supreme Court," "may require" for "shall enter into an agreement with" and inserted "to enter into an agreement," "( § 59.1-479 et seq.)," and "signed or." The section has been set out in the form above at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 74 added the second paragraph.

The 2013 amendment by c. 77 inserted "to provide proof of identity to the clerk and" in the second sentence and added the third through sixth sentences in the first paragraph.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 460 at the end of the second paragraph substituted "as defined in § 17.1-295 " for "of the electronic filing system."

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 317 substituted "Rules of Supreme Court" for "Rules of the Supreme Court" in the first sentence of the first and second paragraphs and substituted "$5 fee" for "$2 fee" in the second paragraph.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Discretion of clerk. - Absent an explicit statutory scheme outlining the procedures required for electronic filing of documents or a legislative enactment to the contrary, it is within the discretion of a clerk of the circuit court to establish such procedures, including the decision regarding the persons with whom he must enter into agreements for such filings. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Paul M. Metzger, Spotsylvania County Circuit Court Clerk, 05-086 (3/27/06).

§ 17.1-258.3:1. Electronic filing of land records; paper form.

  1. A clerk of a circuit court may provide a network or system for electronic filing of land records in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 (§ 55.1-346 et seq.) of Chapter 3 of Title 55.1 regarding the satisfaction of mortgages and the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act (§ 55.1-661 et seq.). The clerk may require each filer to provide proof of identity to the clerk. The clerk shall enter into an electronic filing agreement with each filer in accordance with Virginia Real Property Electronic Recording Standards established by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the clerk from entering into agreements with designated application service providers to provide all or part of the network or system for electronic filing of land records as provided herein. Further, nothing herein shall be construed to require the electronic filing of any land record, and such records may continue to be filed in paper form.
  2. Any clerk of a circuit court with an electronic filing system established in accordance with this section may charge a fee not to exceed $5 per instrument for every land record filed by paper. The fee shall be paid to the clerk's office and deposited by the clerk into the clerk's nonreverting local fund to be used exclusively to cover the operational expenses as defined in § 17.1-295 .
  3. The clerk shall maintain a disaster plan, as defined in § 42.1-77 , for recovery of any land record in possession of the clerk that is maintained as an electronic record. (2008, cc. 823, 833; 2010, c. 430; 2012, c. 234; 2013, c. 77; 2016, c. 264; 2017, cc. 90, 289.)

Editor's note. - To conform to the recodification of Title 55 by Acts 2019, c. 712, effective October 1, 2019, the following substitution was made at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission: substituted "the provisions of Article 3 ( § 55.1-346 et seq.) of Chapter 3 of Title 55.1 regarding the satisfaction of mortgages and the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act ( § 55.1-661 et seq.)" for "the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act ( § 55-142.10 et seq.) and the provisions of Article 2.1 ( § 55-66.8 et seq.) of Chapter 4 of Title 55."

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 430, in the third sentence, substituted "the clerk's" for "a special" and deleted "of such network or system" from the end; in the fourth sentence, deleted "of such network or system" preceding "shall include" and added clauses (i) through (iii).

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 234 inserted "including locating technology in an offsite facility for such purposes or for the implementation of a disaster recovery plan" in clause (iii).

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 77 substituted "as defined in § 17.1-295 " at the end of the third sentence for the former fourth sentence, which defined "operational expenses"; and inserted the fourth and seventh sentences.

The 2016 amendments. - The 2016 amendment by c. 264, effective July 1, 2017, added subsection B.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendments by cc. 90 and 289 are identical, and deleted the former second and third sentences in subsection A which read "The clerk may charge a fee to be assessed for each instrument recorded electronically in an amount not to exceed $5 per document. The fee shall be paid to the clerk's office and deposited by the clerk into the clerk's nonreverting local fund to be used to cover operational expenses as defined in § 17.1-295 "; inserted subsection B, and redesignated former subsection B as subsection C.

§ 17.1-258.3:2. Official certificates and certified records in digital form.

A clerk of circuit court may establish a system for providing official certificates and certified records in digital form of any document maintained by the clerk. The clerk may require any person to provide proof of identity to the clerk in order to obtain access to such records. The clerk or his designated application service provider may assess an additional fee not to exceed $5 per official certificate accompanying or attesting the certified records, subject to subdivision A 8 of § 17.1-275 and to the exemptions provided in § 17.1-267 . The clerk may perform such other notarial acts as allowed under § 47.1-12 . The fee shall be paid to the clerk's office and deposited by the clerk into the clerk's nonreverting local fund to be used to cover operational expenses as defined in § 17.1-295 . Nothing herein shall be construed to require any person to obtain an electronic certificate of any record maintained by the clerk, and such record may continue to be obtained in paper form. The clerk of the circuit court of any jurisdiction shall be immune from suit arising from any acts or omissions relating to providing official certificates and certified records in digital form of any document maintained by the clerk pursuant to this section unless the clerk was grossly negligent or engaged in willful misconduct.

(2010, c. 430; 2011, c. 715; 2013, c. 77.)

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 715 added the third and last sentences.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 77 inserted the second sentence; substituted "as defined in § 17.1-295 " at the end of the fifth sentence for the former fifth sentence, which defined "operational expenses"; and inserted the sixth sentence.

CASE NOTES

Harmless error. - Assuming the trial court erred in admitting a prior conviction order that was signed digitally and was not a properly certified copy, any error was harmless because admitting the digitally signed conviction order had but very slight effect on the final decision; the trial court could have found that defendant had been convicted for driving while intoxicated on two other occasions by simply considering his DMV transcript that listed his convictions. Williams v. Commonwealth, No. 0219-14-1, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 236 (Aug. 4, 2015).

§ 17.1-258.3:3. Submission of records as electronic documents.

Upon written agreement with the clerk, any agency or instrumentality of the Commonwealth may submit any record to the clerk as an electronic document. The form of electronic submission shall comply with the security and data standards established by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency for any such electronic submission. Any record so submitted shall satisfy any law requiring that a document be an original, be on paper or another tangible medium, or be in writing.

(2015, c. 641.)

§ 17.1-258.4. Signature; when effective as original; notarization; seal.

  1. If the electronically filed document contains an electronic signature pursuant to the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (§ 59.1-479 et seq.) that is capable of independent verification and renders any subsequent changes or modifications to the electronic document evident, any statutory requirement for original signature shall be deemed to be satisfied.
  2. Any statutory requirement for a document to be notarized shall be deemed satisfied by the appropriately executed electronic signature of such notary pursuant to the Virginia Notary Act (§ 47.1-1 et seq.).
  3. When a seal or stamp is required to be affixed by any court or clerk on a document, the attachment of an official electronic seal or official electronic stamp to the electronic document is sufficient. "Official electronic seal" and "official electronic stamp" mean an electronic image of a seal or stamp, respectively, of the court or clerk, that is produced by software applications authorized by the clerk that are protected by system credentials to which only the clerk or persons authorized by the clerk have access.

    (2005, c. 744; 2008, cc. 823, 833; 2010, cc. 717, 760; 2013, c. 77.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, c. 744, cl. 2, provides: "That the provisions of §§ 17.1-258.2 through 17.1-258.5 , 55-108 and 55-142.13 shall become effective on July 1, 2005."

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 823 and 833 are identical, and added "pursuant to the Virginia Notary Act ( § 47.1-1 et seq.)" to the end of subsection B.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendments by cc. 717 and 760 are identical, and added subsection C.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 77 inserted "that is capable of independent verification and renders any subsequent changes or modifications to the electronic document evident" in subsection A.

Law review. - For article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 183 (2010).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Electronic notarization. - Prior to July 1, 2008, an electronic notarization of a document by a Virginia notary public constituted a valid notarial act so long as the act was performed by a valid and commissioned notary public who complied with applicable laws and regulations. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable John T. Frey, Clerk of the Circuit Court for Fairfax County, 08-089, 2009 Va. AG LEXIS 8 (2/2/09).

§ 17.1-258.5. Application.

All documents recorded on or after July 1, 2004 that comply with the provisions of this article shall be conclusively presumed to be in proper form for recording, except in cases of fraud.

(2005, c. 744.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, c. 744, cl. 2, provides: "That the provisions of §§ 17.1-258.2 through 17.1-258.5 , 55-108 and 55-142.13 shall become effective on July 1, 2005."

§ 17.1-258.6. Acceptability of electronic medium; submission of trial court record to appellate court.

  1. In connection with civil or criminal proceedings in circuit court, any statutory requirement for an original, original paper, paper, record, document, facsimile, memorandum, exhibit, certification, or transcript shall be satisfied if such is in an electronic form approved for filing under the Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia. However, this section shall not apply to documents the form of which is specified in any statute governing the creation and execution of wills, codicils, testamentary trusts, premarital agreements, and negotiable instruments.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any statutory authorization for the use of copies or reproductions in civil or criminal proceedings in circuit court shall be satisfied by use of such copies or reproductions in hard copy or electronic form approved for filing under the Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia.
  3. Any clerk of a circuit court with an electronic filing system that complies with the Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia may provide the trial court record in electronic form to the appropriate clerk of any appellate court. The clerk of the Supreme Court and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall accept the official civil or criminal record in electronic form as otherwise required by law. The clerk in the appellate court may also request that any paper trial court records be forwarded to such clerk.
  4. The Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia shall not prohibit the use of a private vendor electronic filing system if such system is in compliance with the filing standards established by the Court.

    (2010, cc. 717, 760; 2015, c. 71; 2018, cc. 125, 129, 523.)

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 71, effective January 1, 2016, deleted "the" preceding "Supreme Court" in subsections A and B and added subsections C and D.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendments by cc. 125 and 129 are identical, and substituted "civil or criminal proceedings" for "civil proceedings" in subsections A and B.

The 2018 amendment by c. 523 added the last sentence in subsection C.

Article 5. Master and Incorporating Deeds of Trust.

§ 17.1-259. Recordation of master deed of trust; form and requisites.

  1. Any person may record in any clerk's office in the Commonwealth where deeds are recorded a form of a deed of trust, hereinafter referred to as a "master deed."
  2. The master deed shall bear the caption "Master Deed of Trust," and may contain any provisions not in conflict with law. The provisions shall be numbered or lettered, clearly distinguishable one from the other, and susceptible of exact reference.

    (1954, c. 8, §§ 17-83.2, 17-83.3; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-260. Recordation, effect and requisites of incorporating deed.

Any person may record a deed of trust hereinafter referred to as an "incorporating deed," which incorporates by reference any one or more of the provisions of a master deed recorded in the same clerk's office. The provisions incorporated by reference shall be of the same force and effect and shall be as binding upon the parties to the incorporating deed and their successors in title as if fully set forth in the incorporating deed. No incorporating deed shall refer to more than one master deed.

(1954, c. 8, § 17-83.4; 1998, c. 872.)

Article 6. Names, Discharges, etc., of War Service Men.

§ 17.1-261. Recordation of names of men who served during World War I.

The clerk of the circuit court of each county or city shall preserve the book or books in which have been recorded the lists of the residents of such counties or cities, who became members of the military forces of the United States during World War I.

Any person who has joined either the naval or military forces of the United States or its allies, may have his name spread upon such record, upon application and proof of such service, or some person may make such application for him, and when done his name shall be placed upon the record.

The clerks shall be entitled to the fees allowed by law for copying in similar cases.

(1918, p. 500, § 17-84; Michie Code 1942, § 5214a; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-262. Recordation of discharges of those who served in World War I.

Whenever the honorable discharge of any person who served in the military or naval forces of the United States or its associates during World War I, and who at the time of entering such service was a resident of Virginia shall be delivered to the clerk of any circuit court in this Commonwealth, the clerk shall record the same in the book hereinafter provided for. Copies of honorable discharges certified by the clerk shall be received as evidence of the facts therein stated.

(1924, p. 471, 472, §§ 17-85, 17-86; Michie Code 1942, §§ 5214b, 5214d; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-263. World War I Memorial Record.

Each circuit court clerk shall maintain a loose-leaf binder suitable for permanent record purposes of such standard form as was prescribed by the Virginia World War I History Commission, and sufficient loose leaves printed in such blank form as was prescribed by such commission, known as the "World War I Memorial Record," which shall be a public record book of the clerk's office. The clerk shall record therein the honorable discharges.

If the clerk has recorded the honorable discharges in any other book prior to receipt of the special books, such prior recordations are hereby validated and approved. Recordations and certified copies thereof heretofore or hereafter furnished shall have the same force and effect as those provided by § 17.1-262 and whenever the World War I History Commission shall have approved the form of the record book so previously in use, it shall be optional with the clerk to continue the use of such record book.

(1924, p. 471, § 17-87; Michie Code 1942, § 5214c; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-264. Recording information on discharges of World War II servicemen.

  1. When the honorable or dishonorable discharge of any person who served in the armed forces of the United States, or its associates, during World War II and who was a resident of the county or city at the time of his induction is presented, the clerk shall record the information contained therein in the proper spaces provided for such purpose in the book known as "Induction and Discharge Record, World War II." If the induction record of the veteran presenting a discharge for recordation is not already recorded, the clerk shall ascertain this information and record it along with the discharge.
  2. Such record book shall be kept in the clerk's office as a public record and shall be paid for by the county or city, as other public record books are paid for. It shall be standard loose-leaf construction, suitable for permanent record purposes, and shall consist of a binder with canvas jacket, an index and a quantity of sheets printed to provide space for (i) the induction record, (ii) the service record, and (iii) the discharge. Under clause (i) suitable headings and space for recording the induction information obtained from the draft boards shall be provided and under clauses (ii) and (iii) suitable headings and space for recording the information contained in the discharge papers shall be provided.

    (1944, p. 33, §§ 17-90, 17-91; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 3392a; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-265. Recordation of evidence of discharge generally; confidentiality.

  1. The clerk of the circuit court of the county or city wherein a person discharged from the armed forces of the United States resides shall record, upon presentation, free of charge, the original or a properly authenticated copy of either the discharge certificate or the report of separation from active duty (Department of Defense Document DD-214), or both.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of § 17.1-208 , discharge certificates and reports of separation from active duty recorded pursuant to this section shall be open for inspection and copying only by the following:
    1. The subject of the record;
    2. The duly qualified conservator or guardian of the subject of the record;
    3. The duly qualified executor or administrator of the estate of the subject of the record, if deceased, or, in the event no executor or administrator has qualified, the next of kin of the deceased subject;
    4. An attorney, attorney-in-fact, or other agent or representative of any of the persons described in subdivision 1, 2 or 3, acting pursuant to a written power of attorney or other written authorization; or
    5. A duly authorized representative of an agency or instrumentality of federal, state, or local government seeking the record in the ordinary course of performing its official duties. Under the circumstances in which time is of the essence, including but not limited to, requests for copies of records attendant to the making of funeral arrangements or arrangements for medical care, the clerk, in ascertaining whether a person seeking access to discharge certificates or reports of separation from active duty is qualified to do so pursuant to this section, may rely upon the sworn statement of the requestor made in person before the clerk or his deputy.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection B, the clerk may permit access to discharge certificates or reports of separation from active duty of deceased persons for bona fide genealogical or other research purposes.

    (1934, p. 99, § 17-92; Michie Code 1942, § 5214f; 1980, c. 392; 1998, c. 872; 2002, c. 299.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2002, c. 299, cl. 2 provides: "That this act shall not be construed to require clerks of circuit courts to redact, or otherwise to alter the form or the recordation medium of discharge certificates or reports of separation recorded on or before the effective date of the act."

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 299 added the subsection A designation at the beginning of the first paragraph and added subsections B and C.

Article 7. Fees.

§ 17.1-266. Services rendered in Commonwealth's cases.

No clerk, sheriff or other officer shall receive payment out of the state treasury for any services rendered in cases of the Commonwealth, whether in a court of record or a court not of record, except as allowed by statute. Localities shall be exempt from paying fees for services rendered by a clerk or other court officer for cases, whether in a court of record or a court not of record, when the locality is a party to a case commenced in a court serving that locality or in any other jurisdiction when the localities have a reciprocal waiver of fees agreement. Sheriffs may, in writing, grant a waiver of the sheriff's fee to one or more localities.

(Code 1950, § 14-98; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-87; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 155; 1998, c. 872; 2007, c. 800.)

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 800 added the last two sentences.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 100.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A clerk of court may install recording systems into a Circuit Court, General District Court, and/or Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and require such systems to be on at all times court is in session and, further, that the Clerk may charge a fee for access to such recordings provided that confidentiality is maintained for all proceedings as required by the Virginia Code or Court orders. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Scott A. Surovell, Member, House of Delegates, 10-063, 2010 Va. AG LEXIS 40 (8/2/10).

§ 17.1-267. Services for which clerks may not charge.

  1. No clerk shall charge for taking bond from, administering oath to, or making or copying orders as to the appointment or qualification of any judge, magistrate, sheriff, treasurer, commissioner of the revenue, or of a deputy of any of them, or of any escheator, supervisor, or of a guardian or conservator, when his bond is in a penalty not exceeding $1,000.00, or for making or copying orders as to county allowances, or grand juries, and administering the necessary oaths.
  2. No clerk shall charge for copying or making for or furnishing to the Department of Corrections or a federal probation officer a certified copy of a criminal judgment order or criminal sentencing order.
  3. No clerk shall charge a fee for (i) executing any order of publication under § 17.1-626 ; (ii) keeping, preserving, and holding available for public inspection judgment records, and making entries in and indexing such judgments, or discharging, or marking satisfied, a lien under §§ 15.2-2604 , 15.2-2605 and 15.2-2120 ; (iii) docketing judgment on forfeited recognizance or bond under § 19.2-147; (iv) making out reports to the Central Criminal Records Exchange under § 19.2-390; (v) recording a lien in the miscellaneous lien book under § 43-42 or § 43-43 ; or (vi) filing an appraiser's report under § 56-436.
  4. No clerk shall charge a fee for (i) recording the reports of special receivers and commissioners as required by § 8.01-617 ; (ii) copying in the Induction and Discharge Record information obtained from draft boards or recording the discharge papers, or certified copy of such, of a person who has served in the armed forces of the United States; or (iii) receiving any mark of designation under § 59.1-103. (Code 1950, § 14-101; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-90; 1972, c. 549; 1991, c. 46; 1992, c. 498; 1994, c. 432; 1997, c. 801; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-268. Fee for effort to serve when person cannot be found.

Whenever a sheriff is required to serve a declaration in ejectment or an order, notice, summons or other process in a pending civil case and make return thereon and shall after due effort and without fault be unable to locate such person or make service of such process in some method provided by law, the sheriff shall be paid the same fee provided by law for serving an order, notice or other process and making return thereof, to be taxed as other costs. When service is required in a proceeding not pending in a court then the service shall be paid for by the party at whose instance it is had. No fee shall be paid unless the sheriff returns such paper unexecuted and makes and files therewith an affidavit setting forth the fact that he has made diligent effort to execute such paper and without avail.

(Code 1950, § 14-107; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-96; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 155; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-269. To whom fees charged.

Unless otherwise provided, the fees mentioned in this article shall be chargeable to the party at whose instance the service is performed, except that fees for entering and certifying the attendance of witnesses and the proceedings to compel payment for such attendance shall be charged to the party for whom the witness attended.

(Code 1950, § 14-108; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-97; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-270. Officer to state fees, etc., on affidavit, deposition or report.

A notary or other officer returning affidavits or depositions of witnesses and a commissioner returning a report shall state at the foot thereof the fees therefor, to whom charged and, if paid, by whom.

(Code 1950, § 14-109; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-98; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-271. Deposit of money in bank.

Whenever any clerk of a court receives or collects any money for or on account of the Commonwealth or any county, city, town or person, he shall, within a reasonable time, deposit the same in such bank or banks selected by him to the credit of an official account, and in the event of the failure or insolvency of such bank, the clerk shall not be responsible for any loss of funds resulting from such failure or insolvency.

Any such officer who deposits any such money in his personal account, knowingly intermingles any of the same with his personal funds, or otherwise violates any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. However, prosecution hereunder shall not preclude criminal prosecution under any other section of this Code.

(Code 1950, § 14-112; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-101; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 155; 1981, c. 152; 1993, c. 334; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 15 M.J. Public Officers, § 49.

CASE NOTES

Failure to make deposit not a crime. - This section does not make it a crime for a public officer to fail to deposit his collections as such officer in a bank, but provides relief from his absolute liability if he does make such deposit in a bank. Beckner v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 454 , 5 S.E.2d 525 (1939) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-272. Process and service fees generally.

  1. The fee for process and service in the following instances shall be $12:
    1. Service on any person, firm or corporation, an order, notice, summons or any other civil process, except as herein otherwise provided, and for service on any person, firm, or corporation any process when the body is not taken and making a return thereof, except that no fee shall be charged for service pursuant to § 2.2-4022 .
    2. Summoning a witness or garnishee on an attachment.
    3. Service on any person of an attachment or other process under which the body is taken and making a return thereon.
    4. Service of any order of court not otherwise provided for, except that no fees shall be charged for protective orders issued pursuant to Chapter 11 (§ 16.1-226 et seq.) of Title 16.1.
    5. Making a return of a writ of fieri facias where no levy is made or forthcoming bond is taken.
    6. Summoning a witness in any case in which custody or visitation of a minor child or children is at issue.
  2. The fees for process and service in the following instances shall be $25:
    1. Service and publication of any notice of a publicly-advertised public sale.
    2. Service of a writ of possession or writ of eviction, except that there shall be an additional fee of $12 for each additional defendant.
    3. Levying upon current money, bank notes, goods or chattels of a judgment debtor pursuant to § 8.01-478 .
    4. Service of a declaration in ejectment on any person, firm or corporation, except that there shall be an additional fee of $12 for each additional defendant.
    5. Levying distress warrant or an attachment.
    6. Levying an execution.
  3. The process and service fee for serving any papers returnable out of state shall be $75, except no fees shall be charged for the service of papers in connection with the prosecution of any misdemeanor or felony domestic violence offense, or in connection with the filing, issuance, registration, or service of a protective order or a petition for a protective order. A victim of domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault shall not bear the costs associated with the filing of criminal charges against the offender, and no victim shall bear the costs associated with the filing, issuance, registration, or service of a warrant, protective order, petition for a protective order, or witness subpoena, issued inside or outside the Commonwealth.
  4. The fees set out in this section shall be allowable for services provided by such officers in the circuit and district courts.

    (Code 1950, §§ 14-104, 14-116, p. 25; 1964, c. 386, §§ 14.1-93, 14.1-105; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 155; 1972, c. 719; 1975, c. 591; 1976, cc. 308, 310; 1981, c. 411; 1982, c. 674; 1983, c. 407; 1984, c. 317; 1992, c. 648; 1995, c. 51, § 14.1-95.1; 1998, c. 872; 2002, c. 508; 2004, cc. 198, 211, 588; 2011, cc. 445, 480; 2019, cc. 180, 700.)

Cross references. - As to fee for serving notice upon tenant of forfeiture of right to possession or termination of lease, see § 55.1-1247 .

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 508, in subsection B, added the language following "shall be fifty dollars" in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendments by cc. 198 and 211 are identical, and substituted "$12" for "twelve dollars" in subsection A; substituted "an" for "a declaration in ejectment" in subdivision A 1; deleted subdivisions A 5 and A 6, pertaining to writ of possession and execution or distress warrant or an attachment; redesignated former subdivision A 7 as subdivision A 5; transferred subdivision A 8 to subdivision B 3; added subsection B; redesignated former subsections B and C as subsections C and D; and substituted "$75" for "fifty dollars" in the first sentence of subsection C.

The 2004 amendment by c. 588 added subdivision A 9 and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendments by cc. 445 and 480 are identical, and in subsection C, in the first sentence, twice substituted "a protective order" for "a protection order" and deleted "to protect a victim of domestic violence, stalking or sexual assault" from the end, and in the last sentence, substituted "and no victim shall bear the costs" for "or the costs" and twice substituted "protective order" for "protection order."

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendments by cc. 180 and 700 are identical, and inserted "or writ of eviction" in subdivision B 2.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Fees collected by sheriff when serving writs. - The fees sheriffs may charge for service of Summons to Answer Interrogatories, Summons in Garnishment, and Writs of Fieri Facias are governed by the express terms of § 17.1-272 . See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable L.J. Ayers, III, Sheriff for Amherst County, 10-075, 2011 Va. AG LEXIS 3 (02/04/11).

§ 17.1-273. Establishment and disposition of fees collected by certain high constable.

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, including a general or special act, the City of Norfolk, may, by duly adopted local ordinance, establish fees for the service of process by the office of the high constable. The office of the high constable in such city shall publish a schedule of such fees by January 1 of each year. Copies of the schedule shall be forwarded to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Only in the City of Norfolk, shall high constables execute all processes, warrants, summonses and notices in civil cases before the general district court of the city to the exclusion of the sheriff of the city. Any fees, collected by the office of the high constable for such process, shall be deposited in the treasury of the city wherein such office is situated for use in the general operation of city government.

(1998, c. 872; 2007, c. 813.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2007, c. 813, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall not affect the powers of any locality with respect to any ordinance, resolution or bylaw validly adopted and not repealed or rescinded prior to July 1, 2007."

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 813, in the first sentence, substituted "the City of Norfolk" for "any city having a population in excess of 265,000 as reported in the U.S. Census of 1980 and having an office of the high constable" and "the office of the high constable" for "such office"; and substituted "the City of Norfolk" for "cities having a population in excess of 265,000 as reported in the U.S. Census of 1980" in the second sentence.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 14B M.J. Process, § 15; 16 M.J. Sheriffs, § 1.

§ 17.1-274. Commission on forthcoming bond.

  1. The commission to be included in a forthcoming bond, when one is taken, shall be five percent. Such commission shall not be received unless the bond is forfeited or paid, including the commission, to the plaintiffs. Of whatever interest accrues on such bond, or the execution of judgment thereon, the officer shall be entitled to his proportionable share, on account of his fees included in such bond.
  2. In cities of a population of 100,000 and more, however, the commission to be included in a forthcoming bond, when one is taken, shall be ten percent on the first $100 of the money for which the distress or levy is and two percent on the residue. Such commission shall not be received unless the bond is forfeited or paid, including the commission, to the plaintiffs. Of whatever interest may accrue on such bonds, or the execution of judgment thereon, the officer shall be entitled to his proportionate share, on account of his fees included in the sale. An officer in any such city receiving payment in money or selling goods shall receive the like commission of ten percent on the first $100 of the money paid or proceeding from the sale and two percent on the residue; except that when such payment or sale is on an execution on a forthcoming bond, his commission shall only be half what it would be if the execution were not on such bond.

    (Code 1950, §§ 14-119, 14-121; 1964, c. 386, §§ 14.1-108, 14.1-110; 1995, c. 51; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-275. Fees collected by clerks of circuit courts; generally.

  1. A clerk of a circuit court shall, for services performed by virtue of his office, charge the following fees:
    1. [Repealed.]
    2. For recording and indexing in the proper book any writing and all matters therewith, or for recording and indexing anything not otherwise provided for, $18 for an instrument or document consisting of 10 or fewer pages or sheets; $32 for an instrument or document consisting of 11 to 30 pages or sheets; and $52 for an instrument or document consisting of 31 or more pages or sheets. Whenever any writing to be recorded includes plat or map sheets no larger than eight and one-half inches by 14 inches, such plat or map sheets shall be counted as ordinary pages for the purpose of computing the recording fee due pursuant to this section. A fee of $17 per page or sheet shall be charged with respect to plat or map sheets larger than eight and one-half inches by 14 inches. Only a single fee as authorized by this subdivision shall be charged for recording a certificate of satisfaction that releases the original deed of trust and any corrected or revised deeds of trust. Three dollars and fifty cents of the fee collected for recording and indexing shall be designated for use in preserving the permanent records of the circuit courts. The sum collected for this purpose shall be administered by The Library of Virginia in cooperation with the circuit court clerks.
    3. For appointing and qualifying any personal representative, committee, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, in addition to any fees for recording allowed by this section, $20 for estates not exceeding $50,000, $25 for estates not exceeding $100,000 and $30 for estates exceeding $100,000. No fee shall be charged for estates of $5,000 or less.
    4. For entering and granting and for issuing any license, other than a marriage license or a hunting and fishing license, and administering an oath when necessary, $10.
    5. For issuing a marriage license, attaching certificate, administering or receiving all necessary oaths or affidavits, indexing and recording, $10. For recording an order to celebrate the rites of marriage pursuant to § 20-25 , $25 to be paid by the petitioner.
    6. For making out any bond, other than those under § 17.1-267 or subdivision A 4, administering all necessary oaths and writing proper affidavits, $3.
    7. For all services rendered by the clerk in any garnishment or attachment proceeding, the clerk's fee shall be $15 in cases not exceeding $500 and $25 in all other cases.
    8. For making out a copy of any paper, record, or electronic record to go out of the office, which is not otherwise specifically provided for herein, a fee of $0.50 for each page or, if an electronic record, each image. From such fees, the clerk shall reimburse the locality the costs of making out the copies and pay the remaining fees directly to the Commonwealth. The funds to recoup the cost of making out the copies shall be deposited with the county or city treasurer or Director of Finance, and the governing body shall budget and appropriate such funds to be used to support the cost of copies pursuant to this subdivision. For purposes of this section, the costs of making out the copies authorized under this section shall include costs included in the lease and maintenance agreements for the equipment and the technology needed to operate electronic systems in the clerk's office used to make out the copies, but shall not include salaries or related benefits. The costs of copies shall otherwise be determined in accordance with § 2.2-3704 . However, there shall be no charge to the recipient of a final order or decree to send an attested copy to such party.
    9. For annexing the seal of the court to any paper, writing the certificate of the clerk accompanying it, the clerk shall charge $2 and for attaching the certificate of the judge, if the clerk is requested to do so, the clerk shall charge an additional $0.50.
    10. In any case in which a person is convicted of a violation of any provision of Article 1 (§ 18.2-247 et seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2 or is subject to a disposition under § 18.2-251 , the clerk shall assess a fee of $150 for each felony conviction and each felony disposition under § 18.2-251 which shall be taxed as costs to the defendant and shall be paid into the Drug Offender Assessment and Treatment Fund.
    11. In any case in which a person is convicted of a violation of any provision of Article 1 (§ 18.2-247 et seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2 or is subject to a disposition under § 18.2-251 , the clerk shall assess a fee for each misdemeanor conviction and each misdemeanor disposition under § 18.2-251, which shall be taxed as costs to the defendant and shall be paid into the Drug Offender Assessment and Treatment Fund as provided in § 17.1-275.8 .
    12. Upon the defendant's being required to successfully complete traffic school, a mature driver motor vehicle crash prevention course, or a driver improvement clinic in lieu of a finding of guilty, the court shall charge the defendant fees and costs as if he had been convicted.
    13. In all civil actions that include one or more claims for the award of monetary damages the clerk's fee chargeable to the plaintiff shall be $100 in cases seeking recovery not exceeding $49,999; $200 in cases seeking recovery exceeding $49,999, but not exceeding $100,000; $250 in cases seeking recovery exceeding $100,000, but not exceeding $500,000; and $300 in cases seeking recovery exceeding $500,000. Ten dollars of each such fee shall be apportioned to the Courts Technology Fund established under § 17.1-132 . A fee of $25 shall be paid by the plaintiff at the time of instituting a condemnation case, in lieu of any other fees. There shall be no fee charged for the filing of a cross-claim or setoff in any pending action. However, the fees prescribed by this subdivision shall be charged upon the filing of a counterclaim or a claim impleading a third-party defendant. The fees prescribed above shall be collected upon the filing of papers for the commencement of civil actions. This subdivision shall not be applicable to cases filed in the Supreme Court of Virginia. 13a. For the filing of any petition seeking court approval of a settlement where no action has yet been filed, the clerk's fee, chargeable to the petitioner, shall be $50, to be paid by the petitioner at the time of filing the petition.
    14. In addition to the fees chargeable for civil actions, for the costs of proceedings for judgments by confession under §§ 8.01-432 through 8.01-440 , the clerk shall tax as costs (i) the cost of registered or certified mail; (ii) the statutory writ tax, in the amount required by law to be paid on a suit for the amount of the confessed judgment; (iii) for the sheriff for serving each copy of the order entering judgment, $12; and (iv) for docketing the judgment and issuing executions thereon, the same fees as prescribed in subdivision A 17.
    15. For qualifying notaries public, including the making out of the bond and any copies thereof, administering the necessary oaths, and entering the order, $10.
    16. For each habeas corpus proceeding, the clerk shall receive $10 for all services required thereunder. This subdivision shall not be applicable to such suits filed in the Supreme Court of Virginia.
    17. For docketing and indexing a judgment from any other court of the Commonwealth, for docketing and indexing a judgment in the new name of a judgment debtor pursuant to the provisions of § 8.01-451 , but not when incident to a divorce, for noting and filing the assignment of a judgment pursuant to § 8.01-452 , a fee of $5; and for issuing an abstract of any recorded judgment, when proper to do so, a fee of $5; and for filing, docketing, indexing and mailing notice of a foreign judgment, a fee of $20.
    18. For all services rendered by the clerk in any court proceeding for which no specific fee is provided by law, the clerk shall charge $10, to be paid by the party filing said papers at the time of filing; however, this subdivision shall not be applicable in a divorce cause prior to and including the entry of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony. 19, 20. [Repealed.] 21. For making the endorsements on a forthcoming bond and recording the matters relating to such bond pursuant to the provisions of § 8.01-529 , $1. 22. For all services rendered by the clerk in any proceeding pursuant to § 57-8 or 57-15 , $10. 23. For preparation and issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, $5. 24. For all services rendered by the clerk in matters under § 8.01-217 relating to change of name, $20; however, this subdivision shall not be applicable in cases where the change of name is incident to a divorce. 25. For providing court records or documents on microfilm, per frame, $0.50. 26. In all divorce and separate maintenance proceedings, and all civil actions that do not include one or more claims for the award of monetary damages, the clerk's fee chargeable to the plaintiff shall be $60, $10 of which shall be apportioned to the Courts Technology Fund established under § 17.1-132 to be paid by the plaintiff at the time of instituting the suit, which shall include the furnishing of a duly certified copy of the final decree. The fees prescribed by this subdivision shall be charged upon the filing of a counterclaim or a claim impleading a third-party defendant. However, no fee shall be charged for (i) the filing of a cross-claim or setoff in any pending suit or (ii) the filing of a counterclaim or any other responsive pleading in any annulment, divorce, or separate maintenance proceeding. In divorce cases, when there is a merger of a divorce of separation a mensa et thoro into a decree of divorce a vinculo, the above mentioned fee shall include the furnishing of a duly certified copy of both such decrees. 27. For the acceptance of credit or debit cards in lieu of money to collect and secure all fees, including filing fees, fines, restitution, forfeiture, penalties and costs, the clerk shall collect from the person presenting such credit or debit card a reasonable convenience fee for the processing of such credit or debit card. Such convenience fee shall not exceed four percent of the amount paid for the transaction or a flat fee of $2 per transaction. The clerk may set a lower convenience fee for electronic filing of civil or criminal proceedings pursuant to § 17.1-258.3 . Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the clerk from outsourcing the processing of credit and debit card transactions to a third-party private vendor engaged by the clerk. Convenience fees shall be used to cover operational expenses as defined in § 17.1-295 . 28. For the return of any check unpaid by the financial institution on which it was drawn or notice is received from the credit or debit card issuer that payment will not be made for any reason, the clerk may collect a fee of $50 or 10 percent of the amount of the payment, whichever is greater. 29. For all services rendered, except in cases in which costs are assessed pursuant to § 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 , 17.1-275.3 , or 17.1-275.4 , in an adoption proceeding, a fee of $20, in addition to the fee imposed under § 63.2-1246 , to be paid by the petitioner or petitioners. For each petition for adoption filed pursuant to § 63.2-1201 , except those filed pursuant to subdivisions 5 and 6 of § 63.2-1210 , an additional $50 filing fee as required under § 63.2-1201 shall be deposited in the Virginia Birth Father Registry Fund pursuant to § 63.2-1249 . 30. For issuing a duplicate license for one lost or destroyed as provided in § 29.1-334 , a fee in the same amount as the fee for the original license. 31. For the filing of any petition as provided in §§ 33.2-1023, 33.2-1024, and 33.2-1027, a fee of $5 to be paid by the petitioner; and for the recordation of a certificate or copy thereof, as provided for in § 33.2-1021, as well as for any order of the court relating thereto, the clerk shall charge the same fee as for recording a deed as provided for in this section, to be paid by the party upon whose request such certificate is recorded or order is entered. 32. For making up, certifying and transmitting original record pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court, including all papers necessary to be copied and other services rendered, except in cases in which costs are assessed pursuant to § 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 , 17.1-275.3 , 17.1-275.4 , 17.1-275.7 , 17.1-275.8 , or 17.1-275.9 , a fee of $20. 33. [Repealed.] 34. For filings, etc., under the Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act (§ 55.1-653 et seq.), the fees shall be as prescribed in that Act. 35. [Repealed.] 36. For recordation of certificate and registration of names of nonresident owners in accordance with § 59.1-74, a fee of $10. 37. For maintaining the information required under the Overhead High Voltage Line Safety Act (§ 59.1-406 et seq.), the fee as prescribed in § 59.1-411. 38. For lodging, indexing, and preserving a will in accordance with § 64.2-409 , a fee of $5. 39. For filing a financing statement in accordance with § 8.9A-505 , the fee shall be as prescribed under § 8.9A-525 . 40. For filing a termination statement in accordance with § 8.9A-513 , the fee shall be as prescribed under § 8.9A-525 . 41. For filing assignment of security interest in accordance with § 8.9A-514 , the fee shall be as prescribed under § 8.9A-525. 42. For filing a petition as provided in §§ 64.2-2001 and 64.2-2013 , the fee shall be $10. 43. For issuing any execution, and recording the return thereof, a fee of $1.50. 44. For the preparation and issuance of a summons for interrogation by an execution creditor, a fee of $5. If there is no outstanding execution, and one is requested herewith, the clerk shall be allowed an additional fee of $1.50, in accordance with subdivision A 44.
  2. In accordance with § 17.1-281 , the clerk shall collect fees under subdivisions A 7, A 13, A 16, A 18 if applicable, A 20, A 22, A 24, A 26, A 29, and A 31 to be designated for courthouse construction, renovation or maintenance.
  3. In accordance with § 17.1-278 , the clerk shall collect fees under subdivisions A 7, A 13, A 16, A 18 if applicable, A 20, A 22, A 24, A 26, A 29, and A 31 to be designated for services provided for the poor, without charge, by a nonprofit legal aid program.
  4. In accordance with § 42.1-70 , the clerk shall collect fees under subdivisions A 7, A 13, A 16, A 18 if applicable, A 20, A 22, A 24, A 26, A 29, and A 31 to be designated for public law libraries.
  5. All fees collected pursuant to subdivision A 27 and § 17.1-276 shall be deposited by the clerk into a special revenue fund held by the clerk, which will restrict the funds to their statutory purpose.
  6. The provisions of this section shall control the fees charged by clerks of circuit courts for the services above described.

    (Code 1950, § 14-123, p. 614; 1952, c. 146; 1954, c. 138; 1956, c. 217; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-112; 1966, c. 217; 1970, c. 522; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 95; 1972, cc. 626, 627, 647; 1973, c. 159; 1974, cc. 370, 523; 1975, c. 226; 1976, c. 344; 1977, cc. 449, 463; 1978, c. 502; 1980, c. 145; 1983, c. 103; 1984, cc. 225, 356; 1985, cc. 94, 201; 1986, c. 538; 1988, cc. 49, 52; 1989, c. 595; 1990, cc. 88, 738, 971; 1992, c. 784; 1993, cc. 95, 299, 386; 1994, cc. 64, 432, 498, 842; 1995, cc. 51, 371, 440, 463, 525, § 14.1-111.1; 1996, cc. 344, 976; 1997, cc. 215, 921; 1998, cc. 783, 840, 872; 1999, cc. 9, 1003; 2000, cc. 826, 830; 2001, cc. 481, 496, 501, 836; 2002, cc. 831, 832; 2004, c. 1004; 2005, cc. 373, 681; 2006, cc. 318, 623, 718, 825; 2007, cc. 548, 626, 646; 2009, c. 594; 2010, c. 874; 2011, cc. 707, 890; 2012, cc. 420, 714, 780; 2013, c. 263; 2014, c. 282; 2015, c. 641; 2017, c. 200; 2020, cc. 68, 69, 589, 653; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 427.)

Cross references. - As to the Regional Criminal Justice Academy Training Fund, see § 9.1-106 .

As to fees for home studies, investigations, visitations and reports incident to adoption matters, notwithstanding the provisions of this section, see § 63.2-1248 .

As to parental duty of support, see § 64.2-1801 .

Editor's note. - Acts 1997, c. 921, cl. 2 provides: "That this act shall become effective January 1, 1998. The powers granted and duties imposed pursuant to this act shall apply prospectively to guardians and conservators appointed by court order entered on or after that date, or modified on or after that date if the court so directs, without regard to when the petition was filed. The procedures specified in this act governing proceedings for appointment of a guardian or conservator or termination or other modification of a guardianship or conservatorship shall apply on and after that date without regard to when the petition therefor was filed or the guardianship or conservatorship created."

Acts 2006, c. 825, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act that establish the Putative Father Registry shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2006 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law." The funding was provided in the 2006 appropriation act. See Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 3.

References in this section were updated at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission to conform to the recodification of Title 33.2 by Acts 2014, c. 805, effective October 1, 2014.

To conform to the recodification of Title 55 by Acts 2019, c. 712, effective October 1, 2019, the following substitutions were made at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission: substituted "55.1-653" for "55-142.1" and "55.1-1211 or 55.1-1401 " for "55-218.1."

The 1999 amendments. - The 1999 amendment by c. 9 deleted subdivision 10 a, which read: "Upon conviction in felony cases or when a felony defendant's suspension of sentence and probation is revoked pursuant to § 19.2-306, other than a revocation for failure to pay prior court costs, the clerk shall charge the defendant thirty-six dollars in each case, one dollar of which shall be forwarded to the State Treasurer for deposit in the Regional Criminal Justice Academy Training Fund as provided in § 9-178.2, to be used for financial support of the regional criminal justice training academies," redesignated subdivision 10 b as present subdivision 10; in present subdivision 10, substituted "In any case" for "In addition, in each case," deleted "(i)" preceding "a fee," deleted "and" at the end of clause (i), and deleted clause (ii), which read: "a fee of $100 per case for any forensic laboratory analysis performed for use in prosecution of such violation which shall be taxed as costs to the defendant and shall be paid into the general fund of the state treasury"; deleted subdivision 10 c, which read: "In addition, in all felony cases, including the revocation of suspension of sentence and probation held pursuant to § 19.2-306, other than a revocation for failure to pay prior court costs, the clerk shall collect and tax as costs (i) the expense of reporting or recording the trial or hearing in an amount equal to the per diem charges of the reporter or reasonable charge attributable to the cost of operating the mechanical or electronic devices in accordance with § 19.2-165, (ii) a fee of two dollars and fifty cents per charge, (iii) the fees of the attorney for the Commonwealth as provided for in § 15.2-1627.3 , (iv) the compensation of court-appointed counsel as provided in § 19.2-163, (v) the fees of the public defenders as provided for in § 19.2-163.2, (vi) the additional costs per charge imposed under § 19.2-368.18 to be deposited into the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund, and (vii) in any court of record in which electronic devices are used for the purpose of recording testimony, a sum not to exceed twenty dollars for each day or part of a day of the trial to be paid by the clerk into a special fund to be used for the purpose of repairing, replacing or supplementing such electronic devices, or if a sufficient amount is available, to pay the purchase price of such devices in whole or in part. For the purpose of this subdivision, repairing shall include maintenance or service contracts"; deleted subdivision 10 d, which read: "In addition, a fee of twelve dollars shall be charged to a defendant found guilty in a criminal case in the circuit court as costs for (i) serving a warrant or summons other than on a witness when no arrest is made or (ii) making an arrest on a felony or misdemeanor charge, when such services are provided by the sheriff"; and in subdivision 32, inserted "except in cases in which costs are assessed pursuant to §§ 17.1-275.1 , 17,1-275.2, 17.1-275.3 , or § 17.1-275.4 ."

The 1999 amendment by c. 1003 deleted "issuing any execution, and recording the return thereof, $1.50 and for" preceding "all services rendered" in subdivision A 7; deleted subdivision 10 a, which read: "Upon conviction in felony cases or when a felony defendant's suspension of sentence and probation is revoked pursuant to § 19.2-306, other than a revocation for failure to pay prior court costs, the clerk shall charge the defendant thirty-six dollars in each case, one dollar of which shall be forwarded to the State Treasurer for deposit in the Regional Criminal Justice Academy Training Fund as provided in § 9-178.2, to be used for financial support of the regional criminal justice training academies," redesignated subdivision 10 b as present subdivision 10; in present subdivision 10, substituted "In any case" for "In addition, in each case," deleted "(i)" preceding "a fee," deleted "and" at the end of clause (i), and deleted clause (ii), which read: "a fee of $100 per case for any forensic laboratory analysis performed for use in prosecution of such violation which shall be taxed as costs to the defendant and shall be paid into the general fund of the state treasury"; deleted subdivision 10 c, which read: "In addition, in all felony cases, including the revocation of suspension of sentence and probation held pursuant to § 19.2-306, other than a revocation for failure to pay prior court costs, the clerk shall collect and tax as costs (i) the expense of reporting or recording the trial or hearing in an amount equal to the per diem charges of the reporter or reasonable charge attributable to the cost of operating the mechanical or electronic devices in accordance with § 19.2-165, (ii) a fee of two dollars and fifty cents per charge, (iii) the fees of the attorney for the Commonwealth as provided for in § 15.2-1627.3 , (iv) the compensation of court-appointed counsel as provided in § 19.2-163, (v) the fees of the public defenders as provided for in § 19.2-163.2, (vi) the additional costs per charge imposed under § 19.2-368.18 to be deposited into the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund, and (vii) in any court of record in which electronic devices are used for the purpose of recording testimony, a sum not to exceed twenty dollars for each day or part of a day of the trial to be paid by the clerk into a special fund to be used for the purpose of repairing, replacing or supplementing such electronic devices, or if a sufficient amount is available, to pay the purchase price of such devices in whole or in part. For the purpose of this subdivision, repairing shall include maintenance or service contracts"; deleted subdivision 10 d, which read: "In addition, a fee of twelve dollars shall be charged to a defendant found guilty in a criminal case in the circuit court as costs for (i) serving a warrant or summons other than on a witness when no arrest is made or (ii) making an arrest on a felony or misdemeanor charge, when such services are provided by the sheriff"; deleted "or a summons for interrogation by an execution creditor" preceding "five dollars" in subdivision A 23; inserted "except in cases in which costs are assessed pursuant to §§ 17.1-275.1 , 17.2-275.2, 17.2-275.3, or § 17.1-275.4 " in subdivision A 29; and added subdivisions A 44 and A 45."

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 826 added subdivision A 13a.

The 2000 amendment by c. 830 substituted " § 63.1-219.53" for " § 63.1-236.1" near the end of subdivision A 29.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendments by cc. 481 and 501 are identical, and in subdivision A 27, inserted "including filing fees," and deleted "in accordance with § 19.2-353.3" preceding "the clerk shall."

The 2001 amendment by c. 496, in subdivision A 2, substituted "fifteen dollars for an instrument or document consisting of ten or fewer pages or sheets; thirty dollars for an instrument or document consisting of 11 through 30 pages or sheets; and fifty dollars for an instrument or document consisting of 31 or more pages or sheets" for "thirteen dollars, including the fee of one dollar set forth in subdivision A 1 for up to four pages and one dollar for each page over four pages, and for recording plats too large to be recorded in the deed books, and for each sheet thereof, thirteen dollars," deleted the former fourth sentence, which read: "In addition, a fee of one dollar shall be charged for indexing any document for each name indexed exceeding a total of ten in number," and inserted "and fifty cents" in the present fourth sentence.

The 2001 amendment by c. 836 repealed subdivision A 36.

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 831, effective July 1, 2003, deleted "of this section" following "subdivision A. 4." in subdivision A 6; inserted "or is subject to a disposition under § 18.2-251 " in subdivision A 10; rewrote subdivision A 11; substituted "17.1-275.4, 17.1-275.7 , 17.1-275.8 , or § 17.1-275.9 " for "or § 17.1-275.4 " in subdivision A 32; deleted "10, 11" following "A. 7." in subsection B; deleted subsection D and redesignated former subsections E and F as present subsections D and E; and inserted "A." preceding the subdivision designations in present subsections B, C and D for clarification purposes.

The 2002 amendment by c. 832 repealed subdivisions A 1, A 19 and A 20; and in subdivision A 2, substituted "sixteen dollars" for "fifteen dollars" and "11 to 30" for "11 through 30" in the first sentence, deleted the former second sentence, which read: "This fee shall be in addition to the fee for recording a deed or other instrument recorded in conjunction with such plat sheet or sheets including the fee of one dollar set forth in subdivision A 1," and inserted the present second and third sentences.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 1004 inserted "and Treatment" in subdivisions A 10 and A 11 and made minor stylistic changes throughout subsection A.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 373 added the second through fifth sentences in subdivision A 8; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2005 amendment by c. 681, effective January 1, 2006, in subdivision A 13, rewrote the first and present second sentences and inserted "or a claim impleading a third-party defendant" in the present fourth sentence; substituted "for civil actions, for" for "for actions at law, for" in subdivision A 14; and in subdivision A 26, rewrote the first sentence, inserted the present second sentence and substituted "cross-claim or setoff" for "cross-bill" in the present third sentence; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 318 substituted "$10" for "$1" in subdivision A 35.

The 2006 amendments by cc. 623 and 718 are identical, and substituted " § 2.2-3704 " for " § 2.2-3701 " in subdivision A 8; in the first sentence of subdivision A 13 substituted "$60" for "$50," "$110" for "$100" and "$160" for "$150," and inserted "$10 of which shall be apportioned to the Courts Technology Fund established under § 17.1-132 " after each of these substitutions; and in the first sentence of subdivision A 26 substituted "$60" for "$50" and inserted "$10 of which shall be apportioned to the Courts Technology Fund established under § 17.1-132 ."

The 2006 amendment by c. 825, effective July 1, 2007, in subsection A, substituted "2.2-3704" for "2.2-3701" at the end of the next-to-last sentence in subdivision A 8; and added the last sentence in subdivision A 29.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendments by cc. 548 and 626 are identical, and in subdivision A 8, in the first sentence, inserted "record" following "paper," "electronic" preceding "record," "herein" preceding "a fee" and "or, if an electronic record, each image" at the end; and substituted "$0.50" for "$0.10" at the end of subdivision A 25.

The 2007 amendment by c. 646 repealed former subdivision A 33, which read: "For issuance of hunting and trapping permits in accordance with § 10.1-1154 , $0.25."

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendment by c. 594 substituted "from the person presenting such credit card a reasonable convenience fee not to exceed" for "a service charge of" in subdivision A 27.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 874, cl. 4, as amended by Acts 2011, c. 890, cl. 4, in subdivision A 13, rewrote the first sentence and added the second sentence.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 707, in the third sentence in subdivision A 26, added the clause (i) designation and clause (ii).

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 420 substituted "$50" for "$20" in subdivision A 28 and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2012 amendment by c. 714 added the second sentence of subdivision A 5, rewrote subdivision A 27, and inserted "or debit" in subdivision A 28; added subsection E, and redesignated former subsection E as F.

The 2012 amendment by c. 780, in subdivision A 27, inserted "or debit" twice and substituted "fee for the processing of such credit or debit card. Such convenience fee shall not exceed four percent of the amount paid for the transaction or a flat fee of $2 per transaction" for "fee not to exceed four percent of the amount paid" and added the last sentence; inserted "or debit" in subsection A 28, and added subsection E.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 263, in subdivision A 8, inserted "authorized under this section," "costs included in the," and "and the technology needed to operate electronic systems in the clerk's office" in the fourth sentence; in subdivision A 28, substituted "of the payment" for "to be paid," and deleted "in accordance with § 19.2-353.3" at the end.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 282, effective January 1, 2015, in subdivision A 12 inserted ", a mature driver motor vehicle crash prevention course" following "traffic school."

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 641 added the third and last sentences in subdivision A 27 and substituted "may collect" for "shall collect, if allowed by the court" in subdivision A 28.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 200 substituted "Virginia Birth Father Registry" for "Putative Father Registry" in subdivision A 29.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendments by cc. 68 and 589 are identical, and substituted "$5" for "$2" in subdivision A 39.

The 2020 amendments by cc. 69 and 653 are identical, and in subdivision A 2, substituted "$18" for "$16," "$32" for "$30," and "$52" for "$50" in the first sentence, "$17" for "$15" in the third sentence, and "Three dollars" for "One dollar" in the next to last sentence.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 427, effective July 1, 2021, deleted former subdivision A 35, which read "For filing the appointment of a resident agent for a nonresident property owner in accordance with § 55.1-1211 or 55.1-1401 , a fee of $10,” and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on practice and pleading for the year 1969-1970, see 56 Va. L. Rev. 1500 (1970).

For survey on legal issues involving children in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 705 (1989). For survey on property law in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 773 (1989). For survey on wills, trust, and estates in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 859 (1989).

For article, "Property Law," see 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 777 (2001).

For annual survey commentary, "The Merger of Common-Law and Equity Pleading in Virginia," see 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 77 (2006).

For annual survey article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 9 (2011).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 8B M.J. Forgery, §§ 9, 24.

CASE NOTES

Recording deed to county. - A county clerk is entitled to the fee allowed by this section for recording a deed to the county, in addition to the general allowance made by the board of supervisors, where such allowance was not made to cover recordation fees. Board of Supvrs. v. Coons, 121 Va. 783 , 94 S.E. 201 (1917) (decided under prior law).

Fees for traffic offenses. - Fees are collected on each conviction of a violation of the traffic code from each summons, under § 17.1-275 A 11. Hines v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 752, 576 S.E.2d 781, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 92 (2003).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Failure to pay fee for filing counterclaim. - Retailer's counterclaim against a computer company alleging that the computer company damages computers and other items was dismissed pursuant to Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:9; the counterclaim was actually captioned "Responsive Pleadings," did not bear a file stamp of the court clerk's office as required by Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:4 (h), and the record also failed to show that the court clerk's filing fee for a counterclaim was paid by the retailer, as required by § 17.1-275 . Cox v. Sounds Unlimited, Inc., 60 Va. Cir. 243, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 416 (Danville 2002).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Fee for documents with and without plat. - Subdivision A 2 requires a clerk to charge the fee for recording a document without a plat, plus the one dollar fee required by subdivision A 1 for admitting a writing to record; for recording a document "in conjunction with such plat," the clerk should charge the amended fee for the document and the amended fee plus the one dollar fee required by subdivision A 1 for the plat, and a document recorded with an attached plat is exempt from such fee. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Marilyn L. Wilson, Clerk, Circuit Court of Amelia County, and The Honorable John T. Frey, Clerk, Circuit Court of Fairfax County, 01-071 (11/27/01).

Fee for certificate of satisfaction. - A clerk must assess the one dollar fee required by subdivision A 1 for recording a certificate of satisfaction. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Marilyn L. Wilson, Clerk, Circuit Court of Amelia County, and The Honorable John T. Frey, Clerk, Circuit Court of Fairfax County, 01-071 (11/27/01).

Recordation taxes on documents intended to allow individuals of the Islamic faith to acquire real estate without violating a tenet of their religion. - A circuit court clerk should base the recordation taxes for a "Security Instrument," which allows for the payment of profits as opposed to a traditional deed of trust that is secured by a note requiring the payment of interest, on the original acquisition balance as defined in the instrument, and should assess separate fees for recording an "Assignment Agreement," since the document contains two instruments of equal dignity that serve independent purposes at law. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable John T. Frey, Clerk of the Fairfax County Circuit Court, 02-041, 2002 Va. AG LEXIS 67 (6/24/02).

A Clerk of Court may install recording systems into a Circuit Court, General District Court, and/or Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and require such systems to be on at all times court is in session and, further, that the Clerk may charge a fee for access to such recordings provided that confidentiality is maintained for all proceedings as required by the Virginia Code or Court orders. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Scott A. Surovell, Member, House of Delegates, 10-063, 2010 Va. AG LEXIS 40 (8/2/10).

Returned check fee. - The clerk of a circuit court cannot collect a returned check fee in a civil case. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Eugene C. Wingfield, Clerk of Court, Lynchburg Circuit Court, 12-028, 2012 Va. AG LEXIS 24 (6/8/2012).

§ 17.1-275.1. Fixed felony fee.

Upon conviction of any and each felony charge or upon a deferred disposition of proceedings in circuit court in the case of any and each felony disposition deferred pursuant to the terms and conditions of § 16.1-278.8, 16.1-278.9, 18.2-61 , 18.2-67.1 , 18.2-251 , 19.2-298.02, or 19.2-303.6, there shall be assessed as court costs a fee of $375, to be known as the fixed felony fee.

The amount collected, in whole or in part, for the fixed felony fee shall be apportioned, as provided by law, to the following funds in the fractional amounts designated:

  1. Sentencing/supervision fee (General Fund)  (.4705067);
  2. Forensic science fund  (.1033333);
  3. Court reporter fund  (.0887200);
  4. Witness expenses/expert witness fund  (.0053333);
  5. Virginia Crime Victim-Witness Fund  (.0080000);
  6. Intensified Drug Enforcement Jurisdiction Fund  (.0106667);
  7. Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund  (.0800000);
  8. Commonwealth's attorney fund (state share) (.0533333);
  9. Commonwealth's attorney fund (local share) (.0533333);
  10. Regional Criminal Justice Academy Training Fund  (.0026667);
  11. Warrant fee  (.0320000);
  12. Courthouse construction/maintenance fund  (.0053333); and
  13. Clerk of the circuit court  (.0867733).

    (1999, c. 9; 2002, c. 831; 2003, c. 1039; 2005, c. 631; 2011, c. 565; 2020, Sp. Sess. I, c. 21.)

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 831, effective July 1, 2003, in the first paragraph, substituted "$373" for "$348"; and in the fixed felony fee table, deleted former entry 1, "Supervision fund," added present entries 1 and 2, redesignated former entries 2 through 13 as present entries 3 through 14, respectively, and changed the fractional amounts for all, and added entries 15 and 16.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 1039 deleted reference to § 19.2-303.2 and substituted "$350" for "$373" in the first paragraph and changed fractional amounts in the second paragraph.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 631 deleted "18.2-67.2:1" preceding "or 18.2-251 " in the first paragraph; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 565 rewrote the section, increasing the court cost fee and changing the fixed felony fees.

The 2020 Sp. Sess. I amendment. - The 2020 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 21, effective March 1, 2021, substituted "18.2-251, 19.2-298.02, or 19.2-303.6" for "or 18.2-251 " in the first paragraph.

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Court cannot waive costs. - A trial court has no authority to waive all or any portion of statutorily mandated court costs. Commonwealth v. Terembes, 54 Va. Cir. 193, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 572 (Spotsylvania County 2000).

§ 17.1-275.2. Fixed fee for felony reduced to misdemeanor.

In circuit court, upon the conviction of a person of any and each misdemeanor reduced from a felony charge, or upon a deferred disposition of proceedings in the case of any and each misdemeanor reduced from a felony charge and deferred pursuant to the terms and conditions of § 4.1-305 , 16.1-278.8, 16.1-278.9, 18.2-57.3 , 19.2-298.02, 19.2-303.2, or 19.2-303.6, there shall be assessed as court costs a fee of $227, to be known as the fixed fee for felony reduced to misdemeanor. However, this section shall not apply to those proceedings provided for in § 17.1-275.8 .

The amount collected, in whole or in part, for the fixed fee for felony reduced to misdemeanor shall be apportioned to the following funds in the fractional amounts designated:

  1. Sentencing/supervision fee (General Fund) (.1695154);
  2. Forensic science fund (.1707048);
  3. Court reporter fund (.1465639);
  4. Witness expenses/expert witness fund (.0088106);
  5. Virginia Crime Victim-Witness Fund (.0132159);
  6. Intensified Drug Enforcement Jurisdiction Fund (.0176211);
  7. Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund (.0881057);
  8. Commonwealth's attorney fund (state share) (.0881057);
  9. Commonwealth's attorney fund (local share) (.0881057);
  10. Regional Criminal Justice Academy Training Fund (.0044053);
  11. Warrant fee (.0528634);
  12. Courthouse construction/maintenance fund (.0088106); and
  13. Clerk of the circuit court (.1431718).

    (1999, c. 9; 2002, c. 831; 2003, c. 1039; 2005, c. 631; 2011, c. 565; 2020, c. 1004; 2020, Sp. Sess. I, c. 21.)

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 831, effective July 1, 2003, in the first paragraph, rewrote the first sentence and added the second sentence; and in the fixed felony fee table, deleted former entry 1, "Supervision fund," added present entries 1 and 2, and redesignated former entries 2 through 13 as 3 through 14, respectively.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 1039 substituted "$202" for "$200" in the first paragraph and changed fractional amounts in the second paragraph.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 631 deleted "18.2-67.2:1" preceding "or 19.2-303.2" in the first paragraph; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 565 rewrote the section, increasing the court cost fee and changing the fixed fees for felonies reduced to misdemeanors.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 1004 substituted "19.2-303.2, or 19.2-303.6" for "or 19.2-303.2" in the first sentence of the first paragraph.

The 2020 Sp. Sess. I amendment. - The 2020 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 21, effective March 1, 2021, inserted "19.2-298.02" in the first paragraph.

§ 17.1-275.3. Fixed felony revocation fee.

Upon the partial or full revocation of suspension of sentence or probation of a convicted felon pursuant to § 19.2-306, other than a revocation for failure to pay previously assessed court costs, there shall be assessed as court costs a fee of $158 to be known as the fixed felony revocation fee. A single fixed felony revocation fee shall be assessed per defendant per hearing without regard to the number of revocations being considered.

The amount collected, in whole or in part, for the fixed felony revocation fee shall be apportioned to the following funds in the fractional amounts designated:

  1. Virginia Crime Victim-Witness Fund                             (.0189873);
  2. Intensified Drug Enforcement Jurisdiction Fund                             (.0253165);
  3. Court reporter fund                             (.2105696);
  4. Witness expenses/expert witness fund                             (.0126582);
  5. Commonwealth's attorney fund (state share)                             (.1265823);
  6. Commonwealth's attorney fund (local share)                             (.1265823);
  7. Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund                             (.1898734);
  8. Regional Criminal Justice Academy Training Fund                             (.0063291);
  9. Warrant fee                             (.0759494); and
  10. Clerk of the circuit court                             (.2071519).

    (1999, c. 9; 2003, c. 1039; 2011, c. 565.)

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 1039 substituted "$133" for "$131" in the first paragraph; and changed the fractional amounts in subdivisions 1 through 10.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 565 rewrote the section, increasing the court cost fee and changing the fixed felony revocation fees.

§ 17.1-275.4. Fixed misdemeanor reduced from felony revocation fee.

In circuit court, when a person whose charge was reduced from a felony charge is convicted of a misdemeanor and subsequently suffers partial or full revocation of his suspension of sentence or probation pursuant to § 19.2-306, other than a revocation for failure to pay previously assessed court costs, he shall be assessed as court costs a fee of $114.50 to be known as the fixed misdemeanor reduced from felony revocation fee. A single fixed misdemeanor reduced from felony revocation fee shall be assessed per defendant per hearing without regard to the number of misdemeanor revocations being considered except that if a revocation of probation or suspended sentence upon a felony conviction is also being considered at the same revocation proceeding, a single fixed felony revocation fee shall apply instead. The amount collected, in whole or in part, for the fixed misdemeanor reduced from felony revocation fee shall be apportioned, as provided by law, to the following funds in the fractional amounts designated:

  1. Virginia Crime Victim-Witness Fund                             (.0262009);
  2. Intensified Drug Enforcement Jurisdiction Fund                             (.0349345);
  3. Witness expenses/expert witness fund                             (.0174672);
  4. Commonwealth's attorney fund (state share)                             (.1746725);
  5. Commonwealth's attorney fund (local share)                             (.1746725);
  6. Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund                             (.1746725);
  7. Regional Criminal Justice Training Academy Fund                             (.0087336);
  8. Warrant fee, as prescribed by § 17.1-272 (.1048035); and
  9. Clerk of the circuit court                             (.2838428).

    (1999, c. 9; 2002, c. 831; 2003, c. 1039; 2011, c. 565.)

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 831, effective July 1, 2003, in the first sentence of the introductory language, added "In circuit court" at the beginning and substituted "eighty-seven dollars and fifty cents" for "$87.50"; and inserted "reduced from felony" following "misdemeanor" throughout; and in the fee table, added "as prescribed by § 17.1-272 " following "Warrant fee" in entry 8.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 1039 substituted "$89.50" for "eighty-seven dollars and fifty cents" in the introductory language; and changed the fractional amounts in subdivisions 1 through 9.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 565 rewrote the section, increasing the court cost fee and changing the fixed misdemeanor reduced from felony fees.

§ 17.1-275.5. Amounts to be added; judgment in favor of the Commonwealth.

  1. The clerk shall assess, in addition to the fees provided for by § 17.1-275 .1, 17.1-275 .2, 17.1-275.3 , 17.1-275.4 , 17.1-275.7 , 17.1-275.8 , 17.1-275.9 , 17.1-275.1 0, 17.1-275.11 , 17.1-275.11:1 , or 17.1-275.12 , the following costs:
    1. Any amount paid by the Commonwealth for legal representation of the defendant;
    2. Any amount paid for trial transcripts;
    3. Extradition costs;
    4. Costs of psychiatric evaluation;
    5. Costs taxed against the defendant as appellant under Rule 5A:30 of the Rules of the Supreme Court;
    6. Any fee for a returned check or disallowed credit card charge assessed pursuant to subdivision A 28 of § 17.1-275;
    7. Any jury costs;
    8. Any assessment made pursuant to subdivision A 10 of § 17.1-275;
    9. Any fees prescribed in §§ 18.2-268.8 and 46.2-341.26:8 ;
    10. Any court costs related to an ignition interlock device;
    11. Any fee for testing for HIV;
    12. Any fee for processing an individual admitted to jail as prescribed in § 15.2-1613.1 ;
    13. Any fee for courthouse security personnel as prescribed in § 53.1-120 ;
    14. Any fee for a DNA sample as prescribed in § 19.2-310.2;
    15. Reimbursement to the Commonwealth of medical fees as prescribed in § 19.2-165.1;
    16. Any fee for a local criminal justice training academy as prescribed in § 9.1-106 ;
    17. Any fee prescribed by §§ 16.1-69.48:1.01 and 17.1-275.11 ;
    18. Any expenses charged pursuant to subsection B or F of § 19.2-187.1; and
    19. Any fee for an electronic summons system as prescribed in § 17.1-279.1 .
  2. The total amount of assessments described in subsection A, including (i) the fees provided for by § 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 , 17.1-275.3 , 17.1-275.4 , 17.1-275.7 , 17.1-275.8 , 17.1-275.9 , 17.1-275.1 0, 17.1-275.11 , 17.1-275.11:1 , or 17.1-275.12 and (ii) all other fines and costs, shall be docketed by the clerk as a judgment against the defendant in favor of the Commonwealth in accordance with § 8.01-446 . (1999, c. 9; 2002, c. 831; 2003, cc. 1001, 1022, 1039; 2010, c. 555; 2012, c. 714; 2013, c. 263; 2014, c. 325; 2015, c. 641.)

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 831, effective July 1, 2003, substituted "the fees provided for by §§ 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 , 17.1-275 .3, 17.1-275.4 , 17.1-275.7 , 17.1-275.8 , or § 17.1-275 .9" for "the fixed felony fee, the fixed fee for felony reduced to misdemeanor, or the fixed revocation fee, as the case may be" in the introductory language of subsection A; substituted "subdivision A. 28. of § 17.1-275" for " § 17.1-275 A 28" in subdivision A 6; substituted "subdivision A. 10. of § 17.1-275" for " § 17.1-275 A 10" in subdivision A 8; added subdivisions A 9 through A 13; and substituted "fees provided for by §§ 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 , 17.1-275.3 , 17.1-275.4 , 17.1-275.7 , 17.1-275.8 , or § 17.1-275.9 " for "fixed felony fee, fixed fee for felony reduced to misdemeanor, fixed felony revocation fee, or fixed misdemeanor revocation fee, as the case may be" in subsection B.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendments by cc. 1001 and 1022 are identical, and in subdivision A 9, substituted "fees" for "blood withdrawal fees as."

The 2003 amendment by c. 1039 substituted "through 17.1-275.4 " for "17.1-275.2, 17.1-275.3 " in the introductory language in subsections A and B; and added subdivisions A 14 through A 17.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 555 inserted subdivision A 18 and made a related change.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 714, in subsection A, substituted "by § 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 , 17.1-275.3 , 17.1-275.4 " for "by §§ 17.1-275.1 through 17.1-275.4 " and deleted the section symbol preceding "17.1-275.9" in the first paragraph; and in subsection B, deleted "of this section" following "subsection A," substituted "by § 17.1-275.1, 17.1-275.2 , 17.1-275.3 , 17.1-275.4" for "by §§ 17.1-275.1 through 17.1-275.4" and "or 17.1-275.9 , shall be docketed" for "or § 17.1-275.9 , and no other, shall be forthwith docketed" and added "in accordance with § 8.01-446 ."

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 263 inserted "17.1-275.10, 17.1-275.11 , 17.1-275.11 :1, or 17.1-275.12 " in the introductory paragraph of subsection A; inserted "17.1-275.10, 17.1-275.11, 17.1-275.11:1 , or 17.1-275.12 " in subsection B, and made related changes.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 325 added subdivision A 19 and made related changes.

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 641 in subsection B, added the subdivision (i) designation and inserted "and (ii) all other fines and costs."

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Court cannot waive costs. - A trial court has no authority to waive all or any portion of statutorily mandated court costs. Commonwealth v. Terembes, 54 Va. Cir. 193, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 572 (Spotsylvania County 2000).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Assessment of expenses for indigent defendant. - An indigent criminal defendant convicted in a circuit court may be taxed for court-approved, reasonable expenses in addition to, and over and above the court-appointed counsel pre-waiver compensation limit set forth in subdivision 2 of § 19.2-163. Sections 17.1-275.5 and 19.2-163 must be read together to determine the amount of combined court-appointed counsel compensation and approved expenses that may be assessed. The amount of expenses that may be assessed against such a defendant who is represented by an attorney from a public defender or capital defender office is not limited by the court-appointed counsel pre-waiver compensation limit set forth in subdivision 2 of § 19.2-163. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Cathy C. Hogan, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Bedford County, 13-095, 2013 Va. AG LEXIS 100 (12/27/13).

§ 17.1-275.6. Fees collected from court reporter fund.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any court in which electronic devices are used for recording testimony, a sum not to exceed twenty dollars for each day or part of a day of the trial shall be paid by the clerk, from the court reporter fund as set forth in §§ 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 and 17.1-275.3 , or a sum not to exceed five dollars for each day or part of a day of the trial of a case wherein costs are assessed pursuant to § 17.1-275.8 shall be paid by the clerk, from the court reporter fund as set forth in § 17.1-275.8 , into a special fund to be used for the purpose of repairing, replacing or supplementing such electronic devices or, if a sufficient amount is available, to pay the purchase price of such devices in whole or in part. For the purpose of this section, repairing shall include maintenance and service contracts. Fees collected under this article shall be retained locally and shall not be subject to the provisions of § 17.1-286 .

(2000, c. 875; 2002, c. 831.)

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 831, effective July 1, 2003, substituted " §§ 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 and 17.1-275.3 . . . set forth in § 17.1-275.8 " for " §§ 17.1-275.1 through 17.1-275.3 " in the first sentence.

§ 17.1-275.7. Fixed misdemeanor fee.

In circuit court, upon (i) conviction of any and each misdemeanor, not originally charged as a felony; (ii) a deferred disposition of proceedings in the case of any and each misdemeanor not originally charged as a felony and deferred pursuant to the terms and conditions of § 4.1-305 , 16.1-278.8, 16.1-278.9, 18.2-57.3 , 19.2-298.02, 19.2-303.2, or 19.2-303.6; (iii) any and each conviction of a traffic infraction or referral to a driver improvement clinic or traffic school in lieu of a finding of guilt for a traffic infraction; or (iv) proof of compliance with law under §§ 46.2-104 and 46.2-1158.02 , there shall be assessed as court costs a fee of $80, to be known as the fixed misdemeanor fee. However, this section shall not apply to those proceedings provided for in § 17.1-275.8 . This fee shall be in addition to any fee assessed in the district court.

The amount collected, in whole or in part, for the fixed misdemeanor fee shall be apportioned, as provided by law, to the following funds in the fractional amounts designated:

  1. Sentencing/supervision fee (General Fund) (.0125000);
  2. Witness expenses/expert witness fee (General Fund)(.0250000);
  3. Virginia Crime Victim-Witness Fund (.0375000);
  4. Intensified Drug Enforcement Jurisdiction Fund (.0500000);
  5. Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund (.2500000);
  6. Commonwealth's Attorney Fund (state share) (.0937500);
  7. Commonwealth's Attorney Fund (local share) (.0937500);
  8. Regional Criminal Justice Academy Training Fund (.0125000);
  9. Warrant fee, as prescribed by § 17.1-272 (.1500000);
  10. Courthouse Construction/Maintenance Fund (.0250000); and
  11. Clerk of the circuit court (.2500000).

    (2002, c. 831; 2003, c. 1039; 2005, c. 631; 2009, c. 756; 2011, cc. 283, 565; 2020, c. 1004; 2020, Sp. Sess. I, c. 21.)

Effective date. - Acts 2002, c. 831, cl. 3, provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2003."

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 1039 substituted "$70" for "sixty-eight dollars" in the first paragraph; deleted former subdivision 2, which read "Sentencing/supervision fee (local share) (.0110295)"; redesignated former subdivisions 3 through 12 as present subdivisions 2 through 11; and updated the fractional amounts apportioned in subdivisions 1 through 11.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 631 deleted "18.2-67.2:1" preceding "or 19.2-303.2" in the first paragraph; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendment by c. 756, in the first paragraph, inserted clause (iv) and made related changes.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 283, in the first paragraph, substituted " §§ 46.2-104 and 46.2-1158.02 " for " §§ 46.2-104 and 46.2-1157 " in clause (iv) of the first sentence.

The 2011 amendment by c. 565 rewrote the section, increasing the court cost fee and changing the fixed misdemeanor fees.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 1004 substituted "19.2-303.2, or 19.2-303.6" for "or 19.2-303.2" in clause (ii) in the first sentence of the first paragraph.

The 2020 Sp. Sess. I amendment. - The 2020 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 21, effective March 1, 2021, inserted "19.2-298.02" in the clause (ii) in the first paragraph.

§ 17.1-275.8. Fixed drug misdemeanor fee.

In circuit court, upon conviction of any and each misdemeanor charge, whether or not originally charged as a felony, for a violation of any provision of Article 1 (§ 18.2-247 et seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2, or upon a deferred disposition of proceedings in the case of any and each misdemeanor charge, whether or not originally charged as a felony, deferred pursuant to the terms and conditions of § 18.2-251 , there shall be assessed as court costs a fee of $296.50, to be known as the fixed drug misdemeanor fee. This fee shall be in addition to any fee assessed in the district court.

The amount collected, in whole or in part, for the fixed drug misdemeanor fee shall be apportioned, as provided by law, to the following funds in the fractional amounts designated:

  1. Sentencing/supervision fee (General Fund)                             (.1264755);
  2. Court Reporter Fund                             (.0168634);
  3. Witness expenses/expert witness fee (General Fund)                             (.0067454);
  4. Virginia Crime Victim-Witness Fund                             (.0101180);
  5. Intensified Drug Enforcement Jurisdiction Fund                             (.0134907);
  6. Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund                             (.0674536);
  7. Commonwealth's Attorney Fund (state share)                             (.0252951);
  8. Commonwealth's Attorney Fund (local share)                             (.0252951);
  9. Regional Criminal Justice Academy Training Fund                             (.0033727);
  10. Warrant fee, as prescribed by § 17.1-272 (.0404722);
  11. Courthouse Construction/Maintenance Fund                             (.0067454);
  12. Clerk of the circuit court                             (.0674536);
  13. Forensic laboratory fee (General Fund)                             (.3372681); and
  14. Drug Offender Assessment and Treatment Fund                             (.2529511).

    (2002, c. 831; 2003, c. 1039; 2004, c. 1004; 2011, c. 565.)

Effective date. - Acts 2002, c. 831, cl. 3, provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2003."

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 1039 substituted "$286.50" for "$284.50" in the first paragraph; deleted former subdivision 2, which read: "Sentencing/supervision fee (local share) (.0263620);" redesignated former subdivisions 3 through 15 as present subdivisions 2 through 14; and updated the fractional amounts apportioned in subdivisions 1 through 14.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 1004 inserted "and Treatment" in subdivision 14.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 565 rewrote the section, increasing the court cost fee and changing the fixed drug misdemeanor fees.

§ 17.1-275.9. Fixed misdemeanor revocation fee.

In circuit court, when a person is convicted of a misdemeanor not originally charged as a felony and subsequently suffers partial or full revocation of his suspension of sentence or probation pursuant to § 19.2-306, he shall be assessed as court costs a fee of $77 to be known as the fixed misdemeanor revocation fee. A single fixed misdemeanor revocation fee shall be assessed per defendant per hearing without regard to the number of misdemeanor revocations being considered, except that if a revocation of probation or suspended sentence upon a felony conviction is also being considered at the same revocation proceeding, a single fixed felony revocation fee shall apply instead. The amount collected, in whole or in part, for the fixed misdemeanor revocation fee shall be apportioned, as provided by law, to the following funds in the fractional amounts designated:

  1. Virginia Crime Victim-Witness Fund                             (.0389610);
  2. Intensified Drug Enforcement Jurisdiction Fund                             (.0519481);
  3. Witness expenses/expert witness fee (General Fund)                             (.0259740);
  4. Commonwealth's Attorney Fund (state share)                             (.0974026);
  5. Commonwealth's Attorney Fund (local share)                             (.0974026);
  6. Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund                             (.2597403);
  7. Regional Criminal Justice Training Academy Fund                             (.0129870);
  8. Warrant fee, as prescribed by § 17.1-272 (.1558442); and
  9. Clerk of the circuit court                             (.2597403).

    (2002, c. 831; 2003, c. 1039; 2011, c. 565.)

Effective date. - Acts 2002, c. 831, cl. 3, provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2003."

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 1039 substituted "$67" for "sixty-five dollars" in the first sentence of the first paragraph; and updated the fractional amounts apportioned in subdivisions 1 through 9.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 565 rewrote the section, increasing the court cost fee and changing the fixed misdemeanor revocation fees.

§ 17.1-275.10. Additional fee.

Beginning May 1, 2003, in addition to the fees set forth in §§ 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 , 17.1-275.3 , 17.1-275.4 , 17.1-275.7 , 17.1-275.8 , and 17.1-275.9 , there shall be assessed as court costs, a fee of $2, at the same time fees in such sections are assessed. All fees collected pursuant to this section shall be deposited into the Intensified Drug Enforcement Jurisdiction Fund.

(2003, c. 1042, cl. 9.)

Effective date. - This section became effective May 1, 2003.

§ 17.1-275.11. Additional fee assessed for conviction of certain offenses.

Beginning May 1, 2003, the clerk shall assess a person, in addition to the fees provided for by §§ 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 , 17.1-275.3 , 17.1-275.4 , 17.1-275.5 , 17.1-275.7 , 17.1-275.8 , and 17.1-275.9 , a fee of $100 upon conviction of any and each charge of a violation of §§ 18.2-36.1 , 18.2-51.4 , 18.2-266 , 18.2-266.1 , 18.2-268.3 , 46.2-341.24 or § 46.2-341.26:3 , or any similar local ordinance.

(2003, c. 1042, cl. 9.)

Effective date. - This section became effective May 1, 2003.

§ 17.1-275.11:1. Additional fee assessed for conviction requiring computer analysis.

In addition to the fees provided for by §§ 17.1-275.1 through 17.1-275.5 , 17.1-275.7 , 17.1-275.8 , and 17.1-275.9 , upon a finding of guilty of any charge or charges in which any computer forensic analysis revealed evidence used at trial of a defendant, the defendant may be assessed costs in an amount equal to the actual cost of the computer forensic analysis not to exceed $100 for each computer analyzed by any state or local law-enforcement agency. Upon motion and submission to the court of an affidavit by the law-enforcement agency setting forth the number of computers analyzed and the total amount of costs requested, the court shall determine the appropriate amount to be assessed and order such amount paid to the law-enforcement agency.

(2011, c. 511.)

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 9-2525. Motion for Costs of Computer Forensics.

§ 17.1-275.12. Additional fee for Internet Crimes Against Children Fund.

In addition to the fees provided for by §§ 16.1-69.48:1, 16.1-69.48:1.01, 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 , 17.1-275.3 , 17.1-275.4 , 17.1-275.5 , 17.1-275.7 , 17.1-275.8 , 17.1-275.9 , 17.1-275.1 0, and 17.1-275.11 , a fee of $15 upon each felony or misdemeanor conviction shall be assessed as court costs. All fees collected pursuant to this section shall be deposited into the state treasury and credited to the Internet Crimes Against Children Fund.

There is hereby established in the state treasury the Internet Crimes Against Children Fund. Such fund shall consist of all fees collected under this section, moneys appropriated directly to the Fund, and any other grants or gifts made to the Fund. Moneys in the Fund shall be disbursed in the following manner: to the Virginia State Police, 33.3333 percent of the total annual deposits to support the Northern Virginia Internet Crimes Against Children program; to the Department of Criminal Justice Services, 33.3333 percent of the total annual deposits to support the Southern Virginia Internet Crimes Against Children program; to the Department of Criminal Justice Services, 27.7777 percent of the total annual deposits to support grants and training and equipment for local law-enforcement agencies' use in investigating and prosecuting Internet crimes against children; and to the Department of Social Services, 5.5555 percent of the total annual deposits to support the Virginia Child Protection Accountability System established under § 63.2-1530 .

(2010, c. 685; 2014, c. 794.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2014, c. 794, cl. 3 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities; therefore, Chapter 806 of the Acts of Assembly of 2013 requires the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to assign a minimum fiscal impact of $50,000. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 794, effective April 23, 2014, in the first paragraph substituted "$15" for "$10."

§ 17.1-275.13. Additional fee for offenses related to sex trafficking.

In addition to the fees provided for by §§ 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 , 17.1-275.7 , 17.1-275.1 0, and 17.1-275.12 , any person convicted of a misdemeanor violation of § 18.2-346.01 or of § 18.2-348 or 18.2-349 shall be ordered to pay a $100 fee, and any person convicted of a violation of clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of § 18.2-48 , or of § 18.2-368 , or any felony violation of the laws pertaining to commercial sex trafficking or prostitution offenses pursuant to Article 3 (§ 18.2-346 et seq.) of Chapter 8, with the exception of § 18.2-361 , shall be ordered to pay a $500 fee. All fees collected pursuant to this section shall be deposited into the Virginia Prevention of Sex Trafficking Fund to be used in accordance with § 9.1-116.4 .

(2019, c. 728; 2020, c. 122; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 188.)

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 122 substituted " § 18.2-346 et seq." for " § 18.2-344 et seq." in the first sentence.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 188, effective July 1, 2021, substituted " § 18.2-346.01 " for "subsection B of § 18.2-346 " in the first sentence.

§ 17.1-275.14. Additional fee for Virginia State Police Electronic Summons System Fund.

  1. In addition to the fees provided for by §§ 16.1-69.48:1, 16.1-69.48:1.01, 17.1-275.1 , 17.1-275.2 , 17.1-275.3 , 17.1-275.4 , 17.1-275.5 , 17.1-275.7 , 17.1-275.8 , 17.1-275.9 , 17.1-275.1 0, 17.1-275.11 , 17.1-275.12 , and 17.1-275.13 , a fee of $5 shall be assessed as court costs in each criminal or traffic case in which the Virginia State Police issued the summons, ticket, or citation. All fees collected pursuant to this section shall be deposited into the state treasury and credited to the Virginia State Police Electronic Summons System Fund.
  2. There is hereby created in the state treasury a special nonreverting fund to be known as the Virginia State Police Electronic Summons System Fund, referred to in this section as "the Fund." The Fund shall be established on the books of the Comptroller. All fees collected under this section, moneys appropriated directly to the Fund, and any other grants or gifts made to the Fund shall be paid into the state treasury and credited to the Fund. Interest earned on moneys in the Fund shall remain in the Fund and be credited to it. Any moneys remaining in the Fund, including interest thereon, at the end of each fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund but shall remain in the Fund. Moneys in the Fund shall be used solely for the purposes of funding software, hardware, and associated equipment costs for the implementation and maintenance of an electronic summons system. Expenditures and disbursements from the Fund shall be made by the State Treasurer on warrants issued by the Comptroller upon written request signed by the Superintendent of the Virginia State Police or his designee.

    (2020, c. 342.)

§ 17.1-276. Fee allowed for providing secure remote access to land records.

  1. A clerk of the circuit court who provides secure remote access to land records pursuant to § 17.1-294 may charge a fee as provided in this section. The fee shall be paid to the clerk's office and deposited by the clerk into the clerk's nonreverting local fund to be used to cover operational expenses as defined in § 17.1-295 . The clerk may charge a flat clerk's fee to be assessed for each subscriber, as defined in § 17.1-295 , in an amount not to exceed $50 per month and a separate fee per image downloaded in an amount not to exceed the fee provided in subdivision A 8 of § 17.1-275 . The clerk's fees shall be used to cover operational expenses as defined in § 17.1-295. The Office of the Attorney General, the Division of Debt Collection, the Department of Transportation, the Virginia Outdoors Foundation, the Department of Historic Resources, the Department of General Services, the Department of Conservation and Recreation, the Department of Forestry, the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Authority, the Department of Rail and Public Transportation, and the State Corporation Commission shall be exempt from paying any fee for remote access to land records. If any clerk contracts with an outside vendor to provide remote access to land records to subscribers, such contract shall contain a provision exempting the Office of the Attorney General, the Division of Debt Collection, the Department of Transportation, the Virginia Outdoors Foundation, the Department of Historic Resources, the Department of General Services, the Department of Conservation and Recreation, the Department of Forestry, the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Authority, the Department of Rail and Public Transportation, and the State Corporation Commission from paying any access or subscription fee.
  2. The circuit court clerk shall enter into an agreement with each person whom the clerk authorizes to have remote access, in accordance with the security standards established by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency. Any such agreement between a state agency or employee thereof acting in the employee's official capacity and the clerk or an outside vendor contracted by the clerk to provide remote access to land records to subscribers, or such an agreement between a state agency or employee thereof acting in the employee's official capacity and both the clerk and the outside vendor, shall not contain any provision requiring the state agency or employee thereof acting in the employee's official capacity to indemnify the clerk or the vendor. Any such agreement between a state agency and the clerk or an outside vendor shall provide that the state agency is required to monitor its employees' activity under such agreement to ensure compliance with its terms.
  3. The clerk may establish a program under which the clerk assesses a reasonable convenience fee that shall not exceed $2 per transaction for remote access to land records and a separate fee per image downloaded in an amount not to exceed the fee provided in subdivision A 8 of § 17.1-275 .
  4. Nothing herein shall be construed to require the use by the general public of the secure remote access to land records made available by the clerk, and such records may continue to be accessed in person in the clerk's office.

    (1985, c. 489, § 14.1-118.1; 1993, c. 445; 1995, c. 592; 1997, c. 413; 1998, cc. 650, 872; 2004, c. 230; 2006, c. 474; 2008, cc. 823, 833; 2009, cc. 76, 723, 797; 2010, c. 430; 2011, cc. 434, 493; 2012, cc. 234, 469, 780; 2013, c. 77; 2015, cc. 65, 174; 2019, c. 611; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 124.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1998, c. 650, amended § 14.1-118.1, which was repealed by Acts 1998, c. 872, effective October 1, 1998. At the direction of the Code Commission, effect has been given in this section, as set out above, to Acts 1998, c. 650. In accordance with c. 650, the amendment, in the first sentence, substituted "electronic" for "remote," deleted "internet" following "including," inserted "through the global information system known as the Internet," substituted "may" for "shall" following "17.1-226," inserted "clerk or by the," deleted "in order" following "computer support," and substituted "replacements" for "future replacement"; substituted "The" for "Such" in the second sentence; rewrote the third sentence; and in the fourth sentence, substituted "In addition" for "Furthermore" and inserted "users."

Acts 2009, cc. 76 and 723, cl. 2, which had provided for an expiration date for subsection B, was repealed by Acts 2012, c. 780, cl. 2.

Acts 2009, c. 797, cl. 2, provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-276 of the Code of Virginia shall not void any contractual provision in existence prior to July 1, 2009. The provisions of this act amending § 17.1-276 shall apply to all contracts entered into or renewed on or after July 1, 2009."

Acts 2009, c. 797, cl. 3, provides: "That no provisions of this act or any components of this act shall affect the collection of any amounts owed to the Commonwealth for taxes administered by the Department of Taxation."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 230 added "or as a flat rate fee" at the end of the second sentence; substituted "$25" for "twenty-five dollars" in the last sentence; and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 474 deleted "the global information system known as" preceding "the Internet" in the first sentence.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 823 and 833 are identical, and rewrote this section.

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendments by cc. 76 and 723 are identical, and inserted the A designation at the beginning of the first paragraph and added subsection B. For September 30, 2012 expiration of amendments, see Editor's note.

The 2009 amendment by c. 797 added the last paragraph in subsection A. For applicability, see Editor's note.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 430, in subsection A, in the first paragraph, in the first sentence, inserted "as provided in this section" and deleted "of such electronic access, including, but not limited to, computer support, maintenance, enhancements, upgrades, replacements, and consulting services" from the end, inserted the second sentence, and in the fourth sentence, substituted "the clerk's" for "a special" and deleted "of such electronic access, as defined herein" from the end.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendments by cc. 434 and 493 are identical, and twice inserted "the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Rail and Public Transportation" in the last paragraph in subsection A.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 234, inserted ", including locating technology in an offsite facility for such purposes or for the implementation of a disaster recovery plan" in clause (iii) in subsection A.

The 2012 amendment by c. 469, in subsection A, in the last paragraph, inserted "the" preceding "Division of Debt Collection" in two places and "the Virginia Outdoors Foundation" following "Department of Transportation" in two places.

The 2012 amendment by c. 780, in subsection A, deleted "be paid to the clerk's office and deposited by the clerk into the clerk's nonreverting local fund to" following "The fee shall" in the next-to-last sentence of the first paragraph. Language concerning depositing fees is now found in subsection E of § 17.1-275 . In subsection B, deleted "pilot" before "program" and substituted "reasonable convenience fee that shall not exceed $2 per transaction for remote access" for "daily fee for remote access" and deleted the last two sentences which concerned reports on the pilot program.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 77, in the first paragraph of subsection A, deleted "established by the clerk to cover the operational expenses" at the end of the first sentence, substituted the second sentence for the former, which related to operational expenses, substituted "The clerk may charge a flat clerk's fee to be" for "A flat fee may be" at the beginning, and added "and a separate fee per image downloaded in an amount not to exceed the fee provided in subdivision A 8 of § 17.1-275 " at the end of the third sentence, substituted "The clerk's fees" for "The fee" at the beginning, and added "as defined in § 17.1-295 " at the end, of the fourth sentence; deleted "of the Circuit Court of Prince William County" following "The clerk" at the beginning of subsection B; and added subsection C.

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 65 inserted "the Department of Historic Resources" twice in the second paragraph in subsection A.

The 2015 amendment by c. 174 deleted the last sentence in the first paragraph of subsection A, which read "The circuit court clerk shall enter into an agreement with each person whom the clerk authorizes to have remote access, in accordance with the security standards established by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency."; added subsection B and redesignated former subsections B and C as subsections C and D.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 611, in the second paragraph of subsection A, inserted "the Department of General Services, the Department of Conservation and Recreation, the Department of Forestry, the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Authority" twice; and added the last sentence to subsection B.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 124, effective July 1, 2021, inserted "and the State Corporation Commission" twice in the second paragraph of subsection A, and made related changes.

§ 17.1-277.

Repealed by Acts 2002, c. 831, cl. 2, effective July 1, 2003.

Cross references. - For current provisions as to fixed fees for traffic infractions, see § 16.1-69.48:1.

§ 17.1-278. Additional fees in certain courts; use by Virginia State Bar.

In addition to the fees prescribed by § 16.1-69.48:2 and subdivision A 13 of § 17.1-275 and to be collected by the clerk of the circuit or general district court upon the filing of papers for the commencement of civil actions in such courts, the following additional fees shall be collected in all cities and counties in which civil legal representation is provided for the poor, without charge, by a nonprofit legal aid program organized under the auspices of the Virginia State Bar: (i) upon commencement of a civil action in such circuit court, an additional fee of $10 and (ii) upon commencement of a civil action in such general district court, an additional fee of $10.

The additional fees prescribed by this action shall be collected by the clerk at the time of the filing. The amounts so collected shall be paid by the clerk to the state treasury and credited as follows: (i) $9 to a special fund within the Virginia State Bar fund to be designated the Legal Aid Services Fund, and (ii) $1 to the general fund for funding of the district courts of the Commonwealth. Such amount for the district courts shall be used to assist indigent litigants. Such amounts credited to the Legal Aid Services Fund shall be disbursed by the Virginia State Bar by check from the State Treasurer upon a warrant of the Comptroller to nonprofit legal aid programs organized under the auspices of the Virginia State Bar through the Legal Services Corporation of Virginia to assist in defraying the costs of such programs. However, the additional fees prescribed by this section shall not be collected in actions initiated by any local government or by the Commonwealth.

(1992, cc. 249, 749, § 14.1-125.1; 1998, c. 872; 2002, c. 318; 2004, c. 925; 2005, c. 681; 2006, c. 189; 2008, c. 692.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2004, c. 925, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall only become effective if the general appropriation act for the period July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2006, passed during the 2004 Session of the General Assembly and signed into law by the Governor, includes an appropriation of general funds for a total of 49 additional positions allocated amongst the general district courts, juvenile and domestic relations district courts, and combined district courts, such additional positions being in addition to the total positions for such courts as of June 30, 2004; and if such appropriation is included as provided herein, then the provisions of this act shall expire on July 1, 2006." The appropriation was made in Acts 2004, Sp. Sess. 1, c. 4. See Item 41.

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 318 substituted "four dollars" for "two dollars" in clauses (i) and (ii) in the first paragraph; and in the second paragraph, inserted "as follows: (i) three dollars" and inserted clause (ii) in the second sentence, inserted the present third sentence, and inserted "credited to the Legal Aid Services Fund" in the present fourth sentence.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 925, in the first paragraph, deleted " § " preceding "16.1-69.48:2" and inserted "subdivision A 13 of § " preceding "17.1-275" and deleted "A 13" thereafter; substituted "$5" for "four dollars" twice at the end; in the second paragraph, substituted "$4" for "three dollars" and "$1" for "one dollar" in the first sentence. For expiration date, see Editor's note.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 681, effective January 1, 2006, substituted "subdivision A 13 of § 17.1-275 " for "17.1-275 A 13," "a civil action in such" for "an action whether at law or in chancery in such" and made minor stylistic changes; and substituted "commencement of a civil action in such" for "commencement of an action whether at law or in chancery in such" in clause (i) of the first paragraph.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 189 substituted "$5" for "$4" twice in the first paragraph; and substituted "$4" for "$3" in the second sentence of the last paragraph.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 692, in the first paragraph, substituted "$10" for "$5" twice; and in the second paragraph, substituted "$9" for "$4."

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 5-721. Warrant in Detinue.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A Clerk of Court may install recording systems into a Circuit Court, General District Court, and/or Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and require such systems to be on at all times court is in session and, further, that the Clerk may charge a fee for access to such recordings provided that confidentiality is maintained for all proceedings as required by the Virginia Code or Court orders. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Scott A. Surovell, Member, House of Delegates, 10-063, 2010 Va. AG LEXIS 40 (8/2/10).

§ 17.1-279. Additional fee to be assessed by circuit court clerks for information technology.

  1. In addition to the fees otherwise authorized by this chapter, the clerk of each circuit court shall assess a $5 fee, known as the "Technology Trust Fund Fee," in each civil action, upon each instrument to be recorded in the deed books, and upon each judgment to be docketed in the judgment lien docket book. Such fee shall be deposited by the State Treasurer into a trust fund. The State Treasurer shall maintain a record of such deposits.
  2. Four dollars of every $5 fee shall be allocated by the Compensation Board from the trust fund for the purposes of: (i) developing and updating individual land records automation plans for individual circuit court clerks' offices; (ii) implementing automation plans to modernize land records in individual circuit court clerks' offices and provide secure remote access to land records throughout the Commonwealth pursuant to § 17.1-294 ; (iii) obtaining and updating office automation and information technology equipment including software and conversion services; (iv) preserving, maintaining and enhancing court records, including, but not limited to, the costs of repairs, maintenance, land records, consulting services, service contracts, redaction of social security numbers from land records, and system replacements or upgrades; and (v) improving public access to court records. The Compensation Board in consultation with circuit court clerks and other users of court records shall develop and update policies governing the allocation of funds for these purposes. However, such funds shall not be used for personnel costs within the circuit court clerks' offices. The Compensation Board policies governing the allocation of funds shall require that a clerk submit to the Compensation Board a written certification that the clerk's proposed technology improvements of his land records will provide secure remote access to those land records on or before July 1, 2008. The annual budget submitted by each circuit court clerk pursuant to § 15.2-1636.7 may include a request for technology improvements in the upcoming fiscal year to be allocated by the Compensation Board from the trust fund. Such request shall not exceed the deposits into the trust fund credited to that locality. The Compensation Board shall allocate the funds requested by the clerks in an amount not to exceed the deposits into the trust fund credited to their respective localities.
  3. The remaining $1 of each such fee may be allocated by the Compensation Board from the trust fund (i) for the purposes of funding studies to develop and update individual land-records automation plans for individual circuit court clerks' offices, at the request of and in consultation with the individual circuit court clerk's offices, and (ii) for the purposes enumerated in subsection B to implement the plan to modernize land records in individual circuit court clerks' offices and provide secure remote access to land records throughout the Commonwealth. The allocations pursuant to this subsection may give priority to those individual clerks' offices whose deposits into the trust fund would not be sufficient to implement its modernization plan. The Compensation Board policies governing the allocation of funds shall require that a clerk submit to the Compensation Board a written certification that the clerk's proposed technology improvements of his land records will provide secure remote access to those land records on or before July 1, 2008.
    1. Secure remote access to land records shall be by paid subscription service through individual circuit court clerk's offices pursuant to § 17.1-276 , or through designated application service providers. The clerk may require any entity that is a nonresident of the Commonwealth, prior to becoming a subscriber, to demonstrate that such entity is authorized to do business in Virginia and is in good standing with the State Corporation Commission or other applicable state or federal regulatory agency and that such entity will comply with the secure remote access standards developed by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency pursuant to § 17.1-294 . In the case of an individual, the clerk may require a person who is a nonresident of the Commonwealth to demonstrate that such person has a legal presence in Virginia and will comply with the secure remote access standards developed by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency pursuant to § 17.1-294 . Compliance with secure remote access standards developed by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency pursuant to § 17.1-294 shall be certified by the individual circuit court clerks' offices to the Compensation Board. The individual circuit court clerk's office or its designated application service provider shall certify compliance with such secure remote access standards. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the clerk from entering into a subscriber agreement with an agency of the Commonwealth and delegating the responsibility for compliance with such secure remote access standards to such agency. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the Compensation Board from allocating trust fund money to individual circuit court clerks' offices for the purpose of complying with such secure remote access standards or redaction of social security numbers from land records. D. 1.  Secure remote access to land records shall be by paid subscription service through individual circuit court clerk's offices pursuant to § 17.1-276 , or through designated application service providers. The clerk may require any entity that is a nonresident of the Commonwealth, prior to becoming a subscriber, to demonstrate that such entity is authorized to do business in Virginia and is in good standing with the State Corporation Commission or other applicable state or federal regulatory agency and that such entity will comply with the secure remote access standards developed by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency pursuant to § 17.1-294. In the case of an individual, the clerk may require a person who is a nonresident of the Commonwealth to demonstrate that such person has a legal presence in Virginia and will comply with the secure remote access standards developed by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency pursuant to § 17.1-294. Compliance with secure remote access standards developed by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency pursuant to § 17.1-294 shall be certified by the individual circuit court clerks' offices to the Compensation Board. The individual circuit court clerk's office or its designated application service provider shall certify compliance with such secure remote access standards. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the clerk from entering into a subscriber agreement with an agency of the Commonwealth and delegating the responsibility for compliance with such secure remote access standards to such agency. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the Compensation Board from allocating trust fund money to individual circuit court clerks' offices for the purpose of complying with such secure remote access standards or redaction of social security numbers from land records.
    2. Every circuit court clerk shall provide secure remote access to land records pursuant to § 17.1-294 on or before July 1, 2008.
  4. Such fee shall not be assessed to any instrument to be recorded in the deed books nor any judgment to be docketed in the judgment lien docket books tendered by any federal, state or local government.
  5. If such an application includes automation or technology improvements that would require an interface with the case management system or the financial management system operated and maintained by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court for the purpose of providing electronic information to state agencies in accordance with § 17.1-502 , the circuit court clerk, or the court's designated application service provider, shall certify to the Compensation Board that such automation or technology improvements will comply with the security and data standards of the systems operated and maintained by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court.
  6. Information regarding the technology programs adopted by the circuit court clerks shall be shared with the Virginia Information Technologies Agency, The Library of Virginia, and the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court.
  7. Nothing in this section shall be construed to diminish the duty of local governing bodies to furnish supplies and equipment to the clerks of the circuit courts pursuant to § 15.2-1656 . Revenue raised as a result of this section shall in no way supplant current funding to circuit court clerks' offices by local governing bodies.
  8. Effective July 1, 2006, except for transfers pursuant to this section, there shall be no transfers out of the Technology Trust Fund, including transfers to the general fund.

    (1996, c. 431, § 14.1-125.2; 1997, c. 675; 1998, c. 872; 2000, cc. 440, 446; 2002, cc. 140, 250, 637; 2003, cc. 205, 865, 981, 1021; 2004, c. 676; 2005, cc. 681, 738; 2006, c. 647; 2007, cc. 548, 626; 2009, cc. 793, 858; 2010, c. 430; 2014, c. 460.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2006, c. 647, cl. 2, provides: "That the Virginia Information Technologies Agency is requested to develop methods for the redaction of social security numbers from land record documents maintained in electronic form by offices of circuit court clerks and made available via remote secure access pursuant to § 2.2-3808.2 [see now §§ 17.1-293 and 17.1-294 ]. The Virginia Information Technologies Agency shall submit to the Compensation Board a project budget and obtain approval of the same, prior to commencement of the work, to be billed in accordance with the required procedures for the Virginia Information Technologies Agency to bill other agencies for its services. The Compensation Board is authorized to pay the Virginia Information Technologies Agency such charges as it deems reasonable and proper for the services from funds collected pursuant to subsection C of § 17.1-279 ."

Acts 2006, c. 907, cl. 2, provides: "That, for the initial development and ongoing maintenance of information technology policies, standards, and guidelines to implement the provisions of this act and Chapter 749 of the 2005 Acts of Assembly, the Virginia Information Technologies Agency shall submit to the Compensation Board a project budget and obtain approval of the same, prior to commencement of the agency's work, to be billed in accordance with the required procedures for the Virginia Information Technologies Agency to bill other agencies for its services. The Compensation Board is authorized to pay the Virginia Information Technologies Agency such charges as it deems reasonable and proper for the services from funds collected pursuant to subsection B of § 17.1-279 ."

Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 73 E, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of § 17.1-279 E, Code of Virginia, the Compensation Board may allocate to the clerk of any circuit court funds for the acquisition of equipment and software for a pilot project for the automated application for, and issuance of, marriage licenses by such court. Any such funds allocated shall be deemed to have been expended pursuant to clause (iii) of § 17.1-279 E for the purposes of the limitation on allocations set forth in that subsection."

Acts 2020, c. 1289, Item 73 F, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides:

"1. Notwithstanding the provisions of § 17.1-279 , Code of Virginia, the Compensation Board may allocate up to $978,426 the first year and $978,426 the second year of Technology Trust Fund moneys for operating expenses in the clerks' offices.

"2. Notwithstanding the provisions of § 17.1-279 , Code of Virginia, the Compensation Board when distributing funds to the Circuit Court Clerk's Offices from the Technology Trust Fund shall ensure that each office has at least $1,000 per year for technology related expenditures."

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendments by cc. 440 and 446 are identical, and inserted "and other users of court records" near the beginning of the second sentence in subsection B; in subsection C, deleted "by the Task Force; (ii) funding studies by the Department of Information Technology or other public or private organizations" following "(i) funding studies," inserted "and update," redesignated former clause (iii) as present clause (ii); and added subsection H.

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendments by cc. 140 and 250 are identical, and substituted "2004" for "2002" in subsection H.

The 2002 amendment by c. 637 inserted the last two sentences of subsection E; and substituted "2004" for "2002" in subsection H.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 205 substituted "$3 fee" for "three-dollar fee" throughout the section; and in subsection C, substituted "$1" for "one dollar," and added the last sentence.

The 2003 amendment by c. 865 substituted "$3 fee" for "three-dollar fee" throughout the section; in subsection C, substituted "$1" for "one"; and in subsection H, substituted "2008" for "2004."

The 2003 amendments by cc. 981 and 1021 are identical, and substituted "$3" for "three dollar," and "Virginia Information Technologies Agency" for "Department of Technology Planning" throughout the section; and substituted "$1" for "one dollar" in subsection C.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 676, in subsection A, substituted "$5" for "$3"; in subsection B, substituted "Four dollars of every $5" for "Two dollars of every $3," inserted clauses (i), (ii), and redesignated former clauses (i) and (ii) as (iii) and (iv), in clause (iv), deleted "which may include, but not necessarily be limited to, a digital imaging system," and rewrote the last two sentences in the first paragraph of subsection B, which read: "In allocating funds, the Compensation Board may consider the current automation of the Clerks' offices and the recommendations made in the 1996 report by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) regarding automation of the circuit court clerks' offices. Except for improvements as provided in subsection E, such policies shall require a clerk to submit to the Compensation Board a written certification from the Virginia Information Technologies Agency that the clerk's proposed technology improvements will be compatible with a system to provide statewide remote access to land records in accordance with the recommendations of JLARC and the Task Force on Land Records Management (the Task Force) Established by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency"; in subsection C, rewrote the first sentence and added the last two sentences; rewrote the last sentence of subsection C as the first sentence of subsection D and added the last three sentences in subsection D; redesignated former subsection D as subsection E; rewrote former subsection E and redesignated as subsection F; redesignated former subsections F and G as subsections G and H; deleted former subsection H, which read: "The provisions of this section shall expire on July 1, 2008"; and added subsection I.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 681, effective January 1, 2006, substituted "civil action" for "law and chancery action" in the first sentence of subsection A; and substituted "civil divisions" for "law and chancery divisions" in subsection F.

The 2005 amendment by c. 738 added subsection J.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 647, in the first paragraph of subsection B and in subsection C, substituted "provide" for "accommodate" and "or before July 1, 2007" for "a statewide basis"; in the first sentence in subsection F, substituted "provides" for "has implemented an automation plan for his land records that will accommodate" and "to land records on or before July 1, 2007" for "on a statewide basis"; deleted former subsection I, which read: "It is the intent of the General Assembly that all circuit court clerks provide secure remote access to land records on or before July 1, 2006"; and redesignated former subsection J as subsection I.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendments by cc. 548 and 626 are identical, and substituted "July 1, 2008" for "July 1, 2007" throughout; in subsection B, in the first sentence of the first paragraph, inserted "pursuant to § 17.1-294 " at the end of clause (ii) and in clause (iv), inserted "land records, consulting services" following "maintenance," "redaction of social security numbers from land records" following "service contracts" and "replacements or" following "system"; and rewrote subsections D and F.

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendments by cc. 793 and 858 are identical, and inserted the next-to-last sentence in subsection F; and substituted "Technology Trust Fund" for "fund" in subsection I.

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 430, in subdivision D 1, inserted the second and third sentences; deleted former subdivision D 2 concerning reimbursement of expenditures for redacting social security numbers from land records; redesignated former subdivision D 3 as subdivision D 2; in subsection F, deleted the first sentence, which read: "If a circuit court clerk provides secure remote access to land records on or before July 1, 2008, then that clerk may apply to the Compensation Board for an allocation from the Technology Trust Fund for automation and technology improvements in his office that are not related to land records" and deleted the last sentence, which read: "Such request shall not exceed the deposits into the trust fund credited to that locality."

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 460 in subdivision D 1 inserted the sixth sentence.

Law review. - For survey article on judicial decisions in real estate law from June 1, 2002 through June 1, 2003, see 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 223 (2003).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Technology Trust Fund monies. - A locality or a circuit court judge does not have the statutory authority to direct how a circuit court clerk uses the Technology Trust Fund monies allocated to such clerk's office pursuant to § 17.1-279 . See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable John T. Frey, Fairfax County Circuit Court Clerk, 09-055, 2009 Va. AG LEXIS 40 (10/8/09).

§ 17.1-279.1. Additional assessment for electronic summons system.

Any county, city, or town, through its governing body, may assess an additional sum not in excess of $5 as part of the costs in each criminal or traffic case in the district or circuit courts located where such cases are brought in which the defendant is charged with a violation of any statute or ordinance, which violation in the case of towns arose within the town, and where the defendant is charged with a violation of any such statute or ordinance by a local law-enforcement agency. The imposition of such assessment shall be by ordinance of the governing body, which may provide for different sums in circuit courts and district courts. The assessment shall be collected by the clerk of the court in which the action is filed, remitted to the treasurer of the appropriate county, city, or town, and held by such treasurer subject to disbursements by the governing body to a local law-enforcement agency solely to fund software, hardware, and associated equipment costs for the implementation and maintenance of an electronic summons system. The imposition of a town assessment shall replace any county fee that would otherwise apply.

(2014, c. 325; 2015, cc. 546, 643; 2020, c. 342.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 3-6.04, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "Nothing in § 17.1-279.1 of the Code of Virginia shall be construed to authorize any county, city, or town to assess the sum set forth therein upon any summons issued by a law-enforcement agency of the Commonwealth."

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendments by cc. 546 and 643 are identical, and substituted "county, city, or town" for "county or city" throughout the section; substituted "where such cases are brought" for "within its boundaries" and inserted "which violation in the case of towns arose within the town" in the first sentence, and added the last sentence.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 342 added "and where the defendant is charged with a violation of any such statute or ordinance by a local law-enforcement agency" at the end of the first sentence.

§ 17.1-280. What costs chargeable against prosecutor.

If any warrant of arrest for a misdemeanor or felony, or any search warrant, is issued or procured at the instance of a prosecutor, other than a public officer charged with the enforcement of the laws, and the warrant is dismissed or the accused discharged from the charge or charges, the judge before whom the proceeding is held may give judgment against the prosecutor in favor of the accused for his costs. If the judge believes from the evidence that the warrant was procured by the prosecutor through malice or without reasonable and probable cause, the judge shall grant judgment in favor of the accused for his costs.

(Code 1950, § 14-140; 1960, c. 369; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-131; 1998, c. 872.)

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 1-704. Complaint for Malicious Prosecution.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 100.

CASE NOTES

Legal malice inferred from circumstances is sufficient to support an award of compensatory damages in suits for malicious prosecution. F.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Duncan, 214 Va. 246 , 198 S.E.2d 595 (1973) (decided under prior law).

But an award of punitive damages can be supported only by proof of actual malice. F.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Duncan, 214 Va. 246 , 198 S.E.2d 595 (1973) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-281. Assessment for courthouse construction, renovation or maintenance.

  1. Any county or city, through its governing body, may assess a sum not in excess of two dollars as part of the costs in (i) each civil action filed in the district or circuit courts located within its boundaries and (ii) each criminal or traffic case in its district or circuit court in which the defendant is charged with a violation of any statute or ordinance. If a town provides court facilities for a county, the governing body of the county shall return to the town a portion of the assessments collected based on the number of civil, criminal and traffic cases originating and heard in the town.
  2. The imposition of such assessment shall be by ordinance of the governing body which may provide for different sums in circuit courts and district courts. The assessment shall be collected by the clerk of the court in which the action is filed, remitted to the treasurer of the appropriate county or city and held by such treasurer subject to disbursements by the governing body for the construction, renovation, or maintenance of courthouse or jail and court-related facilities and to defray increases in the cost of heating, cooling, electricity, and ordinary maintenance.
  3. Any county or city which, on or after January 1, 2008, operated a courthouse not in compliance with the current safety and security guidelines contained in the Virginia Courthouse Facility Guidelines, as certified by the Department of General Services upon application to the Department by the county or city, and which cannot be feasibly renovated to correct such non-compliance, through its governing body, may assess an additional sum not in excess of three dollars as part of the costs in (i) each civil action filed in the district or circuit courts located within its boundaries and (ii) each criminal or traffic case in its district or circuit court in which the defendant is charged with a violation of any statute or ordinance. Such additional fee assessed under this subsection shall not be assessed in any civil action if the amount in controversy is $500 or less. Any locality which applies for certification from the Department under this subsection shall reimburse the Department for the actual costs incurred by the Department in complying with the certification request.
  4. The imposition of such assessment shall be by ordinance of the governing body, which may provide for different sums in circuit courts and district courts. The assessment shall be collected by the clerk of the court in which the action is filed, remitted to the treasurer of the appropriate county or city, and held by such treasurer subject to disbursements by the governing body solely for the construction, reconstruction, renovation of, or adaptive re-use of a structure for a courthouse.
  5. The assessments provided for herein shall be in addition to any other fees prescribed by law. The assessments shall be required in each felony, misdemeanor, or traffic infraction case, regardless of the existence of a local ordinance requiring their payment.

    (1990, c. 543, § 14.1-133.2; 1991, c. 689; 1992, cc. 698, 863; 1998, c. 872; 1999, c. 9; 2002, c. 831; 2009, cc. 814, 857.)

The 1999 amendment added the last sentence of the section.

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 831, effective July 1, 2003, inserted "misdemeanor, or traffic infraction case" in the second sentence in the last paragraph.

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendments by cc. 814 and 857 are nearly the same, and designated the former first, second and third paragraphs as subsections A, B and E, respectively; in subsection A, deleted the former second sentence, which read: "The total assessments authorized by any county or city in a civil action pursuant to this section and § 42.1-70 shall not exceed four dollars"; added subsections C and D; and in subsection E, substituted "assessments" for "assessment" twice and "their payment" for "its payment."

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Use of funds to maintain courthouses. - Funds derived from the fee assessed pursuant to the statute may be used to defray increases in the cost of heating, cooling, electricity, and routine maintenance of courthouses located within the city, but may not be used to pay the entire cost of utilities and routine courthouse maintenance. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Margaret P. Spencer, Judge, Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, 01-028 (4/27/01).

§ 17.1-282.

Reserved.

§ 17.1-283. Statements required of clerks of courts of record; exceptions.

  1. Every clerk of a court of record, except the Clerks of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, shall file monthly with the Compensation Board a full and accurate statement showing all such fees, allowances, commissions, salaries or other compensation or emolument of office, derived from the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, or from any other source whatever, collected or received by him. The statements shall include the date of collection and sources from which the collections were made, and shall be verified by a procedure agreed upon by the Compensation Board and the Auditor of Public Accounts. The statements shall be open to public inspection at all times.
  2. The statements shall show in detail all sums actually paid for necessary office expenses, premiums on official bond of the principal and deputies, name and amount of compensation to each deputy or assistant, and a detailed statement of every other expense in connection with the administration of the office actually paid out.

    (Code 1950, §§ 14-145, 14-147, 14-148; 1952, c. 446; 1960, c. 584; 1962, c. 439; 1964, c. 386, §§ 14.1-136, 14.1-138, 14.1-139; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 155; 1983, c. 293; 1996, c. 696; 1998, c. 872.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 73 B, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "The reports filed by each circuit court clerk pursuant to § 17.1-283 , Code of Virginia, for each calendar year shall include all income derived from the performance of any office, function or duty described or authorized by the Code of Virginia whether directly or indirectly related to the office of circuit court clerk, including, by way of description and not limitation, services performed as a commissioner of accounts, receiver, or licensed agent, but excluding private services performed on a personal basis which are completely unrelated to the office. The Compensation Board may suspend the allowance for office expenses for any clerk who fails to file such reports within the time prescribed by law, or when the board determines that such report does not comply with the provisions of this paragraph."

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 3C M.J. Clerks of Court, § 4.

§ 17.1-284. How excess payable into state or local treasury determined.

In determining the excess, if any, to be paid into the state treasury by the clerks, all fees, allowances, commissions, salary or other compensation or emolument of office derived from the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, or from any source whatever, shall be included and enter into the determination of the excess to be paid.

(Code 1950, § 14-149; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-140; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-285. Payment of excess.

  1. The Commonwealth shall be entitled to one-third of the excess fees collected by clerks as required to be reported under § 17.1-283 and the governing body of the county or city shall be entitled to two-thirds of the excess fees collected unless otherwise provided by law. The Compensation Board shall determine on an annual basis by June 30 of each year the methods by which excess fees shall be disbursed.
  2. All of the excess paid into the state treasury by the clerks of the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Court of Appeals shall be retained therein.

    (Code 1950, § 14-150; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-140.1; 1985, c. 575; 1998, c. 872.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2016, c. 780, § 3-5.05, as amended by Acts 2017, c. 836, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2018, provides: "Notwithstanding §§ 15.2-540 , 15.2-639 , 15.2-848 , 17.1-285 , and any other provision of law general or special, effective July 1, 2009, the Commonwealth shall be entitled to two-thirds of the excess fees collected by the clerks of the circuit courts as required to be reported under § 17.1-283 ."

Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 3-5.05, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "Notwithstanding § § 15.2-540 , 15.2-639 , 15.2-848 , 17.1-285 , and any other provision of law general or special, effective July 1, 2009, the Commonwealth shall be entitled to two-thirds of the excess fees collected by the clerks of the circuit courts as required to be reported under § 17.1-283 ."

§ 17.1-286. Disposition of state funds locally collected.

All state funds collected by clerks of courts shall be paid into the state treasury without deductions on account of their compensation or on account of expenses. The Comptroller shall promptly forward to such officers his warrants on the State Treasurer for the compensation due them and the estimated amount allowed them out of such funds for expenses.

(Code 1950, § 14-161; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-161; 1998, c. 872.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 266 B, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 17.1-286 and 58.1-3176 , Code of Virginia, the State Comptroller shall not make payments to the Circuit Court clerks on amounts directly deposited into the State Treasury by General District Courts, Juvenile and Domestic Relations General District Courts, Combined District Courts, and the Magistrates System. The State Comptroller shall continue to make payments, in accordance with §§ 17.1-286 and 58.1-3176 , Code of Virginia, to the respective clerks on those amounts directly deposited into the state treasury by the Circuit Courts."

§ 17.1-287. Salaries of clerks of circuit courts.

The annual salaries of clerks of circuit courts shall be as prescribed in the general appropriation act.

(1982, c. 589, § 14.1-143.2; 1986, c. 370; 1988, c. 841; 1998, c. 872.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 73 G, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "Notwithstanding § 17.1-287 , Code of Virginia, any elected official funded through this Item may elect to relinquish any portion of his state funded salary established in paragraph A 1 of this Item. In any office where the official elects this option, the Compensation Board shall ensure the amount relinquished is used to fund salaries of other office staff."

§ 17.1-288. Compensation and expenses of clerks of circuit courts in Cities of Richmond and Newport News.

In the City of Richmond and in the City of Newport News, the clerk of the circuit court shall be paid a salary by the city of not less than the amount which would be allowed to be retained by the respective clerks under state law. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prevent such clerks from receiving any future increases that may be allowed clerks of circuit courts from time to time by the General Assembly.

Such salaries shall be in full compensation for services and shall be in lieu of the retention by such clerks of any and all official fees, commissions and emoluments of whatever kind or character, and from whatever source derived; and the city council of each such city shall provide for the payment of such salaries out of the city treasury in equal biweekly, semimonthly or monthly installments. The expenses of office of such clerks, including the compensation of all deputies and employees, shall likewise be paid to each such clerk out of the city treasury on duly authenticated vouchers when and as such expenses are incurred or may become due and payable or at least monthly. The maximum amount of such expenses shall be fixed by the Compensation Board, and the Board shall fix the number and compensation of the deputies and employees of each such clerk.

All fees, commissions, and emoluments of every kind or character received or collected by such clerks, and from whatever source derived, shall be paid into the city treasury by such clerks monthly. All fees, commissions, and emoluments of every kind and character whether payable by the Commonwealth, the United States, or by private persons, firms or corporations, now or hereafter made receivable by laws or ordinance by such clerks, shall continue to be paid to and collected by such clerks and shall be paid into the city treasury monthly, except that the city aforesaid shall not be required to pay any such clerk any fees or commissions for services performed for such city.

Except as to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News, nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or remove any of such clerks, their deputies, or employees from coverage by the Virginia Retirement System, but they shall remain in such system, and the city shall pay to the Virginia Retirement System such amount as the Commonwealth would have been required to pay had such clerks, deputies and employees continued to be compensated under other provisions of former Article 3 (§ 14.1-136 et seq.) of Chapter 2 of Title 14.1, and the city shall deduct from the salaries paid such clerks, their deputies and employees the employee contribution to the Virginia Retirement System as provided by law.

(1970, c. 382, § 14.1-144.1; 1973, c. 544; 1981, c. 14; 1983, c. 580; 1998, c. 872.)

Editor's note. - Former Article 3 ( § 14.1-136 et seq.), referred to in the last paragraph, was recodified as § 17.1-283 et seq. by Acts 1998, c. 872.

CASE NOTES

Distinguishing between salaries and compensation. - Throughout this article the statutes consistently distinguish between "compensation," derived from fees, and salaries which shall be in full compensation for services and shall be in lieu of the retention by clerks of any and all official fees or other compensation. Board of Supvrs. v. Marshall, 215 Va. 756 , 214 S.E.2d 146 (1975) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-289. Commission on certain local collections not otherwise provided for.

The clerk of every circuit court shall be entitled to a commission of five percent on local collections received by the clerk on which a commission is not otherwise provided for by law. The commissions shall be deducted by the clerk before the collections are paid into the county, town or city treasury.

(1977, c. 290, § 14.1-155.2; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-290. Contracts by cities.

Subject to the approval of the Compensation Board, the council of any city may enter into contracts with officers providing for salaries for the maximum amount allowed in § 17.1-287 and for the city's pro rata part of the expense of the office approved by the State Compensation Board, in lieu of fees and commissions prescribed by law for services performed for the city and such contracts may relieve the officer from collecting such fees and commissions. In the event such contract is entered into and approved by the Compensation Board, the officer and the city shall not be liable to the Commonwealth for the failure of such officer to collect fees and commissions prescribed by law for services rendered the city. A copy of every such contract, certified by the clerk of the city council, shall be filed with the Comptroller.

(Code 1950, § 14-162; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-162; 1998, c. 872.)

CASE NOTES

Distinguishing between salaries and compensation. - Throughout this article the statutes consistently distinguish between "compensation," derived from fees, and salaries which shall be in full compensation for services and shall be in lieu of the retention by clerks of any and all official fees or other compensation. Board of Supvrs. v. Marshall, 215 Va. 756 , 214 S.E.2d 146 (1975) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-291. Penalty for officers.

Any officer failing to comply with the duties imposed upon him by the provisions of this article shall forfeit to the Commonwealth not less than $25 nor more than $500 for each such failure, such forfeiture to be enforced by the attorney for the Commonwealth in the circuit court having criminal jurisdiction in his city or county.

(Code 1950, § 14-163; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-163; 1972, c. 170; 1998, c. 872.)

Article 8. Secure Remote Access.

§ 17.1-292. Applicability; definitions.

  1. The provisions of § 17.1-293 shall apply to clerks of the courts of record as defined in § 1-212 and courts not of record as defined in § 16.1-69.5.
  2. As used in this article: "Confidential court records" means court records maintained by a clerk of a court of record, as defined in § 1-212 , or a court not of record, as defined in § 16.1-69.5, and recognized as confidential under any applicable law or sealed pursuant to court order. "Court records" means any record maintained by the clerk in a civil, traffic, or criminal proceeding in the court, and any appeal from a district court. "Internet" means the international computer network of interoperable packet-switched data networks. "Land records" means any writing authorized by law to be recorded on paper or in electronic format that the clerk records affecting title to real property, including but not limited to instruments, orders, or any other writings recorded under this title, Article 5 (§ 8.01-446 et seq.) of Chapter 17 of Title 8.01, Title 8.9A and Chapter 6 (§ 55.1-600 et seq.) of Title 55.1. "Nonconfidential court records" means all court records except those court records that are confidential court records. (2007, cc. 548, 626; 2013, c. 77; 2018, cc. 127, 584.)

Cross references. - As to requesting district court records, see § 16.1-69.54:1

Editor's note. - To conform to the recodification of Title 55 by Acts 2019, c. 712, effective October 1, 2019, the following substitution was made at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission: substituted "Chapter 6 ( § 55.1-600 et seq.) of Title 55.1" for "Chapter 6 ( § 55-106 et seq.) of Title 55."

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 77 added the paragraph defining "Court records" in subsection B.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendments by cc. 127 and 584 are identical, and in subsection A, deleted "of this article" preceding "shall apply"; and in subsection B, added the definitions for "Confidential court records" and "Nonconfidential court records."

§ 17.1-293. Posting and availability of certain information on the Internet; prohibitions.

  1. Notwithstanding Chapter 37 (§ 2.2-3700 et seq.) of Title 2.2 or subsection B, it is unlawful for any court clerk to disclose the social security number or other identification numbers appearing on driver's licenses or other documents issued under Chapter 3 (§ 46.2-300 et seq.) of Title 46.2 or the comparable law of another jurisdiction or information on credit cards, debit cards, bank accounts, or other electronic billing and payment systems that was supplied to a court clerk for the purpose of paying fees, fines, taxes, or other charges collected by such court clerk. The prohibition shall not apply where disclosure of such information is required (i) to conduct or complete the transaction for which such information was submitted or (ii) by other law or court order.
  2. Beginning January 1, 2004, no court clerk shall post on the Internet any document that contains the following information: (i) an actual signature, (ii) a social security number, (iii) a date of birth identified with a particular person, (iv) the maiden name of a person's parent so as to be identified with a particular person, (v) any financial account number or numbers, or (vi) the name and age of any minor child.
  3. Each such clerk shall post notice that includes a list of the documents routinely posted on its website. However, the clerk shall not post information on his website that includes private activity for private financial gain.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit access to any original document as provided by law.
  5. This section shall not apply to the following:
    1. Providing access to any document among the land records via secure remote access pursuant to § 17.1-294 ;
    2. Postings related to legitimate law-enforcement purposes;
    3. Postings of historical, genealogical, interpretive, or educational documents and information about historic persons and events;
    4. Postings of instruments and records filed or recorded that are more than 100 years old;
    5. Providing secure remote access to any person, his counsel, or staff which counsel directly supervises to documents filed in matters to which such person is a party;
    6. Providing official certificates and certified records in digital form of any document maintained by the clerk pursuant to § 17.1-258.3:2 ; and
    7. Providing secure remote access to nonconfidential court records, subject to any fees charged by the clerk, to members in good standing with the Virginia State Bar and their authorized agents, pro hac vice attorneys authorized by the court for purposes of the practice of law, and such governmental agencies as authorized by the clerk.
  6. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the Supreme Court or any other court clerk from providing online access to a case management system that may include abstracts of case filings and proceedings in the courts of the Commonwealth, including online access to subscribers of nonconfidential criminal case information to confirm the complete date of birth of a defendant.
  7. The court clerk shall be immune from suit arising from any acts or omissions relating to providing remote access on the Internet pursuant to this section unless the clerk was grossly negligent or engaged in willful misconduct.

    This subsection shall not be construed to limit, withdraw, or overturn any defense or immunity already existing in statutory or common law, or to affect any cause of action accruing prior to July 1, 2005.

  8. Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit any data accessed by secure remote access to be sold or posted on any other website or in any way redistributed to any third party, and the clerk, in his discretion, may deny secure remote access to ensure compliance with these provisions. However, the data accessed by secure remote access may be included in products or services provided to a third party of the subscriber provided that (i) such data is not made available to the general public and (ii) the subscriber maintains administrative, technical, and security safeguards to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and limited availability of the data.

    (2007, cc. 548, 626; 2010, c. 430; 2011, cc. 557, 625, 689, 715; 2012, c. 234; 2013, c. 77; 2014, c. 460; 2017, cc. 78, 92; 2020, cc. 1227, 1246.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, cc. 1227 and 1246, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2021."

Acts 2020, cc. 1227 and 1246, cl. 4 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities; therefore, Chapter 854 of the Acts of Assembly of 2019 requires the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to assign a minimum fiscal impact of $50,000. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 430 added the second sentence in subsection C.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendments by cc. 557 and 689 are identical, and added subdivision E 6 [now E 7], and made a related change.

The 2011 amendment by c. 625 substituted "remote access to any person, his counsel, or staff which counsel directly supervises" for "remote access to any person and his counsel" in subdivision E 5.

The 2011 amendment by c. 715 added subdivisions E 6 and 7, and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendments by c 234 deleted "of this section" following "subsection B" in A; deleted the last sentence in subsection E 7, which read: "However, nothing herein shall be construed to permit any data accessed by secure remote access to be sold or posted on any other Internet website or in any way redistributed to any third party, and the clerk reserves the discretion to deny secure remote access to ensure compliance with these provisions"; and added subsection H.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 77 inserted "to nonconfidential court records" in subdivision E 7; and inserted "clerk" in subsection F.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 460 in subdivision E 4 substituted "that are more than 100 years old" for "prior to 1907."

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendments by cc. 78 and 92 are identical, and added "including online access to subscribers of nonconfidential criminal case information to confirm the complete date of birth of a defendant" at the end of subsection F.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendments by cc. 1227 and 1246, effective January 1, 2021, are identical, and in the first sentence of subsection A, inserted "or other documents issued under Chapter 3 ( § 46.2-300 et seq.) of Title 46.2 or the comparable law of another jurisdiction," and made a stylistic change.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Authorization for access to automated case management system. - A local governing body may not mandate that individuals not employed by the clerk be granted access to a case management system without the clerk's authorization. See opinion of Attorney General to the Honorable Terry G. Kilgore, Member, House of Delegates, 13-047, 2013 Va. AG LEXIS 72 (8/20/13).

§ 17.1-293.1. (For contingent expiration date see cc. 524 and 542) Online case information system.

The Executive Secretary shall make available a publicly viewable online case information system of certain nonconfidential information entered into the case management system for criminal cases in the circuit courts participating in the Executive Secretary's case management system and in the general district courts. Such system shall be searchable by defendant name across all participating courts, and search results shall be viewable free of charge.

(2018, cc. 127, 584.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until amendments by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542 become effective. For the version of this section as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-293.1 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2018, cc. 127 and 584, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 17.1-293.1 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall become effective on July 1, 2019."

§ 17.1-293.1. (For contingent effective date see cc. 524 and 542) Online case information system; exceptions.

  1. The Executive Secretary shall make available a publicly viewable online case information system of certain nonconfidential information entered into the case management system for criminal cases in the circuit courts participating in the Executive Secretary's case management system and in the general district courts. Such system shall be searchable by defendant name across all participating courts, and search results shall be viewable free of charge.
  2. Upon entry of a sealing order pursuant to § 19.2-392.7, 19.2-392.8, 19.2-392.9, 19.2-392.11, or 19.2-392.12, the Executive Secretary shall not make any offense that was ordered to be sealed available for online public viewing in an appellate court, circuit court, or district court case management system maintained by the Executive Secretary.
  3. Upon entry of a sealing order pursuant to § 19.2-392.7, 19.2-392.8, 19.2-392.9, 19.2-392.11, or 19.2-392.12, any circuit court clerk who maintains a viewable online case management or case information system shall not make any offense that was ordered to be sealed available for online public viewing.

    (2018, cc. 127, 584; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 524.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is set out as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542. For the version of this section effective until Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542, become effective, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-293.1 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2018, cc. 127 and 584, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 17.1-293.1 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall become effective on July 1, 2019."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542, cl. 4 provides: "That the provisions of §§ 9.1-101 , 9.1-128 , 9.1-134 , 17.1-293.1 , 17.1-502 , 19.2-310.7, and 19.2-389.3 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, and Chapter 23.2 ( § 19.2-392.5 et seq.) of Title 19.2 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall become effective on the earlier of (i) the first day of the fourth month following notification of the Chair of the Virginia Code Commission and the Chairs of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee for Courts of Justice by the Superintendent of State Police that the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Department of State Police, and any circuit court clerk who maintains a case management system that interfaces with the Department of State Police under subsection B1 of § 17.1-502 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, have automated systems to exchange information as required by §§ 19.2-392.7, 19.2-392.10, 19.2-392.11, and 19.2-392.12 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, or (ii) July 1, 2025."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542, cl. 17 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities; therefore, Chapter 1289 of the Acts of Assembly of 2020 requires the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to assign a minimum fiscal impact of $50,000. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendments by Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542, are identical, and added the subsection A designation; and added subsections B and C. For contingent effective date, see note.

§ 17.1-294. Secure remote access to land records.

  1. No circuit court clerk shall provide secure remote access to any land record that does not comply with the provisions of this section and the secure remote access standards developed by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency in consultation with the circuit court clerks, the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court, the Compensation Board, and users of land and other court records.
    1. Beginning July 1, 2012, any land record made available to subscribers via secure remote access may contain only the last four digits of the social security number of any party. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require the clerk to reinsert the last four digits of a social security number on any land record where the redaction of the entire social security number has been completed prior to July 1, 2012. B. 1.  Beginning July 1, 2012, any land record made available to subscribers via secure remote access may contain only the last four digits of the social security number of any party. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require the clerk to reinsert the last four digits of a social security number on any land record where the redaction of the entire social security number has been completed prior to July 1, 2012.
    2. However, the original land record maintained by the clerk may contain a social security number if otherwise provided by law, but that original record shall not be made available via secure remote access unless it complies with this section.
    3. Except in cases where the original record is required by law to contain a social security number, the attorney or party who prepares or submits the land record for recordation has the responsibility for ensuring that the social security number has been removed from the writing prior to the instrument's being submitted for recordation.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit access to any original document as provided by law.
  3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit any data accessed by secure remote access to be sold or posted on any other website or in any way redistributed to any third party, and the clerk, in his discretion, may deny secure remote access to ensure compliance with these provisions. However, the data accessed by secure remote access may be included in products or services provided to a third party of the subscriber provided that (i) such data is not made available to the general public and (ii) the subscriber maintains administrative, technical, and security safeguards to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and limited availability of the data.
  4. The clerk of the circuit court of any jurisdiction shall be immune from suit arising from any acts or omissions relating to providing secure remote access to land records pursuant to this section unless the clerk was grossly negligent or engaged in willful misconduct.

    (2007, cc. 548, 626; 2009, c. 312; 2011, c. 715; 2012, c. 234.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2007, cc. 548 and 626, cl. 2 provides: "That any clerk of a circuit court shall have the authority to redact social security numbers from any land record made available via secure remote access pursuant to § 17.1-294 of the Code of Virginia, and that this is declarative of existing law."

Acts 2007, cc. 548 and 626, cl. 3 provides: "That any clerk of a circuit court may engage a vendor to redact social security numbers from all land records made available via secure remote access pursuant to § 17.1-294 of the Code of Virginia, using a software redaction system, for records beginning January 1, 1935, to the date of redaction, and that the redaction shall be completed on or before July 1, 2010."

Acts 2007, cc. 548 and 626, cl. 4 provides: "That the provisions of subdivision B 1 of § 17.1-294 of the Code of Virginia of this act shall not become effective unless an appropriation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in a general appropriation act passed by the 2007 Session of the General Assembly, which becomes law." No funds were appropriated.

Subdivision B 1 of § 17.1-294 as enacted by Acts 2007, cc. 548 and 626, were not given effect pursuant to Acts 2007, cc. 548 and 626, cl. 4. The remaining subdivisions in subsection B were renumbered at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission. If the funding had been provided, subdivision B 1 would have read: "Beginning July 1, 2010, any land record made available to subscribers via secure remote access shall not contain the social security number of any party."

Acts 2009, c. 312, cl. 2 provides: "That any clerk of a circuit court may engage a vendor to redact social security numbers from all land records made available via secure remote access pursuant to § 17.1-294 of the Code of Virginia, using a software redaction system, for records beginning January 1, 1935, to the date of redaction, and that the redaction shall be completed on or before July 1, 2012."

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendment by c. 312 added subdivision B 1, redesignated former subdivisions B 1 and B 2 as subdivisions B 2 and B 3, respectively, and in subdivision B 2, inserted "however" at the beginning.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 715 added the last sentence in subdivision B 1.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 234 inserted subsection D and redesignated former subsection D as subsection E.

§ 17.1-295. Definitions.

As used in this title:

"Confidential court records" means any civil or criminal record maintained by a clerk of the circuit court designated by this Code as confidential or any such record sealed pursuant to court order.

"Electronic filing of court records" means the networks or systems maintained by a clerk of the circuit court, or the clerk's designated application service providers, for the submittal of instruments for electronic filing of court records in accordance with this title, the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, and the secure remote access standards developed by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency.

"Electronic recording of land records" means the networks or systems maintained by a clerk of the circuit court, or the clerk's designated application service providers, for the submittal of instruments for electronic filing of land records in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 (§ 55.1-346 et seq.) of Chapter 3 of Title 55.1 regarding the satisfaction of mortgages, the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act (§ 55.1-661 et seq.), and the provisions of this title.

"Operational expenses" means expenses of the clerk of court used to maintain the clerk's office and includes, but is not limited to, (i) computer support, maintenance, enhancements, upgrades, and replacements and office automation and information technology equipment, including software and conversion services; (ii) preserving, maintaining, and enhancing court records, including, but not limited to, the costs of repairs, maintenance, consulting services, service contracts, redaction of social security numbers from certain records, and system replacements or upgrades; and (iii) improving public access to records maintained by the clerk, including locating technology in an offsite facility for such purposes or for implementation of a disaster recovery plan.

"Public access" means that the clerk of the circuit court has made available to subscribers that are other than governmental agencies, secure remote access to records maintained by the clerk in accordance with § 17.1-294 .

"Secure remote access to court records" means public access by electronic means on a network or system to court records maintained by the clerk of the circuit court or the clerk's designated application service providers, in compliance with this title, the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, and the secure remote access standards developed by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency.

"Secure remote access to land records" means public access by electronic means on a network or system to land records maintained by the clerk of the circuit court or the clerk's designated application service providers, in compliance with the Secure Remote Access Standards developed by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency.

"Subscriber" means any person who has entered into a subscriber agreement with the clerk of the circuit court authorizing the subscriber to have secure remote access to land records or secure remote access to court records maintained by the clerk or the clerk's designated application service providers. If the subscriber is an entity with more than one person who will use the network or system to access land records maintained by the clerk, or the clerk's designated application service providers, each individual user shall execute a subscriber agreement and obtain a separate "user id" and "password" from the clerk. The subscriber is responsible for the fees due under this title and the proper use of the secure remote access system pursuant to the subscriber agreement, applicable Virginia law, and Secure Remote Access Standards developed by the Virginia Information Technologies Agency.

(2008, cc. 823, 833; 2013, cc. 77, 263, 422; 2017, cc. 78, 92.)

Editor's note. - To conform to the recodification of Title 55 by Acts 2019, c. 712, effective October 1, 2019, the following substitution was made at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission: substituted "the provisions of Article 3 ( § 55.1-346 et seq.) of Chapter 3 of Title 55.1 regarding the satisfaction of mortgages, the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act ( § 55.1-661 et seq.), and the provisions of this title" for "the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act ( § 55-142.10 et seq.), the provisions of Article 2.1 ( § 55-66.8 et seq.) of Chapter 4 of Title 55."

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 77 added the paragraphs defining "Confidential court records," "Electronic filing of court records," "Operational expenses," and "Secure remote access to court records"; added "and the provisions of this title" at the end of the paragraph defining "Electronic recording of land records"; inserted "or secure remote access to court records" in the first sentence of the paragraph defining "Subscriber"; and made minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

The 2013 amendment by c. 263 added the paragraph defining "Operational expenses."

The 2013 amendment by c. 422 added the paragraph defining "Operational expenses"; and inserted "or remote access to court records" in the paragraph defining "Subscriber."

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendments by cc. 78 and 92 are identical, and in the definition for "Public access," deleted "land" preceding "records maintained by"; and in the definition for "Secure remote access to court records," substituted "court records maintained by" for "land records maintained by."

Chapter 3. Supreme Court.

Composition, Jurisdiction, etc.

Compensation and Expenses; Fees.

Declaration of Judicial Emergency.

Article 1. Composition, Jurisdiction, etc.

§ 17.1-300. Composition of Court; quorum; Chief Justice.

The Supreme Court shall consist of seven justices, any four of whom convened shall constitute a quorum. The Chief Justice shall be elected by majority vote of the justices of the Supreme Court to serve a term of four years. An eligible justice may decline to serve as Chief Justice, or a Chief Justice may resign as such, without thereby relinquishing his membership on the Court as a justice thereof.

(Code 1919, § 5862, § 17-93; 1938, p. 133; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 51; 1998, c. 872; 2002, cc. 43, 552.)

Cross references. - As to appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over habeas corpus decisions, see § 17.1-406 B.

As to appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over matters concerning attorney discipline, see § 54.1-3935 D and Rules of Court, Pt. 6, § IV, para. 13-17.

As to how Supreme Court is constituted, see Va. Const., Art. VI, § 2.

As to how judges are chosen and their qualifications, see Va. Const., Art. VI, §§ 3, 7.

As to appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions of the State Corporation Commission, see Va. Const., Art. IX, § 4.

Editor's note. - Acts 2002, cc. 43 and 552, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall not apply to any Chief Justice holding such office on January 1, 2002."

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendments by cc. 42 and 552 are identical, and rewrote the second sentence, which read: "The justice longest in continuous service shall be Chief Justice and if two or more shall have so served for the same period, the justice senior in years of these shall be Chief Justice."; and deleted the former last sentence which read: "In either event the Chief Justice shall be the justice who would next succeed to the office." For applicability, see Editor's note.

Research References. - Friend's Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 1. Courts. § 1.01 The Court System, et seq. Friend.

§ 17.1-301. Presiding justice when Chief Justice absent.

In the absence of the Chief Justice, the justice longest in continuous service present shall be the presiding justice. If two or more justices have served for the same period, the justice senior in years of these present shall be the presiding justice.

(Code 1919, § 5863, § 17-95; 1938, p. 134; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-302. Senior justice.

  1. Any Chief Justice or justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia who is eligible for retirement, other than for disability, with the prior consent of a majority of the members of the Court, may elect to retire under the Judicial Retirement System (§ 51.1-300 et seq.) and be designated a senior justice. In addition, any Chief Justice or justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia who is retired under the Judicial Retirement System (§ 51.1-300 et seq.) shall be subject to recall, with the consent of a majority of the members of the court, and may be known and designated as a senior justice.
  2. Any Chief Justice or justice who has retired from active service, as provided in subsection A, may be designated and assigned by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia to perform the duties of a justice of the Court. Such justice shall have all the powers, duties, and privileges attendant on the position for which he is recalled to serve.
  3. While serving in such status, a senior justice shall be deemed to be serving in a temporary capacity and, in addition to the retirement benefits received by such justice, shall receive as compensation a sum equal to one-fourth of the total compensation of an active justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia for a similar period of service. A retired justice, while performing the duties of a senior justice, shall be furnished office space, support staff, a telephone, and supplies as are furnished a justice of the Court.
  4. A justice may terminate his status as a senior justice, or such status may be terminated by a majority of the members of the Court. Each justice designated a senior justice shall serve a one-year term unless the Court, by order or otherwise, extends the term for an additional year. There shall be no limit on the number of terms a senior justice may so serve.
  5. Only five retired justices shall serve as senior justices at any one time.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to increase the number of justices of the Supreme Court provided for in Section 2 of Article VI of the Constitution of Virginia and in § 17.1-300 . (1977, c. 251, § 17-95.1; 1990, c. 897; 1998, cc. 190, 872; 2001, c. 295; 2004, c. 346; 2014, c. 776; 2018, c. 709.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2018, c. 709, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2019."

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 295 substituted "support staff" for "a secretary" in subsection C.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 346 added the last sentence in subsection A.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 776, effective April 23, 2014, in subsection A inserted "under the Judicial Retirement System ( § 51.1-300 et seq.)" twice.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 709, effective July 1, 2019, in subsection A, substituted "shall be subject to recall, with" for "and subject to recall pursuant § 17.1-106 , with" and inserted "and" preceding "may be known"; and in subsection B, added the second sentence.

Applied in Hitt Constr. v. Pratt, 53 Va. App. 422, 672 S.E.2d 904 (2009); Layne v. Crist Elec. Contr., Inc., 62 Va. App. 632, 751 S.E.2d 679 (2013).

§ 17.1-303. Election of successor justice before date of vacancy.

Whenever a vacancy occurs or exists in the office of a justice of the Supreme Court while the General Assembly is in session, or whenever the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court will expire or the office will be vacated at a date certain between the adjournment of the General Assembly and the commencement of the next session of the General Assembly, a successor may be elected at any time during a session preceding the date of such vacancy, by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly, for a full term and, upon qualification, the successor shall enter at once upon the discharge of the duties of the office; however, such successor shall not qualify prior to the predecessor leaving office. No person shall be elected or reelected to a subsequent term under this section until he has submitted to a criminal history record search and submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and reports of such searches have been received by the chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. If the person has not met the requirement of filing in the preceding calendar year a disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 or 30-111, he shall also provide a written statement of economic interests on the disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 to the chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

(1991, c. 31, § 17-93.1; 1998, c. 872; 2004, c. 452; 2018, c. 578.)

Editor's note. - The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary” for "House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice” twice. March 10, 2021.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 452 added the last sentence.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 578 substituted "and submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and reports of such searches have been received" for "and a report of such search has been received" in the second sentence; and added the last sentence.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judges, § 5.

§ 17.1-304. Terms and sessions, state of emergency.

  1. The Supreme Court shall hold one term annually, commencing at such time and continuing for such period as it may determine. Sessions shall be held at Richmond commencing at such times and continuing for such periods as the Court from time to time directs.
  2. In the event of a state of emergency declared by the Governor pursuant to Chapter 3.2 (§ 44-146.13 et seq.) of Title 44 or declared by the President of the United States or the governor of another state pursuant to law and confirmed by the Governor by an executive order, the Supreme Court may convene at such time, in such location, and for such purposes as the Court determines is necessary for the efficient and effective administration of justice.
  3. When the Court convenes pursuant to subsection B, the Court may satisfy its quorum by the presence of the justices through the use of technology.

    (Code 1919, § 5866, § 17-99; 1938, p. 134; 1944, p. 486; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 51; 1972, c. 856; 1998, c. 872; 2006, c. 357.)

Cross references. - As to change of place of holding sessions, see §§ 17.1-114 , 17.1-116 .

For rule of Court regulating sessions of Court, see Rule 5:2.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 357 inserted the subsection A designation and added subsections B and C.

§ 17.1-305. Special sessions.

The Supreme Court by an order entered of record, may direct a special session to be held at such time as it may deem proper.

A special session may also be held, by order of the Chief Justice in vacation, on the written request of the Governor to him, or whenever it is proper in the opinion of the Chief Justice. The time of holding the special session shall be designated in the order, which shall be directed to the clerk, who shall enter it in his record book and give notice thereof to each justice of the Court.

(Code 1919, §§ 5884, 5885, §§ 17-100, 17-101; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 51; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-306. What may be tried at special session; effect of decisions.

At any such special session, the Supreme Court, by consent of the parties or their counsel, may hear and determine any cause then ready for a hearing, or, without such consent, upon twenty days' previous notice in writing, given by a party desiring a hearing to the adverse party, of his intention to insist on the same. The Court, at such special session, shall, after notice to the parties or their counsel from the clerk of the Court, hear any cause which, in its opinion, the public interest requires to be heard and determined. Any judgment, decree or order entered or made at such special session shall have the same effect and may be reviewed and reheard in like manner and subject to the same rules as a judgment, decree or order entered or made at a regular session.

(Code 1919, § 5886, § 17-102; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 51; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-307. Information and recommendations as to other courts.

The Supreme Court, with the aid of the Executive Secretary, shall obtain the information to be contained in the reports to be made pursuant to § 17.1-221 and present the same to the next regular session of the General Assembly, and at each recurring session, together with any recommendation it sees fit to make, looking to the equalization of the work of the courts of record of this Commonwealth or any matter pertaining to the conduct of the work of the courts which may enable the General Assembly to have complete knowledge thereof.

(Code 1919, § 3405, § 17-103; 1928, p. 1121; 1938, p. 130; 1944, p. 131; 1973, c. 544; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-308. Court may sit and render final judgment en banc or in divisions; when decision becomes judgment of Court; majority must concur in declaring law unconstitutional; rehearings.

The Supreme Court may sit and render final judgment en banc or in divisions, as may be prescribed by rules of the Court not inconsistent with the provisions of this section. No decision shall become the judgment of the Court, however, except on the concurrence of at least three justices, and no law shall be declared unconstitutional under either the Constitution of Virginia or the Constitution of the United States except on the concurrence of at least a majority of all justices of the Supreme Court. If the justices composing any division differ as to the judgment to be rendered in any cause or if any justice of such division, within a time and in a manner to be fixed by the rules of the Court, shall certify that in his opinion any decision of such division of the Court is in conflict with a prior decision of the Court, or of one of the divisions thereof, the case shall be reheard and decided by the Court sitting en banc.

(Code 1919, § 5862, § 17-94; 1938, p. 133; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 51; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - For constitutional provision, see Va. Const., Art. VI, §§ 1, 6.

For rule of court carrying out the provision of this section concerning sitting en banc or division, see Rule 5:3.

Law review. - For article, "Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia?" see 57 Va. L. Rev. 3 (1971).

§ 17.1-309. (Effective until January 1, 2022) Jurisdiction of writs of mandamus and prohibition.

The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition to the circuit and district courts and to the State Corporation Commission and in all other cases in which such writs, respectively, would lie according to the principles of the common law. Provided that no writ of mandamus, prohibition or any other summary process whatever shall issue in any case of the collection of revenue or attempt to collect the same, or to compel the collecting officers to receive anything in payment of taxes except such money as is legal tender for the payment of revenue, or in any case arising out of the collection of revenue in which the applicant for the writ of process has any other remedy adequate for the protection and enforcement of his individual right, claim and demand, if just.

(Code 1919, § 5864, § 17-96; 1998, c. 872.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective January 1, 2022, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-309 .

Cross references. - As to writs of mandamus and prohibition generally, see §§ 8.01-644 through 8.01-653 .

For rule of court concerning original jurisdiction, see Rule 5:7.

Law review. - For note on the use of mandamus in judicial proceedings in Virginia, see 40 Va. L. Rev. 817 (1954). For article, "Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia?" see 57 Va. L. Rev. 3 (1971). For comment, "Prohibition: The Elusive and Misunderstood Writ," see 16 U. Rich. L. Rev. 693 (1982).

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 6-1201. Petition for Writ of Mandamus Against Officer of a Corporation, et seq.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 12B M.J. Mandamus, § 24; 15 M.J. Prohibition, § 3.

Editor's note. - Most of the cases cited below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

This section gives effect to constitutional provision. - The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in mandamus cases, provided in former § 88 (see now Va. Const., Art. VI, § 1) of the Constitution of Virginia, is carried into effect by this section. Miller v. Ayres, 211 Va. 69 , 175 S.E.2d 253 (1970).

Provisions of Constitution as to mandamus and prohibition not self-executing. - The provisions of former § 88 (see now Va. Const., Art. VI, § 1) of the Constitution of Virginia providing for the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in mandamus and prohibition cases, whether original or appellate, are not self-executing but require, to be carried into effect, an act of the legislature. Price v. Smith, 93 Va. 14 , 24 S.E. 474 (1896).

Jurisdiction coextensive with that exercised at common law. - The jurisdiction which the Supreme Court exercises, under this section in the matter of mandamus, is coextensive with that exercised at common law by the court of King's Bench in England. Harrison v. Barksdale, 127 Va. 180 , 102 S.E. 789 (1920).

Exercise of jurisdiction not discretionary. - The exercise of its jurisdiction in mandamus cases is no more left to the discretion of the Court than is the exercise of its jurisdiction generally. Clay v. Ballard, 87 Va. 787 , 13 S.E. 262 (1891).

Mandamus lies only to compel the performance of ministerial acts or duties and not to compel the performance of discretionary acts or duties. City of Richmond v. Hayes, 212 Va. 428 , 184 S.E.2d 784 (1971).

A ministerial act is an act that one performs in obedience to a legal mandate and in a prescribed manner, without regard to his own judgment as to the propriety of the act to be done. City of Richmond v. Hayes, 212 Va. 428 , 184 S.E.2d 784 (1971).

Mandamus will not issue to require a local political unit to exercise its discretionary legislative function in levying taxes and appropriating funds for the maintenance of public schools. Griffin v. Board of Supvrs., 203 Va. 321 , 124 S.E.2d 227 (1962).

Mandamus awarded to allow inspection of poll books. - The Court has jurisdiction to award mandamus to compel a clerk, who is the custodian of the poll books after election, to permit a party interested to inspect them, and to take memoranda and notes therefrom. Keller v. Stone, 96 Va. 667 , 32 S.E. 454 (1899).

Mandamus to require Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner to condemn land. - The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could not be invoked to issue a writ of mandamus to require the State Highway Commissioner to condemn land which he believed already to be property of the State. A declaratory judgment proceeding is an adequate means for determining the ownership of such land. Gilliam v. Harris, 203 Va. 316 , 124 S.E.2d 188 (1962).

Applied in In re Horan, 271 Va. 258 , 634 S.E.2d 675, 2006 Va. LEXIS 23 (2006).

§ 17.1-309. (Effective January 1, 2022) Jurisdiction of writs of mandamus and prohibition.

The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition to the circuit and district courts, the Court of Appeals, and to the State Corporation Commission and in all other cases in which such writs, respectively, would lie according to the principles of the common law. Provided that no writ of mandamus, prohibition or any other summary process whatever shall issue in any case of the collection of revenue or attempt to collect the same, or to compel the collecting officers to receive anything in payment of taxes except such money as is legal tender for the payment of revenue, or in any case arising out of the collection of revenue in which the applicant for the writ of process has any other remedy adequate for the protection and enforcement of his individual right, claim and demand, if just.

(Code 1919, § 5864, § 17-96; 1998, c. 872; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until January 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-309 .

Cross references. - As to writs of mandamus and prohibition generally, see §§ 8.01-644 through 8.01-653 .

For rule of court concerning original jurisdiction, see Rule 5:7.

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, inserted "the Court of Appeals."

Law review. - For note on the use of mandamus in judicial proceedings in Virginia, see 40 Va. L. Rev. 817 (1954). For article, "Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia?" see 57 Va. L. Rev. 3 (1971). For comment, "Prohibition: The Elusive and Misunderstood Writ," see 16 U. Rich. L. Rev. 693 (1982).

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 6-1201. Petition for Writ of Mandamus Against Officer of a Corporation, et seq.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 12B M.J. Mandamus, § 24; 15 M.J. Prohibition, § 3.

Editor's note. - Most of the cases cited below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

This section gives effect to constitutional provision. - The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in mandamus cases, provided in former § 88 (see now Va. Const., Art. VI, § 1) of the Constitution of Virginia, is carried into effect by this section. Miller v. Ayres, 211 Va. 69 , 175 S.E.2d 253 (1970).

Provisions of Constitution as to mandamus and prohibition not self-executing. - The provisions of former § 88 (see now Va. Const., Art. VI, § 1) of the Constitution of Virginia providing for the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in mandamus and prohibition cases, whether original or appellate, are not self-executing but require, to be carried into effect, an act of the legislature. Price v. Smith, 93 Va. 14 , 24 S.E. 474 (1896).

Jurisdiction coextensive with that exercised at common law. - The jurisdiction which the Supreme Court exercises, under this section in the matter of mandamus, is coextensive with that exercised at common law by the court of King's Bench in England. Harrison v. Barksdale, 127 Va. 180 , 102 S.E. 789 (1920).

Exercise of jurisdiction not discretionary. - The exercise of its jurisdiction in mandamus cases is no more left to the discretion of the Court than is the exercise of its jurisdiction generally. Clay v. Ballard, 87 Va. 787 , 13 S.E. 262 (1891).

Mandamus lies only to compel the performance of ministerial acts or duties and not to compel the performance of discretionary acts or duties. City of Richmond v. Hayes, 212 Va. 428 , 184 S.E.2d 784 (1971).

A ministerial act is an act that one performs in obedience to a legal mandate and in a prescribed manner, without regard to his own judgment as to the propriety of the act to be done. City of Richmond v. Hayes, 212 Va. 428 , 184 S.E.2d 784 (1971).

Mandamus will not issue to require a local political unit to exercise its discretionary legislative function in levying taxes and appropriating funds for the maintenance of public schools. Griffin v. Board of Supvrs., 203 Va. 321 , 124 S.E.2d 227 (1962).

Mandamus awarded to allow inspection of poll books. - The Court has jurisdiction to award mandamus to compel a clerk, who is the custodian of the poll books after election, to permit a party interested to inspect them, and to take memoranda and notes therefrom. Keller v. Stone, 96 Va. 667 , 32 S.E. 454 (1899).

Mandamus to require Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner to condemn land. - The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could not be invoked to issue a writ of mandamus to require the State Highway Commissioner to condemn land which he believed already to be property of the State. A declaratory judgment proceeding is an adequate means for determining the ownership of such land. Gilliam v. Harris, 203 Va. 316 , 124 S.E.2d 188 (1962).

Applied in In re Horan, 271 Va. 258 , 634 S.E.2d 675, 2006 Va. LEXIS 23 (2006).

§ 17.1-310. Habeas corpus, appeals, writs of error and supersedeas.

The Supreme Court shall also have jurisdiction to award writs of habeas corpus and of such appeals, writs of error and supersedeas as may be legally docketed in or transferred to the Court.

(Code 1919, § 5865, § 17-97; 1995, c. 503; 1998, c. 872; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344, 345.)

Cross references. - For statutes relating to rule making power of Supreme Court, see §§ 8.01-3 , 54.1-3909 et seq.

As to appeals generally, see §§ 8.01-669 through 8.01-688 .

For rule concerning applications for writs, see Rule 5:7.

Editor's note. - Former § 17.1-313 , pertaining to review of death sentences, derived from 1977, c. 492, §§ 7-110.1, 17-110.2; 1983, c. 519; 1995, c. 503; 1998, c. 872.

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 3 provides: "That any person under a sentence of death imposed for an offense committed prior to July 1, 2021, but who has not been executed by July 1, 2021, shall have his sentence changed to life imprisonment, and such person who was 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense shall not be eligible for (i) parole, (ii) any good conduct allowance or any earned sentence credits under Chapter 6 ( § 53.1-186 et seq.) of Title 53.1 of the Code of Virginia, or (iii) conditional release pursuant to § 53.1-40.01 or 53.1-40.02 of the Code of Virginia."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 4 provides: "That notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person may be sentenced to death or put to death on or after the effective date of this act [July 1, 2021] for any violation of law."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 5 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation is $77,376 for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities and $0 for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendments by Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, effective July 1, 2021, are identical, and deleted the second sentence, which read: "In accordance with § 8.01-654 , the Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to award writs of habeas corpus upon petitions filed by prisoners held under the sentence of death."

Law review. - For article, "Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia?" see 57 Va. L. Rev. 3 (1971). For survey of Virginia criminal procedure for the year 1975-1976, see 62 Va. L. Rev. 1412 (1976). For article, "Civil Rights and 'Personal Injuries': Virginia's Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 Suits," see 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 199 (1985).

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 6-1301. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to Test Legality of Detention.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 9A M.J. Habeas Corpus, §§ 18, 25.

Editor's note. - The cases cited below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus. However, only the circuit court which entered the original judgment order of conviction may issue a writ for one held under criminal process. The Supreme Court's grant of original jurisdiction in habeas corpus matters is not subject to this limitation. However, the Court of Appeal's grant of jurisdiction in these matters is limited. Bullock v. Director of Dep't of Cors., 1 Va. App. 70, 334 S.E.2d 150, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1023, 106 S. Ct. 576, 88 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1985).

The Supreme Court was given original, but not exclusive jurisdiction, over habeas corpus petitions by former § 88 (see now Va. Const., Art. VI, § 1) of the Constitution of Virginia, Rule 5:5 of the Rules of Court and this section. Creasy v. McConnell, 262 F. Supp. 697 (W.D. Va. 1966).

While the Supreme Court now has original jurisdiction to award the writ of habeas corpus, this does not mean exclusive jurisdiction. Hall v. Verdel, 40 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Va. 1941).

Constitutional provision in regard to habeas corpus not self-executing. - Former § 88 (see now Va. Const., Art. VI, § 1) of the Virginia Constitution which provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, except in cases of habeas corpus, etc., does not, proprio vigore, confer jurisdiction on it in these cases. The exception simply invests the court with capacity to receive original jurisdiction in that class of cases in the event the legislature shall see fit to confer the jurisdiction. Prison Ass'n v. Ashby, 93 Va. 667 , 25 S.E. 893 (1896).

The doctrine of res judicata does not limit the availability of habeas corpus in Virginia. Ferguson v. Cox, 464 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1972).

Court has jurisdiction to grant writ of habeas corpus to determine validity of statute. - The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus to determine the validity of the statute and procedure under which a person was adjudged insane and committed to an institution. Hall v. Verdel, 40 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Va. 1941).

§ 17.1-311. Where prohibition and mandamus issued and tried.

Writs of prohibition or mandamus from the Supreme Court shall issue and be tried at any place of session of the Court.

(Code 1919, § 5872, § 17-98; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - For rule of Court on writs of habeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus, see Rule 5:7.

Law review. - For comment, "Prohibition: The Elusive and Misunderstood Writ," see 16 U. Rich. L. Rev. 693 (1982).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 15 M.J. Prohibition, § 3.

§ 17.1-312. Where criminal jurisdiction exercised.

The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in any criminal case may be exercised at any place of session, no matter where the court may have been held which rendered the judgment in such case.

(Code 1919, § 5870, § 17-110; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-313.

Repealed by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 2, effective July 1, 2021.

Editor's note. - Former § 17.1-313 , which pertained to review of death sentences, derived from 1977, c. 492, §§ 17-110.1, 17-110.2; 1983, c. 519; 1995, c. 503; 1998, c. 872.

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 3 provides: "That any person under a sentence of death imposed for an offense committed prior to July 1, 2021, but who has not been executed by July 1, 2021, shall have his sentence changed to life imprisonment, and such person who was 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense shall not be eligible for (i) parole, (ii) any good conduct allowance or any earned sentence credits under Chapter 6 ( § 53.1-186 et seq.) of Title 53.1 of the Code of Virginia, or (iii) conditional release pursuant to § 53.1-40.01 or 53.1-40.02 of the Code of Virginia."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 4 provides: "That notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person may be sentenced to death or put to death on or after the effective date of this act [July 1, 2021] for any violation of law."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 5 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation is $77,376 for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities and $0 for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

§ 17.1-314. Executive Secretary.

The Office of Executive Secretary to the Supreme Court, to be filled by a person having the qualifications as may be prescribed by the justices of the Supreme Court, is hereby created to be the court administrator for the Commonwealth. He shall be appointed by the Supreme Court, shall hold office at the pleasure of the Court, and during his term of office shall not engage in the private practice of law. He shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by the Court. He may, with the approval of the Court, employ such persons as are necessary for the performance of the duties of his office, whose compensation shall be fixed by the Court within the limits of the amounts appropriated by law.

(1952, c. 506, § 17-111.1; 1966, c. 148; 1973, c. 544; 1998, c. 872; 2005, c. 237.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 237 substituted "as may be prescribed by the justices of the Supreme Court" for "required of a judge of a court of record" in the first sentence.

Law review. - For article, "Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia?" see 57 Va. L. Rev. 3 (1971).

§ 17.1-315. Duties of Executive Secretary.

The Executive Secretary to the Supreme Court shall have the following duties:

  1. He shall be the Secretary of the Judicial Council;
  2. He shall be the Secretary of the Judicial Conference;
  3. He shall assist the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court in the administration of the judicial branch of the government to the end that litigation may be expedited and the administration of justice improved in the courts of the Commonwealth; and
  4. He shall have such other duties as may be required of him by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court in the performance of the administrative functions of that Court.

    (1952, c. 506, § 17-111.2; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - For provisions relating to the Judicial Council, see §§ 17.1-700 through 17.1-705 .

For provisions relating to the Judicial Conference of Virginia, see §§ 17.1-706 through 17.1-709 .

As to evaluation of specialty dockets, see § 18.2-254.2 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2010, cc. 426 and 467, cl. 1 provides: " § 1. That the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall, on an annual basis, consult with the appropriate judicial authorities of adjacent states, and may consult with the appropriate judicial authorities of any other state, concerning the forms used in connection with the issuance of protective orders under the laws of the other states and pursuant to Title 16.1, § 20-103 , or Chapter 9.1 ( § 19.2-152.8 et seq.) of Title 19.2 of the Code of Virginia. The Executive Secretary shall, to the extent feasible under the laws of the Commonwealth, coordinate the contents of such protective order forms with other states in order to facilitate the enforcement of foreign protective orders in the Commonwealth and the enforcement of Virginia protective orders in other states."

Acts Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 36 D, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia shall encourage training of Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court judges regarding the options available for court-ordered services for families in truancy cases prior to the initiation of other remedies."

§ 17.1-316. Printing and binding reports of Supreme Court.

When notified by the reporter of the Supreme Court that he has sufficient copy to issue a volume of the Virginia Reports, or a substantial part thereof, the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia shall order the printing of such copy. The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia shall order sufficient copies for distribution as set forth in § 17.1-319 and for sale to the public.

All reports sold by authority of this section shall be sold at a price per volume fixed by the Executive Secretary, said price to be reasonable and sufficient to cover the cost of printing, binding, mailing and handling. The receipts from such sales shall be paid into the state treasury and credited as revenue to a special fund for use by the Supreme Court. The Executive Secretary may arrange for quantity, volume sales to book dealers or publishers for resale and on such quantity sales he may allow a reasonable discount; but the Executive Secretary may limit such sales whenever such sales would reduce the stock below a reasonable number of volumes to be held for sale to individuals for their own use.

(1980, c. 615, § 17-111.3; 1983, c. 588; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-317. Printing and distribution of advance sheets of such reports.

  1. In addition to the copies authorized to be printed and bound under § 17.1-316 , the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia may have printed, for sale as advance sheets, a number of copies of each such report sufficient to fill orders received for advance sheets. He shall fix the price for advance sheets in an amount to cover the cost of printing, mailing and handling. All the funds collected from the sale of advance sheets shall be paid into the state treasury and reported to the Comptroller for credit to the general fund of the Commonwealth.
  2. The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia may also have printed as advance sheets a number of copies of each such report sufficient to furnish one copy of each such report to the following for their use and the use of their successors in office:
    1. The Clerk of the Supreme Court;
    2. The reporter of the Supreme Court;
    3. The judges of each court of record of this Commonwealth;
    4. The Division of Legislative Services;
    5. The Secretary of the Virginia State Bar;
    6. Each justice of the Supreme Court;
    7. The members of the State Corporation Commission;
    8. Each judge of a general district court and each judge of a juvenile and domestic relations district court and such district courts as shall be designated by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia not to exceed 250 copies;
    9. The Attorney General, his deputies and assistants upon written application to the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia; and
    10. Any member of the General Assembly upon written application to the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

      (1980, c. 615, § 17-111.4; 1990, c. 731; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-318.

Repealed by Acts 2003, c. 280, cl. 2.

Cross references. - For duty of Virginia Code Commission to publish rules adopted by the Supreme Court, see § 8.01-3 .

§ 17.1-319. Custody and distribution of reports of Supreme Court; Court of Appeals.

  1. The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia shall be charged with the custody, disposal and sale of the published reports of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. One copy of each volume of the reports hereafter published shall be furnished either in print or in electronic format to each of the following for their use and the use of their successors in office:
    1. The Clerk and the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court;
    2. The reporter of the Supreme Court;
    3. The judges and retired judges of each circuit court of this Commonwealth;
    4. The clerk of each such court;
    5. Each judge of a general district court and each judge of a juvenile and domestic relations district court, and such district courts as shall be designated by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia not to exceed 250 copies;
    6. The Clerk of the House of Delegates;
    7. The Clerk of the Senate;
    8. The Division of Legislative Services;
    9. The Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission;
    10. The Secretary of the Virginia State Bar;
    11. The clerk of each of the district courts of the United States held in this Commonwealth for the use of the courts and the members of the bar practicing therein;
    12. The attorney for the Commonwealth in counties and cities, and the county attorney in those counties which created the office of the county attorney;
    13. The Attorney General, his deputies and assistants upon written application to the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
  2. Two copies of each volume of the reports hereafter published shall be furnished to each of the justices of the Supreme Court, to each of the judges of the Court of Appeals and to each of the members of the State Corporation Commission for their use and for the use of their successors in office, except that each justice, judge or member shall be entitled to retain for personal use one copy of each volume in which appear any opinions authored by him. Eight copies of each volume of the reports hereafter published shall be furnished to each institution of higher education in the Commonwealth in which a law school approved by the American Bar Association is established. Fifteen copies of each such volume shall be placed in the State Law Library at Richmond.
  3. He shall place in the Law Library at Richmond such additional copies of all of the decisions of the Supreme Court as are available, so as to make up 15 complete sets of the Virginia Reports for the justices' private offices, conference rooms and the Law Library.

    (1980, c. 615, § 17-111.6; 1984, c. 703; 1990, c. 739; 1998, c. 872; 2003, c. 141.)

Editor's note. - At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, "institution of higher education" was substituted for "university and college" in subsection B to conform to Acts 2016, c. 588.

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 141 inserted "either in print or in electronic format" in subsection A; and substituted "15" for "fifteen" in subsection C.

§ 17.1-320. Furnishing reports to law libraries destroyed by fire.

The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia is authorized and directed to furnish to the law school of any institution of higher education in the Commonwealth whose law library has been destroyed by fire, out of any surplus copies on hand and available for such distribution, eight copies of each volume of the Virginia Reports, or so many thereof as may be necessary to replace copies of such volumes which have been destroyed by such fire.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia to purchase any such copies for distribution hereunder.

(1980, c. 615, § 17-111.7; 1998, c. 872.)

Editor's note. - At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, "institution of higher education" was substituted for "university or incorporated college" in the first paragraph to conform to Acts 2016, c. 588.

§ 17.1-321. Reporter of Court; his appointment and salary.

The Supreme Court shall have authority to contract with some suitable person to report such of its decisions as the Court shall direct, at such compensation as may be appropriated by law for the purpose, payable in monthly installments.

The Court may at any time put an end to such contract and contract with another person for performing the service, upon the same terms.

(Code 1919, §§ 5879 and 5882, §§ 17-113, 17-114; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - As to the salary of the Reporter, see § 17.1-326 .

§ 17.1-322. Duties.

The Reporter shall prepare and deliver from time to time to such printer as the Comptroller may direct manuscript reports of such decisions of the Court as the judges thereof shall direct, with an abstract of the points decided in each case and an index to the contents of the volume, a table of cases reported, a table of cases cited and a table of Virginia statutes cited and construed in the volume. The Reporter shall examine and correct the proof sheets thereof as they shall be furnished him by the printer.

(Code 1919, §§ 5880, 5881, § 17-115; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-323. Clerk to deliver opinions to Reporter.

In those cases which the Reporter is directed to report, copies of the reasons stated in writing, under Section 6 of Article VI of the Constitution of Virginia, shall be delivered by the clerk of the Court to the Reporter.

(Code 1919, § 5883, § 17-116; 1938, p. 134; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 1; 1998, c. 872.)

Article 2. Compensation and Expenses; Fees.

§ 17.1-324. Justices of Supreme Court.

The justices of the Supreme Court shall receive such salaries as shall be fixed from time to time in the general appropriation act.

(Code 1950, § 14-38; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-29; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 156; 1972, c. 856; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judges, § 10.

§ 17.1-325. Clerk and deputy clerks of Supreme Court.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court and the deputy clerks of the Court shall each receive an annual salary, as fixed by the Court. The salaries prescribed in this section for the Clerk and deputy clerks of the Supreme Court shall be the entire compensation for all services rendered by them, respectively, and shall be in lieu of any and all fees and other emoluments of their offices, prescribed by any other statutes or acts. A reasonable sum as approved by the Court, shall be allowed for the necessary expenses of maintaining the offices of the Clerk.

Nothing herein contained, however, shall be construed to lessen or eliminate the authority of the General Assembly to fix and determine such salaries.

(Code 1950, § 14-39; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-30; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 156; 1972, c. 856; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-326. Reporter of Supreme Court.

The reporter of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual salary as fixed by the Court.

Nothing herein contained, however, shall be construed to lessen or eliminate the authority of the General Assembly to fix and determine such salary.

(Code 1950, § 14-41; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-32; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 156; 1972, c. 856; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-327. Payment for services of retired judges; members of the State Corporation Commission and Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission.

Any justice, judge, member of the State Corporation Commission, or member of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission who is retired under the Judicial Retirement System (§ 51.1-300 et seq.) and who is temporarily recalled to service shall be reimbursed for actual expenses incurred during such service and shall be paid a per diem of $200 for each day he actually sits, exclusive of travel time.

(1990, c. 832, § 14.1-39.1; 1998, c. 872; 1999, c. 730.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2020, c. 1289, as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 552, Item 477 P 1, effective for the biennium ending June 30, 2022, provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of § 17.1-327 , Code of Virginia, any justice, judge, member of the State Corporation Commission, or member of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission who is retired under the Judicial Retirement System and who is temporarily recalled to service shall be reimbursed for actual expenses incurred during such service and shall be paid a per diem of $250 for each day the person actually sits, exclusive of travel time."

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1A M.J. Administrative Law, § 3.

The 1999 amendment substituted "$200" for "$150."

CASE NOTES

Challenge to constitutionality of retirement system held properly dismissed. - Suit brought by four former Virginia judges for a declaration that certain provisions of the Commonwealth's judicial retirement system covering them were unconstitutional, both under the equal protection clause of Amendment Fourteen of the Federal Constitution and under the Virginia Constitution, held properly dismissed. Thompson v. Walker, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Virginia acted reasonably in setting up its recall system, whether it be obligatory or merely discretionary, for retired judges under 70 years of age. Thompson v. Walker, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Purpose of recall/retirement system. - The clear purpose of the recall/retirement system is to insure the availability of a pool of auxiliary judges so that Virginia courts can more effectively address the problem of case backlogs. This system of benefits and burdens is rationally calculated to achieve this legitimate purpose; its general structure is well within any limitations imposed by the equal protection clause. Thompson v. Walker, 583 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

This section, by giving retired judges over 70 discretion to refuse recall, strikes a sensible balance between the needs of the recall system, on the one hand, and the realities of aging, on the other. The Constitution does not forbid this eminently reasonable accommodation of conflicting concerns. Thompson v. Walker, 583 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Retired judge under 70 must serve if recalled. - The language of subsection D of former § 51-178 is plain and unmistakable. It could not be clearer: A retired judge under 70 must serve if recalled. Thompson v. Walker, 583 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Retired judge who both receives retirement benefits and appears in Virginia courts violates former § 51-179 and Canon 8(C) of the Canons of Judicial Conduct, which incorporates and interprets this section. Thompson v. Walker, 583 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (decided under former § 51-178).

Workers' Compensation Commission. - Matter was not heard before a properly constituted full Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission because only two of the three statutorily authorized commissioners decided it; because the Commission's authority is a matter of legislative prerogative, the Commission is bound by the plain meaning of the words in the Workers' Compensation Act, and § 17.1-327 , which fail to provide the authority to recall or designate a retired commissioner to serve in a review proceeding. Layne v. Crist Elec. Contr., Inc., 62 Va. App. 632, 751 S.E.2d 679 (2013).

By implication, the statute was not intended by the legislature to provide the authority for the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission to recall or designate a retired commissioner to serve on a review panel; the General Assembly has not enacted legislation authorizing retired members of the Commission to sit on the Commission or defining who is to effect the recall. Layne v. Crist Elec. Contr., Inc., 62 Va. App. 632, 751 S.E.2d 679 (2013).

§ 17.1-328. Fees charged and collected by Clerk of Supreme Court.

  1. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall charge the following fees:
    1. In every case in which a petition is presented, $50, which shall be collected at the time such petition is presented. Twenty-five dollars of each fee collected under this section shall be apportioned to the Courts Technology Fund established under § 17.1-132 .
    2. For making and certifying a copy of any record or document in the clerk's office, ten cents per 100 words or twenty-five cents per page.
    3. For verifying and certifying any record or document not actually copied by the clerk, one-half of the fee for copying and certifying, which shall not, however, be applied to the certification of a copy of the record in this court which has already been printed.
    4. For authentication of any record, document or paper under the seal of the court, fifty cents.
    5. For copying and certifying any document or paper of less than 250 words, twenty-five cents.
    6. For administering an oath and entering an order qualifying an attorney to practice in the court, two dollars and fifty cents.
    7. For certificate of such qualification under seal of the court, one dollar plus the cost of engrossing.
    8. For entering an order and licensing an attorney from another state, under the reciprocity statute, $500.
    9. For a law license certificate under seal of the court and a certificate of qualification under seal of the court, $15, which shall be apportioned to the Courts Technology Fund established under § 17.1-132 , plus the cost of engrossing.
    10. For all other services not specifically mentioned above, the same fee as would be charged by a clerk of a circuit court in similar cases.
  2. The tribunal wherein a motion to associate counsel pro hac vice and an application of an out-of-state lawyer are filed shall collect the fee specified in Rule 1A:4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and transmit such fee to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, who shall deposit such fee in the Pro Hac Vice Fund established pursuant to § 17.1-205 . (Code 1950, § 14-129; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-120; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 156; 1972, c. 856; 1977, c. 449; 1992, c. 252; 1998, c. 872; 2006, cc. 623, 718; 2007, cc. 113, 372.)

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendments by cc. 623 and 718 are identical, and substituted "$50" for "twenty-five dollars" and added the last sentence in subdivision 1; and substituted "$15" for "one dollar" and inserted "which shall be apportioned to the Courts Technology Fund established under § 17.1-132 " in subdivision 9.

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendments by cc. 113 and 372 are identical, and in the catchline inserted "and collected" following "Fees charged"; designated the provisions of the section as subsection A; inserted "as" preceding "would be charged" in subdivision A 10; and added subsection B.

§ 17.1-329. Disposition of fees of Clerk of Supreme Court.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall keep an accurate account of all fees and costs collected by him and shall make monthly deposits thereof in a depository, or depositories, approved by the State Treasurer, to the credit of the Commonwealth of Virginia. A report of each deposit shall be promptly submitted to the State Treasurer, and detailed reports thereof shall be made monthly to the State Comptroller. Except as provided in § 17.1-328 , all such fees and costs shall be credited by the Comptroller to the general fund of the state treasury.

(Code 1950, § 14-40; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-31; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 156; 1998, c. 872; 2006, cc. 623, 718.)

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendments by cc. 623 and 718 are identical, and substituted "Except as provided in § 17.1-328 , all" for "All" in the last sentence.

Article 3. Declaration of Judicial Emergency.

§ 17.1-330. Declaration of judicial emergency.

  1. A judicial emergency may be declared as provided in this section when a disaster, as defined in § 44-146.16, substantially endangers or impedes the operation of a court, the ability of persons to avail themselves of the court, or the ability of litigants or others to have access to the court or to meet schedules or time deadlines imposed by court order, rule, or statute. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or, if the Chief Justice is unavailable, the justice longest in continuous service who is available, shall have the power to declare by order a judicial emergency (i) for any court upon the request of the Governor, (ii) for the Supreme Court sua sponte, (iii) for the Court of Appeals, upon the request of the chief judge of the Court of Appeals or, if the chief judge is unavailable, the judge of the Court of Appeals longest in continuous service who is available, or (iv) for any circuit or district court upon the request of the chief judge of the affected circuit or district court or, if the chief judge is unavailable, the judge from the affected circuit or district court longest in continuous service who is available.
  2. Any order declaring a judicial emergency shall specify (i) the court or courts and facilities affected by the order; (ii) the nature of the disaster necessitating the order; (iii) the time period or duration of the judicial emergency; and (iv) any other information relevant to the suspension or restoration of court operations, including but not limited to extension of deadlines. The order shall become effective for each affected court upon the date set forth in the order or, if no date is set forth in the order, upon the date the order is signed.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an order declaring a judicial emergency may designate a neighboring city or county not affected by the disaster for the temporary relocation of the affected circuit or district court. Locations designated under this section may be outside the geographical limits of the affected court's circuit or district.

    If an affected circuit or district court conducts sessions in a city or county not affected by the disaster pursuant to this section, the unaffected city or county shall be a proper venue for civil and criminal actions to the same extent as if the affected court were operating in its original city or county. An affected circuit court may, upon motion of either party, and for good cause shown, summon jurors from the jurisdiction where the affected circuit court has been temporarily relocated.

  4. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, such order may suspend, toll, extend, or otherwise grant relief from deadlines, time schedules, or filing requirements imposed by otherwise applicable statutes, rules, or court orders in any court processes and proceedings, including all appellate court time limitations.
  5. The duration of the order shall be for the shortest period of time necessary under the circumstances of the emergency, but in no event shall the period exceed 21 calendar days. Any such order may be extended for additional periods not to exceed 21 calendar days by a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court, and any order of extension shall include the information required by subsection B for the issuance of an initial order. In the event of a communicable disease of public health threat, as defined in § 44-146.16, a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court may extend such order for the duration of the threat.

    (2010, cc. 451, 757.)

Law review. - For article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 183 (2010).

CASE NOTES

Judicial emergency. - Order established a 55-day deadline for filing any motions relating to the protective order or attorney fees, and that deadline remained tolled until the Virginia Supreme Court entered a judicial emergency order related to the pandemic that terminated the tolling of case-related deadlines; thus, the court reversed the circuit court's denial of appellant's motion for order of production and entry of a protective order based on the timeliness of its filing. Petersen v. Robertston, No. 1026-20-2, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 112 (July 6, 2021).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Delay in commencement of trial due to pandemic. - Continuance of defendant's criminal trial was necessitated and the time period during which the court was not conducting criminal jury or bench trials due to the COVID-19 emergency was excludable because the coronavirus pandemic constituted a natural disaster, as it was a communicable disease of public health threat, and the court found that it could not protect the health and safety of the trial participants if it conducted a jury trial in the midst of the judicial emergency and pandemic. Commonwealth v. Vila, 104 Va. Cir. 389, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 39 (Fairfax County Mar. 30, 2020).

Insureds' claim against their insurer was timely filed because the Virginia Supreme Court, relying on its statutory authority, granted relief from all deadlines due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the United States Supreme Court stated that a court usually may pause the running of a limitations statute in private litigation when some extraordinary circumstance prevents the plaintiff from meeting a deadline. Brown v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,, 2021 Va. Cir. LEXIS 41 (Culpeper Mar. 11, 2021).

Spousal support proceeding tolled. - Court had jurisdiction to hear a motion for spousal support filed on the last day of the 1.5 year period for which the court reserved the issue of spousal support in the parties' final decree of divorce because the period for which spousal support was reserved was tolled from March 16, 2020, through July 19, 2020, pursuant to this section due to the COVID-19 pandemic, just under one year had passed from entry of the final decree on March 27, 2019, and just over half of a year remained once it ended, and extending the deadline for half of a year from July 20, 2020, rendered the reinstatement on October 1, 2020, timely. Heck v. Guion,, 2021 Va. Cir. LEXIS 133 (Chesapeake June 4, 2021).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Evictions during COVID-19 pandemic. - Judicial branch mechanisms that may bar evictions across Virginia during the COVID-19 pandemic include the ability to suspend, toll, or extend filing deadlines, etc., including for unlawful detainers and discretion to grant continuances. See opinion of Attorney General to Hon. Marcia S. "Cia" Price, Hon. Lashrecse Aird, Hon. Jeion A. Ward, Hon. Patrick A. Hope, Hon. Marcus B. Simon, Hon. Paul E. Krizek, Hon. Kelly K. Convirs-Fowler, Hon. Jeffrey M. Bourne, Hon. Kathy K.L. Tran, Hon. Alex Q. Askew, Hon. Chris L. Hurst, and Hon. Lee J. Carter, Members, House of Delegates, 20-033, 2020 Va. AG LEXIS 26 (7/15/20).

§ 17.1-331. Notice.

Any order declaring a judicial emergency shall be recorded in the order book maintained by the clerk of the Supreme Court, and notice shall be provided to the clerk of the Court of Appeals and all judges and clerks of the courts within any affected circuit or district. Notice to the public shall be given by any means reasonably calculated to inform interested persons and may, without limitation, include publication in a newspaper of local or state-wide distribution, posting of written notices at courthouses and other public facilities, and announcements on television, radio, and the Internet.

(2010, cc. 451, 757.)

Chapter 4. The Court of Appeals.

Sec.

§ 17.1-400. Creation and organization; election and terms of judges; oath; vacancies; qualifications; incompatible activities prohibited; chief judge.

  1. The Court of Appeals of Virginia is hereby established effective January 1, 1985. It shall consist of 17 judges who shall be elected for terms of eight years by the majority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly. The General Assembly shall consider regional diversity in making its elections. Before entering upon the duties of the office, a judge of the Court of Appeals shall take the oath of office required by law. The oath shall be taken before a justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia or before any officer authorized by law to administer an oath. When any vacancy exists while the General Assembly is not in session, the Governor may appoint a successor to serve until 30 days after the commencement of the next regular session of the General Assembly. Whenever a vacancy occurs or exists in the office of a judge of the Court of Appeals while the General Assembly is in session, or when the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals will expire or the office will be vacant or vacated at a date certain between the adjournment of the General Assembly and the commencement of the next session of the General Assembly, a successor may be elected at any time during a session preceding the date of such vacancy by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly for a full term and, upon qualification, the successor shall enter at once upon the discharge of the duties of the office; however, such successor shall not qualify prior to the predecessor leaving office. No person shall be elected or reelected to a subsequent term under this section until he has submitted to a criminal history record search and submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and reports of such searches have been received by the chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. If the person has not met the requirement of filing in the preceding calendar year a disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 or 30-111, he shall also provide a written statement of economic interests on the disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 to the chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. All judges of the Court of Appeals shall be residents of the Commonwealth and shall, at least five years prior to the appointment or election, have been licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth. No judge of the Court of Appeals, during his continuance in office, shall engage in the practice of law within or without the Commonwealth or seek or accept any nonjudicial elective office, or hold any other office of public trust, or engage in any other incompatible activity.
  2. The chief judge shall be elected by majority vote of the judges of the Court of Appeals to serve a term of four years.
  3. If a judge of the Court of Appeals is absent or unable through sickness, disability, or any other reason to perform or discharge any official duty or function authorized or required by law, a (i) retired chief justice or retired justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia, (ii) retired chief judge or retired judge of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, or (iii) retired judge of a circuit court of Virginia, with his or her prior consent, may be appointed by the chief judge of the Court of Appeals, acting upon his own initiative or upon a personal request from the absent or disabled judge, to perform or discharge the official duties or functions of the absent or disabled judge until that judge shall again be able to attend his duties. The chief judge of the Court of Appeals shall be notified forthwith at the time any absent or disabled judge is able to return to his duties.
  4. The chief judge of the Court of Appeals may, upon his own initiative, designate a (i) retired chief justice or retired justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia, (ii) retired chief judge or retired judge of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, or (iii) retired or active judge of a circuit court of Virginia, with the prior consent of such justice or judge, to perform or discharge the official duties or functions of a judge of the Court of Appeals if there is a need to do so due to congestion in the work of the court. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to increase the number of judges of the Court of Appeals provided for in subsection A of this section.
  5. Any retired chief justice, retired justice, retired chief judge or active or retired judge sitting on the Court of Appeals pursuant to subsection C or D shall receive from the state treasury actual expenses for the time he or she is actually engaged in holding court.
  6. The powers and duties herein conferred or empowered upon the chief judge of the Court of Appeals may be exercised and performed by any judge or any committee of judges of the court designated by the chief judge for such purpose.

    (1983, c. 413, § 17-116.01; 1984, c. 701; 1987, c. 88; 1991, cc. 31, 442; 1998, c. 872; 2000, c. 8; 2004, c. 452; 2018, c. 578; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489.)

Editor's note. - The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary" for "House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice" twice in subsection A. March 10, 2021.

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 5 provides: "That the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia shall report to the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary detailing the expanded workload of the Court of Appeals of Virginia pursuant to the first enactment of this act each year following the enactment of the first enactment clause of this act for three years by January 1 of such year. The first such report shall be made by January 1, 2023."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 8 increased the number of judges on the Court of Appeals of Virginia from ten to eleven in the second sentence of subsection A.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 452 added the last sentence in the first paragraph of subsection A and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 578, in the first paragraph in subsection A, substituted "and submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and reports of such searches have been received" for "and a report of such search has been received" in the seventh sentence, and added the last sentence.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective July 1, 2021, in subsection A in the first paragraph, substituted "17" for "11" and inserted the third sentence.

Law review. - For 1985 survey of Virginia civil procedure and practice, see 19 U. Rich. L. Rev. (1985).

For article, "The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Virginia Courts in Divorce and Equitable Distribution Proceedings," see 11 G.M.U. L. Rev. 73 (1989).

For an article, "Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence," see 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 405 (2000).

For essay, "The Court of Appeals of Virginia Celebrates Thirty Years of Service to the Commonwealth," see 50 U. Rich. L. Rev. 217 (2015).

Research References. - Friend's Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 1. Courts. § 1.03. Court of Appeals. Friend.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 1, 20.1, 11A M.J. Judges, § 5.

§ 17.1-401. (Effective until January 1, 2022) Senior judge.

  1. Any chief judge or judge of the Court of Appeals who is eligible for retirement, other than for disability, with the consent of a majority of the members of the court first obtained, may elect to retire under the Judicial Retirement System (§ 51.1-300 et seq.) and be known and designated as a senior judge. In addition, any chief judge or judge of the Court of Appeals who is retired under the Judicial Retirement System (§ 51.1-300 et seq.) shall be subject to recall, with the consent of a majority of the members of the court, and may be known and designated as a senior judge.
  2. Any chief judge or judge who has retired from active service, as provided in subsection A, may be designated and assigned by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals to perform the duties of a judge of the court. Such judge shall have all the powers, duties, and privileges attendant on the position for which he is recalled to serve.
  3. While serving in such status, a senior judge shall be deemed to be serving in a temporary capacity and, in addition to the retirement benefits received by such judge, shall receive as compensation a sum equal to one-fourth of the total compensation of an active judge of the Court of Appeals for a similar period of service. A retired judge, while performing the duties of a senior judge, shall be furnished office space, support staff, a telephone, and supplies as are furnished a judge of the court.
  4. A judge may terminate his status as a senior judge, or such status may be terminated by a majority of the members of the court. Each judge designated a senior judge shall serve a one-year term unless the court, by order or otherwise, extends the term for an additional year. There shall be no limit on the number of terms a senior judge may so serve.
  5. Only five retired judges shall serve as senior judges at any one time.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to increase the number of judges of the Court of Appeals provided for in § 17.1-400 . (1993, c. 421, § 17-116.01:1; 1994, c. 401; 1998, cc. 190, 872; 2001, c. 295; 2004, c. 346; 2014, c. 776; 2018, c. 709.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective January 1, 2022, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-401 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2018, c. 709, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2019."

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 295 substituted "support staff" for "a secretary" in subsection C.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 346 added the last sentence in subsection A.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 776, effective April 23, 2014, in subsection A inserted "under the Judicial Retirement System ( § 51.1-300 et seq.)" twice.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 709, effective July 1, 2019, in subsection A, substituted "shall be subject to recall, with" for "and subject to recall pursuant § 17.1-106 , with"; and in subsection B, added the second sentence.

Applied in Williams v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 378, 517 S.E.2d 246 (1999); Layne v. Crist Elec. Contr., Inc., 62 Va. App. 632, 751 S.E.2d 679 (2013).

§ 17.1-401. (Effective January 1, 2022) Senior judge.

  1. Any chief judge or judge of the Court of Appeals who is eligible for retirement, other than for disability, with the consent of a majority of the members of the court first obtained, may elect to retire under the Judicial Retirement System (§ 51.1-300 et seq.) and be known and designated as a senior judge. In addition, any chief judge or judge of the Court of Appeals who is retired under the Judicial Retirement System (§ 51.1-300 et seq.) shall be subject to recall, with the consent of a majority of the members of the court, and may be known and designated as a senior judge.
  2. Any chief judge or judge who has retired from active service, as provided in subsection A, may be designated and assigned by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals to perform the duties of a judge of the court. Such judge shall have all the powers, duties, and privileges attendant on the position for which he is recalled to serve.
  3. While serving in such status, a senior judge shall be deemed to be serving in a temporary capacity and, in addition to the retirement benefits received by such judge, shall receive as compensation a sum equal to one-fourth of the total compensation of an active judge of the Court of Appeals for a similar period of service. A retired judge, while performing the duties of a senior judge, shall be furnished office space, support staff, a telephone, and supplies as are furnished a judge of the court.
  4. A judge may terminate his status as a senior judge, or such status may be terminated by a majority of the members of the court. Each judge designated a senior judge shall serve a one-year term unless the court, by order or otherwise, extends the term for an additional year. There shall be no limit on the number of terms a senior judge may so serve.
  5. Only seven retired judges shall serve as senior judges at any one time.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to increase the number of judges of the Court of Appeals provided for in § 17.1-400 . (1993, c. 421, § 17-116.01:1; 1994, c. 401; 1998, cc. 190, 872; 2001, c. 295; 2004, c. 346; 2014, c. 776; 2018, c. 709; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until January 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-401 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2018, c. 709, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on July 1, 2019."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 295 substituted "support staff" for "a secretary" in subsection C.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 346 added the last sentence in subsection A.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 776, effective April 23, 2014, in subsection A inserted "under the Judicial Retirement System ( § 51.1-300 et seq.)" twice.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 709, effective July 1, 2019, in subsection A, substituted "shall be subject to recall, with" for "and subject to recall pursuant § 17.1-106 , with"; and in subsection B, added the second sentence.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, substituted "seven" for "five" in subsection E.

Applied in Williams v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 378, 517 S.E.2d 246 (1999); Layne v. Crist Elec. Contr., Inc., 62 Va. App. 632, 751 S.E.2d 679 (2013).

§ 17.1-402. (Effective until January 1, 2022) Sessions; panels; quorum; presiding judges; hearings en banc.

  1. The Court of Appeals shall sit at such locations within the Commonwealth as the chief judge, upon consultation with the other judges of the court, shall designate so as to provide, insofar as feasible, convenient access to the various geographic areas of the Commonwealth. The chief judge shall schedule sessions of the court as required to discharge expeditiously the business of the court.
  2. The Court of Appeals shall sit in panels of at least three judges each. The presence of all judges in the panel shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. The chief judge shall assign the members to panels and, insofar as practicable, rotate the membership of the panels. The chief judge shall preside over any panel of which he is a member and shall designate the presiding judges of the other panels.
  3. Each panel shall hear and determine, independently of the others, the petitions for appeal and appeals granted in criminal cases and the other cases assigned to that panel.
  4. The Court of Appeals shall sit en banc (i) when there is a dissent in the panel to which the case was originally assigned and an aggrieved party requests an en banc hearing and at least four judges of the court vote in favor of such a hearing or (ii) when any judge of any panel shall certify that in his opinion a decision of such panel of the court is in conflict with a prior decision of the court or of any panel thereof and three other judges of the court concur in that view. The court may sit en banc upon its own motion at any time, in any case in which a majority of the court determines it is appropriate to do so. The court sitting en banc shall consider and decide the case and may overrule any previous decision by any panel or of the full court.
  5. The court may sit en banc with no fewer than eight judges. In all cases decided by the court en banc, the concurrence of at least a majority of the judges sitting shall be required to reverse a judgment, in whole or in part.

    (1983, c. 413, § 17-116.02; 1984, c. 701; 1988, cc. 71, 478; 1998, c. 872; 2000, c. 8; 2001, c. 555; 2008, cc. 54, 156.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective January 1, 2022, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-402 .

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 8 rewrote the first sentence in subsection E, which formerly read: "The court may sit en banc with fewer than ten but not fewer than eight judges."

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 555, in subsection D, substituted "three other judges" for "two other judges" in two places.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 54 and 156 are identical, and substituted "four judges" for "three other judges" in clause (i) of subsection D.

Law review. - For annual survey article, see "Criminal Law and Procedure," 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 63 (2013).

For essay, "The Court of Appeals of Virginia Celebrates Thirty Years of Service to the Commonwealth," see 50 U. Rich. L. Rev. 217 (2015).

CASE NOTES

As used in subsection C, acting independently merely means that each panel must decide on its own the cases it hears, and not that it is free from traditional rules of decision, such as stare decisis. Commonwealth v. Burns, 240 Va. 171 , 395 S.E.2d 456 (1990) (decided under prior law).

Applying the rule of stare decisis in the court of appeals would not mean that a panel decision, no matter how wrong, would be forever binding. If there is "flagrant error or mistake" in a panel decision, the error or mistake may be corrected through the en banc hearing process. Commonwealth v. Burns, 240 Va. 171 , 395 S.E.2d 456 (1990) (decided under prior law).

Application of Commonwealth for rehearing en banc denied where subsection D requirements not met. - Where, by an unpublished memorandum opinion, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed a conviction, and there was neither a dissent in the panel nor a certification that the decision conflicted with a prior decision of the Court, neither requirement of subsection D of this section for an en banc hearing was satisfied, and accordingly, the application of the Commonwealth for a rehearing en banc would be denied. Grajales v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 1, 353 S.E.2d 789 (1987) (decided under prior law).

Trial court judgment may be reversed by court en banc. - The judgment referred to in subsection E that is subject to reversal in whole or part by a majority of the court sitting en banc includes the judgment entered by the trial court. Cochran v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 604 , 521 S.E.2d 287 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1075, 120 S. Ct. 1692, 146 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2000).

Panel's decision was a judgment within terms of subsection E. - Court of appeals erred in dismissing defendant's petition for a writ of actual innocence because under subsection E of § 17.1-402 , the panel's decision was a judgment within the terms of subsection E since it disposed of all issues in the case and ordered the issuance of a writ of actual innocence, and that judgment could only have been withdrawn and reversed by a majority of the judges sitting in the court of appeals en banc; the proceedings of the court of appeals en banc, therefore, had no effect on the panel's decision. Conley v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 691 , 733 S.E.2d 927, 2012 Va. LEXIS 200 (2012).

Subsection E plain and unambiguous. - Language of subsection E of § 17.1-402 is plain and unambiguous; it applies to all cases decided by the court of appeals en banc, without any distinction between the court's appellate or original jurisdiction. Conley v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 691 , 733 S.E.2d 927, 2012 Va. LEXIS 200 (2012).

Applied in Robinson v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 509, 828 S.E.2d 269, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 144 (2019).

§ 17.1-402. (Effective January 1, 2022) Sessions; panels; quorum; presiding judges; hearings en banc.

  1. The Court of Appeals shall sit at such locations within the Commonwealth as the chief judge, upon consultation with the other judges of the court, shall designate so as to provide, insofar as feasible, convenient access to the various geographic areas of the Commonwealth. The chief judge shall schedule sessions of the court as required to discharge expeditiously the business of the court.
  2. The Court of Appeals shall sit in panels of at least three judges each. The presence of all judges in the panel shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. The chief judge shall assign the members to panels and, insofar as practicable, rotate the membership of the panels. The chief judge shall preside over any panel of which he is a member and shall designate the presiding judges of the other panels.
  3. Each panel shall hear and determine, independently of the others, the petitions for appeal pursuant to § 17.1-406 or 19.2-398 and appeals in criminal and civil cases assigned to that panel.
  4. The Court of Appeals shall sit en banc (i) when there is a dissent in the panel to which the case was originally assigned and an aggrieved party requests an en banc hearing and at least six judges of the court vote in favor of such a hearing or (ii) when any judge of any panel shall certify that in his opinion a decision of such panel of the court is in conflict with a prior decision of the court or of any panel thereof and five other judges of the court concur in that view. The court may sit en banc upon its own motion at any time or upon the petition of any party, in any case in which a majority of the court determines it is appropriate to do so. The court sitting en banc shall consider and decide the case and may overrule any previous decision by any panel or of the full court.
  5. The court may sit en banc with no fewer than 13 judges. In all cases decided by the court en banc, the concurrence of at least a majority of the judges sitting shall be required to reverse a judgment, in whole or in part.

    (1983, c. 413, § 17-116.02; 1984, c. 701; 1988, cc. 71, 478; 1998, c. 872; 2000, c. 8; 2001, c. 555; 2008, cc. 54, 156; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until January 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-402 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 8 rewrote the first sentence in subsection E, which formerly read: "The court may sit en banc with fewer than ten but not fewer than eight judges."

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 555, in subsection D, substituted "three other judges" for "two other judges" in two places.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendments by cc. 54 and 156 are identical, and substituted "four judges" for "three other judges" in clause (i) of subsection D.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, substituted "pursuant to § 17.1-406 or 19.2-398 and appeals in criminal and civil cases" for "and appeals granted in criminal cases and the other cases" in subsection C; in subsection D, substituted "six" for "four" and "five" for "three and inserted "or upon the petition of any party"; and substituted "13" for "eight" in subsection E.

Law review. - For annual survey article, see "Criminal Law and Procedure," 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 63 (2013).

For essay, "The Court of Appeals of Virginia Celebrates Thirty Years of Service to the Commonwealth," see 50 U. Rich. L. Rev. 217 (2015).

CASE NOTES

As used in subsection C, acting independently merely means that each panel must decide on its own the cases it hears, and not that it is free from traditional rules of decision, such as stare decisis. Commonwealth v. Burns, 240 Va. 171 , 395 S.E.2d 456 (1990) (decided under prior law).

Applying the rule of stare decisis in the court of appeals would not mean that a panel decision, no matter how wrong, would be forever binding. If there is "flagrant error or mistake" in a panel decision, the error or mistake may be corrected through the en banc hearing process. Commonwealth v. Burns, 240 Va. 171 , 395 S.E.2d 456 (1990) (decided under prior law).

Application of Commonwealth for rehearing en banc denied where subsection D requirements not met. - Where, by an unpublished memorandum opinion, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed a conviction, and there was neither a dissent in the panel nor a certification that the decision conflicted with a prior decision of the Court, neither requirement of subsection D of this section for an en banc hearing was satisfied, and accordingly, the application of the Commonwealth for a rehearing en banc would be denied. Grajales v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 1, 353 S.E.2d 789 (1987) (decided under prior law).

Trial court judgment may be reversed by court en banc. - The judgment referred to in subsection E that is subject to reversal in whole or part by a majority of the court sitting en banc includes the judgment entered by the trial court. Cochran v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 604 , 521 S.E.2d 287 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1075, 120 S. Ct. 1692, 146 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2000).

Panel's decision was a judgment within terms of subsection E. - Court of appeals erred in dismissing defendant's petition for a writ of actual innocence because under subsection E of § 17.1-402 , the panel's decision was a judgment within the terms of subsection E since it disposed of all issues in the case and ordered the issuance of a writ of actual innocence, and that judgment could only have been withdrawn and reversed by a majority of the judges sitting in the court of appeals en banc; the proceedings of the court of appeals en banc, therefore, had no effect on the panel's decision. Conley v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 691 , 733 S.E.2d 927, 2012 Va. LEXIS 200 (2012).

Subsection E plain and unambiguous. - Language of subsection E of § 17.1-402 is plain and unambiguous; it applies to all cases decided by the court of appeals en banc, without any distinction between the court's appellate or original jurisdiction. Conley v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 691 , 733 S.E.2d 927, 2012 Va. LEXIS 200 (2012).

Applied in Robinson v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 509, 828 S.E.2d 269, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 144 (2019).

§ 17.1-403. (Effective until January 1, 2022) Rules of practice, procedure, and internal processes; promulgation by Supreme Court; amendments; summary disposition of appeals without merit.

The Supreme Court shall prescribe and publish the initial rules governing practice, procedure, and internal processes for the Court of Appeals designed to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of all litigation in that court consistent with the ends of justice and to maintain uniformity in the law of the Commonwealth. Before amending the rules thereafter, the Supreme Court shall receive and consider recommendations from the Court of Appeals. The rules shall prescribe procedures governing the summary disposition of appeals which are determined to be without merit.

(1983, c. 413, § 17-116.03; 1984, cc. 632, 701; 1998, c. 872.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective January 1, 2022, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-403 .

Cross references. - As to the rules of practice of the Court of Appeals, see Part 5A, Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court, Volume 11, Code of Virginia.

Law review. - For 1985 survey of Virginia civil procedure and practice, see 19 U. Rich. L. Rev. (1985).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judgments & Decrees, § 119.

CASE NOTES

Argument dispensed with. - Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission awarded a claimant temporary partial disability benefits and found she made a good faith effort to market her residual work capacity; the court summarily affirmed pursuant to § 17.1-403 and Va. Sup. Ct. Rule 5A:27 because the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented and argument would not have aided the decisional process. Family Care Home Health, Inc. v. Nye, No. 0823-04-3, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 388 (Ct. of Appeals Aug. 10, 2004).

Based on the parties' briefs, the record, and the Workers' Compensation Commission's opinion, the court found that the claimant's appeal was without merit; the court dispensed with oral argument and summarily affirmed pursuant to § 17.1-403 , and Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:27 because the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. Grantham v. B & S Landscaping, Inc.,, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 433 (Sept. 23, 2008).

Interpretation of Supreme Court Rules. - General assembly had empowered the Supreme Court of Virginia to promulgate the rules of practice and procedure both for circuit courts and for the Court of Appeals of Virginia; consequently, while Va. Sup. Ct. R. pt. 5A governed the proceedings of the Court of Appeals, the provisions of Part 5A remained precisely that - rules of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reviews the Court of Appeals' interpretation of rules de novo. LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465 , 722 S.E.2d 838, 2012 Va. LEXIS 45 (2012).

Applied in Whitt v. Commonwealth, No. 0885-11-3, 61 Va. App. 637, 739 S.E.2d 254, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 100 (2013).

§ 17.1-403. (Effective January 1, 2022) Rules of practice, procedure, and internal processes; promulgation by Supreme Court; amendments; summary disposition of appeals.

The Supreme Court shall prescribe and publish the initial rules governing practice, procedure, and internal processes for the Court of Appeals designed to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of all litigation in that court consistent with the ends of justice and to maintain uniformity in the law of the Commonwealth. Before amending the rules thereafter, the Supreme Court shall receive and consider recommendations from the Court of Appeals. The rules shall prescribe procedures (i) authorizing the Court of Appeals to prescribe truncated record or appendix preparation and (ii) permitting the Court of Appeals to dispense with oral argument if the panel has examined the briefs and record and unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because (a) the appeal is wholly without merit or (b) the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.

(1983, c. 413, § 17-116.03; 1984, cc. 632, 701; 1998, c. 872; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until January 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-403 .

Cross references. - As to the rules of practice of the Court of Appeals, see Part 5A, Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court, Volume 11, Code of Virginia.

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, substituted "(i) authorizing the Court of Appeals to prescribe truncated record or appendix preparation and (ii) permitting the Court of Appeals to dispense with oral argument if the panel has examined the briefs and record and unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because (a) the appeal is wholly without merit or (b) the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed" for "governing the summary disposition of appeals which are determined to be without merit."

Law review. - For 1985 survey of Virginia civil procedure and practice, see 19 U. Rich. L. Rev. (1985).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judgments & Decrees, § 119.

CASE NOTES

Argument dispensed with. - Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission awarded a claimant temporary partial disability benefits and found she made a good faith effort to market her residual work capacity; the court summarily affirmed pursuant to § 17.1-403 and Va. Sup. Ct. Rule 5A:27 because the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented and argument would not have aided the decisional process. Family Care Home Health, Inc. v. Nye, No. 0823-04-3, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 388 (Ct. of Appeals Aug. 10, 2004).

Based on the parties' briefs, the record, and the Workers' Compensation Commission's opinion, the court found that the claimant's appeal was without merit; the court dispensed with oral argument and summarily affirmed pursuant to § 17.1-403 , and Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:27 because the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. Grantham v. B & S Landscaping, Inc.,, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 433 (Sept. 23, 2008).

Interpretation of Supreme Court Rules. - General assembly had empowered the Supreme Court of Virginia to promulgate the rules of practice and procedure both for circuit courts and for the Court of Appeals of Virginia; consequently, while Va. Sup. Ct. R. pt. 5A governed the proceedings of the Court of Appeals, the provisions of Part 5A remained precisely that - rules of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reviews the Court of Appeals' interpretation of rules de novo. LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465 , 722 S.E.2d 838, 2012 Va. LEXIS 45 (2012).

Applied in Whitt v. Commonwealth, No. 0885-11-3, 61 Va. App. 637, 739 S.E.2d 254, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 100 (2013).

§ 17.1-404. Original jurisdiction in matters of contempt and injunctions, writs of mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeals shall have authority to punish for contempt. A judge of the Court of Appeals shall exercise initially the authority concerning injunctions vested in a justice of the Supreme Court by § 8.01-626 in any case over which the court would have appellate jurisdiction as provided in §§ 17.1-405 and 17.1-406 . In addition, in such cases over which the court would have appellate jurisdiction, the court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus.

(1983, c. 413, § 17-116.04; 1984, c. 701; 1998, c. 872.)

Law review. - For 1985 survey of Virginia civil procedure and practice, see 19 U. Rich. L. Rev. (1985).

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 6-1201. Petition for Writ of Mandamus Against Officer of a Corporation, et seq.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 20.1; 9A M.J. Habeas Corpus, § 18; 12B M.J. Mandamus, § 24.

Editor's note. - The cases cited below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

The Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus appeals arising from convictions where the death penalty has been imposed. Peterson v. Bass, 2 Va. App. 314, 343 S.E.2d 475 (1986).

Scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus. However, only the circuit court which entered the original judgment order of conviction may issue a writ for one held under criminal process. The Supreme Court's grant of original jurisdiction in habeas corpus matters is not subject to this limitation. However, the Court of Appeal's grant of jurisdiction in these matters is limited. Bullock v. Director of Dep't of Cors., 1 Va. App. 70, 334 S.E.2d 150, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1023, 106 S. Ct. 576, 88 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1985).

The Court of Appeals' habeas corpus jurisdiction, whether appellate or original, must be defined with reference to the "cases over which" it has jurisdiction on direct appeal. Peterson v. Bass, 2 Va. App. 314, 343 S.E.2d 475 (1986).

Original jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus. - The 1985 amendment to § 17-116.05:1 [see now § 17.1-406 ] did not alter this section and sound principles of statutory interpretation require that the Court of Appeals give effect to all provisions of the Code and recognize that the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in appropriate cases. Appellate courts historically have had, and jurisprudentially should have, discretionary original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs in aid of their appellate jurisdiction. White v. Garraghty, 2 Va. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 402 (1986).

Since the Court of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction over the issues raised by the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, under this section the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an inmate who wishes to challenge the validity of his detention in appropriate cases. This in no way limits the clear legislative intent expressed in the 1985 amendment to § 17-116.05:1 [see now § 17.1-406 ] that habeas corpus cases on appeal from the circuit courts go directly to the Supreme Court. White v. Garraghty, 2 Va. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 402 (1986).

No jurisdiction on appeal from habeas corpus proceeding in circuit court. - It is clear from the 1985 amendment to § 17-116.05:1 B [see now § 17.1-406 B] that effective July 1, 1985, the General Assembly terminated the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to hear and determine appeals from a final decision, judgment or order of a circuit court involving a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. White v. Garraghty, 2 Va. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 402 (1986).

Existence of remedy in circuit court under § 8.01-654 . - The Court of Appeals should not consider an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus when an adequate remedy may be had in the circuit courts under § 8.01-654 . White v. Garraghty, 2 Va. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 402 (1986).

Jurisdiction over prohibition writ. - Court had appellate jurisdiction over matters involving divorce and judgments for civil contempt of court; thus, the issues raised in the petition for a writ of prohibition fell within the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court rejected the claim that a final order was necessary to invoke the court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition. Hoffman P'ship, LLP v. Circuit Court, 72 Va. App. 206, 843 S.E.2d 396, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 175 (2020).

Prohibition writ denied. - Wife asserted in her complaint for divorce that the partnership was marital property and she asked for the right to control and manage the partnership; since the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings, including the power to determine the ownership and value of all property, the writ of prohibition did not lie. The circuit court had already entered two orders directing husband, not the partnership, to undertake certain actions, and prohibition did not lie to undo those orders. Hoffman P'ship, LLP v. Circuit Court, 72 Va. App. 206, 843 S.E.2d 396, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 175 (2020).

§ 17.1-405. (Effective until January 1, 2022) Appellate jurisdiction - Administrative agency, Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission, and domestic relations appeals.

Any aggrieved party may appeal to the Court of Appeals from:

  1. Any final decision of a circuit court on appeal from (i) a decision of an administrative agency, or (ii) a grievance hearing decision issued pursuant to § 2.2-3005 ;
  2. Any final decision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission;
  3. Any final judgment, order, or decree of a circuit court involving:
    1. Affirmance or annulment of a marriage;
    2. Divorce;
    3. Custody;
    4. Spousal or child support;
    5. The control or disposition of a child;
    6. Any other domestic relations matter arising under Title 16.1 or Title 20;
    7. Adoption under Chapter 12 (§ 63.2-1200 et seq.) of Title 63.2; or
    8. A final grievance hearing decision issued pursuant to subsection B of § 2.2-3007 .
  4. Any interlocutory decree or order entered in any of the cases listed in this section (i) granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction or (ii) adjudicating the principles of a cause.

    (1983, c. 413, § 17-116.05; 1984, c. 701; 1985, c. 283; 1990, c. 897; 1998, c. 872; 2000, cc. 830, 947, 1006; 2001, cc. 393, 420.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective January 1, 2022, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-405 .

Cross references. - As to certain cases over which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, see § 8.01-670 A.

As to appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over any order of a circuit court, magistrate, or other judicial officer which denies bail, requires excessive bail, or fixes unreasonable terms of recognizance, see §§ 19.2-124 and 19.2-319.

As to appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over any judgment of a circuit court for civil or criminal contempt, see § 19.2-318.

As to appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over any order of a circuit court involving involuntary treatment of prisoner, see § 53.1-40.1 .

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 830 substituted "Chapter 10.2 ( § 63.1-219.7 et seq.)" for "Chapter 11 ( § 63.1-220 et seq.)" in subdivision 3 g.

The 2000 amendments by cc. 947 and 1006 are identical, and added "(i)" and "or (ii) a grievance hearing decision issued pursuant to § 2.1-116.07" in subdivision 1.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendments by cc. 393 and 420 are identical, and deleted "or" at the end of subdivision 3 f, added "or" at the end of subdivision 3 g, and added subdivision 3 h.

Law review. - For 1985 survey of Virginia civil procedure and practice, see 19 U. Rich. L. Rev. (1985).

For article, "The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Virginia Courts in Divorce and Equitable Distribution Proceedings," see 11 G.M.U. L. Rev. 73 (1989).

For survey on legal issues involving children in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 705 (1989).

For an article, "Final and Interlocutory Appeals in Virginia," see 8 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 337 (1999).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B Appeal and Error, §§ 20.1, 68, 72, 73, 78; 5A M.J. Courts, §§ 13, 36.1; 6A M.J. Discovery, § 2; 6A M.J. Divorce and Alimony, §§ 49, 68; 6B M.J. Drugs & Druggists, § 5; 8A M.J. Executors & Administrators, § 256; 9A M.J. Habeas Corpus, § 8; 10A M.J. Injunctions, § 72; 12B M.J. Mandamus, § 24; 15 M.J. Public Officers, § 46.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

"Cases" over which Court of Appeals has "appellate jurisdiction" are defined with reference to subject matter of the case and not the procedural means used to raise the issues. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a procedural device that is used to raise a wide variety of issues that may or may not involve criminal matters. White v. Garraghty, 2 Va. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 402 (1986).

Court has limited civil jurisdiction. - The statutory scheme of civil jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals adopted by the General Assembly is one of limited civil jurisdiction. County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 4, 1985).

While the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear an Indian tribe's appeal of the Water Control Board's decision under the Administrative Process Act, § 2.2-4000 et seq., the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the tribe's separate claims under Treaty at Middle Plantation With Tributary Indians After Bacon's Rebellion, May 29, 1677, art. V which were submitted to the circuit court's general jurisdiction. Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Quality ex rel. State Water Control Bd., 270 Va. 423 , 621 S.E.2d 78, 2005 Va. LEXIS 100 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1192, 126 S. Ct. 2862, 165 L. Ed. 2d 895 (2006).

Jurisdiction over worker's compensation case. - Because an appellate court's jurisdiction was over any final decision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission, the court's review of a workers' compensation case extended only to the Commission's ruling, not the opinion reached by the deputy commissioner. Anderson v. Anderson, 65 Va. App. 354, 778 S.E.2d 132 (2015).

No jurisdiction of appeal from former § 19.2-181 (1) commitment order. - The court of appeals had no jurisdiction of an appeal from a § 19.2-181 (1) (now § 19.2-182.3) commitment order; an examination of this section reveals no proceeding remotely resembling the proceeding at issue. Antzes v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 172, 409 S.E.2d 172 (1991).

Jurisdiction over prohibition writ. - Court had appellate jurisdiction over matters involving divorce and judgments for civil contempt of court; thus, the issues raised in the petition for a writ of prohibition fell within the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court rejected the claim that a final order was necessary to invoke the court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition. Hoffman P'ship, LLP v. Circuit Court, 72 Va. App. 206, 843 S.E.2d 396, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 175 (2020).

Jurisdiction of appeal of suit against the State Police for denial of consent to purchase firearm. - Suit brought by a man convicted of misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence as defined in the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(g)(9), against the state police under subsection E of § 18.2-308.2:2 and § 9.1-135 , after his request to buy a firearm was rejected, was a civil action not an appeal of an administrative agency decision, thereby vesting appellate jurisdiction with the Supreme Court of Virginia rather than the Court of Appeals under § 17.1-405 . Foltz v. Dep't of State Police, 55 Va. App. 182, 684 S.E.2d 841, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 510 (2009).

Jurisdiction of appeal of denial of civil contempt. - For the same reason that subdivision A 3 of § 8.01-670 did not grant appellate jurisdiction to the Virginia Supreme Court to hear an appeal from a judgment refusing to find civil contempt, § 17.1-405 did not grant the appellate court jurisdiction to hear these types of appeals; therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the circuit court's ruling denying the motion for rule to show cause against appellee. Petersen v. Robertston, No. 1026-20-2, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 112 (July 6, 2021).

Appeal of probation revocation. - As a trial court's jurisdiction to revoke a convict's probation and suspension of sentence is part of a purely criminal process, and as under § 19.2-306 the trial court retained jurisdiction over the suspended portion of defendant's sentence during the two-year period of his probation and for one year thereafter, the trial court had jurisdiction over the suspended portion of defendant's sentence at the time it revoked defendant's probation. Accordingly, because defendant's appeal of the revocation order was an appeal from an action taken while the trial court retained jurisdiction over his sentence, his appeal was within the appellate court's jurisdiction under subsection A of § 17.1-406 . Green v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 191 , 557 S.E.2d 230, 2002 Va. LEXIS 23 (2002).

Review of Department of Corrections decisions not within appellate jurisdiction. - Review of a decision of the Virginia Department of Corrections does not fall within the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction because it is not an appeal from a final decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, an appeal from a final order involving a domestic relations matter, or an appeal from a judgment of conviction. Wright v. White, 17 Va. App. 42, 434 S.E.2d 693 (1993).

"Administrative agency." - While a definition of the term "administrative agency" is not found in this section, the court is not confined to the language of that section, but can look to other sections where the same term is used. Schwartz v. Highland County School Bd., 2 Va. App. 554, 346 S.E.2d 544 (1986).

In borrowing from the Administrative Process Act for a definition of the term "administrative agency" in Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of Zoning, 231 Va. 415 , 344 S.E.2d 899 (1986), the court did not incorporate all the provisions of the act into subdivision 1. It merely cited one of the act's exemptions to prove the point that a board of zoning appeals is not a board of state government. Commonwealth, Dep't of Hwys. & Transp. v. E.W. Yeatts, Inc., 233 Va. 17 , 353 S.E.2d 717 (1987).

Because § 33.1-192.1 [now 33.2-1102] required compliance with § 33.1-386 [now 33.2-1101], a surety's right to file a civil action against the Virginia Department of Transportation was dependent on its compliance with the administrative procedures prescribed by that section; thus, its civil action was an appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, and its appeal from the judgment of the circuit court was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. DOT, 269 Va. 362 , 611 S.E.2d 356, 2005 Va. LEXIS 38 (2005).

Subdivision 1 deals with decision made by administrative agency, and not with an administrative decision made by some entity that is not purely an administrative agency. Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415 , 344 S.E.2d 899 (1986).

No jurisdiction over proceeding to implement grievance panel decision. - Pursuant to subdivision 1 of § 17.1-405 , the Court of Appeals of Virginia had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from any final decision of a circuit court on appeal from: (i) a decision of an administrative agency; or (ii) a grievance hearing decision issued pursuant to § 2.2-3005 . The court found that the proceeding in the circuit court to implement the grievance panel decision was not an appeal from a grievance hearing decision. Va. Dep't of Corr. v. Estep, 55 Va. App. 386, 685 S.E.2d 891, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 549 (2009).

Jurisdiction over decisions of state building code technical review board. - Given this unique statutory scheme that effectively assimilates the actions of a locality and those of a state administrative agency and provides appellate review through the mechanism of the Virginia Administrative Process Act, the court of appeals has subject matter jurisdiction to resolve assignments of error relating to the initiation and enforcement of the decisions of the State Building Code Technical Review Board by localities. Gaines v. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 71 Va. App. 385, 837 S.E.2d 54, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 9 (2020).

Circuit court correctly concluded the initial citation of property and a city's subsequent enforcement of the State Building Code Technical Review Board's case decision was not error; because the interests and responsibilities of localities and the Review Board are overlapping and complimentary in the Uniform Statewide Building Code, any distinction between a Review Board case decision and the initiation and enforcement of that decision by a locality is one without a jurisdictional difference. Gaines v. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 71 Va. App. 385, 837 S.E.2d 54, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 9 (2020).

Section not limited to agencies covered by Administrative Procedure Act. - The legislature did not intend only those agencies defined in the Administrative Process Act to be administrative agencies within the meaning of this section. County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 4, 1985).

Appeals from decisions of agencies not under Administrative Process Act. - The legislative purpose set forth in former § 9-6.14:3 [now subsection B of § 2.2-4000 ] does not restrict appeals of all decisions of administrative agencies not encompassed by the Administrative Process Act to the Court of Appeals rather than the Virginia Supreme Court. County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 4, 1985).

Decisions rendered under locality grievance procedures. - Under § 15.2-1507 , grievance procedures adopted by a local governing body must include certain components of the state grievance procedure, but while § 15.2-1507 requires grievance procedures established by localities to be consistent with the provisions of § 2.2-1000 et seq., the locality procedures are distinct from the state procedures and arise under a separate statutory structure, and a decision rendered under a locality procedure is not a decision issued pursuant to § 2.2-3005 or a final grievance hearing decision issued pursuant to subsection B of § 2.2-3007 ; thus, decisions rendered under a locality procedure do not fall within an appellate court's jurisdiction under § 17.1-405 . Styles v. City of Colonial Heights, 43 Va. App. 588, 600 S.E.2d 174, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 378 (2004).

Virginia Department of Transportation is an administrative agency occupying an agency status even when deciding construction contract claims under § 33.1-386 [now 33.2-1101]. Commonwealth, Dep't of Hwys. & Transp. v. E.W. Yeatts, Inc., 233 Va. 17 , 353 S.E.2d 717 (1987).

County commissioner of revenue is not an administrative agency as contemplated by this section. County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 4, 1985).

County commissioner of accounts. - County commissioner of accounts had subject matter jurisdiction to hear a petition for aid and direction filed initially with him because the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and the supreme court reviewed decisions of the circuit court, not decisions of the commissioner; a commissioner's authority to assist the circuit court with the settlement of estates was an extension of the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction to administer estates. Gray v. Binder, 294 Va. 268 , 805 S.E.2d 768, 2017 Va. LEXIS 157 (2017).

No jurisdiction over appeals from determination of a state university. - Under § 17.1-405 , the Virginia Court of Appeals only has jurisdiction over an appeal from an administrative agency, not over an administrative decision made by an entity that is not purely an administrative agency. The Court of Appeals thus lacks jurisdiction over a trial court decision on appeal from the determination of a state university pursuant to § 23-7.4; appellate jurisdiction of such cases lies in the Virginia Supreme Court under subdivision A 3 of § 8.01-670 . George Mason Univ. v. Floyd, 275 Va. 32 , 654 S.E.2d 556, 2008 Va. LEXIS 11 (2008).

An interlocutory order or decree that adjudicates the principles of a cause is one which must determine the rights of the parties and would of necessity affect the final order in the case. Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 451 S.E.2d 711 (1994).

An interlocutory order that adjudicates the principles in a divorce case must respond to the chief object of the suit which was to secure a divorce. Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 451 S.E.2d 711 (1994).

An interlocutory order that adjudicates the principles of a domestic relations dispute must respond to the chief object of the suit, which is to determine the status of the parties' marriage and the custody of the parties' children, and, if appropriate, to award spousal and child support. Wells v. Wells, 29 Va. App. 82, 509 S.E.2d 549 (1999).

Trial court's custody order was an interlocutory order which adjudicated principles of the cause as to custody, and it was therefore separately appealable. Summers v. Summers, No. 2759-98-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 349 (Ct. of Appeals June 15, 1999).

Ruling that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission lacked jurisdiction to consider an administratrix of an estate of a deceased infant's (decedent) claim that the decedent's injuries were due to the doctors' intentional or willful and wanton acts was not an appealable order as it did not adjudicate the underlying issue as to whether the decedent suffered a birth-related neurological injury caused by the doctors, which is necessary to a Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act claim. Maryview Hosp. v. Woodard, 54 Va. App. 13, 675 S.E.2d 837, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 211 (2009).

Interlocutory orders. - Appellate jurisdiction existed even though the case had been remanded to the agency where the lower court had issued a decision on the merits of whether sufficient evidence supported a finding of actual injury to a student, and the Commonwealth had abandoned any actual injury theory of culpability. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Betts, No. 1447-17-1, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 156 (June 12, 2018).

Bifurcation order. - The order in the instant case bifurcating the divorce from the other issues was not an order adjudicating the principles of a cause because it did not determine the rules by which the court would determine the rights of the parties. Nenninger v. Nenninger, 19 Va. App. 696, 454 S.E.2d 45 (1995).

Jurisdiction to consider appeal of interlocutory decree. - Unless the decree holding that the marriage is valid is an interlocutory decree that adjudicates the principles of the cause, Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of the interlocutory decree. Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 451 S.E.2d 711 (1994).

The mere possibility that an interlocutory decree may affect the final decision in the trial does not necessitate an immediate appeal. Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 451 S.E.2d 711 (1994).

Pursuant to this section, the court of appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from "any final judgment, order, or decree of a circuit court involving: . . . adoption;" as well as jurisdiction to hear an appeal from "any interlocutory decree or order entered in any of the cases listed in this section . . . adjudicating the principles of a cause;" thus where an interlocutory order of adoption effectively resolved the issue between these parties, the interlocutory order of adoption was an appealable order. Knight v. Laney, No. 1190-95-1, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 4 (Ct. of Appeals Jan. 11, 1996).

Where no final custody determination or decree of divorce had been entered, the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Wells v. Wells, 29 Va. App. 82, 509 S.E.2d 549 (1999).

An interlocutory decree adjudicates the principles of a cause so as to be subject to appeal when the rules or methods by which the rights of the parties are to be finally worked out have been so far determined that it is only necessary to apply those rules or methods to the facts of the case in order to ascertain the relative rights of the parties, with regard to the subject matter of the suit. Whitaker v. Day, 32 Va. App. 737, 530 S.E.2d 924, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 501 (2000).

A ruling denying a motion to dismiss, which alleges that the action is barred by principles of res judicata, is interlocutory and, therefore, is neither a final decree nor an adjudication of the principles of the cause so as to be ripe for appeal. Whitaker v. Day, 32 Va. App. 737, 530 S.E.2d 924, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 501 (2000).

Where a sanction order was entered solely against an attorney who represented a wife in a divorce case, the attorney had withdrawn from the case by the time the sanction order was entered, and the order resolved all the issues involving sanctions against the attorney, while leaving the underlying divorce action unresolved, the sanction order was an appealable interlocutory order within the meaning of subdivision 4 of § 17.1-405 . Vinson v. Vinson, 41 Va. App. 675, 588 S.E.2d 392, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 590 (2003).

Language of the December 2002 order was sufficient to lift the abeyance and finalize the May 1999 interlocutory order because the December 2002 order explicitly stated that the May 7, 1999 order was in full force and effect; therefore, there was jurisdiction to consider the issues related to the May 7, 1999 order adjudicating the husband's contempt. Klein v. Klein, No. 0211-03-4, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 621 (Ct. of Appeals Dec. 2, 2003).

Order denying intervention was not a final, appealable order as it did not dispose of the whole subject matter of the case; an appeal of an interlocutory order denying a tribe's motion to intervene in an action seeking review of an administrative order was dismissed. Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Va. Marine Res. Comm'n, 43 Va. App. 728, 601 S.E.2d 686, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 408 (2004).

Trial court's order denying a motion to intervene in an administrative appeal was not final and fell outside the appellate court's interlocutory appellate jurisdiction; an appeal of the denial of an intervention motion was dismissed. Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Va. Marine Res. Comm'n, 43 Va. App. 724, 601 S.E.2d 684, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 409 (2004).

Where the trial court indicated in its order that it would not exercise jurisdiction over the parties' divorce or child custody proceedings "at this time," the court expressly reserved jurisdiction on the issues of equitable distribution, child support, and spousal support to a later date, and thus, the trial court did nothing to violate § 20-146.18 ; accordingly, a husband's appeal from said order was dismissed as such was not taken from an appealable interlocutory order. Prizzia v. Prizzia, 45 Va. App. 280, 610 S.E.2d 326, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 117 (2005).

Appellate court could not consider the appeal of the wife's counsel in a divorce case from the trial court's interlocutory order that granted the husband's motion for sanctions and directed the wife's counsel to pay a certain sum in attorney's fees for work the husband's counsel incurred in defense of the wife's repeated pendente lite motions; pursuant to subdivision 4 of § 17.1-405 , the appellate court only had jurisdiction over interlocutory decrees entered in divorce actions where an injunction was involved or there was an adjudication of the principles of a cause, and neither situation was involved because no injunction was at issue and the sanction against the wife's counsel did not respond to the chief object of the suit, which was for the parties to divorce. O'Donoghue v. O'Donoghue,, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 124 (Mar. 27, 2007).

Because the underlying litigation had not been fully resolved, the denial of a daughter's request for permissive intervention as a third party beneficiary in order to enforce her parents' property settlement agreement was neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory order; therefore, the appeal was outside the appellate court's interlocutory jurisdiction under subdivision 4 of § 17.1-405 . Hickman v. Broaddus,, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 197 (May 15, 2007).

Because it was clear from the legislature's amendment of § 8.01-670 , and rejection of an amendment of § 17.1-405 , that § 8.01-670.1 applied only to interlocutory appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Court of Appeals of Virginia lacked jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal under § 8.01-670.1 . Further, the legislature did not limit the exclusion of § 8.01-670 .1 only to those interlocutory appeals over which the Court of Appeals already had jurisdiction, but instead, cited to the whole of § 17.1-405 . Commonwealth v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 49 Va. App. 797, 645 S.E.2d 337, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 249 (2007).

Final distribution of personal property as well as the resolution of the attorney's fees issue was dependent on the outcome of an arbitration hearing, a proceeding that had yet to begin when the divorce decree was entered. Accordingly, the decree failed to satisfy § 17.1-405 and the order was not an interlocutory order that adjudicates the principles of the cause; the appeals court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Fadness v. Fadness,, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 331 (Sept. 4, 2007).

Interlocutory order that a premarital agreement was enforceable was an appealable interlocutory order because the grounds for the divorce were not contested, and the only issue to be decided by the trial court was the validity of the agreement; therefore, the rules or methods by which the rights of the husband and wife were to be finally worked out had been determined by the trial court. Chaplain v. Chaplain, 54 Va. App. 762, 682 S.E.2d 108, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 396 (2009).

While a judge pro tempore's refusal to enjoin a mother from relocating with the parties' children would have fallen within the appellate court's jurisdiction under subdivision 4 of § 17.1-405 , the relocation issue was in fact moot since the judge presumed that the mother's relocation, which was necessitated by her military transfer, was inevitable. As the judge had previously ruled that the mother should receive custody, a separate decision on relocation was unnecessary; therefore, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to hear the father's appeal. de Haan v. de Haan, 54 Va. App. 428, 680 S.E.2d 297, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 349 (2009).

Reviewing court rejected the argument that the trial court lacked authority to order the wife to reimburse the husband pendente lite support since more than twenty-one days had passed since the entry of the order of annulment, because the order of annulment was not a final order. Naseer v. Moghal, No. 2186-12-4, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 220 (Ct. of Appeals July 30, 2013).

Jurisdiction to consider appeal of interlocutory order. - It was readily apparent that the April 7, 2008, order resolved all the questions raised by the complainant's bill, specifically determined the rights of the parties, and necessarily affected the final order in the case; furthermore, the registration of the Washington orders had immediate consequences for the father that could not be remedied by waiting until a final order was entered. Accordingly, the April 7, 2008, order was an appealable interlocutory order that adjudicated the "principles of a cause" within the meaning of subdivision 4 of § 17.1-405 . Phifer v. Commonwealth ex rel. Score,, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 423 (Sept. 22, 2009).

Husband raised the issue of whether the trial court had to relinquish its continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support matters provided by § 20-88.43:2 because neither husband nor wife currently resided in Virginia, but the trial court's order denying the husband's motion was not a final order because there was no live controversy before the court; for example, a pending motion for modification of spousal support pursuant to § 20-109 . Because the trial court's denial of the husband's motion to dismiss was neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory order within the meaning of § 17.1-405 , the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal. Kotara v. Kotara, No. 0290-09-4, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 485 (Nov. 3, 2009).

Standing to appeal adoption order. - Maternal grandmother was not entitled to appeal from a final order of adoption because the grandmother was not a party and did not have standing to appeal the final order. The grandmother never moved to intervene or make an appearance before the entry of the final order and thus, was never a party to the adoption. Bonanno v. Quinn, No. 2032-19-4, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 183 (June 30, 2020).

Dismissal of a grandparent's appeals in an intermediate appellate court was appropriate because the grandparent had no standing to invoke the jurisdiction of that court as the grandparent was not a party to the stepparent adoption proceeding from which the grandparent sought to appeal in that the grandparent had neither moved to intervene, nor entered an appearance before entry of the final order in the proceeding. Bonanno v. Quinn, 299 Va. 722 , 858 S.E.2d 181, 2021 Va. LEXIS 54 (2021).

Rulings on discovery issues not generally within court's jurisdiction. - Ordinarily, a trial court's discovery orders are not subject to review on direct appeal because they are not final within the contemplation of this section; thus, because a trial court's denial of a motion to quash a subpoena neither adjudicated the underlying cause nor related to an attendant injunction but simply resolved an issue arising from discovery incidental to the claim, it was clearly an interlocutory determination over which the appellate court had no jurisdiction. Blue Fox, Inc. v. Rogers, No. 2400-00-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 272 (Ct. of Appeals May 22, 2001).

Orders by the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission compelling a benefits recipient to comply with discovery requests were not appealable; the orders did not affect the recipient's benefits, as there had been no request for review of the award, nor had the recipient been sanctioned for failing to comply with the discovery orders. Green v. Keil Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 42 Va. App. 539, 593 S.E.2d 525 (2004).

Appeal of right. - Because an order barring all future appeals, regardless of their subject matter or merit, until a monetary sanction was paid, effectively closed the doors to the Court of Appeals on a father, including "appeals of right" under § 17.1-405 , the sanction of dismissal under § 8.01-271.1 was unduly severe. Switzer v. Switzer, 273 Va. 326 , 641 S.E.2d 80, 2007 Va. LEXIS 34 (2007), on remand, appeal dismissed, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 440 (Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007).

Court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear a husband's appeal pursuant to the statute because the rule that the common law prohibition in Virginia against an appeal of a trial court's refusal to find a party in contempt had not been abrogated by the General Assembly; the husband assigned error to the circuit court's order that he pay the wife in equitable distribution based on its interpretation of the parties' separation agreement and final divorce decree. Monds v. Monds, 68 Va. App. 674, 813 S.E.2d 1, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 124 (2018).

Writ of coram vobis. - Because a writ of coram vobis fell outside the categories in § 17.1-405 , the appellate court had no jurisdiction to address it; accordingly, the matter was transferred to the state supreme court pursuant to § 8.01-677.1 . Draghia v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 291, 678 S.E.2d 272, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 290 (2009).

Order remanding matter to agency not appealable. - Because a trial court's order did not address the merits of a sanction imposed on real estate agents by the Virginia Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Real Estate Board, but remanded the matter for further consideration, its order was not a "final decision" within the meaning of this section, and the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the Board's appeal. Commonwealth v. Lancaster, 45 Va. App. 723, 613 S.E.2d 828, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 226 (2005).

Where the trial court remanded to the Virginia State Health Commissioner because the administrative record was incomplete, the court's order was not appealable, as it did not adjudicate the principles of the cause; the trial judge did not issue rulings or actual limitations such that it was necessary for the Commissioner to apply those rules or methods to the facts of the case in order to ascertain the rights of the parties in the action. Loudoun Hosp. Ctr. v. Stroube,, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 534 (Dec. 28, 2005).

Circuit court's order remanding an employment matter to a hearing officer for a new hearing because a tape of the grievance proceedings had been lost, precluding its review of the hearing officer's decision, and was not a final order as required for jurisdiction pursuant to subdivision 1 of § 17.1-405 ; therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction of the employer's appeal. Va. Dep't of Corr. v. Hodges, No. 1920-10-2, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 148 (Ct. of Appeals May 3, 2011).

Appeal by witness of discovery order not within court's jurisdiction. - Because a witness who brought a motion to quash a subpoena was not a party to the underlying proceedings, the court was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal; unless and until the witness refused to comply with the discovery order and was found in civil contempt by the court, it would not be a "party" to a case or controversy with standing to appeal. Blue Fox, Inc. v. Rogers, No. 2400-00-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 272 (Ct. of Appeals May 22, 2001).

Appeal from refusal to issue subpoena. - An order of a deputy commissioner refusing to issue a subpoena duces tecum, which was affirmed by the workers' compensation commission, neither adjudicated the underlying cause nor related to an attendant injunction but simply resolved an issue arising from discovery incidental to the claim and was clearly an interlocutory determination over which the court of appeals had no jurisdiction. City of Richmond-Fire & Emergency v. Brandon, 32 Va. App. 787, 531 S.E.2d 22, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 496 (2000).

And Court lacks jurisdiction on appeal as to erroneous assessment. - The Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order of a circuit court determining that a county commissioner of revenue has erroneously assessed taxes against real property. County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 4, 1985).

Since the county commissioner of revenue is not defined as an agency within the meaning of the Administrative Process Act and not generally considered an administrative agency in the general law, and, further, since § 58.1-3992 directs appeals arising from erroneous assessment of local taxes under § 58.1-3984 to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review a ruling of a circuit court as to the assessment of real property taxes. County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 4, 1985).

Appeal from Director of Department of Human Resource Management. - Circuit court did not err in refusing to reverse a decision by the Director of the Department of Human Resource Management upholding an employee's termination because the director was permitted to assign tasks to agency personnel to carry out the director's duties; the tripartite review procedure had been undisturbed because the employee received a review of the facts by the hearing officer, a review of the policy by the department, and a review of the law by the court of appeals. Murphy v. Va. Dep't of State Police, 68 Va. App. 716, 813 S.E.2d 21, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 123 (2018).

Jurisdiction proper in appeal of decree debt obligation determination. - Where matter clearly arose out of the enforcement of a provision in a divorce decree requiring husband to hold wife harmless for their joint debt to bank, Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the trial court's determination that husband failed to comply with the terms of the decree. Douglas v. Douglas, 17 Va. App. 380, 437 S.E.2d 244 (1993).

Local school board is not an administrative agency within the provisions of this section. Schwartz v. Highland County School Bd., 2 Va. App. 554, 346 S.E.2d 544 (1986).

While the county school board was a party in the case involving decision of administrative hearing officers that school board did not give handicapped students a free and appropriate education, the State Board of Education was responsible for compliance with the requirements for receipt of federal assistance for special education programs, and it has adopted regulations that establish the two-tier administrative review process by the Department of Education to implement § 22.1-214 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415. Thus, this appeal involved a decision by an administrative arm of the State Board of Education rather than a decision by a local school board and the appeal was properly within the appellate jurisdiction of the court pursuant to this section. Beasley v. School Bd., 6 Va. App. 206, 367 S.E.2d 738 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 238 Va. 44 , 380 S.E.2d 884 (1989).

For action protesting decision to award contract brought under § 11-70 and not under the administrative appeals procedure authorized by § 11-71, appellate jurisdiction lies with the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals. Allstar Towing, Inc. v. City of Alexandria, 231 Va. 421 , 344 S.E.2d 903 (1986).

Board of zoning appeals not "administrative agency." - The General Assembly did not intend that boards of zoning appeals be included within the meaning of "administrative agency" as used in subdivision 1 of this section. Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415 , 344 S.E.2d 899 (1986).

Boards of zoning appeals are not administrative agencies for purposes of subdivision 1 of this section. Appeals from final decisions of circuit courts on appeal from decisions of boards of zoning appeals are properly brought in the Supreme Court. Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37 , 353 S.E.2d 727 (1987).

Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of motions to dismiss did not affect final decisions. - In ruling upon the motions to dismiss, the Workers' Compensation Commission did not resolve any factual or legal issues concerning the merits of the cases. The Commission's denial of the motions did not affect its final decision of the cases. Canova Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. LMI Ins. Co., 22 Va. App. 595, 471 S.E.2d 827 (1996).

Court lacks jurisdiction of decision of circuit court on appeal from board of zoning appeals. - The Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction of final decisions of circuit courts on appeal from decisions of boards of zoning appeals. Appellate jurisdiction of such cases lies in the Supreme Court under § 8.01-670 A 3, assuming, but not deciding, that a petition for certiorari under former § 15.1-497 (now § 15.2-2314 ) is an "appeal" from a decision of a board of zoning appeals within the meaning of subdivision 1 of this section. Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415 , 344 S.E.2d 899 (1986).

Appeal from § 33.1-387 civil action. - A § 33.1-387 [now 33.2-1103] civil action is, in legislative intendment, a § 17-116.05 1 (now subdivision 1 of this section) appeal, and on appeal therefrom, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction. Commonwealth, Dep't of Hwys. & Transp. v. E.W. Yeatts, Inc., 233 Va. 17 , 353 S.E.2d 717 (1987).

Jurisdiction in child custody dispute. - Appellate court had jurisdiction over an appeal under § 17.1-405 , even though the case was brought under the Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act, § 8.01-184 et seq., because the underlying cause was a custody dispute. Miller v. Jenkins, 54 Va. App. 282, 678 S.E.2d 268, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 291 (2009).

Appellate jurisdiction in child guardian matters. - Subdivision 3 e of this section gives jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in "[a]ny final judgment, order, or decree of a circuit court involving ... [t]he control or disposition of a child." Because § 8.01-670 clearly contemplates the Court of Appeals having initial appellate jurisdiction over at least some of the judgments listed in that section, and because guardianship is a matter commonly involving the control or disposition of a child, these two jurisdictional statutes when read together evince a legislative intent to grant the Court of Appeals initial appellate jurisdiction in matters involving the appointment or qualification of guardians for a minor child. In re O'Neil, 18 Va. App. 674, 446 S.E.2d 475 (1994).

A court which does address the issue of validity of the agreement and declares it invalid acts within its jurisdiction and since the challenge to the validity of the agreement was raised in the divorce proceeding and the court did adjudicate the issue the appeals court had jurisdiction under subdivision 3 to review the determination that the contract, which was integral to the divorce proceeding, was invalid. Derby v. Derby, 8 Va. App. 19, 378 S.E.2d 74 (1989).

Institute could only appeal on issue of standing. - Where psychiatric institute was not a party to the administrative proceedings and where the circuit court did allow psychiatric institute to appeal the agency's final order denying psychiatric institute's permission to intervene although psychiatric institute was not a party to and could not appeal the substantive issues of the case, psychiatric institute could appeal on the issue of its standing and the right to intervene. Tidewater Psychiatric Inst., Inc. v. Buttery, 8 Va. App. 380, 382 S.E.2d 288 (1989).

Neighbor had standing in appeal of liquor license restrictions. - Neighbor objected to the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board's granting of liquor licenses to an applicant. Her failure to timely appeal the Board's decision to grant such licenses was a waiver only of her challenge to the issuance of the licenses, not of her right to defend the Board's decision to impose a 12:00 a.m. restriction on alcohol sales. Harrison v. Ocean View Fishing Pier, LLC, 50 Va. App. 556, 651 S.E.2d 421, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 397 (2007).

The appellant was not an aggrieved party, etc. where he was successful in his request to reverse an administrative finding of child abuse against him and in having all records relating to the case purged, but contended that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on a basis other than one he deemed appropriate. Perry v. Carter, No. 1366-98-1 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 2, 1998).

Husband was not an aggrieved party because he was the prevailing party below; the circuit court granted the husband's motion to reconsider and dismissed the wife's complaint for divorce, and although the husband did not like the circuit court's decision because he wanted it to rule in his favor on the validity of the marital agreement, his dislike did not give him standing to appeal the decision to dismiss the wife's complaint. Kesser v. Kesser, No. 0886-16-1, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 258 (Ct. of Appeals Oct. 11, 2016).

Circuit court did not err in sustaining property owners' demurrer because with respect to the State Building Code Technical Review Board's designation of the owners' barn as a farm building, neighbors' were not aggrieved parties under the Virginia Administrative Process Act; the neighbors did not suffer any deprivation of a personal or property right, or an imposition of any burden or obligation on their rights, from the determination that the owners' barn was a "farm building." Caldwell-Bono v. State Bldg. Code Tech. Review Bd., No. 1870-18-3, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 273 (November 26, 2019).

Transfer of criminal interlocutory appeal to Supreme Court. - Where in an appeal from an interlocutory order in a criminal case, defendant challenged a circuit court's refusal to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds his possession of marijuana with intent to distribute indictment, because the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to decide a defendant's interlocutory appeal in a criminal case, the court transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court. West v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 456, 445 S.E.2d 159 (1994).

Habeas corpus jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals' habeas corpus jurisdiction, whether appellate or original, must be defined with reference to the "cases over which" it has jurisdiction on direct appeal. Peterson v. Bass, 2 Va. App. 314, 343 S.E.2d 475 (1986).

Jurisdiction proper where underlying cause was divorce. - Because the underlying cause in this case was a decree involving a divorce, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the final judgment. Bullis v. Bullis, 22 Va. App. 24, 467 S.E.2d 830 (1996).

No jurisdiction over appeal from dismissal of cross-bill for annulment. - In a divorce case, an interlocutory decree dismissing appellant's cross-bill for annulment was not appealable, as the decree did not determine the status or validity of the parties' marriage, award spousal support, or make an equitable distribution of marital assets, it did not "respond to the chief object" of the domestic relations dispute and did not determine "the principles that were necessary to adjudicate the cause." Lewis v. Lewis, 271 Va. 520 , 628 S.E.2d 314, 2006 Va. LEXIS 44 (2006).

No jurisdiction over injunction related solely to the sale of business. - Appeal brought by a buyer's owner challenging the issuance of an injunction concerning use of a business name under an asset purchase agreement was transferred to the Supreme Court of Virginia because the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of Virginia under subdivision 4 of § 17.1-405 did not extend to an injunction related solely to the sale of a business. Chakri, LLC v. STD, Inc.,, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 235 (May 13, 2008).

Interlocutory classification of marital property not adjudication of cause. - An interlocutory decree in a divorce case which classified certain property as marital property did not adjudicate the principles of the cause and was not appealable in that the court had not valued or distributed the marital property or made any monetary award but had retained jurisdiction to consider these matters. Horn v. Horn, 28 Va. App. 688, 508 S.E.2d 347 (1998).

Inadequacy of pendente lite award. - The appeal of a claim of inadequacy of a pendente lite award in a divorce action is not an appeal from a "final order" or from an order "granting, dissolving or denying an injunction" or "adjudicating the principles of a cause," and, therefore, is not appealable under this section. Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 848, 407 S.E.2d 339 (1991).

An award of pendente lite support is an interlocutory order that does not adjudicate principles of a cause and is therefore not appealable. Lee v. Lee, No. 1888-99-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 684 (Ct. of Appeals Oct. 3, 2000).

Order holding open amount of lump sum award. - Although a 1984 order determined that appellee was entitled to lump sum alimony, it set no amount for the award. Until appellant was actually ordered to pay a lump sum award, the 1984 order (which held open the amount of the lump sum award) was not a final appealable order within the meaning of this section. Weizenbaum v. Weizenbaum, 12 Va. App. 899, 407 S.E.2d 37 (1991).

Order for partial lump sum alimony. - The trial court's order awarding the wife a "partial lump sum" alimony of $150,000 adjudicated "principles of a cause" and constitutes an appealable order. Weizenbaum v. Weizenbaum, 12 Va. App. 899, 407 S.E.2d 37 (1991).

Ruling on validity of premarital agreement. - An interlocutory decree invalidating an antenuptial agreement is not an appealable order. Webb v. Webb, 13 Va. App. 681, 414 S.E.2d 612 (1992).

Where a court order declaring a prenuptial agreement valid pursuant to Virginia law was a non-final, interlocutory order that did not adjudicate the principles of the cause, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Black v. Powers, No. 2022-02-1, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 549 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 4, 2003).

Appeal from final order of divorce following bifurcation. - Plain reading of subsection A of § 20-107.3 makes clear that upon motion and when it is clearly necessary to do so, the General Assembly intended to provide a circuit court with discretion to effectively finalize the issue of divorce independent of ancillary issues, such as equitable distribution and support, and adjudicate them separately, transforming one case into two; upon the proper exercise of discretion, the order granting the divorce becomes final twenty-one days after entry. Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 810 S.E.2d 912 (2018).

Use of the phrase "final decree of divorce" in subsection A of § 20-107.3 to reference a circuit court order reserving jurisdiction to adjudicate equitable matters at some future date, clearly suggests that, following bifurcation of the divorce from the remaining matters, the circuit court loses jurisdiction over the divorce decree twenty-one days from the entry of the order; in such a case, the statute clearly permits an appeal to the court of appeals from such a final order of divorce. Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 810 S.E.2d 912 (2018).

While the mere fact that an order labeled as "final" is not dispositive of its finality, the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of the statutory language "final decree of divorce" in subsection A of § 20-107.3 clearly suggests a statutory classification of finality for the purposes of appeal. Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 810 S.E.2d 912 (2018).

Court order properly bifurcating a divorce proceeding is a final order with respect to the divorce issue, thereby falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals twenty-one days after its entry; however, subsection A of § 20-107.3 also contemplates that following bifurcation, the circuit court retains jurisdiction over all other remaining matters explicitly reserved for future adjudication. Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 810 S.E.2d 912 (2018).

Decree for divorce and spousal support not addressing equitable distribution. - Where a wife had filed a bill of complaint for divorce in which she also sought spousal support and equitable distribution of the parties' property, the decree from which the husband sought to appeal was not a final order because it addressed only the issues of divorce and spousal support; because the decree did not effect an equitable distribution and left open such issues as the value of various items of marital property and the percentage of marital property to which each spouse was entitled, it also did not constitute an appealable interlocutory order. Yun Soo Kim v. Jung Ja Kim, No. 1825-00-4, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 186 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 10, 2001).

Where a pendente lite order freezing the parties' assets pursuant to clause (vii) of subsection A of § 20-103 was justified by the husband's pre-trial actions and the husband did not show that an order "requiring" him to obtain employment to pay child support was a mandatory injunction under § 17.1-405 , the order was not appealable. Wolters v. Wolters, No. 0106-03-4, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 585 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 12, 2003).

Spousal support. - Appellate court held that it had jurisdiction under § 17.1-405 over a wife's appeal as the underlying matter concerned spousal support. Gianaris v. Gianaris,, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 264 (July 6, 2010).

Action to change child's name. - Although an action brought by a parent to change a child's name, brought as a separate proceeding detached from any custody or support litigation, obviously relates to a child, it does not involve the "control or disposition" of the child within the meaning of this section and, therefore, is not within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. Rowland v. Shurbutt, 259 Va. 305 , 525 S.E.2d 917 (2000).

Court lacks jurisdiction over related contract dispute. - In a father's action seeking modification of child custody, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider a mother's appeal of the trial court's judgment granting a law firm's petition to enforce an attorney's lien for unpaid fees because the attorney's lien involved a contract dispute between the mother and the law firm. Mayo v. Mayo,, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 155 (Apr. 1, 2008).

A final decree is one which disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief that is contemplated, and leaves nothing to be done by the court. Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 451 S.E.2d 711 (1994).

Final judgment rule. - Circuit court's order was a final order because it disposed of the whole subject, ruled on all the relief contemplated, provided with reasonable completeness for giving effect to the ruling, and left nothing to be done in the cause save to superintend ministerially the execution of the order, and as such was appealable to an appellate court. Thus, the court's subsequent orders were of no moment in considering the finality of the original order because the jurisdiction of the trial court ceased. Knight v. Ottrix, 69 Va. App. 519, 820 S.E.2d 411, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 312 (2018).

Appeal dismissed where order on review not final. - Since a trial court order imposing conditions on a wife related to the sale of a condominium was not a final decision on the matter of the sale, and since the order specifically continued the matter to a later date, the order was not a final order and the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review it. The appellate court dismissed that part of the wife's appeal that was seeking to challenge the non-final order. Deluca v. Katchmeric,, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 228 (June 14, 2005).

When a circuit court refused to declare a juvenile court custody order void ab initio as requested by the father, the circuit court did not resolve any factual or legal issues concerning the merits of case, and as such, an appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the father's appeal because the circuit court's denial of the father's motion to dismiss was neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory order within the meaning of § 17.1-405 ; the circuit court's order merely denied the father's motion to vacate the order and retained the other matters in the case to be determined at a later time. Shetzline v. Shetzline,, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 50 (Feb. 21, 2012).

Court of Appeals of Virginia lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of an Indian tribe's appeal because the tribe's motion to transfer was merely a procedural step that the circuit court had to navigate along the road to deciding whether the parents' parental rights should be terminated, it was not the circuit court's final destination in adjudicating the merits of the case. Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Dinwiddie Dep't of Soc. Servs., Nos. 1713-12-2, 1724-12-2, 1725-12-2, 1726-12-2, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 250 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 10, 2013).

Reinstatement of order rendered it final. - Appellate court had jurisdiction over the wife's appeal challenging provisions of a final divorce decree where the circuit court's orders, when read together, made clear that the denial of the wife's motion to reconsider had the effect of reinstating a prior order as a final order. Pederson v. Pederson, Nos. 1178-15-4, 2093-15-4, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 217 (Ct. of Appeals Aug. 2, 2016).

Order terminating supervised visitation subject to appeal. - The recitals of the relief decreed in an order terminating supervised visitation clearly indicated that the order disposed of the issue raised by the mother's motion, gave all the relief contemplated and set a date certain, six months from its entry, to review the parties' compliance and, therefore, was subject to appeal; the fact that the trial judge reserved the right to revisit the issue if there was non-compliance did not mean that the order was not final. DeVeau v. Azemoto-DeVeau, No. 2481-99-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 553 (Ct. of Appeals July 25, 2000).

Where order in primary appeal was not appealable. - As a trial court's order remanding to Virginia Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Real Estate Board, for further reconsideration of a sanction it imposed against real estate agents was not a "final decision," the agents' designation of a default judgment ruling as an additional question on appeal under Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:21(b) was also an interlocutory appeal which the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear. Commonwealth v. Lancaster, 45 Va. App. 723, 613 S.E.2d 828, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 226 (2005).

Premature appeal. - Workers' Compensation Commission's order vacating a claimant's award was neither a final order nor an interlocutory order adjudicating the cause. Thus, the claimant's appeal was premature and the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case. Irby v. Lifepoint Health & Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., No. 0939-18-3, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 15 (Jan. 15, 2019).

Adjudication of principles of cause. - The principle is well established that to adjudicate the principles of the cause so as to be subject to appeal, the order must determine that the rules or methods by which the rights of the parties are to be finally worked out have been so far determined that it is only necessary to apply those rules or methods to the facts of the case in order to ascertain the relative rights of the parties, with regard to the subject matter of the suit. DeVeau v. Azemoto-DeVeau, No. 2481-99-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 553 (Ct. of Appeals July 25, 2000).

As a judge pro tempore's order awarding custody and child support to a mother and refusing to enjoin her from relocating with the children left several main objects of the divorce suit unresolved, the order did not adjudicate "the principles of a cause" within the meaning of subdivision 4 of this section. Therefore, the appellate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the father's appeal. de Haan v. de Haan, 54 Va. App. 428, 680 S.E.2d 297, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 349 (2009).

Workers' compensation order holding that a claim for permanent partial disability benefits was not barred by the statute of limitations and retaining jurisdiction to adjudicate a future claim for permanent partial impairment was interlocutory and not an appealable final order where the decision did not adjudicate the principles of the cause. Boar's Head Provisions Co. v. Daughtry,, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 184 (May 4, 2010).

No jurisdiction over alleged actions occurring before circuit court proceedings. - Appellate court's domestic relations jurisdiction was limited to reviewing decisions made by circuit courts; as such, the appellate court could take cognizance of issues pertaining to the guardian's appointment by and in the circuit court, but not any alleged defect that the father claimed occurred in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court proceedings. Accordingly, the issue presented by the father was not properly before the appellate court. Achin v. Ochoa, No. 1466-19-4, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 220 (July 28, 2020).

That no ruling of the circuit court was challenged was made clear in that what underlied father's argument on appeal related to alleged actions or omissions of the guardian that occurred prior to the initiation of proceedings in the circuit court; father's assignments of error in this regard presented no ruling of the circuit court subject to appellate review. Achin v. Ochoa, No. 1466-19-4, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 220 (July 28, 2020).

No jurisdiction. - Appellate court did not have jurisdiction under either § 19.2-318 or this section to review a trial court's ruling that a wife was not in contempt of court for failing to abide by a previous child custody and support order. Newton v. Jones, 66 Va. App. 20, 781 S.E.2d 759, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 42 (2016).

Court of Appeals of Virginia lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue raised by the appeal of a motion to vacate a conviction for extrinsic fraud because the issue was a collateral civil matter. Transfer of the case to the Supreme Court of Virginia was required. Terry v. Commonwealth,, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 347 (Feb. 27, 2017).

Court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to address a mother's claim that emergency removal orders violated the emergency removal statute because neither the emergency removal orders, nor any equivalent orders, were before the circuit court. Gerald v. Charlottesville Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0918-18-2, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 62 (Mar. 19, 2019).

Appellate court did not address the merits of a city's argument regarding the deputy commissioner's exclusion of evidence because the court had no ruling by the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission to review in that the city, in its written statement on review before the Commission, did not ask the Commission to rule on the evidentiary issue or to consider the evidence that had been excluded. Having not been asked, the Commission did not rule on the issue. City of Newport News v. Peninsula Neurosurgical Assocs., No. 1382-19-1, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 83 (Mar. 31, 2020).

Because there was no final decree adjudicating the merits of the parties' divorce action, as the wife died before a final decree was entered, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the daughter's second assignment of error or the husband's request for appellate attorney fees. Johnson v. Johnson, 72 Va. App. 771, 853 S.E.2d 550, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 19 (2021).

Applied in M. Morgan Cherry & Assocs. v. Cherry, 38 Va. App. 693, 568 S.E.2d 391, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 588 (2002); Pound v. Dep't of Game & Inland Fisheries, 40 Va. App. 59, 577 S.E.2d 533, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 119 (2003); Va. Dep't of Corr. v. Compton, 47 Va. App. 202, 623 S.E.2d 397, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 517 (2005); Comcast of Chesterfield County, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 277 Va. 293 , 672 S.E.2d 870, 2009 Va. LEXIS 40 (2009); Whitt v. Commonwealth, No. 0885-11-3, 61 Va. App. 637, 739 S.E.2d 254, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 100 (2013).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Construction with other laws. - If the use of "any" in §§ 8.01-670 A 3 and 17.1-405 is not sufficient to abrogate the common law, then nor should its use in § 16.1-296 A have that effect. Huck v. Banfield, 94 Va. Cir. 182, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 167 (Norfolk Aug. 25, 2016).

§ 17.1-405. (Effective January 1, 2022) Appellate jurisdiction - Administrative agency, Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission, and civil matter appeals.

Unless otherwise provided by law, any aggrieved party may appeal to the Court of Appeals from:

  1. Any final decision of a circuit court on appeal from (i) a decision of an administrative agency, or (ii) a grievance hearing decision issued pursuant to § 2.2-3005 ;
  2. Any final decision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission;
  3. Except as provided in subsection B of § 17.1-406 , any final judgment, order, or decree of a circuit court in a civil matter;
  4. Any interlocutory decree or order pursuant to § 8.01-267.8 , 8.01-626 , or 8.01-675.5 ; or
  5. Any final judgment, order, or decree of a circuit court (i) involving an application for a concealed weapons permit pursuant to Article 6.1 (§ 18.2-307.1 et seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2, (ii) involving involuntary treatment of prisoners pursuant to § 53.1-40.1 or 53.1-133.04 , or (iii) for declaratory or injunctive relief under § 57-2.02 . (1983, c. 413, § 17-116.05; 1984, c. 701; 1985, c. 283; 1990, c. 897; 1998, c. 872; 2000, cc. 830, 947, 1006; 2001, cc. 393, 420; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until January 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-405 .

Cross references. - As to certain cases over which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, see § 8.01-670 A.

As to appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over any order of a circuit court, magistrate, or other judicial officer which denies bail, requires excessive bail, or fixes unreasonable terms of recognizance, see §§ 19.2-124 and 19.2-319.

As to appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over any judgment of a circuit court for civil or criminal contempt, see § 19.2-318.

As to appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over any order of a circuit court involving involuntary treatment of prisoner, see § 53.1-40.1 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 830 substituted "Chapter 10.2 ( § 63.1-219.7 et seq.)" for "Chapter 11 ( § 63.1-220 et seq.)" in subdivision 3 g.

The 2000 amendments by cc. 947 and 1006 are identical, and added "(i)" and "or (ii) a grievance hearing decision issued pursuant to § 2.1-116.07" in subdivision 1.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendments by cc. 393 and 420 are identical, and deleted "or" at the end of subdivision 3 f, added "or" at the end of subdivision 3 g, and added subdivision 3 h.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, added "Unless otherwise provided by law" in the introductory language of the section; rewrote subdivisions 3 and 4; added subdivision 5; and made a stylistic change.

Law review. - For 1985 survey of Virginia civil procedure and practice, see 19 U. Rich. L. Rev. (1985).

For article, "The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Virginia Courts in Divorce and Equitable Distribution Proceedings," see 11 G.M.U. L. Rev. 73 (1989).

For survey on legal issues involving children in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 705 (1989).

For an article, "Final and Interlocutory Appeals in Virginia," see 8 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 337 (1999).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B Appeal and Error, §§ 20.1, 68, 72, 73, 78; 5A M.J. Courts, §§ 13, 36.1; 6A M.J. Discovery, § 2; 6A M.J. Divorce and Alimony, §§ 49, 68; 6B M.J. Drugs & Druggists, § 5; 8A M.J. Executors & Administrators, § 256; 9A M.J. Habeas Corpus, § 8; 10A M.J. Injunctions, § 72; 12B M.J. Mandamus, § 24; 15 M.J. Public Officers, § 46.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

"Cases" over which Court of Appeals has "appellate jurisdiction" are defined with reference to subject matter of the case and not the procedural means used to raise the issues. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a procedural device that is used to raise a wide variety of issues that may or may not involve criminal matters. White v. Garraghty, 2 Va. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 402 (1986).

Court has limited civil jurisdiction. - The statutory scheme of civil jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals adopted by the General Assembly is one of limited civil jurisdiction. County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 4, 1985).

While the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear an Indian tribe's appeal of the Water Control Board's decision under the Administrative Process Act, § 2.2-4000 et seq., the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the tribe's separate claims under Treaty at Middle Plantation With Tributary Indians After Bacon's Rebellion, May 29, 1677, art. V which were submitted to the circuit court's general jurisdiction. Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Quality ex rel. State Water Control Bd., 270 Va. 423 , 621 S.E.2d 78, 2005 Va. LEXIS 100 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1192, 126 S. Ct. 2862, 165 L. Ed. 2d 895 (2006).

Jurisdiction over worker's compensation case. - Because an appellate court's jurisdiction was over any final decision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission, the court's review of a workers' compensation case extended only to the Commission's ruling, not the opinion reached by the deputy commissioner. Anderson v. Anderson, 65 Va. App. 354, 778 S.E.2d 132 (2015).

No jurisdiction of appeal from former § 19.2-181 (1) commitment order. - The court of appeals had no jurisdiction of an appeal from a § 19.2-181 (1) (now § 19.2-182.3) commitment order; an examination of this section reveals no proceeding remotely resembling the proceeding at issue. Antzes v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 172, 409 S.E.2d 172 (1991).

Jurisdiction over prohibition writ. - Court had appellate jurisdiction over matters involving divorce and judgments for civil contempt of court; thus, the issues raised in the petition for a writ of prohibition fell within the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court rejected the claim that a final order was necessary to invoke the court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition. Hoffman P'ship, LLP v. Circuit Court, 72 Va. App. 206, 843 S.E.2d 396, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 175 (2020).

Jurisdiction of appeal of suit against the State Police for denial of consent to purchase firearm. - Suit brought by a man convicted of misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence as defined in the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(g)(9), against the state police under subsection E of § 18.2-308.2:2 and § 9.1-135 , after his request to buy a firearm was rejected, was a civil action not an appeal of an administrative agency decision, thereby vesting appellate jurisdiction with the Supreme Court of Virginia rather than the Court of Appeals under § 17.1-405 . Foltz v. Dep't of State Police, 55 Va. App. 182, 684 S.E.2d 841, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 510 (2009).

Appeal of probation revocation. - As a trial court's jurisdiction to revoke a convict's probation and suspension of sentence is part of a purely criminal process, and as under § 19.2-306 the trial court retained jurisdiction over the suspended portion of defendant's sentence during the two-year period of his probation and for one year thereafter, the trial court had jurisdiction over the suspended portion of defendant's sentence at the time it revoked defendant's probation. Accordingly, because defendant's appeal of the revocation order was an appeal from an action taken while the trial court retained jurisdiction over his sentence, his appeal was within the appellate court's jurisdiction under subsection A of § 17.1-406 . Green v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 191 , 557 S.E.2d 230, 2002 Va. LEXIS 23 (2002).

Review of Department of Corrections decisions not within appellate jurisdiction. - Review of a decision of the Virginia Department of Corrections does not fall within the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction because it is not an appeal from a final decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, an appeal from a final order involving a domestic relations matter, or an appeal from a judgment of conviction. Wright v. White, 17 Va. App. 42, 434 S.E.2d 693 (1993).

"Administrative agency." - While a definition of the term "administrative agency" is not found in this section, the court is not confined to the language of that section, but can look to other sections where the same term is used. Schwartz v. Highland County School Bd., 2 Va. App. 554, 346 S.E.2d 544 (1986).

In borrowing from the Administrative Process Act for a definition of the term "administrative agency" in Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of Zoning, 231 Va. 415 , 344 S.E.2d 899 (1986), the court did not incorporate all the provisions of the act into subdivision 1. It merely cited one of the act's exemptions to prove the point that a board of zoning appeals is not a board of state government. Commonwealth, Dep't of Hwys. & Transp. v. E.W. Yeatts, Inc., 233 Va. 17 , 353 S.E.2d 717 (1987).

Because § 33.1-192.1 [now 33.2-1102] required compliance with § 33.1-386 [now 33.2-1101], a surety's right to file a civil action against the Virginia Department of Transportation was dependent on its compliance with the administrative procedures prescribed by that section; thus, its civil action was an appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, and its appeal from the judgment of the circuit court was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. DOT, 269 Va. 362 , 611 S.E.2d 356, 2005 Va. LEXIS 38 (2005).

Subdivision 1 deals with decision made by administrative agency, and not with an administrative decision made by some entity that is not purely an administrative agency. Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415 , 344 S.E.2d 899 (1986).

No jurisdiction over proceeding to implement grievance panel decision. - Pursuant to subdivision 1 of § 17.1-405 , the Court of Appeals of Virginia had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from any final decision of a circuit court on appeal from: (i) a decision of an administrative agency; or (ii) a grievance hearing decision issued pursuant to § 2.2-3005 . The court found that the proceeding in the circuit court to implement the grievance panel decision was not an appeal from a grievance hearing decision. Va. Dep't of Corr. v. Estep, 55 Va. App. 386, 685 S.E.2d 891, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 549 (2009).

Jurisdiction over decisions of state building code technical review board. - Given this unique statutory scheme that effectively assimilates the actions of a locality and those of a state administrative agency and provides appellate review through the mechanism of the Virginia Administrative Process Act, the court of appeals has subject matter jurisdiction to resolve assignments of error relating to the initiation and enforcement of the decisions of the State Building Code Technical Review Board by localities. Gaines v. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 71 Va. App. 385, 837 S.E.2d 54, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 9 (2020).

Circuit court correctly concluded the initial citation of property and a city's subsequent enforcement of the State Building Code Technical Review Board's case decision was not error; because the interests and responsibilities of localities and the Review Board are overlapping and complimentary in the Uniform Statewide Building Code, any distinction between a Review Board case decision and the initiation and enforcement of that decision by a locality is one without a jurisdictional difference. Gaines v. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 71 Va. App. 385, 837 S.E.2d 54, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 9 (2020).

Section not limited to agencies covered by Administrative Procedure Act. - The legislature did not intend only those agencies defined in the Administrative Process Act to be administrative agencies within the meaning of this section. County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 4, 1985).

Appeals from decisions of agencies not under Administrative Process Act. - The legislative purpose set forth in former § 9-6.14:3 [now subsection B of § 2.2-4000 ] does not restrict appeals of all decisions of administrative agencies not encompassed by the Administrative Process Act to the Court of Appeals rather than the Virginia Supreme Court. County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 4, 1985).

Decisions rendered under locality grievance procedures. - Under § 15.2-1507 , grievance procedures adopted by a local governing body must include certain components of the state grievance procedure, but while § 15.2-1507 requires grievance procedures established by localities to be consistent with the provisions of § 2.2-1000 et seq., the locality procedures are distinct from the state procedures and arise under a separate statutory structure, and a decision rendered under a locality procedure is not a decision issued pursuant to § 2.2-3005 or a final grievance hearing decision issued pursuant to subsection B of § 2.2-3007 ; thus, decisions rendered under a locality procedure do not fall within an appellate court's jurisdiction under § 17.1-405 . Styles v. City of Colonial Heights, 43 Va. App. 588, 600 S.E.2d 174, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 378 (2004).

Virginia Department of Transportation is an administrative agency occupying an agency status even when deciding construction contract claims under § 33.1-386 [now 33.2-1101]. Commonwealth, Dep't of Hwys. & Transp. v. E.W. Yeatts, Inc., 233 Va. 17 , 353 S.E.2d 717 (1987).

County commissioner of revenue is not an administrative agency as contemplated by this section. County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 4, 1985).

County commissioner of accounts. - County commissioner of accounts had subject matter jurisdiction to hear a petition for aid and direction filed initially with him because the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and the supreme court reviewed decisions of the circuit court, not decisions of the commissioner; a commissioner's authority to assist the circuit court with the settlement of estates was an extension of the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction to administer estates. Gray v. Binder, 294 Va. 268 , 805 S.E.2d 768, 2017 Va. LEXIS 157 (2017).

No jurisdiction over appeals from determination of a state university. - Under § 17.1-405 , the Virginia Court of Appeals only has jurisdiction over an appeal from an administrative agency, not over an administrative decision made by an entity that is not purely an administrative agency. The Court of Appeals thus lacks jurisdiction over a trial court decision on appeal from the determination of a state university pursuant to § 23-7.4; appellate jurisdiction of such cases lies in the Virginia Supreme Court under subdivision A 3 of § 8.01-670 . George Mason Univ. v. Floyd, 275 Va. 32 , 654 S.E.2d 556, 2008 Va. LEXIS 11 (2008).

An interlocutory order or decree that adjudicates the principles of a cause is one which must determine the rights of the parties and would of necessity affect the final order in the case. Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 451 S.E.2d 711 (1994).

An interlocutory order that adjudicates the principles in a divorce case must respond to the chief object of the suit which was to secure a divorce. Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 451 S.E.2d 711 (1994).

An interlocutory order that adjudicates the principles of a domestic relations dispute must respond to the chief object of the suit, which is to determine the status of the parties' marriage and the custody of the parties' children, and, if appropriate, to award spousal and child support. Wells v. Wells, 29 Va. App. 82, 509 S.E.2d 549 (1999).

Trial court's custody order was an interlocutory order which adjudicated principles of the cause as to custody, and it was therefore separately appealable. Summers v. Summers, No. 2759-98-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 349 (Ct. of Appeals June 15, 1999).

Ruling that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission lacked jurisdiction to consider an administratrix of an estate of a deceased infant's (decedent) claim that the decedent's injuries were due to the doctors' intentional or willful and wanton acts was not an appealable order as it did not adjudicate the underlying issue as to whether the decedent suffered a birth-related neurological injury caused by the doctors, which is necessary to a Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act claim. Maryview Hosp. v. Woodard, 54 Va. App. 13, 675 S.E.2d 837, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 211 (2009).

Interlocutory orders. - Appellate jurisdiction existed even though the case had been remanded to the agency where the lower court had issued a decision on the merits of whether sufficient evidence supported a finding of actual injury to a student, and the Commonwealth had abandoned any actual injury theory of culpability. Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Betts, No. 1447-17-1, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 156 (June 12, 2018).

Bifurcation order. - The order in the instant case bifurcating the divorce from the other issues was not an order adjudicating the principles of a cause because it did not determine the rules by which the court would determine the rights of the parties. Nenninger v. Nenninger, 19 Va. App. 696, 454 S.E.2d 45 (1995).

Jurisdiction to consider appeal of interlocutory decree. - Unless the decree holding that the marriage is valid is an interlocutory decree that adjudicates the principles of the cause, Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of the interlocutory decree. Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 451 S.E.2d 711 (1994).

The mere possibility that an interlocutory decree may affect the final decision in the trial does not necessitate an immediate appeal. Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 451 S.E.2d 711 (1994).

Pursuant to this section, the court of appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from "any final judgment, order, or decree of a circuit court involving: . . . adoption;" as well as jurisdiction to hear an appeal from "any interlocutory decree or order entered in any of the cases listed in this section . . . adjudicating the principles of a cause;" thus where an interlocutory order of adoption effectively resolved the issue between these parties, the interlocutory order of adoption was an appealable order. Knight v. Laney, No. 1190-95-1, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 4 (Ct. of Appeals Jan. 11, 1996).

Where no final custody determination or decree of divorce had been entered, the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Wells v. Wells, 29 Va. App. 82, 509 S.E.2d 549 (1999).

An interlocutory decree adjudicates the principles of a cause so as to be subject to appeal when the rules or methods by which the rights of the parties are to be finally worked out have been so far determined that it is only necessary to apply those rules or methods to the facts of the case in order to ascertain the relative rights of the parties, with regard to the subject matter of the suit. Whitaker v. Day, 32 Va. App. 737, 530 S.E.2d 924, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 501 (2000).

A ruling denying a motion to dismiss, which alleges that the action is barred by principles of res judicata, is interlocutory and, therefore, is neither a final decree nor an adjudication of the principles of the cause so as to be ripe for appeal. Whitaker v. Day, 32 Va. App. 737, 530 S.E.2d 924, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 501 (2000).

Where a sanction order was entered solely against an attorney who represented a wife in a divorce case, the attorney had withdrawn from the case by the time the sanction order was entered, and the order resolved all the issues involving sanctions against the attorney, while leaving the underlying divorce action unresolved, the sanction order was an appealable interlocutory order within the meaning of subdivision 4 of § 17.1-405 . Vinson v. Vinson, 41 Va. App. 675, 588 S.E.2d 392, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 590 (2003).

Language of the December 2002 order was sufficient to lift the abeyance and finalize the May 1999 interlocutory order because the December 2002 order explicitly stated that the May 7, 1999 order was in full force and effect; therefore, there was jurisdiction to consider the issues related to the May 7, 1999 order adjudicating the husband's contempt. Klein v. Klein, No. 0211-03-4, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 621 (Ct. of Appeals Dec. 2, 2003).

Order denying intervention was not a final, appealable order as it did not dispose of the whole subject matter of the case; an appeal of an interlocutory order denying a tribe's motion to intervene in an action seeking review of an administrative order was dismissed. Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Va. Marine Res. Comm'n, 43 Va. App. 728, 601 S.E.2d 686, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 408 (2004).

Trial court's order denying a motion to intervene in an administrative appeal was not final and fell outside the appellate court's interlocutory appellate jurisdiction; an appeal of the denial of an intervention motion was dismissed. Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Va. Marine Res. Comm'n, 43 Va. App. 724, 601 S.E.2d 684, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 409 (2004).

Where the trial court indicated in its order that it would not exercise jurisdiction over the parties' divorce or child custody proceedings "at this time," the court expressly reserved jurisdiction on the issues of equitable distribution, child support, and spousal support to a later date, and thus, the trial court did nothing to violate § 20-146.18 ; accordingly, a husband's appeal from said order was dismissed as such was not taken from an appealable interlocutory order. Prizzia v. Prizzia, 45 Va. App. 280, 610 S.E.2d 326, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 117 (2005).

Appellate court could not consider the appeal of the wife's counsel in a divorce case from the trial court's interlocutory order that granted the husband's motion for sanctions and directed the wife's counsel to pay a certain sum in attorney's fees for work the husband's counsel incurred in defense of the wife's repeated pendente lite motions; pursuant to subdivision 4 of § 17.1-405 , the appellate court only had jurisdiction over interlocutory decrees entered in divorce actions where an injunction was involved or there was an adjudication of the principles of a cause, and neither situation was involved because no injunction was at issue and the sanction against the wife's counsel did not respond to the chief object of the suit, which was for the parties to divorce. O'Donoghue v. O'Donoghue,, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 124 (Mar. 27, 2007).

Because the underlying litigation had not been fully resolved, the denial of a daughter's request for permissive intervention as a third party beneficiary in order to enforce her parents' property settlement agreement was neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory order; therefore, the appeal was outside the appellate court's interlocutory jurisdiction under subdivision 4 of § 17.1-405 . Hickman v. Broaddus,, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 197 (May 15, 2007).

Because it was clear from the legislature's amendment of § 8.01-670 , and rejection of an amendment of § 17.1-405 , that § 8.01-670.1 applied only to interlocutory appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Court of Appeals of Virginia lacked jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal under § 8.01-670.1 . Further, the legislature did not limit the exclusion of § 8.01-670 .1 only to those interlocutory appeals over which the Court of Appeals already had jurisdiction, but instead, cited to the whole of § 17.1-405 . Commonwealth v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 49 Va. App. 797, 645 S.E.2d 337, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 249 (2007).

Final distribution of personal property as well as the resolution of the attorney's fees issue was dependent on the outcome of an arbitration hearing, a proceeding that had yet to begin when the divorce decree was entered. Accordingly, the decree failed to satisfy § 17.1-405 and the order was not an interlocutory order that adjudicates the principles of the cause; the appeals court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Fadness v. Fadness,, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 331 (Sept. 4, 2007).

Interlocutory order that a premarital agreement was enforceable was an appealable interlocutory order because the grounds for the divorce were not contested, and the only issue to be decided by the trial court was the validity of the agreement; therefore, the rules or methods by which the rights of the husband and wife were to be finally worked out had been determined by the trial court. Chaplain v. Chaplain, 54 Va. App. 762, 682 S.E.2d 108, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 396 (2009).

While a judge pro tempore's refusal to enjoin a mother from relocating with the parties' children would have fallen within the appellate court's jurisdiction under subdivision 4 of § 17.1-405 , the relocation issue was in fact moot since the judge presumed that the mother's relocation, which was necessitated by her military transfer, was inevitable. As the judge had previously ruled that the mother should receive custody, a separate decision on relocation was unnecessary; therefore, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to hear the father's appeal. de Haan v. de Haan, 54 Va. App. 428, 680 S.E.2d 297, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 349 (2009).

Reviewing court rejected the argument that the trial court lacked authority to order the wife to reimburse the husband pendente lite support since more than twenty-one days had passed since the entry of the order of annulment, because the order of annulment was not a final order. Naseer v. Moghal, No. 2186-12-4, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 220 (Ct. of Appeals July 30, 2013).

Jurisdiction to consider appeal of interlocutory order. - It was readily apparent that the April 7, 2008, order resolved all the questions raised by the complainant's bill, specifically determined the rights of the parties, and necessarily affected the final order in the case; furthermore, the registration of the Washington orders had immediate consequences for the father that could not be remedied by waiting until a final order was entered. Accordingly, the April 7, 2008, order was an appealable interlocutory order that adjudicated the "principles of a cause" within the meaning of subdivision 4 of § 17.1-405 . Phifer v. Commonwealth ex rel. Score,, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 423 (Sept. 22, 2009).

Husband raised the issue of whether the trial court had to relinquish its continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support matters provided by § 20-88.43:2 because neither husband nor wife currently resided in Virginia, but the trial court's order denying the husband's motion was not a final order because there was no live controversy before the court; for example, a pending motion for modification of spousal support pursuant to § 20-109 . Because the trial court's denial of the husband's motion to dismiss was neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory order within the meaning of § 17.1-405 , the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal. Kotara v. Kotara, No. 0290-09-4, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 485 (Nov. 3, 2009).

Standing to appeal adoption order. - Maternal grandmother was not entitled to appeal from a final order of adoption because the grandmother was not a party and did not have standing to appeal the final order. The grandmother never moved to intervene or make an appearance before the entry of the final order and thus, was never a party to the adoption. Bonanno v. Quinn, No. 2032-19-4, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 183 (June 30, 2020).

Rulings on discovery issues not generally within court's jurisdiction. - Ordinarily, a trial court's discovery orders are not subject to review on direct appeal because they are not final within the contemplation of this section; thus, because a trial court's denial of a motion to quash a subpoena neither adjudicated the underlying cause nor related to an attendant injunction but simply resolved an issue arising from discovery incidental to the claim, it was clearly an interlocutory determination over which the appellate court had no jurisdiction. Blue Fox, Inc. v. Rogers, No. 2400-00-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 272 (Ct. of Appeals May 22, 2001).

Orders by the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission compelling a benefits recipient to comply with discovery requests were not appealable; the orders did not affect the recipient's benefits, as there had been no request for review of the award, nor had the recipient been sanctioned for failing to comply with the discovery orders. Green v. Keil Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 42 Va. App. 539, 593 S.E.2d 525 (2004).

Appeal of right. - Because an order barring all future appeals, regardless of their subject matter or merit, until a monetary sanction was paid, effectively closed the doors to the Court of Appeals on a father, including "appeals of right" under § 17.1-405 , the sanction of dismissal under § 8.01-271.1 was unduly severe. Switzer v. Switzer, 273 Va. 326 , 641 S.E.2d 80, 2007 Va. LEXIS 34 (2007), on remand, appeal dismissed, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 440 (Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007).

Court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear a husband's appeal pursuant to the statute because the rule that the common law prohibition in Virginia against an appeal of a trial court's refusal to find a party in contempt had not been abrogated by the General Assembly; the husband assigned error to the circuit court's order that he pay the wife in equitable distribution based on its interpretation of the parties' separation agreement and final divorce decree. Monds v. Monds, 68 Va. App. 674, 813 S.E.2d 1, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 124 (2018).

Writ of coram vobis. - Because a writ of coram vobis fell outside the categories in § 17.1-405 , the appellate court had no jurisdiction to address it; accordingly, the matter was transferred to the state supreme court pursuant to § 8.01-677.1 . Draghia v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 291, 678 S.E.2d 272, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 290 (2009).

Order remanding matter to agency not appealable. - Because a trial court's order did not address the merits of a sanction imposed on real estate agents by the Virginia Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Real Estate Board, but remanded the matter for further consideration, its order was not a "final decision" within the meaning of this section, and the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the Board's appeal. Commonwealth v. Lancaster, 45 Va. App. 723, 613 S.E.2d 828, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 226 (2005).

Where the trial court remanded to the Virginia State Health Commissioner because the administrative record was incomplete, the court's order was not appealable, as it did not adjudicate the principles of the cause; the trial judge did not issue rulings or actual limitations such that it was necessary for the Commissioner to apply those rules or methods to the facts of the case in order to ascertain the rights of the parties in the action. Loudoun Hosp. Ctr. v. Stroube,, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 534 (Dec. 28, 2005).

Circuit court's order remanding an employment matter to a hearing officer for a new hearing because a tape of the grievance proceedings had been lost, precluding its review of the hearing officer's decision, and was not a final order as required for jurisdiction pursuant to subdivision 1 of § 17.1-405 ; therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction of the employer's appeal. Va. Dep't of Corr. v. Hodges, No. 1920-10-2, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 148 (Ct. of Appeals May 3, 2011).

Appeal by witness of discovery order not within court's jurisdiction. - Because a witness who brought a motion to quash a subpoena was not a party to the underlying proceedings, the court was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal; unless and until the witness refused to comply with the discovery order and was found in civil contempt by the court, it would not be a "party" to a case or controversy with standing to appeal. Blue Fox, Inc. v. Rogers, No. 2400-00-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 272 (Ct. of Appeals May 22, 2001).

Appeal from refusal to issue subpoena. - An order of a deputy commissioner refusing to issue a subpoena duces tecum, which was affirmed by the workers' compensation commission, neither adjudicated the underlying cause nor related to an attendant injunction but simply resolved an issue arising from discovery incidental to the claim and was clearly an interlocutory determination over which the court of appeals had no jurisdiction. City of Richmond-Fire & Emergency v. Brandon, 32 Va. App. 787, 531 S.E.2d 22, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 496 (2000).

And Court lacks jurisdiction on appeal as to erroneous assessment. - The Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order of a circuit court determining that a county commissioner of revenue has erroneously assessed taxes against real property. County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 4, 1985).

Since the county commissioner of revenue is not defined as an agency within the meaning of the Administrative Process Act and not generally considered an administrative agency in the general law, and, further, since § 58.1-3992 directs appeals arising from erroneous assessment of local taxes under § 58.1-3984 to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review a ruling of a circuit court as to the assessment of real property taxes. County of Roanoke v. Friendship Manor Apt. Village Corp., No. 0394-85 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 4, 1985).

Appeal from Director of Department of Human Resource Management. - Circuit court did not err in refusing to reverse a decision by the Director of the Department of Human Resource Management upholding an employee's termination because the director was permitted to assign tasks to agency personnel to carry out the director's duties; the tripartite review procedure had been undisturbed because the employee received a review of the facts by the hearing officer, a review of the policy by the department, and a review of the law by the court of appeals. Murphy v. Va. Dep't of State Police, 68 Va. App. 716, 813 S.E.2d 21, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 123 (2018).

Jurisdiction proper in appeal of decree debt obligation determination. - Where matter clearly arose out of the enforcement of a provision in a divorce decree requiring husband to hold wife harmless for their joint debt to bank, Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the trial court's determination that husband failed to comply with the terms of the decree. Douglas v. Douglas, 17 Va. App. 380, 437 S.E.2d 244 (1993).

Local school board is not an administrative agency within the provisions of this section. Schwartz v. Highland County School Bd., 2 Va. App. 554, 346 S.E.2d 544 (1986).

While the county school board was a party in the case involving decision of administrative hearing officers that school board did not give handicapped students a free and appropriate education, the State Board of Education was responsible for compliance with the requirements for receipt of federal assistance for special education programs, and it has adopted regulations that establish the two-tier administrative review process by the Department of Education to implement § 22.1-214 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415. Thus, this appeal involved a decision by an administrative arm of the State Board of Education rather than a decision by a local school board and the appeal was properly within the appellate jurisdiction of the court pursuant to this section. Beasley v. School Bd., 6 Va. App. 206, 367 S.E.2d 738 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 238 Va. 44 , 380 S.E.2d 884 (1989).

For action protesting decision to award contract brought under § 11-70 and not under the administrative appeals procedure authorized by § 11-71, appellate jurisdiction lies with the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals. Allstar Towing, Inc. v. City of Alexandria, 231 Va. 421 , 344 S.E.2d 903 (1986).

Board of zoning appeals not "administrative agency." - The General Assembly did not intend that boards of zoning appeals be included within the meaning of "administrative agency" as used in subdivision 1 of this section. Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415 , 344 S.E.2d 899 (1986).

Boards of zoning appeals are not administrative agencies for purposes of subdivision 1 of this section. Appeals from final decisions of circuit courts on appeal from decisions of boards of zoning appeals are properly brought in the Supreme Court. Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37 , 353 S.E.2d 727 (1987).

Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of motions to dismiss did not affect final decisions. - In ruling upon the motions to dismiss, the Workers' Compensation Commission did not resolve any factual or legal issues concerning the merits of the cases. The Commission's denial of the motions did not affect its final decision of the cases. Canova Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. LMI Ins. Co., 22 Va. App. 595, 471 S.E.2d 827 (1996).

Court lacks jurisdiction of decision of circuit court on appeal from board of zoning appeals. - The Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction of final decisions of circuit courts on appeal from decisions of boards of zoning appeals. Appellate jurisdiction of such cases lies in the Supreme Court under § 8.01-670 A 3, assuming, but not deciding, that a petition for certiorari under former § 15.1-497 (now § 15.2-2314 ) is an "appeal" from a decision of a board of zoning appeals within the meaning of subdivision 1 of this section. Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415 , 344 S.E.2d 899 (1986).

Appeal from § 33.1-387 civil action. - A § 33.1-387 [now 33.2-1103] civil action is, in legislative intendment, a § 17-116.05 1 (now subdivision 1 of this section) appeal, and on appeal therefrom, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction. Commonwealth, Dep't of Hwys. & Transp. v. E.W. Yeatts, Inc., 233 Va. 17 , 353 S.E.2d 717 (1987).

Jurisdiction in child custody dispute. - Appellate court had jurisdiction over an appeal under § 17.1-405 , even though the case was brought under the Virginia Declaratory Judgment Act, § 8.01-184 et seq., because the underlying cause was a custody dispute. Miller v. Jenkins, 54 Va. App. 282, 678 S.E.2d 268, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 291 (2009).

Appellate jurisdiction in child guardian matters. - Subdivision 3 e of this section gives jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in "[a]ny final judgment, order, or decree of a circuit court involving ... [t]he control or disposition of a child." Because § 8.01-670 clearly contemplates the Court of Appeals having initial appellate jurisdiction over at least some of the judgments listed in that section, and because guardianship is a matter commonly involving the control or disposition of a child, these two jurisdictional statutes when read together evince a legislative intent to grant the Court of Appeals initial appellate jurisdiction in matters involving the appointment or qualification of guardians for a minor child. In re O'Neil, 18 Va. App. 674, 446 S.E.2d 475 (1994).

A court which does address the issue of validity of the agreement and declares it invalid acts within its jurisdiction and since the challenge to the validity of the agreement was raised in the divorce proceeding and the court did adjudicate the issue the appeals court had jurisdiction under subdivision 3 to review the determination that the contract, which was integral to the divorce proceeding, was invalid. Derby v. Derby, 8 Va. App. 19, 378 S.E.2d 74 (1989).

Institute could only appeal on issue of standing. - Where psychiatric institute was not a party to the administrative proceedings and where the circuit court did allow psychiatric institute to appeal the agency's final order denying psychiatric institute's permission to intervene although psychiatric institute was not a party to and could not appeal the substantive issues of the case, psychiatric institute could appeal on the issue of its standing and the right to intervene. Tidewater Psychiatric Inst., Inc. v. Buttery, 8 Va. App. 380, 382 S.E.2d 288 (1989).

Neighbor had standing in appeal of liquor license restrictions. - Neighbor objected to the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board's granting of liquor licenses to an applicant. Her failure to timely appeal the Board's decision to grant such licenses was a waiver only of her challenge to the issuance of the licenses, not of her right to defend the Board's decision to impose a 12:00 a.m. restriction on alcohol sales. Harrison v. Ocean View Fishing Pier, LLC, 50 Va. App. 556, 651 S.E.2d 421, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 397 (2007).

The appellant was not an aggrieved party, etc. where he was successful in his request to reverse an administrative finding of child abuse against him and in having all records relating to the case purged, but contended that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on a basis other than one he deemed appropriate. Perry v. Carter, No. 1366-98-1 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 2, 1998).

Husband was not an aggrieved party because he was the prevailing party below; the circuit court granted the husband's motion to reconsider and dismissed the wife's complaint for divorce, and although the husband did not like the circuit court's decision because he wanted it to rule in his favor on the validity of the marital agreement, his dislike did not give him standing to appeal the decision to dismiss the wife's complaint. Kesser v. Kesser, No. 0886-16-1, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 258 (Ct. of Appeals Oct. 11, 2016).

Circuit court did not err in sustaining property owners' demurrer because with respect to the State Building Code Technical Review Board's designation of the owners' barn as a farm building, neighbors' were not aggrieved parties under the Virginia Administrative Process Act; the neighbors did not suffer any deprivation of a personal or property right, or an imposition of any burden or obligation on their rights, from the determination that the owners' barn was a "farm building." Caldwell-Bono v. State Bldg. Code Tech. Review Bd., No. 1870-18-3, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 273 (November 26, 2019).

Transfer of criminal interlocutory appeal to Supreme Court. - Where in an appeal from an interlocutory order in a criminal case, defendant challenged a circuit court's refusal to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds his possession of marijuana with intent to distribute indictment, because the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to decide a defendant's interlocutory appeal in a criminal case, the court transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court. West v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 456, 445 S.E.2d 159 (1994).

Habeas corpus jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals' habeas corpus jurisdiction, whether appellate or original, must be defined with reference to the "cases over which" it has jurisdiction on direct appeal. Peterson v. Bass, 2 Va. App. 314, 343 S.E.2d 475 (1986).

Jurisdiction proper where underlying cause was divorce. - Because the underlying cause in this case was a decree involving a divorce, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the final judgment. Bullis v. Bullis, 22 Va. App. 24, 467 S.E.2d 830 (1996).

No jurisdiction over appeal from dismissal of cross-bill for annulment. - In a divorce case, an interlocutory decree dismissing appellant's cross-bill for annulment was not appealable, as the decree did not determine the status or validity of the parties' marriage, award spousal support, or make an equitable distribution of marital assets, it did not "respond to the chief object" of the domestic relations dispute and did not determine "the principles that were necessary to adjudicate the cause." Lewis v. Lewis, 271 Va. 520 , 628 S.E.2d 314, 2006 Va. LEXIS 44 (2006).

No jurisdiction over injunction related solely to the sale of business. - Appeal brought by a buyer's owner challenging the issuance of an injunction concerning use of a business name under an asset purchase agreement was transferred to the Supreme Court of Virginia because the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of Virginia under subdivision 4 of § 17.1-405 did not extend to an injunction related solely to the sale of a business. Chakri, LLC v. STD, Inc.,, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 235 (May 13, 2008).

Interlocutory classification of marital property not adjudication of cause. - An interlocutory decree in a divorce case which classified certain property as marital property did not adjudicate the principles of the cause and was not appealable in that the court had not valued or distributed the marital property or made any monetary award but had retained jurisdiction to consider these matters. Horn v. Horn, 28 Va. App. 688, 508 S.E.2d 347 (1998).

Inadequacy of pendente lite award. - The appeal of a claim of inadequacy of a pendente lite award in a divorce action is not an appeal from a "final order" or from an order "granting, dissolving or denying an injunction" or "adjudicating the principles of a cause," and, therefore, is not appealable under this section. Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 848, 407 S.E.2d 339 (1991).

An award of pendente lite support is an interlocutory order that does not adjudicate principles of a cause and is therefore not appealable. Lee v. Lee, No. 1888-99-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 684 (Ct. of Appeals Oct. 3, 2000).

Order holding open amount of lump sum award. - Although a 1984 order determined that appellee was entitled to lump sum alimony, it set no amount for the award. Until appellant was actually ordered to pay a lump sum award, the 1984 order (which held open the amount of the lump sum award) was not a final appealable order within the meaning of this section. Weizenbaum v. Weizenbaum, 12 Va. App. 899, 407 S.E.2d 37 (1991).

Order for partial lump sum alimony. - The trial court's order awarding the wife a "partial lump sum" alimony of $150,000 adjudicated "principles of a cause" and constitutes an appealable order. Weizenbaum v. Weizenbaum, 12 Va. App. 899, 407 S.E.2d 37 (1991).

Ruling on validity of premarital agreement. - An interlocutory decree invalidating an antenuptial agreement is not an appealable order. Webb v. Webb, 13 Va. App. 681, 414 S.E.2d 612 (1992).

Where a court order declaring a prenuptial agreement valid pursuant to Virginia law was a non-final, interlocutory order that did not adjudicate the principles of the cause, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Black v. Powers, No. 2022-02-1, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 549 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 4, 2003).

Appeal from final order of divorce following bifurcation. - Plain reading of subsection A of § 20-107.3 makes clear that upon motion and when it is clearly necessary to do so, the General Assembly intended to provide a circuit court with discretion to effectively finalize the issue of divorce independent of ancillary issues, such as equitable distribution and support, and adjudicate them separately, transforming one case into two; upon the proper exercise of discretion, the order granting the divorce becomes final twenty-one days after entry. Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 810 S.E.2d 912 (2018).

Use of the phrase "final decree of divorce" in subsection A of § 20-107.3 to reference a circuit court order reserving jurisdiction to adjudicate equitable matters at some future date, clearly suggests that, following bifurcation of the divorce from the remaining matters, the circuit court loses jurisdiction over the divorce decree twenty-one days from the entry of the order; in such a case, the statute clearly permits an appeal to the court of appeals from such a final order of divorce. Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 810 S.E.2d 912 (2018).

While the mere fact that an order labeled as "final" is not dispositive of its finality, the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of the statutory language "final decree of divorce" in subsection A of § 20-107.3 clearly suggests a statutory classification of finality for the purposes of appeal. Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 810 S.E.2d 912 (2018).

Court order properly bifurcating a divorce proceeding is a final order with respect to the divorce issue, thereby falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals twenty-one days after its entry; however, subsection A of § 20-107.3 also contemplates that following bifurcation, the circuit court retains jurisdiction over all other remaining matters explicitly reserved for future adjudication. Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 810 S.E.2d 912 (2018).

Decree for divorce and spousal support not addressing equitable distribution. - Where a wife had filed a bill of complaint for divorce in which she also sought spousal support and equitable distribution of the parties' property, the decree from which the husband sought to appeal was not a final order because it addressed only the issues of divorce and spousal support; because the decree did not effect an equitable distribution and left open such issues as the value of various items of marital property and the percentage of marital property to which each spouse was entitled, it also did not constitute an appealable interlocutory order. Yun Soo Kim v. Jung Ja Kim, No. 1825-00-4, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 186 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 10, 2001).

Where a pendente lite order freezing the parties' assets pursuant to clause (vii) of subsection A of § 20-103 was justified by the husband's pre-trial actions and the husband did not show that an order "requiring" him to obtain employment to pay child support was a mandatory injunction under § 17.1-405 , the order was not appealable. Wolters v. Wolters, No. 0106-03-4, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 585 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 12, 2003).

Spousal support. - Appellate court held that it had jurisdiction under § 17.1-405 over a wife's appeal as the underlying matter concerned spousal support. Gianaris v. Gianaris,, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 264 (July 6, 2010).

Action to change child's name. - Although an action brought by a parent to change a child's name, brought as a separate proceeding detached from any custody or support litigation, obviously relates to a child, it does not involve the "control or disposition" of the child within the meaning of this section and, therefore, is not within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. Rowland v. Shurbutt, 259 Va. 305 , 525 S.E.2d 917 (2000).

Court lacks jurisdiction over related contract dispute. - In a father's action seeking modification of child custody, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider a mother's appeal of the trial court's judgment granting a law firm's petition to enforce an attorney's lien for unpaid fees because the attorney's lien involved a contract dispute between the mother and the law firm. Mayo v. Mayo,, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 155 (Apr. 1, 2008).

A final decree is one which disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief that is contemplated, and leaves nothing to be done by the court. Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 451 S.E.2d 711 (1994).

Final judgment rule. - Circuit court's order was a final order because it disposed of the whole subject, ruled on all the relief contemplated, provided with reasonable completeness for giving effect to the ruling, and left nothing to be done in the cause save to superintend ministerially the execution of the order, and as such was appealable to an appellate court. Thus, the court's subsequent orders were of no moment in considering the finality of the original order because the jurisdiction of the trial court ceased. Knight v. Ottrix, 69 Va. App. 519, 820 S.E.2d 411, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 312 (2018).

Appeal dismissed where order on review not final. - Since a trial court order imposing conditions on a wife related to the sale of a condominium was not a final decision on the matter of the sale, and since the order specifically continued the matter to a later date, the order was not a final order and the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review it. The appellate court dismissed that part of the wife's appeal that was seeking to challenge the non-final order. Deluca v. Katchmeric,, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 228 (June 14, 2005).

When a circuit court refused to declare a juvenile court custody order void ab initio as requested by the father, the circuit court did not resolve any factual or legal issues concerning the merits of case, and as such, an appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the father's appeal because the circuit court's denial of the father's motion to dismiss was neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory order within the meaning of § 17.1-405 ; the circuit court's order merely denied the father's motion to vacate the order and retained the other matters in the case to be determined at a later time. Shetzline v. Shetzline,, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 50 (Feb. 21, 2012).

Court of Appeals of Virginia lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of an Indian tribe's appeal because the tribe's motion to transfer was merely a procedural step that the circuit court had to navigate along the road to deciding whether the parents' parental rights should be terminated, it was not the circuit court's final destination in adjudicating the merits of the case. Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Dinwiddie Dep't of Soc. Servs., Nos. 1713-12-2, 1724-12-2, 1725-12-2, 1726-12-2, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 250 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 10, 2013).

Reinstatement of order rendered it final. - Appellate court had jurisdiction over the wife's appeal challenging provisions of a final divorce decree where the circuit court's orders, when read together, made clear that the denial of the wife's motion to reconsider had the effect of reinstating a prior order as a final order. Pederson v. Pederson, Nos. 1178-15-4, 2093-15-4, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 217 (Ct. of Appeals Aug. 2, 2016).

Order terminating supervised visitation subject to appeal. - The recitals of the relief decreed in an order terminating supervised visitation clearly indicated that the order disposed of the issue raised by the mother's motion, gave all the relief contemplated and set a date certain, six months from its entry, to review the parties' compliance and, therefore, was subject to appeal; the fact that the trial judge reserved the right to revisit the issue if there was non-compliance did not mean that the order was not final. DeVeau v. Azemoto-DeVeau, No. 2481-99-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 553 (Ct. of Appeals July 25, 2000).

Where order in primary appeal was not appealable. - As a trial court's order remanding to Virginia Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Real Estate Board, for further reconsideration of a sanction it imposed against real estate agents was not a "final decision," the agents' designation of a default judgment ruling as an additional question on appeal under Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:21(b) was also an interlocutory appeal which the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear. Commonwealth v. Lancaster, 45 Va. App. 723, 613 S.E.2d 828, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 226 (2005).

Premature appeal. - Workers' Compensation Commission's order vacating a claimant's award was neither a final order nor an interlocutory order adjudicating the cause. Thus, the claimant's appeal was premature and the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case. Irby v. Lifepoint Health & Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., No. 0939-18-3, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 15 (Jan. 15, 2019).

Adjudication of principles of cause. - The principle is well established that to adjudicate the principles of the cause so as to be subject to appeal, the order must determine that the rules or methods by which the rights of the parties are to be finally worked out have been so far determined that it is only necessary to apply those rules or methods to the facts of the case in order to ascertain the relative rights of the parties, with regard to the subject matter of the suit. DeVeau v. Azemoto-DeVeau, No. 2481-99-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 553 (Ct. of Appeals July 25, 2000).

As a judge pro tempore's order awarding custody and child support to a mother and refusing to enjoin her from relocating with the children left several main objects of the divorce suit unresolved, the order did not adjudicate "the principles of a cause" within the meaning of subdivision 4 of this section. Therefore, the appellate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the father's appeal. de Haan v. de Haan, 54 Va. App. 428, 680 S.E.2d 297, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 349 (2009).

Workers' compensation order holding that a claim for permanent partial disability benefits was not barred by the statute of limitations and retaining jurisdiction to adjudicate a future claim for permanent partial impairment was interlocutory and not an appealable final order where the decision did not adjudicate the principles of the cause. Boar's Head Provisions Co. v. Daughtry,, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 184 (May 4, 2010).

No jurisdiction over alleged actions occurring before circuit court proceedings. - Appellate court's domestic relations jurisdiction was limited to reviewing decisions made by circuit courts; as such, the appellate court could take cognizance of issues pertaining to the guardian's appointment by and in the circuit court, but not any alleged defect that the father claimed occurred in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court proceedings. Accordingly, the issue presented by the father was not properly before the appellate court. Achin v. Ochoa, No. 1466-19-4, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 220 (July 28, 2020).

That no ruling of the circuit court was challenged was made clear in that what underlied father's argument on appeal related to alleged actions or omissions of the guardian that occurred prior to the initiation of proceedings in the circuit court; father's assignments of error in this regard presented no ruling of the circuit court subject to appellate review. Achin v. Ochoa, No. 1466-19-4, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 220 (July 28, 2020).

No jurisdiction. - Appellate court did not have jurisdiction under either § 19.2-318 or this section to review a trial court's ruling that a wife was not in contempt of court for failing to abide by a previous child custody and support order. Newton v. Jones, 66 Va. App. 20, 781 S.E.2d 759, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 42 (2016).

Court of Appeals of Virginia lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue raised by the appeal of a motion to vacate a conviction for extrinsic fraud because the issue was a collateral civil matter. Transfer of the case to the Supreme Court of Virginia was required. Terry v. Commonwealth,, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 347 (Feb. 27, 2017).

Court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to address a mother's claim that emergency removal orders violated the emergency removal statute because neither the emergency removal orders, nor any equivalent orders, were before the circuit court. Gerald v. Charlottesville Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0918-18-2, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 62 (Mar. 19, 2019).

Appellate court did not address the merits of a city's argument regarding the deputy commissioner's exclusion of evidence because the court had no ruling by the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission to review in that the city, in its written statement on review before the Commission, did not ask the Commission to rule on the evidentiary issue or to consider the evidence that had been excluded. Having not been asked, the Commission did not rule on the issue. City of Newport News v. Peninsula Neurosurgical Assocs., No. 1382-19-1, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 83 (Mar. 31, 2020).

Because there was no final decree adjudicating the merits of the parties' divorce action, as the wife died before a final decree was entered, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the daughter's second assignment of error or the husband's request for appellate attorney fees. Johnson v. Johnson, 72 Va. App. 771, 853 S.E.2d 550, 2021 Va. App. LEXIS 19 (2021).

Applied in M. Morgan Cherry & Assocs. v. Cherry, 38 Va. App. 693, 568 S.E.2d 391, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 588 (2002); Pound v. Dep't of Game & Inland Fisheries, 40 Va. App. 59, 577 S.E.2d 533, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 119 (2003); Va. Dep't of Corr. v. Compton, 47 Va. App. 202, 623 S.E.2d 397, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 517 (2005); Comcast of Chesterfield County, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 277 Va. 293 , 672 S.E.2d 870, 2009 Va. LEXIS 40 (2009); Whitt v. Commonwealth, No. 0885-11-3, 61 Va. App. 637, 739 S.E.2d 254, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 100 (2013).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Construction with other laws. - If the use of "any" in §§ 8.01-670 A 3 and 17.1-405 is not sufficient to abrogate the common law, then nor should its use in § 16.1-296 A have that effect. Huck v. Banfield, 94 Va. Cir. 182, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 167 (Norfolk Aug. 25, 2016).

§ 17.1-406. (Effective until January 1, 2022) Petitions for appeal; cases over which Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction.

  1. Any aggrieved party may present a petition for appeal to the Court of Appeals from (i) any final conviction in a circuit court of a traffic infraction or a crime, (ii) any final decision of a circuit court on an application for a concealed weapons permit pursuant to Article 6.1 (§ 18.2-307.1 et seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2, (iii) any final order of a circuit court involving involuntary treatment of prisoners pursuant to § 53.1-40.1 or 53.1-133.04 , or (iv) any final order for declaratory or injunctive relief under § 57-2.02 . The Commonwealth or any county, city or town may petition the Court of Appeals for an appeal pursuant to this subsection in any case in which such party previously could have petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of error under § 19.2-317. The Commonwealth may also petition the Court of Appeals for an appeal in a criminal case pursuant to § 19.2-398.
  2. In accordance with other applicable provisions of law, appeals lie directly to the Supreme Court from a final decision, judgment, or order of a circuit court involving a petition for a writ of habeas corpus; from any final finding, decision, order, or judgment of the State Corporation Commission; and from proceedings under §§ 54.1-3935 and 54.1-3937 . Complaints of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Court of Appeals shall not have jurisdiction over any cases or proceedings described in this subsection. (1984, c. 701, § 17-116.05:1; 1985, c. 371; 1987, cc. 707, 710; 1988, c. 873; 1998, c. 872; 2007, c. 889; 2013, c. 746; 2019, c. 809; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344, 345.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective January 1, 2022, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-406 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2013, c. 746, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act are declaratory of existing law."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 3 provides: "That any person under a sentence of death imposed for an offense committed prior to July 1, 2021, but who has not been executed by July 1, 2021, shall have his sentence changed to life imprisonment, and such person who was 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense shall not be eligible for (i) parole, (ii) any good conduct allowance or any earned sentence credits under Chapter 6 ( § 53.1-186 et seq.) of Title 53.1 of the Code of Virginia, or (iii) conditional release pursuant to § 53.1-40.01 or 53.1-40.02 of the Code of Virginia."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 4 provides: "That notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person may be sentenced to death or put to death on or after the effective date of this act [July 1, 2021] for any violation of law."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, cl. 5 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation is $77,376 for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities and $0 for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 889 added clause (iv) in subsection A and made a related change.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 746 substituted "pursuant to Article 6.1 ( § 18.2-307.1 et seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2" for "pursuant to subsection D of § 18.2-308 " at the end of clause (ii) in the first sentence of subsection A.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 809, in subsection A, inserted "or 53.1-133.04 " following "to § 53.1-40.1 ."

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendments by Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, effective July 1, 2021, are identical, and deleted "except where a sentence of death has been Imposed" from the end of clause (i) of subsection A; and deleted "from a conviction in which a sentence of death is imposed" following "Supreme Court" in the first sentence of subsection B; and made stylistic changes.

Law review. - For 1985 survey of Virginia civil procedure and practice, see 19 U. Rich. L. Rev. (1985).

For an article, 'Final and Interlocutory Appeals in Virginia,' see 8 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 337 (1999).

For article surveying developments in criminal law and procedure in Virginia from July 2001 to September 2002, see 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 45 (2002).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 15, 20.1, 56; 9A M.J. Habeas Corpus, §§ 18, 25; 10A M.J. Injunctions, § 72; 12B M.J. Mandamus, § 24.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Constitutionality. - The right to appellate review is a statutory right and is not a necessary element of due process; thus, no due process violation occurs if an appeal is barred. Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460 , 357 S.E.2d 500, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S. Ct. 308, 98 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1987).

The statutes which limit review of a death penalty case to the Supreme Court do not violate equal protection rights, as it is rational for the General Assembly, given the gravity of cases involving a sentence to death, to provide death-penalty defendants as automatic, plenary review in the Commonwealth's highest court. Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460 , 357 S.E.2d 500, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S. Ct. 308, 98 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1987).

No final order of conviction. - Where a motion to nolle prosequi a misdemeanor charge was granted, no final order of conviction was entered; as a result, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction under clause (i) of subsection A of § 17.1-406 to entertain an appeal of the interlocutory order. Everett v. Commonwealth, No. 3036-01-4, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 578 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 12, 2003).

Defendant's appeal of his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol was dismissed because the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction over the appeal of his conviction under Amherst County, Va., Code § 9.1, which was based upon an order correcting a sentencing order, since defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal that named the proper prosecuting authority, and the sentencing order was the final appealable conviction order; the corrected order, which was entered pursuant to subsection B of § 8.01-428 , merely fixed a clerical error and clarified that defendant was convicted under the Amherst County Code, and subsection B of § 8.01-428 was a prescriptive statutory provision simply providing a mechanism to correct non-substantive errors in the record and neither enhanced nor diminished the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. Woody v. County of Amherst,, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 286 (July 20, 2010).

Court of appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's challenge to the trial court's finding of good cause to grant the Commonwealth's motion to nolle prosequi because defendant did not appeal a decision of the trial court leading to his convictions; defendant challenged the trial court's good cause finding with respect to the initial indictments, which became a legal nullity once the trial court entered the nolle prosequi. Truman v. Commonwealth, No. 1703-16-4, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 81 (Mar. 27, 2018).

When the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed defendant's appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss a case in which defendant was found incompetent to stand trial for lack of jurisdiction due to the appeal's criminal nature, the case was not transferred to the Virginia Court of Appeals because there had been no final conviction. Martinez v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 387 , 821 S.E.2d 529, 2018 Va. LEXIS 176 (2018).

Order deferring disposition was not a final judgment of conviction. - Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear defendant's appeal because the trial court's order deferring disposition did not constitute a final judgment of conviction; the trial court's order required further action, either an adjudication of guilty upon violation of probation or the dismissal upon fulfillment of the conditions of probation. Randolph v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 166, 609 S.E.2d 84, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 77 (2005).

Motion to withdraw guilty plea. - Because a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under § 19.2-296 is designed by statute to be filed and disposed of while the circuit court retains jurisdiction over the case, the motion is criminal in nature; such motion does not challenge the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Thus, the defendant's appeal was subject to the criminal appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under subsection A of § 17.1-406 . Williams v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 189 , 557 S.E.2d 233, 2002 Va. LEXIS 22 (2002).

Court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal from an order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion since it did not reacquire plenary jurisdiction when it exercised its limited jurisdiction to enter a corrective sentencing order; the fact that the trial court was authorized to enter the amended order did not vest it with jurisdiction to do anything else regarding the case. Minor v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 728, 791 S.E.2d 757 (2016).

Appeal of probation revocation. - As a trial court's jurisdiction to revoke a convict's probation and suspension of sentence is part of a purely criminal process, and as under § 19.2-306 the trial court retained jurisdiction over the suspended portion of defendant's sentence during the two-year period of his probation and for one year thereafter, the trial court had jurisdiction over the suspended portion of defendant's sentence at the time it revoked defendant's probation. Accordingly, because defendant's appeal of the revocation order was an appeal from an action taken while the trial court retained jurisdiction over his sentence, his appeal was within the appellate court's jurisdiction under subsection A of § 17.1-406 . Green v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 191 , 557 S.E.2d 230, 2002 Va. LEXIS 23 (2002).

Relief that is civil in nature. - Since appellate jurisdiction under subsection A of § 8.01-677.1 is limited to appeals from final criminal convictions, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over relief which was civil in nature, requested by way of a motion to vacate a conviction filed after the conviction became final. Commonwealth v. Southerly, 262 Va. 294 , 551 S.E.2d 650, 2001 Va. LEXIS 111 (2001).

Former § 3.1-796.115 (now § 3.2-6569), the animal seizure statute, was not so punitive in effect as to transform the civil remedy into a criminal penalty; the Court of Appeals of Virginia had only limited jurisdiction in civil matters and statutory forfeiture procedures provided for appellate review only in the Supreme Court of Virginia. Settle v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 212, 685 S.E.2d 182, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 524 (2009).

Intermediate appellate court transferred an appeal to the state supreme court, pursuant to § 8.01-677.1 , because the intermediate court did not have jurisdiction pursuant clause (i) of subsection A of § 17.1-406 to consider an appeal by a reporter and a newspaper of an order placing copies of court exhibits under seal in a criminal matter. The trial court's order to remove the exhibits and place the copies under seal was not a purely criminal matter falling under the intermediate court's jurisdiction under clause (i). Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 213, 725 S.E.2d 737, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 175 (2012).

In a case where a jury found appellant's dog to be dangerous, and the trial court ordered appellant to comply with registration and maintenance provisions and to make restitution, the underlying proceeding and appeal were civil in nature as appellant sustained no criminal conviction; thus, because the current appeal was civil in nature, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider it, and the court of appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Virginia. O'Malley v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 296, 785 S.E.2d 221 (2016).

Habeas corpus jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals' habeas corpus jurisdiction, whether appellate or original, must be defined with reference to the "cases over which" it has jurisdiction on direct appeal. Peterson v. Bass, 2 Va. App. 314, 343 S.E.2d 475 (1986).

Original jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus. - Since the Court of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction over the issues raised by the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, under former § 17-116.04 (now § 17.1-404 ) the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an inmate who wishes to challenge the validity of his detention in appropriate cases. This in no way limits the clear legislative intent expressed in the 1985 amendment of this section that habeas corpus cases on appeal from the circuit courts go directly to the Supreme Court. White v. Garraghty, 2 Va. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 402 (1986).

No jurisdiction on appeal from habeas corpus proceeding in circuit court. - It is clear from the 1985 amendment to subsection B that effective July 1, 1985, the General Assembly terminated the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to hear and determine appeals from a final decision, judgment or order of a circuit court involving a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. White v. Garraghty, 2 Va. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 402 (1986).

By amendment to subsection B, effective July 1, 1985, the General Assembly terminated the jurisdiction of Court of Appeals to hear and determine appeals from a final decision, judgment or order of a circuit court involving a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the clear legislative intent embodied in the 1985 amendment was that habeas corpus cases on appeal from the circuit courts should go directly to the Supreme Court. Hill v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 60, 379 S.E.2d 134 (1989).

No jurisdiction where trial court has not ruled on motion. - Court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear defendant's motion to set aside the jury's verdict and grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence because the motion had not been ruled on by the trial court. Merritt v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 719, 689 S.E.2d 757, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 81 (2010).

An order denying a motion for a copy of the trial transcript is not a final order as contemplated in this section. Phennicie v. Huffman, No. 0744-85 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 23, 1986).

Subject matter of appeal became criminal upon conviction of child and sentencing as adult. - Where the case initially involved the control and custody of a child, when that child was convicted of a criminal offense and sentenced as an adult, the subject matter of his appeal from the circuit court became criminal, not civil and his appeal was properly an appeal by petition pursuant to this section and not an appeal of right. Grogg v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 598, 371 S.E.2d 549 (1988).

Petition not timely filed. - Petition to Court of Appeals was considered a review pursuant to subsection D of § 18.2-308 , and thus its filing more than 30 days after the decision was untimely. It was not treated as a "petition for appeal" under Rule 5A:12 whereby the filing would have followed the record within 40 days and been timely. In re Cummins, 19 Va. App. 128, 449 S.E.2d 263 (1994).

Right to appeal. - Although an aggrieved party, such as defendant following defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana, had a right to present a petition for appeal to the appellate court, the appellate court could not act on defendant's attempt to appeal because § 17.1-406 also required that the appeal be from a final judgment, and since the trial court had not sentenced defendant on defendant's conviction, no final judgment existed for the purposes of appeal. Brown v. Commonwealth, No. 1596-02-1, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 141 (Ct. of Appeals Mar. 18, 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for driving while intoxicated and defendant's claim that the trial court erred in accepting "inadmissible" hearsay based on the trial court's consideration of certificates of analysis establishing defendant's blood alcohol level was rejected, as the petition that granted defendant leave to appeal specifically denied defendant the right to appeal on that ground. West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 597 S.E.2d 274, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 276 (2004).

Court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review. - Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review a circuit court's dismissal of indictments, based upon the circuit court's conclusion that an attempted prosecution violated the circuit court's interpretation of the immunity provision of a plea agreement, because the Court of Appeals was not statutorily permitted to review the circuit court's interpretation of a plea or immunity agreement. Commonwealth v. Morrissey, No. 0559-15-2, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 271 (Sept. 22, 2015).

Court of Appeals of Virginia lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue raised by the appeal of a motion to vacate a conviction for extrinsic fraud because the issue was a collateral civil matter. Transfer of the case to the Supreme Court of Virginia was required. Terry v. Commonwealth,, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 347 (Feb. 27, 2017).

Applied in Whitt v. Commonwealth, No. 0885-11-3, 61 Va. App. 637, 739 S.E.2d 254, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 100 (2013).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Right to appeal. - Counsel was not ineffective for failing to timely prosecute an appeal of the prisoner's conviction because there was no right of appeal of a non-capital criminal case and a reasonable inference from the prisoner's amended complaint was that he discharged his attorney, which was why he did not further pursue the appellate process. Eavey v. Lee, 94 Va. Cir. 383, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 204 (Augusta County Oct. 14, 2016).

§ 17.1-406. (Effective January 1, 2022) Appeals in criminal matters; cases over which Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction.

  1. Any aggrieved party may appeal to the Court of Appeals from any final conviction in a circuit court of a traffic infraction or a crime. The Commonwealth or any county, city, or town may petition the Court of Appeals for an appeal pursuant to this subsection in any case in which such party previously could have petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of error under § 19.2-317. The Commonwealth may also petition the Court of Appeals for an appeal in a criminal case pursuant to § 19.2-398.
  2. In accordance with other applicable provisions of law, appeals lie directly to the Supreme Court from a final decision, judgment or order of a circuit court involving a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, from any final finding, decision, order, or judgment of the State Corporation Commission, and from proceedings under §§ 54.1-3935 and 54.1-3937 . Complaints of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Court of Appeals shall not have jurisdiction over any cases or proceedings described in this subsection. (1984, c. 701, § 17-116.05:1; 1985, c. 371; 1987, cc. 707, 710; 1988, c. 873; 1998, c. 872; 2007, c. 889; 2013, c. 746; 2019, c. 809; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344, 345, 489.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until January 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-406 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2013, c. 746, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act are declaratory of existing law."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2007 amendments. - The 2007 amendment by c. 889 added clause (iv) in subsection A and made a related change.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 746 substituted "pursuant to Article 6.1 ( § 18.2-307.1 et seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2" for "pursuant to subsection D of § 18.2-308 " at the end of clause (ii) in the first sentence of subsection A.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 809, in subsection A, inserted "or 53.1-133.04 " following "to § 53.1-40.1 ."

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendments by Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344 and 345, effective July 1, 2021, are identical, and deleted "except where a sentence of death has been Imposed" from the end of clause (i) of subsection A; and deleted "from a conviction in which a sentence of death is imposed" following "Supreme Court" in the first sentence of subsection B; and made stylistic changes.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, in subsection A, deleted "present a petition for" following "Any aggrieved party may" and deleted clauses (ii)-(iv) in the first sentence, which read: "(ii) any final decision of a circuit court on an application for a concealed weapons permit pursuant to Article 6.1 ( § 18.2-307.1 et seq.) of Chapter 7 of Title 18.2, (iii) any final order of a circuit court involving involuntary treatment of prisoners pursuant to § 53.1-40.1 or 53.1-133.04 , or (iv) any final order for declaratory or injunctive relief under § 57-2.02 "; and made a stylistic change.

Law review. - For 1985 survey of Virginia civil procedure and practice, see 19 U. Rich. L. Rev. (1985).

For an article, 'Final and Interlocutory Appeals in Virginia,' see 8 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 337 (1999).

For article surveying developments in criminal law and procedure in Virginia from July 2001 to September 2002, see 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 45 (2002).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 15, 20.1, 56; 9A M.J. Habeas Corpus, §§ 18, 25; 10A M.J. Injunctions, § 72; 12B M.J. Mandamus, § 24.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Constitutionality. - The right to appellate review is a statutory right and is not a necessary element of due process; thus, no due process violation occurs if an appeal is barred. Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460 , 357 S.E.2d 500, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S. Ct. 308, 98 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1987).

The statutes which limit review of a death penalty case to the Supreme Court do not violate equal protection rights, as it is rational for the General Assembly, given the gravity of cases involving a sentence to death, to provide death-penalty defendants as automatic, plenary review in the Commonwealth's highest court. Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460 , 357 S.E.2d 500, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S. Ct. 308, 98 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1987).

No final order of conviction. - Where a motion to nolle prosequi a misdemeanor charge was granted, no final order of conviction was entered; as a result, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction under clause (i) of subsection A of § 17.1-406 to entertain an appeal of the interlocutory order. Everett v. Commonwealth, No. 3036-01-4, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 578 (Ct. of Appeals Nov. 12, 2003).

Defendant's appeal of his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol was dismissed because the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction over the appeal of his conviction under Amherst County, Va., Code § 9.1, which was based upon an order correcting a sentencing order, since defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal that named the proper prosecuting authority, and the sentencing order was the final appealable conviction order; the corrected order, which was entered pursuant to subsection B of § 8.01-428 , merely fixed a clerical error and clarified that defendant was convicted under the Amherst County Code, and subsection B of § 8.01-428 was a prescriptive statutory provision simply providing a mechanism to correct non-substantive errors in the record and neither enhanced nor diminished the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. Woody v. County of Amherst,, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 286 (July 20, 2010).

Court of appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's challenge to the trial court's finding of good cause to grant the Commonwealth's motion to nolle prosequi because defendant did not appeal a decision of the trial court leading to his convictions; defendant challenged the trial court's good cause finding with respect to the initial indictments, which became a legal nullity once the trial court entered the nolle prosequi. Truman v. Commonwealth, No. 1703-16-4, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 81 (Mar. 27, 2018).

When the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed defendant's appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss a case in which defendant was found incompetent to stand trial for lack of jurisdiction due to the appeal's criminal nature, the case was not transferred to the Virginia Court of Appeals because there had been no final conviction. Martinez v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 387 , 821 S.E.2d 529, 2018 Va. LEXIS 176 (2018).

Order deferring disposition was not a final judgment of conviction. - Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear defendant's appeal because the trial court's order deferring disposition did not constitute a final judgment of conviction; the trial court's order required further action, either an adjudication of guilty upon violation of probation or the dismissal upon fulfillment of the conditions of probation. Randolph v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 166, 609 S.E.2d 84, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 77 (2005).

Motion to withdraw guilty plea. - Because a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under § 19.2-296 is designed by statute to be filed and disposed of while the circuit court retains jurisdiction over the case, the motion is criminal in nature; such motion does not challenge the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Thus, the defendant's appeal was subject to the criminal appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under subsection A of § 17.1-406 . Williams v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 189 , 557 S.E.2d 233, 2002 Va. LEXIS 22 (2002).

Court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal from an order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion since it did not reacquire plenary jurisdiction when it exercised its limited jurisdiction to enter a corrective sentencing order; the fact that the trial court was authorized to enter the amended order did not vest it with jurisdiction to do anything else regarding the case. Minor v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 728, 791 S.E.2d 757 (2016).

Appeal of probation revocation. - As a trial court's jurisdiction to revoke a convict's probation and suspension of sentence is part of a purely criminal process, and as under § 19.2-306 the trial court retained jurisdiction over the suspended portion of defendant's sentence during the two-year period of his probation and for one year thereafter, the trial court had jurisdiction over the suspended portion of defendant's sentence at the time it revoked defendant's probation. Accordingly, because defendant's appeal of the revocation order was an appeal from an action taken while the trial court retained jurisdiction over his sentence, his appeal was within the appellate court's jurisdiction under subsection A of § 17.1-406 . Green v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 191 , 557 S.E.2d 230, 2002 Va. LEXIS 23 (2002).

Relief that is civil in nature. - Since appellate jurisdiction under subsection A of § 8.01-677.1 is limited to appeals from final criminal convictions, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over relief which was civil in nature, requested by way of a motion to vacate a conviction filed after the conviction became final. Commonwealth v. Southerly, 262 Va. 294 , 551 S.E.2d 650, 2001 Va. LEXIS 111 (2001).

Former § 3.1-796.115 (now § 3.2-6569), the animal seizure statute, was not so punitive in effect as to transform the civil remedy into a criminal penalty; the Court of Appeals of Virginia had only limited jurisdiction in civil matters and statutory forfeiture procedures provided for appellate review only in the Supreme Court of Virginia. Settle v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 212, 685 S.E.2d 182, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 524 (2009).

Intermediate appellate court transferred an appeal to the state supreme court, pursuant to § 8.01-677.1 , because the intermediate court did not have jurisdiction pursuant clause (i) of subsection A of § 17.1-406 to consider an appeal by a reporter and a newspaper of an order placing copies of court exhibits under seal in a criminal matter. The trial court's order to remove the exhibits and place the copies under seal was not a purely criminal matter falling under the intermediate court's jurisdiction under clause (i). Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 213, 725 S.E.2d 737, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 175 (2012).

In a case where a jury found appellant's dog to be dangerous, and the trial court ordered appellant to comply with registration and maintenance provisions and to make restitution, the underlying proceeding and appeal were civil in nature as appellant sustained no criminal conviction; thus, because the current appeal was civil in nature, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider it, and the court of appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Virginia. O'Malley v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 296, 785 S.E.2d 221 (2016).

Habeas corpus jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals' habeas corpus jurisdiction, whether appellate or original, must be defined with reference to the "cases over which" it has jurisdiction on direct appeal. Peterson v. Bass, 2 Va. App. 314, 343 S.E.2d 475 (1986).

Original jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus. - Since the Court of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction over the issues raised by the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, under former § 17-116.04 (now § 17.1-404 ) the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an inmate who wishes to challenge the validity of his detention in appropriate cases. This in no way limits the clear legislative intent expressed in the 1985 amendment of this section that habeas corpus cases on appeal from the circuit courts go directly to the Supreme Court. White v. Garraghty, 2 Va. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 402 (1986).

No jurisdiction on appeal from habeas corpus proceeding in circuit court. - It is clear from the 1985 amendment to subsection B that effective July 1, 1985, the General Assembly terminated the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to hear and determine appeals from a final decision, judgment or order of a circuit court involving a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. White v. Garraghty, 2 Va. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 402 (1986).

By amendment to subsection B, effective July 1, 1985, the General Assembly terminated the jurisdiction of Court of Appeals to hear and determine appeals from a final decision, judgment or order of a circuit court involving a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the clear legislative intent embodied in the 1985 amendment was that habeas corpus cases on appeal from the circuit courts should go directly to the Supreme Court. Hill v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 60, 379 S.E.2d 134 (1989).

No jurisdiction where trial court has not ruled on motion. - Court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear defendant's motion to set aside the jury's verdict and grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence because the motion had not been ruled on by the trial court. Merritt v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 719, 689 S.E.2d 757, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 81 (2010).

An order denying a motion for a copy of the trial transcript is not a final order as contemplated in this section. Phennicie v. Huffman, No. 0744-85 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 23, 1986).

Subject matter of appeal became criminal upon conviction of child and sentencing as adult. - Where the case initially involved the control and custody of a child, when that child was convicted of a criminal offense and sentenced as an adult, the subject matter of his appeal from the circuit court became criminal, not civil and his appeal was properly an appeal by petition pursuant to this section and not an appeal of right. Grogg v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 598, 371 S.E.2d 549 (1988).

Petition not timely filed. - Petition to Court of Appeals was considered a review pursuant to subsection D of § 18.2-308 , and thus its filing more than 30 days after the decision was untimely. It was not treated as a "petition for appeal" under Rule 5A:12 whereby the filing would have followed the record within 40 days and been timely. In re Cummins, 19 Va. App. 128, 449 S.E.2d 263 (1994).

Right to appeal. - Although an aggrieved party, such as defendant following defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana, had a right to present a petition for appeal to the appellate court, the appellate court could not act on defendant's attempt to appeal because § 17.1-406 also required that the appeal be from a final judgment, and since the trial court had not sentenced defendant on defendant's conviction, no final judgment existed for the purposes of appeal. Brown v. Commonwealth, No. 1596-02-1, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 141 (Ct. of Appeals Mar. 18, 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for driving while intoxicated and defendant's claim that the trial court erred in accepting "inadmissible" hearsay based on the trial court's consideration of certificates of analysis establishing defendant's blood alcohol level was rejected, as the petition that granted defendant leave to appeal specifically denied defendant the right to appeal on that ground. West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 597 S.E.2d 274, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 276 (2004).

Court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review. - Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review a circuit court's dismissal of indictments, based upon the circuit court's conclusion that an attempted prosecution violated the circuit court's interpretation of the immunity provision of a plea agreement, because the Court of Appeals was not statutorily permitted to review the circuit court's interpretation of a plea or immunity agreement. Commonwealth v. Morrissey, No. 0559-15-2, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 271 (Sept. 22, 2015).

Court of Appeals of Virginia lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue raised by the appeal of a motion to vacate a conviction for extrinsic fraud because the issue was a collateral civil matter. Transfer of the case to the Supreme Court of Virginia was required. Terry v. Commonwealth,, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 347 (Feb. 27, 2017).

Applied in Whitt v. Commonwealth, No. 0885-11-3, 61 Va. App. 637, 739 S.E.2d 254, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 100 (2013).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Right to appeal. - Counsel was not ineffective for failing to timely prosecute an appeal of the prisoner's conviction because there was no right of appeal of a non-capital criminal case and a reasonable inference from the prisoner's amended complaint was that he discharged his attorney, which was why he did not further pursue the appellate process. Eavey v. Lee, 94 Va. Cir. 383, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 204 (Augusta County Oct. 14, 2016).

§ 17.1-407. (Effective until January 1, 2022) Procedures on appeal.

  1. The notice of appeal in all cases within the jurisdiction of the court shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court or the clerk of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission, as appropriate, and a copy of such notice shall be mailed or delivered to all opposing counsel and parties not represented by counsel, and to the clerk of the Court of Appeals. The clerk shall endorse thereon the day and year he received it.
  2. Appeals pursuant to § 17.1-405 are appeals of right. The clerk of the Court of Appeals shall refer each case for which a notice of appeal has been filed, other than appeals in criminal cases, to a panel of the court as the court may direct.
  3. Each petition for appeal in a criminal case shall be referred to one or more judges of the Court of Appeals as the court shall direct. A judge to whom the petition is referred may grant the petition on the basis of the record without the necessity of oral argument. The clerk shall refer each appeal for which a petition has been granted to a panel of the court as the court shall direct.
  4. If the judge to whom a petition is initially referred does not grant the appeal, counsel for the petitioner shall be entitled to state orally before a panel of the court the reasons why his appeal should be granted. If all of the judges of the panel to whom the petition is referred are of the opinion that the petition ought not be granted, the order denying the appeal shall state the reasons for the denial. Thereafter, no other petition in the matter shall be entertained in the Court of Appeals.

    (1984, c. 701, § 17-116.05:2; 1988, cc. 71, 479; 1998, c. 872.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective January 1, 2022, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-407 .

Law review. - For 1985 survey of Virginia civil procedure and practice, see 19 U. Rich. L. Rev. (1985).

CASE NOTES

Constitutionality. - The right to appellate review is a statutory right and is not a necessary element of due process; thus, no due process violation occurs if an appeal is barred. Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460 , 357 S.E.2d 500, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S. Ct. 308, 98 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1987) (decided under prior law).

The statutes which limit review of a death penalty case to the Supreme Court do not violate equal protection rights, as it is rational for the General Assembly, given the gravity of cases involving a sentence to death, to provide death-penalty defendants as automatic, plenary review in the Commonwealth's highest court. Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460 , 357 S.E.2d 500, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S. Ct. 308, 98 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1987) (decided under prior law).

Failure to timely file notice of appeal naming indispensable party required dismissal. - Mother's appeal of the termination of her parental rights was dismissed due to her failure to timely name the children's guardian ad litem, an indispensable party under § 16.1-266, as an appellee in either the notice of appeal or the accompanying certificate of service; the failure to name the guardian ad litem as an appellee meant that the appeal was not perfected under Rule 5A:16, and the appellate court never acquired jurisdiction over guardian ad litem. Watkins v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., 42 Va. App. 760, 595 S.E.2d 19, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 164 (2004).

Time for filing notice of appeal. - Wife's appeal of the trial court's denial of her motion for judgment alleging that the husband breached the parties' marital settlement agreement was dismissed, as the wife's failure to file a notice of appeal from that ruling within 30 days of the date the trial court entered it meant that appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that ruling. Samuel v. Samuel, Nos. 2501-01-2, 1417-01-2, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 41 (Ct. of Appeals Jan. 28, 2004).

Time for filing an estate's appeal began to run from the trial court's entry of its order marked "final for purposes of appeal" and not from any earlier order. Estate of Hackler v. Hackler, 44 Va. App. 51, 602 S.E.2d 426 (2004).

Challenges to trial court's earlier rulings time-barred. - Appellant failed to perfect an appeal of orders not included in his notice of appeal where appellant only included a trial court order finding him in contempt in his notice of appeal; failure to include earlier rulings of the trial court in citations of error as required by § 17.1-408 and in failing to appeal such orders or decrees within 30 days pursuant to this section, did not perfect the appeal within the allotted time and required a dismissal of those issues as time-barred. Homecare of Va., Inc. v. Jones, No. 3134-03-1, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 178 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 20, 2004).

§ 17.1-407. (Effective January 1, 2022) Procedures on appeal.

  1. The notice of appeal in all cases within the jurisdiction of the court shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court or the clerk of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission, as appropriate, and a copy of such notice shall be mailed or delivered to all opposing counsel and parties not represented by counsel, to the clerk of the Court of Appeals, and to the Attorney General in criminal cases. The clerk shall endorse thereon the day and year he received it.
  2. Appeals pursuant to § 17.1-405 and subsection A of § 17.1-406 , other than petitions for appeal by the Commonwealth in criminal cases, are appeals of right. The clerk of the Court of Appeals shall refer each case for which a notice of appeal has been filed to a panel of the court as the court may direct.
  3. Each petition for appeal by the Commonwealth in a criminal case shall be referred to one or more judges of the Court of Appeals as the court shall direct. A judge to whom the petition is referred may grant the petition on the basis of the record without the necessity of oral argument. The clerk shall refer each appeal for which a petition has been granted to a panel of the court as the court shall direct.
  4. Before a petition for appeal by the Commonwealth is denied, counsel for the Commonwealth shall be entitled to state orally before a panel of the court the reasons why its appeal should be granted. If all of the judges of the panel to whom the petition is referred are of the opinion that the petition ought not be granted, the order denying the appeal shall state the reasons for the denial. Thereafter, no other petition in the matter shall be entertained in the Court of Appeals.

    (1984, c. 701, § 17-116.05:2; 1988, cc. 71, 479; 1998, c. 872; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until January 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-407 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, inserted "and to the Attorney General in criminal cases" in subsection A; in subsection B, inserted "and subsection A of § 17.1-406 , other than petitions for appeal by the Commonwealth in criminal cases" and deleted "other than appeals in criminal cases" following "has been filed"; inserted "by the Commonwealth" in subsection C; in subsection D, substituted "Before a petition for appeal by the Commonwealth is denied, counsel for the Commonwealth" for "If the judge to whom a petition is initially referred does not grant the appeal, counsel for the petitioner" and made a gender-neutral change; and made a stylistic change.

Law review. - For 1985 survey of Virginia civil procedure and practice, see 19 U. Rich. L. Rev. (1985).

CASE NOTES

Constitutionality. - The right to appellate review is a statutory right and is not a necessary element of due process; thus, no due process violation occurs if an appeal is barred. Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460 , 357 S.E.2d 500, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S. Ct. 308, 98 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1987) (decided under prior law).

The statutes which limit review of a death penalty case to the Supreme Court do not violate equal protection rights, as it is rational for the General Assembly, given the gravity of cases involving a sentence to death, to provide death-penalty defendants as automatic, plenary review in the Commonwealth's highest court. Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460 , 357 S.E.2d 500, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S. Ct. 308, 98 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1987) (decided under prior law).

Failure to timely file notice of appeal naming indispensable party required dismissal. - Mother's appeal of the termination of her parental rights was dismissed due to her failure to timely name the children's guardian ad litem, an indispensable party under § 16.1-266, as an appellee in either the notice of appeal or the accompanying certificate of service; the failure to name the guardian ad litem as an appellee meant that the appeal was not perfected under Rule 5A:16, and the appellate court never acquired jurisdiction over guardian ad litem. Watkins v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., 42 Va. App. 760, 595 S.E.2d 19, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 164 (2004).

Time for filing notice of appeal. - Wife's appeal of the trial court's denial of her motion for judgment alleging that the husband breached the parties' marital settlement agreement was dismissed, as the wife's failure to file a notice of appeal from that ruling within 30 days of the date the trial court entered it meant that appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that ruling. Samuel v. Samuel, Nos. 2501-01-2, 1417-01-2, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 41 (Ct. of Appeals Jan. 28, 2004).

Time for filing an estate's appeal began to run from the trial court's entry of its order marked "final for purposes of appeal" and not from any earlier order. Estate of Hackler v. Hackler, 44 Va. App. 51, 602 S.E.2d 426 (2004).

Challenges to trial court's earlier rulings time-barred. - Appellant failed to perfect an appeal of orders not included in his notice of appeal where appellant only included a trial court order finding him in contempt in his notice of appeal; failure to include earlier rulings of the trial court in citations of error as required by § 17.1-408 and in failing to appeal such orders or decrees within 30 days pursuant to this section, did not perfect the appeal within the allotted time and required a dismissal of those issues as time-barred. Homecare of Va., Inc. v. Jones, No. 3134-03-1, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 178 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 20, 2004).

§ 17.1-408. (Effective until January 1, 2022) Time for filing; notice; petition.

The notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be filed in every case within the court's appellate jurisdiction as provided in § 8.01-675.3 . The petition for appeal in a criminal case shall be filed not more than forty days after the filing of the record with the Court of Appeals. However, a thirty-day extension may be granted in the discretion of the court in order to attain the ends of justice. When an appeal from an interlocutory decree or order is permitted in a criminal case, the petition for appeal shall be presented within the forty-day time limitation provided in this section.

(1984, c. 701, § 17-116.05:3; 1998, c. 872.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective January 1, 2022, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-408 .

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 4-115. Notice of Appeal; 8-203. Notice of Appeal.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal & Error, § 129.

CASE NOTES

The time requirement for filing is mandatory, and failure of the appellant to timely file the notice of appeal requires dismissal of the appeal. Zion Church Designers & Bldrs. v. McDonald, 18 Va. App. 580, 445 S.E.2d 704 (1994) (decided under prior law).

Wife's appeal of the trial court's denial of her motion for judgment alleging that the husband breached the parties' marital settlement agreement was dismissed, as the wife's failure to file a notice of appeal from that ruling within 30 days of the date the trial court entered it meant that appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that ruling. Samuel v. Samuel, Nos. 2501-01-2, 1417-01-2, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 41 (Ct. of Appeals Jan. 28, 2004).

Time requirement for filing interlocutory appeal by Commonwealth in criminal cases. - In reading §§ 17.1-408 and 19.2-402 and Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:12 together and giving effect to as much of their respective provisions as possible, in any interlocutory appeal by the Commonwealth in a criminal case, a petition for appeal that is compliant with the provisions of Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:12(c)(1) must be filed within fourteen days of the receipt by the clerk of the trial court of the transcript or written statement of facts or, if there are objections thereto, within fourteen days after the judge signs the transcript or written statement of facts, and, in such cases, the Virginia Court of Appeals has no authority to grant an extension of time for any reason, and any grant of such authority to that Court must come from the general assembly. Commonwealth v. Square, No. 2526-11-2, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 202 (June 12, 2012).

Fourteen-day time limit in the more specific and more recent expression of legislative intent of § 19.2-402 applies to interlocutory appeals by the Commonwealth in criminal cases, rather than the forty-day time limit of § 17.1-408 . Commonwealth v. Square, No. 2526-11-2, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 202 (June 12, 2012).

Court of Appeals lacked authority to grant extension for filing appeal. - When the Commonwealth's petition for an interlocutory appeal appealing an order granting a motion to suppress did not contain assignments of error, the appellate court erroneously granted an extension of time within which to file a proper petition and had no jurisdiction to consider the petition because (1) the requirement of assignments of error was jurisdictional, (2) the legislature intended in §§ 19.2-402 and 17.1-408 to expeditiously dispose of such appeals, (3) § 19.2-402 did not let the appellate court grant an extension in such cases, (4) § 19.2-402, reducing the time to file an interlocutory petition for appeal to fourteen days, governed, as the statute was a more specific and more recent expression of legislative intent, and (5) § 19.2-402's incorporation of Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:12 did not include authority to grant extensions of time, so (6) the general assembly did not intend to grant extensions to file a petition for appeal in these cases. Commonwealth v. Square, No. 2526-11-2, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 202 (June 12, 2012).

Additional timely notice of appeal filing unnecessary after delayed appeal award. - Where a timely notice of appeal has been filed on direct appeal but the appeal is dismissed for failure to perfect it and a delayed appeal has subsequently been awarded, an appellant need not file another timely notice of appeal after the delayed appeal is awarded. Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 256, 416 S.E.2d 705 (1992) (decided under prior law).

Challenges to trial court's earlier rulings time-barred. - Appellant failed to perfect an appeal of orders not included in his notice of appeal where appellant only included a trial court order finding him in contempt in his notice of appeal; failure to include earlier rulings of the trial court in citations of error as required by this section and in failing to appeal such orders or decrees within 30 days pursuant to § 17.1-407 , did not perfect the appeal within the allotted time and required a dismissal of those issues as time-barred. Homecare of Va., Inc. v. Jones, No. 3134-03-1, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 178 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 20, 2004).

Failure to timely file notice of appeal naming indispensable party required dismissal. - Mother's appeal of the termination of her parental rights was dismissed due to her failure to timely name the children's guardian ad litem, an indispensable party under § 16.1-266, as an appellee in either the notice of appeal or the accompanying certificate of service; the failure to name the guardian ad litem as an appellee meant that the appeal was not perfected under Rule 5A:16, and the appellate court never acquired jurisdiction over the guardian ad litem. Watkins v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., 42 Va. App. 760, 595 S.E.2d 19, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 164 (2004).

Amendment of assignments of error. - Appellate court exercised its discretion to grant defendant's motion to amend the petition for appeal and, in turn, the court addressed the merits of the appeal because (1) defendant's request for the amendment at issue was made after defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and a timely petition for appeal; (2) the requested amendment was consistent with arguments presented at trial and did not constitute a broadening of the scope of the original assignment of error; and (3) the Commonwealth of Virginia did not articulate any prejudice that would follow from such an amendment. Whitt v. Commonwealth, No. 0885-11-3, 61 Va. App. 637, 739 S.E.2d 254, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 100 (2013).

Defect may be corrected after deadline for filing petition for appeal has passed. - Appellant, who timely files a petition for appeal, can file an amended petition for appeal, even after the deadline for filing the petition for appeal has passed, which corrects a defect under Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:12(c)(1); neither Va. Code Ann. § 17.1-408 nor Rule 5A:12(a) specifies that the petition for appeal must be free of all defects in order to be timely filed, and the statute and the rule do not prohibit an appellate court from considering, and where appropriate, granting, a motion to correct a defect with regard to pointing out where in the record the issue raised on appeal was preserved. Chatman v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 618, 739 S.E.2d 245, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 98 (2013).

Notice of appeal not timely. - Appellate court lacked jurisdiction over defendant's appeal because his notice of appeal was untimely where he had a statutory right to challenge his conviction by timely filing his own notice of appeal or by cross-appealing the Government's appeal, but did neither. Greer v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 324, 796 S.E.2d 422, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 40 (2017).

§ 17.1-408. (Effective January 1, 2022) Time for filing; notice; opening brief; petition.

The notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be filed in every case within the court's appellate jurisdiction as provided in § 8.01-675.3 . The opening brief in a criminal case shall be filed not more than 40 days after the filing of the record with the Court of Appeals. However, an extension may be granted in the discretion of the Court of Appeals in order to attain the ends of justice. In an appeal pursuant to subsection B or C of § 19.2-398, the petition for appeal shall be presented within the 40-day time limitation provided in this section.

Upon receiving a notice of appeal in a criminal case or, if notice of the appeal is received by the clerk prior to the entry of final judgment, upon entry of final judgment, the clerk of the circuit court shall cause a transcript to be prepared of the trial and any other circuit court proceedings, as requested by the appellant in the notice of appeal or by order of the circuit court, at the expense of the Commonwealth.

(1984, c. 701, § 17-116.05:3; 1998, c. 872; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until January 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-408 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, rewrote the section, which read, "The notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be filed in every case within the court's appellate jurisdiction as provided in § 8.01-675.3 . The petition for appeal in a criminal case shall be filed not more than forty days after the filing of the record with the Court of Appeals. However, a thirty-day extension may be granted in the discretion of the court in order to attain the ends of justice. When an appeal from an interlocutory decree or order is permitted in a criminal case, the petition for appeal shall be presented within the forty-day time limitation provided in this section."

Research References. - Virginia Forms (Matthew Bender). No. 4-115. Notice of Appeal; 8-203. Notice of Appeal.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal & Error, § 129.

CASE NOTES

The time requirement for filing is mandatory, and failure of the appellant to timely file the notice of appeal requires dismissal of the appeal. Zion Church Designers & Bldrs. v. McDonald, 18 Va. App. 580, 445 S.E.2d 704 (1994) (decided under prior law).

Wife's appeal of the trial court's denial of her motion for judgment alleging that the husband breached the parties' marital settlement agreement was dismissed, as the wife's failure to file a notice of appeal from that ruling within 30 days of the date the trial court entered it meant that appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that ruling. Samuel v. Samuel, Nos. 2501-01-2, 1417-01-2, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 41 (Ct. of Appeals Jan. 28, 2004).

Time requirement for filing interlocutory appeal by Commonwealth in criminal cases. - In reading §§ 17.1-408 and 19.2-402 and Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:12 together and giving effect to as much of their respective provisions as possible, in any interlocutory appeal by the Commonwealth in a criminal case, a petition for appeal that is compliant with the provisions of Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:12(c)(1) must be filed within fourteen days of the receipt by the clerk of the trial court of the transcript or written statement of facts or, if there are objections thereto, within fourteen days after the judge signs the transcript or written statement of facts, and, in such cases, the Virginia Court of Appeals has no authority to grant an extension of time for any reason, and any grant of such authority to that Court must come from the general assembly. Commonwealth v. Square, No. 2526-11-2, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 202 (June 12, 2012).

Fourteen-day time limit in the more specific and more recent expression of legislative intent of § 19.2-402 applies to interlocutory appeals by the Commonwealth in criminal cases, rather than the forty-day time limit of § 17.1-408 . Commonwealth v. Square, No. 2526-11-2, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 202 (June 12, 2012).

Court of Appeals lacked authority to grant extension for filing appeal. - When the Commonwealth's petition for an interlocutory appeal appealing an order granting a motion to suppress did not contain assignments of error, the appellate court erroneously granted an extension of time within which to file a proper petition and had no jurisdiction to consider the petition because (1) the requirement of assignments of error was jurisdictional, (2) the legislature intended in §§ 19.2-402 and 17.1-408 to expeditiously dispose of such appeals, (3) § 19.2-402 did not let the appellate court grant an extension in such cases, (4) § 19.2-402, reducing the time to file an interlocutory petition for appeal to fourteen days, governed, as the statute was a more specific and more recent expression of legislative intent, and (5) § 19.2-402's incorporation of Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:12 did not include authority to grant extensions of time, so (6) the general assembly did not intend to grant extensions to file a petition for appeal in these cases. Commonwealth v. Square, No. 2526-11-2, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 202 (June 12, 2012).

Additional timely notice of appeal filing unnecessary after delayed appeal award. - Where a timely notice of appeal has been filed on direct appeal but the appeal is dismissed for failure to perfect it and a delayed appeal has subsequently been awarded, an appellant need not file another timely notice of appeal after the delayed appeal is awarded. Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 256, 416 S.E.2d 705 (1992) (decided under prior law).

Challenges to trial court's earlier rulings time-barred. - Appellant failed to perfect an appeal of orders not included in his notice of appeal where appellant only included a trial court order finding him in contempt in his notice of appeal; failure to include earlier rulings of the trial court in citations of error as required by this section and in failing to appeal such orders or decrees within 30 days pursuant to § 17.1-407 , did not perfect the appeal within the allotted time and required a dismissal of those issues as time-barred. Homecare of Va., Inc. v. Jones, No. 3134-03-1, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 178 (Ct. of Appeals Apr. 20, 2004).

Failure to timely file notice of appeal naming indispensable party required dismissal. - Mother's appeal of the termination of her parental rights was dismissed due to her failure to timely name the children's guardian ad litem, an indispensable party under § 16.1-266, as an appellee in either the notice of appeal or the accompanying certificate of service; the failure to name the guardian ad litem as an appellee meant that the appeal was not perfected under Rule 5A:16, and the appellate court never acquired jurisdiction over the guardian ad litem. Watkins v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., 42 Va. App. 760, 595 S.E.2d 19, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 164 (2004).

Amendment of assignments of error. - Appellate court exercised its discretion to grant defendant's motion to amend the petition for appeal and, in turn, the court addressed the merits of the appeal because (1) defendant's request for the amendment at issue was made after defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and a timely petition for appeal; (2) the requested amendment was consistent with arguments presented at trial and did not constitute a broadening of the scope of the original assignment of error; and (3) the Commonwealth of Virginia did not articulate any prejudice that would follow from such an amendment. Whitt v. Commonwealth, No. 0885-11-3, 61 Va. App. 637, 739 S.E.2d 254, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 100 (2013).

Defect may be corrected after deadline for filing petition for appeal has passed. - Appellant, who timely files a petition for appeal, can file an amended petition for appeal, even after the deadline for filing the petition for appeal has passed, which corrects a defect under Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:12(c)(1); neither Va. Code Ann. § 17.1-408 nor Rule 5A:12(a) specifies that the petition for appeal must be free of all defects in order to be timely filed, and the statute and the rule do not prohibit an appellate court from considering, and where appropriate, granting, a motion to correct a defect with regard to pointing out where in the record the issue raised on appeal was preserved. Chatman v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 618, 739 S.E.2d 245, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 98 (2013).

Notice of appeal not timely. - Appellate court lacked jurisdiction over defendant's appeal because his notice of appeal was untimely where he had a statutory right to challenge his conviction by timely filing his own notice of appeal or by cross-appealing the Government's appeal, but did neither. Greer v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 324, 796 S.E.2d 422, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 40 (2017).

§ 17.1-409. Certification to the Supreme Court.

  1. In any case in which an appeal has been taken to or filed with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court in its discretion, on motion of the Court of Appeals, or on its own motion, may certify the case for review by the Supreme Court before it has been determined by the Court of Appeals. The effect of such certification shall be to transfer jurisdiction over the case to the Supreme Court for all purposes.
  2. Such certification may be made only when, in its discretion, the Supreme Court determines that:
    1. The case is of such imperative public importance as to justify the deviation from normal appellate practice and to require prompt decision in the Supreme Court; or
    2. The docket or the status of the work of the Court of Appeals is such that the sound or expeditious administration of justice requires that jurisdiction over the case be transferred to the Supreme Court.

      (1983, c. 413, § 17-116.06; 1984, c. 701; 1998, c. 872.)

CASE NOTES

Imperative public importance. - Certification was denied, because divorce action raised no imperative public question justifying deviation from normal appellate practice. Summers v. Summers, No. 2759-98-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 349 (Ct. of Appeals June 15, 1999).

Applied in Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263 , 513 S.E.2d 400 (1999); Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362 , 626 S.E.2d 383, 2006 Va. LEXIS 29 (2006); Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385 , 641 S.E.2d 494, 2007 Va. LEXIS 26 (2007); Prieto v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 366 , 682 S.E.2d 910, 2009 Va. LEXIS 94 (2009).

§ 17.1-410. (Effective until January 1, 2022) Disposition of appeals; finality of decisions.

  1. Each appeal of right taken to the Court of Appeals and each appeal for which a petition for appeal has been granted shall be considered by a panel of the court. When the Court of Appeals has (i) rejected a petition for appeal, (ii) dismissed an appeal in any case in accordance with the Rules of Court, or (iii) decided an appeal, its decision shall be final, without appeal to the Supreme Court, in:
    1. Traffic infraction and misdemeanor cases where no incarceration is imposed;
    2. Cases originating before any administrative agency or the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission;
    3. Cases involving the affirmance or annulment of a marriage, divorce, custody, spousal or child support or the control or disposition of a juvenile and other domestic relations cases arising under Title 16.1 or Title 20, or involving adoption under Chapter 12 (§ 63.2-1200 et seq.) of Title 63.2;
    4. Appeals in criminal cases pursuant to §§ 19.2-398 and 19.2-401. Such finality of the Court of Appeals' decision shall not preclude a defendant, if he is convicted, from requesting the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court on direct appeal to reconsider an issue which was the subject of the pretrial appeal; and
    5. Appeals involving involuntary treatment of prisoners pursuant to § 53.1-40.1 or 53.1-133.04 .
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A, in any case other than an appeal pursuant to § 19.2-398, in which the Supreme Court determines on a petition for review that the decision of the Court of Appeals involves a substantial constitutional question as a determinative issue or matters of significant precedential value, review may be had in the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of § 17.1-411 . (1983, c. 413, § 17-116.07; 1984, c. 701; 1987, c. 710; 1988, c. 873; 1998, c. 872; 2000, c. 830; 2019, c. 809.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective January 1, 2022, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-410 .

Cross references. - As to requirements for Petition for Appeal in an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, see Rule 5:17, Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court.

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 830 substituted "Chapter 10.2 ( § 63.1-219.7 et seq.)" for "Chapter 11 ( § 63.1-220 et seq.)" in subdivision A 3.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 809, in subdivision A 5, added "or 53.1-133.04 " at the end.

Law review. - For article, "The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Virginia Courts in Divorce and Equitable Distribution Proceedings," see 11 G.M.U. L. Rev. 73 (1989).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 20.1, 73, 137; 5A M.J. Courts, § 36.1.

CASE NOTES

Generally, a decision of the Court of Appeals is final in cases originating before the Industrial (now Workers' Compensation) Commission. Hill City Trucking, Inc. v. Christan, 238 Va. 735 , 385 S.E.2d 377 (1989) (decided under prior law).

Assignments of error dismissed as improvidently granted. - Because neither of a husband's assignments of error involved a substantial constitutional question as a determinative issue or matters of significant precedential value, as required under subsection B of § 17.1-410 , they were dismissed as improvidently granted. Schuman v. Schuman, 282 Va. 443 , 717 S.E.2d 410, 2011 Va. LEXIS 215 (2011).

Imposition of incarceration. - Court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal of her conviction for reckless driving even though the trial court suspended the jail sentence that it imposed on defendant. The finality provisions do not require physical confinement, only the imposition of incarceration, and the subsequent suspension of the sentence does not eliminate the imposition of the jail sentence. Spencer v. City of Norfolk, 271 Va. 460 , 628 S.E.2d 356, 2006 Va. LEXIS 47 (2006).

Constitutional questions. - Court of appeals was authorized to reconsider the constitutionality of the strip search and the admissibility of the strip search evidence when those questions were presented on direct appeal after defendant's conviction; it erred in failing to do so. Cole v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 342 , 806 S.E.2d 387 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2025, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 3250, 204 L. Ed. 2d 228 (2019).

Applied in Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 366 , 541 S.E.2d 920, 2001 Va. LEXIS 26 (2001).

§ 17.1-410. (Effective January 1, 2022) Disposition of appeals; finality of decisions.

  1. Each appeal of right taken to the Court of Appeals and each appeal for which a petition for appeal has been granted shall be considered by a panel of the court. When the Court of Appeals has (i) dismissed an appeal in any case in accordance with the Rules of Court or (ii) decided an appeal, its decision shall be final, without appeal to the Supreme Court, in:
    1. Appeals in criminal cases pursuant to subsections A or E of § 19.2-398 and § 19.2-401. Such finality of the Court of Appeals' decision shall not preclude a defendant, if he is convicted, from requesting the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court on direct appeal to reconsider an issue which was the subject of the pretrial appeal; and
    2. Appeals involving involuntary treatment of prisoners pursuant to § 53.1-40.1 or 53.1-133.04 .
    3. Appeals involving denial of a concealed handgun permit pursuant to § 18.2-308.08 .
  2. All other decisions of the Court of Appeals shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of § 17.1-411 . (1983, c. 413, § 17-116.07; 1984, c. 701; 1987, c. 710; 1988, c. 873; 1998, c. 872; 2000, c. 830; 2019, c. 809; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until January 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-410 .

Cross references. - As to requirements for Petition for Appeal in an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, see Rule 5:17, Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court.

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 830 substituted "Chapter 10.2 ( § 63.1-219.7 et seq.)" for "Chapter 11 ( § 63.1-220 et seq.)" in subdivision A 3.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 809, in subdivision A 5, added "or 53.1-133.04 " at the end.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, rewrote the section.

Law review. - For article, "The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Virginia Courts in Divorce and Equitable Distribution Proceedings," see 11 G.M.U. L. Rev. 73 (1989).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, §§ 20.1, 73, 137; 5A M.J. Courts, § 36.1.

Editor's note. - The case notes under this section predating amendments by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, should be reviewed carefully in light of those changes.

CASE NOTES

Generally, a decision of the Court of Appeals is final in cases originating before the Industrial (now Workers' Compensation) Commission. Hill City Trucking, Inc. v. Christan, 238 Va. 735 , 385 S.E.2d 377 (1989) (decided under prior law).

Assignments of error dismissed as improvidently granted. - Because neither of a husband's assignments of error involved a substantial constitutional question as a determinative issue or matters of significant precedential value, as required under subsection B of § 17.1-410 , they were dismissed as improvidently granted. Schuman v. Schuman, 282 Va. 443 , 717 S.E.2d 410, 2011 Va. LEXIS 215 (2011).

Imposition of incarceration. - Court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal of her conviction for reckless driving even though the trial court suspended the jail sentence that it imposed on defendant. The finality provisions do not require physical confinement, only the imposition of incarceration, and the subsequent suspension of the sentence does not eliminate the imposition of the jail sentence. Spencer v. City of Norfolk, 271 Va. 460 , 628 S.E.2d 356, 2006 Va. LEXIS 47 (2006).

Constitutional questions. - Court of appeals was authorized to reconsider the constitutionality of the strip search and the admissibility of the strip search evidence when those questions were presented on direct appeal after defendant's conviction; it erred in failing to do so. Cole v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 342 , 806 S.E.2d 387 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2025, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 3250, 204 L. Ed. 2d 228 (2019).

Applied in Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 366 , 541 S.E.2d 920, 2001 Va. LEXIS 26 (2001).

§ 17.1-411. Review by the Supreme Court.

Except where the decision of the Court of Appeals is made final under § 17.1-410 or § 19.2-408, any party aggrieved by a final decision of the Court of Appeals, including the Commonwealth, may petition the Supreme Court for an appeal. The Commonwealth, or any county, city, or town, may also petition the Supreme Court for review pursuant to § 19.2-317. The granting of such petitions shall be in the discretion of the Supreme Court.

(1983, c. 413, § 17-116.08; 1997, c. 358; 1998, c. 872.)

Law review. - For essay, "The Court of Appeals of Virginia Celebrates Thirty Years of Service to the Commonwealth," see 50 U. Rich. L. Rev. 217 (2015).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 20.1; 5A M.J. Courts, § 36.1.

CASE NOTES

Jurisdiction. - Although the Court of Appeals of Virginia lacked jurisdiction to hear a grandparent's petition for appeal in that court when the grandparent was not a party in the stepparent adoption proceeding below, the Supreme Court of Virginia did have jurisdiction over the grandparent's petition for appeal in the Supreme Court because the grandparent was a party in the Court of Appeals and was aggrieved by that court's ruling against the grandparent. Bonanno v. Quinn, 299 Va. 722 , 858 S.E.2d 181, 2021 Va. LEXIS 54 (2021).

Definition of "aggrieved." - The word "aggrieved" contemplates a substantial grievance and means a denial of some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or imposition of a burden or obligation upon the petitioner different from that suffered by the public generally. Commonwealth v. Harley, 256 Va. 216 , 504 S.E.2d 852 (1998)(decided under prior law).

Issue rendered moot. - The Commonwealth was not aggrieved by a ruling of the court of appeals that a defendant was constitutionally entitled to a transcript at state expense where the court of appeals had found the trial court's error in denying the defendant a transcript to have been harmless, rendering moot the question of the defendant's entitlement in the first instance. Commonwealth v. Harley, 256 Va. 216 , 504 S.E.2d 852 (1998)(decided under prior law).

Appeals by Commonwealth. - Reading the second sentence of this section with the second sentence of § 19.2-317, the Commonwealth is "also" assured, consistent with Va. Const., Art. VI, § 1 of the right to appeal to the Supreme Court adverse judgments in prosecutions for the violation of any law relating to the state revenue, even though in criminal prosecutions generally, according to § 19.2-317, "the accused" only may appeal to the Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Smith, 230 Va. 354 , 337 S.E.2d 278 (1985) (decided under prior law).

Decision not final under § 17.1-410 . - Court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal of her conviction for reckless driving even though the trial court suspended the jail sentence that it imposed on defendant. The finality provisions of § 17.1-410 do not require physical confinement, only the imposition of incarceration, and the subsequent suspension of the sentence does not eliminate the imposition of the jail sentence. Spencer v. City of Norfolk, 271 Va. 460 , 628 S.E.2d 356, 2006 Va. LEXIS 47 (2006).

Applied in McKellar v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., 290 Va. 349 , 777 S.E.2d 857 (2015).

§ 17.1-412. Affirmance, reversal, or modification of judgment; petition for appeal to Supreme Court upon award of new trial.

A judgment, order, conviction, or decree of a circuit court or award of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission may be affirmed, or it may be reversed, modified, or set aside by the Court of Appeals for errors appearing in the record. If the decision of the Court of Appeals is to reverse and remand the case for a new trial, any party aggrieved by the granting of the new trial may accept the remand or proceed to petition for appeal in the Supreme Court pursuant to § 17.1-411 .

(1983, c. 413, § 17-116.09; 1984, c. 701; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 80.

CASE NOTES

Law of case doctrine not bar to appeal of decision on remand. - Where court of appeals reversed and remanded for recomputation of workers' compensation commission's death benefit award, employer by accepting remand did not waive right to appeal from unfavorable commission decision on remand and appeals court erred in applying "law of the case" doctrine to bar consideration of the merits of employer's appeal. Uninsured Employer's Fund v. Thrush, 255 Va. 14 , 496 S.E.2d 57 (1998) (decided under prior law).

Court of appeals erred in its application of the law of the case doctrine because a city's acceptance of the court of appeals' decision to remand the matter did not bar it from subsequently appealing an unfavorable ruling by the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission. City of Charlottesville v. Sclafani, 862 S.E.2d 101, 2021 Va. LEXIS 93 (Aug. 26, 2021).

Issue not considered in absence of allegation of trial court error. - Because defendant's "questions presented" in her opening brief failed to allege any trial court error, the court of appeals would not consider them on appeal; none of the questions presented invoked assertions of error on the part of the trial court. Newman v. Commonwealth,, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 360 (Aug. 11, 2009).

§ 17.1-413. (Effective until January 1, 2022) Opinions; reporting, printing and electronic publication.

  1. The Court of Appeals shall state in writing the reasons for its decision (i) rejecting a petition for appeal or (ii) deciding a case after hearing. Subject to rules promulgated under § 17.1-403 the Court in its discretion may render its decision by order or memorandum opinion. All orders and opinions of the Court of Appeals shall be preserved with the record of the case. Opinions designated by the Court of Appeals as having precedential value or as otherwise having significance for the law or legal system shall be expeditiously reported in separate Court of Appeals Reports in the same manner as the decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court. The clerk of the Court of Appeals shall retain in the clerk's office a list and brief summary of the case for all unpublished decisions and opinions of the Court of Appeals. The list of cases and summary shall be made available to any person upon request.
  2. The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall contract for the printing of the reports of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and for the advance sheets of each court. He shall select a printer for the reports and prescribe such contract terms as will ensure issuance of the reports as soon as practicable after a sufficient number of opinions are filed. He shall make such contracts after consultation with the Department of General Services and shall distribute these reports in accordance with the applicable provisions of law. He shall also provide for the electronic publication on the Internet of the opinions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals subject to conditions and restrictions established by each court regarding the electronic publication of its opinions.

    (1983, c. 413, § 17-116.010; 1984, cc. 635, 701; 1997, c. 316; 1998, c. 872.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective January 1, 2022, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-413 .

Law review. - For annual survey article, see "Family Law," 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 135 (2013).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Unpublished opinions. - Section 17.1-413 states that opinions designated by the Court of Appeals of Virginia as having precedential value or as otherwise having significance for the law or legal system shall be expeditiously reported in separate court of appeals reports in the same manner as the decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court of Virginia. By implication, unpublished court of appeals' opinions have no precedential effect. Friedberg v. Hague Park Apts., 61 Va. Cir. 589, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518 (Norfolk 2001).

Where a circuit court's opinion was not designated for publication and, therefore, had no precedential value, the opinion was cited merely for persuasive reasoning and language and not as precedent. Moran v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. Cir. 241, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 225 (Rockingham County Apr. 4, 2007).

§ 17.1-413. (Effective January 1, 2022) Opinions; reporting, printing and electronic publication.

  1. The Court of Appeals shall state in writing the reasons for its ruling in a case. Subject to rules promulgated under § 17.1-403 the Court in its discretion may render its decision by order or memorandum opinion. All orders and opinions of the Court of Appeals shall be preserved with the record of the case. Opinions designated by the Court of Appeals as having precedential value or as otherwise having significance for the law or legal system shall be expeditiously reported in separate Court of Appeals Reports in the same manner as the decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court. The clerk of the Court of Appeals shall retain in the clerk's office a list and brief summary of the case for all unpublished decisions and opinions of the Court of Appeals. The list of cases and summary shall be made available to any person upon request.
  2. The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall contract for the printing of the reports of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and for the advance sheets of each court. He shall select a printer for the reports and prescribe such contract terms as will ensure issuance of the reports as soon as practicable after a sufficient number of opinions are filed. He shall make such contracts after consultation with the Department of General Services and shall distribute these reports in accordance with the applicable provisions of law. He shall also provide for the electronic publication on the Internet of the opinions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals subject to conditions and restrictions established by each court regarding the electronic publication of its opinions.

    (1983, c. 413, § 17-116.010; 1984, cc. 635, 701; 1997, c. 316; 1998, c. 872; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until January 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-413 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, substituted "ruling in a case" for "decision (i) rejecting a petition for appeal or (ii) deciding a case after hearing" in subsection A.

Law review. - For annual survey article, see "Family Law," 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 135 (2013).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Unpublished opinions. - Section 17.1-413 states that opinions designated by the Court of Appeals of Virginia as having precedential value or as otherwise having significance for the law or legal system shall be expeditiously reported in separate court of appeals reports in the same manner as the decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court of Virginia. By implication, unpublished court of appeals' opinions have no precedential effect. Friedberg v. Hague Park Apts., 61 Va. Cir. 589, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518 (Norfolk 2001).

Where a circuit court's opinion was not designated for publication and, therefore, had no precedential value, the opinion was cited merely for persuasive reasoning and language and not as precedent. Moran v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. Cir. 241, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 225 (Rockingham County Apr. 4, 2007).

§ 17.1-414. Facilities and supplies.

  1. The Court of Appeals shall be housed in the City of Richmond and, if practicable, in the same building occupied by the Supreme Court. When facilities are required for the convening of panels in other areas of the Commonwealth, the chief judge of the Court of Appeals shall provide for such physical facilities as are available for the operation of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals may use any public property of, or any property leased or rented to, the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions for the holding of court and for its ancillary functions upon proper agreement with the applicable authorities. The Court of Appeals also may use any federal courtroom, the moot courtroom of any accredited law school located in the Commonwealth, or any other facility deemed adequate for the holding of court and for its ancillary functions upon proper agreement with the applicable authorities. Any expense incurred for use of such facilities may be paid from the funds appropriated by the General Assembly to the Court of Appeals.
  2. The Court of Appeals shall purchase such books, pamphlets, publications, supplies, furnishings, and equipment as necessary for the efficient operation of the Court, and the cost thereof shall be paid by the clerk from the appropriation for the operation of the Court of Appeals.
  3. The Court of Appeals shall utilize the State Law Library provided by § 42.1-60 . (1983, c. 413, § 17-116.011; 1984, c. 701; 1998, c. 872; 2020, cc. 67, 197.)

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendments by cc. 67 and 197 are identical, and substituted "also may use any federal courtroom, the moot courtroom of any accredited law school located in the Commonwealth, or any other facility deemed adequate" for "may use any federal courtroom or other facility" in the penultimate sentence in subsection A.

§ 17.1-415. Compensation for judges; expenses.

The judges of the Court of Appeals shall receive from the Commonwealth an annual salary that shall be fixed in the general appropriations act and set at an amount equal to ninety-five percent of the annual salary fixed by law for justices of the Supreme Court. The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive $3,000 per year in addition to the amount received by the other judges of the Court of Appeals. Each judge shall receive such amount as shall be fixed in the general appropriations act for all other expenses not otherwise reimbursed and incurred incident to the conduct of the business of the court.

(1983, c. 413, § 17-116.012; 1998, c. 872; 2001, c. 35; 2006, c. 218.)

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 35 substituted "for" for "in lieu of travel, lodging and" following "general appropriations act," and inserted "not otherwise reimbursed and" in the last sentence.

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 218 substituted "$3,000" for "$1,000" in the second sentence.

§ 17.1-416. Clerk; seal; deputies and other employees; clerk's fees.

There shall be a clerk of the Court of Appeals, who shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Court of Appeals. The clerk shall adopt a separate seal of office for the Court of Appeals as approved by the Court of Appeals. The number and salaries of the deputies and other employees necessary to perform the duties of the Court of Appeals shall be fixed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court by rule of court may promulgate uniform fees for services rendered by the clerk.

(1983, c. 413, § 17-116.013; 1988, c. 391; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-417. Support staff.

Each judge of the Court of Appeals shall be entitled to the services of such support staff as shall be authorized by and paid from the appropriation to the Court of Appeals.

(1983, c. 413, § 17-116.014; 1984, c. 701; 1998, c. 872; 2001, c. 35.)

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 35 substituted "such support staff as shall be authorized by and" for "one research assistant, who shall be a graduate of an accredited law school. Each judge shall also be entitled to the services of a secretary. The salaries of the research assistants and secretaries shall be fixed by the Court of Appeals and shall be."

§ 17.1-418. Fees charged by Clerk of the Court of Appeals.

The Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall charge the following fees:

  1. For filing a notice of appeal or initiating any matter under the original jurisdiction of the court, $50 payable by check or money order to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Twenty-five dollars of each fee collected under this section shall be apportioned to the Courts Technology Fund established under § 17.1-132 .
  2. For making and certifying a copy of any record or document in the Clerk's office, ten cents per 100 words or twenty-five cents per page.
  3. For verifying and certifying any record or document not actually copied by the Clerk, one-half of the fee for copying and certifying, which shall not, however, be applied to the certification of a copy of the record in the Court which has already been printed.
  4. For authentication of any record, document or paper under the seal of the Court, fifty cents.
  5. For copying and certifying any document or paper of less than 250 words, twenty-five cents.
  6. For all other services not specifically mentioned above, the same fee that would be charged by a clerk of a circuit court in similar cases.

    (1992, c. 253, § 14.1-120.1; 1998, c. 872; 2006, cc. 623, 718.)

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendments by cc. 623 and 718 are identical, and in subdivision 1, substituted "$50" for "twenty-five dollars" in the first sentence and added the last sentence.

Chapter 5. Circuit Courts.

Establishment; Jurisdiction; etc.

Article 1. Establishment; Jurisdiction; etc.

§ 17.1-500. Establishment of circuit courts.

For the City of Williamsburg and James City County, and every other county in the Commonwealth, and the Cities of Alexandria, Bristol, Buena Vista, Charlottesville, Chesapeake, Colonial Heights, Danville, Fredericksburg, Hampton, Hopewell, Lynchburg, Martinsville, Newport News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Portsmouth, Radford, Richmond, Roanoke, Salem, Staunton, Suffolk, Virginia Beach, Waynesboro and Winchester, there shall be a circuit court, which shall be called the circuit court of such county or city, or county and city, as the case may be. Each city circuit court shall be the sole court of record for the city and have jurisdiction over each suit, motion, prosecution or thing now or heretofore properly pending in the former courts of record of the city and over the records of such courts. Any reference in this Code or in any act of the General Assembly to a corporation, hustings, law and chancery, law and equity, chancery or other court of record of a city shall apply to the circuit court thereof, mutatis mutandis.

(1973, c. 544, § 17-116.1; 1974, c. 297; 1981, c. 628; 1983, c. 580; 1991, c. 189; 1998, c. 872; 2006, c. 861.)

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 861 deleted "Clifton Forge" following "Chesapeake" in the first sentence.

Research References. - Friend's Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 1. Courts. § 1.04. Circuit Courts. Friend.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 3B M.J. Certiorari, § 11; 5A M.J. Courts, § 43.

§ 17.1-501. Judges of circuit courts; selection, powers and duties of chief judges; exercise of appointive powers.

  1. There shall be as many judges of the circuit courts as may be fixed by the General Assembly. The judges of each circuit shall select from their number by majority vote a chief judge of the circuit, who shall serve for the term of two years. In the event such judges cannot agree as to who shall be chief judge, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall act as tie breaker.
  2. The chief judge of the circuit shall ensure that the system of justice in his circuit operates smoothly and efficiently. He shall have authority to assign the work of the circuit among the judges, and in doing so he may consider the nature and categories of the cases to be assigned.
  3. Unless otherwise provided by law, powers of appointment within a circuit shall be exercised by a majority of the judges of the circuit; however, the order of appointment may be signed by the chief judge or that judge's designee on behalf of the other judges. In case of a tie, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall appoint a circuit judge from another circuit who shall act as tie breaker. Where the power of appointment is to be exercised by a majority of the judges of the Second Judicial Circuit and such appointment is to a local post, board or commission in Accomack or Northampton County, the resident judge or judges of the County of Accomack or Northampton shall exercise such appointment power as if he or they comprise the majority of the judges of the circuit.
  4. No person shall be appointed or reappointed under this section until he has submitted his fingerprints to be used for the conduct of a national criminal records search and a Virginia criminal history records search, submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect, and provided a written statement of economic interests on the disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 . No person with a criminal conviction for a felony shall be appointed as a judge. (1973, c. 544, § 17-116.2; 1976, c. 124; 1994, c. 407; 1998, c. 872; 2004, c. 452; 2005, c. 183; 2018, c. 578.)

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 452 added subsection D.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 183 added "however, the order of appointment may be signed by the chief judge or that judge's designee on behalf of the other judges" at the end of the first sentence of subsection C.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 578 added "submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect, and provided a written statement of economic interests on the disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 " at the end of the first sentence in subsection D.

Law review. - For an article, "Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence," see 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 405 (2000).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Judge's authority may not be delegated. - While the chief judge and, collectively, the judges of a judicial circuit, do possess legal authority to establish rules regarding courthouse security, such power may not be delegated to a circuit court administrator. The chief judge and, collectively, the circuit judges, possess the legal authority to establish a general rule that cellular telephones are permitted in the courthouse. Nonetheless, the sheriff possesses the legal authority to take action in any specific instance in which a cellular telephone causes a disturbance, or otherwise endangers public safety within the courthouse. See opinion of Attorney General to the Honorable William O. Watson, Sheriff, City of Portsmouth, 12-065, 2013 Va. AG LEXIS 48 (7/12/13).

Courthouse security. - While judges and sheriffs should work together to resolve any issues or concerns about courthouse security, judges retain rule-making authority over courthouse security, and the sheriff is responsible for enforcing the rules and responding to any security threats or disturbances. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Paul W. Higgs, Sheriff, City of Fredericksburg, 13-096, 2013 Va. AG LEXIS 93 (12/3/3).

§ 17.1-502. (For contingent expiration date see cc. 524 and 542) Administrator of circuit court system.

  1. The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall be the administrator of the circuit court system, which includes the operation and maintenance of a case management system and financial management system and related technology improvements.
  2. Any circuit court clerk may establish and maintain his own case management system, financial management system, or other independent technology using automation or technology improvements provided by a private vendor or the locality. Any data from the clerk's independent system may be provided directly from such clerk to designated state agencies. The data from the clerk's independent system may also be provided to designated state agencies through an interface with the technology systems operated by the Executive Secretary.
  3. The Executive Secretary shall provide an electronic interface with his case management system, financial management system, or other technology improvements upon written request of any circuit court clerk. The circuit court clerk and the clerk's designated application service provider shall comply with the security and data standards established by the Executive Secretary for any such electronic interface. The Executive Secretary shall establish security and data standards for such electronic interfaces on or before June 30, 2013, and such standards shall be consistent with the policies, standards, and guidelines established pursuant to § 2.2-2009 .
  4. The costs of designing, implementing, and maintaining any such interface with the systems of the Executive Secretary shall be the responsibility of the circuit court clerk. Prior to incurring any costs, the Office of the Executive Secretary shall provide the circuit court clerk a written explanation of the options for providing such interfaces and provide the clerk with a proposal for such costs and enter into a written contract with the clerk to provide such services.
  5. The Executive Secretary shall assist the chief judges in the performance of their administrative duties. He may employ such staff and other assistants, from state funds appropriated to him for the purpose, as may be necessary to carry out his duties, and may secure such office space as may be requisite, to be located in an appropriate place to be selected by the Executive Secretary.

    (1973, c. 544, § 17-116.3; 1998, c. 872; 2009, cc. 793, 858; 2011, c. 715; 2012, c. 234; 2013, c. 422.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until amendments by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542 become effective. For the version of this section as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-502 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2013, c. 422, cl. 2 provides: "That the clerk of the circuit court shall submit data required by § 19.2-390 in a format acceptable to the Central Criminal Records Exchange."

Acts 2018, cc. 127 and 584, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of § 17.1-293.1 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall become effective on July 1, 2019."

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendments by cc. 793 and 858 are identical, and added the language beginning "which shall include responsibility" at the end of the first sentence, inserted the present second through fifth sentences and substituted "The Executive Secretary" for "He" at the beginning of the sixth sentence.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 715 added the sixth sentence.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 234 added the fourth sentence, deleted "not to exceed $104,28" following "Executive Secretary" in the sixth sentence, and inserted "and enter into a written contract with the clerk to provide such services" at the end of the seventh sentence.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 422 rewrote the section.

§ 17.1-502. (For contingent effective date see cc. 524 and 542) Administrator of circuit court system.

  1. The Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall be the administrator of the circuit court system, which includes the operation and maintenance of a case management system and financial management system and related technology improvements.
  2. Any circuit court clerk may establish and maintain his own case management system, financial management system, or other independent technology using automation or technology improvements provided by a private vendor or the locality. Any data from the clerk's independent system may be provided directly from such clerk to designated state agencies. The data from the clerk's independent system may also be provided to designated state agencies through an interface with the technology systems operated by the Executive Secretary.

    B1. If the data from a case management system established under subsection B is not provided to the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court through an interface, such data shall be provided to the Department of State Police through an interface for purposes of complying with §§ 19.2-392.7, 19.2-392.10, 19.2-392.11, and 19.2-392.12. The parameters of such interface shall be determined by the Department of State Police. The costs of designing, implementing, and maintaining such interface shall be the responsibility of the circuit court clerk.

  3. The Executive Secretary shall provide an electronic interface with his case management system, financial management system, or other technology improvements upon written request of any circuit court clerk. The circuit court clerk and the clerk's designated application service provider shall comply with the security and data standards established by the Executive Secretary for any such electronic interface. The Executive Secretary shall establish security and data standards for such electronic interfaces on or before June 30, 2013, and such standards shall be consistent with the policies, standards, and guidelines established pursuant to § 2.2-2009 .
  4. The costs of designing, implementing, and maintaining any such interface with the systems of the Executive Secretary shall be the responsibility of the circuit court clerk. Prior to incurring any costs, the Office of the Executive Secretary shall provide the circuit court clerk a written explanation of the options for providing such interfaces and provide the clerk with a proposal for such costs and enter into a written contract with the clerk to provide such services.
  5. The Executive Secretary shall assist the chief judges in the performance of their administrative duties. He may employ such staff and other assistants, from state funds appropriated to him for the purpose, as may be necessary to carry out his duties, and may secure such office space as may be requisite, to be located in an appropriate place to be selected by the Executive Secretary.

    (1973, c. 544, § 17-116.3; 1998, c. 872; 2009, cc. 793, 858; 2011, c. 715; 2012, c. 234; 2013, c. 422; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524, 542.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is set out as amended by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542. For the version of this section effective until amendments by Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542 become effective, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-502 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2013, c. 422, cl. 2 provides: "That the clerk of the circuit court shall submit data required by § 19.2-390 in a format acceptable to the Central Criminal Records Exchange."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542, cl. 4 provides: "That the provisions of §§ 9.1-101 , 9.1-128 , 9.1-134 , 17.1-293.1 , 17.1-502 , 19.2-310.7, and 19.2-389.3 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, and Chapter 23.2 ( § 19.2-392.5 et seq.) of Title 19.2 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, shall become effective on the earlier of (i) the first day of the fourth month following notification of the Chair of the Virginia Code Commission and the Chairs of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee for Courts of Justice by the Superintendent of State Police that the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Department of State Police, and any circuit court clerk who maintains a case management system that interfaces with the Department of State Police under subsection B1 of § 17.1-502 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, have automated systems to exchange information as required by §§ 19.2-392.7, 19.2-392.10, 19.2-392.11, and 19.2-392.12 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, or (ii) July 1, 2025."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542, cl. 6 provides: "That the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Department of State Police, and any circuit court clerk who maintains a case management system that interfaces with the Department of State Police under subsection B1 of § 17.1-502 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, shall automate systems to exchange information as required by §§ 19.2-392.7, 19.2-392.10, 19.2-392.11, and 19.2-392.12 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, not later than July 1, 2025."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542, cl. 10 provides: "That the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Department of State Police, and any circuit court clerk who maintains a case management system that interfaces with the Department of State Police under subsection B1 of § 17.1-502 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by this act, shall each provide a report to the Virginia State Crime Commission on the progress of implementing automated systems to exchange information as required by §§ 19.2-392.7, 19.2-392.10, 19.2-392.11, and 19.2-392.12 of the Code of Virginia, as created by this act, by November 1, 2021, and by November 1 of each year thereafter until the automated systems have been fully implemented."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542, cl. 17 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities; therefore, Chapter 1289 of the Acts of Assembly of 2020 requires the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to assign a minimum fiscal impact of $50,000. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

The 2009 amendments. - The 2009 amendments by cc. 793 and 858 are identical, and added the language beginning "which shall include responsibility" at the end of the first sentence, inserted the present second through fifth sentences and substituted "The Executive Secretary" for "He" at the beginning of the sixth sentence.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 715 added the sixth sentence.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 234 added the fourth sentence, deleted "not to exceed $104,28" following "Executive Secretary" in the sixth sentence, and inserted "and enter into a written contract with the clerk to provide such services" at the end of the seventh sentence.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 422 rewrote the section.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendments by Sp. Sess. I, cc. 524 and 542, are identical, and added subsection B1. For contingent effective date, see note.

§ 17.1-503. (Effective until January 1, 2022) Rules of practice and procedure; rules not to preclude judges from hearing certain cases.

  1. The Supreme Court may formulate rules of practice and procedure for the circuit courts following consultation with the Chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the executive committee of the Judicial Conference of Virginia for courts of record. Such rules, subject to the strict construction of the provisions of § 8.01-4 , which shall be the only rules of practice and procedure in the circuit courts of the Commonwealth, shall be included in the Code of Virginia as provided in § 8.01-3 , subject to revision by the General Assembly.
  2. No rule shall hereafter be promulgated under the limitations of § 8.01-4 , or otherwise which would avoid or preclude the judge before whom an accused is arraigned in criminal cases from hearing all aspects of the case on its merits, or to avoid or preclude any judge in any case who has heard any part of the case on its merits, from hearing the case to its conclusion. However, another judge may hear portions of a case where a judge is required to disqualify himself, in cases in which a mistrial is declared, or in cases which have been reversed on appeal, or in the event of sickness, disability or vacation of the judge. The parties to any suit, action, cause or prosecution may waive the provisions of this section. Such waiver shall be entered of record.
  3. In its rules of practice and procedure for the circuit courts, the Supreme Court shall include rules relating to court decisions on any order of quarantine or isolation issued by the State Health Commissioner pursuant to Article 3.02 (§ 32.1-48.05 et seq.) of Chapter 2 of Title 32.1 that shall ensure, to the extent possible, that such hearings are held in a manner that will protect the health and safety of individuals subject to any such order of quarantine or isolation, court personnel, counsels, witnesses, and the general public. The rules shall also provide for expedited reviews by the Supreme Court of decisions by any circuit court relating to appeals of any order of quarantine or isolation. (1973, c. 544, § 17-116.4; 1976, c. 212; 1998, c. 872; 2004, cc. 773, 1021.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective January 1, 2022, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-503 .

Editor's note. - The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "the Chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary" for "the chairmen of the House and Senate Courts of Justice Committees" in subsection A. March 10, 2021.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendments by cc. 773, effective April 12, 2004, and 1021, effective April 21, 2004, are identical, and inserted the A and B designations at the beginning of the first and next-to-last paragraphs and added subsection C.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 2; 11A M.J. Judgments & Decrees, § 119.

CASE NOTES

Judge who hears one portion of case not required to hear all parts. - This section does not require that a judge hearing one portion of a case hear all parts of it. Schmidt v. Schmidt, No. 0703-90-4 (Ct. of Appeals April 30, 1991) (decided under prior law).

Section 17.1-503 did not mandate that the judge who hears a preliminary matter hear the entire case; the statute forbids a rule of the Supreme Court that would preclude a judge from hearing a case to its conclusion. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 89, 570 S.E.2d 871, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 618 (2002).

The practice of allowing any circuit judge to handle any probation violation does not violate this section as it pertains to § 8.01-4 . Gurley v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 166, 538 S.E.2d 361, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 836 (2000).

Territorial jurisdiction distinguished from subject matter jurisdiction. - Unlike the subject matter jurisdiction described in § 17.1-513 , which may not be waived, the jurisdiction described in § 19.2-239 refers to a circuit court's authority over persons, things, or occurrences located in a defined geographic area, which is properly categorized as "territorial jurisdiction" and may be waived by failing to timely raise the issue. Gordon v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 818, 568 S.E.2d 452, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 521 (2002).

Interpretation of Supreme Court Rules. - General assembly had empowered the Supreme Court of Virginia to promulgate the rules of practice and procedure both for circuit courts and for the Court of Appeals of Virginia; consequently, while Va. Sup. Ct. R. pt. 5A governed the proceedings of the Court of Appeals, the provisions of Part 5A remained precisely that - rules of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reviews the Court of Appeals' interpretation of rules de novo. LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465 , 722 S.E.2d 838, 2012 Va. LEXIS 45 (2012).

§ 17.1-503. (Effective January 1, 2022) Rules of practice and procedure; rules not to preclude judges from hearing certain cases.

  1. The Supreme Court may formulate rules of practice and procedure for the circuit courts following consultation with the Chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the executive committee of the Judicial Conference of Virginia for courts of record. Such rules, subject to the strict construction of the provisions of § 8.01-4 , which shall be the only rules of practice and procedure in the circuit courts of the Commonwealth, shall be included in the Code of Virginia as provided in § 8.01-3 , subject to revision by the General Assembly.
  2. No rule shall hereafter be promulgated under the limitations of § 8.01-4 , or otherwise which would avoid or preclude the judge before whom an accused is arraigned in criminal cases from hearing all aspects of the case on its merits, or to avoid or preclude any judge in any case who has heard any part of the case on its merits, from hearing the case to its conclusion. However, another judge may hear portions of a case where a judge is required to disqualify himself, in cases in which a mistrial is declared, or in cases which have been reversed on appeal, or in the event of sickness, disability or vacation of the judge. The parties to any suit, action, cause or prosecution may waive the provisions of this section. Such waiver shall be entered of record.
  3. In its rules of practice and procedure for the circuit courts, the Supreme Court shall include rules relating to court decisions on any order of quarantine or isolation issued by the State Health Commissioner pursuant to Article 3.02 (§ 32.1-48.05 et seq.) of Chapter 2 of Title 32.1 that shall ensure, to the extent possible, that such hearings are held in a manner that will protect the health and safety of individuals subject to any such order of quarantine or isolation, court personnel, counsels, witnesses, and the general public. The rules shall also provide for expedited reviews by the Court of Appeals of decisions by any circuit court and by the Supreme Court of decisions of the Court of Appeals relating to appeals of any order of quarantine or isolation. (1973, c. 544, § 17-116.4; 1976, c. 212; 1998, c. 872; 2004, cc. 773, 1021; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until January 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-503 .

Editor's note. - The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "the Chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary" for "the chairmen of the House and Senate Courts of Justice Committees" in subsection A. March 10, 2021.

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendments by cc. 773, effective April 12, 2004, and 1021, effective April 21, 2004, are identical, and inserted the A and B designations at the beginning of the first and next-to-last paragraphs and added subsection C.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, substituted "Court of Appeals of decisions by any circuit court and by the Supreme Court of decisions of the Court of Appeals" for "Supreme Court of decisions by any circuit court" in subsection C.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 2; 11A M.J. Judgments & Decrees, § 119.

CASE NOTES

Judge who hears one portion of case not required to hear all parts. - This section does not require that a judge hearing one portion of a case hear all parts of it. Schmidt v. Schmidt, No. 0703-90-4 (Ct. of Appeals April 30, 1991) (decided under prior law).

Section 17.1-503 did not mandate that the judge who hears a preliminary matter hear the entire case; the statute forbids a rule of the Supreme Court that would preclude a judge from hearing a case to its conclusion. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 89, 570 S.E.2d 871, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 618 (2002).

The practice of allowing any circuit judge to handle any probation violation does not violate this section as it pertains to § 8.01-4 . Gurley v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 166, 538 S.E.2d 361, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 836 (2000).

Territorial jurisdiction distinguished from subject matter jurisdiction. - Unlike the subject matter jurisdiction described in § 17.1-513 , which may not be waived, the jurisdiction described in § 19.2-239 refers to a circuit court's authority over persons, things, or occurrences located in a defined geographic area, which is properly categorized as "territorial jurisdiction" and may be waived by failing to timely raise the issue. Gordon v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 818, 568 S.E.2d 452, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 521 (2002).

Interpretation of Supreme Court Rules. - General assembly had empowered the Supreme Court of Virginia to promulgate the rules of practice and procedure both for circuit courts and for the Court of Appeals of Virginia; consequently, while Va. Sup. Ct. R. pt. 5A governed the proceedings of the Court of Appeals, the provisions of Part 5A remained precisely that - rules of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reviews the Court of Appeals' interpretation of rules de novo. LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465 , 722 S.E.2d 838, 2012 Va. LEXIS 45 (2012).

§ 17.1-504.

Reserved.

§ 17.1-505. Circuit court of county to constitute circuit court of certain cities.

The circuit court of any county, within which is situated any city which has undergone transition from a city of the second class to a city of the first class since the Constitution of 1902, went into effect, shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court of such city in all proceedings at law or in equity, except criminal prosecutions; and the circuit court of such county shall constitute the circuit court of such city. This section shall not apply to the Cities of Bristol, Colonial Heights, Fredericksburg, Martinsville, Salem and Suffolk for which separate circuit courts have heretofore been established and which are continued.

(Code 1919, § 5911, § 17-118; 1920, p. 607; 1962, c. 237; 1968, c. 107; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 27; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-506. Judicial circuits.

  1. The City of Chesapeake shall constitute the first circuit.
  2. The City of Virginia Beach and the Counties of Accomack and Northampton shall constitute the second circuit.
  3. The City of Portsmouth shall constitute the third circuit.
  4. The City of Norfolk shall constitute the fourth circuit.
  5. The Cities of Franklin and Suffolk and the Counties of Isle of Wight and Southampton shall constitute the fifth circuit.
  6. The Cities of Emporia and Hopewell and the Counties of Brunswick, Greensville, Prince George, Surry and Sussex shall constitute the sixth circuit.
  7. The City of Newport News shall constitute the seventh circuit.
  8. The City of Hampton shall constitute the eighth circuit.
  9. The Cities of Poquoson and Williamsburg and the Counties of Charles City, Gloucester, James City, King and Queen, King William, Mathews, Middlesex, New Kent and York shall constitute the ninth circuit.
  10. The Counties of Appomattox, Buckingham, Charlotte, Cumberland, Halifax, Lunenburg, Mecklenburg and Prince Edward shall constitute the tenth circuit.
  11. The City of Petersburg and the Counties of Amelia, Dinwiddie, Nottoway and Powhatan shall constitute the eleventh circuit.
  12. The City of Colonial Heights and the County of Chesterfield shall constitute the twelfth circuit.
  13. The City of Richmond shall constitute the thirteenth circuit.
  14. The County of Henrico shall constitute the fourteenth circuit.
  15. The City of Fredericksburg and the Counties of Caroline, Essex, Hanover, King George, Lancaster, Northumberland, Richmond, Spotsylvania, Stafford and Westmoreland shall constitute the fifteenth circuit.
  16. The City of Charlottesville and the Counties of Albemarle, Culpeper, Fluvanna, Goochland, Greene, Louisa, Madison and Orange shall constitute the sixteenth circuit.
  17. The County of Arlington and the City of Falls Church shall constitute the seventeenth circuit.
  18. The City of Alexandria shall constitute the eighteenth circuit.
  19. The City of Fairfax and the County of Fairfax shall constitute the nineteenth circuit.
  20. The Counties of Fauquier, Loudoun and Rappahannock shall constitute the twentieth circuit.
  21. The City of Martinsville and the Counties of Henry and Patrick shall constitute the twenty-first circuit.
  22. The City of Danville and the Counties of Franklin and Pittsylvania shall constitute the twenty-second circuit.
  23. The Cities of Roanoke and Salem and the County of Roanoke shall constitute the twenty-third circuit.
  24. The City of Lynchburg and the Counties of Amherst, Bedford, Campbell and Nelson shall constitute the twenty-fourth circuit.
  25. The Cities of Buena Vista, Covington, Lexington, Staunton and Waynesboro and the Counties of Alleghany, Augusta, Bath, Botetourt, Craig, Highland and Rockbridge shall constitute the twenty-fifth circuit.
  26. The Cities of Harrisonburg and Winchester and the Counties of Clarke, Frederick, Page, Rockingham, Shenandoah and Warren shall constitute the twenty-sixth circuit.
  27. The Cities of Galax and Radford and the Counties of Bland, Carroll, Floyd, Giles, Grayson, Montgomery, Pulaski and Wythe shall constitute the twenty-seventh circuit.
  28. The City of Bristol and the Counties of Smyth and Washington shall constitute the twenty-eighth circuit.
  29. The Counties of Buchanan, Dickenson, Russell and Tazewell shall constitute the twenty-ninth circuit.
  30. The City of Norton and the Counties of Lee, Scott and Wise shall constitute the thirtieth circuit.
  31. The Cities of Manassas and Manassas Park and the County of Prince William shall constitute the thirty-first circuit.

    (1973, c. 544, § 17-119.1:1; 1974, c. 297; 1976, c. 126; 1977, c. 4; 1983, c. 149; 1986, c. 405; 1987, c. 624; 1991, c. 189; 1998, c. 872; 2006, c. 861; 2016, cc. 164, 312.)

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendment by c. 861 deleted "City of South Boston and the" at the beginning of subdivision 10 and deleted "Clifton Forge" following "Buena Vista" in subdivision 25.

The 2016 amendments. - The 2016 amendments by cc. 164 and 312 are identical, and substituted "City of Lynchburg" for "Cities of Bedford and Lynchburg" in subdivision 24.

§ 17.1-507. Maximum number of judges; residence requirement; compensation; powers; etc.

  1. For the several judicial circuits there shall be judges, the maximum number as hereinafter set forth, who shall during their service reside within their respective circuits and whose compensation and powers shall be the same as now and hereafter prescribed for circuit judges.

    The maximum number of judges of the circuits shall be as follows:

    First - 5

    Second - 8

    Third - 4

    Fourth - 8

    Fifth - 4

    Sixth - 3

    Seventh - 5

    Eighth - 3

    Ninth - 4

    Tenth - 4

    Eleventh - 3

    Twelfth - 6

    Thirteenth - 7

    Fourteenth - 5

    Fifteenth - 11

    Sixteenth - 6

    Seventeenth - 4

    Eighteenth - 3

    Nineteenth - 15

    Twentieth - 5

    Twenty-first - 3

    Twenty-second - 4

    Twenty-third - 5

    Twenty-fourth - 6

    Twenty-fifth - 6

    Twenty-sixth - 8

    Twenty-seventh - 6

    Twenty-eighth - 4

    Twenty-ninth - 5

    Thirtieth - 4

    Thirty-first - 6

  2. No additional circuit court judge shall be authorized or provided for any judicial circuit until the Judicial Council has made a study of the need for such additional circuit court judge and has reported its findings and recommendations to the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The boundary of any judicial circuit shall not be changed until a study has been made by the Judicial Council and a report of its findings and recommendations made to said Committees.
  3. If the Judicial Council finds the need for an additional circuit court judge after a study is made pursuant to subsection B, the study shall be made available to the Compensation Board and the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and Council shall publish notice of such finding in a publication of general circulation among attorneys licensed to practice in the Commonwealth. The Compensation Board shall make a study of the need to provide additional courtroom security and deputy court clerk staffing. This study shall be reported to the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and to the Department of Planning and Budget.

    (1973, c. 544, § 17-119.1:2; 1974, cc. 42, 43; 1975, c. 40; 1977, c. 4; 1979, c. 6; 1980, c. 29; 1981, c. 27; 1982, c. 57; 1983, c. 2; 1985, c. 43; 1986, cc. 78, 479; 1989, c. 43; 1990, cc. 113, 114; 1991, cc. 20, 419, 623; 1992, c. 92; 1993, cc. 9, 89; 1994, cc. 89, 454; 1995, c. 20; 1996, c. 120; 1997, c. 17; 1998, cc. 3, 872; 1999, cc. 10, 319; 2000, c. 37; 2004, Sp. Sess. I, c. 4; 2005, cc. 190, 231, 951; 2006, cc. 35, 738; 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 2; 2013, c. 806; 2014, cc. 812, 822; 2018, cc. 126, 135.)

Twenty-first Judicial Circuit judgeships. - Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822 reduced the number of Circuit Court judges from 3 to 2. Acts 2014, cc. 812 and 822, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act reducing the number of authorized judgeships in the Twenty-first Judicial Circuit shall become effective upon the death, resignation, or retirement on or after January 1, 2014, of any judge of that court."

Second circuit judgeships. - Acts 2018, cc. 126 and 135 reduced the number of Circuit Court judges from 9 to 8. Acts 2018, cc. 126 and 135, cl. 2 provided: "That the provisions of this act reducing the number of authorized judgeships in the Second Judicial Circuit shall become effective upon the death, resignation, or retirement on or after January 1, 2018, of any judge of that court."

Editor's note.

The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary" for "the Courts of Justice Committees of the House of Delegates and Senate" in subsections B and C. March 10, 2021.

The 1999 amendments. - The 1999 amendment by c. 10 deleted, in subsection A, substituted "Fifteenth - 7" for "Fifteenth - 6," and, in subsection B, deleted the former second sentence, which read: "In its study, the Judicial Council shall consider, and report its findings regarding, the reduced case load that will occur if family court judgeships are authorized in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 ( § 16.1-69.6:1 et seq.) of Chapter 4.1 of Title 16.1" and deleted "Additionally" at the beginning of the present second sentence.

The 1999 amendment by c. 319 inserted "and Council shall publish notice of such finding in a publication of general circulation among attorneys licensed to practice in the Commonwealth" at the end of the first sentence in subsection C.

The 2000 amendments. - The 2000 amendment by c. 37, in subsection A, increased the number of judges in the twelfth and the twenty-seventh circuits from four to five.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 4, as amended by Acts 2005, c. 951, and Acts 2006, Sp. Sess. I, c. 2, effective July 1, 2004, in subsection A, substituted "First - 5" for "First - 4," "Fourteenth - 5" for "Fourteenth - 4," "Fifteenth - 8" for "Fifteenth - 7," "Twenty-second - 4" for "Twenty-second - 3," and "Twenty-ninth - 4" for "Twenty-ninth - 3."

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendments by cc. 190 and 231 are identical, and substituted "Twenty-eighth - 3" for "Twenty-eighth - 2."

The 2006 amendments. - The 2006 amendments by cc. 35 and 738 are identical, and substituted "Third - 5" for "Third - 4" in subsection A.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendment by c. 806, cl. 7, substituted "Fifteenth - 9" for "Fifteenth - 8" in subsection A.

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by cc. 812 and 822 are identical, and inserted "maximum" in the first and second paragraphs and rewrote the table.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendments by cc. 126 and 135 are identical, and in the table of subsection A, decreased the number of judges by one in the second, thirteenth, twenty-second and twenty-seventh judicial districts; and increased the number of judges by one in the fifth, seventh, seventeenth, eighteenth, twenty-first, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth judicial districts.

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on pleading and practice for the year 1972-1973, see 59 Va. L. Rev. 1559 (1973).

§ 17.1-508. Judges in new or changed circuits; ratifying, validating and confirming certain actions.

In any case heretofore or hereafter arising in which a judge has been judge of a circuit created under § 17.1-506 as amended, and the counties and cities, or one or more of them, have been transferred to and constituted as part of a new judicial circuit and the remaining counties and cities constituted as a circuit, the judges of the respective circuits are hereby declared to be judges of said circuits in which they reside and their actions are hereby ratified, validated and confirmed.

(1962, c. 3, § 17-119.2; 1978, c. 480; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judges, § 3.

§ 17.1-509. Vacancies in office of judge.

Whenever a vacancy occurs in the office of judge, a successor, who shall be a resident of the same circuit, shall be elected for a full term of eight years and upon qualification shall enter at once upon the discharge of the duties of his office. No person shall be elected or reelected to a subsequent term under this section until he has submitted to a criminal history record search and submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and reports of such searches have been received by the Chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. If the person has not met the requirement of filing in the preceding calendar year a disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 or 30-111, he shall also provide a written statement of economic interests on the disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 to the Chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Subject to the provisions of §§ 17.1-511 and 17.1-512 , the Governor shall have the power while the General Assembly is not in session to fill pro tempore vacancies in such office. Such appointment to every vacancy shall be by commission to expire at the end of 30 days after the commencement of the next regular session of the General Assembly. No person with a criminal conviction for a felony shall be appointed as a judge.

(Code 1919, § 5889, § 17-120; 1920, p. 123; 1924, p. 310; 1944, p. 95; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 27; 1973, c. 544; 1977, c. 197; 1998, c. 872; 2001, c. 256; 2004, c. 452; 2018, c. 578.)

Editor's note. - The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "the Chairmen of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary" for "the chairmen of the House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice" in two places. March 10, 2021.

The 2001 amendments. - The 2001 amendment by c. 256 substituted "while the General Assembly is not in session" for "during the recess of the General Assembly."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 452 inserted the second sentence, deleted "But" at the beginning of the third sentence, added the last sentence, and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 578 substituted "and submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and reports of such searches have been received" for "and a report of such search has been received" in the second sentence, and inserted the third sentence.

Law review. - For an article, "Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence," see 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 405 (2000).

§ 17.1-510. Election of judge of new circuit; how court held meanwhile.

If a new or additional circuit is created, a judge or judges shall be elected or appointed thereto in the same manner as provided by law for the filling of vacancies or newly created judgeships in existing circuits.

During any vacancy from the creation of the new circuit until a judge has been elected or appointed to fill the vacancy and has qualified, terms of the court shall be held by a judge or by judges designated as provided by law in cases of vacancies.

(Code 1919, § 5889, § 17-121; 1920, p. 123; 1924, p. 310; 1944, p. 95; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - For constitutional provision, see Va. Const., Art. VI, § 7.

§ 17.1-511. Investigation and certification of necessity before vacancies filled.

When a vacancy occurs in the office of judge of any court of record, the vacancy shall not be filled until, after investigation, the Supreme Court certifies that the filling of the vacancy is or is not necessary. If the Court certifies that the filling of the vacancy is necessary, the Court shall publish notice of such certification in a publication of general circulation among attorneys licensed to practice in the Commonwealth. No notice of retirement submitted under § 51.1-305 or § 51.1-307 shall be revoked after certification of the vacancy by the Court. If the Court certifies that the filling of the vacancy is not necessary, it shall recommend to the General Assembly the manner of distributing the work of the judge; and the Governor shall not fill the vacancy.

(1940, p. 178, § 17-122; Michie Code 1942, § 5889a; 1944, p. 96; 1962, c. 287; 1973, c. 544; 1998, c. 872; 1999, c. 319; 2004, c. 331.)

The 1999 amendment added the second sentence.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 331 inserted the present third sentence.

§ 17.1-512. Election of successor judge before date of vacancy.

Whenever a vacancy occurs or exists in the office of a judge of a circuit while the General Assembly is in session, or whenever the term of office of a judge of a circuit court will expire or the office will be vacated at a date certain between the adjournment of the General Assembly and the commencement of the next session of the General Assembly, a successor judge may be elected at any time during a session preceding the date of such vacancy, by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly, for a term of eight years and upon qualification, the successor judge shall enter at once upon the discharge of the duties of his office. However, such successor judge shall not enter upon the discharge of his duties prior to the commencement of his term of office. No person shall be elected or reelected to a subsequent term under this section until he has submitted to a criminal history record search and submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and reports of such searches have been received by the Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. No person with a criminal conviction for a felony shall be appointed as a judge. If the person has not met the requirement of filing in the preceding calendar year a disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 or 30-111, he shall also provide a written statement of economic interests on the disclosure form prescribed in § 2.2-3117 to the Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

(1973, c. 544, § 17-122.1; 1993, c. 368; 1998, c. 872; 2004, c. 452; 2018, c. 578.)

Editor's note. - The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "the Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary" for "the chairmen of the House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice" in two places. March 10, 2021.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 452 added the last two sentences.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 578 substituted "and submitted to a search of the central registry maintained pursuant to § 63.2-1515 for any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and reports of such searches have been received" for "and a report of such search has been received" in the third sentence, and added the last sentence.

§ 17.1-513. (Effective until January 1 2022) Jurisdiction of circuit courts.

The circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of proceedings by quo warranto or information in the nature of quo warranto and to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari to all inferior tribunals created or existing under the laws of the Commonwealth, and to issue writs of mandamus in all matters of proceedings arising from or pertaining to the action of the boards of supervisors or other governing bodies of the several counties for which such courts are respectively held or in other cases in which it may be necessary to prevent the failure of justice and in which mandamus may issue according to the principles of common law. They shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases, civil and criminal, in which an appeal may, as provided by law, be taken from the judgment or proceedings of any inferior tribunal.

They shall have original and general jurisdiction of all civil cases, except cases upon claims to recover personal property or money not of greater value than $100, exclusive of interest, and except such cases as are assigned to some other tribunal; also in all cases for the recovery of fees in excess of $100; penalties or cases involving the right to levy and collect toll or taxes or the validity of an ordinance or bylaw of any corporation; and also, of all cases, civil or criminal, in which an appeal may be had to the Supreme Court.

They shall have jurisdiction to hear motions filed for the purpose of modifying, dissolving, or extending a protective order pursuant to § 16.1-279.1 or 19.2-152.10 if the circuit court issued such order, unless the circuit court remanded the matter to the jurisdiction of the juvenile and domestic relations district court in accordance with § 16.1-297. They shall also have original jurisdiction of all indictments for felonies and of presentments, informations and indictments for misdemeanors.

Upon certification by the district court of any felony charge and ancillary misdemeanor charge or when an appeal of a conviction of an offense in district court is noted, jurisdiction as to such charges shall vest in the circuit court, unless such case is reopened pursuant to § 16.1-133.1; a final judgment, order, or decree is modified, vacated, or suspended pursuant to Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 1:1; or the appeal has been withdrawn in the district court within 10 days pursuant to § 16.1-133.

They shall also have jurisdiction for bail hearings pursuant to §§ 19.2-327.2:1 and 19.2-327.10:1.

They shall have appellate jurisdiction of all cases, civil and criminal, in which an appeal, writ of error or supersedeas may, as provided by law, be taken to or allowed by such courts, or the judges thereof, from or to the judgment or proceedings of any inferior tribunal. They shall also have jurisdiction of all other matters, civil and criminal, made cognizable therein by law and when a motion to recover money is allowed in such tribunals, they may hear and determine the same, although it is to recover less than $100.

While a matter is pending in a circuit court, upon motion of the plaintiff seeking to decrease the amount of the claim to within the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the general district court as described in subdivision 1 of § 16.1-77, the circuit court shall order transfer of the matter to the general district court that has jurisdiction over the amended amount of the claim without requiring that the case first be dismissed or that the plaintiff suffer a nonsuit, and the tolling of the applicable statutes of limitations governing the pending matter shall be unaffected by the transfer. Except for good cause shown, no such order of transfer shall issue unless the motion to amend and transfer is made at least 10 days before trial. The plaintiff shall pay filing and other fees as otherwise provided by law to the clerk of the court to which the case is transferred, and such clerk shall process the claim as if it were a new civil action. The plaintiff shall prepare and present the order of transfer to the transferring court for entry, after which time the case shall be removed from the pending docket of the transferring court and the order of transfer placed among its records. The plaintiff shall provide a certified copy of the transfer order to the receiving court.

(Code 1919, § 5890, § 17-123; 1928, p. 1164; 1973, c. 544; 1977, c. 624; 1998, c. 872; 2005, c. 681; 2012, cc. 152, 261; 2015, c. 66; 2020, c. 903; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 187.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective until January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective January 1, 2022, see the following section, also numbered § 17.1-513 .

Cross references. - As to writs of mandamus and prohibition, see §§ 8.01-644 through 8.01-653.1 .

As to jurisdiction in criminal cases generally, see § 19.2-239.

Editor's note. - Acts 2012, cc. 152 and 261, cl. 2 provides: "That beginning July 1, 2013, any circuit court clerk who does not use the Statewide Case Management System operated and maintained by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall provide protective orders directly to the Virginia Criminal Information Network in an electronic format approved by the Department of State Police; and that until July 1, 2013, such clerks shall forthwith forward the protective order to the primary law-enforcement agency providing service and entry of protective orders for entry into the Virginia Criminal Information Network."

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 681, effective January 1, 2006, substituted "all civil cases, except cases upon claims to" for "all cases in chancery and civil cases at law, except cases at law to" in the first sentence in the second paragraph.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendments by cc. 152 and 261 are identical, and added the present first sentence of the third paragraph, and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 66 added the last sentence in the third paragraph.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 903 added the last paragraph.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 187, effective July 1, 2021, inserted the fourth paragraph.

Law review. - For a note on the use of mandamus in judicial proceedings in Virginia, see 40 Va. L. Rev. 817 (1954). For note, "Obtaining Jurisdiction Over Corporations in Virginia," see 12 U. Rich. L. Rev. 369 (1978). For survey of Virginia law on governmental services and social welfare for the year 1978-1979, see 66 Va. L. Rev. 301 (1980). For article, "Appeal De Novo in Virginia: An Examination of Its Present Utility," see 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1149 (1985). For article, "Civil Rights and 'Personal Injuries': Virginia's Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 Suits," see 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 199 (1985).

For article, "Legal Issues Involving Children," see 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 741 (2001).

For annual survey article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 269 (2009).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 357; 3B M.J. Certiorari, § 21; 5A M.J. Courts, § 39; 12B M.J. Mandamus, § 24.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

This section confers potential jurisdiction upon all circuit courts. This is potential jurisdiction which, after valid service of process on the parties, gives the court active jurisdiction and empowers it to hear the case and enter a valid judgment therein. County School Bd. v. Snead, 198 Va. 100 , 92 S.E.2d 497 (1956).

Circuit courts have original general jurisdiction in all personal and transitory actions by authority of this section, their territorial jurisdiction in such actions being coextensive with the State. James v. Powell, 154 Va. 96 , 152 S.E. 539 (1930).

If they obtain jurisdiction of the parties. - Any court in the State would have jurisdiction of a transitory personal action under this section, if it obtained jurisdiction of the parties. Moore v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 124 Va. 628 , 98 S.E. 635 (1919); Stowers v. Harman, 128 Va. 229 , 104 S.E. 703 (1920).

No loss of jurisdiction where conviction for lesser included offense. - This section provides that the circuit court has jurisdiction of all indictments for felonies. Since the defendant was indicted for a felony, the case had to be tried in the circuit court. Circuit courts do not lose jurisdiction to convict and sentence a defendant merely because the conviction turns out to be for a lesser included misdemeanor offense. Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 277, 392 S.E.2d 827 (1990), reversed on other grounds, 241 Va. 244 , 402 S.E.2d 678 (1991).

Power to grant injunctions. - The circuit courts of the State have general equity jurisdiction, including the power to grant injunctions, under this section, and § 8-619 (now § 8.01-627 ) directs an order granting an injunction to be sent to the clerk of such court as has jurisdiction under § 8-611 (now § 8.01-261 ). This is not a limitation upon the power of the court granting the injunction, but simply fixes the venue of the case to be tried. Manifestly, it seemed to the legislature that former § 8-611 furnished the most convenient place to hear the controversy. But equity acts in personam and may compel a party within its jurisdiction to perform and act outside of its jurisdiction. The statute is a venue statute and not a jurisdictional one. Blanchard v. Twin City Mkt., 157 Va. 13 , 160 S.E. 310 (1931).

Errors as to elements of offense not jurisdictional. - To the extent a trial court may have erroneously interpreted the statutory elements of an offense, such an error may provide a basis to appeal but does not divest the court of jurisdiction. Limbrick v. Commonwealth, No. 2568-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 803 (Ct. of Appeals Dec. 12, 2000).

Jurisdiction potential and active. - Under this section the circuit courts have "original and general jurisdiction of all cases in chancery and civil cases at law, . . . ." This is "potential" jurisdiction, which, after valid service of process on the parties, gives the court "active" jurisdiction and empowers it to hear the case and enter a valid judgment therein. Southern Sand & Gravel Co. v. Massaponax Sand & Gravel Corp., 145 Va. 317 , 133 S.E. 812 (1926); Morgan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 148 Va. 272 , 138 S.E. 566 (1927).

Jurisdiction of breach of labor contract. - An individual employee and member of a labor union may sue his employer for a breach of a collective bargaining agreement between the union and the employer in a State court. Pearman v. Industrial Rayon Corp., 207 Va. 854 , 153 S.E.2d 227 (1967).

The State Corporation Commission has no criminal jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is vested solely in the courts not of record and in the courts of record of the Commonwealth. Croatan Books, Inc. v. Baliles, 583 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Va. 1984).

Mandamus to SCC. - Circuit courts derive no jurisdiction from this section to issue writs of mandamus to State Corporation Commission (SCC), since SCC is tribunal of stature and dignity equal to that of circuit court. Atlas Underwriters, Ltd. v. SCC, 237 Va. 45 , 375 S.E.2d 733 (1989).

Court had jurisdiction to convict appellant of violation on naval base. - Since the Little Creek Amphibious Base was acquired by the United States under the provisions of Title 3, Chapter 4, § 19, Virginia Code of 1942, a state cession statute, and since under the provisions of that cession statute, Virginia retained concurrent criminal jurisdiction, this state retained concurrent jurisdiction over the Little Creek Amphibious Base for the enforcement of laws regarding traffic infractions; the circuit court, consequently, had jurisdiction to convict the appellant for a speeding violation while on that naval base. Gay v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 229, 391 S.E.2d 737 (1990).

The circuit court, sitting as chancery court in divorce case, lacked jurisdiction to terminate father's parental rights and, with that termination, father's child support obligation. Church v. Church, 24 Va. App. 502, 483 S.E.2d 498 (1997).

Right to jury trial not improperly denied where plaintiff did not follow procedure. - Dismissal of suit, which complained only of the denial of a trial by jury and asserted a collusion by defendants to deny him one, was proper, where plaintiff's own actions in bringing suit in the general district court rather than the circuit court deprived him of a trial by jury. Had he originally brought his personal injury claim in circuit court, as he was entitled to by this section, he would have received a jury upon request under § 8.01-336 . He also could have received a de novo jury trial by properly perfecting his appeal from general district court under § 16.1-113. His failure to receive a jury trial, therefore, was the result of his own failure to follow valid state procedures rather than the result of any collusion by defendants in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088, 106 S. Ct. 1475, 89 L. Ed. 2d 729 (1986).

Writs did not lie against judge. - Writ of prohibition did not lie against a judge with jurisdiction to adjudicate and to enter any order in proceedings involving felony charges against two defendants; a writ of mandamus did not lie to fix and prescribe the judgment to be rendered. In re Commonwealth's Atty. for Roanoke, 265 Va. 313 , 576 S.E.2d 458, 2003 Va. LEXIS 38 (2003).

Transfers between circuit courts implicated territorial jurisdiction but not subject matter jurisdiction. - Transfer of defendant's criminal trial from Norfolk (the place of the offense), to Arlington and the subsequent transfer back to Norfolk after the jury verdicts did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction since both the Arlington and Norfolk circuit courts had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's charges under § 17.1-513 . The only question was whether a violation of § 19.2-239 occurred when the Arlington circuit court conducted the trial; this issue went solely to the circuit court's lack of authority to exercise territorial jurisdiction and was waived by defendant's failure to timely object. Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203 , 661 S.E.2d 415, 2008 Va. LEXIS 78 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1999, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1097, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 3047 (U.S. 2009).

Jurisdiction proven in criminal case. - In a murder case, the trial court had territorial jurisdiction under §§ 19.2-239 and 17.1-513 because the facts and circumstances proved that the killing occurred in Richmond, Virginia. The undisputed evidence showed that the stabbing occurred at a rooming house in Richmond, Virginia; diagrams of the residence indicated that it was in Richmond; Richmond police and a Richmond prosecutor investigated the case; physical evidence was analyzed in Richmond; and defendant's arrest warrant had a Richmond address. Dixon v. Commonwealth,, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 165 (May 2, 2006).

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's trial, even though under subsection A of § 16.1-241, the juvenile and domestic relations district courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving a juvenile who was alleged to be delinquent, defined under § 16.1-228 as one under 18 years old, as defendant gave defendant's birthdate as December 13, 1986, and the indictment stated that the offense occurred on December 16, 2006. Hall v. Commonwealth, No. 2902-07-3, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 73 (Feb. 17, 2009).

Trial court did not err in convicting defendant of attempted murder because the trial court was not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction when it failed to arraign defendant on the charge when defendant was fully aware of the attempted murder charge and was in no way prejudiced by the omission of a formal arraignment; defendant's continued silence in the face of repeated references to the attempted murder charge was tantamount to a waiver of his right to be arraigned and to enter a not guilty plea, and having failed to raise any objection, defendant waived any defect. Simmons v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 594, 681 S.E.2d 56, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 367 (2009).

Circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's revocation hearing because the General Assembly had granted that court subject matter jurisdiction over the specific class of cases of which the case was a member: the prosecution and the rehabilitation of criminals. Moreover, probation revocation proceedings were part of the criminal process entrusted to the circuit court. Mohamed v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 95, 691 S.E.2d 513, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 145 (2010).

Because defendant admitted that the events in question occurred at the apartment of the victim's grandmother, and because the grandmother and defendant's girlfriend testified that the apartment was in a locality in Virginia, the evidence was sufficient to establish the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction under §§ 19.2-239 and 17.1-513 . Torres v. Commonwealth,, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 420 (Nov. 2, 2010).

Defendant's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on grounds the Commonwealth did not prove where the crimes took place was properly denied because (1) under § 19.2-244, he waived his right to contest venue by not doing so before pleading guilty; and (2) as he pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, he conceded that the trial court had jurisdiction. Bryant v. Commonwealth, No. 1462-12-4, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 214 (Ct. of Appeals July 23, 2013).

Trial court properly tried defendant's trial for the alleged rape of defendant's mentally disabled daughter because the court reasonably concluded that the crime occurred in the private confines of the family home in the county of the trial court where defendant spent several hours alone with defendant's daughters on at least three evenings each week during the month when the pregnancy of the daughter occurred. Romero v. Commonwealth,, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 114 (Mar. 25, 2014).

Although defendant asserted that the delayed entry of the order recording the presentation of the indictment in open court invalidated his conviction, because there was no constitutional requirement that prosecutions for a felony had to be by indictment, as that requirement was merely statutory and could be waived, the trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction; thus, because the trial court properly had jurisdiction, and defendant failed to raise the argument below, defendant's argument on appeal was barred. Davis v. Commonwealth, No. 0215-15-3, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 148 (Ct. of Appeals May 3, 2016).

Delayed entry of the presentment order was not a substantive violation that invalidated defendant's indictment or deprived the trial court of jurisdiction where defendant did not assert that the indictment's contents were deficient in any manner or that the indictment was not returned in open court. Epps v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 393, 785 S.E.2d 792 (2016), aff'd, 293 Va. 403 , 799 S.E.2d 516, 2017 Va. LEXIS 77 (2017).

All circuit courts in the Commonwealth possess subject matter jurisdiction over all felony prosecutions, including those for credit card theft; the circuit court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the four counts of credit card theft against defendant and possessed the statutory authority to impose punishment for those crimes. Bryant v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 697, 832 S.E.2d 48, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 200 (2019).

Neither § 19.2-304 nor § 19.2-306 grants a trial court categorical judicial power over criminal cases or their attendant proceedings, and thus, neither can reasonably be read to strip a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction if the court violates those procedures. Cilwa v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 259 , 836 S.E.2d 378, 2019 Va. LEXIS 153 (Dec. 12, 2019).

No time limitation in either § 19.2-304 or § 19.2-306 implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction to enter uncontested orders extending probation periods before or after their expiration; as a result, the parties are free to extend these deadlines, with the trial court's concurrence, even after their expiration. Cilwa v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 259 , 836 S.E.2d 378, 2019 Va. LEXIS 153 (Dec. 12, 2019).

Jurisdiction in capital murder case. - Defendant had been sentenced to death, but the case was remanded to determine whether he was mentally retarded. That the mandate related solely to the issue of mental retardation did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to consider other legal issues the parties raised on remand, including defendant's motion under § 19.2-264.5 requesting the imposition of a life sentence. In re Commonwealth, 278 Va. 1 , 677 S.E.2d 236, 2009 Va. LEXIS 78 (2009).

Jurisdiction in divorce case. - Trial court had jurisdiction to reinstate a divorce case in order to effectuate its prior orders as three years after the final decree was entered, the parties had not sold the marital realty, and the terms in the final decree did not comply with the terms included in an opinion letter; the trial court had jurisdiction as the issues contested by a husband relating to set-offs and the distribution of the sales proceeds from the properties were necessary determinations to effectuate the original order, and the factors responsible for the additional findings included the length of time that the properties remained unlisted and unsold, and the husband's lack of cooperation in expediting the sales of the property. Brown v. Brown,, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 34 (Feb. 6, 2007).

Jurisdiction for revocation. - Because the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to conduct the 2010 revocation hearing, the 2010 sentencing order was merely voidable and was not subject to collateral attack. Thus, the circuit court properly refused to vacate the 2010 sentencing order at defendant's 2013 revocation hearing. Hardy v. Commonwealth,, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 341 (Oct. 14, 2014).

Circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to revoke defendant's suspended sentences at the probation revocation hearing and impose a period of supervised probation based on the violation of the terms of his probation, and thus, its sentencing order was voidable rather than void ab initio; therefore, the order was subject to the rule and could not be collaterally attacked. Douglas v. Commonwealth, No. 1886-15-3, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 91 (Mar. 28, 2017).

Court had subject matter jurisdiction to impose probation after revoking defendant's suspended sentences because, even if the court erred, the court did not exceed the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Bost v. Commonwealth, No. 1302-17-4, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 200 (July 24, 2018).

Circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to determine parentage in domestic assault cases. - Florida circuit court does not err in exercising subject matter jurisdiction to determine parentage for purposes of adjudicating a defendant's guilt on charges of felony domestic assault, whether or not other proceedings involving a determination of parentage are then pending in the juvenile and domestic relations district court. Graves v. Commonwealth, No. 2938-05-3, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 63 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 20, 2007).

Jurisdiction to hear appeal from denial of coram nobis writ. - Circuit court finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear appellant's appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in a criminal conviction was error because § 16.1-106 was not restricted to only monetary cases; however, coram nobis did not lie as a means by which appellant was allowed to collaterally challenge his guilty plea. Appellant's allegation that he suffered from some undefined lack of capacity due to medication at the time of his guilty plea was not a clerical error nor a claim of an error in fact. Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 503 , 650 S.E.2d 514, 2007 Va. LEXIS 108 (2007).

Circuit court had no original jurisdiction but had appellate jurisdiction. - Circuit court erred when it exercised subject matter jurisdiction over a case alleging an unfit pet owner pursuant to former § 3.1-796.115 that originated in general district court, was appealed to the circuit court and nonsuited there, was subsequently refiled in the general district court, dismissed, and then appealed to the circuit court. The county was required by subsection A of § 8.01-380 to refile its petition, following the nonsuit, in the circuit court. Although the circuit court did not have original or general jurisdiction over the § 3.1-796.115 petition pursuant to § 17.1-513 , the circuit court did obtain appellate jurisdiction derivatively from the de novo appeal taken from the general district court. Davis v. County of Fairfax, 282 Va. 23 , 710 S.E.2d 466, 2011 Va. LEXIS 125 (2011).

Trial court lacked jurisdiction. - Trial court could deny defendant's motion to dismiss or remand to the district court defendant's direct indictment on the felony charge of § 18.2-57 assault on a police officer where a preliminary hearing had not been held. Pursuant to § 17.1-513 , the trial court's appellate jurisdiction was limited and in criminal cases the General Assembly had not provided any authorization that would permit a trial court to review a district court's discretion to end a prosecution, which meant that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the district court's decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Wright v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 690, 667 S.E.2d 787, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 509 (2008).

Because a county department of social services was a unit of county government and exempt from the Virginia Administrative Process Act, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to hear a daughter's appeal of its decision; at no time did a state agency make a finding against the daughter, and consequently, the statutory right to judicial review of the case decision of an administrative agency under the Act did not apply. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Gosney, No. 1524-16-3, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 119 (Ct. of Appeals May 2, 2017).

Jurisdiction improperly exercised. - As neither party sought modification of a child support order in the juvenile and domestic relations district (JDR) court, the circuit court, in an appeal from the JDR court, had no jurisdiction to sua sponte increase the father's child support obligation. Tedford v. Dean-Bryant, No. 1340-03-4, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 458 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 28, 2004).

Failure to object waived issue on appeal. - Defendant's appeal of his misdemeanor conviction in the general district court for a de novo trial in the circuit court fell precisely within the class of cases and controversies that the statutes granted the circuit court authority to adjudicate, and the question of whether his notice of appeal was timely filed concerned the circuit court's active jurisdiction, which could be waived if not preserved. Because defendant failed to preserve this argument in circuit court, it could not be addressed on appeal. Breznick v. Commonwealth, No. 0982-19-3, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 216 (July 28, 2020).

Courthouse security. - Trial court did not err in finding defendant in civil and criminal contempt for defendant's conduct in his capacity as a sheriff in removing a deputy from security at the entrance to a courthouse; defendant's conduct was in direct violation of the trial court's order and even though § 17.1-513 may not have permitted the trial court the jurisdiction to find defendant in contempt, other statutes, such § 53.1-120 gave the trial court authority to provide for both courtroom and courthouse security. Epps v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 687, 626 S.E.2d 912, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 102 (2006).

Dismissal proper. - Circuit court properly dismissed a father's complaint to amend custody and visitation because, while the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the father's refiled appeals, the parties' circumstances changed during the pendency of the nonsuit, the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the father's refiled appeals and did the only thing it could do. Barrett v. Minor, No. 0173-14-3, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 165 (May 12, 2015).

Applied in Penn v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 422, 528 S.E.2d 179, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 329 (2000); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 326, 549 S.E.2d 648, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 448 (2001); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 589 S.E.2d 444, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 637 (2003); Cartwright v. Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r, 270 Va. 58 , 613 S.E.2d 449, 2005 Va. LEXIS 62 (2005); Bonanno v. Quinn, 299 Va. 722 , 858 S.E.2d 181, 2021 Va. LEXIS 54 (2021).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction. - Because a corporation requested a circuit court find it fit under subsection A of § 8.01-324 through a petition that identified no controversy, there was no case currently before the circuit court, and thus, § 17.1-513 did not grant the circuit court subject matter jurisdiction over the petition; while the scope of § 17.1-513 is broad, its provisions extend only to "cases" because the language of the statute makes clear that controversy is implicit to "cases." In re Dow Jones & Co., 79 Va. Cir. 514, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 246 (Norfolk Nov. 17, 2009).

In the absence of statutory authority, the circuit court had no jurisdiction to try de novo civil contempt adjudications of the juvenile and domestic relations district court discharging a mother; therefore, the appeals were dismissed. Huck v. Banfield, 94 Va. Cir. 182, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 167 (Norfolk Aug. 25, 2016).

Because the order denying a motion to dissolve a protective order was not issued by the circuit court, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from that order. Ortiz v. Chappelear, 105 Va. Cir. 49, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 44 (Virginia Beach Apr. 8, 2020).

Actions in equity. - Business that filed an action in equity alleging that a former employee violated a noncompetition agreement and that the employee's new employer misappropriated trade secrets waived its right to a jury trial on legal claims asserted in its complaint. Builders Floor Serv. v. Kirby, 60 Va. Cir. 171, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 261 (Fairfax County 2002).

Contract disputes. - Default judgment entered in a contract dispute where a corporation did not file a response within the 21-day period, a church stated a breach of contract cause of action, venue was waived, and jurisdiction and notice were proper. New Life Christian Church v. Dynabilt Tech. Int'l Corp., 59 Va. Cir. 399, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 367 (Norfolk 2002).

Jurisdiction over parties in wrongful death action. - Motion to dismiss was denied because it was proper for suit to be brought in Virginia against a resident of Virginia for a wrongful death occurring in another state and the Virginia court would apply the law of the other state to the action, as actions for wrongful death were transitory and could be brought in any court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the case; the alleged negligence and wrongful death occurred in North Carolina, and plaintiffs, defendants and the decedent were residents of Virginia. Ewers v. Parker, 69 Va. Cir. 464, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 6 (Portsmouth 2006).

Jurisdiction over claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. - Circuit Court's subject matter jurisdiction encompassed a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, § 17.1-513 ; however, the plaintiff failed to allege objective physical injury, the need for medical attention, or loss of income, and therefore failed to state a claim. Hudgins v. Higginbotham, 82 Va. Cir. 152, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 161 (Chesapeake Feb. 1, 2011).

Jurisdiction proper. - Case was properly before the circuit court because the general district court having been divested of jurisdiction by virtue of a tenant's appeal, the obtaining of the case papers from the GDC became the province of the circuit court's inherent power to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate those causes properly entrusted to the forum; the Calendar Control Judge thus appropriately set a hearing to consider whether the bond set by the GDC judge was required to perfect the appeal. FCRHA Cedar Ridge, L.P. v. Boler, 104 Va. Cir. 132, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8 (Fairfax County Jan. 17, 2020).

Jurisdiction lacking. - Circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners' claims seeking to correct their race/nationality where the Va. Const. art. IV, § 1, did not grant such jurisdiction, correction of race/nationality was not expressly mentioned in § 17.1-513 , and no other law or statute granted the courts such jurisdiction. In re Pacheco, 98 Va. Cir. 231, 98 Va. Cir. 231, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 38 (Virginia Beach Mar. 14, 2018).

§ 17.1-513. (Effective January 1, 2022) Jurisdiction of circuit courts.

The circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of proceedings by quo warranto or information in the nature of quo warranto and to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari to all inferior tribunals created or existing under the laws of the Commonwealth, and to issue writs of mandamus in all matters of proceedings arising from or pertaining to the action of the boards of supervisors or other governing bodies of the several counties for which such courts are respectively held or in other cases in which it may be necessary to prevent the failure of justice and in which mandamus may issue according to the principles of common law. They shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases, civil and criminal, in which an appeal may, as provided by law, be taken from the judgment or proceedings of any inferior tribunal.

They shall have original and general jurisdiction of all civil cases, except cases upon claims to recover personal property or money not of greater value than $100, exclusive of interest, and except such cases as are assigned to some other tribunal; also in all cases for the recovery of fees in excess of $100; penalties or cases involving the right to levy and collect toll or taxes or the validity of an ordinance or bylaw of any corporation; and also, of all cases, civil or criminal, in which an appeal may be had to the Court of Appeals.

They shall have jurisdiction to hear motions filed for the purpose of modifying, dissolving, or extending a protective order pursuant to § 16.1-279.1 or 19.2-152.10 if the circuit court issued such order, unless the circuit court remanded the matter to the jurisdiction of the juvenile and domestic relations district court in accordance with § 16.1-297. They shall also have original jurisdiction of all indictments for felonies and of presentments, informations and indictments for misdemeanors. They shall also have jurisdiction for bail hearings pursuant to §§ 19.2-327.2:1 and 19.2-327.10:1.

Upon certification by the district court of any felony charge and ancillary misdemeanor charge or when an appeal of a conviction of an offense in district court is noted, jurisdiction as to such charges shall vest in the circuit court, unless such case is reopened pursuant to § 16.1-133.1; a final judgment, order, or decree is modified, vacated, or suspended pursuant to Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 1:1; or the appeal has been withdrawn in the district court within 10 days pursuant to § 16.1-133.

They shall have appellate jurisdiction of all cases, civil and criminal, in which an appeal, writ of error or supersedeas may, as provided by law, be taken to or allowed by such courts, or the judges thereof, from or to the judgment or proceedings of any inferior tribunal. They shall also have jurisdiction of all other matters, civil and criminal, made cognizable therein by law and when a motion to recover money is allowed in such tribunals, they may hear and determine the same, although it is to recover less than $100.

While a matter is pending in a circuit court, upon motion of the plaintiff seeking to decrease the amount of the claim to within the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the general district court as described in subdivision 1 of § 16.1-77, the circuit court shall order transfer of the matter to the general district court that has jurisdiction over the amended amount of the claim without requiring that the case first be dismissed or that the plaintiff suffer a nonsuit, and the tolling of the applicable statutes of limitations governing the pending matter shall be unaffected by the transfer. Except for good cause shown, no such order of transfer shall issue unless the motion to amend and transfer is made at least 10 days before trial. The plaintiff shall pay filing and other fees as otherwise provided by law to the clerk of the court to which the case is transferred, and such clerk shall process the claim as if it were a new civil action. The plaintiff shall prepare and present the order of transfer to the transferring court for entry, after which time the case shall be removed from the pending docket of the transferring court and the order of transfer placed among its records. The plaintiff shall provide a certified copy of the transfer order to the receiving court.

(Code 1919, § 5890, § 17-123; 1928, p. 1164; 1973, c. 544; 1977, c. 624; 1998, c. 872; 2005, c. 681; 2012, cc. 152, 261; 2015, c. 66; 2020, c. 903; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 187, 489.)

Section set out twice. - The section above is effective January 1, 2022. For the version of this section effective until January 1, 2022, see the preceding section, also numbered § 17.1-513 .

Cross references. - As to writs of mandamus and prohibition, see §§ 8.01-644 through 8.01-653.1 .

As to jurisdiction in criminal cases generally, see § 19.2-239.

Editor's note. - Acts 2012, cc. 152 and 261, cl. 2 provides: "That beginning July 1, 2013, any circuit court clerk who does not use the Statewide Case Management System operated and maintained by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall provide protective orders directly to the Virginia Criminal Information Network in an electronic format approved by the Department of State Police; and that until July 1, 2013, such clerks shall forthwith forward the protective order to the primary law-enforcement agency providing service and entry of protective orders for entry into the Virginia Criminal Information Network."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 3 provides: "That any case for which a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, shall continue in the Supreme Court of Virginia and shall not be affected by the provisions of this act."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 4 provides: "That any case for which a petition for appeal in a criminal case to the Court of Appeals has been filed prior to January 1, 2022, and a decision on such petition remains pending, such petition for appeal shall be deemed granted and the clerk of the Court of Appeals shall certify the granting of such petition to the trial court and all counsel. Such case shall be considered mature for purposes of further proceedings from the date of such certificate."

Acts 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, cl. 6 provides: "That the provisions of this act amending § 17.1-400 of the Code of Virginia shall become effective in due course and that the remaining provisions of this act shall become effective on January 1, 2022."

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 681, effective January 1, 2006, substituted "all civil cases, except cases upon claims to" for "all cases in chancery and civil cases at law, except cases at law to" in the first sentence in the second paragraph.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendments by cc. 152 and 261 are identical, and added the present first sentence of the third paragraph, and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendment by c. 66 added the last sentence in the third paragraph.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 903 added the last paragraph.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 187, effective July 1, 2021, inserted the fourth paragraph.

The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 489, effective January 1, 2022, substituted "Court of Appeals" for "Supreme Court" in the second paragraph.

Law review. - For a note on the use of mandamus in judicial proceedings in Virginia, see 40 Va. L. Rev. 817 (1954). For note, "Obtaining Jurisdiction Over Corporations in Virginia," see 12 U. Rich. L. Rev. 369 (1978). For survey of Virginia law on governmental services and social welfare for the year 1978-1979, see 66 Va. L. Rev. 301 (1980). For article, "Appeal De Novo in Virginia: An Examination of Its Present Utility," see 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1149 (1985). For article, "Civil Rights and 'Personal Injuries': Virginia's Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 Suits," see 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 199 (1985).

For article, "Legal Issues Involving Children," see 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 741 (2001).

For annual survey article, "Civil Practice and Procedure," see 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 269 (2009).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 357; 3B M.J. Certiorari, § 21; 5A M.J. Courts, § 39; 12B M.J. Mandamus, § 24.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

This section confers potential jurisdiction upon all circuit courts. This is potential jurisdiction which, after valid service of process on the parties, gives the court active jurisdiction and empowers it to hear the case and enter a valid judgment therein. County School Bd. v. Snead, 198 Va. 100 , 92 S.E.2d 497 (1956).

Circuit courts have original general jurisdiction in all personal and transitory actions by authority of this section, their territorial jurisdiction in such actions being coextensive with the State. James v. Powell, 154 Va. 96 , 152 S.E. 539 (1930).

If they obtain jurisdiction of the parties. - Any court in the State would have jurisdiction of a transitory personal action under this section, if it obtained jurisdiction of the parties. Moore v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 124 Va. 628 , 98 S.E. 635 (1919); Stowers v. Harman, 128 Va. 229 , 104 S.E. 703 (1920).

No loss of jurisdiction where conviction for lesser included offense. - This section provides that the circuit court has jurisdiction of all indictments for felonies. Since the defendant was indicted for a felony, the case had to be tried in the circuit court. Circuit courts do not lose jurisdiction to convict and sentence a defendant merely because the conviction turns out to be for a lesser included misdemeanor offense. Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 277, 392 S.E.2d 827 (1990), reversed on other grounds, 241 Va. 244 , 402 S.E.2d 678 (1991).

Power to grant injunctions. - The circuit courts of the State have general equity jurisdiction, including the power to grant injunctions, under this section, and § 8-619 (now § 8.01-627 ) directs an order granting an injunction to be sent to the clerk of such court as has jurisdiction under § 8-611 (now § 8.01-261 ). This is not a limitation upon the power of the court granting the injunction, but simply fixes the venue of the case to be tried. Manifestly, it seemed to the legislature that former § 8-611 furnished the most convenient place to hear the controversy. But equity acts in personam and may compel a party within its jurisdiction to perform and act outside of its jurisdiction. The statute is a venue statute and not a jurisdictional one. Blanchard v. Twin City Mkt., 157 Va. 13 , 160 S.E. 310 (1931).

Errors as to elements of offense not jurisdictional. - To the extent a trial court may have erroneously interpreted the statutory elements of an offense, such an error may provide a basis to appeal but does not divest the court of jurisdiction. Limbrick v. Commonwealth, No. 2568-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 803 (Ct. of Appeals Dec. 12, 2000).

Jurisdiction potential and active. - Under this section the circuit courts have "original and general jurisdiction of all cases in chancery and civil cases at law, . . . ." This is "potential" jurisdiction, which, after valid service of process on the parties, gives the court "active" jurisdiction and empowers it to hear the case and enter a valid judgment therein. Southern Sand & Gravel Co. v. Massaponax Sand & Gravel Corp., 145 Va. 317 , 133 S.E. 812 (1926); Morgan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 148 Va. 272 , 138 S.E. 566 (1927).

Jurisdiction of breach of labor contract. - An individual employee and member of a labor union may sue his employer for a breach of a collective bargaining agreement between the union and the employer in a State court. Pearman v. Industrial Rayon Corp., 207 Va. 854 , 153 S.E.2d 227 (1967).

The State Corporation Commission has no criminal jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is vested solely in the courts not of record and in the courts of record of the Commonwealth. Croatan Books, Inc. v. Baliles, 583 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Va. 1984).

Mandamus to SCC. - Circuit courts derive no jurisdiction from this section to issue writs of mandamus to State Corporation Commission (SCC), since SCC is tribunal of stature and dignity equal to that of circuit court. Atlas Underwriters, Ltd. v. SCC, 237 Va. 45 , 375 S.E.2d 733 (1989).

Court had jurisdiction to convict appellant of violation on naval base. - Since the Little Creek Amphibious Base was acquired by the United States under the provisions of Title 3, Chapter 4, § 19, Virginia Code of 1942, a state cession statute, and since under the provisions of that cession statute, Virginia retained concurrent criminal jurisdiction, this state retained concurrent jurisdiction over the Little Creek Amphibious Base for the enforcement of laws regarding traffic infractions; the circuit court, consequently, had jurisdiction to convict the appellant for a speeding violation while on that naval base. Gay v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 229, 391 S.E.2d 737 (1990).

The circuit court, sitting as chancery court in divorce case, lacked jurisdiction to terminate father's parental rights and, with that termination, father's child support obligation. Church v. Church, 24 Va. App. 502, 483 S.E.2d 498 (1997).

Right to jury trial not improperly denied where plaintiff did not follow procedure. - Dismissal of suit, which complained only of the denial of a trial by jury and asserted a collusion by defendants to deny him one, was proper, where plaintiff's own actions in bringing suit in the general district court rather than the circuit court deprived him of a trial by jury. Had he originally brought his personal injury claim in circuit court, as he was entitled to by this section, he would have received a jury upon request under § 8.01-336 . He also could have received a de novo jury trial by properly perfecting his appeal from general district court under § 16.1-113. His failure to receive a jury trial, therefore, was the result of his own failure to follow valid state procedures rather than the result of any collusion by defendants in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088, 106 S. Ct. 1475, 89 L. Ed. 2d 729 (1986).

Writs did not lie against judge. - Writ of prohibition did not lie against a judge with jurisdiction to adjudicate and to enter any order in proceedings involving felony charges against two defendants; a writ of mandamus did not lie to fix and prescribe the judgment to be rendered. In re Commonwealth's Atty. for Roanoke, 265 Va. 313 , 576 S.E.2d 458, 2003 Va. LEXIS 38 (2003).

Transfers between circuit courts implicated territorial jurisdiction but not subject matter jurisdiction. - Transfer of defendant's criminal trial from Norfolk (the place of the offense), to Arlington and the subsequent transfer back to Norfolk after the jury verdicts did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction since both the Arlington and Norfolk circuit courts had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's charges under § 17.1-513 . The only question was whether a violation of § 19.2-239 occurred when the Arlington circuit court conducted the trial; this issue went solely to the circuit court's lack of authority to exercise territorial jurisdiction and was waived by defendant's failure to timely object. Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203 , 661 S.E.2d 415, 2008 Va. LEXIS 78 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1999, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1097, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 3047 (U.S. 2009).

Jurisdiction proven in criminal case. - In a murder case, the trial court had territorial jurisdiction under §§ 19.2-239 and 17.1-513 because the facts and circumstances proved that the killing occurred in Richmond, Virginia. The undisputed evidence showed that the stabbing occurred at a rooming house in Richmond, Virginia; diagrams of the residence indicated that it was in Richmond; Richmond police and a Richmond prosecutor investigated the case; physical evidence was analyzed in Richmond; and defendant's arrest warrant had a Richmond address. Dixon v. Commonwealth,, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 165 (May 2, 2006).

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's trial, even though under subsection A of § 16.1-241, the juvenile and domestic relations district courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving a juvenile who was alleged to be delinquent, defined under § 16.1-228 as one under 18 years old, as defendant gave defendant's birthdate as December 13, 1986, and the indictment stated that the offense occurred on December 16, 2006. Hall v. Commonwealth, No. 2902-07-3, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 73 (Feb. 17, 2009).

Trial court did not err in convicting defendant of attempted murder because the trial court was not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction when it failed to arraign defendant on the charge when defendant was fully aware of the attempted murder charge and was in no way prejudiced by the omission of a formal arraignment; defendant's continued silence in the face of repeated references to the attempted murder charge was tantamount to a waiver of his right to be arraigned and to enter a not guilty plea, and having failed to raise any objection, defendant waived any defect. Simmons v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 594, 681 S.E.2d 56, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 367 (2009).

Circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's revocation hearing because the General Assembly had granted that court subject matter jurisdiction over the specific class of cases of which the case was a member: the prosecution and the rehabilitation of criminals. Moreover, probation revocation proceedings were part of the criminal process entrusted to the circuit court. Mohamed v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 95, 691 S.E.2d 513, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 145 (2010).

Because defendant admitted that the events in question occurred at the apartment of the victim's grandmother, and because the grandmother and defendant's girlfriend testified that the apartment was in a locality in Virginia, the evidence was sufficient to establish the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction under §§ 19.2-239 and 17.1-513 . Torres v. Commonwealth,, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 420 (Nov. 2, 2010).

Defendant's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on grounds the Commonwealth did not prove where the crimes took place was properly denied because (1) under § 19.2-244, he waived his right to contest venue by not doing so before pleading guilty; and (2) as he pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, he conceded that the trial court had jurisdiction. Bryant v. Commonwealth, No. 1462-12-4, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 214 (Ct. of Appeals July 23, 2013).

Trial court properly tried defendant's trial for the alleged rape of defendant's mentally disabled daughter because the court reasonably concluded that the crime occurred in the private confines of the family home in the county of the trial court where defendant spent several hours alone with defendant's daughters on at least three evenings each week during the month when the pregnancy of the daughter occurred. Romero v. Commonwealth,, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 114 (Mar. 25, 2014).

Although defendant asserted that the delayed entry of the order recording the presentation of the indictment in open court invalidated his conviction, because there was no constitutional requirement that prosecutions for a felony had to be by indictment, as that requirement was merely statutory and could be waived, the trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction; thus, because the trial court properly had jurisdiction, and defendant failed to raise the argument below, defendant's argument on appeal was barred. Davis v. Commonwealth, No. 0215-15-3, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 148 (Ct. of Appeals May 3, 2016).

Delayed entry of the presentment order was not a substantive violation that invalidated defendant's indictment or deprived the trial court of jurisdiction where defendant did not assert that the indictment's contents were deficient in any manner or that the indictment was not returned in open court. Epps v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 393, 785 S.E.2d 792 (2016), aff'd, 293 Va. 403 , 799 S.E.2d 516, 2017 Va. LEXIS 77 (2017).

All circuit courts in the Commonwealth possess subject matter jurisdiction over all felony prosecutions, including those for credit card theft; the circuit court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the four counts of credit card theft against defendant and possessed the statutory authority to impose punishment for those crimes. Bryant v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 697, 832 S.E.2d 48, 2019 Va. App. LEXIS 200 (2019).

Neither § 19.2-304 nor § 19.2-306 grants a trial court categorical judicial power over criminal cases or their attendant proceedings, and thus, neither can reasonably be read to strip a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction if the court violates those procedures. Cilwa v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 259 , 836 S.E.2d 378, 2019 Va. LEXIS 153 (Dec. 12, 2019).

No time limitation in either § 19.2-304 or § 19.2-306 implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction to enter uncontested orders extending probation periods before or after their expiration; as a result, the parties are free to extend these deadlines, with the trial court's concurrence, even after their expiration. Cilwa v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 259 , 836 S.E.2d 378, 2019 Va. LEXIS 153 (Dec. 12, 2019).

Jurisdiction in capital murder case. - Defendant had been sentenced to death, but the case was remanded to determine whether he was mentally retarded. That the mandate related solely to the issue of mental retardation did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to consider other legal issues the parties raised on remand, including defendant's motion under § 19.2-264.5 requesting the imposition of a life sentence. In re Commonwealth, 278 Va. 1 , 677 S.E.2d 236, 2009 Va. LEXIS 78 (2009).

Jurisdiction in divorce case. - Trial court had jurisdiction to reinstate a divorce case in order to effectuate its prior orders as three years after the final decree was entered, the parties had not sold the marital realty, and the terms in the final decree did not comply with the terms included in an opinion letter; the trial court had jurisdiction as the issues contested by a husband relating to set-offs and the distribution of the sales proceeds from the properties were necessary determinations to effectuate the original order, and the factors responsible for the additional findings included the length of time that the properties remained unlisted and unsold, and the husband's lack of cooperation in expediting the sales of the property. Brown v. Brown,, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 34 (Feb. 6, 2007).

Jurisdiction for revocation. - Because the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to conduct the 2010 revocation hearing, the 2010 sentencing order was merely voidable and was not subject to collateral attack. Thus, the circuit court properly refused to vacate the 2010 sentencing order at defendant's 2013 revocation hearing. Hardy v. Commonwealth,, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 341 (Oct. 14, 2014).

Circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to revoke defendant's suspended sentences at the probation revocation hearing and impose a period of supervised probation based on the violation of the terms of his probation, and thus, its sentencing order was voidable rather than void ab initio; therefore, the order was subject to the rule and could not be collaterally attacked. Douglas v. Commonwealth, No. 1886-15-3, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 91 (Mar. 28, 2017).

Court had subject matter jurisdiction to impose probation after revoking defendant's suspended sentences because, even if the court erred, the court did not exceed the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Bost v. Commonwealth, No. 1302-17-4, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 200 (July 24, 2018).

Circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to determine parentage in domestic assault cases. - Florida circuit court does not err in exercising subject matter jurisdiction to determine parentage for purposes of adjudicating a defendant's guilt on charges of felony domestic assault, whether or not other proceedings involving a determination of parentage are then pending in the juvenile and domestic relations district court. Graves v. Commonwealth, No. 2938-05-3, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 63 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 20, 2007).

Jurisdiction to hear appeal from denial of coram nobis writ. - Circuit court finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear appellant's appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in a criminal conviction was error because § 16.1-106 was not restricted to only monetary cases; however, coram nobis did not lie as a means by which appellant was allowed to collaterally challenge his guilty plea. Appellant's allegation that he suffered from some undefined lack of capacity due to medication at the time of his guilty plea was not a clerical error nor a claim of an error in fact. Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 503 , 650 S.E.2d 514, 2007 Va. LEXIS 108 (2007).

Circuit court had no original jurisdiction but had appellate jurisdiction. - Circuit court erred when it exercised subject matter jurisdiction over a case alleging an unfit pet owner pursuant to former § 3.1-796.115 that originated in general district court, was appealed to the circuit court and nonsuited there, was subsequently refiled in the general district court, dismissed, and then appealed to the circuit court. The county was required by subsection A of § 8.01-380 to refile its petition, following the nonsuit, in the circuit court. Although the circuit court did not have original or general jurisdiction over the § 3.1-796.115 petition pursuant to § 17.1-513 , the circuit court did obtain appellate jurisdiction derivatively from the de novo appeal taken from the general district court. Davis v. County of Fairfax, 282 Va. 23 , 710 S.E.2d 466, 2011 Va. LEXIS 125 (2011).

Trial court lacked jurisdiction. - Trial court could deny defendant's motion to dismiss or remand to the district court defendant's direct indictment on the felony charge of § 18.2-57 assault on a police officer where a preliminary hearing had not been held. Pursuant to § 17.1-513 , the trial court's appellate jurisdiction was limited and in criminal cases the General Assembly had not provided any authorization that would permit a trial court to review a district court's discretion to end a prosecution, which meant that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the district court's decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Wright v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 690, 667 S.E.2d 787, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 509 (2008).

Because a county department of social services was a unit of county government and exempt from the Virginia Administrative Process Act, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to hear a daughter's appeal of its decision; at no time did a state agency make a finding against the daughter, and consequently, the statutory right to judicial review of the case decision of an administrative agency under the Act did not apply. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Gosney, No. 1524-16-3, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 119 (Ct. of Appeals May 2, 2017).

Jurisdiction improperly exercised. - As neither party sought modification of a child support order in the juvenile and domestic relations district (JDR) court, the circuit court, in an appeal from the JDR court, had no jurisdiction to sua sponte increase the father's child support obligation. Tedford v. Dean-Bryant, No. 1340-03-4, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 458 (Ct. of Appeals Sept. 28, 2004).

Failure to object waived issue on appeal. - Defendant's appeal of his misdemeanor conviction in the general district court for a de novo trial in the circuit court fell precisely within the class of cases and controversies that the statutes granted the circuit court authority to adjudicate, and the question of whether his notice of appeal was timely filed concerned the circuit court's active jurisdiction, which could be waived if not preserved. Because defendant failed to preserve this argument in circuit court, it could not be addressed on appeal. Breznick v. Commonwealth, No. 0982-19-3, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 216 (July 28, 2020).

Courthouse security. - Trial court did not err in finding defendant in civil and criminal contempt for defendant's conduct in his capacity as a sheriff in removing a deputy from security at the entrance to a courthouse; defendant's conduct was in direct violation of the trial court's order and even though § 17.1-513 may not have permitted the trial court the jurisdiction to find defendant in contempt, other statutes, such § 53.1-120 gave the trial court authority to provide for both courtroom and courthouse security. Epps v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 687, 626 S.E.2d 912, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 102 (2006).

Dismissal proper. - Circuit court properly dismissed a father's complaint to amend custody and visitation because, while the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the father's refiled appeals, the parties' circumstances changed during the pendency of the nonsuit, the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the father's refiled appeals and did the only thing it could do. Barrett v. Minor, No. 0173-14-3, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 165 (May 12, 2015).

Applied in Penn v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 422, 528 S.E.2d 179, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 329 (2000); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 326, 549 S.E.2d 648, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 448 (2001); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 589 S.E.2d 444, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 637 (2003); Cartwright v. Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r, 270 Va. 58 , 613 S.E.2d 449, 2005 Va. LEXIS 62 (2005).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction. - Because a corporation requested a circuit court find it fit under subsection A of § 8.01-324 through a petition that identified no controversy, there was no case currently before the circuit court, and thus, § 17.1-513 did not grant the circuit court subject matter jurisdiction over the petition; while the scope of § 17.1-513 is broad, its provisions extend only to "cases" because the language of the statute makes clear that controversy is implicit to "cases." In re Dow Jones & Co., 79 Va. Cir. 514, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 246 (Norfolk Nov. 17, 2009).

In the absence of statutory authority, the circuit court had no jurisdiction to try de novo civil contempt adjudications of the juvenile and domestic relations district court discharging a mother; therefore, the appeals were dismissed. Huck v. Banfield, 94 Va. Cir. 182, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 167 (Norfolk Aug. 25, 2016).

Because the order denying a motion to dissolve a protective order was not issued by the circuit court, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from that order. Ortiz v. Chappelear, 105 Va. Cir. 49, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 44 (Virginia Beach Apr. 8, 2020).

Actions in equity. - Business that filed an action in equity alleging that a former employee violated a noncompetition agreement and that the employee's new employer misappropriated trade secrets waived its right to a jury trial on legal claims asserted in its complaint. Builders Floor Serv. v. Kirby, 60 Va. Cir. 171, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 261 (Fairfax County 2002).

Contract disputes. - Default judgment entered in a contract dispute where a corporation did not file a response within the 21-day period, a church stated a breach of contract cause of action, venue was waived, and jurisdiction and notice were proper. New Life Christian Church v. Dynabilt Tech. Int'l Corp., 59 Va. Cir. 399, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 367 (Norfolk 2002).

Jurisdiction over parties in wrongful death action. - Motion to dismiss was denied because it was proper for suit to be brought in Virginia against a resident of Virginia for a wrongful death occurring in another state and the Virginia court would apply the law of the other state to the action, as actions for wrongful death were transitory and could be brought in any court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the case; the alleged negligence and wrongful death occurred in North Carolina, and plaintiffs, defendants and the decedent were residents of Virginia. Ewers v. Parker, 69 Va. Cir. 464, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 6 (Portsmouth 2006).

Jurisdiction over claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. - Circuit Court's subject matter jurisdiction encompassed a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, § 17.1-513 ; however, the plaintiff failed to allege objective physical injury, the need for medical attention, or loss of income, and therefore failed to state a claim. Hudgins v. Higginbotham, 82 Va. Cir. 152, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 161 (Chesapeake Feb. 1, 2011).

Jurisdiction proper. - Case was properly before the circuit court because the general district court having been divested of jurisdiction by virtue of a tenant's appeal, the obtaining of the case papers from the GDC became the province of the circuit court's inherent power to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate those causes properly entrusted to the forum; the Calendar Control Judge thus appropriately set a hearing to consider whether the bond set by the GDC judge was required to perfect the appeal. FCRHA Cedar Ridge, L.P. v. Boler, 104 Va. Cir. 132, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 8 (Fairfax County Jan. 17, 2020).

Jurisdiction lacking. - Circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners' claims seeking to correct their race/nationality where the Va. Const. art. IV, § 1, did not grant such jurisdiction, correction of race/nationality was not expressly mentioned in § 17.1-513 , and no other law or statute granted the courts such jurisdiction. In re Pacheco, 98 Va. Cir. 231, 98 Va. Cir. 231, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 38 (Virginia Beach Mar. 14, 2018).

§ 17.1-513.01. Jurisdiction of circuit courts with respect to charitable assets.

  1. The circuit courts shall have the same subject matter jurisdiction over matters pertaining to assets of charitable corporations, incorporated in or doing any business in Virginia, as the circuit courts have with respect to assets held by unincorporated charitable trusts and other charitable entities, including the power to require accountings, appoint receivers, award damages, and enter injunctive relief against such charitable corporations, their officers, directors, agents, employees and others as may be necessary to protect the public interest in such assets.
  2. Nothing contained in this section is intended to modify the standard of conduct applicable under existing law to the directors of charitable corporations incorporated in or doing any business in Virginia.

    (2002, c. 792; 2004, c. 289.)

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 289 inserted the A designation at the beginning of the first paragraph; and added subsection B.

Law review. - For 2002 survey of Virginia law on wills, trusts, and estates, see 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 357 (2002).

Research References. - Harrison on Wills and Administration for Virginia and West Virginia (Matthew Bender). Chapter 17 Beneficiaries. § 17.25 Present Status. Cox.

§ 17.1-513.1. Appeals from administrative proceedings; abuse and neglect; record to be sealed.

In cases appealed to the circuit court involving child abuse and neglect pursuant to § 63.2-1526 , proceedings shall be confidential and the record in the case shall be sealed. However, the court may, for good cause shown, unseal the record.

(2000, c. 478.)

§ 17.1-513.2. Use of telephonic communication systems or electronic video and audio communication systems to conduct hearing.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any civil proceeding in which a party or a witness is incarcerated or when otherwise authorized by the court, the court may, in its discretion, conduct any hearing using a telephonic communication system or an electronic audio and video communication system to provide for the appearance of any parties and witnesses. Any electronic audio and video communication system used to conduct such a hearing shall meet the standards set forth in subsection B of § 19.2-3.1.

(2001, c. 513.)

Law review. - For article, "Legal Issues Involving Children," see 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 741 (2001).

CASE NOTES

Preservation of argument. - Because a husband did not preserve his § 17.1-513.2 and due process argument that he was not provided an opportunity to a full and fair hearing, it was waived pursuant to Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:18. Jackson v. Jackson,, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 211 (May 31, 2005).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Right to cross-examine and to a fair trial not violated. - Because this section authorized a court to conduct any hearing using a telephonic communication system, the transportation commissioner's right to cross-examine and to a fair trial would not be violated if a landowner's appraiser testified under oath and submitted to cross-examination by telephone. Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. Cogil Corp., 67 Va. Cir. 398, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 149 (Warren County June 8, 2005).

Statutory and constitutional safeguards met. - Petitioner's objection to the conduct of a hearing, wherein he appeared by closed circuit audio-video link, was overruled as the statutory and constitutional safeguards were amply met, if not exceeded, by the manner in which the proceeding was conducted; the important public policy of protecting the safety of counsel and others in the courtroom, as well as petitioner himself, justified having him appear remotely, and petitioner's counsel were in the courtroom to represent his interests. Solomon v. Kincaid, 105 Va. Cir. 166, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 68 (Fairfax County Apr. 30, 2020).

§ 17.1-514. When plaintiff entitled to less than $100; judgment for defendant.

In any personal action in a circuit court, wherein it is ascertained that less than $100, exclusive of interest, is due to the plaintiff, judgment shall be for the defendant, unless the court enter of record that the matter in controversy was of greater value than $100, exclusive of interest, in which case it may render judgment for the plaintiff for what is ascertained to be due him, with or without costs, in the court's discretion.

(Code 1950, § 8-511.1; 1952, c. 248; 1977, c. 624, § 17-123.1; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-515. Jurisdiction formerly in county courts.

The jurisdiction and powers which were vested in the county courts and the judges and officers thereof, respectively, on January 31, 1904, by the laws of this Commonwealth or under any will or other instrument of writing shall be vested in, exercised by and imposed upon the circuit courts and the judges and officers thereof, except when otherwise specially provided.

All such acts and proceedings of the circuit courts, judges and officers thereof, respectively, whether de jure or de facto officers, done or had since January 31, 1904, as may hereafter be done under this section, are hereby ratified and made valid.

(Code 1919, § 5891, § 17-124; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-515.1. Territorial jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for the City of Lynchburg.

The territorial jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for the City of Lynchburg shall extend to the corporate limits of the city and to a space of one mile without and around the city limits, except that the same shall not extend further into the County of Amherst than the corporate limits. Any judgment, order, or decree of the Circuit Court for the City of Lynchburg heretofore made in any case in which the court would have had jurisdiction had this section then been in operation shall have the same effect as if it had been at that time in force.

(Code 1919, § 5904, § 17-125; 2018, c. 164.)

Editor's note. - Formerly, this section was not set out in the Code of Virginia. At its April 4, 2017, meeting, the Virginia Code Commission approved setting out the full text.

The 2018 amendments. - The 2018 amendment by c. 164 deleted "shall be the same with that of the Corporation Court for the city and" following "City of Lynchburg" in the first sentence.

§ 17.1-515.2.

Repealed by Acts 2018, c. 164, cl. 2.

Editor's note. - Former § 17.1-515.2 , pertaining to jurisdiction of circuit and district courts of Henry, Roanoke, Augusta and Rockbridge counties over certain property, derived from 1968, c. 33; 1970, c. 523; 1974, c. 297, § 17-126.2.

§ 17.1-515.3. Designation of courtrooms within twenty-first and twenty-third circuits for trial of certain cases.

The chief judge of the twenty-first and the twenty-third judicial circuits may, by order, as in the interest of justice may appear, designate one or more of the courtrooms of any circuit court within their respective circuits as the courtroom or courtrooms in which civil and criminal cases whose venue is laid within the circuit may be tried; provided, that in criminal cases, jurors summoned to appear at such courtroom or courtrooms shall reside in the vicinage of which the crime is laid.

(1976, c. 272; 1977, c. 195, § 17-126.3.)

Editor's note. - Formerly, this section was not set out in the Code of Virginia. At its April 4, 2017, meeting, the Virginia Code Commission approved setting out the full text.

§ 17.1-515.4. Designation of certain courtrooms within sixteenth circuit for trial of certain cases.

When it appears to one or more of the judges of the sixteenth judicial circuit that such use is appropriate, the courthouse of the Circuit Court of Albemarle County may be used for the trial of civil or criminal cases whose venue is laid in the City of Charlottesville, or the courthouse of the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville may be used for the trial of civil or criminal cases whose venue is laid in the County of Albemarle; provided, that in criminal cases, jurors summoned to appear at any such courtroom shall reside in the vicinage of which the crime is laid.

(1978, c. 61, § 17-126.4.)

Editor's note. - Formerly, this section was not set out in the Code of Virginia. At its April 4, 2017, meeting, the Virginia Code Commission approved setting out the full text.

§ 17.1-515.5. Designation of certain courtrooms within twenty-fifth circuit for trial of certain cases.

When it appears to one or more of the judges of the twenty-fifth judicial circuit that such use is appropriate, the courthouse of the Circuit Court of Augusta County may be used for the trial of civil and criminal cases when venue is laid in the City of Staunton; or the courthouse of the Circuit Court of the City of Staunton may be used for the trial of civil or criminal cases when venue is laid in the County of Augusta. However, jurors summoned to appear in any such courtroom shall reside in the jurisdiction where the venue is laid.

(1984, c. 86, § 17-126.5.)

Editor's note. - Formerly, this section was not set out in the Code of Virginia. At its April 4, 2017, meeting, the Virginia Code Commission approved setting out the full text.

§ 17.1-515.6. Concurrent law-enforcement jurisdiction over Joint Judicial Center in Winchester.

The Frederick County Sheriff's Department shall have, concurrently with the City of Winchester Police Department, jurisdiction to arrest perpetrators of all offenses committed in or upon the premises, buildings, rooms, or offices of the Joint Judicial Center located in the City of Winchester.

(1984, c. 363, § 17-126.6.)

Editor's note. - Formerly, this section was not set out in the Code of Virginia. At its April 4, 2017, meeting, the Virginia Code Commission approved setting out the full text.

§ 17.1-516. Jurisdiction of courts over certain waters.

Where any river, watercourse, or bay lies between any counties or any cities, or any county and city in this Commonwealth, the circuit courts for the counties and the cities, on each side, respectively, shall have concurrent territorial jurisdiction over so much thereof as shall be opposite to such counties and cities. And the circuit courts for counties and cities lying on the waters bounding the Commonwealth shall have concurrent territorial jurisdiction respectively over such waters opposite such counties and cities, as far as the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth extends. This section shall not apply to the City of Richmond.

(Code 1919, § 5958, § 17-1 ; 1948, p. 151; 1998, c. 872; 2005, cc. 45, 114.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendments by cc. 45 and 114 are identical, and substituted "City of Richmond" for "Cities of Norfolk and Richmond" at the end of the section.

Law review. - For note discussing bill adding a chapter providing for a court of appeals, see 16 U. Rich. L. Rev. 209 (1982).

§ 17.1-517. Number of terms; how fixed.

The chief judge of each circuit shall fix the terms of each of the courts within his circuit; provided, that there shall be at least four terms of court each year, and the dockets for criminal and civil cases may be called on the same or different days in any courtroom of the circuit. Such terms shall be fixed by order, which shall be entered in the common-law order book in each court. The order fixing or changing the terms of court shall be entered on or before January 1, to become effective July 1, and a copy of the order shall be forwarded to the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court, who shall cause an abstract thereof to be published in the Code of Virginia, as a part of the Rules of Court.

(1973, c. 544, § 17-127.21; 1976, c. 133; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Courts, §§ 5, 7.

§ 17.1-518. Special terms; when, how and by whom appointed.

If any term of a circuit court is to end, or has ended, without the dispatch of all its business or if there be a failure to hold any term or it is expedient in the opinion of the judge of the court to hold a special term for the trial of any cause pending in such court or of issues made up in any cause by consent of parties, or if the situation of a person confined in jail for trial in such circuit court makes it proper that his case should be disposed of before the next regular term thereof, or necessity in the judge's opinion requires it, the judge of such circuit court or, if he is dead or is unable from any cause to hold his court, the judge of any other circuit court who has been designated to hold such terms, may, by order entered in such court or by a warrant directed to the clerk, appoint a special term thereof and prescribe in such order or warrant whether any venire is to be summoned to attend the term. The clerk shall inform the attorney for the Commonwealth and the sheriff of such appointment, post a copy of the warrant or order at the front door of the courthouse and issue all proper process to such special term and the sheriff shall execute the process.

(Code 1919, § 5894, § 17-129; 1973, c. 544; 1998, c. 872.)

CASE NOTES

Presumption of compliance with section. - Where the judge's warrant is duly posted, the presumption is that all of the provisions of this section were complied with. Harman v. Copenhaver, 89 Va. 836 , 17 S.E. 482 (1893) (decided under prior law).

Provisions that clerk shall inform attorney for Commonwealth is directory. - The provision that "the clerk shall inform the attorney for the Commonwealth and the sheriff or sergeant, of such appointment" is directory merely, and his failure to do so does not affect the validity of the proceedings. Harman v. Copenhaver, 89 Va. 836 , 17 S.E. 482 (1893) (decided under prior law).

Meaning of word "term." - Where the word "term" is used in a statute with reference to courts, it should be construed to mean a regular term fixed by law, and not a special term fixed by the court, unless it is otherwise expressly provided or clearly implied from the act. Stultz v. Pratt, 103 Va. 536 , 49 S.E. 654 (1905) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-519. Adjournment thereof to a future day.

Whenever any judge of a circuit court has appointed a special term of any circuit court, by adjournment or warrant in the manner directed by § 17.1-518 , and shall afterward ascertain that he cannot hold the special term on the day appointed for it, he may, by warrant, directed to the clerk of the court, adjourn it to such other day as he deems proper. The warrant shall be transmitted to the clerk, who shall immediately enter it in the order book of the court and, as to the special term thereafter to be held under the continuance, proceed in all other respects in the manner directed by § 17.1-518 .

(Code 1919, § 5895, § 17-130; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - For other provisions as to adjournment, see §§ 17.1-119 , 17.1-120 .

§ 17.1-520. What tried at a special term.

At any such special term:

  1. Any civil case may be tried which could lawfully have been but was not tried at the last preceding term that was or should have been held;
  2. Any motion cognizable by such court may be heard and determined, whether it was pending at the preceding term or not;
  3. Any criminal case may be tried at such special term as if it were a regular term, although at the preceding regular term the same may not have been pending in the court or may have been continued; and
  4. Any cause or matter of controversy, then ready for hearing or which may be made ready by consent of parties, may, with the consent of the parties to such cause or controversy, be heard and determined, although it could not lawfully have been heard at the preceding term that was or should have been held.

    (Code 1919, § 5896, § 17-131; 1998, c. 872; 2005, c. 681.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 681, effective January 1, 2006, deleted "for a judgment or other motion" preceding "cognizable" in subdivision 2; and deleted "at law or in chancery" following "controversy" in subdivision 4.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 10A M.J. Injunctions, § 114.

Editor's note. - The cases below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

No error to confirm report of sale which could have been acted on at preceding term. - It was not error to enter decree confirming a report of sale filed before the commencement of the preceding regular term, and which could have been acted on at that term. Harman v. Copenhaver, 89 Va. 836 , 17 S.E. 482 (1893).

But writ of quo warranto returnable to next term not embraced by section. - The provisions of this section of the Code, declaring what cases and controversies may be heard at a special term, do not embrace a writ of quo warranto issued since the last regular term of the court and made returnable to the next term. Stultz v. Pratt, 103 Va. 536 , 49 S.E. 654 (1905).

And court cannot hear demurrer or dissolve injunction without consent. - Under the provision of this section that any cause ready for hearing may with consent of parties, be heard, the court cannot at such special term, without such consent, hear a demurrer to a bill or dissolve an injunction. Fowler v. Mosher, 85 Va. 421 , 7 S.E. 542 (1888).

A notice upon a forfeited forthcoming bond, given to a regular term of a court which the judge fails to attend, is sufficient to authorize an award of execution on the bond at a special term. Wootten v. Bragg, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 1 (1844).

§ 17.1-521. Who to hold special term; powers.

Every such special term may be held by the judge of the circuit court or, if he is dead or absent or is so situated in respect to any cause pending in the court as in his opinion to make it improper for him to try it, by such other circuit or city judge as may be selected or designated in the manner prescribed by law. The judge so selected or designated shall hold the special term and part of its session may be held by one judge and part of it by another. A judge selected or designated to hold a special term shall have all the powers and is authorized to discharge all the duties of the judge of such circuit court.

(Code 1919, § 5896, § 17-132; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-522. Adjournment of special term.

A special term may be adjourned from time to time during intervals between the regular terms, as necessary, for the dispatch of the business of the court.

(Code 1919, § 5896, § 17-133; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-523. Salaries of judges of circuit courts.

The judges of the circuit courts shall each receive such salary as shall be fixed from time to time in the general appropriation acts. Such salary shall be the total compensation for circuit court judges. However, any county or city which has, prior to March 1, 1976, maintained any program of supplemental retirement or insurance for the benefit of such judges, may continue the same in effect as to judges theretofore covered thereby. The whole of such salaries shall be paid out of the state treasury.

(Code 1950, § 14-43; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-33; 1972, c. 43; 1973, c. 544; 1974, c. 225; 1976, c. 667; 1978, c. 249; 1979, c. 83; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - For constitutional provisions, see Va. Const., Art. VI, § 9.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judges, § 10.

§ 17.1-524.

Repealed by Acts 2009, c. 592.

Chapter 6. Costs Generally.

Sec.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Costs, §§ 2, 3, 5, 7.

§ 17.1-600. Laws of costs not penal; discretion of courts of equity.

The laws of costs shall not be interpreted as penal laws; nor shall anything in this chapter take away or abridge the discretion of a court of equity over the subject of costs, except as provided in § 17.1-604 .

(Code 1950, § 14-174; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-177; 1998, c. 872.)

Cross references. - As to assessment for law library as part of cost in civil actions, see § 42.1-70 .

Research References. - Friend's Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 3. Venue. § 3.10 Award of Costs and Attorneys' Fee. Friend.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

The laws of costs are to be construed as remedial, and liberally and beneficially expounded for the sake of the remedy which they administer. Anglea v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 696 (1853), cited in Commonwealth v. McCue Ex'rs, 109 Va. 302 , 63 S.E. 1066 (1909).

Section applies to both suits and actions. - This section applies to suits in chancery as well as to actions at law. City of Richmond v. Henrico County, 185 Va. 859 , 41 S.E.2d 35 (1947).

The general rule is that costs lie within the discretion of a court of equity, and are properly awarded to the party prevailing. This rule is given statutory sanction by this section. Hylton v. Hunter, Wythe 195 (1793); Dillard v. Dillard, 77 Va. 820 (1883); Adkins v. Edwards, 83 Va. 300 , 2 S.E. 435 (1887); Goodloe v. Woods, 115 Va. 540 , 80 S.E. 108 (1913); McLean v. Hill, 185 Va. 346 , 38 S.E.2d 583 (1946); Safway Steel Scaffolds, Inc. v. Coulter, 198 Va. 469 , 94 S.E.2d 541 (1956).

In equity, the trial court has discretion in the award of costs; nevertheless, there has been found an abuse of that discretion if costs are not awarded in favor of the party or parties substantially prevailing. Smith v. Woodlawn Constr. Co., 235 Va. 424 , 368 S.E.2d 699 (1988).

Such discretion must be exercised soundly and in the light of the result obtained in the litigation by the respective parties. McLean v. Hill, 185 Va. 346 , 38 S.E.2d 583 (1946); Safway Steel Scaffolds, Inc. v. Coulter, 198 Va. 469 , 94 S.E.2d 541 (1956).

It is considered as the exercise of sound discretion to forbid the imposition of costs on a party nowise in the wrong; and the very fact that an appeal will not lie from the court of chancery merely on the ground that the appellant has been improperly decreed to pay costs, renders the lower courts all the more careful in the exercise of the discretion given them on this subject. In cases of doubt or great novelty the court will refuse to award costs to either party against the other, and not infrequently the result is that each party is decreed to pay his own costs. Tabb v. Boyd, 8 Va. (4 Call) 453 (1800); Turner v. Turner, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 66 (1812); Pennington v. Hanby, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 140 (1813); Jackson v. Cutright, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 308 (1817); Lewis v. Thornton, 20 Va. (6 Munf.) 87 (1818); Zane v. Zane, 20 Va. (6 Munf.) 406 (1819); Ashby v. Kiger, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 165 (1825); Farmers' Bank v. Reynolds, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 186 (1826); Jones v. Mason, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 577 (1827); Beverley v. Brooke, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 187 (1847); Magarity v. Shipman, 82 Va. 784 , 1 S.E. 109 (1887); Adkins v. Edwards, 83 Va. 300 , 2 S.E. 435 (1887).

And a clear showing of abuse is necessary for reversal. - The action of an equity trial court in regard to costs will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse. Goodloe v. Woods, 115 Va. 540 , 80 S.E. 108 (1913).

Court costs non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. - The fact that in some instances punishment will be contingent on court costs is sufficient, for definitional purposes, to lift Virginia's requirement that convicted defendants pay court costs into the non-dischargeability provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7). Thompson v. Virginia, 16 F.3d 576 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221 114 S. Ct. 2709, 129 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1994).

The exception of former § 14.1-181 (now § 17.1-604 ) relates only to costs in the Supreme Court, which are to be recovered by the party substantially prevailing. Commonwealth ex rel. State Water Control Bd. v. County Utils. Corp., 223 Va. 534 , 290 S.E.2d 867 (1982).

Since former § 14.1-201 (now § 17.1-629 ) is "in this chapter" within the meaning of this section, it is subject to the discretion of the chancellor in apportioning costs in an equity case in a circuit court. Commonwealth ex rel. State Water Control Bd. v. County Utils. Corp., 223 Va. 534 , 290 S.E.2d 867 (1982).

Sovereign immunity is no bar to an award of costs or attorney fees in an appeal to the circuit court from a juvenile court's finding of no child abuse. Donald v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 20 Va. App. 155, 455 S.E.2d 740 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 251 Va. 227 , 467 S.E.2d 803 (1996).

Plea of sovereign immunity in action seeking attorney fees. - Trial court did not err in sustaining a special plea of sovereign immunity filed by a county department of social services in a father's action seeking attorney's fees pursuant to § 16.1-278.19 because the General Assembly did not waive the Department's sovereign immunity under §§ 17.1-600 and 17.1-629 , in suits in equity where a party sought an award of costs; § 17.1-600 speaks of the courts' "discretion" in equity, but Virginia courts did not have discretion to award attorney's fees in any case, whether legal or equitable, absent a specific grant of such authority, and because § 17.1-600 did not specifically allow the award of attorney's fees, the trial court could not award attorney's fees to the father, especially since the opposing party was the department, a government agency protected by sovereign immunity. Murphy v. Charlotte County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 57 Va. App. 784, 706 S.E.2d 546, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 97 (2011).

Apportionment of costs in a judicial review procedure under § 62.1-44.29 was within the trial court's discretion, and would not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse. Commonwealth ex rel. State Water Control Bd. v. County Utils. Corp., 223 Va. 534 , 290 S.E.2d 867 (1982).

When a proceeding is equitable. - The form and object of a judicial proceeding, and particularly the nature of the relief which it makes available, determine whether it is legal or equitable. The label assigned by the clerk is not controlling. Commonwealth ex rel. State Water Control Bd. v. County Utils. Corp., 223 Va. 534 , 290 S.E.2d 867 (1982).

Reimbursement by parents of guardian ad litem fee. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a mother to pay one-half of a guardian ad litem's fee, where the evidence presented demonstrated that the guardian was appointed to protect the interests of the children and favorably addressed an issue related to the mother's successful treatment for depression. Leake v. Leake, No. 3268-03-4, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 491 (Ct. of Appeals Oct. 12, 2004).

Guardian ad litem fees appropriate. - On appeal from an award of primary physical custody of the children to the father, the mother's contention that the circuit court erred in ordering her to pay one-half of the guardian ad litem's fees was improper under subsection (b) of § 20-79(b) , subdivision 5 of § 20-99 , and former § 14.1-177 (now this section) because, while she clearly made less money than father, she had the ability to pay one-half the cost of the guardian ad litem's fee, notwithstanding the resulting hardship and sacrifice associated with it. Gudino v. Gudino, No. 0068-11-2, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 327 (Nov. 1, 2011).

Discretion to award guardian ad litem fees. - Mother waived her claim of error in the apportionment of guardian ad litem fees in a change in physical custody dispute as although the mother stated her objection in a document of objections to the final order, she did not argue or obtain a ruling from the trial court on the issue; the mother did not argue that the exceptions to Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:18 for good cause or to meet the ends of justice applied, and the record did not reflect any reason to invoke the good cause or ends of justice exceptions since guardian ad litem fees could properly be assigned as costs to the parties under §§ 20-79(b) , 20-99(5) , and 17.1-600 . Turpin v. McGowan, No. 2129-11-4, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 125 (Apr. 24, 2012).

§ 17.1-601. General rule as to recovery of costs on final judgment.

Except when it is otherwise provided, the party for whom final judgment is given in an action or motion shall recover his costs against the opposite party. When the action is against two or more and there is a judgment for, or discontinuance as to, some, but not all of the defendants, unless the court enter of record that there was reasonable cause for making defendants those for whom there is such judgment, or as to whom there is such discontinuance and shall order otherwise, they shall recover their costs.

(Code 1950, § 14-175; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-178; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Costs, §§ 4-6.

Editor's note. - The cases below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

The allowance of costs depends entirely upon statute, no costs being allowed in any case at common law. Scott v. Doughty, 130 Va. 523 , 107 S.E. 729 (1921).

This section applies only to costs in the trial court and not to costs in the Supreme Court. Scott v. Doughty, 130 Va. 523 , 107 S.E. 729 (1921); City of Richmond v. Henrico County, 185 Va. 859 , 41 S.E.2d 35 (1947).

As to costs in the appellate court, "it is otherwise provided" in former § 14.1-181 (now § 17.1-604 ). Scott v. Doughty, 130 Va. 523 , 107 S.E. 729 (1921).

Several trials and appeals of same case. - Where a plaintiff obtained three verdicts and judgments in the trial court, the first two of which were set aside by the Supreme Court but the last affirmed, he is entitled to his costs on the trials in the lower court and the last appeal, but defendant is entitled to the costs on the first two appeals. Scott v. Doughty, 130 Va. 523 , 107 S.E. 729 (1921).

Costs incurred before joinder of party. - A general judgment for costs against two defendants in ejectment was held proper, though one of them did not enter himself a defendant until there had been one trial of the cause and a large portion of the costs had been incurred. Middleton v. Johns, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 129 (1847).

Absent policy commitment to the contrary, insurer providing uninsured motorist coverage insurance is not liable for court costs incurred by its insured in recovering judgment against an uninsured tort-feasor. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Finley, 215 Va. 700 , 214 S.E.2d 129 (1975).

Will contest. - Where in the contest of a will the beneficiary was the active litigant, seeking probate of the will, the contest being between him as a beneficiary on the one hand and the heirs at law of the decedent on the other, if the heirs at law prevail they may properly be awarded their costs against the beneficiary. Bowen v. Bowen, 122 Va. 1 , 94 S.E. 166 (1917).

§ 17.1-602. When successful plaintiff not to recover costs.

In any personal action not on contract, if a verdict is returned for the plaintiff, on an issue or otherwise, for less damages than ten dollars, he shall not recover in respect to such verdict any costs, unless the court enter of record that the object of the action was to try a right, besides the mere right to recover damages for the trespass or grievance in respect to which the action was brought, or that the trespass or grievance was willful or malicious.

(Code 1950, § 14-176; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-179; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Costs, § 7; 18 M.J. Trespass, § 1.

§ 17.1-603. Costs when suit is in name of one person for another.

When a suit is in the name of one person for the benefit of any other, if judgment is entered for the defendant's costs, it shall be against such other.

(Code 1950, § 14-177; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-180; 1998, c. 872.)

Editor's note. - The cases below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

This section is but declaratory of the established rule in the Supreme Court. Western Union Tel. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 116 Va. 1009 , 83 S.E. 424 (1914).

Its provisions are mandatory as to judgment against the beneficial plaintiff. In re Butler, 20 F. Supp. 995 (W.D. Va. 1937), holding that, even assuming that the section was applicable in an action by administratrix under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for the death of her husband, the section did not serve to make decedent's estate liable for costs against the administratrix with the result of relieving her of her personal liability for such costs.

Illustrative cases. - In a suit for an injunction to restrain defendant from hauling timber over a tract which complainant claimed to own, the trial court decreed that complainant was not entitled to the relief prayed for and dismissed the bill at the cost of the complainant and her son, whom the evidence showed to be the fee simple owner of the tract of land and who was shown to have been the instigator of the suit and to have been active in prosecuting it. It was not error to decree costs against complainant's son, although he was not a formal party to the suit. Ashby v. Justus, 183 Va. 555 , 32 S.E.2d 709 (1945).

In action in name of one for use of another, it is usual to state the fact in the declaration, or on it, or on the writ. But this is not necessary. The endorsement may be made at any time during progress of the suit. And whether so endorsed or not, the party for whose use the suit is, if the fact appears of record, is bound for the costs under this section. Hayes v. Mutual Protection Ass'n, 76 Va. 225 (1882).

Where it appears from the record that the recovery in the trial court was for the use of a designated person other than the nominal plaintiff, the Supreme Court, on reversing the judgment of the trial court, will give judgment for costs against the beneficial, and not the nominal, plaintiff in the court below. Such judgment is within the spirit, if not the letter, of this section, as well as within the control of the sound reasoning of the court, in well considered cases decided by it. Western Union Tel. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 116 Va. 1009 , 83 S.E. 424 (1914).

§ 17.1-604. Costs in appellate courts.

In every case in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, costs shall be recovered in such court by the party substantially prevailing.

(Code 1950, § 14-178; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-181; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 156; 1988, c. 525; 1998, c. 872.)

Law review. - For article, "Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia?", see 57 Va. L. Rev. 3 (1971).

Editor's note. - The cases below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

This section relates only to costs in the Supreme Court, which are to be recovered by the party substantially prevailing. Commonwealth ex rel. State Water Control Bd. v. County Utils. Corp., 223 Va. 534 , 290 S.E.2d 867 (1982).

Section is mandatory. - The terms of this section are mandatory. Williams v. Bond, 120 Va. 678 , 91 S.E. 627 (1917); Scott v. Doughty, 130 Va. 523 , 107 S.E. 729 (1921); Ficklen v. City of Danville, 146 Va. 426 , 131 S.E. 689 (1926); McCready v. Lyon, 167 Va. 103 , 187 S.E. 442 (1936).

And applies to both suits and actions. - This section applies to suits in chancery as well as to actions at law. City of Richmond v. Henrico County, 185 Va. 859 , 41 S.E.2d 35 (1947).

Only proper costs recoverable. - The prevailing parties should recover only such items as are properly allowable as costs. The expense of printing extraneous and unnecessary matter in the record is not recoverable as a part of the costs of the prevailing party. McCready v. Lyon, 167 Va. 103 , 187 S.E. 442 (1936).

Litigants not to unnecessarily increase costs. - The party substantially prevailing in the Supreme Court is entitled to recover his costs under this section, but it is the duty of litigants not to unnecessarily increase the costs. Matthews v. Freeman Co., 191 Va. 385 , 60 S.E.2d 909 (1950).

Several trials and appeals. - Where a plaintiff obtained three verdicts and judgments in the trial court, the first two of which were set aside by the Supreme Court but the last affirmed, he is entitled to his costs on the trials in the lower court and the last appeal, but defendant is entitled to the costs on the first two appeals. Scott v. Doughty, 130 Va. 523 , 107 S.E. 729 (1921).

This section may be applied against the State Milk Commission. Roller v. State Milk Comm'n, 204 Va. 536 , 132 S.E.2d 427 (1963).

§ 17.1-605. Same; printing or otherwise reproducing brief and appendix.

Any party in whose favor costs are allowed in the Supreme Court shall have taxed as part of the costs the actual cost incurred by him in printing or otherwise any brief filed with the Court, not to exceed $500 for all briefs filed and the actual cost incurred by him in printing or otherwise reproducing the appendix containing parts of the record filed with the Court, except that the Court for good cause may direct that such party shall recover less than the entire cost incurred by him in printing or otherwise reproducing (i) briefs filed by him (even though less than $500) or (ii) the appendix.

(Code 1950, § 14-179; 1958, c. 601; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-182; 1970, c. 250; 1971, Ex. Sess., c. 156; 1972, c. 856; 1998, c. 872; 2010, c. 343.)

The 2010 amendments. - The 2010 amendment by c. 343 twice substituted "$500" for "$200."

Law review. - For survey of Virginia law on practice and pleading for the year 1969-1970, see 56 Va. L. Rev. 1500 (1970).

CASE NOTES

Construction with other law. - A trial court does not err by failing or refusing to deduct costs awarded on appeal from trial court's monetary equitable distribution award in divorce. Estate of Cummings v. Greenwood, No. 1361-99-3 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 29, 2000).

§ 17.1-606. Persons allowed services without fees or costs.

  1. Any person who is (i) a plaintiff in a civil action in a court of the Commonwealth and a resident of the Commonwealth or (ii) a defendant in a civil action in a court of the Commonwealth, and who is on account of his poverty unable to pay fees or costs, may be allowed by a court to sue or defend a suit therein, without paying fees or costs; whereupon he shall have, from any counsel whom the court may assign him, and from all officers, all needful services and process, without any fees, except what may be included in the costs recovered from the opposite party.
  2. In determining a person's inability to pay fees or costs on account of his poverty, the court shall consider whether such person is a current recipient of a state or federally funded public assistance program for the indigent or is represented by a legal aid society, subject to § 54.1-3916 , including an attorney appearing as counsel, pro bono, or assigned or referred by a legal aid society. If so, such person shall be presumed unable to pay such fees or costs. Except in the case of a no-fault divorce proceeding under subdivision A (9) of § 20-91 , such presumption shall be rebuttable where the court finds that a more thorough examination of the person's financial resources is necessary.
  3. If a person claims indigency but is not presumptively unable to pay under subsection B, or a court, where applicable, finds that a more thorough examination of the financial resources of the petitioner is needed, the court shall consider:
    1. The net income of such person, which shall include his total salary and wages, less deductions required by law and tax withholdings;
    2. Such person's liquid assets, including all cash on hand as well as assets in checking, savings, and similar accounts; and
    3. Any exceptional expenses of such person and his dependents, including costs for medical care, family support obligations, and child care payments.

      The available funds of the person shall be calculated as the sum of his total income and liquid assets less exceptional expenses as provided in subdivision 3. If the available funds are equal to or less than 125 percent of the federal poverty income guidelines prescribed for the size of the household of such person by the federal Department of Health and Human Services, he shall be presumed unable to pay. The Supreme Court of Virginia shall be responsible for distributing to all courts the annual updates of the federal poverty income guidelines made by the Department.

      (Code 1950, § 14-180; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-183; 1972, c. 839; 1987, c. 197; 1998, c. 872; 2017, cc. 226, 227; 2019, cc. 411, 730; 2020, c. 654.)

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendments by cc. 226 and 227 are identical, and rewrote the first sentence, which formerly read "Any person, who is a resident of this Commonwealth, and on account of his poverty is unable to pay fees or costs may be allowed by a court to sue or defend a suit therein, without paying fees or costs; whereupon he shall have, from any counsel whom the court may assign him, and from all officers, all needful services and process, without any fees, except what may be included in the costs recovered from the opposite party" and added the second sentence.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 411 designated the existing provisions as subsections A and B; in subsection B, added "provided that, in the case of a no-fault divorce proceeding under subdivision A (9) of § 20-91 , there shall be a presumption that a person who is a current recipient of a state or federally funded public assistance program for the indigent is unable to pay" in the first sentence and added the second sentence. The first sentence has been set out in the form above at the direction of the Virginia Code Commission.

The 2019 amendment by c. 730 added "provided that, in the case of a no-fault divorce proceeding under subdivision A (9) of § 20-91 , a person who is a current recipient of a state or federally funded public assistance program for the indigent shall not be subject to fees and costs. In such no-fault divorce proceeding, such person shall certify to the receipt of such benefits under oath" at the end.

The 2020 amendments. - The 2020 amendment by c. 654 rewrote subsection B, which read, "In determining a person's inability to pay fees or costs on account of his poverty, the court shall consider the factors set forth in subsection B of § 19.2-159, provided that, in the case of a no-fault divorce proceeding under subdivision A (9) of § 20-91 , a person who is a current recipient of a state or federally funded public assistance program for the indigent shall not be subject to fees and costs. In such no-fault divorce proceeding, such person shall certify to the receipt of such benefits under oath" and added subsection C.

Law review. - For comment, "The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future," see 49 Va. L. Rev. 1150 (1963). For survey of Virginia criminal law for the year 1971-1972, see 58 Va. L. Rev. 1206 (1972). For survey of Virginia law on pleading and practice for the year 1972-1973, see 59 Va. L. Rev. 1559 (1973). For discussion of the question of whether Virginia denies indigents the right to divorce, see 12 U. Rich. L. Rev. 735 (1978).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 1B M.J. Appeal and Error, § 204; 4C M.J. Constitutional Law, §§ 126, 141; 5A M.J. Costs, § 6; 9A M.J. Habeas Corpus, §§ 17, 21; 14B M.J. Poor and Poor Laws, § 2.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Section permits indigent prisoner to proceed in forma pauperis and to have counsel appointed in certain circumstances. Al-Mustafa Irshad v. Spann, 543 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Va. 1982).

Not applicable on appeal. - This section does not apply to appellate proceedings. Tyler v. Garrison, 120 Va. 697 , 91 S.E. 749 (1917).

A petition for a writ of mandamus, when properly grounded, invokes original rather than appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in which a pauper may be allowed to sue without paying fees or costs within the meaning of this section. Greer v. Dillard, 213 Va. 477 , 193 S.E.2d 668 (1973).

A bond is neither a fee nor a cost. Greer v. Dillard, 213 Va. 477 , 193 S.E.2d 668 (1973).

Indigents not excused from appeal bonds. - In 1972, when the General Assembly was in the process of amending the in forma pauperis statute, it was fully aware of its interrelationship with §§ 16.1-106 and 16.1-107 and, had it seen fit, could have authorized indigent appeals without bonds simply by adding the word "bonds" in context with the words "fees or costs." Its failure to do so is not to be treated as an inadvertent omission to be supplied by judicial construction. Greer v. Dillard, 213 Va. 477 , 193 S.E.2d 668 (1973).

It is one thing for the State to excuse indigents from payment of fees and costs which are essentially state interests; it is another thing for the State to excuse indigents from posting bonds designed to protect the judgment rights of successful litigants. Greer v. Dillard, 213 Va. 477 , 193 S.E.2d 668 (1973).

Inmates proceeding in forma pauperis. - Under this provision the courts in Virginia have the discretion to appoint counsel to represent inmates proceeding in forma pauperis. Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 492 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989).

Appointment of counsel not specifically required. - This section, which provides that in a civil action an indigent "shall have, from any counsel whom the court may assign him, . . . all needful services . . ., without any fees to them therefor," does not specifically require the appointment of such counsel. Darnell v. Peyton, 208 Va. 675 , 160 S.E.2d 749 (1968).

Petition must be filed and nonfrivolous claim raised. - Although such limitations do not appear on the face of the statute, appointments are made under this provision only after a petition is filed and then only if a nonfrivolous claim is raised. Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 492 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989).

Petitioner was furnished, without cost, certified copies of the arrest warrants, indictment and the order of conviction at his criminal trial. McCoy v. Lankford, 210 Va. 264 , 170 S.E.2d 11 (1969).

No provision for transcript in applying for habeas corpus. - No provision is made for a transcript of the evidence of the criminal trial for use in applying for habeas corpus. Hudgins v. Circuit Court, 294 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Va. 1968).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Petition granted. - Although the inmate was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis his motion for appointment of counsel was denied because the inmate raised issues that, at best, only tangentially affected his confinement and the court would not intervene in the discretionary decision-making of either the department of corrections or the parole board. Johnson v. Commonwealth,, 2009 Va. Cir. LEXIS 131 (Fairfax County Dec. 1, 2009).

§ 17.1-607. Security for costs upon suit by nonresident.

In any suit or action, except when an indigent is plaintiff, there may be a suggestion on the record in court, or, if the case be at rules, on the rule docket, by a defendant, or any officer of the court, that the plaintiff is not a resident of this Commonwealth and the security is required of him. After sixty days from such suggestion, the suit or action shall, by order of the court, be dismissed, unless, before the dismissal, it is proven that plaintiff is a resident of the Commonwealth or security be given before the court, or its clerk, for the payment of the costs and damages in the court in which the suit or action is instituted which may be awarded to the defendant, and of the fees due, or to become due, in such suit or action to the officers of the court. The security shall be by bond, payable to the Commonwealth, but there need only be one obligor therein, if he be sufficient and a resident of the Commonwealth. The court before whom, or before whose clerk, such bond is given, may, on motion by a defendant or officer, give judgment for so much as he is entitled to by virtue of such bond.

(Code 1950, § 14-182; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-185; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Costs, §§ 6, 20; 6A M.J. Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 13.

Editor's note. - Most of the cases below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

The manifest purpose of this section is to insure the payment of costs which may be awarded against a nonresident plaintiff against whom the court has no means of enforcing a collection. Outlaw v. Pearce, 176 Va. 458 , 11 S.E.2d 600 (1941).

This section, and its statutory ancestors were designed, not to deny nonresidents access to Virginia's courts, but to insure to the defendant and to the officials of the court the payment of costs which may be awarded against a nonresident plaintiff against whom the court has no means of enforcing a collection. Chagnon v. Hofferman, 230 Va. 176 , 335 S.E.2d 268 (1985).

Waiver of right to require security. - Notwithstanding the fact that this section is mandatory, the right of a defendant to require a nonresident plaintiff to give security for costs may be waived by his conduct in failing promptly to move for such security. Outlaw v. Pearce, 176 Va. 458 , 11 S.E.2d 600 (1941).

When motion for security may be made. - It is generally held that motion to require security for costs under this section comes too late when it is made after the case is called for trial or after a verdict has been rendered. Outlaw v. Pearce, 176 Va. 458 , 11 S.E.2d 600 (1941), holding that the motion was too late when made at the time of the argument of a motion for a new trial.

When security may be given. - Where an order was entered for security for costs, to be given within 60 days, and no security was entered within such time it was error to dismiss the suit for failure to give the security if sufficient security was offered at the time of the motion to dismiss. Goodtitle v. See, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 123 (1799).

Security given after 60-day period but before dismissal. - Under this section, when a Virginia resident, named as a defendant in a suit or action brought in a Virginia court by a nonresident plaintiff, files a suggestion of nonresidency, the plaintiff is required to post a bond for costs and damages. If he fails to do so within 60 days, the statute authorizes the court to dismiss the case. The court cannot, however, exercise that authority if "before the dismission . . . security be given." Chagnon v. Hofferman, 230 Va. 176 , 335 S.E.2d 268 (1985).

Additional security; discretion of court. - The lower court having complied with the mandatory provisions of this section, in requiring complainant, a nonresident, to give security for costs, was only bound to exercise reasonable discretion in regard to any subsequent motion for increase of the security, and where such a motion was not passed upon until after the court had decided the merits of the case adversely to the defendant, its refusal by the same decree which disposed of all the other questions to order additional security was reasonable and natural. Goins v. Garber, 131 Va. 59 , 108 S.E. 868 (1921).

Proof of nonresidence. - Where plaintiff proved that his house was inside the state line and that he was living with his family there, proof that the sheriff had twice been there to serve process on him, but could not find him, did not sustain a motion under this section. Evans v. Bradshaw, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 207 (1853).

Effect of failure to give security. - Where, on the motion of the defendant in an attachment case, the plaintiff, who is a nonresident of the State, is ordered to give security for the costs of the suit within 60 days, and fails to do so, his bill should be dismissed; and it is error to proceed to hear and decide the cause. Anderson v. Johnson, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 558 (1879). See Outlaw v. Pearce, 176 Va. 458 , 11 S.E.2d 600 (1941).

Costs in appellate court. - Even prior to the 1938 amendment to this section it was held that it did not apply to costs in the appellate court. Lambert v. Key, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 484 (1810). But any doubt about the matter was clearly removed by the 1938 amendment which expressly limited the application of this section to the payment of costs and damages "in the court in which the suit or action is instituted." Outlaw v. Pearce, 176 Va. 458 , 11 S.E.2d 600 (1941).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Amount to be imposed. - Trial court determined that the amount of the nonresident bond to be imposed in the claimant's medical malpractice case against the health care providers should be an amount that covered the costs essential for prosecution of the lawsuit, such as filing fees or charges for service of process, and imposed an amount accordingly. Torres v. Dixon, 72 Va. Cir. 209, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 221 (Fairfax County 2006).

§ 17.1-608. How obligor in such bond may obtain indemnity.

On the motion of an obligor in such bond, after reasonable notice to the plaintiff, his attorney-at-law or agent, the court may order bond to be given, with sufficient surety, in a penalty equal to the penalty of the former bond, payable to the applicant and with condition to indemnify and save harmless the applicant against all loss or damage, in consequence of executing the former bond. If the bond required under this section is not given within such time as the court may prescribe, it may order the suit to be dismissed.

(Code 1950, § 14-183; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-186; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-609. Costs on certain motions and interlocutory orders.

Upon any motion, other than for a judgment for money, or upon any interlocutory order or proceeding, the court may give or refuse costs, at its discretion, unless otherwise provided. It may, when a demurrer is sustained to a plea in abatement, give judgment for the plaintiff for his full costs, to the time of sustaining it, an attorney's fee only excepted; and when any other part of the pleading is adjudged insufficient, order all costs occasioned by such insufficient pleading to be paid by him who committed the fault.

(Code 1950, § 14-184; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-187; 1998, c. 872.)

CASE NOTES

Interlocutory decrees. - No complaint can be made even by the party substantially prevailing, against the nonallowance of costs upon an interlocutory decree, as upon final decree the question of costs can be properly adjusted. Yost v. Porter, 80 Va. 855 (1855) (decided under prior law).

It is not error for a decree, not final, though adjudicating the principles of a cause, to reserve the question of costs for future adjudication, and to refuse costs to the party prevailing. Cooper v. Daugherty, 85 Va. 343 , 7 S.E. 387 (1888) (decided under prior law).

§ 17.1-610. Payment of costs when new trial granted.

The party to whom a new trial is granted shall, prior to such new trial, pay the costs of the former trial, unless the court enter that the new trial is granted for misconduct of the opposite party, who, in such case, may be ordered to pay any costs which seem to the court reasonable. Such costs shall include the allowances to witnesses as provided in § 17.1-612 . If the party who is to pay the costs of the former trial fails to pay the same at or before the next term after the new trial is granted, the court may, on the motion of the opposite party, set aside the order granting it, and proceed to judgment on the verdict or award execution for the costs, whichever seems best.

(Code 1950, § 14-185; 1962, c. 227; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-188; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 13B M.J. New Trials, § 52.

Editor's note. - The cases below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Object of section; waiver. - The object of the first sentence of this section is to make the payment of the costs of the former trial a condition precedent to a new trial, unless waived by the opposite party. The object of the second sentence is to secure their prompt payment. Haupt v. Tebault, 94 Va. 184 , 26 S.E. 406 (1897).

This section applies only to costs in the trial court, and not to costs in the Supreme Court incurred upon a writ of error. Southern Ry. v. Hansbrough, 107 Va. 733 , 60 S.E. 58 (1908).

The burden of paying the costs applies only to the party to whom the new trial is granted, and not to one who is forced to submit to a new trial because a verdict in his favor has been set aside at the instance of his adversary. Southern Ry. v. Hansbrough, 107 Va. 733 , 60 S.E. 58 (1908).

When costs may be paid or tendered. - If the costs of the former trial are paid before the new trial is had, that satisfies the requirements of this section. Lemons v. Harris, 115 Va. 809 , 80 S.E. 740 (1914).

Where a new trial has been granted upon condition of paying the costs of the former trial, as provided by this section, it is sufficient if the costs are paid or tendered at any time before the order granting the new trial has been set aside, and after such tender or payment it is error to rescind the order for the new trial. Haupt v. Tebault, 94 Va. 184 , 26 S.E. 406 (1897).

Time for making objection. - If the costs have not been paid as required by this section, and the opposite party does not move the court to set aside the order granting the new trial and render judgment upon the verdict, but proceeds with the new trial, he will not be heard afterwards to object in the trial court, or in an appellate court, that the costs of the former trial have not been paid. Central Land Co. v. Obenchain, 92 Va. 130 , 22 S.E. 876 (1895).

After a second trial, a plaintiff cannot for the first time object that the order granting the new trial did not require, as a condition precedent, the payment of the costs of the former trial. Hudgins v. Simon, 94 Va. 659 , 27 S.E. 606 (1897).

§ 17.1-611. Allowances to witnesses for Commonwealth.

All witnesses summoned for the Commonwealth shall be entitled to receive for each day's attendance all necessary tolls, and such reimbursement for his daily mileage as prescribed in § 2.2-2823 . All allowances to witnesses summoned on behalf of the Commonwealth shall be paid by the treasurer of the county or corporation in which the trial is held or in which the grand jury is summoned and the amount so paid by such treasurer shall be refunded to him out of the state treasury, on a certificate of the clerk of the court in which the trial was held or before which the grand jury was summoned.

(Code 1950, § 14-186; 1954, c. 709; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-189; 1972, c. 719; 1976, c. 308; 1977, c. 483; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Costs, § 3; 20 M.J. Witnesses, § 2.

§ 17.1-612. Allowances to other witnesses.

A person attending as a witness under a summons not covered by § 17.1-611 , whether he is a witness from within or without the Commonwealth, shall be reimbursed for his daily mileage as prescribed in § 2.2-2823 , and expenses for the tolls. On his oath an entry of the sum he is entitled to and for what and by what party it is to be paid shall be made: (i) by the clerk of either house or a committee of the General Assembly when the attendance is before such house or committee and (ii) in other cases by the clerk of the court in which the case is or the person before whom the witness attended. When the attendance was on behalf of the Commonwealth before a court, the entry shall be made upon the minutes of the court in which the case is docketed. A witness from outside the Commonwealth in any civil action may be allowed the same mileage and attendance fee as any other witness in any such action. However, no sums for attendance and mileage shall be allowed a witness from outside the Commonwealth, in any civil action, unless the judge of the court determines and certifies that the witness is a material witness in the matter for which he appeared. The court may allow such mileage and attendance fee or any portion thereof as the court may determine to be reasonable under the circumstances of the case. A witness summoned to attend in several cases may have the entry made against either of the parties by whom he is summoned, but no witness shall be allowed reimbursement for his attendance in more than one case at the same time. Every witness who qualifies as an expert witness, when compelled to attend and testify, shall be allowed such compensation and mileage as the court may, if requested in its discretion, order without regard to any limitation described above, but the same shall be paid by the party in whose behalf he shall testify.

(Code 1950, § 14-187; 1952, c. 701; 1954, c. 709; 1962, c. 227; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-190; 1966, c. 671; 1972, c. 719; 1976, c. 308; 1977, c. 483; 1998, c. 872.)

Law review. - For survey on civil procedure and practice in Virginia for 1989, see 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511 (1989).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Costs, § 3; 20 M.J. Witnesses, § 2.

§ 17.1-613. By whom and upon what certificate allowances to witnesses paid.

The sum to which a witness is entitled shall be paid out of the state treasury in any case of attendance before either house or a committee of the General Assembly and in any other case in which the attendance is for the Commonwealth except when it is otherwise specially provided. In all other cases it shall be paid by the party for whom the summons issued. The payment shall be on a certificate of the person required by § 17.1-612 to make the entry or the clerk of the court in whose minutes the entry is made. The certificate shall express by letters and not by figures the separate amount to which the witness is entitled for his attendance, traveling, and tolls which he may have to pay and the aggregate thereof. No clerk or other person authorized to make such entry or give such certificate shall become interested by purchase in any claim payable out of the state treasury which by law he is authorized to certify.

(Code 1950, § 14-188; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-191; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-614. List of entries made on behalf of witnesses.

The clerk shall, immediately after the adjournment of any court, make out two lists of all entries made on behalf of witnesses attending for the Commonwealth, and certify one to the Supreme Court and the other to the county or city treasurer, to which lists shall be attached a certificate to the correctness of the allowances therein and the aggregate amount thereof signed by the judge of the court and by the clerk. Any dispute before or after issuing the certificate between the witness and the party against whom his claim is made as to its justice or amount may, when the case is in a court, be determined by such court. The Comptroller shall not issue a warrant for any claim allowed by a court to a witness unless it appears upon the list certified as herein provided, and, upon the payment of any such claim, the date of approval by the Supreme Court shall be noted on such list.

(Code 1950, § 14-189; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-192; 1978, c. 195; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-615. Time within which witnesses may be paid out of state treasury.

No payment out of the state treasury shall be made to witnesses unless their claims are presented within two years from the time of rendering the service.

(Code 1950, § 14-190; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-193; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-616. Restriction of costs for witnesses generally; when entry for witness not allowed.

The court may restrict the taxation in the costs for witnesses to so many as may be deemed just. No entry for a witness shall be made against a party recovering costs, after execution has issued for such party. In no case shall there be an entry of a witness for attendance at a term, after sixty days from the end of such term.

(Code 1950, § 14-191; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-194; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-617. Number of witnesses paid fees in criminal cases.

Not more than the maximum number of witnesses provided for herein shall be paid out of the state treasury in criminal cases.

The maximum number that may be (i) caused to be summoned by an attorney for the Commonwealth in any one case to go before a grand jury - five; (ii) used before a court not of record in the trial of any criminal case - five; and (iii) caused to be summoned by an attorney for the Commonwealth for the trial of any criminal case - ten.

Nothing herein shall be construed to limit (i) the number of witnesses that may be authorized by any court or the judge thereof to be used when the necessity for additional witnesses appears to the court or judge and the consent of the court or judge is first obtained or (ii) the number of witnesses that a grand jury may of its own motion summon.

(Code 1950, § 14-192; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-195; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 100.

§ 17.1-618. Allowances for jurors; expenses of keeping jury together; fees of jury commissioners and commissioner in chancery for drawing of juries.

Every person summoned as a juror in a civil or criminal case shall be entitled to thirty dollars for each day of attendance upon the court for expenses of travel incident to jury service and other necessary and reasonable costs as the court may direct. Jurors summoned from another political subdivision pursuant to § 8.01-363 may be allowed by the court, in addition to the above allowance, their actual expenses. When kept together overnight under the supervision of the court, the jurors and the sheriff or his deputies keeping the jury shall be furnished suitable board and lodging. Reimbursement for board and lodging shall be set by the judge in an amount not to exceed the amount authorized by travel regulations promulgated pursuant to § 2.2-2823 . Allowances and other costs will be allowed a juror in only one case the same day.

Every person serving as a jury commissioner and every person serving as a commissioner in chancery for the drawing of juries for a circuit court of this Commonwealth may be allowed, by the court appointing him, a fee not exceeding thirty dollars per day for the time actually engaged in such work and such other necessary and reasonable costs as the court may direct.

(Code 1950, § 8-208.33; 1954, c. 709; 1958, cc. 216, 303; 1960, c. 366; 1964, c. 268, § 14.1-195.1; 1968, c. 632; 1969, Ex. Sess., c. 20; 1972, c. 719; 1973, c. 439; 1974, c. 220; 1975, c. 193; 1976, c. 308; 1977, c. 624; 1978, c. 230; 1980, cc. 593, 594; 1982, c. 610; 1983, c. 495; 1984, c. 512; 1993, cc. 345, 635; 1996, c. 332; 1998, c. 872.)

Law review. - For article, "Improving the Jury System in Virginia: Jury Patriotism Legislation Is Needed," 11 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 657 (2003).

§ 17.1-619. How jurors paid.

  1. The compensation and allowances of persons attending the court as jurors in all felony cases shall be paid by the Commonwealth. Jurors in misdemeanor cases shall be paid by the Commonwealth unless the charge is written on a local warrant or summons, in which case the jurors shall be paid by the political subdivision in which the summons is issued. Jurors in all civil cases shall be paid by the political subdivision in which the summons is issued. Payment in all cases shall be by negotiable check, warrant, cash, credit to a prepaid debit card or card account from which the juror is able to withdraw or transfer funds, or electronic transfer upon the Commonwealth, or the political subdivision, as the case may be. If payment is made by credit to a prepaid debit card or card account from which the juror is able to withdraw or transfer funds, such card or card account shall permit the juror to withdraw or transfer funds without incurring any fee for such withdrawal or transfer.

    When, during the same day any juror is entitled to compensation from both the Commonwealth and from the political subdivision in which he has served, the court shall divide the pay for such day between the Commonwealth and the political subdivision. It shall be the duty of the sheriff at the term of the court during which an allowance is made or has been made under this section, to furnish the clerk of the court with a statement showing the number and names of the jurors in attendance upon the court.

  2. A county or city may provide by local ordinance that a juror may direct in writing that compensation due him be paid to the court service unit or to any other agency, authority or organization which is ancillary to and provides services to the courts of the county or city.

    (Code 1950, § 8-208.34; 1954, c. 709; 1958, c. 303; 1960, c. 366; 1968, c. 632, § 14.1-195.2; 1969, Ex. Sess., c. 20; 1972, c. 719; 1973, c. 739; 1974, c. 208; 1975, c. 193; 1977, c. 624; 1982, c. 610; 1991, c. 78; 1998, c. 872; 2005, c. 173; 2017, c. 799.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 173 inserted "cash, or electronic transfer" in the last sentence of subsection A and made a stylistic change.

The 2017 amendments. - The 2017 amendment by c. 799, in subsection A, inserted "credit to a prepaid debit card or card account from which the juror is able to withdraw or transfer funds" in the fourth sentence and added the last sentence in the first paragraph.

§ 17.1-620. When juror not entitled to compensation.

No person shall be entitled to receive any compensation for service as a juror if he departs without the leave of the court, or, being summoned as a witness for the Commonwealth, charges for his attendance as such.

(Code 1950, § 8-208.35; 1973, c. 439, § 14.1-195.3; 1977, c. 624; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11B M.J. Jury, § 30.

§ 17.1-621. Clerk to make entry on minutes stating amount due and by whom payable.

The clerk of any court in which juries are impaneled shall, before its final adjournment at each term, and under the direction of the court, make an entry upon its minutes stating the amount to which each juror is entitled for his services or attendance during the term, and specifying how much is payable by the Commonwealth, and how much by the political subdivision.

(Code 1950, § 8-208.36; 1973, c. 439, § 14.1-195.4; 1977, c. 624; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-622. Clerk to transmit orders making allowances to Supreme Court, treasurer and jurors.

Such clerk shall immediately, after the adjournment of the court, transmit to the Supreme Court a list of all orders under § 17.1-621 making allowances against the Commonwealth, and to the treasurer of the political subdivision a list of all such orders making allowances against the political subdivision, with a certificate to the correctness of the list and the aggregate amount thereof annexed thereto and signed by the judge of the court and himself, and such clerk shall also deliver to each juror copies of any orders making an allowance to him, whether the same be payable by the Commonwealth or by the political subdivision.

(Code 1950, § 8-208.37; 1973, c. 439, § 14.1-195.5; 1977, c. 624; 1978, c. 195; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-623. Payment of allowances.

The treasurer of such political subdivision shall upon demand pay to such juror the amount allowed him by negotiable check, cash, or electronic transfer which shall be repaid to such treasurer out of the public treasury or out of the political subdivision levy, as the case may be, upon the production of satisfactory proof that the same has been actually paid by him. But such treasurer shall not be repaid any allowance made against the Commonwealth unless it appear on the list directed to be sent to the Supreme Court. No such allowance shall be paid unless presented within two years from the time of rendering the service.

(Code 1950, § 8-208.38; 1973, c. 439, § 14.1-195.6; 1975, c. 193; 1977, c. 624; 1978, c. 195; 1998, c. 872; 2005, c. 173.)

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 173 inserted "case, or electronic transfer" in the first sentence.

§ 17.1-624. Who to tax costs.

The clerk of the court wherein any party recovers costs shall tax the same.

(Code 1950, § 14-193; 1952, c. 616; 1954, c. 99; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-196; 1984, c. 703; 1998, c. 872; 2014, c. 315.)

The 2014 amendments. - The 2014 amendment by c. 315 deleted "He shall include therein for the fee of such party's attorney, if he has one:" at the end of the introductory paragraph, subdivisions 1 - 4, and the last paragraph.

CASE NOTES

Review. - When the amount of an attorney's fee in a chancery suit has been taxed under this section, the Supreme Court will not disturb it in the absence of anything in the record to show error. Baker v. Briggs, 99 Va. 360 , 38 S.E. 277 (1901) (decided under prior law).

There must be an order from the Court of Appeals specifically remanding the issue of attorney's fees incurred on appeal, and the trial court does not have such jurisdiction. O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 23 Va. App. 690, 479 S.E.2d 98 (1996) (decided under prior law).

Construction with other law. - A trial court does not err by failing or refusing to deduct costs awarded on appeal from trial court's monetary equitable distribution award in divorce. Estate of Cummings v. Greenwood, No. 1361-99-3 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 29, 2000).

§ 17.1-625.

Repealed by Acts 2018, c. 35, cl. 1.

Editor's note. - Former § 17.1-625 , pertaining to fee of one attorney only to be taxed, derived from Code 1950, § 14-194; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-197; 1998, c. 872.

§ 17.1-626. Other items to be taxed in costs.

The clerk shall tax in the costs all taxes on process, and all fees of officers which the party appears to be chargeable with in the case wherein the recovery is, except that when in any court, on the same side, more than one copy of anything is obtained or taken out, there shall be taxed only the fee for one copy of the same thing. He shall also tax the costs of executing any order of publication made in the case for such party and of any advertisement from him in the case, made in pursuance of law, allowing the amount charged by the publisher, provided such publisher shall file with his certificate of publication or account a printed copy of his fixed rates of advertising, and his charge shall not exceed them, and the allowances to his witnesses, and every further sum which the court may deem reasonable and direct to be taxed for depositions taken out of the Commonwealth, or for any other matter.

(Code 1950, § 14-195; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-198; 1994, c. 432; 1998, c. 872.)

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Costs essential to the prosecution. - Because an administratrix did not establish that a local cardiologist's testimony was "essential to the prosecution" of her cause of action, she was not entitled to tax as costs the expenses incurred in the preparation of the testimony under § 17.1-626 ; however, she was entitled to judgment interest under § 8.01-382 from the date of the verdict to the date that the judgment was paid. Rogers v. Williams, 70 Va. Cir. 73, 2005 Va. Cir. LEXIS 370 (Danville 2005).

§ 17.1-626.1. Recovery of costs in civil actions for bad checks.

  1. In any civil action by a holder to recover the sum payable of a check drawn by the defendant on which payment has been refused by the payor bank because the drawer had no account or insufficient funds, or in any civil action following an arrest under § 18.2-181 or 18.2-182 , the court, upon a determination that the plaintiff has prevailed, shall add the following amounts, as costs, to the amount due to the plaintiff for the check: (i) the sum of $30 to defray the cost of processing the returned check; and (ii) the base wage of one employee for time actually spent acting as a witness for the Commonwealth; provided, however, that the total amount of allowable costs granted under the provisions of this section shall not exceed the sum of $250 excluding restitution for the amount of the check.
  2. Such award of costs shall be contingent upon a finding (i) that the plaintiff complied with the provisions in § 18.2-183 relating to notice and (ii) that the defendant failed to deliver payment or evidence of bank error to the plaintiff within five days after receipt of such notice. (1977, c. 329, § 6.1-118.1; 2010, cc. 343, 794.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2010, c. 343 amended former § 6.1-118.1, from which this section is derived. Pursuant to § 30-152, the 2010 amendment by c. 343 has been given effect in this section as set out above, by substituting "$30" for "$10" in clause (i) of subsection A.

Acts 2010, c. 794, cl. 12 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on October 1, 2010."

CASE NOTES

Virginia law does not permit collection of service charges for bad checks absent express statutory authorization or agreement between the drawer and payee. Otherwise, statutes such as this section would be superfluous. West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Va. 1983)(decided under former § 6.1-118.1)

§ 17.1-627. Premium on indemnifying bond taxed as costs.

In case of any attachment or any levy pursuant to a judgment, where the attaching or judgment creditor is required to give bond to indemnify and save harmless the officer executing such attachment or levy, the clerk shall tax in the costs of the proceeding wherein such attachment is had or judgment is entered the reasonable cost of such bond, such costs to be recovered as provided in § 17.1-601 .

(Code 1950, § 14-195.1; 1954, c. 470; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-199; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-628. Judgment or decree for costs on behalf of Commonwealth; costs to be paid into state treasury.

In a case wherein there is judgment or decree on behalf of the Commonwealth for costs, there shall be taxed in the costs the charge actually incurred to give any notice, although it be more than fifty cents; and the fees of attorneys and other officers for services, and allowances for attendance, as if such fees and allowances were payable out of the state treasury. What is so taxed for fees of, or allowance to, any person, shall be paid by the sheriff or officer who may receive such costs into the state treasury.

(Code 1950, § 14-196; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-200; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-629. No judgment for costs against Commonwealth; exception.

In no case, civil or criminal, whether in a court of record or a court not of record, except when otherwise specially provided, shall there be a judgment for costs against the Commonwealth.

(Code 1950, § 14-197; 1964, c. 386, § 14.1-201; 1998, c. 872.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5A M.J. Costs, § 7; 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 100.

CASE NOTES

Since this section is "in this chapter" within the meaning of former § 14.1-177 (now § 17.1-600 ), it is subject to the discretion of the chancellor in apportioning costs in an equity case in a circuit court. Commonwealth ex rel. State Water Control Bd. v. County Utils. Corp., 223 Va. 534 , 290 S.E.2d 867 (1982) (decided under prior law).

The State Milk Commission is not "the Commonwealth" within the meaning of this section. Roller v. State Milk Comm'n, 204 Va. 536 , 132 S.E.2d 427 (1963) (decided under prior law).

Department of social services. - Trial court did not err in sustaining a special plea of sovereign immunity filed by a county department of social services in a father's action seeking attorney's fees pursuant to § 16.1-278.19 because the General Assembly did not waive the Department's sovereign immunity under §§ 17.1-600 and 17.1-629 , in suits in equity where a party sought an award of costs; § 17.1-600 speaks of the courts' "discretion" in equity, but Virginia courts did not have discretion to award attorney's fees in any case, whether legal or equitable, absent a specific grant of such authority, and because § 17.1-600 did not specifically allow the award of attorney's fees, the trial court could not award attorney's fees to the father, especially since the opposing party was the department, a government agency protected by sovereign immunity. Murphy v. Charlotte County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 57 Va. App. 784, 706 S.E.2d 546, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 97 (2011).

Chapter 7. Judicial Policy-Making Bodies.

Judicial Council.

Judicial Conference of Virginia.

Article 1. Judicial Council.

§ 17.1-700. Composition of Council; committees.

The Judicial Council shall be established in the judiciary branch of state government and composed of 14 members consisting of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, one judge of the Court of Appeals, six circuit court judges, one general district court judge, one juvenile and domestic relations district court judge, two attorneys qualified to practice in the Supreme Court, and the Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary or their designees who shall be members of the Courts of Justice committees. The Council may appoint committees to aid it in the performance of its duties, and members of such committees need not be members of the Council.

(1930, p. 788, § 17-222; Michie Code 1942, § 6571f; 1968, c. 387; 1972, c. 708; 1973, c. 546; 1984, c. 703; 1987, c. 141; 1998, c. 872; 2004, c. 1000; 2008, c. 115.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2004, c. 1000, cl. 5 provides: "That this act shall not be construed to affect existing appointments for which the terms have not expired. However, any new appointments or appointments to fill vacancies made after the effective date of this act shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this act."

The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "the Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary" for "the Chairmen of the Committees for Courts of Justice of the Senate and the House of Delegates." March 10, 2021.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 1000 substituted "established in the judiciary branch of state government and composed of 14 members" for "composed of fourteen members."

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 115 inserted "or their designees who shall be members of the Courts of Justice committees" at the end of the first sentence.

Law review. - For article discussing the Judicial Council, see 10 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 9 (1953). For note discussing the Virginia Judicial Council's intermediate appellate court proposal, see 16 U. Rich. L. Rev. 209 (1982).

Research References. - Friend's Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 1. Courts. § 1.01. The Court System. Friend.

§ 17.1-701. Appointment and terms of members.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the legislative members shall serve terms coincident with their terms of office. The other members of the Council shall be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to serve for four years, or at his pleasure. No member appointed by the Chief Justice shall be eligible to serve more than two consecutive terms. Vacancies occurring other than by expiration of a term shall be filled for the unexpired term. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointments. The remainder of any term to which a member is appointed to fill a vacancy shall not constitute a term in determining the member's eligibility for reappointment.

(1930, p. 789, § 17-223; Michie Code 1942, § 6571f; 1980, c. 177; 1998, c. 872; 2004, c. 1000.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2004, c. 1000, cl. 5, provides: "That this act shall not be construed to affect existing appointments for which the terms have not expired. However, any new appointments or appointments to fill vacancies made after the effective date of this act shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this act."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 1000 inserted "other" preceding "members of the Council" and substituted "at" for "during" in the second sentence and added the first, fourth, fifth and sixth sentences.

§ 17.1-702. Meetings of Council and committees.

The Chief Justice, or, in case of his inability to do so, one of the other justices of the Supreme Court, shall summon the Council to meet at Richmond during the month of October in each year, and at such other times and places as the Chief Justice, or such other justice, may designate. If any member, when so summoned, shall for any cause be unable to attend, he shall promptly notify the justice who issued the summons, of such fact, and such justice shall thereupon summon some other person possessing similar qualifications to attend and act in his stead.

Each member or other person, when so summoned, shall attend and remain throughout the proceedings of the Council, unless excused by the presiding officer, and shall advise as to any matters in respect to which, in his opinion, the administration of justice in the courts of this Commonwealth may be improved.

The Chief Justice or, in case of his inability to do so, one of the other justices of the Supreme Court, may summon the chairman or members of any committee to meet at such time and place as the Chief Justice, or such other justice, may designate.

(1930, p. 789, § 17-224; Michie Code 1942, § 6571g; 1966, c. 23; 1968, c. 387; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-703. Presiding officer; study of procedure.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or the other justice summoning the Council, shall be its presiding officer.

The Council shall, during each of its meetings, make a continuous study of the organization and the rules and methods of procedure and practice of the judicial system of the Commonwealth, the work accomplished and the results produced by the system and its various parts; and shall make studies of the need, or lack of need, of additional judges or justices of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Court of Appeals of Virginia, and the circuit courts.

On the request of the presiding officer, the Attorney General shall attend the Council and confer with the members thereof, more particularly on the Commonwealth's business in the courts, and for the purpose of devising methods for the prevention of undue delay in the trial of such cases.

(1930, p. 789, § 17-225; Michie Code 1942, § 6571h; 1968, c. 387; 1991, c. 406; 1995, c. 41; 1998, c. 872.)

Law review. - For note discussing the Virginia Judicial Council's intermediate appellate court proposal, see 16 U. Rich. L. Rev. 209 (1982).

§ 17.1-704. Expenses; Secretary and assistants; printing.

Each member of the Council shall serve without compensation, and each member of the Council and of its committees summoned and attending its meetings shall be reimbursed for all reasonable and necessary expenses in the performance of his duties as provided in §§ 2.2-2813 and 2.2-2825 . Funding for the costs of expenses of the members shall be paid by the Virginia Supreme Court. As provided by § 17.1-315 the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary of the Judicial Council. The Council may engage such consultants or other assistants as it deems necessary for the performance of its duties.

(1930, p. 789, § 17-226; Michie Code 1942, § 6571i; 1964, c. 9; 1968, c. 387; 1973, c. 544; 1998, c. 872; 2004, c. 1000.)

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 1000 substituted "shall be reimbursed for all reasonable and necessary expenses in the performance of his duties as provided in §§ 2.2-2813 and 2.2-2825 " for "shall be allowed his actual expenses of travel and also his necessary expenses for subsistence while attending the Council" in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

§ 17.1-705. Report and recommendations.

A report of the proceedings of the Council shall be made to the General Assembly and to the Supreme Court, with such recommendations as may be agreed upon. However, this authority to make recommendations shall in no event be construed to establish rules for the judicial system of the Commonwealth.

(1930, p. 789, § 17-227; Michie Code 1942, § 6571i; 1991, c. 406; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-705.1. Civil immunity for investigation of commissioners of accounts, etc.

All members of the Standing Committee on Commissioners of Accounts of the Judicial Council of Virginia shall be immune from civil liability for, or resulting from, any act, decision, omission, communication, finding, opinion or conclusion done or made in connection with the investigation of complaints against any commissioner of accounts, assistant commissioner of accounts or deputy commissioner of accounts, if such act, decision, omission, communication, finding, opinion or conclusion is done in good faith and without malicious intent.

(2004, c. 976.)

§ 17.1-705.2. Days when circuit courts shall be open.

Subject to §§ 2.2-3300 and 17.1-207 , the Judicial Council may determine when the circuit courts of the Commonwealth shall be open for business. Any closing of the circuit courts pursuant to this section shall have the same effect as provided in subsection B of § 1-210 .

(2016, c. 237, 548.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2016, cc. 237 and 548, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall not be construed to empower the Judicial Council to set the hours of operation of a circuit court clerk's office."

Article 2. Judicial Conference of Virginia.

§ 17.1-706. Establishment and membership.

There is hereby established the Judicial Conference of Virginia, which shall have as its active members the Chief Justice and justices of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the chief judge and judges of the Court of Appeals, all other judges of the circuit courts of the Commonwealth and all retired justices and judges of such courts. The honorary membership shall consist of the Attorney General of Virginia, the the Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice or his designee and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary or his designee who shall be members of the Courts of Justice committees, the president and secretary of the Virginia State Bar, the president and secretary of the Virginia Bar Association, the president and secretary of the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association, the president and secretary of the Virginia Association of Defense Attorneys, the president and secretary of the Old Dominion Bar Association, the president and secretary of the Virginia Association of Commonwealth's Attorneys, the president and secretary of the Virginia Women Attorneys Association, the president and secretary of the Virginia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the deans of the law schools of The College of William and Mary in Virginia, University of Richmond, University of Virginia, Washington and Lee University, George Mason University, Regent University, Liberty University, and the Appalachian School of Law, and the two attorneys appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as members of the Judicial Council. The honorary members shall not have voting privileges.

(1950, p. 69, § 17-228; 1964, c. 9; 1970, c. 404; 1980, c. 447; 1981, c. 231; 1984, c. 703; 1989, c. 597; 1990, c. 249; 1998, cc. 38, 872; 2008, c. 115; 2012, c. 76.)

Cross references. - As to the Judicial Conference of Virginia for courts not of record, see § 16.1-218.

Editor's note. - At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, "The College of William and Mary in Virginia" was substituted for "The College of William and Mary" in this section to conform to Acts 2016, c. 588.

The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "the Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice or his designee and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary or his designee" for "the Chairmen of the Courts of Justice Committees of the Senate and House of Delegates or their designees." March 10, 2021.

The 2008 amendments. - The 2008 amendment by c. 115 inserted "or their designees who shall be members of the Courts of Justice committees" in the second sentence.

The 2012 amendments. - The 2012 amendment by c. 76, in the next-to-last sentence, inserted "the president and secretary of the Virginia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers," deleted "and" preceding "Regent University" and inserted "Liberty University, and the Appalachian School of Law."

§ 17.1-707. President; executive committee.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the president of the Judicial Conference. The Conference shall be served by an executive committee composed of eight judges. The Chief Justice, or a justice of the Supreme Court designated by him, shall be chairman of the executive committee.

(1950, p. 70, § 17-229; 1964, c. 9; 1980, c. 178; 1987, c. 161; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-708. Meetings.

The Conference shall meet at least once in each calendar year at the call of the president and at such other times as may be designated by him or by the executive committee for the purpose of discussing and considering means and methods of improving the administration of justice in this Commonwealth. If any active member shall for any cause be unable to attend, he shall promptly notify the president. Unless excused from attendance, it shall be the duty of each active member to attend and remain throughout the proceedings of the Conference.

(1950, p. 70, § 17-230; 1964, c. 9; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-709. Expenses of members.

The active members and honorary members shall receive their reasonable expenses while in attendance at the meetings of the Conference, and of the executive committee.

(1950, p. 70, § 17-231; 1964, c. 9; 1998, c. 872.)

Chapter 8. Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission.

Sec.

§ 17.1-800. Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission created.

There is hereby created within the judicial branch as an agency of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, hereinafter referred to in this chapter as the Commission.

(1994, 2nd Sp. Sess., cc. 1, 2, § 17-232; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-801. Purpose.

The General Assembly, to ensure the imposition of appropriate and just criminal penalties, and to make the most efficient use of correctional resources, especially for the effective incapacitation of violent criminal offenders, has determined that it is in the best interest of the Commonwealth to develop, implement, and revise discretionary sentencing guidelines. The purposes of the Commission established under this chapter are to assist the judiciary in the imposition of sentences by establishing a system of discretionary guidelines and to establish a discretionary sentencing guidelines system which emphasizes accountability of the offender and of the criminal justice system to the citizens of the Commonwealth.

The Commission shall develop discretionary sentencing guidelines to achieve the goals of certainty, consistency, and adequacy of punishment with due regard to the seriousness of the offense, the dangerousness of the offender, deterrence of individuals from committing criminal offenses and the use of alternative sanctions, where appropriate.

(1994, 2nd Sp. Sess., cc. 1, 2, § 17-233; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-802. Membership; terms; compensation and expenses.

  1. The Commission shall be composed of 17 members as follows:
    1. Six judges or justices, who may be judges of a circuit court who regularly hear criminal cases or judges or justices of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia;
    2. One person who is not an active member of the judiciary, to be appointed as Chairman by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia for a term of four years subject to confirmation by the General Assembly. The Chairman shall designate a vice-chairman from among the other members to serve a term commensurate with that of the Chairman;
    3. The Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice or his designee who shall be a member of the committee and two persons to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Delegates;
    4. The Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary or his designee who shall be a member of the committee and one person to be appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules;
    5. Four persons to be appointed by the Governor, at least one of whom shall be a representative of a crime victims' organization or a victim of crime as defined in subsection B of § 19.2-11.01; and
    6. The Attorney General of Virginia or his designee for a term commensurate with his term of office.

      All members shall be citizens of the Commonwealth.

  2. Except for legislative members and gubernatorial appointments, appointments to the Commission made on and after January 1, 2001, shall be for terms of four years. Legislative members shall serve terms coincident with their terms of office. Appointments to the Commission made by the Governor on and after January 1, 2006, shall be for terms of four years. Members initially appointed to the Commission prior to January 1, 1998, may serve no more than three consecutive terms. Members initially appointed on and after January 1, 1998, shall not be eligible to serve more than two consecutive terms except for the Attorney General who shall serve by virtue of his office. Vacancies occurring other than by expiration of a term shall be filled for the unexpired term. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointments. The remainder of any term to which a member is appointed to fill a vacancy or the service of an initial term of three years or less shall not constitute a term in determining the member's eligibility for reappointment.
  3. Legislative members of the Commission shall receive compensation as provided in § 30-19.12 and nonlegislative citizen members of the Commission shall receive compensation as provided in § 2.2-2813 and all members shall be reimbursed for all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties as provided in §§ 2.2-2813 and 2.2-2825 . Funding for the costs of compensation and expenses of the members shall be provided by the Virginia Sentencing Commission. (1994, 2nd Sp. Sess., cc. 1, 2, § 17-234; 1997, cc. 795, 883; 1998, cc. 226, 872; 2002, c. 79; 2004, c. 1000; 2005, c. 596.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2002, c. 79, cl. 2 provides: "That, except for the terms of gubernatorial appointees and the Attorney General, the term of any member currently serving on the Commission shall be extended and expire on December 31 in the year that the member's term is scheduled to expire. The term of any current member appointed by the Governor shall expire on December 31, 2003. All subsequent terms of any member on the Commission, except the Attorney General, shall begin on January 1. For appointments made by the Governor to commence on January 1, 2004, one person shall be appointed to a term of two years, two persons for terms of three years, and one person for a term of four years."

Acts 2004, c. 1000, cl. 5 provides: "That this act shall not be construed to affect existing appointments for which the terms have not expired. However, any new appointments or appointments to fill vacancies made after the effective date of this act shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this act."

Acts 2005, c. 596, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall not be construed to affect existing appointments for which the terms have not expired or for which there is no vacancy. However, any new appointments made after July 1, 2005, shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this act."

The Virginia Code Commission authorized the substitution of "Senate Committee on the Judiciary” for "Senate Committee for Courts of Justice” in subdivision A 4. March 10, 2021.

The 2002 amendments. - The 2002 amendment by c. 79, in subsection B, added "Except for gubernatorial appointments" and substituted "on and after" for "on or after" in the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 1000 substituted "17" for "seventeen" in subsection A; substituted "vice chairman" for "vice-chairman" in subdivision A 2; substituted "Senate Committee on Rules" for "Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections" in subdivision A 4; inserted "or his designee" in subdivision A 6; added the last paragraph in subsection A; added the last three sentences in subsection B; and rewrote subsection C.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 596 substituted "the Chairman of the House Committee for Courts of Justice or his designee who shall be a member of the committee and two persons" for "three persons" in subdivision A 3; substituted "the Chairman of the Senate Committee for Courts of Justice or his designee who shall be a member of the committee and one person" for "two persons" in subdivision A 4; in subsection B, inserted "legislative members and" in the first sentence, and added the second sentence; in subsection C, substituted "Legislative members of the Commission shall receive compensation as provided in § 30-19.12 and nonlegislative citizen members" for "members," and inserted "all members" preceding "shall be reimbursed" and made a minor stylistic change.

§ 17.1-803. Powers and duties.

The Commission shall:

  1. Develop, maintain and modify as may be deemed necessary, a proposed system of statewide discretionary sentencing guidelines for use in all felony cases which will take into account historical data, when available, concerning time actually served for various felony offenses committed prior to January 1, 1995, and sentences imposed for various felony offenses committed on or after January 1, 1995, and such other factors as may be deemed relevant to sentencing.
  2. Prepare, periodically update, and distribute sentencing worksheets for the use of sentencing courts which, when used, will produce a recommended sentencing range for a felony offense in accordance with the discretionary sentencing guidelines established pursuant to subdivision 1.
  3. Prepare, periodically update, and distribute a form for the use of sentencing courts which will assist such courts in recording the reason or reasons for any sentence imposed in a felony case which is greater or less than the sentence recommended by the discretionary sentencing guidelines.
  4. Prepare guidelines for sentencing courts to use in determining appropriate candidates for alternative sanctions which may include, but not be limited to (i) fines and day fines, (ii) boot camp incarceration, (iii) local correctional facility incarceration, (iv) diversion center incarceration, (v) detention center incarceration, (vi) home incarceration/electronic monitoring, (vii) day or evening reporting, (viii) probation supervision, (ix) intensive probation supervision, and (x) performance of community service.
  5. Develop an offender risk assessment instrument for use in all felony cases, based on a study of Virginia felons, that will be predictive of the relative risk that a felon will become a threat to public safety.
  6. Apply the risk assessment instrument to offenders convicted of any felony that is not specified in (i) subdivision 1, 2 or 3 of subsection A of § 17.1-805 or (ii) subsection C of § 17.1-805 under the discretionary sentencing guidelines, and shall determine, on the basis of such assessment and with due regard for public safety needs, the feasibility of achieving the goal of placing 25 percent of such offenders in one of the alternative sanctions listed in subdivision 4. If the Commission so determines that achieving the 25 percent or a higher percentage goal is feasible, it shall incorporate such goal into the discretionary sentencing guidelines, to become effective on January 1, 1996. If the Commission so determines that achieving the goal is not feasible, the Commission shall report that determination to the General Assembly, the Governor and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia on or before December 1, 1995, and shall make such recommendations as it deems appropriate.
  7. Monitor sentencing practices in felony cases throughout the Commonwealth, including the use of the discretionary sentencing guidelines, and maintain a database containing the information obtained.
  8. Monitor felony sentence lengths, crime trends, correctional facility population trends and correctional resources and make recommendations regarding projected correctional facilities capacity requirements and related correctional resource needs.
  9. Study felony statutes in the context of judge-sentencing and jury-sentencing patterns as they evolve after January 1, 1995, and make recommendations for the revision of general criminal offense statutes to provide more specific offense definitions and more narrowly prescribed ranges of punishment.
  10. Report upon its work and recommendations annually on or before December 1 to the General Assembly, the Governor and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Such report shall include any modifications to the discretionary sentencing guidelines adopted by the Commission pursuant to subdivision 1 and shall be accompanied by a statement of the reasons for those modifications.
  11. Perform such other functions as may be otherwise required by law or as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

    (1994, 2nd Sp. Sess., cc. 1, 2, § 17-235; 1998, c. 872; 2003, c. 139.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2014, cc. 100 and 260, cl. 1 provides: " § 1. The proposed modifications to the discretionary sentencing guidelines for convictions related to the possession of child pornography in violation of subsections A and B of § 18.2-374.1:1 of the Code of Virginia adopted by the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission pursuant to subdivision 1 of § 17.1-803 of the Code of Virginia and contained in the Commission's 2013 Annual Report pursuant to subdivision 10 of § 17.1-803 shall not become effective until July 1, 2016. The Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission shall review the discretionary sentencing guidelines recommendations for convictions related to the possession of child pornography in violation of subsections A and B of § 18.2-374.1:1 and complete its review by December 1, 2015. Any proposed modification to the discretionary sentencing guidelines for such convictions contained in the Commission's 2015 Annual Report shall supersede the proposed modifications contained in the Commission's 2013 Annual Report unless otherwise provided by law."

Acts 2016, c. 394, cl. 1 provides: "That the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission shall calculate annually the recidivism rate of federal prisoners released by the U.S. Bureau of Prisons whose sentences were retroactively reduced pursuant to Amendments 782 and 788 of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual for crimes committed in the Commonwealth. The Commission shall make a reasonable attempt to acquire the information necessary to complete the calculation from any available source, including any state or federal entity that has access to such information. The Commission shall report annually to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice (i) such recidivism rate no later than December 31 for the preceding 12-month period complete through the last day of October or (ii) if the Commission is unable to complete the calculation, any information regarding the recidivism rate of such prisoners as the Commission was able to acquire."

Acts 2016, c. 394, cl. 2 provides "That the provisions of this act shall expire on January 1, 2018."

Acts 2016, c. 398, cl. 1 provides: "The Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission (the Commission) under its powers and duties shall evaluate judge-sentencing and jury-sentencing patterns and practices in cases of manufacturing, selling, giving, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, sell, give, or distribute heroin across the Commonwealth and recommend adjustments in the sentencing guidelines previously adopted by the Commission."

The 2003 amendments. - The 2003 amendment by c. 139 twice substituted "25" for "twenty-five" in subdivision 6; and inserted the last sentence in subdivision 10.

§ 17.1-804. Meetings; staff support.

  1. Regular meetings of the Commission shall be held on a quarterly basis and at such other times as the Chairman may determine. Nine members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. The Commission may hold public hearings.
  2. The Commission may appoint a director and fix his duties and compensation. The Director may with prior approval of the Commission employ and fix the duties and compensation of such adequate staff as may be requisite to carry out the duties of the Commission. Other professional personnel, consultants and secretarial and clerical employees may be employed or contracted upon such terms and conditions as set forth by the Commission. The salaries, per diem and other expenses necessary to the functions of the Commission shall be payable from funds appropriated to the Commission. Adequate office space shall be provided by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court.
  3. All agencies of the Commonwealth, their staffs and employees shall provide the Commission with necessary information for the performance of its duties.

    (1994, 2nd Sp. Sess., cc. 1, 2, § 17-236; 1998, c. 872.)

§ 17.1-805. Adoption of initial discretionary sentencing guideline midpoints.

  1. The Commission shall adopt an initial set of discretionary felony sentencing guidelines which shall become effective on January 1, 1995. The initial recommended sentencing range for each felony offense shall be determined first, by computing the actual time-served distribution for similarly situated offenders, in terms of their conviction offense and prior criminal history, released from incarceration during the base period of calendar years 1988 through 1992, increased by 13.4 percent, and second, by eliminating from this range the upper and lower quartiles. The midpoint of each initial recommended sentencing range shall be the median time served for the middle two quartiles and subject to the following additional enhancements:
    1. The midpoint of the initial recommended sentencing range for first degree murder, second degree murder, rape in violation of § 18.2-61 , forcible sodomy, object sexual penetration, and aggravated sexual battery shall be further increased by (i) 125 percent in cases in which the defendant has no previous conviction of a violent felony offense; (ii) 300 percent in cases in which the defendant has previously been convicted of a violent felony offense punishable by a maximum punishment of less than 40 years; or (iii) 500 percent in cases in which the defendant has previously been convicted of a violent felony offense punishable by a maximum punishment of 40 years or more, except that the recommended sentence for a defendant convicted of first degree murder who has previously been convicted of a violent felony offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 40 years or more shall be imprisonment for life;
    2. The midpoint of the initial recommended sentencing range for voluntary manslaughter, robbery, aggravated malicious wounding, malicious wounding, and any burglary of a dwelling house or statutory burglary of a dwelling house or any burglary committed while armed with a deadly weapon or any statutory burglary committed while armed with a deadly weapon shall be further increased by (i) 100 percent in cases in which the defendant has no previous conviction of a violent felony offense, (ii) 300 percent in cases in which the defendant has previously been convicted of a violent felony offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of less than 40 years, or (iii) 500 percent in cases in which the defendant has previously been convicted of a violent felony offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 40 years or more;
    3. The midpoint of the initial recommended sentencing range for manufacturing, selling, giving, or distributing, or possessing with the intent to manufacture, sell, give, or distribute a Schedule I or II controlled substance, shall be increased by (i) 200 percent in cases in which the defendant has previously been convicted of a violent felony offense punishable by a maximum punishment of less than 40 years or (ii) 400 percent in cases in which the defendant has previously been convicted of a violent felony offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 40 years or more; and
    4. The midpoint of the initial recommended sentencing range for felony offenses not specified in subdivision 1, 2, or 3 shall be increased by 100 percent in cases in which the defendant has previously been convicted of a violent felony offense punishable by a maximum punishment of less than 40 years and by 300 percent in cases in which the defendant has previously been convicted of a violent felony offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 40 years or more.
  2. For purposes of this chapter, previous convictions shall include prior adult convictions and juvenile convictions and adjudications of delinquency based on an offense which would have been at the time of conviction a felony if committed by an adult under the laws of any state, the District of Columbia, or the United States or its territories.
  3. For purposes of this chapter, violent felony offenses shall include any felony violation of § 16.1-253.2; solicitation to commit murder under § 18.2-29 ; any violation of § 18.2-31 , 18.2-32 , 18.2-32 .1, 18.2-32.2 , 18.2-33 , or 18.2-35 ; any violation of subsection B of § 18.2-36.1 ; any violation of § 18.2-40 or 18.2-41 ; any violation of clause (c)(i) or (ii) of subsection B of § 18.2-46.3 ; any violation of § 18.2-46.5 , 18.2-46.6 , or 18.2-46.7 ; any Class 5 felony violation of § 18.2-47 ; any felony violation of § 18.2-48 , 18.2-48.1 , or 18.2-49 ; any violation of § 18.2-51 , 18.2-51.1 , 18.2-51 .2, 18.2-51.3 , 18.2-51.4 , 18.2-51.6 , 18.2-52 , 18.2-52 .1, 18.2-53 , 18.2-53.1 , 18.2-54.1 , 18.2-54.2 , or 18.2-55 ; any violation of subsection B of § 18.2-57 ; any felony violation of § 18.2-57.2 ; any violation of § 18.2-58 or 18.2-58.1 ; any felony violation of § 18.2-60.1 , 18.2-60.3 , or 18.2-60.4 ; any violation of § 18.2-61 , 18.2-64.1 , 18.2-67.1 , 18.2-67.2 , former § 18.2-67.2 :1, 18.2-67.3 , 18.2-67.5 , or 18.2-67.5 :1 involving a third conviction of either sexual battery in violation of § 18.2-67.4 or attempted sexual battery in violation of subsection C of § 18.2-67.5; any Class 4 felony violation of § 18.2-63 ; any violation of subsection A of § 18.2-67.4:1 ; any violation of subsection A of § 18.2-77 ; any Class 3 felony violation of § 18.2-79 ; any Class 3 felony violation of § 18.2-80 ; any violation of § 18.2-85 , 18.2-89 , 18.2-90 , 18.2-91 , 18.2-92 , or 18.2-93 ; any felony violation of § 18.2-152.7 ; any Class 4 felony violation of § 18.2-153 ; any Class 4 felony violation of § 18.2-154 ; any Class 4 felony violation of § 18.2-155 ; any felony violation of § 18.2-162 ; any violation of § 18.2-279 involving an occupied dwelling; any felony violation of subsection A or B of § 18.2-280 ; any violation of § 18.2-281 ; any felony violation of subsection A of § 18.2-282 ; any felony violation of § 18.2-282.1 ; any violation of § 18.2-286.1 , 18.2-287.2 , 18.2-289 , or 18.2-290 ; any violation of subsection A of § 18.2-300 ; any felony violation of subsection C of § 18.2-308.1 or § 18.2-308.2 ; any violation of § 18.2-308.2 :1 or subsection M or N of § 18.2-308.2:2 ; any violation of § 18.2-308.3 or 18.2-31 2; any former felony violation of § 18.2-346 ; any felony violation of § 18.2-346.01 , 18.2-348 , or 18.2-349 ; any violation of § 18.2-35 5, 18.2-356 , 18.2-357 , or 18.2-357.1 ; any violation of former § 18.2-358 ; any violation of subsection B of § 18.2-361 ; any violation of subsection B of § 18.2-366 ; any violation of § 18.2-368 , 18.2-370 , or 18.2-370.1 ; any violation of subsection A of § 18.2-371.1 ; any felony violation of § 18.2-369 resulting in serious bodily injury or disease; any violation of § 18.2-374.1 ; any felony violation of § 18.2-374.1:1 ; any violation of § 18.2-374.3 or 18.2-374.4 ; any second or subsequent offense under §§ 18.2-379 and 18.2-381 ; any felony violation of § 18.2-405 or 18.2-406 ; any violation of § 18.2-408 , 18.2-413 , 18.2-414 , 18.2-423 , 18.2-423.01 , 18.2-423.1 , 18.2-423.2 , or 18.2-433.2 ; any felony violation of § 18.2-460 , 18.2-47 4.1, or 18.2-477 .1; any violation of § 18.2-477 , 18.2-478 , 18.2-480 , 18.2-481 , or 18.2-485 ; any violation of § 37.2-917 ; any violation of § 52-48 ; any violation of § 53.1-203 ; any conspiracy or attempt to commit any offense specified in this subsection, or any substantially similar offense under the laws of any state, the District of Columbia, or the United States or its territories. (1994, 2nd Sp. Sess., cc. 1, 2, § 17-237; 1995, c. 482; 1998, cc. 277, 872; 1999, c. 349; 2004, cc. 459, 866; 2005, c. 631; 2011, c. 282; 2013, cc. 424, 647; 2015, cc. 690, 691; 2019, c. 617; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 188.)

Cross references. - As to revocation and suspension of registration of tow truck driver, see § 46.2-117 .

As to mandatory background screenings for TNC partners to provide updated information to transportation network companies, see § 46.2-2099.49 .

Editor's note. - Acts 2015, cc. 690 and 691, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities; therefore, Chapter 2 of the Acts of Assembly of 2014, Special Session I, requires the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to assign a minimum fiscal impact of $50,000. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

Acts 2019, c. 617, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act may result in a net increase in periods of imprisonment or commitment. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of imprisonment in state adult correctional facilities; therefore, Chapter 2 of the Acts of Assembly of 2018, Special Session I, requires the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to assign a minimum fiscal impact of $50,000. Pursuant to § 30-19.1:4 of the Code of Virginia, the estimated amount of the necessary appropriation cannot be determined for periods of commitment to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice."

At the direction of the Virginia Code Commission, substituted "(c) (i)" for "(c)(i)" in subsection C.

The 1999 amendment, in subsection C, substituted "18.2-32.1, 18.2-33 , or § 18.2-35 ; any violation of subsection B of § 18.2-36.1 ; any violation of § 18.2-40 " for "18.2-33, 18.2-35 , 18.2-40 "; substituted "18.2-51.3, 18.2-51.4 , 18.2-52 , 18.2-52.1 " for "18.2-52"; deleted "or" following "18.2-55"; substituted "18.2-67.5, or § 18.2-67.5:1 involving a third conviction of either sexual battery in violation of § 18.2-67.4 or attempted sexual battery in violation of subsection C of § 18.2-67.5 " for "or § 18.2-67.5 "; and substituted " § 18.2-153 ; any Class 4 felony violation of § 18.2-154 ; any Class 4 felony violation of" for " §§ 18.2-153 , 18.2-154 or."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 459 substituted "40" for "forty" throughout the section and inserted "former" preceding " § 18.2-358 " in subsection C.

The 2004 amendment by c. 866 substituted "40" for "forty" throughout the section; inserted "solicitation to commit murder under § 18.2-29 " and "18.2-46.5, 18.2-46.6 , or § 18.2-46.7 " in subsection C; and made a related change.

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 631 inserted "former § " preceding "18.2-67.2:1" in subsection C; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2011 amendments. - The 2011 amendment by c. 282 substituted "any felony violation of subsection C of § 18.2-308.1 or 18.2-308.2 " for "any felony violation of §§ 18.2-308.1 and 18.2-308.2 " in subsection C.

The 2013 amendments. - The 2013 amendments by cc. 424 and 647 are nearly identical, and rewrote subsection C.

The 2015 amendments. - The 2015 amendments by cc. 690 and 691 are identical, and inserted "any violation of § 18.2-357.1 " in subsection C and made a stylistic change.

The 2019 amendments. - The 2019 amendment by c. 617, in subsection C, substituted "any felony violation of § 18.2-346 , 18.2-348 , or 18.2-349 ; any violation of § 18.2-355 , 18.2-356 , 18.2-357 , or 18.2-357 .1;" for "; any violation of subdivision (2) or (3) of § 18.2-355 ; any violation of § 18.2-357.1 ;"; and made stylistic changes.

The 2021 Sp. Sess. I amendments. - The 2021 amendment by Sp. Sess. I, c. 188, effective July 1, 2021, substituted "any former felony violation of § 18.2-346 ; any former felony violation of § 18.2-346.01 ” for "any former felony violation of § 18.2-346 ” in subsection C.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 5B M.J. Criminal Procedure, § 81; 19 M.J. Warrants, § 6; 20 M.J. Weapons, § 4.1.

CASE NOTES

Prior conviction was not a violent felony. - Because of his prior conviction in the military for housebreaking the defendant was guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; however, the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant because the crime was not a violent felony. Turner v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 851, 568 S.E.2d 468, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 525 (2002).

Prior conviction was a violent felony. - Defendant's sentence to a mandatory five-year term under § 18.2-308.2 for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, was affirmed as he had been convicted of possessing a firearm after conviction of a felony in violation of § 18.2-308.2 when he was 14, which would have been classified as a violent felony under subsections B and C of § 17.1-805 , if he had been tried as an adult; defendant's argument that his juvenile conviction could not serve as the necessary predicate act for § 18.2-308.2 because he was not convicted under an indictment was rejected, and § 19.2-217, relied upon by defendant, was inapplicable. Parks v. Commonwealth, No. 2780-02-1, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 385 (Ct. of Appeals July 8, 2003).

Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant possessed a firearm, and since defendant did not dispute that he was previously convicted of a violent felony, the supreme court further held that the jury verdict convicting defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under subsection A of § 18.2-308.2 was not plainly wrong. When police arrived at defendant's residence, defendant was alone in the bedroom in which the firearm was found, and the bedroom contained defendant's clothes and personal effects. Rawls v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 334 , 634 S.E.2d 697, 2006 Va. LEXIS 77 (2006).

Jury was required to fix defendant's sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of subsection A of § 18.2-308.2 to a mandatory sentence of five years of imprisonment as: (1) defendant possessed a handgun found in a pillowcase located at defendant's feet in a car in which defendant was a passenger; and (2) defendant had been previously convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, which was classified as a violent felony under § 17.1-805 . Lee v. Commonwealth, No. 0713-07-1, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 324 (July 15, 2008).

Juvenile and domestic relations district court records received under § 8.01-389 showed that defendant committed a prior violent felony as the petition alleged a violation of § 18.2-91 , which was a violent felony under § 17.1-805 , and the Record of Proceedings stated that defendant was convicted and referenced the only pending case. Preston v. Commonwealth,, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 603 (Nov. 12, 2009).

Defendant's conviction of assault with intent to maim under former Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 386 substantially conformed to § 18.2-51 and could be used under subsection B of § 19.2-297.1 to establish a violent felony under § 17.1-805 to support defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm after being convicted of a violent felony under subsection A of § 18.2-308.2 as defendant was specifically convicted of an intent to maim, which was proscribed by § 18.2-51 . Dillsworth v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 93, 741 S.E.2d 818, 2013 Va. App. LEXIS 148 (2013).

Federal offense not a violent felony. - Trial court erred by ruling that the federal conviction under 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(g)(1) was substantially similar to a violent felony offense as defined by this section, because the federal offense encompassed conduct that could not be a violation of § 18.2-308.2 , as a muffler or silencer was a firearm under the federal statute but not for purposes of § 18.2-308.2 . Williams v. Commonwealth, No. 0808-17-2, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 145 (May 29, 2018).

Attempted arson and obstruction of justice. - Attempted arson fell within the proscribed offenses in the felony obstruction statute because the language of the obstruction statute, when considered in conjunction with the language of the statute that it incorporated by reference, subsection C of § 17.1-805 , reflected an intention by the legislature to proscribe attempt crimes. Tanner v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 86, 841 S.E.2d 377, 2020 Va. App. LEXIS 131 (2020).

Violent felony not sufficiently proven. - As the Commonwealth failed to prove that appellant juvenile was previously adjudicated delinquent of an act that would have been a violent felony under subsection C of § 17.1-805 if committed by an adult, his conviction for possession of a firearm, in violation of subsection A of § 18.2-308.2 , could not stand; the Commonwealth's attempt to prove a prior breaking and entering conviction, in violation of § 18.2-91 , was insufficient where the nature of the delinquent act for which the juvenile was adjudicated was unclear by the document in support of that conviction. Preston v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 52 , 704 S.E.2d 127, 2011 Va. LEXIS 23 (2011).

Applied in Conkling v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 518, 612 S.E.2d 235 (2005); Martin v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 666, 770 S.E.2d 795, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 144 (2015).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Prior conviction was not a violent felony. - Defendant's prior Maine conviction of elevated aggravated assault was not substantially similar to an unlawful wounding charge in Virginia for purposes of classification as a violent felony, subjecting defendant to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five years, because a person could be convicted under the Maine statute for acting knowingly without acting intentionally, which was not in accordance with the Virginia statute, which required that a person could be convicted only if he possessed the specific intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill another. Commonwealth v. Schooley, 94 Va. Cir. 256, 2016 Va. Cir. LEXIS 136 (Nelson County Sept. 7, 2016).

§ 17.1-806. Sentencing guidelines modifications; effective date.

After adoption of the initial guidelines, any modification to the discretionary sentencing guidelines adopted by the Commission shall be contained in the annual report required under § 17.1-803 and shall, unless otherwise provided by law, become effective on the next following July 1.

(1994, 2nd Sp. Sess., cc. 1, 2, § 17-238; 1998, c. 872.)

Chapter 9. Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.

Sec.

§ 17.1-900. Definitions and application of chapter.

As used in this chapter, unless the context requires a different meaning:

"Commission" means the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission provided for in Article VI, Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia.

"Judge" means a justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of Appeals, judge of a circuit or district court, member of the State Corporation Commission, or a member of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission and includes (i) persons who have been elected or appointed to be judges but have not taken the oath of office as judge as well as persons who have taken such oath, (ii) judges designated under § 17.1-105 , (iii) judges under temporary recall under § 17.1-106 , (iv) judges pro tempore under § 17.1-109 and (v) special justices appointed pursuant to § 37.2-803 , all of whom shall be subject to investigations and proceedings under the provisions of this chapter.

"Term" means (i) the period of time between either election or appointment of service as a judge and the first taking of the oath of office, (ii) each period of time for which the person was either elected or appointed as a judge, and (iii) any period of time after retirement during which the person hears cases as a retired judge.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.1; 1984, c. 703; 2001, cc. 113, 844; 2004, c. 363.)

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 363, in the definition of "Judge," inserted the clause (i) designation and inserted clauses (ii) through (v).

Law review. - For comment, "Guarding the Guardians: Judge's Rights and Virginia's Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission," see 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473 (2008).

Research References. - Friend's Virginia Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender). Chapter 1. Courts. § 1.01. The Court System. Friend.

Applied in Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of Va. v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97 , 630 S.E.2d 485, 2006 Va. LEXIS 58 (2006).

§ 17.1-901. Commission created; membership and terms of office.

There is created a Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission in the judiciary branch of government, composed of seven persons who shall be citizens and residents of the Commonwealth. The members of the Commission shall be chosen by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly. The Commission shall elect a chairman and vice-chairman annually from its membership.

The Commission shall consist of three judicial members, who shall be (i) one active judge of a circuit court, (ii) one active judge of a general district court and (iii) one active judge of a juvenile and domestic relations district court; two lawyer members, who shall be active members of the Virginia State Bar who are not judges and who have practiced law in the Commonwealth for 15 or more years immediately preceding their appointment; and two public members who shall not be active or retired judges and shall never have been licensed lawyers.

After the initial appointments, the term of office of each member shall be four years commencing on July 1. No member of the Commission shall be eligible to serve more than two consecutive terms. The remainder of any term to which a member is appointed to fill a vacancy shall not constitute a term in determining the member's eligibility for reappointment.

Commission membership terminates whenever a member resigns or ceases to possess the qualifications that made him eligible for appointment. During any vacancy, which may exist while the General Assembly is not in session, the Governor may appoint a successor to serve until 30 days after the commencement of the next session of the General Assembly. Upon election of a successor by the General Assembly, the new member of the Commission shall serve for the remainder of the term of office of his predecessor.

Any member of the Commission who is the subject of an investigation or hearing by it or is otherwise personally involved therein shall be disqualified by the Commission from acting in such proceedings. In such a case the Governor shall appoint a person possessing the original qualifications of such member as prescribed by this section to serve temporarily as a substitute member of the Commission in such proceedings.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.3; 1978, c. 452; 2001, c. 844; 2004, c. 1000.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2004, c. 1000, cl. 5, provides: "That this act shall not be construed to affect existing appointments for which the terms have not expired. However, any new appointments or appointments to fill vacancies made after the effective date of this act shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this act."

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 1000, in the first paragraph, inserted "in the judiciary branch of government" following "Review Commission" in the first sentence and substituted "shall elect a chairman and vice chairman annually from its membership" for "annually, shall elect one of its members to be chairman of the Commission for the ensuing year" in the last sentence; substituted "15" for "fifteen" in the second paragraph; added the last sentence in the third paragraph; and substituted "30" for "thirty" in the fourth paragraph.

§ 17.1-902. Powers and duties of Commission generally.

The Commission is vested with the power, and it shall be its duty, to investigate charges arising out of the present or any prior term of office which would be the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge under Article VI, Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia and the provisions of this chapter even though the subject judge may have been reelected to a new term of office.

The Commission, after such investigation as it deems necessary, may order and conduct hearings at such times and places in the Commonwealth as it shall determine.

If the Commission finds the charges to be well-founded, and sufficient to constitute the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge, it may file a formal complaint before the Supreme Court.

The Commission shall have the authority to make rules, not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter or of general law, to govern investigations and hearings conducted by it.

No act of the Commission shall be valid unless concurred with by a majority of its members.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, §§ 2.1-37.4, 2.1-37.5, 2.1-37.6; 2001, c. 844.)

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judges, § 26.

CASE NOTES

Review of Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission's findings. - Supreme Court of Virginia does not give due weight to the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission's findings or their credibility determinations, instead, the court will accord the Commission's findings only such weight, if any, as the court deems appropriate in each case. This is so because the Commission's function is only to determine whether the charges are well-founded, and sufficient to constitute the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge, thus resulting in a complaint being filed in the court. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of Va. v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428 , 611 S.E.2d 392, 2005 Va. LEXIS 44 (2005).

While the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, Virginia, believed that it had grounds to file a complaint in the Supreme Court of Virginia, pursuant to Va. Const., Art. VI, § 10, and § 17.1-902 , against a district judge who was found to have violated the Canons of Judicial Conduct, the Commission was not required to do so. Under Va. Const., Art. VI, § 10, and § 17.1-902 , the provisions of Va. Jud. Inq. and Rev. R. 15(A)(2), which allowed a complaint to be filed, were necessarily permissive rather than mandatory. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of Va. v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97 , 630 S.E.2d 485, 2006 Va. LEXIS 58 (2006).

State Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over judicial inquiry proceedings and could determine based on the evidence presented that the trial judge had violated the Canons of Judicial Conduct. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Shull, 274 Va. 657 , 651 S.E.2d 648, 2007 Va. LEXIS 123 (2007).

In a case brought pursuant to Va. Const., Art. VI, § 10 and § 17.1-902 in which the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission proved by clear and convincing evidence that a judge violated Canons of Judicial Conduct 1, 2A, and 3B(2) when she ruled that her order denying a juvenile's written motion for bond and release pending the sentencing hearing was interlocutory and nonappealable, the judge unsuccessfully argued that the Canons were unconstitutionally vague and without appropriately definite standards as applied to the facts in the complaint against her, and that vague and indefinite laws and regulations offended due process rights. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of Va. v. Taylor, 278 Va. 699 , 685 S.E.2d 51, 2009 Va. LEXIS 114 (2009), cert. denied, 177 L. Ed. 2d 304, 130 S. Ct. 3396, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4645 (2010).

In a case brought pursuant to Va. Const., Art. VI, § 10 and § 17.1-902 , the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission proved by clear and convincing evidence that a judge violated Canons of Judicial Conduct 1, 2A, and 3B(2) when she ruled that her order denying a juvenile's written motion for bond and release pending the sentencing hearing was interlocutory and nonappealable. The judge could not prevent the appeal of her decision by ruling that the order was interlocutory and nonappealable; the judge's violations of Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2) constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of Va. v. Taylor, 278 Va. 699 , 685 S.E.2d 51, 2009 Va. LEXIS 114 (2009), cert. denied, 177 L. Ed. 2d 304, 130 S. Ct. 3396, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4645 (2010).

In a case brought by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (Commission) pursuant to Va. Const., Art. VI, § 10 and § 17.1-902 , the judge unsuccessfully argued that subsection E of Canon of Judicial Conduct 3 required the recusal of the Commission's chairman due to his status as complainant in a prior contact with the Commission. Since she had not presented that argument at the Commission hearing, she had waived it. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of Va. v. Taylor, 278 Va. 699 , 685 S.E.2d 51, 2009 Va. LEXIS 114 (2009), cert. denied, 177 L. Ed. 2d 304, 130 S. Ct. 3396, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4645 (2010).

Supervision agreement. - Despite the claims of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission that the terms discussed in a judge's disciplinary hearings had not yet been approved and were never reduced to a formal supervision agreement, the Commission had no right to file a complaint against the judge in the Supreme Court of Virginia pursuant to Va. Const., Art. VI, § 10, and § 17.1-902 . While the judge accepted the Commission's terms in writing, the agreement was not in writing, nothing required it to be in writing, and a valid supervision agreement had been reached; the Commission's concerns that it would not sign an agreement until its chairman and members had approved the document reflected concerns of form rather than substance, and the Court was not inclined to place form over substance. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of Va. v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97 , 630 S.E.2d 485, 2006 Va. LEXIS 58 (2006).

A statement was made that the terms would be reduced to writing, but the Chairman also indicated that the judge could inform others that he would return to the bench; thus, no gag order was imposed, the judge's statements to others that "everything would be OK" did not constitute a breach of the agreement, and he made no representation that the Commission had exonerated him or vindicated him. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of Va. v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97 , 630 S.E.2d 485, 2006 Va. LEXIS 58 (2006).

§ 17.1-903. Officers and employees; experts and reporters; witnesses; legal counsel.

The Commission may (i) employ such officers, assistants, and other employees it deems necessary for the performance of its duties; (ii) arrange for and compensate medical and other experts and reporters; (iii) arrange for attendance of witnesses, including witnesses not subject to subpoena; and (iv) pay from funds available to it all expenses reasonably necessary for effectuating the purposes of Article VI, Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia and the provisions of this chapter, whether or not specifically enumerated herein. The Attorney General shall, if requested by the Commission, act as its counsel generally or in any particular investigation or proceeding.

The Commission may employ counsel, notwithstanding the provisions of § 2.2-510 .

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.7; 1978, c. 260; 2001, c. 844.)

§ 17.1-904. Compensation and expenses.

Members of the Commission shall receive compensation for their services and shall be allowed all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties as provided in §§ 2.2-2813 and 2.2-2825 . The compensation and expenses of members and all other necessary expenses of the Commission shall be provided from existing appropriations to the Commission.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.8; 1978, c. 452; 1979, c. 316; 2001, c. 844; 2004, c. 1000.)

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 1000 deleted "for travel, board, and lodging" preceding "incurred" and substituted " §§ 2.2-2813 and 2.2-2825 " for " § 30-19.12" in the first sentence and rewrote the last sentence, which read: "These and all other necessary expenses of the Commission shall be paid by the Commonwealth."

§ 17.1-905. Annual report.

On or before December 1 of each year, the Commission shall publish a report detailing the activities of the Commission for the prior year. The report shall include the number of complaints filed with the Commission; the number of complaints originating from attorneys, judges, court employees, or the general public; the number of complaints dismissed based on (i) failure to fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission, (ii) failure to state a violation of the Canons of Judicial Conduct, or (iii) failure of the Commission to reach a conclusion that the Canons were breached; the number of complaints for which the Commission concluded that the Canons of Judicial Conduct were breached; and the number of cases from which the staff or any member of the Commission recused himself due to an actual or possible conflict.

(1997, cc. 914, 921, § 2.1-37.8:1; 2001, c. 844.)

§ 17.1-906. Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.

In addition to the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by Article VI, Section 1 and Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia, to conduct hearings and impose sanctions upon the filing by the Commission of complaints against justices of the Supreme Court, judges of other courts of record, and members of the State Corporation Commission, the Supreme Court by virtue of this chapter shall have the same jurisdiction, to be exercised in the same manner, upon the filing by the Commission of complaints against all other judges as defined in this chapter.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.2; 2001, c. 844.)

Law review. - For survey of the Virginia law on administrative law for the year 2007-2008, see 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 73 (2008).

CASE NOTES

Judicial conduct warranting censure. - Judge's inclusion of a purge clause in his contempt order could only be construed as directly contrary to, and in disregard of, a circuit court's stay order, and as a violation of Va. Sup. Ct. R. pt. 6, § III, Canons 1, 2, 2A, and 3B(2). Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Lewis, 264 Va. 401 , 568 S.E.2d 687, 2002 Va. LEXIS 95 (2002).

Applied in Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of Va. v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97 , 630 S.E.2d 485, 2006 Va. LEXIS 58 (2006).

§ 17.1-907. Oaths; inspection of books and records; subpoenas.

In the conduct of investigations and formal hearings, the Commission may (i) administer oaths and affirmations; (ii) order and otherwise provide for the inspection of books and records; and (iii) issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, books, accounts, documents, and other records or tangible evidence relevant to any such investigation or formal hearing.

The power to administer oaths and affirmations, to issue subpoenas, or to make orders for or concerning the inspection of books and records may be exercised by any member of the Commission, unless the Commission shall otherwise determine.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.9; 2001, c. 844.)

§ 17.1-908. Scope of process.

In any investigation or formal proceeding in any part of the Commonwealth, any process issued pursuant to the provisions of § 17.1-907 shall be effective throughout the Commonwealth.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.10; 2001, c. 844.)

§ 17.1-909. Order compelling witness to attend and testify.

If any person refuses to attend or testify or produce any writings or things required by any such subpoena, the Commission may petition any court of record in the Commonwealth for an order compelling such person to attend and testify or produce the writings or things required by the subpoena before the Commission. The court shall order such person to appear before it at a specified time and place and show cause why he had not attended or testified or produced the writings or things as required. A copy of the order shall be served upon him. If it appears to the court that the subpoena was regularly issued, the court shall order such person to appear before the Commission at the time and place fixed in the order and testify or produce the required writings or things. Upon failure to obey the order, such person shall be dealt with by such court as for contempt of court.

All process in any such case may be served in the manner prescribed by law for service of process in civil actions.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.11; 2001, c. 844.)

§ 17.1-910. Depositions.

In any pending investigation or formal hearing, the Commission may order the deposition of a person residing within or without the Commonwealth to be taken in such form and subject to such limitations as may be prescribed in the order. If the subject judge and counsel for the Commission do not stipulate as to the manner of taking the deposition, either the judge or counsel for the Commission may file in a trial court of record a petition entitled "In the Matter of Proceeding of Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission No. ........ (state number)" and stating generally, without identifying the judge, the nature of the pending matter, the name and residence of the person whose testimony is desired, and directions, if any, of the Commission, asking that an order be made requiring such person to appear and testify before a designated officer. Upon the filing of the petition, the court may make an order requiring such person to appear and testify. A subpoena for such deposition shall be issued by the clerk of the court and the deposition shall be taken and returned, in the manner prescribed by law for depositions in civil actions. Upon failure of the person named in the subpoena to appear and testify, he shall be dealt with by such court as for contempt of court. If the deposition is that of a person residing or present within this Commonwealth, the petition shall be filed in the court of record of the county or corporation in which such person resides or is present; otherwise in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.12; 2001, c. 844.)

§ 17.1-911. Suspension of judge.

  1. In any pending investigation or formal hearing, the Commission may suspend a judge with pay if it finds that there is probable cause to believe that the continued performance of judicial duties by the judge constitutes both a substantial and immediate threat to the public interest in the administration of justice.
  2. The Commission shall give the judge reasonable notice of such suspension as prescribed by the rules of the Commission and, if requested by the judge or his attorney, shall schedule a hearing during the first fifteen days of the suspension in order to determine whether justice would be served for the suspension to continue until the completion of the investigation or formal hearing.
  3. Any judge whose powers are suspended by the Commission shall not exercise judicial powers during such suspension, but shall continue to be bound by the Canons of Judicial Conduct.

    (1998, cc. 672, 862, § 2.1-37.12:1; 2001, cc. 309, 318, 844.)

Law review. - For survey of the Virginia law on administrative law for the year 2007-2008, see 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 73 (2008).

Applied in Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of Va. v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97 , 630 S.E.2d 485, 2006 Va. LEXIS 58 (2006); Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Shull, 274 Va. 657 , 651 S.E.2d 648, 2007 Va. LEXIS 123 (2007).

§ 17.1-912. Physical or mental examination.

  1. Whenever the Commission has probable cause to believe a judge is unable to perform his duties as a judge because of excessive use of alcohol or drugs or physical or mental illness, the Commission, after preliminary investigation by informal conference, may direct that the judge submit to a mental or physical examination by a health care provider approved by the Commission after consultation with the judge. The health care provider's report shall be in writing. Upon request, the judge shall provide the Commission with all waivers and releases necessary to authorize the Commission to receive all medical records, reports, and information from any health care provider regarding the judge's mental or physical condition.
  2. Any judge ordered to be examined pursuant to this section shall be afforded reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing before such examination is conducted as to any matters regarding the examination and as to whether there is probable cause to believe that the judge is unable to perform his duties as a judge because of excessive use of alcohol or drugs or physical or mental illness. During such hearing, the judge shall have the right to call witnesses on his behalf.
  3. All costs related to examinations conducted at the direction of the Commission shall be paid out of sums appropriated for the operation of the Commission. The failure of a judge to submit to an examination ordered pursuant to this section or to provide waivers and releases required by this section shall constitute grounds for a new charge.

    (1998, cc. 672, 862, § 2.1-37.12:2; 2001, c. 844.)

§ 17.1-913. Confidentiality of papers and proceedings.

  1. All papers filed with and proceedings before the Commission, and under §§ 17.1-909 and 17.1-910 , including the identification of the subject judge as well as all testimony and other evidence and any transcript thereof made by a reporter, shall be confidential and shall not be divulged, other than to the Commission, by any person who (i) either files a complaint with the Commission, or receives such complaint in an official capacity; (ii) investigates such complaint; (iii) is interviewed concerning such complaint by a member, employee or agent of the Commission; or (iv) participates in any proceeding of the Commission or in the official recording or transcription thereof, except that the record of any proceeding filed with the Supreme Court shall lose its confidential character. However, if the Commission finds cause to believe that any witness under oath has willfully and intentionally testified falsely, the Commission may direct the chairman or one of its members to report such finding and the details leading thereto including any transcript thereof to the attorney for the Commonwealth of the city or county where such act occurred for such disposition as to a charge of perjury as the Commonwealth may be advised. In any subsequent prosecution for perjury based thereon, the proceedings before the Commission relevant thereto shall lose their confidential character. All records of proceedings before the Commission which are not filed with the Supreme Court in connection with a formal complaint filed with that tribunal, shall be kept in the confidential files of the Commission. However, a judge who is under investigation by the Commission, or any person authorized by him, may divulge information pertaining to a complaint filed against such judge as may be necessary for the judge to investigate the allegations in the complaint in preparation for the proceedings before the Commission.
  2. Advice on judicial ethics given by an attorney employed by the Commission to a judge and the records of such advice shall be confidential and not be divulged except as permitted in subsection A. However, the Commission may share such advice, but not the identity of the judge to whom the advice was given, with a committee established by the Supreme Court for the development of formal judicial ethics advisory opinions. Any such shared information shall remain confidential within such committee.

    (1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.13; 1979, c. 11; 1984, c. 650; 1993, c. 92; 2001, c. 844; 2005, c. 508.)

Editor's note. - Acts 2005, c. 508, cl. 2, provides: "That the provisions of this act are declaratory of existing law."

The 2005 amendments. - The 2005 amendment by c. 508 inserted the subsection A designation and added subsection B.

Law review. - For note, "Unlocking the Chamber Doors: Limiting Confidentiality in Proceedings Before the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission," see 26 U. Rich. L. Rev. 367 (1992).

For comment, "Guarding the Guardians: Judge's Rights and Virginia's Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission," see 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473 (2008).

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 11A M.J. Judges, § 26.

Editor's note. - Some of the cases below were decided under former Title 2.1 or prior provisions.

CASE NOTES

Section tested against most exacting scrutiny since it restricts speech. - Because this section restricts speech on the basis of its content, it must be tested against the most exacting scrutiny. To withstand this scrutiny, the Commission must demonstrate that the confidentiality provision is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Baugh v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n, 907 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1990) (remanding for further development of the record on challenge to the constitutionality of this section).

This section does not constitute a prior restraint or attempt by the State to censor the news media. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978).

The First Amendment does not permit the criminal punishment of third persons who are strangers to the inquiry for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding confidential proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978).

Neither the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the reputation of its judges, nor in maintaining the institutional integrity of its courts is sufficient to justify the subsequent punishment of speech of third persons who are strangers to the inquiry divulging truthful information regarding the confidential proceedings of the Commission. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978).

The risk of injury to the judge under inquiry, to the system of justice, or to the operation of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, created by the divulging by third persons of truthful information regarding the confidential proceedings of the Commission falls short of a clear and present danger to the orderly administration of justice. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978).

Strangers include news media. - See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978).

Required proof of clear and present danger. - Proof by "actual facts" of the existence of a clear and present danger to the orderly administration of justice is required before a determination can be made of whether conduct charged falls within the reach of this section and if so whether the legislation is consonant with the First Amendment. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978).

Waiver of objection to admission. - In a case brought by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (Commission) pursuant to Va. Const., Art. VI, § 10 and § 17.1-902 , citing to § 17.1-913 , the judge unsuccessfully argued that it was improper for the Commission to admit and consider evidence of her prior contacts with the Commission; she contended that neither § 17.1-913 nor VA. Jud. Inq. and Rev. R. 16 allowed for the removal of the confidentiality of records of complaints that were not deemed well founded and that her two prior contacts were not determined to be well founded. At the outset of the Commission hearing, counsel for the Commission stated that the exhibits were all in the red binder there on the witness desk and that both the sides were in agreement that there was no objection to the admission of any of the exhibits; pursuant to Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25, the judge's agreement to the Commission's admission of the exhibits was fatal to her argument that the Commission erred in admitting those same exhibits. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of Va. v. Taylor, 278 Va. 699 , 685 S.E.2d 51, 2009 Va. LEXIS 114 (2009), cert. denied, 177 L. Ed. 2d 304, 130 S. Ct. 3396, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4645 (2010).

Applied in Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of Va. v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97 , 630 S.E.2d 485, 2006 Va. LEXIS 58 (2006).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Proceedings before the commission. - Where a judge's request for an opinion regarding future conduct was not a proceeding or "papers filed" before the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, it was not confidential under § 17.1-913 and was subject to disclosure under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, § 2.2-3700 et seq. Zaleski v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n, 64 Va. Cir. 495, 2004 Va. Cir. LEXIS 186 (Richmond 2004).

§ 17.1-914. Privilege.

The filing of papers with and the giving of testimony before the Commission shall be privileged, except where such filing of papers or giving of testimony is motivated or accompanied by actual malice. No other publication of such papers or proceedings shall be privileged in any action for defamation except that (i) the record filed by the Commission with the Supreme Court, in support of a formal complaint filed therewith, continues to be privileged and (ii) a writing which was privileged before its filing with the Commission shall not lose such privilege by such filing.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.14; 2001, c. 844.)

Law review. - For article on libel and slander in Virginia, see 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 769 (1983).

§ 17.1-915. Witness fees; mileage; exception.

  1. Each witness, shall receive for his attendance the same fees and all witnesses shall receive the same mileage allowed by law to a witness in civil cases. The amount shall be paid by the Commission from funds appropriated for the use of the Commission.
  2. This section shall not apply to an officer or employee of the Commonwealth or a political subdivision thereof, or an officer or an employee of a court of the Commonwealth.

    (1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.15; 2001, c. 844.)

§ 17.1-916. Costs.

No award of costs shall be made in any proceeding before the Commission or the Supreme Court.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.16; 2001, c. 844.)

§ 17.1-917. Assistance and information.

State and local public bodies and departments, officers and employees thereof, and officials and all personnel of the courts of the Commonwealth shall cooperate with and give reasonable assistance and information to the Commission and any authorized representative thereof, in connection with any investigations or proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Commission.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.17; 2001, c. 844.)

§ 17.1-918. Transmission of certain information to Virginia State Bar, House Committee for Courts of Justice, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and other members of the General Assembly.

  1. The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission shall transmit to the appropriate District Committee of the Virginia State Bar any complaint or evidence that may come to its attention with reference to the alleged misconduct of a judge, substitute judge or pro tempore judge which relates to his private practice of law.
  2. The Commission shall also transmit any evidence that it has in its possession with reference to the alleged misconduct of any judge whose election is to be considered at the next session of the General Assembly to (i) the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and (ii) any member of the General Assembly, upon request. Such evidence shall include the nature of the complaint, the current status of the complaint, the duration of any suspension and the evidence supporting the probable cause finding therefor, a description of any remedial course of action, and a statement concluding whether any such remedial course was successfully undertaken. A copy of any evidence in whatever form so transmitted shall be sent to the judge in question. Any such evidence transmitted to the House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary or to any member of the General Assembly shall lose its confidential character.

    (1973, c. 387, § 2.1-37.17:1; 1993, c. 92; 1997, c. 914; 1998, cc. 757, 804; 2001, c. 844; 2004, cc. 332, 363.)

Editor's note. - Acts 1998, cc. 757 and 804, cl. 2 provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on the date [January 1, 1999] prescribed by the General Assembly in submitting a constitutional amendment to the voters which specifically provides for or authorizes the General Assembly to provide for an exception to the confidentiality of the proceedings and documents of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission."

The Virginia Code Commission authorized substitution of "House Committee for Courts of Justice, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary" for "House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice" in the section heading and "House Committee for Courts of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary" for "House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice" twice in subsection B. March 10, 2021.

The 2004 amendments. - The 2004 amendment by c. 332, in subsection B, deleted the former last sentence, which read: "Any member of the General Assembly who knowingly discloses such information shall be subject to any sanctions that may be imposed by the Committee on Standards of Conduct" and added the last sentence.

The 2004 amendment by c. 363 inserted "judge or pro tempore" in subsection A and made minor stylistic changes.

§ 17.1-919. Service of process; execution of orders.

It shall be the duty of the sheriffs and sergeants in the several counties, cities, and towns, upon request of the Commission or its authorized representative, to serve process and execute all lawful orders of the Commission or entered by the court at its request without costs therefor.

(1971, Ex. Sess., c. 154, § 2.1-37.18; 2001, c. 844.)

Chapter 10. Court Reporters.

Sec.

§ 17.1-1000. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context requires a different meaning:

"Court reporter" a person who records legal proceedings by stenotype machine or other means allowed under the Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia and provides prompt preparation of an accurate, verbatim written transcript.

"Court reporting services" services provided by a court reporter and associated videography services.

"Court reporting services provider" a business, entity, or firm that provides or arranges for court reporting services.

"Legal proceeding" includes a court proceeding, a deposition, an administrative hearing, an arbitration hearing, an examination under oath, and a sworn statement.

(2018, c. 783.)

§ 17.1-1001. Applicability; waiver.

  1. This chapter applies to court reporting services performed in the Commonwealth, whether a party appears in person or by remote access, provided by:
    1. A court reporter or court reporting services provider, whether or not based in the Commonwealth, in connection with a legal proceeding that is commenced or maintained in the Commonwealth; or
    2. A court reporter or court reporting services provider based in the Commonwealth in connection with a legal proceeding that is commenced or maintained in a foreign jurisdiction.
  2. The provisions of this chapter shall not be waived or otherwise modified. Any waiver or modification is contrary to public policy and is void and unenforceable.

    (2018, c. 783.)

§ 17.1-1002. Prohibited actions; exception.

  1. A court reporter or court reporting services provider shall not:
    1. Enter into an oral or written contractual agreement for more than one case, action, or legal proceeding with a party, insurance company, or any other person or entity that has a financial interest in the case, action, or legal proceeding. This prohibition does not apply to a contract for the provision of court reporting services between a court reporter or court reporting services provider and an attorney or law firm that is counsel of record in one or more cases, actions, or legal proceedings;
    2. Give an economic or other advantage to a party or a party's attorney, representative, agent, insurer, or employee without offering the advantage to all parties or fail to offer comparable services, prices, or financial terms to all parties, except that different credit terms may be offered based on payment experience and creditworthiness;
    3. Offer or provide court reporting services if payment for those services is made contingent on the outcome of the legal proceeding, base the compensation for the court reporting services on the outcome of the legal proceeding, or otherwise give the court reporter or court reporting services provider a financial interest in the action;
    4. Enter into an agreement for court reporting services that restricts an attorney from using the court reporter or court reporting services provider of the attorney's choosing;
    5. Enter into an oral or written contractual agreement with a party, insurance company, or any other person or entity that has a financial interest in the case, action, or legal proceeding to include a court reporter or court reporting services provider on a list of preferred providers of court reporting services that is maintained by a person, business, entity, or firm that has entered into an oral or written contractual agreement for more than one case, action, or legal proceeding with an attorney, party, insurance company, third-party administrator, or any other person or entity that has a financial interest in the case, action, or legal proceeding. This prohibition does not apply to a contract between a court reporter or court reporting services provider and an attorney or law firm to include such court reporter or court reporting services provider on a list of preferred providers maintained by such attorney or law firm;
    6. Allow the format, content, or body of a certified transcript as submitted by the court reporter to be manipulated in a manner that increases the cost of the transcript; or
    7. Provide additional advocacy or litigation support services, including trial preparation assistance, deposition summaries, and nonpublished transcript databases.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection A, if authorized or required by law, ordinance, or rule, a governmental entity may obtain court reporting services on a long-term basis through competitive bidding.

    (2018, c. 783.)

§ 17.1-1003. Comparable treatment of parties.

  1. At any time during or following a legal proceeding, an attorney or a party is entitled to an itemized statement of the rates and charges for all services that have been or will be provided by a court reporter or court reporting services provider that is providing court reporting services to any party to the legal proceeding.
  2. Upon request, a court reporter or court reporting services provider shall provide to the parties, if known, information on prices, terms, and conditions of court reporting services in sufficient time prior to the commencement of the legal proceeding to allow the parties the opportunity to effectively negotiate for any changes necessary to ensure that comparable terms and conditions are made available to all parties.
  3. Upon request, a court reporter or court reporting services provider shall provide an itemized invoice of all rates and charges for court reporting services provided in the administrative body, court, or administrative tribunal in which the action upon which the legal proceeding is based is pending or scheduled to be heard.

    (2018, c. 783.)

§ 17.1-1004. Pro bono services.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the ability of a court reporter or court reporting services provider to provide pro bono services to persons or parties with limited means.

(2018, c. 783.)

§ 17.1-1005. Penalties.

  1. A person harmed by a violation of this chapter may file a motion alleging the violation with the administrative body, court, or administrative tribunal in which the action upon which the legal proceeding is based is pending or is scheduled to be heard. A person need not commence a separate action to allege a violation of this chapter.
  2. A complaint alleging a violation of this chapter may be filed by any person with knowledge of the offense or by the administrative body, court, or administrative tribunal on its own initiative. The court reporter or court reporting services provider alleged to have violated this chapter shall be given notice and a right to be heard on any such complaint, with the right of appeal or review as in other cases.
  3. A complaint and request for civil penalties and sanctions may be brought:
    1. By motion in the administrative body, court, or administrative tribunal in which the case is pending or scheduled to be heard; or
    2. In the general district court for the county or city in which the court reporting services were or are scheduled to be provided.
  4. A court reporter or court reporting services provider that willfully violates this chapter shall be subject to a civil penalty of $500 for the first offense, $750 for the second offense, and $1,000 for the third and any subsequent offense. Such penalty shall be collected by the clerk of the administrative body, court, or administrative tribunal in which such penalty was assessed. The amounts so collected shall be paid by the clerk to the state treasury and credited to the Legal Aid Services Fund within the Virginia State Bar fund. Such amounts credited to the Legal Aid Services Fund shall be disbursed by the Virginia State Bar by check from the State Treasurer upon a warrant of the comptroller to nonprofit legal aid programs organized under the auspices of the Virginia State Bar through the Legal Services Corporation of Virginia.

    In addition to any civil penalty assessed, the administrative body, court, or administrative tribunal that received the complaint pursuant to this section and determined that a person or entity violated this chapter may bar such person or entity from providing services in matters before such body, court, or tribunal.

  5. An administrative body, court, or administrative tribunal that finds a violation as a result of a complaint pursuant to this section shall submit a record of the nature and disposition of each complaint to the Virginia State Bar, which shall make such information publicly available on its website.

    (2018, c. 783.)