CASE NOTES

Relationship to other provisions. - Section 53.1-172 clearly refers to the probable cause hearing described in § 53.1-168 and is entirely consistent with the Interstate Commission for Supervision of Adult Offenders (ICAOS) rules affording offenders a probable cause hearing for probation violations that may result in revocation, ICAOS Rule 5.108. But § 53.1-172 does not transfer to another state the jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a Virginia probation violation and revoke the Virginia probation. Scott v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 142, 676 S.E.2d 343, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 223 (2009).

CASE NOTES

Jurisdiction of other state. - This section clearly refers to the probable cause hearing described in § 53.1-168 and is entirely consistent with the Interstate Commission for Supervision of Adult Offenders (ICAOS) rules affording offenders a probable cause hearing for probation violations that may result in revocation, ICAOS Rule 5.108. But § 53.1-172 does not transfer to another state the jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a Virginia probation violation and revoke the Virginia probation. Scott v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 142, 676 S.E.2d 343, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 223 (2009).

Virginia court was not required to give full faith and credit to an Ohio judgment under U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1 and thus could adjudicate a probation violation. Neither § 53.1-172 nor Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.141(B) granted the Ohio trial court jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of defendant's Virginia probation violation and revoke that probation. Scott v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 142, 676 S.E.2d 343, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 223 (2009).

ARTICLE I.

PURPOSE.

The Compacting States to this Interstate Compact recognize that each state is responsible for the supervision of adult offenders in the community who are authorized pursuant to the Bylaws and Rules of this compact to travel across state lines both to and from each Compacting State in such a manner as to track the location of offenders, transfer supervision authority in an orderly and efficient manner, and when necessary return offenders to the originating jurisdictions. The Compacting States also recognize that Congress, by enacting the Crime Control Act, 4 U.S.C. § 112 (1965), has authorized and encouraged compacts for cooperative efforts and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime.

It is the purpose of this Compact and the Interstate Commission created hereunder, through means of joint and cooperative action among the Compacting States: to provide the framework for the promotion of public safety and protect the rights of victims through the control and regulation of the interstate movement of offenders in the community; to provide for the effective tracking, supervision, and rehabilitation of these offenders by the sending and receiving states; and to equitably distribute the costs, benefits and obligations of the Compact among the Compacting States. In addition, this Compact will: create an Interstate Commission, which will establish uniform procedures to manage the movement between states of adults placed under community supervision and released to the community under the jurisdiction of courts, paroling authorities, corrections or other criminal justice agencies and which will promulgate rules to achieve the purpose of this Compact; ensure an opportunity for input and timely notice to victims and to jurisdictions where defined offenders are authorized to travel or to relocate across state lines; establish a system of uniform data collection, access to information on active cases by authorized criminal justice officials, and regular reporting of Compact activities to heads of State Councils, state executive, judicial, and legislative branches and criminal justice administrators; monitor compliance with rules governing interstate movement of offenders and initiate interventions to address and correct noncompliance; and coordinate training and education regarding regulations of interstate movement of offenders for officials involved in such activity.

The Compacting States recognize that there is no "right" of any offender to live in another state and that duly accredited officers of a sending state may at all times enter a receiving state and there apprehend and retake any offender under supervision subject to the provisions of this Compact and the Bylaws and Rules promulgated hereunder. It is the policy of the Compacting States that the activities conducted by the Interstate Commission created herein are the formation of public policies and are therefore public business.

ARTICLE II.

DEFINITIONS.

As used in this Compact, unless the context clearly requires a different construction:

1. "Adult" means both individuals legally classified as adults and juveniles treated as adults by court order, statute, or operation of law.
2. "Bylaws" means those bylaws established by the Interstate Commission for its governance, or for directing or controlling the Interstate Commission's actions or conduct.
3. "Compact Administrator" means the individual in each compacting state appointed pursuant to the terms of this Compact responsible for the administration and management of the state's supervision and transfer of offenders subject to the terms of this Compact, the rules adopted by the Interstate Commission and policies adopted by the State Council under this Compact.
4. "Compacting State" means any state that has enacted the enabling legislation for this Compact.
5. "Commissioner" means the voting representative of each Compacting State appointed pursuant to Article III of this Compact.
6. "Interstate Commission" means the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision established by this Compact.
7. "Member" means the Commissioner of a Compacting State or designee, who shall be a person officially connected with the Commissioner.
8. "Noncompacting State" means any State that has not enacted the enabling legislation for this Compact.
9. "Offender" means an adult placed under, or subject to, supervision as the result of the commission of a criminal offense and released to the community under the jurisdiction of courts, paroling authorities, corrections, or other criminal justice agencies.
10. "Person" means any individual, corporation, business enterprise, or other legal entity, either public or private.
11. "Rules" means acts of the Interstate Commission, duly promulgated pursuant to Article VIII of this Compact, substantially affecting interested parties in addition to the Interstate Commission, which shall have the force and effect of law in the Compacting States.
12. "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia and any other territorial possessions of the United States.
13. "State Council" means the resident members of the State Council for Interstate Adult Offender Supervision created by each State under Article III of this Compact.

ARTICLE III.

THE COMPACT COMMISSION.

The Compacting States hereby create the "Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision." The Interstate Commission shall be a body corporate and joint agency of the Compacting States. The Interstate Commission shall have all the responsibilities, powers and duties set forth herein, including the power to sue and be sued, and such additional powers as may be conferred upon it by subsequent action of the respective legislatures of the Compacting States in accordance with the terms of this Compact.

The Interstate Commission shall consist of Commissioners selected and appointed by resident members of a State Council for Interstate Adult Offender Supervision for each State. In addition to the Commissioners who are the voting representatives of each State, the Interstate Commission shall include individuals who are not Commissioners but who are members of interested organizations. Such noncommissioner members must include a member of the national organizations of governors, legislators, state chief justices, attorneys general and crime victims. All noncommissioner members of the Interstate Commission shall be ex officio (nonvoting) members. The Interstate Commission may provide in its Bylaws for such additional, ex officio, nonvoting members as it deems necessary.

Each Compacting State represented at any meeting of the Interstate Commission is entitled to one vote. A majority of the Compacting States shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, unless a larger quorum is required by the Bylaws of the Interstate Commission. The Interstate Commission shall meet at least once each calendar year. The chairperson may call additional meetings and, upon the request of 27 or more Compacting States, shall call additional meetings. Public notice shall be given of all meetings, and meetings shall be open to the public.

The Interstate Commission shall establish an Executive Committee, which shall include commission officers, members and others as shall be determined by the Bylaws. The Executive Committee shall have the power to act on behalf of the Interstate Commission during periods when the Interstate Commission is not in session, with the exception of rulemaking or amendment to the Compact or both. The Executive Committee oversees the day-to-day activities managed by the Executive Director and Interstate Commission staff; administers enforcement and compliance with the provisions of the Compact, its Bylaws and as directed by the Interstate Commission and performs other duties as directed by Commission or set forth in the Bylaws.

ARTICLE IV.

THE STATE COUNCIL.

Each member state shall create a State Council for Interstate Adult Offender Supervision, which shall be responsible for the appointment of the Commissioner who shall serve on the Interstate Commission from that state. Each State Council shall appoint as its Commissioner the Compact Administrator from that state to serve on the Interstate Commission in such capacity under or pursuant to applicable law of the member state. While each member state may determine the membership of its own State Council, its membership must include at least one representative from the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government, victims' groups and compact administrators. Each Compacting State retains the right to determine the qualifications of the Compact Administrator who shall be appointed by the State Council or by the Governor in consultation with the Legislature and the Judiciary. In addition to appointment of its Commissioner to the national Interstate Commission, each State Council shall exercise oversight and advocacy concerning its participation in Interstate Commission activities and other duties as may be determined by each member state including but not limited to, development of policy concerning operations and procedures of the Compact within that state.

ARTICLE V.

POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION.

The Interstate Commission shall have the following powers:

1. To adopt the seal and suitable Bylaws governing the management and operation of the Interstate Commission.
2. To promulgate Rules, which shall have the force and effect of statutory law and shall be binding in the Compacting States to the extent and in the manner provided in this Compact.
3. To oversee, supervise and coordinate the interstate movement of offenders subject to the terms of this Compact and any Bylaws adopted and Rules promulgated by the Compact Commission.
4. To enforce compliance with Compact provisions, Interstate Commission Rules, and Bylaws, using all necessary and proper means, including but not limited to, the use of judicial process.
5. To establish and maintain offices.
6. To purchase and maintain insurance and bonds.
7. To borrow, accept, or contract for services of personnel, including, but not limited to, members and their staffs.
8. To establish and appoint committees and hire staff that it deems necessary for the carrying out of its functions including, but not limited to, an executive committee as required by Article III, which shall have the power to act on behalf of the Interstate Commission in carrying out its powers and duties hereunder.
9. To elect or appoint such officers, attorneys, employees, agents, consultants, and to fix their compensation, define their duties and determine their qualifications; and to establish the Interstate Commission's personnel policies and programs relating to, among other things, conflicts of interest, rates of compensation, and qualifications of personnel.
10. To accept any and all donations and grants of money, equipment, supplies, materials, and services, and to receive, utilize, and dispose of same.
11. To lease, purchase, accept contributions or donations of, or otherwise to own, hold, improve or use any property, real, personal, or mixed.
12. To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, abandon, or otherwise dispose of any property, real, personal, or mixed.
13. To establish a budget and make expenditures and levy dues as provided in Article X of this Compact.
14. To sue and be sued.
15. To provide for dispute resolution among Compacting States.
16. To perform such functions as may be necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this Compact.
17. To report annually to the legislatures, governors, judiciary, and State Councils of the Compacting States concerning the activities of the Interstate Commission during the preceding year. Such reports shall also include any recommendations that may have been adopted by the Interstate Commission.
18. To coordinate education, training and public awareness regarding the interstate movement of offenders for officials involved in such activity.
19. To establish uniform standards for the reporting, collecting, and exchanging of data.

ARTICLE VI.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION.

Section A. Bylaws.

The Interstate Commission shall, by a majority of the members, within 12 months of the first Interstate Commission meeting, adopt Bylaws to govern its conduct as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the Compact, including, but not limited to:

1. Establishing the fiscal year of the Interstate Commission;
2. Establishing an executive committee and such other committees as may be necessary;
3. Providing reasonable standards and procedures: (i) for the establishment of committees and (ii) governing any general or specific delegation of any authority or function of the Interstate Commission;
4. Providing reasonable procedures for calling and conducting meetings of the Interstate Commission, and ensuring reasonable notice of each such meeting;
5. Establishing the titles and responsibilities of the officers of the Interstate Commission;
6. Providing reasonable standards and procedures for the establishment of the personnel policies and programs of the Interstate Commission. Notwithstanding any civil service or other similar laws of any Compacting State, the Bylaws shall exclusively govern the personnel policies and programs of the Interstate Commission;
7. Providing a mechanism for winding up the operations of the Interstate Commission and the equitable return of any surplus funds that may exist upon the termination of the Compact after the payment or reserving of all of its debts and obligations or both;
8. Providing transition rules for "start up" administration of the Compact; and
9. Establishing standards and procedures for compliance and technical assistance in carrying out the Compact.

   Section B. Officers and Staff.

   The Interstate Commission shall, by a majority of the Members, elect from among its Members a chairperson and a vice chairperson, each of whom shall have such authorities and duties as may be specified in the Bylaws. The chairperson or, in his absence or disability, the vice chairperson, shall preside at all meetings of the Interstate Commission. The officers so elected shall serve without compensation or remuneration from the Interstate Commission: provided that, subject to the availability of budgeted funds, the officers shall be reimbursed for any actual and necessary costs and expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties and responsibilities as officers of the Interstate Commission.

   The Interstate Commission shall, through its executive committee, appoint or retain an executive director for such period, upon such terms and conditions and for such compensation as the Interstate Commission may deem appropriate. The executive director shall serve as secretary to the Interstate Commission, and hire and supervise such other staff as may be authorized by the Interstate Commission, but shall not be a member.

   Section C. Corporate Records of the Interstate Commission.

   The Interstate Commission shall maintain its corporate books and records in accordance with the Bylaws.

   Section D. Qualified Immunity, Defense and Indemnification.

   The Members, officers, executive director and employees of the Interstate Commission shall be immune from suit and liability, either personally or in their official capacity, for any claim for damage to or loss of property or personal injury or other civil liability caused or arising out of any actual or alleged act, error or omission that occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties or responsibilities; provided, that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to protect any such person from suit and/or liability for any damage, loss, injury or liability caused by the intentional or willful and wanton misconduct of any such person. The Interstate Commission shall defend the Commissioner of a Compacting State, or his representatives or employees, or the Interstate Commission's representatives or employees, in any civil action seeking to impose liability, arising out of any actual or alleged act, error or omission that occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties or responsibilities, or that the defendant had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties or responsibilities; provided, that the actual or alleged act, error or omission did not result from intentional wrongdoing on the part of such person.

   The Interstate Commission shall indemnify and hold the Commissioner of a Compacting State, the appointed designee or employees, or the Interstate Commission's representatives or employees, harmless in the amount of any settlement or judgment obtained against such persons arising out of any actual or alleged act, error or omission that occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties or responsibilities, or that such persons had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties or responsibilities; provided, that the actual or alleged act, error or omission did not result from gross negligence or intentional wrongdoing on the part of such person.

ARTICLE VII. ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION.

The Interstate Commission shall meet and take such actions as are consistent with the provisions of this Compact. Except as otherwise provided in this Compact and unless a greater percentage is required by the Bylaws, in order to constitute an act of the Interstate Commission, such act shall have been taken at a meeting of the Interstate Commission and shall have received an affirmative vote of a majority of the Members present.

Each Member of the Interstate Commission shall have the right and power to cast a vote to which that Compacting State is entitled and to participate in the business and affairs of the Interstate Commission. A Member shall vote in person on behalf of the State and shall not delegate a vote to another member State. However, a State Council shall appoint another authorized representative, in the absence of the Commissioner from that State, to case a vote on behalf of the member State at a specified meeting. The Bylaws may provide for Members' participation in meetings by telephone or other means of telecommunication or electronic communication. Any voting conducted by telephone, or other means of telecommunication or electronic communication shall be subject to the same quorum requirements of meetings where Members are present in person.

The Interstate Commission shall meet at least once during each calendar year. The chairperson of the Interstate Commission may call additional meetings at any time and, upon the request of a majority of the Members, shall call additional meetings.

The Interstate Commission's Bylaws shall establish conditions and procedures under which the Interstate Commission shall make its information and official records available to the public for inspection or copying. The Interstate Commission may exempt from disclosure any information or official records to the extent they would adversely affect personal privacy rights or proprietary interests. In promulgating such Rules, the Interstate Commission may make available to law enforcement agencies records and information otherwise exempt from disclosure, and may enter into agreements with law-enforcement agencies to receive or exchange information or records subject to nondisclosure and confidentiality provisions.

Public notice shall be given of all meetings, and all meetings shall be open to the public, except as set forth in the Rules or as otherwise provided in the Compact. The Interstate Commission shall promulgate Rules consistent with the principles contained in the "Government in Sunshine Act," 5 U.S.C. § 552b, as may be amended. The Interstate Commission and any of its committees may close a meeting to the public where it determines by two-thirds vote that an open meeting would be likely to:

1. Relate solely to the Interstate Commission's internal personnel practices and procedures;
2. Disclose matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
3. Disclose trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is privileged or confidential;
4. Involve accusing any person of a crime, or formally censuring any person;
5. Disclose information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
6. Disclose investigatory records compiled for law-enforcement purposes;
7. Disclose information contained in or related to examination, operating or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of or for the use of, the Interstate Commission with respect to a regulated entity for the purpose of regulation or supervision of such entity;
8. Disclose information, the premature disclosure of which would significantly endanger the life of a person or the stability of a regulated entity; and
9. Specifically relate to the Interstate Commission's issuance of a subpoena, or its participation in a civil action or proceeding.

   For every meeting closed pursuant to this provision, the Interstate Commission's chief legal officer shall publicly certify that, in his opinion, the meeting may be closed to the public, and shall reference each relevant exemptive provision. The Interstate Commission shall keep minutes that shall fully and clearly describe all matters discussed in any meeting and shall provide a full and accurate summary of any actions taken, and the reasons therefor, including a description of each of the views expressed on any item and the record of any roll call vote (reflected in the vote of each Member on the question). All documents considered in connection with any action shall be identified in such minutes.

   The Interstate Commission shall collect standardized data concerning the interstate movement of offenders as directed through its Bylaws and Rules, which shall specify the data to be collected, the means of collection and data exchange and reporting requirements.

ARTICLE VIII.

RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION.

The Interstate Commission shall promulgate Rules in order to effectively and efficiently achieve the purposes of the Compact including transition rules governing administration of the Compact during the period in which it is being considered and enacted by the States.

Rulemaking shall occur pursuant to the criteria set forth in this article and the Bylaws and Rules adopted pursuant thereto. Such rulemaking shall substantially conform to the principles of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 551 et seq., and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.S. app. 2, § 1 et seq., as may be amended (hereinafter APA). All Rules and amendments shall become binding as of the date specified in each Rule or amendment.

If a majority of the legislatures of the Compacting States rejects a Rule, by enactment of a statute or resolution in the same manner used to adopt the Compact, then such Rule shall have no further force and effect in any Compacting State.

When promulgating a Rule, the Interstate Commission shall:

1. Publish the proposed Rule stating with particularity the text of the Rule that is proposed and the reason for the proposed Rule;
2. Allow persons to submit written data, facts, opinions and arguments, which information shall be publicly available;
3. Provide an opportunity for an informal hearing; and
4. Promulgate a final Rule and its effective date, if appropriate, based on the rulemaking record.

   Not later than 60 days after a Rule is promulgated, any interested person may file a petition in the United States District Court of the District of Columbia or in the Federal District Court where the Interstate Commission's principal office is located for judicial review of such Rule. If the court finds that the Interstate Commission's action is not supported by substantial evidence, as defined in the APA, in the rulemaking record, the court shall hold the Rule unlawful and set it aside.

   Subjects to be addressed within 12 months after the first meeting must at a minimum include:

   1. Notice to victims and opportunity to be heard;

   2. Offender registration and compliance;

   3. Violations/returns;

   4. Transfer procedures and forms;

5. Eligibility for transfer;
6. Collection of restitution and fees from offenders;
7. Data collection and reporting;
8. The level of supervision to be provided by the receiving state;
9. Transition rules governing the operation of the Compact and the Interstate Commission during all or part of the period between the effective date of the Compact and the date on which the last eligible State adopts the Compact; and
10. Mediation, arbitration and dispute resolution.

    The existing rules governing the operation of the previous compact superceded by this Act shall be null and void 12 months after the first meeting of the Interstate Commission created hereunder.

    Upon determination by the Interstate Commission that an emergency exists, it may promulgate an emergency rule which shall become effective immediately upon adoption, provided that the usual rulemaking procedures provided hereunder shall be retroactively applied to said rule as soon as reasonably possible, in no event later than 90 days after the effective date of the rule.

ARTICLE IX.

OVERSIGHT, ENFORCEMENT, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION.

Section A. Oversight.

The Interstate Commission shall oversee the interstate movement of adult offenders in the Compacting States and shall monitor such activities being administered in Noncompacting States that may significantly affect Compacting States.

The courts and executive agencies in each Compacting State shall enforce this Compact and shall take all actions necessary and appropriate to effectuate the Compact's purposes and intent. In any judicial or administrative proceeding in a Compacting State pertaining to the subject matter of this Compact, which may affect the powers, responsibilities or actions of the Interstate Commission, the Interstate Commission shall be entitled to receive all service of process in any such proceeding, and shall have standing to intervene in the proceeding for all purposes.

Section B. Dispute Resolution.

The Compacting States shall report to the Interstate Commission on issues or activities of concern to them, and cooperate with and support the Interstate Commission in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities.

The Interstate Commission shall attempt to resolve any disputes or other issues that are subject to the Compact and may arise among Compacting States and Noncompacting States.

The Interstate Commission shall enact a Bylaw or promulgate a Rule providing for both mediation and binding dispute resolution for disputes among the Compacting States.

Section C. Enforcement.

The Interstate Commission, in the reasonable exercise of its discretion, shall enforce the provisions of this Compact using any or all means set forth in Article XII, Section B, of this Compact.

ARTICLE X.

FINANCE.

The Interstate Commission shall pay or provide for the payment of the reasonable expenses of its establishment, organization and ongoing activities.

The Interstate Commission shall levy on and collect an annual assessment from each Compacting State to cover the cost of the internal operations and activities of the Interstate Commission and its staff, which must be in a total amount sufficient to cover the Interstate Commission's annual budget as approved each year. The aggregate annual assessment amount shall be allocated based upon a formula to be determined by the Interstate Commission, taking into consideration the population of the State and the volume of interstate movement of offenders in each Compacting State and shall promulgate a Rule binding upon all Compacting States, which governs said assessment.

The Interstate Commission shall not incur any obligations of any kind prior to securing the funds adequate to meet the same; nor shall the Interstate Commission pledge the credit of any of the Compacting States, except by and with the authority of the Compacting State.

The Interstate Commission shall keep accurate accounts of all receipts and disbursements. The receipts and disbursements of the Interstate Commission shall be subject to the audit and accounting procedures established under its Bylaws. However, all receipts and disbursements of funds handled by the Interstate Commission shall be audited yearly by a certified or licensed public accountant and the report of the audit shall be included in and become part of the annual report of the Interstate Commission.

ARTICLE XI.

COMPACTING STATES, EFFECTIVE DATE AND AMENDMENT.

Any State, as defined in Article II of this Compact, is eligible to become a Compacting State. The Compact shall become effective and binding upon legislative enactment of the Compact into law by no less than 35 of the States. The initial effective date shall be the later of July 1, 2002, or upon enactment into law by the 35th State. Thereafter it shall become effective and binding, as to any other Compacting State, upon enactment of the Compact into law by that State. The governors of nonmember States or their designees will be invited to participate in Interstate Commission activities on a nonvoting basis prior to adoption of the Compact by all States and territories of the United States.

Amendments to the Compact may be proposed by the Interstate Commission for enactment by the Compacting States. No amendment shall become effective and binding upon the Interstate Commission and the Compacting States unless and until it is enacted into law by unanimous consent of the Compacting States.

ARTICLE XII.

WITHDRAWAL, DEFAULT, TERMINATION, AND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT.

Section A. Withdrawal.

Once effective, the Compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each and every Compacting State; provided, that a Compacting State may withdraw from the Compact (hereinafter Withdrawing State) by enacting a statute specifically repealing the statute that enacted the Compact into law.

The effective date of withdrawal is the effective date of the repeal.

The Withdrawing State shall immediately notify the chairperson of the Interstate Commission in writing upon the introduction of legislation repealing this Compact in the Withdrawing State. The Interstate Commission shall notify the other Compacting States of the Withdrawing State's intent to withdraw within 60 days of its receipt thereof.

The Withdrawing State is responsible for all assessments, obligations and liabilities incurred through the effective date of withdrawal, including any obligations, the performance of which extend beyond the effective date of withdrawal.

Reinstatement following withdrawal of any Compacting State shall occur upon the Withdrawing State reenacting the Compact or upon such later date as determined by the Interstate Commission.

Section B. Default.

If the Interstate Commission determines that any Compacting State has at any time defaulted (hereinafter Defaulting State) in the performance of any of its obligations or responsibilities under this Compact, the Bylaws or any duly promulgated Rules the Interstate Commission may impose any or all of the following penalties:

1. Fines, fees and costs in such amounts as are deemed to be reasonable as fixed by the Interstate Commission;
2. Remedial training and technical assistance as directed by the Interstate Commission;
3. Suspension and termination of membership in the Compact. Suspension shall be imposed only after all other reasonable means of securing compliance under the Bylaws and Rules have been exhausted. Immediate notice of suspension shall be given by the Interstate Commission to the Governor, the Chief Justice or Chief Judicial Officer of the state, the majority and minority leaders of the defaulting state's legislature, and the State Council.

   The grounds for default include, but are not limited to, failure of a Compacting State to perform such obligations or responsibilities imposed upon it by this Compact, Interstate Commission Bylaws, or duly promulgated Rules. The Interstate Commission shall immediately notify the Defaulting State in writing of the penalty imposed by the Interstate Commission on the Defaulting State pending a cure of the default. The Interstate Commission shall stipulate the conditions and the time period within which the Defaulting State must cure its default. If the Defaulting State fails to cure the default within the time period specified by the Interstate Commission, in addition to any other penalties imposed herein, the Defaulting State may be terminated from the Compact upon an affirmative vote of majority of the Compacting States and all rights, privileges and benefits conferred by this Compact shall be terminated from the effective date of suspension. Within 60 days of the effective date of termination of a Defaulting State, the Interstate Commission shall notify the Governor, the Chief Justice or Chief Judicial Officer and the majority and minority leaders of the Defaulting State's legislature and the State Council of such termination.

   The Defaulting State is responsible for all assessments, obligations and liabilities incurred through the effective date of termination including any obligations, the performance of which extends beyond the effective date of termination.

   The Interstate Commission shall not bear any costs relating to the Defaulting State unless otherwise mutually agreed upon between the Interstate Commission and the Defaulting State.

   Reinstatement following termination of any Compacting State requires both a reenactment of the Compact by the Defaulting State and the approval of the Interstate Commission pursuant to the Rules.

   Section C. Judicial Enforcement.

   The Interstate Commission may, by majority vote of the Members, initiate legal action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, at the discretion of the Interstate Commission, in the Federal District where the Interstate Commission has its offices to enforce compliance with the provision of the Compact, its duly promulgated Rules and Bylaws, against any Compacting State in default. In the event judicial enforcement is necessary the prevailing party shall be awarded all costs of such litigation including reasonable attorneys' fees.

   Section D. Dissolution of Compact.

   The Compact dissolves effective upon the date of the withdrawal or default of the Compacting State that reduces membership in the Compact to one Compacting State. Upon the dissolution of this Compact, the Compact becomes null and void and shall be of no further force or effect, and the business and affairs of the Interstate Commission shall be wound up and any surplus funds shall be distributed in accordance with the Bylaws.

ARTICLE XIII.

SEVERABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION.

The provisions of this Compact shall be severable, and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision is deemed unenforceable, the remaining provisions of the Compact shall be enforceable.

The provisions of this Compact shall be liberally constructed to effectuate its purposes.

ARTICLE XIV.

BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS.

Section A. Other Laws.

Nothing herein prevents the enforcement of any other law of a Compacting State that is not inconsistent with this Compact.

All Compacting States' laws conflicting with this Compact are superseded to the extent of the conflict.

Section B. Binding Effect of the Compact.

All lawful actions of the Interstate Commission, including all Rules and Bylaws promulgated by the Interstate Commission, are binding upon the Compacting States.

All agreements between the Interstate Commission and the Compacting States are binding in accordance with their terms.

Upon the request of the party to a conflict over meaning or interpretation of Interstate Commission actions, and upon a majority vote of the Compacting States, the Interstate Commission may issue advisory opinions regarding such meaning or interpretation.

In the event any provision of this Compact exceeds the constitutional limits imposed on the legislature of any Compacting State, the obligations, duties, powers or jurisdiction sought to be conferred by such provision upon the Interstate Commission shall be ineffective and such obligations, duties, powers or jurisdiction shall remain in the Compacting State and shall be exercised by the agency thereof to which such obligations, duties, powers or jurisdiction are delegated by law in effect at the time this Compact becomes effective.

(2004, c. 407.)

Uniform law cross references. - For other signatory state provisions, see:

Alabama: Al. St. § 15-22-1.1.

Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 33.36.110.

Arizona: A.R.S. § 31-467 et seq.

Arkansas: A.C.A. § 12-51-101 et seq.

California: California Pen C § 11180.

Colorado: C.R.S. § 24-60-2801 et seq.

Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-133 et seq.

Delaware: 11 Del. C. § 4358 et seq.

District of Columbia: D.C. Stat. § 24-133.

Florida: Fla. Stat. § 949.07.

Georgia: O.C.G.A. § 42-9-80 et seq.

Hawaii: H.R.S. § 353B-1 et seq.

Idaho: Idaho Code § 20-301 et seq.

Illinois: § 45 I.L.C.S. 170/1 et seq.

Indiana: Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 11-13-4.5-1 et seq.

Iowa: Iowa Code § 907B.1 et seq.

Kansas: K.S.A. § 22-4110 et seq.

Kentucky: K.R.S. § 439.561 et seq.

Louisiana: La. R.S. § 15:574.31 et seq.

Maine: 34-A M.R.S. § 9871 et seq.

Maryland: Md. CORRECTIONAL SERVICES Code Ann. § 6-201 et seq.

Massachusetts: ALM GL ch. 127, § 151A et seq.

Michigan: M.C.L.S. § 3.1011 et seq.

Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 243.1605 et seq.

Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-81 et seq.

Missouri: § 589.500 et seq. R.S. Mo.

Montana: M.C.A. § 46-23-1101 et seq.

Nebraska: R.R.S. Neb. § 29-2639 et seq.

Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 213.215 et seq.

New Hampshire: R.S.A. § 651-A:26 et seq.

New Jersey: N.J. Stat. § 2A:168-26 et seq.

New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-20 et seq.

New York: NY CLS Exec § 259-mm.

North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-65.4 et seq.

North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 12-65-01 et seq.

Ohio: ORC Ann. § 5149.21 et seq.

Oklahoma: 22 Okl. St. § 1091 et seq.

Oregon: O.R.S. § 144.600 et seq.

Pennsylvania: 61 P.S. § 324 et seq.

Puerto Rico: 4 L.P.R.A. § 1433 et seq.

Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 13-9.1-1 et seq.

South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-1100 et seq.

South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 24-16A-1 et seq.

Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-401 et seq.

Texas: Tex. Gov't Code § 510.001 et seq.

Utah: Utah Code Ann. § 77-28c-101 et seq.

Vermont: 28 V.S.A. § 1351 et seq.

Virgin Islands: 5 V.I.C. § 4631 et seq.

Washington: Rev. Code Wash. § 9.94A.745 et seq.

West Virginia: W. Va. Code § 28-7-1 et seq.

Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 304.16.

Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-422 et seq.

Editor's note. - Acts 2004, c. 407, cl. 2, provides: "That §§ 53.1-166 and 53.1-167 of the Code of Virginia shall govern the covered interactions between the Commonwealth and those jurisdictions who have not ratified the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Adult Offenders as set out in § 53.1-176.2 ."

Acts 2004, c. 407, cl. 3, provides: "That the provisions of this act shall become effective on the later of July 1, 2004, or upon enactment of the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Adult Offenders, in substantially the form set out in § 53.1-176.2 of this act, by no less than 35 states, as provided in § 53.1-176.2 . In making a determination that this act has come into effect, the Governor may rely on the written representation of the National Institute of Corrections of the United States Department of Justice." As of July 1, 2004, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Adult Offenders had been enacted by 35 states.

ARTICLE I.

The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trials of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.

As used in this agreement:

ARTICLE II.

1. "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of America; a territory or possession of the United States; the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
2. "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final disposition pursuant to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
3. "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article IV hereof.

ARTICLE III.

1. Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officers' jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
2. The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
3. The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on which the detainer is based.
4. Any request or final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, commissioner of corrections or other officials having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
5. Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
6. Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the request.

ARTICLE IV.

1. The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of thirty days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.
2. Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
3. In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
4. Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
5. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.

ARTICLE V.

1. In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place of trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the custodian.
2. The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
   1. Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
   2. A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
3. If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.
4. The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.
5. At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
6. During the continuance or temporary custody or while the prisoner is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
7. For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law.
8. From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.

ARTICLE VI.

1. In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.
2. No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.

ARTICLE VII.

Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.

ARTICLE VIII.

This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom by enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.

ARTICLE IX.

This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

(Code 1950, § 53-304.1; 1970, c. 407; 1982, c. 636.)

Compact cross references. - As to provisions of other member states, see:

Alabama: Code of Ala. § 15-9-81 et seq.

Alaska: Alaska Stat. §§ 33.35.010 - 33.35.040.

Arizona: A.R.S. §§ 31-481, 31-482.

Arkansas: A.C.A. §§ 16-95-101 - 16-95-107.

California: Cal Pen Code §§ 1389 - 1389.8.

Colorado: C.R.S. 24-60-501 - 24-60-507.

Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-186 - 54-192.

Delaware: 11 Del. C. §§ 2540 - 2550.

District of Columbia: D.C. Code § 24-801 et seq.

Florida: Fla. Stat. §§ 941.45 - 941.50.

Georgia: O.C.G.A. §§ 42-6-20 - 42-6-25.

Hawaii: HRS §§ 834-1 - 834-6.

Idaho: Idaho Code §§ 19-5001 - 19-5008.

Illinois: 730 ILCS 5/3-8-9.

Indiana: Burns Ind. Code Ann. §§ 35-33-10-4, 35-33-10-5.

Iowa: Iowa Code §§ 821.1 - 821.8.

Kansas: K.S.A. §§ 22-4401 - 22-4408.

Kentucky: KRS §§ 440.450, 440.460 - 440.510.

Maine: 34-A M.R.S. §§ 9632, 9634.

Maryland: Md. Correctional Services Code Ann. §§ 8-401 - 8-417.

Massachusetts: A.L.M. Spec L Ch. S115, § 1 et seq.

Michigan: MCLS §§ 780.601 - 780.608.

Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 629.294.

Missouri: §§ 217.490 - 217.520 R.S.Mo.

Montana: Mont. Code Anno., §§ 46-31-101, 46-31-102, 46-31-201 - 46-31-204.

Nebraska: R.R.S. Neb. §§ 29-759 - 29-765.

Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 178.620 - 178.640.

New Hampshire: 59 RSA 606-A:1 - 606-A:6.

New Jersey: N.J. Stat. §§ 2A:159A-1 - 2A:159A-15.

New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-5-12 - 31-5-16.

New York: NY CLS CPL §§ 580.10 - 580.30.

North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-761 - 15A-768.

North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code, § 29-34-01 et seq.

Ohio: ORC Ann. 2963.30 - 2963.35.

Oklahoma: 22 Okl. St. §§ 1345 - 1349.

Oregon: ORS §§ 135.775 - 135.793.

Pennsylvania: 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9101 - 9108.

Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 13-13-1 - 13-13-6.

South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-11-10 - 17-11-80.

South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws §§ 23-24A-1 - 23-24A-34.

Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-31-101 - 40-31-107.

Texas: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 51.14.

Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-29-5 - 77-29-11.

Vermont: 28 V.S.A. §§ 1501 - 1509, 1531 - 1537.

Washington: Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) §§ 9.100.010 - 9.100.080.

West Virginia: W. Va. Code §§ 62-14-1 - 62-14-7.

Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. §§ 976.05, 976.06.

Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-15-101 - 7-15-104.

Michie's Jurisprudence. - For related discussion, see 14A M.J. Pardon, Probation and Parole, § 5; 14B M.J. Prisons and Prisoners, § 2.

Editor's note. - Several of the cases annotated below were decided under prior law.

CASE NOTES

Constitutional and statutory provisions as to extradition. - Matters of extradition are constitutionally controlled by Article IV, section 2, clause 2, of the United States Constitution. They are statutorily controlled by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act ( § 19.2-85 et seq.) and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (this chapter). Arebaugh v. Dalton, 600 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Va. 1985).

Defendant's right to speedy trial was not violated where the continuances that delayed his trial were attributable to, or acquiesced in, by the defense. Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 494 S.E.2d 859 (1998).

Where defendant was notified of her rights pursuant to this section and provided the documentation necessary to trigger the benefits of the act, but did nothing to comply for nine months, after which time both Michigan and the Commonwealth fully complied with the required mandates, defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. Miller v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 625, 513 S.E.2d 896 (1999).

Trial court erred, as a matter of law, by holding that the accused's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated because the reason for the delay was legitimate; while at the time of his indictment accused was physically incarcerated in the city jail, he was legally in federal custody awaiting trial on multiple federal drug charges. Thus, under § 53.1-210 . Commonwealth had no ability to bring the accused to trial on his indictments. Commonwealth v. Venable,, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 471 (Oct. 20, 2009).

Governor performs judicial function. - When the governor of an asylum state acts on an extradition request, he performs a judicial function. Accordingly, he would be entitled to absolute immunity in carrying out this function. Arebaugh v. Dalton, 600 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Va. 1985).

The only function of an attorney general, in extradition proceedings, is to assist the governor in determining whether extradition ought to be granted. In this sense, he is entitled to absolute immunity because of the quasi-judicial function he is performing. If it be deemed that his duty in this connection be that of an advocate, he is entitled to the absolute immunity accorded public prosecutors. Arebaugh v. Dalton, 600 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Va. 1985).

Governor of asylum state to make factual findings and legal conclusions. - While the Constitution mandates that a fugitive in one state "shall" be returned to the demanding state, the governor of the asylum state must make factual findings and legal conclusions following specific inquiries prior to granting extradition. First, he must determine whether the accused has been charged with a crime under the laws of the demanding state, and second, whether the accused was within the demanding state at the time of the offense. The former is generally a question of law but it may be a question of fact. The latter is generally a question of fact. The governor's factual determination may not be set aside unless it appears conclusively that the accused could not be a fugitive. Arebaugh v. Dalton, 600 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Va. 1985).

This section provides a means for an accused detained in a sister state to demand a prompt trial in exchange for his voluntary return to the accusatory state; however, he may not exercise his right to demand that the trial be held within the limitation contained in this section unless his cause has progressed through the pretrial steps to a point where it is ready for disposition immediately upon his return. Locklear v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 659, 376 S.E.2d 793 (1989).

The purpose of this congressionally sanctioned interstate compact is to encourage expeditious disposition of outstanding criminal charges where one jurisdiction has lodged a detainer with prison authorities of another jurisdiction where the subject of the outstanding charges is incarcerated. Valentine v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 334, 443 S.E.2d 445 (1994).

The agreement is designed to protect prisoners and prisoner rehabilitation programs in two ways. First, it seeks to eliminate the uncertainty pending charges may create in the prisoner's mind by requiring prompt disposition of those charges. Second, the agreement attempts to ensure that interruptions of the prisoner's incarceration are cut to a minimum, so that the prisoner's continuous physical presence in the sending jurisdiction's rehabilitative programs will be guaranteed. Stewart v. Bailey, 7 F.3d 384 (4th Cir. 1993).

No further judicial inquiry as to probable cause may be had in asylum state after governor acts. - Once the governor of the asylum state has acted on a requisition for extradition based on the demanding state's judicial determination that probable cause existed, no further judicial inquiry may be had on that issue in the asylum state. Arebaugh v. Dalton, 600 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Va. 1985).

"Detainer" contemplated by this section is notification filed with institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction. Miller v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 625, 513 S.E.2d 896 (1999).

Immunity from damages where statutory duty breached. - If the governor and attorney general, in acting on an extradition request, breached some statutory duty or are derelict in their statutory duties, they are, nevertheless, entitled to absolute immunity from damages. Arebaugh v. Dalton, 600 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Va. 1985).

Notice required under Article III. - Language of § 18.2-200.1 plainly means that a request for a return of money advanced on a construction project is sufficient notice if sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, without proof of actual receipt, unlike the notices required by the bad check law, former § 6.1-117, now codified at § 18.2-183 , Virginia Tort Claims Act, § 8.01-195.1 et seq., the Virginia Habitual Offenders Act, former § 46.2-355, repealed in 1999, and the Virginia Interstate Agreement on Detainers, art. III(b), found in § 53.1-210 . Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593 , 587 S.E.2d 561, 2003 Va. LEXIS 96 (2003), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 125 S. Ct. 164, 160 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2004).

Substantial compliance with Article III. - Notice to defendant, who was incarcerated in Connecticut, that a detainer had been lodged against him constituted substantial compliance with Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Any failure or delay by Connecticut in notifying defendant of his right to request final disposition of the charges, after being advised of the detainer lodged against him, did not constitute a substantial violation of Article III. Dismissal is not a required sanction for such a notification omission under Article III. Giardino v. Commonwealth, No. 0509-85 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 17, 1987).

Prisoner must strictly comply with procedure established in Article III for requesting final disposition of an untried indictment. Yiaadey v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 535, 513 S.E.2d 446 (1999).

Appellant's failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Article III was fatal to his claim. Yiaadey v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 535, 513 S.E.2d 446 (1999).

Because defendant failed to comply with the requirements of § 53.1-210 , Art. III, and because the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of burglary and grand larceny of a supermarket, defendant was properly convicted of violating §§ 18.2-91 and 18.2-95 . Peyton v. Commonwealth,, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 216 (May 12, 2009).

Purposes of Article IV (e) and double jeopardy clause compared. - The values protected by the double jeopardy clause are different from those protected by the agreement. The guarantee against double jeopardy is directed at the evil of a second trial in and of itself. In contrast, the purpose of the Article IV (e) restriction on prosecutions is to insure prompt disposition of detainers. Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123, 101 S. Ct. 939, 67 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1981).

Where dismissal of indictment required under Article IV (e). - Article IV(e) of the agreement requires the dismissal of a federal indictment against a prisoner who is obtained from state custody while under a federal detainer if he is returned to state custody without first being tried on the indictment underlying the detainer. United States v. Boyce, 518 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982).

Article IV (e) of the agreement was not violated where a Virginia prisoner, who had been indicted by a federal grand jury, was taken from statute custody for arraignment in federal court and was returned to state custody prior to the lodging of a federal detainer against him with Virginia authorities. United States v. Boyce, 518 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982).

Non-retroactive application of federal case involving invocation of Article IV. - The decision in United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S. Ct. 1834, 56 L. Ed. 2d 329 (1979), which enables a prisoner subject to a detainer whose custody has been obtained by a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to invoke Article IV of the agreement, did not apply retroactively to a state conviction that became final prior to the date when the United States Supreme Court case became final. Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123, 101 S. Ct. 939, 67 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1981).

The provisions of Article IV were inapplicable where the asylum state did not offer to deliver temporary custody of defendant to Virginia, and Virginia did not refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of him. Giardino v. Commonwealth, No. 0509-85 (Ct. of Appeals Feb. 17, 1987).

Exhaustion of state remedies. - Where petitioner for a federal writ of habeas corpus sought dismissal of an escape charge under Articles III and V (c) of the agreement on the ground that the prosecutors and the state circuit court failed to comply with his request for disposition of the charge within 180 days, but petitioner had not received a ruling from the circuit court on his motion to dismiss, the federal court could not consider the petition at that time, since the petitioner had available state remedies which must first be pursued. Brown v. Keohane, 475 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1979).

Writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. - A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, issued by the courts of a jurisdiction party to the agreement on detainers to state authorities in another party jurisdiction, requesting custody of a state prisoner for trial on criminal charges, is not a "detainer" within the meaning of the Agreement on Detainers. Stewart v. Bailey, 7 F.3d 384 (4th Cir. 1993).

Jurisdictions party to the Agreement on Detainers do not circumvent the agreement by issuing, and honoring, the writ ad prosequendum. Stewart v. Bailey, 7 F.3d 384 (4th Cir. 1993).

The use of the word "complaints" in this section was intended to apply only to instruments such as indictments, informations or complaints upon which the detainee could be tried immediately upon his return, and this definition does not include a felony warrant of arrest as was used to detain defendant. Locklear v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 659, 376 S.E.2d 793 (1989).

Amended indictment. - Although an original indictment was amended after defendant appeared pursuant to a detainer, the actual elements remained essentially the same; therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss. Drew v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 224, 571 S.E.2d 928, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 679 (2002).

Parole revocation hearings. - Under the law of this state, parole revocation hearings do not fit under the statutory language of "indictment, information or complaint" in this section. Wellons v. Department of Cors., 474 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Va. 1979), appeal dismissed, 620 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1980).

For a prisoner to be entitled to a dismissal with prejudice of an indictment pending in the receiving state, he or she must prove not only that notice of the request for disposition has been received but also that the request was accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody, together with the information required by this section. Delgado v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 50, 428 S.E.2d 27 (1993).

The Virginia detainer lodged against defendant while he was incarcerated in North Carolina did comport with the requirements of this section where the parties agreed on the procedural aspects of what transpired in the district court and their agreement was consistent with the trial court's handling of this matter. Valentine v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 334, 443 S.E.2d 445 (1994).

Compliance with procedural requirements is only way Commonwealth can be placed on notice. - Compliance with the procedural requirements is the only way the Commonwealth can be placed on notice that they must bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days. Eckard v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 619, 460 S.E.2d 242 (1995).

Allowing substantial circumvention of procedures does not serve IAD's purposes. - Although Article IX states that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) "shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes," allowing substantial circumvention of IAD procedures does not serve the IAD's purposes, which the court views as the orderly and expeditious disposition of charges pending in foreign jurisdictions and the establishment of cooperative procedures to facilitate such disposition. Eckard v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 619, 460 S.E.2d 242 (1995).

The 180-day period of Article III does not commence unless the appropriate official in the sending state sends the prisoner's request to the Commonwealth, together with the appropriate certificate. Yiaadey v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 535, 513 S.E.2d 446 (1999).

The 180-day period does not commence without warden's certificate. - Without the warden's certificate, the 180-day period under Article III(a) does not commence. Eckard v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 619, 460 S.E.2d 242 (1995).

Prisoner's request must be sent by warden or other prison officials. - Prisoner's request must be sent to the receiving state's authorities by the warden, or other appropriate prison officials, in the sending state to whom the prisoner has first communicated his request. Eckard v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 619, 460 S.E.2d 242 (1995).

Prisoner bears burden of establishing that required notice given. - While appellant maintained that he should not be punished for the prison official's dereliction of duty, nothing in the record supported his contention that he sent his notice of request for final disposition to the prison official. Without evidence that he did so, the court cannot presume that appellant did in fact request the certificate from the warden. When alleging a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), the prisoner bears the burden of establishing that the required notice was given. Eckard v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 619, 460 S.E.2d 242 (1995).

Delay did not violate defendant's right to speedy trial. - Five and one-half year delay between the issuance of an arrest warrant and the date of defendant's trial did not violate his right to a speedy trial, where the Commonwealth's negligence in utilizing the procedures of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers was balanced by defendant's actions in resisting extradition from Maryland. Beachem v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 124, 390 S.E.2d 517 (1990).

Convictions established parole violations. - Where New York parole violator warrant was based on defendant's commission of the crime that resulted in his conviction and incarceration in Virginia, the Virginia convictions conclusively establish the parole violation. Bolden v. Murray, 841 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. Va. 1994).

Credit for time served incident to trial under Interstate Agreement on Detainers. - Inmate was transferred to Virginia for the sole purpose of being tried on his pending Virginia charges and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-210 and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:159A-1 et seq., strictly limited Virginia's "temporary custody" in such situations. As such, the inmate was not in Virginia custody "awaiting trial," but was in Virginia custody to stand trial pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers as a New Jersey prisoner. Carroll v. Johnson, 278 Va. 683 , 685 S.E.2d 647, 2009 Va. LEXIS 106 (2009).

Applied in Rease v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 289 , 316 S.E.2d 148 (1984); Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1984); Griffin v. Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Va. 1985); Williamson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 655, 414 S.E.2d 609 (1992); Price v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 785, 485 S.E.2d 655 (1997); Gearheart v. Wallace, 964 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Va. 1997).

CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

Defendant's right to speedy trial was not violated. - Interstate Agreement on Detainers did not apply to detainer based on a probation violation, and, thus, the trial court was not required to dispose of inmate's probation violation that resulted in a detainer being placed on his record, which also meant the inmate's federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated. Offer v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. Cir. 380, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 213 (Fairfax County 2003).

Bench warrant did not implicate 180-day period. - Prisoner's motion to dismiss a detainer pursuant to Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:9 was denied because, pursuant to the Interstate Detainers Agreement Act, a bench warrant on which the detainer was based was not included in the definition of a "complaint," and therefore, the State was not required to act upon the detainer within a 180-day period provided by the Act. Chu v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. Cir. 338, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 58 (Fairfax County 2003).

Article III not violated. - Where defendant had already been tried prior to detention in federal prison and the taking of blood samples under §§ 19.2-310.2 and 19.2-310.3 , was not a penalty for being convicted, defendant's rights under the § 53.1-210 , art. III(d) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers were not violated. Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 63 Va. Cir. 477, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 259 (Fairfax County 2003).

Applicability. - A charge of violating the terms of a suspended sentence was not an untried indictment within the scope of the meaning of the IAD and was inapplicable and, even if the court found that the IAD did apply, defendant failed to comply with the statute. Lindsey v. State, 86 Ark. App. 297, 184 S.W.3d 458, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 396 (2004). See also State v. Bates, 689 N.W.2d 479, 2004 Iowa App. LEXIS 906 (2004).

Order for arrest served on defendant while in the county jail was not a detainer and the provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers were not applicable to defendant because, although defendant did have an untried indictment in that county when he was served with the order while in federal custody, (1) there was nothing in the record to suggest that the order for arrest was ever filed with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, or any institution; and (2) there was nothing in the record to suggest that the state requested federal officials to hold defendant at the end of his federal sentence or notify it prior to defendant's release from federal custody. State v. Prentice, 170 N.C. App. 593, 613 S.E.2d 498 (2005).

Defendant, incarcerated in Oregon while a felony complaint and information was outstanding in Colorado, filed a request for speedy disposition of the charges pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), and Colorado withdrew the detainer and later filed a new one but allowing charges to remain pending despite a defendant's request for speedy disposition, as occurred here, contravenes the explicit purpose of the IAD to "encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints." People v. Robertson, 56 P.3d 121, 2002 Colo. App. LEXIS 1435 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

The provisions of the Agreement on Detainers do not apply to persons being detained for trial who are not serving prison sentences. State v. Hargrove, 273 Kan. 314, 45 P.3d 376, 2002 Kan. LEXIS 138 (2002), cert. denied, Hargrove v. Kansas, 537 U.S. 982, 123 S. Ct. 452 (2002).

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers does not apply to defendants who have been adjudicated guilty, and are awaiting sentencing. Prince v. State, 118 Nev. 634, 55 P.3d 947, 2002 Nev. LEXIS 79 (2002).

Parole violation charges are not covered by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. People ex rel. Williams v. State, 191 Misc. 2d 418, 742 N.Y.S.2d 810, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 569 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).

Not applicable to immigration proceedings. - Where alien sought removal proceedings by immigration authorities, his reliance on the IAD was misplaced as the IAD applied only to pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction and deportation was not a criminal proceeding. Escobar v. United States DOJ,, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8140 (E.D.Pa. May 5, 2005).

Purpose. - The purpose of the act is to facilitate transfers of supervision between participating states. However, there is no absolute obligation on the part of the intended receiving state to accept such a transfer, and therefore, appellant was required to make application to Tennessee for transferring his supervision. Atwell v. State, 848 So. 2d 190, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 348 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Meaning of "untried." - Because defendant plead nolo contendere on the charges underlying the original sentence of probation, there was nothing "untried" within the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers; a charge of violating the terms of a suspended sentence was not an untried indictment within the scope of the meaning of the IAD and was inapplicable and, even if the court found that the IAD did apply, defendant made no demand for trial in compliance with the statute. Lindsey v. State, 86 Ark. App. 297, 184 S.W.3d 458, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 396 (2004).

Anti-shuffling provision. - Interstate Agreement of Detainers Act provided no basis upon which to grant defendant relief from his convictions where defendant was imprisoned in Pennsylvania when he was charged, after waiving extradition, defendant returned to Maryland to face the pending Maryland charges, then before sentencing, defendant was released to Pennsylvania authorities to face unrelated criminal charges in Pennsylvania, but Maryland lodged a detainer against defendant in Pennsylvania to assure that he would be returned to Maryland for sentencing, and a week later, defendant was sentenced in Maryland; as the shuffling of defendant back and forth did not violate the Act. Painter v. State, 157 Md. App. 1, 848 A.2d 692 (2004).

The state did not violate the antishuttling provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, because once the charges against defendant were dismissed, Nevada had no authority upon which to detain the defendant, and sending him back to California was unavoidable. Diaz v. State, 118 Nev. 451, 50 P.3d 166, 2002 Nev. LEXIS 62 (2002).

Jurisdiction. - Jurisdiction is governed by statute and not geography and the IAD clearly provides that the United States of America is a separate "state." Although defendant was taken to the geographical location of Texas, he was never returned to the custody and jurisdiction of the State of Texas; he was taken to the 'state' of the United States of America and was in federal custody the entire time of his absence from the State of Missouri commencing when the Federal Marshals obtained his custody from the State of Missouri. As defendant was not returned to the sending state, the antishuttling provision contained in Article IV(5) was not violated. State v. Robertson, 182 S.W.3d 747, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).

Defendant contended that his drug and firearm convictions had to be reversed because the state violated article V of the IAD, by continuing to hold him after dismissal of a terroristic threat charge. The IAD neither grants nor divests a trial court of jurisdiction and, concomitantly, trial courts in this state do not depend upon the IAD for personal or subject matter jurisdiction, as both are independently provided by other statutes. To hold otherwise would have the unjustified and unwarranted effect of granting greater protection to a defendant over whom the state obtains custody pursuant to the IAD than to prisoners brought to Georgia by other methods. Accordingly, while the better practice in this case may have been for the state to follow a different course of action, e.g., to include all charges for which appellant was prosecuted within the detainer, return appellant to federal custody and file another detainer, or initiate other proceedings by which it could obtain custody of appellant, the state's actions did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the criminal charges filed against appellant. Morrison v. State, 280 Ga. 222, 626 S.E.2d 500 (2006).

Procedure. - The District did not violate Art. IV(a) when it did not honor a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum from the United States Attorney's Office after 30 days. Swanigan v. United States, 853 A.2d 742, 2004 D.C. App. LEXIS 386 (D.C. 2004).

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), required defendant's trial to commence by a certain date, when the state failed to bring him to trial by that date, his defense counsel properly filed a notice of expiration of the IAD's speedy trial period, but discharge pursuant to the IAD was not automatic, as discharge was appropriate only after certain procedures set out in Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191 were followed including the "window of recapture," the 10 additional days for the state to bring defendant to trial. State v. Garza, 807 So. 2d 790, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 1940 (2002).

The court held that the state failed to bring the prisoner to trial in a timely manner under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, where the process followed by the parties to accomplish the transfer mirrored the process set forth in article III, and the time limits of article III, rather than article IV, governed the transfer. State v. Widmer-Baum, 653 N.W.2d 351, 2002 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 246 (2002).

Dismissal. - Absence of Interstate Agreement on Detainers Art III(d) documents from Massachusetts' prison officials in the files of the Hernando County clerk, and the failure to use standard IAD forms did not avoid application of the statute to dismiss Hernando County, Florida charges against the defendant. Halle v. State, 30 Fla. L. Weekly D 2484, 914 So. 2d 470, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 17033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2005).

While trial court properly granted initial indeterminate continuance, defendant's right to be present during determination of actual length of continuance and to argue for trial date as close as possible to Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act's 180-day limitation was violated; accordingly, defendant's convictions were reversed. Conn v. State, 831 N.E.2d 828, 2005 Ind. App. LEXIS 1365 (Ind. App. 2005).

Speedy trial. - Defendant's pro se motion for a speedy trial was insufficient to initiate the running of the 180-day period, because an inmate who wishes to benefit from Art. III's dismissal provisions must, at the very least, ensure that the receiving state has been given all of the information expressly listed in Art. III (a), including a certificate of inmate status. Commonwealth v. Copson, 444 Mass. 609, 830 N.E.2d 193 (2005). See also Commonwealth v. Malone, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 285, 838 N.E.2d 1265 (2005).

Defense counsel agrees to delay. - A criminal defense counsel's agreement to a trial date outside the time period set by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers bars the defendant from seeking dismissal on the ground that the trial did not occur within that period. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 120 S. Ct. 659, 145 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2000).

Any delay resulting from a request made to accommodate the defendant is properly excluded from the 120-day time limit calculation under the IAD. When defense counsel moved to withdraw from representation because of a conflict of interest, to allow the defendant to obtain different counsel who is not biased and does not have a stake in the outcome of the proceedings, under those circumstances, a motion to withdraw is clearly made in an effort to "accommodate the defendant" and the resulting delay was excluded from the time limit calculation. People v. Stone, 269 Mich. App. 240, 712 N.W.2d 165, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 3125 (2005).

Where multiple jurisdictions have charges pending. - The court held that where multiple jurisdictions within a receiving state have charges pending against a defendant, and one of the charging jurisdictions within the receiving state did not bring the appellant to trial within the time limit specified within the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), appellant should not receive the windfall of dismissal of charges merely because there are charges pending against him in so many separate counties that they cannot all be tried within the IAD time limits. State v. Peterson, 137 Idaho 255, 47 P.3d 378, 2002 Ida. App. LEXIS 10 (Ct. App. 2002).

Speedy trial waiver. - Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the Illinois criminal charges against him based on his allegation that the IAD was violated when he was returned to federal custody in Indiana prior to a trial on the Illinois criminal charges; while it was true that the IAD had an anti-shuttling provision, that provision and the 180-day time limit of the IAD in general were waived when defendant filed a number of continuances, which had the effect of pushing the trial past the 180-day limit. People v. Davis, 356 Ill. App. 3d 940, 292 Ill. Dec. 989, 827 N.E.2d 518, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 380 (4 Dist. 2005).

The record demonstrates that defense counsel repeatedly and willingly accepted treatment inconsistent with Interstate Agreement on Detainers time limitations, thus the defendant is deemed to have waived such time limitations. State v. Wells, 638 N.W.2d 456, 2002 Minn. App. LEXIS 69 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), review denied, 2002 Minn. LEXIS 189 (Minn. Mar. 19, 2002).

Allocation of costs. - The language of section V(h) of the IAD, addresses only the allocation of costs between states, which may be changed if "the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among themselves." It does not address the issue whether those costs can then be passed on to a prisoner. We therefore do not read the IAD to conflict with, or impliedly repeal, a Colorado statute requiring prisoner to pay extradition expenses. People v. Fogarty, 126 P.3d 238, 2005 Colo. App. LEXIS 1106 (2005).

The Act does not create a private right of action. - Where appellant victim was raped by a parolee accepted for supervision from another state, the Uniform Act for Out-of-state Parolee Supervision did not create a private right of action, because there is no express or implied legislative intent to impose liability for negligent acceptance. Doe v. State ex rel. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 859 So. 2d 350, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 603 (Miss. 2003).

Applied in GA: Dotson v. State, 253 Ga. App. 787, 560 S.E.2d 349, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 208 (2002); KY: Parks v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 395, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 225 (Ky. 2002); MO: McDonald v. State, 77 S.W.3d 722, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 1349 (Mo. App. 2002); Windham v. State, 118 Nev. 226, 43 P.3d 993, 2002 Nev. LEXIS 35 (2002); NJ: State v. Burnett, 798 A.2d 96, 351 N.J. Super. 222, 2002 N.J. Super. LEXIS 250 (App. Div. 2002); OH: State v. Neal, 2002 Ohio 7374, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 7233 (2002); State v. Ward, 2002 Ohio 4852, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4893 (2002); State v. Owens, 2002 Ohio 4485, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4627 (2002); State v. Shun, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1683 (Ct. App., 9th Dist., 2002); VT: State v. Winnie, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 348 (Dec. 18, 2002); WV: State v. Seenes, 212 W. Va. 353, 572 S.E.2d 876, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 168 (2002).

ARTICLE I.

The party states, desiring by common action to fully utilize and improve their institutional facilities and provide adequate programs for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that it is the policy of each of the party states to provide such facilities and programs on a basis of cooperation with one another, and with the Federal Government, thereby serving the best interest of such offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital expenditures and operational costs. The purpose of this compact is to provide for the mutual development and execution of such programs of cooperation for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders with the most economical use of human and material resources.

ARTICLE II.

As used in this compact, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

1. "State" means a state of the United States; the United States of America; a territory or possession of the United States; the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
2. "Sending state" means a state party to this compact in which conviction or court commitment was had.
3. "Receiving state" means a state party to this compact to which an inmate is sent for confinement other than a state in which conviction or court commitment was had.
4. "Inmate" means a male or female offender who is committed, under sentence to or confined in a penal or correctional institution.
5. "Institution" means any penal or correctional facility, including but not limited to a facility for the mentally ill or mentally defective, in which inmates as defined in d above may lawfully be confined.

ARTICLE III.

1. Each party state may make one or more contracts with any one or more of the other party states, or with the Federal Government, for the confinement of inmates on behalf of a sending state in institutions situated within receiving states. Any such contract shall provide for:
   1. Its duration.
   2. Payments to be made to the receiving state or to the Federal Government, by the sending state for inmate maintenance, extraordinary medical and dental expenses, and any participation in or receipt by inmates of rehabilitative or correctional services, facilities, programs or treatment not reasonably included as part of normal maintenance.
   3. Participation in programs of inmate employment, if any; the disposition or crediting of any payments received by inmates on account thereof; and the crediting of proceeds from or disposal of any products resulting therefrom.
   4. Delivery and retaking of inmates.
   5. Such other matters as may be necessary and appropriate to fix the obligations, responsibilities and rights of the sending and receiving states.
2. The terms and provisions of this compact shall be a part of any contract entered into by the authority of or pursuant thereto and nothing in any such contract shall be inconsistent therewith.

ARTICLE IV.

1. Whenever the duly constituted authorities in a state party to this compact, and which has entered into a contract pursuant to Article III, shall decide that confinement in, or transfer of an inmate to, an institution within the territory of another party state is necessary or desirable in order to provide adequate quarters and care or an appropriate program of rehabilitation or treatment, said officials may direct that the confinement be within an institution within the territory of said other party state, the receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the sending state.
2. The appropriate officials of any state party to this compact shall have access, at all reasonable times, to any institution in which it has a contractual right to confine inmates for the purpose of inspecting the facilities thereof and visiting such of its inmates as may be confined in the institution.
3. Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the terms of this compact shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and may at any time be removed therefrom for transfer to a prison or other institution within the sending state, for transfer to another institution in which the sending state may have a contractual or other right to confine inmates, for release on probation or parole, for discharge, or for any other purpose permitted by the laws of the sending state; provided that the sending state shall continue to be obligated to such payments as may be required pursuant to the terms of any contract entered into under the terms of Article III.
4. Each receiving state shall provide regular reports to each sending state on the inmates of that sending state in institutions pursuant to this compact including a conduct record of each inmate and certify said record to the official designated by the sending state, in order that each inmate may have official review of his or her record in determining and altering the disposition of said inmate in accordance with the law which may obtain in the sending state and in order that the same may be a source of information for the sending state.
5. All inmates who may be confined in an institution pursuant to the provisions of this compact shall be treated in a reasonable and humane manner and shall be treated equally with such similar inmates of the receiving state as may be confined in the same institution. The fact of confinement in a receiving state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any legal rights which said inmate would have had if confined in an appropriate institution of the sending state.
6. Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined pursuant to this compact may be entitled by the laws of the sending state may be had before the appropriate authorities of the sending state, or of the receiving state if authorized by the sending state. The receiving state shall provide adequate facilities for such hearings as may be conducted by the appropriate officials of a sending state. In the event such hearing or hearings are had before officials of the receiving state, the governing law shall be that of the sending state and a record of the hearing or hearings as prescribed by the sending state shall be made. Said record together with any recommendations of the hearing officials shall be transmitted forthwith to the official or officials before whom the hearing would have been had if it had taken place in the sending state. In any and all proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision, the officials of the receiving state shall act solely as agents of the sending state and no final determination shall be made in any matter except by the appropriate officials of the sending state.
7. Any inmate confined pursuant to this compact shall be released within the territory of the sending state unless the inmate, and the sending and receiving states, shall agree upon release in some other place. The sending state shall bear the cost of such return to its territory.
8. Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this compact shall have any and all rights to participate in and derive any benefits or incur or be relieved of any obligations or have such obligations modified or his status changed on account of any action or proceeding in which he could have participated if confined in any appropriate institution of the sending state located within such state.
9. The parents, guardian, trustee, or other person or persons entitled under the laws of the sending state to act for, advise or otherwise function with respect to any inmate shall not be deprived of or restricted in his exercise of any power in respect of any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this compact.

ARTICLE V.

1. Any decision of the sending state in respect of any matter over which it retains jurisdiction pursuant to this compact shall be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state, but if at the time the sending state seeks to remove an inmate from an institution in the receiving state there is pending against the inmate within such state any criminal charge or if the inmate is formally accused of having committed within such state a criminal offense, the inmate shall not be returned without the consent of the receiving state until discharge from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment or detention for such offense. The duly accredited officers of the sending state shall be permitted to transport inmates pursuant to this compact through any and all states party to this compact without interference.
2. An inmate who escapes from an institution in which he is confined pursuant to this compact shall be deemed a fugitive from the sending state and from the state in which the institution is situated. In the case of an escape to a jurisdiction other than the sending or receiving state, the responsibility for institution of extradition or rendition proceedings shall be that of the sending state, but nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent or affect the activities of officers and agencies of any jurisdiction directed toward the apprehension and return of an escapee.

ARTICLE VI.

Any state party to this compact may accept federal aid for use in connection with any institution or program, the use of which is or may be affected by this compact or any contract pursuant hereto and any inmate in a receiving state pursuant to this compact may participate in any such federally-aided program or activity for which the sending and receiving states have made contractual provision, provided that if such program or activity is not part of the customary correctional regimen the express consent of the appropriate official of the sending state shall be required therefor.

ARTICLE VII.

This compact shall enter into force and become effective and binding upon the states so acting when it has been enacted into law by any two states. Thereafter, this compact shall enter into force and become effective and binding as to any other of said states upon similar action by such state.

ARTICLE VIII.

This compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon a party state until it shall have enacted a statute repealing the same and providing for the sending of formal written notice of withdrawal from the compact to the appropriate official of all other party states. An actual withdrawal shall not take effect until one year after the notice provided in said statute has been sent. Such withdrawal shall not relieve the withdrawing state from its obligations assumed hereunder prior to the effective date of withdrawal. Before effective date of withdrawal, a withdrawing state shall remove to its territory, at its own expense, such inmates as it may have confined pursuant to the provisions of this compact.

ARTICLE IX.

Nothing contained in this compact shall be construed to abrogate or impair any agreement or other arrangement which a party state may have with a nonparty state for the confinement, rehabilitation or treatment of inmates nor to repeal any other laws of a party state authorizing the making of cooperative institutional arrangements.

ARTICLE X.

The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed and shall be severable. If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any participating state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state participating therein, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

(Code 1950, § 53-304.9; 1977, c. 339; 1982, c. 636.)

Compact cross references. - As to provisions of other member states, see:

Alabama: Code of Ala. §§ 14-13-1 - 14-13-3.

Alaska: Alaska Stat. §§ 33.36.010 - 33.36.040.

Arizona: A.R.S. §§ 31-491, 31-492.

Arkansas: A.C.A. §§ 12-49-101 - 12-49-103.

California: Cal Pen Code §§ 11189 - 11198.

Colorado: C.R.S. 24-60-1601 - 24-60-1603.

Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 18-105 - 18-107.

Delaware: 11 Del. C. §§ 6570 - 6573.

District of Columbia: D.C. Code §§ 24-1001, 24-1002.

Florida: Fla. Stat. §§ 941.55 - 941.57.

Georgia: O.C.G.A. §§ 42-11-1 - 42-11-3.

Hawaii: HRS §§ 355D-1 - 355D-5.

Idaho: Idaho Code §§ 20-701 - 20-704.

Illinois: 730 ILCS 5/3-4-4.

Indiana: Burns Ind. Code Ann. §§ 11-8-4-1 - 11-8-4-20.

Iowa: Iowa Code §§ 913.1 - 913.3.

Kansas: K.S.A. §§ 76-3001 - 76-3003.

Kentucky: KRS §§ 196.610, 196.620.

Maine: 34-A M.R.S. §§ 9401 - 9424.

Maryland: Md. Correctional Services Code Ann. §§ 8-601 - 8-611.

Massachusetts: Mass. Spec. Laws ch. S138, § 1.

Michigan: MCLS §§ 3.981 - 3.984; MCLS § 791.211a.

Minnesota: Minn. Stat. §§ 241.28 - 241.30.

Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-1351.

Missouri: §§ 217.525 - 217.540 R.S.Mo.

Montana: Mont. Code Anno., §§ 46-19-401, 46-19-402.

Nebraska: R.R.S. Neb. §§ 29-3401, 29-3402.

Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 215A.010 - 215A.060.

New Hampshire: 60 RSA 622-B:1 - 622-B:3.

New Jersey: N.J. Stat. §§ 30:7C-1 - 30:7C-12.

New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-17.

New York: NY CLS Correc §§ 100 - 109.

North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 148-119 - 148-121.

Ohio: ORC Ann. 5120.50.

Oklahoma: 57 Okl. St. §§ 601, 602.

Oregon: ORS §§ 421.245 - 421.254.

Pennsylvania: 61 P.S. §§ 1061 - 1063.

South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. §§ 24-11-10 - 24-11-30.

Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-23-101 - 41-23-104.

Texas: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.19.

Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-28a-1 - 77-28a-5.

Vermont: 28 V.S.A. §§ 1601 - 1610, 1621.

Washington: Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) §§ 72.74.010 - 72.74.900.

Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. §§ 302.25, 302.255.

Law review. - For essay "In the Aftermath of Soering, Is Interstate Extradition to Virginia Illegal?", see 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1477 (1991).

Research References. - 41 Fla Jur Prisons and Prisoners.

83 NY Jur Penal and Correctional Institutions.

73 Oh Jur Penal and Correctional Institutions.

58 Tex Jur Penal and Correctional Institutions.

CASE NOTES

For equal protection purposes, inmates transferred pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact are "similarly situated" to those inmates in the receiving institution. Tucker v. Angelone, 954 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Va.), aff'd sub nom. Tucker v. Virginia Dep't of Cors., 116 F.3d 473 (4th Cir. 1997).

Receiving state as agent. - Pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact, the "receiving state" acts "solely as agent for the sending state," which retains jurisdiction over a transferred inmate and may remove the inmate for any proper purpose. Taylor v. Washington, 2002 D.C. App. LEXIS 559, 808 A.2d 770 (2002).

Jurisdiction. - The court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief because under the Interstate Corrections Compact, Florida corrections officials act only as agents for the State of Kansas, and the Florida court lacks jurisdiction over the length of incarceration or whether that incarceration is served in Kansas or Florida. Meyer v. Moore, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 4198, 826 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2002).

District court lacked jurisdiction, absent any constitutional violations, to order the transfer of a prisoner under the Compact upon a prisoner's allegations that (1) he is fearful of other and (2) he wishes to be near his parents, because the legislature intended the Department of Corrections, and not the courts, to make decisions about which prisoners ought to be transferred under the Compact. State v. Tarver, 2005 NMCA 30, 137 N.M. 115, 108 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2005).

Compacts. - Petitioner challenges the circumstances of his transfer under the Interstate Corrections Compact and the authority of the Virgin Islands government to enter into compacts with sovereign states, such as Virginia, but while it is correct that Congress must grant such authority to the unincorporated territories of the United States, Congress already has acted in this capacity in 4 U.S.C. § 112. Maxwell v. Stridiron, 45 V.I. 185, 2003 V.I. LEXIS 6 (Terr. Ct. St. T. Mar. 25, 2003).

Applied in Fisher v. Carroll, 822 A.2d 396, 2003 Del. LEXIS 188 (Del. 2003); DC: Ali v. District of Columbia, 278 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Daniels v. Crosby, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D 2514, 888 So. 2d 668, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 17035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2004); Van Winkle v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 370 N.J. Super. 40, 850 A.2d 548 (App. Div. 2004); Phifer v. Tenn. Bd. of Parole, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 776 (Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2002).