SUBTITLE II. TITLING, REGISTRATION AND LICENSURE.
Chapter 3. Licensure of Drivers.
Driver License Compact.
Article 18. Driver License Compact.
§ 46.2-483. Compact enacted into law; terms.
The Driver License Compact is hereby enacted into law and entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:
THE DRIVER LICENSE COMPACT
Findings and Declaration of Policy
The party states find that:
- The safety of their streets and highways is materially affected by the degree of compliance with state and local ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles.
- Violation of such a law or ordinance is evidence that the violator engages in conduct which is likely to endanger the safety of persons and property.
- The continuance in force of a license to drive is predicated upon compliance with laws and ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles, in whichever jurisdiction the vehicle is operated.
It is the policy of each of the party states to:
- Promote compliance with the laws, ordinances, and administrative rules and regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles by their operators in each of the jurisdictions where such operators drive motor vehicles.
Make the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility therefor more just and equitable by considering the overall compliance with motor vehicle laws, ordinances and administrative rules and regulations as a condition precedent to the continuance or issuance of any license by reason of which the licensee is authorized or permitted to operate a motor vehicle in any of the party states.
As used in this compact:
(a) "State" means a state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Home state" means the state which has issued and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle.
"Conviction" means a conviction of any offense related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle which is prohibited by state law, municipal ordinance or administrative rule or regulation, or a forfeiture of bail, bond, or other security deposited to secure appearance by a person charged with having committed any such offense, and which conviction or forfeiture is required to be reported to the licensing authority.
The licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee. Such report shall clearly identify the person convicted; describe the violation specifying the section of the statute, code or ordinance violated; identify the court in which action was taken; indicate whether a plea of guilty or not guilty was entered, or the conviction was a result of the forfeiture of bail, bond or other security; and shall include any special findings made in connection therewith.
(a) The licensing authority in the home state, for the purposes of suspension, revocation or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Article III of this compact, as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state, in the case of convictions for:
- Manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;
- Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug, or under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle;
- Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used;
Failure to stop and render aid in the event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another.
(b) As to other convictions, reported pursuant to Article III, the licensing authority in the home state shall give such effect to the conduct as is provided by the laws of the home state.
(c) If the laws of a party state do not provide for offenses or violations denominated or described in precisely the words employed in subdivision (a) of this article, such party state shall construe the denominations and descriptions appearing in subdivision (a) hereof as being applicable to and identifying those offenses or violations of a substantially similar nature and the laws of such party state shall contain such provisions as may be necessary to ensure that full force and effect is given to this article.
Upon application for a license to drive, the licensing authority in a party state shall ascertain whether the applicant has ever held, or is the holder of a license to drive issued by any other party state. The licensing authority in the state where application is made shall not issue a license to drive to the applicant if:
(1) The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been suspended by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such suspension period has not terminated.
(2) The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been revoked by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such revocation has not terminated, except that after the expiration of one year from the date the license was revoked, such person may make application for a new license if permitted by law. The licensing authority may refuse to issue a license to any such applicant if, after investigation, the licensing authority determines that it will not be safe to grant to such person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways.
(3) The applicant is the holder of a license to drive issued by another party state and currently in force unless the applicant surrenders such license.
Except as expressly required by provisions of this compact, nothing contained herein shall be construed to affect the right of any party state to apply any of its other laws relating to licenses to drive to any person or circumstance, nor to invalidate or prevent any driver license agreement or other cooperative arrangement between a party state and a nonparty state.
(a) The head of the licensing authority of each party state shall be the administrator of this compact for his state. The administrators, acting jointly, shall have the power to formulate all necessary and proper procedures for the exchange of information under this compact.
(b) The administrator of each party state shall furnish to the administrator of each other party state any information or documents reasonably necessary to facilitate the administration of this compact.
(a) This compact shall enter into force and become effective as to any state when it has enacted the same into law.
(b) Any party state may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing the same, but no such withdrawal shall take effect until six months after the executive head of the withdrawing state has given notice of the withdrawal to the executive heads of all other party states. No withdrawal shall affect the validity or applicability by the licensing authorities of states remaining party to the compact of any report of conviction occurring prior to the withdrawal.
This compact shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate the purposes thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party thereto, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.
(1968, c. 166, § 46.1-167.8; 1989, c. 727.)
Reports of Conviction
Effect of Conviction
Applications for New Licenses
Applicability of Other Laws
Compact Administrator and Interchange of Information
Entry Into Force and Withdrawal
Construction and Severability
Compact cross references. - As to provisions of other member states, see:
Alabama: Code of Ala. §§ 32-6-30 - 32-6-36.
Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 28.37.010 et seq.
Arizona: A.R.S. §§ 28-1851 - 28-1855.
Arkansas: A.C.A. §§ 27-17-101 - 27-17-106.
California: Cal Veh Code § 15000 et seq.
Colorado: C.R.S. 24-60-1101 - 24-60-1107.
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-111: et seq.
Delaware: 21 Del. C. §§ 8101, 8111 - 8113.
District of Columbia: D.C. Code §§ 50-1001, 50-1002.
Florida: Fla. Stat. §§ 322.43, 322.44.
Hawaii: HRS §§ 286C-1, 286C-2.
Idaho: Idaho Code §§ 49-2001 - 49-2004.
Illinois: 625 ILCS 5/6-700 et seq.
Indiana: Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 9-28-1-1 et seq.
Iowa: Iowa Code §§ 321C.1, 321C.2.
Kansas: K.S.A. §§ 8-1212 - 8-1218.
Louisiana: La. R.S. 32:1420 - 32:1426.
Maine: 29-A M.R.S. §§ 1451 - 1475.
Maryland: Md. Transportation Code Ann. §§ 16-701 - 16-708.
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. §§ 171.50 - 171.56.
Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. §§ 63-1-101 - 63-1-113.
Missouri: §§ 302.600, 302.605 R.S.Mo.
Montana: Mont. Code Anno., §§ 61-5-401 - 61-5-406.
New Hampshire: 21 RSA 263:77 - 263:81.
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. §§ 39:5D-1 - 39:5D-14.
New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-5-49 et seq.
New York: NY CLS Veh & Tr § 516.
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-4.21 - 20-4.30.
Ohio: ORC Ann. 4510.61.
Oklahoma: 47 Okl. St. §§ 781 - 788.
Oregon: ORS § 802.540 et seq.
Pennsylvania: 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1581 - 1586.
Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-29-6.
South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-1-610 - 56-1-690.
Texas: Tex. Transp. Code §§ 523.001 - 523.011.
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§ 53-3-601 - 53-3-607.
Vermont: 23 V.S.A. §§ 3901 - 3910.
Washington: Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) §§ 46.21.010 - 46.21.040.
West Virginia: W. Va. Code §§ 17B-1A-1, 17B-1A-2.
Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-7-201, 31-7-202.
Research References. - For survey, "Sullivan v. Department of Transportation: The Commonwealth Court Holds that the Department Of Transportation May Not Suspend a Driver's License Based on an Out-of-State Traffic Offense," see 6 Widener J. Public L. 855 (1997).
4A Fla Jur Automobiles and Other Vehicles.
8 NY Jur Automobiles and Other Vehicles.
7 Oh Jur Automobiles and Other Vehicles.
Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia Automobiles and Motor Vehicles.
8 Tex Jur Automobiles.
Applied in Commonwealth v. Lowe, 31 Va. App. 806, 525 S.E.2d 636, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 183 (2000).
CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS
Application for driver's license properly denied. - Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) properly refused to issue an applicant a driver's license where his driving privileges remained revoked or suspended in three other states due to his driving while intoxicated (DWI) convictions as § 46.2-483 allowed a person whose driving privileges had been suspended or revoked in another state to apply for a new license in Virginia after expiration of one year from the date of revocation only if permitted by law; § 46.2-316 explicitly prohibited the DMV from issuing a driver's license to any person whose driving privileges were suspended or revoked due to a DWI conviction. Brauer v. DMV, 70 Va. Cir. 145, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 20 (Warren County 2006).
While the Driver License Compact allows a person whose driving privileges have been suspended or revoked in another state to apply for a new license in Virginia after expiration of one year from the date of revocation, such permission is circumscribed by the concluding language of the same sentence: "if permitted by law"; § 46.2-316 explicitly prohibits the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles from issuing a driver's license to any person whose driving privileges are suspended or revoked by reason of a conviction of driving while under the influence of intoxicants or drugs. Brauer v. DMV, 70 Va. Cir. 145, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 20 (Warren County 2006).
Federal: The Driver License Compact merely obligates member states to report violations of their traffic laws by out-of-state motorists to the motorists' home states, but does not authorize enforcement of other states' laws; consequently, Kansas law enforcement officer was not authorized to enforce California requirement that vehicles display two license plates when a California motorist, driving a California-registered vehicle, was stopped in Kansas for displaying only one license plate. United States v. Ramstad, 219 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. Kan. 2000).
By assenting to the Driver License Compact, Congress did not intend to federalize driver's license law, nor did it intend to federalize state actors who give traffic citations. Ambort v. City of Cloverdale,, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3519 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
Arizona: Driver's license remains valid until the driver is properly notified of revocation and afforded an opportunity for hearing. State v. Johnston, 152 Ariz. 273, 731 P.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1987).
The Compact authorizes member states to issue new licenses to drivers who have had their licenses revoked by other member states if it has been at least one year since revocation; conversely, a member state may not, under the Compact, issue a new driver's license to a driver who has a suspended license in another member state until the suspension period has ended.See also, People v. Matsen, 219 Ill. App. 3d 172, 579 N.E.2d 27 (1991); Bray v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 638 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994); Russell v. Director of Revenue, 861 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) State v. Wilkinson, 163 Ariz. 298, 787 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1989).
Connecticut: A Connecticut license holder, convicted in Florida for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, was not denied due process when her hearing before the Connecticut commissioner of motor vehicles to determine whether her license should be suspended was limited to the issue of whether she was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in Florida; denying the plaintiff a full hearing to contest the entirety of the out-of-state conviction, including procedural safeguards, the validity of the conviction and the underlying conduct, was not unconstitutional. Kostrzewski v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 52 Conn. App. 326, 727 A.2d 233, appeal denied, 249 Conn. 910, 733 A.2d 227 (1999).
The suspension of a driver's license, based on an out-of-state criminal prosecution and conviction reported pursuant to the compact, is an administrative sanction that is remedial in nature and advances the interests of public safety; consequently, the suspension is not intended to act solely as a deterrent or retribution, and therefore does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Kostrzewski v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 52 Conn. App. 326, 727 A.2d 233, appeal denied, 249 Conn. 910, 733 A.2d 227 (1999).
Idaho: In this case, the licensee was not entitled to a license under the terms of the compact, but was issued one anyway, because the more specific statute addressing the issue controls over the statute that is more general, when the department discovered in 2000 that the license was revoked in 1992, the department was entitled to refuse to renew the license. In re Marshall, 137 Idaho 337, 48 P.3d 666 (Ct. App. 2002).
Illinois: The phrase "if permitted by law" in the Driver License Compact means that a license may be issued if such an application would be permitted under Illinois law and the Illinois Secretary of State determines that it will be safe to grant such person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways. Girard v. White, 356 Ill. App. 3d 11, 292 Ill. Dec. 376, 826 N.E.2d 517, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 229 (1 Dist. 2005).
Defendant, who purposely concealed prior license revocation in order to mislead authorities and prevent them from properly determining whether a new license should be granted, could not use the new, fraudulently obtained license as a defense to the charge of driving while his previous license was revoked. People v. Waldron, 208 Ill. App. 3d 234, 153 Ill. Dec. 126, 566 N.E.2d 976 (4th Dist. 1991).
The proper issuance of a foreign license by a member state under the Driver License Compact terminates an Illinois revocation just as the proper issuance of an Illinois license terminates an Illinois revocation. People v. Hutson, 178 Ill. App. 3d 808, 128 Ill. Dec. 40, 533 N.E.2d 1128 (3 Dist.), appeal denied, 126 Ill. 2d 563, 133 Ill. Dec. 673, 541 N.E.2d 1111 (1989).
When defendant misplaced his West Virginia driver's license, and subsequently applied for an Illinois license, he was treated as having renounced his right to drive under the West Virginia license just as if he had surrendered it as required by the Driver License Compact, even though he later found the West Virginia license; consequently, the West Virginia license ceased to have legal effect, and defendant's claim that he still possessed a valid driver's license after the Illinois license was revoked had no merit. People v. Romanosky, 160 Ill. App. 3d 120, 111 Ill. Dec. 915, 513 N.E.2d 161 (5 Dist.), appeal denied, 117 Ill. 2d 551, 115 Ill. Dec. 407, 517 N.E.2d 1093 (1987).
Based on the legislative intent behind the Driver License Compact to discipline Illinois licensed drivers for conduct occurring in another state, an out-of-state conviction for DUI, though based on a plea of nolo contendere , still constitutes a conviction for purposes of the Driver License Compact. Rigney v. Edgar, 135 Ill. App. 3d 893, 90 Ill. Dec. 548, 482 N.E.2d 367 (1 Dist. 1985).
The Illinois Code provides that, once a driver's license is revoked, the individual is prohibited from driving in Illinois "until a license is obtained when and as permitted under [the Code]"; however, because the Driver License Compact is a part of the Code, the valid issuance of an Indiana license pursuant to the Compact satisfies the Illinois requirement. People v. Klaub, 130 Ill. App. 3d 704, 85 Ill. Dec. 891, 474 N.E.2d 851 (3 Dist. 1985).
The valid issuance of a driver's license by a non-compact state does not satisfy the Illinois provision that, once an Illinois driver's license is revoked, an individual is prohibited from driving in Illinois "until a license is obtained when and as permitted under [the Code]"; consequently, a former Illinois resident whose Illinois license had been revoked, who subsequently moved to Texas and obtained a valid license there, could still be convicted for driving in Illinois while his Illinois license was revoked. People v. Jones, 100 Ill. App. 3d 831, 55 Ill. Dec. 840, 426 N.E.2d 1214 (4 Dist. 1981).
Maryland: "If permitted by law," meant that Maryland was free not to allow a person whose Florida license had been revoked in perpetuity to apply for reinstatement after another year had elapsed of that revocation. Gwin v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 385 Md. 440, 869 A.2d 822, 2005 Md. LEXIS 107, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 823, 126 S. Ct. 359, 163 L. Ed. 2d 67 (2005).
Missouri: Because the driver applied for limited driving privileges in Missouri more than one year after Illinois had revoked his Illinois driver's license, the trial court's granting of the application was permissible under the statute. Mann v. Dir. of Revenue, 140 S.W.3d 106, 2004 Mo. App. LEXIS 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
Montana: Because, under the Compact, a conviction in a party state is to be given the same effect as if entered in the home state, a Montana resident and driver's license holder could have a five-year old conviction for DUI in Idaho expunged from his Montana driving record, just as Montana law provides for the expungement of such convictions entered in Montana. State v. Sidmore, 286 Mont. 218, 951 P.2d 558 (1997).
New Jersey: Under the doctrine of dual sovereignty, the double jeopardy clause does not bar two states from prosecuting a defendant for the same offense when a defendant's single act violates the laws of two sovereigns, the defendant is treated as having committed two distinct offenses. DMV v. Pepe, 379 N.J. Super. 411, 879 A.2d 747 (2005).
Holder of New Jersey driver's license, who was convicted of DWI in New York, was still subject to New Jersey license suspension even though New York authorities failed to notify New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles about conviction for over nine months, and even though a one-year suspension of New York driving privileges had already been imposed. Boyd v. DMV, 307 N.J. Super. 356, 704 A.2d 1029, 1998 N.J. Super. LEXIS 17 (App. Div. 1998).
The New Jersey Director of Motor Vehicles may suspend a New Jersey license and compel insurance surcharges based on out-of-state motor vehicle violations, regardless of whether or not the license holder is a resident of New Jersey at the time of the offense. In re Johnson, 226 N.J. Super. 1, 543 A.2d 454, 1988 N.J. Super. LEXIS 254 (1988).
Even though the Driver License Compact requires member states to give the same effect to drunk driving convictions from out-of-state that it would those in-state "for the purposes of suspension, revocation or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle," and does not specifically address sentencing, public policy supports the conclusion that the legislature intended an out-of-state drunk driving conviction to be considered a prior offense when sentencing a subsequent in-state offender. State v. Regan, 209 N.J. Super. 596, 508 A.2d 1149, 1986 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1248 (1986).
The Director of Motor Vehicles had the power to suspend a New Jersey driver's license based on a conviction for driving while intoxicated in Vermont, even though Vermont was not a signatory to the Driver License Compact. DMV v. Kleinert, 198 N.J. Super. 363, 486 A.2d 1324, 1985 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1152 (1985).
Oregon: Oregon courts have no authority, under the Driver License Compact, to suspend driving privileges in another state. State v. Scott, 96 Ore. App. 451, 773 P.2d 394, 1989 Ore. App. LEXIS 566 (1989).
Pennsylvania: Court erred in finding that entry of judgment of sentence in a sister state is required for Pennsylvania to deem a licensee 'convicted' for purposes of the Compact without first examining how that sister state defines a conviction. Further, because New York's definition of conviction does not include judgment of sentence and in fact is tantamount to a plea of guilty, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court erred in requiring that judgment of sentence be entered for a valid conviction to have occurred. Guzan v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 582 Pa. 187, 870 A.2d 810, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 601 (2004).
To ignore abstracts from sister states unless they contain a rubber stamp from the out-of-state licensing authority would elevate form over substance; therefore, an Indiana court abstract was allowed as proof of conviction without proof that the abstract came from the licensing authority. Siekierda v. DOT, 580 Pa. 259, 860 A.2d 76 (Pa. 2004).
The domicile of the licensee was not determinative of whether or not Pennsylvania was the "home state" under the Compact, rather, "home state" was determined by the operator's license, and the only license held by the licensee was a valid and current Pennsylvania license; Thus, PennDOT had authority under the Compact to suspend the licensee's operating privilege notwithstanding the fact that he was a New Jersey resident at the time of the suspension. Litterini v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 2004 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 194, 841 A.2d 152, 2004 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 194 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
Although documents submitted under the Compact, must contain some indicia that they were sent from the licensing authority, extrinsic evidence may be used to establish the sender of the report. McCord v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 834 A.2d 1257, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 776 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
The Compact requires that the licensing authority forward the conviction report, not that the licensing authority author the report. Where, as here, the documents proffered by the Bureau contain evidence that clearly shows they were transmitted by the licensing authority of the reporting state, such documents should not have been precluded from admission into evidence. Kilgore v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 832 A.2d 594, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 687 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
A photocopy of an electronic conviction report sufficiently showed that the report originated from the convicting state's licensing authority, even though the top of the report was cut off, including the line that indicated the state that issued the report, since its numerous references to New Jersey statutes and conviction locater numbers in addition to the heading, "Division of Motor Vehicles," established that the report was from the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles. Ferraguti v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 824 A.2d 354, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 257 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
Pennsylvania driver claimed that the New Jersey court denied a jury trial or the right to present extrapolation evidence, but the Pennsylvania court held that the Driver's License Compact is a full faith and credit statute, and Pennsylvania will give full faith and credit to convictions in the courts of other states for DUI to a degree, which renders the driver incapable of safe driving. Lees v. Commonwealth, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 32, 814 A.2d 1289 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
Under Mississippi law, when licensee was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while he had a blood alcohol level of .138%, the Mississippi licensing authority forwarded this information to DOT, which then had a duty, imposed by Article IV of the compact, to "give the same effect to the conduct reported that it would if such conduct had occurred in" Pennsylvania. Dillaman v. DOT, 2002 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 922, 811 A.2d 98 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
Courts have acknowledged that unilateral amendments of compacts that have been ratified by Congress may violate Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution, but, the Driver's License Compact is not reviewable under the United States Constitution because it did not receive the consent of Congress. Wroblewski v. Commonwealth, 2002 Pa. LEXIS 2195, 809 A.2d 247 (Pa. 2002).
Court held that Pennsylvania was the "home state" for purposes of the Compact, because licensee had a Pennsylvania license at the time of his arrest and conviction and it made no difference that he surrendered his Pennsylvania license in return for a Maryland license the day after his New Jersey conviction. Evans v. Commonwealth, 2002 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 488, 800 A.2d 1001 (2002).
Pursuant to 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1586, a different degree of impairment required to convict for driving while ability impaired or a similar charge, as reported by a party state, than the degree required under Pennsylvania law does not keep the party state's law from being "substantially similar" to Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact; consequently, it will not prevent a license suspension under Pennsylvania law. Squire v. DOT, 769 A.2d 1224, 2001 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 107 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). See also Lafferty v. DOT, 735 A.2d 1289 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999); Barrett v. DOT, 746 A.2d 658 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Hunt v. DOT, 750 A.2d 922 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Ester v. DOT, 756 A.2d 84 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Horvath v. DOT, 773 A.2d 199 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
Section 1584 [75 Pa.C.S. § 1584], as amended in 1988 to state that the omission of information from a report sent by a member state pursuant to Article III of the Compact does not excuse Pennsylvania from complying with its duties under Articles IV and V of the Compact, does not violate due process notice requirements; as long as the notice given to the person whose license is being suspended is "sufficient notice of the conduct that forms the basis for a deprivation so that the respondent may adequately prepare a defense," due process notice requirements are satisfied. Harrington v. DOT, 563 Pa. 565, 763 A.2d 386, 2000 Pa. LEXIS 2991 (2000). See also Crooks v. DOT, 564 Pa. 436, 768 A.2d 1106 (2001); Stiver v. DOT, 783 A.2d 841, 2001 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 641 (2001); Kiebort v. Commonwealth, 778 A.2d 773, 2001 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 359 (2001); Zalewski v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 767 A.2d 19 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
The Driver License Compact does not violate the double jeopardy, equal protection, and due process provisions of the U.S. Constitution. DOT v. McCafferty, 563 Pa. 146, 758 A.2d 1155, 2000 Pa. LEXIS 2383 (2000). See also Smega v. Commonwealth, 727 A.2d 154 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999); Pepperling v. DOT, 737 A.2d 310 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
Article III of the Driver License Compact, which contains specific requirements for reports of conviction, only obligates Pennsylvania when it is the reporting state, not the home state; consequently, Pennsylvania DOT is not precluded from relying on an out-of-state report because of perceived deficiencies in the convicting state's report of conviction. DOT v. McCafferty, 563 Pa. 146, 758 A.2d 1155, 2000 Pa. LEXIS 2383 (2000). See also Renna v. DOT, 762 A.2d 785 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Baker v. DOT, 762 A.2d 795 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Geesaman v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 762 A.2d 1142 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Bartoe v. DOT, 764 A.2d 698 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Catanzarite v. DOT, 765 A.2d 1178 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001); Golden v. DOT, 766 A.2d 361 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001); Teti v. DOT, 767 A.2d 647 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
Plea of guilty "with a civil reservation" under New Jersey law, which allows a court to accept a guilty plea but order that it will not be used as evidence in any subsequent civil proceeding, does not preclude Pennsylvania DOT from using the conviction as evidence for license suspension pursuant to the Compact when a Pennsylvania license holder was convicted of DUI in New Jersey; DOT is acting solely upon the conviction, so how the conviction came about is not relevant. Bourdeev v. Commonwealth, 755 A.2d 59, 2000 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 295 (Pa.Commw. Ct. 2000). See also Hunt v. DOT, 750 A.2d 922 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Teti v. DOT, 767 A.2d 647 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001); Hession v. DOT, 767 A.2d 1135 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001); Gies v. DOT, 770 A.2d 799 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
Pennsylvania DOT could not suspend driving privileges for Kentucky DUI conviction because Kentucky was not at the time of the conviction a party to the Driver License Compact. Schuetz v. DOT, 753 A.2d 915, 2000 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 341 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
In statutory appeal from a suspension of a driver's license under the Compact, the initial burden of proof is on the Department of Transportation to produce a record of the foreign conviction; the burden of proof then shifts to the licensee to rebut any inferences drawn from the record. Scott v. DOT, 730 A.2d 539, 1999 Pa. Commw.LEXIS 378 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
Because Maryland law permitted expunging DUI conviction upon successful completion of a rehabilitation program, and expressly stated that such discharge from probation was without judgment of conviction, Pennsylvania DOT did not have the authority to suspend a Pennsylvania driver's license based on the out-of-state conviction provisions of the Compact. Laughlin v. DOT, 719 A.2d 850, 1998 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 819 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
The Driver License Compact became effective when the Pennsylvania Legislature passed a statute adopting it, not when the Legislature passed a law delegating to the Secretary of Transportation the authority to enter into the Compact; consequently, appellee's license could not be suspended for an out-of-state conviction that occurred more than a year before the Legislature enacted the Compact into law. Sullivan v. DOT, 550 Pa. 639, 708 A.2d 481, 1998 Pa. LEXIS 165 (1998). See also Moreland v. DOT, 701 A.2d 294 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997); Touring v. DOT, 712 A.2d 349 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
Rhode Island: When New Hampshire authorities transmitted a copy of a Notice of Action to the Registry, indicating that petitioner had been convicted of driving while intoxicated to Rhode Island authorities pursuant to the Driver License Compact, the document became a public record of the State of Rhode Island upon receipt; consequently, it was admissible under Rhode Island rules of evidence "by proof of custody without more." DePasquale v. Harrington, 599 A.2d 314, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 156 (R.I. 1991).
Nothing in the language of the Compact requires a reporting state to provide notice to the home state of any civil or regulatory actions initiated within the reporting state as to Licensee's reciprocal driving privileges within that state. Additionally, even if such notice, although not required, were provided by the reporting state, nothing within the Compact language requires or authorizes the home state to act upon such notice. Kovalesky v. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 2004 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 400, 850 A.2d 26 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
Applied Federal: CA: Draeger v. Reed, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 378 (3 Dist. 1999).
§ 46.2-484. Department of Motor Vehicles to be "licensing authority" within meaning of compact; duties of Department.
As used in the compact, the term "licensing authority" with reference to this Commonwealth shall mean the Department of Motor Vehicles. The Department shall furnish to the appropriate authorities of any other party state any information or documents reasonably necessary to facilitate the administration of Articles III, IV, and V of the compact.
(1968, c. 166, § 46.1-167.9; 1989, c. 727.)
§ 46.2-485. Compensation and expenses of compact administrator.
The compact administrator provided for in Article VII of the compact shall not be entitled to any additional compensation on account of his service as such administrator, but shall be entitled to expenses incurred in connection with his duties and responsibilities as such administrator, in the same manner as for expenses incurred in connection with any other duties or responsibilities of his office or employment.
(1968, c. 166, § 46.1-167.10; 1989, c. 727.)
§ 46.2-486. Governor to be "executive head" within meaning of compact.
As used in the compact, with reference to the Commonwealth, the term "executive head" shall mean the Governor.
(1968, c. 166, § 46.1-167.11; 1989, c. 727.)
§ 46.2-487. Statutes and ordinances deemed to cover offenses specified in subdivision (a) of Article IV of compact.
For the purposes of complying with subdivisions (a) and (c) of Article IV of the compact, the following sections of the Code of Virginia and county, city, or town ordinances substantially paralleling such sections shall be deemed to cover the offenses of subdivision (a) of Article IV: With respect to subdivision (2), §§ 18.2-266 and 46.2-341.24 A; with respect to subdivision (4), §§ 46.2-894 through 46.2-899 subject to the limitation that the accident resulted in the death or personal injury of another; with respect to subdivisions (1) and (3), the Department shall determine which offenses are covered in the same manner as under § 46.2-389.
(1968, c. 166, § 46.1-167.12; 1989, c. 727; 1994, c. 255.)
§ 46.2-488. Question to be included in application for driver's license; surrender of license issued by another party state.
For the purpose of enforcing subdivision (3) of Article V of this compact, the Department shall include as part of the form for application for a driver's license under § 46.2-323 a question whether the applicant is currently licensed in another state and shall, if the applicant is so licensed, require the surrender of such license prior to the granting of such application in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
(1968, c. 166, § 46.1-167.13; 1984, c. 780; 1989, c. 727.)
Construction with § 46.2-300. - Because defendant, a domiciliary of another state, while residing in Virginia, could use his commercial driver's license (CDL) issued by that state to drive non-commercial vehicles in Virginia, the trial court erred in finding otherwise, requiring reversal of his conviction under § 46.2-300; moreover, this position was consistent with the legislature's intent that the holder of a CDL stood in a class separate from persons who held regular driver's licenses. Meierotto v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 1, 646 S.E.2d 1, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 227 (2007).
SUBTITLE III. OPERATION.
Chapter 8. Regulation of Traffic.
Arrest of Nonresidents.
Article 18. Arrest of Nonresidents.
§ 46.2-944. Definitions.
As used in this article:
"Jurisdiction" means a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
"Home jurisdiction" means the jurisdiction that issued the driver's license of the traffic violator.
"Issuing jurisdiction" means the jurisdiction in which the traffic citation was issued to the motorist.
"Party jurisdiction" means any jurisdiction which by its laws or by written agreement with the Commonwealth extends to residents of Virginia substantially the rights and privileges provided by this article.
"Court" means a court of law or traffic tribunal.
"Citation" means any summons, ticket, or other official document issued by a police officer for a traffic violation containing an order which requires the motorist to respond.
"Terms of the citation" means those options expressly stated upon the citation.
"Compliance" means the motorist must appear for a hearing and/or pay court fines and costs.
"Driver's license" means any license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle issued under the laws of the home jurisdiction.
"Collateral" or "bond" means any cash or other security deposited to secure an appearance for trial, following the issuance by a police officer of a citation for a traffic violation.
"Personal recognizance" means a signed agreement by a motorist made at the time of issuance of the traffic citation that he will comply with the terms of that traffic citation.
"Motorist" means a driver of a motor vehicle operating in a party jurisdiction other than the home jurisdiction.
"Police officer" means any individual authorized by the party jurisdiction to issue a citation for a traffic violation.
(1964, c. 247, § 46.1-179.1; 1974, c. 559; 1975, c. 205; 1980, c. 366; 1989, c. 727.)
§ 46.2-945. Issuance of citation to motorist; party jurisdiction; police officer to report noncompliance with citation.
- When issuing a citation for a traffic violation, a police officer shall issue the citation to a motorist who is a resident of or holds a driver's license issued by a party jurisdiction and shall not, subject to the exceptions noted in subsection C of this section, require such motorist to post collateral or bond to secure appearance for trial, but shall accept such motorist's written promise that he will comply with the terms of such citation; provided, however, the motorist shall have the right upon his request to post collateral or bond in a manner provided by law and, in such case, the provisions of this article shall not apply.
- In the absence of the motorist's written promise, the officer shall proceed according to the provisions of § 46.2-940.
- No motorist shall be entitled to receive a citation under the terms of subsection A of this section nor shall any police officer issue such citation under the same in the event the offense for which the citation is issued shall be one of the following: (i) an offense for which the issuance of a citation in lieu of a hearing or the posting of collateral or bond is prohibited by the laws of this Commonwealth; or (ii) an offense, the conviction of or the forfeiture of collateral for which requires the revocation of the motorist's license.
Upon the failure of any motorist to comply with the terms of a traffic citation, the police officer or the appropriate official shall report this fact to the Department of Motor Vehicles. Such report shall clearly identify the motorist; describe the violation, specifying the section of the statute, code or ordinance violated; shall indicate the location of the offense, give description of vehicle involved, and show the registration or license number of the vehicle. Such report shall be signed by the police officer or appropriate official.
(1964, c. 247, § 46.1-179.2; 1972, c. 474; 1976, c. 7; 1980, c. 366; 1981, c. 382; 1989, c. 727.)
§ 46.2-946. Department to transmit officer's report to party jurisdiction; suspension of resident's license for noncompliance with citation issued by party jurisdiction.
Upon receipt of the report as described in § 46.2-945 , the Department of Motor Vehicles shall transmit a certified copy of such report to the official in charge of the issuance of driver's licenses in the home jurisdiction in which the motorist resides or by which he is licensed.
Upon receipt from the issuing jurisdiction of a certification of noncompliance with a citation by a motorist holding a driver's license issued by this Commonwealth, the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles forthwith shall suspend such motorist's driver's license. The order of suspension shall indicate the reason for the order, and shall notify the motorist that his license shall remain suspended until he has furnished evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner that he has fully complied with the terms of the citation which was the basis for the suspension order.
The licensing authority of the issuing jurisdiction may suspend the privilege of a motorist for whom a report has been transmitted.
It shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to ascertain and remain informed as to which jurisdictions are party jurisdictions hereunder and, accordingly, to maintain a current listing of such jurisdictions, which listing he shall from time to time cause to be disseminated among the appropriate departments, divisions, bureaus and agencies of this Commonwealth, the principal executive officers of the several counties, cities and towns of this Commonwealth and the licensing authorities in all other jurisdictions which are, have been, or claim to be a party jurisdiction pursuant hereto.
Consistent with the terms of the applicable Nonresident Violator Compact, the home jurisdiction shall take no action regarding any report transmitted by the issuing jurisdiction, which is transmitted more than six months after the date on which the traffic citation was issued.
Consistent with the terms of the applicable Nonresident Violator Compact, the home jurisdiction shall take no action regarding any report on any violation where the date of issuance of the citation predates the entry into the compact for the two party jurisdictions affected.
(1964, c. 247, § 46.1-179.3; 1980, c. 366; 1989, c. 727.)