CHAPTER 1. ESTATES IN REAL PROPERTY

Sec.

§ 1. Estate in fee tail abolished.

Where, by the common law, a person might become seised in fee tail of lands by virtue of a devise, gift, grant, or other conveyance, or by other means, such person, instead of being seised thereof in fee tail, shall be seised thereof in fee simple. This section shall not change the effect of any instrument made and executed prior to June 1, 1941.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2631. 1941, No. 37 , §§ 1, 2. P.L. § 2580. G.L. § 2727. P.S. § 2565. V.S. § 2201. R.L. § 1916. G.S. 64, § 1. R.S. 59, § 1.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Personal estate.

This section only refers to estates in land and does not apply where a testator intended that his estate, after the decease of his widow, should be administered as personal estate. Doty v. Chaplin, 54 Vt. 361 (1882).

Cited. Giddings v. Smith, 15 Vt. 344 (1843); Thompson v. Carl, 51 Vt. 408 (1878); In re Estate of Kelso, 69 Vt. 272, 37 A. 747 (1896).

§ 2. Estate in common preferred to joint tenancy; joint tenancy with unequal shares.

  1. Conveyances and devises of lands, whether for years, for life or in fee, made to two or more persons, shall be construed to create estates in common and not in joint tenancy, unless it is expressed therein that the grantees or devisees shall take the lands jointly or as joint tenants or in joint tenancy or to them and the survivors of them. This provision shall not apply to devises or conveyances made in trust or made to spouses or to conveyances in which it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was intended to create an estate in joint tenancy.
    1. An instrument may create a joint tenancy in which the interests of the joint tenants are equal or unequal. (b) (1)  An instrument may create a joint tenancy in which the interests of the joint tenants are equal or unequal.
    2. Unless the instrument creating a joint tenancy contains language indicating a contrary intent:
      1. It shall be presumed that the joint tenants' interests are equal.
      2. Upon the death of a joint tenant, the deceased joint tenant's interest shall be allocated among the surviving joint tenants, as joint tenants, in proportion to their respective joint interests at the time of the deceased joint tenant's death.

        Amended 2003, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2632. P.L. § 2581. G.L. § 2728. P.S. § 2566. V.S. § 2202. R.L. § 1917. G.S. 64, §§ 2, 3. R.S. 59, §§ 2, 3. R. 1797, p. 469, § 11.

Amendments--2003 (Adj. Sess.) Added "joint tenancy with unequal shares" at the end of the catchline, designated existing provisions of section as subsec. (a), and added subsec. (b).

Severability of enactment. 2003, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, provided:

"Sec. 7. Severability.

"If any provision of this act [which amended this section] or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid or in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, the invalidity or the violation shall not affect other provisions of this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable."

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Construction.

Although statute expressing preference for estates in common over joint tenancies did allow a deed to create a joint tenancy by explicit language, legislative policy required court to resolve ambiguity in favor of a tenancy in common rather than a joint tenancy. Kipp v. Chips Estate, 169 Vt. 102, 732 A.2d 127 (1999).

2. Conveyance to two or more persons.

Under statute expressing legislature's preference for estates in common, court could find a joint tenancy only if intent to convey that interest was expressed in clear and definite terms, and therefore trial court correctly refused to admit evidence of circumstances surrounding drafting of deed, since even if extrinsic evidence was overwhelming that parties had intended to create a joint tenancy, that intent was inadequately expressed in deed to allow court to find such an interest. Kipp v. Chips Estate, 169 Vt. 102, 732 A.2d 127 (1999).

Children who took, jointly with their parents, an equitable estate became tenants in common therein. Thompson v. Tryon, 66 Vt. 191, 28 A. 873 (1894).

A condition, in a deed to two or more persons, that they shall pay all the grantor's debts or the deed shall be void, did not create a trust estate or evince a design to create an estate in joint tenancy; the grantees held the estate as tenants in common. Lamb v. Clark, 29 Vt. 273 (1857).

The deeding of a given number of acres to one man, and another number to another, thus conveying the whole right to both, there being nothing to show that the land was intended to be conveyed in severalty, will create a tenancy in common, and they will hold in common, in the proportion of the number of acres specified in their deeds. Preston v. Robinson & Ross, 24 Vt. 583 (1852).

3. Conveyance of undivided interest.

There is a statutory presumption that joint tenants will share equally. The trial court's finding that plaintiff intended to convey nothing was unsupported by the record, and was therefore insufficient to rebut the presumption; thus, the parties, upon the 1996 purchase of the property, each had an undivided one-half interest in the property. Massey v. Hrostek, 186 Vt. 211, 980 A.2d 768 (2009), overruled in part as stated in Whippie v. O'Connor, 2011 VT 97, 190 Vt. 600, 30 A.3d 1292.

A deed which described land simply as so many acres of a certain lot, passed an undivided interest in such lot equal to the proportion which the number of acres sold bore to the whole number of acres in the lot. Sheafe v. Wait, 30 Vt. 735 (1858).

4. Husband and wife.

The common-law incident of survivorship prevails for tenancies by the entirety in Vermont. Buzzell v. Edward H. Everett Co., 180 F. Supp. 893 (D. Vt. 1960).

Conveyance to husband and wife is expressly excepted from operation of this section. Town of Corinth v. Emery, 63 Vt. 505, 22 A. 618 (1891).

Cited. Northeast Petroleum Corp. of New Hampshire, Inc. v. State, 143 Vt. 339, 466 A.2d 1164 (1983); In re Estate of Neil, 152 Vt. 124, 565 A.2d 1309 (1989).

§ 3. Effect of overgrant.

A conveyance by a tenant for life or years, purporting to grant a greater estate than he or she possessed or could lawfully convey, shall not work a forfeiture of his or her estate, but shall pass to the grantee the estate which such tenant could lawfully convey.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2633. P.L. § 2582. G.L. § 2729. P.S. § 2567. V.S. § 2203. R.L. § 1918. G.S. 64, § 4. R.S. 59, § 4.

§ 4. Right of entry for survey.

In cases wherein the title to lands, tenements, or hereditaments may come in question, or in order to establish boundaries between abutting parcels, a licensed surveyor with the necessary assistants employed by any of the parties to such disputed title, may enter upon such lands or real estate or other lands for the purpose of running doubtful or disputed lines and locating or searching for monuments, establishing temporary monuments and ascertaining and deciding the location of the lines and monuments of a survey, doing as little damage as possible to the owners of such lands.

Amended 1985, No. 116 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2637. P.L. § 2586. G.L. § 2733. P.S. § 2571. 1902, No. 160 , § 2.

Amendments--1985 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "or in order to establish boundaries between abutting parcels, a licensed" for "the practical" following "question" and inserted "establishing temporary monuments" preceding "and ascertaining".

CHAPTER 3. ESTATES OF HOMESTEAD

Subchapter 1. General Provisions

§ 101. Definition; exemption from attachment and execution.

The homestead of a natural person consisting of a dwelling house, outbuildings, and the land used in connection therewith, not exceeding $125,000.00 in value, and owned and used or kept by such person as a homestead together with the rents, issues, profits, and products thereof, shall be exempt from attachment and execution except as hereinafter provided.

Amended 1967, No. 287 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1979, No. 67 , § 7; 1995, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 24a, eff. Jan. 1, 1997; 2009, No. 55 , § 8.

History

Source. 1953, No. 127 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 2610. P.L. § 2559. 1921, No. 74 , § 1. G.L. § 2706. P.S. § 2544. V.S. § 2179. R.L. § 1894. G.S. 68, 1. 1860, No. 35 . 1849, No. 20 , § 1.

Amendments--2009. Substituted "$125,000.00" for "$75,000.00" after "exceeding" and made a minor punctuation change.

Amendments--1995 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted "$75,000.00" for "$30,000.00".

Amendments--1979. Substituted "$30,000.00" for "$5,000.00".

Amendments--1967 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "$5,000.00" for "$2,500.00".

Applicability--1979 amendment. 1979, No. 67 , § 11, provided that section 7 of the act, which amended this section, shall apply only to judgments rendered subsequent to May 8, 1979.

Cross References

Cross references. Personal property exempt from attachment and execution, see § 2740 of Title 12.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Purpose.

The original purpose of the homestead exemption was the conservation of family homes. Estate of Giard v. Laird, 159 Vt. 508, 621 A.2d 1265 (1993).

The purpose of the homestead exemption is to protect homeownership from loss to creditors. Mercier v. Partlow, 149 Vt. 523, 546 A.2d 787 (1988).

2. Construction.

Definition of a "homestead" in 27 V.S.A. § 101 is an exemption concept and describes the rest that the state has carved out as being protected from execution by creditors; it has nothing to do with security interests. In re Mayer-Myers, 345 B.R. 127 (Bankr. D. Vt. June 15, 2006).

United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont holds that: (1) the proportion of the Vermont homestead exemption available to a debtor is equal to the proportion of the debtor's ownership interest in the homestead; (2) a debtor's exemptible interest is equal to her equity, and equity is computed by subtracting the full amount of the debtor's liability for liens against the property from the value of the debtor's interest in the property; and (3) a co-tenant's prior bankruptcy filing and claim of exemption have no effect on the debtor's exemption rights. In re Norton, 327 B.R. 193 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2005).

The word "thereof" in this section modifies "a dwelling house, outbuildings and land used in connection therewith . . . owned and used or kept" by a person as a homestead. In re Evans, 51 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985).

This section does not vest in a natural person the absolute right to a homestead exemption, but is qualified by the words "except as hereinafter provided"; the exception is spelled out in section 107 of this title. In re Soter, 26 B.R. 838 (Bankr. D. Vt.), appeal dismissed, 31 B.R. 986 (D. Vt. 1983).

3. Construction with other laws.

Bankruptcy court found that it had jurisdiction to resolve an adversary proceeding Chapter 13 debtors filed against an LLC, which claimed that a mortgage the LLC held was invalid under 27 V.S.A. § 141, because a determination of the validity of the LLC's mortgage was essential and integral to a determination of the LLC's secured status under 11 U.S.C.S. § 506(a), resolution of the LLC's objection to confirmation of the debtors' plan under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1325(a)(3), and resolution of the LLC's objection to a homestead exemption the debtors claimed under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(b)(1) and 27 V.S.A § 101. There was no merit to the LLC's claim that the court should have used its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C.S. § 105(a) to decide the case, instead of determining whether the mortgage was valid under § 141. In re Orcutt, - B.R. - (Bankr. D. Vt. Apr. 2, 2013), appeal dismissed, in part, mot. denied, in part, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2966 (D. Vt. 2013).

Homestead which a Chapter 7 debtor purchased in 2003 was not exempt from credit card debt the debtor began incurring in 2001. Although 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(c) provided that property excepted under § 522 was not liable for any debt the debtor incurred before she declared bankruptcy, that section did not apply because the debtor elected to claim her homestead exemption under 27 V.S.A. § 101, and 27 V.S.A. § 107 provided that her homestead was subject to attachment and levy of execution upon causes of action existing at the time she acquired the homestead. In re Lewis, 400 B.R. 417 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2009).

Statutory homestead exemption, purpose of which was to protect homeownership from loss to creditors, did not apply in context of divorce, and therefore family court did not err by imposing $15,000 lien on mother's real estate in course of its division of marital property. Pearson v. Pearson, 169 Vt. 28, 726 A.2d 71 (1999).

Section 107 of this title does not fix the time for acquiring a homestead since the beginning words "such homestead" in the section presuppose the existence of a homestead which may be created and exempted under this section; rather, section 107 fixes the time at which existing causes of action shall make the homestead subject to attachment and levy of execution, i.e., the date of the filing of the deed on such homestead. In re Soter, 26 B.R. 838 (Bankr. D. Vt.), appeal dismissed, 31 B.R. 986 (D. Vt. 1983).

A debtor may acquire a homestead for purposes of the statutory exemption from attachment and execution under this section and section 107 of this title before the date of the recording of the deed of the homestead. In re Soter, 26 B.R. 838 (Bankr. D. Vt.), appeal dismissed, 31 B.R. 986 (D. Vt. 1983).

4. Scope of exemption.

Farmer who declared Chapter 7 bankruptcy was allowed to claim a homestead exemption under 27 V.S.A. § 101 in a 3.69-acre parcel of land he used as his residence and to operate a wheatgrass business he owned, and because judicial liens an LLC and other creditors had placed on the property impaired the farmer's right to claim an exemption, they could be stripped off pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 522 and treated as unsecured claims; the fact that the farmer's only source of water was a well in a greenhouse that was on the property was evidence that the farmer used the greenhouse and a garage that was attached to the greenhouse as part of his homestead. In re Rommer, 549 B.R. 72 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2016).

Creditor and trustee who objected to debtor's homestead exemption failed to sustain their burden under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003 with respect to their request that the court limit the debtor's homestead exemption to a single parcel of land, or a portion of one parcel. Here, the record was unequivocal that the total value of both of the debtor's parcels was less than the allowable homestead exemption under 27 V.S.A. § 101 and, under that law, the debtor was neither limited to one parcel nor subject to the carve out under 27 V.S.A § 102 since that carve out applied only to situations where the value of the debtor's interest exceeded the applicable monetary limit. In re Mead, 489 B.R. 363 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2013).

Where a debtor owned a one-half interest in homestead property with a co-tenant to whom she was not married, under 27 V.S.A. § 101, the debtor's equity equaled the total amount due on the mortgage less the value of her one-half interest. The co-tenant's prior bankruptcy filing and claim of exemption had no effect on the debtor's exemption rights. In re Norton, 327 B.R. 193 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2005).

The homestead law does not vest any title to the homestead in the wife of the legal and general owner during his lifetime, but only a contingent and inchoate right which, if not released or otherwise barred, may be enforced if the wife survives him. In re Avery, 41 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984).

One could not have a homestead in mere land; nor in land with no buildings but a barn on it; a dwelling house, owned, used, or kept as a home, was the first essential of a homestead. Rice v. Rudd, 57 Vt. 6 (1885).

A person can have but one homestead at a given time. Goodall v. Boardman, 53 Vt. 92 (1880); In re Estate of Wolff, 108 Vt. 54, 182 A. 187 (1936).

*5. Rents.

The homestead exemption provided for by this section does not encompass rents received from the use of a building on land adjoining the homestead premises which is not used as a dwelling by the debtor. In re Evans, 51 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985).

Products of a homestead were exempt from attachment and execution absolutely and without any qualification or exception, even if the debtor had received an equivalent from other portion of his possession. Jewett v. Guyer, 38 Vt. 209 (1865).

*6. Type of dwelling.

Claiming an exemption in a duplex does not appear to be forbidden by law. In re Ruggles, 210 B.R. 57 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1997).

7. Intent to acquire homestead.

Plaintiff, an unmarried man, having bought, improved and kept a piece of land, with a building thereon, with intention of making a dwelling for himself and mother, acquired a homestead. Pierce v. Kusic, 56 Vt. 418 (1883); Hyser v. Mansfield, 72 Vt. 71, 47 A. 105 (1899).

In ascertaining whether premises had been kept as a homestead, the intention of the party making the claim was necessarily an important element for consideration. Whiteman v. Field, 53 Vt. 554 (1881); Thorp v. Wilbur, 71 Vt. 266, 44 A. 339 (1899).

That defendant deeded to his brother his interest in the house; that he gathered materials to build another house; that he filed his petition to have a homestead set out from another part of premises; that he lived for several years in several different towns - were actions inconsistent with the idea that he was keeping the premises for a homestead. Whiteman v. Field, 53 Vt. 554 (1881).

To acquire a homestead in premises, they must be used or kept for a family home; and it could not be gained by a mere intention to occupy them at some indefinite future time; there must be a present use of the premises or the keeping of them for that purpose with a present right to use them. True v. Estate of Morrill, 28 Vt. 672 (1856); Keyes v. Bump's Administrator, 59 Vt. 391, 9 A. 598 (1887).

8. Ownership and occupancy.

House which a Chapter 7 debtor occupied after he was divorced from his wife was his homestead, even though a Vermont court which entered the divorce decree ordered the debtor to sell the house and divide the proceeds with his ex-wife and held the debtor in contempt when he failed to do so; the debtor did not waive his right to claim that $44,500 in equity he had in the house was exempt from creditors' claims under 27 V.S.A. § 101 because he entered a consent judgment when his former mother-in-law sued him to collect a debt, and there was no merit to the mother-in-law's claim that the debtor was not allowed under 27 V.S.A. § 107 to exempt the debt he owed her because the debt arose before he claimed the house as his homestead. In re Kadoch, 528 B.R. 626 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2015), aff'd, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168359 (D. Vt. 2015).

Debtors were entitled to claim the property as exempt under 27 V.S.A. § 101, under circumstances where (i) debtors each had an undivided one-half interest in the property as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and had lived at the property as their primary residence since prior to 2001, (ii) debtors claimed the property as exempt on amended Schedule C, and (iii) the bank did not dispute that debtors were entitled to claim the homestead exemption. In re Lavictoire, - B.R. - (Bankr. D. Vt. Mar. 29, 2011).

Where claimant of homestead exemption owned two buildings, both located on a single piece of property, and rented one and resided in the other, the homestead exemption was applicable only to the building in which the debtor resided, and not the entire property, notwithstanding the fact that the property could not be subdivided; subdivision is not crucial to the protection for the homestead exemption of the debtor. In re Evans, 51 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985).

Ownership and occupancy or use are essential conditions of the existence of the homestead right. In re Avery, 41 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984).

Implicit in this section is some type of ownership by the person claiming the exemption. In re Avery, 41 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984).

Occupancy for a temporary purpose was insufficient to establish a homestead exemption. In re Estate of Wolff, 108 Vt. 54, 182 A. 187 (1936).

Where plaintiff had no right of occupancy, the premises were not used or kept as a homestead. Bugbee v. Bemis, 50 Vt. 216 (1877).

9. Date of filing bankruptcy.

Court having found that debtors were entitled to claim the property as exempt under 27 V.S.A. § 101, 11 U.S.C.S. § 522 made clear that the "applicable" exemption was the exemption statute as it existed on debtors' respective petition dates. In re Lavictoire, - B.R. - (Bankr. D. Vt. Mar. 29, 2011).

Federal bankruptcy law extends the 1995 exemption increase (from $30,000 to $75,000) to all prepetition debt, not only to debts incurred after the effective date of the increase. In re Skjetne, 213 B.R. 274 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1997).

Valuation of a homestead for purpose of exemption in a bankruptcy proceeding is the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition. In re Girard, 98 B.R. 685 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1989).

In order for a bankruptcy debtor to claim a homestead exemption under this section, the debtor must own the subject property at the time a petition for relief in bankruptcy is filed. In re Gorman, 82 B.R. 253 (D. Vt. 1987).

Ownership of the property as of the date of the filing of the petition for relief is a prerequisite for the assertion of a homestead right. In re Gorman, 68 B.R. 541 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986), aff'd, 82 B.R. 253 (D. Vt. 1987).

The date of the filing of a bankruptcy petition determines right of a debtor to a homestead exemption under this section. In re Evans, 51 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985).

Homestead rights are determined as of the date of the filing of the petition for relief. In re Avery, 41 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984).

10. House under construction.

Dwelling house in process of erection could be exempt from attachment as homestead. Woodbury v. Warren, 67 Vt. 251, 31 A. 295 (1894).

11. Equitable interest.

Avoidance of creditor's lien on debtor's property pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(f) was not warranted because debtor's persistent use of the property during the period when his LLC held legal title to the property did not meet the demanding criteria established for equitable title under Vermont law; when debtor acquired the property, he acquired it subject to the creditor's lien, by operation of 27 V.S.A. § 107. In re Hewitt, 576 B.R. 790 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2017).

By filing for divorce, a wife did not acquire equitable title through the property settlement statute to property owned by the husband and therefore was not entitled to a homestead exemption with regard to the mortgage on that property. The family court's injunction against the alienation of marital property did not affect this result, as it did not give either party a right to any item of property. Brattleboro S&L Ass'n v. Hardie, 196 Vt. 144, 94 A.3d 1132 (Mar. 21, 2014).

One may have a homestead in premises in which he has only an equitable title. In re Avery, 41 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984).

One may have a homestead right in premises in which he has only an equitable title; and the avails of the sale of such homestead are exempt from attachment by trustee process. Executor of Doane v. Doane, 46 Vt. 485 (1874).

This section applies to equitable as well as legal ownership; an incumbered as well as unincumbered estate. Morgan v. Stearns, 41 Vt. 398 (1868).

12. Mortgaged property.

Where property is subject to a mortgage, the homestead exemption applies to the debtor's equity, not to the full fair market value of the property. Mercier v. Partlow, 149 Vt. 523, 546 A.2d 787 (1988).

13. Judgment liens.

The homestead exemption applies to judgment liens. Mercier v. Partlow, 149 Vt. 523, 546 A.2d 787 (1988).

14. Judicial liens.

Homestead exemption law encompasses protection against attachment of judicial liens on exempt property. In re Girard, 98 B.R. 685 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1989).

15. Tenants in common.

The provisions of statute relating to homesteads were sufficiently broad and comprehensive to include a homestead right in lands in which owner was the owner of an undivided share as a tenant in common with others. McClary v. Bixby, 36 Vt. 254 (1863); Danforth v. Beattie, 43 Vt. 138 (1870); Richardson v. Richardson, 111 Vt. 140, 11 A.2d 227 (1940).

16. Partnerships.

An individual debtor may not claim a homestead exemption in real property occupied by the debtor but owned by a limited partnership in which the debtor has an interest as a limited partner, since a partnership owns real property as a distinct legal entity separate and apart from the individual partners. In re Russell, 80 B.R. 662 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987).

It is partnership as a separate legal entity, and not the individual partners that owns real property acquired by a partnership. In re Gorman, 68 B.R. 541 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986), aff'd, 82 B.R. 253 (D. Vt. 1987).

17. Conveyances.

Owner of an exempt homestead could convey it even if he did so with intent to place it beyond reach of his creditors. Morse v. Andrews, 112 Vt. 456, 28 A.2d 393 (1942).

Owner of homestead was under no obligation to keep it until his death, so that his creditors could reach it, or, if he disposed of it during his lifetime, to sell it for value or obtain for it something which his creditors could reach. Morse v. Andrews, 112 Vt. 456, 28 A.2d 393 (1942).

18. Abandonment .

Where debtors resided at their homestead on date of filing petition in bankruptcy, even though they had earlier rented said premises for a time and lived in another town they were entitled to an exemption under this section since the evidence showed that they never had an intention of abandoning their homestead permanently and had retained the homestead as a mailing address for voting and registration of their motor vehicle. In re White, 18 B.R. 95 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982).

When a homestead ceased to be used and kept as such, it ceased to exist, regardless of whether another had been acquired. Cushman v. Davis, 79 Vt. 111, 64 A. 456 (1906).

*19. Absence.

Absence alone is not sufficient to constitute an abandonment of a homestead unless an intention to abandon is shown. In re Brent, 68 B.R. 893 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987).

The deciding consideration in determining whether a debtor's absence represents an abandonment of the homestead is whether the debtor has an intention to return. In re Brent, 68 B.R. 893 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987).

If a debtor who is absent from a homestead intends to return to the homestead, then the homestead has not been abandoned and remains exempt during the intervening absence. In re Brent, 68 B.R. 893 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987).

Where husband and wife severally and independently removed from their homestead premises, each then with no intention of again living thereon, the homestead thereby ceased to exist, and could not be revived by an unexplained claim of an interest therein, asserted by wife a long time thereafter. Cushman v. Davis, 79 Vt. 111, 64 A. 456 (1906).

Where wife and children on granting divorce moved from premises and were absent two years, it was an abandonment of the homestead. Heaton v. Sawyer, 60 Vt. 495, 15 A. 166 (1887).

Where on left his homestead with intention of returning to it after temporary sojourn elsewhere for specific purpose, but his absence was protracted by accidents longer than he originally contemplated, and he carried intention into effect as soon as he recovered from his injuries sufficiently to be removed to his home, homestead was exempt during time of such absence. West River Bank v. Gale, 42 Vt. 27 (1869).

*20. Intent to sell.

Intent to sell a homestead is evidence of an intent to abandon the homestead, but no more. In re Bernstein, 62 B.R. 545 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

Where a debtor, who was living in the homestead on the date that debtor's petition for bankruptcy was filed, intended to sell the homestead and had executed a purchase and sale agreement which was in effect on the date of the bankruptcy filing, but had not carried out the intention, the debtor had not abandoned the homestead; the intent to sell the homestead in the future, without more, could not establish a present abandonment of the homestead. In re Bernstein, 62 B.R. 545 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

When one owned two farms in different towns, but lived and made his home with his family on one - the one first acquired - although he intended to seel it, and move on to the other as his home, the one first acquired and so occupied contained the homestead. Goodall v. Boardman, 53 Vt. 92 (1880).

*21. Court order.

An injunction against the use or occupancy of property as a homestead will not deprive the enjoined owner of a homestead exemption. In re Brent, 68 B.R. 893 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987).

A debtor whose intention to return to a homestead was thwarted by a court order in a divorce proceeding which the debtor sincerely, but erroneously, believed prohibited him from occupying the homestead had not voluntarily abandoned the homestead. In re Brent, 68 B.R. 893 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987).

A debtor's failure to return to a homestead because of a mistaken belief that a court order in a divorce proceeding prohibited his return did not constitute an abandonment of the homestead in view of the debtor's abiding intention to return. In re Brent, 68 B.R. 893 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987).

22. Recovery of homestead property.

Where property conveyed was farm worth more than homestead limitation, and homestead interest had never been severed, ejectment was not proper action in which to recover that undivided interest in premises to which creditors were entitled; bill in equity was appropriate remedy. Pease v. Shirlock, 63 Vt. 622, 22 A. 661 (1891).

23. Review.

Findings of judge are conclusive as to whether premises were used or kept for homestead. Russ v. Henry's Estate, 58 Vt. 388, 3 A. 491 (1886).

24. Attachments.

Where a creditor obtained a writ of attachment against property owned by the debtor and his nondebtor wife, the wife set forth sufficient facts to pursue a homestead exemption affirmative defense if and when the court determined that she was liable for the creditor's debt, and the creditor sought to levy on the attachment against property the wife asserted to be her homestead property. Bourdeau Brothers, Inc. v. Montagne (In re Montagne), - B.R. - (Bankr. D. Vt. Feb. 1, 2010).

25. Proceeds of sale of homestead property.

Debtor's proposed exemption of the proceeds from the pre-petition sale of her Vermont homestead property could be claimed as exempt, without durational or reinvestment restrictions, under the homestead exemption provisions of 27 V.S.A. § 101 and 12 V.S.A. § 3023. In re Greene, 451 B.R. 331 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2011).

25. Equitable subordination.

Although a wife who declared Chapter 13 bankruptcy with her husband ("debtors") had the right under 27 V.S.A. § 141 to avoid a mortgage an LLC held on the debtors' homestead because the LLC did not require the wife to sign a mortgage the husband signed when he borrowed money from the LLC to pay debts that were secured by the property, the court had the power under the doctrine of equitable subordination to grant the LLC an equitable lien on the debtors' homestead to secure a portion of a debt in the amount of $153,359 the husband owed, and found that the LLC was entitled to an equitable lien in the amount of $91,851, which included the amount of the loan the debtors used to pay off an existing mortgage and taxes they owed. Jones v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC (In re Jones), 534 B.R. 588 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2015).

Cited. In re Soter, 31 B.R. 986 (D. Vt. 1983); In re Pauquette, 38 B.R. 170 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984); Quimby v. Myers, 179 Vt. 611, 895 A.2d 128 (mem.) (November 9, 2005); Weale v. Lund, 180 Vt. 551, 904 A.2d 1191 (mem.) (July 7, 2006).

Law review commentaries

Law review. Post-judgment executions in Vermont, see 2 Vt. L. Rev. 117 (1977).

§ 102. Designating homestead in case of levy.

When an execution is levied upon real estate of the person of which a homestead is a part or upon that part of a homestead in excess of the limitation of $125,000.00 in value, that person may designate and choose the part thereof, not exceeding the limited value, to which the exemption created in section 101 of this title shall apply. Upon designation and choice or refusal to designate or choose, the officer levying the execution, if the parties fail to agree upon appraisers, shall appoint three disinterested freeholders of the vicinity who shall be sworn by him or her and who shall fix the location and boundaries of the homestead to the amount of $125,000.00 in value. The officer shall then proceed with the sale of the residue of the real estate on the execution as in other cases, and the doings in respect to the homestead shall be stated in the return upon the execution.

Amended 1967, No. 287 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1995, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 24b, eff. Jan. 1, 1997; 2009, No. 55 , § 8.

History

Source. 1953, No. 127 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 2611. P.L. § 2560. 1921, No. 74 , § 2. G.L. § 2707. P.S. § 2545. V.S. § 2180. R.L. § 1895. G.S. 68, § 2. 1849, No. 20 , § 2.

Amendments--2009. Substituted "$125,000.00" for "$75,000.00" in the first and second sentences.

Amendments--1995 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted "$75,000.00" for "$5,000.00" preceding "in value" in the first and second sentences and made a minor change in phraseology in the second sentence.

Amendments--1967 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "$5,000.00" for "$2,500.00" and made other minor changes in phraseology in the first and second sentences.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Setting out.

If land in which debtor has a homestead interest is sold subject to homestead, without setting it out by metes and bounds, levy is void. Whitefield v. Adams, 65 Vt. 632, 27 A. 323 (1893).

Homestead must be set out before the residue of premises can be set off on execution, otherwise levy will be irregular. Fairbanks v. Devereaux, 48 Vt. 550 (1879).

2. Applicability.

Creditor and trustee who objected to debtor's homestead exemption failed to sustain their burden under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003 with respect to their request that the court limit the debtor's homestead exemption to a single parcel of land, or a portion of one parcel. Here, the record was unequivocal that the total value of both of the debtor's parcels was less than the allowable homestead exemption under 27 V.S.A. § 101 and, under that law, the debtor was neither limited to one parcel nor subject to the carve out under 27 V.S.A. § 102 since that carve out applied only to situations where the value of the debtor's interest exceeded the applicable monetary limit. In re Mead, 489 B.R. 363 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2013).

Cited. Abbadessa v. Tegu, 122 Vt. 338, 173 A.2d 153 (1961).

§ 103. When real estate mortgaged.

At the time of such levy of execution, if such homestead or real estate is encumbered by mortgage, the value and location of the homestead shall be fixed as provided in section 102 of this title and thereupon the sale shall proceed in the same manner as when a right to redeem mortgaged lands is taken. Only such portion of the mortgage as is in excess of the value of such real estate, aside from such homestead, shall rest on such homestead.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2612. P.L. § 2561. G.L. § 2708. P.S. § 2546. V.S. § 2181. 1888, No. 74 , § 1. R.L. § 1896. G.S. 68, § 3.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Application of exemption.

Where property is subject to a mortgage, the homestead exemption applies to the debtor's equity, not to the full fair market value of the property. Mercier v. Partlow, 149 Vt. 523, 546 A.2d 787 (1988).

§ 104. Products of homestead.

When the personal property of such person is attached or taken on execution against him or her and the debtor therein claims that the same or a part thereof is the product of such homestead, appraisers shall be appointed and sworn as provided in section 102 of this title. They shall make division of such property, decide upon such claim and set out the products of such homestead to the debtor accordingly, and the doings thereon shall be stated by the officer in his or her return.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2613. P.L. § 2562. 1921, No. 74 , § 5. G.L. § 2709. P.S. § 2547. V.S. § 2182. R.L. § 1897. G.S. 68, § 4. 1849, No. 20 , § 3.

§ 105. Surviving spouse's interest in homestead.

If a person dies leaving a surviving spouse, his or her homestead to the value aforesaid shall pass to and vest in the surviving spouse without being subject to the payment of debts of the deceased, unless legally charged thereon in his or her lifetime; and the surviving spouse shall take the same estate therein of which the surviving spouses's husband or wife dies seised. The probate division of the superior court in which the decedent's estate is pending shall set out such homestead to the surviving spouse.

Amended 1985, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a, eff. Feb. 1, 2011.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2614. P.L. § 2563. 1927, No. 47 . 1921, No. 74 , § 6. G.L. § 2710. P.S. § 2548. 1896, No. 44 , § 17. V.S. § 2183. R.L. § 1898. G.S. 68, § 5. 1856, No. 23 . 1855, No. 14 , § 1. 1849, No. 20 , § 4.

Amendments--2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted "probate division of the superior court" for "probate court".

Amendments--1985 (Adj. Sess.). Amended section generally.

Cross References

Cross references. Notice and exercise of right to election to set out homestead, see Rule 13, Vermont Rules of Probate Procedure.

Statutory share of surviving spouse, see § 461 et seq. of Title 14.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Generally.

The surviving spouse's right of homestead is of such paramount importance that it is regarded as a restraint upon the exercise of another fundamental right - that of testamentary disposition, and it is beyond dispute that any effort to will away such a right must fail. Budde v. Pierce, 135 Vt. 152, 375 A.2d 984 (1977).

Where divorce decree required husband to make a will leaving his real estate to the minor children of the parties, and at time of his death, husband was remarried but had not yet complied with the provisions of the divorce decree, having made no testamentary disposition whatever of the subject real estate, even if divorce decree was a binding and valid contract to devise real estate, its specific enforcement could not affect the rights of the widow of a party to that contract from her statutory claims to a portion of the estate. Budde v. Pierce, 135 Vt. 152, 375 A.2d 984 (1977).

2. Setting out homestead.

Upon decease of husband, the homestead vests in surviving spouse and it becomes duty of probate court having jurisdiction of estate, when necessary, to appoint commissioners to set the same out; it does not depend, however, on contingency of being set out; it is consummated by husband's death. In re Estate of Cooke, 117 Vt. 336, 91 A.2d 683 (1952).

Homestead right does not become a fixed and definite estate in land until it is ascertained and set out; before it is ascertained and set out, it is nothing more than a contingent or inchoate right - a conditional lien or encumbrance. Cole v. Cole, 117 Vt. 354, 91 A.2d 819 (1952).

3. Antenuptial contract.

Where husband failed to perform his part of antenuptial contract as to paying during his lifetime, widow was entitled to homestead; because homestead by force of this section vests in the widow on the death of the husband; and the contract, being a release or discharge of something not in existence at the time it was given, cannot defeat this right. Mann v. Mann's Estate, 53 Vt. 48 (1880).

Antenuptial covenant not to claim a homestead was executory and could only be enforced by a court of general equity powers. Mann v. Mann's Estate, 53 Vt. 48 (1880).

4. Effect of devise.

The homestead interest is a statutory right, created by operation of law only at the death of a spouse, and the statute does not contemplate transfer or waiver of this interest before it vests; therefore, a husband did not convey, by a second quitclaim deed, his homestead interest to his wife. In re Estate of Mainolfi, 178 Vt. 588, 878 A.2d 287 (mem.) (June 1, 2005).

In absence of express or implied intention on part of testator that his widow should elect between her lawful rights in his property and provisions made for her in his will, she shall take both, and he who asserts that testator intended provisions made for her to be in lieu of her marital rights in his estate has burden of proving that fact beyond reasonable doubt. In re Estate of Taylor, 110 Vt. 80, 2 A.2d 317 (1938).

Cited. Whiteman v. Field, 53 Vt. 554 (1881); Heaton v. Sawyer, 60 Vt. 495, 15 A. 166 (1887); In re Hatch's Estate, 62 Vt. 300, 18 A. 814 (1890); Thorp v. Thorp, 70 Vt. 46, 39 A. 245 (1897); Proulx v. Parrow, 115 Vt. 232, 56 A.2d 623 (1948); In re Avery, 41 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984); Charter One Bank v. Estate of Spillane, 174 Vt. 490, 807 A.2d 452 (mem.) (2002).

§ 106. Forfeiture and sale.

  1. When there are minor children living, an executor or administrator may make application to the probate division of the superior court to sell such homestead, such application stating the facts on which it is based, where:
    1. The widow or surviving husband was not living with the deceased husband or wife at the time of the death of the other and had not resided at the homestead for two years immediately prior to such death through the fault of such widow or surviving husband; or
    2. Such widow or surviving husband has left the homestead and his or her residence cannot be ascertained after diligent inquiry by the executor or administrator of the deceased spouse.
  2. After personal notice where possible or after order of publication thereon complied with, the probate division of the superior court may grant a license to the executor or administrator to sell the homestead if upon hearing it finds that such widow or surviving husband resided away from the homestead through his or her own fault or with the intention to abandon the minor children of the deceased.  If the probate division of the superior court shall embody in such license a clause to such effect, such widow or surviving husband shall lose all right in and to such homestead.  The net proceeds of such sale shall be assigned by the probate division of the superior court to such minor children for their use and benefit.

    Amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a, eff. Feb. 1, 2011.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2615. P.L. § 2564. 1927, No. 47 . 1921, No. 74 , § 6. G.L. § 2710. P.S. § 2548. 1896, No. 44 , § 17. V.S. § 2183. R.L. § 1898. G.S. 68, § 5. 1856, No. 23 . 1855, No. 14 , § 1. 1849, No. 20 , § 4.

Amendments--2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted "probate division of the superior court" for "probate court" in subsec. (a) and three times in subsec. (b).

ANNOTATIONS

1. Barring spouse's interest.

Exclusive means by which interest in homestead retained by surviving spouse may be barred is explicitly set out in this section. Budde v. Pierce, 135 Vt. 152, 375 A.2d 984 (1977).

This section is only statutory method of barring widow's homestead. In re Estate of Cooke, 117 Vt. 336, 91 A.2d 683 (1952).

§ 107. Liability of homestead for debts.

Such homestead shall be subject to attachment and levy of execution upon causes of action existing at the time of acquiring the homestead, except as otherwise provided in this chapter. For that purpose, such time shall be the date of the filing of the deed of such homestead in the proper office for the record of deeds.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2616. P.L. § 2565. G.L. § 2712. P.S. § 2550. V.S. § 2186. R.L. § 1901. G.S. 68, § 7. 1849, No. 20 , § 6.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Purpose.

The intent of this section is to fix the time for making certain claims against a homestead subject to attachment and levy rather than to fix the date of the acquisition of the homestead by the debtor. In re Soter, 26 B.R. 838 (Bankr. D. Vt.), appeal dismissed, 31 B.R. 986 (D. Vt. 1983).

2. Construction.

Court found no reason not to construe plainly the plain language of 27 V.S.A. § 107, "liability of homestead for debts," which was premised on there actually being a debt due on the date that debtors acquired the property. In order to obtain the benefits of the shield created by 27 V.S.A. § 107, the burden was on the creditor to establish that it had a "debt" existing when the homestead was acquired, and it failed to do; therefore, enforcement of its judgment was subject to, and limited by, debtors' homestead exemption under 27 V.S.A. § 101. In re Bourgault, - B.R. - (Bankr. D. Vt. Mar. 30, 2011).

The phrase "causes of action existing" as used in this section includes debts existing when the homestead was acquired; the wording is not limited to debts on which the creditor can bring suit - that is, debts that have gone into default. Weale v. Lund, 180 Vt. 551, 904 A.2d 1191 (mem.) (July 7, 2006).

This section does not fix the time for acquiring a homestead since the beginning words "such homestead" in the section presuppose the existence of a homestead which may be created and exempted under section 101 of this title; rather, this section fixes the time at which existing causes of action shall make the homestead subject to attachment and levy of execution, i.e., the date of the filing of the deed on such homestead. In re Soter, 26 B.R. 838 (Bankr. D. Vt.), appeal dismissed, 31 B.R. 986 (D. Vt. 1983).

A debtor may acquire a homestead for purposes of the statutory exemption from attachment and execution under section 101 of this title and this section before the date of the recording of the deed of the homestead. In re Soter, 26 B.R. 838 (Bankr. D. Vt.), appeal dismissed, 31 B.R. 986 (D. Vt. 1983).

3. Prior debts.

Homestead which a Chapter 7 debtor purchased in 2003 was not exempt from credit card debt the debtor began incurring in 2001. Although 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(c) provided that property excepted under § 522 was not liable for any debt the debtor incurred before she declared bankruptcy, that section did not apply because the debtor elected to claim her homestead exemption under 27 V.S.A. § 101, and 27 V.S.A. § 107 provided that her homestead was subject to attachment and levy of execution upon causes of action existing at the time she acquired the homestead. In re Lewis, 400 B.R. 417 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2009).

Homestead was attachable upon a note given after its acquisition in renewal of a note existing before. Robinson v. Leach, 67 Vt. 128, 31 A. 32 (1895).

It was existence of cause of action, and not whether demand was due, which determined liability of homestead. Titus v. Warren, 67 Vt. 242, 31 A. 297 (1894).

Homestead was subject to attachment on all debts existing at time of filing deed of homestead in town clerk's office. Gilson v. Parkhurst, 53 Vt. 384 (1881).

4. Debts contracted after filing of deed.

The homestead of a debtor is exempt from attachment upon debts contracted after the filing of the deed of the homestead for record in the appropriate town clerk's office and before the occupation of the premises by the debtor as a homestead. West River Bank v. Gale, 42 Vt. 27 (1869); Lamb v. Mason, 45 Vt. 500 (1873); In re Bernstein, 62 B.R. 545 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).

5. Avoidance of liens.

Avoidance of creditor's lien on debtor's property pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(f) was not warranted because debtor's persistent use of the property during the period when his LLC held legal title to the property did not meet the demanding criteria established for equitable title under Vermont law; when debtor acquired the property, he acquired it subject to the creditor's lien, by operation of this statute. In re Hewitt, 576 B.R. 790 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2017).

Chapter 7 debtor was allowed under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(f) to avoid a judgment lien a bank placed on a house the debtor purchased after he agreed to surrender the marital home to his wife in a divorce action because the lien impaired a homestead exemption the debtor was allowed to claim under Vermont law on his new home. The debtor was allowed under 27 V.S.A. § 109 to protect equity he had in his new home if he acquired the new home with funds derived from a prior homestead, and IRA funds he used to purchase the new home were part of the consideration he received from the disposition of his former homestead because they were part of a global equitable distribution of marital property the state court approved; it did not matter that the debtor obtained a home equity loan on his new home shortly after he purchased the home and used the money to replace funds he took from his IRA. In re Patterson, 482 B.R. 755 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2012).

Because a Chapter 7 debtor had no interest in certain real property prior to when a creditor's judgment lien attached to the property, she had no right to avoid the lien under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(f) as subject to the homestead exemption of 27 V.S.A. § 107. The lien did not attach after the debtor acquired her interest but rather attached simultaneously with the creation of her interest in the property. In re Nunn, - B.R. - (Bankr. D. Vt. June 13, 2011).

6. Particular cases.

House which a Chapter 7 debtor occupied after he was divorced from his wife was his homestead, even though a Vermont court which entered the divorce decree ordered the debtor to sell the house and divide the proceeds with his ex-wife and held the debtor in contempt when he failed to do so; the debtor did not waive his right to claim that $44,500 in equity he had in the house was exempt from creditors' claims under 27 V.S.A. § 101 because he entered a consent judgment when his former mother-in-law sued him to collect a debt, and there was no merit to the mother-in-law's claim that the debtor was not allowed under 27 V.S.A. § 107 to exempt the debt he owed her because the debt arose before he claimed the house as his homestead. In re Kadoch, 528 B.R. 626 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2015), aff'd, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168359 (D. Vt. 2015).

§ 108. Liability of homestead for taxes.

Like other real estate, a homestead shall be liable for the payment of taxes assessed thereon.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2617. P.L. § 2566. G.L. § 2713. P.S. § 2551. V.S. § 2187. R.L. § 1902. G.S. 68, § 8. 1849, No. 20 , § 6.

§ 109. Acquisition of new homestead.

When a person acquires a new homestead, the prior homestead shall be liable for his or her debts and may be conveyed by him or her like other real estate. Such new homestead shall not be liable for causes of action against him or her to which such prior homestead would not have been liable, if such new homestead is acquired with the consideration derived from the sale or other disposition of such prior homestead, or with other means not derived from the property of such person.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2618. P.L. § 2567. 1921, No. 74 , § 8. G.L. § 2714. P.S. § 2552. V.S. § 2188. R.L. § 1903. G.S. 68, § 9.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Setting out new homestead.

Commissioners could not set out a homestead in old portion of the premises although the newly adopted homestead had been lost by expiration of a decree of foreclosure; newly adopted homestead must be adhered to, and widow given only such portion as she had not lost through the foreclosure. Thorp v. Wilbur, 71 Vt. 266, 44 A. 339 (1899).

2. Prior debts chargeable against new homestead.

The intent and interpretation of the language in this section to the effect that a new homestead is not liable for any causes of action to which the prior homestead would not have been liable if such new homestead was acquired with the consideration derived from the sale or other disposition of such prior homestead or with other means not derived from the property of the person acquiring the new homestead is to transfer to the new homestead only those obligations with which the first homestead was chargeable; those obligations are defined under section 107 of this title as causes of action existing at the time of acquiring the homestead. In re Soter, 26 B.R. 838 (Bankr. D. Vt.), appeal dismissed, 31 B.R. 986 (D. Vt. 1983).

3. Effect of divorce on ability to exemption.

Chapter 7 debtor was allowed under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(f) to avoid a judgment lien a bank placed on a house the debtor purchased after he agreed to surrender the marital home to his wife in a divorce action because the lien impaired a homestead exemption the debtor was allowed to claim under Vermont law on his new home. The debtor was allowed under 27 V.S.A. § 109 to protect equity he had in his new home if he acquired the new home with funds derived from a prior homestead, and IRA funds he used to purchase the new home were part of the consideration he received from the disposition of his former homestead because they were part of a global equitable distribution of marital property the state court approved; it did not matter that the debtor obtained a home equity loan on his new home shortly after he purchased the home and used the money to replace funds he took from his IRA. In re Patterson, 482 B.R. 755 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2012).

Subchapter 2. Conveyance of Homestead

§ 141. Execution and acknowledgment of conveyance.

  1. A homestead or an interest therein shall not be conveyed by the owner thereof, if married, except by way of mortgage for the purchase money thereof given at the time of such purchase, unless the wife or husband joins in the execution and acknowledgment of such conveyance.  A conveyance thereof, or of an interest therein, not so made and acknowledged, shall be inoperative so far only as relates to the homestead provided for in this chapter.
  2. When a mortgagee takes an accruing mortgage, the only debt which shall be secured thereby or become a lien upon the property described therein shall be the debt described in the mortgage and existing at the time of its execution, and any subsequent direct indebtedness of the mortgagor to such mortgagee; provided, that when the mortgage includes a homestead, the written consent of the wife or husband of the mortgagor to the creation of such subsequent direct indebtedness shall be required.
  3. If a mortgaged property includes a homestead, any amendment to the mortgage which increases the amount of the indebtedness secured thereby or extends the date of maturity thereof, shall be executed and acknowledged by both spouses. The failure to obtain the written spousal consent shall not affect the validity or priority of such amendment, but the lien created thereby shall be inoperative so far only as relates to the rights of homestead of such spouse in the mortgaged premises under chapter 3 of this title, provided the amendment is challenged by such spouse before his or her homestead interest is otherwise extinguished.
  4. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this section, a spouse or civil union partner may convey his or her respective homestead interest to the other spouse or civil union partner prior to the time the homestead right vests, thereby divesting the grantor of any homestead interest in the property. A conveyance of homestead property between spouses or civil union partners shall be deemed to include a conveyance of any homestead interest. This section shall apply retroactively, except that it shall not affect a suit begun or pending as of July 1, 2008.

    Amended 1999, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 31, eff. May 24, 2000; 2007, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Source. 1953, No. 127 , § 3. V.S. 1947, § 2619. P.L. § 2568. 1921, No. 74 , § 9. G.L. § 2715. P.S. § 2553. V.S. § 2189. R.L. § 1904. G.S. 68, § 10. 1860, No. 36 , § 1. 1849, No. 20 , § 5.

Amendments--2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsection (d): Added.

Amendments--1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subsection (c): Added.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Purpose.

This section is part of the remedial scheme to protect home ownership from loss to creditors, to conserve family homes and to save families from disintegration and secure their permanency. Estate of Girard v. Laird, 159 Vt. 508, 621 A.2d 1265 (1992).

2. Conveyance by sole deed of spouse.

Under 27 V.S.A. § 141(a), absent circumstances not present here, unless both a husband and a wife joined in the execution and acknowledgement of a conveyance of a homestead interest, such conveyance was inoperative. Here, debtors were married at the time the wife executed the mortgage, and the husband did not join in the execution of the mortgage; therefore, applying the rules set forth in this statute to these facts leads categorically to the conclusion that the conveyance was inoperative. Orcutt v. GMAC Mortg., LLC (In re Orcutt), - B.R. - (Bankr. D. Vt. Feb. 24, 2012).

As debtor extinguished any right she retained in her husband's property prior to her filing for bankruptcy relief, by abandoning this property and claiming another property as her homestead, debtor had no marital property interest which she might either claim as exempt or utilize to void the transfer to defendant. Pierce v. Pierce (In re Pierce), - B.R. - (Bankr. D. Vt. 2003).

A widow's assertion of irregularities in transactions involving advances on a home equity loan that occurred during her first marriage to her husband should have been raised prior to her divorce when she still had an inchoate interest; once that interest was extinguished by divorce, the conveyance was no longer voidable. Charter One Bank v. Estate of Spillane, 174 Vt. 490, 807 A.2d 452 (mem.) (2002).

Debts legally charged within the lifetime of the decedent take priority over homestead interests. Charter One Bank v. Estate of Spillane, 174 Vt. 490, 807 A.2d 452 (mem.) (2002).

Rule that a deed to a homestead property, executed by only one spouse, is void ab initio is abandoned; such a conveyance is ineffective with respect to the spouse who did not join it and may be set aside by that spouse unless the homestead interest is otherwise extinguished. Estate of Girard v. Laird, 159 Vt. 508, 621 A.2d 1265 (1993).

The word "inoperative" in this section conveys that the attempted transfer of a homestead interest of the nonconveying spouse is ineffective but says nothing about whether the defect can be cured or continues after the spouse's homestead interest is extinguished. Estate of Girard v. Laird, 159 Vt. 508, 621 A.2d 1265 (1993).

Where real estate, which includes homestead, owned by husband alone, is conveyed, through a straw man, to husband and wife as tenants by entirety, wife is a necessary grantor in deed to straw man. Abbadessa v. Tegu, 122 Vt. 338, 173 A.2d 153 (1961).

Husband's sole mortgage of his homestead was void. Johnson v. Churchill's Administrator, 88 Vt. 137, 92 A. 26 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Estate of Girard v. Laird (1993) 159 Vt. 508, 621 A.2d 1265.

Homestead act protected husband as well as wife and children; and husband's sole deed of homestead was void and was in no way rendered effective by subsequent death of wife leaving him without children. Martin v. Harrington, 73 Vt. 193, 50 A. 1074 (1901), overruled on other grounds, Estate of Girard v. Laird, 159 Vt. 508, 621 A.2d 1265 (1993).

Owner of a homestead, if a married man, could not convey the same, or any interest therein, except as provided by statute, unless his wife joined in the conveyance; and his sole conveyance thereof was absolutely void as to such homestead. Abell v. Lothrop, 47 Vt. 375 (1875).

The sole deed of a husband of his homestead not worth more than maximum homestead limitations was void. Day v. Adams, 42 Vt. 510 (1869); Cushman v. Davis, 79 Vt. 111, 64 A. 456 (1906); First National Bank v. Bertoli, 88 Vt. 421, 92 A. 970 (1915).

3. Joint deed.

Wife was invested with right to bar her husband from selling or incumbering the homestead, and their joint deed thereof was, as to her, not a conveyance of the title, but a mere release, or waiver, and, in case of a mortgage, only a legal and binding consent to the incumbrance. Gordon v. Deavitt, 84 Vt. 59, 78 A. 113 (1910).

4. Purchase money mortgage.

Mortgage given for purchase price was superior to any right of homestead in the property. Lapoint v. Sage, 90 Vt. 560, 99 A. 233 (1916).

Wife need not join with husband in executing a mortgage on homestead to secure its purchase money. Davenport v. Hicks, 54 Vt. 23 (1882).

5. Lease.

A lease by husband alone of homestead for period of one year, to begin at a future day, was not necessarily an illegal undertaking, for it may have been entered into with expectation that the wife would consent, or that another homestead would be acquired. Welch v. Miller, 70 Vt. 108, 39 A. 749 (1897).

6. Devise of homestead right.

Mortgage against real property of spouses was not invalid based on the lack of one spouse's signature on the mortgage, since the spouses conveyed their interests in the property to one spouse who subsequently signed the mortgage to allow merger of properties and, pursuant to 27 V.S.A. § 141(d), the conveyance divested the non-signing spouse of such spouse's homestead interest in the property. Muther v. Citimortgage, Inc. (In re Muther), 479 B.R. 316 (Bankr. D. Vt. Sept. 28, 2012).

Husband could not by will devise the homestead away from his wife and minor children. Meech v. Estate of Meech, 37 Vt. 414 (1865).

7. Subsequent indebtedness.

Subsequent indebtedness incurred by only one mortgagor could not become a lien upon nonconsenting mortgagor's interest in the property. Bellows Falls Trust Co. v. Gibbs, 148 Vt. 633, 534 A.2d 210 (mem.) (1987).

8. Bankruptcy.

Although a wife who declared Chapter 13 bankruptcy with her husband ("debtors") had the right under 27 V.S.A. § 141 to avoid a mortgage an LLC held on the debtors' homestead because the LLC did not require the wife to sign a mortgage the husband signed when he borrowed money from the LLC to pay debts that were secured by the property, the court had the power under the doctrine of equitable subordination to grant the LLC an equitable lien on the debtors' homestead to secure a portion of a debt in the amount of $153,359 the husband owed, and found that the LLC was entitled to an equitable lien in the amount of $91,851, which included the amount of the loan the debtors used to pay off an existing mortgage and taxes they owed. Jones v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC (In re Jones), 534 B.R. 588 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2015).

It was clear error for a bankruptcy court to hold a Vermont statute controlled and rendered a mortgage inoperative, when both spouses did not sign the mortgage, because the court used the claims allowance process in 11 U.S.C.S. § 506(a) as a basis for the court's authority to adjudicate the mortgage's validity. GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Orcutt, 506 B.R. 52 (D. Vt. 2014).

Bankruptcy court found that it had jurisdiction to resolve an adversary proceeding Chapter 13 debtors filed against an LLC, which claimed that a mortgage the LLC held was invalid under 27 V.S.A. § 141, because a determination of the validity of the LLC's mortgage was essential and integral to a determination of the LLC's secured status under 11 U.S.C.S. § 506(a), resolution of the LLC's objection to confirmation of the debtors' plan under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1325(a)(3), and resolution of the LLC's objection to a homestead exemption the debtors claimed under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(b)(1) and 27 V.S.A § 101. There was no merit to the LLC's claim that the court should have used its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C.S. § 105(a) to decide the case, instead of determining whether the mortgage was valid under § 141. In re Orcutt, - B.R. - (Bankr. D. Vt. Apr. 2, 2013), appeal dismissed, in part, mot. denied, in part, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2966 (D. Vt. 2013).

Cited. Mercier v. Partlow, 149 Vt. 523, 546 A.2d 787 (1988).

§ 142. Homesteader under guardianship.

When the guardian of a married person is licensed to sell the real estate of his or her ward, the wife or husband of the ward may join with the guardian in the conveyance and release his or her right of homestead in the granted premises, as she or he might have done by a conveyance thereof made jointly with the husband or wife if he or she had not been under disability.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2625. P.L. § 2574. 1921, No. 74 , § 11. G.L. § 2721. P.S. § 2559. V.S. § 2195. R.L. § 1910. 1872, No. 41 , § 1.

§ 143. Spouse with a mental condition or psychiatric disability.

  1. When the spouse of an owner of a homestead lacks capacity to protect his or her interests due to a mental condition or psychiatric disability and the owner desires to convey it or an interest therein, he or she may petition the Probate Division of the Superior Court in the district in which the homestead is situated for a license to convey the same. Upon not less than 14 days' notice of the petition to the kindred of the spouse who lacks capacity to protect his or her interests due to a mental condition or psychiatric disability residing in the State, and to the selectboard members of the town in which the homestead is situated, which notice may be personal or by publication, the court may hear and determine the petition and may license the owner or convey the homestead, or an interest therein, by his or her sole deed. The license shall be recorded in the office where a deed of the homestead is required to be recorded and the sole deed shall have the same effect as if the spouse has the capacity to protect his or her interests and had joined therein.
  2. On granting such license, the court may make such special order as to the investment or disposition of the funds as the nature of the case requires.
  3. On the hearing of such petition for license, any of such kindred or the selectboard may appear and be heard in the premises and may appeal as provided for other appeals from decrees of the Probate Division of the Superior Court.

    Amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a, eff. Feb. 1, 2011; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 184(a); 2017, No. 11 , § 54.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, §§ 2626-2628. P.L. §§ 2575-2577. 1921, No. 74 , § 12. G.L. §§ 2722-2724. P.S. §§ 2560-2562. V.S. §§ 2196-2198. R.L. §§ 1911-1913. G.S. 68, §§ 15-17. 1857, No. 29 . 1851, No. 29 .

2013 (Adj. Sess.). In subsection (c), substituted "selectboard" for "selectmen" in accordance with 2013, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 72.

Amendments--2017. Subsec. (a): Substituted "14" for "ten" preceding "days'" in the second sentence.

Amendments--2013 (Adj. Sess.). Catchline: Substituted "with a mental condition or psychiatric disability" for "insane".

Subsection (a): Substituted "the" for "such" throughout the section, "spouse" for "wife or husband" following "When the", "lacks capacity to protect his or her interests due to a mental condition or psychiatric disability" for "is insane" following "homestead", "the spouse who lacks capacity to protect his or her interests due to a mental condition or psychiatric disability" for "such insane wife or husband" following "kindred of", "the spouse" for "such wife or husband" following "effects as if", "the capacity to protect his or her interests" for "been sane" preceding "and had joined therein", and "selectboard members" for "selectmen".

Amendments--2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted "probate division of the superior court" for "probate court" in subsecs. (a) and (c).

§ 144. Effect when spouse joins in conveyance.

The joining by a wife or husband in such conveyance shall have no effect upon her or his right to a third in value of the real estate of which the husband or wife died seised.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2620. P.L. § 2569. 1921, No. 74 , § 10. G.L. § 2716. P.S. § 2554. 1896, No. 44 , § 20. V.S. § 2190. R.L. § 1905. G.S. 68, § 11. 1858, No. 18 .

§ 145. Effect of spouse joining in mortgage.

If the homestead or lands included therein are mortgaged by the joint deed of husband and wife, the joining of the wife or husband in the mortgage shall have no other effect than to bar her or his claim to the homestead as against the mortgage. If the mortgage includes lands other than the homestead, and the owner thereof dies, the other lands shall be first sold by the executor or administrator and applied on the mortgage and the residue only shall rest on the homestead. When the Probate Division of the Superior Court orders the whole to be sold, the balance of the proceeds after the payment of the mortgage not exceeding $125,000.00 shall be under the control of the court as in case of the sale of a homestead under this chapter.

Amended 1967, No. 287 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1995, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 24c, eff. Jan. 1, 1997; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a, eff. Feb. 1, 2011; 2013, No. 194 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. June 17, 2014.

History

Source. 1953, No. 127 , § 4. V.S. 1947, § 2621. P.L. § 2570. 1921, No. 74 , § 3. G.L. § 2717. P.S. § 2555. V.S. § 2191. 1888, No. 74 , § 2. R.L. § 1906. 1865, No. 17 .

Amendments--2013 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "$125,000.00" for "$75,000.00" following "mortgage not exceeding", and made a minor stylistic change.

Amendments--2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted "probate division of the superior court" for "probate court" twice.

Amendments--1995 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted "$75,000.00" for "$5,000.00" in the third sentence.

Amendments--1967 (Adj. Sess.). Made minor changes in phraseology in the first and second sentences and substituted "$5,000.00" for "$2,500.00" in the third sentence.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Share of homestead in debt.

If property of a decedent other than homestead is not sufficient to bear the full burden of the mortgaged debt resting on all such lands, then the homestead must bear the deficiency to its full extent if necessary. Crawford v. Jerry, 111 Vt. 120, 11 A.2d 210 (1940).

Where a homestead was part of premises encumbered by a mortgage executed by a husband and his wife, it was under the burden of bearing its proportion of the mortgage debt. In re Worcester's Estate, 60 Vt. 420, 15 A. 336 (1888).

Subchapter 3. Severance and Sale of Homestead

§ 181. Appraisal and severance of homestead.

When, in a case not otherwise provided for in this chapter, it is necessary in a proceeding to sever or set out a homestead from other real estate, the court in which such proceedings are pending may appoint three commissioners to appraise and set out such homestead who, after being sworn, shall appraise and set out such homestead as provided for setting out homesteads in case of the levy of execution, and make report of their doings to such court. Such report shall be confirmed by the court unless cause is shown to the contrary, and a record thereof shall be made in the office where a deed of such homestead is required to be recorded, which shall operate as a severance of the homestead from the other real estate.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2622. P.L. § 2571. G.L. § 2718. P.S. § 2556. V.S. § 2192. R.L. § 1907. G.S. 68, § 12. 1860, No. 36 , § 2.

Revision note. Deleted "at law or in equity" following "proceeding" in the first sentence to conform to Rule 2, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Generally.

Where impracticability of setting out a homestead from remaining real estate exists, execution creditor could reach the excess over limitation of $2,500 in value, allowed for a homestead, by proceeding in accordance with the provisions set forth in this section. Abbadessa v. Tegu, 122 Vt. 338, 173 A.2d 153 (1961).

2. Ejectment.

In an action of ejectment, where defendant was entitled to a homestead, and the premises in contention were worth more than amount limited, plaintiff could not recover the excess, as section was not applicable to a trial by jury. Canfield v. Hard, 58 Vt. 217, 2 A. 136 (1885).

§ 182. Application to Superior Court for relief.

When a dwelling house, outbuildings, and lands in which a homestead right exists exceed in value $125,000.00 and a severance of the homestead would greatly depreciate the value of the residue of the premises or be of great inconvenience to the parties interested either in the residue or in the homestead, either party may apply for relief to the Superior Court by a complaint setting forth the facts.

Amended 1967, No. 287 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974; 1995, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 24d, eff. Jan. 1, 1997; 2013, No. 194 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, eff. June 17, 2014.

History

Source. 1953, No. 268 , § 1. 1953, No. 127 , § 5. V.S. 1947, § 2623. P.L. § 2572. G.L. § 2719. P.S. § 2557. V.S. § 2183. R.L. § 1908. G.S. 68, § 13. 1857, No. 28 .

Revision note. Substituted "county court" for "court of chancery" pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Substituted "complaint" for "petition" near the end of the section to conform language to Rule 3, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Amendments--2013 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "$125,000.00" for "$75,000.00," following "exceed in value", and made a minor stylistic change.

Amendments--1995 (Adj. Sess.) Deleted "not exceeding half an acre in connection therewith" following "outbuildings and lands" and substituted "$75,000.00" for "$5,000.00 or $2,500.00 if the conveyance of the land and premises was made by the party in whom the homestead right exists prior to July 1, 1968" following "exceed in value".

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" following "relief to the".

Amendments--1967 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "$5,000.00 or $2,500.00 if" for "$2,500.00 or $1,000.00 in the event that" preceding "the conveyance" and "July 1, 1968" for "June 1, 1953" following "prior to" and made other minor changes in phraseology.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited. Chaplin v. Sawyer, 35 Vt. 286 (1862); Palmer v. Palmer, 50 Vt. 310 (1877); Lindsey v. Brewer, 60 Vt. 627, 15 A. 329 (1888).

§ 183. Transfer or sale in lieu of severance.

When it appears upon hearing that such homestead cannot be occupied in severalty without great inconvenience to the parties interested therein or in such residue, the court may order such homestead to be transferred to such other parties and the payment of $125,000.00 to the owner thereof, or, at the option of the owner, the court may order the parties to transfer such residue to him or her and order him or her thereupon to pay such other parties the value thereof to be fixed by the court. If the case requires, the court may order a sale of the whole premises and apportion the proceeds between the parties, and the court may make such orders in the premises as are equitable. If such homestead is sold, the court may control the investment of the proceeds of the sale in a new homestead or make such disposition thereof as equity requires.

Amended 1967, No. 287 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1995, No. 186 (Adj. Sess.), § 24e, eff. Jan. 1, 1997; 2013, No. 194 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. June 17, 2014.

History

Source. 1953, No. 268 , § 2. 1953, No. 127 , § 6. V.S. 1947, § 2624. P.L. § 2573. 1921, No. 74 , § 4. G.L. § 2720. P.S. § 2558. V.S. § 2194. R.L. § 1909. G.S. 68, §§ 13, 14. 1857, No. 28 .

Revision note. Substituted "requires" for "required" at the end of the third sentence to correct a grammatical error.

Amendments--2013 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "$125,000.00" for "$75,000.00" following "and the payment of" and "the Court" for "such court" following "option of the owner,", and made a minor stylistic change.

Amendments--1995 (Adj. Sess.) In the first sentence, substituted "$75,000.00" for "$5,000.00" preceding "to the owner thereof" and made other minor changes in phraseology.

Amendments--1967 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "$5,000.00" for "$2,500.00" preceding "to the owner thereof" and deleted "but, in the event such owner conveyed the land and premises in which such homestead right exists prior to June 1, 1953, the court may order such homestead to be transferred to such other parties and the payment of $1,000.00 to the owner thereof" thereafter in the first sentence.

§ 184. Beneficial sale without severance.

When it appears to the probate division of the superior court that it would be beneficial to the widow or surviving husband of a deceased person, interested in the homestead, or when it appears that the severance of such homestead would greatly depreciate the value of the residue of the premises or would be of great inconvenience to the parties interested in such residue or in such homestead, on application of such widow or surviving husband or parties interested, the court may order the same to be sold as in case of the sale of real estate for the payment of debts.

Amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a, eff. Feb. 1, 2011.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2629. P.L. § 2578. 1921, No. 74 , § 13. G.L. § 2725. P.S. § 2563. 1896, No. 44 , § 21. V.S. § 2199. R.L. § 1914. 1864, No. 67 , § 1.

Amendments--2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted "probate division of the superior court" for "probate court" twice.

§ 185. Control of proceeds of sale.

When a homestead is sold by the guardian of the husband or wife and the wife or husband joins in such conveyance, releasing her or his right of homestead or when it is sold under provisions of section 184 of this title, the probate division of the superior court may control the investment of the proceeds of such sale in a new homestead or may direct the payment thereof to a trustee appointed by such court or to the wife or husband, as the case may be, under such regulations and restrictions as in the judgment of the court will be for the best interest of all concerned.

Amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a, eff. Feb. 1, 2011.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2630. P.L. § 2579. 1921, No. 74 , § 14. G.L. § 2726. P.S. § 2564. 1896, No. 44 , § 22. V.S. § 2200. R.L. § 1915. 1872, No. 41 , § 2. 1865, No. 16 . 1864, No. 67 , § 2.

Amendments--2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted "probate division of the superior court" for "probate court".

CHAPTER 5. CONVEYANCE OF REAL ESTATE

Article 1. Requirements.

Article 2. Proceedings Upon Failure of Grantor to Acknowledge.

Article 1. Machinery.

Article 2. Discharge of Mortgages.

Cross References

Cross references. Bulk sales of personal property, see Uniform Commercial Code, Title 9A.

Chattel mortgages, see Uniform Commercial Code, Title 9A.

Conditional sales of property, see Uniform Commercial Code, Title 9A.

Grantor and grantee defined, see § 118 of Title 1.

Personal estate, real estate, land, and lands defined, see §§ 129 and 132 of Title 1.

Property transfer tax, see § 9601 et seq. of Title 32.

Right of title of entry, statute of limitations, see § 502 of Title 12.

Sales of personal property, see Uniform Commercial Code, Title 9A.

Smoke detector requirements for transfer of single-family dwellings, see § 2883 of Title 9.

Statute of frauds as to contracts for sale of lands, etc., see § 181 of Title 12.

Withholding tax on sales or exchanges of real estate by nonresidents, see § 5847 of Title 32.

History

Law review commentaries

Law review. For comment, " Haner v. Bruce: Failure to Accord to the present Realities of the Real Estate Recording System," see 12 Vt. L. Rev. 283 (1987).

Subchapter 1. Manner of Conveying Interests in or Affecting Realty

Cross References

Cross references. Smoke detector requirements for transfer of single-family dwellings, see § 2883 of Title 9.

§ 301. Manner of conveying.

Conveyance of land or of an estate or interest therein may be made by deed executed by a person having authority to convey the same, or by his or her attorney, and acknowledged and recorded as provided in this chapter.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2638. P.L. § 2587. G.L. § 2734. P.S. § 2572. V.S. § 2208. R.L. § 1922. G.S. 65, § 1. R.S. 60, § 1. R. 1797, p. 304, § 2.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Rights-of-way.

Where plaintiffs' deed contained a right-of-way provision, use of the right-of-way by them is presumed to be in exercise of their rights under such deed. Begin v. Barone, 124 Vt. 421, 207 A.2d 252 (1965).

A right-of-way, when not defined in the deed, may be located by use. Holden v. Pilini, 124 Vt. 166, 200 A.2d 272 (1964).

2. Easements.

An easement created by a deed is not extinguished by mere nonuse. Welch v. Barrows, 125 Vt. 500, 218 A.2d 698 (1966).

§ 302. Effect of oral conveyance.

Estates or interests in lands, created or conveyed without an instrument in writing shall have the effect of estates at will only. An estate or interest in lands shall not be assigned, granted, or surrendered unless by operation of law or by a writing signed by the grantor or his or her attorney.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2649. P.L. § 2597. G.L. § 2744. P.S. § 2582. V.S. § 2218. R.L. § 1932. G.S. 65, § 21. R.S. 60, § 21. R. 1797, p. 304, §§ 1, 2.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Oral transfers.

Interest or estate in land created orally was a tenancy at will. Toussaint v. Stone, 116 Vt. 425, 77 A.2d 824 (1951).

An attempt to transfer an interest in lands without an instrument in writing is of no force or effect under the provisions of this section. Rutland County National Bank v. Swyer, 113 Vt. 485, 35 A.2d 658 (1944).

An oral assignment of a written lease of real estate for years created only a tenancy at will. Abbot v. Lapoint, 82 Vt. 246, 73 A. 166 (1909).

A tenant at will had no interest that he could convey, and an attempt to convey ended his tenancy. Abbot v. Lapoint, 82 Vt. 246, 73 A. 166 (1909).

2. Holding over after expiration of lease.

Where defendants commenced, under a parol lease, to occupy plaintiff's premises at an agreed rent of $45 per month, and later he notified them that if they continued after a certain month they must pay $60 per month, the tenancy was at will and the notice terminated it, and plaintiff was entitled to recover $60 per month after such month, on an implied promise. Amsden v. Floyd & Blaisdell, 60 Vt. 386, 15 A. 332 (1888).

An estate at will was converted into a tenancy from year to year by the payment of rent; and the conversion was wrought, not by the length of time that the tenant held and paid rent, but by the fact that the tenant entered and held under a stipulation to pay annual rent, and paid accordingly. Silsby v. Allen, 43 Vt. 172 (1870).

When a tenant for a fixed term of years or for a year under a formal written lease holds over after the expiration of the term, with the consent or acquiescence of the landlord, a tenancy by implication arises; this begins as a tenancy at will, but, when the landlord accepts the rent, it may and usually does ripen into a tenancy from year to year; in either case the tenant holds the premises subject to all the covenants and conditions of the original lease, without any stipulation or bargain to that effect. Barlow v. Wainwright, 22 Vt. 88 (1849); Hall v. Wadsworth, 28 Vt. 410 (1856); Sartwell v. Sowles, 72 Vt. 270, 48 A. 11 (1900); Maniatty v. Carroll Co., 114 Vt. 168, 41 A.2d 144 (1945); Bergeron v. Forger, 125 Vt. 207, 214 A.2d 85 (1965).

When a tenancy, which was in its inception an estate at will only, became a tenancy from year to year, the tenant could not at any time during the year at pleasure surrender the premises against the will of the landlord and thus excuse himself from the payment of accruing rent. Barlow v. Wainwright, 22 Vt. 88 (1849).

3. Purchase of leased premises.

One who purchased premises held by another under a parole lease, and accepted the stipulated rent, recognized the tenancy on the terms of the original lease. Murphy v. Little, 69 Vt. 261, 37 A. 968 (1897).

4. Oral contract of conveyance.

One in possession of real estate under an oral contract for the conveyance thereof to him, who had made substantial improvements thereon, or who for other reasons could not be placed in status quo, was entitled to specific performance of such contract. Gould v. Estate of Coleman, 114 Vt. 92, 39 A.2d 746 (1944).

5. Sufficiency of writing.

Lease, defectively executed in that it was signed by but one witness to signature of each of parties thereto, did not create merely an estate at will where lease was both in writing and signed by grantor. Tomasi v. Kelley, 100 Vt. 318, 137 A. 196 (1927).

Cited. Prescott v. Smits, 146 Vt. 430, 505 A.2d 1211 (1985); Bassler v. Bassler, 156 Vt. 353, 593 A.2d 82 (1991).

§ 303. Trusts concerning realty.

A trust concerning lands, excepting such as may arise or result by implication of law, shall not be created or declared, unless by an instrument in writing signed by the party creating or declaring the same, or by his or her attorney.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2650. P.L. § 2598. G.L. § 2745. P.S. § 2583. V.S. § 2219. R.L. § 1933. G.S. 65, § 22. R.S. 60, § 22. R. 1797, p. 305, § 3.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Declaration of trust.

A written statement by a trustee fulfills the requirement of this section that trusts concerning lands must be created or declared in writing. Mahoney v. Leddy, 126 Vt. 98, 223 A.2d 456 (1966).

An unequivocal declaration by the settlor is necessary to establish a trust where the settlor constitutes himself trustee for another and thereby changes the nature of his ownership of the property, but is not necessary where the settlor transfers legal title to another who thereafter acknowledges that beneficial ownership remained with the settlor. Mahoney v. Leddy, 126 Vt. 98, 223 A.2d 456 (1966).

The requirements of this section that a trust be in writing are satisfied by a bill of complaint signed by one in the position of trustee. Miele v. Miele, 124 Vt. 110, 197 A.2d 787 (1964).

Any instrument, which sufficiently defines object and terms of trust, signed by either person who creates trust or person who declares it, meets requirements of this section. Straw v. Mower, 99 Vt. 56, 130 A. 687 (1925).

Grantee in a deed which was absolute in its terms and contained no recital of a trust interest, was as much chargeable as trustee by her acknowledgment of the trust in an answer to a bill in chancery brought against her, as though the deed contained an express declaration of the trust. Barron v. Barron, 24 Vt. 375 (1852).

This section did not require that creation of a trust in lands should be by writing, but simply that it be manifested and proved by some writing. Pinney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525 (1843).

Deposition of the trustee, subscribed and sworn to by him, fully proving the trust, was a sufficient manifestation and proof of it, in writing, in a suit between the cestui que trust and an attaching creditor of the trustee. Pinney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525 (1843).

2. Implied trusts.

A trust is implied whenever the circumstances are such that the person taking the legal estate, whether by fraud or otherwise, cannot enjoy the beneficial interest without violating the rules of honesty and fair dealing. Lorenz v. Rowley, 122 Vt. 480, 177 A.2d 364 (1962).

3. Passive trust.

It is not improper to establish a trust for the sole benefit of the declarant. Miele v. Miele, 124 Vt. 110, 197 A.2d 787 (1964).

4. Resulting trust .

Where real estate was conveyed to grantor's daughter and son-in-law upon an express oral trust for the benefit of his grandchildren, but to be performed only upon his death during the continuance of his then illness, and he later recovered so that the trust could not be accomplished, common honesty required that the legal title should be given back to the grantor, and grantees then held property as constructive trustees for grantor. Vilas v. Seith, 108 Vt. 526, 189 A. 862 (1937).

A resulting trust could not be raised by any transactions between the parties subsequent to the passing of the legal title, but it was not necessary that the entire purchase money should have been paid at time of conveyance; it was enough if the one setting up the trust assumed to pay as a part of the original transaction and subsequently did pay the consideration. Barber v. Thompson, 49 Vt. 213 (1876); Williams v. Wagner, 64 Vt. 326, 24 A. 765 (1892).

To create a resulting trust, or trust by implication of law, the purchase money, or some part of it, must have been paid by the plaintiff at the time of purchase, or been paid from his funds; it was not sufficient that it was paid to defendant after purchase, or to a third person in payment of the securities given by defendant at time of purchase. Pinnock v. Clough, 16 Vt. 500 (1844).

Where one buys land in the name of another, and pays the consideration money, the land will generally be held by the grantee in trust for the person who paid the consideration. Pinney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525 (1843); Barron v. Barron, 24 Vt. 375 (1852); Dewey v. Dewey, 35 Vt. 555 (1863); Williams v. Wagner, 64 Vt. 326, 24 A. 765 (1892).

*5. Evidence.

Where a husband paid the purchase price of real estate, and caused the same to be deeded to his wife under a mutual understanding that she should hold the legal title in trust for him, a trust resulted by implication of law, for the presumption that the transaction was intended as a gift to the wife was rebutted by evidence of the understanding. Bickford v. Estate of Bickford, 68 Vt. 525, 35 A. 471 (1896).

Evidence of a resulting trust must be clear and satisfactory, but by this it was only meant that the trier of the case must be reasonably satisfied of the fact which the evidence tended to prove. Williams v. Wagner, 64 Vt. 326, 24 A. 765 (1892).

6. Parties.

It is essential that all parties interested in a trust which is the subject of litigation be made parties either as plaintiffs or defendants. Miele v. Miele, 124 Vt. 110, 197 A.2d 787 (1964).

7. Personal property.

A trust involving only personal property may be instituted without being reduced to writing. Mahoney v. Leddy, 126 Vt. 98, 223 A.2d 456 (1966).

8. Constructive trusts.

When a grantor transferred real property to his then girlfriend, who transferred it to her son after the relationship ended, the statute of frauds did not prevent the grantor from presenting evidence of an alleged oral agreement that the girlfriend would reconvey the property to him. Such evidence could be used not to enforce the terms of the alleged agreement, but to support the grantor's assertion that the girlfriend and son were unjustly enriched and that he was entitled to the imposition of a constructive trust. Savage v. Walker, 185 Vt. 603, 969 A.2d 121 (mem.) (2009).

Cited. In re Carriage House, Inc., 146 B.R. 352 (D. Vt. 1992).

§ 304. Assignment of lease to be by deed.

The assignment of a lease of lands, if the lease is for a longer term than one year, shall be by deed, signed, sealed, witnessed, acknowledged, and recorded as provided for deeds in this chapter. An assignment otherwise executed shall be void as against all persons but the assignor, his or her heirs, or his or her devisees.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2651. P.L. § 2559. G.L. § 2746. P.S. § 2584. V.S. § 2220. R.L. § 1934. G.S. 65, § 24. R.S. 60, § 24. 1818, p. 77.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Assignor, his heirs or devisees.

Assignments of long term lease were not invalid as respecting administrator of last assignee because not acknowledged and signed by two witnesses, for this section impliedly made such an assignment good as against the assignor, his heirs, and devisees. Holton v. Hassam, 94 Vt. 324, 111 A. 389 (1920).

2. Invalidity as defense.

Invalidity of an assignment of a lease because it did not comply with the provisions of this section could not be invoked on behalf of assignee to avoid liability for rent thereunder. Dieter v. Scott, 110 Vt. 376, 9 A.2d 95 (1939).

3. Assignability of lease.

A lease which contained no provision against assigning or subletting was assignable, though it ran to the lessee without mention of his heirs or assigns. Rickard v. Dana, 74 Vt. 74, 52 A. 113 (1902).

§ 305. Conveyances effected through power of attorney.

  1. A deed or other conveyance of lands or of an estate or interest therein, made by virtue of a power of attorney, shall not be of any effect or admissible in evidence, unless such power of attorney is signed, witnessed by one or more witnesses, acknowledged, and recorded in the office where such deed is required to be recorded.
  2. Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall limit the enforceability of a power of attorney which is executed in another state or jurisdiction in compliance with the law of that state or jurisdiction. This subsection shall apply retroactively, except that it shall not affect a suit begun or pending as of July 1, 2010.

    Amended 1973, No. 211 (Adj. Sess.); 1995, No. 6 , § 1, eff. March 15, 1995; 2009, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. May 29, 2010.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2652. P.L. § 2600. G.L. § 2747. P.S. § 2585. V.S. § 2221. R.L. § 1935. G.S. 65, § 24. R.S. 60, § 24. 1818, p. 78.

Amendments--2009 (Adj. Sess.) Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

Amendments--1995 Substituted "one" for "two" following "signed, witnessed by".

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.) Deleted "sealed" preceding "witnessed" and inserted "by two or more witnesses" thereafter.

Retroactive applicability. 1995, No. 6 , § 2(b), provided that the amendment to this section by section 1 of the act shall apply retroactively to all deeds or other conveyances of lands or of an estate or interest therein that were signed or executed, whether directly by the grantor or by virtue of a power of attorney, prior to July 1, 1995; provided that 1995, No. 6 , § 2(b) shall not be construed to apply to any such document, the validity of which is being contested in a suit begun or pending before a court or, which has been invalidated by a court for lack of a signature of a second witness prior to July 1, 1995.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Law governing.

Formalities requisite to creating a power of attorney were governed by law of place where instrument was executed, rather than place where act authorized was to be performed. In re Everett's Estate, 112 Vt. 252, 23 A.2d 202 (1941).

2. Execution.

Power of attorney for sale of real estate was defective when it bore no seal and was attested by only one witness. Burlington Building & Loan Association v. Cummings, 111 Vt. 447, 17 A.2d 319 (1941).

3. Evidence.

Where a conveyance of land is executed by virtue of a power of attorney, the power must accompany the grant upon the records in order to connect the grant with the grantor; otherwise the attorney in fact can convey no title to the land; the record of a copy of such power of attorney was without warrant of law and unavailing. Oatman v. Fowler, 43 Vt. 462 (1871).

4. Applicability.

In arguing that if the original developer wanted to obtain consent for development he had to execute and record a power of attorney rather than embed a consent provision in the declaration, a condominium association's reliance on the statute regarding conveyances effected through power of attorney was misplaced. The declaration of condominium provisions did not allow developers to convey the unit owners' real estate. Madowitz v. the Woods at Killington Owners' Ass'n, 188 Vt. 197, 6 A.3d 1117 (2010).

§ 306. Evidence.

When a deed is made by virtue of a power of attorney thus executed and recorded, a certified copy of the record of such power of attorney may be read in evidence when the original cannot be produced.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2653. P.L. § 2601. G.L. § 2748. P.S. § 2586. V.S. § 2222. R.L. § 1936. G.S. 65, § 25. R.S. 60, § 25.

§ 307. Vendor's liens.

The vendor of real estate shall not have a lien thereon for unpaid purchase money, except such lien as is created and evidenced by deed executed, acknowledged and recorded as deeds of conveyance of real estate.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2654. P.L. § 2602. G.L. § 2749. P.S. § 2587. V.S. § 2223. R.L. § 1937. G.S. 65, § 33. 1851, No. 47 .

§ 308. Mines and quarries.

The grantee of a mine, quarry, or of the right of mining and quarrying, in severance from the ownership of the soil, within 30 days after its execution, shall cause his or her deed, lease, or other instrument to be recorded in a book kept for that purpose in the office where by law a deed of the real estate is required to be recorded. A grantee failing to comply with the foregoing provision shall forfeit to the town, or in case such a mine, quarry, or right of mining or quarrying is situated in an unorganized town or gore, to the county, $50.00, to be recovered in an action on this statute.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2655. P.L. § 2603. 1919, No. 78 . G.L. § 2750. 1917, No. 82 , § 1. P.S. § 2588. R. 1906, § 2482. 1900, No. 12 , §§ 1, 3, 4, 5.

Revision note. Deleted "of tort" following "action" in the second sentence to conform to Rule 2, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Title.

Clear intent of the grantor to retain title in fee to a slate quarry, as distinguished from retaining only a life estate, is not changed by mere absence of words of inheritance. Sheldon Slate Products Co. v. Kurjiaka, 124 Vt. 261, 204 A.2d 99 (1964).

2. Leases.

An alleged novated lease which attempts to reserve granite rights in the lessor did not operate as a conveyance of such granite rights from the lessee to the lessor. Spaulding v. H. E. Fletcher Co., 124 Vt. 318, 205 A.2d 556 (1964).

§ 309. Proration of taxes.

  1. Unless otherwise expressly stated or agreed, in any offer or contract for the purchase and sale of real property, real property taxes assessed and payable shall be prorated as follows so that as between the parties, but not otherwise:
    1. In municipalities where the municipal tax and the school tax fiscal periods are July 1 to June 30, the seller shall bear the burden of real estate taxes allocable to the period beginning July 1 of that fiscal year and ending on the day before closing. The buyer shall bear the burden of real estate taxes allocable to the period beginning with the day of closing and ending on June 30.
    2. In municipalities where the municipal tax fiscal period is other than July 1 to June 30, the seller shall bear the burden of real estate taxes allocable to municipal taxes for the period beginning on the first day of the municipality's fiscal year and ending on the day before closing. The seller shall also bear the burden for real estate taxes allocable to school taxes for the period beginning July 1 of that fiscal year and ending on the day before closing. The buyer shall bear the burden of real estate taxes allocable to both school and municipal taxes for the period beginning with the day of closing and ending with the last day of the respective fiscal year.
  2. This section shall not abridge or affect any other provision of 32 V.S.A. part 2 relating to assessment of property taxes.

    Added 1971, No. 80 , § 1, eff. April 16, 1971; amended 2001, No. 90 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 1, 2002; 2003, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Amendments--2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsection (a): Amended generally.

Amendments--2001 (Adj. Sess.) Subsection (a): Amended generally.

Severability of enactment. 2003, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, provided:

"Sec. 7. Severability.

"If any provision of this act [which amended this section] or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid or in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, the invalidity or the violation shall not affect other provisions of this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable."

Subchapter 2. Execution and Acknowledgment

ARTICLE 1. Requirements

§ 341. Requirements generally; recording.

  1. Deeds and other conveyances of lands, or of an estate or interest therein, shall be signed by the party granting the same and acknowledged by the grantor before a notary public and recorded at length in the clerk's office of the town in which such lands lie. Such acknowledgment before a notary public shall be valid without an official stamp being affixed to his or her signature.
    1. A deed or other conveyance of land that includes a reference to a survey prepared or revised after July 1, 1988 may be recorded only if it is accompanied by the survey to which it refers, or cites the volume and page in the land records showing where the survey has previously been recorded. (b) (1)  A deed or other conveyance of land that includes a reference to a survey prepared or revised after July 1, 1988 may be recorded only if it is accompanied by the survey to which it refers, or cites the volume and page in the land records showing where the survey has previously been recorded.
    2. If the conveyance of land results in the subdivision of a parcel or a change in the boundaries of a parcel after January 1, 2020, the deed shall:
      1. be accompanied by a survey plat that depicts the new parcel boundaries; or
      2. cite the volume and page in the land records that indicates where the new parcel boundaries have previously been recorded.
    3. The failure to comply with this subsection shall not:
      1. void or invalidate the deed or other instruments recorded; or
      2. render the title to the property depicted in the survey plat unmarketable.
  2. A lease of real property that has a term of more than one year from the making of the lease need not be recorded at length if a notice or memorandum of lease, which is executed and acknowledged as provided in subsection (a) of this section, is recorded in the land records of the town in which the leased property is situated. The notice of lease shall contain at least the following information:
    1. the names of the parties to the lease as set forth in the lease;
    2. a statement of the rights of a party to extend or renew the lease;
    3. any addresses set forth in the lease as those of the parties;
    4. the date of the execution of the lease;
    5. the term of the lease, the date of commencement, and the date of termination;
    6. a description of the real property as set forth in the lease;
    7. a statement of the rights of a party to purchase the real property or exercise a right of first refusal with respect thereto;
    8. a statement of any restrictions on assignment of the lease; and
    9. the location of an original lease.
    1. A deed or other instrument may be recorded in the land records pursuant to this section for the purposes provided in this chapter and shall be deemed to impart notice of its contents if it is signed and acknowledged in accordance with the procedures specified in the Emergency Administrative Rules for Remote Notarial Acts adopted by the Vermont Secretary of State (the Emergency Rules) during the period that the Emergency Rules are in effect. (d) (1)  A deed or other instrument may be recorded in the land records pursuant to this section for the purposes provided in this chapter and shall be deemed to impart notice of its contents if it is signed and acknowledged in accordance with the procedures specified in the Emergency Administrative Rules for Remote Notarial Acts adopted by the Vermont Secretary of State (the Emergency Rules) during the period that the Emergency Rules are in effect.
    2. A deed or other instrument executed in compliance with the Emergency Rules shall be presumed to be valid if the notarial certificate attached to the deed or other instrument contains an affirmative statement of compliance with the Emergency Rules.

      Amended 1967, No. 231 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 24, 1968; 1973, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 84, eff. April 9, 1974; 1987, No. 220 (Adj. Sess.); 1993, No. 174 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1997, No. 86 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2003, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 2017, No. 24 , § 3, eff. May 4, 2017; 2017, No. 28 , § 5, eff. May 10, 2017; 2017, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. July 1, 2019; 2019, No. 38 , § 5, eff. Jan. 1, 2020; 2019, No. 95 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 28, 2020.

History

Amendments--2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Added.

su - Subsec. (b): Added the subdiv. (1) designation, and added subdivs. (2) and (3).

Amendments--2017. Subsec. (a): Act No. 28 inserted "or" preceding "county"; deleted ", or judge or register of probate" following "clerk" and substituted "acknowledgment" for "acknowledgement".

Subsec. (c): Act No. 24 deleted "witnessed" following "is executed" in the first sentence.

Amendments--2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted "town clerk," and "master, or county clerk" in the first sentence and substituted "stamp" for "seal" in the second sentence.

Subsec. (b): Substituted "that includes a reference" for "which includes a reference".

§ 342. Acknowledgment and recording required.

A deed of bargain and sale, a mortgage or other conveyance of land in fee simple or for term of life, or a lease for more than one year from the making thereof shall not be effectual to hold such lands against any person but the grantor and his or her heirs, unless the deed or other conveyance is acknowledged and recorded.

Amended 2017, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. July 1, 2019.

History

Amendments--2017 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted "as provided in this chapter" following "and recorded".

§ 343. Conveyance of wife's real estate.

A husband and wife, by their joint deed, may convey the real estate of the wife as she might do by her separate deed if unmarried.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2639. P.L. § 2588. G.L. § 2735. P.S. § 2573. V.S. § 2209. R.L. § 1923. G.S. 65, § 2. R.S. 60, § 2. R. 1797, p. 312, § 12. R. 1787, p. 36.

Cross References

Cross references. Conveyance of real estate of married woman acquired under a name other than present married name, see § 65 of Title 15.

Married woman's right to convey her real estate by her sole deed, see § 64 of Title 15.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited. Dietrich v. Hutchinson, 81 Vt. 160, 69 A. 661 (1908).

§ 344. Conveyances of joint interests when husband under disability.

The wife of a man under guardianship may join with the guardian in making partition of her real estate held in joint tenancy or in common and, with the guardian, may jointly make a release or other conveyance for that purpose, as she might have done with her husband if he had not been under legal disability.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2640. P.L. § 2589. G.L. § 2736. P.S. § 2574. V.S. § 2210. R.L. § 1924. G.S. 71, § 7. R.S. 64, § 7. 1831, No. 7 .

§ 345. Conveyances of wife's realty in which disabled husband has an interest.

When the guardian of a married man is licensed to sell the interests of the ward in any real estate of his wife, the wife may join with the guardian in the conveyance and convey her estate and interest in the granted premises as she might have done with her husband if he had not been under legal disability, but this section shall not authorize the conveyance of the ward's estate of homestead.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2641. P.L. § 2590. G.L. § 2737. P.S. § 2575. V.S. § 2211. R.L. § 1925. 1872, No. 40 .

§ 346. Conveyances by corporation.

A public or private corporation authorized to hold real estate may convey the same by an agent appointed by vote for that purpose.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2642. P.L. § 2591. G.L. § 2738. P.S. § 2576. V.S. § 2212. R.L. § 1926. G.S. 65, § 3. R.S. 60, § 3. 1815, p. 28 § 3.

Cross References

Cross references. Corporations, generally, see § 1.01 et seq. of Title 11A.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Generally.

It was not essential to validity of deed of real estate of a corporation that it should recite vote of the corporation authorizing their agent to execute the deed. McDaniels v. Flower Brook Manufacturing Co., 22 Vt. 274 (1850).

Corporations can convey lands, tenements, and hereditaments only by deed executed by some agent authorized by vote of corporation. Wheelock v. Moulton, 15 Vt. 519 (1843).

Shareholders, as such, could not convey real estate of corporation, though all joined in the deed. Wheelock v. Moulton, 15 Vt. 519 (1843).

2. Name of corporation.

Conveyance of a private corporation must be executed in the name of the corporation and not in that of agent appointed to execute same; sealing instrument with corporate seal was not sufficient. Miller v. Rutland & Washington Railroad, 36 Vt. 452 (1863); Hutchins v. Barre Water Co., 74 Vt. 36, 52 A. 70 (1901).

3. Ratification.

Agreement made in name of a corporation by one acting as agent, but without authority, and without formalities required in the execution of an actual lease, may be subsequently ratified by corporation, and if so ratified, a court will require a specific performance of it. Conant v. Bellows Falls Canal Co., 29 Vt. 263 (1857).

§ 347. Validity of deeds executed under prior law.

Deeds of bargain and sale, mortgages or other conveyances of real estate, heretofore made and executed according to former laws and usages in this state, shall be valid and effectual.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2644. P.L. § 2593. G.L. § 2740. P.S. § 2578. V.S. § 2214. R.L. § 1928. G.S. 65, § 32. R.S. 60, § 32. R. 1797, p. 311, § 10.

§ 348. Instruments concerning real property validated.

  1. When an instrument of writing shall have been on record in the office of the clerk in the proper town for a period of 15 years, and there is a defect in the instrument because it omitted to state any consideration therefor or was not sealed, witnessed, acknowledged, validly acknowledged, or because a license to sell was not issued or is defective, the instrument shall, from and after the expiration of 15 years from the filing thereof for record, be valid. Nothing herein shall be construed to affect any rights acquired by grantees, assignees or encumbrancers under the instruments described in the preceding sentence, nor shall this section apply to conveyances or other instruments of writing, the validity of which is brought in question in any suit now pending in any courts of the state.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, any deed, mortgage, lease, power of attorney, release, discharge, assignment, or other instrument made for the purpose of conveying, leasing, mortgaging, or affecting any interest in real property that contains any one or more of the following errors is valid unless, within three years after the instrument is recorded, an action challenging its validity is commenced, and a copy of the complaint is recorded in the land records of the town where the instrument is recorded:
    1. The instrument contains a defective acknowledgment.
    2. In the case of a conveyance by a corporation, limited liability company, partnership, limited partnership, or limited liability partnership, or by any other entity authorized to hold and convey title to real property within this state, the instrument designated such entity as the grantor but was signed or acknowledged by an individual in the individual capacity of such person, or fails to disclose the authority of the individual who executes and acknowledges the instrument.
    3. The instrument contains an incorrect statement of the date of execution, or contains an execution date, or other date that is later than the date of the recording. In case of such conflict, the date of recording prevails.
    4. The instrument does not contain a statement of consideration.
    5. The acknowledgement clause of an instrument executed by an attorney-in-fact inaccurately recites the personal appearance of the principal and not the attorney-in-fact who personally appeared on behalf of the principal.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, any deed, mortgage, lease, power of attorney, release, discharge, assignment, or other instrument made for the purpose of conveying, leasing, mortgaging, or affecting any interest in real property that is executed pursuant to a recorded power of attorney and contains one or more of the following errors or omissions is valid as if it had been executed without the error or omission:
    1. The instrument was executed by an attorney-in-fact but was signed or acknowledged by the attorney-in-fact without reference to his or her capacity.
    2. The instrument was executed by an attorney-in-fact but does not reference the power of attorney.
    3. The power of attorney was effective at the time the instrument was executed but is recorded after the instrument is recorded.
  4. A release, discharge, or assignment of mortgage interest executed by a commercial lender with respect to a one- to four-family residential real property, including a residential unit in a condominium or in a common interest community as defined in Title 27A, that recites authority to act on behalf of the record holder of the mortgage under a power of attorney but where the power of attorney is not of record, shall have the same effect as if executed by the record holder of the mortgage unless, within three years after the instrument is recorded, an action challenging the release, discharge, or assignment is commenced and a copy of the complaint is recorded in the land records of the town where the release, discharge, or assignment is recorded. This subsection shall not apply to releases, discharges, or assignments obtained by fraud or forgery.
  5. A power of attorney made for the purpose of conveying, leasing, mortgaging, or affecting any interest in real property that has been acknowledged and signed in the presence of at least one witness shall be valid, notwithstanding its failure to comply with 14 V.S.A. § 3503 or the requirements of the Emergency Administrative Rules for Remote Notarial Acts adopted by the Vermont Secretary of State, unless within three years after recording, an action challenging its validity is commenced and a copy of the complaint is recorded in the land records of the town where the power of attorney is recorded. This subsection shall not apply to a power of attorney obtained by fraud or forgery.

    Added 1977, No. 79 , § 1, eff. April 27, 1977; amended 2007, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2009, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. May 29, 2010; 2021, No. 19 , § 1, eff. May 6, 2021.

History

Amendments--2021. Subsec. (b): Substituted "that" for "which" following "real property" in the intro. para.

Subdiv. (b)(5): Added.

Subsec. (c): Substituted "that" for "which" following "real property" in the intro. para.

Subsec. (e): Added.

Amendments--2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsection (a): Inserted "witnessed" preceding "acknowledged" in the first sentence.

Amendments--2007 (Adj. Sess.). Amended section generally.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Generally.

Reasonable and straightforward reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that the term "defective acknowledgment" in 27 V.S.A. § 348(b), includes the defects listed in § 348(a). A "defective acknowledgment" under § 348(b) includes both missing and invalid acknowledgments. Warner v. Citifinancial, Inc. (In re Warner), 446 B.R. 651 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2011).

Vermont legislature began 27 V.S.A. § 348(b) with the clause "notwithstanding subsection (a)". The court interpreted the notwithstanding clause to mean the legislature intended to shorten the window in which a challenge could be brought against written documents affecting an interest in real property, perhaps in an effort to provide earlier certainty and finality to written documents affecting title to real property. Warner v. Citifinancial, Inc. (In re Warner), 446 B.R. 651 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2011).

Although debtors' complaint accurately alleged that the subject mortgage did not meet the acknowledgement requirements for a mortgage on a homestead property owned jointly by a husband and wife, it failed to set forth grounds for relief in that this defect had been cured by the passage of time under 27 V.S.A. § 348. Since the written instrument in question affected real property and had a "defective acknowledgment," it fell squarely under § 348(b) and automatically became valid three years after it was recorded. Warner v. Citifinancial, Inc. (In re Warner), 446 B.R. 651 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2011).

In enacting 27 V.S.A. § 348(b)(1), the Vermont legislature intended to allow properly recorded, written instruments affecting real property that were defective, due, inter alia, to a missing acknowledgment or an invalid acknowledgment, to become valid instruments if not challenged within three years. More than three years passed between the date the subject mortgage was recorded and the date debtors initiated a legal challenge to it; accordingly, under § 348(b)(1), the subject mortgage was valid, notwithstanding the lack of a statutorily required acknowledgment. Warner v. Citifinancial, Inc. (In re Warner), 446 B.R. 651 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2011).

§ 349. Conveyance to grantor and others.

  1. Without an intervening conveyance a person may convey interests in real estate directly:
    1. to himself or herself in a different legal capacity; or
    2. to his or her spouse; or
    3. to himself or herself and one or more other persons, including his or her spouse.  A person shall not convey an interest in a tenancy by the entirety or in homestead property to any person except his or her spouse, unless the spouse joins in the conveyance.
  2. A conveyance made pursuant to this section shall be effective to convey such title as would be conveyed by the deed if the grantor were not also a grantee.

    Added 1977, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.); amended 1979, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 26, 1980.

History

Amendments--1979 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), added the second sentence in subdiv. (3) of that subsection and added subsec. (b).

ANNOTATIONS

Cited. , 1962-64 Op. Atty. Gen. 127; In re Hutchins, 306 B.R. 82 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2004).

§ 350. Change in name or status of owner of real estate.

Any person or corporation owning real estate or having an interest in real estate whose name has been changed, and any corporation which has been merged into or consolidated with another, may file with the town clerk of the town in which the real estate is located a certificate giving the names before and after the change, merger or consolidation, and the town clerk shall record and index the certificate in the land records.

Added 1993, No. 174 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

Retroactive applicability of enactment. 1995, No. 6 , § 2(b), provided that the enactment of this section by 1993, No. 174 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, shall apply retroactively to all deeds or other conveyances of lands or of an estate or interest therein that were signed or executed, whether directly by the grantor or by virtue of a power of attorney, prior to July 1, 1994; provided that 1995, No. 6 , § 2(b) shall not be construed to apply to any such document, the validity of which is being contested in a suit begun or pending before a court or, which has been invalidated by a court for lack of a signature of a second witness prior to July 1, 1995.

§ 351. Estates and trusts; conveyances, satisfactions, grants, and releases.

  1. A conveyance or grant of an interest in real or personal property made to the estate of a decedent, to the estate of a ward, to the ward's guardian, or to a trust, including a trust in the form of a pension or profit-sharing plan, that names the estate, the guardian, or the trust as the grantee of the interest is a valid and effective conveyance or grant to the personal representative, to the ward, or to the trustee of the trust, in like manner and effect as if the ward, or the personal representative or trustee in his or her fiduciary capacity, had been named the grantee of the conveyance or grant.
  2. A discharge, mortgage discharge, release, conveyance, grant, or satisfaction of an interest in real or personal property that is made by an estate, a guardian, or a trust described in subsection (a) of this section, that names the estate, the guardian, or the trust as the holder or grantor of the interest, and that is executed by the personal representative or trustee authorized to execute the instrument is valid in like manner and effect as if the personal representative, guardian, or trustee had been named the holder or the grantor in the instrument.

    Added 2003, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

Severability of enactment. 2003, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, provided:

"Sec. 7. Severability.

"If any provision of this act [which enacted this section] or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid or in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, the invalidity or the violation shall not affect other provisions of this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable."

Retroactive applicability of enactment. 2003, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 9(c) provides that section 3 of that act, which enacted this code section, shall apply retroactively to trust instruments whenever created or executed and to past and future conveyances, grants, mortgage discharges, satisfactions, and releases. However, if a notice of the pendency of an action or proceeding contesting the validity of such a document is recorded or filed before November 1, 2004 in the land records of the municipality in which the real property affected by the action or proceeding is located, this section does not affect such action or proceeding.

§ 352. Repealed. 2009, No. 20, § 27.

History

Former § 352. Former § 352, relating to certificate of trust, was derived from 2003, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

ARTICLE 2. Proceedings Upon Failure of Grantor to

Acknowledge

§ 371. Proving execution when grantor dies or leaves state.

When a grantor or lessor dies or leaves the state without acknowledging his deed, the execution thereof may be proved by the testimony of a subscribing witness thereto before a justice of the supreme court, a superior judge or a judge of the superior court. If all the subscribing witnesses to such deed are dead or out of the state, the same may be proved before the supreme or superior court by proving the handwriting of the grantor or lessor and of a subscribing witness or adducing other evidence to the satisfaction of such court. Such evidence entered on such deed or annexed thereto shall be equivalent to the grantor's or lessor's acknowledgment thereof.

Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2656. P.L. § 2604. G.L. § 2751. 1915, No. 1 , § 103. P.S. § 2590. V.S. § 2224. R.L. § 1938. G.S. 65, § 10. R.S. 60, § 10. R. 1797, p. 306, § 6. R. 1787, p. 34.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" at the end of the first sentence.

§ 372. Proceedings when grantor refuses to acknowledge - Summons.

When a grantor or lessor refuses to acknowledge his or her deed, the grantee or lessee, or a person claiming under him or her, may apply to a district judge who shall thereupon issue a summons to the grantor or lessor to appear at a certain time and place before him or her to hear the testimony of the subscribing witnesses to the deed. Such summons, with a copy of the deed annexed, shall be served like a writ of summons, seven business days at least before the time therein assigned for proving the deed.

Amended 1973, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 85, eff. April 9, 1974; 2017, No. 11 , § 55.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2657. P.L. § 2605. G.L. § 2752. 1915, No. 1 , § 104. P.S. § 2591. V.S. § 2225. R.L. § 1939. G.S. 65, § 11. R.S. 60, § 11. R. 1797, p. 307, § 7. R. 1787, p. 35.

Amendments--2017. Inserted "business" following "seven" in the second sentence.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "district judge" for "justice of the peace" following "apply to a" in the first sentence.

§ 373. Notice.

When such summons is served by leaving a copy thereof at the usual place of abode of the grantor or lessor, and it does not appear that actual notice was given, the judge shall continue the hearing from time to time, not exceeding 90 days, and direct that actual notice be given if the party resides in the state. When such notice cannot be given, the judge shall proceed in the examination as provided in section 374 of this title, and his or her certificate of the execution of the deed shall have the same effect as therein provided.

Amended 1973, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 86, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2659. P.L. § 2607. G.L. § 2754. P.S. § 2593. V.S. § 2227. R.L. § 1941. G.S. 65, § 13. R.S. 60, § 13. R. 1797, p. 307, § 7. R. 1787, p. 35.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "judge" for "justice" preceding "shall continue" in the first sentence and preceding "shall proceed" in the second sentence.

§ 374. Hearing and certificate.

When it appears from the officer's return that a copy of such summons was delivered to the grantor or lessor, the judge may take evidence of one or more of the subscribing witnesses to the execution of such deed, at the time designated for hearing or at an adjournment thereof. If such execution is proved to the satisfaction of the judge, he or she shall certify the same thereon and in his or her certificate shall note the presence or absence of the grantor or lessor and such certificate shall be equivalent to the acknowledgment of the grantor or lessor.

Amended 1973, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 87, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2658. P.L. § 2606. G.L. § 2753. P.S. § 2592. V.S. § 2226. R.L. § 1940. G.S. 65, § 12. R.S. 60, § 12. R. 1797, p. 307, § 7. R. 1787, p. 35.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "judge" for "justice" following "lessor, the" in the first sentence and preceding "he shall certify" in the second sentence.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited. Catlin v. Washburn, 3 Vt. 25 (1830).

§ 375. Witnesses dead or out of state.

When a grantor or lessor refuses to acknowledge his or her deed and the subscribing witnesses to the same are dead or out of the state, it may be proved before the supreme or any superior court by proving the handwriting of the grantor or lessor and of a subscribing witness, such court first summoning the grantor or lessor as provided in this chapter.

Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2661. P.L. § 2609. G.L. § 2756. P.S. § 2595. V.S. § 2229. R.L. § 1943. G.S. 65, § 15. R.S. 60, § 15. R. 1797, p. 306, § 6. R. 1787, p. 34.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" preceding "by proving".

§§ 376 Repealed. 1967, No. 231 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 24, 1968.

History

Former § 376. Former § 376, relating to two witnesses on deed, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2663; P.L. § 2611; G.L. § 2758; P.S. § 2597; V.S. § 2231; R.L. § 1945; G.S. 65, § 18; R.S. 60, § 18.

§ 377. Repealed. 1973, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 111, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Former § 377. Former § 377, relating to appeals, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2660; P.L. § 2608; G.L. § 2755; 1917, No. 254 , § 2711; P.S. § 2594; V.S. § 2228; R.L. § 1942; G.S. 65, § 14; R.S. 60, § 14; R. 1797, p. 307, § 7; R. 1787, p. 35.

§ 378. Effect of recording unacknowledged deed.

A person interested in a deed or lease not acknowledged may cause the deed or lease to be recorded without acknowledgment before or during the application to the court, or the proceedings before any of the authorities named in sections 371-376 of this title; and, when so recorded in the proper office, it shall be as effectual as though the same had been duly acknowledged and recorded for 60 days thereafter. If such proceedings for proving the execution of the deed are pending at the expiration of such 60 days, the effect of such record shall continue until the expiration of six business days after the termination of the proceedings.

Amended 2017, No. 11 , § 56.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2662. P.L. § 2610. G.L. § 2757. 1915, No. 1 , § 105. P.S. § 2596. V.S. § 2230. R.L. § 1944. G.S. 65, §§ 16, 17. R.S. 60, §§ 16, 17. R. 1797, p. 307, § 7.

Reference in text. Section 376 of this title, referred to in this section, was repealed by 1967, No. 231 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 24, 1968.

Amendments--2017. Inserted "business" following "expiration of six" in the second sentence.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Temporary effect.

Recording of an unacknowledged deed could have no other effect than the temporary effect which this section gave it. Hoisington v. Hoisington, 2 Aik. 235 (1827).

§ 379. Repealed. 2017, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, effective July 1, 2019.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2664. P.L. § 2612. G.L. § 2759. P.S. § 2598. V.S. § 2232. R.L. § 1946. G.S. 65, § 9. R.S. 60, § 9. 1831, No. 36 . R. 1797, p. 312, § 13. R. 1787, p. 34.

Former § 379. Former § 379, relating to acknowledgment out of state, was derived from 1993 (Adj. Sess.), No. 174, § 2.

Amendments--1993 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing text of the section as subsec. (a) and substituted "out of" for "without the" following "which is taken" in the first sentence of that subsection and added subsec. (b).

Retroactive applicability. See note set out under section 341 of this title.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Determination of state where acknowledged.

Acknowledgment of a deed, the certificate of which did not show in what state it was taken, was legal and sufficient when place of taking appeared with reasonable certainty from an inspection of the whole instrument. Brooks v. Chaplin, 3 Vt. 281 (1831).

Subchapter 3. Recording

§ 401. Index of deeds by county clerk; penalty.

  1. The county clerk shall keep for public use a general index of the record of deeds and other transfers of land recorded in his or her office, similar to those required to be kept by town clerks, but this section shall not apply to transfers of the title under a judgment or order of court.
  2. A county clerk who neglects to keep the index required in subsection (a) of this section, shall be fined $50.00 for each six months' neglect.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, §§ 1431, 1432. P.L. §§ 1397, 1398. G.L. §§ 1633, 1634. 1917, No. 254 , § 1594. P.S. §§ 1379, 1380. V.S. §§ 1032, 1033. 1884, No. 147 , §§ 1, 2.

Cross References

Cross references. Distribution decrees, see § 1742 of Title 14.

Fees, see § 1760 of Title 32.

Index by county clerk, see § 656 of Title 4.

Mortgages, see § 441 et seq. of this title and § 1155 of Title 24.

Successor in office, certificate by, see § 739 of Title 4.

Town clerk, duties of, see § 1151 et seq. of Title 24.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Correction of error.

A recording officer has the authority and duty while in office to correct the errors which he made in the records whenever he discovers them or they are brought to his attention so as to make the records conform to the facts without the necessity of re-recording the instrument; the authority, however, being incidental to the office ends with the termination of the office; the clerk cannot come in to correct his past mistakes, but a successor to the office may correct errors when he discovers them from data in his office; however, the practice should be if a clerk discovers an error of his own or his predecessor, any correction should be initialed and dated in order that the record reflect all of the facts and protect their reliability. 1968-70 Op. Atty. Gen. 253.

§ 402. Record in county clerk's office.

A purchaser of lands, in addition to the record in the town clerk's office, may cause his or her deed or other conveyance with the certificate of its record in the town clerk's office to be recorded by the county clerk of the county in which such lands lie, in the book kept for the purpose of recording deeds. If the records of a town in which such deed or conveyance is recorded are destroyed, an attested copy of such deed or other conveyance from the office of such county clerk shall be of the same validity as a copy from the town clerk's office.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2646. P.L. § 2595. G.L. § 2742. P.S. § 2580. V.S. § 2216. R.L. § 1930. G.S. 65, § 8. R.S. 60, § 8. R. 1797, p. 167, § 6.

§ 403. Records when lands lie in unorganized place.

Deeds and conveyances of lands in an unorganized town, gore, or grant shall be recorded by the clerk of the county in which such lands lie in a book to be kept by him or her for that purpose, which shall be a sufficient record thereof.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2645. P.L. § 2594. G.L. § 2741. P.S. § 2579. R. 1906, § 2473. V.S. § 2215. R.L. § 1929. G.S. 65, § 6. R.S. 60, § 5. R. 1797, p. 305, § 5.

§ 404. Lost instruments affecting property titles; copy recorded in another town.

When an instrument in writing affecting the title to real estate in more than one town is lost, destroyed or defaced, if such instrument has been recorded in any town, upon complaint and proof, the superior court may order a copy of such record to be recorded in any town where a part of such real estate is situated. The proceedings upon such complaint shall be the same as in case of judgment files lost or destroyed, and a record so made shall be treated as a record of the original instrument.

Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2352. P.L. § 2319. G.L. § 2488. P.S. § 2210. V.S. § 1854. R.L. § 1605. 1878, No. 83 .

Revision note. Substituted "complaint" for "petition" in the first and second sentences to conform language to Rule 3, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" preceding "may order" in the first sentence.

§ 405. Vendor to record his or her title on request.

When a person sells and conveys lands, or an estate or interest therein, he or she shall cause his or her title deed to be recorded in the proper office within six months after request made in writing by a subsequent purchaser of the same lands or an estate or interest therein.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2665. P.L. § 2613. G.L. § 2760. P.S. § 2599. V.S. § 2233. R.L. § 1947. G.S. 65, § 19. R.S. 60, § 19. R. 1797, p. 310, § 8. R. 1787, p. 35.

§ 406. Proceedings upon vendor's refusal.

When such person, after being so requested and after the expiration of such six months, has not procured his or her deed to be recorded, a judge, on the complaint of the party whose right or title is liable to be affected by such neglect, may issue his or her warrant to bring such person forthwith before him or her to be examined in the premises.

Amended 1973, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 88, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2666. P.L. § 2614. G.L. § 2761. P.S. § 2600. V.S. § 2234. R.L. § 1948. G.S. 65, § 20. R.S. 60, § 20. R. 1797, p. 310, § 8. R. 1787, p. 35.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "a judge" for "a justice" following "recorded".

§ 407. Commitment of vendor for refusal.

When such person does not show sufficient cause for omitting to procure his or her deed to be recorded, the judge shall sentence him or her to jail, there to remain until he or she procures it to be recorded and pays the costs of the complaint and commitment. Either party may appeal from the decision of such judge as provided in this chapter. Such person shall also be further liable for damages to the party whose right or title is affected in an action on this statute.

Amended 1973, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 89, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2667. P.L. § 2615. G.L. § 2762. P.S. § 2601. R. 1906, § 2495. V.S. § 2235. R.L. § 1949. G.S. 65, § 20. R.S. 60, § 20. R. 1797, p. 310, § 8. R. 1787, p. 35.

Revision note. Deleted "of tort" following "action" in the third sentence to conform to Rule 2, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 , § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "judge" for "justice" preceding "shall sentence" in the first sentence and preceding "as provided" in the second sentence.

§ 408. Recording subordination of liens.

An agreement for the subordination of a prior lien or other encumbrance on real property shall be recorded in the land records of the town in which the property is situated, and a reference to the record of the subordination agreement shall be noted on the margin of the record of the instrument affected thereby. If not so recorded, the same shall bind only the parties thereto.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2647. 1935, No. 54 , § 4.

§ 409. Record of assignment by landlord.

An assignment of or any agreement affecting the rights or interest of a landlord or owner of real property occupied by a tenant or sharecropper shall be recorded in the land records of the town in which the property is situated. If not so recorded, the same shall bind only the parties thereto.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2724. 1935, No. 54 , § 4.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Absence of recording.

An assignment of an interest in land passes the assignor's interest to the assignee even though such assignment is not recorded. Spaulding v. H. E. Fletcher Co., 124 Vt. 318, 205 A.2d 556 (1964).

§ 410. Lien priorities.

  1. Definitions.  For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:
    1. "Debtor" means a person who owes payment or other performance of an obligation secured, but if the debtor and the owner of real estate are not the same person, the term means the owner of real estate in any provision of this section dealing with collateral.
    2. "Future advances" means funds advanced to a debtor, or other obligations incurred on behalf of a debtor, by a mortgagee after the debtor executes a mortgage.
    3. "Future advances made to protect collateral" means future advances made or incurred:
      1. for the reasonable protection of the mortgagee's interest in the collateral, such as payment of real property taxes, hazard insurance premiums, or maintenance charges imposed under a common interest community declaration or other restrictive covenant; or
      2. under a mortgage, created to enable completion of a contemplated improvement, that secures an obligation which the debtor incurred at the time of execution of the mortgage for the purpose of making an improvement of the real estate in which the mortgage interest is given.
    4. A future advance is made "pursuant to commitment" if the mortgagee is bound at the time the mortgage is created to make it, whether or not a default or other event not within its control has relieved or may relieve it from its obligation. A future advance made "pursuant to commitment" shall also include advances and readvances made pursuant to an agreement whereby the debtor is entitled to borrow and reborrow sums advanced thereunder.
  2. Lien priorities; future advances.
    1. An obligation secured by a mortgage may include future advances, whether or not future advances are made pursuant to commitment.
    2. A future advance made to protect collateral is secured by a mortgage even though the mortgage does not provide for future advances.
    3. Except as expressly set forth in 9 V.S.A. chapter 51, subchapter 1, a future advance made under a recorded mortgage takes priority as of the date of the recording:
      1. if made pursuant to commitment, to the extent of the outstanding future advances that do not exceed the maximum amount stated in the mortgage;
      2. if not made pursuant to commitment, to the extent of future advances that are outstanding before the mortgagee receives written notice of the intervening interest.
    4. A future advance made to protect collateral takes priority as of the date a mortgage is recorded, even though the mortgagee has received written notice of an intervening interest at the time the future advance is made.
  3. If a mortgaged property includes a homestead within the meaning of chapter 3 of this title, any future advance made pursuant to commitment shall not require spousal consent pursuant to section 141 of this title, provided that such written spousal consent to the mortgage was previously obtained or was not required at the time of the making of the mortgage.
  4. In the case of conflict between this section and any other provision of law, except for the provisions of Title 9A, this section shall control.

    Added 1999, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 32, eff. May 24, 2000.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Notice.

Statute setting forth the optional/obligatory advance doctrine is satisfied by any written notice and requires neither that the notice come from the junior creditor nor that the junior creditor specifically object to future advances. This is the natural meaning of the section as written, and a court will generally give a statute its plain meaning. Daniels v. Elks Club of Hartford, 192 Vt. 114, 58 A.3d 925 (2012).

Comparatively minimal statutory requirement in the statute setting forth the optional/obligatory advance doctrine - that the notice be written - appears to have the primary purpose of ensuring that mortgagees not be burdened with constantly monitoring for attachments before issuing advances, as they would be if record notice were sufficient to undermine priority. Accepting actual notice in the place of written notice does not undermine this purpose because it does not impose any additional burden upon the mortgagee; a mortgagee need not seek out information about attachments to ensure that its priority is preserved, but where it has received such information, it cannot expect to retain its priority. Daniels v. Elks Club of Hartford, 192 Vt. 114, 58 A.3d 925 (2012).

In interpreting the statute setting forth the optional/obligatory advance doctrine to be satisfied by actual notice, the Vermont Supreme Court agrees that future advances made by a mortgagee will be subordinate if made after the mortgagee has actual notice of the intervening lien, and it aligns itself with the way that most states have construed the notice contained in the optional/obligatory advance doctrine. Advances do not get priority if there is credible evidence from disinterested witnesses to the effect that an officer of defendant bank had actual knowledge of the existence of a junior mortgage. Daniels v. Elks Club of Hartford, 192 Vt. 114, 58 A.3d 925 (2012).

Subchapter 4. Mortgages

Cross References

Cross references. Chattel mortgages, see Uniform Commercial Code, Title 9A.

Foreclosure of mortgages, see § 4523 et seq. of Title 12.

ARTICLE 1. Machinery

§ 441. Manner of mortgaging machinery.

Machinery attached to or used in a shop, mill, quarry, mine, printing office, or factory may be mortgaged by deed executed, acknowledged and recorded as deeds of real estate. Such mortgages may be assigned, discharged, or foreclosed as mortgages of real estate.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2735. P.L. § 2680. G.L. § 2806. P.S. § 2640. V.S. § 2269. 1888, No. 61 . R.L. § 1980. G.S. 108, §§ 5, 6. 1860, No. 17 .

ANNOTATIONS

1. Construction.

In order to change the character of property from chattel to real by annexation to the freehold, it must be attached in such a manner that it cannot be removed without permanent injury to the realty or to the property itself as a chattel. Kendall v. Hathaway, 67 Vt. 122, 30 A. 859 (1894).

A cider mill and shingle mill standing on legs, and only held in place by belts which ran them, and a circular sawmill so attached to building that it could be removed without damage to itself or the building, were chattels. Kendall v. Hathaway, 67 Vt. 122, 30 A. 859 (1894).

A waterwheel and shafting attached to a lumber mill in the usual manner retained their character as chattels in favor of a conditional vendor as against a prior mortgage; this was so although old machinery covered by the mortgage was taken out to make room for the new, and although the waterwheel could not be removed without destroying the penstock. Page v. Edwards, 64 Vt. 124, 23 A. 917 (1891).

§ 442. Attachment and sale of machinery mortgaged with real estate.

If machinery is mortgaged with real estate, the equity of redemption in such machinery and real estate may be attached and sold on execution as real estate is sold.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2736. P.L. § 2681. G.L. § 2807. P.S. § 2641. V.S. § 2270. 1894, No. 162 , § 2210.

ARTICLE 2. Discharge of Mortgages

§ 461. By entry on record.

Mortgages may be discharged by an entry on the margin of the record thereof in the record of deeds, acknowledging satisfaction of the mortgage, signed by the mortgagee or by his or her executor, administrator, assignee, attorney at law, or attorney acting under a duly executed and recorded power of attorney, such signature to be witnessed by the town clerk or assistant town clerk having custody of such record. Such entry shall have the same effect as a deed of release acknowledged and recorded.

History

Source. 1953, No. 195 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 2668. P.L. § 2616. G.L. § 2764. P.S. § 2602. V.S. § 2236. R.L. § 1950. G.S. 65, § 29. R.S. 60, § 29. R. 1797, p. 311, § 11. R. 1787, p. 34.

Cross References

Cross references. Recording discharge or assignment of mortgage, see § 1158 of Title 24.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Generally.

As between parties, surrender to attorney as defendants' agent of cancelled note and mortgage and his acceptance thereof constituted discharge. Siwooganock Guaranty Savings Bank v. Cushman, 109 Vt. 221, 195 A. 260 (1937).

2. Substitution.

When a new note is substituted for an old mortgage note, the mortgage is not thereby discharged, unless it appears that such was the intention of the parties. Richardson v. Wright, 58 Vt. 367, 5 A. 287 (1886).

3. Discharge by assignee.

Legal assignee (not the equitable) was proper party to make discharge of mortgage. Torrey v. Deavitt, 53 Vt. 331 (1881).

§ 462. By acknowledgment of payment.

Mortgages may also be discharged by the mortgagee or by his or her executor, administrator, assignee, attorney at law, or attorney acting under a duly executed and recorded power of attorney, acknowledging payment thereof by an entry on the mortgage deed, signing the same in the presence of one or more witnesses, which entry, upon being recorded on the margin of the record of such mortgage in the record of deeds, shall discharge such mortgage and bar all actions brought thereon.

History

Source. 1953, No. 195 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 2669. P.L. § 2617. G.L. § 2765. P.S. § 2603. V.S. § 2237. R.L. § 1951. G.S. 65, § 30. R.S. 60, § 30. 1837, No. 6 .

§ 463. By separate instrument.

  1. Mortgages may be discharged by an acknowledgment of satisfaction, executed by the mortgagee or his or her attorney, executor, administrator, or assigns, which shall be substantially in the following form:
  2. When such satisfaction is acknowledged before a notary public and recorded, it shall discharge such mortgage and bar actions brought thereon.

    Amended 1973, No. 47 , § 2, eff. April 12, 1973; 2003, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2017, No. 28 , § 6, eff. May 10, 2017; 2017, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. July 1, 2019.

I hereby certify that the following described mortgage is paid in full and satisfied, viz: ______________ mortgagor to ______________ mortgagee, dated ______________ 20____, and recorded in book ______, page ______, of the land records of the town of ________________________________________.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2670. P.L. § 2618. G.L. § 2766. P.S. § 2604. V.S. § 2238. 1890, No. 36 , §§ 1, 2.

Amendments--2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Deleted "town clerk" following "acknowledged before a" and deleted ", master, or county clerk," following "notary public".

Amendments--2017. Subsec. (b): Inserted "or" preceding "county" and deleted "or judge or register of probate" following "clerk,".

Amendments--2003 (Adj. Sess.). Added the (a) and (b) subsec. designations, and substituted "20" for "19" in the form of subsec. (a), deleted "signed in the presence of one or more witnesses" preceding "acknowledged" and inserted "before a town clerk, notary public, master, county clerk, or judge or register of probate" thereafter in subsec. (b).

Amendments--1973. Substituted "in the presence of one or more witnesses" for "sealed, witnessed" following "signed" in the last sentence.

Severability of enactment. 2003, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, provided:

"Sec. 7. Severability.

"If any provision of this act [which amended this section] or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid or in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, the invalidity or the violation shall not affect other provisions of this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable."

Retroactive applicability of 2004 amendment. 2003, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 9(b) provides that section 6 of that act, which amends this code section, shall apply retroactively to conveyancing instruments whenever executed.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Presence of witnesses.

Where two persons signed mortgage discharge on face of mortgage, but neither signed in presence of each other or any other person, discharge was ineffective under plain language of this section. In re Carriage House, Inc., 146 B.R. 352 (D. Vt. 1992).

§ 464. Liability of mortgagee for failure to provide payoff statements and refusal to discharge.

  1. Within five business days after the mortgagee's receipt of a written request for a statement of the amount of funds or other obligations required to satisfy a note or other obligation secured by a mortgage, the mortgagee shall provide a written payoff statement to the mortgagor. The mortgagee shall not impose a fee or other charge for providing the payoff statement, unless the request specifically asks for expedited service. A request for a payoff statement shall include the name of the mortgagor, the loan number assigned to the loan, and the address of the property securing the loan. If a written payoff statement is not deposited in the U.S. mail, delivered to a courier service, sent by facsimile, or sent by other method of service customarily used for delivery of messages, within five business days after receiving the request, the holder and any servicer shall be jointly and severally liable to any aggrieved party in a civil action for statutory damages equal to $25.00 per day after the expiration of the five business days, up to an aggregate maximum of $5,000.00 for all aggrieved parties; provided, however, any servicer not authorized to issue a payoff statement shall not be liable as set forth herein.
  2. Within 30 days after full performance of the conditions of the mortgage, the mortgagee of record shall execute and deliver a valid and complete discharge as provided in sections 461-463 of this title, together with any instrument necessary to establish the mortgagee's record ownership of the mortgage and to establish the authority to execute the discharge. As used in this section, the term "mortgagee" shall mean both the holder of the mortgage at the time it is satisfied and any servicer who receives the final payment satisfying the debt. If a discharge is not executed and delivered within 30 days, the holder and any servicer shall be jointly and severally liable to any aggrieved party in a civil action for statutory damages equal to $25.00 per day after the expiration of the 30 days, up to an aggregate maximum of $5,000.00 for all aggrieved parties; provided, however, any servicer not authorized to execute such discharge shall not be liable as set forth in this subsection. With respect to a mortgagee securing an open-end line of credit, the 30-day period to deliver a discharge commences after the mortgagor delivers to the address designated for payments under the line of credit a written request to terminate the line of credit and mortgage, together with payment in full of all amounts secured by the mortgage.
  3. The aggrieved party may file an action under subsection (a) or (b) of this section in superior court or, if the action is for monetary damages only and if the ad damnum requested is equal to or less than the maximum jurisdiction of a small claims proceeding, the complaint may be filed as a small claims action.
  4. In addition to any statutory damages, the mortgagee shall also be liable for consequential damages, punitive damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney's fees to any aggrieved party who substantially prevails in an action under this section. An aggrieved party may file an action to recover such damages, costs and fees in superior court. The court shall equitably allocate punitive damages among multiple aggrieved parties and may grant such other relief as the court deems appropriate.

    Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974; 1999, No. 105 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2671. P.L. § 2619. G.L. § 2767. P.S. § 2605. V.S. § 2239. R.L. § 1952. G.S. 65, § 31. R.S. 60, § 31. R. 1797, p. 311, § 11. R. 1787, p. 34.

Revision note. Deleted "of tort" following "action" in the first sentence to conform to Rule 2, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Substituted "county court" for "court of chancery" in the second sentence pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Amendments--1999 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the section.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" following "relief in a" in the second sentence.

Applicability--1999 (Adj. Sess.) amendment. 1999, No. 105 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, provided that this act shall apply to all requests for payoffs and mortgage discharges received on or after October 1, 2000.

Cross References

Cross references. Judgment lien, see § 2901 et seq. of Title 12.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Construction.

This section is penal in nature and therefore must be strictly construed. Judge Development Corp. v. Bank of New York, 814 F. Supp. 384 (D. Vt. 1993); Perkins v. Factory Point National Bank, 137 Vt. 577, 409 A.2d 578 (1979).

2. Payment.

Cause of action was not made out under this section where mortgagor failed to satisfy the debt or make a valid tender of the remaining sum due on the mortgage note prior to the request for discharge. Perkins v. Factory Point National Bank, 137 Vt. 577, 409 A.2d 578 (1979).

Co-makers of mortgage note had obligation to satisfy the debt prior to requesting discharge of mortgage and suing for failure to discharge upon payment of the debt and a request for discharge, and where there was no evidence that prospective purchasers from co-makers, who had obtained a commitment letter for a purchase money loan from bank which took mortgage from co-makers, were assuming co-makers' obligation on co-makers' mortgage note, and there were questions as to marketability which raised doubts as to whether the sale would go through, it could not be said there was a valid tender of payment of co-makers' mortgage within this section. Perkins v. Factory Point National Bank, 137 Vt. 577, 409 A.2d 578 (1979).

3. Elements of action.

To recover damages under this section a plaintiff must show: (1) payment of entire debt secured, and full performance of other specified conditions; (2) a request to mortgage to discharge mortgage, which has not been complied with within ten days; and (3) tender to mortgagee of its reasonable expenses in connection with discharging mortgage. Judge Development Corp. v. Bank of New York, 814 F. Supp. 384 (D. Vt. 1993).

A valid tender of payment of secured debt, as opposed to actual payment, is sufficient to give rise to liability under this section. Judge Development Corp. v. Bank of New York, 814 F. Supp. 384 (D. Vt. 1993).

4. Good faith.

Although consideration of bank's motive in refusing to discharge mortgage upon valid tender of payment was appropriate, question of bank's good faith was a fact question requiring further development, and summary judgment as to liability under this section was therefore denied. Judge Development Corp. v. Bank of New York, 814 F. Supp. 384 (D. Vt. 1993).

§ 464a. Discharge by licensed attorney.

  1. A recorded mortgage may be discharged by an attorney-at-law licensed to practice in this State if:
    1. the mortgagee, after receipt of payment of the mortgage in accordance with the payoff statement furnished to the mortgagor by the mortgagee, or the mortgagee's agent, fails to execute and record a discharge of the mortgage in accordance with section 461, 462, or 463 of this title;
    2. the discharge is executed by, or is in the name of, a purported mortgagee that is not holder of record of the mortgage; or
    3. the discharge of record was not executed in accordance with section 461, 462, or 463 of this title.
  2. An attorney-at-law who discharges a mortgage under this section shall execute and record with the discharge an affidavit in the record of deeds affirming that:
    1. the affiant is an attorney-at-law in good standing and licensed to practice in Vermont;
    2. the affidavit is made at the request of the mortgagor or the mortgagor's executor, administrator, successor, assignee, or transferee or the transferee's mortgagee;
    3. the purported mortgagee has provided a payoff statement with respect to the loan secured by the mortgage;
    4. the purported mortgagee has received payment of the mortgage in accordance with the payoff statement that has been proved by a bank check, certified check, or attorney client funds account check negotiated by the purported mortgagee or by evidence of receipt of payment by the purported mortgagee; and
    5. more than 30 days have elapsed since the payment was received by the purported mortgagee.
  3. The affidavit must include: the names and addresses of the mortgagor, the original mortgagee, and the purported mortgagee; the date of the mortgage; and the book and page number and similar information with respect to the most recent recorded assignment of the mortgage.
  4. The affiant shall attach to the affidavit the following, certifying that each copy is a true copy of the original document:
    1. photocopies of the documentary evidence that payment has been received by the mortgagee, provided that the payor's account number may be redacted; and
      1. if paid by check, a photocopy of the mortgagee's endorsement of the payoff check; or
      2. if paid by wire, written confirmation that the monies wired left the sender's account; and
    2. a photocopy of the payoff statement received from the mortgagee or servicer.
  5. An affidavit recorded under this section has the same effect as discharge under section 461, 462, or 463 of this title.
  6. An attorney-at-law who executes and records a discharge of mortgage in accordance with this section shall not be liable to the holder of the mortgage on account of such discharge except in the event of negligence or fraud by the discharging attorney.

    Added 1995, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § 38, eff. Jan. 1, 1997; amended 2007, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2017, No. 24 , § 1, eff. May 4, 2017.

History

Amendments--2017. Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

Amendments--2007 (Adj. Sess.). Amended section generally.

§ 465. When mortgagee dead.

When it appears from the record of a mortgage on real estate that such mortgage is undischarged, and the mortgagee therein named, or the person to whom such mortgage is assigned, is deceased, the owner of such real estate may make written application to the probate division of the superior court of the district within which such real estate is situated for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of such deceased mortgagee or assignee to discharge such mortgage. The probate division of the superior court may appoint an administrator of such deceased mortgagee or assignee to discharge such mortgage, if upon hearing and upon payment of the costs of such hearing, the administrator is satisfied that the conditions of such mortgage have been complied with and is further satisfied that there is no person within the state having authority to discharge such mortgage.

Amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a, eff. Feb. 1, 2011.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2672. P.L. § 2620. 1919, No. 79 , § 1. G.L. § 2763. 1910, No. 94 .

Amendments--2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted "probate division of the superior court" for "probate court" twice.

§ 466. Notice to parties.

The application provided in section 465 of this title shall state the names and addresses of all parties in interest, so far as they are known to the applicant, and the probate division of the superior court shall order such notice by registered mail, publication or service of process, as to it shall seem proper to protect the rights of all parties in interest. Failure on the part of a party in interest to receive such notice shall be ground for relief under 12 V.S.A. § 2357 , if such party is possessed of enforceable rights which are prejudiced by the discharge of a mortgage as aforesaid.

Amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a, eff. Feb. 1, 2011.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2675. P.L. § 2623. 1919, No. 79 , § 1. G.L. § 2763. 1910, No. 94 .

Amendments--2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted "probate division of the superior court" for "probate court".

§ 467. When death of mortgagee not established.

In case the death of a mortgagee or assignee is not established, and the court would have jurisdiction to proceed under 14 V.S.A. §§ 2305 and 2306, the court, upon like petition, hearing and proof, may appoint a trustee to discharge such mortgage.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2673. P.L. § 2621. 1919, No. 79 , § 1. G.L. § 2763. 1910, No. 94 .

§ 468. - Manner of discharge by trustee or administrator.

Such mortgage may be discharged by such administrator or trustee in the manner provided by law for the discharge of a mortgage by a mortgagee. Such discharge shall have the same effect as though made by the mortgagee or assignee thereof when living. An administrator or trustee appointed for such purpose shall have no authority relative to the estate of which he or she is appointed, other than as herein provided. The judge of such court, in his or her discretion, may require such administrator or trustee to give bonds as in his or her opinion the circumstances of the case require.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2674. P.L. § 2622. 1919, No. 79 , § 1. G.L. § 2763. 1910, No. 94 .

§ 469. Mortgagee corporation whose charter has expired.

When it appears from the record of a mortgage on real estate that such mortgage is undischarged, and the mortgagee named therein, or the assignee of such mortgage, is a private corporation whose charter has expired by its own limitation, or has been dissolved by operation of law, forfeiture, or for any other reason, a complaint may be brought to the presiding judge of the superior court of the county wherein such mortgage is recorded and, after such hearing as said presiding judge may direct, if he or she is satisfied that the conditions of such mortgage have been complied with, and have no force in law, and is further satisfied that there is no person within the state having authority to discharge such mortgage, he or she may direct an order discharging such mortgage. Such proceedings shall be without taxation of costs except that the moving party shall bear the costs of such notice as said presiding judge may order.

Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. 1955, No. 108 .

Revision note. Substituted "presiding judge of the county court" for "chancellor" in the first sentence and "presiding judge" for "chancellor" in that sentence and in the second sentence pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Substituted "complaint" for "petition" in the first sentence to conform language to Rule 3, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" in the first sentence.

§ 470. Validation of mortgage discharge on one- to four-family residential property.

  1. Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, a mortgage discharge executed on behalf of a banking or lending institution with respect to a mortgage encumbering a one- to four-family residential real property, including a residential unit in a condominium or in a common interest community as defined in Title 27A, that is not valid because it is not executed by or is not issued by or in the name of the record holder of the mortgage, shall be valid as if it had been issued or executed by the record holder of the mortgage if:
    1. No person has within three years after the discharge is recorded brought an action challenging the validity of the discharge and recorded a copy of the complaint in the land records of the town where the discharge is recorded; and
    2. An affidavit is recorded that is dated more than three years after the recording date of the mortgage discharge and contains the following:
      1. A statement that the affiant has been the record owner of the real property described in the mortgage for at least two years prior to the date of the affidavit.
      2. The recording information for the mortgage, any assignments, and the release.
      3. A statement that, since the date of the recording of the release, the affiant has received no demand for payment of all or any portion of the debt secured by the mortgage and has received no notice or communication that would indicate that all or any portion of the mortgage debt remains due or owing.
      4. A statement that, to the best of the affiant's knowledge and belief, the mortgage has been paid in full.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any release obtained by fraud or forgery.

    Added 2007, No. 177 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

Subchapter 5. Perpetuities

§ 501. Reformation of interests violating rule against perpetuities.

Any interest in real or personal property which would violate the rule against perpetuities shall be reformed, within the limits of that rule, to approximate most closely the intention of the creator of the interest. In determining whether an interest would violate said rule and in reforming an interest the period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual rather than possible events.

History

Source. 1957, No. 177 , § 1.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Application.

In action for partition, court erred in finding that unlimited duration of repurchase option violated rule against perpetuities, thus rendering option invalid, since this section operates to reform documents violating rule to carry out grantor's wishes. Colby v. Colby, 157 Vt. 233, 596 A.2d 901 (1991).

§ 502. Application of subchapter.

This subchapter shall apply only to inter vivos instruments and wills taking effect after the subchapter becomes operative and to appointments made after the subchapter becomes operative including appointments by inter vivos instrument or will under powers created before the subchapter becomes operative. This subchapter shall apply to both legal and equitable interests.

History

Source. 1957, No. 177 , § 3.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Application.

Even though this section specifically rejects a retroactive application of the subchapter by stating that its provisions would apply only to wills and instruments taking effect after the enactment of the statute, the combined effect of the subchapter with a prior decision, which precluded collateral attacks on unappealed decrees, reformed the application of the rule against perpetuities in Vermont in already settled estates as well as in future instruments. Ransom v. Bebernitz, 172 Vt. 423, 782 A.2d 1155 (2001).

§ 503. Effect on prior interests.

This subchapter shall not be construed to invalidate or modify the terms of any interest which would have been valid prior to its enactment.

History

Source. 1957, No. 177 , § 2.

Subchapter 6. Miscellaneous

§ 541. Deeds of lands held adversely.

Deeds, leases and other conveyances of lands, duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, shall have the effect to convey such title therein as the grantor or lessor may have, notwithstanding any actual possession thereof by any other person claiming the same.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2676. P.L. § 2624. G.L. § 2768. P.S. § 2606. V.S. § 2240. 1884, No. 146 . R.L. § 1953. G.S. 65, § 26. R.S. 60, § 26. 1807, p. 69.

§ 542. Fraudulent deeds.

Fraudulent and deceitful deeds, conveyances, and alienations of lands, or of an estate or interest therein, and charges upon lands or upon the rents and profits thereof, procured, made or suffered with intent to avoid a right, debt or duty of a person, shall be void as against the person, his or her heirs or assigns, whose right, debt, or duty is so intended to be avoided.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2677. P.L. § 2625. G.L. § 2769. P.S. § 2607. V.S. § 2241. R.L. § 1955. G.S. 65, § 28. R.S. 60, § 28. R. 1797, P. 313, § 14.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Burden of proof.

One who alleges that a conveyance is fraudulent must establish affirmatively all the facts necessary to make out the fraud. Darling v. Ricker, 68 Vt. 471, 35 A. 376 (1896).

2. Conveyance of exempt property.

Conveyance of property exempt from attachment was not fraudulent as to creditors. Darling v. Ricker, 68 Vt. 471, 35 A. 376 (1896).

3. Consideration.

Fact that a consideration passed did not validate a deed executed with fraudulent intent. Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 18 A. 153 (1889).

Conveyance upon an inadequate consideration, or upon no consideration, was not void as to creditors, provided the grantor had remaining property sufficient with which to pay his debts. Wilbur v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 432, 18 A. 154 (1889).

Marriage was a valuable consideration for a deed; and a deed executed for such consideration would not be set aside in behalf of existing creditors, unless it appeared that both parties to the deed intended by the conveyance to delay the creditors of the grantor, or at least unless the grantee knew that the grantor so intended. Pierce v. Harrington, 58 Vt. 649, 7 A. 462 (1886).

Cited. Foster v. Foster, 56 Vt. 540 (1884); Still v. Buzzell, 60 Vt. 478, 12 A. 209 (1887); Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 18 A. 153 (1889).

§ 543. Highways as encumbrances.

When real estate is conveyed by deed, the existence of a highway over or upon any part of such estate shall not be treated as a breach of the covenant of seisin or warranty or any covenant against encumbrances contained in such deed, unless the parties to such deed expressly refer to and covenant against such highway.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 5140. P.L. § 4869. G.L. § 4532. P.S. § 3952. V.S. § 3431. R.L. § 3042. G.S. 24, § 81. 1856, No. 31 .

ANNOTATIONS

1. Presumptions.

Public use of right of way may raise a rebuttable presumption of permissive rather than adverse use, to be resolved as a question of fact upon introduction of opposing evidence. Begin v. Barone, 124 Vt. 421, 207 A.2d 252 (1965).

§ 544. Energy devices based on renewable resources.

  1. No deed restrictions, covenants, or similar binding agreements running with the land shall prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting solar collectors, clotheslines, or other energy devices based on renewable resources from being installed on buildings erected on the lots or parcels covered by the deed restrictions, covenants, or binding agreements. A property owner may not be denied permission to install solar collectors or other energy devices based on renewable resources by any entity granted the power or right in any deed restriction, covenant, or similar binding agreement to approve, forbid, control, or direct alteration of property with respect to residential dwellings. For purposes of this subsection, that entity may determine the specific location where solar collectors may be installed on the roof within an orientation to the south or within 45ø east or west of due south, provided that this determination does not impair the effective operation of the solar collectors.
  2. In any litigation arising under the provisions of this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
  3. The legislative intent in enacting this section is to protect the public health, safety, and welfare by encouraging the development and use of renewable resources in order to conserve and protect the value of land, buildings, and resources by preventing measures which will have the ultimate effect, whether or not intended, of driving the costs of owning and operating commercial or residential property beyond the capacity of private owners to maintain. This section shall not apply to patio railings in condominiums, cooperatives, or apartments.

    Added 2009, No. 45 , § 15d, eff. May 27, 2009.

§ 545. Covenants, conditions, and restrictions of substantial public interest.

Deed restrictions, covenants, or similar binding agreements added after March 1, 2021 that prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting land development allowed under 24 V.S.A. § 4412(1)(E) and (2)(A) shall not be valid. This section shall not affect the enforceability of any property interest held in whole or in part by a qualified organization or State agency as defined in 10 V.S.A. § 6301a , including any restrictive easements, such as conservation easements and historic preservation rights and interests defined in 10 V.S.A. § 822 . This section shall not affect the enforceability of any property interest that is restricted by a housing subsidy covenant as defined by section 610 of this title and held in whole or in part by an eligible applicant as defined in 10 V.S.A. § 303(4) or the Vermont Housing Finance Agency.

Added 2019, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Oct. 12, 2020; amended 2021, No. 4 , § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

History

Amendments--2021. In the first sentence, substituted "March" for "January" following "added after" and "24 V.S.A § 4412(1)(E) and (2)(A)" for "a municipality's bylaws" preceding "shall not be valid".

Retroactive effect of 2021 amendment. 2021, No. 4 , § 2 provides that the amendment made to this section by § 1 of that act shall take effect retroactively on January 1, 2021.

Subchapter 7. Marketable Record Title

ANNOTATIONS

1. Applicability.

Plaintiff's way of necessity across defendants' land created in 1931 upon severance of commonly owned land was not extinguished by failure to regularly and openly use the way, the plaintiff used the way from 1943 until plaintiff purchased the land, and a road over the way was visibly apparent. Traders, Inc. v. Bartholomew, 142 Vt. 486, 459 A.2d 974 (1983).

§ 601. Requirements.

  1. Any person who holds an unbroken chain of title of record to any interest in real estate for 40 years, shall at the end of that period be deemed to have a marketable record title to the interest, subject only to such claims to the interest and such defects of title as are not extinguished or barred under this chapter, and such interests, limitations or encumbrances as are inherent in the provisions and limitations contained in the muniments of which the chain of record title is formed which have been recorded during the 40-year period.
  2. For purposes of this section and sections 602 and 603 of this title, "person" shall mean and include any natural person, firm, partnership, corporation, association, executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, fiduciary, or any other legal entity, excepting the state of Vermont, political subdivisions of the state, and the United States.

    Added 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Applicability.

Since plaintiff did not and had never held record title to fee in the property in question, he was unable to state a claim under the Marketable Record Title Act. Galkin v. Town of Chester, 168 Vt. 82, 716 A.2d 25 (1998).

The repose extended by subsection (a) of this section is intended only for bona fide purchasers without notice. Merritt v. Merritt, 146 Vt. 246, 500 A.2d 534 (1985).

§ 602. Unbroken chain; conditions and suspension.

  1. A person shall be deemed to hold an unbroken chain of title to an interest in real estate for purposes of this subchapter when the official public records disclose:
    1. A conveyance not less than 40 years in the past, properly executed and recorded according to law, which purports to create such interest in such person with nothing appearing of record during the 40-year period purporting to divest the person of the purported interest; or
    2. A conveyance not less than 40 years in the past, executed and recorded according to law, which purports to create such interest in some other person and other conveyances or events of record by which the purported interest has become vested in the person first referred to, with nothing appearing of record during the 40-year period purporting to divest the person first referred to of such interest.
  2. No absence, incapacity, disability, or lack of knowledge of any kind on the part of any person shall suspend the running of the 40-year period.
  3. For purposes of this section, "conveyance" means any deed, lease, decree, or other written instrument proper on its face to transfer title to an interest in real estate under the laws of this state, and also includes the transfer of an interest in real estate by inheritance or descent occasioned by death.

    Added 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1971, No. 14 , § 16, eff. March 11, 1971.

History

Amendments--1971. Subsection (a): Inserted "during the forty-year period" preceding "purporting to" in subdivs. (1) and (2).

§ 603. Successors in interest; notices of claims, filing for record.

A person holding a marketable title under this subchapter shall hold the same, and it shall be taken by his or her successors in interest, free and clear of any and all interests, liens, claims, and charges the existence of which depends in whole or in part upon any act, transaction, event or omission that occurred prior to such 40-year period, whether or not the instrument purporting to create such interest, lien, claim, or charge was properly executed so as to validly create the interest, lien, claim, or charge, and all such interests, liens, claims, and charges are declared void and of no effect either at law or in equity, except that any such interest, lien, claim or charge may be preserved from the effect of this chapter if the holder of the interest files for record within the 40-year period, a notice in writing, duly verified by oath, setting forth the nature of the claim as provided in section 605 of this title.

Added 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

Cross References

Cross references. Conservation and preservation rights and interests, see § 823 of Title 10.

§ 604. Failure to file notice.

  1. This subchapter shall not bar or extinguish any of the following interests, by reason of failure to file the notice provided for in section 605 of this title:
    1. the interest of any lessor or his or her successor as reversioner of the right to possession on the expiration of any lease or any lessee or the successor to his or her rights in and to any lease;
    2. any interest of a mortgagee, or interest in the nature of a mortgagee's interest, until after the obligation secured by the mortgage has become due and payable;
    3. any interest of a mortgagee, or interest in the nature of a mortgagee's interest, when the instrument creating the interest contains no due date for the obligation secured thereby;
    4. any interest held by adverse possession not evidenced by a recorded instrument;
    5. any remainder interest, reverter or reversionary interest or interest arising upon a condition, except an interest arising upon a condition as to the distance between a structure on real estate and a public highway or other property of a municipality;
    6. any easement or interest in the nature of an easement, the easement, the existence of which is clearly observable by physical evidences of its use;
    7. any easement or interest in the nature of an easement, or any rights appurtenant thereto granted, excepted, or reserved by a recorded instrument creating such easement or interest; or
    8. any conservation rights or interests or preservation rights or interests created pursuant to 10 V.S.A. chapters 34 and 155.
  2. This subchapter shall not affect any right, title, or interest in real estate owned or held by the United States, the State of Vermont, or any political subdivision of the State.

    Added 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1977, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 12, 1978; 1985, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2011, No. 118 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2015, No. 84 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

Amendments--2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(8): Inserted "or preservation rights or interests" preceding "created" and substituted "chapters 34 and" for "chapter" preceding "155".

Amendments--2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subdivision (a)(7): Deleted "including any rights for future use, except rights and interests created pursuant to chapter 34 of Title 10" from the end.

Subdivision (a)(8): Added.

Amendments--1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subdivision (a)(5): Added "except an interest arising upon a condition as to the distance between a structure on real estate and a public highway or other property of a municipality" following "interest arising upon a condition".

Amendments--1977 (Adj. Sess.). Subdivision (a)(7): Added "except rights and interests created pursuant to chapter 34 of Title 10" following "future use".

ANNOTATIONS

1. Easement by necessity.

By definition, interests implied by operation of law, as easements by necessity are, do not fall within the statutory category of interests "granted . . . by a recorded instrument." To conclude otherwise would stretch the language of the statute beyond its plain meaning. Had the legislature intended to include among the interests that are not extinguished by the Marketable Record Title Act interests that arise by operation of law in the absence of a deeded right, it would have said so. Gray v. Treder, 209 Vt. 210, 204 A.3d 1117 (2018).

Even if an easement by necessity in favor of plaintiffs' lot arose in 1948, it was extinguished by the Marketable Record Title Act because it had remained unrecorded, as the exception to the act for interests "granted, excepted, or reserved by a recorded instrument" did not apply to interests implied by operation of law, such as easements by necessity. Gray v. Treder, 209 Vt. 210, 204 A.3d 1117 (2018).

§ 605. Contents of notice of claim; recording.

  1. To be effective the notice referred to in section 603 of this title shall contain a full and accurate description of the land affected by the notice, set forth in particular terms, shall be recorded at length in the land records in the office where a deed of the land is required to be recorded, and shall be indexed in the general index for deeds under the claimant's name as grantee and under the name of the current record owner of the land as grantor.
  2. The notice provided for in this section and section 603 of this title may be filed by a claimant or any person acting on behalf of a claimant if such claimant is:
    1. Under a disability;
    2. Unable to assert a claim on his or her own behalf; or
    3. One of a class whose identity is uncertain.
  3. When a notice is filed for record under this section, it shall remain effective for a period of 40 years from the date of filing.

    Added 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1971, No. 14 , § 17, eff. March 11, 1971; 1993, No. 68 , § 8.

History

Amendments--1993. Subsection (a): Amended generally.

Amendments--1971. Subsection (a): Deleted "for record" following "filed" and inserted "and indexed" following "recorded" in the first sentence and deleted "also" following "notice shall" in the second sentence.

§ 606. Limitation of actions.

Nothing in this subchapter shall extend the periods for the bringing of an action or suit or for the doing of any act required under existing statutes of limitation, nor affect the operation of existing statutes governing the effect of the recording of or of the failure to record instruments affecting real estate.

Added 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; amended 1971, No. 14 , § 18, eff. March 11, 1971.

History

Amendments--1971. Inserted "of" following "recording".

§ 607. Time-shares; right to cancel.

  1. For the purposes of this section a "time-share" means an interest in a project involving real property acquired by means of a time-share estate or a time-share license.  A "time-share estate" is a right to occupy a unit or any of several units during separated time periods coupled with a freehold estate or an estate for years in a time-share property or a specified portion thereof.  A "time-share license" means a right to occupy a unit or any of several units including renewal options, not coupled with a freehold estate or an estate for years.
  2. A purchaser of a time-share shall have a right to cancel a contract of sale for five days after executing the contract. This right to cancel may not be waived.
  3. If a purchaser elects to cancel a contract pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, he or she may do so by written notice hand-delivered to the seller or mailed to the developer or to his or her agent for service of process.  If mailed, written notice shall be by certified mail and shall be dated on or before the fifth day. Cancellation is without penalty, and all payments made by the purchaser before cancellation must be refunded within 15 days after receipt of the notice of cancellation.
  4. A contract for the sale of a time-share shall include in a size equal to at least 10-point bold type the language set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of this section.  A contract violating this subsection shall be unenforceable.

    Added 1983, No. 103 (Adj. Sess.), eff. April 1, 1984.

§ 608. [Reserved for future use.].

If standing timber is conveyed by deed or other instrument, with a clause limiting the time for removal, title to any uncut timber remaining on the land at the expiration of the time for removal shall revert to the owner of the fee.

Added 1985, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

§ 610. Housing subsidy covenants; enforceability.

  1. Definition.  As used in this section, "housing subsidy covenant" means a covenant the purpose of which is to encourage the development and continued availability of affordable rental and owner-occupied housing for low and moderate income persons.  A housing subsidy covenant may be created during ownership or at the time of conveyance by the owner of real property as a condition of:
    1. an allocation of "low income housing tax credits" pursuant to regulations of the agency of commerce and community development;
    2. a grant, loan or contract made by an agency, instrumentality or political subdivision of this state;
    3. a grant, loan, or contract made by a nonprofit corporation;
    4. a subsidized loan from any lending institution that makes loans for residential housing; or
    5. a subsidized private transaction.
  2. Restrictions.  A housing subsidy covenant may include without limitation restrictions on the use of real property, restrictions on resale price, restrictions on tenant income and rents and restrictions on the income of a purchaser of housing or a housing unit for his or her own residence.
  3. Requirements.  A housing subsidy covenant shall be set forth in a separate and distinct document and executed, acknowledged and recorded in the manner provided by law for the execution, acknowledgment and recording of deeds.
  4. Duration.  A housing subsidy covenant may be perpetual or may be limited to a period of time specified in the document and may be amended or terminated by written agreement of the owner of the land and all persons or entities holding the right to enforce the covenant. Any amendment or termination shall be executed, acknowledged and recorded as provided in this section.
  5. Enforceability.  A covenant that complies with this section shall run with the land and shall be enforceable according to its terms.  The covenant may include provisions for monitoring and enforcing compliance.  The covenant may be enforced by the person or entity that provided the subsidy of which creation of the covenant was a condition, or by any agency, instrumentality or political subdivision of the state or nonprofit corporation organized for the purpose of promoting affordable housing to whom the right of enforcement has been assigned.

    Added 1989, No. 91 , § 1; amended 1995, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 1(a).

History

Amendments--1995 (Adj. Sess.) Subdivision (a)(1): Substituted "agency of commerce and community development" for "agency of development and community affairs".

§ 611. Remediation certificates.

A remediation certificate issued under the provisions of 18 V.S.A. § 1221a , and duly recorded under the provisions of 18 V.S.A. § 1221b , shall correct any title deficiencies under this subchapter that were caused by the absence of a subdivision permit required under the provisions of 18 V.S.A. chapter 23.

Added 1993, No. 187 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

History

Reference in text. 18 V.S.A. §§ 1221a, referred to in this section, was repealed by 1999, No. 46 , § 12.

18 V.S.A. §§ 1221b, referred to in this section, was repealed by 2001, No. 133 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

§ 612. Municipal permits.

  1. Notwithstanding the majority decision in Bianchi v. Lorenz (1997), for land development, as defined in 24 V.S.A. § 4303(10) , no encumbrance on record title to real estate or effect on marketability shall be created by the failure to obtain or comply with the terms or conditions of any required municipal land use permit as defined in 24 V.S.A. § 4303(11) .
  2. A purchaser shall have the right to terminate a binding contract for the sale of real estate if, prior to closing, the purchaser determines and gives written notice to the seller that land development has occurred on the real estate without a required municipal land use permit or in violation of an existing municipal land use permit. Following the receipt of written notice, the seller shall have 30 days, unless the parties agree to a shorter or longer period, either to obtain the required municipal land use permits or to comply with existing municipal land use permits. If the seller does not obtain the required municipal land use permits or comply with existing municipal land use permits, the purchaser may terminate the contract if, as an owner or occupant of the real estate, the purchaser may be subject to an enforcement action under 24 V.S.A. § 4454 .

    Added 1997, No. 125 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. April 27, 1998; amended 1999, No. 46 , § 8, eff. May 26, 1999; 2009, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2011, No. 102 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. May 5, 2012.

History

Reference in text. 24 V.S.A. § 4304(3), referred to in subsec. (a), is a reference to 24 V.S.A. § 4304(10), as amended by 2003, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 83.

24 V.S.A. § 4304(24), referred to in subsec. (a), is a reference to 24 V.S.A. § 4304(11), as amended by 2003, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 83.

Amendments--2011 (Adj. Sess.) Subsection (b): Substituted "24 V.S.A. § 4454" for "24 V.S.A. § 4496" at the end.

Amendments--2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsection (a): Substituted " § 4303(10)" for " § 4303(3)" and " § 4303(11)" for " § 4303(24)" .

Amendments--1999. Amended section generally.

Retroactive applicability 1999 amendment. 1999, No. 46 , § 15(b), provided that the amendment to this section by section 8 of the act shall take effect May 26, 1999, and shall apply retroactively to April 27, 1998, but shall terminate specified encumbrances that otherwise might have existed at any time before or after that date.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited. Ladd v. Gorczyk, 177 Vt. 551, 861 A.2d 1094 (mem.) (August 27, 2004).

§ 613. Repealed. 2011, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

Former § 613. Former § 613, relating to stormwater discharge permits during transition period, was derived from 2011, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 2 and amended by 2015, No. 73 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; and 2017, No. 168 (Adj. Sess.), § 23.

Repeal and reenactment of section. The former § 613, relating to stormwater discharge permits during transition period, was derived from 2003, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 6 amended by 2007, No. 43 , § 2. The former § 613 was repealed on January 1, 2012 by 2003, No. 140 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, as amended by 2007, No. 43 , § 2. The text of the former § 613 was reenacted as the existing § 613 by 2011, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

Repeal of section. 2011, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, as amended by 2015, No. 73 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and 2017, No. 168 (Adj. Sess.), § 24, provided: "27 V.S.A. § 613 (stormwater discharges during transition period; encumbrance on title) shall be repealed 180 days after the date the Agency of Natural Resources adopts the stormwater rule pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 1264." The stormwater rule was adopted by the Agency pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 1264 on February 25, 2019, and as a result this section was repealed by operation of law 180 days after that date.

§ 614. Transfer of stormwater discharge permits to a municipality.

  1. The failure of the residential subdivision to obtain, renew, or comply with the terms of a pretransition stormwater discharge permit shall not create an encumbrance on record title to real property within the residential subdivision or affect marketability of title of real property within the residential subdivision, provided that:
    1. The residential subdivision transfers a pretransition stormwater permit to a municipality according to the requirements of 10 V.S.A. § 1264(i) ;
    2. Property owners within the residential subdivision record in the land records:
      1. The deed or other legal document of conveyance of the stormwater system to the utility; and
      2. A notice indicating that the stormwater utility has assumed responsibility for the permitting of the stormwater system located in the residential subdivision.
  2. The definitions found in 10 V.S.A. § 1264 and subsection 613(a) of this title apply to this section unless otherwise indicated. For the purposes of this section, "residential subdivision" means land identified and demarcated by recorded plat or other device that a municipality has authorized to be used primarily for residential construction.

    Added 2007, No. 130 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. May 12, 2008.

§ 615. Wetland permit.

No encumbrance on record title to real estate or effect on marketability shall be created by failure to obtain or comply with a permit of the secretary of natural resources pursuant to 10 V.S.A. chapter 37.

Added 2009, No. 31 , § 10.

§ 616. Groundwater source testing; disclosure of informational material.

  1. Disclosure of potable water supply informational material.  For a contract for the conveyance of real property with a potable water supply, as that term is defined in 10 V.S.A. § 1972(6) , that is not served by a public water system, as that term is defined in 10 V.S.A. § 1671(5) , executed on or after January 1, 2013, the seller shall, within 72 hours of the execution, provide the buyer with informational materials developed by the department of health regarding:
    1. the potential health effects of the consumption of contaminated groundwater; and
    2. the availability of test kits provided by the department of health.
  2. Marketability of title.  Noncompliance with the requirements of this section shall not affect the marketability of title of a property.
  3. Penalty; liability.  Liability for failure to provide the informational materials required by this section shall be limited to a civil penalty, imposed by the department of health under 18 V.S.A. chapter 3, of no less than $25.00 and no more than $250.00 for each violation.

    Added 2011, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2013.

§ 609. Conveyance of standing timber.

CHAPTER 6. ENHANCED LIFE ESTATE DEEDS

Sec.

§ 651. Short title.

This chapter shall be known as the "Enhanced Life Estate Deed Act" or the "ELED Act".

Added 2019, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 13, 2020.

§ 652. Application of chapter.

This chapter applies to deeds in which a grantor reserves a common law life estate interest in real property while expressly reserving rights such that the deed creates a contingent remainder interest in the grantee.

Added 2019, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 13, 2020.

§ 653. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless a deed indicates an intention to the contrary:

  1. "Convey" means to grant, sell, gift, lease, transfer, or encumber real property, with or without consideration, including the ability to revise or revoke a deed.
  2. "Enhanced life estate deed" or "ELE Deed" means a deed in which:
    1. the grantor expressly reserves a common law life estate;
    2. the grantor expressly reserves the right to convey the property during the grantor's lifetime;
    3. the grantee acquires a contingent remainder interest such that, prior to the death of the grantor, the grantee has no vested rights in the property; and
    4. upon the death of the grantor, title vests in the surviving grantee or, for a deceased grantee, title passes pursuant to section 658 of this title, subject to encumbrances of record.
  3. "Grantee" means one or more grantees and the grantee's heirs and assigns.
  4. "Grantor" means one or more grantors, each of whom shall be a natural person, and the grantor's heirs and assigns.
  5. "Revoke" means to negate an ELE deed and is accomplished when the grantor records a deed from the grantor to himself or herself.
  6. "Revise" means to change the grantee on an ELE deed and is accomplished when the grantor records a new ELE deed to a grantee other than, or in addition to, the grantee named in the prior ELE deed. A revised deed supersedes and replaces a prior ELE deed. To add an additional grantee to an existing ELE deed, the new ELE deed must name all grantees.

    Added 2019, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 13, 2020.

§ 654. Execution and recording of an enhanced life estate deed.

  1. Subject to the rights expressly reserved in the deed, a validly executed and recorded ELE deed does not:
    1. affect the ownership rights of the grantor or the grantor's creditors;
    2. transfer or convey any present right, title, or interest in the property or create any present legal or equitable interest in the grantee; or
    3. subject the grantor's property to process from the grantee's creditors.
  2. The grantor may convey the property described in an ELE deed, or any portion thereof, without the need for joinder by, consent from, agreement of, or notice to the grantee.
  3. If not previously conveyed during the lifetime of the grantor, upon the death of the grantor, subject to encumbrances of record, the interest stated in an ELE deed vests in the grantee or, for a deceased grantee, the interest passes pursuant to section 658 of this title.

    Added 2019, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 13, 2020.

§ 655. Acceptance or consideration not required; conveyance not permitted.

  1. An enhanced life estate deed is effective without:
    1. acceptance by the designated grantee during the grantor's life; or
    2. consideration.
  2. A grantee named in an ELE deed shall not convey the grantee's contingent remainder interest during the grantor's lifetime, and any conveyance which attempts to do so is void.

    Added 2019, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 13, 2020.

§ 656. Revocation, revision, mortgages.

  1. A grantor may revoke or revise an ELE deed.
  2. Joinder by, consent to, agreement of, or notice to the grantee of an ELE deed shall not be required for revocation or revision.
  3. The granting of a mortgage shall not operate to revoke or revise an ELE deed, but the property interests conveyed and reserved in an ELE deed shall be encumbered by the mortgage and by any future advances made pursuant to it.

    Added 2019, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 13, 2020.

§ 657. Execution by guardian; use of power of attorney.

  1. With the approval of the Probate Division, a guardian may convey the real property of a person under guardianship by an ELE deed.
  2. An ELE deed may be executed by an agent under a power of attorney if the power of attorney complies with the requirements of 14 V.S.A. chapter 123, including any applicable gifting and self-dealing provisions.

    Added 2019, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 13, 2020.

§ 658. Death of grantee prior to death of grantor.

Unless the ELE deed provides otherwise:

  1. If an ELE deed conveys title to a single grantee and the grantee predeceases the grantor, upon the death of the grantor, title to the property vests in the heirs of an intestate grantee or the interest shall be distributed or conveyed to a grantee's heirs or beneficiaries, as directed by the Probate Division.
  2. If an ELE deed conveys title to multiple grantees as tenants in common and one or more grantees predecease the grantor, upon the death of the grantor, title to the property vests in the heirs of any intestate grantee or the interest shall be distributed or conveyed to a grantee's heirs or beneficiaries, as directed by the probate court.
  3. If an ELE deed conveys title to multiple grantees as joint tenants and one or more grantees predecease the grantor, upon the death of the grantor, title to the property vests in any grantee who survives the grantor.

    Added 2019, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 13, 2020.

§ 659. Previously executed and recorded enhanced life estate deeds.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the validity of an enhanced life estate deed, a "Life Estate Deed with Reserved Powers," a "Lady Bird Deed," a "Medicaid Deed," an "Italian Deed," or similar deed executed and recorded prior to the effective date of this act.

Added 2019, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 13, 2020.

§ 660. Optional form for enhanced life estate deed.

The following form may be used to create an enhanced life estate deed:

ENHANCED LIFE ESTATE DEED

(Vermont statutory form deed)

KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS, that I/We, ______________ and ______________ of ______________, in the County of ______________ and State of Vermont, Grantors, without consideration, by these presents, do freely GIVE, GRANT, SELL, CONVEY, AND CONFIRM unto the Grantees, ______________ and ______________, of ______________, in the County of ______________ and State of Vermont and their heirs and assigns forever as ______________ [insert nature of tenancy] a certain piece of land in ______________, in the County of __________________, and State of Vermont, described as follows:

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION:

[Insert property description or attach schedule]

GRANTORS RESERVED RIGHTS:

This is an enhanced life estate deed executed pursuant to, and with the rights and privileges set forth in, 27 V.S.A. chapter 6, the Enhanced Life Estate Deed Act (the "ELED Act"). The Grantors, or the survivor of them, hereby reserve unto themselves: (a) a common law life estate, with the exclusive use, possession, and enjoyment of the property; and (b) the right to convey the property. Reference is hereby made to the aforementioned deeds and records and to the deeds and records contained in those documents, in further aid of this description. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said granted premises, with all the privileges and appurtenances thereof, to the said Grantees, _____________ and _____________, and their heirs and assigns, to their own use and behoof forever, as ______________________________ [insert nature of tenancy]. I/We, the said Grantors, for ourselves and our heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns do covenant with the said Grantees, and ______________________________, and their heirs and assigns, that until the ensealing of these presents we are the sole owners of the premises and have good right and title to convey the same in the manner aforesaid, that they are FREE FROM EVERY ENCUMBRANCE, except as aforesaid, and the Grantors hereby engage to WARRANT AND DEFEND the same against all lawful claims whatsoever, except as otherwise provided in this deed. I/WE HAVE HEREUNTO set our hands this ______________, of _____________, 20________. _____________________________________________________________________________ [INSERT NOTARY CLAUSE]

Added 2019, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. July 13, 2020.

CHAPTER 7. PROPERTY HELD FOR RELIGIOUS, FRATERNAL, OR CHARITABLE PURPOSES

Subchapter 1. General Provisions

§ 701. Corporate powers.

The worshipful master, senior warden, and junior warden of a lodge of ancient, free, and accepted masons, and the trustees of fraternal, religious, or charitable organizations, elected according to the constitution and bylaws of such lodge or organization, shall have corporate powers, with perpetuity, for the purpose of taking and holding real and personal estate for the use and benefit of such lodge or organization and for other charitable purposes.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2709. P.L. § 2657. G.L. § 2784. 1912, No. 98 . 1908, No. 68 , § 1. P.S. § 2618. 1896, No. 258 , § 1.

Cross References

Cross references. Conveyances by corporation, see § 346 of this title.

Corporations, generally, see § 1.01 et seq. of Title 11A.

§ 702. Mortgage or conveyance of property.

Such master and wardens and such trustees, if authorized by a majority vote of the members of such lodge or organization present and voting at an annual, regular, or special communication or meeting thereof, subject to the constitution and bylaws of such lodge or organization, may sell, mortgage, and convey any or all of such real and personal estate.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2710. P.L. § 2658. G.L. § 2785. 1908, No. 68 , § 2. P.S. § 2619. 1896, No. 258 , § 2.

§ 703. Estate or interest not vested in person in office or successor.

A grant, conveyance, devise, or lease of real or personal estate to, or a trust of such real or personal estate for the benefit of, a person or the person's successors in an ecclesiastical office shall not vest an estate or interest in such person or the person's successor. Such a grant, conveyance, devise or lease to or for such person, by the designation of such office, shall not vest an estate or interest in a successor of such person. This section shall not be deemed to admit the validity of such grant, conveyance, devise, or lease heretofore made.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2678. P.L. § 2626. G.L. § 2770. P.S. § 2608. V.S. § 2242. R.L. § 1956. G.S. 91, § 1. 1856, No. 46 , § 1.

§ 704. No interest vests unless grantee is a corporation.

A grant, conveyance, devise, or lease of real estate for the purpose of religious worship for the use of a congregation or society shall not vest a right, title or interest in a person to whom such grant, conveyance, devise, or lease is made, unless the same is made to a corporation organized for the support of the gospel and the maintenance of public worship, or to procure, hold and keep in repair a house of public worship according to law.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2679. P.L. § 2627. G.L. § 2771. P.S. § 2609. V.S. § 2243. R.L. § 1957. G.S. 91, § 2. 1856, No. 46 , § 2.

§ 705. Disposition upon death of noncorporate grantee.

Real estate heretofore granted, devised, or demised, for the purpose mentioned in section 704 of this title, to a person in an ecclesiastical office or orders shall be deemed to be held in trust for the benefit of the congregation or society using the same. Unless previously conveyed to a corporation, as provided in section 704 of this title, such real estate, upon the death of the person in whom the legal title was vested on November 17, 1856, shall vest in the religious corporation formed by the congregation or religious society occupying and enjoying such real estate, if such a corporation, organized according to law, is in existence at the time of such death. If such congregation or society is not incorporated, the title of such real estate shall vest in the state.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2680. P.L. § 2628. G.L. § 2772. P.S. § 2610. V.S. § 2244. R.L. § 1958. G.S. 91, §§ 3, 4. 1856, No. 46 , §§ 3, 4.

§ 706. Reconveyance by governor.

When title to such real estate vests in the state, it shall be under the charge of the governor. Upon the governor being satisfied that such congregation or society has become a corporation according to law, he or she shall grant and convey such real estate and the rights, title, and interest of the state to such corporation, which shall thereupon be vested with such rights, title, and interest.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2681. P.L. § 2629. G.L. § 2773. P.S. § 2611. V.S. § 2245. R.L. § 1959. G.S. 91, § 5. 1856, No. 46 , § 5.

Subchapter 2. Insurance on Buildings Mortgaged to Charitable Institutions

§ 741. Insurance required.

When funds of a charitable or eleemosynary institution are invested in a mortgage on real estate, the buildings included shall be insured by the mortgagor in such company duly authorized to transact business in this state as the trustees, directors, or board of investment of such institution may designate; and the policies of insurance shall be duly assigned, or the loss made payable to such institutions. The trustees, directors, or board of investment may procure or renew such policy of insurance in such company authorized to do business in this state, as they may elect, from year to year, or for a longer or shorter period, if the mortgagor neglects so to do, and, when necessary, the treasurer of such institution may sign premium notes, and may charge the amount paid for such insurance to the mortgagor.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 9116. P.L. § 7008. G.L. § 5573. P.S. § 4780. 1900, No. 62 , § 1.

§ 742. Payment of insurance expenses.

The necessary expenses of such procurement or renewal shall be paid by the mortgagor to such charitable or eleemosynary institution, and shall be a lien upon the property so mortgaged, recoverable with interest annually at the same rate as the debt secured by the mortgage from the time of payment, as part of the moneys secured by such mortgage.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 9117. P.L. § 7009. G.L. § 5574. P.S. § 4781. 1900, No. 62 , § 2.

Subchapter 3. Baptist Church

§ 781. Property to vest in Vermont Baptist State Convention.

All property of any kind belonging to or held in trust for any Baptist church, Baptist church and society, or Baptist society, hereafter referred to as the Baptist church in this subchapter, organized under the laws of this state, which has become or shall become extinct by death of all its members or otherwise, and which has been or shall be at any time affiliated with the Vermont Baptist State Convention, a religious corporation existing by virtue of No. 111 of the Acts of 1851, and engaged in religious missionary work and in fostering weak Baptist churches in this state or connected with any Baptist church affiliated with such Vermont Baptist State Convention, shall vest in and become the property of such Vermont Baptist State Convention.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2691. P.L. § 2639. G.L. § 2780. 1917, No. 271 , § 1.

§ 782. When property vests; how held.

A Baptist church of this state, affiliated with the Vermont Baptist State Convention aforesaid, which has ceased or failed to maintain religious worship or services, or to use the property for religious worship or services, for the space of two consecutive years immediately prior thereto, or whose membership has so diminished in numbers or in financial strength as to render it impossible or impracticable for such church to maintain religious worship or services, or to protect its property from exposure to waste and dilapidation, or to fulfill the purpose for which it was incorporated, may be declared extinct or dissolved, by an order of the superior court. The property of such church, or property which may be held in trust for such church, may be transferred to and the title and possession thereof vested in such Vermont Baptist State Convention. The avails of such property so transferred shall be held in trust and added to the permanent fund of such convention and the income thereof employed for its usual work until a local Baptist church is again organized in the same neighborhood, when the income shall be used to aid such local church as needed.

Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2692. P.L. § 2640. G.L. § 2781. 1917, No. 271 , § 2.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" at the end of the first sentence.

§ 783. Procedure for transferring property.

An application for such an order and disposition of property may be made by any member of the Vermont Baptist State Convention when duly authorized thereto by the board of trustees or the executive committee of the board of trustees of the Vermont Baptist State Convention, or by any member of such church, upon a verified complaint setting forth the facts authorizing such order and disposition of property. Upon the presentation of such complaint to the superior court, such court may proceed in a summary manner, after such notice as the court may prescribe, to inquire into the merits of such application. If upon examination by the court it shall appear that the making of the order and disposition of the property applied for is necessary or proper for any of the causes mentioned in section 782 of this title, such court shall make a final order declaring such church extinct, or dissolving the same, and transferring any property, and the title and possession thereof which may belong to such church, or held in trust for such church, and vest the same in the Vermont Baptist State Convention, it being the intention and purpose of this section and sections 781 and 782 of this title to preserve to the Baptist denomination in this state, as represented by the Vermont Baptist State Convention, for religious uses all property owned by or held in trust for any such church. Such an order of transfer shall not be made if objected to by five or more members of such church. This section and sections 781 and 782 of this title shall not affect reversionary interests of any person or persons in such property or any valid legal liens of creditors thereon.

Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2693. P.L. § 2641. G.L. § 2782. 1917, No. 271 , § 3.

Revision note. Substituted "complaint" for "petition" in the second sentence to conform language to Rule 3, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Substituted "county court" for "court of chancery" in the second sentence pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" following "petition to the" in the second sentence.

§ 784. Construction with other laws.

In case of conflict between the provisions of sections 781-783 of this title and special acts of the general assembly relating to the Vermont Baptist State Convention, the provisions of such sections shall control.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2694. P.L. § 2642. G.L. § 2783. 1917, No. 271 , § 4.

§ 785. Application to nonaffiliated church.

The provisions of sections 781-784 of this title shall apply to any Free Will Baptist church or society not affiliated with the Vermont Baptist State Convention. However, the superior court shall not make any order of transfer under section 783 of this title if objection is made by a member of such church or society. Such court in making an order under that section may direct that the property of such church or society be sold and the proceeds shall be paid to such convention, after deducting necessary expenses.

Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2695. P.L. § 2643. 1919, No. 80 , § 1.

Revision note. Substituted "county court" for "court of chancery" in the second sentence pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" following "however, the" in the second sentence.

Subchapter 4. Congregational Church

§ 821. Vesting of property of extinct churches.

All property of any kind belonging to or held in trust for a Congregational church, Congregational church and society, or Congregational society, hereafter referred to as Congregational church in this subchapter, organized under the laws of this state, which has become or shall become extinct by death of all its members or otherwise, and which has been or shall be at any time affiliated with the Vermont Congregational Conference, a religious corporation existing by virtue of No. 267 of the Acts of 1872 as since amended, or with the Vermont Domestic Missionary Society, a religious corporation existing by virtue of No. 268 of the Acts of 1872, and engaged in religious missionary work and in fostering weak Congregational churches in this state connected with a Congregational church affiliated with such Vermont Congregational Conference or such Vermont Domestic Missionary Society, shall vest in and become the property of such Vermont Domestic Missionary Society.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2696. P.L. § 2644. 1921, No. 75 , § 1.

§ 822. Dissolution of church by superior court.

A Congregational church of this state, affiliated with the Vermont Congregational Conference or the Vermont Domestic Missionary Society, which has ceased or failed to maintain religious worship or services for the space of two consecutive years immediately prior thereto or whose membership has so diminished in numbers or in financial strength as to render it impossible or impracticable for such church to maintain religious worship or services or to protect its property from exposure to waste and dilapidation or to fulfill the purpose for which it was incorporated, by an order of the superior court, may be declared extinct or dissolved.

Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2697. P.L. § 2645. 1921, No. 75 , § 2.

Revision note. Substituted "county court" for "court of chancery" pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" following "order of the".

§ 823. Property to vest in Vermont Domestic Missionary Society as trustee.

Upon such extinction or dissolution, the property of such church or property which may be held in trust for such church shall be transferred to, and the title and possession thereof vested in, the Vermont Domestic Missionary Society. The avails of such property so transferred shall be held in trust and added to the permanent fund of such society and the income thereof employed for its usual work until a local Congregational church is again organized in the same neighborhood, when the income shall be used to aid such local church.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2698. P.L. § 2646. 1921, No. 75 , § 2.

§ 824. Application for dissolution.

An application for such an order and disposition of property may be made by a director of the Vermont Domestic Missionary Society when duly authorized thereto by the board of directors or the executive committee of the board of directors of such society, or by a member of such church, upon a verified complaint setting forth the facts authorizing such order and disposition of property.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2699. P.L. § 2647. 1921, No. 75 , § 3.

Revision note. Substituted "complaint" for "petition" to conform language to Rule 3, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

§ 825. Court order transferring property; intention of the law.

Upon the presentation of such complaint to the superior court, such court may proceed in a summary manner, after such notice as the court may prescribe, to inquire into the merits of such application. If, upon examination by the court, it shall appear that the making of the order and disposition of the property applied for is necessary or proper for any of the causes mentioned in section 822 of this title, such court shall make a final order declaring such church extinct, or dissolving the same and transferring any property, and the title and possession thereof, which may belong to such church, or held in trust for such church and vest the same in the Vermont Domestic Missionary Society, it being the intention and purposes of this and sections 821-824 of this title to preserve to the Congregational denomination in this state, as represented by the Vermont Domestic Missionary Society, for religious uses all property owned by or held in trust for any such church.

Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2700. P.L. § 2648. 1921, No. 75 , § 3.

Revision note. Substituted "complaint" for "petition" in the first sentence to conform language to Rule 3, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Substituted "sections 821-824 of this title" for "the four preceding sections" in the second sentence for purposes of clarity.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" preceding "such court may" in the first sentence.

§ 826. Objection to transfer.

Such an order of transfer shall not be made if objected to by five or more members of such church.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2701. P.L. § 2649. 1921, No. 75 , § 3.

§ 827. Effect of transfer on reversionary interests or liens.

Sections 821-826 of this title shall not affect the reversionary interest of a person in such property or a valid legal lien of a creditor thereon.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2702. P.L. § 2650. 1921, No. 75 , § 3.

§ 828. Construction with other laws.

In case of conflict between the provisions of sections 821-827 of this title and special acts of the general assembly relating to the Vermont Congregational Conference or the Vermont Domestic Missionary Society, the provisions of such sections shall control.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2703. P.L. § 2651. 1921, No. 75 , § 4.

§ 829. Exceptions.

The First Congregational Church and society of Rochester and Bristol are expressly excluded from the operation of sections 821-828 of this title.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2704. P.L. § 2652. 1921, No. 75 , § 5.

Subchapter 5. Methodist Church

§ 861. Powers of trustees to hold realty.

The trustees of the several circuits and stations of the United Methodist Church and their successors in office shall have corporate powers, with perpetuity, for the purpose of taking and holding real or personal estate to support religious worship or for church sites, buildings, or parsonages and to maintain and support deaconesses' homes and other religious work.

Amended 1969, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 5, 1970.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2682. 1941, No. 38 , § 1. P.L. § 2630. G.L. § 2774. 1908, No. 67 . P.S. § 2612. 1906, No. 78 , § 1. V.S. § 2246. 1892, No. 46 . R.L. § 1960. G.S. 90, § 13. R.S. 81, § 13. 1828, No. 19 .

Amendments--1969 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted "United" preceding "Methodist Church".

§ 862. Powers of trustees to convey.

Such trustees and their successors in office may convey such real estate, if authorized by a majority vote of the members of a quarterly conference in the circuit or station where such estate is situated, and, by vote duly recorded, may authorize one of their number to convey such property.

Amended 2015, No. 72 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 12, 2016.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2683. P.L. § 2631. G.L. § 2775. P.S. § 2613. 1906, No. 78 , § 2. V.S. § 2247. R.L. § 1961. G.S. 90, § 14. R.S. 81, § 14. 1833, No. 18 .

Amendments--2015 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted "a majority" following "authorized by" and deleted "two-thirds of" following "vote of".

ANNOTATIONS

1. Estoppel.

Where stewards of society conveyed land but without any vote of the quarterly meeting conference, and the society had acquiesced in the acts of its stewards for more than twenty years, the society by retaining the benefit of the acts of its agents was estopped from denying their validity. French v. Town of Barre, 58 Vt. 567, 5 A. 568 (1886).

§ 863. Powers as to campgrounds.

Such trustees and their successors in office may erect within their respective circuits, upon grounds used for camp meetings under the usages of such church, boarding tents for such persons as attend and furnish board and lodging during such meetings.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2684. P.L. § 2632. G.L. § 2776. P.S. § 2614. 1906, No. 78 , § 3. V.S. § 2248. R.L. § 1962. G.S. 90, § 15. 1853, No. 52 .

§ 864. Property of extinct circuits or stations.

All property of any kind belonging to or held in trust by any circuit or station of the United Methodist Church within the bounds of the Troy Annual Conference of the United Methodist church in the state of Vermont which by order of the superior court may be declared extinct or dissolved, shall be transferred to and the title and possession thereof vested in the Troy Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, a corporation, under the following circumstances:

  1. When such circuit or station has become or shall become extinct by the death or removal of all its members or otherwise; or
  2. When such circuit or station has ceased or failed to maintain religious worship or services or to use its property for religious worship or services for the space of five years immediately prior thereto; or
  3. When the membership of such circuit or station has so diminished in numbers or financial strength as to render it impossible or impracticable to maintain religious worship or services or to protect its property from exposure and waste or to fulfill the purpose for which such property was held.

    Amended 1969, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. March 5, 1970; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2685. 1941, No. 38 , § 2. P.L. § 2633. 1923, No. 48 , § 1.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" following "order of the" in the introductory paragraph.

Amendments--1969 (Adj. Sess.) Inserted "United" preceding "Methodist Church" in three places in the introductory paragraph.

§ 865. Complaint to dissolve circuit or station.

The trustees of the Troy Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church or any member of the board of trustees, when duly authorized thereto by a vote of the board, may apply by complaint to the superior court within the county where such circuit or station is located for the relief prayed for in section 864 of this title. Upon the filing of such complaint in such court, a hearing shall be had upon such notice as shall be ordered by such court. If upon hearing it shall be found by such court that the case is brought within the provisions of section 864 and that the transfer of property prayed for ought, in equity and good conscience, to be made, the court shall make a decree in the premises that the circuit or station in question is dissolved or extinct and transfer the property described in the complaint to the Troy Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church to be held and used according to the discipline of such church and the provisions of its charter.

Amended 1969, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 5, 1970; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2686. 1941, No. 38 , § 3. P.L. § 2634. 1923, No. 48 , § 2.

Revision note. Substituted "complaint" for "petition" in the section catchline and the first through third sentences to conform language to Rule 3, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" preceding "within the county" in the first sentence.

Amendments--1969 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted "United" preceding "Methodist Church" in the first and third sentences.

§ 866. Recording decrees affecting realty.

When any property affected by a decree of the superior court as provided for in section 865 of this title is real estate, a copy of such decree duly certified by the clerk of such court shall be recorded in the land records of the town where such property is situated.

Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2687. P.L. § 2635. 1923, No. 48 , § 3.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" preceding "as provided."

Subchapter 6. Protestant Episcopal Church

§ 901. Taking title to land.

The rector, wardens, and members of the vestrymen of a parish of the Protestant Episcopal Church and their successors in office, elected according to the canons and usages of such church, shall have corporate powers with perpetuity for the purpose of taking and holding real or personal estate to support religious worship or for church sites, buildings, or rectories.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2688. P.L. § 2636. G.L. § 2777. P.S. § 2615. V.S. § 2249. 1894, No. 134 , § 1. R.L. § 1963. 1868, No. 44 , § 1.

§ 902. Conveyance of property.

Such rector, wardens, and members of the vestry may by majority vote give, sell, and convey real or personal estate belonging to such parish when empowered so to do by a majority vote at an annual meeting of the parish or one called for that purpose, and by vote duly recorded may authorize one of their number to execute all proper conveyances. In like manner, they may give, sell, and convey real or personal estate belonging to such parish to the Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont to receive and hold the same for the purpose specified in the act of incorporation thereof and amendments thereto. Provided, however, that the rector, wardens, and members of the vestry shall not encumber or alienate any real or personal estate belonging to such parish or alienate any part thereof (save for refinancing of an existing loan) without the written consent of the bishop and standing committee of the Diocese of Vermont.

Amended 1991, No. 58 .

History

Source. 1951, No. 57 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 2689. P.L. § 2637. G.L. § 2778. P.S. § 2616. 1898, No. 50 , § 1. V.S. § 2250. 1894, No. 134 , § 2. R.L. § 1964. 1868, No. 44 , § 2.

Amendments--1991. Substituted "members of the vestry" for "vestrymen, by unanimous consent" following "wardens and" and inserted "by majority vote" preceding "give" in the first sentence and substituted "members of the vestry" for "vestrymen" in the third sentence.

§ 903. Rights of parish conveying property.

A parish making such a conveyance to the Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont shall have no right or authority to charge such real or personal estate with any debts of such parish incurred subsequent to the making of such conveyance. Real and personal estate heretofore conveyed by a parish to the Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont shall not be liable for the debts of the parish incurred subsequent to November 15, 1898.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2690. P.L. § 2638. G.L. § 2779. P.S. § 2617. 1898, No. 50 , § 2.

§ 904. Transfer of property of extinct parishes and missions.

All property of any kind belonging to or held in trust for a parish or mission of the Protestant Episcopal Church, which, under the canons and usages of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Vermont, ceases to exist as a parish or mission, shall vest in and become the property of the Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Vermont, the property, or the avails thereof, to be used by said trustees for the aid, benefit or advancement of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Vermont in the manner authorized by the corporation charter of November 19, 1880 as amended.

Added 1969, No. 96 , § 1.

§ 905. Procedure for transferring property.

Upon presentation to the superior court of the county in which said property is situated of a complaint signed by the Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Vermont requesting an order transferring the title to property of any kind belonging to a parish or mission to the Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont on the ground that such parish or mission has ceased to exist as a parish or mission under the canons and usages of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Vermont, such court may proceed in a summary manner, after such notice as the court may prescribe, to inquire into the merits of such complaint. If, upon examination by the court, it shall appear that the making of the order and disposition of the property applied for is necessary or proper for the cause mentioned in section 904 of this title, such court shall make a final order transferring the title to the property of such parish or mission to the trustees of the Diocese of Vermont for the purposes and uses set forth in section 904 of this title.

Added 1969, No. 96 , § 2; amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Revision note. Substituted "complaint" for "petition" in two places in the first sentence to conform language to Rule 3, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" following "presentation to the" in the first sentence.

Subchapter 7. Universalist Church

§ 941. Transfer of property of extinct churches.

All property of any kind belonging to or held in trust for any Universalist church and society or Universalist society, hereafter referred to as the Universalist church in this subchapter, organized under the laws of this state, which has become or shall become extinct by death of all its members or otherwise, and which has been or shall be at any time affiliated with the Universalist Convention of Vermont and the Province of Quebec, a religious corporation incorporated under No. 224 of the Acts of 1888, as amended by No. 398 of the Acts of 1912, and engaged in religious missionary work and in fostering weak Universalist churches in this state, or connected with any Universalist church affiliated with The Vermont and Quebec Universalist Unitarian Convention, shall vest in and become the property of The Vermont and Quebec Universalist Unitarian Convention.

History

Source. 1949, No. 61 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 2705. P.L. § 2653. 1933, No. 37 , § 1.

§ 942. Transferred property held in trust.

Any Universalist church of this state affiliated with the Vermont and Quebec Universalist Unitarian Convention aforesaid, which has ceased or failed to maintain religious worship or services, or to use the property for religious worship or services, for the space of two consecutive years immediately prior thereto, or whose membership has so diminished in numbers or financial strength as to render it impossible or impractical for such church to maintain religious worship or services, or to protect its property from exposure to waste and dilapidation, or to fulfill the purpose for which it was incorporated, by an order of the superior court, may be declared extinct or dissolved, and the property of such church or property which may be held in trust for such church, be transferred to and the title and possession thereof vested in the Vermont and Quebec Universalist Unitarian Convention. The avails of such property so transferred shall be held in trust and added to the permanent fund of the convention, and the income thereof employed for its usual work until a local Universalist church is again organized in the same neighborhood, when the income shall be used to aid such local church as needed.

Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. 1949, No. 61 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 2706. P.L. § 2654. 1933, No. 37 , § 2.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" preceding "may be declared" in the first sentence.

§ 943. Manner of effecting transfer.

Any application for such an order and disposition of property may be made by any member of the Vermont and Quebec Universalist Unitarian Convention when duly authorized thereto by the board of trustees or the executive committee of the board of trustees of the Vermont and Quebec Universalist Unitarian Convention, or by any member of such church upon a verified complaint setting forth the facts authorizing such order and disposition of property. Upon the presentation of such complaint to the superior court, such court may proceed in a summary manner, after such notice as the court may prescribe, to inquire into the merits of such application. If upon examination by the court it shall appear that the making of the order and disposition of the property applied for is necessary or proper for any of the causes mentioned in section 942 of this title, such court shall make a final order declaring such church extinct or dissolving the same, and transferring any property, and the title and possession thereof, which may belong to such church, or held in trust for such church, and vest the same in the Vermont and Quebec Universalist Unitarian Convention. It is the intent and purpose of this section and sections 941 and 942 of this title to preserve to the Universalist denomination in this state, as represented by the Vermont and Quebec Universalist Unitarian Convention for religious uses all property owned by or held in trust for any such church. Such an order of transfer shall not be made if objected to by five or more members of such church. This shall not affect reversionary interests of any person or persons, in such property, or any valid legal liens of creditors thereon.

Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. 1949, No. 61 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 2707. P.L. § 2655. 1933, No. 37 , § 3.

Revision note. Substituted "complaint" for "petition" in the first and second sentences to conform language to Rule 3, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

Substituted "section 942 of this title" for "the preceding section" in the third sentence for purposes of clarity.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "superior court" for "county court" preceding "such court may" in the second sentence.

§ 944. Construction with other laws.

In case of conflict between the provisions of this subchapter and special acts of the general assembly relating to the Vermont and Quebec Universalist Unitarian Convention, the provisions of this subchapter shall control.

History

Source. 1949, No. 61 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 2708. P.L. § 2656. 1933, No. 37 , § 4.

CHAPTER 9. PROPERTY EXTENDING INTO LAKE CHAMPLAIN

Sec.

§ 1001. Repealed. 1967, No. 308 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, eff. March 22, 1968.

History

Former § 1001. Former § 1001, relating to construction of wharfs into Lake Champlain, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2634; P.L. § 2583; G.L. § 2730; P.S. § 2568; 1906, No. 77 , § 1; V.S. § 2204; R.L. § 1919; G.S. 64, §§ 5, 6; R.S. 59, §§ 5, 6; 1827, No. 38 , § 1. The subject matter is now covered by section 351 et seq. of Title 29.

§ 1002. Control of wharves.

Wharves, storehouses, or breakwaters erected agreeably to the provisions of grants heretofore made or of this chapter, may be exclusively used and controlled by the persons erecting them, their heirs, or their assigns.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2635. P.L. § 2584. G.L. § 2731. P.S. § 2569. 1906, No. 77 , § 2. V.S. § 2205. R.L. § 1920. G.S. 64, § 7. R.S. 59, § 7. 1827, No. 38 , §§ 2, 3.

§ 1003. Title to railroad property confirmed.

When a railroad company in this state has constructed its railroad beyond low-water mark into Lake Champlain or has built into such lake a wharf, dock, pier, or other structure in connection with such railroad for its accommodation or use which does not impede ordinary navigation in such lake, such building and structures shall be lawful and the legal title thereto shall vest in such railroad company or others lawfully claiming under it.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 2636. P.L. § 2585. G.L. § 2732. P.S. § 2570. V.S. § 2206. R.L. § 1921. 1874, No. 85 .

ANNOTATIONS

1. Low-water mark.

By "low-water mark," as applied to the boundary of lands bordering on Lake Champlain, was meant ordinary low-water mark. McBurney v. Young, 67 Vt. 574, 32 A. 492 (1895).

CHAPTER 11. LOST PROPERTY

Sec.

§ 1101. Finder to give notice.

A person who finds money or goods, to the value of $3.00 or more, or takes up a stray beast, the owner of which is not known, shall, within six days thereafter, make two notices, describing such money, goods, or beast, with the natural or artificial marks, with the time and place of finding or taking up the same, and post them in two public places in the town in which such property was found.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 7632. P.L. § 8295. 1933, No. 157 , § 7932. G.L. § 6746. P.S. § 5653. V.S. § 4849. R.L. § 4053. G.S. 100, § 31. R.S. 88, § 26. 1806, p. 160. R. 1797, p. 373, § 12. R. 1787, p. 144.

Cross References

Cross references. Animals generally, see § 3341 et seq. of Title 20.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Six-day period.

Day when advertisements were posted was excluded in computation of six-day period. Chaffee v. Harrington, 60 Vt. 718, 15 A. 350 (1888).

2. Lost pets.

Trial court did not err in failing to apply notice requirements of lost property statutes in case involving lost dog. Lamare v. North Country Animal League, 170 Vt. 115, 743 A.2d 598 (1999).

From its plain terms and judicial application over time it is evident that the "lost property" statute -- which dates from the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries -- was designed for agricultural animals of substantial monetary value, not lost pets. Morgan v. Kroupa, 167 Vt. 99, 702 A.2d 630 (1997).

Cited. Andrews v. Carl, 77 Vt. 172, 59 A. 167 (1904).

§ 1102. Penalty for destroying notices.

A person who willfully takes down or destroys such a notice within 60 days from the time of posting the same shall be fined $7.00, unless the owner has appeared and claimed such property.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 7633. P.L. § 8296. G.L. § 6747. P.S. § 5654. V.S. § 4850. R.L. § 4054. G.S. 100, § 40. R.S. 88, § 35. 1806, p. 163. R. 1797, p. 375, § 16.

§ 1103. Publication of notice in newspaper.

If the value of such property exceeds $10.00, the person finding it shall immediately cause a copy of the notice to be published three weeks successively in some newspaper circulating in such town.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 7634. P.L. § 8297. G.L. § 6748. P.S. § 5655. V.S. § 4851. R.L. § 4055. G.S. 100, § 33. R.S. 88, § 28. 1906, p. 160. R. 1797, p. 373, § 12.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited. Morgan v. Kroupa, 167 Vt. 99, 702 A.2d 630 (1997).

§ 1104. Recording copy of notice.

If the owner of such property does not appear and claim it within 20 days from the date of such notice, the person so finding it shall cause a copy of the notice to be recorded in the office of the clerk of such town.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 7635. P.L. § 8298. G.L. § 6749. P.S. § 5656. V.S. § 4852. R.L. § 4056. G.S. 100, § 32. R.S. 88, § 27. 1817, p. 160. R. 1797, p. 373, § 12.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited. Morgan v. Kroupa, 167 Vt. 99, 702 A.2d 630 (1997).

§ 1105. Sale of property; disposition of proceeds.

If the owner of the property does not appear and prove his title within 90 days from the time of posting the first notice, the person finding the property may sell it at public auction. The avails of the sale, after paying the expenses of keeping the property, and of the proceedings relating to the same, shall be paid to the town treasurer, at the time of paying the avails of the sale.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 7636. P.L. § 8299. G.L. § 6750. P.S. § 5657. V.S. § 4853. R.L. § 4057. G.S. 100, § 34. R.S. 88, § 29. 1806, p. 161. R. 1797, p. 373, § 12. R. 1787, p. 145.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited. Morgan v. Kroupa, 167 Vt. 99, 702 A.2d 630 (1997).

§ 1106. Accounting for proceeds.

The account of the expenses shall be examined and allowed by a district judge of the county, and deposited with such treasurer, at the time of paying the avails of the sale.

Amended 1965, No. 194 , § 10, operative Feb. 1, 1967; 1973, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 90, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 7637. P.L. § 8300. G.L. § 6751. 1908, No. 62 . P.S. § 5658. V.S. § 4854. R.L. § 4058. G.S. 100, § 35. R.S. 88, § 30. 1806, p. 161.

Amendments--1973 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted "justice or a" preceding "district judge".

Amendments--1965. Substituted "district" for "municipal" preceding "judge".

§ 1107. Owner may have property before sale.

If, previous to the sale, the owner appears and proves his or her title to the property, he or she shall be entitled to the same on paying the expenses of keeping, and of the proceedings required by this chapter.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 7638. P.L. § 8301. G.L. § 6752. P.S. § 5659. V.S. § 4855. R.L. § 4059. G.S. 100, § 36. R.S. 88, § 31. 1806, p. 162. R. 1797, p. 373, § 12. R. 1787, p. 144.

§ 1108. Failure of finder to comply with chapter.

If a person finds money or goods, or takes up a stray beast and does not thus advertise or perform the duties required of him or her by this chapter, he or she shall not receive pay for keeping, or for other proceedings relating to such property, and shall forfeit to the use of the town in which the same is found, the value of such money, goods, or stray beast, to be recovered in an action on this statute.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 7639. P.L. § 8302. G.L. § 6753. P.S. § 5660. V.S. § 4856. R.L. § 4060. G.S. 100, § 38. R.S. 88, § 33. 1806, p. 162. R. 1797, p. 375, § 13.

Revision note. Deleted "of tort" following "action" near the end of the section to conform to Rule 2, Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of Title 4.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Express promise to pay.

Although finder did not advertise his taking up an estray, where owner promised to pay for its keeping, he waived his right to take advantage of the noncompliance with the requirement of this section, and became liable to finder for keeping of the beast. Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681 (1864).

§ 1109. Found beast may be worked.

A person who takes up a stray beast may put such beast to reasonable labor, and the magistrate, in allowing the account of the expenses, shall allow the owner a reasonable compensation therefor.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 7640. P.L. § 8303. G.L. § 6754. 1908, No. 62 . P.S. § 5661. V.S. § 4857. R.L. § 4061. G.S. 100, § 37. R.S. 88, § 32. 1806, p. 162.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Lost pets.

From its plain terms and judicial application over time it is evident that the "lost property" statute -- which dates from the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries -- was designed for agricultural animals of substantial monetary value, not lost pets. Morgan v. Kroupa, 167 Vt. 99, 702 A.2d 630 (1997).

§ 1110. Liability of owner upon death of beast.

If the beast so taken up dies, the owner thereof shall be liable to pay to the person who took it up a reasonable compensation for the costs and expenses of keeping and other proceedings relating to such beast, unless its death was occasioned by the carelessness or negligence of such person.

History

Source. V.S. 1947, § 7641. P.L. § 8304. G.L. § 6755. P.S. § 5662. V.S. § 4858. R.L. § 4062. G.S. 100, § 39. R.S. 88, § 34. 1806, p. 162. R. 1797, p. 375, § 14.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited. Morgan v. Kroupa, 167 Vt. 99, 702 A.2d 630 (1997).

CHAPTER 12. MUSEUM PROPERTY

Sec.

§ 1151. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. "Lender" means a person whose name appears on the records of a museum as the person legally entitled to, or claiming to be legally entitled to, property held by the museum or, if such person is deceased, the legal heirs of such person.
  2. "Loan" means a deposit of property not accompanied by a transfer of title to the property.
  3. "Museum" means an institution operated by a nonprofit corporation or a public agency primarily for educational, scientific, historic preservation, or aesthetic purposes, and the institution owns, cares for, exhibits, studies, collects, archives, or catalogues property. "Museum" also includes historical societies, parks, monuments, and libraries.
  4. "Property" means a tangible object, animate or inanimate, that has intrinsic, historic, artistic, scientific, or cultural value, and the object is under the care of a museum.

    Added 2007, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

§ 1152. Property held without a loan agreement.

Any property held by a museum that is not subject to a loan agreement and has been held for 10 or more years and has remained unclaimed shall be deemed to be abandoned. The property shall become the property of the museum, provided the museum has given notice pursuant to section 1154 of this title and no assertion of title has been filed for the property within 180 days from the date of the third published notice.

Added 2007, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

§ 1153. Property held pursuant to a loan agreement.

  1. Property in the possession of a museum subject to a loan agreement shall be deemed to be donated to the museum, provided:
    1. No claim is made or action filed to recover the property after termination of the loan.
    2. The museum provided notice as required pursuant to section 1154 of this title.
    3. No assertion of title has been filed within 180 days following the date of the third published notice.
  2. A museum may terminate a loan of property if the loan was for an indefinite term and the property has been held by the museum for 10 years or more by providing notice pursuant to section 1154 of this title. For the purposes of this chapter, property on permanent loan shall be considered property loaned for an indefinite term.
  3. A museum may terminate a loan of property loaned for a specified term by providing notice pursuant to section 1154 of this title any time after the expiration of the specified term or earlier if permitted by the loan agreement.
  4. The owner of property on loan to a museum shall notify the museum promptly of any transfer of ownership or change in address of the owner.
  5. Prior to acceptance of a loan of property, a museum shall provide to the owner of the property written notice of the provisions of this chapter.

    Added 2007, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

§ 1154. Notice requirements by museums for loaned property.

  1. A museum required to provide notice pursuant to this chapter shall mail by certified mail, return receipt requested, written notice to the last known owner at the most recent address. If the museum has no record of the owner's address or the museum has not received written proof of receipt of the mailed notice within 30 days after mailing, the museum shall publish at least one notice each month for three consecutive months in the principal newspaper of general circulation in each of the following:
    1. the county of the last known address of the owner, if known.
    2. the county in which the museum is located. For the purposes of this subdivision, if property is loaned to a branch of a museum, the museum shall be considered to be located in the county in which the branch is located, otherwise a museum shall be located in the county in which it has its principal place of business.
  2. The published notice shall contain all the following:
    1. The notice shall be entitled: "Notice of Abandonment."
    2. A clear description of the unclaimed property.
    3. The last known name and address of the owner.
    4. A request that any person who has any knowledge of the whereabouts of the owner provide written notice to the museum.
    5. The name and address of the museum.
    6. The name, address, and contact information of the person to be contacted regarding the property.
    7. A statement that if written assertion of title is not presented by the owner to the museum within 180 days after the date of the final published notice, the property shall be considered abandoned or donated and shall become the property of the museum.
  3. A copy of all notices required in this chapter relating to property in the form of identifiable works of art that changed hands in Europe between the years 1933 and 1945 shall be sent to The Art Loss Register or any successor organization having similar purposes on or before the date on which the notices are mailed or first published.

    Added 2007, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

§ 1155. Provision of mission statement.

  1. Prior to the acquisition of property by gift, a museum, upon request, shall provide a donor or prospective donor with a written copy of its mission statement and collections policy, which shall include policies and procedures of the museum related to deaccessioning.
  2. If the museum has the knowledge of a planned bequest of any property prior to the death of the testator, the museum shall provide the testator with a written copy of its mission statement and collections policy, which shall include policies and procedures of the museum relating to deaccessioning.
  3. Any museum that routinely makes its mission statement and collections policy available on its website shall be deemed to have complied with this section.

    Added 2007, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

§ 1156. Property vested in museums.

  1. If no written assertion of title has been presented by the owner to the museum within 180 days after the date of the third published notice, title to the property shall vest in the museum free of all claims of the owner and any other person claiming under the owner.
  2. A person who purchases or otherwise acquires property from a museum acquires good title to the property if the museum has acquired title to the property under this chapter.

    Added 2007, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

§ 1157. Exemptions.

This chapter shall not apply to either of the following:

  1. Any property that changed hands by theft, seizure, confiscation, forced sale, or other involuntary means in Europe between 1933 and 1945.
  2. Any property reported as stolen in writing to a law enforcement officer, insurer, or The Art Loss Register, or any successor organization having similar purposes, notwithstanding any notice provided pursuant to section 1155 of this title.

    Added 2007, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

§ 1158. Record of acquisition.

The museum shall maintain or continue to maintain to the extent such information is available a record of acquisition whether by purchase, bequest, gift, loan, or otherwise of property for display or collection and of deaccessioning or loan of property currently held or thereafter acquired for display or collection.

Added 2007, No. 127 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

CHAPTER 13. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY

Sec.

§§ 1201-1207. Repealed. 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 31, eff. Jan. 1, 1965.

History

Former §§ 1201-1207. Former § 1201, relating to notification of owner, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 7642; P.L. § 8305; G.L. § 6756; P.S. § 5663; 1906, No. 184 , § 1; V.S. § 4859; R.L. § 4063; 1870, No. 75 ; G.S. 28, §§ 73, 74; G.S. 100, § 41; 1855, No. 29 , § 1; 1849, No. 41 , § 56; 1843, No. 22 , § 1.

Former § 1202, relating to notification of owner when unknown, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 7643; P.L. § 8306; G.L. § 6756; P.S. § 5663; 1906, No. 184 , § 1; V.S. § 4859; R.L. § 4063; 1870, No. 75 ; G.L. 28, §§ 73, 74; G.S. 100, § 41; 1855, No. 29 , § 1; 1849, No. 41 , § 56; 1843, No. 22 , § 1.

Former § 1203, relating to sale of unclaimed property, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 7644; P.L. § 8307; G.L. § 6757; P.S. § 5664; V.S. § 4860; R.L. § 4064; G.S. 28, § 74; 1855, No. 29 , § 1.

Former § 1204, relating to notice of sale, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 7645; P.L. § 8308; G.L. § 6758; P.S. § 5665; 1906, No. 184 , § 2; V.S. § 4861; R.L. § 4065; G.S. 28, § 75; G.S. 100, § 42; 1855, No. 29 , § 2; 1843, No. 22 , § 2.

Former § 1205, relating to report of sale, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 7646; P.L. § 8309; G.L. § 6759; P.S. § 5666; 1906, No. 184 , § 3; V.S. § 4862; R.L. § 4066; G.S. 28, § 76; G.S. 100, § 43; 1855, No. 29 , § 3; 1843, No. 22 , § 3.

Former § 1206, relating to disposition of proceeds, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 7647; P.L. § 8310; G.L. § 6760; P.S. § 5667; V.S. § 4863; R.L. § 4066; G.S. 28, § 76; G.S. 100, § 43; 1855, No. 29 , § 3; 1843, No. 22 , § 3.

Former § 1207, relating to property and avails to vest in state after two years, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 7648; P.L. § 8311; G.L. § 6761; P.S. § 5668; V.S. § 4864; R.L. § 4067; G.S. 28, § 77; 1855, No. 29 , § 4.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Applicability.

There is no provision in this chapter which exempts the state, as a holder of funds, from its terms. 1964-66 Op. Atty. Gen. 241.

§§ 1208-1211. Repealed. 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Former §§ 1208-1211. Former § 1208, relating to definitions of unclaimed property, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 1 and was amended by 1965; amended 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and 1987, No. 143 (Adj. Sess.), § 1. For present provisions, see now § 1241 of this title.

Former § 1209, relating to property held by banking or financial organizations or business associations, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 2 and was amended by 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1 and 2 and 2003, No. 66 , § 301.

Former § 1209a, relating to contents of safe deposit box or other safekeeping depository box, was derived from 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 3 and was amended by 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 3. For present provisions, see now § 1243 of this title.

Former § 1210, relating to unclaimed funds held by life insurance corporations, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 3 and was amended by 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 4 and 5 and 2003, No. 66 , § 301a.

Former § 1210a, relating to insurance other than life insurance, was derived from 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 9a and was amended by 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 6 and 2003, No. 66 , § 301b.

Former § 1210b, relating to unclaimed demutualization proceeds, was derived from 2003, No. 66 , § 301c. For present provisions, see now § 1244 of this title.

Former § 1211, relating to deposits and refunds held by utilities, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 4 and was amended by 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 7 and 2003, No. 66 , § 301d.

§ 1212. Repealed. 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 13.

History

Former § 1212. Former § 1212, relating to application of chapter, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 5.

§§ 1213-1235. Repealed. 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Former §§ 1213-1235. Former § 1213, relating to undistributed dividends and distributions, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 6, and was amended by 1993, No. 43 , § 1, eff. June 3, 1993; 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 8 and 2003, No. 66 , § 301e.

Former § 1214, relating to property of business associations and banking or financial organizations held in course of dissolution, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 7.

Former § 1215, relating to property held by fiduciaries, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 8 and was amended by 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 9 and 2003, No. 66 , § 301f.

Former § 1216, relating to express trust, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 9.

Former § 1217, relating to property held by states, state courts, and public officers and agencies, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 10 and was amended by 1987, No. 143 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1993, No. 43 , § 2; 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 10 and 2003, No. 66 , § 301g.

Former § 1218, relating to miscellaneous personal property held for another person, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 11 and was amended by 1987, No. 143 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 11 and 2003, No. 66 , § 301h.

Former § 1219, relating to reciprocal actions and agreements with other states, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 12 and was amended by 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, see now § 1263 of this title.

Former § 1220, relating to report of abandoned property, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 13 and was amended by 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 1987, No. 26 , § 1; 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 12 and 1999, No. 49 , § 76.

Former § 1221, relating to notice and publication of lists of abandoned property, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 14, eff. Jan. 1, 1965 and was amended by 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 9 and 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 13 and 17, see now § 1249 of this title.

Former § 1222, relating to payment or delivery of abandoned property, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 15 and was amended by 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 14, see now § 1248 of this title.

Former § 1223, relating to relief from liability by payment or delivery, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 16 and was amended by 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

Former § 1224, relating to income accruing after payment or delivery, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 17.

Former § 1225, relating to periods of limitations not a bar, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 18, see now § 1259 of this title.

Former § 1226, relating to abandoned property; public sale, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 19 and was amended by 1995, No. 63 § 283; 1997, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 53 and 2001, No. 80 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

Former § 1227, relating to deposit of funds, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 20 and was amended by 1975, No. 243 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; and 1995, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 15, see now § 1253 of this title.

Former § 1228, relating to claim for abandoned property paid or delivered, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 21.

Former § 1229, relating to determination of claims, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 22.

Former § 1230, relating to judicial action upon determination, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 23 and was amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10 and 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

Former § 1231, relating to election to take payment or delivery, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 24, see now § 1257 of this title.

Former § 1232, relating to examination of records, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 25.

Former § 1233, relating to proceedings to compel delivery of abandoned property, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 26.

Former § 1234, relating to penalties, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 27 and was amended by 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, see now § 1264 of this title.

Former § 1235, relating to rules and regulations, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 28, see now § 1267 of this title..

§ 1236. Repealed. 1985, No. 240 (Adj. Sess.), § 13.

History

Former § 1236. Former § 1236, relating to application of laws, was derived from 1964, No. 35 (Sp. Sess.), § 29.

§§ 1237-1239. Repealed. 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Former §§ 1237-1239. Former § 1237, relating to miscellaneous unclaimed property, was derived from 1971, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1238, relating to agreement to locate reported property and heir finder fee limits, was derived from 1987, No. 26 , § 2 and was amended by 2003, No. 66 , § 301i.

Former § 1239, relating to unclaimed property of deceased owner, was derived from 2001, No. 12 , § 1 and was amended by 2003, No. 66 , § 301j.

CHAPTER 14. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY

Sec.

§§ 1241-1270. Repealed. 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Former §§ 1241-1271. Former § 1241, relating to definitions, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1242, relating to presumptions of abandonment, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1243, relating to contents of safe deposit box or other safekeeping depository, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1244, relating to unclaimed demutualization proceeds, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1244a, relating to unclaimed life insurance benefits, was derived from 2013, No. 43 , § 1.

Former § 1245, relating to rules for taking custody, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1246, relating to burden of proof as to property evidenced by record of check or draft, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1247, relating to report of unclaimed property, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1248, relating to payment or delivery of unclaimed property, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and amended by 2019, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 280.

Former § 1248a, relating to electric utility cooperatives, was derived from 2007, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), § 51.

Former § 1249, relating to notice and publication of lists of unclaimed property, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and amended by 2007, No. 40 , § 8.

Former § 1250, relating to custody by state; recovery by holder; relief of holder from liability, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1251, relating to income accruing after payment or delivery, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1252, relating to public sale of unclaimed property, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1253, relating to deposit of funds; information concerning owner, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2009, No. 13 , § 1; and 2011, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § E.132.

Former § 1254, relating to claim of another state to recover property, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1255, relating to filing claim with treasurer; handling of claims by treasurer, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1256, relating to appeal, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1257, relating to election to take payment or delivery, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1258, relating to destruction or disposition of property having no substantial commercial value; immunity from liability, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1259, relating to periods of limitation, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and 2009, No. 13 , § 3.

Former § 1260, relating to requests for reports and examination of records, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1261, relating to retention of records, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1262, relating to enforcement, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1263, relating to interstate agreements and cooperation; joint and reciprocal actions with other states, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1264, relating to interest and penalties, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1265, relating to agreement to locate property; asset locators, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1266, relating to foreign transactions, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1267, relating to rules, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1268, relating to uniformity of application and construction, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1269, relating to severability clause, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 1270, relating to deceased owners; multiple claimants, was derived from 2005, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and amended by 2009, No. 13 , § 2; 2009, No. 55 , § 10; and 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a.

CHAPTER 15. CONDOMINIUM OWNERSHIP ACT

Cross References

Cross references. Cooperative housing, see § 1581 et seq. of Title 11.

History

Law review commentaries

Law review. For article, "Keeping Faith: Fiduciary Obligations in Property Owners Associations," see 11 Vt. L. Rev. 422 (1986).

Subchapter 1. Condominium Ownership

History

Amendments--1985 (Adj. Sess.) 1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, designated the existing provisions of this chapter, comprising sections 1301-1349, as subchapter 1 and added the subchapter heading.

§ 1301. Short title.

This chapter shall be known as the "condominium ownership act."

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Reenacted without change.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Powers of condominium association.

In a declaration of condominium, the declarant clearly reserved to itself the right to expand the condominium up to the stated maximum number of 250 units and to adjust fractional ownership of the common facilities correspondingly. Furthermore, nothing in the declaration or the Condominium Ownership Act gave the condominium association a power to block future development of land not within the condominium common area. Highridge Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Killington/Pico Ski Resort, 198 Vt. 44, 111 A.3d 427 (2014).

§ 1302. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. "Apartment" means a part of the property intended for any type of independent use, including commercial uses. An "apartment" is one or more rooms or enclosed spaces located on one or more floors in a building, and with a direct exit to a public street or highway or to a common area leading to a street or highway.
  2. "Apartment owner" means the person owning an apartment in fee simple absolute or any other estate in real property recognized by law and an undivided interest in the fee simple estate or any other estate in real property recognized by law of the common areas and facilities in the percentage specified and established in the declaration.
  3. "Apartment number" or "site number" means the number, letter, or combination thereof, designating the apartment or site in the declaration.
  4. "Association of owners" means all of the apartment or site owners acting as a group in accordance with the bylaws and declaration.
  5. "Building" means a building containing two or more apartments, or two or more buildings containing a total of two or more apartments, and comprising a part of the property.
  6. "Common areas and facilities," unless otherwise provided in the declaration or lawful amendments thereto, includes:
    1. Land on which the building or site is located;
    2. Foundations, columns, girders, beams, supports, main walls, roofs, halls, corridors, lobbies, stairs, stairways, fire escapes, and entrances and exits of the building;
    3. Basements, yards, gardens, private roads and streets, parking areas, and storage spaces;
    4. Premises for the lodging of janitors or persons in charge of the property;
    5. Installations of central services such as power, light, gas, hot and cold water, heating, refrigeration, air conditioning, sewage disposal, and incinerating;
    6. Elevators, tanks, pumps, motors, fans, compressors, ducts, and in general all apparatus and installations existing for common use;
    7. Such community and commercial facilities as may be provided for in the declaration; and
    8. All other parts of the property necessary or convenient to its existence, maintenance and safety, or normally in common use.
  7. "Common expenses" include:
    1. All sums lawfully assessed against the apartment or site owners by the association of owners;
    2. Expenses of administration, maintenance, repair, or replacement of the common areas and facilities;
    3. Expenses agreed upon as common expenses by the association of owners;
    4. Expenses declared common expenses by this chapter, or by the declaration or the bylaws.
  8. "Common profits" means the balance of all income, rents, profits, and revenues from the common areas and facilities remaining after the deduction of the common expenses.
  9. "Declaration" means the instrument by which the property is made subject to this chapter, as herein provided, and as the instrument may be amended from time to time.
  10. "Limited common areas and facilities" means those common areas and facilities designated in the declaration as reserved for use of a certain apartment or apartments or sites to the exclusion of other apartments or sites.
  11. "Majority" or "majority of apartment owners" or "majority of site owners" means the apartment or site owners with more than fifty per cent of the votes in accordance with the percentages assigned in the declaration to the apartments or sites for voting purposes.
  12. "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, association, trustee, or other legal entity.
  13. "Property" includes the land, the building or site and all improvements and structures thereon all owned in fee simple absolute or any other estate in real property recognized by law and all easements, rights and appurtenances belonging thereto, and all articles of personal property intended for use in connection therewith, which have been or are intended to be made subject to this chapter.
  14. "Site" means the spatial location occupied or to be occupied by a mobile home, including all utilities and amenities appurtenant to the location such as piping, wiring, plants, platforms or supports, lights, walls, and other improvements but not including the land on which the site is located.
  15. "Mobile home park" has the meaning given in 10 V.S.A. § 6201 .

    Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Subdivision (1): Rewrote the existing text as the first and second sentences.

Subdivision (3): Inserted "or 'site number"' preceding "means" and "or site" preceding "in the declaration".

Subdivision (4): Deleted "apartment" following "association of" and inserted "or site" preceding "owners acting".

Subdivision (6): Inserted "or site" following "building" in subdiv. (A), "private roads and streets" following "gardens" in subdiv. (C), and "sewage disposal" following "conditioning" in subdiv. (E).

Subdivision (7): Inserted "or site" following "the apartment" in subdiv. (A) and deleted "apartment" following "association of" in that subdivision and subdiv. (C).

Subdivision (10): Inserted "or sites" following "apartments" in two places.

Subdivision (11): Inserted "or 'majority of site owners' " preceding "means the apartment", inserted "or site" thereafter and "or sites" preceding "for voting".

Subdivision (13): Inserted "or site" following "building".

Subdivision (14): Added.

Subdivision (15): Added.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Liability .

Town that took title at its own tax sale to several lots in a residential condominium development was liable for payment of the annual fees assessed on the properties by corporation that managed the condominium development. Alpenwald Village, Inc. v. Town of Readsboro, 166 Vt. 28, 687 A.2d 481 (1996).

2. Construction.

Under plain language of 27 V.S.A. §§ 1302, 1306 and 1322, undeveloped land subject to a declaration of condominium was not the same as "common areas," and therefore undeveloped land could be taxed to developer separately from condominium owners. Layden v. City of Rutland, 169 Vt. 594, 737 A.2d 894 (mem.) (1999).

3. Common elements.

Condominium association violated the terms of the amended declaration, the Condominium Ownership Act, and the Common Interest Ownership Act when it authorized dormer expansions that impacted commonly owned airspace without unanimous approval of the unit owners. While an expansion into the attic space from the unit immediately below did not alter the footprint of the unit, an allocation of a portion of the airspace to any individual unit resulted in a reallocation of that airspace from a common element to a part of a unit. Watson v. Vill. at Northshore I Ass'n, Inc., 207 Vt. 154, 184 A.3d 1133 (Feb. 9, 2018).

§ 1303. Application of chapter.

This chapter shall apply only to property, the sole owner or all of the owners of which make the property subject to this chapter by duly executing and recording a declaration as herein provided.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Reenacted without change.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Chapter found applicable.

Developer acquired exclusive control over condominium owners' association, common areas, and undeveloped land and development rights of project, and thus any undeveloped land associated with project and development rights were contained within declaration of condominium, and therefore fell under rubric of condominium ownership act. Layden v. City of Rutland, 169 Vt. 594, 737 A.2d 894 (mem.) (1999).

Cited. Royal Parke Corp. v. Town of Essex, 145 Vt. 376, 488 A.2d 766 (1985).

§ 1304. Status of the apartments or sites.

Each apartment or site, together with its undivided interest in the common areas and facilities, shall for all purposes constitute real property.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or sites" following "apartments" in the section catchline and "or site" preceding "together" in the text of the section.

§ 1305. Ownership of apartments or sites.

Each apartment or site owner shall be entitled to the exclusive ownership and possession of his or her apartment or site.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or sites" following "apartments" in the section catchline, and "or site" following "apartment" in two places and "or her" following "his" in the text of the section.

§ 1306. Common areas and facilities.

  1. Each apartment or site owner shall be entitled to an undivided interest in the common areas and facilities in the percentage expressed in the declaration. That percentage shall be computed by taking as a basis the value of the apartment or site in relation to the value of the property.
  2. The percentage of the undivided interest of each apartment or site owner in the common areas and facilities as expressed in the declaration shall have a permanent character and shall not be altered without the consent of all of the apartment or site owners expressed in an amended declaration duly recorded. The percentage of the undivided interest in the common areas and facilities shall not be separated from the apartment or site to which it appertains and shall run with the interest conveyed or encumbered even though not expressly mentioned or described.
  3. Common areas and facilities shall remain undivided. No apartment or site owner or any other person may bring any action for partition or division of any part thereof, unless the property has been removed from the provisions of this chapter as provided in sections 1316 and 1326 of this title. Any covenant to the contrary shall be null and void.
  4. Each apartment or site owner may use his or her respective common areas and facilities in accordance with the purpose for which they were intended without hindering or encroaching upon the lawful rights of the other apartment or site owners.
  5. The necessary work of maintenance, repair and replacement of the common areas and facilities and the making of any additions or improvements thereto shall be carried out only as provided herein and in the bylaws.
  6. The association of owners shall have the irrevocable right, to be exercised by the manager or board of directors, to have access to each apartment or site from time to time during reasonable hours as may be necessary for the maintenance, repair or replacement of any of the common areas and facilities therein or accessible therefrom, or for making emergency repairs therein necessary to prevent damage to the common areas and facilities or to another apartment or apartments or sites.

    Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Subsection (a): Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in the first and second sentences.

Subsection (b): Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in two places in the first sentence and in the second sentence.

Subsection (c): Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in the second sentence.

Subsection (d): Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in two places and "or her" preceding "respective".

Subsection (f): Deleted "apartment" following "association of", inserted "or site" preceding "from time" and added "or sites" following "apartments".

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Construction.

Plain language of the statute regarding common areas and facilities in condominiums does not contemplate a bar on procurement of prior consent to future development through embedding a power of attorney in the declaration. Madowitz v. the Woods at Killington Owners' Ass'n, 188 Vt. 197, 6 A.3d 1117 (2010).

Through the declaration of condominium, unit owners gave limited consent for developers to amend the declaration as they proceeded with a phased development plan to reflect each new change in the unit owners' undivided interests in the common areas and facilities. Though the statute regarding common areas and facilities in condominiums was later amended to prohibit the practice of obtaining prior consent to development in this manner, there was simply no way to construe the statute, as it appeared at the time the deeds of condominium were conveyed, as prohibiting this practice. Madowitz v. the Woods at Killington Owners' Ass'n, 188 Vt. 197, 6 A.3d 1117 (2010).

Under plain language of 27 V.S.A. §§ 1302, 1306 and 1322, undeveloped land subject to a declaration of condominium was not the same as "common areas," and therefore undeveloped land could be taxed to developer separately from condominium owners. Layden v. City of Rutland, 169 Vt. 594, 737 A.2d 894 (mem.) (1999).

2. Assessments.

Read in conjunction with the statute governing common profits and expenses for condominiums, common expenses are indeed assessed as part of the permanent property interest assigned in the statute governing common areas and facilities. Thus, a unanimous decision of unit owners was required to amend the formula for assessing common expenses. Arapaho Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Alpert, 199 Vt. 553, 128 A.3d 397 (2015).

3. Airspace.

Condominium association violated the terms of the amended declaration, the Condominium Ownership Act, and the Common Interest Ownership Act when it authorized dormer expansions that impacted commonly owned airspace without unanimous approval of the unit owners. While an expansion into the attic space from the unit immediately below did not alter the footprint of the unit, an allocation of a portion of the airspace to any individual unit resulted in a reallocation of that airspace from a common element to a part of a unit. Watson v. Vill. at Northshore I Ass'n, Inc., 207 Vt. 154, 184 A.3d 1133 (Feb. 9, 2018).

§ 1307. Compliance with covenants, bylaws and administrative provisions.

Each apartment or site owner shall comply strictly with the bylaws and with the administrative rules adopted under them, as either may be lawfully amended from time to time, and with the covenants, conditions and restrictions set forth in the declaration or in the deed to his or her apartment or site. Failure to comply with them shall be grounds for an action to recover sums due, for damages or injunctive relief or both maintainable by the manager or boards of directors on behalf of the association of owners or, in a proper case, by an aggrieved apartment or site owner.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in two places and "or her" following "his" in the first sentence, deleted "apartment" following "association of" and inserted "or site" preceding "owner" in the second sentence.

§ 1308. Certain work prohibited.

No apartment or site owner may do any work which would jeopardize the soundness or safety of the property, reduce the value thereof or impair an easement or hereditament without the unanimous consent of all the other apartment or site owners being first obtained.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in two places.

§ 1309. Liens against apartments or sites; removal from lien; effect of part payment.

  1. After recording the declaration as provided in this chapter, and while the property remains subject to this chapter, no lien may thereafter arise or be effective against the property. During that period liens or encumbrances shall arise or be created only against each apartment or site and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities, appurtenant to that apartment or site, in the same manner and under the same conditions in every respect as liens or encumbrances may arise or be created upon or against any other separate parcel of real property subject to individual ownership. Labor performed or materials furnished with the consent or at the request of an apartment or site owner or his or her agent or his or her contractor or subcontractor, shall not be a basis for filing a mechanic's lien against the apartment or site or any other property of any other apartment or site owner not expressly consenting to or requesting the work, except that the express consent shall be deemed to be given to the owner of any apartment or site in the case of emergency repairs thereto. Labor performed and materials furnished for the common areas and facilities, if duly authorized by the association of owners, the manager, or board of directors in accordance with this chapter, the declaration or bylaws, shall constitute a basis for filing a mechanic's lien against each of the apartments or sites and shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section.
  2. If a lien against two or more apartments or sites becomes effective, the owners of the separate apartment or site may remove their apartment or site and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to that apartment or site from the lien by payment of the fractional or proportional amounts attributable to each of the apartments or sites affected.  The individual payment shall be computed by reference to the percentages appearing on the declaration.  After any payment, discharge or other satisfaction the apartment or site and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant thereto shall thereafter be free and clear of the lien so paid, satisfied or discharged.  That partial payment, satisfaction or discharge shall not prevent the lienor from proceeding to enforce his or her rights against the rest of the undischarged property.

    Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Revision note. Substituted "subsection (b) of this section" for "subparagraph (b) hereunder" at the end of subsec. (a) for purposes of clarity and conformity with V.S.A. style.

Amendments--1993. Subsection (a): Inserted "or site" following "apartment" wherever it appeared in the first through third sentences, inserted "or her" following "his" in two places in the third sentence, and deleted "apartment" following "association of" and inserted "or sites" following "apartments" in the fourth sentence.

Subsection (b): Inserted "or sites" following "apartments" in two places, "or site" following "apartment" in three places and deleted "apartment" following "effective, the" in the first sentence, inserted "or site" following "apartment" in the third sentence and "or her" preceding "rights" in the fourth sentence.

§ 1310. Common profits and expenses.

Annually, the common profits of the property may be distributed among, and the common expenses shall be charged to, the apartment or site owners according to the percentage of the undivided interest in the common areas and facilities.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or site" following "apartment".

ANNOTATIONS

1. Assessments.

Read in conjunction with the statute governing common profits and expenses for condominiums, common expenses are indeed assessed as part of the permanent property interest assigned in the statute governing common areas and facilities. Thus, a unanimous decision of unit owners was required to amend the formula for assessing common expenses. Arapaho Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Alpert, 199 Vt. 553, 128 A.3d 397 (2015).

§ 1311. Contents of declaration.

The declaration shall contain the following particulars:

  1. Description of the land on which the building or sites and improvements are or are to be located.
  2. In the case of a building, a description of the building, stating the number of stories and basements, the number of apartments and the principal materials of which it is or is to be constructed; in the case of a mobile home park, a description of the entire property, stating the number of sites, the utilities and amenities provided to the several sites, the principal materials of which the mobile home foundations, walks, drives, and streets are or are to be constructed, and any buildings on the property.
  3. The apartment number of each apartment or site, and a statement of its location, approximate area, number of rooms in the case of an apartment, and immediate common area to which it has access, and any other data necessary for its proper identification.
  4. Description of the common areas and facilities.
  5. Description of the limited common areas and facilities, if any, stating to which apartments or sites their use is reserved.
  6. Value of the property and of each apartment or site, and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appertaining to each apartment or site and its owner for all purposes, including voting.
  7. Statement of the purposes for which each building and each of the apartments or sites are intended and restricted as to use.
  8. The name of a person to receive service of process in the cases herein provided, together with his or her residence or place of business which shall be within the city or county where the property is located.
  9. Provision as to the percentage of votes by the apartment or site owners which shall be determinative of whether to rebuild, repair, restore, or sell the property in the event of damage or destruction of all or part of the property.
  10. Any further details in connection with the property which the person executing the declaration may consider desirable to set forth consistent with this chapter.
  11. The method by which the declaration may be amended, consistent with this chapter.
  12. Reference to recorded floor plan in the case of a building or site plan in the case of a mobile home park, and recorded lot plan.

    Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Subdivision (1): Inserted "or sites" following "building".

Subdivision (2): Substituted "in the case of a building, a description" preceding "of the building" and added "in the case of a mobile home park, a description of the entire property, stating the number of sites, the utilities and amenities provided to the several sites, the principal materials of which the mobile home foundations, walks, drives, and streets are or are to be constructed, and any buildings on the property" following "constructed".

Subdivision (3): Inserted "or site" preceding "and a statement" and "in the case of an apartment" preceding "and immediate".

Subdivision (5): Inserted "or sites" following "apartments".

Subdivision (6): Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in two places.

Subdivision (7): Substituted "each" for "the" preceding "building" and inserted "or sites" following "apartments".

Subdivision (8): Inserted "or her" preceding "residence" and substituted "property" for "building" preceding "is located".

Subdivision (9): Inserted "or site" following "apartment".

Subdivision (12): Inserted "in the case of a building or site plan in the case of a mobile home park" following "floor plan".

ANNOTATIONS

1. Amendments.

Neither amendment to a declaration of condominium violated the Common Interest Ownership Act, which did not apply to the condominium association at the time of the amendments, or the Condominium Ownership Act, because the association satisfied its requirement that the declaration contain the method by which the declaration could be amended. Watson v. Vill. at Northshore I Ass'n, Inc., 207 Vt. 154, 184 A.3d 1133 (Feb. 9, 2018).

Cited. Royal Parke Corp. v. Town of Essex, 145 Vt. 376, 488 A.2d 766 (1985).

§ 1312. Contents of deeds of apartments or sites.

Deeds of apartments or sites shall include the following particulars:

  1. Description of the land as provided in section 1311 of this title, or the post office address of the property, including in either case the book, page and date of recording of the declaration.
  2. The apartment number of the apartment or site in the declaration and any other data necessary for its proper identification.
  3. Statement of the use for which the apartment or site is intended and restrictions on its use.
  4. The percentage of undivided interest appertaining to the apartment or site in the common areas and facilities.
  5. Any further details which the grantor and grantee may consider desirable to set forth consistent with the declaration and this chapter.
  6. Reference to recorded floor plan or site plan, and recorded lot plan.

    Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or sites" following "apartments" in the section catchline and the introductory paragraph, "or site" following "apartment" in subdivs. (2)-(4) and "or site plan" following "floor plan" in subdiv. (6).

§ 1313. Copy of the floor plans to be filed.

  1. Simultaneously with the recording of the declaration there shall be filed in the office of the recording officer a lot plan and, in the case of an apartment building, a set of the floor plans of the building showing the layout, location, apartment or site numbers, and dimensions of the apartments or sites, stating the name of the building or that it has no name. In the case of a mobile home park, there shall be filed in the office of the recording officer a site plan showing the layout, location, site numbers, and dimensions of the sites, and the layout, location, and materials of all utilities, including underground utilities. Each set of building or site plans shall bear the verified statement of a licensed architect, licensed professional engineer, or licensed land surveyor certifying that it is an accurate copy of portions of the plans of the building or site as filed with and approved by the municipal or other governmental subdivision having jurisdiction over the issuance of permits for the construction of buildings or mobile home parks. If the plans do not include a verified statement by the licensed architect, licensed professional engineer, or licensed land surveyor that they fully and accurately depict the layout, location, apartment or site numbers, and dimensions of the apartments or sites as built, there shall be recorded before the first conveyance of any apartment or site an amendment to the declaration, to which shall be attached a verified statement of a licensed architect, licensed professional engineer, or licensed land surveyor certifying that the plans previously filed, or being filed simultaneously with the amendment, fully and accurately depict the layout, location, apartment or site numbers, and dimensions of the apartments or sites as built. Plans shall be kept by the recording officer in a separate file for each building or park, indexed in the same manner as conveyance entitled to record, numbered serially in the order of receipt, each designated "apartment ownership" or "site ownership," with the name of the building or park, if any, each containing a reference to the book, page, and date of recording of the declaration. Correspondingly, the record of the declaration shall contain a reference to the file number of the floor plans of the building or of the site plans of the parks affected.
  2. If the declaration has been of record for 15 or more years, no effect on marketability of title shall be created by failure to file or record floor plans.

    Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 13, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1989, No. 139 (Adj. Sess.); 1993, No. 97 , § 2; 2017, No. 24 , § 4, eff. May 4, 2017.

History

Amendments--2017. Added subsec. (a) designation, deleted "thereby" following "affected" at the end of that subsection, and added subsec. (b).

Amendments--1993. Rewrote the former first sentence as the first through third sentences, inserted "or site" following "apartment" in three places and "or sites" following "apartments" in two places in the fourth sentence, inserted "or park" following "building" in two places and "or 'site ownership'" preceding "with the name" in the fifth sentence and inserted "or the site plans of the parks" preceding "affected" in the sixth sentence.

Amendments--1989 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted "licensed" for "registered" preceding "architect", deleted "or" thereafter and inserted "or licensed land surveyor" preceding "certifying" in the first sentence, substituted "licensed architect, licensed professional engineer or licensed land surveyor" for "architect or engineer" following "include a verified statement by the" and substituted "licensed architect" for "registered architect or" following "attached a verified statement of a" and inserted "or licensed land surveyor" preceding "certifying" in the second sentence.

§ 1314. Blanket mortgages and other blanket liens affecting an apartment or site at time of first conveyance.

At the time of the first conveyance of each apartment or site, every mortgage and other lien affecting the apartment or site, including the percentage of undivided interest of the apartment or site in the common areas and facilities, shall be paid and satisfied of record, or the apartment or site being conveyed and its percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities shall be released therefrom by partial release duly recorded.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 14, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in the section catchline and in four places in the text of the section.

§ 1315. Recording.

  1. The declaration, any amendment or amendments thereof, any instrument by which this chapter may be waived, and every instrument affecting the property or any apartment or site shall be entitled to be recorded. Neither the declaration nor any amendment thereof shall be valid unless duly recorded.
  2. In addition to the records and indexes required to be maintained by the recording officer, the recording officer shall maintain an index or indexes whereby the record of each declaration contains a reference to the record of each conveyance of an apartment or site affected by the declaration, and the record of each conveyance of an apartment or site contains a reference to the declaration of the building of which the apartment is a part and the record of each conveyance of a site contains a reference to the declaration of the property of which the site is a part.

    Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 15, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in the first sentence of subsec. (a) and in two places in subsec. (b) and added "and the record of each conveyance of a site contains a reference to the declaration of the property of which the site is a part" at the end of that subsection.

§ 1316. Termination, dissolution.

  1. All of the apartment or site owners may remove a property from the provisions of this chapter by an instrument to that effect, duly recorded, if the holders of all liens affecting any of the apartments or sites consent thereto or agree, in either case by instruments duly recorded, that their liens be transferred to the percentage of the undivided interest of the apartment or site owner in the property as herein provided.
  2. Upon removal of the property from the provisions of this chapter, the property shall be considered to be owned in common by the apartment or site owners. The undivided interest in the property owned in common which shall appertain to each apartment or site owner shall be the percentage of undivided interest previously owned by the owner in the common areas and facilities.

    Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 16, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in two places in subsec. (a) and in the first sentence of subsec. (b), and "or sites" preceding "consent" in subsec. (a).

§ 1317. Resubmission.

The removal provided for in section 1316 of this title shall in no way bar the subsequent resubmission of the property to the provisions of this chapter.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 17, eff. Jan. 23. 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Reenacted without change.

§ 1318. Bylaws.

The administration of every property shall be governed by bylaws, a true copy of which shall be annexed to the declaration and made a part thereof. No modification of or amendment to the bylaws shall be valid unless set forth in an amendment to the declaration and such amendment is duly recorded.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Reenacted without change.

§ 1319. Contents of bylaws.

  1. The bylaws may provide for the following:
    1. The election from among the apartment or site owners of a board of directors, the number of persons constituting it, and that the terms of at least one-third of the directors shall expire annually; the powers and duties of the board; the compensation, if any, of the directors; the method of removal from office of directors; and whether or not the board may engage the services of a manager or managing agent.
    2. Method of calling meetings of the apartment or site owners; what percentage, if other than a majority, of apartment or site owners shall constitute a quorum.
    3. Election of a president from among the board of directors who shall preside over the meetings of the board of directors and of the association of owners.
    4. Election of a secretary who shall keep the minute book wherein resolutions shall be recorded.
    5. Election of a treasurer who shall keep the financial records and books of account, and shall report annually to owners.
    6. Maintenance, repair, and replacement of the common areas and facilities and payments therefor, including the method of approving payment vouchers.
    7. Manner of collecting from the apartment or site owners their share of the common expenses.
    8. Authority over personnel necessary for the maintenance, repair and replacement of the common areas and facilities.
    9. Method of adopting and of amending administrative rules and regulations governing the details of the operation and use of the common areas and facilities.
    10. Such restrictions on and requirements respecting the use and maintenance of the apartments or sites and the use of the common areas and facilities, not set forth in the declaration, as are designed to prevent unreasonable interference with the use of their respective apartments or sites and of the common areas and facilities by the several apartment or site owners.
    11. The percentage of votes required to amend the bylaws.
    12. Other provisions considered necessary for the administration of the property consistent with this chapter.
  2. In the case of a mobile home park condominium of more than three units, the bylaws shall provide that no member or site owner shall have more than 30 percent of the aggregate association vote.

    Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 19, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2; 1993, No. 141 (Adj. Sess.), § 19, eff. May 6, 1994.

History

Amendments--1993 (Adj. Sess.). Amended section generally.

Amendments--1993. Amended section generally.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Temperature monitoring devices.

Bylaw requiring condominium unit owners to use a temperature monitoring device during the winter to prevent burst pipes was necessary to prevent unreasonable interference with other units or common areas and was therefore a valid exercise of the condominium association's powers under the Condominium Ownership Act. Watson v. Vill. at Northshore I Ass'n, Inc., 207 Vt. 154, 184 A.3d 1133 (Feb. 9, 2018).

§ 1320. Books of receipts and expenditures; availability for examination.

The manager or board of directors, as the case may be, shall keep or see to keeping of detailed, accurate records in chronological order, of the receipts and expenditures affecting the common areas and facilities, specifying and itemizing the maintenance and repair expenses of the common areas and facilities and any other expenses incurred. Those records and the vouchers authorizing the payments shall be available for examination by the apartment or site owners at convenient hours of week days.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 20, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in the second sentence.

§ 1321. Waiver of use of common areas and facilities; abandonment of apartment or site.

No apartment or site owner may exempt himself or herself from liability for his or her contribution towards the common expenses by waiver of the use or enjoyment of any of the common areas and facilities or by abandonment of his or her apartment or site.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 21, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Added "or site" following "apartment" in the section catchline, and in the text of the section, inserted "or site" following "apartment" in two places, "or herself" following "himself", and "or her" following "his" in two places.

§ 1322. Separate taxation.

Each apartment or site and its percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities shall be considered to be a parcel and shall be subject to separate assessment and taxation by each assessing unit and special district for all types of taxes authorized by law including but not limited to special ad valorem levies and special assessments, except that parcels held in identical ownership may be combined and treated as one parcel for purposes of assessment and taxation at the discretion of the listers. Neither the building, the property nor any of the common areas and facilities shall be deemed to be a parcel.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 22, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1987, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 3, 1988; 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in the first sentence.

Amendments--1987 (Adj. Sess.). Added "except that parcels held in identical ownership may be combined and treated as one parcel for purposes of assessment and taxation at the discretion of the listers" following "special assessments" at the end of the first sentence.

Cross References

Cross references. Appraisal of property generally, see § 4041 et seq. of Title 32.

Assessment of taxes generally, see § 4601 et seq. of Title 32.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Construction.

Under plain language of 27 V.S.A. §§ 1302, 1306 and 1322, undeveloped land subject to a declaration of condominium was not the same as "common areas," and therefore undeveloped land could be taxed to developer separately from condominium owners. Layden v. City of Rutland, 169 Vt. 594, 737 A.2d 894 (mem.) (1999).

Cited. Royal Parke Corp. v. Town of Essex, 145 Vt. 376, 488 A.2d 766 (1985).

§ 1323. Priority of lien.

  1. All sums assessed by the association of owners but unpaid for the share of the common expenses chargeable to any apartment or site shall constitute a lien on that apartment or site prior to all other liens except only (i) tax liens on the apartment or site in favor of any assessing unit and special district, (ii) all sums unpaid on a first mortgage of record, and (iii) mechanic's liens. The lien may be foreclosed by suit by the manager or board of directors, acting on behalf of the apartment or site owners, in like manner as a mortgage on real property. In any foreclosure the apartment or site owner shall be required to pay a reasonable rental for the apartment or site, if so provided in the bylaws, and the plaintiff shall be entitled to the appointment of a receiver to collect it. The manager or board of directors, acting on behalf of the apartment or site owners, may, unless prohibited by the declaration, bid on the apartment or site at foreclosure sale, and acquire and hold, lease, mortgage and convey the same. Suit to recover a money judgment for unpaid common expenses shall be maintainable without foreclosing or waiving the lien securing the same.
  2. Where the mortgagee of a first mortgage of record or other purchaser of an apartment or site obtains title to the apartment or site as a result of foreclosure of the first mortgage, the acquirer of title, his or her successors and assigns, shall not be liable for the share of the common expenses or assessments by the association of owners chargeable to the mortgagor which became due before the acquisition of title to the apartment or site by the acquirer. The unpaid share of common expenses or assessments shall be considered common expenses collectible from all of the apartment or site owners including the acquirer, his or her successors and assigns.

    Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 23, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Subsection (a): Deleted "apartment" following "association of" in the first sentence, inserted "or site" following "apartment" wherever it appeared in the first through fourth sentences and substituted "on" for "in" following "bid" in the fourth sentence.

Subsection (b): Inserted "or site" preceding "obtains", preceding "as a result" and preceding "by the acquirer" and "or his" preceding "successors" and deleted "apartment" following "association of" in the first sentence, and inserted "or site" following "apartment" and "or her" preceding "successors" in the second sentence.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited. Alpenwald Village, Inc. v. Town of Readsboro, 166 Vt. 28, 687 A.2d 481 (1996).

§ 1324. Joint and several liability of grantor and grantee for unpaid common expenses.

In a voluntary conveyance the grantee of an apartment or site shall be jointly and severally liable with the grantor for all unpaid assessments against the latter for his or her share of the common expenses up to the time of the grant or conveyance, without prejudice to the grantee's right to recover from the grantor the amounts paid by the grantee therefor. However, any such grantee shall be entitled to a statement from the manager or board of directors, as the case may be, setting forth the amount of the unpaid assessments against the grantor and the grantee shall not be liable for, nor shall the apartment or site conveyed be subject to a lien for, any unpaid assessments against the grantor in excess of the amount therein set forth.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 24, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in the first and second sentences and "or her" preceding "share" in the first sentence.

§ 1325. Insurance.

The manager or the board of directors, if required by the declaration, bylaws or by a majority of the apartment or site owners, or at the request of a mortgagee having a first mortgage of record covering an apartment or site, shall have the authority to, and shall, obtain insurance for the property against loss or damage by fire and such other hazards under such terms and for such amounts as shall be required or requested. Such insurance coverage shall be written on the property in the name of such manager or of the board of directors of the association of owners, as trustee for each of the apartment or site owners in the percentages established in the declaration. Premiums shall be common expenses. Provision for such insurance shall be without prejudice to the right of each apartment or site owner to insure his or her own apartment or site for his or her benefit.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 25, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or site" following "apartment" wherever it appeared, deleted "apartment" following "association of" in the second sentence, and inserted "or her" following "his" in two places in the fourth sentence.

§ 1326. Disposition of property; destruction or damage.

If, within 90 days of the date of the damage or destruction to all or part of the property, it is not determined by the association of owners to repair, reconstruct, or rebuild, then and in that event:

  1. The property shall be considered to be owned in common by the apartment or site owners;
  2. The undivided interest in the property owned in common which shall appertain to each apartment or site owner shall be the percentage of undivided interest previously owned by the owner in the common areas and facilities;
  3. Any liens affecting any of the apartments or sites shall be considered to be transferred in accordance with the existing priorities to the percentage of the undivided interest of the apartment or site owner in the property as provided herein; and
  4. The property shall be subject to an action for partition at the suit of any apartment or site owner, in which event the net proceeds of a sale, together with the net proceeds of the insurance on the property, if any, shall be considered as one fund and shall be divided among all the apartment or site owners in a percentage equal to the percentage of undivided interest owned by each owner in the property, after first paying out of the respective shares of the apartment or site owners, to the extent sufficient for the purpose, all liens on the undivided interest in the property owned by each apartment or site owner.

    Added 1967, No. 288 (Adj. Sess.), § 26, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Deleted "apartment" following "association of" and substituted "then" for "them" following "rebuild" in the introductory paragraph, and inserted "or site" following "apartment" wherever it appeared in subdivs. (1)-(4).

§ 1327. Actions.

Without limiting the rights of any apartment or site owner, actions may be brought by the manager or board of directors (in either case in the discretion of the board of directors) on behalf of two or more of the apartment or site owners, as their respective interests may appear, with respect to any cause of action relating to the common areas and facilities of more than one apartment or site. Service of process on two or more apartment or site owners in any action relating to the common areas and facilities of more than one apartment or site may be made on the person designated in the declaration to receive service of process.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 27, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or site" following "apartment" in three places in the first sentence and in two places in the second sentence.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited. Meadowbrook Condominium Association v. South Burlington Realty Corp., 152 Vt. 16, 565 A.2d 238 (1989).

§ 1328. Personal application.

  1. All apartment or site owners, their tenants, employees of owners and tenants, or any other persons that may in any manner use property or any part thereof made subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to this chapter and to the declaration and bylaws of the association of owners adopted under this chapter.
  2. All agreements, decisions and determinations lawfully made by the association of owners in accordance with the voting percentages established in the act, declaration or bylaws, shall be binding on all apartment or site owners.

    Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 28, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "or site" preceding "owners, their" in subsec. (a) and deleted "apartment" following "association" in that subsection and subsec. (b).

§ 1329. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof in any circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the chapter and of its application shall not be affected thereby.

Added 1967, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 29, eff. Jan. 23, 1968; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 2.

History

Amendments--1993. Reenacted without change.

Subchapter 2. Protection of Tenants in Conversion of Rental Units

History

Application. 1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, provided that the provisions of this subchapter shall apply to declarations filed on or after July 1, 1986.

Cross References

Cross references. Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Protection and Abuse Relief Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.

Regulation and enforcement of residential rental agreements, see § 4451 et seq. of Title 9.

§ 1331. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. "Comparable housing" means housing that is decent, safe, sanitary, and in compliance with all local and State housing codes, and provided with facilities equivalent to those provided by the landlord in the dwelling unit in which the tenant then resides in regard to each of the following: apartment size, rent range, major kitchen and bathroom facilities, special facilities necessary for persons with disabilities or who have an infirmity, and desirability of neighborhood, school facilities, or area.
  2. "Conversion" means a change in character of residential real property from a rental to an ownership basis. A common interest community, stock cooperative, or similar arrangement shall be deemed such a change in character of ownership.
  3. "Declarant" means any person who offers for transfer ownership interests in a common interest community as part of an initial common promotional plan.
  4. "Tenant who is an elder" means a tenant who is 62 years of age or older.
  5. "Tenant with a disability" means a tenant who has a physical or mental impairment which restricts one or more major life activities, including functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, or working.
  6. "Low-income tenant household" means a household having an income not exceeding 80 percent of median income for area of residence as set forth in regulations promulgated from time-to-time by the Department of Housing and Urban Development pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq.

    Added 1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; amended 1997, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1999; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 185.

History

Amendments--2013 (Adj. Sess.). Undesignated paragraph: Made a minor stylistic change at the end.

Subdiv. (1): Substituted "persons with disabilities or who have an infirmity" for "the handicapped or infirmed" following "necessary for" and made minor stylistic changes.

Subdiv. (4): Substituted "'Tenant who is an elder"' for "'Elder tenant"' preceding "means a tenant".

Subdiv. (5): Substituted "'Tenant with a disability"' for "'Handicapped tenant"' preceding "means a tenant".

Amendments--1997 (Adj. Sess.). In subdiv. (2), substituted "common interest community" for "condominium" at the beginning of the last sentence, and in subdiv. (3), substituted "common interest community" for "residential condominium unit".

Cross References

Cross references. Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, see Title 27A.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Conversion .

Tenant's apartment was not being "converted" to condominiums where landlord intended existing building to be demolished and replaced by newly-built condominiums, and thus Condominium Ownership Act and its notice period did not apply. Golden Key, LLC v. Harper, 170 Vt. 641, 751 A.2d 798 (mem.) (2000).

§ 1332. Applicability.

This subchapter shall apply to the conversion of all residential rental property in the state other than a mobile home park, except the conversion of any single-family dwelling unit which is individually owned but has been rented. Conversion of a mobile home park shall be subject to subchapter 3 of this chapter.

Added 1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; amended 1993, No. 97 , § 3.

History

Amendments--1993. Inserted "other than a mobile home park" following "state" in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited. Golden Key, LLC v. Harper, 170 Vt. 641, 751 A.2d 798 (mem.) (2000).

§ 1333. Conversion building; notice to tenants.

  1. If the building to be converted consists of more than five dwelling units or if the building to be converted is part of an apartment complex or is one building in a group of buildings which are contiguous or which share common areas, the landlord shall give to each tenant the following minimum written notice to vacate or purchase the unit: two years to tenants who are elders or have a disability; one year to low-income tenant households; six months to all other tenants.
  2. If the building to be converted consists of five or fewer dwelling units, the landlord shall give to each tenant the following minimum written notice to vacate or purchase the unit: one year to tenants who are elders or have a disability; six months to low-income tenant households; three months to all other tenants. A landlord may not circumvent the longer notice requirements by converting a building consisting of five or fewer dwelling units if the conversion is part of a plan to convert more than five dwelling units.
  3. The notice shall state that the building is to be converted to a common interest community. It shall set forth generally the rights of tenants under this subchapter, and shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested, at the address of the unit or any other mailing address provided by the tenant. Failure to give notice as required by this section is a defense to an action for possession.
  4. During the notice period, a tenant may not be required to vacate except for a reason specified in 9 V.S.A. § 4467(a) or (b).
  5. During the notice period, rent increases shall be limited to an amount which reflects reasonable profits, actual increased costs of maintenance and operation of the dwelling unit subject to conversion.  Costs associated with the proposed conversion are not a permissible basis for a rent increase.
  6. After receipt of the notice prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, a tenant may terminate the rental agreement upon 30 days' written notice to the landlord.
  7. Nothing in this section permits termination of a written lease by a landlord in violation of its terms.
  8. The notice requirements imposed by this section shall not affect the right of a declarant to transfer ownership interests in dwelling units which are not subject to those requirements or as to which the notice period has expired.

    Added 1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; amended 1997, No. 104 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1999; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 186.

History

Revision note. In subsec. (f), substituted "subsection (a) of this section" for "subsection (a)" to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

Amendments--2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsections (a) and (b): Substituted "tenants who are elders or have a disability" for "elder and handicapped tenants".

Amendments--1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsection (c): Substituted "a common interest community" for "condominiums" at the end of the first sentence.

Cross References

Cross references. Municipal regulation of condominium conversion, see § 2293 of Title 24.

ANNOTATIONS

Analysis

1. Consumer fraud.

Because the owners of a mobile home park proposed both a condominium conversion and a sale of the park, they properly included both notice of their intention to sell the park pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 6242(a), and "written notice to vacate or purchase" pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, but because plaintiffs did not rely on, or sustain damages as a result of, the eviction notice, as required under 9 V.S.A. § 2461(b), they did not have an actionable claim under the Consumer Fraud Act, 9 V.S.A. §§ 2451-2480g. Russell v. Atkins, 165 Vt. 176, 679 A.2d 333 (1996).

2. Applicability .

Tenant's apartment was not being "converted" to condominiums where landlord intended existing building to be demolished and replaced by newly-built condominiums, and thus Condominium Ownership Act and its notice period did not apply. Golden Key, LLC v. Harper, 170 Vt. 641, 751 A.2d 798 (mem.) (2000).

§ 1334. Exclusive right to purchase.

  1. For 90 days after giving the notice described in section 1333 of this title, the declarant shall offer to convey each unit or proposed unit occupied for residential use to the tenant who rents that unit.  The tenant shall be given all documents provided to the general public or to other tenants as part of the offering for sale of the unit.  If a tenant fails to contract for the unit during the offer period, the declarant may not offer an interest in that unit during the following 90 days at a price or on terms more favorable to the offeree than the price or terms offered to the tenant.
  2. If a declarant conveys a unit in violation of section 1333 to a purchaser for value who has no knowledge of the violation, recordation of the deed conveying the unit extinguishes any right a tenant may have to purchase the unit, but does not affect the right of a tenant to recover damages from the declarant.
  3. This section shall not apply to any unit in a conversion building if that unit will be restricted exclusively to nonresidential use or the boundaries of the converted unit do not substantially conform to the dimensions of the residential unit before conversion.

    Added 1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

History

Revision note. In the first sentence of subsec. (a), substituted "section 1333 of this title" for "section 1333" to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

§ 1335. Comparable housing.

The declarant may offer a tenant assistance in locating comparable housing. If, as a result, the tenant obtains comparable housing, the tenant may be required upon 90 days' notice to vacate the premises.

Added 1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

§ 1336. Relocation costs.

  1. The declarant shall pay the actual documented cost of relocation, not to exceed $1,000.00, to any tenant entitled to receive notice under section 1333 of this title who does not purchase the unit which he or she occupies or another unit in the same building or buildings.
  2. Relocation costs shall be payable within 10 days after the date the tenant vacates the unit; provided, however, that no tenant is eligible for relocation costs unless:
    1. all rent due and payable has been paid by the tenant prior to the date on which the unit is vacated; and
    2. the tenant has voluntarily vacated the unit on or before the expiration of half the applicable notice period.

      Added 1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

History

Revision note. In subsec. (a), substituted "section 1333 of this title" for "section 1333" to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

§ 1337. Waiver prohibited.

No lease or rental agreement, oral or written, shall contain any provision by which the tenant prospectively waives any of his or her rights under this subchapter. Any such waiver shall be deemed contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.

Added 1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

§ 1338. Circumvention of this subchapter.

A declarant shall not attempt to circumvent the provisions of this subchapter; nor shall any person willfully cause a tenant to vacate a dwelling unit or to be evicted from the unit without good cause in contemplation of conversion before the issuance of the notice prescribed in section 1333 of this title.

Added 1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

History

Revision note. At the end of the section, substituted "section 1333 of this title" for "section 1333" to conform reference to V.S.A. style.

§ 1339. Violations.

A violation of this subchapter is deemed to be a violation of 9 V.S.A. § 2453 , and is subject to all rights, obligations and penalties provided under 9 V.S.A. chapter 63.

Added 1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

Subchapter 3. Protection of Tenants in Conversion of Mobile Home Parks

Cross References

Cross references. Ejectment generally, see § 4851 et seq. of Title 12.

Protection of tenants in conversion of rental units, see § 1331 et seq. of this title.

§ 1351. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. "Association" means all of the site owners acting as a group in accordance with the bylaws and declaration.
  2. "Convert," "conversion," or "converted" means a change in character of a mobile home park from a rental to a common interest ownership basis. A condominium or similar arrangement shall be deemed to be such a change in character of ownership. However, "conversion" does not include the creation of a cooperative housing corporation, pursuant to 11 V.S.A. chapter 14.
  3. "Dealer" means a person in the business of selling sites for his or her own account.
  4. "Declarant" means any person who offers for transfer the ownership interest in a mobile home park to a condominium or similar arrangement.
  5. "Commissioner" means the commissioner of the department of housing and community affairs.
  6. "Election period" means the six-month period which begins with the declarant's submission of notice of intent to convert a mobile home park under section 1353 of this subchapter.
  7. "Leaseholder" means a person who has a leasehold interest derived from the declarant or any site purchaser in a site in a mobile home park to be converted pursuant to this subchapter.
  8. "Mobile home park" means a mobile home park as defined under 10 V.S.A. § 6201(2) .
  9. "Nonpurchasing leaseholder" means a leaseholder who has elected not to purchase a site in a mobile home park to be converted pursuant to this subchapter.
  10. "Purchasing leaseholder" means a leaseholder who has elected to purchase a site in a mobile home park to be converted pursuant to this subchapter.
  11. "Site" means the spatial location occupied or to be occupied by a mobile home, including all utilities and amenities appurtenant to the location such as piping, wiring, plants, platforms or supports, lights, walls, and all other improvements but not including the land on which the site is located.
  12. "Site purchaser" means the purchaser of a site from a declarant under this subchapter. A site purchaser may be a purchasing leaseholder or other purchaser of the site.
  13. "Tenant" means a person who has a present possessory interest derived from the leaseholder in a site in a mobile home park to be converted pursuant to this subchapter; any person who leases a mobile home located on the site from the declarant shall be considered a tenant.

    Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

History

Revision note. Inserted "a" preceding "declarant" in the first sentence of subdiv. (12) to correct a grammatical error.

§ 1352. Conversion of mobile home parks permitted.

A mobile home park may not be converted except in accordance with this subchapter. For the purpose of this subchapter, the provisions of subdivision 1302(1) of this title shall not be construed to prevent the conversion of a mobile home park. Any sale of a mobile home park shall be governed by the provisions of 10 V.S.A. § 6242 ; the conversion of a mobile home park under this subchapter shall not be deemed to be a sale.

Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1353. Notice of intent to convert a mobile home park.

  1. A declarant shall give notice of intent to convert a mobile home park at least six months prior to giving formal notice of conversion.
  2. The declarant shall provide notice of intent to convert a mobile home park to all leaseholders and the commissioner of the department of housing and community affairs by certified mail.
  3. The notice shall contain:
    1. the name and principal address of the declarant and of any other persons with an ownership interest in the mobile home park, and a statement that the proposed form of ownership is either a condominium or planned community;
    2. a general description of the mobile home park, including to the extent known, the types, number, and the declarant's schedule of commencement and completion of construction of buildings, and amenities that the declarant anticipates including in the mobile home park;
    3. the number of sites in the mobile home park;
    4. the price of each condominium site;
    5. a statement describing the present condition of the park including all water, sewer and electrical systems, and history of the maintenance and repair of those systems and the status of compliance with all environmental health and safety regulations to the declarant's best knowledge;
    6. the date by which leaseholders must vote to proceed with conversion of the mobile home park.

      Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1354. Election period.

  1. The declarant shall provide leaseholders an election period of at least six months from the date that notice of intent to convert a mobile home park is given, to allow leaseholders to consider their options to either purchase their site or to vote against conversion.
  2. During the election period, the declarant, representatives of the leaseholders, members of the department of housing and community affairs and advocates of the leaseholders shall have access to the mobile home park and the leaseholders to facilitate meetings and informational sessions so that the leaseholders may evaluate their options prior to voting on the proposed conversion.
  3. Leaseholders shall vote either to pursue a conversion or not to pursue a conversion before the end of the election period. Each leaseholder shall have one vote per leasehold, except that no leaseholder shall have more than 30 percent of the aggregate park vote. The commissioner shall assist the leaseholders to hold an election using secret ballots.
  4. If leaseholders representing at least 70 percent of the leaseholds elect to pursue a conversion, the declarant may proceed toward conversion by following the requirements under sections 1355-1362 of this subchapter.
  5. If leaseholders representing less than 70 percent of the leaseholds elect to pursue a conversion, a conversion shall not take place without providing additional notice pursuant to section 1353 of this title.

    Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1355. Notice of conversion.

  1. A declarant shall give notice of an intended conversion by delivering the notice by certified mail to all leaseholders and the commissioner of the department of housing and community affairs, and by delivering the notice to all mobile homes located in sites in the mobile home park. For purposes of this subchapter, the date of mailing or the date of delivery, whichever is later, shall be considered the date of the notice of conversion. An affidavit of the person delivering the notice to the mobile home shall be adequate proof of the date of delivery.
  2. The declarant shall deliver the notice to any prospective purchasing leaseholder of a mobile home or to any prospective leaseholder. The declarant shall deliver the notice by certified mail to the town clerk of any town in which the mobile home park is located.
  3. The notice shall contain or fully and accurately disclose:
    1. the name and principal address of the declarant and of the proposed owners of the mobile home park, and a statement that the proposed form of ownership is either a condominium or planned community;
    2. a general description of the mobile home park, including to the extent known, the types, number, and the declarant's schedule of commencement and completion of construction of buildings, and amenities that the declarant anticipates including in the mobile home park;
    3. the number of sites in the mobile home park;
    4. the price of each condominium site, which may not exceed by more than 10 percent the price stated in the notice of intent to convert;
    5. copies and a brief narrative description of the significant features of the declaration (other than any surveys and plans) and any other recorded covenants, conditions, restrictions, and reservations affecting the mobile home park; the bylaws, and any rules or regulations of the association; copies of any contracts and leases to be signed by purchasing leaseholders at closing, and a brief narrative description of any contracts or leases that will or may be subject to cancellation by the association or managing entity;
    6. a recent appraisal of the mobile home park as a rental park and as converted;
    7. any current balance sheet and a projected budget for the association, either within or as an exhibit to the notice, for one year after the date of the first conveyance to a purchasing leaseholder, and thereafter the current budget of the association, a statement of who prepared the budget, and a statement of the budget's assumptions concerning occupancy, inflation and factors relating to repair or upgrading of the park. The budget shall include:
      1. a statement of the amount, or a statement that there is no amount, included in the budget as a reserve for repairs and replacement;
      2. a statement of any other reserves;
      3. the projected common expense assessment by category of expenditures for the association; and
      4. the projected monthly common expense assessment for each type of site;
    8. any services not reflected in the budget that the declarant provides, or expenses that he or she pays, and that he or she expects may become at any subsequent time a common expense of the association and the projected common expense assessment attributable to each of those services or expenses for the association and for each type of site;
    9. any initial or special fee due from the purchasing leaseholder at closing, together with a description of the purpose and method of calculating the fee;
    10. a description of any liens, defects, or encumbrances on or affecting the title to the mobile home park;
    11. a description of any financing offered or arranged by the declarant;
    12. a statement of what actions the declarant agrees to perform if the declarant withdraws an offer to sell a site during the conversion period before a leaseholder purchases a site;
    13. the terms and significant limitations of any warranties provided by the declarant, including statutory warranties and limitations on the enforcement thereof or on damages;
    14. a statement of any unsatisfied judgments or pending suits against the association, and the status of any pending suits material to the mobile home park of which a declarant has actual knowledge;
    15. any restraints on alienation of any portion of the mobile home park and any restrictions:
      1. on use, occupancy, and alienation of the sites; and
      2. on the amount for which a site may be sold or on the amount that may be received by a site owner on sale, condemnation, or casualty loss to the site or to the mobile home park;
    16. a description of any insurance coverage provided for the benefit of site owners;
    17. any current or expected fees or charges to be paid by site owners for the use of the common elements and other facilities related to the common interest community;
    18. the extent to which financial arrangements have been provided for completion of all improvements which the declarant is obligated to build;
    19. a brief narrative description of any zoning and other land use requirements affecting the mobile home park, including, to the declarant's knowledge, a statement of the extent to which the mobile home park is in compliance with those requirements;
    20. a statement by the declarant, based on a report by an independent architect or engineer, describing the present condition of all water, sewer, drainage and other structural components and mechanical and electrical installations material to the use and enjoyment of the mobile home park, including a description of the history of maintenance and repair of those components;
    21. the expected useful life of each item;
    22. a list of any outstanding notices of uncured violation of the building code and of any applicable municipal, state or federal regulations and the cost of curing those violations;
    23. a description of any problems which may materially affect the habitability or use of the mobile home park, and the estimated cost of curing those problems, to the declarant's knowledge;
    24. all unusual and material circumstances, features, and characteristics of the mobile home park and the sites. The declarant shall promptly amend the notice to report any material change in the information required by this section.

      Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1356. Leaseholder conversion period.

  1. Each leaseholder shall have a conversion period of six months from the date of notice of conversion to elect to become either a purchasing or a nonpurchasing leaseholder.
  2. During the conversion period, the declarant shall offer to convey each site to the leaseholder at the price, terms and conditions stated in the notice of conversion. Unless the leaseholder provides written notice that the leaseholder will not purchase the site, the declarant may not offer the site for sale to any other person within the conversion period.
  3. A leaseholder may elect to become a purchasing leaseholder by negotiating a purchase and sale agreement with the declarant within the conversion period. Such agreement shall be on terms at least as favorable to the leaseholder as those stated in the notice of conversion. A leaseholder may assign the purchase and sale agreement to any site purchaser.
  4. Failure to elect under this section within the conversion period shall be deemed to be an election to become a nonpurchasing leaseholder.

    Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1357. Protection of purchasing leaseholders.

  1. Express warranties of quality:
    1. Express warranties made by a declarant to a purchasing leaseholder of a site, if relied upon by the purchasing leaseholder, are created as follows:
      1. Any affirmation of fact or promise which relates to the site, its use or rights appurtenant to it, area improvements to the mobile home park that would directly benefit the site, or the right to use or have the benefit of facilities not located in the mobile home park, warranties conformity of the site and related rights and uses.
      2. Any model or description of the physical characteristics of the mobile home park, including plans and specifications for improvement, warranties conformance of the mobile home park to the model or description.
      3. Any description of the quantity or extent of the real estate comprising the mobile home park, including plats or surveys, warranties conformity of the mobile home park to the description, subject to customary tolerances.
      4. Any provisions that a purchasing leaseholder may put a site only to specified use warranty the legality of the specific use.
    2. Neither the use of "warranty" or "guarantee," nor a specific intention to make a warranty, are necessary to create an express warranty of quality, but a statement purporting to be merely an opinion or commendation of the real estate or its value does not create a warranty.
    3. A conveyance of a site transfers to the purchasing leaseholder all express warranties of quality made by previous declarants.
  2. Implied warranties of quality:
    1. A declarant and any dealer warrant that a site will be in at least as good condition at the time of the conveyance or delivery of possession, whichever is earlier, as it was at the time of contracting, reasonable wear and tear excepted.
    2. A declarant and any dealer impliedly warrant that a site and the common elements in the mobile home park are suitable for the ordinary uses of real estate of its type and that any improvements made or contracted for by him or her, or made by any person before the creation of the mobile home park, will be:
      1. free from defective materials; and
      2. constructed in accordance with applicable law, according to sound engineering and construction standards, and in a workerlike manner.
    3. In addition, a declarant and any dealer warrant to a purchasing leaseholder of a site that may be used for residential use that an existing use, continuation of which is contemplated by the parties, does not violate applicable law at the time of conveyance or delivery of possession, whichever is earlier.
    4. Warranties imposed by this subsection may be excluded or modified as specified in subsection (c) of this section.
    5. For purposes of this section, improvements made or contracted for by an affiliate of the declarant are made or contracted for by the declarant.
    6. A conveyance of a site transfers to the purchasing leaseholder all the declarant's implied warranties of quality.
  3. Exclusion or modification of implied warranties of quality:
    1. Except as limited by subdivision (2) of this subsection, with respect to a purchasing leaseholder of a site that may be used for residential use, implied warranties of quality:
      1. may be excluded or modified by agreement of the parties; and
      2. are excluded by express disclaimer, such as "as is," "with all faults," or other language that implies the exclusion of warranties.
    2. With respect to a purchasing leaseholder of a site that may be occupied for residential use, no general disclaimer of implied warranties of quality is effective, but a declarant and any dealer may disclaim liability in an instrument signed by the purchasing leaseholder for a specified defect or specified failure to comply with applicable law, if the defect or failure was part of the basis of the bargain.
  4. Statute of limitations for warranties:
    1. A judicial proceeding for breach of any obligation arising under subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues. In the case of a site that may be occupied for residential use, an agreement to reduce the six-year period shall be evidenced by separate instrument executed by the purchasing leaseholder.
    2. Subject to subdivision (3) of this subsection, a cause of action for breach of warranty of quality, regardless of the purchasing leaseholder's lack of knowledge of the breach, accrues:
      1. as to a site, at the time the purchasing leaseholder to whom the warranty is first made enters into possession if a possessory interest was conveyed or at the time of acceptance of the instrument of conveyance if a nonpossessory interest was conveyed; and
      2. as to each common element, at the time the common element is completed or, if later, as to
        1. a common element that may be added to the mobile home park or portion of it, at the time the first site is conveyed to a bona fide purchasing leaseholder; or
        2. a common element within any other portion of the common interest community, at the time the first site is conveyed to a bona fide purchasing leaseholder.
    3. If a warranty of quality explicitly extends to future performance or duration of any improvement or component of the mobile home park, the cause of action accrues at the time the breach is discovered or at the end of the period for which the warranty explicitly extends, whichever is earlier.

      Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1358. Protection of nonpurchasing leaseholders.

  1. A nonpurchasing leaseholder shall have the right to continue the leasehold interest in the site on which the leaseholder's mobile home is located.
  2. A declarant or site purchaser may not accept an offer for a site without providing the leaseholder the opportunity to purchase the site at the price, terms and conditions stated in the offer. If the leaseholder accepts the offer, the declarant or site purchaser must sell the unit to the leaseholder; the leaseholder must enter into a purchase and sales agreement with the declarant at the same terms stated in the notice of offer within 30 working days of the declarant's notice to the leaseholder of the offer. The declarant's notice of offer must be delivered by certified mail.
  3. If a nonpurchasing leaseholder elects to move from the mobile home park and gives notice to the declarant during the conversion period, the declarant shall pay the nonpurchasing leaseholder's relocation costs as follows:
    1. The leaseholder shall make a good faith effort to move the mobile home, and shall have the obligation to restore the site to the condition it was in prior to occupation by the leaseholder, reasonable wear and tear excepted.
    2. Subject to the obligations stated in subdivision (1) of this subsection, the declarant shall pay to a nonpurchasing leaseholder who removes a mobile home from the site the actual documented reasonable costs of relocating the household in possession and the mobile home, not to exceed $2,200.00.
    3. Subject to the obligations stated in subdivision (1) of this subsection, in the event the nonpurchasing leaseholder vacates the site but does not move the mobile home from the site, the declarant shall pay to the nonpurchasing leaseholder the actual documented reasonable costs of relocating the household in possession, not to exceed $1,000.00, provided that:
      1. the nonpurchasing leaseholder transfers title to the mobile home to the declarant;
      2. the nonpurchasing leaseholder transfers title to a third party who moves the mobile home within 30 days of the date upon which the nonpurchasing leaseholder vacates the mobile home;
      3. the nonpurchasing leaseholder transfers title to the mobile home to a purchasing leaseholder of the site on which the mobile home is located.
  4. After the date of the notice of conversion, and unless otherwise modified by this subchapter, the provisions of 10 V.S.A. chapter 153 shall apply to all leases within the mobile home park. A leaseholder may not be required to vacate except for failure to comply with the obligation imposed on the leaseholder by this subchapter, or for the reasons specified in 10 V.S.A. § 6237(a) , provided that the conversion of the mobile home park shall not constitute a change in use or a termination of the park.
  5. Any rights granted leaseholders under this subchapter against the declarant shall apply against any transferees of a site from the declarant.

    Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1359. Protection of tenants.

  1. Within 30 days of the notice of conversion, a leaseholder must notify any tenants in possession of the leased site of the intended conversion. The notice shall be delivered by certified mail to the tenant. The notice of conversion shall contain at least a notice of the intended conversion, the nature of the leaseholder's possessory interest in the site, and a description of the tenant's rights under subchapter 2 of this chapter.
  2. A tenant shall have the same rights against the leaseholder as are provided to tenants of buildings against declarants under subchapter 2 of this chapter.

    Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1360. Stabilization of lot rent.

  1. As soon as a declarant gives notice of intent to convert as provided by section 1353 of this subchapter, the lot rents of all leaseholders in the park shall be reduced to the level in effect three months prior to the notice of intent to convert.
  2. The lot rent charged for sites occupied by leaseholders shall not be increased during the period beginning with the notice of intent to convert as provided by section 1353 of this subchapter and ending either when the condominium association takes control of the common areas of the park, or at the expiration of the conversion period as provided by section 1356 of this subchapter, whichever is later.
  3. Following the period designated in subsection (b) of this section, the annual lot rent charged for sites occupied by nonpurchasing leaseholders may be increased by no more than an amount which is equal to the amount of any annual increase in the fees charged by the condominium association to its members. In no event may the lot rent charged to nonpurchasing leaseholders be increased more frequently than as provided for in 10 V.S.A. § 6236 .

    Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1361. Enforcement.

  1. A rent increase greater than that provided for by section 1360 of this subchapter is unenforceable to the extent the increase exceeds that provided for in that section.
  2. A declarant or site purchaser shall not commence eviction proceedings against a leaseholder for nonpayment of the part of the lot rent which represents an increase in excess of that provided for in section 1360 of this subchapter.

    Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1362. Waiver prohibited.

No lease or rental agreement, oral or written, shall contain any provision by which the tenant or leaseholder prospectively waives any of his or her rights under this subchapter. Any such waiver shall be deemed contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.

Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1363. Circumvention of this subchapter.

A declarant shall not attempt to circumvent the provisions of this subchapter; nor shall any person willfully cause a tenant or leaseholder to vacate a dwelling unit or to be evicted from the site without good cause before issuance of the notice prescribed in section 1353 of this title.

Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1364. Protection against harassment.

  1. No park owner or site owner may willfully cause, directly or indirectly, the interruption or termination of any utility service being supplied to a resident, except for temporary interruptions for emergency repairs.
  2. No park owner or site owner may directly or indirectly deny a resident access to and possession of the resident's rented or leased premises, except through proper judicial process.
  3. No park owner or site owner may directly or indirectly deny a resident access to and possession of the resident's property, except through proper judicial process.
  4. Any resident who sustains damage or injury as a result of an illegal eviction may bring an action for injunctive relief, damages, costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
  5. A court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the park owner or site owner if, upon motion and hearing, it is determined that the action was not brought in good faith and was frivolous or intended for harassment only.
  6. A park owner or site owner may not retaliate by establishing or changing terms of a rental agreement or by bringing or threatening to bring an action against a resident who has not elected to become a purchasing leaseholder or who has organized or become a member of a resident's association or similar organization.
  7. If a park owner or site owner acts in violation of this section, the resident is entitled to recover damages and reasonable attorney's fees and has a defense in any retaliatory action for possession.

    Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

§ 1365. Violations.

A violation of this subchapter is deemed to be a violation of 9 V.S.A. § 2453 , and is subject to all rights, obligations and penalties provided under 9 V.S.A. chapter 63.

Added 1993, No. 97 , § 1.

CHAPTER 17. FILING OF LAND PLATS

Sec.

History

Revision note. Chapter was enacted as "Chapter 15" but was renumbered as "Chapter 17" to avoid confusion with pre-existing Chapter 15.

§ 1401. Acceptance of survey plats; definition.

  1. Each town clerk shall accept survey plats for filing and maintain files and indices to files of survey plats in accordance with this chapter.
  2. As used in this chapter:
    1. "Survey plat" means a map or plan drawn to scale of one or more parcels, tracts, or subdivisions of land, showing, but not limited to, boundaries, corners, markers, monuments, easements, and other rights.
    2. "Center" means the Vermont Center for Geographic Information.
    1. Whenever a survey plat that maps the subdivision of a parcel or a change in a parcel boundary is filed for record with a town clerk, the surveyor who created the survey plat shall submit a digital copy of the plat to the Center. The Center shall maintain digital copies of survey plats in a statewide digital repository and make them available to the public. (c) (1)  Whenever a survey plat that maps the subdivision of a parcel or a change in a parcel boundary is filed for record with a town clerk, the surveyor who created the survey plat shall submit a digital copy of the plat to the Center. The Center shall maintain digital copies of survey plats in a statewide digital repository and make them available to the public.
    2. The failure of a surveyor to comply with subdivision (1) of this subsection shall not void, alter, or invalidate the subdivision or boundary adjustment and shall not render the title to the property depicted in the survey plat unmarketable.
  3. The survey plat filed with the town clerk shall be the official plat of record.

    Added 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, amended 1991, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2019, No. 38 , § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.

History

Amendments--2019. Subsec. (b): Substituted "As used in" for "For purposes of" in the introductory language; added the subdiv. (1) designation, and substituted "means" for "shall mean" following "Survey plat"; and added subdiv. (2).

Subsecs. (c) and (d): Added.

Amendments--1991 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted "survey" preceding "plats" in the section catchline, substituted "survey" for "land" following "accept" and "and indices to files of survey" for "of land" following "maintain files" in subsec. (a) and amended subsec. (b) generally.

§ 1402. Repealed. 2009, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, eff. May 6, 2010.

History

Former § 1402. Former § 1402, relating to storage of filed survey plats, was derived from 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 3 and amended by 1991, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1995, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 4(c)(2).

§ 1403. Composition of survey plats.

  1. Plats filed in accordance with this chapter shall be on sheets 11 inches by 17 inches or 18 inches by 24 inches in size or 24 inches by 36 inches if the town or city has appropriate storage facilities as determined by the town or city clerk.
  2. Plats filed in accordance with this chapter shall also conform with the following requirements:
    1. Each survey plat shall contain an inset locus map clearly indicating the location of the land depicted and a legend of symbols used.
    2. All lettering and data shall be clearly legible.
    3. Plat scale ratios shall be sufficient to allow all pertinent survey data to be shown, and each plat shall contain a graphic scale graduated in units of measure used in the body of the plat.
    4. Each plat sheet shall have a minimum one-half inch margin, except the binder side, which shall have a minimum one and one-half inch margin.
    5. Each plat sheet shall contain a title area in the lower right-hand corner of the sheet stating the location of the land, scale expressed in engineering units, date of compilation, the name of the record owner as of that date, the land surveyor's certification as outlined in 26 V.S.A. § 2596 , and a certification that the plat conforms with requirements of this section. These certifications shall be accompanied by the responsible land surveyor's seal, name and number, and signature.
    6. Each survey plat shall contain a graphical indication of the reference meridian used on the survey plat and a statement describing the basis of bearings referenced on the survey plat.
    7. When the plat sheet is produced by a reproduction process, the process shall be identified and certified to by the producer in the margin of the plat sheet. Original plat sheets shall be so identified and certified to by the same process.
    8. The recordable plat materials shall be composed in one of the following processes:
      1. fixed-line photographic process on stable base polyester film; or
      2. pigment ink on stable base polyester film or linen tracing cloth.
  3. Survey plats prepared and dated before July 1, 1992 shall be exempt from the requirements of subdivisions (b)(1)-(6) and (8) of this section, but shall comply with requirements in State law in effect when the plats were prepared and dated.
  4. Survey plats prepared and dated before any statutory regulation of land plats shall comply with subsection (a) and subdivision (b)(7) of this section.
  5. Any survey plat exempted by subsection (c) or (d) of this section and revised after July 1, 1992 shall meet all the requirements of this chapter.
  6. A digital copy of a survey plat filed with the Center pursuant to section 1401 of this chapter shall be submitted in portable document format (PDF). The Board of Land Surveyors, in consultation with the Center, shall have the authority to establish a digital survey standard for digital copies of survey plats.

    Added 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; amended 1991, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1993, No. 62 , §§ 1--3; 1995, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 4(c)(2), eff. May 6, 1996; 2009, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 13, eff. May 6, 2010; 2011, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; 2011, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, eff. July 1, 2013; 2015, No. 156 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 2019, No. 38 , § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.

History

Amendments--2019. Subsec. (f): Added.

Amendments--2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Deleted "further" following "following".

Subdiv. (b)(8): Added.

Subsec. (c): Substituted "subdivision (b)(1)-(6) and (8)" for "subdivision (b)(2)-(7)".

Subsec. (d): Substituted "subsection (a) and subdivision (b)(7)" for "subsection (a) and subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(8)".

Subsec. (e): Substituted "of this chapter" for "sections 1401-1406 of this title".

Amendments--2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subdivision (b)(8): Added.

Amendments--2009 (Adj. Sess.) Subsection (b): Deleted former subdiv. (1) and redesignated former subdivs. (2)-(8) as present subdivs. (1)-(7), and in subdiv. (7), deleted the former second sentence, and made stylistic and gender neutral changes throughout the subsection.

Amendments--1995 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted "commissioner of buildings and general services" for "commissioner of general services" in subdivs. (b)(1) and (8).

Amendments--1993. Subsection (a): Inserted "11 inches by 17 inches or" preceding "18 inches" in subsec. (a), deleted "at least five inches in length" preceding "graduated" in subdiv. (b)(4) and added subsecs. (c)-(e).

Amendments--1991 (Adj. Sess.). Amended section generally.

Repeal of subdiv. (b)(8). 2011, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 18, provided for the repeal of subdiv. (b)(8) on July 1, 2013.

ANNOTATIONS

1. Land surveyor's map .

Where there was no indication that a map prepared by a land surveyor for the purpose of obtaining a subdivision permit was filed in accordance with this section, or was intended to comply with it, it could not be concluded that the statute made the map a land survey. State v. Brooks, 177 Vt. 161, 861 A.2d 1096 (September 3, 2004).

§ 1404. Exemptions.

  1. Survey plats prepared and filed by municipal and State government agencies shall be exempt from subdivision 1403(b)(5) of this chapter. Each plat sheet filed under this exemption shall contain a title area in the lower right-hand corner of the sheet stating the location of the land, the scale expressed in engineering units, and the date of compilation. Highway plats or plans filed under this exemption shall also include right-of-way detail sheets and a title sheet.
  2. Survey plats prepared and filed in accordance with 24 V.S.A. § 4463 shall be exempt from subdivision 1403(b)(5) of this chapter. Survey plats or plans filed under this exemption shall contain a title area, the location of the land, and scale expressed in engineering units. In addition, they shall include inscriptions and data required by zoning and planning boards.
  3. Survey plats prepared and filed in accordance with chapter 15 of this title shall be exempt from subdivision 1403(b)(5) of this chapter. Each plat sheet filed under this exemption shall contain a title area stating the location of the land, the scale expressed in engineering or architectural units, and the date of compilation.

    Added 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; amended 1991, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2011, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2013, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 30; 2015, No. 156 (Adj. Sess.), § 19.

History

Amendments--2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section heading: Substituted "Exemptions" for "Exceptions".

Subsec. (a) and (b): Substituted "1403(b)(5) of this chapter" for "1403(b)(5) of this title".

Subsec. (c): Substituted "1403(b)(5) of this chapter" for "1403(b)(6) of this title".

Amendments--2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsection (a): Substituted "subdivision 1403(b)(5)" for "subdivision 1403(b)(6)" following "be exempt from", and made stylistic changes.

Amendments--2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsection (b): Substituted "with 24 V.S.A. § 4463 shall be exempt from subdivision 1403(b)(5)" for "with section 4416 of Title 24 shall be exempt from subdivision 1403(b)(6)" in the first sentence.

Amendments--1991 (Adj. Sess.). Amended section generally.

§ 1405. Applicability.

This chapter does not apply to layout plats of highways or other transportation facilities prepared by or for the agency of transportation, other than plats of individual parcels, before that agency issues a right-of-way clearance certificate for a transportation project. When the agency of transportation issues a right-of-way clearance certificate for a transportation project, it also shall file with the appropriate municipal clerk one set of plans that conforms to the requirements of this chapter, with instructions to the clerk to dispose of all previously filed plats for that particular project.

Added 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; amended 1993, No. 61 , § 29, eff. June 3, 1993; 1997, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 18.

History

Revision note. Substituted "Applicability" for "Exceptions" in the section catchline in order to avoid confusion with 27 V.S.A. § 1404.

Former § 1405, relating to exceptions to the provisions of this chapter, was derived from 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, and repealed by 1991, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

Amendments--1997 (Adj. Sess.). Added the language beginning "before that agency" to the end of the first sentence and added the second sentence.

§ 1406. Prohibition.

A town clerk shall not accept any survey plat for filing unless it is in compliance with the requirements of this chapter.

Added 1969, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; amended 1991, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Amendments--1991 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted "survey" preceding "plat" and deleted "or any plan for recording" preceding "unless".

CHAPTER 18. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY

Subchapter 1. General Provisions

§ 1451. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1452. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. "Administrator" means the Vermont State Treasurer.
  2. "Administrator's agent" means a person with whom the Administrator contracts to conduct an examination pursuant to subchapter 10 of this chapter on behalf of the Administrator. The term includes an independent contractor of the person and each individual participating in the examination on behalf of the person or contractor.
  3. "Apparent owner" means a person whose name appears on the records of a holder as the owner of property held, issued, or owing by the holder.
  4. "Business association" means a corporation; joint stock company; investment company other than an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as may be amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 through 80a-64; partnership; unincorporated association; joint venture; limited liability company; business trust; trust company; land bank; safe deposit company; safekeeping depository; financial organization; insurance company; federally chartered entity; utility; sole proprietorship; or other business entity, whether or not for profit.
  5. "Confidential information" means records, reports, and information that are confidential under section 1612 of this title.
  6. "Domicile" means:
    1. for a corporation, the state of its incorporation;
    2. for a business association whose formation requires a filing with a state, other than a corporation, the state of its filing;
    3. for a federally chartered entity or an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as may be amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 through 80a-64, the state of its home office; and
    4. for any other holder, the state of its principal place of business.
  7. "Electronic" means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
  8. "Electronic mail" means a communication by electronic means that is automatically retained and stored and may be readily accessed or retrieved.
  9. "Financial organization" means a savings and loan association, building and loan association, savings bank, industrial bank, bank, banking organization, or credit union.
  10. "Game-related digital content" means digital content that exists only in an electronic game or electronic-game platform. The term:
    1. includes:
      1. game-play currency such as a virtual wallet, even if denominated in U.S. currency; and
      2. the following if for use or redemption only within the game or platform or another electronic game or electronic-game platform:
        1. points sometimes referred to as gems, tokens, gold, and similar names; and
        2. digital codes; and
    2. does not include an item that the issuer:
      1. permits to be redeemed for use outside a game or platform for:
        1. money; or
        2. goods or services that have more than minimal value; or
      2. otherwise monetizes for use outside a game or platform.
  11. "Gift card" means:
    1. a stored-value card:
      1. the value of which does not expire;
      2. that may be decreased in value only by redemption for merchandise, goods, or services; and
      3. that, unless required by law, may not be redeemed for or converted into money or otherwise monetized by the issuer; and
    2. includes a prepaid commercial mobile radio service, as defined in 47 C.F.R. § 20.3, as may be amended.
  12. "Holder" means a person obligated to hold for the account of, or to deliver or pay to, the owner, property subject to this chapter.
  13. "Insurance company" means an association, corporation, or fraternal or mutual-benefit organization, whether or not for profit, engaged in the business of providing life endowments, annuities, or insurance, including accident, burial, casualty, credit-life, contract-performance, dental, disability, fidelity, fire, health, hospitalization, illness, life, malpractice, marine, mortgage, surety, wage-protection, and workers' compensation insurance.
  14. "Loyalty card" means a record given without direct monetary consideration under an award, reward, benefit, loyalty, incentive, rebate, or promotional program that may be used or redeemed only to obtain goods or services or a discount on goods or services. The term does not include a record that may be redeemed for money or otherwise monetized by the issuer.
  15. "Mineral" means gas, oil, coal, oil shale, other gaseous liquid or solid hydrocarbon, cement material, sand and gravel, road material, building stone, chemical raw material, gemstone, fissionable and nonfissionable ores, colloidal and other clay, steam and other geothermal resources, and any other substance defined as a mineral by law of this State other than this chapter.
  16. "Mineral proceeds" means an amount payable for extraction, production, or sale of minerals, or, on the abandonment of the amount, an amount that becomes payable after abandonment. The term includes an amount payable:
    1. for the acquisition and retention of a mineral lease, including a bonus, royalty, compensatory royalty, shut-in royalty, minimum royalty, and delay rental;
    2. for the extraction, production, or sale of minerals, including a net revenue interest, royalty, overriding royalty, extraction payment, and production payment; and
    3. under an agreement or option, including a joint-operating agreement, unit agreement, pooling agreement, and farm-out agreement.
  17. "Money order" means a payment order for a specified amount of money. The term includes an express money order and a personal money order on which the remitter is the purchaser.
  18. "Municipal bond" means a bond or evidence of indebtedness issued by a municipality or other political subdivision of a state.
  19. "Net card value" means the original purchase price or original issued value of a stored-value card, plus amounts added to the original price or value, minus amounts used and any service charge, fee, or dormancy charge permitted by law.
  20. "Non-freely transferable security" means a security that cannot be delivered to the Administrator by the Depository Trust Clearing Corporation or similar custodian of securities providing post-trade clearing and settlement services to financial markets or cannot be delivered because there is no agent to effect transfer. The term includes a worthless security.
  21. "Owner" means a person that has a legal, beneficial, or equitable interest in property subject to this chapter or the person's legal representative when acting on behalf of the owner. The term includes:
    1. a depositor, for a deposit;
    2. a beneficiary, for a trust other than a deposit in trust;
    3. a creditor, claimant, or payee, for other property; and
    4. the lawful bearer of a record that may be used to obtain money, a reward, or a thing of value.
  22. "Payroll card" means a record that evidences a payroll-card account as defined in Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. Part 1005, as may be amended.
  23. "Person" means an individual, estate, business association, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or other legal entity.
  24. "Property" means tangible property described in section 1465 of this title or a fixed and certain interest in intangible property held, issued, or owed in the course of a holder's business or by a government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality. The term:
    1. includes all income from or increments to the property;
    2. includes property referred to as or evidenced by:
      1. money, virtual currency, interest, or a dividend, check, draft, deposit, or payroll card;
      2. a credit balance, customer's overpayment, stored-value card, security deposit, refund, credit memorandum, unpaid wage, unused ticket for which the issuer has an obligation to provide a refund, mineral proceeds, or unidentified remittance;
      3. a security except for:
        1. a worthless security; or
        2. a security that is subject to a lien, legal hold, or restriction evidenced on the records of the holder or imposed by operation of law, if the lien, legal hold, or restriction restricts the holder's or owner's ability to receive, transfer, sell, or otherwise negotiate the security;
      4. a bond, debenture, note, or other evidence of indebtedness;
      5. money deposited to redeem a security, make a distribution, or pay a dividend;
      6. an amount due and payable under an annuity contract or insurance policy; and
      7. an amount distributable from a trust or custodial fund established under a plan to provide health, welfare, pension, vacation, severance, retirement, death, stock purchase, profit-sharing, employee-savings, supplemental-unemployment insurance, or a similar benefit; and
    3. does not include:
      1. property held in a plan described in 26 U.S.C. § 529A, as may be amended;
      2. game-related digital content;
      3. a loyalty card; or
      4. a gift card.
  25. "Putative holder" means a person believed by the Administrator to be a holder, until the person pays or delivers to the Administrator property subject to this chapter or the Administrator or a court makes a final determination that the person is or is not a holder.
  26. "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. Records of the holder include records maintained by a third party that has contracted with the holder.
  27. "Security" means:
    1. a security as defined in 9A V.S.A. § 8-102;
    2. a security entitlement as defined in 9A V.S.A. § 8-102, including a customer security account held by a registered broker-dealer, to the extent the financial assets held in the security account are not:
      1. registered on the books of the issuer in the name of the person for which the broker-dealer holds the assets;
      2. payable to the order of the person; or
      3. specifically indorsed to the person; or
    3. an equity interest in a business association not included in subdivisions (A) or (B) of this subdivision.
  28. "Sign" means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:
    1. to execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
    2. to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.
  29. "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
  30. "Stored-value card" means a record evidencing a promise made for consideration by the seller or issuer of the record that goods, services, or money will be provided to the owner of the record to the value or amount shown in the record. The term:
    1. includes:
      1. a record that contains or consists of a microprocessor chip, magnetic strip, or other means for the storage of information, that is prefunded, and whose value or amount is decreased on each use and increased by payment of additional consideration; and
      2. a payroll card; and
    2. does not include a loyalty card, gift card, or game-related digital content.
  31. "Utility" means a person that owns or operates for public use a plant, equipment, real property, franchise, or license for the following public services:
    1. transmission of communications or information;
    2. production, storage, transmission, sale, delivery, or furnishing of electricity, water, steam, or gas; or
    3. provision of sewage or septic services or trash, garbage, or recycling disposal.
  32. "Virtual currency" means a digital representation of value used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, or store of value that does not have legal tender status recognized by the United States. The term does not include:
    1. the software or protocols governing the transfer of the digital representation of value;
    2. game-related digital content; or
    3. a loyalty card.
  33. "Worthless security" means a security whose cost of liquidation and delivery to the Administrator would exceed the value of the security on the date a report is due under this chapter.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1453. Inapplicability to foreign transaction.

This chapter does not apply to property held, due, and owing in a foreign country if the transaction out of which the property arose was a foreign transaction.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1454. Rulemaking.

The Administrator may adopt rules pursuant to 3 V.S.A. chapter 25, to implement and administer this chapter.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 2. Presumption of Abandonment

§ 1461. When property presumed abandoned.

Subject to section 1469 of this title, the following property is presumed abandoned if it is unclaimed by the apparent owner during the period specified below:

  1. a traveler's check, 15 years after issuance;
  2. a money order, seven years after issuance;
  3. a state or municipal bond, bearer bond, or original-issue-discount bond, three years after the earliest of the date the bond matures or is called or the obligation to pay the principal of the bond arises;
  4. a debt of a business association, three years after the obligation to pay arises;
  5. a payroll card or demand, savings, or time deposit, including a deposit that is automatically renewable, three years after the maturity of the deposit, except a deposit that is automatically renewable is deemed matured on its initial date of maturity unless the apparent owner consented in a record on file with the holder to renewal at or about the time of the renewal;
  6. money or a credit owed to a customer as a result of a retail business transaction, three years after the obligation arose;
  7. an amount owed by an insurance company on a life or endowment insurance policy or an annuity contract that has matured or terminated, three years after the obligation to pay arose under the terms of the policy or contract or, if a policy or contract for which an amount is owed on proof of death has not matured by proof of the death of the insured or annuitant, as follows:
    1. with respect to an amount owed on a life or endowment insurance policy, three years after the earlier of the date:
      1. the insurance company has knowledge of the death of the insured; or
      2. the insured has attained, or would have attained if living, the limiting age under the mortality table on which the reserve for the policy is based; and
    2. with respect to an amount owed on an annuity contract, three years after the date the insurance company has knowledge of the death of the annuitant;
  8. property distributable by a business association in the course of dissolution, one year after the property becomes distributable;
  9. property held by a court, including property received as proceeds of a class action, one year after the property becomes distributable;
  10. property held by a government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, including municipal bond interest and unredeemed principal under the administration of a paying agent or indenture trustee, one year after the property becomes distributable;
  11. wages, commissions, bonuses, or reimbursements to which an employee is entitled, or other compensation for personal services, other than amounts held in a payroll card, one year after the amount becomes payable;
  12. a deposit or refund owed to a subscriber by a utility, one year after the deposit or refund becomes payable; and
  13. property not specified in this section or section 1462, 1463, 1464, 1465, 1466, or 1467 of this title, the earlier of three years after the owner first has a right to demand the property or the obligation to pay or distribute the property arises.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1462. When tax-deferred retirement account presumed abandoned.

  1. Subject to section 1469 of this title, property held in a pension account or retirement account that qualifies for tax deferral under the income-tax laws of the United States is presumed abandoned if it is unclaimed by the apparent owner three years after the later of:
    1. the following dates:
      1. except as in subdivision (B) of this subdivision (1), the date a second consecutive communication sent by the holder by first-class U.S. mail to the apparent owner is returned to the holder undelivered by the U.S. Postal Service; or
      2. if the second communication is sent later than 30 days after the date the first communication is returned undelivered, the date the first communication was returned undelivered by the U.S. Postal Service; or
    2. the earlier of the following dates:
      1. the date the apparent owner becomes 72 years of age, if determinable by the holder; or
      2. if the Internal Revenue Code, as may be amended, 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., requires distribution to avoid a tax penalty, two years after the date the holder:
        1. receives confirmation of the death of the apparent owner in the ordinary course of its business; or
        2. confirms the death of the apparent owner under subsection (b) of this section.
  2. If a holder in the ordinary course of its business receives notice or an indication of the death of an apparent owner and subdivision (a)(2) of this section applies, the holder shall attempt not later than 90 days after receipt of the notice or indication to confirm whether the apparent owner is deceased.
  3. If the holder does not send communications to the apparent owner of an account described in subsection (a) of this section by first-class U.S. mail, the holder shall attempt to confirm the apparent owner's interest in the property by sending the apparent owner an electronic-mail communication not later than two years after the apparent owner's last indication of interest in the property. However, the holder promptly shall attempt to contact the apparent owner by first-class U.S. mail if:
    1. the holder does not have information needed to send the apparent owner an electronic mail communication or the holder believes that the apparent owner's electronic mail address in the holder's records is not valid;
    2. the holder receives notification that the electronic-mail communication was not received; or
    3. the apparent owner does not respond to the electronic-mail communication not later than 30 days after the communication was sent.
  4. If first-class U.S. mail sent under subsection (c) of this section is returned to the holder undelivered by the U.S. Postal Service, the property is presumed abandoned three years after the later of:
    1. except as in subdivision (2) of this subsection, the date a second consecutive communication to contact the apparent owner sent by first-class U.S. mail is returned to the holder undelivered;
    2. if the second communication is sent later than 30 days after the date the first communication is returned undelivered, the date the first communication was returned undelivered; or
    3. the date established by subdivision (a)(2) of this section.

      Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1463. When other tax-deferred account presumed abandoned.

Subject to section 1469 of this title and except for property described in section 1462 of this title and property held in a plan described in 26 U.S.C. § 529A, as may be amended, property held in an account or plan, including a health savings account, that qualifies for tax deferral under the income tax laws of the United States is presumed abandoned if it is unclaimed by the apparent owner three years after the earlier of:

  1. the date, if determinable by the holder, specified in the income tax laws and regulations of the United States by which distribution of the property must begin to avoid a tax penalty, with no distribution having been made; or
  2. 30 years after the date the account was opened.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1464. When custodial account for minor presumed abandoned.

  1. Subject to section 1469 of this title, property held in an account established under a state's Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or Uniform Transfers to Minors Act is presumed abandoned if it is unclaimed by or on behalf of the minor on whose behalf the account was opened three years after the later of:
    1. except as in subdivision (2) of this subsection, the date a second consecutive communication sent by the holder by first-class U.S. mail to the custodian of the minor on whose behalf the account was opened is returned undelivered to the holder by the U.S. Postal Service;
    2. if the second communication is sent later than 30 days after the date the first communication is returned undelivered, the date the first communication was returned undelivered; or
    3. the date on which the custodian is required to transfer the property to the minor or the minor's estate in accordance with the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act or Uniform Transfers to Minors Act of the state in which the account was opened.
  2. If the holder does not send communications to the custodian of the minor on whose behalf an account described in subsection (a) of this section was opened by first-class U.S. mail, the holder shall attempt to confirm the custodian's interest in the property by sending the custodian an electronic-mail communication not later than two years after the custodian's last indication of interest in the property. However, the holder promptly shall attempt to contact the custodian by first-class U.S. mail if:
    1. the holder does not have information needed to send the custodian an electronic-mail communication or the holder believes that the custodian's electronic-mail address in the holder's records is not valid;
    2. the holder receives notification that the electronic-mail communication was not received; or
    3. the custodian does not respond to the electronic-mail communication not later than 30 days after the communication was sent.
  3. If first-class U.S. mail sent under subsection (b) of this section is returned undelivered to the holder by the U.S. Postal Service, the property is presumed abandoned three years after the later of:
    1. the date a second consecutive communication to contact the custodian by first-class U.S. mail is returned to the holder undelivered by the U.S. Postal Service; or
    2. the date established by subdivision (a)(3) of this section.
  4. When the property in the account described in subsection (a) of this section is transferred to the minor on whose behalf an account was opened or to the minor's estate, the property in the account is no longer subject to this section.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1465. When contents of safe-deposit box presumed abandoned.

Tangible property held in a safe-deposit box and proceeds from a sale of the property by the holder permitted by law of this State other than this chapter are presumed abandoned if the property remains unclaimed by the apparent owner five years after the earlier of the:

  1. expiration of the lease or rental period for the box; or
  2. earliest date when the lessor of the box is authorized by law of this State other than this chapter to enter the box and remove or dispose of the contents without consent or authorization of the lessee.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1466. When stored-value card presumed abandoned.

  1. Subject to section 1469 of this title, the net card value of a stored-value card, other than a payroll card, is presumed abandoned on the latest of three years after:
    1. December 31 of the year in which the card is issued or additional funds are deposited into it;
    2. the most recent indication of interest in the card by the apparent owner; or
    3. a verification or review of the balance by or on behalf of the apparent owner.
  2. The amount presumed abandoned in a stored-value card is the net card value at the time it is presumed abandoned.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1467. When security presumed abandoned.

  1. Subject to section 1469 of this title, a security is presumed abandoned three years after:
    1. the date a second consecutive communication sent by the holder by first-class U.S. mail to the apparent owner is returned to the holder undelivered by the U.S. Postal Service; or
    2. if the second communication is made later than 30 days after the first communication is returned, the date the first communication is returned undelivered to the holder by the U.S. Postal Service.
  2. If the holder does not send communications to the apparent owner of a security by first-class U.S. mail, the holder shall attempt to confirm the apparent owner's interest in the security by sending the apparent owner an electronic-mail communication not later than two years after the apparent owner's last indication of interest in the security. However, the holder promptly shall attempt to contact the apparent owner by first-class U.S. mail if:
    1. the holder does not have information needed to send the apparent owner an electronic-mail communication or the holder believes that the apparent owner's electronic-mail address in the holder's records is not valid;
    2. the holder receives notification that the electronic-mail communication was not received; or
    3. the apparent owner does not respond to the electronic-mail communication not later than 30 days after the communication was sent.
  3. If first-class U.S. mail sent under subsection (b) of this section is returned to the holder undelivered by the U.S. Postal Service, the security is presumed abandoned three years after the date the mail is returned.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1468. When related property presumed abandoned.

At and after the time property is presumed abandoned under this chapter, any other property right or interest accrued or accruing from the property and not previously presumed abandoned is also presumed abandoned.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1469. Indication of apparent owner interest in property.

  1. The period after which property is presumed abandoned is measured from the later of:
    1. the date the property is presumed abandoned under this subchapter; or
    2. the latest indication of interest by the apparent owner in the property.
  2. Under this chapter, an indication of an apparent owner's interest in property includes:
    1. a record communicated by the apparent owner to the holder or agent of the holder concerning the property or the account in which the property is held;
    2. an oral communication by the apparent owner to the holder or agent of the holder concerning the property or the account in which the property is held, if the holder or its agent contemporaneously makes and preserves a record of the fact of the apparent owner's communication;
    3. presentment of a check or other instrument of payment of a dividend, interest payment, or other distribution, or evidence of receipt of a distribution made by electronic or similar means, with respect to an account, underlying security, or interest in a business association;
    4. activity directed by an apparent owner in the account in which the property is held or in another account of the owner's held by the same business association or financial organization, including accessing the account or information concerning the account, or a direction by the apparent owner to increase, decrease, or otherwise change the amount or type of property held in the account;
    5. a deposit into or withdrawal from an account at a financial organization, including an automatic deposit or withdrawal previously authorized by the apparent owner other than an automatic reinvestment of dividends or interest;
    6. subject to subsection (e) of this section, payment of a premium on an insurance policy;
    7. in the case of any demand, savings, or matured time deposits with a banking or financial organization, including deposits that are automatically renewable, the holder has sent the owner by first-class U.S. mail a statement of account or other associated mailing from the bank or financial institution, which has not been returned by the U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable. In the event the mailing was returned as undeliverable, the property shall be considered abandoned three years after the return, unless the owner during that three years takes any action described in subsection (b) of this section; and
    8. any other action by the apparent owner that reasonably demonstrates to the holder that the apparent owner knows that the property exists.
  3. An action by an agent or other representative of an apparent owner, other than the holder acting as the apparent owner's agent, is presumed to be an action on behalf of the apparent owner.
  4. A communication with an apparent owner by a person other than the holder or the holder's representative is not an indication of interest in the property by the apparent owner unless a record of the communication evidences the apparent owner's knowledge of a right to the property.
  5. If the insured dies or the insured or beneficiary of an insurance policy otherwise becomes entitled to the proceeds before depletion of the cash surrender value of the policy by operation of an automatic-premium-loan provision or other nonforfeiture provision contained in the policy, the operation does not prevent the policy from maturing or terminating.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1470. Knowledge of death of insured or annuitant.

  1. In this section, "Death Master File" means the U.S. Social Security Administration Death Master File or other database or service that is at least as comprehensive as the U.S. Social Security Administration Death Master File for determining that an individual reportedly has died.
  2. With respect to a life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract for which an amount is owed on proof of death, but which has not matured by proof of death of the insured or annuitant, the company has knowledge of the death of an insured or annuitant when:
    1. the company receives a death certificate or court order determining that the insured or annuitant has died;
    2. due diligence, performed as required pursuant to 8 V.S.A. part 3, to maintain contact with the insured or annuitant or determine whether the insured or annuitant has died, validates the death of the insured or annuitant;
    3. the company conducts a comparison for any purpose between a Death Master File and the names of some or all of the company's insureds or annuitants, finds a match that provides notice that the insured or annuitant has died, and validates the death;
    4. the Administrator or the Administrator's agent conducts a comparison for the purpose of finding matches during an examination conducted under subchapter 10 of this chapter between a Death Master File and the names of some or all of the company's insureds or annuitants, finds a match that provides notice that the insured or annuitant has died, and the company validates the death; or
    5. the company:
      1. receives notice of the death of the insured or annuitant from an administrator, beneficiary, policy owner, relative of the insured, or trustee or from a personal representative, guardian, executor, or other legal representative of the insured's or annuitant's estate; and
      2. validates the death of the insured or annuitant.
  3. The following rules apply under this section:
    1. A Death Master File match under subdivision (b)(3) or (4) of this section occurs if the criteria for an exact or partial match are satisfied as provided by:
      1. law of this State other than this chapter;
      2. a rule or policy adopted by the Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Financial Regulation pursuant to 3 V.S.A. chapter 25; or
      3. section 1472 of this title.
    2. The Death Master File match does not constitute proof of death for the purpose of submission to an insurance company of a claim by a beneficiary, annuitant, or owner of the policy or contract for an amount due under an insurance policy or annuity contract.
    3. The Death Master File match or validation of the insured's or annuitant's death does not alter the requirements for a beneficiary, annuitant, or owner of the policy or contract to make a claim to receive proceeds under the terms of the policy or contract.
    4. If no provision in 8 V.S.A. part 3 establishes a time for validation of a death of an insured or annuitant, the insurance company shall make a good faith effort using other available records and information to validate the death and document the effort taken not later than 90 days after the insurance company has notice of the death.
  4. This chapter does not affect the determination of the extent to which an insurance company before the effective date of this chapter had knowledge of the death of an insured or annuitant or was required to conduct a Death Master File comparison to determine whether amounts owed by the company on a life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract were presumed abandoned or unclaimed.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1471. Deposit account for proceeds of insurance policy or annuity contract.

If proceeds payable under a life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract are deposited into an account with check or draft-writing privileges for the beneficiary of the policy or contract and, under a supplementary contract not involving annuity benefits other than death benefits, the proceeds are retained by the insurance company or the financial organization where the account is held, the policy or contract includes the assets in the account.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1472. Unclaimed life insurance benefits.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. "Contract" means an annuity contract. The term "contract" shall not include an annuity used to fund an employment-based retirement plan or program where:
      1. the insurer does not perform the record-keeping services; or
      2. the insurer is not committed by terms of the annuity contract to pay death benefits to the beneficiaries of specific plan participants.
    2. "Death Master File" means the U.S. Social Security Administration's Death Master File or any other database or service that is at least as comprehensive as the U.S. Social Security Administration's Death Master File for determining that an individual reportedly has died.
    3. "Death Master File match" means a search of the Death Master File that results in a match of the Social Security number or the name and date of birth of an insured, annuity owner, or retained asset account holder.
    4. "Knowledge of death" shall mean:
      1. receipt of an original or valid copy of a certified death certificate; or
      2. a Death Master File match validated by the insurer in accordance with subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section.
    5. "Policy" means any policy or certificate of life insurance that provides a death benefit. The term "Policy" shall not include:
      1. any policy or certificate of life insurance that provides a death benefit under an employee benefit plan:
        1. subject to The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-406, as may be amended, or
        2. under any Federal employee benefit program;
      2. any policy or certificate of life insurance that is used to fund a preneed funeral contract or prearrangement;
      3. any policy or certificate of credit life or accidental death insurance; or
      4. any policy issued to a group master policyholder for which the insurer does not provide record-keeping services.
    6. "Record-keeping services" means those circumstances under which the insurer has agreed with a group policy or contract customer to be responsible for obtaining, maintaining, and administering in its own or its agents' systems information about each individual insured under an insured's group insurance contract, or a line of coverage thereunder, at least the following information:
      1. Social Security number or name and date of birth;
      2. beneficiary designation information;
      3. coverage eligibility;
      4. benefit amount; and
      5. premium payment status.
    7. "Retained Asset Account" means any mechanism whereby the settlement of proceeds payable under a Policy or Contract is accomplished by the insurer or an entity acting on behalf of the insurer depositing the proceeds into an account with check or draft writing privileges, where those proceeds are retained by the insurer or its agent, pursuant to a supplementary contract not involving annuity benefits other than death benefits.
  2. An insurer shall perform a comparison of its insureds' in-force Policies, Contracts, and Retained Asset Accounts against a Death Master File, on at least a semi-annual basis, by using the full Death Master File once and thereafter using the Death Master File update files for future comparisons to identify potential matches of its insureds. For those potential matches identified as a result of a Death Master File Match, the insurer shall:
    1. within 90 days of a Death Master File Match:
      1. complete a good faith effort, which shall be documented by the insurer, to confirm the death of the insured or retained asset account holder against other available records and information;
      2. determine whether benefits are due in accordance with the applicable policy or contract; and if benefits are due in accordance with the applicable policy or contract:
        1. use good faith efforts, which shall be documented by the insurer, to locate the beneficiary or beneficiaries; and
        2. provide the appropriate claims forms or instructions to the beneficiary or beneficiaries to make a claim including the need to provide an official death certificate, if applicable under the policy or contract.
    2. With respect to group life insurance, insurers are required to confirm the possible death of an insured when the insurers maintain at least the following information of those covered under a policy or certificate:
      1. Social Security number or name and date of birth,
      2. beneficiary designation information,
      3. coverage eligibility,
      4. benefit amount, and
      5. premium payment status.
    3. Every insurer shall implement procedures to account for:
      1. common nicknames, initials used in lieu of a first or middle name, use of a middle name, compound first and middle names, and interchanged first and middle names;
      2. compound last names, maiden or married names, and hyphens, blank spaces, or apostrophes in last names;
      3. transposition of the "month" and "date" portions of the date of birth; and
      4. incomplete Social Security number.
    4. To the extent permitted by law, the insurer may disclose minimum necessary personal information about the insured or beneficiary to a person who the insurer reasonably believes may be able to assist the insurer locate the beneficiary or a person otherwise entitled to payment of the claims proceeds.
  3. An insurer or its service provider shall not charge any beneficiary or other authorized representative for any fees or costs associated with a Death Master File Search or verification of a Death Master File Match conducted pursuant to this section.
  4. The benefits from a Policy, Contract, or a Retained Asset Account, plus any applicable accrued contractual interest, shall first be payable to the designated beneficiaries or owners and, in the event said beneficiaries or owners cannot be found, shall be reportable to the Administrator as unclaimed property pursuant to this chapter. Interest payable under 8 V.S.A. § 3665 shall not be payable as unclaimed property under this chapter.
  5. An insurer shall notify the Administrator upon the expiration of the statutory time period for the property to be presumed abandoned that:
    1. a Policy or Contract beneficiary or Retained Asset Account holder has not submitted a claim with the insurer; and
    2. the insurer has complied with subsection (a) of this section and has been unable, after good faith efforts documented by the insurer, to contact the Retained Asset Account holder, beneficiary, or beneficiaries.
  6. Upon such notice, an insurer shall immediately submit the unclaimed Policy or Contract benefits or unclaimed Retained Asset Accounts, plus any applicable accrued interest, to the Administrator.
  7. Failure to meet any requirement of this section with such frequency as to constitute a general business practice is a violation of 8 V.S.A. § 4724(9) . Nothing herein shall be construed to create or imply a private cause of action for a violation of this section.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1473. When abandonment period is accelerated.

Notwithstanding sections 1461 through 1469 of this title, and subject to section 1469 of this title:

  1. If the holder has imposed a charge against property for reason of owner inactivity or the failure of the owner to claim the property within a specified period of time, and the abandonment period for the property as specified in sections 1461 through 1469 of this chapter is greater than two years, the property shall instead be presumed abandoned two years from the date of the owner's last indication of interest in the property.
  2. A deceased owner cannot indicate interest in his or her property. If the holder has reason to believe that the owner's deceased, and the abandonment period for the owner's property in sections 1461 through 1469 of this title is greater than two years, the property shall instead be presumed abandoned two years from the date of the owner's last indication of interest in the property. If the owner's property is subject to section 1462 or 1463 of this title, the two-year presumption of abandonment shall run from the earliest of the date of distribution or attempted distribution of the property, the date of the required distribution as stated in the plan or trust agreement governing the plan, or the date, if determinable by the holder, specified in the income tax laws of the United States by which distribution of the property must begin in order to avoid a tax penalty.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 3. Rules for Taking Custody of Property Presumed Abandoned

§ 1481. Address of apparent owner to establish priority.

In this subchapter, the following rules apply:

  1. The last-known address of an apparent owner is any description, code, or other indication of the location of the apparent owner that identifies the state, even if the description, code, or indication of location is not sufficient to direct the delivery of first-class U.S. mail to the apparent owner.
  2. If the U.S. postal zip code associated with the apparent owner is for a post office located in this State, this State is deemed to be the state of the last-known address of the apparent owner unless other records associated with the apparent owner specifically identify the physical address of the apparent owner to be in another state.
  3. If the address under subdivision (2) of this section is in another state, the other state is deemed to be the state of the last-known address of the apparent owner.
  4. The address of the apparent owner of a life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract or its proceeds is presumed to be the address of the insured or annuitant if a person other than the insured or annuitant is entitled to the amount owed under the policy or contract and the address of the other person is not known by the insurance company and cannot be determined under section 1482 of this title.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1482. Address of apparent owner in this State.

The Administrator may take custody of property that is presumed abandoned, whether located in this State, another state, or a foreign country if:

  1. the last-known address of the apparent owner in the records of the holder is in this State; or
  2. the records of the holder do not reflect the identity or last-known address of the apparent owner, but the Administrator has determined that the last-known address of the apparent owner is in this State.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1483. If records show multiple addresses of apparent owner.

  1. Except as in subsection (b) of this section, if records of a holder reflect multiple addresses for an apparent owner and this State is the state of the most recently recorded address, this State may take custody of property presumed abandoned, whether located in this State or another state.
  2. If it appears from records of the holder that the most recently recorded address of the apparent owner under subsection (a) of this section is a temporary address and this State is the state of the next most-recently recorded address that is not a temporary address, this State may take custody of the property presumed abandoned.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1484. Holder domiciled in this State.

  1. Except as in subsection (b) of this section or section 1482 or 1483 of this title, the Administrator may take custody of property presumed abandoned, whether located in this State, another state, or a foreign country, if the holder is domiciled in this State or is this State or a governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of this State, and
    1. another state or foreign country is not entitled to the property because there is no last-known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property in the records of the holder; or
    2. the state or foreign country of the last-known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property does not provide for custodial taking of the property.
  2. Property is not subject to custody of the Administrator under subsection (a) of this section if the property is specifically exempt from custodial taking under the law of this State or the state or foreign country of the last-known address of the apparent owner.
  3. If a holder's state of domicile has changed since the time property was presumed abandoned, the holder's state of domicile in this section is deemed to be the state where the holder was domiciled at the time the property was presumed abandoned.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1485. Custody if transaction took place in this State.

Except as in section 1482, 1483, or 1484 of this title, the Administrator may take custody of property presumed abandoned whether located in this State or another state if:

  1. the transaction out of which the property arose took place in this State;
  2. the holder is domiciled in a state that does not provide for the custodial taking of the property, except that if the property is specifically exempt from custodial taking under the law of the state of the holder's domicile, the property is not subject to the custody of the Administrator; and
  3. the last-known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property is unknown or in a state that does not provide for the custodial taking of the property, except that if the property is specifically exempt from custodial taking under the law of the state of the last-known address, the property is not subject to the custody of the Administrator.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1486. Traveler's check, money order, or similar instrument.

The Administrator may take custody of sums payable on a traveler's check, money order, or similar instrument presumed abandoned to the extent permissible under 12 U.S.C. §§ 2501 through 2503, as may be amended.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1487. Burden of proof to establish Administrator's right to custody.

If the Administrator asserts a right to custody of unclaimed property, the Administrator has the burden to prove:

  1. the existence and amount of the property;
  2. the property is presumed abandoned; and
  3. the property is subject to the custody of the Administrator.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 4. Report by Holder

§ 1491. Report required by holder.

  1. A holder of property presumed abandoned and subject to the custody of the Administrator shall report in a record to the Administrator concerning the property. The Administrator may not require a holder to file a paper report.
  2. A holder may contract with a third party to make the report required under subsection (a) of this section.
  3. Whether or not a holder contracts with a third party under subsection (b) of this section, the holder is responsible:
    1. to the Administrator for the complete, accurate, and timely reporting of property presumed abandoned; and
    2. for paying or delivering to the Administrator property described in the report.

      Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1492. Content of report.

  1. The report required under section 1491 of this title must:
    1. be signed by or on behalf of the holder and verified as to its completeness and accuracy;
    2. if filed electronically, be in a secure format approved by the Administrator that protects confidential information of the apparent owner in the same manner as required of the Administrator and the Administrator's agent under subchapter 14 of this chapter;
    3. describe the property;
    4. except for a traveler's check, money order, or similar instrument, contain the name, if known; last-known address, if known; and Social Security number or taxpayer identification number, if known or readily ascertainable, of the apparent owner of property with a value of $50.00 or more;
    5. for an amount held or owing under a life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract, contain the name and last-known address of the insured, annuitant, or other apparent owner of the policy or contract and of the beneficiary;
    6. for property held in or removed from a safe-deposit box, indicate the location of the property, where it may be inspected by the Administrator, and any amounts owed to the holder under section 1516 of this title;
    7. contain the commencement date for determining abandonment under subchapter 2 of this chapter;
    8. state that the holder has complied with the notice requirements of section 1501 of this title;
    9. identify property that is a non-freely transferable security and explain why it is a non-freely transferable security; and
    10. contain other information the Administrator prescribes by rules.
  2. A report under section 1491 of this title may include in the aggregate items valued under $25.00 each. If the report includes items in the aggregate valued under $25.00 each, the Administrator may not require the holder to provide the name and address of an apparent owner of an item unless the information is necessary to verify or process a claim in progress by the apparent owner.
  3. A report under section 1491 of this title may include personal information as defined in section 1611 of this title about the apparent owner or the apparent owner's property to the extent not otherwise prohibited by federal law.
  4. If a holder has changed its name while holding property presumed abandoned or is a successor to another person that previously held the property for the apparent owner, the holder must include in the report under section 1491 of this title its former name or the name of the previous holder, if any, and the known name and address of each previous holder of the property.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1493. When report to be filed.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section and subject to subsection (c) of this section, the report under section 1491 of this title must be filed before May 1 of each year and cover the 12 months preceding January 1 of that year.
  2. Subject to subsection (c) of this section, the report under section 1491 of this title to be filed by an insurance company must be filed before May 1 of each year for the immediately preceding calendar year.
  3. Before the date for filing the report under section 1491 of this title, the holder of property presumed abandoned may request the Administrator to extend the time for filing. The Administrator may grant an extension. If the extension is granted, the holder may pay or make a partial payment of the amount the holder estimates ultimately will be due. The payment or partial payment terminates accrual of interest on the amount paid.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1494. Retention of records by holder.

A holder required to file a report under section 1491 of this title shall retain records for 10 years after the later of the date the report was filed or the last date a timely report was due to be filed, unless a shorter period is provided by rule of the Administrator. The holder may satisfy the requirement to retain records under this section through an agent. The records must contain:

  1. the information required to be included in the report;
  2. the date, place, and nature of the circumstances that gave rise to the property right;
  3. the amount or value of the property;
  4. the last address of the apparent owner, if known to the holder; and
  5. if the holder sells, issues, or provides to others for sale or issue in this State traveler's checks, money orders, or similar instruments, other than third-party bank checks, on which the holder is directly liable, a record of the instruments while they remain outstanding indicating the state and date of issue.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1495. Property reportable and payable or deliverable absent owner demand.

Property is reportable and payable or deliverable under this chapter even if the owner fails to make demand or present an instrument or document otherwise required to obtain payment.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1496. Electric utility cooperatives.

  1. Electric utility cooperatives organized under or otherwise subject to 30 V.S.A. chapter 81 shall report capital credits that have been retired and declared payable by the cooperative's board of directors, but that have not been claimed by the owner in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Electric utility cooperatives shall not pay or deliver the unclaimed capital credits to the Administrator. As used in this section, "capital credits" means those credits to a capital account of a member of an electric utility cooperative that the cooperative is obliged to pay after operating costs and expenses have been paid.
  2. The Administrator shall provide notice of unclaimed capital credit properties reported by electric utilities in accordance with the provisions of section 1503 of this title. In the event of a claim for a capital credit property, the Administrator shall refer the claimant to the appropriate electric utility cooperative who shall evaluate the claim and upon provision of satisfactory proof of ownership shall pay the claimant.
  3. The electric utility cooperative shall notify the Administrator of the resolution of all claims for unclaimed property.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 5. Notice to Apparent Owner of Property Presumed Abandoned

§ 1501. Notice to apparent owner by holder.

  1. Subject to subsection (b) of this section, the holder of property presumed abandoned shall send to the apparent owner notice by first-class U.S. mail that complies with section 1502 of this title in a format acceptable to the Administrator not more than 180 days nor less than 60 days before filing the report under section 1491 of this title if:
    1. the holder has in its records an address for the apparent owner that the holder's records do not disclose to be invalid and is sufficient to direct the delivery of first-class U.S. mail to the apparent owner; and
    2. the value of the property is $50.00 or more.
  2. If an apparent owner has consented to receive electronic-mail delivery from the holder, the holder shall send the notice described in subsection (a) of this section both by first-class U.S. mail to the apparent owner's last-known mailing address and by electronic mail, unless the holder believes that the apparent owner's electronic-mail address is invalid.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1502. Contents of notice by holder.

  1. Notice under section 1501 of this title must contain a heading that reads substantially as follows: "Notice. The State of Vermont requires us to notify you that your property may be transferred to the custody of the State Treasurer if you do not contact us before (insert date that is 30 days after the date of this notice).".
  2. The notice under section 1501 of this title must:
    1. identify the nature and, except for property that does not have a fixed value, the value of the property that is the subject of the notice;
    2. state that the property will be turned over to the Administrator;
    3. state that after the property is turned over to the Administrator an apparent owner that seeks return of the property must file a claim with the Administrator;
    4. state that property that is not legal tender of the United States may be sold by the Administrator; and
    5. provide instructions that the apparent owner must follow to prevent the holder from reporting and paying or delivering the property to the Administrator.

      Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1503. Notice by Administrator.

  1. The Administrator shall give notice to an apparent owner that property presumed abandoned and appears to be owned by the apparent owner is held by the Administrator under this chapter.
  2. In providing notice under subsection (a) of this section, the Administrator shall:
    1. except as otherwise provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, send written notice by first-class U.S. mail to each apparent owner of property valued at $50.00 or more held by the Administrator, unless the Administrator determines that a mailing by first-class U.S. mail would not be received by the apparent owner, and, in the case of a security held in an account for which the apparent owner had consented to receiving electronic mail from the holder, send notice by electronic mail if the electronic-mail address of the apparent owner is known to the Administrator instead of by first-class U.S. mail; or
    2. send the notice to the apparent owner's electronic-mail address if the Administrator does not have a valid U.S. mail address for an apparent owner, but has an electronic-mail address that the Administrator does not know to be invalid.
  3. In addition to the notice under subsection (b) of this section, the Administrator may use any of the following to provide additional notice to the apparent owners:
    1. publication in a newspaper of general circulation:
      1. in the area of the State in which the last known address of a person to be named in the notice is located;
      2. in the area in which the holder has its principal place of business in the State; or
      3. in the area the Administrator deems to provide the best opportunity to reach the apparent owner;
    2. individual contact by regular or electronic mail, or by telephone, if the treasurer has current contact information on file;
    3. any other manner and method that the treasurer considers effective for providing notice and publication.
  4. In addition to the notice under subsection (b) of this section, the Administrator shall maintain a website or database accessible by the public and electronically searchable that contains the names reported to the Administrator of all apparent owners for whom property is being held by the Administrator. The website or database maintained under this subsection must include instructions for filing with the Administrator a claim to property and a printable claim form with instructions for its use.
  5. In addition to giving notice under subsection (b) of this section, publishing the information under subdivision (c)(1) of this section and maintaining the website or database under subdivision (d)(2) of this section, the Administrator may use other printed publication, telecommunication, the Internet, or other media to inform the public of the existence of unclaimed property held by the Administrator.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1504. Cooperation among State officers and agencies to locate apparent owner.

Unless prohibited by law of this State other than this chapter, on request of the Administrator, each officer, agency, board, commission, division, and department of this State, any body politic and corporate created by this State for a public purpose, and each political subdivision of this State shall make its books and records available to the Administrator and cooperate with the Administrator to determine the current address of an apparent owner of property held by the Administrator under this chapter.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 6. Taking Custody of Property by Administrator

§ 1511. Definition of good faith.

In this subchapter, payment or delivery of property is made in good faith if a holder:

  1. had a reasonable basis for believing, based on the facts then known, that the property was required or permitted to be paid or delivered to the Administrator under this chapter; or
  2. made payment or delivery:
    1. in response to a demand by the Administrator or Administrator's agent; or
    2. under a guidance or ruling issued by the Administrator that the holder reasonably believed required or permitted the property to be paid or delivered.

      Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1512. Dormancy charge.

  1. A holder may deduct a dormancy charge from property required to be paid or delivered to the Administrator if:
    1. a valid contract between the holder and the apparent owner authorizes imposition of the charge for the apparent owner's failure to claim the property within a specified time; and
    2. the holder regularly imposes the charge and regularly does not reverse or otherwise cancel the charge.
  2. The amount of the deduction under subsection (a) is limited to an amount that is not unconscionable considering all relevant factors, including the marginal transactional costs incurred by the holder in maintaining the apparent owner's property and any services received by the apparent owner.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1513. Payment or delivery of property to Administrator.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, on filing a report under section 1491 of this title, the holder shall pay or deliver to the Administrator the property described in the report.
  2. If property in a report under section 1491 of this title is an automatically renewable deposit and a penalty or forfeiture in the payment of interest would result from paying the deposit to the Administrator at the time of the report, the date for payment of the property to the Administrator is extended until a penalty or forfeiture no longer would result from payment, if the holder informs the Administrator of the extended date.
  3. Tangible property in a safe-deposit box may not be delivered to the Administrator until 120 days after filing the report under section 1491 of this title.
  4. If property reported to the Administrator under section 1491 of this title is a security, the Administrator may:
    1. make an endorsement, instruction, or entitlement order on behalf of the apparent owner to invoke the duty of the issuer, its transfer agent, or the securities intermediary to transfer the security; or
    2. dispose of the security under section 1532 of this title.
  5. If the holder of property reported to the Administrator under section 1491 of this title is the issuer of a certificated security, the Administrator may obtain a replacement certificate in physical or book-entry form under 9A V.S.A. § 8-405. An indemnity bond is not required.
  6. The Administrator shall establish procedures for the registration, issuance, method of delivery, transfer, and maintenance of securities delivered to the Administrator by a holder.
  7. An issuer, holder, and transfer agent or other person acting under this section under instructions of and on behalf of the issuer or holder is not liable to the apparent owner for, and must be indemnified by the State against, a claim arising with respect to property after the property has been delivered to the Administrator.
  8. A holder is not required to deliver to the Administrator a security identified by the holder as a non-freely transferable security. If the Administrator or holder determines that a security is no longer a non-freely transferable security, the holder shall deliver the security on the next regular date prescribed for delivery of securities under this chapter. The holder shall make a determination annually whether a security identified in a report filed under section 1491 of this title as a non-freely transferable security is no longer a non-freely transferable security.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1514. Effect of payment or delivery of property to Administrator.

On payment or delivery of property to the Administrator under this chapter, the Administrator as agent for the State assumes custody and responsibility for safekeeping the property. A holder that pays or delivers property to the Administrator in good faith and substantially complies with sections 1501 and 1502 of this title is relieved of liability arising thereafter with respect to payment or delivery of the property to the Administrator.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1515. Recovery of property by holder from Administrator.

  1. A holder that under this chapter pays money to the Administrator may file a claim for reimbursement from the Administrator of the amount paid if the holder:
    1. paid the money in error; or
    2. after paying the money to the Administrator, paid money to a person the holder reasonably believed entitled to the money.
  2. If a claim for reimbursement under subsection (a) of this section is made for a payment made on a negotiable instrument, including a traveler's check, money order, or similar instrument, the holder must submit proof that the instrument was presented and payment was made to a person the holder reasonably believed entitled to payment. The holder may claim reimbursement even if the payment was made to a person whose claim was made after expiration of a period of limitation on the owner's right to receive or recover property, whether specified by contract, statute, or court order.
  3. If a holder is reimbursed by the Administrator under subdivision (a)(2) of this section, the holder may also recover from the Administrator income or gain under section 607 that would have been paid to the owner if the money had been claimed from the Administrator by the owner to the extent the income or gain was paid by the holder to the owner.
  4. A holder that under this chapter delivers property other than money to the Administrator may file a claim for return of the property from the Administrator if:
    1. the holder delivered the property in error; or
    2. the apparent owner has claimed the property from the holder.
  5. If a claim for return of property under subsection (d) of this section is made, the holder shall include with the claim evidence sufficient to establish that the apparent owner has claimed the property from the holder or that the property was delivered by the holder to the Administrator in error.
  6. The Administrator may determine that an affidavit submitted by a holder is evidence sufficient to establish that the holder is entitled to reimbursement or to recover property under this section.
  7. A holder is not required to pay a fee or other charge for reimbursement or return of property under this section.
  8. Not later than 90 days after a claim is filed under subsection (a) or (d) of this section, the Administrator shall allow or deny the claim and give the claimant notice of the decision in a record. If the Administrator does not take action on a claim during the 90-day period, the claim is deemed denied.
  9. The claimant may initiate a proceeding under 3 V.S.A. chapter 25 for review of the Administrator's decision or the deemed denial under subsection (h) of this section not later than:
    1. 30 days following receipt of the notice of the Administrator's decision; or
    2. 120 days following the filing of a claim under subsection (a) or (d) of this section in the case of a deemed denial under subsection (h) of this section.
  10. A final decision in an administrative proceeding initiated under subsection (i) of this section may be appealed to the Civil Division of the Washington County Superior Court, which shall hear the appeal de novo.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1516. Property removed from safe-deposit box.

Property removed from a safe-deposit box and delivered under this chapter to the Administrator under this chapter is subject to the holder's right to reimbursement for the cost of opening the box and a lien or contract providing reimbursement to the holder for unpaid rent charges for the box. The Administrator shall reimburse the holder from the proceeds remaining after deducting the expense incurred by the Administrator in selling the property.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1517. Crediting income or gain to owner's account.

If property other than money is delivered to the Administrator, the owner is entitled to receive from the Administrator income or gain realized or accrued on the property before the property is sold.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1518. Administrator's options as to custody.

  1. The Administrator may decline to take custody of property reported under section 1491 of this title if the Administrator determines that:
    1. the property has a value less than the estimated expenses of notice and sale of the property; or
    2. taking custody of the property would be unlawful.
  2. A holder may pay or deliver property to the Administrator before the property is presumed abandoned under this chapter if the holder:
    1. sends the apparent owner of the property notice required by section 1501 of this title and provides the Administrator evidence that the holder sent such notice;
    2. includes with the payment or delivery a report regarding the property conforming to section 1492 of this title; and
    3. first obtains the Administrator's consent in a record to accept payment or delivery.
  3. A holder's request for the Administrator's consent under subdivision (b)(3) of this section must be in a record. If the Administrator fails to respond to the request not later than 30 days after receipt of the request, the Administrator is deemed to consent to the payment or delivery of the property and the payment or delivery is considered to have been made in good faith.
  4. On payment or delivery of property under subsection (b), the property is presumed abandoned.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1519. Disposition of property having no substantial value; immunity from liability.

  1. If the Administrator takes custody of property delivered under this chapter and later determines that the property has no substantial commercial value or that the cost of disposing of the property will exceed the value of the property, the Administrator may return the property to the holder or destroy or otherwise dispose of the property.
  2. An action or proceeding may not be commenced against the State, an agency of the State, the Administrator, another officer, employee, or agent of the State, or a holder for or because of an act of the Administrator under this section, except for intentional misconduct or malfeasance.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1520. Periods of limitation and repose.

  1. Expiration, before, on, or after the effective date of this chapter, of a period of limitation on an owner's right to receive or recover property, whether specified by contract, statute, or court order, does not prevent the property from being presumed abandoned or affect the duty of a holder under this chapter to file a report or pay or deliver property to the Administrator.
  2. The Administrator may not commence an action or proceeding to enforce this chapter with respect to the reporting, payment, or delivery of property more than five years after the holder filed a non-fraudulent report under section 1491 of this title with the Administrator. The parties may agree in a record to extend the limitation in this subsection.
  3. The Administrator may not commence an action, proceeding, or examination with respect to a duty of a holder under this chapter more than 10 years after the duty arose.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 7. Sale of Property by Administrator

§ 1531. Public sale of property.

  1. Subject to section 1532 of this title, not earlier than three years after receipt of property presumed abandoned, the Administrator may sell the property.
  2. Before selling property under subsection (a), the Administrator shall give notice to the public of:
    1. the date of the sale; and
    2. a reasonable description of the property.
  3. A sale under subsection (a) of this section must be to the highest bidder:
    1. at public sale at a location in this State that the Administrator determines to be the most favorable market for the property;
    2. on the Internet; or
    3. on another forum the Administrator determines is likely to yield the highest net proceeds of sale.
  4. The Administrator may decline the highest bid at a sale under this section and reoffer the property for sale if the Administrator determines the highest bid is insufficient.
  5. If a sale held under this section is to be conducted other than on the Internet, the Administrator must publish at least one notice of the sale, at least three weeks but not more than five weeks before the sale, in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the property is sold.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1532. Disposal of securities.

  1. The Administrator may not sell or otherwise liquidate a security until three years after the Administrator receives the security and gives the apparent owner notice under section 1503 of this title that the Administrator holds the security.
  2. The Administrator may not sell a security listed on an established stock exchange for less than the price prevailing on the exchange at the time of sale. The Administrator may sell a security not listed on an established exchange by any commercially reasonable method.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1533. Recovery of securities or value by owner.

  1. If the Administrator sells a security before the expiration of six years after delivery of the security to the Administrator, an apparent owner that files a valid claim under this chapter of ownership of the security before the six-year period expires is entitled, at the option of the Administrator, to receive:
    1. replacement of the security; or
    2. the market value of the security at the time the claim is filed, plus dividends, interest, and other increments on the security up to the time the claim is paid.
  2. Replacement of the security or calculation of market value under subsection (a) must take into account a stock split, reverse stock split, stock dividend, or similar corporate action.
  3. A person that makes a valid claim under this chapter of ownership of a security after expiration of six years after delivery of the security to the Administrator is entitled to receive:
    1. the security the holder delivered to the Administrator, if it is in the custody of the Administrator, plus dividends, interest, and other increments on the security up to the time the Administrator delivers the security to the person; or
    2. the net proceeds of the sale of the security, plus dividends, interest, and other increments on the security up to the time the security was sold.

      Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1534. Purchaser owns property after sale.

A purchaser of property at a sale conducted by the Administrator under this chapter takes the property free of all claims of the owner, a previous holder, or a person claiming through the owner or holder. The Administrator shall execute documents necessary to complete the transfer of ownership to the purchaser.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1535. Military medal or decoration.

  1. The Administrator may not sell a medal or decoration awarded for military service in the U.S. Armed Forces.
  2. The Administrator, with the consent of the respective organization under subdivision (1) of this subsection, agency under subdivision (2) of this subsection, or entity under subdivision (3) of this subsection, may deliver a medal or decoration described in subsection (a) to be held in custody for the owner to:
    1. a military veterans organization qualified under the Internal Revenue Code, as may be amended, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (19);
    2. the agency that awarded the medal or decoration; or
    3. a governmental entity.
  3. On delivery under subsection (b) of this section, the Administrator is not responsible for safekeeping the medal or decoration.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 8. Administration of Property

§ 1541. Deposit of funds by Administrator.

  1. All funds received under this chapter, including the proceeds from the sale of unclaimed property under subchapter 7 of this chapter, shall forthwith be received by the Administrator, except that the Administrator shall retain in a separate fund an amount not exceeding $100,000.00 or 55 percent of the funds received during the previous year, whichever is greater, from which he or she shall make prompt payment of claims duly allowed by him or her as provided in this section.
  2. The Administrator shall maintain an account with an amount of funds the Administrator reasonably estimates is sufficient to pay claims allowed under this chapter. If the aggregate amount of claims by owners allowed at any time exceeds the amount held in the account, an excess claim must be paid by the Administrator.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1542. Administrator to retain records of property.

The Administrator shall:

  1. record and retain the name and last-known address of each person shown on a report filed under section 1491 of this title to be the apparent owner of property delivered to the Administrator;
  2. record and retain the name and last-known address of each insured or annuitant and beneficiary shown on the report;
  3. for each policy of insurance or annuity contract listed in the report of an insurance company, record and retain the policy or account number, the name of the company, and the amount due or paid; and
  4. for each apparent owner listed in the report, record and retain the name of the holder that filed the report and the amount due or paid.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1543. Expenses and service charges of Administrator.

Before making a deposit of funds received under this chapter to the General Fund, the Administrator may deduct:

  1. expenses of disposition of property delivered to the Administrator under this chapter;
  2. costs of mailing and publication in connection with property delivered to the Administrator under this chapter;
  3. reasonable service charges;
  4. expenses incurred in examining records of or collecting property from a putative holder or holder; and
  5. property valued at $100.00 or less more than 10 years after the abandoned property was received from the holder under subchapter 6 of this chapter shall be paid by the Administrator into the Vermont Higher Education Endowment Trust Fund created by 16 V.S.A. § 2885 under authority of this subdivision. For purposes of this subdivision, the value of the abandoned property shall be that value as of the date the property was received from the holder by the Administrator.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1544. Administrator holds property as custodian for owner.

Property received by the Administrator under this chapter is held in custody for the benefit of the owner and is not owned by the State.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 9. Claim to Recover Property from Administrator

§ 1551. Claim of another state to recover property.

  1. If the Administrator knows that property held by the Administrator under this chapter is subject to a superior claim of another state, the Administrator shall:
    1. report and pay or deliver the property to the other state; or
    2. return the property to the holder so that the holder may pay or deliver the property to the other state.
  2. The Administrator is not required to enter into an agreement to transfer property to the other state under subsection (a) of this section.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1552. When property subject to recovery by another state.

  1. Property held under this chapter by the Administrator is subject to the right of another state to take custody of the property if:
    1. the property was paid or delivered to the Administrator because the records of the holder did not reflect a last-known address in the other state of the apparent owner and:
      1. the other state establishes that the last-known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property was in the other state; or
      2. under the law of the other state, the property has become subject to a claim by the other state of abandonment;
    2. the records of the holder did not accurately identify the owner of the property, the last-known address of the owner was in another state, and, under the law of the other state, the property has become subject to a claim by the other state of abandonment;
    3. the property was subject to the custody of the Administrator of this State under section 1485 of this title and, under the law of the state of domicile of the holder, the property has become subject to a claim by the state of domicile of the holder of abandonment; or
    4. the property:
      1. is a sum payable on a traveler's check, money order, or similar instrument that was purchased in the other state and delivered to the Administrator under section 1486 of this title; and
      2. under the law of the other state, has become subject to a claim by the other state of abandonment.
  2. A claim by another state to recover property under this section must be presented in a form prescribed by the Administrator, unless the Administrator waives presentation of the form.
  3. The Administrator shall decide a claim under this section not later than 90 days after it is presented. If the Administrator determines that the other state is entitled under subsection (a) to custody of the property, the Administrator shall allow the claim and pay or deliver the property to the other state.
  4. The Administrator may require another state, before recovering property under this section, to agree to indemnify this State and its agents, officers, and employees against any liability on a claim to the property.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1553. Claim for property by person claiming to be owner.

  1. A person claiming to be the owner of property held under this chapter by the Administrator may file a claim for the property on a form prescribed by the Administrator. The claimant must verify the claim as to its completeness and accuracy.
  2. The Administrator may waive the requirement in subsection (a) of this section and may pay or deliver property directly to a person if:
    1. the person receiving the property or payment is shown to be the apparent owner included on a report filed under section 1491 of this title;
    2. the Administrator reasonably believes the person is entitled to receive the property or payment; and
    3. the property has a value of less than $250.00.

      Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1554. When Administrator must honor claim for property.

  1. The Administrator shall pay or deliver property to a claimant under subsection 1553(a) of this title if the Administrator receives evidence sufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Administrator that the claimant is the owner of the property.
  2. Not later than 90 days after a claim is filed under subsection 903(a), the Administrator shall allow or deny the claim and give the claimant notice in a record of the decision.
  3. If the claim is denied under subsection (b) of this section:
    1. the Administrator shall inform the claimant of the reason for the denial and specify what additional evidence, if any, is required for the claim to be allowed;
    2. the claimant may file an amended claim with the Administrator or commence an action under section 1556 of this title; and
    3. the Administrator shall consider an amended claim filed under subdivision (2) of this subsection as an initial claim.
  4. If the Administrator does not take action on a claim during the 90-day period following the filing of a claim under subsection 1553(a) of this title, the claim is deemed denied.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1555. Allowance of claim for property.

  1. Not later than 30 days after a claim is allowed under subsection 1554(b) of this title, the Administrator shall pay or deliver to the owner the property or pay to the owner the net proceeds of a sale of the property, together with income or gain to which the owner is entitled under section 1517 of this title. On request of the owner, the Administrator may sell or liquidate a security and pay the net proceeds to the owner, even if the security had been held by the Administrator for less than three years or the Administrator has not complied with the notice requirements under section 1532 of this title.
  2. Property held under this chapter by the Administrator is subject to a claim for the payment of an enforceable debt the owner owes in this State for:
    1. child-support arrearages, including child-support collection costs and child-support arrearages that are combined with maintenance;
    2. a civil or criminal fine or penalty, court costs, a surcharge, or restitution imposed by a final order of an administrative agency or a final court judgment; or
    3. state taxes, penalties, and interest that have been determined to be delinquent or as to which notice has been recorded with the appropriate authority.
  3. Before delivery or payment to an owner under subsection (a) of this section of property or payment to the owner of net proceeds of a sale of the property, the Administrator first shall apply the property or net proceeds to a debt under subsection (b) of this section the Administrator determines is owed by the owner. The Administrator shall pay the amount to the appropriate State agency and the State agency notify the owner of the payment.
  4. The Administrator may make periodic inquiries of State agencies in the absence of a claim filed under section 1553 of this title to determine whether an apparent owner included in the unclaimed property records of this State have enforceable debts described in subsection (b) of this section. The Administrator first shall apply the property or net proceeds of a sale of property held by the Administrator to a debt under subsection (b) of this section of an apparent owner that appears in the records of the Administrator and deliver the amount to the appropriate State agency. The Administrator shall notify the apparent owner of the payment.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1556. Action by person whose claim is denied.

Not later than one year after filing a claim under subsection 1553(a) of this title, the claimant may commence an action against the Administrator in the Civil Division of the Washington County Superior Court to establish a claim that has been denied or deemed denied under subsection 1553(d) of this title. On final determination of the action, the court may, on application, award to the prevailing party its reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1557. Deceased owners; multiple claimants.

  1. If the Administrator holds unclaimed property in the name of a deceased owner, the Administrator may deliver the property as follows:
    1. In the case of an open estate, to the Administrator or executor.
    2. In the case of a closed estate and the unclaimed property is valued at less than $5,000.00, in accordance with the Probate Division of the Superior Court decree of distribution.
    3. In the absence of an open estate or Probate Division of the Superior Court decree of distribution, and the unclaimed property is valued at less than $5,000.00 to the surviving spouse of the deceased owner, or, if there is no surviving spouse, then to the next of kin according to 14 V.S.A. § 314 .
    4. In all other cases where the Administrator holds property in the name of a deceased owner, a probate estate shall be opened by the claimant, or other interested party, in order to determine the appropriate distribution of the unclaimed property. Where an estate is opened solely to distribute unclaimed property under this section, the Probate Division of the Superior Court may waive any filing fees.
  2. If the Administrator holds unclaimed property valued at $250.00 or less that more than one person owns, the Administrator may deliver the property as follows:
    1. If the property has been listed on the Administrator's website for less than one year, a proportionate share to each of the persons who owns the property and who files a claim.
    2. If the property has been listed on the Administrator's website for a year or more, to the first person who files a claim and who owns at least a share of the property.

      Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 10. Verified Report of Property; Examination of Records

§ 1561. Verified report of property.

If a person does not file a report required by section 1491 of this title or the Administrator believes that a person may have filed an inaccurate, incomplete, or false report, the Administrator may require the person to file a verified report in a form prescribed by the Administrator. The verified report must:

  1. state whether the person is holding property reportable under this chapter;
  2. describe property not previously reported or about which the Administrator has inquired;
  3. specifically identify property described under subdivision (2) of this section about which there is a dispute whether it is reportable under this chapter; and
  4. state the amount or value of the property.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1562. Examination of records to determine compliance.

The Administrator, at reasonable times and on reasonable notice, may:

  1. examine the records of a person, including examination of appropriate records in the possession of an agent of the person under examination, if the records are reasonably necessary to determine whether the person has complied with this chapter;
  2. issue an administrative subpoena requiring the person or agent of the person to make records available for examination; and
  3. bring an action seeking judicial enforcement of the subpoena.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1563. Rules for conducting examination.

  1. The Administrator shall adopt rules governing procedures and standards for an examination under section 1562 of this title, including rules for use of an estimation, extrapolation, and statistical sampling in conducting an examination.
  2. An examination under section 1562 of this title must be performed under rules adopted under subsection (a) of this section and with generally accepted examination practices and standards applicable to an unclaimed-property examination.
  3. If a person subject to examination under section 1562 of this title has filed the reports required under sections 1491 and 1561 of this title and has retained the records required by section 1494 of this title, the following rules apply:
    1. The examination must include a review of the person's records.
    2. The examination may not be based on an estimate unless the person expressly consents in a record to the use of an estimate.
    3. The person conducting the examination shall consider the evidence presented in good faith by the person in preparing the findings of the examination under section 1567 of this title.

      Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1564. Records obtained in examination.

Records obtained and records, including work papers, compiled by the Administrator in the course of conducting an examination under section 1562 of this title:

  1. are subject to the confidentiality and security provisions of subchapter 14 of this chapter and are not public records;
  2. may be used by the Administrator in an action to collect property or otherwise enforce this chapter;
  3. may be used in a joint examination conducted with another state, the United States, a foreign country or subordinate unit of a foreign country, or any other governmental entity if the governmental entity conducting the examination is legally bound to maintain the confidentiality and security of information obtained from a person subject to examination in a manner substantially equivalent to subchapter 14 of this chapter;
  4. must be disclosed, on request, to the person that administers the unclaimed property law of another state for that state's use in circumstances equivalent to circumstances described in this subchapter, if the other state is required to maintain the confidentiality and security of information obtained in a manner substantially equivalent to subchapter 14 of this chapter;
  5. must be produced by the Administrator under an administrative or judicial subpoena or administrative or court order; and
  6. must be produced by the Administrator on request of the person subject to the examination in an administrative or judicial proceeding relating to the property.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1565. Evidence of unpaid debt or undischarged obligation.

  1. A record of a putative holder showing an unpaid debt or undischarged obligation is prima facie evidence of the debt or obligation.
  2. A putative holder may establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there is no unpaid debt or undischarged obligation for a debt or obligation described in subsection (a) of this section or that the debt or obligation was not, or no longer is, a fixed and certain obligation of the putative holder.
  3. A putative holder may overcome prima facie evidence under subsection (a) of this section by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a check, draft, or similar instrument was:
    1. issued as an unaccepted offer in settlement of an unliquidated amount;
    2. issued but later was replaced with another instrument because the earlier instrument was lost or contained an error that was corrected;
    3. issued to a party affiliated with the issuer;
    4. paid, satisfied, or discharged;
    5. issued in error;
    6. issued without consideration;
    7. issued but there was a failure of consideration;
    8. voided not later than 90 days after issuance for a valid business reason set forth in a contemporaneous record; or
    9. issued but not delivered to the third-party payee for a sufficient reason recorded within a reasonable time after issuance.
  4. In asserting a defense under this section, a putative holder may present evidence of a course of dealing between the putative holder and the apparent owner or of custom and practice.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1566. Failure of person examined to retain records.

If a person subject to examination under section 1562 of this title does not retain the records required by section 1494 of this title, the Administrator may determine the value of property due using a reasonable method of estimation based on all information available to the Administrator, including extrapolation and use of statistical sampling when appropriate and necessary, consistent with examination procedures and standards adopted under subsection 1563(a) of this title and in accord with subsection 1563(b) of this title.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1567. Report to person whose records were examined.

  1. At the conclusion of an examination under section 1002 of this title, the Administrator shall provide to the person whose records were examined a complete and unredacted examination report that specifies:
    1. the work performed;
    2. the property types reviewed;
    3. the methodology of any estimation technique, extrapolation, or statistical sampling used in conducting the examination;
    4. each calculation showing the value of property determined to be due; and
    5. the findings of the person conducting the examination.
  2. If an examination of the records of a person results in the disclosure of property reportable under this chapter, the Administrator may assess the cost of the examination against the holder at the rate of $200.00 per day for each examiner, or a greater amount that is reasonable and was incurred, but the assessment may not exceed the value of the property found to be reportable.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1568. Complaint to Administrator about conduct of person conducting examination.

  1. If a person subject to examination under section 1562 of this title believes the person conducting the examination has made an unreasonable or unauthorized request or is not proceeding expeditiously to complete the examination, the person in a record may ask the Administrator to intervene and take appropriate remedial action, including countermanding the request of the person conducting the examination, imposing a time limit for completion of the examination, or reassigning the examination to another person.
  2. If a person in a record requests a conference with the Administrator to present matters that are the basis of a request under subsection (a) of this section, the Administrator shall hold the conference not later than 30 days after receiving the request. The Administrator may hold the conference in person, by telephone, or by electronic means.
  3. If a conference is held under subsection (b) of this section, not later than 30 days after the conference ends, the Administrator shall provide a report in a record of the conference to the person that requested the conference.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1569. Administrator's contract with another to conduct examination.

  1. As used in this section, "related to the Administrator" refers to an individual who is:
    1. the Administrator's spouse, partner in a civil union, domestic partner, or reciprocal beneficiary;
    2. the Administrator's child, stepchild, grandchild, parent, stepparent, sibling, stepsibling, halfsibling, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew;
    3. a spouse, partner in a civil union, domestic partner, or reciprocal beneficiary of an individual under subdivision (2) of this subsection; or
    4. any individual residing in the Administrator's household.
  2. The Administrator may contract with a person to conduct an examination under this subchapter. The contract may be awarded only under contracting policies and standards approved by the Vermont Secretary of Administration.
  3. If the person with which the Administrator contracts under subsection (b) of this section is:
    1. an individual, the individual may not be related to the Administrator; or
    2. a business entity, the entity may not be owned in whole or in part by the Administrator or an individual related to the Administrator.
  4. At least 60 days before assigning a person under contract with the Administrator under subsection (b) of this section to conduct an examination, the Administrator shall demand in a record that the person to be examined submit a report and deliver property that is previously unreported.
  5. If the Administrator contracts with a person under subsection (b) of this section:
    1. the contract may provide for compensation of the person based on a fixed fee, hourly fee, or contingent fee;
    2. a contingent fee arrangement may not provide for a payment that exceeds 10 percent of the amount or value of property paid or delivered as a result of the examination; and
    3. on request by a person subject to examination by a contractor, the Administrator shall deliver to the person a complete and unredacted copy of the contract and any contract between the contractor and a person employed or engaged by the contractor to conduct the examination.

      Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1570. Limit on future employment.

The Administrator or an individual employed by the Administrator who participates in, recommends, or approves the award of a contract under subsection 1569(b) of this title on or after the effective date of this chapter may not be employed by, contracted with, or compensated in any capacity by the contractor or an affiliate of the contractor for one year after the latest of participation in, recommendation of, or approval of the award or conclusion of the contract.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1571. Report by Administrator to General Assembly.

Not later than January 15 of each year, the Administrator shall compile and submit a report to the General Assembly. The report must contain the following information about property presumed abandoned for the preceding fiscal year for the State:

  1. the total amount and value of all property paid or delivered under this chapter to the Administrator, separated into:
    1. the part voluntarily paid or delivered; and
    2. the part paid or delivered as a result of an examination under section 1002 of this title, separated into the part recovered as a result of an examination conducted by:
      1. a State employee; and
      2. a contractor under section 1569 of this title;
  2. the name of and amount paid to each contractor under section 1569 of this title and the percentage the total compensation paid to all contractors under section 1569 of this title bears to the total amount paid or delivered to the Administrator as a result of all examinations performed under section 1569 of this title;
  3. the total amount and value of all property paid or delivered by the Administrator to persons that made claims for property held by the Administrator under this chapter and the percentage the total payments made and value of property delivered to claimants bears to the total amounts paid and value delivered to the Administrator; and
  4. the total amount of claims made by persons claiming to be owners that:
    1. were denied;
    2. were allowed; and
    3. are pending.

      Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1572. Determination of liability for unreported reportable property.

If the Administrator determines from an examination conducted under section 1562 of this title that a putative holder failed or refused to pay or deliver to the Administrator property that is reportable under this chapter, the Administrator shall issue a determination of the putative holder's liability to pay or deliver and give notice in a record to the putative holder of the determination.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 11. Determination of Liability; Putative Holder Remedies

§ 1581. Informal conference.

  1. Not later than 30 days after receipt of a notice under section 1572 of this title, the putative holder may request an informal conference with the Administrator to review the determination. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the Administrator may designate an employee to act on behalf of the Administrator.
  2. If a putative holder makes a timely request under subsection (a) for an informal conference:
    1. not later than 20 days after the date of the request, the Administrator shall set the time and place of the conference;
    2. the Administrator shall give the putative holder notice in a record of the time and place of the conference;
    3. the conference may be held in person, by telephone, or by electronic means, as determined by the Administrator;
    4. the request tolls the 90-day period under sections 1583 and 1584 of this title until notice of a decision under subdivision (7) of this subsection has been given to the putative holder or the putative holder withdraws the request for the conference;
    5. the conference may be postponed, adjourned, and reconvened as the Administrator determines appropriate;
    6. the Administrator or Administrator's designee with the approval of the Administrator may modify a determination made under section 1012 of this title or withdraw it; and
    7. the Administrator shall issue a decision in a record and provide a copy of the record to the putative holder and examiner not later than 20 days after the conference ends.
  3. A conference under subsection (b) of this section is not an administrative remedy and is not a contested case subject to 3 V.S.A. § 809 . An oath is not required and rules of evidence do not apply in the conference.
  4. At a conference under subsection (b) of this section, the putative holder must be given an opportunity to confer informally with the Administrator and the person that examined the records of the putative holder to:
    1. discuss the determination made under section 1572 of this title; and
    2. present any issue concerning the validity of the determination.
  5. If the Administrator fails to act within the period prescribed in subdivision (b)(1) or (7) of this section, the failure does not affect a right of the Administrator, except that interest does not accrue on the amount for which the putative holder was determined to be liable under section 1572 of this title during the period in which the Administrator failed to act until the earlier of:
    1. the date under section 1583 of this title the putative holder initiates administrative review or files an action under section 1584 of this title; or
    2. 90 days after the putative holder received notice of the Administrator's determination under section 1572 of this title if no review was initiated under section 1583 of this title and no action was filed under section 1584 of this title.
  6. The Administrator may hold an informal conference with a putative holder about a determination under section 1572 of this title without a request at any time before the putative holder initiates administrative review under section 1583 of this title or files an action under section 1584 of this title.
  7. Interest and penalties under section 1594 of this title continue to accrue on property not reported, paid, or delivered as required by this chapter after the initiation, and during the pendency, of an informal conference under this section.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1582. Review of Administrator's determination.

A putative holder may seek relief from a determination under section 1572 of this title by:

  1. administrative review under section 1583 of this title; or
  2. judicial review under section 1583 of this title.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1583. Administrative review.

  1. Not later than 90 days after receiving notice of the Administrator's determination under section 1572 of this title, a putative holder may initiate a proceeding under 3 V.S.A. chapter 25, subchapter 2 for review of the Administrator's determination.
  2. A final decision in an administrative proceeding initiated under subsection (a) of this section may be appealed to the Civil Division of the Washington County Superior Court, which shall hear the appeal de novo.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1584. Judicial remedy.

  1. Not later than 90 days after receiving notice of the Administrator's determination under section 1572 of this title, the putative holder may:
    1. file an action against the Administrator in the Civil Division of the Washington County Superior Court challenging the Administrator's determination of liability and seeking a declaration that the determination is unenforceable, in whole or in part; or
    2. pay the amount or deliver the property determined by the Administrator to be paid or delivered to the Administrator and, not later than six months after payment or delivery, file an action against the Administrator in the Civil Division of the Washington County Superior Court for a refund of all or part of the amount paid or return of all or part of the property delivered.
  2. If a putative holder pays or delivers property the Administrator determined must be paid or delivered to the Administrator at any time after the putative holder files an action under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the court shall continue the action as if it had been filed originally as an action for a refund or return of property under subdivision (a)(2) of this section.
  3. On the final determination of an action filed under subsection (a) of this section, the court may, on application, award to the prevailing party its reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.
  4. A putative holder that is the prevailing party in an action under subdivision (a)(2) of this section for refund of money paid to the Administrator is entitled to interest on the amount refunded, at the same rate a holder is required to pay to the Administrator under subsection 1594(a) of this title, from the date paid to the Administrator until the date of the refund.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 12. Enforcement by Administrator

§ 1591. Judicial action to enforce liability.

  1. If a determination under section 1572 of this title becomes final and is not subject to administrative or judicial review, the Administrator may bring an action in the Civil Division of the Washington County Superior Court or in an appropriate court of another state to enforce the determination and secure payment or delivery of past due, unpaid, or undelivered property.
  2. In an action under subsection (a) of this section, if no court in this State has jurisdiction over the defendant, the Administrator may commence an action in any court having jurisdiction over the defendant.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1592. Interstate and international agreement; cooperation.

  1. Subject to subsection (b) of this section, the Administrator may:
    1. exchange information with another state or foreign country relating to property presumed abandoned or relating to the possible existence of property presumed abandoned; and
    2. authorize in a record another state or foreign country or a person acting on behalf of the other state or country to examine its records of a putative holder as provided in subchapter 10 of this chapter.
  2. An exchange or examination under subsection (a) of this section may be done only if the state or foreign country has confidentiality and security requirements substantially equivalent to those in subchapter 14 of this chapter, or agrees in a record to be bound by this State's confidentiality and security requirements.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1593. Action involving another state or foreign country.

  1. The Administrator may join another state or foreign country to examine and seek enforcement of this chapter against a putative holder.
  2. On request of another state or foreign country, the Vermont Attorney General may commence an action on behalf of the other state or country to enforce, in this State, the law of the other state or country against a putative holder subject to a claim by the other state or country, if the other state or country agrees to pay costs incurred by the Attorney General in the action.
  3. The Administrator may request the official authorized to enforce the unclaimed property law of another state or foreign country to commence an action to recover property in the other state or country on behalf of the Administrator. This State shall pay the costs, including reasonable attorney's fees and expenses, incurred by the other state or foreign country in an action under this subsection.
  4. The Administrator may pursue an action on behalf of this State to recover property subject to this chapter but delivered to the custody of another state if the Administrator believes the property is subject to the custody of the Administrator.
  5. The Administrator may retain an attorney in this State, another state, or a foreign country to commence an action to recover property on behalf of the Administrator and may agree to pay attorney's fees based in whole or in part on a fixed fee, hourly fee, or a percentage of the amount or value of property recovered in the action.
  6. Expenses incurred by this State in an action under this section may be paid from property received under this chapter or the net proceeds of the property. Expenses paid to recover property may not be deducted from the amount that is subject to a claim under this chapter by the owner.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1594. Interest and penalty for failure to act in timely manner.

  1. A holder that fails to report, pay, or deliver property within the time prescribed by this chapter shall pay to the Administrator interest at the higher of the annual rate established by the Vermont Tax Department for unpaid tax liabilities pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 3108 or the prime rate as reported in the Money Rates section of the Wall Street Journal on the day the invoice for interest is issued by the Administrator on the property or value of the property from the date the property should have been reported, paid, or delivered to the Administrator until the date reported, paid, or delivered.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in section 1595 or 1596 of this title, the Administrator may require a holder that fails to report, pay, or deliver property within the time prescribed by this chapter to pay to the Administrator, in addition to interest included under subsection (a) of this section, a civil penalty of $200.00 for each day the duty is not performed, up to a cumulative maximum amount of $5,000.00.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1595. Other civil penalties.

  1. If a holder enters into a contract or other arrangement for the purpose of evading an obligation under this chapter or otherwise willfully fails to perform a duty imposed on the holder under this chapter, the Administrator may require the holder to pay the Administrator, in addition to interest as provided in subsection 1594(a), a civil penalty of $1,000.00 for each day the obligation is evaded or the duty is not performed, up to a cumulative maximum amount of $25,000.00, plus 25 percent of the amount or value of property that should have been but was not reported, paid, or delivered as a result of the evasion or failure to perform.
  2. If a holder makes a fraudulent report under this chapter, the Administrator may require the holder to pay to the Administrator, in addition to interest under subsection 1594(a) of this title, a civil penalty of $1,000.00 for each day from the date the report was made until corrected, up to a cumulative maximum of $25,000.00, plus 25 percent of the amount or value of any property that should have been reported but was not included in the report or was underreported.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1596. Waiver of interest and penalty.

The Administrator:

  1. may waive, in whole or in part, interest under subsection 1594(a) of this title and penalties under subsection 1594(b) or section 1595 of this title; and
  2. shall waive a penalty under subsection 1594(b) of this title if the Administrator determines that the holder acted in good faith and without negligence.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 13. Agreement to Locate Property of Apparent Owner Held by Administrator

§ 1601. When agreement to locate property enforceable.

An agreement by an apparent owner and another person, the primary purpose of which is to locate, deliver, recover, or assist in the location, delivery, or recovery of property held by the Administrator, is enforceable only if the agreement:

  1. is in a record that clearly states the nature of the property and the services to be provided;
  2. is signed by or on behalf of the apparent owner; and
  3. states the amount or value of the property reasonably expected to be recovered, computed before and after a fee or other compensation to be paid to the person has been deducted.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1602. When agreement to locate property void.

  1. Subject to subsection (b) of this section, an agreement under section 1601 of this title is void if it is entered into during the period beginning on the date the property was paid or delivered by a holder to the Administrator and ending 24 months after the payment or delivery.
  2. If a provision in an agreement described in subsection (a) of this section applies to mineral proceeds for which compensation is to be paid to the other person based in whole or in part on a part of the underlying minerals or mineral proceeds not then presumed abandoned, the provision is void regardless of when the agreement was entered into.
  3. An agreement under subsection (a) of this section that provides for compensation in an amount that is unconscionable is unenforceable except by the apparent owner. An apparent owner that believes the compensation the apparent owner has agreed to pay is unconscionable or the Administrator, acting on behalf of an apparent owner, or both, may bring an action in the appropriate court to reduce the compensation to the maximum amount that is not unconscionable. On the final determination of an action filed under this subsection, the court may, on application, award the prevailing party its reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.
  4. An apparent owner or the Administrator may assert that an agreement described in this section is void on a ground other than it provides for payment of unconscionable compensation.
  5. This section does not apply to an apparent owner's agreement with an attorney to pursue a claim for recovery of specifically identified property held by the Administrator or to contest the Administrator's denial of a claim for recovery of the property.
  6. An agreement between an owner and an asset locator, the primary purpose of which is to locate, deliver, recover, or assist in the recovery of property that is presumed abandoned and that provides for compensation that exceeds 10 percent of the value of the unclaimed property, shall be unenforceable.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1603. Right of agent of apparent owner to recover property held by Administrator.

  1. An apparent owner that contracts with another person to locate, deliver, recover, or assist in the location, delivery, or recovery of property of the apparent owner that is held by the Administrator may designate the person as the agent of the apparent owner. The designation must be in a record signed by the apparent owner.
  2. The Administrator shall give the agent of the apparent owner all information concerning the property that the apparent owner is entitled to receive, including information that otherwise is confidential information under section 1612 of this title.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1604. Asset locators.

  1. All asset locators seeking to interact with the Administrator on behalf of apparent owners shall first register with Administrator on forms prescribed by the Administrator. Registration information shall include an asset locator's previous business experience and whether the asset locator has a criminal record. In order to obtain and maintain registered status, all asset locators shall post a performance bond of not less than $10,000.00 to insure the Administrator against any fraudulent or mistaken claims that may arise as a result of an asset locator's representation of an apparent owner. A copy of any agreement, or contract, between an asset locator and an apparent owner shall be filed with the Administrator, together with a signed by the apparent owner and notarized "notice to claimant" form, as prescribed by the Administrator, describing the rights of the apparent owner under this subchapter.
  2. An owner may not assign his or her rights, or property interests, under this chapter to an asset locator. No power of attorney containing provisions contrary to this section shall be enforceable.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 14. Confidentiality and Security of Information

§ 1611. Definitions; applicability.

  1. As used in this subchapter, "personal information" means:
    1. information that identifies or reasonably can be used to identify an individual, such as first and last name in combination with the individual's:
      1. Social Security number or other government-issued number or identifier;
      2. date of birth;
      3. home or physical address;
      4. electronic-mail address or other online contact information or Internet provider address;
      5. financial account number or credit or debit card number;
      6. biometric data, health or medical data, or insurance information; or
      7. passwords or other credentials that permit access to an online or other account;
    2. personally identifiable financial or insurance information, including nonpublic personal information defined by applicable federal law; and
    3. any combination of data that, if accessed, disclosed, modified, or destroyed without authorization of the owner of the data or if lost or misused, would require notice or reporting under 9 V.S.A. chapter 62 and federal privacy and data security law, whether or not the Administrator or the Administrator's agent is subject to the law.
  2. A provision of this subchapter that applies to the Administrator or the Administrator's records applies to an Administrator's agent.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1612. Confidential information.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following are confidential and exempt from public inspection or disclosure:
    1. records of the Administrator and the Administrator's agent related to the administration of this chapter;
    2. reports and records of a holder in the possession of the Administrator or the Administrator's agent; and
    3. personal information and other information derived or otherwise obtained by or communicated to the Administrator or the Administrator's agent from an examination under this chapter of the records of a person.
  2. A record or other information that is confidential under law of this State other than this chapter, another state, or the United States continues to be confidential when disclosed or delivered under this chapter to the Administrator or Administrator's agent.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, or of 1 V.S.A. chapter 5, subchapter 3, the Administrator may withhold information concerning an individual, or specific abandoned property, when in the Administrator's judgment it is necessary to ensure that abandoned property is returned to the rightful owner or to otherwise protect the owner. In addition, the Administrator may withhold information concerning individuals and abandoned property until notice has been provided in accordance with section 1503 of this title, deny requests for lists of apparent owners in any format for 24 months after the date the property is paid or delivered to the Administrator, and withhold information concerning uncashed checks and other similar payment information prior to the property being presumed abandoned as set forth in subchapter 2 of this chapter.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1613. When confidential information may be disclosed.

  1. When reasonably necessary to enforce or implement this chapter, the Administrator may disclose confidential information concerning property held by the Administrator or the Administrator's agent only to:
    1. an apparent owner or the apparent owner's personal representative, attorney, other legal representative, relative, or agent designated under section 1603 of this title to have the information;
    2. the personal representative, executor, other legal representative, relative of a deceased apparent owner, agent designated under section 1603 of this title by the deceased apparent owner, or a person entitled to inherit from the deceased apparent owner;
    3. another department or agency of this State or the United States;
    4. the person that administers the unclaimed property law of another state, if the other state accords substantially reciprocal privileges to the Administrator of this State, or if the other state is required to maintain the confidentiality and security of information obtained in a manner substantially equivalent to subchapter 14 of this chapter;
    5. a person subject to an examination as required by subdivision 1564(6) of this title.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 1612(a) of this title, the Administrator shall include on the website or in the database required by subdivision 1503(c)(2) of this title the name of each apparent owner of property held by the Administrator. The Administrator may include in published notices, printed publications, telecommunications, the Internet, or other media and on the website or in the database additional information concerning the apparent owner's property if the Administrator believes the information will assist in identifying and returning property to the owner and does not disclose personal information except the home or physical address of an apparent owner.
  3. The Administrator and the Administrator's agent may not use confidential information provided to them or in their possession except as expressly authorized by this chapter or required by law other than this chapter.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1614. Confidentiality agreement.

A person to be examined under section 1562 of this title may require, as a condition of disclosure of the records of the person to be examined, that each person having access to the records disclosed in the examination execute and deliver to the person to be examined a confidentiality agreement that:

  1. is in a form that is reasonably satisfactory to the Administrator; and
  2. requires the person having access to the records to comply with the provisions of this subchapter applicable to the person.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1615. No confidential information in notice.

Except as otherwise provided in sections 1501 and 1502 of this title, a holder is not required under this chapter to include confidential information in a notice the holder is required to provide to an apparent owner under this chapter.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1616. Security of information.

  1. If a holder is required to include confidential information in a report to the Administrator, the information must be provided by a secure means.
  2. If confidential information in a record is provided to and maintained by the Administrator or Administrator's agent as required by this chapter, the Administrator or agent shall:
    1. implement administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of the information required by 9 V.S.A. chapter 62 and federal privacy and data security law whether or not the Administrator or the Administrator's agent is subject to the law;
    2. protect against reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security, confidentiality, or integrity of the information; and
    3. protect against unauthorized access to or use of the information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to a holder or the holder's customers, including insureds, annuitants, and policy or contract owners and their beneficiaries.
  3. The Administrator:
    1. after notice and comment, shall adopt and implement a security plan that identifies and assesses reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks to confidential information in the Administrator's possession and seeks to mitigate the risks; and
    2. shall ensure that the Administrator's agent adopts and implements a similar plan with respect to confidential information in the agent's possession.
  4. The Administrator and the Administrator's agent shall educate and train their employees regarding the plan adopted under subsection (c) of this section.
  5. The Administrator and the Administrator's agent shall in a secure manner return or destroy all confidential information no longer reasonably needed under this chapter.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1617. Security breach.

  1. Except to the extent prohibited by law other than this chapter, the Administrator or Administrator's agent shall notify a holder as soon as practicable of:
    1. a suspected loss, misuse or unauthorized access, disclosure, modification, or destruction of confidential information obtained from the holder in the possession of the Administrator or the Administrator's agent; and
    2. any interference with operations in any system hosting or housing confidential information that:
      1. compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of the information; or
      2. creates a substantial risk of identity fraud or theft.
  2. Except as necessary to inform an insurer, attorney, investigator, or others as required by law, the Administrator and the Administrator's agent may not disclose, without the express consent in a record of the holder, an event described in subsection (a) of this section to a person whose confidential information was supplied by the holder.
  3. If an event described in subsection (a) of this section occurs, the Administrator and the Administrator's agent shall:
    1. take action necessary for the holder to understand and minimize the effect of the event and determine its scope; and
    2. cooperate with the holder with respect to:
      1. any notification required by law concerning a data or other security breach; and
      2. a regulatory inquiry, litigation, or similar action.

        Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1618. Indemnification for breach.

  1. If a claim is made or action commenced arising out of an event described in subsection 1617(a) of this title relating to confidential information possessed by the Administrator's agent, the Administrator's agent shall indemnify, defend, and hold harmless a holder and the holder's affiliates, officers, directors, employees, and agents as to:
    1. any claim or action; and
    2. a liability, obligation, loss, damage, cost, fee, penalty, fine, settlement, charge, or other expense, including reasonable attorney's fees and costs, established by the claim or action.
  2. The Administrator shall require an Administrator's agent that will receive confidential information required under this chapter to maintain adequate insurance for indemnification obligations of the Administrator's agent under subsection (a) of this section. The agent required to maintain the insurance shall provide evidence of the insurance to:
    1. the Administrator not less frequently than annually; and
    2. the holder on commencement of an examination and annually thereafter until all confidential information is returned or destroyed under subsection 1406(e) of this title.

      Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

Subchapter 15. Miscellaneous Provisions

§ 1621. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this uniform chapter, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1622. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

This chapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c) , or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C. § 7003(b) .

Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.

§ 1623. Transitional provision.

  1. An initial report filed under this chapter for property that was not required to be reported before the effective date of this chapter, but that is required to be reported under this chapter, must include all items of property that would have been presumed abandoned during the 10-year period preceding the effective date of this chapter as if this chapter had been in effect during that period.
  2. This chapter does not relieve a holder of a duty that arose before the effective date of this chapter to report, pay, or deliver property. Subject to subsections 1520(b) and (c) of this title, a holder that did not comply with the law governing unclaimed property before the effective date of this chapter is subject to applicable provisions for enforcement and penalties in effect before the effective date of this chapter.

    Added 2019, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.