Upon appeal to the Director or the court, the hearing officer or court shall proceed de novo and determine the correct valuation of the property as promptly as practicable and to determine a homestead and a housesite value if a homestead has been declared with respect to the property for the year in which the appeal is taken. The hearing officer or court shall take into account the requirements of law as to valuation and the provisions of Chapter I, Article 9 of the Constitution of Vermont and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. If the hearing officer or court finds that the listed value of the property subject to appeal does not correspond to the listed value of comparable properties within the town, the hearing officer or court shall set said property in the list at a corresponding value. The findings and determinations of the hearing officer shall be made in writing and shall be available to the appellant. If the appeal is taken to the Director, the hearing officer may inspect the property prior to making a determination, unless one of the parties requests an inspection, in which case the hearing officer shall inspect the property prior to making a determination. Within 10 days of the appeal being filed with the Director, the Director shall notify the property owner in writing of his or her option to request an inspection under this section.
ANNOTATIONS
Analysis
1. Constitutional law.
Legislature clearly intended that State board of appraisers would adjudicate constitutional questions in determining the validity of town appraisals; this section specifically requires the board to take into account the applicable provisions of the U.S. and Vermont Constitutions. Alexander v. Town of Barton, 152 Vt. 148, 565 A.2d 1294 (1989).
2. Construction with other laws.
The Legislature did not intend that appeals under
§
3708 of this title, governing payments in lieu of taxes for lands held by the Agency of Natural Resources, be governed by the same standard and procedures that it established for this section. Town of Victory v. State, 177 Vt. 383, 865 A.2d 373 (October 22, 2004).
Valuation of land of a municipal corporation situated outside its territorial limits for tax purposes is governed by this section, and not
§
3659 of this title, where property similar to the property at issue cannot be found within the taxing municipality. City of Barre v. Town of Orange, 152 Vt. 442, 566 A.2d 951 (1989).
Where
§
3659 of this title provided that municipal property outside the limits of the municipality shall be taxed by the municipality in which the property lies, the property to be valued at the same value as similar property, and property similar to the property at issue could not be found, that section did not apply and this section, relating to tax appeals generally and providing that, if it is found on appeal that the listed value does not correspond to the listed value of comparable properties within the town, the property shall be set in the listing at a corresponding value, was to be applied. Village of Morrisville Water & Light Dept. v. Town of Hyde Park, 134 Vt. 325, 360 A.2d 882 (1976).
3. Purpose.
An appeal of property valuation to the board of appraisers is a de novo proceeding, and the board must first determine the fair market value of the property, then "equalize" that amount to insure that the property is listed comparably to corresponding properties in town. Gouin v. Town of Halifax, 148 Vt. 524, 535 A.2d 788 (1987).
Under this section, the board of appraisers must determine whether the listed value of the property corresponds to the listed value of comparable properties within the town. Gouin v. Town of Halifax, 148 Vt. 524, 535 A.2d 788 (1987).
One vital purpose of the statutes relating to tax appraisal appeals is to grant to an aggrieved taxpayer the opportunity to establish uniformity of evaluation as it relates to the taxpayer's his property. Bookstaver v. Town of Westminster, 131 Vt. 133, 300 A.2d 891 (1973).
4. Court's duty and power.
Upon appeal by taxpayers from decisions of a town board of civil authority, which applied separate equalization ratios to separate classes of real property, the State board of appraisers had the jurisdiction to reach a decision, despite this section which allows the board to equalize property values only to "comparable properties within the town." Not every dispute over what is a comparable property must be resolved initially as a dispute over jurisdiction. Taxpayers are entitled to argue for a view of comparability as favorable as they can reasonably achieve without having their appeal summarily dismissed because they crossed over an unseen jurisdictional line. Knollwood Building Condominiums v. Town of Rutland, 166 Vt. 529, 699 A.2d 31 (1997).
This section mandates trial court to try dispute anew, as though it had never been heard before, and trial court is required to determine correct valuation in light of requirements of law and provisions of State and federal constitutions. In re Milot, 151 Vt. 615, 563 A.2d 1005 (1989).
In de novo appeal of property evaluation for tax purposes, court's function was to determine whether the listed value of the property corresponded with the listed value of comparable properties, and if not it was for the court to determine the appropriate relief by setting the property in the list at a corresponding value. Rutland Country Club, Inc. v. City of Rutland, 137 Vt. 590, 409 A.2d 591 (1979).
Where town's reappraisal of property was unacceptable as it used a method not in compliance with statute, lower court, in which taxpayer sought a lower appraisal, would not be ordered to set property in grand list at valuation in effect during next year prior to reappraisal; such an order would be proper had town introduced no other evidence of fair market value and uniformity of comparable properties' assessments; but where town introduced evidence on such issues, and taxpayer also introduced evidence on such issues, lower court should set fair market value and proper listing of property in a new trial. Ames v. Town of Danby, 136 Vt. 78, 385 A.2d 1075 (1978).
5. Function of board of appraisers.
Determination of whether properties are "comparable" for purposes of establishing equalization ratio under this section is within the sound discretion of the State board of appraisers. Philbin v. Town of St. George, 156 Vt. 640, 588 A.2d 1060 (mem.) (1991).
Upon appeal of appraisal, board of appraisers is not required to sit as trier of fact and determine whether facts introduced to overcome presumption of validity of appraisal of property are more believable than the facts supporting the assessment; the standard for evaluation of the facts sought to be used to overcome the burden is not one of credibility, requiring a subjective evaluation of the evidence, but rather of admissibility, requiring evaluation of whether the fact offered in proof affords a basis for a rational inference of the fact to be proved. Rutland Country Club v. City of Rutland, 140 Vt. 142, 436 A.2d 730 (1981).
The ultimate decision of the board of tax appraisers is focused upon the critical question of whether a taxpayer's property has been appraised at its fair market value within the legal concepts of that term and in compliance with statutory requirements. Town of Barnet v. New England Power Co., 130 Vt. 407, 296 A.2d 228 (1972).
6. Certiorari.
Petition stating that parcel of property was listed in grand list at a higher acreage than it actually contained and raising several other questions relating to matters of fact was insufficient to authorize the grant of a writ of certiorari. Villeneuve v. Commissioner of Taxes, 128 Vt. 356, 264 A.2d 774 (1970).
It was Supreme Court's duty, upon being presented with a petition for writ of certiorari by taxpayer attacking personal property appraisal and board of appraisers' upholding of it upon administrative review, to examine the evidence and determine whether there was the competent proof of facts necessary to authorize the adjudication, and whether in making it, any rule of law affecting the taxpayer's rights was broken. In re Health, 128 Vt. 519, 266 A.2d 812 (1970).
Commissioner of Taxes was a necessary party to taxpayer's petition for certiorari where, and only because, the record was in the Commissioner's possession. In re Health, 128 Vt. 519, 266 A.2d 812 (1970).
*7. Remand.
Decision of State board of appraisers was remanded where the record did not reveal whether statutorily mandated site visit had been conducted by board in connection with assessment of taxpayer's property. Giorgetti v. City of Rutland, 154 Vt. 9, 572 A.2d 933 (1990).
Where record as certified to Supreme Court upon taxpayer's petition for writ of certiorari to review board of appraisers' appraisal of personal property was inadequate as a matter of law to determine the regularity of the board's exercise of jurisdiction, cause would be remanded. In re Heath, 128 Vt. 519, 266 A.2d 812 (1970).
*8. Prejudicial error.
Where, in landowner's proceeding for lowering of land's appraisal for property tax purposes, court was required by statute to find fair market value and, because of its confusion over fair market value and listed value, court made a finding only as to listed value, there was prejudicial error requiring reversal. Ames v. Town of Danby, 136 Vt. 78, 385 A.2d 1075 (1978).
Where a prime issue raised before the board of tax appraisers by petitioners was whether the evidence introduced by them established that the listed value of comparable properties corresponded to the listed value of petitioner's land, board's failure to decide the issue was not in compliance with this section and was prejudicial error. In re Reed, 129 Vt. 102, 272 A.2d 127 (1970).
9. Property values
.
Constitutional considerations of equal protection and proportional contribution require State board of appraisers to apply equalization ratio to subject property to ascertain its listed value. Vermont Electric Power Co. v. Town of Cavendish, 158 Vt. 369, 611 A.2d 389 (1992).
Fact that fair market value of plaintiff utility company's property was established by methods other than review of sales of comparable properties does not make equalization ratio inapplicable; where equalization ratios are applied to property assessed at fair market value, constitutional considerations of equal protection and proportional contribution require that they be applied to all property so valued. Vermont Electric Power Co. v. Town of Cavendish, 158 Vt. 369, 611 A.2d 389 (1992).
Under the statutes relating to an appeal from the appraisal of property for tax purposes, the court is mandated to determine the correct valuation of the property taking into account the requirements of law and the provisions of the State and federal constitutions. Bookstaver v. Town of Westminster, 131 Vt. 133, 300 A.2d 891 (1973).
*10. Fair market value.
Where a town met its burden of production with respect to fair market value and taxpayer failed to show an arbitrary or unlawful valuation, reversal of the State appraiser's decision setting taxpayer's property in the town grand list at less than its fair market value was required because it was contrary to statutory requirements. Barrett v. Town of Warren, 179 Vt. 134, 892 A.2d 152 (September 16, 2005).
The fair market value of property is that price which the property will bring in the market place taking into consideration its availability, use, and limitations, and should not be based on only one criterion. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 149 Vt. 446, 545 A.2d 509 (1988).
The fair market value of a comparable property in another town is relevant to the fair market value of the subject property, though not necessarily conclusive on that issue. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 149 Vt. 446, 545 A.2d 509 (1988).
Opinions of well informed persons based upon the purposes for which the property is suited are to be considered in arriving at fair market value. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 149 Vt. 446, 545 A.2d 509 (1988).
Superior Court's findings in regard to valuation of real estate for tax purposes, read as a whole, clearly established fair market value and basis therefore where owner's expert testified that he considered three methods of appraisal, that he relied most heavily on the income approach, that on that basis alone he appraised the property at $250,000.00, and that his final opinion of fair market value was $280,000.00. Brown v. Town of Windsor, 139 Vt. 129, 422 A.2d 1268 (1980).
Board of tax appeals, in proceedings held pursuant to this section, is under duty to render findings on the fair market value of the subject property. Town of Walden v. Bucknam, 135 Vt. 326, 376 A.2d 761 (1977).
Whether the board of civil authority visited person's property or not for assessment of taxes has little bearing in the trial de novo and the trial court's obligation to make its own determination as to fair market value. Monti v. Town of Northfield, 135 Vt. 97, 369 A.2d 1373 (1977), disapproved by Vermont Div. of State Buildings v. Town of Duxbury (1984) 144 Vt. 228, 475 A.2d 235.
On appeal to State board of tax appeals from town board of civil authority's affirmance of property appraisal, State board could, in determining the fair market value of the property, take into account lease and option to purchase. Townsend v. Town of Middlebury, 134 Vt. 438, 365 A.2d 515 (1976).
Upon appeal from administrative authority's tax appraisal, lower court, which under this section is to determine the correct valuation of the property, has the duty to appraise the property at its fair market value. Vermont Marble Co. v. Town of West Rutland, 134 Vt. 308, 360 A.2d 91 (1976).
Supreme Court will not disturb the listers' or board's determinations of fair market value of real and personal property unless errors of law affecting the merits of the case appear. In re Health, 128 Vt. 519, 266 A.2d 812 (1970).
*11. Listed values.
Approach taken by an appraiser in determining listed value was consistent with the applicable statute and with case law. After the parties agreed to the fair market value, the appraiser considered evidence to determine an appropriate equalization ratio; an opinion letter offered by taxpayers in support of the value-added methodology was irrelevant to this analysis, and even assuming that the document was excluded in error, the taxpayers failed to show that they suffered any harm from its exclusion. Shaffer v. Town of Waitsfield, 183 Vt. 428, 956 A.2d 520 (Apr. 11, 2008).
Appeals to the board of appraisers are hearings de novo, and the board is required to make findings of fact supporting its ultimate determination; where conflicting evidence has been presented, the board must state clearly what evidence it credits and why, so that the parties and Supreme Court will know how the decision was reached; further, unless the board's determination of value is supported by adequate findings, it will not be affirmed. Beach Properties, Inc. v. Town of Ferrisburg, 161 Vt. 368, 640 A.2d 50 (1994).
State board of appraisers' function, to determine whether listed value of property corresponds to listed value of comparable properties within town, requires two steps: establishment of fair market value and equalization of that value to insure comparable listing of comparable properties. Vermont Electric Power Co. v. Town of Cavendish, 158 Vt. 369, 611 A.2d 389 (1992).
State board of appraisers committed error by looking at the listed value of properties which were not comparable to the property before it, in determining whether there were differences between listed and fair market values. Alexander v. Town of Barton, 152 Vt. 148, 565 A.2d 1294 (1989).
In deciding whether property's listed value is comparable to that of other properties, State board of appraisers must use two-step procedure: first, it must determine subject property's fair market value; and second, that value must be equalized to ensure listing is comparable to corresponding properties. Littlefield v. Town of Brighton, 151 Vt. 600, 563 A.2d 998 (1989).
When a tax assessment is appealed to the State board of appraisers, if the property is unique within the town, its listed value is determined by applying the common equalization ration of all properties in the town to its market value. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 149 Vt. 446, 545 A.2d 509 (1988).
On appeal of property valuation to board of appraisers, the listed value of a comparable property within the town is not to be used in determining a subject property's fair market value, and listed value alone, in the absence of fair market value, is useless in arriving at a ration for equalization purposes. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 144 Vt. 348, 477 A.2d 965 (1984), appeal after remand (1988) 149 Vt. 446, 545 A.2d 509.
Where unique property is the subject of litigation, under this section providing that if upon appeal from appraisal of property for tax purposes it is found that the listed value of the property does not correspond to the listed value of comparable properties within the town the property shall be set in the list at a corresponding value, all property within the town is comparable for the purpose of determining the proper corresponding listed value. New England Power Co. v. Town of Barnet, 134 Vt. 498, 367 A.2d 1363 (1976).
Since the county board of appraisers exercise a judicial function, the correctness of its actions will be inquired into where substantial questions of law affecting the merits of a case are in issue. In re Health, 128 Vt. 519, 266 A.2d 812 (1970).
*12. Comparable properties.
Approach of taxpayers' expert, and his exclusion of certain sales, was inconsistent with cases holding that all property within the same class was considered "comparable" for purposes of the statute governing appeals, not just property that was appreciating at the same rate. The trial court did not err in rejecting the taxpayers' evidence and looking instead to a town-wide ratio. Dewey v. Town of Waitsfield, 184 Vt. 92, 956 A.2d 508 (Apr. 11, 2008).
In the assessment of real property, evidence of comparable sales are admissible although comparable properties are rarely, if ever, identical properties.
Absent abuse of discretion, the degree of comparability goes to the weight of the evidence and is a matter for the trier of fact. Scott Construction, Inc. v. City of Newport Board of Civil Authority, 165 Vt. 232, 683 A.2d 382 (1996).
If comparable properties exist within town, comparison is made between current market value and listed value to determine equalization ratio for property tax purposes. Vermont Electric Power Co. v. Town of Cavendish, 158 Vt. 369, 611 A.2d 389 (1992).
For equalization ratio purposes, comparable properties within town means properties of same general class as subject property, even if those properties would not meet initial comparability criteria on basis of factors like building size, age, description, condition, use, income and expenses, and surroundings. Vermont Electric Power Co. v. Town of Cavendish, 158 Vt. 369, 611 A.2d 389 (1992).
For purposes of establishing equalization ratio under this section, "comparable properties within the town" means properties of the same general class as the subject properties, even if the properties within the set selected for equalization analysis would not meet the initial valuation comparability criteria on basis of factors like building size, age, description, condition, use, income and expenses, and surroundings. Philbin v. Town of St. George, 156 Vt. 640, 588 A.2d 1060 (mem.) (1991).
Even though decision of board of appraisers omitted direct comparisons between subject and comparable properties, board met its obligation to consider fair market value of residential property, where board first identified comparable properties and then proceeded to recite in detail categories in subject property it considered misgraded in relation to same categories in comparables. Gionet v. Town of Goshen, 152 Vt. 451, 566 A.2d 1349 (1989).
Where on appeal of property appraisal to the State board of appraisers town's expert testified that the neighboring property offered by taxpayer as comparable, to taxpayer's was smaller and, unlike taxpayer's, was without a garage or fireplace, the board's finding of the fair market value of taxpayer's property, which was higher than the appraisal of the property offered as comparable, was supported by credible evidence and would not be disturbed. Kruse v. Town of Westford, 145 Vt. 368, 488 A.2d 770 (1985).
Where unique property is the subject of litigation under this section, all property within the taxing municipality is comparable for purposes of determining the proper corresponding listed value. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 144 Vt. 348, 477 A.2d 965 (1984), appeal after remand (1988) 149 Vt. 446, 545 A.2d 509.
In taxpayer's proceeding for lower tax appraisal of land, it was error to refuse to allow taxpayer to testify to appraisal placed on taxpayer's adjoining property in the next town as part of the basis for opinion of the fair market value of the property at issue. Ames v. Town of Danby, 136 Vt. 78, 385 A.2d 1075 (1978).
Where property the appraisal of which is appealed is unique, and the court is required to find whether its listed value corresponds to the listed value of comparable properties and to set it in the list at a corresponding value if it does not, all property within the town shall be considered comparable and the court may consider a sales-ratio study analyzing the average of ratio between sales price and listed value of land sold in arms-length transactions within the town. New England Power Co. v. Town of Barnet, 134 Vt. 498, 367 A.2d 1363 (1976).
The statute relating to tax appraisal mandates the use of comparable property values in the determination of an appeal from the board of civil authority's appraisal when one of the prime issues is that the listed property of comparable properties does not correspond to the listed value of plaintiff's land. Bookstaver v. Town of Westminster, 131 Vt. 133, 300 A.2d 891 (1973).
On appeal from appraisal of property for tax purposes the court must consider the value of comparable properties within the same town and in such case it is not enough for the court to simply state that such were considered, rather findings are required on that critical issue. Bookstaver v. Town of Westminster, 131 Vt. 133, 300 A.2d 891 (1973).
*13. Equalization.
When the parties agreed that the fair market value of the taxpayers' property was $1,000,000.00, the only question before the appraiser was calculation of an appropriate equalization ratio (ER). The town presented credible evidence to support its proposed ER, and it was not required to provide the taxpayers with an adequate explanation as to why the resulting listed value differed from the listed value found below; in any event, regardless of the position taken by the town, the appraiser was not bound by the findings below, and it was ultimately for the appraiser to weigh the evidence and determine the correct valuation of the property. Shaffer v. Town of Waitsfield, 183 Vt. 428, 956 A.2d 520 (Apr. 11, 2008).
Appraiser appropriately looked to town-wide sales after concluding that taxpayers' evidence of comparable sales was insufficient to calculate an equalization ratio. Shaffer v. Town of Waitsfield, 183 Vt. 428, 956 A.2d 520 (Apr. 11, 2008).
Appraiser's calculation of an equalization ratio (ER) was erroneous when not only did the appraiser fail to explain exactly how he arrived at his result, but his ultimate conclusion was contradicted by his own findings. There was no evidence that any of the 2005 sales identified by the taxpayers were valid sale transactions for purposes of calculating an ER, and the appraiser's crude averaging of these unvalidated sales with a town-wide common level of appraisal was equally arbitrary and erroneous. Shaffer v. Town of Waitsfield, 183 Vt. 428, 956 A.2d 520 (Apr. 11, 2008).
Whole point of calculating and applying an equalization ratio (ER) is to ensure proportionality among a town's taxpayers. Having calculated and applied an ER, the appraiser does not need to then make additional findings that the listed value is in fact proportionate to comparable properties, and there is similarly no requirement that the appraiser make findings regarding the uniformity of each individual component of a taxpayer's property. Shaffer v. Town of Waitsfield, 183 Vt. 428, 956 A.2d 520 (Apr. 11, 2008).
Taxpayers' evidence of the listed value of comparable properties was meaningless absent evidence of the fair market value of these properties. Listed value alone, in the absence of fair market value, is useless in arriving at a ratio for equalization purposes; simply adducing evidence regarding the listed value of a comparable property, without ascertaining and applying an equalization ratio to ensure equitable taxation among similar properties, does not prove correct valuation. Shaffer v. Town of Waitsfield, 183 Vt. 428, 956 A.2d 520 (Apr. 11, 2008).
Because the court could not discern from the record precisely how the State appraiser implemented a time adjustment or why its application to all classes of property rendered an equalization ratio more accurate, it remanded the case for additional findings. Dewey v. Town of Waitsfield, 184 Vt. 92, 956 A.2d 508 (Apr. 11, 2008).
Because there was evidence presented to the Superior Court that residential property in a town was experiencing a rapid rate of appreciation prior to April 1, 2002, it appeared that the most accurate equalization ratio (ER) would be derived from all sales, adjusted for time if appropriate, occurring in the year prior to - or the six-month period before and after - the April 1, 2002 appraisal date. The court therefore reversed and remanded for the application of such an ER, subject to any arguments that might be raised as to why such an ER was inappropriate on the facts of the case. Dewey v. Town of Waitsfield, 184 Vt. 92, 956 A.2d 508 (Apr. 11, 2008).
When the trial court found taxpayers' expert to be inconsistent in his calculation and application of proper equalization ratios, it acted well within its discretion in looking to all property sales within the town to ensure that the taxpayers were not paying a disproportionate share of the town's tax burden. Dewey v. Town of Waitsfield, 184 Vt. 92, 956 A.2d 508 (Apr. 11, 2008).
Where evidence is presented showing a steep rate of appreciation, the most accurate equalization ratio is determined by looking at sales closest in time to the appraisal date - whether one year prior to the appraisal date or six months before and after the appraisal date - unless the trier of fact is persuaded by the evidence that such an approach is unfair, flawed, or otherwise inappropriate. Dewey v. Town of Waitsfield, 184 Vt. 92, 956 A.2d 508 (Apr. 11, 2008).
State appraiser had wide discretion in calculating an appropriate equalization ratio and was not required to adopt a town's approach. Nor was the appraiser obligated to explain in detail why he was not persuaded by the town's position. Dewey v. Town of Waitsfield, 184 Vt. 92, 956 A.2d 508 (Apr. 11, 2008).
There was no error in the State appraiser's conclusion that the most relevant data in a case was derived from a study of sales within one year of the appraisal date. As reflected in his decision, the appraiser was persuaded by taxpayers' expert that home values were rapidly rising in the town, and thus, that recent data provided a more reliable and accurate equalization ratio. Dewey v. Town of Waitsfield, 184 Vt. 92, 956 A.2d 508 (Apr. 11, 2008).
State board of appraisers properly applied town's average equalization ratio (AER) to determination of listed value of plaintiff utility company's property, since there was only one other comparable property in town and AER was sole and best alternative evidence. Vermont Electric Power Co. v. Town of Cavendish, 158 Vt. 369, 611 A.2d 389 (1992).
For purposes of establishing equalization ratio under this section, "comparable" properties include all properties within the class of property to which the subject property belongs. Philbin v. Town of St. George, 156 Vt. 640, 588 A.2d 1060 (mem.) (1991).
Where a fixed value like net book value is the basis for appraisal of property, equalization ratios applicable to market value properties under this section are immaterial. Grand Union Co. v. City of Winooski, 152 Vt. 193, 566 A.2d 398 (1989).
State board of appraisers is required to look at both fair market value and "listed" value of comparable properties so that the valuation set by the board can be "equalized" - that is, reduced from fair market value to listed value by the percentage actually used for comparable properties in the town. Alexander v. Town of Barton, 152 Vt. 148, 565 A.2d 1294 (1989).
Where defects in computer program resulted in undervaluation of some properties, and sufficient evidence on fair market value of comparable properties was not presented, city-wide equalization ratio was to be applied as if property were "unique." In re Milot, 151 Vt. 615, 563 A.2d 1005 (1989).
Where a tax assessment is appealed to the State board of appraisers, if comparable properties exist within the town, a comparison must be made between their current market value and their listed value; this comparison will yield the equalization ratio that must be applied to the fair market value of the subject property to determine its listed value. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 149 Vt. 446, 545 A.2d 509 (1988).
On appeal of property valuation to board of appraisers, the fair market value of the property must first be determined and then "equalized" to insure that the property is listed comparably to corresponding properties in town. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 144 Vt. 348, 477 A.2d 965 (1984), appeal after remand (1988) 149 Vt. 446, 545 A.2d 509.
On appeal of property valuation to board of appraiser, when comparable properties exist within the town, their current market value must be compared with their current listed value to arrive at an equalization rate, and this rate must then be applied to the subject property's fair market value to produce the proper listed value. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 144 Vt. 348, 477 A.2d 965 (1984), appeal after remand (1988) 149 VT. 446, 545 A.2d 509.
*14. Determination of value generally.
Where the State appraiser was presented with testimony from an expert who examined a total of 80 properties in the town and the disparity between the listed values of those properties as compared to taxpayers' properties led the appraiser to conclude that there were a large number of properties in the town comparable to the subject property that were assessed substantially below fair market value, those differences supported the State appraiser's conclusion that, in fact, the town did not treat all residential properties the same when it assigned values for listing purposes. Allen v. Town of W. Windsor, 177 Vt. 1, 852 A.2d 627 (2004).
Partition of taxpayers' property (former dairy farm consisting of about 148 acres and two residences) for appraisal purposes did not violate this section even though it refers to "the property" and not to parts of a property, as there is nothing inconsistent in a statutory reference to "the property" and a valuation analysis that considers parts of the whole. Scott Construction, Inc. v. City of Newport Board of Civil Authority, 165 Vt. 232, 683 A.2d 382 (1996).
Determinations by the board of appraisers on appeal involve a two-step process; the board must first determine the fair market value of the property in question and then "equalize" the property to insure that it is listed comparably to corresponding properties in the town. Gionet v. Town of Goshen, 152 Vt. 451, 566 A.2d 1349 (1989).
When a tax assessment is appealed to the State board of appraisers, the board must establish the fair market value of the subject property and equalize that value to ensure comparable listing with other corresponding properties. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 149 Vt. 446, 545 A.2d 509 (1988).
In proceeding to determine valuation of property for tax purposes, court could not list taxpayers' property higher than fair market value, even if comparable properties were listed above fair market value; so that where court determined the fair market value of the property and ordered the property listed at that value, town could not complain that the court failed to make findings of the values of comparable properties. Brown v. Town of Windsor, 139 Vt. 129, 422 A.2d 1268 (1980).
In administrative tax appraisal appeal, where television station owner refused to address theory of board of appraisers as to how television transmitting facility should be valued, it was not error for board to adopt appraisal of town's expert which was based on original cost, adjusted to reflect current reproduction cost, less depreciation. Mt. Mansfield TV, Inc. v. Town of Stowe, 137 Vt. 435, 407 A.2d 172 (1979).
Where board of tax appeals reduced listed value of petitioners' property established by local board of civil authority, but review of board's written report of findings indicated that while findings stated that comparison of petitioners' property to other similar properties in the town was made, there was no finding that properties mentioned in the report were comparable to the petitioners' property, conclusion rendered was not supported by board's findings of fact since to merely state that inequities existed was not a proper or sufficient method for board to discharge its duties under this section. Town of Walden v. Bucknam, 135 Vt. 326, 376 A.2d 761 (1977).
Provision in this section that board of tax appeal consider "comparable properties" in appraising property did not require that board's review of appraised value of personal property be restricted exclusively to comparison of other taxable personal property in the jurisdiction, and board correctly concluded that all property, real and personal, must be subjected to a uniform ratio of fair market to listed value. Town of Barnet v. Palazzi Corp., 135 Vt. 298, 376 A.2d 24 (1977).
Where this section requiring State board of tax appeals to make specific finding concerning consideration of the fair market value of comparable properties, when on appeal of tax appraisal from board of civil authority one of the principal issues is that the listed value of comparable properties did not correspond to the listed value of plaintiff's property, was not complied with, and board of tax appeals merely stated that it had "checked" comparable properties, there was reversible error. Schweizer v. Town of Pomfret, 134 Vt. 436, 365 A.2d 134 (1976).
In property appraisals by the board of tax appraisers, the fair market valuation must be determined in accordance with statutory requirements and correspond to the listed values of comparable properties within the town. Town of Barnet v. Central Vt. Public Service Corp., 131 Vt. 578, 313 A.2d 392 (1973).
*15. Real and personal property.
A town that values, for purposes of taxation, business personal property at fair market value may not have one equalization ratio for real property and another (or none) for personal property. Real and personal property must be considered comparable for purposes of this section. Knollwood Building Condominiums v. Town of Rutland, 166 Vt. 529, 699 A.2d 31 (1997).
*16. Evidence.
In establishing the listed values of property that was part of a dairy farm, the trial court did not err in crediting the methods and conclusions of the town appraiser. The mere fact that the appraiser was not himself a dairy farmer was not enough to show an abuse of discretion in crediting his testimony and report; as for the trial court's failure to credit the taxpayers' "regression analysis," the trial court properly found the town appraiser's testimony more compelling than the taxpayers' testimony with regard to the appropriate appraisal method. Boivin v. Town of Addison, 188 Vt. 571, 5 A.3d 897 (mem.) (2010).
Towns are statutorily required to submit fair market values to the Division of Property Valuation and Review (PVR), which then uses these values to arrive at a "common level of appraisal" (CLA) ratio. There was no indication that a town did anything but what it was statutorily required to do - that is, submit its grand list values to the PVR; therefore, it was entirely reasonable for the town and the trial court to rely on the CLA derived from statewide equalization studies. Boivin v. Town of Addison, 188 Vt. 571, 5 A.3d 897 (mem.) (2010).
Taxpayers' argument regarding the admission of a town appraiser's updated study failed. The report differed from a pretrial report only in the fact that the pretrial report was based on an estimate of the town's equalization rate, while the report relied on at trial utilized the finalized equalization study; furthermore, the taxpayers raised no objection to any part of the town appraiser's testimony at trial. Boivin v. Town of Addison, 188 Vt. 571, 5 A.3d 897 (mem.) (2010).
Proceeding before an appraiser was a de novo hearing, which required the appraiser to try the dispute anew, as though it had never been heard before. This means that a town was not limited to proffering - and the appraiser was not limited to considering - only such evidence as was presented below, and that the appeal presented the taxpayers with the risk of increase as well as the chance of decrease. Shaffer v. Town of Waitsfield, 183 Vt. 428, 956 A.2d 520 (Apr. 11, 2008).
Although the State board of appraisers is normally limited to comparing to properties in the same class as that of the taxpayer's property, where the board concludes that it lacks evidence of a statistically representative sample, it may use evidence of other classes. Therefore, the board acted well within its discretion in rejecting the equalization proposal of a town, which used different equalization ratios for different classes of real property, and using instead an average ratio for all categories of real property derived from State valuation data, as the ratios for separate classes of property were based on small sample sizes. Knollwood Building Condominiums v. Town of Rutland, 166 Vt. 529, 699 A.2d 31 (1997).
If State board of appraiser concludes that it lacks statistically representative sample of comparable property, it may use other evidence to determine appropriate equalization ratio; however, if property is unique within town, its listed value is determined by applying average of equalization ratios for all town properties. Vermont Electric Power Co. v. Town of Cavendish, 158 Vt. 369, 611 A.2d 389 (1992).
State board of appraisers erred in looking only at appraisal of only other utility company in town when determining whether property tax appraisal for plaintiff utility company was appropriate; other relevant evidence existed. Vermont Electric Power Co. v. Town of Cavendish, 158 Vt. 369, 611 A.2d 389 (1992).
For purposes of determining whether equalization ratio under this section adequately reflects the average of all ratios for properties within the class of comparable properties, a property owner, the taxing authority, and the courts may rely on any relevant evidence. Philbin v. Town of St. George, 156 Vt. 640, 588 A.2d 1060 (mem.) (1991).
State board of appraisers did not err by not considering evidence of fair market value of comparable properties offered by taxpayer, where there were differences between the comparables and taxpayer's property but no evidence about the differences and their effect on value and taxpayer testified that the properties "were not truly comparable" and that his property was "unique." Elliott v. Town of Barnard, 153 Vt. 306, 571 A.2d 653 (1989).
Where taxpayer failed to offer evidence of the ratio of listed values to fair market values for comparable properties or evidence to town-wide equalization ratio, State board of appraisers had adequate justification for accepting town's position that the listed value of taxpayer's property equaled the fair market value. Elliott v. Town of Barnard, 153 Vt. 306, 571 A.2d 653 (1989).
In de novo trial under this section, evidence was not limited to evidence presented to board of civil authority, and trial court properly considered evidence of higher fair market value, where defect in computer program had resulted in undervaluation of some properties even though city did not file cross-appeal. In re Milot, 151 Vt. 615, 563 A.2d 1005 (1989).
Once presumption of validity accorded appraisal by board of civil authority disappears, town must produce evidence justifying appraisal, either by showing that it substantially complied with relevant statutory and constitutional requirements, or by substantiating it with independent evidence relative to property's fair market value and listed value of comparable properties. Littlefield v. Town of Brighton, 151 Vt. 600, 563 A.2d 998 (1989).
Where presumption of validity of property appraisal was overcome by taxpayer, town's evidence of listed value of comparable property, without application of equalization rates, was insufficient to support property valuation. Littlefield v. Town of Brighton, 151 Vt. 600, 563 A.2d 998 (1989).
When taxpayers in appraisal case did not introduce evidence of sales of comparable lakefront lots on the same lake, their speculation that property on a large lake was more valuable than property on a small pond did not substitute for evidence. Sondergeld v. Town of Hubbardton, 150 Vt. 565, 556 A.2d 64 (1988).
The State board of appraisers has discretionary power to review the evidence and establish fair market value based on that evidence. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 149 Vt. 446, 545 A.2d 509 (1988).
Whatever property the State board of appraisers uses to establish fair market value of a property is an evidentiary question and within its discretion; only if the property or properties used are so dissimilar that they are of no comparative value whatsoever will its findings be disturbed on appeal. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 149 Vt. 446, 545 A.2d 509 (1988).
The weight to be given testimony, including the testimony of experts, is always within the discretion of the board. Adams v. Town of West Haven, 147 Vt. 618, 523 A.2d 1244 (1987).
On appeal of a property appraisal, the State board of appraisers, as the trier of fact, is under no obligation to accept, interpret, or apply evidence in accordance with the views of either party. Kruse v. Town of Westford, 145 Vt. 368, 488 A.2d 770 (1985).
Where on appeal of property appraisal to the State board of appraisers taxpayer overcame the presumption that the appraisal was valid by comparing his property with a neighboring property which had been appraised at a lower value, the town met its burden of producing evidence to justify its appraisal when its expert testified that the property offered by taxpayer as comparable was smaller and, unlike taxpayer's was without a garage or fireplace. Kruse v. Town of Westford, 145 Vt. 368, 488 A.2d 770 (1985).
Taxpayer failed to show evidence below was insufficient to support finding that properties were not appraised in excess of fair market value where taxpayer relied on testimony of one witness, who was taxpayer's employee, and witness relied for his valuation on purchase cost of a small portion of the property and the purchase was not at "arm's length" and thus not a reliable indicator of fair market value. Mettowee Lumber & Plastics Co. v. Town of Sandgate, 138 Vt. 63, 411 A.2d 368 (1980).
In administrative tax appraisal appeal, board of appraisers, in appraising fair market value of television transmitting facility, could accept appraisal of town's expert witness, which valued property at what it could be sold for on the open market as a functioning transmitting station, after board repeatedly invited taxpayer to submit evidence of property's fair market value as a functioning station and taxpayer refused, insisting property should be valued with reference to what it could be sold for piecemeal in the electronics market. Mt. Mansfield TV, Inc. v. Town of Stowe, 137 Vt. 435, 407 A.2d 172 (1979).
Which properties the court will consider and compare in reaching its decision as to fair market value is an evidentiary question laying within its sound discretion, and such findings will not be disturbed unless the properties are so dissimilar as to give rise to no comparison at all. Monti v. Town of Northfield, 135 Vt. 97, 369 A.2d 1373 (1977), disapproved by Vermont Div. of State Buildings v. Town of Duxbury (1984) 144 Vt. 228, 475 A.2d 235.
17. Burden of proof.
To prevail on appeal of property valuation taxpayer must show an arbitrary or unlawful valuation. Sondergeld v. Town of Hubbardton, 150 Vt. 565, 556 A.2d 64 (1988).
On appeal of property valuation, town has initial burden to produce evidence of fair market value; once town has met its burden, taxpayer retains burden of persuasion as to contested issues. Sondergeld v. Town of Hubbardton, 150 Vt. 565, 556 A.2d 64 (1988).
If the taxpayer introduces credible evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that taxpayer's property was appraised at more than its fair market value, the presumption that the appraisal is valid and legal disappears. Adams v. Town of West Haven, 147 Vt. 618, 523 A.2d 1244 (1987).
Even after the presumption of validity of a property appraisal disappears, the burden of persuasion on all contested issuers on appeal of the appraisal remains with the taxpayer; it does not shift to the town. Kruse v. Town of Westford, 145 Vt. 368, 488 A.2d 770 (1985).
A taxpayer satisfies burden of going forward with evidence to overcome the presumption that appraisal of taxpayer's property is valid when taxpayer introduces credible evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that taxpayer's property was appraised at more than its fair market value. Kruse v. Town of Westford, 145 Vt. 368, 488 A.2d 770 (1985).
Once the presumption of validity of a property appraisal is overcome by a taxpayer, the town must produce evidence to justify its appraisal and can prevail by either demonstrating that the method of appraisal substantially complied with relevant constitutional and statutory requirements or by substantiating the appraisal with independent evidence relevant to the fair market value of the subject property and the listed value of comparable properties within the town. Kruse v. Town of Westford, 145 Vt. 368, 488 A.2d 770 (1985).
Taxpayer who appealed appraisal of real estate to the State board of appraisers but merely submitted a letter stating the basis of his grievance, rather than presenting factual evidence, failed to satisfy burden of presenting sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of the appraisal's validity. Manganelli v. Town of Proctor, 144 Vt. 451, 479 A.2d 155 (1984).
The duty of overcoming presumption of validity of appraisal of real estate lies with the aggrieved taxpayer; if the taxpayer presents sufficient evidence raising a question of fact, the presumption is extinguished. Manganelli v. Town of Proctor, 144 Vt. 451, 479 A.2d 155 (1984).
The burden of producing evidence to overcome the presumption of validity of appraisal of real estate is satisfied by the introduction of credible evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the property was assessed at more than the fair market value or that the listed value exceeded the percentage of listed value actually applied to the general mass of property in the community. Manganelli v. Town of Proctor, 144 Vt. 451, 479 A.2d 155 (1984).
Taxpayer's burden of overcoming presumption of validity and legality of actions of listers may be satisfied by credible evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the property was assessed at more than fair market value or that the listed value exceeded the percentage of listed value actually applied to the general mass of property in the community; or the taxpayer may attack the town's method of appraisal directly by evidence demonstrating that the method used was invalid. Beaudry v. Town of Chester, 143 Vt. 182, 463 A.2d 220 (1983).
Once a taxpayer presents evidence overcoming presumption of validity and legality of actions of listers, the town, to prevail, must produce evidence to justify the appraisal and may either show that the method of appraisal substantially complied with the relevant constitutional and statutory requirements, or substantiate the appraisal with independent evidence relative to the fair market value of the property and the listed value of comparable properties in the town. Beaudry v. Town of Chester, 143 Vt. 182, 463 A.2d 220 (1983).
In a de novo appeal to the Superior Court under this section, a presumption of validity and legality attaches to the actions of the listers, and upon evidence of the appraisal being introduced, that presumption remains until countervailing evidence is introduced fairly and reasonably showing that the property was appraised in excess of its fair market value. Jeffer v. Town of Chester, 142 Vt. 23, 451 A.2d 823 (1982).
Upon appeal of property valuation, once presumption of validity of the appraisal disappears, the burden of persuasion remains on the taxpayer as to all contested issues. Rutland Country Club v. City of Rutland, 140 Vt. 142, 436 A.2d 730 (1981).
On appeal of property valuation, once relevant evidence challenging the assessment has been introduced to overcome the presumption of the validity of the appraisal, in order to prevail, the town must produce evidence to justify the appraisal, which can be done either by demonstrating that the method of appraisal substantially complied with the relevant constitutional and statutory requirements or by substantiating the appraisal with independent evidence relative to the fair market value of the subject property and the listed value of comparable properties within the municipality. Rutland Country Club v. City of Rutland, 140 Vt. 142, 436 A.2d 730 (1981).
In tax appeal proceeding, landowner attacking assessment as not being comparable to similar properties at all times had burden of persuasion on the issue. Schwartz v. Town of Norwich, 137 Vt. 130, 400 A.2d 991 (1979).
In a de novo appeal to Superior Court of appraisal of land for tax purposes, the burden of persuasion remains on the taxpayer as to all contested issues. Leroux v. Town of Wheelock, 136 Vt. 396, 392 A.2d 387 (1978).
Once a taxpayer presents evidence overcoming presumption of validity and legality of actions of listers, the town, to prevail, must produce evidence to justify the appraisal and may either show that the method of appraisal substantially complied with the relevant constitutional and statutory requirements or substantiate the appraisal with independent evidence relative to the fair market value of the property and the listed value of comparable properties in the town. Leroux v. Town of Wheelock, 136 Vt. 396, 392 A.2d 387 (1978).
Taxpayer's burden of overcoming presumption of validity and legality of actions of listers may be satisfied by credible evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the property was assessed at more than fair market value or that the listed value exceeded the percentage of listed value actually applied to the general mass of property in the community; or the taxpayer may attack the town's method of appraisal directly by evidence demonstrating that the method was invalid. Leroux v. Town of Wheelock, 136 Vt. 396, 392 A.2d 387 (1978).
In de novo appeal of appraisal of land to Superior Court, where taxpayers showed that land appraisals averaged 37 1/2 percent under sales price of recently sold properties and appraisal of homes averaged 35 percent under sales price of recently sold homes and that to be equitable in view of those percentages their property, appraised at $106,400.00 in 1973 and $110,400.00 in 1975, should be valued at $79,500.00 for both years, taxpayers placed the burden of producing evidence to justify the appraisal on the town. Leroux v. Town of Wheelock, 136 Vt. 396, 392 A.2d 387 (1978).
In de novo appeal to Superior Court questioning validity of town's method of appraising property value, burden of persuasion as to all contested issues remains on taxpayer. Welch v. Town of Ludlow, 136 Vt. 83, 385 A.2d 1105 (1978).
Through taxpayer's own testimony and that of real estate appraiser using willing buyer, willing seller definition of fair market value, taxpayer clearly satisfied burden of producing credible evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that property was assessed at more than fair market value. Welch v. Town of Ludlow, 136 Vt. 83, 385 A.2d 1105 (1978).
In de novo appeal to Superior Court questioning validity of town's method of appraising property value, once taxpayer introduces credible evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that property was assessed at more than fair market value or that listed value exceeded percentage of listed value actually applied to general mass of property in community, to prevail, town has burden of producing evidence to justify appraisal and may meet its burden by introducing evidence demonstrating substantial compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements relative to fair market value and uniformity, or by introducing independent evidence of fair market value of subject property and listed value of comparable properties within town sufficient to justify appraisal. Welch v. Town of Ludlow, 136 Vt. 83, 385 A.2d 1105 (1978).
Allocation of burdens of proof set forth in Schweizer v. Town of Pomfret (1976) 134 Vt. 436, 365 A.2d 134, and New England Power Co. v. Town of Barnet (1976) 134 Vt. 498, 367 A.2d 1363, are equally applicable in proceedings before State tax appeals board. Town of Walden v. Bucknam, 135 Vt. 326, 376 A.2d 761 (1977).
Where taxpayer clearly met its burden of showing patent inequality in the ratio of fair market to listed value applied to its property as compared to that applied to other taxable property in the town, tax appeal board's action in lowering by 40 percent the fair market value of taxpayer's property would be upheld, in absence of any showing that the board had abused its authority under this section and although the record gave no indication that any "common level" or ratio was applied to taxpayer's property, or that such ratio even existed in the town. Town of Barnet v. Palazzi Corp., 135 Vt. 298, 376 A.2d 24 (1977).
When a town's appraisal of property for tax purposes is challenged there is a presumption that the appraisal is valid and the property owner has the burden of producing evidence to overcome the presumption, a burden satisfied by credible evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show assessment at more than fair market value or a listed value exceeding the percentage of listed value applied to the general mass of property in the community, at which point the town has the burden of justifying the appraisal. New England Power Co. v. Town of Barnet, 134 Vt. 498, 367 A.2d 1363 (1976).
In a proceeding challenging the appraisal of property for tax purposes, the burden of persuasion as to the contested issues remains at all time with the taxpayer. New England Power Co. v. Town of Barnet, 134 Vt. 498, 367 A.2d 1363 (1976).
18. Presumptions.
By producing the expert appraiser's testimony that the properties were overvalued, the time-share owners overcame the presumption of validity of a town's tax appraisal. Jackson Gore Inn v. Town of Ludlow, 211 Vt. 498, 228 A.3d 643 (2020).
The presumption of validity of appraisal disappears once the taxpayer introduces evidence showing that the appraisal exceeded fair market value. Elliott v. Town of Barnard, 153 Vt. 306, 571 A.2d 653 (1989).
Presumption of validity accorded appraisal reached by board of civil authority is overcome and disappears once taxpayer presents evidence that fairly and reasonably indicates that property was assessed at more than fair market value or that listed value exceeded percentage of fair market value applied generally within community. Littlefield v. Town of Brighton, 151 Vt. 600, 563 A.2d 998 (1989).
Taxpayers' objections to appraisal of property, supported by references to valuation standards in State appraisal manual, together with taxpayers' testimony of value of property and of neighboring properties, overcame presumption of validity of town appraisal in hearing before State board of appraisers under this section. Littlefield v. Town of Brighton, 151 Vt. 600, 563 A.2d 998 (1989).
A tax appraisal by a municipality enjoys a presumption of validity, and a taxpayer challenging the appraisal has both the initial burden of overcoming the presumption and the underlying burden of proving that the standard of this section was violated. Alison v. Town of Rochester, 150 Vt. 525, 554 A.2d 259 (1988).
In a de novo appeal to the Superior Court under this section, a presumption of validity and legality attaches to the actions of the listers, and once the town introduces the appraisal of the taxpayer's property into evidence, the burden of going forward with evidence to overcome the presumption resides with the taxpayer. Beaudry v. Town of Chester, 143 Vt. 182, 463 A.2d 220 (1983).
A presumption that an appraisal is valid and legal accompanies a taxpayer's appeal to the State board of appraisers; the burden rests on the taxpayer to go forward with evidence to overcome this presumption. Adams v. Town of West Haven, 147 Vt. 618, 523 A.2d 1244 (1987).
In appeals taken to the State board of appraisers there is a presumption that the appraisal is valid, and the burden rests with the taxpayer to go forward with evidence to overcome the presumption. Kruse v. Town of Westford, 145 Vt. 368, 488 A.2d 770 (1985).
The standard by which the trier must weigh the facts sought to be used to overcome the presumption of validity of a property appraisal is not one of credibility, but rather of admissibility, requiring evaluation of whether the fact offered in proof affords a basis for a rational inference of the fact to be proved. Kruse v. Town of Westford, 145 Vt. 368, 488 A.2d 770 (1985).
Inherent in an appeal before the State board of appraisers if the presumption that the challenged appraisal is valid. Manganelli v. Town of Proctor, 144 Vt. 451, 479 A.2d 155 (1984).
The presumption of validity attaching upon appeal of the town's evaluation of property is overcome when credible evidence is introduced fairly and reasonably indicating that the property was assessed at more than the fair market value or that the listed value exceeded the fair market value applied generally to property within the community; upon the introduction of such evidence, the presumption disappears and becomes functus officio. Rutland Country Club v. City of Rutland, 140 Vt. 142, 436 A.2d 730 (1981).
In an appeal taken to board of appraisers, there is a presumption that the appraisal is valid, and the property owner has the burden of going forward with evidence to overcome that presumption. Rutland County Club v. City of Rutland, 140 Vt. 142, 436 A.2d 730 (1981).
In a de novo appeal to the Superior Court of valuation of property for tax purposes a presumption of validity and legality attached to the lister's actions and remains until evidence is introduced which fairly and reasonably tend to show the property was appraised in excess of its fair market value. Mettowee Lumber & Plastics Co. v. Town of Sandgate, 138 Vt. 63, 411 A.2d 368 (1980).
In a de novo appeal to Superior Court of appraisal of land for tax purposes, a presumption of validity and legality attaches to the actions of the listers, and once the town introduce the appraisal into evidence the burden of going forward with evidence to overcome the presumption resides with the taxpayer. Leroux v. Town of Wheelock, 136 Vt. 396, 392 A.2d 387 (1978).
In de novo appeal to Superior Court questioning validity of town's method of appraising property value, presumption of validity and legality attaches to actions of listers, and once town introduces appraisal of taxpayer's property into evidence, burden of going forward with evidence to overcome presumption resides with moving party. Welch v. Town of Ludlow, 136 Vt. 83, 385 A.2d 1105 (1978).
A presumption of validity and legality attaches to the actions of listers, and when a town introduces the appraisal into evidence, the burden of going forward with evidence to overcome the presumption rest with the taxpayer, and upon presentation of such evidence the presumption disappears and the town must then produce evidence of fair market value and evidence relative to listed values of comparable properties. Ames v. Town of Danby, 136 Vt. 78, 385 A.2d 1075 (1978).
In the de novo hearing required by this section the taxing authority has the burden of showing fair market value and having done so, the presumption is that the appraisal and subsequent listing is valid; in order to rebut this presumption, the taxpayer must produce countervailing evidence, such as the lack of uniformity, or a showing of excessiveness. Town of Barnet v. Palazzi Corp., 135 Vt. 298, 376 A.2d 24 (1977).
19. Findings and conclusions.
In a property tax appeal, the trial court was not bound by the findings of the board of civil authority or limited to the evidence presented below. The proceeding before the court was de novo, which required the court to try the dispute anew, as though it had never been heard before; thus, it followed that a town did not need to file a cross-appeal to advocate for a higher fair market value than that found by the board of civil authority. Dewey v. Town of Waitsfield, 184 Vt. 92, 956 A.2d 508 (Apr. 11, 2008).
Trial court did not err in setting the fair market value of taxpayers' property at $1,500,000.00; the trial court was presented with competing evidence as to fair market value from the taxpayers and a town, and it found the town's evidence more persuasive. Its findings reflected the proper number of adjustments made to each comparable property, and they accounted for a mathematical error discovered at trial. Dewey v. Town of Waitsfield, 184 Vt. 92, 956 A.2d 508 (Apr. 11, 2008).
In determining fair market value, the trial court was not required to make a specific finding regarding the effect of a transmission line on the taxpayers' property. The trial court had no specific duty to make findings, requested or otherwise, on each point raised; findings were sufficient if they disposed of the issues presented. Dewey v. Town of Waitsfield, 184 Vt. 92, 956 A.2d 508 (Apr. 11, 2008).
The board of appraisers did not fail to make adequate findings of fact concerning what comparable properties were rejected and which were used in its market data approach. The board's valuation fell squarely between the town's valuation and the taxpayer's valuation and was within the evidence and, more importantly, within the range of rationality. Lake Morey Inn Golf Resort v. Town of Fairlee, 167 Vt. 245, 704 A.2d 785 (1997).
The board of appraisers' conclusions in regard to its use of the cost approach were supported by adequate findings of fact.
The board, in detail, described the formula and data it used to compute the value of the property. Lake Morey Inn Golf Resort v. Town of Fairlee, 167 Vt. 245, 704 A.2d 785 (1997).
In assessing real property, the law merely requires that the court sift through the evidence and make findings sufficient to indicate to the parties how it reached its ultimate conclusion, not that it make findings tailored to any particular theory of valuation. Scott Construction, Inc. v. City of Newport Board of Civil Authority, 165 Vt. 232, 683 A.2d 382 (1996).
Although State board of appraisers is statutorily required to make site visits as part of assessment of property, the board is not required to indicate the results of its visit in findings and conclusions. Giorgetti v. City of Rutland, 154 Vt. 9, 572 A.2d 933 (1990).
A simple declaration that the property is unique does not satisfy the board of appraiser's duty of stating in its findings the basis for its conclusion. Adams v. Town of West Haven, 147 Vt. 618, 523 A.2d 1244 (1987).
Findings of fact must state how a decision was reached in order to give a taxpayer reasons for the board's result as well as to give the Supreme Court an adequate basis for review. Adams v. Town of West Haven, 147 Vt. 618, 523 A.2d 1244 (1987).
On appeal of a property appraisal, the State board of appraisers is required to sift the evidence and make findings sufficient to indicate to the parties how it reached its ultimate conclusion. Kruse v. Town of Westford, 145 Vt. 368, 488 A.2d 770 (1985).
On appeal of a property appraisal, the board of appraisers is required to make finding of fact supporting its ultimate determination of value. Shetland Properties, Inc. v. Town of Poultney, 145 Vt. 189, 484 A.2d 929 (1984).
In making findings of fact upon review of appraisal of property, the board of appraisers has a duty to sift the evidence and make a clear statement so that the parties and the Supreme Court will know what was decided and how that decision was reached. Shetland Properties, Inc. v. Town of Poultney, 145 Vt. 189, 484 A.2d 929 (1984).
Where board of appraisers affirmed reappraisal of taxpayer's real estate but its findings of fact contained no comparison of the characteristics of taxpayer's property with those characteristics of properties which it found to be comparable, the board's failure to make specific findings of fact to support its conclusions concerning comparable property values constituted reversible error. Shetland Properties, Inc. v. Town of Poultney, 145 Vt. 189, 484 A.2d 929 (1984).
Where on appeal of property reappraisal the board of appraisers merely recited certain testimony in the case and accepted the conclusions of the listers regarding a material change in the property, without findings of fact sufficient to support its conclusions, the board committed reversible error. Shetland Properties, Inc. v. Town of Poultney, 145 Vt. 189, 484 A.2d 929 (1984).
On appeal of property appraisal State board of appraisers is required to make findings of fact supporting its ultimate determination and it has a duty to sift the evidence and make a clear statement so that the parties and the Supreme Court will know what was decided and how the decision was reached. Manganelli v. Town of Proctor, 144 Vt. 451, 479 A.2d 155 (1984).
Where on appeal of property valuation, board of appraiser found that the fair market value of taxpayers' property was $380,000.00 and applied a ration of 32 percent, representing the "overall appraisal ratio [of all properties] in the town," but make no findings as to the fair market value shown by comparable properties within the town and resulting equalization rate or that taxpayers' property was unique, thus justifying the application of the general town ratio, the findings were insufficient, inconsistent, and could be resolved only through conjecture and, therefore, could not stand. Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 144 Vt. 348, 477 A.2d 965 (1984).
On appeal of property appraisal, State board of appraisers is under a duty to render findings on the fair market value of the subject property. Bailey v. Town of Craftsbury, 144 Vt. 260, 475 A.2d 1390 (1984).
Where on appeal State board of appraisers made findings that compared the listed values of plaintiffs' properties with the listed value of comparable properties within the town, but failed to find the fair market value of plaintiffs' properties, the matter would be remanded for a finding on the fair market value. Bailey v. Town of Craftsbury, 144 Vt. 260, 475 A.2d 1390 (1984).
In making findings of fact upon review of appraisal of property, the board of appraisers has a duty to sift the evidence and make a clear statement so that the parties and the Supreme Court will know what was decided and how the decision was reached. Chelsea Limited Partnership v. Town of Chelsea, 142 Vt. 538, 458 A.2d 1096 (1983).
Findings by board of appraisers, on appeal of town's appraisal of property, rejecting cost method used by the listers to ascertain the fair market value of taxpayer's property, adopting income method of ascertaining fair market value, and incorporating unrefuted evidence presented by taxpayer as to the income valuation, were adequate to support board's decision as to the amount at which the property would be set in the grand list. Chelsea Limited Partnership v. Town of Chelsea, 142 Vt. 538, 458 A.2d 1096 (1983).
On appeal of a property appraisal, the board of appraisers is required to make findings of fact supporting its ultimate determination of value. Chelsea Limited Partnership v. Town of Chelsea, 142 Vt. 538, 458 A.2d 1096 (1983).
This section mandates a finding of fair market value of subject properties. Villeneuve v. Town of Waterville, 141 Vt. 154, 446 A.2d 358 (1982).
Trial court properly sustained the listers' and board of civil authority's appraisals as to woodlots owned by taxpayers, a substantial increase over the fair market value in the previous year, where the trial court found the fair market values of the properties involved and also found the sale price of a comparable property, although not specifically stating it was fair market value; the finding of a sale price, although not as specific as it might have been, was sufficient to support the judgment, as the sale price, which was arrived at in an arms-length transaction by a willing buyer and seller, was functionally the same as the fair market value. Villeneuve v. Town of Waterville, 141 Vt. 154, 446 A.2d 358 (1982).
Where the board of appraisers, on appeal from town's valuation of property, admitted appraisal report of town's expert, which included a clear mathematical error, and there was no other credible evidence supporting his conclusion, the board's reliance upon the erroneous fair market value figure of the expert in determining the appraised value of the property constituted error. Corrette v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 140 Vt. 315, 437 A.2d 1112 (1981).
In making findings of fact upon review of valuation of property, the board of appraiser has a duty to sift the evidence and make a clear statement so that the parties and the Supreme Court will know what was decided and how the decision was reached. Corrette v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 140 Vt. 315, 437 A.2d 1112 (1981).
On appeal of a property appraisal, the board of appraisers, after a de novo hearing, is obliged to make findings of facts supporting its ultimate determination of value. Corrette v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 140 Vt. 315, 437 A.2d 1112 (1981).
This section mandates the use of comparable property values and where this is the principal issue on appeal, the board of appraisers must make specific findings in that regard. Corrette v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 140 Vt. 315, 437 A.2d 1112 (1981).
Where findings of fact of board of appraisers on appeal from property valuation alleging that appraisal was inequitable when compared with comparable properties merely set forth the positions of both parties and the evidence in support of their claims, only made positive findings in respect to the descriptions of the real estate involved and found as facts all of the comparables testified to by all of the parties, but made no reference to the specific individual properties used in evidence, the absence of findings as to comparables and absence of positive findings on the evidence presented left the board's conclusions unsupported and, in reaching a conclusion without findings of facts sufficient to support it conclusions, the board committed reversible error. Corrette v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 140 Vt. 315, 437 A.2d 1112 (1981).
Although findings are required in tax appeals once made, a party will not be heard to object to their adequacy unless party has requested new or further findings. Jeffer v. Town of Chester, 138 Vt. 478, 417 A.2d 937 (1980).
Where lower court held that method listers used to appraiser property followed the statutory requisites, considering factors including location, use, access, road frontage, view, size, type, and sales of comparable properties, and listers viewed other properties and the subject property, appraisal would not be disturbed unless some error of law was made, and no error was shown where taxpayer placed in evidence only one small assertedly comparable parcel appraised at approximately half the per acre value of his property and that parcel was much steeper in grade and thus less valuable. Mettowee Lumber & Plastics Co. v. Town of Sandgate, 138 Vt. 63, 411 A.2d 368 (1980).
Where court in de novo appeal of property evaluation for tax purposes made inconsistent findings on the meaning and measure of fair market value as applied to the property, and Supreme Court's evaluation of lower court's intentions could only be reached by conjecture, reversal and remand for resolution of the inconsistency was required. Rutland Country Club, Inc. v. City of Rutland, 137 Vt. 590, 409 A.2d 591 (1979).
Failure of court hearing de novo appeal of appraisal of property for tax purpose to make requisite findings of fair market value was prejudicial error requiring reversal. Leroux v. Town of Wheelock, 136 Vt. 396, 392 A.2d 387 (1978).
In appeal to lower court from administrative authority's tax appraisal, court committed reversible error where its conclusions as to value of the land had no basis under the facts found. Vermont Marble Co. v. Town of West Rutland, 134 Vt. 308, 360 A.2d 91 (1976).
20. Review.
Although de novo review presumes the validity of a taxing authority's decision only until a taxpayer produces some evidence to the contrary, this does not mean that a court ultimately owes no deference to the decision of the administrative agency. Mollica v. Div. of Prop. Valuation & Review, 184 Vt. 83, 955 A.2d 1171 (May 2, 2008).
Property owners could not assert their action challenging property tax assessments in a federal court because the State court provided potential for an adequate and complete remedy including consideration of the owners' constitutional claims. Boivin v. Town of Addison, - F. Supp. 2d - (D. Vt. July 15, 2008), aff'd, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3054 (2d Cir. Vt. 2010).
Court's determination of whether fair market value of real estate corresponds to fair market value of comparable properties within the town will be upheld on appeal unless the properties are so different that comparison is illogical. Harte v. Town of Bennington, 153 Vt. 256, 571 A.2d 53 (1989).
Town had no standing to raise issue that board of appraisers failed to perform second step prescribed by this section, comparing the subject property to comparable properties for purposes of equalization, where any such failure could only have benefited the town. Gionet v. Town of Goshen, 152 Vt. 451, 566 A.2d 1349 (1989).
The Supreme Court's function on appeal from a determination of the board of appraisers is to scrutinize the board's actions in conducting its de novo review of a property appraisal. Kruse v. Town of Westford, 145 Vt. 368, 488 A.2d 770 (1985).
Since the county board of appraisers exercise a judicial function, the correctness of its actions will be inquired into where substantial questions of law affecting the merits of a case are in issue. In re Heath, 128 Vt. 519, 266 A.2d 812 (1970).
Supreme Court will not disturb the listers' or board's determinations of fair market value of real and personal property unless errors of law affecting the merits of the case appear. In re Heath, 128 Vt. 519, 266 A.2d 812 (1970).
21. Inspection.
Statutes clearly require an inspection at both the board of civil authority (BCA) and State appraiser appeals, and neither the board of civil authority nor the State appraiser is afforded discretion to ignore this requirement. Garbitelli v. Town of Brookfield, 186 Vt. 648, 987 A.2d 327 (mem.) (2009).
Full inspection is a prerequisite to review by the State appraiser. Garbitelli v. Town of Brookfield, 186 Vt. 648, 987 A.2d 327 (mem.) (2009).
State appraiser properly dismissed a taxpayer's appeals from reappraisals on the ground that the taxpayer had refused to allow a full interior inspection. The limited inspections taxpayer did allow were insufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the board of civil authority's determination; estoppel did not apply because the taxpayer offered no evidence demonstrating that the State appraiser intended to induce reliance on the sufficiency of a limited inspection and because the taxpayer chose to limit the inspection of the taxpayer's properties; and although it was inappropriate for the town appraiser to communicate with the State appraiser while the taxpayer's appeals were pending, the statutes requiring inspection did not allow the State appraiser any discretion to ignore this requirement. Garbitelli v. Town of Brookfield, 186 Vt. 648, 987 A.2d 327 (mem.) (2009).
Absence of an adequate inspection by the State appraiser upon appeal of the board of civil authority decision demands dismissal. Inherent in such an appeal is the presumption that the challenged appraisal is valid and the duty of overcoming this presumption of validity lies with the aggrieved taxpayer; in the absence of an adequate inspection, there is simply no way that the taxpayer can present the evidence needed to extinguish this presumption. Garbitelli v. Town of Brookfield, 186 Vt. 648, 987 A.2d 327 (mem.) (2009).
22. Estoppel.
There was no merit to taxpayers' judicial estoppel argument when the prior litigation cited by the taxpayers involved entirely different tax years and, therefore, entirely different assessments; as a result, the town was not precluded from utilizing a different appraisal report in the instant litigation than it relied upon in the previous litigation. Moreover, the taxpayers had failed to demonstrate how their reliance on the actions taken by the town during the prior proceedings had prejudiced them in any way. Boivin v. Town of Addison, 188 Vt. 571, 5 A.3d 897 (mem.) (2010).
Cited.
Rooney Vermont Associates v. Town of Pownal, 140 Vt. 150, 436 A.2d 733 (1981); Soucy v. Soucy Motors, Inc., 143 Vt. 615, 471 A.2d 224 (1983); Saufroy v. Town of Danville, 148 Vt. 624, 538 A.2d 168 (1987); Couse v. Town of Leicester, 156 Vt. 570, 593 A.2d 473 (1991); Miller v. Town of West Windsor, 167 Vt. 588, 704 A.2d 1170 (mem.) (1997); USGen New Eng., Inc. v. Town of Rockingham, 176 Vt. 104, 838 A.2d 927 (2003).