Chapter 1. Supreme Court

§ 1. Unified court system established.

The Judiciary shall be a unified court system under the administrative control of the Supreme Court. It shall consist of an appellate division, which shall be the Supreme Court, and a trial division, which shall consist of a trial court of general jurisdiction to be known as the Superior Court, and a Judicial Bureau.

HISTORY: Amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1368. P.L. § 1334. G.L. § 1574. P.S. § 1320. 1906, No. 63 , § 1. V.S. § 989. R.L. § 778. 1870, No. 1 , § 16. G.S. 30, § 1. R.S. 25, § 1. R. 1797, p. 76, § 6. 1791, p. 15. R. 1787, p. 43.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

§ 2. Supreme Court established; jurisdiction.

  1. The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from judgments, rulings, and orders of the Superior Court, administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers unless otherwise provided by law.
  2. The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Superior Court, of proceedings in certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto and shall have jurisdiction to issue all writs, processes, and orders that may be necessary to the furtherance of justice and the regular execution of the law.

HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. March 29, 1972; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1372. 1947, No. 202 , § 1406. P.L. § 1338. G.L. § 1578. 1917, No. 254 , § 1539. P.S. § 1324. V.S. § 993. R.L. § 782. G.S. 30, § 11. R.S. 25, § 6. 1824, p. 19, § 2. 1820, p. 10, § 1. R. 1797, p. 76, § 6. 1791, p. 16. R. 1787, p. 44.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.) Added “supreme court established” in the section heading, and deleted “the district court and all other courts” following “superior court” in subsec. (a).

—1973 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “superior court” for “county courts” preceding “the district” in subsec. (a) and preceding “of proceedings” in subsec. (b).

—1971 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

CROSS REFERENCES

Supreme Court jurisdiction, see Vt. Const. Ch. II, § 30.

ANNOTATIONS

Certiorari.

In a petition for extraordinary relief brought by teacher against school board for failure to renew her teaching contract, the teacher’s case was properly viewed as a petition to the Superior Court for review under V.R.C.P. 75, governing review of governmental action in the nature of a writ of certiorari, since review of school board decisions under section 1752 of Title 16, governing grounds and procedures for suspension and dismissal, may be obtained by a writ of certiorari as provided by this section. Burroughs v. West Windsor Board of School Directors, 141 Vt. 234, 446 A.2d 377, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 505 (1982).

Absent other methods of appeal, important questions of law, unlike issues of fact, are subject to review on certiorari. In re Davenport, 129 Vt. 546, 283 A.2d 452, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 303 (1971).

Issuance of writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but rather is largely discretionary depending on the merits of the case made by the petition and record. In re Davenport, 129 Vt. 546, 283 A.2d 452, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 303 (1971).

Teachers suspended by superintendent on direction of school board, and, after statutory hearing on appeal to school board, dismissed from the faculty, had right to petition for certiorari to review suspension and dismissal. In re Davenport, 129 Vt. 546, 283 A.2d 452, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 303 (1971).

Change of venue.

Supreme court had power to transfer venue of criminal trial after assistant judge, who was disqualified by presiding judge for alleged improper action with respect to an interlocutory appeal, filed a petition in Supreme Court challenging disqualification. State v. Hunt, 150 Vt. 483, 555 A.2d 369, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 213 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1026, 109 S. Ct. 1155, 103 L. Ed. 2d 214, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 790 (1989).

Concurrent jurisdiction.

Petitions for extraordinary relief should ordinarily be addressed to the Superior Courts. Pfeil v. Rutland District Court, 147 Vt. 305, 515 A.2d 1052, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 419 (1986).

Construction with other laws.

Section 9817 of Title 32, making appeal to the Superior Court the exclusive remedy for review of a decision of the Commissioner of Taxes, precluded direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of the Commissioner, but not an appeal from a subsequent Superior Court decision. International Business Machines Corp. v. Department of Taxes, 133 Vt. 269, 336 A.2d 158, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 381 (1975).

Interlocutory appeals.

Jurisdictional scheme for appeals in Vermont is that a final judgment is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction unless the narrow circumstances authorizing an interlocutory appeal are present, and Supreme Court has broad authorization to adopt rules regarding the procedure for taking appeals from orders that are not final judgments. In re J.G., 160 Vt. 250, 627 A.2d 362, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 50 (1993).

For order to be reviewable before final judgment, it must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from merits of action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. State v. Fisher, 150 Vt. 655, 555 A.2d 368, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 194 (1988) (mem.).

Trial court’s denial of request for disqualification of county State’s Attorney’s Office was not reviewable collateral order since it would be reviewable on appeal from final judgment. State v. Fisher, 150 Vt. 655, 555 A.2d 368, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 194 (1988) (mem.).

This section gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction to entertain interlocutory appeals. State v. Springer, 139 Vt. 471, 431 A.2d 460, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 499 (1981).

Juvenile proceedings.

State’s appeal from final judgment of District Court, dismissing juvenile proceeding, properly brought case before Supreme Court. In re F.E.F., 156 Vt. 503, 594 A.2d 897, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 100 (1991).

Resentencing.

When defendant was convicted on two counts of boating while intoxicated, and the second count was reversed on appeal because both convictions arose out of the same incident, the court had the power to order resentencing on the remaining count when the trial court had sentenced defendant on the first count based on harm to only one of the two victims. Defendant by appealing his convictions placed the entire judgment in issue, and the holding on appeal in no way decreased his culpability or called into question the sentencing judge’s assessment of the scope of the necessary punishment. State v. Martin, 2009 VT 15, 185 Vt. 286, 973 A.2d 56, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 10 (2009).

Right of appeal.

Under the authority granted to the court to issue orders that might be necessary to the furtherance of justice, the facts warranted reinstatement of petitioner’s right of appeal from his first postconviction relief petition, as this and the underlying case had been plagued by extraordinary delay, the error of appointed counsel in failing to file a timely notice of appeal was inexcusable, and petitioner had received no help in regaining his appeal right. The failure here was not simply of the assigned counsel to timely file a notice of appeal but of the whole system thereafter to protect petitioner’s rights. In re Babson, 2014 VT 105, 197 Vt. 535, 107 A.3d 339, 2014 Vt. LEXIS 105 (2014).

When a defendant challenges his convictions in a case where his sentences are interdependent, that challenge necessitates review and redetermination of the full sentencing package. Remands are therefore necessary in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction, and to ensure the regular execution of the law; the District Court, although its power to resentence is limited, may be imbued with that power by a proper order of the Supreme Court of Vermont. State v. Martin, 2009 VT 15, 185 Vt. 286, 973 A.2d 56, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 10 (2009).

Termination of parental rights.

Where mother wrote her attorney prior to a decision terminating her rights in her children asking him to appeal the anticipated order and the attorney missed the appeal deadline and where mother was reasonably prompt in attempting to perfect her appeal after she received notice of the decision, considering the important rights at stake, the reasons for mother’s untimely appeal and the fact that the parties argued the merits of mother’s appeal in their briefs, the substance of mother’s appeal was addressed to advance the interests of justice and fundamental fairness. In re A.D.T., 174 Vt. 369, 817 A.2d 20, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 319 (2002).

Transfer of cause.

Although 12 V.S.A. § 2555 provides a right of appeal from the Probate Court to the Superior Court, where one of the parties appealed a decision of the Probate Court to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Probate Court did not have jurisdiction to determine title to a particular piece of property, the Supreme Court, upon holding that the probate did have such jurisdiction, and pursuant to its supervisory authority and the request of all parties, properly transferred the cause to the Superior Court for a de novo trial on the issue of ownership. In re Estate of Piche, 166 Vt. 479, 697 A.2d 674, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 108 (1997).

Cited.

Cited in Shumway v. Sargeant, 27 Vt. 440, 1855 Vt. LEXIS 53 (1855); In re Kennedy, 55 Vt. 1, 1883 Vt. LEXIS 2 (1883); Davidson v. Whitehill, 87 Vt. 499, 89 A. 1081, 1914 Vt. LEXIS 267 (1914); St. George v. Larson, 125 Vt. 352, 215 A.2d 511, 1965 Vt. LEXIS 254 (1965); In re M. and G., 132 Vt. 410, 321 A.2d 19, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 360 (1974); Crabbe v. Veve Associates, 145 Vt. 641, 497 A.2d 366, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 412 (1985); In re Estate of Johnson, 158 Vt. 557, 613 A.2d 703, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 88 (1992); State v. Forte, 159 Vt. 550, 624 A.2d 352, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 23 (1993).

§ 3. Judicial officers; administrative and disciplinary control.

The Supreme Court shall have administrative and disciplinary control of all judicial officers of the State, in addition to and not inconsistent with the constitutional powers of the General Assembly in those matters. It shall adopt and promulgate a Code of Judicial Ethics which shall be binding on those officers for disciplinary purposes. It may issue rules and regulations providing for the exercise of disciplinary control, including providing for the manner of making and disposing of complaints of violations of judicial ethics, a committee of the Judiciary for determining issues raised by complaints, and imposing sanctions, including when appropriate suspension from judicial duties for the balance of the term of the judicial officer charged.

HISTORY: 1965, No. 194 , § 14.

History

Revision note

—2017. Deleted “, but not limited to,” following “including” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 2a .

CROSS REFERENCES

Code of Judicial Conduct, see Administrative Order No. 10, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

Judicial Ethics Committee, see Administrative Order No. 35, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

Rules for Disciplinary Control, see Rules of the Supreme Court for Disciplinary Control of Judges.

ANNOTATIONS

Authority over judges.

There is little question that the Vermont Constitution, statutes, and Code of Judicial Conduct vest plenary authority in the Supreme Court of Vermont to exercise disciplinary control over all functions of assistant judges, administrative, adjudicative and otherwise. In re Boardman, 2009 VT 42, 186 Vt. 176, 979 A.2d 1010, 2009 Vt. LEXIS 46 (2009).

Construction with other law.

This section was intended to grant the Supreme Court the power to use the full range of sanctions authorized by the Constitution. In re Hill, 152 Vt. 576, 569 A.2d 446, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 245 (1989).

Jurisdiction of supreme court.

Fact that a judge has left the bench does not preclude the Supreme Court from exercising jurisdiction to discipline judges for conduct committed during their judicial tenure. In re Steady, 161 Vt. 636, 641 A.2d 117, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 29 (1994) (mem.).

Suspension.

This section gives a broad grant of disciplinary authority that specifies the power to suspend in certain circumstances, but does not limit use of the suspension sanction to those circumstances. In re Hill, 152 Vt. 576, 569 A.2d 446, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 245 (1989).

Cited.

Cited in In re Douglas, 135 Vt. 585, 382 A.2d 215, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 684 (1977); In re Mandeville, 144 Vt. 608, 481 A.2d 1048, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 536 (1984); In re Crushed Rock, Inc., 150 Vt. 613, 557 A.2d 84, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 226 (1988); In re Hill, 152 Vt. 548, 568 A.2d 361, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 220 (1989); In re O'Dea, 159 Vt. 590, 622 A.2d 507, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 20 (1993).

§ 4. Justices.

  1. The Supreme Court shall consist of one Chief Justice and four Associate Justices, appointed in accordance with the Constitution and chapter 15 of this title or retained in office under subsection (c) of this section.
  2. When the Office of Chief Justice becomes vacant for any reason, the duties of that Office shall forthwith devolve upon the Justice with the longest period of service on the Supreme Court until the appointment of a Chief Justice in accordance with the Constitution.
  3. A Supreme Court Justice may file in the Office of the Secretary of State, on or before September 1 of the year preceding the expiration of the term for which he or she was appointed or retained, a declaration that he or she will be a candidate for retention.  However, a Justice appointed and having taken the oath of office after September 1 of the year preceding the expiration of the term of office shall automatically be a candidate for retention without filing notice.  When a Justice files such a declaration, his or her name shall be submitted to the General Assembly for a vote on retention.  The General Assembly shall vote upon one ballot on the question “Shall the following Supreme Court Justices be retained in office?” The names of the Justices shall be followed by “Yes  _______________  No  _______________  .” If a majority of those voting on the question vote against retention, upon expiration of the term of office a vacancy shall exist which shall be filled by appointment in accordance with the Constitution and chapter 15 of this title; if the majority vote is in favor of retention, the Justice shall, unless removed for cause, remain in office for another term, and, at its end, shall be eligible for retention in office in the manner herein prescribed.
  4. The Court Administrator shall notify the Secretary of State whenever a Justice is appointed and takes the oath of office after September 1 of the year preceding the expiration of the term of office to which the Justice has succeeded thereby resulting in automatic notification of an intention to continue in office. Whenever a Justice files a declaration under subsection (c) of this section, or notification occurs automatically, the Secretary of State shall notify the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Office of Legislative Counsel, and the Office of Legislative Operations forthwith.

HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 306 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1969, No. 125 , § 8; 1975, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1981, No. 3 , § 1; 1985, No. 98 , § 1; 2019, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 21.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1369. P.L. § 1335. G.L. § 1575. 1915, No. 1 , § 3. 1908, No. 57 , § 1. P.S. § 1321. 1906, No. 63 , § 2. V.S. § 990. R.L. § 779. 1870, No. 1 , § 16. G.S. 30, § 1. 1857, No. 1 , § 1. 1849, No. 40 , § 1. R.S. 25, § 1. 1828, No. 1 . 1824, p. 18, § 1. R. 1797, p. 76, § 6. 1791, p. 15. R. 1787, p. 43.

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): In the second sentence, inserted “the Office of Legislative Counsel,” and substituted “Office of Legislative Operations” for “Legislative Council”.

—1985. Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

Subsec. (d): Substituted “after September 1 of the year preceding” for “less than 90 days before” preceding “the expiration of the term” in the first sentence and, in the second sentence, deleted “and” preceding “the speaker of the house”, inserted “and the legislative council” thereafter, and deleted “after they take office” following “forthwith”.

—1981. Subsec. (c): Added the second sentence.

Subsec. (d): Added the first sentence and inserted “or notification occurs automatically” following “subsection (c)” in the second sentence.

—1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “appointed” for “elected” preceding “in accordance with the constitution” and added “and chapter 15 of this title or retained in office under subsection (c) of this section” thereafter.

Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

Subsec. (c): Inserted “or retained” following “appointed” and made other minor stylistic changes in the first sentence, substituted “for a vote on his retention” for “on the same date that members of the judiciary are elected” following “assembly” in the second sentence, and “appointment in accordance with the constitution and chapter 15” for “election under section 573” following “filled by” in the fifth sentence.

—1969. Subsec. (c): Substituted “ninety” for “sixty” preceding “days before the” and “expiration” for “end” thereafter and deleted “elected or” preceding “appointed” in the first sentence, substituted “same date that” for “day for election of” preceding “members of the judiciary” in the second sentence and added “are elected” thereafter, rewrote the third sentence, and added the fourth sentence.

—1967 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 3 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Filling judicial vacancies, see Vt. Const. Ch. II, § 32.

Election of state and judicial officers by General Assembly, see 2 V.S.A. § 10 .

Special assignment of judicial officers, see § 22 of this title.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in Peck v. Douglas, 148 Vt. 128, 530 A.2d 551, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 463 (1987); State v. Mills, 167 Vt. 365, 706 A.2d 953, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 1 (1998).

Law Reviews —

For note, “Judicial Tenure in Vermont: Does Good Behavior Merit Retention?,” see 24 Vt. L. Rev. 1321 (2000).

§ 5. Term of Justices.

  1. The term of the Justices, except in case of an appointment to fill a vacancy, shall be for a term of six years from and including April 1 in the year of such appointment or retention under subsection 4(c) of this title.  When a Justice of the Supreme Court, who has sat at the hearing of a cause, retires from office before such cause is decided, the Justice shall remain a member of such Court for the purpose of assisting in the decision thereof and of signing the entry order, provided that such service may extend only to the following term of Court.  For such service the Justice shall receive a reasonable compensation to be fixed by the Justices of such Court and reasonable expenses while on office business.
  2. A justice shall remain in office until a successor is appointed and qualified, unless sooner removed for cause or unless he resigns.

HISTORY: Amended 1975, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1985, No. 98 , § 2.

History

Source.

1955, No. 13 . 1949, No. 5 , § 3. V.S. 1947, § 1371. P.L. § 1337. G.L. § 1577. 1915, No. 83 , § 1. P.S. § 1323. V.S. § 992. R.L. § 781. 1870, No. 1 , § 18. G.S. 126, § 15. 1858, No. 43 , § 1.

Amendments

—1985. Subsec. (a): Substituted “April 1” for “March 1” in the first sentence, “the justice” for “he” preceding “shall remain” in the second sentence and preceding “shall receive” in the third sentence and deleted “his” preceding “reasonable expenses” in the third sentence.

—1975 (Adj. Sess.) Designated existing provisions of section as subsec. (a), rewrote the first sentence of that subsec., and added subsec. (b).

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 4 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Filling judicial vacancies and interim judicial appointments, see Vt. Const. Ch. II, §§ 32 and 33.

Mandatory retirement, see Vt. Const. Ch. II, § 35.

ANNOTATIONS

Constitutionality.

Subsection (a) of this section, requiring justices, who assume office as successors to justices who leave the bench prior to the end of their term, to serve out the unexpired term of their predecessor rather than be appointed to an initial six-year term of their own, is constitutional. Peck v. Douglas, 148 Vt. 128, 530 A.2d 551, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 463 (1987).

Composition of court.

The power to decide when to include former justices in the composition of the Supreme Court is a judicial power that does not belong to the legislative branch of government and cannot be exercised by it. Wolfe v. Yudichak, 153 Vt. 235, 571 A.2d 592, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 285 (1989).

§ 6. Disqualification of Justices.

A Justice of the Supreme Court shall not be an officer in a railroad, banking, or insurance corporation in this State.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1370. P.L. § 1336. G.L. § 1576. 1915, No. 1 , § 3. P.S. § 1322. 1906, No. 63 , § 9. V.S. § 991. R.L. § 780. 1878, No. 101 .

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 5 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Motion for disqualification of Justice, see V.R.A.P. 27.1.

Disqualification of Justice who participated in prehearing conference, see V.R.A.P. 33(d).

Code of Judicial Conduct, see Administrative Order No. 10, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

Disqualification of Justice for conflict of interest generally, see 12 V.S.A. § 61 .

Justice acting as referee, auditor, commissioner or master, see 12 V.S.A. § 62 .

Nisi prius judge sitting in banc or on appeal, see 12 V.S.A. § 63 .

§ 7. Repealed. 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 22.

History

Former § 7. Former § 7, relating to superior or district judges sitting in place of disabled or disqualified supreme court justices, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1375; P.L. § 1341; G.L. § 1581; 1915, No. 1 , § 3; 1912, No. 89 , § 1; P.S. § 1327; 1906, No. 63 , § 7 and amended by 1969, No. 125 , § 1.

§ 8. General and special terms.

The terms of the Supreme Court and times and places of those terms shall be stated by administrative order of the Supreme Court. The Court Administrator shall act as Clerk of the Supreme Court.

HISTORY: Amended 1963, No. 15 , § 1; 1967, No. 174 , § 1; 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Source.

1957, No. 26 . V.S. 1947, § 1373. 1935, No. 44 , § 1. P.L. § 1339. G.L. § 1579. 1910, No. 78 , § 1. 1908, No. 58 , § 1. P.S. §§ 1325, 4447. 1906, No. 63 , § 3. 1906, No. 118 , § 23. 1898, No. 36 , § 2. V.S. §§ 994, 3868. 1892, No. 28 , § 1. 1888, No. 160 . 1886, No. 70 . 1884, Nos. 150, 151. 1882, Nos. 93, 94, 95. R.L. §§ 783, 3404. 1876, No. 114 . 1874, Nos. 45, 46, 48. 1872, No. 2 , § 7. 1866, No. 47 . 1865, No. 3 , § 5. G.S. 30, § 7.

Amendments

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1967. Rewrote the third sentence.

—1963. Substituted “February, April, June, October and December” for “January, May, September and November and the first Wednesday in March” following “Tuesday in” in the first sentence.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 7 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Terms of Supreme Court, see Administrative Order No. 21, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in Tucker v. Eden, 68 Vt. 168, 34 A. 698, 1896 Vt. LEXIS 67 (1896).

§§ 9-12. Repealed. 1977, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

History

Former §§ 9-12. Former § 9, relating to time and place of hearing causes, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1374; 1935, No. 44 , § 2; P.L. § 1340; G.L. § 1580; 1908, No. 58 , § 2; P.S. § 1326; 1906, No. 63 , § 4; 1898, No. 36 , § 2; V.S. § 994; 1892, No. 28 , § 1; No. 31; R.L. § 784; G.S. 30, § 7; 1860, No. 7 ; 1859, No. 8 , § 3; 1857, No. 1 , §§ 5, 6 and amended by 1959, No. 262 , § 37.

Former § 10, relating to causes heard at stated terms, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1380; P.L. § 1346; G.L. § 1586; P.S. § 1333; V.S. § 998; R.L. § 789; G.S. 30, § 8; 1859, No. 8 , § 2.

Former § 11, relating to causes retained for consultation, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1381; P.L. § 1347; G.L. § 1587; P.S. § 1334; V.S. § 999; R.L. § 790; G.S. 30, § 10; 1859, No. 8 , § 5 and amended by 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

Former § 12, relating to a mandate or judgment order filed in vacation, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1382; P.L. § 1348; G.L. § 1588; 1917, No. 254 , § 1549; P.S. § 1335; V.S. § 1000; 1888, No. 64 , § 1.

§§ 13-15. Repealed. 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 237, eff. March 29, 1972.

History

Former §§ 13-15. Former § 13, relating to dockets, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1376; P.L. § 1342; 1933, No. 31 ; G.L. § 1582; 1915, No. 1 , § 3; P.S. § 1328; 1906, No. 63 , § 21; V.S. § 995; 1892, No. 28 , § 3. The subject matter is now covered by V.R.A.P. 45(b).

Former § 14, relating to files and papers, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1377; P.L. § 1343; G.L. § 1583; 1915, No. 1 , § 3; P.S. § 1330; 1906, No. 63 , § 22; V.S. § 997; R.L. § 786; G.S. 30, § 9; 1859, No. 8 , § 4; 1857, No. 1 , § 8. The subject matter is now covered by V.R.A.P. 10(b) and 45(d).

Former § 15, relating to furnishing briefs to the clerk, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1378; P.L. § 1344; G.L. § 1584; P.S. § 1331; R. 1906, § 1237; 1896, No. 26 , § 1. The subject matter is now covered by V.R.A.P. 31.

§ 16. Repealed. 2021, No. 53, § 8 and 2021, No. 66, § 7, effective June 7, 2021.

History

Former § 16. Former § 16, relating to briefs and other papers kept in the State Library, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1379; P.L. § 1345; G.L. § 1585; P.S. § 1332; 1896, No. 26 , § 2 and amended by 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(c); 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 7 and by 1983, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b).

§ 17. Reporter of decisions; appointment.

The Justices of the Supreme Court shall in each even year appoint a reporter of the decisions of the Court and may fill a vacancy in such office.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1414. P.L. § 1380. G.L. § 1617. 1915, No. 1 , § 3. P.S. § 1364. V.S. § 1018. R.L. § 807. 1876, No. 113 . 1870, No. 1 , § 9. G.S. 8, § 67. R.S. 8, § 46. 1837, No. 9 , § 1. 1827, No. 4 . 1823, p. 9.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 16 .

§ 18. Opinions; filing and preservation; copies.

  1. Each opinion of the Supreme Court shall be signed by one or more of the Justices and filed with the reporter of decisions.
  2. When a volume of the Vermont Reports has been published, the reporter shall transmit for preservation the original opinions in the cases printed therein to the clerk of the general term.
  3. On tender of the fees therefor, the reporter or clerk shall furnish a certified copy of any opinion to any person applying for the same.
  4. The reporter shall forthwith furnish the Commissioner of Labor, free of charge, copies of all opinions filed involving the administration of the labor laws of the State.

HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. March 29, 1972; 2005, No. 103 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 5, 2006.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, §§ 1383, 1417. P.L. §§ 1349, 1383. 1923, No. 41 , § 1. G.L. §§ 1589, 1620. 1917, No. 254 , § 1550. 1917, No. 74 , § 1. 1915, No. 1 , § 3. 1912, No. 88 .

Editor’s note—

Reference to clerk of the general term in subsec. (b) is obsolete.

Amendments

—2005 (Adj. Sess.) Subsec. (d): Deleted “and industry” following “commissioner of labor”.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted the second sentence.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 17 .

§ 19. Repealed. 1977, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

History

Former § 19. Former § 19, relating to reports of opinions by justices and furnishing of certificates to the commissioner of finance, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1415; P.L. § 1381; G.L. § 1618; 1915, No. 1 , § 3; P.S. § 1365; V.S. § 1019; R.L. § 808; G.S. 30 §§ 15, 16; 1846, No. 4 , § 1; R.S. 8, § 50; 1837, No. 9 , § 4; 1827, No. 4 , § 1 and amended by 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(c).

§ 20. Reports of decisions.

The reporter shall annually prepare the decisions of the Court for publication, read the proof, and superintend the printing and binding thereof. All causes decided shall be reported within one year after the decisions are made.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1416. P.L. § 1382. G.L. § 1619. 1917, No. 74 . P.S. § 1366. V.S. § 1020. R.L. § 809. 1878, No. 128 , § 1. G.S. 8, § 68. 1938, No. 2 , § 1. R.S. 8, § 47. 1837, No. 9 , § 2. 1829, No. 3 , § 1. 1823, p. 9.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 19 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Publication of Vermont Reports, see 29 V.S.A. § 1191 .

§ 21. Court Administrator.

The Office of Court Administrator is hereby created. He or she shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Supreme Court which shall fix his or her salary and prescribe his or her duties from time to time. He or she shall devote full time to his or her official duties to the exclusion of engagement in any other business or profession for profit.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 174 , § 2.

History

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 20 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Court Administrator to act as Clerk of the Supreme Court, see § 8 of this title.

Responsibilities relating to Budgetary and Fiscal Operations and Personnel Administration, see Administrative Order No. 3, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

Supervision of Court Reporters, see Administrative Order No. 19, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

§ 21a. Duties of the Administrative Judge.

  1. The Administrative Judge shall assign and specially assign Superior judges, including himself or herself, and Environmental judges to the Superior Court. All Superior judges except Environmental judges shall be subject to the requirements of rotation as ordered by the Supreme Court. Assignments made pursuant to the rotation schedule shall be subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
  2. In making any assignment under this section, the Administrative Judge shall give consideration to the experience, temperament, and training of a judge and the needs of the court. In making an assignment to the Environmental Division, the Administrative Judge shall give consideration to experience and expertise in environmental and land use law and shall assign or specially assign judges in a manner to provide appropriate attention to all geographic areas of the State.
  3. In making any assignments to the Environmental Division under this section, the Administrative Judge shall regularly assign two judges, at least one of whom shall be an Environmental judge. An Environmental judge may be assigned to other divisions in the Superior Court for a period of time not exceeding two years. When assigned to other divisions in the Superior Court, the Environmental judge shall have all the powers and responsibilities of a Superior judge.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Oct. 1, 1990; amended 1993, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 40; 1995, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 20; 1999, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 71, eff. May 24, 2000; 2001, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 71, eff. June 27, 2002; 2003, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, eff. Jan. 31, 2005; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

Subsec. (b): Substituted “division” for “court” following “environmental” and added “and shall assign or specially assign judges in a manner to provide appropriate attention to all geographic areas of the state” following “land use law” in the second sentence.

Subsec. (c): Substituted “division” for “court” following “environmental” and “assign two judges, at least” for “assign both environmental judges through August 2008 and a minimum of two judges thereafter, at least” in the first sentence, “assigned to other divisions in the superior court for a” for “assigned to another other divisions in the superior court only with the judge’s consent and for a” in the second sentence, and added the third sentence.

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “Environmental judges” for “the Environmental judge” in the first sentence.

Subsec. (b): Added the second sentence.

Subsec. (c): Added.

—2001 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “superior and district judges” following “shall assign” and substituted “to the superior, district and family courts” for “to the family court” in the first sentence.

Subsec. (b): Substituted “and training of a judge and the needs of the court” for “training, and willingness of a judge to serve in the family court” following “temperament” in the first sentence.

—1995 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in In re O'Dea, 159 Vt. 590, 622 A.2d 507, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 20 (1993).

§ 22. Designation and special assignment of judicial officers and retired judicial officers.

    1. The Chief Justice may appoint and assign a retired Justice or judge with his or her consent or a Superior or Probate judge to a special assignment on the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice may appoint, and the Administrative Judge shall assign, an active or retired Justice or a retired judge, with his or her consent, to any special assignment in the Superior Court or the Judicial Bureau. (a) (1) The Chief Justice may appoint and assign a retired Justice or judge with his or her consent or a Superior or Probate judge to a special assignment on the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice may appoint, and the Administrative Judge shall assign, an active or retired Justice or a retired judge, with his or her consent, to any special assignment in the Superior Court or the Judicial Bureau.
    2. The Administrative Judge may appoint and assign a judge to any special assignment in the Superior Court. As used in this subdivision, a judge shall include a Superior judge, a Probate judge, a Family Division magistrate, or a judicial hearing officer.
  1. The Administrative Judge may appoint and assign a member of the Vermont Bar residing within the State of Vermont to serve temporarily as:
    1. an acting judge in Superior Court;
    2. an acting magistrate;
    3. an acting Probate judge; or
    4. an acting hearing officer to hear cases in the Judicial Bureau.
  2. Special assignments may be made as a result of the disqualification, disability, or death of a Justice or judge, or because of the vacancy of a judicial office, or because the business of the court requires. When so designated and assigned and in the actual performance of those judicial duties, an appointee shall have all the powers and authority of the assigned judicial office, but not otherwise and shall retain them until the duties devolving upon him or her are fully performed. A designated and assigned Justice or judge or acting judge shall not be counted in the number of Justices or judges provided by law.
  3. [Repealed.]
  4. The Supreme Court shall develop and provide whatever judicial training it deems necessary to enable persons who are specially assigned under this section to carry out their assigned judicial duties.
  5. In making an appointment under subsection (b) of this section, the Administrative Judge shall apply the criteria and standards for judicial appointments contained in section 601 of this title.

HISTORY: Added 1973, No. 268 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 1, 1974; amended 1977, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1995, No. 59 , § 1; 1995, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 1997, No. 5 , §§ 1, 2, eff. April 8, 1997; 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2001, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 72, eff. June 27, 2002; 2003, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 8, eff. Jan. 31, 2005; 2005, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. May 20, 2006; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2013, No. 170 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 2014.

History

Amendments

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1): Substituted “Superior or Probate judge” for “superior judge” following “his or her consent or a”.

Subdiv. (a)(2): Substituted “The Administrative Judge may appoint and” for “The administrative judge shall” at the beginning, and added the second sentence.

Subdiv. (b)(3): Added, and redesignated former subdiv. (b)(3) as present (b)(4).

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “or district judge” following “superior judge” in the first sentence, substituted “the superior court or the judicial bureau” for “the district, family, environmental or superior courts” in the second sentence, deleted “district, family, environmental or” preceding “superior court” in the third sentence, and deleted the fourth and fifth sentences.

Subsec. (b): Deleted “a district, family, environmental, or” preceding “superior court” in subdiv. (b)(1).

—2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Repealed.

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(1): Inserted “environmental,” following “family,”.

—2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “environmental” preceding “or Superior Court” in the third sentence, and deleted the last sentence, which provided that the Environmental judge would sit in environmental court.

—1997 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “judicial bureau” for “traffic and municipal ordinance bureau” in subdiv. (b)(3) and subsec. (d).

—1997. Subsec. (b): Substituted “state of Vermont” for “territorial unit” following “residing within the” in the introductory paragraph and deleted “involving traffic and civil ordinance violations” following “hear cases” in subdiv. (3).

Subsec. (f): Added.

—1995 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “environmental” following “family” in the third sentence and added the sixth sentence.

Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

—1995. Section amended generally.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1977 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

CROSS REFERENCES

Compensation for special assignments, see § 23 of this title.

Special assignment of assistant judges of the Superior Court, see § 111(c) of this title.

ANNOTATIONS

Composition of court.

The power to decide when to include former justices in the composition of the Supreme Court is a judicial power that does not belong to the legislative branch of government and cannot be exercised by it. Wolfe v. Yudichak, 153 Vt. 235, 571 A.2d 592, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 285 (1989).

Disqualification.

Principle of necessity required that Supreme Court justices sit on a case challenging the constitutionality of a moratorium on civil jury trials which had been ordered by the court; since the challenged actions were taken by the justices in their official capacity, appointment of substitute justices would not eliminate the asserted disqualification to act. In re Vermont Supreme Court Administrative Directive No. 17, 154 Vt. 217, 576 A.2d 127, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 71 (1990).

Cited.

Cited in State v. Mills, 167 Vt. 365, 706 A.2d 953, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 1 (1998).

§ 23. Compensation.

In the performance of judicial duties, the specially assigned judicial officer shall be entitled to a per diem equal to the daily compensation authorized for the judicial position to which he or she is assigned and necessary expenses. An acting judge in Criminal Division of the Superior Court shall receive $75.00 a day and necessary expenses. Payment of compensation for special judicial assignments shall not diminish the retirement compensation of retired judicial officers. However, a retired judicial officer shall not receive total annual compensation in excess of the annual salary of a Superior Judge. Active judicial officers shall receive the compensation of their regular judicial office or that of the office to which they are specially assigned, whichever is greater.

HISTORY: Added 1973, No. 268 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. April 1, 1974; amended 1977, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2009, No. 154 , § 238.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “criminal division of the superior court” for “district court” in the second sentence.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Added the second sentence.

—1977 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

CROSS REFERENCES

Salaries of justices and judges, see 32 V.S.A. § 1003 .

§ 24. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former § 24. Former § 24, relating to designation and special assignment of district or superior judge to hear child support enforcement actions, was derived from 1985, No. 63 , § 2.

§ 25. Judicial Branch; furlough days; administrative leave.

  1. The Supreme Court is authorized to declare up to 12 unpaid Judicial Branch furlough days in a fiscal year and on those days may close the courts in the State.  For purposes of implementing a furlough day, the Supreme Court is authorized to reduce on a daily or hourly basis all salaries established by 32 V.S.A. §§ 1003(c) , 1141, and 1142, and all other salaries paid by the Judicial Branch. Furlough days declared under this section shall have the same effect as holidays under 1 V.S.A. § 371 for the purpose of counting time under the Rules of Court Procedure and the Vermont Statutes Annotated.
  2. The Supreme Court is authorized to pay on an hourly basis all persons whose compensation is established by 32 V.S.A. §§ 1010 , 1511, and 1551 and 4 V.S.A. §§ 23 , 75, and 356.
  3. The Supreme Court may allow Supreme Court Justices, Superior judges, Environmental judges, magistrates, hearing officers, Probate judges, Superior Court clerks, or any State-compensated employees of the Judicial Branch not covered by a collective bargaining agreement to take an administrative leave of absence without pay, or with pay if the person is called to active duty in support of an extended national or State military operation. These judicial officers and State employees shall be entitled to be compensated in the same manner as Judicial Branch employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement called to active duty. The Court Administrator, at the direction of the Supreme Court, shall include provisions in the personnel rules of the Judiciary to administer these leaves of absence.

HISTORY: Added 1991, No. 50 , § 97a; amended 1991, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2003, No. 66 , § 114a; 2003, No. 122 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 99a, 100; 2005, No. 66 , § 4; 2009, No. 1 (Sp. Sess.), § E.204.1, eff. June 2, 2009; 2009, No. 1 54 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

History

Revision note—

In the third sentence of subsec. (a), substituted “ 1 V.S.A. § 371 ” for “ 3 V.S.A. § 371 ” to correct an error in the reference.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “superior judges, environmental judges, magistrates” for “superior court judges, district court judges, environmental court judges, magistrates”, deleted “court” following “probate” and substituted “state-compensated” for “state compensated” in the first sentence.

—2009. Subsec. (a): In the first sentence, inserted “may” preceding “close”; deleted “all” following “close” and “ 4 V.S.A. § 461(e) ” preceding “and all other”.

—2005. Subsec. (b): Deleted the second sentence.

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—2003. Subsec. (b): Inserted “1141” following “1010” and deleted “on the basis of a half-day minimum and hourly thereafter” from the end of the subsection.

—1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Deleted “1141” following “§§ 1010” in the first sentence and added the second sentence.

§ 26. Half-time judges.

Of the Superior judge positions authorized by this title, up to two may be shared, each by two half-time judges. Of the magistrate positions authorized by this title, one may be shared by two half-time magistrates. Of the hearing officer positions authorized by this title, one may be shared by two half-time hearing officers. Half-time Superior judges, magistrates, and hearing officers shall be paid proportionally and shall receive the same benefits as State employees who share a job. Half-time Superior judges, magistrates, and hearing officers shall not engage in the active practice of law for remuneration.

HISTORY: Added 1995, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; amended 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 36; 1999, No. 58 , § 1; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “and district” following “superior” in the first and second sentences, and inserted “superior” preceding “judges” in the last sentence.

—1999. Substituted “this title” for “Title 23” following “authorized by” in the third sentence.

—1997 (Adj. Sess.). Added the second and third sentences and inserted “magistrates and hearing officers” in the last two sentences.

§ 27. Court Technology Special Fund.

There is established the Court Technology Special Fund which shall be managed in accordance with 32 V.S.A. chapter 7, subchapter 5. Administrative fees collected pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7252 and revenue collected pursuant to fees established pursuant to sections 1105 and 1109 of this title shall be deposited and credited to this Fund. The Fund shall be available to the Judicial Branch to pay for contractual and operating expenses and project-related staffing not covered by the General Fund related to the following:

  1. The acquisition and maintenance of software and hardware needed for case management, electronic filing, an electronic document management system, and the expense of implementation, including training.
  2. The acquisition and maintenance of electronic audio and video court recording and conferencing equipment.
  3. The acquisition, maintenance, and support of the Judiciary’s information technology network, including training.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 65 , § 61; amended 2007, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.026.

History

Amendments

—2007 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “and project-related staffing” following “operating expenses” in the third sentence of the introductory paragraph.

§ 27a. Contracts for Internet service.

Every contract to provide broadband Internet access service, as defined in 3 V.S.A. § 348 (d)(1), for the Judicial Branch shall include terms and conditions requiring that the Internet service provider certify that it is in compliance with the consumer protection and net neutrality standards established in 3 V.S.A. § 348 .

HISTORY: Added 2017, No. 169 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

History

Application. 2017, No. 169 (Adj. Sess.), § 7 provides: “The requirements of Secs. 3-6 of this act [which enacted 3 V.S.A. § 349 , amended 22 V.S.A. § 901 , and enacted 2 V.S.A. § 754 and 4 V.S.A. § 27a ] shall apply to all government contracts for Internet service entered into or renewed on or after either April 15, 2019 or the date on which the Governor’s Executive Order No. 2-18 (Internet neutrality in State procurement) is revoked and rescinded, whichever is earlier.”

§ 27b. Electronically filed verified documents.

  1. A registered electronic filer in the Judiciary’s electronic document filing system may file any document that would otherwise require the approval or verification of a notary by filing the document with the following language inserted above the signature and date:

    “I declare that the above statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that if the above statement is false, I will be subject to the penalty of perjury.”

  2. A document filed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall not require the approval or verification of a notary.
  3. This section shall not apply to an affidavit in support of a search warrant application or to an application for a nontestimonial identification order.

HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 77 , § 4, eff. June 19, 2019.

History

Notarization; alternative filing requirements. 2019, No. 95 (Adj. Sess.), § 7 provides: “(a) As used in this section, ‘emergency period” means the period beginning with the Governor’s declaration of a state of emergency on March 13, 2020 arising from COVID-19 and ending 30 days after the Governor terminates the state of emergency by declaration.

“(b) During the emergency period, notwithstanding 4 V.S.A. § 27b :

“(1) A party may file any document that would otherwise require the approval or verification of a notary by filing the document with the following language inserted above the signature and date:

“ ‘I declare that the above statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that if the above statement is false, I will be subject to the penalty of perjury or other sanctions in the discretion of the court.’

“(2) A document filed pursuant to this subsection shall not require the approval or verification of a notary.

“(c) This section shall not apply to an affidavit in support of a search warrant application or to an application for a nontestimonial identification order.”

§ 28. Municipal Ticket Repayment Revolving Fund.

  1. The Municipal Ticket Repayment Revolving Fund is created for the purpose of facilitating the transfer of incorrectly deposited Judicial Bureau payments to the appropriate municipality. A municipality may request a loan from the Municipal Ticket Repayment Revolving Fund in the amount owed another municipality if the municipality requesting the loan:
    1. received payments from the Judicial Bureau that were actually owed to the other municipality for penalties collected by the Judicial Bureau for violations of an ordinance within the other municipality; and
    2. received such payments from the Judicial Bureau between June 30, 2004 and June 30, 2007.
  2. The Court Administrator shall have the authority to approve all loans from the Municipal Ticket Repayment Revolving Fund. To request a loan from the Fund, a municipality shall file an application on a form approved by the Court Administrator by July 1, 2008. The application shall contain the following information:
    1. an agreement, signed by both municipalities, defining the amount owed by one municipality to the other; and
    2. a plan for the municipality requesting the loan to repay the Fund by July 1, 2013. The plan may authorize the Court Administrator to withhold Judicial Bureau violation payments to the municipality requesting the loan for deposit into the Fund.
  3. The maximum loan balance at any time shall be $250,000.00 for one municipality and $400,000.00 for all municipalities. The Court Administrator shall administer the Municipal Ticket Repayment Revolving Fund and shall establish procedures to allocate the available funds fairly and equitably. Upon the recommendation of the Court Administrator, the Secretary of Administration shall approve spending in anticipation of receipts from the Fund up to a maximum of $220,000.00.
  4. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the sending or receiving municipality from otherwise agreeing on, or bringing a civil action to resolve, overpayment issues prior to June 30, 2004.
  5. Upon completion of the agreements authorized by this section, the remaining balance in the Fund shall be deposited in the Court Technology Special Fund pursuant to section 27 of this title.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 51 , § 16; amended 2007, No. 90 (Adj. Sess.), § 83, eff. March 6, 2008; 2013, No. 50 , § E.204.

History

Revision note

—2007. Redesignated as “ 4 V.S.A. § 28 ” to avoid conflict with the similarly designated “Court Technology Special Fund” [ 4 V.S.A. § 27 ] enacted by 2007, No. 65 , § 61.

Amendments

—2013. Subsec. (e): Added.

—2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “$250,000.00” for “$100,000.00” and added the second sentence.

§ 30. Superior Court.

    1. A Superior Court having statewide jurisdiction is created. The Superior Court shall have the following divisions: (a) (1) A Superior Court having statewide jurisdiction is created. The Superior Court shall have the following divisions:
      1. A Civil Division, which shall be a court of record and have jurisdiction over the matters described in section 31 of this title. The Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply in the Civil Division.
      2. A Criminal Division, which shall be a court of record and have jurisdiction over the matters described in section 32 of this title. The Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply to criminal matters in the Criminal Division, and the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to civil matters in the Criminal Division.
      3. A Family Division, which shall be a court of record and have jurisdiction over the matters described in section 33 of this title. The Vermont Rules of Family Procedure shall apply in the Family Division.
      4. An Environmental Division, which shall be a court of record and have jurisdiction over the matters described in section 34 of this title. The Vermont Rules for Environmental Proceedings shall apply in the Environmental Division.
      5. A Probate Division, which shall have jurisdiction over the matters described in section 35 of this title. The Vermont Rules of Probate Procedure shall apply in the Probate Division.
    2. The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules, subject to review by the Legislative Committee on Judicial Rules under 12 V.S.A. chapter 1, which establish criteria for the transfer of cases between divisions.
  1. The Supreme Court shall by rule divide the Superior Court into 14 geographical units which shall follow county lines, except that, subject to the venue requirements of subsection 1001(e) of this title, the Environmental Division shall be a court of statewide jurisdiction and shall not be otherwise divided into geographical units. The Superior Court shall be held in each unit of the State.
  2. Terms of the Superior Court shall be stated by administrative orders of the Supreme Court. The Court Administrator shall provide appropriate security services for each court in the State.

HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 7, 7a.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(1)(E): Added.

§ 31. Jurisdiction; Civil Division.

The Civil Division shall have:

  1. original and exclusive jurisdiction of all original civil actions, except as otherwise provided in sections 2, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 1102 of this title;
  2. appellate jurisdiction of causes, civil and criminal, appealable to the court;
  3. original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Supreme Court, of proceedings in certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto;
  4. exclusive jurisdiction to hear and dispose of any requests to modify or enforce orders in civil cases previously issued by the Superior or District Court other than orders relating to those actions listed in sections 437 and 454 of this title; and
  5. jurisdiction to hear and dispose of any other matter brought before the court pursuant to law that is not subject to the jurisdiction of another division.

HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 7b; amended 2013, No. 34 , § 1.

History

References in text.

Sections 437 and 454 of this title, referred to in subdiv. (4), were repealed by 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

Amendments

—2013. Subdiv. (5): Inserted “jurisdiction to hear and dispose of” preceding “any other matter brought”.

ANNOTATIONS

Jurisdiction.

Civil division has original and exclusive jurisdiction of all original civil actions, apart from certain exceptions; moreover, within that general jurisdiction, the divisions of the superior court have the power under the Declaratory Judgment Act to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. Hence, the civil division presumptively had jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action here, and defendant was required to preserve, by raising before the trial court, his contention that the court lacked authority under the circumstances of the case to adjudicate plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief. Burlington School District v. Provost, 2019 VT 87, 211 Vt. 277, 224 A.3d 841, 2019 Vt. LEXIS 172 (2019).

Through its 2009 reorganization of the Superior Court, the legislature not only divested the civil division of exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising under the chapter governing municipal and regional planning and development but also granted exclusive jurisdiction to the environmental division. When viewed together, the plain language of the statutes governing the jurisdiction of the civil and environmental divisions make this clear. Gould v. Town of Monkton, 2016 VT 84, 202 Vt. 535, 150 A.3d 1084, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 81 (2016).

§ 32. Jurisdiction; Criminal Division.

  1. The Criminal Division shall have jurisdiction to try, render judgment, and pass sentence in prosecutions for felonies and misdemeanors.
  2. The Criminal Division shall have jurisdiction to try and finally determine prosecutions for violations of bylaws or ordinances of a village, town, or city, except as otherwise provided.
  3. The Criminal Division shall have jurisdiction of the following civil actions:
    1. appeals of final decisions of the Judicial Bureau;
    2. DUI license suspension hearings filed pursuant to 23 V.S.A. chapter 24;
    3. extradition proceedings filed pursuant to 13 V.S.A. chapter 159;
    4. drug forfeiture proceedings under 18 V.S.A. chapter 84, subchapter 2;
    5. fish and wildlife forfeiture proceedings under 10 V.S.A. chapter 109;
    6. liquor forfeiture proceedings under 7 V.S.A. chapter 19;
    7. hearings relating to refusal to provide a DNA sample pursuant to 20 V.S.A. § 1935 ;
    8. automobile forfeiture and immobilization proceedings under 23 V.S.A. chapters 9 and 13;
    9. sex offender proceedings pursuant to 13 V.S.A. §§ 5411(e) and 5411d(f);
    10. restitution modification proceedings pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7043(k) ;
    11. municipal parking violation proceedings pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 1974a(e) , if the municipality has established an administrative procedure enabling a person to contest the violation, and the person has exhausted the administrative procedure;
    12. proceedings to enforce 9 V.S.A. chapter 74, relating to energy efficiency standards for appliances and equipment;
    13. proceedings to enforce 30 V.S.A. § 53 , relating to commercial building energy standards.

HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 7c.

History

Revision note

—2011. In subdiv. (c)(10), substituted “§ 7043(k)” for “§ 7043(h)” for purposes of clarity.

§ 33. Jurisdiction; Family Division.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the Family Division shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the following proceedings filed or pending on or after October 1, 1990:
    1. All desertion and support proceedings and all parentage actions filed pursuant to 15 V.S.A. chapter 5.
    2. All rights of married women proceedings filed pursuant to 15 V.S.A. chapter 3.
    3. All enforcement of support proceedings filed pursuant to Title 15B.
    4. All annulment and divorce proceedings filed pursuant to 15 V.S.A. chapter 11.
    5. All parent and child proceedings filed pursuant to 15 V.S.A. chapter 15.
    6. Grandparents’ visitation proceedings filed pursuant to 15 V.S.A. chapter 18.
    7. All uniform child custody proceedings filed pursuant to 15 V.S.A. chapter 20.
    8. All juvenile proceedings filed pursuant to 33 V.S.A. chapters 51, 52, and 53, including proceedings involving “youthful offenders” pursuant to 33 V.S.A. § 5281 whether the matter originated in the Criminal or Family Division of the Superior Court, except for a proceeding charging the holder of a commercial driver’s license as defined in 23 V.S.A. § 4103 with an offense or violation listed in 23 V.S.A. § 4116 that would result in the license holder being disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle if convicted.
    9. All enforcement of support proceedings filed pursuant to 33 V.S.A. chapter 39.
    10. All guardianship services proceedings for persons with developmental disabilities filed pursuant to 18 V.S.A. chapter 215.
    11. All mental health proceedings filed pursuant to 18 V.S.A. chapters 179, 181, and 185.
    12. All involuntary sterilization proceedings filed pursuant to 18 V.S.A. chapter 204.
    13. All care for persons with intellectual disabilities proceedings filed pursuant to 18 V.S.A. chapter 206.
    14. All abuse prevention proceedings filed pursuant to 15 V.S.A. chapter 21. Any Superior judge may issue orders for emergency relief pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 1104 .
    15. All abuse and exploitation proceedings filed pursuant to 33 V.S.A. chapter 69, subchapter 2.
    16. All proceedings relating to the dissolution of a civil union.
    17. All requests to modify or enforce orders previously issued by the District or Superior Court relating to any of the proceedings identified in subdivisions (1)-(16) of this subsection.
    18. Concurrent with the Probate Division, special immigration judicial determinations regarding the custody and care of children within the meaning of the federal Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (27)(J) and 8 C.F.R. § 204.11) issued pursuant to 14 V.S.A. chapter 111, subchapter 14.
  2. The Family Division has jurisdiction to hear and dispose of proceedings involving misdemeanor motor vehicle offenses filed or pending on or after July 1, 2016, pursuant to 33 V.S.A. §§ 5201 , 5203, and 5280. The Family Division of the Superior Court shall forward a record of any conviction for violation of a law related to motor vehicle traffic control, other than a parking violation, to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 1709 .

HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 7d; amended 2011, No. 29 , § 2; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; 2015, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 19; 2019, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 27, eff. Oct. 7, 2020; 2021, No. 65 , § 13, eff. June 7, 2021.

History

Amendments

—2021. Subdiv. (a)(8): Inserted “, except for a proceeding charging the holder of a commercial driver’s license as defined in 23 V.S.A. § 4103 with an offense or violation listed in 23 V.S.A. § 4116 that would result in the license holder being disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle if convicted”.

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(18): Added.

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Redesignated existing text as subsec. (a), and added subsec. (b).

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (10): Generally amended.

Subdiv (13): Generally amended.

—2011. Subdiv. (7): Substituted “20” for “19” following “chapter”.

ANNOTATIONS

Delinquency.

Statutory scheme in place when defendant was charged in 2010 for crimes he allegedly committed when he was a juvenile provided the family division with exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate charges alleging delinquent acts committed by defendants under the age of fourteen. The family division’s jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency proceedings is exclusive and takes precedence over any inconsistent criminal law provisions, but normally ends when the juvenile reaches eighteen years of age. In re D.K., 2012 VT 23, 191 Vt. 328, 47 A.3d 347, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 20 (2012).

§ 34. Jurisdiction; Environmental Division.

The Environmental Division shall have:

  1. jurisdiction of matters arising under 10 V.S.A. chapters 201 and 220;
  2. jurisdiction of matters arising under 24 V.S.A. chapter 61, subchapter 12 and chapter 117; and
  3. original jurisdiction to revoke permits under 10 V.S.A. chapter 151.

HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 7e.

ANNOTATIONS

Jurisdiction.

Because a landowner’s claim that new zoning regulations violated the chapter governing municipal and regional planning and development was a statutory claim—not a constitutional claim—it belonged in the Environmental Division. Gould v. Town of Monkton, 2016 VT 84, 202 Vt. 535, 150 A.3d 1084, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 81 (2016).

Through its 2009 reorganization of the Superior Court, the legislature not only divested the civil division of exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising under the chapter governing municipal and regional planning and development but also granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Environmental Division. When viewed together, the plain language of the statutes governing the jurisdiction of the civil and environmental divisions make this clear. Gould v. Town of Monkton, 2016 VT 84, 202 Vt. 535, 150 A.3d 1084, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 81 (2016).

§ 35. Jurisdiction; Probate Division.

The Probate Division shall have jurisdiction of:

  1. the probate of wills;
  2. the settlement of estates;
  3. the administration of trusts pursuant to Title 14A;
  4. trusts of absent persons’ estates;
  5. charitable, cemetery, and philanthropic trusts;
  6. the appointment of guardians, and of the powers, duties, and rights of guardians and wards;
  7. proceedings concerning 18 V.S.A. chapter 231;
  8. accountings of attorneys-in-fact where no guardian has been appointed and the agent has reason to believe the principal is incompetent;
  9. adoptions and relinquishment for adoption;
  10. uniform gifts to minors;
  11. changes of name;
  12. issuance of new birth certificates and amendment of birth certificates;
  13. correction or amendment of civil marriage certificates and death certificates;
  14. emergency waiver of premarital medical certificates;
  15. proceedings relating to cemetery lots;
  16. trusts relating to community mausoleums or columbaria;
  17. civil actions brought under 18 V.S.A. chapter 107, subchapter 3, relating to disposition of remains;
  18. proceedings relating to the conveyance of a homestead interest of a spouse under a legal disability;
  19. the issuance of declaratory judgments;
  20. issuance of certificates of public good authorizing the civil marriage of persons under 16 years of age;
  21. appointment of administrators to discharge mortgages held by deceased mortgagees;
  22. appointment of trustees for persons confined under sentences of imprisonment;
  23. fixation of compensation and expenses of boards of arbitrators of death taxes of Vermont domiciliaries;
  24. emancipation of minors proceedings filed pursuant to 12 V.S.A. chapter 217;
  25. grandparent visitation proceedings under 15 V.S.A. chapter 18;
  26. other matters as provided by law; and
  27. concurrent with the Family Division, special immigration judicial determinations regarding the custody and care of children within the meaning of the federal Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (27)(J) and 8 C.F.R. § 204.11) issued pursuant to 14 V.S.A. chapter 111, subchapter 14.

HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 7f, eff. Feb. 1, 2011; amended 2019, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 28, eff. Oct. 7, 2020.

History

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (27): Added.

§ 36. Composition of the court.

  1. Unless otherwise specified by law, when in session, a Superior Court shall consist of:
    1. For cases in the Civil or Family Division, one presiding Superior judge and two assistant judges, if available.
      1. For cases in the Family Division, except as provided in subdivision (B) of this subdivision (2), one presiding judicial officer and two assistant judges, if available. (2) (A) For cases in the Family Division, except as provided in subdivision (B) of this subdivision (2), one presiding judicial officer and two assistant judges, if available.
      2. The Family Division shall consist of one presiding judicial officer sitting alone in the following proceedings:
        1. all juvenile proceedings filed pursuant to 33 V.S.A. chapters 51, 52, and 53, including proceedings involving “youthful offenders” pursuant to 33 V.S.A. § 5281 , whether the matter originated in the Criminal or Family Division of the Superior Court;
        2. all guardianship services proceedings for persons with developmental disabilities filed pursuant to 18 V.S.A. chapter 215;
        3. all mental health proceedings filed pursuant to 18 V.S.A. chapters 179, 181, and 185;
        4. all involuntary sterilization proceedings filed pursuant to 18 V.S.A. chapter 204;
        5. all care for persons with intellectual disabilities proceedings filed pursuant to 18 V.S.A. chapter 206; and
        6. all proceedings specifically within the jurisdiction of the office of magistrate except child support contempt proceedings held pursuant to a magistrate’s jurisdiction under subdivision 461(a)(1) of this title.
      3. Use of the term “judicial officer” in subdivisions (A) and (B) of this subdivision (2) shall not be construed to expand a judicial officer’s subject matter jurisdiction or conflict with the authority of the Chief Justice or Administrative Judge to make special assignments pursuant to section 22 of this title.
    2. For cases in the Criminal Division, one Superior judge sitting alone.
    3. For cases in the Probate Division, one Probate judge sitting alone.
    4. For cases in the Environmental Division, one Environmental judge sitting alone.
  2. Questions of law and fact.   In all proceedings, questions of law shall be decided by the presiding judge. In cases not tried before a jury, questions of fact shall be decided by the court. Mixed questions of law and fact shall be deemed to be questions of law. The presiding judge alone shall decide which are questions of law, questions of fact, and mixed questions of law and fact. Written or oral stipulations of fact submitted by the parties shall establish the facts related therein, except that the presiding judge, in his or her discretion, may order a hearing on any such stipulated fact. Neither the decision of the presiding judge under this subsection nor participation by an assistant judge in a ruling of law shall be grounds for reversal unless a party makes a timely objection and raises the issue on appeal.
  3. Availability of assistant judges.   If two assistant judges are not available, the court shall consist of one presiding judge and one assistant judge. In the event that court is being held by the presiding judge and one assistant judge and they do not agree on a decision, a mistrial shall be declared. If neither assistant judge is available, the court shall consist of the presiding judge alone, and the unavailability of an assistant judge shall not constitute reversible error.
  4. Method of determining availability.   Before commencing a hearing in any matter in which the court by law may consist of the presiding judge and assistant judges, the assistant judges physically present in the courthouse shall determine whether they are available for the case. If two or more cases are being heard at one time and assistant judges may by law participate in either, each assistant judge may determine in which case he or she will participate.
  5. Duty to complete hearing or trial.   After an assistant judge has decided to participate in a hearing or trial, he or she shall not withdraw therefrom except for cause. However, if the assistant judge is not available for a scheduled hearing or trial or becomes unavailable during trial, the matter may continue without his or her participation, and he or she may not return to participate.
  6. Emergency relief.   A presiding judge may hear a petition for emergency relief when the court is not sitting and may issue temporary orders as necessary.
  7. Jury trial.   In order to preserve the right to trial by jury, when issues sounding in law and in equity are presented in the same action, the Supreme Court shall provide by rule for trial by jury, when demanded, of issues sounding in law.

HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; amended 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 2013, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 11, 2014.

History

References in text.

18 V.S.A. chapter 181, referenced in subdiv. (a)(2)(B)(iii), was repealed by 1977, No. 252 (Adj. Sess.), § 36.

Amendments

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 96 amended section generally.

Act No. 185, in (a)(2)(B)(vi), inserted “except child support contempt proceedings held pursuant to a magistrate’s jurisdiction under subdivision 461(a)(1) of this title” following “the office of the magistrate” and added subdiv. (a)(2)(C).

ANNOTATIONS

Review.

Because a taxpayer failed to file a motion or otherwise object to assistant judge participation in the overall decision, the taxpayer could not raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Transcanada Hydro Northeast, Inc. v. Town of Newbury, 2017 VT 117, 206 Vt. 462, 180 A.3d 843, 2017 Vt. LEXIS 138 (2017).

§ 37. Venue.

  1. The venue for all actions filed in the Superior Court, whether heard in the Civil, Criminal, Family, Environmental, or Probate Division, shall be as provided in law.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Supreme Court may promulgate venue rules, subject to review by the Legislative Committee on Judicial Rules under 12 V.S.A. chapter 1, which are consistent with the following policies:
    1. Proceedings involving a case shall be heard in the unit in which the case was brought, subject to the following exceptions:
      1. when the parties have agreed otherwise;
      2. status conferences, minor hearings, or other nonevidentiary proceedings; or
      3. when a change in venue is necessary to ensure access to justice for the parties or required for the fair and efficient administration of justice.
    2. The electronic filing of cases on a statewide basis should be facilitated, and the court is authorized to promulgate rules establishing an electronic case-filing system.
    3. The use of technology to ease travel burdens on citizens and the courts should be promoted. For example, venue requirements should be deemed satisfied for some court proceedings when a person, including a judge, makes an appearance via video technology, even if the judge is not physically present in the same location as the person making the appearance.
      1. Subject to subdivision (B) of this subdivision (4), in proceedings involving the termination of parental rights, the Supreme Court is authorized to designate a region of no more than four counties in which the venue for specified types of cases in the region shall be the region as a whole, irrespective of the county in which the venue would lie for the case under the governing statute. A designation under this subdivision shall be made by rule and shall be reviewed by the Legislative Committee on Judicial Rules pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 1 . (4) (A) Subject to subdivision (B) of this subdivision (4), in proceedings involving the termination of parental rights, the Supreme Court is authorized to designate a region of no more than four counties in which the venue for specified types of cases in the region shall be the region as a whole, irrespective of the county in which the venue would lie for the case under the governing statute. A designation under this subdivision shall be made by rule and shall be reviewed by the Legislative Committee on Judicial Rules pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 1 .
      2. A region designated pursuant to subdivision (A) of this subdivision (4) shall not include Grand Isle or Essex County for purposes of permitting termination of parental rights proceedings originating in Grand Isle or Essex County to be heard in other counties or regions unless all parties consent. This subdivision shall not preclude termination of parental rights proceedings originating in other counties from being heard in Grand Isle or Essex County.

HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; amended 2015, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. June 6, 2016.

History

Amendments

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “12 V.S.A. chapter 1” for “chapter 1 of Title 12” in the introductory paragraph.

Subdiv. (b)(4): Added.

Legislative intent. 2015, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, effective June 6, 2016 provides: “The General Assembly does not intend Sec. 4 of this act, which amends 4 V.S.A. § 37 to permit regional venue in proceedings involving the termination of parental rights (TPR), to result in the closure of any Vermont courts. Sec. 4 is intended to permit greater flexibility in the TPR process, in response to the findings and recommendations made by the Committee on Child Protection in 2014, and it may, in fact, result in an increase rather than a decrease in court proceedings for some jurisdictions.”

§ 38. Section 38 repealed effective July 1, 2025. Judicial Masters.

  1. The Administrative Judge may appoint a licensed Vermont lawyer who has been engaged in the practice of law in Vermont for at least the last five years to serve as a Judicial Master. The Judicial Master shall be an employee of the Judiciary and be subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct. A Judicial Master shall not engage in the active practice of law for remuneration while serving in this position. In making this appointment, the Administrative Judge shall apply the criteria and standards for judicial appointments contained in section 601 of this title. The Judicial Master may hear and decide the following matters as designated by the Administrative Judge:
    1. In the Criminal Division of the Superior Court, proceedings in treatment court dockets, as approved by the presiding judge, to assure compliance with court orders, including attendance and participation with a treatment plan, imposition of sanctions and incentives, including incarceration in the course of the program and dismissal from the program due to noncompliance; the Master shall not have authority to accept pleas or to impose sentences, to hear motions to suppress, or to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case.
    2. In the Family Division of the Superior Court, in juvenile proceedings, as approved by the presiding judge, to assure compliance with existing court orders, including attendance and participation in substance abuse, mental health, and other court-ordered counseling; compliance with and modification of parent-child contact; to act as the administrative body to conduct permanency hearings pursuant to 33 V.S.A. § 5321(g) unless a contested permanency hearing becomes necessary; and to provide case management of juvenile proceedings; the Master shall not have the authority to hear temporary care hearings, requests for juvenile protective orders, or hearings on the merits, or to conduct disposition hearings.
    3. In the Family Division of the Superior Court, proceedings, with the approval of the presiding judge, to assure compliance with existing court orders relating to parent-child contact; to act as a Master pursuant to Rule 53 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure where no order has been made pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 1758(b) ; and to provide case management of proceedings with 15 V.S.A. chapters 5, 11, 15, and 18; the Master shall not have authority to determine divorce or parentage actions, parental rights and responsibilities, or spousal maintenance or modifications of such orders.
  2. The Judicial Master may be appointed to serve as an acting judge pursuant to subsection 22(b) of this title in any matter in which he or she has not previously acted as a Judicial Master.
  3. The decision of a Judicial Master under this section shall have the same effect as a decision of a Superior judge, except when acting as a Master pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) of this section.

HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 6, 2016; repealed on July 1, 2025 by 2019, No. 77 , § 25.

History

Prospective repeal of section. 2019, No. 77 , § 25, provides that this section shall be repealed on July 1, 2025. Previously, 2015, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 2 had provided for the repeal of this section on July 1, 2019, and 2017, No. 85 , § E.204 had extended the date of that repeal until July 1, 2020.

§ 39. Capital budget requests; county courthouses.

  1. On or before October 1 each year, any county requesting capital funds for its courthouse, or court operations, shall submit a request to the Court Administrator.
  2. The Court Administrator shall evaluate requests based on the following criteria:
    1. whether the funding request relates to an emergency that will affect the court operations and the administration of justice;
    2. whether there is a State-owned courthouse in the county that could absorb court activities in lieu of this capital investment;
    3. whether the county consistently has invested in major maintenance in the courthouse;
    4. whether the request relates to a State-mandated function;
    5. whether the request diverts resources of other current Judiciary capital priorities;
    6. whether the request is consistent with the long-term capital needs of the Judiciary, including providing court services adapted to modern needs and requirements; and
    7. any other criteria as deemed appropriate by the Court Administrator.
  3. Based on the criteria described in subsection (b) of this section, the Court Administrator shall make a recommendation to the Commissioner of Buildings and General Services regarding whether the county’s request should be included as part of the Judiciary’s request for capital funding in the Governor’s annual proposed capital budget request.
  4. On or before January 15 of each year, the Court Administrator shall advise the House Committee on Corrections and Institutions and the Senate Committee on Institutions of all county requests received and the Court Administrator’s recommendations for the proposed capital budget request.

HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 31.

History

Editor’s note

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). This section was enacted as section 38 of this title, but was redesignated as section 39 to avoid conflict with section 38 as added by 2015, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

§ 40. Report on temporary employees.

Annually, on or before January 15, the State Court Administrator shall submit a report to the House Committee on General, Housing, and Military Affairs and the House and Senate Committees on Government Operations identifying for each of the two prior calendar years:

  1. the total number of individuals employed by the Judiciary Department on a temporary basis who have worked in excess of 1,280 hours in the prior calendar year, excluding employees identified in 3 V.S.A. § 1011(7) , (8)(A)-(D), (8)(F)-(G), and (8)(I)-(K);
  2. the total number of temporary positions in which one or more individuals have been employed for a combined total of more than 1,280 hours, excluding positions filled by employees identified in 3 V.S.A. § 1011(7) , (8)(A)-(D), (8)(F)-(G), and (8)(I)-(K);
  3. the total number of hours worked by each temporary employee identified pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection; and
  4. the total number of years during which each temporary employee identified pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection has worked for the Judiciary Department.

HISTORY: Added 2019, No. 58 , § 6.

Chapter 3. Superior Judges and Superior Courts

History

Amendments

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974, substituted “Superior” for “County ” preceding “Courts” in the chapter heading.

Law Reviews —

Regulation of the practice of law; practice and procedure, and court administration in Vermont, see 8 Vt. L. Rev. 211 (1983).

Subchapter 1. Superior Judges

§ 71. Appointment and term of Superior judges.

  1. There shall be 34 Superior judges, whose term of office shall, except in the case of an appointment to fill a vacancy or unexpired term, begin on April 1 in the year of their appointment or retention, and continue for six years.
  2. A Superior judge may file in the Office of the Secretary of State, on or before September 1 of the year preceding the expiration of the term for which he or she was appointed or retained, a declaration that he or she will be a candidate for retention.  However, a Superior judge appointed and having taken the oath of office after September 1 of the year preceding the expiration of the term of office shall automatically be a candidate for retention without filing notice.  When a judge files such a declaration his or her name shall be submitted to the General Assembly for a vote on retention.  The General Assembly shall vote upon one ballot on the question “Shall the following Superior judges be retained in office?” The names of the judges shall be listed followed by “Yes  _______________  No  _______________  .” If a majority of those voting on the question vote against retention, upon expiration of the term of office a vacancy shall exist which shall be filled by appointment in accordance with the Constitution and chapter 15 of this title; if the majority vote is in favor of retention, the judge shall, unless removed for cause, remain in office for another term and, at its end, shall be eligible for retention in office in the manner herein prescribed.
  3. The Court Administrator shall notify the Secretary of State whenever a Superior judge is appointed and takes the oath of office after September 1 of the year preceding the expiration of the term of office to which the judge has succeeded, thereby resulting in automatic notification of an intention to continue in office. Whenever a Superior judge files a declaration under subsection (b) of this section or notification occurs automatically, the Secretary of State shall notify the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Office of Legislative Counsel, and the Office of Legislative Operations forthwith.
  4. A Superior judge shall remain in office until a successor is appointed and qualified, unless sooner removed for cause or unless he or she resigns.
  5. The Supreme Court shall designate one of the Superior judges to serve as Administrative Judge.  The Administrative Judge shall serve at the pleasure of the Supreme Court.

HISTORY: Amended 1966, No. 64 (Sp. Sess.), § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 1967; 1969, No. 125 , § 9; 1973, No. 106 , § 1, eff. May 25, 1973; 1973, No. 159 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, eff. March 15, 1974; 1975, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1975, No. 206 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1979, No. 182 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 3; 1981, No. 3 , § 2; 1985, No. 98 , § 3; 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1999, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 91; 2001, No. 63 , § 91; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2015, No. 68 (Adj. Sess.), § 60b, eff. March 8, 2016; 2019, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 22.

History

Source.

1949, No. 5 , § 2. V.S. 1947, § 1391. P.L. § 1357. G.L. § 1595. 1915, No. 85 , § 1. P.S. § 1342. 1906, No. 63 , § 8.

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): In the second sentence, inserted “the Office of Legislative Counsel,” and substituted “Office of Legislative Operations” for “Legislative Council”.

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “34 Superior” for “32 superior” preceding “judges”.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “32 superior judges” for “15 superior judges”.

Subsec. (e): Deleted “or district” preceding “judges” in the first sentence.

—2001. Subsec. (a): Substituted “15 superior judges” for “14 superior judges”.

—1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “14 superior judges” for “12 superior judges”.

—1989 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “12” for “ten” preceding “superior”.

—1985. Subsec. (a): Substituted “April” for “March”.

Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

Subsec. (c): Substituted “after September 1 of the year preceding” for “less than 90 days before” preceding “the expiration” in the first sentence and, in the second sentence, deleted “and” following “senate”, inserted “and the legislative council” preceding “forthwith” and deleted “after they take office” thereafter.

—1981. Subsec. (b): Added the second sentence.

Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “ten” for “eight” preceding “superior” and deleted the second and third sentences.

Subsec. (e): Added.

—1975 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 204 rewrote the first sentence and substituted “with the longest period of service as a superior judge” for “first elected” preceding “shall be the chief superior” in the second sentence and “appointment” for “election” in two places in the third sentence.

Act No. 206 rewrote the first sentence and inserted “or retention” following “appointment” and substituted “with the longest period of service as a superior judge” following “upon the superior judge” in the third sentence.

Subsec. (b): Act No. 204 inserted “or retained” following “appointed” and made other minor stylistic changes in the first sentence, substituted “for a vote on his retention” for “on the same date that justices of the supreme court are elected” following “assembly” in the second sentence, and substituted “appointment in accordance with the constitution and chapter 15 of this title” for “election under section 603 of this title” following “filled by” in the fourth sentence.

Subsec. (d): Added by Act No. 204.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “seven” for “six” preceding “superior” in the first sentence.

—1973. Subsec. (a): Added “who shall perform those administrative duties as the chief justice of the supreme court may prescribe” following “chief superior judge” in the second sentence.

—1969. Subsec. (b): Substituted “ninety” for “sixty” preceding “days before the” and “expiration” for “end” thereafter and deleted “elected or” in the first sentence, rewrote the second and third sentences, and added the fourth sentence.

—1966. Section amended generally.

Redesignation of county courts as Superior courts and of presiding judges of county courts as Superior judges. 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974, provided: “In all places in the statutes of this state references to the county court or courts shall be construed as references to the Superior Court and references to the presiding judge of the county court shall be construed as references to the superior judge assigned to the particular Superior Court insofar as that construction is not inconsistent with the intent of the amended constitution and the provisions of this act.”

CROSS REFERENCES

Filling judicial vacancies, see Vt. Const. Ch. II, § 32.

Mandatory retirement, see Vt. Const. Ch. II, § 35.

Election and term of assistant judges, sheriffs and state’s attorneys, see Vt. Const. Ch. II, § 50.

Election of state and judicial officers by General Assembly, see 2 V.S.A. § 10 .

Special assignment of judicial officers generally, see § 22 of this title.

Administrative Judge generally, see Administrative Order No. 18, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

Law Reviews —

For note, “Judicial Tenure in Vermont: Does Good Behavior Merit Retention?,” see 24 Vt. L. Rev. 1321 (2000).

§ 72. Disqualification.

A Superior judge shall not be an officer in a railroad, banking, or insurance corporation in this State.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1392. P.L. § 1358. G.L. § 1596. P.S. § 1343. 1906, No. 63 , § 9.

CROSS REFERENCES

Disqualification of judge for conflict of interest generally, see 12 V.S.A. § 61 .

Superior judge acting as referee, auditor, commissioner or master, see 12 V.S.A. § 62 .

Nisi prius judge sitting in banc or on appeal, see 12 V.S.A. § 63 .

Motion for disqualification, see V.R.C.P. 40(e).

Code of judicial conduct, see Administrative Order No. 10, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

Notes to Opinions

Legislative draftsman.

There is nothing to prohibit a Superior Court judge from being appointed a legislative draftsman. 1942-44 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 124.

§ 73. Assignment.

  1. In accordance with the direction of the Supreme Court, the Administrative Judge shall assign the Superior judges among the units and divisions of the Superior Court. The Administrative Judge shall assign a presiding judge to each unit and may assign a judge to preside in more than one unit. In a case where a Superior judge is disqualified or unable to attend any term of court or part thereof to which he or she has been assigned, the Administrative Judge may assign another Superior judge to act as judge at that term or part thereof for that period during which the assigned judge is disqualified or unable to attend. If during a term of the Superior Court the court in a unit is unable to complete all or part of the work before it in a reasonable time, the Administrative Judge, with the approval of the Supreme Court, may modify judge assignments to reduce delays in that unit. The court shall publish the judicial rotation schedule in electronic format and distribute it electronically to attorneys licensed in Vermont.
  2. Pursuant to section 21a of this title, the Administrative Judge shall assign Superior judges to hear and determine Family Court matters. The Administrative Judge shall ensure that such hearings are held promptly. Any contested divorce case which has been pending for more than one year shall be advanced for prompt hearing upon the request of any party.
  3. As necessary to ensure the efficient operation of the Superior Court, the presiding judge of the unit may specially assign a Superior judge assigned to a division in the unit, including the presiding judge, to preside over one or more cases in a different division. As the Administrative Judge determines necessary for the operation of the Superior Court throughout the State, and with the approval of the Supreme Court, the Administrative Judge may additionally assign for a specified period of time a Superior judge to preside over a particular type of case, or over a particular type of motion or other judicial proceeding, in all or part of the units in the State.

HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. March 29, 1972; 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1981, No. 219 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1985, No. 63 , § 3; 1999, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 72, eff. May 24, 2000; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 11.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1393, P.L. § 1359. 1929, No. 41 . 1923, No. 42 , § 1. G.L. § 1597. P.S. § 1344. 1906, No. 63 , § 11. V.S. § 1002. 1892, No. 33 , § 1. 1892, No. 32 , § 1. 1890, No. 24 , § 1. 1886, No. 55 , § 2. R.L. §§ 788, 792. G.S. 30, § 6. 1857, No. 1 , § 12.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1999 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1985. Subsec. (c): Added.

—1981 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “hold the court of chancery and” following “number to” in the first sentence and “and chancellor” following “presiding judge” in the third sentence, and made other minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

CROSS REFERENCES

Special assignment of judicial officers generally, see § 22 of this title.

Geographic divisions for assignment of Superior judges, see Administrative Order No. 12, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in In re O'Dea, 159 Vt. 590, 622 A.2d 507, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 20 (1993).

§ 74. Repealed. 1977, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

History

Former § 74. Former § 74, relating to Supreme Court justices or District judges acting as Superior judges, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1394; P.L. § 1360; G.L. § 1598; 1915, No. 1 , § 3; P.S. § 1345; 1906, No. 63 , § 14 and amended by 1969, No. 125 , § 2; 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

§ 75. Powers of Justice or Superior judge after expiration of term or vacation of office.

Whenever the term of office of a Justice, Superior judge, Environmental judge, magistrate, or hearing officer expires or he or she otherwise vacates the office, the Justice, judge, magistrate, or hearing officer shall have the same authority to conclude causes he or she has partly or fully heard that he or she would have had if remaining in that office. The Justice, judge, magistrate, or hearing officer may make and sign findings and orders for judgments or decrees in causes pending before him or her, may make interlocutory orders and decrees, and shall be paid compensation commensurate with that paid specially assigned judicial officers as provided by section 23 of this title.

HISTORY: Amended 1977, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 12.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1395. P.L. § 1361. 1929, No. 40 , § 1.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1977 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

ANNOTATIONS

Conclusion of causes.

Absent authority by constitution, statute or court rule, a successor judge has no power to enter a judgment where testimony has been taken before his predecessor unless the parties consent, and a presiding judge, who has started a case, may continue to its completion, even though his term of office may have expired, or after a particular term of court has ended. Atlas Financial Corp. v. Oliver, 129 Vt. 216, 274 A.2d 687, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 247 (1971).

Cited.

Cited in Blair v. Cohen, 122 Vt. 83, 163 A.2d 843, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 107 (1960); Pizzano Construction Co. v. Hadwen, 133 Vt. 495, 346 A.2d 224, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 440 (1975); Wolfe v. Yudichak, 153 Vt. 235, 571 A.2d 592, 1989 Vt. LEXIS 285 (1989).

Subchapter 2. Superior Courts

History

Amendments

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974, substituted “Superior Courts” for “County Courts” in the subchapter heading.

§ 111. Superior Court sessions.

  1. When the business of a Superior Court cannot otherwise be disposed of with reasonable dispatch, by direction of the Administrative Judge, there may be held additional sessions of that Superior Court simultaneously with the regular session consisting of a presiding judge and one or more assistant judges, if available.
  2. A Superior Court may be temporarily recessed or adjourned from the place designated for holding a regular term or session to another place having adequate facilities, when the regular facilities at the designated courthouse are not adequate.
  3. The Administrative Judge may assign assistant judges, with their consent, to a special assignment in a court where they have jurisdiction in another county when assistant judges of that county are unavailable or the business of the courts so requires.

HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. March 29, 1972; 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1981, No. 60 ; 1983, No. 201 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 27, 1984; 1999, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 73, eff. May 24, 2000; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 13.

History

Source.

1953, No. 170 . V.S. 1947, § 1398. P.L. § 1364. 1923, No. 43 , § 1. G.L. § 1601. P.S. § 1349. 1906, No. 63 , § 13. V.S. § 1007. R.L. § 796. G.S. 30, § 22. 1857, No. 1 , §§ 11, 12. 1849, No. 40 , § 3. R.S. 25, § 3. 1824, p. 20, § 4. R. 1797, p. 72, § 1. 1791, p. 13. R. 1787, p. 42.

Revision note—

Undesignated paragraphs were designated as subsecs. (a)-(c) to conform section to V.S.A. style.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Substituted “a court where they have jurisdiction in” for “the superior court of” preceding “another county” in the first sentence and deleted the second sentence.

—1983 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

—1981. Subsec. (a): Added the second and third sentences.

Subsec. (b): Inserted “one or more” preceding “assistant judges”.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the first paragraph, inserted “or district judge” following “supreme court” in the second paragraph, deleted “provided that” preceding “a county court may” in the third paragraph, and made other minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

CROSS REFERENCES

Composition of court, see § 36 of this title.

Times and places of Superior Court sessions, see Administrative Order No. 12, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

Notes to Opinions

Redesignation of county courts as Superior Courts.

Act of the legislature which created the Superior Court neither repealed nor superceded this section; the legislature’s intent was to convert the county courts into Superior courts, not replace the county courts with an entirely new system. 1972-74 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 92.

Act of the legislature which created the Superior courts and intended to convert the county courts into Superior courts did not abrogate the judicial functions of the assistant judges as set forth in this section. 1972-74 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 92.

ANNOTATIONS

Adjournment to another place.

County court could be adjourned from court house to residence of one of assistant judges. Bates v. Sabin, 64 Vt. 511, 24 A. 1013, 1892 Vt. LEXIS 80 (1892).

Composition of court.
—Availability of assistant judges.

Where a presiding judge heard a case without assistant judges because the two assistant judges of the court were sitting with another presiding judge in another matter and thus were unavailable, the trial court was not improperly constituted. Behn v. Northeast Appraisal Co., 145 Vt. 101, 483 A.2d 604, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 550 (1984).

—Improperly constituted court.

Where defendant failed to timely object to allegedly improper participation of assistant judges in action pertaining to dissolution of a partnership and upon objection, assistant judges were excused from proceedings, the participation of the assistant judges did not provide grounds for a new trial. Neel v. Sun, 156 Vt. 239, 590 A.2d 887, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 57 (1991).

Compliance with subsection (a) of this section, governing composition of Superior courts, was a jurisdictional prerequisite to the hearing of any case, and absent such compliance, the Superior Court had no authority to hear and decide a matter. Vermont Union School District No. 21 v. H. P. Cummings Construction Co., 143 Vt. 416, 469 A.2d 742, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 557 (1983).

Where during trial one of the assistant judges suffered a stroke which rendered him incapable of continuing his duties, and the presiding judge, acting pursuant to an internal administrative directive that had no force of law, dismissed the remaining assistant judge and proceeded with the trial, since the court was not properly constituted, a mistrial had to be declared. Vermont Union School District No. 21 v. H. P. Cummings Construction Co., 143 Vt. 416, 469 A.2d 742, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 557 (1983).

Absent compliance with provisions of subsection (a) of this section and section 112 of this title dealing with the requirements as to composition of Superior courts for the trial of cases, a Superior Court had no authority to hear and decide a matter, and the orders of such a court were without basis in law and void. Bennett Estate v. Travelers Insurance Co., 140 Vt. 339, 438 A.2d 380, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 602 (1981) (mem.).

Judgment would be vacated where, on second day of two day trial in which resolution of principal issue depended to a large degree on the facts, there was no court sitting as the presiding judge was present, an assistant judge was not present and this section required presence of assistant judge. University of Vermont v. Town of Colchester, 136 Vt. 403, 392 A.2d 413, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 761 (1978).

—Presiding judge and one assistant judge.

Subsection (a) of this section, which clearly provided that when a court consisting of one presiding judge and one assistant judge was unable to reach a decision, a mistrial was to be declared, could not be interpreted as being limited to nonjury cases. Davis v. Manning, 143 Vt. 311, 465 A.2d 1352, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 516 (1983).

Where due to the unavailability of an assistant judge plaintiff’s action to recover damages for injuries allegedly received in a car accident was tried before a jury with a court consisting of one presiding judge and one assistant judge, and following entry of judgment for defendant the judges failed to reach an agreement on plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, a mistrial had to be declared. Davis v. Manning, 143 Vt. 311, 465 A.2d 1352, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 516 (1983).

—Questions of law and fact.

Where due to the unavailability of an assistant judge plaintiff’s action to recover damages for injuries allegedly received in a car accident was tried before a jury with a court consisting of one presiding judge and one assistant judge, and after judgment was entered for defendant plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, since the presiding judge viewed the motion as involving a mixed question of fact and law, participation of the assistant judge in the resolution of plaintiff’s motion was proper. Davis v. Manning, 143 Vt. 311, 465 A.2d 1352, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 516 (1983).

—Quorum.

In a hearing on damages in a negligence case, where both of the assistant judges participated, a quorum essential to decision was present and the Superior Court had authority to hear the matter and return findings. Bennett Estate v. Travelers Insurance Co., 140 Vt. 339, 438 A.2d 380, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 602 (1981) (mem.).

Only findings and orders of a majority of members of county court who participate in trial have any force and effect, and these alone are to be treated as judicial action of court under this section. Labor v. Carpenter, 102 Vt. 418, 148 A. 867, 1930 Vt. LEXIS 137 (1930).

Cited.

Cited in Thornworth v. Blanchard, 87 Vt. 38, 87 A. 52, 1913 Vt. LEXIS 160 (1913); Titus v. Titus, 128 Vt. 444, 266 A.2d 432, 1970 Vt. LEXIS 250 (1970); Winooski Urban Renewal Agency v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 134 Vt. 497, 365 A.2d 514, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 712 (1976); Miller v. Ladd, 140 Vt. 293, 437 A.2d 1105, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 607 (1981); Lewandoski v. Vermont State Colleges, 142 Vt. 446, 457 A.2d 1384, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 417 (1983); Soucy v. Soucy Motors, Inc., 143 Vt. 615, 471 A.2d 224, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 596 (1983); Vermont National Bank v. Dowrick, 144 Vt. 504, 481 A.2d 396, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 510 (1984); State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 494 A.2d 108, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 317 (1985).

Law Reviews —

For note relating to constitutionality of use of lay judges, see 3 Vt. L. Rev. 147 (1978).

For note relating to powers and role of side judges in the legislative and judicial branches of government, see 10 Vt. L. Rev. 321 (1985).

§ 111a. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former § 111a. Former § 111a, relating to designation and jurisdiction of Superior Court, was derived from 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and amended by 2009, No. 20 , § 2.

ANNOTATIONS

Annotations From Former § 111

Cited.

Cited in University of Vermont v. Town of Colchester, 136 Vt. 403, 392 A.2d 413, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 761 (1978); Ragosta v. Ragosta, 143 Vt. 107, 465 A.2d 228, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 486 (1983).

§ 112. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

History

Editor’s note

—2010. Former 4 V.S.A. § 112 was substantially recodified as 4 V.S.A. § 36 pursuant to 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

Former § 112. Former § 112, relating to composition of jurisdiction, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1399. P.L. § 1365. G.L. § 1603. P.S. § 1350. V.S. § 1008. R.L. § 797. G.S. 30, § 23. R.S. 25, § 28. 1822, p. 18. 1813, p. 109. 1801, p. 4 and amended by 1977, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 4 and 1983, No. 201 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

Annotations From Former § 112

Authority of judges.

—Assistant judges.

—Single judge.

Availability of assistant judges.

Construction with other laws.

Findings.

Improperly constituted court.

Prior law.

Questions of law and fact.

Annotations From Former § 112

Authority of judges.

—Assistant judges.

In an action under Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen a divorce case based on plaintiff’s claim that the settlement agreement incorporated into the final divorce order was unconscionable, assistant judges were not entitled to make controlling determinations as to whether the separation agreement was unconscionable and whether the motion was filed within a reasonable time. Riehle v. Tudhope, 171 Vt. 626, 765 A.2d 885, 2000 Vt. LEXIS 383 (2000) (mem.).

Assistant judges in parentage action lacked authority to award custody and their order awarding custody to father was a nullity, where conclusions to be drawn from the facts found were conclusions of law which were to be decided by the presiding judge. Bolduc v. Courtemanche, 158 Vt. 642, 603 A.2d 1129, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 15 (1992) (mem.).

Assistant judges are not permitted to rule on legal questions. Trustees of Net Realty Holding Trust v. AVCO Financial Services of Barre, Inc., 147 Vt. 472, 520 A.2d 981, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 449 (1986).

—Single judge.

One judge acting alone under this section by reason of disqualification of other two judges may enter judgment after adjournment. Saund v. Saund, 100 Vt. 387, 138 A. 867, 1927 Vt. LEXIS 171 (1927).

Where presiding superior judge of a term of a county court and one of its assistant judges were disqualified, and a case was heard by another superior judge presiding for the particular case and the other assistant judge, but before the facts were found and judgment rendered the latter judge died, the survivor had authority to determine the cause. Platt v. Shields, 96 Vt. 257, 119 A. 520, 1923 Vt. LEXIS 163 (1923).

Presiding judge alone may adjourn to another place if the two assistant judges are disqualified from acting. Bates v. Sabin, 64 Vt. 511, 24 A. 1013, 1892 Vt. LEXIS 80 (1892).

Presiding judge in a criminal cause has authority to charge the jury, and to receive their verdict, when assistant judges are legally disqualified from acting, and are absent from court house. State v. Bryant, 21 Vt. 479, 1849 Vt. LEXIS 62 (1849).

Availability of assistant judges.

Where trial was held before presiding judge and one assistant judge and nothing appeared in the record as to presence of the nonparticipating assistant judge in the courthouse nor as to that judge’s availability, Supreme Court would presume unavailability of the assistant judge and that the trial court was properly constituted. Lamoureux v. Chromailoy Farm Systems, Inc., 150 Vt. 156, 549 A.2d 649, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1988).

Trial court consisting of a presiding judge, sitting alone, was properly constituted, under the doctrine of presumptive regularity, even though trial transcript did not indicate that unavailability of assistant judges in courthouse was determined. Brennen v. Mogul Corp., 151 Vt. 91, 557 A.2d 870, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 237 (1988).

Superior Court consisting of presiding judge alone was without jurisdiction to consider motion for reduction of sentence where the record did not indicate on its face that both assistant judges were unavailable; assumption that because the assistant judges who sat at defendant’s trial had retired, no other assistant judges could become available for further hearings in the case, was without authority. State v. Messier, 148 Vt. 392, 533 A.2d 1192, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 509 (1987).

Unavailability of an assistant judge is factual absence as opposed to legal disqualification. Furno v. Pignona, 147 Vt. 538, 522 A.2d 746, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 464 (1986).

Jurisdiction of the Superior Court was not established at sentencing proceeding, where the record and the findings of the presiding judge were inadequate to explain the absence of assistant judges. In re Foy, 147 Vt. 648, 518 A.2d 372, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 429 (1986) (mem.).

Fact that Superior Court judge sat alone when he heard husband’s motion to dismiss and wife’s motion to amend the complaint in divorce action did not mean that the court was not statutorily constituted where the order denying the motion to dismiss stated that assistant judges were not available and the order granting the motion to amend was signed by the presiding judge and two assistant judges. Ragosta v. Ragosta, 143 Vt. 107, 465 A.2d 228, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 486 (1983).

Construction with other laws.

Statute which provided that when a county court case was tried by the court the facts were to be reduced to writing and signed by a majority of the members of the court did not indirectly repeal this section, authorizing one judge of the county court to try and determine a cause pending therein, when the other judges were disqualified. Platt v. Shields, 96 Vt. 257, 119 A. 520, 1923 Vt. LEXIS 163 (1923).

Findings.

Custody order made by presiding judge in parentage action was vacated and the cause remanded, where record revealed uncertainty about whether presiding judge based her conclusion and order on assistant judges’ findings, her own findings, or both. Bolduc v. Courtemanche, 158 Vt. 642, 603 A.2d 1129, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 15 (1992) (mem.).

Trial court was at all times properly constituted and judgment was not void because two assistant judges, who heard only first of two days of evidence, signed findings and conclusions; assistant judges were unavailable on second day, there was no evidence their signing was anything but oversight, and their signatures were mere surplusage as presiding judge’s signature alone would have been sufficient. State v. Shure, 156 Vt. 646, 592 A.2d 868, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 79 (1991) (mem.).

Where findings were not signed by assistant judge who participated at trial, case had to be remanded for determination as to whether the findings reflected the beliefs of the assistant judge. Bevins v. King, 147 Vt. 645, 513 A.2d 41, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 472 (1986) (mem.).

Improperly constituted court.

Where defendant failed to timely object to allegedly improper participation of assistant judges in action pertaining to dissolution of a partnership and upon objection, assistant judges were excused from proceedings, the participation of the assistant judges did not provide grounds for a new trial. Neel v. Sun, 156 Vt. 239, 590 A.2d 887, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 57 (1991).

Absent compliance with provisions of subsection (a) of section 111 of this title and this section dealing with the requirements as to composition of Superior courts for the trial of cases, a Superior Court had no authority to hear and decide a matter, and the orders of such a court were without basis in law and void. Bennett Estate v. Travelers Insurance Co., 140 Vt. 339, 438 A.2d 380, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 602 (1981) (mem.).

Where this section provided that Superior Court consisted of presiding and two assistant judges, any two of whom were a quorum, and that a single judge could try and determine a pending case only when the other judges were disqualified, presiding Superior Court judge could not, by agreement of parties and consent of the judge, hear contempt petitions without an assistant judge being present, for the Superior Court judge, sitting alone, did not constitute a statutory court and thus was without statutory authority to hear the cause. Suitor v. Suitor, 137 Vt. 110, 400 A.2d 999, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 961 (1979).

Prior law.

For decisions under prior provisions relating to composition of the Superior Court, see annotations under section 111 of this title.

Questions of law and fact.

A judge’s decision whether to grant a motion for a new trial involves mixed questions of both law and fact, which questions are to be decided by the presiding judge alone. Debus v. Grand Union Stores of Vermont, 159 Vt. 537, 621 A.2d 1288, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 17 (1993).

Cited.

Cited in Winooski Urban Renewal Agency v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 134 Vt. 497, 365 A.2d 514, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 712 (1976); University of Vermont v. Town of Colchester, 136 Vt. 403, 392 A.2d 413, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 761 (1978); Lewandoski v. Vermont State Colleges, 142 Vt. 446, 457 A.2d 1384, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 417 (1983); Soucy v. Soucy Motors, Inc., 143 Vt. 615, 471 A.2d 224, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 596 (1983); Bloch v. Angney, 149 Vt. 29, 538 A.2d 174, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 568 (1987).

Law Reviews —

For note relating to powers and role of side judges in the legislative and judicial branches of government, see 10 Vt. L. Rev. 321 (1985).

§§ 113, 114. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Editor’s note

—2010. Former 4 V.S.A. § 113 was substantially recodified as 4 V.S.A. § 31 pursuant to 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 7a.

Former §§ 113 and 114. Former § 113, relating to jurisdiction of Superior Court, was derived from 1965, No. 194 , § 10 and amended by 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1993, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 38; and 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

Former § 114, relating to criminal jurisdiction of Superior Court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1401. 1939, No. 45 , § 1. P.L. § 1367. G.L. § 1605. 1917, No. 254 , § 1566. 1915, No. 91 , § 11. P.S. § 1352. V.S. § 1010. R.L. § 799. G.S. 30, § 25. R.S. 25, § 8. R. 1797, p. 72, § 1. 1791, p. 13. R. 1787, p. 42 and amended by 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3 and 1974; No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

Annotations From Former § 113

Administrative agencies.

Concurrent jurisdiction.

Construction.

Jurisdiction found.

Lack of jurisdiction.

Annotations From Former § 114

Assistant judges.

Scope.

Annotations From Former § 113

Administrative agencies.

Section 113 of Title 4, which gives the Superior Court “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all original civil actions,” does not grant the court exclusive jurisdiction over a waste management enforcement action. An administrative action is not a “civil action” as that term is commonly understood. Secretary v. Upper Valley Regional Landfill Corp., 167 Vt. 228, 705 A.2d 1001, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 269 (1997).

Concurrent jurisdiction.

Because the forum selection clause in the promissory note at issue contained no specific language of exclusion, it conferred jurisdiction in New York, but did not exclude jurisdiction elsewhere, such as in Vermont; thus, plaintiff law firm had made a prima facie showing that subject matter jurisdiction existed in Vermont. Flemming, Zulack, Williamson, Zauderer, LLP v. Morrow, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42339 (D. Vt. May 29, 2008).

Petitions for extraordinary relief should ordinarily be addressed to the Superior Courts. Pfeil v. Rutland District Court, 147 Vt. 305, 515 A.2d 1052, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 419 (1986).

Construction.

Although the family court has exclusive jurisdiction over divorce proceedings, there is no provision in the family court’s jurisdiction for the separation of unmarried parties; thus, to the extent that parties negotiated for themselves an agreement on support and property division, that agreement was enforceable through civil action in the Superior Court. Rogers v. Wells, 174 Vt. 492, 808 A.2d 648, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 229 (2002) (mem.).

Legislation which created family court simultaneously denied Superior Court jurisdiction over actions cognizable in family court. St. Hilaire v. DeBlois, 168 Vt. 445, 721 A.2d 133, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 351 (1998).

Jurisdiction found.

In a family dispute over stock, a son was not improperly allowed to “split” his claim for dividends, as the issue of dividends was not within the scope of the agreed-upon arbitration, and the trial court had not decided this issue as part of the parents’ challenge to the arbitration award. Instead, following the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitration award, the son filed a statement of claim, to which the parents filed an answer and a counterclaim; thus, the trial court plainly had subject matter jurisdiction. In re Shelburne Supermarket, Inc., 2010 VT 30, 187 Vt. 514, 996 A.2d 230, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 28 (2010).

Lack of jurisdiction.

A separation agreement later incorporated into a final divorce order could not be collaterally attacked, in an action in Superior Court, on the grounds that the agreement was unconscionable and obtained through fraud, deceit and duress. Although plaintiff labeled her complaint a tort action, in fact she was attempting to relitigate the property distribution agreement that the family court adopted rather than asserting a unique claim separate and distinct from the divorce decree. Tudhope v. Riehle, 167 Vt. 174, 704 A.2d 765, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 258 (1997).

Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, and suit will be dismissed at any stage when want of jurisdiction appears. Sanders v. Pierce, 68 Vt. 468, 35 A. 377, 1896 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1896).

Annotations From Former § 114

Assistant judges.

The mere participation of assistant judges in criminal cases which involve legal questions, questions of mixed law and fact, or by extension, questions calling for the exercise of judicial discretion, does not initially deprive a Superior Court of its jurisdiction under this section to hear the case. State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 494 A.2d 108, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 317 (1985).

Although in a criminal case participation of assistant judges in decisions involving questions of pure law, or the application of law to findings of fact, would be improper, the basis for this fatal flaw would be a deprivation of constitutional due process and the right to counsel, not that the court lacked jurisdiction to reach those questions. State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 494 A.2d 108, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 317 (1985).

Scope.

Superior Court composed of two assistant judges and a presiding judge had subject matter jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion to transfer criminal proceedings against him to juvenile court and his motion to suppress certain evidence, both of which defendant claimed involved mixed questions of law and fact, and a proffered plea agreement, when those issues were considered at trial. State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 494 A.2d 108, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 317 (1985).

Cited.

Cited in Page v. Newbury, 113 Vt. 336, 34 A.2d 218, 1943 Vt. LEXIS 182 (1943); Neal v. Brockway, 136 Vt. 119, 385 A.2d 1069, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 699 (1978); Miner v. District Court, 136 Vt. 426, 392 A.2d 390, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 768 (1978); State v. Springer, 139 Vt. 471, 431 A.2d 460, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 499 (1981); Gerrish Corp. v. Dworkin, 145 Vt. 107, 483 A.2d 261, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 551 (1984); Molesworth v. University of Vermont, 147 Vt. 4, 508 A.2d 722, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 341 (1986); Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. Holland, 159 Vt. 21, 613 A.2d 712, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 90 (1992); Hunt v. Village of Bristol, 159 Vt. 439, 620 A.2d 1266, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 204 (1992); State v. Forte, 159 Vt. 550, 624 A.2d 352, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 23 (1993); Allen v. Allen, 161 Vt. 526, 641 A.2d 1332, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 37 (1994); In re Vermont Electric Power Producers, Inc., 165 Vt. 282, 683 A.2d 716, 1996 Vt. LEXIS 79 (1996); Bidgood v. Town of Cavendish, 2005 VT 64, 179 Vt. 530, 878 A.2d 290, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 148 (2005) (mem.).

Cited.

Cited in State v. Lapham, 135 Vt. 393, 377 A.2d 249, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 638 (1977); State v. Hunt, 145 Vt. 34, 485 A.2d 109, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 566 (1984).

Law Reviews —

For note relating to powers and role of side judges in the legislative and judicial branches of government, see 10 Vt. L. Rev. 321 (1985).

§ 115. Stated terms of Superior Court.

The Superior Court shall operate continuously irrespective of the term in which events occur. Terms are designated for purposes of determining the rotation schedule of Superior judges and the responsibility of a Superior judge once a term has expired. When at the expiration of a term a Superior judge is no longer assigned to a specified unit, the judge shall complete any matters that have been heard or taken under advisement for that unit. The Administrative Judge, pursuant to rules of the Supreme Court, may specially assign a Superior judge to continue to preside over one or more cases even though the judge is no longer assigned to the unit of origin of the case or cases. In the absence of such a direction or of an assignment made pursuant to subsection 73(c) of this title, a judge who at the end of a term is no longer assigned to a unit shall have no further responsibility for cases in that unit.

HISTORY: Amended 1963, No. 15 , § 2; 1965, No. 51 , §§ 1-3; 1973, No. 106 , § 2, eff. May 25, 1973; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 15.

History

Source.

1957, No. 81 . V.S. 1947, § 1408. P.L. § 1374. 1927, No. 41 , § 1. 1923, No. 44 , § 1. 1923, No. 45 , § 1. 1921, No. 66 , § 1. 1919, No. 64 , § 1. G.L. § 1611. 1917, No. 73 . 1910, No. 79 . 1910, No. 80 . 1908, No. 60 . P.S. § 1358. R. 1906, § 1258. 1906, No. 66 , §§ 1, 2. 1904, No. 56 , § 1. 1902, No. 36 , § 1. 1900, No. 33 , § 1. 1898, No. 36 , § 1. 1896, No. 25 , § 1. V.S. § 1012. 1894, No. 140 . 1892, No. 35 , § 1. 1892, No. 36 , § 1. 1888, No. 159 , § 1. 1882, No. 94 . R.L. § 801. 1878, No. 134 . 1878, No. 135 . 1876, No. 115 . 1876, No. 116 . 1876, No. 117 . 1874, No. 44 . 1874, No. 47 . 1870, No. 85 . 1868, No. 50 . 1867, No. 67 . 1862, No. 25 . G.S. 30, § 26, etc.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “superior court” for “county courts” in the section heading and in the text of the section.

—1973. Section amended generally.

—1965. Subdiv. (1): Substituted “December” for “November”.

Subdiv. (10): Substituted “first” for “second” and “June and December” for “March and September”.

Subdiv. (14): Amended generally.

—1963. Subdiv. (1): Substituted “second” for “first” and “June” for “May”.

Subdiv. (6): Substituted “March” for “April”.

Subdiv. (8): Substituted “December” for “November”.

Subdiv. (9): Substituted “December” for “November”.

Subdiv. (13): Substituted “March” for “April”.

CROSS REFERENCES

Terms of Superior Court, see Administrative Order No. 12, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in Roddy v. Fitzgerald Est., 113 Vt. 472, 35 A.2d 668, 1944 Vt. LEXIS 105 (1944); Blair v. Cohen, 122 Vt. 83, 163 A.2d 843, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 107 (1960).

§§ 116, 117. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former §§ 116 and 117. Former § 116, relating to special sessions of Superior Court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1409. P.L. § 1375. G.L. § 1612. 1915, No. 90 , § 15. P.S. § 1359. 1906, No. 63 , § 35. V.S. § 1013. R.L. § 802. G.S. 30, § 30. R.S. 25, § 24. 1824, p. 21, § 8. R. 1797, p. 81, § 15 and amended by 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

Former § 117, relating to special hearings of Superior Court, was derived from 1951, No. 33 . 1949, No. 52 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 1407. P.L. § 1373. 1933, No. 157 , § 1229. G.L. § 1610. 1910, No. 81 . P.S. § 1357. 1906, No. 62 , § 1. 1906, No. 63 , § 25. 1898, No. 35 , § 5 and amended by 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 13 and 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

Annotations From Former § 116

Constitutionality.

Order.

Public hearing.

Review.

Annotations From Former § 117

Annotations From Former § 116

Constitutionality.

Legislature has power to determine number of and time for holding regular terms of the courts and to provide for special terms, the ordering of the same, and the nature of the business to be transacted thereat, since the only constitutional provisions regarding that matter are those requiring courts to be maintained in every county in the state, and providing that justice shall be impartially administered therein without corruption or unnecessary delay. State v. Alfred, 87 Vt. 157, 88 A. 534, 1913 Vt. LEXIS 182 (1913).

Legislature had power to enact this section, giving presiding judge of a county court authority to call a special term thereof for trial of criminal cases. State v. Alfred, 87 Vt. 157, 88 A. 534, 1913 Vt. LEXIS 182 (1913).

Order.

Filing of order calling a special term of county court was sufficient notice to all parties, and any form of order clearly indicating the purpose of the presiding judge to order such a term to be held at a designated time was sufficient. State v. Alfred, 87 Vt. 157, 88 A. 534, 1913 Vt. LEXIS 182 (1913).

If presiding judge was within the state when he called a special session, he had jurisdiction to do so, regardless of whether he was then in the particular county. State v. Alfred, 87 Vt. 157, 88 A. 534, 1913 Vt. LEXIS 182 (1913).

Fact that presiding judge was unable to be present at opening of a special term of a county court did not invalidate the term, where assistant judges opened the court and adjourned it from time to time. State v. Alfred, 87 Vt. 157, 88 A. 534, 1913 Vt. LEXIS 182 (1913).

Public hearing.

Where order for a special term of county court was made at request of state’s attorney representing interests of the state, the question of necessity of notice to the public, giving opportunity to be heard on question of making the order, could not be raised. State v. Alfred, 87 Vt. 157, 88 A. 534, 1913 Vt. LEXIS 182 (1913).

Review.

Discretion of presiding judge in calling special term of county court cannot be reviewed by Supreme Court. State v. Alfred, 87 Vt. 157, 88 A. 534, 1913 Vt. LEXIS 182 (1913).

Annotations From Former § 117

Cited.

Cited in Blair v. Cohen, 122 Vt. 83, 163 A.2d 843, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 107 (1960); Winooski Urban Renewal Agency v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 134 Vt. 497, 365 A.2d 514, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 712 (1976).

§ 118. Repealed. 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 237, eff. March 29, 1972.

History

Former § 118. Former § 118, relating to time for exceptions, liens, bail and execution, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1406; P.L. § 1372; G.L. § 1609; 1917, No. 254 , § 1570; P.S. § 1356; 1898, No. 35 , § 4. The subject matter is now covered by V.R.C.P 62(f) and 77(d) and V.R.A.P. 4.

§ 119. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former § 119. Former § 119, relating to completion of cases commenced in Superior Court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1396. P.L. § 1362. 1929, No. 40 , § 2 and amended by 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3 and 1977, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

Annotations From Former § 119

Application.

Purpose.

Annotations From Former § 119

Application.

This section applies to cases at law, but not to cases at equity, as to which there is no time limit for finishing a hearing and rendering a judgment. Kelly v. Alpstetten Association, 130 Vt. 443, 296 A.2d 232, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 297 (1972).

Purpose.

Legislature did not intend that this section be a limitation upon powers and duties of the court, but an extension of the law relating to their powers. Pabst v. Lathrop, 135 Vt. 266, 376 A.2d 49, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 604 (1977).

Cited.

Cited in Appliance Acceptance Co. v. Stevens, 121 Vt. 484, 160 A.2d 888, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 148 (1960); Blair v. Cohen, 122 Vt. 83, 163 A.2d 843, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 107 (1960); B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Twin State Electrical Supply Co., 127 Vt. 94, 238 A.2d 663, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 180 (1968); Lafko v. Lafko, 127 Vt. 609, 256 A.2d 166, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 288 (1969); Atlas Financial Corp. v. Oliver, 129 Vt. 216, 274 A.2d 687, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 247 (1971); Pizzano Construction Co. v. Hadwen, 133 Vt. 495, 346 A.2d 224, 1975 Vt. LEXIS 440 (1975); DeGrace v. DeGrace, 147 Vt. 466, 520 A.2d 987, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 448 (1986).

Subchapter 3. Provisions Applicable to Both Supreme and Superior Courts

History

Amendments

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974, substituted “Superior” for “County” preceding “Courts” in the subchapter heading.

§§ 151-154. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former §§ 151-154. Former § 151, relating to opening and adjournment of court by judge or sheriff, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1410. P.L. § 1376. G.L. § 1613. 1915, No. 1 , § 3. 1915, No. 90 , § 16. P.S. § 1360. V.S. § 1014. R.L. § 803. G.S. 30, § 37. R.S. 25, § 5. R. 1797, pp. 72, 76, §§ 1, 6. 1791, pp. 13, 15. R. 1787, p. 43 and amended by 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

Former § 152, relating to adjournment of court to another day, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1411. P.L. § 1377. G.L. § 1614. P.S. § 1361. V.S. § 1015. R.L. § 804. G.S. 30, § 38. R.S. 25, § 23. R. 1797, p. 81, § 16 and amended by 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

Former § 153, relating to change in time of holding sessions, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1412. P.L. § 1378. G.L. § 1615. P.S. § 1362. V.S. § 1016. R.L. § 805. G.S. 30, § 28. R.S. 43, § 4 and amended by 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.) § 3.

Former § 154, relating to designation of time of commencement of term, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1413. P.L. § 1379. G.L. § 1616. P.S. § 1363. V.S. § 1017. R.L. § 806. G.S. 30, § 27. R.S. 43, § 3. 1821, p. 74. 1814, p. 147, § 7.

ANNOTATIONS

Annotations From Former § 152

Cited.

Cited in Paul v. Burton, 32 Vt. 148, 1859 Vt. LEXIS 77 (1859).

Chapter 5. Court of Chancery

History

Merger of law and equity; legislative findings and intent. 1983, No. 201 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. April 27, 1984, provided:

“(a) The general assembly finds that the 1969 general assembly passed act number 129 of that year in order to merge law and equity. While matters of equity were assigned to the presiding judges of the courts then known as county courts and now known as superior courts, the 1969 general assembly recognized that often it was and is difficult to clearly define what is an equity matter.

“(b) The general assembly further finds that the 1969 general assembly intended that participation of assistant judges in equity matters was not intended to constitute reversible error.”

§§ 211-218. Repealed. 1969, No. 129, § 5, eff. date, see note set out below.

History

Former §§ 211-218. Former § 211, relating to establishment, powers and jurisdiction of the court of chancery, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1277; P.L. § 1245; G.L. § 1487; P.S. § 1231; V.S. § 907; R.L. § 695; G.S. 29, §§ 1, 2; R.S. 24, §§ 1, 23; R. 1797, pp. 125, 126, §§ 1, 3; 1788, p. 10.

Former § 212, relating to amount in dispute, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1278; P.L. § 1246; G.L. § 1488; P.S. § 1232; V.S. § 908; 1890, No. 32 ; R.L. § 696; G.S. 29, § 3; R.S. 24, § 24.

Former § 213, relating to superior judges as chancellors, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1279; P.L. § 1247; G.L. § 1490; P.S. § 1234; 1906, No. 63 , §§ 10, 33; V.S. § 910; R.L. § 698; G.S. 29, § 4; 1857, No. 1 , § 10; 1849, No. 40 , § 9; R.S. 24, § 2; R. 1797, p. 125, § 1; 1788, p. 10.

Former § 214, relating to Supreme Court justices as chancellors, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1280; P.L. § 1248; G.L. § 1492; 1915, No. 1 , § 3; 1908, No. 55 , § 3 and amended by 1969, No. 125 , § 3.

Former § 215, relating to completion of chancery case commenced prior to chancellor’s election as Supreme Court justice, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1281; P.L. § 1249; 1923, No. 40 , § 1.

Former § 216, relating to masters and examiners in chancery, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1283; P.L. § 1250; G.L. § 1492; P.S. §§ 1235, 1236; V.S. §§ 911, 912; R.L. §§ 699, 700; G.S. 29, §§ 7-10; 1857, No. 3 ; R.S. 24, §§ 72-74; 1825, No. 1 , § 10.

Former § 217, relating to terms of court of chancery, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1284; P.L. § 1251; G.L. § 1493; P.S. § 1238; V.S. § 914; R.L. § 702; G.S. 29, §§ 12, 13, 16; R.S. 24, §§ 3, 4, 5.

Former § 218, relating to business hours of court of chancery and authority of chancellor at chambers and during vacation, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1285; P.L. § 1252; G.L. § 1494; P.S. § 1239; 1898, No. 35 , § 6; V.S. §§ 915, 986; 1894, No. 49 , § 1; R.L. § 703; G.S. 29, §§ 14, 15; R.S. 24, §§ 6, 7; 1824, p. 19, § 2; 1821, p. 75, § 4; 1820, p. 13, § 7.

§ 219. Powers of chancellor.

The powers and jurisdiction of the courts that were heretofore vested in the courts of chancery are vested in the Superior Court. Superior, Environmental, and Probate judges have the powers of a chancellor in passing upon all civil matters which may come before them.

HISTORY: 1969, No. 129 , § 1, eff. date, see note set out below; amended 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 14, eff. March 29, 1972; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974; 1983, No. 201 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 27, 1984; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 16.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “superior, environmental” for “district” in the second sentence.

—1983 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the first sentence and deleted “shall” following “judges” in the second sentence.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “superior courts” for “county courts” in two places in the first sentence.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

Changes in terminology. 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(a) and (b), eff. March 29, 1972, provided:

“(a) Whenever the words ‘chancery’ or ‘court of chancery’ appear in the statutes, they shall be taken to mean a county court held by the presiding judge alone, sitting without a jury.

“(b) Whenever the word ‘chancellor’ appears in the statutes, it shall be taken to mean the presiding judge of a county court.”

ANNOTATIONS

Constitutionality.

Legislature’s prospective change in the composition of the trial courts in equity matters did not violate separation of powers doctrine. Neel v. Sun, 156 Vt. 239, 590 A.2d 887, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 57 (1991).

Duties of trial court.

It is incumbent upon the trial court to make sure that it is properly constituted in cases seeking equitable relief. Braun v. Humiston, 140 Vt. 302, 437 A.2d 1388, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 612 (1981); Swanson v. Bishop Farm, Inc., 140 Vt. 606, 443 A.2d 464, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 475 (1982).

Presence or participation of assistant judges.
—Generally.

Assistant judges have no role in cases in equity in the Superior court, and their presence is improper. Pockette v. LaDuke, 139 Vt. 625, 432 A.2d 1191, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 535 (1981).

In an equitable action, assistant judges should not and cannot participate therein. White Current Corp. v. Vermont Agency of Transp., 140 Vt. 290, 438 A.2d 393, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 616 (1981).

—Harmless error.

Where defendant failed to timely object to allegedly improper participation of assistant judges in action pertaining to dissolution of a partnership and, upon objection, assistant judges were excused from proceedings, the participation of the assistant judges did not provide grounds for a new trial. Neel v. Sun, 156 Vt. 239, 590 A.2d 887, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 57 (1991).

Where Soucy v. Soucy Motors, Inc., 143 Vt. 615, 471 A.2d 224 (1983), which overruled several decisions that had held that the presence of assistant judges in cases involving equity was harmless error if the assistant judges did not participate in the cases or affect the outcomes, clearly established a new principle of law, and if it were applied retroactively, any case ever decided by an improperly constituted court would be void and would have to be vacated if one of the parties so moved, Soucy would be applied prospectively only. Solomon v. Atlantis Development, Inc., 145 Vt. 70, 483 A.2d 253, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 546 (1984).

—Jurisdiction.

Decision of the Supreme Court holding that participation of assistant judges in equity actions required new trial, rendered after hearing in dissolution of partnership proceedings in which assistant judges participated, did not provide grounds for reversal. Neel v. Sun, 156 Vt. 239, 590 A.2d 887, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 57 (1991).

Trial court which consisted of presiding judge and two assistant judges had jurisdiction to hear equitable matters where the case was tried before December 12, 1983, the date of the Supreme Court’s decision in Soucy v. Soucy Motors, Inc. 143 Vt. 615, 471 A.2d 224 (1983). Brown v. Whitcomb, 150 Vt. 106, 550 A.2d 1, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 132 (1988).

A Superior Court constituted with one presiding judge and two assistant judges is without jurisdiction to hear a case sounding in equity; only a court with a presiding judge sitting alone has such power. Pockette v. LaDuke, 139 Vt. 625, 432 A.2d 1191, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 535 (1981); Soucy v. Soucy Motors, Inc., 143 Vt. 615, 471 A.2d 224, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 596 (1983), limited, Vermont Nat'l Bank v. Dowrick, 144 Vt. 504, 481 A.2d 396, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 510 (1984).

—Reversible error.

Act which provided that no court could set aside any judgment, decree or order entered before December 12, 1983, by the Superior Court on the grounds that the participation or nonparticipation of assistant judges was improper constituted a retroactive limitation of the Court’s jurisdiction over cases that had been commenced prior to the enactment of the act and was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers principle embodied in chapter II, section 5 of the Vermont Constitution.Solomon v. Atlantis Development, Inc., 145 Vt. 70, 483 A.2d 253, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 546 (1984).

Since a petition which asked the Superior Court for a declaration on the validity of decedent’s marriage also asked for a declaration on the validity of a trust amendment executed by decedent, thereby invoking the equitable jurisdiction of the court, and the court that sat and heard the petition and that signed the findings, conclusions and judgment was comprised of the presiding judge and one assistant judge, the court was without jurisdiction to hear the matter in equity and its judgment would be reversed and remanded. Melen v. First Vermont Bank & Trust Co., 144 Vt. 226, 475 A.2d 237, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 434 (1984).

If the record clearly shows that assistant judges actively participated in the hearing and in the making of the findings of fact in a case involving a claim for equitable relief, that would be reversible error. Braun v. Humiston, 140 Vt. 302, 437 A.2d 1388, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 612 (1981).

Probate Courts.

This section, insofar as it relates to Probate Courts, speaks only to powers that Court may properly exercise once its jurisdiction has been established. In re Estate of Leonard, 132 Vt. 348, 318 A.2d 179, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 348 (1974).

Section 2328 of Title 14, expressly giving county court cy pres jurisdiction g governed as against provision of this section, giving probate judges the powers of a chancellor in equity in passing upon all civil matters coming before them, so that county court, not Probate Court, was the place to decide a cy pres issue. In re Estate of Leonard, 132 Vt. 348, 318 A.2d 179, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 348 (1974).

Cited.

Cited in Markowski v. Town of Pittsford, 130 Vt. 218, 290 A.2d 27, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 257 (1972); Kelly v. Alpstetten Association, 130 Vt. 443, 296 A.2d 232, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 297 (1972); Monti v. Town of Northfield, 135 Vt. 97, 369 A.2d 1373, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 565 (1977); Pike Industries, Inc. v. Middlebury Associates, 140 Vt. 67, 436 A.2d 725, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 582 (1981), Merchants Bank v. Thibodeau, 143 Vt. 132, 465 A.2d 258, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 497 (1983); Vermont National Bank v. Dowrick, 144 Vt. 504, 481 A.2d 396, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 510 (1984); In re V.C., 146 Vt. 454, 505 A.2d 1214, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 400 (1985); In re C.B., 147 Vt. 378, 518 A.2d 366, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 424 (1986); Allen v. Allen, 161 Vt. 526, 641 A.2d 1332, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 37 (1994).

Law Reviews —

For note relating to powers and role of side judges in the legislative and judicial branches of government, see 10 Vt. L. Rev. 321 (1985).

§§ 220-222. Repealed. 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 22.

History

Former §§ 220-222. Former § 220, relating to clerks, was derived from 1969, No. 129 , § 2 and amended by 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

Former § 221, relating to transition of matters from courts of chancery to county courts, was derived from 1969, No. 129 , § 3 and also repealed by 1983, No. 201 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. April 27, 1984.

Former § 222, relating to merger of rules, was derived from 1969, No. 129 , § 4 and also repealed by 1983, No. 201 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. April 27, 1984.

Chapter 7. Probate Courts

History

Transitional provisions and redesignation of probate court. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 237(c), (f), and (g) provide:

“(c) On February 1, 2011, the probate court shall be redesignated as the probate division of the superior court, and all cases and files of the former probate court shall be transferred to the probate division of the superior court.

“(f) Sec. 17 of this act shall establish probate districts for the November 2, 2010 probate judge election, and for all probate judge elections thereafter. Probate judges in office upon passage of this act shall continue to serve, and probate districts in effect upon passage of this act shall continue to exist, until February 1, 2011.

“(g) On the effective date of this subsection, the newly consolidated probate court district within each county is deemed to be a continuation of the prior probate court districts within the county. The newly consolidated court shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings, records, orders, decrees, judgments and other acts of the probate courts of the prior probate districts within the county, including all pending matters and appeals. The records of the prior probate court districts shall become the records of the probate court of the newly consolidated probate district. The newly consolidated probate court district shall have full authority to do all acts concerning all such proceedings and other matters as if they had originated in that court. The current probate registers of the prior probate districts shall be allowed to maintain their employment status that was in effect on January 31, 2011 for six months, at which time the court administrator, in consultation with the probate judge, shall appoint a single probate register for the district. The assistant judges of these counties shall maintain offices for the newly formed district in the former districts which may be used by the probate court full or part time to provide access to probate services. The judge of the newly formed district with the approval of the court administrator shall establish the hours of operation and staffing for each office.”

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in American Oil Co. v. State Highway Board, 122 Vt. 496, 177 A.2d 358, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 127 (1962).

Subchapter 1. Probate Districts

§ 271. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a(a)(1), eff. February 1, 2011.

History

Former § 271. Former § 271, relating to probate districts, was derived from 1957, No. 261 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 90. P.L. § 72. G.L. § 60. P.S. § 56. V.S. § 48. R.L. § 47. G.S. 14, § 1 and amended by 1993, No. 171 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2009, No. 4 , § 118 and 2009; No. 4, § 122.

§ 272. Probate districts; Probate judges.

  1. There shall be one Probate district in each county, which shall be designated by the name of the county. Each Probate district shall elect one Probate judge.
  2. To hold the position of Probate judge, a person shall be admitted by the Supreme Court to practice law. This subsection shall not apply to any person who holds the office of Probate judge on July 1, 2010.
  3. The Administrative Judge may specially assign a Probate judge to hear a case in a geographical district other than the district for which the Probate judge was elected.

HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 17.

History

Former § 272. Former § 272, relating to division of Addison County into two probate districts, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 91; P.L. § 73; G.L. § 61; P.S. § 57; V.S. § 49; R.L. § 48; G.S. 14, § 6. This section was previously repealed by 1957, No. 261 , § 4.

Transitional provisions. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 237(f) provides:

“(f) Sec. 17 of this act shall establish probate districts for the November 2, 2010 probate judge election, and for all probate judge elections thereafter. Probate judges in office upon passage of this act shall continue to serve, and probate districts in effect upon passage of this act shall continue to exist, until February 1, 2011.”

§ 273. Repealed. 2009, No. 4, § 120, eff. April. 24, 2009.

History

Former § 273. Former § 273, relating to Bennington and Manchester probate districts, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 92; P.L. § 74; G.L. § 62; P.S. § 58. V.S. § 50; R.L. § 49; and G.S. 14, § 2.

§ 274. Repealed. 1993, No. 171 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. June 1, 1994.

History

Former § 274. Former § 274, relating to Bradford and Randolph probate districts, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 93; P.L. § 75; G.L. § 63; P.S. § 59; V.S. § 51; 1882, No. 214 ; R.L. § 50; G.S. 14, § 7.

§§ 275-277. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a(a)(1), eff. February 1, 2011.

History

Former §§ 275-277. Former § 275, relating to the Fair Haven and Rutland districts, was derived from 1953, No. 272 , § 1; V.S. 1947, § 94; P.L. § 76; G.L. § 64; P.S. § 60; V.S. § 52; R.L. § 51; G.S. 14, § 4.

Former § 276, relating to the Marlboro and Westminster districts, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 95; P.L. § 77; G.L. § 65; P.S. § 61. V.S. § 53; R.L. § 52; G.S. 14, § 3.

Former § 277, relating to the Hartford and Windsor districts, was derived from V.S. 1957, No. 27 , § 1; V.S. 1947, § 96; P.L. § 78; G.L. § 66; P.S. § 62; V.S. § 54; R.L. § 53; G.S. 14, § 5.

§ 278. Authorization of assistant judges.

  1. An assistant judge or a candidate for the office of assistant judge may also seek election to the office of Probate judge, and, if otherwise qualified and elected to both offices, may serve both as an assistant judge and as Probate judge.
  2. In the event a probate matter arises in the Superior Court over which an assistant judge is also the Probate judge that presides, or has presided, over the same or related probate matter in the Probate Court, the assistant judge shall be disqualified from hearing and deciding the probate matter in the Superior Court.
  3. In the event a probate matter arises in the Probate Court over which a Probate judge is also an assistant judge that presides, or has presided, over the same or related probate matter in the Superior Court, the Probate judge shall be disqualified from hearing and deciding the probate matter in the Probate Court.

HISTORY: Added 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 17a.

ANNOTATIONS

Elections.

There exists a potential conflict between the statute authorizing assistant judges and Vermont’s judicial resign-to-run provision, a potential conflict that implicates the separation of powers between the coordinate branches of government. In re Hodgdon, 2011 VT 19, 189 Vt. 265, 19 A.3d 598, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 14 (2011).

Subchapter 2. Jurisdiction

§ 311. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a(a)(1), eff. February 1, 2011.

History

Former § 311. Former § 311, relating to probate court jurisdiction, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2793; P.L. § 2723; G.L. § 3177; P.S. § 2710; V.S. § 2325; R.L. § 2018; G.S. 48, § 12; R.S. 44, § 10 and amended by 1985, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2001, No. 135 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2003, No. 106 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2005, No. 55 , § 3; 2007, No. 56 , § 2; 2009, No. 3 , § 12a; No. 20, § 3; 2009, No. 92 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; and No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a.

Annotations From Former § 311

Action against executor or administrator.

Duration.

Equity jurisdiction.

Exclusive jurisdiction.

Property ownership.

Annotations From Former § 311

Action against executor or administrator.

The fact that the probate court is given plenary and exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of settlement of estates does not mean that no action can be brought in other courts against an executor or administrator. Kreichman v. Webster, 110 Vt. 105, 2 A.2d 199, 1938 Vt. LEXIS 125 (1938).

Where claim had been presented to commissioners, there was an appeal, and it was ultimately decided that suit could not be maintained because of nonjoinder of parties, county court had no jurisdiction of same cause of action brought directly to it against administrators and after commission on estate had closed. Goff v. Robinson, 60 Vt. 633, 15 A. 339, 1888 Vt. LEXIS 193 (1888).

Mere neglect of administratrix to inventory choses in action, or to account for them in settlement of her administration account, had she made the settlement, would not give a common law court original jurisdiction in suit against administratrix upon claim which accrued in the lifetime of the intestate, but the jurisdiction would still be in probate court. Boyden v. Ward, 38 Vt. 628, 1866 Vt. LEXIS 42 (1866).

Duration.

Jurisdiction of probate court over settlement of estates of deceased persons is not lost by lapse of time, or by court’s inactivity, or otherwise, and continues until work is completed by final decree. In re Fisher's Estate, 104 Vt. 37, 156 A. 878, 1931 Vt. LEXIS 141 (1931).

Equity jurisdiction.

Probate court is given plenary and exclusive jurisdiction in matter of settlement of estates, and jurisdiction of court of chancery in such matters is not original but special and limited, and only in aid of probate court when powers of that court are inadequate. Domestic & Foreign Missionary Society v. Eells, 68 Vt. 497, 35 A. 463, 1896 Vt. LEXIS 107 (1896); Harris v. Harris, 79 Vt. 22, 64 A. 75, 1906 Vt. LEXIS 94 (1906).

Equity has no jurisdiction to establish a suppressed, destroyed or spoliated will, for probate court has exclusive jurisdiction of probate of wills. Domestic & Foreign Missionary Society v. Eells, 68 Vt. 497, 35 A. 463, 1896 Vt. LEXIS 107 (1896).

Where an executrix settled her final account in the probate court, but made no return of certain property belonging to the estate, equity had no jurisdiction in a suit brought after her death, for the probate court could grant complete relief. Davis v. Eastman, 66 Vt. 651, 30 A. 1, 1894 Vt. LEXIS 145 (1894).

Exclusive jurisdiction.

Wife’s alleged misuse of the funds in a Vermont Uniform Gift to Minors Act (VUGMA) account did not transform the child’s property into the property of her parents. To the extent that wife violated her obligations as custodian on the account, the VUGMA provides a different remedy in a different forum. Wade v. Wade, 2005 VT 72, 178 Vt. 189, 878 A.2d 303, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 155 (2005).

By this section, probate courts are clothed with original and plenary jurisdiction over settlement of estates of deceased persons, and, subject to right of heirs and beneficiaries to pay debts and divide property between themselves without intervention of court, this jurisdiction is exclusive. In re Fisher's Estate, 104 Vt. 37, 156 A. 878, 1931 Vt. LEXIS 141 (1931).

Property ownership.

Whether the determination of property ownership is necessary and incidental to matters within the probate court’s jurisdiction depends upon the relationship of the parties to the estate. The general rule is that the probate court is without power to decide a disputed claim between an estate and a stranger thereto, a “stranger” being generally defined as a person or entity that is not an heir or beneficiary under the will. Where, therefore, a stated beneficiary on a credit union designation-of-beneficiary card was also, as nephew of the decedent, a beneficiary under the will, he was not a stranger to the estate, and the probate court could determine whether he or the estate was entitled to the credit union account. In re Estate of Piche, 166 Vt. 479, 697 A.2d 674, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 108 (1997).

Cited.

Cited in In re Prouty's Estate, 101 Vt. 496, 144 A. 691, 1929 Vt. LEXIS 197 (1929).

§ 311a. Venue generally.

For proceedings authorized to the Probate Division of Superior Court, venue shall lie as provided in Title 14A for the administration of trusts, and otherwise in a probate district as follows:

  1. Decedent’s estate for a resident of this State: in the district where the decedent resided at the time of death.
  2. Decedent’s estate for a nonresident of this State: in any district where estate of the decedent is situated.
  3. Appointment of a conservator for the estate of an absent person:
    1. in the district of the absent person’s last legal domicile; or
    2. if a nonresident of this State, in any district where estate of the absent person is situated.
  4. [Repealed.]
  5. Appointment of a trustee for the estate of an absent person:
    1. in the district of the absent person’s last legal domicile; or
    2. if the absent person has no domicile in this State, in any district where property of the absent person is situated; or
    3. in any district of residence of a fiduciary or representative of an estate having possession and control of property the absent person received by virtue of a legacy or as an heir of an estate.
  6. Cemetery trusts:
    1. in the district where the trustee resides; or
    2. in the district where the creation of the trust is recorded.
  7. Appointment of a guardian of a person resident in this State: in the district where the person under guardianship resides at the time of appointment, except when the guardian is appointed for a minor who is interested in a decedent’s estate as an heir, devisee, or legatee or representative of either, in the district where the decedent’s estate is being probated.
  8. Appointment of a guardian for a nonresident minor: in the district where the minor owns or has an interest in real estate.
  9. Termination or modification of a guardianship or change of a guardian:
    1. in the district of the appointing court; or
    2. in the district where the person under guardianship resides.
  10. [Repealed.]
  11. Estate of a nonresident charitable or philanthropic testamentary trust:
    1. in any district where the legacy or gift is to be paid or distributed; or
    2. in any district where the beneficiary or beneficiaries reside or are located.
  12. Appointment of a guardian as to the estate of a nonresident subject to guardianship in this State or under guardianship in another state: in any district where the estate of the nonresident under guardianship or person who may need a guardian is situated.
  13. Change of residential placement for a person under total or limited guardianship:
    1. in the district of the appointing court; or
    2. in the district where the person under guardianship resides.
  14. Petition to determine title to property in the name of a person deceased seven or more years without probate of a decedent estate: in the district where the property is situated.
  15. Uniform gifts to minors:
    1. petition to expend custodial property for a minor’s support, education, or maintenance: in the district where the minor resides;
    2. petition for permission to resign or for designation of a successor custodian: in the district where the minor resides.
  16. Relinquishment for adoption:
    1. in the district where a written relinquishment is executed; or
    2. in the district where a licensed child-placing agency to which written relinquishment is made has its principal office.
  17. Adoption:
    1. if the adopting person or persons are residents of this State, in the district where they reside;
    2. if the adopting person or persons are nonresidents, in a court of competent jurisdiction where they reside; or
    3. if the prospective adoptee is a minor who has been relinquished or committed to the Department for Children and Families or a licensed child-placing agency, in the district where the Department or agency is located or has its principal office.
  18. Change of name: in the district where the person resides.
  19. Appeal from a denial by the State Registrar of Vital Records of a request for a new, corrected, amended, or delayed birth certificate: in the district where the birth occurred or allegedly occurred.
  20. Correction or amendment of a civil marriage or civil union certificate or issuance of delayed certificate: in the district where the marriage or civil union license was issued or allegedly issued.
  21. Appeal from a denial by the State Registrar of Vital Records of a request for a corrected or amended death certificate: in the district where the death occurred or, if the place of death is unknown, where the body was found.
  22. Emergency waiver of premarital medical certificate: in the district where application is made for the civil marriage license.
  23. Proceedings relating to cemetery lots: in the district where the cemetery lot is located.
  24. Trusts relating to community mausoleums or columbariums: in the district where the community mausoleum or columbarium is located.
  25. Petition for license to convey homestead interest of a spouse who lacks capacity to protect his or her interests due to a psychiatric disability: in the district where the homestead is situated.
  26. Declaratory judgments (unless otherwise provided in Title 14A for proceedings relating to the administration of trusts):
    1. if any related proceeding is then pending in any Probate Division of the Superior Court, in that district; or
    2. if no proceeding is pending:
      1. in the district where the petitioner resides; or
      2. if a decedent’s estate, a guardian or person under guardianship, or trust governed by Title 14 is the subject of the proceeding, in any district where venue lies for a proceeding thereon.
  27. [Repealed.]
  28. Appointment of a trustee for a person confined under a sentence of imprisonment: in the district or unit in which the person resided at the time of sentence, or in the district or unit in which the sentence was imposed.
  29. Proceedings concerning 18 V.S.A. chapter 231: in the district where the principal resides or in the district where the principal is a patient admitted to a health care facility.
  30. Proceedings under 18 V.S.A. chapter 107, subchapter 3: in the district where the decedent resided at the time of death or where the remains are currently located.

HISTORY: Added 1985, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; amended 2005, No. 55 , § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 2005; 2007, No. 56 , § 3; 2009, No. 3 , § 12a, eff. Sept. 1, 2009; 2009, No. 20 , § 4; 2009, No. 92 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 18A, eff. Feb. 1, 2011; 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 2013, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 100; 2017, No. 46 , § 56, eff. July 1, 2019.

History

Amendments

—2017. Subdiv. (19): Amended subdiv. generally.

Subdiv. (20): Amended subdiv. generally.

Subdiv. (21): Amended subdiv. generally.

Subdiv. (27): Repealed.

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (7): Act No. 96 deleted designations for former subdivs. (7)(A) and (7)(B), and in former (7)(A) substituted “person under guardianship” for “ward”, and made minor stylistic changes.

Subdivs. (9)(B), (13)(B), and (26)(B)(ii): Act No. 96 substituted “person under guardianship” for “ward”.

Subdiv. (12): Act No. 96 inserted “the” following “where” and substituted “nonresident under guardianship” for “nonresident ward” and “person who may need a guardian” for “prospective ward”.

Subdiv. (13): Act No. 96 substituted “person” for “ward”.

Subdiv. (17)(C): Act Nos. 96 and 131 substituted “Department for Children and Families” for “department of social and rehabilitation services”.

Subdiv. (25): Act No. 96 substituted “a” for “an insane” and inserted “who lacks capacity to protect his or her interests due to a psychiatric disability”.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Act No. 92 repealed subdiv. (4) and substituted “Cemetery” for “Charitable, cemetery and philanthropic” preceding “trusts” in the introductory paragraph of subdiv. (6).

Act No. 154, effective February 2, 2011, substituted “to the probate division of superior court venue” for “to probate courts venue”, and inserted “probate” preceding “district” and deleted “of the court” thereafter in the introductory paragraph, inserted “division of the superior” following “probate” in subdiv. (26)(A), and substituted “unit” for “county” following “district or” in subdivs. (27) and (28).

—2009. Introductory paragraph: Inserted “as provided in Title 14A for the administration of trusts, and otherwise” following “shall lie”.

Subdiv. (10): Deleted.

Subdiv. (26): Inserted “(unless otherwise provided in Title 14A for proceedings relating to the administration of trusts)” following “judgments”.

Subdiv. (26)(B)(ii): Inserted “governed by Title 14” following “trust”.

—2007. Subdiv. (30): Added.

—2005. Subdiv. (29): Added.

Effective date of 2017 amendment of subdivs. (19)-(21) and (27). 2017, No. 46 , § 63, as amended by 2018, No. 11 (Sp. Sess.), § I.1(b), provides that the amendments to subdivs. (19)-(21) and (27) of this section shall take effect on July 1, 2019.

CROSS REFERENCES

Probate districts, see § 272 of this title.

Change of venue, see V.R.P.P. 38.

ANNOTATIONS

Nonresident decedent.

Venue for the administration of the estate of a nonresident decedent shall lie in any district where the estate of the decedent is situated. In re Estate of Bedard, 161 Vt. 587, 657 A.2d 167, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 149 (1993) (mem.).

§ 312. Resident’s estate; settlement.

If an inhabitant of this State dies, his or her will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted and his or her estate settled in the Probate Court of the district in which he or she resided at the time of his or her death.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2794. P.L. § 2724. G.L. § 3178. P.S. § 2711. V.S. § 2326. R.L. § 2019. G.S. 48, § 17. G.S. 51, § 2. R.S. 44, § 15. R.S. 47, § 2. 1821, p. 40. R. 1797, p. 214, § 15. R. 1797, p. 220, § 25. R. 1797, p. 237, § 60. R. 1787, p. 51.

ANNOTATIONS

Change of probate district.

Administration de bonis non, granted by probate court of district other than the one in which administration was first granted, but to which the town where deceased resided had been attached by a later statute, was not void, but only voidable on appeal. Clapp v. Beardsley, 1 Vt. 151, 1828 Vt. LEXIS 12 (1828).

Domicile.

Where person removed from one place to another, with intention of remaining at the latter, as a place of fixed present domicile, for an indefinite time, it was to be deemed his place of domicile, notwithstanding he may have entertained a floating intention of returning at some future period. Anderson v. Estate of Anderson, 42 Vt. 350, 1869 Vt. LEXIS 88 (1869).

§ 313. Nonresident’s estate; settlement.

If a person resided out of the State at the time of his or her death, his or her will shall be allowed and recorded and letters testamentary or of administration shall be granted in the Probate Court of any district in which he or she had estate.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2795. P.L. § 2725. G.L. § 3179. P.S. § 2712. V.S. § 2327. R.L. § 2020. G.S. 48, § 18. R.S. 44, § 16. 1821, p. 40. R. 1797, p. 237, § 60.

ANNOTATIONS

Construction.

Appropriate court of jurisdiction in which assets of estate of nonresident testator are found may grant probate upon his will, even though will has not been presented for probate in state of domicile, such jurisdiction being inherent and existing independently of statute, which is regarded as merely declaratory of common law. In re Estate of Holden, 110 Vt. 60, 1 A.2d 721, 1938 Vt. LEXIS 119 (1938).

Effect of nonresidence.

Administration of the estate of a nonresident decedent shall be allowed in the probate court of any district in which he had an estate. In re Estate of Bedard, 161 Vt. 587, 657 A.2d 167, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 149 (1993) (mem.).

Fact that decedent was nonresident would not affect jurisdiction of probate court provided such jurisdiction were otherwise established. In re Estate of Holden, 110 Vt. 60, 1 A.2d 721, 1938 Vt. LEXIS 119 (1938).

Where estate of decedent domiciled in Florida at time of death consisted in part in stocks in Vermont corporations, mortgage on Vermont real estate and deposits in Vermont banks, and where no proceedings were pending in Florida, admission to probate in Vermont for district in which real estate and banks were located of instrument purporting to be decedent’s last will and testament was justified, since such court had jurisdiction. In re Estate of Holden, 110 Vt. 60, 1 A.2d 721, 1938 Vt. LEXIS 119 (1938).

§§ 314, 315. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a(a)(1), eff. February 1, 2011.

History

Former §§ 314, 315. Former § 314, relating to probate court retention of jurisdiction over estate once taken, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2797; 1947, No. 202 , § 2820; P.L. § 2727; G.L. § 3181; P.S. § 2713; V.S. § 2328; R.L. § 2021; G.S. 48, § 19; R.S. 44, § 17.

Former § 315, relating to contest of probate court jurisdiction, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2798; P.L. § 2728; G.L. § 3182; P.S. § 2714; V.S. § 2329; R.L. § 2022; G.S. 48, § 20; R.S. 44, § 18.

Annotations From Former § 315

Collateral attack.

Court of another state.

Annotations From Former § 315

Collateral attack.

Where record of probate court did not show whether insane ward resided in another probate district when guardian was appointed, appointment could not be collaterally attacked as void on that ground. Mason's Guardian v. Mason, 86 Vt. 279, 84 A. 969, 1912 Vt. LEXIS 182 (1912).

Court of another state.

This section does not refer to jurisdiction assumed by a probate court of another state. Domenchini's Administrator v. Hoosac Tunnel & Wilmington Railroad, 90 Vt. 451, 98 A. 982, 1916 Vt. LEXIS 302 (1916).

Subchapter 3. Organization and Powers

§§ 351-353. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a(a)(1), eff. February 2, 2011.

History

Former §§ 351–353. Former § 351, relating to the record and seal of probate court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2790; P.L. § 2719; G.L. § 3173; P.S. § 2706; V.S. § 2322; R.L. § 2015; G.S. 48, § 2; R.S. 44, § 2; 1821, p. 31; R. 1797, p. 262, § 104; R. 1787, p. 120.

Former § 352, relating to the impression of the probate court seal to be kept by governor, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2791; P.L. § 2720; G.L. § 3174; P.S. § 2707; 1898, No. 52 , § 1.

Former § 353, relating to probate court always being open, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2792; 1941, No. 40 ; P.L. § 2722; G.L. § 3176; P.S. § 2709; V.S. § 2324; R.L. § 2017; G.S. 48, §§ 26, 27; R.S. 44, §§ 24, 25; 1821, p. 33.

§ 354. Disqualification of judge or register; penalty.

A judge or register shall not act as guardian, executor, administrator, trustee, or in any other fiduciary capacity or as attorney in any probate matter pending in any court in the State while holding either office. A judge or register who violates a provision of this section shall be imprisoned not more than six months or fined not more than $500.00, or both.

HISTORY: Amended 1961, No. 149 , eff. June 7, 1961.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2808. P.L. § 2736. 1923, No. 52 . G.S. § 3192. P.S. § 2723. V.S. § 2339. R.L. § 2032. G.S. 48, § 38. R.S. 44, § 36. 1821, p. 34. R. 1797, p. 248, § 80.

Amendments

—1961. Rewrote the first sentence.

CROSS REFERENCES

Disqualification of judge for conflict of interest generally, see 12 V.S.A. § 61 .

Code of judicial conduct, see Administrative Order No. 10, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

§ 355. Disqualification or disability of judge.

When a Probate judge is incapacitated for the duties of office by absence, removal from the district, resignation, sickness, death, or otherwise or if the judge or the judge’s spouse or child is heir or legatee under a will filed in the judge’s district, or if the judge is executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased person in his or her district, or is interested as a creditor or otherwise in a question to be decided by the court, he or she shall not act as judge. The judge’s duties shall be performed by a Superior judge assigned by the presiding judge of the unit.

HISTORY: Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 20, eff. Feb. 1, 2011.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2803. P.L. § 2734. G.L. § 3190. P.S. § 2721. 1902, No. 50 , §§ 1, 2. V.S. §§ 2336, 2337. 1888, No. 71 . R.L. §§ 2029, 2030. 1865, No. 19 . G.S. 48, §§ 8, 9. 1859, No. 3 . 1854, No. 15 , §§ 1, 2, 3. 1851, No. 18 . R.S. 44, §§ 7, 8. 1822, p. 15. 1821, p. 32.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “superior” for “county” preceding “court of the county” in the second sentence.

ANNOTATIONS

Construction.

Provision stating that when a probate judge is incapacitated, his or her duties may be performed during the period of incapacity by either the register of probate, a probate judge from another district, or an assistant judge of the Superior Court in the same district has no bearing on Vermont’s judicial resign-to-run provision. That an assistant judge may temporarily perform the duties of a probate judge does not affect the clear import of the resign-to-run provision, which is concerned with the broader implications of running for one judicial office while performing the duties of another. In re Hodgdon, 2011 VT 19, 189 Vt. 265, 19 A.3d 598, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 14 (2011).

The word “absence” in this section does not mean mere physical nonpresence, but rather effective absence, and a register may only perform the probate judge’s duties if the judge is away from court, cannot be reached, and the situation demands immediate attention. Scrivens v. Elizabeth Lund Home, 138 Vt. 593, 421 A.2d 1276, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1380 (1980).

Vacationing at a summer home within the same probate district is not “absence” for purposes of this section. Scrivens v. Elizabeth Lund Home, 138 Vt. 593, 421 A.2d 1276, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1380 (1980).

Determination of disqualification.

While probate judge has authority to pass on question of his disqualification in first instance, his decision is not final as there is right of appeal from it to county (Superior) court or, if only a question of law is involved, directly to Supreme Court. Ricci v. Bove's Administrator, 116 Vt. 406, 78 A.2d 13, 1951 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1951).

Jurisdiction of acting judge.

Until there has been a disqualification of a probate judge no person named in this section to perform duties of judge in event of his disqualification would have authority to perform such duties. Ricci v. Bove's Administrator, 116 Vt. 406, 78 A.2d 13, 1951 Vt. LEXIS 110 (1951).

Jurisdiction of probate judge while acting in another district owing to disqualification of judge of that district is coextensive with the disqualification of such judge extending only to question which the judge of that district was disqualified to hear and decide. In re Estate of Prouty, 107 Vt. 504, 181 A. 138, 1935 Vt. LEXIS 206 (1935).

On petition to correct orders of allowance to widow made by probate judge, disqualified by reason of his having made such orders, judge from another district was confined in his jurisdiction to question whether orders should be corrected and did not have jurisdiction sua sponte to raise and decide question whether such orders were void in part by reason of having been made without giving notice and opportunity to be heard to creditors, or have jurisdiction to annul and void such orders. In re Estate of Prouty, 107 Vt. 504, 181 A. 138, 1935 Vt. LEXIS 206 (1935).

Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to ensure that matters requiring immediate handling receive the necessary attention. Scrivens v. Elizabeth Lund Home, 138 Vt. 593, 421 A.2d 1276, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1380 (1980).

§ 356. Authority of judge after end of term.

  1. A Probate judge whose term of office has expired, or who has vacated such office, shall have authority to act in the capacity of Probate judge to conclude causes and proceedings partly or fully heard before the judge as Probate judge as fully and effectively as he or she could if he or she remained in such office. He or she may make, sign, and enter findings, decisions, orders, and decrees in causes or proceedings so pending before him or her as Probate judge, and all such acts so performed by the judge shall have as full force and effect as they would have had if he or she had remained in office.
  2. The jurisdiction conferred by subsection (a) of this section shall not be exercised if the presiding judge of the unit determines that the successor to the Probate judge will assume jurisdiction for all or part of the cases.
  3. A Probate judge who exercises the jurisdiction conferred by subsection (a) of this section shall receive compensation at a rate fixed by the Court Administrator.

HISTORY: Amended 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 15, eff. March 29, 1972; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 21, eff. Feb. 1, 2011.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, §§ 2804-2806. 1935, No. 56 , §§ 1-3.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “the judge” for “him” in two places and made other gender-neutral changes throughout the subsec.

Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

Subsec. (c): Substituted “court administrator” for “successor judge, and the compensation and necessary expenses allowed by the successor judge shall be paid by the state” following “fixed by the”.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

§ 357. Registers of Probate.

The Superior Court clerk or court operations manager, in consultation with the Probate judge, and following the approval of the Court Administrator, shall hire a register of probate for each unit. The Probate judge may request that the Court Administrator designate one or more staff persons as additional registers.

HISTORY: Amended 1969, No. 125 , § 4; 1971, No. 191 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 1973, No. 106 , § 3, eff. May 25, 1973; 1977, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), eff. March 30, 1978; 1981, No. 76 ; 1997, No. 92 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 22; 2017, No. 28 , § 1, eff. May 10, 2017.

History

Source.

1957, No. 300 , § 2.

Amendments

—2017. Section amended generally.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1997 (Adj. Sess.). In subsec. (a) added “and compensation” after “fringe benefits”, added the language at the end beginning “who are similarly situated”, and deleted the last sentence.

—1981. Designated existing provisions of section as subsec. (a), deleted “with the advice of the state employees’ compensation review board” preceding “subject” in the second sentence of that subsection, and added subsec. (b).

—1977 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “court administrator with the advice and consent of the” preceding “probate judge” in the first sentence and deleted “concerned” thereafter.

—1973. Section amended generally.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted the second sentence.

—1969. Section amended generally.

Prior law.

V.S. 1947, §§ 2799, 10,469.

§§ 358-361. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a(a)(1), eff. February 1, 2011.

History

Former §§ 358-361. Former § 358, relating to duties of probate court register, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2800; 1947, No. 202 , § 2823; P.L. §§ 2730, 2732; G.L. §§ 3185, 3188; P.S. §§ 2717, 2719. V.S. §§ 2332, 2334; R.L. §§ 2025, 2027; G.S. 48, §§ 4, 6. R.S. 44, §§ 3, 5; 1821, pp. 31, 33; R. 1797, p. 262, § 104 and amended by 1971, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1985, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1997, No. 53 , § 6; and 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a.

Former § 359, relating to judge performing probate court register’s duties, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2802; P.L. § 2733; G.L. § 3189; P.S. § 2720; V.S. § 2335; R.L. § 2028; G.S. 48, § 7; R.S. 44, § 6; 1821, p. 33 and amended by 009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a.

Former § 360, relating to card index required in probate court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2801; P.L. § 2731; 1933, No. 157 , § 2518; G.L. § 3186; 1912, No. 253 , § 10; 1910, No. 98 and amended by 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(c); 1971, No. 179 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1983, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b); 1985, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a.

Former § 361, relating to maintenance of ledger in probate court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2809; 1947, No. 202 , § 2832; P.L. § 2737; G.L. § 3193; P.S. § 2724; V.S. § 2340; R.L. § 2033; G.S. 126, § 21; 1859, No. 2 , § 6 and amended by 1977, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a.

Annotations From Former § 358

Ministerial acts.

Duties referred to in this section are purely ministerial so mandamus will lie if circumstances otherwise permit. Carpenter's Adm'r v. Brown, 118 Vt. 148, 102 A.2d 331, 1954 Vt. LEXIS 92 (1954).

There is a distinction between rendition of a judgment and its entry: rendition is the judicial act of the court and entry is the ministerial act of the clerk and is merely the record and evidence of what has been adjudicated. In re Estate of Moody, 115 Vt. 1, 49 A.2d 562, 1946 Vt. LEXIS 71 (1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 814, 67 S. Ct. 1201, 91 L. Ed. 1833, 1947 U.S. LEXIS 2388 (1947).

§ 362. Oaths.

A Probate judge or register may administer oaths.

HISTORY: Amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 23, eff. Feb. 1, 2011.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

§ 363. Powers.

  1. A Probate judge may issue warrants, subpoenas, and processes in conformity with the law necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses or to produce books, papers, documents, or tangible things, or to carry into effect the orders, sentences, or decrees of the Probate Court or the powers granted it by law.
  2. A Probate judge may appoint not more than three masters to report on a particular issue or to do or perform particular acts or to receive and report evidence.

HISTORY: Amended 1985, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a, eff. Feb. 1, 2011; 2011, No. 1 , § 3, eff. Feb. 2, 2011.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2810. 1947, No. 202 , § 2833. P.L. § 2738. G.L. § 3194. P.S. § 2725. V.S. § 2341. R.L. § 2034. G.S. 48, § 14. R.S. 44, § 12. 1821, p. 32.

Editor’s note

—2011. 2009, No. 54 (Adj. Sess.), § 238(a)(1), inadvertently repealed this section effective February 1, 2011. The section was reenacted effective February 2, 2011 by 2011, No. 1 , § 3.

Amendments

—2011. Substituted “judge” for “court” following “probate” in subsecs. (a) and (b).

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “The probate division of the superior court” for “A probate court” in subsecs. (a) and (b), and substituted “division” for “court” preceding “or the powers” in subsec. (a).

—1985 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

CROSS REFERENCES

Discovery in probate proceedings generally, see V.R.P.P. 26.

Subpoenas generally, see V.R.P.P. 45.

Masters generally, see V.R.P.P. 53.

§ 364. Commitment to enforce orders.

If a person does not comply with an order, sentence, or decree of the Probate Division of the Superior Court in a proceeding formerly within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court, the court may issue a warrant committing the person to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections until compliance is given.

HISTORY: Amended 1985, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 24, eff. February 1, 2011.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 2811. 1947, No. 202 , § 2834. P.L. § 2739. G.L. § 3195. P.S. § 2726. V.S. § 2342. R.L. § 2035. G.S. 48, § 15. R.S. 44, § 13. 1821, p. 32. R. 1797, p. 247, § 77.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “probate division of the superior court in a proceeding formerly within the jurisdiction of the” preceding “probate court”.

—1985 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

ANNOTATIONS

Imprisonment.

Probate judge could imprison executor who willfully refused to perform order to pay monthly certain sums of money for maintenance of widow and children during settlement of estate. Leach v. Peabody, 58 Vt. 485, 2 A. 737, 1886 Vt. LEXIS 48 (1886).

Probate court had no authority to imprison administrator for purpose of enforcing final decree for mere payment of money, and he was entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus. In re Bingham, 32 Vt. 329, 1859 Vt. LEXIS 107 (1859).

Decree against administrator, who had been discharged and had settled his account, to pay over to his successor balance of money found due from him to intestate, such money having been received by him for sale of personal and use of real estate of intestate, was not such a specific decree as could be enforced by probate court by imprisonment. In re Bingham, 32 Vt. 329, 1859 Vt. LEXIS 107 (1859).

Remedy of legatee.

When, after decree of distribution, executor neglects and refuses to pay over legacy to residuary legatee, latter may bring action of contract in nature of debt on decree for its recovery, but being final and not administrative decree, may not proceed against him in probate court under this section. Reed v. Hendee, 100 Vt. 351, 137 A. 329, 1927 Vt. LEXIS 162 (1927).

§ 365. Repealed. 1985, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 163.

History

Former § 365. Former § 365, relating to commissions to take depositions, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2812; P.L. § 2740; G.L. § 3196; P.S. § 2727; V.S. § 2343; R.L. § 2036; G.S. 48, § 16; 1859, No. 18 ; R.S. 44, § 14; 1821, p. 32; R. 1797, p. 241, § 70.

§§ 366, 367. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a(a)(1), eff. February 1, 2011.

History

Former §§ 366, 367. Former § 366, relating to the costs taxed to witnesses in probate court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2813; P.L. § 2741; 1933, No. 157 , § 2528; G.L. § 3197; 1917, No. 254 , § 3149; P.S. § 2728. V.S. § 2344; R.L. § 2037; 1865, No. 20 , §§ 1, 2; G.S. 48, § 41; R.S. 44, § 39; 1936, No. 13 , § 2; 1834, No. 4 , §§ 4, 5 and amended by 1985, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a.

Former § 367, relating to the security for costs taxed to witnesses in probate court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2814; P.L. § 2742; G.L. § 3198; P.S. § 2729; V.S. § 2345; R.L. § 2038; 1865, No. 20 , § 3 and amended by 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238a.

Annotations From Former § 367

Petition without citation.

Where petition did not have citation requiring appellant to appear and answer before probate court, petitioner could not be required under this section to furnish security for costs. In re Welch's Will, 69 Vt. 127, 37 A. 250, 1896 Vt. LEXIS 20 (1896).

§ 368. Repealed. 1985, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 163.

History

Former § 368. Former § 368, relating to service of notice by publication, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2815; P.L. § 2743; G.L. § 3199; P.S. § 2730; 1896, No. 47 , § 1. The subject matter is now covered by Rule 4(e), Vermont Rules of Probate Procedure.

§ 369. Nonresident’s estate; notice to Commissioner of Taxes; information to banks.

  1. When an executor or administrator is appointed to administer within this State an estate of a deceased person who resided in another state or country at the time of his or her death, the judge who issued the appointment shall forthwith notify the Commissioner of Taxes in writing of the appointment, giving the name and residence of the deceased person at the time of his or her death, the name and residence of the executor or administrator, the date of his or her appointment, and the court making the appointment.
  2. The Commissioner shall keep a full record in each case and upon inquiry made of him or her by any savings bank or savings institution in the State shall at once notify the bank or institution whether, as shown by his or her record, an executor or administrator has been appointed by any court in the State to administer the estate of the deceased person named in the inquiry. If there has been such an appointment, the Commissioner shall furnish the information required by this subsection to the bank or institution forthwith.

HISTORY: Amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 25, eff. Feb. 1, 2011.

History

Revision note

—2017. In subsec. (b), deleted “above” before “information”, inserted “required by this subsection” after “information”, to conform with V.S.A. style.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

§ 370. Repealed. 1985, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 163.

History

Former § 370. Former § 370, relating to notice of hearings, was added by 1967, No. 259 (Adj. Sess.).

Chapter 9. District Court

History

Revision note—

Substituted “District court” for “Municipal Courts” in the chapter heading to reflect changes made by 1965, No. 194 and 1967, No. 194 .

General amendment. 1965, No. 194 , § 10, operative Feb. 1, 1967, provided: “Each section of the statutes in which the word ‘municipal’ appears referring to the municipal courts, judges or officers is amended by striking out the word ‘municipal’ and inserting instead the word ‘district’.”

Transitional provisions and redesignations of courts. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 237(a) and (b) provide:

“(a) The judicial office of district judge is eliminated. On the effective date of Sec. 9 [June 3, 2010] of this act, each District judge shall become a Superior judge and have all of the powers and duties of a Superior Judge. The term of each Superior Judge who reached the office by virtue of this subsection shall be the same as if the person had remained a District Judge.

“(b) On July 1, 2010:

“(1) the superior court as it formerly existed shall be redesignated as the civil division of the superior court, and all cases and files of the former superior court shall be transferred to the civil division of the superior court;

“(2) the family court as it formerly existed shall be redesignated as the family division of the superior court, and all cases and files of the former family court shall be transferred to the family division of the superior court;

“(3) the district court as it formerly existed shall be redesignated as the criminal division of the superior court, and all cases and files of the former district court shall be transferred to the criminal division of the superior court; and

“(4) the environmental court as it formerly existed shall be redesignated as the environmental division of the superior court, and all cases and files of the former environmental court shall be transferred to the environmental division of the superior court.”

§ 421. Repealed. 1965, No. 194, § 16.

History

Former § 421. Former § 421, relating to title and jurisdiction of municipal courts, was derived from 1955, No. 285 , § 1; 1949, Nos. 54, 55; V.S. 1947, § 1437; 1935, No. 45 , § 1; P.L. § 1403; 1933, No. 181 , § 3; 1933, No. 180 , §§ 2, 4; 1933, No. 32 , §§ 1, 2; 1931, No. 230 , § 100; 1931, No. 34 , § 1; 1921, No. 293 ; G.L. § 1642; 1917, No. 254 , § 1602; 1915, Nos. 321, 319; 1915, No. 289 , §§ 22-39; 1915, No. 272 , §§ 294, 342; 1915, No. 91 , §§ 11, 24-26; 1912, Nos. 357, 356, 355, 354, 353; 1912, No. 293 , §§ 110-126; 1912, No. 290 , §§ 13, 14; 1910, Nos. 325, 324, 291; 1910, No. 286 , §§ 8, 9; 1908, Nos. 296, 295, 294, 293, 292, 291; 1908, No. 249 , §§ 205-245; 1908, No. 242 , §§ 285-333; 1906, Nos. 307, 306; 1906, No. 280 , §§ 232-280; 1906, No. 276 ; 1906, No. 261 , §§ 291-339; 1906, No. 208 , § 1; 1904, No. 231 , § 5; 1904, No. 222 ; 1902, No. 211 , §§ 21-43; 1902, No. 155 ; 1900, No. 163 , § 10; 1900, No. 162 , §§ 96-123; 1898, No. 183 , § 30; 1896, No. 149 , §§ 4, 5; 1896, No. 148 , §§ 223-270; 1896, No. 143 , §§ 3-6; 1894, No. 174 ; 1894, No. 166 , §§ 35-59; 1894, No. 165 , §§ 21-46; 1892, No. 116 , § 14; 1892, No. 110 , § 15; 1886, No. 199 , § 15; 1884, No. 226 , §§ 48-65; 1882, No. 204 , §§ 59-79; 1882, No. 92 ; 1880, Nos. 208, 205, 204, 203; 1876, No. 183 , § 3; 1874, No. 170 , § 4; 1874, No. 49 ; 1872, No. 255 , § 11; 1872, No. 3 ; 1869, No. 128 , § 7; 1867, No. 88 , § 3; 1866, No. 171 , § 38; 1865, No. 139 , § 8; 1864, No. 98 , § 11; 1852, No. 85 , § 20 and amended by 1959, No. 142 , § 1.

§§ 421a-435. Repealed. 1967, No. 194, § 22, eff. March 1, 1968.

History

Former §§ 421a-435. Former § 421a, relating to establishment and territorial jurisdiction of district courts, was derived from 1965, No. 194 , § 1.

Former § 422, relating to civil jurisdiction of district court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1449; P.L. § 1415; 1933, No. 32 , §§ 21, 32; G.L. § 1649; 1917, No. 254 , § 1609; 1915, No. 91 , §§ 11, 15; 1908, No. 62 ; G.L. § 1659; P.S. § 1391; V.S. § 1041; R.L. § 822; G.S. 31, § 20; R.S. 26, § 8; 1823, p. 19 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 2.

Former § 423, relating to matter in demand, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1450; P.L. § 1416; G.L. § 1650; 1917, No. 254 , § 1611 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10.

Former § 424, relating to concurrent jurisdiction in civil matters, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1451; P.L. § 1417; 1933, No. 32 , § 21 1/2; G.L. § 1649; 1917, No. 254 , § 1609; 1915, No. 91 , §§ 11, 15; 1908, No. 62 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 3.

Former § 425, relating to transfer of causes, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1452; P.L. § 1418; 1933, No. 32 , § 21; 1925, No. 42 , § 1 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 4; 1967, No. 119 , § 1.

Former § 426, relating to jurisdiction of prosecutions for misdemeanors, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2421; 1939, No. 45 , § 2; P.L. § 2394; G.L. § 2565; 1915, No. 91 , § 1 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10.

Former § 427, relating to jurisdiction of prosecutions for violations of bylaws or ordinances, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2422; P.L. § 2395; G.L. § 2566; 1915, No. 91 , § 2 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10.

Former § 428, relating to jurisdiction to render judgment and pass sentence upon a plea of guilty in prosecutions for felonies, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2423; P.L. § 2396; G.L. § 2567; 1917, No. 254 , § 2530; 1915, No. 91 , § 3 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10.

Former § 429, relating to powers same as justice court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1442; P.L. § 1408; 1933, No. 32 , § 8; G.L. § 1641; 1917, No. 254 , § 1601; 1908, No. 62 ; G.L. § 1642; 1917, No. 254 , § 1602; 1915, No. 91 , § 11 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10.

Former § 430, relating to power over records and proceedings, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1439; P.L. § 1405; 1933, No. 32 , § 12; G.L. § 1644; 1915, No. 91 , §§ 4, 11, 13 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10.

Former § 431, relating to court of record and seal, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1438; P.L. § 1404; 1933, No. 32 , § 3 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10.

Former § 432, relating to appointment of and practice of law by district court judges, was derived from 1957, No. 290 , § 5; V.S. 1947, § 1440; P.L. § 1406; 1933, No. 180 , § 5; 1933, No. 32 , § 6; G.L. § 1639; 1915, No. 1 , §§ 46, 208; 1912, No. 16 , § 3; P.S. § 326; 1906, No. 208 , § 1; V.S. § 241; 1890, No. 73 , § 1 and amended by 1959, No. 142 , § 2; 1965, No. 194 , § 5.

Former § 433, relating to acting judges, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1441; 1947, No. 35 , § 1; P.L. § 1407; 1933, No. 32 , § 7; G.L. § 1640; 1917, No. 254 , § 1600; 1915, No. 91 , § 18 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10.

Former § 434, relating to court officers, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1455; P.L. § 1421; 1933, No. 32 , § 14 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10.

Former § 435, relating to construction of statutes relating to district courts with special laws, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1468; P.L. § 1434; G.L. § 1648; 1917, No. 254 , § 1608 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10.

§ 436. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former § 436. Former § 436, relating to creation of district court, was derived from 1967, No. 194 , § 1.

Annotations From Former § 436

Validity.

The Vermont Constitution does not prohibit the legislature from creating courts other than those named in that instrument, thus the General Assembly could properly create the district court. Woodmansee v. Smith, 129 Vt. 284, 276 A.2d 617, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 257 (1971).

Cited.

Cited in Ketcham v. Lehner, 149 Vt. 314, 542 A.2d 290, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 9 (1988).

§ 436a. Repealed. 2011, No. 1, § 7, eff. Feb. 2, 2011.

History

Former § 436a. Former § 436a, relating to a special circuit court at Waterbury to hear applications for treatment of mentally ill individuals, was derived from 1973, No. 107 , § 2 and amended by 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 7 and 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 27.

Annotations From Former § 436a

Equitable powers.

There is no indication that the district court’s equitable powers under this section are limited, in cases properly within its jurisdiction. In re V.C., 146 Vt. 454, 505 A.2d 1214, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 400 (1985).

Section 219 of this title, granting the powers of a chancellor to district court judges in civil matters, does not limit the power of the special unit under this section. In re V.C., 146 Vt. 454, 505 A.2d 1214, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 400 (1985).

Once subject matter jurisdiction is established under this section, the court can exercise equitable powers as provided in section 219 of this title. In re V.C., 146 Vt. 454, 505 A.2d 1214, 1985 Vt. LEXIS 400 (1985).

Cited.

Cited in In re C.B., 147 Vt. 378, 518 A.2d 366, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 424 (1986).

§ 436b. Repealed. 2003, No. 71 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

History

Former § 436b. Former § 436b, relating to special circuit at Brandon, was derived from 1977, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, and amended by 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 8.

§ 437. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Editor’s note

—2010. Former § 4 V.S.A. § 437 was substantially recodified as 4 V.S.A. § 32 pursuant to 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 7c.

Former § 437. Former § 437, relating to civil jurisdiction of district court, was derived from 1967, No. 194 , § 2 and amended by 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 1993, No. 237 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1995, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2001, No. 49 , § 10; No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2003, No. 146 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2005, No. 152 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2005, No. 208 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; and 2007, No. 77 , § 12.

Annotations From Former § 437

Title.

Annotations from prior law, former § 422

Equity.

General jurisdiction.

Annotations From Former § 437

Title.

Provision of this section giving district courts “jurisdiction of civil actions wherein the debt is not over $5,000 and title to real estate is not involved” does not refer to any particular form of action or rest exclusion on any abstract possibility of the occurrence of a title question, but depends on whether, without reference to the nature of the action, title is actually in controversy. Carney v. O'Bryn, 132 Vt. 482, 321 A.2d 35, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 373 (1974).

Cited.

Cited in Hendricks v. Dietrich, 135 Vt. 409, 376 A.2d 770, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 639 (1977); Neal v. Brockway, 136 Vt. 119, 385 A.2d 1069, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 699 (1978); Trudeau v. Conway, Comm. of Motor Vehicles, 139 Vt. 167, 423 A.2d 854, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1506 (1980); Gerrish Corp. v. Dworkin, 145 Vt. 107, 483 A.2d 261, 1984 Vt. LEXIS 551 (1984); Gokey v. Bessette, 154 Vt. 560, 580 A.2d 488, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 160 (1990).

Annotations from prior law, former § 422

Equity.

A municipal court, whose civil jurisdiction was limited to actions at law, could not require specific performance as a condition to the recovery of the price in action between buyer and seller. Lash Furniture Co. of Barre, Inc. v. Norton, 124 Vt. 58, 196 A.2d 506, 1963 Vt. LEXIS 30 (1963).

General jurisdiction.

Municipal courts were courts of general jurisdiction and every presumption not inconsistent with the record was to be indulged in favor of their jurisdiction. Enosburg Grain Co. v. Wilder, 112 Vt. 11, 20 A.2d 473, 1941 Vt. LEXIS 126 (1941); Town of Brighton v. Town of Charleston, 114 Vt. 316, 44 A.2d 628, 1945 Vt. LEXIS 87 (1945).

Cited.

Cited in Town of Duxbury v. Town of Williamstown, 102 Vt. 94, 145 A. 872, 1929 Vt. LEXIS 149 (1929).

§ 438. Repealed. 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 237, eff. March 29, 1972.

History

Former § 438. Former § 438, relating to transfer of civil causes to county court, was added by 1967, No. 194 , § 3.

§§ 439-444. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Editor’s note

—2010. Former § 4 V.S.A. §§ 439 - 441 were substantially recodified as 4 V.S.A. §§ 32 - 34 pursuant to 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 7c.

Former §§ 439-444. Former § 439, relating to jurisdiction of district court in felony cases, was derived from 1967, No. 194 , § 4 and amended by 1981, No. 223 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 440, relating to jurisdiction of district court in misdemeanor cases, was derived from 1967, No. 194 , § 5 and amended by 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

Former § 441, relating to jurisdiction of district court with respect to violations of bylaws or ordinances, was derived from 1967, No. 194 , § 6 and amended by 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

Former § 442, relating to powers of the district court, was derived from 1967, No. 194 , § 7 and amended by 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

Former § 443, relating to appeals from district court, was derived from 1967, No. 194 , § 8.

Former § 444, relating to number, appointment, and assignment of district judges, was derived from 1967, No. 194 , § 6 and amended by 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

Annotations From Former § 440 Formerly § 426

Jury trial.

Annotations From Former § 442

Annotations From Prior Law, Former § 430

Findings.

Annotations From Former § 443

Construction with other laws.

Annotations From Former § 444

Assignments.

Annotations From Former § 440 Formerly § 426

Jury trial.

A municipal court had no authority to try a respondent for an offense within its jurisdiction without a jury. State v. Hirsch, 91 Vt. 330, 100 A. 877, 1917 Vt. LEXIS 252 (1917).

Annotations From Former § 442

Cited.

Cited in State v. Emrick, 129 Vt. 475, 282 A.2d 821, 1971 Vt. LEXIS 294 (1971); Trudeau v. Conway, Comm. of Motor Vehicles, 139 Vt. 167, 423 A.2d 854, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1506 (1980).

Annotations From Prior Law, Former § 430

Findings.

Duty of county court to find and state facts in cases tried by it was imposed upon municipal court by this section. Wright v. Burbee, 112 Vt. 197, 22 A.2d 494, 1941 Vt. LEXIS 152 (1941), limited, Lash Furniture Co. v. Norton, 123 Vt. 226, 185 A.2d 734, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 229 (1962).

Annotations From Former § 443

Construction with other laws.

Provision of section 7112 of Title 18 authorizing appeals to Superior Court from District Court was applicable to direct appeal of patient’s order of hospitalization issued by District Court since that section was more specific and more recently enacted than this section. State v. O'Connell, 135 Vt. 182, 375 A.2d 982, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 581 (1977).

Annotations From Former § 444

Assignments.

The power of the governor to appoint district judges is to appoint to the District Court as a single court, irrespective of assignment; the power of assignment, regular or special, is in the Judicial Branch. Ketcham v. Lehner, 149 Vt. 314, 542 A.2d 290, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 9 (1988).

The phrase “from time to time” in this section does not indicate that all changes in assignment made under the authority of the Administrative Judge are temporary assignments. Ketcham v. Lehner, 149 Vt. 314, 542 A.2d 290, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 9 (1988).

When a regular assignment is changed after first appointment, the residency requirement follows the change. Ketcham v. Lehner, 149 Vt. 314, 542 A.2d 290, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 9 (1988).

Where vacancy on District Court bench occurred when judge who resided in and was regularly assigned to Unit II was appointed to the Supreme Court, Administrative Judge could change the regular assignment of another district judge from Unit III to Unit II, and new appointee could be regularly assigned to Unit III. Ketcham v. Lehner, 149 Vt. 314, 542 A.2d 290, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 9 (1988).

§ 444a. Repealed.

History

Former § 444a. Former § 444a, relating to Essex county and powers of assistant judges in district court, was derived from 1995, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 5a and amended by 1999, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 75. Subsec. (c) of this section, provided that the section would be repealed on the date that the senior assistant judge of Essex County holding office on May 1, 1996 vacated that office. That judge vacated the office on February 1, 2011.

§ 445. Repealed. 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 22.

History

Former § 445. Former § 445, relating to acting district judges, was added by 1967, No. 194 , § 10 and amended by 1969, No. 125 , § 5; 1979, No. 59 , § 29.

§ 446. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former § 446. Former § 446, relating to court officer in district court, was derived from 1967, No. 194 , § 11.

Notes to Opinions

Construction.

This section was mandatory on officer as determined by judge. 1946-48 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 368.

Chapter 10. Family Court

ANNOTATIONS

Equitable adoption.

The Superior Court was without authority to consider the visitation petition of plaintiff, the female partner of a child’s adoptive mother, as it was without equitable powers to adjudicate a dispute that could not be brought in statutory proceedings within the family court’s jurisdiction, there being no public policy considerations which compelled a judicially created right of equitable adoption. Were such a right created, it would establish, in effect, a two-tiered system in which persons who could not bring their visitation and custody petitions in statutory proceedings before the family court would turn to the Superior Court for relief. The Legislature did not contemplate such a system, and the law does not compel it. Titchenal v. Dexter, 166 Vt. 373, 693 A.2d 682, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 16 (1997).

Subchapter 1. Family Court

§§ 451-454. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238, effective July 1, 2010.

History

Editor’s note

—2010. Former 4 V.S.A. § 454 was substantially recodified at 4 V.S.A. § 33 pursuant to 2009, 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 7d.

Former §§ 451-454. Former § 451, relating to the creation of the Family Court, was derived from 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and amended by 1991, No. 245 (Adj. Sess.), § 94a and 1997, No. 92 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

Former § 452, relating to composition of Family Court, was derived from 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 453, relating to powers of Family Court, was derived from and 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

Former § 454, relating to jurisdiction of Family Court, was derived from 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and amended by 1991, No. 180 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1995, No. 145 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1997, No. 116 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and 1999, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

Transitional provision and redesignation of Family Court. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 237(b) provides: “On July 1, 2010:

“(1) the superior court as it formerly existed shall be redesignated as the civil division of the superior court, and all cases and files of the former superior court shall be transferred to the civil division of the superior court;

“(2) the family court as it formerly existed shall be redesignated as the family division of the superior court, and all cases and files of the former family court shall be transferred to the family division of the superior court;

“(3) the district court as it formerly existed shall be redesignated as the criminal division of the superior court, and all cases and files of the former district court shall be transferred to the criminal division of the superior court; and

“(4) the environmental court as it formerly existed shall be redesignated as the environmental division of the superior court, and all cases and files of the former environmental court shall be transferred to the environmental division of the superior court.”

Annotations From Former § 453

Remedy.

Annotations From Former § 454

Appellate jurisdiction.

Construction.

Annotations From Former § 453

Remedy.

In a divorce action abated by the death of husband, the Family Court correctly concluded that contempt provided no adequate remedy where husband removed wife as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy in violation of a pre-abatement order. Aither v. Estate of Aither, 2006 VT 111, 180 Vt. 472, 913 A.2d 376, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 313 (2006).

Cited.

Cited in Allen v. Allen, 161 Vt. 526, 641 A.2d 1332, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 37 (1994); Demgard v. Demgard, 173 Vt. 526, 790 A.2d 383, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 425 (2001) (mem.).

Annotations From Former § 454

Appellate jurisdiction.

Where nothing in the parties’ stipulation, or the final divorce order, granted plaintiff the right to collect the entire sum of maintenance from a trust account all at once, the Family Court had jurisdiction to bar plaintiff’s attempt to use an account control agreement in a manner contrary to the final order. Lussier v. Lussier, 174 Vt. 454, 807 A.2d 374, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 145 (2002) (mem.).

By invoking the exhaustion doctrine, the Family Court assumed, incorrectly, that it had appellate jurisdiction to review the actions of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation. In re R.L., 163 Vt. 168, 657 A.2d 180, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 6 (1995).

Family court’s only appellate jurisdiction authorized by statute is over decisions from the Family Court Magistrate. In re R.L., 163 Vt. 168, 657 A.2d 180, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 6 (1995).

Construction.

Although an addendum to a separation agreement was not presented to the divorce court, it was an agreement intended to settle the divorce proceedings. Thus, the Family Court had jurisdiction to determine its validity. Quinn v. Schipper, 2006 VT 51, 180 Vt. 572, 908 A.2d 413, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 142 (2006) (mem.).

Although the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over divorce proceedings, there is no provision in the Family Court’s jurisdiction for the separation of unmarried parties; thus, to the extent that parties negotiated for themselves an agreement on support and property division, that agreement was enforceable through civil action in the Superior Court. Rogers v. Wells, 174 Vt. 492, 808 A.2d 648, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 229 (2002) (mem.).

Cited.

Cited in Tudhope v. Riehle, 167 Vt. 174, 704 A.2d 765, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 258 (1997); Hixson v. Plump, 167 Vt. 202, 704 A.2d 1159, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 261 (1997); St. Hilaire v. DeBlois, 168 Vt. 445, 721 A.2d 133, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 351 (1998).

§ 455. Transfer of Probate proceedings.

  1. Any guardianship action filed in the Probate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to 14 V.S.A. chapter 111, subchapter 2, article 1 and any adoption action filed in the Probate Division pursuant to Title 15A may be transferred to the Family Division of the Superior Court.
  2. In an adoption action filed in the Probate Division pursuant to Title 15A, the Family Division shall order the transfer of the proceeding on motion of a party or on its own motion if it finds that the identity of the parties, issues, and evidence are so similar in nature to the parties, issues, and evidence in a proceeding pending in the Family Division that transfer of the probate action to the Family Division would expedite resolution of the issues or would best serve the interests of justice.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1990; amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 28a, eff. Feb. 1, 2011; 2013, No. 170 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. Sept. 1, 2014.

History

Amendments

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “14 V.S.A. chapter 111, subchapter 2, article 1” for “chapter 111, subchapter 2, article 1 of Title 14” preceding “and any adoption” and “Family Division of the Superior Court” for “family division of the Superior Court as provided in this section” at the end.

Subsec. (b): Substituted “In an adoption action filed in the probate division pursuant to Title 15A, the family division” for “The family division” at the beginning.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “division of the superior” preceding “court” in two places, substituted “division” for “court” preceding “pursuant to” and inserted “Title 15A” thereafter.

Subsec. (b): Substituted “division” for “court” in three places.

§ 456. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former § 456. Former § 456, relating to appeals from family court, was derived from 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

§ 457. Participation and availability of assistant judges.

  1. Application.   This section shall apply in all proceedings in which the Family Court consists of one presiding judge and two assistant judges.
  2. Questions of law and fact.   In all proceedings, questions of law shall be decided by the presiding judge.  Mixed questions of law and fact shall be deemed to be questions of law.  The presiding judge alone shall decide which are questions of law, questions of fact, and mixed questions of law and fact. Written or oral stipulations of fact submitted by the parties shall establish the facts related therein, except that the presiding judge, in his or her discretion, may order a hearing on any stipulated fact.  Neither the decision of the presiding judge under this subsection nor participation by an assistant judge in a ruling of law shall be grounds for reversal unless a party makes a timely objection and raises the issue on appeal.
  3. Availability of assistant judges.   If two assistant judges are not available, the court shall consist of one presiding judge and one assistant judge.  If neither assistant judge is available, the court shall consist of the presiding judge alone, and the unavailability of an assistant judge shall not constitute reversible error.
  4. Mistrial.   In the event that court is being held by the presiding judge and one assistant judge, and they do not agree on a decision, a mistrial shall be declared.  If the case is retried, the court shall consist of the presiding judge alone or the presiding judge and two assistant judges.
  5. Method of determining availability.   Before commencing a hearing in any matter in which the court by law may consist of the presiding judge and assistant judges, the assistant judges shall determine whether they are available for the case.  A schedule of proceedings in Family Court in which the assistant judges by law may participate shall be made available sufficiently in advance to give assistant judges reasonable opportunity to determine in which cases they will participate.  If two or more cases are being heard at one time, and assistant judges may by law participate in either, each assistant judge may determine in which case he or she will participate.
  6. Duty to complete hearing or trial.   After an assistant judge has decided to participate in a hearing or trial, the assistant judge shall not withdraw therefrom except for cause.  However, if an assistant judge is not available for a scheduled hearing or trial or becomes unavailable during trial, the matter may continue without that assistant judge’s participation, and he or she may not return to participate.
  7. Emergency relief.   A presiding judge may hear a petition for emergency relief when the court is not sitting, and may issue temporary orders as necessary.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1990.

ANNOTATIONS

Custody determinations.

Presiding judge of family court erred by striking the court’s prior decision to deny father’s motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities because that decision was a valid, final order, and as such, father’s failure to appeal the decision barred the court from issuing an order for retrial. Sundstrom v. Sundstrom, 174 Vt. 565, 816 A.2d 439, 2002 Vt. LEXIS 328 (2002) (mem.).

An assistant judge lacks authority to make custody determinations; custody determinations are mixed questions of law and fact, which, pursuant to 4 V.S.A. § 457 , are to be decided by the presiding judge. Woodbury v. Woodbury, 161 Vt. 628, 641 A.2d 367, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 33 (1994) (mem.).

Mistrial.

Fact that assistant judge dissented from findings of fact in child custody proceeding did not automatically trigger a mistrial pursuant to this section; rather, the reviewing court would decide whether the disagreement on facts caused the presiding judge’s custody determination to be wrong as a matter of law. Woodbury v. Woodbury, 161 Vt. 628, 641 A.2d 367, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 33 (1994) (mem.).

Cited.

Cited in Velardo v. Ovitt, 2007 VT 69, 182 Vt. 180, 933 A.2d 227, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 170 (2007).

§ 458. Venue.

The place of trial in the Family Division of the Superior Court shall be in the county in which one of the parties resides, if one party resides within the State. If no party resides within the State, the place of trial may be in any county.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1990; amended 2009, No. 154 , § 238.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.) Substituted “family division of the superior court” for “family court”.

§ 459. Powers of assistant judges.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict the constitutional powers of assistant judges.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1990.

Subchapter 2. Office of Magistrate

§ 461. Office of magistrate; jurisdiction; selection; term.

  1. The office of magistrate is created within the Family Division of the Superior Court. Except as provided in section 463 of this title, the office of magistrate shall have nonexclusive jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the following cases and proceedings:
    1. Proceedings for the establishment, modification, and enforcement of child support, including contempt proceedings instituted against an obligated party for the limited purpose of enforcing a child support order.
    2. Cases arising under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.
    3. Child support in parentage cases after parentage has been determined.
    4. Cases arising under 33 V.S.A. § 5116 , when delegated by a presiding judge of the Superior Court.
    5. Proceedings to establish, modify, or enforce temporary orders for spousal maintenance in accordance with 15 V.S.A. §§ 594a and 752.
    6. Proceedings to modify or enforce temporary or final parent-child contact orders issued pursuant to this title.
    7. Proceedings to establish parentage.
    8. Proceedings to establish temporary parental rights and responsibilities and parent-child contact.
  2. A magistrate shall be an attorney admitted to practice in Vermont with at least four years of general law practice. Magistrates shall be nominated, appointed, and confirmed in the manner of Superior judges.
    1. Terms of office of magistrates, except in the case of an appointment to fill a vacancy or unexpired term, shall be for a term of six years from and including April 1 in the year of the magistrate’s appointment or retention. A magistrate shall remain in office until a successor is appointed and qualified, unless sooner removed for cause or unless he or she resigns. (c) (1) Terms of office of magistrates, except in the case of an appointment to fill a vacancy or unexpired term, shall be for a term of six years from and including April 1 in the year of the magistrate’s appointment or retention. A magistrate shall remain in office until a successor is appointed and qualified, unless sooner removed for cause or unless he or she resigns.
    2. A magistrate may file in the office of the Secretary of State, on or before September 1 of the year preceding the expiration of the term for which he or she was appointed or retained, a declaration that he or she will be a candidate to succeed himself or herself. However, a magistrate appointed and having taken the oath of office after September 1 of the year preceding the expiration of the term of office shall automatically be a candidate for retention without filing notice. When a magistrate files such a declaration, his or her name shall be submitted to the General Assembly for a vote on retention. The General Assembly shall vote upon one ballot on the question: “Shall the following magistrates be retained in office?” The names of the magistrates shall be listed followed by “Yes _______________  No _______________ .” If a majority of those voting on the question vote against retaining a magistrate in office, upon the expiration of the term, a vacancy shall exist which shall be filled in accordance with the Constitution and chapter 15 of this title. If the majority vote is in favor of retention, the magistrate shall, unless removed for cause, remain in office for another term, and at its end, shall be eligible for retention in office in the manner herein prescribed.
    3. The Court Administrator shall notify the Secretary of State whenever a magistrate is appointed and takes the oath of office after September 1 of the year preceding the expiration of the term of office to which the magistrate has succeeded, thereby resulting in automatic notification of an intention to continue in office. Whenever a magistrate files a declaration under subsection (a) of this section or when notification occurs automatically, the Secretary of State shall notify the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Office of Legislative Counsel, and the Office of Legislative Operations forthwith.
  3. Magistrates shall be exempt employees of the Judicial Branch, subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct, and, except as provided in section 26 of this title, shall devote full time to their duties. The Supreme Court shall prescribe training requirements for magistrates.
  4. A magistrate shall have received training on the subject of parent-child contact before being assigned to hear and determine motions filed pursuant to subdivision (a)(6) of this section.
  5. [Repealed.]

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1991, No. 189 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. July 5, 1992; 1993, No. 227 (Adj. Sess.), § 21; 1995, No. 63 , § 139a; 1995, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 19; 1999, No. 54 , § 2; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 29; 2009, No. 156 (Adj. Sess.), § E.319; 2019, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 23.

History

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (c)(3): In the second sentence, inserted “the Office of Legislative Counsel,” and substituted “Office of Legislative Operations” for “Legislative Council”.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Amended generally by Act No. 154 and Act No. 156.

—1999. Substituted “Except as provided in section 463 of this title, the” for “The” and inserted “concurrent with the family court” after “jurisdiction” in the second sentence of the introductory paragraph of subsec. (a); substituted “Interstate Family” for “Reciprocal Enforcement of” preceding “Support Act” in subdiv. (a)(2); added subdivs. (a)(5) and (a)(6); added subsec. (e); and made minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

—1995 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (f): Repealed.

—1995. Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

—1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Repealed.

—1991 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Substituted “$37,500.00 beginning July 5, 1992, and $40,000.00 beginning July 4, 1993 and thereafter” for “$35,000.00” following “compensation of”.

ANNOTATIONS

Attorney’s fees.

Magistrate had authority to award attorney’s fees in child support modification proceeding; all evidence to determine financial circumstances of parties was before magistrate, as it was necessary to ascertain child support obligation, and there was no reason to require parties to repeat trial before the family court for purpose of awarding attorney’s fees. Harris v. Harris, 168 Vt. 13, 714 A.2d 626, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 160 (1998).

Child support.

In a divorce action, the court, noting that the parties had not presented sufficient evidence to calculate child support amount based on the statutory guidelines, estimated a monthly support amount of $1500, and invited the parties, if they wished to litigate the issue, to request a hearing before the magistrate. Although unusual, the court’s order was reasonable under the circumstances. The $1500 estimate was not significantly higher than the $1350 per month set in a temporary order; moreover, the court may have believed that the parties would prefer to accept the estimate rather than engage in another expensive legal dispute. Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485, 697 A.2d 644, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 101 (1997).

Trial court in divorce action could decline to enter final child support order, leaving that task to Family Court magistrate; court was free to await decision by magistrate on question of support prior to acting on the issue. Williams v. Williams, 158 Vt. 574, 613 A.2d 200, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 75 (1992).

§ 461a. Essex County; powers of assistant judges and magistrates in Family Court proceedings.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, an assistant judge of Essex County who has satisfactorily completed the training provided by the Vermont Supreme Court pursuant to Sec. 20 of Act No. 221 of the 1990 (Adj. Sess.), or a similar course of training that has been approved by the Supreme Court, shall act as a magistrate and hear and dispose of proceedings for the establishment, modification, and enforcement of child support and establishment of parentage in all cases filed or pending in the Family Division of the Superior Court in Essex County.
  2. The Administrative Judge may appoint and may specially assign a magistrate to serve as the presiding judge in the Family Division of the Superior Court in Essex County.
  3. No Vermont Family Court action filed or pending in Essex County, except for temporary abuse prevention proceedings and juvenile proceedings under Title 33, shall be heard at or transferred to the Family Division in another unit of the Superior Court.

HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 59 , § 27e, eff. June 3, 1993; amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 29a.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “and establishment of parentage” following “child support” and “the family division of the superior court in” preceding “Essex County”.

Subsecs. (b) and (c): Amended generally.

§ 461b. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former § 461b. Former § 461b, relating to powers of assistant judges in Essex and Orleans Counties in parentage proceedings, was derived from 993, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 15 and amended by 1995, No. 59 , § 2.

§ 461c. Powers of assistant judges in divorce proceedings.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, an assistant judge may elect to hear and determine a complaint or action which seeks a divorce, legal separation, or civil union dissolution in cases where a final stipulation of the parties has been filed with the court.
  2. When an assistant judge elects to hear such cases, the clerk shall set it for hearing before the assistant judge if available.
  3. Prior to hearing an uncontested domestic matter, an assistant judge shall sit with a Superior judge on domestic proceedings for a minimum of 100 hours, satisfactorily complete a minimum of 30 hours of training on subjects relevant to domestic proceedings and the Code of Judicial Conduct, and conduct a minimum of three uncontested domestic hearings with a Superior judge who shall, in his or her sole discretion, certify to the Administrative Judge that the assistant judge is qualified to preside over matters under this section. Upon application of an assistant judge, some or all of these requirements may be waived by the Administrative Judge based on equivalent experience. The requirements set forth herein shall only apply to assistant judges who elect to conduct uncontested final hearings in domestic cases after July 1, 2010. An assistant judge already conducting hearings under this section as of July 1, 2010 shall be deemed to have complied with these requirements.

HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 237 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, eff. Nov. 1, 1994; amended 1995, No. 59 , § 3; 1997, No. 90 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 29b.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “who has served in that office for a minimum of two years” preceding “may elect”, inserted “legal separation, or civil union dissolution” following “divorce”, and “final” preceding “stipulation, and substituted “filed with the court” for “reached”.

Subsec. (b): Added “if available” following “assistant judge” in the first sentence, and deleted the second sentence.

Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

—1997 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “two years” for “four years” in subsec. (a).

—1995. Deleted “in Rutland county” following “judges” in the section heading, substituted “who has served in that office for a minimum of four years” for “in Rutland county” following “judge” in subsec. (a), and rewrote subsec. (c).

CROSS REFERENCES

Divorce proceedings generally, see 15 V.S.A. chapter 11, subchapter 3.

§ 462. Findings; orders; stipulations.

  1. The magistrate shall make findings of fact, conclusions, and a decision and shall issue an order. An order issued by a magistrate may be enforced by the Family Division of the Superior Court in the unit in which the magistrate hearing was held.
  2. A magistrate may issue an order based on a stipulation regarding any preliminary matter necessary to issue a child support order.
  3. If the stipulation of the parties regarding child support includes matters other than preliminary matters necessary to issue a child support order, the stipulation may be accepted and approved by the magistrate in respect to those preliminary matters and signed by the magistrate as an order of the Family Division of the Superior Court.
  4. A magistrate shall issue an order for child support based upon the actual physical living arrangements of the children during the prior three months if the parties have not stipulated concerning parental rights and responsibilities. If parental rights and responsibilities are contested, the Family Division of the Superior Court shall make an order allocating parental rights and responsibilities.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1990; amended 1993, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 1995, No. 59 , § 14; 2009, No. 146 (Adj. Sess.), § C14; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 30.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Act No. 146 deleted the third sentence.

Act No. 154 inserted “division of the superior” preceding “court” and substituted “unit” for “county” preceding “in which” and deleted the third sentence.

Subsecs. (c) and (d): Act No. 154 inserted “division of the superior” preceding “court”.

—1995. Subsec. (a): Inserted “judge” preceding “upon motion of either” and inserted “family court judge” preceding “magistrate”.

Subsec. (b): Amended generally.

Subsec. (c): Amended generally.

—1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Inserted “regarding parentage or” preceding “establishing” and made a minor punctuation change in the first sentence.

Subsec. (c): Substituted “parentage or” for “and” following “other than child support” and inserted “parentage” preceding “and parent-child contact”.

Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

ANNOTATIONS

Construction.

Nothing in the language of the statute regarding magistrates’ findings and of the statute regarding temporary relief in divorce proceedings suggests that findings or conclusions of a magistrate in a temporary order are binding upon the family court when it makes a final determination. Thus, there was no merit to a mother’s argument that the trial court was bound by the findings of a temporary order. Frazer v. Olson, 2015 VT 84, 200 Vt. 13, 127 A.3d 86, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 67 (2015).

§ 463. Jurisdiction of Family Division of Superior Court over child support.

Upon motion of either party, upon motion of the magistrate, or upon the court’s own motion, a judge of the Family Division of the Superior Court may hear and determine the issue of child support, provided there is a prior existing support order in effect or an interim or temporary order and the court finds one of the following:

  1. The support matter is so intrinsically tied to an action that must be heard by a judge that hearing before a magistrate would unduly delay the proceedings.
  2. The identity of the parties, issues, and evidence are so similar in nature that consolidation with an already scheduled matter would in fact expedite resolution of the support issue.
  3. A material legal issue must be resolved for which there is no legal precedent.
  4. Such good and substantial cause as the court may find, consistent with the principle that support cases shall be heard in a timely manner.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1990; amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 31.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “division of the superior” preceding “court” in the section heading and in the introductory paragraph, and deleted “family” preceding “court” in subdiv. (4).

§ 464. Representation.

  1. Any person or other legal entity, including the State, shall be entitled but not required to be represented by an attorney before a magistrate. Nonattorney employees of the Office of Child Support who have been duly qualified by the Office of Child Support may sign complaints and motions and may participate in child support hearings before a magistrate, including those arising under 33 V.S.A. § 5116 subject to the conditions in subsections (b) and (c) of this section. This participation shall not be considered the unauthorized practice of law.
  2. Participation in a proceeding shall consist of:
    1. presentation of current and material evidence relative to both parents’ income and resources;
    2. computation of parental support obligations based upon child support guidelines, and recommendations for any deviations from that amount after consideration of the best interests of the child;
    3. relevant supporting documentation and legal justification for the recommendation.
  3. A current roster of qualified Office of Child Support staff shall be furnished to the court by the Office of Child Support. Such staff may be denied the right to participate in child support proceedings upon notice to the Office of Child Support from the Court Administrator. The notice shall indicate the basis for the decision.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1990; amended 1993, No. 105 , § 2; 1995, No. 63 , § 139b, eff. July 1, 1996; 2013, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 101.

History

Amendments

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “ 33 V.S.A. § 5116 ” for “ 33 V.S.A. § 5533 ” following “arising under” and “This participation” for “Such participation” at the beginning of the last sentence.

—1995. Subsec. (a): Inserted “including those arising under section 5533 of Title 33” following “magistrate” in the second sentence and added the fourth sentence.

—1993. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a), rewrote the second sentence of that subsection as the second and third sentences, and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

CROSS REFERENCES

Office of child support generally, see 33 V.S.A. chapter 41.

ANNOTATIONS

Construction with other law.

Legislature did not intend that nonattorney employees of office of child support prosecute reciprocal enforcement of support (URESA) cases on behalf of state’s attorneys; rather, legislature placed sole responsibility for dealing with URESA cases on Vermont’s state’s attorneys. McSweeney v. McSweeney, 159 Vt. 629, 618 A.2d 1332, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 180 (1992) (mem.).

Cited.

Cited in Cantin v. Young, 170 Vt. 563, 742 A.2d 1246, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 330 (1999) (mem.).

§ 465. Appeals.

An appeal from a decision of a magistrate shall be on the record to the Family Division of the Superior Court. At the request of a party, the Family Court shall hear additional evidence.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1990; amended 2009, No. 154 , § 238.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “family division of the superior court” for “family court”.

ANNOTATIONS

Appeal to Vermont Supreme Court.

Statute and rule governing appeals from magistrates’ orders in family proceedings do not allow an appeal of a magistrate’s remanded order directly to the Vermont Supreme Court without first appealing to the Superior Court. Any order of the magistrate is appealable under the statute to the family court, not to the Supreme Court. Patnode v. Urette, 2014 VT 46, 196 Vt. 416, 98 A.3d 787, 2014 Vt. LEXIS 42 (2014).

Vermont Supreme Court could not address either the Superior Court’s remanding the issue of child support to a magistrate or the magistrate’s subsequent order on remand. The magistrate’s order had not been properly appealed through the Superior Court, and the Superior Court order was not a final appealable order because it remanded the issue of child support back to the magistrate. Patnode v. Urette, 2014 VT 46, 196 Vt. 416, 98 A.3d 787, 2014 Vt. LEXIS 42 (2014).

Construction.

Because this section is internally inconsistent and therefore ambiguous, it must be construed as set forth in V.R.F.P. 8(g)(4). Gavala v. Claassen, 2003 VT 16, 175 Vt. 487, 819 A.2d 760, 2003 Vt. LEXIS 17 (2003) (mem.).

Cited.

Cited in Williams v. Williams, 158 Vt. 574, 613 A.2d 200, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 75 (1992); In re R.L., 163 Vt. 168, 657 A.2d 180, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 6 (1995); Tetreault v. Coon, 167 Vt. 396, 708 A.2d 571, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 8 (1998).

§ 466. Procedure.

  1. A proceeding before a magistrate shall, in cases involving child support, be initiated by the filing of a petition.  If a proceeding for divorce, annulment, or separation has been commenced before the Family Division of the Superior Court, the magistrate shall have jurisdiction to determine a temporary amount of child support on the basis of the complaint or petition filed in the Family Division of the Superior Court.
  2. A magistrate hearing shall be conducted according to rules adopted by the Supreme Court, subject to review by the Judicial Rules Committee.  The rules shall include postjudgment procedures and deadlines for the establishment of support orders which comply with the requirements of federal law.
  3. The Vermont Rules of Evidence shall apply to magistrate proceedings, except that evidence not admissible under those Rules may be admitted if it is of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs and is not precluded by statute or privilege.
  4. Witnesses shall be sworn.  Hearings shall be electronically recorded.  The magistrate shall assist the parties in developing relevant and reliable evidence.
  5. The Family Division of the Superior Court clerk shall provide for personal service or shall mail to the respondent, at one or more of the addresses supplied by the respondent, by certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee, the expense being paid by the petitioner, a notice signed by the clerk.  If acceptance of service is refused, the clerk may serve the notice on the respondent by sending it to the respondent by ordinary first class mail and by certifying that such service has been made. In the alternative, the clerk may provide for mail service as provided in Rule  4(l) of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure.
  6. When an obligor is referred to an employment services program, the magistrate may require the program to file periodic written reports with the court regarding the obligor’s progress and cooperation with the program requirements. Such reports shall be admissible in an enforcement or contempt proceeding without the appearance of a witness from the program unless there is a dispute with respect to the authenticity of the report or the obligor disputes the facts set forth in the report concerning the obligor’s performance and the facts in dispute are relevant to the determination of the issues before the court.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1990; amended 2009, No. 154 , § 238; 2011, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Amendments

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (f): Added.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “Family Division of the Superior Court” for “family court” in (a) and (e).

§ 467. Forms; Office of Child Support; IV-D services.

  1. The Court Administrator shall prepare and make available to the public forms for proceeding before a magistrate, including forms for the filing of an action, responding to a petition and filing motions.  The purpose of the standardized forms is to make the magistrate hearing accessible to all parties in a dispute without the assistance of counsel.
  2. The form for filing a petition with the magistrate shall include provision for the petitioner to request IV-D services from the Office of Child Support established in 33 V.S.A. § 4101 . If the petitioner requests IV-D services, the court shall immediately notify the Office of Child Support.
  3. The Court Administrator and the Office of Child Support shall jointly prepare and make available to the public a booklet describing the services available to both custodial and noncustodial parents and the judicial procedure applicable to child support and parentage cases.
  4. The Court Administrator and the Office of Child Support shall prepare a standardized child support order.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1990.

History

Revision note—

In the first sentence of subsec. (b), substituted “section 4101 of Title 33” for “section 3751 of Title 33” in view of the recodification of that title by 1989, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 1, 2(e).

Chapter 11. Justices of the Peace

§ 491. Qualification of justice of the peace—Filing of oath and certificate.

Before entering upon his or her duties, each justice shall deposit with the town clerk a copy of his or her official oath, signed by himself or herself, with a certificate of the magistrate or notary public administering the same. The Secretary of State shall provide oath forms for this purpose. The term of office of justices of the peace shall be two years, and shall commence on the first day of February next after their election.

HISTORY: Amended 1959, No. 71 ; 1981, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1983, No. 26 , eff. April 11, 1983.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1469. P.L. § 1435. 1919, No. 66 , § 2. G.L. § 1655. P.S. § 1385. V.S. § 1037. 1894, No. 40 , § 1. 1892, No. 37 , § 1. 1888, No. 66 , § 1. R.L. § 820. 1876, No. 63 .

Revision note—

Deleted “or master in chancery” following “notary public” in the first sentence in light of the repeal of § 216 of this title, relating to masters in chancery.

Amendments

—1983. Added the third sentence.

—1981 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1959. Inserted “notary public or master in chancery” preceding “administering” in the first sentence.

ANNOTATIONS

Failure to follow procedure.

Justice of peace who had not filed copy of his oath as such with clerk of county as required by this section was not qualified to serve as member of board of civil authority. Federal Land Bank v. Flanders, 105 Vt. 204, 164 A. 539, 1933 Vt. LEXIS 204 (1933).

Cited.

Cited in 1930-32 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 128.

§ 492. Penalty.

When a justice willfully neglects to make such deposit with the town clerk, he or she may be fined not more than $100.00.

HISTORY: Amended 1981, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1470. P.L. § 1436. G.L. § 1656. 1915, No. 91 , § 1. P.S. § 1386. V.S. § 1038. 1894, No. 40 , § 1. 1888, No. 66 , § 1. R.L. § 820.

Amendments

—1981 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “town” for “county” preceding “clerk” and deleted “or to return his commission to the governor for sixty days from date thereof” thereafter.

§ 493. Repealed. 1981, No. 239 (Adj. Sess.), § 45.

History

Former § 493. Former § 493, relating to county clerk’s return of names of qualified justices, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1471; P.L. § 1437; 1919, No. 66 , § 3; G.L. § 1657; P.S. § 1387; R. 1906, § 1286; V.S. § 1039; 1894, No. 40 , § 1; 1892, No. 37 , § 1; R.L. § 820.

§§ 494-499. Repealed. 1973, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 111, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Former §§ 494-499. Former § 494, relating to termination of office and delivery of files to county clerk on removal from county, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1483; P.L. § 1449; G.L. § 1669; P.S. § 1401; V.S. § 1051; R.L. § 832; G.S. 31, § 71; R.S. 26, § 53; R. 1797, p. 424, § 22; 1789, p. 12; R. 1787, p. 87.

Former § 495, relating to delivery of files to county clerk on death of justice, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1484; P.L. § 1450; G.L. § 1670; P.S. § 1402; V.S. § 1052; R.L. § 833; G.S. 31, § 72; R.S. 26, § 54; R. 1797, p. 424, § 22; 1789, p. 12; R. 1787, p. 87.

Former § 496, relating to certification of copies of records and files deposited with county clerk, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1485; P.L. § 1451; G.L. § 1671; P.S. § 1403; V.S. § 1053; R.L. § 834; G.S. 31, § 73; R.S. 26, § 55; R. 1797, p. 424, § 22; 1789, p. 13; R. 1787, p. 87.

Former § 497, relating to execution issued by county clerk, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1486; P.L. § 1452; G.L. § 1672; P.S. § 1404; V.S. § 1054; R.L. § 835; G.S. 31, § 74; R.S. 26, § 56; 1822, p. 12.

Former § 498, relating to revival of judgment before another justice, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1487; P.L. § 1453; G.L. § 1673; P.S. § 1405; V.S. § 1055; R.L. § 836; G.S. 31, § 75; 1850, No. 7 ; R.S. 111, § 12; R. 1797, p. 424, § 22; R. 1787, p. 147 and amended by 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 16.

Former § 499, relating to execution issued by justice out of office, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1488; P.L. § 1454; 1931, No. 35 , § 1; G.L. § 1674; P.S. § 1406; V.S. § 1056; R.L. § 837; G.S. 31, § 62; R.S. 26, § 52; 1835, No. 9 .

§ 500. Expiration of term of office; certified copies of records.

After the expiration of his or her term of office and while residing in the same county, a justice may make and certify copies of the records of his or her official business. Such copies shall have the same validity as though made and certified while he or she was in office.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1489. P.L. § 1455. G.L. § 1675. P.S. § 1407. V.S. § 1057. R.L. § 838. G.S. 31, § 76. 1858, No. 20 , § 1.

Revision note—

Substituted “Expiration of term of office; certified copies of records” for “—Certified copies” as the section heading for purposes of clarity in light of the repeal of §§ 494-499 of this title.

§§ 501-504. Repealed. 1973, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 111, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Former §§ 501-504. Former § 501, relating to substitution of a justice, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1490; P.L. § 1456; G.L. § 1676; P.S. § 1408; V.S. § 1058; 1882, No. 88 , § 1; R.L. § 839; G.S. 31, § 31; 1851, No. 14 , § 1.

Former § 502, relating to record of substitute justice, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1491; P.L. § 1457; G.L. § 1677; P.S. § 1409; V.S. § 1059; 1882, No. 88 , § 2; R.L. § 840; G.S. 31, § 32; 1851, No. 14 , § 2.

Former § 503, relating to civil jurisdiction, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1472; P.L. § 1438; G.L. § 1658; P.S. § 1390; V.S. § 1040; R.L. §§ 821, 1145; G.S. 31, § 18; G.S. 34, § 73; 1863, No. 13 ; 1853, No. 8 , § 1; 1847, No. 44 , § 1; R.S. 26, § 7; R.S. 29, § 2; 1835, No. 14 , § 1; 1824, p. 24; 1823, p. 19; 1821, p. 76; 1811, p. 169; R. 1797, p. 414; 1794, p. 117; 1789, p. 9; R. 1787, pp. 20, 84.

Former § 504, relating to matter in demand in action on note or book account, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1473; P.L. § 1439; G.L. § 1659; P.S. § 1391; V.S. § 1041; R.L. § 822; G.S. 31, § 20; R.S. 26, § 8; 1823, p. 19.

§ 505. Repealed. 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 19.

History

Former § 505. Former § 505, relating to criminal jurisdiction, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2428; P.L. § 2397; 1931, No. 40 , § 1; G.L. § 2570; 1917, No. 254 , § 2533; P.S. § 2287; V.S. § 1926; R.L. § 1666; G.S. 31, § 1; R.S. 26, § 1; 1816, p. 137; R. 1797, p. 413, § 1; 1789, p. 9; R. 1787, p. 84.

§§ 506-508. Repealed. 1973, No. 249 (Adj. Sess.), § 111, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Former §§ 506-508. Former § 506, relating to records, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1479; P.L. § 1445; G.L. § 1665; P.S. § 1397; V.S. § 1047; R.L. § 828; G.S. 31, § 27; R.S. 26, § 63; 1821, p. 30.

Former § 507, relating to officer of justice’s court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1505; P.L. § 1471; G.L. § 1691; P.S. § 1647; V.S. § 1296; 1884, No. 134 ; R.L. § 1059; 1880, No. 30 ; G.S. 31, § 49; R.S. 26, § 39; R. 1797, p. 426, § 25.

Former § 508, relating to adjournment of justice’s court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1506; P.L. § 1472; G.L. § 1692; P.S. § 1649; V.S. § 1297; R.L. § 1060; G.S. 31, § 41; R.S. 26, § 18; R. 1797, p. 423, § 19.

Chapter 13. Judicial Council

§§ 561-563. Repealed. 1995, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

History

Former §§ 561-563. Former § 561, relating to members and duties of the judicial council, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1266; 1945, No. 24 , § 1; and amended by 1969, No. 32 .

Former § 562, relating to reports, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1267 and 1945, No. 24 , § 2.

Former § 563, relating to expenses, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1268 and 1945, No. 24 , § 3.

Chapter 15. Judicial Nominations and Appointments

History

Amendments

—1975 (Adj. Sess.). 1975, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, substituted “Nominations” for “Selections” following “Judicial” in the chapter heading.

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in Aronstam v. Cashman, 132 Vt. 538, 325 A.2d 361, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 387 (1974); Peck v. Douglas, 148 Vt. 128, 530 A.2d 551, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 463 (1987).

§ 601. Judicial Nominating Board created; composition.

  1. The Judicial Nominating Board is created for the nomination of Supreme Court Justices, Superior judges, magistrates, and the Chair and members of the Public Utility Commission.
  2. The Board shall consist of 11 members who shall be selected as follows:
    1. The Governor shall appoint two members who are not attorneys at law.
    2. The Senate shall elect three of its members, not all of whom shall be members of the same party, and only one of whom may be an attorney at law.
    3. The House shall elect three of its members, not all of whom shall be members of the same party, and only one of whom may be an attorney at law.
    4. Attorneys at law admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of Vermont, and residing in the State, shall elect three of their number as members of the Board. The Supreme Court shall regulate the manner of their nomination and election.
    5. The members of the Board shall serve for terms of two years. All appointments or elections shall be between January 1 and February 1 of each odd-numbered year, except to fill a vacancy. A House vacancy that occurs when the General Assembly is adjourned shall be filled by the Speaker of the House and a Senate vacancy that occurs when the General Assembly is adjourned shall be filled by the Senate Committee on Committees. Members shall serve until their successors are elected or appointed. Members shall serve no more than three consecutive terms in any capacity.
    6. The members shall elect their own chair, who will serve for a term of two years.
  3. Legislative members of the Board shall be entitled to per diem compensation and reimbursement for expenses in accordance with 2 V.S.A. § 23 . Members of the Board who are not otherwise compensated by their employer shall be entitled to per diem compensation and reimbursement for expenses in the same manner as board members are compensated under 32 V.S.A. § 1010 . All compensation and reimbursement shall be paid from the legislative appropriation.
  4. The Judicial Nominating Board shall adopt rules under 3 V.S.A. chapter 25 which shall establish criteria and standards for the nomination of candidates for Justices of the Supreme Court, Superior judges, magistrates, and the Chair and members of the Public Utility Commission based on the attributes identified in subsection 602(d) of this title. The application form shall not be included in the rules and may be developed and periodically revised at the discretion of the Board.
  5. A quorum of the Board shall consist of eight members.
  6. The Board is authorized to use the staff and services of appropriate State agencies and departments as necessary to conduct investigations of applicants. The Office of Legislative Counsel shall assist the Board for the purpose of rulemaking.
  7. Except as provided in subsection (h) of this section, proceedings of the Board, including the names of candidates considered by the Board and information about any candidate submitted by the Court Administrator or by any other source, shall be confidential.
  8. The following shall be public:
    1. operating procedures of the Board;
    2. standard application forms and any other forms used by the Board, provided they do not contain personal information about a candidate or confidential proceedings;
    3. all proceedings of the Board prior to the Board’s receipt of the first candidate’s completed application; and
    4. at the time the Board sends the names of the candidates to the Governor, the total number of applicants for the vacancy and the total number of candidates sent to the Governor.

HISTORY: Amended 1966, No. 64 (Sp. Sess.), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1967; 1967, No. 306 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1969, No. 125 , § 6; 1971, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 1975, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1979, No. 141 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 1985, No. 108 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 25, 1986; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 32; 2011, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § E.125.1, eff. March 7, 2012; 2013, No. 194 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. June 17, 2014; 2015, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. May 23, 2016; 2019, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 24.

History

Revision note

—2020. In subsec. (c), substituted “ 2 V.S.A. § 23 ” for “ 2 V.S.A. § 406 ” in accordance with 2019, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 12(2).

—2017. In subsecs. (a) and (d), substituted “Public Utility Commission” for “Public Service Board” in accordance with 2017, No. 53 , § 12.

—2013. In subsec. (d), deleted “, but not limited to,” following “include” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4 and changed “committee” to “Board” in subsec. (e) for purposes of accuracy and consistency.

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (f): Substituted “Counsel” for “Council” in the second sentence.

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “of the Public Services Board,” following “Chair”.

Subdiv. (b)(5): Deleted “appointed by the Governor” following “Board” and “and may serve for no more than three terms” in the first sentence, deleted the former second and third sentences and added the present third and fifth sentences.

Subsec. (d): Inserted “and” following “magistrates,” and “based on the attributes identified in subsection 602(d) of this title” following “Board” and deleted the former second sentences.

Subsecs. (g), (h): Added.

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Deleted “qualified” preceding “candidates for”, and added the third sentence.

Subsec. (f): Added the second sentence.

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Rewrote the subsection.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “and” preceding “superior” and deleted “and district” thereafter, and added “magistrates, the chair of the public service board, and members of the public service board”.

Subsec. (d): Amended generally.

—1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “and” preceding “district judges” and deleted “and the defender general” thereafter.

Subdiv. (b)(5): Substituted “terms” for “a term” preceding “of two years” in the first and second sentences and rewrote the third sentence.

Subdiv. (b)(6): Amended generally.

Subsec. (d): Added.

Subsec. (e): Added.

Subsec. (f): Added.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added.

—1975 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1969. Subsec. (e): Inserted “or until their successors are elected or appointed” following “two years” and deleted “beginning in 1967” following “odd year”.

—1967 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “Supreme Court justices and” preceding “superior” in the first paragraph.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 571 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Nominations for filling judicial vacancies, see Vt. Const. Ch. II, § 32.

Regulations for nomination and election of attorneys to the judicial nominating board, see Administrative Order No. 1, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

Law Reviews —

For note, “Judicial Tenure in Vermont: Does Good Behavior Merit Retention?,” see 24 Vt. L. Rev. 1321 (2000).

§ 602. Duties; Justices, judges, magistrates, and the Chair of the Public Utility Commission.

    1. Prior to submitting to the Governor the names of candidates for Justices of the Supreme Court, Superior Court judges, magistrates, and the Chair of the Public Utility Commission, the Judicial Nominating Board shall submit to the Court Administrator a list of all candidates, and he or she shall disclose to the Board information solely about professional disciplinary action taken or pending concerning any candidate. (a) (1) Prior to submitting to the Governor the names of candidates for Justices of the Supreme Court, Superior Court judges, magistrates, and the Chair of the Public Utility Commission, the Judicial Nominating Board shall submit to the Court Administrator a list of all candidates, and he or she shall disclose to the Board information solely about professional disciplinary action taken or pending concerning any candidate.
    2. From the list of candidates, the Judicial Nominating Board shall select by majority vote, provided that a quorum is present, well-qualified candidates for the position to be filled.
  1. Whenever a vacancy occurs in the office of a Supreme Court Justice, a Superior Court judge, magistrate, or Chair of the Public Utility Commission, or when an incumbent does not declare that he or she will be a candidate to succeed himself or herself, the Board shall submit to the Governor the names of as many persons as it deems well qualified to be appointed to the office.
    1. A candidate for judge or Justice shall be a Vermont resident and an experienced lawyer who has practiced law in Vermont for a minimum of ten years, with at least five years immediately preceding his or her application to the Board. The Board may make exceptions to the five-year requirement for absences from practice for reasons including family, military, academic, or medical leave. (c) (1) A candidate for judge or Justice shall be a Vermont resident and an experienced lawyer who has practiced law in Vermont for a minimum of ten years, with at least five years immediately preceding his or her application to the Board. The Board may make exceptions to the five-year requirement for absences from practice for reasons including family, military, academic, or medical leave.
    2. A candidate for magistrate shall be a Vermont resident and an experienced lawyer who has practiced law in Vermont for at least five years immediately preceding his or her application to the Board.
    3. A candidate for Chair of the Public Utility Commission shall not be required to be an attorney; however if the candidate is admitted to practice law in Vermont, the Judicial Nominating Board shall submit the candidate’s name to the Court Administrator, and he or she shall disclose to the Board information solely about professional disciplinary action taken or pending concerning the candidate. If a candidate is not admitted to practice law in Vermont, but practices a profession requiring licensure, certification, or other professional regulation by the State, the Judicial Nominating Board shall submit the candidate’s name to the State professional regulatory entity and that entity shall disclose to the Board any professional disciplinary action taken or pending concerning the candidate.
  2. A candidate shall possess the following attributes:
    1. Integrity.   A candidate shall possess a record and reputation for excellent character and integrity.
    2. Legal knowledge and ability.   A candidate shall possess a high degree of knowledge of established legal principles and procedures and have demonstrated a high degree of ability to interpret and apply the law to specific factual situations.
    3. Judicial temperament.   A candidate shall possess an appropriate judicial temperament.
    4. Impartiality.   A candidate shall exhibit an ability to make judicial determinations in a manner free of bias.
    5. Communication capability.   A candidate shall possess demonstrated oral and written capacities, with reasonable accommodations, required by the position.
    6. Financial integrity.   A candidate shall possess demonstrated financial probity.
    7. Work ethic.   A candidate shall demonstrate diligence.
    8. Administrative capabilities.   A candidate shall demonstrate management and organizational skills or experience required by the position.
    9. Courtroom experience.   For Superior Court, a candidate shall have sufficient trial or other comparable experience that ensures knowledge of the Vermont Rules of Evidence and courtroom procedure. For the Environmental Division of the Superior Court, a candidate shall have experience in environmental and zoning law.
    10. Other.   A candidate shall possess other attributes the Board deems relevant as identified through its rules.

HISTORY: Amended 1966, No. 64 (Sp. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1967; 1967, No. 41 , eff. March 16, 1967; 1967, No. 306 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1969, No. 125 , § 7; 1971, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 1975, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 1985, No. 108 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. March 25, 1986; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 33; 2015, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. May 23, 2016.

History

Revision note

—2017. In the section heading and in subdivs. (a)(1), (c)(3) and subsec. (b), substituted “Public Utility Commission” for “Public Service Board” in accordance with 2017, No. 53 , § 12.

Amendments

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “qualified” preceding “candidates”, substituted “magistrates, the chair of the public service board, and members of the public service board” for “and district judges”, deleted “or General Assembly as set forth in subsec. (b) of this section” following “Governor”, and substituted “the administrator” for “he” in the first sentence, and substituted “for the position to be filled” for “as set forth in subsec. (b)” in the second sentence.

Subsec. (b): Deleted “or district” preceding “judge” in the first and last sentences, and made gender neutral changes throughout the subsec.

—1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “and” preceding “district judges” and deleted “and the defender general” thereafter in the first sentence and inserted “by majority vote, provided that a quorum is present” preceding “qualified” in the last sentence.

Subsec. (b): Deleted “or the defender general” following “judge” throughout the subsec.

—1975 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “and the defender general” following “district judges” in the first sentence.

Subsec. (b): Inserted “or the defender general” following “district judge” in the first sentence and following “judge” in the third sentence.

—1969. Subsec. (a): Deleted “such” following “list of all” and substituted “including candidates for re-election, and he” for “and the officer” preceding “shall disclose” in the first sentence, inserted “including candidates for re-election” following “presented” in the third sentence and added the fourth sentence.

—1967 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1967. Section amended generally.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 572 .

ANNOTATIONS

Governor’s power.

The Vermont Statutes Annotated provide that whenever a vacancy occurs in the office of a Supreme Court Justice or when an incumbent does not declare that he or she will be a candidate to succeed himself or herself, the Judicial Nominating Board shall submit to the Governor the names of as many persons as it deems well qualified to be appointed to the office. This provision cannot expand the Governor’s power beyond that established in the Constitution. Turner v. Shumlin, 2017 VT 2, 204 Vt. 78, 163 A.3d 1173, 2017 Vt. LEXIS 2 (2017).

Use of the word “or” in the statute governing judicial nominations and appointments indicates that an incumbent not declaring for retention is distinct from the creation of a vacancy. The statute does not confer any power on the Governor; rather, it merely allows the Judicial Nominating Board, in anticipation of an expected vacancy, to submit the names of candidates to the Governor, nothing more. Turner v. Shumlin, 2017 VT 2, 204 Vt. 78, 163 A.3d 1173, 2017 Vt. LEXIS 2 (2017).

Cited.

Cited in State v. Dunkerley, 134 Vt. 523, 365 A.2d 131, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 719 (1976); Doe v. Salmon, 135 Vt. 443, 378 A.2d 512, 1977 Vt. LEXIS 649 (1977).

Law Reviews —

For note, “Judicial Tenure in Vermont: Does Good Behavior Merit Retention?,” see 24 Vt. L. Rev. 1321 (2000).

§ 602a. Duties; Public Utility Commission members.

  1. In accordance with 30 V.S.A. § 3 , whenever a vacancy occurs for a member position on the Public Utility Commission, the Governor shall submit at least five names of potential nominees to the Judicial Nominating Board for review. The Judicial Nominating Board shall submit to the Governor the names of candidates it deems well qualified. The Judicial Nominating Board shall submit to the Governor a summary of the qualifications and experience of each candidate whose name is submitted to the Governor, together with any further information relevant to the matter. Vacancies for the position of Chair of the Public Utility Commission shall follow the procedure set forth in section 602 of this title.
  2. A candidate for the position of member of the Public Utility Commission shall not be required to be an attorney; however, if the candidate is admitted to practice law in Vermont, the Judicial Nominating Board shall submit the candidate’s name to the Court Administrator, and he or she shall disclose to the Board information solely about professional disciplinary action taken or pending concerning the candidate. If a candidate is not admitted to practice law in Vermont, but practices a profession requiring licensure, certification, or other professional regulation by the State, the Judicial Nominating Board shall submit the candidate’s name to the State professional regulatory entity and that entity shall disclose to the Board any professional disciplinary action taken or pending concerning the candidate.
  3. A candidate shall possess the attributes provided in subsection 602(d) of this title.

HISTORY: Added 2015, No. 123 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. May 23, 2016.

History

Revision note

—2017. In the section heading and in subsecs. (a) and (b), substituted “Public Utility Commission” for “Public Service Board” in accordance with 2017, No. 53 , § 12.

§ 603. Appointment of Justices, judges, magistrates, Public Utility Commission Chair, and members.

Whenever the Governor appoints a Supreme Court Justice, a Superior Judge, a magistrate, the Chair of the Public Utility Commission, or a member of the Public Utility Commission, he or she shall select from the list of names of qualified persons submitted by the Judicial Nominating Board pursuant to law. The names of candidates submitted and not selected shall remain confidential.

HISTORY: Amended 1966, No. 64 (Sp. Sess.), § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 1967; 1967, No. 306 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1971, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; 1973, No. 106 , § 4, eff. May 25, 1973; 1975, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 34.

History

Revision note

—2017. In the section heading and in two places, substituted “Public Utility Commission” for “Public Service Board” in accordance with 2017, No. 53 , § 12.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted the third sentence.

—1975 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “election from panel” following “appointment” in the section heading, rewrote the first sentence and added the second sentence.

—1973. Added “who shall perform those administrative duties as the chief justice of the Supreme Court may prescribe” following “chief district judge” in the second sentence.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “or the defender general” following “district judge”, deleted “or” preceding “a superior judge” and inserted “or the defender general” thereafter in the first sentence.

—1967 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “a Supreme Court justice or” following “appoints” and following “elects” in the first sentence.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 573 .

§ 604. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former § 604. Former § 604, relating to district judge declaration of intent to continue office, was derived from 1966, No. 64 (Sp. Sess.), § 5 and amended by 1967, No. 306 (Adj. Sess.), § 5; 1969, No. 125 , § 10; 1971, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 1975, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; 1981, No. 3 , § 3 and 1985, No. 98 , § 4.

§ 605. Political activity by judges prohibited.

Superior judges shall not make any contribution to or hold any office in a political party or organization or take part in any political campaign.

HISTORY: Amended 1966, No. 64 (Sp. Sess.), § 6, eff. Jan. 1, 1967; 1971, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.) § 5; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 35.

History

Revision note—

Deleted “and the defender general” following “judges” in the heading and in the text pursuant to 1975, No. 227 (Adj. Sess.), § 7.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “and district” preceding “judges”.

—1971 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “and the defender general” following “judges” in the heading and in the text.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 575 .

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in Aronstam v. Cashman, 132 Vt. 538, 325 A.2d 361, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 387 (1974).

§ 606. Repealed. 2011, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § E.125.2.

History

Former § 606. Former § 606, relating to expenses and payment of board, was derived from 1966, No. 64 (Sp. Sess.), § 7 and amended by 1975, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 10 and 1983, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b).

§ 607. Joint Committee on Judicial Retention; creation.

  1. There is created the Joint Committee on Judicial Retention composed of four members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House and four members of the Senate appointed by the Committee on Committees of the Senate.  The appointments shall be made, if practicable, within seven days of the convening of each biennial session of the General Assembly.
  2. The Committee shall endeavor to hold its organizational meeting within seven days of its appointment and shall elect a chair from among its membership and adopt rules of procedure consistent with the rules of the Senate.
  3. The Committee may use the staff and services of the Office of Legislative Counsel and the Office of Legislative Operations to, in addition to other duties, obtain information on the performance of a judge or Justice by soliciting comments from members of the Vermont Bar and the public.

HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; amended 1985, No. 98 , § 6; 2013, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.), § 72; 2019, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 25.

History

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Substituted “Office of Legislative Counsel and the Office of Legislative Operations” for “Legislative Council”.

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “chair” for “chairman”.

—1985. Subsec. (a): Inserted “if practicable” preceding “within” in the second sentence.

Subsec. (b): Inserted “shall endeavor to hold its organizational meeting within seven days of its appointment and” preceding “shall elect”’.

Subsec. (c): Added.

Law Reviews —

For note, “Judicial Tenure in Vermont: Does Good Behavior Merit Retention?,” see 24 Vt. L. Rev. 1321 (2000).

§ 608. Functions.

  1. Declarations submitted to the General Assembly by a Supreme Court Justice under subsection 4(c) of this title, by a Superior Court judge under subsection 71(b) of this title, or by a magistrate under subsection 461(c) of this title shall be referred immediately to the Joint Committee on Judicial Retention.  The declarations shall be accompanied by a supporting statement by the judge, the Justice, or the magistrate seeking retention.  In the case of a Superior Court judge or magistrate, the declaration shall also be accompanied by information on the next succeeding rotation schedule for the judge seeking retention.
  2. The Joint Committee responsible for the recommendation of retention shall review the candidacies of those Justices, Superior judges, and magistrates desiring to succeed themselves.  In conducting its review, the Committee shall evaluate judicial performance, including such factors as integrity, judicial temperament, impartiality, health, diligence, legal knowledge and ability, and administrative and communicative skills.
  3. For the purpose of receiving information and hearing testimony, the Joint Committee responsible for the recommendation of retention shall hold hearings which, if possible, shall not commence until the General Assembly is in session.  Information obtained under subsection 607(c) of this title shall be confidential until the Committee commences its hearings under this subsection.
  4. A judge, a Justice, or a magistrate seeking retention has the right to present oral or written testimony to the Committee relative to his or her retention, may be represented by counsel, and may present witnesses to testify in his or her behalf.  Copies of written comments received by the Committee shall be forwarded to the judge, the Justice, or the magistrate.  A judge, a Justice, or a magistrate seeking retention has the right to a reasonable time period to prepare and present to the Committee a response to any testimony or written complaint adverse to his or her retention and has the right to be present during any public hearing conducted by the Committee.
  5. On or before the tenth Thursday after the convening of each biennial and adjourned session, the Committee shall report to the General Assembly its recommendation whether the candidates should continue in office, with any amplifying information which it may deem appropriate, in order that the General Assembly may discharge its obligation under Chapter II § 34 of the Constitution of the State of Vermont.
  6. In the performance of its official functions, the Joint Committee on Judicial Retention may by a majority vote of its membership issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses to testify under oath and to produce documents.
  7. The votes on retention under subsections 4(c), 71(b), and 461(c) of this title shall be conducted in one joint assembly of the General Assembly, except that in the event that the Joint Committee reports to the General Assembly that it is not able to make its recommendation on a particular Justice, judge, or magistrate under subsection (b) of this section on or before the date set for such joint assembly, the vote on such individual or individuals shall be deferred to a subsequent joint assembly, and separate ballots shall be used despite any other statutory provisions relating to the votes on retention.

HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 204 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; amended 1979, No. 109 (Adj. Sess.); 1985, No. 98 , § 7; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 36; 2013, No. 142 (Adj. Sess.), § 13; 2015, No. 131 (Adj. Sess.), § 21.

History

Revision note

—2014. In subsec. (b), deleted “but not limited to” in accordance with 2013, No. 5 , § 4.

—2005. References to “section 604(b)” of this title in subsecs. (a) and (g) changed to “section 604(a)” to conform references to text of section 604, as amended.

Amendments

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Substituted “Chapter II § 34” for “section 34 of Chapter II”, and deleted the final sentence, which read, “The provisions of 2 V.S.A. § 20(d) (expiration of required reports) shall not apply to the report to be made under this subsection.”.

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (e): Substituted “Constitution of the State of Vermont” for “Vermont constitution” at the end of the first sentence and added the second sentence.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “magistrate under subsection 461(c) of this title” for “district court judge under subsection 604(a) of this title” in the first sentence, “judge, the justice, or the magistrate” for “judge or justice” in the second sentence, and deleted “district or” preceding “Superior Court judge” and inserted “or magistrate” thereafter in the third sentence.

Subsec. (b): Substituted “magistrates” for “district judges” in the first sentence.

Subsec. (d): Substituted “judge, a justice, or a magistrate” for “judge or justice” in the first sentence, “judge, the justice, or the magistrate” for “judge or justice” in the second sentence, and inserted “or a magistrate” preceding “seeking retention” in the third sentence.

Subsec. (g): Substituted “461(c)” for “604(a)”, inserted “or magistrate” preceding “under subsection (b)”.

—1985. Section amended generally.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “the sixth Thursday after the convening of each biennial and adjourned session” for “February 1” preceding “the committee” in the second sentence.

CROSS REFERENCES

Election of judicial officers by General Assembly, see 2 V.S.A. § 10 .

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Vermont Office of Court Administrator, 717 F. Supp. 261, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8386 (D. Vt. 1989).

Law Reviews —

For note, “Judicial Tenure in Vermont: Does Good Behavior Merit Retention?,” see 24 Vt. L. Rev. 1321 (2000).

§ 609. Judicial retirement.

  1. The Justices of the Supreme Court and judges of all subordinate courts shall be required to retire at the end of the calendar year in which they attain 90 years of age.
  2. This section shall not limit the Supreme Court’s power to establish procedures for taking appropriate action to remove or suspend or restrict the services of an individual Justice or judge of any age.

HISTORY: Added 2003, No. 49 , § 1, eff. June 2, 2003.

Chapter 17. Clerks of Court; Court and Other Records and Accounts

Subchapter 1. Supreme Court and Superior Court

History

Amendments

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974, substituted “Superior Court” for “County Court” in the subchapter heading.

§ 651. Clerks of courts.

The Court Administrator shall act as clerk of the Supreme Court as provided in section 8 of this title. The Court Administrator shall appoint a Superior Court clerk for each unit. The Court Administrator may appoint the same person to be clerk in more than one unit. With approval of the Court Administrator, the clerk shall hire office staff. The clerk shall have the powers and responsibilities formerly held by the clerk of the district court or the family court and may delegate specific powers and responsibilities to assigned staff. Unless so designated by the assistant judges of a specific county, with the approval of the Court Administrator, a Superior Court clerk shall not also serve as a county clerk.

HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 174 , § 3; 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 37.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1428. P.L. § 1394. G.L. § 1630. P.S. § 1376. V.S. § 1030. R.L. § 818. G.S. 12, § 66. R.S. 11, § 59. 1824, p. 21, § 7. 1805, p. 107, §§ 1, 2. R. 1797, pp. 81, 580, §§ 17, 5. 1794, p. 118, § 1. 1792, p. 59. R. 1787, p. 28.

Revision note—

Deleted “and court of chancery” preceding “for the county” at the end of the first sentence in light of the repeal of §§ 211-218 of this title, relating to courts of chancery.

Substituted “section 8 of this title” for “section 7 of Title 4” to conform reference to renumbering of such section and V.S.A. style.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.) Section amended generally.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “superior” for “county” preceding “court” in the first sentence.

—1967. Section amended generally.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 601 .

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in State v. Brown, 121 Vt. 459, 160 A.2d 879, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 144 (1960); Abbadessa v. Tegu, 121 Vt. 496, 160 A.2d 876, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 150 (1960); In re Waterhouse, 125 Vt. 202, 212 A.2d 696, 1965 Vt. LEXIS 225 (1965).

§ 651a. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former § 651a. Former § 651a, relating to county clerk to be Superior Court clerk, was derived from 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 2.

§ 652. Repealed. 2013, No. 67, § 15.

History

Former § 652. Former § 652, relating to records of judgments and other proceedings; dockets; certified copies, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1429; P.L. § 1395; G.L. § 1631; 1915, No. 1 , § 61; P.S. § 1377; V.S. § 1031; R.L. § 819. G.S. 12, § 71; 1845, No. 32 , § 14; R.S. 11, § 63. 1805, p. 108, § 3; R. 1797, p. 81, § 17 and amended by 1967, No. 174 , § 4; 1969, No. 27 , § 1; 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; 1979, No. 187 (Adj. Sess.) § 6; 2009, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 38.

§ 653. Repealed. 1969, No. 27, § 2.

History

Former § 653. Former § 653, relating to printing of dockets and jury calendars, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1436; P.L. § 1402; G.L. § 1638; P.S. § 1384; R. 1906, § 1283; V.S. § 1036; 1894, No. 162 , § 977a; R.L. § 4556 and amended by 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(c); 1967, No. 174 , § 5.

§ 654. Repealed. 1977, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

History

Former § 654. Former § 654, relating to report of bonds called and not paid, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1430; P.L. § 1396; G.L. § 1632; P.S. § 1378; 1906, No. 89 , §§ 1, 2 and amended by 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(c).

§§ 655, 656. Repealed. 2013, No. 67, § 15.

History

Former §§ 655, 656. Former § 655, relating to court accounts, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1427; P.L. § 1393; 1919, No. 21 , § 8. G.L. § 1629; P.S. § 1375; V.S. § 1029; R.L. § 817. 1878, No. 44 , § 5; 1869, No. 52 , § 3 and amended by 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(c); 1967, No. 174 , § 6; 1983, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b); 1987, No. 121 , § 5.

Former § 656, relating to index of records, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1433; P.L. § 1399; G.L. § 1635; P.S. § 1381; V.S. § 1034; 1884, No. 147 , § 3 and amended by 1967, No. 174 , § 7.

§ 657. Transcribing damaged records.

When records in the Office of the Superior Court Clerk become faded, defaced, torn, or otherwise injured, so as to endanger the permanent legibility or proper preservation of the same, the Court Administrator may direct the court clerk to provide suitable books and transcribe such records therein. At the end of a transcript of record so made, the clerk shall certify under official signature and the seal of the court that the same is a true transcript of the original record. Such transcript or a duly certified copy thereof shall be entitled to the same faith and credit and have the same force as the original record. The expense of making such transcript shall be paid by the State.

HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 174 , § 8; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 39; 2013, No. 67 , § 5.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1435. P.L. § 1401. G.L. § 1637. P.S. § 1383. V.S. § 2886. 1884, No. 152 .

Amendments

—2013. Substituted “Office of the Superior Court Clerk” for “court clerk’s office” and “the Court Administrator may” for “by an order in writing recorded in the court clerk’s office, the court administrator shall” in the first sentence.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “the clerk” for “he” preceding “shall certify under” and deleted “his” thereafter in the second sentence and substituted “state” for “county” in the last sentence.

—1967. In the first sentence, substituted “court” for “county” preceding “clerk’s office” in two places, “court administrator” for “judges of the county court” preceding “shall direct the” and “court” for “county” thereafter.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 607 .

§ 658. Repealed. 2013, No. 67, § 15.

History

Former § 658. Former § 658, relating to Supreme Court records, was derived from 1967, No. 174 , § 9 and amended by 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 40.

§ 659. Preservation of court records.

  1. The Supreme Court by administrative order may provide for permanent preservation of all court records by any photographic or electronic or comparable process in accordance with standards that shall be no less protective of the records than the standards established by the Vermont State Archives and Records Administration programs that take into account the quality and security of the records and ready access to the record of any cause so recorded.
  2. After preservation in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, the Supreme Court by administrative order may provide for the disposition of original court records by destruction or, in cases where the original court record may have historical or intrinsic value, by transfer to the archives of the Secretary of State.

HISTORY: Added 1975, No. 241 (Adj. Sess.), eff. April 7, 1976; amended 1995, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 4(c)(2), eff. May 6, 1996; 2009, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 41; 2013, No. 67 , § 6.

History

Editor’s note

—2010. 2009, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 7, repealed this section. However, the section was re-enacted pursuant to 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 41.

Amendments

—2013. Subsec. (a): Inserted “or comparable” following “photographic or electronic”, deleted “which will provide compact records in reduced size” preceding “in accordance”, and substituted “that shall be no less protective of the records than the standards established by the State Archives and Records Administration programs that” for “established by the secretary of state which”.

Subsec. (b): Substituted “Secretary of State” for “secretary of state, the Vermont historical society, or the University of Vermont” following “archives of the”.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1995 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “department of buildings and general services” for “department of general services” in subsecs. (a) and (b).

Subchapter 2. District Court

History

Revision note—

Substituted “District” for “Municipal” in the subchapter heading to reflect changes made by 1965, No. 194 , § 10. See note set out preceding § 421 of this title.

§ 691. Clerks and assistants; appointment; compensation.

  1. The Superior Court clerk, with the approval of the Court Administrator, may hire and remove staff for the Superior Court subject to the terms of any applicable collective bargaining agreement. The clerks and staff shall be State employees and shall be entitled to all fringe benefits and compensation accorded classified State employees who are similarly situated, subject to any applicable statutory limits, unless covered by a collective bargaining agreement that sets forth the terms and conditions of employment negotiated pursuant to the provisions of 3 V.S.A. chapter 28.
  2. A staff person for the Superior Court may also serve as the county clerk if the Court Administrator approves of such service with the concurrence of the assistant judges. If a Superior Court staff person serves as county clerk pursuant to this subsection, the Court Administrator and the assistant judges shall enter into a memorandum of understanding with respect to the duties, work schedule, and compensation of the person serving.
  3. With respect to counties where the assistant judges have elected to offer passport processing services, the Court Administrator and the assistant judges shall enter into a memorandum of understanding providing for the acceptance and processing of United States passport applications. The memorandum may provide for performance of passport acceptance and processing duties by the court clerk, county clerk, a Superior Court staff person serving as county clerk pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, or any other court or county employee.

HISTORY: Amended 1967, No. 194 , § 12, eff. March 1, 1968; 1969, No. 125 , § 11; 1973, No. 106 , § 5, eff. May 25, 1973; 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 12; 1997, No. 92 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 42; 2011, No. 1 , § 9, eff. Feb. 2, 2011; 2011, No. 1 , § 9, eff. Feb. 2, 2011.

History

Source.

1957, No. 290 , § 4. 1955, No. 285 , § 2. 1955, No. 45 . 1953, No. 221 , § 1. V.S. 1947, § 1445. P.L. § 1411. 1933, No. 32 , §§ 13, 17, 18. 1931, No. 34 , § 1.

Revision note—

Reference to “compensation review board” changed to “compensation advisory board” pursuant to 1977, No. 109 , § 34.

Amendments

—2011. Subsec. (c): Added.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b), and in subsec. (a), rewrote the first sentence and substituted “staff” for “assistant clerks” in the second sentence.

—1997 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “subject to the terms of any applicable collective bargaining agreement. The clerks and assistant clerks” for “and fix their compensation, with the advice of the state employees’ compensation advisory board, subject to any applicable statutory limits, who, while serving”, added “and compensation” in the second sentence, and added the language beginning “who are similarly situated”.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “and” preceding “assistant clerks” and deleted “and stenographic reporters” thereafter.

—1973. Section amended generally.

—1969. Section amended generally.

—1967. Section amended generally.

Effective date of amendment. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 239(b) provided: “Sec. 42 of this act [which amended this section] shall take effect on July 1, 2010, except that the power to hire and remove staff, which is currently performed by county employees, as set forth in 4 V.S.A. § 491 as amended by Sec. 42 of this act, shall take effect on February 1, 2011.”

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 641 .

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in 1956-58 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 267.

§ 692. Powers of clerk in absence of judge.

In the absence of the judge:

  1. the clerk may continue a cause;
  2. the clerk may set conditions of release in noncapital criminal cases prior to trial as provided by law or by rule promulgated by the Supreme Court.

HISTORY: Amended 1973, No. 118 , § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1973.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1446. P.L. § 1412. 1933, No. 32 , § 19.

Revision note—

Subsection designation at beginning of section deleted to conform section to V.S.A. style.

Amendments

—1973. Section amended generally.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 642 .

Notes to Opinions

Fees.

Clerk cannot charge a fee for taking bail after usual business hours of court. 1940-42 Vt. Op. Att'y Gen. 448.

§§ 693, 694. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former §§ 693, 694. Former § 693, relating to district court docket and records, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1447; P.L. § 1413; 1933, No. 32 , § 20 and amended by 1979, No. 187 (Adj. Sess.), § 7.

Former § 694, relating to filing of process with judge or clerk in district court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1448; P.L. § 1414; 1933, No. 32 , § 5.

Annotations From Former § 693

Access to records.

Affidavits of probable cause.

Parties interested.

Annotations From Former § 693

Access to records.

This section does not merely describe record-keeping duties of the clerk, but rather provides an affirmative right of public access to court records. In re Sealed Documents, 172 Vt. 152, 772 A.2d 518, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 36 (2001).

Documents upon which a court bases a decision to issue a search warrant, which are filed with the court, and which become part of the case record subject to disclosure in connection with subsequent motions for return of property or suppression of evidence, must be considered part of the “records of the court”; accordingly, interested persons would be entitled to examine search warrants and related materials that have been executed and returned to the court absent any superseding legal requirement that they be kept confidential. In re Sealed Documents, 172 Vt. 152, 772 A.2d 518, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 36 (2001).

This section preserves common-law exceptions to the presumptive right to examine court records. In re Sealed Documents, 172 Vt. 152, 772 A.2d 518, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 36 (2001).

Presumptive right of access to court records, including pre-indictment search warrant materials, may be overcome only by showing that a substantial threat exists to the interests of effective law enforcement, or individual privacy and safety. In re Sealed Documents, 172 Vt. 152, 772 A.2d 518, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 36 (2001).

In order to overcome the presumptive right of access to court records, the requisite showing of harm must be demonstrated with specificity as to each document; general allegations of harm are insufficient. In re Sealed Documents, 172 Vt. 152, 772 A.2d 518, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 36 (2001).

Secrecy of court records should extend no further than necessary to protect the interests in confidentiality; thus, trial court must determine whether these interests might be served by deletion of the harmful material. In re Sealed Documents, 172 Vt. 152, 772 A.2d 518, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 36 (2001).

In rendering decision on sealing court records, trial court must examine each document individually, and make fact-specific findings with regard to why the presumption of access has been overcome. In re Sealed Documents, 172 Vt. 152, 772 A.2d 518, 2001 Vt. LEXIS 36 (2001).

Affidavits of probable cause.

After it has been reviewed by a court, an affidavit of probable cause becomes a public document. State v. Tallman, 148 Vt. 465, 537 A.2d 422, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 549 (1987).

A court can temporarily seal an affidavit of probable cause upon a preliminary examination of the likelihood of adverse publicity and its potential effect on the accused’s right to a fair trial; however, such an order must be carefully drawn to afford the maximum recognition of the rights of both the defendant and the public. State v. Tallman, 148 Vt. 465, 537 A.2d 422, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 549 (1987).

Parties interested.

The words “parties interested” in this section include the public. State v. Tallman, 148 Vt. 465, 537 A.2d 422, 1987 Vt. LEXIS 549 (1987).

Cited.

Cited in Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 136 Vt. 293, 390 A.2d 398, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 739 (1978); Herald Ass'n v. Judicial Conduct Board, 149 Vt. 233, 544 A.2d 596, 1988 Vt. LEXIS 30 (1988).

§ 695. Repealed. 2013, No. 67, § 15.

History

Former § 695. Former § 695, relating to accounts of court officer and reporter, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1457; P.L. § 1423; 1933, No. 32 , § 16. G.L. § 1629; P.S. § 1375; V.S. § 1029; R.L. § 817. 1878, No. 44 , § 5; 1869, No. 52 , § 3; G.L. § 1646. 1917, No. 254 , § 1606; 1915, No. 91 , § 19. and amended by 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(c); 1983, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b).

Subchapter 3. Court Records Generally

§ 731. English language.

Writs, processes, complaints, informations, indictments, pleas, answers, and entries in the courts, except technical terms, shall be in the English language.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1265. P.L. § 1236. G.L. § 1481. P.S. § 1223. V.S. § 900. R.L. § 691. G.S. 30, § 39. R.S. 25, § 31. R. 1797, p. 99, § 50. R. 1787, p. 27.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 671 .

ANNOTATIONS

Dates.

Term “Anno Domini,” in an information or bill of indictment, is equivalent to “the year of our Lord”; either is good, as is the want of either. State v. Gilbert, 13 Vt. 647, 1841 Vt. LEXIS 127 (1841).

Indictment was not defective merely by its being written with usual initials and numerical figures for dates, as A.D. 1830, when the same are plainly legible. State v. Hodgeden, 3 Vt. 481, 1831 Vt. LEXIS 39 (1831).

Numbers.

The Arabic numerical figures are for some purposes a part of the English language, but of themselves they signify mere numbers, and words or signs are therefore necessary to predicate the number signified of any particular subject or thing. Clark v. Stoughton, 18 Vt. 50, 1844 Vt. LEXIS 167 (1844).

Symbols.

Signs of degrees and minutes, commonly in use to show meaning of figures with which they are connected, are not part of English language within statute. State v. Town of Jericho, 40 Vt. 121, 1868 Vt. LEXIS 10 (1868).

Mark commonly used to denote dollars ($) is not part of English language, declaration in which amount for which note was given was only expressed in figures with mark for dollars prefixed ($226.17) was insufficient on demurrer. Clark v. Stoughton, 18 Vt. 50, 1844 Vt. LEXIS 167 (1844).

§ 732. Lost document or record.

When a court document, record, or file in an action pending in court is lost, mislaid, or destroyed, the court may order a duplicate document, record, or file to be filed under such conditions as the court prescribes. A duplicate document or record shall have the same validity and may be used in evidence in the same manner as the original document, record, or file.

HISTORY: Amended 2013, No. 67 , § 7.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1901. P.L. § 1848. G.L. § 2038. P.S. § 1759. V.S. § 1404. R.L. § 1172. 1878, No. 30 . G.S. 33, § 1. R.S. 28, § 43. 1807, p. 156.

Amendments

—2013. Section amended generally.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 672 .

ANNOTATIONS

Pending action.

Under this section, action might be pending in court before actually entered upon court’s docket. Cuthbertson v. Ritchie, 99 Vt. 50, 130 A. 756, 1925 Vt. LEXIS 168 (1925).

Although action might be pending in court within meaning of this section as soon as service of process was begun, provided service was completed and process duly returned, failure to return process as law directed vitiated all previous acts thereunder, and action could not thereafter be said to be pending in court by virtue of such service. Cuthbertson v. Ritchie, 99 Vt. 50, 130 A. 756, 1925 Vt. LEXIS 168 (1925).

Cited.

Cited in Bingham v. Marcy, 32 Vt. 278, 1859 Vt. LEXIS 96 (1859); Aldrich v. Weeks, 62 Vt. 89, 19 A. 115, 1889 Vt. LEXIS 115 (1889); Schott v. Baker, 132 Vt. 564, 326 A.2d 157, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 393 (1974).

§ 733. Preservation of attachment liens.

When real or personal estate is attached on such writ, the plaintiff may procure from the clerk of the town in which the estate was attached a certified copy of the writ, complaint and officer’s return thereon, and cause the same to be filed in such court. The same proceedings shall thereupon be had, and the estate so attached held to respond to the judgment in the action, as though the original writ, complaint, and return were in court.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1902. P.L. § 1849. G.L. § 1039. P.S. § 1760. V.S. § 1405. R.L. § 1173. G.S. 33, § 12. R.S. 28, § 44. 1807, p. 157.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 673 .

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in Schott v. Baker, 132 Vt. 564, 326 A.2d 157, 1974 Vt. LEXIS 393 (1974).

§§ 734-738. Repealed. 2013, No. 67, § 15.

History

Former §§ 734-738. Former § 734, relating to copy of lost petition, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1903; P.L. § 1850; G.L. § 2040; P.S. § 1761; V.S. § 1406; 1892, No. 40 ; R.L. § 1172.

Former § 735, relating to record of proceedings, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1904; P.L. § 1851; G.L. § 2041; P.S. § 1762; R. 1906, § 1658; V.S. § 1407; R.L. § 1174; G.S. 33, § 13; R.S. 28, § 45; 1807, p. 158.

Former § 736, relating to lost records or judgment files; recording of copy, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2349; P.L. § 2316; G.L. § 2485; P.S. § 2207; V.S. § 1851; R.L. § 1602; G.S. 13, §§ 1, 2. 1853, No. 23 , §§ 1, 2.

Former § 737, relating to appeal or exception, was derived from .S. 1947, § 2350; P.L. § 2317; G.L. § 2486; P.S. § 2208; V.S. § 1852; R.L. § 1603; G.S. 13, § 3; 1853, No. 23 , § 3.

Former § 738, relating to costs for recording, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 2351; P.L. § 2318; G.L. § 2487; P.S. § 2209; V.S. § 1853; R.L. § 1604; G.S. 13, § 4; 1853, No. 23 , § 4.

§ 739. Record certified by successor in office.

When a recording officer has made a record but has omitted to make an official certificate thereof, any person subsequently holding the office may make such certificate. Such certificate shall be as valid as if made by the officer who made the record, but shall not affect any intervening right.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1253. P.L. § 2320. G.L. § 2489. P.S. § 2211. V.S. § 1855. R.L. § 1607. 1878, No. 84 .

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 679 .

§ 740. Court records; dockets; certified copies.

The Supreme Court by administrative order or directive shall provide for the preparation, maintenance, recording, indexing, docketing, preservation, and storage of all court records and the provision, subject to confidentiality requirements of law or court rules, of certified copies of those records to persons requesting them.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 221 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. Oct. 1, 1990; amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 43; 2013, No. 67 , § 8.

History

Amendments

—2013. Inserted “or directive” following “administrative order”.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “family” preceding “court records” and substituted “law or court rules” for “chapter 55 of Title 33” preceding “of certified copies”.

Subchapter 4. Payment by Credit Card

§ 741. Payment by credit card.

  1. [Repealed.]
  2. If any such card draft is not paid by the bank or other company or is charged back to the court or bureau, any record of payment made by the court or bureau honoring the card shall be void. The obligation of the person to pay the court costs, fee, penalty, surcharge, or fine shall continue as an outstanding obligation as if no payment had been made.
  3. Card account numbers, while in the possession of the court or bureau, are confidential.

HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 155 (Adj. Sess.), § 66d; amended 1999, No. 58 , § 2; 2003, No. 61 , § 4.

History

Amendments

—2003. Subsec. (a): Repealed.

—1999. Subsec. (a): Substituted “judicial” for “traffic and municipal ordinance” preceding “bureau” in the first sentence.

—1997 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “judicial bureau” for “traffic and municipal ordinance bureau”.

Chapter 19. Stenographic Reporters

CROSS REFERENCES

Supervision of court reporters, see Administrative Order No. 19, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

§§ 791-793. Repealed. 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 22.

History

Former §§ 791-793. Former § 791, relating to appointment of reporters for Superior Court, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1418; P.L. § 1384; G.L. § 1621; 1908, No. 56 , § 2; P.S. § 1367; 1906, No. 63 , § 26; 1902, No. 37 , § 1; V.S. § 1021; R.L. § 810; 1878, No. 44 , §§ 2, 3; 1869, No. 52 , § 1 and amended by 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3. The subject matter is now covered by Administrative Order No. 19, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

Former § 792, relating to discharge of reporters and contempt, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1420; P.L. § 1386; G.L. § 1622; P.S. § 1368; V.S. § 1022; 1882, No. 91 , § 1; R.L. § 810. The subject matter is now covered by Administrative Order No. 19, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

Former § 793, relating to criminal trials, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1421; P.L. § 1387; 1931, No. 33 ; G.L. § 1623; 1917, No. 254 , § 1583; P.S. § 1369; R. 1906, § 1269; 1902, No. 35 , § 1; V.S. § 1023; R.L. § 811; 1878, No. 36 , § 1.

§ 794. Oath; correctness of reports and copies.

Upon appointment, a stenographic reporter shall be sworn before entering upon his or her duties, and shall be responsible for the correctness of his or her reports and certified copies thereof made by him or her or under his or her direction.

HISTORY: Amended 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 13.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1422. P.L. § 1388. G.L. § 1624. 1917, No. 254 , § 1584. P.S. § 1370. V.S. § 1024. R.L. § 812. 1878, No. 44 , § 3. 1870, No. 83 , § 1. 1869, No. 52 , § 1.

Amendments

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Added “Upon appointment” preceding “a stenographic reporter” and deleted “appointed under the provisions of this chapter” thereafter.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 734 .

§ 795. Filing of copies of transcripts.

When directed by the presiding judge of a Superior Court so to do and within the time prescribed by such judge, such stenographic reporter shall file with the clerk thereof certified copies of the evidence and proceedings in a cause heard by it. Such copies shall be verbatim transcripts of the evidence and proceedings and be a part of the files of such court.

HISTORY: Amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1423. P.L. § 1389. G.L. § 1625. 1917, No. 254 , § 1585. P.S. § 1371. V.S. § 1025. R.L. § 813. 1878, No. 44 , § 3. 1870, No. 83 , § 1. 1869, No. 52 , § 1.

Amendments

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “superior” for “county” preceding “court” in the first sentence.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 735 .

§ 796. Transcripts for quasi-judicial proceedings.

A stenographic reporter shall furnish a verbatim and certified transcript of the evidence and proceedings in every hearing before a commission, department, or other quasi-judicial proceeding reported by him or her to the presiding officer within 20 days after the termination of such hearing.

HISTORY: Amended 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1424. P.L. § 1390. G.L. § 1626. P.S. § 1372. V.S. § 1026. R.L. § 814. 1878, No. 44 , § 3.

Revision note—

Substituted “quasi-judicial proceedings” for “referees, etc.” at the end of the section heading to reflect changes made by 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.

Substituted “A stenographic reporter” for “he” at the beginning of the section for purposes of clarity.

References to “chancellor” and “masters in chancery” were deleted in light of the repeal of §§ 211-218 of this title, relating to chancery court.

Amendments

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “before a commission, department or other quasi-judicial proceeding” preceding “reported by him” and substituted “to the presiding officer” for “under the order of the presiding judge, to an auditor, referee or commissioner” thereafter.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 736 .

§ 797. Repealed. 1987, No. 120, § 2.

History

Former § 797. Former § 797, relating to transcripts for parties, was derived from 1949, No. 53 ; V.S. 1947, § 1425; P.L. § 1391; 1921, No. 67 ; G.L. § 1627; 1917, No. 254 , § 1587; 1908, No. 61 ; P.S. § 1373; V.S. § 1027; R.L. § 815; 1878, No. 44 , § 3; 1870, No. 83 , § 2 and amended by 1959, No. 192 , § 2; 1969, No. 143 , § 1; 1973, No. 266 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 15.

§ 798. Probative force of transcripts.

All transcripts of evidence or proceedings in a cause or hearing tried in Superior Court or before an auditor, referee, or commissioner, ordered to be reported by a Probate or Superior judge, and made by or under the direction of the reporter and duly certified by him or her to be a verbatim transcript of the verbatim stenographic notes of such evidence or proceedings, shall be received as evidence in any action, civil or criminal, if relevant thereto.

HISTORY: Amended 1965, No. 194 , § 10, operative Feb. 1, 1967; 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 16; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 44.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1426. P.L. § 1392. G.L. § 1628. P.S. § 1374. V.S. § 1028. R.L. § 816. 1878, No. 44 , § 4.

Revision note—

Reference to “chancellor” and “masters in chancery” were deleted in light of the repeal of §§ 211-218 of this title, relating to chancery court.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “Probate court or District court“ following “Superior Court”, “the presiding judge” following “reported by”, substituted “superior” for “district” preceding “judge” and made gender-neutral changes in the section.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “superior” for “county” following “hearing tried in”.

—1965. Substituted “district” for “municipal” preceding “court or before” and preceding “judge, and made”.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 738 .

ANNOTATIONS

Admissibility.

Stenographer’s transcript of testimony given on former trial of same case by a deceased witness was admissible, although witness was unable to speak, and the signs made by him were described by stenographer in words. Quinn's Administrators v. Halbert, 57 Vt. 178, 1884 Vt. LEXIS 16 (1884).

Certification.

Certification of transcript by trial court reporter “that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcription of the stenographic notes taken by me” does not meet requirements of this section. Merrill v. Reed, 123 Vt. 248, 185 A.2d 737, 1962 Vt. LEXIS 236 (1962).

Cited.

Cited in Estate of Corey, 62 Vt. 1, 20 A. 273, 1889 Vt. LEXIS 99 (1889); State v. Rosenberg, 88 Vt. 223, 92 A. 145, 1914 Vt. LEXIS 214 (1914); Houghton v. Grimes, 103 Vt. 54, 151 A. 642, 1930 Vt. LEXIS 112 (1930); Proulx v. Parrow, 115 Vt. 232, 56 A.2d 623, 1948 Vt. LEXIS 59 (1948).

§ 799. Probate Division reporters.

Upon request of a Probate judge, the Superior Court clerk shall appoint and assign a staff member to make a verbatim report of the proceeding in the Probate Division.

HISTORY: Amended 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 44a, eff. Feb. 1, 2011.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1419. P.L. § 1385. 1933, No. 157 , § 1241. 1921, No. 69 . G.L. § 1646. 1917, No. 254 , § 1606. 1915, No. 91 , § 19.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted “The court administrator” preceding “upon request”, inserted “the Superior Court clerk” preceding “shall appoint” and substituted “staff member” for “stenographic reporter” preceding “to make”.

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 739 .

§ 800. Repealed. 1969, No. 125, § 16.

History

Former § 800. Former § 800, relating to district court reporters, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1456; P.L. § 1422; 1933, No. 32 , § 15; 1921, No. 69 ; G.L. § 1646; 1917, No. 254 , § 1606; 1915, No. 91 , § 19 and amended by 1965, No. 194 , § 10. The subject matter is now covered by Administrative Order No. 19, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

§ 801. Hearings before commissions and quasi-judicial tribunals.

In hearings before a commission, department, or other quasi-judicial proceedings, such tribunal shall hire stenographic reporters for the purpose of making verbatim reports of the proceedings when one of the parties so requests in writing.

HISTORY: 1959, No. 192 , § 1, eff. May 20, 1959.

History

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 741 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Transcripts for quasi-judicial proceedings, see § 796 of this title.

ANNOTATIONS

Application.

This section is restricted to agencies of state government, excluding those functioning at local level. Rutland Cable T.V., Inc. v. City of Rutland, 122 Vt. 1, 163 A.2d 117, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 91 (1960).

Purpose.

The purpose of this section was to bring quasi-judicial proceedings in administrative tribunals into conformity with procedure applicable to courts. Rutland Cable T.V., Inc. v. City of Rutland, 122 Vt. 1, 163 A.2d 117, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 91 (1960).

§ 802. Approval of accounts.

The presiding officer of a State department, commission, board, or other agency shall approve the accounts of the stenographer or reporter in the proceeding referred to in sections 797 and 801 of this title and shall forward the same to the Commissioner of Finance and Management for payment.

HISTORY: 1959, No. 192 , § 3, eff. May 20, 1959; amended 1983, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b).

History

References in text.

Section 797 of this title, referred to in this section, was repealed by 1987, No. 120 , § 2.

Revision note—

Reference to “sections 737 and 741 of this title” changed to “sections 797 and 801 of this title” to conform reference to renumbering of such sections.

Reference to “auditor of accounts” changed to “finance director” pursuant to 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(a). See note set out under § 182 of Title 32.

Reference to “finance director” changed to “commissioner of finance” to conform reference to new title and reorganization of state government pursuant to 1971, No. 92 . See § 2201 et seq. of Title 3.

Reference to “commissioner of finance and information support” changed to “commissioner of finance and management” in light of Executive Order No. 35-87, which provided for the abolition of the department of finance and information support and the transfer of the duties, responsibilities and authority of the commissioner of that entity to the commissioner of the department of finance and management as established by the order. By its own terms, Executive Order No. 35-87 took effect on July 1, 1987, pursuant to 3 V.S.A. § 2002 . Executive Order No. 35-87, was revoked and rescinded by E.O. 06-05 (No. 3-46).

Amendments

—1983 (Adj. Sess.). Added “and information support” following “commissioner of finance”.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 742 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Approval of compensation for stenographic services by secretary of administration, see 32 V.S.A. § 1763 .

ANNOTATIONS

Cited.

Cited in Rutland Cable T.V., Inc. v. City of Rutland, 122 Vt. 1, 163 A.2d 117, 1960 Vt. LEXIS 91 (1960).

§ 803. Electronic recording equipment.

  1. Subject to any rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to law, electronic sound or sound and video recording equipment may be used for the recording of any Superior Court or judicial bureau proceeding; testimony, objections, rulings, exceptions, arraignments, pleas, sentences, statements, and remarks made by any attorney or judge; oral instructions given by the judge; and any other judicial proceedings to the same extent as any recording by a stenographer or reporter permitted or required under existing statutes.
  2. For the purpose of operating recording equipment, the judge may appoint or designate the official reporter of that court, a special reporter, the clerk of the court, any staff of the court, the court officer, or any other designated court personnel. The person operating recording equipment shall subscribe to an oath that the operator will well and truly operate it to record all matters and proceedings.
  3. The court may then designate the person operating the equipment or any other competent person to read the recording and to transcribe it into typewriting.  The person transcribing the recording shall subscribe to an oath that it has truly and correctly been transcribed.
  4. The transcript may be used for all purposes for which transcripts are now received and accepted under existing statutes.

HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 95 ; amended 1985, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 45.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Inserted “or sound and video” following “electronic sound” and substituted “Superior Court or judicial bureau proceeding” for “civil, criminal, or probate proceedings”.

Subsec. (b): Deleted “the sound” preceding “recording equipment” in the first and second sentences, and substituted “staff” for “assistant clerks” in the first sentence.

—1985 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

Subsec. (b): Substituted “the operator” for “he” following “oath that” in the second sentence.

Subsec. (c): Substituted “it” for “he” following “oath that”, inserted “been” preceding “transcribed” and deleted “it” thereafter in the second sentence.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 743 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Recording of probate proceedings, see V.R.P.P. 47.

Recording of Supreme Court proceedings by news media, see V.R.A.P. 35.

Chapter 21. Commissioners in Other States and Foreign Countries

§ 851. Appointment and powers of commissioners.

The Governor may appoint commissioners in other states and in foreign countries, who shall hold office for five years unless sooner removed by him or her. They may take depositions, affidavits, and testimony to be used in any proceedings in Superior Court, administer oaths and take the acknowledgment of deeds and other instruments to be used or recorded in this State, and their acts therein shall have the same force as though performed by a justice or master in this State.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 477. P.L. § 440. G.L. § 422. P.S. § 324. V.S. § 239. R.L. § 180. 1878, No. 73 , § 1. 1876, No. 103 . G.S. 8, §§ 74, 75. 1849, No. 35 , § 1. 1841, No. 31 . R.S. 8, §§ 51, 52. 1831, No. 34 , §§ 1, 2.

Revision note—

Substituted “Superior Court” for “chancery” following “proceedings in” in the second sentence pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d) and 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3. See notes set out under §§ 71 and 219 of this title.

Deleted “in chancery” following “master” in the second sentence to conform reference to V.R.C.P. 53 pursuant to 1971, No. 185 (Adj. Sess.), § 236(d). See note set out under § 219 of this title.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 791 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Taking of depositions by commissioners, see 12 V.S.A. § 1248 .

§ 852. Oath and bond.

Before entering upon his or her duties, each commissioner shall take and subscribe an oath of office before a magistrate of his or her locality and execute a bond to this State with sureties to the satisfaction of the Governor in the sum of $500.00, conditioned for the faithful performance of his or her duties. The bond shall be kept in the office of the Secretary of State, and an action may be maintained against any or all signers thereof, in the name of the State, for the benefit of a person injured by the act or neglect of the commissioner.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 478. P.L. § 441. G.L. § 423. P.S. § 325. V.S. § 240. R.L. § 181. G.S. 8, § 76. R.S. 8, § 53. 1831, No. 34 , § 4.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 792 .

Chapter 23. Attorneys

History

Reenactment of chapter. 1985, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. June 30, 1986, reenacted this chapter.

Periodic review of licensing statutes, boards and commissions. For provisions relating to the mandatory periodic review of licensing laws and their effect on this chapter, see 26 V.S.A. § 3102 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Incorporation of professional persons, see 11 V.S.A. ch. 3.

Regulation of professional conduct of attorneys, see Rules of Professional Conduct.

§ 901. Rules for admission of attorneys.

Justices of the Supreme Court shall make, adopt, and publish and may alter or amend rules regulating the admission of attorneys to the practice of law before the courts of this State.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1385. P.L. § 1351. 1933, No. 157 , § 1206. G.L. § 1591. 1915, No. 1 , § 3. R.S. §§ 1330, 1337. 1906, No. 63 , §§ 6, 12, 22. V.S. § 1003. 1892, No. 28 , § 5. R.L. § 793. G.S. 30, § 21. R.S. 25, § 12. R. 1797, p. 82, §§ 21, 22. 1826, No. 5 . 1791, p. 34. 1789, p. 18, R. 1787, p. 23.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 841 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Disqualification of attorneys in particular cases, see 12 V.S.A. § 61 .

Admission of attorneys to practice, see Rules of Admission to the Bar of the Vermont Supreme Court.

ANNOTATIONS

Enforcement.

Rules of the Supreme Court, made pursuant to this section, have the force of law; and although that court can alter or abrogate such rules, yet while they stand they must be enforced as to all cases within their scope. Taft v. Taft, 82 Vt. 64, 71 A. 831, 1909 Vt. LEXIS 245 (1909).

Unauthorized practice of law.

There was no probable cause to charge defendant, a “jailhouse lawyer” who gave legal advice to, and drafted motions for, fellow inmates, with the unauthorized practice of law and with criminal contempt. Such inmates might perform a valuable service in promoting more meaningful access to justice than their fellow inmates would otherwise enjoy; furthermore, defendant received no payment for her services, and the pleadings or motions she drafted were reviewed and signed by the inmates she was helping. In re Morales, 2016 VT 85, 202 Vt. 549, 151 A.3d 333, 2016 Vt. LEXIS 83 (2016).

Court has implied power to punish for contempt persons pretending to the office of attorney, and practicing as such in courts of this state without authority. In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 A. 550, 1924 Vt. LEXIS 139 (1924).

This section relates to the power of Supreme Court to make rules regulating admission of attorneys and not to one who pretends to act as an attorney without being qualified. In re Carney, 71 Vt. 501, 1900 Vt. LEXIS 167 (1900).

Cited.

Cited in In re Haddad, 106 Vt. 322, 173 A. 103, 1934 Vt. LEXIS 175 (1934); In re Monaghan, 122 Vt. 199, 167 A.2d 81, 1961 Vt. LEXIS 56 (1961); In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665, 1966 Vt. LEXIS 161, 1966 Vt. LEXIS 162 (1966); Welch v. Smith, 486 F. Supp. 153, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10255 (D. Vt. 1980).

§ 902. Board of Bar Examiners.

The Board of Bar Examiners shall consist of 11 voting members whose term of office shall be for four years and until a successor is appointed. Two members of the Board shall be laypersons not admitted to practice law in this or any other state. The Supreme Court shall annually appoint not more than four members of the Board on October 1. Vacancies on the Board may be filled by the Court. The Commissioner of Finance and Management shall issue his or her warrant for the expenses of each member of the Board, when approved by the Court Administrator.

HISTORY: Amended 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 8(c); 1983, No. 81 , § 5; 1983, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 5(b); 2019, No. 13 , § 1, eff. April 30, 2019.

History

Source.

V.S. 1947, § 1386. P.L. § 1352. G.L. § 1592. 1915, No. 1 , § 3. P.S. § 1338. 1898, No. 157 , §§ 1, 2.

Revision note—

Reference to “finance director” changed to “commissioner of finance” to conform reference to new title and reorganization of state government pursuant to 1971, No. 92 . See § 2201 et seq. of Title 3.

Reference to “commissioner of finance and information support” changed to “commissioner of finance and management” in light of Executive Order No. 35-87, which provided for the abolition of the department of finance and information support and the transfer of the duties, responsibilities and authority of the commissioner of that entity to the commissioner of the department of finance and management as established by the order. By its own terms, Executive Order No. 35–87 took effect on July 1, 1987, pursuant to 3 V.S.A. § 2002 . Executive Order No. 35–87, was revoked and rescinded by E.O. 06–05 (No. 3–46).

Amendments

—2019. Substituted “11 voting members” for “nine persons”, substituted “four” for “three”, and made minor stylistic changes.

—1983 (Adj. Sess.). Inserted “and information support” following “commissioner of finance” in the last sentence.

—1983. Substituted “nine” for “six” preceding “persons” and “four” for “three” preceding “years” and added “and until a successor is appointed” thereafter in the first sentence, added the second sentence, rewrote the third sentence, and substituted “Court Administrator” for “Chief Justice of the Supreme Court” following “approved by the” in the last sentence.

—1959 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “finance director” for “auditor of accounts” preceding “shall issue” in the last sentence.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 842 .

ANNOTATIONS

Examining and grading applicants.

In the matter of examining and grading applicants for admission to the bar, both orally and in writing, members of the Board of Bar Examiners are exclusive judges, and the Supreme Court would not investigate to ascertain probity of results certified to it in the absence of clear and unequivocal allegations of probative facts to establish imposition, discrimination and manifest unfairness. In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 193, 225 A.2d 387, 1967 Vt. LEXIS 165 (1967).

Cited.

Cited in In re Monaghan, 122 Vt. 199, 167 A.2d 81, 1961 Vt. LEXIS 56 (1961); In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665, 1966 Vt. LEXIS 161, 1966 Vt. LEXIS 162 (1966); Welch v. Smith, 486 F. Supp. 153, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10255 (D. Vt. 1980).

§§ 903-905. Repealed. 1977, No. 235 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

History

Former §§ 903-905. Former § 903, relating to presentation of disbarment complaints when the Supreme Court was not in session, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1387; P.L. § 1353; 1919, No. 63 , § 1.

Former § 904, relating to appointment of investigation committee in vacation, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1388; P.L. § 1354; 1919, No. 63 , § 2.

Former § 905, relating to attorney acting when not employed, was derived from V.S. 1947, § 1389; P.L. § 1355; G.L. § 1593; P.S. § 1339; V.S. § 1004; R.L. § 794; G.S. 125, § 9; R.S. 106, § 8; 1807, p. 176, § 2.

Annotations From Former § 904

Hearings.

It was for the committee investigating attorney’s conduct to decide, in the light of any legal and due process considerations relating to matters improper, scandalous or impertinent, whether such proceedings, at any point when the issue was raised, would, in whole or in part, be open or closed to the public. In re Wright, 130 Vt. 111, 287 A.2d 553, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 236 (1972).

§ 906. Conflicting appointments, excuse from attending by Administrative Judge.

When an attorney is required to attend more than one trial, hearing, or other proceeding before a court or commission having judicial or quasi-judicial functions, or both, at times which conflict so that he or she cannot reasonably attend each appointment, the attorney may request the Administrative Judge to designate which appointment he or she shall attend. The Administrative Judge shall designate the appointment the attorney shall attend and shall notify the presiding magistrate of each court and commission of his or her decision. The attorney shall be excused from attending at that time any proceedings other than the one designated by the Administrative Judge, and the other proceedings shall be rescheduled.

HISTORY: 1959, No. 169 ; amended 1979, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 18.

History

Amendments

—1979 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “administrative” for “superior” preceding “judge” in the section heading and “Administrative Judge” for “chief superior judge” throughout the text of the section.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 846 .

CROSS REFERENCES

Court appearance conflicting with legislative duties, see 21 V.S.A. § 496 .

ANNOTATIONS

Grounds.

Engagement of counsel in other trial courts will not be considered cause for an automatic continuance or a ground for finding a court in abuse of discretion for dismissing the proceeding; counsel has burden of resolving appointment conflicts. In re Estate of Peloquin, 137 Vt. 559, 409 A.2d 586, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1099 (1979).

Where counsel received notice of date of drawing of jury and advised deputy clerk of court that he had two administrative hearings already scheduled for that date, and counsel failed to move for continuance, or use statutory procedure for resolution of appointment conflicts, and court dismissed the proceeding with prejudice, the judgment would stand on appeal to Supreme Court. In re Estate of Peloquin, 137 Vt. 559, 409 A.2d 586, 1979 Vt. LEXIS 1099 (1979).

Request for continuance.

Alleged fact that defendant’s counsel was engaged in court elsewhere did not compel granting of motion to strike defaults where no request for a continuance appeared to have been made. Fairview Garage, Inc. v. Terjelian, 127 Vt. 239, 246 A.2d 830, 1968 Vt. LEXIS 214 (1968).

§ 907. Licensing and renewal fees.

The Supreme Court may by rule impose a fee on applicants for admission to the bar on motion and on applicants for admission to the bar by examination. The Court may also impose an annual fee on lawyers admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court as a condition of being licensed to practice law.

HISTORY: Added 1983, No. 81 , § 1; amended 2011, No. 75 (Adj. Sess.), § 102, eff. March 7, 2012.

History

Amendments

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted the final sentence which read: “All fees received shall be transferred to the state treasurer for deposit in the general fund.”

CROSS REFERENCES

Annual licensing fee, see § 1, Rules for Licensing of Attorneys.

Fees for application for admission to the bar, see § 9, Rules of Admission to the Bar of the Vermont Supreme Court.

§ 908. Attorneys’ Admission, Licensing, and Professional Responsibility Special Fund.

There is established the Attorneys’ Admission, Licensing, and Professional Responsibility Special Fund which shall be managed in accordance with 32 V.S.A. chapter 7, subchapter 5. Fees collected for licensing of attorneys, administration of the bar examination, admitting attorneys to practice in Vermont, and administration of mandatory continuing legal education shall be deposited and credited to this Fund. This Fund shall be available to the Judicial Branch to offset the cost of operating the Professional Responsibility Board, the Board of Bar Examiners, the Judicial Conduct Board, the Committee on Character and Fitness, the mandatory continuing legal education program for attorneys and, at the discretion of the Supreme Court, to make grants for access to justice programs or to the Vermont Bar Foundation to be used to support legal services for the disadvantaged.

HISTORY: Added 2005, No. 215 (Adj. Sess.), § 60; amended 2013, No. 67 , § 10.

History

Revision note

—2006. Deleted the subsec. (a) designation at the beginning of the section to conform section to V.S.A. style.

Amendments

—2013. Inserted “for access to justice programs or” following “to make grants” in the last sentence.

Chapter 25. Jury Commission

§ 951. Repealed. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 238.

History

Former § 951. Former § 951, relating to office of jury commission established, was derived from 1967, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 and amended by 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

§ 952. Rules of Court Administrator.

  1. The Court Administrator, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, shall make rules regarding the qualifications, lists, and selection of all jurors and prepare questionnaires for prospective jurors. Each Superior Court clerk shall, in conformity with the rules, prepare a list of jurors from residents of its unit. The rules shall be designed to assure that the list of jurors prepared by the Superior Court clerk shall be representative of the citizens of its unit in terms of age, sex, occupation, economic status, and geographical distribution.
  2. Rules adopted under this section shall be consistent with the provisions of this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1993, No. 24 , § 4; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 46; 2011, No. 31 , § 4, eff. May 17, 2011.

History

Amendments

—2011. Subsec. (a): Substituted “Superior Court clerk” for “jury commission” preceding “shall be”.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “Superior Court clerk” for “jury commission”, “the rules” for “said rules” in the second sentence, and “unit” for “county” in the second and third sentences.

—1993. Designated the existing provisions of the section as subsec. (a) and added subsec. (b).

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 902 .

ANNOTATIONS

Age.

Method of compiling jury lists from voter registration and driver’s license records, which resulted in underrepresentation of young adults up to the age of twenty-four from impartial jury in defendant’s murder trial, did not contravene statutory requirement that jury selection be “representative of the citizens of its county in terms of age,” where jury commission had complied with rules of court administrator as required by statute. State v. Pelican, 154 Vt. 496, 580 A.2d 942, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 133 (1990).

Geographical distribution.

Where judicial district was comprised of three counties and District Court sat in each of the three counties, called circuits, at different times, it was not a violation of rights of accused under the federal or Vermont Constitution to draw his jury from the residents of the county in which he was tried, as the jury did not have to be drawn from the residents of all three counties combined. State v. Murphy, 134 Vt. 106, 353 A.2d 346, 1976 Vt. LEXIS 606 (1976).

Cited.

Cited in State v. Jenne, 156 Vt. 283, 591 A.2d 85, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 56 (1991).

§ 953. Sources of names.

  1. The clerk, in order to ascertain names of persons eligible as jurors, may consult the latest census enumeration, the latest published city, town, or village telephone or other directory, the listers’ records, the elections records, and any other general source of names.
  2. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the Court Administrator may obtain the names, addresses, and dates of birth of persons which are contained in the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Labor, the Department of Taxes, the Department of Health, and the Department for Children and Families. The Court Administrator may also obtain the names of voters from the Secretary of State. After the names have been obtained, the Court Administrator shall compile them and provide the names, addresses, and dates of birth to the clerk in a form that will not reveal the source of the names. The clerk shall include the names provided by the Court Administrator in the list of potential jurors.
  3. There shall be continuous research for persons qualified and liable for jury service, in order to obtain as many prospective jurors as necessary and in order to limit as many prospective jurors as necessary and in order to limit as much as possible repetition of jury service.
  4. No person’s name shall be placed on venire to serve in any State court of the State of Vermont more than once in any two-year period.
  5. All public officers shall, on request, furnish the clerk or the Court Administrator without charge, any information it may require to enable it to select eligible persons, ascertain their qualifications, or determine the number needed.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2003, No. 146 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2005; 2005, No. 103 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 5, 2006; 2005, No. 174 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 47.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “clerk” for “jury commission” wherever it appeared throughout the section.

—2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Act No. 103 deleted “and industry” for “department of labor” in the first sentence.

Act No. 174 substituted “families” for “family services” at the end of the first sentence.

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Amended generally.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 903 .

ANNOTATIONS

Master list.

Jury commission’s use of one master list for two years under specific statutory authorization did not contravene requirement of another provision of statute requiring the commission to conduct “continuous research for persons qualified and liable for jury service.” State v. Pelican, 154 Vt. 496, 580 A.2d 942, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 133 (1990).

Cited.

Cited in State v. Jenne, 156 Vt. 283, 591 A.2d 85, 1991 Vt. LEXIS 56 (1991).

§ 954. Deposit of list.

Prior to the first day of July in each biennial year, the clerk shall prepare and file a current master list of jurors and certify its completion and filing to the Court Administrator. The current master lists shall contain the number of names necessary adequately to serve the needs of the courts involved for a two-year period beginning July 1.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1969, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. March 31, 1970; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 48.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “clerk” for “jury commission” preceding “shall prepare” and deleted “in the office of the county clerk” following “list of jurors” in the first sentence.

—1969 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 904 .

ANNOTATIONS

Construction with other laws.

Jury commission’s use of one master list for two years under specific authorization of this section did not contravene requirement of section 952 of this title requiring the commission to conduct “continuous research for persons qualified and liable for jury service.” State v. Pelican, 154 Vt. 496, 580 A.2d 942, 1990 Vt. LEXIS 133 (1990).

§ 955. Questionnaire.

The clerk shall send a jury questionnaire prepared by the Court Administrator to each person selected. When returned, it shall be retained in the Office of the Superior Court Clerk. Pursuant to section 952 of this title, the Court Administrator shall promulgate rules governing the inspection and availability of the juror questionnaires and the information contained in them.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1969, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. March 31, 1970; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 49; 2013, No. 67 , § 1.

History

Amendments

—2013. Substituted “Office of the Superior Court Clerk” for “Superior Court clerk’s office” and rewrote the second sentence.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—1969 (Adj. Sess.). Rewrote the second sentence.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 905 .

§ 956. Contents of list.

Names may be added or dropped from the jury list in accordance with rules issued by the Court Administrator under section 952 of this title.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.

History

Revision note—

Substituted “section 952” for “section 902” to conform reference to renumbering of such section.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 906 .

§ 957. Drawing and summoning jurors.

The manner of drawing and summoning jurors from the lists provided shall be in accordance with the rules of the court in which they are called to serve and all applicable statutes, including section 952 of this title, requiring that the panel shall be representative of the citizens of the unit in terms of age, sex, occupation, economic status, and geographical distribution.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 50.

History

Revision note—

Reference to “section 902” of this title changed to “section 952” to conform reference to renumbering of such section.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “unit” for “county” preceding “in terms of age”.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 907 .

§ 958. Nonappearance; penalty.

A juror who does not appear after being summoned, and does not submit an excuse satisfactory to the court in which the juror was summoned to appear, shall be assessed a civil penalty by the presiding judge of not more than $200.00. The prospective juror may be excused from paying the assessment for good cause shown or in the interests of justice.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 2003, No. 146 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2005.

History

Amendments

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “the juror” for “he” and “assessed a civil penalty by the presiding judge of not more than $200.00” for “fined $50.00” in the first sentence, and added the second sentence.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 908 .

§ 959. Grand jurors; venire.

The clerk, as directed by the judges of each Superior Court, shall summon 18 judicious persons within the unit to appear at any stated or special term of that court to serve as grand jurors of the unit. The clerk of the court shall issue a venire accordingly.

HISTORY: Added 1967, No. 284 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; amended 1973, No. 193 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. April 9, 1974; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 51.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “clerk” for “jury commission” and “unit” for “county” in two places in the first sentence.

—1973 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “superior” for “county” following “judges of each” in the first sentence.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 909 .

§ 960. Repealed. 1969, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. March 31, 1970.

History

Former § 960. Former § 960, relating to privileges of jurors, was derived from 1969, No. 100 . The subject matter is now covered by 21 V.S.A. § 499 .

§ 961. Failure to return form; misrepresentation; penalties.

  1. Any person who fails to return a completed questionnaire within 14 days of its receipt may be summoned by the Superior Court clerk to appear forthwith before the clerk to fill out a jury questionnaire. Any person so summoned who fails to appear as directed shall be ordered forthwith by the presiding judge to appear and show cause for his or her failure to comply with the summons. Any person who fails to appear pursuant to such order or who fails to show good cause for noncompliance may be found in contempt of court and shall be subject to the penalties for contempt.
  2. Any person who willfully misrepresents a material fact on the jury questionnaire form for the purpose of avoiding or securing service as a juror may be fined not more than $50.00.

HISTORY: Added 1969, No. 228 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 52; 2017, No. 11 , § 1.

History

Amendments

—2017. Subsec. (a): Substituted “14” for “ten” in the first sentence.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “Superior Court” for “county” preceding “clerk” and deleted “forthwith” thereafter, and inserted “forthwith” preceding “before the clerk” in the first sentence, and inserted “or her” following “his” in the second sentence.

Prior law.

4 V.S.A. § 911 .

§ 962. Qualifications; excuse from service.

  1. A person shall be qualified for jury service if the person:
    1. is a citizen of the United States who has attained the age of majority;
    2. resides within the geographical jurisdiction of the court in which called to serve;
    3. is able to read, write, understand, and speak the English language;
    4. is capable, by reason of mental or physical condition, to render satisfactory jury service; and
    5. has not served a term of imprisonment in this State after conviction of a felony.
  2. No person shall be automatically excused from jury service; however, the presiding judge may excuse a person for all or part of the two-year period upon individual request showing undue hardship on the prospective juror or the employer.

HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 24 , § 1, eff. March 1, 1994.

CROSS REFERENCES

Employment security for persons summoned to jury duty, see 21 V.S.A. § 499 .

ANNOTATIONS

Imprisonment.

Because the statute prescribing juror qualifications excludes from jury service only those felons who had served a period of confinement in Vermont, it did not disqualify a juror who served part of her post-release supervision in Vermont but who was convicted and imprisoned in Nevada. State v. Perrault, 2017 VT 67, 205 Vt. 235, 173 A.3d 335, 2017 Vt. LEXIS 84 (2017).

§ 963. Term of service.

A person summoned to petit jury service shall not appear before the court for jury selection more than three times in any two-year period of time and shall be required to appear at the courthouse to serve as a juror on the date of trial no more than three times in that two-year period.

HISTORY: Added 1993, No. 24 , § 2, eff. March 1, 1994; amended 2003, No. 146 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2005.

History

Amendments

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “not appear” for “be summoned to appear” and “for jury selection” for “for voir dire no”, added “and shall be required to appear at the courthouse to serve as a juror on the date of trial no more than three times in that two-year period” in the first sentence, and deleted the second sentence.

Chapter 27. Environmental Court

History

Amendments

—1993 (Adj. Sess.). 1993, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 38, eff. March 15, 1995, substituted “court” for “law division” following “Environmental”.

CROSS REFERENCES

Rules governing proceedings of the Environmental Law Division, see Rules 1-7, Vermont Rules for Environmental Court Proceedings.

§ 1001. Environmental Division.

  1. The Environmental Division shall consist of two judges, each sitting alone.
  2. Two environmental judges shall be appointed to hear matters in the Environmental Division and to hear other matters in the Superior Court when so assigned by the administrative judge pursuant to subsection 21a(c) of this title.
  3. An environmental judge shall be an attorney admitted to practice before the Vermont Supreme Court. An environmental judge shall be nominated, appointed, confirmed, paid, and retained, and shall receive all benefits in the manner of a superior judge.
  4. An environmental judge shall be appointed on April 1, for a term of six years or the unexpired portion thereof.
  5. Evidentiary proceedings in the Environmental Division shall be held in the county in which all or a portion of the land which is the subject of the appeal is located or where the violation is alleged to have occurred, unless the parties agree to another location; provided, however, that the environmental judge shall offer expeditious evidentiary hearings so that no such proceedings are moved to another county to obtain an earlier hearing. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, all nonevidentiary hearings may be conducted by telephone or video conferencing using an audio or video record. If a party objects to a telephone hearing, the court may require a personal appearance for good cause.
  6. [Repealed.]
  7. The Supreme Court may enact rules and develop procedures consistent with this chapter to govern the operation of the Environmental Division and proceedings in it. In adopting these rules, the Supreme Court shall ensure that the rules provide for:
    1. expeditious proceedings that give due consideration to the needs of pro se litigants;
    2. the ability of the judge to hold pretrial conferences by telephone;
    3. the use of scheduling orders under the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure in order to limit discovery to that which is necessary for a full and fair determination of the proceeding; and
    4. the appropriate use of site visits by the presiding judge to assist the court in rendering a decision.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 98 , § 2; amended 1991, No. 108 , § 3; 1993, No. 92 , § 14; 1993, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 39, eff. March 15, 1995; 1995, No. 181 (Adj. Sess.), § 21; 2001, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 73, eff. June 27, 2002; 2003, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. Jan. 31, 2005; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 53.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Section heading: Substituted “division” for “court”.

Subsecs. (a) and (b): Amended generally.

Subsec. (e): Substituted “division” for “court” preceding “shall be held” in the first sentence, and inserted “or video conferencing” following “telephone” in the second sentence.

Subsec. (f): Repealed.

Subsec. (g): Substituted “division” for “court” and “it” preceding “the court” in the first sentence of the introductory paragraph.

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “two judges, each sitting alone” for “the presiding judge sitting alone”.

Subsec. (b): Substituted “Two” for “One” and “judges” for “judge”; deleted “23 and” following “chapters”; inserted “and 220” following “201”; deleted “in environmental court” and the former second sentence and added the present second sentence.

Subsec. (e): Deleted “tape” following “video” in the second sentence.

Subsecs. (f), (g): Added.

—2001 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Deleted the former second sentence, which authorized the administrative judge to assign additional judicial functions to the environmental judge, and added the present second sentence.

Subsec. (e): Deleted.

Subsec. (f): Redesignated as subsec. (e), inserted “all or a portion of” preceding “the land” and added the last sentence.

—1995 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “granted to” for “of” following “authority” in the first sentence.

Subsec. (b): Substituted “in environmental court” for “and shall not be assigned any other judicial functions” at the end of the first sentence and added the second sentence.

Subsec. (e): Substituted “another judge on a case specific basis” for “and specially assign a member of the Vermont bar” following “appoint”.

Subsec. (f): Added.

—1993 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “court” for “law division” following “environmental” in the section heading.

Subsec. (a): Amended generally.

Subsec. (b): Deleted “law” following “environmental” and inserted “chapter 117 and” following “24 V.S.A.”

Subsec. (c): Deleted “law” following “environmental” in the first and second sentences and inserted “paid” preceding “and retained” and “and shall receive all benefits” thereafter in the second sentence.

Subsec. (d): Deleted “law” following “environmental”.

Subsec. (e): Deleted “law” following “environmental” in two places.

Subsec. (f): Repealed.

—1993. Subsec. (b): Substituted “chapters 23 and 201” for “chapter 201” preceding “of Title 10”.

—1991. Subsec. (b): Inserted “and matters arising under 24 V.S.A. chapter 61, subchapter 12” following “Title 10”.

Transitional provision and redesignation of Environmental Court. 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 237(b) provides: “On July 1, 2010:

“(1) the Superior Court as it formerly existed shall be redesignated as the Civil Division of the Superior Court, and all cases and files of the former Superior Court shall be transferred to the Civil Division of the Superior Court;

“(2) the Family Court as it formerly existed shall be redesignated as the Family Division of the Superior Court, and all cases and files of the former Family Court shall be transferred to the Family Division of the Superior Court;

“(3) the District Court as it formerly existed shall be redesignated as the Criminal Division of the Superior Court, and all cases and files of the former District Court shall be transferred to the Criminal Division of the Superior Court; and

“(4) the Environmental court as it formerly existed shall be redesignated as the Environmental Division of the Superior Court, and all cases and files of the former Environmental Court shall be transferred to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court.”

CROSS REFERENCES

Assignment of Superior judges to Environmental Court, see § 21a of this title.

Rules governing proceedings of the environmental court, see Rules 1-7, Vermont Rules for Environmental Court Proceedings.

ANNOTATIONS

Constitutionality.

Landowner was not denied equal protection of the laws, because there were rational bases for legislative classifications which gave municipality two ways in which it could seek judicial enforcement of its zoning ordinance, one of which did not include a right to jury trial. In re Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 726 A.2d 31, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 409 (1998).

§ 1002. Conduct of hearings.

Hearings before the Environmental Division shall be conducted in an impartial manner subject to rules of the Supreme Court providing for a summary, expedited proceeding.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 98 , § 2; amended 1993, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 38, eff. March 15, 1995; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 53a.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “Division” for “Court” preceding “shall be”.

—1993 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “court” for “law division” following “environmental”.

§ 1003. Evidence.

  1. Irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded.  The Vermont Rules of Evidence shall be followed, except that evidence not admissible under the Rules of Evidence may be admitted if it is of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs.  Objections to evidentiary offers may be made and shall be noted in the record.  Subject to these requirements, when a hearing will be expedited and the interests of the parties will not be prejudiced substantially, any part of the evidence may be received in written form.  Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily available.  Upon request, parties shall be given an opportunity to compare the copy with the original.
  2. Notice may be taken of judicially cognizable facts.  In addition, notice may be taken of generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the agency’s specialized knowledge.  Parties shall be notified either before or during the hearing, or by reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of the material noticed, including any staff memoranda or data, and they shall be afforded an opportunity to contest the material so noticed.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 98 , § 2.

§ 1004. Access to information.

  1. In connection with any proceedings under 10 V.S.A. chapter 201, each party shall provide all other parties with all written statements and information in the possession, custody, or control of the party relative to the violation, including any technical studies, tests and reports, maps, architectural and engineering plans and specifications, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, and other data compilations from which information can be obtained, the names and addresses of the party’s witnesses, and any other information which the Environmental Division deems necessary, in its sole discretion, to a fair and full determination of the proceeding.
  2. No other discovery or depositions, written interrogatories or requests to admit shall be permitted except that which is necessary for a full and fair determination of the proceeding.

HISTORY: Added 1989, No. 98 , § 2; amended 1993, No. 232 (Adj. Sess.), § 38, eff. March 15, 1995; 2003, No. 115 (Adj. Sess.), § 10, eff. Jan. 31, 2005; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 53b.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “division” for “court” preceding “deems necessary”.

—2003 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “that which is necessary for a full and fair determination of the proceeding” for “in extraordinary circumstances”.

—1993 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “court” for “law division” following “environmental”.

Chapter 29. Judicial Bureau

§ 1101. Repealed. 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.

History

Former § 1101. Former § 1101, relating to definitions, was derived from 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, and amended by 1999, No. 151 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

§ 1102. Judicial Bureau; jurisdiction.

  1. The Judicial Bureau is created within the Judicial Branch under the supervision of the Supreme Court.
  2. The Judicial Bureau shall have jurisdiction of the following matters:
    1. Traffic violations alleged to have been committed on or after July 1, 1990.
    2. Civil ordinance violations alleged to have been committed on or after July 1, 1994.
    3. Minor fish and wildlife violations alleged to have been committed on or after September 1, 1996.
    4. Violations of 7 V.S.A. § 1005(a) , relating to possession of tobacco products by a person under 21 years of age.
    5. Violations of 7 V.S.A. § 1007 , relating to furnishing tobacco products to a person under 21 years of age.
    6. Violations of 24 V.S.A. § 2201 , relating to littering, burning of solid waste, and illegal dumping.
    7. Violations of 16 V.S.A. chapter 9, subchapter 5, relating to hazing.
    8. Violations of 20 V.S.A. §§ 2056a , 2056b, and 2056c, relating to unauthorized disclosure of criminal record information.
    9. Violations of 7 V.S.A. § 656 , relating to illegal possession of alcoholic beverages.
    10. Violations under 7 V.S.A. § 658(c)(1) ,  relating to an employee of a second-class licensee selling alcohol to a minor during a compliance check.
    11. Violations of 18 V.S.A. § 4234b(b) , relating to selling ephedrine base, pseudoephedrine base, or phenylpropanolamine base.
    12. Violations of 13 V.S.A. § 352(3) , (4), and (9), relating to cruelty to animals, and 13 V.S.A. § 355(d) , relating to interference with a guide dog.
    13. Violations of 18 V.S.A. § 4249 , relating to the introduction of tobacco or tobacco products into a correctional facility.
    14. Violations of 21 V.S.A. chapter 5, subchapter 1, relating to conditions for employment.
    15. Violations of 9 V.S.A. § 3023(a) , relating to the purchase and sale of scrap metal.
    16. Violations of 18 V.S.A. chapter 38 that are subject to civil penalties pursuant to subsection 1760a(a), relating to reducing lead hazards in housing.
    17. [Repealed.]
    18. Violations of 23 V.S.A. § 3327(d) , relating to obeying a law enforcement officer while operating a vessel.
    19. [Repealed.]
    20. Violations of 21 V.S.A. § 692(c)(1) .
    21. Violations of State or municipal rental housing health and safety laws when the amount of the cumulative penalties imposed pursuant to 18 V.S.A. § 603 is $800.00 or less.
    22. Violations of 10 V.S.A. § 1266b , relating to the application of fertilizer to nonagricultural turf.
    23. Violations of 18 V.S.A. § 1513 , relating to minors using tanning facilities.
    24. Violations of 18 V.S.A. §§ 4230a and 4230b, relating to possession of cannabis.
    25. Violations of 9 V.S.A. chapter 97A that are subject to civil penalties pursuant to 9 V.S.A. § 3890(a) , relating to the purchase and sale of precious metal by a precious metal dealer, as defined in 9 V.S.A. § 3881 .
    26. Violations of 9 V.S.A. § 4191 , relating to the solicitation or acceptance of a fee to remove a booking photograph from the Internet.
    27. Violations of 10 V.S.A. § 1454(a) -(d), relating to the transport of aquatic plants and aquatic nuisance species.
    28. Violations of 20 V.S.A. § 4625 , relating to the use of drones near correctional facilities.
    29. Violations of 10 V.S.A. chapter 21, relating to the prohibition of outdoor advertising.
  3. The Judicial Bureau shall not have jurisdiction over municipal parking violations.
  4. Three hearing officers appointed by the Court Administrator shall determine waiver penalties to be imposed for violations within the Judicial Bureau’s jurisdiction, except municipalities shall adopt full and waiver penalties for civil ordinance violations pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 1979 . For purposes of municipal violations, the issuing law enforcement officer shall indicate the appropriate full and waiver penalty on the complaint.

HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 1999, No. 63 , § 2; 1999, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 1999, No. 151 (Adj. Sess.), § 11; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 1999, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 1a; 2005, No. 23 , § 2; 2005, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. Sept. 30, 2006; 2007, No. 51 , § 19; 2007, No. 64 , § 1; 2007, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2007, No. 176 (Adj. Sess.), § 35, eff. Jan. 1, 2010; 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 11, eff. July 1, 2009; 2009, No. 30 , § 5; 2009, No. 54 , § 58; 2009, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 6d; 2009, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2009, No. 142 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; 2009, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; 2011, No. 37 , § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2012; 2011, No. 73 (Adj. Sess.), § 8; 2011, No. 97 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. May 2, 2012; 2013, No. 76 , § 3; 2013, No. 196 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2015; 2015, No. 62 , § 5; 2015, No. 106 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2017, No. 67 , § 5, eff. June 8, 2017; 2017, No. 101 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 17, 2018; 2019, No. 27 , § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 2019; 2019, No. 48 , § 7; 2019, No. 59 , § 49; 2021, No. 65 , § 9, eff. June 7, 2021.

History

References in text.

16 V.S.A. chapter 1, subchapter 9, referenced in subdiv. (a)(7), comprising §§ 140a-140d, was redesignated as 16 V.S.A. chapter 9, subchapter 5, article 3, comprising §§ 570i-570 l , by 2013, No. 92 (Adj. Sess.) §§ 77-81.

Revision note

—2020. In subdiv. (b)(24), substituted “cannabis” for “marijuana” in accordance with 2019, No. 164 (Adj. Sess.), § 32 and 2019, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 26.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(19), as added by 2009, No. 142 (Adj. Sess.), § 4, was redesignated as subdiv. (b)(20) to avoid conflict with subdiv. (b)(19) as added by 2009, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 6d.

Subdiv. (b)(19), as added by 2009, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, was redesignated as subdiv. (b)(21) to avoid conflict with subdiv. (b)(19) as added by 2009, No. 78 (Adj. Sess.), § 6d.

—2009. Subdiv. (b)(18), which was enacted as subdiv. (b)(17) by 2009, No. 30 , § 5, was redesignated to avoid conflict with existing subdiv. (b)(17), as added by 2009, No. 54 , § 58.

—2008. Redesignated subdiv. (b)(14) as added by 2007, No. 195 (Adj. Sess.), § 11 and by 2007, 176 (Adj. Sess.), § 35, as subdivs. (b)(15) and (b)(16) to avoid conflict with the similarly designated subdivision as added by 2007, No. 144 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.

—2007. Redesignated subdiv. (b)(12) as added by 2007, No. 64 , § 1 as subdiv. (b)(13) to avoid a conflict with the similarly designated subdivision as added by 2007, No. 51 , § 19.

—2005. In subdiv. (b)(4), substituted “sub section 1005(a) of Title 7” for “ 7 V.S.A. 1005(a)”; in subdiv. (b)(7), substituted “subchapter 9 of chapter 1 of Title 16” for “16 V.S.A. § chapter 1, subchapter 9”; and in subdiv. (b)(10), substituted “subdivision 658(c)(1) of Title 7” for “ 7 V.S.A. § 658(c)(1) ” to correct a typographical error and to conform references to V.S.A. style.

Revision note— Subdiv. (b)(9), which was enacted as subdiv. (b)(7) by 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, was redesignated to avoid conflict with subdiv. (b)(7) as enacted by 1999, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

Subdiv. (b)(10), which was enacted as subdiv. (b)(7) by 1999, No. 163 (Adj. Sess.), § 1a, was redesignated to avoid conflict with subdiv. (b)(7) as enacted by 1999, No. 120 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

Amendments

—2021. Subdiv. (b)(7): Substituted “9” for “1” following “chapter” and “5” for “9” following “subchapter”.

Subdiv. (b)(19): Repealed.

—2019. Subdiv. (b)(4): Substituted “under 21” for “less than 18”.

Subdiv. (b)(5): Substituted “21” for “the age of 18”, and inserted “of age” at the end.

Subdiv. (b)(21): Added.

Subdiv. (b)(29): Added.

Subsec. (d): Deleted (d)(1) designation and merged former subsec. (d) and subdiv. (d)(1) as present subsec. (d).

—2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(28): Added.

—2017. Subdiv. (b)(27): Added.

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(21): Repealed.

—2015. Subdiv. (b)(26): Added.

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(25): Added.

—2013. Subdiv. (b)(24): Added.

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(17): Deleted.

Subdiv. (b)(23): Added.

Subdiv. (d)(2): Deleted.

—2011. Subdiv. (b)(22): Added.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(12): Act No. 121 added “and 13 V.S.A. § 355(d) , relating to interference with a guide dog” following “animals”.

Subdiv. (b)(19): Added by Act No. 78.

Subdiv. (b)(20): Added by Act No. 142 and redesignated as described in above revision note.

Subdiv. (b)(21): Added by Act No. 147 and redesignated as described in above revision note.

—2009. Subdiv. (b)(17): Added by Act No. 30.

Subdiv. (b)(18): Added by Act 54 and redesignated as described in above revision note.

Subsec. (d): Rewrote the subsec.

—2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(14): Added by Act Nos. 144, 176 and 195.

—2007. Subsec. (b): Capitalized the first word in subdivs. (1)-(11), substituted a period for the semicolon appearing at the end of subdivs. (1)-(10), and added subdiv. (12).

Subdiv. (13): Added.

—2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (b)(11): Added.

—2005. In subdiv. (b)(6), inserted “burning of solid waste” following “relating to littering”.

—1999 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Act No. 160 inserted “judicial” preceding “bureau” in the introductory paragraph.

Subdiv. (b)(4): Act Nos. 151 and 160 deleted “for” preceding “violations” and “and” following “age”.

Subdiv. (b)(5): Act Nos. 151 and 160 deleted “for” preceding “violations” and made a minor change in punctuation.

Subdiv. (b)(6): Act Nos. 151 and 160 made a minor change in punctuation.

Subdiv. (b)(7): Added by Act Nos. 120, 160 and 163.

Act No. 151 substituted “relating” for “related” and added “and” following “hazing”.

Subdiv. (b)(8): Added by Act No. 151.

Subsec. (c): Act No. 160 inserted “judicial” preceding “bureau”.

Subsec. (d): Added by Act No. 160.

—1999. Subdiv. (b)(6): Added.

ANNOTATIONS

Constitutionality.

Landowner was not denied equal protection of the laws, because there were rational bases for legislative classifications which gave municipality two ways in which it could seek judicial enforcement of its zoning ordinance, one of which did not include a right to jury trial. In re Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 726 A.2d 31, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 409 (1998).

§ 1103. Venue.

Venue for violation hearings in the Judicial Bureau shall be in the unit of the Superior Court where the violation is alleged to have occurred.

HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 54.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “Superior” for “District” preceding “Court”.

§ 1104. Appointment of hearing officers.

The Administrative Judge shall appoint members of the Vermont Bar to serve as hearing officers to hear cases. Hearing officers shall be subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct.

HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 55a.

History

References in text.

The Code of Judicial Conduct, referred to in this section, is codified as Administrative Order No. 10, Administrative Orders of the Supreme Court.

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Deleted the last sentence.

§ 1105. Answer to complaint; default.

  1. A violation shall be charged upon a summons and complaint form approved and distributed by the Court Administrator. The complaint shall be signed by the issuing officer or by the State’s Attorney. The original shall be filed with the Judicial Bureau; a copy shall be retained by the issuing officer or State’s Attorney and two copies shall be given to the defendant. The Judicial Bureau may, consistent with rules adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 1 , accept electronic signatures on any document, including the signatures of issuing officers, State’s Attorneys, and notaries public. The complaint shall include a statement of rights, instructions, notice that a defendant may request a hearing or accept the penalties without a hearing, notice of the fee for failure to answer within 21 days, and other notices as the Court Administrator deems appropriate. The Court Administrator, in consultation with appropriate law enforcement agencies, may approve a single form for charging all violations, or may approve two or more forms as necessary to administer the operations of the Judicial Bureau.
  2. A person who is charged with a violation shall have 21 days from the date the complaint is issued to request a hearing or to state that he or she will accept the penalties without a hearing. The Judicial Bureau shall assess against a defendant a fee of $20.00 for failure to answer a complaint within the time allowed. The fee shall be assessed in the default judgment and deposited in the Court Technology Special Fund established pursuant to section 27 of this title.
  3. A person who accepts the penalties may so indicate and sign the complaint. The Bureau shall accept the admission or statement that the allegations are not contested and accept payment of the waiver penalty.
  4. If the person sends in the amount of the waiver penalty without signing the complaint, the Bureau shall accept the payment indicating that payment was made and that the allegations were not contested.
  5. A person who denies the allegations or who wishes to have a hearing on the complaint for any other reason may so indicate and sign the complaint. Upon receipt, the Bureau shall schedule a hearing.
  6. If a person fails to appear or answer a complaint, the Bureau shall enter a default judgment against the person. However, no default judgment shall be entered until the filing of a declaration by the issuing officer or State’s Attorney, under penalty of perjury, setting forth facts showing that the defendant is not a person in military service as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 3911 (Servicemembers Civil Relief Act definitions), except upon order of the hearing officer in accordance with the Act. The Bureau shall mail a notice to the person that a default judgment has been entered. A default judgment may be set aside by the hearing officer for good cause shown.
  7. All Judicial Bureau judgments shall contain a notice of tax setoff pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 5941 .

HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 1999, No. 58 , § 3; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2007, No. 51 , § 1; 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 17; 2013, No. 57 , § 23; 2017, No. 74 , § 6; 2019, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 9, eff. Oct. 7, 2020.

History

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “request a hearing or accept the penalties without a hearing” for “admit, not contest, or deny a violation” and “21” for “20”.

Subsec. (b): Substituted “21” for “20” and “request a hearing or to state that he or she will accept the penalties without a hearing” for “admit or deny the allegations or to state that he or she does not contest the allegations in the complaint”.

Subsec. (c): Substituted “accepts the penalties” for “admits or does not contest the allegations”.

Subsec. (e): Inserted “or who wishes to have a hearing on the complaint for any other reason”.

—2017. Subsec. (f): In the second sentence, substituted “in 50 U.S.C. § 3911” for “at 50 App. U.S.C. § 511” and “the Act” for “the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 App. U.S.C. Titles I-II”.

—2013. Added the fourth sentence in subsec. (a), added the second sentence in subsec. (f).

—2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “$20.00” for “$10.00”.

—2007. Subsec. (a): Added “notice of the fee for failure to answer within 20 days” preceding “and other notices” in the fourth sentence.

Subsec. (b): Added the second and third sentences.

Subsec. (g): Added.

—1999 (Adj. Sess.). Added new subsec. (a), and redesignated former subsecs. (a)-(e) as present subsecs. (b)-(f).

—1999. Subsec. (b): Inserted “waiver” preceding “penalty” in the second sentence.

Subsec. (c): Inserted “waiver” preceding “penalty”.

§ 1106. Hearing.

  1. The Bureau shall notify the person charged and the issuing officer of the time and place for the hearing.
  2. The hearing shall be held before a hearing officer and conducted in an impartial manner. The hearing officer may, by subpoena, compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books and records. All witnesses shall be sworn. The burden of proof shall be on the State or municipality to prove the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. As used in this section, “clear and convincing evidence” means evidence which establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable. Certified copies of records supplied by the Department of Motor Vehicles or the Agency of Natural Resources and presented by the issuing officer or other person shall be admissible without testimony by a representative of the Department of Motor Vehicles or the Agency of Natural Resources.
  3. The hearing officer shall make findings which shall be stated on the record or, if more time is needed, made in writing at a later date. The hearing officer may make a finding that the person has committed a lesser included violation. If the hearing officer finds that the defendant committed a violation, the hearing officer shall consider evidence of ability to pay, if offered by the defendant, prior to imposing a penalty.
  4. A law enforcement officer may void or amend a complaint issued by that officer by so marking the complaint and returning it to the Bureau, regardless of whether the amended complaint is a lesser included violation. At the hearing, a law enforcement officer may void or amend a complaint issued by that officer in the discretion of that officer.
  5. A State’s Attorney may dismiss or amend a complaint.
  6. The Supreme Court shall establish rules for the conduct of hearings under this chapter.

HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 2009, No. 54 , § 59, eff. June 1, 2009; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 55b; 2011, No. 73 (Adj. Sess.), § 9; 2015, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 21.

History

Amendments

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Added the third sentence.

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Deleted “or the natural resources board” following “the Agency of Natural Resources” in two places.

Subsec. (e): Deleted “except that dismissal or amendment of a complaint subject to subdivision 1102(b)(17) of this title shall be governed by 10 V.S.A. § 8019(c) ” from the end.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (d): Deleted “With approval of his or her supervisor” preceding “a law enforcement” and added “regardless of whether the amended complaint is a lesser included violation” in the first sentence, and substituted “in the discretion of that” for “subject to the approval of the hearing” in the second sentence.

—2009. Subsec. (b): Inserted “the agency of natural resources, or the natural resources board” following “vehicles” in two places.

Subsec. (e): Inserted “except that dismissal or amendment of a complaint subject to subdivision 1102(b)(17) of this title shall be governed by 10 V.S.A. § 8019(c) .” following “complaint”.

§ 1107. Appeals.

  1. A decision of the hearing officer may be appealed to the Criminal Division of the Superior Court. The proceeding before the Criminal Division of the Superior Court shall be on the record, or at the option of the defendant, de novo. The defendant shall have the right to trial by jury. An appeal shall stay payment of a penalty and the imposition of points.
  2. [Repealed.]
  3. If a decision is appealed, the State’s Attorney of the county in which the violation occurred shall represent the State, and the State’s Attorney, municipal attorney, or other designee of the legislative body of the municipality shall represent the municipality.
  4. No appeal as of right exists to the Supreme Court. On motion made to the Supreme Court by a party, the Supreme Court may allow an appeal to be taken to it from the Criminal Division of the Superior Court.

HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 2005, No. 188 (Adj. Sess.), § 7; 2009, No. 54 , § 60, eff. June 1, 2009; 2009, No. 154 , §§ 236, 238; 2011, No. 73 (Adj. Sess.), § 10; 2017, No. 93 (Adj. Sess.), § 3.

History

Editor’s note

—2010. Substituted “Environmental Division of the Superior Court” for “Environmental Court” and substituted “division” for “court” throughout the section.

Amendments

—2017 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (c): Deleted “grand juror, or” preceding “municipal” and inserted “, or other designee of the legislative body of the municipality” following “attorney”.

—2011 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Deleted “except for a decision in a proceeding under subdivision 1102(b)(17) of this title” from the end of the first sentence.

Subsec. (b): Deleted.

Subsec. (c): Deleted the former second sentence.

Subsec. (d): Deleted “or the Environmental” preceding “Division of the Superior Court”.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “Criminal Division of the Superior Court” for “District Court” in subsecs. (a) and (d).

—2009. Subsec. (a): Inserted “except for a decision in a proceeding under subdivision 1102(b)(17) of this title” following “court”.

Subsec. (b): Rewrote the subsec.

Subsec. (c): Added.

Subsec. (d): Redesignated former (c) as present (d), and added “or Environmental Court” following “court”.

—2005 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (a): Substituted “and” for “but not” following “penalty.”

ANNOTATIONS

Constitutionality.

Landowner was not denied equal protection of the laws, because there were rational bases for legislative classifications which gave municipality two ways in which it could seek judicial enforcement of its zoning ordinance, one of which did not include a right to jury trial. In re Letourneau, 168 Vt. 539, 726 A.2d 31, 1998 Vt. LEXIS 409 (1998).

§ 1108. Judicial bureau violations; jurisdiction of assistant judges.

  1. Subject to the limits of this section and notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, an assistant judge sitting alone shall have the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties to hear and decide matters within the jurisdiction of the judicial bureau under section 1102 of this title as a hearing officer has under the provisions of this chapter.
    1. An assistant judge who elects to hear and decide matters in the judicial bureau shall: (b) (1) An assistant judge who elects to hear and decide matters in the judicial bureau shall:
      1. [Repealed.]
      2. have successfully completed at least 40 hours of training, which shall be provided by the court administrator; and
      3. annually complete eight hours of continuing education supervised by the court administrator.
    2. The training and education required by this subsection shall be developed by the court administrator in consultation with the association of assistant judges. Law clerk assistance shall be available to the assistant judges.
  2. The Administrative Judge may assign or direct assignment of an assistant judge with his or her consent to hear matters in the Judicial Bureau within the county in which the assistant judge presides or in a county other than the county in which the assistant judge presides if the assistant judge has elected to hear and decide such matters.

HISTORY: Added 1997, No. 121 (Adj. Sess.), § 4; amended 2005, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. May 20, 2006; 2009, No. 154 (Adj. Sess.), § 55a.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—2005 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

§ 1109. Remedies for failure to pay; contempt.

  1. Definitions.   As used in this section:
    1. “Amount due” means all financial assessments contained in a Judicial Bureau judgment, including penalties, fines, surcharges, court costs, and any other assessment authorized by law.
    2. “Designated collection agency” means a collection agency designated by the Court Administrator.
    3. [Repealed.]
  2. Late fees; suspensions for nonpayment of certain traffic violation judgments.
    1. A Judicial Bureau judgment shall provide notice that a $30.00 fee shall be assessed for failure to pay within 30 days. If the defendant fails to pay the amount due within 30 days, the fee shall be added to the judgment amount and deposited in the Court Technology Special Fund established pursuant to section 27 of this title.
      1. In the case of a judgment on a traffic violation for which the imposition of points against the person’s driving record is authorized by law, the judgment shall contain a notice that failure to pay or otherwise satisfy the amount due within 30 days of the notice will result in suspension of the person’s operator’s license or privilege to operate, and that payment plan options are available. If the defendant fails to pay the amount due within 30 days of the notice, or by a later date as determined by a Judicial Bureau clerk or hearing officer, and the case is not pending on appeal, the Judicial Bureau shall provide electronic notice thereof to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. After 20 days from the date of receiving the electronic notice, the Commissioner shall suspend the person’s operator’s license or privilege to operate for a period of 30 days or until the amount due is satisfied, whichever is earlier. (2) (A) In the case of a judgment on a traffic violation for which the imposition of points against the person’s driving record is authorized by law, the judgment shall contain a notice that failure to pay or otherwise satisfy the amount due within 30 days of the notice will result in suspension of the person’s operator’s license or privilege to operate, and that payment plan options are available. If the defendant fails to pay the amount due within 30 days of the notice, or by a later date as determined by a Judicial Bureau clerk or hearing officer, and the case is not pending on appeal, the Judicial Bureau shall provide electronic notice thereof to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. After 20 days from the date of receiving the electronic notice, the Commissioner shall suspend the person’s operator’s license or privilege to operate for a period of 30 days or until the amount due is satisfied, whichever is earlier.
      2. At minimum, the Judicial Bureau shall offer a payment plan option that allows a person to avoid a suspension of his or her license or privilege to operate by paying no more than $30.00 per traffic violation judgment per month, and not to exceed $100.00 per month if the person has four or more outstanding judgments.
    1. Civil contempt proceedings.   If an amount due remains unpaid for 75 days after the Judicial Bureau provides the defendant with a notice of judgment, the Judicial Bureau may initiate civil contempt proceedings pursuant to this subsection. (c) (1) Civil contempt proceedings.   If an amount due remains unpaid for 75 days after the Judicial Bureau provides the defendant with a notice of judgment, the Judicial Bureau may initiate civil contempt proceedings pursuant to this subsection.
    2. Notice of hearing.   The Judicial Bureau shall provide notice by first class mail sent to the defendant’s last known address that a contempt hearing will be held pursuant to this subsection, and that failure to appear at the contempt hearing may result in the sanctions listed in subdivision (3) of this subsection.
    3. Failure to appear.   If the defendant fails to appear at the contempt hearing, the hearing officer may direct the clerk of the Judicial Bureau to do one or more of the following:
      1. cause the matter to be reported to one or more designated collection agencies; or
      2. refer the matter to the Criminal Division of the Superior Court for contempt proceedings.
      3. [Repealed.]
      1. Hearing.   The hearing shall be conducted in a summary manner. The hearing officer shall examine the defendant and any other witnesses and may require the defendant to produce documents relevant to the defendant’s ability to pay the amount due. The State or municipality shall not be a party except with the permission of the hearing officer. The defendant may be represented by counsel at the defendant’s own expense. (4) (A) Hearing.   The hearing shall be conducted in a summary manner. The hearing officer shall examine the defendant and any other witnesses and may require the defendant to produce documents relevant to the defendant’s ability to pay the amount due. The State or municipality shall not be a party except with the permission of the hearing officer. The defendant may be represented by counsel at the defendant’s own expense.
      2. Traffic violations; reduction of amount due.   When the judgment is based upon a traffic violation, the hearing officer may waive the reinstatement fee required pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 675(a) or reduce the amount due on the basis of the defendant’s driving history, ability to pay, or service to the community; the collateral consequences of the violation; or the interests of justice. The hearing officer’s decision to reduce the amount due shall not be subject to review or appeal except in the case of a violation of rights guaranteed under the Vermont or U.S. Constitution.
    4. Contempt.
      1. The hearing officer may conclude that the defendant is in contempt if the hearing officer states in written findings a factual basis for concluding that:
        1. the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that he or she owed an amount due on a Judicial Bureau judgment;
        2. the defendant had the ability to pay all or any portion of the amount due; and
        3. the defendant failed to pay all or any portion of the amount due.
      2. In the contempt order, the hearing officer may do one or more of the following:
        1. Set a date by which the defendant shall pay the amount due.
        2. Assess an additional penalty not to exceed ten percent of the amount due.
        3. [Repealed.]
        4. Recommend that the Criminal Division of the Superior Court incarcerate the defendant until the amount due is paid. If incarceration is recommended pursuant to this subdivision (c)(5), the Judicial Bureau shall notify the Criminal Division of the Superior Court that contempt proceedings should be commenced against the defendant. The Criminal Division of the Superior Court proceedings shall be de novo. If the defendant cannot afford counsel for the contempt proceedings in the Criminal Division of the Superior Court, the Defender General shall assign counsel at the Defender General’s expense.
  3. Collections.
    1. If an amount due remains unpaid after the issuance of a notice of judgment, the Court Administrator may authorize the clerk of the Judicial Bureau to refer the matter to a designated collection agency.
    2. The Court Administrator or the Court Administrator’s designee is authorized to contract with one or more collection agencies for the purpose of collecting unpaid Judicial Bureau judgments pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7171 .
  4. For purposes of civil contempt proceedings, venue shall be statewide. No entry or motion fee shall be charged to a defendant who applies for a reduced judgment under subdivision (c)(4)(B) of this section.
  5. Notwithstanding 32 V.S.A. § 502 , the Court Administrator is authorized to contract with a third party to collect fines, penalties, and fees by credit card, debit card, charge card, prepaid card, stored value card, and direct bank account withdrawals or transfers, as authorized by 32 V.S.A. § 583 , and to add on and collect, or charge against collections, a processing charge in an amount approved by the Court Administrator.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 51 , § 2; amended 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 18; 2009, No. 154 , § 238; 2013, No. 128 (Adj. Sess.), § 1; 2015, No. 147 (Adj. Sess.), § 5, eff. May 31, 2016; 2019, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

History

Amendments

—2019 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (c)(4)(B): Inserted “waive the reinstatement fee required pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 675(a) or” in the first sentence and deleted “on a motion” following “decision” in the second sentence.

—2015 (Adj. Sess.). Section amended generally.

—2013 (Adj. Sess.). Subdiv. (a)(3): Repealed.

Subdiv. (c)(2): Inserted “do one or more of the following” before the colon.

Subdiv. (c)(2)(A): Substituted “collection agencies” for “credit bureaus” before the period.

Subdiv. (c)(2)(C): Added.

Subdiv. (c)(4)(B)(iii): Rewrote the subdiv.

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “Criminal Division of the Superior Court” for “District Court” in (c)(2)(B) and (c)(4)(B)(iv).

—2007 (Adj. Sess.). Subsec. (b): Substituted “$30.00” for “$15.00”.

§ 1110. Licenses or governmental contracts.

  1. As used in this section, “license” means any license, certification, or registration issued by an agency to conduct a trade or business, including a license to practice a profession or occupation, or a license required to engage in recreational activities, including licenses to hunt, fish, or trap.
  2. Every applicant for a license shall sign a statement that the applicant is in good standing with respect to any unpaid judgment issued by the Judicial Bureau or Criminal Division of the Superior Court for fines or penalties for a violation or criminal offense. A license may not be issued or renewed without such a statement.
  3. For the purposes of this section, a person is in good standing with respect to any unpaid judgment issued by the Judicial Bureau or Criminal Division of the Superior Court for fines or penalties for a violation or criminal offense if:
    1. 60 days or fewer have elapsed since the date a judgment was issued; or
    2. the person is in compliance with a repayment plan approved by the judiciary.

HISTORY: Added 2007, No. 51 , § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2008; amended 2009, No. 154 , § 238.

History

Amendments

—2009 (Adj. Sess.). Substituted “Criminal Division of the Superior Court” for “District Court” in subsecs. (b) and (c).

§ 1111. Civil violation; failure to produce identification.

  1. A law enforcement officer is authorized to detain a person if:
    1. the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person has committed a civil violation of Title 7, 10, 13, 18, or 23; and
    2. the person refuses to identify himself or herself satisfactorily to the officer when requested by the officer.
  2. The person may be detained under this section only until the person identifies himself or herself satisfactorily to the officer or is properly identified. If the officer is unable to obtain the identification information, the person shall forthwith be brought before a judge in the Criminal Division of the Superior Court for that purpose. A person who refuses to identify himself or herself to the court on request shall immediately and without service of an order on the person be subject to civil contempt proceedings pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 122 .

HISTORY: Added 2013, No. 194 (Adj. Sess.), § 12, eff. June 17, 2014.